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POST-NATIONAL DIMENSION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROSCEPTICISM: THE CASE OF EUROSCEPTIC PARTY GROUPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

DOKTORA TEZİ

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Danışman: Doç. Dr. ÇİĞDEM NAS

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ONAY SAYFASI

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
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ABSTRACT

The thesis focuses on the concept 'Euroscepticism' in an evolving post-national dimension alongside the European integration, aiming to create a post-national dialogue. For that reason, the Eurosceptic phenomenon is acknowledged as the acceptance of European level politics, while approaching critically the EU governance structures (regime) it has developed. Moreover, it is also in opposition, resisting and/or pressuring these developments at different levels and scope that exceeds the traditional national understanding and requires a post-national analysis.

The nation-state in Europe cannot be properly analyzed without a post-national outlook. The European integration has intervened into the politics of the Member States, and has thus, as detailed in this thesis, opened up a political contestation. The frequently asked question alongside this contestation is 'what brings Member States together and what holds them apart?' As detailed and argued in this thesis, Euroscepticism mirrors both of these views. The condition of this togetherness and apartness, as is argued in the thesis, requires a post-national understanding. Representing mostly the distinctions in the form of Euroscepticism, the argument in the thesis is that the political parties are contributing to a post-national form of politics.

In order to test this hypothesis, the thesis focuses on the extant literature of Euroscepticism through definitions and typologies, and develops the argument that Euroscepticism is required for developing a community of democracy, accountability and transparency, rather than being against these values of European integration.

According to this argument, the thesis details the Eurosceptic parties both at national and supranational levels. In the light of this examination, the views shared and defended by these parties overlap with that of the European values and norms. More importantly, these views, aside of reflecting national, tend to serve the post-national movements.

Key Words

Post-nationalism, Post-modernism, European Integration, Euroscepticism, Party Politics

ÖZET

Bu çalışmada post-milliyetçi bir anlayış sergileyen AB ve bu sürecin içinde yer alan (ve hatta bunun bir parçası olan) Avro-kuşkucular kavramı üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu nedenle Avro-kuşkucular, Avrupa düzeyinde gelişen politikaları kabul eden fakat bütünleşme ile gelişen yönetim biçimine (rejimine) karşı kuşku ile yaklaşan, farklı düzeylerde zaman zaman karşı duran, baskı uygulayan, ama aynı zamanda geleneksel ulusal anlayış çerçevesi dışına taşan tutumlarıyla post-milliyetçi bir bakış açısıyla ele alınmıştır.

Avrupa bütünleşmesinin, birliğe üye olan devletlerin ulusal siyasetine olan müdahalesi açıkça görülmektedir. Bu nedenden ötürü, bu tez de ele alındığı üzere bu siyasi bir çekişmeye yol açmıştır. Bu siyasi çekişmeyle birlikte sıkça dile getirilen husus 'üye devletleri birbirlerine yakınlaştıran ama aynı zamanda kutuplaştıran nedir' sorunsalı önem kazanmaktadır. Bu tez de irdelendiği üzere Avro-kuşkucular bu yakınlaşma ve kutuplaşma durumuna ayna tutmaktadır. Bu durum post-milliyetçi bir anlayışla kavranabilir, zira tek tipleşme yerine benzerliklerin yanında farklılıkların vurgusu bu kuşkucu görüşler tarafından eşzamanlı yansıtılmaktadır. Daha çok farklılık söylemlerine vurgu yapan Avro-kuşkucuların aslında post-milliyetçi politikalara hizmet ettiği görülmektedir ki bu da farklılıklara yapılan vurgunun ulus-üstü düzeyin yanında, ulus-devlet içinde de benzer farklılaşma etkileri yaratmaktadır.

Bu hipotezi savunurken, öncelikle Avro-kuşkuculuk kavramı üzerinde durulmakta, literatüre hâkim olan tanım ve tipolojiler doğrultusunda Avro-kuşkuculuğun Avrupa bütünleşmesine karşı olmak bir yana, bir takım argümanlarıyla bütünleşme için gerekli olan demokratik, özgürlükçü ve şeffaf toplum yaratmadaki rolü ortaya çıkartılmıştır.

Bu argüman doğrultusunda çalışmada irdelenen Avro-kuşkucu partiler hem ulus hem de ulus üstü düzeyde incelenmiştir. Bu inceleme ışığında bu partilerin ve savundukları bazı ortak görüşlerin Avrupa bütünleşme fikri ve değerleri ile örtüştüğü ortaya konulmuştur.

Dahası bu görüşlerin milliyetçi olma eğilimi bir yana post-milliyetçi tezlere hizmet ettiği savunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Avro-Kuşkuculuk, Post-milliyetçilik, Post-modernizm, Avrupa entegrasyonu, , Parti politikaları.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ALDE   Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

ATTAC   Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and for Civic Actions

BNP   British National Party

CAP   Common Agricultural Policy

CEEC   Central and Eastern European Countries

CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy

DPM   Differentiated Policy Model

DPP   Danish Peoples Party

EDD   Europe of Democracies and Diversities

EEC   European Economic Community

EFD   Europe of Freedom and Democracy

ELDR   European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party

EMU   Economic and Monetary Union

EPP   European Peoples Party

EU   European Union

FN   Front National

FPÖ   Freedom Party of Austria

GUE-NGL   European United Left/Nordic Green Left

ID	Independence and Democracy
IG	Intergovernmental
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MNP	Member of National Parliament
NGO	Non-governmetal Organization
ODS	Civic Democratic Party
ÖVP	Austrian Freedom Party
PES	Party of European Socialists
PİS	Law and Justice Party
PJN	Poland Comes First
QMV	Qualfied Majority Voting
RRP	Radical Right Party
S&D	Socialists and Democrats
UEN	Union for Europe of the Nations

TABLES AND FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

Post-war Europe is changing noticeably, opening up a dynamic academic as well as a public debate about the nature and historical significance of these changes. At the heart of this debate, which is the focus of the thesis, lie conflicting arguments about the extent, form and consequences of contemporary nationalism. On one side, there are the post-nationalists, cosmopolitans, pacifists, globalists, etc., who argue that the world is being deeply and irreversibly transformed by contemporary challenges. On the other are the sceptics, who believe that the above-mentioned groups' claims are exaggerated and poorly demonstrated. The sceptics contest the idea of post-nationalism and/or cosmopolitanism, arguing that the power of the nation-state and nationalism remain the determining features of our age. In fact, being a part of this (and at a level of support as argued in this thesis), they do fall short of how to clarify this process of dynamism, change or transformation about the nation-state, which certainly is important, but no longer the paradigmatic anchor of the entire order.

According to the aforementioned arguments, analyzing the European integration as a micro case, post-nationalism, whether against or not, is the potential arrangement so far reached by the European states. More importantly, if the integration is to move on, there is a need to expand this discourse, to allow the public to participate in what has traditionally been only the elitist and academic world. However, no matter which direction the EU will take, the case, or its direction, depends on the position of both the Euro-sceptics and the Euro-enthusiasts, which express different political attitudes at different levels (national, sub-national, supranational and even non-national). This thesis emphasizes this antagonism as constructive and positive, addressing it as the emerging post-national politics of the EU.

Starting with the 1990s, scholars have been describing the EU as a "post-modern international political form" (Ruggie, 1993), a "post-modern state" (Cooper, 2006), a "post-modern space" (İrem, 2006), a "post-modern security actor" (Rieker, 2007), etc. What does 'post-modern' signify, and more importantly, as debated in this thesis, is it

shaking the foundations of the modern nation-state, alongside the objectives of nationalism? A well-known scholar on nationalism studies, Elie Kedourie (1960) argues that while "nationalism helped create states, it now creates new power containers" (*Cited in* Newmann, 2000:21). The aforementioned citation from Kedourie highlights two important facts. Firstly, no one can argue that nationalism is standing in the same position as it was once upon a time during the 18th century. And secondly, like many other social and political phenomena, it is subjected to such a rapid transformation that it cannot be handled within the nation-state paradigm. Apart from the rest of the world, the European integration, in particular, makes this transformation more visible. It is clear that there is not much room left for nationalism or nationhood, especially in Europe. The emerging new supranational entities and institutions, in this case the European Union (EU), are taking over the role of the nation-state, abolishing the *raison d'être* of nationalism. That is why the aim of this thesis is to tackle nationalism firstly as a reflection of nationhood, in an era where the Member States of the EU are transferring their power upwards to the EU level. This begs the question of how nationhood is to be institutionalized within states, while simultaneously institutionalizing their relations with other states. This should be the task of emerging trends, such as post-nationalism, enabling states to maintain their remaining duties in a more cooperative manner, rather than acknowledging nationalism as "a set of processes some ideational and some material leading to the boundaries of nations and states to coincide" (Morgan, 2005:56-57). Although this is a clear definition of the modern paradigm in nationalism studies, it is lacking depth in contemporary debates.

This is actually the point at which the problem originates, as the current developments are "forcing to reject the identification of the 'state' and 'nation' and the useless insistence on homogeneity that have characterized nationalism once upon a time" (Nimni, 2010:8). Nationalism is nation-centric, and it falls short of reading contemporary politics. That is why Nimni argues that "…an ongoing paradigm shift is giving birth to a more multidimensional understanding of the relationship between *nationalism*, *sovereignty*, *self-determination*, and *democratic governance*" (Nimni, 2010:21).

The European integration touches all these aforementioned terms and, if it has started as a post-national project, dating back to 1951 Paris Treaty, the Member States have already accepted the decline of nationalism. Thus, they are inevitably working towards developing political resistance towards nationalism, racism, xenophobia etc. This is a direct result of the transformation in Europe, whereby new political responses to the changes in a post-national environment are becoming a reality in a twofold (Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm) situation, which is contradictory at certain times. That is why this thesis focuses on Euroscepticism, aiming to disprove Euroscepticism as a political attitude reflecting a sole national view, or simply as a 'national backlash'. The view supported here is that the 'nation' does not share the same attitudes (Euro-enthusiasm, Euroscepticism) in the name of European integration. It can be seen that there is an intra-nation public division in the Member States, simultaneously developing post-national bonds across the Member States. That is why the objective of the thesis is to focus on how Euroscepticism represents the interests of the citizens, rather than the nation, in benefit of developing post-national politics. More importantly, it is not even rational to develop a positive – negative dichotomy between the sceptics and enthusiasts in the name of Europe. There is a diversity of views attached to the European integration, due to a variety of reasons. It would be a misinterpretation to acknowledge Euroscepticim as "identified by its radical extremes; advocates of nationalism on the one hand and unreformed communists on the other" (Nichols, 2010:10) assumed to be nested at the margins. Euroscepticism, like Euro-enthusiasm, is approached on the definition of post-nationalism as "multiple ties and interactions linking both people and/or institutions across the borders of the Member States in the EU" (Vertovec, 1999:448), no matter what their race, ethnicity, nation, political ideology is. They are assumed to find common grounds on divisions, contradictions, desires, etc. This political interaction extends beyond class and identity; otherwise, it would not have generated common grounds between Eurosceptic movements as well as Eurosceptic parties.

It is debated in the first chapter below on Gellner's argument of nationalism, defined as a "congruency between the political and national unit", that these two elements no longer coincide. This brings the debate to what Chatterjee has put forth as the

particularistic perspective (*See* Chatterjee, *Nation and its Fragments*, 1993). This thesis focuses on the concept of 'Euroscepticism' in an evolving post-national dimension alongside the European integration, aiming to create a post-national dialogue. However, Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm do not provide the basis for a "bridging political consensus" (*barrowing this interpretation from* Soysal, 2001:175) but rather a basis for contestation. Disagreements need to be taken into consideration and incorporated into this emerging post-national political level that, as Bellamy and Castiglione argue, should rest on "no false homogenizing but rather a realistic discontent that forces the polity to adapt itself and recognize, respect and represent the values, opinions and vital interests of its members" (2008:175-177). For that reason, the Eurosceptic phenomenon is acknowledged as the acceptance of European level politics, while approaching critically the governance structures (regime) it has developed, and in opposition, resisting and/or pressuring these developments.

Nationalism is incapable of explaining these ongoing developments in the Member States as well as the European integration. That is why there is a need to explore recent contemporary realities that are challenging nationalism today. This challenge starts from what is called a 'European economy' and a 'European political governance' having important effects on governing (both at mass and government business level), resulting in political change, bringing social and economic movements, and groups or parties responding to engage with this environment (the fragment state argument).

However, more importantly, how is this affecting the public that is facing a confrontation between the remnants of nationalist attitudes parallel to a shrinking nationalist rhetoric, and an emerging post-national thinking in an increasing social and political space simultaneously? There is need to focus on relocating analytical spaces of the nation without defining it by national history, territory, culture or whatever else we might add to the legacies. For instance, the definition of the nation used to be, according to Heinrich von Treitschke (1914):

> The individual must forget his own ego and feel himself a member of the whole; he
> must recognize what a nothing his life is in comparison with the general welfare.
> The individual must sacrifice himself for a higher community of which he is a

member; but the state is itself the highest in the external community of men (*Cited in* Guibernau, 1996:8).

As stated above, until the 20th century, the nation-state (with the help of nationalism) was the only and highest community, in which the individual was a member. Starting with the second half of the 20th century, certainly nation-state may continue being one of the highest, but not the only community with which citizens will identify. In this case, the European integration is at the heart of this debate, as Guibernau defines it "a living laboratory in which experiments about new ways to understand sovereignty, territoriality and identity are currently being tested" (1999:149). The aforementioned citation from Kedourie remarks on, and reminds us of, the new emerging power containers not only above the state, but also from below. The question is thus, in which position is the European integration altering this modern phenomenon, namely nationalism, through the political transformation in Europe? According to Therborn (1995), Europe has actually become the least nationalist part of the world; however, the question to be tackled within this thesis, related to the European integration, is how are emerging concepts like Euroscepticism contributing to the post-national politics?

Scope and Arguments of the Thesis

After the rejection of the European Constitution, as well as the adventure of the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, the position and status of the EU has been subject to continuing debates by politicians, scholars, intellectuals, as well as by the ordinary European citizens. Both Euro-enthusiasm and Euroscepticism have increased in depth, starting with the Maastricht treaty. At the political level, the two camps have even become more polarised. However, the question tackled in this thesis is 'what is the influence of Euroscepticism on the functioning of the European Union', and more importantly, its role in feeding the post-national thesis alongside with Euro-enthusiasm. The thesis aims to prove that they are supplementary in creating post-national politics, debated by scholars such as Bartolini (2005) as "critical capital of political structuring" in Europe. These questions are important in view of the further development of the

European Union. It is thus the aim of this thesis to focus on the reasons behind the increase in the depth of contemporary movements (like Euroscepticism) and to examine the impact of this movement on the European integration. In the name of satisfactory results, the thesis starts with a literature review of the extant nationalism and post-nationalism studies, revealing modern and post-modern debates. The aim is to support the arguments laid down in this thesis with a theoretical background. The debate continues with the questioning of the Eurosceptic phenomenon with the reasons of being a part of the post-national framework. This argument is supported with the case studies, presented in the last chapter of the thesis. Detailing the Eurosceptic parties, namely the European Conservatives and Reformists, and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Groups, both at national and transnational levels in the third chapter, it is argued that developing similar patterns and arguments across the Member States in EU, the Eurosceptic phenomenon is affecting, as well as emerging as, a post-national attitude in Europe. In support of this argument, the party case studies detailed in the third chapter provide hints on how the issues are politicizing, as well as developing common motives among the Eurosceptic parties. It is the goal of this thesis, to investigate as well as to understand a contemporary phenomenon, namely Euroscepticism, upon real life evidence. For this reason, the third chapter gives a certain amount of space to multiple sources of documentation containing party declarations, party working papers, manifestos, as well as the speeches given by the Member of national parliaments (MP's) and Member of the European Parliament (MEP's) in laying down the common motives driving their Euroscepticism. In using the data collected, the thesis interprets these to find linkages between the outcomes and the research question. The case study research method used in the third chapter is accurate in order to inquire into a particular phenomenon, namely Euroscepticism, to understand its relation with post-nationalism. For that reason the case studies have been detailed in the final chapter with an evaluative and interpretative outlook.

Definitional Remarks

Any study related to nationalism comes to be contested. Thus, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, there is a need to define how the concepts studied in this thesis are acknowledged. A group of modernist scholars argue that both nations and nationalism appear to be in a discontinuity (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Breuilly, 1993), which is detailed in depth in the first chapter. This is the foremost argument of nationalism waning with the increase of powers being shifted towards supranational bodies in the light of post-modern assumptions and arguments countering the paradigm of the modern nation-state. Early debates on nationalism witnessed the confrontation between primordialism and modernism. However, in the 21st century, the question has started circling around the modern and post-modern debates. The argument put forth in this thesis is to consider the EU as the only example for reflecting on how post-national polity or society can be built, as there are no other examples apart from the EU. In analyzing this, the focus is given to the Eurosceptic movement, defined as a sum of political actions, attitudes, and discourses, all of which overflow the nation-state framework and become a part of the post-national political space in Europe. The Eurosceptic movement, with special reference to the Eurosceptic parties detailed in the final chapter, plays an important role in shaping popular concerns, however not in a national frame, but post-national, finding either support or counterly opposition. To make the picture clearer, the concepts *nationalism, post-nationalism* and *Euroscepticism* require a working definition and explanation.

Defining Nationalism

Nationalism is known to be a complex and actually a contested concept. There are too many different definitions and approaches in defining the term. The main reason for this diversity stems from confronting different types of *nationalism,* and the evolution of nationalism having different characteristics from one to another.

> …nationalism stands for widely different phenomena that only have one thing in
> common – namely, the focus on national identity. Nationalism can harbour almost

everything from universal liberal ideas about national identification through strong irredentism to explicit fascism. It may thus enter into numerous combinations with either humanitarian ideas about mankind or with racist and hawkish practices (Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson 2005:89).

Scholars determine nationalism, based mainly on three aspects. The first is acknowledging nationalism as a principle or political doctrine, seeking legitimacy based on popular sovereignty. Secondly, nationalism is seen as a political action of groups who act in the name of their nation with political goals and agendas. Thirdly, nationalism can be understood as a reflection of national identity (feeling and belonging) (Bücker, 2007:118). The second aspect of nationalism defined above is the core element considered within this work. The first and last aspects are not given credit, as nationalism in an entity like the EU does not have any space for reality as a doctrine in a process where sovereignty is shared and transferred to supranational level. Moreover, nationalism as a reflection of national identity cannot be adhered to the whole nation, as although attached to a nation, the individual is not willing to become politically active in the name of his/her nation (*See* E. B. Haas, Nationalism and Liberalism, 1997). As a result, national identity and nationalism are not exactly alike. As mentioned above, the second aspect of nationalism—'political action of groups who act in the name of their nation with political goals and agendas'—is the main concern within this thesis. Since, in this thesis, nationalism is not acknowledged as the actions or attitudes of a (monolith) nation, but attitudes or actions of different competing groups. Although living within the territory of the state, such groups are subject to the de-territorialisation alongside the European integration, trying to influence the de-hierarchization of the EU structures, finally becoming a part of the political contestation in a post-national space.

In today's global world, the questions that have been included into recent debates are those addressing whether nationalism is an eternal phenomenon, has the nation-state come to an end, or is it the global forces which are eroding both the state and the nation in which the market will become the first order. The aforementioned doubts about the future of nationalism have overflowed the common sense of 'nationalism within the nation-state' principle. With the increasing level of

industrialization, capitalism, technology and communication, all of which scholars focused on when defining nationalism, it is clear that it can no longer be handled within the nation-state framework. For instance, for Gellner, nationalism is rooted on the periodization/modernization, which is the *industrialization*, or for Anderson it is *print capitalism*, for Breuilly it is the *development of the modern state*, for Deutsch it is *communication,* and for Hobsbawm it is the *invention of tradition* (Hutchinson, 1994:6-7). However, as all these scholars have argued, nationalism is not everlasting, which is what this thesis carries on debating in a post-national framework.

Defining Post-nationalism

The ideological development of the nation-state "with its own individuality, history and destiny" (Smith, 1991:73) is deeply questioned. Scholars have recently started paying attention to post-national perspectives (Arendt 1994, Habermas 1999, Delanty 2002) which have great effect on both national (fragmentation) and international (transnational, post-national, cosmopolitan, etc.) dimensions. The increasing level of interdependence is forcing states to cooperate in nearly all areas in human life. This increasing transnational interaction between states forces them to work and cooperate with each other. And this interdependence, according to Haas, is actually a necessity. He underlines that "even liberal nation-states are less and less able to satisfy their citizens without closer transnational collaboration" (Haas, 1993:509). That is to say, not only the relation among states is under question, but the interaction among political parties is giving birth to such kind of a dissemination of post-national politics. The challenge of "globalization and devolution integrate new horizontal systems to the traditional vertical ones" (Kettlei, 2000:12), which fragments the nation. That is why nationalism puts forth the argument of citizens having a sense of belonging, or togetherness; however, post-national integration requires a sense of attachment to a polity (Mason, 2000:127-129). This will be detailed in the post-national dimension of the European integration under the concept of Euroscepticism, which this thesis acknowledges as one of the main components of the post-national dimension in Europe. This is built on the argument pertaining to the definition of post-nationalism as "taking

culture, society, government, politics and the economics of an individual nation and inserts these components into an increased regional, continental and global perspective…" (Nunn, 2011:10).

The thesis argues that post-nationalism be placed in a strategically driven environment centring 'preferences' at the heart of its debate, without addressing those preferences in a need of a specific group (ethnic, linguistic, religious etc) of people or community. These assumptions are shared by post-national and cosmopolitan theories. Post-modern and post-national assumptions run parallel in most cases, and post-nationalism is mostly embraced by post-modern scholars (the main reason for addressing post-nationalism under a post-modern outlook). However, they differ in one general understanding. According to James, for post-modern theorists, belonging to a territory is negative "as if being related to a territory is always a root cause of conflict" (2006:305). For this reason, they prefer a more fluid, deconstructed society, where nothing should remain still, however, for pos-nationalism, there is a need of attachments (strong or weak) identifying the individual. Post-nationalism here firstly leads to opening out the issue for re-evaluating the role and function of nationalism, and secondly to grasping it through the emerging transformations. For this reason, the post-national dimension is argued within this thesis in reference to a political, economic and social level, which resides both at Member State and EU level, as they both enable each other (Habermas, 2001:74).

Forging such an argument, as mentioned above, is not a simple task. Leaving behind the questions related to the modern assumptions, but lacking depth on a common theory of nationalism, leaves too many questions unanswered. However, the European integration with its policy agendas, goals, institutions and its complex relations with Member States (plus non-EU and Candidate States), requires special attention on how this is emerging as the post-national dimension for Europe. That is why, ahead of questioning Euroscepticism, the thesis firstly debates nationalism in contemporary politics, both in a modern and post-modern theoretical framework. The aim of this debate is firstly to highlight the weakness of the modern theories and to criticize them through the post-modern assumptions, as well as to define the Eurosceptic phenomenon as an indicator

for post-nationalism, rather than nationalism. As mentioned throughout the thesis, the arguments put forth to develop or to defend the interests of the Eurosceptic movement are made in the name of the public, often referenced to the 'European people' or 'citizens of Europe'.

The European integration process has opened up (and will continue to do so in the future) a variety of debates, each focusing on a different perspective throughout the integration process. One of these debates that have gained momentum, starting in the 1970s, still remains important for the future of the EU. This debate is certainly about the question of 'how the integration of the people will be achieved'. This situation is questioned by different groups, which have their own views about the ongoing integration process. The most frequently tackled questions are: Could a European civil society be created? Or can national identities be subordinated by Europeanness? These are the frequently asked questions by the scholars dealing with the realms of identity and nationalism, which both remain "janus – faced" (Nairn, 1997).

Decades ago, what the Member States did to tackle their concerns alone is now carried out under the EU with a common approach. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Single Market and Economic Monetary Union (EMU) are the milestones some scholars label as *economic governance* or *economic confederation.* The objective is once again mobilization and search for legitimization, which is at this time at supranational level. This makes me remember Tom Nairn's analysis of *Nationalism* as "an ideology of economic modernization, mobilizing societies on the semi-periphery and periphery of the world system to resist imperialism and compete with the core nations for economic resources" (Jenkins and Sofos, 1996:10-11).

One of the factors challenging the nation-state today is the market forces, and considering the Single Market project as the touchstone of European integration, it is important to stress that, when analyzing post-nationalism, it is imperative to focus on not only the concepts of identity, ethnicity or culture, but also the key issues, such as the flow of capital, the market and migration, besides the ones that are shaping/using this process.

Starting with the 1980s, the global world has dispensed with the assumptions of economic nationalism[1] overthrowing its necessities of tariffs, quotas, subsidies, restrictions on foreign investment, etc. However, it is also evident that economic concerns are important dynamics fuelling nationalism. Nevertheless, within an entity like the EU, whether these concerns should be handled in the basket of nationalism or post-nationalism is an important question to tackle. Within the EU, the increasing level of supranationalism has given birth to a kind of post-nationalism, which is built both on cooperation and competition. It feeds both cooperation and competition within a relationship marked by deep disjuncture, through human movement (migration), technological flow, and financial transfer (Appadurai, 1996:35). The key phrase here is actually *European construction* and how or what kind of construction the Union is moving towards? Is it an instrumentalist process for gaining certain benefits both at national and supranational level? Or a kind of transformation that is engendered by today's globalizing world.

Defining Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism was born in the United Kingdom (UK), long before the European elites gathered to start working towards integration (although it was not known as Euroscepticism at that time). However, its importance comes from what scholars are now questioning, namely the increasing level of this phenomenon across Europe, as well as its magnitude in national politics across the European nation-state system. For some scholars, Euroscepticism is rooted in modern nationalism, which possesses and

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[1] According to Motyl, "This particular brand of nationalism is premised on the belief that the overall success of the nation lies in, or at the very least is intimately connected with, the successful control of the national economy." Friedrich List (1789–1846), one of the most important theoreticians of economic nationalism, expressed the following in his 1856 book *The National System of Political Economy:* "Between the individual and humanity there is the nation . . . it is only through the nation and within the nation that the individual can receive spiritual training, *achieve productive force, security and welfare . . .*" and that "[i]t is the task of national economy to accomplish the economic development of the nation, and to prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future." "This understanding of the important relationship between the nation and its productive forces is accompanied by the notion that economic wealth, efficiency, and prosperity might profitably take a back seat to the more pressing goal of economic independence from foreign influence and control." *See,* Alexander J. Motyl (ed.) **Encyclopedia of Nationalism** Vol. II, Academic Press, USA, 2001, p.137

reflects certain characteristics of it. For others, it does not belong to any sort of ideology, and is a natural outcome of the European integration. Hence it should be studied independently alongside the integration process (the ideology vs. strategy dichotomy). Although supporting the latter argument, the thesis will provide a detailed analysis of nationalism and its relation, if available, with Euroscepticism. The reason behind this research query lies in questioning the relation between Euroscepticism and nationalism. The assumption of the thesis is that evaluating the trajectory of Euroscepticism along European integration will provide us an analysis of this phenomenon as an emerging post-national dimension, rather than an indicator or reflection of nationalist ideology. Euroscepticism is evaluated as a movement placing the people at the centre of concern, a movement coming out of a "passive subordination to an active assertion" (Smith, 1991:64) and in doing this, creating group consciousness, rather than national consciousness, at the level of EU. This emerging post-national attitude or relation toward the state and the EU is actually a step towards creating a European public sphere, where political dialogue and public opinion are becoming more transnational (Habermas, 2001:73–74). Whether this is sharing the same rhetoric, barrowing discourse, debating, building counterarguments, etc., in either way (party based and/or mass movement), it will grasp the people of Europe and finally capture a critical as well as a positive European attitude through dissemination of arguments across national borders becoming placed in wider European level of politics. This political contestation is urgently required for deeper European integration, and as well as for improving the democratic credentials in the EU. The role of Euroscepticism lies in the heart of this contestation.

In order not to cause confusion in the chapters ahead, hereafter Euroscepticism[2] is acknowledged according to the typology of Kopecky and Mudde (2002), which is

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[2] According to the typology of Kopecky and Mudde (2002), four general types of party position are put forward: *Euro-enthusiasts*, *Eurosceptics*, *Europragmatists* and *Eurorejects*. *Euro-enthusiasts*, who are simultaneously Euro-enthusiasts and EU optimists, approve of European integration and are optimistic about the trajectory of EU development. *Eurosceptics*, who are Euro-enthusiasts and EU pessimists, favor European integration in principle, but criticize the actual development of the EU. *Europragmatists* are Europhobes and EU optimists, who are not supportive of the broad project of European integration, but are nevertheless positive about the current EU insofar as it is deemed to serve particular national or

debated in the second chapter in depth. There is an increasing academic interest on Euroscepticism both at public and party level. The number of literature sources is increasing on this phenomenon, with topics ranging from party politics, through mass movements, to citizens' attitudes, etc. It is the goal of this thesis to focus on the existence, the increasing saliency, its impact on post-national European integration and contribution to the general perception of the EU. It is clear that the Eurosceptic discourse covers expressions of dissatisfaction, revealing shortcomings of the integration process and inadequate steps taken in the name of Europe; still, the key point is the lack of opposition within the EU (lack of government-opposition relation). Any opposite voice or critique of the EU remains open to comment, as if these attitudes or views disregard the EU. This results in a handicap of understanding the Eurosceptic phenomenon. However contrary, as outlined in this thesis, the opposition coming from Eurosceptic parties/movements is in motion between both national and post-national levels that is, as this thesis argues, required for a deeper European integration.

The Organization of the Chapters

The first chapter will present a detailed analysis of the theories of nationalism, with a specific focus on the modernist and post-modernist school, based on the argument pertaining to the type of situation nationalism is transformed into. It is questioning whether nationalism is potentially fed by the same dynamics as it was in the past. The questioning of nationalism through the modernist camp will continue with the discussion on how post-modern and post-national theories have contributed to the study and understanding of nationalism. As a result, the goal is to better understand the relationship between nationalism and European integration. In order to question whether Euroscepticism is fed by nationalism, and if not, how does it contribute to the post-national politics in Europe.

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sectoral interests. Finally, *Eurorejects*, who are Europhobes and EU pessimists, simultaneously criticize the idea of integration and the specific form it has taken in the EU. P. Kopecky and C. Mudde. ''**The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe**'', *European Union Politics*, 313, 2002, p. 303

The second chapter opens up the concept of Euroscepticism alongside with other concepts, such as Euro-pragmatism and Euro-enthusiasm, questioning the link between post-nationalism and these emergent concepts. Is the integration process we are facing giving birth to a product of greater systemic change, which is called the post-national dimension, feeding the political contestation in Europe, and shading the era of nationalism? Or, has the European integration process opened up the era of what is called *de-nationalization*, giving birth to different movements, in this case Euroscepticism, which is argued to be the empirical evidence of the post-national order in Europe? Putting aside the Euro-enthusiasts, the thesis puts forth the argument of not treating Euroscepticism separately from pro-Europeanism, but rather to separate the concerns shared, or not shared (at party and public level), in the name of European integration.

As argued in this thesis, in contrast to general beliefs, Euroscepticism is not actually the desire of the demolition of the EU. It is about questioning the form, or the process the integration is heading towards. That is why, if the EU is willing to grasp the people of Europe, it certainly needs to consider their desires. As Milner puts it, according to a Louis Harris poll (1999), "Europeans want more Europe, but a different Europe" (*Cited in* Milner, 2000:2). Louis Harris started criticizing with the motto 'Yes to Europe, No to Maastricht, and becoming more salient with the post-Maastricht era.' This argument does evince the fact, but not the how, which will be the main question tackled within the second chapter.

The third chapter moves on to explore Euroscepticism and the way it is used within the politics of Europe, referenced to the political parties located in the European Parliament. The aim of this chapter is to establish whether these party groups or families are contributing to the pan- or post-national dimension within the EU. For such an assessment, a survey of the party manifestos, as well as their discourses, will be analyzed, and the concept of Euroscepticism will be once again in the centre of this analysis. The analysis will be drawn under three stages of which the first is to focus on the institutions of the EU with special reference to the European Parliament as a unique institution with an idiosyncratic character. Secondly, debating the useless classification

of the party groups within the European parliament as pro- vs. anti-EU would be of great help in understanding the integration. Thirdly, the focus is on how parties and party politics are in a transformation, according to the emerging post-national dimension with reference to the parties, *Europe of Freedom and Democracy* and the *European Conservatives and Reformists*. It is not a coincidence that these two party groups have been chosen for analysis. The fact is that, they disproof the argument of EU-criticism being an unfavorable condition. For an assessment of this argument, the party groups mentioned above will be analyzed both at transnational and national levels, with their attitudes on mainly three specific issues—the democratic deficit, sovereignty and anti-immigration rhetoric.

In sum, in this thesis, the research is finalized with the abovementioned third chapter with a revelatory, unique and a critical case study of the selected political parties.

1. TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONALISM IN EUROPE

Exploring nationalism in an EU context requires remembering the well known assumption of neo-functionalism from its father Ernst B. Haas, for him what the integration process was to bring along is; ''The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national state'' (Haas, 1958; 16). Jonathan Hearn argues that ''nationalism is the making of combined claims, on behalf of population, to identity, to jurisdiction and to territory'' (Hearn, 2006:11). Denoted by ''smaller social groups in the name of a larger population'' (2006:11), whom claim to seek a common identity (based on descent, culture, language, history, religion but which can also include liberty, democracy, egalitarianism). These claims are also related with or ''translated into laws'' (2006:11) on a specific territory occupied by the national group. The author further argues that one can speak of nationalism when all these three kinds of claims are present. At this point, alongside the European integration it is important to question how these claims are made by the nation-states in the EU. It is clear that, joining the EU involves surrendering of sovereignty (or at least a part of it). For Monnet (1943) ''sovereignty and nationalism were pernicious historical developments to be overcome and superseded by the equally historical attempt at creating a united Europe'' (*Cited in* Wellings, 2011:5-6).

Probably the most important obstacle for Haas and for his assumption is the counter movement, namely *nationalism*. That is why detailing the theories of nationalism below will require the questioning of how theories of nationalism approach such an assumption of 'shift of loyalties towards a new center'. Is this shift according to Kedourie creating new power containers, or is it only for receiving certain advantages in roundtable bargaining? In both cases, the power of the elite is undeniable. For that reason, according to Radu, instead of underlying the assumptions of neo- functionalism or say inter-governmentalism or any other theory, importance should be attributed to the elites, which shape the process, rather than the public, or paying attention to the public

opinion (Radu, 2000:7). A counter argument is that, the reason of nationalism still being alive in Europe is because of the EU itself is still an elitist project in nature, not being able to touch the grassroots[3]. As if the situation was different in the past[4] on the establishment of the modern nation-state.

However starting with the 1990's and specifically the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty changed these ideas. The Eurosceptic attitudes and the parties representing these started criticizing the integration process. There is nothing wrong approaching the integration in a critical manner, infact the Eurosceptic parties themselves define their role as constructive partners (ex. British Tories). However, they have also assumed the role of defending the 'national' cause alongside the integration process. What does defending the 'nation' and/or 'national' signify in this process? Since, it is evident that Euroscepticism does not emerge from a general national pattern. On the other hand, there are the Euro-enthusiasts who find the European integration necessary and willing to take further steps. As a result there is a competing of interests which make the national level obsolete. From the side of the Eurosceptics, it is important not to override national sovereignty, on the other hand their co-nationals, namely the Euro-enthusiasts argue that liberties and rights have priority in the world over national sovereignty. Since the EU acknowledges the European populations beyond the nation-state, (free movement, EU citizenship etc.) this study compares movements, groups and/or governments whom want to weaken state sovereignty with those who do not.

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[3] The academic interest in public attitudes towards the EU is increasingly gaining importance. Beicheld marks these views in his study as ''Classical European integration theory paid only scant attention to public opinion. Put crudely, neo-functionalists considered public attitudes irrelevant; intergovernmentalists disregarded European-level attitudes because of the exclusive significance of the national level; and federalists took for granted the a priori existence, or uncomplicated development, of mass support for the European project. The sceptic view mainly questions the risk taken by the attempt of abandoning the already existing legitimized nation-state in favor of the uncertain future advantages of integration''. Timm Beicheld, ''**Euro-scepticism in the EU Accession Countries**, *Comparative European Politics,* Vol. 2, No.1, 2004: 29-50

[4] Historians and political scientists have described ''...eighteenth-century France (for many, the embodiment of civic nationalism) as a state that pursued aggressive, even violent, cultural policies aimed at turning peasants into Frenchmen''. *See*, Eugen Weber, **Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914**.*,* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976, *See,* Ronald Wardhaugh, **Languages in Competition: Dominance, Diversity, and Decline**. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1987

The abovementioned developments are tackled in this thesis, firstly with the question of who speaks in the name of the nation for what purpose. The issue is firstly questioned in a theoretical perspective through the modern and post-modern thesis on nationalism and the nation-state.

1.1 The Modernity and Post-Modernity of Nationalism

Nationalism studies mainly fall under three categorizations; primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism, however recently incorporates post-modern approaches as well. The thesis will proceed by firstly laying down a modern approach to nationalism, and this will be followed by a post-modern outlook.

The concept of *Nationalism*[5] actually is a broad term which can not be easily defined, or theorized, as there is an ongoing debate on not the concept *nationalism* but *nationalisms*[6] (*See* Özkırımlı, 2000: 226-229). Vincent shares the same view, as argues ''there is no one nationalist doctrine- there are rather nationalisms'' (Vincent, 1995:241). For instance, there is a need of having a few words on how complicated or tricky using the term *nationalism* may become. Nationalism refers to a part of an official state ideology or a political principle (Gellner, 2006:1), then where might we

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[5] Modern nationalism has its ideological roots in both the Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction to it. Definitions of 'nationalism' the 'nation' vary in the social sciences: first, according to the particular aspect of 'nationalism' that they emphasize as essential to its nature. From this perspective, definitions can be divided mainly between political and cultural variables. Some scholars, like Hans Kohn, Carlton J. H. Hayes, John Plamenatz, Hugh Seton Watson, and A. D. Smith, have favored either typological or more inclusive definitions. Second, definitions vary according to the dating of nationalism, either before or during the French Revolution. This dating divides them into pre-modernist and modernist theories. Variations can also be found in explanations of nationalism, i.e., in the motivations and circumstances behind the rise of nationalist demands. Apart from the lack of consensus regarding the nature of nationalism, there is the further difficulty of distinguishing between the ideological and the analytical approaches to the phenomenon. *See* George Ritzer (ed.) **The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology**, Blackwell Publishing, UK, 2007 p.3153

[6] There is an increasing literature on the problematic of 'nationalism(s)'. It is clear that many circumstances cause nationalism and as a result nationalism has many ambitions. Therefore, there are ''…distinctions between 'territorial' and 'diaspora' nationalism; 'modernization' or 'reform' nationalism and 'conservative' nationalism; 'unification' and 'separatist' nationalism; 'nation-building' or 'state' nationalism and 'sub-national', 'anti-colonial', or 'post-imperial' nationalisms; 'official' and 'insurgent' nationalism; 'majority' and 'minority' nationalism; or between 'state-framed' and 'counter-state' nationalism. One study listed thirty-nine types of nationalism''. *See* A.D. Smith, **Theories of Nationalism**, Duckworth, London, 1983, p.211–29

locate *stateless nationalism* according to this assumption. The nation-states use the state as an instrument for national unity however; more importantly how are the nation-states in Europe to use the state in an entity like the EU for their national unity in economic, social or cultural life.

Nationalism, on the other hand might also refer to a non-state popular movement (Oran, 1977:14), then how could this movement be labeled comes to mind, as it may vary from *diaspora nationalism* to *cultural* or even as *religious nationalism?* Certainly the scope of this thesis is not debating these questions but for underlying how flexible the concept may become I felt it essential to give a few examples which one may come across.

Primordialism or scholars whom fall under the category of primordialist argue that ''nationality is a natural part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell'' (Özkırımlı, 2000:64). Scholars like Smith (1994) and Tilley (1997) classify primordialism under different divisions. For Smith primordialism requires to be understood in different versions like naturalist[7], sociobiological[8] and cultural[9] approaches (Smith, 1994:376-7). Sharing the same argument Tilley classifies these approaches as; biological, psychological and cultural. What primordialsts argue in general is that, identities and/or attachments are given, the sentiments are ineffable (overpowering and coercive) and primordialism is related with emotion and affect (Eller and Coughlan, 1993:187). For primordialism nations have existed since time immemorial. Between Primordialism and Modernism stands Ethno-symbolism known to be the third way. Ethno-symbolism puts forth the argument; the formation of nations requires it to be studies in a time period. For Hutchinson ''nations require to be contextualized within the larger phenomenon of ethnicity which shapes them'' (1994:7). For Conversi ethno-symbolism ''rejects the axiom that nations may be ipso facto

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[7] According to Smith, ''the Naturalist approach includes the argument of nations having natural frontiers, hence, a specific origin and place in nature as well as a peculiar character, mission and destiny''. A.D. Smith, **Nations and Nationalism In A Global Era**, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, p.32

[8] The Sociobiological approach according to Van den Berghe includes ''kin selection or mating with relatives is a powerful cement of sociality in humans too. Both ethnicity and race are extensions of the idiom of kinship, therefore ethnic and race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection''. P. Van den Berghe, ''**Race and Ethnicity: A Sociological Perspective, Ethnic and Racial Studies** 1 (4), 1978:401-11.

[9] Cultural primordialism refers to ''individuals feeling attachment to certain elements of their culture, assuming that they are given, sacred and underived''. Umut Özkırımlı, **Theories of Nationalism**, NY, Palgrave, 2000, p.72

invented, claiming that they rely on a pre-existing texture of myths, memories, values and symbols'' (1995:73-74).That is why, nationalism is seen as the final stage of ethnic consciousness dating back to older collective organizations, namely the ethnie. However, modernist scholars whether it is primordialism or ethno-symbolism ignore these approaches in nationalism studies. They insist on the common assumption of modern theories that 'nation is a modern construct'.

For sure it is clear that ''more and more present-day scholars of nationalism accept that there is a wide spectrum of explanations for the formation of nations[10], at different times and places, and that no one theory can cover all cases'' (Smith 1998, 1–23). However in today's contemporary world locating the term nation[11] is increasingly becoming more difficult. According to Triandafyllidou (1998)

> Nationalism and, indeed, the nation itself appear in an ever greater diversity of forms and configurations, changing and constantly reinventing the phenomena that scholars have meticulously tried to fit into analytical categories. However, even though no definition may appear completely satisfactory given the complexity and multidimensionality of national identity, a working definition is necessary for constructing a theoretical framework (Triandafyllidou 1998, 594–95).

Besides being an ill defined phenomenon, there is no consensus about the date of birth for nationalism. According to the academic literature, for Kohn it is the English Revolution, for Kedourie it is the date of Fichte's addresses to the German nation and for Breuilly is the German reaction towards the German disunity, Cobban points it to the American Revolution, but for most it is the French Revolution as the date of birth for nationalism (Smith, 1998:17). However instead of tackling the date of birth for nationalism, the thesis will focus mostly on the question of whether nationalism is declining, regenerating or transforming or not. It is commonly agreed among scholars

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[10] A working definition of Nation is ''an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'', *See*, Benedict Anderson, **Imagined Communities**, Verso, UK, 1983, p.6

[11] For instance, ''Enoch Powell recognizes that his usage of the term 'nation' is idiosyncratic. Not all cultural, religious, or ethnic communities are 'nations' in his strict sense of the term, because not all of these communities are willing to accept rule by a single unitary sovereign''. *See* Glyn Morgan, **The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration**, Princeton University Press, UK, 2005, p.60

that nationalism is a modern phenomena, but the point is whether this phenomena is to survive under certain pressures and processes arising from both outside and inside of the state.

At this point Hroch (1985) analyzes nationalism under three phases. For Hroch the first phase is the about the awakening of the national idea lead by the intellectuals, and phase two is its dissemination, and finally and most importantly the interpretation and working for the transformation of the national idea to the nation-state (*Cited in* Billig, 1995:44). However, the questions arising today related with Hroch's study on 'phases of nationalism' is not directly about the stages detailed by Hroch, but is on what happens to nationalism after the nation-state is established? Answer to this question will be detailed below under the contributions made by the post-modern theories on the studying of nationalism.

1.1.1   Modern Theories of Nationalism

The modern school in the name of nations and nationalism argue that both 'nations' and 'nationalism' are modern constructs. For making a general understanding of the modern theories of nationalism, there is a need of underlying the common assumptions they argue in the name of theorizing nationalism. Firstly, a vast number of orthodox theories of nationalism argue that origins of nationalism are a result of a process of change (capitalism, industrialism, secularism etc) (Smith, 1994:377). And, secondly what modern theories argue, is the important role of the political and/or economic elites in shaping this process of change. Whether this be *social-engineering* (Hobsbawm, 1992), *instrumentalism* (Brass, 1979), *modern constructs and artifacts of men's convictions* (Gellner, 1983), *political movements seeking state power* (Breuilly, 1994) and many more on which scholars touch the argument about the constructed and manipulated nature of nationhood, which is an important critic of the abovementioned scholars emphasize.

This process of change, according to the modern theories required the establishment of a unified national identity to be established with the help of literacy, linguistic

homogenization, mass culture and standard education systems. What emerged out of this process is known to be the modern nation-state, which exists in a composite of other nation-states, which has the power of institutional forms, monopoly over a territory with boundaries, and direct control of internal and external issues (Hearn, 2006:67) which have been shaped by the elites. Balibar and Wallerstein argue in the name of elite manipulation as;

> No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations included within them, divided up among them or dominated by them are ethicized—that is, represented in the past or in the future *as if* they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcend individuals and social conditions (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991:96).

The debates with the questions mentioned in the introduction require firstly a theoretical discussion. That is why the first chapter will make a debate through the theories of nationalism, with special attention on Ernest Gellner (1983), Eric J. Hobsbawm (1990), and John Breuilly[12] (1993) which have made remarkable considerations on nationalism. It is not a coincidence that these scholars and their theories will be underlined within this thesis. Although each of them has a different approach in theorizing nationalism, they do have a point in common, other than belonging to the modernist thought, this common view shared among these scholars mentioned above is that they argue the discontinuity of nationalism. Certainly this requires a detailed analysis of their theories.

After debating the modern theories, the chapter proceeds through debating what post-modern theories argue in the name of nationalism and the nation-state. Since post-modern theories criticize the characteristics of the modern nation-state.

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[12] Although detailing the theories of nationalism within this chapter, Breuilly's contribution on ''nationalism is considered more a like as a general procedure for the study of nationalism rather than a theory. Breuilly treats nationalism as a form of politics. It creates a typology of nationalist politics and then uses the method of comparative history to study particular cases. Nationalism is best understood as an especially appropriate form of political behavior in the context of the modern state and the modern state system''. John Breuilly, **Nationalism and the State**, (2nd edition), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, p.1

1.1.1.1 Social Transformation

Nationalism brought along a transformation process resulting with the establishment of the nation-state. One of these processes was the social dimension, tackled by a well known scholar Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm, puts forward that, both nations and nationalism are products of what he names ''social – engineering''. For Hobsbawm the social – engineering which is attributed to the political and economic elites has resulted with the ''invention of tradition''. For Hobsbawm manufacturing of these traditions was first to invent the nation itself and later to make it survive. Hobsbawm, building his argument on Hroch's classification, separates these inventions under three phases. According to this, phase A includes purely cultural and literary inventions, which have no relations with political outcomes. Phase B consists of the militants of the national idea, which is the start of developing national sentiments and certainly campaigning for securing them. And finally, phase C is the era of nationalism becoming official state ideologies requiring mass support (Hobsbawm, 1992:11-12). However, certain developments and emerging movements are challenging the 'state ideology', 'nationalism' and 'mass support' (detailed below under post-modern theories).

The traditions are defined by Hobsbawm as; ''a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with a suitable historic past'' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:1). Hobsbawm singles out these traditions in three important innovations. These are the development of primary education, the invention of public ceremonies, and mass production of public monuments (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:271). For Hobsbawm, 'primary education' in the French case was the process of turning ''the peasants not only into Frenchmen but also into good Republicans'' (1983:271). Schooling was clarified as a process of loading common patterns of behavior and values as well as a process of interlinked networks, and institutionalization (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:293). The same view is shared by Kedourie in his work on *Nationalism*, he identifies ''schools as instruments of state policy just like the army, the police and the exchequer'' (Kedourie, 1966:84). For Kedourie, education is not only a process of

learning, or transmitting knowledge, etc. but its purpose is rather political, which ''is to bend the will of the young to the will of the nation'' (1966:83-84). Certainly Kedourie marks these words rooted in Fichte's ideas on education as; ''…If you want to influence him at all, you must do more than merely talk to him; you must fashion him, and fashion him, and fashion him in such a way that he simply cannot will otherwise than you wish him to will'' (*Cited in* Kedourie, 1966:83).

Hobsbawm details education and its outcomes as, primary education classifying people as belonging to the lower order, secondary education becoming the minimal criterion for acceptance to middle class status. And finally, higher education training people qualified enough to the upper – middle – class (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1982:293). The mass education and establishing a common education system was vital for raising educated citizens, who will play their role in contributing to the economy as well as politics. This is not only about participating in elections, or accurately paying tax, but also being integrated to a society sharing the same common values with the rest of the members (Dunkerley, et al., 2002:131).

The second point which Hobsbawm underlines is the invention of ''public ceremonies''. Whether these ceremonies were liturgy, music or organization, there main goal was to converge the state, society and nation. What Hobsbawm underlines here is the classification of these ceremonies, which on one hand were official and on the other hand unofficial. The official ceremonies were lead by state institutions with the aim of political outcomes, while the unofficial ceremonies were rather social (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:263). For instance, the celebration of the 'Bastille Day', which is known as the French National holiday, was initiated by the government in 1790. Similarly, the Armistice Day, which is celebrated every year from the beginning of 1918, can be counted as an official ceremony, marking the end of the First World War. Certainly this ceremony is shared by most of the Western countries. Either official or unofficial the aim of these traditions is for one purpose, feeling and showing a common joy, sadness or gratefulness to one's state or to it's past.

Thirdly, Hobsbawm makes reference to the 'public monuments' which had a symbolic way of attaching the nations commemoration, and reflecting the nations will with that of

the state, in which Hobsbawm refers to as the ''the image of the Republic itself''. Certainly the scope of using these monuments was to maintain a civic memory by using civilian figures, whom had been local or nation wide patriots (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:271).

In addition to the aforementioned rituals and traditions, what actually attached people together was the sharing of a common language, on which K. Deutsch has marked the importance of communication, or the ability to communicate more effectively (Deutsch, 1953:97). When the languages of the European states are to be traced back to history, the only communication language appears is the Latin language which was both spoken and written among the clergy and nobility. The rest of the society, such like the peasants did speak some other dialects showing divergence upon the region they lived in that state. Due to this divergence of language[13] speaking, most of the people, located in different regions neither understood each other nor was able to share something common whether this was cultural or political.

However, according to Hobsbawm the period of these traditions and making use of them belongs to the 19th and 20th centuries. In today's world, for Hobsbawm after the postwar era, the use of these traditions, in the name of nationalism is no longer important facts. In the 19th and 20th centuries the aim of building strong nation-states alongside with a competitive national economy was the central fact. However, after the postwar era, there is no more ''a territorially bounded national economy, since the 1960's the role of the national economies has been undermined by major transformations in the international division of labor whose basic units are transnational, and multinational'' (Hobsbawm, 1992:183).

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[13] For instance, ''in the case of the French language, which was defined as 'French of Paris' was not commonly used until Philip the Fair who made it compulsory as the language of Royal edicts, which later became compulsory in official deeds by Francis I in 1539, and finally Louise XIII which made French compulsory in every kind of registration (marriages, burials, baptisms etc.) This era is labeled as the French language been Frenchified around the 15th century''. See, Liah Greenfeld, **Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity**, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1992, pp.98-99

As a result, what Hobsbawm puts forth is that there is no importance of using such traditions for securing the nation. For him, ''nations belong exclusively to a particular, and historically recent period'' (Hobsbawm, 1992:9). A similar explanation comes from Robertson (1990; 1992) as well. For him ''the heyday of the nation-state was from 1880 to 1920'' (*Cited in* Billig, 1995:129). During this period the aim of the states was unification and search for homogeneity. However in a world of fluid boundaries, mass migrations etc. such claims have been overridden by economic interests (the very reason of establishing the ECSC in the first place in 1951). Billig summarizes this as ''the capital dictating a homogenized culture'' (Billig, 1995:131). The increasing speed of the capital belongs to the force of the system itself which is pushing it out without any limitation in the name of borders, restrictions etc. For that reason in the thesis of Hobsbawm the national traditions, rituals and collective practices as argued in this thesis have become to a partial halt, a kind of a passive alliance, where new actors, interests with new traditions have become apparent.

Hobsbawm does not argue that both nations and nationalisms would disappear from our world; however what he underlines is the importance or the mission of this phenomenon has started fading away. Similar arguments are put forth by other scholars like Bhabha (1990) who argues that boundaries of the state can never be secure, as the nation seeks to define itself in relation to what is left outside or beyond its borders (Spencer and Wollman, 2002:50). The emerging new entities like the EU certainly push these arguments into questions of who is outside and who remains in, through what kind of border lines?

> Nation-states and nations will be seen as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by, the new supranational restructuring of the globe. Nations and nationalism will both be present but in subordinate, and often rather minor roles (Hobsbawm, 1992:191).

That is why; there is no need for maintaining such traditions for securing both the nation and the interests of the state. As the interests of the nation-states are no more handled or secured solely by them. The growing interdependence among the states is

forcing them to cooperate and work towards fulfilling common interests they share. This will has also given birth to Intergovernmental[14] (IG) and Non-governmental organizations (NGO).

> On the contrary, it will inevitably have to be written as the history of a world which can no longer be contained within the limits of 'nations' and 'nation-states' as these used to be defined, either politically, or economically, or culturally, or even linguistically. It will be largely supranational and infranational, but even infranationality, whether or not it dresses itself up in the costume of some mini-nationalism, will reflect the decline of the old nation-state as an operational entity (Hobsbawm, 1992:191).

This increase of economic dependency alongside with the flow of capital, goods, people etc. has forced the states around the world to dictate the same rules. ''Capital dictates the norms and sets the social agenda, free marketers have won over the social engineers'' as argued by Zubaida (1978:66) and according to Breuilly, this introduced in what he calls the ''Modern economic groupings'' (Breuilly, 1994:21). In such an environment of economic dependency, the need of developing such traditions, either for discourse or practice appeared to be null. Besides the flow of capital or goods, what became important is the flow of the traditions or rituals from one state to another. Certainly with the help of technology, communication and transportation these no more belong to a single state, but to regions, or even to the globe as a whole. This became a reality under two conditions. The first process is the nation- states affecting one another either through exporting or importing certain traditions. Or the second way of certain interaction among states settled in blocs, regional groupings, or Unions which are affected from above, namely from supranational institutions. Scholars like Pierson (2001), Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) have underlined the growing internationalization and deregulation of economies which has reduced the role and instruments of the states to secure and control their economies (*Cited in* Jaeger and Kvist, 2003:561).

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[14]''David Held (1988) underlines the importance of the IG and NGO's by making a statistical investigation and coming up with the number of IG organizations established in 1951 being 123, and being increased to 280 in 1971, and 365 in 1984. On the other hand the increase of the NGO's to 2,173 in 1972, and doubling to 4,615 in the next twelve years…''. *Cited in* Hobsbawm, **Nations and Nationalism since 1780**, Cambridge University Press, p. 181.

As Hobsbawm indicates, the traditions and the national organizations for creating or securing the state and the national economy are no more a matter of nationalism. In his words;

> Nationalism is historically less important. It is no longer, as it were, a global political programme, as it may be said to have been in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. It is at most a complicating factor, or a catalyst for other developments (Hobsbawm, 1992:181).

For Hobsbawm ''nations only exist as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one'' (Hobsbawm, 1992:10). Nairn and Smith puts it different by acknowledging that ''nationalism did not erase class differences or antagonisms, but it certainly could override them in moments of external danger, and temporarily unify the classes to achieve common goals'' (Nairn, 1997; Smith, 1981b). Even in a time of crisis or a perception of danger, as argued in this thesis, instead of a unifying national resistance, it can be seen that there are a divergence of attitudes. And, one of these appears to be Euroscepticism being against centralization rather than assimilation. Because the boundaries of a strict and homogen national (supra-identity) has become more flexible than ever. The aforementioned statements from Hobsbawm, Nairn and Smith stick nationalism to the goal of establishing a state or at least for securing it. Then what happens when the nation reaches the goal of establishing a state, and more importantly does not have to think of securing it. Is the mission of nationalism suspended? Or is it shifted / used towards a way of manipulation? For Brass, it is actually a strong tool flexible enough to manipulate the masses according the goal which is in concern at time, for him both nationalism and ethnicity are creations of elites which they use for protecting their well being or for willing to gain economic or political advantage (Spencer and Wollman, 2002:48).

However, Hobsbawm does not share the arguments of identity politics being irrational, because of being identity driven, as it is no more solely about identities, for him the importance is the cycle in which would lead to a Universalist rationality. Or the argument of economic identities would transcend cultural ones. For Hobsbawm, in his

words ''wherever we live in an urbanized society, we encounter strangers: uprooted men and women who remind us of the fragility, or the drying up of our own families roots'' (1992:192). And, besides this ''being English or Irish or Jewish, or a combination of all these, is only one way in which they use for this purpose, as occasion demands'' (1992: 192). The key question here is what and how the demands of the people shape or transform nationalism into a different kind of fashion? For instance Hobsbawm underlines;

> Nations and their associated phenomena must therefore be analyzed in terms of political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions and requirements. For this reason they are in my view, dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings, and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist (Hobsbawm, 1992:10).

That is to say, the interests, needs, hopes of the people have to be taken into consideration if a certain kind of national sentiment is to be deployed. However, in a world of nations containing dual citizens, denizens[15], migrants, sub-state national[16] groups how can such common interests be considered for satisfying the needs or demands of the whole society? The decisive factor, which this thesis will underline is the economic situations and demands the people are subjecting to one another or to their states. This brings the situation to Gellner's thesis of the confusion between emotional or rational behavior of the individual. Similarly Hobsbawm acknowledges this as; ''official ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what it is in the minds of

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[15] T.Hammar, denizens are ''neither regular foreign citizens nor naturalised citizens of the host state. Denizens enjoy almost full social, economic and civil citizenship rights whereas they only have limited access to political rights. With the exception of a few states that granted denizens voting rights in local elections, they are excluded from democratic participation and processes''. T. Hammar, **Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration**, Aldershot, Avebury, 1990, p.13.

[16] By sub-state nationals or synonymously used as 'nations without states' Guibernau refers to ''nations which, in spite of having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more states maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves'' Montserrat Guibernau, ''**Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without States: the Catalan Case**'' The Open University, Barcelona, 2003, p.4 URL: http://www.icps.cat/archivos/WorkingPapers/wp222.pdf

even the most loyal citizens or supporters'' (Hobsbawm, 1992:11). For instance Isreal in supporting this argument;

> National heritage is no longer seen as a sealed box of treasures to be passed on intact. Most individuals today, in civilized and democratic countries, internalize the identity they were born and bred into, but also see themselves free to prioritize other identities. Most people do not hold the nation above religion, humanity, morality or justice (Israel, 2011:67).

Economic welfare could be attached to the aforementioned list which brings us to Friedrich List and his work on economic nationalism. List argues that;

> […the world is divided into nations, each of which had distinctive national interests which were defined not just in materialist terms but also in terms of power and the expression of national culture and identities. Although individuals had their own private economic interests, more important from List's standpoint was their shared interests as members of the same nation. If private and national interests did not coincide, he believed the latter should prevail (Cited in Helleiner, 2002:312).

The question is do such national interests still transcend private ones. Leaving aside private or national interests within a nation state, do the national interests in today's global economy preserve their prior rank in certain interactions, integrations etc? For Hobsbawm, ''national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods'' (Hobsbawm, 1992:11).

In a world of strictly interrelated relations, not just among the states, but also among the societies do affect each other, and at the same time do affect the communities view with the state it is attached. That is why Hosbsbawm underlines the importance of this change or shift of identification, through marking it to be analyzed within a wider framework and not limiting this only with the nation state.

1.1.1.2 Political Transformation

Another process of nationalism is the political transformation. John Breuilly, one of the foremost scholars dealing with nationalism, explains this phenomenon to the development of the modern state. Starting his words through identifying what the states has come to be as follows;

> The modern state is the possessor of sovereignty over a given territory. Sovereignty resides in a specific institution such as monarchy or parliament, and is considered to be, by its very nature, indivisible. The state possesses an elaborate institutional structure which delimits, justifies and exercises the claims attached to sovereignty (Breuilly, 1994:369).

The aforementioned role of the state, when considered under the EU integration process, bears some questions in mind. For Glenn it is obvious that the ''European states are not losing their autonomy in a zero-sum fashion but, are becoming a member of a multi-level polity in which they do share sovereignty in particular areas and at different levels of governance'' (Glenn, 2002:3).

Linking nationalism to the modern state constitutes Breuilly's attribution to modernity, in what he believes, society's perception is becoming closer related with the market or the state, rather than to the nation (Breuilly, 1994:270). For Breuilly nationalism ''is best understood as an especially appropriate form of political behavior in the context of the modern state…'' (Breuilly, 1994:1). Breuilly evaluates nationalism as a form of politics, for him, ''nationalism is, above, and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is principally about control of the state'' (Breuilly, 1994:1). What is meant by *above* and *beyond all else*, is that, culture, ideology, identity, class etc. should only be handled as contributions to nationalism, rather than solely dealing with them separately for understanding nationalism (Breuilly, 1994:1-2).

Breuilly emphasizes the shift from what he calls 'corporate' to a 'functional' division of labor, he defines this as in past, people were administrated only under single corporate organizations, while with the establishment of the modern state the needs of the society

have been met by separate function-specific organizations, which have all been covered under a bureaucratic state (Breuilly, 1996:163). For Breuilly the modern state developed in a liberal way which included public powers being exercised by state institutions and the private powers being transferred to non-political institutions, the system went through a rapid transformation in which the monarchy, or the church or even the lordships were thrown away (Breuilly, 1996:164).

Certainly this transformation introduced ''the state as public and the civil society as private with the modern idea of sovereignty '' (Breuilly, 1996:164) which required to be secured with a strong political shield, namely nationalism. That is why for Breuilly, securing the needs and controlling the direction for protecting the state what he believes is; ''nationalism is used to refer to political units seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments'' (Breuilly, 1994:1). The establishment of the institutions and the public – private distinction requires the participation of the citizens. Through this participation the goal is to bind the individual to the state, which is to make the state-society connection. Breuilly speaks of ''a harmony between the public interests of citizens and the private interests of selfish individuals'' namely the elites (Breuilly, 1996:165). For this aim, first was to construct the tie between the state and society and afterwards secure it in the name of framing the individuals. In that sense Breuilly talks about three different functions of the use of nationalism. These are coordination, mobilization and legitimization.

What Breuilly argues is that the coordination is required for the elites to meet on common grounds for developing the idea of common interests; on the other hand mobilization is for gaining support namely from the grassroots to bring their attention towards the cause, and finally legitimacy is for justifying the national ideas developed (Breuilly, 1996:166-167). This was all about establishing the state-society connection, in which has come to be a polity of citizens. For Breuilly, ''it is the political rights, not the cultural identities of those who are citizens'' (Breuilly, 1996:165). On the contrary a limit was put forth for 'the body of citizens' as ''the notion of freedom as privacy beyond the state by defining freedom solely as participation in the implementation of the general will'' (Breuilly, 1996:165).

However, in what position is this connection understood today? Is the individual solely connected to his or her state, or are their other systems of power in charge, which the individual is willing to participate. For Dewey (1927) public is as he defines;

> Those indirectly and seriously affected for good or for evil form a group distinctive enough to require recognition and a name. The name selected is the Public. This public is organized and made effective by means of representatives who as guardians of custom, as legislators, as executives, judges, etc., care for its especial interest by methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of individuals and groups. Then, and in so far association adds to itself political organization, and something which may be government comes into being: the public is a political state (*Cited in* Eriksen, 2005:18-19).

As understood from the aforementioned citation, the public as a political state was an outcome of nationalism which for Breuilly was inevitable in such a process. However, the question which remains is as how inevitable is nationalism in contemporary Europe. Far away the integration process has resulted with a mixture of multi-level governance, although according to some scholar, still rest in a voluntaristic way. Even if it is that way, for surely it is resulting with imposing different ways of cooperation among the Member States of the EU. It is not only the modern nation-state which shapes the process of decision-making for the good of its public in the name of being a political state.

> Voluntary cooperation on practical questions, based on the free access to information and mutual deliberation, constitutes an 'intelligent' problem-solving method. The more free the participants are to suggest proposals and to assess information and assumptions, the more rational the problem-solving. It is this model of societal cooperation that Dewey applies to democracy, as he sees it as the political form of organization based on conscious deliberation and experimentation in which human intelligence can be fully realized (Eriksen, 2005:18).

What is more important than the aforementioned role of nationalism by Breuilly, is his distinction of nationalism as a political doctrine, as a political movement led by parties

and party politics, and as a sentiment which is about the consciousness shared between the fellow citizens (Breuilly, 1996: 146-147). The question remains as, are these definitions of nationalism still valid? Can nationalism be handled as a doctrine, a state ideology, as a political movement, or is it only and only a sentiment trying to survive among the nations around the world, which is often confused with other emotions such like patriotism, xenophobia, racism etc. As an ideology or political doctrine, (state-led or governmental nationalism) has lost its validity at least for Europe after the Second World War.

The post- war era was a fight between the west – east rivalry, rather than solely between the nation-states. After the fall of the Soviet Union, nationalism did find a different position back to politics, however, as a political movement it survived as an important factor determining the internal politics of the European nation-states, although what Habermas defines rather as ''a cheap resource from which governments and political leaders can draw on occasions, when they are temped to exploit a well known psychological mechanism for the purpose of turning the attention of citizens away from internal social conflicts…'' (Habermas, 1998:288).

Therefore in what position can nationalism be understood, as a political movement, or as a sentiment among the grassroots? According to Breuilly, ''a nationalist movement may ignore nationalist intellectuals and may also include non-nationalist values rather than nationalist propaganda'' (Breuilly, 1996:163). Whence European politics within the EU framework are to be reconsidered under this argument, the question appears to be what are then the sudden rise of certain nationalist values abroad EU states. Is it a resistance against the new forms of transnational democratic decision-making, or the increasing pressures of the fluid boundaries, which for Gellner is the spread of ''portable nationalism'' threatening (the other) wherever it settles?

> Nations are not deeply rooted in history, but are notable consequences of the revolution that constituted modernity and as such tied to their features and conditions, with the result that once these features and conditions are transformed, nations would gradually wither away and be superseded (Breuilly, 1994:21-22).

For Breuilly, the changes and transformations brought along with modernity are mostly in the economic realm. Making reference to market relationships, it is a way put forward for breaking down local isolation and the ones which are controlling it. Through this direction it will provide entry for outside political groups, and as well as for the locals to turn their attention outwards (Breuilly, 1994:20). Nationalism will, therefore, be understood neither as an expression of some enduring reality such as the nation nor as an arbitrary ideological construction, but rather as one response to certain crucial aspects of modernity (Breuilly, 1996:140).

Similar to the thesis of Hobsbawm, Breuilly shares the argument that of the nation-state would confront a kind of subordination. Acknowledging these arguments in the EU, it is evident that modernization did take a big step forward, though modernizing the capitals and leaving behind the urban, however in an era of post-modernism, say alongside with projects like the EU integration, has managed to develop not only what industrialism did for metropolis, but also for the urban modernization (Delanty, 2000:117). That is why, for Breuilly, many people, do now take either economic or political interest in the world beyond their locality.

1.1.1.3 Cultural Transformation

Probably the foremost cited scholar on 'nationalism studies' is Ernest Gellner, and his theory of nationalism. Although very often criticized, Gellner and his contribution to nationalism studies are undeniable. Gellner in his book *Nations and Nationalism*, describes firstly the relation between the state, nation and nationalism. Briefly, for Gellner, ''… Nations, like states, are a contingency and not a universal necessity'' (Gellner, 1983:6) moving on with the argument of ''neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances'' (Gellner, 1983:6). Moreover, Gellner argues nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy'' (Gellner, 1983:6).

For Gellner, the age of nationalism is explained through the transition from agrarian to industrial society, and, more importantly given birth to what he names ''high cultures''.

> Nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population … It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind (Gellner, 1983:57).

There are three phases of human history as Gellner identifies: the hunter-gatherer, the agro-literate and the industrial. He does not attribute much importance to the first two phases, which can be understood from his definition; nationalism is ''primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'' (Gellner, 1983:1).

That is why, for Gellner Nationalism is ''a theory of political legitimacy'' (Gellner, 1983:1). And, that is the reason why Gellner links this definition to the state as; ''that agency within society that possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence. States only exists where there is division of labor, and the state is that instit or set of instits specifically concerned with the enforcement of order'' (whatever else they may also be concerned with) (Gellner, 1983:4).

This political principle in order to survive requires a culture to disseminate the will of the mass through sharing, but for Gellner this is required only in the era of nationalism. Gellner carries forward his argument with ''Nationalism creates nations, not the other way around'' (Gellner, 1983:56).

According to Gellner this political principle may not always exists, as some states may also include foreigners, non-nationals, or unmixed with others resulting with vagueness about who the national group is (Gellner, 1983:1). That is why, Gellner argues that;

> The infrastructural investment made in them can be relied on to perpetuate them. Partly because many boundaries have already adjusted themselves to the boundaries of these cultures, and partly because the nationalist imperative is now

so widely respected that developed societies seldom defy it brazenly, and try to avoid head- on confrontations with it; for these various reasons, late industrial society can be expected to be one in which nationalism persists, but in a muted, less virulent form (Gellner, 1983: 121-122).

Nationalism is still seen as distinctive to modernity, but it is now part of a philosophy of history that distinguishes three phases in human progress, the pre-agrarian, the agrarian, and the industrial. Neither the hunter-gatherer nor the agro-literate periods have the characteristics as such, namely a state and having a national sentiment.

> But the consequence is that social participation and effective economic, political, and cultural citizenship is a condition of the mastery of a given high culture. The perpetuation of that high culture is a very expensive business which has to be undertaken either by the state or at least protected by the state. All this leads to the link between state and culture, which is the essence of nationalism. This imposes nationalism on modern man (Gellner, 1995).

Gellner sets his theory on the age of industrialism, which has been the main determinant of developing the national sentiment. The mass production with the need of qualified humans, forced the individuals to migrate from the countryside to the capitals giving birth to the creation of common grounds, namely *culture*. These common sharings required a common language for mobility and communication under the control of the state.

> When we look at the society controlled by this kind of state, we also see why all this must be so. Its economy depends on mobility and communication between individuals, at a level which can only be achieved if those individuals have been socialized into a high culture, and indeed into the same high culture…] (Gellner, 1983:140).

The process of industrialization has given birth to what Gellner names 'modular man', in which, the individual is no longer bound to ''ritual, blood relations, and micro communities, but share a common culture'' (Gellner, 1996:100). For Gellner modular man, with the help of culture, ''learns to wear and identify with the different roles and

identities he or she will assume in life'' (Gellner, 1996:100). And due to the concept of *modular man*, on which Gellner argues is a society with industrial structure, which is flexible, cohesive, and a machine of progress. (Gellner, 1996:100) What shall be understood from being *flexible, cohesive* and *towards progress,* will be discussed below in the realm of post-nationalism.

Besides the dynamics listed above, Gellner attributes importance to education, which should be sustained and supervised by the state, which is the only way for raising qualified and culturally adequate members for what Gellner names, ''industrial social organization''. That is why Gellner rejects nationalism being natural, self evident and self generating, for him nationalism and its birth to the nation-state are modern constructs; ''Nations are the artifacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities'' (Gellner, 1983:7). In that case, is there a possibility of the de-construction of the nations, since post-modern theories argue? Like in all his assumptions, Gellner, replaces *culture* in the middle of his argument and argues that;

> [...multiculturalism is indeed a contemporary necessity dictated by the force
> majeure of globalization and states are inhabited by minorities they can no longer
> impose a homogenous culture with democratic mean, states have to stress pluralism
> (*Cited in* Leoussi, 2001:106).

However in an era called as post-industrial, the determinants for instance as education, invented traditions etc. which in past juxtaposed the individuals, for some time is now alienating them. This has become a reality through high levels of education which has increased unique skills, qualifications, mobility, and multilingualism, which starts with learning a foreign language at primary education, namely *lingua franca*. The education received at national level results with insufficient and deficient ends. This is the argument of Nussbaums's 'twin concepts'[17] of world citizenry and cosmopolitan education. The individual is keen for developing him or herself with the needs of *high-tech* or requirements of *postmodern hyperspace* etc. These results are forcing the individual to become open to outside opportunities and economic redistribution, which

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[17] *See*, Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism', in Joshua Cohen (ed.), **For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism**, MA: Beacon Press, Boston, 1996, pp. 2–3.

results with communicative interaction this time not only among co nationals but through transnational networks (Kitschelt, 1995:7). This, for some other scholars is put forward as *post-materialist[18] value change* (Maslov, 1962; Inglehart, 1977) while for others is *cognitive mobilization* (Janssen, 1991; Gabel, 1998). That is why, indirectly education can be positively related to support for European integration through raising cognitive mobilization and enabling citizens to benefit from economic opportunities in an integrated market (Gabel, 1998:334).

> The employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals … now hinges
> on their education … A man's education is by far his most precious investment,
> and in effect confers identity on him. Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a
> land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture (Gellner, 1983:36).

For Gellner, the members of the upper professional class of developed industrial societies have already transformed into some kind of ''international labor market and interchangeability'' (Gellner, 1983:118). Becoming loyal to a culture certainly remains essential for an individual to develop a personality of his or her, nevertheless is this acute for him or her to reflect his presence in a global environment without any modifications to the needs of the global world.

However for Gellner, the question remains as, can or will this situation become generalized? In fact, whether generalized or not, what appears to be vital, is the outcome it has caused. This is a gap of divergent interests among the individuals depending on their occupation level. According to this view Bernard Moss (1998) argues that in European issues the individual reflects support or opposition to the integration according to his/her class, rather that the nation (*Cited in* Milner, 2000:40).

Llamzares and Gramacho share the same argument that working class individuals are more Eurosceptic when compared with upper class members (Llamzares and Gramacho, 2007:211). On the other hand De Master and Le Roy (2000) argue that people

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[18] Inglehart (1977) defines Post-materialism as relying on a core distinction between two vales systems: ''…materialism and post-materialism. The former emphasizes 'Conservative values' such as public order, physical security and economic growth, the latter prioritizes non-conformist values, such as self-expression, and individual freedom, participative democracy and quality of life''. *See*, Cecile Leconte, **Understanding Euroscepticism**, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2010, p.252.

belonging to social categories fear stronger de-nationalization[19] due to further European integration, and that is why they support Euroscepticism more strongly (*Cited in* Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010:789).

For Hutchinson;

> …although states are important protectors of nations in a world of competing states, they can be denationalizing since, in the pursuit of economic and social efficiency, they adopt the successful strategies of rival polities, intervening to restructure social institutions and exposing their populations to transnational tastes and perspectives'' (Hutchinson, 2006:300).

For Gellner, labeled as the 'enlightenment fundamentalist', the notion of self-determination is absolutely central to Kant's thought;

> It is individual human nature which is really sovereign for Kant and it is universal and identical in all men. A person's identity and dignity is for Kant rooted in his universal humanity, or, more broadly, his rationality, and not in his cultural or ethnic specificity (Gellner, 1983: 130-131).

However, there is a need of detailing Gellner's discourse of 'high culture' and the 'individual' alongside with today's European integration, as the rest of thesis will attribute importance to post-modern and post-national approaches towards the EU.

It has been a long time since the Member States of the EU have entered a tunnel of political acculturation. For some there is no reflection of this acculturation to the ordinary citizens. However, when analyzed, the results are remarkable. Keane (1993) puts forward that up to the 1990's the total sum of Community law (laws, directives) reached to 623, including standards for central heating, purity of wine and beer, conditions of women's employment, etc (Keane, 1993:12). Same arguments are shared by Peter van Ham (2001) as; ''It is the EU that is affecting the daily concerns of

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[19] De-nationalization is ''reflected empirically in the 'hollowing out' of the national state apparatus with old and new state capacities being reorganized territorially and functionally on supranational, national, sub-national and trans-local levels as attempts are made by state managers on different territorial scales to enhance their respective operational autonomies and strategic capacities''. Bob Jessop, **The Future of the Capitalist State**, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.195

European citizens and denizens by dealing with such matters as food labeling, pension entitlements and maternity leave regulations'' (Peter van Ham, 2001:14).

For such outcomes listed above the Member States are interacting in different political spheres;

> Nations are no longer so separated by their own borders; instead, they – along with a host of new sub – and supranational actors – communicate more interactively in real time, along multiple, more de-centered, and more polyglossic communication circuits, and via a greater complexity of positions from which to speak (Buell, 1998:550).

In view of the aforementioned citation, the EU with its institutions, all have different communication mechanisms, alongside with the Member States institutions, which are developing a new form of a political interaction.

Gellner tends to see material economic processes driving ideological ones, or put it differently, economics are the main factors of competition between nations. Indeed this was the story for Europe once upon a time; the nation-states were in a tough competition for innovating, producing and for marketing their commodities only and only for a stronger economy.

> Over the past few centuries a European states system developed in which nationalism and industrialization were closely linked to state sovereignty and democracy. In this national context, vertically organized structures of government, business, military and political authority corresponded closely with geographical boundaries and identities (Peter van Ham, 2001:37).

For postwar Europe the situation remains entirely different, competition has been replaced by cooperation and coordination. ''European protectionism is accordingly the strategy of capital that links the creation of a single internal market to protecting European industry against external competitors'' (Beck and Grande, 2007:147). Who remains outside or inside is the main question, the dilemma of 'us' and the 'other'.

The process of globalization has brought us in a new, postmodern era in which these traditional foundations of political order are being undermined, step by step. Vertically organized national cultures and national economies are gradually being replaced by new horizontal and global networks. These new networks are not simply pyramids of governance that rise from one level to the next – from local to regional to national to global. Instead, transversal politics has overtaken the classical inside/outside dyad and given new meaning to both the spheres of domestic and international politics (Peter van Ham, 2001: 37-38).

It is clear, when analyzed, whether the thesis of Hobsbawm, Gellner or Breuilly or other scholars tackling nationalism, the main gap stems from the unanswered question of what nationalism has so far come to be. It is obvious that the scholars listed above fall short of answering the question. However the main suffering is how Van Den Berghe (1970) explains as;

…nor does it make sense to continue forever the debates on primordialism, perennialism, modernism, instrumentalism and other theories which pretend to offer the ultimate formula for the origin of the nation–state. The multiplicity of contradictory theories proves that there is no one formula that fits all cases. Most theories are highly reductionist and the authors are often accused either of social engineering or of biological determinism (*Cited in* Israel, 2011:67).

The post-modern theories as argued in the above quotation oppose modernity and reject the modern forms of rationality being reductive and oppressive. As Smith emphasizes, ''nationalism was indeed a progressive political movement around 1900, but nowadays nationalism among the populist movements resembles an attempt to turn back the clock'' (Smith, 1998). It seems that it certainly is no more a future ideal, however, what are the main dynamics which have kept this ideology, though corrupted, up to the 21st century. Lane and Ersson (2005) link this to nationalism containing too much different things;

…nationalism stands for widely different phenomena that only have one thing in common – namely, the focus on national identity. Nationalism can harbour almost

everything from universal liberal ideas about national identification through strong irredentism to explicit fascism. It may thus enter into numerous combinations with either humanitarian ideas about mankind or with racist and hawkish practices (Lane and Ersson 2005:89).

The modernist literature, in the event, presents no tools with which to investigate the phenomenon (*especially in the name of post-modernism or post-nationalism*). Instead, it offers ''a portrait of nationalism in absolutes: either nationalism is linked to the modern state or it is, by definition, no longer nationalism itself'' (Laible, 2008:28). Nationalism certainly clarifies the process, reason of establishing a nation-state with the primary objective of self-determination, but through new models of governance, for instance multi – state collaboration considering the EU, certainly is limiting the scope of nationalism, or at least eradicating the reason of nationalism. Taking into account the multi – level politics in EU, there is a need of separating what is called micro (local) types of nationalism from macro (nation wide). The former is more related with ethnic nationalism, and for gaining more and more rights, privileges, recognition etc. Hobsbawm argues that in the ''industrialized west, so-called nationalist movements should be viewed as 'regional' interests cloaking themselves in the language of nationalism in a quest for legitimacy'' (Hobsbawm, 1992:178).

The latter appears uneven and confused with different ideologies (racism, xenophobia) which require focusing on the certain reasons resulting in such matter. In this sense, ''these movements are not true nationalisms, because nationalism is premised on the quest for sovereign statehood, which is no longer an option in the world political system or in the EU'' (Laible, 2008:27). In that case, what is the source of national politics in Europe? It certainly is not directly about self-determination or sovereignty, as Hansen argues ''if national sovereignty relay constitutes the sanctity, there would have been no EU in the first place'' (2009:14) which as a result remains depending mostly on identity politics.

First nationalists may be unaware of the extent to which state sovereignty is compromised in the EU. Or, second, nationalists may believe that having won

statehood, they will be able to reclaim sovereignty, either by leaving the EU or by reforming its institutions and practices to restore earlier forms of state sovereignty (Laible, 2008:38).

In the aforementioned citation by Laible (2008) the nationalist parties do have to behave as the guardian of the nation to maintain such claims, however, if analyzed, the parties (sub-state nationalist, ethno-regionalist) in that stream do not stress such arguments of leaving off the integration project for gaining full independence.

The modern school, for understanding nationalism and certainly its influence in EU politics, is not able to answer the questions related with the integration process. That is why; from the very beginning the argument of nationalism within the nation-state paradigm urgently requires reconsideration. It is emphasized that nationalism itself is not nation-centric any more. According to Hix (2005) this is about the actors (in our case the Member States of the EU) do not structure their ''preferences and strategies in isolation'' (Hix, 2005:12). This work in progress is named as ''co-operative political solidarities'' in which ''the EU is slowly redefining existing political arrangements, altering traditional policy networks, triggering institutional change, reshaping the opportunity structures of member states and their major interests'' (Müller and Wright, 1994:6). In which this is moving towards as what Schwarzmantel (2005) argues as a more ''progressive agenda of political action unhampered by nationalist division'' (*Cited in* Breen and O'Neill, 2010:87).

As argued above in the thesis of Hosbawm, Gellner and, Breuilly the calculations of the need to raise an army capable of defending the nation, institute an education system capable of rationalizing the language and the creation (or at least securing) a non-dependent economy with its own currency is not efficient. These conditions are becoming less important in those countries integrated into the global economy, especially if concentrated on the European Union (Bauman 1995: 250), the question of and the opinion towards this transformation has recently become evident that nation-states are too small for some functions (security, economy at community level, granting rights, liberties at individual) and too large for others (dealing with multi-nationalism, poly-ethnicity). In the modern nation-state thinking that every state

should be a nation and every nation should be a state seems misleading, as many states today cover more than one nation (or at least a cultural, linguistic group) within their boundaries. And, it is this problem that all states are multi-ethnic, if not, multi-cultural but many do not admit this.

That is why; reminding the argument of this thesis once again, is to handle the politics in Europe in the post-national dimension rather than solely under the nationalist ideology. The transformation through which these changes are likely to influence sovereign states is through a more generalized awareness that the nation-state cannot handle these in some of the ways in which it did in the past.

Figuring out the aforementioned question of 'what nationalism has so for come to be' requires what recent approaches are contributing to the subject, namely the post-modern theories of nationalism.

1.1.2   Post-modern Theories of Nationalism

As explained in the previous sections, modern theories (Gellner, Hobsbawm, Breuilly), of nationalism although arguing the discontinuity of nationalism, (the reason why they were selected for an analysis in the first place) do not emphasize how the process will pursue. Does this discontinuity of nationalism emphasize afterness, a different level or phase completely to be different from the modern, or continuity in nature but with a primary object of extending the modern to a post-modern phase of development? According to Smith;

> Post-modernism seeks to extend the range of modernism to what it sees as a 'postmodern' phase of social development. But in doing so it subtly undermines and problematizes some of the basic assumptions of modernism, notably its belief in the sociological reality of nations, and the power of nationalist ideologies (Smith, 1998:202).

For making an assessment of the post-modern theories, firstly there is a need of touching the prefix 'post-'. What is understood from *post-* depends on the scholar

tackling an issue related with a dimension of *continuity* and/or *afterness*. This remains an issue causing division among the post-modern thinkers. For instance, post-modernists like Laclau and Mouffe, Jameson, Lyotarad acknowledge this prefix as

> … the postmodern does not simply replace the modern, but rather performs a continual rereading and critique of modern values and projects. Post-modernity is not a new age, but rather the name for a collection of critiques that seek to challenge the premises of those discourses that have shaped modern experience. It is thus a critical attitude within the modern rather than a replacement of it (Malpas, 2005:44).

As understood from the abovementioned citation, *post-* does not replace or stand for something acknowledged beforehand, it may also supplement, refresh the existing without removing it (Lyotard, 1992:76 *Cited in* Malpas, 2005: 41-42).

However, for other post-modern scholars, like Baudrillard and Kroker the 'post-' signifies the 'afterness'. In this view ''the *post-* indicates something like a conversion: a new direction from the previous one'' (Malpas, 2005:42). According to this view, post-modernism, is not a continuity, and if it is acknowledged in that matter, post-modern arguments would contradict with themselves. That is why, it is important to mention that besides the use of *post-modernism* there is a wide use of the term *second modernism*[20] as well. The scholars with the argument of *continuity* prefer the label 'second modernism' (not to be perceived as abandoning modernism completely) in their studies, which shows that there is a diversity of views on the 'timing or period' of post-modern literature.

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[20] *Second modernism* is defined as ''a radical continuation of modernization of the world with the aid of the new information technologies, connection of the world in globalism as a new paradigm, and globalization as a process that goes with the intensification of the global risk society. Consequently, the second modernism is nothing else but radicalization of modernism by science, technique and technology that stringently drags behind the other, opposite side, in form of various scepticisms and anti-modernist ideological responses''. Andelko Milardovic, ''Euroscepticism in a Conflict of Ideologies of the Second Modernism'', *in* **Euroscepticism and European Integration**, Krisztina Arato and Petr Kaniok (eds.) Political Science Research Center, Zagrep, 2009, p.41

Before debating what post–modern theories have brought along on nationalism, nation, and the state, the concept modernity and modernization (theory) requires a special attention here once again for not to cause a contradiction on what is argued in the name of 'modern' and 'post-modern' within this thesis. For Rattansi (1995) modernity is defined as;

> […a theoretical category: the form of conceptualization adopted here focuses especially on the dualities of modernity; for example, between the formation of democratic institutions and disciplinary complexes of bureaucracy and power/knowledge; between the excitement of rapid change and out of control; and the constant destabilization of identities, and continuous reinvention of 'traditions'. (Rattansi, 1995: 250-251)

Delanty (2000) underlines the importance of modernity as a process of integration which has resulted with pushing the individual towards becoming a member of a society;

> […the movement from mechanical forms of integration, characterized by ascriptive values and an immediate identification of the individual with the collectivity, to organic forms of integration, which are characterized by contractual relations and require cooperation between groups (Delanty, 2000:116).

At this point, as argued before, and contrary to the above quotation, whether this is mechanical or afterwards an organic form of integration or group cooperation, there is the ignorance of fragmentation (detailed below). For Tönnie ''community signifies the organic and cohesive world of traditional society while society refers to the fragmented world of modernity with its rationalized, intellectualized and individualized structures'' (*Cited in* Delanty, 2000:116) which is currently in change. Grasping these concepts under the framework of the 'nation' or 'nation-state' as modern constructs, are not capable of clarifying this fragmentation which becomes the reason of its weakness. For this reason, post-modern theories debated below, have the goal of providing answers for understanding the current and future trajectory of the modern nation-state and nationalism.

Post-modern theories have attracted attention with the beginning of the 1960's when scholars started focusing and theorizing this phenomenon which they name as 'critiques of the modern' (Best and Kellner, 1997:5). The fathers of the post-modern school are mainly Baudrillard, Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida etc. However it is important to mention that, locating these authors in a homogenous and coherent school of though appears to be difficult. It might be better naming them as a set of political thinkers, concerned with similar issues, but with different ways of approaching the post-modern phenomenon. This has resulted with the authors mentioned above and many more, approaching and theorizing post-modernism through a variety of critical assessments on political deficits such as post-national identity construction, and even to gender or feminism studies.

The use of post-modernism is too broad, which is applied from politics to philosophy, from environmental theory to education and even to economics, which explains why it still lacks a clear definition (Best and Kellner, 1997:19). Scholars like Baudrillard (1975; 1983b), Foucault (1980; 1988a), Lyotard (1984a; 1988c), Jameson (1983) are the main figures in the post-modern debate. However, the thesis will focus on the post-modern theories dealing with directly nationalism and the nation-state, rather than the general approaches of the abovementioned scholars. However, it is useful to state what post-modern scholars in general critic about the modern;

> Post-modern theory rejects unifying or totalizing modes of theory as rationalist myths of the Enlightenment that are reductionist and obscure the differential and plural nature of the social field, while politically entailing the suppression of plurality, diversity, and individuality in favor of conformity and homogeneity. In direct opposition to modern views, postmodernists valorize incommensurability, difference, and fragmentation as the antidotes to repressive modern modes of theory and rationality (Foucault, 1980:81).

The post-modern theories of nationalism underline the importance of the change in the dynamics feeding nationalism. Contrary to the modern school, they argue that nationalism is not fed by race, ethnicity, blood, history etc. like in the past. In the contemporary world, they argue, nationalism is still alive however in a completely

different position which is fed by socio-economic issues like the market, migration flows, gender etc, however none of these are framed in a nation-state framework. This is on the one hand destroying ''traditional structuring factors such as class, ethnicity and age which are losing their importance'' (Gibbens and Reimer, 1999:79) and on the other hand opening up the area what is called the ''post-national agenda'' (Smith, 1998:201). The developments in regional integration as well as the effects of globalization is causing what Rosenau (1998) argues ''fragmentation – the simultaneous integration and fragmentation of social relations'' (*Cited in* Lupel, 2004:158). This definition of the process, is the aim of this thesis to tackle Euroscepticism causing on one hand a fragmentation (elite-mass, left-right, government-opposition) on the other hand integrating similar views across the European continent.

For instance Baudrillard, in his words argues: ''history has gone into reverse as the critical distance between rationality and reality that is necessary for us to understand or change the way things are have vanished in contemporary hyper-reality'' (Baudrillard, 1994: 10). What Baudrillard argues is that with the rapid speed of change and transformation during the modernity we have now reached a point at which things happen too quickly to make sense out of them. In his words: ''the acceleration of modernity, of technology, of events and media, of all exchanges – economic, political and sexual – has propelled us to 'escape velocity', with the result that we have flown free of the referential sphere of the real and of history'' (Baudrillard, 1994: 1).

The second point on which Baudrillard focuses is on the term ''consumer society'', in which he argues that the relationship between 'commodity' and the 'sign' is emerging as the post-modern identity.

> …today, 'capitalism crosses the entire network of natural, social, sexual and cultural forces, all languages and codes'. Contemporary capitalism, is not simply the circulation of money and commodities, but rather infests every aspect of experience. When one desires or purchases a commodity, one is not simply buying the object itself, but also the signs, images and identities that go along with it (Baudrillard, 1975: 138).

On the other hand, scholars like Lyotard, focus mainly on the fall of ideology in what Lyotard names ''fall of grand meta-narrative'' in which assumes that there is no one single truth as well as universal ethics, he makes important remarks on the difference between modern and post-modern politics in which the former is based on ideology and the latter mostly on individual, niche and particularistic politics (for instance in our case Euroscepticsim), for him modern politics were mostly based on traditional forms of public debate and through one way communication, however recently the latter focuses on openness and self-analyzing and interactive (Lyotard, 1979).

Returning back to the question of how post-modern theories read nationalism requires a special focus here. Nationalism is often labeled as a modern phenomena, however post-modern theories start criticizing the modern theories firstly on their nature, finding them weak because of eliciting more questions than answers. According to Nimni (2010) ''modern theories of nationalism are not connected by one essential common feature but by series of overlapping similarities'' (Nimni, 2010:24). And, argues that, this is why there is no clear paradigm that can be called modernist. Actually the problem, for post-modern theories, starts with how nationalism is defined, in fact still remaining undefined as well as under-theorized. The lack of this undefined *nationalism* in their argument stems from the changing determinants feeding nationalism (argued above).

These debates definitely require a dual approach; with both a state and a societal centered one. Considering the European integration in mind, there is a clear distinction between states, government and the civil society (*See*, Andrew Glencross, 2008). For a better understanding, the post-modern theories below have been analyzed firstly in a state based approach and, secondly a society based one. For the post-modern theorists (Chatterjee 1986; Bhabha 1990; Balibar 1991; Soysal 1995; Sim 2001) there are two assumptions put forth. The first is, the rapid transformation of the society, which is becoming more and more multiethnic and multicultural, which in a form has become 'multi-national' or 'poly-ethnic' (*See* McNeill, 1986) state. In that sense, post-modern theories argue, there is a need of an analytical assessment of nationalism in what they call to get rid of the ''negative codings'', which is the void and useless protective and exclusionary positioning of nationalism. As a result of this, secondly, argued by the

post-modern theories the modern state is not sufficiently capable of handling issues in contemporary politics. And that, deconstruction is inevitable detailed below in the post-modern theories of identity. And secondly, the argument of reconstruction is necessary with the 'hollowing out of the state' as they argue, through diverse ways of intervention from below and above, which the thesis proceeds debating below under post-modern theories of nationalism and the state (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998:257). However, it must be stated here that, the thesis concentrates on the deconstruction thesis as it still early to speak of an established European identity among mass publics in EU Member States. But the weakening of the nation-state and the fragmentation at national level, as argued in this thesis gives signs of broader forms of association whether this be Euro-enthusiasm or Euroscepticism both having a particularistic perspective, however making references to a European level, and lacking nationalist vocabulary.

1.1.2.1 Post-modern Theories of Nationalism and the State

The main argument of post-modern theories is based on the transformation of the nation-state. According to the transformation of the role/function of the state, scholars like Pierson (2001a), Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) are debating the growing internationalization and de-regulation of economies which have decreased the role and instruments of the states to control their political economies (*Cited in* Jaeger and Kvist, 2003:561). In the post-modern thesis about the future of the nation-state there are certain theories put forth such as the 'de-territorialisation'[21], among boundaries, the 'de-limitation'[22] of the state (power), and the 'de-hierarchisation'[23] between on the one hand

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[21]De-territorialisation is linked to the notion of 'in-betweenness'. Bhabha's Notion of in-betweeness refers to ''a creative 'third' space between traditional readings of the nation and readings of resistance, 'in betweeness' refers to the general instability of nations and the potential restructuring of national identity''. *See* Homi K. Bhabha, **The Location of Culture**, London, Routledge, 1994. For Bell, ''deterritorialisation, and more specifically, an 'ethics of deterritorialisation' provides a purposeful means of interconnecting the breakdown of territory with new possibilities of belonging, where there is at work a break from the traditionally accepted community''. *See* Eleaner Bell, **Questioning Scotland Literature, Nationalism, Postmodernism**, NY, Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. p.131

[22]De-limitation here signifies ''the debate upon whether the nation-state is the sole unit of legitimacy within an entity like the EU. For post-nationalists the links between certain units (ex. pressure groups, private foundations, business networks, etc) have surpassed the limit of the states''. *See* Eleaner Bell, **Questioning Scotland Literature, Nationalism, Postmodernism**, NY, Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. p.131-132

the state and the society, on the other hand between the state and the meta-state institutions (in our case EU institutions) (Goetz and Hix, 2001:22). According to Bell, ''the agenda of the nation-state is also now under general scrutiny, where we are at present existing in an *in-between* state, or rather in-between states, where a sense of insecurity and immanent change now pervades'' (Bell, 2004:125). In the name of Europe, this opening up of the national level, has and is causing new movements to emerge. As argued in this thesis Euroscepticism becomes apparent as one of these emerging movements. And as detailed in the second and third chapters, the ubiquity of Euroscepticism with its particularistic character requires handling it under a post-national framework in a process of de-territorialisation, de-hierarchisation and de-limitation of the state. As Bell argues;

> The common problem, I believe, is this: the nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life. It is too small for the big problems because there are no effective international mechanisms to deal with such things as capital flows, commodity imbalances, the loss of jobs, and the several demographic tidal waves that will be developing in the next twenty years. It is too big for the small problems because the flow of power to a national political center means that the center becomes increasingly unresponsive to the variety and diversity of local needs. In short, there is a mismatch of scale (Bell, 1988:3).

Considering the abovementioned arguments put forth by Bell (1988) about the nation-state becoming ''to big for the small problems'' is an important motive for Euroscepticism and that is why as argued in this thesis, the Eurosceptic parties are becoming more salient and adapted in to this policy making or framing of the European integration. The claims made by the Eurosceptic parties may seem small (or at least concerning the local) however, carried to EU level through these political parties, grasps even more attention beyond the territory of the nation-state, shared by other states, regions or parties. For that reason the issues become more fluid in circulating abroad Europe.

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[23] De-hierarchisation will be discussed in the third chapter alongside with the concept of heterarchy within the institutional structure of the EU.

The theory of de-terriorialisation is based on the argument of fluid boundaries. Especially with the increasing level of transnational networks, the nation-state boundaries are decreasing in importance. Considering the EU at this point, helps understand the issue in practice. The first point is the changing territory of the Union with enlargements, and a result of this, the incorporation of new difference(s) with a wide range of European regulations (from a free circulation called Shengen Area, to symbolic EU signposts, from new neighbor countries to the territorial waters of fishing zones etc) are at finally becoming a part of the EU territory.

Contrary to what modernization thesis put forth, post-modern theories argue building on the work of Ferdinand Tönnies (1887) 'Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft' that there is the ''transition from a closed, particularistic, undifferentiated, and hierarchical gemeinschaft to an open, Universalist, functionally differentiated, and individualist gessellschaft'' (*Cited in* Blokker, 2005:373). According to this view, as argued by post-modern theories, communities are; ''culturally integrated totalities while society is essentially defined by its parts… The idea of community thus suggests a strong sense of place, proximity and totality, while society suggests fragmentation, alienation and distance'' (Delanty, 2000:116).

Another contradicting argument is that according to the modernization theory, once regions (urban, regional land) are incorporated into a social system they would actually be homogenized into a cultural system and that is why, nationalism, which is ''infused along the state would disseminate even faster and ethnic mobilization would become transitory'' (Calhoun, 1993:218). The question is, can such an argument be applied to the EU integration process? Modernist arguments put forth the industrialization, or the modern-state when emphasizing the process, but for post-modernists we are approaching, for some we have already approached, the post-industrial society, which unlike modernists gives importance to urban modernization as well. The EU, at this point comes to mind with the 'Europe of Regions' policy.

> Thus, the thesis of postmodernism proclaims a vision of the future world. In this world, no longer is the national territory *the* place from which identities, attachments and patterns of life spring... In place of the bordered, national state, a

multiplicity of *terrae* is emerging. And those, who see their identities in terms of gender or sexual orientation, are... bound by no earthly *terra,* restricted by no mere sense of place. Thus, a new sensibility - a new psychology - emerges in global times (Billig, 1995:134).

As understood from the above citation, belonging is now fragile, especially ''…since there is little in daily or social life to hold it securely or at least to present its tangible model'' (Best, 2004:130). That is why territory and togetherness is in to question, especially with the increasing level of European penetration in to Citizens lives. For Balibar (1991) the state in Europe today is neither *national* nor *supranational* in character (*Cited in* Morris, 1997:196). As a result what is this process of 'neither-nor'? Is it the capitalist system transforming the industry (or economy) in becoming post-industrial or post-fordist, or is it the national policy domains entering the European stage which come to be neither national nor supranational.

> […new forms of postmodern economy and society are produced by transnational corporations replacing the nation-state as arbitrators of the economy in an emergent stage of transnational capitalism that erases previous boundaries of space and time and that produces an ever expanding global marketplace and division of labor…] (Best and Kellner, 1997:13).

The main problem stems from the state whether a nation-state or not, which has changed (still changing in due course) and transformed with its components. That is why studies on nationalism falls short of identifying this phenomenon within today's 'post-modern state' definition. Another argument put forward is that nationalism has lost its power on politics and actually has retired into its cultural shell, leading towards a more gap between the 'nation' and the 'state'. For modernists the key elements of understanding the world (in which for them the only unit for analysis remains the nation-state) are identity, unity, authority and finally certainty which are the parameters of the modern nation-state. However, for post-modern theories[24] in attacking the

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[24] Besides Post-modernism, Critical, Global, Trans-national, and World System theories similarly attack the assumptions of the modernization theory.

'nation' and the 'state', argue that these parameters are replaced by; difference, plurality, scepticism[25] and textuality[26] (Best and Kellner, 1991:169).

However, what is the dynamics causing such shifts is important. For many there is a shift of power from politics to the market, with neo-liberal economic politics which are increasing the power of multi-national corporations and reducing the capacity of traditional state structures, seen as in the EU. These changes have opened up the debate on what is called ''complex internationalism'' which provides both threats and opportunities to ordinary people locating themselves around non-state institutions, as well as for states feeling uncomfortable (Porta and Tarrow, 2005:2). These shifts of power sharing have opened up the debate of de-limitation of the state. The EU, as being one of the arguments put forth in this thesis, is limiting the autonomous capacity of the national governments controlling their regions independently and, as a result, on the other hand giving a more say for the regional and local entities.

> The regional dimension is thus intended to reflect better the cultural and national
>
> divisions within Europe and, therefore, to tackle more adequately the problems left
>
> unsolved by the 'obsolete' national structure. In this context, the nation-state would

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[25] Postmodernism is ''a reaction to the assumed certainty of scientific, or objective, efforts to explain reality. In essence, it stems from a recognition that reality is not simply mirrored in human understanding of it, but rather, is constructed as the mind tries to understand its own particular and personal reality. For this reason, postmodernism is highly skeptical of explanations which claim to be valid for all groups, cultures, traditions, or races, and instead focuses on the relative truths of each person. In the postmodern understanding, interpretation is everything; reality only comes into being through our interpretations of what the world means to us individually. Postmodernism relies on concrete experience over abstract principles, knowing always that the outcome of one's own experience will necessarily be fallible and relative, rather than certain and universal''. Quek Swee Hwa, ''**Faithful Unto Death in the Post-Modern Era**'', 18th World Congress ICCC, Brazil, 24 January, 2012.

[26] For Carr and Zanetti ''to explore the multiple 'hidden' meanings that a text may 'contain', postmodernists suggest, in order to make language the object of its own scrutiny, the reader employs a range of 'techniques' (e.g: deconstruction; playfulness; the clash-of-opposites; intertwining form and content; an appeal to metaphoricality). The optic used by postmodernists frames the relationship between author, text, and reader in a manner that overturns the familiar view. Conventionally, language is conceived in terms of a signrepresentational model in which there is some kind of fixed relationship and understanding of what words and other signifiers are meant to represent. Language is referential in that it seeks to connect with something other than itself, and, in so doing, becomes an object to be interpreted. In modernist formulations, it is the author who, as the creator of the text, holds the privileged position of being the ultimate authority of his/her creation. In the postmodernist formulations, however, the reader and the text are privileged over the author in that the reader is given freedom to create textual meaning, regardless of the intentions of the author or pretensions to objective content''. Adrian N. Carr and Lisa A. Zanetti, ''**Textuality and the postmodernist neglect of the politics of representation**'', Tamara: *Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science*, Les Cruces, Vol. 1, Iss. 3, 2001.

play only a secondary linking role between those two centers (Alomar et al. 1994:28).

However, the limitation of state is not solely coming from below; it is also increasing from above. International organizations, international agreements, transnational networks are limiting the state power and functions. For that reason it is natural that, the relations between the state and meta-state institutions come across under certain issues. It is obvious that there are differences of opinion and in the case of the EU this comes out to be forming the Eurosceptic movement.

Figure1. The Modern and the Postmodern Corporatism[27]

MODERN   **POST- MODERN**

State   (New) State

Labor   National Capital   Consumer   Transnational Producer

As seen in Figure 1 above, post-modern theories stress, besides the nation-state, the importance of the increasing level of corporate techniques of globalization and the use of meta-state institutions (Ex. The European Union (institutions), International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization). There are divergence of views on supporting and opposing the role of these institutions at national level.

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[27] John R. Gibbens and Bo Reimer, **The Politics of Postmodernity**, Sage, London, 1999, p.127

As explained above in Breuilly's approach for understanding nationalism, the nation has the will of reaching to power by using the state or state control. However, this falls short of explaining the role of the meta-state institutions and/or organizations. And more importantly gaining power by whom and for what remains important in an era of capital movement as well as diverging trends of production and consumption. The phase of modernization established the institutionalization of the separation, for example, of church and state, of politics and economics, or of religion and science, however with the development of, say, EU institutions (in our case) there is now a re-institutionalization of the separations of powers in shifting hands.

According to Appadurai (1996) and Paasi (2003) the link between territory, sovereignty and identity, which, at least in principle, has characterized the modern nation state, is no longer valid. Post-modern theories fall apart from modern, who look at Europe and refuse to adopt the same conceptual categories used for making sense of the nation-state, as they cannot be taken as criteria for evaluating the process of European integration[28] (Delanty, 2003: 472). The classic neo-realist school centers the nation-states as the sole decision-makers in the system. However, what they misread is how other state or even non-state actors influence the process through decision-shaping and framing, and how much really is the state sovereign in taking these decisions. Taking this into account there is an ongoing political conflict as well as a competing of strategies which are solely driven by neither the nation nor state any more. This brings the debate to what is argued in the name of this study as emerging political attitudes (namely Euroscepticism) neither fuelled by the whole national feeling, nor as a part of a state (government) policy.

There is an ongoing debate between the *state* (classical) and *postmodern state*, for some there is no difference, for that reason there is no need to stress the state as post-modern, while for some scholars, though they look very much like, remain different. Cooper

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[28] The European Union is not a state however there is an important amount of work including the comparison of the EU with nation-state, or state characteristics. This for Delanty (2003) remains as ''an important paradox in which on the one hand, the argument of the EU not being a state, but comparing it with state characteristics''. *See*, Gerard Delanty, ''**Conceptions of Europe: A Review of Recent Trends**'', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 6 (4) 2003:471-88.

(2000) defines it as, ''the post-modern state is – more pluralist, more complex, less centralized than the bureaucratic modern state but not at all chaotic, unlike the pre-modern'' (Cooper, 2000:31). For Ham (2001) the postmodern state ''emphasize welfare rather than warfare'' (Ham, 2001:15) and the EU is a good example in delivering a moral conciousness among the masses with its pacifist objectives.

> In a postmodern environment, traditional concerns like borders, national identity and state sovereignty are of less concern than the pursuit of prosperity, democratic governance and individual well-being. This reflects the strong pluralist and individualist streak of postmodern society, which is tolerant to cultural and political dissent, stresses multiculturalism and legitimizes multiple identities and lifestyles (Ham, 2001:15).

For Rosecrance, the difference stems from the emergence of, what he calls the ''virtual state''; ''a state that has deliberately limited its territorially-based production capability and has almost 'emancipated' itself from the land'' (*Cited in* Ham, 2001:97). He puts forth the power of transnational firms in bargaining the state when it comes to establishing their facility in a suitable location for the sake of their profit margin, which results with establishing an economic space for the state to sustain economic growth (*Cited in* Ham, 2001:97). This kind of a flexible environment is named as postmodern which is related to 'shifting frameworks of power and resistance' to 'new politics', 'new values' and the reshaping of politics around issues of identity, difference and lifestyles (Gibbins and Reimer, 1999:14). For Beck (2008) ''it envisions a borderless world, not for labor but for capital. This is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy through the structural reform policies initiated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank'' (Beck, 2008:798). For Nimni ''governmental processes are no longer seen as discrete, centralized, and homogeneous (as in the old nation-state model) but as asymmetrical, multilayered, multicultural, and devolved into multiple jurisdictions'' (Nimni, 2010:21).

According to post-modern theories it is a counterculture creating an entirely new society and culture. For post-modernists, politics is not centered on political parties or on solely

certain facts; it is also related with social and political struggle. The much more fragmented, de-centralized institutional patterns emerge from this diversity would have to allow for the following developments, such as, democratic, communal self-government, second, a public debate on the matters communities have in common, and third, protection of legitimate powers to uphold autonomy; and, finally, the political coordination of the communities which keeps them part of one larger community. Many of these communities have 'transnational' political, economic, and cultural links with their 'home country' and ''retain a sense of loyalty to, and possibly derive even their identity from, their 'place of origin', the state will find it difficult to facilitate or, even more ambitiously, guide their interactions within the state territory'' (Axtmann, 2004:265).

For instance this opens up a past-present dichotomy, according to Foucault ''politics should be taken into account with the transformative possibilities within the present'' (Malpas and Lyotard, 2005:16). That is why post-modern theories reject the argument of the modernists, about 'the past dictating the present'. As analyzed in Hobsbawm's theory 'the invention of tradition' with its aim of creating symbols, rituals or monuments, or in Gellner's thesis of industrialization created 'high cultures', is not valued by post-modernism and also by post-nationalism. In the past, nationalism did serve well in eliminating the alienating aspects of industrialization, as discussed above in Gellner, however today in contemporary European societies it is nationalism itself now causing the alienation (between the natives and immigrants, denizens, asylum seekers). That is why; post-modern theories reject modern assumptions of ''social coherence and notions of causality in favor of multiplicity, plurality, fragmentation, and indeterminacy'' (Best and Kellner, 1991:4). Post-modern theories put forth the emerging of a post-traditional society[29]. For post-modern theories, traditions which

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[29] *The post-traditional society* is ''an ending; but it is also a beginning, a genuinely new social universe of action and experience. It is one where social bonds have effectively to be made, rather than inherited from the past - on the personal and more collective levels this is a fraught and difficult enterprise, but one also that holds out the promise of great rewards. It is decentred in terms of *authorities*, but recentred in terms of opportunities and dilemmas, because focussed on new forms of interdependence''. Anthonyn Giddens, Living in a Post-Traditional Society' in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (eds.) **Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order**, Cambridge: Polity, 1994, pp.56-110.

generate culture do not have the goal (like in the past) in shaping the general direction of the community, for achieving political ends (argued by the modern theories). Habermas[30] notes the same argument of which the weakening state functions and/or form, for him is the disintegration of culture and politics which are emerging as distinct spheres. As Israel acknowledges;

> National heritage is no longer seen as a sealed box of treasures to be passed on intact. Most individuals today, in civilized and democratic countries, internalise the identity they were born and bred into, but also see themselves free to prioritise other identities. Most people do not hold the nation above religion, humanity, morality or justice (Israel, 2011:67).

This has pushed scholars questioning the structure of community. For instance, Morris (1996) argues ''a community beyond tradition'' or Corlett (1993) calls ''community without unity'', for Delanty (2000) it is ''post-modernized communities of the global era are highly fragmented, contested, and far from holistic collectivities; they are characterized more by aesthetic codes than by a moral voice'' (2000:1122). That is why as argued in the second and third chapters of this thesis, there is an emerging polarization within the European nation-states, and the Eurosceptic movement as analyzed within this thesis, is becoming an important dynamic of the emancipation of the people. As Harris argues ''the more underestimation of the democratic aspect of nationalism leads only to more nationalism'' (2009:190). Although supporting this argument, what this thesis puts forth is that the democratic deficit is an important dynamic in Eurosceptic politics, however, reading nationalism here in its classic sense does not explain the cause effect relationship. The very misreading stems from the classical theories of nationalism which have nothing to say in the name of the 'internationalising of nationalism' (Harris, 2009:293) which is debated in this thesis as

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[30] Best and Kellner define Habermas as a critical rather than post-modern, whom they argue is a ''strong advocate of modernity and defender of what he considers its progressive elements, while criticizing its oppressive and destructive aspects. He does, however, call for a revision of the project of Enlightenment rationality and proposes some reconstructions of the concept of reason and critique of a subject-centred tradition of rationalism. On the other hand, he criticizes all counter-Enlightenment theory as potentially dangerous, theoretically and politically - a point that is central to his 1980's interventions in the post-modern debates''. Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, **Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations**, The Guilford Press, NY, 1991, p.237

the post-national dimension. Because as analyzed in the second and third chapters, Eurosceptic attitudes besides their criticism, put forth issues like improving democracy within the EU institutional structure, or extending the issue of migration (with reference to non-European) to be handled at EU level, and in doing this, build coalitional groups to become more powerful in force.

At this point, another argument is the expanding of the EU with a boundary problem. With the increasing level of transnational bonds, the fluidity of boundaries is an important issue, in which ''the nation seeks to define itself in relation to what is outside or beyond its boundaries'' (Spencer and Wollman, 2002:50). How may the nation keep on defining itself with a set of barriers or boundaries in a post-modern era? ''The boundary is janus faced and the problem of outside/inside must always itself be a process of hybridity, incorporating new people in relation to the body politics…]'' (Spencer and Wollman, 2002:50). The same concerns are shared by Calhoun (2006) ''capital, human migrations and media all flowed across borders; why should military and political power maintain borders?'' (Calhoun, 2006:4).

> A process of democratic will-formation that can cross national borders needs a unified context, and this in turn requires the development of a European public sphere and a common European political culture. In a post-national communicative context of this sort, an awareness of collective membership needs to emerge from the background of an already existing fabric of interests (Habermas, 2001:18-19).

What then is the difference between modern and of the post-modern thesis on nationalism? First, post-modernists put forth objectivist explanations of ethnicity, nations and nationalism, secondly they object the argument of nationalism being ''mediation between means-ends relationship'', and finally arguing that ''identities are socially constructed instead of pre-given, which is about discourse and social practice'' (Walker, 2001:619-620). Both discourse and social practice shows divergence due to micro-politics, demassified culture, particularistic practices of identity etc. This multi-dimensional structure has become important on issues in institutional power struggles, where the problem stems from the functions (law-making, trade, economy, defense) of the state's are deprived by supranational and international structures, where they are not

paired with sufficient democratic credentials. This is the point where the Euroscepticism feeds from. And, more importantly the arguments built under the Eurosceptic phenomenon are not built on ethnic and/or national principles, but on free, open and legal ones under a European banner.

Recent debates on nationalism and the nation-state confront the argument of the challenge to the modern nation-state which for Smith (1995) is ''the external crises of autonomy and the internal crises of legitimacy'' (*Cited in* Morris, 1997:193). How this argument should be perceived, considering the EU integration process. What is alluded by 'crises of autonomy' or 'crises of legitimacy'? The crises of autonomy refers to the role played by the non-national actors in the decision-making and framing of the EU, and as a result the crises of legitimacy is the questioning of how democratic are the actors in using this power, mainly questioned by the Eurosceptics. Habermas counts this as the pressure of de-nationalization, which for him is the society covered as nation-state is opening itself to an economically driven world society (Habermas, 2001:61) or at least, in our case a European society.

> For if is state sovereignty is no longer conceived as indivisible but shared with international agencies; if states no longer have control over their national territories; and if territorial and political boundaries are increasingly permeable, the demos, consent, representation, and popular sovereignty – are made distinctly problematic (Habermas, 2001:61).

On the other hand Peter Van Ham (2001) puts forth the importance of the economy and how it is slipping towards a more transnational or even a global sphere, in which the power of the state is under attack.

> The erosion of state control over the 'national' economy and civil society places limits on the range of policy options which governments can pursue in managing the state 'top-down'. In particular, the twin processes of economic globalization and European integration are accelerating the development of mature postmodern

states in Western Europe; other parts of Europe and the world are still in different

stages of societal formation (Peter Van Ham, 2001:16).

A similar argument is shared by Anthony Smith who acknowledges nationalism functional in an environment of competing industrial states, however recently comes out to be obsolete in an era of transnational system of information (Smith, 1990:175). Smith dedicates importance to culture, which for him is the main tool of constructing the nation. ''Nations were built and forged by state elites or intelligentsias or capitalists; like the Scots kilt or the British Coronation ceremony, they are composed of so many 'invented traditions' whose symbols we need to read through a process of deconstruction…'' (Smith, 1990:177-178). These findings takes Smith to the possibility of a cosmopolitan culture, in which he doubts whether this be rewritten or created on pre-existing national or folk cultures.

That is why, similar to Hobsbawm, in Renan's words ''a true character of a nation is constantly being reinvented; old symbols can and do attain new meanings. Even nationalists can be critical of their own particular culture; they can aspire to change it, develop it, or redefine it'' (*Cited in* Tamir, 1993:6). In such an international environment the nation-state certainly is under a transformation, however the question behind this argument is, whether it has the role or impact of the nation-state being reduced or instead reinforced.

For others, like Daniel Bell (1976) put aside the state, the society is under a transformation as well, namely becoming *post-industrial*[31]. The definition of the industrial society is clarified as ''industrial society being characterized by universalistic, specific, and achievement norms, a high degree of social mobility, a well developed and insulated occupational system, and 'an egalitarian class system based on generalized patterns of occupational achievement'' (Myers, 1972:260). As a result what is then the difference between 'industrial' and 'post- industrial' society? Is it according to Dalton (1996) the economic conditions which redefine the concerns of societies, which lead to

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[31] *See*, Daniel Bell, **The Coming of Post-Industrial Society**, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1976.

certain levels of transformations, or is about the changing international environment forcing the states or nation-states to keep up with the ongoing transformations caused by technology, science, etc. which do at the end hit the grassroots?

1.1.2.2 Post-modern Theories of Nationalism and Identity

As an outcome of the post-modern theories, *post-nationalism* which is often named as a buzzword has entered into the academic debate bringing along many questions related with it. Although receiving attention, it still lacks a common definition or explanation. According to Shaw (1999) ''Post- nationalism is neither a fixed or defined concept within academic writing and thinking, nor a certain empirically observable phenomenon of law or politics'' (Shaw, 1999:11).

As the aforementioned citation indicates post-nationalism, in the same way as post-modernism similarly involves the same quality, which is not simply replacing nationalism, but rather reshaping, rereading or a critique of the nation itself. For instance it is expressed, ''to designate a political attitude which is corresponding to the emergence of the new political bodies in the wake of economic globalization'' (Resina, 2002:377). However, what is argued in this thesis, in the name of post-national (referencing to the EU), is the democratic political organization which is still not fully present, but emerging freely from the nation-state. It is described as a ''space-in-formation'' (Kramsch et al., 2004:533) based on a re-negotiation of policies giving birth to new movements like Euro-enthusiasm or Euroscepticism (even if compromise is reached or not) which opens up new negotiations in a multi-level perspective.

For Appadurai *post-nationalism* refers to the ''emerging of strong alternative forms for the organization of global traffic in resources, images, and ideas – forms that either contest the nation-state actively or constitute peaceful alternatives for large scale political loyalties'' (Appadurai, 1996:169). According to Shaw (1999) post-nationalism is explained as;

> Post-nationalism may be seen as the denial of nationalism, or, perhaps more appropriately, as the attempt to recover and rethink some of the core values of nationalism as lending meaning to a particular community with shared practices and institutions, without the necessary institutional baggage or ideological weight of the modern (nation) state or a negative sense of nationalism as exclusion (Shaw, 1999:8-9).

In the aforementioned citation, post-nationalism can be acknowledged as a reformulation of nationalism, which is inclusionary rather than exclusionary, and throwing away the ideological dimension introduced by it. If post-nationalism is not to be determined by ideology, what then should drive this recent phenomenon? Is it cosmopolitan values or strategically determined politics? As this study argues, it is the competing of these both. On one hand there are the advocates of a cosmopolitan order (the Euro-enthusiasts); on the other hand, there are the challengers of the cosmopolitan order, arguing that it does/will not work in a multicultural Europe (targeting non-European groups like Muslims, Black or Roma). Post-modern theories argue that there is a ''complex common community of institutions which include states, nations, transnational associations, regions, alliance of regions'' (Meehan, 1993:1) which is leading to identities representing ''fragmentary, hybrid, and dynamic notion of the self'' (Collinson, 2006:182). For Ruggie, naming EU, the first truly post-modern international political form, which it is assumed in this thesis as the emerging post-national, rests his ideas on the evolving structure of the EU. Ruggie points to the ''multi-perspectival polity, organized around multiple centers of authority, which defy the notion of a fixed and exclusive territoriality'' (Ruggie, 1993:140). What shall multi-perspectival polity signify? Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue of a simultaneous operation (as well as a contestation) of 'logic of difference' and 'logic of equivalence'. Difference signals a post-national order, which does not ignore ethnic, religious or cultural differences, however, also does not use them to draw borders. On the other hand equivalence signals a cosmopolitan order in which humanity belongs to a single moral ethic community. This is an important clash between the Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics, in which the former desires a cosmopolitan view, while the latter is not against a post-national, but advocates a communitarian type of cooperation. And, circling around the concept non-

European, where the Eurosceptics avoid any fixed terms in the name of Europe and European.

Theories of post-nationalism refer to the EU, either as identity networks such as EU Citizenship representation, naming it as the post-*national membership* which has been introduced by Yasemin Soysal. Or, as novel governance sharing political identity of what Habermas has named *Constitutional Patriotism*[32] (*See*, Habermas, 2001). The argument put forth within this thesis focuses on the latter, in which the only way for the legitimization of the EU, is to open room for post-national politics, which is evident either in a Euro-enthusiast or Eurosceptic way within the parliamentarisation of the European polity (*See* Habermas, 2001). This thought of developing a loyalty to a constitution covers an establishment of a thin identity, however more importantly what Markell (2000) puts forth is that it also ''covers a resistance towards a unifying identification'' (*Cited in* Müller, 2012:22-23). For Chryssochoou, public authority should not be limited within a single decision-making level, however should be among ''different governance levels and forms of social, political and cultural deliberation leading to the congruence between territorially defined claims with general public issues'' (2009:174). According to the abovementioned arguments of Markell, this thesis gives importance to the arguments of the Eurosceptics, as firstly opposing unifying identification, however underlying the importance of empowering of the citizens. This brings the issue to the post-national thesis on which the Eurosceptic movement covers supplementing the particularity (due to the fragmentation within the nation-state) of different thoughts on European integration, as well as the particularity of European values and norms in a wider picture when addressing the non-European. For that reason Euroscepticism is against total unifying principles and as a result, is a product of the variation of interests and ideas of the European Community.

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[32] Constitutional patriotism introduced by Habermas refers to the ''individual's political identity which can derive from the constitution they live under, establishing a political bond that constitutes a political community without relying on the imagined community of the nation. (*See*, Cronin, 2003) Such kind of a European constitutional patriotism refers to a novel form of political community without statehood or nationalism will be the product of the conferral by the EU of specific individual rights or the promotion of certain constitutionally enshrined values''. Andrew Glencross, ''**Post-nationalism and the Problem of Supranational Political Representation: Legitimising the EU without the Nation-State**'', *EUI Working Papers*, No.2008/01, p.13

1.1.2.2.1 Post-National Membership

Besides, post-nationalism, what have come to be prior are the concepts of *post-national, post-nationalist, or post-national membership*. For Geoghegan (1994) the terms post-national and post-nationalist have importantly different meanings. Post-national as he identifies, is that the nation-state and national identities do not matter. However, post-nationalist does not deny the nation-state and national identity.

> …the term 'postnationalist', which best captures the nature of the debate, does not
> imply a denial of national identity or its endurance. Rather, the suggestion is that
> the nation-state and the forms of nationalism that underpinned it, while they have
> not been dissolved, are being empirically and normatively *superseded* (Breen and
> O'Neill, 2005:2-3).

As stated above, the thesis supports the post-nationalist understanding of today's Europe and the nation-state. Soysal abstains from a fixed definition of the concept post-national and focuses more on a comparison of national and post-national models of membership, in which she establishes it through the decoupling of rights on one hand and identities on the other. She establishes her theory on the ''sharing of sovereignty among local, national and transnational political institutions which result with the nature of making claims, acquiring rights, and change of mobilizing identities'' (Soysal, 1996:255). According to her typology (*See* Annex 1) the classical model of citizenship is nation-state bounded. In the post-national model, the boundaries of membership are fluid, for instance a Turkish guest worker can become a member of the French polity without French citizenship (Soysal, 1994:141-142), or an ethnic Pakistani may hold a dual citizenship, one from his/her country of origin and UK citizenship, calling himself ethnically Pakistani, however as an English in the Commonwealth world (Kymlicka, 2011:295). This increasing population is referred to as third-country nationals. In 2008, their amount estimated to almost 20 million people and make up the majority of foreign citizens in most Member States (Eurostat, 2009).

> By holding citizenship in one state while living and enjoying rights and privileges
> in a different state, guest workers violate the presumed congruence between

membership and territory. The growing number of dual nationality acquisitions further formalizes the fluidity of membership (Soysal, 1994:141).

The classic form of nation-state articulates equality in the sense of uniform citizenship rights. Citizenship becomes a single status to all the citizens whom are entitled to the same rights and privileges. On the other hand the post-national model involves multiplicity of membership. For instance in the emerging European system, certain groups of migrants are more privileged than others: legal permanent residents, political refugees, dual citizens, and nationals of single market countries (Soysal, 1994:141).

In the classical model, shared nationality is the main source of equal treatment among members. Citizenship involves individuals with equal rights and obligations on the grounds of shared nationhood. In that sense, the basis of legitimacy for individual rights is located within the nation-state. However, the immigrants experience shows that membership, and the rights they are granted are not necessarily based on the criterion of nationality. In the post-national model, universal personhood replaces nationhood; and universal human rights replace national rights. The justification for the state's obligations to foreign populations exceeds the nation-state itself. The rights and claims of individuals are established in a transnational community, through international codes, conventions, and laws on human rights, independent of their citizenship in a nation-state. Hence, the individual transcends the citizen. This is the most essential way that the post-national model differs from the national one (Soysal, 1994:142). An important part of these arguments are the second-country nationals, who live in another Member State rather than the country of their nationality, for instance the Germans living in France, French living in Germany. Since the early 1990s, this group has been steadily growing and amounted to an estimated 11 million in 2008 (*See*, Eurostat 2009).

Besides the aforementioned difference the key point on which post-national theories argue is the process of *individualization.*

> The postmodern self is less securely located than its predecessors, being located at
> the complex intersection of a more pluralized set of localities, a devolved set of

nationalities and an all-pervasive set of international and transnational structures and sources of provision (Gibbens and Reimer, 1999:57).

Alongside what post-nationalism suggests is that the scope for citizenship and democracy should not be limited within the nation-state, and should be treated as an alternative way of legitimization between the polity and the citizenship. That is why two facts appear to be important for the post-national theories which underline these as; global homogenization and local fragmentation (Walker, 2001:614).

The introduction of the European Citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty has come to be an important determinant of the European identity that European citizenship does not only recognizes individual rights, mentioned by Soysal, but also promotes an 'understanding of a commonly accepted rules' of interaction between different collective identities and ''sense of belonging to a common space'' (Udine Declaration, 2007). It introduces a way of active participation in the decision-making of the collectivity, and the attribution of economic and social rights, with the aim of ''placing the citizen at the heart of European construction''. That is why, it is argued that the only way possible for strenghening the polity, lies on developing a legal 'demoi' rather than 'demos', because there is no constitutive demo in the creation of today's EU, but a group of demoi. That is why, as defined above in the light of the arguments of Habermas' on 'constitutional patriotism', Müller argues that ''constitutional patriots always claim more from their constitutional cultures and in making these claims they oppose, critic and pressure the existing system'' (Müller, 2012:136). This is important in the name of becoming successful by introducing more citizen rights and benefits for strengthening post-national membership. And, more importantly, the role of Euroscepticism in creating these channels of contestation.

As argued above on the one hand, national citizenship is undermined by alternative institutions for assessing rights claims, and on the other by national culture migration, relativism and post-modernism (Bauman 1990b). This does not, however, show the withering away of nationalism but while nation-state institutions of citizenship may be failing (Soysal, 1994), nationalism appears still working well as a mobilizing force for

social protest. However, shall these movements be handled as 'nationalist' speaking in the name of the whole nation, or protesting and participation in the form of new politics/parties, or even as a more generalized anti-state, anti-party protest, which the state no longer is capable of resisting (these issues are further debated in the second and third chapters which overlap with Euroscepticism).

In the arguments discussed above, Schöpflin shares the same argument, in which argues that identity politics is, simply irrational, that once people return to their true interests, through gaining rights or certain other benefits, they will drop their identity driven claims and recognize a Universalist rationality. (Schöpflin, 2000:10) These same arguments are shared above in Gellner and his theory of nationalism, through the concept of 'modularity'. Lucas (2001) emphasizes Gellner's contributions as suitable in today's multi-national world through globalization and supranationalization;

> The flexibility and adaptability of Gellner's modular individual, and his or her ability to absorb new skills and cultural traits, implicitly supersedes the limits of the highly cohesive and uniform political culture Gellner associates with the nation-state (Lucas, 2001:833).

It is clear that there is a combination of complexity, for instance Soysal acknowledges this as a result of the global system, however the thesis reduces this to the European integration, and in the case of the EU, the system enacts multiple institutionalized scripts, which do not always function in agreement, and contrary can lead to what Soysal argues as ''conflicting claims and empowerments'' (Soysal, 1994:7). This results with multiply coexisting institutions and their discourses which might lead to positive and negative outcomes. The point is that, ''these actions, policies and identities may reflect multiple sets of norms and institutions, equally and/or concomitantly acted upon'' (Soysal, 1994:7). This has the possibility of damaging the emerging European identity, through loading certain meanings to it, which is argued resulting with binary distinctions such as European/non-European, self/other, essential/contingent, universal/particular, etc (Derrida, 1980 *Cited in* Ivic and Lakicevic, 2011:10). However, it is these binary classifications which are harming the post-national level in framing

these issues, attitudes as European, non-European, self and other etc. Since, be it political or social norms and values, they become altered, fixed or abandoned which need not be framed in such a classification.

This is in fact the violence of post-nationalism itself , which is, ''…in other words, that of silencing, forgetting, or otherwise eschewing the violence by which such sovereign designations as Spain, France or UK – let alone the US – have been maintained, are maintained'' (Epps, 2003:134). A similar argument comes from Fox and Idriss (2008) ''people are not just consumers of national meanings; they are simultaneously their contingent producers'' (2008: 546). That is why in post-national thinking; history, heritage and traditions become re-invented, reformulated and/or abandoned temporarily or permanently. Fox and Idriss illustrates this as;

> To what extent do Fourth of July celebrations in the USA engender the sort of 'collective effervescence' described by Durkheim? Are the principles of *liberté*, *égalité* and *fraternité* experienced – and constituted – by the ordinary French citizens attending Bastille Day commemorations? The nationalist passions of the multitudes are not always ignited by national holiday commemorations. Rather, such events often become occasions for family outings or consumer spending rather than the public affirmation of national pride. The national symbols adorning these commemorations are viewed by many as commercialized accessories, denuded of their officially sanctioned national venerability (Fox and Idriss, 2008:546-547).

That is why, as argued in this thesis, ''we are now witnessing a 'disembedding' of culture and society, where in the movement away from tradition an increasing rift is established between the politics of the state and the moral choices of individuals'' (Giddens, 1994:107). The modern theories of nationalism discussed above do not fit in with present developments, especially if one speaks of Europe. This is put forth by Benner (1997) as ''…while nationalism plays out its old divisive role in the east, the integrating properties of nationhood are being rediscovered in the west'' (Benner, 1997:192). Even the issue remains complicated in the west upon what are, or should those properties be for integration. For instance the issue of EU enlargement at this

point is very important. The accession states, by some means or other, have to prove their Europeanness or commonality by ''shedding their non-European or not yet fully European nature'' (Blokker, 2008:268). However where does criticism stand on a contested concept like 'European'. For Beck, the reality of EU requires criticism which is neither nostalgic, nor national but radically European (2006:166). What should be understood by European is it as stated earlier the 'logic of difference' or the 'logic of equivalence'. This is the point where Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics differ. For Euro-enthusiasts, the logic of post-national level demands the formation of a supranational regime which promotes policy, decision-making and law above the national level. For the Eurosceptics, cooperation at EU level is also inevitable however questioning the 'supranational regime' on how decision-making and law[33] be transferred to EU level and if this is to become a reality, requires stressing the 'logic of difference' rather than 'equivalence' respecting the diversity of 'national' 'regional' and 'local' under the motto 'Unity in diversity'. This is actually the importance of Euroscepticism representing and emphasizing the diversity on what can be common and can not.

This certainly is not a surprise as such disputed issues even at national level are occurring in most part of Europe. This is to some degree acknowledged if some ongoing developments are to be considered, such as Catalan autonomy in Spain or Scottish self-rule in UK, a considerable will of divergence in Belgium, a region named Padania oscillating between Rome and Brussels etc. This is a twofold situation, firstly these local or regional movements are willing for more and more rights and privileges, which contradicts with Breuilly and his assumptions of nationalism (detailed above) which are instead what Soysal argues as receiving rights out of the state. However, it is more important that the respond from the national level (government or the political party in

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[33] A 'diversity-related' Euroscepticism, according to Schendel and Aronstein ''is based on the notion that by Europeanisation cultural diversity and national identities are distorted. This distortion cannot be justified by the economic and social benefits or political cooperation resulting from Europeanisation. Furthermore, European cooperation is criticized because law and politics are culturally bound and should not be intertwined with other cultures, since the interpretation of norms, laws and other values would not be the same in another culture and would therefore be totally misunderstood or misapplied''. Frank van Schendel and Irene Aronstein, ''**Euroscepticism and Multiculturalism**'', Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 6, Issue, 3, 2010, p.3

office) towards these movements is not in a nationalistic behavior/attitude like in the past (oppression, assimilation, toleration, ignorance etc.), but rather post-nationalist, reflecting the ''ambivalence of identification''[34] resulting in consultation, negotiation, bargaining etc.

In the nation-state formation, the process emerged as for fetching a common public space under a centre-periphery cleavage, however Bartolini (2005) argues that the European integration is very different from the turbulent nation formation processes of centre formation, ''this process of cultural homogenization and nation building was never peaceful, completed, comprehensive or uniform'' (Bartolini 2005: 86). However, in opposition direction the Union from the very beginning is based on the 'unity in diversity' principle. That is why, in this thesis, it is argued that, the European integration, is forcing the centre to collaborate with the periphery, and this process under a Europeanness is emerging.

It is evident that multi-nationalism does not have the capacity to work towards fulfilling the rising ambitions. The problem is that in most multi-national states, there is no public institution that can serve as the vehicle for developing new models of dominant group national identity. The regional governments in Scotland and Catalonia can take on the responsibility for formulating a citizenship agenda that involves integrating immigrants into a new multicultural conception of Scottish, or Catalan nationhood. This is indeed what these governments have done in the past. But as Kymlicka argues; there is no English parliament, no English-Scottish or Italian-Pandanian parliament, no legislative body or authority that can plausibly claim to speak for these national groups or that can claim the mandate to formulate ideas of Spanish or English nationhood. Sub-state

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[34] Will Kymlicka at this point argues that; ''this is a significant political achievement, but to see this we need to change our measures of successes. If we measure success in terms of identity or commitment – 'identifying with Britain' or 'commitment to Britain' (which can be multiplied in each case as Spain, Italy, Belgium etc.) – then we are likely to draw the wrong conclusions. In many multinational states, feelings of identification with the larger state are ambivalent. This looks like failure on standard models of citizenship promotion, but on a multinational conception, ambivalent feelings and contested commitments are not evidence of a failure of citizenship, but rather define the challenge to which citizenship must respond. And a successful response is one that acknowledges these ambivalences and contestations in a way that respects fundamental values of peace, freedom, democracy, social justice and human rights''. Will Kymlicka, ''**Multicultural Citizenship within Multinational States**'', *Ethnicities*, 11 (3) 2011:281-302, p.289

nations in the West now have their own parliaments, but as a result dominant groups do not. They may de facto dominate the larger Spanish, British, Italian, Belgian parliaments, but these parliaments represent and speak on behalf of all citizens, and it would be strange for them to formally become the vehicles of Castilian, English or English-Scottish nationhood (Kymlicka, 2011:296). The issue even becomes more confusing when incorporating the dual citizens, denizens, second country nationals into this debate.

That is why, it is important that, the emerging post-national model and its link to the EU level, under the Citizenship of the EU, is creating political attitudes towards it. This post-national thinking is more open, co-operative, and fetching for pacifist solutions which are not limited at the national level but this time, considering the EU as well as at supranational level (EU institutions). However, this sometimes results with other problems, such as a division in the society of a Member State upon groups whose interests are threatened and those promoted due to the transformation of the nation-state thanks to the European integration process. This ends up with the use and abuse of recent phenomena like Euroscepticism and/or Euro-enthusiasm, rather than solely nationalism itself. Since, the integration process with compromise as well as mutual exclusions, from common policies to limited cooperation in certain fields is giving birth to multiple views towards the EU. For that reason Olsen (2006) argues ''the European integration faces difficulty in treating individuals as Citizens of Europe and rather refers to them as employees, employers or self employed'' (*Cited in* Glencross, 2008:13) which results with the please or not by the groups or individuals under subject of the change of policy.

In the light of the abovementioned arguments, ''the communities are becoming less bounded; individuals are involved in increasingly complex and competing social networks that divide their loyalties; and institutional loyalties are becoming more fluid'' (Dalton, 1996:8). The question to be tackled is how politics, party programs are prepared, interchanged, rephrased according to the needs of the emerging trends in the society.

For Held;

> Deliberative and decision-making centers beyond national territories are to be appropriately situated when those significantly affected by a public matter constitute a cross-border or transnational grouping, when 'lower' levels of decision-making cannot manage and discharge satisfactorily transnational …policy questions, or when the principle of democratic legitimacy can only be properly redeemed in a transnational context (*Cited in* Scheuerman, 2008:127).

How such economic openness, neo-liberal policies, principles of solidarity, have affected the citizens of the EU. Could these be referenced to Gellner and his thesis of 'industrialization' which for him was the process of dissemination of nationalism through transforming the 'agrarian societies' to 'industrial ones'? Or the increasing importance of the market, forcing people to migrate to the capitals and giving birth to what Gellner has named 'high cultures'. Or is it in today's global world according to Betz (1994) a transition from industrial welfare capitalism to post-industrial individualized capitalism? (*See* Betz, 1994). For another, it is that, every strata of the society is under transformation as post-modern theories argue (Best and Kellner, 1997:19). Or the ''social, political, cultural and/or economic organization of modernity has changed, or is changing'' (Walker, 2001:613). For instance, along the European integration (touching more and more policy areas), besides diverging of national interests, there is an emergence of sectoral interests[35].

> [A postmodernist will] develop actions, thought and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition and disjunction [and] **. . .** prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, and mobile arrangements over

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[35] To single out just one group Kitschelt gives the example of the ''working class which is increasingly divided into different segments by sectoral market and occupational experiences. The shrinking number of less skilled workers is declining but protected sectors has an inclination to opt for left authoritarian politics. Their market situation removes them from competitive pressures and predisposed them toward a more leftist economic policy preference. At the same time, their occupational experiences and their limited education predispose them toward more authoritarian political appeals. Higher skilled workers in internationally competitive industries, in contrast, are more likely to support middle-of-the-road economic policiesand moderate cultural political views''. Herbert Kitschelt, **The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis**, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995, pp.8-9.

systems. Believe that what is productive and not sedentary, but nomadic (Foucault, 1984, p. xiii).

For Habermas, ''today, all of us live in pluralist societies that move further away from the format of a nation-state based on a culturally more or less homogenous population'' (Habermas, 1998:289). Say the EU, although not close in becoming such a population, with the help of pluralism and liberalism, can establish an area of free individuals, in which post-national governance may encourage tolerance and satisfy most if not all. (Gibbens and Reimer, 1999:154)

Democratic citizenship, should be more than providing a legal status, arguing that it must include a shared political culture. For this to become a reality, firstly, ''the national state must get rid of that ambivalent potential of nationalism which was originally the vehicle for its success'' (Habermas, 1998:288). And, secondly the dissemination of a generalized political culture to be inclusive and shared by all citizens. For Habermas this is in what he names ''constitutional patriotism'' (Glencross, 2008:1).

> The success of deliberative politics depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and condition of communication, as well as on the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with informally developed public opinion. (Habermas, 1998:298)

In his words ''…a unified public is unnecessary for discursive control over the formal public sphere, provided there is communication between these publics – that conversations take place across their boundaries and between these publics and the formal, parliamentary sphere'' (Habermas, 1998:301). For other scholars economy and mass culture is replaced by a flexible mode of sociopolitical and economic organization, which they label as 'post-fordism' (Best and Kellner, 1997:13). Similarly, Habermas in his approach talks about the creation of a cosmopolite society, in which rests on logical means with mutual respect. In his words;

The only normatively satisfactory alternative as a socially and economically effective European Union, constituted along federalist lines – an alternative that points to a future cosmopolitan order sensitive both to difference and to social equality (Habermas, 2001: xix).

According to the abovementioned quotation Habermas' approach is built on what he names ''deliberative democracy'' or ''deliberative politics''[36] which rests on deliberative rights; openness, access, participation, reflexivity and conflict mediation (Gibbens and Reimer, 1999:163). The deliberative process of arguing and counter-arguing is a process ''that shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of a public conception of the public good'' (Cohen 1989: 19). Deliberation opens up the process of reaching agreements through reason-giving. Such a process may end in a consensus with regard to a particular decision, or as in a conflict (Eriksen, 2005:16).

For instance, when compared to modernity, post-modern theories have been identified with a move towards disorganized capitalism, consumerism, increasing level of speed and perpetual change, the mass media, globalization, unpredictability, and finally the questioning of reality, and individualism[37], often cited as the *post- national self*, where post-nationalism becomes a part of the post-modern debate (Gibbins and Reimer, 1999:22). In this context; what counts for Barry Buzan (1996) on the *post- national self* is ''…postmodern society is incompatible with great-power politics''

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[36] In this perspective ''deliberative politics is seen as a *reflexively organized learning process* – as a problem-solving procedure that brings in knowledge and relevant normative perspectives and qualifies (or validates) them in order to establish mutual understanding and agreement. 'Politics has the function of coordinating the learning process of the whole society' (Deutsch and Markovits 1980: 38). Deliberative politics, when institutionalized correctly, contributes to resolve conflicts impartially and achieve common aims legitimately. Consequently, we may conceive of societies as problem solving entities in which success can be measured according to *collective rationality* – that is, according to standards of justice and the common good (Peters 1991: 204ff; Habermas 1996: 319)''. Erik O. Eriksen, ''Reflexive integration in Europe'', in **Making the European Polity**, Erik Oddvar Eriksen (ed.) Routledge, London, 2005, p.17

[37] Beck defines individualism as ''the ethic of individual self-fulfillment and achievement is the most powerful current in modern society. The choosing, deciding, shaping human being who aspires to be the author of his or her own life, the creator of an individual identity, is the central character of our time. It is the fundamental cause behind changes in the family and the global gender revolution in relation to work and politics. Any attempt to create a new sense of social cohesion has to start from the recognition that individualism; diversity and scepticism are written into Western culture''. Ulrich Beck, ''Living Your Own Life in a Runaway World: Individualisation, Globalization and Politics'' in **On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism**, Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens (eds), London: Jonathan Cape, 2000, pp. 164-174.

His basic claim is that citizens of postmodern society do not put much trust in their own governments and are no longer prepared to die for their country (or at least not with the zeal of old). Individualism and a consumer ethic have turned western citizens into lethargic free-riders, looking (often in vain) to an illusory 'international community' to douse the political and military bush fires that continue to ignite around the globe (*Cited in*, Peter van Ham, 2001:35-36).

The abovementioned quotation marks the decreasing level of trust people feel for their governments and or parliaments. However, this does not signal for deeper feelings for the EU as well.

Table 1.Three forms of integration, solidarity, and nationalism[38]

Mode of Integration	Basis of Social Solidarity	Type of Nationalism
Mechanical	Tolerance	Ethnic
Relational	Common Values	Civic/Liberal
Dialectical	Mutual Identification	Cosmopolitan

For that reason social solidarity can have its possibility through mutual identification resting on dialogue which will finally lead to a boundary-free identification, namely becoming cosmopolitan. This is acknowledged as ''transversal politics'' by Goodman. This is about ''politics of dialogue across difference, in which different points of departure are acknowledged, and mutually traversed, to permit common understanding'' (Goodman, 2002:14). However this does not always comes along with a common

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[38] James Goodman, ''**Nationalism and Globalization: Social Movement Responses**'' *The International Scope Review*, Vol.4, Issue 8 (Winter), 2002, p.13

understanding, the European issues also become contested or at least questioned under Euroscepticism.

For Rattansi (1995)

> The project of "de-centering" and de-essentializing both "subjects" and the "social": the individual is no longer conceptualized as a fully coherent, 'rational', self-knowledgeable agent capable of direct access to reality and truth, and is theorized as living within the tension of a variety of potential and actual subject positions; social formations are no longer regarded as tightly knit complexes of institutions with necessary, predetermined forms of connection or logics of development - there are no final determining instances or levels such as the economy, and no laws of motion as posited in most versions of Marxism (Rattansi, 1995: 250).

The roots of post-modern thinking could be traced back to pre modern scepticism, namely to the Socratic quest (Delanty, 2000; Hollinger, 1994). For Delanty, post-modernism is the ''reflexivity of the self, which is built on the modern discursivity, on beforehand the distanciation of subjectivity and objectivity'' (Delanty, 2000:131). The wording of 'reflexivity' rests on two logics, first deconstructionism and constructivism. For Delanty, deconstructionism is the ''dissolution of the self'' whereas constructivism is on its way creating the new selves (Delanty, 2000:132).

That is why the modernist camp of nationalism centering 'education' in the middle of their theories whether this be Hobsbawm's theory of using 'memorial ceremonies' in school, and for Breuilly naming education the only mechanism combining the individual to the beloved nation and the state, or Gellner defining education as the way of creating common grounds for reaching what he names 'high cultures' remains obsolete for post-modern theories. Because state led public schooling is currently confronting private school establishments.

> …with the privatization of the state education system, the educational arena has become an increasingly efficient one for bargaining with the state. These processes weaken the education system's dependency on the state and amplify its attention to

pupils and their families, now perceived as clients of the system, who, as such, have greater power to shape it (Feder, 2011:582).

In such an environment citizens are becoming more educated, however lesser interested in politics, becoming active and individualistic, which makes them more self-centered for their specific needs and interests, as well as for their society, in which they live in (Gibbens and Reimer, 1999:170). The EU with a diversity of programmes and activities (the most well known *Erasmus Student Mobility*) is in full support of improving an active citizenship and intercultural dialogue. Postmodern scholars have opened up the debate on the fragmentation of contemporary national identities, and what they suggest, is the emerging of a new 'post-national' order of identity politics and global culture. Scholars of such post-modern themes as fragmentation, feminism and globalization can be seen as continuations of components of the modernist paradigm, however the emerging of segmentation in the 'national community' is causing deficiency in properly understanding the nation-state as a modern construct in today's conditions (especially in the framework of EU) (Smith, 2003:224-225).

Post-modern thesis acknowledges the growing autonomy of the individual and an ongoing functional differentiation of the society. In this manner, the right-wing radicalism (extremism) can be defined as the radical effort to counter such social change. The counter-concept to social differentiation is the nation as community, and the counter-concept to individualization is the return to traditional roles and status of the individual in such a community (Minkenberg, 2007:262).

The most observable result of European citizenship, ''is not as a new level of political community above the national, but rather as small 'pockets' of semi-post national and localized communities within Member States'' (Fernandez, 2011:10). This is the most important point, in which scholars are focusing. However, instead of centering the Union Citizenship in the heart of the debate, it might be more useful to debate the level of politics occurring at different levels within the EU.

This has caused a fragmentation in which on one hand the supporters of transnational and global change, which can be mostly attributed to left, centre, centre right etc, while

on the other hand the one's which are not totally against, however critical about this process, namely the radical right and left. In fact even analyzed in a bigger picture, David Held and Anthony McGrew (2002) have opened up a similar debate over globalization; they have defined three general perceptions as the hyper-globalists, the skeptics, and the transformationalists[39], whom all have different views towards globalization.

In the case of the EU, these political movements are classified in the debate between the Euro-enthusiasts and the Eurosceptics in what is argued in this thesis as contributing to the post-national dimension of politics. Alongside European integration, ''globalization is creating a more homogenized and shared world, it is doing so unevenly, thus proliferating difference and heterogeneity at the same time it produces resemblance and homogeneity'' (Best and Kellner, 2011:114). For this reason, postmodern theory focusing on ''identity politics concentrates on the specific interests (cultural, ethnic or political) of a group and constructs identities through identification with its struggles'' (Best and Kellner, 2001:107). That is why, in the realm of post-nationalism, different attitudes (Euroscepticism etc.) are feeding the identification and attachment to the integration process whether for, critical or againts it. This opens up a new level of contestation between the sides. For this reason identification does not have to be built on a basis of a similarity among all Europeans, but to develop common identifications with the European project itself.

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[39] The *hyperglobalist* understands ''contemporary globalization as heralding a new epoch of human history driven by the free movement of global capital and characterized by the inevitable rise of a world civilization that will result in the end of the nation-state. The *skeptic*, on the other hand, argues that this understanding of globalization is greatly exaggerated. Focussing on economic factors, the skeptic argues that there is nothing unprecedented about current levels of national interdependence, and that nation-states continue to be and will remain the primary political and economic actors in international affairs for the foreseeable future. In contrast, the transformationalist understands the current era as one of unprecedented change. But unlike the hyperglobalist, the transformationalist argues that the direction of this process remains uncertain and in contest. The *trans- formationalist* disputes the claim that the sovereign state is a thing of the past, but also challenges the claim that states remain as strong as ever. He argues rather that globalization transforms the relationship between states, markets, sovereignty, and the transnational sphere. It challenges the governing and legitimation capacities of old political arrangements, domestically and internationally. And it thus adds new incentives to the search for political innovation''. David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti- Globalization (Oxford: Polity Press, 2002). *Cited in* Adam Lupel, ''**Regionalism and Globalization: Post-Nation or Extended Nation**'', *Polity*, Vol.36, No:2, 2004:153-174.

1.2 The Post-national Dimension and European Integration

One of the foremost obstacles standing in the way of the European integration is the dilemma between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism. The question remains as, will integration like the EU manage to overcome the harsh effects of nationalism, by moving towards a post-national, a cosmopolitan system, or a constitutional pacifist order[40]. Or a communitarian type of a 'Fortress Europe'. The dilemma lies in the communitarian particularism vs. cosmopolitan universalism (Manners, 2011:13) in which the EU reflects characteristics of both.

The post-national dimension, as argued throughout this thesis, is certainly neither debating an established or an emerging post-national state nor an establishment of a post-national identity. It is rather to lay down broader forms of association, apart from the (fragmented) national level which manifests post-national forms of politics in which the Europeans participate via social movements, transnational Euro-parties etc. Post-nationalism is evaluated in this thesis as the emerging dimension of democracy beyond the nation-state, whether or not creating a European 'demos', it is important to address the emerging contestation alongside the argument of 'telos', in which Euroscepticism is becoming an important part of this.

There are different visions with regard to the post-national European thesis; Scholars and intellectuals put forth different arguments such as D. Archibugi and M. Köhler (1998) whom are more moderate and realist in this process, however, scholars like Beck and Braidotti (2004) are more doctrinaire, or A. Giddens (1998) and J. Habermas (2006) are more specific on an emerging European and global governance (*Cited in* Hansen, 2009:7-8). What is argued in the name of a 'post-national' dimension is the emerging level of a political space above the national-level which is analyzed under politics beyond the nation-state concerned with a sum of interests, aspirations, reservations, resistances etc. Differing from national integration as 'belonging together', post-

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[40] Shin Chiba (2008) classifies pacifism under different types; the fourth type of pacifism ''is the recent 'global peace and justice movement.' This newer type of pacifism, based on a global citizens' network for peace, justice, and human rights, is usually carried out by various types of NGO groups and voluntary associations. This type of pacifism can be called *network pacifism* or *grassroots pacifism* and it can now be observed beyond the borders of the nation-states'', **Peace Movements and Pacifism after September 11**, Shin Chiba (ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, UK, 2008, pp. 128-136

national integration is about 'sense of belonging' towards a polity. For Beck it is ''to belong or not belong, that is the cosmopolitan question (2003:45). As Habermas argues ''postnationalist democratic institutions depends not on the possibility of forging a new unified national identity corresponding to these institutions, but the interactions between the various publics, which must exercise discursive control over formal democratic institutions'' (1998:301). This policy making at EU level can not be acknowledged as sole foreign policy of the nation-states in Europe. The integration has pushed the Member States to frame their policies within an EU entity. This has resulted with the ''EU becoming less foreign and more a part of the domestic political sphere'' (Ladrech, 2005:95) both at national and local levels which in return is emerging as post-national. Because the European level is perceived as a political level and at the heart of this debate lies the Eurosceptic movement as a ''composite of responses'' (McLaren, 2007:7-8) towards the EU, aiming to reshape the European level. The increasing level of this 'more domestic – less foreign' development is increasing the polarization between different views towards the integration, which is certainly natural. The congruency between the political and cultural is diminishing, as the nation-states are divided upon European issues domestically however no more nationally.

For Featherstone and Kazamias ''change and continuity are juxtaposed as domestic fault lines across the domestic system'' (2000:13). The fragmentation is leading the 'nation' to divide politically as *Functional* Europeans, *Identity* Europeans and *Critical* (commonly known as *Eurosceptics*) Europeans. The transform of competences to the European level in an increasing dimension is ending with a penetration of European level decisions into national political systems which do not have the luxury of ignorance by the Member States. This emerging post-national level does not have the aim of suppressing ethnic, cultural or religious values, however questions their significance in a global world, and more importantly their current form in the nation-state framework. In such a search, this does not mean ignoring or abandoning the national level, however it is also impossible to push it out of the domestic arena. In the Westphalian sense, remaining sovereign can not be interpreted as ''the exclusion of external source of authority'' within an entity like the EU (Krasner, 2001:20-21). For that reason neither the integration is external nor the nation-state sovereign. The EU is as Sarikakis defines

a ''transnational regime within an international regime of accumulation and regulation that is largely facilitated and driven by communication'' (Sarikakis, 2005:157). Therefore, the ideals of democracy and freedom of expression, or the 'European way of life' become some of the elements negotiated, which in turn becomes important political discourse in moving these ideals upwards towards a new level or not.

1.2.1 Approaches to Post-National European Integration

The project of European integration is based on the very idea of 'Unity in Diversity' and by doing this the EU is not into a bias of using these differences. The EU is a 'state-improvement project' in a win-win fashion. However, not always all Member States share the developments agreed at EU level, and if not, they prefer opting out, which is under certain circumstances fully respected by other Member States. However there are certain provisions (introduced by treaties) which must be approved by all the Member States of the Union, which leads to differentiated politics regarding these developments, taking further steps in the name of integration which opens up the debate between demarcation and integration. This brings the issue to the Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts, which are handled as the two sides of the same coin named as the 'Europhiles', argued by Kopecky and Mudde (2002) and acknowledged the same way within this thesis. Euro-enthusiasm and Euroscepticism interrelate with each other and with the developments in European integration and its effects on the nation-state through Europeanisation (Wilde and Trends, 2012:6). As debated below although classified as Functional, Identity and Critical Europeans they combine interrelated elements. That is why, critical Europeans acknowledged as Euroscepticism (due to its common use) should not be acknowledged as a marginal concept, but according to Hooghe and Marks (2009) ''stands at the heart of the more recent dynamics of post-functional integration'' (*Cited in* Wilde and Trends, 2012:6) which this thesis puts forth as post-national. This is because Euroscepticism opens up a contestation including Eurosceptic arguments as a response to justificatory arguments made by Euro-enthusiasts, for instance criticizing the bureaucratic nature of the institutions, or more

accountability for the EU, are all well known critics made by most Eurosceptic parties which finally do overlap with the arguments put forth by the Euro-enthusiasts who contain functional and identity European assumptions. For this reason, in the coming chapter, Euroscepticism is not treated analytically separate from Euro-enthusiasm but more importantly separated upon the concerns they share or disagree. And more importantly Euroscepticism will not be marginalized with the disagreements and will not be linked to negative connotations.

In arguing this, the thesis puts forth the existing discourse (political rhetoric) on European developments as well as reforms (in the name of integration) in a policy-making arena which in turn are producing important feedbacks (either opposition or support) towards the European integration. At this point, Appadurai questions whether 'post-nationalism is a pro-European attitude leading to marginalize the national stage and to consider the EU level as the forthcoming horizon of identification and democratic practices?'.

Appadurai's discussion on post-nationalism brings him to the definition ''emerging of strong alternative forms for the organization of global traffic in resources, images and ideas – forms that either contest the nation-state actively or constitute peaceful alternatives for large scale political loyalties'' (Appadurai, 1996). Actually the EU is developing democratic features, and this is the only way in strengthening the political attachments to EU level. For Shaw (1999) there is no such purpose of replacement of national, as ''post-nationalism in the EU project refers dispositively as an open-textured concept expressing the sui generis dynamics and elements of the integration process'' (Shaw, 1999:11). The EU is in a process (always as a dynamic process) of fulfilling the necessities of the post-national level, however still not being able to leave behind traditional claims. According to the predictions of Shaw, this can lead to a polity formation in its own characteristics. This begs the question of what kind of polity is slid slipping between national and post-national. And where stand the Eurosceptics and/or Euro-enthusiasts, within this equation? The point is that, there is a diversity of attachments to the European integration, in which this thesis handles in the post-national realm. As it is the European level providing the opportunities of mobilization, however

not always do these movements contain the same people (NGO's, political parties, or individual) for instance supporting EU membership but rejecting the European constitution. This is can not be simplified as feeling loyalty to EU or not, it is about how the EU is perceived or expected to be in a rational way of thinking beyond the nation, rather than emotionally felt.

In 1874, Wilhelm Scherer has made a comparison between national and cosmopolitan lines as;

> Nationality against cosmopolitanism; the force of nature against artificial cultivation; autonomous powers against centralization; self-governance against satisfaction from above; individual freedom against the omnipotence of the state; the dignity of history against the constructed ideal; the honoring of the ancient against the hunt for the new; development against artificial fabrication; feeling and intuition against understanding and logic; organic against mathematical form; the sensuous against the abstract; natural creative powers against the rule; the living against the mechanistic (*Cited in* Habermas, 2001:8).

The basic characteristic of this new kind of emerging European polity is that its legitimacy is neither based on a collective, whom can be called 'the people,' as the federalists[41] argue, nor on the single peoples of the member states, as in the realist paradigm[42]. Instead, its legitimacy derives from a pluralistic 'citizenship' as argued by

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[41] According to the federalists, ''legitimacy rests upon links between the EU and European citizens, citizen involvement in policy-making at the European level, and identification with the institutions of European governance. Central to this configuration is the importance of the citizens of Europe, or the European people (Spinelli, 1958), who already possess a kind of European identity that complements their national, regional, and local orientations. Through the election of a parliament they freely express their will and contribute directly to decision making in the EU (Schneider, 1986)''. Wolfgang Wessels and Udo Diedrichs, ''The European Parliament and EU Legitimacy'' in **Legitimacy and the European Union**, Thomas Bauchoff and Mitchell P. Smith (eds.) Taylor and Francis E-Library, 2005, p.140

[42] According to the realist paradigm ''legitimacy is mainly secured by the peoples of the member states via their nationally elected representative bodies. The basic assumption is that there is no single European people on whom a European statehood could be founded (Weiler, 1997:255–58), nor a European public space that would shape the will and opinion of the population''. Wolfgang Wessels and Udo Diedrichs, ''The European Parliament and EU Legitimacy'' in **Legitimacy and the European Union**, Thomas Bauchoff and Mitchell P. Smith (eds.) Taylor and Francis E-Library, 2005, p.138

Soysal above (*See* Soysal, 1994). This is not only a community of the states, but also of the citizens as underlined in the motto as 'unity-in-diversity' by the Union (Schneider, 1994; Hassner, 1995; Laffan, 1996). Although the EU is not aiming such a uniform standardization or establishment among the Member State societies, the question requiring focus is the uniformity within the Member States. As stated earlier Gellner's argument of nationalism, is the 'congruency between the political and national unit'. However, scholars like Mudde (2002) argue that there is a weakness in defending the argument of nationalism, as the political and cultural units do not coincide anymore. The European integration, with the help of globalization, is bounding the state, which in turn the state under certain matters abandons the national interests in the name of supranational interests. According to Mudde this has introduced a process of nativism rather than nationalism, in which people are becoming ''simply protectionist in relation to their own culture'' (*Cited in* Liang, 2007:4), and in protecting it from what is perceived as foreign, they use ''politics of selective exclusion'' (Betz,, 2007:34) with the argument of the politics sustained by the elite are no more expressing the general will of the people. This kind of segregation is causing what is argued in this thesis as Euro-enthusiasm or Euroscepticism towards the supranational driven policies. For instance a party MP from the Danish People's Party demonstrates how this nativism is shaping exclusion in Europe;

> It should not be difficult to understand that Arabs and Africans are so different from the Danish culture, tradition and language that it will be very difficult for them to integrate in Denmark. (…)It is clear that when we have to give citizenship, it plays an important role whether the person is for example a Christian Asian. I think that a Christian Asian has greater chances of being integrated than a Muslim Asian, naturally (Krarup *Cited in* Holm 2005: 103).

As mentioned in the above citation the anti-immigrant attitude rests on non-European immigrants coming from outside. Although debated in the second and third chapters, it is worth mentioning here that the Eurosceptic arguments are mostly related with anti-immigration rhetoric, however when analyzed this rhetoric, discourse and/or policies

are not directly linked with nationalism, but with what is called 'nativism'[43][44] as defined above. According to Betz there is important linkage between American 19th century nativism and today's contemporary radical right (Betz, 2007:34). Then, what is this connection, and more importantly why is there a need of distancing nationalism from nativism, and the way this contributes to post-nationalism in Europe. First of all, citing once again one the representatives of the radical right in Europe: the Danish People's Party demonstrates;

> (…) last Friday we received the happy news that so far only about 600 applications for Danish citizenship have been accepted. This number contrasts directly with the 17,000 foreigners who became Danish citizens last year. (…) this is an issue which is going to be successfully realised (…) We are now almost living up to the spirit of our constitution, saying that citizenship can only be given by law, where the Parliament decides for each individual person who wants to be accepted into the Danish community. (…) the demands related to citizenship now signal that foreigners must make an effort if they want to be accepted as equal members in [Danish] society. Also the demand that they must declare their loyalty to the democratic pillars in Danish society sent a signal that there is no place in Denmark for **a** parallel society with its own norms (Kjærsgaards ugebrev 07- 10-2002).

Although the party is an important supporter of nativist politics, it at the same time maintains humanist, pacifist and tolerant ideas and views such as the working

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[43] According to Betz, ''nativism emerged in the early nineteenth century in the US, at a time when the new country was faced with a first mass wave of immigrants from Europe, many of them Roman Catholic peasants from Ireland and Germany.7 It was a defensive response on the part of the original settler community to newcomers, who were seen as threatening the culture, basic values and institutions of that community.8 The white, native-born Protestants responded to the immigrants with resentment and open hostility, reflecting wide-spread fears that mass immigration was part of 'a Papal plot to subvert American liberty and seize control of the United States politically through the use of slavish Catholic immigrant minions'. At the height of the anti-immigrant backlash in the 1840s and 1850s, nativist groups formed the Know Nothing party (also known as the American Party), a political association designed to fight the 'despotic faith' (Catholicism) that in their view was seeking to uproot the tree of Liberty''. Hans Georg Betz, ''Anti-Islamic Nativism in Comteporary Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe'', in **Europe for Europeans**, Christina Schori Liang (ed.) 2007, p.35

[44] Besides 'nativism' other scholars have made emphasize on different terms in the academic literature like ethno-pluralism (Rydgren 2007), cultural fundamentalism (Stolcke 1995); new right (Declair 1999), neo-racism (Hervik forthcoming); racism without races (Balibar 1991) to mention but some of these. *Cited in* Anders Hellström and Peter Herrik, ''**Feeding the Beast: Nourishing nativist appeals in Sweden and in Denmark**'', *CoMID Working Paper Series*, No.1, 2011, p.8 URL: http://www.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1315/1315481_the-beast-goes-to-gothenburg.pdf

programme of the Danish People's Party (DPP) in 2007 gives us hints on this issue. The party defines the Danish values that must be defended, which are ''the freedom of speech, equality, broad-mindedness and tolerance'' (Danish Peoples Party, Work Program, 2007). Same discourse is seen nearly in all radical right parties for instance leader of the Vlamms Belang Filip Dewinter has demonstrated;

> Dear friends, multiculturalism is the Islamic Trojan horse, and mass immigration has led to our European identity and civilisation being threatened, and multiculturalism has also led to the loss of our pride in our own cultural identity and uniqueness (Filip Dewinter, Speech at Cologne, May 9, 2009).

The point requiring attention in these demonstrations is the reference made to Europe and/or European values, norms and even the contested term identity which clearly exceeds the boundary of the nation, and secondly reflecting the fragmentations within these societies. As Bauman argues among others Europe is defined in terms of a 'European culture' that knows no borders, and Europe he argues ''is allergic to borders'' (2003:7). That is why modern notions of 'solidarity', 'alliances', 'consensus', 'universal rights', 'macropolitics' and 'institutional struggle' require merging with postmodern notions of 'difference', 'plurality', 'multiperspectivalism', 'identity', and 'micropolitics' (Best and Kellner, 2001:116). The task today is to construct ''what Hegel called a ''differentiated unity'', where the various threads of historical developments come together in a rich and mediated way'' (*Cited in* Best and Kellner, 2001:116). According to the party stances stated above the concept 'differentiation' comes through the fragmentation (*See* Chatterjee, 1993) of different interests which were produced as a false unity (namely the nation in the modern sense). This masked and ''suppressed differences and privileged certain groups at the expense of others'' (Best and Kellner 2001:116).

Same arguments can be seen in nowadays debate between globalization and nationalism (*See* Annex 2). However the similar point is that ''…democratic societies today embody a Kantian cosmopolitanism that disentangles the state from the nation. Democracies are becoming they argue post-national'' (Earnest, 2008:141). That is why nationalism

seems to be archaic, (at least for Europe) which is instead replaced by a post-national understanding of political discourses such like Euroscpeticism, or contrary Euro-enthusiasts in the name of Europe. This in two ways becomes to happen; the first is the impossible reality of addressing an issue to the attention of the nation as a whole when it comes to vital national interests, because of the increasing fragmentation of expectations and views (lack of collectivity or coherence). This, as a result, might cause different counter movements coming from inside as well as outside of the State. Since, when addressing an issue, there is the possibility of excluding certain groups if such politics are put on the way, whether this is the minorities, dual citizens or even the whole EU citizens (divided on EU issues), which directly become the outside group. This is mostly seen in the case of autonomist regions, which with their policies very often contradict with the politics, maintained at national level, in which strengthens the argument of multi-nationalism not answering or responding to the arising problems with properly developed solutions.

The European nation-states today as described above, do not contain only nationals, but also permanent residents, political refugees, denizens, illegal migrants, cross-border minorities etc. who do not always share the will of the rest of the nation (like sub-nationals). Besides this general mark, what I would like to point to, as well, is that whether a citizen or denizen, the attitude of the sole individual should not be missed either. Jameson names this as 'existential anomie' in which ''individualism and social atomization puts through the individuals to organize and collectivize as groups, and new structures of social movements proliferate often with oppositional agendas'' (Jameson, 1988:178). This situation is seen mostly among Green politics. For instance, an X Member State might find it difficult to adapt certain environmental policies, and oppose the decision-making as well as the regulations to be adopted. Because of this reason the party in government would be accused of being Eurosceptic especially by other Member States. However, what is more important, is the government can also be blamed from not taking certain measures by environmentalist groups at national level, whom as a result come up to be Eurosceptic as well, the reason of this Euroscepticism is because of the EU not being able to reach such a co-decision with the related issue who would be favored by the environmentalists. For instance this leads to mobilizations of

national groups who target the EU for pressuring their own governments for material and symbolic resources, such as the British environmentalists, whom paid increasing attention to the EU when political opportunities at home were not helpful (Porta and Tarrow, 2005:5).

For sure it is not Europe that is rejected here, but specific EU policies whether these are adopted or not, gives birth to such resistances positively or negatively. Considering the EU, for Gabel (1998) this is about ''certain individuals (or groups) are likely to benefit more than others in the integration process'' (*Cited in* McLaren, 2006:17). In this perspective, it is about an increasing level of disparities which the groups are awaiting, each with a different expectation. This has lead to a kind of segregation in which the national elite are aware of focusing on a specific group or only strata out of the nation, instead of introducing an overall political view (hoping it would lead to attract the rest once shared) in the name of developing their discourse. This is leading to what Burbach explains as ''the decline of ideology and mass-based political parties is the social fragmentation of post-modern societies'' (Burbach, 2001:72).

> The erosion of state control over the 'national' economy and civil society places limits on the range of policy options which governments can pursue in managing the state 'top-down'. In particular, the twin processes of economic globalization and European integration are accelerating the development of mature postmodern states in Western Europe; other parts of Europe and the world are still in different stages of societal formation (Peter Van Ham, 2001:16).

However, if European states are compared with one to another the point is multi dimensional. Some states are more open and flexible when it comes to questioning themselves along the integration process while others are not. However, either in some way or another, the integration is both limiting the sovereignty of the states while at the same time segmenting their societies. What shall be understood from 'segmentation' is that, *multiple publics* are emerging alongside the integration process. This is a Janus-faced process occurring at both national and supranational levels, at the same time, developing different movements which represent the concerns at stake, or for securing the interests of the segments.

According to Fraser ''the plurality of competing publics (and the ones which are representing them) is promoting the ideal type of participatory parity'' (Fraser, 1995:291). This argument is one of the main assumptions of post-nationalism, which is about the diversity of publics, giving birth to counter publics as well. In that sense, this may not lead to developing a post-national identity, post-nationalism may have nothing to do with, constructing, reshaping or inventing identities or identification, its purpose is to develop a sphere for the already existing identities to reflect, or to participate in, with their will. In this sense Moravcsik has put forth the need of ''giving individuals a reason to care about EU politics which is to give them a stake in it'' (Moravcsik, 2002:616). In this sense, this does not have to end up with a 'demos', 'a we feeling', 'community' or something else. That is why Lyotard argues ''the modern 'we' of human solidarity, community, and universality is inexorably fissured and shattered'' (*Cited in* Best and Kellner, 1991:170). It is the fragmentation in societies and the competing interests which the post-national condition is leading to an ''agnostic behavior'' (*See* Lyotard, 1981) in contemporary politics. However, this is the way how post-nationalism is to develop with the increasing divergence of expectations will require a solution to agree on through grasping the whole sides at a new level or sphere.

> It can be inferred from the current research on post-national identifications that a post-national EU based on rights and citizenship does not require a fully articulated cultural or political identity comparable to national societies; rather what it needs is the creation of public spheres in which people – individual citizens, social movements, collectivities of various kinds – can raise their voices (Delanty, 2005:141).

However, is the EU developing such a public level at supranational level is to be a more over debate? These questions will be debated in the second and third chapters of this dissertation with special reference on Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm with their political reflections on the integration within the political parties. However it is important to emphasize once again that emergence of a post-national level does not cover the understanding of a superseding of the national. What is important in this context is that whether in support, critical or against the EU, this results with new spaces of political communication whether this is conflict or collaboration which is

extending the boundaries of the national arena. This has opened up the debate between the Eurosceptics and the Euro-enthusiasts to convince the electorate of the EU serving or not the interests of the EU dismantling the society.

> Although there is not agreement among all of the member states regarding the role of the state in this new system, the European integration process is likely to be perceived as threatening state sovereignty and national identity among at least part of the European citizenry…it may be possible to create and change identities, such a process is not likely to be easy, especially given that not all elites are in agreement about the need to change the nature of identity in Europe to a more cosmopolitan, less 'parochial' form of identity… (i.e. to promote European identity over national identity (Lauren Mc Laren, 2006:7).

And why, with all these negative connotations is nationalism still alive, and rescued with modifications like 'good' or 'healthy' nationalism? For Kearny (1997) this is the difficulty causing a misreading of the relation between nationalism and its aftermath. This is the most important point. For some, when debating post-nationalism, they perceive the use of this emergent concept as overriding nationalism. However, it is exactly the opposite, post-nationalism is to broaden individual freedom through preventing extreme types of nationalism, which do harm the individual as well as the state.

> In endeavoring to go beyond negative nationalism one must be wary, therefore, not to succumb to the opposite extreme of anti-nationalism. Those who identify all forms of nationalism with irredentist fanaticism habitually do so in the name of some neutral standpoint that masks their own ideological bias. Surely what is required... is a transition from traditional nationalism to a post nationalism which preserves what is valuable in the respective cultural memories of nationalism (Irish and British) whilst superseding them (Kearny, 1997:58-59).

However, what is worth rescuing from this outdated ideology, as Kearny acknowledges, is it that the cultural elements need to be pushed towards a post-national understanding, but at the same time eliminating the harsh side effects (negative codes) it has caused. This contradicts in theory and practice. For instance, if analyzed the behavior of the elites resembles hypocrisy, the international crisis has made this situation more evident.

For instance, the two leading figures of Europe; Germany and France, namely Sarkozy succeeded by Hollande and Merkel, are willing for closer cooperation in Europe, however with different agendas.

> The nation-state is falling into crisis. Realizing this, and fearful that the people will also realize it, those in power often begin to act as sovereign rulers or monarchs. They substitute communications propaganda for the assent of the people *(demos)*. They try to fill the ''credibility gap'' no longer by police or military force - as in former times - but by media seduction or simulation (Kearny, 1997:65).

As outlined above, there is still a divergence of interests among the Member States of the EU, when it comes to the role of the state and to a more importance the issue of remaining sovereign. However it is obvious as what Peter van Ham argues;

> The nation-state as we know it today can no longer claim to be an exceptional actor in world politics, it is now one source of authority among several. I argue that this requires new political and institutional frameworks beyond the state, which widen the boundaries of policy-making and the existing dialogic community (Peter van Ham, 2001:3).

It is more important to focus on the policy debating and shaping processes, which are not bounded by nation-state institutions. For instance, as a response to leaders of the Member States, the president of the European Central Bank (ECB) Draghi has stated that ''whatever the approach is, companies, markets, and the citizens of the Europe expect policy-makers to act decisively to resolve the crisis. It is time to adapt the euro area design with a set of institutions, rules and processes that is commensurate with the requirements of monetary union'' (European Parliament Speech, December 1, 2011).

Post-nationalism contains both pluralism and discontinuity, which makes it possible to overcome the boundaries of existing nation-states, and translates them into numerous overlapping divisions (Ham, 2001:113-114). Emerging cross-national and non-statist political movements are challenging state priorities and policies on a wide range of issues, which are inevitably pluralizing the existing collective political identification.

These identities are shaped without taking the state or any sense of territoriality into account and thereby increase the voices of new socio-political communities (Ham, 2001: 114).

The individual becoming a member in a nation is mostly referenced to his or her ethnicity. That is why Cedermann marks the need of strengthening supranationalism which is directly related with being inclusionary and territorially bounded, for what Cedermann it is Euro-nationalism. As Ralf Dahrendorf notes, this requires the inclusion of 'habit of cooperation' which can be ''a force for integration because it transcends institutional structures and looks to soft power influences— like culture, knowledge, education—for building momentum'', rather than ethnic cores (Dahrendorf, 2009:234). Through this direction it can manifest itself as a post-national self-understanding both within and beyond national cultures (Taras, 2009:73). However it should be noted that this kind of Euro-nationalism, which I prefer naming post-national, has given birth to negative attitudes especially starting in the 1990's. Taras acknowledges these as ''– cliché-ridden, self-regarding, even intolerant and, some would say, Islamophobic'' (Taras, 2009:72).

Before focusing on the 'Critical Europeans' which is mostly referenced as Eurosceptics, and classified by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) as Soft and Hard, there is a need to define the general picture on attitudes towards the European integration which mainly fall under three forms of EU positions which are according to Conti (2003)

> *…functional Europeanism* where there is no principled support for European integration, but rather pragmatic approval of the EU, and *identity Europeanism* for a principled commitment to European integration akin to what was once called federalism (Conti, 2003:17).

Besides Functional and Identity Europeanism, this thesis argues (with special focus on) the third group namely the Critical Europeans (commonly known as Eurosceptics) contributing to the post-national dimension of the EU. Apart from the general picture of these attitudes, the chapter asserts that whether it is the Identity

Europeanism, or Critical Europeanism, they have long ago spread from one Member State to another. Identity Europeanism can no longer be attributed only to Germany, and/or Critical Europeanism is no longer nested in Britain. The emerging political level (assumed as post-national in this thesis) is developing where actors are trying to penetrate their politics to those of the others (Supranational institutions, Member States, political parties). However, in doing this, they are positioning themselves (or at least) searching for positions (inevitably) in this post-national level.

1.2.1.1 Functional Europeanism

The functional approach is based on the assumption that the nation-state is no longer functional in delivering the needs of or solutions to today's problems. the The term 'functional' indicates support for European integration however priority is given to a main goal (serving specific country interest). In this case, pro-Europeanism is functional to a goal other than European integration. In a Member State, which contains this kind of attitude, there is no commitment to further integration unless it is proved that it would serve those specific interests of the country and/or the party. And if not, party support is given only to the favorable outcomes already gained and there is no desire or favor of furthering the integration process. This attitude can take the shape of a 'status quo pro-Europeanism' (or Euro-realism attributed to certain parties from the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC's) or of a more pro-active attitude bounded in to the logic of giving support as long as the specific interest of the party is enhanced by European integration. It is clear that parties express a conditional support to European integration that can experience shifts (reflecting criticism) according to contextual interest change. European integration

Functional Europeanism indicates qualified support rather than full, when the integration serves the certain interest of the Member State (party in office). It assumes the model of integration to be based on intergovernmental (state to state) negotiation and bargaining. For instance Sarkozy (succeeded by Hollande) in one of his speeches

has stated ''Together we will make proposals to guarantee Europe's future… The integration of Europe will go the intergovernmental way because Europe needs to make strategic political choices'' (The Guardian, December 1, 2011). How can this speech be interpreted, are the Member States of the EU heading towards a Realpolitik, putting forth their national interests, or are they masking their real intentions in an era of crisis. Whether this is federalism or anti-federalism as abovementioned statements includes the reference point is of more Europe, its future or needs for this matter. On the opposite side, after taking power from Sarkozy, Hollande has given signals of a more identity Europeanism, Hollande in a recent speech has underlined the importance of integration due to the economic crisis as;

> The Euro zone has priority when it comes to further integration, something that will eventually have to be reflected in the European Parliament… The eurozone needs common growth, competitiveness, industrial and energy policies leading to a political union that could justifiably see the transfer of sovereignty. My position is that the solidarity integration has to happen first among the 17 [euro states]… If we wait for the 27 to come to an agreement we risk waiting for a long time'' (Francois Hollande, June 29, 2012, EU Summit).

Hollande marks two important points in his speech, the first is referencing the European Parliament dimension in the eurozone crisis and the shift of more power to the supranational level (namely to EP). For this reason, shift of powers from one party to another directly affects the Member State's stance towards the EU. For instance currently in the case of France from functional towards identity Europeanism. There is an important point between functional and idenetity Europeanism. Functional Europeanism is close to system integration; however identity Europeanism includes also social integration as well. When inevitable certain measures are open to debate and consensus is provided and further steps are taken. However, as debated in the last chapter, it can be seen that party discourse or attitude can cover one or more of the classifications (Functional, Identity or Critical) stated here. In fact argued by Anderson and Goodman post-nationalists themselves have developed out of functionalists (1995:604), and as this thesis argues so have Criticals. Because alongside the

integration process (deepening and widening) there is a fragmentation on views regarding on the EU, for that matter, not all Member States can or want to continue at the same level and speed of the integration.

1.2.1.2 Identity Europeanism

Identity Europeanism indicates principled support to European integration. Further integration is proposed with deepening and widening the EU. The integration process is considered necessary in an era of globalization. Identity Europeanism does not support every aspect of the integration; however, they believe the solutions to these problems require supranational improvements.

Identity Europeans argue and often refer to what they evaluate as the benefits of the EU to its Member States. They argue that European citizens enjoy benefits such as the right to free movement, work, study, and settle across Europe, as well as social benefits such as employment rights, and consumers benefit from greater choice and guaranteed standards. However, for identity Europeans it is not this 'cost – benefit' calculation that brings them together. The general belief, and probably the most important argument to motivate them, is that they also feel they belong to a community of people with common bonds, namely Europeans.

For instance Merkel in one of her recently speeches argue ''because the world is changing so much, we must be prepared to answer the challenges. That will mean more Europe, not less Europe'' (The Telegraph, November 9, 2011). What does 'more Europe' in Merkel's speech signify? In one of her recent speeches (related with the economic crisis) she demonstrates and answer as;

> While it should be made possible that all member states take part we should not stay still because one or other [member state] does not yet want to join in, pointing to a two-speed Europe in matters of economic integration. We do not just need a currency union but also a so-called fiscal union - more common budget policy.

> Emphasizing a political union necessary: That means that step-by-step in the future we have to give up more powers to Europe and grant Europe more oversight possibilities (Angela Merkel, Public Speech, June 7, 2012).

The point mostly debated is not about federalism as a way of managing the administrative components in EU. As critical Europeans question it is about 'how this would affect the sovereignty of the 'nation' and more importantly how it would affect the politics of identity' remains important. Identity Europeans are evaluated to be standing close to the federal Europe desire. However, not all identity Europeans shares this goal. For instance the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats do not aspire a kind of federal Europe, neither do the Greens- European Free Alliance, whom supports decentralization and regionalization. Identity Europeans are often (however mistakenly) referred to as pro-Europeans. They favor of European co-operation and cultural interchange in a wider geographical area, however also do functional and critical Europeans. That is why, this thesis refers to these politics, movements, attitudes as Euro-enthusiasts rather than identity and/or pro Europeans.

1.2.1.3 Critical Europeanism

The final group is the Critical Europeans, which contains the most hybrid form of attitude towards the European integration. In public and political debate the Critical Europeans are mostly known as Eurosceptics, for that reason they will be evaluated as Eurosceptics. Taggart and Szczerbiak have developed a typology of soft and hard Euroscepticism for a better understanding of these attitudes. On the other hand there is the use of Criticals in naming these attitudes, which are also seen in parties whom are in support of the current and future trajectory of the EU. That is why, is there a need of a clear cut between *Euroscepticism*[45] and what is called *Critical Europeans*[46]. The former

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[45] Ray (2007) argues ''by combining the prefix 'euro' (meaning somehow related to Europe) and the word scepticism ('an undecided, inquiring state of mind, doubt, uncertainty'— we arrive at euroscepticism.'' *See*, Leonard Ray, ''**Mainstream Eurscepticism: Trend or Oxymoron?**'', *Acta Politica*, **42**, 2007:153-172

may apply to the Adamant Eurosceptics with different levels of being *soft* and *hard*, which will be detailed below in the second chapter, and the latter is more of being critical, or questioning the integration whether upon exact knowledge or lack of information leading to different situations. However, the study does not find a clear distinction between Euroscepticism and Critical Europeans. As many soft Eurosceptic parties also find themselves as constructive critics and partners within the EU. For that reason throughout the study, due to its common use Eurosceptics is used interchangeably with Criticals.

Euroscepticism refers to parties that either question the whole process of European integration or, the process it has currently arrived. The parties located in this attitude have the goal of either reforming the process and/or changing it according to a completely new model. Certain parties (ex. United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) debated in the final chapter) have the goal of their country's withdrawal from EU as well. A main argument is that, the strategy of the Eurosceptic attitude is to strongly question the EU legitimacy without proposing any measures for the EU to gain more legitimacy, however this thesis argues the opposite. It is a strategy that aims to create disaffection in the public with different goals apart from the EU (ex. office seeking, vote maximisation). Illustrating the critical attitude (related with the economic crisis), Kaczynski (leader of the Law and Justice Party) has demonstrated that ''the creation of a two-speed Europe is paving the way towards the European Union plunging into another crisis and to this we say an emphatic No'' (Kaczynski, September 9, 2011 Public Speech). It is clear that the Eurosceptic wing is not willing to be pushed aside and marginalized. They are aspiring to be perceived as a part of the project with equality. Another recent critic related with the current crisis has been raised by Nigel Farage (leader of UKIP), who in one his speeches has argued ''Europe uses every crisis as a pretext to take away another piece of democracy from its members'' (Nigel Farage, June 18, 2012 Joint Speech with Vaclav Klaus). This critic signals the dissatisfaction of

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[46] Wessels (2007) classifies Euroscepticism under three types in which he names as Critical Europeans, Eurosceptics and Adamant Eurosceptics, *See*, Bernhard Wessels, ''**Discontent and European Identity: Three Types of Euroscepticism**'', *Acta Politica*, 42, 2007:287-306.

the value of democracy in Europe, which is shared by almost all parties in the EP, whether they are Eurosceptic or Euro-enthusiast.

Apart from the Functional and Identity Europeanism, the task of the thesis is to grasp the Critical Europeans (Eurosceptics) and their contribution to the post-national politics in the EU, however in search for this investigation, it is also clear that, there are certain common grounds between functional, identity and critical Europeans. Besides the characteristics of Euroscepticism whether it is mass or elite driven, soft or hard, mainstream or isolated, more important is, as investigated in this work is what do these signify about Euroscepticism in general. The second chapter proceeds debating these in depth.

1.4 Concluding Remarks

The aforementioned transformations are called into question in the next chapter under the title of post-national dimension. In the name of European integration the Eurosceptics are to be detailed with their stances towards the EU. Inglehart, Rabier, and Reif (1991) have argued that ''the EU represents a vehicle for social, political, and economic reform toward a less nationalistic, more egalitarian society…'' (1991: 152). Up until the 1990's this was the issue, however, debated below, the post-Maastricht era is reflecting different signals in the name of the nation-state as well as the European integration. Does this emphasize lesser room for post-nationalism, or is it to supply the emerging trends in Europe in a more flexible environment? For sure, nationalism is itself one of those flexible phenomena, and upon how post-nationalism can clarify the emerging trends in Europe, remains an important question. For instance, ''nationalism lends itself to ideologies of the right as well as to the left. It provides a sense of historical continuity; it is a flexible ideology which is Janus- faced, looking backwards to create the future'' (McCrone, 1998:182).

Nationalism certainly did lend itself to either the left or right politics, unlike nationalism, post-nationalism leave aside lending, directly attacks the rightist or leftist

politics. This stems from post-nationalism placing rational thinking (rational individual) in the centre of its arguments. For nationalism in the past, social cleavage appeared to be the most important approach for understanding the behavior of the individual. This was the part in which nationalism lent itself to the right upon identity or, to the left upon the State. The social cleavage theory does not work when analyzing concepts like Euroscepticism. The post-national camp finds this redundant as according to one of its assumptions, there is a diversity of modern motivations behind the thoughts of the individual. And secondly, at a post-national level, it is the issues which determine the politics, not the State, or a political party solely, as the issues transcends the boundaries (politically or territorially). This can be witnessed in many cases throughout the European integration (Transnational issues, NGO's, transnational parties etc.).

The first chapter focused on the alteration of nationalism suffering from both discourse and room for maneuver. However, the EU integration process has carried out the issue of nationalism, into what may be called post-national attitudes towards the EU. Might this be called the project of what Zürn (1998) names as ''denationalisierung'' or something completely different? For Beisheim (1999);

> Political denationalization has been defined as a process whereby institutions at the level of the nation-state are losing ground not only to international institutions but also to institutions at the sub national level. Thus denationalization is proposed to refer to fragmentation as well as to integration. (Beisheim et al., (1999) *Cited in* Goldmann, 2001:20).

In that sense the European integration process is causing on one hand a fragmentation within the nation-state as well as integration at supranational level. The political and economic relations between the Member States are becoming significant in contemporary Europe (region, nation and supra-nation *See*, Smith 1992; Weiler 1995). For Ladrech (2007) the parties located in European politics are facing a paradox, ''on one hand it is these parties which participate in the decision-making process at EU level, but on the other hand it is them developing a resistance, resisting possible spill-over's'' (Ladrech, 2007:226) at the national level. For the functionalists this is about ''the

psychological attachments to existing nations are strong, and governmental institutions are almost entirely oriented toward the single nation'' (Peters, 1991: 32) and this is why ''EU citizens have been socialized to accept the power and sovereignty of the nation-state'' (McLaren, 2002:555). However, the question is, how sovereign and powerful is the European nation-state, which is the most frequently asked question in EU politics? The running of the Community requires inter-state coordination and cooperation on policy issues between the local, national, and supranational. This process is not always about nationalist, or national in opposing the functioning of the EU it is also related with current political situations, economic conditions, technical details regarding the policy area in implementation etc.

> National governments must respond sector by sector and item by item to the agenda as it evolves in the Community. Moreover, they must develop policy positions on the future development of the EC and the institutional balance. Political and official responses to a particular Commission proposal depends on a variety of factors, most notably the economic interests at stake, traditional ways of doing things, the ease with which an EC directive can be implemented, the cost of implementation, the attitude of the relevant interest groups and the sensitivity of an issue in domestic political terms (Laffan, 1992:177).

Talking for Europe, it is clear that nationalism overlaps with the aforementioned concepts. This requires a Janus-faced analysis, the first is the redundancy of using nationalism (at least in the political sphere) in an entity like the EU, and secondly, developing any such national discourse, leads to certain groups becoming outsiders, and results in those decisions or practices to become a European wide issue, under different forms, namely Euroscepticism, and/or Euro-enthusiasm.

> Nations are no longer so separated by their own borders; instead, they – along with a host of new sub- and supranational actors- communicate more interactively in real time, along multiple, more de-centered, and more poly-glossic communication circuits, and via greater complexity of positions from which to speak (Buell, 1998:550).

Even though having resistance and objections, the Eurosceptics, just like Euro-enthusiasts have to be tackled within the post-national realm, rather than under the outdated ideology of nationalism. This requires answering the questions of what actually are the reasons of developing certain kinds of attitudes towards the EU. What do the Eurosceptics imply for in the name of criticizing the integration, while the Euro-enthusiasts are working towards pushing their nation towards closer cooperation, which means sharing and uploading more power to the EU?

Modern theories concentrated hard for explaining nationalism; however for emerging movements like Euroscepticism it is the task of post-nationalism to detail the assumptions of these emergent concepts in a post-modern thinking. As argued throughout this chapter, modern school explains the reason why regional, ethnic and cultural etc identities have been politicized under the nation-state framework, however the modernists fall short of explaining why and how territorial, religious, extreme right and left politics are emerging with a hostile attitude to their nation-state as well as to outside actors. Speaking in the name of Europe, this emerging politics fall under Euroscepticism, which is explored in the second chapter.

> Neither the nostalgia of the left, those old bearers of hope, for the times when it knew the correct line, nor the arrogant insecurity of the right that simultaneously declares the grass roots dead while fearing its demands, can alter the fact the new forces for change have coalesced into a new politics (Jordan, 1999:1).

As argued above, neither the extreme left nor the radical right politics are able to explain their atavistic 'national' legacy in a nationalist way along the integration process. Because their national legacy is not shared by most of their co-nationals even if they belong to the same group of right or left politics whom do not overstate their national identities. For that reason, there is a need of analyzing Euroscepticism in the post-national dimension. Leave aside empirical evidence, even studying a phenomenon like Euroscepticism, requires starting with a post-nationalist understanding, as such an analysis needs examining it between different levels of governance, and in a

relationship between the public, political parties, national institutions, and the way they are interrelated with actors and institutions at the EU level. For that reason, Euroscepticism can not be handled as a national phenomenon in a national framework in an era of de-nationalization in a society, where both Eurosceptic and Euro-enthusiast claims are sharing both on national and post-national grounds.

There is a general will to increase citizen's involvement in the European integration process. However, starting with the post-Maastricht era, there is a general dissatisfaction with the EU and the way the integration is proceeding. That is why, as argued in this thesis, developing a European wide public sphere requires harbouring criticism, protest and questioning of the EU alongside different views.

2. EMERGENGE OF EUROSCEPTICISM AND THE POST-NATIONAL DIMENSION

‘‘The EU integration process is a victim of its success’’[47].

Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, 2004.

The abovementioned argument by Harmsen and Spiering (2004) is a rehearsal of what Neunreither argued back in the 1990's as ‘‘…the EU is not structured for opposition’’. For that reason every critic made in the name of EU does not mean a critic towards the whole European integration in Neunreither's words ‘‘becoming a systemic critique’’. However, at the same time, every critic towards the European integration does not cover a desire of reversing the integration backwards, with a rising national tendency towards Europe.

The debate in the previous chapter through a theoretical analysis focused on the phenomena of 'nationalism', with the questions of how modern, post-modern theories perceive both nationalism, and the nation-state under the pressures of transnational and global impacts. However, as argued in the previous chapter, the nation-state in Europe, leave aside nationalism, is confronting post-nationalism as well. This is a result of what Hoffman has argued long ago as the tension between ‘‘logic of integration’’ (Europeanism) and ‘‘logic of diversity’’ (nationalism) (Hoffman, 1966:881).

The previous chapter debated the transformation of nationalism through modern and post-modern theories, the goal of this chapter, is to open up the debate about effects of the integration in Europe, aiming harmonization and convergence, however at the same time leading to divergence. This introduces the concepts of Euroscepticism and Euro-

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[47] Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, ‘‘Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate’’ in **Euroscepticism:Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration**, Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering (eds.) Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2004, p.13

enthusiasm under a post-national dimension. A related question here is whether policy preferences changed due to the integration and shift towards supranationalism, or it is still perceived within the nation- state paradigm. It is evident that, reading a multi-dimensional integration process within the nation-state framework or simply with supranational institutions alone, does not give sufficient answers, it is important to understand the relationship of the abovementioned levels, and the way of their interaction, which is giving birth to different movements, such as Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm. It is not important on whether this cycle will lead to more supranationalism or intergovermentalism. The point is that, has the European integration engendered a post-national dimension, if so what are the signs of this transformation from national to post-national level?

Answering the abovementioned question firstly requires an assessment of the concepts 'supranationalism' and 'intergovernmentalism' and as a result of these, the combination of the EU as a unique political system needs to be clarified for understanding the current form of the EU and how political movements are acting upon the developments. This will help better understand, how the institutional structure of the EU rends the functions of the modern nation-state, and more importantly as debated in the third chapter, how political parties are responding to the transformation of both nationalism and the nation-state.

2.1 EU as a Political System

The EU is an entity containing a total number of 27 different states (others to join sooner or later), each having a different national political system or character when compared to one another. The differences can be classified in various groups; Federal or Unitary States, Statist or Pluralist, Parliamentary or Semi-Presidential etc. The transformation of the states (argued in the first chapter), through the integration, can be acknowledged more or less whether upon their roles (limited), or their institutions dealing with policies (modified), according to the needs of the global (or at least

European) order. In that sense, understanding Euroscepticism, requires firstly exploring the structure of the EU, which is the main reason why the impact of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism have been explained below.

European states are increasingly merging their instruments of government in order to cope with the problems of interdependence and cooperation, through creating a new kind of political system. The integration process involves more than merely a horizontal 'pooling of sovereignties', ''it implies a merger of public resources from several levels of governance and a diffusion of responsibilities across these units that renders conventional conceptions of accountability unviable'' (Wessels, 1997:274). In establishing and afterwards developing the European integration was and is based on the desire of the nation-states to put aside the nationalist notion of 'absolute sovereignty' and to adopt the concept of ''redistributed, shared or overlapping sovereignty'' (*See* McCormick, 2005). As argued earlier in this study, this introduced the 'EU becoming less foreign and more a part of the domestic political sphere'. Because the nationalistically sustained foreign policies (pre-1945) have been abandoned and replaced with a consensus building, including reciprocity, participation, mutuality, inclusiveness etc (Peterson and Bomber, 1999; Reid, 2005; Rifkin, 2004). And as an outcome of this contrary to the pre-war, the post-war era contains mostly of abandoning nationally driven politics, in favor of post-national perspectives (combination of both national and supranational interests). In this process, the cooperation with a commonness approach has been strengthened, rather than a competitive approach stressing differences.

This does not mean that the national governments and their administrations are replaced or absorbed by a European mega state or a bureaucracy or whatever we might call it, instead they form a part of a complex and differentiated mix of political and institutional arrangements. EU institutions become what Wessels argues ''agents for efficient and effective policy-making,'' developing their own ''institutional ambitions'' (Wessels, 1997:274). These institutions are driven by the dynamics of an increasing participation by an increasing number of actors, leading in turn to a high degree of

complexity and differentiation in decision-making procedures which leads to becoming a proponent of either Euroscepticism and/or Euro-enthusiasm. The polarization is between the opponents and supporters of the European integration.

In the competition for power between EU institutions, success for each institution depends upon its ability to act as a reliable and constructive partner, which this thesis handles as contributing to the post-national dimension (Wessels and Diedrichs, 2005:142-143). However, this does not mean that the political elite, in the name of integration, are to, or should become fully supportive of the European integration. This is the point, where Euroscepticism enters the agenda of European politics. As with the deepening of the EU, absorbing more and more policy domains, new Member States, introduction of institutions and as well as strengthening its competences, is likely to be criticized both at elite and public level. This is and will in the future be an important character of this political system. As stated above, the EU is not a state; it does not have a government and yet does not have an opposition in that manner. As a result the structure of the EU, with more and more deepening and widening, is forcing a strict polarization becoming more clearly witnessed in nowadays European integration.

However, what should be kept in mind is that the EU is unique due to its complex structure. It is not a state; hence it does not have a government, which according to the traditional sense means not having a 'centralized hierarchical structure of authority' giving it the ability to take decisions solely. However, the EU is perceived not only as ''cooperation between states but an actual political entity of its own, at least a political system'' as what Hix (1999) has named. Thus, accompanying deeper integration is a whole new way of analyzing the EU, namely as a political system rather than political systems (Member States) interacting. For instance, according to Easton (1964) a political system, is ''a means for resolving differences or as a set of interactions through which demands are processed into outputs'' (*Cited in* Jolly, 2007:7) which reflects the reason and the outcome.

This political system has supranational elements such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which guarantees supremacy of EU law within its field of competence, and a directly elected Parliament which has obtained the power of co-decision with the (intergovernmental) Council in a wide range of policy fields (which is grasping more policy areas with treaty amendments). A political system, in the present does not mean a full-fledged state, but a system in which a central polity co-exists with local and national units. In Europe the Member States and the EU have both shared and independent powers with neither having supreme authority over the other. The EU has supranational institutions like the Commission, a Central Bank, and a single currency. The EU has supranational dimensions but does not fit in with the usual concept of being a 'state', as it does not possess the required means, such as monopoly of violence and taxation, or a well developed collective identity necessary for majority of vote, to enforce its will. As argued in the first chapter, the EU is ''not sovereign within a fixed, contiguous and clearly delimited territory'' (Eriksen, 2005:10-11) which is subject to change.

That is why; the EU has been and still is developing new ways for reaching economic or political solidarity. This becomes a reality under different forms such as inter-institutional consensus, participatory politics, practices, benchmarking which do transcend national political life. These new methods result in what Rennan and Bauer (2005) emphasize as ''a more progressive agenda of political action unhampered by nationalist division'' (*Cited in* Breen and O'Neill, 2010:87). The European trajectory with the questions coming alongside is deeply integrating into the national level. For that reason, pursuing a national rhetoric becomes unreasonable where the Eurosceptics take an active part in domesticating European issues (See Fuchs et al., 2009).

> The European Union meshes national and European governments in a system of multi-level governance that pools sovereignty over important aspects of citizens' lives. To the extent that European integration makes it more difficult for national governments to pursue distinctly national preferences, it undermines national self-

determination and blurs boundaries between distinct national communities. (Hooghe and Mark, 2005:423).

The supranationality is non-hierarchical and a consequence of its unusual 'separation of powers', which is due to the role of the Commission and the Council, combining representative and executive functions. This kind of supranationality ensures the Member States a strong and consistent say in collective decision-making processes, in particular through the Council of the European Union. The institutional structure of the EU embodies a complex mixture of supranational, transnational and intergovernmental elements. There is disagreement among scholars with regard to how this order should be named (Eriksen, 2005:11).

The exercise of political authority is no longer exclusively state based, and the relationship between state and non-state actors is non-hierarchical. Such a regime is based on shared authority, which aims not of 'redistribution', but 'regulation' of social and political risks. It is a method for dealing with political debates in which actors, political and non-political, come together by deliberating and negotiating with each other on certain policies. In this view the EU comes close to a heterarchy, which is ''political authority is not centralized as in the hierarchical order of the state model nor is it decentralized as in an anarchical order. Rather the units of the system pool their sovereignties'' (Eriksen, 2005:11). The launching and boom era of the EU up to the Single European Act (1986) did not face any serious challenge in the name of sovereignty.

However, with 1990's, the situation started to change. The integration was not so much a matter for the citizens of Europe up to the 1990's, the well known 'permissive consensus' handled the EU policy space allowing the national political elites to act upon their interests, which did not hit the grassroots. However, the Maastricht Treaty is a milestone in this respect, grasping the nationals, under what became a reality of EU citizenship. This became the death of the 'permissive consensus' while at the same time a birth of ''constraining dissensus'' or contrary what Joschka Fischer named as ''post-nationalist consensus'' (Milner, 2004:66) however, this study supports the argument

developed by Bill Reading which is a ''community of dissensus'' (*Cited in* Delanty, 2000:130). Certainly this opened up the debate between the Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics, debating the issues of sovereignty, the supranational character of the EU and its future trajectory. However, this contestation is important, as Delanty demonstrates;

> I believe that the idea of discursive democracy is the most appropriate means of conceiving of this, a notion that is related to Bill Reading's community of dissensus. A reflexive community is a discursive community a self-quesitoning one for whom dissensus rather than consensus is the central characteristic (Delanty, 2000:130)

As understood from the above citation today's western communities have become highly fragmented, contested and lacking holistic integrity. The EU is cross cutting the spheres of culture, communication and as well as politics, in a fusion of post-national. In order for a better understanding the decoupling of this process, there is a need to focus on the two paradigms of European integration and their effect on the nation-state.

2.1.1 Supranationalism in the EU

Although concepts like suprnationalism and intergovernmentalism are important in understanding the European integration, the interest of the thesis in this section is not to debate the structure of the EU alongside these concepts, but to analyze how these have been politicized by either the Eurosceptics or Euro-enthusiasts. In the past debates, supranationalism and intergovernmentalism were key concepts in understanding the structure of the EU debated overwhelmingly by the academic and elite, however currently they have become important denominators forming the European political rhetoric both at elite (party) and mass (popular) level. This point is important as it will

firstly clear the understanding of where Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm stand in party based attitudes towards the EU.

One of the key concepts of explaining the EU is supranationalism, which is the transfer of decision-making to an authority above the states in an organization or entity. The EU being the foremost example according to this method of decision-making certainly has made it unique due to its nature.

> As early as in 1949 Schuman used the term 'supranational associations' and he defined the supranational cooperation as 'a new step in the human kind development, or even a new era in the history of the world, a century of supranationalism which followed the century of nationalisms.' (Price, 2004: 30-31).

However, defining supranationalism[48] simply as transfer of 'decision-making' does not reflect the way it is used in practice. The use of supranationalism depends on the policy area which can either fall under exclusive, shared or supporting competences in the EU. However, if detailed, the significance of the EU exclusively can be seen in the realms of Single Market and European Monetary Union. The launching of the regulations related with the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor are handled by the EU at supranational level. It is evident that more or less what have been domestic interests or concerns have now come to be European or a kind of combination of domestic and European (Semetko et al., 2001:131).

> Supranational community is a project that is more challenging than 'unity', but it is also more radical. It is more challenging because it redefines the notion of borders among nations and between the nation and the state, or even within the nation

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[48] Semantically the ''Latin prefix *supra* used in compound words should be translated not only as 'beyond', but also, or, most accurately perhaps, as 'above' as opposite in meaning to the prefix *sub* denoting 'under' or 'below'. Therefore the notion of supranationalism (or supranationality) means that something happens above nations, and sometimes above the states, or that its importance is recognized by all people (such as ideas, values, etc)''. *See,* Janusz Ruszkowski, ''**Supranationalism as a Challenge for the European Union in the Globalized World**'', *Global Jean Monnet Conference ECSA-World Conference*, 23-24 November, Brussels, 2006.

itself. The Project is more radical because, on one hand, it demands more from the actors of such community but, on the other hand, it imposes more limitations on them (Ruszkowski, 2006:2).

This situation has given birth to the questioning of firstly the structure of the EU of whether the EU integration is more a supranational rather than an intergovernmental polity raising controversies among political and social actors as well as scholars of the EU. It is therefore doubtful whether one can say 'what is the EU as it is' and what will be its future trajectory. The second questioning linked to the aforementioned *future* of the EU, is the sovereignty of the state in contemporary Europe today. Instead of ''claiming the monopoly on sovereignty, states in the contemporary global order, and most significantly in the EU, must share their prerogatives with supra-state, sub-state and trans-state systems'' (Laible, 2008:28). For Nugent supranational integration is;

> …involves states working with one another in a manner that does not allow them to retain complete control over developments. That is, states may be obliged to do things against their preferences and their will because they do not have the power to stop decisions. Supranationalism thus takes inter-state relations beyond co-operation into integration, and involves some loss of national sovereignty (Nugent, 1999:502).

As argued above supranational refers to the delegation of powers (decision making) to independent bodies, namely post-national institutions (e.g. the European Commission, the Court of Justice, and European Parliament). For Tallberg;

> …to address problems that cannot be dealt with effectively at the national level… jointly develop international governance structures. Increasingly, the design of such structures involves the delegation of decision-making powers to institutions that are organizationally and politically independent of the founding states, and therefore conceived of as 'supranational' (Tallberg, 2002: 23).

The form of supranationalism touches the masses with the problem of lack of democracy which is widening a gap between the decision-makers and the one's who are

subjected to this change that is why there is a need of transforming the distance, lack of interest without marginalizing different visions of Europe as De Winter and Gomez-Reino identify;

> Yet on the other hand it has constituted an amplification of the "democratic deficit" defined in terms of distance between decision-makers and the beneficiaries of public policy (De Winter and Gomez-Reino, 2002: 489).

And that is why, this results in different perceptions from the public (whether cued by the elite or even the other way round), when questioning the issue of sovereignty in a complex structure like the EU. For some this is an era of post-sovereignty or others call it liberal international sovereignty[49] while on counter side Eurosceptics call this undemocratic or even anti-democratic.

> …in an era where sovereignty is no longer entirely concentrated in the modern state, they may find that recognition and equality stem not from claiming the norm of sovereignty that existed in a previous era, but from new types of political claims (Laible, 2008:33-34).

This leads to the questioning of 'what kind of Europe' debate. A Christian Europe versus a 'secular Europe' or, a 'communitarian' versus a 'cosmopolitan Europe' or even the model of a 'social Europe' versus a 'neo-liberal Europe. The EU is called as a sui generis system which consists of con-federal as well as federal elements, at the same time including intergovernmental bargaining. The Union's special status is not stabilized in what could be called its final status that is why it is labeled as a work in progress, which results with not being static but dynamic. And as a result, there are

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[49] According to Benhabib, ''…the conceptions of liberal international sovereignty, the formal equality of states is increasingly dependent upon their subscribing to common values and principles such as the observance of human rights and the rule of law and respect for democratic self determination. Sovereignty no longer means ultimate and arbitrary authority; states that treat their citizens in violation of certain norms, that close borders, prevent a free market, limit freedom of speech and association, and the like, is thought not to belong within a specific society of states or alliances; the anchoring of domestic principles in institutions shared with others is crucial''. Seyla Benhabib, **The Rights of Others Aliens, Residents and Citizens**, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2004, p.41

different perceptions towards this evolving integration. That is why placing Euroscepticism in an anti-European side does not reflect this dynamism of the EU. Euroscepticism is constantly evolving alongside the integration process, and the claims made by Eurosceptics include protection of cultural factors, respect for religious beliefs or language etc, but these claims carried out, also include liberty, democracy etc.

The general acceptance is that Europe has been connected to individualism, liberalism, the rule of law, constitutionalism, a free market economy, openness and secularization. In this sense securing the abovementioned characteristics, ''the institutions of the EU are found on a formal institutionalization, namely supranationalism rather than on common attitudes and identities'' (Riishoj, 2007:504-505). That is why supranationalism affects the national as the EU law or generally the legal system is distancing the Member State law from its cultural elements. As argued by Legran ''…the outward manifestation of an implicit structure of attitude and references, they are a reflection of a given legal culture'' (1996:57). However, the body of rule or law of the EU is challenging the Member State's legal systems melting them into its own legal culture. As a result the Court of Justice ranks a higher place in judging (certainly limited with the acquis) the Member States as well as the individuals. For this reason from some views the Court becomes strictly criticized due to certain decisions, however, for others it is evaluated as the defender of equal rights. On the other hand, the EP is seen by Euro-enthusiasts as fulfilling the democratic credibility the Union requires, however Eurosceptics argue it is still far away from democratic values.

2.1.2 Intergovernmentalism in the EU

In the work of Stanley Hoffmann (1964) another theory explaining the nature of European integration remains the intergovernmental way. The theory assumes the states (governments) as the main actors in European integration controlling the level and speed of the integration. The motive of the goverments relies on promoting their national interest. The role of these governments are sustained through a roundtable bargaining (namely in the European Council and Council of the European Union). The

importance of this supranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism debate is that it carries the main part of the contestation in Europe. The Eurosceptic parties mainly advocate an intergovernmental EU and the Euro-enthusiasts a supranational (namely federal) one. However, the Eurosceptic parties in backing up an intergovernmental EU fall into a dilemma, as they support intergovernmentalism but are against roundtable bargaining behind closed doors. They argue for a more transparent EU, fulfilling the democratic creditentials and becoming closer to its citizens, where they make indirect reference to the 'co-inhabitants' of the EU, rather than to 'co-nationals', but find intergovernmentalism more suited in the name of their nation-state.

In such different perceptions towards the EU, at this point reminding Benedict Anderson (1983) in defining the nation argues ''it has to be imagined in order to be a reality'', however, when it comes to debating the European integration, there can be no one imagining. As former President of France, Sarkozy has demonstrated that ''there are clearly two Europes, there is one which wants more solidarity between its members and regulation, the other is attached solely to the logic of the Single Market'' (BBC, public interview, December 12, 2011). There are different perceptions towards the EU, which are not shared by the whole nation, and more importantly does not have to be imagined in that sense. Identity here is taken both as self-awareness (individual) and with collective elements (local, regional, national) of identity which is membership in a community. The point is that, the community does not have the goal of acting as a monolith unit, namely the nation or more accurately in a national way. As Trandafoiu argues ''far from being monolithic, national public spheres are divided and fragmented, with competing versions of Europe appearing under the banner of different political factions'' (2006:93) which one them analyzed in this thesis remains as Euroscepticism.

As debated in the first chapter, according to Appadurai, ''the image, the imagined, the imaginary- these are all terms which direct us to something critical and new in global cultural processes: the imagination as a social practice. . .'' the imagination is the key component of the ''new *European* order'' (1996:31, *italics mine*). This new *European* order is characterized by disjuncture and scapes ''the critical point is that the relationship among ethnoscapes, technoscapes, and financescapes is deeply disjunctive

and profoundly unpredictable…'' (1996:35). Because of this uncertainty and a vast number of developments introduced especially by treaty ratifications, brings along a European wide questioning.

The EU is dominated by a dynamic development which changes the Union's status step by step. The tendency of this development is evident: Since the Rome Treaties of 1957, the Union is strengthening its federal elements step by step but without becoming a traditional federation. The point is how this emerging system shapes the nationhood of the Member States. For instance Becker (1996) explains how institutions can ''generate 'non-cognitive' trust, a sense of security about others benevolence and compliance that is not focused on specific people or institutions, nor a matter of conscious strategic choice'' (*Cited in* Follesdal, 2002: 305). This brings the issue of the political response to social change both in the state-government relation, and level of mass politics. As the European level becomes a sphere of politics, it either falls into the debates of how this could be furthered in the name of common interactions and interests (what is usually argued by Euro-enthusiasts), or contrary questioned on how future EU trajectories might harm (in a democratic and legitimate sense) the current or future policy debates (asserted by the Euroseptics). This renders;

> Yet participation in EU politics itself alters nationalist tactics. Whereas European integration has become a tool for nationalists to advance their struggles, this tool transforms nationalist politics and introduces tensions into nationalist debate about the nature of sovereignty in a supranational context (Laible, 2008:13).

Both the discourse and the rhetoric of any issue declared at national level becomes a European level one because it is the supranational forces which are pressuring the previously national policy areas. In this context, Stone Sweet and Sandholz argue: ''as European rules emerge and are clarified and as European organizations become arenas for politics, what is specifically supranational shapes the context for subsequent interactions…'' (Stone Sweet and Sandholz, 1997:311). As a result of this the issue falls into the agenda of other publics, political actors at different levels etc. This has

introduced also to what Weiler has named 'infranationalism'[50]. This brings along two important dimensions, firstly the issue of sovereignty and secondly, self-determination. This opens up the differentiation, in which, a group of national political elites argue that there is an ignorance of 'the will of the people' and critic the 'supremacy of the EU', and mobilize scepticism in developing these arguments with different views and combining them with very diverse issues, such as anti-immigration politics, Islamophobia, law and order, defense of traditional values etc. On the other hand there are elites who advocate the integration with its supranational order, in which they argue the uselessness of defending the nation, and what Laible (2008) argues ''… the desire to secure sovereign authority and then immediately to surrender it to a-national and multi-national European institutions appears to undermine the very premise of nationalism'' (Laible, 2008:2). As a result, what happens is that, the issues become politicized both at national and European level and, are not bounded only by the nation anymore, whether this is debating 'abortion' in Ireland, 'sexual discrimination' in Poland, treatment of 'illegal migration' in Italy and many more. A share of sovereignty exists between the EU and its Member States. However According to Beck (2008) the share of sovereignty is actually strengthening the nation-state not weakening it;

> Sharing sovereignty increases sovereignty rather than reduces it. The benefits of
> sharing include security and stability, reduced military spending, and economic and

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[50] 'Infra-nationalism' is defined as ''a world where mid-level officials, committees, and key private and semi-public actors have come to create a new sort of political/institutional structure. Infra-nationalism would, ..., be a third paradigm which addresses a meso-level reality which operates below the public macro and above the individual micro; is not a reflection of the State-Community paradigm and the contours and dynamics of which are ill-served by the perennial, supranational, intergovernmental discourse; is, ..., more administrative and managerial than constitutional and diplomatic; is polycentric, or even non-centric but certainly dualist; has dynamics which are neither national or *Communautaire*, but functional and sectoral; has a modus operandi which is less by negotiation and more by deliberation. Infranationalism does not obliterate the intergovernmental or the supranational but operates alongside them, if you think of the Community as governance, infranationalism helps define an important layer in the European multi-layered system. If you think of the Community as a polity, it is infranationalism which often conceptualizes better a polity in which national controls were not only removed on the highways and at airports. Infranationalism is to Supranationalism and Intergovernmentalism what post-modernity is to modernity: it challenges the epistemic comfort of boundaries- and in this infranationalism becomes, arguably, the most dramatic expression of integration itself''. Joseph H.H. Weiler, ''Epilogue: Comitology as revolution – infrantionalism, constitutionalism, and democracy'', in **EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics**, Christian Joerges and Ellen Vas (eds.) Hart Publishing, 1999, pp.342-3.

technological cooperation. There is a national interest in denationalization, in sharing sovereignty in order to solve national problems (Beck, 2008:801).

This remains the issue debated in the first chapter, which is how the sub-state national movements are willing for more autonomy, but not directly desiring full sovereignty, and instead sharing sovereignty for gaining certain advantages from the national level. The nation-state in Europe has started giving and sharing authority with its regions, however falls into a dilemma of when the issue of sovereignty is debated at EU level, when certain rules or regulations override national, and cause fragmentation at both levels. It is to analyze now one of those sides causing this fragmentation, namely Euroscepticism.

2.2 Euroscepticism as an Emerging Aspect of Post-national Politics

As mentioned above, up until the 1990's there was actually no use of these terms, say, Eurosceptic, the elites or the public reflecting scepticism were named as 'anti-Marketeers' which was a word linked to British opposition (Spiering, 2004:128) though Britain was a forerunner of being reluctant even before becoming a member. This could be extended even far back, when there was no European Community at all (*see* Winston Churchill, Zürich Speech, 1946). In fact for Spiering (2005) the leaders of Britain; Churchill, Wilson, Thatcher were all Eurosceptics stuck between ''calculated analyses and frenzied tirades against Brussels'' (Spiering, 2005:128). However, all these negative discourses, attitudes did not restrain the country becoming a Member State (after being vetoed twice) in 1973. That is why, for scholars like Spiering (2004) Holmes (1996; 2002) ''such patterns of sharp turns do render the term meaningless''. In that sense, there is a need of analyzing the concept with different connotations. A similar view is shared by Katz[51] (2008) insisting on a need for a different word in

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[51] Katz, for example, in his contribution, implies that ''a different term may be appropriate for principled opposition to the European project given that "scepticism" ordinarily refers to doubts or reservations rather than outright opposition''. *See*, Richard S. Katz ''Euroscepticism in Parliament: A Comparative

defining this phenomenon. However, as argued in this thesis, the argument does not cover the lack of Euroscepticism leading to a definitional confusion. The problem stems from the mistakenly use of the concept in a wide area, and along the integration process. For instance;

> In the 1980s, European integration was essentially a market-making project, favored by the right, less so by the left. By the turn of the century, the situation was reversed, as left-leaning policies, such as environmental policy, social policy, and employment policy came on the agenda (Marks, 2004:235).

As understood from the above citation, Euroscepticism is a concept emerging before the EU, however increasing in scope alongside the integration process. Although seen from the early years of the integration under different forms and rhetoric, Euroscepticism has gathered pace with the starting of the Intergovernmental Conference towards the Maastricht treaty. The main reason for such a rise of Euroscepticism was the Maastricht treaty bringing a rapid transformation for the European Economic Community (EEC) in which remained as an economic driven Community up to the 1990's, however with the Maastricht treaty it started becoming as well as a political one. The treaty incorporated a wide range of new policy areas falling under the 3 Pillar Structure of what was to be called the EU. The treaty included highly sensitive policies like EMU, Citizenship of the Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) etc. under different competencies which are all the characteristics of the Union's unique structure. This transformation has heated the debate on the future trajectory of the EU centering the concept 'Euroscepticism' in the heart of this debate. This is in two ways important; firstly the treaty introduced a mixture of both *soft* and *hard* politics, touching both the elite as well as the public. At this point it is important to stress that, the rise of public concern towards the integration has become salient, and the people voice their claims and concerns which they evaluate not been taken into consideration by their nation-states.

Analysis of the European and National Parliaments'', in **Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism**, Aleks Szczerbiak andPaulTaggart (eds.), Oxford University Press, NY, 2008

In the name of hard politics, issues mentioned above like EMU, CFSP, touching directly the issue of sovereignty of the state, which opened up a huge gap between the national elites (between the ones opposed and in favor). And, secondly soft politics like Education, Culture, and EU Citizenship directly entered the lives of thousands grasping the populations of Europe. According to Kraus through a diversity of policy the EU started ''connecting general political principles to particular life-worlds'' (Kraus, 2008:8). Influencing the public, who have been ignoring the integration from the very beginning, thanks to the permissive consensus, became an important part in these debates. Beforehand the public was not much interested with the European journey. However, the ratification of the Maastricht treaty also became known as the declaration of the death of the permissive consensus which resulted in successful mobilizations of on the one hand the Eurosceptics and on the other anti-EU[52] (Euroreject) political forces.

The confusion of the European politics starts with the post-Maastricht era. One of the reasons for this fluctuation is that, during the 1990's western European states were ruled mostly by the left-wing parties or coalition governments led by these parties with mostly center left and right. The discourse of these parties contained arguments of a free market, open borders and free immigration which had been argued as a direct result of the deepening integration, and as an inevitable political result of the EU. The left reasserted their decisions as inevitable measures which were a direct outcome of the EU and that opposing these developments would be considered as violation of the EU law. The left-wing was mostly supporting of the integration and only used a discourse of 'blame shifting' pointing to the EU when necessary. The attitude of the left can be acknowledged as a mid-term policy strategy for easing the transformation process, however in the long run, exaggerating the EU as the ultimate source of this

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[52] This work draws a clear distinction between Euroscepticism and anti-EU/European. The latter is mostly referenced to what is called as the Eurorejects. According to Mudde, ''the Eurorejects are more nativist and believe that the EU represents a threat to national independence with a serious 'democratic deficit'. They support country withdrawal and abolishment of the EU. Among the Eurorejects are the British National Party, *Democracia Nacional,* Democratic Unionist Party, *Veritas*, and the Swiss People's Party''. C. Mudde, **Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2007, p.163.

transformation, resulted as a miscalculation leading to certain backlash. In general terms the policies handled at EU level are centrist for that reason it is a normal outcome for some parties oppose while others support more integration. By the mid-1990's the situation reversed as radical right-wing parties and actors started entering the political stage. The radical right started spelling the arguments of the left the other way round.

They started directly criticizing the issue of sovereignty within the EU context, as throughout the 1980's and early 1990's they were tried to be convinced by the center left and/or right that it was the European integration forcing the Member States for taking such steps or measures in the name of integration. This made the radical right wing to put the problems of immigration, economic and monetary issues on the agenda with a sovereignty perspective as a direct consequence of the EU. More importantly it paved the way, dividing the political map of Europe into Eurosceptics, Euro-enthusiasts and Eurorejects. Euroscepticism is shared by different party and popular movements with different backgrounds. However, currently it is mostly referenced to the right. It must be stated here that Euroscepticism is seen from the right to the left of the political spectrum.

The concept of 'Euroscepticism' or 'Eurosceptic' whom as we name, in political view could either be leftists or rightists, ecologists as well as libertarians, according to religious view, protestants or Catholics, atheists or orthodox, in terms of social or culture, a blue or white collar, an ethno-nationalist or even post-nationalist. At this point the questions requiring attention is firstly where actually Euroscepticism feeds from and, secondly what is the relationship between Euroscepticism and post-nationalism which will be the questions tackled in this chapter. Before debating these issues, Euroscepticism (in the light of the theoretical and typological approaches debated below) is evaluated as well as defined as a post-national phenomenon questioning and responding to an unbounded space, containing formerly domains of the nation-state. As specified earlier this questioning and criticism is derived from a functional European

perspective approaching the performance of the integration and becoming a part of the contestation.

The ubiquitous politics have started attracting people from different backgrounds as stated above, and it is important to stress that the grand narratives (in our case nationalism) is under a decline. At this point, the European integration is crosscutting the nation with emerging movements like Euroscepticism affecting a broad range of people across borders in Europe. As Derrida argues that ''a 'new international spirit', a link of affinity in suffering has already come into being as the nemesis of the dominant transnationalism'' (Derrida, 1994:52-53). As argued in this thesis, these counter movements give the individual a post-national link to the integration process no matter of supporting or criticizing its certain aspects. As post-nationalism does not disregard the national (ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious) differences but does not intend to use them for drawing distinctions as well. Euroscepticism can deeply penetrate in the lives of people making them think of or at least question the significance of European attachment and as a result support or criticize the European project, however even in a critical position, there are common grounds established and developed between the Eurosceptic parties in the name of Euroscepticism. The Eurosceptic phenomenon is seen nearly in all parties however more salient in the far- right and left parties. However in debated in chapter three, in length, these parties are not in a complete denial of the European project. These parties put together common attitudes in the name of defending these interests, and in doing this their nation becomes an 'imaginary non-place' as these interests are not shared by their co-nationals, but by their European allies.

The far right parties do not reject the EU as a whole; in fact the European project can not be evaluated in a sense of 'all or nothing'. For instance, the far-right parties even specify certain common values like Christianity (Danish Peoples Party, Lega Nord) or Western culture, Civilized West, European values under certain circumstances which became very salient during their insistence of referencing these values under treaties (ex. The need of an acknowledgement of Christian roots inserted into the draft European Constitution), which according to the right, reflects a common Europeanness

but at the same time they share some doubts of losing their national identity as they acknowledge the European integration, as Mudde (2000) argues ''a melting pot model through multiculturalism'' (*Cited in* Fligstein et al., 2012:115). As argued in the first chapter there is an ongoing conflict between the increasing autonomy of the societal subsystems causing differentiation and segmentation openly favoring European integration and on the other hand movements aiming to counter the change in a 'nation as community' framework which remain critical of the integration process. The EU is standing in the middle of this crisis which is a consequence of the integration, itself (Minkenberg, 2007:262). More importantly whether it is the right or the left, the main investigation in this thesis, is how Euroscepticism contributes to the post-national dimension. As debated in the first chapter, public spheres have become increasingly divided and fragmented, with the European integration they have even gained more momentum appearing under competing and diverging politics, namely Euro-enthusiasm and Euroscepticism. Even though Euroscepticism contains doubts and reservations as detailed below, it is as argued in this thesis, a point of debate and discussion ''a proof of the existence of a European public sphere of debate formed by diverging spheres… even when nationally or regionally defined has a European frame of reference'' (Trandafoiu, 2006:95). This public sphere has started emerging with the post-Maastricht era.

Throughout the integration of Europe, crises have been an important part of the integration (institutional inertia in the 1960's, economic stagnation in the 1970's, re-launching integration in the 1980's) are all important events in that manner. However, the post-Maastricht crisis is different which contains not only the elites but also the masses in an increasing level.

However, concerning the political as well as the academic world, Euroscepticism became even more attractive in today's European debate. Given that, it is worth to remember the EU from Maastricht to Lisbon, which has covered enlargements of 1995, 2004 and 2007 in a total number of 15 new Member States, and with compromising on as twice as more policy fields, incorporated in treaties, which is normal to bring along a

degree of criticism and/or opposition into a Union of 27 Member States, which can be interpreted as 27 different visions. That is why; scholars (Eriksen and Fossum, 2004; Sjursen, 2007; Howorth, 2007; Schmidt, 2009) have put forth three types of approaches for understanding Member State behavior. The first is the pragmatic approach, in which the EU is acknowledged as a problem solving entity providing a free market and regional security. The forerunner of this approach is the UK latterly influenced the CEEC's, in which Margaret Thatcher has been the prominent figure in advocating the idea as a Eurosceptic;

> I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe should try to speak with a single voice. I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than alone. Europe is stronger when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defense, or in our relations with the rest of the world (Thatcher, Bruges Speech, 1988)

The second is the normative approach in which the EU is evaluated as a value based community securing and fostering solidarity. This approach is supported by Germany and France and to some degree by the other western European Member States which aims of a rights based post-national union providing democracy, human rights etc. For instance Gerhard Schroeder as a well known Euro-enthusiast had marked this as;

> The time for individual nations [in Europe] having its own tax, employment and social policies is definitely over. We must finally bury the erroneous ideas of nations having sovereignty over foreign and defense policies. National sovereignty will soon prove itself to be a product of the imagination (Gerhard Schröder, January 1999).

The direction of integration mentioned in the above quotation from Schroeder marks the issue of sovereignty, and moving towards forgetting the national past and working for a common destiny.

And, finally there is the strategic (functional) approach which is about being a part of the global presence of the EU as an actor in international relations, dealing with global problems like environment, terrorism, multilateralism etc (Schmidt, 2012:170) the Member States like Sweden, Denmark, Austria are the supporters of this kind of a functional approach. As argued in this thesis, according to the classification mentioned above, or any other approaches, whether this be pragmatic or strategic; or the normative approach contributing to a more post-national Europe, fall into a dimension of Euroscepticism where each Member State or a group of Member States have something to oppose in disproving the other, as the institutions of the EU provide 'multiple logics' to the Member States in which the EU reflects a divergence of organizational characteristics (Friedland and Alford, 1991 *Cited in* Soysal, 1994:190-93) and more importantly these disagreements which is debated below in depth, should not be perceived as anti-European. That is why, Schlesinger and Fossum argue ''it is certainly more appropriate to imagine the EU as constituted by a multiplicity of communicative spaces than to think of it as having one, overarching public sphere'' (2005:44). And, more importantly the diverging of the public spheres all have a European and/or cross national reference. As argued by Delanty and Rumford;

> …the European space has grown to the extent that it is no longer possible to say what is national and what is European […] All national identities are becoming more like societal identities, that is, broadly defined cultural categories (Delanty and Rumford 2005, 53).

For this reason evaluating Euroscepticism as a pure nationalist backlash is not appropriate in understanding this emerging phenomenon. There is no general tendency of British, Spanish or Belgian Euroscepticism grasping the whole view of the people. It is not likely to evaluate them all in a single framework, namely as the nation (in a monolith sense). For instance a Catalan can either be a Eurosceptic or Euro-enthusiast with totally different reasons apart from the rest of the Spanish population, or a Scott, a Padanian, a Corsican etc. With the party case studies detailed in the third chapter, the

party attitudes and purposes gives important signs of Euroscepticism exceeding the national frame towards becoming a part of the post-national dimension.

2.2.1 Definitional and Theoretical Implications of Euroscepticism

Surrounded by a general understanding, Euroscepticism is surely not only about 'the politics of opposition' with its commonly known definition, which comes out to be a general misconception. And this is why Euroscepticism will not be solely linked to *patterns of opposition* within this thesis. As it is argued, it can not purely be linked to a negative connotation, except of having doubts about the European integration. For instance according to Gibbins and Reimer (1999) scepticism is defined as;

> Sceptics are political agnostics who advocate withdrawal, whereas affirmatives are optimists who advocate participation. The former seek solace in the non-political, whereas affirmatives advocate participation in new movements and politics. Sceptics consider absolute assertions of truth and right, and of practices premised upon them, to be meaningless and dangerous. For them, nihilism, uncertainty and relativity are the only facts of life and politics (Gibbens and Reimer, 1999:17).

According to the quotation above, sceptics are detailed as non participant in politics and movements and acknowledge certain practices as irrelevant, however the European integration proves that the Eurosceptics are an important part of this broad project and are not to be named as outcasts. Like the abovementioned definition, linking Euroscepticism directly with a negative meaning of 'rejection' is a mistake of both understanding Euroscepticism and the European integration. According to Fligstein et al. (2012) Eurosceptics are ''supporters of basic EU principles but are also simultaneously harsh anti-EU critics'' (2012:115). The European integration process has opened up a literature on recent political positions such as Euro-enthusiasts, Eurosceptics and even Eurorejects. The Euro-enthusiasts and Eurorejects are more definite when compared to Eurosceptics. For that reason, in this chapter besides

detailing the concept of Euroscepticism, the main argument put forth is could this political movement, which will be detailed below, be an indicator of the emerging post-national dimension of the EU.

2.2.1.1 Defining Euroscepticism

Entering the academic as well as the political debate with the 1990's, the concept Euroscepticism is widely used when detailing the European popular or party behavior, upon whether they support or criticize the European integration. Although carrying different features, in addition to Euroscepticisim, there is a wide use of concepts like Europhobe, Euro-cynicism as synonyms for Euroscepticism. Before defining Euroscepticism there is need to purify the concept from the abovementioned misconceptions. First of all, Euroscepticism has no close relation with Europhobia, which is defined as, ''fear and distrust to all objectives and methods of the EU with a xenophobic attitude'' (Henderson, 2001:13). Because the word of ''phobia represents a fear of the unknown'' (Henderson, 2001:13). However, when analyzed it can be seen that the Eurosceptics have detailed information on the European integration where they possess their reservations. Euroscepticism should not be mistakenly used to mention Euro-cynicism as well. *Cynicism* is defined as ''oppositional to political efficacy and as inversely related to trust in different social, economic and political institutions'' (Mishler and Rose 2001). Both Europhobia meaning 'fear' and Euro-cynicism meaning 'distrust' should not be confused with scepticism. As evidence, the issue of trusting national governments and/or institutions in Member States is measured below than trust in EU institutions. It would be helpful to remind that, according to a Eurobarometer survey in 2009 only 32% of the EU citizens trusted their governments and their national parliament (Flash Eurobarometer 162:17). On the other hand, Europhobia has no role in Euroscepticism, which has no close relation. Eurosceptics mostly have doubts and reservations on the future of the integration especially 'moving towards an ever closer union'; this is not a fear of the EU but concerns of its developments.

In order for not to cause a conflict, the typology of Kopecky and Mudde (detailed below) will be used in this assessment of Euroscepticism. As according to this typology, as argued in this thesis, grasps both the Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics as Europhiles, in which the former has an optimist flavor while the latter pessimist. However, besides Kopecky and Mudde, other typologies will be given space here to understand the literature in the studies of Euroscepticism, finally to develop a more suitable understanding.

Before getting into detail on *Euroscepticism* both in theoretical and typological terms in understanding the politics of Europe, there is a need of having a few words on this phenomenon in terms of its definition. Sorensen defines the term semantically as;

> [...euroscepticism consists of three components: euro, skeptic and -ism. Each poses definitional challenges; indeed, it is not clear from most usages whether the term is taken to include scepticism towards the EU (or Europe?) as a whole, whether 'sceptic' means being 'open to persuasion', or outright rejection, and to what extent euroscepticism—given its 'ism'-ending—can be seen as an ideology in its own right (Sorensen, 2008:5).

In that sense, firstly what actually does being skeptic signify? According to Stuart Sim, in addressing post-modernism, he names scepticism as a *sine qua non* in the name of post-modernism, which is deeply rooted in western thought.

> One of the best ways of describing post-modernism as a philosophical movement would be as a form of scepticism – scepticism about authority, received wisdom, cultural and political norms, etc. – and that puts it into a long running tradition in western thought… (Sim, 2001:3).

Is it how Sim argues, an indispensable *attitude of questioning* required in the post-modern world, where the individual has become used to since the Enlightenment? Or should it be acknowledged as a contemporary new phenomena entering new domains (in our case politics) emerging with the speed of globalization Crespy and Verschueren,

(2009) put forth the argument of using alternative concepts such as 'resistance to European integration', because they argue ''Euroscepticism is used by supporters of European integration as a derogatory label to discredit their political opponents'' (*Cited in* Wilde and Trends, 2012:15). In turn, critics of European integration have already started to label themselves as 'Eurocritics' or 'Eurorealists' (For instance The European Conservatives and Reformists group prefer calling themselves as Euro-realists). However, it is worth understanding Euroscepticism separately from the abovementioned misconceptions, rather than fetching for other concepts.

The second point which Sorensen marks is about the suffix –ism, and on how it should be acknowledged, is a great matter to understand this concept. Does it cover a connotation of extremism, or simply an ideology (or an emerging one) building itself on already existing ones, namely nationalism? If (euro) scepticism is to be analyzed from a post-national approach, it would be regular to acknowledge it as normal. First of all, it is post-national, which accepts diversity of views, whether these have different priorities or not. Secondly, and probably the most important assumption of post-national and post-modern politics, is their critic on the significance of ideologies. Contemporary politics, argued by post-modernists, are not fed by ideological reason. At this point, for Milardovic (2009) ''Euroscepticism is not some kind of a consistent ideology, but more a sum of approaches, reflections and political practices…'' (Milardovic, 2009:44). For that reason the thesis grasps Euroscepticism as a strategically driven phenomenon cross cutting the political spectrum.

Thirdly, Sorenson's critic on the questioning of 'euro' in scepticism is important of whether it contains the EU or Europe or maybe both? This captures the debate firstly on who belongs to Europe, and secondly where it ends. In this sense is Euroscepticism towards Europe, namely to the outsiders of EU (related with the Enlargement) remaining in Europe, or completely framed into the EU itself. And contrary, if the latter argument is to be supported, then how might we capture the non-EU Member States with a Eurosceptic attitude. The thesis does not make a distinction of Europe and EU, in the analysis of Euroscepticism, as the phenomenon can be seen outside the framework of the current EU as well (non-EU members, candidate countries).

2.2.1.2 Theoretical Approaches and Typologies of Euroscepticism

There are mainly three degrees of Euroscepticism in which the first two are centered on doubts about (way or benefits) the integration, while the third degree is about direct hostility towards the integration (George, 2000:15). However, contrary to popular belief, ''Eurosceptics hold a positive view of the broad project of European integration but are critical of the actual development of the EU'' (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004:19).

When analyzed, Euroscepticism itself is divided under different categories for instance; Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) have introduced a typology of *soft* and *hard* Euroscepticism. Soft Eurosceptics are the ones who do not have a principled objection to the EU, do not support withdrawal from the EU, and only express opposition on specific policies, which they name as sensitive issues.

> *Soft Euroscepticism* is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory (Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2008:8).

On the other hand, hard Eurosceptics are, those who oppose European integration, they have the opinion of staying outside the EU, and opposing nearly all the policies brought along with the integration process.

> *Hard Euroscepticism* is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008:7).

However, although not accepting the distinction of *soft* and *hard* Euroscepticism, it is important to remember that, parties located as soft or hard Eurosceptic have the

potential of shifting from their positions from hard to soft, or the other way round. In that sense, without distinguishing soft and hard, the argument put forth in this thesis, is to evaluate both of these degrees which are contributing to the post-national dimension. In fact the distinction of soft and hard Euroscepticidsm is blurred and some parties may themselves defy this categorization (*See* Berglund et al., 2006). The only contribution of this soft and hard separation introduced by Taggart and Szczerbiak is that, it gives certain clues of how these parties or movements soften and harden their stances and rhetoric with political maneuvers opening room for European contestation[53]. For this reason, before proceeding to the typologies and theoretical approaches, it is important to underline that, the focus of this study is to locate Euroscepticism as a part of the political contestation in Europe, rather than a marginal soft or hard type of opposition. For instance, the Front National (FN) known to be a hard Eurosceptic party declares full opposition towards the whole EU thing, however it is also totally against Turkish accession (similar views shared by Austrian Freedom Party as well as by Vlaams Belang). Then why would a party oppose Turkish accession to the EU where it is willing to withdrawal from the EU. Or the Northern League (detailed in the last chapter) was a full supporter of the integration throughout the 1990's, however has become Eurosceptic with the beginning of 2000. For this reason as detailed below, there is a need of a clarification between Euroscepticism and Euro-rejectionsim. In this sense, for instance, Katz argues in the name of *Euroscepticism*, that it should also include

> …those who merely want to make haste more slowly or who express uncertainty about the wisdom of some or all of the proposed 'advances', given that the term 'scepticism' ordinarily refers to doubts or reservations rather than to outright opposition (Szcerbiak and Taggart, 2008:2).

If not, as mentioned above in the citation, this leads to a confusion of to what degree do soft Eurosceptics oppose the EU? If analyzed at whole it is evident that the Eurosceptics

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[53] According to Morgen, ''the early years of the European integration and upto the 1970's the term European federalism was not contested. 'European integration' and 'European federalization' were often used as synonyms. Only later federalism (the f-word used by Morgan) became one of the most controversial terms in European integration''. Glenn Morgan, **The Idea of a European Superstate. Public Justification and European Integration**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, pp.11-12

at certain times and specific issues support the European integration process (a deep analysis is made in the last chapter throughout the case studies). On the contrary, Euro-enthusiasts sometimes co-operate with Eurosceptics when in opposition to certain issues. Flood and Conti mark a different point through putting Euroscepticism away from the purely oppositional pole; ''Euroscepticism as one end of a spectrum that needs to be seen as continuous and incorporating different types of support (as well as opposition) to European integration (*Cited in*, Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2008:6).

At this point, another approach comes from Beichelt who opposes the Taggart and Szczerbiak's distinction of 'hard' and 'soft' versions of Euroscepticism, he argues that the degree of the Euroscepticism is not important, but the quality of it matters. Instead of their distinction, he proposes the distinction of Euroscepticists and EU scepticists. Euroscepticists are those who do not like the idea too much integration into a supranational structure, consequently they also oppose the integration practices. On the other hand EU scepticists are those who do not object the idea of integration but disfavor the way the integration is organized by the EU. He acknowledges that in both of the stances various degrees of scepticisms towards integration are possible, either soft or hard (Beichelt, 2004:4-5).

As given in the introduction of this thesis, I take the typology developed by Kopecky and Mudde, who have challenged the terminology introduced by Taggart and Szczerbiak. The former has introduced a different distinction other then 'hard' and 'soft' conceptualization of Euroscepticism. The reason of using the typology developed by Kopecky and Mudde is that they evaluate Euroscepticism as a part of the Europhiles though with a pessimist notion, and this correlates with the argument of the thesis on not to marginalize the Eurosceptics as outright rejectionists. They propose 'diffused' and 'specific' support for European integration. By diffused support they mean the support for general ideas of European integration, while by specific support they mean support for specific practice of European Union. The first conceptualization differentiates the 'Europhiles and Europhobes'. *Europhiles* like the idea of European integration and pooled sovereignty, whereas Europhobes totally rejects the idea of integration and fear about the loss of national sovereignty. The second

conceptualization separates EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. It denotes optimism of the direction of the developing EU or pessimism of the way it develops. The Euro-pessimists are not necessarily rejecting the EU integration but they propose different formula to further integration (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002:301-302).

Before detailing Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm, which according to Kopecky and Mudde, both contribute to the Europhile attitude there is a need of defining few other concepts. EU-optimists are those who believe in the current trajectory of the EU or are hopeful about it known as Euro-enthusiasts. A critical attitude towards a certain EU policy does not exclude the party from this category, as long as its attitude overall is judged to be positive.

Parties which are critical or pessimistic of the EU's current trajectory are the EU pessimists, known as Euro-sceptics. According to Kopecky and Mudde (2002), ''this category does not necessarily include membership objections, as long as EU-pessimist parties support the ideas of the integration process and are hopeful about making the EU a closer reflection of them'' (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002:303). On the other hand, Euro-enthusiasts combine Europhile and EU-optimist positions, and Eurosceptics combine Europhile and EU-pessimist positions. The *Eurorejects* are Europhobes and EU-pessimists, and the *Europragmatists* are Europhobes and EU-optimists. This typology introduced by Kopecky and Mudde (2002) in the Table 3 below summarizes the separation of the concepts.

Table 2. Support for European integration[54]

	Europhile	Europhobe
EU-Optimist	Euro-enthusiasts	Euro-pragmatists
EU- Pessimists	Eurosceptics	Eurorejects

As can be seen in the Table 3 above, the Eurosceptics are defined as Europhiles and EU pessimists, whom favor the European integration but criticize the actual development of it, in which as argued in this thesis to be a part of the emerging post-national dimension. To make the distinction more clearly according to this typology, the Euro-enthuasiasts give support for the theory and practice of integration, and on the other hand Eurosceptics support the general ideas of European integration however are pessimistic about the practice. They are defined as a part of the Europhiles in this typology. On the other hand there are Eurorejects, who reject both of the theory and the practice, and finally Europragmatists reject the theory, but show support for the practice (mostly for utilitarian objectives) and these are defined as the Europhobes (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 300-303). Apart from this general typology the main concern of the thesis is on the location of Euroscepticism and its impact on the integration. As argued in this thesis, and in the light of the abovementioned typology, Euroscepticism derives from a Europhile and EU-pessimist attitude towards European integration in particular and the EU in general. At this point, it is important to focus on the difference between Euroscepticism and Eurorejection to understand why Euroscepticism is acknowledged as a pro-EU phenomenon. According to Mudde (2007) the British National Party

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[54] P. Kopecky and C. Mudde (2002) ''The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe'', *European Union Politics*, 3:3 p.303

(BNP), Democracia Nacional, Democratic Unionist Party and the Veritas Party (split from UKIP) are very close to the Euroreject attitudes. For a better evaluation there is a need of pointing the differences between Euroscepticism and Euro-rejectionism (referenced mostly as anti-European).

When the issue becomes comparing the Eurosceptic parties with that of Euro-rejects the issue becomes more clear. The arguments put forth by Euro-rejectionism are, if member, 'country withdrawal from the EU' or if not, 'denial of membership' and as a result gaining back full sovereignty. The arguments also put forth by Eurorejects are the dissolution of the EU. However, on the other hand, as debated before, for the Eurosceptics it is evident that they do not have simple positions but rather complex mixtures which include certain elements of support for the European integration. Some parties (ex.. located in the ECR group) remain opportunistic Eurosceptics, while others constructive (willing to participate in reforming) or others committed to their core Eurosceptic attitude. They put forth the need of a radical reform of the EU, and more economic liberalization (mostly argued by British Conservatives). Or, more flexible structure for the EU and greater transparency and accountability with regard to the institutions of the EU (mostly argued by DPP, UKIP). Or for other parties, it is about equal status, or position in EU affairs, mostly put forth by parties located in the CEEC's. Another difference between Euroscepticism and Euro-rejectionism is that the Eurosceptics are approaching the integration with the aim of shaping the process, which requires intervening; however the Euro-rejects have no intention of becoming a part of this process of contestation. Euroscepticism represents a common ground for all the individuals, groups and parties who criticize the EU, its institutions and its organization, but who do not formally oppose them or campaign against the EU. However Euro-rejects, on the other hand, are the common noun for movements and/or parties who oppose clearly and radically against the EU, the so-called European idea and everything related to it.

Another difference between Euroscepticism and Euro-rejecitonism stems from party behavior. Eurosceptic parties include the role of taking up issues from Euro-enthusiast

parties, they emulate as well as absorb issues, discourses and politics, and take their part in the contestation, whether this is dissatisfaction with democracy or the centralization of the EU; however the Euro-rejects do not.

The reason of centering Euroscepticism as a positive European attitude and its contribution to the post-national dimension is that, an increasing number of political areas are becoming subject to EU level decision-making. And as a result of this it gives birth to diverging responses. However, more importantly it grasps the national political arenas. As argued by Trenz and De Wilde ''the decisions made at EU level have effects on citizens in the Member States both directly and indirectly through transposition and enforcement of the EU regulations at the national level in what is generally referred to as a process of Europeanization'' (Trenz and De Wilde, 2012:6). As a result parties locate themselves positions on European issues. Euroscepticism is not treated analytically separate from a positive view of point in the European framework, but more importantly separated upon the concerns they share or disagree with that of Euro-enthusiasts.

Placing Euroscepticism in such a location requires a detailed analysis of this concept. There are generally accepted three theoretical approaches for understanding Euroscepticism. Although different scholars point these under different titles there are mainly three approaches in determining Euroscepticism. If the roots of Euroscepticism are to be analyzed, the determinants of Euroscepticism have to be detailed. Scholars (Taggart, 1998; Mc Laren, 2003; De Vries et al., 2009) agree on certain determinants in understanding Euroscepticism which are; 1.*Utilitarian* or *economic approach*, 2.*political/civic* approach and, 3.*cultural or identity* approach. It is important to remind that these determinants do not reflect fundamental attitudes in the European Union though, they reflect diverging attitudes; it depends mostly on the Member State which is under question. It is certainly an attitude of criticism, however, to what or who is at utmost importance. For instance, opposing a particular policy of the EU, or opposing the enlargement of the EU with more and more new Member States, or even opposition towards transfer of powers to supranational institutions (Katz, 2008:155).

2.2.1.2.1 Cultural and Identity Approach

Turning back to the determinants of Euroscepticism, one of the determinants (probably the most important) of resistance, as mentioned above, developed against the European integration, is the problem of 'cultural or identity' politics which is handled under the cultural or identity approach. The Eurosceptics make arguments of Europe to be a threat to the nation's cultural homogeneity, and to national identity or for others it is perceived as a threat to sovereignty. As argued in the first chapter one of the charactericistics of nationalism is that, the nation-state responds collectively to a perceived threat. However, this is not exactly what is witnessed under European integration and certainly with the arguments of the Eurosceptics, as they do not reflect a coherent interest of their whole nation. This new societal division has been mentioned by Jean Marie Le Pen who has argued that ''the socio-economic cleavage has lost any relevance, and has been replaced by opposition between the proponents of a cosmopolitan and those of a national identity'' (Bornschier 2008: 89) in a communitarian sense. The same argument has been recently put forth by the leader of the UKIP, Nigel Farage as he has argued;

> This task of restoring real power to national democracies is one which transcends national, regional and political allegiances — it is higher than differences between the left and right… This goes to show that the big issue in Europe at the moment is not about left and right but about freedom, democracy, and identity (Nigel Farage, Public Speech, May 8, 2012).

This opposition comes out from the point of what Taggart (1998) explains ''the nation-state as the appropriate point of reference for identity'' (*Cited in* McLaren, 2002:554). This is about how the individual acknowledges the link between his or her identity and its main protector, the nation-state. The Eurosceptics support the no-demos-thesis, built on the lack of a common history, culture, language, religion and geography etc where no proper reference can be made to a European identity. For the European integration, this appears as one of the major issues for the sceptics, as this is related with ''the successful integration of Europe might demand an iconography of identity that would complement, but not necessarily replace, national, regional and local identities''

(Graham 1998:42-43). Even if we assume an existence of a collective European identity, this would not mean that Euroscepticism would be eliminated. For different reasons, there will still be a questioning and critising of the integration process. This stems out from a misunderstanding between the EU and the Citizens based on the lack of information, and manipulation by elites.

> Janssen (1991) argues that the complexity of the European integration process makes it too abstract and too distant for the majority of EU citizens to fully understand, thus rendering them unable to form independent and informed attitudes about the EU (*Cited in* Olsson, 2009:7).

From the very beginning the citizens are forced to evaluate the EU within their national political grounds, which is under the great comfort open to the political parties, to frame the issues according to their private interests. Actually the Survey polls reflect the opposite. According to Eurobarometer Survey 73 (Sp. 2010) the question of ''what does the EU mean to you personally?'' has been responded mostly with the answer of ''freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU'' with 45% of the respondents. This was followed by the ''euro'' with 40% and ''peace'' with 24%. Ranking in the 13th position with only 12% of respondents have said ''loss of cultural identity'' (Eurobarometer 73, 2010:127). For some scholars these outcomes do not reflect the correct results as the citizens of Europe are not well enough informed about the ongoing integration process.

> In Anderson's (1998) view, this lack of knowledge and information causes citizens to use "proxies," or cues, in their evaluations of the EU, which are based on perceptions of the *national* government, rather than the performance of the EU itself (Anderson, 1998:576 *Cited in* Olsson, 2009:7).

However an opposite argument comes from Dalton (1996:347) who acknowledges about citizens becoming fragmented into a variety of distinct issue publics. He argues that ''rather than politics being structured by a group benefits framework, which often reflected socially derived cues, citizens now tend to focus on specific issues of immediate or personal importance'' (*Cited in* Thomassen, 2005:16). And, this is the

main reason of why they respond to such questions as mentioned in the aforementioned survey which is a direct reflection of what they think and expect, or how they feel about the EU. Different groups can support or be against to different policies of the EU. There can be no uniform acceptance or resistance to these policies.

On the contrary, a different opinion shared among the supporters of European integration put forth ''people in general need clear and tangible concepts in order to develop a sense of belonging. And, that sense of identity is an indispensable factor in achieving and maintaining European unity'' (Wistrich 1994:80). According to McLaren (2002) the issue of identity can not be solely addressed to the individual. This is mostly about how the European integration causes threat/*or not* in minds of the people namely a 'fear of' or 'hostility towards' the other which results with reflecting the degradation of their nation-states. This is related to how politics of identity are shaped or manipulated alongside the integration process (McLaren, 2002:553-554).

> …assume that some individuals are more concerned about national degradation than others. These individuals are likely to be hostile toward any institution or practice that is in any way a threat to the nation-state, whereas those who are less concerned about national integrity will be less threatened by such institutions and practices. There are many threats to national integrity (such as immigration and globalization, for instance), and the European Union is but one of these (McLaren, 2002:554).

However what is more important to be analyzed, is how the parties represented at national level develop certain cues in the minds of the masses which do reflect their behavior, which results in support of or opposing certain policies of the EU. At this point, Euroscepticism is evaluated as a result of the weakness of a European identity; however this thesis argues the opposite. Whether it is the commonalities or differences, these can serve as sources for a European identity in a ''*differentia specifica*'' (*See* Fuchs et al., 2009:93). Leave aside post-modern theories, even the modern school (with a socio-psychological outlook) assumes all collective identities containing multiple identities and attachments (Turner 1987, Hoggl/Abrams 1988, Stryker/Burme 2000, Brewer 2001). And none of these identifications constrain identification with another.

This is about what Immerfall describes below (in Table 4.) under 3 dimensions. Post-nationalism is related with cognitive thought rather than being affective as a feeling (once searched in nationalism as a psychological attitude) it is not also a conative behavior on how Laura Cram has argued (2001) ''not a hot flag-waving fashion, but in a day-to-day acceptance of the numerous European symbols'' (*Cited in* Immerfall et. al., 2010: 340). It is cognitive alongside with awareness, empathy and altruism and even reciprocity. Otherwise what else could be thought out of the motto 'Unity in Diversity'[55], other than a post-national meta-identity made up of multiple identities, which is according to Betz (1990) ''preventing the domination of majority cultures and on the other allowing a continuous process of intercultural dialogue, cultural learning, and renewal'' (Betz, 1990:184-92). As stressed in the first chapter the richness of post-nationalism comes from difference and otherness. Same arguments are shared by, post-modern scholars, for instance, Foucault argues ''attempts to break unifying and totalizing strategies, to cultivate multiple forms of resistance, to destroy the prisons of received identities, and discourses of exclusion, and to encourage the proliferation of differences of all kinds'' (*Cited in* Best and Kellner, 1991:57). Similar to Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe argue that society is

> …discursively constituted as an unstable system of differences. Sociopolitical identities an the social field in general are never closed and finalized structures; rather, they are open, unstable, disunified, and contingent, always in a process of being articulated in one form or another and always negotiable (Best and Kellner, 1991:195).

However this also leads to respect the claims of diverse democratic communities, including their distinctive cultural, legal, and constitutional self-understandings, while at the same time strengthening their commitments to an emerging post-national or

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[55] The motto of unity and diversity' refers to an ''old leitmotif of European philosophical thinking. It reflects the belief in the value of the individual before the general but also the insights of the embedding of the individual within the general. Europe has always been the „plural continent", in which the perception of diversity and pluralism was sharpened. At the same time, Europe stands in a long tradition to take up the challenge of overcoming its internal differences and of conceiving societal and political order in terms of unity in diversity''. J.P. Olsen, **Europe in Search of Political Order. An Institutional Perspective on Unity/Diversity, Citizen/their Helpers, Democratic Design/Historical Drift, and the Co-Existence of orders**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

cosmopolitan political space. Otherwise this leads to certain resistance, in our case Euroscepticism[56], towards what is to be created upon the existing valid, say cultural, legal or constitutional norms. For instance the recent referendum on the Lisbon Treaty reflects such an attitude. The Irish people (in the first referendum) gave a 'No' for the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. However what is more surprising than that, is according to a Eurobarometer survey, during the run up to the referendum (12 June 2008) the Irish people still thought of their membership in the EU as a good thing (73% compared to an EU average of 52%), and that their country has benefited from being a member of the EU (82% compared to 54% in the EU at large) (Eurobarometer 69.2, 2008:12). According to this survey it would not be wrong to argue that, the Irish 'No' voting is not directly against the European integration. For Crespy and Verschueren this is about resistance which often comes out to be ''rather resist to constructed representations and amplified aspects of European integration in contexts where uncertainty with regard to the impact of EU policies or constitutionalization is often very high'' (Crespy and Verschueren, 2009:385). Apart from a belonging or feeling to the European integration, it is more important to focus on the thinking of the integration process. As Immerfall points (Table 3 below), there is a cognitive dimension of identification, it rests on the thoughts and perceptions, not solely feelings. As argued in this thesis, the dynamic process of the European integration is forcing both party and public level questioning, and alongside criticizing the integration with constantly new issues arising within this process.

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[56] It that matter, ''scepticism is a standpoint that induces suspicion and distrust for something. It is a judgement which doesn't accept things a priori. It is based on skepsis and suspicion. In the scientific and philosophical appraoch, skepsis, such as a methodic skepsis, is the beginning of reflection. It can be seen in Descartes' rationalistic philosophy. Scepticism in philosophical sphere means 'elevation of mistrust to the level of principle, particularly of the mistrust in undisputable criterion of truth, a denial of possibility of undisputable statement about the esence of a thing, and by that, a denial of possibility of cognition…''. Andelko Milardovic, ''Euroscepticism in a Conflict of Ideologies of the Second Modernism'', in **Euroscepticism and European Integration**, (eds.) Krisztina Arato and Petr Kaniok, Political Science Research Center, Zagrep, 2009, p.39

Table 3. Three Perspectives on European Identity[57]

Identity as…	Dimension	Definition with regard to Europe	Operationalizations
a) Identification 'feeling'	Affective	Sensing closeness between the populations of Europe and the object of identification (Europe/EU)	Positive attitudes toward geopolitical unit
b) Representation 'thinking'	Cognitive	Framing European Integration	Mental associations, images, and perceptions referring to Europe and the European Union
c) Behavior 'doing'	Conative	Displaying loyalty to group, altering behavior in favor of group-related activities	Everyday behavior and activities related to EU

As seen from the above table, Euroscepticism can be acknowledged as an identification of framing Europe with different perceptions. Apart from feeling, it comes into a form of thinking Euro-identification. Identification nested in a questioning and critically approaching the integration, the very well reason why the European states launched the integration in post-war Europe; in an era of sceptic thoughts between European nation-states and as well as critically approaching the future of the European continent forced them to integrate certain institutional and political mechanisms under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). For that reason identification with Europe and support for the EU remains not the same thing. Even supporting the EU does not mean to be feeling European. As Bruter argues ''the latter is only one aspect of the former'' (2004:23). Because the wording of *support* can be attributed to a variety of dimensions within the context of European integration. For that reason, it is also important to focus on how the integration process is utilized by the Eurosceptics.

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[57] Stefan Immerfall et. al, ''Identity'', in **Handbook of European Societies**, Stefan Immerfall and Göran Therborn (eds.) Springer, NY, 2010, p.335

2.2.1.2.2 Utilitarian and Economic Approach

The second determinant of understanding Eurosceptic attitude is the economic approach named as *Utilitarian Appraisals* by Gabel (1998). This utilitarian approach requires an assessment it two ways. Firstly at individual level, this is upon how the citizens perceive and make use of the integration process, and secondly at organizational level, namely party level. Gabel and Palmer (1995) argue that ''EU citizens in different socio-economic situations experience different costs and benefits from the integration process; that these differences in economic welfare shape their attitudes towards the integration'' (Gabel, 1998:336). This determinant of whether to be in favor of, or, critical depends on the occupational and education levels of the individuals, which reflect divergence. This is measured under two important policies within the EU. The first is the Single Market, and how the liberalization of the market is affecting citizens attitudes, and secondly the Economic and Monetary Union, which has economic, political and cultural effects on the attitudes towards the EU. The evidence to measure the Eurosceptic or Euro-enthusiasm upon economic means depends on the level of education, occupation, and residence etc.

> Trade liberalization increases the international substitutability of labor because firms are more able to shift production across borders, and this intensifies job insecurity for less-skilled workers (Rodrik, 1997). International economic openness puts pressure on welfare systems and shifts the burden of taxation from mobile factors of production to immobile factors (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Scharpf, 2000) (*Cited in* Hooghe and Mark, 2005:421).

The integration process with its deepening and widening effects, puts a lot of questions in the societies within the EU (Arato and Kaniok, 2009:27). These count for the reasons of why Norway and Switzerland are abstaining from EU membership and approaching EU lead issues in a sceptic attitude. This is linked with the problem of harming the welfare, in which the foreigners are blamed for damaging the welfare state.

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However, at the organizational or party level, this utilitarian approach requires the analysis of whether it is completely relied upon strategic or tactical choices, or deeply rooted in ideological or principle ones. The debate is mostly focused on the question of, is it the strategic ends that force the politics of Europe making use of ideology in the name of reaching those strategic ends. Or, the ideological roots, forcing the politics to be strategically determined on different means for different ends, such as electorate manipulation, adaptation and competition among parties.

> …the same causal mechanisms that determine whether or not, and how, a party uses the European issue in party competition can also determine whether or not a party uses what we have termed as the rhetoric of 'Euro-contestation'. This refers to those parties that problematize Europe—use rhetoric that is critical of the EU— while retaining a broad, underlying position that is supportive of EU integration in principle or even of the EU's current/future integrationist trajectory. In other words, electoral strategic or coalition-tactical reasons may cause parties that are supportive of the EU project to use rhetoric that is highly critical of the EU on occasions (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008:258).

This leads the debate to the assessment of the 'rhetoric' of political parties. Is the ideology used as a tool for vote maximizing, rather than the values and aims underlined by that ideology? According to Sitter (2002) European integration, has opened up new ways of tactical, strategic and principled opposition as a project driven by the governing 'cartel' of parties. The tactical levels, in which the protest parties are located, have found it useful to add criticism of the mainstream parties approach to EU politics. That is why, as quoted above, the 'critic', these parties direct to the EU, in the name of immigration can and should not be handled in the field of nationalism and or racism. Firstly these parties[58] (analyzed in the third chapter) are not demanding withdrawal from the EU. However, their concerns are mostly related with socio-economic problems which they believe is an outcome of immigration. It would not be proper to link the

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[58] As analyzed in the third chapter, the largest parties forming the European Conservatives and Reformists Group are; the British Conservative Party, Law and Justice Party, Civic Democratic Party, and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group; in which the largest parties are the United Kingdom Independence Party, Lega Nord, and the Danish People's Party. With one exception which is UKIP, neither of these parties are demanding withdrawal from the EU.

anti-immigration attitude of these parties to national concerns. Anti- immigration policies are developed mainly around three themes[59], in which the Eurosceptics link this with the 'economic and social costs' like labor market, social benefits, housing problems etc. The Eurobarmeter survey supports this situation when the issue is questioned at EU level. For instance Eurobarometer 75 has asked the question of 'what are the most important issues you are facing … at the moment' the respondents at personal level have stated 'increasing prices and inflation' with 46% which was followed by 'economic situation' 22%, unemployment 19%, and immigration with a low level of 4%. The same question when asked at EU level the respondents have stated economic situation 43%, unemployment 23%, and immigration 20% (Eurobarometer 75, 2011:24). It is clear that individuals link issues like immigration to the European level rather than national.

At the strategic level, however it can be seen that several parties also link their main issues with a European dimension, whether they are mainstream issues such as economic regulation or more marginal issues which vary from anti- NATO position (in the case of True Finns) to the opposition to immigration as mentioned mostly by the DPP, Vlaams Belang, Lega Nord etc. At a third level, principled objections to European integration may be based on issues like national identity, democratic legitimacy or sovereignty, or even opposition to regional integration (Sitter, 2002:10).

2.2.1.2.3 Political and Civic Approach

The third determinant of understanding citizen's attitudes towards the EU is the political/civic approach. The EU, as most often named as an elite driven project,

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[59] According to Biorcis, ''the politics about non-EU and non-Western immigrants develops around three main themes; 1. the economic and social costs (housing problems, labor market, criminality, social benefits), 2. the need to defend the ethnic and cultural identity against non-western origins, 3. the attack against the political economic and religious establishment via support to the development of a multicultural and multiethnic society''. Roberto Biorcis (1997) *Cited in* Susi Meret, **The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support**, *SPIRIT PhD Series*, Thesis no.25, 2007, p.165.

requires public support than ever before. That is why; the partisan politics appear to be important in shaping this process. Several studies by Franklin and other scholars (1994, 1994, 1995) have argued that ''voters tie their support for integration to their support for their government'' (*Cited in* Gabel, 1998:339). However the situation is more complicated than ever. The citizens reflect low levels of trust to their national governments or parliaments when compared to EU institutions. The issue remains more complicated when the party's positions change due to specific policy areas relating with the integration. For instance, an X party, labeled as Euro-enthusiast, in some matters makes use of Eurosceptic rhetoric. (For instance the Czech Party *Občanská demokratická strana* (ODS). Or, on the contrary, an X party being Eurosceptic, can be based on frustration, rather than direct opposition, because of the EU not being effective enough at supranational level to serve their interests (in the case of the Green Parties located in the Nordic states) (Taggart, 1998:372).

Put it differently, even the federalists can be critical about the lack of democracy and/or transparency in Europe, heating up the debate of the 'democratic deficit'. This is certainly not about an opposition, but becoming sceptic about the way the integration has/is developing. For instance the Greens are known to show deep Euroscepticism on the aforementioned lack of democratic values and principles. For Hooghe (2007) this is also related with the party positions ''…that parties may shift positions on Europe as they go in and out of government, scent electoral gain, and use Europe as a lever to exploit dissent in their opponents, or as a strategy to alter the political agenda'' (Hooghe, 2007:7). Similarly, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) finds that;

> …citizens are more likely to be Eurosceptic if they have a low opinion of the European-level institutions and a high opinion of their domestic institutions, including the party in government at the time and the performance of the domestic system in the provision of public goods (*Cited in* Hix, 2005:135).

Nevertheless, Rohrschneider (2002) has an alternative perspective: if citizens 'trust' their domestic institutions, they are also likely to trust the EU institutions – presumably because they trust what their leaders are doing at the EU level (Hix, 2005:135) although

recent Eurobarometer[60] surveys say the opposite. There is a decrease in the electoral turnout both at European and national levels. Links to political parties as well as partisan commitment are not much strong whence compared to the past. For that reason, Eurosceptic party role in the integration process is important, as they make issues more salient for the public, and ''link the de-politicized electorate in a more neutral and non-partisan system of European governance'' (Roger, 2009:277). For sure it links the electorate to EU level issues, however as argued in the case studies in the third chapter, this is also followed by partisan behavior. For understanding this argument, there is a need of assessing a general picture of Euroscepticism in Europe.

2.2.2 A General Overview of Euroscepticism in European Politics

There is a need to take a general picture of Euroscepticism and the way it is perceived by the public, which is known as public or popular Euroscepticism (detailed below). This certainly reflects a diversity of views with a mixture of diverging reasons. For instance, Euroscepticism, emerging with the beginning of the 1990's 'as a post-Maastricht crisis', is understandable for the Western European Member States (even before the EU15) such like the Danish 'No' for the Maastricht Treaty ratification, or the slight support (51% in favor) of the French referendum or, the rejection of the Constitutional treaty in France and Netherlands.

> According to most populist radical right groups, the creation of the European Union was a 'no' to Maastricht and a 'yes' to the idea of a 'Europe of Nation States', or a Europe of peoples based on ethnicity. Drawing on their ethno-pluralist values, the populist radical right promotes the idea of a 'Europe of the Europeans', based on the core values of a 'European civilization' – a Europe whose sovereignty does not lie with Europe or with the existing states but with their cultural communities (Liang, 2007:12).

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[60] *See*, **Eurobarometer Survey 71** (Sp. 2009) p. 118

It is evident that for Western European states the deepening and widening of the EU requires limitation. However, for the Central and Eastern European Member States the situation remains different, becoming Member States in 2004 and 2007, they were more aware of the costs-benefits of entering the Union, which left behind the heated debates of the Amsterdam and Nice treaties and the EU was on its way preparing the draft Constitution. Then what is it that attracts countries joining the EU, although having a degree of Euroscepticism before and after full accession? An answer to this dilemma is the responses towards the policies of the European integration are not directly towards the core policies of the EU which consists of a single market for goods, services, capital and labor, a citizenship with granting extra rights etc which are the main benefits of the integration. The problem stems from the costs which are a result of the abovementioned benefits such as social alienation, immigration, unemployment etc. Important evidence reflecting these concerns of the Eurosceptic parties was seen in the 'Vienna Declaration of Patriotic and National Movements and Parties in Europe'[61] announced in 2005. Their joint declaration is a call to;

> …a stop to immigration in the entire European Union and the defense of Europe against terrorism, aggressive Islamism, superpower imperialism and economic aggression by low-wage countries. The parties also reject the boundless enlargement of European integration to geographically, culturally, religiously and ethnically non-European territories in Asia and Africa such as Turkey…][62] (Liang, 2007:14).

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[61] Eurosceptic Parties from seven Member States attended and signed the declaration which consist of FPÖ, Vlaams Belang, Ataka, FN, Italian Azione Sociale and Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT), Romanian PRM and the Spanish Alternativa Espanola. Christina Schori Liang, ''Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right'' in **Europe for the Europeans**, Christina Schori Liang (ed.) Ashgate, England, 2007, p.13

[62] The 'Vienna Declaration of Patriotic and National Movements and Parties in Europe' is as follows;
1. ''The establishment of a Europe of free and independent nationals within the framework of a confederation of sovereign nation states;
2. The renunciation of all attempts to create a constitution for a centralist European super-state;
3. The clear rejection of a boundless enlargement of European integration to geographical, cultural, religious and ethnic non-European areas of Asia and Africa such as Turkey;
4. The effective protection of Europe against dangers of terrorism, aggressive Islamism, superpower imperialism, and economic aggression by low-wage countries;
5. An immediate immigration stop in all states of the European Union, also in the area of so-called family reunion;
6. A pro-natalist family policy, which aims at the promotion of large numbers of children of the European ethnic communities (Völker) within the traditional family;

The *Vienna Declaration* consists of eight Articles which mainly underline two important facts, which are the issue of remaining sovereign and, immigration. The declaration does not reflect an outright rejection of the EU other than the emerging draft Constitution for Europe. Another interesting point in the declaration is the reference made to a 'confederation' of the European nation-states. This view is based on the model of a 'Europe of Fatherlands' mentioned by Charles de Gaulle in early years of the EEC. The model emphasizes the nations joining under a confederation, and not giving away their sovereignty but only for organizing co-operation among them, serving both national and European interests (Liang, 2007:12). Although diverging, apart from the abovementioned model, radical right parties show Euroscepticism towards other future models for the integration.

Another important dimension marked by the declaration, is its reference to the issue ethnicity as 'European ethnic communities' (Articles 7-8) which are in need of uniting for what is called a 'solidarist struggle' blaming globalization and its probable outcome of immigration. It is interesting to say that, the abovementioned Vienna Declaration has not drawn much attention among the Europsceptic parties. For instance none the Eurosceptic parties detailed in the case studies in chapter three have become signatory to the declaration. This stems from what Knudsen argues of a need to distinguish between what he calls 'backward-looking' vision of Europe stuck between the Nation-state vs. EU, and a forward-looking Euroscepticism who ''…take active and constructive part in the daily work over the EU and only in referendums really differ considerably from the line taken by pro-EU parties'' (Knudsen, 2008:166). Euroscepticism is a part of the growing political landscape in Europe, and what is argued in the third chapter an important emerging block within the EP as well. As detailed in the third chapter, there are Eurosceptic parties whom participate actively in the European integration, engage in Euro-party groups, establish common policies, and

7. The solidarist struggle of European ethnic communities against the social and economic effects of globalization;
8. The restoration of the social systems of the member state of the European Union and social justice for the European ethnic communities. Christina Schori Liang, ''Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right'' in **Europe for the Europeans**, Christina Schori Liang (ed.) Ashgate, England, 2007, p.14

try to pressure the institutions of the EU in what they argue is best and required for the future trajectory of the EU.

Apart from Eurosceptic politics between the Member States, a certain degree of divergence can be witnessed in the Member States as well. For instance, Keating (2001) acknowledges this as ''contradicting trends of Euroscepticism both among and within Member States which is breaking down the linkage between nationalism/regionalism and protectionism''. It is these sub-state actors and/or parties, which contradict with the central or national governments upon their attitude towards the EU. For instance, seen in regionalist parties and/or sub-state actors, being critical of certain policy areas in the EU does not count them in being Eurosceptic, as they remain supportive of strengthening the supranational dimension of the EU with the aim of by-passing the national level.

This mirrors two important events, the first is, these regional sub-state demands are actually not much nationalist anymore, and more importantly ''from the early 1990's onwards, there is evidence of Europe increasingly becoming a normal political issue, subject to debate along relatively stable and clearly articulated lines of division'' (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004:25). It is important to mention that Eurosceptic party's debate and discuss their divergences in public, although belonging to the Eurosceptic majority.

> The rise of nationalism in the 19th century accompanied the consolidation of the state. One of the effects of such consolidation was the assertion of the sway of developing national parties over localized aggregated interests. This was, essentially, the sway of the centre against the periphery, the state against the regions (Gaffney, 2003:4).

However, with the European integration, particularly related with multi-level governance with its characteristics of subsidiarity and proportionality, the interests of the local/regional and national do not coincide anymore. This obliges us to reconsider nationalism, as mentioned in the first chapter on Hobsbawm's thesis of understanding nationalism as a dual phenomenon, constructed above, but which cannot be understood

unless also analyzed from below. It is clear that the regional or local levels are competing with national level in the EU context. That is why the issue of European integration is absorbed by the different levels resulting with not becoming 'national' but a part of 'internal' or 'domestic' (Risse, 2010:238). This is a result of EU, cross cutting different levels and becoming normal politics, politicization of EU related issues at different public spheres, which find representation at transnational level, namely through Euro-parties both of whom are Eurosceptic and/or Euro-enthusiast. This, has also developed as what Weiler (1999) names ''infra-nationalism''. This understanding of the new EU opportunity structure which opens ''that some nationalists will be sufficiently attracted to participating in the European political order through sub-state institutions that the draw of statehood will be reduced'' (*Cited in* Laible, 2008:29).

Certainly this is not limited with sub-state elites, as the actors at national level are also aware of this participation for working towards achieving common goals. Contrary to the Euroscepticism, the factors which are promoting Euro-enthusiasts and their policy stances towards the integration rests on post-materialist values, cognitive mobilization, utilitarianism, and support for the governing party in their own state. Euro-enthusiasts are known to be pro-Europeans, who support full integration to the level of federalization of the EU. They want to reduce the government authority of the nation-state and increase the centralized authority of the EU. Contrary, what Euro-sceptics criticize is the over bureaucratization of the EU, strengthening its centralized authority.

However, this opportunity structure or the process of integration has led to the rise of rightist parties. The recent national and European elections have resulted with different kinds of far right parties (from right wing populists and nationalists to fascists and neo Nazis) gaining support across Europe. These parties can be listed as, for instance, *Party for Freedom* in Netherlands, *Austria Freedom Party* in Austria, *and Vlaams Belang* in Belgium. What is it that these parties argue and face serious problems due to their harsh politics?

The increasing level of political and socio-economic disappointment and dissatisfaction among voters due to the rapid transformation of the nation-state as well as the process

of globalization has pushed these votes towards the radical right. When analyzed, no matter in which European state it is, what the far right has in common, is anti-immigration with jointly religious otherness, feeding namely Islamophobia. For instance, Geert Wilders' speech includes ''race riots are not necessarily a bad thing'' or ''I want the fascist Koran banned'', ''no more mosques, no more Islamic schools, no more imams…'' (The Observer, February 17, 2008). Similar opinions are shared by Danish People's Party as the leader Pia Kjaersgaard stated ''there is no east-west clash of civilizations because there is only one civilization and that is ours. The others want to implement, ferocity, the primitive, the barbaric, the medieval'' (Speech in Parliament, October 4, 2001). In the case of Belgium the Vlaams Belang party documents included the 'expelling the majority of non-European immigrants to their home countries'. This led to banning of the party by the court with the statement of breaching the 1981 anti-racism law (Erk, 2005:494). However with all these negative views, it does not mean that these parties are against the entire European project as stated before. For instance one the leading figures of Euroscepticism, Pim Fortuyn stated that;

> I love Europe; I love its multitude of peoples, cultures, landscapes, weather conditions, language and human beings. I sometimes hate the Euro-elite in its arrogant negligence. In short, I want a Europe of the people, of the human scale, a Europe of you and me (*Cited in* Liang, 2007:12).

Same arguments are carried out by most radical right wing parties such Umberto Bossi, former leader of the Lega Nord has ''invited the government to stop muslim and black migrants from entering the country'' (Umberto Bossi, 2001 *Cited in* Meret, 2009:168). Bossi points the issue of immigration as a result of globalization in his earlier speeches as;

> It is not only an economic problem, here the point is to stop globalization and to avoid that everything becomes commodified and reified. Men are reduced to the same thing, *homo oeconomicus*, without soul and identity. With the alibi of racism the most unbearable things are allowed, as the right of peoples to defend their

identity and the duty of other peoples to (…) be their own masters, but elsewhere, in their homes (Bossi and Vimercati, 1998 *Cited in* Meret, 2009:168).

According to this view the Eurosceptics are in favor of a 'Europe of Europeans' project, however oppose the idea of a federal 'United States of Europe' eroding national identity and leading to a multicultural Europe (Liang, 2007:13). The politics of Fortuyn ''is a kind of tribalism expressed in a language of diversity'' (Caldwell, 2011:353). Because as Fortuyn argues ''it is different to accept someone who comes from a similar cultural background, whence compared to someone who is completely different from our culture'' (*Cited in* Caldwell, 2011:339). These views from Fortuyn make him a very well defender of Europeanness; however, this communitarian type of Europeanness is clashing with that of the cosmopolitanism. This brings the issue to another typology developed by Kaniok.

Apart from the other typologies referred above, Kaniok (2009) puts forth three distinct views towards the EU which consists firstly of 'Europeanists'. What are mentioned by Europeanists is the supporters of the supra-national idea of European integration, and the concepts derived from it. However, not all political parties support this kind of a supranational Europeanness, and need not be a supporter to be acknowledged as a good European. For instance another opinion from a Euro-enthusiast Göran Johansson (2005) (former Mayor of Gottenburg) has expressed his views as ''I don't like assimilation; I like integration. Both Sweden and immigrants must change. I don't care if you respect our culture. You must have to obey the law'' (*Cited in* Caldwell, 2011:173). As seen by different fractions, there are different views and opinions on the issue of migration. Europeanists support European integration as a matter of principle. The integration process is not reviewed from a calculation of benefits and advantages to the national scene or the party; instead, deepening integration is seen as the goal in and of itself. European integration is considered to be good in itself. Therefore, the parties advocate the creation of strong supra-national institutions, etc. At this point ''a relatively important, if not decisive indicator is the content of communication from the given subject. Its message is the celebration of the European idea, and clearly stresses positive information about the EU'' (Kaniok, 2009:166).

The second category is that of the 'Euro-governmentalists'. Their conceptual base is mainly the inter-governmental paradigm of the integration process. What sets them apart from Europeanists is a more reserved and critical stance towards today's model of integration. Groups that can be labeled as Euro-governmentalistic acknowledge the necessity for and benefits of European cooperation. They are also aware of its limitations. It cannot be said that Euro-governmentalists reject every form of political integration or political cooperation. Cooperation in the area of foreign policy is possible, for example, but only if it is not controlled by a strong and completely independent supranational center. An important aspect of this concept is the acceptance of the idea of European integration, but emphasizing its evolutionary and gradual implementation (Kaniok, 2009:167).

It can be argued that Kaniok has placed the Euro-pragmatists, as Euro-governmentalists in Kopepky and Mudde's typology. However its importance comes from Euro-governmentalists cover a wide range of soft-Euroscepticism which separates them from anti-European to being more pro- European, which makes this typology important in what is currently debated or what these parties call themselves as pro-European realists.

The last category according to Kaniok's typology is the 'Eurosceptics'. At this point, although being against the argument, according to Kaniok, Euroscepticism is located as ''appropriate, although some criticism can be made of the term's misuse, its fuzziness, and its tendency to expand and cover everything'' (Kaniok, 2009:168). Eurosceptics do in fact present a real opposition to European integration as a value. In the sense of the abovementioned typology, no objection can be made to its use. Its definition though may sometimes cause misunderstandings.

This requires answering the question of what has post- national politics to do with Euro-enthusiasts and/or Eurosceptics. It is actually not directly about post-nationalism; however it remains the transformation of nationalism itself. At this point, combining intergovernmentalism with nationalism on the European level has introduced exclusionary Europeanism constituting a strange sort of ''nationalism beyond the nation-state'' (Risse, 2010:231) in which, values are/were traditionally identified with

nationalism are transferred to the European level. Some other scholars name this as ''progressive nationalism'' (*See*, Hanley, 2008:162). However, it is not bounded by the sole nation-state any more.

> Political transformations must meet requirements of publicity, accessibility, and sufficiency, Euroscepticism does not, on the face of it, call for a transformative project of its own; it merely seeks to block the transformation sought by Euro-enthusiasts (Morgan, 2005:57-58).

As emphasized in the aforementioned citation, although carrying a negative connotation with meanings of blocking, resisting etc, in which this work argues quite the opposite, Euroscepticism has positive outcomes on the European integration, in which it is under transformation. First of all, it opens up the European political space not only to the ones in support of, but as well as critical (or at least sceptic towards), by opening up the deliberation of what the EU is, and the beliefs about what it should be in the future which is required for further integration. Through the re-politicization of issues by the Eurosceptics, has opened up a public debate on the EU. The problem at this point stems from the Euro-enthusiasts misreading and their acknowledgement of all forms of scepticism as ''inexorably intertwined, and to locate the Soft Eurosceptics together with the Hard'' (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008:3), although being aware of the fact that ''the major practical proposals toward which Euroscepticism is addressed generally are package deals that raise possibilities for many, if not all, forms of scepticism'' (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008:3). The main reason of this stems from the political elites not debating the motives driving of Euroscepticism and the Euro-enthusiasm, rather approaching the issue through a strategy of ''muting or mitigating intra-party divisions on the EU, in conformity with elite's attempts to de-politicize EU issues'' (Leconte, 2010:114). This is an important fact of classifying these views in academic as well as public debate in an anti- or pro- EU scale, which is a misleading way towards creating an 'other', as if the one's with critics are not the part of this project.

Certainly post-national like local, regional and national, represent political cultures with divergent scopes and degrees of consolidation. However post-nationalism does not aim

to impose a European continent without differences as a popular goal. As a result, it is unreasonable not to debate European issues from both sides whether this be opposing or supporting the issues of EU.

For post-nationalism it is important of articulating and preserving differences to avoid potential repression and manipulation. However, it falls short of reenacting issues, whether to be debated or not, and instead rephrasing them. In the name of the EU this comes to be a reality of 'silencing'. Argued by Risse (2010) ''silencing emerging debates is the failure which fosters Euroscepticism'' (Risse, 2010:8) and populism. This situation is witnessed especially before and after treaty ratifications of the EU. The contents of what the treaties will bring or how they are to change domestic politics for surely are not transmitted to the publics. The lack of information, causing disinformation, becomes vulnerable open to direct manipulation. This was witnessed during the ratification of the Draft Constitution for the EU in France and Netherlands. The debates and discussions in fact went beyond the draft treaty itself, issues like anti-Islamism, opposition towards Turkey, anti-enlargement etc. were highly debated and used in political discourse. In that sense, political parties to large extent political elites in Brussels and in the national capitals are framing the issues which result with the non-politicize EU affairs. This mostly depends on the act and behavior of the Euro-enthusiasts. Although supporting the developments, in the name of integration, they fall short of explaining their reasons of support to the citizens of the EU. According to Hix (2005) they fear losing traditional voters if they clearly articulate their position on EU. The Euro-enthusiasts, which fall directly into the post-national context, act on the belief that the integration process is inevitable and certainly beneficiary to the Member States.

> EU pessimists can still be Europhile in that they believe in the key ideas of European integration underlying the EU, which is about institutionalized cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty and an integrated liberal market economy (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002:301).

In the post-national era, the two forms of power, economic and social, no longer merge as they did in the era of national markets. The appearance of a non-national political

space dominated by the market and by those who control it indicates not only a shift in the coercive measures that power always employs but also in the levels at which power must work in order to be effective. For such a work in progress, as quoted above, there is no need of a full support for the European integration, but only conciliation for common goals, whether this is the Euro-enthusiasts or Eurosceptics. And, as John Agnew argues, ''the transmission of power across space involves practices by intervening others who transform it as it moves from place to place. Not only is the flow of power potentially disrupted in its actual spatial deployment, it is also subject to negotiation and redirection'' (*Cited in* Joan Ramon Resina, 2003:54). However at this point the mainstream parties lowering the salience of European issues, which require more debate and negotiation negates the integration process. For that reason Eurosceptics must not be the only side blamed for slowing down or preventing European integration.

However negotiating at horizontally (at the EU level) or vertically (at domestic levels) opens up room for Euroscepticism in party systems, which is the impact of the institutional environment, what Kitschelt (1986) and Tarrow (1994) term ''political opportunity structures''. It is evident that party systems may play a significant role in either the exaggeration or the minimization of the European issue in different domestic settings, namely the parties located in opposition (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008:7).

The gap between elites and non-elites creates certain logic for national oppositions: in playing the populist card. As the national opposition has no say in the European Council and the Council of Ministers, it will be tempted to blame the EU's decision for the major outcomes which they argue giving harm to domestic issues whether this be causing lack of self-determination, unemployment, cultural threats etc. However, as argued above, although being Eurosceptic, most parties and/or non-party organizations are not anti-European movements. The third chapter will debate party based Euroscepticism in depth. However beforehand, it would be of great help focusing on non-party organizations, to understand the mistake of locating certain Eurosceptic groups as forerunners of anti-Europeanism.

2.2.2.1 Popular Euroscepticism

The public (an individual or group) has the potential of using the term to express ''a critical attitude towards the EU'' (Forster 2002: 1-2). This criticism can be either on further integration, being against a federal Europe, opposing enlargement, or critical towards a specific policy field etc. The question is, do such popular criticisms include the total rejection of EU, or country's withdrawal from the EU. Since, there is no direct measure of popular Euroscepticism, apart from referenda and surveys; it would be helpful, at this point, referencing a Eurobarometer Survey. According the Eurobarometer Surveys (EB 71, 2009) the issue is not rejecting or withdrawal from the EU. As the survey indicates that, in total 53% of EU citizens have stated 'EU membership as a good thing', 28% as 'neither good nor bad', and 15% have responded 'membership as a bad thing'. This brings us to the point of firstly, even if the Euro-enthusiasts are considered in this manner, it would imply that no one, or very few, citizens would be named as non-Eurosceptic, as unconditional, uncritical acceptance of all EU developments is exceptional (*See* Taggart, 1997). And secondly, critical public attitudes may be directed against the particular developments within the European integration process rather than against the whole EU and European integration, and/or membership.

However it was not until the Maastricht Treaty that the popular Euroscepticism was taken into consideration and debated. The Danish and French referenda on the Maastricht treaty revealed the issue to be urgently handled. As apart from the political parties, other platforms were established in the name of criticism. For instance the June Movement and People's Movement in Denmark started campaigning against the Maastricht treaty.

As argued above, Euroscepticisim shows divergence upon which member state it is attributed to. For instance the use of Euroscepticism is not the same whence compared between Britain, the Czech Republic or in Austria. For Britain, named as a 'Eurosceptic state', is for Harmsen and Spiering ''not simply an opposition to the particular institutional forms which have been assumed by the European integration. It is a deeper

sense of a Franco-German dominated Continent as *the other*'' (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004: 16) which can be seen more or less in almost every British party. Or with a more general example, Austria for instance when compared to UK, the Austrian elites in the name of Euroscepticism have nothing to do with a Franco-German dominated EU (as argued by most UK elites), on the contrary they even show some support when it comes to an issue including their neighboring nationals, namely Germans, which is labeled as a kind of ''co-exclusive nationalism''[63], however, they may on the other hand become strict Eurosceptics on issues related with enlargement, namely Turkish accession.

Surveys, such as Eurobarometer poll questions, and the referenda[64] results (as discussed below), gives important clues in the examination of the phenomenon.

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[63] Peter Anderson (2004) defines, *Co-exclusive nationalism'*as ''a form of nationalism which will accept one or just a very few other forms of nationalism as equal or superior, but which regards all other nationalisms as inferior, subsidiary or servile. For instance this type of nationalism might be referenced to the Anglosphere''. ''A Flag of Convenience? Discourse and Motivations of the London-Based Eurosceptic Press'' in **Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration** (eds.) Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, European Studies 20, Amsterdam, 2004. p.153

[64] A number of eight referenda on the EU issues (not including accession referenda) were held in 15 old member states between years 2000 and 2006. Five resulted in a 'no' vote: in 2000 Denmark voted 'no' to the introduction of the single currency; in 2001: Ireland voted 'no' to the Nice Treaty; in 2002: Ireland voted 'yes' to the Nice Treaty; in 2003: Sweden voted 'no' to the introduction of the single currency; in 2005: Spain voted 'yes' to the Constitutional Treaty; in 2005: France voted 'no' to the Constitutional Treaty; in 2005: The Netherlands voted 'no' to the Constitutional Treaty; in 2005: Luxembourg voted 'yes' to the Constitutional Treaty. This is in contrast to the results of the eight referenda prior to 2000, where only one resulted in a 'no' vote. In 1986: Danes accepted the Single European Act; in 1987: the Act was endorsed by the Irish; in 1992: Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty; in 1992: the Irish voted 'yes' to the Maastricht Treaty; in 1992: the French accepted the Treaty; in 1993: Denmark voted 'yes' to the Edinburgh compromise; in 1998: Denmark votes 'yes' to the Amsterdam Treaty; in 1998: the Irish accepted the Amsterdam Treaty. *Cited in*, Catherina Sorensen, ''To Love or Not to Love… Notes on Public Euroscepticism'' in Krisztina Arato and Petr Kaniok, (eds.) **Euroscepticism and European Integration**, Political Science Research Center, 2009, p.77

Figure 2. Support versus opposition in EC/EU countries: EC/EU membership and the unification of Europe, 1953-2009[65]

In the early 1960's an average of more than 70 % of citizens supported their countries membership of the EEC. This support even increased with the enlargement and during the 1970's as a 30 % point increase was seen in the accession states. However, besides the growing support, due to certain crises like the first and second oil shocks the support to the EEC decreased with 10 % in the first and 15 % during the second oil shock. The major decline of support towards the EU began with the pre-Maastricht era starting with the 1990's. The level of support was 57% in 1995 (EU15) (Eurobarometer 43/1, 1995:4). The final results measured in 2010 shows that the support is recently around 49% (Eurobarometer 73, 2010:11). Although there is a steady decrease in support for the EU, one would expect a rise in Eurosceptic parties in the EP elections. Eurosceptics

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[65] Cecile Leconte, **Understanding Euroscepticism**, Palgrave MacMillan, UK, 2010, p.164

have increased their presence only at a minimal degree from 15% to 20% of the parliament (Leconte, 2010:131). Presently there are two party groups in the EP who are named as Eurosceptic, which is discussed in the third chapter.

Apart from being elite or party-based, Euroscepticism emerges also in forms of various Eurosceptic groups of the civil and transnational civil societies, anti-global movements, which appear to be a public/popular Euroscepticism. Just to mention a few organizations, for instance, the *June Movement* established in 1992 was not against Denmark's membership, but was opposing further integration, the *Democracy Movement* which was established in 1998 as a type of a 'non-party campaign' reflecting scepticism towards euro as the 'unique currency', as well as towards the 'Brussels system of government', acknowledging decision making power of the EU non-democratic. When analyzed the group has no anti- flavor, however only criticizing certain aspects of the integration which they find as a serious breach of sovereignty. According to their principles

> Because of our commitment to diversity, democracy, and de-centralization in our continent, we consider ourselves to be the real pro-Europeans in this debate. We believe that those who are trying to construct a pan-European government are working against the interests of all ordinary European people. The more decision-making is centralized in Brussels, the less voting power ordinary European citizens possess. The key contradiction of the EU project is that it seeks to concentrate ever more decision-making power in Brussels when single policies simply cannot suit the different, local needs and aspirations of Europe's diverse countries and people. (DM Statement of Principles, September 2005)[66].

As stated above the group defines itself to be pro- European, and commits itself working towards preventing centralization. It is evident that the group is more in favor of an intergovernmental Europe rather than supranational. However the point is, how can it be labeled as being anti-EU? A similar example is *European No Campaign* known as another network of organization from different parts of Europe.

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[66] Retrieved from, http://www.democracymovement.org.uk/ 28.12.2011

We are also united in the belief that the EU status quo isn't working. Only a wide-ranging reform debate can re-engage Europe's citizens with the EU's institutions, and will enable the EU to meet the challenges of the future. The ENC supporters represent different views on Europe's future. The ENC will not look to influence the reform debate. Its single purpose is to stop the proposed Constitution. What happens afterwards is up to Europe's people and politicians (ENC, Draft Paper by Nov. 2, 2004)[67].

From the quotation the group has a single issue related with the EU, which is the draft constitutional treaty. There aim is to block the ratification of the treaty, however not having the aim of influencing the reforms afterwards. It is evident that the group has no vision for Europe in the future as well. *The European alliance of EU-critical movement's team* appears as another organization consisting of 60 organizations, political parties, and non-parties from more than 20 countries across Europe.

The building of a centralized federal-style EU Super state, with common supranational policies and harmonization in more and more political areas, reduces the power of democratic nation states and the right to self-determination of their citizens. The centralization of more and more power to Brussels and Frankfurt removes decision-making and control from national governments and parliaments – which are democratically accountable to their voters and citizens – to bureaucrats and politicians at EU- level, who decide policy package deals among themselves behind closed doors (EU Critical Movement)[68].

It might be argued that the abovementioned movements are mostly London based or dominated. However, if enlarged, same findings can be seen in arguments from other NGO's as well. For instance, one of these which has recently managed to capture attention (not limited to Europe but worldwide), is the Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and for Civic Action (ATTAC) known as an international organization. It put forths the same arguments (with the movements listed above) however does not give an alternative strategy, which brings the issue to the question of

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[67] Retrieved from, http://www.europeannocampaign.com/download.html 27.12.2011
[68] Retrieved from; http://www.teameurope.info/node/12 25.12.2011

how to evaluate these movements criticism, as part of a reformist strategy, or as an anti-system principled opposition. Or Open Europe, which is known mostly as London based, has offices in both Brussels and Berlin trying to lobby the European debates and affairs. For that reason, it is important to argue that, these NGO's, think-tanks and movements are not only limited within their national arena, but trying to establish connections across Europe.

Contrary when analyzed, pro-EU movements or NGO's committed to the European integration share certain similarities with Eurosceptic groups. For instance the Flash-Back group of artists located in Denmark shared their Manifesto for a call to European artists willing to work for Europe in 2010 stating that;

> Flash- Back is a new European venture in the international art world for developing the creative democratic conscience. With our basis in Augustiana we wish to develop and intensify an exchange co-operation with life artists in the EU who wish to work for the democratic free meeting in a time where fear has become the narrow-minded incentive in all political decisions. Augustiana will be the centre of this European co-operation where we artists will work with important themes for the development of an international co-existence with man in the centre- not only within the EU but for a global democratic EU in contrast to the present political EU (Jan Jenson, Flash-back Manifesto, 2010).

As stated above, currently whether it is Euro-enthusiasm or Euroscepticism, the main lines of critic towards the EU stems from lack of democracy and accountability. Therefore it is important, whether to define European integration as a process that leaves significant powers in the hands of national governments as part of intergovernmentalism, or whether to consider mere opposition to the current supra-national tendency of the integration process as a sign of Euroscepticism and keep on labeling these Eurosceptics as anti- EU movements or politics (Kaniok, 2009:165). However, one of the positions of Euroscepticism related with the post-national dimension within this thesis, is that, Euroscepticism itself contains diversity rather than

a monotypic political movement, defined as ''an organization of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity''[69] (Hannerz, 1990:237) including not only political parties but as well as different views and critics from labor unions, youth organizations, women's movements to even local charities whom are very different in character however find common grounds on what they agree to defend in a Eurosceptic way.

Most of the data explaining the rise of Euroscepticism underline the still existing divide between a more Euro-optimist attitude of the elites and a more Euro-pessimist attitude of the non-elites. In the late 1990s, the gap between the elites and public opinion became deeper. The clear majority among the national elites (defined as political, administrative, socio-economic, media and cultural elites) saw the EU membership of their respective countries positive and backed the view that their countries profited from membership. Public opinion had the opposite view: a majority saw membership and benefits negative (with diverging reasons) (Hooghe and Marks, 2006: 249). This is understandable from the abovementioned reason on the government parties vs. opposition parties at domestic level.

2.2.2.2 Party-based Euroscepticism

It is obvious that the Eurosceptic politics rely both on left and rightist politics, as well as the one's rejecting these labels, such as the Lega Nord, Front National discussed in the third chapter (this even diverges among different rightist and leftist parties located in the Member States) though with different projects. Euroscepticism today is primarily fed by traditionalist far-right parties which articulate cultural concerns about the erosion of their national identities, however in the Nordic countries there is a strong leftist opposition to the EU, which is primarily related to ''socio-economic concerns of the negative integration which is thought to deteriorate the Nordic welfare model'' (Hooghe and Marks, 2009:18 *Cited in* Papadopoulos and Magnette, 2010:718). The left side

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[69] Hannerz marks this definition to a world culture under a global outlook, however the perspective is applied and used here to define Euroscepticism having the same character under the banner Unity in diversity. Ulf Hannerz, ''**Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture**'', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 7, 1990, p.237

opposition mostly stems from economic liberalism and towards the capitalist state which they argue is dividing as well as widening the winners and losers in society.

However, how do these aforementioned factors determine policy agendas in European politics? There is a need of detailing the party politics and how the aforementioned approaches try explaining their political behavior in this context; this will be left to be discussed in the next chapter through analyzing the two political party groups located in the European Parliament.

However, a grouping on party-based Euroscepticism is Taggart's ''four manifestations of Euroscepticism'' is important which can be fetched in; - single issue anti-EU parties, - protest parties that include Euro-scepticism, - established parties with Euro-sceptic positions, and − Euro-sceptic factions within mainstream parties (Taggart, 1998:368-369).

The single-issue Eurosceptic parties are known to be strictly opposing the whole European integration, in that sense they use Euroscepticism in the name of mobilizing the electorate in their cause (June Movement, People's Movement). Protest based parties are in general opposed to the functioning of the political systems; the reason why they oppose the EU is that they acknowledge the EU as being a part of this corrupted system (Swedish Green Party, French Communist Party). Established parties with Eurosceptical positions include parties being in office (or having the potential of), containing Eurosceptic attitude (Lega Nord). And finally Eurosceptical factions are found in an existing party expressing opposition while the party overall expresses support for the EU (Labor Party in UK).

Firstly, when analyzed, the catch-all parties, which are competing on the mainstream dimension, are the ones with a minor potential for being or containing party-based Euroscepticism. This strategy involves maximizing votes and prioritizing the goal of office, while playing down ideology and policy commitments. When parties take part in government, adopting a principled stance against the European integration is

problematic. Moderate Euroscepticism in the form of opposition to specific policy proposals is another matter. Even this is more difficult when in government, as parties have to defend compromises they engage in with other government partners. However, this is completely different when in opposition, as the degree of Euroscepticism depends on the strategy for competition (Sitter, 2009:255).

Secondly, the parties which compete across the mainstream dimension are closer for containing both soft and harder criticisms towards the European integration. These parties, which can be a single-issue, protest or anti-EU, confront a fundamental dilemma of whether they are to shape the main dimension of the party system, or to split out of it. According to Sitter many of these parties have chosen the latter, mobilizing voters along cross-cutting cleavages or policy dimensions. The central point of this attitude is that Euroscepticism, according to these parties, is related to territorial, cultural or economic opposition, not merely cleavages or parties (Sitter, 2009:255-256), for instance in the case of UKIP and the Lega Nord.

Other such parties acknowledge the EU as a useful braking on the national government, which most ethnic and regionalist party's fall into this category, like the Scottish National Party, Basque National Party etc. whom are favoring the EU. These parties have the potential to recognize that nation-spaces are complex arenas where questions of race, class, gender, and nation are in constant conflict. They reject traditional notions of statehood and actively work against ''obscurantist politics based on a history of origins'' (Chowdhury, 2002). In this sense, if analyzed from the view of these namely 'ethno-regionalist' parties, the EU is supporting their regional cause (the Europe of Regions). The European integration has opened up the way or has made it easier for regional autonomies to represent themselves in the right of 'nation-regions'.

> With the institutionalization of the Committee of the Regions, subsidiarity became bound to the European polity project and today it is undeniable that Europe has provided one of the stimuli for bottom up regionalism emboldening regions, and more specifically, ethno-regionalist political actors within those regions to assert

for their territorial autonomy by opening quasi-embassies, enabling even some of them to get into para-diplomatic activities (Antunes, 2010).

As can be understood from the above quotation, the EU is itself working towards supporting the regions of Europe and considering their political and/or cultural demands as important, rather than the arguments put forth by their national governments. The idea related with the patterns of party-based Euroscepticism are therefore based on a model of Euroscepticism as the politics of opposition, where patterns of competition shape the translation of the European question into party politics. First, principled 'hard' Euroscepticism is not expected in catch-all parties that compete along the main (socio-economic) left-right dimension; although the softening of policy-based opposition to aspects of European integration may be expected, especially when a party is out of office, for instance mostly seen in the UK. Second, interest or value-based parties' tendency towards Euroscepticism are driven by the extent to which they perceive the state as their ally or a threat, such as in the case of Lega Nord, or whether their core policy preferences are compatible with the relevant EU policies (Sitter, 2009:256). Third, populist anti-establishment stances link the new politics and new populist parties to Euroscepticism, which remains more to confusion.

Finally, Eurosceptic parties at recent times modify or avoid Euroscepticism to the extent that they aspire to, or actually participate in governing coalitions. This reflects the dynamic element in the model: changes in the party-based Euroscepticism develop as strategies of opposition and coalition building, under certain issues arising from the national and EU level (further detailed in the third chapter).

As argued earlier, the Eurosceptic attitude in the EU15 Member States is more understandable when compared with the recent enlargements. As the EU15 up to the 2000's had to face rapid transformation due to the treaties adopted, which caused serious problems in government (coalition) and between opposition. However, analyzing the new comers in this manner appears to be confusing, on the Eurosceptic attitudes arising from these countries. That is why; there is a need of a clear-cut of

party-based Euroscepticism. In order for a classification Kopecky and Mudde have introduced a typology of party attitudes towards Europe. As seen in the table below, party-based Euroscepticism is pro-integration in nature however critical (according to the typology they are defined as anti-trajectory however I do not agree with it, and will instead use the wording critical) of the current and future trajectory of the integration. This typology helps us understand the logic behind the Euroscepticisms, as discussed above, which are more sceptic towards the trajectory of the integration rather than the current EU itself.

Table 4. *Typology of Party Positions on Europe*[70]

Euro-enthusiasts (pro-integration, trajectory)	Euro-pragmatists (anti-integration, pro-trajectory)
Eurosceptics (pro-integration, anti-trajectory)	Eurorejects (anti-integration, anti-trajectory)

According to the typology above, the Czech Civic Democratic Party known to be a Eurosceptic party (although the Party claims to identify itself as Euro-realist) seated in the European Conservatives and Reformists group (discussed in the third chapter) is a pro-integrationist party, however anti- in EU's future trajectory (Szczerbiak Taggart, 2008:246), the same example can be seen in the UKIP, which is the dominant party of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group. These parties although criticizing are not opposing the European integration. Recently in 2010 two Members of the European Parliament (MEP) (Nikki Sinclaire and Mike Nattrass) from the UKIP party left the EFD group, stating that ''the majority of EFD group want to stay in the EU, however, we believe that we should leave'' (Lynch et al., 2011:7). This result provides evidence of the difficulties Eurosceptic parties must overcome to make a real impact in

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[70] P. Kopecky and C. Mudde, ''**The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe**'', *European Union Politics*, 3, 2002: 297–326, p.303

the EP. Such problems include the ideological and/or strategic heterogeneity of Eurosceptic views, divisions between 'soft' and 'hard' types of Euroscepticism, the divergence of Eurosceptic party groups.

Another Eurosceptic party the DPP, located in the EFD group in the EP argues in the party's working program that;

> Immigration from countries that are far away from Danish and European culture and way of life' – groups that are 'impossible to integrate in Danish society'. Due to high birth rates, marriages and family reunions, this 'can transform Danes into a minority in Denmark within the 21st century (Andersen, 2007:107).

The abovementioned quotation marks the party's opposition towards immigration and multiculturalism, however, related with the EU makes reference to a 'European culture and way of life'. This brings the issue, stated earlier in the first chapter, to nativism, which becomes embracing European values, traditions etc. however with a 'selective exclusion' precluding other types of immigrants, namely from Asia or Africa. The party's working program also includes the fear of ''European Unionization' which is suppressing national self-determination'' (Andersen, 2007:107). Another Eurosceptic party close to the views of the abovementioned Danish People's Party was the Pim Fortuyn List in Netherlands (dissolved in 2008). The party leader Pim Fortuyn, although a Eurosceptic, was committed to the European integration. The party supports the underlying values of European integration. Fortuyn in one of his speeches summarized his European vision as: ''I am a loyal supporter of the EU, but while retaining [the Dutch] identity and where possible while retaining sovereignty'' (Mudde, 2007:217). As understood from the above statement, as one of the vehement Eurosceptics Fortuyn commits himself to the European integration however reserves the issues of identity and sovereignty.

At this point, to be more specific, the typology of which Flood (2002) has introduced might be more helpful, which breaks down the issue to six categories. According to

Flood there are six categories in which the party's may be located according to their views towards the EU. It is important to stress that Flood avoids using the term Euroscepticism in his typology; there is a six group classification in his work as;

_ *Rejectionist*: Positions opposed to *either* (*a*) membership of the EU *or* (*b*) participation in some particular institution or policy.

_ *Revisionist*: Positions in favor of a return to the state of affairs before some major treaty revision *either* (*a*) in relation to the entire configuration of the EU *or* (*b*) in relation to one or more policy areas.

_ *Minimalist*: Positions accepting the status quo but resisting further integration *either* (*a*) of the entire structure *or* (*b*) of some particular policy area(s).

_ *Gradualist*: Positions supporting further integration *either* (*a*) of the system as a whole *or* (*b*) in some particular policy area(s), so long as the process is taken slowly and with great care.

_ *Reformist*: Positions of constructive engagement, emphasizing the need to improve one or more existing institutions and/or practices.

_ *Maximalist*: Positions in favor of pushing forward with the existing processes as rapidly as is practicable towards higher levels of integration *either* (*a*) of the overall structure *or* (*b*) in some particular policy areas (all emphases in the original) (Flood, 2002:5).

Apart from Kopecky and Mudde, the typology introduced by Flood, is more suitable for understanding party-based Euroscepticism, rather than popular or public Euroscepticism. This typology would be detailed further in chapter three analyzing the party attitudes and their discourses, because it approaches attitudes towards the integration more technical and specifically, however still acknowledged as Eurosceptic their stances will be broken down into these positions. Besides certain classifications as stated above, there are shifts in party positions in Member States and this classification will help understand the shifts of party attitudes in a more flexible manner.

A shift can be seen in political parties over time reflecting different attitudes throughout the integration process. For instance the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) was a supporter of Austria becoming a member of the EEC in the 1950's and 1960's, however recently it now reflects a hard Eurosceptic position towards the EU. This was even the opposite when the party entered a coalition with the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) in 2000, being a part of the government it had to soften its hard racist discourse or attitude (due to pressure from the rest of the Member States). For instance the coalition government had to issue a declaration in the name of convincing the EU as;

> Our government programme identifies itself resolutely with Europe and with the fundamental values which characterize the new Europe. We are Austrians and we are European and proud of it. The Austrian population has expressed this in the last five years and in the high electoral vote for the membership (….) There is no alternative to the participation in the EU. Participation in the monetary union was the last important progress. (…) And Austria has another unique historical opportunity with the enlargement of the European Union. (…) The federal government strongly commits to a common security and defense policy and to peace in Europe' (ÖVP-FPÖ Policy Statement, 2000 *Cited in* Meret, 2009:204).

That is why, it is important to stress that Eurosceptic parties usually pick up issues which other parties do not mention, or do not attribute much importance. They try to influence the voters with these untouched issues. However the question is how long could this strategy be maintained and more importantly what the parties confront when getting under government responsibility as in the abovementioned case of FPÖ. More importantly, as a hard Eurosceptic party the FPÖ does not reject the European integration, neither claims withdrawal. The party's official programme demonstrates that ''the future of Europe lies in the close cooperation of its peoples […] The European Union is only one part of the European reality. It should not develop to a European federal state but to a confederation of states'' (FPÖ Party Programme, 2007 *Cited in* Meret, 2009:204). As understood from the party programme, the party supports cooperation however is critical of the future trajectory on deepening and widening.

Another important aspect touched by the party is that, it evaluates the EU only one part of the European reality. This is important as it makes reference to the 'European' sphere where it attributes importance to other ways of cooperation.

Not just the FPÖ but the whole stream of political parties in Austria has shifted their positions on the subject of EU. In the past the left wing was critical of the EEC due to neutrality, however it is now the right wing reflecting resistance (Pelinka, 2004:213). That is why; parties attitudes related with EU issues can not be predicted easily in a left/right dimension. For Hooghe (2007) this is acknowledged as ''…parties may shift positions on Europe as they go in and out of government, scent electoral gain, and use Europe as a lever to exploit dissent in their opponents, or as a strategy to alter the political agenda'' (Hooghe, 2007:7).

According to Taggart's suggestion, party-based Euroscepticism is not only a product of policy positions and identity or values, but also the parties itself, which these parties locate themselves in the line of 'relative position in the political system'. The European issues therefore provides a potential standard for domestic attitudes varying from ideological opposition (although strategically driven as argued above) on the part of protest parties to leadership struggles within established core parties. Euroscepticism covers a wide range of political strategies for opposition, and its translation into party politics depends on the structure of the party system in general and competition between governments and different forms of opposition in particular (Sitter, 2002:11). That is why; the next chapter debates the question of how Euroscepticism shapes party attitudes at national and EU level.

However, before proceeding to this question, there is a need of a distinction between the Eurosceptic parties at both national and EU level (as discussed in the third chapter) and what is named as the populist, ultra nationalist parties. Euroscepticism and populism are two distinct phenomena. Populism is a concept difficult to define as it varies with depth across countries. However, there are common political attitudes on which populism

flourishes. It is related with the traditional politics put forth by the conservatives when stressing the defense of the tradition, culture etc. and similarly defended by the far-right parties. For instance Betz in defining populism argues that it is ''the mobilization of resentment'' (*See* Betz, 1993) and this resentment is directed firstly towards established political parties and, secondly towards immigrants, foreigners and refugees (Howard, 2000:19).

Becuase populists claim ''legitimacy on the grounds that they speak for the people: that is to say, they claim to represent the democratic sovereign, not a sectional interest'' (Canovan, 1999:5) like a specific class or group. Contrary Euroscepitcs admit a fragmentation and acknowledge that there arguments put forth are only one in a competing environment. However, applying populism at EU level is not much credible for these parties. As the issue of differentiation becomes more problematic when grasping a 'European' context on who is foreign and who is not. Examples can be seen in the speeches made by the extremist party leaders in the past, such as Jörg Haider, and Jean Marie Le Pen, what they put forth, in the name of Euroscepticism is anti-establishment, anti-Islamic arguments, in which non of these are directly related with the EU. This leads to the abuse of the concept scepticism itself, because they have no direct argument, claim or critic against directly the EU, other than being 'a wrong project which has already gone too far'. There so-called European political rhetoric, including election manifestos, public speeches fall directly into a national framework as if they are competing in a national election rather than European. This causes two important results. The first is what Hartleb argues is that ''linking certain irrelevant issues to Euroscepticism only serves to normatively charge the term of Euroscepticism in a negative and generalizing manner'' (Hartleb, 2011:1-2). This shadows the legitimate and necessary criticisms of many problems of the EU such like Euro-zone crisis and the bailouts, the ongoing debates on democratic deficit, issues related with enlargement etc.

It is important to evaluate whether the opposition or critic makes good reasoning, leading to good decision as well as contributing to the European integration in democratic terms. As the Eurosceptic party groups analyzed in the final chapter, do

have critics about the European integration, however put forth these arguments in either a redemptive or pragmatic interpretation of democracy at EU level. As argued by British Foreign Minister William Hague ''people feel that in too many ways the EU is something that is done to them, not something over which they have a say'' (Public Speech at pro-democracy Koerber Foundation, October 22, 2012). However, when analyzed, the abovementioned populist parties lack such depth, not only at national but also at EU level, as they become marginalized with their racist and xenophobic discourse. Fennema and Maussen argue that most of these parties aggressively claim to speak in the name of their nation while excluding the opponents, they establish, flourish in a democratic environment, however, do not reflect the democratic traditions like accountable representation, deliberative character, mutual respect etc (2000:396). That is why, this results with not becoming a part of a Euro-party, becoming marginal and choosing absentee as exit strategy in the EP (*See* Nathalie Brack et al., 2012) as racism and xenophobia do not lend themselves well to transnational coalition building and apart from EU level, they also remain incompatible at national level. Parties like the Front National (France), Austria Freedom Party, and Pim Fortuyn List can be evaluated in this framework.

However, as argued in chapter three, the Eurosceptic movement and the Eurosceptic parties have and are developing a more coherent opposition form especially after the 2004 European Parliament elections. Their arguments and critics towards the integration are becoming salient under three issues; democratic deficit, sovereignty and anti-immigration, and even though some build anti-Islamic sentiments like the DPP or LN their arguments are rendered in to a general Eurosceptic position at EU level. They find common grounds in the name of criticizing the integration and developing cross party attitudes in referencing their views for justifying their causes.

2.3 The Eurosceptic challenge and the Dilemma of post-nationl European Integration

As argued above, Euroscepticism has become an important indicator in shaping European politics, and the way the integration is preceding. At this point, for the sake of my argument, there is a need of focusing on the question of what has Euroscepticism to do with post-nationalism? Recently, if we are emerging an era of post-national (assuming the weakening of the nation-state), this is a result of an environment of different competing strategies, not solely of ideologies, in which one of them is nationalism. And as a result of this weakening, which has been argued to become thinner (though not directly abandoning national identity/identification) discussed in the first chapter, there is an emergence of a post-national level. According to Shabani ''the national arenas can be so opened up to each other that a self-propelling process of shared political opinion and will formation on European issues can develop above the national level'' (Shabani, 2006:704-705). This 'political opinion' and/or 'will formation' does not only refer to supporting the EU or being against, it can also include certain criticism and opposition towards specific policies. Because citizens perceptions towards the EU (ongoing integration process), and/or towards specific political or institutional developments are in turn effecting and influencing the political parties no matter if they are in government office or not.

Actually such a process of political opinion is evolving in European politics especially after the Maastricht era. That is why; post-nationalism should not be seen as only instituting individual rights as argued by Soysal (1995) or institutional competences and/or campaigns among anti- vs. pro-Europeans. It is also about the ways in which citizens can influence the interpretation, development, and revision of these attitudes or facts (Shabani, 2006:708) such like, public Euroscepticism towards further integration, or a 'No' voting in a referendum such as 'Yes to Europe, No for Maastricht'.

Tackling post-nationalism in Europe requires attention to the European integration, and this leads to analyzing the attitudes towards the integration in which appears to be post-

national in its nature. The questions of *why* and *how* will be answered under three points which help understanding Euroscepticism, and how this contributes to the post-national dimension. Firstly, nearly in all EU member states (with a few exceptions) plus non-EU (Norway and Switzerland) and candidate (Turkey) both Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm can be witnessed. It can not be adhered to one or a few member states solely which makes it significantly important. That is why, ''societies have to consider nationals of other states when addressing issues of solidarity, identity, and redistribution'' (Telo, 2001 *Cited in* Warleigh, 2003:7), and as a result of this, may find that ''their own preferences are only one, relatively small, part of the issues that policy makers from their own state must examine'' (Telo, 2001 *Cited in* Warleigh, 2003:7) this might seem increasing the scope of Euroscepticism. However, not agreeing with Telo at this point, it is important to mark a different perspective. The societies (at least a fragment of it) are defending the thought of their 'preferences as being one, relatively small part of the issue' however it is becoming wider, exceeding the national arena in becoming transnational when it is surfaced at European level. It is shared by others (nationals from other states) with the same interests or contrary developing common grounds of being against. For instance, as argued by Hix ''left-wing British citizens and right wing French citizens are the policy winners while right-wing British citizens and left wing French citizens are the policy losers from the EU'' (2008:65). An example supporting this argument is, Nigel Farage (leader of UKIP) has demonstrated that his party and the French Communist party were celebrating the rejection of the European Constitution treaty in Paris (Nigel Farage, Speech at the pro-Europa Christiana Federation, May 31, 2011). Assuming European politics to be mostly centrist, it can develop resistance either from the right and left, and even develop a co-operation among them like the example above.

This brings the issue to the competing strategies; pushing for deeper integration, or on the other hand resisting or abstaining from it. It is evident that European integration in it's ''various aspects, whether economic, cultural or political, results in a diversity of forms for different members of the national community'' (ex new forms of conflict are created) (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, 2011:2-3). Risse (2003) defines this as a must in the

name of a European public sphere, which this thesis assumes as already functioning in a post-national integration.

> Contestation is a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of a European public sphere rather than an indicator for its absence. … If political issues are not contested, if European politics remains the business of elites, the attention level for Europe and the EU will remain low. European issues must become salient and significant in the various public debates so that a European public sphere can emerge (Risse, 2003:6).

However, more importantly is that, these competing interests push aside the 'national' rhetoric to justify the cause in a European sphere which becomes post-national including 'diverse human coalitions and projects' becoming useless to make a distinction among national and non-national, like the example mentioned above between French left and British right. For Trandafoiu (2006);

> Micro politics discuss events that all have a European significance, simultaneously, and with cross national references. So despite widespread worries about overwhelming scepticism and the future of the European project, several counter points need to be raised (Trandafoiu, 2006:97).

For Bartolini who makes reference to *pro* and *anti-* Europeanism emphasizes that ''In the European post-war electoral history there is no other single theme which has had similar large and standardizing effects across the European party system'' (Bartolini, 2005:319). This sets out how widely these attitudes are used, accepted, and manipulated in contemporary European politics. That is why, identifying Euroscepticism with nationalism and/or evaluating as a dimension within a (re)-nationalization project, is misleading. It can not be reduced to a couple of Member States attitudes with a nationalist dimension. As stated above, the 'integration process in a diversity of forms is different for members of the national Member States'. The Eurosceptic phenomenon has been emerged with the forms of unsatisfaction with the integration process, rather than built on nationalist causes (lacking a nation wide congruency).

On the other hand it can not be addressed to the whole nation as well. It is important to remind here that, one of the fundamental objectives of both Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm is how they represent the citizen's interests, rather than the nation. And, as a result of this, citizens choose the best party whom represent their aspirations, wishes or interests, and it is this point of choice which is argued as the emerging post-national level which exceeds the national and/or cultural codes. According to Hix (2008) it is accepted as the way of the ''maturation of the EU's political system'' (*See* Simon Hix, 2008). A counter argument for this is that ''the terms of party competition have not yet been altered by European integration; a pro- / anti integration cleavage shows no signs of superseding the existing national-level patterns of politically relevant cleavages…'' (Harmsen and Spiering 2004:21). However, is there a need of a pro- / anti cleavage for understanding European politics? Is it possible to acknowledge the diverse views in a single perspective or in a holistic approach? For Harmsen (2010) this is to ''understand Euroscepticism in relational terms – i.e. relative not to fixed boundaries or categories, but as particular junctures within the context of necessarily fluid situations'' (Harmsen, 2010:336). As mentioned above parties shift positions very often when they face certain issues arising from the European integration, therefore it is impossible to locate them on a pro-/anti scale. For Sitter (2002) the reason of this is;

> …parties translation of questions and/or issues of European integration into party competition, and this is why attitudes are dynamic, they become largely linked to the contextual situation of challenges and opportunities open to parties at different points in time (*Cited in* Conti, 2003:8-9).

Some scholars (Crespy and Petithomme, 2009; Kopecky and Mudde 2002) share the same views and stress that, there is need of extending this issue beyond the binary vision of a pro- anti- EU position. They argue that these competing views on the European project, with the deepening of the EU (political and institutional), have engaged with different kinds of critics towards the integration with the increasing of political areas touched by the EU (Brack and Costa, 2012:105). For instance, issues like environment, sustainable development, migration, and democracy etc. are touched by all the Euro-parties from Euro-enthusiasts to Eurosceptics.

The argument put forth within this thesis does not find the pro/anti EU classification useful. However, instead argue that Euroscepticism is itself an important indicator of an emerging political cleavage in European politics which completes the political debate along with the Euro-enthusiasts. For Kriesi (2007) it constitutes part of an emerging cleavage, in the Rokkanian sense, that it is transforming the political space in Western Europe. For Kriesi European integration requires to be considered in the larger picture of globalization as well as 'denationalization'. More importantly Kriesi rejects the perception of Euroscepticism as purely opposition and puts forth the argument that ''Euroscepticism itself is an emerging new cleavage in European politics'' (2007:84-91).

It is evident that, Euroscepticism exceeds national, ethnic and social cleavages which cause more fragmentation. Since, Eurosceptics themselves are also in search of prosperity and security, like the Euro-enthusiasts, however contrary to them, Eurosceptics argue this in an 'in *Europe*' principle not '*for Europe*' like Euro-enthusiasts. Considering this as a movement or at party level, whether it is Euroscepticism or Euro-enthusiasm, the ultimate aim is to convince the electorate of the EU on what is right or wrong in the name of European integration. It is for sure early to speak of a European society, which the EU is still perceived as a community[71], however it is clear that the abovementioned movements are dismantling the society in the Member States. That is why; Hix (1999) argues that;

> EU-related interests of social groups is bound to be fragmented. Intra-class or intra-sector alliances are unlikely to hold since they come to be divided respectively on the national/territorial cleavage and on the socio-economic cleavage (*Cited in* Conti, 2003:5).

At this point to better understand Euroscepticism, as mentioned in the first chapter, Euroscepticism does not feed from a consistent ideology, (remains a cross cutting phenomenon) which actually justifies the arguments of 'weakening of ideologies' which

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[71] According to Deutsch (1957) the concept ''*Community* in the EU framework is mostly referenced to international relations. It is acknowledged as society is understood in the realm of the nation-state while community refers something transcendent and elusive''. *Cited in* Delanty (2000) **Modernity and Postmodernity**, Sage Publications, London, p.120-121

is currently challenged by diversity of political views. It is obvious that, whether this is the west or the Eastern Europe (plus the non-EU members), the Eurosceptic phenomenon has affected party competition more than any other single issue in the last couple of decades. According to Nick Sitter, (2002) ''it has been incorporated into party platforms, deliberately ignored or circumvented by the use of referendums; it has divided several parties, and has even contributed directly to the collapse of a handful of governments'' (Sitter, 2002:5). It is more interesting that, apart from the EU, Euroscepticism under divergence of views also grasps other International Organizations like the IMF or WTO. For instance, the Eurosceptics, form opposition towards certain interference of IMF into the EU political economy, or the ongoing criticism of the power of the European Commission in the WTO negotiations. There are important hints that reflect the presence of Euroscepticism in a wider picture, namely globalization. According to Kriesi (2005);

> The mobilization of the potential winners and losers of this new structural conflict between 'integration' (into the European or global community) and 'demarcation' (of the national community) by the political parties is expected to have a profound impact on the national party systems'. Here party alignments are shaped by a new structural conflict whereby the winners and losers of globalization compete over its consequences in politics (a supra-national authority challenge), economics (a market liberalization challenge) and culture (an immigration challenge) (*Cited in* Statham and Trenz, 2013:110).

However counter to these arguments, the question still tackled, is, how powerful are these current phenomena in creating identities? The argument put forth within this thesis, whether it is Euroscepticism or Euro-enthusiasm, the goal is not of identity construction, but how to engage people in a common interest with improving a social and political consciousness above the national level. What is developing from these movements is not a denial of European integration, but rather a reformulation of it. And, it is this contestation creating the consciousness in the minds of the masses, as every issue debated among the societies of the Member States includes a European reference. Secondly, although these attitudes appear in a bottom-up process, it is rather top-down.

Since either Euroscepticism or Euro-enthusiasm are results of, or a reaction to the steps taken at supranational level in the name of integration. Hooghe explains this as; ''In the early decades of European integration Euroscepticism was rooted in opposition to market integration, since the Maastricht Treaty, it has taken on the role of defending the national community'' (Hooghe, 2007:7). However, there are also the ones whom are insisting on the uselessness of defending the 'nation'. Through the integration process these attitudes do show divergence in their rhetoric as well as in the Member State which is under subject. For Marks (2004)

> In the 1980s, European integration was essentially a market-making project, favored by the right, less so by the left. By the turn of the century, the situation was reversed, as left-leaning policies, such as environmental policy, social policy, and employment policy came on the agenda (Marks, 2004:235).

As new issues and policy areas arrive to the EU agenda, it is evident that attitudes towards Europe have become more composite leading towards to an expansion of the positions defended by the Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics. As argued in the first chapter post-national and post-modern politics require or have to be constantly thematized with the increasing level of trans-nationalism and/or globalization, it is a Eurosceptic attitude leading to different themes throughout the integration process with a loading of diverging reasons to such a resistance, or contrary the various reasons of support by the Euro-enthusiasts, becoming ''trans-thematic links'' (Porta and Tarrow, 2005:9) which are ''new choices and constraints implied by membership'' (Marks, et al., 2006:170). As new policy issues are becoming a part of the EU and to fall under the co-decision procedure like the common market, health, research, employment etc. the parties as well as the citizens diverge regarding their interests. However, issues, at the same time give birth to common views such as anti-immigration, sovereignty or the value of democracy mostly underlined and shared by Eurosceptic parties (detailed in the third chapter). These issues, thanks to the Eurosceptic parties, are becoming important debates at EU level exceeding the national.

That is why conflicts, contestation, or certain strategically defined politics are also reshaped at supranational level according to the direction in which the EU is heading towards. Certainly it is the Member States (governments) which decide upon such

directions in which the integration will be pushed towards. Helbling, et al., (2010) states this process as 'framing' of the political parties in which ''To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation'' (2010:498-499). However this process sooner or later grasps other agents such like the Citizens of Europe, social movements, interests groups, members of the European Parliament, national political parties etc in a so-called melting pot reflecting their own resistance or favoring European attitudes which results with reversing the issue back to the decision-makers (governments of the Member States) responding to the issue in order for a make up. This ''forms an important link between the events of politics and the behavior of individuals in reaction to those events'' (Verba, 1965:516 *Cited in* Sara De Master, 2000:422). This ends up with a widening gap between the politics of the state (governing party) and the choices of the opposition (parties) which ends up leading to Euroscepticism or Euro-enthusiasm. The well known thesis of Huntington ''ideas versus institutions'' (*Cited in* Müller, 2012:76) puts forth similar arguments. In the case of Euroscepticism the issue results in a clash between both national and transnational institutions and a divergence of ideas carried out by political parties. This opens up the fragmentation caused by the integration process.

Approaching the post-national level does not signify establishing a common ground in the name of the 'nation' as a single unit. That is why, Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm are both the strength and weakness of the political actors whom are either united and/or confront each other, more importantly, shaping the political developments and the direction of the integration. However, Euroscepticism plays an important role within this process, referencing to European issues and bringing them directly to the national level, contributes to firstly the domestication of the issues previously ignored by the public and, secondly to make them answered or responded by the Euro-enthusiasts, which is urgently required for the governments to make themselves clear on these issues and to make the citizens understand and make their choices on either public sanctioning or supporting European issues (Topaloff, 2012:7). However, this process

sometimes develops into opposite dimensions. The Eurosceptic parties' attitudes lead to affecting other parties' attitudes, according to Bale (2005);

> …traditional centre-right wing parties (mostly liberals and conservatives) – particularly on immigration policy and law and order – have started to inhabit and promote parts of the same discursive and rhetoric universe, which before was almost exclusively the domain of the radical right agenda (Bale, 2005:235-236).

As quoted above, this spread of politics leads to the perception of the rising tide of racism and/or xenophobia in the Member States, however it is not directly related with that. The centre right or left usually choose this strategic attitude for receiving votes from the marginal parties, rather than reflecting this attitude as a core policy of their political ideology.

Political parties (in office) through the European Council provide the instruments at first hand in delivering them up to the EU level, (though the initiator is the European Commission) which are shaped in becoming an EU law or a piece of legislation (alongside with the EU Parliament) and, finally translated into politics at national level resulting either in a full support, opposition, or maybe even both. In Shaw's words this multi-level administration is ''the institutional dimension of handling and managing power in a world where states are highly interdependent and are not the only *loci* and *foci* of political activity and processes'' (Shaw, 1999:9). Shaw makes reference especially to the market management dimension. A similar point is acknowledged by Steenbergen (2007) as;

> First, political elites can adopt whatever position the mass public takes on European integration. This bottom-up connection – Carrubba (2001) calls it an 'electoral connection' – assures correspondence between masses and elites through a process of representation. Second, mass publics can adopt the positions of the political elites. This top-down process assures correspondence between masses and elites through a process of information and persuasion (Steenbergen et al., 2007:14).

And thirdly, the post- national attitudes include both elites at national and supranational level, as well as the individuals solely with different outcomes for each of them. It has created the space for supranational actors to show presence (Porta and Caiani, 2009: 169) resulting in competition, cooperation, and dissatisfaction. All these reactions lead to ''a political attitude *negatively or positively* which is corresponding to the emergence of the new political bodies in the wake of economic globalization'' (Resina, 2002:377). These consequences are for surely not the same for all Member States as well as for the members of the communities. However what they finally evoke is new disparities, oppositions and new forms of competition both within and between national communities.

> This situation opens broader spaces for those political movements and entrepreneurs who do not accept the responsibility for the systemic compatibility of the integration process and appeal to voters on nationalistic, protectionist, solidarity, and security issues, cemented by a common distrust of European integration and its anonymous, techno-bureaucratic and distal rule (Bartolini, 2005:320).

This is about the forces of the European integration as well as globalization. Parties which do not adapt to the changes introduced by these processes (regionalism, globalization etc.) develop discourses towards or against them, stick themselves to national backlash attitude (economic or political) in the name of manipulating masses. However, their use of national discourse contains contradictions, making references to the need of States of Europe to cooperate, and making references to the European civilization, values, culture however, still putting forth the issue of 'otherness' in the name of cultural differentialism. However in doing this and targeting specific groups such like Muslims or Blacks and acknowledging them as a threat is only a ''politics of selective exclusion'' (Betz, 2007:34) which brings the issue to nativism rather than nationalism. If it were to be nationalism, the nation-state would respond coherently to a perceived threat, however there is no collective perception in that manner.
Euroscepticism is the sceptic face of the post-national which is aware of the need to cooperate or to integrate certain politics for common interests, however not wholly

devoted to accept everything in the name of regionalism and/or globalization (Arato and Kaniok, 2009:42).

> This determines the muting of issues pertaining to those domains that are no longer under national control. National political elites are less proactive in dealing with the integration issues and in incorporating them within their programmatic profiles and competition. They tend often to collude, resorting to gag rules to expel from the political agenda those issues whose solutions are no longer under their direct control (Bartolini, 2005:320).

However, this introduces positive outcomes as well. For instance, considering that the national political elites have a deep impact on the integration, ''the more they are divided on European issues the more people come to think about the costs and benefits'' (Immerfall et.al., 2010:344). This leads us to what Milner (2000) acknowledges as 'healthy Euroscepticism', as the citizens are becoming increasingly aware and critical of the EU. However, in what positions are the national elites divided in this process and on which ends is an important question.

It is obvious that this issue can not be understood with the old cleavage of the left-right. For instance, just to mention a few examples, in Sweden the left is more opposed to the integration while the right in support. On the contrary, in Germany the left is in support, while in the Czech Republic is opposed (Ripple et. al., 2007). This leads to contradicting trends. However, whether it is the left or the right, the common resistance towards the integration becomes centered on the theme of 'democracy'. The European integration is embracing more and more political areas, and as a result, is touching the lives of millions whom are subjected to these changes. For that reason is becoming more questionable in democratic terms. As detailed in the next chapter, it can be seen that, this is the most important part of the Eurosceptic arguments. The Eurosceptic parties analyzed below in the third chapter put forth the argument that it is the 'national democracy' endangered by the integration rather than the 'national identity'. And, more importantly, evaluating the Eurosceptic phenomenon as a 'national backlash' is a misreading of the integration process, as the ''more integration is deepening the more supranational decision-making is becoming more popularly apparent'' (Lindseth,

1999:649). As a result of the decisions made in the name of integration requires a regular questioning of them among the public. And secondly parties and/or the individuals do not respond to the integration in a cohesive manner to be named as a 'national backlash', for instance the Eurosceptics put forth the argument of the 'integration causing a cultural threat' however, for Euro-enthusiasts the integration is acknowledged as a 'cultural enrichment'. For this reason, there is certainly a developing backlash, however not a national one, in which this thesis argues but a post-national exceeding the scope of national, where in search of a presence at EU level. Both Eurosceptics as well as Euro-enthusiasts are becoming salient in (with a divergence of arguments) organizing where reference of 'national' becomes blurred. It is evident that, nationalism has lost its force of mobilization in the name of masses.

2.4 Concluding Remarks

For Lipset and Rokkan (1967) understanding party politics rests on cleavages either on centre-periphery, urban-rural, state-church or owner-worker. In contemporary politics or societies the above mentioned categories or boundaries drawn for distinction are not credited by post-modern theories of the State. For Lyotard (1979) these boundaries are in a decline, and fragmentation. There is no one single truth or universal ethics in what he names the 'fall of grand meta-narrative', which I assume here as the weakening of political ideologies, (in our case nationalism) which are been challenged by issues like different forms of citizenship, identity and gender. For Best and Kellner (1997) ''as for politics, the old distinctions have lost virtually any meaning. Terms like 'left and right, 'base and superstructure', 'production and reproduction', 'materialism and idealism', 'reason and unreason', 'advanced and primitive', 'masculine and feminine' have become nearly unserviceable, except to perpetuate prejudice'' (*Cited in* Anderson, 1998:19). That is why, in understanding contemporary EU politics with the abovementioned categorizations fall short of explaining both policy-making and the institutional networks located in the EU. Locating Euroscepticism in either a left or right political location causes a contradiction with the European integration and with the arguments discussed previously in the first chapter in post-modern theories. Because

whether it is Euroscepticism or Euro-enthusiasm they exceed the national level. Euroscepticism according to Leconte ''does not express a single stable set of ideas'' (Leconte, 2010:4). In the same manner, it is a mistake to classify, the attitudes of Euroscepticism and/or Euro-enthusiasm as anti- or pro-European. As argued by Trenz and De Wilde ''there is no single narrative to contest the legitimacy of European integration, but rather parallel and partially competing narratives that can be re-arranged in concrete performances'' (2012:11). For that reason, building on Lipset and Rokkan model, Hix (2005) argues that understanding the EU rests on two cleavages: the national-territorial, and transnational-socioeconomic. These issues will be discussed in depth in the third chapter.

There is a need of analyzing the big picture without framing it into the nation-state. There is a struggle between ''globalized nationalism vs. internationalist multiculturalism which is increasingly prominent in the globalized economy'' (Liang, 2007:29). Between these two forces lays Euroscepticism which is evolving and becoming a defensive reaction to supranationalism as well as to neo-conservative or neo-liberal globalization. However, in such a reaction or resistance it becomes layered outside of the framework of the nation-state. With declining state intervention alongside the European integration process the Eurosceptic politics become framed in a post-national environment. As a result of the deconstruction of the political, cultural, economic framework, movements like Euroscepticism have been embraced by a segment of the societies in nearly all of the Member States, however endorsing psot-national references. The following chapter will continue in adapting these arguments, typologies and theories to the Eurosceptic parties in a multi-dimensional framework for understanding how they form their demands, for what reason, in the name of integration.

Furthermore, so far the study has focused on the content and determinants of Euroscepticism, however, it is also important to emphasize that, Euroscepticism also needs a sphere of influence to reflect its performance. For that reason the proceeding chapter will concentrate on the European Parliament with special reference on the two Eurosceptic party groups. As argue Gabel and Hix (2002) ''since the shape of the

political space – the number of dimensions, the policy content of these dimensions, and the location of actors in this space – is a central determinant of political competition…'' (*Cited in* Benoit and Laver, 2012:195). For this reason it is important to lay down the competition in a framework of 'agents' (political actors) and their positions and views on EU issues. This is to be questioned in the next chapter.

3. POST-NATIONAL DIMENSION IN THE EUROSCEPTIC PARTY GROUPS IN THE EP

‘‘The giant is fast asleep because those who could wake it up generally have no incentive to do so and those who have an incentive cannot’’[72].

Christoffer Green, 2012

As the abovementioned metaphor from Green marks, there is an ongoing contestation between the ones whom are pushing towards more European integration, on the other hand the ones trying to form different political demands (democratically) and steps taken in the name of integration. This results in a mutual justification, which is as important as disputes occurring between political parties. According to Müller this is about ‘‘ways of agreeing to disagree’’ (2012:60). However, besides these counter movements, in which the focus in this chapter is given to the Eurosceptic parties, it is important to understand how they contribute to the general perception of the EU. The aim of this chapter is to measure empirically how Euroscepticism is formed on what conditions and composed of what kind of discourses in the name of projecting the concerns of the political parties and their electorate. In the heart of this debate lies the well known discussion of 'deliberative democracy'. The question and/or the connection between Euroscepticism and the 'democratic deficit' brings the issue to the analysis of the political parties and how actually the issues related with the integration are finally giving signals of an emerging politicization. This is the main argument of this chapter on what is argued in this thesis as an emerging post-national dimension alongside the de-politicization of the national issues (*See*, Smith, 1995) in an emerging politicization of Euro-polity resting on ‘‘non-national principles’’ (Weiler, 1999:344-348) as well as the ‘‘the law of law making’’ (Müller, 2012:57).

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[72] The 'Sleeping giant' was first introduced by Franklin and Van der Eijk (1996, 2004) refering to the mainstream partie's strategy to de-politicize the integration process. *Cited in* Christoffer Green, ‘‘**A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and Politicization of European Integration**’’ Political Studies, Vol. 60, Issue 1 (03), 2012, p.115

It is important to state that the Eurosceptic phenomenon can be seen in nearly all party groups in the EP, not solely in the two party groups analyzed in this chapter. However, the general acceptance is, to mostly attribute Euroscepticism to the European Conservatives and Reformist Group, and Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group which are mostly dominated by approaching the integration critically.

Political parties are the indispensable as well as necessary organizations of political life and democracy. A general acceptance hence is that parties like democracy are nation bounded institutions, an assumption which is questioned currently by scholars (*See* Curtin, 1997). The issue at this point is to focus on the importance between democracy and nation which for Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot are born together, in which the individual feels the very loyalty to the nation which he or she perceives as the reason for his or her liberty through the democratization process (2005:13). Sharing the same views many other scholars have put forth the argument that the democratization alongside the European integration would make nationalism redundant (Csergo and Goldgeier, 2004:271). At this point, it is interesting to focus on Euroscepticism, which correlates with both democracy and the nation within the context of the EU. The European integration forces scholars as well as politicians questioning the terms like 'people' 'the other' and 'sovereignty'. This questioning stems from the power transfer to supranational level which has and is causing ''diffusion and fragmentation of normative power altering the balance of power at the national level'' (Lindseth, 1999:632). In this occasion, for instance, Habermas argues that the critics towards the EU should rethink the history of Europe to understand its possibility to continue evolving;

> If the emergence of national consciousness involved a painful process of abstraction, leading from local and dynastic identities to national and democratic ones, why, first, should this generation of a highly artificial kind of civic solidarity… be doomed to come to a final halt just at the borders of our classical nation-states? (Habermas, 2006:35).

Between weak and dense citizenship perceptions, the European nation-states although very different, reference to the same secular, liberal, democratic, plural values. All these

norms alongside with the specific European laws, regulations etc are transforming the State in Europe into a socialization which for Cantzen (1994) is ''Weniger Staat - Mehr Gesellschaft'' opening room for a European public sphere, in which Euroscepticism stands in the middle of these debates. As argued further in this chapter rather than inhibiting, Eurosceptic politics or parties are contributing to the democratization of the EU. As explained in the second chapter, Euroscepticism, firstly reflects the clash between cultural practices vs. liberal values, and secondly the lack of democratization of the EU which is assumed by the Eurosceptics as undemocratic, and even anti-democratic keeping the issue of democracy in a constant debate.

In such criticisms, the Eurosceptic parties, like all other subjects, are also into a transformation or adaptation necessary in providing the needs of the masses with the ultimate aim of gaining power and/or office. However, as mentioned above, what is meant about *transformation* and/or *adaptation*, and how can a party adapt or transform in to what, remains important, especially within such a complex system like the EU. Rosamond identifies the institutional and politics structure of the EU as ''the development of the EU affords an exciting opportunity to consider policy networks and the role of institutions in conditions where (old) national and (new) supranational politics overlap'' (2000:15). The political parties crosscutting these networks and institutions require analyzing whether the national party systems are into a transformation (their dissemination and mobilization) alongside the integration process. This is argued as ''European level of political activity implies a profound transformation in traditional conceptions of politics, such as the way it is practiced at the national level'' (Abélès, 1995:75) which is analyzed in the post-national debate within this chapter.

The Euro-parties such as Christian Democrats, Liberals, Socialists and the Greens are excluded from this analysis, as they are currently in favor or in support of the mostly abovementioned arguments laid down in the first and second chapters on the European project. These mainstream parties at some level all agree on a moderate Euro-enthusiast position throughout Europe (Hix, 1999; Hooghe and Marks, 2002; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004). However, their importance for the arguments put forth in this thesis

remains as these mainstream parties at the national level have consequently been described as a ''silent cartel'' (Weber, 2007: 519) in which they are the de-politicizers of ideas about Europe. They keep European issues off the agenda which is important in the name of understanding Euroscepticism, which this thesis tries to clarify within this chapter.

That is why; the special focus in this chapter is to understand how Euroscepticism is acknowledged by the selected two Euro-party groups namely the European Conservatives and Reformists, and Europe of Freedom and Democracy and the parties forming these groups at national level. The abovementioned party groups reflect Euroscepticism, and do not hesitate to manifest Euroscepticism (in speeches, declarations, manifestos etc.), although with different dimensions. However, the question is, what kind of Euroscepticism are we talking about in the name of Europe? According to the divergence of views and critics towards the European integration, it is becoming confusing on how to name these groups, are they anti- system and principled opposition parties, or as currently used ''pro-European realists'' (Brown, 2005) or ''alter- EU'' (Leconte, 2010) parties[73].

Contrary to the general understanding, although placing the abovementioned party federations and the transnational party groups within the European Parliament in the heart of this debate, making such an analysis will not only include the European Parliament. Since this would firstly, contradict with the arguments mentioned in the first and second chapters (on post-modern discourse on inter meta-state institutions). As Wikonson defines, ''The EU represents a very particular post-national context, one which is defined and characterized not only by its own cultural and historical particularity but by its unique institution-legal development'' (Wilkınson, 2002:181). And secondly would lead to a misreading of the developing inter-institutional structure of the

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[73] Throughout the European integration process, ''…there is a shift of names used, or attributed to these groups such as between the 1940' and 1950's they were named as anti-Europeans, from the 1960's to 1970's they were anti-marketeers, starting with the 1990's up to 2000 they were named as Eurosceptics, and recently certain parties like the European Conservatives and Reformists, they name themselves as pro-EU realists''. N.J. Crowson, **The Conservative Party And European Integration Since 1945, At the heart of Europe?**, Routledge, NY, 2007, p.159

EU. That is why quoting Laffan (1996) who has called the governance structures of the EU as ''all-party institutions'' (Laffan, 1996:93) explains the need of firstly approaching them all together in order to firstly understand the role of the European Parliament in this institutional set up, and secondly to acknowledge the Euro-parties in this context.

3.1 The evolution of the (all-party) EU Institutions

Although the chapter will mainly concentrate on the European Parliament and the Euro-parties (with a Eurosceptic tendency), it is important firstly to touch all the EU institutions, as it would be of great help understanding the role and structure of the European Parliament in the first place.

As the European Parliament is but one institution in the EU institutional structure, and certainly not the most significant (though gaining more and more power along the integration), it has been the most debated both among the academic and political world. The reason is that, since the only elected body in the EU is the EP which causes it to attract attention. However, when analyzed, the remaining institutions of the EU namely the European Commission, The Council of the European Union and as well as the European Council all consist of members which are filtered by a voting environment (though at national level). The point is not to discuss the issue of representation here, but to mark that these institutions of the EU, are all-party institutions which are interrelated with each other under an EU shelter. The EU is not a system of parliamentary sovereignty but one of separation of powers among the institutions mentioned above. Power is divided vertically among the Commission, the Council, the Parliament and the Court of Justice, and horizontally among local, national and transnational levels – requiring concurrent majorities for action to be taken. For instance, if a piece of legislation is to exist, the Commission must propose, the parliament must consent, if the result is challenged, the court must approve, and national parliaments or officials must transpose (download) it into national law, finally to be implemented by national or local authorities (Moravcsik, 2002:610).

European wide elections are held every five years and every EU citizen has the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament. Starting with the 1980's there is an emerging party system at the European level which contain party organizations in the EP (party groups) and the national party leaders (party federations). Firstly, the establishment and development of these Euro-parties is a must for a European wide representative democracy. And secondly, the participation and adaptation of these parties to the institutional environment of the EU is required, if they are to influence the political processes. With more and more policy areas subject to the co-decision procedure (named currently as the Ordinary Legislative Procedure), Jones (2011) argues ''elections to the European Parliament have gained importance – if not necessarily for its citizens, at least for those who are campaigning'' (*Cited in* Adam and Maier, 2011:433).

> …party adaptation means adapting precisely to given institutional dynamics. In this regard, the EP may be seen as a nexus or site for a network of partisan organizations which exist within the EP— party groups—and outside of it—national parties and transnational party federations (Ladrech, 2005: 101).

The abovementioned argument is important in referencing 'network of partisan organizations' which is clear that political parties (not just the Europarties) are developing in a system of what Bartolini (1999) argues 'unbounded territories' whether they be Eurosceptic or Euro-enthusiast. Although becoming famous with the beginning of the 1990's, Euroscepticism has been seen from the very beginning, apart from the EP (Euro-party, national parties etc), in all the EU institutions. For instance the members of the European Commission, Court of Justice and the Committee of Regions or the Economic and Social Committee officials etc are directly assigned by Member State governments. Although becoming independent when starting office in the European Commission, the Commissioners are certainly assigned to this post according to their congruence with the government's position. That is why, apart from the Euro-parties with Eurosceptic flavor, other institutions of the EU may embody Eurosceptic or Euro-critical ideas. This results with both Euro-enthusiast and Eurosceptic views towards

each other, which can be seen, apart from national or local level in the highest level of the EU itself. To mention a few examples, the Member States nominees of Commissioners has always been acknowledged as a reflection of the Member States behavior towards the EU, Frits Bolkestein's nomination as a Commissioner caused trouble in Netherlands in 1999 due to his Eurosceptic position. Or the other way round, candidates to enter the ''Commission with strong Euro-enthusiasm have been blocked, some examples are John Major's blocking Jean-Luc Dehaene in 1994 and, Tony Blair with Guy Verhofstadt in 2004'' (Leconte, 2010:15). Or, more importantly, the EP view towards the nomination of the President of the Commission. For instance, the opposition towards the Belgian liberal Jean Luc Dehane as the future President of the Commission in 2004 was not welcomed by the EP (especially by the Christian Conservative Group). After the pressure arising from the EP, the Member States agreed on a conservative figure to the post, namely Joes Manuel Barroso (Mzes, 2005:655).

The increasing role of the EU institutions as well as their inter-relations are evolving and developing in a dynamic process. This transformation is rearranging the attitudes of the institutions in which the EP seems the one most gaining power. The EU is in the middle of this inter-institutional cooperation which besides the supranational institutions involves local, national, or regional parliaments, governments etc in terms of policy initiation. Apart from Community directives, an increasing share of domestic legislation originates in the Commission or the Council. The EU and EMU, in particular, thus not only set limits to what is politically and economically necessary, but also serve as forums for policy diffusion, for example, in ''1983-94 about 20 per cent of all Bundestag legislation originated at the European level'' (Raunio and Hix, 2001:153) which brings along debate, discourse as well as division. According to Raunio and Hix the situation is more or less the same in other Member States. The agenda-setting and policy initiations are, therefore, not only in the hands of the national governments, but also their room for maneuver is also to an increasing extent influenced by European policy choices. This is emphasized by Vivian Schmidt as;

> …between court decisions, policy recommendations, standardization procedures,
> or business and regional access and influence, the EU has in many different ways

diminished the autonomy of national governments in policy formulation, limited their flexibility in policy implementation and reduced their control over national constituencies (Schmidt, 1997:142).

Because of this executive dominance all Member States legislatures have established European Affairs Committees (EAC's) whose aim is to coordinate parliamentary scrutiny of European matters and to monitor the government representatives in the Council. The main function of the EAC's is to influence and control national decision-making on individual pieces of EC legislation. To counterbalance such domination by the executive branch, the House of Commons, Danish and Finnish parliaments, and the French Senate have established offices in Brussels in order to attain relevant information and to provide channels of communication between the national parliament and the EU institutions. According to Raunio and Hix (2001) national MP's also favor increasing inter-parliamentary co-operation. An elite survey from 1996 reported that almost two-thirds of MEP's and MNP's favored joint committees to examine EU matters and joint committee meetings. The majority of MNP's also support stronger links between themselves and the commissioners (Raunio and Hix, 2001:155). On the other hand, MEPS' (especially from the Eurosceptics) argue that, the members of the Commission should be selected out of the EP, or at least the President of the Commission should be elected from within the EP. It is evident that, besides the Member States, the institutions of the EU are taking place in this game of both policy and institutional diffusion.

3.1.3 The European Parliament

It is almost impossible to talk about the stability of advanced democracies without considering the trans-national level which is becoming more and more important. This is true for the political level and the economy as well as the civil society, and that the conditions of democratization, as well as the performance of parties of advanced or trans-national democracies which must be adjusted to these new circumstances (Giorgi, 2006:27).

The EU is increasingly recognized by political actors as an arena in which a discourse is emerging and arguments are exchanged. With this broader context, the European Parliament is becoming an important forum of contestation, by providing a stage for the expression and exchange of diverging views on institutional and policy issues, and fostering debate among the political families represented at the European level (Wessels and Diedrichs, 2005:137). Currently there are 754 MEP's located in political groups (and the non-attached) in the European Parliament. These MEP's sit according to their political affinity (partisan as well as non-partisan) known as Europarty (with their internal structures, *See* Annex 3.) rather than national and, according to Hix (2003) this political line or internal cohesion[74] is strengthening when compared to national lines (Hix et. al, 2003:327). However, more importantly, the post-national sphere is manifested in the EP which brings together politicians from 27 Member States whom debate 'European issues' sometimes with consensus and agreement, and sometimes with division and dispute. No matter in which direction the debates end, it is important to stress that the debates are framed in a European level parliamentary body. And, more importantly, as debated in this thesis, the EP brings together a divergence of political views without framing them into a single culture, identity, ethnie, society and a nation forming a post-national European Parliament.

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[74] As detailed in a study by Colomer, ''the calculations on the basis of roll-call votes show that the average proportions of individual members of the Parliament voting in accordance with their European political group rises over time: from 74 per cent in 1984–9, to 84 per cent in 1989–94, 88 per cent in 1994–9 and 90 per cent in 1999–2000''. Josep M. Colomer, ''The European Union A Federal Democratic Empire?'' in **Comparative European Politics**, Josep M. Colomer (ed.) 3rd ed. Routledge, USA, 2008, p. 292

The increasing level of party cohesion is important in the name of what is argued in this thesis, as the post-national dimension. Studies on Euro-parties show that the MEP's[75] are voting together based on ideological or strategic issues more than national ones (Kreppel 2002; Hix et al., 2005) or combine both European and national interests. Throughout the history of European integration, no other institution has evolved more than the EP, gaining more and more influence which has pushed the actors of the EP, namely the Euro-parties to establish more stable and ideologically or strategically based groups. Hix and Lord (1997) argues that this is a ''transition from a system based on *nation* to one based on *party*'' (*Cited in* Jensen and Spoon, 2010:179).

Sharing the same views, Pridham and Pridham name this 'Transnational Partisan Cooperation' in the EC as: ''the term applied to the institutionalized co-ordination and promotion of common policy positions and other forms of European activity by political parties of the same ideological tendency from different member countries within the broad framework of the European Community'' (Pridham and Pridham, 1981:1-2). However, it is important to mark that besides party level; more importantly is how to bring the public into this framework of deliberation, which is according to the arguments in this thesis is already inside. Starting from the 1990's the Eurosceptic parties are becoming an important side of this deliberation.

In contrast to state parliaments in parliamentary regimes, the European Parliament has no legislative initiative, although with some regularity it is able to put new issues on the EU agenda. The Parliament has significant decision powers, together with the Council, especially on single market issues and most economic, social, environmental, research and technology, and cultural policy areas. It also shares significant powers with the Council in the process of approving the budget of the EU. Disagreements between the Parliament and the Council regarding legislation are negotiated at the 'Conciliation

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[75] In a research on the concept of representation in the Parliament, Raunio shows that ''MEPs understand their role to be to combine European and national interests, with members viewing contribution to EU policy-making as their primary function. *See* Bardi (1989), Bowler and Farrell (1992), and Raunio (1996a, 1997b). *Cited in* Tapio Raunio ''Second – Rate Parties? Towards a better understanding of the European Parliament's party groups'' in **Parliamentary Party Groups in the European Democracies** in Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole (eds.) Routledge London, 2000 p. 246.

Committee' which contains equal number of attendants from both institutions. The European Parliament also has significant powers in the appointment and dismissal of the European Commission and its President, as well as in approving appointments of independent institutions made by the Council. The Parliament also appoints the EU Ombudsman (Colomer, 2008:291).

On the other hand, the parties which form the EP are the Euro-parties. Since its establishment back to 1957, political groups are officially recognized and receive financial support for administrative costs from the parliamentary budget. These political groupings are called Euro-parties which represent over 150 different political parties from 27 Member States. The Euro-parties have party constitutions and rules of procedure, annual or biannual party congresses, executive committees, party and parliamentary leaders, common manifestos and programs. Similar to the leaders of political parties in national parliaments, the party group presidents in the EP are spokespersons and chairmen (McElroy and Benoit, 2007:6).

Contestation about the institutional shape and policies of the Euro-polity has drawn diverse national interests to Brussels and diverse European issues into national arenas (Marks and Wilson, 1999:115). That is why the role of political parties has come under pressure in the areas that mostly affect their basis of popular legitimacy which is their performance. For this reason adaptation to the wider political environment of the EU becomes a reality in order to bring a partisan influence to EU policy-making (Ladrech, 2005:100). However, what remains important is, on which positions and locations are these contestations made, and would such a transformation finally lead to a post-national type of democracy remains an important question to tackle. The broadening of the EU has deepened the importance of questioning the 'support' and 'opposition' of positions in the EU, which have become complex terms not properly responding with satisfying answers. For Hix, the EU has developed from a ''hyper consensus form of government towards a more majoritarian form of government'' (2008:32). He has put forth three[76] reforms which have altered the EU in becoming less consensual more

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[76] Hix identifies three major reforms in the last two decades which hava made the EU more majoritarian and less consensual; These are; ''1. the extension of QMV in the Council, 2. the increases in the

majoritarian. For that reason it is not directly the institutional problem but the legitimacy and democracy causing to what Hix calls 'policy gridlock', it is the interests of changing and reforming existing policies where one group of parties want policy change in one direction while other parties want in the opposite direction. In the middle of this contestation lays the attitudes of the masses. Up to the Maastricht treaty the citizens did not much question the integration, however in the post-Maastricht era they do not blindly accept European level deals made by their governments. This widens the contestation between the Eurosceptic and Euro-enthusiast approaches towards the integration.

The Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptic party groups located in the EP are heterogeneous groups differing greatly in the name of what is acceptable or what is worth to defend against the European integration. These are detailed by party positions which depend on party traditional factor (ideology, family group), political functional factor (in government, opposition etc), and finally socio-political factor (relation with other parties, public, and in the case of the EU; other M.S) (Pridham and Pridham, 1981:17-27) which is the main concern in this chapter.

3.1.3.1 Divergence of pro- European attitudes in the European Parliament

Although party competition[77] on European issues is sometimes approached in terms of a pro-/anti-integration cleavage, this does lack proper understanding of the European integration. Especially when it comes to naming the parties, for instance as pro-EU,

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legislative powers of the European Parliament, 3. the changes to the way the European Commission is chosen''. Simon Hix, **What's Wrong With the European Union and How To Fix It**, Polity Press, UK,2008, pp.32-33

[77] Szczerbiak and Taggart make contribution ''to the same causal mechanisms that determine whether or not, and how, a party uses the European issue in party competition can also determine whether or not a party uses the rhetoric of 'Euro-contestation'. This refers to those parties that problematize Europe—use rhetoric that is critical of the EU—while retaining a broad, underlying position that is supportive of EU integration in principle or even of the EU's current/future integrationist trajectory. In other words, electoral strategic or coalition-tactical reasons may cause parties that are supportive of the EU project to use rhetoric that is highly critical of the EU on occasions''. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart ''Theorizing Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality'' in **Opposing Europe: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism**, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.), Vol.2, Oxford University Press, NY,2008

these parties are not always Euro-enthusiasts (full support of the integration), or Eurosceptic parties are not anti-European (against the whole EU thing). To be sure, if it is to be acknowledged as a new cleavage, the European question might be expected to have an impact on domestic party politics (in causing separation). However, the literature on party system change indicates that it might not be downloaded into party competition at the domestic level. This problem reflects the de- versus realignment debate in Western European politics, for instance the question of whether post-materialism, feminism, green and new politics (detailed under post-modern politics in the first chapter) represent new cleavages that replace the old cleavages which were developed in Lipset and Rokkan's 'cleavage model', which can be acknowledged as the decline of the old cleavages[78] and arising of new issues.

As mentioned in the second chapter, upon how to locate the Euro-parties on contestation, is a difficult issue. It is evident that the left/right[79] cleavage does not suit in well with the politics of Euro-parties when it comes to their stance on European issues (*See* Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003). Argued by Gabel and Hix (2004) it is clear that left and right have switched positions on European integration over the past two decades. The center-right European Peoples Party was more pro-integration than the

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[78] Teperoglou and Tsatsanis make a mark on ''…the identification of structural transformations in western societies has prompted new analyses of the major divisions in contemporary political systems. Technological changes, the reorganization of economic production and the increased significance of the ever expanding middle class have supposedly dulled the classic capital-labor conflict. In addition, economic growth, increased affluence levels and the rapid expansion of education have created a secularising dynamic and a purported generational value shift (Inglehart 1977). Hypotheses that new cleavages are gradually replacing older ones, or that simply traditional cleavages are in decline (e.g. Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992), abound in the relevant literature. The new divisions might reflect divergence of interests within the middle class (Kriesi 1998) or the emergence of new value conflicts and divergence of interests within the middle class. There has been an array of labels intended to capture these new cleavages: left libertarianism vs. right authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1994), new left vs. new right (Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003), materialist vs. postmaterialist (Inglehart 1977, 1990). These new conflicts are not supposed to have added any fundamentally new dimension of conflict into the political space but to have merely transformed the meaning of the two already existing ones (Kriesi et al. 2008b:13)''. *Cited in,* Eftichia Teperoglou and Emmanouil Tsatsanis, ''**The Dichotomy of Left-Right vs globalization and antiglobalization**'', Conference Paper, International Political Science Association and European Consortium of Political Research, 16-19 February, 2011, Brazil, p.2

[79] In his study Marks argues that ''the most remarkable link found at the aggregate level between left/right position and European integration is an inverted U-curve describing support for European integration among centrist parties, and opposition among parties toward the extremes of both left and right'' (Aspinwall 2002; Hix and Lord 1997; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; Taggart 1998). *Cited in* Gary Marks, ''European Integration and Political Conflict'' in **European Integration and Political Conflict**, Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen (eds.) Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.238

party of European Socialists in the 1970s; by the 1990s, the situation was reversed with different political attitudes with different political aims towards the integration. Centre right parties were historically more in favor of European integration, while the socialist and/or social democrats were sceptic about the increase of economic competition. At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, centre-right parties were generally favoring integration, while the socialists were more Eurosceptic. However, starting from the 1990s, the European Socialist Party (PES) became more Euro-enthusiast as they began to support regulatory capitalism through the EU instead of welfare capitalism. On the other hand, the political forces of the European People's Party (EPP) became more Eurosceptic as they began to support neo-liberal economic policies and those of the already neo-liberal European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) became more Eurosceptic as the EU became more regulatory (Conti, 2010:100).

However the development of market correcting policies in the EU, made the centre-right, conservatives and the liberals less committed to the integration process (Gabel and Hix, 2002:951). That is why it is argued that, the left right positioning on attitudes towards integration varies across time and across sectors as well as upon issues (Leconte, 2010:110). That is why McElroy and Beroit (2007) argue that using the left-right positions do not always explain the case as the more specific policy areas the further divergence occurs. The main center parties in Europe are to some degree evaluated through the left-right division, which is however becoming problematic as promises offered by different parties to voters are recently hard to distinguish from one to another, they have minor differences on same themes or issues and the rise of extreme and regional politics is diffusing into this division causing even more fragmentation (*See* Mudde, 2002).

For instance, party based Euroscepticism in Sweden is left-wing however in a country like Denmark, the Danish Social Democratic party is counted as the least pro-EU party among the social democrats (Hooghe et al. 2002:975). Or at EU level, the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Greens, and the United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE) are left and Euro-enthusiasts in character, the European People's Party (EPP) and European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) are centre right and broadly

Euro-enthusiast, and finally Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) and Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) are located as economic right and Eurosceptic on the EU federalism dimension (McElroy and Benoit, 2007:21).

As mentioned in the second chapter of the thesis, contemporary politics argued by post-modern theories have to be constantly thematized. And, if we are to assume the EU as a moving target, it is inevitable for Euro-parties, as well as to national ones, to transform in a changing environment. This is actually a force of transformation for the whole party system itself or only for an individual party. Leconte argues that the 'New politics' phenomenon has opened up new 'dimensions' as well as 'divisions' of the politicization of new dimensions such as: inter-ethnic relations, immigration, gender equality, rights of sexual minorities, civil liberties, environment etc. (Leconte, 2010:111) and new divisions such as support for the general idea of European integration is not the same thing of support for EU membership of one's country, or even supporting a supranational institutional system (referred to as centralization and bureaucratization in political debate). In that sense, each party both at national and supranational level has diverging goals on certain issues. However, the point to mark here is that, although coming to disagreements, problems or even deadlocks at certain times on specific policies, the institutions of the EU (especially the Commission and the EP) has gained the ability to frame these in a European political framework and moreover working towards prevention of any issue becoming alien to Europe or the integration process.

The political parties are shifting on positions on different matters very often. As social cleavages shift, and new social, economic, and religious divisions become vital in society, two changes are possible within the party system: Either new political parties are born that correspond to the social groups defined by the emerging cleavage, or the established parties expand and adapt in an attempt to incorporate the new social division (Kreppel, 2001:41). That is why, not just the Euro-parties, but also the one's feeding them from national level, are under a forced transformation.

Parties are enthusiastic about belonging to party families because they know that they have shared origins. Sometimes there are tensions within a family (because of the

divisions mentioned above), but they are usually overridden by underlying affinities. These affinities derive of course from common experience of societal cleavage. There is a need therefore an approach that takes an appropriate account of cleavage analysis, but also integrates the transnational dimension (Hanley, 2008:22-23). The European integration is changing the political scenario in which the parties operate in, are facing altering traditions. As because of historical differences between the countries (27 Member State), the terms left and right as well as anti- and pro- may have very different meanings in political discourse in the different Member States.

Mainstream political parties prefer contestation on left/right issues and generally try to avoid contestation over European issues and adopt generally pro-integrationist positions, whom are willing for maintaining the status quo (Hix 1999; Marks et al. 2002; Taggart 1998). Actually this is what provides a new opportunity for opposition and mobilization from the extreme left and right, and also from the 'new politics' dimension by green and populist parties. Parties wishing to gain from oppositional positions on the European issue try to relocate party competition and on the party system by attacking European integration as an extension of domestic opposition (Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Taggart 1998). It is quite a dilemma that, although the mainstream parties are more Euro-enthusiasts, it is the Eurosceptic parties which bring down European issues to national level contestation. That is why as argued in the second chapter, the questioning of the sceptics in uploading and downloading these issues remains important in the name of deliberative democracy for the EU.

> The anti-EU movements in Denmark and France, the critical positions of many Green parties (in Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom), of non-communist Left parties (in Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, and Sweden), of neo-communist parties (in France, Greece, Portugal, and Germany), of right-wing and nationalist parties (in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy), and of some Protestant orthodox parties (in Finland and The Netherlands) focus more on the constitutive issues of membership, competencies and decision making rules than on

isomorphic issues of a left-right nature (Taggart 1998; Christensen 1996 *Cited in* Bartolini, 2006:34-35).

Building on Lipset and Rokkan's social cleavage, Simon Hix (2005), as mentioned in the second chapter, has developed the national-territorial, and transnational-socioeconomic[80] cleavages. The national–territorial cleavage comes into surface in EU politics when an issue on the agenda puts individuals from different nations on different sides of the debate, for example when ''one national group appears to gain at the cost of another'' (Hix, 2005:148) or when different party fractions meet on same interests. For instance the right in France and the left in Britain supported the Constitution, while the left in Franceand the right in Britain opposed it (Hix, 2008:63). On the other hand, for Hix, cross-cutting these national divisions are 'latent' transnational ones. At certain levels a group of citizens in one nation-state may have more in common with a similar group in another nation-state rather than with the rest of the society in their own nation-state. For instance Hix (2005) gives the example of Dutch and Hungarian farmers who do have a common interest in defending the Common Agricultural Policy against the interests of Dutch and Hungarian consumers. And the people who live in cross-border regions are pleased with the trade in the EU, which is actually a natural outcome. Or, the way of business and trade sectors are keen on the Euro currency in running their businesses.

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[80] According to Apeldoorn, ''there is a need of an analysis of transnational social forces in the making of what is interpreted as a new European socio-economic order emerging out of the re-launching of the European integration process of the 1980s and 1990s. This transnational struggle over European order is seen as taking place within the context of a changing global political economy in which the social relations of capitalist production are increasingly constituted beyond the nation-state. [. . .] it is only by putting the process of European integration within a global context that one can fully capture present dynamics and see how that process has been bound up with a transnational restructuring of European state-society relations. This has, in turn, involved a transformation of the historical bloc underpinning the European project. In this perspective, European change is seen as linked to global change through the mediating agency of transnational social forces, understood as collective actors whose identities, interests and strategies take shape within a changing global structural context, and who struggle over the direction and content of the European integration process''. Bastian van Apeldoorn, ''The Struggle over European Order: Transnational Class Agency in the making of Embedded Neo-Liberalism'', in **State/Space A Reader**, Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones and Gordon Macleod (eds.) Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2003, p.147

This is on what Hooghe and Marks put forth same arguments as they argue, in understanding EU politics; there is a need to focus on supranational-national cleavages, according to their assumptions left-right cleavage does not work in explaining politics in the EU properly, for that reason they make a distinction between 'economic integration' and 'political integration', in which left-right debates do shed light on the former, however not on the latter. According to this view, it is the political integration becoming an important problem in which the mainstream parties (although supportive) remain divided while the radical left or right criticize or oppose. This brings the issue to the state-market cleavage. As detailed below, the right oriented parties are to a degree in favor of economic integration, however very sceptic about political. However more importantly it is what Morgenthau described as ''the supreme task of any effective government, namely the proven ability 'to change the distribution of power in society without jeopardizing the orderly and peaceful processes upon which the welfare of society depends'' (Morgenthau, 1954:415 *Cited in* Scheuerman, 2009:46).

The European integration has brought advantages to certain regions however it has also brought socio-economic divisions. These divisions can not be approached by a 'national-territorial' understanding. Firstly, they are linked closely with transnational, and secondly do not reflect any 'national' fear (in the classic sense) apart from economic pessimism. If it were such, it would be expected to reflect high levels of support for Eurosceptics (at EU level) as well as nationalists (at local or national level). That is why, the EU is a multi-dimensional reality, and requires to be understood and recognized in its historical dimension as being diverse and subject to a divergence of goals and/or interests which are flourishing with emerging party and party groups.

This can be multiplied with numerous examples such as transnational cleavages can be mobilized around traditional social divisions, but can also emerge around newer 'issue divisions', mentioned above, such as post-materialist values, age, education and information (Hix, 2005:148). For this reason scholars like Hooghe et al. (2002) and Kriesi (2007) argue that new issues relocate political party positions which result in their stance towards European integration. For instance, parties with Conservative or authoritarian views on these new issues reflect their degree of Euroscepticism, (Leconte,

2010:111) of which two of them will be debated below. On the other hand, issues arising from the integration process may shift Euro-enthusiast parties towards a more sceptic view, such as the Swedish Greens criticism on the immigration policy of the EU. However, there are certain issues which even touch all Euro-parties whether they support or oppose, such as the issue of 'democratic deficit' is on the agenda of both the Euro-enthusiasts, with the argument that the EU should push itself towards solving the issue (becoming more democratic). On the other hand the Eurosceptics, are using this issue for legitimizing their cause of blaming the EU as a bureaucratic system and not democratically credible. According to Meny (2003) the democratic deficit is a powerful catchphrase which can easily be manipulated by Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts (who are interested in improving EU efficiency) (*Cited in* Jolly, 2007:44).

The issue stems from those who are of the opinion that it is neither useful nor accurate to talk about a European democratic deficit, which tend to view the European Union as a technocratic regime similar to international organizations for which traditional democratic standards relating to openness, participation nor transparency do not apply, namely pointing intergovernmentalism. However, Eurosceptic parties, mostly close to intergovernmentalism, bring the issue of democratic deficit in to the heart of the European debate. Alternatively, those who are strategically closer to representative democracy and federalism are keener to point to the European democratic deficit and demand further actions for fulfilling the gap (Giorgi, 2006:36).

The most important difference here stems from national and post-national democracies which is that the latter can rely less on a ''quasi-automatic identification with a political community facilitated through the awareness and solidarity that results from sharing a common language and tradition'' (Giorgi, 2006:39-40). It is in this relationship that post-nationalists stand in opposition to those still insisting on the necessity to maintain the nation-state as the only level of democratic organization, or legitimization. For the latter, the absence of a political identification rooted in non-political elements is a serious obstacle to the constitution of the European polity (*See* Miller, 2000). For this reason, the post-nationalists argue this tradition need not pre-exist but can be constructed; more importantly, it can or should be based on political participatory

elements, such as deliberation, compromise, communication and mutual recognition, on which the more Europe assumes form as a political system (gaining more power or at least sharing with the nation-state) and the more European citizens become aware of this and get to participate (*See* Habermas, 1998) in its making or developing, the Union will gain more legitimacy. The EP is mostly referenced to this dynamism as it has evolved from a 'consultative assembly' to an 'influential legislature' which has an impact on Euro-party attitudes.

3.1.1.2 An Evaluation of Political Groups/Families in the European Parliament (1994-2011)

After every European election, the structure of the EP is always subject to change. There are new comers, such as first time elected members as well as the old, new party group formations result with the collapse of the former, there are election of new president, vice-president, and re-establishing committees etc. which are all reformulated.

As discussed in the second chapter, Euroscepicism entered the political debate starting with the Maastricht Treaty (1993). One year after the ratification of the treaty, in 1994, the EP elections resulted with the first group naming itself as Eurosceptic within the EP. Debated in the second chapter, it is not a coincidence that these parties found expression and entered the European political stage. According to Balestrini et al. the Maastricht Treaty as well as the following treaty amendments lead to the forming of parties developing critical approaches towards the integration;

> ...the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent Treaties brought the EU into the arena of domestic redistribution, a move which made the EU particularly visible and politically vulnerable to public opinion. Many of the changes brought about by Maastricht and subsequent treaties in the period from 1992 to 2001 were not just perceived of as affecting the social and economic situation of member states, but also as affecting their national identity and sovereignty: for example, the intrusion of the EU into domestic welfare policies could well be perceived in this regard as

an erosion of national cohesion, as the welfare state can be instrumental in fostering a strong community. It is therefore likely that public attitudes towards the post-Maastricht EU are not only subject to people's national socio–economic appraisals but also to their respective preferences for different models of EU integration (Balestrini et al., 2010:381).

According to the abovementioned concerns issues of welfare, sovereignty, and identity became strictly questioned by the first Eurosceptic Euro parties. The first was named the 'European Nations' (1994-1996) lead by James Goldsmith which consisted of the June Movement, People's Movement against the EU (Denmark), Movement for France (France), and Reformed Political Party – Reformed Political League (Netherlands) with a total number of 19 MEP's, the group was more like a coordination group and dissolved in 1996, the party was succeeded by 'Group of Independents for a Europe of Nations' up to the 1999 European Parliament elections.

After the 1999 elections to the EP, the abovementioned 'Group of Independents for a Europe of Nations' was dissolved and its successor became the Europe of Democracies and Diversities. The member parties of the group were June Movement (Denmark), Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition Party, Rally for France (France), Christian Union – Reformed Political Party (Netherlands), United Kingdom Independence Party (UK), League of Polish Families (Poland).

The period in the EP, between 2004 and 2009 was actually more different, due to the fifth enlargement with the entrance of 10 new Member States, citizens from these newcomers elected the MEP's for the first time which increased the number of MEP's to 736.

The entrance of new MEP's means the expanding of the Euro-parties, or establishment of new ones. There are currently seven[81] (*See* Annex 4) Euro-party groups plus the non-

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[81] According to their number of seats the party groups are as follows; Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats), Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Greens-European Free Alliance, European Conservatives and Reformists, European United Left-Nordic Green Left, Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group.

attached in the EP, of whom two of the groups are known to be Eurosceptic. Like in the EP elections 2004, the European People's Party (EPP), remains the largest group in the EP, followed by the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), which of both have been the two dominant groups in the EP since its establishment. The EPP is a center-right, political party sheltering liberal conservative, Christian democrat, and rightist parties. The EPP is mostly dominated by Christian Democratic Parties, which are rooted in catholic social teaching with the principle of ''human rights and fundamental liberties have priority everywhere in the world over national sovereignty'' (Papini, 1997:110 *Cited in* Marks and Wilson, 2005:127). They have been committed to the EU project. However, with the enlargements and new Christian Democratic Parties as well as Conservatives entering the European Parliament has increased the heterogeneity of this party family. For instance, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty showed that Christian Democratic Parties being in favor, while the Conservatives in opposition of more Europe (similarly seen in the ratification of Amsterdam and Nice Treaties). The reason of this division is based on the ''confrontation between supranational origins of Christian Democracy and national origins of Conservatism'' (Hix and Lord, 1997:29). This became even more evident with the 2004 enlargement of the EU, resulting with separations from the EPP to other Euro-parties (currently established or to be founded ex. the British Conservatives left the group and formed the European Conservatives and Reformists group in 2009).

The S&D on the other hand represents social democracy. The EPP and the S&D have a history of cross-ideological legislative partnership. As in the 2004-2009 EP the two parties continue to cooperate closely as a 'Grand Coalition' and, together very often shape politics in the EP, as if they were a single party, both favoring European integration to a level, with diverging interests (Archick and Mix, 2011:6-7). It is useful to stress that the British Labor Party (a lite Eurosceptic) remains within this group. The S&D at both national and European level are facing a dilemma. According to Griffiths (1993) they are in favor of supranationalism as long as it frames nationalism; however, more supranationalism means more regulation and transfer of power in the name of European integration, which limits legislation and implementation of socio-economic policies at national level (*Cited in* Marks and Wilson, 2005:120). This has become

evident after the Maastricht Treaty, when the EU started covering policy areas like cohesion policy, environmental policy, social policy etc. in which the social democrats are mot much favoring the increasing competence of the EU institutions in these areas. However both the S&D and EPP criticize the democratic accountability and transparency in the EU. For instance the S&D group approaches this problem in nearly all official party documents as;

> We oppose the closed-door policy culture of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. The Socialists and Democrats Group has played a lead role on a series of European Parliament reports which strongly reflect our values, in leading the fight for stronger democratic scrutiny and control and proposing ways of giving a stronger role in European policy-making also to national Parliaments (S&D Policy Paper 'For a Democratic Europe': 3).

The aforementioned arguments are shared nearly by all Eurosceptic parties, either through criticizing the lack of democracy, accountability and transparency in the EU. However, the Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics diverge slightly on these issues. For Eurosceptics the main problem regarding this issue of accountability and transparency is because of the European Commission. They argue, either the Commission must be dissolved or its members should be directly elected from the EP. For the Euro-enthusiasts, the solution is strengthening the EP and making it equal with the European Council.

The third largest group in the EP is the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The ALDE group consists of diversity of parties which is acknowledged as a centre party. The liberals can be handled in two spheres in this group. The political liberals are in support of national self-determination; however ''oppose communal presumptions underlying nationalism'' (Marks and Wilson, 2005:124). They handle the issue of EU as a mechanism to both extend individual freedom and suppress aggressive nationalism (Clarke and Curtice, 1997). On the other hand economic liberals support European integration in the name of decreasing international trade barriers and institutionalize free markets. What they oppose in the name of EU, is the increasing

centralization, which they believe lacks political influence of the individuals resulting with lack of direct democracy in the EU. For that reason they support developing legislation as decentralized a manner as possible.

The remaining four political groups in the EP are smaller in size, when compared to the abovementioned groups. On the left side of the political spectrum there are the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA), and the Con-federal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL). The Greens-EFA is largely comprised of numerous European Green parties leftist in political orientation with a strong emphasis on pro-environment politics and human rights and several regional parties (e.g. Scottish, Welsh, Basque, and Catalonian) with a leftist or center-left outlook. Their main criticisms towards the European integration are; more openness especially for the Commission to be more answerable to the EP, strictly critizing the CFSP and ESDP, the Euro-party insists on solving problems by peaceful means, and finally further steps to be taken in ecology, social and cultural areas, rather than overstating 'economic' integration. The GUE-NGL consists of parties that are even farther left in orientation of who have a Green emphasis while others have roots in communism. Both the GUE-NGL and Greens-EFA are in favor of EU integration, but strongly critical of existing EU structures, policies, and overall direction. The president of the ALDE group, Guy Verhofstadt and Co-president of the Greens-EFA, Daniel Cohn-Bendit has published the book 'Manifesto for a post-national and federal Europe'. The arguments they put forth are very much closer to what the Eurosceptics argue in the name of Europe. For instance their call is not a centralized, anti-democratic super state, but is to democratize Europe in Daniel Cohn-Bendits words ''we want a European Europe, not different nationalist views of Europe'' (Conference at LSE, October 8, 2012). According to these opinions and views, what do the Euroseptics argue in the name of Europe?

On the right side of the political spectrum there are two new groups (formerly under different party groups) the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD). The ECR was formed in 2009, after the UK Conservative Party broke up with the EPP because of differing with the EPP's

support for EU integration. The ECR is right-wing in political orientation and strongly opposed to a 'federalist' Europe. Further to the right is the EFD group, composed of 'eurosceptics' and critics of the EU who oppose further European integration.

As argued above, locating these parties as anti-European is and would be a big mistake. They are counted as a Eurosceptic parties, however locating them in an 'anti' block, is a misreading of the whole EU. They attempt to justify what is worth defending in the name of Europe and what is not. They question the rationale behind the integration and criticize its scope and authority. These parties, from certain European countries have been unwilling to join the centre-right European People's Party group. These parties generally have a national conservative, regional, single issue or social-democratic agenda. This holds for parties such as the Lega Nord, United Kingdom Independence Party, League of Polish Families, the Czech Civic Union, the Polish Law and Justice Party, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale, and Forza Italia. The sceptic side within the EP goes back to the 1960's, however was not until the late 1980's that they became known as Eurosceptics.

The first such Group in the EP was formed when the French Gaullists left the Liberal Group in 1965 and created a new Group called the 'European Democratic Union'. The Group was renamed in 1973 to the 'Group of European Progressive Democrats' when the Gaullists were joined by the Irish Fianna Fáil and by the nationalist and social-democratic Scottish National Party, and renamed itself once again 1984 to the 'Group of the European Democratic Alliance'. The European Democratic Alliance joined with MEP's from Forza Italia to become the 'Group Union for Europe' in 1995, but it did not last and the Forza Italia MEP's left in 1998 to join the European Peoples Party (EPP), leaving 'Union for Europe' to struggle on until it separated in 1999. The French Rally for the Republic members joined the EPP, but Fianna Fáil and the Portuguese CDS–PP members joined a new group called 'Union for Europe of the Nations Group' (UEN). The group was heterogeneous with mostly a national conservative flavor. The other national parties forming the group were mainly Danish People's Party, National Alliance, Lega Nord from Italy, and the Polish Law and Justice Party etc. The other Eurosceptic group during 2004-2009 period was the Independence/Democracy (I/D)

group. After the 2009 Parliament elections the 'Union for Europe of Nations' group was abolished due to a lack of members, with the remaining members splitting into groups, with some joining with the remaining members of I/D to form 'Europe of Freedom and Democracy', a new Eurosceptic group, and the remaining members joining with the European Democrat former members of the EPP-ED to form the 'European Conservatives and Reformists' (ECR) group. Both of these groups have came out from the former UEN and I/D groups which will be analyzed below in depth.

Another dimension at this point is that, arguments and/or critics similar to that of the Eurosceptics do come from other sides of politics, for instance democrats believe that the EU is harming the value of democracy, or from socialists who think the welfare-state is undermined due to the integration whom do not identify themselves with the Eurosceptic phenomenon (Hansen, 2009:16). Peter Mandelson (British Labor Party member and ex-commissioner) argues;

> There are degrees of Euroscepticism and out-and-out anti-Europeanism… We have many views on Europe that we want to see happen or to change, the decisions that we want to see taken or suit our interests, but we have less and less foothold in Europe, less and less standing in Europe to make our case, to have it heard, and the decisions to be taken as we would like them (July 27, 2012 URL: http://www.euractiv.com/uk-europe/peter-mandelson-euro-sceptic-cze-interview-514165).

According to Mandelson's above critic there are two important messages given, the first is the distance drawn between 'Euroscepticism' and 'anti-Europeanism', and the second point is the diverging of interests and expectations from the integration process. The second argument seen nearly in all Eurosceptic parties is the sovereignty issue. As analyzed, the Eurosceptic parties commonly put forth the argument of the integration pushing aside the people's preferences. Their main argument is built on the outcomes of the referendums made in different Member States (namely in France, Netherlands, and Ireland) with arguments like 'people of Europe rejected the elite driven process'.

3.2 Approaches of two different party groups on Euroscepticism in the European Parliament

When compared to the past, today's Eurosceptics are not mainly represented by nationalists like in the first periods of the EP, which consisted of French Gaullists, French radical socialists, or purely national conservatives (Leconte, 2010:130). Forming such groups like extreme-right named as 'Technical Group of the European Right' (1989) including the Front National (France), Republikaner (Germany), and Vlaams Blok (Belgium) have been transformed, however are currently excluded in taking seat by Euro-parties. For that reason the Euro-party groups analyzed below do not shelter extreme views like the parties listed below and recently are represented mostly by the radical right, single issue and/or regional parties.

These parties differ from the former nationalist parties, as they are aware of the impossibility of creating, securing identity construction or pursuing a protectionist (closing in) economy policy in a neo-liberal world. They do not exert superiority in the name of their nation, and as analyzed below even make reference to common grounds between European nation-states (ex reference to 'west and the rest' 'Christian religion', 'cultural' values, European civilization etc). The far-right mainly represents the working class and the bottom of the social hierarchy, they are aware of their representation limits within the fragmented nation. Their discourse is built on anti-immigration however do not target certain groups in the name of racial hatred (biological or sociological racisim) but because of the intolerant attitudes of certain groups with liberal ideas. For this reason, the ''domestic politics of EU integration is not only constituted within the structures of nationalism, but they also represent, interpret, select, and thereby transform these structures'' (Waever, 1998:104-105). National communities are transforming into a post-national ''community of fate'' (Held, 1997; For similar views *See*, Beck, 2004; Bohman, 2007) however, in the process of this change the problems and critics come from the costs and risks the transformation causes alongside closer and closer European integration. The risks seen or critics made towards the integration by these parties can be issued and is analyzed below as; anti-immigration rhetoric, the democratic deficit problem, and the issue of sovereignty of the Member States. These issues are touched

by all the parties debated below, for that reason these issues will guide the analysis made on these parties below. However it must be mentioned that, the Euro-enthusiasts parties as referenced above in the previous section also make reference to these issues.

Over the last two decades one of the most significant and controversial developments in European politics has been the uneven success (*See* Annex 5) of these Radical Right Parties (RRP's). The success of RRP's with a populist[82] rhetoric can not just be limited to France (Jean-Marie Le Pen) and Austria (Jörg Haider) or Netherlands (Pim Fortuyn) it can be seen from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean States and from the Benelux countries to the post-communist states. Minkenberg and Perrineau label the term Radical Right ''as a collection of authoritarian, xenophobic, and extremist parties…'' (Minkenberg and Perrineau, 2007:30). The radical right or populist parties are commonly blamed for reflecting fantasy arguments, which include bringing no rational solutions to the problems they point.

However, as analyzed below, the recent parties, although belonging to the right, are not as nationalistic as former similar parties. Recently, the parties of the right are opposed to open or flexible immigration policies and globalization. They draw attention to the distance of traditional parties from the concerns of the people, and have a tendency to focus their policies on local and regional politics combining these with Euroscepticism. They argue that the EU is cross cutting their national and statist traditions which requires dealing and criticizing it from national level. However, analyzed below, this is under change. The European integration is mainly driven by a political elite seeking to alter and institutionalize their interests through economic, political, and social relations among a collection of peoples. There is a search of changing, reforming or preventing certain aspects of the European integration, whether this is the Eurosceptics or the Euro-

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[82] In general terms, the concept of *populism* according to the definition made by Brito; ''aims to describe sociopolitical movements, forms of government, political regimes, and/or ideological formulae that focus around the idea of the people, understood as a ''virtuous'' social ensemble that carries values that are considered to be ''superior.'' Populism is also characterized by the action of charismatic leaders, the use of a rhetoric discourse, a particular relationship between the leaders and the social groups that give them support, and different types of social mobilizations. Populism is nevertheless a problematic concept for both political science and political sociology since this notion has been used and is still used to describe a multiplicity of phenomena that have important differences''. Myrian Brito, ''Populism'' in **The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology**, George Ritzer (ed.), Blackwell Publishing, USA, 2007, p.3537

enthusiasts. However, when analyzed, there is no aspiration among the anti-EU (Euroreject) parties, groups etc. towards the EU other than the discourse of withdrawal from membership and disintegration of the EU, and finally regaining full sovereignty. Although these assumptions are laid down in defining the causes of what is called the 'Eurorejects', in practice there are no political parties naming themselves explicitly as 'Euroreject' (as debated in the second chapter). For that reason the Eurosceptic party groups and their attitudes on immigration, sovereignty and democracy will be analyzed below. As they all have some arguments towards the European integration in the name of these issues. Approaching the two Euro-party groups below will be divided under three core themes. The first theme is the 'democratic deficit' in light of transnational democratic institutions questioned alongside lacking democratic principles. The second theme is the issue of sovereignty questioned alongside the regime of the EU and non-national institutions shaping the Euro-polity. And thirdly the anti-immigration politics pursued by the Eurosceptic groups on what and whom is argued to be non-European.

Nearly all the elements of the EU are criticized by the Eurosceptic as well as by Euro-enthusiast parties with different reasons; however, the three main themes mentioned above have come to be salient in the Eurosceptic party attitudes. It also evident that the emphases of European ideas have, and are changing leading to a change of both the level and the scope of the critics. For instance the recently ratified Lisbon Treaty introduces certain provisions like extension of the majority voting, enhancing the role of the national parliaments through touching the principle of subsidiarity and laying down the choice of withdrawal from the EU. The developments are forcing Eurosceptic parties to re-evaluate their policies towards the integration process. That is why, Forster makes an analysis of the Eurosceptics as;

> …sceptics did not, until the late 1980s, really take seriously the need to fully understand the technical nature of European integration – their knowledge levels were rather low since they themselves needed little convincing of their own rectitude. There has, however, been an important change particularly since the watershed Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1993, with serious Eurosceptic

groupings now seeking to develop a capacity to provide autonomous analysis of policy-making, decisions and Treaty outcomes (Forster, 2002:8).

As stated in the citation, the post-Maastricht era is important in the name of accumulation and interaction of the Eurosceptic attitudes. Beforehand they were not much interested and involved in the political space in Europe. For instance, in the first referendum in Denmark for the Maastricht treaty, the Danes said 'No'. This did not cause European wide mass movements or party attitudes in the name of Euroscepticism. However starting especially with the convention of a Constitution for Europe, the Eurosceptic movement has gained momentum affecting the Member States attitudes in a more coherent and European wide manner. In becoming more active in European politics, the Eurosceptic parties have become more engaged in the integration, through delivering leaflets during referendums, holding European wide campaigns, organizing meetings, debating and supporting (in their own way) treaty referendums in different Member States exceeding their national level. For that reason, Eurosceptic parties at both national and transnational level can not be avoided and pushed towards a narrow negative outlook to the European integration, as the Eurosceptic parties are pushing the citizens of Europe to influence the direction and content of the integration.

Certainly all these abovementioned examples only supports the theoretical approaches explained in the second chapter and do not contain empricial evidence. For that reason Euroscepticism requires an empirical analysis of the public speeches, campaigns and manifestos directly made by the Eurosceptic parties. For this reason the European Conservatives and Reformists, and the Europe of Freedom and Democracy party groups are chosen for such an analysis both in their formations as current Euro-parties at EU level and the parties forming them at national level.

Before proceeding to the case studies, there is a need of clearing the picture with the question of 'on what purpose do these cases help understand the logic of post-nationalism. In this work, the cases are acknowledged to be revelatory, representative and reflecting a critical assessment. Firstly, it is critical, as the case studies chosen have the aim of understanding how the general argument, whether the hypothesis meets the

circumstances laid down in the fisrt two chapters. Secondly, it is representative because the cases detailed below are actually examples as well as a part of a broader category (contribution to the post-national literature). And, thirdly it is revelatory (a kind of mix blessing) which helps manifest novel research questions, on how the literature on Euroscepticism and the data collected from party discourses help understanding this phenomenon in a wider picture (from a positive point of view), reflecting a positive European attitude rather than misunderstood in a binary pro- anti- European framework. Since both Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm refer to political positions on European integration, as neither the Euro-enthusiasts can be taken for granted, nor the Eurosceptics are in an absolute denial of the EU.

3.2.1   Case Study 1: European Conservatives and Reformists Group

The first case analyzed with reference to Euroscepticism is mainly the conservative group within the European Parliament. The European Conservatives and Reformists Group is the first group integrating the conservative ideology in a Euro-party. Before detailing on what the party attitude constitutes in the name of European integration, there is need of drawing a general picture of conservativism. There are two important aspects of conservativism related with European integration which constructs their post-national attitude. The first is the support of neo-liberal politics (supporting the Single Market) in which they reflect enthusiasm;

> The Single Market is a great achievement, which the Conservative Party has always strongly supported. In recent years, a centre-right led European Commission, headed by Jose Manuel Barroso, has taken some steps towards cutting back regulation and breaking down the remaining barriers to the single market, which we welcome (David Cameron, Euromanifesto, 2009:1).

As referenced in the citation above the Conservative leader of Britain David Cameron supports the Single Market project as well as giving credit to the European Commission. This reflects a post-national understanding towards Europe, the Union

citizenship still remains weak whence compared to national, however, the Single Market with 'free movement of people' is a strong element of EU competence. The Single Market project is an important part of the EU and the main part of economic integration however, this is becoming a core for political integration. Since, supporting the Single Market means supporting and downloading the regulations created at EU level, which consist and falls into a wide range of policies, from the free movement of people to consumer and health directives etc within the borders of the EU. The Single Market is one of the most important aspects of the supranational EU falling under the European Community (formerly known as the First Pillar). As Marks and Wilson summarize;

> The creation of a single European market undermines national regulation in two ways. First, it creates supranational rules that eliminate or reduce non-tariff barriers, including national subsidies, national industrial policies and regional policies carried out by national governments. Secondly, economic integration creates incentives for national governments to compete with each other in establishing capital-friendly environments where companies pay little tax and face minimal regulation (Marks and Wilson, 2000:454).

It is important here to stress that the Single Market project is related with supranational decision-making, and if supported and the developments welcomed (as stated by David Cameron above) it requires to be handled above the national level in becoming post-national shared by the Member States as well as the EU institutions. Because the policies opposed or supported in that manner are extended to the people of Europe rather than the nation. However, at this point the conservatives (or more general speaking the Eurosceptics) fall into the dilemma of on the one hand supporting non-national institutions (due to its efforts in pushing the Single Market forward) with its post-national measures. On the other hand criticizing the EU when the issue comes to national self-determination (with the argument of European integration diffusing state authority and undermining sovereignty), which is the main concern and basis of their Euroscepticism towards the EU. This is due to;

> …conservatives defend national culture, language, community and national sovereignty against the influx of immigrants, against competing sources of identity within the state, and against external pressures from other countries and international organizations. Nationalism has an unambiguous bottom line for European integration: the national state should not share with European institutions its legitimate sovereign right to govern persons living in its territory (Marks and Wilson, 2000:455).

As stated above, conservative politics of the party involves a dilemma, they are in favor of a Single Market project and reflect the effort of developing it within the European integration (inevitable transfer of power to EU), on the other hand, they argue, national sovereignty must be defended at national level. The Single Market, for which the conservatives give support, includes a dimension of 'free movement of people' whom have the right to live, work, study throughout the EU. As the abovementioned citation marks 'the national state should not share with European institutions its legitimate sovereign right to govern persons living in its territory' is an important fact shared by most Eurosceptic parties. However, there are two overt issues in this argument. The first is the reference of 'the right to govern persons' and secondly the argument of 'living in its territory'. For whom could these arguments can be attributed remains important. In a geography of free movement (with open borders among the Member States) belonging to which nation (or as the citation argues *persons*) on which homeland appears questionable. In an integration where EU citizenship, minority protection, asylum policy, and free movement procedures and standards are applied, it is becoming hollowed to defend the traditional national community. Because the imposition of uniform laws, customs, and to some degree culture are becoming blurred within the national framework.

It is evident that, the congruence of politics, society and territory are challenged by a post-national dimension secured in the Single Market (freedom for the individual where he or she is not bound by national ties or borders) in which the ''nation-state is losing capacity for controlling the territorial space, together with the people inhabiting that place'' (Kutay, 2008:3). The same argument holds for free movement of goods, capital

and services as well. For Lindseth the regulations for developing and securing the Single Market is ''no longer strictly national but supranational, often rooted in a commitment to abstract economic values, free trade, efficient markets, that many people either poorly understand or fear and disparage as alien and technocratic'' (1999:648). It is at this point where Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts differ. For the sceptics even though supporting they criticize this uncontrolled market measures which have social and cultural dimensions alongside deregulation, liberalization, flexibility, fluidity etc.

To make it clear, Eurosceptics use the European political scene for their own purposes, and consider it as a platform for reaching their objectives (ex. supporting the Single Market) in which they themselves actually undermine it. For instance, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher supported Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council for the sake of securing the Single Market project. However as a result of this, some of these concerns have actually become European (ex. as an outcome of the Single Market criticizing the free movement of people). Even though criticized by the Eurosceptic parties, every move or step taken forward in the name of integration gives birth to parties showing Euro-enthusiasm for these developments of improving or developing certain aspects of the integration. That is why, the issue can not be framed within a 'defense of the national', as the ''European level becomes more relevant and appropriate than the national, and they (Eurosceptics as well as Euro-enthusiasts) expect transnational political answers to these issues'' (Feron, 2004:124). The issues can not be framed in a national framework (which includes the EU level) and are not shared by the 'nation' in a cohesive manner (becoming post-national), because it becomes linked to a European dimension (supranational decision-making, involvement of EU institutions, other Member States etc), even if there are resistances or reservations in the name of that issue or policy area.

> Over the past two decades the geographic coverage and the substantive scope of the European Union have increased significantly and the inherent nature of the EU's decision-making processes has changed considerably. Put differently, more countries are now legislating collaboratively, they are doing so in more policy areas, and they are making more and more use of qualified majority voting (QMV),

a procedure which shifts decision-making from an intergovernmental to a supranational logic (Carter and Poguntke, 2009:4).

This contestation pushes the 'national' aside once the issues become debated between the concerning parties at EU level. This brings the issue to what is argued in the name of this thesis as the emerging post-national level, as debated in the first chapter ''nationhood becomes mindlessly and countlessly flagged[83] (Billig, 1995:38). For instance especially during treaty ratifications Eurosceptic MEP's in the EP prefer wearing or waving national symbols, however they expect answers to their questions (which they define as vital national interests) from the President of the European Commission in an accountable way and in a responsible manner. They question their so-called national interests however expect answers from a non-national institution. Michael Billig in the mid-1990 has argued, as such attitudes, are reflecting some sort of ''banal nationalism''. These kinds of symbolism, for instance for British parties, waving the 'Union Jack' in the EP does not reflect a unifying attitude of the British people. And more importantly the Eurosceptic MEP's (British or any other) sit in different party groups according to their political view rather than nationality. And, because of this, the symbolism or the practices and mechanisms used by nationalism to reflect a unifying whole, does not work for that matter. It is evident that the issues exceed the narratives of the nation, and becomes directly related with survival for political power, and/or manipulation of masses in the name of party strategies, however in doing this becoming post-national.

For a better analysis of the conservatives, the study will proceed firstly to focus on the Euro-party established by them, namely the European Conservatives and Reformists, and then to focus on the main national parties forming this group at EU level. The cases will proceed through analyzing these parties' attitudes towards sovereignty, immigration and the democratic deficit in the EU.

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[83] According to Michael Billig; ''some flags are consciously waved and saluted symbols while the majority remains unsaluted and unwaved. Billig answers the question: *what are all these unwaved flags doing around the world*, by stating that they are providing banal reminders of nationhood. .The remembering is mindless, occurring as other activities are being consciously engaged in''. Michael Billig, **Banal Nationalism**, Sage Publications, London, 1995, pp.40-41

3.2.1.1 European Conservatives and Reformists Group at Transnational level

The Conservatives in the pasts did not have much potential in influencing the EU (European Parliament) politics, as they were mostly a part of big coalition groups, such as seated in the EPP. However, after the 2009 European Parliament elections they have managed to establish a conservative group. The group currently comprises of 53 MEP's making it the fifth-largest group in the European Parliament. As understood from its name, the European Conservatives and Reformists is a conservative anti-federalist political group in the European Parliament. The conservative philosophy contains the maintaining of the status-quo and the strong love of authority and traditions (political and cultural). Although there are varieties of conservatism the parties forming the ECR group is mostly modern liberal conservatives (ex. British Tories, Civic Democratic Party) or social conservatives (ex. Law and Justice Party).

Throughout the formation of the group, the Members (national parties) stated the aim of establishing a group united around its common interests as, Atlanticism, decentralism, the free market, and anti-bureaucratization. However, even this reflects an unsuitable basis for a group formation, for instance some of the parties (notably the Mouvement pour la France) rejects Atlanticism, while others (like the Dutch Christian Union, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), the Latvian for Fatherland and Freedom Party) show scepticism towards free-market policies (Maurer and Parkes 2006: 15). However, the group was established after negotiations with the result of the Prague Declaration on reflecting the party's vision.

An initiative in 2003 was the first step among the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the British Tories and Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) parties whom issued the 'Prague Appeal'. The document laid down the rejection of the draft European Constitution which was a step towards creating a 'centralized and federal European super state, serving the interests of the bureaucrats and politicians, rather than those of the people' ('Prazská vyzva' 2006: 91 *Cited in* Hanley, 2008:209).

The ECR group is mostly dominated by the Tories (British Conservatives). It was founded after the June 2009 European Parliament elections, which has its roots based on

the Movement for European Reform. The largest national parties[84] forming the group are the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom, Law and Justice and Poland Comes First (PJN) of Poland, and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of the Czech Republic. Most of the member parties joined from previous groups such like the European Democrats section of the EPP-ED and the Union for Europe of the Nations. Since the party was established after the 2009 EP election it does not have an election manifesto to reference what the parties election bulletin is, for that reason it is important to read the party's charter named as the Prague Declaration.

Although having slight differences what these parties have in common is; rule of law and reluctance in giving up state power. As stated above conservatives have strong moral towards preserving traditional values and social norms through law and regulations in which they acknowledge social change as often suspicious (Layton-Henry, 1982:1), which brings the issue to Euroscepticism. However as debated in the first chapter, the European integration as well as globalization is forcing these parties to differentiate their positions or the ideology they defend. The European integration specifically requires legal and political actions which fall under the community law, and success of implementation of these laws, regulations etc can not be achieved without certain costs, for this reason the parties have to admit political changes alongside the European integration. The liberal democratic European states need moving towards a post-national understanding of integration if they will to establish equality and individual rights for Europeans under the Single Market which these parties also support. They acknowledge their role as to defend the citizens of EU against the bureaucratic structure of the EU.

The group is described as centre-right to right-wing, and a (soft) Eurosceptic party. However the party defines itself as Euro-realist[85], rather than Eurosceptic. After the

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[84] Apart from the largest parties seated in the group of the European Conservatives and Reformist, the ECR also includes MEP's from Ulster Unionist Party (UK), United Poland (Poland), Poland Comes First (Poland), Christion Union (Netherlands), Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (Lithuania), For Fatherland and Freedom (Latvia), Libertarian Direct Democratic (Belgium)

[85] Although not clearly defined, Euro-realism can be defined as, a realistic but reformist perception of the European Union and European integration as a whole. The term originates in the broader anti-federalist movement but is currently in use as a completely separate and independent ideology within the European debate. It is coined by think tanks such as Open Europe and Silent Majority, as well as by the European

founding of the Euro-party two MEP's of the group Konrad Szymanski and Charles Tannock describe their difference as;

> We see the EU differently for just one single reason – we want it to reform and therefore succeed. That is why we cannot call ourselves eurosceptics in the way the media, especially in the UK, use the term to describe destructive secessionists who argue for our countries' withdrawal from EU membership. We nevertheless remain constructively sceptical of many of the ideas and current EU policies being put forward. The more accurate and neutral term we have adopted, and therefore used in our Prague Declaration setting out the main principles of our new European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Group, is 'Eurorealist' (URL; www.europesworld.org on 5 June, 2012).

As stated above, the party is willing for distancing itself from what they argue Euroscepticism involving 'destructive secessionism for country withdrawal from EU membership'. None of the parties located in the group seek withdrawal from the EU, the term Euro-realist is a way for drawing a distance from the other Eurosceptic group (EFD group) within the EP. However as debated in this chapter, although the party names itself as Euro-realist, their critical attitudes will be evaluated as Eurosceptic, as commonly known by the public.

So at this point the question remains as 'what is it that makes this group to fall under the title Eurosceptic'. However, it is not directly the point of falling under Euroscepticism, it is the semantic (negatively) meaning attached to this phenomena. The problem stems from the perception of linking anti-federalist Eurosceptic arguments with anti-Europeanism. And, the mistake of linking Euroscepticism directly with country withdrawal. There is even a confusion regarding the other parties or political actors when it comes to the federal EU debate. For instance, a former President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pottering has demonstrated that;

> I am a federalist, but I prefer not to use this word, which has become almost synonymous with centralization (…). I prefer to speak of a system of European

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Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament and many of its constituent parties such as the Czech Civic Democrats and the Flemish Dedecker List.

communities; (…) one does not speak of federalism as such any more, but the system moves in the direction we intended (Le Monde Interview, February 24, 2010).

As stated above by the former president of the EP, the wording of federalism has become closely evaluated as centralization and domination. For that reason Eurosceptic parties approach federalism negatively linking this to the sovereignty issue. For that reason, the party attitude will be analyzed below under three themes, namely arguments developed on sovereignty, the democratic deficit and anti-immigration. These themes are salient in the parties forming the group at national level. And, detailing these will help understand how Euro-parties form common arguments at transnational level. The aim is to explain the reasons of opposition, and as well as to explain that these views are not directly linked with anti-European stances.

3.2.1.1.1 The Arguments of Sovereignty:

Thanks to the dynamic nature of the EU, from the view of the ECR group, the EU can still be shaped or reformed. This can be clearly seen in the parties Prague Declaration (*See* Annex 6) which starts with defining what the aim of the party is, as; ''Conscious of the urgent need to reform the EU on the basis of Euro-realism, Openness, Accountability and Democracy, in a way that respects the sovereignty of our nations and concentrates on economic recovery…'' (Prague Declaration, 2009). The fact here is that, the wording of 'sovereignty of our nations' is pretty much different from what we understand of 'sovereignty of the state'. As discussed in previous chapters, the state is a political unity, whereas the nation (mentioned like above in the quotation) refers to a cultural group. For Giddens the nation ''only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed'' (1985:19). In that sense, should we handle national sovereignty as self-determination, as a request for state sovereignty or as nations quest for cultural autonomy remains important. The study supports the latter, as the term 'sovereignty' can not be acknowledged as a project willing to achieve control over a political space on which a

significant national group is located but rather the main goal is to defend an established national culture against what is perceived as foreign (ex immigration) (Csergo and Goldgeier, 2004:289). Firstly, because mostly these parties handle these issues in an anti-immigration rhetoric and secondly stress the decoupling of the nation and the state. For instance party MEP Timothy Kirkhope argues on developing ''…different ideas on the future of European co-operation based on states and nations'' (Kirkhope, 2007:8). Or another MEP sharing the same view from the party group Ryszard Antoni Legutko speaks of ''Europe's strength lies in the freedom, enterprise and culture of Europe's nations and states'' (Ryszard Antoni Legutko, July 6, 2011 EP Speech). This view reminds Alain Finkielkrauts argument ''… it is at the expense of his culture that the European individual has conquered, one by one, all his liberties, it is also, and more generally, the critique of tradition which constitutes the spiritual foundation of Europe'' (*Cited in* Müller, 2007:105-106). That is why; the challenge may come in the form of Euroscepticism, however it also comes in to the form of Euro-enthusiasm reacting towards the integration in the name of migration flows, however without corresponding this issue directly with sovereignty.

The most important part of the Declaration as argued above is on the statement related to the issue of sovereignty of the nation, and opposing to EU federalism. There are different opinions and views on the institutional development of the EU. For instance a MEP from the ECR group Timothy Kirkhope explains the role of President Barroso as ''he is the President of the European Commission, must be there talking, because otherwise we run the risk of deals being done not within the EU, but deals outside…'' (Timothy Kirkhope, November 14, 2011). This lays a contradiction; on one hand the party criticizes the bureaucratic nature of the EU, on the other hand attributes importance to the post- of the President of the Commission. This brings the issue (what was argued in the second chapter regarding the political system of the EU) to the legal and political order especially on the role given to non-national decision-makers which are as a result affecting the national frame in becoming a post-national one. Because the Commission represents the Union, not the Member States of EU.

As mentioned earlier, the members of the party define themselves as 'constructively sceptical of many of the ideas and current EU policies'. However, Eurosceptic parties or policies are favoring a different type of EU rather than its current trajectory. They do support European integration however with a different vision. Mirek Topolank MEP from the ECR group explains the party's vision as;

> We are here and we are ready to defend our values together. We are ready to defend freedom. We are ready to defend ourselves against Euro Federalists. We are ready to defend common sense against the Euro-sense. We are ready to defend citizens against bureaucracy. We are ready to defend our conservative view of the world. We are ready, we have the will and the strength to demand changes, which will bring a fresh breeze into the European Union (Mirek Topolank, PIS Conference, 2010).

As understood from the above quotation the issues referenced to EU are againts federalism and bureaucracy, defending freedom, demanding changes etc. For that reason all these references are directly linked to non-democratic or undemocratic nature of the EU, rather than non-national. More importantly, the abovementioned citation marks the unifying stance of the group in defense of the European citizens in a 'common sense' and defense of values, exceeding the national frame against what the party names centralization of EU. Because as Gellner (1964) has defined that the ''legitimacy of modern nation-states rests not just on rulers and ruled being 'co nationals', but also on their ability to deliver prosperity and economic growth to their people''. It is the European integration speeding up the divergences of national trajectories in the name of prosperity and economy. For that reason, there is a contestation, where capitalism is both treated as a threat or as an opportunity. This falls into the area of nationalism where a divergence of national (regional, local) needs, confront post-national preferences. This 'needs vs. preferences' are giving birth to a redefinition of the political attitudes. As detailed in the citation above, the party leads a Europeanness clashing over with the EU institutions.

The ECR party group, whence compared with former similar groups, such as 'Union for Europe of Nations', is under a rapid change. It seems like the ECR has finally started

adapting to the EU nature through approaching somehow a more positive attitude towards the European integration. The forerunner of the party group emphasized the wording of 'Europe of nations' (2004-2009) while with a radical turn now they are known as 'European Conservatives and Reformists'. It is evident that the mobilization of this Euro-party is at a transnational level, and does not reject the idea of European identity (at least in geographical expression), although in favor of another type of European integration. Including the label 'conservative' is understandable due to the parties political fraction, and the willingness to engage with their counterparts, however picking up the wording 'reformists' requires attention here. The question is, what is that the party group seeks to reform, or why adjusting itself to such a direction remains important to tackle. The party political headlines give hints about the reforming aspiration of the party as;

> We should find the courage to present new and strong leadership that is ready to redefine the current EU paradigm and to articulate a new EU vision – to prove that we are not trapped in the thinking of the past but rather that we are willing to propose positive solutions for the future. Such leadership must be facilitated with the appropriate institutional and political background (ECR, Political Guidelines, 2011: 7).

When compared to the past, it is evident that the group has shifted towards a more positive and constructive attitude. At least, if not all, they are working forward towards fulfilling their vision for Europe (apart from a federal one) rather than fetching strategies for blocking it like in old times, as the only vision the Eurosceptics had, was only opposition. For Leconte (2010) the Eurosceptics themselves are self contradictory. For them ''*normative integration* exacerbates the dilemma between their pro-market orientation and their concerns over *normative sovereignty*'' (Leconte, 2010:115). It is evident that the Conservatives have always been critical about a federal EU. However although still being a part of this criticism, they vision the issue as a level of social and political activity in which they participate to reform, that is why, as argued by Liang, not only the Euro-enthusiasts but also the Eurosceptics are reinventing themselves (Liang, 2007:13).

The creation of the ECR Group – the genuine and positive reforming force in the European Parliament – is the first step towards a reform of the European Union. It is an attempt to break through the political status quo in the Parliament and respond to voters' desire to see changes made to the European Union institutions (ECR Group, Party Policy Paper).

The party's President Jan Zahradil has clearly announced their opinion in a speech in the EP as ''we simply can not live forever under a 50-year-old federalist vision of European integration. The paradigm has changed and the sooner everyone in this parliament understands that, the better for us all'' (Zahradil, April 5, 2011). It is clearly understood that, the ECR group acknowledges the EU as an intergovernmental 'problem solving' organization. However, it is important to stress that, why is being anti-federal synonymously used as being anti-European. First of all there is still a widespread debate on the concepts of European, Europeanness etc. for this reason a classification of pro- or anti- gives no satisfactory results in a debate where European remains mostly undefined. However, what remains important is whether proceeding towards intergovernmentalism or federalism, it is more important to focus on the emerging post-national level debated in this thesis. As either intergovernmental or federal Europe visions contain the argument of underestimating the role of the nation-state, which finally requires a post-national understanding of liberal rights, democratic values, and legitimacy exceeding the national level. Even in the form of intergovernmentalism, the integration is forcing the nation-state governments to bargain certain policies via European Council, Council of Ministers in a wide area of policies (once under the competence of the nation-state) weakening state power in a mutual dependency framework. The decision-making structures within the EU are between plural actors and institutions in a non-hierarchical way, often called as hetararchy, seeking to compromise or not. And, whether in its current form or future developments, there is at present a functioning European Community (formerly known as the first pillar of the EU) with a core of the Single Market project (also supported by the group) driving the economic integration, however penetrating into the political domains (consumer, competition, environment, trade etc which were once under the competence of the nation-state) which is driven by the community method with an elected EP as

well as a European Commission and Court of Justice having a remarkable level of power, which certainly requires more democratic credibility. The EU is a mix of supranational, transnational, transgovernmental, and intergovernmental structures. Although it is not certain in which one of these the EU will develop into, the process as well as the contestation which comes along at this point is important.

There are arguments on especially the Single Market project or more widely the European Community requiring a more federalized EU, and if so, in what this thesis argues, it requires becoming pre-emptively post-national. However, as argued by MEP Zahradil above apart from a federal European vision, political parties may contain an Intergovernmental European integration, or a model based on 'variable geometry'[86] as well as 'multi-speed Europe'[87], in the name of these aspirations Kaniok argues;

> If we adopt the fact that European integration in its existing form is not the only possible variation as our starting point, a set of classifications begins to offer itself which considers pro-European forces (in the sense of supporting the idea of European integration) to mean both the supra-nationalist backers of European integration, as well as supporters of the inter-governmental model (Rosamond, 2003). The label Eurosceptic, then, will be applied only to the opponents of the very idea of European integration, and not to those who prefer integration in its inter-governmental form (Kaniok, 2009: 166).

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[86] Variable Geometry ''denotes a model of European integration in which Member States decide whether or not to participate in a particular activity, although there will normally be a number of 'core activities' in which all states that chose not to take part in new activities, then this could lead to a two speed Europe. For this reason, with a few notable exceptions (such as the Euro) the European Union has chosen to venture into new areas of activity only if all Member States are willing to become involved. Nevertheless with the prospect of a larger, more heterogenous Union the 'variable geometry' model is sure to find some supporters on the grounds that it offers greater flexibility and corresonds more closely to political reality''. Timothy Bainbridge, **The Penguin Companion to European Union** (3rd edition) Penguin Books, 2004, p.533-534

[87] Multi Speed Europe also known as 'Two-Speed Europe' or 'Two-tier Europe' refers ''to the fact that not all Member States are willing and able to proceed towards integration at the same pace, and that some means should be found of allowing the more enthusiastic to make progress without being held back by the others. Although formally rejected, something very close to a two-speed Europe was given de facto recognition in 1979 with the setting up of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS)''. Timothy Bainbridge, **The Penguin Companion to European Union** (3rd edition) Penguin Books, 2004, p.521

The above quotation by Kaniok fails to notice of why anti-federalism means anti-European. As this thesis argues parties supporting the integration in its intergovernmental form can still remain Eurosceptic. But the opponents of the very idea of European integration require to be shifted into a new basket, namely Euro-rejectionism. It is clear that, the European integration itself proves the argument of the nation-state's becoming unable to tackle the problems (in a global sense) as well as the tools and methods the integration process is inevitably forcing upon them. That is why, besides the critics on specific policy fields, it is more important, how and by whom and at which level they will be managed is the main division between Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics. If ''people's attitudes towards the EU is debated this also includes their relationship with their nation-states'' (Berglund et al., 2006:2). However as argued in this thesis the interests or attitudes of specific groups do not reflect their relationship with their rest of their nations. It is very clear that the ''national demos now holds largely separate conversations'' (McMohon, 2012:565). The dilemma is between whether the steps taken in the name of integration represent the Europe of the nation-states or Europe of the citizens, however in either way this requires post-national democratic values, rights etc.

The Union might end up with in becoming federal or in its current mixture of intergovernmental and federal elements, however in either way there are other issues occurring such as 'territorially based sovereignty', 'regionalism', 'minority rights' etc which are alternating nationalism itself. For this reason there are emerging aspects of post-nationalism which find attachments to EU level. As argued in the first chapter, the EU project gives us hints of ''superseding the binary opposition of domestic-foreign and inside-outside'' (Anderson and Goodman, 1995:602).

The intergovernmental way, which includes the argument of nations remaining important in democratic terms is referenced as, ''democratic entities that can create inclusive social mechanisms'' (Berglung et al., 2006:32) however on the other hand argues Berglund that federalism in turn involves the centralization of politics, power institutions etc having the possibility of undermining plurality and more democratic deficit (2006:32) argued and shared mostly by Eurosceptics. For this reason proceeding

in either way (federal or intergovernmental) requires strengthening the post-national dimension in Europe under democratic terms. At this point, the Conservatives are facing a dilemma; they clearly have committed themselves for change in the EU. However, this is not like in the past, distancing (marginalizing) itself from the integration project, but to bind itself in to the project for gaining ability to influence it. Otherwise, why would it be for a party to publish a charter explaining the ''10 ways the ECR group has made citizen's lives better'' (ECR Group, Policy Paper). Is this what Bobbitt (2002a)[88] argues emphasizing the transformation of the nation-state, ''which no longer aims to improve the well-being of the nation, but to make the world available for the individual by creating new worlds of choice and protecting the autonomy of the person to choose it'' (Bobbitt, 2002a: 233).

It is evident that, the ECR Group aims to attach itself to the EU project and not to be acknowledged as the 'Euro-outsider' any more. The Deputy Chairman of the ECR group Timothy Kirkhope in one his speeches makes the parties ambitions clear as ''we are the first realist 'Euro-realist' group in the EP neither blindly in favor of everything done by EU nor unthinkingly opposed, we are not against European cooperation…'' (Speech to Party Conference, October 8, 2009). This brings the issue on what Knudsen argues of a need to distinguish between what he calls 'backward-looking' vision of Europe stuck between the nation-state vs. EU, and a forward-looking Euroscepticism who ''…take active and constructive part in the daily work over the EU and only in referendums really differ considerably from the line taken by pro-EU parties'' (Knudsen, 2008:166).

The ECR group stands in the latter group, which seeks deliberation and communication between levels of national and supranational. In a recent speech by Michal Kaminski on the re-election of Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has stated that;

> The European Conservatives and Reformists Group will support President Barroso.
> We will do so not because we agree with the President in every matter. There are

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[88] Although Bobbitt (2002a) relates the transformation of the nation-state to the market, in what he argues has come to be a market-state, I acknowledge this as the post-national state however attributing the same importance to the market forces, but not as the sole source of transformation.

many views, which we do not share. Fist, I will mention President Barroso's enthusiastic support for the Lisbon Treaty. We do not subscribe to this enthusiastic support… (Michal Kaminski, EP Speech, September 16, 2009).

As mentioned above the Eurosceptic parties differ greatly when new treaties come into debate. Every new treaty includes an important amount of contents from different policy areas, and it is natural to be criticized by political parties. The Eurosceptic parties themselves assume their role in the EP to be critical on every aspect about European integration, however as stated above by an MEP however 'not unthinkingly opposed'. For instance, the rest of Kaminski's speech is more important which gives credit to the President's speech on aggressive nationalism as;

> …but we do share the aversion and condemnation that the President has expressed toward all forms of nationalism and nationalistic egoism. Europe, our continent, which we want to continue to live in peace, has experienced a sea of tragedies at the hands of nationalistic chauvinism. We thank God that today we are living in a peaceful Europe (Michal Kaminski, EP Speech, September 16, 2009).

As argued in the abovementioned speech Kaminski underlines the harms given to Europe by nationalism which is condemned by the ECR group. The will to live under peace and the elimination of 'national egoism' makes (indirectly) reference to a post-national Europe. Condemning every type of nationalism in his speech, the party supports the arguments of post-nationalism which does not use 'ethnic', 'national' or 'racial' distinctions to draw borders. The ECR group, in my opinion, acknowledges the EU level as a special option of the idea of societal problem-solving as Eriksen argues ''it represents the institutionalization of communicative processes for the selection of problems and solutions for a community'' (Eriksen, 2005:17). In that sense, deliberation should not be seen solely as an instrument for reaching better decisions, but also as a learning process through the testing of arguments. Eriksen argues that ''parties can provide self-reflexive interpretations, as well as provide intelligible, inter-subjective reasons for their behavior which is procedurally deep-rooted'' (Eriksen, 2005:17). This emerging democratic understanding makes divergence of voices heard and as well as taken into consideration, which brings challenging arguments, and makes actors to

rationalize their claims by institutionalizing critical opposition and/or offering alternatives. It is important in the process of cooperation.

Apart from above suggestions, the Prague Declaration also includes the sensitivity of another issue, which is often stated as an important factor for Eurosceptic stances especially in the CEEC's which is ''respect and equitable treatment for all EU countries, new and old, large and small'' (Prague Declaration, 2009). This kind of principle coming from a Eurosceptic party group appears to be touching, as the EU can not become a platform where, the will of the stronger imposing its will on the weaker becoming a reality. This will in the first place jeopardize the post-national vision for Europe stressing plurality and diversity. And, secondly it facilitates and removes the unnecessary fear of being 'excluded' together with fear of being 'absorbed' (Riishoj, 2008:114) which is mostly shared by some parties from the CEEC's. This is what Giddens (1991: 20) calls;

> ...*institutional reflexivity*, which defines as '[t]he regularized use of knowledge about circumstances of social life as a constitutive element in its organization and transformation'. Such *procedural self-reference* entails communication over communication and reflection over the selection of selections… (*Cited in* Eriksen, 2005: 17-18).

This is about the value of cooperation to be maintained in a democratically environment in a constantly evolving integration becoming wider and wider with enlargements. The EU laid down the need of reforming the institutions in order to be more effective and accountable back in the Laeken Declaration in 2001. The ECR group attributes importance in the name of fulfilling the necessities laid in the Laeken Declaration. For instance as argued by Timothy Kirkhope in his 'Simplifying Treaty' pamphlet;

> …if the Laeken Declaration[89] had been upheld, we would never, in logic, have
> ended up with the EU Constitution as it subsequently emerged. Laeken was all

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[89] Timothy Kirhope makes reference to the Laeken Declaration which proposed back in 2001 ''At the same time, citizens also feel that the Union is behaving too bureaucratically in numerous other areas…National and regional differences frequently stem from history or tradition. They can be enriching. In other words, what citizens understand by 'good governance' is opening up fresh opportunities, not

about making the institutions more efficient and more accountable and about creating a greater understanding between European institutions and the people whose lives are affected by them. In short, Laeken asked all the right questions, but Europe's elite somehow managed to find all the wrong answers (Timothy Kirkhope, 2007:10).

As stated above by Kirkhope from the ECR group, they are in a defense of accountable institutions becoming closer to the citizens of Europe, whom are directly affected by the decisions taken by them. The statement clearly makes reference to EU level decision-making interfering to the individual and national levels in a post-national way. Since it is post-nationalism which oversees those individuals from different cultural, religious, ethnic and national backgrounds could live in a peaceful environment under political institutions they also see as legitimate. However it is the issue of legitimacy under question which is not perceived as providing the necessary democratic creditentials. This brings the issue to the democratic deficit in the EU.

3.2.1.1.2 The Arguments of the Democratic Deficit:

It does not matter whether the ECR group is in support of or against a federal Union, as argued before, this does not locate them in an anti-European position. It is about the presence of opposition, and what the Euro-party argues ''need of new intellectual thinking'' (MEP Derk Jan-Eppink, Public Speech, 2009) in a democratic understanding. This brings the issue towards the argument of;

> All organizations are better if they have an opposition any organization that is immune to criticism will end up becoming flabby, corrupt and self-serving. So, even the most committed Euro-integrationist should welcome the existence of the ECR as healthy, critical opposition (MEP Daniel Hannan, Public Speech, 2009).

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imposing further red tape. What they expect is more results, better responses to practical issues and not a European Superstate or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life''. *See* Timothy Kirhope, Simplifying treaty for the European Community, August 2007, Retrieved from; http://www.conservativeeurope.com/publicationsarchive.aspx?page=5 on 15.10.2012

For instance, MEP's from the ECR group, like Hannan argues '' for 50 years this Parliament had nothing in the character of an official opposition, now closer European integration is no more inevitable, it is just one among the series of competing ideas'' (MEP Daniel Hannan, Public Speech, 2009). It is important to mention that, the ideas of the group, besides of blaming or criticizing the EU, is based on the group's aspirations in the name of Europe. The argument of the ECR group is that the European elites must acknowledge that Euroscepticism is fundamentally healthy, because it gives the chance for closer examination of the policies open to Europe (competence), and thus increases the involvement of ordinary people (debating) in the EU's policymaking process, as they become more widely debated among the Euro-parties in a democratic environment. It supports the very idea of ''demanding democracy from below'' (Porta et. al., 2006:7). This involvement leads to a better understanding of the policies which are at stake and the reasons why various policies have been adopted, or not, that challenge or even over-ride the sovereign powers of individual nation-states (Merritt, 2007:2). Otherwise, if not debated and/or negotiated by all parties, this would cause to more antagonism argues ECR chairman Callanan as; ''European economic governance is becoming antonymous with democracy'' his statement follows as;

> …there is a grave antagonism emerging between greater EU economic control on one hand, and national democracy on the other. The further down this road we move, the further we take power away from the ballot box. If people feel incapable of influencing their economic destiny in elections, we are delivering a recipe for social unrest (MEP Martin Callanan, Public Speech, May 30, 2012).

However, the issue at this point is to detach what is called 'healthy criticism' from populist rhetoric. Chris Patten an ex -commissioner criticizes the issue as;

> …the battle of ideas must be constantly refought. If politics is reduced to mere managerialism, then xenophobic populism will reassert itself… Even some who are keen to co-operate in Europe seem to want to do so on an imaginary basis purporting to be pro-Europe, but anti-European Union. It is time to get real (Chris Patten, Speech in London, 2002).

Patten claims that it is impossible to be pro-Europe and anti-European Union at the same time, predicting that the development of the EU marks unreservedly the future for all Europe. This is because, if analyzed, for the sceptics', European policies reflect their critique of the EU which does not target the substance of the European project. Rather, their critique of the EU is mostly about problematizing Europe rather than opposing it.

> Conservatives theoretically support enlargement and the opening up of domestic labor markets to new Member States citizens in the name of solidarity. On the other hand this stance risks pitting them against their core traditional constituencies as well as trade unions (Leconte, 2010:116).

That is why Majone argues questioning of the EU is an important function within the EU's political system. And this function he assumes is ''part of any political system which gives the ability to receive feedback and react to it'' (Majone, 2009:xii). As argued throughout this thesis, this is important for strengthening and securing a post-national Europe. At this point Bartolini shares the same opinions, for him there is firstly the need of removing the taboo against critical views on the depth or substance of the EU (mainly on constitutional aspects) and to focus more on the contents of the policy areas the Union has incorporated in its decion-making (Bartolini, 2006:32-33). For instance the ECR group has made the same remarks in supporting this argument;

> There is certainly more agreement on, for example, the need to cut CO_2 emissions than there ever was on the need for an EU Constitution. But Europe's institutions must be disciplined in maintaining focus on these issues and ensuring not just the formulation of policies but also proper implementation and real delivery. Needless and fruitless debates and squabbles about institutional arrangements are simply a distraction and a waste of institutional energy. The EU must concentrate on substance, not process (MEP Timothy Kirkhope, 2007:8).

As cited above, the group is supporting a shift of priorities in the name of integration, from institutional arrangements to more specific areas of urgent cooperation on which the group campaigns like protecting the environment, recognition of EU wide volunteering, reducing the costs of the EP (*See* Campaigns of the ECR group). As in the given example above on an environmental issue on CO2 emmisions, the sharing of

sovereignty becomes important in tackling an issue reaching far beyond the nation-state borders. And, if not as argued above, the deliberation of the European integration will continue circling around the main themes of federal Europe, intergovernmental decision-making, and/or bureaucratization/ centralization etc. in which the citizens would not be allowed to follow what common policies under the EU are offering, introducing etc. At this point Chairman of the ECR group Martin Callanan in a recent speech has demonstrated that;

> …the people do not trust the EU because the EU does not trust the people. Democracy is the principle of the rule of the people: that the demos is able to determine the future of public policy. But the principle of ever-closer union and its spin-off tools such as the euro have pushed power upwards towards unelected commissioners, the troika, or have enshrined it in EU legislation. The people are not able to fully determine their own destiny. We cannot go on taking them for granted. They are already moving away to ugly extremes in their droves (Callanan, Public Speech, May 10, 2012).

The abovementioned citation marks the importance of legitimacy in a more democratic EU, an argument shared by both Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts. However the issue of 'people do not trust the EU' does not reflect the reality of the citizen's attitudes towards the EU. According to a survey research in 2009, 73% of citizens feel attached to their nation and to the EU at the same time (*See*, Fuchs et al., 2009:101).

Two MEP's from the Group Konrad Szymanski and Charles Tannock had made similar arguments very before back in 2009 when the Euro-party was recently established. According to their demonstration;

> …we in the ECR are totally opposed to such a form of governance. It is not democratic for unelected and totally unaccountable judges to make the law, but this is far from the only problem the EU has with democracy. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that an elected political leader proposes a referendum in any of the EU's member countries. If the result turned out to be contrary to expectations, surely politicians would not dare say that the outcome is wrong just because it is

politically unwelcome. Yet this seems to be a regular occurrence in the EU; after spending millions of euros from public budgets on information campaigns designed to encourage people to vote, EU leaders nevertheless decide not to accept the rejection of the outcomes of treaty referenda in Denmark, Ireland, France, and the Netherlands. The reason, of course, is, that the results did not fulfil the expectations of these politicians, who apparently deem themselves to be the ultimate guardians of the European integration process (Konrad Szymanski and Charles Tannock, 2009).

Under democratic values, no one is able to argue the opposite, taking into consideration the abovementioned remarks, the value of these critics are not to dynamite the whole EU project, but if it is to continue in the direction in which recent approaches reflect, there has to be a consent from the people of the EU. The Member States do have different concerns in the name of Europe, however their interests are developing common grounds when it comes to criticize the EU in a coherent way (ex. Anti-Islamization carried out under anti-immigration with links to Europe, cross-national references made by one Member State to another). This makes reference to a post-national Europe debate where the governors and governed become complicated. This forces the governed to question the governors in a gradually widening space exceeding the national arena. In doing this, Eurosceptics politicize the treaty referendums, carried out in different Member States to justify and legitimise their arguments in the name of European citizens (not solely their nations), and to promise to defend the expectations of not only their own demos, but in a sense of a European demoi. For that reason the Eurosceptic parties mostly make reference indirectly to a demoi above the nation, as the political developments, at either in another Member State or at EU level (giving birth to opportunities) become 'internal' rather than what these parties name as 'external', oppositely giving them ability to mobilize the masses in using these resources.

3.2.1.1.3 The Arguments of Anti- immigration

The group of the ECR was formed on the idea of anti-federalist MEP's rather than anti-immigrant. After the 2009 EP election, there was a debate on which parties will take seat within the group. The debate was especially between the ODS and British Tories.

The ODS wanted the recently established group to have many MEP's as possible, however the Tories rejected this, and prevented MEP's from an anti- immigration rhetoric including the DPP and LN becoming members of the party group (David Charter, London Times, June 17, 2009). It is clear that the ECR group is willing to prevent any anti-immigration rhetoric especially having xenophobic and/or racist impression.

However, the issue of immigration is closely watched by the ECR group, as stated in the official party document, the Prague Declaration argues ''effectively controlled immigration and an end to abuse of asylum procedures'' (Prague Declaration, 2009). The party argues that demographic shifts and family values are just a few of the most important challenges facing the EU. Chairman Kamiński stated that the ECR Group's supports ''pro-family policies and immigration is not the right solution for demographic problems. We have to solve these problems internally, not externally'', (ECR Chairman Michał Kamiński, Public Speech, October 4, 2010).

Besides the official party programme, the MEP's for instance Timothy Kirkhope (former UK Immigration Minister) has criticized the Schengen Agreement arguing that is requires an update for Europe to secure its borders from outside immigration, in his words;

> The Schengen agreement has created economic benefit for the EU, especially for those who have signed up to it. However, the picture in Europe 2011 is one of high unemployment, with a large number of EU migrants and an increasing threat from terrorism. It is fair to say that the current Schengen system has flaws and now leaves Europe very vulnerable… Without tighter border controls there is only so much that we can do to eliminate terrorism and cross-border crime such as trafficking without the risk of undermining fundamental liberties. The EU needs to make the Schengen system a more modern tool which is representative of the security and domestic needs of member states (MEP Timothy Kirkhope, EP Speech, May 3, 2011).

However, different from the EFD group (detailed below) the party does not target a specific group of people as a threat to European culture, values or rights. The party finds

the open border of Europe beneficial (for the Schengen states) however doubts its future trajectory. The risk the party underlines related with immigration is unemployment terrorism and cross-border crimes[90] which they argue is undermining liberal values. The party calls for the Member States ''to agree for a concerted effort to efficiently guard and monitor the EU's border'' (Timothy Kirkhope, EP Speech, May 3, 2011). Actually there policy correlates with that of the European Commission who argues;

> During the last decade, the need for a common, comprehensive immigration policy has been increasingly recognized and encouraged by the European Commission and the EU's Member States. The Commission is therefore now proposing concrete principles and measures – accompanied by a new strategy on immigration governance – on which to base the further development of the common immigration policy over the coming years (European Commission, June 17, 2008).

As understood from the above quotation the European Commission is also developing policy frameworks in order to control the migration issue in Europe. The policy agenda of both the European Commission and that of the ECR overlap, as the party also seeks the issue of immigration to be tackled in a European framework. However an important reservation comes from one the MEP's of the ECR group. Konrad Szymanski argues in the debate of the Sechengen Agreement

> I would like the changes to the Schengen Code not to be used as a pretext for limiting the freedom of movement of citizens of the European Union's Member States. Such proposals have been made for many years in respect of the Polish-German border, to the disadvantage of Polish citizens. It will be easier to reach an agreement if we have a full guarantee that changes to the Schengen code will not affect the citizens of the Member States (Konras Szymanski, May 10, 2011, EP Speech).

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[90] ''Especially in the last decade or so, anxieties about transnational criminal networks, drug trafficking, terrorism, and immigration have resulted in dramatic augmentations of shared and increasingly complex forms of policing and security policies operating 'beyond the nation-state' (e.g. the European search warrant), with one scholarly commentator describing the movement toward supranationalized policing in Europe as 'one of the strongest expanding fields of activity' within the EU''. *Cited in*, William E. Scheuerman, ''**Postnational Democracies without Postnational States? Some Skeptical Reflections**'', *Ethics and Global Studies*, Vol.2 No:1, 2009, p.49

As the abovementioned speech underlines, the view is not of an internal, but an external boundary drawing. The abovementioned citation gives signals to the borders and issues related (immigration, security etc) with it, and this is an important dimension of a post-national order in Europe. A trans-boundary dimension is challenging the traditional nation-state border under policies like trade, migration, security, transport etc. These support the arguments laid down in the first chapter on the de-terriotiralization thesis. The speech given below in full length covers dealing with the migration from outside the European borders as;

> Immigration from North Africa quite naturally exacerbates cultural and social tensions, and intensifies pressure on the social budgets of the Member States. We therefore have a lot to discuss, and we should not try to ignore the matter. French, Italian and Maltese citizens are today faced with the highest bills on account of the fact that controls along the European Union's external borders are simply not working. The European nations are also footing the bill for our failed efforts to halt immigration into Europe (Konras Szymanski, May 10, 2011, EP Speech).

Another important dimension related with the issue of migration is the Enlargement policy of the EU. Although having some reservations in the name of migration, according to the party policy, the ECR group supports the Enlargement policy of the EU. In his 'Simplifying Treaty' pamphlet Timothy Kirkhope acknowledges ''…it will be important not to lose sight of the fact that enlargement is probably the EU's most successful policy, and indeed one that continues to enjoy support from all the main UK political parties (MEP, Timothy Kirkhope, 2007:8-9). As discussed in the first chapter, the centre – periphery concept is important in understanding nationalism. However, alongside the European integration, despite all the disputes between the centre and periphery, the centre has a long sharing of history with the periphery, and this sharing has become attached with the Europeanness. However migrants are perceived as carriers of a different culture and assumed to be the 'others' within this equation.

In order for a more detail analysis, apart from the Euro-party group, there is a need to focus on what drives Euroscepticism in these parties at national level. The three

dominant parties forming the ECR group, namely the British Conservative Party, the Czech Civic Democratic Party and the Law and Justice party will be detailed below.

3.2.1.2 European Conservatives and Reformists Group: Member Parties at National Level

Besides the Euro-group debated above, analyzing the parties forming this group from national level is also important. This gives information on how they debate European issues, how they adopt to European integration either in a manipulating or changing the political environment in a critical attitude. For that reason three parties have been debated below selected according to the level of their representation (number of MEP's) within the Euro-party group.

3.2.1.2.1 Conservative Party of UK

Since 1945 the Conservative party has manifested itself under different labels, such as, anti-Marketeer and Eurosceptic, however the staff involved in Conservative politics and/or Euroscepticism has changed over the past sixty years. Actually up until the 1990's the Conservatives have been Euro-enthusiasts in most of the policies related with the integration such as the accession referendum in 1975, the move towards the Single European Act as well as the Maastricht Treaty. Their arguments have evolved to take account of Britain's changed international position. Although there is no single Eurosceptic position (argued as in the second chapter) the core themes of scepticism have remained constant for the British Conservatives such as supranationalism (further deepening) and issues like the EMU.

As argued above, British conservatism is based on the ideas of conservatism and unionism. The party is a center-right part currently being the largest with 306 seats in the House of Commons. British scepticism, with a conservative flavor is based on the

idea of British Unionism[91], which starting from the 1980's is under question and, strictly related with the British institutional identity.

The problem, however, is the increased complexity of governance in the context of regional and global integration that is linking Britain into a system of rule making which is not accepted to be compatible with domestic institutions. There is a clear contradiction here in that the shift towards an idea of sovereignty as expressed through interdependence both reinforces and challenges executive power as a pool of sovereignty and the national interest. However, the transformation of state power, shifting authority and responsibility upwards to the forms of international and transnational governance and downwards to regional authorities as well as to the market, has resulted with a clash between popular movements (Welsh, Irish, and Scottish) willing representation, and a (London) based elite claiming powers back from Brussels, whom are still trying to legitimize the multi-national British state through the defense of Parliamentary sovereignty, which is believed to be sine-qua-non for the British identity (Wellings, 2007:401).

> We debate and agonize over our involvement in the European Union precisely because, unlike the Germans or French, we invest our national character in the institutions that govern us. . . . Because Britain's common political institutions are central to the British people's common identity, if you attack these institutions, you are attacking the common identity and the qualities that come with it (Hague, 1999a).

As acknowledged in the above citation, British identity is labeled as a state identity, an attachment to the state, rather than to the people. The Conservatives, put forward the issue of *otherness* of the European Union which has been for long time their motto in contemporary British politics of nationhood. However, the situation in UK is twofold, firstly the debate is not directly between London and the EU institutions, it also includes regional authorities (Scottish, Welsh, Irish), and who do not mostly share the same

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[91] British Unionism is a political ideology favoring the continued existence of the United Kingdom as a sovereign state, consisting of four constituent countries, England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

interests. That is why, this situation results with inconsistent attitudes towards the European integration. In policy terms, the Conservatives have positioned themselves against further integration (though there is a Euro-enthusiast Tory wing within the party) and, in some areas such as social policy, employment, and immigration they are committed to taking back powers from Europe. However, for Gifford Conservative's general approach to constitutional matters, is the extent to which the European issue is increasingly viewed more as a matter of popular rather than parliamentary sovereignty (Gifford, 2010:331). However, there is a divergence of views when European issues are debated at national level. For instance Welsh First Minister Carwyn Jones argues;

> Wales would sit more easily in a Europe which had a different structure, which is more federal, but the EU needs to be more transparent, it's absolutely crucial that [EU] citizens feel they have an influence on what the Commission, for example, does. And that isn't the case at the moment in many ways (Carywn Jones, January 26, 2012 Public Interview).

As stated above there are competing interests on the European integration, and in that sense it would be a mistake talking about a general British Euroscepticism. There is a Welsh and Scottish population mostly in favor of the EU reflecting Euro-enthusiasm, and contrary an England based scepticism towards the EU. However more importantly as argued by Carywn Jones above it is important for EU citizen's feel of having influence on the activities carried out by the European Commission. A view for the European Commission to be more transparent and accountable shared nearly by all Eurosceptic parties.

At this point Bevir and Rhodes (2003) argue that there is an ongoing two competing models in British politics which more or less explains the whole British party politics. The first is what they call Differentiated Polity Model (DPM) which includes the hollowing out of the state power, transfer of authority as well as responsibility upwards and downwards (same assumption argued by post-modern thesis) which result in ''a move away from static asymmetric and hierarchical power relations towards more diffuse and plural network in which power is constantly negotiated'' (*Cited in* Gifford,

2010:326). In opposition to this, argued by Marsh (2008) there is the British Political Tradition (BPT) which is trying to maintain a 'limited liberal' notion of representation with a conservative flavor of responsibility and representation in a top-down way of democracy in a ''government knows best fashion'' (*Cited in* Gifford, 2010:326-27). These explain the center-periphery relations in Britain.

Clearly, the principle of opt outs and 'red lines' in European negotiations has preserved the British way of dealing with the EU allowing continued engagement conditional on the basis that it is in line with domestic policy agendas. The issue is therefore not whether sovereignty is compromised by the increasing level of interdependence but how it will be secured (the ongoing debate on future trajectory of the EU). It is crucially linked to the expression and value of executive power, ensuring that European decisions are in line with the government's (Labor, Liberal or Conservative) domestically mandated policy agenda implies that British parliamentary sovereignty remains integral. The Conservative quest for referenda on European issues reflects the continued importance of a popular sovereignty of the Party. At this point, the Party is supported by the large majority of Conservative Party members, the popular press and a variety of significant Eurosceptic pressure and campaign groups. Europe is therefore an issue on which the Conservative Party looks to popular sovereignty reflecting the extent to which British Euroscepticism separated itself from mainstream party politics during the 1990's and was reconfigured as a national right-wing movement. Despite the ongoing divisions and tensions within this movement and the general public's apparent lack of interest, ''it has established in the popular imagination of the belief that European integration remains a chronic threat to national identity and has been entered into by political elites without the consent of the British people'' (Gifford, 2010:332). There are contrary arguments within the conservatives as well. For instance, the Justice Secretary Ken Clarke has demonstrated that;

> I can't think of anything more irrelevant to the present situation actually, nor personally can I think of anything more disastrous than the British leaving the EU and deciding that now is the moment to take up splendid isolation alongside Iceland and others'' (Public Speech, The Telegraph, May 20, 2012).

However, whether the Conservatives or the Labor, both Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts appear to be important factions and more importantly ''sceptics have been influential to destabilize political parties, comprising at various times sizeable factions in both the Labor and the Conservative parties with serious consequences for each'' (Forster, 2002:8). This brings the argument towards what Bartolini (1999) has put forth ''state-centric paradigm in which political parties have traditionally operated is gradually being replaced by a system of 'unbounded territories' (*Cited in* Carter et. al, 1999:7). And it is this unboundedness or ubiquity of Euroscepticism that inevitably feeds these party policies not be kept in a national but post-national dimension.

In this context, it seems that the British Conservatives may wish to adopt a more pragmatic approach to Europe, reconstructing a different kind of engagement with Europe. In that sense, reminding Tony Blair's speech in 2006 which stated clearly that ''the rejection of the European constitution is an opportunity to re-shape a different vision of Europe's future; and for Britain to feel comfortable within it'', (Tony Blair, Speech on Future of Europe, Oxford University, 2006). Or, quoting Blair's aspiration of the ''EU to become a superpower rather than a super state'' (Taylor, 2008:60). This certainly makes it clear where UK politics stand in Europe and its future trajectory which has always been close to an economic Europe (PM Margaret Thatcher supported QMV in the Council for the sake of securing the Single Market)[92] but not much to a political one resulting in a search for a different vision for European integration. The same views are shared by the Conservatives which are taking steps to fulfill their vision. As reminded by Usherwood ''there is some kind of recasting of the European order'' (2005:5) and the Eurosceptics are certainly a part of this project – not as outside watchers. At this point calling for Britain to take a stronger position on shaping EU policy, Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski has remarked that the EU: ''is an English-

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[92] Marks and Wilson define the importance of the Single Market with the example of ''Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who agreed to weaken national sovereignty by instituting Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers to stop recalcitrant national governments holding the Single Market programme hostage to national vetoes. However, once the Single Market was set in motion, Thatcher opposed further political integration on nationalist grounds''. Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson, ''**The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration**'', British Journal of Political Science, 30, 2000, p.455

speaking power. The Single Market was a British idea. A British commissioner runs our diplomatic service. [And] you could, if only you wished, lead Europe's defense policy'' (Radek Sikorski, Speech at the Global Horizons Conference, September 21, 2012). It is important to read how parties are affecting other parties in the name of what is perceived as a 'common good'. And this interaction certainly finds space at Euro party level, in which the conservatives managed to form a more coherent party group.

The first step towards this establishment is the decision of the party to withdraw its MEP's from the centre right European People's Party following the 2009 European elections, and seating in the new group, argued above, namely ECR. The leader of the Conservatives in UK, David Cameron, in which his party has seat with 26 MEP's in the group of ECR, names himself as a sceptic in his speech at Lord Mayor's Banquet;

> …we sceptics have a vital point we should look sceptically at grand plans and utopian visions. We have a right to ask what the European Union should and should not do… and change it accordingly. As I said, change brings opportunities… (David Cameron, November 14, 2011).

For instance, PM David Cameron, although naming himself as sceptic, if analyzed his speech reflects a pro-EU will, and even though including certain critics does not jeopardize his positive EU stance. For instance another passage of his speech details what UK is expecting from the integration;

> …Britain's EU growth plan is focused – together with other allies – on promoting open markets, flexible economies and enterprise. And it's why we must continue to work with the European Commission for the completion of the single market in services… the opening up of our energy markets… and the scrapping of the bureaucracy that makes it so hard to start a new business. European countries account for 50 per cent of our trade and much of our inward investment. Leaving the EU is not in our national interest (David Cameron, November 14, 2011).

As the abovementioned speech underlines two important facts, the first is given to the importance of working with the European Commission, and secondly no intention of British withdrawal from the Union. Albeit, certain criticisms (especially in media) have

been made about the speech, such as; Cameron has been accused of ''facing down his most zealous Eurosceptic MEPs'' (The Economist, Nov. 14, 2011) who are actually not satisfied with the speech of Cameron. As mentioned in the second chapter mainstream parties may contain both Eurosceptic and Euro-enthusiast fractions like in the Conservative party.

According to Hix and Lord (1997) it is the EU which makes the national political parties to face either the threats or opportunities, in either way they have to be a part of this, to organize, participate, and influence political processes. It is evident that, the UK Conservative party, as a Eurosceptic party, is well aware of the adaptation to the EU level, what Anderson and Goodman (1995) argues ''modern reaction vs. postmodern adaptation''. For that reason as argued in this thesis, it is important to differentiate the Eurosceptic parties, from what can be called populist ultra nationalist parties like BNP, Front National, and Austrian Freedom Party etc. whom do not and can not be adapted to EP party groups and are ignored for cooperation in that matter.

The perception of a party being critical and favoring a different kind of EU may well lead to scepticism however this does not make it anti- European. Another misperception, also mentioned in the first and second chapters, is that, being Eurosceptic does not count for favoring nationalism or the nation-state. For sure there is a huge difference between *favoring* and *using* nationalism in political discourse, in which the latter is more related with populism. However, there is no one Europe, and there are different meanings attached both to Europe and the EU, and there is no need for creating stereotypes as anti- or pro- in that manner. Although, this is used especially for drawing clear cuts between parties during elections, to impress their electorates, this recently does not seem to work either, except for the populist parties. However, what is important is that, these Euro-parties are identifying themselves as a part of a broader body or institution, which is the EP. They have a European dimension, which is that, they belong to both national and supranational levels, which makes them visible and legitimate at both levels. Reminding Thatcher's 1988 Bruges speech is important as she demonstrated ''we would all become identikit Europeans in a supranational way'' (*Cited in* Taylor, 2008:52). At this point Taylor argues on ''what about the failure of the

British turning identikit English in a supranational UK as the Scots still remain Scottish, the Welsh still Welsh…'' (2008:52). As a result under so many years of British rule, none of these identities have been disappeared, as Britishness remains a regional and political identity, rather than a national one. And, the EU, as a political process is not seeking to remove national identities (and certainly its fragments) and is trying to grasp all these diversifications, in what is called a post-national environment where each of them have something to argue in the name of Europe.

There has been a division of opinion amongst the Eurosceptic leadership about whether the issue of Europe is an issue that can be trusted to the people, although calls for a referendum have featured strongly in the Eurosceptic argument. This has been an important part of Conservative scepticism ''proposing that people should be the arbiters of decision-making'' (Crowson, 2007:166). These arguments have finally met action with the UK coalition government (Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) passing the European Union Act in 2011 which gives the right to hold referendum on any amendment of the Treaty on the EU or the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which was clearly stated in the government programme back in 2010.

Britain's relationship with the EU, at least according to the conservative look, is defined as 'half-detachment' (Ichijo, 2003:54). However as issued in this thesis, there is no clear sign of hostility and/or fear (feeding racism or nationalism) but rather indifference and sometimes ignorance comes to manifest itself towards the EU. However this indifference brings along more important developments in UK rather than with its relations with the EU. It certainly jeopardizes the minimum reconciliation, the Unionism requires. And, more importantly, if the general picture of British politics (allocation between Conservatives, Labor and Liberal Democrats) is to be considered, the attitude of British voter's signals to a more liberal open economy, which in essence requires support for integration (namely economic), however at the same time reflecting Euroscepticism towards a more political union. The political side of integration opens up a suspicious debate in UK on whether this will harm the democratic values of the nation. For the Eurosceptics, defending Westminster against Brussels however does not cover a general will in the name of the nation. The transfer of sovereignty to the

supranational level is not leading to strong nationalist attitudes neither in UK nor in the other Member States. As the modern literature on nationalism makes reference to 'mass-based' politics losing ground, where regional politics are strengthening alongside centrifugal attitudes.

3.2.1.2.2 Civic Democratic Party (ODS)

In the Czech Republic different political groups/parties have differing positions on the evolution of the European integration. However, up to the late 1990's there was a consensus among the political elite on the vision of 'return to Europe' which meant joining the EU as soon as possible. After becoming a Member State of the EU, the political parties started differing in their stances towards the integration. Although differing in their rhetoric they do share certain positions (mirrored from the perceptions of the Czech community). All major parties in the Czech Republic, i.e. the Social Democrats, Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Christian Democrats with the exception of the Communists consider the Czech Republic a part of Euro-Atlantic civilization and endorse its values of democracy and human rights (Melich, 2005:16).

Slightly differing from the western European Member States, the scepticism in the Czech Republic is not mostly related to loosing traditional culture, language, identity etc. The major concern for most of the Czechs is related to the feeling of the EU as a big ''external, alien, and bureaucratic organization'' (Melich, 2005:12-13). The Czechs are argued to have the most pragmatic approach towards the EU (less emotional) and they perceive the EU in the economic rather than in national-emotional terms (Melich, 2005:13). That is why, apart from the term Eurosceptic, there is a wide use of the term Euro-realist in defining the political class in the Czech Republic.

The Civic Democratic Party recently after accession put forth certain visions and programmes for future alternative steps to be taken in the name of integration. The Blue Chance programme was an open call to the UK, Ireland, Scandinavia, the Baltic states and Portugal as natural allies in such a 'reform current' (Zahradil 2004: 9–10, 14). The

programme was a renewal of earlier ODS positions. The most important critic was towards Germany, identified as 'still viewed as wishing to export its own federal political system to Europe which was presented as the main obstacle to reform'. Zahradil, one of the main architects of 'Euro-realism' (2005a) suggested, that the political problems in Germany resulting from the 2005 election offered the Eurosceptics a political opportunity to assert alternative visions for Europe. The ODS stressed its identity as a standard West European party, however its Euroscepticism (for the party Euro-realism) left it isolated on the wider European centre-right where the British Conservatives became its only significant allies on European issues (Hanley, 2008:208).

The ODS has 9 seats (second largest) sitting in the ECR group. The ideas of the party are very close to those of the British Conservatives like European conservatism, economic liberalism and Euroscepticism. However stated earlier, the party names itself to be Euro-realist, but at the same time reflecting a changeable political rhetoric. President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus (founder of the Civic Democrat Party, former Prime Minister) rejects the term Euroscepticism and prefers defining himself as a Euro-realist who ''believes that Europe has to be freer, more democratic and more efficient when it comes to productivity'' (April 2003 *Cited from* www.ceskenoviny.cz). For Klaus (2006), Euroscepticism is ''the existing pluralism of opinions in many particular things, this ideology more or less determines all the important current events in Europe through its exceptional strength, its general acceptance and its dangerous simplicity'' (URL: http://www.klaus.cz/clanky/1326). However, in making this critic, Klaus comes to the question of 'what is the basic entity of the European integration', is it the man (the individual) or the state? As argued and stated in the first chapter, post-nationalism comes into being in both of these directions, in a process of 'individualism' where the individual becomes free in an environment to choose or not to choose anything and without overstating his or her national identity. And, secondly the state level, in which state mechanisms (namely institutions) becoming insufficient to reflect a common single perspective towards the integration project due to competing perspectives and interests towards the EU.

The building of a supranational entity, which is an evident and undisguised ambition of Europeanism and of Europeanists, weakens the states and strengthens the direct relationship of the individual towards the EU. The weakening of the state creates a vacuum. The European Union is not a state. It is merely a 'set of supranational authorities', whereas the state is an entity which is fundamentally, by its very nature, more than a set of authorities. It is possible to like or not to like the country you live in. It is possible, for example, to cheer for it or not to cheer for it at the Olympics in Torino. It is possible to defend it with a gun in the hand. It is (usually) possible to speak its language. It is possible to worship it and hate it. It is not possible, however, to have such relationship towards a set of supranational authorities (which J. Delors wanted to provide with his proverbial 'soul' of the EU) (Klaus, 2006 URL: http://www.klaus.cz/clanky/1326).

As stated in the above citation Klaus himself admits the weakening of the state, and the strengthening of the bond between the individual and EU. However, what he misreads is that, the real ambition (at least argued by the federalists) is not a replacement of the national bonds and loyalties, but a construction of association of states not a subordination of them. A divergence of views can be witnessed in the ODS as well, some MP's are closer to President Klaus whom remain hard sceptics however, others more soft on their European opinions.

Argued in the second chapter, the ODS, falls into the category of a party of shifting policies when in and out of government. For instance,

…in most speeches and writings during the 1990s, Klaus presented his views on European integration as sceptical reflections, which did not draw explicit political conclusions. However, after losing office in 1997, the Civic Democrats as a party developed a considerably more strident and wide-ranging Eurosceptic critique; making detailed criticisms of EU institutions and the acquis and focusing more narrowly on the concept of the Czech 'national interest' (Hanley, 2008:255-256).

For instance, ODS, like all Czech political parties during the accession process and quiet afterwards fell into the 'back to Europe' project, which reflected a clear Euro-enthusiasm towards the integration process. However, the treaty reform (draft

Constitutional Treaty) which cross-cut the fifth enlargement of the EU, made a big impact on the CEEC's to re-evaluate their interests towards the integration. The party for instance was against the Constitutional Treaty as well as its aftermath, namely the Lisbon Treaty, in which the party argued that the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty being virtually the same (Braun, 2009:4) on which the party argued that the Lisbon Treaty deserved the same criticisms. However, the party did not speak out loud these criticisms during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. According to Braun softening the scepticism had two important reasons, firstly because of the coalition government, in which the ODS was sharing with two small Euro-enthusiast parties, and secondly the upcoming Czech EU Presidency in 2009 (Braun, 2009:4).

As stated earlier, the ODS is a good example of how parties switch positions when in and out of the government. That is why, to better understand this dilemma, there is need of debating the confusion between Eurosceptic party positions on the one hand, and the use of Eurosceptic discourses in inter-party competition (at national level) on the other. It is evident, that the party falls into the latter. According to an argument, the party had already been supported by the majority of the people favoring EU (younger, wealthier, educated etc.) but not from the electorates of the Communists and Republicans (Herzmann 2000; Mišovičc 2000). That is why; the party's Euroscepticism can perhaps be interpreted as a strategic attempt to realign the Czech electorate winning over more Eurosceptic voters on the centre and the left. (*Cited in*, Hanley, 2008: 260-261). It is surprising that the ODS is the main right-wing party in the Czech Republic, however, its electorate does not share the views of the party elite when it comes to European issues. As argued by Braun (2009);

> …like the British Tories, the ODS cannot expect to win many votes by criticizing the EU; in fact, their voters are more pro-European than the Czech electorate at large. Thus, their euroscepticism cannot be explained as a means of vote utilization (Eurobarometer 69 (2008) *Cited in* Bruan, 2009:1-2).

The main change in the ODS started with the beginning of the 2000's when the party declared its ambitions in the 'Manifesto of Czech Euro-realism' introduced in 2001.

…an ideal model of European integration, but from the two alternatives described above – the intergovernmental and the supranational model, the Czech Republic should clearly prefer the intergovernmental one. European integration must be a bottom-to-top process; it must come from below, from European nations and citizens of Member States represented by their parliaments and governments, not from the office desks of the European political and bureaucratic elite (Czech Manifesto, 2001).

As the aforementioned quotation marks, the ODS, is not against the European integration, however is critical in the way it is proceeding, towards federalism, and criticizing the bureaucracy it has developed. But, what remains important is the reference made to the need of a 'bottom-up process' directly coming from the Citizens of Europe which would finally credit the democratic administration in the Union. For this reason none of these criticisms can be handled as anti-European. And in fact, Kopecek and Sedo have described the politics of the ODS as 'pro-European with reservations' (2003:3). The Czech Euro-realism manifesto includes the bottom-up approach as

European integration must be a bottom-to-top process; it must come from below, from European nations and citizens of Member States represented by their parliaments and governments, not from the office desks of the European political and bureaucratic elite. We should reject further unnatural 'intensification' of the integration process tending toward a federal state (Zahradil, 2001:4).

As clearly seen from the abovementioned citation, the party clearly supports an intergovernmental EU, and not to become a federal state. However, it is important to say that, the same document includes another dimension laying down the fragmentation the integration is clearly evoking. The Czech civic democrats argue three main forms of confrontation of European integration. The first is defined as ''the confrontation of European interests (the common interests of European bureaucracy, European institutions and Member States) with the interests of the world's other centers''. The second form of confrontation is ''the clash of interests between the European bureaucracy and individual member states'' (Zahradil, 2001: 3), and the final form on

which this thesis intends to focus, is defined in terms of a ''confrontation among the individual regional or local entities and lobbies within each Member State as well as within the EU as a whole'' (Zahradil, 2001: 3). As argued in this thesis, there is a divergence of interests dismantling the society of the Member States, and it is these diverse views developing links to the integration process, certainly with different reasons, but becoming linked in a post-national perspective. Because in either way the Czech remains still Czech and favoring a federal Europe does not make one less Czech or the other way round defending an intergovernmental Europe does not make one more Czech, or these need not be to reflect his or her Czech identity. It is important to surface the interests without surfacing the identity the one owns.

According to the party views, there is a softening discourse and rhetoric, becoming a part of the government again in 2006, and signing an agreement with the British Conservative Party in 2006 to leave the EPP-ED Group and form a new European political party in 2009, currently the European Conservatives and Reformists. The major shift of this policy is explained in the 2009 European election manifesto.

> For us integration in itself is not the goal, but rather a means of achieving prosperity for the Czech Republic and its citizens. With neither prejudice nor useless illusions we are seeking ways to achieve this within unified Europe. Thorough analysis and realistic assessment form the basis of professional and effective European policy (ODS European Election Manifesto, 2009:9).

In the light of a 'unified Europe' as the party speaks of, puts forth two possible scenarios for European integration. First building a closed regional bloc as the party manifesto states;

> …the greatest possible extent of legal, political and economic units – Europe as a state; and secondly take the path of a flexible, economically open and further expanding unit bringing about the concept of 'flexible' or 'variable' integration (ODS, European Election Manifesto, 2009:11).

Although supporting the latter way for deeper European integration, the ODS is aware of the importance of closer co-operation within its statement. The ODS, as argued in the second chapter according to the typology of Kopecky and Mudde, defines itself as Eurosceptic as ''we have not given in to either pandering or sycophantic Euro-enthusiasm or disdainful and rejectionist Euro-negativism (ODS, European Election Manifesto, 2009:36). It is evident that the party aims to isolate itself from 'Europhobia' which has no relations with the party's vision in Europe. As Mirek Topalanek (leader of the ODS) demonstrates, ''we are offering responsible solutions instead of populism and fear; solutions that in future will help people, not hurt them'' (ODS, European Election Manifesto, 2009).

> Conversely, we do not doubt that there are areas where the capabilities of individual states are absolutely inadequate and where it will be necessary to deepen integration. Even here we will not hesitate to advance the 'most European' approach. A typical example of this is the hitherto underappreciated area of energy policy and security (ODS, European Election Manifesto, 2009:12).

When analyzed, the matters which draw attention in the above citation are firstly the party's reference for 'deepening integration' and, secondly 'advancing the most European approach' when actually necessary. For that reason the party has a constructive and responsible approach towards the European integration.

However, more importantly, according to a study (on better-doing countries e.g Czech Republic, Slovenia *See*, Merlich 2005) there is a measurement of progress and optimism about the future regarding the European integration at least in the middle and upper strata of the Czech community, and as a result of this social polarization, the strata left behind assumes that catching up with the European integration would remain the same which left them dissatisfied already (Merlich, 2005:14). This kind of fragmentation, as argued in the first and second chapters, is the point which links the issue to the post-national agenda. The nation rather than as a single unit, is represented by different fragments under different reasons in the name of the European integration. And, the ODS in the middle of this current stratification does not support withdrawal from the

EU. It seeks reformist solutions resting on anti-federalism and on the other hand a safe environment with strong transatlantic links (ex in energy, security and defense). These interests were well reflected during the Czech Presidency whom with a constructive way handled the gas crisis in 2009. For this reason Hanley defines the attitude of the party as;

> …whatever its overall 'hardness' or 'softness', must be seen in terms of opposition to *specific policies* within a multi-faceted and often contradictory EU project encompassing liberalization *and* regulation, selective political integration and enlargement (Hooghe and Marks 1999; Hooghe *et al.* 2002). Party positions, they suggest, are rooted in and given coherence by competing ideologically derived models of European political economy, which respond to a kaleidoscopic, constantly evolving European project (Hanley, 2008:210).

In sum the Czech Civic Democratic Party presents three main themes when criticizing the integration. These are, resisting a technocratically driven super state, working in the name of securing the rights of smaller Member States, and finally supporting a 'flexible integration' model mainly focusing on the Single Market project or more generally in areas of economic and energy cooperation.

The Civic Democratic Party's attitudes are strategically driven, shaping policies according to the developments of the EU, rather than solely on ideological terms. For this reason under certain circumstances and periods the party makes use of Eurosceptic discourse. According to the political environment as well as to gain full advantage of the bargaining and/or negotiation process, the party elite benefits from hardening or softening their Euroscepticism both at national and supranational levels.

3.2.1.2.3 Law and Justice Party (PIS)

Throughout the 1990's Poland had a very high level of support for European integration as well as willing to take part in it. The country applied for membership in 1994, and the negotiations started in 1998, however, a slow pace of scepticism started emerging with the accession negotiations. The emerging scepticism became clear in the 2001 general elections in Poland. Two (hard) Eurosceptic parties Self Defense won 10.2 % of the votes, while the League of Polish Families won 7.87 % of the votes. On the other hand, the other two parties supporting the EU, however critical of the accession negotiations, namely the Law and Justice Party won 9.5 % of the votes, and the Polish Peasant Party won 8.98 %. The only party gaining progress out of these four became the Law and Justice Party reaching 27.0% of votes in 2005, and 29.89% in 2011 elections.

The Law and Justice party was found in 2001 by the Kaczynski brothers, in which the core of the party split from the Solidarity Electoral Action and Christian Democratic Centre Agreement (both parties dissolved in 2001).

Like the British Tories as well as the Czech Civic Democratic Party, The Law and Justice Party of Poland is a conservative party, however slightly differs in being a social conservative one. The Law and Justice Party like the British Conservatives and the Civic Democratic Party has exercised being part of the government. Similar in the case of the Czech Republic, the Law and Justice Party apart from the label Eurosceptic embraces the term Euro-realist. A former member of the party Artur Zawisza in one of his speeches has demonstrated this as; ''a certain scale of sensitivity exists (within the party). Some are more Euro-enthusiastic, others are more Eurosceptical, but the party programme, which everyone accepts, is Euro-realistic'' (*Gazeta Wyborcza*, 30 July 2002 *Cited in* Szczerbiak, 2008:232).

According to the party programme, the Law and Justice Party is a supporter of the European project, however, critical in approaching the issues related with the EU. This is mostly due to the Catholic Church remaining in a strong social position in Poland (Holubec and Rae, 2010:190). When analyzed, the influence of the church can be seen in the Law and Justice party politics like focusing on cultural and moral issues. The

party is in opposition with the argument of 'the EU imposing a form of secularism in the country' which it does not welcome.

As to the ideology of the party, it strongly opposes federalist tendencies (Party Program, 2011:219) and is interested in EU relations within the Community to be regulated in a fair and transparent manner, strongly criticizing domination within the EU (so-called Berlin-triangle) (Party Program, 2011:220) in which it commits itself to change this situation. For Cebul, the claims made by the Law and Justice party were built on two inconsistent sentiments; concern of EU domination, and expectation to receive aid and benefit from EU membership (Cebul, 2009 *Cited in* Styczynska 2012:11). The party has demonstrated its defense against domination as; ''At the European Council meeting in June, we minimized regulations that were harmful to Poland from the rejected Constitutional Treaty'' (PİS Programme, 2007: 52). This defense from the party is because it fears the EU is/will be dominated by the strongest Member States.

The Law and Justice party is evaluated as a patriotic party (rather than nationalist) who stands up to major EU policies when in government (in order to advance Polish interests), by this way it assumes to give the voters (at least the impression) that Polish interests are defended and are not taken for granted (Szcerbiak, 2011:5). However as questioned in this thesis, for whom can 'polish interest' be attributed to remains important. In a post-national approach the rhetoric of national, racial or ethnic losses its importance. As according to the case, the opponents of PIS party become non-Polish as they do not share the same scepticism or what the party defines as the 'national interest' in the name of Europe. In an opposite view, for Vermeersch the scepticism is combined with nationalism, as he argues;

> The connection between nationalism and EU-criticism which is seen in the attempts of centrists and radical politicians to 'nationalize' moral issues. Any development coming from outside Poland was framed as potentially threatening to the traditional moral order of Poland. Underlying the mobilization campaigns of Law and Justice was a political understanding of the Polish nation that reduced it to

a morally homogenous nation under the constant threat of anti-Polish, anti-religious and, therefore, immoral enemies (Vermeersch, 2009:20).

The abovementioned argument brings the issue to the question on which this study is investigating; 'who is to be the true representative of the nation in an EU entity'. The Law and Justice Party using a nationalist rhetoric does not signify of speaking in the name of the nation. It is clear that, (European) issues can not be addressed to the whole nation. Divergence of views towards the European debate has fragmented the community. For instance another example may clear this situation, a Euro-enthusiast party the Polish Civic Platform demonstrates;

> …the idea that the Polish nation had always been part of the European civilization and that Law and Justice Party had done nothing else but distancing Poland from that cultural zone. The EU membership has to be defended in order to protect the material well-being of the nation and to improve the international standing of the country (Vermeersch, 2009:21).

As argued above, a party committed to the European integration, is also able to make reference to the nation, and link its enthusiasm with Polish national interest. However, the question remains, do these discourses reflect nationalism or as argued in this study post-nationalism. Because in either case, political parties may be favoring or opposing further EU integration for different reasons, however, the ''narrative they deploy to make their case, will to some extent have to find resonance within the realm of existing ideas about the relationship between the national state and Europe'' (Vermeersch, 2009:8). As a result, the concept 'nation' and/or 'nationalism' becomes null, only and only involving a ''discourse of order'' (*See* Chatterjee, 1993). For Chatterjee (1986) as argued in the first chapter, nationalism becomes deconstructed, serving the objectives of the elites in a fashion of barrowing the same discourse. For Vermeersch as he argues;

> …And if we think of these national narratives as 'legacies', to what extent are these narratives based on a cultural given, and to what extent are they a newly constructed discourse, a malleable 'tool kit' (*See* Swidler, 1986) in the hands of political parties competing for power? (Vermeersch, 2009:2).

As understood from the above citation, the Law and Justice party is in defense of European diversity against the uniformity of Brussels (Norman, 2000 *Cited in* Melich, 2005:26) however argued in this thesis, there is no understanding of a proper uniformity in the nation as well.

According to the Law and Justice party, as stated in the party's programme, supports the idea of EU 'solidarity', which is an idea built on a large EU budget involving substantial regional aid and fiscal transfers from richer to poorer states. The party is in full support of the economic integration of Europe with the keeping of the subsidiarity rule (Fortuyn, 2002:178-179) with reflecting solidarity. One of the MEP's of the PİS underlines the need of solidarity as follows;

> …the word 'solidarity' is very often used in the EU. It is a word which attracts other European countries to our Community and, at the same time, obliges us to enlarge the EU further. Unfortunately, in many cases the EU does not show solidarity in its internal relations (MEP Ryszard Antoni Legutko, EP Speech, November 25, 2009).

On the other hand the party's opposition to the domination of Brussels signals confusion on the integration on how to be kept running without joint institutions and certainly without transferring competencies to EU level. The Law and Justice party supports liberalizing the EU internal market, encouraging free movement of labor and more open and flexible labor markets, however on the other hand opposes moves to harmonise taxes and increase EU social regulation. Another goal of Law and Justice party is engagement with East European post-Soviet states in order to convince becoming closely into the Western domain, (such as Ukraine) and the development of common EU policies aimed at securing external energy security (Szcerbiak, 2011:3).

In one of his recent speeches the leader of the Law and Justice Party, Kaczynski has demonstrated at the Krynica Economic Forum that;

I am a Euro-realist and I support a stronger Europe, especially in the political-military aspect. I want Europe to be a superpower. Europe should have a political centre, but equipped with armed forces this political centre could be an equal partner for the United States and we must not forget India and China (Kaczynski, EUbusiness Public Speech, September 9, 2011).

Evaluating the EU in the global picture, it is clear that Kaczynski is willing for a more unified Europe to become closer in security and defense however as a Eurosceptic (for him a Euro-realist) how this statement can be interpreted. A leader on one hand opposing federalism, and on the other hand aspiring a political centre to serve a military power EU. The first point to be underlined is the misreading of Euroscepticism 'not be perceived as anti-EU' and secondly the importance of 'national preference formation'. There are certain issues among the party's MP's who do not share the the main policies of the party, or differing interests of order of importance. Recently, the Law and Justice Party faced a crisis when four of its MEP's left the ECR group and joined the EFD group within the EP. They formed the United Poland officially founded in 2012 by former Law and Justice MP Zbigniew Ziobro. The MEP's argued that the ECR's liberal politics on gay marriage, support for the EU's climate-change, and limitation on EU spending on agriculture was inconsistent with their views, forcing them to leave the group and to join the EFD group (www.Europeanvoice.com, Retrieved on 26 June 2012).

As stated earlier there is a dominant role of the Catholic Church on polish politics which makes certain issues like euthanasia, abortion etc. heatly debated among the political parties. However, according to Szczerbiak (2007) the increasing EU criticism within Polish domestic political party campaigning since 2000 does not signal growing levels of Euroscepticism among the broader public. Vermeersch shares the same opinion that the scope of political Euroscepticism is not socially rooted. Eurosceptic parties received more votes in 2001 and in 2005, but in both elections the turnout was extremely low (the final elections in 2011 appeared the same with a voter turnout of 48.92%), reflecting that EU-criticism is not a particularly strong element in

helping bringing people to the polls. According to the Eurobarometer 2009[93], 61% of the Polish citizens view Polish membership positive and 74% believe their membership in the EU is beneficial to their country.

As stated in the previous chapter, the parties located in the ECR group, can be evaluated as ''Eurosceptic factions within mainstream parties'' (Taggart, 1998:368-369). As the Tories, the Czech democrats and the Polish conservative parties contain both Euro-enthusiast and Eurosceptic factions. Another aspect they have in common is that these parties do not principally reject the European integration. Their Eurosceptic attitude is mostly seen on regime criticism, defending the status quo of the integration and questioning further integration. As stated in the second chapter, according to the typology of Flood (2002), the ECR group can be situated as 'reformists' whom are constructive and engaged to the integration, however arguing for improvements to be made either institutionally or in practice. However the wording of 'improvement' should not be perceived purely as pushing forward towards further integration. It is also covers limitations as debated above under certain aspects.

As stated throughout the party views above, these parties support an intergovernmental Europe rather than federal, and secondly are in support of functional integration with a market oriented programme. More importantly the question at this point is can the post-national dimension survive (apart from federalism) under an intergovernmental EU. As argued throughout this thesis, both Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm are the two sides of the same coin responding to the change of interests. The more they become salient, the more they become open towards the European level under different conditions. For that reason whether it be 'United States of Europe' or 'Europe of United States', it is more evident that both future visions contain a post-national perspective as in either case they foresee a future trajectory in the name of both Europe and its citizens, and the one's representing these views in the EP.

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[93] Eurobarometer Autumn, 2009 Retrieved from:
hhtp://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_fact_pl_en.pdf on 21.08.2012

3.2.2   Case Study 2: Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group

Like the above explained ECR group, the EFD group is also defined as Eurosceptic however harder than the former. Differing from the ECR group, the EFD does not have a consistent ideology. The parties involved in this Euro-party diverge from single-issue to regional, from far-right to social conservativism. However, their common ground is referenced to 'anti-immigration' politics, the reason of being described as 'far-right lite'.

The leading figure of the Euro-party group is the UKIP. This remains an important dilemma within the party. UKIP strongly criticizes the conservative party (whom is in office in UK) because of not supporting withdrawal, however on the other hand UKIP has formed a Euro-party group with 11 parties, none of whom except UKIP advocate withdrawal from the EU. Because of this reason, a group of members have split from UKIP (establishing Veritas Party) with the argument of UKIP becoming moderate in European politics.

As stated above, there are mainly two determinants of Euroscepticism shared by all parties in the group. The first is anti-immigration rhetoric, in which its members believe that the Member States should have the right to protect their own borders (although some argue this in a European way). The second determinant of Euroscepticism of the EFD group (similar to the arguments of the ECR group) is the issue of sovereignty, in which the group argues it is the right of the Member States to strengthen the cultural, historical and traditional values of the nations. This is leading towards an emerging fear of homogenization of cultural, social and symbolic boundaries overlapping with the ones of the nation-state. However, the question asked by Harris is important to state here

> …if national identity is inherent to nations, and so valuable that it needs protecting by a sovereign state, than how can it be at the same time so weak that it is threatened by a political process that does not seek to remove nations? (2009:176).

It is interesting that, the EU is actually in the same position in defending the values, cultures and identities of its Member States, clearly stated in the Articles[94] of the Lisbon Treaty. The cultural and linguistic diversity of the Member States are detailed nearly in all official documents of the EU, and headed by the European Commission, the institutions of the EU stress the duty to protect this diverse richness on which the EU is found. Stressing this position, the EU institutions are referencing to a 'moderate diversity'. However for the EFD group, the EU is undermining the values of the nation-state, and with this argument according to Peters the ''political, economic and social changes introduced by the integration is forcing new groups and parties to occupy the niches it creates'' (1991:2). That is why; Eurosceptic parties mostly use and make reference to the issues which lack proper understanding by the masses and make these open to questioning and debate. However in doing this these parties are becoming an important part of the political contestation in Europe. They are creating links among political parties who approach the integration critically and by this way make free exchange of ideas and arguments and, as a result create space for deliberation. The more open this becomes; the less importance is 'national' or 'nationalism' but the share of common interests in the name of Europe.

This contestation is urgently needed for deepening the democratic public life in Europe. According to Wilkinson it is this nature of integration (normative, functional or territorial) which is the ''subject of constant flux, frequent contestation and occasional differentiation…'' (2002). There are many motives behind the integration (economic, legal, cultural, foreign policy) it is impossible to place them all into a single framework. For that reason there is a result of competing interests. This is important, as the more contestation increases, the more EU institutions, governments in office, opposition parties etc become melted into a political debate, and as a result the more this becomes, the more the media draws attention and citizens get to know about the integration. Because issues occurring in one Member State are not only watched over in that

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[94] Article 3 (3) Lisbon Treaty; The Union shall respect the Member States' cultural and linguistic diversity. Article 4 (2) Lisbon Treaty; The Union shall respect [the Member States'] national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions (…). Official Journal of the EU, Vol.50, 17 December 2007, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML on 10.09.2012

Member State solely, it becomes salient and monitored by a vast majority of European public and political actors. And finally in developing this debate, the below detailed EFD group, makes use of different channels of contestation. Besides the political parties, this gives the people of Europe a chance of constantly ''negotiate and to decide how much they wish to share and how much they wish to keep apart'' (Müller, 2007:125).

3.2.2.1 Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group at Transnational level

Nigel Farage, the Co-president of the EFD group has recently stated that ''Mr. Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council, an unelected man, does not represent the interests of the EU'' (Nigel Farage, EP, November 16, 2011). A European citizen, having not much interest in EU politics, after reading the quoted statement above, would think of the EFD group to be one of the most Euro-enthusiast party groups in the EP; fetching for a post-national democratic Union (pointing to the unelected post of the President of the European Council), as well as watching over the interests of the EU. Although, the fact remains opposite, as currently the EFD group is defined as a hard Eurosceptic party group in the EP.

The EFD group is a Euro-party sharing national conservatism and Euroscepticism. The group is formed after the EP elections in 2009, which mostly was a part of the former group of UEN in the EP. The party group now contains eleven political parties[95], in which lead by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) (11 MEP's), which consist of total 33 MEP's.

The Euro-party is labeled as a 'hard Eurosceptic', however some parties forming the group remains 'Soft Eurosceptic' parties (ex Danish People's Party, True Finns). Since

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[95] Apart from the United Kingdom Independence Party and Lega Nord the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Party contains; Danish People's Party (Denmark), True Finns (Finland), Movement For France (France), Popular Orthodox Rally (Greece), Order and Justice party (Lithuania), Reformed Political Party (Netherlands), Slovak National Party (Slovakia), United Poland (Poland) Io amo I'Italia (Italy).

the party was established after the 2009 EP elections, like the ECR group, they do not have an election manifesto to analyze their common critics on the European integration. However the party has introduced a short charter laying down the interests and goals the party seeks to defend. Similar to the ECR group, the EFD group will be analyzed below under the three important themes the party assumes as important.

3.2.2.1.1 The Arguments of Sovereignty:

The party's main concerns are sovereignty and democracy, in which they believe, is possible only in the nation-state framework.

> Convinced that the legitimate level for democracy lies with the Nation States, their regions and parliaments since there is no such thing as a single European people; the Group opposes further European integration (treaties and policies) that would exacerbate the present democratic deficit and the centralist political structure of the EU (EFD Charter, 2009).

However, understood from the principle above, the EFD party is aware of the changing nature of the nation-state, rephrasing the legitimacy and democracy being a right of ''the nation-states, their regions and parliaments'' (EFD Charter, 2009), making it clear that, such claims are not appearing from above but also from below. They criticize the weak democratic nature of the EU as ''not against too much Europe, but of not enough democratic Europe'' (Porta et. al., 2006:7). That is why the EFD group proposes national referenda, if new treaties or modifications to existing treaties are required, which needs to reflect directly the will of the people. The EFD group mostly criticizes the EU in the name of democracy and sovereignty. The Co-president of the EFD, Nigel Farage states that ''we are Eurosceptics, we are Eurocritics our job is to provide a voice of opposition in this parliament, my goodness me it is much more needed'' (Public Speech, September 29, 2009).

The party in its discourse refers to the institutions of the EU as the European Commission being a 'Politburo', and the European Council as a kind of 'Soviet Council' due to their undemocratic nature. For instance EFD group co-president Nigel Farage accuses the Commission members, in his words ''none of you have been elected and none of you have democratic legitimacy for the roles you currently hold'' (Nigel Farage, EP Speech, November 16, 2011). The issues of democracy and legitimacy are very often rehearsed by the MEP's of the EFD group. The group criticizes the characteristics of the supranational union with the abovementioned lack of democracy and legitimacy, however at the same time offering a Euro-enthusiast solution, which is to meet the values of democracy and accountability at EU level. For some, this offer could be acknowledged as to frame democracy within the nation-state and to reverse the powers back to the Member States of the EU. However for the EFD group there is a need of extending it to supranational level, as Nigel Farage demonstrates this in accusing the European Commission members;

> By any objective measure, the euro is a failure. Who is actually responsible? Who is in charge out of you lot? Well of course the answer is none of you, because none of you have been elected. None of you actually have any democratic legitimacy for the roles that you currently hold within this crisis […] You should all be held accountable for what you have done. You should all be fired (Nigel Farage, EP Speech, November 16, 2011).

As argued in the first and second chapters, the post-national level includes different views from both Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts which finally contain a positive European argument. As cited above in Farage' speech contains a justification of the EU where the people in charge must be accountable and responsible. The party believes this attitude of questioning itself reflects the core values of Europe. For instance Farage argues ''we are Europeans, and proud of it. It is this centralized, homogenized EU, which is anti-European'' (Nigel Farage, Public interview, October 18, 2012). This view makes reference to a Europeanness where anti-democratic formations having no place in Europe as well as not meeting with the European values and norms. There is a correlation between on the one hand claims of nationalism and on the other hand those

of international (in our case European) norms and policies (Halliday, 2000: 159). As a result, legitimacy is not directly dependent on a collective identity (namely nation) because important decisions are also taken with reference to European norms and values. At the heart of this twofold situation (nation-state vs. European regime) are the Eurosceptics, whom express this dilemma. At this point, reminding Magone's argument of ''the EU rescued the nation-state from its selfish realist interests…'' (Magone, 2010:2) explains the importance of approaching problems in today's international relations, and within an entity like the EU gives the Member States of the Union the ability to coordinate them under the EU level. As post-national theory argues, the link between citizenship and democracy need not be bounded at nation-state level. And it is in the context of the EU that Eurosceptics are separating the democratic accountability from the existence of a shared national identity. According to the EFD group undermining sovereignty actually brings them more responsibility in defending the interests of their electorates (not their pure nation). According to scholars (Moravcsik, 1998; Weiler, 1999) integrity is defined as ''the state or quality of being entire or complete, and national integrity to refer to a public perception of the unimpairedness of the nation-state'' (Moravcsik, 2006:220). However, the current structure is quite the opposite, and the people in the nation are interested on a divergence of interests which either overlap with their co-nationals or with other people from the Member States, namely co-inhabitants, falling under the thin Europeanism. The arguments grasp will for democracy and legitimacy for the overall Europeans. For this reason Eurosceptics are trying to reinvent representation in a post-national way. According Hansen (2009)

> …national governments do not 'jealously guard' national sovereignty. Had national sovereignty really constituted the 'sanctity' that countless scholars argue, there would have been no EU in the first place, no single market and certainly no swapping of national currencies for a common currency – so much for the national currency being one of the crown jewels of national sovereignty. Rather, national governments guard their political interests by dressing them up as national interests (Hansen, 2009:14).

As stated above it is important to stress that the parties can make use of their political interests under Eurosceptic rhetoric. However making use of them under a national one does not rest on the nations political institutions participation or inclusion, but the interpretation of this fact is important in the name of the masses, to acknowledge or question the supranational institutions as legitimate or not. The Member States governments have already given up an important part of their sovereign decision-making powers. For that reason, in the framework of nationalism, sovereignty can no longer be viewed in absolute terms, but in relative terms alongside the European integration (*See* Karolewski, 2007).

3.2.2.1.2 The Arguments on the Democratic Deficit:

Democracy beyond the nation-state still reserves some doubts, however it is evident that democracy within the nation-state has weakened as well. Recently there is a widening and a diverging gap within the nation and the state as argued in the first chapter; an example below shows this situation from speeches made by two MEP's from the EP. Nigel Farage, Co-president of the EFD group;

> …something changed though on Friday, Mr. Cameron may not know it but we are now on course, Britain is going to make the Great Escape. We are going to get out of this Union, we are going to be the first European country to get our freedom back. I suspect many others will follow and then we'll have is our democracy back, our liberty back, and we'll have influence in the world as you lot head for disaster. It is going to happen. (Nigel Farage, EP speech, 13 December 2011).

It is surprising that, Farage's above quoted speech, was answered by his (so-called) co-national. Alyn Smith a member of the Scottish National Party and, member of the Greens-European Free Alliance group (with a blue card question) responded as such;

> …he certainly did not speak on behalf of the people of Scotland, with one representative at the Westminster Parliament from my country. He certainly did not

speak on behalf of the aspirations of the Scottish Parliament. Would he agree with me that, if he does achieve the aim that he has facilitated and the United Kingdom does leave this place, the people of Scotland will do considerably better representing ourselves, free from London rule as part of this family of nations as a constructive partner? (Alyn Smith, EP speech, 13 December 2011).

As mentioned above in the quotation, whether this is national or a European issue, it can not be addressed to the whole nation (in which most niche parties fall into such a mistake). As argued in the first chapter, there is a need of a distinction between the nation and the state. Or otherwise there is a clash of interests as well as identities, in issues arising from the European integration between local, regional and national levels. It is clear that ''…re-legitimizing the state by shifting power from national to local level, may end up deepening the legitimisation crisis of the nation-state, and the tribalization of society in communities built around primary identities'' (Castells 1997: 275).

However, what makes it important to mention is that, these problems are represented and legitimized also at supranational level. As the nation is no longer divided by its own borders, and in fact being a part of this, it is currently hosting as well as facing sub-national actors (with their identification) at supranational level. It is clear that British politics alongside the European integration is contested with diverging interests at alternative levels (Gifford, 2010:328). For instance, a demonstration by Alex Salmond (former leader of the Scottish National Party, First Minister for Scotland) in 2007;

> I cannot be alone, however, in noting the irony that over the next six months Slovenia will chair and set the agenda for all meetings of the Council – while Scotland, a rich country and society, with more than twice the population, huge economic potential, and with vital interests at stake - is without a seat at the table (Alex Salmond, 2007; *Cited in* Gifford, 2010:328).

It is important here to stress that, parties in UK are examples of the fragmentation since MEP's from UK have been elected on a regional basis, for instance Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and nine English regions as constituencies. The UK is one of only five

EU member states using regional rather than state-wide lists for EP elections, however on the other hand regional representation has been opposed by other member states (with a strong territorial dimension) such as Spain (Corbett et al., 2007: 19). As stated above in the quotation, either at regional or at national level, the views and interests in British politics, related with the EU, remain mostly about representation and sovereignty which gives birth to Euro-enthusiasm for the one's aspiring more representation (backed up by the EU level) and the one's which are aspiring to secure their representation within this transformation whether this be the Conservatives, the UKIP, or even to some degree the Labor. However, they also develop a different kind of rhetoric when criticizing the undemocratic nature of the EU. For instance, indicating the European Commission as an over bureaucratic institution and criticizing its right to initiate legislation (the only institution having right to propose Community Law). This is seen as a prerogative action only reserved fro the European Commission, which makes the MEP's question their assignment as ''why am I elected'' (Nigel Farage, Public Speech, 2009). This opens up a self-questioning of the MEP's on their duties and responsibilities within the EU project which they argue to be undemocratic.

However the issue of democracy has become fragile at the national level as well. Especially in different forms of loyalty and of self-determination, for instance regions can legitimately adopt policies aimed at strengthening a sense of 'we' amongst its members. These identity-building (or protecting) projects can sometimes be contradictory, in being a part of the EU, for instance British politicians may promote a common British identity in a way that minimizes the significance of regional identities, on the other hand, Scottish (or Welsh, Irish, Catalan, Padanian etc) politicians may promote a sense of their nationhood that views national authorities as surrendering or as an artificial or ersatz (known as ersatz nationalism[96]) which finally grasps the EU level. As argued by Kymlicka ''EU politicians may imply that both national and local (regional) identities are anachronisms in an increasingly post-national European demos'' (Kymlicka, 2011:288). That is why; once again, as argued earlier, the issue is

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[96] ''Ersatz nationalism was derived from the German noun 'ersatz' meaining copied from something else and usually not as good as the original, being usually artificial and inferior substitute or imitation. In the nationalism literature it is defined as weak national identities''. Cecile Leconte, **Understanding Eurosepticism**, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2010, p. 104

between the federalists vs. intergovernmentalists, rather than on an anti- pro axis. There are the ones who are favoring to federalize the Union, and the ones who are favoring to protect the status quo in an intergovernmental structure. However, this political contestation (contrary to intergovernmental bargaining) is making the issues publicly visible, and as argued in this thesis, the Eurosceptic parties are assuming an important role in this process. It would be a mistake to acknowledge this process on a pro/anti- EU axis. The Co-president of the EFD group in the EP and the leader of the UKIP party in UK has stated several times of not being anti-European, but underlying what he argues the anti-democratic EU. In his words;

> …but it is not, it is democracy. What is sweeping northern Europe now, starting off in April with that amazing result in the Finnish general election, is a new democratic revolution. It is not anti-European. It wants a Europe of trade; it wants a Europe of cooperation; it wants a Europe where we can do student exchanges and we can work in each others' capital cities; it wants those things. But it does not want this European Union model (Nigel Farage, EP Speech, September 28, 2011).

It is an important point to remark from the abovementioned speech made by a hard Eurosceptic group leader in the EP that firstly rejecting the label of anti-Europeanism, and approaching the Europe of cooperation (namely the Single Market) positively and more importantly referencing the success of a sister party, namely True Finns election result as the ultimate goal of the group's ambitions of a different European project. Proceeding on with the statements made by these party members, will help analyze their real ambitions towards the EU. For instance, another member party of the group is Movement for France, argues in working for ''guarantee, preserve and reinstate the national independence in a Europe of the cooperation of the States and the peoples […] the Movement for France proposes a new Europe, a Europe of the nations and the peoples'' (Mouvement for France 2007a).

The EFD group as well as the parties forming it at national level was against the Lisbon Treaty, now with the same arguments are opposing the Fiscal Union. More importantly the EFD group worked hard (public speeches supporting the 'no' side, campaigning,

publishing information leaflets etc.) to prevent the ratification of the Fiscal Compact Treaty, focusing on the Irish referendum and informing the Irish through delivering leaflets demonstrating 'no' to the treaty. However, the outcome of the referendum is 60.3% 'yes'. After the referendum, EFD Group member Paul Nuttall demonstrated ''we in the EFD Group salute those proud Irishmen and women who voted and campaigned for a 'no' vote with noble intentions, for they are Irelands hope'' (June 1, 2012 URL: www.efdgroup.eu/newsroom). It is stated by the party leader Nigel Farage that it is their goal to defend the interests of the Irish people as well as the Greek (recently for the Fiscal Compact treaty). This exposes one of the dimensions of the group's post-national dimension, as the group does not have any MEP's from either Member States emphasized above; however they assume a role to defend both the Irish and Greek. This signifies the development of the contestation in Europe. Back in 2009, right after the European Parliament elections, the Co-president of the EFD group, Nigel Farage made it clear that ''I'm here to represent the opinions and rights of ordinary Europeans in all the Member States'' (Public Speech, September 29, 2009). It is here important to stress that, the Eurosceptic party is willing to develop and establish relations with supporters of Euroscepticism outside the nation-state. For that reason, a phenomenon like Euroscepticism does not serve the national consciousness; in fact, it is one of the hints of the very fragmentation within the nation-state itself.

The same contributions by the EFD group campaigning for 'no' votes were seen during the Lisbon treaty as well. However, afterwards there were positive references made to the treaty. For instance, MEP of the EFD group and the Danish Peoples Party Morten Messerschmidt argues referencing the Treaty of Lisbon that

> …there were two glimmers of light in the Lisbon Treaty. One of these was the Citizens Initiative. That is also why – on behalf of both my party in Denmark and my group here in the European Parliament – I entered into the negotiations precisely with a view to getting the Citizens' Initiative in place, which, in spite of everything, was a tiny glimmer of light in an otherwise very dark and very federal EU (MEP Morten Messerschmidt, EP Debate, December 15, 2010).

It is evident that, the Eurosceptic attitude towards the EU, arising from the EFD group, is only to increase the democratic values in the EU; as far as the people are informed, their opinions are listened, and their aspirations are reflected in the integration. The Citizens initiative in the Lisbon Treaty is referenced as the first step towards listening to the people of Europe. According to the party there is a need of accountable and transparent post-national decision-making within the EU. The party according to the abovementioned speech opposes federalism with the fear of centralization of power (namely towards Brussels) in a result leading to less plurality.

3.2.2.1.3 The Arguments of Anti-Immigration

The EFD group as stated earlier has laid down its charter, underlying major issues for the party under a four clause statement (*See* Annex 7). The charter starts with a reference given to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNHR), of who acknowledges it, can become a member of the EFD group. With such a reference, the party is attempting to disaffirm the accusations of being xenophobic and racist, which still is under question by scholars since the politics of the Lega Nord confirm. In fact the predecessor of the EFD group was the Independence and Democracy Group which faced a crisis in 2006 because of the MEP's from the Lega Nord were expelled from the group. The reason ''was one of the Ministers (Roberto Calderoli) in Italy from the Lega Nord wore a T-shirt depicting one of the Danish Muslim cartoons'' (www.euobserver.com, 16.03.2006). In order not to give a rise to such attitudes to be repeated the EFD group has committed itself to the UNHR charter, to prevent any such attitudes. In fact, in the light of the UNHR charter the EU itself has introduced the Racial Equality Directive in 2000 (*See*, Council Directive 2000/43/EC).

However, the issue of immigration remains an important problem for the EFD group as well as for the parties forming the group at national level. A paradox lies within the discourses of these parties. They make reference to Europe and/or a European dimension in the field of immigration, however at the same time blame the EU in the name of non-European immigration (Vandystadt, 2012). For that reason, they are aware

of a need in tackling immigration under a European dimension, and as argued in this thesis are contributing to a post-national understanding for a solution. For instance the Co-President of the EFD group Francesco Enrico Speroni calls for Europe;

> To take charge of illegal migration, because maritime borders belong not only to France, Spain, Malta or Italy but they are borders of the whole Union. Therefore it's important to develop Frontex, the European body in charge of controlling and fighting illegal immigration (MEP Francesco Enrico Speroni, Public Speech, September 29, 2009).

As argued above, even the Eurosceptic party members call for a European dimension in dealing with the problem of immigration, which is defined not as a national problem, but a European, and searching for a European wide post-national solution for one of the most important problem Europe is facing. However, differing from the abovementioned ERC group, the EFD group names specific groups who are assumed as the 'other' in Europe. MEP's from the EFD group handle the anti-immigration issue from a different dimension targeting certain groups (Muslims, Black, Roma etc) in Europe. For instance MEP Mario Borghezis argues ''Europe has to defend itself against illegal immigrants, it's the new policy and we will fight – me in particular with the Civil Liberties Committee to defend Europe. We won't accept an Islamic Europe, it has to remain Christian'' (MEP Mario Borghezis, Public Speech, September 9, 2009). For instance a MEP from EFD group Frank Vanhecke demonstrates this as;

> …I would like these European efforts and muscle to be somewhat more visible in the military guarding of our own external borders. A silent war is also being fought at the moment, a frightening harbinger of an immigration invasion that no one talks about. We need European muscle to deal with this, too (Frank Vanhecke, EP Strasbourg, March 25, 2011).

The most important argument these parties put forth in the name of immigration is that, they evaluate non-European values incompatible with that of European. However, what this thesis finds important is that their critic makes reference to a post-national Europe, where the 'other' is defined to be inadequate with a European culture as well as

becoming a part of a European identity. For instance, according to the abovementioned quotation, it might seem inegalitarian. However, it refers to more Europe, which means less asylum or migration at the same time meaning less cosmopolitan, but becoming closer to a post-national European order (a pan-European and/or extending communitarianism beyond the local or national level). In an era of strict, homogen national identities becoming flexible, the Eurosceptic parties are developing a cultural and religious based supra-ethnic identity in Europe pointing to the 'other'. And more importantly, the EU itself under certain aspects supports both cosmopolitanism and communitarian traits (for instance supporting unity in diversity, multiculturalism however at the same time granting EU membership to European states, linking EU citizenship to nationality etc) what some scholars name as ''cosmopolitcs'' (*See,* Kinnvall and Nesbitt, 2010). Alongside the European integration, the issue of 'otherness' is becoming apparent in a discourse of non-white, non- Christian population when it comes to defining Europeanness. It is important to stress that, these views are also shared by well known Euro-enthusiasts whom are committed to a closer European project. For instance, the current President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy in a speech back in 2004 argued as follows

> …an expansion of the EU to include Turkey cannot be considered as just another expansion as in the past. The universal values which are in force in Europe, and which are fundamental values of Christianity, will loose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey (Herman Van Rompuy, November 19, 2009).

As seen in the abovementioned citation, the issue of 'otherness' is supported not only by Eurosceptic politicians or parties, but as well as finds support by Euro-enthusiasts. At this point, another supporting view was made by one of the advisors of the Lithuanian President to the Russians. In his words ''Europe will not want you, you are Christian but Asian; on the other hand the Turks are European but not Christian'' (Ortaylı, 2011:173). Besides the Eurosceptic parties, these views and opinions are shared by a large sum of Europeans. These views feed the anti-immigration rhetoric used by the Eurosceptic parties which manifest a post-national dimension extending the national level. As the Eurosceptic parties have and are developing a ''diacritica'' (*See* Barth,

1969b) on what is assumed to be European and non- European. At this point, post-nationalism seems to contest multiculturalism, with a communitarian perspective, and as debated in previous chapters, Euroscepticism is contributing to this clarification of Europeanness.

As argued throughout this study anti-immigration rhetoric is not united with the state, the Eurosceptic movements are creating a separate public sphere (at EU level) which is developing independanlty from the nation-state. In fact, starting with the 2000's, the EU has taken serious steps in developing cooperation on immigration matters. The first step in this realm was the establishment of the 'European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU' namely known as FRONTEX in 2004. The aim is to promote and coordinate ''European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights chart applying the concept of integrated border management'' (URL:http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about/origin). The removal of the borders within the EU, required by the Schengen agreement, opened up the debate on how to protect the external borders, that is why, it was important to develop a strategy to protect the external borders of the EU from outside. Frontex was established in order to fulfill these objectives. This appears because of a lack of nation's uniformity giving birth to a polarization as well as a re-categorization between 'native' and 'non-native' which entangles handling the 'nation'. Dushesne and Frogmier (1995) defined this process as a clash between 'cosmopolitanism' and 'localism', however this is not the debate of this chapter, but what is important to mention here is that, as questioned by Hansen (2009) ''does post-nationalism have to secure cosmopolitan guarantees'' remains important. There is a re-drawing of the boundaries, however not between the Member States of the EU, but between natives and immigrants on making distinctions on whether immigrants are from inside or outside Europe. It is evident that, leaving aside Eurosceptics for a moment, even Euro-enthusiasts whom are committed strictly to the European integration can become very protectionist of their culture, tradition, language etc. and their attitudes may contain 'too many immigrants' rhetoric, however they do not evaluate this as a direct outcome of the integration and in a blaming rhetoric towards the EU. That is why; Rydgren (2007) has named such parties as immigrant-sceptic rather than Eurosceptic. Because the scepticism is not directly

towards the whole EU thing, as well as is not directed towards the 'European man', it is towards (in the rhetoric of these parties) the 'Muslims' for parties like Danish Peoples Party and Vlaams Belang, and the 'non-white North Africans' for Lega Nord. And it is 'Russians' for some parties located in the CEEC's.

The process of European integration at this point has two clear effects on these parties reflecting resistance. Firstly, it moderates the ideological distance that in the past had rendered common political goals or collective action in the form of transnational party federations difficult. Second, it highlights and gives political visibility to the common new agenda of these parties on issues such as identity, ecology, and the democratization of the European Union, or the resistance towards multiculturalism, which has as a result currently become salient in centrist party agendas as well. Establishing more coherent views towards the European integration brings these parties more closely to each other leading to cross party working programmes, receiving support from each other in national elections, or criticizing each others political attitudes etc. That is why, it is important to analyze the national parties, apart from their Euro-party groups in the EP, for understanding what they argue from national level towards the level of EU.

3.2.2.2 Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group: Member Parties at National Level

Besides the detailed Euro-party above, it is important to analyze what the parties (forming the Euro-party) argue at national level. However, starting from national level in making these arguments, there is an organizing of post-national interests at EU level. Because their positions change on issues arising from the European integration and this certainly effects other party positions on the same issues as well. For that reason three parties have been debated below selected according to the level of their representation (number of MEP's) within the Euro-party.

3.2.2.2.1 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

As stated earlier, British Euroscepticism has a long history in EU relations (identified under four distinct phases[97]). For that reason, the current phase of Euroscepticism is tackled, when new Eurosceptic parties entered British politics, in which one of them is United Kingdom Independence Party.

The debate has a natural division of before and after the referendum on Britain's continued membership of the EC. Until this event the Eurosceptics were fighting to prevent either British membership or some alternative form of closer political and economic association with Europe. Thereafter, they were ''obliged to accept membership of the EC and work from within the system to seek to reduce the EC's influence'' (Crowson, 2007:152). Taking part in the construction of a political space, or participation for influencing it, which in either ways is assumed counting for a post-national dimension.

UK Independence Party is the leading party in the EFD group with 11 seats. The party is a right-wing, hard Eurosceptic (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008), niche[98] (Lynch et al.,

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[97] According to David Baker et. al., (2008) there are four phases to understand British Euroscepticism. ''…the first phase of British Euroscepticism can be defined as the period between the end of the Second World War and the parliamentary ratification of Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972. At the outset of this period, Euroscepticism was the conventional wisdom amongst the British political elite. By 1972, such intellectual and political hegemony had been lost. Nevertheless, the pragmatic economic rationale presented for membership failed to undermine Euroscepticism. Indeed, an abbreviated second phase then followed until the 1975 referendum in which Eurosceptics vainly fought a rearguard action to secure Britain's exit from the EEC through a 'no' vote in the referendum on Labor's renegotiated terms of membership. The period thereafter until 1988 forms a third period in which, following the outcome of the referendum and despite developments within the Labor Party, Euroscepticism became a much more latent feature of British politics. The fourth and current phase of Euroscepticism began in the late 1980s. In this period, Euroscepticism became fundamental to the contemporary configuration of British politics and general elections.With the dynamics for closer political integration accelerating, issues of sovereignty and national identity have become central to Eurosceptic concerns, catalysing the growth of Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party and the creation of new Eurosceptic minor parties''. David Baker, et al. ''Euroscepticism in the British Party System: A Source of Fascination, Perplexity, and Sometimes Frustration'', in **Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism**, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.) Oxford University Pres, 2008, p.94

[98] Meguid defines 'niche parties' as those ''with a distinctive focus on a limited set of issues which lie beyond the traditional class cleavage and are largely ignored by mainstream parties''. B. Meguid, ''**Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success**'', *American Political Science Review*, 99, 2005:347–359, p.2

2011:1) party. UKIP was formed in 1993, and is competing in general elections since 1997 and in European elections since 1994 (before than the national elections which explains its single-issue policy in the first place). More importantly, the party was formed during the ratification of the Maastricht treaty known by then as Anti-federalist League. It was not until the party gained seats with its first three MEP's elected in 1999. The party's general election performances have been much less notable. Although it was the fourth placed party in terms of nationwide share of the vote, UKIP polled only 3.1% of the votes in general elections in 2010. In that sense, it is important to mention, of what Taggart and Szczerbiak has argued as ''high levels of public Euroscepticism does not necessarily translate into high levels of support for parties expressing hard Euroscepticism'' (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002:32).

The party however, with time has been forced to expand, explore and modify its policies. The steps can be represented as a development from principled non-engagement (from not taking up seats in the EP) to pragmatic engagement (with the existing system in order to change it). This shift is counted as developing new policy lines and arenas of activity, and to re-contextualizing the entire opposition to the EU with the idea of independence, (Usherwood, 2008:259) which is withdrawal from the EU. UKIP is the only one out of ten parties to demand withdrawal from the EU in the EFD group. For instance the Lega Nord, Danish People's Party, which are other Eurosceptic parties forming the EFD group do not have the goal of withdrawal from the EU. That is why, Lynch argues that the EFD is a marriage of convenience providing the benefits of group status, but allowing members of the party to vote as what they see necessary. There is little coordination of positions in the group which appears to be the least cohesive group, with the Lega Nord frequently voting in favor of integration (under certain matters) and UKIP against (Lynch et al., 2011:7).

Considering British politics, the attitude of UKIP, is clearly understood, when analyzing the rest of the British nation-level parties. For instance, UKIP is in competition on the one hand with the British National Party (BNP), and on the other with the Conservatives, in which the party's leaders, (former leader) Lord Pearson and the current leader Nigel Farage as well as a significant number of party members and voters

are all former Conservative members, who all have a certain degree of Euroscepticism. In dissociating itself from the BNP, though is easy, as to state itself to be a libertarian, and a non-racist party, which is something it had to demonstrate several times in the EFD group as well. Party leader Nigel Farage made this clear in his press speech in 2008 where he rejected any offer from the BNP for electoral pact as;

> There are no circumstances, no possible situations, in which we would even consider doing any type of deal with the BNP whatsoever… we are a non-racist, non-sectarian party… I'm simply amazed that the BNP thought we would even consider such a thing…] (Nigel Farage, 2008 *Cited in* www.news.bbc.co.uk).

However, trying to distance itself from the Conservatives has troubled the party in recent elections[99]. Both the Conservatives and the UKIP are known to be Eurosceptic, (although the latter being a hard Eurosceptic) and for that reason, what is it that these two parties differ makes it difficult to vote according to the masses.

The distancing of UKIP was to distinguish itself from the others mentioned above, through hardening its Euroscepticism, and linking it to 'withdrawal from the EU' argument. This kind of Euroscepticism falls into the category of using Eurosceptic discourse in inter-party competition at national level. The latest official document of the party for the 2012 Local Elections with the slogan of ''Shaping the Future'' includes the aspiration of leaving the EU (Local Manifesto, 2012:4). However, if analyzed, the party demonstrations also include proposals about the future of the EU or the way the integration should develop especially in the institutional dimension. That is why a dilemma lies in the party attitudes; on one hand the party supports withdrawal from the EU, on the other hand displays future scenario for the European integration.

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[99] According to Lynch et al., ''47% of UKIP's 2009 voters switched to the Conservatives at the general election, 17% to Labor, 16% to the Liberal Democrats and another 16% stayed with UKIP. On the other hand UKIP thus benefitted considerably in 2009 EP elections from Conservative supporters 'lending their votes'. See, Philip Lynch, Richard Whitaker and Gemma Loomes'', ''**The UK Independence Party: Understanding a Niche Party's Strategy, Candidates and Supporters**'', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 2011:1-25, p.20

According to Laible, nationalists and/or populists seek to participate in European institutions primarily because they believe it is valuable for promoting the domestic political interests of their parties, and that this participation may have an important symbolic dimension. Nationalists use European institutions to establish a presence that they believe legitimizes themselves as parties and contributes to strengthening their causes. The importance of presence can be demonstrated as, nationalists are highly active in EP politics in ways that can only be understood as symbolic and that do not always appear directly related to party policy. Nationalists may also attempt to attract international support, pass legislation that will benefit their constituents, and pursue self-interested goals. Yet overall, the behavior of nationalists in the EP should be understood as part of an effort to establish an image of nationalists as legitimate actors in the European arena for a domestic audience (Laible, 2008:153). Although agreeing with this observation, the thing which requires focus, is how Eurosceptic parties change themselves (or transform) when actually fighting for their nationalist cause, which they are in favor to spread this cause among other Member States and/or towards the EU as a whole. They do come up with internal or domestic interests; however their causes are filled by post-national motives like criticizing the undemocratic EP and searching transnational partners sharing similar views. For instance rephrasing the issues of legitimacy, as well as democracy in the EU, it is worth quoting Nigel Farage at length, in his words;

> [...at a moment there was a moment and they might have got this European project right, and it was the launching of the Constitution, Giscard d'estaing great project... and they thought, that they were going to mirror what those great men in America had done back in the 1780's, and they began to prejudice this wonderful political constitution for the European Union, and I know that many of the Christian groups indeed lobbied very hard to try get it written in to the constitution that is was a christian culture that existed within the EU, of course that did not seem like today. But had they, had the people behind this used the European Constitution as an opportunity to democratise the EU to be honest with the peoples of the EU, about their intentions to make the government of Europe come from within the elected European Parliament, if they had done those things, they may well, through popular referendums have carried the day. But if you remember that

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isn't actually what happened is it, that isn't what happened. They determined the leaders not to give referendums, but in the end one or two buttled and it was Chirac who buttled…] (Nigel Farage, Speech at the Pro-Europa Christiana Federation, May 31, 2011).

As quoted above, after so many years of the rejection of the draft Constitution treaty, it is important for a Eurosceptic party leader to make reference to the treaty on how worthy it would have been if written down in a more democratic way. A main argument towards the strategy of the Eurosceptic attitude is 'to strongly question the EU legitimacy without proposing any measures for the EU to gain more legitimacy' however, the abovementioned quotation from the UKIP leader argues the opposite. The abovementioned quotation marks two important criticisms. The first is the emphasis on the missed opportunity of the Constitutional treaty, in which the EU could have been moved towards a more democratic direction. And the second point is, the suggestion and (would be) the result of the former, which is bringing out the government (namely the European Commission) from the EP. According to Conti (2003)

> …support to European integration can be re-conducted to a strategy, serving domestic interests or a different party goal. There is no commitment to further integration, unless it is proved it would serve such interests. Otherwise, commitment to European integration is mainly in terms of defense of the status quo (Conti and Verzichelli 2002 *Cited in* Conti, 2003:16).

Although Conti references this definition to the (soft) Eurosceptics, there are certain elements which can be attributed to the (hard) Eurosceptics as well. It is evident that, the issues which are strongly put under question are 'democracy' and the 'legitimacy' of the EU. The above quotation, by the party's leader, is proposing new measures (in which blaming the Member States of not been honest) on which the EU has lost its chance (during the ratification of the European Convention) to gain more legitimacy. Through making the European Commission to come out directly from the European Parliament, as a government, what would be the goal of UKIP (apart from desiring democratization) a party supporting withdrawal from the EU, favoring the members of

the Commission to be direclty elected from the EP. As stated earlier this appears as what Wilkinson (2002) argues 'subjects of constant flux'. UKIP despite the 'nation' (rather than in the name of the nation) develops different attitudes towards the integration in which it finds accurate to its policies. However in setting this agenda there is no wide support from the national electorate. That is why, social spaces have blurred the local associations of community which was once contained in the national concept of society (Beck, 2000:28) is argued as becoming currently post-national.

For instance, quoting Nigel Farage once again; ''what we represent is not anti-Europeanism – that is not what it is about. We believe in nation-state democracy, we want a Europe of trade, we want a Europe of co-operation, and we want a Europe that is responsible'' (Nigel Farage, 17 January, 2012, European Parliament). Nigel Farage has several times stated that their party is not anti- European, however favoring a Europe which is not in its current form. It is evident that nearly all parties' visions in UK overlap according to their aspirations regarding Europe. However, what is important to remark at this point is the politics of UKIP is a clear sign of the party aiming to distance itself from the major political parties in the UK. It is not a policy shift of hardening its Euroscepticism towards the EU. In fact the split in the party in 2005 is a clear sign of the party moderating its policies in EU issues. A group of members split from the UKIP in 2005 to form the VERITAS (meaning 'truth' in Latin) party. The party's primary goal was to form opposition on immigration to the UK and, become more specific on EU issues when compared to UKIP's general Euroscepticism. The party's statement[100] on core values and beliefs clearly demonstrates their hard Euroscepticism.

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[100] Veritas party principle; ''We will seek opportunities for nations to work together, to co-operate and share resources informally or within formal structures, voluntarily and not coerced, for mutual benefit and in matters of common interest. We support internationalism and not supra-nationalism. We are of one world; and seek the best for the world and humanity through international effort that respects the sovereignty of the people of each nation. Our 'nationalism' is not jingoistic, antagonistic, aggressive or isolationist; it is quiet and under stated, yet forms the bedrock of our beliefs. We are neither xenophobic, nor possessive of any sense of superiority over other nations. We welcome cultural exchange and cooperation with other nations whilst being determined to conserve the integrity and primacy of our own nation's cultural wealth and its sovereignty''. *Cited from* URL: http://www.veritasparty.com/core_values.php on 26 June 2012.

As a result, UKIP is a party with low levels of support at national level (3,1 % of vote in 2010 elections). And competing in an environment with other Eurosceptic parties (Tories as well as the BNP) it is not a surprise that the party makes use of Eurosceptic rhetoric for mostly tactical reasons. These are the sort of campaigns which are not directly related with a realistic assessment of the strengths and/or failures of the European integration process, rather they are evidence of electoral opportunism (vote maximization). Parties hope to win votes simply by putting forth the political interests of the party however with a national make up, of which they often claim to be the only sole representatives, against the interests of the undemocratic technocrats in Brussels. However, they do gain support from the electorates and parties like UKIP become successful in EP elections. It is clear that, in the case of the UK, the electorate is willing for a strong opposition voice in the EP. However do not credit the same parties whether this is BNP or UKIP in national elections. For Haba, these recent trends do not derive from the ''immaturity of democracy, but occur in the process of overcoming the deficits of democracy, and of introducing the people's participation…'' (2007:6). The same situation can be witnessed in current British politics on the democratic deficit the country is facing. According to a proposal of a MEP from UKIP, there is a need of establishing an English parliament[101] on the same conditions like the Scottish, Welsh and Irish. According to Nuttall;

> Moreover, contrary to idle rhetoric, an English Parliament will only strengthen the United Kingdom against the undemocratic EU, which wishes to break up England into nine euro-regions. The EU is trying to force countries together without permission. With our policy we are trying to create democratic equality and maintain the Union with the consent of the people (URL: http://www.ukip.org/content/latest-news/2455-a-union-for-the-future, September 12, 2011).

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[101] A proposal from P. Nuttall on the issue is as follows; ''a significant number of national opinion polls have consistently shown that the people of England want the same measure of self-government offered to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Worryingly, most recent polls have shown a jump in support for English independence linked, we believe, to the growing feeling of frustration felt by the English towards the democratic deficit that exists at this present moment in time''. Paul Nuttall, MEP, Retrieved from: http://www.ukip.org/content/latest-news/2455-a-union-for-the-future, on 12 September 2011.

As stated above in the citation, the proposal introduced by Nuttall is to strengthen the democracy in UK against what is argued as the undemocratic EU. That is why, it is important to stress that ''dimensions of support of European integration also mark the dimensions of possible resistance'' (Trenz and De Wilde, 2012:14). That is why rather than a clash of interests between the Euroseptics and the Euro-enthusiasts, it is more a challenge and confrontation which needs to be considered. As argued in the second chapter, the Eurosceptic parties concentrate on the value of democracy in the EU. Since the EU still lacks the democratic legitimacy, they are not to be blamed as corrupting the integration process, but rather problematizing the issue of democracy linking this to the well known 'national democracy under threat' argumentation. The EU is trying to bring together a divergence of political differences however in doing this on which Tully adheres importance is that

> …there should not be to reach final agreements on universal principles or procedures, but to ensuring that constitutional democracies are always open to the democratic freedom of calling into question and presenting reasons for the renegotiation of the prevailing rules of law, principles of justice and practices of deliberation (Tully, 2002:218).

It is important here to stress that, the contestation between the Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics, is based on the argument whether democratic values can be separated from national identities, rather than solely defending the national loyalties or accusing of destroying them.

3.2.2.2.2 The Northern League (Lega Nord)

In the past, (up to the 2000's) Italian elites, political parties, and public opinion had traditionally been Euro-enthusiast (pro-European), and in favor of European integration. With the establishment of the second Berlusconi coalition government in May 2001 (Lega Nord, National Alliance and Christian Centre and Democrats), Euroseptic attitudes gained momentum, even though some signals had already emerged during the

first Berlusconi government in 1994 (coalition with National Alliance, Lega Nord). As a result, Eurosceptic attitudes, appeared at the governmental level for the first time in Italian politics (remembering Italy as one of the founding Member States of the ECSC).

However, it is important to stress that, despite the remarkable changes that the Italian political system underwent during in the 1990s, the Euro-enthusiasm of Italian public opinion remains strong, whereas Eurosceptic positions surfaced amongst centre-right political parties.

> On the one hand, the Northern League's embracing of Soft—and, increasingly, Hard—Euroscepticism is purely an electoral strategy with very few roots in the ideological base of the party and with seemingly little consensus amongst its supporters. On the other hand, the National Alliance's abandonment of its past Soft Euroscepticism is part of a broader top-down 'rehabilitation' strategy, which, however, tends to clash with the ideological platform of the party and is hardly shared by its supporters (Quaglia, 2008:59).

According to the abovementioned quotation it is important to focus on the LN and its critical approaching of the EU. The Lega Nord which is also known as the Northern League is a regionalist political party with a focus on the northern part of Italy, known as Padania. Lega Nord's political program includes the transformation of Italy into a federal state, support of federalism and greater regional autonomy, especially for the North. In past it has advocated secession of the North, known as Padania, from Italy. Established in 1991, the party had a strong pro-EU policy up to 1999. For instance, one of its senior figures and MP Giancarlo Pagliarini argued that ''the political objective of Europe is fundamental for us. . . . If we look back, the best laws put in place in Italy are the laws based on EU legislation'' (*Financial Times*, 7 July 1994). Or, the former leader of the party, Umberto Bossi has stated that ''the treaty of Maastricht re-allocates power at different levels and across the territory of each Member State and gives new vitality to local autonomies'' (Quaglia, 2008:67). The party in the 1990's had a very positive view on the European integration like most Italian political parties. For instance the LN's 1994 election programme includes the reference of the EU as;

> [The Northern League says] a clear yes to the European Union, political and economic, as this is taking shape according to the Maastricht Treaty, signed by all EEC countries. This choice entails for the country a pro-European policy, coherent and credible, driven by liberalism and federalism and respectful of all the communitarian obligations (LN, Working Paper, 1994 *Cited in* Meret, 2009:177).

Making clear reference to Europe, the Party leader Bossi has demonstrated that;

> European man . . . has a multiplicity of belongings. He belongs to his family, to the local community, to his city or region, to his nation or ethnic group, to his professional group, to the culture of his social group and so on. The sociological fact is the ideal starting point for federal institutions based upon the principle of subsidiarity, of grassroots sovereignty, of a capillary democracy inserted into a great continental confederation, which would be the guarantee of constitutional rules and individual liberty . . . the Lega's theories have nothing in common with the cultural provincialism and economic isolationism that were, instead, the hallmarks . . . of fascism as a regime (Bossi, 1992:202).

As stated in the above quotation Bossi the former leader of the LN firstly marks the probability of multiple identities in what he argues starting by a *European man…* and secondly pointing to a type of confederation the integration might lead towards in the future. The LN having such positive feelings and vision for Europe lasted up to the late 1990's. Starting with the 2000's, the party has become a strict critical of the EU. Recent politics have shown that Italian identity has become an increasingly important issue. This shows evidence upon the rise of the party LN, in the North of Italy. The party argues that the North of Italy has its own identity, distinct from Italian. The LN is willing to construct this identity on socio-economic divisions[102], as there is no ethnic

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[102] In 2007, according to the European Commission working paper, ''five Southern regions of Italy – Campania Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria and Sicily – had a GDP per capita that was still less than 75% of the European average, while all the Northern Italian regions had a GDP per capita equal or superior to the European average. The GDP of Italy's five southernmost regions is in line with the GDP of Greece and Portugal, while the GDP of the central and northern regions of Italy is in line with that of the neighboring countries to the North and west. In Europe a similar gap between two macro regions of the same nation can be found only along the linet hat divided Germany into the blocs after the end of WWII''. European

base for what is claimed to be Padanian. These claims have raised questions about the future of the Italian State. The party puts forth the argument of federalizing the State alongside creating geography (namely Padania) on which to construct some kind of geographical identification, which challenges the Italian nation-state. For fulfilling such claims, the LN has utilized different strategies and discourses. The LN is arguing for a long time that they have been deceived by a corrupt, bureaucratic and wasteful central State (Giordano, 2002:171).

However, gaining 8.4% of the electorate and entering the coalition in 1994 with partners like Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale, forced the LN to drop its rhetoric of secession. However, although gaining more support in the 1996 elections (10.1% of the electorate), LN started slipping towards becoming a mainstream political party, which faced decreasing levels of support. The party's silencing of its claims during the 1990's apart from the reason of forming the coalition, was according to Oneto and Pagliarini that the European Monetary Union (EMU) was on its way, and that there was no way the Italian State would enter it, fulfilling the criteria with the enormous gap between the (poor) south and the (rich) north (Oneto and Pagliarini 2005 *Cited in* Huysseune, 2010:71). However, this did not happen, as the LN foresaw.

> After Italy's acceptance into the EMU, the Lega started critiquing the very acceptance of a single currency. It argues on the one hand that the exchange rate Lire–Euro accepted by the Italian government burdened the northern economy (Oneto and Pagliarini 2005, 31), and that only the North should have been accepted in the EMU. But it also rejects the principle of the Euro, which for the Lega has been imposed by Germany and France (with the connivance of Italy) to facilitate their economic penetration of Padania (Bossi and Vimercati 1998 *Cited in* Huysseune, 2010:71).

The 2001 elections became a catastrophe for LN as it's previously 10.1% (in 1996) electorate turnout decreased to 3.9%. The talks during the EMU and the acceptance of

Euro afterwards shifted LN from a Euro-enthusiast attitude towards a more sceptic one. However, the scepticism of LN reflects a dilemma. The main reason of this critic stems from, as the party argues, firstly because of the EU still taking the nation-state as a reference instead of the regions. It argues that the demise of the geopolitical order of the Cold War should lead to the disappearance of the centralized, artificial and Jacobin nation-state. The party understands itself as ''a supporter of the revival of peoples that rediscover their individuality and therefore acquire the right to autonomy or even independence'' (Bossi and Vimercati 1993 *Cited in* Huysseune, 2010:65).

The LN after the Euro schock (separate EMU accession for Northern Italy), in which aspired to enter the Euro zone as a distinct region, namely 'Padania' separately from Italy was abandoned and claims of separation were set to cooling. However, the party started this time to develop politics for federalizing Italy, rather than secession. It can be argued that, besides other claims and aspirations, the LN has three consistent objectives from its very establishment. First of all, the party maintains hostility towards the central Italian state (though being a part of the coalition government several times), secondly support of a different Northern Italian identity, and thirdly opposing immigration.

However, all these claims the party puts forth is strategically driven rather than ideological. The party dropping its claims for secession had to replace them by developing new political goals. Opposing to centralization alone was not beneficiary for the party politics which took place in the coalition governments. That is why it would be difficult convincing the masses (located in Northern Italy). As a result the party started building its policies on opposing immigration and the developments which the party believes has caused this, namely European integration and globalization. This opened up the LN's Eurosceptic rhetoric which actually contradicts in itself. On the one hand LN is favoring to integrate Padania into the European and global economy, as well identifying itself with European values and identity, on the other hand is willing for protecting Padania from any intervention by non-Padanian institutions (from Rome and Brussels etc). That is why, Huysseune argues LN ''accepts European identity however opposes the EU'' (Huysseune, 2010:69).

By anchoring its anti EU discourse to the widespread hostility towards the Italian bureaucracy, the party has been able to embed Euroscepticism in a national context where it has traditionally been very weak and where the party that proposes this discourse itself offers strong identification with Europe (Huysseune, 2010:73).

The opposition to EU rests on the bureaucratization and centralization or can also be identified by supranationalism. The party is favoring a 'Europe of Regions' project rather than a 'European Super State'. However, the party, as mentioned above is also against centralization within Italy, namely against Rome. Contrary to these political discourse Italians continue to trust European institutions more then the national ones. (trust in EU institutions 47%, trust in national government 23% Autumn, 2010 *Cited in* Comelli, 2011:5-6). However, when it comes to official positions, most Italian parties support transferring more power to Brussels and proceeding with European integration. For instance LN has demonstrated that ''we must construct a Europe that is founded on the respect of national and territorial realities, giving the European Union only a limited degree of sovereignty, delimiting its competences and the fields of its intervention avoiding ambiguities'' (Lega Nord 2006: 26 *Cited in* Vasilopoulou, 2009:10).

For Comelli ''in particular, a bipartisan consensus exists on the need to strengthen the Common European Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and to proceed with enlargement'' (Comelli, 2011:8). In particular, most parties (left and right) support for instance Turkey's EU membership, with the only notable exception of the Northern League.

In fact the party has no outright opposition towards the EU and is constantly referencing the European dimension in its identity building agenda. As argued by Huysseune (2006)

Both in its more pro-European early years and in its later Eurosceptic phase, the Lega has thus emphasized the European-ness of northern Italy, arguing even that Padania is the heart of Europe (Oneto and Pagliarini 2005, 22). The Lega associates Europe with modernity, a rich man's club to which Padania has a right to belong. It therefore constantly emphasizes its sameness to the rich core

territories both in socioeconomic profile and in cultural and historical terms. As a token of Padania's modernity and European-ness, the Lega as a rule rhetorically accepts what are supposed to be the core European values…] (*Cited in* Huysseune, 2010:67).

According to the LN, foreign immigration has created new problems threatening homogeneity and social cohesion especially from outside the EU (Giordano, 2002:176). Sharing similar abovementioned views Gifford argues that ''Euroscepticism is as a legitimate expression of national identity'' (2010:391). Assuming Euroscepticism as a legitimate expression though might be correct, however, the wording of 'outside the EU' on immigration matters, makes reference to EU level as well as evoking a 'fortress Europe' which this thesis argues as a post-national. And if we consider the issue of immigration touched nearly all by Eurosceptic parties, it makes these arguments even more important. The party has a strict behavior on crime and immigration (from Muslim countries), and terrorism. It supports the promotion of immigration from non-Muslim countries in order to protect the ''Christian identity of Italy and Europe, which, according to party officials, should be based on Judeo-Christian heritage'' (URL: http://www.onlyinitaly.com/mainarchives/072108.htm).

Linked to the issue of Enlargement policy the problem of immigration is an important aspect for the LN. Italy since the 1990's has witnessed a massive flow of foreigners, that now amount to around 4,5 million (7,2 %) (Comelli, 2011:5). The increasing number of crimes committed by immigrants in past years, has become an important debate on the media and an anti-immigration political discourse developed by some parties, like the LN. The EU is brought into this debate in a twofold manner. On the one hand, Italian political elite are claiming that illegal immigration is a European problem, which cannot be solved by the State alone or more generally by southern European countries. On the other hand, the EU citizens of Roma origin have been involved in some crimes which has dangerously generated a link between immigration and EU enlargement in political and media discourse (Comelli, 2011:5).

Lega Nord, makes critics towards the European integration on two important facts, the first as mentioned above rests on anti-immigration discourse, and the second is mostly the concerns for centralization. However, the party during the ratification of the recent Lisbon Treaty silenced its Eurosceptic rhetoric and voted in favor of the treaty with the parliament voting in favor unanimously.

> Bossi declared that his party would vote in favor of the ratification of the Treaty in parliament. In fact, The Senate approved the bill on July 23 unanimously (287 yes votes out of 287 votes cast) and the Chamber of Deputies did likewise on 31 July (517 yes votes out of 517 votes cast), paving the way for the ratification on 2 August (Comelli, 2011:9).

To sum up, LN, as the party itself defines certain elements of its roots to the European Identity, is not against the European integration, however, doubts certain developments. It is understandable of using this sceptic rhetoric as the party is willing to gain autonomy within Italy and working towards de-centralization, and it would be a dilemma of favoring centralization at EU level. For that reason, the LN is criticizing the bureaucratization and centralization of the EU.

3.2.2.2.3   Danish Peoples Party

As discussed in the previous chapter, Euroscepticim became evident with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The first signal was the ratification in Denmark. The referendum in 1992 resulted with 49,3% in favor and 50,7% voting against. The referendum was followed by the Edinburgh Agreement, including 4 opt-outs for Denmark. The first one is partly exception from Union Citizenship[103], secondly, Denmark would not participate in the third phase of the EMU, thirdly exception, is in area of Justice and Home Affairs (only take part in intergovernmental JHA co-operation) , and fourth, the exception that Denmark would not take part in the Common

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[103] The question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State will be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.

Defense Policy nor Western European Union. The Edinburgh Agreement was approved by a second referendum with 56, 7% majority in 1993.

The debates over the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1998 and the EMU in September 2000 have continued along the same positions outlined in 1992-93. The debate over Amsterdam was approved in referendum by 55,1% by Danish people. On contrary, the discussion over the EMU became a dilemma, polls reflecting support for 'yes' long before the referendum, changed and became in last months finally to, 'no'. The referendum resulted with 53,2% 'no' and 46,8% 'yes' in 2000. After these developments, Denmark did not take the popular referendum way in Nice, Draft Constitution or the Lisbon Treaties. Although clearly stated, in the Danish Constitution[104], is it the avoidance of referendums causing the increase of scepticism in the country.

It is true to say that most objectives Denmark have had against the treaties are to large extent an outcome of ''Lilliputian Chauvinism''[105]. If deeply analyzed, for Denmark it is the economic goal of the EU (completing the Single Market) which Denmark stays committed. On the other hand, Denmark has been one of the best countries in implementation of EU law. It is also true to argue that Denmark has always strongly supported the enlargement of the EU, also being quite active and playing an important role. It is in Denmark's interest to welcome new countries in the EU, as those countries belong to the smaller ones, having more partners to share common interests with. For

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[104] Section 20 of the Danish Constitution;
(1) Powers vested in the authorities of the Realm under this Constitutional Act may, to such extent as shall be provided by statute, be delegated to international authorities set up by mutual agreement with other states for the promotion of international rules of law and cooperation.
(2) For the enactment of a Bill dealing with the above, a majority of five-sixths of the members of the Folketing shall be required. If this majority is not obtained, whereas the majority required for the passing of ordinary Bills is obtained, and if the Government maintains it, the Bill shall be submitted to the electorate for approval or rejection in accordance with the rules for referenda laid down in section 42. Finn Laursen, ''**Denmark and the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: How a Referendum was avoided**'', Paper prepared for delivery at 4th Annual EUCE Conference, Dalhousie University, 6-8 June, 2010, p.4
[105] According to the questioning of Danishness Ostergard comes to the solution as ''what is Danish in Denmark is so obvious to the foreigner here. *Hygge* (cosiness), *Tryged* (security) and *Trivsel* (well-being) are the three Graces of Danish culture and socialization. Ostergard uses the term. The Lilliputian Chauvinism which is inherently evident in Danish national discourse''. Uffe Ostergard, **Peasants and Danes: Danish national identity and political culture**, Arhus, University of Lund, 1990, p.19

understanding the Eurosceptic attitudes more specifically there is a need to focus on the DPP and what the party stands against in the name of European integration.

The Danish Peoples Party founded in the mid 1990's is a right-wing, (soft) Eurosceptic party. The party centers its politics mainly on anti-immigration rhetoric, protection of the cultural heritage, a pro-welfare orientation, and strict rule of law as its main concerns. The DPP, like other main parties of Denmark is not sceptic towards membership. It is evident that, ''Euroscepticism in Denmark is not based on an outright rejection of the EU'' (Knudsen, 2008:153) which actually remains enthusiastic about many European issues[106]. The Danish Peoples Party remains in the middle of these politics which gained success in the 2001 elections receiving 12% of the votes, which slightly increased in 2005 (13.2%) and 2007 (13.9%). After gaining a high degree of votes the party leader demonstrated that;

> The Danish People's Party now runs all-round politics. We cannot be brushed aside as a single-issue party; we are now a government leading party, which is helping to secure the welfare state and is not afraid to carry out the necessary reforms of the Danish society (…) the Danish People's Party has placed itself at the centre of Danish politics' (Pia Kjærsgaard, 2002 *Cited in* Meret, 2009:100).

The party beginning from the 2000's up to 2011 supported the coalition governments (supporting pro-EU government, which according to the party; the supporting role does not include EU issues) in Denmark which in turn gained certain compromises such as reform packages in 2002 on tightening immigration, or budget negotiations etc. Although Euroscepticism is gaining slight support in Denmark, the country currently has the most Euro-enthusiast government in office headed by Helle Thorning Schmidt (Social Democrats). Assuming office in 2011, the first step was to establish a Ministry

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[106] Knudsen argues ''…in spite of the fact that Denmark's governments are often coalition, minority ones, they have never changed over European issues, not even in the wake of rejected referendums against the will of the current government. First, an important factor is that whereas the establishment at large—that is, the large majority of the political parties and mainstream media—is broadly pro-EU, they have accepted a nuanced, Soft Eurosceptic approach to the EU since the early 1990's''. Ann Christina Lauring Knudsen, ''Euroscepticism in Denmark'', in **Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism**, Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.) Oxford University Press, NY, 2008, p.153

for European Affairs and working towards establishing it's pro-EU credentials and distancing itself from previous administrations. According to Timme Bertolt Dossing's demonstration (former member of the secretariat of the Danish Socialists in the EP) ''Rasmussen was pro-European, but he was not really interested in the whole project. Now with this government, we see a very pro-European position, although some socialists are still bit sceptical'' (Public Speech, October 4, 2011 URL: http://www.neurope.eu/article). As stated above, it is clear that European issues have a clear cut in Danish politics. Euro-enthusiast government and a Eurosceptic minority lead by the DPP. However, what is important to mention is role of the DPP as a support party in the governing coalitions has softened its attitude on opposing the EU.

When it comes to issues regarding the EU affairs the DPP is not so enthusiast about further EU integration. The party has defined its EU policy objectives on a case-by-case basis. It supports issues such as a common trade policy, environment and, as well as the general cooperation at EU level. The party's programme demonstrates its support as follows;

> We oppose the development of the EU which is going towards the United States of Europe. The Danish People's Party wants a close and friendly cooperation in Europe but cooperation should be limited to areas such a trade policy, environmental policy and technical cooperation. We oppose the introduction of a European political union (Vasilopoulov, 2009:10).

The Union has already developed into a political Union after the Maastricht treaty and because of this; the party is not much clear on what it means by opposing 'European political Union'. Because of this view the party directs a critique against the political establishment, however putting forth the democratic deficit behind the whole European integration process. For the party, the agenda and development of Europe are designed by the political elite in a process involving only politicians and public administrators, who do not listen to common people. However, the governing parties stand in the opposite direction. The Prime Minister Thorning Schmidt in a recent EP speech argued ''what the Community Method really means is that Europe is no longer ruled by the

strongest, but that Europe is now ruled by law and democracy and that is worth defending'' (EP Speech, January 18, 2012, Strasbourg). The cross cutting of European issues is well seen from the abovementioned speeches by two different party stances on the integration process.

On the other hand, the party is against the Euro (final stage of entering the EMU), and opposing the expansion of the EU in becoming a federal state in which the party perceives the Euro to be an important tool strengthening this. The main reason of the party opposing further European integration is its belief in power moving away from the peoples of Europe to the technocratic elite (Danish Peoples Party, Work Program, 2009 URL; http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/62205592/ Introduction_30_3.doc).

The party works on criticizing the major weaknesses of the EU administration as in terms of ''irresponsible management and waste of the European taxpayer's money, widespread corruption and nepotism'' (Danish Peoples Party, Work Program, 2009 URL; http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/62205592/ Introduction_30_3.doc). The party believes that the European Commission is increasing its powers in becoming a European government as the party puts forth ''the Commission management is characterized by self-sufficiency and strong closedness. We want the EU Commission to be transformed into a proper official body subject to the Council of Ministers'' (Danish Peoples Party, Work Program, 2009 URL; http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/62205592/ Introduction_30_3.doc). This refers to the intergovernmental way, placing the Council of Ministers in the heart of European integration. The party's argument in the name of this shift of institution rests on pushing the Commission under a democratically formed Council of Ministers. However, whether it is the intergovernmental or contrary the federal way, what is argued in this thesis is that, the Union's development is inevitably giving birth to diverse views to the integration, and it is this diversity melting into a post-national dimension. As with the extension of the QMV in the Council, as well as the increasing role of the EP, the EU still and will have a permissive structure out of the national framework. And what comes to be the main obstacle in front of this, is the lack of democracy. Even if we assume the intergovernmental way, centering the Council of Ministers in the heart of

the integration, as the DPP argues, this will still cover the areas of sovereignty, identity, and boundary becoming concepts defined, related and even negotiated alongside the European integration under the cover of a roundtable of Council of Ministers.

It is important to stress that, whether it is a federal or intergovernmental Europe, Euroscepticism is accepted as a democratic form in Denmark, where any criticism or opposition towards EU requires being debated, rather than silencing. The Danish parliament makes sure its existence on by financing Eurosceptic activities. Denmark is an exceptional case in this matter as the Eurosceptics are granted a number of privileges which are not proportionate to their (lack of) representation in parliament, as the Danish political system is relatively generous in its treatment of minorities. The parliament financially supports Eurosceptics and Euro-supporters beyond the political parties through the EU Board. As a result, this gives them equal access to financing EU-related information with 'a debate-creating purpose' over the issue, regardless of the European orientation. Each year, the parliament allocates money towards this purpose, and has granted special appropriations during all referendum campaigns. The political parties in the parliament and the two extra-parliamentarian Eurosceptic parties usually get a fixed share of the annually allotted amounts (Knudsen, 2008:164).

Apart from the democratic deficit and issue of sovereignty, according to the DPP the issue of immigration is an important problem. The 2001 party programme was entitled as: 'Common values – common responsibilities'. The Danish values of 'solidarity and community are considered to be 'threatened from several sides; from inside the country by a closed and intolerant minority (namely the Black and Muslim Europeans) and from outside by globalization and the power of the international capital' (DPP, Work Program 2001). The most important part of the party's criticism is towards the issue of immigration. According to a party member and MNP Krarup argues;

> …it should not be difficult to understand that Arabs and Africans are so different
> from the Danish culture, tradition and language that it will be very difficult for
> them to integrate in Denmark. (…)It is clear that when we have to give citizenship,
> it plays an important role whether the person is for example a Christian Asian. I

think that a Christian Asian has greater chances of being integrated than a Muslim Asian, naturally (*Cited in* Holm 2005: 103).

Another figure in the DPP, MP Thulesen Dahl supports these ideas confirming that ''It all depends on which kind of foreigners it is, where they are from and what their businesses are'' (URL; http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/62205592/ Introduction_30_3.doc on 14.07.2012). These views date back to the early 2000's when the DDP entered the parliament at both national and transnational levels. For instance MEP Mogens Camre stated at the time;

…take in cultural traits from the Western world, such as freedom, democratization, equality, education, economic reform and limitation of population growth. [Developing countries] are poor: poor because their culture denies progress, innovative thinking, science, freedom – and work. They will never succeed in improving their lives, if they do not follow our culture's path. (Mogens Camre, MEP, Danish People's Party, 14 June 2004).

According to abovementioned views, as argued in the first chapter, the western societies are displaying a 'politics of selective exclusion'. The DPP's 'nativist' politics goes beyond the Danishness towards a European or what the party calls western type of culture, or solidarity, which actually contributes to the post-national dimension. Their anti-immigrant, in what they strictly link to Euroscepticism, however makes selections between who belongs to European values and who does not. One of the main characteristic of nationalism is the issue of 'otherness'. The otherness is applied towards any foreign group outside the nation. However the DPP does not apply this otherness to Europeans (and for whom would be followers of European values). For the party this otherness stands for the Muslim and Black minorities in Denmark and Europe. The party's 2001 book 'Denmark's future. Your land, your choice' for instance, reflects fears of Islam. According to the party, ''multiculturalist and multiethnic experiments have again opened the doors to the middle Ages, which the Danes (…) had left behind centuries ago'' (DPP Pamphlet, 2002/1:2). With arguments against Islam and the Muslims the party assumes them as incompatible with western values. As argued by

Eisenstadt (2000) many of the attachments do not belong or rest on the nation-state any more, but on ethnic, local, regional or transnational levels. And at this point the DPP bases its arguments on a post-national dimension melting this anti-immigration rhetoric into a non-European way.

According to the party's political programme, it argues that ''our cohesion is threatened by immigration and the arrival of refugees from countries outside the Western cultural sphere'' (Danish People's Party Official Website, 2007). The party is willing for a kind of 'Fortress Europe', which should only belong to the European people, and because of the open borders within the EU, the party reflects scepticism to the EU of which is blamed causing this immigration problem. However, the party's critic at this point as argued in this thesis contributes to the post-national politics. As the issue is addressed to the EU level and extended to a European, Western, Christian culture. For instance, Kitschelt has argued that support for the right-wing parties in this case DPP (sharing similar arguments), depends on their ability to combine market-liberal economic policies with ''an authoritarian and particularistic stance on political questions of participatory democracy, of individual autonomy of lifestyles and cultural expressions, and of citizenship status'' (1995:8-9). As a result of this view, a European Union that combines a common internal market with strong barriers against a flow from outside the EU territory is exactly what the agenda of the DPP includes. The party argues that most immigrants ''belong to communities of faith and cultures, which lies far away from the democratic and Christian worldview'' (Danish People's Party Official Website, 2007) and ''certain cultures have a family structure that is significantly different from the Danish and Western'' (Danish People's Party Official Website, 2007). For instance, the DPP Work program includes the argument of;

> The EU has long since reached a size which itself impedes the democratic decision making. Danish People's Party is extremely concerned to extend cooperation with new, unstable states, and we are opposed to inclusion of countries outside the Western culture group. We are opposed to the accession negotiations with Turkey, which is not a European country, and whose culture makes it incompatible with Europe. Only a small part of Turkey, a few percent of land area, is located on the

European continent. Turkey belongs to the Middle East and its people are not Europeans (Danish Peoples Party, Work Program, 2009 URL; http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/62205592/ Introduction_30_3.doc on 10.07.2012).

It is clear that the issue of 'Danishness' or its historical origins, and the programmes do not draw any distinctions between Danish and other Western cultures. However, there is reference to the modern, secular, democratic Western culture, as compared with non-Western cultures (Black, Muslim etc). In the introduction to the party programme, Pia Kjærsgaard states that 'the essence of the party programme is a ''warm and strong love of our country'' (Programme of Principles, of October 2002) reflecting a patriotic sentiment rather than nationalist. The party's working programme says in a section about citizenship:

> Belonging to a nation presumes that you are a part of the community that binds the nation's citizens together: Common language, a common set of values, common basic views, customs developed through history, and behavior the nation's citizens feel confident about. People who do not share the common values – or actively oppose them – cannot be admitted to the community (Andersen, 2007:106).

As Pia Kjærsgaard expressed this in 2003: ''EU does not need new visions (…) the EU project has gone too far. It must be rolled back because it has come too far from what people wish'' (Kjærsgaards, Public Speech, September 15, 2003 *Cited in* Meret, 2009:139). She has demonstrated that the ''EU-elite in its Babel tower'' dreams eating at the restaurants in Brussels and Strasburg is one thing. What the 'old cultural Europe' of the people wants is something else and much more down-to-earth (Kjærsgaards, Public Speech September 15, 2003 *Cited in* Meret, 2009:139). Kjaersgaards makes reference to what she calls the 'old cultural Europe' again extending the issue to European level, which is making reference to Christian and historical Europeanness. For Holmes (2009) the far right parties put forth the argument of 'Europeans are Christians' and share a common history, as a result exclude the immigrants. They demonstrate their ''national ethnic uniqueness which invokes the Christian and historical heritage of

European citizens as a way to justify the exclusion of outsider groups'' (Fligstein et al, 2012:14) which in the point of this study exceeds the national level contributing to the emerging post-national (which as well as signals a pan-national European echo).

As stated earlier Denmark is one of the Member States enjoying certain opt-outs within the EU, which it acknowledges as crucial. Being a part of this European project with the motto of 'Unity in Diversity', Danish language becoming one of the official languages of the Union, the non-euro membership and Kroner as the national currency, currently exercising the Presidency of the EU, in which the Danish government argues ''…the will to unite, also when it comes to offering support to the poor and those, who might be less fortunate or capable, both internationally and here in Denmark and regardless of race and creed, which also means automatic rejection of racism and animosity towards foreigners'' (Danish Social Democrats, Ideology and Political Principles, 2005), and many more examples to be listed. With all these political currents, the DPP argues that ''Denmark is the Danish people's country, and the citizens shall have the possibility to live in a secure society based on the Rule of Law, which develops in accordance with Danish culture'' (URL; http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/62205592/Introduction_30_3.doc on 14.07.2012).

However, what shall be understood by 'secure society' and/or defending 'Danish culture'? The party has committed itself to be serving the security and the culture of the Danish people (nation), however, the demonstrations made by MP's from the DPP, in the name of defending the culture, include 'hate speech' discourse and as a result have been punished by the municipal or regional courts of Denmark. As argued in the first chapter, according to Delanty (2000) the ''transgression has become the blurring of the spheres of cultural modernity and the loss of autonomy that comes with this weakening…'' (2000:134). Because of this weakening, the Eurosceptic discourse with an 'otherness' rhetoric is causing not only an alienation among the 'native' and the 'other' but also an alienation between the 'native' whom do not share the same views

within the community[107]. This brings the issue to what Marcuse (1972) has termed as an ''alienation from alienation'' (*Cited in* Best and Kellner, 2001:110). For that reason the Euroscepticism of the DPP involves a European dimension as well. Since, it becomes an important way to generalize the 'commonness' and/or 'otherness' in a broader European way. For Karolewski and Suszycki these occur as ''pan-European movements to combat the Islamization of Europe… At the same time placing anti-immigrant politics within a wider context of globalization, where the EU is viewed as an ally'' (2007:190). This means the European Member States are seen as a part of what actually is defining both Danishness and European simultaneously.

Maier and Rittberger share the same view, as they acknowledge this as ''an identity shared by fellow Europeans forming a distinct civilization with its own history, culture, tradition and religion'' (2008:250). However in displaying this political attitude, they become a part of a contestation. Olsen (1996) describes this as the 'polity becomes differentiated internally' however manifests at EU level where actors (namely political parties) are positioned on a continuum of more or less integration (Hix, 1998:8). They incorporate a future destiny attitude in the name of Europe, however in becoming salient into forms of politics on different topics. On the one hand supporters of a cosmopolitan Europe willing for more liberation, and on the other hand the ones finding EU as an aggressive type of cosmopolitanism, are defending it from outside pressures like interference (from other international institutions), immigration and enlargement. It can be argued that, while Euro-enthusiasts are searching for European values and norms, on the other hand Eurosceptics are in a search of what is not European or not belonging to Europe. Bur finally these movements contain the same ingredients as both sides argue this in their discourse referencing a European or western civilization[108]

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[107] For Delanty, ''…cultural imaginary must be seen in the context of the deterriotializing and globalizing of community. The new discourse of community are not those of the traditional peasant communities about which the founding fathers of sociology wrote; community is decentred, contested and is thereby open to new interpretations. Nor is it a moral order based on cultural consensus, or a moral voice, as the communitarian philosophies would have it''. Gerard Delanty, **Moderntiy and Postmodernity**, Sage Publications, London, 2000, p.128

[108] At the Copenhagen Summit in 1973, the nine Member States adopted a ''Declaration on European Identity. This document set out a definition of a: European identity based on the principles of the rule of law, social justice, respect for human rights and democracy, and in relation to: (i) the status and the responsibilities of the nine member states vis-à-vis the rest of the world; (ii) the dynamic nature of the

(argued by the EU back in 1973), European culture etc. under different circumstances. In Waever's words ''certain fear of coming too close to the centre of Europe'' (2000:259), however remaining in a betweenness ''of being both part of Europe and separate from it'' is what this thesis names as post-national. As the party attitudes reflect this and they define themselves not solely within the national framework. However, what is worth defending is the political contestation at national level with competing of interests. Like in most EU Member States, there is a clear elite division in the Member States. And according to Gellner (1983) ''if state elites do not back a nationalist collective identity or indeed, oppose it then the possibility of its success is not high''.

The clear division of interests clashes with what Anderson (1991) describes the 'nation' as a culturally grounded, imagined political community, where all the members are perceived to have common interests, although most will never meet or know of the existence of other members. The shared common interest, or at least the consensus of the elite, started differentiating with the mid 1990's giving birth to different competing interests. Rogers Brubaker argues that ''it enables us to distinguish between people's national feelings, as they are best described through the concept of a collective national identity'' (2000:79); however people's political attitudes, can either be nationalist or liberal. As a result mentioned in the first chapter 'people do not always become politically active in the name of their nation', however in the name of European integration become either enthusiast or sceptic (issue of fragmentation). The reason of the sceptic attitude is not a direct attack to the cosmopolitan values or vision, but an aim to develop a communitarian type of character. This idea clashes with the institutional sphere which the integration is developing (as argued in an undemocratic nature). This results with two important critics seen in almost all Eurosceptic parties.

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process of European unification. The political definition of European identity was intertwined with Euro-centric statements invoking a common European civilisation whose survival had to be ensured''. Declaration on European Identity Copenhagen 14 December 1973, **Bulletin of the European Communities**, December 1973, No.12 Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

As argued above there are two motivations behind the Eurosceptic attitude of the DPP, the first is the related with anti-immigration, and the second issue with sovereignty. As mentioned above Denmark has and still is working to increase the participation of the people into the political sphere[109]. The DPP similar to many political parties in the UK is strictly defending its parliamentary sovereignty and reflecting hostility towards any power sharing in that manner. For this reason, the DPP like the ones detailed above, requires approaching them in an anti-federal dimension, rather than anti-European. They favor an intergovernmental Europe, however whether developing into federal or intergovernmental, the concept of 'nation' and 'national' is becoming blurred and becoming inevitably referenced to a (European) post-national space. The issues of otherness and immigration are referenced to what is defined as non-European. The DPP expresses these same views in the Nordic Council where it shares a political party group with the True Finns under Nordic Freedom Party Group. The Eurosceptic view of the party does not prevent it from being and becoming active in different political stages where it finds it beneficial and supportive.

As argued throughout the parties forming the EFD group, they desire a limited degree of cooperation in a limited number of policy areas. According to the typology of Flood (2002) they can be situated as minimalist. Accepting certain policies of integration, however oppose the institutional structure in which it develops. However, even drawing limits to the integration process, there are references made to Europe or European in these party attitudes. As put forth in this thesis, contributions made in the name of Europe, whether these be drawing commonness or differences is important as it is covered under a European debate. And, it is more accurate to name the parties forming the EFD group as anti-federal parties, rather than anti-European.

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[109] Sorensen marks the role of the people in Denmark ''arguably reaching an extent that is unparalleled in other European countries. The argument is supported by the fact that there have been as many as six referenda on European issues in Denmark, while the majority of member states in EU15 have held none. Interestingly, the word for referendum in Danish is folkeafstemning, meaning "people's vote". The frequent use of the word folk (people) in the Danish language is, in fact remarkable, and illustrates the degree to which sovereignty is placed with the people in Denmark: Apart from folkeafstemning, Danes name their parliament folketing, although the word parlament is part of the Danish vocabulary, and refer to their political system as folkestyre (people's rule) and members of parliament as folkevalgte (elected by the people)''. Catharina Sorensen, ''**Danish and British Popular Euroscepticism Compared: A Sceptical Assessment of the Concept**'', *DIIS Working Paper*, No.25, 2004, p.20

3.3 An Analysis of Eurosceptic Party Groups in a Post-national Perspective

Both Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm are challenging national unity (Olsen, 1996:150) in a proactive and participatory manner in driving the European level. There desire of shaping the post-national Europe, whether to become federal or con-federal, gives them an important role in this interplay. As debated in the party attitudes towards the EU, there is an ongoing contestation between the cosmopolitan and communitarian type of future perspectives. The Eurosceptics, as argued in this thesis, supports the communitarian way of cooperation, however not covering the national, but mostly concentrating on the local or regional levels and in doing this finding similar arguments shared by political parties in the Member States and echoed at a European level. However as argued in the case studies these do not reflect pure nationalist sentiments (due to a lack of consistency at national level). The nation-state for sure exists however alongside a post-national one. As detailed in the case studies, the Eurosceptic parties reference a post-national system of voluntary cooperation, rather than a centralization of powers (namely Brussels based politics). Their views contain references to European dimensions and a call for a ''democratic ethos'' (*See,* Bohman, 2007:1-2) which makes these parties finding common ground beyond class and identity. With its ubiquitous character, Euroscepticism helps creating the sense of a demoi, where the more fragmented the demos, the more emerge the common grounds between the demoi.

This post-national space is actually controlled by both the Eurosceptics and Euro-enthusiasts under different references made towards the European level. This post-national space, as argued earlier is not cohesive and bounded by uniform frameworks and actually need not be. This is where the post-national space receives its strength, from the splits caused by the integration process upon the Member States, where the state assumes an independent role. For that reason this thesis handles the Eurosceptics just like the Euro-enthusiasts as contributing to the post-national dimension of the integration. Throughout the case studies above it is evident that the Euro-enthusiasts are ''seeking to shore up and vindicate the core tenets of the democracy and the Eurosceptics pointing to weaknesses with the intent of providing remedies or antidotes for such deficits'' (Dallmayr, 1996:281). For that reason the party case studies detailed

in this chapter leads to the finding of evaluating an important part of the criticisms to the integration through a democratic perspective. At the supranational level of the EU, the Eurosceptic parties carry on a lengthy debate about the democratic deficit of the supranational institutions. However at the same time specify the strength of the European Council and the European Commission and the lack of power of the European Parliament. In the same manner they criticize the EU and hold it responsible for certain failures (currently like the euro crisis), this may seem weakening the EU, however also strengthens it legitimacy where the Eurosceptic parties adhere responsibility. They admit what can be named as a post-national democracy (*See* Crouch, 2004) when criticizing the technocratic strength of the European Commission, however at the same time specify limits to the institutional structure of the EU. However in reflecting these attitudes, as they argue, are in the name of the 'European peoples' and/or 'citizens of EU', not in the name of a couple of Member State's well being, or in the name of a Member State national community. It is important to remind that although using 'nation-state democracy' rhetoric, there is no limit drawn by the Eurosceptic parties, or any limit drawn for the flow of political deliberation and/or interaction across the borders of the nation-states in the name of debating as well as questioning the EU. There are overlapping publics and politics across the Member States in the name of Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism shelters a plurality of cultural, regional, national, local identities and/or interests where it finds identification of what is a not European values, identity, culture etc rather than what is to be European. A kind of resistance towards an *idée fixe*.

The Europeanization (top-down, bottom-up) of politics not need to lead towards what some Eurosceptic parties argue 'a super state' structure of integration. The EU in its current form is a kind of ''confederation of states'', but also becoming closer to a ''confederation of citizens'' (Scheuerman, 2009:45) and as argued in this thesis, Euroscepticism is an important part of this. However, more importantly what the integration requires is the people of Europe need to be comfortable within a post-sovereign Europe, since the Eurosceptic parties under certain policies argue the need of a limit of nation-state sovereignty, in policy fields where necessary, for instance on the improvement of the Single Market Project. It is at this point important to improve the

democratic values at EU level. With the criticisms put forth, the Eurosceptics stand in the middle of fusing democracy with post-sovereign Europe. Democracy and the nation-state developed concomitantly and nationalism was the cement of this community. However, currently acknowledging the nation as an undivided whole is a misperception. The congruency between the political and cultural is diminishing, as the nation is divided upon European issues domestically however no more nationally. As debated in the case studies above, perceptions towards Europe can not be handled in an 'all-or-nothing' dimension. There are different risks and reservations put forth by Eurosceptic and/or Euro-enthusiast parties in the name of Europe.

However, as the case studies show, the national parties forming these Euro-party groups manage to establish common grounds in their arguments towards the integration as well as in the name of Europe.

As argued in the case studies, for Eurosceptics, the Euro-enthusiasts have a blind eye on the European integration, blaming them on not questioning the current as well as the future trajectory of the EU. For Euro-enthusiasts, the Eurosceptics evaluate every problem they face caused by the integration, making it directly related with the policies of the EU. However what is important in these attitudes correlating with the argument of this thesis is the reference of both 'success' and/or 'failures' are attributed to the level of Europe in the name of responsibility, rather than solely Member States or nation-states. The importance of Euroscepticism here is that it ''scrutinizes the European integration very well in the agendas of the parties, keeping the issues questioned and debated making European topics first order politics'' (Topaloff, 2012:4).

Another dimension of evaluating Euroscepticism in a post-national space is the issue of immigration, an important argument used by the Eurosceptic parties. As explained in the cases above, the Eurosceptic groups are combining their native sentiments in a European way, introducing exclusionary Europeanism (attributing otherness to Muslim, Black immigrants or even to Jews and Roma) constituting a sort of what Risse calls a ''nationalism beyond the nation-state'' (Risse, 2010:231). These politics which are/were traditionally identified with nationalism are transferred to the European level. Some

other scholars name this as ''progressive nationalism'' (*See*, Hanley, 2008:162). However, as debated in the first chapter, if it is to be acknowledged as a pure nationalist attitude, there would be strong nationalist attitudes between the Member States towards each other. However, as analyzed in the party case studies above, there are no nationalist references made by the Eurosceptic parties to other Member States. In the name of defending anti-immigration, the Eurosceptic parties are pushing the issue towards a European dimension of handling as they do not share the same political views shared by the rest of the national community or with the government in office. However not bounded by the sole nation any more (perceived in different ways by the people), the Eurosceptic parties develop partnerships with other Eurosceptic parties whom perceive the same interests in what they argue requiring rational solutions rather than national (the term nation becomes ambiguous). At this point, as the cases reflect, the Eurosceptic parties are becoming aware of defining the issue of immigration as a high cross-border problem and the need of a European solution. For this reason, there are no signs of a nationalist vocabulary, but questioning and criticizing, directly or indirectly the consequences of European integration on the Member States.

For that reason, the state is 'Janus-faced'. One face of the state is oriented inwards, to the domestic arena (fragmented), and the other is oriented outwards, to the European community or society of states emerging in a post-national way.

3.3   Concluding Remarks

As debated above the Eurosceptic party groups have access to a wide range of resources (financial, social and political) which allows them to develop different strategies (framing same issues in different ways) on the integration process. The above findings in the case studies reflect that the parties reject certain aspects of the EU leading towards what they argue as a 'United States of Europe', however, generally accept the idea of European cooperation at EU level but not in the shape of the current EU. For this reason with the case studies examined above, and in the light of the Kopecky and Mudde's typology, Euroscepticism can not be analytically separated from a positive

point o view besides its reservations (expressive, normative, and instrumental) of European evaluations. As argued in the first chapter, the Eurosceptic phenomenon itself includes functional characters of European cooperation and in this manner it makes reference to a reformulation of the European project.

The post-national agenda, argued within this thesis, gives signs of emerging identity based openness, and the acceptance of what Peterson has called ''pick-and-mix'' politics when referenced to Europe. This allows the political elite as well as the individuals to choose the things or parts that they wish to choose and not choose. For instance, conservative parties (British Tories, Czech ODS etc) remain in between market liberalization and national closure, parties like Lega Nord and DPP favor a 'European' what they call 'civilization', 'western cultural', 'Christian' type of rhetoric when defending themselves on issues like immigration and enlargement, however whom remain critical on the centralization of the Union. On the other hand parties like UKIP are strictly obsessed with the issue of sovereignty and as well as the value of democracy within the EU.

At this point, another finding from the case studies above is that, the Eurosceptic parties do not manifest their opinion on most political areas falling under EU competence. They either handle their criticism towards the whole EU project, or to issues which they perceive as crucial. This is the common point of these parties stance on EU integration which falls under the areas of immigration, borders, identity and sovereignty in which each of these currently have a European dimension. According to the party survey in this chapter, Eurosceptic politics of the selected parties have become responsive to the debate on the EU and this correlates with the Euro-enthusiast politics (Trenz and De Wilde, 2012:1) who are also constantly emphasizing the lack of 'democracy' and 'legitimacy' in the EU.

However emphasizing these issues is important as it makes them more salient and debated, as well as forcing other parties to become a part of the contestation. Conversi names this as a ''demo-skeptic'' (2008:156) attitude, in which both Eurpsceptics and Euro-enthusiasts approach critically the problem of democratic deficit in the EU.

The political elite especially after the ratification of the Maastrciht Treaty, started to differ from standards and harmonization (namely the Union acquis) and, as a result of this, societies began to present differences in every context. The different fragments of society are producing divergence of views which are partly compatible and partly incompatible with those of the others (either within the same community and/or with other Member States). That is why, it is important to remind that, the Eurosceptic politics do not contain pure 'nationalist' concerns. Since, there are also different views not shared by the whole nation or community. As debated in the first chapter, there is an emerging fragmentation causing on the one hand a kind of communion and re-tribalism in where the nation has lost its functions, and on the other hand individualism with diverse coalitions and projects in the European nation-states. In these emerging settings (argued as becoming post-national), local concerns and interests are often linked together in new ways, going beyond the classical nation-state framework, selecting alliances with transnational organizations (or coalitions within the EU) or even outside the institutional framework, such as references of religion (namely Christianity), or cultural frameworks such as European civilization, Western values. For this reason, Kriesi reminds that, the integration in its various forms is perceived differently by members of the national community, and as a result creates ''similarities as well as disparities and new forms of conflict or settlement'' (2008:3). Because of these outcomes Wilkonson (2002) argues it is difficult to filter the perceptions into a single perspective or holistic assessment of the European project. It is this multi-perspective outlook enriching the Eurosceptic politics which can not be handled under a single banner as well as a national frame.

As debated in this chapter, the integration process is viewed differently by Eurosceptic political parties in the Member States, causing divisions within the parties (party split) as well. However, Euroscepticism on the other hand, is establishing common issues and motives, on which these parties meet at EU level. It is evident that Euroscepticism is seen from Social Democrats to the Conservatives, from the Liberals to regionalist parties. Euroscepticism is a cross cutting phenomenon becoming salient alongside introducing ''the new choices and constraints coming to fore by membership2''. For instance, as outlined in the party case studies above, the integration project touches the

issues of democracy, liberal values, sovereignty, law, bureaucracy, Christian love between the Member States of the Union. However, what is important to remind is that all of the abovementioned issues either approached positively or negatively, have a European dimension simultaneously with the national.

CONCLUSION

The EU is defined as a space (continent) of freedom, peace and security, all of which have been reached by overcoming national egoism, racism, chauvinism, etc. The Treaty on the EU (Article 6) specifies the principles of the Union as "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law",[110] referenced to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. In the name of these values, both Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm find references, whatever their trajectory of European integration is. For that reason, the aim of this thesis was to focus on broader forms of association apart from the national, to the EU level, on which one of these appear to be approaching the integration critically, in the form of Euroscepticism.

The thesis has concentrated on the deconstruction and reconstruction of identities and boundaries, as a result of diverging attachments to Europe, rather than arguing a replacement of one political order by another. In doing so, it was important to tackle the Eurosceptic phenomenon, the way it emerged, and with what kind of arguments in the name of integration. There is certainly a divergence of competing interests in the nation when it comes to the European integration. It is this segmentation, which different scholars have named as 'hybrid', 'fragment', 'disjuncture', and 'migrancy', as outlined in this thesis. Grasping all these views, it was the starting point of this thesis to acknowledge the European political sphere as the emerging post-national one. The goal and objective of this thesis was not to argue that nationalism is disappearing from the European continent. However, the aim was to analyze its transformation and, if any, effects on the Eurosceptic phenomenon in a post-national integration like the EU.

As discussed in the first chapter, the nation-state has lost its coherence (Rhodes, 1997) and the European integration is an important denominator within this process. For Appadurai (1996), it is the European integration giving birth to 'disjuncture', 'disconnection', 'displacement', 'disengagement', and 'dismantling', resulting with a

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[110] *See*, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the EU and The Treaty on the functioning of the EU, Official Journal of the European Union, 2012/C 326/01, URL; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF

separation of institutionalized spheres of control and a fragmented society in the Member States. As a result of these developments, the Eurosceptic parties and their arguments have been analyzed in the third chapter. The politics they develop gives important signs and hints of an emerging post-national dimension. At the transnational party level, the politics of these parties have been analyzed under three common motives shared by all these parties. These are the *democratic deficit*, the *issue of sovereignty* and *anti-immigration* politics. All these issues are present and occupy the political debate in Europe, and are clearly not only limited to Eurosceptic politics. Thus, the Eurosceptic discourse does not cover or reflect past practices, commemorating events and/or providing authoritative records in the name of surfacing national legacies. Nonetheless, Eurosceptics put forth and open up into debate the presently existing issues, where none of these belong to or can fit into the national framework solely.

As a result, the main criticisms (as detailed in the third chapter) of the Eurosceptic parties are not towards blocking *development, reform*, and/or *progress*. Since the party case studies analyzed in the thesis reflects an increasing tide of scepticism, rather than anti Europeanism. The current, emerging and future vagueness of the integration forces these parties to deeply question the substance of these developments as well as the European integration. Forming a part of the contestation, Euroscepticism is becoming an important aspect of the integration, running parallel to globalization, and in attempts to define what should not become European and what is non-European. In taking this approach, the Eurosceptic parties are contributing to an outside boundary, drawing on specifically what remains non-European. And, in confronting multiculturalism, they embrace a particularistic perspective when compared to a Universalist cosmopolitan outlook defended mostly by the Euro-enthusiasts. The Eurosceptic parties analyzed in the final chapter are in support of the current European project; however, they clearly criticize both the regime the EU has so far established and the future trajectory of the EU.

Finding 1

The first finding in this thesis is that Euroscepticism is not fed by a sole national cause with an outright rejection of the European integration, as the 'nation' has no collective interest when it comes to European issues. However, as one may argue, members of a community are already divided into groups with important political differences, value divisions, etc. and what makes Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm differ from other divisions (*namely cleavages*). The difference is that they derive their strength directly from the European integration (*evolving into a new cleavage*), rather than limiting it in the national frame. As debated in the last chapter, Euro political parties are not restricted to a limitation in a national framework. Whether in government or not, they find ground or different channels to pressure their own Member State and. As a result, any argument or attitude developed in the name of these movements grasp the attention of either the institutions of the EU, other Member States (in public, elite and/or party level) and or third party international organizations, to name a few. Euroscepticism is seen in nearly all Member States of the EU as well as in the candidate and potential candidate countries. For that reason, it is not accurate to frame Euroscepticism in a 'national' approach. Consequently, it would have very different connotations depending on the Member State under study. In contrast (as analyzed in the party case studies), Euroscepticism finds common grounds in critically approaching the integration, as well as an important dynamic in developing and establishing Euro-party groups. This does not mean that every party becomes a part of a Euro-party in the EP. For instance, some parties (e.g., FN and FPÖ) tend to stay outside transnational parties. However, there is a need of further study of these parties and evaluate them as either Eurosceptic or Euroreject parties, on which this thesis draws a distinction.

The research carried out in this thesis has approached both Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm as being two parts of the same coin—Europhile. For that reason, at times, both movements have been detailed to ascertain how the emerging political contestation they carry out helps understand their contribution to post-nationalism studies. The main reason for approaching Eurosceptics rather than the Euro-enthusiasts for such an evaluation rests on the assumption that post-nationalism accepts conceptual

fragmentation of values, and does not insist on intertwining with state politics and/or ideology. However, it does find similar grounds across the borders of nations. This was once the main ideology for securing the wellbeing of the 'nation' by the state under the banner of nationalism. However, the Eurosceptics are competing with other strategies in the name of their future trajectory of the EU, however not in a national but in the post-national way. Firstly, the politics they pursue do not overlap with either the other fragments, or with state policies (assuming the Eurosceptic phenomenon in a weaker position). Secondly, any political attitude or even a speech, whether supporting or opposing the EU, finds echo in a wider framework encompassing Europe, rather than the nation.

As studied throughout the thesis, Euroscepticism exceeds national, ethnic and social cleavages, causing more fragmentation. The Eurosceptic parties, analyzed in the third chapter, are in search of prosperity and security, like the Euro-enthusiasts; however, contrary to them, Eurosceptic parties emphasize this in an 'in Europe' approach not 'for Europe', as Euro-enthusiasts do. Considering this as a movement or at party level, whether it is Euroscepticism or Euro-enthusiasm, the ultimate aim is to convince the electorate of the EU on what is right or wrong in the name of European integration. It is still early to speak of a congruent European society (demos), as the EU is still perceived as a community. However, it is clear that the abovementioned movements are dismantling the society in the Member States.

At this point, contemporary Europe and European integration is developing its own dynamics (movements like Euroscepticism, Euro-enthusiasm), reflecting similar as well as different characteristics from one Member State to another (e.g., pre/post accession). This does not mean that nationalism is swept away from the European continent. The people of different nations still do identify themselves as being German, Spanish or Greek and they still imagine (as argued by Benedict Anderson) that others do so as well. Still, they do not imagine themselves as identical to the other German, Spanish or Greek individuals. If they would have, an overall attitude (a collective will) would have been developed in the same manner in every Member State of the Union when it comes to

European debates or issues. However, as witnessed, there are diverging trends, as some individuals, although attached to the nation, are not politically or culturally active in the name of this nation. Others, again attached to the nation or at least feeling a belonging, become active in the name of more rights and liberty from outside the nation-state. Finally, for some individuals, it is important to defend the democratic ideal in an entity like the EU, assumed to be undemocratic.

This study focused on the interest intermediation between European and national levels, and the influence of the former on the latter. Eurosceptic politics (the arguments put forth) highlights the differentiation of the interests, while promising more realistic assumptions concerning the European integration. However, in doing this, they are not able to address this questioning, or issuing by excluding the European level. Otherwise, there policy agenda becomes incomplete, lacking proper European and international perspectives, which certainly requires political updates. And by doing this, their agendas overlap with other party policy programmes (from a diverse number of Member States) or fall contrary to their own government programme. In becoming a part of this, Euroscepticism does not only contest the minority and/or majority in a nation-state framework. Nonetheless, it does contest many competing strategies in a wider post-national environment.

It is important, as argued within this thesis, that the concerns shared and put forth by the Eurosceptics (with diverging concerns) are subject to an investigation, as it is evident that they do not only emerge from the national level. They are direct results of supranational and/ or intergovernmental decision-making. Either way, it grasps different opinions and strategies. In this thesis, Euroscepticism is handled as an important part of the political contestation in Europe, rather than a marginal phenomenon. It is an integral part of the dynamic European debate circling around support and criticism. If the EU is to settle a polity in the future (actually inevitable for further integration), Euroscepticism is an important part of this polity design.

Euroscepticism is situated at the intersection between the national and European levels, mapping critical responses to the integration process. However, the contents of these

responses exceed the narrow forms of the 'national', and grasp broader understandings of the interests (of certain groups, movements, etc.) in a post-national environment, as Euroscepticism does not emerge from a general national pattern. It is not possible to label 50% of a population as Eurosceptic, as the positions are certainly diverse. The point is that not only public attitudes towards the EU are centred between scepticism and enthusiasm (as argued in this work as the post-national politics), these attitudes (variable degrees) are also likely directed against different aspects of integration (depending on type, including economic, legal, cultural, foreign policy integration).

The involvement of the Member States in the integration process is not directly leading to the nations losing their national identity in the legal or political sense. However, the impact of regional interchange between Member States is resulting in the priorities of the societies being connected to the integration process. In stronger states (e.g., Germany), such a process further strengthens their aspirations. For this reason, they prefer moving towards a post-national level. For strong economies, strong political bodies, the adoption and advocating of the post-national structure result in the removal of their own national characteristics, as they strive towards fulfilling common EU interests, which also means an increase in their sphere of influence. On the other hand, the integration process creates critical and partial concerns in countries that are not so strong or have not yet established economic and/or political stability (seen especially in the case of Lega Nord). That is why they prefer developing certain attitudes and/or discourses for resistance (namely Euroscepticism). However, the political attitude they develop does not grasp their whole nation and/or their co-nationals anymore, but extends to a wider space shared by co-inhabitants, namely Citizens of EU, which are also forced to face different arguments within this wider political space.

The integration has resulted in political and economic interests being reproduced in more detail and differently for almost every Member State. As a result, the conditions of solidarity and conflict are reformed. Consequently, whether this is Euro-enthusiasm or Euroscepticism, it has developed within the post-national structure of the EU. Being a part of the project, these movements require linking themselves to the post-national level or they would otherwise have no ability to change, reform or at least to bargain

their aspirations. As detailed in the third chapter, starting with the 2009 EP elections, the Eurosceptics have become keener on establishing coherent party groups at the EU level. Their aspiration is to reflect or demonstrate that the vacuum caused by the integration must not result in transferring the autonomy to unaccountable institutions or any other technocratic elite in Europe.

The Eurosceptics are becoming increasingly important part of the debate, along with the Euro-enthusiasts, as they are helping to remove the taboo against critical views towards the integration. As an outcome, the political debates in the EU are improving and focusing on the contents of common policies, making them more transparent for the citizens to understand and make their own free choices on the issues debated. This same intent is shared by the Euro-enthusiasts that, at different levels, support opportunities for political participation in an environment where people can become free, engaged and autonomous.

Finding 2

The second finding this thesis yielded is that Euroscepticism is an important part of the contestation in Europe, serving for the benefit of the 'Telos' thesis. It is put forth as an important part for constructing the 'demoi', and is as a result becoming a part of the post-national politics.

Contemporary European movements, whether they contain criticism, resistance or support, extend beyond the national level. Thus, in an entity like the EU, they do not have means to solely concentrate on specific issues, such as defending and securing their own national wellbeing. What is argued in the name of a 'post-national' dimension is the emerging level of a political space above the national-level, which is analyzed under politics beyond the nation-state concerned with a sum of interests, aspirations, reservations etc. The integration has pushed the Member States to frame their policies within an EU entity. The thesis divides the European attachment of citizens under Euro-enthusiasm and Euroscepticism, relating them with the political parties outlined in the

third chapter, and singling out a non-attached Euro-reject segment found in certain Member States.

The European integration and the evolution of Euroscepticism, alongside the politicization, is important. As argued in the second chapter, the death of the permissive consensus has opened up the domestic political space to a Europe-wide contestation. However, the question still tackled, is, how powerful are these current phenomena in creating identities? The argument put forth within this thesis is, whether it is Euroscepticism or Euro-enthusiasm, the goal is not of identity construction, but how to engage people in a common interest by improving a social and political consciousness above the national level. What is developing from these movements is not a denial of European integration, but rather a reformulation of it. Moreover, this contestation is creating the consciousness in the minds of the masses, as every issue debated among the societies of the Member States includes a European reference.

After the rejection of the Draft European Constitution, as well as the adventure of the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, the position and status of the EU has been subject to continuing debates by politicians, scholars, intellectuals, as well as by the ordinary European citizens. Subsequently, Euroscepticism has increased in depth starting with the Maastricht Treaty. However, this thesis focused on the influence of Euroscepticism on the functioning of the European Union, in debating the fundamental questioning about its current and future trajectory through a *Telos*. Both Euroscepticism and Euro-enthusiasm are becoming supplementary in creating post-national politics on the ultimate objective of the integration.

As debated in the first and second chapters, Euroscepticism contributes to the post-national dimension, as the Eurosceptic parties are responsible for making European issues salient in national arenas, to be debated among the masses. As argued in this thesis, Euroscepticism assumes a meaning that must be understood in relation to the different political traditions and experiences of European integration, which are framed in a post-national debate (exceeding the national level). National identity, national

sovereignty, political, administrative, and territorial integrity have all been fed by the nationalist ideology. However, as argued in this thesis, all these concepts are currently weakening alongside the European integration and becoming European-wide issues of debate. Emerging as a cross-national and non-statist political movement, Euroscepticism is becoming important, and this movement is challenging state priorities and policies on a wide range of issues, which are inevitably pluralizing the existing collective political identification. The ubiquity of Euroscepticism with its particularistic character requires handling it under a post-national framework in a process of de-territorialisation, de-hierarchisation and de-limitation of the state as debated in the first chapter.

European politics are said to be second-order politics, with the domestic level being the first. However, as argued in this thesis, Euroscepticism makes European issues more salient at both national and supranational levels. According to the findings from the current research under the case studies, there is an increasing level of shift from second- to first-order politics. It is evident that European politics are gradually occupying a growing share of the overall political discourse in individual Member States. And the most important role of this share belongs to the questions carried out by the Eurosceptic parties. Debates over European politics are increasingly becoming part of regular party politics, whether this is in opposition and/or support of the European project. However, as debated in this thesis, its importance stems from the growing interconnectedness and the demarcation, blurring the line between national and supranational level of politics, becoming what is argued as post-national. The Eurosceptics, like Euro-enthusiasts, are becoming attached to this process, become a part of the whole, which is studied as becoming post-national. However, the importance of Euroscepticism is best seen in the fact that none of these changes in the name of European integration are possible without the approval of the forces of opposition (witnessed during the referendums of the Maastricht, Constitutional and Lisbon treaties), or at least the ones critical to European integration. The role of Euroscepticism and what the Eurosceptics serve is not only of strategic or sole opposition. Even if some Eurosceptic parties, movements and actors may not recognize this (being critical but constructive), they are still becoming a part of the macro European level (although making references to micro-level issues) of the

European policy-making (as well as shaping), without which a political balance would actually not be possible due to a lack of government – opposition structure.

As mentioned throughout this study, Euroscepticism cannot be acknowledged as anti-European. It is evident that some Eurosceptic parties analyzed in the last chapter put forth anti-federal, anti-enlargement, and anti-immigrant arguments, they still link them towards a general understanding of anti-European lacks depth. The political programmes of the parties analyzed in the last chapter certainly do include specifically anti-immigrant, anti-islamist, anti-federal arguments, but these arguments cannot be directly interpreted as the party support of the masses, solely because of these arguments in a national way. If this were to be true, the Eurosceptic parties would have gained more support at national elections (voting support), rather than a low level of marginal support. However, they do receive increasing levels of support at European elections. It is evident that the masses are in favor of placing a voice of opposition in the EP. This is another important dimension of Euroscepticism becoming an important part of the post-national dimension. According to the findings presented in the last chapter, there is a growing trend of parties forming Euro-party groups in the name of establishing coherent and consistent politics. The current crisis of the Union, which is the common argument shared mostly by the Eurosceptic parties, is a problem of legitimacy and democracy. However, these arguments are also shared by the Euro-enthusiasts. And as an outcome of these criticisms, they are backed up by the masses voting for them in order to voice their concerns in the EP, in an institution, ranking high in the degree of trust among the European citizens.

APPENDICES

ANNEX 1.

Comparison of National and Post-National Models of Membership

Dimension	Model I: National Citizenship	Model II. Post-National Membership
Time Period	19th to mid- 20th centuries	Postwar
Territorial	Nation-state bounded	Fluid boundaries
Congruence between membership and territory	Identical	Distinct
Rights and Priviliges	Single status	Multiple Status
Basis of membership	Shared nationhood (national rights)	Universal personhood (human rights)
Source of Legitimacy	Nation-state	Transnational community
Organization of membership	Nation-state	Nation-state

Source: Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, **Limits of Citizenship Migrants and Post-national Membership in Europe**, The University of Chicago Pres, Chicago, 1994, p.140

Globalization and Nationalism: Contradictory Processes

Factors Opposing Nationalism	**Factors Promoting Nationalism**
Shared Prosperity	Resentment of Supranational Institutions
Economic Integration	Fears of Unemployment
Migration	Hostility to Immigration
Global Threats	Fears of Terrorism and Subversion
End of belief in economic sovereignty	Lose of Control of Foreign Investors
Travel and Tourism	Dislike of Alien Cultures
World wide Communications	Hostility to Global Media
Employment Abroad	Attractions of Secession

Source: Fred Halliday, ''Nationalism'' in **Globalization of World Politics**, John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2001, p.442

ANNEX 3.

The Internal Structure of a European Parliamentary Party Group

CHAIRMAN

VICE CHAIRMAN

BUREAU CHAIRMAN, VICE-CHAIRMAN, ORDINARY MEMBERS AND THE TREASURER

GROUP MEMBERS ALL MEMBERS AND THE GROUP	
NATIONAL PARTY DELEGATIONS	WORKING GROUPS AND SPOKESPERSONS

Source: Tapio Raunio, ''Second Rate Parties?: Towards a better understanding of the European Parliament's Party Groups'', in **Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies**, Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole (eds.) Routledge, London, 2000, p.237

**Table 1. Political Groups and Seats in the European Parliament:
Results of the 2009 Election**

(736 seats total)

	Total Seats	%
European People's Party [Christian Democrats] (EPP; center-right)	265	36
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D; center-left/socialists)	184	25
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE; centrist/liberals)	84	11.4
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA; greens and regionalists)	55	7.5
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR; right-wing, anti-Federalist)	54	7.3
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL; far-left and former communists)	35	4.8
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD; euroskeptics)	32	4.3
Non-attached members	27	3.7

*Source:*http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/index_en.html

Support for RRP in Parliamentary Elections in Western Europe, 1980-2011

Country	Party	Highest Ever (Percent)	Most Recent (Percent)
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	10.7 (2008)	10.7 (2008)
	Austria Freedom Party (FPÖ)	26.9 (1999)	17.5 (2008)
Belgium	National Front (Belgian) (FNb)	2.3 (1995)	0.5 (2010)
	Flemish Interest (VB)	12 (2007)	7.8 (2010)
Britain	British National Party (BNP)	1.9 (2010)	1.9 (2010)
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DFP)	13.8 (2007)	12.3 (2011)
France	National Front (FN)	14.9 (1997)	4.3 (2007)
Germany	The Republicans (REP)	2.1 (1990)	0.4 (2009)
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	5.6 (2009)	5.6 (2009)
Italy	Northern League (LN)	10.1 (1996)	8.3 (2009)
Netherlands	Centre Democrats (CD)	2.5 (1994)	---
	Party for Freedom (PVV)	15.5 (2010)	15.5 (2010)
Portugal	National Renovator Party (PNR)	0.3 (2011)	0.3 (2011)
Spain	New Force (FN)	0.5 (1982)	---
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	5.7 (2010)	5.7 (2010)
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	28.9 (2007)	26.6 (2011)

Source: Cas Mudde, ''The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North America'', *Migration Policy Institute*, May 2012, URL: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/

ANNEX 6.

Prague Declaration of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, 2009

1. Free enterprise, free and fair trade and competition, minimal regulation, lower taxation, and small government as the ultimate catalysts for individual freedom and personal and national prosperity

2. Freedom of the individual, more personal responsibility and greater democratic accountability.

3. Sustainable, clean energy supply with an emphasis on energy security.

4. The importance of the family as the bedrock of society.

5. The sovereign integrity of the nation state, opposition to EU federalism and a renewed respect for true subsidiarity.

6. The overriding value of the transatlantic security relationship in a revitalized NATO, and support for young democracies across Europe.

7. Effectively controlled immigration and an end to abuse of asylum procedures

8. Efficient and modern public services and sensitivity to the needs of both rural and urban communities.

9. An end to waste and excessive bureaucracy and a commitment to greater transparency and probity in the EU institutions and use of EU funds.

10. Respect and equitable treatment for all EU countries, new and old, large and small

Source:http://www.Conservativeeurope.com/Conservatives-In-The-European-Parliament.aspx

ANNEX 7.

The Group is open to Members that subscribe to a Europe of Freedom and Democracy and acknowledge the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and parliamentary democracy. The Group subscribes to the following programme.

1. Freedom and co-operation among people of different States

Committed to the principles of democracy, freedom and co-operation among Nation-States, the Group favors an open, transparent, democratic and accountable co-operation among sovereign European States and rejects the bureaucratization of Europe and the creation of a single centralized European superstate.

2. More democracy and respect for People's will

Convinced that the legitimate level for democracy lies with the Nation States, their regions and parliaments since there is no such thing as a single European people; the Group opposes further European integration (treaties and policies) that would exacerbate the present democratic deficit and the centralist political structure of the EU. The Group favors that any new treaties or any modification of the existing treaties are to be submitted to the peoples' vote through free and fair national referenda in the Member States. The Group does believe that the legitimacy of any power comes from the will of its Peoples and their right to be free and democratically ruled.

3. Respect for Europe's history, traditions and cultural values

Peoples and Nations of Europe have the right to protect their borders and strengthen their own historical, traditional, religious and cultural values. The Group rejects xenophobia, anti-Semitism and any other form of discrimination.

4. Respect for national differences and interests: Freedom of votes

Agreeing on embodying these principles in its proceedings, the Group respects the freedom of its delegations and Members to vote as they see fit.

Source: http://www.efdgroup.eu/index.php/about-us/who-we-are/charter.html

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