

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İKTİSADI ANABİLİM DALI

**ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS OF TURKISH YOUTH FROM EU
MEMBERSHIP**

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

Efehan DANIŞMAN

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ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB İktisadı Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencisi Efehan DANIŞMAN'ın, "ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS OF TURKISH YOUTH FROM EU MEMBERSHIP" konulu tez çalışması.....27.06/2013 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği / ~~oyçokluğu~~ ile başarılı / ~~başarısız~~ bulunmuştur.

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ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS OF TURKISH YOUTH FROM EU MEMBERSHIP

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzed young people's perception of the European Union (EU), their expectations from the EU membership and specifically economic expectations of the youth from the EU membership. Lack of sufficient studies on youth's perception regarding the EU, specifically university students', Turkey's young population and EU integration process of Turkey which is expected to fasten during next months are main motivations behind this thesis. Study has been conducted with 485 samples through internet and face to face interviews in Istanbul. Attendees are asked 21 different questions concerning their age, gender, income, where they were born, EU's image, belief to the EU membership, economic expectations from the EU membership and university students' prospects to go and live in the EU countries. At the end of this analysis it has been found that university students have rather neutral EU image and do not see EU as source of prosperity as before. Most of them do not believe Turkey will ever be an EU member. Nonetheless, university students would like to go and live in the EU countries.

Key words: European Union, public opinion, EU Economics

TÜRK GENÇLERİNİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NDEN EKONOMİK BEKLENTİLERİ

ÖZET

Bu tez gençlerin Avrupa Birliği'nden (AB) beklentilerini, özel olarak da ekonomik beklentilerini analiz etmiştir. Tezin temel motivasyonu gençlerin AB algıları hakkında yeterli sayıda çalışma olmaması, Türkiye'nin genç nüfusu ve önümüzdeki aylarda hızlanacağı beklenen Türkiye'nin AB ile bütünleşme sürecidir. Çalışma İstanbul'da 485 örnekleme internet ve yüz yüze görüşmelerle 21 soruluk bir anketin katılımcılara yöneltilmesiyle gerçekleştirilmiştir. Sorular katılımcıların yaşı, cinsiyeti, geliri, doğduğu şehir, AB'nin imajı, AB üyeliğine olan inancı, AB'den ekonomik beklentileri ve AB ülkelerinde yaşama ve çalışma isteğini ölçmeyi amaçlamıştır. Sonuçlara göre gençler artık AB'yi eskisi gibi bir refah kaynağı olarak görmemekte ve AB'nin imajını nötr olarak bulmaktadır. Üniversite öğrencilerinin büyük bölümü Türkiye'nin hiçbir zaman AB'ye üye olamayacağına inanmaktadır. Bunun yanında katılımcıların büyük bölümü AB ülkelerinde yaşamak ve çalışmak istemektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, kamuoyu, AB İktisadı

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Justice and Development Party
BiH: Bosnia and Herzegovina
CEEC: Central and Eastern European Countries
CEFTA: Central European Free Trade Agreement
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union
Df: Degrees of Freedom
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
EEC: European Economic Community
ESI: European Stability Initiative
EU: European Union
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FTA: Free Trade Agreement
FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G20: Group of Twenty
G8: Group of Eight
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GMFUS: German Marshall Fund of the United States
ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
MENA: Middle East and North Africa
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: Non-governmental Organization
OECD: Organisation for Co-operation and Economic Development
OSYM: Turkish Student Selection and Placement Center
PISA: Programme for International Student Assessment
PTA: Preferential Trade Agreements
RA: Readmission Agreement
SETA: Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
TEPAV: Economic Policy Research Foundation Turkey
TESEV: The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Turkstat: Turkish Statistical Institute
TUSEV: The Third Sector Foundation of Turkey
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNMIK: The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USA: United States of America
USAK: International Strategic Research Organization
WB: Western Balkans

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation

Turkey and the European Union (EU) have a long standing, unique and controversial relationship which started in 1963 with Ankara Agreement. Ankara Agreement is a framework agreement in essence and aimed full membership if necessary conditions are met according to its Article 28. Even today, Ankara Agreement is the base of Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. The long story between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC) started with Ankara Agreement and still continues.

Turkey - EU relations had many ups and downs throughout the half century and nature of this relationship changed due to transformation of both sides. Turkey transformed itself to middle income level and became 17th biggest economy in the world and 6th biggest in Europe as an emerging market rather than agriculture dominated, poor country. Currently Turkey is regarded as second tier of emerging markets after Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. During the period when Turkey was experiencing such a transformation, the EU evolved from the EEC to EU. This is a sign of widening vision of the EU since member states decided to go for further economic and political integration rather than being a mere free trade area. The EU and Turkey gradually integrated to each other during those 50 years in economic, social and political aspects. According to European Commission even though there is a declining trend in share of the EU in Turkey's whole trade, still EU is Turkey's biggest trade partner while Turkey is EU's 7th and 5th biggest partner in import and export respectively (European Commission The Directorate General for Trade, 2012a) Also more than 60% of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is coming from the EU countries according to the Under Secretariat of Treasury General Directorate of Foreign Investment (2011).

In terms of social aspects, number of Turkish citizens living in Europe is also estimated to be around 4 million according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013). Every year with different reasons such as education, business, conferences, cultural activities or tourism, hundreds of thousands Turkish people go to Europe. According to the European Stability Initiative's study (ESI, 2011) 624,361 Turkish citizens applied for a short term Schengen visa to the EU countries while 591,950 of them were accepted. Both parties are also regularly cooperating in international institutions as part of the western alliance. These data and information are showing us a small picture about how EU and Turkey are already con-

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nected to each other with strong economic, political and social ties.

Today sovereign debt crisis is threatening EU more than ever in its history. EU is facing with one of the biggest tests. Even though crisis originally started in United States of America (USA) mainly in housing and financial sector, it disseminated to the whole world. Recovery seems to have started, however it is going to take more time than expected in the EU. Today all member states are putting lots of effort to save Euro-zone's future and defend their national interests which creates conflicts occasionally. Leaders of the EU and national governments gathered several times during the last years at different platforms such as European Council, Council of Ministers, The Group of Eight (G8) or The Group of Twenty (G20) to save Euro-zone's future. In all possible scenarios after the crisis, the world and the EU will never be the same. Naturally, these changes will be very crucial to determine future path of relations with Turkey.

Demography has also been one of the biggest concerns of Europe in these years and is expected to be a bigger concern during the next decades. Recent reforms in several member states, especially after global economic crisis, started to increase retirement age and aimed more flexible or more flexicure (a concept which combines flexibility with security)¹ in Europe in terms of employment conditions. Moreover, Europe has an ageing population which increases burden on the social security systems. During the next decades, burden is expected to be heavier. According to the Eurostat, median age of Europe is currently around 41 while that of Turkey is around 29 in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012). Furthermore, Turkey is the youngest country among EU members and candidate countries. Hence this issue is also an important aspect of relations between Turkey and the EU. For Turkey, this aspect is usually perceived as an opportunity, however in reality, it is a challenge as well. It is a fact that Turkey's young population has a potential. Nevertheless to use it properly, Turkey needs to educate them by considering global world's demands. It is also needed to increase labor force participation especially for woman. Unless these conditions are met, it is unlikely for Turkey to reach its famous 2023 targets. Otherwise, young population may become a liability after the next 20 years since ageing of the population has already started. Another big challenge is quality of education in Turkey. When Turkish student's competences compared with their peers in Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development (OECD) countries according to the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, Turkey is

¹ More information can be found about flexicurity at Wilthagen and Tros (2004).

significantly behind from the other countries by being 32th among 34 countries (OECD, 2010). Also, TEPAV researcher's evaluation notes states that among OECD countries intergenerational mobility is lowest in Turkey after Slovakia (Aslankurt, 2013). If necessary measures will not be taken young, dynamic but uneducated population will become a liability rather than an asset for Turkey and the region. This is an issue which should be analyzed in depth nevertheless we are not going to make this analysis since it is out of the scope of this thesis.

The rise of nationalism and extremism in Europe in the recent years, especially after the economic crisis have become an important concern. Immigrants or in other words perceived outsiders including EU citizens from former Communist countries are first to blame in bad times. Since Turkey has one of the biggest immigrant populations with 4 million Turkish citizens in EU, this issue is also closely related with Turkey. Right wing politicians such as Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Freedom Party and Marine Le Pen, the leader of far right Front National who ran for presidential elections in 2012 in France tried to exploit such concerns in Europe widely. Partially they succeeded too. Former French President Sarkozy also clearly stated his anti-Turkish membership views even though referenced Turkey's importance as a partner during campaign for presidential elections in 2007 and 2012. Especially in countries with huge number of Turkish immigrants such as Austria, France and Germany, public opinion is not supportive for Turkish accession. These kinds of developments sentiments and actions are also increasing opposition against Turkish membership to the EU.

It is obvious that there is and there will be always a group which opposes Turkish membership to the EU even though it is not usually dominant clearly. Their one of the biggest concerns is that Turkey is too big in terms of size and population. Moreover Turkey's population is mostly consisted from young people. Thesis aimed to see whether university students from Istanbul still see Europe as source of economic prosperity. Do they want to live and work in the EU? In case of an accession or not, thesis aimed to look for whether university students from Istanbul have still economic expectation from EU or whether they would like to go and live in European countries in search of prosperity.

According to the different studies including Eurobarometer's, surveys about Turkish citizens support to the EU accession shows that, support to the EU accession is diminishing during the last decade. This should be an important concern for the ones both in Europe and

Turkey who advocates Turkey's integration with the Europe. In case of accession which is far-fetched in the short run, a referendum could come to the force in both parties. In 2010 and 2011, President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul stated several times that, Turkey may choose a path like Norway who rejected EU accession with a referendum (Milliyet, 2009). Referendum is the case for Turkish accession in some EU member states such as Austria and France. Thus, trends in Turkish public opinion about EU membership, especially young people's opinion is very important since half of the population is under 30 years of age according to TurkStat statistics measured during December 2011 (Turkstat, 2013). Also rejection of Constitutional Treaty in several member states is also another example of the increasing importance of the public opinion in the EU. Nevertheless, unfortunately there is not sufficient study on even the public opinion in Turkey and even less for young people's perceptions and economic expectations regarding EU membership. This constitutes main motivation of this thesis.

Another aim of the thesis is looking for knowledge level of the young people about EU. Different actors of the field such as Non Governmental Organizations' (NGO's) and Ministry of the EU Affairs² are continuously trying to increase understanding of the EU in Turkey and Turkey in EU. For this reason, EU Communication Strategy is adopted by Ministry of EU Affairs (former European Union Secreteriat-General) in 2010 and trying to increase knowledge on Turkey in the EU and the EU in Turkey. Moreover, currently EU Information Centers are operating in 21 cities of Turkey. Turkey's participation to "The EU Youth and Life Long Learning Program" also enhanced citizens especially youth's information level. Through programs of the Turkish National Agency, 61.000 young people benefited from the EU funds for mobility or training purposes during 2012 (Vatan, 2012). However do still young Turkish people know enough about EU is a big question? According to Eurobarometer studies, Turkish people always know less than EU average concerning EU. Thesis will try to find an answer to this question as well for the university students through the survey by asking questions which are either same as Eurobarometer did or inspired from them. Until now these questions have been asked in all Eurobarometer Semi Annual Reports between 2004 and 2012 (Eurobarometer, 2004-2012). Our survey is exclusively focusing on university students in Istanbul rather than general public which makes it different from other public opinion studies. Hence higher knowledge level concerning EU affairs can be expected from the students.

² Former Secreteriat-General for the EU Affairs.

University students in Istanbul will be future leaders of Turkey in different sectors such as public, business, civil society and academia. Thus, it is important to see whether EU is still socially and economically attractive for them since they are going to drive public opinion in near future. Furthermore, due to practical reasons such as limited human and financial resources to reach to other cities and author's personal network which facilitate reaching young university students from Istanbul also justifies this selection. This thesis is also important and differs from previous studies due to lack of sufficient studies regarding youth's public opinion especially on economic expectations. Even Eurobarometer studies did not show age distribution for each country and question. Focusing only on university students is also another difference when one compares it with other studies. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, half of the Turkish population is under 30 years of age (Turkstat, 2011). Nonetheless, studies on youth's opinion regarding EU are significantly insufficient. This thesis could be a nice starting point for further studies to fill the gap on the literature concerning youth's economic expectations from the EU and their EU perception.

The thesis consists of four chapters. After presenting motivation of this study, thesis will briefly explain Turkey's EU journey, the ups and downs throughout the history to show the evolution of the relationship.

Second chapter is focused on the literature review of the Turkish people's perception of the EU, WB's perception on the EU and EU citizens' perception on Turkish accession to the EU. In the literature review, theories developed on public opinion and European integration are covered. Moreover, differences of support level between Turkey, candidate and potential candidate countries in Western Balkans (WB) are compared in this part to see the similarities and differences with Turkey regarding this phenomenon. Last part of the chapter focused on EU citizens' public opinion regarding Turkish accession.

Third chapter consist aims, research method, population and sample, data, reliability test, hypothesis, main findings, hypothesis testing, limitations and results and discussions. At this part, duration of data, method and why this specific statistical method is chosen will be justified. Chi-square method will be implemented to test hypothesis which were built. Moreover, university students' different aspects such as age, region where they were born and income level are analyzed in our survey. Survey is made with 485 samples and 21 different hypotheses are tested.

After the third chapter, the fourth chapter is the conclusion part of the thesis with last remarks, wrap up of the subject and present suggestions for the future studies.

1.2 Turkey – EU Relations: Short history

To understand changes in Turkish public opinion on EU accession, Turkey and EU relations needed to be analyzed. This part is written to explain the evolution of Turkey – EU relations briefly since the 1950's. After the massive destruction in Europe after the 2nd World War, six European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherland) signed the Treaty to establish European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1953. Couple of years later, in 1957, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community which is also known as Rome Treaty is signed by those countries in Rome. In time those six countries created a common market among each other based on four freedoms; free movement of persons, services, goods and capital.

In those days, Turkey was struggling with its own challenges and economically it was still at the transition period from poor, agriculture dominated economy to a manufacture and service based economy. Turkey's one of the main motivation was improving its economic development. Moreover, security considerations due to the cold war were also an important aspect for Turkey. When those motives summed with Greek factor which is Greece's approach to the EEC in 1959, Turkey followed Greece as well, since Turkey followed all the actions that Greece took in order not to be isolated from the international community due to its conflicts with Greece. When Turkey's foreign policy considered in those years approaching EEC was a consistent movement with other important milestones such as participating intervention in Korea under the auspices of United Nations (UN), memberships to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), OECD and Council of Europe (Aybey, 2004). After long negotiations which are interrupted for a while due to coup d'etat in 1960, Turkey and EEC signed Ankara Agreement on 12th September 1963. Ankara Agreement is a framework agreement in essence and second association agreement which EEC signed. First one is signed with Greece. According to the agreement, Turkey and the EEC will be represented equally in institutions of the agreement which are the Association Council, the Association Committee and Joint Parliamentary Assembly (Lasok, 1991). Agreement has 3 stages to form a Customs Union between contracting parties. These 3 stages are preparatory, transition and

final period to form Customs Union. Nevertheless, formation of the Customs Union is not ultimate aim of Ankara Agreement since its Article 28 envisages full membership to the community.

After 7 year of transitory period, Turkey and the EEC signed additional protocol to start transitional stage of the Customs Union in 1970. This period provides a framework regarding how to reach four freedoms which are free movement of capital, goods, people and service. A timetable between 12 to 22 years determined for removing all tariffs and quantitative barriers for the goods coming from the EEC and free movement of persons. EEC abolished all tariffs and quantitative barriers when additional protocol came into force.

1970's brought plenty of problems to the relations such as Cyprus intervention, Greek full membership application to the EEC, oil crisis in the world, eurosclerosis³ and military interventions in Turkey. Some of those problems are directly related with internal conditions of the parties while some of them are due to cyclical situation in the world. Ecevit government proposed to suspend Turkey's commitments which arise from the Ankara Agreement in 1978 due to economic problems of Turkey. However the government changed shortly after and this proposal had been withdrawn. Just before coup d'etat, prospective Prime Minister and President of Turkey Turgut Ozal was working in State Planning Organization (DPT). Ozal cherished liberalization with 24th January decisions in 1980 and these decisions include devaluation of Turkish lira, promise of removal of state subsidies and increasing export subsidies and interest rates (Rodrik, 1990). Then military intervention occurred on 12th September 1980 and this event delayed Turkey's future prospects.

European Commission condemned coup d'etat and suspended relations with Turkey due to violations of human rights, democracy and rule of law which just became relatively more important for EEC in those years. Relations between parties did not normalize until 1984 until local elections took place in Turkey.

Council forwarded Turkey's application to the European Commission and Commission released an avis 2.5 years later concerning membership bid of Turkey. The avis pointed out Turkey's eligibility for the membership nevertheless EEC can not accept Turkey

³ Eurosclerosis is a term derived from sclerosis which describes stalling further integration in Europe and economic stagnation between mid-1960's and mid-1980's.

as a candidate or member because its economy is not developed sufficiently. During that era, EEC was still busy with digesting new members which were Spain and Portugal. Moreover, EEC was concentrated on completing her single market rather than further enlargements. Moreover, during these years Turkey's human rights records were not bright and raised eyebrows in EEC (European Union Center of North Carolina, 2008). Turkey's bid in 1987 can be regarded both too late and too early. It is too late because Turkey missed the enlargement train while struggling with her internal issues when countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain were admitted. On the other hand, Turkey's application was too early for the next enlargement while EEC was trying to complete its internal market with Single European Act and absorbing new members. Ozal government's main rationale was changing paradigm in Turkey – EU relations since they have found current framework insufficient and thought that Turkey's interests lies in the EU integration (Arikan, 2006).

To revitalize the relations, Commission prepared Matutes Package which is requested by Council of Ministers in 1990. According to the package, completion of Customs Union, renewal of cooperation in industry, technology and finance and increase in political and cultural links are envisaged. However this package has never been implemented due to the objection of Greece.

EEC decided to complete its single market until 1993 by Single European Act in 1986 which became effective in 1987. After that, with the end of the Cold War era, Europe faced a new challenge after completing its single market. Enlargement of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) is mentioned in Maastricht Treaty for the first time in 1992. During European Council Copenhagen Summit in 1993 Turkey is excluded while CEEC were included through invitation to the summit. During this summit, famous Copenhagen Criteria were determined. Copenhagen criteria entailed as functioning market economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the union, stability of institutions and guaranteeing of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities and ability to take on the obligations of the membership.

Meanwhile the end of the cold war and the collapse of communism transformed importance of relationship between Turkey and EU significantly. Turkey was not as important as before in terms of security for Europe (Kramer, 1996). Hence, Turkey started to look for new collaborations with countries in Central Asia and Black Sea shores which have historical

ties with Turkey. This could also be regarded as a counter strategy against the possibility of isolation from Western alliance especially from the Europe. However, Turkey could not find what it expected from those countries. This attempt could be regarded as similar with the current changes in the Arab world and Turkey's increasing ties with these countries. Nevertheless, this should be perceived as a complementary aspect rather than substitute for EU integration which is Turkey's long standing foreign policy vision.

Between 1993 and 1995, Turkey and the EU which evolved from the EEC, intensified their relations under the framework of association. After long negotiations both parties agreed on proceeding to the next stage; forming the Customs Union. However, the Customs Union omitted agricultural products and free movement of labor. Forming the Customs Union decision which is criticized due to different aspects is still controversial in Turkey due to several deficiencies. Those criticisms are: lack of representation in the decision making process of the trade policy of the EU in EU institutions which do not always serve Turkey's interests, Turkey's de facto obligatory alignment of its preferential trade policy with EU's Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) to avoid from trade distortion, latecomer effect through entering a market which EU signed a free trade agreement (FTA) later than its competitors from the EU and coinciding with countries which are not enthusiastic to sign a PTA with Turkey (Akman, 2010). Recently planned negotiations on EU-USA free trade agreement will also increase visibility of the Customs Union discussions in Turkey. Beside technical aspects, there are studies criticizing Customs Union in terms of political aspects as well (Manisalı, 2009). On the other hand several studies including Yilmaz (2010) argued that Customs Union with EU increased productivity and competitiveness. Nevertheless shortcomings of Customs Union due to EU's focus on bilateralism rather than multilateralism in its trade policy and blurred membership perspective decreased its desirability. Note that, Turkey is the unique country which formed the Customs Union without being full member and this issue creates an asymmetrical relation between both parties.

Before European Council Luxembourg Summit which was held in 1997, Turkey had some severe issues with Greece and Cyprus due to small islets called Kardak in Aegean Sea and Greek Cypriots attempt to pass Green Line in the island. During Luxembourg Summit, EU divided CEEC's into two groups. While first group of countries were starting accession negotiations (Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia), the EU offered to speed up the preparations for accession negotiations with remaining countries

(Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta) except Turkey. At the conclusions of the summit, European Council confirmed eligibility of Turkey to be a member of the EU and it is mentioned with a separate article called “A European Strategy for Turkey”. This summit created a big disappointment in Ankara which perceived this as an unfair treatment (Robins, 2003). Coalition government suspended political dialogue and did not attend the European Conference. After the exclusion from the accession process, Turkey felt that she was treated unfairly and suspend political dialogue on Cyprus and human rights issues for 6 months.

Next European Council summits following Luxembourg Summit in Cardiff, Vienna and Cologne did not melt ices between Turkey and the EU even though first regular progress report was released for Turkey after the Cardiff summit. Nevertheless, during Helsinki Summit, the EU offered candidacy to Turkey in 1999. After that, European Commission adopted Accession Partnership Document for Turkey. Following this, Turkey adopted its National Program for the Adoption of Acquis during 2001. Even though candidacy is a positive development during Helsinki Summit, there are points that Turkey did not satisfy especially regarding Cyprus issue. At the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki Summit (1999) it is stated that;

“9. (b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.”

After the era of Helsinki Summit, Turkish accession and Cyprus issue became interdependent due to Cyprus’s march to the EU membership. During Helsinki Summit, EU also showed its determination for establishing Common European Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) which will enable EU led military operations autonomy from the NATO against international crisis. In connection with this, it is not surprising that Turkey is offered candidacy during this summit due to Turkey’s importance in security matters. Greece’s foreign policy stance changed and 1999 Earthquake in Marmara region warmed up relations through disaster diplomacy (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). Aegean issue is not an obstacle anymore during Turkey’s candidacy process.

1.3 Turkey – EU Relations: Current state of play

After the economic crisis in Turkey and change of the government respectively in 2001 and 2002, Justice and Development Party (AKP) started reform process rapidly for EU membership with incentive of candidacy. Laws regarding democratization started to pass since 2001 and those laws includes controversial issues such as new civil code, decreasing military effect on politics and broadcasting in a language other than Turkish etc. (Bac, 2005).

During Brussels Summit in December 2004, the European Commission has decided to open up accession negotiations in October 2005 after European Council decided that Turkey sufficiently fulfills “Copenhagen Criteria”. Negotiation framework at that date is revised by European Commission. According to negotiation framework, pace of negotiations depends on Turkey’s fulfillment of Copenhagen Criteria and Turkey’s alignment with *acquis communautaire*. Practically speaking, accession negotiations means that membership question became how and when rather than yes or no question. Even though question evolves to how and when in general, EU put reservation on accession negotiations with Turkey while pointing that accession negotiations are an open-ending process. Austria and France were played a key role at the inclusion of these reservations. This point is not as strong as in Turkey’s in Croatia’s negotiation framework document which started accession negotiations at the same time with Turkey.

After accession negotiations have started, momentum has been lost day by day due to different reasons. During the accession negotiations between the EU and Southern Cyprus Greek Administration, reconciliation attempts in the island intensified however Annan Plan was rejected by Greek part of the island. Then, Southern Cyprus Greek Administration became an EU member in 2004. This means that Turkey should extend the Customs Union to the Southern Cyprus as well with other countries. This could also mean recognition of the Southern Cyprus Greek Administration. Turkey and the EU agreed on implementation of additional protocol which envisages Turkey’s opening to the Cypriot planes and vessels while stating that this does not mean recognition of Cyprus. Nevertheless to implement additional

protocols, Turkey demanded mutual abolition of all limitations on the free movement of commodities, persons and services from the EU. This demand is based on also decision taken by Council of Ministers in 26th April 2004. Yet this decision has been blocked by Cyprus in the council. As a response, Turkey did not implement additional protocol to Cyprus. Thus, European Council decided to block eight chapters and to not close any of them provisionally since 11th December 2006. Blocked chapters are free movement of goods, right of establishment and freedom to provide services, financial services, agriculture and rural development, fisheries, transportation policy, customs union and external relations.

Furthermore in France and Germany, centre-left governments are changed with centre-right governments' (Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy came into power) which are generally aimed to slow down the accession negotiations and turn the vision from full membership to privileged partnership. This is also an important milestone which changed the momentum. For instance, France blocked chapters such as economic and monetary policy, regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, financial and budgetary provisions and freedom of movement for workers is blocked during Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy due to their direct relation with full membership. Though, with the victory of François Hollande in France, it is expected that relations would become milder between Turkey and France. Hollande's approach to the Turkish accession is more moderate than Sarkozy.

Turkey also reacted negatively against permanent safeguards especially for the labor market access since this will only mean a *de facto* privileged partnership practically. At the end, it can be said that, momentum has also been lost at the public level as well. According to the Eurobarometer Semi Annual Reports, support to the EU membership decreased from %74 to %50 between 2000 and 2007 in Turkey (Eurobarometer, 2000; Eurobarometer, 2007).

When one look at the current situation, It can be seen that negotiations are on a stalemate. Only one of the chapters is provisionally closed while others are blocked by France, Cyprus or European Council. Since the Spanish Presidency at the European Council during first half 2010, there is not any chapter opened for accession negotiations. Also, stalemate on Cyprus issue is also continuing. At the current discourse, Turkey expects EU to lift isolation from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) while EU expects Turkey to implement the additional protocol for Southern Cyprus Greek Administration. However both sides are waiting for an action from each other currently. Unfortunately,

negotiations under the auspices of UN between both sides of the island are not bringing any improvement too. After the banking crisis in Cyprus, unification of the island will not be expected to be on top of the agenda for a while.

Furthermore, Positive Agenda initiative which is started by Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Füle and Minister of EU Affairs Egemen Bagis may also create a new momentum on the relations. Working groups have already started to work on 8 different chapters to gain a new momentum to the accession negotiations. Positive Agenda also brings a new approach to the visa facilitation process between Turkey and the EU which is one of the main obstacles between the relations. Recently, EU offered the roadmap for visa liberalization which includes 79 different benchmarks that Turkey needs to satisfy. Furthermore, French Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed with his Turkish counterpart to open Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments chapter which is expected to be open during July 2013. These developments can be regarded positive even though, visa-free travel or accession is not expected to take place during the next couple of years. Moreover, during the first half of 2013, Ireland took the Presidency of the Council of the EU and gives positive signals to fasten accession negotiations.

It is obvious that both sides evolved significantly during the past five decades of the relationship. This evolution also changed the perceptions of both sides regarding Turkey's accession throughout the years. Next chapter analyzes these changes through a literature review on public opinion by focusing on last decade.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Turkish Public Opinion About the EU

Public opinion term is not used until 18th century. Public opinion can be defined as attitudes of public against a particular topic, expressed by a significant proportion of a community. For today, public opinion can also be defined as a function of national and international determinants conditions (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). This section starts with public opinion theories which are developed on European integration. Afterwards literature review made on previous studies to see how much of Turkish people, specifically Turkish youth support EU membership of Turkey and why. Important milestones mentioned to show the changes in the public opinion if necessary. This part is useful to compare results of our survey with the previous studies.

To understand public attitudes against European integration, numerous theories are developed. In this part the thesis summarizes those theories. These theories are cognitive mobilization, political values, utilitarian calculations, class partisanship and support for government (Gabel, 1998). Cognitive mobilization indicates that citizens with high cognitive skills tend to embrace supranational identities (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991). Political value theory claims that support to European integration is associated with political and economic values of citizens. Utilitarian calculations perceive support to the EU membership as a cost and benefit analysis (Gabel and Harvey, 1995). It is mainly based on winners and losers of the integration in terms of material benefits. This approach claims that, individuals assess the EU membership through material benefits that he or his country or region will gain (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). According to this theory, winners of the EU integration are generally considered as large businesses, skilled labors, upper-middle class people, farmers through EU subsidies etc. However, later on it has been found that, utilitarian approach is not as relevant as before, especially after the Maastricht Treaty due to further political integration in ever closer union, the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). According to the study, citizens now consider also specific policy issues and cultural aspects as well with macroeconomic conditions. Class partisanship theory suggests, people decide whether EU membership is beneficial or harmful for them according to political party which they support (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991). Lastly theory suggested that the public tie their support to the EU integration with their support to the government (Gabel, 1998).

All those theories are valid up to a certain level even though each has several shortcomings. Starting from 2000's, identity theory's importance increased with increasing political integration in the EU. It is argued that utilitarian calculations and identity became most accepted theories in general (Hooghe and Mark, 2005). According to same study, utilitarian calculations are also shaped by type of capitalism which citizens live in. On the other hand, identity and cultural explanation of public attitudes towards EU membership claims that when people consider themselves with their national identity exclusively, they tend to be more Eurosceptic and perceive integration as a threat. For instance, it is claimed that fear of losing identity transforms into less support to the EU, even though it doesn't create a mere opposition (McLaren, 2004). Obviously, when the union deepens, fear of losing identity rises. Also national traditions play a significant role in identification of countries (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). Carey (2002) founded that utilitarian and identity based explanations are almost equally significant to drive public opinion in EU states. Political cues theory added to the two dominant theories as well afterwards (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Theory claims that domestic politics also shapes attitudes towards EU significantly. Generally previous studies on domestic politics effects to support EU integration argued that left leaning people are more pro-EU. Nevertheless, in Scandinavian countries case, European integration is seen as regulatory competition and just opposite is valid (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). All those studies above develop theories on European integration and tried to answer the following questions: "What drives public opinion towards EU memberships?" and "How do people decide whether to support European integration or not". Nonetheless there is not a consensus on the answer. It depends on several factors such as global conjuncture, main issues in the agenda of a country and countries' tradition.

When one looks at the Turkish public, EU membership generally sounds attractive to average Turkish citizens even though it touches to the sensitive issues in Turkish society such as abolition of death penalty, decreasing militaries effect on politics and broadcasting in a language other than Turkish. Nevertheless, we can claim that Turkish public opinion is widely driven by political elites as in other countries. USA has been studied as case study to prove that public opinion is driven by political elites (Page and Shapiro, 1992). The study claims that, people assess their interests for the political and economic events according to the signals they get from the political elites due to lack of coherent knowledge about domestic and international political issues. The same argument is also assumed by another study on

Turkey's EU accession (Gerhards and Hans, 2011). It is argued that enlargement is not touching citizens' everyday life and their perception is significantly affected by political elites. However, this also depends on how unified are political elites and parties in European affairs (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Gabel and Scheve 2007). In the Turkish case, during last decade one can say that political elite, especially government is not unified on European matters even they are from the same political entity. This can be regarded as one of the reasons on diminishing support of Turkish citizens to the EU membership. Of course, there are other determinants as well which drive public opinion. Nonetheless, knowledge level of Turkish public concerning the EU has been lower than almost all EU countries (Eurobarometer, 2012) during the last decade. Furthermore, political elites of the EU are giving mixed signals to the public which creates distrust against the EU and stimulate Euroscepticism.

Previous studies based on these theories either studied whole EU countries or some regions of the EU. However, those theories are also applied for Turkey by different scholars. However, It is hard to say those studies are sufficient. For Turkey, Europe and specifically the EU has mostly perceived as a source of prosperity by Turkish public according to Eurobarometer surveys between 2004 and 2012. Some of the studies argue that Turkish citizens' support to the EU accession is driven both by utilitarian calculations and national identity (Kentmen, 2008; Senyuva, 2009). One of the innovative results of Kentmen's (2008) study is that religion has no effect on individuals' EU perception in Turkey. Another study also supported effect of utilitarian and national identity approaches (Carkoglu and Kentmen, 2011). Thus the traditional losers of utilitarian approach who are low skilled labor became winners in Turkish case according to theory. Another study suggested that, there is a shift from utilitarian calculations to identity considerations due to size and culture of Turkey (De Vreese, Boomgarden and Semetko, 2008). Hence in the light of these studies, a clear distinction can not be made regarding validity of those theories neither for Turkey nor for other EU countries. Their validity changes according to data set, conjuncture, method and many other determinants. It is also found that, when people engage and are accustomed more with EU policies, they adapt their utilitarian calculations accordingly (Elgun and Tillman, 2007). Another study suggests that, without considering those theories, perception of Turkish public is divided into 3 groups (Dartan and Nas, 2002). First group constitutes, major businessman, capital owners, partially conservative parts of the society, liberals and left-wing

intellectuals who favors Turkey's full integration with the EU. Second group which is constituted by people with radical left and far right ideologies advocates a strict no. Small and medium businesses, secular and republican intellectuals are the last group who says yes to the EU but. They generally tend to gather around principles of Copenhagen Political Criteria.

Unlike general European public opinion, most of the Turks supported Turkey's EU membership bid since beginning of the 1990's. We have never seen a hard Euroscepticism in Turkey which is defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) as;

Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.

Rather than this, soft Euroscepticism has seen several times in Turkey which is again defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) as:

Soft Euroscepticism: is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory.

On occasion, some aspects about EU membership touches to sensitive areas and are discussed in Turkey widely with positive and negative aspects. However knowledge level on EU related issues is not at a desirable level in Turkey. For sure it is not expected that everybody know technical details regarding membership. Nonetheless knowledge level is not satisfactory in the society comparing with the other EU countries in such an important issue which touches daily life of citizens extensively even though Turkey is not part of the EU. According to the Eurobarometer studies, Turkish people's average knowledge level about the EU is almost always lower than average of the candidate and member countries (Eurobarometer; 2004-2011).

Before starting literature review on previous surveys on Turkish citizens' perception regarding EU accession, it is important to mention about the limitations of the previous studies. First of all there is not sufficient data and study on the Turkish public opinion,


specifically on youth regarding EU matters especially before 2000's. Most of the studies on EU concentrated on political and economical aspects of the relations rather than public opinion.

At the beginning of the 2000's, there was an increasing number of studies and increasing support on Turkish accession from Turkish citizens. Nevertheless, starting from the mid 2000's support to the EU accession is diminished in Turkey (Eurobarometer, 2006-2012). Public opinion specifically young people's opinion on EU membership has not been considered significantly in previous studies. Since half of Turkey is under 30 years of age and around 19 million of them are between 15 and 29 years old their opinion should not be underestimated. Previous studies generally have limited or no places for youth hence this chapter covered general public opinion as well.

First study on Turkish public opinion regarding EU has been done by Esmer in 1993 and 1994 respectively in Istanbul and Konya with a relatively limited sample. After that Erder from Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) conducted a wide nationwide survey in 1996 and 1998 (Senyuva, 1996).


Eurobarometer provides most relevant and systematic data since 2001 which is the date when European Commission has started conducting surveys through local contractors' semi annually in Turkey rather than including it into Central and Eastern European Barometer. From 1999 to 2011 according to the Eurobarometer surveys, change can be seen in support for the EU membership at the general public. Since Eurobarometer do not have information concerning distribution of ages for each country and question, it is not possible provide a general picture of the young people's perception for these surveys in Turkey. Furthermore the question "Will Turkey's EU membership would be a good thing?" has not been asked in each survey. Nonetheless, when we look at the general public's attitudes, we have clearly seen that Turkish people were really enthusiastic regarding EU membership when EU offered candidacy to Turkey in 1999 with 71% of support. Fastened reforms with AKP government were an important determinant which was a positive signal to drive public opinion. However after negotiations started in 2005, Turkish people started to feel that EU membership is not as attractive as before due to different reasons such as euro crisis, stalemate on negotiations, growing mistrust against EU etc. Support started to decline gradually and reached bottom level with 41% in 2011. Nevertheless, overall attitude is still positive towards EU today (Eurobarometer, 2012; GMFUS, 2012).

There are different reasons behind this decline as mentioned above. Even though Turkey officially still committed to EU membership, Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s vision called *Strategic Depth* brings a diversification of interest in Turkey’s foreign policy (Grigoriadis, 2010; Saz, 2011). Furthermore, several times it is also mentioned that “EU is not the only game in the town” for Turkey by different stakeholders (Alessandri, E., 2011). Another study by Goksel (2012) stated that stalemate on Cyprus, visa issues and mixed signals from the political elite are important aspects of increased cynicism in Turkey towards EU. Marc Pierini, former head of EU Delegation to Turkey, also pointed to mixed signal from political elites and claimed that Turkey distanced from Europe (Pierini, M. 2012). Katinka Barysch from Centre for European Reform (CER) found this stalemate as a blame game of two parties in her policy brief (Barysch, 2010). Both parties were accusing each other regularly due to stalemate and they have not taken any action until recently. Positive agenda was initiated by Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Füle and Minister of EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis. When all those aspects are gathered, a declining level of support to the EU can be seen in Turkey. Graph 1 shows this decline of support to the EU membership in Turkey between 2000 and 2011.



What EU means for Turkish citizens is an also important question asked by Eurobarometer. For Turkish people, economic prosperity is seen in the first rank between 2004 and 2011. Yet, economic prosperity lost its first rank by decreasing from 48% to 23% between 2004 and 2011. Sovereign debt crisis can be considered as one of the main reasons behind this decline. On the other hand, freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU has still a significant meaning for Turkish people by 31% in 2012. Visa issue is an important aspect that makes this choice still attractive. Losing cultural identity is also a significant concern for Turkish people and it is fluctuating between 13% and 23% during the last 9 years. However, losing cultural identity has never been sole meaning of the EU for Turkish citizens which is compatible with argument that religion is not very important for Turkish people's EU perception according to Kentmen's (2008) study.

EU's meaning reached its bottom point in terms of positive aspects recently in 2012 throughout the last decade. Note that in this question, attendee's can choose multiple choices. There are also other options in the questions which are not very relevant with the subject of this thesis. Those are peace, stronger say in the world, cultural diversity, social protection, bureaucracy and waste of money. There are several reasons behind decline of the economic prosperity expectation from the EU. Firstly euro crisis which has been continuing since 2009 changed perception of the public concerning EU. Furthermore, increasing prosperity of Turkey during the last decade decreased people's economic expectations. Nonetheless, one should not forget that Turkish economy is still interdependent to the EU in many aspects such as trade, FDI and tourism. Graph 2 shows meanings of EU memberships for Turkish citizens according to the Eurobarometer reports (Eurobarometer, 2004-2012).




Graph 2. What does EU Membership Means for Turkish Citizens?

Source: Eurobarometer Semi Annual National Reports 2004-2012

The second most important international research regarding Turkish public opinion is US German Marshall Fund’s (GMFUS) Transatlantic Trends survey which has been conducted in Turkey since 2004 (GMFUS, 2004-2011). Graph 3 shows support for EU membership in Turkey which is decreased from 73% to 48% between 2004 and 2011 according to GMFUS’s Transatlantic Trends Survey. When GMFUS’s question is compared with Eurobarometer’s “Is EU membership good for Turkey?” there are differences in results since 2011. Whereas they also following similar trend until 2011.

At the GMFUS survey, some years it has been asked whether Turkey’s membership will be economically good or not for Turkey. Since “Is EU membership good for Turkey economically?” question has not been asked regularly, there is not any consistent data about that. Hence only “EU membership is a good thing” question has been considered which is similar with Eurobarometers’ annual question. Graph 3 shows Turkish public’s perception on EU membership according to the GMFUS (GMFUS, 2004-2011).



Another survey is commissioned and financed by The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) in 2002. According to this study, expected benefit from the EU membership is increasing prosperity with 27% for Turkish citizens (Yilmaz, 2005). Benefits such as decreasing corruption (19%), political benefits such as advanced democracy (17%), freedom of movement (11%) and rising power in the international arena (10%) followed prosperity.


Another study looked for different parts of the society and their support on EU membership (Carkoglu, 2003). The interesting result of his study is that even pro-Islamist and nationalist parties voters in Turkish society has significant support to the EU accession (between 30% and 45%) even though overall they do not support.

Turkish public opinion is also studied by Kadir Has University during the last 4 years. Turkey Social and Political Leanings Research have been conducted with 1000 sample of over 18 years of age. Face to face meeting is used as a method. Support to the EU membership in this study is also researched. During 2010, support level was 54.7%, while in 2011, it increased to 58.1%. Nonetheless, in 2012 support decreased to 50.4%. Benefits of EU membership are only asked in 2010 and economic aspects are leading in this question with a big margin, 41.7%. Democratization is coming after economic aspects, with 17.6%, life standards is 17.4%, human right is 15.2%, free movement is 5.3% and education is 2.2%. In 2010 and 2012, public belief to the EU membership is asked and respectively 37.3% and 34.4% of the public believe that Turkey will be an EU member one day (Kadir Has University, 2011; 2012; 2013).

Turkish Social Sciences Association conducted a research with high school students who are at the last year of the high school studies in 2005 with 4200 high school students (Turkish Social Sciences Association, 2005). Title of the research was “Youth, EU and The Contrary Feelings: I would like to have your body but never your soul”. According to this study, 66.9% of the high school students see EU as a positive thing while 18.6% perceive it negatively. These results are natural with the general momentum of the Turkey – EU relations since until mid 2000’s Turkish perception on EU was at peak in terms of positive aspects. After 2005, EU’s image started to decline as other studies revealed.

Turkstat also conducted a survey for the youth on different issues. Support to the EU membership is measured through the question, “If there would be referendum today, would you vote in favor of EU membership?” Research is conducted between 2005 and 2011. According to the research, like in the other ones, general trend is decreasing support to the EU. Nevertheless, the support is slightly higher than adults according to TurkStat with 44.3% for adults and 47.2% for youth. It is also higher than overall sample of Eurobarometer (41%) in 2011 (TurkStat, 2011; Eurobarometer; 2011). At this research youth is defined between 15 and 24 years old and the research is conducted with approximately 7000 people each year including adults. Unfortunately, study does not provide number of young people specifically

for the questions concerned. Graph 4 shows referendum tendencies of Turkish youth on EU membership (Turkstat, 2012).



In 2006, International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) conducted a survey with a sample of 1100 people on EU Perceptions in Turkey in 6 big cities: Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana and Konya. According to the survey, 50% of the attendees support Turkey’s EU membership while 45% do not (USAK, 2006).

Group of scholars from European Union Institute of Marmara University conducted a survey for the youth in 2004 (Dartan, M., Nas, C., Akman, S. Savran, C. and Suner, S., 2004). Survey is conducted with 886 students from Marmara University. When Marmara University’s cosmopolite structure is considered, this study could also be a reference for university students in whole Turkey. Study analyzed students’ views on Turkey’s fundamental issues such as Turkey’s Europeaness, headscarf issue etc. and perception on international matters such as trust in international organizations. According to this study 46.7% of the students perceives EU’s image as positive, 24.6% of them neutral, 15.7% of

them negative, 6.4% very positive and 5.8% of them very negative. Among students of Marmara University, 68% of the students support EU membership while 21% opposes which was the trend during 2004. For those students, EU means economic and social welfare with 46%, democracy and rule of law with 15%, cultural diversity with 9% and losing of sovereignty and independency with 9%. 52.9% of the students states that, “I support EU membership because of the “new employment opportunities and freedom of movement”.

According to the TESEV’s Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey which has been done with a sample of 1000 people, 69% of Turkish people want Turkey to be part of the EU (TESEV, 2011). Differences between regions are not high generally. Nonetheless Central Anatolia has lowest support level only with 58% while Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia supports with 87% and 91%. Main motivations of this support are freedom of movement (22%) which is an economic motivation, direct economic benefits (21%), democracy (13%), job opportunities (8%) and increasing life standards (7%). Note that in this study support to the EU membership is significantly higher than other studies in the same year.

Another relatively recent study is conducted by KONDA and Istanbul Kultur University in April 2011 about Turkish Youth with 2366 sample (KONDA, 2011). In this research “Turkey must be member of the EU” statement is evaluated by young people. Around 46% of the youth stated his evaluation through “I agree” or “I totally agree”. On the other hand, around 32% have chosen “disagree” or “totally disagree” with this statement. Remaining sample stated that “I have no idea” about this issue. This result is also similar with other studies such as Eurobarometer (41%) and GMFUS (48%) in 2011.

Most recent study on our topic is conducted by Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies in 2013 (EDAM, 2013). 33.3% of the attendants stated that Turkey should insist on full membership target while 19% stated that Turkey should give up full membership target and look for other engagement options with the EU and 25% stated that Turkey should give up EU membership target and should not look for other engagement options. Slightly more than half of respondents with full membership or some other model supports Turkey’s engagement with the EU. When same questions are asked to foreign policy experts in Turkey by EDAM, a big majority, 86.6% of them support Turkey’s continuation of full membership target. This study contains 1509 people from 18 major cities of Turkey and 202 foreign policy experts. Unfortunately there is not any specific reference on youth in this study.

Other studies on Turkish public opinion are generally based on Eurobarometers studies and mostly regression analysis is carried to test different hypothesis according to the current data sets. There is not any further significant study to take into consideration regarding this issue.

2.2 Public opinion about the EU in other candidate countries: The Case of Western Balkans

This part is written to see the support to the EU accession in candidate countries and compare this support in WB and Turkey. Iceland is not considered due to its geography, size and other differences.

Even though there is considerable literature regarding comparison of Turkey and CEEC's support for EU accession, literature lacks sufficient study on this issue between Turkey and WB (Elgun and Tillman, 2007; Taraktas, 2008). Main aim is to see differences and similarities of public opinion in these countries with that of Turkey. Before starting, it is important to note that Turkey's membership bid should be evaluated separately from these countries due to Turkey's geographic position, history, size and potential impact on the EU. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that, Turkey has very close connections and interest in WB and play a role up to some level in WB's European integration (Szigetvari, 2012).

After the EU's enlargement through Central and Eastern Europe, now WB countries are looking forward to join the EU. These are the countries which are established after dissolution of Yugoslavia and they are in the EU accession process at the same time with Turkey. These countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Montenegro and Serbia⁴.

EU accession journey of WB states started with the Association and Stability Agreement in 1999. One year after, at the Zagreb summit, WB states endorsed conditions and objectives (basic democratic principles of the EU and characteristics of EU Internal Market) of this agreement. After that, The EU committed itself for the full membership at the conclusions of Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 by confirming that WB's common future lies within Europe. Europe Commission granted candidacy status to FYROM in 2005,

⁴ Croatia is omitted due to the fact that she is going to be an EU member at 1st July 2013.

Montenegro in 2010 and Serbia in 2011. While Montenegro started accession negotiations in June 2012, FYROM and Serbia do not have a starting date for accession negotiations mostly due to their respective problems with Greece and Kosovo. On the other hand, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are still potential candidates with different problems waiting to be solved.

In terms of economic integration with the EU, The Agreement on Amendment of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 2006) in 2006 signed with WB states. Firstly it has been signed with Albania, FYROM, Moldova, Montenegro and United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK)/Kosovo and then next year in 2007 with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Agreement is called as CEFTA 2006 since original CEFTA was designed for CEEC's until their full membership. Furthermore EU is giving around one billion € aid every year to those states (Perio, 2011). WB states and the EU's amount of trade increasing year by year while exported goods and services are worth 30.1 billion € imported goods and services are worth 16.3 billion € in 2011. EU is the main trade partner of WB countries since 63.6% of overall trade is made with the EU in 2011 (European Commission the Directorate General for Trade, 2012b).

All those countries are struggling with different problems on the path of European integration. Nevertheless, there are commonalities as well. First of all, enlargement fatigue is a concept used for those states as well like Turkey. Moreover after each enlargement, being part of the EU is getting harder. After the sovereign debt crisis in the EU, it is claimed that countries like Bulgaria and Romania acceded while they were not ready. In order to avoid the same story for WB states and due to their different political, economic and social problems the road to be part of the EU road will be longer (Union of European Federalists Serbia, 2010). And also absorption capacity criterion is an important aspect in the EU enlargement especially during economic crisis times. Support from the European public opinion for the enlargement in general has also decreased from around 49% to 40-43% between 2007 and 2011 (Eurobarometer, 2011). One of the reasons behind this is economic crisis since countries most negatively affected from the crisis (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) are the ones who changed their perception negatively against enlargement (Eurobarometer, 2011). Nevertheless, when Turkey is separated from the question, support to the enlargement slightly increases. This study will not go into detail on this issue since there will a separate chapter on public opinion of EU citizens.


An important aspect of the Western Balkan countries' integration with Europe is discussed by Vachudova (2005) through asymmetric interdependence concept. According to this concept, candidate countries are generally small and economically weak (Central and Eastern Europe and WB) and this makes disintegration with EU costly for them while increasing EU conditionality. On the other hand, Turkey can not be regarded similarly due to its size and social, economic and political ties with other parts of the world. It is correct that EU is very important for Turkey however it can not be regarded as the only game in the town. This can be seen also from economic weight of the region, since whole WB's merchandise trade with the world is only 0.3% and 0.2% respectively for import and export when we exclude intra-EU trade (European Commission European Commission the Directorate General for Trade, 2012b).

WB states have different challenges to overcome before accession. For Albania, functioning of the political system is a challenge waiting to be solved to accelerate the process. Parliamentary elections in June 2013 will be an important milestone for Albania. Bosnia and Herzegovina has its problems regarding constitutional reform and problems with the Croatian and Serbian minorities (Sarajlic-Magic, 2011). Republika Srpska (one of the two political entities in BiH) pushes for referendum about secession which could make things more complicated. According to the Gallup's research, 87% of the Bosnian Serbs support secession in 2010 (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010). Furthermore, in BiH, different ethnic groups primarily identify themselves with their ethnic groups rather than Bosnian and those different ethnic groups have different perceptions on EU (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010).


Kosovo's final status has not been determined yet since she has not been recognized by 5 of the EU Member states and Serbia. Also signing Stabilization and Association Agreement is important for Kosovo to be an official candidate. FYROM has a long standing name dispute with Greece and still this issue is on a stalemate. Hence, FYROM could not start accession talks due to Greek objection. Kosovo's final status and cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are the issues to be dealt for Serbia's accession. These are all complicated issues which must be studied extensively nevertheless scope of this study is not sufficient for looking to those problems in depth.

Literature review on public opinion vis-à-vis EU starts with Gallup's Balkan Monitor Survey which is primary data on public opinion of the region. Data is available between 2006 and 2011. Unfortunately there is not any available data for 2007. Each survey includes a

sample between 400 and 2000 citizens which depends on the year and country. The main question to be dealt with is same with the Eurobarometer’s question “Would EU membership be a good thing for your country?” As one can see from the graph below, results are very diverse. While Albania and Kosovo has traditionally high support to the membership with tiny fluctuations, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia have a decreasing support tendency. However, overall tendency of the public is supporting the EU membership as you can see from the graph except for Serbia. Albania and Kosovo also has higher percentage of identification themselves with Europe (Manchin, 2011). When one compares these countries with Turkey, only Serbia’s trend is similar with Turkey’s while others are completely different. Graph 7 shows perception of EU membership in WB countries (Gallup, 2006-2011).



Gallup also looked for young people’s opinion about the EU membership with the same question above. Even though low sample size (between 140 and 350 depending on the country) decreases credibility of the survey results, it is still worth to analyze. For the young people, as expected, EU membership is perceived as slightly positive thing at all WB countries even though general trends are similar. Graph 8 shows youth perception on EU membership in WB countries.



Another important study has been conducted by comparing the two different generations of the Balkans (European Fund for the Balkans, 2011). 1971 generation is the generation that grew up in the Yugoslavian system and experienced the war and dissolution of the federation. On the other hand, the 1991 generation did not grow up in the old system and has not been affected from the wars as previous generation. To distinguish differences on their perceptions, the survey is conducted with the people who were born in 1971 and 1991 and differences are compared. Questions asked were similar with Gallup’s survey. As expected according to results of the survey, youngsters also see the EU as the future of the region more than old people in all countries. However difference is not more than 5% in general.

When one looks at what EU means for Balkan people, again according to the Gallup’s study, EU means free travel for almost whole WB’s states except Croatia, with more than 80% between 2009 and 2011. Unfortunately there is not any sufficient data before that date.

Eurobarometer also asks same question to the candidate countries which are FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia since they became official candidates. Also, EU membership means for a vast majority more employment opportunities, political stability and security for all of them except Serbia. Same question is asked to candidate countries which

are FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia. Macedonians and Montenegrins perceive EU as source of democracy, freedom to travel, peace and economic prosperity since 2008 and 2011 respectively which is the date when Eurobarometer started to ask this question in these countries. For Serbia, result is the same for the first half of 2012. Unfortunately, there is not any sufficient data for the previous years since those countries' candidacy is recent.

What is the rationale behind this level of support to the EU membership in WB is an important question to be asked. First of all, we can argue that, visa liberalization in WB had positive effects on EU perception, even though there are discussions to bring the old visa regime back in the EU due to high number of asylum seekers from those countries. In 2011 13,980 people from Serbia, 5,545 people from FYROM, 3060 people from Albania, 2,595 from Bosnia and Herzegovina and 630 people from Montenegro were claimed asylum in EU member states mostly in Germany, Belgium and Sweden (ESI, 2013). As one of the most effective conditionality mechanisms, in 2006, Commission offered Visa Liberalization Agreement in exchange of the Readmission Agreement (RA). After that, when tailor-made benchmarks are achieved by WB states, Serbia, Montenegro and FYROM achieved visa free travel in 2009, whereas Albania and BiH achieved in 2010. It can be definitely said that 2010 was the highest point for EU support for Bosnia and Montenegro. However, it is not possible to argue the same for other countries. There is even decrease at the support for EU in Albania from 2009 to 2010 (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2009; Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2010).

Economic crisis is one of the main reasons of decline in support to the EU accession in WB especially when one considers that Balkan countries are affected from sovereign debt crisis highly due to their high dependence to the EU specifically to Germany, Greece and Italy. High unemployment (more than 20% in some of the countries) and contraction in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of WB countries questioned EU's transformative power as it happened in Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey's asymmetric interdependence is not as high as WB states.

When results are compared with Turkey overall, it can be said that at 2011, Turkey had lower support for EU membership compared to WB countries. Even Serbia which has lowest support among WB has a higher support than Turkey during last couple of years. At the both sides, youth is more pro-EU (Gallup, 2006-2011).


At the end of this chapter, it can be argued that, one can not look for WB states as a single entity while discussing about the support to EU membership. These countries have even quite different attitudes against EU. Nevertheless aspects such as crisis, political development and commitment of the citizens are common determinants which effects support differently.

2.3. Public Opinion at the EU on Enlargement: The Case of Turkey

Turkish accession issue has always been debated in academic and political circles in the EU. Tens of scholars have studied this subject. It is also debated in public as well. Indeed, it is a controversial matter. For Turkey, it is unlikely to accede into the EU with a strong opposition from the EU citizens. In this chapter, thesis gives background information on skepticism regarding Turkish accession to the EU. The thesis believes that the EU member states' public opinion is crucial for Turkey's accession. Aim of this chapter is to show the perception of Europeans to the Turkish accession and its main reasons.

Turkey is a candidate country since 1999 and negotiating accession since 2006. This chapter will cover time frame between 2000 and today to see evolution of support since Turkey's candidacy. Furthermore, available data is more systematic since that date.

Firstly there will be always a group of people who are always skeptical against Turkey's further integration with Europe due to different rationales. The first source will be Eurobarometer statistics again, since it is obviously the most systemic and coherent work to be used on the public opinion. Eurobarometer occasionally (unfortunately not regularly) asked to the public regarding if each country would be in favor or against accession and Turkey is included to the survey since it became an official candidate in 1999. The support fluctuates between 30% and 35% while there is an increasing tendency of opposition from 48% to 59% between 2000 and 2010. An interesting result from Eurobarometer (2003) is that 95% of the people have answered yes to "have you ever heard of Turkey?" question with highest percentage comparing with other candidate countries. Graph 9 shows public opinion in EU countries concerning Turkey's EU membership (Eurobarometer, 2000-2010).



When Turkey became an official candidate and started accession negotiations, some countries such as Austria and France have promised to make a referendum to approve Turkey’s membership at European Council (Akcapar and Chaibi, 2006). Until today throughout history of the EU, such a thing for enlargement only happened in France to approve or reject Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom’s (UK) membership in 1972. Nevertheless, outcome was positive. Now the main question is why is there such an opposition?

One of the most discussed reasons is the fear of Turkish mass immigration to the EU countries. This is conceptualized as “polish plumber”. In 2004, when Poland’s full membership date is determined, this concept created to symbolize cheap labor from CEEC by French comedian Philippe Val in *Charlie Hebdo* in a weekly satirical newspaper. The similar rhetoric is used for Turkey as well during the beginning of accession negotiations and is being used currently as well. Even today, there is a huge debate in (UK) since UK has to lift derogations to work and benefit from welfare system for Bulgarians and Romanians. Current estimates have shown that 100.000-150.000 people from Bulgaria and Romania living in the UK (The Guardian, 2013). According to Migration Watch (2013) during the next 5 years, it is

estimated that 250.000 Romanian and Bulgarian will move to the UK. Also studies argued that people coming from CEEC are benefiting from generous welfare systems in Western European countries especially in UK (Booth, Howard and Scarpetta, 2012). Even though still there is a long way for Turkey's membership, this will be one of the primary concerns of public in case of Turkish accession. This issue is also the reason of permanent derogation discussions for Turkey which means *de facto* privileged partnership rather than full membership.

It is also argued that Turkey is too big and its prospective power within EU institutions will create problems in decision making process in the EU. It is obvious that Turkey will be a challenge for EU institutions (Bac, 2004; Bac, 2008; Gordon and Taspinar, 2004; Baldwin and Widgren, M. 2005). Nonetheless, this argument is challenged in a study which claims that Turkey's influence will be narrow in case of membership and will not be a huge challenge (Pahre and Ucaray-Mangitli, 2011). About this issue, recent remarks of opinion leaders such Kemal Dervis, Vice President of the Brookings Institution and Prime Minister Erdogan have shown that, opinion leaders in Turkey nowadays keen to prefer a la carte Europe rather than one size. Another Eurosceptic member state in the EU may not be desirable for countries in the core of integration such as France and Germany in case of Turkey's accession (Dervis, 2012). Sure nobody knows future architecture of EU after the storm of the economic crisis is ceased.

Turkey's negative image in abroad specifically in Europe is also a considerable factor. According to one policy note, 93% of Germans believes that Islam is hostile and aggressive to woman (ESI, 2006). In Anholt – GfK Roper Nation Brand Index, Turkey's image was 34th among 40 countries in 2007 (Barysch, 2007). It is also found that when number of Turkish immigrations increase in a country, opposition against Turkish accession increases as well (Saz, 2011). Another study (Kemming and Sandikci, 2006) analyzed different dimensions of Turkey's image. Those dimensions are: tourism, economy, politics and people/culture. Stereotypes are playing a role in negative Turkish perception of EU citizens according to this study. Rise of far right also contributed negatively to Turkish image since public opinion is driven by political elites. Representatives of right and far right of political spectrum several times stated clearly that they oppose to Turkey's EU membership due to cultural and historical reasons. Some of those statements can be found (Karlsson, 2009).

When it comes to theories regarding Euroscepticism, a study found that citizens who oppose Turkey's accession are approaching the issue with identity related arguments while supporters view it with a post-national vision (Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2007).

McLaren has studied contemporary hostility against Turkish accession (McLaren, 2007). Study has been conducted with data acquired from Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer; 2000). (McLaren, 2007) analyzed opposition through two main concept; rational economic self-interest and perceived threat to group resources and way of life. Her study found that rational economic interests do not vary among different occupations and income levels in EU countries. Nonetheless, perceived threat to group resources and way of life is more significant in this theory. Large scale migration from Turkey to the EU countries is also one of the main perceived threats to group resources and way of life.

Reasons behind opposition to Turkish accession explained by another study with four different factors from Eurobarometer surveys: economic benefit of Turkish membership, cultural differences, political ideology and citizens' general attitude toward EU (Gerhards and Hans, 2011). Data is acquired through Eurobarometer surveys. (Eurobarometer, 2006; Eurobarometer, 2008). In this sense, study has found that national economy considerations and cultural differences have considerable effect on support or opposition to Turkey's accession. Furthermore, people who see themselves European and who trust EU institutions tend to support Turkey. Between 2006 and 2008, there is not any change on Turkish accession to the EU in terms of support level.

Before concluding this chapter, it is useful to see individual countries assessment briefly about Turkish accession to the EU. As it is mentioned Austria and France already promised a referendum on this issue. Furthermore, German public has a considerable opposition as well.

Project coordinated by Yilmaz from Bogazici University and a survey conducted with 5000 people from France, Germany, Poland, Spain and the UK in 2009. Participants stated that most important criteria to admit a new member are applicant's performance in democracy and human rights and possible contribution to Europe's economic development and welfare (Yilmaz, 2009). Furthermore, this study found that more than half of the European public shapes their opinion according to the political leaders and opinion leaders' view about Turkey. This proves that political elite drives public opinion and leadership is a crucial matter

in public opinion. Same study also revealed that, more than half of the respondents are against Turkish accession in France and Germany while more than half supports in Poland, UK and Spain. In all countries, young people between 18 and 24 years old tend to support Turkish accession more. When main factors against Turkish accession have been asked, leading answer is cultural factors with 40% and the economic and political factors are 27% and 26% respectively. Also public thought with a majority that Turkish people will immigrate to EU countries, Turkey will be too strong in decision-making process and Turkey will be big burden economically for the EU which are also factors that are explained at the beginning of this chapter.

In 2010 another study by Senyuva and Ustun (2010) attempted to outline how Turkey's EU bid is perceived by different member states between 2006 and 2009. This study argues that French opposition is following a stable trend. Moreover, opposition to Turkish accession is also closely related with general opposition to the enlargement.

Lastly, the table below will give some information regarding EU countries citizens' opinion on Turkish accession. These statistics are calculated by Gerhard and Hans (2011) from Eurobarometer surveys. Unfortunately, question related with Turkey's accession has not been asked regularly. Results have shown that in only 7 of the countries, citizens support Turkish accession with more than 50% according to the most recent data in 2008. Furthermore in key countries like Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany and Greece, a huge majority do not support Turkish accession. Hence, a negative result after a possible referendum in Austria and France would not be surprising in the short and medium term. Thesis will not go deeper into this subject since individual countries perceptions and their various reasons are not directly related with the aims of thesis. Table 1 shows support for Turkey's EU membership in each EU member state.

EU-27	2006	2008
Romania	78.3%	80.5%
Spain	49.5%	58.5%
Hungary	45.6%	53.4%
Bulgaria	58.5%	52.7%
Poland	48.9%	51.5%
Slovenia	44.7%	51.4%
Sweden	52.3%	50.9%
Portugal	50.7%	47.0%
Lithuania	44.0%	44.4%
Netherlands	38.9%	41.9%
UK	36.3%	41.7%
Ireland	38.3%	41.3%
Malta	39.4%	41.2%
Latvia	37.9%	40.0%
Estonia	32.0%	38.5%
Czech Republic	32.0%	38.5%
Belgium	36.0%	36.3%
Denmark	28.6%	34.5%
Finland	25.3%	32.4%
Slovakia	36.7%	31.2%
Italy	29.9%	29.8%
Greece	24.6%	21.7%
France	24.0%	21.2%
Luxembourg	17.7%	20.8%
Germany	17.1%	17.1%
Cyprus	19.9%	12.2%
Austria	5.6%	7.2%
Table 1. Support for EU Membership of Turkey		
Source: Gerhard and Hans (2011)		

From the literature review, it can be easily seen that public perception is one of the main challenges against Turkey within EU. To transform this longstanding relationship to full membership, both parties must explain clearly benefits of this process to their public and to each other as Jose Manuel Barroso, President of European Commission said in 2005: *“Europe must learn about Turkey. And Turkey must win hearts and minds of the European citizens”*.

3. SURVEY

3.1 Aim

There are numerous studies regarding different aspects of Turkey-EU relations. However, there is not sufficient study on public opinion in Turkey for the Turkish accession to the EU. Moreover, existing ones do not study exclusively on the young Turkish people's opinion which constitutes around 25% of the whole population with 18.848.407 people according to the Turkstat statistics (Turkstat, 2011).

Firstly young is defined differently by several studies. While UN and World Bank defined young people aged between 15 and 24, EU defined as young people aged between 15 and 29 (Gür, B.S., Dalmış, İ., Boz, N., Kirmizidag, N. and Celik, Z., 2012). This thesis defined young between 15 and 29 years of age as the EU. Since university students are our target group, we can say that our target group narrowed between 18 and 29 years old. University students in Istanbul are selected as target group because they will be leader of the future as decision makers and will shape countries' future in different areas such as business, politics, civil society etc. Furthermore, the university students in Istanbul naturally will have much more chance to be future decision-makers due to quality of the universities. Istanbul is also a magnificent melting pot since students are coming from very different parts of Turkey with very different backgrounds. This will provide us a great picture of university students in the country. Another reason of the selection is occupation of author which facilitates reaching university students. Note that results are not expected to be explanatory for whole population, even for whole youth in Turkey. Results are only explanatory for university students in Istanbul.

Even though there are some studies focused on Turkish youth, unfortunately there is very limited study solely focused on university student's expectations from the EU. Hence, this thesis perceives that while Turkey is in EU accession process and this process is expected to fasten starting from the 2013, looking for university students' opinion and economic expectations are important to understand university students' EU perceptions and their motives, specifically economic ones.

At this thesis, university students' expectations from the EU membership can be seen especially in terms of economic expectations. Economic expectations in case of

accession such as increasing Turkey's welfare, increasing personal welfare, tendency to go and live EU countries have special consideration. The thesis will also show knowledge level concerning the EU, support level to the EU accession and EU's image according to university students. All those determinants will be analyzed through also demographic features such as gender, income level, region where he/she were born etc.

This study is looking for the knowledge level of the university student regarding EU issues too. Knowledge level is tested through subjective and objective questions used by Eurobarometer. Since the last decade, the Turkish public knowledge level has always been lower than EU and EU candidate countries (Senyuva, 2006). Nevertheless, thesis is going to test this for university students in Istanbul which is a relatively higher educated part of the society. Hence a higher knowledge level than average can be expected.

When those are added all together, a clear picture of the university students' economic expectations from the EU, EU image, tendency to vote in a possible referendum, belief to Turkey's EU membership, tendency to go and live in the EU countries and knowledge level in terms of different demographic features will be revealed. This study differs from the previous studies by focusing solely on university students in Istanbul as target group and putting economic expectations at the centre of the study.

3.2 Research Method

Cross-sectional survey is conducted to get information at one point of time from the students. Thesis analyzed relationship between demographic features and university students' economic expectations from the EU, EU image, tendency to vote in a possible referendum, belief to Turkey's EU membership, tendency to go and live in the EU countries and knowledge level. Our method is compatible with our aims.

While developing most of the questions, we either take or are inspired from Eurobarometer questions. Same questions are also asked by other renowned surveys such as German Marshall Funds Transatlantic Trends.

Thesis assumes that university students have very diverse opinion and expectations from the EU in terms of support to the accession, image of the EU and economic expectations. Random sampling has been done through distributing survey in different

channels such as universities, youth organizations, mail groups etc. Main findings of the thesis also supported diversity of sample.

3.3 Population and sample

Turkish Student Selection and Placement Center (OSYM) 2011-2012 Higher Education Statistics states that there are 4.353.542 students in higher education in Turkey including distant education (OSYM, 2012). 401.780 of them are in 42 universities of Istanbul according to the same document which constitutes population of this thesis (OSYM, 2012). Sample of this survey is slightly more than 0.1% of the all university students in Istanbul.

When population is over 100.000, acceptable number of sample in a survey is 384 with 95% confidence level (Triola, 2010). Thesis reached slightly more than %0.1 of total population through 485 samples. Random sampling is used. Survey is conducted through internet and face to face meetings with university students in Istanbul. Author's network which he acquired through his occupation facilitates reaching enough number of university students.

3.4 Data

Survey has 17 questions. First 5 questions are aimed to determine demographic specifications of the students such as gender, age, region he/she is born, income and department which he/she studies. 6th, 7th and 8th questions are aimed to see students' objective and subjective knowledge level regarding the EU. 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th questions are aimed to look for support level to the EU membership and university students' belief about EU membership.

13th, 14th and 15th questions are about the economic expectations which are the base of the thesis. 16th and 17th questions are about young people's aspirations to work and study in the EU. Likert scale is used for 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th questions. Likert scale is a psychometric scale, one of the most common methods in researches, developed by Rensis Likert (Likert, 1932). Last question is about last remarks and communication in case attendee wants.

Through internet, we expected that students can answer more honestly since their identity will remain anonymous. Increasing internet penetration among youth also validates representativeness of the sample among population. Studies have shown that internet penetration among youth (aged between 16 and 24 and aged between 25 and 34) is 67.7% and 58.5% respectively. In Istanbul internet penetration is 60.6% (Turkstat, 2012).

Chi-square test is conducted to check if there is a relationship between two categorical variables. In our case thesis looks for a relationship between demographic features, support to the EU, tendency to go and live in the EU, knowledge level and economic expectations.

3.5 Reliability Test

To confirm questions' reliability, reliability-test on survey has been made with 485 university students. Data gathered between 11th January and 5th of March through internet. Survey is distributed through different networks which contains university students from Istanbul.

Cronbach's Alpha is used to test reliability of questions. According to Cronbach (1951) if alpha is;

$\alpha < 0.5$ Unacceptable

$0.5 < \alpha < 0.6$ Poor

$0.6 < \alpha < 0.7$ Questionable

$0.7 < \alpha < 0.8$ Acceptable

$0.8 < \alpha < 0.9$ Good

$0.9 < \alpha < 1$ Excellent

Generally alpha is considered meaningful if it is between 0.8 and 1 which means good or excellent reliability. At our reliability test on questions 13th, 14th and 15th which aimed to measure economic expectations, Cronbach alpha value is 0,784. Hence, reliability test below has shown that our value is highly acceptable and slightly lower to consider it as good.

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	Number of Items
,784	,782	3

Table 2. Reliability Statistics for Economic Expectations

3.6 Hypothesis

Hypothesis are constructed to see relationship between demographic features of the university students in Istanbul and perceptions of the EU membership under different sub topics such as economic expectations, knowledge level regarding EU, image of the EU, support to the EU accession, belief to the EU accession and tendency to study and work in the EU. From the previous studies which are mentioned at the literature review chapter, we knew that features such as different income levels, region where he/she born etc. could affect young people's opinions differently. Hence, testing different hypothesis will be useful to analyze university students' expectations from the EU, specifically economic expectations.

Hypothesis constructed are tested below. Pearson's Chi-square method is used to test whether there is a relationship or not between two different categorical variables.

H₀1: University students' subjective knowledge level and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H₁₁: University students' subjective knowledge level and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H₀₂: University students' income and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H₁₂: University students' income and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H₀₃: University students' EU image and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H₁₃: University students' EU image and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H₀₄: University students' region where he/she born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H₁₄: University students' region where he/she born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H₀₅: University students' belief to Turkish accession to EU and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H₁₅: University students' belief to Turkish accession to EU and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H₀₆: University students tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H₆₁: University students tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H₀₇: University students' income and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H₁₇: University students' income and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H8₀: University students' region where he/she born and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H8₁: University students' region where he/she born and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H9₀: University students' tendencies to vote yes in a possible referendum and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H9₁: University students' tendencies to vote yes in a possible referendum and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H10₀: University students tendency to live and work in EU countries and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H10₁: University students tendency to live and work in EU countries and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H11₀: University students' income level and their EU image have no relationship.

H11₁: University students' income level and their EU image have a relationship.

H12₀: University students' income level and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum have no relationship.

H12₁: University students' income level and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum have a relationship.

H13₀: University students' income level and their belief to Turkey's EU accession have no relationship.

H13₁: University students' income level and their belief to Turkey's EU accession have a relationship.

H14₀: University students' income level and their tendency to go and live in the EU countries have no relationship.

H14₁: University students' income level and their tendency to go and live in the EU countries have a relationship.

H₀15: University students' region where they have born and their perception on EU's image have no relationship.

H₁15: University students' region where they have born and their perception on EU's image have a relationship.

H₀16: University students' region where they have born and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum concerning Turkey's EU accession have no relationship.

H₁16: University students' region where they have born and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum concerning Turkey's EU accession have a relationship.

H₀17: University students' region where they have born and their tendency to go and live in EU countries have no relationship.

H₁17: University students' region where they have born and their tendency to go and live in EU countries have a relationship.

H₀18: University students' gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship

H₁18: University students' gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H₀19: University students' gender and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship

H₁19: University students' gender and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

H₀20: University students' gender and their perception on EU's image have no relationship.

H₁20: University students' gender and their perception on EU's image have a relationship.


H₀21: University students' gender and their belief to the Turkey's EU membership have no relationship.

H₁₂₁: University students' gender and their belief to the Turkey's EU membership have a relationship.


3.7 Main Findings and Hypothesis Testing

This section starts with main findings of the survey. Firstly demographic features of the attendants are demonstrated. After that, their answers to specific questions such as economic expectations from the EU, EU image, tendency to vote in a possible referendum, belief to Turkey's EU membership, tendency to go and live in the EU countries and knowledge level have been shown. After showing main findings of survey, results of the hypothesis testing have been discussed.


Attendants are mostly between 18 and 24 years of age since majority of university students are also at this range. 76.91% (373) of the attendants are between 18 and 24 years old while 23.09% (112) are between 25 and 29. Graph 10 show ages of the attendants.




Gender is also evenly distributed as well. 45.57% (221) of the attendants are male while 54.43% (264) of them are female. Graph 11 shows attendants' gender.




University students are mostly studying social sciences, engineering and natural sciences. 54.43% (272) are studying social sciences, 32.36% (157) studying engineering and natural sciences which constitute more than 85% of the attendants. 3.73%’s of the students’ study field is fine arts (18) while 1.85% (9) are studying medicine and health sciences, 3.50% (17) are in literature and linguistics while 2.89% (14) of them are studying in other fields. 1.24% (6) of the students do not want to reveal what they are studying. Graph 12 shows attendants’ field of study.




Income is distributed evenly and it can be considered that roughly 75% of the attendants are from middle class families between 1000 and 5000TL income. 10.52% (51) can be considered lower income with under 1000TL income while 46.80% have been between 1000 and 2500TL (227) income monthly and can be considered as lower middle income. 30.10% (146) of the attendants have between 2500 and 5000TL monthly income as upper middle income and only 12.58% (61) of them have more than 5000TL income per month. Graph 13 shows attendants' income level.




Attendants mostly born in Marmara region (Istanbul, East Marmara and West Marmara) since region consists 24.106.776 while 75.627.384 is whole Turkey's population (Turkstat, 2013). Survey takes place in Istanbul and it is natural to reach more people who were born in Marmara region comparing to other parts of country which is 59.38% (288) of all attendants. Furthermore number of people between 15 and 29 in the region is 5.944.314 which is 25% of the whole population (Turkstat, 2013). 7.22% of the attendants are born in Aegean (35) region, 7,01% (34) of them born in Blacksea, 11,55% (56) of them born in Central Anatolia, 4,74% (23) of them were born in East Anatolia, 7.22% (35) of them born in Mediterranean region of Turkey while only 2,89% (14) of them were born in Southeastern Anatolia. Graph 14 shows attendants region where he/she were born.




Knowledge level of the university students' regarding the EU is divided into subjective and objective knowledge. Firstly to measure subjective knowledge of university students, this statement is asked them: "I know how EU functions (decision making system, institutional structure etc.)". 53.81% (260) of the attendants said yes to this question while 46.19% (224) of them said no. Graph 15 shows university students' answer to the statement "I know how EU functions (decision-making, structure etc.)".



On objective knowledge level, two statements have been given to measure knowledge. First was European Union will have 28 member states with Croatia's accession to the EU. 74.43% (361) of the attendants said yes to this statement while 25.57% (124) of them said no. Graph 16 shows university students' answer to the statement "EU will have 28 Members with Croatia's Accession".




Next statement was "Switzerland is an EU member state". 72.16% (350) of students said no to this statement while 27.84% (135) of them said yes. Even though general public's knowledge level is below average than other EU member states, in these questions it is seen that majority of university students have known basic facts about the EU. Graph 17 shows university students' answer to the statement "Switzerland is an EU Member".




When young people are asked about the image of the EU, 47.22% (229) of them choose neither positive nor negative as an answer. 27.84% (135) of attendants have chosen positive while 15.46% (75) of them have chosen negative. Only a tiny proportion, 3.92% (19) and 5.57% (27) sees it totally positive and totally negative respectively. Even though neutral answers are the majority, positive EU perception is still higher than negative. Thus, it can be said that university students' perception is mixed due to reasons explained at the literature review section such as euro crisis⁵, increasing self-confidence of Turkey parallel with opening up to the other countries, Arab Spring and increasing reputation of Turkey in the MENA region, growing mistrust against the EU, mixed signals from political elites to public, stalemate at the relations due to Cyprus issue and some member states governments' relentless objection against Turkey. Neutral 47.22% will be important in terms of its distribution through positive or negative perception in the future. Graph 18 shows EU's image among university students' in Istanbul.


⁵ Even though euro crisis affect Turkey negatively as well since there are strong economic ties between both parties.




University students are also asked about whether they see EU membership is a good thing or not. 42.27% (205) of them answered yes to the statement “I believe that EU membership will be beneficial for Turkey” while 29.28% (142) of them said no. 24.95% (121) have chosen neither good nor bad while 3.51% (17) have no idea about the issue. This question supported the argument that young people still perceive EU membership beneficial for Turkey even though a significant number of them perceive EU negatively or neutrally. Graph 19 shows whether university students’ see EU membership is a good thing or not.



If today there would be a referendum concerning Turkey's EU membership, 56.08% (272) of attendants would say yes. 35.67% (173) stated that they will say no while 8.25% (40) do not have an idea. Graph 20 shows voting tendencies of university students in case of a referendum.




When it comes to the belief to Turkey's EU membership, only 28.25% (137) of university students believe that Turkey will ever be an EU member. 58.56% (284) of them do not believe it while 13.22% (64) of attendants have no idea. Though university students still support Turkey's EU membership bid with a majority, they do not believe in Turkey's EU membership possibility. Controversial and long negotiation process created an increasing distrust against EU as seen in previous surveys (Senyuva, 2009; USAK, 2006). For instance, in 2010 and 2011 only 21% and 22% of Turks tend to trust in EU respectively, while EU average was 41% and 43% in terms of trust to the EU (Eurobarometer, 2010; Eurobarometer, 2011). Graph 21 shows university students' belief to the EU membership below.




Those results provoke some thoughts when we consider them all together. Even though only 30% of university students perceive EU as a positive or total positive thing, 56% of them would say yes in a possible referendum while 42% of them think it is a good thing for Turkey. This is a signal that students' approach EU pragmatically even though they do not perceive it as a good thing as can be seen in Graph 19.

Regarding economic expectations, three statements are presented to university students. First one is "If Turkey will be an EU member, Turkey's welfare will be increased". A small majority of attendants said "I disagree" as an answer with 29.28%.


28.87% of attendants agree with the statement, 27.63% neither agree nor disagree, 9.69% totally agree while 4.54% totally disagree. Graph 22 shows university students' answer to the statement "If Turkey will be an EU Member, Turkey's Welfare will be Increased".




At the second statement, this time the statement was "EU means welfare for me". 29.69% (144) of the attendants have chosen disagree as answer while 26.19% (127) of them have chosen agree. Neither agree nor disagree option is selected by 26.80% (130) of the attendants. 7.22% (35) of them totally agree while 10.10% (49) attendants totally disagree. Graph 23 shows university students' answer to the statement "EU means welfare for me".




Last statement is “EU means employment for me”. 34.16% (165) of attendants have chosen agree while 24.64% (119) of them disagree. 29.19% (141) neither agree nor disagree while 8.07% (39) and 3.93% (19) of them totally agree and disagree respectively. There is a rather balanced result on university students’ economic expectations from the EU. Economic crisis, fast economic growth in Turkey which increased self-confidence of Turkey can be considered as main reasons behind this since declining Europe rhetoric is widely used in media and politics. Graph 24 shows university students’ answer to the statement “EU means employment for me”.



At the last part of the survey, university students' tendency to go and live in the EU countries is asked them through two statements. First one is "I would like to study in EU countries during next few years" while second is "I would like to live and work in EU countries during next few years". In the results of the first statement, it can be seen that young people would like to be in EU countries. 42.27% (205) stated that they totally agree with first statement while 40.41% (196) of them agree. Only 8.66% (42) of university students are neutral and 6.39% (31) disagree while 2.27% (11) of them totally disagree. Graph 25 shows university students' answer to the statement "I would like to study in EU countries during next years".



In the results of the second statement, still majority of young people would like to live and work in EU countries even though it is less than the desire to study. 34.23% (166) and 35.05% (170) of the university students would like to live and work in EU countries by stating that they totally agree or agree in this statement. 14.02% (68) of them neither agree nor disagree while 12.16% (59) and 4.54% (22) of university students disagree and totally disagree respectively. Graph 26 shows university students' answer to the statement "I would like to live and work in EU countries".



After main findings of our survey, twenty one hypotheses are tested to see if there is a relationship between economic expectations, image of the EU, demographic features, support to the EU, knowledge level concerning the EU and tendency to go and live in the EU.

Our first hypothesis looks for a relationship between subjective knowledge of university students on EU and their perception on Turkey’s welfare in case of EU membership. Table 3 shows cross tabulation of subjective knowledge level of university students and their perception on Turkey’s welfare in case of EU membership. According to Table 4, Pearson Chi-Square and p value for H_01 is 9.042 and 0.060 respectively. Since p value (0.060) is slightly higher than confidence level (0.05) we fail to reject our hypothesis for H_01 which practically means we can not find any significant relationship between those two variables.

H_01 : University students’ subjective knowledge level and their perception on Turkey’s welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H₁1: University students' in subjective knowledge level and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

			I know functioning of the EU (decision-making, structure etc.)		Total	
			NO	YES		
Turkey's welfare will be increased if Turkey would be an EU member	Totally agree	Count	16	31	47	
		Expected Count	21,7	25,3	47,0	
	Agree	Count	55	85	140	
		Expected Count	64,7	75,3	140,0	
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	69	66	135	
		Expected Count	62,4	72,6	135,0	
	Disagree	Count	74	67	141	
		Expected Count	65,1	75,9	141,0	
	Totally Disagree	Count	10	12	22	
		Expected Count	10,2	11,8	22,0	
	Total		Count	224	261	485
			Expected Count	224,0	261,0	485,0

Table 3. Cross tabulation of subjective knowledge level of university students and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9,042	4	,060
Likelihood Ratio	9,122	4	,058
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 4. Chi-square test between subjective knowledge level of university students and their support to the statement about economic expectations

Second hypothesis tests whether there is a relationship or not between university students' income and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Table 5 shows cross tabulation of monthly income of university students and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Furthermore, Table 6 shows Pearson's Chi-square (12.739) and p value (0.388) between university students' income and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Since our p value (0.388) is significantly higher than confidence level (0.05), we fail to reject this hypothesis H_20 . Thus, relationship can not be found between monthly income of university students and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Income of university students' does not play any role in their perception of Turkey's welfare in case EU membership.

H_02 : University students' income and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_12 : University students' income and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

		Monthly income of either you or your family				Total	
		Under 1000TL	Between 1000TL and 2500TL	Between 2500TL and 5000TL	Over 5000TL		
Total		Count	51	227	146	61	485
		Expected Count	51,0	227,0	146,0	61,0	485,0
Turkey's welfare will be increased if Turkey would be an EU member	Totally agree	Count	5	22	11	9	47
		Expected Count	4,9	22,0	14,1	5,9	47,0
	Agree	Count	17	53	51	19	140
		Expected Count	14,7	65,5	42,1	17,6	140,0
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	17	68	37	13	135
		Expected Count	14,2	63,2	40,6	17,0	135,0
	Disagree	Count	10	73	42	16	141
		Expected Count	14,8	66,0	42,4	17,7	141,0
	Totally disagree	Count	2	11	5	4	22
		Expected Count	2,3	10,3	6,6	2,8	22,0

Table 5. Cross tabulation of monthly income of university students and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12,739	12	,388
Likelihood Ratio	12,812	12	,383
Linear-by-Linear Association	,372	1	,542
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 6. Chi-square test between monthly income of university students and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

Third hypothesis is looking for a relationship between university students EU image and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Table 7 shows

cross tabulation of EU image of university students and their perceptions on Turkey's welfare in case of membership. Table 8 shows Pearson's chi-square (375.14) and p value (~0.000) between university students EU image and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Since our p value (~0.000) is lower than confidence level (0.05), we reject H_03 . This proves that there is a relationship between university students' EU image and perception of Turkey's welfare in case of membership.

H_03 : University students' EU image and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_13 : University students' EU image and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

			How is EU's image in your perception?					Total
			Totally positive	Positive	Neither positive nor negative	Negative	Totally negative	
Turkey's welfare will be increased if Turkey would be an EU member	Totally agree	Count	15	20	8	3	1	47
		Expected Count	2,0	12,8	22,3	7,2	2,7	47,0
	Agree	Count	5	67	61	6	1	140
		Expected Count	6,1	38,1	66,4	21,4	8,1	140,0
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	1	30	88	12	4	135
		Expected Count	5,8	36,7	64,0	20,6	7,8	135,0
	Disagree	Count	0	15	71	48	7	141
		Expected Count	6,1	38,4	66,9	21,5	8,1	141,0
	Totally disagree	Count	0	0	2	5	15	22
		Expected Count	1,0	6,0	10,4	3,4	1,3	22,0
	Total	Count	21	132	230	74	28	485
		Expected Count	21,0	132,0	230,0	74,0	28,0	485,0

Table 7. Cross tabulation of university students EU image and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	375,140	16	,000
Likelihood Ratio	246,843	16	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	162,439	1	,000
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 8. Chi-square test between university students EU image and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

Fourth hypothesis is looking for a relation between where university students were born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Table 9 shows cross tabulation of region where university students were born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of membership. Table 10 shows Pearson's chi-square (18.548) and p value (0.776). Since our p value (0.776) is significantly higher than our confidence level 0.05, we fail to reject H_04 . Thus, for this study one can say that there is not any relationship between where university students were born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of membership. Nevertheless since 59.38% of the students were born in Marmara region in our survey, with a region specific study with higher number of sample this result can be changed.

H_04 : University students' region where he/she born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_14 : University students' region where he/she born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

			Total	Region where university students have born						
				Mediterranean	Aegean	East Anatolia	Southeast Anatolia	Central Anatolia	Blacksea	Mar- mara
Turkey's welfare will be increased if Turkey would be an EU member	Totally agree	Count	47	3	7	3	3	6	2	23
		Expected Count	47,0	3,3	3,5	2,2	1,4	5,4	3,3	27,9
	Agree	Count	140	12	7	6	5	13	12	85
		Expected Count	140,0	9,8	10,4	6,6	4,0	16,2	9,8	83,1
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	135	8	12	6	3	15	11	80
		Expected Count	135,0	9,5	10,0	6,4	3,9	15,6	9,5	80,2
	Disagree	Count	141	9	10	7	2	20	6	87
		Expected Count	141,0	9,9	10,5	6,7	4,1	16,3	9,9	83,7
	Totally disagree	Count	22	2	0	1	1	2	3	13
		Expected Count	22,0	1,5	1,6	1,0	,6	2,5	1,5	13,1
	Total	Count	485	34	36	23	14	56	34	288
		Expected Count	485,0	34,0	36,0	23,0	14,0	56,0	34,0	288,0

Table 9. Cross tabulation of university students region where they have born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18,548	24	,776
Likelihood Ratio	19,180	24	,742
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,444	1	,230
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 10. Chi-square test between university students region where they have born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership

Fifth hypothesis tests relationship between university students' belief to Turkey's EU accession and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Table 11 shows cross tabulation of university students' belief to Turkey's EU Accession and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Table 12 shows Pearson's Chi-square (41,635) and p value (0,000). Since p value is lower than confidence

level (0.05) we reject H_05 . Thus, we can say that there is a relationship between belief to the Turkey's EU accession and perception of Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

H_05 : University students' belief to Turkish accession to EU and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_15 : University students' belief to Turkish accession to EU and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

		Belief to Turkey's EU Accession			Total		
		Yes	No	No Idea			
Turkey's welfare will be increased if Turkey would be an EU member	Totally Agree	Count	22	22	3	47	
		Expected Count	13,9	26,9	6,2	47,0	
	Agree	Count	51	75	14	140	
		Expected Count	41,3	80,2	18,5	140,0	
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	32	68	35	135	
		Expected Count	39,8	77,4	17,8	135,0	
	Disagree	Count	31	99	11	141	
		Expected Count	41,6	80,8	18,6	141,0	
	Totally disagree	Count	7	14	1	22	
		Expected Count	6,5	12,6	2,9	22,0	
	Total		Count	143	278	64	485
			Expected Count	143,0	278,0	64,0	485,0

Table 11. Cross tabulation of university students' belief to Turkey's EU Accession and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic. Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41,635	8	,000
Likelihood Ratio	38,734	8	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	5,538	1	,019
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 12. Chi-square test between university students belief to Turkey's EU accession and their perception of Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

Sixth hypothesis tests relationship between university students' tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Table 13 shows cross tabulation of university students' tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare. Table 14 shows results of chi-square test between university students' tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare. Pearson chi-square between two variables is 195.271 while p value is 0,000. Since p value is lower than our confidence level 0.05 we reject H_{06} . This demonstrates that there is a relationship between students' tendency to vote yes in a referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare.

H_{06} : University students tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_{16} : University students tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

			Voting tendencies in a possible referendum			Total	
			Yes	No	No idea		
Turkey's welfare will be increased if Turkey would be an EU member	Totally agree	Count	44	3	0	47	
		Expected Count	26,1	17,1	3,9	47,0	
	Agree	Count	120	15	5	140	
		Expected Count	77,6	50,8	11,5	140,0	
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	70	40	25	135	
		Expected Count	74,9	49,0	11,1	135,0	
	Disagree	Count	32	99	10	141	
		Expected Count	78,2	51,2	11,6	141,0	
	Totally disagree	Count	3	19	0	22	
		Expected Count	12,2	8,0	1,8	22,0	
	Total		Count	269	176	40	485
			Expected Count	269,0	176,0	40,0	485,0

Table 13. Cross tabulation of university students' tendency to vote in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	195,271	8	,000
Likelihood Ratio	204,946	8	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	100,659	1	,000
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 14. Chi-square test between university students voting tendencies in a possible referendum and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership

Seventh hypothesis tests university students' income and their perception on their own welfare in case of Turkey's EU membership. Table 15 shows cross tabulation between university students' income and their perception on their own welfare in case of Turkey's EU membership. Table 16 shows Pearson's Chi-square (11.579) and p value (0.48). Since p value is higher than 0.05 it fails to reject H_07 . This shows us there is no relationship between university students' income and their perception on their own welfare in case of Turkey's EU membership. Regardless of their income, university students tend to agree, disagree or stay neutral in this issue since there is not a dominant perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

H_07 : University students' income and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_17 : University students' income and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

			University students' income				Total
			Under 1000TL	Between 1000TL and 2500TL	Between 2500TL and 5000TL	Over 5000TL	
EU means welfare for me	Totally agree	Count	4	19	7	7	37
		Expected Count	3,9	17,3	11,1	4,7	37,0
	Agree	Count	18	54	42	13	127
		Expected Count	13,4	59,4	38,2	16,0	127,0
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	13	58	42	18	131
		Expected Count	13,8	61,3	39,4	16,5	131,0
	Disagree	Count	11	76	40	14	141
		Expected Count	14,8	66,0	42,4	17,7	141,0
	Totally disagree	Count	5	20	15	9	49
		Expected Count	5,2	22,9	14,8	6,2	49,0
	Total	Count	51	227	146	61	485
		Expected Count	51,0	227,0	146,0	61,0	485,0

Table 15. Cross tabulation university students' income and their perception on their own welfare in case of Turkey's EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11,579	12	,480
Likelihood Ratio	11,472	12	,489
Linear-by-Linear Association	,333	1	,564
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 16. Chi-square test between university students' income and their perception on their own welfare in case of Turkey's EU membership.

Our next hypothesis is looking for a relationship between regions where university students were born and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership. Table 17 shows cross tabulation of region where university students were born and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership. Table 18 shows Pearson's Chi-square (23.097) and p value (0,514). Since our p value is higher than 0.05 confidence level, we fail to reject H_0 . This demonstrates there is not any relationship between region where university students were born and their perception on their own welfare as in H_0 which looked for a relationship between region where university students' were born and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of membership. Our limitation in H_0 applies here as well since our sample is mostly born in Marmara region.

H_{0} : University students' region where he/she born and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_{1} : University students' region where he/she born and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

			Region where university students have born							Total
			Mediterranean	Aegean	East Anatolia	Southeast Anatolia	Central Anatolia	Blacksea	Marmara	
EU means welfare for me	Totally agree	Count	2	4	2	3	7	1	18	37
		Expected Count	2,6	2,7	1,8	1,1	4,3	2,6	22,0	37,0
	Agree	Count	10	8	4	6	12	10	77	127
		Expected Count	8,9	9,4	6,0	3,7	14,7	8,9	75,4	127,0
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	8	9	6	2	11	13	82	131
		Expected Count	9,2	9,7	6,2	3,8	15,1	9,2	77,8	131,0
	Disagree	Count	12	12	6	2	19	6	84	141
		Expected Count	9,9	10,5	6,7	4,1	16,3	9,9	83,7	141,0
	Totally disagree	Count	2	3	5	1	7	4	27	49
		Expected Count	3,4	3,6	2,3	1,4	5,7	3,4	29,1	49,0
	Total	Count	34	36	23	14	56	34	288	485
		Expected Count	34,0	36,0	23,0	14,0	56,0	34,0	288,0	485,0

Table 17. Cross tabulation between region where university students have born and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23,097	24	,514
Likelihood Ratio	21,709	24	,597
Linear-by-Linear Association	,015	1	,904
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 18. Chi-square test between region where university students have born and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

Our ninth hypothesis looks for a relationship between university students' tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on their own welfare in

case of Turkey's EU membership. Table 19 shows cross tabulation between university students' tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on their own welfare. Table 20 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square (125.177) tests and p value (0.000). Since p value is lower than confidence level (0.05) we reject H_0 . Thus, there is a relationship between university students' tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on their own welfare. This also can be seen from cross tabulation at table 24.

H_0 : University students' tendencies to vote yes in a possible referendum and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_1 : University students' tendencies to vote yes in a possible referendum and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

		Voting tendencies in a possible referendum			Total		
		Yes	No	No idea			
EU means welfare for me	Totally agree	Count	31	6	0	37	
		Expected Count	20,5	13,4	3,1	37,0	
	Agree	Count	103	19	5	127	
		Expected Count	70,4	46,1	10,5	127,0	
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	80	32	19	131	
		Expected Count	72,7	47,5	10,8	131,0	
	Disagree	Count	47	81	13	141	
		Expected Count	78,2	51,2	11,6	141,0	
	Totally disagree	Count	8	38	3	49	
		Expected Count	27,2	17,8	4,0	49,0	
	Total		Count	269	176	40	485
			Expected Count	269,0	176,0	40,0	485,0

Table 19. Cross tabulation between university students' tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	125,177	8	,000
Likelihood Ratio	130,455	8	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	70,978	1	,000
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 20. Chi-square test between university students' tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and their perception on their own welfare.

Tenth hypothesis tests if there is a relationship between university students' tendency to live and work in EU countries and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership. Table 21 shows cross tabulation between university students' tendency to live and work in EU countries and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership. Table 22 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square (136.982) tests and p value (0.000). Since our p value is lower than confidence level (0.05) we reject H_{010} . This demonstrates us there is a relationship between university students' tendency to live and work in EU countries and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

H_{010} : University students tendency to live and work in EU countries and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship.

H_{110} : University students tendency to live and work in EU countries and perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

			I would like to live and work in EU countries during next few years					Total
			Totally agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Totally disagree	
EU means welfare for me	Totally agree	Count	28	6	3	0	0	37
		Expected Count	12,7	13,0	5,2	4,6	1,4	37,0
	Agree	Count	65	42	10	7	3	127
		Expected Count	43,7	44,8	17,8	15,7	5,0	127,0
	Neither agree nor disagree	Count	44	55	17	13	2	131
		Expected Count	45,1	46,2	18,4	16,2	5,1	131,0
	Disagree	Count	25	57	27	29	3	141
		Expected Count	48,6	49,7	19,8	17,4	5,5	141,0
	Totally disagree	Count	5	11	11	11	11	49
		Expected Count	16,9	17,3	6,9	6,1	1,9	49,0
	Total	Count	167	171	68	60	19	485
		Expected Count	167,0	171,0	68,0	60,0	19,0	485,0

Table 21. Cross tabulation between university students' tendency to go and live in EU countries and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	136,982	16	,000
Likelihood Ratio	121,474	16	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	89,363	1	,000
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 22. Chi-square test between university students' tendency to go and live in EU countries and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

After ten hypotheses which looked for economic expectations, now we are going to compare different issues such as EU image, tendency to go and live in the EU and voting yes in a possible referendum with demographic aspects. Our eleventh hypothesis looks for a relationship between university students' income level and their EU image's. Table 23 shows cross tabulation between university students region where they born and their EU image. Table 24 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square (9.148) tests and p value (0.69). Since p value is higher than confidence level we fail to reject H_0 . Hence there is no relationship between university students' income level and their EU image's.

H_0 : University students' income level and their EU image have no relationship.

H_1 : University students' income level and their EU image have a relationship.

			How is EU's image in your perception?					Total
			Totally positive	Positive	Neither positive nor negative	Negative	Totally negative	
Income	Under 1000TL	Count	1	19	24	6	1	51
		Expected Count	2,2	13,9	24,2	7,8	2,9	51,0
	Between 1000TL and 2500TL	Count	9	59	111	33	15	227
		Expected Count	9,8	61,8	107,6	34,6	13,1	227,0
	Between 2500TL and 5000TL	Count	7	35	72	25	7	146
		Expected Count	6,3	39,7	69,2	22,3	8,4	146,0
	Over 5000TL	Count	4	19	23	10	5	61
		Expected Count	2,6	16,6	28,9	9,3	3,5	61,0
	Total	Count	21	132	230	74	28	485
		Expected Count	21,0	132,0	230,0	74,0	28,0	485,0

Table 23. Cross tabulation between university students' income level and their EU image's.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9,148	12	,690
Likelihood Ratio	9,524	12	,658
Linear-by-Linear Association	,267	1	,605
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 24. Chi-square test between university students' income level and their EU image.

Twelfth hypothesis tests relationship between university students' income level and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum. Table 25 shows cross tabulation between university students' income level and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum. Table 26 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square (3.597) test and p value (0.731). Since p value is higher than confidence level (0.05), we fail to reject H_0 12. There is no relationship between income level and voting tendencies in a possible referendum.

H_0 12: University students' income level and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum have no relationship.

H_1 12: University students' income level and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum have a relationship.

			Voting tendencies in a possible referendum			Total
			Yes	No	No idea	
Income	Under 1000TL	Count	31	14	6	51
		Expected Count	28,3	18,5	4,2	51,0
	Between 1000TL and 2500TL	Count	122	87	18	227
		Expected Count	125,9	82,4	18,7	227,0
	Between 2500TL and 5000TL	Count	85	50	11	146
		Expected Count	81,0	53,0	12,0	146,0
	Over 5000TL	Count	31	25	5	61
		Expected Count	33,8	22,1	5,0	61,0
Total		Count	269	176	40	485
		Expected Count	269,0	176,0	40,0	485,0

Table 25. Cross tabulation between university students' income level and their voting tendencies in a possible referendum.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3,597 ^a	6	,731
Likelihood Ratio	3,592	6	,732
Linear-by-Linear Association	,015	1	,903
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 26. Chi-square test between university students' income level and their voting tendencies in a possible referendum.

Thirteenth hypothesis tests relationship between university students' income level and their belief to EU membership. Table 27 shows cross tabulation between university students' income level and their belief to EU membership. Table 28 shows results of Pearson Chi-square tests (10.162) and p value (0.118). Since p value is higher than confidence level (0.05), we reject $H_{13}0$. Thus, there is no relationship between university students' income level and their belief to Turkey's EU accession.

H_{013} : University students' income level and their belief to Turkey's EU accession have no relationship.

H₁₃: University students' income level and their belief to Turkey's EU accession have a relationship

		Belief to Turkey's EU accession			Total		
		Yes	No	No idea			
Income	Under 1000TL	Count	16	24	11	51	
		Expected Count	15,0	29,2	6,7	51,0	
	Between 1000TL and 2500TL	Count	56	139	32	227	
		Expected Count	66,9	130,1	30,0	227,0	
	Between 2500TL and 5000TL	Count	50	83	13	146	
		Expected Count	43,0	83,7	19,3	146,0	
	Over 5000TL	Count	21	32	8	61	
		Expected Count	18,0	35,0	8,0	61,0	
	Total		Count	143	278	64	485
			Expected Count	143,0	278,0	64,0	485,0

Table 27. Cross tabulation between university students' income level and their belief to EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10,162	6	,118
Likelihood Ratio	10,063	6	,122
Linear-by-Linear Association	3,720	1	,054
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 28. Chi-square test between university students income level and their belief to Turkey's EU accession

At fourteenth hypothesis, relationship between university students' income level and their tendency to go and live in the EU countries will be tested. Table 29 shows cross

tabulation between university students' income level and their tendency to go and live in the EU countries. Table 30 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square test (17.515) and p value (0.131) between university students' income level and their tendency to go and live in the EU countries. Since p value is higher than confidence level (0.05) we fail to reject H_{140} . Thus there is no relationship between income and university students' tendency to go and live in the EU. Regardless of income, most of the university students' would like to live in EU countries.

H_{014} : University students' income level and their tendency to go and live in the EU countries have no relationship.

H_{114} : University students' income level and their tendency to go and live in the EU countries have a relationship.

			I would like to live and work in EU countries during next few years					Total	
			Totally agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Totally disagree		
Income	Under 1000TL	Count	23	21	6	1	0	51	
		Expected Count	17,6	18,0	7,2	6,3	2,0	51,0	
	Between 1000TL and 2500TL	Count	81	71	37	28	10	227	
		Expected Count	78,2	80,0	31,8	28,1	8,9	227,0	
	Between 2500TL and 5000TL	Count	45	56	14	24	7	146	
		Expected Count	50,3	51,5	20,5	18,1	5,7	146,0	
	Over 5000TL	Count	18	23	11	7	2	61	
		Expected Count	21,0	21,5	8,6	7,5	2,4	61,0	
	Total		Count	167	171	68	60	19	485
			Expected Count	167,0	171,0	68,0	60,0	19,0	485,0

Table 29. Cross tabulation between university students' income level and their tendency to go and live in the EU.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17,515	12	,131
Likelihood Ratio	21,834	12	,039
Linear-by-Linear Association	4,321	1	,038
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 30. Chi-square test between university students' income level and their tendency to go and live in EU countries.

Fifteenth hypothesis looks for relationship between region where university students have born and their perception on EU's image. Table 31 shows cross tabulation between region where university students have born and their perception on EU's image. Table 32 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square test (36.535) and p value (0.049) between region where university students have born and their perception on EU's image. Since p value is lower than confidence level (0.05) we reject H_{015} . This shows us there is a relationship between university students' region where they were born and their EU image.

H_{015} : University students' region where they have born and their perception on EU's image have no relationship.

H_{115} : University students' region where they have born and their perception on EU's image have a relationship.

			How is EU's image in your perception?					Total
			Totally positive	Positive	Neither positive nor negative	Negative	Totally negative	
Region where university students have born	Mediterranean	Count	0	13	14	3	4	34
		Expected Count	1,5	9,3	16,1	5,2	2,0	34,0
	Aegean	Count	2	11	19	3	1	36
		Expected Count	1,6	9,8	17,1	5,5	2,1	36,0
	East Anatolia	Count	1	6	11	3	2	23
		Expected Count	1,0	6,3	10,9	3,5	1,3	23,0
	Southeast Anatolia	Count	4	4	3	3	0	14
		Expected Count	,6	3,8	6,6	2,1	,8	14,0
	Central Anatolia	Count	3	15	24	10	4	56
		Expected Count	2,4	15,2	26,6	8,5	3,2	56,0
	Blacksea	Count	1	5	18	8	2	34
		Expected Count	1,5	9,3	16,1	5,2	2,0	34,0
	Marmara	Count	10	78	141	44	15	288
		Expected Count	12,5	78,4	136,6	43,9	16,6	288,0
	Total	Count	21	132	230	74	28	485
		Expected Count	21,0	132,0	230,0	74,0	28,0	485,0

Table 31. Cross tabulation between university students' region where they have born and their perception on EU's image.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	36,535	24	,049
Likelihood Ratio	28,610	24	,235
Linear-by-Linear Association	,705	1	,401
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 32. Chi-square test between university students region where they have born and their perception on EU's image.

Sixteenth hypothesis looks for relationship between region where university students have born and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum concerning Turkey's EU accession. Table 33 shows cross tabulation between region where university students have born and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum. Table 34 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square test (11.511) and p value (0.486) between region where university students have born and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum. Since our p value is significantly higher than confidence level (0.05) we fail to reject H_{016} . This indicates us there is not any relationship between region where university students were born and their voting tendencies.

H_{016} : University students' region where they have born and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum concerning Turkey's EU accession have no relationship.

H_{116} : University students' region where they have born and their tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum concerning Turkey's EU accession have a relationship.

			Voting tendencies in a possible referendum			Total	
			Yes	No	No idea		
Region where university students have born	Mediterranean	Count	21	13	0	34	
		Expected Count	18,9	12,3	2,8	34,0	
	Aegean	Count	25	8	3	36	
		Expected Count	20,0	13,1	3,0	36,0	
	East Anatolia	Count	12	9	2	23	
		Expected Count	12,8	8,3	1,9	23,0	
	Southeast Anatolia	Count	8	3	3	14	
		Expected Count	7,8	5,1	1,2	14,0	
	Central Anatolia	Count	28	24	4	56	
		Expected Count	31,1	20,3	4,6	56,0	
	Blacksea	Count	19	12	3	34	
		Expected Count	18,9	12,3	2,8	34,0	
	Marmara	Count	156	107	25	288	
		Expected Count	159,7	104,5	23,8	288,0	
	Total		Count	269	176	40	485
			Expected Count	269,0	176,0	40,0	485,0

Table 33. Cross tabulation between university students' region where they have born and their voting tendencies in a possible referendum

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11,511 ^a	12	,486
Likelihood Ratio	13,742	12	,317
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,108	1	,147
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 34. Chi-square test between university students region where they have born and their voting tendencies in a possible referendum

Seventeenth hypothesis looks for a relationship between region where university students have born and their tendency to go and live in EU countries. Table 35 shows cross tabulation between region where university students have born and their tendency to

go and live in EU countries. Table 36 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square test (23.204) and p value (0.508) between region where university students have born and their tendency to go and live in EU countries. P value is again higher than confidence level and this shows there is not any relationship between region where university students were born and their tendency to go and live in EU countries.

H₀17: University students' region where they have born and their tendency to go and live in EU countries have no relationship.

H₁17: University students' region where they have born and their tendency to go and live in EU countries have a relationship.

			I would like to live and work in EU countries during next few years					Total
			Totally agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Totally disagree	
Region where university students have born	Mediterranean	Count	7	17	1	6	3	34
		Expected Count	11,7	12,0	4,8	4,2	1,3	34,0
	Aegean	Count	13	16	3	3	1	36
		Expected Count	12,4	12,7	5,0	4,5	1,4	36,0
	East Anatolia	Count	7	7	4	4	1	23
		Expected Count	7,9	8,1	3,2	2,8	,9	23,0
	Southeast Anatolia	Count	4	6	0	3	1	14
		Expected Count	4,8	4,9	2,0	1,7	,5	14,0
	Central Anatolia	Count	24	16	9	4	3	56
		Expected Count	19,3	19,7	7,9	6,9	2,2	56,0
	Marmara	Count	101	96	46	37	8	288
		Expected Count	99,2	101,5	40,4	35,6	11,3	288,0
	Total	Count	167	171	68	60	19	485
		Expected Count	167,0	171,0	68,0	60,0	19,0	485,0

Table 35. Cross tabulation between university students' region where they have born and their tendency to go and live in EU countries

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23,204	24	,508
Likelihood Ratio	26,108	24	,348
Linear-by-Linear Association	,482	1	,488
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 36. Chi-square test between university students region where they have born and their tendency to go and live in the EU

Eighteenth hypothesis looks for a relationship between gender of the university students and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Table 37 shows cross tabulation between university students' gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Table 38 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square test (15.040) and p value (0.005) between university students' gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. Since p value is lower than confidence level (0.05) we reject H_{018} which states there is a relationship between university students' gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

H_{018} : University students' gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship

H_{118} : University students' gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

			Turkey's welfare will be increased if Turkey would be an EU member					Total
			Totally agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Totally disagree	
Gender	Male	Count	26	71	56	52	16	221
		Expected Count	21,4	63,8	61,5	64,2	10,0	221,0
	Female	Count	21	69	79	89	6	264
		Expected Count	25,6	76,2	73,5	76,8	12,0	264,0
Total		Count	47	140	135	141	22	485
		Expected Count	47,0	140,0	135,0	141,0	22,0	485,0

Table 37. Cross tabulation between university students' gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15,040	4	,005
Likelihood Ratio	15,222	4	,004
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,026	1	,155
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 38. Chi-square test between university students gender and their perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership.

Nineteenth hypothesis looks for a relationship between gender of the university students and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership. Table 39 shows cross tabulation between gender of the university students and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership. Table 40 shows results of Pearson's Chi-square test (18.601) and p value (0.001) between university students' gender and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership. P value (0.001) is lower than confidence level (0.05) which means H_0 19 is rejected. This shows us there is a

relationship between gender and university students own welfare perception in case of membership.

H₀19: University students' gender and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have no relationship

H₁19: University students' gender and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership have a relationship.

		EU means welfare for me					Total	
		Totally agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Totally disagree		
Gender	Male	Count	27	62	47	59	26	221
		Expected Count	16,9	57,9	59,7	64,2	22,3	221,0
	Female	Count	10	65	84	82	23	264
		Expected Count	20,1	69,1	71,3	76,8	26,7	264,0
Total		Count	37	127	131	141	49	485
		Expected Count	37,0	127,0	131,0	141,0	49,0	485,0

Table 39. Cross tabulation between university students' gender and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18,601	4	,001
Likelihood Ratio	18,912	4	,001
Linear-by-Linear Association	3,290	1	,070
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 40. Chi-square test between university students gender and their perception on their own welfare in case of EU membership.

Twentieth hypothesis looks for a relationship between gender of the university students and their EU image. Table 41 shows cross tabulation between gender of the

university students and their perception on EU's image. Table 42 shows results of Pearson Chi-square test (38.842) and p value (0.000) between gender of the university students and their perception on EU's image. Since p value is lower than confidence level (0.05), H_0 is rejected. This shows there is a relationship between gender and their perception on EU's image.

H_0 : University students' gender and their perception on EU's image have no relationship.

H_1 : University students' gender and their perception on EU's image have a relationship.

		How is EU's image in your perception?					Total	
		Totally positive	Positive	Neither positive nor negative	Negative	Totally negative		
Gender	Male	Count	18	77	80	28	18	221
		Expected Count	9,6	60,1	104,8	33,7	12,8	221,0
	Female	Count	3	55	150	46	10	264
		Expected Count	11,4	71,9	125,2	40,3	15,2	264,0
Total		Count	21	132	230	74	28	485
		Expected Count	21,0	132,0	230,0	74,0	28,0	485,0

Table 41. Cross tabulation between university students' gender and their perception on EU's image.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2- sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	38,842	4	,000
Likelihood Ratio	40,140	4	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	8,472	1	,004
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 42. Chi-square test between university students gender and their perception on EU's image.

Twenty-first hypothesis looks for a relationship between gender of the university students and their belief to Turkey's EU membership. Table 43 shows cross tabulation between gender of the university students and their belief to Turkey's EU membership. Table 44 shows results of Pearson Chi-square test (10.405) and p value (0.006) between gender of the university students and their belief to Turkey's EU membership. Since p value is lower than confidence level (0.05) H_{021} is rejected. This shows us there is a relationship between gender and university students belief to Turkey's EU membership.

H_{021} : University students' gender and their belief to the Turkey's EU membership have no relationship.

H_{121} : University students' gender and their belief to the Turkey's EU membership have a relationship.

		Belief to Turkey's EU Accession			Total	
		Yes	No	No idea		
Gender	Male	Count	81	116	24	221
		Expected Count	65,2	126,7	29,2	221,0
	Female	Count	62	162	40	264
		Expected Count	77,8	151,3	34,8	264,0
Total		Count	143	278	64	485
		Expected Count	143,0	278,0	64,0	485,0

Table 43. Cross tabulation between university students' gender and their belief to Turkey's EU accession.

	Value	Degrees of freedom	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10,405	2	,006
Likelihood Ratio	10,404	2	,006
Linear-by-Linear Association	9,142	1	,002
Number of Valid Cases	485		

Table 44. Chi-square test between university students gender and their belief to Turkey's EU accession.

Results of the all 21 hypothesis can be found below at Table 45.

HYPOTHESIS	RESULT
H ₀ 1	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 2	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 3	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 4	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 5	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 6	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 7	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 8	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 9	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 10	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 11	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 12	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 13	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 14	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 15	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 16	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 17	FAIL TO REJECT / NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 18	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 19	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 20	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES
H ₀ 21	REJECT / RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIABLES

Table 45. Results of the hypothesis

3.8 Limitations

This thesis includes only university students in Istanbul. Due to lack of sufficient human and financial resources, it was not possible to extend this study to whole over Turkey for now. Nevertheless, study could be a base for future studies in the field. Especially this thesis can be extended to whole country with sufficient number of scholars, a more detailed survey and larger number of samples. Due to geographical constraints, it is not expected to have an idea regarding university students in all Turkey or general public opinion. Nonetheless, Istanbul is still an important place which consist young people from all over the country and different backgrounds.

This study is limited with the answers of the samples to the questions. Due to nature of method we have used, relationships that were founded at hypothesis does not claim any casualty or do not indicate anything about correlation of the two variables. Further studies can be made on this thesis which looks for casualty and direction of the relationship.

3.9 Results and Discussions

EU is in the middle of Turkish people's daily lives in different ways even though it is not realized sufficiently. This thesis tried to analyze young people's specifically university students' expectations from the EU and their perception on EU's image. In this section thesis is going to elaborate results of thesis, offer suggestions to improve both sides and demonstrate improvements that could be done to this thesis in future studies.

Turkey is a young country rhetoric has always been used as one of its strengths. Nevertheless, young people's specifically university students' public opinion has not been taken into consideration concerning important issues including EU affairs sufficiently. In this thesis, it is aimed to learn the perception of university students on specific issues concerning EU accession and find determinants that shape this perception. Survey is conducted with 485 samples and results are worth to analyze.

First of all, university students do not have high level of economic expectation from the EU. Previous studies mostly revealed that Turkish public's biggest expectation from the EU is material benefits. Nevertheless, in case of university students in Istanbul,

there is an even distribution (28.87%-agree, 27.63%-neutral, 29.28%-do not agree), when university students are asked regarding the increase in Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership. There are also similar results when they have been asked concerning EU's meanings for them such as welfare and employment. As a result, it can be said that university students are not seeing EU as a source of prosperity predominantly. In the long run, this trend could even decrease more when Turkey gradually increases its prosperity. Nonetheless, when university students are asked about whether they would like to live, study and work in the EU countries a clear majority of university students answered these statements positively. Roughly between 70% and 80% of the university students stated that they would like to live and work in EU countries and they would like to study in EU countries respectively.

Why university students do not expect anything from EU countries economically but want to study and work in these countries? First of all, it can be said that university students are looking for new experiences to add new skills to themselves. If this study extended to include university students motives to study and live in EU countries, more coherent results could be revealed concerning this. Another interesting result is that university students' knowledge level is significantly higher than average public. Around 72.16% and 74.43% of university students answered questions correctly concerning basic issues about the EU. Nonetheless, only 53.81% students think they know how EU functions.

When it comes to EU's image, almost half (47.22%) of the university students perceive EU neutrally. Moreover, 24.95% of them think that EU membership would be neither good nor bad for Turkey. Even though overall positive perceptions are higher than negative ones, there is strong neutrality among university students concerning EU nowadays.

When compared with other major studies such as Eurobarometer and GMFUS, results are not very different. 48% and 41% of the attendants in 2012 thought that EU membership will be a good thing according to GMFUS (2012) and Eurobarometer (2011) respectively while our study found 42.27%. There is significant differences when one compares our study with another study which also has been conducted with university students Dartan, M., Nas, C., Akman,S. Savran, C. and Suner,S. (2004). %68 of the students would vote yes in referendum in 2004 while it is 56.08% today. Furthermore,

46% perceive EU as a positive thing according to (Dartan, M., Nas, C., Akman, S. Savran, C. and Suner, S., 2004) while only 30% have seen it positive in our study.

When the relationships between variables are analyzed, striking results popped up as well. Income level of university students has no relationship with 6 different variables; university students perception on Turkey's welfare in case of accession, university students their own welfare in case of accession, EU image, tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum, tendency to live and work in EU countries and belief to the EU membership. Hence, university students' perception concerning EU issues is independent from their income level.

Region where university students were born has only relationship with their EU image. It has no relationship with university students' perception on Turkey's and their own welfare, tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and tendency to go and live in EU countries. Further studies can be made on why EU image differs in different regions? Moreover, with reaching more people from different regions than Marmara, different results can be found since our sample is predominantly born in Marmara region.

On this study there are several updates which can be made since it is open for development. Firstly, this study only covers university students in Istanbul and do not demonstrate any result for university students or young people in general. In the near future number of samples and extend could be widened to have a view of whole university students in Turkey. Also, studies could be made on other expectations of young people from the EU. Previous studies (Eurobarometer, 2004-2012) mostly revealed freedom to work, study and travel and economic expectations at the top for general public. For university students their expectations from the EU could be analyzed as well.

As known, visa liberalization road map is delivered to Turkey by European Commission. One important question to be analyzed is if Turkey will be granted visa-free travel would EU's attractiveness decrease in Turkey? At the comment section of thesis, some attendees stated that, only important thing for me is travel freely to EU. Another thing that can be researched in depth, if young people do not have economic expectations, what makes them prone to study, work and live in EU countries. All those are areas that could not be covered due to constraints on financial and human resources.

Overall, this thesis claims that university students have mixed perceptions and expectations concerning the EU. At this conclusion part, it is assumed that Turkish political elite will stick into Republic's long-standing foreign policy, EU integration even though they sometimes send mixed signals to public regarding this matter. EU process is expected to be accelerated during next years through positive agenda, French President Hollande's mild approach and Turkey's increasing importance in the world. It is very important to engage young people into this process through universities, NGO's and other means. Even though university students' knowledge level is higher than average, they also should be included in practical matters and should learn effects of EU to their daily life. Furthermore, young people's belief to the EU membership should be improved since only 28.25% of university students' believe that Turkey will be EU member one day. Without belief to the EU membership driving the process will be difficult. Especially when EU integration considered as a long term process since it is expected to continue at least 8-10 years until Turkey became member in an optimist approach. Thus, university students will be elite of this country in proceeding years and will be the driving force of this process. The same applies to Turkey's image of Europe which is not bright unfortunately. Those young people will become faces of Turkey to enhance its prestige in Europe and the world.

Thesis tried to analyze university students' expectations specifically economic ones from the EU. Even though the thesis has limitations, it reached some important results explained above and could be improved in the future with further studies.

4. CONCLUSION

This thesis tried to see university students' economic expectations from the EU membership. Since half of Turkey is under 29 years of age, young people's expectations are important to shape the future of the Turkey-EU relations.

The first chapter of this thesis explained the motivation of this study, the short history of Turkey-EU relations and the current state of play. The main motivation of this study is the diminishing public support to the EU membership in Turkey and the lack of sufficient studies on the young people's specifically university students' public opinion concerning the EU. Most of the studies focused on the general public and very limited of them focused on young people. Furthermore, there are very few studies showing people's economic expectations from the EU membership. Focus on economic expectations is another strength of this study. Also Eurobarometer does not always show the distribution of ages for each question and country. After elaborating the motivation of this thesis, the evolution of Turkey-EU relations has been explained with ups and downs throughout the last half century which created a base for today. Lastly, the current state of the Turkey-EU relations and accession negotiations are analyzed. In this part, the main problems and current opportunities are briefly explained.

The second chapter is focused on the literature review of the Turkish people's perception of the EU, WB's perception on the EU and EU citizens' perception on Turkish accession to the EU. In the literature review, theories developed on public opinion and European integration are covered. After that, applications of theories developed on European integration to Turkey are analyzed. The next part of this study is mainly dealt with public opinion studies on Turkey concerning the EU. Nonetheless, there is a limited number of studies regarding young people's perception in Turkey. This thesis focused on mostly systematic studies which are conducted after the 2000's. The second part of the second chapter has been written to see similarities and differences of EU perception in other candidate countries, specifically in WB states. The third part analyzed EU citizens' attitude against Turkish accession and has shown reasons behind those attitudes. This chapter widely benefited from studies conducted by Eurobarometer, GMFUS and Gallup.

Third chapter includes the aim of the thesis, research method, population and sample, data collection methods, construction of hypothesis, confidence test, the main findings of our survey, hypothesis testing and limitations of this study. Survey is made with 485 samples and 21 different hypotheses are tested. Aim of the survey is to learn economic expectations of the university students from the EU and their perceptions of the EU and EU membership. There are balanced results on gender and income level of the attendees. Around 80% of the attendees are studying social sciences, engineering or natural sciences. 60% of the attendee was born in Marmara region while remaining have born in other regions.

Main findings of survey and results of hypothesis revealed thought provoking results. Unlike previous Eurobarometer results, university students' knowledge level is significantly higher than average. Around 75% of the students answered both questions correctly concerning the knowledge level. Young people have seen EU's image neutral even though a slight majority of them support Turkey's EU membership with 56%. However almost 60% of the university students believe that Turkey will never be an EU member ever.

In terms of economic expectations, university students' do not see EU as primary source of prosperity. Rather there is an even distribution between university students who see EU as a source of prosperity and who do not. However more than 70% of the university students would like to live and study in EU countries.

When one looks at the results of the hypothesis, there are interesting results as well. Firstly there is not any relationship between income and six different variables: university students' perception on Turkey's welfare in case of accession, university students' own welfare in case of accession, EU image, tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum, tendency to live and work in EU countries and belief of Turkey's EU membership. Hence, university students' perception concerning EU issues is independent from their income level.

Furthermore region where university students were born only has a relationship with EU's image while has no relationship with university students' perception on Turkey's and their own welfare, tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and tendency to go and live in EU countries. There is a relationship between university

students' perception on Turkey's welfare in case of EU membership and EU image, belief to Turkey's EU accession, tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum. There is also relationship between university students' perception on their own welfare and tendency to vote yes in a possible referendum and tendency to live and work in EU countries. Lastly university students' gender has relationship with their perception on Turkey's welfare, perception on their own welfare, EU's image and belief to the Turkey's EU membership.

Above all this study is only valid for university students' in Istanbul since our sample is selected among them. It can not be accepted as whole public's or young people's economic expectations. This thesis could not reach whole Turkey due to limited human and financial resources. It can be extended to whole Turkey with more detailed questions to have a general perception of university students concerning the EU. Thesis believes that, young people's perceptions should be analyzed carefully and deeply on EU issues to understand their perception. Understanding young people's perception will contribute to the understanding of public opinion and policy making process of decision makers. Overall those can facilitate Turkey's EU integration. Furthermore youth should be more engaged with the EU's policies and its effect on their daily life. Since those young people will be decision makers in the near future, it is important for them to know what EU means and communicate this with public in Turkey and in the EU as well.

APPENDIX

SURVEY

1. Cinsiyetiniz nedir?

- A. Erkek
- B. Kadın

2. Kaç yaşındasınız?

- 1. 18-24
- 2. 25-29

3. Ailenizin veya sizin aylık geliriniz ne kadar?

- A. 750TL altı
- B. 750-1500TL
- C. 1500-2500TL
- D. 2500TL üstü

4. Doğum yeriniz?

- A. Akdeniz
- B. Ege
- C. Doğu Anadolu
- D. Güneydoğu Anadolu
- E. İç Anadolu
- F. Karadeniz
- G. Marmara

5. Aşağıdaki bilimlerden hangisinde okuyorsunuz?

- 1. Sosyal Bilimler (İşletme, İktisat, Siyaseti Bilimi, Psikoloji, Sosyoloji v.b.)
- 2. Mühendislik ve Doğa Bilimleri (Bilgisayar Müh., Endüstri Mühendisliği, Fizik, Kimya v.b.)
- 3. Güzel Sanatlar
- 4. Eğitim Bilimleri (Öğretmenlik, Pedagoji v.b.)
- 5. Tıp fakültesi
- 6. Diğer

6. Avrupa Birliđi'nin nasıl alıřtıđını biliyorum. (karar alma sistemi, yapısı v.b.)

1. Evet
2. Hayır

7. Avrupa Birliđi'nin 27 üyesi vardır.

1. Evet
2. Hayır

8. İsvire Avrupa Birliđi üyesidir.

1. Evet
2. Hayır

Ařađıdaki yargıları kesinlikle katılmıyorum (5), katılmıyorum (4), ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum (3), katılıyorum(2) ve kesinlikle katılıyorum (1) řıklarından birini seerek lütfen cevaplayınız.

9. Avrupa Birliđi'nin sizin gözünüzdeki imajı nedir?

1. Tamamen Pozitif
2. Pozitif
3. Ne pozitif ne negatif
4. Negatif
5. Tamamen negatif

10. AB üyeliđinin Türkiye için genel olarak iyi bir řey olacađına inanıyorum.

1. Evet
2. Hayır
3. Ne iyi ne kötü bir řey olur

11. Bugün referandum olsaydı, Türkiye'nin AB'ye girmesi yönünde oy kullanırdım.

- A. Evet
- B. Hayır
- C.Fikrim yok

12. Türkiye'nin bir gün AB'ye üye olacađına inanıyorum.

1. Evet
2. Hayır
3. Fikrim yok

13. Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliđi'ne girdiđi takdirde Türkiye'nin refahı artacaktır.

1. Kesinlikle katılıyorum
2. Katılıyorum
3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
4. Katılmıyorum
5. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum

14. Avrupa Birliđi benim için refah anlamına gelmektedir.

1. Kesinlikle katılıyorum
2. Katılıyorum
3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
4. Katılmıyorum
5. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum

15. Avrupa Birliđi benim için istihdam anlamına gelmektedir.

1. Kesinlikle katılıyorum
2. Katılıyorum
3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
4. Katılmıyorum
5. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum

16. Önümüzdeki bir kaç yıl içinde AB üyesi ülkelerin birinde eğitim almak isterim.

1. Kesinlikle katılıyorum
2. Katılıyorum
3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
4. Katılmıyorum
5. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum

17. Önümüzdeki birkaç yıl içinde AB üyesi ülkelerden birinde yaşamak ve çalışmak isterim.

1. Kesinlikle katılıyorum
2. Katılıyorum
3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
4. Katılmıyorum
5. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum

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