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SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION: THE CASE OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

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Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Münevver Cebeci

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ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencisi Sinem YÜKSEL'in, ***"SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION:THE CASE OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS"*** konulu tez çalışması 11.10.2013 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği / ~~oyçokluğu~~ ile başarılı / ~~başarısız~~ bulunmuştur.

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ABSTRACT

This study aims at analyzing "securitization of migration" in Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. Analysis is made in order to see how the EU securitizes migration in its relations with Turkey and whether it is a political choice or not. The Copenhagen School's theory of securitization, multisectoral security approach and speech act are given special emphasis in this regard. The major argument of this study is that the EU has securitized migration from Turkey mainly for political reasons; thus, securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations is a political choice.

The first chapter aims to set the theoretical foundation of the study. Therefore, the concept of security is examined historically and conceptually. While different approaches on security are analysed briefly, the special reference is given to the Copenhagen School's securitization theory. Additionally, multisectoral security approach of the Copenhagen School is applied due to its analysis of different sectors. In this context, the societal sector which contains migration and migration related issues is emphasized. The second chapter aims to analyse the concept of migration historically and conceptually and to show the reasons of securitization of migration depending on anti-immigration discourses in Europe. In the last chapter, securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations is examined by special emphasis on internal security, cultural identity and welfare state. Accordingly, the conclusion of this study is that securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations does not depend on real existential threats and the EU has politically securitized migration from Turkey.

ÖZ

Bu yüksek lisans çalışmasının amacı, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği (AB) ilişkilerinde göçün güvenlikleştirilmesini incelemektir. İnceleme, AB'nin Türkiye ile olan ilişkilerinde göçü nasıl güvenlikleştirdiğini ve bunun siyasi bir seçim olup olmadığını ortaya koymak için yürütülmüştür. Bu doğrultuda, Kopenhag Ekolü'nün güvenlikleştirme teorisi, çok-sektörlü güvenlik yaklaşımı ve söz eylemin rolü üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu çalışmanın ana argümanı, AB'nin Türkiye'den gelen göçü özellikle siyasi nedenlerle güvenlikleştirdiği ve bundan dolayı da Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinde göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin siyasi bir seçim olduğudur.

Birinci bölümün amacı, tezin teorik çerçevesini çizmektir. Bundan dolayı, güvenlik kavramı tarihsel ve kavramsal olarak incelenmiştir. Güvenlik üzerine farklı yaklaşımlar kısaca incelenirken, Kopenhag Ekolü'nün güvenlikleştirme teorisi özellikle vurgulanmıştır. Ayrıca, farklı sektörleri analiz etmesi nedeniyle Kopenhag Ekolü'nün çok-sektörlü güvenlik yaklaşımı kullanılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, göç ve göçle ilgili konuları içeren toplumsal sektör vurgulanmıştır. İkinci bölüm, göç kavramını tarihsel ve kavramsal olarak analiz etmeyi ve göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin nedenlerini Avrupa'daki göç karşıtı söylemlere dayanarak göstermeyi amaçlamıştır. Son bölümde, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinde göçün güvenlikleştirilmesi iç güvenlik, kültürel kimlik ve refah devleti vurgulanarak incelenmiştir. Buna göre bu çalışmanın sonucu, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinde göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin gerçek varoluşsal nedenlere dayanmadığı ve AB'nin Türkiye'den gelen göçü politik olarak güvenlikleştirdiğidir.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BNP	British National Party
CARIM	Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	Christian Social Union
CEPS	Center for European Policy Studies
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Community
ECPR	European Consortium for Political Research
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
FPÖ	Austrian Freedom Party
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
HWWI	Hamburgisches WeltWirtschafts Institut

IOM	International Organization for Migration
LAOS	Laikos Orthotoxos Synagermos
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PVV	Freedom Party of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands
RSC	Regional Security Complex
SEA	Single European Act
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TCNs	Third Country Nationals
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study is to analyse "securitization of migration" regarding the relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) and to decide whether it is a political choice or not. The Copenhagen School's theory of securitization, multisectoral security approach, and the role of speech act are specifically referred for their social constructivist structure. Its major argument is that, the EU has securitized migration from Turkey mainly for political reasons; thus, securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations is a political choice.

This study focuses mainly on security, securitization, migration and Turkey-EU relations regarding migration. Identifying security and securitization is significant in terms of constructing the theoretical framework of the study. Different schools of thought are included briefly in defining security in order to demonstrate its contested nature. There are basically two groups – traditionalists and non-traditionalists – that define security from their own perspectives. Traditionalists define security as freedom from any militarily threat against survival of state.[1] They emphasize military aspect of security. On the other hand, non-traditionalists object narrowing the scope of security down to the military realm. They state that anything could become a security issue. In the light of the debate between traditionalists and non-traditionalists, a wider approach to security, is adopted in this study to form its theoretical foundation. In this sense, multisectoral security approach of the Copenhagen School comes to the fore. The reason is that, the Copenhagen School argues for a constructivist approach that extends the analysis of international security to culture, identity, economics, environment, etc. It is emphasized that referent objects and threats against them can vary from person to person and state to state; that is why, there are norms and values on the basis of security according to social constructivism.

[1] Vladimir Šulovic, 'Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization', Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 5 October 2010, p.2, available at: http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/sulovic_(2010)_meaning_of_secu.pdf, retrieved on: 21.11.2011

In this study, security is seen as a process of "social construction of threats"[2] via speech acts; that is, securitization. The Copenhagen School states: "The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act."[3] In addition, securitization starts by declaring something as a threat. Therefore, speeches of political actors/politicians are examined in terms of securitization of migration. Thus, the theoretical framework is applied to practice.

The abovementioned multisectoral security approach of the Copenhagen School is applied in terms of the societal sector because it is related to the subject of the study. Securitization of migration is an issue of the societal sector; therefore, society is identified in details. Also, identity is emphasized, because societal security is seen as "identity security"[4] in a sense. In addition, several threats to society and identity are defined in order to analyse securitization in the societal sector. Migration and integration come to the fore as threats to society in Europe and special emphasis is put on migration due to the scope of this study.

Generally, migration is defined as the movement of people from one place to another. However, definitions of several types of migration are made to ensure conceptual clarification. International Organization for Migration (IOM) and United Nations General Assembly have made several definitions of migration. Migration is defined by IOM as:

> "The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a state. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification."[5]

Migration takes place both voluntarily and involuntarily. *Voluntary migrants* are individuals who move from one place to another by their own will and desire. *Voluntary migration* contains migrant workers, seasonal migrants, and people who

[2] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1998, p.34
[3] Ibid., p.26
[4] Ibid., p.120
[5] 'Key Migration Terms', *International Organization for Migration*, available at: http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Migration, retrieved on: 25.12.2012

make family reunification.[6] A *migrant worker* is defined as "[…] a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national."[7] A *seasonal migrant* is "[…] a migrant worker whose work by its character is dependent on seasonal conditions and is performed only during the part of the year."[8] A *family reunification* is "[a] process whereby family members already separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one their origin, it implies certain degree of state discretion over admission."[9] *Involuntary migration* is defined as *forced migration* stemming from several reasons such as wars, regional conflicts, natural reasons, and etc. Involuntary migrants are refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons.[10] A *refugee* is defined as "a person, who 'owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.'"[11] *Asylum seekers* are defined as "persons seeking to be admitted into a country as refugees and awaiting decision on their application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments."[12] A *displaced person* is defined as "a person who flees his/her State or community due to fear of dangers other than those which would make him/her a refugee."[13]

In addition, migration, emigration and immigration are different concepts. This difference must be clarified to ensure conceptual consistency. *Migration* has been defined above. *Emigration* is defined as "the act of departing or exiting from one State with a view to settle in another."[14] *Immigration* is defined as "a process by which non-

[6] 'World Migration Report 2000', Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2000, p.9
[7] United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/45/158, 69th Plenary Meeting, 18 December 1990, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r158.htm, retrieved on: 25.12.2012
[8] Ibid.
[9] Richard Perruchoud, *International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration*, Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2004, p.24
[10] 'World Migration Report 2000', p.15
[11] Ibid., p.53 and for further information see also Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, December 2010, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html, retrieved on: 25.12.2012
[12] Perruchoud, *International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration*, p.8
[13] Ibid., p.19-20
[14] Ibid., p.21

nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement."[15] In this study, the concepts of migration and migrant are employed in order to ensure conceptual utility.

This study looks into how migration comes to the fore as a threat to society. Its major focus is how migration is turned into a security issue in Europe and how it is included into the European policy agenda. The Member States' efforts to launch a common migration policy are also discussed. Within the framework of political and economic developments this study also attempts to reveal how European countries' attempts encouraging migration turned into restrictions regarding migration. Furthermore, it analyses securitization of migration as based on political, economic and security reasons; in the light of anti-immigration discourses of politicians. Identification of society as a referent object and migration as a threat, which are emphasized in anti-immigration discourses of politicians, ensure an important base for securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations.

In addition, Jef Huysmans' conceptualization of securitization on three related themes – internal security, cultural identity, welfare state – is used as the framework to show how the EU securitizes migration in its relations with Turkey. In this context, internal security, cultural identity, and welfare state are analysed in details as referent objects in accordance with migration between Turkey and the EU. Securitization of migration affects the mutual relations between Turkey and the EU as a whole; and, reflections of securitization are seen especially in the negotiation process. That is, securitization of migration causes "migration diplomacy"[16] between Turkey and the EU.

On the other hand, this study tries to show that securitization of migration is a political choice in Turkey-EU relations. Some statistics are also used to prove that there is no need for securitization. Europe's population is aging, and they need labour force to maintain the sustainability of internal market and welfare state. Therefore, prospect of Turkish migration in case of membership does not pose a threat against the internal

[15] Ibid., p.31
[16] Ahmet İçduygu and Ayşem Biriz Karaçay, 'Demography and Migration in Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations', Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar (eds.), *Turkey Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities*, Series Edition HWWI, Vol.5, Hamburg University Press, 2012, p.36

market and welfare state. Additionally, integration difficulties of Turkish migrants, which are mentioned in political discourses, are also analysed, especially in the light of Kaya and Kentel's research, in order to show that Turkish migrants are not threat. As their study clearly points, integration of Turkish migrants into European society is seen in the third and fourth generations.

This study also uses some findings of econometric studies, which estimate Turkish migration towards Europe in the following years. They also show that there is no need to fear Turkish migration, because "[t]he experiences of Greece, Portugal, and Spain indicate that a successful accession period with high growth and effective implementation of the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There is no *a priori* reason why Turkey would not go through a similar experience."[17] On the other hand, it is estimated that the growth of Turkish population will also decrease; therefore, the fear of huge population movements from Turkey to Europe, as many European politicians refer in their speeches, becomes unjustifiable and unreasonable.

This study aims to show securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations, yet, it has a limited scope. Therefore, it is important to note that this study does not aim to make a discourse analysis even though the content of some discourses are examined to show the effects of speech acts in securitization of migration. In other words, security discourses are not analysed in details. The point is to address how migration is defined as a security issue; and, to show negative connotations regarding migration. The role of media, which is important in securitization process, is not handled in this study.[18] On the other hand, integration vs. fragmentation in the EU, which is a related topic of securitization of migration, is only briefly mentioned due to the limited scope of this study. Another limitation of this study stems from its theoretical framework. This study deals with security as a socially constructed process through speech acts; and, migration is examined in accordance with securitization perspective. Other approaches regarding

[17] Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzubaş, Nilüfer Yıldız, 'Growth and Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU,' *CEPS Turkey in Europe Monitor*, No.12, Brussels, December 2004, p.124, emphasis original

[18] For analytical utility this thesis only focuses on European leaders and politicians and the discourse of the media and civil society organizations is deliberately left outside the scope of this study.

security may examine security aspect of migration from different perspectives; nevertheless they do not form the content of this study.

The research materials of this study are official documents of the EU that contain founding treaties, amending treaties, association agreement, and Council decisions; official documents of the United Nations (UN) regarding refugees and migration; and speeches of the political actors, which have important role in securitization process. In addition, this study benefits from the literature on security, migration, and Turkey-EU relations and securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations. Statistical data and findings of econometric models from several studies are also used in this study.

To sum up, this study aims to analyse securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations from the perspective of the Copenhagen School's security approach; to show how migration turned into a security issue; and, to what extent the EU securitizes migration, and its reflections on Turkey-EU relations. The major argument is that, the EU has securitized migration from Turkey and securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations is a political choice. The research questions of this study are:

- How is migration turned into a security matter?
- How does the EU securitize migration?
- Which policies does the EU develop regarding migration?
- To what extent does the EU securitize migration in its relations with Turkey?
- In which case does securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations take place?
- Is securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations a political choice or not?

This study is composed of three chapters. The first chapter aims to set the theoretical foundation of the study. Therefore, the concept of security is examined according to different approaches by giving special reference to the Copenhagen School's securitization theory. Widening scope of security in Europe is covered

according to traditionalists and non-traditionalists. Multisectoral security approach of the Copenhagen School is mentioned due to its analysis of how securitization occurs in different sectors. Special emphasis is given to the societal security sector which contains migration and migration related issues. Additionally, securitization theory is applied to societal sector; because, societal sector seems as a starting point in the analysis of securitization of migration.

The second chapter discusses migration both conceptually and historically. The types and reasons of migration are also mentioned briefly. Different factors, which show migration as a threat, are revealed. In addition, the EU's policies regarding migration, its efforts to develop a common migration policy; and, the question if the EU is successful to create a common migration policy, or not are discussed in this chapter. The reasons behind securitization of migration in Europe are also listed. Political, economic, and security reasons are examined and the logic of securitization is revealed. Finally, anti-immigration discourses of politicians, which are crucial in securitization process, are referred to in this chapter in order to show how securitizing actors exaggerate situations and/or events via their speeches.

The third chapter aims at analyzing securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations in terms of three interrelated themes – internal security, cultural identity, and welfare state. Migration trend between Turkey and Europe is studied historically in order to understand why migration is seen as a threat. In the context of internal security, the main issue is free movement of persons. Therefore, free movement of persons between Turkey and the EU is examined in the light of official documents. In the case of free movement of persons, the fear of influx of Turkish migrants is analysed within the framework of speeches of politicians, and extraordinary measures taken Turkey-EU relations due to such securitization are identified.

In the context of cultural identity, securitization of migration puts the emphasis on belonging, cultural and political integration, Turkey's otherness, culturally different roots and religion. Thus this chapter attempts to show how Turkey's candidacy is affected. The reason for this is that, securitization of migration affects the negotiation process; and, its reflections are seen in the wording of Negotiation Framework

Document in the form of extraordinary measures that do not normally exist in the EU's practice regarding enlargement to other candidate countries.

The third chapter also looks into the context of Turkey-EU relations in terms of the welfare state as a subject of securitization of migration. Economic and social benefits of welfare state are categorized as pull factors. The concepts of welfare state damagers and free riders of welfare state are analysed in terms of securitization. In addition, Turkey is presented as a transit country; therefore, asylum seekers, refugees, and illegal immigrants gain importance in terms of welfare state. In this context, geographical limitation in UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU are given special emphasis for their nature as extraordinary measures.

This study concludes that, the EU has securitized migration from Turkey regarding both Turkish migrants – in the case of free movement of people – and the other migrants – in the form of asylum-seekers and refugees – from the near abroad of Turkey. It can be seen that the EU has posed a protectionist attitude regarding migration in the negotiation process with Turkey. By doing so, the EU has attempted to put responsibility on Turkey via the above mentioned measures without ensuring free movement of Turkish people. Thus, the EU has securitized migration and this is mainly a political choice.

I. SECURITY: A BLURRED CONCEPT

Security is – as a blurred concept – defined according to several approaches, and it even differs from person to person. That is, it does not have a common definition. Developments aftermath of the Cold War proved that security was related to states' concerns not only in military terms but also in non-military terms.

In the post-Cold War period, military threats were removed to a certain extent, yet, new threats such as migration, smuggling and trafficking, natural disasters, epidemics and etc. emerged. The scope of security studies has widened. In this context, the Copenhagen School classified security into five sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.[19] According to the Copenhagen School, security is a process of social construction of threats.[20] For them, security is an essentially contested concept, a specific way of framing an issue, and a speech act.[21] The last one is important in securitization theory of the Copenhagen School because, securitization process starts by declaring something as a threat. Thus, defining something as a threat changes its nature and gives a priority to it.

In this chapter, the concept of security is used in accordance with the Copenhagen School's securitization theory. Especially their view of the societal security which contains migration issue is analysed in this respect. This theoretical background is crucial for understanding how the EU securitizes migration from Turkey to Europe and how this affects Turkey-EU relations.

1.1. The Historical and Conceptual Evolution of Security

The answer of the question, "what is security?" is a hard one; because, as mentioned earlier, any approach regarding security makes its own definition. As Wolfers argues, the meaning of national security differs from person to person, it is not

[19] Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed., Colchester: ECPR, 2007, p.38
[20] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p.34 and p.203
[21] Ole Wæver, 'European Security Identities', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.34, No.1, March 1996, p.106

precise; that is, it is "an ambiguous symbol."[22] On the other hand, Walter Lipmann argues that a nation is secure when it is not in danger to sacrifice its core values that are previously acquired.[23] Another definition of security in Wolfers' article is that security is a value which is possible to have more or less. Wolfers' most acknowledged definition of security is that "security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."[24] There is no uniformity in defining the term security for two reasons. First, each state has had its own past experiences, which have shaped and affected its definition of security. Second, each state has not faced the same degree of danger.[25] In addition, according to Wæver,[26] the basis of each nation's fears is unique; fears are based on its own precision and historical experience. Therefore, security has had different meanings for different human collectivities.[27] As a result, although efforts for security vary from nations to nations, the core concepts regarding security are common: fear, danger, threat, interest, and etc.

Definitions of security have changed after the end of the Cold War. In previous periods, security was heavily defined in militarily terms. Emphases on military aspects of security were primarily based on the traditional view of the state and its two other components, power and interest. According to Buzan's study, till the end of 1980s, the debates on security were still military.[28] However, there are also criticisms against this traditional state-centric view of security in terms of its narrow scope. Richard Ashley, Leonard Beaton, Stanley Hoffmann and Hedley Bull as well as Buzan criticized the limited, actor-oriented, narrowly focused approaches to security analysis and they

[22] Arnold Wolfers, '"National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.67, No.4, 1952, p.481
[23] Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy, Boston, 1943, p.51, cited in Wolfers, p.484
[24] Wolfers, op.cit., p.485
[25] Ibid., p.486
[26] Ole Wæver, 'Conflicts of Vision: Visions of Conflicts', in Ole Wæver, Pierre Lamaitre, and Elzbieta Tromer (eds.), *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Confrontation*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989, p.302
[27] Ole Wæver, 'Security, the Speech Act Analysing the Politics of a Word', (2nd draft), *Centre of Peace and Conflict Research*, Paper presented at the Research Training Seminar, Sostrup Manor, June, 1989, Revised Jerusalem/Tel Aviv, June 25-26, 1989, p.46
[28] Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.27

emphasized that the more extensive, broader approaches to security analysis were required.[29]

These views are prominent because military issues and state-centric views on security have become insufficient to explain the notion of security. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order, discussions on traditional state-centric view of security were started and the main argument of realist thought was subjected to criticism. The reason was "[t]he failure of any international relations specialist working within the realist paradigm to foresee the end of the Cold War […]"[30]

During the Cold War, threat perceptions of states were shaped by the tension between two blocs (the West and the East); after the end of it, the perceptions of threat and security changed and widened. The perceived threats, including the expansion of communist regime, transformed into terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, migration, expansion of nuclear arms, and so on.[31] At this point it might be helpful to have a look at how the concept of security has been defined by different researchers and schools of thought.

Although security is a basic need in daily life, security-related approaches have entered the literature with the emergence of international relations as a discipline after the World War I. Since security is about survival, it is regarded as the first priority realm in international relations and it is different from daily life.[32] Within the discipline of international relations different theoretical approaches defined security in accordance with their original perspectives. Considering the period during which international relations emerged, the definition of security was traditionally state based, therefore, here it can be seen that the understandings of "everything is for the state" and "security for the state and its nation" were dominant. In this context, security was also defined as national security. On the other hand, as Buzan argued, until 1980s definition of national

[29] Ibid., p.28.
[30] Richard W.Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 1999, p.96
[31] Philippe Marchesin, 'Yeni Tehditler Karşısında Avrupa', in Beril Dedeoğlu (der.), *Dünden Bugüne Avrupa Birliği,* Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, Ekim 2003, p.422
[32] Czeslaw Mesjasz, 'Security As An Analytical Concept (draft version)', Paper presented at the 5th Pan-European conference on International Relations, in The Hague, 9-11 September 2004, p.5,available at: http://www.afes-press.de/pdf/Hague/Mesjasz_Security_concept.pdf, retrieved on: 14.12.2011

security was dominated by two approaches: "Realists tended to see security as a derivative of power: an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result [...] Idealists tended to see security as a consequence of peace: a lasting peace would provide security for all."[33]

The core of most of the security studies is that security means being free from conflict; fear; and, any form of threats or possible threats. Traditionalists define security as freedom from any militarily threats against survival of state.[34] Since the sovereign state is the main actor in the realist theory, the security understanding of realism is shaped around this main actor. In this context, wars, which are historically the most common ways for states to attain more power and security, reflect security understanding of realism. As Walt argues, main focus of security studies is the phenomenon of war.[35] Because, in realism, the international system is anarchic[36]; states are in pursuit of power as a result of this anarchic structure and war is the way to achieve power. In addition, security, which is mentioned in realism, is national security. This is because, in realism, security of the state includes security of individuals as a whole. According to realists, security is prerequisite for each activity; all other behavior and policies of the state become meaningless when the state does not provide its security.[37]

In realism, security is state security; the threat, which is the subject of security, generally comes from other states, namely from their military forces. Therefore, states provide security by increasing their military capacity. Traditionalists have seen security from the state-centric view and for them more power means more security. This understanding of security has caused to a bi-directional process. On the one hand, security has referred to the means that ensure self-protection and the sense of being secure. On the other hand, it has exhibited vulnerabilities and the sense of insecurity.

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[33] Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.26
[34] Šulovic, 'Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization', p.2
[35] Stephen M. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.35, No.2, 1991, p.212
[36] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979, p.113
[37] Ibid., p.126

Attaining more power for security bring more insecurity for the other party; and, actors feel obliged to get more power in order to get rid of this sense of insecurity. Hence, this process eventually ends up in a "security dilemma" which generates both security and insecurity as Herz conceptualizes.[38] This means that lesser security concerns may make the world more secure, because security dilemmas can thus be averted.

Critical security studies, have criticized the view of realism, in which individuals and their security have been pushed to the backburner. According to critical security understanding, security is related to individuals under pressure and oppressed groups. Thus, security means emancipation, the freeing of human beings from those social structures which constrain their behavior.[39] Similarly, in peace studies, security is opposed to "structural violence,"[40] which causes inequality and injustice. According to those studies, human security and peace is achieved through dialogue instead of military methods. The reality is that, many people do not have the chance to live a healthy life with dignity, which is the most important threat against human beings. Thus, the core of those security studies is individuals, is not states as in realism.

On the other hand, in social constructivism, unlike realism, security cannot be explained by phenomena such as military capacity and power. Although social constructivism does not deny their presence, it advocates that there are ideational factors such as norms and values on the basis of security. States make a friend-enemy distinction based on their own perceptions, values and norms, and generate their security policies accordingly. For example, as Wendt states:

> "[…] British missiles have a different significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles. The distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the 'distribution of knowledge' that constitute their conceptions of self and other."[41]

[38] John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, Vol.2, No.2, Jan 1950, p.158
[39] Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17,No.4, October 1994, p.319
[40] Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.6, No.3, 1969, p.171
[41] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol.46, No.2, Spring 1992, p.397

At this point, the phenomenon of "identity" comes to the fore as "the basis of interests"[42], and threats to collective identity become important. This is because; conceptualization of the self and the other serves the states' interests which constructivists treat as "derivative of process of social interaction."[43] The Copenhagen School which seems more constructivist in explaining security, conceptualizes security as a process of social construction of threats.[44] Thus, security in social constructivism is not only related to state security, but also to ideational factors as norms and values. Additionally, the Copenhagen School has divided security – according to different types of threats – into five sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environmental.[45] This classification of security which is so comprehensive gives a clear picture in defining security from the perspective of other sectors apart from military.

1.2. Security and Securitization According to the Copenhagen School

In 1980s, the views that security can be provided through non-military means, apart from traditional security approach; and, security is not the subject of military realm only but also it is necessary and valid in other areas, affected the approach of the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School does not reject the strong link between the state and security; however, it rejects the narrowness of traditionalists' definition. They state: "We argue against the view that the core of security studies is war and force and that other issues are relevant only if they relate to war and force."[46]

On the other hand, traditionalists criticize that everything would be a security matter. In this regard, according to the Copenhagen School, it is necessary to separate security issues from non-security ones to eliminate traditionalists' concerns in scope of security.[47] The Copenhagen School, too, emphasizes that everything should not be turned into a security issue. This is because; security is not a positive value in their

[42] Ibid., p.398
[43] Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, p.173
[44] Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, op.cit., p.34 and p. 203
[45] Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.38
[46] Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, op.cit., p.4
[47] Ole Wæver, 'Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New "Schools" in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the *International Studies Association*, Montreal, March 17-20, 2004, p.8

view. For them, since securitization leads to limitations on fundamental rights and freedoms, security cannot be regarded as a positive value.

The Copenhagen School has conceptualized the term security in three ways. Firstly, Buzan has argued that security is an "essentially contested concept" referring to W. B. Gallie; because this term – like the others; love, power, justice peace, etc. – has caused unsolvable debates in their applications and meanings.[48] Secondly, security is "a specific way of framing an issue"[49] and finally it is a "speech act"[50] as Wæver pointed out:

> "With the help of language theory we can regard 'security' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise naming a ship). By uttering 'security,' a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it."[51]

In addition, Ole Wæver has classified the Copenhagen School's security approach in three main areas, "securitization", "sectors", and, "regional security complexes"[52]. They have defined security in a brief way: "'Security' is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics."[53]

The Copenhagen School tried to find answers to the basic question, "What quality makes something a security issue in international relations?"[54] They argue that security is about survival, and if there is an existential threat against designated referent object (it may be state, territory, nation, environment, and so on.) there is also a security matter and it is required to use extraordinary measures to cope with this security matter.[55] At this point, it is important to determine who decides existential threats and

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[48] Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 29
[49] Wæver, 'European Security Identities', p.106
[50] Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p.55
[51] Ibid.
[52] Wæver, 'Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New "Schools" in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery', p.7
[53] Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, op.cit., p.23
[54] Ibid., p.21
[55] Ibid.

extraordinary measures, because not everybody has the same effectiveness in public sphere, they must be state representatives or elites.[56] This case shows how securitization will occur as a result of a speech act.

Securitization is one of the three main ideas of the Copenhagen School's approach.[57] Four components are developed to identify securitization: existential threat, designated referent object, extraordinary measure, and state representatives or elites.[58] When state representatives or elites, namely securitizing actors, point that there is an existential threat against state, or core values of state, it is essential to use extraordinary measures to cope with the issue.

Securitization is an approach ensures that something can be perceived as a security matter; that is, making something a security issue is securitization.[59] In considering something as a security issue, the main point is the existential threat. The reason is that when it is defined as existential, there must be an absolute priority, and it is required to take extraordinary measures. The securitizing actor –power holder – may use securitization to gain control over any issue, hence securitization can be based not only on a real existential threat but also on a perceived threat.[60] In addition, speech act is at the core of securitization since securitization starts by declaring something as security issue and by turning it into a security issue. Yet, it must be noted that a successful securitization requires acceptance of the audience.[61] In order to ensure acceptance (on any issue), the concept of national security, which has an enormous power on mobilization, can be used. What is more, "national security dress"[62] can be used by actors to gain control over something. At this point, the focus is on the word "security", because it is sufficient to show priority and danger by itself. The security

[56] Michael C. Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics', *International Studies Quarterly* 47, No. 4, 2003, p. 514.
[57] The other two are sectors and regional security complexes. In Wæver, 'Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New "Schools" in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery', p.7
[58] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.21
[59] Ibid.
[60] Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', p.54
[61] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.25
[62] Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', p.57

label; however, is sometimes used even though there is no problem. It is simply because, declaring something as a security issue, is a political choice.[63]

Speech act is important in the process of securitization, because, as before mentioned, securitization starts by declaring something as a threat and turning something into a security issue. The Copenhagen School has equated the speech act and the process of securitization by saying: "The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act."[64]

When "X" is defined as a threat, its nature changes; and a need for an authority, which must be recognized by a group of people, in order to make this declaration to audience emerges. The authority can be officials, experts, NGOs, political leaders, bureaucrats, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups. The audience must accept that there is an existential threat and a possible point of no return so that it can be mobilized through the use of the rhetoric of emergency. It must be solved immediately otherwise it will be too late.[65] It is required to use extraordinary measures in order to eliminate this threat; and these extraordinary measures might involve breaking of normal political rules of the game, like limiting the fundamental rights.[66]

Security is regarded as a speech act.[67] An actor changes the topic when he talks about security; in such case the topic is no longer about politics but refers to security concerns; thereby, actor legitimates extraordinary means against socially constructed threat. Therefore, security is socially constructed and it is self-referential;[68] because, the issue is presented as a threat. When the speech act is used, the matter becomes a security issue in this regard. Two elements are crucial in the securitization process. One is the securitizing actor, who decides to put an issue onto the security agenda. The other is the audience who may accept or reject the securitizing actor's claims about the

[63] Ibid., p.65
[64] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.26. And it must be said here, in security discourse, the issue is presented as a supreme priority and then the security actor has a right and a need to use extraordinary means. In addition to this, the Copenhagen School is keen to stress that the threat that is mentioned here is an existential threat as an existential threat would require emergency action. In the same resource p.27
[65] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.24
[66] Wæver, 'European Security Identities', p.106-107
[67] Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', p.55
[68] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.24

security agenda. Justification of the agenda and extraordinary means can only be ensured by the consent of the audience.[69] Therefore, securitization is inter-subjective and it is constructed through interaction with others and among the subjects.[70] What is more, one should remember that in order for securitization to be successful it should be accepted by an audience. As a result, the success of securitization depends not on the decision of the securitizing actor but on the acceptance of the audience. In this regard, the decision of the securitizing actor is only a securitizing move; but once it is accepted by audience, then it becomes securitized[71] with the imposition of extraordinary measures.

The Copenhagen School contends that securitization is an extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary means in the name of security.[72] It is a way of framing and handling an issue.[73] In this sense, it can be argued that securitization is in fact a political choice. As Williams pointed out:

> "Focusing on the speech act highlights the decision to securitize an issue. While the background conditions for enabling securitization to take place must exist, a focus on decision highlights the explicitly political nature of such a choice. Securitization can never be reduced to the conditions of its social accomplishment: it is an explicitly political choice and act"[74]

The multisectoral security approach of the Copenhagen School is another contribution to security theory. The Copenhagen School divides security into five sectors:[75] military, political, societal, economic and environmental. Buzan identifies them as follows:

> "Generally speaking, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other

[69] Šulovic, 'Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization', p.4
[70] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.30-31
[71] Ibid., p.25
[72] Ibid., p.23
[73] Wæver, 'European Security Identities', p.106
[74] Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics', p.520
[75] Wæver, 'European Security Identities', p.107

> human enterprises depend. These five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages."[76]

This sectoral identification of security is reasonable because it shows that there are various types of referent objects which are not limited to states; and, referring to them in different sectors might make it more coherent to explain such a contentious concept as security.

Another important aspect of the Copenhagen School's approach towards security is regional security complexes. "Security complexes are regions as seen through the lens of security."[77] Buzan defined a security complex "[…] as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."[78]

The security dynamics in a region link units – especially states – and force them to act together. As a consequence of this, states may establish regional organizations such as ASEAN, EU, NAFTA, and so on. But, it must be kept in mind that, this does not necessarily always occur. The linkage among units does not always emerge in a positive way. This is because, "[e]ach RSC [regional security complex] is made up of the fears and aspirations of the separate units (which in turn partly derive from domestic features and fractures)."[79] Additionally, common concerns constitute interdependence among states and interdependence makes states more vulnerable to each other. Thus, "[s]ecurity complexes emphasize the interdependence of rivalry as well as that of shared interests."[80]

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[76] Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.38
[77] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.43-44
[78] Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* p.160
[79] Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, p.43
[80] Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.160

1.3. Securitization in the Societal Sector: A Conceptual Analysis

Securitization is a significant tool to mobilize the masses. After the Cold War, societal sector became one of the main areas of security in Europe. Societal security has almost become equally important with state security. Then how can securitization be analysed in the societal sector? What are the referent objects and threats to it? Who are the actors that have the right to speak? And which measures are taken?

Nation and identity are at the core of the societal sector. While security is identified in terms of society, developments take place around nation and identity. In Europe, identity groups are mainly national[81]; therefore, in this situation, a threat against identity is directly related to the nation. Therefore, in some cases, societal security may be seen as the same with national security –especially after the Cold War. From this point of view, it can be argued that the referent object of societal security in Europe is the nation. State representatives and/or elites, who are the securitizing actors, tend to represent the nation (and its identity) always at stake. What is crucial here is that society which is one of the components of the state does not speak on its behalf; thus, state representatives or elites usually claim the right to speak on behalf of society.

Threats against societal security are threats against identity. First of all, identity has a conservative nature; in this sense, change and conversion are at the top of identification of threats. If a society loses its identity because of change or conversion, it will not be able to live as itself. In addition to this, if the existential threat against society is not handled on time, people who define themselves as "we" will not be as themselves.[82] As a matter of fact, "[societal security] is about sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom."[83]

[81] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.120
[82] Wæver, 'European Security Identities', p.111
[83] Ole Wæver, 'Societal Security: The Concept', in Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (eds.), *Identity, Migration and The New Security Agenda in Europe*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1993, p.23

The most frequently referred threats that cause change and conversion in a society are migration[84], internationalization (Americanization mostly), and integration (Europeanization). These threats have been regarded as existential threats by state representatives and elites. Once they are presented as existential threats and they are subjected to the speech act, then people can be mobilized against them. In societal security, the distinction between real and perceived threats become important as state representatives or elites may prefer to use the security speech act to further their own political interests. The reason is that, as mentioned before, power holders can securitize any issue to gain control over it.[85] Besides, it is another indicator that securitization is a political choice.

Internationalization is perceived as a threat against the society. As Buzan argues: "It threatens society with powerful inflows of language, style, culture and values that may weaken or overwhelm their indigenous counterparts, disrupt the ability of local cultures to reproduce themselves, and/or generate the distorting effects of xenophobia."[86] Internationalization is generally referred to as Americanization due to its dominant character, both economically and technologically.

The other threat against the society is integration – especially Europeanization. In the context of European integration, despite the fact that European states share the same core values, they have sometimes seen integration as a threat against their identity. The Member States' concern regarding integration is the fear that the EU may be "constructed as a replica state and/or a nation."[87]

As a result, a threat to a group's identity is conceptualized according to its definition of "the self." People, who do not share the same values, are regarded as strangers. This has caused thinking in terms of "us" and "them" –and defining "us" and "others". A more extreme version of this line of thought is the clash of civilizations. This is because, "[civilization] is defined both by common objective elements, such as

[84] Since migration is analysed in details in the following chapter, it is not mentioned here.
[85] Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', p.54
[86] Barry Buzan, 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation', in Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (eds.), *Identity, Migration and The New Security Agenda in Europe*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1993, p.42
[87] Wæver, 'European Security Identities', p.123

language, history, religion, customs, institutions and by the subjective self-identification of people."[88] These elements are components of culture which would be the dominating source of conflicts as Huntington argues.[89] Therefore, when people define their identity in terms of these elements, "they are likely to see an 'us' versus 'them' relation existing between themselves and people" who have different roots.[90]

Consequently, the referent object in societal sector is mainly a group of people who perceive a threat to their identity. Threats can be classified as follows: migration, integration, internationalization, etc. To face these threats, normal political rules are broken, and state representatives can use any measures to deal with them. The measures are taken to strengthen the existing identities like nationalism, restrictive regulations regarding border controls, and migration.

1.4. Security Perceptions in Europe: The Case of Societal Sector

Security perceptions in Europe were based on maintaining the status quo in the period between the end of the World War II and the end of the Cold War. European security was shaped with struggles and tensions between two blocks and that is why maintaining the status quo was placed at the centre of the security policy. Thus, military security which was about state survival was at the core of the security agenda. During the Cold War there was a balance of power policy between the West and the East Blocks, any one side objected to the change of balance in favour of the other side.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the security agenda became multi-dimensional and some developments related to society, environment, and etc. began to be regarded as threats. This was mainly because, the lack of a major armed threat against European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union urged them to define new threats to base their security policies on. These new threats have been scrutinized in several sectors by the Copenhagen School through a multisectoral security approach.

[88] Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72, No.3, Summer 1993, p.24
[89] Ibid., p.22
[90] Ibid., p.29

State survival has also been extended to new areas. One of these areas is the societal sector which has come to the forefront especially after the end of the Cold War.

Societal security as a sector refers to the threat perceptions and security practices of human collectivities which mainly base their survival on sustaining their identity. Individuals form parts of society; yet, a society is more than the sum of its parts, it is about a "we" feeling; it is about identity, through which individuals identify themselves as a member of a particular community.[91] Societies are different from other social groups as Wæver's study points; they have "a high degree of social inertia, a continuity and a strong infrastructure of norms, values and institutions in the wider sense."[92]

Identity, as an important value, is at the center of the societal security analysis. In a sense, societal security can be named as "identity security".[93] However, it should be noted that people do not possess one stable identity. There are multiple identities through which people can define themselves according to their religion, nationality or ethnicity; and, these multiple identities can cause multiple types of fear, enmity (antagonism), and in the end, societal insecurity. "Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms."[94] At the same time, societal security is about measures taken as a response to the threats against collective identity.

When it comes to threats against society, from internationalization to migration and competing identities, a wide variety of threats are named. First of all, there is a great number of nationalities in the world, and the terms "internationalization" or "globalization", which signify to a powerful economy, technology, etc., emerge as threats against others.[95] On the one hand, internationalization and globalization may also or get perceived in the forms of Americanization and Europeanization, leading to concerns about cultural imperialism. Societies perceive threats from such moves to their cultures in various ways. On the other hand, globalization and internationalization lead

[91] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.119
[92] Wæver, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p.21
[93] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.120
[94] Wæver, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p.23
[95] Buzan, 'Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation', p.42

to more freedom of movement, intensifying migratory flows. Therefore, Immigration has long been perceived as one of the main threats against society and its identity.

In terms of immigration, "absorption and adaptive capacity of society"[96] is an important factor on deciding about the threat coming from migratory flows. For example, if the receiving society is a conservative one, the society may be less willing to absorb new comers. In addition to this, immigrants' cultural, economic and social profiles are equally important while deciding whether they represent threats or not. Depending on their profiles, migrants may choose one of the three ways which are "allowing themselves to be absorbed completely, seeking a halfway or encapsulating themselves within a cultural ghetto."[97] As a consequence of this, the receiving society may perceive threat from migrants who choose last two ways. This is because, they cannot become well-integrated into the host society.

Another threat against society comes from competing identities. Competing identities mean "mutually exclusive identities."[98] One may have more than two identities, especially when he/she identifies himself/herself according to his/her religion, ethnicity, etc; and yet these identities are impossible to be mutually exclusive. For instance Muslim and Christian identities are mutually exclusive, and one cannot possess these two identities at the same time. Therefore, if an identity is wider and more dominant than the other, then it can be seen as threatening. Or both identities may influence each other mutually. For example, as Buzan states: "Islamic fundamentalists are sensitive to penetration of Western ideas, practices and fashions into their own culture. Likewise, Europeans are often sensitive to Islamic immigrants whose strong, visible and alien culture can be seen as a defiance of integration, and therefore as a kind of invasion."[99]

Based on internationalization, immigration and competing identities (especially mutually exclusive ones), societies perceive many threats to their identities. While some of these threats are real, others remain as perceived threats.

[96] Ibid., p.45
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.,p.44
[99] Ibid.

When it comes to Europe, threats to societal security can be analysed in two main areas. One of them is integration and the other is migration. Europe has been reshaped by the integration project as a security community. The most obvious threat against this security community has usually been seen as a return to its own past[100], which is full of wars and power balancing policies. Hence, in order not to return to its own past, integration is seen as a necessity for Europe. On the other hand, Member States and societies sometimes perceive integration as a threat against society in terms of national identity. Although the EU is regarded as the main source of stability in Europe, European states have been concerned about their national identities and other values of their societies.

On the other hand, the EU has also seen national identities and nationalism as a threat against itself as well as its integration project in some cases. It has tried to create a European entity (and/or identity) based on common European values. However, Member States have avoided approaching the EU as an emerging state[101]; they have put their own national identities at the core of their presence. Buzan and Wæver argue that European integration which has threatened national identities; and, renationalization, which has threatened Europe,[102] may cause a fragmentation and even a return to Europe's past and this should be avoided. While the EU has encouraged multiculturalism, some Member States have tried to encapsulate themselves. As a consequence, it can be argued that there is a societal security dilemma within Europe. Societal security for the European Union is not the same thing as societal security for the Member States.

In Europe, migration has been regarded as a societal security threat that can be identified in two ways: First, legal migration which is both a threat and a boon. Second, illegal migration, which is a threat and the source of new threats such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and international organized crime.

[100] Wæver, 'European Security Identities', p.122
[101] Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, p.375
[102] Ibid.

In the case of legal migration, it is considered that the host society and its cultural heritage may be affected by migration because "foreigners are different."[103] Racial and religious reasons are important components in defining the immigrants as alien or hostile. On the other hand, European integration process also facilitates migration. Free movement of labour, services, goods and capitals has been ensured; and, abolition of border controls among Member States via the Single European Act has led to new security concerns.[104] In addition to this, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union has also brought about new threats regarding migration due to the abolition of border controls between the East and the West. As Buzan argues: "From East to West, the threat is one of political and/or economic chaos in the East triggering migration into the West."[105]

The threat of migration from the East to the West has been greatly employed by centre-periphery approach. However, post-Soviet countries, that is, Eastern European countries are thought to, have a shared European identity and common values such as Christianity and culture. In terms of migration, from the South to the North, from non-EU countries to the EU and vice versa the threat has been seen as: "From south to north there is a perceived risk of mass migration caused by overpopulation, underdevelopment, political violence and/or ecological degradation."[106] In the case of migration from the South to the North cultural difference is repeatedly mentioned in the security speech act used against immigrants.

European Security Strategy (ESS) has outlined key threats to Europe as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. Europeans tend to associate some of these threats with illegal

[103] Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p.54, cited in Ingemar Dörfer, 'Old and New Security Threats to Europe', Swedish Defence Research Agency, available at: http://www.afes-press.de/pdf/Doerfer_Mont_9.pdf , retrieved on: 27.09.2012, p.4
[104] Matthew J. Gibney, 'Security and The Ethics of Asylum After 11 September', available at: http://fmreview.nonuniv.ox.ac.uk/FMRpdfs/FMR13/fmr13.14.pdf , retrieved on: 22.03.2012, p.1
[105] Barry Buzan, 'Introduction: The Changing Security Agenda in Europe', in Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (eds.), *Identity, Migration and The New Security Agenda in Europe*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1993, p.5
[106] Ibid.

immigration which has been clearly stated under the heading of organized crime in the ESS. Accordingly,

> "Europe is target for organized crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism."[107]

On the other hand, Europeans also tend to see illegal immigration as a root cause of terrorism. Especially after the 9/11 attacks the EU has pointed to the link among security, borders, terrorism and illegal immigration. For instance, in the conclusion of the Laeken European Council of 14-15 December 2001, it was clearly stated: "Better management of Unions external border controls will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human beings."[108]

Consequently, migration is seen as a threat against societal security, and other threats that emerged obviously after the collapse of the Soviet Union have been associated with migration. European Security Strategy classified threats by realms; and, politicians have seriously relied on them to make securitization on migration legitimate. In order to cope with migration as a threat, the EU and the Member States have sometimes taken extreme measures that can be considered as either regulations or securitization.

Concluding Remarks

Security which is an important and mainly contested phenomenon has been defined according to several approaches. While it was mainly military-based previously, in the aftermath of the Cold War it has been correlated several realms such as societal, political, economical and environmental. Therefore, it can be seen that the scope of security has widened. The referent objects and threats have varied.

In this context, the Copenhagen School's multisectoral security approach has come to the fore. The Copenhagen School has defined security with the help of the

[107] Council of The European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.4
[108] Presidency Conclusion of Laeken European Council, 14-15 December 2001, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-18_en.htm

speech acts and securitization theory. According to securitization theory, state representatives/elites can make an issue a security issue by transforming its nature via his/her speeches. Securitization, here, is mainly a socially constructed process in which securitizing actors can decide whether something constitutes a threat or not. In accordance with this approach, security is defined in several sectors. Societal sector is one of the most significant realms. On the other hand, it can also be claimed that state survival and societal survival are interwoven. Society is an important component of the state.

In this chapter, security has been identified in details for the purpose of showing its contested nature and revealing its socially constructed nature especially via analyzing societal security as a sector and security perceptions in Europe after the Cold-War. In the following chapter, migration, which is perceived as one of the threats against society and it is one of the sub-topics of this thesis study, is analysed in terms of securitization.

II. MIGRATION: A THREAT OR A BOON?

Migration is defined generally as a population movement caused by several reasons; pull and push factors of states. Population movements have been perceived both as a boon and as a threat in Europe. In 1950s and 1960s migration was seen as a tool for additional labour force for European states. However, these migrants were also seen as a threat according to changing conditions since 1970s. Especially, after the end of the Cold War, the issue gained prominence and the fear of mass migration from Eastern European countries as well as from the Middle East and Africa emerged. Mass migration from Eastern Europe did not occur. Yet, migrants from the Middle East and Africa has started to be seen as scapegoats after the September 11 attacks in the United States (US) and the Madrid and London bombings that took place in the following years.

The aims of this second chapter are to analyse migration conceptually and historically; to show the reasons of migration and the reasons of conceptualization of migrants as a threat, the EU's migration policies; and to explain how the EU securitizes migration through anti-immigration discourses and practices.

2.1. A Conceptual and Historical Analysis of Migration

Population movements have a significant historical background. The phenomenon of migration can be seen in each period of history. From prehistoric times to the present, these movements took place in various times and places. Basically, migration can be defined as the movement of people from one place to another. In the literature, migration is described as the movement of persons across and/or within the national borders for purposes other than travel or short term residence. International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as:

> "The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a state. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees,

> displaced persons, economic migrants and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification."[109]

Population movements have been in various forms with different reasons. Many scholars agree that migration is as ancient as history even as the earliest days of human existence.[110] People had not been living in a stable place; they had not been sedentary in prehistoric periods. Migration was a way of their life. With the alteration of conditions, people chose the settled lifestyle; they also faced migration from time to time. Mass migration occurred depending on the major climate changes in those days. Because of climate changes, unfavorable living conditions such as draught and famine, people searched for better places to live. Over time, migration movements emerged within smaller groups, or at the individual level, instead of mass migration compared to the past. People started to migrate for different reasons including cultural, economic, social, and political reasons.

International migration is an umbrella term which is multidimensional and multifaceted. It must be kept in mind that migration takes place not only voluntarily but also involuntarily. Firstly, people who want to head to another place decide where to go by their own will and desire are voluntary migrants. They migrate for "employment, study, family reunification, or other personal factors"[111] as pointed out in the International Organization for Migration Report 2000. They can be migrant workers – "[…] a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national"[112] – seasonal migrants (workers) – "[…] a migrant worker whose work by its character is dependent on seasonal conditions and is performed only during the part of the year"[113] – and family reunification – "[a] process whereby family members already separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one their origin, it implies

[109] 'Key Migration Terms', *International Organization for Migration*, available at: http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html#Migration, retrieved on: 25.12.2012
[110] Anthony J. Marsella and Eric Ring, 'Human Migration and Immigration: An Overview', in L.L. Adler and U.P. Gielen (eds.), *Migration: Immigration and Emigration in International Perspective*, the USA: Praeger, 2003, p.3
[111] 'World Migration Report 2000', Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2000, p.8
[112] United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/45/158, 69th Plenary Meeting, 18 December 1990, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r158.htm, retrieved on: 25.12.2012
[113] Ibid.

certain degree of state discretion over admission."[114] Voluntary migrants have sought to gain better living conditions and they have wanted to raise the standards of living.

Secondly, people are forced to migrate for several reasons such as wars, regional conflicts, natural reasons like climate change, or disasters, development induced displacement, population exchange, human trafficking, and so on.[115] These involuntary migrants are generally referred to as refugees – "A person, who 'owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.'"[116] – asylum seekers – "Persons seeking to be admitted into a country as refugees and awaiting decision on their application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments"[117] – displaced persons – "A person who flees his/her State or community due to fear of dangers other than those which would make him/her a refugee."[118]

People have migrated for several reasons over the ages. In Europe, especially after the end of the World War II, migration has gained significance. Western European countries were trying to recover their industries (economies) in the aftermath of the War, and in 1950s they were suffering from the lack of domestic labour force; in other words, they were not self-sufficient. To overcome these labour shortages, Western European countries found the solution, which included two main types of migratory activities. The first one was the guest worker system. The second one was colonial migration, which was used to supply the need for labour. In the guest worker system, the important point was that these guest workers were recruited temporarily; that is, the host countries did not provide them permanent residence, and did not consider them as settlers; as Hansen states: "the workers would remain so long as there were jobs for

[114] Perruchoud, *International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration*, p.24
[115] Deutsche Bank Research, 'International Migration: Who, Where and Why?', in Anthony M. Messina and Gallya Lahav (eds.), *The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder and London, 2006, p.16
[116] Perruchoud, op.cit., p.53 and for further information see also Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, December 2010, avalible at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html, retrieved on: 25.12.2012
[117] Perruchoud, op.cit., p.8
[118] Ibid., p.19-20

them, and they would return home once the economy soured."[119] In case of colonial migration, migrant workers were supplied from the former colonies of the West European countries, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium.

In 1950s and 1960s labour migration was welcomed thanks to a strong economy and full employment. The indigenous workers did not see migrant workers as a threat. One reason was that, migrant workers were doing the "3-Ds: dirty, dangerous and difficult"[120] jobs, which were not preferred by natives. However, labour migration needed to stop in 1970s because of stagnation in the economy furthermore it was the time for the existing migrant workers to repatriate. Ensuing developments were not expected.

In the meantime, a new form of migration emerged: family reunification. The earlier migrants have chosen the way family of reunification against the policies of stopping recruitment. On the other hand, Western European countries tried to solve the problem by giving additional benefits to those migrants who return to their country of origin. However, Western European countries were not successful in repatriation. Attempts to stop immigration led to the emergence of new forms of migration such as family reunification, asylum, refugees, and illegal immigration. On the other hand, these unsuccessful attempts showed that migration was out of control. As a result, European nationals have felt threatened due to immigration and seen immigrants as jobtakers, aliens and destroyer of their identities.[121] It must be noted that although migrants were seen as threat, they were also needed because of low fertility rates and declining population in Europe. That is, migration is perceived as both threat and boon.

In addition, the restrictions on migratory activities brought about an irregular (illegal) migration problem caused by undocumented migrants and asylum seekers; and refugee issues gained importance especially in the 1980s. Another migratory activity

[119] Randall Hansen, 'Migration to Europe Since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons', in Sarah Spencer (ed.), *The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change*, Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2003, p.26
[120] Peter Stalker, *The No-Nonsense Guide to International Migration*, New International Publications Ltd, Oxford, 2001, p.23
[121] Marsella and Ring, 'Human Migration and Immigration: An Overview', p.8

emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. Political changes in Eastern Europe, newly independent states, and reunification of Germany showed new aspects of migration.

Undocumented migrants are seen as job-seekers because of the lack of opportunity in their country of origin. On the other hand, these undocumented migrants are usually seen as criminals. A strong link between migrants and crime has been established. Migrants have also been associated with other new threats – i.e. drug trafficking, organized crime, and smuggling – against European society by right wing extremists. In addition, politicians – especially right wing – have used these claims to gain more votes in the elections. They created panic politics over migration; and, they showed migrants as causes of economic and social problems in their populist speeches.[122] To overcome undocumented migration, refugee and asylum seeker issues, European states have also taken restrictions on the right of asylum and increased border controls; they have amended their migration policies not only at the national level but also at the European Union level. For instance, to shorten the process of asylum claim, intergovernmental agreements among the EU Member States prevent people to apply to more than to one country; and, if they are rejected to have refugee status in one Member State, they cannot use the right of asylum in another member state. These restrictions have gained prominence and continued to develop dramatically, especially after the 9/11 attacks as well as London and Madrid bombings; because a new aspect of migration has emerged: terror.

2.2. Migration as a Threat and the EU's Approach

Migration has been perceived as a threat in terms of different dynamics. Firstly, political developments have led to such threat perceptions due to its linkage with identity and security. When it is analysed, it can be seen that political developments such as the 1973 oil crisis and the following afterwards stagnation in 1970s, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 attacks, London and Madrid bombings, all impacted on migration-security-identity issues.

[122] Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen and Stephen Castles, *Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.31

Secondly, the nature of societies plays a role in defining migrants as a threat. The reactions of homogenous and heterogeneous societies regarding migration are different from each other. For example, the preservation of an ethnic character may be more important in a homogeneous society than a heterogeneous one.[123] "An ethnically homogeneous society, for example, may place a higher value on preserving its political and cultural identity than does a heterogeneous society and may therefore regard on influx of migrants as a threat to its security."[124] In addition, willingness/unwillingness of migrants to integrate into the host society has become prominent with regard to the structure of the latter. The very reason is that integration is more crucial yet difficult in a homogeneous society compared to a heterogeneous one.

Thirdly, the way that host society defines itself may cause insecurity in the migration realm. Once they define themselves according to the values they share, they inevitably exclude others. The distinction of "us" and "them" often creates fears; in this sense, migration becomes a security issue. A widely shared view is that migrants hold their own distinctive cultural and ethnic identity in host society; and, the diversity among them may change the character of receiving society. Hence, the capacity of the receiving society, in terms of protecting its political and national identity, becomes important. On the other hand, ethnic affinity is a significant element in determining whether or not to accept migration. If the host society shares common values with migrants, it will be more willing to accept them. For example, the Eastern European states, after the collapse of the iron curtain, were perceived as the fellow-members of the European society due to their cultural and ethnic ties with Western Europe.[125] Thus, migration from east to west was more preferable than the one from south to north, because there was cultural linkage – especially ethnic and religious – among these states.

Fourthly, distinction between strong and weak states is another important point in migration issues. Weak states are more open to threats, like migration, than the strong

[123] Myron Weiner, 'Security, Stability, and International Migration', *Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, Massachusetts, December 1990, p.12
[124] Yannis A.Stivachtis, 'International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security', *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2008, p.3
[125] Ibid., p.6

ones.[126] The reason is that they do not have enough capabilities to cope with such issues. Strong states and weak states do not have the same capacity in terms of economics and politics. If the host country's economic capacity can cope up with the problems caused by migrants, migration may not be regarded as a threat, but if not, migration may create xenophobia (and paranoia), and the levels of toleration may decrease. Especially at times of recession and unemployment, migrants may be blamed for being economically and socially destabilizing.

Additionally, host societies usually tend to see migrants as the cause of the increase in criminality. Migrants may be seen as the reason of domestic political violence undermining organizational ideology of the state; as factors damaging the welfare state and economic prosperity, and as the cause of job loss due to provision of cheaper labour as the migrants work for lower wages. Furthermore, especially after the 9/11 attacks, a strong link between migration and terrorism was established and migration has started to be seen as a cause of terrorism.

Because of these tendencies and developments, migration stands at the top of the European policy agenda. It is assumed that migration inflows threaten overall stability of Europe. The management of the issue requires full cooperation and coordination among actors.

In the EU, immigration as a security matter has fostered cooperation among the Member States due to its transboundary nature. The EU as a regional actor has put the issue on its policy agenda in order to restrain migration. Although the EU did not define migration as a threat in its security strategy, it was mentioned under the heading of organized crime as: "This internal threat [organized crime] to our society has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons […]."[127] This statement has openly linked illegal migration with organized crime.

[126] Ibid., p.16
[127] Council of The European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.4

On the other hand, the willingness to deal with migration through cooperation conflicted with national interests of the Member States. Because, not all Member States of the EU have felt the same degree of threat that is posed from migration against their national interests. Thus, the members who do not face migration flows frequently do not want to share burden of combating illegal immigration. For example, the Spanish government called for help from the EU to cope with illegal immigration issue on the Canary Islands; yet, the attempts of operations of the EU were postponed several times. And, when the Spanish government repeated the request for the EU assistance the German Interior minister Schauble emphasized:

> "[…] the events in the Canary Islands were first and foremost a Spanish problem. He recalled how Germany had not benefited from any solidarity of its partners when it received record numbers of asylum-seekers from the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s."[128]

This was a clear statement which showed Member States' unwillingness to cooperation on combating illegal immigration because of their own interests. Additionally, the migration issue has not been carried effectively at the EU policy level for decades; the reason is Member States' reluctance at supranationalization.[129] Migration-related issues are still discussed on the intergovernmental basis. As Ceccorulli states:

> "[…] even if the European Union understands the importance of a comprehensive cross-pillar and multi-level approach towards migration, states are still struggling to keep away from completely harmonized asylum measures, refugees qualification and legal immigration provisions."[130]

2.2.1. The Evolution of the EU's Approach to Migration Until 2000s

When the European Economic Community (EEC) was first established, migration was not on the European policy agenda. The only thing regarding population movements was free movement of workers among Member States, which was a result of the establishment of internal market. Free movement of workers was extended to the

[128] Sarah Leonard, 'The "Securitization" of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School's Framework', Paper Presented at the SGIR Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference, Turin: Italy, 12-15 September 2007, p.26
[129] Michela Ceccorulli, 'Migration as a Security Threat: Internal and External Dynamics in the European Union', Forum on the Problems of Peace and War, *Garnet Working Paper*, No:65/09, Florence, April 2009, p.7
[130] Ibid., p.23

all citizens of Member States. While the free movement of persons was on the European policy agenda, the movement of third country nationals (TCNs) was not; because, the latter was not considered within the European Community's (EC) competence. The movement of TCNs, i.e. migration from outside of the EC, gained importance progressively. Ugur argues that the Council Regulation 1612/68 which distinguished the right of free movement of nationals of Member States from the right of free movement of nationals of third countries was an important attempt as it laid the foundation for "fortress Europe" in the area of immigration.[131]

The EC encouraged migration previously, but migration became an issue of public concern and started to get politicized in 1970s. In due course, migration has been seen as a danger due to its economic and political repercussions. Only after the achievement of free movement of person among Member States, and abolition of border controls, the Community started paying attention to migration.

As a consequence, the first intergovernmental working group – TREVI Group – which was responsible for terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, was established in 1976. The group was not directly related with migration; yet, "its scope was extended in 1985 to include illegal immigration and organized crime."[132] The first concrete step to tackle migration was the adoption of the Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration in 1985. The Guidelines roughly aimed at the equal treatment of all migrants whatever their origin.[133] Another important group was the intergovernmental ad hoc Working Group on Immigration, which aimed to coordinate asylum and immigration policies. Since 1980s in many intergovernmental conferences, asylum and immigration issue and TCNs' situation have been discussed.

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[131] Mehmet Ugur, 'Freedom of Movement vs. Exclusion: A Reinterpretiation of the "Insider" – "Outsider" Divide in the European Union', *International Migration Review*, Vol.29, No.4, p.967 and p.977, cited in Jef Huysmans, 'The European Union and The Securitization of Migration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.38, No.5, December 2000, p.754

[132] Georgios Karyotis, 'European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11: The Security-Migration Nexus', *Innovation*, Vol.20, No.1, 2007, p.4

[133] Demetrios G.Papademetriou, *Coming Together or Pulling Apart?: The European Union's Struggle With Immigration and Asylum*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1996, p.19

One of the most important milestones was the Single European Act (SEA) ensuring the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. It also required security measures to tackle problems of external borders; because, especially free movement of persons created a distinction between internal borders and external European Union borders. Another important development was the Schengen Agreement that was signed in 1985, and went into force in 1995. The Schengen Agreement aimed to abolish internal controls on the borders of signatory countries. Both the SEA and the Schengen Agreement required harmonization and strengthening of border controls at the external borders of the EC. In Article 7 of the Schengen Agreement this requirement is stated: "The parties shall endeavour to approximate as soon as possible their visa policies in order to avoid any adverse consequences that may result from the easing of controls at the common frontiers in the field of immigration and security that may result from easing checks at the common borders."[134]

In 1990s, many developments affected the progress of migration policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union, conflicts in Yugoslavia, and the Iraq War showed another aspect of migration. Especially due to the last two factors not only illegal migration, but also refugees and asylum seekers began to be perceived as security matters. An important attempt here was the Dublin Convention in 1990 which has restrictive and control-oriented basis.[135] The aim of the Dublin Convention was to avoid multiple applications of asylum seekers in the European Community and the evaluation of applications by no more than one country.[136] In addition to this, the Eurodac finger print data system was added to the 1990 Convention with the Dublin II Convention on 2003.[137] The developments regarding migration from 1970s to 1991 emphasized the strengthening of external border controls. Due to the abolition of internal borders, strength of the external borders came to the fore as an important issue.

[134] The Schengen Aquis as Referred to in article 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999, Official Journal of the European Communities, 22.09.2000, p.14
[135] Huysmans, 'The European Union and The Securitization of Migration', p.756
[136] Papademetriou, *Coming Together or Pulling Apart?: The European Union's Struggle With Immigration and Asylum*, p.41
[137] Ceccorulli, 'Migration as a Security Threat: Internal and External Dynamics in the European Union', p.8. Here one should not overlook the impact of September 11 attacks which will be analysed below.

In 1991, immigration and asylum issues were included to the EU's structure for the first time that by Maastricht Treaty which distinguished the competences between the EC Pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Pillar and the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar.[138] Immigration and asylum issues were put into the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. This pillar mainly had an intergovernmental structure. Cooperation among Member States was minimal and ineffective.

The EU tried to enhance cooperation among Member States by transferring immigration and asylum issues from third pillar to the first one, and committing to harmonize national policies with the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). However, the Member States' sensitivities regarding their national sovereignty have prevented them from taking effective measures, and creating a uniform approach. They have refrained from harmonizing their national legislation regarding immigration and asylum. Member States have ensured cooperation at lower levels internally and they have emphasized heavily control measures, and restrictive policies.

Although the EC/EU had tried to take necessary measures, these were not sufficient. The progress made in its immigration policy was limited because of the multidimensional dimension of the problem. Strengthening border controls and applying restrictive measures could only work up to a certain point. But they were not sufficient for approaching the issue from its all possible dimensions. As Huysmans contends:

> "For example, the increase of border controls at the external borders of the European Union does make it more difficult for some immigrants and refugees to enter the European Union. As a consequence some refugees will have to rely on human traffickers who can smuggle them into countries of European Union. This reinforces the image that refugees are not genuine refugees but economic immigrants illegally entering the country and claiming asylum when caught. In response, security agencies may come up with additional and/or more sophisticated ways of controlling immigration and asylum."[139]

Proactive policies such as cooperation and coordination with sending and transit countries are also necessary and crucial for gaining control over the issue. The

[138] Papademetriou, *Coming Together or Pulling Apart?: The European Union's Struggle With Immigration and Asylum*, p.59
[139] Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London: Routledge, 2006, p.58

Tampere European Council in 1999 pointed to the real causes of migration, and this required broad participation in policy formulation together with Member States as well as the transit and sending countries. As it was pointed out in the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council; an effective migration policy partnership with countries of origin and transit requires "combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights."[140]

From 1960s to 2000, migration issues have been handled in various forms. While migration had been encouraged by European states because of the lack of labour in the 1960s, it stopped in the 1970s. Member States developed their own policies regarding migration individually during these years. In the 1980s and 1990s, there were several attempts to tackle migration-related issues and problems on the EU basis. Although these attempts were successful to a certain extent, Member States did not achieve a common policy on the EU level. Consequently, the issue has remained on the intergovernmental basis.

2.2.2. The Evolution of the EU's Approach to Migration in the 2000s

In 2000s, the view that migration is a threat was strengthened. The reason is the subsequent terrorist attacks in New York, Pentagon, London and Madrid. Security aspect of migration became important and it was highly emphasized at the Council meetings that were held in the aftermath of these terrorist attacks. The Council Common Position on Combating Terrorism was prepared shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, on 27 December 2001. The linkage between migration and terrorism was clearly seen in the Articles 16 and 17 of this common position:

> "Article 16
>
> Appropriate measures shall be taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts. The Council notes the Commission's intention to put forward proposals in this area, where appropriate.

[140] Presidency Conclusions of Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm

Article 17

> Steps shall be taken in accordance with international law to ensure that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organisers or facilitators of terrorist acts and that claims of political motivation are not recognised as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists. The Council notes the Commission's intention to put forward proposals in this area, where appropriate."[141]

The European Council meeting in Seville in 2002 introduced four policy priorities in the realms of asylum and immigration. The first one was related with combating illegal immigration. The second one focused on coordination and integration of management of external borders. The third one was about the Union's relations with third countries. It was stated that the Union desired to integrate its immigration policy with those countries. The last one was related with legislative work on the framing of a common policy on immigration and asylum.[142]

The Member States have also given priority to migration and defined it as the first objective to be met. The measures such as, stricter border controls, information exchange system, visa requirements, and etc. have been taken depending on restrictive policies on migration. The aim was to make it more difficult to enter the EU's territories. The EU has also used its basic foreign policy instruments such as bilateral agreements, enlargement and pre-accession processes, European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans and regional cooperation in order to ensure coordination and the participation of third parties on migration issues.[143]

Cooperation on external border controls became operational with FRONTEX[144] in 2005. After subsequent enlargements in 2004 and 2007, FRONTEX became important due to the enlarged external borders of the EU. In addition to this, it must be noted that the EU has had to face regional problems because of its new periphery. Ceccorilli states: "[…] stability within the Union can be assured when stable

[141] Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on Combating Terrorism, Official Journal of the European Communities, 2001/930/CFSP, L 344/91
[142] Presidency Conclusions of Seville European Council, 21/22 June 2002, Brussels, 24 October 2002, pp.8-12
[143] Ceccorulli, 'Migration as a Security Threat: Internal and External Dynamics in the European Union', p.19
[144] The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, available at: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin.

is its outside edge."[145] This was the logic adopted and emphasized by the European Security Strategy, too: "It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed."[146] Once again the enlargement processes showed the importance of regional cooperation.

The Pact on Immigration and Asylum that was adopted by the Council of the EU in 2008 contributed to the development of a common immigration and asylum policy. In the context of the Pact, the European Council set five basic commitments which would continue to be transposed into concrete measures:

> "First, organise legal immigration to take account of the priorities, needs and reception capacities determined by each Member State, and encourage integration; second, control illegal immigration by ensuring that illegal immigrants return to their countries of origin or to a country of transit; third, make border controls more effective; fourth, construct a Europe of asylum; and fifth, create a comprehensive partnership with the countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between migration and development."[147]

At this point, what is needed is the implementation of the Pact in order to develop a common immigration and asylum policy. In addition, the Pact is an important attempt to ensure participation and coordination among origin, transit and destination countries as understood from its commitments.

European Commission has also emphasized the significance of migration stating that from the perspective of the EU, it is both a challenge and an opportunity.[148] The Commission got involved in the process and prepared communications,[149] through which Member States would be encouraged to develop a coordinated and integrated approach towards immigration. Although the EU had taken initiatives related to

[145] Ceccorulli, 'Migration as a Security Threat: Internal and External Dynamics in the European Union', p.12
[146] Council of The European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', p.7 and 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy –Providing Security in a Changing World' , S407/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008, p.6
[147] Council of the European Union, 'The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum', Brussels, 24 September 2008, p.4
[148] European Commission, 'An Opportunity and A Challenge: Migration in the European Union', Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2009
[149] Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Common Immigration Policy, COM (2007) 780 final, Brussels, 5 December 2007 and A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools, COM (2008) 359 final, Brussels, 17 June 2008

migration to develop a common European immigration policy in 2007 and 2008,[150] these attempts were insufficient; because the Member States were reluctant to harmonize their national legislation. This is mainly because Member States wanted to deal with the issue on their own, or at the intergovernmental level.

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which regulates immigration issues under Title V "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice", pointed to the need to develop a common immigration policy and the Member States' reluctance to harmonize national legislation. In the Article 79 of the Treaty of Lisbon it was stated that,

> "1. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy […] 4. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States."[151]

Consequently, even this last basic treaty of the EU showed that immigration has not become communitarized sufficiently, and the Member States do not tend to empower the EU regarding immigration. Therefore, immigration has remained as an intergovernmental issue.

2.3. Securitization of Migration in Europe

The country that faces migrant inflows might see migration as a threat against national security as well as domestic and international stability. Jef Huysmans argues that securitization of migration in the EU has three interrelated themes: internal security, cultural security and the welfare state.[152]

According to the European Internal Security Strategy:

> "The concept of internal security must be understood as a wide and comprehensive concept which straddles multiple sectors in order to address these major threats [such as terrorism, serious and organised crime, drug trafficking, cybercrime, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography, economic crime

[150] Ibid.
[151] The Treaty of Lisbon, Official Journal of the European Union, 2010/C 83/01, Vol.53, 30 March 2010, p.83/77-83/78
[152] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, p.69 and see also Huysmans, 'The European Union and The Securitization of Migration', p.758

> and corruption, trafficking in arms and cross-border crime] and others which have a direct impact on the lives, safety and well-being of citizens…"[153]

Thus, internal security does not regard only internal borders; yet, in the context of European integration process, it also contains external borders.[154] This is because, "[it] is crucial to understand that internal security cannot be reduced to the national territory. […] internal security has developed on a European scale."[155]

Internal security points to the internal market security here, therefore, securitization of migration in terms of internal market refers to the free movement of people. Bigo states:

> "Internal security will include undertaking activities such as surveillance of clandestine immigration, surveillance of cultural, religious and social influences from the country of origin of migrants and even on their offspring, surveillance and maintenance of order in so called problem districts, and control of transborder flows."[156]

Additionally, "[o]ne expected that the market would not only improve free movement of law-abiding agents, but would also facilitate illegal and criminal activities by terrorists, international criminal organizations, asylum-seekers and immigrants."[157] Thus, securitization of migration regarding internal security, as mentioned above, emerged on the basis of internal market; that is, free movement of people.

Cultural security is one of the components of securitization of migration because the European states have seen immigration as a threat to cultural homogeneity. Huysmans argues: "Migration and supporters of a liberal multiculturalism are among the internal and external enemies challenging the rescue of the national tradition and the protection of western civilization."[158]

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[153] 'Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards A European Security Model', Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, p.8
[154] Didier Bigo, 'When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe', in Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, London: Routledge, 2000, p.172-173
[155] Ibid., p.183
[156] Ibid., p.172
[157] Huysmans, 'The European Union and The Securitization of Migration', p.760
[158] Ibid., p.762

Cultural security is related to cultural identity and belonging; so the question of migration and the politics of belonging are connected.[159] Immigrants and asylum-seekers that come from the Third World are seen as culturally different. On the other hand, while skilled foreign labourers are seen as culturally similar, the asylum-seekers are perceived as culturally different.[160] In addition to those, securitization of migration in terms of cultural security generates and then uses racism and xenophobia as its tools.

Finally, the welfare state is an important motivation for people who aim at migrating and benefiting from its social and economic rights. However, national citizens do not tend to share these rights with asylum-seekers and immigrants. Because they see immigrants as economic burden for the welfare state, this interpretation brings out welfare chauvinism.[161] Welfare chauvinism emphasizes cultural homogeneity of the nation state by using the cultural identity and belonging issues and immigrants are portrayed as illegitimate recipients of welfare system of a community that they do not belong to.[162]

The reasons of securitization of migration in Europe can be classified into three groups. First is the political will and vested interests of politicians. Second is related to economics, which shows migrants as a threat and a boon. The third one is that securitization of migration is seen as a basis for the new threats such as organized crime, drug and human trafficking, etc.

2.3.1. Political Reasons for the Securitization of Migration

The terms migration, security and identity are socially constructed and subjective concepts. Hence, "who is defining the term and who benefits by defining the terms in a given way"[163] is important. This statement opens up the way to securitization, which is used by state representatives or elites, especially politicians, for taking control over any issue. It is noteworthy to remember that, they can put "national security

[159] Wæver, 'Societal Security: The Concept', p.17
[160] Huysmans, 'The European Union and The Securitization of Migration', p.764
[161] Ibid., p.767
[162] Ibid., p.768
[163] Nazli Choucri, 'Migration and Security: Some Key Linkages', *Journal of International Affairs*, vol.56:1, pp.98-122, 2002, cited in Yannis A.Stivachtis, 'International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security', *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2008, p.1

dress"[164] on any issue and, "[i]n some instances, state leaders use reference to state and sovereignty; in others, to nation and identity. […] actors of traditional political form who are bidding for state power but do not possess it use references to nation more than state."[165]

This serves politicians' vested interests effectively. Once migration is defined as a threat against national security, the connection between migrants and criminality is set up; this may cause xenophobia within society whether migration is a real existential threat or not. As a consequence, the government in power may be affected by the rise of right-wing and anti-immigration political parties, and popular demand for anti-immigration policies.

In some European countries, "[r]ight leaning political parties tend to promote stricter policies towards immigrants and may reinforce negative stereotypes concerning immigrants being a threat to economic or cultural stability."[166] For example, in May 2005 United Kingdom (UK) elections, the Conservative Party produced a manifesto regarding migration which pointed to control measures and also established a migration-threat-security linkage. The manifesto states:

> "[…] an immigration system which is now out of control – which is undermining good community relations, placing an ever-increasing burden on our public services and threatens our very security.
>
> We face a real terrorist threat in Britain today – a threat to our way of life, to our liberties. But we have absolutely no idea who is coming into or leaving our country. There are a quarter of a million failed asylum seekers living in our country today. No one knows who they are or where they are.
>
> To defeat the terrorist threat we need action not talk – action to secure our borders."[167]

In this manifesto, the Conservatives have presented the issue as a threat to security, their way of life and etc. By doing this, they aimed at gaining more votes. This

[164] Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', p.54
[165] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, op.cit., p.123
[166] Elisa Rustenbach, 'Sources of Negative Attitudes Towards Immigrants: A Multi-level Analysis', *International Migration Review*, Vol.44, Issue.1, Spring 2010, p.69
[167] Extract from the speech by Michael Howard on 2005, cited in: R. Capdevila and J. Callaghan, '"It's not racist. It's common sense." A Critical Analysis of Political Discourse Around Asylum and Immigration in the UK', *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, Vol.18, Issue.1, Northampton, 2008, p.9-10

is because, even if the content of the manifesto was really true, the important point here was the time when it was presented: during the UK elections.

Another instance from Europe is France. Nicolas Sarkozy who is the former French President gained elections with the help of his anti-immigration rhetoric. As Lequesne and Rozenberg state:

> "As Home Affairs minister and during the 2007 campaign for the Presidency, Sarkozy put the question of immigration at the top of his agenda. His successful electoral strategy was to capture the extreme right voters to the detriment of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front. After his election in May 2007, he chose to continue in this direction […]"[168]

In addition, the Pact on Immigration was prepared in 2008 during the French Presidency of the EU. Thus, Sarkozy put immigration and asylum issues onto the European agenda and this was seen as a continuation of his national policy.[169] During 2012 elections campaign, Sarkozy used anti-immigration rhetoric again in order to gain Marine Le Pen's National Front's votes against his important rival François Hollande.[170] Hence, it can be seen from here and several other instances that politicians use anti-immigration rhetoric as a bargaining tool to influence citizens' opinion and behaviour[171] – especially in order to gain more votes.

Another example, LAOS (Laikos Orthotoxos Synagermos), which is one of the right-wing parties in Greece, takes migration as a negative issue. In a speech Konstantinos A. Plevris (the member of parliament of LAOS) stated: "For us immigration is a problem." In another speech, he contended: "Immigration is the biggest national problem in the country."[172] Plevris defined immigration as a national problem, and in this way he used the securitization framework. This shows that political

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[168] Christian Lequesne and Oliver Rozenberg, 'The French Presidency of 2008: The Unexpected Agenda', *Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies*, 2008:3op, Stockholm, November 2008, p.30
[169] Ibid.
[170] 'French President Nicolas Sarkozy Pledges Tough Anti-immigration Policies in Bid to Win Elections', http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/french-president-nicolas-sarkozy-pledges-1120030, 24.04.2012
[171] Ricard Zapata-Barrero, 'Anti-immigration Populism: Can Local Intercultural Policies Close the Space?', *Discussion Paper for Policy Network*, December 2011, p.4
[172] 'The immigration discourse of a Greek radical right party', available at: http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/642_292.pdf, retrieved on: 07.02.2013

parties use securitization in their campaigns to obtain political power and gain popularity.

2.3.2. Economic Reasons for the Securitization of Migration

The economic aspect of migration has two dimensions. Migration is seen either as a challenge or an opportunity depending on the way it is defined, and by whom it is defined. On the one hand, migrants who are considered as "jobtakers" or "damagers" of welfare state may be regarded as challenging citizens' benefits and threatening the economic stability of the receiving state. This is because, migrants are usually numerous and poor.[173] It is thought that they may strain the housing, education, transportation and communication services of the welfare state; they may increase consumption and the state may try to preserve its welfare by increasing taxes.[174] Citizens tend to believe that they will be affected by this situation mainly in three ways. First, they may face unemployment since migrants are more preferable due to their lower wage rates in the labour market. Second, as explained above, citizens may have to pay more taxes depending on the increases in the burden to the welfare state. And last, citizens may not want to share benefits of welfare state with foreigners with whom they do not have common roots. As Canoy et.al. state: "If migrants are unemployed they are easily perceived as 'welfare scroungers' who do not contribute to the welfare of the society. Even if they are employed, they are sometimes presented as 'stealing the jobs' of natives."[175] As a result, once migration is defined as a threat in this situation, securitization of migration gets facilitated. This also serves politicians who have vested interests in defining migration as a threat, especially during election campaigns.

On the other hand, it is a reality that European states need migrants to ensure workforce in labour market. Low fertility rates and ageing population in Europe have caused a decrease in its labour force. It is expected that Europe will need 20 million

[173] Stivachtis, 'International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security', p.17
[174] Martin O. Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry, 'Migration and the Links Between Social and Societal Security', in Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (eds.), *Identity, Migration and The New Security Agenda in Europe*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1993, p.155-157
[175] Marcel Canoy, et.al, 'Migration and Public Perception', Bureau of European Policy Adversaries (BEPA): European Commission, 09.10.2006, p.17 available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/publications/docs/bepa_migration_final_09_10_006_en.pdf

workers by the year 2030 and 65 million by 2050.[176] To sustain the growth of the economy in Europe, migrant labour is required. However, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron said what they need is not mass immigration but good immigration.[177] The word "mass" is important; because, the use of the words "mass", "flood", "invasion", etc. allows for securitization without making a more complex argument[178] and "portray[s] immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees as a serious threat to the survival of the socio-economic system" as Huysmans argues.[179] Consequently, securitization of migration in the economic realm has caused a dichotomy, and migrants are characterized either as threat or as boon depending on the person defining them.

2.3.3. Security Reasons for the Securitization of Migration

The security dimension came to the fore especially after the Cold War. The state-centric view of security was diminished and new security challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, migration, environmental degradations, economic and political instability were created. Analyzing these challenges one can see that the general tendency has been to show migration as the root cause of other problems. For example, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the EU tried to increase control measures in borders and adopted more restrictive immigration policies. This was mainly because, there was a general belief that migrants were behind these attacks. As a consequence, securitization of migration served to explain new threats and provided basis to them.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the EU held the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting in 20 September 2001. The Council invited "the Commission to examine *urgently* the relationship between safeguarding internal

[176] Zuhal Yeşilyurt Gündüz, 'From "Necessary" to "Dangerous" and Back Again? The Economization, Securitization and Europeanization of Migration', *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Annual 12, 2007, p.83
[177] 'David Cameron: Good immigration, not mass immigration', http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2011/04/David_Cameron_Good_immigration_not_mass_immigration.aspx, 14.04.2011.
[178] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, p.48
[179] Huysmans, 'The European Union and The Securitization of Migration', p.769

security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments."[180] As a response to the Council, the Commission prepared a Working Paper. According to this Working Paper, the EU put forth a set of restrictive measures, especially in the case of exclusion of refugees and asylum-seekers. For instance the Paper states:

> "In determining the applicable standard of proof in exclusion procedures, it has to be acknowledged that exclusion proceedings do not amount to a full criminal trial. The term '*serious reasons for considering'*, used in the chapeau to article 1 (F), should be interpreted as meaning that the rules on the admissibility of evidence and the high standard of proof required in criminal proceedings do not need to apply in this respect. There is therefore no need to prove that the person has committed the act, which may justify the exclusion from refugee status. It is sufficient to establish that there are serious reasons for considering that the person has committed those acts."[181]

In view of this statement, it can be argued that the reasons for the exclusion of refugees may be open-ended sometimes. On the other hand, in many cases, the EU has tried to justify those restrictive measures by using "public order" and "domestic/national security" clauses.

Additionally, it can be understood from an overall analysis of the Paper that the EU has a tendency to present refugees and asylum-seekers as potential criminals and even terrorists. As a result, the wording of this Working Paper represents a clear securitizing act in which migration is merged with terrorism.[182]

The rhetoric on the linkage between migration, crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and etc. has been excessively employed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks; yet, it was also underlined previously. For example, Margaret Thatcher stated: "We joined Europe to have free movement of goods… not …to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal diseases and illegal immigrants."[183] Through such a wording she made many people think about migration in criminological terms. Another example, in this regard, was the subway bombing in France in 1995

[180] Commission of the European Union, 'Commission Working Document', COM(2001), 743 Final, Brussels, 05.12.2001, p.2, emphasis added
[181] Ibid., p.11, emphasis original
[182] Karyotis, 'European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11: The Security-Migration Nexus', p.7
[183] Margaret Thatcher's Interview with Daily Mail, 18.05.1989, cited in Mekonnen Tesfahuney, 'Mobility, Racism and Geopolitics', *Political Geography*, Vol.17, No.5, Great Britain, 1998, p.506

which "relaunched the surveillance of all immigrant associations and the strengthening of legislation concerning not only terrorism but immigration and political asylum."[184]

Consequently, as Faist states: "Immigration can be referred to by politicians in explaining many social, economic and security problems – such as unemployment, housing shortages, crime – without having to give concrete evidence because the effects of immigration are empirically hard to establish."[185] Therefore, migration issues have been emphasized when negative events occur and migrants have become scapegoats. In addition to this, it is noteworthy that the reasons of securitization of migration – political, economic and security – are intertwined and usually depend on the self-other distinction.

2.4. Anti-immigration Discourses in Europe

Anti-immigration discourses and policies have been employed in several European countries. Terrorist attacks and the financial crises have shaped discourses of politicians and elites regarding immigration; and, justified anti-immigration policies. The 2010 elections in Netherlands was an important evidence of securitization of migration, in which the hard-right anti-immigration party of Geert Wilders – the Freedom Party (PVV) – raised its seats in the parliament from 9 to 24; this showed how popular the securitization of migration had become. In his discourses Wilders expressed anti-immigration and anti-Islam ideas. Philips reported: "He wants to stop islamicisation of Netherlands, impose a tax on headscarves and deport Muslims from Europe."[186] In addition to this, in his speech on Dutch TV, Wilders told: "We are the biggest winner today. The Netherlands chose more security, less crime, less immigration and less Islam."[187] These statements are clear securitizing speech acts that serve the securitizing actor's interests.

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[184] Bigo, 'When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe', p.187
[185] Thomas Faist, '"Extension du Domaine de la Tutte": International Migration and Security Before and After September 11,2001', *International Migration Review*, Vol.36, No.1, Spring 2002, p.12
[186] Leigh Phillips, 'Netherlands to elect EU-wary liberal', http://euobserver.com/political/30243, 09.06.2010.
[187] 'Dutch election: Liberals take one-seat lead as far-right party grows in influence', http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/7816382/Dutch-election-Liberals-take-one-seat-lead-as-far-right-party-grows-in-influence.html, 10.06.2010.

In the Nordic states, hard-right political parties have gained visibility with their populist and anti-immigration rhetoric in recent years. The party of Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), which is known for its racist and anti-immigration policies, has also used the security speech act against migration in Europe. The Swedish Democrats' anti-immigration and anti-Muslim statements gained some popularity in this regard. The party leader Jimmie Akesson wrote in daily Aftonbladet on 19 October 2009: "The Muslims are our greatest threat – as a Swedish Democrat, I see this as our greatest foreign threat since the Second World War and I promise to do all within my power to turn this trend when we go to elections."[188] This was an important example of the speech act that reached its aim in 2010 elections. The Swedish Democrats gained 20 seats in the parliament and it was the first time that they got such a big success. In addition to this, in Finland, another Nordic State, a survey by Finnish daily Helsingin Sanomat showed that the 60 percent of Finns were opposing immigration to their country.[189] Another anti-immigration party is Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) that won 28 seats in local elections in Vienna in 2010.[190]

One of the most important principles that the EU has set up, is respect for human rights. However, when the European countries securitize migration, this principle is ignored. Securitization of migration has, in many cases, inevitably led to practices that contradict the notion of respect for human rights. The relations between Italy and Libya during the dictatorship of Qaddafi are evidence that Italy securitizes migration at the expense of human rights. This is because; Libya was seen as a guard for Italy and in general for the EU and the authoritarian regime of the Country was not effectively sanctioned by the EU and Italy.

The Treaty on Friendship Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya was signed in 2008. In accordance with the Treaty, Italy took measures which may be evaluated as extraordinary. As Ronzitti states:

> "Article 19 of the Treaty calls for two things […]. On the one hand, previous agreements and protocols on immigration, in particular those stipulated in 2007, are to

[188] Helena Spongenberg, 'Populism on the rise in the Nordic Region', http://euobserver.com/news/30797, 16.09.2010.
[189] Ibid.
[190] Lisbeth Kirk, 'Far-right gain in Vienna elections', http://euobserver.com/tickers/111781, 11.10.2010.

> be implemented, and the approximately 2000 km of Libyan coast patrolled by mixed crews on patrol boats provided by Italy. Six patrol boats were supposed to enter into operation on 15 May 2009. On the other, Libyan land borders are to be controlled by a satellite detection system jointly financed by Italy and the European Union."[191]

According to this Treaty and previous agreements and protocols, Italy started to return refugees, asylum seekers and migrants that intercepted in international waters, back to Libya at the expense of human rights and international law. In 2009, Italian coastguard vessels transported individuals to Tripoli without checking if any individuals on board were in need of international protection or basic humanitarian assistance.[192] Considering that Libya is not a party to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention, the importance of this relation between Italy and Libya can be better analysed. Libya does not receive any claim of asylum, maintains the use of death penalty, generally against foreigners, who are vulnerable due to insufficient translation services and lack of immediate access to their consular representatives.[193] Moreover, the EU and Libya have agreed on migration cooperation agenda on 5 October 2010.[194] As a result, Amnesty International Report on Human Rights criticized members of the EU for ignoring human rights concerns in Libya because of their demands to decrease immigration from Africa to Europe.[195] It was obviously stated in the report as:

> "Members of the EU have been actively seeking the collaboration of Libya in controlling the flow of migrants to European shores – turning a blind eye to Libya's dire human rights record, the absence of a functioning asylum system in Libya, and persistent reports of the abuse and ill-treatment of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants."[196]

This situation has remained unchanged even after the end of the regime in Libya in 2011. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) states it as: "It is worrying that, although the European political establishment is well aware of the situation of insecurity faced by migrants and asylum seekers in Libya and the serious

[191] Natalino Ronzitti, 'The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?', *Bulletin of Italian Politics*, Vol.1, No.1, 2009, p.130
[192] "'Libya of Tomorrow' What Hope for Human Rights", Amnesty International Publications, United Kingdom, 2010, p.93
[193] Ibid., p.11
[194] 'European Commission and Libya Agree a Migration Cooperation Agenda during High Level Visit to Boost EU-Libya Relations', Memo 10/472, Brussels, 5 October 2010.
[195] 'Libya of Tomorrow' What Hopes for Human Rights, p.94
[196] Ibid., p.93

violation of their human rights, the objective of controlling migration continues to outweigh all other considerations."[197]

Additionally, while the EU, on the one hand, has included an essential element clause regarding respect for human rights, in its bilateral trade and cooperation agreements, on the other hand, it is noteworthy that both the EU and Italy – as a founding member – have led to disappointment because of their relations with Libya. Consequently, those relations have demonstrated "the dominance of domestic interests over human rights considerations."[198]

More importantly, these issues are overlooked by the EU because migration is securitized in terms of its linkage with terrorism. While the real problem should be the free movement of terrorists, a new paranoia is created, in which every single person moving freely across the borders is perceived as a potential terrorist. For that reason, as Bigo said fight against terrorism has served as a justification for strengthening control mechanisms[199] and securitization of migration.

The former European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, Franco Frattini, said in his speech in 2006: "It is clear that for the European Union, the fight against terrorism and the management of migration flows are the main, current priorities."[200] The important point here is that Frattini used terrorism and migration phrases in the same sentence and gave them main priority. As it was said before, the absolute/main priority is very significant in analyzing securitization and finally justifying it. The association of migration with terrorism through such rhetoric has surely helped securitization of migration, carrying it to a new and different level.

Adam Walker who is a staff manager of British National Party (BNP), described immigrants as "savage animals" and "filth" while he was working as a

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[197] 'Libya: The Hounding of Migrants Must Stop', International Federation for Human Rights, Paris, 2012, p.34

[198] Emanuela Paoletti, 'Migration Agreements Between Italy and North Africa: Domestic Imperatives versus International Norms', *Middle East Institute*, December 19, 2012, p.4

[199] Didier Bigo, 'Immigration Controls and Free Movement in Europe', *International Review of Red Cross*, Vol.91, No.875, September 2009, p.588

[200] 'Management of Migration flows' - Speech by EU Commission VP Frattini, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_6294_en.htm, Strasbourg, 27.09.2006.

technology teacher at a college.[201] The Secretary General of the Solidarity Trade Union Pat Harrington, however, said that Walker did not describe immigrants as savage animals, he actually said "those immigrants who had been convicted of raping and murdering British people were savage animals."[202] Even if this was the case, it is still not a proper use, because the emphasis is on immigrants. Although these accusations are significant for both natives and immigrants, Walker pointed especially to the immigrants and got into a significant act of othering which would lead to and/or facilitate more securitization.

BNP leader Nick Griffin said in an interview with the BBC in 2009: "[…] the only measure, sooner or later which is going to stop immigration and stop large numbers of sub-Saharan Africans dying on the way to get over here is to get very tough with those coming over. Frankly they need to sink several of these boats."[203] In addition to this, he said "Europe has sooner or later to close its borders or its simply going to be swamped by the Third World."[204] In his interview Nick Griffin obviously securitized migration. He pointed to being "swamped by the Third World", and argued that the boats of undocumented migrants should be sank. These thoughts surely raise questions about humanity and the measure he proposes (sinking the boats) surely refer to the most extreme case of extraordinary measures used in securitization; showing how securitization can really be dangerous.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in her Potsdam speech in 16 October 2010, told: "[…] the multicultural approach and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other has failed, utterly failed."[205] The Governor of Bavaria, Horst Seehofer, of the Christian Social Union (CSU) also said that Germany should end immigration from Turkey and

[201] 'BNP activist cleared of intolerance on online comments', http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/8703184.stm, 25.05.2010.
[202] 'Solidarity Welcomes Abolition of GTC but Dismisses Gove's Comments as "Uninformed at Best and Lies at Worst"', http://www.bnp.org.uk/news/solidarity-welcomes-abolition-gtc-dismisses-gove%E2%80%99s-comments-%E2%80%9Cuninformed-best-and-lies-worst%E2%80%9D
[203] 'Sink immigrants' boats – Griffin', http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8141069.stm, 08.07.2009.
[204] Ibid.
[205] Leigh Phillips, 'Merkel stokes anti-immigrant discourse in Germany', http://euobserver.com/political/31062, 18.10.2010.

Arab countries and they do not need additional immigration from other cultures.[206] The phrase "other cultures" is important because securitization of migration contains othering or depends heavily on distinction between the self and others.

The former President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy made an obvious link between crime and immigration in his Grenoble speech in July 2010. He said: "[…] crime was driven by permissiveness and uncontrolled immigration."[207] On the other hand, he stated: "French nationality should be stripped from any person of foreign origin who voluntarily tries to take the life of a policeman, gendarme or other figure of public authority."[208] His emphasis on "foreign origin" should be highlighted because the same crime by natives and people of foreign origin must normally be seen as the same and equally punished with the same penalty. This emphasis by former French President was a significant speech act which facilitated securitization, if not started it. In addition to this, the destruction of Romani camps and deportation of Romas to Romania and Bulgaria from France as a part of wider security clampdown was also announced by Nicolas Sarkozy.[209] These can be seen as extraordinary measures which are important for securitization.

In his speech David Cameron, the Prime Minister of United Kingdom, in 2011 said: "[…] during the election campaign, Conservatives made a clear commitment to British people […] that we would aim to reduce net immigration to the levels we saw in the 1980s and 1990s."[210] This is a clear statement showing how politicians use immigration discourse in their election campaigns to gain popular support. On the other hand, the Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice Damian Green stated: "[…] one of the biggest challenges of our Government is immigration […] the country needs a tough, practical immigration policy that pushes the numbers down. Down to

[206] Ibid.
[207] 'Sarkozy Suggests Some Violent Criminals Be Stripped of French Nationality – Bloomberg', http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-30/sarkozy-suggests-some-violent-criminals-be-stripped-of-french-nationality.html, 30.07.2010.
[208] Ibid. and see also Honor Mahony, 'Sarkozy accused of aping the far-right', http://euobserver.com/justice/30570, 02.08.2010.
[209] Honor Mahony, 'Italy to raise EU citizen expulsion policy at September meeting', http://euobserver.com/news/30657, 23.08.2010.
[210] 'David Cameron: Good immigration, not mass immigration', http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2011/04/David_Cameron_Good_immigration_not_mass_immigration.aspx, 14.04.2011.

levels where people feel comfortable. Down to the levels which ease the strains on housing, schools and the health service. Down to levels which help all our communities live at ease with one another."[211] As a securitizing actor Green pointed to the immigrants as "the biggest challenge", and defended extraordinary measures. In addition to these, the Home Secretary Theresa May in her speech in 2011 told: "[…] we know what damage uncontrolled immigration can do. To our society, as communities struggle to cope with rapid change. To our infrastructure, as our housing stock and transport system become overloaded. And to our public services, as schools and hospitals have to cope with a sudden increase in demand."[212] In this speech, Ms. May uses a similar language with the aim of influencing people. Her speech can be seen a clear justification of why the Copenhagen School takes security as a negative value and prefers desecuritization to securitization.

Concluding Remarks

Population movement i.e. migration is an ancient phenomenon. People have moved from one place to another throughout history. There has been a set of reasons which led to migration. These are mainly in two forms: pull and push factors. Both the pull factors of the receiving country and push factors of the sending country affect the migration trend. In addition, there are several types of migration such as labour migration, family reunification, asylum-seekers, refugees and etc.

In the context of labour migration, migration towards Europe has come to the forefront, especially after the end of the World War II. Europe needed labour to recover its industry and economy after the World War II. In this regard, migration was encouraged by several European countries. However, they stopped recruitment from abroad later on due to the economic crisis. Migration continued in the form of family reunification in those days. After 1970s, migration became politicized; it turned in to an issue of public concern. In the aftermath of the Cold War, as a consequence of the

[211] 'Green: A tough, practical immigration policy', http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2011/10/Green_A_tough_practical_immigration_policy.aspx, 04.10.2011.
[212] 'May: Conservative values to fight crime and cut immigration', http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2011/10/May_Conservative_values_to_fight_crime_and_cut_immigration.aspx, 04.10.2011.

collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent states emerged in Central and Eastern Europe and this also added a new dimension to migration. It was thought that a large scale population movement would occur from those states. The development gap between West and East led to concern in Europe. However, such a mass movement did not occur.

On the other hand, migration and migration related issues have been put onto the European policy agenda. This is because; developments regarding migration have coincided with the establishment of the internal market which ensures free movement of people. Following the abolition of internal borders, the EU has taken restrictive control measures at the external borders. Thus, the situation has led to the emergence of a security driven rhetoric which have been intensified as a result of 9/11 attacks, Madrid and London events.

Securitization of migration is clearly seen in the anti-immigration discourses of European politicians. They try to move migration issues from the realm of normal politics to the realm of high politics. This situation is different and beyond ensuring public awareness. Thus, it is a clear securitizing act which might end up in panic politics.

In this chapter, migration has been explained both conceptually and historically in order to see how migration has been turned into a security matter via the securitarian rhetoric. As a result, in this chapter, it has been showed that migration, which European politicians define as a threat, is a socially constructed phenomenon. Thus, its meaning depends on the purpose according to which it is defined as well as how it is defined and by whom it is defined. That is, securitization of migration is a political choice. The next chapter looks into how this political choice with regard to migration affects Turkey-EU relations.

III. SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN TURKEY-EU RELATIONS: A POLITICAL CHOICE

Economic (labour) migration between Turkey and Europe started in 1950s individually and in 1960s as a state based policy. Turkey signed bilateral recruitment agreements with several European states in 1960s. The guest worker system, thus, emerged in this period. This was a well functioning system until the economic conditions changed in 1970s. In addition to this, political developments in Turkey affected migration trend to Europe dramatically in 1980s. Asylum applications increased in 1980s and in 1990s both from Turkey and neighbours of Turkey due to political developments and the conflict in the country's south eastern region.

In this context, Turkey's geographical location which seems as a bridge between Eastern countries and Europe, gains importance with regard to the migration trend towards Europe. That is, Turkey has been as a transit country for migration besides being a sending country. Many people who aim at migrating to Europe pass Turkey's territories. Turkey's being a transit country is important when people head to Europe *illegally*. On the other hand, Turkey is also a receiving country since the early years of the Republic mainly because of the historical ties with its neighbours. In addition, Turkey also receives migrants from Europe in the recent years.

This chapter analyses migration in Turkey-EU relations and securitization of migration in terms of internal security, cultural identity, and the welfare state in this regard. In the internal security aspect, securitization of migration is related to free movement of Turkish labour (migrants). In the cultural security aspect, securitization of migration is about Turkish identity – especially in terms of its Islamic orientation – that is regarded as alien. In the welfare state aspect, securitization of migration is related to consumption of benefits of the welfare state and perceiving migrants as welfare state damagers and job takers. All these analyses show that securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations is a political choice due to the absence of reasonable motives.

3.1. Migration in Turkey-EU Relations

After the end of World War II, Western Europe started to repair and reconstruct itself, yet there was a lack of labour force to do this. In 1950s, many Western European countries started to encourage migration for the purpose of providing labour force. They demanded migrant workers and received them from Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey.

The migration aspect of Turkey-EU relations can be divided mainly into three periods. The first is the guest worker system that began with bilateral agreements in 1960s. The second is the period of family reunification, which started in 1970s when European countries stopped recruitment from abroad because of economic stagnation. The last is the period of the asylum seekers and refugees that emerged in 1980s and 1990s.

Migration relations between Turkey and Europe began in 1950s on an individual basis.[213] Accordingly, people who wanted to immigrate to Europe, applied on their own (not through any institution[214]). However, this situation changed and became systematic in 1960s because, bilateral labour recruitment agreements were signed between Turkey and some European countries such as Germany (in 1961); the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria (in 1964); France (in 1965); and, Sweden (in 1967).[215] The guest worker system that did not ensure permanent settlement was created according to these bilateral agreements. The creation of the guest worker system coincided with the establishment of the association relationship between Turkey and the European Community (EC). The Ankara Agreement that was signed in 1963 contained an important phrase regarding labour. It is stated in Article 12 of the agreement that parties shall ensure the free movement of labour gradually. This was an important attempt in terms of labour migration from Turkey to Europe.

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[213] Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı, 'İşgücü Piyasası Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu-Yurtdışında Yaşayan Türkler Alt Komisyonu Raporu', DPT:2642-ÖİK:650, Ankara, 2001, p.1

[214] Such as Turkish Employment Organization.

[215] Çiğdem Akkaya, 'Avrupa Birliği Ülkelerinde Yaşayan Türkler ve Türkiye'nin AB'ye Entegrasyonu Kapsamındaki Rolleri', *Üyelik Perspektifinde Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri Tebliğ Metinleri*, 2004 Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, Cilt:9, p.207

According to the initial arrangements, guest workers were expected to return to Turkey after a certain period of time that is, when the receiving countries no longer needed them. In due course, this guest worker system was altered, because the workers who emigrated from Turkey did not have any intention to go back. Additionally, their family members had also gone to Europe under the name of family reunification in 1970s, when European countries stopped labour migration because of the oil crisis (in 1973) and economic stagnation. The signing of the Additional Protocol was an important development in these years. The Protocol was signed between Turkey and the EC in order to put into practice the Ankara Agreement. The importance of the Protocol, regarding migration, stemmed from its articles that have a set of aims to ensure free movement of labour in the following 22 years and equal rights with that of other states' labour.[216] Moreover, according to Article 37 of the Additional Protocol, "[…] the rules which each Member State applies to workers of Turkish nationality employed in the Community shall not discriminate on the grounds of nationality […]."[217] It can be seen from this article that the Community was against discrimination on the basis of nationality. On the other hand, while developments were as such between Turkey and the EC, some European countries reduced the migration flow but could not stop migration as a whole in 1970s.

Migration from Turkey to the European Union (EU) continued in a transformed way in 1980s and 1990s. The new forms of migrants were asylum seekers and refugees as well as illegal migrants. Political developments in 1980s – especially the coup d'état in Turkey in 1980 – resulted in human rights abuses and asylum-seeking. Applications for asylum-seeking continued in 1990s mainly because of the Kurdish problem and the living conditions in Turkey's South Eastern regions.[218]

[216] For more information see Articles 36, 37, 39 of the Additional Protocol and Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement.
[217] Additional Protocol, Official Journal of European Communities, Vol.16, No C 113/27, 24 December 1973, Article 37
[218] Ahmet İçduygu, 'Europe, Turkey and International Migration: An Uneasy Negotiation', Presentation at The Migration Working Group, European University Institute, 26 January 2011, p.8

Migration that occurred after 1973 was not only in the form of labour migration, but also in the forms of family reunification and asylum-seeking, which became a general population movement.

> "The evolution of migration from Turkey to Europe was impressive. Starting with the outflow of a few Turkish migrants in late 1961, there were more than half a million Turkish migrants and their relatives living in Europe by the early 1970s, almost two million by the early 1980s, more than two and a half million by the early 1990s, and over three million by the early 2000s."[219]

In the aforementioned three periods, Turkey was traditionally perceived as an emigration country; that is, a sending country. However, Turkey has also been a receiving country since the early years of establishment of the Republic; and a transit country especially since 1980s. Turkey as a receiving country has faced migration because of its historical and religious ties with its near abroad. Turkey has received migrants from Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asian and the Middle Eastern countries due to economic and political problems in those places.[220] On the other hand, Turkey has received migrants not only from those countries but also from European countries. As İçduygu states, "[…] an increasing number of foreign nationals arrive in Turkey for work or education"[221] from the West. In addition to this, Turkey is also a destination country for European retired migrants.[222]

On the other hand, Turkey as a transit country has faced migration because of its geographical location. Turkey is seen as a bridge between European, Asian and African continents and surrounded by four seas on three sides. As a consequence of this geographical location, many people who face several problems – e.g. economic, political and security – in their home countries head to Turkey in order to pass to the developed countries of the West.[223]

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[219] Ibid.
[220] Serdar Ünal and Gülsen Demir, 'Göç, Kimlik ve Aidiyet Bağlamında Türkiye'de Balkan Göçmenleri', *VI. Ulusal Sosyoloji Kongresi Bildiri Kitabı*, VI. Ulusal Sosyoloji Kongresi, Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi: Aydın, Ekim 2009, p.381
[221] Ahmet İçduygu, 'International Migration and Human Development in Turkey', *UNDP Human Development Reports Research Paper*, 2009/52, October 2009, p.13
[222] Ibid., p.14
[223] Ahmet İçduygu, *Türkiye Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri Bağlamında Uluslararası Göç Tartışmaları*, TÜSİAD Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p.71

The classification of Turkey as a sending, receiving and transit country is important. The reason is that migration issues are contentious and even securitized in Turkey-EU relations under the headings of "irregular transit migration through Turkey to Europe", "invasion of migrants from Turkey if and when membership occurs", and "integration difficulties of Turkish immigrants."[224] Turkey as a sending country faces securitization of migration in issues like free movement of labour and integration of Turkish migrants into the host society. On the other hand, Turkey as a receiving and transit country has a set of problems that contains mainly lifting the "geographical limitation"[225] and signing a "readmission agreement" with the EU. Thus, securitization of migration with regard to asylum-seekers and refugees comes to the fore.

The classification of Turkey as a sending, receiving and transit country helps to understand that how the EU securitize migration from Turkey to the EU. Thus, the next three sections of the thesis analyse securitization of migration under the themes: internal security; cultural identity (security); and, the welfare state.

3.2. Securitization of Migration in Turkey-EU Relations: the Case of Internal Security

The EU's notion of internal security has largely been derived from the establishment of the internal market, and especially from the securitization of migration in the case of the internal market. The Single European Act defines the internal market as "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provision of this Treaty."[226] As the internal market was established, internal border controls were diminished, and the external frontiers were strengthened. As Huysmans argues, "border controls have played a key role in the spill-over of the socio-economic project of the internal market

[224] İçduygu, 'Europe, Turkey and International Migration: An Uneasy Negotiation', p.2

[225] Turkey was among the drafters and original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of Refugees. According to the Convention Turkey accepted refugees with time and geographic limitation. Time limitation was removed with the 1967 Protocol. However geographical limitation has remained. In accordance with geographical limitation, Turkey has accepted refugee status of people who come only from Europe. Kemal Kirişçi, 'Is Turkey Limiting the "Geographical Limitation"? – The November 1994 Regulation on Asylum in Turkey', *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol.8, No.3, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.293

[226] Single European Act, Official Journal of the European Communities, 29 June 1987, No L 169/7, Article 13

into an internal security project."[227] In this sense, an important issue came to the fore: migration.

Turkey-EU relationship has been established on the basis of association in 1963 when the Ankara Association Agreement was signed with the European Economic Community (EEC). Considering migration from Turkey to the EEC countries, Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement set an aim for "progressively securing freedom of movement for workers between them."[228] This was an important step in terms of gradually ensuring the free movement of people. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol that was signed in 1970 regulated the issue of free movement of workers in Article 36 as "[f]reedom of movement for workers between Member States of the Community and Turkey shall be secured by progressive stages in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement of Association between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of that Agreement."[229] Additionally, the Association Council which was established in accordance with the Ankara Agreement also set decisions on the free movement and rights of workers. The 2/76, 1/80 and 3/80 decisions of the Association Council regulated several aspects of Turkey's labour relations with the EC countries. Although these decisions seemed to ensure equal rights with EC countries' nationals, Turkish workers were treated as third country nationals and they only obtained these equal rights when they applied to the courts.[230] Moreover,

[227] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, p.70

[228] Ankara (Association) Agreement, Official Journal of European Communities, Vol.16, No C 113/5, 24 December 1973, article 12

[229] Additional Protocol, Article 36

[230] TBMM, 'Yurtdışında Yaşayan Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla, Anayasanın 98. ve İçtüzüğün 104 ve 105. Maddeleri Uyarınca Bir Meclis Araştırması Açılmasına İlişkin Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu', Dönem:22, Yasama Yılı:2, Esas No. 10/8,4, S.Sayısı.335, 2004, p.31. See for example Soysal Case. The operative part of the judgment of the Soysal Case stated: "*Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol, which was signed on 23 November 1970 at Brussels and concluded, approved and confirmed on behalf of the Community by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2760/72 of 19 December 1972, is to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes the introduction, as from the entry into force of that protocol, of a requirement that Turkish nationals such as the appellants in the main proceedings must have a visa to enter the territory of a Member State in order to provide services there on behalf of an undertaking established in Turkey, since, on that date, such a visa was not required."* in Official Journal of the European Union: Court Proceedings, Case C-228/06, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 19 February 2009. Additionally see also, Abatay and Sahin Case, (Joined Cases C-317/01 and C-369/01, Judgment of the Court, 21 October 2003) and Savas Case (Case C-37/98, Judgment of the Court, 11 May 2000) in order to see how Turkish workers obtained their rights in the EU.

these decisions restricted free movement of workers which was ensured by the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol between Turkey and the EC. Uluç argues that this is because these decisions were valid for workers only within the EC countries not for all Turkish workers.[231]

Free movement of workers was not put into practice on the determined time, which was 1986 according to the Additional Protocol, because the relations between Turkey and the EC worsened due to economic stagnation in 1970s and political developments in Turkey in 1980s. In addition, although relations got better, the aim of free movement of labour has not been achieved due to several reasons; especially for the fear of the prospect of large-scale migration flows from Turkey to the EU.

After the EU's declaration of Turkey as a candidate country, discussions emerged on Turkey's accession. Many people in Europe have believed that there would be a large amount of migration after Turkey's accession into the EU.[232] As Duner states in her study, by a Finnish diplomat that "Are you people up here in Finland really ready to have five million or so Turkish immigrant workers coming in as soon as the ink is dry on the accession agreement?"[233] This statement is a clear speech act that starts securitization of migration.[234] Finnish diplomat – as a securitizing actor – tried to show Turkey's accession into the EU as a threat by an exaggerating argument;[235] because five million Turkish migrants heading only to Finland is not reasonable. Additionally, this statement has a negative connotation.[236] Another negative phrase was that, approximately 17 million Turks would migrate to Europe if they could, stated in a column in the Belgian paper (De Standard) by Dirk Jacob Niewboer.[237]

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[231] Çağatay Uluç, 'Avrupa Birliği'nde İşçilerin Serbest Dolaşımı ve Türk İşçilerin Durumu', *SÜ İİBF Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, p.14
[232] Refik Erzan and Kemal Kirişçi, 'Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration Within the EU and Migration to Turkey', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Fall 2004, p.2
[233] Bertil Duner, 'Why let Turkey in?' in Bertil Duner (ed.), *Turkey: the Road Ahead?*, cited in Münevver Cebeci, 'Multidimensional Security Concept and Its Implications For Post-Cold War Europe and Turkey', Marmara University, European Union Institute, unpublished Phd. thesis, İstanbul, 2004, p.199
[234] Cebeci, ibid.
[235] Ibid.
[236] Ibid.
[237] Erzan and Kirişçi, 'Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration Within the EU and Migration to Turkey', p.2

Securitization of migration in the case of internal market, namely free movement of persons, has shaped the Turkey-EU relations for years. This has affected accession negotiations. It has also caused "migration diplomacy"[238] between parties. The negative connotations regarding free circulation of people emerged in the context of Turkey's accession negotiations and had repercussions in official documents. For example, an official document states:

> "[…] with over three million, Turks constitute by far the largest group of third country nationals legally residing in today's EU. Available studies give varying estimates of expected additional migration following Turkey's accession. Long transition periods, and a permanent safeguard clause can be considered to avoid serious disturbances on the EU labour market."[239]

In addition, the Negotiation Framework Document has a negative wording in the case of free movement of persons. 12th principle of the Document states:

> "Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member States. Transitional arrangements or safeguards should be reviewed regarding their impact on competition or the functioning of the internal market."[240]

All these mean that several measures can be taken against the free movement of persons "when necessary."[241] At this point, the word necessary is significant, because this is a socially constructed phenomenon such as threat or security. Therefore, definition of *necessity* depends on how and by whom it is defined. In this connection, as mentioned before, political will (interest) comes to the fore. This is because; in the case of free movement of Turkish workers, politicians may assert that taking some measures is *necessary*. While, on the one hand, this assertion may be real, on the other hand, it may serve politicians in the way of gaining more popularity; even, of justifying their securitizing moves in this regard. Additionally, it has been seen that generating policies

[238] İçduygu and Karaçay, 'Demography and Migration in Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations', p.36
[239] Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European Parliament, Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, COM (2004), 656 Final, Brussels, 06.10.2004, p.5
[240] Principles Governing Negotiations, Negotiating Framework, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, p.5
[241] İçduygu, 'Europe, Turkey and International Migration: An Uneasy Negotiation', p.13

against or in the favor of Turks has affected the political gain in Europe. As Akkaya states in her study, Schroder Government carried out the policies in favor of Turks, faced some challenges and even Social Democratic Party and Greens lost the votes in some shires in Germany.[242] On the other hand, generating policies against Turkey's EU accession is in the interest of some politicians. Consequently, securitization emerges in the case of free movement of Turkish nationals and their rights in this regard. Some try to equalize Turkish membership with that of an influx of Turkish migrants. As İçduygu states:

> "Certainly, concern about the issue of the "free circulation of labour," which was quite often described as an influx of Turkish migrants fleeing into EU countries after Turkey's membership, contributed to the calls for long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements, or provisions of permanent protection. These calls were designed to prevent the so-called influx of Turkish migrants and were heavily responsible for the fact that debates over Turkish membership have been dominated by the question of migration. These debates have a variety of economic, socio-cultural, political and demographic implications, which evoke concerns or fears for the EU public and influence the framing of the question of the free circulation of labour, or of migration."[243]

However, the fear of influx of Turkish migrants after Turkey's membership is unjustifiable. Several studies that are analysed below argue that Turkey's membership will not cause a large-scale population movement – unlike the Finnish diplomat's speech or the column in the Belgian paper – into the EU. It is estimated that migration from Turkey to the EU would be 2.7 million until 2030 in the longer term[244]. Another econometric model states:

> "[…] net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 in the period 2004-2030 is between 1 and 2.1 million, foreseeing a successful accession period with high growth and free labour mobility starting 2015 – a rather optimistic assumption to explore the upper bound of the immigration potential. On the other hand, if Turkey's membership process is endangered and high growth cannot be sustained, 2.7 million people may be penetrating the EU-15 despite the prevailing strict restrictions on labour mobility."[245]

[242] Akkaya, 'Avrupa Birliği Ülkelerinde Yaşayan Türkler ve Türkiye'nin AB'ye Entegrasyonu Kapsamındaki Rolleri', p.216
[243] İçduygu, 'Europe, Turkey and International Migration: An Uneasy Negotiation', p.15
[244] A.M. Lejour, R.A. de Mooij and C.H. Capel, 'Assessing the Economic Implications of Turkish Accession to the EU', *CPB Documents*, No.56, The Hague, 2004, p.11. For more information see also Harry Flam, 'Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession', *Cesifo Working Paper*, No.893, Category 1: Public Finance, March 2003
[245] Erzan, Kuzubaş and Yıldız, 'Growth and Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU', p.115

Those studies clearly show that there will not be a huge amount of migrantion towards Europe in the case of Turkish membership. What is more, migration trend from Turkey to Europe has decreased in the recent years. The classification of Turkish migration into terms clearly indicates this decline. It has already been mentioned above that Turkish labour migration towards Western Europe was intensive between the periods of 1961 and 1974, yet, especially after the oil crisis in 1973, the form of this migration changed, it turned into family reunification in Western Europe in 1970s. The migration rates towards Europe have decreased gradually. What is more, the immigration countries (towards where Turkish workers head) changed in 1980s – the Arab countries – and in 1990s – the countries of former Soviet Union.[246]According to Turkish Employment Organization's statistics, Turkish workers have headed to Middle Eastern and Arabic countries especially since 1980.[247] This situation has remained unchanged in 1990s and 2000s.[248] In the meantime, Turkey did not remain only as a migrant sending country, but became a receiving country, too. This is an important point that must be kept in mind in terms of the EU's previous experiences. As İçduygu and Karaçay argue:

> "Considering that a similar process has been experienced by current EU Member States such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, it can be said that these new migratory processes [in the case of Turkey's prospective membership] can bring Turkey to a status that is parallel to those of such states in the European migration- and asylum-seeking regimes."[249]

Another similarity, with those EU members, can be the return migration after and as a result of Turkish accession to the EU. Kaya and Kentel clearly state:

> "[…] the previous experiences in the integration of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece to the Union did not result in immense migration. In these cases even reverse migration was experienced. It seems that the same could apply to the Turkish case. The proportion of those people who would consider going back to the homeland in the case of Turkey's membership to the Union is more than 30% in both countries."[250]

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[246] Ahmet İçduygu, 'Turkey: The Demographic and Economic Dimension of Migration', in Philip Fargues (ed.), *CARIM Mediterranean Migration Report 2008-2009,* Fiesole: Italy, 2009, p.358-359
[247] Türkiye İş Kurumu, 2012 Yıllık Tabloları, Tablo 37, available at: http://www.iskur.gov.tr/KurumsalBilgi/istatistikler.aspx#dltop
[248] Ibid.
[249] İçduygu and Karaçay, 'Demography and Migration in Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations', p.34
[250] Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, *Euro-Türkler: Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında Köprü mü, Engel mi?,* İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları 108, Ağustos 2005, p.119

This is a significant rate considering the huge amount of Turkish migrants living in Germany. Although Turkey has been evaluated as having a general intention to migrate, still, it has "the least number of people with a specific intention to migrate. In this respect, only 0.3% of the population of Turkey has a specific intention to migrate in the following five years."[251] In this sense, reliable studies prove that there will not be a large-scale migration from Turkey to the EU in the case of Turkey's membership. However, populist rhetoric affects the process of Turkey's membership via securitization of migration.

In the case of Turkey-EU relations, within the framework of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, the threat is constructed as the free movement of Turkish workers (generally migration as a whole); the referent object is the internal market and the EU/Europe (i.e. European society and citizens) itself; securitizing actors are representatives of Member States; the audience is nationals of EU Member States as well as the media and some civil society actors in Europe; and extraordinary measures are restrictive policies, permanent safeguards, long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements, etc. despite the EU's clear commitments in the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

3.3. Securitization of Migration in Turkey-EU Relations: the Case of Cultural Identity

The notion of belonging is predominant in identity issues. It is contested if Turkey is European or not due to mainly how European countries define themselves and their others. Actually, definitions of Europe and Europeanness are also contested in themselves. Kaya and Kentel argue:

> "There are at least two definitions of Europe and Europeanness. The first is the one proposed by the Conservatives in a way that defines Europeanness as a static, holistic and prescribed cultural entity. The second is the one proposed by the Social Democrats, Liberals, Socialists and Greens underlining the understanding that 'Europeanness' refers to a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, syncretic and non-essentialist process of being and becoming. While the first definition highlights a *cultural project*, the latter definition

[251] İçduygu and Karaçay, 'Demography and Migration in Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations', p.32

> welcomes a *political project* embracing cultural and religious differences including Islam."[252]

These two definitions can be analysed in terms of monoculturalism and multiculturalism especially based on European identity. According to monoculturalists, European identity already exists; Europeans already share core cultural values that are the essence of European identity.[253] On the other hand, according to multiculturalists; diversity is a reality within the EU, core cultural values of several identities are different and making the groups coalesces around the incompatible.[254] In the light of aforementioned two definitions, it can be seen that "Europe is a contested concept in itself".[255] This is because, although the EU is well integrated in the economic realm, there are some problems regarding political integration (especially European identity and European legitimacy). Nevertheless, the debate on Europeaness of Turkey is centered[256] when Turkey's membership is of concern.

Müftüler-Bac argues: "Complicating Turkey's ambiguous relations with the EU is Europe's own identity crisis, which begs the question 'what is Europe?' Is it 'Atlantic Europe,' based on a collective defense, or is there a 'core Europe' with roots in ethnicity and culture?"[257] If it is "Atlantic Europe" based on a collective defense, Turkey is seen as an ally – especially during the Cold War, Turkey was an important ally.[258] On the other hand, if there is a "core Europe" with roots in ethnicity and culture, Turkey is seen as an alien with its Asian and Islamic ties. In this context, Rumelili states:

> "[…] on the one hand, through its membership in Western/European institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe, Turkey is considered as a part of Europe. On the other hand, as a predominantly Muslim country that is situated mostly in Asia, Turkey

[252] Kaya and Kentel, *Euro-Türkler: Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında Köprü mü, Engel mi?*, p.107, emphasis original.
[253] Rik Pinxten, Marijke Cornelis and Robert A.Rubinstein, 'European Identity: Diversity in Union', *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol.30, Issue. 6-7, 2007, p.687
[254] Ibid., p.688
[255] Zeynep Gülşah Çapan and Özge Onursal, 'Situating Turkey within the European Union', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol.8, No.1, April 2007, p.101
[256] Ibid.
[257] Meltem Müftüler-Bac, 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 2000, p.22
[258] Ibid., p.29

> has been perceived as a threat to exclusive notions of European identity based on geography and Judeo-Christian culture."[259]

It can be clearly understood that "[…] Turkey occupies a liminal, a partly-self, partly-other position. Turkey is often represented as a country of contradictions; […]."[260] Therefore, in the context of securitization of migration, Turkey is emphasized as the other and alien depending on some European leaders' attitudes. The reasons of perceiving Turks as "alien" or the "other" can be attributed to the historical image of Turks; integration problems of the first generation Turkish migrants; and culturally different roots of them especially in religious terms. The last one has gained a new dimension after 9/11 events.

Turks and Europeans did not have good neighbourly relations in the past. The historical image of Turks as the other contains two aspects: military-political and religious. In the context of military-political aspect, the relations between Turks and Europeans were full of wars and struggles/conflicts. Two of them are crucial in terms of defining Turks as the other. The first was the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. It is argued that Turks have been in Europe since 1453, yet, they are "*in* but not *of* Europe."[261] The statement explicitly shows that Turks are not seen as European. The second was the siege of Vienna which has still affected attitudes towards Turkey. As Frits Bolkestein who was a European Commissioner stated: "If Turkey accedes to the EU, then this means that the efforts of the German, Austrian and Polish troops that resisted the Ottoman Turks' siege of Vienna in 1683 would be in vain."[262] This is a clear securitizing act which has pointed Turks as other/as threat. Similarly, Jörg Haider who was an Austrian politician asked: "For what reasons did our ancestors defend our

[259] Bahar Rumelili, 'Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.9, No.2, 2003, p.222
[260] Bahar Rumelili, 'Negotiating Europe: EU-Turkey Relations from an Identity Perspective', *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10, No.1, 2008, p.102
[261] Ingrid Kylstad, 'Turkey and the EU: A "New" European Identity in the Making', *LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series,* No.27, 2010, p.7, emphasis original
[262] 'Turkish Accession: Why Frank Discussion is Vital', *European Voice*, Vol.10, No.30, 9 September 2004, p.9, cited in Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Evrim Taşkın, 'Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Does Culture and Identity Play a Role?', *Ankara Review of European Studies*, Vol.6, No.2, Spring:2007, p.43

country against the Turks if we are now letting them in again?"[263] By asking that, he has pointed historical other image of the Turks and tried to emerge a threat perception by this way; that is, he has issued a securitizing act, too.

On the other hand, in terms of the religion aspect of historical images of the Turks, the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim identity versus Christian Europe shaped relations between them. It is contended "Turkish peril was viewed as the latest phase in the centuries – old assault of Islam on Christianity."[264] In the light of these relations, Turks were even defined as barbarian. As Neumann and Welsh states: "Europe represented 'civilised' world and the Ottomans belonged to the 'barbaric' world. It was claimed that the 'Turk' possibly did not belong to the progressive mankind."[265] Neumann also argues: "[…] the dominant other in the history of the European state system remains 'the Turk,' and because the lingering importance of that system, we have here a particularly important other."[266] According to this argumentation, otherness of Turks has remained as in the past. While Europeannes of Turkey was not questioned during the Cold War for strategic and ideological reasons – then Europe's other was communism – the historical "images of Turks hammering on the gates of Vienna" was included in Turkey's relations with Europe when approaching the end of the Cold War.[267] Consequently, Turks are defined as barbarian, the other and non-European historically; that is why European societies still have a negative view of the Turks and EU Member States tend to establish a limited relationship with Turkey which depended on their own interests. This is also seen in the current relations and policies of European politicians; they use such a rhetoric with regard to Turkey's membership and more specifically, to Turkish migrants who want to head to Europe.

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[263] Cited in Bülent Küçük, 'Europe and the Other Turkey: Fantasies of Identity in the Enlarged Europe', *Eurosphere Working Paper Series: Online Working Paper*, No.34, 2011, p.16, original source not available.
[264] Iver B. Neumann, *Use of the Other: "The East" in European Identity*, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.44
[265] Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer Welsh, 'The Other in European Self-definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17, 1991, p.344, cited in Müftüler-Baç and Taşkın, 'Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Does Culture and Identity Play a Role?', p.41
[266] Neumann, *Use of the Other: "The East" in European Identity*, p.39-40
[267] Susannah Verney, 'National Identity and The Political Change on Turkey's Road to EU Membership', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol.9, No.3, December 2007, p.216

The integration problems of Turkish migrants also constitute an important problem and add to the securitization of migration. This surely has a close and interwoven relation with cultural identity. Depending on the previous experiences, many Europeans believe that Turks are not integrated into the host society. Hence, they do not tend to receive more Turks into their society, and securitize migration.

It is true that first generation migrants could not integrate into the host society well, which has basically two main reasons. First, those people who immigrated to Europe were generally from rural areas.[268] They were more conventional, protective, and unskilled.[269] Second, neither home country nor host country put an effort to ensure integration of migrants into the host society, because according to the guest worker system, these migrants were expected return to their home countries.[270] Additionally, as Kaya states: "[…] their reluctance to integrate actually results from existing structural problems of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, xenophobia, heterophobia, nationalism and racism."[271] It should be stated at this point that an important problem Euro-Turks have faced is discrimination and racism.[272]

On the other hand, the results of the study conducted by Kaya and Kentel show that the second and third generation migrants have integrated into the European society successfully.[273] Thus, it can be argued that the integration problem of Turkish migrants has been exaggerated to a certain extent. To increase the level of integration, political rights must be given to migrants and political integration must be ensured. The reason is that political integration brings out active political relations and participation to the political life of host country. Migrants get more involved with the host country's policies and become active participants. Consequently, once political integration is guaranteed, cultural integration follows it. Nevertheless, because Turkish guest workers

[268] See for example, Kemal Kirişçi, 'Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration', *Centre for European Studies*, Bogazici University: İstanbul, November 2003, available at: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=176, retrieved on: 28.03.2013
[269] Ibid.
[270] Erzan and Kirişçi, 'Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration Within the EU and Migration to Turkey', p.5
[271] Ayhan Kaya, 'Migration Debate in Europe: Migrants as Anti-citizens', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.10, No.1, Spring 2011, p.82
[272] Kaya and Kentel , *Euro-Türkler: Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında Köprü mü, Engel mi?*, p.86
[273] Ibid, p.71

were not given the chance of sufficient political participation their integration into the host society has also been harder. As Kaya argues:

> "The attribution of citizenship to migrants can very well be an efficient integration tool. Immigrants attain the fullest degree of political rights if they become citizens of their country of settlement. Granting migrants the right to elect and to stand as a candidate on top of their social, civil and cultural rights (civic citizenship, or denizenship) has a great potential to prompt them to wither away from mobilizing themselves along with ethnic, cultural, religious and traditional lines, and thus to mobilize themselves along with political parties of the country they reside in."[274]

Political integration is crucial for ensuring cultural integration. However, political leaders, mostly members of right-wing political parties, generally emphasize Turkey's Muslim identity that is accepted as a non-European character. They define Europeanness by emphasizing a shared culture, religion, civilization, and heritage. What is important is that some European leaders labeling Turkey as non-European affect both Turkey's EU membership prospect and integration of Turkish migrants living in the EU. For example, Wilfred Martens, a Christian Democrat in the European Parliament (EP), declared: "the EU is in the process of building a civilization in which Turkey has no place."[275] Declaring this, he stigmatized Turkey as being uncivilized and the "other". Another politician Wolfgang Schauble, who was the parliamentary leader of Christian Democratic Union (CDU), stated: "Turkish membership in the EU might be 'too much for Europe' and that Turkey's membership could endanger the identity and political workability of the EU."[276] These reflections on the political arena do not only severely damage the integration process; but also point to a definite securitizing act, in which Turkey and Turkish migrants are negatively portrayed.

In addition, considering the fact that religion is an important component of Europeanness, securitization of cultural identity becomes more apparent. The reason is that throughout the history Europeans have always perceived Islam as a challenge. Especially after the 9/11 attacks, Islam became more prominent, it was even securitized. 9/11, Madrid and London attacks have made some Western (Christian, European and

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[274] Ayhan Kaya, 'Securitization of Migration in the West and Integration of Migrants', *Istanbul Kultur University Conference on "Migration, Turkey and the EU"*, 23 March 2007, p.4-5

[275] 'Turkey and Europe, Just not Our Sort', *The Economist*, March 13, 1997, available at: http://www.economist.com/node/369243 , retrieved on: 29.03.2013

[276] 'Minutes of European People's Party Meeting', Val Duchesse, Brussels, March 4, 1997, cited in Müftüler-Bac, 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', p.30

American) societies establish a link between Islam and terrorism; mainly due to the religious motivation of perpetrators. As a result of prejudgments, those societies started to perceive almost all Muslims as terrorists, without evaluating if they were really terrorists or not. For example, in a survey it was pointed out that 83% of Germans equated "Islam" with "terrorism."[277]

This was also a result of anti-Muslim approach emphasized in several speeches of European leaders. For example, on 19 October 2009, in a debate article in Sweden's biggest daily Aftonbladet, the party leader Jimmie Akesson wrote: "The Muslims are our greatest threat – as a Swedish Democrat, I see this as our greatest foreign threat since the Second World War and I promise to do all within my power to turn this trend when we go to elections."[278] An anti-immigrant populist politician of the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, has founded an International Freedom Alliance with the aim of securing European and Western values as well as shared interests from the threat of the Islam.[279] In several speeches he referred to Muslims within a negative framework. He said: "A new wind will blow in the Netherlands" and "We want the Islamisation to be stopped."[280] He generally underlined the Islamisation of the Netherlands or Islamisation of Europe for the purpose of obtaining the acceptance of the European public for his securitizing acts. He also set a link between Islam and freedom of Europeans in a negative correlation by saying: "I have a problem with the Islamic ideology, the Islamic culture, because I feel that the more Islam that we get in our societies, the less freedom that we get."[281] Moreover, his most important speech was the one in which he claimed: "more security, less crime, less immigration, less Islam - that is what the Netherlands

[277] 'Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslim in the EU: Developments since September 2001', Reported by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, March 2005, p.76, available at: http://www.art1.nl/nprd/factsheets/Intolerance%20against%20muslims%20in%20the%20EU%2003-2005.pdf

[278] Helena Spongenberg, 'Populism on the Rise in the Nordic Region', http://euobserver.com/news/30797, 16.09.2010

[279] 'Wilders Sets up International Alliance Against Islam', http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/wilders-sets-international-alliance-against-islam, 16.07.2010

[280] Valentina Pop, 'Dutch Coalition to Target Burqas, Muslim Immigration', http://euobserver.com/social/30942, 01.10.2010

[281] 'Dutch Politician Forms Anti-Islam Coalition', http://news.sky.com/story/793070/dutch-politician-forms-anti-islam-coalition, 16.07.2010

has chosen."[282] In that speech, he explicitly established a relationship between migration, crime, security and Islam.

As stated above, in one of her speeches German Chancellor Angela Merkel contended: "the multicultural approach and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other [...] has failed, utterly failed."[283] Such a wording reveals what Merkel thinks about immigrants. That is; the immigrants – especially from Turkey and Arabic countries – do not get sufficiently integrated into the host country. Horst Seehofer, one of Angela Merkel's key allies stated: "it is clear that immigrants from other cultural circles like Turkey, and Arab countries have more difficulties. From that I draw the conclusion that we do not need any additional foreign workers from other cultures."[284]

Considering the fact that a vast amount of Turkish population is Muslim, these speeches and anti-immigrant attitudes affect both Turkey's EU candidacy and Turkish migrants in Europe. As Müftüler-Bac argues: "[…] the main obstacle to Turkey's membership in the EU is not the reasons that European officials formally cite – problems related to democracy, economics and human rights – but rather, perceptions of Turkey as alien."[285] More interestingly, she revealed that Turkey had "a more developed market economy than most of"[286] the other candidate countries and "its political problems [were] no worse than those of any other applicants"[287] when Turkey was not accepted as a candidate country at the Luxembourg European Council held in December 1997. This shows that a crucial obstacle has been Turkey's identity. The claims that the EU is a Christian club came to the fore as a consequence of this decision taken at the Luxembourg European Council.

Turkey was treated differently from other applicant countries at the Luxembourg European Council. This situation changed at Helsinki European Council in

[282] 'Dutch Election: Liberals Take One-Seat Lead as Far Right Party Grows in Influence', http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/7816382/Dutch-election-Liberals-take-one-seat-lead-as-far-right-party-grows-in-influence.html, 10.06.2010
[283] Leigh Phillips, 'Merkel Stokes Anti-immigrant Discourse in Germany', http://euobserver.com/political/31062, 18.10.2010
[284] Ibid.
[285] Müftüler-Bac, 'Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe', p.21
[286] Ibid.
[287] Ibid.

December 1999 when Turkey was declared as a candidate country. However, Turkey was treated differently from the other countries one more time. The reason is that, although Turkey's candidacy was decided, the date of the negotiations was not mentioned. Therefore, distrust was formed in terms of Turkey-EU relations. Additionally, before starting negotiations with Turkey, "privileged partnership" was proposed by a number of Member States instead of membership. Despite such opposition, accession negotiations were opened with Turkey in October 2005. What is more, even after the accession negotiations were launched, the privileged partnership issue was re-emerged by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Berlin in 2009.[288] It is noteworthy that, although Turkey started negotiations for the aim of being a full member, such a statement could be made and it caused more distrust between Turkey and the EU. On the other hand, "[t]he 'privileged partnership' has not been mentioned within the EU *acquis* or in any official documents."[289] However, the wording of Negotiation Framework Document of 3 October 2005 included negative arguments which may be evaluated with regard to privileged partnership issue. As Kirişçi states:

> "The document declared the purpose of the negotiations to be membership and, yet, also emphasized that negotiations would be open-ended. The document also foresaw the need to tie Turkey to the EU in the strongest manner possible in the event that the negotiations did not lead to membership. Such wording had not been adopted in previous cases of enlargement and have not been adopted for Croatia. This led much of the Turkish public and as well as Turkish officials to believe that the EU held 'double standards' and was not committed to Turkey's eventual membership."[290]

Considering Müftüler-Bac's abovementioned determination, what lies behind the exclusion of Turkey can be its culturally different identity. Many in Europe believe that if Turkey becomes an EU member, an influx of Turkish workers will be inevitable. They think that, in this sense, this influx will cause integration problems due to

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[288] Saban Kardas, 'Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey', *Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol.6, Issue.92, 13.05.2010, available at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34983&cHash=ddff3b536e#.UbTu3NhApmg

[289] Beril Dedeoğlu and Seyfettin Gürsel, 'EU and Turkey: the Analysis of Privileged Partnership or Membership', Betam, 21.06.2010, p.3, available at: http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/en/archives/666/eu-and-turkey-the-analysis-of-privileged-partnership-or-membership_final, emphasis original

[290] Kemal Kirişçi, 'Managing Irregular Migration in Turkey: A Political-Bureaucratic Perspective', *CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes*, 2008/61, p.19

Turkey's different culture, religion, heritage and etc. For this reason it can be argued that the EU applies double standards and securitizes Turkish immigration.

Consequently, according to the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, the threat that Europe perceives in this regard seems to be Turkish immigrants; the referent object is Europeans as their cultural identity is at stake; securitizing actors are European leaders and politicians; the audience is nationals of the EU Member States; and extraordinary measures are double standards that are applied in Turkey's negotiation process that are listed above and some limitations on practicing religion and strict visas application to Turkish citizens.

3.4. Securitization of Migration in Turkey-EU Relations: the Case of Welfare State

People migrate for several reasons which are categorized under the name of pull and push factors. Push factors emerge from home country's poor economic, social and political conditions. On the other hand, pull factors are directly related to the host country's welfare, which is an important motivation for people who want to migrate to that country and benefit from social and economic rights of the welfare state. However, citizens of the host country do not want to share these rights with migrants. They see migrants as free-riders of benefits of the welfare state. Moreover, they perceive migrants as the welfare state damagers. In this sense, culturally different roots of migrants are used and migrants are classified as the "other". Consequently, "welfare chauvinism"[291] emerges. In this case, migrants are seen as a threat both towards cultural homogeneity and the welfare state.[292] This tendency brings out securitization of migration in the case of the welfare state.

With the economic crisis in the 1970s, European countries stopped recruitment and tried to encourage migrants to return their home countries. This economic recession and rising unemployment affected the views about migrants. Huysmans states:

> "As a result of successive economic recession and the rise in unemployment since the early 1970s, the struggle over the distribution of social goods such as housing,

[291] Huysmans, 'The European Union and The Securitization of Migration', p.768
[292] Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, p.78

> healthcare, unemployment, job and other social services has become more competitive. Scarcity makes immigrants and asylum-seekers rivals to national citizens in the labour market and competitors in the distribution of social goods."[293]

This is an important articulation to understand the reasons behind anti-immigration attitudes in the case of the welfare state.

In the context of Turkey-EU relations, the welfare state is a subject of securitization of migration in two different forms. First are Turkish migrants who are thought to migrate to the EU if Turkey becomes an EU member. Second are asylum-seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants who use Turkey as a transit country on their way to the EU.

In the case of Turkish migrants, welfare chauvinism is explicitly seen. Many Europeans tend to see that Turkish migrants have not integrated into host societies especially because of their different culture. Therefore, they do not want to share benefits of the welfare state with those culturally different people. Because of having a huge and young population and high rates of population growth; Europeans believe that Turkey's membership would cause to a huge population movement towards the EU countries, which would damage the welfare state. Securitization of migration can clearly be seen in the form of welfare chauvinism. Europeans perceive Turkey's population as a threat in this regard. However, this is not a real, but a perceived threat because; Turkey's population has been in transformation. According to United Nations projections, Turkey's population growth has shown a decreasing tendency after 1980s and it is estimated that population growth rate would decline to ‰8 between the periods 2025-2035 and it would decrease by ‰2 between the periods 2090-2100.[294] As İçduygu and Karaçay state:

> "By 2050, it is estimated that while Turkey's population will increase by approximately 40 %, the ratio of the 65 + age group will also double. This transformation will take place especially in the period following the year 2025 following a decline in fertility rates and the aging of the current generations, being replaced by a relatively smaller population. In this context, forecasts estimate that the size of the 65 + age group, which

[293] Ibid., p.77
[294] Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, '2010 Yılı Uluslararası Nüfus Göstergeleri' *Gözden Geçirme Notaları*, Sayı: U.17.1/101, 20.09.2011, p.25

> was 3.6 million in the year 2000, will reach 17 million in 2050. It seems that after the year 2025, Turkey will no longer have a young population."[295]

Moreover, they argue that, "it is evident that the number of migrants possibly required by the labor force market in the EU cannot be met even in the event of Turkey's entire population migrating to Europe."[296] As a matter of fact, Turkey's population might not be a threat to Europe; to the contrary, it might become a remedy for Europe's aging populations in its internal market and also in the welfare state. Europe needs a young working population to protect the welfare state. Additionally, Turkey's membership would ensure a more homogeneous Europe, because integration of Turkish migrants would be facilitated with Turkey's membership.[297]

In the context of asylum-seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants the situation is a bit different. It seems that the EU tries to establish a dumping ground or a buffer zone to maintain its welfare state. As Kirişçi states:

> "[Turkish officials] fear that Turkey will become a dumping ground for unwanted immigrants by the EU. Turkish officials are especially concerned because Turkey is encountering great difficulties in initiating negotiations let alone actually concluding [readmission] agreements with many of the sending countries of illegal migrants. They fear that this may lead to a situation where the EU would be able to send back illegal migrants to Turkey while Turkey will not have the means of ensuring their return to their respective countries of origin."[298]

The EU insists on signing a readmission agreement with Turkey at the expense of Turkey's concerns in this regard. Thus; the aim is explicitly seen in its relations with Turkey. The EU securitizes migration in terms of welfare, and Turkey faces securitization not only as a sending country but also as a transit country.

Turkey is a transit country between Europe, Africa and Asia. Because of its geographical location, Turkey becomes an important "stepping stone"[299] on the road to final destination – mainly the EU – of asylum-seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants.

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[295] İçduygu and Karaçay, 'Demography and Migration in Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations', p.29-30
[296] Ibid., p.31
[297] Erzan and Kirişçi, 'Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration Within the EU and Migration to Turkey', p.5
[298] Kemal Kirişçi, 'Reconciling Refugee Protection with Efforts to Combat Irregular Migration: the Case of Turkey and the European Union', *Global Migration Perspectives*, No.11, Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva, October 2004, p.8
[299] İçduygu, 'Europe, Turkey and International Migration: An Uneasy Negotiation', p.11

Illegal immigrants, who aim to use Turkey as a bridge to enter Europe, are mainly undocumented migrants, overstayers and asylum-seekers whose applications are rejected. Turkey signed the UN Refugee Convention with "geographical limitation". That is why there are two types of asylum seekers: According to the limitation, Turkey accepts asylum applications only from Europe. On the other hand, it provides temporary protection to asylum-seekers who are from other countries and regions, on condition that their applications are accepted by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) until they get out of Turkey and settle in another country. Thus, if Turkey lifts geographical limitation, it has to accept all applications that are posed to it because of being a first country of asylum.

Asylum-seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants are seen as a threat to the European welfare state. They are perceived as job takers, causes of unemployment and burden for social security systems as well as for the welfare state. May states: "While the right type of immigration can stimulate growth, badly managed migration has led to serious social impacts in some areas, with pressure being placed on key public services such as schools, the health service, transport, housing and welfare."[300] Immigration control or management become prominent in relation to the welfare state. European countries take measures to control and restrict these types of immigrants, sometimes at the expense of human rights.

The EU asks Turkey to cope with immigration issues in the negotiation process. Within the context of protecting the welfare state, lifting geographical limitation and signing readmission agreements are important. The reason is that, while the EU tries to secure its welfare, it creates a buffer zone with neighbouring countries against unwanted immigrants. The buffer zone, here, is Turkey. If Turkey lifts the geographical limitation, it has to accept all applications of asylum-seekers. As the first-entry country, Turkey has to ensure protection to asylum-seekers whose applications are accepted by UNHCR. This situation seems reasonable. However, considering Turkey's geographical location as a bridge between Europe, Africa and Asia, Turkey would become a dumping ground of asylum-seekers and refugees who cannot make

[300] Theresa May, 'The Home Secretary's Immigration Speech', http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/speeches/immigration-speech, 05.11.2010

application to the EU.[301] In order to eliminate this concern, the EU must adopt a burden-sharing mechanism which will help Turkey to maintain its technical, financial and legislative resources.[302] As Kirişçi states: "Turkish officials will expect to see burden sharing mechanisms that would go beyond what the current Refugee Fund has to offer."[303] On the other hand, "[t]he ultimate 'burden sharing' mechanism is actually the solidarity that is supposed to be embedded in membership."[304] And membership is seen "as the most important manifestation of 'burden sharing'".[305] Additionally, a transitional period regarding resettlement of refugees outside Turkey is expected by Turkish officials; yet, the current aquis does not allow such a practice.[306] There are no such mechanisms. Because of the double standards, what exists is distrust among the Turkish public and officials towards the EU's approach to Turkey's membership. Therefore, without membership, the burden sharing turns to burden shifting.[307]

On the other hand, signing a readmission agreement with the EU brings additional burden for Turkey. In the case of signing readmission agreement, Turkey has to readmit unwanted migrants who enter to the EU's territory by passing Turkey. For the EU, it is an important tool in the fight against illegal immigration. However, Turkey can sign readmission agreements with only some origin countries of illegal immigration, thus, Turkey would become a buffer zone for the EU's unwanted migrants if it signs the readmission agreement with the EU.

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[301] Kirişçi, 'Managing Irregular Migration in Turkey: A Political-Bureaucratic Perspective', p.21
[302] Nurcan Özgür Baklacıoğlu, 'Building "Fortress Turkey": Europeanization of Asylum Policy in Turkey', available at: http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-porto/virtualpaperroom/096.pdf, p.2-3
[303] Kemal Kirişçi, 'Reconciling Refugee Protection with Efforts to Combat Irregular Migration: the Case of Turkey and the European Union', p.10
[304] Kirişçi, 'Managing Irregular Migration in Turkey: A Political-Bureaucratic Perspective', p.24
[305] Ibid., p.21
[306] Kemal Kirişçi, 'Turkey: The Political and Social Dimension of Migration', in Philip Fargues (ed.), *CARIM Mediterranean Migration Report 2006-2007*, Fiesole: Italy, 2007, p.335
[307] On the other hand, Greek Minister of Citizen Protection requested from FRONTEX to deploy RABITs at Greece's external border with Turkey in order to prevent illegal immigration. Thus, Turkey as a transit country has been perceived as a threat and RABITs which have been deployed by FRONTEX at Greece-Turkey borders is a clear extraordinary measure. For more information see, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-deploys-rapid-border-intervention-teams-to-greece-PWDQKZ. Additionally, Greece decided to build fence at its borders with Turkey for the same reason. Thus, this fence between Turkey and Greece is another extraordinary measure. For more information see, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12109595, http://euobserver.com/fortress-eu/118565 and http://www.euronews.com/2012/05/10/greece-s-anti-immigrant-fence/

With reference to the accession partnership document, there is an important phrase: "conclude urgently a readmission agreement with Turkey."[308] This means that the situation is so important for the EU. The term "urgently" shows that the EU regards this issue as an emergency issue. Additionally, the EU also shows Turkey as a conduit for asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants, indirectly by emphasizing this urgency. Consequently, the EU securitizes migration in the case of welfare, and demands these arrangements from Turkey to deal with the migration threat and uses them as extraordinary measures.

Consequently, in the context of Turkey-EU relations, according to the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, threats are perceived on the one hand, as Turkish immigrants, and on the other hand, as asylum seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants from third countries; the referent object is the welfare state; securitizing actors are European leaders and politicians; the audience is nationals of the EU Member States; and extraordinary measures are arrangements such as signing a readmission agreement with the EU and lifting the geographical limitation which are expected from Turkey during negotiation process.

Concluding Remarks

As this chapter has elaborated, migration relations between Turkey and Europe have a long history. In 1950s, migration started as individually. Migration became more systematic with the bilateral recruitment agreements in 1960s. Turkish workers were well received in those days. This was because; Europe needed labour force to recover its industry and economy.

European countries stopped recruitment in 1970s – especially after the economic stagnation in 1973 – yet, migration continued as in the form of family reunification. Political developments in both Turkey and near abroad of it changed the form of migration in 1980s and 1990s. Asylum-seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants came to the fore.

[308] Accession Partnership Document, Official Journal of the European Union, 26 February 2008, p.51/13

Turkey's geographical location which seems as a bridge between East and West has gained importance regarding migration. Thus, Turkey has become both a sending and a receiving country. Turkey faces securitization of migration as a sending country in the context of internal market i.e. free movement of labour. On the other hand, Turkey as a transit country has problems such as lifting geographical limitation and signing a readmission agreement with the EU.

This chapter has shown that securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations has three aspects: internal security, cultural identity and the welfare state. In the case of internal security, the core of securitization logic is free movement of people. European politicians try to create fear that if Turkey becomes a member of the EU, a great number of people will migrate to Europe. They exaggerate the situation; this is because, they use securitarian rhetoric.

In the case of cultural identity, the core of securitization logic is Turkey's otherness. This is affected by historical images of Turks and culturally different roots – especially in terms of religion which has gained importance after the 9/11 attacks. This is because; the general belief is that migrants were behind the attacks. In addition, Europeans claim that Turkish migrants are not well integrated into the host society. However, the abovementioned studies put forth that these claims are unjustifiable.

In the context of the welfare state, the core of securitization of migration logic is welfare chauvinism which links cultural identity with welfare state. Europeans do not want to share benefits of the welfare state with migrants who do not belong to the society. In addition, general belief is that migrants do not contribute welfare; yet, they benefit from it. Thus, migrants are seen as the welfare state damagers. On the other hand, in the case of Turkey-EU relations, securitization of migration stems from Turkey's geographical location as a transit country. The EU uses securitization as a tool for the purpose of protecting European welfare state and asks Turkey to lift geographical limitation and to sign a readmission agreement.

The analysis provided in this chapter, openly show the three aspects of securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations. It has revealed that in all three

aspects, it is rather a political choice on the part of the Europeans to securitize migration in their relations with Turkey rather than a move based on solid facts. European utilitarian perspective of migration and exaggerations of European politicians are crucial examples of this political choice.

CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to analyse "securitization of migration" in Turkey-EU relations by giving special reference to securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. Building on this theory, this thesis has attempted to show that securitization of migration is a political choice on the part of the EU in its relations with Turkey. To do this, first, the concepts of security and securitization have been analysed. It is seen that security is a contested concept and securitization is a process of social construction of threats. The phenomenon of migration has also been examined in order to see how it turns into a security matter i.e. threat. After the linkage between security and migration is established, securitization of migration is analysed as a conscious choice of some European leaders and politicians depending on their speeches. Finally it is analysed how Turkey faces securitization of migration as a sending, transit and receiving country in the contexts of internal security, cultural identity and welfare state.

Security and securitization have been studied in depth in order to set theoretical foundation of this study. Security has been defined according to several approaches to show its contested nature. After the end of the Cold War, the scope of security has widened by the way of emerging new threats. Several kinds of threats – migration, organized crime, smuggling and trafficking, natural disasters, epidemics and etc. – have gained importance. Analysis of new threats has brought about sectoral identification of security. In the light of the multisectoral security approach of the Copenhagen School, societal sector has been used as an analytical tool to present migration-identity-security linkage. Special emphasis has been put on the Copenhagen School's way of framing security as a social construction of threats. The process of social construction of threats; that is, securitization process starts with speech acts. Therefore, speeches of politicians have been examined in order to see their importance on emerging new threats. As a consequence, security has been identified in detail for the purpose of showing its contested nature and giving socially constructivist aspect of it prominence. In addition, securitization analysis has also shown how the process developed as an extreme version of politicization.

Migration which is perceived as a new threat has been examined historically and conceptually in order to show how the issue turned into a security matter in due course. Historical analysis is essential because the reasons behind perceiving migration as a threat have been put forth via this analysis. Significant economic and political developments have pointed migrants as root causes of other matters; thus, migrants have been affected by consequences of these political and economic developments. Economic stagnation in 1970s was an important development that turned migration as a politicized area. Collapse of the Soviet Union was another important development. Immigration from the newly independent states was taken into consideration and the fear of flows came to the forefront. The most important development was the 9/11 attacks through which the linkage between migration and terrorism established. This was mainly because; there was a thought that migrants were behind these attacks. Migration was moved from politicized realm to securitized one. According to these developments, the EU has tried to find answers to its migration related problems and it has shaped its policies in this regard. However, the EU's efforts on migration related policies are not sufficient to act commonly because of Member States' different interests. In addition, the EU's policies regarding migration are mostly restrictive and control-oriented even though the emphasis has been put on cooperation and coordination. Actually, these restrictive measures are consequences of securitization of migration.

In this thesis securitization of migration in Europe has been analysed in three interrelated themes: internal security, cultural identity and the welfare state. In the context of the internal security, special reference has been given to the establishment of internal market which ensures free movement of people. Internal market means the removal of internal borders. Thus, the external borders have gained prominence and the EU has taken restrictive control measures in this regard. These measures, such as FRONTEX, can be seen as extraordinary measure which is taken as a consequence of securitization.

In the case of cultural identity, securitization of migration is related to belonging. The main issue regarding cultural identity is definitions of self and other.

Immigrants who come from Third World are seen as culturally different and they are stigmatized as the other. Stigmatization of immigrants as the other can cause to emerge threat perceptions regarding them. On the other hand, religion is an important component of identity. Therefore, it is also important in defining the other. Then European other here is Muslims. As this thesis has shown, some European politicians declare that they do not want to Muslims in their territories. Thus, those declarations have transformed into securitizing acts. They have tried to put several bans on religion. In the context of securitization, those bans constitute extraordinary measures that limit fundamental rights.

In the case of the welfare state, securitization of migration is turned into welfare chauvinism which links cultural identity with welfare. Welfare state benefits are important pull factors that caused migration. However, Europeans do not want to share the welfare state benefits with immigrants. Because, according to them immigrants do not belong to their society. In addition, Europeans tend to see immigrants as welfare state damagers. This is because; the general belief that immigrants do not contribute to the welfare state; yet, they benefit from it. However, European population is ageing and fertility rates are low. Hence, they need labour force in order to keep the welfare state intact. As a consequence, securitization of migration in this case is of no benefit.

This thesis has portrayed that securitization of migration in Europe has mainly three types of reasons: Political, economic and security. Political reasons are used in election campaigns generally. Politicians tend to point immigrants as a threat during their election campaigns. Some European politicians – from countries such as France, Germany, Greece, Austria and the Netherlands – have gained popularity by this way. This has clearly shown that securitizing acts of politicians, under the name of election campaign, accepted by audience. Therefore, securitization of migration is successful in those countries. Economic reasons are usually related to the welfare state and unemployment for natives. In terms of the welfare state, immigrants are seen as extra burden. They are blamed for taking more but paying less. On the other hand, immigrants constitute cheaper labour force; therefore they are also blamed for causing unemployment. In addition, there are security reasons for securitization of migration.

Security reasons have come to the fore after the end of the Cold War. This is because; threat perceptions have been varied and migration is seen as at the root of other threat perceptions – such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, international organized crime, terrorism and etc. Security reasons have aggravated especially after the 9/11 attacks. When a negative event occurs, immigrants are brought to the fore as scapegoats. Consequently, it can be seen that all these reasons are intertwined and especially stem from self and other distinction. This case is clearly shown in Turkey-EU relations from past to present.

The last chapter has revealed that actually migration was viewed positively between Turkey and Europe in 1950s and 1960s. The situation has changed when Europe no longer needed migrant labour. Migration started as individually in 1950s, and then became systematic with bilateral recruitment agreements in 1960s. Migrants were named as guest workers and they were temporary labour. In those days, Europe needed labour force in order to recover its industry and economy. However, the situation changed during 1970s with economic stagnation. Thus, Europe stopped recruitment from abroad and tried to send guest workers to their home countries. As a consequence of this, a new form of migration occurred: family reunification. And those guest workers who were expected to return to their home countries turned into permanent guests. Turkey-EC/EU relations have also been affected by those developments. Furthermore, political developments in Turkey and wars in its near abroad brought out new migration types: asylum-seekers and refugees in 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, while Turkey was only a sending country previously, it also became a transit and receiving country in due course.

This thesis has attempted to show that Turkey has faced securitization of migration as both a sending and a receiving country. European politicians have tried to create fear that a great number of people will migrate from Turkey to Europe via anti-immigration discourses. However, it is unjustifiable. This is because; when the statistics of Turkish Employment Organization are analysed, it can be seen that Turkish workers who head to abroad generally have chosen to go to the Middle East and Arabic countries since the 1980s.

On the other hand, Turkey has faced securitization of migration as a consequence of Turkey's geographical location that seems as a bridge between East and West, i.e. as a transit country. Asylum-seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants have headed to Europe through Turkey. Therefore, the EU asks Turkey to cope with this situation via lifting geographical limitation and signing a readmission agreement with the EU. However, there is distrust between Turkey and the EU; thus, Turkey does not want to take such measures without reciprocity.

The last chapter has analysed securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations through three dimensions: internal security, cultural identity and the welfare state. In the case of internal security, the core is the internal market and, especially as a result of it, the free movement of people. European politicians use a populist rhetoric against Turkey's membership and securitized migration in this regard. They claim that if Turkey becomes a member, a huge amount of population movement will occur. However, their claims are seem to be exaggerated. Several studies have shown such a movement will not occur and even reverse migration will take place as in the cases of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece.

In the case of cultural identity, the core is the issue of belonging and Turkey's otherness – especially in terms of religion. Historical images of Turks, Islamic roots of their identity and integration difficulties of earlier Turkish immigrants have come to the fore in this regard. Turks are defined as non-European, as other and alien. General belief is that they do not belong to European society. Therefore, European politicians emphasize those differences in order to gain popular support. They usually behave in accordance with their utilitarian perspectives. In addition, although it is true that the first generation immigrants had some integration difficulties, the second and third generations are well integrated into the host society. Thus, it can be seen that the situation is exaggerated.

In the case of the welfare state, the core is welfare chauvinism that links the welfare state with cultural identity. The dominating thought is that people who do not belong to the society do not benefit from economic and social rights of the welfare state. In addition, it must be kept in mind that securitization of migration in the case of the

welfare state depends on Turkey's geographical location which seems as a transit country. Therefore, lifting geographical limitation and signing a readmission agreement is gained prominence. The EU asks Turkey to lift geographical limitation and sign a readmission agreement with it in order to protect European welfare state from asylum-seekers and refugees.

Consequently, this thesis has analysed securitization of migration according to the Copenhagen School's securitization theory through five crucial elements: threat, referent object, securitizing actor, audience and extraordinary measures. In the case of internal security, the threat is constructed as the free movement of Turkish workers (generally migration as a whole); the referent object is the internal market and the EU/Europe itself; securitizing actors are representatives of Member States; the audience is nationals of EU Member States; and extraordinary measures are restrictive policies, permanent safeguards, long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements, etc. In the case of cultural identity, the threat that Europe perceives in this regard seems to be Turkish immigrants; the referent object is Europeans as their cultural identity is at stake; securitizing actors are European leaders and politicians; the audience is nationals of the EU Member States; and extraordinary measures are double standards that are applied in Turkey's negotiation process and some limitations on practicing religion and visas. In the case of the welfare state, threats are perceived on the one hand, as Turkish immigrants, and on the other hand, as asylum seekers, refugees and illegal immigrants from third countries; the referent object is the welfare state; securitizing actors are European leaders and politicians as well as the media and some civil society organizations; the audience is nationals of the EU Member States; and extraordinary measures are arrangements such as signing a readmission agreement with the EU and lifting the geographical limitation which are expected from Turkey during negotiation process.

To conclude it can be said that securitization of migration in Turkey-EU relations is a political choice. This is because, in many cases, securitization is not based on real threats and some European leaders and politicians exaggerate the situation through their speeches. They mainly do this to get more votes from those European

people who fear migration for various reasons. However, this situation may be altered by giving emphasis on desecuritization of migration. The past experiences are important to analyse desecuritization of migration. Because, the post-Soviet Union States' EU membership did not cause mass migration to Europe unlike many Europeans' suppositions. The same situation may be valid for Turkey's EU membership. However, some politicians who oppose Turkey's EU membership have used securitization of migration politically. If and when they give up using it, desecuritization process will start. Additionally, in order to ensure desecuritization on migration from Turkey, Europeans must stop to declare it as a threat and they must give up showing securitization of migration as a political choice. Actually, the ultimate solution which ensures desecuritization is Turkey's EU membership.

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