

**T.C.  
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER  
ANABİLİM DALI**

**THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LANGUAGE  
POLICY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN  
IDENTITY**

**DOKTORA TEZİ**

**Neriman HOCAOĞLU BAHADIR**

**İstanbul, 2015**

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ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı İngilizce/Türkçe Doktora Programı öğrencisi Neriman Hocaoğlu Bahadır'ın, "**THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY**" konulu tez çalışması ile ilgili 26.11.2015 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından oybirliği/ oyçokluğu ile başarılı bulunmuştur.

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26.11.2015 tarih ve 2015/13 Sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararı ile onaylanmıştır.

*To my family, especially to my mother and son*

## **ABSTRACT**

European identity has been constructed for many years but within the European Union context, it was first introduced in the 1970s. Since then, it has been constructed and reconstructed and it is still under construction. It is a socially constructed identity, which is not defined, not fixed but dynamic. Its construction process can be examined with historical developments which includes treaties and many other official documents. It has been promoted with programmes, actions and symbols which aimed to create a feeling of belonging, raising awareness and sustaining cohesion. Each enlargement contributes to the construction process of European identity as each national identity enriches, shapes and changes it. European identity and the national identities coexist without damaging but complementing each other.

European Union is a multilingual Union which has 24 official languages. Since its foundation, the official languages of the member states, at least one of their official languages, are the official languages of the European Union. So the language policy of the European Union has been developed for many years and it has been promoted with many programmes, actions and projects just like the European identity. The European Union's language policy includes multilingualism, translation and interpretation. Even though member states are the main decision-makers in this policy area, the European Union supports and promotes linguistic diversity and multilingualism.

In this thesis, it is aimed to examine the role of European Union's language policy in constructing European identity. Both the European identity and the language policy stand on the same ground: "unity in diversity" principle of the European Union. Besides, they both serve to the conflict resolution, social cohesion and integration. They are in relation with one another and the language policy has an effect in the construction of European identity as it is socially constructed with the interactions of individuals as agents equipped with language resources and with the developments sustained by the institutions.

## ÖZET

Avrupa kimliđi yıllardır inşa edilmektedir ancak ilk olarak Avrupa Birliđi bağlamında 1970lerde öne sürölmüştür. O zamandan beri tekrar tekrar inşa edilmektedir ve hala inşa aşamasındadır. Avrupa kimliđi, sosyal olarak inşa edilen, sınırları belirlenmemiş, kesinleşmemiş dinamik bir kimliktir. İnşa süreci birçok anlaşma ve resmi belge içeren tarihsel gelişmeler ile incelenebilir. Bu süreç, ait olma duygusu yaratmak, bilinci arttırmak ve uyum oluşturmak amacıyla programlar, faaliyetler ve sembollerle desteklenmektedir. Her bir genişleme, her ulusal kimliđin Avrupa kimliđini zenginleştirmesi, şekillendirmesi ve deđiştirmesi dolayısıyla, Avrupa kimliđinin inşa sürecine katkı sağlamaktadır.

Avrupa Birliđi 24 resmi dili olan çok dilli bir Birlik'tir. Kuruluşundan itibaren üye devletlerin resmi dilleri, en azından resmi dillerinden bir tanesi, Avrupa Birliđi'nin ulusal dili olmuştur. Bu nedenle de Avrupa Birliđi'nin dil politikası yıllardır gelişmektedir ve Avrupa kimliđinin inşa sürecinde olduđu gibi Avrupa Birliđi'nin dil politikası da programlar, faaliyetler ve projelerle desteklenmektedir. Avrupa Birliđi'nin dil politikası çok dilliliđi, yazılı ve sözlü çeviriyi içermektedir. Bu politika alanının temel karar vericileri üye devletler olmasına rağmen Avrupa Birliđi dil çeşitliliđini ve çok dilliliđi desteklemektedir.

Bu tez kapsamında, Avrupa Birliđi'nin dil politikasının Avrupa kimliđinin oluşumundaki rolü incelenmektedir. Avrupa kimliđi ve Avrupa Birliđi'nin dil politikası aynı zemin üzerinde bulunmaktadır: Avrupa Birliđi'nin 'çeşitlilikte birlik' ilkesi. Ayrıca her ikisi de uyumsuzluk çözümü, sosyal uyum ve entegrasyona hizmet etmektedir. Birbirleriyle ilişki içerisinde oldukları ve Avrupa kimliđinin, dil kaynakları ile donanmış ajanlar olan bireylerin etkileşimleri ve kurumların sağladığı gelişmelerle sosyal olarak inşa edilmesi dolayısıyla Avrupa Birliđi dil politikasının Avrupa kimliđinin inşasında etkisi bulunmaktadır.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AKP</b>	Justice and Development Party
<b>ANAP</b>	Motherland Party
<b>ATEME</b>	Advancing the European Multilingualism
<b>CAP</b>	Common Agriculture Policy
<b>DGs</b>	Directorate Generals
<b>DSP</b>	Democratic Left Party
<b>DYLAN</b>	Language Dynamics and Management of Diversity
<b>EAA+</b>	European Economic Area Plus
<b>EAM</b>	Extended Associate Membership
<b>EC</b>	European Community
<b>ECSC</b>	European Coal and Steel Community
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>EEZ</b>	Exclusive Economic Zone
<b>ELDIA</b>	European Language Diversity for All
<b>EMU</b>	Economic and Monetary Union
<b>EP EPI</b>	EF English Proficiency Index
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FUEN</b>	Federal Union of European Nationalities
<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>HM</b>	Hegemonic Multilingualism
<b>LINEE</b>	Languages in a Network of European Excellence
<b>MHP</b>	Nationalist Action Party
<b>NMS</b>	New Member States
<b>SEA</b>	Single European Act
<b>TED</b>	Turkish Education Association
<b>TEPAV</b>	The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
<b>TEU</b>	Treaty on European Union
<b>USA</b>	United States of America

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Identity is a multifaceted and heterogeneous concept which has different definitions. However, within the framework of this study, identity is evaluated as a process, which is fluid, unfinished and always under construction. It is thought to be constructed and reconstructed in interactions with the actors in relations. In other words, it is never complete. And it is a term which can be used to understand, name and perceive the other actors and ourselves in any kind of relations.

The idea of Europe can be traced back to Ancient times. Therefore, the European identity is not a new concept. In the historical context which goes back to Ancient times, the ‘other’ of Europe has changed many times. Turks, Islam, Russian communism, and its own history which includes wars have been the ‘other’ of Europe in defining itself. Some of them can still be used as the ‘other’ of Europe in defining European identity but some cannot. Even though the process goes back a very long way, in this thesis, the emergence and the existence of European identity are analysed in the framework of the European Union (EU). The Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity is taken as a starting point as the concept of European identity was introduced in the Declaration and the construction process is examined by using top-down institutional arrangements in a historical context to see how it has evolved and changed in time. Yet, survey results are also analysed, which forms the bottom-up approach of the thesis. And the interviews, which were conducted in Brussels and Ankara, are used to reflect the perceptions of the officials working in the European Commission and the Ministry for EU Affairs of the Turkish Republic.

The construction process of European identity can be related with many different policy areas. However, in this thesis the European identity is related with one of the oldest policies of the EU: language policy. Language, like the concept of ‘identity’, is one of the most researched issues in social sciences. And as known, the EU is a multilingual union. When it was first founded, it had only 4 official languages but now with subsequent enlargements, it has become a union with 24 official languages. This means that the legislation and policy documents of major public importance are translated to the languages of all member states. Even though some of the languages are

used more frequently, all of these languages have an equal value. None of them has superiority over the others. Language, as a way of communication or a tool for communication or a power, is fundamental because it sustains interaction and relations which contributes to European identity, which is socially constructed in interactions. However, language is not just a way of communication; it is also a constituent of culture and identity. This is why, in this thesis, it is preferred to evaluate identity in relation to language. And therefore, the construction of European identity is aimed to be examined in relation with the EU's language policy.

The foundation of the EU's language policy can be traced back to the Treaty of Rome and the Council Regulation No 1/58. Article 217 of the Treaty of Rome and the Council Regulation No 1/58 are the first steps of the EU's language policy. The EU's language policy includes multilingualism, translation and interpretation as sub-policy areas.

Multilingualism in Europe gives opportunity to the Europeans to communicate with the EU institutions and to reach the legislation in their own languages, and it also provides mobility for studying, working and visiting in Europe which maintains social integration and cohesion in the EU. Without social cohesion and integration, political integration will be incomplete. In sustaining multilingualism, translation and interpretation play a significant role. In the construction of European identity multilingualism, translation and interpretation; namely the language policy of the EU has a role as they maintain a democratic, transparent, equal, functioning and integrated EU for its citizens. Moreover, it sustains the continuation of communication and interactions so it contributes to the construction of European identity which is socially constructed.

### **1.1. The Purpose and the Research Question of the Thesis**

The aim of the research is to review the issue of European identity in relation to the EU's language policy, especially multilingualism, translation and interpretation. It also aims to find out the significance of multilingualism as a way of presenting "unity in diversity" in construction of European identity because multilingualism is important in

providing a democratic, efficient, transparent, and functioning Europe for its people. The main argument (basis) of this thesis stems from the assertion that European identity is a construction and the language policy of the EU has a role in this construction process.

In this research, multilingualism in the functioning of EU institutions and multilingualism of the citizens is also mentioned to see how they affect the construction of European identity because European integration without social acceptance or unifying effect of European identity will not be complete. In addition to these objectives, it is intended to shed light on the future research in the field of European identity and EU's language policy. In a nut shell, the purpose of this thesis is to draw attention to the effect of EU's language policy in constructing European identity. It is aimed to elaborate on the effects of language policy in construction of identity. Therefore, it is focused both on the construction of European identity and the language policy of the EU.

The main question of the thesis is: What is the role of EU's language policy in constructing European identity? In order to fulfil the purpose of the thesis and answer the main question, the following questions are also tried to be answered:

- What are the reasons of emerging European identity in the EU?
- How has European identity developed in an historical context?
- What is the language policy of the EU?
- What are the reasons of promoting multilingualism? What is the importance of linguistic diversity?
- How is multilingualism promoted? Who are the main actors in promoting multilingualism?
- How has the language policy of the EU developed in time?

## **1.2. The Methodology of the Thesis**

The method which is preferred to be used in this study is mainly qualitative method. Alan Bryman defines qualitative research as a research strategy which focuses

mostly on words rather than numbers and quantification in data collection and analysis and adds that qualitative research has inductivist, constructivist and interpretivist features but the researches “do not subscribe to all three of these features”.<sup>1</sup> He notes that from inductive view, theory is generated out of research. He asserts that in regard to interpretivist feature, the emphasis is “on the understanding of social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants” and with regard to constructivist feature, social properties are evaluated as “outcomes of the interactions between individuals, rather than phenomena ‘out there’ and separate from those involved in its construction”.<sup>2</sup> Another definition which is quite in line with this definition is: “qualitative research is a naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs, values etc.) within their social worlds”.<sup>3</sup> Departing from these definitions, identity construction process and the effect of language policy are decided to be analysed by qualitative research method because both identity and language are social realities. Identity is a socially constructed reality within relations. Identities are fluid, not static. They are constantly constructed and reconstructed in interactions between the actors. Both the construction of European identity and the language policy of the EU are dynamic as they enrich and develop with each enlargement. Thus in this thesis, the interpretivist and constructivist point of view is preferred due to the nature of identity construction process and effect of language policy which is questioned within the framework of this study.

Snape and Spencer indicate observation, in-depth individual interviews, focus groups, biographical methods and analysis of documents and texts as main qualitative research methods.<sup>4</sup> Within this study, in-depth interviews and analysis of documents and texts, which can be grouped as primary and secondary resources, are used as research methods. The reasons for choosing these methods are to be able to see the construction process of European identity by analysing official documents and observe

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<sup>1</sup> Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, p.380.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Dawn Snape and Liz Spencer, “The Foundations of Qualitative Research”, in Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis (Eds.), *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2003, p.2.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p.4.

the perceptions of the key officials in the European Commission and in the Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkish Republic. However, survey results and statistics of Eurobarometer, Eurostat, World Bank, Turkish Statistical Institute and Turkish Research Company TNS Piar are also used to support and compare the results and to see the differences and similarities.

Qualitative research method has some strengths and weaknesses. N. Aslı Şirin notes these strengths and weaknesses by referring to Sotirios Sarantakos as follows:

**Strengths**

- Studying people in their natural settings
- Giving importance to interpretation and meanings
- Getting deep into respondent's world to achieve a better understanding
- Humanising research process by attaching importance to the researched
- Allowing higher flexibility
- Presenting the world in a more realist way

**Weaknesses**

- Extreme subjectivity may cause reliability problems
- Risk of collecting information which is irrelevant and not useful
- Research takes too much time
- Representativeness and generalizability of findings may cause problems
- The risk of researcher being not objective and detached from the researched
- Problems of ethics.<sup>5</sup>

Some of these weaknesses are tried to be eliminated before the interviews, during the interviews and data analysis. For example, the information which is irrelevant and not useful for the purpose of the thesis is not used. The interviews in Brussels were planned four months before the field work and it was asked to the interviewees if they could give a date for the first week of September. As they had four months, the interviewees were able to give a meeting date for the first week of September. Therefore, the interviews in Brussels were conducted as planned. The interviews with the officials in Ankara took place on the same day as they were

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<sup>5</sup> Nedime Aslı Şirin, "Back Home?: The Reality of Return in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Role of the European Union in the Return Process", Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Marmara University, European Union Institute, 2008), p.138.

contacted a month before the interviews. Another weakness, which is about the objectivity of the researcher, is eliminated by using most of the views of the interviewees directly. Lastly, in order to eliminate the problems of ethics the researcher introduced herself and explained the aim of the research before the interviews and the names of the interviewees are not announced.

### **1.2.1. The Field-work in Brussels and Ankara**

The above mentioned in-depth interviews were carried out both in Brussels and Ankara. Before the interviews in Brussels it was tried to get in touch with the officials in the European Commission as European Commission is the supranational institution of the EU and it has the largest translation service among the other institutions of the EU and the largest interpretation service in the world and it also has a directorate general related to education and culture. Five key officials from three different Directorate Generals (DGs) of the European Commission accepted the interview request. The DGs are DG Translation, DG Interpretation and the DG Education and Culture. These DGs were especially chosen as they are the most related DGs with the subject of the research. The interviews took place in the offices of the officials in the European Commission. The questions of the interviews were sent by email before the interviews were conducted and tape-recorder was used with the permission of the officials during the interviews. All the interviews in Brussels were carried out in the first week of September 2014.

The second part of the interviews was carried out in Ankara. It was aimed to reach the officials from the parallel departments. Emails were sent to the officials from the Translation Coordination Directorate, the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate, the Research and Documentation Directorate and the Training and Institution Building Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs. But it was more difficult to get in touch with the officials in Turkey as some of them did not even reply the emails. The officials from the Training and Institution Building Directorate answered the email immediately but they refused to make interview. They stated that the subject is not related with their Directorate even though the researcher noted that she had had interviews with the officials from the DG Education and Culture in Brussels. However,



they indicated that an interview with an official from the Social, Regional and Innovative Policies Directorate would be more helpful. And they gave the email addresses of the officials from that Directorate. So the interview was carried out with an official from that Directorate. The official from the Directorate of Social, Regional and Innovative Policies also suggested an official from the Accession Policy Directorate, yet the official refused the interview. But on the day of the interviews, the official from the Translation Coordination Directorate helped to arrange an interview with that official from the Accession Policy Directorate. The official from the Translation Coordination Directorate also helped to arrange an interview with the officials from the Directorate of the Civil Society Communication and Culture as they did not answer the emails which were sent to them. Thus, the interviews were carried out with 7 officials from five different directorates.

The interviews were held in the offices of the officials in the Ministry for EU Affairs, on 27 February 2015. The questions of the interviews were sent by email before the interviews were carried out and tape-recorder was used with the permission of the officials during the interviews.

All of the interviews started with an explanation of the identity of the researcher and the aim and context of the research. Most of the interviewees did not note anything about announcing their names but just the officials from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate wanted to be sure about their names would not be announced. Even though they had been explained that their names were not announced with regard to confidentiality principle, they wanted to be sure when the tape recorder was closed at the end of the interview. And one of the interviewees requested to see the final text.

There were some problems regarding the field work. One of them is finding key officials to make interviews. As stated above, most of them refused the interview. Some of them noted that they were not related with the subject, some of them indicated that they were really busy and some of them said that they were getting many request from the researchers and it was impossible to accept all of them. But at the end, with the help of some officials, interviews were carried out according to the arrangements. All

the interviewees were kind and welcoming. They provided some booklets, texts and documents. Even after the interviews they sent links, reports and articles that they thought would be helpful for the research.

Another problem was about transportation. The researcher could not find a direct flight to Brussels. Thus she got to Dusseldorf by plane and she went from there to Brussels by train. At the beginning, the most annoying thing was that one of the officials changed the date and time of the interview and the researcher had to carry out the interview as soon as she got to Brussels after a day long trip. Moreover, the taxi driver did not want to take the researcher to the Berlaymont building because it was so close to the accommodation. And the official waited more than an hour till 19:00. There were also transportation problems in Turkey. The researcher departed for Ankara from Lüleburgaz after her classes in Kırklareli University which finished at 21:00. After a long night on the way to Ankara, there was a taxi problem in Ankara, as well. The taxi driver took the researcher to a wrong address. However, at the end all of the interviews went well.

In order to analyse the data, the researcher transcribed all the interviews and translated the interviews which were carried out in Ankara. The narratives of the respondents generally were quoted directly to be able to transfer their perceptions directly. Just a few of them were paraphrased in order to prevent repetition.

Beside these interviews, as stated above, survey results and statistics are also used to be able to compare and support the results. Another research method used is document analysis. The treaties of the EU and the documents related to the identity issue and language policy of the EU were analysed according to the purpose of the thesis. Thus the interviews as the primary data and the survey results and documents as the secondary data were analysed. And lastly it should be noted that literature review is done as it is used in most of the thesis. Academic articles and books have also an important role in this research. Internet and libraries are the main source of the articles and the books but the scholars were also asked for information and advice. Some of these scholars are Lars-Erik Cederman, Georg Sorensen, Michael Byram and Bonny Norton.

### **1.3. The Structure of the Thesis**

This thesis is composed of six chapters, including the introductory chapter. In the second chapter, social constructivism and identity issues are discussed. As stated above, the aim of the thesis is to examine the role of EU's language policy on the construction of European identity. In order to analyse this subject social constructivism is chosen as the theoretical framework because social constructivism focuses on identities and their construction processes and highlights the importance of ideas, interactions, actors and institutions in the process. So, for the purpose of the thesis, social constructivism and its different approaches are explained. The identity issue is also explained according to different social disciplines to show how a broad and complex nature it has. Lastly, diverse identities are mentioned and their relation with the European identity is stated to understand European identity clearly.

In the third chapter, the focus is on the European identity. Firstly, the emergence of European identity within the EU context is discussed. The political, social and economic reasons which have effects in the emergence of European identity are noted. And then the European identity, which was first introduced in the Copenhagen Declaration, is traced with the treaties and official documents in order to observe the historical development. After giving the historical background, the European identity perceptions of the officials with whom interviews were carried out in Brussels are stated. Survey results are also used to be able to compare and support the data.

In the fourth chapter, the language policy of the EU is discussed. Its development in a historical context is given in order to see the changes and how it has been supported and promoted in time. Historical developments are also given to be in line with the third chapter. Then multilingualism, translation and interpretation which can be evaluated as the components of the EU's language policy are discussed. Translation and interpretation can be evaluated as a tool for sustaining and maintaining multilingualism and linguistic diversity which are closely related with equality, transparency and the functioning of the EU. Therefore, it is focused on them. Translation and interpretation services of the EU are also noted in numbers and their workload to show their importance. Lastly, the relation between language and identity is

emphasised and the relation is analysed according to the scholars' views and the projects and researches.

In the fifth chapter, Turkey – EU relations are discussed and the focus is on both the Turkish identity and European identity within the context of these relations. First, Turkey - EU relations are examined in a historical context. 1959 is noted as the beginning of the relations when Turkey applied for associate membership to the European Economic Community (EEC). It is also drawn attention to Turkey's membership application, candidacy status, its accession negotiations and the obstacles in this process. In other words, Turkey – EU relations which have many ups and downs are explained briefly. Besides, both the Turkish and European identities are under scrutiny in this chapter. Even though the emphasis is more on Turkish identity, it is also slightly focused on European identity. Lastly the emphasis is on Turkish language in constructing European identity even though it is not one of the official languages of the EU.

The last chapter is the conclusion chapter. In this chapter, the brief overview of the chapters is given. The evaluation and the main conclusions of the thesis are the main focus of this chapter. So, the role of EU's language policy in constructing European identity is discussed and the findings are presented.

As a last remark, it can be noted that this thesis aims to contribute to the researches on European identity even though identity is one of the most known and researched concept, European identity is not researched much in terms of EU's language policy and especially with regard to multilingualism. There are not many researches related to multilingualism in Turkey, as well. So, it will be a forward-looking research which may be useful for the Turkish politicians, researchers and academics. This research will also serve the researchers who aim to find out the relation between the EU's language policy and the European identity. And finally, it is significant as it includes fieldwork to observe and explain the perceptions of the EU officials and the officials of the Ministry for EU Affairs about the European identity, multilingualism and their relations.

## 2. THE ISSUE OF IDENTITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

In this thesis, the identity issue is analysed from the perspective of social constructivism. The main reason of using constructivism as the theoretical framework is that it enables us to see the process of constructing European identity.

Essentialist or primordialist approach can also be used in examining the identity issue. According to essentialists, the identity construction is driven by cultural variables and they claim that “each ethnic core produces a political identity in a more or less direct fashion” and these ethnic cores, which are cultural “primitive units”, are presumed to exist and it is aimed “to rediscover and transform it into a politically operational identity.”<sup>6</sup> However, the constructivists concentrate on politics and according to them, “link between cultural raw material and political identities is broken by an active process of identity-formation entailing manipulation of cultural symbols.”<sup>7</sup> They also imply that “cultural systems are inherently multi-dimensional, history does not deliver ready-made packages such as ethnic cores” but “intellectuals and political activist select the ethnic cleavages to be mobilized or suppressed, a process that may also produce new cultural combinations.”<sup>8</sup> From the constructivist point of view, as identities are socially constructed, the European identity can also be constructed. However, from the essentialist point of view, “there is a positive correlation between “culture” and “identity”, thus it is too hard to construct supranational identities because of the lack of common cultural characteristics among Member States”, so it is difficult to construct European identity.<sup>9</sup>

So constructivism seems to better explain what is targeted to be examined in this thesis that is the construction of identities. It enables us to evaluate the construction of European identity and as Ted Hopf asserts constructivism is a “theory of process”<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Lars-Erik Cederman, “Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it would take to construct a European Demos”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.7, No.2, (2001), p.142.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Selcen Öner, “Construction of European Identity within the European Union”, PhD Thesis (Marmara University, European Union Institute, 2008), p.150.

<sup>10</sup> Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, *International Security*,

and he adds that a major part of the constructivist research program is about “understanding how identities are constructed, what norms and practices accompany their reproduction, and how they construct each other”.<sup>11</sup> These expressions clearly explain why it is chosen as the theoretical framework in this thesis. From this perspective, the construction of European identity and the role of EU’s language policy in constructing European identity can be traced in a process. Social constructivism and the identity issue are explained in details in this chapter to form the basis of the thesis but the essentialist point of view which focuses on pre-existing units in identity formation is not analysed as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. In this chapter, it is also focused on diverse identities in relation with the European identity but the emergence and construction process of European identity are analysed in the following chapter.

## 2.1. Social Constructivism<sup>12</sup>

Constructivism, which is argued to focus on ideas and thoughts, as one of the international relations theories rises up in the 1980s but its roots can be traced to the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico in the eighteenth century.<sup>13</sup> According to Jackson and Sorensen, state and state systems are artificial and they are man-made so it can be changed and developed in new and different ways by men and women.<sup>14</sup> From this point of view, there is a possibility of change and development in state systems and in international relations in direct proportion to the changes and developments in human being. Then, in 1984, Anthony Giddens used the concept of structuration in sociology.

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Vol.23, No.1, (Summer 1998) p.196.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p.192.

<sup>12</sup> In order to overcome conceptual misunderstanding the terms constructivism and social constructivism are used interchangeably for the purpose of the thesis.

<sup>13</sup> L. Pompa, *Vico: Selected Readings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; cited in Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, "Social Constructivism", in *Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Oxford university press, 2006, [http://e-edu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/147644/mod\\_resource/content/0/jackson\\_sorensen\\_Intro\\_in\\_IR\\_chap06.pdf](http://e-<u>edu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/147644/mod_resource/content/0/jackson_sorensen_Intro_in_IR_chap06.pdf</u>) (28.02.2014), p.164.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, "Social Constructivism", in *Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition., Oxford university press, 2006, [http://e-edu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/147644/mod\\_resource/content/0/jackson\\_sorensen\\_Intro\\_in\\_IR\\_chap06.pdf](http://e-<u>edu.nbu.bg/pluginfile.php/147644/mod_resource/content/0/jackson_sorensen_Intro_in_IR_chap06.pdf</u>) (28.02.2014), p.164.

He uses it for analysing the relationship between structures and actors.<sup>15</sup> According to Jackson and Sorensen:

The relationship between structures and actors involves intersubjective understanding and meaning. Structures do constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new ways. The notion of structuration therefore leads to a less rigid and more dynamic view of the relationship between structure and actors. IR constructivists use this as a starting-point for suggesting a less rigid view of anarchy.<sup>16</sup>

Here it is important to note that the term of intersubjectivity is also used widely in constructivism. Intersubjective understanding and meaning is thought to define the international relations and this constitutes its empirical side.<sup>17</sup>

Jackson and Sorensen state that Immanuel Kant's view about human consciousness can also be seen as a premise of constructivist views. According to Kant, people can obtain knowledge but this knowledge is subjective as it is shaped by their own consciousness. Jackson and Sorensen also add Max Weber's focus on subjective understanding of sociological knowledge and starting from constructivists' insights they point out the importance of meaning and understanding in constructivism.<sup>18</sup> These statements show the importance and role of consciousness, subjective understanding and meaning in constructivism and in identity formation.

After the above mentioned developments, "constructivism" was introduced as a term in International Relations by Nicholas Greenwood Onuf in his book *World of Our Making* (1989). Onuf states there that "people always construct, or constitute, social reality even, as their being, which can only be social, is constructed for them."<sup>19</sup> Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie and Peter Katzenstein are the mostly referred scholars who have contributed to the development of constructivism with their researches.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p.163.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.166.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p.164.

<sup>19</sup> Nicholas G. Onuf, *World of Our Making*, Columbia: University of South California Press, 1989, p.1.

Constructivism is generally evaluated as a middle ground. For example, Ben Rosamond states that constructivism is “a middle way between rationalism and reflectivism.”<sup>20</sup> Before constructivism, there was a debate between realism and liberalism which are noted as rationalist approaches by constructivists. Against rationalism, there were reflectivist approaches such as post modernism and critical theory.<sup>21</sup> Antje Weiner positions constructivism between realism and reflectivism and expresses that “the constructivism point of the triangle bundles approaches which are explicit distinguished from the two corner positions on the base line of the triangle”.<sup>22</sup> Emanuel Adler also makes a similar evaluation and indicates that “constructivism occupies the middle ground between rationalist approaches (whether realist or liberal) and interpretive approaches (mainly postmodernist, post structuralist and critical)”,<sup>23</sup> as well.

Jackson and Sorensen explain constructivism’s rise with historical context and theoretical discussions. The end of the Cold War is evaluated as the historical reason and the discussions between neorealists and liberals are the other reasons which helped the rise of constructivism.<sup>24</sup> They characterize constructivism as “both a social theory and a number of different substantive theories of IR.”<sup>25</sup> According to them, reality is constructed in the social theory. In this point of view, both human relations and international relations are based on ideas and thoughts, not on material elements. As they state, “the social world is a world of human consciousness: of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages and discourses, of signs, signals and understanding among human beings.”<sup>26</sup> Alexander Wendt indicates two basic tenets of constructivism;

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<sup>20</sup> Ben Rosamond, “New Theories of European Integration”, in Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez Solorzano Borragan (Eds.), *European Union Politics (104-122)*, Oxford University Press, Third Edition, 2010, p.117.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p.116.

<sup>22</sup> Antje Wiener, “Constructivism: The Limits of Bridging Gaps”, [http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/JIRD\\_2003\\_6\\_3\\_Wiener\\_252-275.pdf](http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/JIRD_2003_6_3_Wiener_252-275.pdf) (25.04.2014), p.256.

<sup>23</sup> Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.3, No.3, (September 1997), <https://wiki.zirve.edu.tr/sandbox/groups/economicsandadministrativesciences/wiki/30f1e/attachments/167a3/Seizing%20the%20Middle%20Ground-%20Constructivism%20in%20World%20Politics.pdf> (02.07.2015), p.319.

<sup>24</sup> R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, "Social Constructivism", p.163.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.164.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp.164-165.



one of them is that “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces” and the second one is that “the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”<sup>27</sup> Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener imply that “one of the major contributions of constructivist approaches is to include the impact of norms and ideas on the construction of identities and behaviours.”<sup>28</sup> In International Relations discipline, scholars like Nicolas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, and Peter Katzenstein focus on “the importance of culture and identity”<sup>29</sup> and Jackson and Sorensen add that “The social and political world is made up of shared beliefs rather than by physical entities.”<sup>30</sup> This can be seen as the starting point of this thesis as it emphasizes the importance of ideas, thoughts, culture and identity. It also dwells on construction and relations which are also crucial in identity formation.

According to Thomas Risse, constructivism is “based on social ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meaning (‘culture’ in broad sense).”<sup>31</sup> Adler also points out that according to constructivists, “identities, interests, and behavior of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings, interpretations and assumptions about the world”.<sup>32</sup>

According to Chris Reus-Smit, constructivism has three “core ontological prepositions”. First of them is the primacy of ideational over material. The second one is the constitution of interests and actions by identities and the last one is the mutual constitution of agents and structures.<sup>33</sup> Constructivists base relations on thoughts, ideas rather than material forces. Relations are not based on material sources such as

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<sup>27</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.1.

<sup>28</sup> Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, “Introduction”, in Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen & Antje Wiener (Eds.), *The Social Construction of Europe*, London: Sage Pub., 2001, p.5.

<sup>29</sup> R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, "Social Constructivism", p.172.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Thomas Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p.145.

<sup>32</sup> Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*, London: Routledge Pub., 2005, p.93.

<sup>33</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, “The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory after the Cold War”, Australian National University, *Department of International Relations Working Paper*, No.4, (1996), pp.8-9.

weapons, population, territory which possessed but on human consciousness. The social world is not given and it is not part of nature and as Jackson and Sorensen state, it is constructed by human being, by their ideas, thoughts and by their understandings. It owes its existence to an intersubjective awareness among people.<sup>34</sup> Risse also focuses on the construction and the reproduction of the social reality by human agents through their daily practices and he mentions that “social reality does not fall from heaven.”<sup>35</sup> Here interactions are important in the construction of social reality. Reus-Smit asserts that it is important to understand how interests are constituted by identities in order to make sense of international phenomena.<sup>36</sup> Wendt indicates that “identities are the basis of interests”:

Actors do not have a ‘portfolio’ of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead they define interests in the process of defining situations...Sometimes situations are unprecedented in our experience, and in these cases we have to construct their meaning, and thus our interests, by analogy or de novo. More often they have routine qualities in which we assign meanings on the basis of institutionally defined roles. When we say that professors have an ‘interest’ in teaching, research, or going on leave, we are saying that to function in the role identity of ‘professor’, they have to define certain situations as calling for certain actions.<sup>37</sup>

This is a clear explanation of how identities affect interests. As known, the third proposition is that agents and structures are mutually constituted.<sup>38</sup> Risse notes that the structures of the international system are constructed by the states and their interaction.<sup>39</sup> Without this interaction it is not possible to have structures and the agents in the international system as they are not given but constructed.

Ted Hopf states that constructivism is a “theory of process”, not a “substantive outcome”. He comes to this point from Kratochwil’s statement which emphasizes that constructivism is not a theory but an approach.<sup>40</sup> The emphasis on “process” is crucial

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<sup>34</sup> R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, "Social Constructivism", pp.162 -164.

<sup>35</sup> T. Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", p.145.

<sup>36</sup> C. Reus-Smit, "The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After The Cold War", p.9.

<sup>37</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, Vol.46, No.2, (Spring 1992), p.398.

<sup>38</sup> C. Reus-Smit, "The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After The Cold War", p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> Thomas Risse, "Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies a Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument", <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/orderbooks/myth/03Risse.pdf> (01.03.2014), p.29.

<sup>40</sup> T. Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", p.196.

as in this thesis the identity formation is analysed from this point. European identity is not an outcome but a concept which is constructed continuously, which changes and which is fluid. Checkel also indicates that constructivists like Hopf and Zehfuss evaluate identities as fluid and multiple.<sup>41</sup>

From the constructivist point of view, institutions have a constitutive and shaping role. Koslowski and Kratochwil state that “the constructivist research program identifies institutions as both elements of stability and as strategic variables for the analysis of change” and add that “institutions are continually reproduced and modified through the actors’ practices.”<sup>42</sup> Pollack indicates that:

... constructivist scholars generally define institutions more broadly to include informal norms and intersubjective understandings as well as formal rules, and posit a more important and fundamental role for institutions, which *constitute* actors and shape not simply their incentives but their preferences and identities as well.<sup>43</sup>

And he adds that “actor preference, therefore, are not exogenously given and fixed but endogenous to institutions, and individuals’ identities shaped and reshaped by their social environment.”<sup>44</sup> He also claims that Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener put the argument about the institutions shaping effect most forcefully<sup>45</sup> as they imply that:

A significant amount of evidence suggests that, as a process, European integration has a transformative impact on the European state system and its constituent units. European integration itself has changed over the years, and it is reasonable to assume that in the process agents’ identity and subsequently their interests and behaviour have equally changed. While this aspect of change can be theorized within constructivist perspectives, it will remain largely invisible in approaches that neglect processes of identity formation and/or assume interests to be given exogenously.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics”, *ARENA Working Papers*, WP 15/03, (2003), p.4.

<sup>42</sup> Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System”, *International Organization*, Vol.48, No.2, (Spring 1994), p.227.

<sup>43</sup> Mark A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.39, No.2, (June 2001), p.234.

<sup>44</sup> Mark A. Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy Making”, in Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack and Alasdair R. Young (Eds.), *Policy-making in the European Union*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p.24.

<sup>45</sup> M. A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration”, p.234.

<sup>46</sup> T. Christiansen, K. E. Jorgensen and A. Wiener, “Introduction”, p.2.

Therefore, it would not be wrong to state that institutions also have an effect on the construction process of the European identity. Martin Kohli supports this idea by stating that the European identity will be a by-product of its institutional constructions and he adds that its growing cultural networks of communication and exchange, its common economy and currency, its political framework of governance and representation, its institutions of redistribution and solidarity and its European level organisations also contributes to the construction of European identity.<sup>47</sup> Here it is important to notice that institutions have effects on constructing and shaping the identities.

Thus, constructivism is situated in the middle of rationalist and reflectivist approaches as Rosamond, Weiner and Adler argue. In constructivism, ideas and thoughts are more important than material forces, identities have a crucial role in the constitution of interests and actions, agents and structures are constructed mutually, institutions have a role in constructing identities, and constructivism is a theory of process. So, social constructivism is chosen as the main theoretical background of this thesis because it researches identities and their constructions and changes as a process. In this thesis, the role of EU's language policy on the construction of European identity is analysed. As this is an unfinished process, it is argued from the constructivist point of view, which focuses on the process rather than outcomes or end-products, which highlights the importance of ideas, interactions, actors and institutions in this process. Moreover, the European identity is socially constructed as constructivist point of view argues.

### **2.1.1. Different Approaches to Social Constructivism**

There are different classifications of social constructivism. Checkel distinguishes between three types of constructivism which are conventional constructivism, interpretative constructivism and critical/radical constructivism.<sup>48</sup> Hobson is another scholar who also specifies three types of constructivism. According

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<sup>47</sup> Martin Kohli, "The Battlegrounds of European Identity", *European Societies*, Vol.2, No.2, (2000), [http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Martin\\_Kohli2/publication/232946439\\_THE\\_BATTLEGROUND\\_OF\\_EUROPEAN\\_IDENTITY/links/0a85e5354f913131f0000000.pdf](http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Martin_Kohli2/publication/232946439_THE_BATTLEGROUND_OF_EUROPEAN_IDENTITY/links/0a85e5354f913131f0000000.pdf) (02.05.2015), p.119.

<sup>48</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Constructivist Approaches to European Integration", <http://www.follesdal.net/projects/ratify/TXT/Checkel-SageHandbookChapter.pdf> (01.03.20148), p.2.

to him, constructivism can be classified as “international society centric constructivism”, “state centric constructivism” and “radical constructivism”.<sup>49</sup> According to another classification, constructivism is categorized into three groups. These are “systemic constructivism”, “unit-level constructivism” and “holistic constructivism”.<sup>50</sup>

Conventional constructivism is one of the approaches of constructivism and it is represented by many scholars such as Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Christian Reus-Smit, John Ruggie, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Ted Hopf and Martha Finnemore.<sup>51</sup> Hopf describes conventional constructivism as “a collection of principles distilled from critical social theory but without the latter’s more consistent theoretical or epistemological follow-through.”<sup>52</sup> Checkel states that conventional constructivism examines the role of norms and identity in shaping international political outcome. This kind of constructivism usually takes place in the United States of America (USA). The scholars of this type of constructivism are positivist in epistemological orientation and according to Checkel; they support bridge building among diverse theoretical perspectives. In their researches, they use qualitative method and process tracing case studies as methodological background.<sup>53</sup> Even though Checkel gives details of conventional constructivism and use it in his researches he also criticizes it and states that process-tracing just works in situations where things happen constantly step by step and adds that it “cannot capture the recursivity and fluidity of post-positivist epistemologies.”<sup>54</sup> He argues that this leads to principled and practical outcomes such as conceptual confusion and limitation to bridge building efforts and explains the reason for such a neglect of epistemology with Wendt’s view about when “we agree on

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<sup>49</sup> John M. Hobson, “Constructivism”, *The State and International Relations*, UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, First edition: 2001, pp.145 -173.

<sup>50</sup> Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, in Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, et al. (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2005, p.189.

<sup>51</sup> R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, "Social Constructivism", p.167.

<sup>52</sup> T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, p.181.

<sup>53</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Constructivism and EU Politics”, in Knud Erik Jorgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond (Eds.), *Handbook of European Union Politics*, London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2006, p.58.

<sup>54</sup> J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.9.

ontology –as most constructivist do- the rest (epistemology) will fall into place.”<sup>55</sup> Hopf also makes similar point and adds: “constructivism adopts positivist conventions about sample characteristics, methods of difference, process tracing, and spuriousness checks.”<sup>56</sup> Emanuel Adler draws attention to a need to develop “a coherent constructivist methodological base that suggests a practical alternative to imitating the physical sciences”.<sup>57</sup> This can be seen as an attempt to carry constructivism a step forward and eliminate criticism directed to conventional constructivism.

According to Hopf, conventional constructivism expects to uncover differences, identities and multiple understanding and in this way they assume to specify conditions under which one can expect to see one identity or another.<sup>58</sup> This leads to the point of predictability which decreases the uncertainty in the international relations and domestic society.<sup>59</sup> From Hopf’s point of view, conventional constructivists aim to discover identities and their social practices to make explanation about how those identities imply certain actions. They accept their existence and want to realize their reproduction and effects. They also want to see the production of the knowledge and insights based on novel understanding.<sup>60</sup> And this is also about predictability and making international relations and domestic society more certain to be able to know what may come next.

Checkel cites Hooge in one of his articles and states that conventional constructivists explores in what degree institutions like Commission affects the values and the identities of social agents.<sup>61</sup> Here it is important to realize that effect and its degree. According to conventional constructivist approach, persuasion, arguing and rhetorical actions cause changes in agents properties and they evaluate language as a causal mechanism.<sup>62</sup> So language is an element in constructing identities.

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid., pp.9-10.

<sup>56</sup> T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, p.183.

<sup>57</sup> Emanuel Adler, "Constructivism and International Relations", in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage, 2002, p.109.

<sup>58</sup> T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, p.183.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p.174.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., pp.183-185.

<sup>61</sup> J. T. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.7.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p.16.

In conventional constructivism, the origin of the identity is related with cognition. Conventional constructivists accept the existences of identities and, as stated above, they aim to understand their effects and reproduction in order to make predictions for future.<sup>63</sup>

Critical Constructivism is another approach of social constructivism. According to critical constructivists, “‘truth claims’ are not possible because there is no neutral ground where we can decide about what is true.”<sup>64</sup> They wish to uncover the relation between power and truth and it is represented by David Campbell, Jim George, James Der Derian, R. B. J. Walker, Andrew Linklater and Ann Tickner.<sup>65</sup>

Checkel states that critical constructivists focus on the linguistic and they “add an explicitly normative dimension by probing a researcher’s own implication in the reproduction of the identities and the world he /she is studying.”<sup>66</sup> Here the emphasis is on the discourse – theoretical and the key sources of theoretical inspiration are linguistic approaches. Critical constructivists, as post-positivist constructivists, research the discursive practices. The key words for critical constructivists are power and discourse and as Checkel cites Eriksen and Fossum, they explore what kind of identity should be possessed by the EU to be democratic and legitimate.<sup>67</sup> Critical constructivists want to discover the identities just as conventional constructivists do but not to state the effect. Here they aim “to elaborate on how people come to believe in a single version of naturalized truth.”<sup>68</sup>

Critical constructivists evaluate “other” as an important instrument in constructing identities. Hopf refers to Tzvetan Todorov, Ashis Nandy and Hegel’s bondsman’s tale to show the importance of “other” for the production of identity and he cites Inayatullah and Bandy and states that in critical constructivism the assimilation or oppression of the “other” is implied while the existence of difference in conventional

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<sup>63</sup> T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, p.184.

<sup>64</sup> R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, "Social Constructivism", p.167.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> J. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.6.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p.7.

<sup>68</sup> T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, p.184.

constructivism is allowed to reign.<sup>69</sup> Here for the construction of identity, the existence of “other” is crucial. Its existence is a necessity in order to differentiate itself and construct one’s own identity, without alienation it is not possible to form an identity according to critical constructivism.

In critical theory, the concept of identity is related with power and it is exercised in every social exchange and there is always a dominant actor and here researching power relations constitute an important part of their agenda.<sup>70</sup>

Holistic constructivism is another type of constructivism. It is evaluated as a form of modernist constructivism and it is assumed to be concrete and historical.<sup>71</sup> Holistic constructivism aims to bridge systemic constructivism and unit-level constructivism. In order to succeed in this, holistic constructivists “bring the corporate and the social together into a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and the international as two faces of a single social and political order.”<sup>72</sup> C. Reus-Smith states that this type of constructivism concerns with the dynamics of global change and searches out grand shifts between international systems and recent changes within the modern system. John Ruggie and Kratochwil’s writings are given as an example of this kind of researches. Holistic constructivism is thought to have the ability “to explain the development of the normative and ideational structures of the present international system, as well as the social identities they have engendered.”<sup>73</sup> But it is criticised for losing human agency in the researches as it focuses more on grand tectonic transformations. Both Ruggie’s and Kratochwil’s writings focus on grand transformations as the former researches the change from the feudal Europe to sovereign states of Europe and the latter focuses on the end of the Cold War.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p.185.

<sup>71</sup> Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.4, No.3, (1998) [http://www.politics.ubc.ca/fileadmin/user\\_upload/poli\\_sci/Faculty/price/Dangerous\\_Liaisons.pdf](http://www.politics.ubc.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/poli_sci/Faculty/price/Dangerous_Liaisons.pdf) (10.05.2015), pp.268-269.

<sup>72</sup> C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, p.201.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.



Another approach of constructivism is international society centric constructivism. The international society centric constructivism is evaluated to be positive in the construction of state identities. It is also stated that “global norms tend, *on the whole*, to be positive benign and increasingly inclusionary.”<sup>75</sup>

This kind of constructivism is stated in Finnemore’s book, “National Interests in International Society” (1996). As cited by Hobson, Finnemore evaluates states as normative-adaptive entities. She asks the question of how states' interests are defined and notes that the state identities and interests are defined by normative structure of international society. She emphasizes structure over agency. According to her, there are two tiers. The first tier is thought to be the normative structure and Hobson describes it as the deep structure of the international society and it is stated that this includes many international norms “which socialise states into following ‘appropriate’ behavioural patterns.”<sup>76</sup> The second tier is thought to be the ‘surface structure’ of the international society and it contains both international non-state actors and international organizations, which are seen as agents that transmit or diffuse the norms of the deep structure.<sup>77</sup>

Interpretative constructivism is another approach which is more popular in Europe and uses post-positivist epistemologies. In interpretative constructivism, the role of language is researched to understand its importance in mediating and constructing social reality. Interpretative constructivists prefer “how possible” questions rather than “why” questions in order to make it clear how change is possible. They do not explore “what factors causes what” as conventional constructivists do. They focus on the reproduction of identity. They explore background conditions, discourses using linguistic techniques to find out how change is possible and how identity is reproduced.<sup>78</sup>

Radical constructivism is another constructivist approach. Hobson compares radical constructivism with international society centric constructivism and notes that

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<sup>75</sup> J. M. Hobson, “Constructivism”, p.157.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p.149.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>78</sup> J. Checkel, “Constructivist Approaches to European Integration”, p.2.

radical constructivism includes negative implications. He also indicates that the construction of state identities is understood in negative terms in radical constructivism. He explains it as “the process of state identity formation necessarily leads to exclusion, repression violence and marginalization of minorities.”<sup>79</sup> Here it is also emphasized that in constructing national identity a threatening other, against which the self is defined negatively, is created. The threatening other has a uniting role upon the self. But it also has another role showing states military preparation natural for the state’s foreign policy.<sup>80</sup> Hobson also mentions the criticisms of this approach and expresses that radical constructivists are criticized to be “nihilistic” because of their insistence that states and nations are “not real”. But he thinks that this is not correct as it means that “the state and all social forms do not exist as fully complete of finished entities whose legitimacy is unproblematic and fixed once and for all”.<sup>81</sup>

State centric constructivism is another variant of constructivism which focuses on the national/domestic sphere, rather than the international one. Katzenstein researches the impact of state’s power upon norms and the impact of norms upon the state. Hobson states that Katzenstein gives three normative structures to inform state policy choices, which are economic security norms, external military security norms and internal security norms and each of them can take two main forms. According to these forms, norms can either be contested or uncontested.<sup>82</sup> He also states that:

The basic formula is that where norms are uncontested, so state policy becomes flexible, and the state’s domestic and international agential power is enhanced; conversely, where norms are contested, state policy becomes rigid, and agential power in the domestic and international arena is diminished.<sup>83</sup>

Another type of constructivism is systemic constructivism. As Jackson and Sorensen state, Martha Finnemore has proposed systemic analysis in her book “National Interest in International Society” (1996).<sup>84</sup> The research agenda of systemic constructivism is the relations and interactions between unitary state actors. C. Reus- Smit explains it as:

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<sup>79</sup> J. M. Hobson, “Constructivism”, p.157.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p.159.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p.160.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., pp.165-166.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p.166.

<sup>84</sup> R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, "Social Constructivism", p.169.

“The social identities of the states are thought to be constituted by the normative and ideational structures of international society, and those structures are seen as the product of state practices.”<sup>85</sup> Wendt’s researches are thought to be best examples of this type of constructivism as he focuses on the constitutive role of the international social interaction.<sup>86</sup>

In this approach, world politics is explained with the relations of states and domestic politics is ignored. According to C. Reus-Smit, systemic constructivism has a major deficiency: “it confines the processes that shape international societies within an unnecessarily and unproductively narrow realm.”<sup>87</sup> Price and Reus-Smit also state that this kind of research “offers an overly static conception of the state and the international system, providing no clue as to how agents or structures change.”<sup>88</sup> World politics is the centre of systemic constructivism and this is criticized for as narrowing the process as it ignores domestic factors.

Unit-level constructivism is different from systemic constructivism as it mostly focuses on internal determinants but it does not ignore the role of international norms. In unit-level constructivism, the relationship between domestic social and legal norms, the identities and interest of states are researched. Different types of identity, interest and action across states can be explained with unit-level constructivism. Katzenstein’s writing about Germany and Japan is given as an example of unit-level constructivism as these countries have many common features such as military defeat, foreign occupation, economic development but they have different internal and external national security policies. Unit-level constructivism is criticised for having difficulty in accounting “for similarities between states for patterns of convergence in state identity and interest.”<sup>89</sup>

The subject of the thesis is the role of EU’s Language Policy and translation in the construction of European identity. In this study, different aspects of these

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<sup>85</sup> C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp.199-200.

<sup>86</sup> R. Price and C. Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism”, p.268.

<sup>87</sup> C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, pp.199-200.

<sup>88</sup> R. Price and C. Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism”, p.268.

<sup>89</sup> C. Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, p.200.

approaches are used as social constructivism is the main theoretical background of this thesis but it should also be noted that the aspects of conventional and interpretative constructivist approaches can be noticed more within this study. As stated above, qualitative method is preferred to examine European identity and its construction process just like in conventional constructivist approaches and the role of language is researched to understand its importance in constructing European identity just like in interpretative constructivist approaches. So, firstly construction of European identity is analysed in a step by step process- tracing method in order to see the construction process within Europe and its development since its foundation is indicated. It is also aimed to find out in what degree and how an institution like Commission affects and contributes to the construction of identities of the citizens. Then, the EU's Language Policy is examined and lastly the role of language policy and translation in this construction process is questioned to see how and in what way, they affect the construction of European Identity.

## **2.2. The Identity Issue**

In this part, before focusing on the European identity, the concept of identity is examined generally to understand and see what is meant with the term and which meanings are attributed to it. To be able to give a general perspective different social science disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, social psychology, social anthropology and international relations are referred to.

There are many researches on the concept of identity as it was stated in the introduction of the “Handbook of Identity Theory and Research” (2011) that there are 1999 records, which are journal articles, books, book chapters and doctoral dissertations, from the 1960s, 5296 from the 1970s, 11106 from the 1980s, 44557 from the 1990s and the number increased more in the 2000s. The increase in identity literature has been far more than many other literatures.<sup>90</sup> These numbers show how much this term has been researched and how the number of researches related to the term has increased within the years.

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<sup>90</sup> Vivien L. Vignoles et al., “Introduction: Toward an Integrated view of Identity”, in Seth J. Schwartz et al. (Ed.), *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*, New York: Springer, 2011, p.2.

Before focusing on these concepts, it is important to state why identities are important and why they are necessary in international politics and domestic society as Ted Hopf states they are necessary “in order to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order”<sup>91</sup> and he also notes that “identities cannot be understood without a simultaneous account of normative, cultural and institutional context.”<sup>92</sup> So in order to understand and make sense of the international relations and domestic society, identities should be analysed and normative, cultural and institutional contexts need to be clarified to understand identities. The knowledge about identities increases the predictability and decreases the uncertainty of the international relations. Hopf indicates that “A world without identities is a world of chaos.”<sup>93</sup> In his article, he cites Henri Tajfel and states that identities have functions such as “they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are.”<sup>94</sup> As it is clear from these statements, identities provide information about the actors of everyday life and the international relations and this prevents the relationship in international relations from being chaotic by increasing predictability.

Identity is usually stated to be introduced to the social analysis in the social sciences and political discourses in the 1960s in the USA.<sup>95</sup> The concept has different definitions and this causes ambiguity in the use of the term. Brubaker and Cooper ask the question of what scholars mean when they talk about identity and what conceptual and explanatory work the term is supposed to do. To answer these questions, they explain the uses of identity and state that:

It is used to highlight non-instrumental modes of action; to focus on self-understanding rather than self-interest; to designate sameness across persons or sameness over time; to capture allegedly core, foundational aspects of selfhood; to deny that such core, foundational aspects exist; to highlight processual, interactive development of solidarity and collective self-understanding; and to stress the fragmented quality of the contemporary

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<sup>91</sup>T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, p.174.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p.175.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p.175.

<sup>95</sup>Rogers Brubaker and Frederic Cooper, “Beyond “Identity””, [http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/brubaker/Publications/18\\_Beyond\\_Identity.pdf](http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/brubaker/Publications/18_Beyond_Identity.pdf) (11.05.2014), p.2.

experience of 'self,' a self unstably patched together through shards of discourse and contingently 'activated' in differing contexts.<sup>96</sup>

These uses of identity show how multifaceted and heterogeneous the term is. For that reason, it is important to specify the term because otherwise it may cause misunderstandings. It should be stated in which context we use identity and with what limits. The uses of the term should also be stated in order to be clear and reach the ultimate objective of the research. It should also be indicated what work the term of identity is supposed to provide and aimed to do. At this point, Brubaker and Cooper suggest “alternative analytical idioms” to prevent confusion instead of using the term of “identity” with many adjectives and connotations. They indicate their suggestions in three groups. First group includes identification and categorization, the second one includes self-understanding and location and the last group includes commonality, connectness, and groupness.<sup>97</sup> But in this thesis, the term of “identity” is used as an umbrella term which includes different but specified and defined connotations.

Sociologist Richard Jenkins describes identity as a human capacity. According to him, the term defines the human world and the places of human in this world and it includes “...who we are, knowing who others are, them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on..”<sup>98</sup> Here identity answers the question of who we are. It defines the term with our understanding and describing of ourselves, the others understanding and describing of us and our understanding and describing who the others think we are. It can be stated that here perception plays an important role to place human in this world. Jenkins also emphasizes that identity “is a process - identification– not a ‘thing’. It is not something that one can have, or not; it is something that one does.”<sup>99</sup> Cultural theorist and sociologist Stuart Hall also states that identity is a process. According to him, identity should be thought as “a 'production', which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation.”<sup>100</sup> He also states that “Identity is always an open, complex and

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp.6-8.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., pp.14-21.

<sup>98</sup> Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Abingdon: Routledge, 2008, p.5.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora”, [http://www.unipa.it/~michele.cometa/hall\\_cultural\\_identity.pdf](http://www.unipa.it/~michele.cometa/hall_cultural_identity.pdf) (20.05.2014), p.1.

unfinished game - always 'under construction'.<sup>101</sup> Another researcher, social anthropologist Chris Shore also emphasizes the importance of change in describing identity and notes that identity is constantly changing.<sup>102</sup> It is clear that identity is not static, fixed or inactive; on the contrary it is active and alive. It is a process in which the identities are both constructed, reconstructed and they change in time and, as it is stated above, it is never complete but always under construction.

Gerard Delanty, who is also a sociologist, makes contribution to the issue of identity with his researches. He indicates four aspects of identity which are; identities are processual or constructed; they have a narrative dimension; they include a relation of self and other and lastly it is needed to concern what is referred to as multiple identities.<sup>103</sup> In this thesis, identities' being processual or constructed feature is mostly referred as the European identity is thought to be constructed in a process, which is evaluated in the next chapter. To support his ideas, he states that identity is not given but it is a mode of self-understanding and they are fluid, negotiable and contested.<sup>104</sup>

Another sociologist, Manuel Castells, defines identity as "a set of values that provide symbolic meaning to people's life by enhancing their individuation (or self-definition) and their feeling of belonging."<sup>105</sup> He also thinks that people may have different identities and they may feel Portuguese, socialist, catholic, woman and the dominance of these identities can change according to the moment of life and the realm of activity.<sup>106</sup> This clear definition explains what is referred with identity and how they can co-exist. European identity is an identity which consists of many values and different identities may compose European identity.

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<sup>101</sup> Stuart Hall, "Globalisation Europe's Other Self", *Marxism Today*, (August 1991), <http://www.unz.org/Pub/MarxismToday-1991aug-00018> (20.05.2014), p.19.

<sup>102</sup> Chris Shore, "Imaging the New Europe: Identity and Heritage in European Community Discourse", in Paul Graves-Brown and Sian Jones (Eds.), *Cultural Identity and Archaeology: The Construction of European Communities*, London: Routledge, 1996, p.110.

<sup>103</sup> Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, "Is there a European identity?: European self-understanding beyond unity and diversity", *Rethinking Europe: Social theory and the implications of Europeanization*, Oxon: Routledge, 2005, p.51.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p.52.

<sup>105</sup> Manuel Castells, "The Construction of European Identity", <http://www.chet.org.za/files/CASTELLS%202004%20European%20Identity.pdf> (06.06.2015), p. 3.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

Philosophers focus on “the condition of sameness.”<sup>107</sup> According to Harold Noonan, the concept of identity “is an utterly unproblematic notion.”<sup>108</sup> Riley states that identity is “a quality which entities ‘have’ without reference to other entities.”<sup>109</sup> So here there is no need to make any kind of comparison, identity is something which human being has naturally. But there are also philosophers like Kant and Hegel who describe identity with a reference to ‘other’.<sup>110</sup> Here it should be noted that they generally analyse, the issue in regard to political science and international relations and the stereotype of “other” is a need for the creation of the identity. An actor identifies himself/herself by differentiating himself/herself from the other. Wendt states that identity is a way of understanding “who or what actor is.”<sup>111</sup>

Psychologists usually begin to research the concept with Erikson’s focus on “identity as an individual phenomenon developing in social contexts.”<sup>112</sup> After Erikson, Krappmann and Döbert researched and developed the issue “to construct a theory of communication and socialization.”<sup>113</sup>

Social psychologist Robert M. Krauss and Jennifer S. Pardo use two types of identity: social identity and personal identity. They describe social identity as an identity which is determined by the individual’s social group or some categories and personal identity is an identity which is related with individuals’ formation.<sup>114</sup> It is clear than social groups, others and some categories are at the forefront when identity is evaluated socially. As Riley states: “Identity is a quality which is ascribed or attributed to an individual human being by other human beings.”<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Philip Riley, *Language, Culture and Identity*, Bloomsbury Academic, 2007, p.70.

<sup>108</sup> Harold Noonan, "Identity", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/identity/> (01.03.2014).

<sup>109</sup> P. Riley, *Language, Culture and Identity*, p.86.

<sup>110</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, “Identity and International Relations”, *International Relations*. Vol.22, No.4, (2008), <http://ire.sagepub.com/content/22/4/473> (01.03.2014), p.474.

<sup>111</sup> A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.231.

<sup>112</sup> Kamila Ciepiela, “From language as an identity marker to language as a toolkit for identity performance” in Kamila Ciepiela (Ed.), *Identity through a Language Lens*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2011, p.7.

<sup>113</sup> M. Kohli, "The Battlegrounds of European Identity", p.115.

<sup>114</sup> Robert M. Krauss and Jennifer S. Pardo, “Speaker Perception and Social Behavior: Bridging Social Psychology and Speech Science”, <http://www.columbia.edu/~rmk7/PDF/Bridges.pdf>, (08.05.2015), p.8.

<sup>115</sup> P. Riley, *Language, Culture and Identity*, p.86.



Identity is also defined with reference to ‘other’ in international relations. Mayer and Palmowski indicate that identity is constructed “through interaction with each other and with outsiders.”<sup>116</sup> Here ‘outsiders’ can be read as ‘others’ with whom individuals are compared to and identity is formed. Identity is an interpretation of individual’s herself/himself by using ‘other’ in an interaction. Mead also emphasizes the importance of interaction as he states that “selves can only exist in definite relationship to other selves.”<sup>117</sup>

Identity is mostly described with relation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ as it is clear, in some of the examples given above. But the meaning of the concept is not so clear because concepts like “self” and “personality” are also used instead of it.<sup>118</sup> ‘Self’ is defined by Rosemberg as: “the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object of evaluation”.<sup>119</sup> According to Ellen E. Pastorino and Susann M. Doyle-Partillo, “self-concept is our perception or image of our abilities and our uniqueness.”<sup>120</sup> R. J. Crisp and R. N. Turner give the definition of three types of ‘self’: individual self, relational self and collective self. According to them, individual self is “consistence of attributes and personality traits that differentiate us from other individuals”, relational self is related with “our relationships with significant others” and collective self “reflects our membership in social groups.”<sup>121</sup> Mead, as one of the mostly referred scholars in this field indicates self as “something which has a development” and according to him, self “develops in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process.”<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Franz. C. Mayer & Jan Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe”, *JCMS*, Vol.42, No.3, (2004), p.577.

<sup>117</sup> George Herbert Mead, "Play, the Game and the Generalized Other", in George Herbert Mead and Charles W. Morris (Eds.), *Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1934, p.164.

<sup>118</sup> Stephen C. Peck, "The Jingle-Jangle Jungle of Identity: Historical Perspective and Future Directions", <http://www.rcgd.isr.umich.edu/garp/articles/peck04.pdf> (08.05.2015), p.4.

<sup>119</sup> Morris Rosenberg, *Conceiving the Self*, New York: Basic Books, 1979, p.7; cited in Neil J. Mackinnon and David R. Heise, *Self Identity and Social Institutions*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Inc., 2010, p.96.

<sup>120</sup> Ellen E. Pastorino and Susann M. Doyle-Partillo, *What is Psychology?: Essentials*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Canada, Wadsworth: Cengage Learning, 2013, p. 482.

<sup>121</sup> Richard J. Crisp and Rhiannon N. Turner, *Essential Social Psychology*, London: Sage Publications, 2007.

<sup>122</sup> George Herbert Mead, "The Self and the Organism", in George Herbert Mead and Charles W. Morris (Eds.), *Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*, Chicago: University of Chicago 1934, p.135.

Mead's this statement is another example of defining identity as a process as stated above.

“Other” as one of the mostly referred concepts in definitions of identity includes different aspects, properties than the “self” has. William E. Connolly explains it clearly. According to him, “identity requires difference in order to be and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.”<sup>123</sup> Jean- François Staszak states that “Otherness and identity are two inseparable sides of the same coin. The Other only exists relative to the Self, and vice versa.”<sup>124</sup> According to this view, we need “other” to define an identity. Differences and othering are necessities in constructing identity. But there are also views that without other it is still possible to construct an identity. Ole Waever is one of these scholars. According to him, being away from the centre of Europe does not mean to be “anti-Europe” but refers to those who are away from the centre as “less Europe”<sup>125</sup> and Selcen Öner adds that ‘othering’ is not necessary for construction of an identity, but distinguishability is necessary and there are different ways of differentiation.<sup>126</sup>

As it can be seen above, many social scientists and social theorists have written on the subject of identity. There are also many others who have researched the concept. Some of them are Zygmunt Bauman, Pierre Bourdieu, Fernand Brudel, Craig Calhoun, S.N. Eisenstadt, Anthony Giddens, Bernard Giessen, Jürgen Habermas, David Laitin, Claude Levi-Strauss, Paul Ricoeur, Amartya Sen, Margaret Somers, Charles Taylor, Charles Tilly and Harrison White.<sup>127</sup>

In this short introduction to identity issue, it can be understood clearly that the term of identity has many different definitions, it can be described with many different adjectives and it has many uses so it is important to draw the burdens of the term in

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<sup>123</sup> William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.64.

<sup>124</sup> Jean- François Staszak, “Other/Otherness”, <http://www.unige.ch/ses/geo/collaborateurs/publicationsJFS/OtherOtherness.pdf> (05.03.2012), p.2.

<sup>125</sup> Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community” in Emmanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (Eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.100.

<sup>126</sup> Selcen Öner, *Turkey and The European Union: The Question of European Identity*, USA, Lexington Books, 2011, p.23.

<sup>127</sup> R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, “Beyond “Identity””, p.4.

order not to cause any kind of misunderstandings. Within the framework of this thesis, the term of identity is used to analyse the construction process of European identity and the impact and contributions of multilingualism and translation in this construction process. Here identity is used as an umbrella term. And identity is a term which can be used to understand, name and perceive the other actors and ourselves in any kind of relations. It is a process, which is fluid, unfinished and always under construction. So it would not be wrong to state that in this thesis the concept of identity is mostly referred from the point of view of two disciplines: namely international relations and sociology.

### **2.2.1. Diverse Identities and Their Relation with the European Identity**

As stated above, identity is one of the most researched issues and to make it clear and to define it thoroughly classifications are made. Therefore, it is possible to notice terms like multiple identities, personal identity, collective identity, societal identity, cultural identity, civic identity, social identity, personal identity, political identity, hyphenated identity and cosmopolitan identity in the literature. Here all these identities are not analysed because they are beyond the scope of the thesis. In this part, Michael Bruter's political identity with its civic and cultural components, Thomas Risse's multiple identities and Anthony D. Smith's national identity and Gerard Delanty's collective identity are analysed. The reasons for focusing on these identities are that Bruter's civic and cultural identities state the elements of the European identity clearly,<sup>128</sup> Risse's model of identities explains how multiple identities can relate,<sup>129</sup> Smith's perspective on the European identity and national identities helps to compare these identities and Delanty's collective identity puts the identity in a wider social and historical context.<sup>130</sup> But these identity types are not evaluated just according to these

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<sup>128</sup> Michael Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2005, p.11.

<sup>129</sup> Thomas Risse, "An Emerging European Identity? What We Know And How To Make Sense of It?", 2003, <https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CBwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hup.fi%2Fcollegium%2Fevents%2F europeanidentity.pdf&ei=mEJOVYDzJIOZsAHp276wCA&usg=AFQjCNGYnB32PvIod3CDgG2vj4R1hxf5eg&sig2= BVjaCrHPsfvkHmmbmH3VQ&bvm=bv.95039771,d.bGg> (07.06.2015), pp.5-6.

<sup>130</sup> G. Delanty and C. Rumford, "Is there a European identity? European self-understanding beyond unity and diversity", p.52.

scholars. Other scholars who have contributed to the definition of the aforementioned identities are also included in this part.

Before giving information about identity types, it is important to be aware of the co-existence of identities. Here it should be noted that there are political thinkers who are opposed to different identities being compatible. As Bruter states, Japperson supports this idea in the case of European identity and thinks that the European identity is an elite phenomenon. He adds that this is also the view of Inglehart to some extent but Bruter indicates that the new state organizations show that multiple allegiances are possible.<sup>131</sup> So this means that individuals may have many identities at the same time. It is possible to have both the European identity and national identity simultaneously. From this starting point, he focuses on subsidiarity principle that "claims several identities co-exist" and summarizes it by giving 'a concentric model' according to which it is assumed that a citizen will feel closer to people from his own city, from the same region, from the same country<sup>132</sup> and this can be extended to the people from the same Union. So throughout the present thesis, it is accepted that many different identities can co-exist. Even though it is beyond the scope of this thesis, in order to make their co-existence clear, the hierarchy and the relationship between these different identities will be explained according to Risse's ways of thinking identities.

Lastly, before focusing on identity types, it should be noted that within the scope of this thesis, the European identity is accepted as the identity of the EU, as a *sui generis* entity, which consists of member states. The European identity and the national identities of the EU's member states co-exist and contribute without damaging each other. This identity is socially constructed, reconstructed and with each new enlargement it enriches and changes. So the European identity is a socially constructed, fluid and resilient identity, which co-exists with national identities and is constantly under construction and it has some components that are noted in the following pages. And all these features form the characteristics of European identity. It should also be mentioned that the identity types, which are examined in this part, support this European identity view.

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<sup>131</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.15.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, p.16.

### 2.2.1.1. *National Identity*

Wintle expresses that "European unity and European collective and cultural identity is derived from the concepts evolved in the literature about nations and states."<sup>133</sup> Therefore, national identities are evaluated in this part in order to be able to help in understanding the European identity. It is thought that it is limitedly possible to make analogy between the process of state-building and European integration process because of their different natures.<sup>134</sup> In this part, state-building process is not analysed, as it is beyond the scope of this thesis, but nation-building process which leads to national identities is briefly evaluated. There are different views about comparing the European identity with national identity and the process of constructing these identities. While some of the scholars argue that the construction processes of the European identity and nation-building are similar, others state that national identities and the European identity cannot be compared. Some of these different views are indicated in this part to be aware of the discussions and to use some of their outcomes.

The EU is a *sui generis* entity. It is not a state so the identity construction process can be different than the nation-building processes of the states. However, some of the instruments which are used in nation-building processes can be used in constructing European identity. So it may be useful to specify the instruments, tools and the components which are used in constructing national identities in order to make comparison between these two identities and see their relations and interactions.

It is important to clarify what it is meant by nation. Anderson defines nation as an "imagined political community".<sup>135</sup> According to Smith, "a nation is a population who share a historical territory, common memories, myths, a mass standardized public culture, a common economy, territorial mobility, common legal rights and duties for all

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<sup>133</sup> Michael Wintle, "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Michael Wintle (Ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, Aldershot, England: Avebury/Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1996, p.17.

<sup>134</sup> Tobias Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 28.

<sup>135</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 2006, p.6.

its citizens."<sup>136</sup> The components of a nation may be evaluated as the components of its identity. It is also important to mention the nation-building process to be able to understand how the identities are constructed and which components they have. Smith states some elements, which constitute the nation-building process. These elements are;

- the growth, cultivation and transmission of common memories, myths and symbols of the community;
- the growth, selection and transmission of historical traditions and rituals of community;
- the designation, cultivation and transmission of 'authentic' elements of shared culture (language, customs, religion, etc.) of the 'people';
- the inculcation of 'authentic' values, knowledge and attitudes in the designated population through standardized methods and institutions;
- the demarcation, cultivation and transmission of symbols and myths of a historic territory or homeland;
- the selection and husbanding of skills and resources within the demarcated territory;
- and the definition of common rights and duties for all the members of designated the community.<sup>137</sup>

Here he clearly gives the element of the process. Hroch also indicates the components of the nation-building process and according to him, a memory of common past, a density of linguistic or cultural ties and a conception of the equality of all members of the group are the elements of the process.<sup>138</sup> Wintle expresses that nation-building is "a largely internal and cultural process" and states that it is supported by "an army of willing civilizers anxious to create a uniform language and spelling, an improved and standardized education, and generally shared concepts of cultural behaviour."<sup>139</sup> While he is evaluating the achievements of the European elites he also adds that in nation-states "language standardization, control of media, religious policy, control of the army,

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<sup>136</sup> Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and The Idea of European Unity", *International Affairs*, Vol.68, No.1, (January 1992), p.60.

<sup>137</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, pp.89-90.

<sup>138</sup> Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe" in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (Eds.), *Becoming National*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.61.

<sup>139</sup> M. Wintle, "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience", p.17.

education policy and standardization of taxation"<sup>140</sup> have a role in nation-building. Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak argue that "the construction of national identity builds on a common history and history has always to do with remembrance and memory."<sup>141</sup> So it would not be wrong to state that history, memories, myths, symbols, traditions and rituals, language, customs, religion, common rights and duties, standardized education, shared concepts, media, army and taxation are used in nation-building process.

It is obvious language is evaluated as one of the components of the nation-building process. Andrew Simpson supports this view and notes that:

Studies of nationalism and the emergence and maintenance of nations regularly concur that language, and in particular the existence of broadly shared language, is very often a primary and critical component in the successful moulding of a population as a nation.<sup>142</sup>

Here it can be noticed that shared language is an element in constructing national identities and it has a role in shaping this identity but it should not be forgotten that the EU is a *sui generis* entity and language is also an important element of the European identity. However, in the EU context, the diversity of languages is aimed and supported rather than having a shared or common language as the EU is a multilingual Union. There are also views which focus on diversity of languages in societies. Jyotirindra Dasgupta's view can be given as an example. According to Dasgupta, "...institutional capacity cannot be built by denying or deriding the existence of the language divisions in a multi-lingual society."<sup>143</sup> So denying linguistic diversity even in nation-building process is not acceptable and it cannot be acceptable for the EU, as well. Moreover the necessities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century should not be missed. As Saran Kaur Gill notes: "language can function as a pillar of identity at all levels and the citizen of the 21st

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid., p.20.

<sup>141</sup> Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discursive Construction of National Identities", *Discourse & Society*, Vol.10, No.149, (1999), [http://www.sagepub.in/upm-data/40470\\_13b.pdf](http://www.sagepub.in/upm-data/40470_13b.pdf) (01.06.2015), p.154.

<sup>142</sup> Andrew Simpson, "Language and National Identity in Asia: a Thematic Introduction", in *Language and National Identity in Asia*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2007, p.1.

<sup>143</sup> Cited in Saran Kaur Gill, "Language, Nation-Building and Identity Formation in a Multi-Ethnic Society", in *Language Policy Challenges in Multi-Ethnic Malaysia*, Dordrecht: Springer, 2014, p.21.

century should be able to move from one cultural linguistic base to the other, as the particular context requires."<sup>144</sup>

Wintle focuses on 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' initiatives in nation-building process and gives examples for top-down initiatives such as Euro-flag and Euro-anthem. He states that top-down activities can contribute to the process but he also asserts that 'grass-root' or 'bottom-up' initiatives are needed to "complement the actions of government and elite and external forces."<sup>145</sup> Garcia also expresses that European identity cannot be constructed just from above,<sup>146</sup> with top-down initiatives.

There are different definitions of national identities. According to Boxhoorn, "national identity is no more and no less than a shared and usually artificially constructed historical experience, memory or a combination of the three."<sup>147</sup> Kostakopoulou defines national identities as strong as "they satisfy human psychological needs such as belonging to somewhere."<sup>148</sup> Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak describe national identity as:

... a sort of habitus, that is to say as a complex of common ideas, concepts or perception schemes, (a) of related emotional attitudes intersubjectively shared within a specific group of persons; (b) as well as of similar behavioural dispositions; (c) all of which are internalized through 'national' socialization.<sup>149</sup>

Selcen Öner makes a comparison between the constructions of European identity and nation building. She makes her comparison by focusing on many elements which are used in nation building process. Some of these instruments are education, language, political leadership, elites, remembering and forgetting, history, memory, symbols, roots, other, European peoples, borders and Euro. As a result she states that

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> M. Wintle, "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience", pp. 20-21.

<sup>146</sup> Soledad Garcia, "Europe's fragmented Identities and the Frontiers of Citizenship", in Soledad Garcia (Ed.), *European Identity and Search for Legitimacy*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993, p.15.

<sup>147</sup> Bram Boxhoorn, "European identity and the process of European unification: Compatible notions?", in Michael Wintle (Ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, Aldershot, England: Avebury/Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1996, p.140.

<sup>148</sup> Theodora Kostakopoulou, *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, p.23.

<sup>149</sup> R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and R. Wodak, "The Discursive Construction of National Identities", p.153.



the processes of constructing European identity and nation building have similarities and some similar instruments are used but the process of constructing European identity has unique characteristics and therefore, nation-building cannot be used as a basis for constructing European identity.<sup>150</sup> There are also other scholars who think that any comparison cannot be made between these two identity construction processes. Kohli proposes that "European identity cannot take its clues from national identity, neither in form nor in substance."<sup>151</sup> P. van Ham also states that "a European identity will not have to be modelled on the national identities" and adds that "European identity should be based on its celebrated diversity, its openness and inclusiveness."<sup>152</sup> Ash expresses that European identity "will not be constructed in the fashion of the historic European nation."<sup>153</sup> However, there are also scholars who support the idea that the concepts used in both identities are similar as one of them evolved from the other one. As aforementioned, Wintle supports this view. Even though both processes have idiosyncratic features, they also have similar features and they use some similar instruments and these features and instruments and their usefulness in guiding the process should not be missed.

The co-existence of national identities and the European identity is explained latter in this part but the interactions between the European identity and national identities should also be mentioned briefly to understand how these identities interact with each other. According to Strath, there are two perceptions about these interactions. The first perception is that the European identity is an alternative to the national identities and it might replace national identities and the second one is that the European identity overlaps and supplements national identities.<sup>154</sup> There are scholars who support the first perception but generally the second perception is supported. For example, Risse asserts that "it is wrong to conceptualize European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an

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<sup>150</sup> Selcen Öner, "Construction of European Identity within the European Union", PhD Thesis (Marmara University, European Union Institute, 2008), pp.341-354.

<sup>151</sup> M. Kohli, "The Battlegrounds of European Identity", p.114.

<sup>152</sup> Peter van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity*, New York: Routledge Pub., 2001, pp.72-73.

<sup>153</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, "Europe's True Stories", *Prospect Magazine*, Issue 131, February 2007, <http://proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/library/working%20papers/Ash%202007.pdf> (06.06.2015), p.1.

<sup>154</sup> Bo Strath, "Introduction: Europe as a Discourse" in B. Strath (Ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang Pub., 2000, p.13.

increase in European identity necessarily decreases one's loyalty to national or other communities."<sup>155</sup> In this thesis, it is examined that the second perception fits more to the officials with whom interviews were conducted in Brussels. The interviews are presented in the following chapter. Mayer and Palmowski also draw attention to the interaction between the European identity and national identities. According to them, the European identity has an effect on the national identities but this identity "does not resolve the exclusivity of nationalism, but it moderates it" and they add that "national identities still matter but within the EU the barriers between them have become permeable".<sup>156</sup> This means that national identities still preserve their existence within the EU.

### **2.2.1.2. Cultural and Civic Identities**

In examining European identity, civic identity and cultural identity can be used to understand the components of this identity. Bruter argues the question of; how to define European identity conceptually and he indicates that "we should differentiate between two aspects of political identities, a 'cultural' one and a 'civic' one".<sup>157</sup> He states that as a political identity, European identity can be divided into two components which are civic identity and cultural identity.<sup>158</sup>

According to Bruter, civic identity is "a set of institutional frameworks which defines individual's values, perceptions of freedom, rights and obligations" while cultural identity is "referring to common values, language, religion, ethnicity, history, myths, etc."<sup>159</sup> He also expresses that cultural elements include "a citizen's sense of belonging to a human community with which s/he believes s/he shares a certain common culture, social similarities, ethics, values, religion or even ethnicity, however defined" and civic elements include "a citizen's identification with political system, that

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<sup>155</sup> Thomas Risse, "European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?", in Richard Hermann, Thomas Risse and Marilyn Brewer (Eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 2004, p.248.

<sup>156</sup> F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, "European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind The Peoples of Europe", p.591.

<sup>157</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.5.

<sup>158</sup> Michael Bruter, "Political identity and European Elections", <http://www.afsp.msh-paris.fr/activite/diversafsp/collgspegael04/bruter.pdf> (01.06.2015), p.7.

<sup>159</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.103.

is, an acknowledgement that this political system defines some of her/his rights and duties as a political being."<sup>160</sup> Daniel Hart, Cameron Richardson and Britt Wilkenfeld also give a definition for civic identity. According to them, civic identity is "...a set of beliefs and emotions about oneself as a participant in civic life."<sup>161</sup> They add that this kind of identity is usually related with communities and societies in a specific geographical location. According to them, individuals might think of or evaluate themselves as concerned about their neighbourhood, as an active citizen of their town, or a proud, contributing member of their country.<sup>162</sup> In this thesis, Bruter's definition for both civic and cultural identity can be observed easily in the European identity context.

Both the civic and cultural components are referred in defining the European identity. For example, Delanty describes European identity as a "diffuse and open ended process of cultural and institutional experimentation."<sup>163</sup> And Risse states that "European institutions and European elites deliberately try to construct a post-national civic identity."<sup>164</sup> According to Bruter, the European civic identity "can be understood as the degree to which they feel that they are citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life" and the European cultural identity can be understood "as individuals' perceptions that fellow European are closer to them than non-Europeans".<sup>165</sup> According to his surveys, Bruter emphasizes that "the two components of political identities exist in parallel in citizens' mind."<sup>166</sup> Another result of his surveys is that the news affects citizens' civic identity while the symbols affect their cultural identity.<sup>167</sup> Individuals may have both the civic and cultural components while they are referring to their identity. But as the European identity does

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<sup>160</sup> Michael Bruter, "Legitimacy, Euroscepticism & Identity in the European Union - Problems of Measurement, Modelling & Paradoxical Patterns of Influence", *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, Vol.4, No.4, <http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/153> (03.05.2015), p.279.

<sup>161</sup> Daniel Hart et al., "Civic Identity", in Seth J. Schwartz, et al. (Eds.), *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research*, New York: Springer, 2011, p.773.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Gerard Delanty, "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism", *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol.3, No.3, (2002), p.357.

<sup>164</sup> T. Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", p.154.

<sup>165</sup> Michael Bruter, "Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: News, Symbols, and European Identity", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.36, No.10, (December 2003), p.1155.

<sup>166</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.12.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p.xv.

not have a common language, religion, ethnicity, and memory, it should be constructed on common values such as democracy, human rights and diversity.

### **2.2.1.3. Multiple Identities**

Individuals can identify themselves with many different properties they have in their daily lives. According to Risse, individuals can have multiple identities and feel loyalty to several social groups and they can identify themselves with these identities that can change according to the context, in which people act.<sup>168</sup> Charlotte Breterton and John Vogler state that "sources of identity may include gender, sexuality, sporting activity, occupation, social class, ethnicity, religion, a political organization or ideology, a nation state, a region or a city."<sup>169</sup> Smith also argues that in a world of multiple ties and identities, multiple collective identifications are quite common and possible but their scope and intensity can vary with time and place.<sup>170</sup> He explains this by indicating that "individuals may feel loyalty not only to their families, villages, castes, cities, regions and religious communities, as well as to class and gender identifications; they may also feel allegiances to different ethnic communities at different levels of identifications simultaneously."<sup>171</sup> Bruter's views about co-existence of several identities are also expressed above. He explains this co-existence with 'concentric model' and states that citizens will feel closer to people from his own city, from the same region, from the same country respectively.<sup>172</sup> This gives an explanation for the co-existence of identities within a hierarchical structure.

Risse explains these multiple identities with different models as he thinks that "European and national identities can go together".<sup>173</sup> He uses four ways of thinking about multiple identities which are the 'nested identities', 'cross-cutting identities',

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<sup>168</sup> Thomas Risse, "Nationalism and Collective Identities: Europe versus the Nation-State", in Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes (Eds.), *Developments in West European Politics*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2002, pp.77-83.

<sup>169</sup> Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The EU as a Global Actor*, London: Routledge Pub., 1999, pp.223-226.

<sup>170</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, England: Penguin Books, 1991, p.175.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p.24.

<sup>172</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.16.

<sup>173</sup> T. Risse, "European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?", p.250.

'separate identities' and 'marble cake identities'.<sup>174</sup> These ways are mentioned briefly to be aware of how different identities can overlap or co-exist and to be aware of their relations, so it will be useful to see how European identity co-exists with other identities.

Risse explains nestedness with 'Russian Matruska' model. In this model, it is possible to see the hierarchy in people's sense of belonging and loyalties. He indicates that "European and other identities pertaining to territory defined entities can be nested into each other so that 'Europe' forms the outer boundary, while one's region or nation state constitutes the core."<sup>175</sup> This kind of relationship is similar to what Bruter explains as a 'concentric model' with which he makes similar hierarchy. Risse states that European identity is the outer boundary while the national identities are the core of 'Russian Matruska' model.<sup>176</sup>

Cross-cutting identities consist of identities which overlap and an individual has a sense of belonging to the both identities. In the European dimension, the individuals have both the European identity and national identity overlapping. This may occur with some of the individuals but not with all.<sup>177</sup> On the other hand, separate identities are identities in which there is no overlap in group membership as an individual's interests and professions are separate.<sup>178</sup>

In marble cake model, different identity components come together and blend into each other. He mentions that these components can be nested or enmeshed.<sup>179</sup> He clarifies it as "the various components of an individual's identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels, as the concepts of nestedness and of cross-cutting identities both imply."<sup>180</sup> He gives German identity as an example; "Post-Second World War German identity has evolved into a European identity as a means of overcoming the country's nationalist and militarist past; as a result, Germanness and Europeanness

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., p.251.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p.250.

<sup>179</sup> T. Risse, "Nationalism and Collective Identities: Europe versus the Nation-State", p.83.

<sup>180</sup> T. Risse, "European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?", p.251.

are firmly enmeshed and cannot be separated easily."<sup>181</sup> This means that it is difficult to separate the components of one identity from the other one and decide which component belongs to which identity.

These ways of thinking multiple identities are crucial to see how identities can co-exist and the relationship between the European identity and national identities and other identities, as well. It also supports the idea that European identity and national identities are not damaging each other, their co-existence is possible without diminishing the loyalties. Fossum states that "People have always had multiple identities and the European integration process may make it easier to simultaneously embrace a national and European identity."<sup>182</sup> He also points out that supranational, transnational and intergovernmental features of the EU, as a *sui generis* entity, enable the EU to maintain a wide range of identities and forms of belonging.<sup>183</sup>

Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski also draws attention to multiple identities as explained according to the Risse and she expresses that European identity is conceptualized as a component of a hybrid identity, as well. She indicates that "the notion of hybridity puts emphasis on the fusion of identities which is the result of the increasingly interwoven and multicultural nature of modern societies".<sup>184</sup> As Paul Meredith emphasises "Bhabha posits hybridity as such a form of liminal or in-between space".<sup>185</sup> This kind of identity may be discussed from the perspective of Turkish origin immigrants in the EU and their contribution to the European identity.

When the subject is hybridity, Grossberg's view should also be stated. As Grossberg notes that Hall uses the dispute between essentialists and anti-essentialists to explain the constitution of identity. According to him, from the essentialist perspective the identity "is defined by either a common origin or a common structure of experience

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<sup>181</sup> T. Risse, "Nationalism and Collective Identities: Europe versus the Nation-State", p.83.

<sup>182</sup> Jon Erik Fossum, "Identity Politics in the EU", *Arena Working Papers*, Vol.1, No.7, (2001), [https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2001/wp01\\_17.htm](https://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2001/wp01_17.htm) (06.06.2015).

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, "The debate on European identity in the functional perspective", *Citizenship and Collective Identity in Europe*, Oxon: Rutledge, 2010, p.49.

<sup>185</sup> Paul Meredith, "Hybridity in the Third Space: Rethinking Bi-cultural Politics in Aotearoa/New Zealand", 1998, <http://lianz.waikato.ac.nz/PAPERS/paul/hybridity.pdf> (22.06.2015), p.2.

or both" and in this perspective, "the 'authentic' and 'original' content of the identity" is tried to be discovered and the aim is to offer "one fully constituted, separate and distinct identity in place of another".<sup>186</sup> However, from the anti-essentialist (constructivist) perspective, it is impossible to have both "fully constituted, separate and distinct identities" and "authentic and ordinary identities" as the identities "are always relational and incomplete, in process" and the focus is on "the multiplicity of identities and differences rather than on a singular identity".<sup>187</sup> These expressions pinpoint the reason for choosing constructivist perspective in examining the construction of European identity, in this thesis. Grossberg also gives some figures in defining identities: namely difference, fragmentation, hybridity, border and diaspora. Here difference "describes a particular constitutive relation of negativity", fragmentation "emphasizes the multiplicity of identities and of positions within an apparent identity", diaspora is related to border-crossing, transnationality and movement and finally hybridity is explained with three different figures: namely (Bhabha's term) 'third space' (in-between place), liminality (on the border) and between-ness (border-crossing).<sup>188</sup>

#### **2.2.1.4. Collective Identity**

The European identity can be examined in relation to collective identities. Delanty is one of the scholars who evaluates the identity issue of the EU from collective identity perspective and states that European identity is a question of collective identity and according to him; it is no different than the question of national identity theoretically.<sup>189</sup> Firstly he expresses that a collective identity "is not simply the aggregation of individual identities" and "will not necessarily result from personal identities" but it is "the self-understanding of a particular group", it can exist without a direct relation to personal identities and it can derive from institutional framework that articulates a collective identity.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Lawrence Grossberg, "Identity and Cultural Studies: Is That All There Is?", in Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay (Eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity*, London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1996, p.89.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., pp.90-92.

<sup>189</sup> G. Delanty and C. Rumford, "Is there a European identity? European self-understanding beyond unity and diversity", p.52.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., pp.52-54.

Delanty argues that national identities are changing and becoming more decentred, liquid and reflexive in their awareness of their limits and they become more and more mixed through societal-cross fertilization because of major shifts in culture and politics.<sup>191</sup> But national identities and European identity can co-exist as there is no tension between them, "they are embroiled in each other" and "all national identities in Europe contain elements of European identity, which is not an identity that exists beyond or outside national identities."<sup>192</sup> Here it may be asserted that each new enlargement with new national identities, as a kind of change within the EU, also contributes to the European identity and this makes it difficult to have a clear-cut definition of it. However, not having a clear-cut definition should not be understood as a negative aspect on the contrary it makes it more resilient, acceptable, alive and open to changes rather than being fixed and rigid which can cause acceptance problems for the member states.

From the perspective of constructivist logic of identity formation, "the connection between cultural variables such as ethnic belongings or religious or ideological affiliations, on the one hand, and collective identities, on the other, is more historically contingent, tenuous, and subject to constructions and reconstructions."<sup>193</sup> This shows that identities are constructed, they are not given or pre-existing. Risse also adds that there is a need to differentiate 'Europeans' from 'others' in collective European identity.<sup>194</sup> But the 'other' depends on the context. He indicates that sometimes the USA and Japan, and sometimes its own past just as in the German discourse can be the 'other' so he expresses that this changing 'other' "warns us not to reify the concept of European identity and to fix its meaning once and for all."<sup>195</sup> However, it should not be understood that no definition can be made. The European identity can be defined generally in a context, its constitutive elements and features can be itemized.

Finally, Risse's views about the European identity from a social constructivist perspective should be noted as he claims that questions related to European identity

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<sup>191</sup> Ibid., p.53.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., p.54.

<sup>193</sup> T. Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", p.152.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., p.155.



"assume centre stage in constructivist account", the EU both "regulates the daily lives of the individuals" and "constitutes 'Europe' as a political and social space in people's beliefs and collective understandings", the European identity is not given but it is constructed "in time and space whose content actually changes depending on the social and political context in which it is enacted" and lastly the European identity is not fixed but it is frequently contested.<sup>196</sup> These statements explain the European identity from the social constructivist perspective clearly.

To sum up, the European identity is not a threat for national identities as they can co-exist without damaging but complementing each other. Even though their construction processes and the instruments used in these processes have differences, they also have similarities and these similarities may help to shed light on construction process of the European identity. When it is focused on the relationship between the identities, it is possible to evaluate identities according to nested identities, cross-cutting identities, separate identities and marble cake identities. They vary by the situation and the relationship in which an individual acts. And it should not be forgotten that the European identity as a political identity has both civic and cultural components in different degrees. It should also be noted that European identity as a collective identity is not the sum of many different national identities but the identity of a particular group. The construction of European identity is a process, which is fluid, unfinished and always under construction. It is not stable. The European identity is not given or fixed but it is contested. It flourishes with each new enlargement and new member state. The shifts in the world and particularly in the EU affect and contribute to the European identity.

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<sup>196</sup> Ibid., pp.155-156.

### 3. THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed a plan on 9 May 1950, which is known as the basis of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This Plan, the Schuman Declaration, proposed the pooling of coal and steel resources of France and Germany and establishing an organization open to the participation of any other European country. After almost a year, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Paris which established the ECSC on 18 April 1951 and these members were the founding members of the EU.<sup>197</sup> As Desmond Dinan states according to John Gillingham, the Treaty of Paris was a *de facto* peace treaty between France and Germany.<sup>198</sup> Even though the states accepted the Treaty for different reasons, in general, it was accepted to find solution to the problem of Ruhr, economic issues, cold war and to provide peace and security in the region.<sup>199</sup> The need and necessity to build peace has led to the integration of Europe which is a process and covers more than 60 years. In these 60 years, it has evolved into the EU. The construction of European identity was also a need and it has emerged in the 1970s and developed since the first attempts.

Michael Bruter divides the European integration process into four phases; the 1950s, the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s - 1990s. According to him, in the first phase, the focus was on an "international cooperation", in the second phase "policy-making" was the aim, the third phase was about "institutionally consolidated system" and in the last phase the focus was on identity and citizenship.<sup>200</sup> In this thesis, the phase, which focuses on identity and citizenship, is analysed. But there are also other classifications. One of them is John T.S. Keller's classification. Keller identifies three eras in the development of European Community (EC) studies. These are the launch era, the doldrums era and the renaissance/boom era. He states that *the launch era* started with the implementation of the Treaty of Rome, *the doldrums era*, started with the "empty

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<sup>197</sup> European Commission, The Schuman Declaration, [http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm) (22.12.2014).

<sup>198</sup> Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004, p.57.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.36-52.

<sup>200</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.xiv.

chair crisis” and he described this era as a dark age and the last era, started with the rapid succession of integration achievements from the mid-1980s onwards.<sup>201</sup> These classifications are important to see in which period and why the subject of identity came to the fore. Before constructing identity, there should be a need to construct it and the degree of necessity affects the constructing speed; with a low degree of necessity the process will slow down and with a high degree of necessity the process will accelerate. The speed of construction is also closely related with its urgency. If European identity is needed urgently, the construction process will be fast; on the contrary, if it is not needed urgently, the construction process will not be so fast. There are also other factors that affect the construction process such as its importance for the whole Union, the acceptance of the citizens and the effects of other factors like national identities and globalization. In the first two phases of Bruter and the first era of Keller, there was a real and urgent need for peace and cooperation, and for that reason the project of coming together to be a community is evaluated as a success story. The construction of European identity is also a need but its degree of necessity and urgency cannot be evaluated at the same level. For that reason, the construction process of European identity is not at an expected level with an expected speed. As it can be seen later in this part, according to the Eurobarometer results, there are still many citizens who do not mention European identity when they are asked how they feel even though many steps have been taken.

In this chapter, the emergence of European identity, its historical development and the perception of the officials and the citizens are analysed in three parts. In the first part, the reasons and the need to construct European identity are examined to understand how the idea to construct a European identity emerged. In the second part, the development of the European identity with institutional regulations in a historical context is given to track the top-down process of constructing European identity. And in the last part, the views of the European Commission's officials are used to grasp the perception of European identity and it is also benefitted from the Eurobarometer results

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<sup>201</sup> John T.S. Keller, "Mapping EU Studies: The Evolution from Boutique to Boom Field 1960–2001", *JCMS*, Vol.43, No.3, (2005), p.554.

to support these perceptions and to be able to catch the citizen's view with an ultimate goal to see how parallel these perceptions are with the top-down process.

Before focusing on the emergence of European identity within the EU, it may be useful to give a historical background for the idea of Europe to show its roots. Delanty analyses the origin of the idea of Europe. He gives the development of the idea from the Ancient times until the present. According to him, for much of Antiquity, Europe had a different connotation from today and it referred to a geographical region rather than a cultural model or cultural unity.<sup>202</sup> With the split of Roman Empire into two parts, the Eastern and Western Empires, "the idea of Europe began to take shape as a cultural idea".<sup>203</sup> Here the western half was related with Latin Christianity and from the seventh century the idea of Europe was constructed against Islam.

As Delanty argues, "the clash of Christianity and Islam was crucial in the formation of the Eurocentric world-view."<sup>204</sup> In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire to the Balkans, Turks were presented as a threat to Christianity.<sup>205</sup> Moreover, Delanty evaluated the nineteenth century as an age of nationalism.<sup>206</sup> At the beginning of the twentieth century after the World War I, Europe stopped to be the centre of the world and the new Europe was constructed in position to Soviet communism and "Pan-European" movement emerged.<sup>207</sup> Delanty describes the twentieth century Europe as a product of war and he indicates that the idea of civilisation was replaced with fascism and anti-Semitism as the major expressions of the idea of Europe, for twenty five years, after the World War I.<sup>208</sup>

The Reformation changed the viewpoint from 'Christian' versus 'Muslim' to 'Civilised Europeans' versus 'uncivilised barbarians' and Turks remained as a threat with

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<sup>202</sup> Gerard Delanty, "The Origins of the Idea of Europe", *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp.20-21.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p.23.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.23-24.

<sup>205</sup> Mikael af Malmberg and Bo Strath, "Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe", in Mikael af Malmberg and Bo Strath (Eds.), *The Meaning of Europe*, Oxford and New York: Oxford International Publishers Ltd, 2002, p.1.

<sup>206</sup> Gerard Delanty, "Europe in the Age of Modernity", *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p.79.

<sup>207</sup> Gerard Delanty, "The Crisis of European Identity", *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p.107.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.108-111.

a gradual decrease in its importance.<sup>209</sup> Renaissance and the Enlightenment also caused some changes and the idea of Europe "became the cultural model of the West and served as a unifying theme of modernity" while the French Revolution "gave to Europe a common sense of European identity".<sup>210</sup>

As it can be seen clearly, the idea of Europe and the European identity are not new and they have changed since the ancient times. Turks, Islam, Russian communism, and its own history which includes wars can be the other of Europe in defining itself. However, in the following part, the emergence and the existence of European identity are analysed in the framework of the EU.

### **3.1. The Emergence of European Identity**

In this part, the underlying reasons of constructing European identity is analysed to show how and under which circumstances a need to construct European identity emerged and to find out why such a need arose. Risse points out that "identities become salient and are fought over in particular historical moments, especially in times of crisis".<sup>211</sup> From this point of view, the reasons of constructing European identity can be grouped in three: political, economic and cultural reasons, but all these reasons aim to maintain continuity of the European integration. The Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity can be evaluated as the first attempt in constructing European identity. Before focusing on this Declaration, the factors that caused this attempt should be examined.

#### **3.1.1. The Role of Political Developments in the Emergence of European Identity**

Charles de Gaulle, the President of the French Republic, influenced the EEC during his presidency from 1959 to 1969. At the first stage of the constructing of the

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<sup>209</sup> G. Delanty, "Europe in the Age of Modernity", p.67.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., pp.65-73.

<sup>211</sup> Thomas Risse, *A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*, Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 2010, cited in Viktoria Kaina and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, "EU governance and European identity", *Living Reviews in European Governance*, Vol.8, No.1, (2013), <http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2013-1/download/lreg-2013-1Color.pdf> (24.08.2015), p.5.

European Community, Britain declined to take part in a supranational organisation because of different factors. Dedman gives three reasons that explain how Britain missed the chance to be part of the EEC. One of them is 'an absence of forethought', the second one is 'a bad error of judgement in adopted policy' and the last one is 'a misplaced confidence and belief in Commonwealth's commercial significance as an alternative to the EEC'<sup>212</sup>. But after a while, as Dedman indicates, in 1960 the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan applied to enter the EEC because the Commonwealth would not be an important market for Britain's high quality goods.<sup>213</sup>

De Gaulle rejected the applications of Britain to join the EEC twice in 1963 and 1967. The first rejection was on 14 January 1963 while the entrance of Britain was negotiated and the second one was in November 1967 because of Britain's economic difficulties. De Gaulle prevented Britain's entry unilaterally and Britain could join the EEC only after his resignation in 1969.<sup>214</sup> De Gaulle's first rejection which was announced in a press conference unilaterally in January 1963 is regarded as one of the reasons of 'the first crisis' in the EEC.<sup>215</sup> Dedman gives reasons for prevention of Britain's entrance to the EEC as follows; the French industry which was opposed to British entry, the Polaris deal and de Gaulle's desire to be the leading power in Western Europe.<sup>216</sup> Dinan also mentions the Nassau agreement<sup>217</sup> which made the UK Polaris Programme possible. This agreement disappointed de Gaulle because of his expectation of taking in partnership with Britain to "save France a fortune on defence research costs" and it ended Britain's independent nuclear force.<sup>218</sup> But Dinan also emphasises the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). It was thought that de Gaulle's proposals for agriculture would not have been accepted if Britain had been a

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<sup>212</sup> Martin J. Dedman, *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945 - 95*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp.107-108.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p.113.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.114-118.

<sup>215</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, pp.97-101.

<sup>216</sup> M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945 - 95*, p.115.

<sup>217</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.101.

<sup>218</sup> M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945 - 95*, p.115.

member of the EEC before the CAP was fully completed.<sup>219</sup> These are the reasons given for the first rejection.

Britain's second application had also difficulties and it was also rejected. De Gaulle's statements in a press conference gave the reasons for his rejections which were; the sterling crisis, and different British commercial and agricultural policies. Strategic consideration was another reason for not accepting Britain's application. Because of "French intransigence" and "Germany's diffidence", Britain held its application.<sup>220</sup> With both of these rejections, de Gaulle generally aimed to preserve national interests in the EEC. Dedman evaluates it as:

De Gaulle's brutal handling of the EEC was designed to extract the maximum economic benefit for France while using it as a vehicle to advance his own policies in Europe, with France - not the supranational EEC - as a regional leader.<sup>221</sup>

This is a clear evaluation of de Gaulle's attitude during his presidency and his rejections to the Britain's applications. This is also the general reason of the 'empty chair' crisis, which had effects on the EEC and, which is evaluated as 'the most exciting political conflict in the EU history'.<sup>222</sup>

The empty chair crisis was also an important crisis which unveiled de Gaulle's attitude. The signals of crisis began with the Commission's proposal which included to draw the use of " 'own resources', consisting of duties from agricultural and industrial imports from which the CAP would be permanently funded" before the stipulated date.<sup>223</sup> In the first part of the Treaty of Rome, it was stated that "The common market shall be progressively established during a transitional period of twelve years".<sup>224</sup> This transitional period was divided into three stages. The "own resources" were supposed to be used in 1970 when the third stage of the customs union was completed.<sup>225</sup> The first Commission President, Walter Hallstein behaved early as he wanted more power for the

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<sup>219</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.101.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid*, pp.110-111.

<sup>221</sup> M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945 - 95*, p.118.

<sup>222</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.10.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid*, p.104.

<sup>224</sup> European Commission, *The Treaty of Rome, 1957*, [http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu\\_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf) (30.01.2015), p.5.

<sup>225</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.104.

Commission as a supranational organ of the EEC. He thought that the use of the Community's own resources would cause "a transfer of budgetary power from national parliaments to the European Parliament" and he also thought that "the Commission might also acquire budgetary authority".<sup>226</sup> But things did not go as Hallstein planned and the June meeting was ended by France in the early hours of July 1 and they were not represented in the Council till the end of the crisis.<sup>227</sup> The "empty chair crisis" started with France leaving its seat in the Council of Ministers so the Council was unable to operate.<sup>228</sup> This was de Gaulle's second unilateral action. He did not want to accept two arrangements; one of them was the use of qualified majority voting rather than the principle of unanimity in new policy areas, this change was stipulated in the Treaty of Rome, especially in the CAP and the second one was strengthening the budgetary power of the European Parliament and the Commission.<sup>229</sup> This crisis was overcome with the Luxembourg Compromise which was signed in Luxembourg on 29 January 1966. According to the Luxembourg Compromise:

Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community...<sup>230</sup>

It was also stated that: "...the French delegation considers that where very important interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached."<sup>231</sup> The Luxembourg Compromise overcame the crisis but the phrase of "very important interests" was not defined in the text. It was left to the member states to decide on the issues which were really important for their national interests. In other words, it gave member states the right to veto any issue which was not at stake with

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<sup>226</sup> Ibid., p.104.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., p.105.

<sup>228</sup> CVCE, The Luxembourg Compromise (January 1966), <http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/d1cfaf4d-8b5c-4334-ac1d-0438f4a0d617/a9aaa0cd-4401-45ba-867f-50e4e04cf272> (17.02.2015).

<sup>229</sup> Ibid.

<sup>230</sup> Extraordinary Session of the Council, 1966, [http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/297\\_Luxembourg%20Compromise.pdf](http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/297_Luxembourg%20Compromise.pdf) (17.02.2015), p.5.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid.



their national interests and it was partially changed by the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987.<sup>232</sup>

In 1969, there was also another important political fact. There were political developments both in France and Germany which led to changes in leaderships. In 1969, Willy Brandt became the chancellor of Germany and de Gaulle, whose handling of the EEC was described to be "designed to extract the maximum economic benefit for France while using it as a vehicle to advance his own policies in Europe" by Dedman,<sup>233</sup> resigned as the president of France.<sup>234</sup> These two changes had effects in the EEC because de Gaulle's successor George Pompidou paved the way for Britain's accession to the EEC and French obstruction to further integration was overcome and the USA European relations were improved.<sup>235</sup> According to Dinan, even though Pompidou was in favour of Britain's accession, he was an intergovernmentalist just like de Gaulle and he also defended the Luxembourg Compromise and supported the CAP.<sup>236</sup> This statement shows that he is not very different than de Gaulle in defending France's interests. British accession was also about France's interests because of Germany's economic and growing political power and France was trying to use Britain as a counterweight to growing German power.<sup>237</sup> Neill Nugent also itemizes the policy change reasons in France. According to him, Britain could be a counterweight to Germany and support the French opposition to the supranationalism in the Community, and there were two economic reasons; with the Britain's accession France would reach its markets and Britain would be a contributor to the budget.<sup>238</sup> Different from Pompidou, Brandt was described by Dinan as "a moderate supranationalist" and his foreign policy priority was Ostpolitik (West Germany's Eastern Policy).<sup>239</sup>

After the leadership changes in France and Germany, the meeting of the heads of state or government, which is known as the Hague Summit, was held on 1-2

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<sup>232</sup> CVCE, *The Luxembourg Compromise* (January 1966).

<sup>233</sup> M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945 - 95*, p.118.

<sup>234</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.125.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, p.128.

<sup>237</sup> M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945 - 95*, p.119.

<sup>238</sup> Neill Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, 7<sup>th</sup> Edition, the UK: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2010, p.36.

<sup>239</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.125.

December 1969.<sup>240</sup> The proposal for the meeting came from France and it was approved by the other member states. The main agenda items were decided to be 'completion' which referred to the issues related with budget, 'deepening' which was about the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 'enlargement'.<sup>241</sup> There were important points in the final communiqué of the Hague Summit on 2 December 1969. It was stated in the communiqué that it was reaffirmed that the member states were determined to "...pass from the transitional period to the final stage of the European Community and accordingly to lay down a definite financial arrangement for the common agricultural policy by the end of 1969."<sup>242</sup> In the communiqué, it was also mentioned that entering to the final stage was not just about the "irreversible work accomplished" but it was also about the political desire of the member states:

...they have a common conviction that a Europe composed of States which, in spite of their different national characteristics, are united in their essential interests, assured of its internal cohesion, true to its friendly relations with outside countries, conscious of the role it has to play in promoting the relaxation of international tension and the rapprochement among all peoples, and first and foremost among those of the entire European continent, is indispensable if a mainspring of development, progress and culture, world equilibrium and peace is to be preserved.<sup>243</sup>

Here it is important to notice that there was an emphasis on different national characteristics, the essential interests and internal cohesion of the EU. This can be seen as the signals of the EU motto: unity in diversity which can be evaluated as the basis for its identity. The reference to the role of the EU at the international level is also a crucial point as it serves to create a feeling of togetherness for the member states and strengthens both the integration and the European identity.

There were also statements about a plan in stages for the creation of EMU, the enlargement of the Community within the scope of the Treaty of Rome, the studies about the political unification, reforming the Social Fund, the establishment of

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<sup>240</sup> Meeting of the Heads of State or Government - The Hague, 1969, [http://aei.pitt.edu/1451/1/hague\\_1969.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/1451/1/hague_1969.pdf) (22.02.2015), p.1.

<sup>241</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.129.

<sup>242</sup> CVCE, Final communiqué of the Hague Summit (2 December 1969), [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/33078789-8030-49c8-b4e0-15d053834507/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/33078789-8030-49c8-b4e0-15d053834507/publishable_en.pdf) (23.02.2015), p.2.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

European university, researches for European Atomic Energy Community and the technological activity of the Community.<sup>244</sup> The main aim of mentioning the Hague Summit here is to create a perception about the political situation of the period just before the Copenhagen Declaration but it is also important to realise that there were statements, such as different national characteristics but united interests; internal cohesion; European university, which evoke the European identity.

Denmark, Ireland and Norway also applied for the EEC membership parallel with Britain.<sup>245</sup> Denmark, Ireland and Britain became the member of the Community, after The Hague Summit in which enlargement was one of the main items of the agenda, in 1973 but Norway's entrance was rejected in a referendum in 1972 by Norwegian people.<sup>246</sup>

Ostpolitik was also an important issue to be evaluated in order to understand the political landscape of the period because a part of the EEC; West Germany signed two treaties with USSR and Poland in 1970.<sup>247</sup> The first treaty, which was signed with the USSR, was the Treaty of Moscow. In this Treaty, both of the countries declared that maintaining international peace and achieving detente were their objectives and it was also stated that "they shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force".<sup>248</sup> The other treaty was the Treaty of Warsaw. In this Treaty, the desire to establish foundations to co-exist in peace and to strengthen the peace and security in Europe was stated. It was also stated that "the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in Europe within their present frontiers are a basic condition for peace."<sup>249</sup> The above given reference about the settlement of disputes was also repeated. These two treaties had impact on the EEC because West Germany had independent diplomatic

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<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.139.

<sup>246</sup> N. Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, p.36.

<sup>247</sup> M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945 - 95*, p.119.

<sup>248</sup> CVCE, The Moscow Treaty (12 August 1970), [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/d5341cb5-1a49-4603-aec9-0d2304c25080/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/d5341cb5-1a49-4603-aec9-0d2304c25080/publishable_en.pdf) (04.03.2015), p.2.

<sup>249</sup> CVCE, The Treaty of Warsaw (7 December 1970), [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/7f3363b0-2705-472a-b535-c42bd229f9e2/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/7f3363b0-2705-472a-b535-c42bd229f9e2/publishable_en.pdf) (04.03.2015), p.2.

relations with the East and according to Dedman, France got surprised at these developments because of West Germany's previous western-oriented policy.<sup>250</sup>

Britain's two applications to enter the Community, France's rejections of Britain's application, the empty chair crisis, the Luxembourg Compromise, the changes in the leaderships, West Germany's Eastern Policy were all indicators of the political landscape of the period. It is difficult to describe the period as stable because of de Gaulle's unilateral activities which were closely related with his national interests and which caused crisis in the Community. After these crises and leadership changes in the Community, the Hague Summit can be evaluated as detente and an attempt of swift recovery because the member states emphasised their willingness on completion, deepening and enlargement which led to further integration. The Copenhagen Declaration, which is discussed later in this chapter, may also be seen as an attempt of recovery.

### **3.1.2. The Role of Economic Developments in the Emergence of European Identity**

The economic situation, before the introduction of European identity, should also be examined to be able to evaluate the emergence of attempts to construct European identity and see under what conditions the need to construct an identity emerged. The crises stated above, which were generally caused by France particularly by de Gaulle, were mostly interest oriented. Besides many different reasons for Britain's rejection, there were also economic reasons in de Gaulle's rejections to Britain's applications. According to Moravcsik, the reason behind the rejections was the fear of possible British opposition to the financing of CAP, economic conflicts about the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and he explains de Gaulle's commercial concerns and gives examples from his discourse.<sup>251</sup> There were also economic reasons for accepting Britain to the Community after de Gaulle's resignation as stated above. With Britain's accession, France would be able to reach the British

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<sup>250</sup> M. J. Dedman, *The Origins and the Development of the European Union 1945 - 95*, p.119.

<sup>251</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, "De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–1970 (Part 2)", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vo.2, No.3, Fall 2000, <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/grandeur2.pdf> (26.02.2015), p.9.

markets and Britain would have contributions to the budget. So both the rejections and acceptance of Britain's accession had economic reasons and this was an indicator which showed how the decisions and the acts were related with the economy.

There were other important economic developments in the 1970s. The twelve year of transitional period for the common market ended and, as stated above, the "own resources" were supposed to be used. In April 1970, the first decision on "own resources" was adopted. According to this decision, an independent financing system was introduced instead of financial contributions of member states. In that period, the own resources were agricultural levies and customs duties and they were collected from the Communities policies not from the member states and for that reason these own resources were known as natural own resources.<sup>252</sup> Another economic issue of the period was the developments related to the EMU, which were closely related with the deepening of the Community. France and Germany had different reasons to support EMU. France was supporting it to constrain German monetary independence, to project a European monetary identity and to support their currency while Germany was supporting it to show its commitment to the West.<sup>253</sup> Pierre Werner, who was the prime minister and finance minister of Luxembourg, was assigned to design a plan to establish EMU in stages.<sup>254</sup> The Werner Report, which had the goals to fix exchange rates, has a common monetary policy and a single monetary authority<sup>255</sup>, was published on 8 October 1970.<sup>256</sup> As stated on the Commissions web-site, three-stage plan for the EMU within 10 years was decided and the final objectives were thought to "be the irreversible convertibility of currencies, free movement of capital, and the permanent locking of exchange rates – or possibly a single currency"<sup>257</sup>.

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<sup>252</sup> CVCE, The development of the Communities' and the Union's own resources, [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/4/5/cc05b5ce-8f83-4443-8328-9922fc7bc07a/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2005/4/5/cc05b5ce-8f83-4443-8328-9922fc7bc07a/publishable_en.pdf) (03.03.2015), pp.2-3.

<sup>253</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, p.131.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, p.132.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>256</sup> Chronology of European Integration 1945-2006, <http://www.epp-ed.eu/Activities/docs/chronologie-historique-en.pdf> (05.03.2015), p. 16.

<sup>257</sup> European Commission, Phase 1: the Werner Report, [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/euro/emu/road/werner\\_report\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/road/werner_report_en.htm) (05.03.2015).

Bakker evaluates the start of the EEC as promising but he states that the progress became difficult to be made because member states had problems about liberalisation of capital movements. Some countries preferred to abolish restrictions but others wanted to remain in control of domestic monetary policy.<sup>258</sup> This caused differences between the member states. The Commission had some attempts to broaden the liberalization policy in order to develop European capital market and strengthen the functioning of the Common Market but the attempts failed, Baker states the reason for this failure as; institutional and structural obstacles as well as the worsened international economic climate and these led to reimposition of restrictions on the market for 15 years.<sup>259</sup> There were two international monetary crises in May and August in 1971. The member states could not reach any common decision about how to react against the first crisis, which arose because of a massive flow of funds from the United States to Germany, so while Germany and the Netherlands floated their currencies the other member states took a different position and imposed capital controls.<sup>260</sup> This crisis was evaluated as the collapse of Bretton Woods System.<sup>261</sup> This was another occasion in which member states could not be able to have a common position. The second crisis came with the change of the convertibility of dollar to gold and the Members States could not act together again.<sup>262</sup> Prior to these crises, there were also other crises such as the pound sterling crisis from 1964 to 1967, the devaluation of the franc in 1968, the revaluation of the mark in 1969.<sup>263</sup> All these crises affected the economic situation and the developments of the period and they also affected the integration process of Europe. As Bo Strath indicates, "the European integration based on the management of the economies of growth in a national framework culminated in the late 1960s"<sup>264</sup> and the crises jeopardised the integration process which started in the 1950s.

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<sup>258</sup> Age F. B. BAKER, "the 1960s: Lost Momentum", *The Liberalization of the Capital Movements in Europe; the Monetary Committee and Financial Integration 1958-1994*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, pp.104-105.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, p.105.

<sup>260</sup> D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, pp.133-134.

<sup>261</sup> The End of the Bretton Woods System (1972-81), <https://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm>, (10.03.2015).

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, p.134.

<sup>263</sup> Peter M. Garber, The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System, <http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6876.pdf>, (10.03.2015), p.463.

<sup>264</sup> Bo Strath, "Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other" in B. Strath (Ed.),

In 1973, the first oil crisis was also another economic development, just before the introduction of the concept of European identity in December 1973. This crisis had effects on the European countries' economies which had many other problems. After this crisis, the energy issue was also negotiated at the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973 and decisions about energy were published in an Annex to the Summit Conference Final Communiqué.<sup>265</sup>

Up to now, the economic developments of the period in which member states had problems in acting together have been elaborated in order to make clear the reasons, which had a role in the emergence of identity issue. The economic developments of the period showed that the EEC had problems in acting together in the economic field just as they had problems in the political field even though they had a promising start. The member states acted according to their own national interests and according to their own situations. For example, while Germany and the Netherlands floated their currencies, the other member states imposed capital controls in the first international monetary crisis. This can be seen as a sign of a need to have a common position and it can also be seen as one of the reasons of the emerging need of common identity which may have power to make member states come together.

### **3.1.3. The Role of Social Developments in the Emergence of European Identity**

There were also social developments which had role in the emergence of identity issue. Here, it is important to mention the student movements and protests in May 1968 which occurred generally because of the learning environment, career outlook and life prospects of the students.<sup>266</sup> The protests were evaluated as one of the most important social developments of the period. Many scholars describe the movements in different ways. According to Ingrid Gilcher Holtey, these protests were

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*Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang Pub., 2000, p.399.

<sup>265</sup> European Commission, The Copenhagen Summit Conference, <http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=1KGyQ1tKtTpNjBQwQh6cwgC2yLn7BJMymvTrDq5s2rD3JYR9RfGQ!243197488?docId=203013&cardId=203013> (12.03.2015), p.11.

<sup>266</sup> Ingrid Gilcher Holtey, "May 1968 in France: The Rise and Fall of a New Social Movement", in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, Detlef Junker (Eds.), *1968 The World Transformed*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.259.

"an expression of new social movement"<sup>267</sup> and she points out different views of scholars about the events. She states that Allain Touraine defines the event as a 'new social conflict', Edgar Morin describes it as a 'generational revolt', Michael Crozier interprets it as an 'institutional crisis' and Pierre Bourdieu evaluates the event as a 'critical movement'.<sup>268</sup>

These movements led to some changes. Hagen Schulz - Forberg states that these protests "changed the character of Western democracies and germinated continuous opposition among dissidents and the subversive political culture in Czechoslovakia and to some degree in Poland, too."<sup>269</sup> This can be seen as a significant change. The protests started at the Paris University of Nanterre as a student movement but it spilled over from the student movement to all levels of public and the student's union, the union of university teachers, young workers, parties, trade unions and many people joined the protests.<sup>270</sup> All these groups had some demands and they "demanded nothing less than a complete change of society and democratic reorganization."<sup>271</sup> These protests had important effects on the social organisation of France and according to Forberg, the crisis revealed a distortion in the French society.<sup>272</sup> The protests affected France because nearly two-third of the workforce got involved in the protests and it led to new parliamentary elections in June.<sup>273</sup>

It should be noted that France was not the only country which was affected from the student movements and protests in 1968. The USA, Germany, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Mexico and many other countries were affected from protests.<sup>274</sup> According to Harold James, there are different explanations for these revolts and he gives explanations which are related with both education and politics. He states

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<sup>267</sup> Ibid., p.254.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid., pp.253-254.

<sup>269</sup> Hagen SCHULZ-FORBERG, "Claiming Democracy: The Paris 1968 May Revolts in the Mass Media and Their European Dimensions", *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, Vol.31, (2009), [http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/70587093/Claiming\\_Democracy.pdf](http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/70587093/Claiming_Democracy.pdf) (12.03.2015), p. 30.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid., p.33.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., p.35.

<sup>273</sup> Eric Maurin and Sandra McNally, "Vive la Revolution! Long-Term Educational Returns of 1968 to the Angry Students", *JOLE*, Vol.26 No.1, (2008), <http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/docs/maurin-eric/jole-1968.proof.pdf> (13.05.2015), p.4.

<sup>274</sup> Peter Schwarz, "1968: The general strike and the student revolt in France", <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/05/may1-m28.html> (13.03.2015).



that "larger student numbers, greater expectations of entry into an elite that were vulnerable to disappointment, and the inadequacy of the infrastructure (lecture halls, dormitories, and above all the professors) all contributed to an eruption of protest" and he also gives political explanations.<sup>275</sup> Each country and different groups in these countries had different motivations in order to be part of the protests. But the movements in France were more general than the other protests as the workers were involved in them.<sup>276</sup> According to Claus Leggewie, the protests which took place in the USA, in the Czechoslovakia (the Prague Spring) and in France (Paris May) "signalled the success of "socialism at the periphery" in the Third World, "socialism with a human face" in Eastern Europe, and "advanced socialism" in the West."<sup>277</sup>

The late 1960s was a difficult period as there were many protests in Europe and the world. Each of the protests and movements in every country had different motivation and consequences. These motivations and consequences in particular are not in the scope of this thesis but in general it is important to note that the EEC members did not move together in these events, either. Each country had its own methods in dealing with the protests as they all had different properties and in general, as Leggewie states, it was the success of advanced socialism in the West.

The end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s have importance in constructing European identity as there were many developments both in the EEC and the world which had effects in the emergence of European identity. The developments which have been analysed above are thought to have an effect in the emergence of a need to construct an identity. According to Strath, the key concept of identity comes "in a situation where the very legitimacy of the European integration project was at stake."<sup>278</sup> Strath's this statement supports the idea, which is argued in this part, that the concept of identity emerged as a need just like integration which was a need after the Second World War and he states that the European identity was evaluated as an

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<sup>275</sup> Harold James, "A Golden Age: The 1960s", in *Europe Reborn a History, 1914-2000*, Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2003, p.310.

<sup>276</sup> I. G. Holtey, *May 1968 in France: The Rise and fall of a New Social Movement*, p.258.

<sup>277</sup> Claus Leggewie, "A Laboratory of Postindustrial Society Reassessing the 1960s in Germany", in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, Detlef Junker, et.al. (Eds.), *1968: The World Transformed*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.278.

<sup>278</sup> B. Strath, "Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other", p.385.

instrument to save both "the national economies over into new arrangements" and "the place of Europe in a reconstructed international order".<sup>279</sup> Juan Delgado Moreira also supports the idea that European identity is necessary to "achieve cohesion, solidarity, subsidiary, concentration and cooperation".<sup>280</sup> Michael Wintle's statement, "...identity was seen as a panacea for the problems besetting the EC at that time"<sup>281</sup> can be seen as a support to this idea, as well. Another scholar, who supports this idea, is Bram Boxhoorn, who indicates that identity was used "in an attempt to bring about, respectively, more internal cohesion and a common foreign policy."<sup>282</sup>

To sum up, it can be pointed out that the EEC had failed to act together in political, economic and social sphere in the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s. Coupled with failures, these severe conditions mentioned above possibly led to emergence of a need to construct a common European identity which might have effects in bringing member states closer, having deepening effect in the EEC, supporting the integration process of the EEC, which might have a role in creating more powerful community with a single voice at the international level.

### **3.2. The Historical Development of the European Identity**

In the previous chapter, it is emphasized that identities are fluid, and constructed continuously in the constructivist way of thinking, so it is accepted that the European identity is also constructed. From this point of view, the construction process of European identity is examined by using top-down institutional arrangements in a historical context to see how it has evolved and changed in time.

The Copenhagen Summit can be evaluated as the first step of this historical context. The concept of European identity was introduced at the Copenhagen

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<sup>279</sup> Ibid., p.402.

<sup>280</sup> Juan Delgado Moreira, "Cultural Citizenship and The Creation of European Identity", *Electronic Journal of Sociology*, <http://www.sociology.org/content/vol002.003/delgado.html> (13.03.2015).

<sup>281</sup> Michael Wintle, "Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe" in Michael Wintle (Ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, Aldershot, England: Avebury Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1996, p.3.

<sup>282</sup> Bram Boxhoorn, "European identity and the process of European unification: Compatible notions?", in Michael Wintle (Ed.), *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*, Aldershot, England: Avebury Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1996, p.142.

Summit,<sup>283</sup> which took place in Copenhagen in 1973 and the *Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity* was published on 14 December 1973.<sup>284</sup> But before this Summit, the European Parliament passed a Resolution and there was an emphasis on the political identity of Community.<sup>285</sup>

In the introduction of the Declaration, it was stated that this document on European identity would give the member states the opportunity "to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs."<sup>286</sup> This could be seen as an attempt to provide visibility and existence in the international order. It was also emphasized that Europe must come together to become one in the international order in order to "make itself heard and play its role in the world".<sup>287</sup> This statement and the statements like this one demonstrate how it is important to be able to be one in the world with great powers.

In the Document, three statements were used to define European identity:

- reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community,
- assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities which result from this,
- taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification.<sup>288</sup>

These statements also constitute the three parts of the Document. In the first part, the importance of unity was expressed as indicating that "unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common."<sup>289</sup> Later the "unity of diversity", which signifies how Europeans come together while sustaining different cultures, traditions and languages of the continent, became the motto of

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<sup>283</sup> B. Strath, "Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other", p.385.

<sup>284</sup> European Commission, The Copenhagen Summit Conference, p.118.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6.

<sup>286</sup> CVCE, Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973), [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf) (20.03.2015), p.2.

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*, p.3.

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid.*

European Union in 2000.<sup>290</sup> Here democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights were given as the fundamental elements of the European identity and some of the essential parts of the European identity like the Treaties of Paris, Rome, the common market, the customs union, the institutions, common policies were also indicated.<sup>291</sup> It is important to notice that the common European values and essential parts which constitute the EU took part in defining European identity. This was also stated in the Document with an emphasis to cultural diversity which is one of two components of today's European motto even though the unity, then, did not have the same connotation as mentioned below:

The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism.<sup>292</sup>

In this paragraph, the uniqueness of European identity was related with its cultural diversity, common values and principles, the convergence of life, common interests and determination to construct a "United Europe" and it was noted that these constituents of the European identity also gave its own dynamism. This is also an emphasis to dynamic nature of constructing identity in general and constructing European identity in particular. Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford point out that the 'unity' in this Declaration was used differently than today's focus. According to them, unity in that context "referred to a 'common European civilization' based on a 'common heritage' and 'converging' attitudes and ways of life."<sup>293</sup> Even though it is not in the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that this was a federalist point of view as Delanty and Rumford stated. They also emphasised that the 'European Identity' in this Declaration was an official identity as it was written with capital 'I'.<sup>294</sup>

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<sup>290</sup> European Commission, The EU Motto, [http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/motto/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/motto/index_en.htm) (20.03.2015).

<sup>291</sup> CVCE, Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973), p.2.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid.

<sup>293</sup> G. Delanty and C. Rumford, "Is there a European identity?: European self-understanding beyond unity and diversity", pp.57-58.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid., p.58.

In the second part, the European identity was evaluated in relation to the world. Even though European unification was "not directed against anyone" or was not "inspired by a desire for power" as stated in the Document, there was a focus on becoming one and having common position in the international order to be able to play its active role.<sup>295</sup> After the emphasis of not being inspired by a desire for power, the objectives of being together as a union were itemized. These were contributing to have a basis in international relations, preserving the independence and the equilibrium of the states better, sharing the prosperity more equitably and guaranteeing the security of the countries more effectively.<sup>296</sup> All these objectives can be related to the integration process and European identity.

In this part, the relations of the Community with the rest of world, the countries they had special relations with, the Mediterranean and African Countries, the Middle Eastern countries, the USA, the industrialised countries such as Japan and Canada, the USSR and the East European countries, China, other Asian countries and Latin American countries, were also mentioned.<sup>297</sup> Strath evaluates this ranking and states that the USA comes after the Middle East in this list and according to him, the collapse of dollar and the oil price shock have effects in this kind of ranking.<sup>298</sup> This can be an example of how relations can change and how international developments affect the relations between the actors.

In the last part, the dynamic nature of the European identity was emphasized more clearly and it was noted that the European identity will evolve. It was also indicated that the European identity will be defined in accordance with the other countries progressively. According to this document, this kind of evolution will contribute to the cohesion and European foreign policy and this policy will have affects in transforming "the whole complex of their relations into European Union."<sup>299</sup> It is crucial to notice that other countries were used in defining European identity and the focus on progressive nature of the constructing process is also a significant point.

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<sup>295</sup> CVCE, Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973), p.3.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid., p.3.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid., pp.3-4.

<sup>298</sup> Bo Strath, "Introduction: Europe as a Discourse", p.21.

<sup>299</sup> CVCE, Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973), p.4.

Another historical development in the construction of European identity is the *Tindemans Report*. The Prime Minister of Belgium Leo Tindemans prepared a report, about the term "European Union", upon request of the Heads of Governments of the Member States at the Conference, in Paris, in 1974.<sup>300</sup> Before focusing on the Report, it should be mentioned that Tindemans wrote a letter to his European Council colleagues. In this letter, he pointed out the aim of EU as building: "a more humane society in which, along with mutual respect for our national and cultural characteristics, the accent will be placed more on the factors uniting us than on those dividing us."<sup>301</sup> This statement shows a need to construct a union for the people, not just for the technocrats. It was stated that the people of the EU should feel the existence of EU in their daily life; it should have reflection in communication, culture, education. This was also mentioned clearly in the text as "No one wants to see a technocratic Europe..."<sup>302</sup> After this emphasis in *Tindemans Report*, "People's Europe" became the subject of another report in 1985.

In *Tindemans Report*, the focus on the cultural diversity and uniting factors, which can be evaluated as the common values, should not be missed. It was also proposed that there should be greater integration in education and media in order to show the European reality, give information about the cultural heritage of the EU and to support the spread of information and to know each other better. It was emphasised that educational integration can be provided with bilateral and multilateral agreements between universities and reciprocal recognition of studies in various sectors. These all aimed to bring the EU citizens nearer and as it was mentioned, they gave "its social and human dimension".<sup>303</sup> After this emphasis on educational integration, Erasmus programme, which provides student exchanges, was proposed by the European Commission in 1986. And in 2014, Erasmus+, which replaced seven programmes and which will support the actions between 2014 and 2020, was introduced. These programmes were;

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<sup>300</sup> European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1 /76, <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/european-union-pbCBNF76001/> (25.03.2015), p.7.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid., p.14.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., p.30.

- The Lifelong Learning Programme (Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci, Comenius, Grundtvig and Jean Monnet)
- The Youth in Action programme
- Five international cooperation programmes (Erasmus Mundus, Tempus, Alfa, Edulink, the programme for cooperation with industrialised countries)
- The new sport action<sup>304</sup>

*Tindemans Report* can be seen as the early steps of the great amount of projects and activities which have been encouraged and will be supported in the field of education, training, youth and sport. The importance of Erasmus programme in constructing European identity should not be missed out because it provides the mobility of students, makes distances closer, helps to create a feeling of belonging and provides awareness of European culture. This is also mentioned briefly, in the following chapters.

In this report, there were some suggestions and it was mentioned that the EU needs the solidarity of its people in order to be effective and adequate. And it was also stated that in order to protect their lives and have developments in their life style the EU should be felt in their people's daily life.<sup>305</sup> These are the reasons for constructing European identity and they were inserted into the Report. This can be seen as an attempt to make the EU something real, to make it a 'discernible reality'<sup>306</sup> for its citizens.

Enrique Banus puts another emphasis on the relationship between European identity and progress in political integration by citing from the *Tindeman's Report* as it is stated in the report that "Europe cannot proceed to a greater degree of political integration without the underlying structure of a unifying European identity."<sup>307</sup> So, it can be noted that social cohesion and integration is needed to fulfil a political integration. And as indicated previously, this statement shows that constructing European identity has an integrative role in the EU. The European identity is trying to be constructed out of necessity. It was an attempt to stay together after crises in that period and it is still one of the factors that keeps the EU together.

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<sup>304</sup> EACEA, Erasmus+, [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/home/erasmus-plus\\_en](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/home/erasmus-plus_en) (13.04.2015).

<sup>305</sup> European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1 /76, p.15.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>307</sup> Enrique Banus, "Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity" in Mary Farrell, Stefano Fella, et al. (Eds.), *European Integration in the 21st Century (Unity in Diversity?)*, London: Sage Pub., 2002, p.159.

The next step in the construction of European identity was the *Solemn Declaration on European Union*. The Declaration was signed in the Stuttgart European Council, in June 1983.<sup>308</sup> In the objectives of this Declaration, there is an emphasis on European identity. It is stated that:

The Heads of State or Government, on the basis of an awareness of a common destiny and the wish to affirm the European identity, confirm their commitment to progress towards an ever closer union among the peoples and Member States of the European Community.<sup>309</sup>

In this statement, it can be clearly noticed that the member states had a desire to have an ever closer union and they decided to put the awareness of common destiny and the European identity on the basis of this ever closer union. From this point, it will not be wrong to state that the Union can only rise above an awareness of common destiny and may also rise above the common heritage and the European identity. So it can be said that a crucial role was attributed to the European identity. Chris Shore mentions the attempt to construct identity by using media and information policy initiatives and according to him, this started with the *Tindemans' Report* on European Union and Solemn Declaration on European Union, and with these two reports cultural issues became the subject of European integration by using "...a consciousness raising as a strategy for making Europe more visible and 'closer to its citizens'.." <sup>310</sup> Shore draws attention to two reasons for the emphasis on culture. According to him, the first reason is that "'culture' has become a major area of commercial activity" and the second one is that "the notion of culture itself is now recognized as a key dimension of European integration". <sup>311</sup>

The Fontainebleau Summit, which took place in 1984, was another progress in constructing European identity. In this Summit, many decisions related to budgetary issues, social policy and a people's Europe were taken. It was also decided to set up two

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<sup>308</sup> European Commission, European Union, [http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1980-1989/1983/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1980-1989/1983/index_en.htm) (14.04.2015).

<sup>309</sup> Eurotreaties, Solemn Declaration on European Union, <http://www.eurotreaties.com/stuttgart.pdf> (14.04.2015), p.2.

<sup>310</sup> Chris Shore, "Transcending the Nation-State?: The European Commission and the (Re)-Discovery of Europe", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol.9, No.4, (December 1996), [https://www.academia.edu/8249401/Transcending\\_the\\_Nation-State](https://www.academia.edu/8249401/Transcending_the_Nation-State) The European Commission and the Re -Discovery of Europe (14.04.2015), p.478.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*, p.476.



*ad hoc* committees; one for the institutional affairs and one for preparing and coordinating the issues related to strengthening the European identity. It was stated that:

The European Council considers it essential that the Community should respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world.<sup>312</sup>

The *ad hoc* committee, responsible for cultural issues, was the Adonnino Committee and it was chaired by Pietro Adonnino. The Committee prepared two reports and they released one of them in March 1985 and the other one in June 1985.

The first (interim) report was about proposals related to "freedom of movement for Community citizens", "freedom of movement of goods", "administrative formalities for border-area traffic" and "wider opportunities for employment and residence".<sup>313</sup> In the report, it was stated that their aim in proposing some short term and long term arrangements was to offer the citizens "tangible benefits in their everyday lives" and to ease the "rules and the practices which cause irritation to Community citizens."<sup>314</sup> There were many proposals under the above given titles but the introduction of the uniform European passport needs special attention because this is one of the European symbols and it was approved after it was again proposed in the Committee's Report. So, these arrangements and proposals may make the Union visible, tangible in the daily lives of the citizens, they may experience it more and this may lead to the feeling of belonging or in other words this may lead to the feeling of being a part of the Union. Tobias Theiler names these arrangements as "utilitarian support measures".<sup>315</sup>

The second (final) report included more culture-oriented issues. In this report, there were proposals related to the "special rights of citizens" such as the citizen's involvement in the political life, simplification of Community law, and the community model driving licence. There were also suggestions about cultural issues,

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<sup>312</sup> CVCE, Conclusions of the Fontainebleau European Council (25 and 26 June 1984), [http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/19/ba12c4fa-48d1-4e00-96cc-a19e4fa5c704/publishable\\_en.pdf](http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/19/ba12c4fa-48d1-4e00-96cc-a19e4fa5c704/publishable_en.pdf) (14.04.2015), p.3.

<sup>313</sup> A People's Europe Reports from the *ad hoc* Committee, [http://aei.pitt.edu/992/1/andonnino\\_report\\_peoples\\_europe.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/992/1/andonnino_report_peoples_europe.pdf) (15.04.2015), p.9.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Tobias Theiler, *Political Symbolism and European Integration*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p.60.

communication and information which were encouraging European audio-visual co-productions; declaring 1988 as the 'European Film and Television Year'; developing a multilingual European television channel; establishing a European Academy of Science, Technology and Art to give prizes in the related areas; organising a Euro lottery to reach the Europeans; regulating the admission terms of the museums, institutions to attract young Europeans; and providing information about the construction of Europe. Proposals in connection to youth, education, exchanges and sport were the most extensive part of the Report. There were proposals about language teaching, exchanges between schools, voluntary work camps, Europe Day, cooperation in universities such as European Academic Credit Transfer System, vocational training, exchanges and sport. In this part, it is mentioned that the multilingualism of the Union contribute to the diversity and richness. In the Report, there are also proposals related to volunteer work in third world development and twinning of towns and cities. The suggestions made about health, social security and drugs were mentioned to be in connection with the quality of the citizen's life and proposals in this group included having Emergency Health Card and accessing to medical facilities such as treatment throughout the Community. And lastly offers for strengthening the image and identity of the Community, such as having a flag and emblem; using the music of the 'Ode to Joy' from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony as an anthem; designing stamps about the events and ideas in the Community; abolishing inadequate and obsolete signs at internal borders, are stated.<sup>316</sup>

Brigid Laffan evaluates these reports as "a deliberate process of manufacturing and legitimizing a European identity from the 'top down'."<sup>317</sup> It can be clearly noticed that many proposals were made to strengthen the image and the identity of the EU and to make it tangible and alive for the peoples of Europe. As Chris Shore mentions, various 'symbolic measures' to enhance the Community profile were recommended as a remedy for the ordinary citizens because of their lack of consciousness of their identity

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<sup>316</sup> A People's Europe Reports from the ad hoc Committee, pp.18-30.

<sup>317</sup> Brigid Laffan, "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.34, No.1, (March 1996), p.96.

and heritage.<sup>318</sup> Many proposals of the Adonnino Committee were realised, some of them without losing time and some of them in the long term. The Ode of Joy was adopted as the EU anthem in 1985 and the flag, which has twelve yellow stars, was also adopted in 1985.<sup>319</sup> Shore indicates three points about what kind of Europe is being imagined and constructed with these symbols. First of them is that these symbols indicate more conservative current of nineteenth-century social evolutionist thought, the second one is that both the new Europe and the old nation states use the same symbolic terrain and lastly European cultural heritage is represented in a contradictory way.<sup>320</sup> According to Laffan, symbols have an important role in constructing new frames of meaning, they may have a role in changing the consciousness of individuals and the world and they also have a role in connecting individuals to the social and political order.<sup>321</sup> So these symbols have very important duties in setting consciousness, constructing the European identity and connecting the people's Europe to the social and political order which is also in process of construction. Bruter argues that these symbols were introduced with the idea to "reinforce the citizen's sense of belonging to their new political community."<sup>322</sup>

Another historical progress in constructing European identity took place in the SEA which entered into force on 1 January 1987. In this Treaty, there was a reference to the European identity. This reference to the European identity was related with the closer co-operation on European security. Even though this reference did not give detailed information about the European identity, the concept entered into the EU treaties. It was mentioned in the Treaty as:

The High Contracting Parties consider that closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They are

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<sup>318</sup> Chris Shore, "Creating the People's Europe: Symbols, History and Invented Traditions", *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, Oxon: Routledge, 2000, p.47.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.47-48.

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.* pp.50-52.

<sup>321</sup> Brigid Laffan, "The European Union and Its Institutions as "Identity Builders" in Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn B. Brewer (eds), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004, p.83.

<sup>322</sup> M. Bruter, "Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: News, Symbols, and European Identity", p.1152.

ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security.<sup>323</sup>

The Maastricht Treaty was another step in constructing European identity. There were references both to the European identity in the Treaty and in the Declarations there were references to the European security and defence identity. But as Delanty states, there was no attempt to describe the European identity; there were just some references to the "common cultural heritage".<sup>324</sup> The references were generally about common foreign and security policy. This was obvious in the ninth recital of the Treaty where was stated that it was:

Resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world,<sup>325</sup>

It was also mentioned in Article B where the objectives were set. One of the objectives was:

to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.<sup>326</sup>

Here the European identity is aimed to be presented at the international level by implementing common foreign and security policy. As indicated above, there were also references to the European security and defence identity in the Declaration on Western European Union. As Moreira expresses, the Maastricht Treaty only linked the European identity to defence.<sup>327</sup> He also draws attention to Article F in which national identities are touched upon.<sup>328</sup> In the first paragraph of Article F, it is pointed out that "The Union shall respect; the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government

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<sup>323</sup> Eur-lex, The Single European Act, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:1987:169:FULL&from=EN> (25.04.2015), pp.13-14.

<sup>324</sup> G. Delanty, "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism", p.350.

<sup>325</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty on European Union, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=EN> (25.04.2015), p.1.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>327</sup> J. D. Moreira, "Cultural Citizenship and the Creation of European Identity".

<sup>328</sup> Ibid.

are founded on the principles of democracy."<sup>329</sup> Here it is clear that national identities are aimed to be preserved and respected.

As Shore expresses, 'culture' was not mentioned in the treaties till the Maastricht Treaty and "there was no such thing as 'EC cultural policy', only a number of *ad hoc* 'cultural actions'".<sup>330</sup> But in 1992, common cultural heritage, which can be related with the European identity, took place in the Treaty. Under Title IX, the issue of culture was organized as:

1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.

2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:

— improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;

— conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;

— non-commercial cultural exchanges;

— artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.

3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe.

4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty.

5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council:

— acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States. The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedures referred to in Article 189b;

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<sup>329</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty on European Union, p.5.

<sup>330</sup> C. Shore, "Creating the People's Europe: Symbols, History and Invented Traditions", pp.45-46.

— acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.<sup>331</sup>

Here the emphasis on the diversity and common cultural heritage was clear and it was stated that the Community shall support its development and the actions aimed to be supported were stated. This can also be seen as a reference to the motto of the EU: "unity in diversity". It is obvious that the EU is willing to contribute to the national and regional diversity besides supporting the common cultural heritage. Provisions related to education were also mentioned in the Treaty under the title VIII.<sup>332</sup> These provisions, which were set under this title, will not be stated here, as they are more closely related with the multilingualism of the EU rather than the identity issue. Therefore, they will be evaluated briefly in the following chapter.

The Maastricht Treaty's contribution to the European citizenship should not be missed because the concept of Union Citizenship became legal when it was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.<sup>333</sup> The concept of citizenship and European identity have a kind of common point as Ulrich K. Preuss emphasises that "the concept of citizenship is a social construction" and according to him, it is "constitutive of the identity of a particular -political-community" and it "defines the social identity of the individuals."<sup>334</sup> So its existence is important in constructing identity.

Another report on the European identity after the Tindemans and Adonnino Reports was the 1993 *De Clercq Report*<sup>335</sup>. The Report was generally related with the information and communication policy of the EU but there were also references to the European identity and it was clearly stated that "there is little feeling of belonging to Europe" and it was added that "European identity has not yet been engrained in peoples' minds." The values shared by the Europeans were also indicated and it was mentioned

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<sup>331</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty on European Union, p.24.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid., p.23.

<sup>333</sup> Laura Herrero, "The Cultural Component of Citizenship", <http://www.houseforculture.eu/upload/Docs%20ACP/THECULTURALCOMPONENTOFCITIZENSHIPlayout.pdf> (25.04.2015), p.3.

<sup>334</sup> Ulrich K. Preuss, "Citizenship in the European Union: A Paradigm for Transnational Democracy?", Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler (Eds.), *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p.142.

<sup>335</sup> David Dunkerley, et al., *Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens*, London: Routledge Pub., 2002, p.117.

that these values could be seen as the basis of the European identity. Additionally, the importance of symbols and mottos were expressed and it was argued that the Europeans were realizing their identity and also asserting their position and their cultural richness in the world.<sup>336</sup> There were many recommendations related to European identity. But as Shore states, the Report was criticised by the journalists and some officials for being too commercial while the EU Commissioner for Information and Culture preferred not to distance himself from it.<sup>337</sup>

In the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997, there were many amendments. One of them was the amendment made to the ninth recital which was stated above. The statement was amended and the phrase "the eventual framing" became "the progressive framing".<sup>338</sup> There were also amendments to Article F. The first paragraph of the Article became as:

"1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States."<sup>339</sup>

The existing third paragraph became the fourth paragraph and the new third paragraph was stated as: "the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States."<sup>340</sup> Here the common values of the EU, and as stated in my interviews<sup>341</sup> with the officials from different DGs, the common values related to European identity or the components of European identity, were expressed clearly as the principles of the EU. According to Laffan, beside these common values, the self-definition of the EU includes references to diversity and he gives Article 6(3) and 151(1) of the Amsterdam Treaty as an example of respecting and referring its diversity.<sup>342</sup> Thomas Risse also draws attention to these common values and points out that these values become the constitutive elements of the

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<sup>336</sup> Reflection on Information and Communication Policy of the European Community, [http://aei.pitt.edu/29870/1/DE\\_CLERCQ\\_REPORT\\_INFO\\_COMM\\_POLICY.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/29870/1/DE_CLERCQ_REPORT_INFO_COMM_POLICY.pdf) (25.04.2015), pp.1-33.

<sup>337</sup> C. Shore, "Creating The People's Europe: Symbols, History and Invented Traditions", p.56.

<sup>338</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty of Amsterdam Amending The Treaty On European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European Communities and Certain Related Acts, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT&from=EN> (26.04.2015), p.7.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>341</sup> The interviews which were made in Brussels, in September 2014, will be given in the following part.

<sup>342</sup> B. Laffan, "The European Union and Its Institutions as "Identity Builders", p.82.

EU as it is not possible to be a member of the EU without subscribing to them because they became the criteria for accession (Copenhagen criteria).<sup>343</sup> This shows how crucial these core values are in becoming a member of the EU.

In the Treaty of Nice, the concept of identity just had a slight reference and it was described as "a coherent force on the international scene".<sup>344</sup> Here identity was thought in the international context just as a tool. There were also references to the Union citizenship.

Another significant development was the Constitutional Treaty which was not ratified. There were references to national identities in its preamble, in the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article I- 5 of the Treaty. It was emphasised that the Union shall respect the national identities of the member states.<sup>345</sup> The Union's values were also stated in the Treaty as:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.<sup>346</sup>

The promotion of these values was indicated as one of the objectives of the EU and it was indicated that traditional - cultural diversities and national identities were respected while supporting these common values.<sup>347</sup> In this Treaty, there was not any clear reference to European identity. But the symbols of the Union were itemized with the Article I-8 as:

- The flag of the Union shall be a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue background.
- The anthem of the Union shall be based on the 'Ode to Joy' from the Ninth Symphony by Ludwig van Beethoven.
- The motto of the Union shall be: 'United in diversity'.

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<sup>343</sup> T. Risse, "European Institutions and Identity Change: What have we learned?", p.256.

<sup>344</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty of Nice Amending The Treaty On European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European Communities And Certain Related Acts, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12001C/TXT&from=EN> (26.04.2015), p. 8.

<sup>345</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:FULL&from=en> (30.04.2015).

<sup>346</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, p.11.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid., pp.11-41.



- The currency of the Union shall be the euro.
- Europe day shall be celebrated on 9 May throughout the Union.<sup>348</sup>

Many member states agreed to hold referenda to ratify the Treaty and the results of referenda in France and in the Netherlands put its ratification in danger and Britain stopped the ratification.<sup>349</sup> So the Treaty was rejected and the European symbols were not adopted in this Treaty.

The Lisbon Treaty is noted to be evolved out of the Constitutional Treaty which was signed on the 13 December, 2007<sup>350</sup>, and even though there were ratification problems, it was ratified. The common values were also stated in the Lisbon Treaty with the same words in the Article 1a but there were not any references to European identity.<sup>351</sup> The symbols that implied a supranational state and indicated in the Constitutional Treaty were abandoned in the Lisbon Treaty<sup>352</sup> but 16 member states declared that they will continue to use the symbols in order to "express the sense of community of the people in the European Union and their allegiance to it".<sup>353</sup> This can be seen as stepping back because of the state implications of the symbols. This may be a sign of doubt or disturbance about the European identity and its power which exists with national identities. However, 16 member states still use these symbols and their existence and effect in the daily lives of the citizens are present. So they still have an effect in constructing European identity. Jens-Peter Bonde supports this view by expressing that "...all the symbols will continue to be used in practice, for they had no legal basis before. They were even used in the signing ceremony..."<sup>354</sup>

There were also other attempts to promote constructing European identity such as forums established by the universities, projects and reports prepared by committees

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<sup>348</sup> Ibid., p.19.

<sup>349</sup> Christian Kaunert, "Commentary Editorial: The Lisbon Treaty and the Constitutionalization of the EU", *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, Vol.5, No.3, (2009), <http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/viewFile/250/170> (23.06.2015), p.467.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., pp.465-466.

<sup>351</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty of Lisbon, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT&from=EN> (23.06.2015), p.11.

<sup>352</sup> CIVITAS, Treaty of Lisbon (2007), <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSTREAT/TR6.php> (23.06.2015).

<sup>353</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty of Lisbon, p. 267.

<sup>354</sup> Jens-Peter Bonde, "From EU Constitution to Lisbon Treaty", [http://www.eudemocrats.org/eud/uploads/downloads/e-Lissabon\\_til\\_netdet.pdf](http://www.eudemocrats.org/eud/uploads/downloads/e-Lissabon_til_netdet.pdf) (01.10.2015), p.18.

to support and show the importance of constructing European identity. As Kohli states, there were efforts to construct and nurture the European identity at all levels such as politics, economics, culture and also at the individual level.<sup>355</sup> Shore also emphasises the EU's persistent attempts to construct European identity and consciousness about it.<sup>356</sup> The above mentioned developments were the attempts to construct European identity at the level of basic treaties and some official declarations which can be seen as key points. According to Shore, the EU tries both to develop the European identity and citizenship "above the level of the nation state" and to contribute "the 'flowering' of local, regional and national cultures and identities below it".<sup>357</sup>

Bruter indicates that there are two main approaches to study or characterise the European identity, namely 'top-down' approach and 'bottom-up' approach. He states that the first approach is close to 'the socio-historical collective identity tradition' and the second one to 'the political psychology tradition'. In the first approach, "common objective characteristics or a 'shared heritage' (values, history, ethnicity, etc.) between Europeans" are used to identify European identity while in the second one it is important to know "which – and how many – individuals actually define themselves as European and what they mean by this".<sup>358</sup> In this chapter, the top down approach is used to see the historical developments of constructing European identity but this does not mean that the bottom up approach is not effective in constructing European identity. It has been preferred to use the top down approach to see the historical developments and official efforts in the construction process. According to Kraus, the institutional outcomes of the 'identity-building from above' efforts are "the introduction of Union citizenship", "the proliferation of official European symbols" and "the adoption of several important European programs devoted to education and culture".<sup>359</sup> As stated in this chapter, Union citizenship was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty; official

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<sup>355</sup> M. Kohli, "The Battlegrounds of European Identity", p.120.

<sup>356</sup> Chris Shore, "Whither European Citizenship? Eros and Civilization Revisited", *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol.7, No.1, (2004), <https://cdn.auckland.ac.nz/assets/europe/our-research/cris-shore/European%20Citizenship%20EJST%202004.pdf> (02.05.2015), p.38.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid., p.28.

<sup>358</sup> M. Bruter, "Political Identity and European Elections", p.5.

<sup>359</sup> Peter A. Kraus, "Cultural Pluralism and European Polity-Building: Neither Westphalia nor Cosmopolis", <http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/etes/documents/multieu-jcms.pdf> (02.05.2015), pp.28-29.

European symbols such as European flag, anthem, passport, driving licence, etc. were presented and many educational and cultural developments were achieved. Most of these outcomes have been stated in the previous pages. But the stepping back in the Lisbon Treaty should not be missed even though many of the symbols are present in the daily lives of the citizens. Bottom-up approach is also used in order to understand how the officials define the European identity and how many and which individuals define themselves as European. This is discussed in the next part.

### **3.3. The European Identity from the Commission Officials' Perspective**

In this part, the views of the officials working in the Commission, the supranational institution of the EU, are used to analyse their perception of European identity and it is also referred to the statistics taken from the Eurobarometer. Here the aim is to be able to grasp the European identity idea of the Commission officials and to support these perceptions with Eurobarometer statistics. It is also aimed to apprehend the European identity idea of the citizens of Europe and to see whether they are parallel with the top-down approach of constructing European identity or not.

Eurobarometer was established in 1973 to be able to monitor the evolution of public opinion. In the website, it is stated that enlargement, social situation, health, culture, information technology, environment, the Euro, defence are some of the major topics of surveys and studies of Eurobarometer.<sup>360</sup> In this part, the focus is on the standard Eurobarometer 82 which is the last Eurobarometer<sup>361</sup>, published in December 2014, the Standard Eurobarometer 77 published in spring 2012, as it is the latest standard Eurobarometer which has direct relation to European identity, 40 years Eurobarometer in order to see the public opinion about the issue of the European identity, Special Eurobarometer 278 on European Cultural Values published in 2013 and the European Parliament Eurobarometer EB 79.5 also published in 2013. Here it is preferred to use the most recent Eurobarometers related to the identity issue to be able to get the recent picture of the people of Europe on this issue. Bruter indicates that

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<sup>360</sup> European Commission, Public Opinion, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm) (15.05.2015).

<sup>361</sup> At the time of the writing Eurobarometer 82 was the last one but in July 2015, Eurobarometer 83 was published.

Eurobarometer surveys, which are semi-annual in general, are used as the only relatively regular measures of European identity by political scientists.<sup>362</sup> But it is difficult to generalise identity related issues in a historical context using these surveys because as Bruter notes the questions used by Eurobarometer on European identity have changed over time.<sup>363</sup> However, Eurobarometer results on European identity are used to give a bottom-up perspective to the present thesis as they reflect the opinions of the citizens.

The interviews, which are used in this part, were conducted in September 2014 in order to collect data on the Commission officials' views and experiences and also to see their perceptions of European identity and the effects of multilingualism in constructing European identity. Four interviews were conducted with 5 officials from different DGs which are thought to be directly related with the subject of the thesis. They are DG Education and Culture, DG Interpretation, and DG Translation. 12 questions were asked to be able to evaluate the European identity, to find out how the officials describe it and the effects of multilingualism and translation in constructing the European identity.

When the officials were asked to describe European identity and to state what they understand from the concept of European identity, just one of the officials gave a description. Generally they think that it is difficult to give a clear-cut definition of the European identity and this can be seen as parallel to the nature of identity from the social constructivist perspective as the European identity is consistently constructed, fluid and not fixed. However, a general definition with stating its context can be given. The first official from the DG Translation stated:

That is maybe the ... European identity as an individual feeling or sentiment. And we are not sure if there is really a common European identity. That is why the closest, I could think of, of anything like that is the citizenship. Because that is something more concrete ... well all of us, we have different identities. We may think that how much do we feel European or we are European that varies from one person to another.<sup>364</sup>

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<sup>362</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.101.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid.

<sup>364</sup> Interview with two officials from the DG Translation, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

As it is clear, she stated that they are not sure of a common European identity. She indicated that the definition of European identity changes from one person to another and this makes it subjective. According to her, citizenship is more concrete as it includes more objective components while identity is something abstract and artificial.<sup>365</sup> The second official from the DG Translation said that it is possible to have a common definition of the European identity but he asked if other people would agree with it.<sup>366</sup> The first official from the DG Translation also added that it is related with "how every single person sees it and on what levels" and she gives an example as follows: "If you are from a small village, so you don't really necessarily feel European there but then if you are in another continent, then you might feel European."<sup>367</sup> This view can lead to the idea that identity can change from one context to another and the functions and the constitutive elements of the identity can also change from one situation to another. It should be noted that this is quite important as it shows what makes the European identity socially constructed.

An official from the DG Interpretation asserted that it is difficult "to be in a situation and say and define it positively, what you are" and said that "...the best definition of what is Europeanness, is that you consider yourself European."<sup>368</sup> He related the European identity with economics and added:

For me, I think ... European identity is the concept of how most Europeans in... mainstream political orientation that believe in, what the Germans call the social economy that is a capitalist system which has a strong state that intervenes in order to make sure that capitalism functions with some elements of social fairness. ... you have capitalist system with elements of redistribution and a clear acceptance, except on the fringes on the both sides, of the role of the state as a service provider and an agent invigilating negative effects of a capitalist system. So that to me is, you might say, the definition of European identity, for the whole world economical is the man acting in society, in economic production.<sup>369</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid.

<sup>368</sup> Interview with the official from DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid.

But he also made an emphasis on geography and mentioned that Europe is a geographical entity. His view about Europe as a geographic entity is noted in the fifth chapter as he related it to Turkey's candidacy.

An official from the DG Education and Culture indicated that the European identity is something new, different and unique. According to him, it is a post-national identity. But he also said that he cannot describe the European identity and stated:

It [European Identity] is simply too big. You could take, you can have different approaches. You can say, look we have 28 national cultures plus the national cultures of all the European countries around the European Union. And you could say if you take all of these cultures and the regional and local cultures, if you put all of that together that gives you the enormous mass and volume of European Identity. ... But I think, that approach contradicts what I said about something more essential and the foundation of European values.<sup>370</sup>

While expressing the 'bigness' of European identity he said:

... The European Union wants to respect the incredible diversity and complexity of the European identity. ... But I do not think the European Union as a political organisation will ever capture that cultural and historical complexity. It is impossible. So I think Europeanness and European identity will always be bigger than the European Union. And I think it is normal.<sup>371</sup>

The 'bigness' of European identity with its diversity can also be seen in the results of the Special Eurobarometer Surveys on European Cultural Values. In the report, it was stated that 76 % of the respondents indicated that diversity makes European culture unique and valuable while 13% disagreed with the idea.<sup>372</sup>

As it is focused in many official documents, most of the interviewees also emphasized the importance of common values while trying to explain the European identity. The official from the DG Education and Culture asserted that the values of the EU are at the foundation of the EU and he added that European identity is vast because these values go much deeper and wider. According to him, European identity goes by hundreds of years and the EU has been built on top of that and "has developed a unique

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<sup>370</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid.

<sup>372</sup> European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 278, *European Cultural Values*, Fieldwork: February-March 2007, published in September 2007, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_278\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_278_en.pdf) (21.05.2015), p.69.

way of living those values and bringing them to life."<sup>373</sup> Another official from the DG Education and Culture answered the question of European identity in relation with the common European values and indicated that:

...they are based on basic human rights, respect for democracy, democratic principles and rule of law all those things that are essential to the European philosophy... But ... I wouldn't say that is the same thing as the identity on the contrary it is many different identities blend together and mixed together to create an interesting forum. And these people from different cultures they agree on certain things, they agree on certain values. So there is certainly such a thing as European values.<sup>374</sup>

But she also focused on sense of belonging in defining the concept of identity and added that:

...our identity is made up of how we understand our belonging, our sense of belonging. So some people will be first and foremost a member of their own town and region where they grew up and then of their nation and then in some cases also of Europe. ... some people say first my village, then Europe, then my country. Depends on what kind of outlook you have.<sup>375</sup>

The second official from the DG Translation referred to common values in the question of European identity, as well. He stated that:

When we discussed upon we also came up with those values democracy, human rights, etc. The Copenhagen criteria which each country, wants to become the member of the EU, has to achieve.<sup>376</sup>

As stated in the previous part, Risse refers to Copenhagen Criteria while addressing common values<sup>377</sup> and it is crucial to notice that the common values were mentioned even in the Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity as one of the elements that gives originality and dynamism to European identity. The interviewees' references to common values are parallel to the official documents.

There were also references to the motto of the EU, unity in diversity, when the European identity was tried to be defined. But the motto was referred more when the multilingualism was the subject. The first official from the DG Translation indicated

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<sup>373</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>374</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid.

<sup>376</sup> Interview with the officials from the DG Translation on September 4, 2014.

<sup>377</sup> T. Risse, "European Institutions and Identity Change: What have we learned?", p.256.

that "many of the core values... embrace these cultures and languages but not submerge them, not the melting pot. But let the different identities be what they are and respect them as such."<sup>378</sup> The official from the DG Interpretation has a functional view about the motto of the Union. According to him, the motto of the Union reflects part of Europeanness and "it is very much about working together while respecting the fact people are different. And they have different forms of organisations up to a point."<sup>379</sup> This can be seen as a quite functional and clear view which explains the Union's efforts to stay together in peace or in harmony and which serves to the integration process. The emergence of the unity in diversity can be evaluated as a need to maintain togetherness in the EU just as the emergence of the concept of "European identity". Wintle supports this idea in a way and states that the motto of unity in diversity was adopted in the 1970s to make the community popular and more interesting for the Europe's people and he explains unity in diversity as "Europe is certainly very diverse, but there is also some kind of common quality, if not unity, in Europe."<sup>380</sup> From the 1970s, the concept of unity in diversity has been used as a tool in the construction of European identity. The official from the DG Education and Culture also drew attention to unity in diversity and expressed that:

...It is constructing something together but preserving the diversity at the same time. So that means that we do not wish to harmonise our culture on the contrary we want all the cultures to try even to develop to live their own lives but we want to be able to work together and to have an exchange between ourselves and to have an open mind...<sup>381</sup>

Shore emphasises that the Commission both promotes the unity in diversity and respects the mosaic of cultures to create European identity.<sup>382</sup> Delanty asserts that European cultural identity is based on unity in diversity and gives the first paragraph of Title IX of Maastricht Treaty, which is stated above, as a proof for his idea.<sup>383</sup> He also indicates that unity in diversity obtains "Europe's contemporary mode of self-understanding" and

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<sup>378</sup> Ibid.

<sup>379</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>380</sup> M. Wintle, "Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe", p.5.

<sup>381</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>382</sup> C. Shore, "Whither European Citizenship? Eros and Civilization Revisited", p.38.

<sup>383</sup> Gerard Delanty, "The quest for European Identity", in Erik O. Eriksen (Ed.), *Making the European Polity: Reflexive Integration in the EU*, London: Routledge, 2005, p.132.



explains that "unity can only consist of the recognition of diversity and must refer to values compatible with the fact of diversity."<sup>384</sup>

To understand what the European identity is, its components should also be analysed. The official from the DG Interpretation replied that the economic values are quite central as the components of the European identity. He thought that it was natural to start with economic cooperation as the community could be constructed on a concrete basis.<sup>385</sup> The official from the DG Education and Culture asserted the idea of free movement as one of the components of the European identity beside the common values such as human rights.<sup>386</sup> The idea of free movement is also related with economic cooperation and this leads to the idea that she places economic values close to common values. Different from them, another official from the DG Education and Culture expressed the notion of "constant doubt" which he sees in the essence of European culture. He explained it as "...there is a constant doubt, a doubting, a constant questioning of what has happened before and I think that is part of Europe's dynamism and Europe's ability to reinvent itself constantly."<sup>387</sup> The officials from the DG Translation answered the question in relation with European citizenship. The first official asserted human rights, democracy, transparency and respect for diversity as the cornerstones of the European identity and then she continued with the freedom of people, the freedom to go and live in another member state, freedom to use health care system and the social security system and the second one added education and recognition of diplomas to the components which the first one stated. Their views are quite related with citizenship because according to them, citizenship is concrete, genuine whereas identity is abstract, imposed and artificial.<sup>388</sup> So they construct the identity over the citizenship as it provides legal basis.

In Eurobarometer 77, the most important elements that make up the European identity were also asked. According to the answers, the Euro was mentioned by 41% of

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<sup>384</sup> Gerard Delanty, "Is there a European identity? ", *Global Dialogue*, Vol.5, No.34, (Summer/Autumn 2003), <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=269> (05.05.2015).

<sup>385</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>386</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>387</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>388</sup> Interview with the officials from the DG Translation on September 4, 2014.

the people, democratic values by 40%, culture and history each by 26%, the success of the European economy by 21%, geography by 18%, the European flag by 16%, the EU's motto unity in diversity by 12%, and the European hymn by 7% as the elements that make up the European identity.<sup>389</sup> The results have some common elements with the interviewees' views as they also mentioned economic values, democratic values, and unity in diversity as the components of the European identity but they did not indicate the Euro. Culture, the European flag and hymn were not mentioned, as well. It was also expressed in the results that New Member States (NMS)<sup>390</sup> put the democratic values in front of the Euro. There are differences in the ranking of the elements among the member states. Some evaluated the Euro as the most important element; some evaluated democratic values and some geography and so on.<sup>391</sup> It changes from one member state and respondent to another.

40 years Eurobarometer, which researched the effects of the economic and financial crisis on European public opinion, also included a part related to European identity, and in this part, there are three questions which can be connected with the questions asked to the interviewees. Two of the questions, namely "how close European countries are in terms of shared values" and "what really unites Europeans", are directly related and the other one "how interested Europeans are in other EU countries" is indirectly related. According to the answers of the question about the shared values, it can be seen that about half of the respondents (49%) thought that they were close to shared values while 42% of them thought that they were not close to them.<sup>392</sup> In the question about the uniting elements, it can be realised that culture (28%), history (23%) and economy (23%) were the elements which mostly create a feeling of community among the Union's people.<sup>393</sup>

In 40 years Eurobarometer, the results were from autumn 2013 and when the results of Eurobarometer 82 Autumn 2014 are examined, it can be noticed that culture

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<sup>389</sup> European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 77, Spring 2012, *European Citizenship*, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_en.htm) (15.05.2015), p.27.

<sup>390</sup> The countries which became member state with the enlargements in 2004 and 2007.

<sup>391</sup> Ibid.

<sup>392</sup> European Commission, 40 Years Eurobarometer, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/topics/eb40years\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/topics/eb40years_en.pdf) (20.05.2015), p.7.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid., p.6.

(30%), history (23%) and economy (24%) are still among the most important elements. Besides these elements, sports (24%) was added to them as another important one. There were 3% of people stating that such a feeling does not exist and religion was one of the least referred elements with 9%.<sup>394</sup> With the last question, which is not just one question but five questions constructed in the same way, it was asked: In the last 12 months have you visited another EU country; read a book, newspaper or magazine in a language other than your mother tongue; socialised with people from another European country; watched TV programs in a language other than your mother tongue; used internet in order to purchase a product or a service from another EU country?<sup>395</sup> Here it was tried to find out the amount of citizens living and looking beyond the boundaries of their own country and have any relation with the other member states. According to the surveys, the question which got the most "Yes" answer is the question about socialisation with people from another European country. 51% of the people replied positively to this question in Eurobarometer 82 and it increased from 48% in autumn 2013. According to Eurobarometer 82 results, 43% of the people visited another EU country in the last 12 months whereas the rate was 40% in autumn 2013. In Eurobarometer 82, 37% of the citizens watched TV programs in a language other than their mother tongue but it was 35% in Eurobarometer 80. The rate of people who read a book, newspaper or magazine in a language other than their mother tongue was 27% in autumn 2014 and 25% in autumn 2013. Lastly, the rate of the people who used internet in order to purchase a product or a service from another EU country results changed from 22% (Eurobarometer 80) to 26% (Eurobarometer 82).<sup>396</sup> As it can be noticed clearly, there has been an increase in the answers to all the questions. These are the general results for the EU. The results of each member state are quite different from one question to another but it will not be evaluated according to each member state, as the aim of this analysis is to grasp the general perception of the citizens about the European identity. Here it is clear that more than half of the citizens socialise with people from other member states, nearly half of them travels in the EU and more than one third of the citizens are able to read in a foreign language. These results are important as it

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<sup>394</sup> European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 82, Autumn 2014, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82\\_anx\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_anx_en.pdf) (20.05.2015), pp.174-175.

<sup>395</sup> European Commission, 40 Years Eurobarometer, p.5.

<sup>396</sup> European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 82, pp.168-172.

shows that people are aware of each other, they socialise, they move and they read in a foreign language. Even though it is not clear how they realise these actions, it is known that the EU supports free movement, foreign language learning and awareness raising. So, all these actions can be seen as serving to the construction of European identity in one way or another. According to his surveys, Bruter also indicates that:

Travelling abroad regularly makes them -logically- more likely to perceive the concrete significance of a 'People's Europe' whose citizens can travel without border control (within the Schengen area) and therefore increase their civic identity.<sup>397</sup>

In Special Eurobarometer Surveys on European Cultural Values, it was stated that the EU and its institutions are crucial in promoting cultural exchange by 44 %.<sup>398</sup> The role of institutions in constructing European identity was questioned in the interviews conducted in September 2014. The first official from the DG Translation sorted the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, which propose and adopt the laws, as the institutions which have a role in constructing the European identity. The second one added the European Court of Justice which he evaluates as having role in shaping both Europe and the European identity. Beside these institutions, the Committees such as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions were put aside as consultative organs by the first one.<sup>399</sup> None of the other interviewees answered the question as directly as the officials from the DG Translation did. The official from the DG Education and Culture emphasized that the ability of the institutions to create a European identity should not be overestimated and according to him, it is not expected from the institutions to create a European identity but to respect the European identity.<sup>400</sup> However, he also indicated that:

... this European Union identity created by the institutions and I think more importantly not created only by the European Union institutions but European Union identity which is created by its people; living together, working together, marrying each other, going on Erasmus exchanges,

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<sup>397</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.120.

<sup>398</sup> European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 278, *European Cultural Values*, p.84.

<sup>399</sup> Interview with the officials from the DG Translation on September 4, 2014.

<sup>400</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

working in another country that daily life together will create the European Union identity.<sup>401</sup>

As it is clear from the above statement, according to the official from the DG Education and Culture, the European identity is created both by people and the institutions but mainly by its people and the institutions respect and support the identity. He added that this creating process is happening in different ways, the identity is created by the programmes, conflict, solidarity and the others.<sup>402</sup> Here the others, conflicts, solidarity and the programmes can be seen as the tools helping to create the European identity. The official from the DG Interpretation focuses on conflict, as well. He evaluated the issue of European identity as "a new European narrative" to maintain the peace because he believes that young people have no notion of history, i.e. what happened from 1914 to 1918s and from 1939 to 1945s, and he also mentioned that the conflict is so close to the surface. He described the efforts of the Commission to create European identity as an outcome of the attempts to keep the conflicts and stated that "... you cannot sell the story directly because people do not accept it as possible."<sup>403</sup> From this point of view, the European identity can be evaluated as a cover to make it possible to keep peace without referring to it directly.

As it was stated above by the official from the DG Education and Culture, mostly there is a reference to the others in constructing identities. He mentioned that it is not possible to construct identity without a reference to the others and added:

... it is impossible to create an identity as an island, isolated from the rest of the world. I think modern identity for a nation and for a political entity like the European Union must have as a starting point. The first question is; what is our place in the world? How do we relate to the rest of the world? I think it is impossible for us to sit down around a table and just to look inwards and think about what our identity is.<sup>404</sup>

The official from the DG Interpretation also stated that it is not possible to create an identity without a reference to the others because "you cannot be aware of yourself without being aware of others".<sup>405</sup> The officials from the DG Translation expressed that

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<sup>401</sup> Ibid.

<sup>402</sup> Ibid.

<sup>403</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>404</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>405</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

the other changes according to the situation, to the level (religion, geography, economy) and where you are.<sup>406</sup> In general, the other is used in describing an identity. It is taken as a starting point which provides the possibility to define yourself.

It was also asked who are more pro-European according to their view. The first official from the DG Translation replied that young people, more educated people and the city people are more pro-European because young people and more educated people "are open to new experience, they are more international ... they deal with the new media more, ... open more to influences whereas and they travel more."<sup>407</sup> The second official also agreed with the first one and added the old people to this list. He thought that the old people have memories of the war.<sup>408</sup> Because of the same reason, the official from the DG Education and Culture and the official from the DG Interpretation think that old people are more pro-European. The official from the DG Education and Culture emphasises that the least nationalist people are also more European as she believes that "there is a contradiction between nationalism and European identity."<sup>409</sup>

The thoughts of the official from the DG Interpretation are quite similar to that of the officials from the DG Translation. As noted above, he specifies that older people, younger people, more educated people, wealthier people, people who live in the city centre and country sides are more pro-European. He explained this with people's socio-economic status. According to him, it "reflects their feelings about Europe but more in terms of how they feel about governments in general than in terms of specific Europeanness."<sup>410</sup> The official from the DG Education and Culture looked from the same perspective but clarified it in a different way. He expressed that the European identity is more dominant among the people who benefit more (students who benefit from Erasmus, farmers who benefit from agricultural policy, the poorest regions which benefit more and the regions which get money to build roads and bridges). He sees this

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<sup>406</sup> Interview with the officials from the DG Translation, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>407</sup> Ibid.

<sup>408</sup> Ibid.

<sup>409</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>410</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

as a challenge because many people may never have a chance to benefit from the EU in terms of direct financial support.<sup>411</sup>

All these views show that people who benefit from the EU and who have direct relation with the EU and feel the effect of the EU materially feel more European. McLaren uses egocentric utilitarianism and sociotropic utilitarianism to explain this kind of relation. According to the egocentric utilitarianism, people "who benefit (or are likely to benefit) economically from European integration should be more supportive of the process; those who lose (or are likely to lose) should be more hostile" and according to sociotropic utilitarianism, "the actual benefits received by the member states have an impact on levels of support for the EU."<sup>412</sup> But there are also views that do not relate material benefits with the European identity. Risse's view about transfer of loyalty into the European level related to the material benefits received through European integration can be given as an example because he claims that "if this were the case, farmers should be the most ardent supporters of the EU throwing their tomatoes at Euro-sceptics rather than at bureaucrats in Brussels" and he adds that there is "little spill-over from the material to the ideational realm."<sup>413</sup>

In the Eurobarometer (EB 79.5) results of the Parliament, there is socio-demographic data related to the European identity. According to the results, men, young people and managers are the most attached to the EU (men (50%), young people (51%), students (55%), and managers (60%)). In the Report, it is also stated that the European identity is less pronounced among the oldest age groups, retired people and the unemployed and in the non-euro zone.<sup>414</sup> Those results can be seen as parallel to the answers of the Commission officials interviewed because they also stated that the European identity is more dominant among students, young people and well-educated

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<sup>411</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>412</sup> Lauren M. McLaren, "'Rational' Explanations of Support for European Integration", *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2006, pp.31-44.

<sup>413</sup> Thomas Risse, "Neo-Functionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration", [http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~atasp/texte/haas\\_jepp\\_tr.pdf](http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~atasp/texte/haas_jepp_tr.pdf) (23.06.2015), p.15.

<sup>414</sup> European Parliament, European Parliament Eurobarometer (EB79.5), One year to go to the 2014 European Elections, 21 August 2013, <http://www.europarl.it/resource/static/files/Eurobarometr/eb79.5-annex-sociodemographique-en.pdf> (29.05.2015), p.3.

people but they also indicated a view which is different from these results as they think that the elderly are attached to the European identity more than the middle aged.

The contribution of the new member states was also asked to find out what they think about their contribution. Generally, the officials stated that each member states contribute to the identity construction process. The official from the DG Education and Culture noted that "... countries do not join and then dissolve into soup. They come into the Union and they contribute".<sup>415</sup> He also added that "They have a huge contribution to make: culturally, socially, economically, politically."<sup>416</sup> However, it is difficult to find out each new member state's contribution rate as each member state has its own national identity. Even though it is difficult to measure the contribution rate it can be concluded that with each enlargement the European identity changes and flourishes and it is also reconstructed within the relation of the new national identities. This reconstruction and change supports the social constructivist perspective which claims that the identity construction is an unfinished process.

Lastly, whether the European identity erodes national identities or not was discussed. All the interviewees replied that it does not except the official from the DG Education and Culture who said that "...if the EU is going to be a success and is going to continue be a success, it must respect national identity and understand the new European identity..."<sup>417</sup> The other interviewees said that the answer is no. The official from the DG Interpretation expressed that the European identity reinforces national identities and he explained it clearly with an example which has been used by the Danish Employers Association:

Imagine Denmark afloat alone with the pressures from the Americans, the pressures from the Soviet Union and later the Russians, the pressures from Sweden to Norway and some from Germany having to defend the Danish identity against the onslaught of McDonalds and globalisation in general, compare to the situation where Denmark inside the EU, is within unity in diversity. And actually has a protection of its cheese brands, has a protection of its language, its way of living. We are more able to be Danish with Danish

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<sup>415</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>416</sup> Ibid.

<sup>417</sup> European Parliament, European Parliament Eurobarometer (EB79.5), p.3.



identity as members of the EU. Because the solidarity protects us then we would be if we were left on our own outside.<sup>418</sup>

He believes that national identities have "a better chance of surviving than it is left to the wolves of globalisation" in a Union in which these identities are respected.<sup>419</sup> These views are parallel to the official documents which emphasised the respect to the national identities. So as Bruter indicates, European identity and national identities are positively correlated and local and regional identities are included in this correlation.<sup>420</sup> To a question which has similarities with this question asked in Eurobarometer surveys namely; "Do you see yourself as nationality only, nationality and European, European and nationality, European only, none?"<sup>421</sup>, 39% of the respondents replied as nationality only, 51% of them answered as nationality and European, 6% of them replied as European and nationality, 2% said European, 1% said none. The results were also given in comparison in total and according to these results, 8% of the respondents chose more European than national and 90% of them chose more national than European option.<sup>422</sup> According to the results, the rate of respondents who feel just European is quite low and the rate of respondents who has a sense of just nationality is high but the rate of respondents who feel both national and European and European and national is more than them. So, it can be said that more than half of the respondents feel European in a way and this rate cannot be evaluated as low and it can also be stated that both the national identity and the European identity can stand together without damaging each other.

In this part, the views of the officials from different DGs of the Commission are presented to see their perception, view and experiences on the issue of European identity. In general, the views are parallel to the historical developments as the officials focused on common values, unity in diversity and respect to the national identities while constructing European identity. However, only one of them gave a definition of European identity but it is not clear and one of the officials from the DG Translation stated that they are not sure of the existence of the European identity. Economic values,

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<sup>418</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>419</sup> Ibid.

<sup>420</sup> M. Bruter, *Citizens of Europe?: The Emergence of a Mass European Identity*, p.169.

<sup>421</sup> European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 82, pp.160-161.

<sup>422</sup> Ibid.

free movement, constant doubt, human rights, democracy, respect for diversity, transparency, freedom, education, recognition of diplomas are expressed as the components of the European identity. According to these interviews, identity helps to maintain peace and in constructing this identity, "conflicts" and "the other" are used. The other of European identity can change in relation with the situation and different levels (religion, geography, economy). It was also expressed by the interviewees that the European identity is more dominant among young people, old people, the least nationalists, more educated, wealthier people and city people. And finally it was indicated that the European identity does not erode national identities but it strengthens them.

Eurobarometer results related to the questions asked to the interviewees have also been revealed to see the perception of the European identity among the people of Europe and to show whether the people's and the officials' idea of European identity are parallel to each other. It has been realised that there are some commonalities but there are also differences. According to the Eurobarometer results, European identity is more dominant among the young people, students and managers but less common among the old people. Generally economic values, democratic values and unity in diversity are seen as the components of the European identity in both groups. Existence of both national identities and European identity together is also a common point between the officials and the citizens.

In conclusion, from the social constructivist perspective, it can be expressed that it is difficult to have a clear-cut, fixed definition of the European identity, which makes it more resilient and acceptable, because it is always under construction and it changes in time and space according to the political and social context. The changes and shifts in the world and enlargements in the EU also cause changes in the content of the European identity. With each enlargement, the definition of the identity changes because of the national identities of the new member states enrich and contribute to the European identity. However, it should not be forgotten that the contribution rate of the member states can vary and it is difficult to measure it. It is also difficult to state that the contributions of the each member state are same as each member state comes with its

own national identity. The 'other' which is used in constructing European identity depends on the context, as well. Unity in diversity, democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and common market are the constituting elements of the European identity. And as Risse states, these elements "are constructed as what is special about the EU."<sup>423</sup> The European identity is constructed with decisions taken step by step. Symbols such as European flag, anthem, driving licence, passport, Europe Day, etc. and exchange programmes such as Erasmus are used as instruments in constructing the European identity even though there is a stepping back in the Lisbon Treaty. And their effects in raising awareness and creating the feeling of belonging should not be missed in the construction process. It should also be noted that 16 member states decided to continue to use these symbols. So they and their effects are still present in the daily lives of the citizens.

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<sup>423</sup> T. Risse, "Social Constructivism and European Integration", p.153.

#### **4. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S LANGUAGE POLICY: MULTILINGUALISM, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION**

The EU is a multilingual Union with 24 official languages and over 60 indigenous regional or minority languages. The general information about the EU's policies can be reached in all of its official languages. The citizens of the EU can use one of these languages in correspondence with the EU institutions and the institutions have to answer in the same language.<sup>424</sup> In this part, the EU's language policy, which includes multilingualism, translation and interpretation, is analysed in order to find out its impact, and contribution to the European identity. Firstly it is focused on the development of the language policy since the foundation of the Community; it is given with the official documents to be parallel with the research stated in the previous chapter about the developments of the European identity. Multilingualism, translation and interpretation are also explained to be able to understand the EU's language policy. Besides, the projects, which are realized to support multilingualism, are given to show the significance attributed to this policy area, as well. And lastly it is focused on language-identity relations.

Before elaborating on the historical development of the language policy, the reasons for promoting multilingualism should be pinpointed. DG Translation indicates that linguistic diversity is one of the core values of the EU; it serves to continuity of communication within the EU; it provides greater transparency, legitimacy and efficiency; learning and speaking other languages have positive effects on the cognitive skills and strengthens the ability to use the mother tongue of the citizens;<sup>425</sup> it also supports the prosperity of both the EU and its citizens and it contributes to intercultural dialogue and social cohesion.<sup>426</sup> Former Director-General of DG Translation, Karl-Johan Lönnroth also states the reasons for Europeans' attachment to cultural, linguistic diversity and their own language. He specifies three reasons;

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<sup>424</sup> European Commission, Multilingualism, [http://europa.eu/pol/mult/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/pol/mult/index_en.htm) (13.06.2015).

<sup>425</sup> Directorate-General for Translation, United in Diversity- Multilingualism in the European Union, September 2014, pp.1-2.

<sup>426</sup> Eur-lex, Multilingualism: an asset for European and shared commitment, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0566&from=EN> (24.06.2015), pp.5-9.

1. The increasing complexity and diversity of our societies amidst globalisation. This leads often bewildered individuals to a quest for their own roots and for some stable reference points — one of which is language;

2. The centuries of devastating conflicts between our tribes, and later our nations, where languages emerged as symbols of cultural identity and resistance to foreign domination; and

3. The advent of the liberal market economy, which forces producers and service providers to localise their products in the local language in order to reach customers and stakeholders.<sup>427</sup>

In parallel with these reasons, Rosita Rindler Schjerve and Eva Vetter assert that multilingualism serves to economic growth, transnational communication, socio-cultural cohesion and the development of a common European identity.<sup>428</sup> So it is clear that the language policy of the EU has close relations with integration, the functioning, the economy and the identity of the EU.

#### **4.1. The Historical Development of the European Union's Language Policy**

In this part, the historical developments are examined in two parts. The developments till the Lisbon Strategy is analysed in the first part and the developments with and after the Lisbon Strategy are analysed in the second part as the perception related to multilingualism has changed with the Lisbon Strategy.

##### **4.1.1. The Historical Developments Before the Lisbon Strategy**

The roots of language policy can be traced back to the very beginning of the EU. The first article related to the language policy was stated in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. According to the Article 217: "The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting

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<sup>427</sup> Karl-Johan Lönnroth, Speech - Efficiency, transparency and openness: translation in the European Union, XVIII World Congress of the International Federation of Translators "Translation and cultural diversity", Shanghai, 4-7 August 2008, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/publications/presentations/speeches/20080801\\_shanghai\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/publications/presentations/speeches/20080801_shanghai_en.pdf) (24.06.2015), p.4.

<sup>428</sup> Rosita Rindler Schjerve and Eva Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2012, p.2.

unanimously."<sup>429</sup> Here attention should be paid to the unanimous consent of the Council in deciding the issues related to the language use of the Community's institutions, as Peter Ives states, and this shows the importance illustrated to the language issues from the beginning.<sup>430</sup> Another article related to the language policy of the EU was the Article 248. With this Article, it was noted that all four texts of the Treaty were equally authentic.<sup>431</sup>

After the Treaty of Rome, the first regulation, which was adopted, was about determining the language of the European Community. It was stated in the Council Regulation No 1/58 that:

Having regard to Article 217 of the Treaty which provides that the rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously;

Whereas each of the four languages in which the Treaty is drafted is recognised as an official language in one or more of the Member States of the Community;<sup>432</sup>

So, with this regulation, it was accepted that Dutch, French, German and Italian were the official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the Community and it was also decided that regulations and other documents of general application shall be prepared in the official languages. It was noted that the Official Journal of the Community shall be drafted in the official languages, as well.<sup>433</sup> Wright states that this Regulation can be evaluated as "a departure from the practice of the European Coal and Steel Community which had used French for its treaty as well as for most of its internal deliberations and administrations."<sup>434</sup>

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<sup>429</sup> European Commission, *The Treaty of Rome*, 1957, p.74.

<sup>430</sup> Peter Ives, "Language, Representation and Suprastate Democracy Question Facing the European Union", in David Laycock (Eds.), *Representation and Democracy Theory*, Canada: UBC Press, 2004, p.31.

<sup>431</sup> European Commission, *The Treaty of Rome*, 1957, p.80.

<sup>432</sup> Eur-lex, EEC Council: Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community, Brussels: The Council, 15 April 1958, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31958R0001:EN:HTML> (14.06.2015).

<sup>433</sup> Ibid.

<sup>434</sup> Sue Wright, "Managing Plurilingualism in the Institutions of the EU", *Community and Communication: The Role of Language in Nation State Building and European Integration*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 2000, p.162.

Article 2 and 3 regulated the communication language of the member states or people with the institutions of the Community. Articles 6 and 7 entitled the institutions to stipulate the languages to be used in special cases, in their rules of procedures and the last Article, Article 8, was about the member states which have more than one official language and it was stated that "If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be used shall, at the request of such State, be governed by the general rules of its law".<sup>435</sup> Isidor Mari and Miquel Strubell evaluate this Article according to the case of Catalan, and they express that Catalan as an official language for over 10 million Europeans is not an official EU language probably because of the inhibition of each state.<sup>436</sup> They also touch upon the Irish and Luxembourgish<sup>437</sup> situations in the EU. The situation of the Catalan and the other official languages will be examined later in this chapter.

After the Regulation, there was a development related to language teaching in 1976; the *Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Education on comprising an action programme in the field of education* included language related proposals. One of the objectives which was stated in the Resolution was "offering all pupils the opportunity of learning at least one other Community language".<sup>438</sup> This objective is less demanding than the objectives of the later years which aim mother tongue plus two languages. For example, in the Conclusions of the Council and the Ministers for Education, it was "agreed to promote all appropriate measures to enable the maximum number of pupils to acquire, before the end of compulsory schooling, a working knowledge of two languages in addition to the mother tongue".<sup>439</sup> In this Resolution, there were many other objectives about language learning and the teachers of foreign

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<sup>435</sup> Eur-lex, EEC Council: Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community, Brussels: The Council, 15 April 1958.

<sup>436</sup> Isidor Mari and Miquel Strubell, "The linguistic regime of the European Union: Prospects in the face of enlargement", [http://www.europadiversa.org/eng/pdf/strubell\\_mari\\_eng.doc](http://www.europadiversa.org/eng/pdf/strubell_mari_eng.doc) (25.06.2015), p.5.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid, pp.5-6.

<sup>438</sup> Eur-lex, Resolution of The Council and of The Ministers of Education, Meeting Within The Council: comprising an action programme in the field of education, 9 February 1976, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41976X0219&from=EN> (27.06.2015), p.4

<sup>439</sup> Eur-lex, Council Resolution on the early teaching of European Union languages, 16 December 1997, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31998Y0103\(01\)&from=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31998Y0103(01)&from=EN) (27.06.2015), p.1.

languages and this shows the importance attributed to the language learning in the 1970s.

In the SEA, there was a reference to the language and it was about the equally authentic version of the treaties. According to the Article 34:

This Act, drawn up in a single original in the Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish languages, the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic, will be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which will remit a certified copy to each of the Governments of the other Signatory States.<sup>440</sup>

Here it should be noted that the languages in this Article increased with the enlargements. It should also be noted that the Treaty was written also in Irish but the Irish became the full original language of the EU in 2007. There were no other references to the languages in this Treaty.

The Maastricht Treaty has importance in the development of the EU's language policy, as stated in the previous chapter there were significant developments in the Maastricht Treaty about the culture and education. When the articles related to culture and education are examined, it can be seen that there is also a focus on language. The reference to education was stated under the Title VIII. The Article 126, under the Title VIII, gave information about quality education. There it was stated:

1. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.

2. Community action shall be aimed at:

— developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States;

— encouraging mobility of students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study;

— promoting cooperation between educational establishments;

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<sup>440</sup> Eur-lex, The Single European Act, p.15.



— developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education systems of the Member States;

— encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational instructors;

— encouraging the development of distance education...<sup>441</sup>

As it can be noticed, the development of the quality education can be supported, encouraged and supplemented but with an attention to the content of the teaching, education system, cultural and linguistic diversity of the member states and the development can be sustained by teaching and dissemination of the languages of the member states. The EU attaches special importance to the language teaching, it can be traced through the programmes and projects it has funded such as Erasmus, Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus+, Creative Europe, Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions, Horizon 2020, Europe for Citizens.<sup>442</sup> For example, Advancing the European Multilingualism (ATEME) is a project which is funded by the EU as part of Horizon 2020.<sup>443</sup> Lingua is one of the early examples of the programmes related to language, which aimed to "promote a quantitative and qualitative improvement in foreign language competence with a view to developing communication skills within the Community"<sup>444</sup> and there was an emphasis on less widely used and taught languages in this programme.<sup>445</sup> Erasmus and Erasmus+ are also good examples by which student exchange is possible; they support both the multilingualism and the construction of European identity by providing mobility for students, creating the feeling of belonging, raising awareness of European culture, sustaining both interaction and cohesion. Language learning and linguistic diversity are among the priorities of Erasmus+, which has almost 15 billion Euros budget for over seven years<sup>446</sup> and it is aimed to fund 4

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<sup>441</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty on European Union, Together with the Complete Text of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1992:224:FULL&from=EN> (26.06.2015), p.44.

<sup>442</sup> European Commission, Find Founding Projects, [http://ec.europa.eu/languages/opportunities/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/languages/opportunities/index_en.htm) (26.06.2015).

<sup>443</sup> CORDIS, ATHEME, [http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/111514\\_en.html](http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/111514_en.html) (26.06.2015).

<sup>444</sup> Eur-lex, Council Decision: establishing an action programme to promote foreign language competence in the European Community (Lingua), 28 July 1989, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31989D0489&from=EN> (27.06.2015), p.25.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid.

<sup>446</sup> European Commission, Find Founding Projects.

million people in the period of 2014-2020.<sup>447</sup> One of the officials from the DG Education and Culture stated that Erasmus+ "... will give the opportunity to four million people to study, work in another country of the European Union."<sup>448</sup> And he added that:

...one of the six main objectives of Erasmus+ is to promote the teaching and learning of languages. So the objective of linguistic diversity is really at the heart of the Erasmus programme. And when those four million people go and work or train or volunteer with people in other countries, they will learn the language of that country. And we will help them to learn the language of that country. ... We believe very deeply that for the people of Europe to build trust and confidence and understanding between each other, they need to spend time together. ... they need to live and work and study together.<sup>449</sup>

He expressed that there is a crisis of identity beside the economic crisis in the Europe and thinks that Europe should ask some questions to itself such as "Are we simply ... an economic space? Or are we simply an economic space manages to govern by the Euro? Or are we much more than that?, are we still a cultural and social entity?"<sup>450</sup> He asserted that:

So I think we have to rebuild this idea of Europe being about much more than all of these things and I think the Erasmus + programme is one of the best examples because it is about people ... and it is about giving opportunities to people to go and study or work or volunteer in another country and get to know each other. ... I think there are lots of things that the European Union does which create the sense of identity but I think as I said, let me underline, what is special about Erasmus + programme is that it is about people. It is a programme for people.<sup>451</sup>

As it is clear from his expressions, he gives special importance to the Erasmus+ programme. The officials from the DG Translation also mentioned Erasmus+ and the second official said that:

...Erasmus programme... It is policy, it was somebody followed it 30 years ago and it of course ... helps create European sense of humanity and because it makes people travel around Europe and get in touch with each other. It has been very successful thing and you will see more and more mixed marriages as well. ... And maybe the children of those people may feel more European. I married to German and so our children are half Dutch - half German. What

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<sup>447</sup> European Commission, Erasmus 2012-13: the figures explained, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-14-476\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-476_en.htm) (26.06.2014).

<sup>448</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid.

<sup>450</sup> Ibid.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid.

will be their identity? How will they feel? Will they feel German, Dutch, Belgian or European or a mix?<sup>452</sup>

With the interactions in social life, with mobility and employability within the Europe mixed marriages happen and the children of these marriages have two national identities at the same time and they also have the European identity. And if their parents use both of the national languages the children are grown up with two languages. So they will become bilingual without much effort and probably they will learn another language. But this is not always the case. The first official also pinpointed the significance of Erasmus and she claimed that:

... Erasmus ... it is concrete ... it really helps in a very practical way. So it is considered important at EU level, at the European level. So that might definitely EU. Well it can help, build a European identity. ... Because it is, then, something tangible. It is like the citizenship. It is something real. That you have a passport or you can participate because you study in a university in Spain or France. Then you get a diploma and that is happening a lot more. It was very unusual among my generation to go to a foreign country to study. Now it is common place.<sup>453</sup>

She expressed the importance of concrete elements in defining European identity and thinks that Erasmus provides a kind of concreteness.

As stated in the previous chapter, there were developments related to culture in the Article 128,<sup>454</sup> of the Maastricht Treaty. Here the flowering of the cultures, respecting national and regional diversities, bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore was mentioned but there was not any reference to linguistic diversity. However, there was an increase in educational and cultural projects and programmes which included language teaching and learning.<sup>455</sup> It should be noted that, the reason for emphasising the educational development is its relation with language learning and language teaching which supports and develops the EU's multilingualism, language policy and accordingly its identity construction process.

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<sup>452</sup> Interview with two officials from the DG Translation, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>453</sup> Ibid.

<sup>454</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty on European Union, Together with the Complete Text of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, p.47.

<sup>455</sup> P. Ives, "Language, Representation and Suprastate Democracy Question Facing the European Union", p.34.

In the final provisions, the Article S gave information about the treaty languages in the same parallel with at Article 248 of the Treaty of Rome but the new languages were added because of the enlargements. According to the Article S,

This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish languages, the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the government of the Italian Republic, which will transmit a certified copy to each of the governments of the other signatory States.<sup>456</sup>

In 1995, with a Council Resolution it was expressed that "pupils should as a general rule have the opportunity of learning two languages of the Union other than their mother tongue(s)" and "the provisions of teaching for languages which are less widely used or less frequently taught should be increased and diversified as far as possible".<sup>457</sup> These two objectives were also the aims of the Lingua programme. In this Resolution, the equality of the languages of the Union was reaffirmed and it was added that the improving and diversifying the teaching of languages are crucial for "enabling every citizen to have access to the cultural wealth rooted in the linguistic diversity of the Union".<sup>458</sup> Here the emphasis on less widely used and less taught languages is significant as it can be evaluated as an attempt to equalise their situation but it is difficult because of the dominance of English as a foreign language, which is preferred more than many other languages at many different levels.

Liddicoat claims that this Resolution "locates language education in broad context of the construction of a unified Europe."<sup>459</sup> He explains this with a citation from the Resolution, it was indicated that the aim of the Resolution is "to provide basis for reflection on how the educational systems themselves can continue the construction of a Europe without internal frontiers, and strengthen understanding between the peoples of

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<sup>456</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty on European Union, Together with the Complete Text of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, p.99.

<sup>457</sup> Eur-lex, Council Resolution on improving and diversifying language learning and teaching with the education system of the European Union, 31 March 1995, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1995:207:FULL&from=EN> (27.06.2015), p.4.

<sup>458</sup> Ibid., p.1.

<sup>459</sup> Anthony J. Liddicoat, "Policies of Foreign Language Learning", *Language in Education Policies: The Discursive construction of Intercultural Relations*, Great Britain: Short Run Press Ltd., 2013, p.61.

the Union." <sup>460</sup> Liddicoat argues that language education is "co-opted into the building of the European polity in a way which appears to conflate the idea of national and linguistic boundaries, with language education", or it might be stated that multilingualism which is aimed as an end product of language education, works "to remove the internal linguistic boundaries of Europe". <sup>461</sup> He also adds that this polity building and intercultural understanding help to access the European culture. <sup>462</sup>

Before the Amsterdam Treaty there was also another development: the *White Paper on Education and Training, Teaching and Learning towards the Learning Society* <sup>463</sup> (1995). In this Paper, it was stated that the internationalisation of the economy, dissemination of new technologies and the risk of cultural uniformity led the EU to take action to compete with the developments, changes and unemployment <sup>464</sup> and five objectives were set;

- encourage the acquisition of new knowledge;
- bring school and the business sector closer together;
- combat exclusion;
- develop proficiency in three European languages; and
- treat capital investment and investment in training on an equal basis. <sup>465</sup>

Proficiency in three European languages was one of the objectives of the Paper, and it was asserted that proficiency in languages helps to "benefit from the occupational and personal opportunities open to them in the border-free Single Market", "build up the feeling of being European with all its cultural wealth and diversity and of understanding between the citizens of Europe" and open "the mind, stimulates intellectual agility and, of course, expands peoples cultural horizon". <sup>466</sup> Here the contributions of multilingualism to the citizens were itemized clearly. It was also expressed that "Multilingualism is part and parcel of both European identity/citizenship and the

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<sup>460</sup> Eur-lex, Council Resolution on improving and diversifying language learning and teaching with the education system of the European Union, p.1.

<sup>461</sup> Anthony J. Liddicoat, "Policies of Foreign Language Learning", p.61.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid.

<sup>463</sup> White Papers are documents with some proposals for action in a specific area.

<sup>464</sup> Eur-lex, the White Paper on Education and Training, Teaching and Learning towards the Learning Society, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51995DC0590&qid=1433420196688&from=EN> (27.06.2015), pp.1-4.

<sup>465</sup> Ibid., p.I.

<sup>466</sup> Ibid., p.44.

learning society."<sup>467</sup> It is clear that multilingualism was related to European identity. So the contribution of multilingualism to the construction of European identity should not be missed. It was also noted that being European means having "the advantage of a cultural background of unparalleled variety and depth".<sup>468</sup> As it can be noticed, diversity was also focused and it was described as an advantage and an asset for the EU.

In the Amsterdam Treaty, there were some amendments. For example, a paragraph was added to the Article 8d which is about the right to petition. According to the added part: "Every citizen of the Union may write to any of the institutions or bodies referred to in this Article or in Article 4 in one of the languages mentioned in Article 248 and have an answer in the same language."<sup>469</sup> This explains the possible languages that can be used in communication between the citizens and the EU institutions. The roots of this Article can be traced back to the Article 2 and 3 of the Council Regulation No 1/58. It should be noted that the Article 8d became Article 21 with the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of Establishing the European Community.<sup>470</sup>

In Article 15, the treaty languages were given. It is the extended version of the Article 248 because of the enlargements and new member states and it was changed as:

This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which will transmit a certified copy to each of the governments of the other signatory States.<sup>471</sup>

The Article 248 became Article 314 with the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.<sup>472</sup> The Article 217 of the Treaty of Rome

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<sup>467</sup> Ibid.

<sup>468</sup> Ibid., p.51.

<sup>469</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty of Amsterdam Amending The Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European Communities and Certain Related Acts, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1997:340:FULL&from=EN> (28.06.2015), p.27.

<sup>470</sup> Ibid., pp.85-86.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid., p.79.

<sup>472</sup> Ibid., p.91.

became Article 290 also with the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.<sup>473</sup>

After the Amsterdam Treaty, in the *Council Resolution on the early teaching of European Union languages*, it was stated that the cultural diversity is one of the features that makes the EU distinguished and it was also expressed that the EU's construction "has always been founded on respect for such diversity, which finds expression in, among other things, its great linguistic diversity" and it was added that "the promotion of linguistic diversity thus becomes one of the objectives of education."<sup>474</sup> There was also an emphasis on languages and cross-cultural skills in relation to their contribution to the development of European citizenship.<sup>475</sup> From this point of view, it can be claimed that languages and cross-cultural interactions which can be sustained, among other things, with multilingualism, is at the base of constructing European identity. In this Resolution, learning languages at an early age was indicated as a significant factor in maintaining cultural and linguistic diversity and promoting European multilingualism and it was asserted as a factor which "may foster greater understanding, mutual respect among young people through the knowledge which they could gain of one another and openness to Europe's cultural wealth."<sup>476</sup> Here it is crucial to notice the duty attributed to the European multilingualism, it is also important to notice the emphasis on "European multilingualism" and this shows that the languages which are going to be learned and taught are European languages.

The member states were assigned to provide language learning at an early age by encouraging the early teaching of languages and diversifying the languages taught, encouraging cooperation between schools and fostering students mobility, promoting the continuous provision of teaching several languages, increasing awareness and lastly encouraging measures to develop and distribute the most suitable teaching materials and multimedia resources.<sup>477</sup> In order to be able to realise these objectives, the Commission was invited to support the member states and encourage them within the framework of

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<sup>473</sup> Ibid.

<sup>474</sup> Eur-lex, Council Resolution on the early teaching of European Union languages, p.1.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid., pp.1-2.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid., p.2.

existing Community programmes.<sup>478</sup> These objectives were stated in details to be able to start teaching languages at an early age which was evaluated as an important factor in sustaining multilingualism. It should be noticed that the member states are the main actors in this process but the Commission also has a duty; it should support and encourage the member states.

#### **4.1.2. The Historical Developments After the Lisbon Strategy**

The Lisbon Strategy can be evaluated as a changing point as the perception related to the multilingualism has changed with the Lisbon Strategy.

In 2000, in the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, it was mentioned that a special meeting was held “to agree a new strategic goal for the Union in order to strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-based economy.”<sup>479</sup> Here the aim was to prepare the EU to the changes both at EU level and at international level and there were measures related to education and training in order to be appropriate for the knowledge-based economy. It was stated that new skills, which can be provided through lifelong learning, should be defined in a European framework and some of these skills were indicated as: “IT skills, foreign languages, technological culture, entrepreneurship and social skills.”<sup>480</sup> Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski evaluate the Lisbon Strategy as a “tipping point which triggered the Union’s interest in multilingualism and related issues.”<sup>481</sup> Schjerve and Vetter also note that after the Lisbon Strategy “the plea for multilingualism started to integrate the separate perspectives into the larger scope of the European diversity debate.”<sup>482</sup> Wodak and Krzyzanowski also add that it “put languages among a set of crucial skills to be fostered throughout the EU member states if the Union is to become

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<sup>478</sup> Ibid.

<sup>479</sup> European Parliament, Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 Presidency Conclusions, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm) (14.07.2015).

<sup>480</sup> Ibid.

<sup>481</sup> Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski, Hegemonic Multilingualism in/of the EU Institutions: An Inside-Outside Perspective on European Language Policies and Practices”, in Ruth Wodak and Martin Stegu (Eds.), *Sprach im Kontext: Mehrsprachigkeit aus der Perspektive zweier EU-Projekte*, Frankfurt am Main: PeterLang, 2010, [http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/34197/1/krzyzanowski\\_wodak.pdf](http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/34197/1/krzyzanowski_wodak.pdf) (14.07.2015) p.117.

<sup>482</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.4.



one of the world's most competitive knowledge-based economies."<sup>483</sup> So, it can be said that the Lisbon Strategy had an effect in shaping the language policy because language skills were aimed to be used to cope with the new developments and the necessities of that time. Thus the EU would be competitive at the international level. The importance of this Strategy was also noted later, in the *Final Report of High Level Group on Multilingualism*. It was claimed that "the learning of language is no longer simply regarded as being beneficial to the individual citizens, but as being of special importance for the Lisbon aims of economic growth and social cohesion."<sup>484</sup> This can be interpreted as broadening the scope of the language policy by adding new objectives such as becoming one of the most competitive knowledge-based economies. From then on, the language policy of the EU also serves as an instrument to fulfil this goal besides its other objectives such as sustaining individual multilingualism and providing many benefits to the citizens both at the individual level and the EU level.

The Decision of the European Parliament and the Council on the *European Year of Languages 2001* was also an important development to understand the importance of linguistic diversity. According to this Decision, the languages question was defined as a challenge which must be tackled as a part of the European integration process.<sup>485</sup> Here it is important to notice word of "challenge"; as it can be evaluated as having negative connotation. However, there were not any other connotations that can be understood negatively. It was stated in the Decision that language learning is important as it contributes to develop "mutual understanding and giving a tangible content to the concept of European citizenship", to enhance "awareness of cultural diversity", to eradicate "xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism and intolerance" and to benefit economically.<sup>486</sup> The cooperation of the member states, the Commission and the Council of Europe was aimed to strengthen cultural diversity, to ensure consistency and

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<sup>483</sup> R. Wodak and M. Krzyzanowski, "Hegemonic Multilingualism in/of the EU Institutions: An Inside-Outside Perspective on European Language Policies and Practices", p.117.

<sup>484</sup> European Commission, Commission of the European Communities High Level Group on Multilingualism Final Report, <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/high-level-group-on-multilingualism-pbNC7807451/> (10.07.2015), p.5.

<sup>485</sup> Eur-lex, Decision No 1934/2000/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the European Year of Languages 2001, 17 July 2000, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000D1934&from=GA> (28.06.2015), p.1.

<sup>486</sup> Ibid.

to achieve the objectives of the proposed action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. The measures, which were aimed to be undertaken to encourage language learning, would cover the EU's official languages, Irish, Letzeburgesh, and other languages in line with those identified by the member states.<sup>487</sup> As it can be seen, the action is multilingual; it does not include just the official languages of the EU, but many other languages.

The objectives of the action were set as: "to raise awareness of the richness of linguistic and cultural diversity within the European Union and the value in terms of civilisation and culture", "to encourage multilingualism", "to bring to the notice of the widest possible public the advantages of competencies in several languages", "to encourage the lifelong learning of the languages", and "to collect and disseminate information about teaching and learning of languages".<sup>488</sup> The budget of the *European Year of Languages* was 11 million Euros; forty-five European countries participated with a total of 190 co-financed projects which included festivals, conferences, seminars, exhibitions, open-days, mini language courses and competitions in 60 languages. The European Week of Adult Language Learners in May and a European Day of Languages in September were considered as the focal points of the events.<sup>489</sup> In the conclusion report, it was stated that "the European Year of Languages succeeded in creating a framework to encourage grassroots activity with a common European identity".<sup>490</sup> This was a multilingual event with participation of the member states, with many different activities to raise awareness and it was evaluated to be succeeded.

The Treaty of Nice also had some regulations related to languages. In the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, Article 64 was about the language arrangements. It was stated that until the new arrangements were applied the governing language arrangements shall continue to apply;

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<sup>487</sup> Ibid., pp.2-3.

<sup>488</sup> Ibid., p.3.

<sup>489</sup> European Commission, *European Year of Language 2001*, [http://ec.europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/education\\_training\\_youth/lifelearning/c11044\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_training_youth/lifelearning/c11044_en.htm) (13.06.2015), p.1.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid.

Until the rules governing the language arrangements applicable at the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have been adopted in this Statute, the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance governing language arrangements shall continue to apply. Those provisions may only be amended or repealed in accordance with the procedure laid down for amending this Statute.<sup>491</sup>

The Article 290 was also replaced by the following: “The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously.”<sup>492</sup> The Article 190 was also replaced in a quite similar way.<sup>493</sup> Under the Transitional and Final Provisions, Article 13 of the Nice Treaty is also about the languages of the Treaty and their state of being equally authentic and it is in the same parallel with the previous treaties. According to the Article:

This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which will transmit a certified copy to each of the governments of the other signatory States.<sup>494</sup>

In 2001, there was also a *Resolution about the promotion of linguistic diversity*. The importance of language learning was emphasised in this Resolution. It was asserted that the knowledge of languages is a necessity to take part in the European knowledge society effectively, to facilitate integration, cohesion, mobility and it was added that all European languages are equal and form an integral part of European culture and civilisation. It was also expressed that the supply of languages should be diversified, the opportunity to learn two or more languages should be offered, and language learning should be promoted from an early age and in vocational training.<sup>495</sup> These were some of the measures to promote language learning which were noted in the Resolution. The

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<sup>491</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty of Nice Amending The Treaty On European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European Communities And Certain Related Acts, p. 66.

<sup>492</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>493</sup> Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>494</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>495</sup> Eur-lex, Council Resolution on the promotion of linguistic diversity and language learning in the framework of the implementation of the objectives of the European Year of Languages 2001, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32002G0223%2801%29&from=EN> (05.07.2015), p.2.

emphasis on the equality of languages, language learning at an early age and vocational training are important points. Especially, vocational training shows that language training at all levels was aimed.

Another step was taken in 2002. In the conclusions of the Barcelona European Council meeting of 15-16 March 2002, the European Council called for action in some fields and language was one of them. In the conclusion it was stated that:

"to improve the mastery of basic skills, in particular by teaching at least two foreign languages from a very early age: establishment of a linguistic competence indicator in 2003; development of digital literacy: generalisation of an Internet and computer user's certificate for secondary school pupils"<sup>496</sup>

This is one of the reference points of the Union's language policy. In most of the documents related with language teaching and multilingualism, it can be noticed that one of the clear objectives of the EU is teaching foreign languages. But, even though it is still aimed, this aim has changed in time. As it is stated above, in 1976, the aim was to provide the opportunity of learning at least one of the Community languages, in 1995 it became two languages of the Union, in 1997 and in 2001 it was stated that two languages and if possible more languages should be learnt. This aim was restated with some slight changes in 2002 and it became at least two languages which can be interpreted as two and more languages. This can be related with the enlargements, as the official languages of 1976 were not as much as the official languages of 2002. Moreover, the developments, changes both in the world and in the EU and the needs to cope with these changes improved the aims. The emphasis on "the Community languages" and "languages of the Union" was also made in 1976 and 1995 and now it has also changed.

In 2003, an *Action plan on language learning and linguistic diversity* was planned for 2004-2006. In the Communication of the Commission, it was expressed that communication in at least two languages other than the mother tongue of the citizens is aimed. Here the responsibilities of both the member states and the Union were also set as the member states were fully responsible for organising their educational systems in

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<sup>496</sup> European Commission, Presidency Conclusions: Barcelona European Council 15 and 16 March 2002, [http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download\\_en/barcelona\\_european\\_council.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/barcelona_european_council.pdf) (30.06.2015), p.19.

accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and the Union was responsible for supporting and supplementing it. The objectives of the plan were grouped in three: life-long language learning, improving language teaching and creating a language-friendly environment.<sup>497</sup>

A report related to the implementation of this plan was prepared in 2007. The importance of this Action Plan is “to set out a vision for language policies going beyond foreign language teaching and encompassing all languages spoken in Europe, whether official, regional or minority languages or languages spoken by immigrant communities.”<sup>498</sup> In the introduction, it was highlighted that languages both reflect different cultures and provide a key to understand these cultures. Besides, citizens speaking more languages were thought to be able to reap the full benefits of free movement, integrate more easily in another country for study or work, be more employable, reach other cultures and improve intercultural understanding both within Europe and with the rest of world.<sup>499</sup>

In the Report, it was pointed out that in general, “the promotion of language learning, linguistic diversity and multilingualism as a whole have gained significantly in political importance” and it was added that from the national level, there was general consensus on: “the importance of languages as a key competence in a lifelong learning perspective, the need for teaching students two languages in their initial education, and the necessity of quality language teaching and transparent assessment.”<sup>500</sup> However, some parts of the programmes did not perform as expected. For example, the number of the projects related to developing materials for language teachers training, the number of students who were involved in language projects, the number of teachers who received a training grant and the number of languages preferred to be trained were under the expected numbers. Thus, it was asserted that this did not correspond to the objective

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<sup>497</sup> Eur-lex, Action plan on language learning and linguistic diversity, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:c11068&from=EN> (05.07.2015).

<sup>498</sup> Eur-lex, Report on the implementation of the Action Plan "Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity", <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0554&from=EN> (06.07.2015), p.17.

<sup>499</sup> Ibid., p.3.

<sup>500</sup> Ibid., p.5.

of promoting linguistic diversity and increasing the range of languages on offer.<sup>501</sup> These results showed the dominance of English as a foreign language. The officials from the Commission also indicated the dominance, importance and the situation of English in the EU but they also emphasised the significance of linguistic diversity. For example, the official from the DG Education and Culture stated that:

If we accept that the European Union is only an economic space, then we will all speak English. Because English is the *lingua franca*, English is the international language of business. Therefore, we would simply encourage all of our children to learn English and nothing else. But that is a very poor, and a very narrow and purely economic way of seeing the world. ... that is not, that is not the European Union's vision of society and what we are trying to do is to recognise and appreciate and support the diversity and to do what we can, to support that. But I think, let's be realistic. There is a challenge, we know. ... English ... is becoming more popular. We know the young people all over the Europe. ... they think ok. You know, I want to get a job in the future. I want to have an interesting job. The most useful language for me is English. Nothing. I think more and more countries in the European Union, English is not considered to be a foreign language. It is the second language, it is a necessary language, it is an essential language. And I think whether we agree or disagree with that, that is simply a social and an economic reality.<sup>502</sup>

Another official from the DG Education and Culture also noted the importance of English:

There is only one language that you have to learn and that is English. I don't know what my colleagues said ... But today, in today's world, if you don't speak English you are handicapped. Now what we are saying is; English is not enough. ... you cannot put English in the same sentence or discussion as the others. It is not English or, it is English and...<sup>503</sup>

These expressions show the real situation and the dominance of the English. To be able to provide full multilingualism on the level of individuals, the EU should draw attention to less preferred languages. The same official states that promoting language learning at school is difficult. She said that:

...But we are not really doing very well. To be perfectly honest we are not doing very well. ... And the sad truth is that the language learning is very difficult to promote in schools. Because everybody just wants to learn English. Simple as that, and I don't think that we have been particularly successful. To be perfectly honest, I think it is very very difficult to make

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<sup>501</sup> Ibid., pp.7-8.

<sup>502</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>503</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

people learn or want to learn languages if they find it difficult to learn languages.<sup>504</sup>

The dominance of English in learning foreign languages can be noticed in the Special Eurobarometer 386 results, as well. According to the results, 67% of the respondents think that English is the most useful language for them and English is followed by German, French, Spanish and Chinese with per cents of 17%, 16%, 14% and 6% respectively.<sup>505</sup> The different rates of preference between the English and other languages are remarkable.

So, it can be said that the EU should raise awareness about the importance of learning languages and it should create a need to motivate the citizens to learn diverse languages. As stated in the official documents, language skills are defined as new skills in the changing world, they are evaluated as a benefit in sustaining mobility, employability and intercultural dialogue.

There was an attempt to diversify the languages in teaching and learning to succeed this; a conference was organised on “Regional and Minority Languages in Education Systems” and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages was ratified by 14 EU Member States.<sup>506</sup> The European Parliament also drew attention to regional and lesser-used languages and prepared many Resolutions related to regional and minority languages in 1981, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2001, 2003<sup>507</sup>, etc. In the Report, it can be seen that the general trends were evaluated as positive but it was drawn attention to the differences among the member states because their point of departure and the initial policy approach were different.<sup>508</sup> But these developments can be

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<sup>504</sup> Ibid.

<sup>505</sup> European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 386, Europeans and Their Languages: Report, June 2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_386\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_386_en.pdf) (09.07.2015), p.7.

<sup>506</sup> Eur-lex, Report on the implementation of the Action Plan "Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity", p.17.

<sup>507</sup> European Parliament, European Parliament resolution with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and lesser-used languages – the languages of minorities in the EU – in the context of enlargement and cultural diversity (2003/2057(INI)), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2003-0372+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (06.07.2015).

<sup>508</sup> Eur-lex, Report on the implementation of the Action Plan "Promoting language learning and linguistic diversity", p.20.

evaluated as crucial when the criticism about the EU's multilingualism, as not being fully multilingual, is considered.

Departing from the Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council 2002 which called for the establishment of a linguistic competence indicator, the Commission prepared a report in 2005<sup>509</sup>; the Council decided upon the key issues concerning it and its preparations in 2006 and a Framework for the European survey on language competences was finished in 2007<sup>510</sup>. The first final report was published in 2012.<sup>511</sup> The purpose of the Indicator was set as measuring "overall foreign language competencies in each Member States" and it was also added that the objective of the Commission "is a truly multilingual European society in which the rate of individual multilingualism steadily increases until every citizen has practical skills in at least two languages to his or her mother tongue."<sup>512</sup> The emphasis on the individual multilingualism should not be missed as multilingualism is evaluated in three groups; individual multilingualism, societal multilingualism and institutional multilingualism.<sup>513</sup> The EU's language policy aims to realize all three types of multilingualism but with this Indicator it was aimed to measure individual multilingualism to be able to see the level of language competences between the member states and compare them.

The survey was conducted in 14 member states; in each education system the most widely taught two languages were tested out of the five most widely taught official languages (English, French, German, Italian and Spanish) of the EU and about 54.000 students participated in the survey.<sup>514</sup> According to the results, language competences should be improved because the results showed that the level of competences in both first and second foreign languages were low, the results of the first foreign language for

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<sup>509</sup> Eur-lex, The European Indicator of Language Competence, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0356&from=EN> (06.07.2015).

<sup>510</sup> Eur-lex, Framework for the European survey on language competences, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52007DC0184&from=EN> (06.07.2015).

<sup>511</sup> SurveyLang, About the survey, <http://www.surveylang.org/About-SurveyLang/About-the-survey.html> (06.07.2015).

<sup>512</sup> Eur-lex, The European Indicator of Language Competence, pp.3-6.

<sup>513</sup> FUEN, Linguistic Diversity and Multilingualism in Europe, [https://www.fuen.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Dokumente/Documents-3\\_Our-language-diversity-campaign\\_Linguistic-diversity-and-multilingualism-in-Europe.pdf](https://www.fuen.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Documents-3_Our-language-diversity-campaign_Linguistic-diversity-and-multilingualism-in-Europe.pdf) (06.07.2015), p.9.

<sup>514</sup> European Commission, First European Survey on Language Competences: Final Report, [http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/strategic-framework/documents/language-survey-final-report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/strategic-framework/documents/language-survey-final-report_en.pdf) (06.07.2015), p.5.



all tested skills (reading, listening, writing) were better, English was the first foreign language in most of the educational systems and it was the most likely to be mastered among the students, there were differences within and between educational systems.<sup>515</sup> This indicator showed the multilingual level of the EU and it can be evaluated as not at an expected level because of the low language competences. Thinking that these results are pretty new, it can be interpreted that some revisions are needed for the language policy. Multilingualism has been supported since the 1970s but it is far from fulfilling the goals of learning languages, even the one which aimed learning one additional language. Eurobarometer results also prove it. For example, Special Eurobarometer results showed that just 54 % of the Europeans can communicate in at least one additional language.<sup>516</sup> It is difficult to compare this result with the previous rates because of the enlargements.

Another important development in the EU's language policy was the *Framework Strategy for Multilingualism*. In this document, it was stated that it was the first Commission Communication to explore this policy area and multilingualism was defined. According to this definition, "Multilingualism refers to both a person's ability to use several languages and the co-existence of different language communities in one geographical area."<sup>517</sup> In this definition, two kinds of multilingualism can be noticed: individual multilingualism and societal multilingualism. Later, the definition was restated and it included institutional multilingualism, as well.

In the Framework, the aims of the multilingualism were itemized as "to encourage language learning and promoting linguistic diversity in a society", "to promote a healthy multilingual economy", and "to give citizens access to European Union legislation, procedures, and information in their own language." In achieving these aims, the member states were mainly noted to be responsible but the Commission also had responsibilities; the responsibilities were itemized both for the member states

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<sup>515</sup> European Commission, First European Survey on Language Competences: Executive Summary, [http://ec.europa.eu/languages/library/studies/executive-summary-eslc\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/languages/library/studies/executive-summary-eslc_en.pdf) (06.07.2015), pp.2-11.

<sup>516</sup> European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 386, Europeans and Their Languages: Report, p.142.

<sup>517</sup> Eur-lex, A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0596&from=EN> (07.07.2015), p.3.

and the Commission clearly and in details.<sup>518</sup> According to this document, the contributions of multilingualism from the citizens' perspective were; providing freedom to work or study in another member state, making people more open to other cultures and outlooks, improving cognitive skills and strengthening learner's mother tongue skills. From the Union's perspective, multilingualism is crucial for the well-functioning of the EU and for its highly competitive economy.<sup>519</sup>

For emphasising the unity in diversity, the EU was defined as not being a "melting pot" in which differences are rendered down, but a common home in which diversity is celebrated, and where our many mother tongues are a source of wealth and a bridge to greater solidarity and mutual understanding."<sup>520</sup> These expressions show the general attitude of the EU in constructing its identity as it has been stated by the interviewees in the previous chapter; unity in diversity is one of the components of the European identity. Here the relation between culture and language was also pointed out with two expressions. One of them is: "Language is the most direct expression of culture; it is what makes us human and what gives each of us a sense of identity"<sup>521</sup> and the second one is: "Together with respect for the individual, openness towards other cultures, tolerance and acceptance of others, respect for linguistic diversity is core value of the European Union"<sup>522</sup> Thus, it should not be wrong to claim that diversity is promoted in constructing European identity and linguistic diversity is one of the EU's core values and it strengthens the feeling of belonging.

*Multilingualism: an Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment* was another step in developing the language policy. But before it, in February 2008, the Council's first ministerial conference on multilingualism, which had a view to prepare the ground for a broader policy, was organised.<sup>523</sup> In the *Multilingualism: an Asset for Europe and a Shared Commitment*, multilingualism was evaluated in a broader sense. It was analysed in relation with intercultural dialogue, cohesion, prosperity, lifelong learning,

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<sup>518</sup> Ibid., pp.2-15.

<sup>519</sup> Ibid., pp.3-15.

<sup>520</sup> Ibid., p.2.

<sup>521</sup> Ibid.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid., pp.2-3.

<sup>523</sup> Eur-lex, Multilingualism: an asset for Europe and a shared commitment, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0566&from=EN> (08.07.2015), p.4.

media, new technologies, translation and external relations.<sup>524</sup> This analysis shows how broad is the framework for multilingualism as it can be related with many policy areas such as economic policy, education policy, culture policy, research and innovations policy, the communication policy and foreign policy. For example, in relation to intercultural dialogue and social cohesion, it was indicated that all languages, including national, regional, minority and migrant languages, adds facet to the EU's common cultural background and this should be used to foster dialogue and mutual respect. It was also added that: "Multilingual people are a precious asset because they act as the glue between different cultures."<sup>525</sup> In relation to prosperity, languages were evaluated as a competitive advantage and a valuable communication tool for EU business and the recommendations of the 'Business Forum for Multilingualism' were given.<sup>526</sup> In the case of lifelong learning, it was aimed to reach wider range of citizens with wider range of languages. It was focused on media, technologies and automatic and human translation services with an aim to bring variety of languages and cultures closer to the citizens and to help them cross language barriers. And lastly the relation with the external world was evaluated and the importance of multilingualism was stated.<sup>527</sup> This can give an idea in how broad sense multilingualism is evaluated. It is an asset for these policy areas and it contributes to European identity by shaping, changing and constructing it.

In the document, the importance of languages and multilingualism was also set as:

Languages define personal identities, but are also part of a shared inheritance. They can serve as a bridge to other people and open access to other countries and cultures, promoting mutual understanding. A successful multilingualism policy can strengthen life chances of citizens: it may increase their employability, facilitate access to services and rights and contribute to solidarity through enhanced intercultural dialogue and social cohesion. Approached in this spirit, linguistic diversity can become a precious asset, increasingly so in today's globalised world.<sup>528</sup>

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<sup>524</sup> Ibid., pp. 5-14.

<sup>525</sup> Ibid., pp.5-6.

<sup>526</sup> Ibid., p.7.

<sup>527</sup> Ibid., pp.10-14.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid., p.3.

While focusing on the significance of the linguistic diversity and stating that it is a source of benefit and richness it was also pointed out that it can present challenges as well as widening the gap between people of different cultures.<sup>529</sup> The responsibilities are divided among the member states who are the key decision makers in this policy area, the Commission and other stakeholders such as educational providers, regional and local authorities, social partners, media and services.<sup>530</sup> Lastly it should be noted that this document aims a qualitative shift as the previous attempts were mostly about education in promoting linguistic diversity, except the Lisbon Strategy, but here it was aimed to address languages in wider context for social cohesion and prosperity<sup>531</sup> with many other relations as stated above. This aim goes a step further by carrying it to a wider context.

*Council Resolution on a European Strategy for Multilingualism* is an important document which asserted that “linguistic diversity is part and parcel of the European identity; it is at once a shared heritage, a wealth, a challenge and an asset for Europe.”<sup>532</sup> This statement clearly notes that it is a component of European identity and for that reason it contributes to constructing this identity which is constantly under construction; it is a kind of richness and an asset but a challenge, as well. In the document, multilingualism was defined as a cross-cutting theme encompassing the social, cultural, economic and therefore, educational spheres.<sup>533</sup> Multilingualism was related with strengthening social cohesion, intercultural dialogue, European construction, European economy’s competitiveness, people’s mobility and employability, assistance for translation to encourage the circulation of ideas and knowledge in Europe and across the world and member states and the Commission was invited to promote multilingualism, besides strengthening lifelong learning and promoting EU languages across the world.<sup>534</sup> These can be seen as the benefits which are aimed with promoting multilingualism and it can be noticed that the context is quite wide. Multilingualism is

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<sup>529</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>530</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>531</sup> Ibid.

<sup>532</sup> Eur-lex, Council Resolution on a European strategy for multilingualism, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008G1216%2801%29&from=EN> (08.07.2015), p.1.

<sup>533</sup> Ibid.

<sup>534</sup> Ibid., pp.2-3.

evaluated as a policy which is related with many different areas and which may have feedbacks in all these areas if it is promoted well and sustained within the Europe.

Many other conclusions, resolutions and reports related to multilingualism were prepared till today. Some of the Council conclusions are *Council Conclusion on multilingualism*<sup>535</sup>, *Council conclusions on a Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training*<sup>536</sup>, *Council conclusions on Language Competences to Enhance Mobility*<sup>537</sup> and *Council conclusions on Multilingualism and the Development of Language Competences*<sup>538</sup>. In most of them, the developments were stated; the importance of linguistic diversity was noted; why it should be supported and how it can be supported, enhanced and provided are argued; and objectives were set again and again.

As a last point in this part, the treaties in force are analysed. It can be seen that there were amendments in the Articles related to the language issue; firstly with the Lisbon Treaty and then with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In the General Provisions, under Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, it was noted that the European Union shall establish an internal Market and it was added that “It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”<sup>539</sup> In the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union,<sup>540</sup> the Article 2 was stated as Article 3 but the wording was not changed. The use of the languages in the relations of the citizens with the EU institutions was asserted in

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<sup>535</sup> The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusion on multilingualism, [http://www.eu2008.si/si/News and Documents/Council Conclusions/May/0521 EYC-MULTILIN.pdf](http://www.eu2008.si/si/News_and_Documents/Council_Conclusions/May/0521_EYC-MULTILIN.pdf) (08.07.2008).

<sup>536</sup> Eur-lex, Council conclusions on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XG0528%2801%29&from=EN> (08.07.2015).

<sup>537</sup> The Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on language competences to enhance mobility, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/126373.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/126373.pdf) (08.07.2015).

<sup>538</sup> The Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on multilingualism and the development of language competences, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/142692.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/142692.pdf) (08.07.2015).

<sup>539</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT&from=EN> (08.07.2015), p.11.

<sup>540</sup> Eur-lex, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN> (08.07.2015).

Article 17 paragraph 2(b) as: “the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language.”<sup>541</sup> It became Article 20 with the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union without any other changes.<sup>542</sup> There was an amendment in Article 53 in the Final Provisions in addition to the first paragraph with the Treaty languages expressing their equality. Here a second paragraph was added. According to this paragraph:

2. This Treaty may also be translated into any other languages as determined by Member States among those which, in accordance with their constitutional order, enjoy official status in all or part of their territory. A certified copy of such translations shall be provided by the Member States concerned to be deposited in the archives of the Council.<sup>543</sup>

This Article became Article 55; 23 treaty languages were given with the same wording which changed in Lisbon Treaty.<sup>544</sup> Jean Claude Piris interprets the second paragraph as:

The translation into these languages would therefore not be ‘authentic text’ within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 55 TEU, which concerns only the official languages of the EU, but rather unofficial translations for the information of those EU citizens who use these languages.<sup>545</sup>

With Declaration 16, it was noted that this change “contributes to fulfilling the objective of respecting the Union's rich cultural and linguistic diversity as set forth in the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(3)” and it was drawn attention to the EU’s attachment “to the cultural diversity of Europe and the special attention it will continue to pay to these and other languages.”<sup>546</sup> This development is argued to be “a significant step towards the recognition of minority languages as a constituent in international treaties, even if there are no specified language rights for this second list of languages in

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<sup>541</sup> Eur-lex, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, p.52.

<sup>542</sup> Eur-lex, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN> (08.07.2015), p.57.

<sup>543</sup> Ibid., p.41.

<sup>544</sup> Eur-lex, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, p.45.

<sup>545</sup> Jean-Claude Piris, *The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.136.

<sup>546</sup> Eur-lex, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, p.346.

the EU.”<sup>547</sup> This is a process which started in 1980s and it did not improve till this amendment. Colin H. Williams claims that “From a legal perspective there has been a gradual, if idiosyncratic, recognition that linguistic diversity goes well beyond the official state languages of the EU.”<sup>548</sup> But he also asserts that there are difficulties in operating this kind of gains to the EU’s political realm because of a great deal of variation in applying the recommendations and mandated guidelines.<sup>549</sup> Even though there are differences and difficulties applying recommendations, it is important to note that their existence was recognized with a treaty. The EU’s official languages is just a part of its linguistic diversity as there are indigenous regional and minority languages (more than 60) and non-indigenous languages spoken by migrant communities.<sup>550</sup>

The Article 64 of the Protocol (No 3) which is about the Court of Justice of the EU was amended in the Lisbon Treaty and in the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union it was given as:

The rules governing the language arrangements applicable at the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be laid down by a regulation of the Council acting unanimously. This regulation shall be adopted either at the request of the Court of Justice and after consultation of the Commission and the European Parliament, or on a proposal from the Commission and after consultation of the Court of Justice and of the European Parliament.

Until those rules have been adopted, the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court governing language arrangements shall continue to apply. By way of derogation from Articles 253 and 254 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, those provisions may only be amended or repealed with the unanimous consent of the Council.<sup>551</sup>

When focused on the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the language related Articles are Article 20 (ex Article 17 TEC), Article 24 (ex Article 21 TEC), Article 165 (ex Article 149 TEC), and Article 342 (ex Article 290 TEC). As mentioned above, Article 20 was about the petition right and the

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<sup>547</sup> Colin H. Williams, *Minority Language Promotion, Protection and Regulation: The Mask of Piety*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2013, p.44.

<sup>548</sup> Ibid.

<sup>549</sup> Ibid.

<sup>550</sup> European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 386, Europeans and Their Languages: Report, p.2.

<sup>551</sup> Eur-lex, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, p.226.

languages that can be used in communications. Article 24 is also about the communication between the citizens and the institutions or bodies. It was stated as:

Every citizen of the Union may write to any of the institutions or bodies referred to in this Article or in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union in one of the languages mentioned in Article 55(1) of the Treaty on European Union and have an answer in the same language.<sup>552</sup>

Article 165 is generally about education and there it was noted that “developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States” should be aimed.<sup>553</sup> Another article is Article 342, which is about the governing languages of the institutions and it was regulated as:

The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Union shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously by means of regulations.<sup>554</sup>

It is important to be noted that decisions related to the languages of the institutions are taken by the Council, acting unanimously because the member states are the key decision makers in the issues related to languages.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union is the last document which is analysed in this part. In the Charter, Article 21 and Article 22 are about equality and Article 41 is about the right to good administration. According to Article 21:

1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
2. Within the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.<sup>555</sup>

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<sup>552</sup> Eur-lex, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, p.58.

<sup>553</sup> Ibid., p.120.

<sup>554</sup> Ibid., p.193.

<sup>555</sup> Eur-lex, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN> (09.07.2015), p.400.



In this article, any kind of discrimination was prohibited and with Article 22 diversity was supported by stating that “The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.”<sup>556</sup> Lastly, Article 41 has a paragraph explaining the citizen’s right to use one of the official languages of the EU in his/her relations with the institutions and it was expressed as: “Every person may write to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of the Treaties and must have an answer in the same language.”<sup>557</sup> The developments in the Lisbon Treaty are important. Schjerve and Vetter note that: “Before the ratification of this treaty, the Union would not directly interfere into the language regimes of the member states simply due to its lack of competence to do so” and they add that “the provisions concerning linguistic diversity and especially the respect of linguistic minorities as laid down in the Lisbon Treaty now have a legally binding character, which was not the case before.”<sup>558</sup> This shows the change but the EU still can interfere to language issues just as long as the related articles give permission. These articles support linguistic diversity, prohibit discrimination and provide the right to communicate with the EU institutions in one of the treaty languages so apart from these regulations member states are still responsible from their language policies as long as they stay in line with these articles.

Thus as it can be noticed in this part, there have been many developments related to the languages since the Treaty of Rome and the First Regulation. At least, treaty languages or the official languages of the EU increased and this increase adds value to the European identity which is under-construction, and enriches the diversity within the EU. But this is not the only development; many projects, programmes and actions have been realized and there are programmes which are renewed and still go on; Erasmus+ is one of them. The first objectives were less demanding as offering an opportunity of learning at least one Community language was aimed in 1976, in 1995 it was aimed to provide the students the opportunity to learn two languages of the EU and in 2002, with the Barcelona objective, it became at least two foreign languages. The number of the languages increased and there was not any limitation like “Community language”. The importance of multilingualism and linguistic diversity has been restated

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<sup>556</sup> Ibid.

<sup>557</sup> Ibid., p.404.

<sup>558</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.19.

in most of the official documents. The benefits of multilingualism for the citizens, for the society and for the Union have been argued and noted as multilingualism was mostly evaluated as richness, benefit and asset but in some documents it was also stated that it can be a challenge. Many conclusions, resolutions and recommendations have been asserted to realize multilingualism, to support it and to respect the linguistic diversity. However, proposals do not have any meaning, other than showing the aim of the EU, if they are not realized. The Final Report of the European Indicator of Language Competences have shown that the language competences are not at an expected level, English is the most preferred foreign language and there are differences between the member states. These results may not reflect the whole Union as 14 member states attended to the survey, but it gives an idea about the situation. It is difficult to get the same result from each of the member states which are the main decision-makers in this field. Commission and the other stakeholders can just recommend, supplement and support the actions. However, it should be noted that there is a progress such as; adding the possibility for translation of the treaties to some other languages, except the official languages of the EU which can be seen as recognition of these languages; adding articles which aim respecting linguistic diversity, which regulate the communication languages of the citizens with the institutions, which refer to the teaching and dissemination of the languages; and including prohibition of discrimination.

As expressed in this part, it should not also be missed that supporting and respecting multilingualism has effects on social cohesion, intercultural dialogue, cognitive skills, integration, openness, tolerance, preventing xenophobia, mobility, employability, economy and the European identity. Linguistic diversity of the EU is one of the components of the European identity; it affects its construction, it changes it and it is an added value, richness for the identity. Monolingual Europe would not be what it is today; in constructing European identity, the diverse languages which shape, change and enrich it should not be underestimated. The European identity without the language policy, which stands on the linguistic diversity and the equality of the languages, would be different.

## 4.2. Multilingualism, Translation and Interpretation

As stated in the previous part, the language policy of the EU started to be shaped in 1950s. Schjerve and Vetter express that the requirements of economic growth and conflict resolution are the underlying reasons of the policy and when cultural diversity was codified in the Maastricht Treaty, European multilingualism started to be developed as an explicit policy.<sup>559</sup> As stated before, they also claim that “The EU’s move towards multilingualism was primarily fostered by the requirements of the Europeanization process, where multilingualism was to ensure not only economic growth and transnational communication but also sociocultural cohesion and the development of a common European identity.”<sup>560</sup> So, as it is obvious, both the identity construction and language policy serve to the economic integration and conflict resolution. While they are serving to the same purposes, they also stand on the same ground: “unity in diversity” principle of the EU. They are in relation with one another and the language policy has an effect on social cohesion which leads to the European identity.

The EU’s language policy includes multilingualism, translation and interpretation as sub-policy areas in this field. In the previous part, with the historical development of the language policy, multilingualism is referred many times but it is also analysed in this part, besides translation and interpretation, to be able to consider the components of the language policy. The reason for taking multilingualism as a separate title is to be able to evaluate it in more detail as it can be seen as the main part of the European language policy. Translation and interpretation also have importance as practical tools of the language policy and supporters of multilingualism. Language education can also be evaluated as a tool for sustaining multilingualism. However, as it is mentioned in the previous part within the historical developments and being beyond the scope of the thesis, it is not argued in this part again. Evaluating language learning, translation and interpretation as a tool for sustaining multilingualism was also noted by one of the interviewees during the interviews. The first official from the DG Translation explained it as:

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<sup>559</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.2.

<sup>560</sup> Ibid.

...we, commission departments, dealing with languages we often like to think as language learning is at one end. So people learning to communicate themselves in the language to share the thoughts, but then at the other hand ... when they fall short of language competencies then the translators and the interpreters come into picture and make sure as the communication can go on even if you don't speak the language on the other part.<sup>561</sup>

As it can be seen the official focuses on the communication and she notes that language learning, translation and interpretation sustain the continuation of communication and they also contribute to multilingualism.

#### 4.2.1. Multilingualism

Multilingualism is defined as "an individual's ability to communicate in several different languages and the co-existence of different language communities in one geographical/political area and an organisation's policy choice operate in more than one language."<sup>562</sup> Schjerve and Vetter characterise European multilingualism as a multi-layered concept that is apparently in the making<sup>563</sup> just like the European identity. They evaluate European multilingualism as a provider of mobility, employability and competitiveness and as an appropriate means reflecting and sustaining the political and cultural distinctiveness of the member states. And they added that this gives "political legitimacy to the Union as an integrated democratic collectivity incorporating cultural and linguistic diversity."<sup>564</sup> Multilingualism is also seen as significant for the proper functioning of the EU<sup>565</sup> as it is evaluated as "a prerequisite for the Union's democratic legitimacy and transparency that citizens should be able to communicate with its Institutions and read EU law in their-own national language, and take part in the European project without encountering any language barriers."<sup>566</sup>

As stated in the previous part, the development of the language policy started with the Treaty of Rome and the first Regulation. In time, it has developed and flourished. In this process, the Maastricht Treaty has an importance. In the *Final Report*

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<sup>561</sup> Interview with two officials from the DG Translation, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>562</sup> European Commission, Multilingualism in the European Union, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/multilingualism/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/multilingualism/index_en.htm) (14.06.2015).

<sup>563</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.5.

<sup>564</sup> Ibid., pp.43-44.

<sup>565</sup> Eur-lex, A new Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, p.15.

<sup>566</sup> Ibid., p.12.

of High Level Group on Multilingualism, the Maastricht Treaty was evaluated as a corner stone of the EU's educational policy because of the promotion of language learning and individual multilingualism besides emphasising on linguistic diversity. According to the report, in the 1990s, the focus was on promoting the learning of official languages but it changed and the aim became promoting the learning of all languages. Moreover, the benefits of learning foreign languages were stated both for individuals and the EU.<sup>567</sup> All of these developments are examined in the previous part. However, as stated in the Report, the EU did not aim "to establish a coherent and comprehensive framework for its various regulations, policies, practices and initiatives regarding multilingualism" but it was Jose Manuel Barroso's decision "to make 'Multilingualism' part of the portfolio of one of the Commission members" and "to assign him responsibility for multilingualism in education, culture, interpretation, translation and publications that set the signal for the development of a coherent and comprehensive EU language policy."<sup>568</sup> These all gained momentum with Leonard Orban's assignment and identifying "Multilingualism" as a separate portfolio, in 2007 and all these developments were seen as a result of the enlargement and the challenges it brought together; in terms of size, complexity and policy relevance.<sup>569</sup> With the enlargement in 2004, the number of the member states increased and this had effects in many fields in the EU; identity and the language policy were two of them. The official languages increased and as a matter of fact the languages spoken in the EU increased. Even the linguistic diversity is evaluated as richness, it is also a challenge. So to be able to deal with this challenge the EU set multilingualism as a separate portfolio. But today, there are criticisms about the developments and one of them is that:

... multilingualism has gone from a dedicated portfolio in the 2007 commission, to forming part of Androulla Vassiliou's education, culture, multilingualism and youth portfolio in 2010, to being relegated to a unit within the commission's DG for employment, social affairs and inclusion in the Juncker commission.<sup>570</sup>

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<sup>567</sup> European Commission, Commission of the European Communities High Level Group on Multilingualism Final Report, p.5.

<sup>568</sup> Ibid.

<sup>569</sup> Ibid.

<sup>570</sup> James O'Brien, "EU's commitment to promoting multilingualism under fire", **The Parliament Magazine**, 8 April 2015, <https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/special-report/eus-commitment-promoting-multilingualism-under-fire> (11.07.2015).

Gillian Moreira sets three different levels of implementation and practice to discover how multilingualism is taken up as a policy in the EU; an institutional and public level, a community and local level, personal and family level. According to her, on the institutional and public level “the official, national languages coexist on an equal footing” in the EU and this means that “each has equal status in the European space and is sovereign in the member state(s) it represents.”<sup>571</sup> She also adds that this policy reflects the political organisation of the EU and the capacity of a group of languages which are recognised to represent the whole.<sup>572</sup> On the institutional level, the citizens’ of the EU are represented by their official languages and they have right to write to the institutions by using their official language which is also the official language of the EU, in most cases, and the related institution has to reply in the same language. The citizens have the right to use their national language. This type of multilingualism is also named as institutional multilingualism and it is explained as “in a narrow sense these institutions are public or private, local, regional, national or supranational administrations that offer their services in different languages. In a broad sense the concept of institutional multilingualism also encompasses schools and even families.”<sup>573</sup>

According to Moreira, the multilingualism on the community and local level is present in each member state and across the EU because “all member states are multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious to a greater or lesser degree” and multilingual.<sup>574</sup> She also draws attention to the differences among the member states according to levels of migration, types of migration, laws governing migration, languages and profiles<sup>575</sup> which can be given as a reason for the practices on this level of multilingualism. Another expression for this kind of multilingualism, which can be seen in the literature, is social multilingualism. This concept is quite appropriate in the context of the EU as it “refers to the coexistence of several languages in one society.”<sup>576</sup>

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<sup>571</sup> Gillian Moreira, “Building a common European home: the contribution of language policy and multilingualism”, *Debater A Europa*, No.4, (January 2011), <http://europe-direct-aveiro.aeva.eu/debatereuropa/images/n4/building.pdf> (11.07.2015), p.112.

<sup>572</sup> Ibid.

<sup>573</sup> FUEN, *Linguistic Diversity and Multilingualism in Europe*, p.12.

<sup>574</sup> G. Moreira, “Building a common European home: the contribution of language policy and multilingualism”, p.112.

<sup>575</sup> Ibid.

<sup>576</sup> FUEN, *Linguistic Diversity and Multilingualism in Europe*, p.11.

In a research of Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN), this kind of multilingualism has two dimensions. The first one is geographic policy dimension which “refers to the manifestation of multilingualism within a certain geographic area (e.g. a city, a region or a country) and to the policy-arrangements for influencing the status, its institutionalisation and legitimisation of the languages that are spoken in a particular area” and the second one is social-psychological dimension which “refers to the distribution, the function, the status, vitality, etc. of the individual languages in (specific language communities within) a multilingual society.”<sup>577</sup>

On the third level of multilingualism, individuals take place. As Moriera notes, “multilingualism is a natural state of being in many parts of the world, and human beings have a capacity to live with and learn many languages and to communicate in many different discourse settings to different levels of competence.”<sup>578</sup> She also claims that the multilingual Europeans evaluate multilingualism as a positive aspect of their identity.<sup>579</sup> In the Report of FUEN, the third kind of multilingualism is individual multilingualism. In this Report, individual multilingualism is described as the multilingualism of human beings generally but there are also “broad” and “narrow” definitions for individual multilingualism. According to the narrow definition, a person is multilingual “when he acquired his languages in his early childhood and if he commands these languages perfectly (both orally and in written form)” and according to broad definition, “a person is multilingual, when he uses two (or more) languages regularly in his daily life, at some point of his life.”<sup>580</sup> So, it is about individuals. In the EU, all three types of multilingualism can be examined. It may not be wrong to indicate that the EU aims to improve and increase the individual and social multilingualism with supporting language learning, raising awareness about its importance and deciding on the Barcelona objective and it also aims to sustain institutional multilingualism with its translation and interpretation policy.

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<sup>577</sup> Ibid., pp.11-12.

<sup>578</sup> G. Moreira, “Building a common European home: the contribution of language policy and multilingualism”, p.113.

<sup>579</sup> Ibid.

<sup>580</sup> FUEN, Linguistic Diversity and Multilingualism in Europe, p.10.

From the context of EU, the working languages and the official languages of the EU should be mentioned when the subject is multilingualism because it is one of the most criticised subjects about the EU's language policy. Michele Gazzola expresses that there is an operational difference between official and working languages. He notes that official languages are "those used in communication between institutions and the outside world" while working languages are the languages "used between institutions, within institutions and during internal meetings convened by the institutions."<sup>581</sup>

The EU has 24 official and working languages as stated above, there were 4 at the beginning but in time the number has increased with the enlargements. The number of the languages is less than the number of member states because there are common languages. There are also co-official languages such as Catalan and Welsh.<sup>582</sup>

As stated before, the Council Regulation No 1/58 regulates the official languages but there are some member states with more than one language and this causes some limitations to the applicability of the language regime.<sup>583</sup> The member states which can be evaluated in this situation are Malta, Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Spain<sup>584</sup> in a way.

Maltese and English are both the official languages of Malta. For that reason, with the accession of Malta to the EU, Maltese has become the official and working language of the EU but at the request of Maltese government, the Community institutions have applied a partial and temporary "derogation from the obligation to draft their acts in Maltese and to publish them in this language in the Official Journal."<sup>585</sup>

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<sup>581</sup> Michele Gazzola, "Managing Multilingualism in the European Union: Language Policy Evaluation For the European Parliament", *Language Policy*, (2006), [http://www.euc.illinois.edu/includes/docs/managing\\_multilingualism\\_in\\_the\\_eu.pdf](http://www.euc.illinois.edu/includes/docs/managing_multilingualism_in_the_eu.pdf) (12.07.2005), p.396.

<sup>582</sup> European Commission, The Official languages of the EU, [http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/linguistic-diversity/official-languages-eu\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/linguistic-diversity/official-languages-eu_en.htm) (12.07.2015).

<sup>583</sup> Phoebus Athanassiou, "The Application of Multilingualism in the European Union Context", ECB Legal Working Paper Series, No.2, (February 2006), <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp2.pdf> (12.07.2015), p.13.

<sup>584</sup> Ibid., pp.14-17.

<sup>585</sup> Ibid., p.14.



The situation of Ireland was close to the situation of Malta. Ireland also has two official languages: Irish and English. But Ireland had an agreement with the Community and according to this agreement, Irish was not a working language of the EU but this changed in 2007 and it became a full official language with “derogation for a renewable period of 5 years” and Irish was extended till 31 December 2016.<sup>586</sup> Irish had official recognition but it did not have equal status. Only the Treaties and the major documents used to be translated into Irish as there were just about 30.000 Irish speaking it.<sup>587</sup>

Different from Ireland, Luxembourg has not applied for recognition of Luxembourgish as an official language<sup>588</sup> even though it became the national language of the State in 1984<sup>589</sup> because they have two more official languages, namely French and German, which are both the official languages of the EU. This preference for not applying to the EU for Luxembourgish to be recognised as the EU's official language is quite parallel to the Article 8 of the Council Regulation No 1/58.

Cyprus has Greek and Turkish as official languages. Greek has been one of the official languages of the EU since the accession of the Greece, but Turkish is not. According to Phoebus Athanassiou, “Turkish would presumably have attained the status of an official and working Community language if the United Nations Secretary-General’s Plan of 31 March 2004 for the settlement of the Cyprus Problem had not been rejected in a referendum held in April 2004.”<sup>590</sup>

As stated in the previous part, Mari and Strubell criticise the EU’s language policy for not recognising Catalan as an official language. The situation of Catalan has changed in time. As stated above, Catalan and Welsh are some of the co-official

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<sup>586</sup> European Commission, 7.2.4. Rules governing the languages in the institutions, <http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-370204.htm> (25.06.2015).

<sup>587</sup> P. Ives, "Language, Representation and Suprastate Democracy Question Facing the European Union", p.45.

<sup>588</sup> I. Mari and M. Strubell, "The linguistic regime of the European Union: Prospects in the face of enlargement", p.6.

<sup>589</sup> Daniel Redinger, “Language Planning and Policy on Linguistic Boundaries: the case of Luxembourgish”, in Robert McColl Millar (Ed.), *Marginal Dialects: Scotland, Ireland and Beyond (90-106)*, Aberdeen: Forum for Research on the Languages of Scotland and Ireland, <https://www.abdn.ac.uk/pfrlsu/documents/Redinger,%20Language%20Planning%20and%20Policy%20on%20Linguistic%20Boundaries.pdf> (26.06.2015), p.90.

<sup>590</sup> Phoebus Athanassiou, “The Application of Multilingualism in the European Union Context”, p.15.

languages of the EU, which means that they “can receive certain services in the EU, such as interpretation during meetings, translation of final legislation or the possibility for citizens to correspond with EU institutions in the language.”<sup>591</sup> This situation is generally criticised as hindering the EU’s language policy to be fully multilingual with equal rights as there are languages which have co-official status and which do not have even co-official status like Turkish. But the status of Turkish is related to the Cyprus’s request so it can be evaluated in a different context.

As it can be noticed, it is difficult to state that the issue related to the EU official languages is fixed and stable. Instead, the issue of working languages is contested. The institutions of the EU are generally attached to the language policy of the EU when their relation and communication with the citizens and legal requirements are the subjects. However, there are differences in practice as; “the *de facto* working languages of the European Commission are limited to English, French and, to a lesser extent, German” and internally the European Court of Justice “deliberates in French only.”<sup>592</sup> But it should be noted that this is just in practice, it is not the legal situation.<sup>593</sup> The Commission indicates that they use the above mentioned languages in the interest of cost-effectiveness and it goes “fully multilingual only when it communicates with the other EU institutions, the Member States and the public.”<sup>594</sup> This clearly explains its working approach with languages but it is also noted that “As the EU grows, the practical difficulties of according equal status to all official languages also grow; but any approach that failed to respect all official languages would betray the very foundation of the EU’s philosophy.”<sup>595</sup> Thus it can be said that even though there can be reductions in the working languages inside an institution the equal status of the official languages is still respected.

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<sup>591</sup> European Commission, Welsh Language in the EU, [http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/about\\_us/office\\_in\\_wales/welsh\\_language\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/about_us/office_in_wales/welsh_language_en.htm) (12.07.2015).

<sup>592</sup> Phoebus Athanassiou, “The Application of Multilingualism in the European Union Context”, pp.17-27.

<sup>593</sup> M. Gazzola, “Managing Multilingualism in the European Union: Language Policy Evaluation for the European Parliament”, p.397.

<sup>594</sup> European Commission, Translation and Multilingualism, European Union Publications Office, <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/translation-and-multilingualism-pbHC0414307/> (12.07.2015), p.3.

<sup>595</sup> Ibid.

Gazzola divides the institutions of the EU as; the “representative institutions and bodies” such as the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee and the other institutions such as the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. According to this classification, he claims that in the first group, multilingual communication “has generally been implemented, although different solutions can be adopted within the same institution” while in the second group, “multilingual communication is usually managed through a limitation of the number of working languages.”<sup>596</sup> Gazzola also indicates the reasons for and against the multilingual communication. The reasons for supporting multilingual communication are sustaining equality of rights, participation of the citizens in EU political activities, to be represented in the EU, equality among the parties and support to linguistic and cultural diversity. The reasons against full multilingualism are practical and budgetary issues as working with many different languages slows down the process and costs more than using limited languages.<sup>597</sup>

In 1994, Allain Lamassoure, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed to decrease the working languages to five but it was rejected and Sue Wright states that when the work expands “it appears that respect for the plurilingual regime occurs only at certain fixed points.”<sup>598</sup> Wright indicates that by referring to the Schlossmacher’s study, there is a “mismatch between actual practice and declared policy; clearly MEPs are lending verbal support to plurilingualism but accepting pragmatically that it is not working.”<sup>599</sup> However, the Council and the European Parliament are evaluated as the “institutions which come closest to the ‘ideal’ situation in the sense that in formal settings such as the Parliament’s plenary sessions, all official languages are used.”<sup>600</sup> The emphasis on the formal settings should not be missed. As Wright mentions, in the negotiations before plenary sessions, unscheduled meetings, lobbying from pressure groups and individuals and unstructured input through networks and socialising, usually

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<sup>596</sup> M. Gazzola, “Managing Multilingualism in the European Union: Language Policy Evaluation for the European Parliament”, pp.396-397.

<sup>597</sup> Ibid., pp.397-400.

<sup>598</sup> Sue Wright, "Managing Plurilingualism in the Institutions of the EU", p.167.

<sup>599</sup> Ibid., p.168.

<sup>600</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.40.

French and English are used in accordance to the purpose.<sup>601</sup> Thus, this shows the reality against the ideal.

Before the 2004 enlargement, a working document<sup>602</sup> was prepared and models of language variations were proposed for the European Parliament: monolingualism, nationalisation, reduced multilingualism, asymmetric systems, controlled multilingualism, full multilingualism with management correctives, pure full multilingualism.<sup>603</sup> Gazzola explains these variations which were proposed to cope with the challenges that the enlargement would cause. As it was expressed in the report and as Gazzola explains; monolingualism is defined as using one official and working language; nationalism is maintenance of the pre-enlargement structure; in reduced multilingualism six official and working languages are used; asymmetric system means to speak–write in all language but listen-read in only a limited number of languages; controlled multilingualism identifies that all the members of the European Parliament have the right to speak-write and to listen-read in the language that they prefer; full multilingualism with management correctives is the extension to all languages of the former system; and lastly pure full multilingualism is the use of all official languages (then was 20).<sup>604</sup> Even though these options were presented it is difficult to state that there are any differences today than before the enlargements, except the increase of official and working languages. But the reduction of working languages is still argued even if it is difficult to come out with exact results.

As stated before, member states are the main decision maker in this field, and it is difficult for the member states to accept to reduce their own languages as an official language even though it would make the functioning of the EU more efficient and practical and it would be more sensible in terms of budgetary issues. As Robert Phillipson indicates, “one of the paradoxes of language policy in the EU institutions is that languages are often regarded as purely practical, technical matters, while at the

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<sup>601</sup> Sue Wright, "Managing Plurilingualism in the Institutions of the EU", p.169.

<sup>602</sup>European Parliament, Working Document No 9 – The Language Regime: Additional Options, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/budg/20010912/DT9en.pdf> (12.07.2015).

<sup>603</sup> Michele Gazzola, “Managing Multilingualism in the European Union: Language Policy Evaluation For the European Parliament”, p.402.

<sup>604</sup> Ibid.

same time they are fundamental to personal, group, and national identity and national interests.”<sup>605</sup> The reduction in the number of working languages may cause problems as they represent the sovereign member states.

Phillipson points out the situation of languages in the EU with paradoxes and tensions as follows:

- a legacy of ‘nation’ states, ‘national’ interests and languages, BUT supranational integration, and the internationalization of many domains, commerce, finance, education, science, politics, and civil society in EU member states;
- the formal equality of EU member states and their languages, BUT a pecking order of states and languages, currently visible in the shift from French to English as the primary working language in EU institutions;
- the onward thrust of americanization, cultural homogenization (‘McDonaldization’), and the hegemony of English, BUT the celebration of European linguistic diversity, multilingualism, cultural and linguistic hybridity, and support for minority and national language rights;
- languages seen as purely technical, pragmatic tools, BUT languages as existential identity markers for individuals, cultures, ethnic groups, and states;
- Germany as a demographically and economically dominant force in Europe, BUT German progressively marginalized in scholarship, commerce, youth culture, and in the global linguistic marketplace, in similar ways to a reduction in the power of French internationally;
- English being promoted as a linguistic panacea, BUT of the 378 million citizens of the member states, only 61 million speak English as a mother tongue, less than half of the rest are proficient in English as a foreign language, and the proportion speaking it confidently varies greatly from country to country.<sup>606</sup> (Eurobarometer 54 of 15 February 2001)

These paradoxes and tensions are still the case in the EU even with increases in degrees as both the official languages and minority languages have increased. The situation of working languages is also contested. The dominance of English is permanent both on the level of individual multilingualism as expressed in the Final Report of the European Indicator of Language Competences and by the officials of the Commission and on the level of institutional multilingualism as expressed by researchers.

The dominance of English in the Commission was also noted by one of the officials from the DG Education and Culture. According to her:

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<sup>605</sup> Robert Phillipson, *English-Only Europe?*, London: Routledge, 2003, p.21.

<sup>606</sup> *Ibid.*, p.11.

...all institutions are totally in favour of multilingualism and we say that, you know, equality between languages, we favour multilingual people and we try to have interpretation in our meetings and so on. But it is getting more and more dubious because the Commission is going forwards with big big steps, always in hurry. And for practical reasons it works in English. We are still multilingual, I mean publishing different languages but we work in English. This is the reality. The European Parliament is really pissed off with the European Commission because of this reason. ... they consider themselves as the better practitioners of the multilingualism because somebody who is politically pointed shouldn't have to be a linguist. They should always be able to use their own language. But if you walk around the corridors of the European Parliament, you hear they are speaking in English with each other. But it is always nice; you know when you hear other languages. And yes even if it is, even if it is a bit theoretical we do, I mean we always preach multilingualism. And try to encourage people to speak several languages. And I suppose that is also ... European feature and we are still happy that we have some very multilingual people working for Europe like the interpreters and the translators.

This expression is so clear and vital as it shows the real situation at first hand. The members of the Parliament, 'better practitioners of the multilingualism', are also speaking in English according to their needs or according to the context and there is nothing strange about it. But the ideal they support is different.

As it can be seen, multilingualism is supported in nearly all of the official documents and by the EU. In ideal, the equality of the languages is accepted but there are differences in reality. In order to sustain efficiency and in some situations to cope with the budgetary issues, the working languages are reduced. Even though it is difficult to state that the full multilingualism is functioning on the all levels of the EU, it should not be forgotten that the EU is a *sui generis* entity. It is neutral to have multilingualism with different aspects; it should not be evaluated as a nation state. There are 24 official languages and the functioning of the EU is closely related with these languages. The dominance of English both on the individual and on the institutional level is a reality. But as stated in the Framework for the European survey on language competences; "Multilingualism is as a core value in Europe. It is part of what makes Europe unique and contributes to the richness of its culture and society."<sup>607</sup>

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<sup>607</sup> Eur-lex, Framework for the European survey on language competences, p.2.

#### 4.2.2. Translation and Interpretation

It is stated in the previous part that there are debates about the official languages and the working languages of the EU. However, the EU is a multilingual entity which has 24 official languages and this indicates its uniqueness.

On the web-page of DG Translation, it is noted that “the EU needs high quality translation and relies on professional linguists to keep it running smoothly” and “the role of the language services in the various EU institutions and bodies is to support and strengthen multilingual communication in Europe and to help Europeans understand EU policies.”<sup>608</sup> So translation is one of the tools of the EU in supporting its language policy; namely multilingualism. This can be better emphasised with Umberto Eco’s statement: “The language of the EU is translation”<sup>609</sup> It is also noted in the *Final Report of High Level Group on Multilingualism*. There, it was stated that the linguistic diversity of the EU can be achieved by using a language other than the first language of the citizens or by availing themselves by language mediation. It was also added that “the Union has sought to facilitate both modes of interlanguage communication – by supporting language learning and teaching in education systems of the Member States (and beyond) and by creating, expanding and maintaining interpretation and translation services of unparalleled size, complexity and quality.”<sup>610</sup>

As stated in the *Framework Strategy for Multilingualism*, the EU research programmes addresses multilingualism in two areas: namely Information Society Technologies programme and the social science and humanities programme. The first programme “includes research to overcome language barriers through new information and communication technologies” and the second one “supports research on language issues in relation to social inclusion and exclusion, identity, political participation,

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<sup>608</sup> European Commission, Translation, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/index_en.htm) (14.07.2015).

<sup>609</sup> Eur-lex, Multilingualism: an asset for Europe and a shared commitment, p.13.

<sup>610</sup> European Commission, Commission of the European Communities High Level Group on Multilingualism Final Report, p.6.

cultural diversity and cross-cultural understanding.”<sup>611</sup> Some of the technologies aimed here were:

- productivity tools for translators (translation memories, on-line dictionaries and thesauri);
- interactive semi-automatic translation systems for fast, high-quality translation of texts in specific fields;
- fully automatic systems for translations of low-to-medium quality; and
- artificial speech recognition and synthesis, dialogue and translation.<sup>612</sup>

So these technologies can be evaluated as tools that will affect in sustaining multilingualism and they can also be more cost effective in time when the translation and interpretation costs are thought. The figures related to the staff and costs in translation and interpretation services of the EU are noted in the following pages.

In the Framework Strategy, translation and interpretation services were also mentioned. The developments related to translation services such as translation memories, machine-aided translation, on-line translation, e-mail translation, speech processing, multilingual document management, dictionaries and banks of unusual characters were indicated.<sup>613</sup> European Standard for Translation Services, which was being prepared, was indicated as well and it (European quality standard EN-15038) was officially published in 2006.<sup>614</sup> In the Framework, interpretation services’ contribution were evaluated as safeguarding human and democratic rights as interpreters “support immigrant communities in courts, hospitals, police and immigration services.”<sup>615</sup>

The importance of translation and interpretation was also explained clearly. According to the Framework, translation and interpretation “guarantee cost-effective communication and make decision-making democratic and transparent”, “ensure that European and national institutions can effectively exercise their right of democratic scrutiny” and “guarantee that citizens can communicate with the Institutions and have access to decisions in their national languages.”<sup>616</sup> Moreover, interpreters also “enable delegates to defend their countries’ interests in their own languages and to communicate

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<sup>611</sup> Eur-lex, A new Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, p.8.

<sup>612</sup> Ibid.

<sup>613</sup> Ibid., p.11.

<sup>614</sup> European quality standard EN-15038:2006, <http://qualitystandard.bs.en-15038.com> (16.07.2015).

<sup>615</sup> Eur-lex, A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, p.11.

<sup>616</sup> Ibid., p.13.



with other delegates.”<sup>617</sup> It is important for the delegates to be able to speak in their own languages because they should not be the best linguists but they should be the best experts.<sup>618</sup> This was also pointed out by an official from the DG Interpretation in the interviews while explaining the interpretation in the Council. According to him, “you can send your best minister again; you do not have to send the best linguist to defend your point of view in Brussels.”<sup>619</sup> Because interpretation is provided in the Council when they meet at ministerial level and the official states that:

If you do not have all languages they cannot make a decision. So all languages are present for very pragmatic reason that we do not want anyone to come afterwards and say, "I didn't have interpretation so I am not sure what I signed up". Now the interpretation is there, we guarantee, we did interpretation. We guarantee that it is top quality and there is no room for misunderstanding. So when ministers make decisions, they can have full confidence in the quality of the interpretation and they don't have to worry about that.<sup>620</sup>

This expression explains both the reason and the importance of the interpretation as it sustains the functioning of the Council and it prevents any kind of misunderstanding.

In the Framework, the balance between the costs and the benefits were also mentioned and it is added that “The system that makes multilingualism function in the European Union does, of course, have a cost attached; but, without it, a democratic and transparent European Union is simply not possible.”<sup>621</sup> This can be seen as an answer to the debates about reducing the number of working languages in the institutions. Here the amount of money spent on translation and interpretation can be evaluated as money spent for sustaining democracy and transparency in the EU. The second official from the DG Translation also supported this idea by stating:

...we do not translate because it is the treaty. There is a deeper value behind it which is by translating we enable all five hundred and something million EU citizens to participate in the EU democracy and the democratic process.

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<sup>617</sup> Ibid.

<sup>618</sup> Ibid.

<sup>619</sup> Interview with the official from DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>620</sup> Ibid.

<sup>621</sup> Eur-lex, A New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, p.13.

And that is very, respect to the value of democracy it has. And translation enables that.<sup>622</sup>

Here the value attached to the translation should not be missed. It is not just because of the treaties it is for functioning, but moreover, it is for involving the citizens to that process, to make them participate in the EU democracy.

There were also some recommendations in the Framework. Some of them were organising translation competitions, continuing to offer universities grants and teaching assistance in the field of conference interpreting, supporting Master degree in Conference Interpreting, providing universities with a model curriculum of a Master degree in translation and supplying visiting translators to help train students in translation.<sup>623</sup> These and the other recommendations in the Framework shows the importance attributed to translation and interpretation.

Another document in which the importance of translation and interpretation was asserted and recommendations were made is *Multilingualism: an asset for Europe and a shared commitment*. In the globalizing Europe, languages and communication tools were seen as the important part of the skills required. As mentioned before here it was stated that “The media, new technologies and human and automatic translation services can bring the increasing variety of languages and cultures in the EU closer to citizens and provide the means to cross language barriers.”<sup>624</sup> Moreover, it was thought that they can have a role in allowing “citizens, companies and national administrations to exploit the opportunities of the single market and the globalising economy.”<sup>625</sup>

In the Document, it was mentioned that the use of technologies developed and with these technologies interpretation “in several languages in combination with communication with distant places and with wider public” is possible by using tools such as video conferencing, internet chats, and web-streaming of conferences and events.<sup>626</sup> Here it was recommended to encourage investment in development and use of

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<sup>622</sup> Interview with two officials from the DG Translation, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>623</sup> Ibid., p.14.

<sup>624</sup> Eur-lex, *Multilingualism: an asset for European and a shared commitment*, p.12.

<sup>625</sup> Ibid.

<sup>626</sup> Ibid., p.13.

these technologies.<sup>627</sup> Human and automatic translations were indicated as an important part of multilingualism as they can provide the exchange of information and improve cross-border administrative cooperation. The role of automatic translation in providing more transparency regarding public procurement opportunities and in the procedures of the European Patent Office and the role of human translation in accessing other cultures were highlighted.<sup>628</sup> As it can be seen, translation and interpretation have important role in the continuing of the communication on all levels and sustaining transparency in the EU.

The importance of translation can also be seen in Special Eurobarometer 386. The results show that 43% of the respondents believe in translation's important role in their everyday lives but 30% of them stated that it does not play role at all. According to the results of the survey, Europeans believe the importance of translation in many different areas across society such as; in education and learning, in health and safety, for jobs, for news from all over the world, for participating of getting information about EU activities, for accessing public services and for leisure time activities. 76% of the respondents think that translation is important in education and learning. This is the highest rate but the other rates are high, as well.<sup>629</sup>

In the *Final Report of High Level Group on Multilingualism*, it was touched upon the changes in interpretation and translation over the years and it was stated that with the increase of the languages of the EU, the management of the interpretation and translation services were also changed. Thus new terms occurred such as; "supply on demand", "real needs", "relay", and "retour".<sup>630</sup> DG Interpretation explains "relay" as:

When a delegate speaks in a language not covered by an interpreter in an active language booth, this booth can "connect" (audio link) to another booth that does cover this language and "take the relay" of that. The interpreter works via another language without a perceptible loss of quality.<sup>631</sup>

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<sup>627</sup> Ibid.

<sup>628</sup> Ibid.

<sup>629</sup> European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 386, Europeans and Their Languages: Report, p.9.

<sup>630</sup> European Commission, Commission of the European Communities High Level Group on Multilingualism Final Report, p.15.

<sup>631</sup> European Commission, What is Relay?, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/what-is-conference-interpreting/relay/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/what-is-conference-interpreting/relay/index_en.htm) (16.07.2015).

The European Parliament also started to use a system of relay languages in 2004 to cope with the enlargements as “it is not always possible to translate directly from all source languages into all target languages especially where lesser-used languages are concerned.”<sup>632</sup> By using this system, “the text is first translated into English, French or German and then from that language into the other languages.”<sup>633</sup> So it is possible to meet the need. Another term “retour” means:

Normally interpreters work into their mother tongue. Some interpreters know a second language well enough to be able to work into that language from their mother tongue. This is called "retour" interpreting.<sup>634</sup>

There were many other terms added to the terminology with the developments but the above mentioned terms are good examples to show the results of the workload. The official from the DG Interpretation also noted the real needs:

...we do not interpret everything into everything. We in fact have a very clear view of what we call the real need. So we do not go beyond what people actually need. Which means if you have a Greek engineer who was trained in Germany and that has all his university study in Germany? He doesn't necessarily need a Greek interpreter. But he can function with German interpretation. So we can use those Greek interpreters in somewhere else, for somebody who actually needs it. So we look at very concretely what are the needs of people...<sup>635</sup>

He implied that the Commission started to use the real need system before the Council and added that the Council refused to use it before 2001. According to him:

We said them to look; “Let’s talk about the real needs!”, it is well for us the political need is also a real need. So they accepted to spend on more money than actually necessary in order to maintain the political symbolism. Whereas with the Commission we had better control over but the Council eventually came completely around to the notion of real need by setting up the on request system. Because they realised that they would become so costly and it couldn't be defended even it is politically necessary expenditure.<sup>636</sup>

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<sup>632</sup> European Parliament, EP Translators, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/multilinguisme/EP\\_translators\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/multilinguisme/EP_translators_en.pdf) (18.07.2015), p.1.

<sup>633</sup> Ibid.

<sup>634</sup> European Commission, What is Retour?, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/what-is-conference-interpreting/retour/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/what-is-conference-interpreting/retour/index_en.htm) (16.07.2015).

<sup>635</sup> Interview with the official from DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>636</sup> Ibid.

He also stated that the Council had some changes before the enlargement in 2004. He indicated that:

Starting in 2001 preparing for the enlargement in 2004 they have, a study group to, working group in the Council to look at what to do with the language system. Because they were paying at that time about 45 million Euros a year for interpretation and if they just doubled without doing anything, it would be ninety. So they looked carefully at how to contain it and it is currently about sixty so they did a very good job in containing it. But it also meant restructuring the way they approach languages.<sup>637</sup>

This shows how the enlargement affected the language policy of the EU. They had some changes to be able to cope with the enlargement with the new languages and to be able to sustain language diversity. The official also explained how the Council reorganized its language approach. As he stated;

We have a budget. This is big. ...Clearly when ministers meet, there has to be full coverage. That is out of the central budget. When the heads of states of governments meet; ...full coverage so that is also a gain. Then we have meetings which is basically people who are diplomats who are post in Brussels as Attachés perform the diplomatic services. They meet, they discuss things ... But since they are from the foreign ministries they have been trained in the languages so they will not need interpretation. So we will take these 200 groups and remove interpretation from them. Not always easy. But it was done. So there are hundreds of groups that work with no interpretation at all. And then they look for other, at the working groups. We say: We have these 20 groups here which are seriously important and where often the participants come from the member states ... They do not necessarily have language competence. So for these 20 groups, we will also pay out of the central budget. ... For these groups will establish an on request system so what is left the budget will give about 1 million Euros to each country. And so for that they can decide where they want interpretation and whether they want interpretation both when they speak and when they listen, what we call passive and active interpretation, or whether they just want to be able to speak their own language but they are willing to listen to some other languages, which costs less because you need fewer interpreters, or whether they do not want interpretation at all in certain meetings.<sup>638</sup>

This clearly explains how they coped with the enlargement. The real needs and the on request system helped them cut the expenses. Another official from the DG Education and Culture also drew attention to the changes but not to the enlargements. He drew attention to the translations in relation to economy and stated that:

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<sup>637</sup> Ibid.

<sup>638</sup> Ibid.

It can be seen as a luxury and it is very difficult and we have cut our budgets, we are trying to translate more with less money. We are doing that. We are cutting our budgets, we are cutting staff. So we are reacting to economic situations. ... We have to resist the idea that is a luxury. I think we have to say: No. It is who we are. This is who we are.<sup>639</sup>

In the *Final Report of High Level Group on Multilingualism*, it was claimed that “The changes must not result in a decline in quality. It must be clear to all concerned that quality has its price.”<sup>640</sup> As stated above, the official also said that they guarantee the quality of the interpretation they do. So, there have been some reductions but these reductions were about the quantity not about the quality.

In the report, it was asserted that languages deserve to be seen and treated as a language of culture as they are not just means of communication and it was added that “multilingualism is a value and as such a characteristic of European cultural identity.”<sup>641</sup> Looked at from this point of view, translation was evaluated as “an indispensable means of enabling Europeans to read cultural products written in European languages they do not understand”, but not just a tool for communication.<sup>642</sup> Programmes, which serve this point of view, have been organised to promote the translation of literary translation. Culture 2000<sup>643</sup> is one of these programmes and Culture 2007-2013<sup>644</sup> and Creative Europe Programme<sup>645</sup> are the others. The official from the DG Education and Culture mentioned the Creative Europe Programme in relation to its support for translation. He said that:

Creative Europe gives money for the translation of new books, fiction, new novels. So we help young writers across the Europe Union to find the new audience with that book so we support translation. That is useful.<sup>646</sup>

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<sup>639</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>640</sup> European Commission, Commission of the European Communities High Level Group on Multilingualism Final Report, p.15.

<sup>641</sup> Ibid.

<sup>642</sup> Ibid., p.16.

<sup>643</sup> European Commission, Culture 2000 Programme, [http://ec.europa.eu/culture/tools/culture-2000\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/culture/tools/culture-2000_en.htm) (17.07.2013).

<sup>644</sup> European Commission, Culture Programme (2007-2013), [http://ec.europa.eu/culture/tools/culture-programme\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/culture/tools/culture-programme_en.htm) (17.07.2015).

<sup>645</sup> European Commission, Creative Europe, [http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/index_en.htm) (17.07.2015).

<sup>646</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

This Programme brings together the former Culture, MEDIA and MEDIA Mundus Programmes between 2014 and 2020. One of the general objectives of the Programme is “to safeguard, develop and promote European cultural and linguistic diversity and to promote Europe's cultural heritage.”<sup>647</sup> So it is clear that promoting linguistic diversity is one of the objectives of the Programme. This Programme includes Culture Sub-Programme and within this programme it is aimed to support “literary translation and its further promotion.”<sup>648</sup> In 2014 there were two categories for Literary Translation Projects. The first one was “Two year projects” and the second one was “Framework partnerships”.<sup>649</sup> Under the first category, 238 projects were submitted and just 63 projects were selected. Bulgaria applied with 26 projects and 9 of them were selected.<sup>650</sup> Under the second category, 23 projects were submitted and 11 of them were selected.<sup>651</sup> So in total 74 projects were selected and promoted in 2014 and the Programme will continue till 2020. This shows that many projects related to literary translation will be promoted to support the linguistic diversity and be aware of European culture.

There are also other programmes, activities and contests with which translation is supported such as European Master's in Translation, visiting translation scheme, visits to DG Translation and Juvenes Translatores.<sup>652</sup>

As it can be noticed, the importance of the translation and interpretation were stated many times in the official documents, it was stated by the interviewees and it can be seen that it is supported with programmes. But it is also significant to notice this importance within the institutional context. So, here the translation and interpretation

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<sup>647</sup> Eur-lex, Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1295&from=EN> (17.07.2015), pp.223-226.

<sup>648</sup> Ibid., p.229.

<sup>649</sup> European Commission, Literary Translation Projects – Selection results 2014, [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/selection-results/literary-translation-projects-selection-results-2014\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/selection-results/literary-translation-projects-selection-results-2014_en) (01.10.2015).

<sup>650</sup> European Commission, Support to Literary Translation Projects - Category 1 - Two year projects - Applications by Country, [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/documents/results-lit-trans-eacs192013applications-by-country-cat1\\_en.pdf](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/documents/results-lit-trans-eacs192013applications-by-country-cat1_en.pdf) (01.10.2015).

<sup>651</sup> European Commission, Support to Literary Translation Projects - Category 2 – Framework partnership - Applications by Country, [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/documents/results-lit-trans-eacs192013applications-by-country-cat2\\_en.pdf](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/documents/results-lit-trans-eacs192013applications-by-country-cat2_en.pdf) (01.10.2015).

<sup>652</sup> European Commission, Programmes for schools, universities and business, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/programmes/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/programmes/index_en.htm) (17.07.2013).

offices of the EU are also researched slightly to have an idea about their extent and functions.

DG Translation is an in-house translation service of the European Commission whose main functions are set as;

- **translate laws, policy papers, reports, correspondence and other written texts** drafted by or sent to the **Commission**
- help the **Commission communicate with the public in all EU official languages**
- **edit original documents** drafted by Commission authors, who routinely write in languages other than their own
- **advise other Commission departments** on linguistic matters and on managing multilingual websites.<sup>653</sup>

In the official web-site of the DG Translation, it is indicated that everything is not translated in to all official languages, just legislation and policy documents of major public importance are produced in all 24 official languages. The other documents such as correspondence with national authorities and individual citizens, reports, internal papers are translated into the needed languages according to the situation and internal documents are written in and sometimes they are translated into English, French and German. It is also mentioned that the incoming documents are also translated into one of these three languages.<sup>654</sup> So, it is clear that the DG Translation use English, French and German as a working language but legislation and policy documents of major public importance are translated into all official languages. The official from the DG Education and Culture explained it and expressed its importance as:

...every time the European Commission produces an important political document, for example, a new proposal for a new law, for a directive or regulation that document will always be published in the 24 official languages of the European Union. So everybody in the European Union can hold that text and read that text in their language. And I think that it is fantastic commitment by the European Commission to the multicultural and multilingual identity of its citizens. I think we should all be right proud about that.<sup>655</sup>

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<sup>653</sup> European Commission, The European Commission's in-house translation service, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/whoweare/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/whoweare/index_en.htm) (18.07.2015).

<sup>654</sup> European Commission, Translation and the European Union, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/translating/index_en.htm) (18.07.2005).

<sup>655</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.



Looking at the figure may give us an idea to be able to understand how this service is provided. According to 2014 figures, there were 2,255 people working in DG Translation and 1,471 of them were translators and the others were managers, administrators, assistants and field officers. 67% of them were women and 33% of them were men. The number of staffs differs according to the member states. For example, there were 200 Belgians and just one Cypriot. Most of them are employed in Luxembourg and Brussels and small amount of them are working in the field offices. And 2 302 465 pages were translated in 2014<sup>656</sup> and 71% of it was translated in-house and the rest of them by contractors as the translations are done both by in-house translators or freelance translators.<sup>657</sup> According to the 2015 figures, the DG Translation has 2,388 and it is the third largest service in the European Commission after the DG for International Cooperation and Development and DG Joint Research Centre.<sup>658</sup> The estimated cost of the translation is 330 million euros each year or 0.60 euros per citizens. After the 2004-2007 enlargements, the costs increased 20% even though the number of official languages doubled from 11 to 23.<sup>659</sup> These figures show how enormous the service is with its staff and the workload. But it also shows that how the Commission coped with the enlargements. The Commission found a way to cut the expenses. If nothing had been done to cut the expenses there would have been a problem as the number of official languages would have affected the cost of translation services in a direct proportion and the costs would have doubled just as the number of languages. But as the Commission officials stated above, they found a way to cope with the enlargements which may have been a real problem if they had not found a solution.

None of the other institutions has a large translation service as the Commission has. One of the other institutions which has translation service is the European Parliament and it is stated on the web-page of the European Parliament that it “differs from the other EU institutions in its obligation to ensure the highest possible degree of

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<sup>656</sup> European Commission, Translation in Figures-2014, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/whoweare/translation\\_figures\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/whoweare/translation_figures_en.pdf) (18.07.2015), pp.1-2.

<sup>657</sup> European Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/faq/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/faq/index_en.htm) (18.07.2015).

<sup>658</sup> European Commission, Human Resources Key Figures- Staff Members, [http://ec.europa.eu/civil\\_service/docs/hr\\_key\\_figures\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/hr_key_figures_en.pdf) (18.07.2015), p.1.

<sup>659</sup> European Commission, Frequently Asked Questions.

multilingualism.”<sup>660</sup> It has its own in-house translation service but it also works with contractors for non-priority texts and they translate around 30% of the texts.<sup>661</sup>

Other institutions which have separate translation services are the European Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank, and the European Investment Bank. There are also institutions which share their translation services such as the European Council and the Council of the European Union, the Court of Justice with the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee. There is also the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union. Each has different numbers of translators or lawyer linguists to meet the needs of the institutions but none of them has more translators than the Commission.<sup>662</sup>

When looked at the interpretation services, it can be noticed that the Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament has interpretation services. DG Interpretation is the Commission’s interpretation service and conference organiser which provides interpreters for around 11.000 meeting every year as the largest interpretation service in the world. There are 50-60 meetings every day with 300-400 freelance interpreters and this cost 0.25 euros a year per citizen.<sup>663</sup> There were 551 interpreters and 69% of them were women and 31% of them were men according to 2014 figures.<sup>664</sup> It serves to the Commission, the European Council, the Council of the Union, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Investment Bank and the agencies and offices in the member states. On its web-page, it is stated that 46% of the interpretation service is provided for the Council, 40% of it to the Commission and 14% of it to the other

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<sup>660</sup> European Parliament, Multilingualism in the European Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00013/Multilingualism> (18.07.2015).

<sup>661</sup> European Parliament, EP Translators, p.1.

<sup>662</sup> European Commission, Interpreting and Translating for Europe, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/publications/brochures/interpreting\\_translating\\_europe\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/translation/publications/brochures/interpreting_translating_europe_en.pdf) (18.07.2015).

<sup>663</sup> European Commission, What we do, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/about-dg-interpretation/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/about-dg-interpretation/index_en.htm) (18.07.2015).

<sup>664</sup> European Commission, Interpretation in Figures – 2014, [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/docs/about\\_dg\\_int/statistics-brochure.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/docs/about_dg_int/statistics-brochure.pdf) (18.07.2015).

institutions, agencies and bodies.<sup>665</sup> But according to the 2014 figures, the Council of the European Union got 62% of the service, the Commission got 29% and the others got the rest of it.<sup>666</sup>

DG Interpretation mentions that it aims to make multilingual communication possible at the Community decision making by:

- providing quality interpretation services;
- providing an effective service of conference organisation including technical support and design management of modern conference facilities;
- helping to put the Commission's new multilingualism strategy into practice.<sup>667</sup>

And it is added that it is a fundamental requirement of the democratic legitimacy of the EU to provide to everybody to communicate in their own language at the table in order to understand each other. Here it is also mentioned that the citizens should be represented by their best experts rather than their best linguists.<sup>668</sup> This view is also indicated above.

As stated above, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice have their own interpretation services but they collaborate closely with the DG Interpretation<sup>669</sup> which is the largest interpretation service among all. As it is stated on the web-page of the European Parliament, there are about 330 interpreters and external accredited interpreters in the European Parliament.<sup>670</sup> They provide interpreting for: plenary sessions, meetings of parliamentary committees, meetings of political groups, press conferences, meetings of Parliament's governing bodies, meetings of the Committee of the Regions, meetings of the European Commission in Luxembourg, meetings of the Court of Auditors, meetings of the European Ombudsman, meetings of the European Data Protection Supervisor and meetings of the Translation Centre in

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<sup>665</sup> European Commission, What we do.

<sup>666</sup> European Commission, Interpretation in Figures – 2014.

<sup>667</sup> European Commission, What we do.

<sup>668</sup> Ibid.

<sup>669</sup> Ibid.

<sup>670</sup> European Parliament, the Interpreter, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/interpretation/en/the-interpreter.html> (18.07.2015).

Luxembourg.<sup>671</sup> The interpretation service in the Court of Justice has about 70 permanent interpreters and they provide interpretation during the hearings of the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal.<sup>672</sup>

The importance of these services in the EU was also noted in the interviews conducted in the Commission by the interviewees. For example, the official from the DG Education and Culture expressed how they are proud of having these services and their importance as follows:

The European Commission is very proud to have the world's best interpreters and translators. I mean we feel very proud of that. We have a very very high level of service. And if you go to a meeting in the European Parliament, or if you go to a meeting in the European Commission or meeting well the member states are discussing and negotiating, the level of interpreting they will have when you wear your headphones is of the highest order. And we think that this is extremely important. And we invest a lot of money in that because if the EU is not multilingual, then it is not the EU.<sup>673</sup>

Thus it can be evaluated that translation and interpretation are the tools which have effective role in sustaining transparency, democracy, multilingualism and the functioning of the EU. They are the bridges between the citizens and the institutions and also between the member states and the institutions. Some of the institutions and agencies have either translation or interpretation service or both of them but the Commission's translation and interpretation services are the largest services. All language services in all of the EU institutions cost less than 1% of the annual general budget of the EU and this costs around 2 euros per person per year roughly.<sup>674</sup> This amount of money may not be evaluated as much when the service provided is thought, when the right to write to the institutions in one of the official languages is sustained, when it provides participation to the democracy and when the legislation is provided in all official languages. Linguistic diversity should be maintained as it serves social cohesion, intercultural dialogue and constructing the European identity and it is the component of this identity.

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<sup>671</sup> European Parliament, Interpreting in the European Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/interpretation/en/interpreting-in-the-parliament.html> (18.07.2015).

<sup>672</sup> The Court of Justice, Interpretation Directorate, [http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2\\_12357/direction-de-l-interpretation](http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_12357/direction-de-l-interpretation) (18.07.2015).

<sup>673</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>674</sup> European Commission, Frequently Asked Questions.

It was asked to the officials of the Commission how the European Union's language policy contributes to the construction of European identity. They gave different answers to this question. According to the second official from the DG Translation;

...the linguistic diversity promotes multilingualism, translation that also helps to promote to exchange the ideas. People learn more about each other and facilitate communication between people who don't speak each other's language. ...So in that sense, yes, we have also constructed, helped a European identity, in some point. ...<sup>675</sup>

The first official of the DG Translation also shared this idea and added that:

...and then what we really do, and the interpreters ... help this communication between languages, cultures and identities which are linked. And that is really the practical daily work of us.<sup>676</sup>

The official from the DG Interpretation stated that:

So again the identity, the national identity is preserved through the presents of the language and interpretation and translation. And I guess the way it matches with European identity is that Europe shows its Europeanness through the respect and through the way it braces also the national culture and the national language so that the Europeanness is the systems on all languages being equal which is a legal fact and which to some extent is also the fact and reality.<sup>677</sup>

He also added that:

...The Europeanness if we accepted the Europeanness as that you can be in unity in diversity that you can work together but you can still also have an expression of a national identity. Then the multilingualism policy makes sure that this can actually happen.<sup>678</sup>

It is possible to claim that the officials both from the DG Translation and DG Interpretation evaluate translation and interpretation as practical business. The official from the DG Interpretation expressed it clearly by saying:

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<sup>675</sup> Interview with two officials from the DG Translation, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

<sup>676</sup> Ibid.

<sup>677</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>678</sup> Ibid.

We have people who need to have a conversation and they do not share a language so we help them. ... So again we do not see ourselves I think in the identity business. I think we see ourselves in the practical business.<sup>679</sup>

The official from the DG Education and Culture answered this question as:

I think it is simply a question of recognising and respecting this reality that we have. I do not think we need to do too much. I think the European Union is already full of millions and millions of people speaking lots of different languages and that is a good thing. I think what we are trying to do, inside the European Union, is to encourage that. To encourage young people to learn a new language, to encourage people to see languages as a way of getting a better job, a more interesting job. We want to encourage businesses to see languages as a good skill to have in the work place. So there are lots of things that the European Union is doing to encourage the teaching and the learning of languages through the Erasmus programme. And those are all good things but I think the most important thing is simply to recognise and to appreciate this great diversity that we have. And sometimes we do need to protect it, we have smaller languages, we have regional languages. We have to make sure that these smaller languages are also protected and supported.<sup>680</sup>

So it can be stated that he thinks that just recognising, respecting and in some cases protecting the reality contributes to the construction of European identity and it should be encouraged by the EU.

Thus, it can be understood from this and the previous part that EU's language policy has relation with many other policies. Its relation with education policy, culture policy, foreign policy, communication policy and research policy can be traced with the documents. It has changed since the beginning. According to Schjerve and Vetter, at the beginning, there were references to European commonalities and objectives such as cultural heritage, identity and welfare but after the Maastricht Treaty, it was linked to the constitutional values and political principles and they interpret this as: "this is the reason why the highly contentious issue of European identity and citizenship came to be debated in connection with the linguistic diversity and the political impact, multilingualism has on the development of democracy, equality and the respect of human rights."<sup>681</sup> They also draw attention to the integration of the multilingualism to the portfolio of Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism and to the legal

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<sup>679</sup> Ibid.

<sup>680</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

<sup>681</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.18.

developments sustained with the Lisbon Treaty.<sup>682</sup> But here the reference to the link between the European identity and language policy should not be missed as it is in the scope of this thesis. The relation of the European identity and its language policy stands on the diversity, the respect of this diversity. Unity in diversity is the motto of the EU as stated before and it is also the constituent part of its identity.

#### **4.3. Language – Identity Relations in the Construction of European Identity**

In this thesis, the role of EU's language policy in constructing European identity is examined. It can be seen in the previous parts that the EU tries to protect, respect and promote its multilingualism and linguistic diversity. Translation and interpretation are used as tools to support and sustain multilingualism mainly at the institutional level. Language learning and teaching is also used as a provider of multilingualism. It also has a role in supporting and sustaining multilingualism mostly on the individual level. As it can be understood from the previous part, linguistic diversity and multilingualism or as a general framework EU's language policy is related with many policy areas such as education policy, economic policy and culture policy beside many other policy areas. To be able to understand the role of language policy in constructing European identity, the role of language should be stated clearly.

Language is one of the most researched issues in social sciences. Many scholars research and write many precious articles about the issue. Language is researched in relation with psychology, sociology and anthropology beside many other disciplines. These researches are not explained here as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. So just some of the researches, which are thought to serve and be related to the aim of this thesis are used.

It would be appropriate to start with what language means. According to Edward Sapir, "Language is a purely human and noninstinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by means of a system of voluntarily

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<sup>682</sup> Ibid., p.19.

produced symbol.”<sup>683</sup> He also states that language is a tool of significant expression.<sup>684</sup> Therefore, language is a way of communicating and by using this tool the ideas, emotions and desires are transferred. He also defines speech as “an extremely complex and ever-shifting network of adjustments—in the brain, in the nervous system, and in the articulating and auditory organs—tending towards the desired end of communication.”<sup>685</sup>

Sapir also notes that:

Language is a guide to 'social reality.' ... Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group.<sup>686</sup>

This expression of Sapir points out the importance of language and it defines language as a social reality and a medium of expression for the society. So, it can be said that people construct their identities by using languages as a medium of expression but it is not just a tool for expression or communication. David Kilgour by citing Edward Sapir notes that “Language is not only a vehicle for the expression of thoughts, perceptions, sentiments, and values characteristic of a community; it also represents a fundamental expression of social identity.”<sup>687</sup> Thereby languages can be seen as a tool that reflects our social identity and it is a constituent of it.

#### **4.3.1. Language – Identity Relations in General**

There are many researchers who focus on language and identity. According to Diana Boxer, Florencia Cortes Conde, Sandra McKay, King Yuen Wong, Bonny

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<sup>683</sup> Edward Sapir, *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech*, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2004, p.5.

<sup>684</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17.

<sup>685</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6.

<sup>686</sup> Edward Sapir, “The Status of Linguistics as a Science”, in David G. Mandelbaum (Ed.), *Culture, Language and Personality: Selected Essays*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949, p.68.

<sup>687</sup> David Kilgour, “The Importance of Language”, <http://www.david-kilgour.com/mp/sahla.htm> (23.07.2015).



Norton, Aneta Pavlenko and James Lantolf are some of them and they are “interested in studying how incorporating an additional language and culture impinges on or impacts one’s sense of who one is in the world.”<sup>688</sup> She notes that “adding a language to one’s verbal repertoire necessarily entails modifying one’s self-perception in relationship to others in the world.”<sup>689</sup> This clearly emphasises the role of language in changing and shaping one’s identity. She also interprets Pavlenko and Lantolf’s linguistic and cultural “affordance” term and states that the word ‘affordances’ “refers to aspects of the new language and culture that have the potential to transform one’s sense of self.”<sup>690</sup>

Boxer and Cortes-Conde put forth the concept of “relational identity” in their researches about second language learning and they state that this identity is different from individual and social identity. They explain relational identity as a “bonding between interlocutors that is formed by the group and for the group” and they add that it is the identity of the total groups, not any individual’s identity.<sup>691</sup> European identity may be evaluated as the identity of the citizens as a group in their interactions in a multilingual community. They indicate that the development of this identity can be sustained only when “individuals perceive each other as valid interlocutors.”<sup>692</sup>

As stated above, Norton is another scholar whose researches focus mainly on identity and language issues. In line with poststructuralist way of thinking, she thinks that “language constructs our sense of self” and the identity, which is constructed, is “multiple, changing and site of struggle”.<sup>693</sup> According to her, the boundaries between “social” and “cultural” have collapsed and because of this collapse “we can talk about

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<sup>688</sup> Diana Boxer, “Discourse Studies: Second Language”, in Keith Brown (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Elsevier, 2006, p.678.

<sup>689</sup> Ibid.

<sup>690</sup> Ibid.

<sup>691</sup> Diana Boxer and Florencia Cortes-Conde, “Identity and Ideology: Culture and Pragmatics in Content-Based ESL”, in Joan Kelly Hall, Lorrie Stoops Verplaetse (Eds.), *Second and Foreign Language Learning Through Classroom Interaction*, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000, p.203.

<sup>692</sup> Ibid.

<sup>693</sup> Ron Darvin and Bonny Norton, “Identity and a Model of Investment in Applied Linguistic”, *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, Vol.35, (2015), p.36.

identity as a sociocultural construct.”<sup>694</sup> By focusing on recent studies about identity and language she gives five main characteristics of this identity which are:

- Identity is dynamic and constantly changing across time and place.
- Identity is complex, contradictory, and multifaceted.
- Identity constructs and is constructed by language.
- Identity construction must be understood by relations of power.
- Identity is tried to be linked with classroom practice.<sup>695</sup>

The third point is closely related with this thesis; identity is constructed by language. In the case of European Union, the European identity is constructed by its languages, namely by its language policy and multilingualism. Being in line with Norton’s characteristics of identity, it is noted in the second chapter that identity is dynamic, it is constantly under construction, in time and place it changes, it is never completed, it is contested and most notably it is socially constructed in relations with the citizens who are the agents of this process. In this construction process, linguistic diversity and the language policy of the EU affect it. Aneta Pavlenko defines language and identity construction by citing Pierre Bourdieu and Chris Weedon and indicates that language is seen as both “the locus of social organization and power, and as a form of symbolic capital” and “a site of struggle where subjectivity and individual consciousness are produced.”<sup>696</sup>

Norton explains sociocultural theory to help understand identity and language learning relationship with Michael Bakhtin, Pierre Bourdieu, Christine Weedon, Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger. By giving reference to Bakhtin she claims that “language needs to be investigated not as a set of idealized forms independent of their speakers or their speaking, but rather as situated utterances in which speakers, in dialogue with

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<sup>694</sup> Bonny Norton, “Identity as a sociocultural construct in second language education”, in K. Cadman and K. O’Regan (Eds.), *TESOL in Context*, Special Issue, (2006), <http://faculty.educ.ubc.ca/norton/Norton%202006%20in%20Australia%20TESOL.pdf> (23.07.2015), p.3.

<sup>695</sup> Ibid.

<sup>696</sup> Aneta Pavlenko, “Gender and Sexuality in Foreign and Second Language Learning: Critical and Feminist Approaches”, in Bonny Norton and Kelleen Toohey (Eds.), *Critical Pedagogies and Language Learning*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.54.

others, struggle to create meanings.”<sup>697</sup> Here the emphasis on creating meaning is significant which shows the power of language. Bourdieu’s views about power and language will be focused on separately. It is also crucial to evaluate Weedon’s views about language and identity in sociocultural context. According to Norton’s citation, Weedon implies that:

Language is the place where actual and possible forms of social organization and their likely social and political consequences are defined and contested. Yet it is also the place where our sense of ourselves, our subjectivity, is constructed.<sup>698</sup>

Norton uses the notion of “investment” in second language acquisition to explain that investment in another language has effects on individual’s identity. In other words, she evaluates it as an investment to the individual’s identity. According to her:

If learners ‘invest’ in the target language, they do so with the understanding that they will acquire a wider range of symbolic and material resources, which will in turn increase the value of their cultural capital. Unlike notions of instrumental motivation, which conceive of the language learner as having a unitary, fixed, and a historical ‘personality,’ the notion of investment conceives of the language learner as having a complex identity, changing across time and space, and reproduced in social interaction. An investment in the target language is best understood as an investment in the learner’s own identity.<sup>699</sup>

In the case of European identity, it can be claimed that when the citizens of the EU invest on their multilingualism they will be invested on their own identity and thereby they will also be invested on the European identity as they co-exist.

Power and conflict can be set as other two notions that should be examined in relation to identity and language. Schjerve and Vetter note that the power relations can be examined through Bourdieu’s notion of ‘symbolic capital’, Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ and Foucault’s notion of ‘institutional power’. They define hegemony as “the control of rule by dominant groups through winning consent from subordinate groups.”<sup>700</sup> In the terminology part of the book of *Selections from Prison Notebook*

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<sup>697</sup> B. Norton, “Identity as a sociocultural construct in second language education”, p.4.

<sup>698</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>699</sup> Bonny Norton, “Identity: Second Language”, in Keith Brown (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, Elsevier, 2006, p.504.

<sup>700</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.134.

(1999), it is explained that there are some difficulties about the translation of the terms into English. Hegemony is one of these terms. As it is stated in the book:

...the term “hegemony” in Gramsci itself has two faces. On the one hand it is contrasted with “domination” (and as such bound up with the opposition State/Civil Society) and on the other hand “hegemonic” is sometimes used as an opposite of “corporate” or “economic corporate” to designate an historical phase in which a given group moves beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political and social arena. Non-hegemonic groups or classes are also called by Gramsci “subordinate”, “subaltern” or sometimes “instrumental”.<sup>701</sup>

Wodak and Krzyzanowski also explain hegemony in order to make their concept “hegemonic multilingualism” (HM) clear. They indicate that their concept derives from the understanding of *hegemony* according to Gramsci. And they define it as:

- (a) It is usually a strategic project which embraces several or all areas of social action (incl. politics, economy, education, etc.);
- (b) It entails a combination of domination (power) and intellectual and moral leadership. In line with the latter reproduction of hegemony in/through discourse, HM usually entails references to values, axiology/-ies and other ethically-charged notions;
- (c) It emphasises the role of ideologies (in our case mainly language ideologies, cf. below) in shaping the social and political order which is legitimised via different hegemonic and strategic projects.<sup>702</sup>

Schjerve and Vetter indicate that Gramsci and Foucault define power as “mainly conceived in terms of persuasion and consent, in which language is given a central role.”<sup>703</sup> According to them, from this perspective “power is not ‘held’ by any person or institution but is developed through interaction.”<sup>704</sup> So the role of language in interaction is significant in sustaining power.

Bourdieu’s notions of ‘symbolic power’ and ‘symbolic capital’ are also evaluated in relation to language. According to Bourdieu, symbolic capital is “a credit; it is the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition” and he defines symbolic power as “the power to make

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<sup>701</sup> Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, in Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (Eds.), London: ElecBook, 1999, p.20.

<sup>702</sup> R. Wodak and M. Krzyzanowski, “Hegemonic Multilingualism in/of the EU Institutions: An Inside-Outside Perspective on European Language Policies and Practices”, p.117.

<sup>703</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.134.

<sup>704</sup> Ibid.

things with word.”<sup>705</sup> Here he also states that symbolic power depends to the symbolic capital and it has to be based on it.<sup>706</sup> In this perspective, Schjerve and Vetter state that language is seen as a symbolic power which determines the positioning of the individuals in social markets.<sup>707</sup> Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall claims that Bourdieu is one of the most important practice theorists as he considers language as practice which is not different from other forms of everyday social activities and they add that “through sheer repetition language, along with other social practices, shapes the social actor’s way of being in the world, what Bourdieu calls *habitus*.”<sup>708</sup>

According to Schjerve and Vetter, the term of conflict is given as an outcome of asymmetrical distribution of power and in the case of multilingualism, it is stated that “unequal power relations are a general and conflict-ridden characteristic of European multilingual societies.”<sup>709</sup> In relation with their researches, Schjerve and Vetter state that power issues may be repressed and they give European cultural policies, with which European narratives on culture are purified and colonial past is repressed, as an example to this kind of repression.<sup>710</sup> Multilingualism and linguistic diversity can be evaluated in this context, as well. They are respected and supported in the EU, rather than emphasising monolingualism or using common language which may cause conflict. Even though there are critics about the equal status of the languages, it does not prevent the functioning of the EU, or its integration. Schjerve and Vetter mention that while political power emphasises the language equality which is stated in law, multilingualism in economy is focused on efficiency and competitiveness.<sup>711</sup> This also causes conflicts as multilingualism for equal languages and multilingualism for efficiency and competitiveness cannot be achieved with following the same path. Because in equality principle all languages are equal without any differences but in economy the languages which serve to efficiency and competitiveness cannot be

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<sup>705</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power”, *Sociological Theory*, Vol.7, No.1, (Spring, 1989), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/202060> (25.07.2015), p.23.

<sup>706</sup> Ibid.

<sup>707</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.135.

<sup>708</sup> Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall, “Language and Identity”, in Alessandro Duranti (Ed.), *A Companion to Linguistic Anthropology*, Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004, p.377.

<sup>709</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.136.

<sup>710</sup> Ibid., p.138.

<sup>711</sup> Ibid.

evaluated on the same level. In the interviews which were conducted in Brussels the officials also emphasised it. As stated in the first part of this chapter, two officials from the DG Education and Culture expressed the importance of English in the economy and business sector. Another official from the DG Interpretation said that:

English is not enough. So there is, without it being explicitly set anywhere, the understanding is: Yes, people will learn English and that is a good thing. Because they ... give them the possibility to function as global citizens. But as Europeans we should not limit ourselves to just one language because learning languages is good for the soul for understanding how our neighbours function.<sup>712</sup>

The importance of English is clear from this expression, as it helps people to be able to function as a global citizen. However, the importance of learning other languages was also emphasised. The same official formulated Barcelona objective mother tongue + 2 referring to the American cultural imperialism. He stated that:

American scholar cultural imperialism, to use a good word, has treated English as the main *lingua franca*, not just Europe but as whole world and that is the language that people learn. And the European Union language learning policy mother tongue +2 essentially is a reaction to that ... code for mother tongue + English + more.<sup>713</sup>

Thus, it would not be wrong to state that there are differences among the languages and this may lead to conflicts. But it should not be forgotten that according to the documents analysed in the first part, multilingualism and linguistic diversity are respected, supported and tried to be promoted. Even though there are deficiencies, the multilingualism of the EU can be developed, improved in time according to these deficiencies and the present day conditions. It can be seen with the Lisbon Strategy. In this strategy, the needs of the knowledge based economy and new skills were stated and languages were one of them which was not the case beforehand. Another development was giving co-official status to some languages such as Catalan and Gallic. Then with the Lisbon Treaty discrimination was prohibited. These developments show that the language policy of the EU is evolving and changing in time just as identity. While it is evolving the contested issues and 'conflicts', such as, the status of some languages, have been improved.

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<sup>712</sup> Interview with the official from the DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>713</sup> Ibid.

Wodak and Krzyzanowski criticise EU multilingualism. They claim that it has become a tool for implementing hegemonic project of the Lisbon Strategy 2000 in order to cope with globalisation and sustain competitiveness.<sup>714</sup> According to ‘Languages in a Network of European Excellence’ (LINEE) findings, Schjerve and Vetter mention that “multilingual communicative competence is experienced as one of the many resources of power” but they add that “there is a clear ranking among the European languages regarding their actual use and their presumed utility.”<sup>715</sup> So they question which languages provide their speakers with what degree of power while they express the importance of English as *lingua franca* in economic relations and in education<sup>716</sup> as it is used and preferred more than other languages. These expressions are in line with the above stated arguments. Both Wodak and Krzyzanowski and Schjerve and Vette emphasise the conflict between multilingualism in economy (globalisation and competitiveness issue) and multilingualism in politics (human rights and equality issue). According to LINEE findings, Schjerve and Vette claims that in shaping identities, language ideologies are not always compatible and they may be contradictory to each other and by citing Area Report A of the LINEE they state that:

At the supranational level, the European discourse on multilingualism appears to be strongly informed by the linguistic human rights discourse, although it appears to have become intermingled with socioeconomic ideologies in the more recent past. As a consequence and against the background of these seemingly contradictory ideologies, stakeholders and policy makers find it difficult to come to terms with human rights and economic capitalisation at the same time.<sup>717</sup>

Another important issue in language identity relation is multi-competence as a means of power. Schjerve and Vetter note the close interaction between power and multi-competence and they explain multi-competence with flexible language use and proficiency and they constitute symbolic power in the European knowledge-based society.<sup>718</sup> Multi-competence is defined by Vivian Cook as “the knowledge of more than one language in the same mind” and he tells how he has improved the term as he

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<sup>714</sup> R. Wodak and M. Krzyzanowski, “Hegemonic Multilingualism in/of the EU Institutions: An Inside-Outside Perspective on European Language Policies and Practices”, p.126.

<sup>715</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.140.

<sup>716</sup> Ibid.

<sup>717</sup> Ibid., pp.100-101.

<sup>718</sup> Ibid., p.143.

stated it first in 1991 and then restated it 1994.<sup>719</sup> Vivian Cook also expresses Grosjean’s idea from a different background to give details about multi-competence and adds that it is assumed that “someone who knows two or more languages is a different person from a monolingual and so needs to be looked at in their own right rather than as a deficient monolingual”<sup>720</sup> He focuses on the differences between monolinguals and second language users such as differences related to phonology, lexicon, syntax and pragmatics.<sup>721</sup> In the web page of multi-competence, Cook’s classification of the evidences for multi-competence is given with a notice that these evidences come from Cook’s work in 1992. They are stated as:

**I. Evidence for multi-competence as a distinct state of mind**

1. L2 users differ from monolinguals in knowledge of the L1 [e.g. VOT, word associations]
2. advanced L2 users differ from monolinguals in knowledge of the L2 [e.g. ‘ultimate’ attainment, RTs, STM]
3. people who know an L2 have a different metalinguistic awareness from people who know only an L1 [e.g. detection of anomalous sentences, arbitrariness of sign, etc.]
4. L2 users have different cognitive processes from monolinguals [e.g. cognitive flexibility]

**II. Evidence for wholistic multi-competence**

1. the L1 and L2 share the same mental lexicon
2. L2 users code switch readily from L1 to L2
3. L2 processing cannot be cut off from L1
4. both languages are stored in roughly the same areas of the brain
  - a) hemispheric lateralisation
  - b) same sites
5. the level of L2 proficiency in academic circumstances is related to the level of L1 proficiency<sup>722</sup>

Cook cited other scholars such as Gregory Yelland, Ellen Bialystok, Istvan Kecskes, Tünde Papp, Fergus I. M. Craik, Raymond Klein, Mythili Viswanathan, Porter E. Coggins and David Green and their researches about the effects of second language learning some of which are; developing the areas of brain responsible for control, delaying the onset of Alzheimer’s disease and leading to greater density of connections

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<sup>719</sup> Vivian Cook, “Multi-competence”, <http://homepage.ntlworld.com/vivian.c/Writings/Papers/MCEntry.htm> (27.07.2015).

<sup>720</sup> Ibid.

<sup>721</sup> Ibid.

<sup>722</sup> Vivian Cook, “Evidence for Multi-competence”, <http://homepage.ntlworld.com/vivian.c/SLA/Multicompetence/MCEvidence.htm> (27.07.2015).



in the corpus callosum area that connects left and right hemispheres of the brain.<sup>723</sup> Viorica Marian and Anthony Shook also discuss similar effects and they express that bilingualism has cognitive, neurological and social benefits.<sup>724</sup>

When looked from the EU perspective according to the LINEE findings, Schjerve and Vetter note that at the European level, “multi-competence appears as something that is shaped through politically and ideologically invested discourse” and at the local level “it seems to connect more directly with identity and culture specific issues.”<sup>725</sup> They also add that “multi-competent individuals are seen as language users who dispose of an extended and integrated linguistic repertoire with regard to their knowledge of languages and their ability to adapt the process of learning and using languages.”<sup>726</sup> Multi-competent individuals with knowledge of different languages have the opportunity to communicate with the EU citizens who know the same foreign languages. This is the social, cultural benefit of multi-competence. As stated in the previous parts in the context of historical development, it has cognitive effects, as well. It should also be indicated that it has effects on identity construction as identities are socially constructed by interactions of the agents who are equipped with necessary resources such as languages which provide interactions.

Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall explain the construction of identity with interactions. They define identity as the social positioning of the self and the other. According to them, identity is a relational and socio-cultural phenomenon which “emerges and circulates in local discourse contexts of interaction rather than as a stable structure located primarily in the individual psyche or in fixed social categories.”<sup>727</sup> This explanation is quite clear and in line with the constructivist point of view which is mentioned in the second chapter. They focus on identity from the socio-cultural linguistic perspective by researching language, culture and society and analysing identity as a centrally linguistic phenomenon. They state five principles; the emergence

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<sup>723</sup> Ibid.

<sup>724</sup> Viorica Marian and Anthony Shook, “The Cognitive Benefits of Being Bilingual”, [http://dana.org/Cerebrum/2012/The\\_Cognitive\\_Benefits\\_of\\_Being\\_Bilingual/](http://dana.org/Cerebrum/2012/The_Cognitive_Benefits_of_Being_Bilingual/) (27.07.2015).

<sup>725</sup> R. R. Schjerve and E. Vetter, *European Multilingualism: Current Perspectives and Challenges*, p.143.

<sup>726</sup> Ibid., p.133.

<sup>727</sup> Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall, “Locating Identity in Language”, in Carmen Llamas and Dominic Watt (Eds.), *Language and Identities*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2010, p.18.

principle, the positionality principle, the indexicality principle, the relationality principle and the partialness principle.<sup>728</sup> They use the emergent principle to identify identity as an emergent product out of social action through linguistic interactions and explain it as:

1. Identity is best viewed as the emergent product rather than the pre-existing source of linguistic and other semiotic practices and therefore as fundamentally a social and cultural phenomenon.<sup>729</sup>

The positioning principle is related to the positioning of individuals on macro and micro level categories;

2. Identity encompasses (a) macro level demographic categories; (b) local, ethnographically specific cultural positions; and (c) temporary and interactionally specific stances and participant roles.<sup>730</sup>

The positioning may occur simultaneously just as in the EU; European identity can stand with national, regional and local identities. They indicate indexicality principle as;

3. Identity relations emerge in interaction through several related indexical processes, including: (a) overt mention of identity categories and labels; (b) implicatures and presuppositions regarding one's own or other's identity position; (c) displayed evaluative and epistemic orientations to ongoing talk, as well as interactional footings and participant roles; and (d) the use of linguistic structures and systems that are ideologically associated with specific persons and groups.<sup>731</sup>

The relationality principle is about the contradictory elements of identity;

4. Identities are intersubjectively constructed through several often overlapping, complementary relations, including similarity/difference, genuineness/artifice and authority/delegitimacy.<sup>732</sup>

The last principle is partialness principle and it is about how identities can be constructed:

5. Any given construction of identity may be in part deliberate and intentional, in part habitual and hence often less than fully conscious, in part an outcome of interactional negotiation and contestation, in part an

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<sup>728</sup> Ibid., pp.18-25.

<sup>729</sup> Ibid., p.19.

<sup>730</sup> Ibid., p.21.

<sup>731</sup> Ibid.

<sup>732</sup> Ibid., p.23.

outcome of others' perceptions and representations, and in part an effect of larger ideological processes and material structures that may become relevant to interaction. It is therefore constantly shifting both as interaction unfolds and across discourse contexts.<sup>733</sup>

All these principles show the relation between identity and language in constructing identities and they reflect most of the features of identity according to the constructivist point of view, which is mentioned in the second chapter. So, it can be claimed that the role of language in constructing identities is significant as it is constructed socially within linguistic interactions. Thereby it can be applied to the construction of European identity. The European identity is also constructed in linguistic interactions but from the constructivist point of view it would be more appropriate to name it as a process not as a product as stated above even though it emerges out of sociolinguistic interactions. Positioning of the individuals themselves can also be observed with multiple identities which co-exist in local, regional, national and community context. This can also be evaluated as an example of the relationality principle in the Union because it is about the overlapping and complementary relations which are discussed according to national identities and the European identity. The constantly constructed and unfinished feature of European identity may be thought in relation with partialness principle which includes constantly shifting of an identity. Thus it would not be wrong to state on all levels interactions are explicit and these social interactions are sustained mainly by using languages. Therefore, it can be noted that the language policy of the EU including official, local, and minority languages affects the construction process of European identity. It may be claimed that multi-competent individuals who have symbolic power benefit it more as they use it for interaction, communication, for getting closer and understanding each other. John Edward states "language and identity are powerfully and complexly intertwined and contexts of bilingualism and multilingualism only reinforce this point."<sup>734</sup> This reinforcement is crucial in the EU context as it has many languages in duty in constructing European identity rather than one or two as in some nation states.

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<sup>733</sup> Ibid., p.25.

<sup>734</sup> John Edward, *Language and Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.254.

#### 4.3.2. Language - Identity Relations: Projects and Researches

When it is focused on the European support in researching this subject projects, researches, surveys and reports which are conducted and prepared by scholars draw attention. A Policy Review, which examined identity issue and covered more than 20 projects, is one of them and it was published under the title of *The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business* in 2012. In these projects nine conceptually distinct dimensions were used;

- Multiple social identities and biographical identity;
- Transnational intimate relationships;
- Collective action;
- Standardization and regulation;
- Cultural production
- Intercultural translation;
- Inclusion/Exclusion;
- Structural conditions and opportunity structures;
- The public sphere and state-regulated institutions.<sup>735</sup>

Identity and language issues were analysed with the dimensions of intercultural translation and inclusion/exclusion.

In *The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business*, culturalist and structuralist models of identity formation were stated. Here, while the culturalist model is based on “...core, established European values and their expression in public practices, most notably in governance and the operation of the legal system”, the structuralist model is based on “association with other Europeans.”<sup>736</sup> The first model uses ‘top down’, the second one uses ‘bottom up’ mechanisms and the second model identities are formed in interaction with others.<sup>737</sup> In this thesis, both of these models can be realized. The first model is used in general identity formation efforts which can be traced with the documents in which core values were emphasised and the symbols which were presented. The second model, on the other hand, can be noticed in identity language relation in the process of constructing European identity because in

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<sup>735</sup> European Commission, *The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business*, [https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy\\_reviews/development-of-european-identity-identities\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/development-of-european-identity-identities_en.pdf) (28.07.2015), p.3.

<sup>736</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>737</sup> Ibid.

this model, identities come from interactions and language is the main tool for interactions. Moreover, as Michael Byram expresses, languages and varieties of languages “are ways of expressing and recognising the many social identities people have.”<sup>738</sup>

Some of the projects which focused on identity and language issues are LINEE Project, which is mentioned above, the Language Dynamics and Management of Diversity (DYLAN) Project and the European Language Diversity for All (ELDIA) Project. There is also another project which was not mentioned in this Policy Review: Youth and European Identity Project. There are also many other projects related to identity within other fields but as it is beyond the scope of this thesis, they are not mentioned here. There are also programmes related to the language policy of the EU such as Erasmus, Lingua, Socrates and Creative Europe which are indicated before. The projects related to both the identity and language issues are noted in this part to be able to see the relation from the EU perspective.

Youth and European Identity Project is a Project which was part of the 5th Framework Programme of the European Commission. The Project researched what ‘being European’ means among young men and women and analysing and comparing factors for the development of European identity. In this Project, interviews were conducted with randomly chosen 400 young people between the age of 18 and 24 in specific cities in Europe, in 2002. According to this Project, there were outcomes related to language skills, language and identity and language and values. The results related to language skills showed that English is the most frequent foreign language, French and German came after it, there is a relation between education level and speaking several languages and women are better according to language skills. The results related to language and values showed that young people with more language skills preferred ‘Openness’ and ‘Enhancement’ instead of ‘Conservation’ and

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<sup>738</sup> Michael Byram, “Languages and identities”, [https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAAahUKEwidnL3ch4THAhWCyROKHVOQCo8&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.coe.int%2Ft%2Fdg4%2Flinguistic%2FSource%2FByram\\_Identities\\_final\\_EN.doc&ei=Mbq6Vd2\\_BIKTU9Ogqvgl&usg=AFQjCNH\\_ZrXNOmb4LG4tv2tSaFxu2RyPWg&sig2=iaX6HgWa7TS0dExc1Acc-g&bvm=bv.99028883.d.bGg&cad=rja](https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAAahUKEwidnL3ch4THAhWCyROKHVOQCo8&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.coe.int%2Ft%2Fdg4%2Flinguistic%2FSource%2FByram_Identities_final_EN.doc&ei=Mbq6Vd2_BIKTU9Ogqvgl&usg=AFQjCNH_ZrXNOmb4LG4tv2tSaFxu2RyPWg&sig2=iaX6HgWa7TS0dExc1Acc-g&bvm=bv.99028883.d.bGg&cad=rja) (30.07.2015), p.6.

‘Transcendence’. Lastly the results about the language and identity relation indicated that the youth who can communicate with four or more European languages had the strongest sense of European identity.<sup>739</sup> Daniel Fuss, Gemma G. Garcia Albacate and Miryam Rodriguez Monter state that “Language skills are one of the key resources in the process of identity formation.”<sup>740</sup> This is the starting point of this thesis as it focuses on the role of languages in constructing identities. They also expressed according to their findings in this project that:

...knowledge of other language is associated with a higher level of identification with Europe. A similar effect can be observed for foreign country experience. According to a basic intention of European Union’s education policies, the results prove that language skills and personal contacts beyond national borders are relevant factors for the establishment of a common feeling of European-ness among young adults. Hence, the general idea of multilingualism and transnational exchange as promising ways towards a ‘People’s Europe’ is supported.<sup>741</sup>

These results are clearly related to what is aimed with this thesis because it shows the relation between multilingualism and European identity. According to these results, it can be said that multilingualism affects identifying yourself with European identity. But it is difficult to state that it is the only determinant in this relation because many other factors may have also affected the construction process. This is the limitation of this research field as the construction of identity is related with many fields and it is complex and intertwined. Even though the identity construction process is complex, it is related with language knowledge as it is stated above, multi-competence has effects on individuals.

Using the results of the project, Daniel Fuss and Marita A Grosser draw attention to social interaction and resources. They indicate that:

At first sight, the focus on social interactions may suggest a lesser salience of collective identities such as a European identity in people’s life compared to rather personal issues. But whether membership to the abstract category of

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<sup>739</sup> Daniel Fuss, Gema M. Garcia Albacete and Miryam Rodriguez Monter, “Language Values and European Identity”, [http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/youth/docs/Poster\\_InterKnow\\_Fuss\\_Garcia\\_Monter.pdf](http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/youth/docs/Poster_InterKnow_Fuss_Garcia_Monter.pdf) (28.07.2015).

<sup>740</sup> Daniel Fuss, Gema M. Garcia Albacete and Miryam Rodriguez Monter, “The Role of Language Skills and Foreign Country Experiences in the Development of a European Identity”, *Sociologia*, Vol.36, No.3, (2004), <http://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/02081212FUSS.pdf> (01.08.2015), p.273.

<sup>741</sup> *Ibid.*, p.283.

European citizenship becomes an important aspect of self or not depends on what is foregrounded in everyday social interactions. A European identity may be invoked only in particular circumstances and be literally out-of-mind most of the time. ... But Europe may also be experienced as a more internalized aspect of self if social interactions with significant others are constantly reinforced by attributions of 'Europeanness' and a kind of overall European rhetoric.<sup>742</sup>

Here the importance of social interaction can be realized clearly and it can be said that the EU should provide the citizens this kind of social interaction at EU level in order to support the construction of European identity. And this social interaction can be conveyed with languages. Fuss and Grosser evaluate languages as resources and they mention that: "Resources that arguably may serve as raw material of a European identity are experiences of travel across European countries, command of several European languages, contact to people from other European countries, and transnational mobility aspirations."<sup>743</sup> Thus it can be assumed that multi-competent individuals who have language resources can contribute to the construction of European identity by socially interacting at the EU level. Here the resources can be seen as symbolic capital. They also draw attention to the unequal distribution of resources in constructing European identity as a constraint.<sup>744</sup> By referring to the existing programmes, they also suggest that further measurements which enhance the opportunity to get these resources and help people make use of their European citizenship must be taken.<sup>745</sup> It can be stated that the EU tries to prevent this unequal distribution with its policies such as providing programmes for language learning. However, the level of language competence and individual multilingualism is not at an expected level as it can be seen in the results of the surveys, researches and interviews. So, it can be claimed that they are not enough and more effort is needed.

LINEE Project, as it is mentioned above, is one of the projects related to language-identity issue but it was not just about identity and language. 'Language, identity and culture' was just one of the thematic areas researched in this research

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<sup>742</sup> Daniel Fuss and Marita A. Grosser, "What makes young Europeans feel European? Results from a cross-cultural research Project", in Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski and Viktoria Kaina (Eds.), *European Identity. Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Insights*, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2006, p.213.

<sup>743</sup> Ibid., p.215.

<sup>744</sup> Ibid.

<sup>745</sup> Ibid., p.238.

Project. ‘Language Policy and Planning’, ‘Multilingualism and Education’ and ‘Language and Economy’ were the other three thematic areas. It was a network of nine European universities and it was co-funded by the 6th Framework Programme from 2006 to 2010.<sup>746</sup> One of its results was that “English performs an important function as a *lingua franca* and in fact does not threaten linguistic diversity.”<sup>747</sup> LINEE+ as a network is continuing to search and promote linguistic and cultural diversity with partners of LINEE.<sup>748</sup>

Dylan Project is another project which can be evaluated in the language – identity context. It researched how European linguistic diversity can be evaluated as an asset rather than a drawback while the EU’s linguistic diversity is increasing with the enlargements in a knowledge-based society.<sup>749</sup> Three questions were asked and the answers of these questions were the results of the project. The most relevant results in the case of this thesis were the cognitive and strategic assets. According to cognitive assets, the usage of multilingual repertoires can be seen as a resource for the construction, transmission and use of knowledge:

- by providing various kinds of access to information processing and helping actors retain and classify new information;
- by changing our perception of processes and objects;
- by deepening and “fine-tuning” conceptual understanding;
- by revealing hidden or implicit meanings, and “unfamiliarising” supposedly familiar meanings;
- by shedding new light on concepts approached from multiple angles;
- by allowing for a closer look at words and a deeper reflection on the linguistic substance of concepts residing in the languages used.<sup>750</sup>

And according to the strategic asset, the usage of multilingual repertoires affects the interactions of the participants, the extent of their participation and the construction of leadership. It was also stated that multilingualism had impact on ways of negotiating,

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<sup>746</sup> European Commission, The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business, p.102.

<sup>747</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>748</sup> LINEE, About LINEE+, <http://linee.info/de/linee/about-linee.html?PHPSESSID=7d023fcd69adaa166c03bae9b8c365ec> (28.07.2015).

<sup>749</sup> European Commission, The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business, p.98.

<sup>750</sup> DYLAN, The DYLAN Project Booklet, [http://www.dylan-project.org/DYLAN-Project-Final-Booklet\\_A4\\_300412.pdf](http://www.dylan-project.org/DYLAN-Project-Final-Booklet_A4_300412.pdf) (28.07.2015), p.32.



agreement and disagreement, the construction of expertise, problem-solving and decision-making, ensuring coherence between conceptual dimensions.<sup>751</sup>

The last project mentioned above is ELDIA. It was about revitalizing minority language, vehicular language and language maintenance studies with an aim to create an easily applicable measurement instrument to investigate language situations.<sup>752</sup> At the end of the project many support mechanisms “to enable minority language communities to realise their common position and utilize the EU as a means of communication” were proposed.<sup>753</sup>

As expressed above, there are also reports which emphasises on this issue. One of them is the *Final Report of High Level Group on Multilingualism*. Some of the results of this report are given in previous parts but here the language identity relation is examined according to this Report. And another report, which was prepared by a group chaired by Amin Maalouf, is *A Rewarding Challenge How Language Diversity Could Strengthen Europe*.

The *Final Report of High Level Group on Multilingualism* mostly focuses on multilingualism, regional and minority languages, language learning and the relation of languages with the media, business, translation and interpretation but it also mentions identity – language relation. According to the Report, “Languages are means of communication, but they are also important aspect of personal, social, and cultural identity.”<sup>754</sup> It was also focused on the intercultural and transversal values of learning languages and it was noted that languages provides openness to other cultures and attitudes besides raising “awareness of one’s own culture and values and stimulate the willingness and enhance the ability to communicate and co-operate with people across language and cultural boundaries.”<sup>755</sup> Interaction can be sustained by this way. As a transversal value, it was mentioned that language learning supports cognitive development of the young children and mental agibility of old people in long term. The

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<sup>751</sup> Ibid., p.33.

<sup>752</sup> European Commission, *The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business*, p.104.

<sup>753</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>754</sup> European Commission, *Commission of the European Communities High Level Group on Multilingualism Final Report*, p.8.

<sup>755</sup> Ibid.

cognitive functions supported by learning languages were set as; attention, perception, memory, concentration, concept formation, critical thinking, problem solving, cognitive flexibility and ability to work in teams.<sup>756</sup> These cognitive benefits of language learning are in line with Cook, Marian and Shook's views which are indicated above. There were also proposals for further researches on language and identity issues.

In the second Report, it was claimed that "Linguistic diversity is a challenge for Europe, but, in our view, a rewarding challenge."<sup>757</sup> It was explained why linguistic diversity was evaluated as a challenge and seen as a rewarding challenge. Firstly it was defined as a challenge because of its constraints such as the cost in terms of time and money. Here it should be noted linguistic diversity can also be seen as a challenge as the EU is not a complete project. New enlargements bring new official languages and this can be seen as a burden. Each new official language means more expenses and workload. However, in the Report, it was asserted that linguistic diversity is a cultural reality and the basis of the European ideal. It was noted that: "While most of the European nations have been built on the platform of their language of identity, the European Union can only build on a platform of linguistic diversity."<sup>758</sup> In the Report, a common sense of belonging raised on linguistic and cultural diversity was evaluated as a weapon against fanaticism. And the importance of the diversity of cultural expressions and the universality of essential values were also mentioned.<sup>759</sup> The report proposed measurements related to linguistic diversity and learning languages. And it was concluded by stating that:

... judicious and imaginative management of linguistic diversity can indeed boost European integration, promote citizenship and the feeling of belonging to the European Union. It can also contribute significantly to the dialogue between cultures and their harmonious co-existence, both in relation to the rest of the world and within our own societies. It could even give European integration fresh impetus and a new lease of life.<sup>760</sup>

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<sup>756</sup> Ibid.

<sup>757</sup> European Commission, "A Rewarding Challenge How Language Diversity Could Strengthen Europe", <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/a-rewarding-challenge-how-language-diversity-could-strengthen-europe-pbNC3008147/> (31.07.2015), p.3.

<sup>758</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>759</sup> Ibid.

<sup>760</sup> Ibid., p.14.

So it can be noted that the contribution of the linguistic diversity makes it an asset rather than a challenge.

Other than these reports and projects, surveys were also conducted to investigate the situation of language in the EU. For example, Special Eurobarometer 386 focused on Europeans and Their Languages. But in this survey, the results were mostly about languages and there was not any direct reference to the close relation between language and identity. There was just one question, which was about the main advantages of learning a new language. In this question, question card was used and more than ten options were set and one of them was ‘to feel more European.’<sup>761</sup> The other options were mainly about mobility and employability but there were also options about personal satisfaction and understanding people from other cultures. Just 10 % of the EU citizens chose ‘to feel more European’ option, the most chosen option was ‘to be able to work in another country’ with 61%.<sup>762</sup> ‘To feel more European’ option was chosen at most in Denmark with 18% and at least in Ireland with 4%. ‘To keep up knowledge of a language spoken by your family’ option was also chosen by 10% of the citizens.<sup>763</sup> These two were the least chosen options. When the answers were compared it was noted that 13% of respondents at the age of 20+ chose the option while just 6% of the respondents at the age of 15 or below chose the option.<sup>764</sup> There are differences between the age group in evaluating the option as an advantage. Many other factors may be related with the results but as general it is difficult to state that the Europeans evaluate language learning as an advantage to feel more European. These may be because of other options as they were related with the mobility and employability which touch on their life directly. But it should not be forgotten that these options were set in most of the official documents in order to raise awareness for language learning. So, even though it was not stated clearly that language affects European identity, all the options have effects in constructing European identity as most of them expressed in the documents.

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<sup>761</sup> European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 386, Europeans and Their Languages: Technical Specifications, [http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/strategic-framework/documents/ebs\\_386\\_anx\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/strategic-framework/documents/ebs_386_anx_en.pdf) (31.07.2015), p.Q3.

<sup>762</sup> Ibid., pp.T13-T14.

<sup>763</sup> Ibid., p.T14.

<sup>764</sup> European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 386, Europeans and Their Languages: Report, p.64.

In the survey, there were results about languages and the language competence of the member states, as well. According to the results, most of the Europeans, 72% of them, believe that they should be able to speak more than one language other than their mother tongue and 84% of them believe that Europeans should be able to speak at least one foreign language. Another result which is remarkable shows that 88% of the respondents believe in usefulness of knowing a language other than their mother tongue.<sup>765</sup> But according to the survey, just 54 % of the Europeans can communicate in at least one additional language; this is followed with 25% in at least two and 10% in at least three.<sup>766</sup> So just half of them can communicate in an additional language and it is not the expected level.

The intersection point of European identity and languages is the social interactions which are sustained by communication and languages. European identity can be evaluated as a relational identity which is constructed on relations and interactions. It is also a fluid, constantly changing and socially constructed by the agents. Language as a symbolic power has impact on this construction. Having this power and resources will maintain interaction, mobility and employability to the individuals. The individuals, who invest on language competences, benefit from this investment in many fields of life such as social, cultural and economic life. In the European context, individuals also invest on European identity. So, it can be stated that being multilingual has some effects on individuals and on their identities. The EU should take some measurements to sustain this power and resources to the individuals, provide medium for the individuals to interact socially at EU level and prevent the unequal distribution of these resources. As Byram asserts “the importance of language was evident from the beginning and the link with identity is implicit.”<sup>767</sup>

In this part, the importance of language in constructing identity is analysed within the language identity literature, projects and reports. Even though there is not enough information provided with the surveys both the academic views, the projects and reports show the importance of language in constructing European identity.

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<sup>765</sup> Ibid., pp.7-8.

<sup>766</sup> Ibid., p.142.

<sup>767</sup> M. Byram, “Languages and Identities”, p.12.

Especially the ‘Youth and European Identity Project’ shows the relation clearly. Eurobarometer 386 results give information about the Europeans and their languages but it is difficult to state identity-language relation with these results as they mainly focus on the state of languages in the EU.

In the previous parts in this chapter, the importance of languages, multilingualism, translation and interpretation and their relation with the identity can also be traced with the documents and the views of the officials with whom interviews were conducted. The importance attributed to the languages can be understood from the first Regulation as it was first mentioned in the Regulation. After that in 1976, the importance of language learning was indicated. Later with the EU White Paper it was emphasised that proficiency in languages helps to benefit from economic opportunities, sustain the feeling of being European and understanding between the citizens of Europe and it was also noted that multilingualism is part and parcel of European identity and citizenship. Then with the *European Year of Languages 2001* the importance of language learning was indicated by stating its advantages such as developing mutual understanding and European citizenship, providing awareness of cultural diversity, eradicating xenophobia and providing economic benefits. These are just some of the expressions which show the relation between language and identity. Many of them are mentioned in the previous parts. The DG Translation also draws attention to linguistic diversity and it is highlighted on its web-page that linguistic diversity is a core value and contributes to social cohesion, intercultural dialogue and prosperity besides many other areas. It should not be forgotten that core values are components of the European identity so they contribute to its construction. The officials from the European Commission also stated the importance of languages and their relation with identities, most of them mentioned unity in diversity and core values as the components of the European identity. As one of the officials from the Commission asserted, to sustain trust, confidence and understanding the people of the Europe should spend time, live, work and study together. This can be sustained by communicating, having opportunity to be able to interact. So, it can be said that interaction of the agents equipped with resources or with symbolic power, which are languages in this context, is needed to construct the European identity as it is socially constructed with ideas, thoughts and

understanding from the constructivist way of thinking. Therefore, knowledge of language is crucial in this process.

Lastly, it can be stated that both the individuals as agents and the institutions have roles in constructing European identity. When looked from the institutional level, it can be seen that both the identity construction and language policy have been developed and improved since the beginning with the treaties and other official documents. Their relation is sometimes shown implicitly and sometimes explicitly. When looked from the individual level, the effect of multilingualism in constructing European identity can be seen, as well. Individuals as agents equipped with resources construct it socially. Medium for interactions and resources should be provided to support the construction of European identity.

## 5. TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Turkey's EU membership process started with its associate membership application in 1959. In 1963, Ankara Agreement, which was an association agreement,<sup>768</sup> was signed between the Community and Turkey but because of many different reasons the process has not been completed with Turkey's membership, yet. There are many reasons that caused this process to be so long. Some of them are; political, economic, religious and cultural reasons and some of the reasons are closely related with the population and geography. Even if the process has gained speed with the 1999 Helsinki European Council, there are still some impediments. In this chapter, Turkey's EU membership process is analysed briefly with main developments and the obstacles. And then the relation between European identity and Turkish identity is examined and lastly it is focused on the situation of Turkish language in constructing European identity.

### 5.1. The Historical Developments of the Membership Process

Turkey - EU relations and Turkey's membership process are researched and defined by many scholars. They evaluate Turkey in different ways but they generally note the importance and difference of Turkey in this process. For example, Nathalie Tocci states that "Turkey has always been, is, and will likely remain one of the most important countries for the European Union."<sup>769</sup> Mirela Bogdani indicates that "Among countries that aspire to join the EU, Turkey is the one attracting most attention."<sup>770</sup> Joseph S. Joseph mentions many countries like Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Albania which also have relations with the EU but he expresses that "Turkey is the most interesting case."<sup>771</sup> Turkey's membership process draws attention as it is so long and the relation between Turkey and the EU has

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<sup>768</sup> Nathalie Tocci, "Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown", The Centre on the United States and Europe at Brookings, *Turkish Policy Project Paper*, No.5, November 2014, p.2.

<sup>769</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1.

<sup>770</sup> Mirela Bogdani, *Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2011, p.18.

<sup>771</sup> Joseph S. Joseph, "EU Enlargement: The Challenge and Promise of Turkey", in Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu (Eds.), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, p.172.

distinctive features. The historical developments of the Turkey's EU membership process can be evaluated in many ways but in this thesis it is preferred to divide the process in two phases; before and after 2005 as the accession negotiations were opened in 2005.

### 5.1.1. Turkey –EU Relations: Before 2005

Turkey's relation with the EEC started at the end of the 1950s and Turkey applied for association membership to the EEC in June 1959.<sup>772</sup> Hacı Can and Çınar Özen note that there were political, economic and cultural reasons behind this application. According to them, the Soviet Union which was perceived as a threat and the Greek application for association were the political reasons for Turkey's application. Turkey's economic problems, its economic interdependence to the EEC and the possible negative economic outcomes that Greek's association to EEC would cause are given as the economic reasons and lastly they evaluate Turkey's Westernisation policy as a cultural reason for the association application.<sup>773</sup> In line with Can and Özen's view, Çiğdem Nas also draws attention to security concerns and economic considerations as reasons of searching for closer ties with the EEC in its application for association.<sup>774</sup> Thus, it can be stated that Turkey aimed to be within the Community because of many different reasons.

The association negotiations started in September 1959 and after ten meetings the agreement which is known as Ankara Agreement was signed in September 1963.<sup>775</sup> It was aiming association between the parties in accordance with Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome.<sup>776</sup> In the Article it was stated that:

The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an international organisation agreements establishing an association involving

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<sup>772</sup> Hacı Can and Çınar Özen, *Türkiye-Avrupa Topluluğu Ortaklık Hukuku*, Ankara: Gazi Kitapevi, 2005, p.1.

<sup>773</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.2-8.

<sup>774</sup> Çiğdem Nas, "The Europeanisation of Identity: The Case of the Rebuffed Candidate", in Çiğdem Nas and Yonca Özer (Eds.), *Turkey and the European Union*, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, October 2012, p.31.

<sup>775</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17.

<sup>776</sup> European Commission, Agreement, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, Vol.16, No.C113, (24 December 1973), [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association\\_agreement\\_1964\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf) (04.08.2015), p.2.



reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures...<sup>777</sup>

According to Can and Özen, Ankara Agreement has two aims; one of them is an economic development and the other one is an eventual accession to the EC.<sup>778</sup> The first aim was noted in the first paragraph of Article 2;

The aim of this Agreement is to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions of the Turkish people.<sup>779</sup>

Here the economic aim was stated clearly and the aim of full membership can be noticed in Article 28:

As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.<sup>780</sup>

They evaluate this Agreement as a preparatory agreement leading to full membership but they also draw attention to the different arguments about its legally binding feature. They express that it does not provide an automatic transmission to the full membership; it just presents it as a possibility and an issue that would be discussed by the parties.<sup>781</sup> Meltem Müftüler-Baç expresses that the Association Agreement began hopefully with a possibility of membership if and when the parties could fulfil their obligations and responsibilities related to the membership but it turned out to be the longest association relation.<sup>782</sup> Even though the process started with an eventual accession more than 50 years ago Turkey's full membership is still contested and other options are being discussed by the scholars and even the member states propose other options such as privileged membership. They are discussed later in this chapter.

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<sup>777</sup> European Commission, *The Treaty of Rome, 1957*, p.78.

<sup>778</sup> H. Can and Ç. Özen, *Türkiye-Avrupa Topluluğu Ortaklık Hukuku*, pp.21-23.

<sup>779</sup> European Commission, *Agreement*, p.4.

<sup>780</sup> *Ibid.*, p.7.

<sup>781</sup> H. Can and Ç. Özen, *Türkiye-Avrupa Topluluğu Ortaklık Hukuku*, pp.22-23.

<sup>782</sup> Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Lauren M. McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey", *European Integration*, Vol.25, (2003), <http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/muftuler/files/2008/10/muftulermclaren2003journalofeuropainintegration1.pdf> (04.08.2015), p.20.

In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership to the EC on the basis of Article 237 of the Rome Treaty<sup>783</sup> which regulates membership relations between the EC and any European State.<sup>784</sup> The reply for the application for full membership did not come immediately. It took the EEC two years to respond the application. According to Müftüler-Baç and McLaren, the respond was an unexpected outcome and they indicate that this was the first major event which led to doubts about Turkey's membership.<sup>785</sup> *Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community* was published in December 1989. Commission stated that it would not be appropriate for the Community to involve in new accession negotiations, it would not be useful to start accession negotiations because of Turkey's political and economic situation but they were interested in helping Turkey for its modernization process.<sup>786</sup> In the opinion, there was an emphasis on Turkey's geopolitical position, its position in Atlantic alliance and its largeness. And according to Turkey's aspirations and needs, four measures were also asserted. They were the "completion of the customs union, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation, and the strengthening of political and cultural links."<sup>787</sup> Müftüler-Baç and Mc Laren note that it was not an outright rejection however; it showed a long term process for the membership.<sup>788</sup> It did not have any date mentioned about the accession negotiations and this showed the uncertainty of the process. So, until Turkey granted candidate status many countries applied to the EU for membership and they became EU members. For example, Austria, Finland and Sweden became members in 1995 and Turkey's candidacy status came four years later even after eleven more states were included in the enlargement process in 1997.

Before the candidacy status, during the Turkey-EC Association Council meeting the decision on the establishment of the Customs Union was signed on 6 March

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<sup>783</sup> ABGS, Chronology of Turkey European Union Relations (1959-2015), <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/chronology.pdf> (04.08.2015), p.2.

<sup>784</sup> European Commission, The Treaty of Rome, 1957, p.78.

<sup>785</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç and L. McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey", p.21.

<sup>786</sup> Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community, <http://aei.pitt.edu/4475/1/4475.pdf> (04.08.2015), p.8.

<sup>787</sup> Ibid.

<sup>788</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç and L. McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey", p.21.

1995 and it entered into force on 31 December 1995.<sup>789</sup> By realising the final stage of the association relations, Turkey was expecting developments related to its application for membership in 1987. However, as Müftüler-Baç expresses Turkey was ignored in the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 and this caused hostile reactions from Turkey. According to her, the unexpected outcome of the membership application and not including Turkey to the group of applicant countries which would start accession negotiations led to doubts about Turkey's membership.<sup>790</sup>

In the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council, an inclusive, comprehensive enlargement process was launched. It was stated that the process would be in stages and the applicant states would proceed at its own pace. The Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus were determined as candidate states on an equal footing. It was also stated that the accession negotiations were going to start in 1998 and the process was defined.<sup>791</sup> Despite Turkey's expectations, Turkey was not declared as a candidate. Turkey's eligibility for accession to the EU was confirmed and *A European Strategy for Turkey* was put forth. The aim of this Strategy was to prepare Turkey for accession as Turkey's political and economic conditions were not evaluated as satisfactory. Turkey was also mentioned in the part related to the European Conference which was planned to be held in London in March 1998.<sup>792</sup> Turkey was invited to the Conference with the other applicant states but Turkey decided not to attend the Conference, to suspend political dialogue with the EU and to continue its relations on the basis of association agreement because the opposition parties, the coalition government and the Turkish political and economic elite, all, had a negative attitude against the EU.<sup>793</sup> Müftüler-Baç claims that a patron-client relationship was needed in order to get the candidacy in the Luxembourg Summit which was the case for Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Cyprus but Turkey did not have any

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<sup>789</sup> İKV, Customs Union, [http://oldweb.ikv.org.tr/icerik\\_en.asp?konu=gumrukbirligi&baslik=Customs%20Union](http://oldweb.ikv.org.tr/icerik_en.asp?konu=gumrukbirligi&baslik=Customs%20Union) (05.08.2015).

<sup>790</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç and L. McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey", p.21.

<sup>791</sup> European Parliament, Luxembourg European Council 12 and December 1997 Presidency Conclusions, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm) (06.08.2015).

<sup>792</sup> Ibid.

<sup>793</sup> Atilla Eralp, "Turkey in the Enlargement Process: From Luxembourg to Helsinki", <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Atila-Eralp.pdf> (06.08.2015), p.3.

patron state to push for its candidacy. Instead of supporters, there was a clear adversary like Greece because of historical and strategic disputes between Turkey and Greece and Germany was also against the Turkish candidacy because of cultural differences between Turkey and Europe.<sup>794</sup> However, the situation changed with the Helsinki Summit.

Between the Luxembourg Summit and the Helsinki Summit, there were also other summits and regular report was prepared for the first time for Turkey and for the other candidate states. However, as Eralp expresses, these summits were not able to change the situation and overcome the stalemate in Turkey-EU relations.<sup>795</sup> But the situation changed with the Helsinki Summit. Turkey was granted a candidate status. And it was stated that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of same criteria as applied to the other States.”<sup>796</sup> This was an important development as Turkey was granted candidacy on an equal footing with the other candidate states. Paragraphs 4, 9 and 12 were related to Turkey. Paragraph 4 was about the peaceful settlement of border disputes; namely Aegean issue. Paragraph 9 was about the Cyprus issue and lastly paragraph 12 was about Turkey and its accession process.<sup>797</sup>

Eralp points out that the Helsinki Summit was a turning point in Turkey-EU relations as it clarified the Turkey’s position in the enlargement process. He claims that EU’s turn towards geopolitical concerns, the stability need and security concerns, the reaproachment between Turkey and Greece after the earthquakes in both countries and the government change in Germany from Christian Democrat to Social Democrat-Green led to changes in the relationship between Turkey and the EU and as an outcome of these changes the resolutions of the Helsinki Summit became more open, inclusive and less discriminatory.<sup>798</sup> Müftüler-Baç also makes a quite similar evaluation about the policy change in the EU from Luxembourg Summit to Helsinki Summit. She asserts the same reasons but she adds two more reasons for the reaproachment between Greece and

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<sup>794</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç and L. McLaren, “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey”, pp.22-23.

<sup>795</sup> A. Eralp, “Turkey in the Enlargement Process: From Luxembourg to Helsinki”, p.3.

<sup>796</sup> European Parliament, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999 Presidency Conclusions, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm) (06.08.2015).

<sup>797</sup> Ibid.

<sup>798</sup> A. Eralp, “Turkey in the Enlargement Process: From Luxembourg to Helsinki”, pp.7-8.

Turkey. One of them was the government change in Greece and the other one was policy preferences which changed in Greece in two years. She also notes the U.S. support and Turkey's role for finding solution for the Cyprus problem when it is included in the enlargement process rather than isolating it.<sup>799</sup> All these changes led to a change in Turkey's long-standing applicant country status and Turkey became a candidate state.

After the Helsinki Summit, Accession Partnership Document for Turkey was adopted and Turkey prepared the National Programme in 2001.<sup>800</sup> The reform process started with the coalition government consisting of Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland Party (ANAP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and it continued with Justice and Development Party (AKP)<sup>801</sup> which became the leading party in the 2002 elections. Eralp defines that period as a reform period and as a period in which civil society actors were involved in the process.<sup>802</sup> Between 2002 and 2005 eight harmonization packages were enacted series of amendments.<sup>803</sup> All the developments and amendments were important but in relation to the subject of this thesis it should be noted that there were also amendments regulating the legislation in broadcasting. The main legislation regulating the broadcasting is Law No.3984 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Broadcasts (1994) and there was an amendment in 2004. With the amendments, according to the Article 4 of the Broadcasting Law, broadcasts in languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives are possible.<sup>804</sup> The Regulation on Radio and Television Broadcasts in different Languages and Dialects which are traditionally used by the

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<sup>799</sup> M. Müftüler-Baç and L. McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey", pp.22-27.

<sup>800</sup> ABGS, Chronology of Turkey European Union Relations (1959-2015), <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/chronology.pdf> (04.08.2015), p.3.

<sup>801</sup> Atilla Eralp, "Temporality Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship", *EDAM Discussion Paper Series*, Vol.2, (2009), [http://www.ces.metu.edu.tr/docs/eralp\\_discuss\\_paper.pdf](http://www.ces.metu.edu.tr/docs/eralp_discuss_paper.pdf) (06.08.2015), p.5.

<sup>802</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6.

<sup>803</sup> Ministry for EU Affairs, Political Reforms in Turkey, Ankara: M&B Tanıtım Hizmetleri ve Tic. Ltd., 2007, <http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/prt.pdf> (06.08.2015).

<sup>804</sup> Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs, "Minority Rights and Cultural Rights", 12-13 October 2012, [http://www.ab.gov.tr/tarama/tarama\\_files/23/SC23DET\\_Minority%20Rights%20and%20Cultural%20Rights.pdf](http://www.ab.gov.tr/tarama/tarama_files/23/SC23DET_Minority%20Rights%20and%20Cultural%20Rights.pdf) (01.10.2015), pp.32-33.

Turkish citizens in their daily lives was entered into force on 25 January 2004.<sup>805</sup> This was an important development when multilingualism is thought. Turkey changed the legislation in order to be in line with EU and respect other languages used in daily lives of the Turkish citizens.

Ziya Öniş defines the period which started from the summer of 2002 to October 2005 as the golden age period. He points out that this period had profound impact in three areas; namely economy, democracy and foreign policy. He notes many developments in these areas such as reduction of inflation to single digit numbers, attracting foreign direct investment, extending the boundaries of civil and human rights and the rule of law, abolishing the death penalty, and the attempt to improve relations with all neighbours.<sup>806</sup> All these developments show the favourable internal environment for the EU membership.

In Copenhagen Summit in 2002, it was decided to review Turkey's candidacy in 2004. In the Presidency Conclusions, paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 were related to Turkey. First two paragraphs were about the Copenhagen criteria, its importance for starting the accession negotiations and Turkey's reform process. The last paragraph was about accession strategy.<sup>807</sup>

Before the accession negotiations, Turkey also focused on Cyprus issue. According to Eralp, incentive of EU membership caused political changes in Turkey and Northern Cyprus but not in Greek Cypriot side because of the imbalanced structure of incentives/conditionality provided to both sides.<sup>808</sup> This imbalance led to continuation of the disputes as Greek Cypriots believed that they could be an EU member without settlement of the problem and they rejected the Annan Plan while Turkish Cypriots accepted it. As a result, Cyprus became member of the EU without

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<sup>805</sup> *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, "Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerde Yapılacak Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınları Hakkında Yönetmelik", 25 January 2004, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/01/20040125.htm#9> (01.10.2015).

<sup>806</sup> Ziya Öniş, "Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10. No.4, (2008), [http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey\\_vol\\_10\\_no\\_4\\_2008\\_onis.pdf](http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_10_no_4_2008_onis.pdf) (08.08.2015), pp.38-39.

<sup>807</sup> Council of the European Union, Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002 Presidency Conclusion, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/73842.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/73842.pdf) (07.08.2015), pp.5-6.

<sup>808</sup> A. Eralp, "Temporality Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship", pp.6-7.

any settlement of the problem and it “was perceived as a case of ‘double standards’ on the part of the EU: a country that had said ‘no’ to the Annan Plan in a referendum was a member of the EU and would have veto power over Turkey’s accession process.”<sup>809</sup> Thus the dispute became even more difficult to be resolved.

On 16 December 2004, it was declared that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the criteria for opening the accession negotiations in October 2005.<sup>810</sup> But Cyprus membership without settlement of the problem and the EU’s own problems such as institutional problems and non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty slowed down the negotiations.<sup>811</sup> The long-awaited negotiations did not start with an expected excitement.

### **5.1.2. Turkey – EU Relations: After 2005**

Accession negotiations formally opened on 3 October 2005 with the adoption of the Negotiation Framework.<sup>812</sup> The Negotiation Framework consists of 3 parts; principles governing the negotiations, substance of the negotiations and negotiating procedures. There are 35 Chapters in this process.<sup>813</sup> Three fundamental elements are noted for the negotiation process by the Ministry for EU Affairs. These elements are fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, undertaking and applying the EU *acquis* and establishing-strengthening the dialogue with civil society.<sup>814</sup>

Negotiations are based on ‘screening’ and ‘negotiating positions’. Screening is a process in which the Commission and the candidate country examine each chapter to note how well the country is prepared and the negotiating position is indicated as a position which must be submitted by the candidate country and a common position

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<sup>809</sup> Ibid., pp.7-8.

<sup>810</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Turkey, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm) (07.08.2015).

<sup>811</sup> A. Eralp, “Temporality Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship”, p.7.

<sup>812</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Turkey.

<sup>813</sup> European Commission, Negotiating Framework (Luxembourg 3 October 2005), [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002\\_05\\_tr\\_framedoc\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf) (07.08.2005).

<sup>814</sup> Ministry for EU Affairs, Accession Negotiations, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=37&l=2> (07.08.2015).

which must be adopted by the EU before negotiations can start.”<sup>815</sup> The screening process for Turkey was started and completed in 2006 and while the screening process was continuing the Science and Research Chapter (Chapter 25) was also opened and provisionally closed in June 2006. Today, there are 13 more chapters which are open.<sup>816</sup> Even though, all chapters must be closed in order to complete the process,<sup>817</sup> they cannot be provisionally closed. Tocci explains this situation with multiple vetoes of the European Council, France and the Republic of Cyprus and this means that most chapters are frozen and none of the chapters can be provisionally closed.<sup>818</sup> The European Council vetoed eight chapters in December 2006 because Turkey refused to apply the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus and it was stated that until Turkey agree on it none of the chapters would be provisionally closed.<sup>819</sup> France added vetoes on four of the chapters in 2007 and Cyprus vetoed further six of them in 2009.<sup>820</sup> Therefore, there are no provisionally closed chapters except Chapter 25. Tocci notes that the negotiations process of Turkey “proceeded at a snail’s pace in their early years and stalled altogether between 2010 and 2013.”<sup>821</sup> There were not any chapters which were opened between these dates.

Ziya Öniş evaluates the post-2005 era and states that the government lost the enthusiasm and commitment which was the focal point of Turkish foreign policy previously and he describes it as a kind of “loose Europeanization” or “soft Euro-Asianism” strategy.<sup>822</sup> He notes many factors - both external and domestic - related to this loss of enthusiasm for the EU membership project in Turkey. These factors are the debate after Brussels Summit of 2004 about Turkey’s European credentials; European representation as a monolithic block by the Turkish media; constitutional stalemate in the EU; some key decisions of the EU which were evaluated as unfair treatment such as

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<sup>815</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Steps towards joining, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index_en.htm) (07.08.2015).

<sup>816</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Turkey.

<sup>817</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Steps towards joining.

<sup>818</sup> Ibid.

<sup>819</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Turkey.

<sup>820</sup> Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Nathalie Tocci, *Turkey and the European Union*, London: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2015, p.34.

<sup>821</sup> N. Tocci, “Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown”, p.2.

<sup>822</sup> Z. Öniş, “Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate”, pp.40-41.



the possibility of permanent safeguards on full labour mobility and the Cyprus issue; the negative external environment originating from the EU and the deterioration of the relations with the USA.; and the AKP's weakening commitment to the goal of EU membership.<sup>823</sup> There are also other developments such as the Eurozone crisis in 2010 and the current situation of Greece. Tocci indicates that after the crisis the EU is "in a profound state of transformation."<sup>824</sup> All these factors affected the AKP's, the public's and the EU's perceptions.

When the surveys about the EU membership are examined, it can be observed that less than half of the Turkish population supports EU membership. According to the 2013 survey results of the Turkish Statistical Institute, 46,5 % of the general population and 52,3 % of the young people said that they were going to approve Turkey's membership to the EU in a referendum.<sup>825</sup> According to 2010 Eurobarometer results, even though the support for membership declined 5 points since the previous results, 42% of the respondents thought that Turkey's membership would be a good thing and 32% of the respondents thought that Turkey's membership would be a bad thing.<sup>826</sup> According to Transatlantic Trend 2013 which was conducted in 11 EU countries, Turkey and the United States, 44% of Turkish respondents said that Turkey's membership would be 'a good thing'.<sup>827</sup> Another recent survey conducted by Turkish Research Company TNS Piar shows another decrease. According to results, just 28% of the Turkish people thought that Turkey's membership would be 'a good thing' while 39 % of them thought that it would be 'a bad thing'.<sup>828</sup> The Eurobarometer 82 results about evaluating Turkey's membership as a 'good thing' or a 'bad thing'<sup>829</sup> are same with the Turkish Research Company TNS Piar. So it can be seen that there are declines in

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<sup>823</sup> Ibid., pp.41-42.

<sup>824</sup> N. Tocci, "Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown", p.3.

<sup>825</sup> Turkish Statistical Institute, Istatistiklerle Gençlik 2013, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/HbPrint.do?id=16055> (08.08.2015).

<sup>826</sup> European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 74, Autumn 2010, Public Opinion in the European Union, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74\\_publ\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_publ_en.pdf) (08.08.2015), p.35.

<sup>827</sup> Atlantic Council, "Survey: Turkish Support for EU Membership ON Decline, Opinion Divided on NATO", 18 September 2013, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/blogs/natosource/survey-turkish-support-for-eu-membership-on-decline-opinion-divided-on-nato> (12.08.2015).

<sup>828</sup> *Daily Sabah Turkey*, "Opinion poll shows Turkish support for EU membership at record low", 18 December 2014, <http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/12/18/opinion-poll-shows-turkish-support-for-eu-membership-at-record-low> (12.08.2015).

<sup>829</sup> European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 82, p.T26.

support to Turkey's membership to the EU. The prolonged negotiations and many other reasons stated above have caused the loss of enthusiasm. As Tocci mentions, none of the previous accession processes lasted over a decade; just Spain and Croatia's processes lasted 8 years.<sup>830</sup> Croatia's accession negotiations also started in 2005 and it became member in 2013, however, Turkey is still a candidate country with four new countries, namely the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania.<sup>831</sup>

## 5.2. Obstacles and Options in the EU Accession Process

As mentioned in the previous part, Turkey and the EU have had relations for more than half a century. These relations started with Turkey's association application and now Turkey is a candidate country which started accession negotiations in 2005. Many countries which applied after Turkey became EU members but each country should be evaluated in its own context as they all have different features. Therefore, Turkey's situation should be considered in its own context. Bogdani analyses Turkey's process and she determines three factors/obstacles influencing this process, namely formal obstacles, semi-formal obstacles and informal obstacles.<sup>832</sup>

According to Bogdani, formal obstacles consist of domestic political and economic factors and other issues such as the Cyprus issue, the Kurdish issue and the Armenian issue. With regards to the political factors, she states that Turkey is not in line with the European standards, even though there are some developments. Because there are problems related to military relations, human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of press, minority rights, children's and women's rights as stated in the Progress Reports, in the *European Parliaments Report of 2006* and in the *Annual Report on Human Rights 2009* of British Foreign Office. She gives examples of infringement of the given rights from all these reports.<sup>833</sup> When the last Progress Report (2014) is looked at, it can be noticed that there are improvements and developments

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<sup>830</sup> N. Tocci, "Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown", p.3.

<sup>831</sup> European Commission, European Union: Countries, [http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm) (08.08.2015).

<sup>832</sup> M. Bogdani, *Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession*, p.25.

<sup>833</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.26-30.

however; there are still some issues which needs further improvement. Some of the improvements and developments stated in the Report, are; the adoption of a law to ‘bring a stronger legal foundation to the settlement process’, the adoption of an *Action Plan on Prevention of Violations of the European Convention on Human Rights*, the adoption of ‘A 2013-17 national child rights strategy’, the adoption of legislation related to the situation of socially vulnerable and people with disabilities.<sup>834</sup> However, issues which need developments or further developments are also noted.

In terms of economic criteria, Turkey is evaluated as “a poor country, with unstable growth, high levels of debt and unemployment and low GDP per capita” by Bogdani.<sup>835</sup> Therefore, there are many inequalities between Turkey and the EU member states. According to Bogdani, member states evaluate the economics and the enlargements from pragmatic point of view so these inequalities make Turkey ineligible in the eyes of the Europeans. Even though Turkey with its poor, unemployed population and large agricultural sector is seen as a burden she also gives the proponents’ views. According to them, there are some possible benefits such as providing cheap labour force, a large market with many opportunities and decreasing the average age of the Europeans.<sup>836</sup> However, the research results of the World Bank are looked at and there is not big difference among the unemployment rates of the EU member states and Turkey. The unemployment rate of Turkey was 10% in 2013. 15 of the member states’ unemployment rates were higher than Turkey. There are member states whose unemployment rate were higher than Turkey like Ireland (13.1%) and Croatia (17.7%)<sup>837</sup> whose population were not more than 5 million<sup>838</sup> but there are also highly populated member states like Italy whose unemployment rate was 12.2%<sup>839</sup> and its population was over 60 million.<sup>840</sup> There are also member states like Greece and Spain

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<sup>834</sup> European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2014, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2014/20141008-turkey-progress-report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-turkey-progress-report_en.pdf) (08.08.2015), pp.5-20.

<sup>835</sup> M. Bogdani, *Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession*, p.31.

<sup>836</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.31-32.

<sup>837</sup> The World Bank, Unemployment total (% of total labour force) (modelled ILO estimate), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS> (10.08.2015).

<sup>838</sup> The World Bank, Total Population (in number of people), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL> (10.08.2015).

<sup>839</sup> The World Bank, Unemployment total (% of total labour force) (modelled ILO estimate).

<sup>840</sup> The World Bank, Total Population (in number of people).

whose unemployment rates were 27.3% and 26.6% respectively<sup>841</sup> and the population of Spain was more than 45 million.<sup>842</sup> So it is difficult to state that there are great differences between Turkey and the member states. But when the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is considered, Turkey's GDP per capita is low. Just two member states' GDP per capita was lower than Turkey in 2014 and they are Bulgaria and Romania.<sup>843</sup> So it can be said that Turkey needs progress according to this data.

The Cyprus issue as one of the formal obstacles in Turkey's accession process is discussed above slightly in relation to the Annan Plan and the Cyprus vetoes, so it is not going to be mentioned again. However, it should be noted that in the Progress Report, it was noted that "There was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus."<sup>844</sup> In 2014, another dispute occurred between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot side because "Turkey deployed a seismic exploration vessel into the Republic of Cyprus's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the southern coast of the island" in order to protect the Rights of the Turkish Cypriot but later it was withdrawn.<sup>845</sup> And now there are some developments between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot. According to the current president of the Turkish Cypriot side Mustafa Akıncı, there could be a settlement within months in 2015.<sup>846</sup> This may also contribute to the settlement of the disputes between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot side and eventually the negotiations would gain speed.

The Kurdish issue and the Armenian issue are the other formal obstacles in Turkey's accession process. As noted above, there were improvements about the Kurdish issue. But now it is difficult to predict the process as there have been many developments after a bomb attack in Suruç in July 2015. According to the Progress Report, there were developments about the Armenian issue such as Prime Minister

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<sup>841</sup> The World Bank, Unemployment total (% of total labour force) (modelled ILO estimate).

<sup>842</sup> The World Bank, Total Population (in number of people).

<sup>843</sup> The World Bank, GDP per capita (current US\$), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> (10.08.2015).

<sup>844</sup> European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2014, p.19.

<sup>845</sup> Vincent L. Morelli, "Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive", <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41136.pdf> (10.08.2015).

<sup>846</sup> *EurActiv*, "Akıncı: Kıbrıs Sorunu Aylar içinde Çözülebilir", 27 July 2015, <http://www.euractiv.com.tr/ab-ve-turkiye/article/akinci-kibris-sorunu-aylar-icinde-cozulebilir-031915> (10.08.2015).

Erdoğan's statement offering condolences to the descendants of the 1915 events but it was also stated that the protocols, which were signed in 2009, were still not ratified.<sup>847</sup> There are still many developments and steps which should be focused on about the formal obstacles because even though there are developments, further action is needed according to the Progress Report 2014.

According to Bogdani, geography, demography, size, security and institutional factors and the world financial crisis are given as semi-formal factors. She states that while proponents argue that the geography cannot be an obstacle as Turkey is a candidate country, the opponents still evaluate it as an obstacle because with possible membership Turkey's size and population will have both economic and institutional effects in the EU.<sup>848</sup> Population can be evaluated as a significant factor because Turkey has an increasing population. Therefore, Turkey's membership might affect the decision making mechanism, labour market and the identity of the EU. Now Turkey with a total population of 75.837.020 is the second most populated country after Germany with a population of 80.889.505<sup>849</sup> in the EU and in the future it is expected to be the most populated country. According to Eurostat, in 2050 Germany's population will be 74,721,315<sup>850</sup> while according to Turkish Statistical Institute; Turkey's population will be 93,475,575.<sup>851</sup> This makes population an important issue in Turkey's EU membership especially when its probable effect on decision making process is thought.

From the geographic perspective, there are different views. For example, Giscard d'Estaing noted that Turkey "was not a European country" as its capital was not in Europe and 95% of its population lived outside Europe.<sup>852</sup> Giscard d'Estaing defines the borders of the Europe and thinks that Turkey is not within these borders. According to him, most of Turkey's population live outside Europe, so it is not a European

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<sup>847</sup> European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2014, p.75.

<sup>848</sup> M. Bogdani, *Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession*, pp.37-43.

<sup>849</sup> The World Bank, Total Population (in number of people).

<sup>850</sup> European Commission, Population Projections, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&pcode=tps00002&language=en> (10.08.2015).

<sup>851</sup> Turkish Statistical Institute, Nüfus Projeksiyonları 2013-2075, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=15844> (10.08.2015).

<sup>852</sup> *BBC News*, "Turkey Entry 'Would Destroy EU'", 8 November 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm> (10.08.2015).

country. The official from the DG Interpretation also drew attention to geography and he stated that:

...if you look at the geographical definition of the Europe, it is basically everything that is west of the Europe so somebody say ok. .... Everything west of that is Europe. Geographical Europe is natural and not political. And you have member states or you have countries that have said like Morocco: "We are European so we want to be the members of the EU." Or various countries in Middle East said, we are European and as you know Turkey has been a candidate member state since early 1960s. So, again where you can discuss, Turkey is a European country. Parts of Turkey certainly are and other parts certainly are not. So where is the balance?<sup>853</sup>

From this point of view, it can be argued that Turkey is evaluated as partially European, partially not. And this kind of understanding reminds Bhabha's concept of 'hybridity' and 'in-between space' which are noted in the previous chapters.

In the interviews which were conducted in Ankara, an official from the Social, Regional and Innovative Policies Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs mentioned that the values of EU are known and he stated that if a country accepts these values, it will be a member but he also indicated geographic issues and added:

They say that Turkey is not in the European Union. If you look to the latitude which passes from the middle of Turkey it includes the Scandinavian countries ... or if you line down from the east of Scandinavian countries more than half of Turkey is in. So how are they in European geography?<sup>854</sup>

Even though there are different views about Turkey's accession to the EU from the geographic perspective, it should not be forgotten that Turkey was evaluated as eligible for EU membership in the Luxembourg Summit as stated above. The European Parliament draws attention to Article O of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in which it was stated that "the applicant country must be a 'European State'" and explains that this Article "can be read equally well in geographical, cultural and political terms".<sup>855</sup> From this point of view, Turkey and Morocco is compared and it is noted that

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<sup>853</sup> Interview with the official from DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

<sup>854</sup> Interview with the official from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>855</sup> European Parliament, Briefing No 23 Legal Questions of Enlargement, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm), (10.08.2015).

Morocco was rejected by the Council for not being a European State while Turkey has been confirmed as an eligible country by the Parliament and the Council.<sup>856</sup>

Bogdani argues security and energy as the other semi-official obstacles and mentions that in terms of security Turkey is an important country since it has borders with a region which is unstable and has conflicts. As she notes, Turkey is a buffer state between the EU and this unstable region. So the opponents prefer it to stay as a buffer and being away from this region. However, the proponents prefer it to be a part of the EU and serve as an anchor of stability in this region.<sup>857</sup> It is clear that Turkey is both seen as an asset and a challenge. Its membership can provide both advantages and disadvantages. This causes the process to be complicated and contested.

According to Bogdani, religious and cultural factors are defined as informal obstacles in the process. She argues that Copenhagen criteria and the other issues are not the real factors but just a “fig-leaf” hiding the real factors; religion and culture.<sup>858</sup> The previous President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy’s statement may support this view. According to him, “Turkish membership to the EU would undermine current universal values in Europe which are also fundamental Christian values, received major attention.”<sup>859</sup> As it can be seen here, van Rompuy defines European values as Christian values and according to him, as a Muslim country Turkey’s membership will undermine European values or in other words Christian values. But it should be stated that van Rompuy came up with this explanation before he became the President of the European Council, and he did not make this statement as the President of the European Council. It should also be noted that this kind of perception about the European identity shows that European identity is evaluated as a cultural identity rather than a civic identity which focuses on rights, obligations, perception of freedom and values. Civic and cultural identity perceptions are noted in the first chapter.

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<sup>856</sup> Ibid.

<sup>857</sup> M. Bogdani, *Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession*, pp.40-42.

<sup>858</sup> Ibid., pp.43-47.

<sup>859</sup> David Cronin, “Keeping Turkey out of Europe”, *The Guardian*, 6 January 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/06/turkey-european-union-membership> (10.08.2015).

Another statement in line with the above mentioned view is Nicolas Sarkozy's statement. As he stated: "Turkey may one day enjoy a privileged relationship with the EU, but full membership is out of the question. Turkey is not European – geographically or culturally."<sup>860</sup> According to Sarkozy, in one way or another Turkey is not European. It is not European either culturally or geographically. There are many other opposite views based on religion which can be evaluated as 'othering' Turkey and in the meanwhile the Turkish identity. Hakan Yılmaz notes the opposite views of Philippe De Villiers, Michael Glos, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Edmund Stoiber, Angela Merkel, Friedbert Pflüger and Nikolas Sarkozy.<sup>861</sup> He evaluates their discourses and indicates that:

'Extinguished volcano' is perhaps a good metaphor to understand the importance of Christianity in the discourses of the right-wing political elites of both France and Germany regarding European identity. The volcano has long stopped its activity but it is still there, it serves as a place maker, and perhaps one day it will start to erupt again.<sup>862</sup>

Here it should be noted that far-right parties seized ground in the last European Parliament elections held in May 2014.<sup>863</sup> Taking into account Yılmaz's evaluation, it can be claimed that religion and culture based opposition can be perceived more. But in the interviews conducted in Ankara, one of the officials noted that Turkey's Muslim population, its language or its culture is not a problem. He thinks that as long as Turkey becomes a powerful country and it would not be an economic burden, all other obstacles would disappear.<sup>864</sup> According to this view, all obstacles are about being self-sufficient and not being a burden for the EU. So these obstacles can be observed as to be about fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and this kind of understanding can be argued as focusing on civic identity rather than cultural identity. Another official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs claimed that

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<sup>860</sup> Tariq Ramadan, "Turkey is part of Europe. Fear keeps it out of the EU", *The Guardian*, 6 August 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/aug/06/turkey-eu-membership> (10.08.2015).

<sup>861</sup> Hakan Yılmaz, "Turkish identity on the road to the EU: Basic Elements of French and German oppositional discourses", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol.9, No.3, (December 2007), pp.296-300.

<sup>862</sup> *Ibid.*, p.298.

<sup>863</sup> *BBC News*, "Euro-sceptic 'earthquake' rocks EU elections", 26 May 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27559714> (12.08.2015).

<sup>864</sup> Interview with the official from the Social Regional and Innovative Policies Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.



Europeans who support political European identity are concerned about Turkey's adaptation to the political, economic and social rules of Europe rather than Turkey's cultural and religious differences.<sup>865</sup> This view is also based on the understanding of European identity as a civic identity. Mayer and Palmowski also assert that:

As long as Turkey can fulfil the institutional, economic and legal requirements for membership, Turkey is not principally excluded from a European identity which has been shaped so decisively by the institutions and the law of EU.<sup>866</sup>

The official from the Research and Documentation Directorate also added that:

... the values such as democracy, human rights and rule of life, which are put as a precondition for accession by Europe, are universal values. Universal values and institutions are not under control of any culture. Therefore, as long as Turkish people internalise political principles, values and institutions, they would involve in European political culture and it would be possible for European identity and Turkish identity to be ... together.<sup>867</sup>

Although it might be evaluated that there are many opposite views about Turkey's membership and its credentials; there are also positive views. According to Semih Akçomak, the cultural differences between Turkey and other EU member states are exaggerated. He gives Geert Hofstede's investigation on the work related to the values of people in over 50 countries as an evidence for this exaggeration. He also gives the data from the European Values Study 1999, as an evidence for this exaggeration. According to him, many of Turkey's supposed cultural differences with the rest of Europe are in fact unsubstantiated.<sup>868</sup> There are also politicians who support Turkey's membership. For example, Joschka Fisher states that:

Turkish membership could one day offer tremendous opportunities. The EU will benefit as it will have an opportunity to better integrate other cultures, it will gain in external stability, it will have a bridge to the countries of the Middle East. I am convinced that Turkey as a politically stable and modern

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<sup>865</sup> Interview with the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>866</sup> F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, "European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe", p.593.

<sup>867</sup> Interview with the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>868</sup> Semih Akçomak, "Differences Between the EU and Turkey Greatly Exaggerated", [http://www.merit.unu.edu/archive/docs/hl/200610\\_200610\\_akcomak.pdf](http://www.merit.unu.edu/archive/docs/hl/200610_200610_akcomak.pdf) (10.08.2015), p.1.

democracy will be a valuable asset for the European Union. Thus Turkey's fulfilment of the reform goals should be met by the fulfilment of the EU's pledges.<sup>869</sup>

In this statement, even though there is a reference to culture in accordance with better integration, the benefits of Turkey's EU membership can also be noticed. Here Turkey's membership is also evaluated as 'a valuable asset'. Nas supports this idea by indicating that Turkey's accession to the EU is generally based on benefits and rational cost-benefit calculations by the supporters of Turkey's membership.<sup>870</sup> This can also be observed with the options, proposed as an alternative to full membership of Turkey, as mentioned below.

As it can be seen, Turkey's EU accession process is a long, difficult and contested process. There are different views about Turkey's membership. Moreover, there are many obstacles. Some are formal and some are informal and this makes the process unique as all other accession processes. In this process, options rather than full membership are mentioned different from other accession processes. As it is obvious above, one of them is privileged relations. Besides privileged partnership Özgür Beyazıt mentions three other options which are European Economic Area Plus (EAA+), Extended Associate Membership (EAM), and Gradual Integration.<sup>871</sup> Even though he indicates that those options are not stated in the official documents, he draws attention to the statements and phrases which recalls these options such as 'absorption capacity' 'open-ended', 'cannot be guaranteed' and 'partnership'.<sup>872</sup> According to him, there would be an opposition in the member states even if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria and finishes the accession negotiations but EU does not have a common decision for rejecting or admitting Turkey. He sets the reasons as "having a young and increasing population, growing economy, dynamic military power and a large market"

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<sup>869</sup> Joschka Fischer, "Turkey's European Perspective: The German View", <http://homes.ieu.edu.tr/aburgin/IREU%20308%20Turkey-EU%20Relations/Fischer%20Turkeys%20Europan%20Perspective.pdf> (13.08.2015), p.6.

<sup>870</sup> Ç. Nas, "The Europeanisation of Identity: The Case of the Rebuffed Candidate", p.25.

<sup>871</sup> Özgür Beyazıt, "Privileged Partnership: as an Alternative Way to the Turkey's European Union Membership Bid", *Law & Justice Review*, No.9, (December 2014), <http://www.taa.gov.tr/yayin/law-justice-review-sayi-9/> (10.08.2015), pp.309-313.

<sup>872</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.297-305.

he also adds economic reasons, security and energy issues as the stimulation for the Privileged Partnership.<sup>873</sup>

Beyazıt explains the Privileged Partnership model referring to the study of ‘The Privileged Partnership, an alternative to membership’. He states that according to this study, some of the suggestions are; establishing institutional ties between the EU and Turkey in the Economic and Security–Defence areas, expanding the Customs Union to the agriculture and services and Turkey would stay outside of the decision-making bodies of the EU.<sup>874</sup> Cemal Karakaş states that Turkey is practising the Privileged Partnership model now because of the Customs Union and Turkey is attending some of the EU programmes such as Erasmus without taking part in decision-making process. He also claims that this model aims to prevent Turkey’s membership.<sup>875</sup>

In the second model, Norway is given as an example and according to this model; the *acquis* related to Single Market and four freedoms with some exceptions and derogations is adopted. According to this model, it is consulted in the decision-making process in integrated areas.<sup>876</sup>

The third model consists of EEA, Customs Union and widening and deepening of cooperation on trade and economic policies without any involvement in the decision making procedures. This model also includes several limitations and restrictions on the free movement of people and workers.<sup>877</sup> Karakaş expresses that in this model the borders of the EU should be decided and according to Quaisser and Wood, Turkey is

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<sup>873</sup> Ibid., pp.301-302.

<sup>874</sup> Ibid., pp. 309-310.

<sup>875</sup> Cemal Karakaş, “Üye Olmadan Entegrasyon Mümkün mü? Türkiye’nin AB Üyeliğinin Hukuki Dayanakları ve Tam Üyelik Alternatifleri”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol.4, No.16, (Winter 2007-2008), [http://www.uidergisi.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Uye\\_Olmadan\\_Entegrasyon\\_Mumkun\\_mu.pdf](http://www.uidergisi.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Uye_Olmadan_Entegrasyon_Mumkun_mu.pdf) (11.08.2015), pp.34-36.

<sup>876</sup> Ö. Beyazıt, “Privileged Partnership: as an Alternative Way to the Turkey’s European Union Membership Bid”, pp.310-311.

<sup>877</sup> Ibid., p.312.

not a European country therefore, it cannot be a member. However, as Karakaş notes, Turkey's eligibility was stated and Turkey is a candidate country.<sup>878</sup>

Beyazıt states that the last model is introduced by Cemal Karakaş and adds that it was proposed with different terms such as 'various geographic' or 'two-speed Europe'.<sup>879</sup> Karakaş claims that Turkey rejected all three models as these models do not present any better status for Turkey than the Turkey's current status which has been provided by ongoing relations/cooperation between Turkey and the EU.<sup>880</sup> Karakaş explains his model as a dynamic model which consists of 3 phases with a membership perspective. He notes that when the phases are accomplished Turkey would be a member of the EU. In this process, Turkey would have right to participate in the decision-making process in the integrated areas without having the right to veto.<sup>881</sup>

The above mentioned three models include economic relations, and relations related to security and defence. So, this can be evaluated as partnership rather than membership. Turkey will not be included in the decision making process and will not be a member but relations on the decided issues will be sustained.

Even though these models are discussed among the scholars and politicians, Turkey aims full membership and it has been stated many times. Lastly in the EU Strategy it is noted that "The "EU Strategy" will boost this spectrum of relations and help eliminate the obstacles on Turkey's path to EU membership."<sup>882</sup> Also in *Today's Zaman* it was indicated that "Davutoğlu stated that no matter how much conditions may change, membership to the EU will always be strategic for Turkey."<sup>883</sup> Here the emphasis on membership is important; other options are not on the agenda.

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<sup>878</sup> C. Karakaş, "Üye Olmadan Entegrasyon Mümkün mü? Türkiye'nin AB Üyeliğinin Hukuki Dayanakları ve Tam Üyelik Alternatifleri", p.37.

<sup>879</sup> Ö. Beyazıt, "Privileged Partnership: as an Alternative Way to the Turkey's European Union Membership Bid", pp.314-315.

<sup>880</sup> C. Karakaş, "Üye Olmadan Entegrasyon Mümkün mü? Türkiye'nin AB Üyeliğinin Hukuki Dayanakları ve Tam Üyelik Alternatifleri", p.39.

<sup>881</sup> Ibid., pp.39-43.

<sup>882</sup> Ministry for EU Affairs, Turkey's New European Union Strategy [http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/turkeys\\_new\\_eu\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/turkeys_new_eu_strategy.pdf) (11.08.2015), p.4.

<sup>883</sup> *Today's Zaman*, "Italian PM Renzi expresses support for Turkey's EU bid", 12 December 2014, [http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa\\_italian-pm-renzi-expresses-support-for-turkeys-eu-bid\\_366816.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_italian-pm-renzi-expresses-support-for-turkeys-eu-bid_366816.html) (12.08.2015).

As it can be seen, Turkey's membership process is a long process with ups and downs. There are many obstacles which Turkey should overcome in the process; some of which are official and some are not. The obstacles and the ups and downs in the process have caused the emergence of new options/models for Turkey but as stated above, Turkey aims full membership.

### **5.3. European Identity – Turkish Identity Relations**

It is stated in the previous chapters that from the constructivist point of view, European identity is constantly under-construction. It is not finished and not fixed; it changes. It is a socially constructed identity in interactions. It is a collective identity consists of many national identities which co-exist and complement each other. As Mayer and Palmowski indicates:

European identity is closely tied to national identity, but it can and does move beyond it, in two ways. First, European identity is –obviously- common to all Europeans, it complements national and regional identities. As a composite identity made up of a large number of national identities, it is both the same as and more than each individual national identity.<sup>884</sup>

It is also stated in the previous chapters that each new member state affects the European identity as it is constructed and reconstructed with the enlargements. And after the enlargements, as long as the interactions continue, the construction process of the identities will continue, as well. Nas notes this effect as: “The boundaries between different national identities would become less conflictual, and more ‘fuzzy’ due to the common source of identity construction that European integration would present.”<sup>885</sup> Thus it can be interpreted that Turkey as a candidate country has effects on the construction of European identity and the EU also has effects on Turkish identity. Nas expresses it clearly: “Turkey’s relation to and status regarding Europe is both a factor influencing and influenced by identity construction.”<sup>886</sup>

The European identity is analysed in the previous chapters therefore, in focusing on the relation between European identity and Turkish identity, Turkish

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<sup>884</sup> F. C. Mayer & J. Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU: The Ties That Bind the Peoples of Europe”, p.591.

<sup>885</sup> Ç. Nas, “The Europeanisation of Identity: The Case of the Rebuffed Candidate”, p.26.

<sup>886</sup> Ibid., p.31.

identity should be mentioned slightly. But before giving information about Turkish identity, it would be useful to see the European identity views of the officials with whom interviews were conducted in Ankara, in February 2015. An official from the Accession Policy Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs stated that:

Geography and history are very important. I think the emergence of European values as Renaissance and Reform... We cannot talk about only one Europeanness identity. The Greeks and Danes are quite different but yet in the framework of European Union integration, I think they carry the common sharing they bring from the past to the future... I think the components of the EU identity are Renaissance and Reform. ... The components of the EU identity, yes, there is the issue of common values...<sup>887</sup>

She is the only official who noted Reform and Renaissance as the components of the European identity. She also noted that with the crisis countries like Germany tried to dominate the policies of the EU and added that she thought that this damaged the EU identity.<sup>888</sup> It can be interpreted that Germany, as being one of the dominant countries which tries to shape and lead the EU, affects the European identity. However, the European identity is not in the monopoly of powerful or core state/s. This situation can also be observed in the meetings between France and Germany about the crisis in Greece. These relations and interactions have impacts on the European identity and it may be claimed that they damage it as the official noted.

Another official from the Research and Documentation Directorate defined European identity as an image rather than a reality and he expressed that:

Europeanness, as many other political social concepts, is a concept which cannot be defined completely. Throughout history, it appeared as a construct which was shaped in regards to different periods and different conditions. We should emphasise that it is inevitably a construction process which is led by elite discourses. When it is looked to the EU's official discourses, it is claimed that European identity is based on common values such as Copenhagen criteria which are within the political culture. When considered from this point of view, it can be argued that being European means adopting core values of the EU.<sup>889</sup>

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<sup>887</sup> Interview with the official from the Accession Policy Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>888</sup> Ibid.

<sup>889</sup> Interview with the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

As it was focused on many other interviews, the core values were also emphasised in this interview. But the official preferred to define it both in historical context and in the EU context. The other officials from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate also focused on common values, Copenhagen criteria, rule of law, respect to fundamental human rights, freedom of expression, multilingualism, free movement of goods and people.<sup>890</sup> The official from the Translation Coordination Directorate expressed the same components but she also added democracy, equality, transparency, accountability and separation of powers.<sup>891</sup> The official from the Research and Documentation Directorate also focused on EU symbols such as EU flag, EU anthem, common currency Euro, May 9 - European Day and 'unity and diversity'. However, he noted that it was interesting that they were not mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty.<sup>892</sup> The reason for not mentioning these symbols may be the perception that they imply a supranational state as stated in the previous chapters. Here it should be noted that European identity can be observed mostly as a civic identity which includes obligations and rights rather than a cultural identity according to these answers of the interviewees.

The 'other' of European identity was also asked in the interviews and different answers were given but it was mostly stated that the Muslims or Islam is the 'other' of European identity. For example, the official from the Accession Policy Directorate stated that:

There are two basic 'other'; this 'other' is interchangeably but namely the 'other' of the Cold War period and the 'other' of today, post 11 September, can change. While 'other' is determined the international conjuncture is important, this is my basic idea. International conjuncture determined the 'other' of the Cold War period as: the Soviet communist bloc. It determined the 'other' of the post-September 11 period as: Islam and Muslims. ... But today both of them are 'other's'. ... If we had talked 2 or 3 years ago, I would have not said Russia but now I think, Russia is a very important 'other'.<sup>893</sup>

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<sup>890</sup> Interview with the official from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>891</sup> Interview with the official from the Translation Coordination Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>892</sup> Interview with the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>893</sup> Interview with the official from the Accession Policy Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

It may be noted that the recent events in Ukraine and the attacks in the USA, in Denmark and in France caused changes in perceptions and it changed the ‘other’ of European identity. But it should also be noted that Islam is evaluated as the ‘other’ of Europe from time to time as it is stated in the previous chapters. The official from the Research and Documentation Directorate indicated that:

... In the emergence of identity, it is necessary to highlight ‘other’ which is constructed as opposite of the identity. In other words, the othering process is an indivisible part of the emerging process of identities. ... European history principally appears as an othering history; first Muslims and Turks, then respectively barbarians of the new world, Jews, communism, and today the immigrants of the third world countries and Muslims again. Recently, the Islamophobia and xenophobia which has gained wide currency in Europe is the clearest evidence of it.<sup>894</sup>

It can be noted that the ‘other’ of the European identity changes. The official from the Translation Coordination Directorate asserted that “... the ‘other’ of ‘European’ can change according to the time and context.”<sup>895</sup> The other officials from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate also confirmed that it changes but they evaluated it according to the individual countries and they indicated ‘other’ for countries. They gave Turks as an example of ‘other’ for Germany and Arabs for France and Moroccans for the Netherlands. But they also noted Islam as the ‘other’ of Europe.<sup>896</sup> The views of the officials in Ankara about the variability of the ‘other’ of the European identity are also in line with the views of officials in Brussels. However, the officials in Brussels did not mention the ‘other’ of the European identity as clear as the officials in Ankara.

As stated above, the European identity is analysed clearly in the previous chapters and here the views of the officials from the Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkish Republic is stated to see their perception of European identity. So it can be focused on Turkish identity in order to see the relations between the European identity and the Turkish identity. But Turkish identity is not going to be evaluated as deeply as the

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<sup>894</sup> Interview with the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>895</sup> Interview with the official from the Translation Coordination Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>896</sup> Interview with the official from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.



European identity since it is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is examined in order to understand the relations and interactions which may have effects on constructing both of the identities.

It is stated in the previous part that there are many obstacles in the membership process of Turkey. While Turkey is trying to overcome these obstacles, its identity is affected and reconstructed in this process. Nas explains this as: “The struggle to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for membership necessitates a process of identification which would entail a degree of Europeanisation of identity even in the case of Turkey.”<sup>897</sup> Müftüler-Baç and Evrim Taşkın claim that “Turkish identity and European identity are subject to change in accordance with the circumstances dictated by the nature of the relationship.”<sup>898</sup> Departing from this point of views, it can be stated that membership process which occurs in interaction has effects on the candidate country’s identity and on the European identity, as well. Both of the identities shape and contribute to each other’s construction process.

It is noted in the previous part that from the constructivist point of view identities are socially constructed in interactions. Therefore, it can be claimed that Turkish identity is also constructed within relations. The actor with whom Turkey has relations has an effect on its identity construction process. With regards to the Turkey – EU relations which started more than 50 years ago, and furthermore, its relations with Europe goes back many years even many centuries so it can be claimed that Turkish identity has changed and shaped throughout the process. Nas asserts that “Turkish identity cannot be understood without recourse to its relations with Europe.”<sup>899</sup> Even though Europe is not the only actor which has effects on Turkish identity, in this thesis Europe’s especially the EU’s effects are determined in order to be within the scope of the thesis.

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<sup>897</sup> Ç. Nas, “The Europeanisation of Identity: The Case of the Rebuffed Candidate”, p.25.

<sup>898</sup> Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Evrim Taşkın, “Turkey’s accession to the European Union: Does Culture and Identity Play a Role?”, *Ankara Review of European Studies*, Vol.6, No.2, (Spring 2007), <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/16/1124/13229.pdf> (13.03.2015), p.50.

<sup>899</sup> Ç. Nas, “The Europeanisation of Identity: The Case of the Rebuffed Candidate”, p.30.

Nas explains Turkish identity construction process clearly in an historical context starting from Central Asia. According to her,

Social construction of Turkishness embodies an interpretation of historical memories, the mythical journey of Turkic tribes from Central Asia and Anatolia, the conversion to Islam, the controversial Ottoman heritage, the experiences of the wars of independence, the nation-state building during the Republican era and Ataturk's legacy as well as the perception of how Turks are viewed by the outside mainly by the West and Europe.<sup>900</sup>

Here the period before the relations with the EEC started is summarized. As mentioned before, there were many reasons such as economic, political, security based reasons for starting relations with the EEC. Therefore, as Nas indicates the relations were based on economic benefits and political necessities and it gained more political character after the 1980s.<sup>901</sup> But it can be noticed that the most remarkable changes occurred after the candidacy status. The EU accession incentives led many reforms in Turkey just before the start of accession negotiations. Nas asserts that during the last decade the state identity of Turkey, Turkish foreign policy, political landscape, civil society and the Turkish identity evolved and change in a way. She supports her view by giving examples of changes in the foreign policy some of which are; the change in the Turkey's Cyprus policy after 2003, the attempts to solve the problems with Greece and Armenia and the adoption of 'zero problems with neighbours approach'.<sup>902</sup> All these changes affected the Turkish identity positively and it has changed.

However, the discourses, which are mentioned above about the Europeanness of Turkey, caused changes in the Turkish identity and these discourses brought questions to mind about the sincerity of the EU because Turkey's Europeanness and Turkey's identity was questioned after giving candidacy status. Senem Aydın-Düzgit notes that:

Yet as the accession process has progressed, debates on the desirability of Turkish accession have intensified in the EU. As the prospect of accession has become more real, opposition has been increasingly based on the

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<sup>900</sup> Ibid., pp.30-31.

<sup>901</sup> Ibid., p.31.

<sup>902</sup> Ibid., pp.32-34.

grounds that the country poses a profound challenge to the European project due to the perceived ambiguities over its 'Europeanness'.<sup>903</sup>

Rainer Hülse also argues that this has an effect on the European identity. He claims that: "The discourse on Turkey's suitability for EU-membership simultaneously is a discourse on the European identity" and also adds that "For the EU the discourse on Turkey's suitability for EU-membership functions as a means to (re-)construct its own identity."<sup>904</sup> So, it may be asserted that while questioning Turkey's Europeanness, the EU constructs its own identity. Therefore, the reality that each enlargement contributed and affected the construction process of the European identity should not be missed. So it is not different in Turkey's accession process. Turkish accession process can be evaluated as even having more effect on the European identity as the interactions have been continuing for more than any other accession process. Paul Kubicek notes this by indicating that "Turkish membership could ... have a transformative impact, far more than the 2004 expansion did, on Europe itself."<sup>905</sup>

Nas evaluates this questioning period as "a new phase in Europe's construction of Turkey's identity evolving of being defined as a 'liminal' identity in the door step of Europe to being definitely out of Europe."<sup>906</sup> According to Nas, Turkey may be critical of Europe and try to establish a more active role in regional and global affairs but she notes that this should not be understood as an end of the Europeanisation of identity. She explains this as;

The recent evaluation of identity in the case of Turkey displays signs of Europeanisation in the sense of adoption and incorporation of values, norms and ways of doing things. At the same time, Turkey may be turning away from Europe as a centre of allegiance which could be explained by the exclusionary approach displayed by the EU and the problems that emanated during the accession process. In the terms of socio-economic development and modernisation Europe continues to pose as the main reference point and

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<sup>903</sup> Senem Aydın-Düzgit, *Construction of European Identity: Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Pub., 2012, p.1.

<sup>904</sup> Rainer Hülse, "The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference – Turkey as Europe's Other", Discussion paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim, March 26-31 1999, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.200.9166&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (16.08.2015), p.17.

<sup>905</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Turkey's Place in the New Europe", Perception, 2004, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Paul-Kubicek.pdf> (16.08.2015), p.58.

<sup>906</sup> Ç. Nas, "The Europeanisation of Identity: The Case of the Rebuffed Candidate", p.40.

the EU membership aim is still on the table as evidence by the recent establishment of a ministry for EU Affairs.<sup>907</sup>

Thus it can be argued that even though there are changes in discourses and positions of the actors, the relations between Turkey and the EU are going on. Therefore, the identity construction process is also going on as identities are constantly constructed and reconstructed in interactions. These new reconstructions do not mean leaving all what you have from the previous reconstructions. So Turkey uses previously adopted norms and values in its present relations in positioning itself in the region. Turkey's modernisation process started many years ago, however, as Yılmaz argues, "it is generally believed that Turkey's secularism is fake, it is artificial, it has been assimilated by a small Westernized elite, it has not submerged into the 'cultural genes' of the larger Turkish society, and it has been protected only by the force of arms."<sup>908</sup> But whether it is believed or not, Turkey experienced this process and it has shaped its identity. Its identity cannot be the same identity which Turkey had before the candidacy status and the start of the accession negotiations but it is not the same identity with the identity constructed after 2009 and even it is not the same identity with the identity which has been constructed after the elections of June 2015.

The effects of the EU in constructing Turkish identity is slightly tried to be explained. It can be recognized that there is a kind of 'othering' in the discourses of some politicians regarding Turkey's Europeanness. So, the similarities between the European identity and Turkish identity were asked in the interviews which were conducted in Ankara. According to the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate;

Although Turkish identity was perceived as the 'other' of the European identity on the basis of cultural components, it would be a big mistake to ignore the common cultural history of the European identity and Turkish identity. It can be said that Turkish identity and European identity have commonalities with regards to holy history and religious identity. ... We are European both geographically and politically. Istanbul was the capital city of Byzantium. Ottoman is called the 'sick man of Europe'. The question which is argued is whether we are culturally European or not. This is because of

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<sup>907</sup> Ibid.

<sup>908</sup> H. Yılmaz, "Turkish identity on the road to the EU: basic elements of French and German oppositional discourses", p.300.

religion. But the place where Christianity was out is also Anatolia. It should not be forgotten that the oldest churches are in Turkey after Israel.<sup>909</sup>

Here it can be noticed that the official thinks that there are similarities on cultural, historical, geographic and religious basis. He notes that Anatolia is the place where Christianity took place. So ignoring the Turkish identity may be evaluated as ignoring its own identity which has roots in Anatolia. Another official from the Translation Coordination Directorate noted that:

It depends on what you understand from the Turkish identity. For me, Turkey is also a mosaic in which different cultures can live together. If we live aside the geography, if we understand rule of law, equality when it is said the European identity, we, as Turkey, try to sustain these principles.<sup>910</sup>

The officials from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate also stated that it changes according to the context and they added that culturally there are not similarities but they stated that there are similarities from the perspective of universal values such as rule of law, democracy, hospitality and respect to differences.<sup>911</sup> Here it can be observed that the officials from the Translation Coordination Directorate and the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate think that the similarities change according to the situation and context. But the official from the Research and Documentation is sure about similarities and he refers to common culture. And he perceives ignoring it as a big mistake.

The official from the Accession Policy Directorate indicated that:

I think we have a very complicated relation. On the one hand we are the 'other' of each other; they are infidel for us and we are the 'other' for them, as well. But this is the reality. But on the other hand geography, history, conjuncture, say whatever you want, make us live together. ... I think we are Europeans as much as Bulgarians. I think republic is very important. I think what the Republic adds to this country is very important; I think what it adds to Turkish identity is very important. ... When we are in Turkey we say

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<sup>909</sup> Interview with the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>910</sup> Interview with the official from the Translation Coordination Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>911</sup> Interview with the official from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

things to Europeans, we hate them, and we say that they scorn us ... but when we go a little east we do not feel that we belong to there.<sup>912</sup>

This is also about hybridity of the Turkish identity. As Turkey is situated on two continents, its identity also reflects its being ‘in-between space’. The official explained clearly how both of the identities evaluate each other and how reality, and may be, the interests make these two identities live together and interact. Regardless of the various reasons such as geography, immigrants, security, economy and population the Turkish identity and the European identity were and always will be in interaction. As the official stated, this is the reality. Turkey may contribute to the construction of European identity as a national identity within the EU or it may contribute as the liminal identity outside the EU.

Here the relations between the Turkish identity and European identity are defined as complicated. Bogdani also uses a similar expression to define Turkey-EU relations. She states that Turkey issue “has turned out to be the ‘horny issue’ or ‘hot potato’ topic of EU enlargement policy.”<sup>913</sup> It can also be asserted that the Europeanness of Turkey changes according to where you are. This may happen because of Turkey’s geography as being situated between two continents, yet it is the bridge between two civilisations. It is generally evaluated as an asset and advantage for Turkey. Yılmaz notes that “Turkish political and intellectual elites usually take pride in the notion that Turkey is a bridge between the East and the West, connecting Asia to Europe.”<sup>914</sup> He adds that while Turkish political leaders evaluate this as a reason to include Turkey to the EU, Angela Merkel evaluates it differently. He refers to Angela Merkel’s expression and according to this expression, “... a bridge ... should never belong totally to one side. Turkey can fulfil its function of a bridge between Asia and Europe much better if it does not become a full member of the EU.”<sup>915</sup> This statement may be interpreted as having both the western and eastern values in Turkish identity is not an asset but an obstacle or a challenge in the accession process.

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<sup>912</sup> Interview with the official from the Accession Policy Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>913</sup> M. Bogdani, *Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession*, p.18.

<sup>914</sup> H. Yılmaz, “Turkish identity on the road to the EU: basic elements of French and German oppositional discourses”, p.297.

<sup>915</sup> Ibid.

Thus it can be stated that similarities and commonalities between the Turkish identity and European identity changes according to the context, according to the situation and to whom you are asking. While most of the officials focus on the reality that it changes, each of them evaluate the question from their own perspective and this shows how differently they can evaluate it.

In another question the differences between Turkish identity and European identity was asked. The official from the Translation Coordination Directorate expressed that she does not think personally that religion will be a difference as long as it is evaluated from the framework of believing in the existence and mercy of God.<sup>916</sup> This point is important as it focuses on religion as a belief system and evokes another way of seeing religion. According to this view, if religion as a belief system is the case there will be no difference. But if it is perceived differently, there may be a problem. Yılmaz also focuses on this difference in his studies and refers to Agustin Jose Menendez and Heinrich August Winkler. According to them, he expresses that “what makes a person ‘Christian’ ... is not so much spirituality, belief and prayer, but the deep-seated and generationally transmitted civilization, way of life and values.”<sup>917</sup> So, it can be said that it is not much about Christianity or Islam as a religion but it is about a way of life.

The last question was about the possible effects of Turkish identity in constructing European identity in the case of possible membership. The official from the Translation Coordination Directorate indicated that Turkey’s membership would enrich the cultural mosaic of European identity.<sup>918</sup> The official from the Research and Documentation Directorate evaluated Turkey’s membership as an opportunity for unity of cultures and religions. He noted that “a European identity which have more ... relations with Turkish identity and other identities and which includes diversities would

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<sup>916</sup> Interview with the official from the Translation Coordination Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>917</sup> H. Yılmaz, “Turkish identity on the road to the EU: basic elements of French and German oppositional discourses”, p.298.

<sup>918</sup> Interview with the official from the Translation Coordination Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

be the base of European citizenship.”<sup>919</sup> Another official from the Accession Policy Directorate expressed that:

... Islam is part of Europe. Europe must see it. It cannot fight with its citizens. ... the people it is ‘othering’ have French passport, German passport, and British passport. They do not have Turkish passport or they are not Moroccan or African. They are the citizens of this country. It must make peace with these people. It must compromise at a point. And yes, Turkey’s Islam identity, if we can come through democratization ... in European standards, I think it is an advantage. Turkey’s this Islam identity, Muslim identity, this is the reality, if we ... succeed in having democracy, economy and all in European standards, this Muslimism would be an asset, if we can do everything well. ... I think Turkey’s EU membership would have an intermediating role. ...<sup>920</sup>

It can be said that interviewees think that Turkey’s Muslim identity would be an advantage and asset rather than a disadvantage or challenge for the EU because it can have an intermediating role. Moreover, the motto of the EU and one of the components of the European identity, namely ‘unity in diversity’, may be provided well with Turkey’s accession. Thus European identity may be able to include its Muslim citizens to its identity properly without ‘othering’ them and show that it is not a Christian club but an entity in which diversity is praised rather than discriminated.

Supporting this view, Bahar Rumelili cites Guenter Verheugen’s expression:

The advantage for the European Union of having a Muslim country standing firmly by its side are becoming ever clearer, providing living proof that it is perfectly possible for such a country to share our values. One of the great questions of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be how we shape the relationship between the West and the Islamic world. Turkey has a key role to play here.<sup>921</sup>

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<sup>919</sup> Interview with the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>920</sup> Interview with the official from the Accession Policy Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

<sup>921</sup> European Parliament: Debate on Turkey’s Application for EU Membership (June 4, 2004), cited in Bahar Rumelili, “Negotiating Europe: EU-Turkey Relations from an Identity Perspective”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10, No.1, (2008), <http://files.setav.org/uploads/Pdf/insight-10-1-rumelili.pdf> (16.07.2015), p.105.



She also cites Ismail Cem's evaluation about Turkish identity: "We consider ourselves both European and Asian and consider this dual identity to be an asset" and Rumelili interprets this as the representation of Turkey's hybrid identity.<sup>922</sup> She also adds that:

... Turkey occupies a liminal, partly-self, partly other position. Turkey is often represented as a country of contradictions; one that is geographically situated both in Europe and in Asia, where a predominantly Islamic society co-exists with staunchly secular westernizing state, founded on the rejection of its Ottoman and Islamic heritage.<sup>923</sup>

It should also be added that Turkish identity's effect would be examined well with Turkey's accession to the EU. In the accession process, Europe has more impact on Turkish identity. Nas explains this with Europeanisation. According to her;

Europeanisation in the case of candidate country mostly involves a top-down mechanism of the EU influencing and acting as an agent of change by providing external incentives and/or sanctions guiding the behaviour and internal reform process of candidate countries.<sup>924</sup>

But this does not mean that Turkish identity does not affect European identity. Selcen Öner notes that; "construction process of European identity has been also affected by its interactions with Turkey, especially through questioning Turkey's membership in terms of its Europeanness which has led to questioning of European identity itself."<sup>925</sup> So as long as there is an interaction, mutual effects on constructing both identities will be in existence. Öner also asserts that:

The membership of Turkey is usually considered as a contribution to the construction process of EU identity in the world as a global player. On the other hand, it is usually perceived as a challenge to the construction process of European identity within the EU, especially by those who define European identity on cultural basis.<sup>926</sup>

In conclusion, the relation between the Turkish identity and European identity should be underlined. Turkey and the EU have had relations for more than 50 years.

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<sup>922</sup> Bahar Rumelili, "Negotiating Europe: EU-Turkey Relations from an Identity Perspective", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10, No.1, (2008), <http://files.setav.org/uploads/Pdf/insight-10-1-rumelili.pdf> (16.07.2015), p.106.

<sup>923</sup> *Ibid.*, p.102.

<sup>924</sup> Ç. Nas, "The Europeanisation of Identity: The Case of the Rebuffed Candidate", p.42.

<sup>925</sup> Selcen Öner, "Construction of European Identity within the European Union", PhD Thesis (Marmara University, European Union Institute, 2008), p. 370.

<sup>926</sup> *Ibid.*, p.439.

Especially after Turkey granted candidacy status the relations and the membership incentive have affected Turkish identity. As noted many times, from the constructivist point of view, identities are socially constructed and reconstructed so the Turkish identity and the European identity have changed with these reconstructions in this process and they may continue to be constructed as long as this relation continues.

#### **5.4. The Role of Language in Turkey – EU Identity Relations**

In this part, developments related to language issues and multilingualism in Turkey are examined in order to see the role of language in Turkey – EU identity relations. Before focusing on the developments related to language issues in Turkey, the developments at the end of the Ottoman Empire should also be mentioned.

The Ottoman Empire was multilingual and some of the languages which were spoken were Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish besides many other minority languages. Ottoman Turkish was the official language but Arabic and Persian were also spoken and taught because Arabic was evaluated as the language of science and Persian as the language of literature. During the final period of the Ottoman Empire French, German and English were also taught.<sup>927</sup> Yasemin Kırkgöz notes that English language teaching dates back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century and she evaluates it as a mark for the beginning of westernization policy of the education system.<sup>928</sup> But French was taught before English as a result of “the attempts for the renewal and modernization of the Ottoman institutions, particularly the military structure”.<sup>929</sup> So it can be stated that foreign language teaching and learning has a long history and it started as a need and a tool for modernization and Westernization. It started with French and continued with English. Gülay Sarıçoban divides the history of English Language teaching in three periods which are Tanzimat Period, in which English teaching started; the Republican Period, in which there were many reforms in many fields as well as culture, education and

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<sup>927</sup> Bayram Küçüköğlü, “The History of Foreign Language Policies in Turkey”, *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Vol.70, (2013), p.1091.

<sup>928</sup> Yasemin Kırkgöz, “English Language Teaching in Turkey: Policy Changes and their Implementations”, in George Braine (ed.), *Teaching English to the World: History, Curriculum, and Practice*, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., 2005, p.160.

<sup>929</sup> Gülay Sarıçoban, “Foreign Language Education Policies in Turkey”, *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, Vol.46, (2012), p.2644.

language; and the last period started with the 1997 Education Reform.<sup>930</sup> As it is beyond the scope of this thesis, these periods are not discussed in detail in this part but it is important to be aware of the development of foreign language teaching and learning in order to notice the aim and the desire to be a part of the Western culture.

The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 and Turkish became the official language of Turkey. The reforms related to the language started with the alphabet reform in 1928 and within ten years Turkish Language Society was established in 1932 and three Turkish Language Congresses were organised in 1933, 1934 and 1936.<sup>931</sup> These developments were about the purification of Turkish language and replacing Arabic and Persian words with the pure Turkish ones.<sup>932</sup> But it is also about the Westernization policy of the Turkish Republic as the alphabet was changed, Arabic and Persian influence on the language was aimed to be eliminated and Turkish Language Society was established. Robert Underhill supports this view by stating that “the language reform movement must be understood in the political and social context of the Kemalist revolution, a nationalist and secularist movement aimed at the modernization and Westernization of Turkey.”<sup>933</sup>

Another development related to the language issue was the establishment of the official Translation Bureau in 1940, which “published over a thousand translations of mainly Western classics until 1966.”<sup>934</sup> This is also about the Westernization policy of Turkey as Western classics were preferred to be translated. Besides these developments, there were many other social, political and economic developments such as abolition of sultanate, unity in education, adoption of Western time and calendar, universal suffrage, adoption of international numeric system and developments related to women’s rights.

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<sup>930</sup> Ibid., pp.2643-2644.

<sup>931</sup> Vecihe Hatipoğlu, “Atatürk ve Terim Devrimi”, in Doğan Atılğan (ed.), *Atatürk ve Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı, Türk Eğitimi ve Türk Kültürü Konusunda Seçme Yazılar*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006, pp.31-33.

<sup>932</sup> Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?*, Oxon: Routledge, 2006, p.55.

<sup>933</sup> Robert Underhill, “Turkish”, in Dan Isaac Slobin and Karl Zimmer (eds.), *Studies in Turkish Linguistics*, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company, 1986, p.8.

<sup>934</sup> Şehnaz Tahir Gürçağlar, “Sherlock Holmes in the Interculture: Pseudotranslation and Anonymity in Turkish Literature”, in Anthony Pym, Miriam Shlesinger and Daniel Simeoni (eds.), *Beyond Descriptive Translation Studies: Investigations in Homage to Gideon Toury*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company, 2008, p.147.

According to Şehnaz Tahir Gürçağlar, the reforms were about the construction of new and secular Turkish identity.<sup>935</sup> And this identity was tried to be constructed on Western values.

In the Republican Period, Turkish Education Association (TED) was established in January, 1928. Then between 1928 and 1934, the TED Colleges were established. In the 1950s, a new type of school called “college” was established and the medium of instruction was English and these colleges became Anatolian High Schools later,<sup>936</sup> in the 1970s.

In 1997, there were changes related to the foreign language teaching. It was aimed “at promoting effective English teaching in both public and private schools in the country” and English started to be taught at the 4<sup>th</sup> grade.<sup>937</sup> So students began learning English at the age of 9 but it has also been changed and now students start to learn English at the 2<sup>nd</sup> grade. These developments can be evaluated as positive because age is an important factor in learning foreign language. As stated in the previous chapter, there was a *Council Resolution on the early teaching of European Union languages* in which learning languages at an early age was indicated as a significant factor in maintaining cultural and linguistic diversity. It was also stated that providing foreign language learning at an early age is the responsibility of the member states.<sup>938</sup> Turkey’s attempt to start language learning at an early age and the above mentioned Council Resolution are in the same parallel and they both aim to sustain foreign language competence at an early age which will have effects in maintaining cultural and linguistic diversity besides closer relations.

In the primary and secondary schools, students have attended many projects which are funded by the EU as since 2004 Turkey is eligible for the Community Programmes. When the participation of Turkey to Community programmes between 2004 and 2009 is examined, it can be seen that 142.000 individuals went to EU

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<sup>935</sup> Ibid., p.137.

<sup>936</sup> Ömer Demircan, *Dünden Bugüne Türkiye’de Yabancı Dil*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1988; cited in Ali Işık, “Yabancı Dil Eğitimindeki Yanlıklar Nereden Kaynaklanıyor?”, *Journal of Language and Linguistic Studies*, Vol.4, No.2, (October 2008), p.16.

<sup>937</sup> G. Sarıçoban, “Foreign Language Education Policies in Turkey”, p.2644.

<sup>938</sup> Eur-lex, Council Resolution on the early teaching of European Union languages, pp.1-2.

countries and 100.000 individuals came to Turkey.<sup>939</sup> The number of students and staffs who participated in Comenius actions, which aimed “to help young people and educational staff better understand the range of European cultures, languages and values”, between 2004 and 2009 was more than 27.000.<sup>940</sup> The number of individual mobility under the Erasmus Programme (for higher education) was more than the mobility under the Comenius actions; it was 38.457 for the same period and there were also 13.119 individuals who came to Turkey under this programme.<sup>941</sup> These programmes provide closer relations and better understanding among the participant countries. They also contribute to raising awareness of cultures and values and constructing and shaping identities.

In the universities, the medium of instruction is Turkish in general but there are universities which use English partly as the language of instruction. There are also some universities which “use English, German or French as the language of instruction preceded by one year preparatory classes”.<sup>942</sup> University students have the opportunity to be an Erasmus student which is an opportunity to experience the European culture, learn and improve foreign languages. These exchanges provide interaction and they make cultures closer so people can understand each other better. People who have these experiences and who can speak more languages are open to the developments as they have a chance to meet and share life with different cultures. As stated before, multilingualism helps to develop mutual understanding, eradicate xenophobia and be aware of cultural diversity. So it is obvious that Erasmus and other Community Programmes also contribute to Turkey’s modernization process.

As it can be seen, English learning starts at an early age and continues during the university education but the number of English knowing population is lower than in many EU member states. In Eurostat statistics, there are two kinds of statistics related to

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<sup>939</sup> Avrupa, Information Note on the Community Programmes, Jean Monnet Scholarship Programme and EU FP7 Marie Curie Actions, [http://avrupa.info.tr/fileadmin/Content/Downloads/PDF/Information%20Note%20on%20Community%20Programmes%20-%20JeanMonnet\\_MarieCurie\\_011110\\_Final\\_eng.pdf](http://avrupa.info.tr/fileadmin/Content/Downloads/PDF/Information%20Note%20on%20Community%20Programmes%20-%20JeanMonnet_MarieCurie_011110_Final_eng.pdf) (09.10.2015), p.2.

<sup>940</sup> Ibid., p.3.

<sup>941</sup> Ibid., pp.3-4.

<sup>942</sup> The Council of Higher Education, “Higher Education System in Turkey”, Ankara, 2014, <https://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10348274/10733291/TR'de+Y%C3%BCksek%C3%B6%C4%9Fretim+Sistemi2.pdf/9027552a-962f-4b03-8450-3d1ff8d56ccc> (08.10.2015), p.16.

languages. One of them is statistics about “Language learning” and the other one is “Self-reported language skills”. There is no data related to language learning proportions in Turkey but there is some information about the foreign language knowing proportion according to self-reported language skills. According to the statistics, in Turkey 81.8% of the people do not know a foreign language, 15.9% of them know just one foreign language, 2.3% of the people know two foreign languages and there is no data for people who know three or more foreign languages. There is also information according to the sexes and males who know one and two languages are more than females.<sup>943</sup> When the estimated EU results are looked at in detail, it can be seen that 34.3% of the people in the EU do not know any foreign language, 35.8% of the people know one foreign language, 21.1% of the people know two foreign languages and 8.8% of them know three or more languages. Turkey’s percentage of the people who do not know any foreign languages is the highest in the list which includes the EU member states, Norway, Switzerland, Serbia and Turkey. Hungary follows Turkey with 63.2%.<sup>944</sup> These numbers show how low the foreign language knowing proportion is in Turkey. Moreover, this information is self-reported and there is a possibility of overestimation. It can be noted that the foreign language knowing population is so low even though English teaching starts at an early age and continues nearly at all levels of the education life.

Another survey result about English learning was conducted by British Council and the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) in 48 state schools between February-July 2013.<sup>945</sup> Large sample of students (19.380 students) and parents of 4<sup>th</sup> grade students (1394 parents/guardians) attended this survey. According to the results, 74% of the students and 94% of the parents consider English as an important language. But it is also indicated in the Report of the survey that “84% of the parents and 32% of the students have an English level that is at beginner level or below.”<sup>946</sup>

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<sup>943</sup> Eurostat, Number of foreign languages known (self-reported) by sex, 2011, <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>, (08.10.2015).

<sup>944</sup> Ibid.

<sup>945</sup> British Council and TEPAV, Turkey National Needs Assessment of State School English Language Teaching, November 2013, [http://www.britishcouncil.org.tr/sites/default/files/turkey\\_national\\_needs\\_assessment\\_of\\_state\\_school\\_english\\_language\\_teaching.pdf](http://www.britishcouncil.org.tr/sites/default/files/turkey_national_needs_assessment_of_state_school_english_language_teaching.pdf) (08.10.2015), p.9.

<sup>946</sup> Ibid., pp.37-39.

Another finding of the survey is that “More than 95% of students in Government schools across Turkey cannot speak or respond to normal, or slowly-spoken English at the end of Grade 10, an estimated minimum of 920 class-hours delivered over 7 school years.”<sup>947</sup> As it is clear, these results are quite low even though English is the most taught foreign language after German in Turkey.<sup>948</sup> According to these results, it can be claimed that Turkey’s multilingualism related to foreign language teaching should be increased as it is quite low. The diversity of the languages which are thought should also be increased.

There is also another data which can give an idea about Turkey’s English proficiency level: namely EF English Proficiency Index (EP EPI). The fourth edition of the EP EPI was published in 2014. According to EP EPI, Turkey’s English proficiency level is very low and Turkey ranks 47<sup>th</sup> out of 63 countries on the index. In the world and Europe, Denmark takes the first place while Turkey takes the last place in Europe. Even though Turkey’s adults’ English skills are weak, they seem to improve fast as Turkey is the best country in improving English skills in Europe but it does not change the general evaluation as the English proficiency level is lower than all other EU countries. In the country fact sheet of Turkey, it is stated that women’s average English level is higher than men’s and “Turkey’s generational gaps follow the global trend, with adults aged 25-44 possessing the strongest English skills.”<sup>949</sup> The average English level according to sexes is contradictory to the data presented above according to self-reported language skills results but as stated, there is always a possibility of overestimation in self-reported data. In general, it is clear that Turkey’s English proficiency level is low as Turkey is at the last place in Europe but it is improving. In order to sustain this improvement and get to higher ranks, there should be more researches and attempts related to foreign language issues. Different languages should also be taught as language competencies and multilingualism have an effect in

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<sup>947</sup> Ibid., p.56.

<sup>948</sup> Eurostat, Foreign Language Learning Statistics, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Proportion\\_of\\_pupils\\_in\\_primary\\_education\\_learning\\_foreign\\_languages,\\_by\\_language,\\_2013\\_%28C2%B9%29\\_%28%25%29\\_YB16.png](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Proportion_of_pupils_in_primary_education_learning_foreign_languages,_by_language,_2013_%28C2%B9%29_%28%25%29_YB16.png) (08.10.2015), p.9.

<sup>948</sup> Ibid., pp.37-39.

<sup>949</sup> EF Education First, EF English Proficiency Index Country Fact Sheet: Turkey, <http://media.ef.com/sitecore/~/media/centralefcom/epi/v4/downloads/fact-sheets/ef-epi-country-fact-sheet-v4-tr-en.pdf> (11.10.2015).

constructing identities. Therefore, Turkey's multilingualism level will have effect in its EU accession process, integrating Turkish citizens to the EU, getting closer to the European identity and sustaining more acceptable Turkish identity within the EU. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that languages maintain the continuation of the communication and interaction which contributes to the construction of identities.

There are many languages spoken in Turkey but there is not much information about the foreign language knowing population. So it is difficult to evaluate Turkey's multilingualism level and its effect in constructing identity. However, it should not be forgotten that there are attempts to improve the multilingualism level such as starting foreign language teaching at an early age but the above mentioned results show that foreign language competence is not at the same level with the EU. Foreign language learning should be supported and promoted more in Turkey as it is a richness and people who know foreign languages are open to new ideas, cultural exchanges and interactions which have a role in constructing identities, integrating people and sustaining mutual understanding. Moreover, lack of foreign language competence can also be a barrier in communication. Even though it may not be an official hindrance for the EU membership, as member states are responsible for their language policies, it will possibly have effects on closer relations and social integration.

### **5.5. Turkish Language in the EU**

Turkish is not one of the official languages of the EU. This may be regarded as normal because Turkey is not a member of the EU. However, Turkish would have been one of the official languages of the EU if Cyprus had applied for it.

Cemile Akça Ataç expresses that, according to the Article 3 of the Cypriot Constitution, Greek and Turkish have both official language status.<sup>950</sup> As noted before, Greek became the official language of the EU with Greece's accession to the EU in 1980s therefore, when Cyprus became member of the EU, it did not have to apply for Greek. Cyprus may have applied for Turkish but it did not happen, as well, most probably because of the disputes between Turkey and Greek Cypriot side. The Annan

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<sup>950</sup> Cemile Akça Ataç, "Empire of Languages: EU's Multilingualism Policy and the Turkish Language", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.13, No.4, (2012), p.589.



Plan, which was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek Cypriots also had effects on this outcome. If the Plan had been accepted by both sides, Turkish may have been one of the official languages of the EU, before Turkey's membership to the EU.

Turkish and Luxembourgish are not the official languages of the EU even though they are the official languages of the member states. As indicated before, member states are the main decision-makers of their language policies. For that reason and according to Article 8 of the Council Regulation No 1/58, a member state should apply for an official language status of its language. As long as they do not apply, a language cannot get the official language status automatically by becoming a member state. Therefore, Luxembourgish and Turkish are not the official languages of the EU.

If Turkish had become the official language of the EU, it would have been beneficial for citizens of Europe whose mother tongues are Turkish, in integrating to the EU. As known, there are many Turkish people living in the EU. Some of them are Turkish minorities who live in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. Some of them are immigrants who live in the EU. There are also Turkish Cypriots. And they were integrated to the EU in 2004 and according to the 2011 de facto results, the population of Turkish Cypriot was 294 906.<sup>951</sup> Even though it is difficult to get the proper number of the Turkish population in the EU, there is news which is related to it. According to *Milliyet* news, the Turkish population in the EU became 5.2 million with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania which is more than the population of some EU member states such as Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Estonia.<sup>952</sup>

Cemile Akça Ataç evaluates the status of Turkish language both from the Cyprus issue and the context of immigrants in the EU. With regard to Cyprus issue, she indicates that: "The EU executive and member states should realize that the failure of including Turkish in the EU languages has further aggravated the Turkish Cypriots'

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<sup>951</sup> Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, KKTC Hakkında, <http://kktcbe.org.tr/www/tr/Icerik.ASP?ID=763> (16.08.2015).

<sup>952</sup> Gülay Fırat, "AB'deki Türk nüfusu 5 milyona yükseldi", *Milliyet*, 12 January 2007, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/01/12/siyaset/asiy.html> (16.08.2015).

disenchantment with the EU...”<sup>953</sup> This can be interpreted as a kind of discrimination because although the Turkish Cypriots are the members of the EU they cannot use their official language for communication with the EU institutions. She also focuses on the Turkish immigrants in Europe and notes that:

... since languages define personal identities and are matters of personal pride, immigrants may demonstrate resistance to learning the host country’s language, as it may, in their eyes, stand for giving up their own national identity. A European linguistic environment embracing Turkish may break such resistance among the Turkish immigrants all around Europe.”<sup>954</sup>

Getting official language status would be beneficial not only for the Turkish Cypriots but also for the Turkish immigrants and Turkish minorities in the EU. Ataç claims that Turkish’s inclusion “will result in a good number of results of desirable outcomes for some prolonging problems within the EU” and she also adds that it “will guarantee a much closer integration, peaceful harmonization, and perfect twinning, as it will take part in an atmosphere of cultural diversity and plurality...”<sup>955</sup>

As discussed in the previous chapter, multilingualism has many beneficial effects in sustaining integration, communication, mutual understanding, enhancing awareness of cultural diversity, eradicating xenophobia, racism and intolerance and constructing European identity. Therefore, including Turkish in this multilingual Union would also be beneficial for the harmony of the EU. This can be provided with Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, adding one more official language can be evaluated as a burden but as mentioned before, linguistic diversity is an asset rather than a challenge. There may be a cost but it can be acceptable when its benefits are thought.

Turkey’s EU accession process is evaluated in this chapter to see the process and identity relations. In order to observe the relations, it is focused on both pre-2005 and post-2005 periods and the relations are given in a historical context. It is seen that many reforms and developments have been realised. Turkey’s accession process is longer and different than any other country’s accession process and it includes many ups and downs. There are many obstacles in this process; some are official and some are

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<sup>953</sup> C. Akça Ataç, “Empire of Languages: EU’s Multilingualism Policy and the Turkish Language”, p.590.

<sup>954</sup> Ibid., p.591.

<sup>955</sup> Ibid., p.588.

not. However, the process is going on, it has slowed down but is going on. Even though the Turkish government aims just one outcome at the end of this process, many other options have been mentioned by some of the politicians. In this process, the relations between Turkey and the EU have affected the Turkish identity as Turkey is a candidate with an ultimate aim of membership. The process has also affected the European identity; as sometimes Turkey is evaluated as the 'other' of Europe by some officials whereas sometimes it is evaluated as European by some others. And those different evaluations and perceptions contributed to the constructions of both identities. The position of the Turkish language is also indicated with regards to Cyprus accession as Turkey is not a member of the EU. If Turkish language became one of the official languages of the EU whether as an outcome of Cyprus's application for accepting Turkish as an official language or as an outcome of Turkey's accession to the EU, it would be beneficial in many ways as indicated above. As noted before, each enlargement affected, contributed and shaped the European identity. Therefore, Turkish accession, as many accessions realised before, would contribute to the construction of the European identity.

## 6. CONCLUSION

The subject of this thesis is the role of EU's language policy in constructing European identity. The construction process of European identity is examined in relation with the language policy of the EU. Therefore, it is focused on the European identity and the EU's language policy.

The idea of Europe and the European identity are not new; even the idea of Europe can be traced back to ancient times. They have developed and changed in time. In constructing European identity 'other', which is mostly referred in identity constructions, has changed many times since the beginning. Turks, Islam, Russian communism, and Europe's own history, which includes wars, have been the 'other' of Europe in defining itself. And today it can be noted that Islam, as some of the interviewees referred to, has become again the 'other' of European identity after the attacks in Europe and also in the USA. But it should be noted that, as most of the interviewees indicated, the 'other' of European identity is changing according to the situation and context; it is not fixed just as the identity itself.

The construction process of European identity is discussed according to the social constructivism as it focuses on ideas and thoughts. Moreover, identities have a crucial role in the constitution of interests and actions, agents and structures are constructed mutually. Institutions have a role in constructing identities and constructivism is a theory of process. So, European identity, which is socially constructed with the interactions of the actors in relations, is argued from the constructivist point of view. The construction process of European identity is an ongoing process which is shaped with changes within the EU and changes happening in the international context. Each new enlargement contributes to the construction and reconstruction of the European identity which is an unfinished and a dynamic process. The reason for choosing social constructivism as the theoretical framework of the thesis can also be supported with Hopf's expression which notes that a major part of the constructivist research program is about "understanding how identities are constructed,

what norms and practices accompany their reproduction, and how they construct each other”.<sup>956</sup>

The EU is a *sui generis* entity. Even though its identity construction process is different than that of national identities, some of the instruments which are used in nation-building processes can be used in constructing European identity, as well. Both of the processes have idiosyncratic features but they also have similar features and use some similar instruments. For example, the EU, just like the nation states, uses symbols such as flag, anthem, driving licence and passport. These symbols have duties in setting consciousness, constructing the European identity and connecting the people's Europe to the social and political order which is also in process of construction. However, there is a stepping back in the Lisbon Treaty.

National identities of the member states and the European identity are constantly in relation. They co-exist without damaging but supplementing each other. Risse asserts that "European and national identities can go together" and he explains their co-existence with different models such as 'nested identities', 'cross-cutting identities', 'separate identities' and marble cake identities. These models are crucial in seeing how multiple identities can co-exist and in understanding their relations. It also supports the idea that European identity and national identities are not damaging each other, their co-existence is possible without diminishing the loyalties. The European identity as a political identity has both civic and cultural components in different degrees. But as the European identity does not have a common language, religion, ethnicity, and memory, it may be constructed on common values such as democracy, human rights and diversity.

In this thesis, the construction process of European identity is evaluated in the EU context and the introduction of European identity with the Copenhagen Declaration is taken as a starting point as it was first introduced with this Declaration. Before focusing on its development within the historical context, reasons for the emergence of European identity is stated. The reasons are discussed according to the political, economic and social developments of the period which led to introduction of the

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<sup>956</sup> T. Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", p.192.

European identity. In respect to the developments in the period, it is noticed that member states had problems in acting together so a need to construct a common European identity, which might have effects in bringing member states closer, having deepening effect in the EEC, supporting the integration process of the EEC, which might have a role in creating more powerful community with a single voice at the international level, emerged.

The historical developments of the construction process of European identity started to be explained with the Copenhagen Declaration on European identity and the developments which can be traced with the official documents of the EU are noted in order to explain the process. Here declarations, reports and treaties are analysed and it is noticed that democracy, rule of law, social justice and human rights were presented as the fundamental elements in the Copenhagen Declaration. There was also an emphasis on the dynamic nature of European identity and its importance with regard to visibility in the international order and being one in this order. Then, with the *Tindemans Report* it was aimed to take the people (citizens) into the process. And all other declarations and reports focused on this process contributed to the construction process of European identity with their proposals on strengthening and promoting the European identity. For example, in *Adonnino Reports*, many symbols and education related programmes were proposed to be tangible in the daily lives of the citizens. Laffan evaluates these reports as "a deliberate process of manufacturing and legitimizing a European identity from the 'top down.'"

There were also developments in respect to the treaties. In the SEA, there was a reference to identity in relation to closer cooperation on European security and it continued with the Maastricht Treaty with which identity was linked to the defence issue. But there were also other developments in the Maastricht Treaty such as aiming to preserve and respect national identities, national and regional diversities; mentioning culture for the first time in a treaty and introducing the concept of 'citizenship'. After these developments, common values were stated clearly in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Constitutional Treaty included symbols but as it was rejected, the symbols were not adopted and there were no reference to symbols in the Lisbon Treaty. However, some of

the member states decided to continue to use them. So, even though there was a stepping back in the Lisbon Treaty, many of the symbols are present in the daily lives of the citizens.

The above mentioned developments are the attempts to construct European identity at the level of basic treaties and some official declarations which can be seen as key points. These are also the institutional outcomes of the process which have been sustained by the institutions. And this can be evaluated as the top-down identity construction process of the EU. Here the changes in the process can be traced as many proposals were made to strengthen and promote the European identity in time and some of the symbols were internalised but they did not become legally binding. The relations of the EU with other countries have also changed. One of these changes can be noticed in the Copenhagen Declaration in which there is a list of countries in relation with the EU. In this list, what is striking is the fact that USA was stated even after the Middle Eastern Countries. Thus it can be noted that historical developments show that European identity is not defined and not fixed; with each new report, new treaty and the enlargements it has been constructed and reconstructed. In this construction process, sometimes nation building instruments such as symbols, educational programmes and rules can be used but it is difficult to see all the instruments as the EU is a *sui generis* entity.

The views of the officials from the Commission and surveys (Eurobarometer) are used to analyse the perception of European identity, as well. Eurobarometer results on European identity are used to give a bottom-up perspective to the thesis as they reflect the opinions of the citizens and help to notice the perceptions of the citizens. It is also aimed to grasp the European identity idea of both the officials and the people of Europe.

According to the interviews, it is difficult to give a clear-cut definition of the European identity and this is parallel to the nature of identity from the social constructivist perspective as the European identity is constantly constructed, fluid and not fixed or rigid. It is also qualified as something new, different and unique. Uniqueness of Europe is noted in respect to its diversity. In explaining European

identity, interviewees mostly refer to common and core values as they embrace differences within the EU without submerging them.

Another point emphasised with regard to European identity is ‘unity in diversity’ which has been used as a tool in the construction of European identity since the 1970s. The motto of the EU, ‘unity in diversity’, is evaluated as a functional tool which helps to sustain the possibility of working and living together in harmony within differences. The emergence of ‘unity in diversity’ can be interpreted as a need to maintain togetherness in the EU just as the emergence of the concept of European identity. Other than ‘unity in diversity’, economic values, free movement, constant doubt, human rights, democracy, respect for diversity, transparency, freedom, education, recognition of diplomas are expressed as the components of the European identity. These views are also in line with some survey results because they also note democratic values, economic values and unity in diversity as important elements of the European identity. But they also add Euro, the European flag and hymn and history, as well. According to the interviews, identity, its constitutive elements and functions can change from one context to another. It should be noted that this is quite important as it shows what makes the European identity socially constructed and not finished.

In the construction process of European identity the role of people, institutions, conflicts, the ‘other’ and the new member states should not be missed. Generally it is believed that without reference to the ‘other’ it is not possible to construct identity. The ‘other’ of European identity is believed to change in respect to the situation and to the context. Educational programmes also have an important role in creating the feeling of belonging and raising awareness of the European identity. According to the interviewees, European identity is more dominant among young people, old people, the least nationalists, more educated, wealthier people and city people who benefited more from the EU because they feel the European identity in their daily life. The views of the officials have similarities with the survey results but there are also differences. For example, according to the surveys, the oldest age groups pronounce European identity less while some of the interviewees thought that old people feel more European as they have memories of war and they know what it means.



In respect to the views of the interviewees, European identity reinforces the national identities and each new national identity contributes to the identity construction process. This shows that the views of the officials and the official documents, where the respect for national identities is emphasised, are in line. Even though national identities and European identity contribute to each other, according to Eurobarometer results, just 57% of the Europeans think in terms of both nationality and Europeanness and 39% of them refer to just their national identity.

Focusing on the language policy of the EU, it can be said that the EU is a multilingual Union with 24 official languages. Since the beginning, the official languages of the member states are the official languages of the EU and the EU supports and promotes multilingualism and linguistic diversity because of different reasons. Some of these reasons are sustaining communication within the EU, providing transparency, legitimacy and efficiency, supporting prosperity, contributing to intercultural dialogue and cohesion, providing the functioning of the EU and contributing to integration and the European identity.

The EU's language policy includes multilingualism, translation and interpretation. The development of this policy is discussed in respect to the treaties and other documents such as conclusions, resolutions, recommendations and some other reports which can be related to the language policy of the EU. The Treaty of Rome and the First Regulation are the initial documents of this process while the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union are the last documents which include the latest regulations but it cannot be said that they are the end point as the process is going on. It is a dynamic process which includes many developments. Since the beginning, many projects, programmes, actions have been realized such as Erasmus, Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci, Erasmus+, Creative Europe and Horizon 2020. They support both the multilingualism and the construction of the European identity by providing mobility, creating the feeling of belonging, raising awareness, sustaining interaction and cohesion. The importance of these programmes was also stated by the interviewees.

The Maastricht Treaty has importance in the development of the language policy as there was a reference to linguistic diversity and teaching the languages of the member states. Initial objectives of the language policy were less demanding as they were offering an opportunity of learning at least one Community language but in time it has become at least two foreign languages. Today there is no limitation regarding the languages so, many different languages can be learnt. In 1995, with the EU White Paper, it was indicated that proficiency in languages helps to benefit from economic opportunities, sustain the feeling of being European and understanding among the citizens of Europe. Besides, it was emphasised that multilingualism is part and parcel of European identity and citizenship. The importance and benefits of multilingualism and linguistic diversity for the citizens, society and the EU have been stated and restated in most of the official documents. However, at the beginning the benefits of the multilingualism were stated in relation to citizens but with the Lisbon Strategy, its importance for the EU was also expressed. The Lisbon Strategy had an effect in shaping the language policy because language skills were aimed to be used to cope with the new developments and the necessities of the time. Thus the EU would be one of the competitive knowledge-based economies at the international level. From then on the language policy of the EU also serves as an instrument to fulfil this goal besides its other objectives such as sustaining individual multilingualism and providing many benefits to the citizens both at the individual level and the EU level. And in 2007, multilingualism was assigned and identified as a separate portfolio. The last changes came with the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of EU. The related articles in these documents support linguistic diversity, prohibit discrimination and provide the right to communicate with the EU institutions in one of the treaty languages. Nevertheless, apart from these regulations member states are still responsible from their language policies as long as they stay in line with these articles.

In this policy area, member states are the main decision-makers. The Commission, the other EU institutions and the stakeholders just recommend, supplement and support the actions related to the language policy, apart from the above stated power of the EU. And this causes differences within the EU. The Final Report of the European Indicator of Language Competences shows the differences in language

competences among the member states of the EU. It also shows that the language competences are not at an expected level as English is the most preferred foreign language. However, these results do not reflect the whole Union as 14 member states attended to the survey, but it gives an idea about the situation.

Multilingualism in the EU is evaluated as individual multilingualism, social multilingualism and institutional multilingualism. All three types of multilingualism are present in the EU. Individual multilingualism is the multilingualism of the citizens and it is tried to be promoted by providing opportunities for the citizens to learn foreign languages. The social multilingualism is about the languages which are present in the society. And institutional multilingualism is about the multilingual nature of the EU institutions. However, there are criticisms about both the individual multilingualism and the institutional multilingualism of the EU because of the dominance of English.

Multilingualism is supported nearly in all of the official documents and by the EU. In ideal, the equality of the languages is accepted but there are differences in practice. Even though there are differences in the institutions of the EU, the working languages are reduced to sustain efficiency and sometimes to cope with the budgetary issues. Therefore, it is difficult to state that the full multilingualism is functioning on the all levels of the EU but it should not be forgotten that the EU is a *sui generis* entity with 24 official languages and its functioning is closely related with these languages. It is neutral to have multilingualism with different aspects; it should not be evaluated as a nation state.

The EU promotes multilingualism in two ways. First, it promotes individual multilingualism and social multilingualism with projects, programmes, actions and with language learning and teaching. Second, it promotes institutional multilingualism with translation and interpretation. These are important tools which have a role in the continuing of the communication, sustaining transparent decision-making, accessing to decision in the official languages of the EU, presenting the country interests in one of the official languages, involving citizens to process, sustaining the functioning of the EU and providing the multilingual character of the EU institutions. Interviewees also note translation and interpretation as practical tools which facilitate communication

between people, languages and identities and they also help to preserve national identities and sustain their co-existence. However, it should be noted that everything is not translated into all official languages; just legislation and policy documents of major public importance. In general, translation and interpretation are used as tools to support and sustain multilingualism mainly at the institutional level.

In the EU, some of the institutions and agencies have either translation or interpretation service or both of them but the Commission's translation and interpretation services are the largest services. Even though there are criticisms about the cost of these services, when their above mentioned service is thought it may not be evaluated as much. Linguistic diversity should be maintained as it serves social cohesion, intercultural dialogue and constructing the European identity and it is the component of this identity.

The enlargements have effects on the language policy of the EU. It can be seen in translation and interpretation services as the management of these services change with the enlargements. The terms like on request system, supply on demand, relay, real needs are the outcomes of these changes. So, on the one hand, enlargements add value to the linguistic diversity and to the European identity but on the other hand they are also challenges in terms of costs, time and efficiency. Each new enlargement may have economic effects when the costs of the translation and interpretation services are thought. It can also cause some time and efficiency problems as it will be difficult to provide translation and interpretation services with more languages. Nevertheless, supporting and respecting multilingualism has effects on social cohesion, intercultural dialogue, cognitive skills, integration, openness, tolerance, preventing xenophobia, mobility, employability, economy and European identity. Linguistic diversity of the EU is one of the components of the European identity; it affects its construction, changes it and it is an added value and richness for the identity. So, the EU should rise to the challenges of being a multilingual Union.

The role of languages in changing and shaping an identity is also discussed and supported with the literature. The term of linguistic and cultural 'affordance', which is related with the potential of new language and culture in changing identity, is one of the

terms with which identity language relation can be noticed. Another one is ‘investment’ which is about investing on target language which have effects on individual’s identity. In respect to European identity, it can be claimed that when the citizens of the EU invest on their multilingualism they will be invested on their own identity and thereby they will also invest on the European identity as they co-exist. Symbolic power is another concept which means the power of the words in making things and it is languages in this context. The last concept is ‘multi-competence’ as the state of the brain knowing more than one language. Multi-competent individuals with knowledge of different languages, which can be evaluated as language resources or symbolic power, have the opportunity to communicate with the EU citizens from different member states. Thus the communication and interactions contribute to the construction of European identity. This is the social and cultural benefit of multi-competence besides its cognitive effects which are stated in the previous chapters.

The intersection point of European identity and language policy of the EU is the social interactions which are sustained by communication and languages. European identity is an identity which is socially constructed with the interactions of the agents who are equipped with necessary resources and power, which are languages in this context. The individuals, who invest on language competences, benefit from the investment in many fields of life such as social, cultural and economic life and this will also affect European identity. The EU should take some measurements to sustain this power and resources to the individuals, provide medium for the individuals to interact socially at EU level and prevent the unequal distribution of these resources.

In constructing European identity, both the individuals as agents and the institutions have roles. When looked from the institutional level, it can be seen that both the identity construction and language policy have been developed and improved since the beginning with the treaties, other official documents, programmes and projects. When looked from the individual level, the effect of multilingualism in constructing European identity can be seen, as well. Individuals as agents equipped with resources construct it socially. The EU should provide medium for interactions and resources for the individuals to support the construction of European identity.

In short, both the European identity and the EU's language policy serve to the conflict resolution, social cohesion and integration. While they are serving to the same purposes, they also stand on the same ground: "unity in diversity" principle of the EU. They are in relation with one another and the language policy has an effect on the construction of European identity.

Turkey - EU relations are also discussed in the thesis to see the process and identity relations. Turkey's EU membership process is a long process which includes many ups and downs. It is the longest accession process. In this process, there are many obstacles; some are official and some are not. Even though full membership is aimed, there are many options which have been discussed by some of the politicians. Both the Turkish identity and the European identity have affected, changed and constructed in this process, and they are still changing as the process is going on even though it has slowed down. Turkey's identity has affected more as Turkey is a candidate country which aims to be a member of the EU, which uses incentives in this process and shapes Turkey's identity. Turkish identity has been evaluated differently by politicians and scholars; some of them evaluate it as European and some evaluate it as 'other' of the European identity and those evaluations and perceptions contributed to the constructions of both identities.

From the language perspective, it can be said that even though Turkey has a long history in foreign language teaching, the percentage of foreign language knowing population is lower than the EU percentages. But there are attempts to increase the number of people knowing foreign languages such as starting teaching foreign languages at an early age. However, it should be supported and promoted more as foreign language knowledge has effects in constructing identities. It should not be forgotten that foreign languages have a role in integrating people, providing mutual understanding and closer relations. So multilingualism at a desirable level in Turkey will have positive role in its accession process, acceptance of Turkish identity and Turkey's adaptation to the European identity. Both identities will be socially constructed and reconstructed in interactions provided by languages.

Turkish language is also mentioned in respect to Cyprus's accession because Turkish is one of the official languages of Cyprus but it has not been applied to be one of the official languages of the EU. So, Turkish people who are living in the EU are not able to use their languages in their relations with the EU institutions just like many other minorities in the EU. If Turkish language became one of the official languages of the EU, it would be beneficial in many ways as indicated above. As noted before, each enlargement affects, contributes and shapes the European identity. Therefore, Turkish accession, as many accessions realised before, would contribute to the construction of the European identity, as well.

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## **APPENDICES**

## **APPENDIX I**

Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 1, 2014.

Interview with the official from DG Interpretation, Brussels, September 2, 2014.

Interview with the official from the DG Education and Culture, Brussels, September 4, 2014.

Interview with the officials from the DG Translation, Brussels, September 4, “2014.

Interview with the official from the Accession Policy Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

Interview with the official from the Civil Society Communication and Culture Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

Interview with the official from the Research and Documentation Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

Interview with the official from the Social Regional and Innovative Policies Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

Interview with the official from the Translation Coordination Directorate of the Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, February 27, 2015.

## APPENDIX II

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What is European Identity (Europeanness)? How can you define it?
2. What are the components of European Identity?
3. Do you think that multilingualism and translation have an important role in constructing identities? If so, why and how?
4. How does the European Union's language policy of multilingualism contribute to the construction of European Identity?
5. What is the role of EU institutions in constructing identity? Which institutions play a role and in what way?
6. Is it possible to construct identity without a reference to “other”? Can we use “other” in constructing European Identity? If so, what is the "other" of European Identity?
7. What is the function of European Identity? Does European Identity have political function?
8. Do you think that the citizens of new Member States identify themselves with European Identity? If so, in what way?
9. Are there any differences between new and old members? Do they have any contribution in constructing European Identity? If so, how do they contribute?
10. In which groups European Identity is more dominant?
11. Do you think that European Identity erode national identities?

## APPENDIX III

### INTERVIEW QUESTIONS - 2

1. Avrupa kimliđi (Avrupalılık) nedir? Bu kimliđi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
2. Avrupa kimliđini oluřturan unsurlar nelerdir?
3. Çok dillilik ve çevirinin kimliklerin oluřturulmasında (inřaasında) önemli bir rolünün olduđunu düşünüyor musunuz?
4. Avrupa Birliđi'nin çok dillilik politikası Avrupa kimliđinin oluřturulmasında nasıl bir katkı sağlar?
5. Avrupa Birliđi kurumlarının kimlik oluřturulmasındaki rolü nedir? Hangi kurumlar ne tür bir rol oynar?
6. "Öteki" kavramı kullanılmadan bir kimliđin oluřturulması mümkün müdür? "Öteki" kavramını Avrupa kimliđini oluřtururken kullanabilir miyiz? Eđer kullanabilirsek Avrupa kimliđinin "öteki"si kimdir/nedir?
7. Avrupa kimliđinin işlevi nedir? Siyasi bir işlevi var mıdır?
8. Hangi gruplar arasında Avrupa kimliđi daha baskındır?
9. Avrupa kimliđinin ulusal kimliklere zarar vereceđini düşünüyor musunuz?
10. Sizce Türkiye kimliđi, Avrupa kimliđi ile benzerlikler taşıyor mu? Taşıyorsa bu benzerlikler nelerdir?
11. Türkiye kimliđi ile Avrupa kimliđi arasında fark var mıdır? Varsa bu farklar nelerdir? Türkiye'nin olası üyeliđi Avrupa kimliđini oluřturulmasına katkı sağlayacak mıdır? Sağlayacaksa nasıl?