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INTEGRATION OF MUSLIMS IN EUROPE: THE FAILURE OF MULTICULTURALISM IN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW PARADIGM

DOKTORA TEZİ

ZEKERİYA TÜZEN

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ONAY SAYFASI

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to examine the integration of immigrant Muslims in Europe, particularly in accordance with the integration policies of Great Britain and Germany. Both countries have implemented different forms of multicultural policies to harmonize diversities in their societies. While implementing these policies, both countries have encountered significant challenges to the integration of Muslim immigrants. Muslims living in Europe have a high degree of diversification with respect to their ethnic, linguistic and cultural community characteristics. The common denominator among them is religious identity.

The association of Islam with terrorism after the September 11 attacks has cultivated exclusivist attitudes towards Muslims in western societies. This situation has laid the groundwork for a politically constructed phenomenon: Islamophobia. Anti-immigrant rhetoric more or less overlaps with anti-Muslim rhetoric making Islamophobia commonplace in today's European public. There is a backlash against multiculturalism in Europe that coincides with the rise of Islamophobic attitudes. The discourses regarding the problems of integration of immigrant Muslims in Europe evoke Islamophobic sentiments which are associated with the exclusion of Muslims in European societies. Thus, this study examines whether there is a relationship between the policies of multiculturalism and the rise of Islamophobia in Europe with references to the controversies surrounding multiculturalism in Great Britain and Germany.

Key words: Integration, Multiculturalism, Terrorism, Islamophobia, Euro-Islam

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Avrupa'daki göçmen Müslümanların entegrasyonunu özellikle İngiltere ve Almanya'nın entegrasyon politikaları çerçevesinde incelemektir. Her iki ülke kendi toplumlarında farklılıkları uyumlaştırmak için çokkültürcülük politikalarının farklı şekillerini uygulamakta ve bu uygulamalar esnasında önemli ölçüde güçlüklerle karşılaşmaktadırlar. Avrupa'da yaşayan Müslümanlar, etnik, dilsel ve kültürel topluluk özellikleri bakımından yüksek derecede çeşitliliğe sahiptirler. Aralarındaki ortak payda ise dini kimliktir.

11 Eylül saldırılarından sonra terörle İslam'ın ilişkilendirilmesi Batı toplumlarında Müslümanlara yönelik en etkili dışlayıcı tutum olarak gelişmiştir. Bu durum, siyasi olarak inşa edilmiş bir olguya zemin hazırlamıştır: İslamofobi. Genel olarak, Avrupa'da İslamofobiyi klişe haline getiren göçmen karşıtı söylem az ya da çok Müslüman karşıtı söylem ile örtüşmektedir. Avrupa'da İslamofobik tutumların yükselişi ile eş zamanlı olarak çokkültürcülüğe karşı bir tepki vardır. Avrupa'daki Müslümanların entegrasyon sorunları ile ilgili söylemler, Müslümanların Avrupa toplumlarından dışlanma yönünde muamele göreceklerini çağrıştıran İslamofobik duyguları harekete geçirmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma Avrupa'da çokkültürcülük politikaları ile artan İslamofobi arasında bir ilişki olup olmadığını, çokkültürcülük hakkında İngiltere ve Almanya bağlamında ele alınan tartışmalara referanslarla incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Entegrasyon, Çokkültürcülük, Terörizm, İslamofobi, Euro-İslam

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AABF	*Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Fedrasyonu* (German Federation of Alevi Communities)
ABF	*Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu* (Alevi Bektashi Federation)
AfD	*Alternative für Deutschland* (Party of Alternative for Germany)
AMKA	*Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten* (Office of the Multicultural Affairs)
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BAMF	*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge* (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)
BCM	Bradford Council for Mosques
BfV	*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
BMF	British Muslim Forum
BMI	*Bundesministerium des Innern* (Federal Ministry of Interior)
CDU	*Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
Civitas	Institute for the Study of Civil Society
CLGC	Communities and Local Government Committee
CRS	Congressional Research Service
Da'ish	*al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil-Iraq wa al-Sham*
DCLG	Department of Communities and Local Governments
DIB	*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı* (Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs)
DIK	*Deutsche Islam Konferenz* (German Islam Conference)
DITIB	*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birlikleri* (Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs)
ESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EU	European Union

EUMC	European Union Monitoring Center
FES	Friedrich Ebert Foundation
HAMAS	*Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah*
HuT	*Hizb ut-Tahrir*
IAK	*Islamischer Arbeitskreis in Deutschland* (Islamic Working Group)
IGBD	*Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland* (Islamic Community of Bosnians)
IGD	*Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland* (Islamic Community in Germany)
IGMG	*Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş* (Islamic Community Milli Görüş)
IRD	*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany)
IS	Islamic State
ISC	Islamic Sharia Council
ISB	Islamic Society of Britain
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria / Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
IZH	*Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg* (The Islamic Centre Hamburg)
JaN	*Jabhat al-Nusra*
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
JI	*Jama'at-l Islami*
KRM	*Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland* (Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany)
LEA	Local Education Authority
LGA	Local Government Association
MAT	Muslim Arbitration Tribunal
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MCB	Muslim Council of Britain
MINAB	Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKSB	*Nordkaukasische Separatistenbewegung* (North Caucasus Separatist Movement)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

NOP	Non-Profit Organisation
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany
ONS	Office for National Statistics
OSI	Open society Institute
PBM	Progressive British Muslims
PEGIDA	*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West)
PMDPT	Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought
PVV	*Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom)
RAXEN	Racism and Xenophobia European Network
SCHURA	*Rat der Islamischen Gemeinschaften in Hamburg* (Council of the Islamic Communities in Hamburg)
SIC	State of the Islamic Caliphate
SMC	Sufi Muslim Council
SPD	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
TH	Turkish Hezbollah
TJ	*Tablighi Jama'at*
UK	United Kingdom
UKACIA	United Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs
UKIM	United Kingdom Islamic Mission
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UMO	Union of Muslim Organization of the UK and Eire
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
VIKZ	*Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren* (Association of Islamic Cultural Centres)
WWII	World War II
YMUK	Young Muslims United Kingdom
ZMD	*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland* (Central Council of Muslims in Germany)

INTRODUCTION

Approximately 20 million Muslims live in Europe.[1] The vast majority of these Muslims have immigrant backgrounds. The significant size of this population paves the way for many questions about Muslim accommodation in Europe. The perception of Europeans about Muslims is characterized by a fear of Islam as an expanding religion enabling extremism and violence. The European approach to Muslims is often dominated by significant stereotypes and broad generalizations of political discourses.

Muslims living in Europe differ significantly in terms of their ethnic, linguistic and cultural community characteristics. Most of them have struggled to reconcile their existence within European host societies and the role of their religion. The lack of unique representation at the European level has led to questions about their existence in European countries. Muslims in Europe have been subject to integration policies at the national level since their arrival in Europe as guest workers after the Second World War (WWII).

Islam has constituted a persistent aspect of European society and has a significant role in shaping the European integration. However, there is a lack of a common policy concerning the integration of Muslim communities at the European Union (EU) level, while each country has its own respective national policies towards Muslim immigrants. In that sense, Europeans' initiatives to accommodate

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[1] In this study, the term Europe refers to the countries listed in Table 1 where Muslims are a minority of less than 10 % of the population in the country concerned. Since some European states do not collect data on their citizens' religion, more accurate data concerning the Muslim population in Europe is not available. The Pew Research Center study in 2011 estimates that over 18 million Muslims live in Western Europe and projects that it will be approximately 30 million in 2030 (Pew Research Center, *The Future of the Global Muslim Population*, Washington: Pew Research Center, 2011). The number is estimated to be around 20 million in the relevant literature because official figures of the Muslim population do not include irregular immigrants – between 120 and 500 thousand migrants, the majority of which are coming from Muslim countries – entering these countries illegally every year.

immigrant Muslims in Europe are comprised of a spectrum of policies ranging from recognizing multiculturalism to adopting assimilation.

In this study, the European attempts to integrate immigrant Muslims in Europe are examined through the cases of integration policies in Great Britain and Germany respectively, taking into account their specific policy applications towards the Muslim communities. Both countries have implemented different forms of multiculturalism to harmonize diversities in their societies.

Muslims in Europe have been subject to several academic studies ranging from migration to criminal investigations when their presence has reached significant numbers in the European countries. In these studies, the Muslim presence in Europe became the focal point in the context of integration of immigrants into the European civic and political order. These studies have largely been classified within the political and sociological context. Some of them have taken into account the political concerns related to developments about Islam and Muslims in the Middle East, while others have focused on the issues of Islam and Muslims in Europe as the logical extension of these developments. Among them, there is a growing literature focusing on the rise of Islamophobia in Europe because it has reached a tremendous level in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the consecutive terrorist events in Europe. Thus, they focus on conflicts between European host societies and Muslim immigrants. Some of these studies have made over-generalizations about the presence of Muslim communities because they have envisioned Islam as a unified, homogenous and radical monolithic bloc that has emerged in Europe.

Indeed, this perception has come to the fore with the growing number of Muslims in Europe through immigration. Moreover, it has a cumulative effect since Muslims and their identity, sometimes distinctive dress, and appearance have become increasingly visible in the European public space. At the political level, Islam and Muslims are considered as a potential threat against European security and culture.

Anti-Muslim discourses accelerated with the growth of terrorist and radical movements not only in Europe but also in Muslim majority countries as they became the source of inspiration for some European Muslims. These Muslims are sometimes accused of being proxies of terrorist organizations originating outside Europe. Boko Haram in Nigeria, al Shabaab in Somalia, the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, al Qaeda in Afghanistan and their provocative instruments in Europe are some of major examples in this context. With significant numbers of the IS fighters recruited from Europe and actively participating in the civil and sectarian war in Iraq and Syria, the European governments initially considered increasing security measures. The developments that occurred in the aftermath of the Paris attack at the beginning of 2015 have informed the growing protests in European streets led by anti-Muslim movements against "Islamization of Europe" and have signalled the failure of the existing security measures.

Europeans' fear of radicalism and terrorism attributed to Muslims contributes to exclusive attitudes in the form of stigmatization and marginalization of Muslim communities. They are criminalized by the discourses of far-right parties and this garners great attention in the mainstream media which relates radical and terrorist activities to immigrant Muslims. Moreover, some politicians and academicians participate in these exclusivist discourses against Muslims in Europe. In these discourses, European Muslim organizations are often accused of being the center of illegal activities. Anti-Muslim discourses give references to the linkages between European Muslims and the radical movements stemming from the Muslim majority countries which are associated with the role of the Muslim organizations in Europe.

The increasing trend of Islamophobia following the terrorist attacks and the anti-Muslim responses in Europe has led many academicians and politicians including Muslim scholars in European countries to find an immediate way out in order to keep the current situation from deteriorating. Since a growing number of European leaders have announced that the multicultural policy "of people from different cultures living happily side by side" has failed, debates on multicultural

policies in Europe have increased exponentially, especially in the case of Muslim immigrants.

This study aims to determine whether there is a relationship between the controversies surrounding policies of multiculturalism and the rising trend of Islamophobia by focusing on the integration processes of Muslim immigrants in Great Britain and Germany, in particular after September 11. Specifically, the historical roots of both countries' long lasting experiences of immigration waves and the development of multiculturalism in the relevant literature are analysed. Both countries' initiatives to integrate Muslim immigrants are examined in the historical context since the end of the WWII. This study argues that anti-Muslim attitudes undermined the notion of peaceful coexistence of people from different cultures in both countries.

Muslims in Europe are not granted minority status but they are unofficially called minorities. Although the aim of this study is not to discuss whether Muslims in Europe are a minority or not, it needs to be underlined that the vast majority of the studies on assimilation, multiculturalism and integration widely use the term minority when they point out about the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in European societies. Besides, the current problems concerning the Muslim presence in Europe, focusing on issues ranging from security to identity, cannot be adequately described without reference to the context of the minority-majority dynamics since the Muslims in Europe are few in number but they have the capacity to reshape attitudes, behaviours and practices of the host societies. In this respect, this study associates the terms "minority", "minority groups" and "minority communities" with Muslims in order to specify their distinctive category in the European societies in which they live. In addition, it is thought to be the most appropriate term in describing their vulnerable position vis-à-vis the increasing trend in anti-Muslim discourses and grievances of Islamophobia related arguments.

Taking this into consideration, the dimensions of the current problems are scrutinized through official discourses and reports related to the integration policies

towards Muslim immigrants in both countries. In fact, the integration studies on Muslims in Europe have been searching for alternative perspectives instead of the currently unpromising odds of success of integration polices at the national level in Europe. There are some initiatives seeking for European Islam as a comprehensive solution to tackle the current problems and to accommodate Muslim communities in Europe. It is often called Euro-Islam and has increasingly been discussed in studies of some prominent scholars in the last decade as a new phenomenon to define the Muslims' status in Europe as a whole.

This study deals with Euro-Islam as a newly emerging initiative based on the discourses of the European Muslim intellectuals, mainly Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan and to find common ground in their discussions related to the integration of immigrant Muslims in Europe. Euro-Islam is investigated to determine if it can produce a full-fledged roadmap capable of achieving positive outcomes for the sake of peaceful co-existence of Muslim communities and European host societies in the foreseeable future.

This is a comparative study that to some extent makes use of the discourses as a research method. A comparative study provides a significant analytical guide capable of explaining social researches. One of the recent studies about this method describes comparative analysis as follows:

> "Comparative analysis is an old mode of research, widely used within many, if not all, fields of scientific inquiry. As a method strategy, comparison plays an important part in the most diverse branches of the humanities and the social sciences alike; and while its early uses can be traced back to the Antiquity, it seems to be more fashionable and evolving than ever, as results from contemporary comparative research can be found in nearly all disciplines and applied to the study of almost any topic…" (Azarian, 2011: 113)

Comparative analysis basically enables an examination of patterns, similarities and differences between the policies and their social consequences revealed from the selected cases. In this study, the government policies in Great

Britain and Germany, as two models of multiculturalism towards immigrants, provide adequate domains for the application of a comparative analysis. However, the degree of comparability of integration policies in the two countries depends on their respective approaches to multiculturalism and its implementation towards the immigrant Muslim communities. It also requires the analyses of the problems in two domains, namely the problems related with the Muslim communities and the problems encountered by the Muslim communities in both countries. The essential systematic features of both countries' problems with Muslim immigrants are based on their common religious identity and the current problems regarding their integration. In this comparative analysis, the political discourses of the incumbent prime ministers of Great Britain and Germany, namely Cameron and Merkel, are made use of in order to examine the controversies on multiculturalism.

In that sense, in order to answer questions about the integration of Muslim communities in Europe, particularly in Great Britain and Germany, the concepts "integration", "assimilation" and "multiculturalism" and their implementation in both countries are examined through a selected literature review as the secondary sources for the analysis of these cases.

There are also analyses of the facts concerning the rising trend of Islamophobia which are informed by official and think-tank reports such as the Runnymede Trust Reports on Multiculturalism and Islamophobia, Open Society Institute (OSI) Reports on the Community Cohesion, Reports of the Department of Communities and Local Governments (DCLG) on Muslim organizations in Britain, the Nationality Act, Report on the Social Cohesion, Migration and Integration Reports of the Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) on Muslim organizations in Germany, and newspapers at both country levels, as well as the EU Official Journals, the European Commission Reports, the European Council Presidency Conclusions and the European Union Monitoring Center (EUMC) reports at the EU level.

After the analysis of controversies regarding multicultural policies in Great Britain and Germany through presentation of the statements of both Cameron and

Merkel, Euro-Islam is studied through the experience of European Muslims. In search of Euro-Islam, scholarly debates and discussions on Islamophobia shed light on the importance of analysis of the facts about Muslim immigrants in Europe. Thus, Euro-Islam is examined by, to some extent, making use of the discourses illustrating that it is a newly emerging form of Islam in the European context.

However, there has not been systematic research on Euro-Islam covering all aspects of the phenomenon, but it seems more likely that it will be a much used but little understood term similar to Islamophobia. In general, it was coined to refer to the religious patterns of Muslim immigrants in Europe. It is an ongoing debate and there are not adequately well-established domains for a structured scholarly discourse analysis. For this reason, this study primarily uses the approaches of two prominent scholars among European born Muslims, namely Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan, in order to conceptualize the term Euro-Islam and compare their discourses to find out whether they have a common understanding of the term.

These two scholars were selected for the following reasons. Bassam Tibi has become a reference for many academic studies concerning European Muslims and he is the first academician who coined the term Euro-Islam from his distinctive perspective. He defines the concept by providing a criticism of Muslim communities in Europe and then offers alternative ways of thinking for them. At the same time, Ramadan contributed to the term Euro-Islam in a conservative manner as a traditional Muslim thinker. He is accepted as one of the most famous intellectuals among European Muslims and his ideas are also influential outside Europe. In general, Tibi's and Ramadan's views on Euro-Islam are in contrast with each other, but they pursue some common understandings of the term. In other words, Tibi's understanding of Euro-Islam is mostly based on the reformist ideas requiring changes in religious premises by making it a secular religion, while Ramadan rejects reform in Islamic sources and advises Muslims to protect their religious identity by making it more European through adaptation of the existing legal order in the society in which they live. Tibi's views are widely supported by the European secularist circles and his opponents accused him of being a popular modernist, whereas Ramadan is

strongly supported by the European Muslim religious fellows and, therefore, he is accepted as a prominent representative of traditional Islam. His opponents often accused him of being a *salafi* Islamist. However, both Tibi and Ramadan agree on the new interpretation of the Islamic sources in the European context.

In this context, the research question of this study is formulated as follows: What is the relation between multiculturalism and Islamophobia? Is there any relation at all in the relevant studies and public debates?

The growing presence of Muslims in Europe is often associated with "the problem of Islam in Europe", which is assumed to be the source of conflict within the European societies that more or less reveals the "boundaries and limits of multiculturalism" (Zemni, 2002: 1). Discussions of multiculturalism in Europe are indispensable for examining identity related issues and problems of identification (Grillo, 2007). That is to say, debates on the failure of multiculturalism are related to the confrontational issues concerning the identity of European Muslims.

Systematic researches on Islamophobia constitute a newly emerging field. Correspondingly, there are no studies that sufficiently examine the relationship between the rising trend of Islamophobia and the policies of multiculturalism. The majority of the literature widely focuses on multiculturalism and Islamophobia separately or at least without any substantial attempt to illustrate direct relationships between them. For this reason, there is a gap between multiculturalism in theory and its implementation in the existing approaches towards European Muslims and their practices. Therefore, this study examines the relationship between policies of multiculturalism and the core problems related to Muslims in Europe, particularly after 9/11, in the British and German cases.

Europeans' concerns about the failure of multiculturalism have arisen with the rise of Islamophobia after 9/11. There are many studies on integration, Islamophobia and multiculturalism in the European context, but studies seeking to establish direct relations between these concepts are very scarce in number. The rising trend of Islamophobia has signalled a backlash against the multicultural

policies, or at least it has become an alert for the retreat of multiculturalism, in the case of integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe. Thus, this study aims to establish a relationship between the rise of Islamophobia and the controversies concerning policies of multiculturalism in the context of Muslims in Great Britain and Germany as a comparative case study in terms of the following assumption:

Multiculturalism aims to improve the "idea of people from different cultures living happily side by side." Contrary to this view, Islamophobia indicates the growing hate against the Muslims in Europe. This situation highlights the fact that Muslims and European host societies will not be able to agree on the idea of "living happily side by side." Both Cameron and Merkel stated the failure of multiculturalism in their countries with references to the radicalism, extremism and terrorism growing within their Muslim communities. Their discourses have coincided with the rise of Islamophobic discourses, especially in the mainstream western media and the publicities of the ultra-right political parties. Thus, in order to answer the question of how Islamophobia and related issues have been increasing in Europe, both leaders' criticisms of multiculturalism will be analysed in this study.

After the examination of both Cameron's and Merkel's criticisms of multiculturalism, this study will elaborate on a relatively nascent approach, namely, Euro-Islam in terms of the discourses of Tibi and Ramadan in Europe in order to indicate whether there is a consensus about this concept as an antidote against the Islamophobia, and whether it has become an alternative to the current policies. The discussions on Euro-Islam are examined to determine whether this term identifies common ground cultivating a new idea accepted by European Muslims and non-Muslims for the sake of their peaceful co-existence.

By examining their discourses, the present study seeks to determine how Tibi and Ramadan promote analytical guides capable of interpreting Islam and being Muslim in Europe through a comparative perspective of their understandings of European Islam. Tibi supports the idea of reforming Islam as to fully comply with European culture and existing secular structures, whereas Ramadan sees Muslims in

Europe as European citizens and accepts the tenets of Islam and European pluralistic values as tantamount to sources of their identity. In general, the studies of both scholars are based on references about two sources of identity in European context: Islam identity and European identity. The compatibility of both sources of identity depends on the applicability of interpretations of Islamic and European values for Muslims living in Europe. Tibi's interpretation overwhelmingly focuses on reform in Islam as a way to make it compatible with the European values and rejects the current interpretations of the Muslim diaspora[2] about Euro-Islam, while Ramadan thinks that Euro-Islam is a social model for both Muslims and Europeans needing to merge the universal claims of both European and Islamic values.

In addition, the main features of Euro-Islam that reflect the general concerns of both European Muslims and non-Muslims will be examined from the perspective of the Muslim communities and their organizations in Great Britain and Germany. A comparative analysis is used to realize their understandings, approaches and their eventual contributions to the Euro-Islam project. Thus, this study takes into account their organizational structures, purposes and criticisms directed at their attitudes in the country they inhabit in order to find out similarities and differences among them as the supplementary evidences for the Euro-Islam discourse. The Muslim organizations were selected taking into consideration the number of mosques, religious centres and foundations they control at the national and local levels and the number of members they represent by taking into consideration the Islamic movements they are affiliated with.

This thesis is composed of five chapters, including the introduction. Chapter I is based on the conceptual analyses of integration approaches toward immigrant Muslims in Europe. Assimilation and multiculturalism are examined through the

[2] *International Encyclopedia of Political Science* (2011: 650-651), notes that the word *diaspora* comes from the ancient Greek *dia spero*, meaning to sow over. It refers to populations, such as members of an ethnic or religious group that originated from the same place but have now scattered to different locations. The concept of diaspora has long been used to refer to the Greeks in the Hellenic world and to the Jews after the fall of Jerusalem in the early 6th century BCE. Beginning in the 1650s and 1960s, scholars began to use it with reference to the African diaspora, and the use of the term was extended further in the following decades.

context of the terms and their meanings in Europe since they were coined as contested concepts in the European polities. The term integration is used as a political, and even more legitimate, tool capable of explaining European's concerns about immigrant Muslims, in contrast to multiculturalism and assimilation.

The integration debate on the Muslim presence in Europe is analysed in Chapter II by studying the multicultural policies of Great Britain and Germany. This chapter focuses on their multicultural policies towards Muslim immigrants. In that respect, Great Britain is analysed through the official acts and the citizenship regime as the legal basis of multiculturalism, and the policy of community cohesion against segregation within the British society. In the case of Germany, there is not any official statement about multiculturalism but the country's implementation of the policies towards immigrants are treated as multicultural, which is examined through the gradual evaluation of the citizenship regime as the legal basis.

Chapter III describes Islamophobia as a signal for the failure of multiculturalism in Europe. It addresses the roots of the problems with immigrant Muslims in Europe through selected official reports and the EU's approach toward Islamophobia in accordance with its legislation for non-discrimination and counter-terrorism as securitization measures. The dramatic rise of Islamophobia is identified as the most important consideration in the discourse of European politicians, particularly in Great Britain and Germany, on the failure of multiculturalism, justifying the policies of exclusion toward Muslim minorities in Europe.

Chapter IV conceptualizes the term Euro-Islam with respect to the scholarly discourse and the Muslim organizations in Great Britain and Germany. In that regard, there is a scholarly debate about Euro-Islam between Tariq Ramadan and Bassam Tibi. While Tibi coined the term Euro-Islam and gives it a secular meaning in his studies by seeking reform in Islam, Ramadan interpreted the term with respect to the identity concerns of European Muslims by discussing it in terms of the values of Islam in a traditional manner. Muslim organizations in both countries have a set of differences in representing their European Muslim fellows. Thus, their organizational

structures and purposes vis-à-vis the official statements and reports about their activities are examined in order to find out whether they pursue common grounds concerning the term as a supplementary contribution to the Euro-Islam discourse.

I. APPROACHES TO INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE

The subject of “integration” is a primary focus of research on social issues in the European countries. It is widely used to analyse minority-majority relations concerning problems of immigration. Europeans’ current problem with immigrants is mainly revealed through the discussion on “integration” of Muslim immigrants in Europe. The policies of European countries implemented for the integration of Muslim minorities are described with the following concepts: assimilation, multiculturalism, absorption, accommodation, acculturation and community cohesion. In general, they are classified in a spectrum of models ranging between two contested concepts, namely assimilation and multiculturalism.

There are “contradiction(s) in terms” arising from conflicting ideas about the concepts of integration, assimilation and multiculturalism. In search of the reasons behind such contradictions, the basic and accepted meanings of these concepts are the focal interest of this study because the approaches to integration of immigrant Muslims constitute a dynamic field that ascribes different meanings in the analyses of the relevant literature.

In order to understand the issues related to the concept of integration concerning Muslim minorities and policies oriented towards them, conceptual definitions and analyses of assimilation and multiculturalism are required. Therefore, this chapter constitutes the conceptual framework of the study.

I.1. Approaches to “Integration”, “Assimilation” and “Multiculturalism”

The concepts of integration, assimilation and multiculturalism are used to describe minority-majority interactions in the examination of social phenomenon. These three concepts constitute interrelated approaches toward social issues and are

frequently misused in describing the minority-majority dialect. However, social problems are often defined by a combination of these three concepts. Integration is mentioned as an all-inclusive term covering both assimilation and multiculturalism as the two opposite poles in this phenomenon. Multiculturalism and assimilation represent the main references in describing the minority-majority relationship in this study.

I.1.1. Positive Connotations of a Vague Term: "Integration"

The term "integration" derived from the Latin word "integer" that means "complete" or "consistent". Thus, "…integration could be translated as the remaking of an entity. [From this point of view, it is accepted that] …immigrants destroy an intact and functioning entity – that is, society – which should be reinstalled through integration measures" (Miera, 2012: 196).

Some scholars claim that the current theories of integration derive from the classical assimilation theory. Advocates of this theory define assimilation as "…the social process that brings ethnic minorities into the mainstream [of the life of a host nation]" (Alba and Nee, 1997: 828). In the case of Muslim communities in Europe, this theory requires them to give up their own identity and internalize the host societies' dominant culture. Most European countries do not implement this policy towards their minority[3] communities because it undermines the notions and principles of liberal democracy and creates discrimination against differences within their societies.

[3] Sociologist Louis Wirth's definition of minority in 1945 (quoted in Joppke, 2010: 49) is: "A minority group is any group of people who because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination". Encyclopaedia Britannica defines minority as "a culturally, ethnically, or racially distinct group that coexists with but is subordinate to a more dominant group. As the term is used in the social science, this subordinancy is the chief defining characteristics of a minority group. As such, minority status does not necessarily correlate to population. In some cases one or more so-called minority groups may have a population many times the size of the dominating group, as was the case in South Africa during the apartheid regime."

The integration policies through which Europeans have attempted to accommodate immigrant minorities since the migration flows started after the WWII are mainly examined in a spectrum comprising of two relatively opposite poles. One end of spectrum is assimilation, which demands conformity to the values and norms of the host society, while on the other end is multiculturalism, which permits minority groups to maintain their cultural or religious identity and live in the society as equals, without facing discrimination.

Notwithstanding the fact that the connotations of the assumptions of both assimilation and multiculturalism vary among the European countries, they generally tend to use the term integration that has become more legitimate to explain their concerns. This is because "integration thus appears to have an inherently positive connotation, in contrast to the concepts of multiculturalism or assimilation" (Miera, 2012: 193). However, it seems as if integration is a vague term and has no particular policy applications but implies generalization of the very nature of issues and problems in the policy discourses of many European states.

I.1.2. Universalism in a Word: "Assimilation"

The *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968) points out that the term "assimilation" originated in anthropology and essentially refers to a group process which can also be defined at the individual level. Assimilation is a process of harmonizing and mainstreaming individuals from one cultural group into a dominant host culture. The *Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought* (PMDPT) defines assimilation as a process "whereby an immigrant community adopts the outward forms and political allegiance of a host community, without necessary absorbing the majority culture or adopting the majority religion" (PMDPT, 2007: 42). Besides, in the case of racially diverse societies due to the massive immigration of non-Europeans, Alba and Nee (2003: 11) define assimilation as "the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences".

The minority group in any unassimilated case is perceived as a potential threat to the existing economic, social and political structures of the host country. Correspondingly, assimilation requires minority groups to achieve an adequate measure of social, economic and political adaptation into the mainstream society. The expectation from such adaptation is best achieved when members of minority groups become indistinguishable from members of the host society.

Assimilation also explains a change in both individual and group identities because of the continuous social interactions between minority and majority groups in a given society where minorities gradually adopt patterns of the dominant culture. This does not mean that the characteristics of minority groups and cultures disappear by losing their members' loyalty to the majority cultural group; quite the contrary, as Alba and Nee (2003: 11) point out, "assimilation does not require the disappearance of ethnicity; and the individuals undergoing it may still bear a number of ethnic markers." They further state that assimilation allows a change in the nature of mainstream society and subsequently, "assimilation is eased insofar as members of minority groups do not sense a rupture between participation in mainstream institutions and familiar social and cultural practices" (ibid).

Assimilation is accepted as the opposite pole of multiculturalism. In policy terms, it is accepted that assimilated individuals and groups lose their desire to claim themselves as distinct communities in the host nations. The politics of assimilation demands a monolithic notion of citizenship and rejects any policy measures based on minority ethno-cultural-religious differences (Emerson, 2011: 2).

The classical approach of assimilation states that it comes into existence when minorities internalize the patterns of the dominant society's culture through natural adaptation; hence assimilation is defined as:

> "...a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life." (Park and Burgess, 1969: 735)

This approach does not mean a unidirectional or forced assimilation process, rather, it is assumed that "acculturation would happen spontaneously or even unintentionally by the very nature of human contact" (Yanasmayan, 2011: 24). From this point of view assimilation is, to a certain extent, accepted as an outcome of human interactions.

In this study, the concept assimilation refers to a policy of immigrant integration through which immigrant groups are absorbed into host societies. It requires a change in the characteristics of members of the immigrant groups to resemble those of the host society. It results in "the acceptance of a minority group by a majority population, in which the group takes on the values and norms of the dominant culture" (Brown and Bean, 2006: 1). Thus, it defines "a process of becoming the 'same'" through the "absorption of immigrants" within the dominant society's culture so that this approach emphasizes "...the supposition of an idealized homogenous society prior to the immigration" (Yanasmayan, 2011: 24).

Assimilation is a policy that brings responsibility to minority people to integrate themselves into wider societies in which they live without requisite tolerance of their minority group rights. For this reason, assimilation is often thought to be a utopian policy vision because it seeks to achieve "a desired outcome for a society where all members would be culturally indistinguishable from one another" (ibid). Assimilation also requires a process for individual adaptation into host society in which:

> "...the individual who has come from a minority immigrant group has totally blended in with the landscape of the country of adoption – in terms of citizenship and mastery of the language, and as a matter of attitudes and perceived identity." (Emerson, 2011: 2)

As an example for the policy approach concerning immigrant integration, assimilation means "…encouraging immigrants to learn the national language and take on the social and cultural practices of the receiving community" (Castles and Davidson, 2000: 60). In this example, assimilation presumes that "the immigrants'

descendants would be indistinguishable from the rest of the population" (ibid). It requires conformity and assent of minority groups with existing mainstream values and beliefs of the host society. From this point of view, assimilation is regarded as a standardizing model for immigrant integration. Therefore, the assimilation model accepts migrants as individuals and they are welcomed if they indicate favourable attitudes to the existing patterns of local traditions, institutions and legislation of the host country.

The model of assimilation is often described with reference to France's long standing implementation as an integration approach which claims "universalism" meaning the assimilation of individuals into French culture through a citizenship process. In principle, universalism claims that all citizens shall receive equal rights, treatment and protection before the rule of law uniquely as French citizens, without any discrimination based on cultural, ethnic, racial, or religious background. This model emphasizes that assimilation is a necessary process of societal integration because "universalism" is based on the idea that citizenship requires cultural cohesion. Instead of multiculturalism, "universalism" is indicated as a policy approach in order to refrain from "communitarianism" and "sectarianism" among the immigrant communities within the society (Freedman, 2004: 8).

"French universalism" unavoidably clashes with the integration of immigrant minorities in France. The "universalism" requires egalitarian ideals which for French society are based on strong cultural uniformity (Franz, 2007: 100). Most French political leaders and public authorities claim that French culture should not make accommodations for differences regarding immigrant cultures. In regards to the Muslim community, former President Nicolas Sarkozy stated: "Whether I like it or not, Islam is the second religion of France. So you've got to integrate it by making it more French" (Economist, 2004). The French universalist approach seems to reveal marginalization and rejection of "differences" concerning assimilation of minority communities because no exceptions are permitted in the public sphere. Events such as the 2004 ban on the *hijab* (headscarf) in public schools and the 2005 riots in the *banlieues* indicate that France has become a barometer for controversial issues

concerning minority integration throughout Europe, especially in accordance with policies of assimilation (Bowen, 2007: 157).

Moreover, the French approach to integration of minorities is criticized as aggressively and unapologetically assimilationist. This means that individuals and groups are always exposed to the idea of the "universalism". Assimilation is simply viewed as the best way to protect what are viewed as universal rights from the "tyranny of the minority". According to Republican thought, "living together in a society requires agreement on basic values" such that "citizens must all subscribe to the same values in the public sphere" (ibid). The public sphere, where general and common interests are represented over and above individual interests and diversity, requires clear constraints on conduct and expression of diverse identities. For France, the most important constraint is *laicité*, the French conception of secularism (Bowen, 2007: 11).

I.1.3. Politics of Inclusion: "Multiculturalism"

"Multiculturalism" is defined as a paradigm which criticizes assimilation and its imposition of the patterns, assumptions and values of a dominant culture on minority groups. Since assimilation makes discrimination between dominant and minority cultures, it enables segregation in culturally diverse societies, and therefore, it is accused of being racist policy. "Multiculturalism" refers to a society consisting of distinctive "mono" cultures and rejects supremacy of a single culture or, subordination of sub-cultures to a dominant one (Horsti, 2010: 157).

"Multiculturalism" is used as an analytical framework for very different policy areas ranging from immigrant integration to autonomous claims of national minorities, etc. (Bousetta and Jacobs, 2006: 25). It is often considered to be a sort of panacea in the context of the public management of identity differences in a given society. In that respect, "[w]hile the precise meaning of the word is never clear, it refers generally to the dilemmas and difficulties of the politics of difference" (Ang,

2005: 35). This accounts for why the term “multiculturalism” has remained a controversial concept despite of its common use in the examination of the minority policies of some western countries since the 1970s (ibid).

Even though there is no clear meaning of the term, Rosado (2006: 3) suggested a comprehensive definition for the patterns of multiculturalism to explain human interactions in a pluralistic society as follows:

> “Multiculturalism is a system of beliefs and behaviors that recognizes and respects the presence of all diverse groups in an organization or society, acknowledges and values their socio-cultural differences, and encourages and enables their continued contribution within an inclusive cultural context which empowers all within the organization or society.”

This definition explains how all aspects of a society benefit when policies are inclusive, encourage diverse contributions and enable all groups to participate in socio-cultural life.

The model of multiculturalism was previously conceived as a framework in which immigrants would be welcomed as residents of a host country whose attitude towards them would be similar to that of their native citizens. The host country would take into consideration the distinctive features of their religion, ethnicity and culture. It requires an adaptation process between the host society and the migrant community to prevent segregation and ghettoization within the society as a whole. At an early stage, this process of adaptation between the two communities requires institutional regulation and monitoring authorized by the host country in order to prevent social exclusion that may arise from discrimination.

Multiculturalism as a policy discourse emerged in the 1970s, but it was only in the 1990s that, led by scholars such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, a political theory of multiculturalism emerged in Canada, Australia and the United States. “From the 1970s to mid-1990s there was a clear trend across the Western democracies towards the increased recognition and accommodation of diversity

through a range of multiculturalism policies and minority rights" (Kymlicka, 2010: 32).

Multiculturalism became recognized as the key instrument of government policy to manage "ethnic pluralism" within the national polity. When it was employed in Canada, it was recognized that "...multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal. Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging" (Kumaran and Salt, 2010: 1).

In the European context, multiculturalism as an official policy discourse was first adopted in Sweden at the end of the 1970s to manage circulation and settlement of the "guest immigrant workers" (Runblom, 1994: 623). Multiculturalism was also influential in the Netherlands though it was defined as the "minority policy" of the country (Bousetta and Jacobs, 2006: 25). Britain has historically espoused a policy approach based on the idea of "racial equality". It struggled against discrimination rather than recognition of minority cultures (Modood, 1993: 513). Some of the other European countries have implemented a variety of public policies related to multiculturalism. They have experienced multicultural policies without officially labelling them "multicultural" (Bousetta and Jacobs, 2006: 25).

Multiculturalism has paved the way for western liberal democracies to identify themselves as multicultural societies although there are a few governments that have recognized official policies of multiculturalism until the 1990s (Kymlicka, 1995 and Taylor: 1992). Since the beginning of 1990s, the concept of "multiculturalism" is heavily associated with the social and cultural consequences of growing immigration in Western European countries. The governmental use of multiculturalism is widely related to the principles of equality and tolerance toward immigrants from different cultures. In order to implement these principles toward migrants within the liberal societies of Europe, "multiculturalism" is defined as a social integration model that "distinguishes itself as a positive alternative for policies of assimilation, connoting a politics of recognition of the citizenship rights and

cultural identities of ethnic minority groups and, more generally, an affirmation of the value of cultural diversity" in a pluralistic society (Ang, 2005: 37).

Multiculturalism represents a distinctive model for the management of cultural diversity, in particular the integration of minorities. Thus, it is accepted as an inclusive process where no one is excluded in a given society (Rosado, 2006: 18). In debates regarding integration of minorities, multiculturalism refers generally to solving dilemmas and difficulties of the politics of difference through democratic citizenship. Concerned as it was with the principles of legitimating democracy and liberalism, it was accepted as an extension of debates on liberal democratic citizenship (Triandafyllidou et al., 2006: 4).

In this study, multiculturalism is generally applied to achieve a conceptual framework for the accommodation of Muslim immigrant communities in Europe, particularly in Great Britain and Germany. The multicultural approach accepts the conception of equality between majority and minority groups especially in the case of integrating immigrant Muslim minorities into the European host societies. Tariq Modood and Riva Kastoryano (2006: 171) state that the multicultural approach requires the conception for equality in terms of "the right to have one's 'difference' (minority ethnicity, etc.) recognized and supported in the public and private spheres". In addition, they argue that multiculturalism needs the conception for equality of assimilation, "the right to assimilate to the majority/dominant culture in the public sphere; and toleration of the 'difference' in the private sphere." (ibid).

Multiculturalism needs both conceptions of equality because it requires the finding and cultivating of common ground between the minority and majority cultures (Modood and Kastoryano, 2006: 172). They further argue that it is not the cultural assimilation of individual immigrants that is at issue, but the recognition of the group identity that makes multiculturalism important (ibid). According to this argument, minority group recognition through multiculturalism allows minority people to actively participate in public sphere.

Some multiculturalists argue that liberal democratic states could recognize the "right of self-governance" to minority groups in certain areas of public policy because of their cultural differences (Klausen, 2005: 96). Critics argue that this approach actually would be a violation of the systems of governance of western liberal societies. They claim that it is difficult to determine whose group rights take precedence within a multicultural society (ibid).

Contrary to support for group rights, there is a significant reaction against policies of multiculturalism towards immigrants, as some critics perceive the "metics problem"[4] intertwined with concerns of immigrant groups. Will Kymlicka points out that they confuse the situation of immigrant groups with that of metics. He further states such confusion as follows:

> "…many of these metics have either broken the law to enter the country (illegal immigrants), or broken their promise to return to their country of origin (guest-workers), and so are not viewed as worthy of citizenship. For these and other reasons, the official policy in many countries is not to try to integrate metics into the national community, but to get them to leave the country, either through expulsion or voluntary return." (Kymlicka, 2001: 170)

This situation is often related to the policy of multiculturalism that has been discussed for migrants who are excluded from access to citizenship. In the case of access to German citizenship, multiculturalism is considered for metics (e.g. for Turks as guest-workers) that is used "as a rationalization for exclusion, rather than a means for improved integration" (Kymlicka, 2001: 153). The famous example which best illustrates this exclusion is that until the 1980s, the governments of some German provinces (*länder*) kept Turkish children out of German classes, and prepared separate classes for them with a curriculum mainly in Turkish, taught by teachers imported from Turkey, aimed to prepare them for their future life in Turkey (Kymlicka, 2001: 170).

[4] Encyclopaedia Britannica defines metic as in Ancient Greece, the term metic (Greek métoikos: from metá, indicating change, and oîkos "dwelling") referred to a resident alien, one who did not have citizenship rights in his or her Greek city-state (polis) of residence. Or, the term used in Ancient Greece to refer to residents of Athens who were permanently excluded from citizenship.

This is an example of an implementation of multiculturalism not conceived to open opportunities for German citizenship, but rather implemented strictly so that Turkish children were not considered as German citizens. It was a form of exclusion suggesting that Turkish children certainly did not belong as citizens of Germany but to their "home" in Turkey (Kymlicka, 2001: 170-171). The metic problem is directly related to the citizenship regime of the home country to migrants as seen in the example because it expressed the idea that foreigners were not citizens and never could be.

In the light of metic problem, European countries with restrictive immigrant policies have faced a dilemma of whether or not to eventually accept guest-workers when they are needed as in the 1950s and 1960s. It has also affected the immigrants who have permanent residence because metics, who eventually have to return to their home, are more likely to migrate to the country where it is home to migrants for their descendants or at least for their country of origin. These metics are viewed as the most unstable group among immigrants since they force the conditions to enter or stay in the country concerned. When some metics break the law to enter a country, legal migrants become focus of criticism and are sometimes associated with their illegal activities.

On the other hand, multiculturalism is essentially a liberal ideology that only works out in liberal institutions with the acceptance of universal rights. Thus, it assumes that all humans should be treated as equals and cultural diversity can only co-exist peacefully if there exists a wider consensus on liberal values within the society (Kymlicka, 2001: 174). In other words, the multicultural policy requires consensus on accommodation of diversity within the boundaries of constitutional principles based on liberal values ensuring equal opportunity and individual rights for all.

However, there are limits of multiculturalism which immigrant minority groups are expected to understand and accept (ibid). In a diverse society certain attitudes of any minority group may provoke undesirable outcomes resulting in

potential rise of stereotypes and feelings of prejudice against them. As a result, multiculturalism intrinsically has these limits to prevent the stigmatization of any minority group within the society.

Approaches to the politics of multiculturalism entered a new era in the mid-1990s with the controversies on citizenship rights and immigrants that signalled a retreat from multiculturalism. This retreat mainly reflects the fear of western societies about their common values and identity. The result of such retreat connotes a "return of assimilation" as Kymlicka (2010: 41) asserts that "the retreat from immigrant multiculturalism reflects a return to the traditional liberal and republican belief that ethnicity belongs in the private sphere, and that citizenship should be unitary and undifferentiated".

This chapter mainly focused on the definitions of the concepts of assimilation and multiculturalism in order to specify multiculturalism as a distinctive category which will be applied in the analysis of the integration policies of Great Britain and Germany towards Muslim immigrants in the following chapter.

II. INTEGRATION DEBATES ON MUSLIM PRESENCE IN EUROPE: MULTICULTURALISM IN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Over the last decade, policies of integration concerning immigrants in Europe became subject to several discussions in politics, media and academia, in particular after September 11, 2001. In many of these discussions, integration is used to explain almost all controversial developments related to the Muslim presence in Europe. Integration discourse on Muslims in Europe reflects means of prejudices which incline to homogenise the Muslim presence irrespective of their diverse ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds.

Today the Muslim population in Europe is estimated to be around 20 million, consisting of the largest and religiously most active minority communities on the continent (Nielsen, 1995: 1). This significant numbers of Muslims are predominantly from the Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries. The economic incentives of the labour shortages of the 1960s and 1970s encouraged a large number of Muslims to migrate Europe (Laurence, 2007: 2). The largest immigrant communities exist in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Smaller communities reside in other European countries. The continuing growth of the Muslim communities in the European countries, substantial numbers which are expected to be double over the next 20 to 25 years, coupled with the decreasing birth rate among native European peoples have magnified the importance of the integration of Muslims into European host societies (ibid).

Table II.1.

Number of Muslims in Europe

Country	**Estimated Muslim Population 2010**	**Estimated Percentage of Population that is Muslim 2010 (%)**	**Estimated Muslim Population 2030**	**Estimated Percentage of Population that is Muslim 2030 (%)**
Austria	475,000	5.7	799,000	9.3
Belgium	638,000	6.0	1,149,000	10.2
Denmark	226,000	4.1	317,000	5.6
Finland	42,000	0.8	105,000	1.9
France	4,704,000	7.5	6,860,000	10.3
Germany	4,119,000	5.0	5,545,000	7.1
Greece	527,000	4.7	772,000	6.9
Ireland	43,000	0.9	125,000	2.2
Italy	1,583,000	2.6	3,199,000	5.4
Luxembourg	11,000	2.3	14,000	2.3
Netherlands	914,000	5.5	1,365,000	7.8
Norway	144,000	3.0	359,000	6.5
Portugal	65,000	0.6	65,000	0.6
Spain	1,021,000	2.3	1,859,000	3.7
Sweden	451,000	4.9	993,000	9.9
Switzerland	433,000	5.7	663,000	8.1
United Kingdom	2,869,000	4.6	5,567,000	8.2
Total	**18,267,000**	**4.5**	**29,759,000**	**7.1**

Source: Pew Research Center, (2011).

* Population estimates are rounded to thousands. Percentages are calculated from unrounded numbers.

The presence of Muslims in Europe is testing the notions and principles of liberal democratic "pluralism" in the European countries where Muslim communities exist. (Khan, 2000: 29). The willingness of "liberal" European societies to accommodate these Muslim communities in terms of "principles of equality" for cultural differences has become crucially challenging since the 1990s (ibid).

Some approaches claim that today's European experience on the nature and level of integration of Muslim communities into host societies indicates that "...no society can ever ensure full equality to all its cultural minorities" because there is a "majority/minority dichotomy" in European societies which creates "inevitable social and cultural impact of inequality" (Parekh, 1998: 411). This is an "unequal dichotomy" that gives rise to tension and imposes a confrontational relationship between communities in European societies (Khan, 2000: 29). In that respect, the existence of Muslim minority communities in Europe is examined through the lens of conflict.

II.1. Integration of Immigrant Muslims in Europe

When the first generation migrants arrived in the European countries after the WWII, there were no official integration policies. At first the European governments encouraged migration flows from outside of Europe to fill their labour shortages but they lacked any formal integration of migrant workers. The main reason behind this was that immigrants were treated as temporary "guest-workers" required for the infrastructure of the European economic recovery in the 1950s and 1960s (Laurence, 2007: 2). At that time, Europeans saw them as "units of labour" and did not predict the consequences of their long term settlement in Europe, as immigrants called their families and started the process of family re-unification. Since the oil crisis in the mid-1970s economic development in European countries stalled and accordingly the presence of immigrants became an inconvenience for Europeans.

The integration debate has focused on mutual perceptions between "…those who see themselves as the reference point and those who see themselves described as [the source of the problem]" (Fekete, 2008: 4). The question of how these Muslim communities in Europe came to be viewed as the source of the problem must be scrutinized in terms of developments following their first arrival in the European countries.

Though Muslim populations had reached a significant number and started to establish communities in the European countries by the mid-1970s, their "Muslim identity" was not a source of consideration since they were accepted as immigrants. Initially they were simply viewed as "black", "Arab", "Turkish", "guest worker", or "asylum-seeker" rather than a homogenous society having a different religious and cultural identity (Laurence, 2007: 3). In the 1970s and 1980s, Muslims were acknowledged as "constituting racial and ethnic minorities" and not all Muslims were regarded as immigrants since there emerged an increasing number of people who were born in European countries (Taras, 2012: 57). Over the past two decades, these Muslims began to be "labelled" in terms of ethno-religious references as their presence reached significant numbers in the European countries.

When economic growth decreased in the mid-1970s, some European governments found interim solutions to prevent the situation from worsening by increasing public expenditures on housing, education, health and improving social aid allotments for these workers thus facilitating their passage from temporary migrants to permanent settlers without accessibility of citizenship status (Fekete, 2008: 8).

In essence, this was not an immigration or an integration policy, but a "foreigners' policy". Since the immigrants became permanent settlers in European countries, they began to establish communities in accordance with their diverse ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. Thus, contrary to previous views, which treated migrants from a socio-economic perspective, they started to be taken into consideration within a religio-cultural context. In other words, over the past three

decades, Muslims in Europe came to be labelled in terms of their ethno-religious references when their religio-cultural characteristics became visible in the European public sphere.

With the rise of political Islam and Islamic regimes in the Middle East especially following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Europeans became aware of their Muslim migrant workers drawing inspiration from these conjunctural changes (Peach, 1997: 269). This situation ushered a change of Europeans' discourse in defining Muslim immigrants from race and ethnicity to religion. Besides, conflicts in the Middle East, especially the incitement of the long-lasting Arab/Palestinian-Israeli war, had cumulative effects on the reactions of Muslim communities in Europe because they became frustrated with the Western reluctance to intercede in such conflicts.

Moreover, since the early 1980s, European governments were prepared to discuss the increasing concerns on the Muslim presence in their countries, as they were facing the dramatic growth of a new wave of immigration in the form of refugees and asylum seekers due to the Iran-Iraq war, first and second Gulf wars, the NATO-Taliban war in Afghanistan and the consecutive civil wars in the Horn of Africa.

II.2. Multiculturalism in Great Britain and Germany

In this study, multicultural policies in Great Britain and Germany have been examined in the context of both countries' extensive experiences with migration flows following the WWII. On the one hand, in Britain, several Acts have ushered in the evolution of multiculturalism. Over past decade, Britain has developed a community cohesion program to cope with the remnants of the multicultural policy which is considered to have caused segregation and parallel societies in the country. On the other hand, in Germany there is no official arrangement concerning multiculturalism but its implementation of foreigner policy has been effectively a

multicultural one. Both countries' citizenship regimes are related to the evaluation of multiculturalism. Since the overwhelming majority of immigrants are Muslims, multiculturalism has become a preferred means of dealing with problems related to integration of Muslim immigrants in both countries.

II.2.1. Multiculturalism in Great Britain

After the WWII, migrants who arrived as "Citizens of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth", have been recognized as ethnic and racial communities requesting different treatment and state support to obtain their citizenship rights (Meer and Modood, 2007: 89). This has become the essence of many Race Relations Acts in Britain, and in 1976, the third Race Relations Act introduced state sponsorship of racial equality to promote the integration of communities into the British society and offer them equality of opportunity in the labour market (Meer and Modood, 2007: 89-90).

This Act established the legal basis of multiculturalism in Britain to promote a balance of "race relations". Christian Joppke points out that the result was a "balance between citizenship universalism and racial group particularism" in which the third Race Relations Act resolved discussions on "granting special group rights to immigrants" (Joppke, 1999: 642).

This Act is accepted as the starting point for multiculturalism in Britain though there is no officially named "Multicultural Act" or "Charter" as in the case of Australia and Canada (Meer and Modood, 2007: 89). Indeed, nearly forty years ago Britain rejected the idea of integration of communities through cultural assimilation since the British Labour Party Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966 defined the integration process "not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (quoted in Joppke, 1996: 480).

In Britain, there is a tradition facilitating the development of "multiculturalism as a public policy" that "has been heavily localized, often made voluntary", but also encouraged by "a legislative framework giving additional resources and new powers to local authorities" to improve equality among diverse communities (Singh, 2005: 169). This development paved the way for the transformation of ethnic communities from being the "bastions of official racism" to being the "supporters of anti-racism and multiculturalism" (ibid). Several important examples of this transformation of local multiculturalism sprung from the programmes of anti-racist and multicultural education which were legalized at the Local Education Authority (LEA) because the LEAs effectively fostered anti-racist and multicultural efforts in several local areas where large ethnic community populations resided (Meer and Modood, 2007: 90).

In 1985, the Swann Report was published as the main public policy document describing the features of multiculturalism in Britain. The Swann Report is the official affirmation of multiculturalism in Britain where minority communities are recognized whether based on ethnicity or race. The Report clearly states how a multiracial society functions responsively in accordance with the principles of pluralism which requires:

> "all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate fully in shaping the society as a whole within a framework of commonly accepted values, practices and procedures, whilst also allowing and, where necessary, assisting the ethnic minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within this common framework." (Swann Report, 1985: 5)

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a variety of unofficial initiatives to explore and discuss how the British society supports multicultural policies including several reports published by the Runnymede Trust Commission[5] to explore and encourage multiculturalism in Britain. The Runnymede Trust is "devoted to the cause of promoting racial justice" and to proposing ways of "making Britain a

[5] Runnymede is the UK's leading independent race equality think-tank. It generates intelligence for a multi-ethnic Britain through research, network building, leading debate, and policy engagement.

confident and vibrant multicultural society at ease with its rich diversity." *The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain,* consisting of twenty-three individuals recruited from different communities, was established by the Runnymede Trust in 1998. The Commission's report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain was published in 2000, also known as the Parekh Report after the Commission's chairperson, Bhikhu Parekh. The report frankly states that "Britain is both a community of citizens and a community of communities, both a liberal and a multicultural society, and needs to reconcile their sometimes conflicting requirements" (Parekh, 2000: 1). This statement indicates the unresolved, complex, and ambiguous relationship between multiculturalism and the notions of liberalism, although the multicultural approach is also used descriptively in some academic studies to point out the diversity management policies of governments.

Moreover, this report postulated several fundamental principles of a multi-ethnic society assumed to be widely shared in the British society. Five of these principles are stated as follows:

> "First, all individuals have equal worth irrespective of their colour, gender, ethnicity, religion, age or sexual orientation, and have equal claims to the opportunities they need to realise their potential and contribute to collective wellbeing... Second, citizens are not only individuals but also members of particular religious, ethnic, cultural and regional communities... Third, ...equality must be defined in a culturally sensitive way and applied in a discriminating but not discriminatory manner. Fourth, every society needs to be cohesive as well as respectful of diversity, and must find ways of nurturing diversity while fostering and shared identity among its members. Fifth, ...human rights principles provide a valuable framework for handling differences..." (Parekh, 2000: 1-2)

Since the introduction of the multiculturalism as a "community of communities" in the British society, conservatives criticized the Parekh Report for contributing to the "balkanization"[6] of society. Advocates of multiculturalism argue

[6] The PMDPT (2007: 53) defines balkanization as follows: "Term coined by German socialists to describe the effect of late-nineteenth- century Tsarist policy on the Balkan states bordering the Russian Empire, and later used to denote the divisive effects upon those states of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918). Hence: division of a region into a number of small, autonomous states, often mutually

that "...its goal is to promote better and fairer terms of integration" for immigrant groups, whereas critics see it as promoting balkanization and separatism in society (Kymlicka, 2001: 170). The main reason fuelling these criticisms is the problem of "metics" or "guest-workers" who are denied a course of citizenship in the European countries. Therefore, many European states have no desire to acquire new immigrant citizens, and have no established infrastructure for integrating them (ibid).

The British multiculturalism has developed through implementation of the country's citizenship regime towards immigrants. Britain has the legacy of a colonial empire that made immigration and multiculturalism inseparable after the WWII. Britain's immigrants consisted primarily of former colonial subjects, most notably Caribbean blacks and South Asians (Joppke, 1996: 476). In the post-war era, Britain's dealings with immigration changed as it shifted from a multi-racial empire to a nation-state. Thus, its liberal approach towards race relations emanating from the colonial period turned into an exclusionist form. It was extremely difficult to reconcile the post-war "civic" nation model with the potential of post-colonial mass immigration, and therefore, changing the form of "civic" nation to an "ethnic" nation was inevitable (Joppke, 1996: 477).

In the post-WWII era, Britain was considered to have a multicultural citizenship regime. The migrants in Britain were the "subjects of the British Commonwealth" in which they had equal political and social rights granted under "the Immigration Act of 1971 and the British Nationality Act of 1981".[7] Both Acts recognized "ancestry" by territorial birth in Britain, with respect to "patriality clause", as the requirement for full citizenship (Koopmans and Statham, 1999: 663). The patriality clause stipulated at least one British grandparent to satisfy the right of residence. In addition, the Act of 1981 sought to reform nationality law "establishing a three-tier system of British, dependent territory, and oversee citizenship, with the

hostile, in order to remove the possibility of a serious military threat from any of them. Since the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Balkan states have shown a remarkable ability to balkanize themselves."

[7] Both Acts prioritized "the access of predominantly white subjects of the Old Commonwealth over the predominantly nonwhite subjects of the New Commonwealth" (quoted in Koopmans and Statham, 1999: 663).

right of entry and residence for 'British citizens' only" (Joppke, 1996: 478). These developments indicate that British immigration policy has become gradually restrictive and discriminating towards immigrants from its former colonies.

It is pointed out that Britain has performed "good race relations" depending on "strict immigration control" as a government principle (Joppke, 1996: 479). Despite the exclusionist treatment in the British citizenship regime, it has always rejected assimilationist policy against its former "colonial subjects". Instead, multiculturalism has been considered the optimal strategy for promoting a healthy relationship between races. Home Secretary Roy Jenkins frankly stated this strategy in his famous 1966 speech:

> "Integration is perhaps rather a loose word. I do not regard it as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a 'melting pot', which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone's misplaced vision of the stereotypical Englishman. I ... define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance." (quoted in Joppke, 1996: 480)

II.2.1.1. Multiculturalism and Muslims in Great Britain

The 2001, the UK census report[8] estimated the number of Muslims in the UK was over 1.5 million, comprising 2.7 percent of the 57.1 million population of Great Britain (UK Census, 2001). In 2010, the Pew Research Center determined that the Muslim population increased to approximately 3 million, constituting 4.6 percent of the population (Pew Research Center, 2010: 5). However, the 2011, the UK census estimated that the number of Muslims was 2.7 million, standing at 4.8 percent

[8] The Office for National Statistics (ONS) is the UK's largest independent producer of official statistics and is the recognised national statistical institute of the UK. It is responsible for collecting and publishing statistics related to the economy, population and society at national, regional and local levels. It also conducts the census in England and Wales every ten years. ONS plays a leading role in national and international good practice in the production of official statistics. It is the executive office of the UK Statistics Authority and although they are separate, they are still closely related. Official website: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/about-ons/index.html

of total 63.2 million (UK Census, 2011). These polls clearly exhibit a trend of growth which has become a cause of concern for many within the British society.

The success of the British multiculturalism experience has been challenged by the integration of immigrant Muslims. While some argue that it has been successful at integrating minority communities into the British society as envisaged by the policy makers, critics insist that Britain's Muslims are challenging the country's multicultural model and have tended to "retreat into their communities" because of the Muslim community's strength in the face of racial conflict, economic and social obstacles (Abbas, 2007: 289-290).

In Britain, questions about integration of minority communities are related to the question of how much multicultural policy can accommodate cultural differences, in particular integration of the Muslim communities into the British society (Joppke, 2009: 469). It is sometimes claimed that the general atmosphere of Britain's integration model has created conflicts between Muslim and British cultures. British Muslims have become disappointed because they perceive inadequate opportunities in maintaining the notions of their culture although British society prides its strong tradition as "...being so culturally liberal, they find it necessary to challenge the limits of toleration" (ibid). After the 9/11 events and subsequent 7/7 2005 London bombings, many scholars and politicians started to question the limits of the British multiculturalism and toleration against the Muslim communities in the country.

Although the debate on the British multiculturalism has caused some fundamental disagreements on the suitability of multiculturalism for the British society in relation to immigrant Muslims, some academics like Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, in gauging the changing political and societal situation of the Muslim community, argue that multiculturalism and tolerance are not the source of radicalization and that Britain is not in danger of failing but rather is being "rebalanced" (Meer and Modood, 2009).

The integration of the immigrant Muslim communities in Britain is somewhat problematic in terms of their relations with the host society because the dominant culture of the host society seeks to achieve its power in politics "without much regard to the values, culture and identity" of immigrant groups. (Khan, 2000: 30). In that sense, the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia prepared a report for the Runnymede Trust entitled *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*. It states:

> "The UK government's official stance is one of inclusion, and to enable minorities such as the Muslims to participate freely and fully in the economic, social and public life of the nation, while still being able to maintain their own culture, traditions, language and values." (Runnymede, 1997: 1)

However, the report draws attention to the difficulties of such participation and maintenance as follows:

> "In practice it is not always easy for Muslim citizens of the United Kingdom both to participate freely and fully in the economic, social and public life of the nation, and at the same time to take a full part in their religious and cultural traditions, language and values." (ibid)

II.2.1.2. Community Cohesion in the British Multiculturalism

The British multiculturalism came under further scrutiny following the race revolts in northern England of 2001 which involved people from both small and large Muslim communities. The British multiculturalism was criticized as the leading factor behind religious and racial segregation as it was considered a catalyst for the "parallel lives" in the society. The Cantle Report in 2001 asserted that some communities, in particular some Muslim communities, led "parallel lives" causing self-segregation in the society. For this reason, in order to discourage self-segregation and prevent isolation of communities, the British government started to

initiate a policy of "community cohesion" aiming to rebalance the recognition of differences in the British multiculturalism.

Community cohesion is a new policy priority of the British government which aims to cope with problems related to ethnic segregation. It became a priority following the 2001 riots which primarily involved people from different religious and racial backgrounds and resulting in a revolt against the police and destruction of public property (Cantle, 2001: 5). The common concern about managing ethnic diversities led the government to launch a complementary initiative enhancing the policy of multiculturalism. The Cantle Report underlined the existing causes behind the riots and mainly focused on the education system. The most important recommendation listed in the report was stated as follows:

> "Church and faith leaders should take advantage of their special arrangements and voluntarily limit the faith intake in both new and existing independent and state sector schools. This should again be by offering, at least 25% of, places to other faiths or denominations and would immediately be more inclusive and create a better representation of all cultures or ethnicities… It would also be consistent with the desire of church leaders to promote religious tolerance and understanding and help to embed the new discrimination legislation. In some cases, this may similarly require support." (Cantle, 2001: 50)

Community cohesion marked a change of government priority from respect for diversity to the ideas of communality, cohesion and integration with the intention of avoiding ethnic segregation and social exclusion of minority communities in the British society. The changing priority of the British government is mainly stated as follows:

> "[I]ntent on replacing the emphasis on the respect for diversity as an end point of political tolerance and political unity in a multicultural, multi-racial and multi-faith context with a new 'integration' project that insists on forging a new level of meta allegiance through establishing shared values." (McGhee, 2008: 84)

Community cohesion represents a new approach to ethnic-race relations, promoting national identity through increasing the sense of citizenship among potentially marginalized groups within the society. The essence of the community cohesion envisions greater "contact" as a way of preventing "parallel lives" and it requires communities to take responsibility in a process of dialogue (Thomas and Sanderson, 2012: 160).

Indeed, it is not a new policy alternative to multiculturalism but its overwhelming emphasis is on integration with diversity, combined with the idea of unity in diversity (McGhee, 2008: 84). It requires an active citizenry taking responsibility for integration into the society, fostered by community dialogue. Integration with diversity requires achievement of a common culture to which all parts of society can contribute. In diverse societies, causes of division are generally overemphasized at the expense of paths to unity. Therefore, communities are isolated against each other through cultural walls, which pave the way for parallel lives.

Community cohesion has always been criticized since it has not yet led to the integration of Muslim communities in Britain. There is a demand for a community cohesion policy which gives priority to the community or minority groups on the basis of ethnic-race distinctions. The existing policy fails to mention religious based communities in this category and thus is open to the criticism concerning the integration of Muslim communities in the country.

The British multiculturalism does not recognize Muslims as a "social group" whose membership is defined in terms of common faith-based beliefs and attitudes. The Open Society Institute (OSI) defines social groups in terms of "gender, age, race/ethnicity, nationality or class" for the sake of community cohesion in its publication titled *Muslims in the UK: Policies for Engaged Citizens*. For the purpose of this study, Muslims are considered as a religious, faith-based group to better formulate solutions for current problems facing the British multiculturalism. The OSI publication states that Muslims have their associations based on "certain common beliefs" which are defined as "'faith-based' beliefs". This definition adequately

accounts for similarities among Muslims in Britain to identify them as a social group because Islam is the main indicator of identity for the British Muslims (OSI, 2005: 58).

The British Muslim communities do not have the capacity to improve community cohesion and their sense of belonging to the British society since government policy does not allow communities to identify themselves with faith-based religious group as a whole. From this point of view, if Muslim identity is recognized as a distinctive social group, the current problem of Muslim communities lacking a sense of belonging in Britain may be resolved by a simple action as follows:

> "The public recognition of Muslim identity will allow individuals to feel that they are accepted by the State and in the public sphere. For British Muslims to have a sense of belonging to a wider political community, they must be able to identify with the key legal and political institutions as Muslims, and feel included in the public culture of Great Britain as Muslims." (OSI, 2005: 46)

The successful implementation of the British multiculturalism depends on the inclusion process of Muslims as a faith-based social group because this process is essential for creating the stable conditions that Muslims require for promoting community cohesion in Britain.

Another problem arising from the lack of group-based recognition is the social exclusion of minority communities. The British government defines social exclusion as a combination of problems ranging from unemployment to family breakdown (OSI, 2005: 49). In the case of British Muslims, this definition states "their involuntary exclusion" from social, economic and political institutions of the country. Another aspect of social exclusion emerged after 9/11 when the British Muslims and Islam were critically discussed in the public arena, and Muslims were perceived as "a group that is particularly at risk of being culturally alienated" from the rest of the society (OSI, 2005: 50-51).

The recognition of Muslims as a social group is the essential dimension to constituting community cohesion between the Muslim communities and the rest of the British society. This recognition increases consent within the Muslim community towards the government policies for harmonization of community differences in the British multiculturalism.

Community cohesion is a crucial instrument for improving communication and tolerance among diverse cultures while strengthening a sense of citizenship in the British context. In that regard, the Local Government Association (LGA), (2002: 6), made its widely accepted definition as follows:

> "[first], there is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; [second], the diversity of people's different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued; [third], those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and [fourth] strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods."

From this point of view, establishment of a sense of belonging and recognition of individuals as the members of social groups seem to be indispensable requirements of a cohesive society. It is clear that recognising individuals solely as citizens fails to address the problem of integrating minority communities in a society because it excludes social group dimension.

Belonging to a social group brings rights and responsibilities to both the group and group members in the public sphere. There is a strong connection between law and social attitude because it establishes communal values that all people respect. The law and legal institutions define the rights of social groups, while they could indicate willingness to carry out their responsibilities in the public sphere. Recognition creates legal bonds between the state and social groups as well as between social groups within society.

Law and legal institutions have a crucial role in sustaining social life and shared values because their effect on social life is not neutral, particularly when private individual identity is concerned:

> "Citizens, who sense that key legal and political institutions understand, accommodate and reflect their central concerns will feel a deeper sense of identification and belonging to these institutions." (OSI, 2005: 60)

Recognising Muslims as a social group encourages them to increase their identification with the legal institutions when they seek to achieve direct solutions to their concerns in accordance with the law establishing both their individual and group rights. The following statement points out how this process motivates Muslims to identify with the legal institutions in Britain:

> "Recognition of their existence as a social group may also ensure that the self-identification of citizens as Muslims is accurately reflected in legal and political institutions, thereby satisfying Muslims' right to the recognition and respect that are part of what it means for a liberal state to treat citizens as autonomous and free." (OSI, 2005: 62)

When the British Muslims internalize this process of identification and feel that their concerns are taken into consideration by legal and political institutions, they may exhibit a greater willingness to conform and fulfil their responsibilities to society, as deemed by these institutions (ibid).

Moreover, according to Iris Marion Young (1990: 43), social groups are formed through interactions among individuals that are not randomly selected but rather they are intertwined with the way in which the individuals identify themselves and the way in which they are described different by others. Thus, a social group is distinguished from others by the patterns of cultural forms, definite practices and way of life. The members of a group have particular familiarity with each other through established norms and ways of life that foster them to interact with one another, at least more than with people not associated with a group.

The identity of a group mainly emerges when there is communication or dialogue with other groups. When group members are aware of their differences through these interactions with other group members, they organize themselves in a way which represents their distinct identity while maintaining a sense of belonging to a wider society.

There are no certain rules for differentiating social groups from each other. In some cases, there are sufficient indications separating groups when their race, ethnicity, national origin and religion are adequately distinct. However, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish which social group is based on the same ethnicity and religion.

The British legislative framework determined the criteria to clarify the understanding of ethnic origin definition as wider than race after the Mandla v. Dowell Lee case in 1983. With this case, the House of Lords established certain criteria for claiming a group identity:

> "[first] a long-shared history of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups; [second] a cultural tradition of the group's own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance; [third] and either a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number of common ancestors." (quoted in Meer and Modood, 2007: 91)

The third phrase of the statement has become one of the essential criteria for identifying group membership (Meer and Modood, 2007: 91).

As a result, the British government recognizes ethnic religious minorities such as Sikh and Jews and they receive direct protection as a social group, whereas religious minorities like Muslims as non-ethnic religious minorities benefit only from indirect protection in some areas (OSI, 2005: 48). This situation makes the social exclusion of British Muslims inevitable because they are not given direct access to important "legal rights and public goods" recognized for ethnic or racial groups (OSI, 2005: 59).

In other words, members of a religious minority group could claim that "their group is also an ethnic minority". In that sense, "Sikhs and Jewish minorities are also ethnic minorities, because of 'descent from a small number of common ancestors'; Roman Catholic, Muslims and Hindu minorities are not" (Wintemute, 2014: 5).

This rule has caused some degree of hardship for Muslims as they were not defined as a group in the same way as those defined by both ethnic and racial criteria. Muslims are composed of people from many nations and colours, they speak a variety of languages and their only common denominator is religion and the religious-based culture (OSI, 2005: 59). This heterogeneity does not satisfy the qualifications set for being recognized as an "ethnic or racial group" in the British society.

This situation has been criticized due to the fact that the British Jews consist of Ashkenazi Jews from Eastern Europe and Black African Jews from Ethiopia who speak different languages, while Sikhs may include ethnically diverse people through conversion. All of them have been given certain social and political protection granted by the third Race Relations Act (Meer and Modood, 2007: 91).

In addition, community cohesion is the British government purpose towards all communities, envisioned to include especially Muslims, but the controversy regarding their group recognition created a gap between initial expectations and the consequences. Community cohesion has significant aims to increase a sense of belonging between all communities. Recognition of Muslim communities as a distinct social group may contribute substantially to social solidarity and political stability in Britain. Over two decades, the British Muslim communities have been asking the government to recognize Muslims as a distinct category (OSI, 2005: 59), a gesture which would be instrumental for Muslims to carry out their group identity as represented in the public sphere.

Establishing stable relationships with minority communities prevents the problem of social exclusion and fosters their integration within society. Social

exclusion is the essential step for group marginalization which comes into force when members of a group cannot adequately participate in the economic, political, cultural and institutional life of a society (OSI, 2005: 64). In the case of Muslim communities in Britain, community cohesion underlined the grievances both within their communities and in their relations with the state but it fell far short of initial expectations and carried poor prospects for success in preventing social exclusion and promoting integration.

II.2.2. Multiculturalism in Germany

Historically, Germany is not considered a multicultural country and does not officially recognize multiculturalism as a politics of recognition of differences as it is observed in some other diverse western societies. Debates on multiculturalism in Germany have widely been based on the country's long-standing policies on citizenship status of the immigrants/foreigners. Contrary to diverse societies that recognize citizenship status by the principle of *jus soli*[9], as Elke Winter (2010: 169) states:

> "Germany is usually seen as the prototype of the notorious 'ethnic nation', characterized by strong ethnic homogeneity, shared descent and a blood-based citizenship law (*jus sanguinis*)[10]."

In the mid-1980s, the term multiculturalism began to be associated with Germany in academic circles when it was accepted as obvious that "the presence of foreigners (*Ausländer*) in German society was neither temporary nor an exception" (ibid). In public discourse, multiculturalism was not directly discussed concerning immigrants because it was considered an undesirable breakthrough against Germany's long-standing ideal as an ethnic nation. In other words, multiculturalism

[9] *Jus soli*: "Latin word; right of the soil, whereby citizenship is acquired by birth within the territory of the state, regardless of parental citizenship." (*Britannica*)

[10] *Jus sanguinis*: "Latin word; right of blood, whereby a person, wherever born, is a citizen of the state if, at the time of his birth, his parent is one." (*Britannica*)

was not used as a policy to reconstruct German national identity assuming immigrants as an integral part of such identity as Christian Joppke notes:

> "Multiculturalism in Germany is only secondarily about immigrants; primarily it is about the Germans themselves. In insisting, against the official doctrine, that "Germany is an immigration country," the proponents of multiculturalism are trying to bury the dreadful ghost of the *volkisch* [ethnic] national tradition and to build a postnational community." (Joppke, 1996: 466)

The German model of multiculturalism is best understood in the historical context of German immigration policies. Germany experienced a huge mass immigration flow from the Eastern Europe after the WWII. The immigrants did not become a crucial problem for the German society because they were essentially German refugees. They were easily integrated into the German society in terms of the idea of *jus sanguinis* assuming ethnic nation instead of *jus soli.* Until 2001 the German governments consistently posited that Germany was not "a country of immigration" though it had accommodated 18 million newcomers, ethnically both Germans and non-Germans, through immigration from East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and non-Germans from other Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s (Panayi, 2004: 467-469). The last newcomers to Germany in the 1990s were asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia who were accepted as foreigners or foreign workers who did not possess the right of nationality (Panayi, 2004: 469).

Until the 1990s, public debate in Germany focused largely on policies of immigrant integration. Since the beginning of 1990s, a significant shift in this debate has been observed and issues related to multiculturalism have become highly controversial (Eckardt, 2007: 235).

In the mid-1990s, political discourse in Germany developed in two opposite directions: the Greens used the term multiculturalism to improve the co-existence of immigrants and Germans in social, economic, cultural and political life, while the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) insisted on the German historical

understanding of nationhood instead of the multicultural understanding of the German society (Eckardt, 2007: 235-236). Indeed, the Greens launched initiatives to promote multiculturalism in the city of Frankfurt where the largest immigrant population in Germany resides. They sought to institutionalize “multicultural governance” representing cultural diversity at the administrative body of the city, and finally, they succeeded to introduce a city councillor responsible for the integration of foreigners. When D. Cohn-Bendit was appointed to this post, he advocated himself as the “multicultural consciousness of the Greens”. With his famous book *Babylon as Home*, Cohn-Bendit and Schmid (1993) emphasized the importance of “diversity instead of homogeneity” in the German society (Eckardt, 2007: 241). The formal initiatives resulted in the establishment of the Office of the Multicultural Affairs (AMKA) in the city of Frankfurt as a fitting example of the Greens' multicultural approach (ibid).

This debate reached another phase, paying particular attention to the citizenship controversy after the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party formed a coalition government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 1998. The political debates about immigration focused on changes of citizenship policies promoting dual citizenship and naturalization to establish *jus soli* for children of foreigners born in Germany (Howard, 2008: 49).

Contrary to the governments of the CDU claiming that Germany was not “a country of immigration”, the Süssmuth Commission,[11] established by the SPD and the Green Party coalition government in 2000, paved the way for the acceptance of multiculturalism in the country for the first time. The Commission, in its report, acknowledges that “Germany has become a country of immigrants”. It emphasizes the importance of immigrants for Germany and states their responsibility towards them:

[11] The Süssmuth Commission was established under the Chairperson Rita Süssmuth on 12 September 2000. It published a report that was the result of the efforts undertaken by the Independent Commission on Migration to Germany titled “Structuring Migration – Fostering Integration” which resulted on 4 July 2001 (*Bundesministerium des Innern*, 2001: 11).

> "…the integration of people who immigrate to our country will be one of the most important political tasks over the next few decades. Mastering this task requires a long-term policy and an overall plan with clearly defined objectives: in order to meet humanitarian responsibilities, to contribute to the safe-guarding of economic prosperity, to improve the co-existence of Germans and immigrants to Germany as well as to foster integration" (*Bundesministerium des Innern*, 2001: 11)

After examining the historical developments about the presence of immigrants in Germany, the report uses the term multiculturalism in the section titled "education available to immigrants": "…educational skills make it easier to deal with the multicultural reality in educational institutions and facilitate the co-ordinated advancement of foreign children" (*Bundesministerium des Innern*, 2001: 210).

In general, after the commission's report focused on the issues related to integration of migrants, it expressed multicultural sentiments with its suggestions for standardizing existing measures to benefit migrants by giving them equal opportunity in the economic, cultural and political life of the country (*Bundesministerium des Innern*, 2001).

A new era for the reform of integration policies had been put on the political agenda, improving multiculturalism at the federal level under the leadership of the coalition of the SPD and the Green Party (1998 - 2005). After the government clearly declared Germany a *de facto* country of immigration and reform in the citizenship law, Germany officially took a significant step to change its historical notion "from ethnic nation to universalistic immigrant integration [nation]" (Heckmann, 2003: 45). Thus, the debates on "dual nationality" were seen as a notable change in Germany's integration policy towards a multicultural initiative.

Some scholars claim that there is a strong link between multiculturalism and dual citizenship. Thomas Faist, Jürgen Gerdes and Beate Rieple point out that dual citizenship has a "path-dependent effect". They further state that path-dependency "…occurs when a previous decision, norm or rule reinforces itself, when it determines in part the subsequent development of events" (Faist, Gerdes and Rieple,

2004: 919). Thus, granting dual citizenship as the government response to immigrants would give them a sense of belonging to the German society; and strengthen conditions for the political integration of these newcomers. Otherwise, not granting dual citizenship may have a negative impact on migrant attitudes toward civic life in the country and likely cause a reluctance to internalize their responsibilities in the German society. Therefore, dual citizenship encourages immigrants to respond favourably to the policies of integration in the country.

The nascent political discourse on multicultural society in Germany at the federal level has largely been sacrificed by the sudden rise of terrorism since 2001. Germany emerged as one of the centres for terrorist recruitment, for example, some of the 9/11 alleged hijackers were well-educated migrants living in Hamburg and connecting to the al-Qaeda terrorist network (Lentini, 2007: 215). For this reason, the government began placing restrictions on laws ranging from immigration issues to anti-terrorist activities.

Many strict controls and regulations started to address the activities of hate preachers or radical imams due to the fact that terrorism from Islamic extremists was accepted as the most important security concern of the German state after the September 11 terrorist attacks.

In Germany, multiculturalism is still in progress because it has not fully accepted immigrants/foreigners as an inseparable part of the society. The country is in a transition with respect to notions of liberal citizenship laws since the beginning of 2000s. it has faced some challenges arising from its strong leading or core culture (*Leitkultur*) as opposed to multiculturalist and assimilationist approach to integration. The political and public debates on Germany’s long standing nationhood based on ethno-cultural notions have been closely attached to the citizenship status of immigrants. As Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller (2009: 41) state, “immigration of culturally diverse people presents nation-states with a dilemma: incorporation of the newcomers as citizens may undermine myths of cultural homogeneity; but failure to [do so] may lead to divided societies, marked by severe inequality and conflict.”

From this point of view, Germany is considered as a country of immigration because it has become home to millions of foreigners consisting of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds who undermine the notions of *Leitkultur* in the German society.

"Eligibility for German citizenship, prior to 2000, was based on German ancestry and not country of birth" (CRS, 2005: 32). Instead, foreigners in Germany were offered civil and social rights such as social security benefits without citizenship rights. With the reform of the citizenship law of "German Nationality Act"[12] in 2000, the second generation of foreigners born in Germany became eligible to apply for citizenship if one of their parents had legal right of permanent residence in the country and if they were willing to give up their other nationality. In 2004, the Immigration Act made some changes in immigration law with specific emphasis upon integration requirements: naturalisation, language course, etc.

In Germany, two controversial approaches about multiculturalism have emerged since the beginning of 2000s (Lanz, 2010: 137). The first approach, assimilative multiculturalism, complies with the traditional German idea of differences between cultures assuming a dominant German culture; the second approach, liberal multiculturalism, permits diversity within society as opposed to the German model. The assimilative multiculturalism signifies a potential threat of cultural differences against social adhesion and therefore requires a specific kind of cultural assimilation, while the latter implies social normality based on dynamic cultural diversity, assuming mutual tolerance within the German society.

In 2005, "integration programme (*Integrationskonzept*)" passed by the local parliament of Berlin with the statement of "Promote plurality – strengthen cohesion" symbolizes a significant example of dynamic diversity model of multiculturalism (ibid). This multicultural initiative in Berlin gained legitimacy when an anti-discrimination office was established with a "representative for migration and

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[12] On 21 May 1999 the Bundesrat gave its assent to the Act to reform the nationality law as last amended by the Act of 23 July 1999 (Federal Law Gazette I pp. 1618 ff.). The main articles of the Nationality Act come into existence as from 1 January 2000.

integration" that was considered "…as a contact point for everybody who feels discriminated against on ethnic, religious and ideological grounds" (ibid). The main purpose of the initiative was "to strengthen and encourage a culture of acceptance towards persons of other religions and other ethnicities…" (ibid).

Although these official initiatives contribute to evolution of multiculturalism in the country, the German society seems as if they are not ready to internalize the notions of multicultural society because many Germans define their nationality in accordance with ethnic and cultural terms and do not accept people as German without German ancestry though there is a substantial number of foreigners – more than 7 million foreigners or approximately 9 percent of German population – living in their country (CRS, 2005: 32).

II.2.2.1. Multiculturalism and Muslims in Germany

The vast majority of foreigners living in Germany are Muslims. In 2010, the Pew Research Center study estimated that over 4 million Muslims reside in Germany making about 5 percent of the population (Pew Research Center, 2010: 5). The largest group among them are Turkish Muslims followed by relatively small groups from the former Yugoslavia, Arabs and South Asian Muslims. Thus, Muslims are the third largest religious group in Germany after Catholics and Protestants. It is estimated that Muslims have the highest birth rate, three times greater than the rest of German society (CRS, 2005: 33).

Since 9/11 and successive terrorist attacks in Europe, public debates focused on the Muslim community as they were seen as potential security threats in Germany. The Muslim community in the country felt uneasy about the lack of a clear distinction between extremist and ordinary Muslims in public attitudes. For instance, there was a change in the meaning of the term "Islamist". Until 2001, it meant someone studying Islamic sciences; since then it has been associated with the meaning of "radical fundamentalist" (Mühe and Hieronymus, 2011: 97). These kinds

of impairments in public attitudes towards Islam and Muslims dramatically increased in the German media. The following statements show how the German public and media discourses towards Islam and Muslims dramatically changed since September 11:

> "The number of those associating Islam with discrimination against women, fanaticism and radicalism and a disposition towards violence and revenge is increasing. The representation of Muslims and Islam in the German media also shows a high prevalence of stories linking Islam and Muslims to terrorism, violence and other social problems." (ibid)

The events of 9/11 had a deep impact on the German public opinion because Muslims were considered a potential risk against the national security. For instance, the murder of Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 coincided with debates on integration of immigrants, in particular the citizenship status of immigrants in Germany.

The Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris of January 2015 further exacerbated exclusivist attitudes towards immigrant Muslims and provoked anti-Muslim protests in many cities of the country. This spread to other cities in Europe and ignited several mass protests mainly organized by anti-Muslim movements.

In this case, the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA), originated in Germany and organized in social media, was established on 20 October, 2014 and quickly reached over 25.000 members. PEGIDA marched in the German city of Dresden in the early aftermath of the Paris attack (Isal, 2015). It has provoked Europeans to react against the "Islamization of Europe" through demonstrations of its branches in several European countries particularly in Germany, France and the UK.

II.3. The Integration Policy of the EU for the Immigrants: Inclusion of Third Country Nationals and European Citizenship

In 2004, the EU in its "Common Basic Principles" declared that "integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. …[it] implies respect for the basic values of the European Union" (EU Council, 2004: 17). However, assimilation is a one-way process operating on the religious and cultural level not on the socio-economic one because assimilation requires treatment of the immigrants under the host society. Muslims in Europe are thought to be problematic in terms of religio-cultural divisions, not economic considerations (Fekete, 2008: 1-2). Problems such as unemployment, crime, drugs and criminality are not related to socio-economic factors but to the Muslims' socio-religious features (ibid).

The integration policies of the EU focus on immigrants as the third country nationals. There is no clear statement on the integration of Muslim communities in the member states. The EU endorses the member states' integration policies on immigrants by advocating contributions to the inclusion of the third country nationals in the economic, social and cultural life of the host countries.

The EU's approach toward immigrant integration is explicitly related to the economic benefits of immigration. For this reason, the EU needs efficient integration policies "to realise the potential benefits of immigration and to facilitate the integration of immigrants through better policies on immigration and integration at local, regional, national and EU level" (EU Commission, 2003: 17). The European Commission states its understanding of immigrant integration as follows:

> "Integration should be understood as a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant. This implies on the one hand that it is the responsibility of the host society to ensure that the formal rights of immigrants are in place in such a way that the individual has the possibility of participating in economic, social, cultural and civil life and on the other, that immigrants respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate

> actively in the integration process, without having to relinquish their own identity." (EU Commission, 2003: 17-18)

Moreover, the official documents of the EU clearly state that there is a need for a "holistic approach" for the immigrant integration policies at the EU level:

> "The most important being the need for a holistic approach which takes into account not only the economic and social aspects of integration but also issues related to cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, participation and political rights. While priorities will vary between countries and regions, integration policies need to be planned within a long-term, coherent overall framework, and at the same time they should be responsive to the specific needs of particular groups and tailored to local conditions." (EU Commission, 2003: 18-19)

In the Presidency Conclusion of the Tampere European Council in 1999, it is explicitly requested that an enhanced integration policy concerning the "third country nationals' rights and obligations" should be ensured in the EU member states:

> "The European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia." (Council of the EU, 1999: 5)

In other words, the "fair treatment of third country nationals" in the member states is vigorously achieved by approximation of the rights and obligations of third country nationals to that of member states' nationals:

> "A person, who has resided legally in a Member State for a period of time to be determined and who holds a long-term residence permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens; e.g. the right to reside, receive education, and work as an employee or self-employed person, as well as the principle of non-discrimination vis-à-vis the citizens of the State of residence." (ibid)

Furthermore, the EU strengthened its approach toward the third country nationals through a statement that encourages those who are "long-term legally resident, to be offered the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member States in which they are resident." The European Council and the Commission endorse the attempts for this encouragement:

> "It is widely recognised that acquiring nationality is a means of facilitating integration, although it need not be the ultimate aim of the integration process and it does not by itself avoid problems arising from social exclusion and discrimination. Obtaining nationality is important, however, because it encourages a sense of belonging in national life. Nationality entitles the bearer to full citizens' rights guaranteeing *de jure* participation in the political, civil, social, economic and cultural life of the Member State." (Council of the EU, 1999: 5; EU Commission, 2003: 22)

II.3.1. Integration of Immigrants at the EU Level: Multiculturalism or Assimilation Debate

Integration of immigrants in Europe is debated at the EU level as in the case of the third country nationals in the member states. Some scholars claim that the EU's approach on immigrant integration is emerging as a mixture of the member states' policies. According to Aggestam and Hill (2008: 99), the EU promotes the principle of multiculturalism because the founding treaty of the European Community does not question the cultural identity of its member states, permitting them to represent their differences in the EU institutions. Those who favour the policy of multiculturalism, claim that cultural diversity among the EU member states affirms cultural richness present in society as a whole. Therefore, the EU members are expected to protect the cultural identities in their respective societies without losing the spirit of unity.

On the other hand, the debates on assimilation of immigrants in the EU member states have become controversial, especially since September 11, 2001. Klausen argues that the focus of political discourse regarding integration of

immigrants has shifted from multiculturalism to assimilation. This change in policy approach reveals promoting certain rights to immigrants because the "welfare state as a vehicle for integration" has become explicitly assimilationist and coercive in essence (Klausen, 2005: 69). For this reason, opponents argue that the policy of multiculturalism leads to socio-economic disparities and segregation among the peoples (ibid).

For assimilationists, it is expected that immigrants should assimilate into the majority by accepting the cultural and moral codes of the host society. Aggestam and Hill (2008: 104) argue that this assimilationist approach is an effort to deny the cultural existence of the immigrant and this is not a reliable prospect to achieve at the EU level. In addition to these criticisms, Erik Bleich (1998: 84) explains that strict assimilationist policies aimed at creating homogeneity may lead to "preparationist" policies which highlight cultural differences as a preparation for the exclusion of immigrants.

There is no clear reference for the integration of Muslim immigrants at the EU level. It can be expected that integration of Muslim immigrants is best achieved by granting them the same rights and obligations as the EU citizens have. As it is stated in the case of third country nationals, when a "two-way process of integration" based on mutual rights and obligations is applied for Muslim immigrants without discrimination, they will be better integrated into the European host societies in which they reside.

II.3.1.1. European Citizenship: A Remedy for the Integration of Immigrants?

The significant part of the literature shows that both "multiculturalist" and "assimilationist" policies could not prevent the conflict between immigrant communities and host societies in Europe, particularly following 9/11. The former has led to segregation of the immigrant communities from the host societies, while

the latter has caused reactions and ghettoization of some immigrant groups. The "EU citizenship" which promises to provide equality for all individuals settled as citizens of the member states, ensures "pluralism" within the larger society without any discrimination. Therefore, "pluralism" is seen the best way to avoid confrontation with immigrant communities, in particular with Muslim immigrants because radical views of any immigrant group can be absorbed in a plural environment.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 stipulated that minority integration would be ensured primarily in terms of the member states purview. For instance, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar included a provision establishing and then granting "European citizenship" to all nationals of the EU member states. With this provision, all individuals who acquire "European citizenship" are entitled to four basic rights. First, they may move freely and reside in any EU member state of their choice. Second, they may vote, run for office or do both in the municipal and European Parliamentary elections. Third, they have the right to diplomatic protection. Fourth, they may petition the European Parliament (Maastricht Treaty, 1992).

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 made substantial progress regarding the EU involvement in domestic immigration and immigrant integration policies. For example, it strengthened the European Commission's role by increasing "controls on the external borders, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation on civil matters". This situation created a collective area of "freedom, security and justice," which explicitly guaranteed protections to all minorities residing in the EU member states (COM, 1997).

The Amsterdam Treaty also mandated adjustments in the JHA pillar for minority groups throughout the Union regardless of citizenship status to "prevent and combat racism and xenophobia" within the domestic societies of the EU member states (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997). The Amsterdam Treaty signified an increasing degree of coherence in supranational and intergovernmental policymaking processes in the EU on behalf of immigration and minority integration (COM, 2001).

Integration of minority groups in the EU was an important issue in the context of the Nice Treaty of 2000 and the proposed EU Constitution of 2004. The Nice Treaty had implications for Muslim communities across Western Europe in two related issue areas. The first was the establishment of a "Charter on Fundamental Rights" to apply to all inhabitants of the EU member states, be they citizens or non-citizens. The second was the enhancement of the role of the European Economic and Social Committee (ESC) in cultivating more inclusive civil societies across the region (EU Constitution; The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, 2001).

Article 10 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion to include the right "either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance" (The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, 2001). This article is related to the debates over issues such as the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls attending public schools and the construction of mosques in densely Muslim populated areas. Similarly, Article 14 of this charter grants parents the right to "ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions" (ibid).

In addition, Articles 21 and 22 of the chapter on equality, ban any discrimination based on "sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation," and explicitly state respect for "cultural, religious and linguistic diversity" throughout the EU (ibid). In a related manner, in terms of supranational recourse for national or non-national legal residents of EU member states who feel they have received unfair treatment, Articles 42-44 of the chapter on citizens' rights include the following guarantees: first is the "access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents"; second is the "right to refer to the Ombudsman of the Union in cases of maladministration in the activities of the Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance acting in their judicial roles"; and third is the "right to petition the European Parliament" (ibid).

The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 reintroduced the idea of "European citizenship" set out in the Maastricht Treaty. It explains that "all people who hold the nationality in any of the 27 EU member states are also EU citizens. This means that while they are citizens of their home country, with the rights and responsibilities that citizenship involves, they are also citizens of the European Union, with extra rights and duties" (Lisbon Treaty, 2007). With the Lisbon Treaty, "Citizens of the EU now have a Charter of Rights that is legally binding and which their state authorities must deliver in accordance with their duty of good faith to the EU". And the Charter reinforces that "Third country nationals ever more resemble citizens of the Union through their inclusion as beneficiaries of Charter rights under the same conditions as citizens of the Union" (Guild, 2010: 7).

Today in the EU, there is a significant number of Muslim minority inhabitants as the third country nationals and the European citizenship states that they "enjoy EU rights through a variety of instruments that have been adopted" (Guild, 2010: 5). These measures indicate that the European citizenship serves as a functional instrument to achieve "pluralism" and integrate "Muslim communities" into the larger societies in Europe.

The rights listed in the EU provisions above were beneficial for those Muslims already possessing national citizenship in any EU member state. Despite the potential benefits of this provision, the criterion for eligibility for European citizenship of being a national of a member state limits its ability to integrate minority communities, especially Muslim minorities, into the EU community (Geddes, 2000: 15).

European citizenship is criticized because it does not include third-country nationals. This situation directly affects those Muslims who could not acquire citizenship status in one of the EU member states. For this reason, the immigrant Muslim minorities have not been treated in an "equal" sense with the EU citizens even though they have been offered the same conditions as the citizens of the Union. Thus, it is unlikely that the European citizenship can be a remedy which will

effectively remove obstacles for the integration of Muslim minorities in the EU as a whole. Rather, some scholars claim that the European citizenship increased the barriers to integration of Muslim minorities. Seyla Benhabib, Turkish-born Jew, explains this situation in an example:

> "It is a dramatic fact that while European Union citizenship makes it possible for all EU citizens to vote, run for, and hold office in local as well as Union-wide elections, this is not the case for third-country nationals. …while the terrains that we are travelling on have changed, our normative maps have not." (Benhabib, 2005: 675)

Granting citizenship status develops a sense of belonging for individuals and gives them responsibility for contributing to the accord of the wider society in which they live. Alongside the existing citizenship, the EU needs to develop new instrument(s) on behalf of the third country nationals by taking into consideration their vulnerable situation vis-à-vis the unfavourable treatment in the member states.

This chapter examined the evolution of the integration policies towards immigrant Muslims in Europe, particularly in Great Britain and Germany as the two multicultural models. The historical developments of both countries' citizenship regimes have significantly determined the essentials of their integration policies towards immigrant Muslims. Their experiences with the implementation of multicultural polices are inseparable from problems related to the integration of Muslim immigrants which are examined within the context of Islamophobia, and through the controversies on multiculturalism, in the next chapter.

III. THE RISE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA AS AN ALERT FOR THE FAILURE OF MULTICULTURALISM IN EUROPE

> "In the aftermath of the July 2005 bombings in central London, British public opinion largely agreed on one thing: that British multiculturalism was dead and militant Islam had killed it off." (Singh, 2005: 157)

When multiculturalism was introduced in northern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s as an official policy to combat racism, it was presumed as an alternative to assimilation policy which excluded different socio-cultural identities (Horsti, 2010: 157). Multiculturalism was envisioned to recognize cultural rights of minority groups which had been ignored in the countries concerned.

In the early 2000s in Europe, the policy of multiculturalism was deprived of the capacity to ensure social cohesion as it was intrinsically assumed in the 1970s and 1980s. It was assigned as "…a policy and strategy that nations, [later] the European Union, and other communities and institutions use to manage plurality and social problems related to diversity" (Horsti, 2010: 157). However, several consecutive terrorist events in Europe in the post-9/11 era were accompanied with a retreat from multiculturalism in the case of integration of immigrant Muslims (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010: 5-6; Back, 2007: 133).

Starting in the early 2000s multicultural policies signalled a backlash in Europe not only because of the terrorist attacks and a perceived rise in crime but also other events which stigmatized Muslims for "wearing hijabs" in schools, "honor killings", "forced marriages", etc. The rapid growth of such stereotypes are primary evidences associated with the rise of Islamophobia and therefore with the "end of multiculturalism" (Horsti, 2010: 158). In other words, post-9/11 era critiques of multiculturalism find its assumptions, promising peaceful co-existence of diverse

communities in European societies, too idealistic. Stigmatization of Muslims through stereotype discourses and bridging the presence of migrants with security concerns of Europeans constitute basic corollary for the failure of immigrant multiculturalism in Europe. In that sense, Nilüfer Göle and Ayhan Kaya are among a few scholars who draw attention to the relations between the rise of Islamophobia and the failure of multiculturalism in Europe. In that sense, Kaya (2013: 65) directly states this relationship as follows:

> "Coupling migration with terrorism, violence, crime and insecurity, as well as drug trafficking and human smuggling, is likely to result in the birth of a popular Islamophobic discourse and the culturalisation of what is actually social, economic and political in the everyday life of migrant-origin individuals in a way that invalidates the multiculturalist policies of integration in the west."

Europeans' attempt to securitize migration signalled the backlash of not only multicultural but also republican policies, which Kymlicka previously addressed as "a return to the republican belief", since immigrants became the source of fear of the host societies when their identity and common values are at stake. In another study, Kaya (2012: 399) further emphasizes that the republicanist policies have also failed as follows:

> "…the process of securitization and stigmatization of migration and Islam in the West, and to claim that both republicanist and multiculturalist policies of integration proved to have failed in this process to politically mobilize migrants and their descendants."

Likewise, Nilüfer Göle (2013: 15) approaches the problem in a similar manner and asserts how multiculturalism loses legitimacy in its encounter with Islam in Europe:

> "I highlight the correlation between the emergence of Islam in European public debate and the disappearance of multiculturalism as a framework for thinking about difference. Today, we witness the de-legitimization of multiculturalism in confrontation with Islam, and this constitutes a new national political stance in European countries."

Previously, she related the problem with the visibility of Islam in the European public space and stated that "both the republican politics of integration and the multiculturalist politics of difference fall short in face of the nonassimilative strategies of European Islam" (Göle, 2006: 11).

Europeans' encounter with Islam revealed the conflicting aspects of two cultures in the public sphere. In another study, Göle (2002: 175) bases her approach on the universal claims of the public sphere and describes the nature of the conflict between two cultures, European and Islamic, with the following assumption:

> "The articulations and tensions between two different cultural codes, modern and indigenous, intervene in distinguishing and defining public and private spheres, interior and exterior spaces, licit and illicit practices."

Nevertheless, the vast majority of academic studies concerning integration of Muslims in Europe have focused on Islamophobia and determined integration process through European lenses. Their perception of fears from Islam and Muslims since 9/11 constitutes over-generalizations and stereotype discourses in the "Islamophobic literature". Some scholars have scrutinized the current debates on integration of Muslims in Europe by emphasizing perception of Islamophobia from the European Muslims' perspective. There is a newly emerging literature that converge both sides in the studies.

III.1. Islamophobia: A Counterfactual Argument

The term "Islamophobia" has gradually been propagated as the indication for "anti-Muslim/Islamic" manners in Europe since the mid-1990s. When the discussions about anti-Muslim prejudices were related to this term, some researchers became aware of the growing alert and sought to examine the reasons behind this concern. "Islamophobia is a much used but little understood term, which is believed to become popular after the report of Runnymede Trust's Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia" (Kaya, 2011: 6-7). The report titled *Islamophobia: A*

Challenge for Us All stated the definition of Islamophobia as "the shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims" (Runnymede, 1997: 1). The Report assumes eight main features of closed and open views of Islam in two categories, where closed views are equated with Islamophobia.

Table III.1.

Runnymede Trust Report: Closed and open views of Islam

Closed and open views of Islam		
Distinctions	**Closed views of Islam**	**Open views of Islam**
1. Monolithic / diverse	Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities.	Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development.
2. Separate / interacting	Islam seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them.	Islam seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures – (a) having certain shared values and aims (b) affected by them (c) enriching them.
3. Inferior / different	Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist.	Islam seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect.
4. Enemy / partner	Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a clash of civilisations'.	Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems.
5. Manipulative / sincere	Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.	Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents.
6. Criticism of West rejected / considered	Criticisms made by Islam of 'the West' rejected out of hand	Criticisms of 'the West' and other cultures are considered and debated.
7. Discrimination defended / criticised	Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.	Debates and disagreements with Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion.
8. Islamophobia seen as natural / problematic	Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and 'normal'.	Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair.

Source: http://www.runnymedetrust.org

The repetitive features of the closed views of Islam presented in the Table indicate that the Islamophobia Report of Runnymede Trust implies to internalise the problems regarding statement of Islamophobia within Muslim communities and in essence within Islam itself (Allen, 2010: 58). The report descriptions represent a normative approach to Islamophobia with a set of prejudiced arguments and discriminatory discourses directed at Islam and Muslims.

Although the Report introduces Islamophobia as a specific form of "phobia" encapsulating "unfounded hostility towards Islam [with] the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs", it is not clearly distinguished from the other types of xenophobia including racism. Inasmuch as there is no officially recognized definition of Islamophobia, "[it] is discussed within the broad concepts of racism and racial discrimination" (Kaya, 2011: 7).

Islamophobia is a growing concern in Europe. Almost all undesirable developments related to Muslims contribute to the rise of Islamophobia. This increasing mood of anti-Muslim resentment creates mutual reactions and constitutes an opposite phobia, Europhobia. All kinds of actions, vitriolic discourses and prejudices excluding Muslim minorities strengthen divisions within European societies and pave the way for ghettoization of these Muslims.

Ghettoization enables the emergence of parallel societies. If alternative routes cannot be found for parallel societies to meet their socio-economic needs and if the authority cannot improve communication channels, crises grow unexpectedly and reactions against the authority become inevitable. The exclusive approaches toward Muslims in Europe promise a vicious cycle and fall too far behind to prevent the current situation of turmoil from getting much worse.

Islamophobia has been used to express all kinds of criticism of Islam and Muslims including sarcastic discourses on Islam and Muslims for assorted ideological reasons. When the dramatic events broke out consecutively in Europe

after 9/11, there emerged several reasons for Islamophobic reactions that became more visible, especially in the western media.

Islamophobia as a contested concept is more a predicament than an explanation so it is widely used to define very assorted phenomena ranging from Muslim identity to radicalism. It covers all diverse patterns of discourse, speech and acts ensuing from the same ideological substance that is an "irrational fear – a phobia of Islam" (Cesari, 2009a: 18).

On the other hand, in analysing Islamophobia, until recently there were no well-grounded studies sufficiently capable of analysing all aspects of the problem, but a holistic approach was revealed from the studies which reproduce Islamophobia discourse. Indeed, coupling Islam and Muslims' cultures and ethnicities constituting a basis for European Muslims as a unified homogeneous bloc around "shared values" gives rise to misperceptions in the description of Islamophobia.

Some scholars assert a distinction between religion, culture and ethnicity in understanding of the main source of Islamophobia. For example, Oliver Roy (2009: 8) puts forward that "religions are more and more disconnected from the cultures in which they have been embedded. Immigration and secularisation have separated cultural and religious markers". He further states that "to identify a religion with an ethnic culture is to ascribe to each believer a culture and/or an ethnic identity that he or she does not necessarily feel comfortable with" (ibid). In the case of Muslims in Europe, they represent rich diversities and divisions generated from their primary cultural and ethnic backgrounds. In describing current discussions on Muslim presence in Europe, he ascribes that "to identify religion and culture means also identify European Muslim citizens as a 'Middle Eastern Diaspora', and thus to import the Middle Eastern conflicts into the European space, precisely at the time when this import is defined as a source of potential tensions" (ibid). For this reason, Europeans need to treat Islam as a religion without identifying it with Muslims' diverse culture which is thought to be subject to the private life of Muslims in

European secular system. In that respect, Roy advises Europeans to treat Islam as follows:

> "To deal with religions as 'mere' religions, not as the experience of cultures or ethnic groups… To recognise the faith communities on the basis of an individual and free choice… Ethnolinguistic minorities should not be mixed up with faith communities…" (ibid)

Another approach assumes that Islam and secularism are not compatible because Muslim societies have never experienced the process of secularisation as in Western societies. From this point of view, Muslims are thought to be incapable of separating religion from politics, hence separation of religious life from the public space. The advocators of this approach claim that Muslims perceive secularism as very critical to their religious existence so that secularism is a western product intrinsically attached to the western values. In that regard, Muslims are perceived as strangers to the very essence of secularising tradition as Raymond Taras (2012: 17) clarifies: "There is a reason why the western tradition has not remarked upon this development: the fact that political Islam can encompass secularism is foreign to the experience of the West, where secularisation was carried out in opposition to Christianity". Islamophobia mainly uproots the perception of secularized western societies about the absence of secularization within Muslim societies and Islamic tradition.

However, Islamophobia is sometimes related with the very essence of Islam and Muslims' cultures together. Since Islam and Muslims' cultures are strictly intertwined, there is not a clear boundary between what Muslims religiously believe and what they culturally ascribe. Therefore, "Islamophobia bundles religious, ethnic and cultural prejudices together, just as anti-Semitism (which means more than anti-Judaism) does. Because a defining stricture of Islam is precisely the inseparability of religious life from politics and identity, any sentiment or action targeting a Muslim is necessarily anti-Islamic" (Taras, 2012: 18). Thus, Islamophobia goes far beyond a simple perception of specific patterns of Islam and Muslims. It is more than reducing

Islam as a way of life with symbols and practices of diverse Muslim communities in Europe.

III.1.1. Association of Islam with Terrorism: "Enemy Within"

Integration policies for Muslim immigrants in Europe entered a new era after the terrorist attacks in both the USA and Western Europe. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, D.C., the assassination of the politician Pim Fortuyn in May 2002 and the film-maker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 in the Netherlands, the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, the London transportation system bombings of July 7, 2005, the revolts in French suburbs in October and November 2005, the "Danish cartoon crisis" which generated Muslims' reactions and protests against the publishing of depictions of the Prophet Mohammed in the newspapers on September 30, 2005, and the Glasgow Airport attack on 20 June 2007 are often illustrated as significant proof of an increasing trend of anti-Western sentiment among "radical" Muslim communities (Bleich, 2009: 353). Muslims and Islam were widely associated with radicalism and terrorism in the wake of these events. However, in the terrorist event on July 22, 2011 in Norway, an ultra-nationalist, right-wing Christian extremist Anders Behring Breivik killed 69 people on the Labour Party camp on the Utoeya Island. This became one of the most crucial indications about the anti-Muslim discourse motivated by hate against Muslims since he believed that the party's politics were continuing support for Muslim immigration to the country (Wiggen, 2012: 585).

Apart from the events occurring in Europe in the 2000s, there is another reality related to the viewpoint to Muslim immigrants. After the uprising against the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad regime turned into a full scale civil and sectarian war in the country in March 2011, there emerged a radical Islamist group fighting for

a so-called Islamic State (IS)[13] merging Iraq and Syria. The Europeans' concern about the IS came to the fore when it recruited significant numbers of jihadist fighters from the European countries. And finally, on January 7, 2015, the murders of 17 people including 12 staff members at the Charlie Hebdo Magazine in Paris attributed to French born Muslims linked to the IS and al-Qaeda, is the latest resounding terrorist attack that has magnified the deep association of Islam with terrorism (Harris, 2015).

In the post-9/11 era, European states increased security measures through new anti-terrorism laws and extensive restraints on immigration policies at the national level against a "terrorism" frequently associated with Islam by policy makers and commentators.

European Muslims are increasingly tarred with the most negative term "terrorism" despite the fact that some European states have always made a clear distinction between "terrorism" and Islam. Their official declarations state that all people have equal rights, treatment and protection before the law without any discrimination (Bowen, 2007). For instance, the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and some political leaders have frankly stated that there is no discrimination against Muslim minorities and they have no exception within the French society (Economist, 2004). On the contrary, in most of the studies associated with Muslims' integration in Europe, although the advocates of integration policies for Muslim minorities have made analyses and comments on their respective approaches in detail, they demonstrated their ideological prejudices when the terms "Islam" and "terrorism" were associated with each other (Looney, 2003; Napoleoni, 2007; Stemmann, 2006).

The economic incentives in European countries have led many Muslims to migrate to Europe and hundreds of imams have come to Europe from Asian and

[13] The name of this radical group has been called in many forms known as *al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil-Iraq wa al-Sham* (Da'ish), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), the State of the Islamic Caliphate (SIC), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or in short actually called as the Islamic State (IS).

African countries at the request of immigrant Muslim communities (Looney, 2003: 166). It is often claimed that in some cases these imams are recruited from radical Islamic groups from abroad (Jordan and Boix, 2004: 10-11).

Although the overwhelming majority of immigrant Muslims in Europe do not support any radical activities, some extremist groups recruited from Islamic communities advocate terrorism and assist terrorist networks. It is claimed that Europe's relatively open borders and lack of effective terrorism laws have facilitated the free movement of terrorists. In that sense, the Congressional Research Service (CRS)[14] Report states that Germany and Spain are seen as the bases for terrorist recruitment of al-Qaeda in Europe (CRS, 2006: 2).

Since the European governments are not able to fully integrate Muslim communities into mainstream societies, they become vulnerable against terrorist networks. As a result, Muslim communities feel disenfranchised in the European societies. These relatively alienated Muslims, especially young Muslims, strengthen their ties with Muslim communities, including extremists and some become radicalized by Muslim clerics (Rotella, 2005).

Western European states did not have strict immigration laws in the past and this made easy access for radical people, especially radical clerics, to migrate to Europe from the Middle East. They exploited all freedoms in the liberal states such as in the UK which became a new home for the radical imams who had often claimed that they were under political suppression in their home countries.

It is extremely difficult to determine how much the terrorist recruitments are associated with the majority of immigrant Muslim communities in the countries where they reside. It is sometimes considered that the mobility within the Muslim communities facilitates radicalization movements and "radical" networks in Europe, thus the odds of such recruitments from the large communities might be higher than

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[14] The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and the Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

smaller ones. For instance, some of the 9/11 hijackers were recruited from Germany and organized a terrorist network but they did not belong to the large Turkish Muslim community and were radicalized outside that community. Indeed, most of the alleged 9/11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia (Lentini, 2007: 215). Similarly, the French-born Zacarias Moussaoui was radicalized in Britain, away from his original Moroccan immigrant community (Napoleoni, 2007: 173). There is no evidence indicating any relationship between terrorists and the Muslim communities which represent the overwhelming majority of immigrant Muslims in Europe.

Mosques are the central institutions in all Muslim communities in Europe but they are often viewed as centres for radicalizing Muslims. For example, there was a network of mosques that supported Al Qaeda which received a lot of attention when Zacarias Moussaoui was provided financial and emotional support by the network (ibid). According to Napoleoni (ibid), European intelligence services believe that the mosque networks remain an effective source of recruiting, financing, and coordinating illegal networks for “Islamic terrorism” in Europe.

It is sometimes argued in the mass media through statements of policy makers and commentators that there are ties between “terrorist activities” and “Islamic radicalism” in Europe, in particular after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Economist, 2004). The source of terrorism is occasionally associated with Muslims because of the belief that some of the terrorist activities in Europe and even the events in the US, including 9/11 were perpetrated by Muslims educated and settled in Europe (Napoleoni, 2007: 173). Therefore, most European states have reviewed the existing policies towards their “Muslim minorities” to take some measures for “securitisation” of Islam in the national policy-making process for the integration of Islam in Europe. By this way, in most European countries, legal acts and regulations have expanded the authority of the state to deal with potential “threats” associated with “radical Islam” (Cesari, 2008).

III.1.2. EU Legislation for non-discrimination and counter-terrorism as a Form of Securitization

The debates on integration of Muslim minorities at the EU level have coincided with similar discussions within the member states. Since "global terrorism" has become an increasing security problem for almost all states, the EU is inevitably faced with the problem of integration of immigrant communities, especially of non-European and non-Christian groups. After 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks, several discussions have opened about possible solutions at the EU level regarding the integration of Muslim minorities, with the EU legislation gaining a new impetus. In parallel with the member states, the EU has handled immigrant Muslims through security measures which have been systematically related with several aspects of discrimination. In that sense, to fight against both discrimination and terrorism through the EU legislation is an important consideration vis-a-vis the security measures that often expose immigrants to vulnerability arising from the security discourse in which:

> "The security discourse conceals the fact that ethnic/religious/identity claims of migrants and their reluctance to integrate actually *result from* existing structural problems of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, xenophobia, nationalism and racism." (Kaya, 2013: 70)

Generally, the protection of religious freedom is granted by the EU Treaty provisions like the Declaration No.11 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and Article 52 of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty of the EU. The Treaty provisions also emphasize "the separation of competences between states and the EU institutions over religious affairs" because the EU respects the member states' competence over religious affairs, which is deemed as a national issue.

Article 13 of the Treaty establishing the European Community emphasizes the importance of the principle of non-discrimination based on "sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation". In addition to this, "the EU addressed the specific problem of religious discrimination" in 2000 through a directive "prohibiting discrimination in employment on grounds of religion and

belief, disability, age and sexual orientation". This legislation is expected as a provision to protect religious minorities, including Muslims, in the EU (Council of the EU, 2000).

The EU Council Directive 2000/43/EC, titled "Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union," has a significant role in granting these rights. In addition, Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, chapter entitled "Non- Discrimination and Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Diversity" have indicated how the EU approaches the integration of Muslims (Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, 2007). Cultural diversity has been promoted by the EU authorities while it has been implementing policies to counter racism and xenophobia since the early 1990s. Therefore, the EU has not specifically dealt with Muslims in order to take measures against "anti-radicalization" and "counter-terrorism".

On the other hand, the European Commission has prepared guidelines capable of distinguishing the words "Muslim/Islam" and "terrorism" in the "Race Directive-2000", which was implemented in the domestic law of all member states by 2003. According to Articles 1 and 2 of the Directive, "direct or indirect discrimination was prohibited" (Council of the European Community, 2000).

In the aftermath of 9/11, there is a specific reference to Islam in the country reports of an agency of the EU, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)[15], concerning discrimination and racism on anti-Islamic reactions in the EU (EUMC, 2001). These reports were published in 2001 and then condensed in the Report on Islamophobia in the EU in May 2002 (Allen and Nielsen, 2002).

[15] The EUMC was established in Vienna as an independent body of the European Union in 1997 and took up its activities in 1998 and ended them on 28 February 2007. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) is the successor organisation to the EUMC, but was awarded a far broader mandate to provide evidence-based advice on a wide range of fundamental rights, in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Official EUMC documents and reports are available on the FRA website. Available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en

The following year, the European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, Anna Diamantopoulou called for cooperation with the EUMC. After this, there were significant workshops and conferences among academics and policy makers to discuss the ethnic and religious discrimination in the EU (European Commission, 2002e and 2003c). In these discussions, they specifically focused on the issues of "anti-Semitism" (December 2002), "Islamophobia" (February 2003), "intercultural dialogue" (March 2003) and a conference was also held on "Youth and Gender, Trans-national Identities and Islamophobia". These assemblies did not offer any specific guidelines for policy-makers about the issue of non-discrimination (Silvestri, 2005: 389).

In 2003 the EU Council adopted the "Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union". This document states the EU's commitment to preventing racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and sources of terrorism without breaching the basic rights of EU citizens. The document also emphasizes the integration of immigrants: "…stability and cohesion within our societies benefit from the successful integration of legally resident third country nationals and their descendents …to prevent the isolation of certain groups" (Council of the EU, 2005). This document indicates that there is a "…perception of Islamophobia following 9/11 in Europe and that anti-terrorism laws are being applied abusively against Muslims" (Stemmann, 2006: 1).

After the Hague Programme, the EU Council approved "The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism" in November 2005. It states that "…radicalization and recruitment to terrorism are not confined to one belief system or political persuasion… [b]ut the terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qa'ida and extremists inspired by Al-Qa'ida has become the main terrorist threat to the Union" (Council of the EU, 2005). This document emphasized the importance of cooperation with Muslims specifically by stating that "Al-Qa'ida and those inspired by them will only be defeated with the engagement of the public, and especially Muslims" (ibid).

In order to prevent terrorist activities, it is considered that the EU needs to monitor travel to conflict areas and implement further restrictions against "those playing a role in radicalization including in prisons, places of education or religious training, and worship" (ibid). In this strategy document, the EU also seeks to promote "moderate Islam" stating that "[w]e need to support the availability of mainstream literature, seek to encourage the emergence of European imams and enhance language and other training for foreign imams in Europe" to prevent the spread of radical ideologies (ibid). In addition, the EU seeks to "…co-ordinate and enhance our efforts to change the perceptions of European and Western policies particularly among Muslim communities, and to correct unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims" without linking Islam to terrorism (ibid).

In February 2007, the EU Council adopted "Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan" based on new insights, which added some new points regarding counter-terrorism but did not change the key aspects of the previous strategy (Council of the EU, 2007). This document strengthens the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism in preventing the radicalization of young people both in the EU and in third countries.

It is considered that these provisions of the EU are important milestones for preventing religious discrimination. However, the EU institutions need enhanced cooperation with the member states concerning the integration of Muslim minorities in order to harmonize their responsibility to immigrant Muslims in the EU because Islam in Europe has dramatically affected many aspects of contemporary European societies and policies, such as the issues of emigration from Muslim countries, integration of newcomers, employment, social cohesion, identity, freedom of religion, and protection of minorities (Silvestri, 2005). Indeed, there are many significant obstacles ranging from the heterogeneity of Islam to legal constraints that do not allow to constitute an institution at the EU level regarding religious affairs (ibid). As a result, it is questioned whether the EU will eventually develop a comprehensive policy towards Muslim minorities since many controversial debates

associated with Islam have become highly sensitive issues in European society and politics.

III.1.3. Islamophobia in the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia Reports

The EUMC research reports on discrimination against Muslims in Europe are accepted as the first studies that give a sense of generalization about the use of the term Islamophobia and make it reliable at the EU level. Two of the most important EUMC Reports are "Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001" from May 2002 and "The Impact of July 7 2005, London Bomb attacks on Muslim communities in the EU" from November 2005. These reports state the responsibilities of the governments of the European countries towards their own Muslim minorities by exploring discrimination and anti-Islamic attitudes against Muslims in order to take precautions on behalf of community cohesion. Both reports emphasized a visible rise of discrimination and anti-Islamic attitudes in the European countries concerned following the September 11 attacks in USA and July 7 attacks in London.

There is a considerable increase in the trends of Islamophobia in the EU countries which became more visible following the events of 9/11. They are categorized in three dimensions as follows:

> "[First] the increase in acts of physical and especially verbal aggression; [second] the changes in attitude and opinion among the European Union's population: anxiety, hostility, curiosity but also a desire for dialogue; [third] attempts by certain parties, organisations and movements to make political and electoral use of the fear of Islam." (Geisser, 2004: 40)

Even though these dimensions differ among the EU countries, Islamophobia symbolizes a general European fear of Islam. According to the EUMC and the

RAXEN network reports (2001: 1), this fear paves the way for Europeans to justify verbal and physical attacks against Muslims, in particular after 9/11:

> "…acts of violence or aggression and changes in the attitude of the EU population towards ethnic, cultural or religious minorities (especially Muslim/Islamic communities but also other vulnerable groups or new types of victims), related to the recent terrorist attacks in the USA."

Nevertheless, these Islamophobic behaviours started to become functional, taking the form of anti-Muslim biases in which Muslims began to be stigmatized by politicians through the mainstream western media. Media portrayals became one of the most important sources of stereotypical understandings regarding Muslims and Islam that frankly encouraged the Islamophobic discourses. In general, the European governments seem to be reluctant in recognizing Islamophobia and unaware of the negative impact of press releases and thus refrain from taking direct action against anti-Muslim attitudes in their societies. This makes Islamophobia a natural social concern and creates public consensus about its existence.

In that regard, the European governments actually deal with the consequences of the events related to Muslims and encourage their people by addressing specific cases and sometimes accusing Muslims of being responsible for provocations against Muslims in society. The Danish example is considerable in this case. In 2003, during Anders Fogh Rasmussen's term as the Prime Minister of Denmark, a campaign against imams began following his criticism of a fundamentalist imam:

> "We have felt revulsion by the fact that small girls are subjected to mutilation by circumcision. It has filled us with disgust that imams residing in this country support capital punishment by stoning. And it is horrifying that an imam expresses understanding for suicide bombers in Friday prayers. This is medieval religious thinking, which we must denounce and fight in the strongest terms." (Rasmussen, 2003)

Islamophobia became a common discourse in describing exclusivist attitudes against Muslims in Europe. It is a secular anti-Islamic projection arising

with the debates about the integration of immigrant Muslims, in particular after 9/11. The legitimacy of the term Islamophobia is ambiguous, while there is no official definition of the term, it is widely used in the media, political and academic circles.

However, the EUMC country report titled "Summary report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001" generalizes the term Islamophobia at the EU level with respect to the discrimination against the Muslim population in Europe. The report defines the hostile attitudes against Muslims including physical aggression in the member states in accordance with the data collected by national agencies. The report explains the rise of Islamophobia elements in the post-9/11 era in Europe:

> "Islamic communities and other vulnerable groups have become targets of increased hostility in this era. A greater sense of fear among the general population has exacerbated already exiting prejudices and fuelled acts of aggression and harassment in many EU Member States." (EUMC, 2002: 1)

Apart from the EUMC Reports, in the USA, the CRS report titled "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries" states the problems in Europe as lack of a common framework for immigrant integration by addressing problems in Britain, France, Germany and Spain:

> "There is no legal basis in the EU treaties for the Union to act on or direct integration policy, and implementation is up to the member states. However, members increasingly believe that the EU can and should play a role in encouraging good integration practices, harmonizing standards, and monitoring policies." (CRS, 2005: 5)

Since the EU has no legal basis for a common integration policy, the member states could not be successful in improving a sense of belonging to their national identities for immigrant Muslims through national policies. Thus, Muslim

communities have become vulnerable to "Islamist extremism"[16] and terrorist networks.

III.2. Politics of Exclusion: Failure of Multiculturalism in the Light of Islamophobia Discourse

Some European politicians, as well as many academicians, have crucially started to discuss the failure of the current approaches toward immigrant Muslims in Europe with particular focus on multicultural policies. Discussions on the failure of multiculturalism in Europe have been directly related to the rise of right-wing extremism and Islamophobic discourses in the last decade.

European governments widely focus on the securitization of Muslim immigration whilst political discourse has contributed to the increase of Islamophobia in practice. The political discourse reflects anti-Muslim attitudes in European societies and therefore the failure of multicultural policies. In that respect, one of the most important surveys carried out by Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) indicates how anti-Muslim attitudes are strong in 8 European countries as follows:

Table III.2.

Anti-Muslim statements (agreement in percent)

No.	Item	Germany	Great Britain	France	Netherlands	Italy	Portugal	Poland	Hungary
1	There are too many Muslims in [country].	46.1	44.7	36.2	41.5	49.7	27.1	47.1	60.7

[16] Quallim Foundation, as a think-tank providing information to some European media channels about extremism and terrorism, defines "Islamist extremism" as follows: "It is the belief that Islam is a totalitarian political ideology. It claims that political sovereignty belongs to God rather than people. Islamists believe that their reading of *Shari'a* should be state law, and that it is the religious duty of all Muslims to create and pledge allegiance to an Islamic state that reflects these principles." Available at: www.quilliamfoundation.org

2	Muslims are too demanding.	54.1	50.0	52.8	51.8	64.7	34.4	62.3	60.0
3	Islam is a religion of intolerance. [France: Islam is a religion of tolerance.]	52.5	47.2	52.3*	46.7	60.4	62.2	61.5	53.4
	Additional items								
4	The Muslim culture fits well into [country/Europe].	16.6	39.0	49.8	38.7	27.4	50.1	19.0	30.2
5	Muslims' attitudes towards women contradict our values.	76.1	81.5	78.8	78.2	82.2	72.1	72.1	76.8
6	Many Muslims perceive terrorists as heroes. [France: question not asked].	27.9	37.6	-	29.2	28.5	30.3	30.2	39.3
7	The majority of Muslims find terrorism justifiable. [France: not justifiable]	17.1	26.3	23.3*	19.9	21.5	22.4	26.0	29.6

Source: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2011: 61), www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de

* The value for France is the percentage of respondents who "somewhat" or "strongly" disagreed with the statement

The controversies on the failure of multiculturalism concerning the integration of Muslim communities in Europe coincide with the rise of Islamophobic attitudes in the European societies. Previously anti-immigrant rhetoric more or less overlapped with the anti-Muslim rhetoric of extreme right–wing parties because immigrants were largely Muslims. Their exclusivist pronouncements against immigrant Muslims attract popular support, while reproducing Islamophobic sentiments. Moreover, the growing support for their discourse has recently been proliferating through the protests of anti-Muslim movements in many European cities. However, the ruling parties have often used a relatively soft discourse toward immigrant Muslims though their anxiety about the Muslim immigrants has reached a critical point with the participation of European born Muslims in the IS and the terrorist events after their return to home.

Until December 2014, it is estimated that since the emergence of civil and sectarian wars in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, more than 15,000 foreign fighters, both men and women, from more than 80 countries around the World left their homeland and joined these wars (Global Center, 2014). The number of the fighters from European countries is disconcerting.

Table III.3.

The number of the fighters joined the IS from European countries

Countries	**Dec. 2013**	**Nov. 2014**	**% change**
France	412	700	+ 69.9
UK	366	500	+ 36.6
Germany	240	400	+ 66.7
Belgium	296	300	+ 1.4
Netherlands	152	150	- 1.3
Denmark	84	100	+ 19
Spain	95	100	+ 5.3
Sweden	87	100	+ 14.9
Austria	60	60	0
Italy	50	50	0
Norway	40	50	+ 25
Finland	20	30	+ 50
Ireland	26	30	+ 15.4
Switzerland	1	10	+ 900
TOTAL	**1929**	**2580**	+ **34**

Source: Euronews (2014), www.euronews.com

The table shows how many citizens left European countries and joined the IS to fight in Syria and Iraq, as of December 2013 and November 2014, together with the percentage increase but the estimated number is reportedly more than 3000 (BBC, 2014). This poses a further security challenge in the case of radicalized

fighters returning to Europe. To prevent such terrorist recruitments and their activities, European governments have engaged new security measures about the return of radicalized fighters to Europe. With the disconcerting numbers of the IS fighters in Table 3, their concerns reached a critical juncture in the aftermath of the Paris attack in January 2015 because the perpetrators had close links with the IS and some of them were returnees from conflict areas. Another example highlighting the potential threat of returnees occurred in Belgium, as reported by Global Center (2014: 1) in a policy brief as follows:

> "After returning to Europe from fighting in Syria, 29-year-old Mehdi Nemmouche is now on trial on suspicion of attacking a Jewish museum in Belgium earlier this year, killing four people. Some experts fear that many more cases will emerge in the near future, with radicalised foreign fighters that are motivated by hateful ideology and willing to take the lives of innocent people."

The recruitments of fighters and their return have led European countries to take precautions as a form of securitization of radicalized fighters, assuming they will engage in criminal activity in Europe after they return. In the case of the UK, on February 12, 2015 the Parliament enacted a bill titled "Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015" after a long debate about its compatibility with the international law[17] concerning citizenship status:

> "the new counterterrorism and security bill would create a statutory Temporary Exclusion Order, allowing authorities to "manage" the return of British citizens suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activities abroad. Some have argued that such a law might render these individuals de facto stateless while their return is managed." (Great Britain, Home Affairs Committee, 2014)

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[17] According to international law, however, one has to respect the prohibition on rendering individuals stateless after revoking their citizenship. Nationality is considered a fundamental human right, as it functions as a basic condition for the enjoyment of a wide range of other human rights. For details, see Christophe Paulussen and Laura van Waas, *UK Measures Rendering Terror Suspects Stateless: A Punishment More Primitive Than Torture*, 5 June 2014; available at: http://www.icct.nl/publications/icct-commentaries/uk-measures-rendering-terror-suspects-stateless-a-punishment-more-primitive-than-torture

In the Netherlands, the law allows authorities to void citizenship when an individual participates in terrorist activities including jihadist recruitment. This law can only be executed in accordance with the following condition: "a person needs to possess dual nationality, as revocation of citizenship cannot lead to statelessness. In case an individual poses a threat to national security, it is also possible to revoke his or her residency permit, which can subsequently be followed by an exclusion order to impose an entry ban" (Global Center, 2014: 11).

In Germany, the passport law allows cancellation of travel documents when an individual is considered a threat against the country's internal and external security with respect to the changes in "the national identity card law to facilitate the revocation[18] of identity cards for suspected radical Islamic extremists and prevent them from travelling abroad" (ibid). However, in September 2014, Germany took up new security measures[19] that penalize jihadist recruitment and ban the use of symbols of any terrorist organization including the IS flag and provocative publications including social media.

In France, a new counter-terrorism law was enacted in 2012. It allows the prosecution of those who return to the country after being involved in terrorist activities or training in terrorist camps abroad. Besides, the French Senate passed a

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[18] In addition to revocation of identity cards, substitution of these cards is also being considered. Since German law requires citizens to be able to identify themselves, current proposals envision that a government-issued identity card could be equipped with a blocking notice or be substituted with a replacement card (Global Center 2014: 11). See Joint Declaration of the Federal and State Interior Ministers on 17 October 2014; available at:
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Nachrichten/Kurzmeldungen/gemeinsame-erkl%C3%A4rung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

[19] The security measures include the following statements: The ban states that the activities of the Islamic State association violate criminal law and are directed against the constitutional order and the notion of international understanding. The ban prohibits the operation of the Islamic State within German territory (more specifically, within the territory covered by the Act on Associations). It also prohibits the public promotional use of "Islamic State" in meetings or in writings, in sound or picture productions, or in images or representations that can be distributed or intended for distribution. The prohibition applies in particular to a set of six logos that are reproduced in the text of the ban. Under the ban, the assets of the IS are to be seized and confiscated by the Federal government, within the scope of the Act on Associations. The property of third parties will also be seized and confiscated to the extent that their efforts had promoted in Germany the transfer of classified information to the IS or if the parties had intended to support such efforts. Library of Congress, (2014), "Germany: Prohibition of Support for the Islamic State", access: May 10, 2015; available at:
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205404184_text

bill in November 2014 that allows the state to prohibit citizens from travelling to the conflicting regions and it allows for the confiscation of identification documents for two years in the case of their participation in terrorist activities (Global Center, 2014: 13).

The Paris attack signalled another aspect of the issue, the mobilization of masses against Muslim immigrants with the exclusivist discourse of the right-wing party politicians. Even though the European governments, particularly the French and German governments, drew a distinction between the terrorists involved in the attack and Muslim people in their initial declarations, the growth of anti-Muslim hatred and protests has further accelerated the tendency towards Islamophobia. It is reported that the Islamophobic incidents increased 500% in several European countries after the Charlie Hebdo event (Harris, 2015).

The Paris attack has made another aspect of Islamophobia more visible, which is the mobilization of masses through anti-Muslim movements. Henceforth, it seems that the European governments must deal with two contested issues: terrorism through increasing security measures; and anti-Muslim protests in the European streets.

The right-wing parties in Europe have already set up anti-Muslim campaigns in their publications to boost their popularity but they are now accompanied by the growing public protests in the European streets against the Muslim presence and immigration. The protesters are dramatically motivated by Muslim hate and showing off greater willingness to increase it. Previously, the centrist parties followed the same discourse in a softer tone but the recent trend indicates a significant change in their rhetoric concerning Muslim immigrants. Their primary concern is about the role of Muslim immigrants in the failure of the multicultural policies vis-s-vis the increase of the popularity of extreme parties in the elections. From this point of view, "[i]t seems that the declaration of the 'failure of multiculturalism' has become a catchphrase of not only extreme-right wing political

parties but also of centrist political parties all across the continent, although it is not clear that each attributes the same meaning to the term" (Kaya, 2011: 43).

With the rise of PEGIDA-like organizations, Islamophobia could be inflamed exponentially by targeting Muslim immigrants through mobilization of masses. It has also signalled how Islamophobia is more likely to increase in the foreseeable future of Europe, too.

Many European leaders strongly rejected both radicalism and discrimination and treated anti-Islamic movements as discrimination against humanity. The approaches of the European leaders were on display in the Paris march on January 11, 2015 condemning terrorism and discrimination. Most of them warned against the PEGIDA-like movements after the attack, whereas the ultra-right wing parties pointed to the attack as clear evidence justifying their opposition against immigrant Muslims.

In Britain, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is closely associated with anti-migrant attitudes and its former leader Nigel Farage called for the defence of "Judeo-Christian culture" against the "Islamist terrorism" in the same manner as Wilders in the Netherlands. After the Paris attack, the UKIP declared its opposition against implementation of multicultural policy and claimed that Britain and the other EU countries were facing the consequences of multiculturalism which discouraged integration of immigrants and paved the way for cultural segregation of communities:

> "We in Britain, and I've seen some evidence of this in other countries too, have a really rather gross policy of multiculturalism. By that, what I mean is that we've encouraged people from other cultures to remain within those cultures and not integrate fully within our communities…" (The Guardian, 2015)

In 2006, the UKIP-MEP Gerard Batten proposed a "ban on new European mosques," suggested the "Qur'an needs updating" and declared that "British Muslims should sign a special code of conduct" entitled "A Proposed Charter of Muslim

Understanding"[20]. The Charter requests Muslims to sign a declaration rejecting some parts of the Qur'an concerning "violent physical Jihad" that should be accepted as "inapplicable, invalid and non-Islamic". Otherwise, he described Islam as "a mono-cultural, totalitarian ideology," and claimed that "It is not a religion. It is against multi-culturalism and only promotes its own culture. It is against everything modern Britain stands for" (The Guardian, 2014).

The rise of extreme right-wing parties in elections has played a crucial role in the mobilization of masses through anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim discourses in Europe. In the Netherlands, far-right populist politician and leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV) Geert Wilders draws attention to the "Islamization of Europe" and claims that there is no place for Muslims citing Islam as a threat to their Judeo-Christian source of identity. He accuses multiculturalism and politicians with permissive attitudes towards Muslim immigration to the country of being responsible for the current European crisis with Islam (Bowen, 2011).

In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel warned against the PEGIDA and joined a Muslim community rally in Berlin to support tolerance and condemn terrorism and extremism after the Paris attack. However, the far-right groups participating in the initial PEGIDA protests like the xenophobic National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), today's Nazis, saw the protests as a chance to take their anti-immigrant worldview to the German people. The Party of Alternative for

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[20] Batten's "proposed charter of Muslim understanding" was written in 2006 and revised in 2007 by Sam Solomon, a former Muslim who converted to Christianity, with a foreword by the MEP himself. The Preamble of the Charter: We the undersigned as the representatives of Muslim communities in our capacity as leaders at various levels as *Muftis*, *Ulemas*, *Imams*, community leaders, heads of Islamic *madrassas*, *Muezzins*, *Mazuns* and all other Islamic relevant offices including those of free thinkers and leaders of NGOs as well as NOPs (Non-Profit Organisations), the leaders of youth and women's groups, and leaders at all levels of Islamic institutions commit to uphold, promote, propagate and abide by these articles in letter and spirit of this *Charter of Muslim Understanding*. We commit to the fostering and promotion of peaceful coexistence across Europe in the spirit of one brotherhood amongst all humanity treating all as equals in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the charter of the United Nations, the United Nations' *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 1948), and the United Nations' *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966). Whosoever breaches any of the articles stated and detailed below will be regarded as a person outside the House of Islam, and shall be denounced as a non-Muslim, and will find no protection in the Muslim community.

Germany (AfD) leader Bernd Lucke declared that “Islam is alien to Germany” and during the demonstrations its representative stated that “all of the people who ignored or maybe even laughed at the concerns raised by some of us about the dangerous threat of Islam are being punished by this bloody deed” (Foreign Affairs: 2015; Wall Street Journal: 2015).

In France, in the aftermath of the Paris attack, the President Hollande while criticising radical Islam stated that anti-Muslimism is a danger just as is anti-Semitism, that should be condemned and punished, therefore Muslims must be protected. He further added that “It is the Muslims who are the first victims of fanaticism, fundamentalism and intolerance…” (BBC, 2015). However, the French National Front has followed “an electoral strategy that associates Islam with terrorism” and its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen emphasized “the potential radicalization of Muslim immigrants in terms that implicated him for inciting hatred” (Cesari, 2009b: 4). His party –currently run by his daughter Marine Le Pen– won about a third of the seats in the National Assembly of France in the last election and signalled a potential triumph for the next election in 2017.

III.2.1. Official Discourse on Failure of Multiculturalism in Great Britain and Germany

The recent developments concerning the integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe came after the official statements about multiculturalism in Great Britain and Germany. The incumbent prime ministers of both countries announced the failure of multiculturalism as regards migrant integration in their countries. In the first place, German Chancellor Angela Merkel in October 2010 declared that the idea of “…the multicultural concept and [different communities should] live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other, has failed, and failed utterly.” (Spiegel Online, 2010).

After Merkel, the UK Prime Minister David Cameron declared in February 2011 that the "doctrine of state multiculturalism" failed so that "…we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives… [w]e've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong"; instead, he further stated that "we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism" (BBC, 2011). In 2011, the Former President of France Nicolas Sarkozy joined both leaders stating that multiculturalism was a failure in Europe.

Both Cameron and Merkel stated that multiculturalism failed by emphasizing the extremism, radicalism and terrorism sponsored by radical groups related to Muslim communities. They pointed out the failure of multiculturalism in light of such general concerns but it can be inferred from their statements that multiculturalism failed in the case of integration of Muslim minorities in their countries.

There is a widespread belief in Western Europe about the failure of multiculturalism since its notion of recognizing diverse ethno-religious groups and their cultures have led to parallel lives in the wider societies. This determination was clearly stated by the Prime Minister David Cameron that was echoed by Angela Merkel: "We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values" (ibid). In spite of the shared rhetoric in their criticism, Cameron aimed to draw attention to overly tolerant attitudes toward extremist Islam, while Merkel focused on the problems regarding the slow integration pace of Turkish immigrants.

It is claimed that blaming multiculturalism has been politically useful but dangerous so that populist reservations may cause unintended consequences in which they determine "an enemy within": Islam and Muslims (Bowen, 2011). However, criticism of multiculturalism ignores that Europe has not faced immigrant related problems only in the new millennium, but has a considerable history since the immigrants arrived in Europe after the WWII. The transformation of cultural and

religious aspect of European societies by diverse immigrant populations is not a recent phenomenon.

Furthermore, as Bowen (2011) stated, Cameron's statement about "state multiculturalism" is thought to be a warning about handling new immigrants. Contrary to this view about newcomers, multiculturalism is a historical fact since the Western European governments were aware that immigrants and their families would not stay temporarily, they promoted a number of strategies to integrate them into the host society. This awareness led them to generate pragmatic approaches that were eventually called "multicultural" rather than a project aiming for assimilation or preserving spatial and cultural separation within the society (ibid).

In the case of Germany, Merkel's statement indicated that Muslim immigrants are inassimilable. Indeed, her criticism was echoed as opportunistic prior to her election and a reflection of Germans' strong anti-immigrant feelings about immigrants. Her speech followed a number of anti-Muslim statements by some officials and politicians in Germany over the last decade.

Previously, the former Deputy Interior Minister August Hanning stated in 2008 that there were roughly 700 German citizens involved in extreme Islamist circles and it was expected that their numbers would grow exponentially. He contributed to German fears about radical Islamic movements and requested more scrutiny against Muslim communities. "Since then, the term *leitkultur*, which refers to a European cultural sphere and had been taboo for many years, returned to the vernacular and can now be employed approvingly by members of the centre-right" (Cesari, 2009b: 4).

Likewise, Helmut Schmidt from Social Democratic Party (SPD), who was the chancellor from 1974-1982, clearly stated that "it was a mistake for us to bring guest workers from foreign cultures into the country at the beginning of the 1960s…. The concept of multiculturalism is difficult to make fit with a democratic society" (Hannah, 2004). Prior to Merkel's speech, in 2010, Thilo Sarrazin, a senior official at Germany's central bank and the member of the SPD, published a book that received

popular attention in which he criticized Muslim immigrants for lowering the intelligence of the German society and said that “no immigrant group other than Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and crime” (BBC, 2010).

This chapter examined the development of Islamophobia in Europe, in particular after 9/11 with references to the EU legislation and the EUMC reports in order to understand how the rise of Islamophobia undermined multicultural policies, particularly in Great Britain and Germany.

The political discourse in both countries brought to light that there is a significant backlash against multiculturalism. The main thrust of their discourses was that multiculturalism is responsible for the rise of extremism, radicalism and terrorism within the immigrant Muslim communities because it tolerates segregated communities and does not promote a sense of common identity. Although they blamed multiculturalism regardless of the official recognition in their countries, the problem is being addressed concerning the integration of Muslim migrants.

The controversies on the failure of multiculturalism are directly related to the problems with the immigrant Muslims in Europe, which is assumed to be the source of conflict within the European societies.

The reasons underlined for the failure of multiculturalism are also considered as the reasons for the rise of Islamophobia. Therefore, speaking of the reasons for the failure of multiculturalism is indispensable for speaking of the reasons related to the rise of Islamophobia in Europe.

The main message of their discourse is that there is a growth of radicalism, extremism and terrorism within the Muslim communities because multiculturalism has promoted the toleration for the activities by segregated communities. Indeed, multiculturalism promotes peaceful coexistence of segregated communities and brings mutual rights and responsibilities for each community, including host society. Their discourse does not mention the responsibility of the host society concerning the

Islamophobic attitudes towards the Muslim communities. They ignore that the increase of Islamophobic attitudes undertaken within the host society has also undermined the premises of multiculturalism in both countries.

IV. THE QUEST FOR A NEW PARADIGM: EURO-ISLAM?

It is considered that the religious dimension as a vital component of the identity of migrants was ignored when they initially arrived in Europe as temporary workers. This is because their cultural identity was invisible until the 1970s and they were politically impotent until the 1980s (Parekh, 2008: 6). It was generally accepted in some academic circles and even by European politicians that migrants' religious identities would eventually and successfully disappear when they "acculturated to the values of liberal democracy" (Koenig, 2007: 911). This assumption is already falsified since the increasing presence of Islam has become clearly visible in European public spheres. In the wake of the emergence of politically motivated Islamic fundamentalism, Europeans have started to deal with Muslims, their organizations and public claims. In this context, Europeans have paid attention to issues of religious governance concerning the long-term integration of Muslim migrants.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, a number of tragic events in the international arena have been associated with a "militant version of Islam" as a result of a rising trend of "political Islam" in the Middle East accelerated by the Iranian Revolution which was perceived as a critical risk factor in international relations (Cesari, 2004: 3). This situation has affected Europe's treatment of their Muslim populations and created political interest in Islamic integration because they perceived such developments as a threat that might provoke Muslims living in Europe. These concerns have at least doubled after 9/11 and consecutive terrorist events in Europe. Therefore, initiatives for Euro-Islam cultivating grounds for peaceful integration of Muslims in Europe have taken their potentials from these developments.

The increase of public visibility of Islam has revealed how much Middle Eastern states were involved in the emergence of Muslim infrastructure in Europe. It was a way for the oil-rich states which began to finance Muslim organizations,

mosques and related foundations, “to recycle petro-dollars into the Muslim infrastructure” in Europe so as to promote their political impact by keeping these Muslims in their orient (Grillo, 2004: 863). This points to another motivation for Europeans to find an alternative means for integrating Muslims; preventing outside control over them. In short, Europeans have needed to find a suitable place for Islam by exposing it as an issue of their internal affairs.

In this regard, Europeans have been discussing how to cope with these existing problems and whether it is possible to integrate these Muslims within their established infrastructure. These debates actually oscillate between Muslims and non-Muslim Europeans responsibility to solve problems surrounding Islam and its future place within the European secular system.

In Europe, Muslims are increasingly criticized about whether they have allegiance to the patterns of Europeans’ “core liberal values” and their public claims of their religious identity (Yildiz and Verkuyten, 2012: 360). Europeans perceive that Muslims have not substantially proved whether their expression of cultural identity is fully compatible with such values and is independent of the existing threat of radical Islam. In this respect, Muslims and Muslim leaders are expected to change the essence of their identity which are suspected of being open to the radical recruitments that have been building for years. For this reason, it is considered that Muslims can resist this change since they have perceived reform as a threat to their identity which has been firmly constructed for years.

It is difficult for Muslims to reconcile national identity with their religious matters. The great majority of Muslims, especially the second and third generations, define their future in the European host societies (Gallup, 2009: 45). However, their response to the pressure of developing a form of Islam complying with the established European values, norms and beliefs vis-a-vis their perceived religious identity has determined the general framework of these debates.

IV.1. Searching for Solution: Muslims and Islamism

When scholars talk about problems of the Muslim presence in Europe, they assert differences between Islamism and Muslims. Islamism is actually understood as a political instrument to achieve certain objectives. It is thought to be a concept tantamount to political Islam. As Graham Fuller states (2003: xi), the supporters of political Islam claim that "Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion". This broad generalization indicates a formulation for an analytical guide explaining how political activities are often associated with Islam. There is no major problem related to other immigrant groups explaining ideological matter with their adherents as in the case of Muslim immigrants in Europe so that Islam and Islamism have been treated as a "political ideology rather than religion or theology" (Ayoob, 2009: 2).

The descriptions about the purpose of Islamism essentially emphasize the idea of the instrumentalization of Islam by Muslim individuals and networks pursuing political aims. At this point, Islamism provides legitimacy to political activities in which it "provides political responses to today's societal reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition" (Denoeux, 2002: 61). It is believed that despite of all their diverse cultural backgrounds, almost all Islamist groups have "the desire to 'Islamize' society" through changes of the basics of social life based on the principles of Islam (Woltering, 2002: 1133). Their desire cannot be realized as independent of political power. It means that Islamization of society cannot be achieved unless the existing political system of the country, where Muslims live, is replaced with that of the Islamic order. Robert Woltering, (2002: 1133), in his study titled "The Roots of Islamic Popularity" points out their desire with the following terms:

> "As to the political aspect of their desire, all Islamists have in common the conviction that sooner or later the realm of politics will have to be altered fundamentally. Islamisation may start at the bottom, or it may be implemented from above, but it is clear that any Islamisation of society

> cannot be complete until the existing political system of the country in question is replaced with a usually undefined – Islamic one."

However, Islamists have already ignored contemporary features of social, economic and political life, in which Muslim people interact because they believe that these features have caused the decline of Muslims. For this reason, their struggle to instrumentalize Islam has taken roots from the "golden age", and therefore, they wish to revitalize its notions for providing a road map to Muslims under today's conditions (Ayoob, 2009: 2). The greater majority of Muslims have thought beyond the Islamists view because they have pursued a way to reconcile their faith to the reality of contemporary social, economic and political life.

Many Islamists, as Bassam Tibi (2008: 171) points out, aim to Islamize Europe through immigration that seems to be rational to increase presence of Muslims in Europe, and then they could claim about the objectives of Islamism. According to his analysis, Islamists have explicitly given certain damages to the initiatives of the nascent European Islam. Islamists have struggled to open a certain place for their political objectives and they have sought to achieve this through using the Western discourse of democracy.

Those studies concerning the problems of integration of Muslim immigrants and their struggle to find alternative routes in Europe have tried to put a clear distinction between Muslim and Islamist. The proponents of European Islam accuse Islamists of being responsible for the long standing problems depriving Muslim people from integration into the European host societies.

Some scholars claim that current problems about integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe are strictly fed by the Islamists. They are seen as the main obstacle to the adaptation of Islam and Muslims to the European social and cultural fabric. One of these scholars is Samuel Huntington whose thesis rests on two ideas. On the one hand, religion is the predominant source of identity and represents indispensable value orientation for Muslims, that is, "Liberal" and "Muslim" values

are irreconcilable. (Klausen, 2005: 4). The religious Muslims are perceived as interlocutor of Islamist discourse since they cannot separate secular public law and religion in private life. On the other hand, Huntington claims that Islam and Christianity have already struggled for global domination. Islam is perceived as a monolithic religion with the objective of world control. (ibid). Another scholar Bernard Lewis points out that "in any encounter between Islam and unbelief, Islam must dominate" (Lewis, 1993: 53). Lewis further states that "For Muslims, Islam is not merely a system of belief and worship, a compartment of life, so to speak, distinct from other compartments which are the concern of nonreligious authorities administering nonreligious laws" (Lewis, 1993: 4). From this point of view, Islamic supremacism encompasses the very essence of daily life of Muslims and constitutes a guide capable of expressing political activities brought about by Islamists.

Those scholars who have criticized Islamists with reference to current problems related to Muslims in Europe are requested to differentiate ordinary religious Muslim people and those who follow the radical and extremist discourses. To clarify, there is no generally accepted reference about how Islamist propaganda has transformed Muslims in Europe. Europeans' problems about Muslims are predominantly determined in terms of some extreme reactions and criminal events. Contrary to controversial issues related to Islamists, most of them have affirmative attitudes towards the existing system of European liberal democracy. In that regard, "those 'Islamists' who have genuinely accepted the rules of the system they participate in should not be called Islamists, because they no longer have the desire to overthrow this system" (Woltering, 2002: 1134).

Nonetheless, there is not a clear reference to indicate that political Islam and Islamists aim to siege non-Muslims in a non-Muslim country in the name of world domination of Islam. Political Islam promotes the idea of resistance against the foreign influence in political, cultural and economic fields of the established Muslim countries. In this regard, Islamism is an ideology of protests and a project that ensures a comprehensive critique of existing social, political, economic and cultural order of the countries ruled by authoritarian regimes where Muslim societies are

expected to obey. For this reason, Islamism and political Islam are used as two interchangeable terms in this study.

Usually, Islamism is considered as a threat against the secular system of government but there is no clear sign indicating that Muslims would prefer Islamic regimes. Indeed, it has been more than 13 centuries since Islamism failed to achieve a notable appearance in the Islamic history (Woltering, 2002: 1136). There is no shining example of an Islamic political system which runs successfully in the world that Islamists may emulate when political Islam or Islamism are at stake in Europe. In fact, Muslims in Europe do not have a vision of political Islam which its adherents have followed to alter the existing political regime as in some Muslim countries, in order to change the political economic and cultural essence of the European countries.

Islamism is a term used to cover both politics of Islamists and a process of Islamization. Islamist politics are actually undertaken by the activities of religious networks which accuse governments of being promoters of anti-Islamic attitudes in the public sphere. It is widely articulated in the Muslim majority countries that have problems with the movements of political Islam. This is an established political ideology expressing a demand for a change of government, to be replaced with an Islamic one (İsmail, 2004: 616).

There is a tendency in most academic studies to perceive almost all Islamists in a unique perspective. In some aspects, Islamism represents unique ideological sentiments when there is reference to Islam as a universal religion, but it does not share the same visions of a political Islam in a unique perspective in the sense that it promotes a religion for social and political life (Woltering, 2002: 1137). Even though there is a concept of *umma* which describes unity of Islam, it has been seen just as a symbolic call since there is not a well-organized Islamist movement that encompasses all Muslims of the world to unite.

In Europe, Islamism is often associated with the Muslim organizations and mostly their members are called Islamists. Indeed, in Europe, the members of Islamic

organizations share Islamic values, but the greater majority of them put a clear distinction between religion and other aspects of life. Their relations with these organizations are primarily related to their religious needs such as prayers, mosques and other religious rituals. These organizations operate under the state authority and they are required to obey the existing secular order of the country. For this reason, some of them have relations with the state when they accept foreign aid and their administrative bodies are officially under scrutiny, which means that they cannot act reluctantly against the existing secular order in Europe.

The alternative route that Muslims could take is one of the main questions about their future in Europe. Mathias Rohe (2010) describes five possible roles that Muslims attitudes could play in the European secular system.

Firstly, there is the "muddling through" pragmatic approach. It points out that the significant majority of Muslims accepts the European legal and social framework without any theoretical reflections about it: They consider vital problems in their actual life such as economic and educational conditions; they accept democracy as the best political regime at this time in which they could easily participate; and they are more likely non-religious people or, at least losing their religious affiliations day by day (Rohe, 2010: 222).

Secondly, he states the "ex-Muslim" approach in which individual Muslims are to make a preference between secular democratic state and Islam that is an inevitable process: It is easily explained by the very negative attitudes toward Islam of some personal experiences that have paved the way for this extreme distinction (ibid). For example, Necla Kelek in Germany points out this process explaining why reform is difficult in Islam as follows:

> "For me Islam as a *Weltanschauung* [ideology] and a system of values cannot be integrated into the European societies. …it lacks the institutional, structural and theological prerequisites for that…. Islam is not capable for integration, whereas the single Muslim as a citizen is." (quoted in Rohe, 2010: 223)

This approach clearly represents an extreme form of assimilation through secularization of individuals. It is obviously considered that Muslims in Europe automatically refuse this approach.

Thirdly, there is the “exclusivist approach” which is accepted as the opposite of the second approach, in which there are some extremist people rejecting European orders and requesting the supremacy of Islamic rules (Rohe, 2010: 223). This is the reference point for the extremists to use violence in realizing their ambitions and represents the essence for their further radicalization within the society. Groups like *Khilavet Devleti*, *Hizb al-Tahrir*, *Tablighi Jamaat* and *Murabitun* are the major examples of this extreme approach (ibid). This approach and the examples have symbolic impact upon many Europeans’ perception of the main reasons behind the catastrophic events in Europe, indicating why they believe Muslims cannot be a part of their society. It distorts the integration process and enables automatic segregation and therefore exclusion of Muslims from the mainstream society.

Fourthly, the “traditionalistic approach” envisions the opposite or at least rejects the extremist approaches concerning the use of violence against non-Muslims within society; they respect the social norms and gender issue; they sufficiently tend to cooperate with non-Muslims and, more importantly, “…they are ready to integrate into the given order, but maintain a very traditional position towards gender-related issues and in matters of orthopraxy” (Rohe, 2010: 225).

According to this approach, Muslims aim to preserve their religious identity and obey the law in the society in which they live. Indeed, they represent a small number of the Muslims in Europe, while they are the best organized people especially around mosques (ibid). They practice the essential religious requirements without reaction against the secular order. They perceive this situation as a determined state of religious emergency by referring to the confrontation between two contested concepts, *dar al-Islam* (house of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (house of war), while Muslims can live in security but they are required to respect the existing

law of the host country in accordance with the principle of *dar al-‘ahd* (peace treaties) (ibid). In this sense, Europe represents the house of war for Muslims and therefore, they are obliged to respect the admissible law of the country where they live peacefully but they are intrinsically aware of their difference from the rest of the society consisting of non-Muslims who are voluntarily ruled by the secular orders.

Finally, Muslims could follow a way of the “substantial integrationist” approach in which they frankly accept full compliance with the leading principles of integration and preserve their religious identity within the system of religious freedoms (Rohe, 2010: 226-227). Integrationist Muslims promote new approaches to adapt their ways of life within the established legal and social system in Europe. They are against the divisions of traditionalistic approach and accept the notion for Muslims that can live in any part of the world without reference to the house of war or the house of Islam but just one house that is our world for all mankind as a whole (Rohe, 2010: 228). They do not accept societal divisions in terms of religious affiliations. They call Muslims to take responsibility and serve on behalf of the whole society.

This is a very peaceful way for Muslims to go beyond the debates on whether or not they are a permanent part of Europe. It can enable Muslims to actively participate in promoting their integration process. With this approach, Muslim identity is no longer a worrisome problem for Europeans. Moreover, they would be aware of a stable Muslim presence in their countries. Indeed, by this way, Muslims could show how much they become familiar to the Europeans’ indispensable, unquestionable values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law which are the essence of their legal orders. It is important to note that such orders do not reject religion and they are not all non-religious people. If they co-operate in this manner, Muslims and non-Muslims can achieve peaceful co-existence, prevent segregation within the society and agree on the principles of such legal orders through which all will be better off.

In other words, this approach represents the best alternative route for Muslims to promote integration that Europeans also would like to support. It seems to be a sole route Euro-Islam can be based on so as to solve the current problems arising from the debates on integration of Muslims in Europe.

IV.2. Euro-Islam as a Remedy against the European Anxiety?

The political visibility of Muslims has shown their religious identity in the European public sphere since 1980. This has led the Europeans to question how to integrate the Muslims as loyal citizens within their societies. On the one hand, the majority of influential voices have stated the pessimistic view that it is impossible to integrate Muslims. For example, Helmut Schmidt in Germany and Roy Jenkins in Britain confessed that it was initially a mistake to accept them without forecasting their increasing number with current problems in the foreseeable future (Parekh, 2008: 10). Their claims essentially criticize the essence of Islam by giving reference to the Muslim countries: “[Islam] was inherently undemocratic, which was why no Muslim country had so far thrown up a stable democracy, and almost all of them strenuously resisted internal and external pressures to introduce one” (ibid). From this point of view, European Muslims are automatically perceived undemocratic and far from having the capacity for integrating in a predominantly Christian/secular society.

This fear of Muslims has led the European countries to pursue new instruments against the potential threat related to Islam within European democratic societies since 1990s. Europeans started to develop a controversial strategy for accommodating their Muslims. It has strictly put Muslims under scrutiny with anti-terrorist laws accompanying the following applications of the host country: greater surveillance of their networks, monitoring mosques, banning imams imported from abroad, requiring competence in local language, requiring Muslim leaders to take some sort of responsibility for their religious fellows, etc. (Parekh, 2008: 14). Indeed,

these requirements more or less reveal the Europeans' expectations from Euro-Islam[21].

There is a vicious cycle in the European anxiety against the so-called "Islamic threat". They consider that Muslim demands, once satisfied, will likely trigger consecutive demands and claims particularly in the public sphere. At this point, Parekh summarizes their anxiety in the following terms:

> "When the request for *halal* meat was met, they asked for time-off for prayer at workplaces. When the latter was met, they asked to ban blasphemous books. And when that was met or seen off, they wanted recognition of polygyny. And after that, they pressed for interest-free loans, Islamic banks and insurance companies, and so on and so on." (Parekh, 2008: 11)

Their concerns signify that Muslims request to live in Europe in terms of what they have apparently thought as innocent demands without any change and restraint within the host society. For this reason, they perceived Muslims as potential enemy within because they never denied the right to import their culture from their homelands.

Moreover, the traumatic effect of the terrorist events contributed to this negative perception which made the fear of Muslims tantamount to fear of Islam as a religion. Thus, the search for Euro-Islam became a very immediate concern for the Muslims, especially for their intellectuals to draw an alternative route for their followers.

[21] The concept of Euro-Islam was first introduced in the 1990s by Professor Bassam Tibi of Gottingen University in Germany. Many other ideas then followed, such as "Western Islam", "American Islam", etc. Then, Tariq Ramadan contributed to the term as he mainly focused on "European Muslims," which is a more specific term than "Western Muslims".

IV.2.1. Euro-Islam or Islam in Europe: Divisions and Differences among Muslims

There are several divisions among the Muslims in Europe that make it difficult to talk about a unique term of European Islam. It is not only challenged by matters of sectarian divisions such as *Sunni* or *Shia*, but also by shades of religiosity and secularism. Furthermore it faces divisions of national identity, cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds.

Notwithstanding that this situation shows the complex picture of Muslims in Europe, most people, especially in Western Europe, make a mistake when discussing the presence of Islam and Muslims in Europe. Their treatment of Muslims and Islam – especially in the aftermath of some tragic events related to Muslims – implies there is a monolithic community representing Islam and Muslims as a whole. Their way of thinking of Islam and Muslims as a monolithic community ignores the fact that the so-called Islamic community in Europe is composed of many nationalities, traditions, languages, etc. (Colombo, 2013: 149).

On the other hand, European Muslims consist of several ethnic groups but in general they are embedded in Arabic and Asiatic pristine cultures which are not purely passed down from preceding generations and have not been considered as the source of problem as much as their religion. Oliver Roy describes their culture as a typical western urban sub-culture emerging from social exclusion and ghettoization, not through smooth importation from their primary culture (Roy, 2000: 1). From this point of view, the identification of a European Muslim community only by patterns of their ethnic origin, does not express Islam in Europe as such. In this sense, "[w]hat we see is that Muslims do adapt, not by changing Islam, but by adjusting their way of thinking about themselves as believers" (ibid).

The premises of Islam as a religion are more than an ethnic identity. European Muslims are required to go through a process of self-questioning to purify their genuine notions from conventional Islam that has already been intertwined with diverse local cultures inextricably. And then, they could seek to answer whether

there is a considerable misperception about Muslims and Islam. In other words, Muslims in Europe initially need a process to "purge from conventional Islam all precepts and rituals which offend modern democratic sensibilities, such as the subordination of women to men or eye for eye justice" (O'Brien, 2012: 6). That is likewise a process of "enlightened Islam" which is compatible with the European values. It is thought to be a remarkable consideration altering misperceptions about Islam and Muslims.

Regardless of the differences among Muslims in Europe, the signs for a vision of Euro-Islam are possible if they internalize the process of changing their "old image" of themselves in religious and social ways. Oliver Roy (2000: 29) points out the importance of this process as follows:

> "The real processes at work among the Muslims are that of individualization and reconstruction of identities along different patterns, all phenomena that undermine the very idea of "one" Muslim community in Europe. There is no Western Islam, there are Western Muslims."

Moreover, the European Muslims who would like to have a pure Islamic identity face the same ethnic division problem. This makes it hard to talk about a unique Muslim community in Europe, but divisions represent the essence in their understanding of Islam. Even though they are all Muslims or have "Islamic label", each community has distinctive practices of Islam incorporating their traditional and historical backgrounds that also represent a litmus test eliciting such divisions among them (Colombo, 2013: 149). This is a significant reason why Muslim people in Europe are not unified. For example, centres for religious practices, mainly mosques, are attended in accordance with common country of origin, sectarian affiliation, language, or politically decomposed community groups such as *Ahmadiyya*, Kashmiri, etc.

In spite of a unity in their belief, Muslims in Europe subscribe to different communities which provide them a sense of belonging in accordance with these divisions. For this reason, it is considered that Muslims as individuals may not

contribute to the idea of Euro-Islam because they cannot become fully aware of what is obviously not a coherent attitude in their relations with other Muslim communities and also with the wider society. The essential reason behind the lack of awareness is a tradition that gives opportunity only to those who have the right to possess knowledge through a chain of authorities recognized as religious leaders with a monopoly on positions (Cesari, 2009a: 153).

Identifying Islam and Muslims' culture is not a determination of non-Muslim Europeans as a result of simple perception but comes essentially from within. These divisions are not only among the first generation of immigrant Muslims in Europe but among second and third generations as well. This identification is the main obstacle to talk about "true Islam" but there could be a way to overcome the cultural divisions related to primary ethnic culture even in the extremist cases, as in the example below:

> "The 'salafist' approach, which stresses the return to an authentic Islam, rid of local traditions and superstitions, fits well with the contemporary process of acculturation. Its proponents strive to build non-ethnic mosques and communities." (Roy, 2000: 1)

To end such cultural divisions, speaking the host country's language might be a common denominator among the European Muslims. Both language and the idea of getting rid of extremist elements might be the initial steps for the process of acculturation of Muslim communities in Europe.

IV.2.2. Intellectual Discourse on Euro-Islam

Euro-Islam has recently been discussed to find possible alternative routes for Muslims to comply with the Europeans' integration strategy. It aims to strengthen integrative approaches to be "more inclusive of religious-ethnic minorities… to avoid radicalization and to make sure that Muslims are properly familiarized with and incorporated in the ethos of the European countries in which they live" (Silvestri,

2010b: 49). Correspondingly, Euro-Islam is thought to be a new form of incorporation of the European values, democracy and pluralism while maintaining Muslim identity in the European context.

Europeans' anxiety about the issues of Muslims and Islam has often addressed the divisive nature of interpretation of Islam as examined by European Muslim scholars and intellectuals. Their diverse interpretations of Islam have rarely shown similarities but frequently differences and sometimes confrontations according to the intra-Islamic debate in Europe. In general, it can be inferred from these debates that Muslims have faced a dilemma to incorporate the principles, values and ideas of Islam and Europe.

The intellectual debate on interpretation of Euro-Islam has offered different perspectives for integration of Muslims in Europe. Some reliable arguments have been drawn about how Muslims should adopt themselves to the newly emerging but inevitable reality of Euro-Islam. In this study, the scholarly debate on Euro-Islam is mainly examined according to the writings and speeches of Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan, both European born Muslim intellectuals.

Even though Bassam Tibi coined the concept of Euro-Islam, there are some other scholars who define and contribute to this term. For example, Tariq Ramadan in 1999 claims for a Euro-Islam that is compatible with "Islamic doctrines and European conventions" (quoted in Yildiz and Verkuyten, 2012: 361). He emphasises the universal principles of Islam in which Muslims ought to be faithful and that would request them to integrate and participate in the societies they live in. Contrary to Ramadan, Tibi calls for a process of reformation of Islam that would contribute to the interpretation of Euro-Islam. He further states:

> "Euro-Islam is an interpretation of Islam that makes it compatible with four European constitutional standards: Laicism (that is, the separation of religion and politics), secular tolerance based on individual human rights (this includes the freedom of dissent and belief), democratic pluralism and last but not least, civil society." (Tibi, 2001: 226)

The problem of defining the Islamic presence in Europe including the cultural identity of Muslims has become an essential subject for both Muslims and Europeans. It has also become a central theme in almost all debates to formulate a new comprehensive project to describe a process for integrating Muslims, in particular second and third generations. It is a considerable question on a new project for especially such generations because they were born in Europe. In the case of Britain, for instance, the majority of second and third generations born in Britain are British citizens whose parents are Pakistanis; they speak English and their parent's languages, thus, are they just Muslims, or indeed British Muslims (Karić, 2002: 440)? As a result, the question can also be applied for Muslims in every European state.

The second and third generations of Muslims in Europe are relatively convenient for integration into the European society. The process is defined as an emerging self-consciousness for the European Muslims in which they have germinated some signs of a change of their mentality separating them from the first generation.

There are several attempts to define Euro-Islam but none of them encapsulates general expectations of both Muslims, especially the second and third generations, and Europeans. Actually the debates on defining Euro-Islam are expected to agree upon some important issues including mutual acceptance on both the European and Muslim sides. In general terms, the Europeans are expected to find effective grounds for the integration of Muslim people into European society with a greater respect for their universal values and norms within the European polity. On the side of European Muslims, the issues of Islamic cultural identity and equal treatment in social, economic and political terms are expected to be vital components (ibid).

Muslims must embrace some important responsibilities in order to receive a positive response to their demands for Islamic cultural identity. Initially, they are clearly required to avoid radical and extremist identity characteristics imported from

their country of origin and to agree on the new principles in the European environment. In that sense, Tariq Ramadan, one of the chief proponents of Euro-Islam describes Europe as a "home" for Islam, as a "house of testimony" for Muslims, and therefore, "the European environment as an *area of responsibility*" and "an *area of testimony*" for Muslims (Ramadan 2004: 76-77). His approach to the adaptation process of Muslims' cultural identity in Europe is treated as a reformist one:

> "The aim is to protect the Muslim identity and religious practice, to recognize the Western constitutional structure, to become involved as a citizen at the social level and to live with true loyalty to the country to which one belongs.'' (Ramadan, 2004: 27)

IV.2.2.1. The Euro-Islam Discourse of Bassam Tibi

The Euro-Islam project has sought to promote a policy of inclusion instead of exclusion of Europe's diverse Muslim communities into the European social and political fabric in order to avert extremism and ghettoization within the European societies. The prominent scholar of Euro-Islam, Bassam Tibi (2002: 32) mentions a process of the Euro-Islam as follows:

> "[Tibi] argue[s] against polarization and suggest[s] a Euro-Islam as a strategy for peace within Europe to replace the exclusion which is inflicted by Europeans on Muslims and which contributes to their defensive response of self-ethnicization."

In this case, divisions among the Muslim communities are no doubt one of the main concerns of discussions on the failure of initiatives for Euro-Islam at the national level in Europe.

Tibi claims that Euro-Islam aims to represent depoliticized features of Islam which seeks to accommodate rather than contradict or clash with the existing European secular order. In that sense, he summarizes his expectations for Euro-Islam as follows:

> “By acknowledging cultural and religious pluralism, Euro-Islam would give up the claim of Islamic dominance. Thus defined, Euro-Islam would be compatible with liberal democracy, individual human rights, and the requirements of a civil society. It would also contrast sharply with the communitarian politics that result in ghettoization. To be sure, the politics of Euro-Islam would not allow complete assimilation of Muslims. Yet it could enable the adoption of forms of civil society leading to an enlightened, open-minded Islamic identity compatible with European civic culture.” (Tibi, 2002: 37-38)

The complexity between what is civil and political in describing Muslim-related issues led Tibi to focus on describing Islam in Europe. The increasing presence of Muslims in Europe coincides with the problems of political Islam in international relations. To determine how these Muslims can adapt to European values and ethics, he emphasizes two universalisms, namely European and Islamic. He points out that multiple identities can exist within European and Islamic concepts in which there is no reason for Muslims to integrate themselves in the European universalism. In essence, he suggests what Muslims need to realize their religious identity are all found within the European context:

> “A Muslim can be European without being Christian, and without having roots in Europe. The sole precondition is adopting the European civic values that are the result of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. And if you do that, you can remain Muslim. But how Muslims wholeheartedly become European citizens and espouse “Europe, a Beautiful Idea” without reforming and rethinking Islam?” (Tibi, 2007)

Tibi’s description of multiple identities is not a threat against both Muslims and Europeans since the pluralistic character of European societies allow for differences and opportunities that facilitate adjustments of Islam towards civil society. In other words, pluralistic society requests some reforms in Islam to adapt to European civic values (ibid).

In that sense, Muslims are expected to recognize European values which are the essence of Europeans’ civilising identity and pose no threat to Muslim identity.

Indeed, when Tibi describes Euro-Islam, he reveals permanent common features between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe (Tibi, 2008: 208). His understanding of a European version of Islam includes “cultural modernity”, democracy and “…tolerance that goes beyond the Islamic tolerance restricted to Abrahamitic believers.” (Tibi, 2002: 37). European Muslims are expected to achieve this in cooperation with non-Muslims since Islam does not belong to a specific geography and conditions; however, there are other examples indicating how Islam adapted to other diverse areas of the world.

Tibi claims that change is a necessary condition for peaceful adaptation of Muslims in Europe and it must be from within to be successful because Euro-Islam can be achieved when “…change and religious reforms are admitted by Muslims” (Tibi, 2008: 189). It implies a very controversial issue to explain whether or not Muslims would answer this reform process affirmatively.

However, it is seen that European Muslims would participate in the idea of cultural adaptation independent of outside control. Muslims are required to be aware of the fact that outside impact like financial aid and foreign imams from Muslim governments is the main obstacle to the development of a robust Euro-Islam (Rohe, 2010: 227).

His understanding of reform in Islam states that Muslims should adapt to the European values by internalizing the very essence of pluralist society. It does not mean that Muslims should adjust their values to that of Christians, but reject the conflicting features related to Islam. As an example, Tibi requests European Muslims to understand that *jihad* and *shari'a* law are not a noteworthy choice instead of European law and order (Tibi, 2008: 190). When he analyses the features of Euro-Islam, he states that there is only one law for Muslims that is “no shari'a in Europe for the Islamic minorities in any area of law, including family law” (quoted in Boening, 2007: 4).

Tibi thinks that Muslims can only find a peaceful place in Europe if they refrain from the use of instruments that make them different than the host society.

Articulation of such differences within the society has already resulted with the ghettoization of Muslims. Seeking solution to this segregation within the society brings responsibilities for both Muslims and European governments. Muslims ought to give up all they own as negative instruments leading them into ghettoization, while the governments ought to satisfy their needs as the "Muslim citizens" in terms of a sense of belonging, otherwise, "[if] the conflict of norms, values and the related worldviews are not resolved in a pluralist society, …[it] could (and in fact, has already) led to hostility within Muslim-ghettos in western Europe" (Boening, 2007: 4).

Nevertheless, Eric Brown supports Tibi's recommendations for peaceful accommodation of Muslims within European society by requesting them to adopt the European values. He hopes that Muslims will promote an Islamic solution to radicalism and extremism; one that "combines religious fidelity with an allegiance to the principles, institutions, and sovereignty of liberal democratic government" (Brown, 2005: 7). His statement invites Muslims to constitute an ideological bulwark against the radical and extremist ideologies infiltrating from outside Europe.

In his book *Islam in Global Politics: Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging*, Tibi (2012: 113) defines himself as a Muslim immigrant with a European identity who tries to "establish a venture of a secular-liberal Euro-Islam". He criticizes Islamist and Salafists for having an agenda of the Islamisation of Europe. He goes further and claims that Europeans who deny the multiple identities in their pluralistic society constitute obstacles to promoting European Islam. He finds himself in contrast to these Europeans because he claims that they promote multiculturalism as if an acceptance of an "Islamic space" in Europe not only admitting "Islamist *shari'a*, but also a neo-absolutism that fuels the inter-civilizational conflict" (ibid). He opposes the absolutist Islamism and the relativist multiculturalism and supports a Euro-Islam which subscribes to pluralism. He further points out that contrary to the pluralistic society idea, Muslims could only stay as aliens living in Europe which is called *dar al-shahada*, another term introduced by Tariq Ramadan instead of *dar al-Islam* (house of Islam) that is not Europe (ibid).

Those perceptions viewing Muslims only in terms of their migratory backgrounds promote their exclusion and marginalization. This identification alienates Muslims from obtaining a sense of belonging and internalizing European values. To recover from this alienation, Muslims seek to establish their own "diasporic ghettos" in major European cities and legitimize their presence through growing awareness of their ethnic and religious identity which is perceived as the main obstacle for Muslims to become European "citizens of the heart" (Tibi, 2012: 113-114).

For Tibi, this situation becomes a political problem and a "great challenge" to Europe when the radical Islamists use the emerging "enclaves" for recruitment of activists since they perceive this as the logical extension of *dar al-Islam* in Europe. He claims that al-Qaeda has already recruited its jihadists from these enclaves which are promoting "parallel societies" (ibid). In that sense, both Europeans and Muslim immigrants are thought to be responsible for the actual crisis to the extent that they have mutually contributed to the emergence of parallel societies: Islamic diaspora and Europe.

Tibi points out that Euro-Islam is restricted only with the migratory Islam in Europe; it has no relation with the world of Islam. Its vision focuses on change in the context of Islam in Europe. He states the core argument of Euro-Islam: "if a European, secular Islam by reform is accepted both Europeans and Muslims, then both parties may manage to live together in peace without any proselytization on both sides" (Tibi, 2012: 115). It is understood from his explanation that in order to avoid ghettoization of Muslims as the source of imminent peril toward both Muslim immigrants and European host societies, they need to agree on cooperation about their immediate concerns.

Tibi discusses issues related to the integration of Muslims in Europe in accordance with two scenarios for the future of Europe: "Europeanizing of Islam", or "the Islamization of Europe" in light of his vision of a Euro-Islam aiming to change (Tibi, 2012: 117). He accepts the notion of a Europeanised Islam in which the

civilizational identity of Europe developed with its dynamics, not only an Islamic notion because "Europe is not a part of [dar al-Islam which also means the territoriality of Islam]… and I hope – as a European Muslim – that Europe will never be mapped in dar al-Islam, because this would be clearly an imperialism" (ibid). This means that European Islam is required to adapt itself to the European civilization without aiming to change it. Therefore, Muslims are requested to relinquish any agenda for the Islamization of Europe; and accept the notion of Europeanization of Islam.

He often emphasizes Euro-Islam based on the Europeanization of Islam as an alternative to prevent the Islamization of Europe promoted by the Islamists. The current problems related to Muslim migrants are always perceived as incitements of radical Islamism. In their dissemination, Islam is used as an ideological weapon prompting Islamophobia. In this sense, he calls for Europeans to replace Islamophobia with the term "bashing Islam" since Islamophobia is used for all adverse statements against Muslims (Tibi, 2012: 121). Europeanization of Islam represents one aspect of the integration process of Muslims in Europe. Nevertheless, it implies that Muslims are expected to initiate religious reforms in order to achieve a vision of Europeanised Islam by making it compatible with the European secular identity.

Tibi admits that "Euro-Islam is a secular concept", but it requires religion on behalf of political ethics, yet it separates faith from politics (Tibi, 2012: 124). From this point of view, there is no reason to conflict based on religion. Correspondingly, he describes Europeanization of Islam as a process in which "Euro-Islam is a policy instead of policing" (ibid). This gives the message to Muslim immigrants that their fear of Europeans' treatment of Islam is a misperception.

Europeanizing Islam requires religious reform to strengthen the integration process of Muslim immigrants, to prevent ghettoization or parallel societies and to make them true Europeans (Tibi, 2012: 128). It is also envisioned as a process to provide Muslims an Islamic legitimation. In this regard, Tibi postulates five pillars of

Euro-Islam which are the basic requirements of civil society: 1. Democracy as a political culture belongs to a civil society with its core values. 2. Strict separation of politics and religion, that is, secularity does not exclude religion from life as in secularism, but a separation between of faith from politics. 3. Individual human rights according to the entitlements. 4. Pluralism of cultures and religions requiring equal treatment of all religions within the society. 5. Tolerance towards all differences in terms of the notions of pluralism, based on modern comprehension of the term (ibid).

Some scholars have harshly criticized Tibi's Euro-Islam definition that Islam can be compatible with European values of democracy, secularism and civil society. His understanding of Islam is thought to be oversimplified and only enclosed in individual's private sphere as source of ethics. For example, Heinz Halm points out "Shariah as an organic part of Islamic faith and mentions the impossibility of separating Shariah from a life that is guided by Islam" (quoted in Tol, 2009: 136).

Some scholars reject Tibi's Euro-Islam because his understanding of Islam is oversimplified by making a strict distinction between Islam in Europe and the rest of Muslim world. Rosen Lawrence (2003) states that Islam and Muslims have never experienced a process of reformation in religion in their long history as in the Christian faith. In other words, he states that "…obviously no strict analogy between present day Islam and the Protestant Reformation is tenable" (Lawrence, 2003: 156). The greater majority of Muslim migrant in Europe has given priority to their economic and social needs. When they are in conflict with the authority of state, they inevitably tend to strengthen their communitarian ties.

There is no single form of Islam among the Muslim migrants in Europe, but a variety of forms due to their diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In this sense, before seeking to achieve Euro-Islam as Tibi states, Muslim migrants are more likely to follow the way of the Muslim countries from which they have stemmed in response to their needs (Lawrence, 2003: 156-157). These Muslims have overwhelmingly conceived their family life and forms of religious rituals from their

country of origin. Therefore, Tibi's understanding of Euro-Islam through reformation seems to be a utopian approach.

Furthermore, it is claimed that Tibi ignores the historical dimension about the current problems when he criticizes Islamism as the main obstacle to the successful integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe. Contrary to his criticism which accuses Islamism of being responsible for the rise of radicalism, some Muslim leaders in Germany have perceived Islamism "as conceptualizing the marginalization of Muslims as the product of a historical conspiracy by the Western world against Islam" used to exclude Muslims from the political, economic and social structures of the country (Tol, 2009: 138). They believe that "Islamism in [the West] is a resistance to marginalization" because the historical perception of Westerners about Muslims and Islam has always been articulated through hostile attitudes (Tol, 2009: 136). Even though Tibi criticizes Islamism as one of the main sources for the exclusion of Muslims migrants in Europe, the historical perception is clearly stated as in the case of Muslim leaders in Germany that "Islamism capitalizes on the perceived and real discrimination against the Turks by German society. It portrays the Muslim community as the victim of German 'oppression'" (ibid).

Almost all Muslim scholars point out that religion is the defining dimension of Muslim identity formation. It means that other elements of Muslim identity such as gender and national affiliations are perceived secondarily (İsmail, 2004: 615). Tibi's search for reform in European Islam complying with the European secular polities assumes religion as a private matter which has no claim in the public sphere. He pleads an optimistic approach that Islam in Europe reaches "a position to engage in cross-cultural fertilization" (Tibi, 2009: 31). He formulates his assumption as follows: "Islam has to change in light of its predicament with modernity, and this is a feasible project" (Tibi, 2009: 57). In other words, Islam and modernity are always examined in a confrontational context that makes the current crisis concerning Islam with modernity inevitable. For this reason, he suggests religious reform and cultural change as a way for a peaceful resolution. (Tibi, 2009: 58). With this suggestion, he determines philosophical grounds for the sake of cultural accommodation of

Muslims in Europe in order to overcome the crisis with modernity and to provide a suitable prospect for Islamic societies in the long-run.

He accuses Islamists of being responsible for various claims of political movements in the public sphere, but Muslim identity does not necessarily endorse these movements. If religion is an indispensable element of the Muslim identity and rejects any change in its essence, the question of how the reformation in his Euro-Islam agenda could functionally respond to political needs seems to be an open ended process.

Tibi advocates full separation between religion and politics and the significance of religion only in the private sphere (Tibi, 2009: 181). He further states that the concept of secularism does not claim rejection of religion from the public sphere as a whole (Tibi, 2008: 88). He means that secularism needs depoliticized religion and requests Islam to adjust itself to the cultural basis of the European civilization (Tibi, 2009: 207). For this reason, he emphasizes the importance of reform on behalf of Euro-Islam. His rational approach to Islam allows the integration of Islam to the modern European culture (Tibi, 2008: 29). He seeks to achieve a secularized Islam which has notions adaptable to the secular environment. He implies that this approach respects the Islamic sources related to its cultural interpretations since Islam can accommodate a culture which does not contradict with its essence.

It is considered that the separation of religion from state is well suited when Christianity is at stake but it becomes problematic in the case of adhering to Islam. From this point of view, William Galston (2003: 73-75), points out that Islam requires the implementation of religious practice more than Christianity. Islam has several common features with the core values of European culture but it is more likely to be accepted that it has some fundamental differences at the heart of the current clashes in Europe. From this perspective, in order to understand why Tibi promotes reform in European Islam, Noah Feldman makes a comparison between Christians' and Muslims' understanding of relations between state and religion, in

which "if many in the West cannot imagine democracy without separation of church and state, many in the Muslim world find it impossible to imagine legitimate democracy with it" (quoted in Joseph and D'Halingue, 2012: 137).

This situation reflects Tibi's concerns involving political Islam in the policy making process and manipulation of people through religious discourses in Muslim majority countries where political systems, even ostensibly democratic ones, are dominated by religious features. Thus, as he means, political Islam has considerable impact upon the European Muslims so that Islamists inevitably exploit Muslims in Europe in their engagement with the state authority. His understanding of reform in European Islam aims to build a barrier against Islamists and their involvement in the policy making process in Europe. In other words, since European Muslims have been subject to the manipulation of the Muslim countries where Islamists actively participate in political life, Muslim communities cannot internalize separation of religion from state. Noah Feldman points out that such internalization is impossible because Islam is the main legitimating source for everything in the Muslim world:

> "Separation of church and state is an excellent idea, even, even a constitutional necessity, in a religiously diverse country like the U.S. Where almost everybody in a country is Muslim, however, a democratic state may nonetheless have a religious character." (quoted in Joseph and D'Halingue, 2012: 138)

IV.2.2.2. The Euro-Islam Discourse of Tariq Ramadan

While Bassam Tibi coined the term Euro-Islam initially in Germany, Tariq Ramadan is a well-known and influential Muslim intellectual not only in Europe but throughout the Muslim countries and diaspora. He has criticized and contributed to the term, and inspired many scholars to think of initiatives for the integration of Muslims in Europe. Ramadan, apart from his own prolific scholarship, has himself along with his ideas become the subject of several studies. For instance, Eric Brown speaks about him as "the ubiquitous Swiss Islamist intellectual and political activist" and describes him as a person who "embodies the internal contradictions within

mainstream Islamism today" (Brown, 2005: 10-11). Some intellectuals refer to his statements with high praise, while others criticize him for alleged contradictions in his statements. In general, he is accepted as a peerless in the discussions of Islam in Europe (Tibi, 2008: 156).

Almost all who study Ramadan and his writings reference his background as the grandson of Hassan al-Banna, the founding father of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. Al-Banna's influence on Tariq Ramadan's ideas about interpretations based on Islam cannot be disregarded. He is sometimes associated with political Islam as an adherent of Islamism since he rejects the idea of reform in Islam Tibi advocates in the European context. In this sense, Caroline Fourest wrote a book about him titled *Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan*, in which she portrays Ramadan as a person who does not seek a real modernization of Islam in the full sense of the word, particularly in Europe (Fourest, 2008: 233).

However, Ramadan is accepted as a "global phenomenon" in the case of issues related to Muslims and he is the most quoted writer in Europe (Fourest, 2008: foreword). He is considered amongst a few most influential Muslim intellectuals on the Muslim youth throughout the globe. In that regard, for the purpose of this study, Tariq Ramadan's ideas about Islam in Europe are analysed by giving reference to the critiques and support of scholars about his writings and statements. His approach toward Euro-Islam is examined in a controversial context.

Euro-Islam debate actually oscillates between writings and statements of Tibi and Ramadan and their criticisms of each other have captured the attention of intellectuals and politicians to the debates on Muslims in Europe. Their ideas have already attracted many people to consider questions about the integration of Muslim people in Europe. Ramadan is accepted as a leading moderate Muslim and advocate of "an anti-dogmatic and hybridized form of Euro-Islam" (Brown, 2005: 11). His ideas on the compatibility of Islam with the current socio-political structure of Europe are perceived as a sensible step for Muslims in Europe to rethink modern and democratic European life. He emphasizes on the importance of integration of

Muslims in Europe and insists that Muslims are required to fully comply with the integration process into the host societies without making concessions from their religion.

Ramadan's basic approach to Euro-Islam is based on the idea that *Qur'an* and *Sunna* need an interpretation in detail within the European context. He states his ideas about Euro-Islam in the book called *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. In this book, Ramadan suggests Muslims in Europe stop perceiving themselves as minority groups (Ramadan, 2004: 6). He formulates three major principles which are also described as his road map for Muslims in Europe: 1. There is no obstacle for Muslims to live in the West in accordance with the Islamic sources; 2. Muslims are required to obey the rules in the country they live, Muslims are under the authority of an agreement whose terms must be respected on condition that they do not force Muslims move in opposition to their conscience; 3. In the case of conflict occurred between their faith and the terms which they are subjected to obey in the country they live, a new specific form of study is required as groundwork for legal opinion, *fatwa*, determined by Muslim jurists (Ramadan, 2004: 95). These principles provide Muslims with a satisfying solution for the sake of their adaptation process within the European host societies.

He suggests Muslim people in non-Muslim majority countries take honourable attitudes towards the existing order that help them protect their identity as Muslims. In the case of secularism, Muslims are also requested to obey the rules so that embracing secularism does not mean ignoring Islamic principles; it enables all people to interact in the country without superiority of any religious group over another and provides religious freedom for all (Colombo, 2013: 143-144). Muslims as individuals, citizens or residents can make choices without conflict with non-Muslims due to their religious identity in the European secular environment.

Ramadan emphasises the importance of interpretation of the religious sources to find solutions for contemporary problems of Muslims. This is the only

way for connecting to universal principles of Islam to meet the changing social needs of Muslims in the current environment (Ramadan, 2004: 37).

Ramadan calls on Muslims to struggle against the stereotypical perception of Westerners about Islam. The association of Islam with terrorism is the main concern in his call as follows:

> "The Muslims must rapidly develop a critical discourse that rejects the victim pose and criticises radical verbal or cultural interpretations of the Holy Writings. In the name of the guiding principles of Islam they must take a stand to stop their religion being distorted to justify terrorism, domestic violence or forced marriages." (Financial Times, 2006)

He considers that Muslims in Europe have responsibilities to change their image and requests they participate actively in all aspects of society. In the case of the integration debate, Muslims have been accused of leading parallel lives which resulted in isolation from the rest of European mainstream societies. To prevent such exclusion, he draws attention to financial and political independence of Muslims from the Muslim countries. This is the main concern of the advocates of Euro-Islam. They claim that rejection of outside interventions in the affairs of European Muslims contributes greatly in favour of their integration and participation in the society. Accordingly, the main obstacle before the Euro-Islam project would disappear. From this perspective, Ramadan again calls Muslims in Europe to be aware of the importance of such participation:

> "It is regrettable that politicians are increasingly exploiting fears to mobilise voters. Muslim citizens should respond to these attempts by doing exactly the opposite of what would be their instincts tell them. Instead of withdrawing from public debate, they have to leave their religious, social, cultural and political ghettoes." (ibid)

Another controversial issue about Euro-Islam oscillating between Tibi and Ramadan is the debate on *shari'a*. Contrary to Tibi's rejection of *shari'a* within the Euro-Islam context, Ramadan accepts that it is a crucial subject for raising European anxieties but says that *shari'a* is the "expression of the universal principles of Islam"

and the structure which makes a guide capable of expressing all aspects of human history (Ramadan, 2004: 32). He points out some different meanings of *shari'a* and accepts that it is the formulation of human intellect based on the reference to the principles and the sources of Islam. In other words, *shari'a* is the expression of "the way to faithfulness" as "the work of human intellect" (Ramadan, 2004: 34). It is embraced as a term more than an individual commitment and more than progression of memory as a necessary part of individual identity. In Mustafa Ceric's definition, "The [*shari'a*] is the communal commitment and the community identity that is the continuation of the collective memory" (Ceric, 2007: 42).

Ramadan rejects the idea of those who claim that there is no distinction between private and public spheres, religion and politics inasmuch as Islam covers all aspects of life. Because of this approach, it is presumed that Muslims are "not capable of integration" into the European secular societies since Islam prevents them from accepting modern secular constraints (Ramadan, 2004: 34). The universalistic nature of Islam does not put restrictions before Muslims to live in non-Muslim societies. He thinks that integration of people into a wider society can be made of different parts of cultures combining them, or adapting one another. At this point, he suggests Muslims act as permanent members of the society in which they live, not as the align individuals who need to be integrated because he "prefers to talk about contribution rather than integration and about reform and transformation in place of adaptation" (Giorgi, 2009: 468).

He believes that religion has higher value than culture because culture is tantamount to nationality but the "the essence of Islam is religious" (Ramadan, 2004: 214). It means that Muslims first and foremost have spiritual values, second, they have membership in a "community of faith"; and finally they have nationality ties (Giorgi, 2009: 467). He makes a clear distinction between religious identity and nationality, thus culture, which people barely abide as follows:

> "Muslim identity responds to the question of being and as such is essential, fundamental, primal, and primordial, because it contains the justification of life itself. The concept of nationality as it is understood in the industrialized

> countries, is of a completely different order: as an element of identity, it organizes, from within both a given constitution and a given space, the way in which a man or woman is related to his or her fellow-citizens and to other human beings." (Ramadan, 2004: 93)

In this respect, Muslims are more likely free to exercise their religious requirements in Europe as compared to many Muslim countries (Giorgi, 2009: 468). But he thinks that it is still not an ideal form because there is a problem of the "neutrality" of the public sphere in European countries. This neutrality problem is actually understood as an ideology promoting irreligion; hence, Ramadan defines it as follows:

> "Spirituality is of great significance in Islam, and the neutrality of the public space in secularized societies has often been taken to mean a total absence of religiosity (even a categorical rejection of it), or the primacy of an atheistic ideology that does not call itself by its name." (Ramadan, 2004: 70)

In Europe, Muslim communities face a question related to the neutrality issue of how to protect the vitality of their spiritual life in a secularized society, and therefore, how to "pass the necessary knowledge, which alone is able to provide authentic freedom" which is thought as a necessary condition for Muslims in making a choice (Ramadan, 2004: 71).

For a comprehensive accommodation of Muslims, there is a need for neutrality of the public sphere in Europe. In contrast, he states that the non-neutrality of the public sphere has created some principal consequences. It renders a rejection of multiculturalism as the main concern in terms of integration policies in particular for Muslims in Europe. For Ramadan, multiculturalism has, at least intrinsically, three toils when it confines integration as a model: first, it creates dualism which implies "us" and "them"; second, it constitutes minority thinking; and third, it eventually requires adaptation or assimilation (Giorgi, 2009: 468).

This approach could only provide that Muslims in Europe "need to free themselves of their double inferiority complex—in relation to the West on the one

hand, and in relation to the Muslim world on the other" (Ramadan, 2004: 225). Moreover, the non-neutrality of the public sphere calls for Muslims, including converts[22] to make strategic alliances with other so-called minority groups so as to request changes within the European societies concerning the respect of rule of law in which Muslims can revitalize their identities (Giorgi, 2009: 468). Since the European Muslim converts have their roots in these societies, they can be a significant guide in this strategic alliance. At the end, "this process will give birth to what we have called a European and American Islamic culture — both respectful of the universal principles and sustained by the history, traditions, tastes, and styles of various Western countries" (Ramadan, 2004: 216).

This seems to be a quite controversial call of Ramadan, as if he invites Muslim converts to provoke existing approaches towards Muslims in Europe in the long run. His interpretation of current problems related to integration of Muslims in Europe paves the way for the questions of why several intellectuals criticize his intention about European Islam.

It is inferred from his analysis that European society has not strung connotation in terms of "cultural terms", but is confined by "rule of law" in which it provides favourable space to the religious communities, and therefore, right for citizenship depends on reference to active mobilization of religious communities (Giorgi, 2009: 469).

However, Muslims are requested to respect the existing legal order of the host society since the sources of Islam allow them to carry out their responsibilities under "the contract of the country" in which they live (Giorgi, 2009: 468). Muslims in European countries, as Ramadan points out, can accommodate their life with adapting particular rules within the scope of legislation that are likely to vary from

[22] Ramadan (2004: 225) suggests converts a crucial place in the sense of their position of being insider about knowledge of the Western societies. This situation is expected to help for identifying other so-called minority groups which are sensible to develop particular strategic alliances. It can also help Muslims in Europe to involve policy making process and understand the policy structure in the liberal democratic societies of Europe in order to learn how the existing legislation can be changed and used on behalf of the minorities.

one country to another, hence, "Rules, would have to be formulated – as they already have been on numerous points – taking into account the legislation of the country, the teachings of Islam and needs arising from the environment Muslims are faced with" (Ramadan, 2004: 95).

In this sense, Mustafa Ceric, the former Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina and currently president of the World Bosniak Congress, for example, states that Muslims ought to accept Europe as a "house of peace, not a house of war"; and Muslims should state that "their minimum claim is to be free from social interference in their cultural life and that their maximum claim is for social recognition because of their positive contribution to the common good of European society as a whole" (Ceric, 2007: 46).

On the other hand, Ramadan is the author of another important book concerning the problem of Islam and Europe titled *To Be a European Muslim* that provides evidence for a consensus between political liberalism and Islam in Europe. In this book, he analyses how European Muslims relate their problems to Islamic sources and the existing political system. He mentions the main problem of Muslims in Europe as the viability of traditional understanding of "Islamic social codes" to Muslims in the modern era (March, 2007b: 406).

His understanding of interpretation of Islamic sources is not static and he rejects expressing the notions of Islam as the "whole series of rules, interdictions or prohibitions, rulings which explain Islam within the framework of a specific relation of protection from an environment which is perceived as too permissive and even hostile" (Ramadan, 1999: 3). It means that Islam is initially fixed and closed forever against all changing conditions in that its social codes cannot be implemented for all times and places. It is also understood that this static assumption, as he states, implies that "…the Islamic juridical frame [is] entirely immutable, fixed once and for all, because it is from God or because our previous '*ulama*' have already formulated all that has to be known and followed…" (Ramadan, 1999: 55). Contrary to this view, he explains that with the exception of the laws of worship, principles of Islamic

social code including all aspects of social relations “need constant reflection and adaptation in order to permit their faithful enforcement in light of the global principles of *Shari’a*” (Ramadan, 1999: 43).

Ramadan’s understanding of European Islam is envisioned as a process requiring a new social contract within European society. His definition of Europe as a house for Muslims stands between two tensions arising from the traditional understanding of Islam related to geography: abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) where the Islamic rules, *shari’a* is implemented by the state; and in contrast, Muslims who live outside of this political geography are considered to be in the abode of war (*dar al-harb*). Ramadan claims that both classical concepts are irrelevant in explaining the current situation for Muslims. Instead, he defines a new concept *shahada* (testimony) which provides Muslims an area for expressing their identity and implementing their role in society (Ramadan, 2004: 74). This definition is considered as a way for promoting interreligious dialogue and cooperation in the contested areas.

When he postulates the notions of Europe as a testimony for Muslims, he draws attention to the concept of social contract in which European Muslims implicitly recognize as “underwriting the constitutional democratic structure” (Tampio, 2011: 619). According to Ramadan, “Relations between human beings are based on respect, trust, and, above all, absolute faithfulness to agreements, contracts, and treaties that have been explicitly or silently entered into” (Ramadan, 2004: 74). In this contract, as he states, Muslims are required to bear witness to universalistic values of Islam, but committing themselves morally to European societies instead of retreat into “self-protective ghettoes” (March, 2010: 34). Muslims are expected to embrace their citizenship in European countries under this contract without any restriction since the contract will:

> “…determine [their] status, fix [their] duties and rights and direct the nature and scope of [their] actions. Once agreed, the terms of a covenant should be respected and if there is a point which seems to work against Muslim rights – or even their conscience as Believers – this has to be discussed and negotiated because Muslims are, unilaterally, not allowed to breach a treaty.” (Ramadan 1999: 172)

The notion of the Muslim social contract in Europe is conceived as compatible with "[t]he original justification of a society as an agreement between its equal members has long been known as the idea of the social contract" (Novak, 2005: 1). Since Europe is accepted as a *dar al-sulh* (the house of social contract), Ceric states that the social contract, *sulh*, provides a legitimate base for "peace, [re]conciliation, settlement, accord and contract as the opposite of *harb* [that is] war, warfare, fight, combat, etc." (Ceric, 2007: 45). Nonetheless, Ramadan further states that Muslims are automatically accepted as the binding feature of the constitution and the laws in the country they reside because, for instance, "[b]y signing a work contract or asking for a visa, they acknowledge the validity and authority of the constitution, the laws and the state all at once" (Ramadan, 1999: 164).

The construction of a Muslim social contract based on citizenship principles can provide Muslims with official support for participating in social and political life, while it can be a test to affirm their loyalty within the context of a non-Muslim liberal democratic state. The principles of liberal democracy which protect individual rights and liberties including freedom of religion are considered as a noteworthy reason in transforming loyalty and public recognition (March, 2007a: 244). When their rights are first recognized through this contract, Muslims' sense of belonging to the country in which they reside could peacefully be constructed so that, as Ramadan mentions, the universal principles of Islam teach Muslims "wherever the law respects their integrity and their freedom of conscience and worship, they are at home and must consider the attainments of these societies as their own and must involve themselves, with their fellow-citizens, in making it good and better" (Ramadan, 2004: 5). It is a process in which Muslims would have equal opportunity for expressing their identity in a pluralistic environment.

In contrast, some scholars claim that religion cannot comply with the notions of pluralism. For a pluralist society, theologian professor Ted Peter, for instance, argues that pluralism is akin to atheism, and therefore, "…each representative of a traditional religious position must give up reliance upon the definitiveness of his or her religious perspective in order to join the pluralist club.

Despite what they say, members of the pluralist club do not in fact respect the positions articulated by each religion's specific theology" (Peter, 2007: 90). It is believed that in a pluralistic society, people from different religious backgrounds more likely interact by keeping their differences and seeking to understand each other, instead of tolerating their differences, while preserving their own religious premises (Largen, 2007: 410). Moreover, Peter points out that the evaluation of pluralism has come into existence in a conflicting background within the religious crisis since the medieval period. For this reason, he claims, pluralists consider that their beliefs are more peaceful than all traditional beliefs, in particular, when they are associated with "fundamentalist religion" (Peter, 2007: 88).

He accuses fundamentalists of being responsible for a religious crisis. And finally he believes that if religious fundamentalism stops, religious inspired violence can automatically stop. He introduces pluralism as if a philosophy that can replace religion or a religious-like thought. In other words, he clearly notes this idea by stating "the step that must be taken to move our global society from religious violence to religious peace …we must convert the leaders of specific religious traditions to pluralism" (Peter, 2007: 90).

Contrary to Peter's critical approach to religious pluralism, Ramadan thinks that mutual knowledge is essential for peaceful coexistence of religions. There are several ways within the Islamic tradition that can produce methods to facilitate interfaith dialogue. People from all religious groups who have to live together must take an initial step to launch interfaith dialogue in order to gain "one another's respect and have managed not only to live but also to work together on shared endeavors. …we feel the need to engage even more in this process: Western societies' religious pluralism makes mutual knowledge essential" (Ramadan, 2004: 200).

Ramadan does not clearly speak to resolve all questions of whether his understanding of Islam in pluralistic societies provides permanent Islamic support on behalf of liberal pluralistic order. He thinks that this is a mutual acknowledgement

process arising as a part of "overlapping consensus" on the rationality of political liberalism (March, 2007b: 412). He encourages Muslims about the fact that the conception of justice in pluralistic society is a dynamic force to improve relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims because justice does not differentiate between their interests: "To defend justice cannot be to defend Muslims only: the best witness of the excellence (*ihsan*) of the Islamic way of life lies in respecting the ideal of justice over and above the failings of Muslim believers" (Ramadan, 1999: 22).

He supports political participation of Muslims in European political systems in his understanding of European Islam context which is contrary to some Muslim scholars' rejection of this participation because it is perceived as a sinful treatment in non-Islamic political framework and that it may contribute strength to the non-Muslim societies (March, 2007b: 411). However, some Islamic scholars prefer this participation as long as it only contributes to the Muslims' interests. For this reason, liberals oppose this idea since there is a potential of risk that could tend to violation of existing laws, such participation gives vent to non-Muslims' dislike for cooperation with Muslims in the political arena (March, 2007b: 412). In this sense, Ramadan gives the meaning of political participation of Muslims in liberal societies with the following terms:

> "Muslims should be allowed to commit themselves within society and to act in favour of human solidarity. This also means that Muslims can be engaged in social as well as political and economic activities. This is why, both at local and national levels, their commitment as Muslims and citizens is imperative for it is the sole way of completing and perfecting their Faith and the essential Message of their Religion. The social space, with its laws and customs, should permit them to attain this." (Ramadan, 1999: 134)

He promotes active participation of Muslims in all aspects of politics in order to realize their responsibilities and protect their rights in liberal societies. He points out that "the social message of Islam is born in all people's consciousness of their obligations to make it possible on the collective level to organize structurally the protection of the rights of all" (Ramadan, 2004: 49). He tries to keep Muslims in

balance in their relations with the European host societies and sees political participation as an integral part of fulfilling their citizenship rights. Thus, his insistence on political participation of Muslims explicitly shows his will of allegiance to liberal democratic pluralism:

> "My aim is to show, in theory and practice, that one can be both fully Muslim and Western and that beyond our different affiliations we share many common principles and values through which it is possible to 'live together' within contemporary, pluralistic, multicultural societies where various religious coexist." (Ramadan, 2010: 20)

IV.2.2.3. A Comparison of Euro-Islam Discourses between Tibi and Ramadan

Ramadan's approach to European Islam does not constitute a view from outside to the problems related to Muslims but from within the religion, whereas Tibi employs a rationalist criticism regarding the issue. Both scholars more or less agree about the need for an alternative route for Muslims in Europe, but their models systematically and radically differentiate from one other. On the one hand, Tibi promotes reform-based change within Islam in the European context, while on the other hand Ramadan encourages evolutionary steps for the change in Muslims' life and their understanding of religious interpretations by taking into consideration the requirements of social, economic and political framework of the country in which they live.

In this regard, Tibi's Euro-Islam emphasizes the importance of Europeanised Islam as opposed to Islamization of Europe, whereas Ramadan promotes an intellectual basis for Islam which maintains and respects the essence of the faith making it more a reliable path in the current context for achieving a peaceful place for Islam in Europe. Tibi's approach includes criticism about radical treatments within the Islamic tradition stemming from the Muslim countries through immigration in European context, hence; it prevents Muslims from internalizing

European culture, while Ramadan claims that religion encompasses significantly more than culture and Islam does not order Muslims such radical treatments.

Ramadan represents a figure from within Islam and a scholar teaching Muslims, whereas Tibi is perceived as an intellectual seeking to achieve philosophical grounds for Muslims complying with the European existing secular social fabric without having “any” religious concerns.

Both Tibi and Ramadan reject the communitarian politics that result in ghettoization of Muslim people in Europe. And they warn Europeans that politics of multiculturalism cannot be a remedy capable of preventing segregation in European societies. Instead it promotes parallel lives and leads Muslims to create enclaves within the host societies. They also reject assimilation policy for the integration of Muslims in Europe. Both Tibi and Ramadan advocate European Islam as a civic religion that must abandon Islamic dominance, but made compatible with the established principles of liberal democracy by acknowledging religious and cultural pluralism, and interreligious and intercultural dialogue.

They point out the universalistic notions of both Europeanness and Islam that could functionally coexist. In this point, Tibi claims that there is no obstacle preventing Muslims from integrating themselves into European universalism, whereas Ramadan thinks that both Muslims and Europeans can live together in the pluralistic environment without intervention or rejection of each other.

Tibi’s understanding of European Islam demands reform in Islam in which Muslims are required to adapt European values and reject the radical features of Islam, namely *shari’a* law. He asserts that *shari’a* law is not compatible with the European law and that European Muslims’ insistence on traditional applications of Islam automatically results in their dramatic exclusion from mainstream society in Europe. In contrast, Ramadan introduces *shari’a* as the whole of all aspects of human history and the work of human intellect that form the universal principles of Islam. Thus, he accepts that *shari’a* is more than individual commitment and individual religious identity, but is the soul of Islam. He explains that *shari’a* and Islam are not

two separable concepts but they are indivisible in essence, and therefore, if the *shari'a* is rejected from Islam, nothing remains to distinguish Islam as a religion. In that sense, he claims that the universalistic nature of Islam does not prevent Muslims from living in non-Muslim societies and Islamic sources allow them to obey the laws and order of the country in which they live.

Tibi strictly accuses Islamists of being responsible for the current political turmoil not only in Europe but also in the Muslim countries. He thinks that their discourse exacerbates the very negative attitudes of Europeans towards Muslims and thus the stigmatization of Muslims with the radical treatments becomes inevitable. For the sake of Euro-Islam, Muslims must purge themselves of such Islamists and their ideology of political Islam stemming from the Muslim countries. Moreover, he rejects the idea of absolutist Islamism supported by the Islamists adherents, and seeks to achieve a Euro-Islam that is subscribed to the European values. He does not accept the very traditional approach defining Europe between the two contested concepts: *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*. Since both concepts derive their roots from the classical debates on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims depending on geography, he does not suggest a place for Euro-Islam between them; however, he supports a secular and liberal Euro-Islam.

Ramadan opposes this approach and his definition of Europe as *dar al-shahada* describes Europe as a testimony for Muslims in which Muslims can express their identity and improve their contributions in society. Ramadan encourages Muslims for political participation not only in the name of Muslims but also non-Muslims and calls for Muslims to improve dialogue and cooperation with non-Muslims in order to prevent misperceptions.

Tibi accuses Ramadan of promoting the project of Islamization of Europe, while stating that it is the greatest threat against secular Euro-Islam as a peaceful route for Muslim integration into the European secular societies. Tibi states that when a secular form of Euro-Islam is eventually "accepted by both Europeans and Muslims, then both parties may live together in peace" (Tibi, 2010a: 158). Tibi

criticizes Ramadan's statement on universalist notions of Islam because it implies the expansionist aspect of Islam that is the basis of the allegation of the Islamization of Europe. In this sense, Ramadan points out the universality of Islam: "In order to ward off the 'necessarily expansionist' universality of Islam, either Islam must be refused its claim to universality or Muslims must be pressed to accept this exercise in wholesale relativisation" (Ramadan, 2004: 32).

There are other scholars supporting Tibi's criticism about Ramadan's approach to the universality of Islam. Caroline Fourest, for example, thinks that his intention is to encourage the project to Islamize Europe. She claims that "He is simply sticking to his grandfather's method, namely seeking first social conquest and then political conquest" (Fourest, 2008: 187). She means that if there emerges a social place for Islam in Europe, it will gradually spread to the political arena and force the notions of Islamization of Europe.

Furthermore, Tibi criticises Ramadan about his understanding of Euro-Islam. For Tibi, the concept of Euro-Islam aims not only to establish coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe, but also interprets Islam in terms of liberal democratic pluralism. He thinks that Ramadan's Islamic term *dar al-shahada* is not compatible with the Euro-Islam because the term has Islamic notions itself rather than adapting European values. It shows a roadmap for Muslims to internalize not European values but their pre-existing religious ones. Tibi makes it clear by saying that "…the concept of Euro-Islam means an interpretation of Islam in a liberal, open-minded and unscriptural manner to accommodate civic values of pluralism in Islamic terms" (Tibi, 2010b: 143). Thus, Tibi's Euro-Islam contradicts with that of Ramadan for its embrace of secular democracy.

This division between Tibi and Ramadan becomes critical when they cannot agree on the meaning of Euro-Islam about cultural changes and reform in Islam in the European context. Tibi thinks that Ramadan uses the term Euro-Islam as another form of traditional Islam. He explains their different perceptions about Euro-Islam with the following words:

> "…I should make it clear that Euro-Islam is impossible without cultural change involving religious reforms. And this is not something Tariq Ramadan is pursuing. By now there is lot of nonsense going on in the name of Euro-Islam, and at the same time it is becoming an increasingly meaningless buzz-word…. Ramadan presents Orthodox Islam as Euro-Islam presumably with the intent to deceive." (Tibi, 2007)

In his writings, Tibi mentions that the Muslim diaspora in Europe prompts a serious alert of an "ethnicity of fear" which has become a great stumbling block to the European Islam project (Tibi, 2010b: 126). According to his observations, "Islam claims the ideal of a universal *umma* that stands above ethnicity, but Muslims are not only ethnic among themselves, but also invent an 'Islamic ethnicity'" (Tibi, 2010b: 128). For this reason, their interaction with Europeans has inevitably become an ethnic one. This has led Muslims to constitute a ghetto of Islam as a social fact which is becoming increasing problematic for the successful integration of Islam in Europe. Tibi finds that the emergence of conflicts in ethnic-religious terms yields a "religionization of the ethnic conflict" wherever "the religious-language expresses an ethnicization and religionization of the issue in the process of the construction of identity" (Tibi, 2010b: 129).

From this perspective, he accuses Ramadan of distorting the term Euro-Islam. He claims that Ramadan "…never abandoned the belief that Muslims in Europe are part and parcel of an ethnic *umma*" (Tibi, 2010b: 143). Based on his observations in Africa and Southeast Asia, Tibi says that Islam has culturally been integrated in these regions and thus, it can happen in Europe in such a way (Tibi, 2010b: 142). He means that in order to interpret Islam in a liberal manner in the European context, it requires an analytical guide capable of adapting European values and giving up ethnic differences. Accordingly, Euro-Islam is a vision aiming to prevent established Islamic parallel societies and an ethicised Muslim diaspora in Europe. Otherwise, there is nothing to say about Euro-Islam but Muslim living in Europe. Tibi thinks that Ramadan more likely equates these two, which is why Tibi insists on basic religious reforms (Tibi, 2010b: 143).

Tibi mentions that there are two possibilities for Muslims in Europe: Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam. Since Islamic culture entered Europe, it has added significantly to its diverse social fabric. The Euro-Islam project of Tibi offers an alternative to prevent Islamic parallel societies and integrate them as Europeans without articulating any ethnic claims, while Ramadan does not make such a clear distinction in his approach. As he insists on the importance of interreligious dialogue, Ramadan holds the view that "Muslims – with their spirituality, ethics and creativity" can be accepted as contributing to European pluralist societies as follows:

> "European societies have been changing, and the presence of Muslims has forced them to experience an even greater diversity of cultures. As a result, a European identity has evolved that is open, plural and constantly in motion, thanks to the cross-fertilisation between reclaimed cultures of origin and the European cultures that now include new [Muslim] citizens." (quoted in O'Brien, 2012: 28)

Tibi clearly states that a Euro-Islam project is a policy affirmation of European governments but "as a policy concept adopted by the European governments, such as Sweden and France, is not the kind of 'European Islam' spokesmen of the West European Islam diaspora like Tariq Ramadan use as a cover for their favoured political strategies that aim at something quite different" (Tibi, 2006: 209). Tibi continues explaining that Euro-Islam is meaningless without religious reform and cultural change of Islam and he strictly rejects Ramadan's main claim for Muslims in Europe that affects Islam as in the rest of world. Based on his experiences Tibi "…challenge[s] the view that the diaspora of Islam will be, as some US pundits believe, the location for a change that could affect Islam as home.… the view that Europe could be the place where Islam's predicament will be solved, or where Islam and democracy meet, is wrong" (Tibi, 2009: 21). Contrarily, Ramadan defines his understanding of Euro-Islam as follows:

> "Euro-Islam is a term invented by Bassam Tibi and promoted by journalists. I am not thinking about something which is coming from Europe. It could come from any part in the world. We don't have an Islamic social model for Europe. For me, three things are essential for Muslims in Europe: speaking

> the language, abiding by the law of the country, being loyal to our countries in Europe, because we are Europeans." (Mende, 2009)

From this point of view, Ramadan points out that Islam could be integrated with the European democratic values while keeping its core principles, Islamic values, as the essence of Muslim identity in Europe, an idea which is rejected by Tibi.

In general, even though both scholars support the idea of Islam in pluralism, their views differ in the details for integrating Muslims into the European societies. Tibi fosters a worldview for Muslims for their full integration into the European secular society in accordance with the notions of pluralism. His ideas tend to bridge Western and Islamic cultures, or Islamic and European customs and he believes that his opponents accept his controversial determination of reform in Islam (Tibi, 2009: xv). For Tibi, pluralism enables an Islamic dimension of Europe that makes it compatible with European secular order based on rule of law, democratic pluralism and civil society (Tibi, 2001: 226). He emphasizes loyalty of Muslims to the European laws and constitution which orders strict separation of religion and politics. Thus, Muslims need to demonstrate their loyalty to European secular society through such reform process (Tibi, 2001: 228). His understanding of reform aims to integrate Islam to European culture and prevent competition between them. In short, for Tibi, pluralism encourages Muslims to adapt to the civic obligations of the state and never claim distinctive religious features within the society in exchange for the state recognition of their citizenship rights.

Contrary to Tibi, Ramadan claims that Muslims are in a position to articulate equal rights in the pluralistic society and reject any minority treatment. His understanding of Muslims civic obligations has limits in which people have a right to dissent when the state acts in a manner contrary to their core values (Ramadan, 2007). However, he gives Muslims a responsibility to help new immigrant Muslims if they are the source of the problem or misperception: "We can rely on the Muslims who are here, and who have an understanding of the society, to help the new

immigrants to be more integrated and to understand European culture and customs" (ibid).

Both scholars embolden Muslims for defining their identity in terms of a state centric approach and discuss the role of Islam in this context. Tibi promotes the full integration of Muslims to the European secular identity in the public sphere and suggests Muslims keep religion in private sphere. In contrast, Ramadan claims that Muslims can hold both Islamic and European identities in which they can be Muslims as they believe and European which is the source of their national identity as well.

In addition, Tibi and Ramadan hold different views in defining Muslims social status as diaspora or minority in Europe. The difference between both concepts implies distinct loyalty and participation of a social group in society. Muslims in Europe can be called both diaspora and religious minority. It is accepted that Islamic diaspora emerged in Europe and developed religious transnational networks (Casanova, 2005: 5). Nevertheless, Muslims are also called a minority in terms of their share of the culture, customs and religion in the greater society. Tibi states that Muslims have a transnational diaspora in Europe based on different ethnic and cultural histories (Tibi, 2006: 213). The politics of the transnational Muslim diaspora encourages extremism in different European polities, and became the main sponsor of the radical Islamic groups responsible for the terrorist events in Europe following the 9/11 attacks (ibid).

IV.2.3. A Need for a Single Muslim Authority

The social contract mentioned above is conceived as a basis for European Muslims in search of a single Muslim authority at the European level. At this point, Ceric calls on Muslims to establish a single Muslim authority that can represent Islam as a world religion and Muslims as good citizens or residents of Europe (Ceric, 2007: 46). Indeed, Muslims in Europe are represented by a variety of organizations

consisting of several communities in accordance with their cultural backgrounds stemming from different Muslim countries. In that sense, the question of how Muslims could achieve a single Muslim authority in Europe upon this fragmented picture becomes paramount. For a single Muslim authority, the shared values of Islam are conceived as becoming a common ground for all Muslims living in Europe. The institutionalization of Islam as a universal religion is required in order to represent Muslims as global citizens to the European civic culture. Ceric suggests a significant perspective for Muslims in understanding of the importance of the need of a single Muslim authority as follows:

> "It is clear to everyone that for the representation of Islam and Muslims to exist only on a voluntary level in Europe would be misleading inasmuch as it would be contrary to Muslim dignity and European peace." (ibid)

However, Europeans' recognition of the Muslim presence on the continent is insufficient since Muslims need more than mere recognition. They demand the legalization of their presence in economic and political fields through functional institutions that require a substantial degree of official support and public acceptance (ibid). Muslims in Europe need a single Muslim authority; Ceric offers two ontological and two historical factors. As the ontological factors indicate, Europe is testimony for Muslims as Ramadan stated before:

> "[First,] The divine origin of the Qur'an is the reason why the divine call for the covenant with humans is perpetual, not negotiable and not terminable; humans need to learn how to keep their promise to God at all times and in all places. [Second,] The personal confession of faith [*shahada*-testimony] and the collective moral commitment [*shahada*] must find expression in the practical function of leadership […] as the human way of discipline and loyalty to the common good of civil society." (Ceric, 2007: 47)

The historical factors represent why there is a need for a Muslim social contract which secures rights and responsibilities bound by the rule of law and human rights. This would offer Muslims a significant tool to change the patterns of what they have historically such as ethnic and national features which are not

functional in the contemporary era. Thus, the historical factors are represented as follows:

> "[First,] A Muslim social contract in Europe is the best way for the Muslim community to safeguard its historical place in the European democratic societies…. [Second,] …Muslims in Europe have an historic chance to create a new version of the global imamate, one that is based on universal Islamic identity." (ibid)

From this perspective, both the Muslim community and European society need a single Muslim authority that can speak in the name of Muslims in bridging relations with the host society and government. Yet the idea which will be put in practice actually seems to be idealistic. The main reason behind this is that the Muslim community in Europe has a very nascent capacity to implement this idea because their differences are greater than their commonalities. In addition, the possible contribution of this project to the European peace and security is also far removed from the understanding of European society, which may not value the significance of such authority which is capable of eliminating their concerns related to Muslims before the public within a single framework.

IV.3. Religious Institutionalization in Great Britain and Germany

There are considerable Islamic policy networks acting within a balance of the state support for religion in Britain. Indeed, there is no official separation of Church and state in the British legal system. The official website of the British monarchy states that "The Sovereign holds the title 'Defender of the Faith and Supreme Governor of the Church of England'", while it describes the relationship between the Queen and non-Christian Faiths as follows:

> "Modern Britain is a multi-faith society, made up of Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Jews, Sikhs and people of other faiths. The Commonwealth is also made up of people with different religious beliefs. The Queen's role as Head of State and Head of Commonwealth is to respect and recognise these

> various faiths, and to promote balance and understanding between people of different religions." (The Royal Household, 2008/09)

This statement recognizes Islam as having strong religious influence in the British society. As there is no written Constitution in Britain, it cannot be stated that there is a consolidated set of rules for the guarantee of religious recognition. Nevertheless, the only guarantee regarding the issue is the signature to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1998 which has yet to be fully incorporated into the British legislation. Based on the Convention, the Parliament's report points out the importance of the ECHR by saying that "[it] requires courts and tribunals, as public bodies to interpret law… as to be consistent with the Convention" (The UK Parliament, 2003). According to the Article 9 of the ECHR:

> "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion… to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching practice and observance. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in domestic society…" (Council of Europe, 1950)

In this context, Muslim communities in the UK have established organizations to represent the interests of their constituents vis-a-vis the government. Islamic policy networks have been a focus of the debates since the government established seven working groups titled "Preventing Extremism Together" to help form policy concerning Muslims in the country following the London terrorist attacks in July 2005 (Fetzer and Soper, 2005: 51). After the establishment of the working groups consisting of Muslim people, the government requested they prepare policy recommendations especially regarding two critical themes: First, Tackling Extremism and Radicalization; second, Imams and the role of Mosques (Home Office, 2005).

The British government called on these community-led working groups to collaborate with the Muslim communities in developing policy recommendations on critical issues, including radical recruitments and guidelines for teaching staffs in

mosques and Islamic centres. In that regard, it is stated that the members of the working groups "have brought new experience and expertise to bear – and the result is a set of practical actions that represent the first step in a longer term partnership between government and Muslim communities" (ibid). The result inferred from this official attitude is that there is a growing need for the British government to cooperate with the Muslim communities, seeking long lasting solutions through sustained dialogue.

Islamic networks in Germany, on the other hand, have pushed forward their actions within the state approach of religious neutrality. In Germany, there is no official doctrine that requires full separation of religion and state. Instead, there is cooperation between the state and religious institutions, while guaranteeing freedom of religion from state intervention (Library of Congress, 2010). This situation allows Muslim communities to arrange their needs in terms of their religions, ethnic and cultural differences. The German system promotes religious pluralism which is often stated by state officials, as in the example of the Federal President Joachim Gauck, who pointed out in 2012 the changing attitudes towards Muslims in Germany and emphasized the importance of religious pluralism: "We are living today in a state in which the German-speaking Christian tradition which has long been part of our heritage has been joined by other religions, like Islam, and by other languages, traditions and culture" (Gauck, 2012).

Religious pluralism in Germany is supported by the Basic Law under the Constitution. It does not recognize Germany as being *laicist* requiring strict separation of relations between state and religion. The Article 3 of the Basic Law accepts all people as equal before the law and bans all discriminatory attitudes based on faiths or religions: "No person shall be favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavoured because of disability" (The German Constitution, 1949).

The German system recognizes religious freedom to all and respects the rights of religious practices guaranteed by anti-discrimination and anti-racist laws. As in the secular democratic states, Church and state relations are not separated by the German law, however there is a significant public corporation between government and relatively dominant religious groups affording them official status. In that sense, Roman Catholic, Protestant Churches and the Jewish community have official religious status (CRS, 2005: 34). The government collect "church taxes" from these groups and subsidizes the construction and activities of churches and synagogues, whereas the Muslim people were deprived of this status and benefits from public corporations until the end of 2012 (ibid). Nevertheless, the corporate system provides equality for civil society and therefore, Muslims have been organized only as minorities in order to achieve a successful integration and struggle against anti-discrimination.

After the anti-terrorism law in 2001, the government started to deal with the Muslim communities and their activities in mosques and religious centres because there was a growing concern about religious extremism in particular after 9/11. There was a concern that radical clerics may actively control the mosques because Germany never pursued training of Muslim clerics in practice. For this reason, some German states demanded a law requiring imams be trained in the country instead of being imported from outside of Europe (ibid).

It is assumed that Muslim and other religious organizations in Germany are generally harmonious institutions that are capable of developing dialogue with the state, but this has not been achieved so far due to significant competition among the Muslim groups (ibid). Moreover, contrary to Muslim immigrants, German Christians appear to be getting increasingly secular, a fact illustrated by the numbers of the regular church attendees which are decreasing day by day (CRS, 2005: 34-35). In Germany, most public schools have religious courses and they are gradually integrating Islamic teaching into their curriculum which is under the purview of the individual states.

The debates on Islamic teaching in Germany and other religious needs and practices of Muslims entered a new era since the end of 2012 because some individual German states started to confer Islam an official religious status. After long debates, the agreements were signed between Muslim religious community institutions and state governments respectively in Hamburg in November 2012, Hesse in December 2012 and Bremen in February 2013 (Haneghan, 2012). By these agreements, Muslims have constituted the third largest officially recognized religious group in Germany. These agreements, which have been in negotiations since 2007, "[were] signed by the council of Islamic communities (*Schura*), the Turkish-Islamic Union (Ditib), the association of Islamic cultural centres (VIKZ), as well as the city's Alevi community" (The Local, 2012).

IV.3.1. Muslim Organizations in Great Britain and Germany

When there emerged a need for Muslim representation, European governments were engaged in policy decisions to support the institutionalization process of Muslim immigrants and to establish a legal basis for expressing their status in society. By doing this, European governments enabled groundwork for promoting moderate Islam as well as for preventing extremist forms of organized Islam. Since the last decade, Europeans have paid increasing attention to concerns related to the Muslim presence in Europe. To accommodate the growth of Muslims inside Europe on a domestic political level, Europeans have focused on the Muslim transnational networks and their involvement in issues related to security.

Some European states prioritize representation of Muslims at the organizational level before the legal system and cooperation of Islamic institutions with the legal system in order to achieve the mainstream Islamic community. The institutionalization of Islam in Europe faces difficulties vis-a-vis the general tendency of individualization or organization of Muslims at the local level and therefore, "The institutionalization of Islam seems to contradict with the process of individualization of Islam" (Kaya, 2010: 59). The tendency of individualization

among Muslims and the request for institutionalization of Islam in Europe oscillate between "two-anti-thetical processes" as Kaya (2009: 168) illustrates:

> "On the one hand, contemporary flows of globalization prompt young Euro-Muslims to develop their own individual Islam, which is likely to emancipate them from the restraints of their patriarchal culture. On the other hand, both the community and the state are inclined to compel them to remain within the boundaries of Islamic community for the sake of management of an ethno-culturally and religiously different set of people by the so-called secular state."

Even though the participation of young European Muslims in the Islamic organizations gradually decreases, they constitute the main interlocutors between governments and their community. Thus, their role in this process is significant to determine the relationship between Muslims and the state in Europe. Furthermore, the British and German governments actually rely on them as the main interlocutors for communication with immigrant Muslims since there is lack of alternative instruments to contact the state about integration problems beyond the existing Muslim organizations.

IV.3.2. Muslim Organizations and Euro-Islam in Great Britain and Germany

The role of Muslim organizations in both Great Britain and Germany has considerable impact for the development of European Islam. Muslim organizations primarily represent the communication between Muslims and governments in order to foster the interests of their members. They preserve the social and economic interests of Muslims through strengthening common discourses among them and also struggle against the exclusion of their members from the existing societal structure.

Since Muslims in Europe have diverse cultural and national backgrounds, their organizations inevitably represent such diversification, limiting their ability to become unifying actors not only at the European level but also in the countries where they are established. However, it is significant to question how many Muslims

believe these organizations represent them; and whether or not these organizations, as they are mostly perceived, are only for those Muslims seeking to fulfill their religious practices.

These organizations are sometimes accused of being involved in illegal activities and are often viewed with suspicion. In general, most of the Muslim organizations in Europe are run by elders who are traditional figures and more likely to represent discourses of Islam, but the new generation is establishing nascent organizations which are sometimes active in civil society. Muslim organizations are not much important at the European level since they are basically established in European countries and lack the capacity to coordinate their vested positions across Europe.

Muslim organizations in Europe are established on the basis of three approaches used by the state: top-down, bottom-up and mixed. According to the top-down approach, organizations come into existence through a strong governmental promotion where there are relatively "weak forms of self-organization" representing Muslims in the country concerned (Silvestri, 2010a: 51). In the case of the bottom-up approach, which offers a form of organization where there is a "strong civil society mobilization and social capital" within the Muslim community, the state is not involved in the process of establishment, but does encourage civil society initiative (ibid). In the mixed approach, state encourages initiative especially by offering logistic aid, but does not involve itself in the administration of Muslim organizations (ibid).

In the case of Great Britain and Germany, almost all initial Muslim organizations were examples of the bottom-up approach because they were mainly mosques and established by the Muslim communities as a response to meet the need of immigrants (ibid). In the course of mass immigration, foreign governments intended to become influential over the immigrants through use of these organizations which fits well into the top-down approach.

Furthermore, there are initiatives to establish umbrella organizations paving the way for common groundwork in promoting dialogue between the state and Muslims. In this case, the government is seen as the main side demanding to find a partner representing the majority of Muslims as much as possible. The government provides basic needs of the organization to establish a relative degree of independence, while keeping its activities under close scrutiny. The umbrella organizations represent the mixed approach. Muslim umbrella organizations are herein examined in order to analyse their relationships with the state in Germany.

Islamic institutions are expected to constitute interlocutors between their members and the state on behalf of a moderate form of Islam considered to meet the requirements of Euro-Islam. Thus, an integrated form of Islam assumed to be inclusive of diversities within the Muslim communities, encourages European Muslims for the following purposes:

> "…to be more inclusive of religious- ethnic minorities, to maintain law and order, to stem radicalization, and to make sure that Muslims are properly familiarized with and incorporated in the ethos of the European countries in which they live. Ultimately, many argue that this process will construct a specifically European version of Islam or 'Euro-Islam'." (Silvestri, 2010a: 49)

The expectation of Euro-Islam from both European Muslim organizations and the governments is to remove the existing obstacles for the peaceful integration of immigrant Muslims in Europe. There are however significant differences in their primary concerns, and therefore, their mutual objectives and ways of attaining them must be clarified.

The British and German governments assert their views about existing policies towards the integration of immigrant Muslims through the official statements, declarations and reports. In general, the official views have determined the existing policies of integration as a failure but have not offered an alternative. It is safe to say that there is a gap in defining their approaches to the integration of Muslims.

Nevertheless, the official statements by the British and German governments on the failure of multiculturalism request self-criticism from Muslim communities and encourage them to articulate favourable attitudes for cooperation with the official authorities to better facilitate the integration of their followers. Whilst the British government calls for strong liberalism which requires mutual respect for community differences but a struggle against radicalism in line with the rest of the British society, the German government pursues a policy of recognition of Muslim community as a unified form in representation and calls for cooperation with the state for the sake of the community affairs in the country.

Correspondingly, the role of Muslim organizations in this process is crucial to articulate their capability of forging the integration of their members in these countries for the advancement of European Islam. In this sense, their organizational purposes are examined to see whether they pursue favourable attitudes towards the European Islam or have only self-enclosed forms of communities separate from the mainstream British and German societies.

IV.3.2.1. Muslim Organizations in Great Britain

Muslim organizations in Great Britain are widely established by Muslim immigrants from the Southeast Asia and the Middle East. However, there are some active organizations established by Turkish Muslims such as *Milli Görüş* and *Diyanet*-sponsored organizations, but they do not play an active role in representing Muslims since their members are relatively small in number among Muslims in Britain. It is considered that Britain has more likely liberal – i.e. open to the secular and democratic values of pluralistic society – Muslim organizations than the rest of Europe because the British government engages with the mainstream-moderate Muslim organizations and provides them with resources to spread their message in the society (Rabasa et al., 2011: 128). In that regard, the government formed an agency for promoting relations with the Muslim community: The Department for Communities and Local Governments (DCLG) (Rabasa et al., 2011: 129). The

DCLG might facilitate the government's engagement with Muslim organizations by communicating with them to prevent radicalization and violence, and seeking whether or not they are acting in accordance with the law in order to refrain from undermining community cohesion in Britain.

For this purpose, the governmental priority is to "fundamentally rebalance our engagement towards those organisations that uphold shared values and reject and condemn violent extremism" (DCLG, 2007: 9). The balance of engagement actually determines the main characteristics of the relationship between the British state and Muslim organizations in the country as follows: "Government is giving priority, in its support and funding decisions, to those leadership organisations actively working to tackle violent extremism, supporting community cohesion and speaking out for the vast majority who reject violence" (ibid).

Establishment of Muslim organizations as communal organising entities in the Great Britain started in the 1960s, with mosques serving as the primary institutions. At the beginning, these organizations were mainly established by local ethnic communities and served for religious practices and basic needs of immigrants such as housing. Their managers were appointed from within the communities with minimal accountability undertaken by the informal networks. The British government has officially ceased to recognize existing elected Muslim representative bodies contrary to other European countries (McLoughlin, 2008: 130).

However, in the 1980s at the local level, and since the 1990s at the national level, the government has tended to provide public legitimacy to the un-elected Muslim institutions such as the Councils of Mosques through consultation and channelling resources (McLoughlin, 2008: 131). There emerged leaders of mosque committees among the first generation of immigrants in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and they became interlocutors of the local governments (ibid). They were operating within the boundaries of ethnic culture which was mainly representing the South Asian cultural norms.

In 1970, the Union of Muslim Organization of the UK and Eire (UMO) was established as a national umbrella organization. As Jorgen Nielsen describes "…it was essentially irrelevant because all the Major aspects of government which affected Muslims were based at local level until well into 1980s" (Nielsen, 1999: 40). Afterwards, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) was established in London as a moderate institution. It was in a controversial position to represent Muslims in the UK at the national level. During the events of Rushdie Affairs of 1988 and 1999, the UKACIA intended to become a mediator against the turmoil created by the Bradford Council for Mosques (BCM) mass protest against Salman Rushdie's controversial book *The Satanic Verses*, but were unsuccessful (McLoughlin, 2008: 133).

The UKACIA started a campaign requesting the legal system develop Britain's blasphemy laws to defend Islam but failed, while the government called Muslim activists to coordinate their groups to speak with one voice, which is considered the most influential way to engage the government (McLoughlin, 2008: 134). Subsequently, the leaders of the UKACIA established the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) as a new umbrella Muslim organization in Britain.

On the other hand, the report ordered by the House of Commons and prepared by the Communities and Local Government Committee (CLGC) entitled *Preventing Violent Extremism* in 2010 clarifies that the engagement with Muslim organizations to promote moderate Islam is not a government responsibility and criticizes the fact that the local authorities are overly involved in this process as follows:

> "There is a sense that Government has sought to engineer a 'moderate' form of Islam, promoting and funding only those groups which conform to this model. We do not think it is the job of Government to intervene in theological matters, but we are also concerned that local authorities have been left with too much responsibility for deciding how engagement and project funding should be managed. We make a range of recommendations on this topic and conclude that this is an area requiring immediate attention by Government." (CLGC, 2010: 4)

The 2009 British government report prepared by the DCLG titled *The Pakistani Muslim Community in England: Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities*[23] reveals the diverse ethnic and sectarian features of the Muslim community according to the 2001 Census as follows: the majority of Muslims in Britain are Sunni, representing 96 percent, with Shi'a Muslims standing at a mere 2 percent (DCLG, 2009: 39). The report also states four major movements emerging from the Sunni Muslim community in the UK: "Deobandis and Tablighi Jamaat, Barelvis or Sunni Sufis, the Jamaat-e Islami and the Ahl-e-Hadith. Other groups with a more Arab influence are the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, and Hizb ut-Tahrir"[24]. The relationship between the Muslim communities and these movements came into existence as the logical extension of the community formation that is stated in the DCLG report as follows:

> "Communities did not arrive in the UK with an automatic loyalty to these movements. This had to be won in the early period of community formation. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, when the sectarian segmentation of mosques was most noticeable, this could be seen in the fierce rivalry for mosque control that was mostly played out between the Deobandi influenced outreach movement, the Tablighi Jamaat, and the Pakistani Sufi orders known as the Barelvis." (ibid)

For the examination of Muslim organizations in Britain, the government reports and statements, discussions in the media particularly following critical cases vis-à-vis organizational attitudes, approaches and statements about such cases are analysed in this part. The Muslim organizations are especially selected in terms of the number of mosques, religious centres and foundations they control at the national

[23] The report was approved by Ministers and has official status. The findings and recommendations in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG, 2009).

[24] The DCGL report describe four movements with reference to the site muslimsInBritain.org as follows: Deobandi and Tablighi Jamaat affiliated or inspired mosques represent circa 742 mosques or approximately half of all mosques in the UK. Barelvis and Sunni Sufi affiliated or inspired mosques represent circa 345 mosques or approximately a quarter of the total mosques in the UK. Jamaat-e-Islami or Maudoodi-inspired mosques represent circa 57 mosques or approximately four per cent of the total mosques in the UK. Ahl-e Hadith affiliated or inspired (older generation as distinct from modern Salafi) represent circa 35 mosques or two per cent of the total mosques in the UK (ibid).

and local levels and the number of members they represent, taking into consideration the Islamic movements they are affiliated with.

IV.3.2.1.1. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)

After its establishment in 1997, the MCB became a main interlocutor organization representing Muslims in its dealing with the government. It has represented the majority of Muslims in Britain as an umbrella organization handling many different tensions for Muslims. The MCB as a multi-faceted organization in its official website declares that it represents more than “500 affiliated national, regional and local organisations, mosques, charities and schools” (MCB, 2015). Its constituency is defined as “British citizens with an Islamic heritage” and, its objectives are stated as “a more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslims in the wider society” (McLoughlin, 2008: 134).

The MCB aims to influence the government policy in order to provide a public sphere for the British Muslims. The major aim of the MCB is stated in its constitutions as “…to promote cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK and to work for the eradication of disadvantages and forms of discrimination faced by Muslims and to foster better community relations and work for the good of society as a whole” (MCB, 2015). The British government affirmed its aim in the DCLG report and added that the organization significantly contributes to community cohesion and struggles against discrimination (DCLG, 2009: 59).

It is considered that the MCB has been more successful in promoting these aims than other Muslim organizations in Britain. It has strengthened its prestigious position in society and gained the status of “first among equals” of various Muslim organizations since it has a good relationship with the government (Pedziwiatr, 2007: 272). Although the government has subsidized its activities, it is mainly self-funded, independent and better-organized than its counterparts (Vidino, 2010: 122).

The MBC, for the first time, represented a larger number of Muslims with a common leadership because it has connections with a diverse group of affiliates. It does not cover secular Muslim organizations but includes several Islamic groups including Shias, prominent Muslim intellectuals and some Muslim Members of the Parliament (ibid). The MCB have associations with the *Deobandi* tradition (neo-traditionalist) and the *Jama'at-l Islami* (JI) movement related organizations that include UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), the Islamic Foundation, Young Muslims UK (YMUK) and the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) (McLoughlin, 2008: 136). Its representation of these diverse groups implies that "the MCB created a space for multi-ethnic, cross-sectarian alliances which prioritised an overarching Muslim politics of identity" (McLoughlin, 2008: 137).

Nevertheless, the representative capability of the MCB is limited and thus, it cannot be accepted as an organization speaking in the name of all Muslims in Britain. Most of the other Muslim organizations accuse the MCB of pursuing its organizational interests instead of those of Muslims in Britain. The London bombings affected the integrity and capability of having moderate leadership of the MCB because it was strictly criticized in media and government. The MCB leaders stated how the British Muslims were affected by these criticisms and perceived such criticisms as a discrimination against Muslims and Islam in their declarations with the following terms:

> "Recent years have seen the characterisation of British Muslims as a 'problem community' in much of the media and through statements made by Government and police officials. These have contributed to a growing anti-Muslim climate in the UK." (quoted in Kfir, 2007: 102)

It was also a time in Britain when discourse on Islamophobia was rising, most notably Jack Straw's controversial statements about the veil in 2006, and this is considered the turning point for the rise of anti-Muslim hatred and abuse in the UK (Kfir, 2007: 102). The MCB was in a position to appease both Muslims about their discrimination and the government about the reactions of Muslims.

In the post-9/11 era, the British government accepted that the radical Islamist threat could be prevented through cooperation with the moderate mainstream Islamist organizations, and continued to work with the MCB as a nonviolent Islamist-dominated organization (Rabasa et al., 2011: 128). Nevertheless, the MCB connections with the think-tanks of Islamists groups caused the deterioration of relations with the government. In 2009, the government suspended formal relations with the MCB when its senior officer condemned a coalition of troops, including British, intercepting arms directed for Gaza (McLoughlin and Abbas, 2010: 549). The DCLG report stated the official view about the MCB as follows:

> "…after several years of community discussion, in more recent years it had become the focus of controversy for its linkages to Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama'at-i Islami. Consequently, the government distanced itself from the MCB and started a process of consulting, funding and endorsing other Muslim organisations. However, this led to the perception that the government was promoting sectarianism as well as making the formation of a vigorous, broad front against violent extremism more difficult, with some Muslim groups withholding active support. This has been recognised by the government and the MCB has been readmitted in the context of widening consultation nationally and locally." (DCLG, 2009: 59)

Moreover, the MCB reacted against the government foreign policy which it perceived as a provocation against Muslims in Britain since 2006 and exacerbated with the Prime Minister Cameron's Munich speech in 2011 about the failure of multiculturalism in Britain. In its declaration about the speech, the MCB stated that Cameron decries multiculturalism solely for security concerns, but forgets that "we need a discussion on our shared values that includes all of us, not just Muslims" and that the British society needs to learn how to cooperate against common challenges, and prevent the isolation and demonization of particular communities (Islamonline, 2011).

The recent developments with the crisis in Syria and Iraq have led the government to propose anti-terror laws to counter British-born jihadists seeking to

block British nationals fighting with the IS militants from re-entering the UK (RT Online, 2014). The MCB secretary stated the organization's concerns about the government proposal by saying that it could lead young Muslims closer to radical clerics, and instead:

> "They need to be talking to us and others to understand what it is that's leading these boys down this route… Part of the problem is the constant talk of legislation, harassment and monitoring, stripping people of their passports. This is what's leading young people towards radicalism." (ibid)

While these discussions have strictly continued between the government and the MCB, the organization has no platform concerning Euro-Islam or a project to organize all Muslims through cooperation with the other Muslim organizations outside of Britain. This is because since its foundation, the organization has almost focused on the issues related to Muslims in the British context.

IV.3.2.1.2. The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB)

The ISB was established in 1990 as an MCB affiliate organization that was mainly inspired from Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood activities (Hellyer, 2009: 159). Its purpose is to develop Islamic identity as free from traditional biases of immigrants. According to the organization's official website in a statement called "faith at home":

> "The Islamic Society of Britain is a community based charity and not-for-profit company. Established in 1990, we were one of the first organisations that sought to evolve a uniquely British flavour to Islam. In order for this to happen we felt that Muslims would have to think seriously about understanding their faith in a British context." (ISB, 2012)

The ISB has connections at the European level and its first leader was a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. When it was established in Britain, its members believed that they could easily spread their messages in a

democratic society. According to their declaration, the aim of the ISB is "to promote greater understanding and awareness of Islam; to organise, educate and enhance the development of British Muslim communities; to encourage positive contribution to British society and the promotion of social justice" (ibid). The government report affirms and supports its aim with reference to the site of the organization as follows:

> "The Islamic Society of Britain was set up to "provide a vehicle for committed British Muslims to combine their knowledge, skills and efforts for the benefit of one another and British society as a whole, through the promotion of Islam and Islamic values." (DCLG, 2009: 58)

Initially the ISB as a social enterprise gave priority to the education for Muslim Britons and tried to reach young Muslims, considered the most crucial method for spreading their vision and message on Muslim identity to the future generations. Their understanding of Islam and society is more conservative and described as follows:

> "…Islam as a religion of peace and a continuation of age-old teachings from God to humanity. Not as a new religion, but as a way of life that has a strong focus – in spiritual terms on the worship of one God, and in social terms on justice and equity between people." (ISB, 2012)

This means that the ISB intends to bridge two aspects of Islam, spiritual and social, in the UK. Indeed, that is what they could not articulate in the societies where they were previously well-organized such as Egypt. In that sense, it has currently executed activities particularly educational programs throughout Britain based in 8 cities with 16 branches covering England and Scotland (ibid). In their educational programs conducted as "British Muslim Identity and Loyalty", the organization focuses on the issues of integration and cohesion, democracy, etc. (ibid). In other words, the ISB pursues a mission to protect the spirit of Islam and Muslim identity in Britain that can only continue through education (Hellyer, 2009: 159). Moreover, it played more of an active public role in Britain after the 9/11 attacks because its leaders were often invited by mainstream media and gave moderate messages representing authentic voices of the British Muslim community (ibid).

The organization’s young Muslim branch the YMUK, established in 1984, works to attract newly arrived immigrant Muslims in Britain and to convert non-Muslims to Islam in order to achieve Britain as a Muslim majority country, which is thought to be unrealistic (Vidino, 2010: 117). The YMUK became a forum for young British Muslims to discuss problems concerning Muslims and even non-Muslims in order to contribute much more to the British society since it is a “leading force in encouraging positive contributions to British society through the development of a British Islam” (DCLG, 2009: 58). This vision is a visible approach to developing a multi-faith dialogue since the discourse of its representatives is open to all of the British society.

The discourse of the organization against terror and extremism took a significant place in the British media especially in the case of the murder of Fusillier Lee Rigby, a British army soldier, in May 2013 in Woolwich by a British of Nigerian descent who was a convert to Islam. The executive director of the ISB Julie Siddiqi, a Muslim woman of British origin representing a Muslim organization in Europe, condemned this murder and stated their responsibility was to cooperate with all society in order to cope with terrorism (The Guardian, 2013).

On the other hand, there are some Muslim organizations in Britain accusing of being responsible of radical recruitment and terrorism. The Home Office Report titled *Prescribed Terrorist Organizations* determines the criteria to ban an organization under the Terrorism Act 2000[25] as follows:

[25] The Act defines “Terrorism” as “means the use or threat which: involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life (other than that of the person committing the act); creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public; or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. The use or threat of such action must be designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and be undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. If the statutory test is met, there are other factors which the Secretary of State will take into account when deciding whether or not to exercise the discretion to proscribe. These discretionary factors are: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the UK; the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism” (quoted in Home Office, 2015: 2).

> "…the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned in terrorism. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation: commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or is otherwise concerned in terrorism." (Home Office, 2015: 2)

The al-Muhajiroun[26] network, established in 1983 when the Hizb ut-Tahrir[27] movement excluded its members, became notorious for radicalism in the UK and was proscribed in 2004 under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Home Office, 2015: 5). The murderers of Lee Rigby had attended al-Muhajiroun events. Its leaders, like Anjem Choudary, are accused of promoting radical activism and championing for *shari'a* in the country. They were "found to have led a network of groups that had become

[26] The New Muslim Project and Caring for Converts which is an attractive and popular website among the converts to Islam established in 1993, describes the current status of the Muslim organizations in Britain. In the case of Al-Muhajiroun, it states that "Al-Muhajiroun (*The Emigrants*) is an Islamic organisation whose two offshoots, The Saviour Sect and Al-Ghurabaa are banned under the British Terrorism Act 2006, for the 'glorification' of terrorism. It operated in the United Kingdom from 14 January 1986 until the British Government announced an intended ban in August 2005. Omar Bakri founded Al-Muhajiroun in Mecca, Saudi Arabia on 3 March 1983 following 'the 59th anniversary of the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate,' in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. According to Bakri, the Hizb ut-Tahrir leadership did not accept the group. As such, Bakri established Al-Muhajiroun independently from Hizb ut-Tahrir. Al-Muhajiroun's proclaimed aims are to establish public awareness about Islam, to influence public opinion in favor of the sharia, to convince members of society that Islam is inherently political and a viable ideological alternative, to unite Muslims on a global scale in the threats facing the Ummah and to resume the Islamic way of life by re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate. In June 2009 following more than a five year hiatus the organisation re-launched itself". Available at: http://www.newmuslimsproject.net

[27] In the case of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the website states that "Hizb ut-Tahrir is a global Islamic political party that was established in 1953 under the leadership of its founder - the scholar, political thinker and judge in the Court of Appeals in al-Quds (Jerusalem), Taqiuddin an-Nabhani. Hizb ut-Tahrir's global leadership is currently headed by Ata' abu Rishta. Hibut Tahrir aims to establish an Islamic way of life by reintroducing the concept of the Khilafah (Caliphate) state by following an exclusively political method. Hizb ut-Tahrir adopts the methodology employed by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) when he established the first Islamic State in Madinah. The Prophet Muhammad limited his struggle for the establishment of the Islamic State to intellectual and political work without resorting to violence. The party presents Islam as a comprehensive way of life that is capable of managing the affairs of state and society. The party also expresses its views on political events and analyses them from an Islamic perspective. It disseminates its thoughts through discussions, study circles, lectures, seminars, leaflet distribution, publishing books and magazines and via the Internet.
In the West, Hizb ut-Tahrir works to cultivate a Muslim community that lives by Islam in thought and deed, adhering to the rules of Islam and preserving a strong Islamic identity. The party does not work in the West to change the system of government. The party also works to project a positive image of Islam to Western society and engages in dialogue with Western thinkers, policymakers and academics". Available at: http://www.newmuslimsproject.net

the 'single biggest gateway to terrorism in recent British history' in 2013" (The Independent, 2015). There is competition between the ISB and al-Muhajiroun to get hold of the mosques in Britain.

However, the ISB accuses far-right parties of being responsible for the increase of Islamophobia in Europe and calls governments to deal with Islamophobia and terrorism at the same time. In its activities and the discourse of its representatives, the organization pursues clear commitments to democracy, gender equality, anti-violence and conformity with the British legal order. On every occasion, the organization promotes a moderate discourse for the sake of a peaceful co-existence of communities in the British society. Especially its youth wing, the YMUK, promotes more transparent activities contributing to multi-faith dialogue in the country.

IV.3.2.1.3. The UK Islamic Mission (UKIM)

The UKIM, founded in 1962, was inspired from the Mawdudist movement in which Mawdudi gave moral support to its mission as he praised the organization for being "pioneers of an Islamic movement and resolution in the Western world" and moreover, he encouraged them to strengthen their *dawa* in the UK because "there is no reason why the rest of humanity are not persuaded to embrace Islam today" (quoted in Vidino, 2010: 116). Its purpose is to preserve the social and religious customs of Muslims in Britain. According to its official website, the Mission defines itself as "not only an organization trying to serve Muslim community, but it is also an ideological movement" based on the belief that Islam covers all aspects of life and must be implemented in all spheres of entire human life (UKIM, 2008). The UKIM declares its aim as seeking to achieve the social order for Muslims and non-Muslims living in Britain as follows:

> "Developing an individual as a God-oriented person; [d]eveloping the Muslim community with a network of institutions, to serve the needs of the community such as Masjids, Madaris, relief work, sports clubs, and social

> organisations for cultural activities; [d]eveloping an outreach to the society at large in order to share Islam; its beliefs, values, principles and way of life; [t]aking a lead in changing individuals and society with all its dimensions for the better." (ibid)

The UKIM focuses on education in order to extend its mission in the British society and was launched to set up its branches in the country like other Muslim organizations. It has forty-nine branches and provides Islamic education to the British Muslims as a nation-wide organisation and its activists present Islam as an alternative way of life to the British people as a whole (Vidino, 2010: 116). Its educational program mainly aims to reach young people through providing seminars, courses and publications, including *Paigham* which means Message in Urdu language (Vidino, 2010: 116-117).

The organization, in its publications, emphasizes dialogue to prevent Islamophobia and criticizes media claiming that "violence and terrorism actually goes back deep into the roots of Islam, into its religious roots" (Murad, 1998: 6). The UKIM has provided clear insights for Muslims about peaceful coexistence within the European societies.

The government attitudes toward the UKIM changed amid the turmoil in Afghanistan since the mid-2000s, although they reject all kinds of extremism as a nationwide organization holding several programs in their mosques and state that "we have instructed all our branches not to allow any more speakers with radical or fundamentalist views", their activities and statements were criticized by the British government (Doward, 2007). When he was the Prime Minister, Tony Blair said that the Mission "is extremely valued by the government for its multi-faith and multicultural activities", but it supports the ideas of Taliban in Afghanistan as revealed by the secret reports recording their activities such as a preacher captured on film praising the Taliban in 2007 (ibid).

Contrary to this criticism, the DCLG report describes the purpose and activities of the UKIM including its interfaith dialogue as follows:

> "[it] is a national organisation with over 40 branches and Islamic Centres across the United Kingdom. The UK Islamic Mission was formed in the early 1960s and organises events at the local, regional and national level to improve the understanding of Muslim beliefs and practices, Islamic teachings, Islamic information, Islamic knowledge. Its activities include running daily educational classes for young people, weekly activities for teenagers, youth and male/ female adults, seminars for Muslims and other faith communities, exhibitions at schools and libraries, as well as facilitating visits to Mosques and working with interfaith groups throughout the country (England, Scotland and Wales)." (DCLG, 2009: 58)

Actually, the UKIM has no official statement about contributing to radical recruitment but the British media and sometimes government state that it is a movement harbouring Islamization with no hope of promoting moderate Islam for Muslims in Britain.

IV.3.2.1.4. The Islamic Sharia Council (ISC)

Established in 1982, the ISC is thought to be an interest group. It is composed of Sunni Muslims and some of them have the MCB affiliations. It seeks to achieve the essential religious needs of the British Muslims. According to the organization's official website, the Islamic Sharia Council was set up for the following purpose:

> "…to solve the matrimonial problems of Muslims living in the United Kingdom in the light of Islamic family law. The council is made up of members from all of the major schools of Islamic legal thought (*mad'hab*) and is widely accepted as an authoritative body with regards to Islamic law." (ISC, 2015)

The ISC offers guidance for the British Muslims in areas related to the interpretations of religious issues, in particular delivering *fatwas* for family life. It operates in the form of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT)[28] which is a website

[28] The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) was established in 2007 to provide a viable alternative for the Muslim community seeking to resolve disputes in accordance with Islamic Sacred Law. Under the

for the *fatwas* and describes the method to apply for the settlement of disputes. From this point of view, the ISC is treated as a quasi-Islamic court that has high standing authority for the interpretation of Islam regarding the *shari'a* law in the British context. Its capacity to reach Muslims about such interpretations has significant influence on Muslims who seek solutions to problems concerning private life such as the *fatwas* on marriage and divorce issues (Talwar, 2012).

With its respected capacity to interpret the *shari'a* law, the ISC has gained popularity among Muslims who take their problems to its courts voluntarily. In recent years, there is a growing demand for the *shari'a* councils and thus it is estimated that there are 85 councils and 13 tribunals operating in Britain according to the Institute for the Study of Civil Society (Civitas)[29] think-tank report titled *Sharia Law or 'One Law For All'* (Civitas, 2009: 69). The report findings basically reflect the negative responses to the ISC *fatwas*[30] assuming that they have failed to reveal significant evidence for the compatibility of Islam and the legal system since its *fatwas* have already been conceived as Islamist interpretations.

The tribunals managed by the local councils of the ISC are operating in parallel to the British legal system. The critics claim that this situation creates a double legal system which is not acceptable in modern secular society because it is deemed incompatible with the Western law codes including gender equality as Denis MacEoin, author of the Civitas report, argues:

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remit of the Arbitration Act 1996, MAT acts as an effective, efficient and unique Alternate Dispute Resolution organisation which deals with Islamic Sacred Law within the context of the English Legal System. Available at the official website: http://www.matribunal.com

[29] Civitas describes itself as an independent social policy think-tank which receives no state funding either directly or indirectly and has no links to any political party. Although the think-tank describes itself as classical liberal and non-partisan, The Times and The Daily Telegraph describe it as a right-of-centre think-tank; and also, The Times describes it as an ally of the Conservative Party politician Michael Gove who is the former Education Secretary and the incumbent Secretary of State for Justice appointed on 10 May 2015 (The Times, 2014; The Telegraph, 2014).

[30] Its remark on the term fatwa in the report is often associated with the negative connotations with the following terms: A 'Fatwa' is the traditional title for a Sharia legal judgement or legal opinion. Sadly since the Ayatollah Khomeini issued his infamous 'Fatwa' calling for the death of Salman Rushdie this respectable legal term has acquired an entirely negative connotation in the West and the mass media.

> "Women are not equal in sharia law, and sharia contains no specific commitment to the best interests of the child that is fundamental to family law in the UK. Under sharia, a male child belongs to the father after the age of seven, regardless of circumstances." (The Independent, 2009; Civitas, 2009)

However, the British legal system enables communities to establish their own courts for issues concerning private life according to the 1996 Arbitration Act passed in the Parliament. The Act states the rules under which "parties in a dispute have the right to go to an impartial tribunal to get justice without expensive litigation" (The Independent, 2009). In this regard, Muslim representative lawyers interpreted this statement as granting *sharia* courts for Muslims permitted to act as "arbitration"[31] panels with legally binding decisions, which they began in 2007. Their argument for this interpretation is the implementation of the Act by the Jewish community in the country stated as follows:

> "Jewish Beth Din courts have operated in this country for centuries, used mainly by Orthodox Jews, and are recognised under the 1996 Act. Both parties in a case have to be Jews, and have to agree to have their cases heard by the Beth Din court." (ibid)

Since there is a legal basis for the Islamic courts in Britain, it is believed that this situation promotes discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims and undermines liberties in the British society. From point of this view, the Civitas report (2009: 73) delivers its concerns as follows:

> "The introduction of sharia law into this country is a recipe for a dichotomous legal system that holds Muslims and non-Muslims to different standards. This is not a matter of eating halal meat or seeking God's blessing on one's marriage. It is a challenge to what we believe to be the rights and

[31] Civitas report (2009: x-xi) describes arbitration as "a form of trial before a 'judge' who is not appointed by the state but is instead agreed to by the parties. It is regulated by statute and involves the parties signing an arbitration agreement before the 'trial' begins. The arbitrator can act in accordance with the rules of any legal system specified in the arbitration agreement including, of course, sharia law and the ultimate 'judgement' of the arbitrator can be registered with the civil courts and enforced in the same way as if it were a judgement of the ordinary civil courts. It is this aspect of civil courts enforcing arbitration judgements based on sharia principles which has led to suggestions that sharia law has been given 'official' recognition."

> freedoms of the individual, to our concept of a legal system based on what parliament enacts, and to the right of all of us to live in a society as free as possible from ethnic-religious division or communal claims to superiority and a special status that puts them in some respects above the law to which we are all bound."

Interestingly, a significant voice of support for the implementation of *shari'a* law came in 2008 when the Archbishop of Canterbury suggested that these courts and tribunals should be given authority to settle the disputes:

> "there are ways of looking at marital disputes, for example, which provide an alternative to the divorce courts as we understand them. In some cultural and religious settings they would seem more appropriate." (The Guardian, 2008)

The British government is engaged in a review of the *shari'a* courts, as it was discussed in the Parliament and stated by the Home Secretary Theresa May before the May 2015 elections. The Prime Minister Cameron also affirmed her statement as "there would also be an independent figure commissioned to investigate the use of Islamic law by Sharia councils, used to settle family and inheritance disputes by some British Muslims" (Reuters, 2015).

During these discussions, the ISC has kept its position as a civil society initiative standing for the implementation of *shari'a* law that is assumed to be compatible with the British legal system.

IV.3.2.1.5. The Progressive British Muslims (PBM)

The PBM, established in 2005, is considered the most liberal Muslim organization in Britain. Its primary aim is to fight against extremism by encouraging Muslim integration and supporting liberal democratic values. According to the organization's official website with a slogan "Exploring the rights of British Muslims", it advocates the following aims in a broader sense:

> "equality in the Muslim community, especially between men and women, but also address equality issues based on sexual preference and disability; Muslim integration into mainstream British society whilst maintaining an Islamic identity; freedom of speech; respect for all faiths; human rights and democracy." (PBM, 2014)

It is not actually defined as a representative organization, but a group based on liberal principles supported by Muslims seeking a forum to pursue a voice for the British Muslims who "feel unrepresented by the existing faith-based Muslim groups" (ibid). The purpose of the PBM is to articulate the views of Muslims who consider themselves to be British, "integrated into mainstream society" and "who have a cultural identity as Muslims" (ibid).

They primarily speak about themselves and their personal experiences of being Muslim in a non-Muslim country and reflect the views of those who consider themselves as "British and Muslims". The group came into existence in the immediate aftermath of the London bombings in July 2005. They consider that the nihilism of the terrorists can only be overcome if the British public addresses the relevant issues, not blaming all Muslims for the actions of a few (Bi, 2006).

The group members are highly educated people and organized in business. They support democracy and pluralism, and are proud of their Muslim identity. The PBM can be understood as a good example for the notions of Euro-Islam, but it has a limited network for reaching the wider Muslim community in Britain, or at least, its message is inadequately spread to other British Muslims because of their lack of effective religious centres like mosques.

IV.3.2.1.6. The Sufi Muslim Council (SMC)

The SMC is a new Muslim organization, like the PBM, established in 2006 as a result of disenchantment from the previous organizations failure in attracting Muslims in Britain. It was set up with government support in order to balance

existing organizations. The SCM defines itself as a representative body of the silent moderate Muslims who are accepted as the followers of the classical form of Islam instead of political manifestations (McLoughlin and Abbas, 2010: 550). It seems to be pleased with the government's view that existing organizations could not articulate convenience with their struggle against the radicalization and extremism in their respective communities. According to the organization's website, the SMC aims:

> "…to provide practical solutions for British Muslims, based on the traditional Islamic legal rulings of an international advisory board, many of whom are recognized as the highest ranking Islamic scholars in the world; For the first time in the UK, we have tried to integrate traditional scholarship in resolving contemporary issues affecting the maintenance of Islamic beliefs in a modern, secular society." (SMC, 2015)

The organization rejects the deviant extremism of Saudi sponsored Wahhabism and variants of *Salafism*, while it is considered to be an organization for the Sufi Muslims who represent nearly 80 percent of the Muslims in Britain (The Guardian, 2006). As a state sponsored organization, it is assumed to represent the "silent majority" of the British Sufi Muslims and struggles against radicalism and extremism since the MCB was dismissed as an unrepresentative and divisive formation (ibid). The SMC claimed that the existing Muslim organizations, including the MCB, did not articulate the necessary effort to cope with radicalism and extremism.

The British government frankly pursues a critical balancing act towards the Muslim organizations for the sake of social cohesion. In the case of the MCB, when the British government claimed that the MCB ceased to be representative of the Muslims in 2006, it started to support the SMC as a new initiation. The SMC emphasizes its cooperation with the state to tackle extremism and promote moderate Islam in the country. It also has a close cooperation with British Muslim Forum

(BMF),[32] which is an umbrella group established in 2005 and representing more than 600 mosques around the UK, indicates its promising capacity as a representative body.

The SMC was launched in Westminster and endorsed by the Communities and Local Government Minister Ruth Kelly who stated that "we must work together to protect our young people from recruitment to violence… we are looking to organisations and individuals across the Muslim communities to be vocal and challenge the ideology of the extremists" (ibid). In that regard, the organization is considered as an apolitical entity which seeks to achieve moderate Islam in Britain. One of its founders states their purposes in this point as follows:

> "Unfortunately, many UK Muslim organisations lack the courage to stand up and speak forthrightly about extremism; …to tackle Islamic radicalisation following the 7/7 London bombings, the SMC is seeking to fill a 'vacuum' within the Muslim community." (ibid)

The organization asserts that the Muslim community in Britain needs to deal with an internal criticism to isolate the ideology representing Islam with false claims; to encourage more moderate values in civil society; and to promote a pure, classical form of Islam (ibid). As the main principles of the SMC in their activities, it pursues Quranic teaching, works proactively with non-Muslims representing Islam as a religion of moderation, condemns terrorism in all its forms, emphasizes common heritage of Abrahamic religions, supports the classical Islamic theology, and rejects radicalised Islamist strains. All of the above statements show the SMC's willingness of full compatibility of the Muslim community in British society. That is, the SMC's

[32] The BMF which was set up as a forum in 2005 to represent *Barelwi* Muslims, but actually it has not any invisible public activity, statement and declarations about the relevant issues regarding Muslims in the British context. For the DCLG report, the BMF is described as follows: "Launched in 2005, The BMF claims to represent 600 mosques in the UK. In July 2005, it issued a fatwa in response to the London bombs, condemning the use of violence and suicide bombings. Working with other national Muslim organisations, the BMF aims to provide a coordinating platform to respond to the concerns of Muslim communities in the UK. Collaborative initiatives have included the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), which was launched in 2006 as a self-regulation body aiming to improve standards and governance of mosques in the UK" (DCLG, 2009: 59). Actually, there is not any proof about the BMF activities and its website www.thebmf.org.uk used as a reference in the report is suspended, and it has no alternative one.

views seem to be more compatible in engaging with the Euro-Islam discourse than other Muslim organizations in the UK (SMC, 2015).

Besides, the SMC founder Haras Rafiq stated the objectives of the organization in promoting moderate Islam in Britain and calls Muslims for self-criticism in order to isolate the networks for radical recruitment in the country as follows:

> "There is an urgent need for the British Muslim community to engage in an internal debate to isolate the ideologies that falsely claim to represent Islam, to develop a strong field of moderate, intellectually astute, forward-thinking leaders and scholars who can promote the moderate values of civic society, engagement and diversity which characterise classical Islam." (The Guardian, 2006)

Among others, the MCB seeks to inform Muslims concerning the changing perception towards Muslim community in the country, in particular after 9/11, but has almost no projection about the integration of the Muslim community, while the recently established SMC has already dealt with the accommodation of Muslims in the country by promoting convenience vis-à-vis the society and the government; it has already pursued the discourse of a European Islam that is compatible with the British legal order. In that regard, the DCLG report approves its aim as follows:

> "Launched in 2006 with an avowedly anti-extremism stance and with the support of all the mainstream political parties as well as Anglican and Jewish representatives, the SMC claims to represent 'a silent majority' of Muslims who are frustrated with existing Muslim leadership in the UK. Its inception was seen as a direct challenge to the MCB and the 'politicised' presentation of Islam. The SMC aims to provide practical solutions for British Muslims, based on the traditional Islamic legal rulings of an international advisory board, including some of the highest ranking Islamic scholars in the world in order to integrate traditional scholarship in resolving contemporary issues affecting the maintenance of Islamic beliefs in a modern, secular society." (DCLG, 2009: 59)

From this point of view, with the state support the SMC seems to be a new form of organization performing favourable attitudes in changing the misperception about Muslims in the country by promoting a moderate form of Islam.

IV.3.2.2. Muslim Organizations in Germany

The Muslim community in Germany consists of diverse sectarian groups even though the greater majority is Turkish and is the best organized group among the country's ethnic and religious minorities (Goldberg, 2002: 40). This diversity becomes more visible in the case of organizational representation of Muslims in Germany. Alongside the vast majority of Sunni Muslims, who compose 74 percent of the Muslim population, there are 13 percent Alevis, and 7 percent Shiite with the other 6 percent representing minority sects of Islam in the country (BMI, 2011). Nevertheless, around 20 percent of Muslims actively participate in religious organizations in Germany. At first glance, this seems to be the most important reason to state that Muslim organizations in Germany have no significant legitimacy to represent all Muslims. Besides, the Muslim community in Germany is rather fluid because many older Muslims from Turkey return to their country for retirement and currently there is an emerging fourth generation living in the country (euro-islam.info)[33]. Nonetheless, some of the established Muslim organizations emerge as the main actors reacting against government policies concerning the Muslim immigrants in the country and are more likely to contribute to the public perception of Islam/Muslims in the country.

[33] Euro-Islam.info which is the website (http://www.euro-islam.info) provides news and analysis on Islam in Europe and North America. It is an active network of researchers and scholars who conduct comparative research on Islam and Muslims in the West and disseminate key information to politicians, media, and the public. Sponsored by GSRL Paris/CNRS France and Harvard University, the Euro-Islam research network consists of over forty researchers and hosts over 50,000 unique visitors each month. The site is recognized in political and media circles as the most reliable online reference for Islam in Europe.

Since the German state recognizes religious neutrality, separation of religion and state relations is directed by cooperation between state and the religious institutions. Muslim communities are organized around these principles and their organizations consist of several sub-organizations, associations and federations participating in institutional platforms. Their role in representing Muslims in the country is also considered a potential contribution to Euro-Islam in a wider spectrum of discourse. Euro-Islam in the German context needs a comprehensive platform to emerge cooperatively for the achievement of a common voice for Muslims in Germany as well as in other European countries.

In retrospect, the German government on some occasions attempted to hold conferences on Islam in order to promote initiatives establishing a comprehensive dialogue with the country's Muslim community. In that sense, there are some initiatives to achieve this common voice, like the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland*, ZMD) established in 1994 as an umbrella organization representing the Muslim minority in Germany. Unfortunately, various Muslim organizations and groups participating in the ZMD did not pursue constructive perspectives for dialogue (Buck, 2007). Another initiative is the German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, DIK) established in 2006 by the former Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble. It has a national impact on religious affairs yet Muslim organizations did not sufficiently participate in the DIK.

In 2007, the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birlikleri*, DITIB), The Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, IRD), the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres (*Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren*, VIKZ) and the ZMD, as the four largest Muslim organizations, founded the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (*Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland*, KRM), which became the largest umbrella Muslim organization representing the vast majority of Sunni and Shiite Muslim communities in Germany, though it is considered as a loose consortium (DIK, 2010). The KRM was not officially recognized because "KRM was met with the reservations by the German

government, which continues to address the organizations independently" (Rosenow-Williams, 2012: 87). The Alevi community was involved in the consultation of the DIK, but it did not become a member of the KRM (Kortmann and Rosenow-Williams, 2013: 45). In addition, the SCHURA – Council of the Islamic communities in Hamburg (*Rat der Islamischen Gemeinschaften in Hamburg e.V.*), established in 1999 as a small organization which played a role in the official recognition of Islam in Hamburg, Hesse and Bremen, did not become member of the KRM. The SCHURA represents local mosques which are not member of any umbrella organization and thus deals only with independent mosques at the local level.

In 2002, a government report stated that "from the government's perspective, …nontransparent organizational structures and the lack of clear membership rules…are the biggest obstacles to granting corporation status to those who have asked for it" (euro-islam.info). Furthermore, there is a strong influence of foreign governments over the Muslim community in Germany including those of Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This situation is officially stated as an obstacle for Muslims' integration in the country, and besides, increase the nationality influence in their identity. For this reason, individual initiatives cooperating with German state seem to be more important than the Muslim organizations which are open to foreign influence in promoting integration of immigrant Muslims in the country.

Recently, German Federal Ministry of the Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innern*, BMI) published a report about terrorism related to Muslim communities which is revisited at the end of each year. The report titled "2014 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution: Facts and Trends" was presented to the public in June 2015. The aim of the report was stated as follows:

> "The Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution is intended to inform the public and to increase general awareness about anti-constitutional activities in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is based on the intelligence collected by the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV / the domestic intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany) in the framework of its legally assigned tasks, in co-operation with the intelligence services of the federal states. This report cannot give an exhaustive overview, but it provides information about the essential findings and

analyses and evaluates significant developments and correlations." (BMI, 2015)

Accordingly, the report listed the number of people from the Muslim communities engaging in Islamism/Islamist terrorism on the basis of the anti–constitutional activities:

Table IV.1.

The Number of Islamism/Islamist terrorism

Islamist Following*		
Organizations**	**2013**	**2014**
Core al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Shabab	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
Islamic State (IS)	not listed	no hard numbers
Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN)	not listed	no hard numbers
Salafist Movements	5,500	7,000
Hezbollah	950	950
Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (HAMAS)	300	300
North Caucasus Separatist Movement (NKSB – Nordkaukasische Separatistenbewegung)	250	220
Turkish Hezbollah (TH)	350	360
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT)	300	300
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) / Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V. (IGD)	1,300	1,000
Tablighi Jama'at (TJ)	700	700
Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e.V. (IZH)	no hard numbers	no hard numbers
Milli Görüş movement and affiliated associations	(IGMG) 31,000	31,000***
Other****	2,540	2,060
Total	**43,190**	**43,890**

Source: BMI (2015: 20), www.bmi.bund.de
* The figures refer to Germany and are partly estimated and rounded off.
**The list includes – in a systematic order – terrorist organisations and those which refrain from violence.
***The figures for the Milli Görüş movement include the members of the Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş e.V. (IGMG). Due to the ongoing process of change within the IGMG, no reliable figures on its current following are available. Therefore, the figures of the 2013 Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution have been adopted. However, not all IGMG members/followers pursue or support Islamist goals. No reliable figures have as yet been available on the other associations affiliated with the Milli Görüş movement.
****Other organisations whose membership/adherent figures are relevant to the Islamist following.

The modest increase in the total number between 2013 and 2014 is a result of a rise in numbers of the *Salafist* movement in Germany. The IS has been a proscribed organization in the country since September 12, 2014. The report does not specify any criminal activity attributed to members of the organizations in the table, but shows the findings of the domestic intelligence service, namely the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV).

The BMI in 2015 announced the list of proscribed Muslim organizations on the basis of anti–constitutional activities as in the table below:

Table IV.2.
Forbidden Islamist Organizations, as of 3/6/2015

Organization	Date prohibition order	Prohibited grounds	Status
“Tawheed Germany”	03/26/2015	Spare organization of legally banned organization “Millatu Ibrahim”	Unchallengeable
“Islamic State”	09/12/2014	Organization is directed against the constitutional order and the concept of international understanding	Unchallengeable
“Orphans Project Lebanon e.V.”	02/04/2014	Violation of the concept of international understanding	Not legally
“Dawa Team	25.02.2013	The association’s purpose is directed	Unchallengeable

Islamic Audios"		against the constitutional order and violates the concept of international understanding	
"On-Nussrah"	25.02.2013	Part of the organization legally prohibited association "Millatu Ibrahim"	Unchallengeable
"DawaFFM" including sub-organization "International Youth Club - Dar al Shababe e.V."	25.02.2013	The association's purpose is directed against the constitutional order and violates the concept of international understanding	Unchallengeable
"Millatu Ibrahim"	29.05.2012	The association's purpose is directed against the constitutional order and violates the concept of international understanding	Unchallengeable
"International humanitarian organization e.V." (IHH)	23.06.2010	Violation of the concept of international understanding	Unchallengeable
"Al-Manar TV"	29.10.2008	Violation of the concept of international understanding	Unchallengeable
"Yatim Kids Help e.V."	30.08.2005	Successor organization of the legally prohibited "al-Aqsa e.V."	Unchallengeable
"Bremer Hilfswerk e.V."	Dissolve itself with effect from 18.01.2005; deletion from the register of associations on 29/06/2005		The BMI had on 3 December 2004 an association legal investigation with the aim of a ban against the "Bremer Hilfswerk e.V." initiated. The Association is the prohibition of pre-empted by self-dissolution.
"Yeni Akit GmbH" publisher of the European edition of the Turkish-language daily newspaper "Anadolu'da Vakit"	22.02.2005	Denial and trivialization of the Holocaust in ways incites hatred, dissemination of anti-Semitic / anti-Western propaganda	Unchallengeable
"Hizb ut-Tahrir" (Hut)	10.01.2003	Violation of the concept of international understanding, advocacy	Unchallengeable

		of violence to achieve political goals	
"Al-Aqsa e.V."	31.07.2002	Violation of the concept of international understanding (financial support for Hamas and its so-called social clubs)	Unchallengeable
"Caliphate State" and 35 subsidiary organizations	08.12.2001 14.12.2001 13.05.2002 16.09.2002	The association's purpose is directed against the constitutional order and violates the concept of international understanding, and propagates violence as a means to achieve political goals	Unchallengeable

Source: *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, 2015

*Organisations banned by the BMI against extremist efforts in the period from January 1990 to June 2015.

The German constitution banned these organizations mainly on the grounds of their publications on the internet and the BfV observations about the organizations. The report directly uses the term Islamist terrorism in defining the nature and scope of anti-constitutional developments and distinguishes it from Islam and Muslims. In that regard, another report of the BMI titled "Migration and integration: Residence law and policy on migration and integration in Germany" from 2014 defines Islamism or Islamist terror as follows:

> "Islamism is a heterogeneous political, mainly social revolutionary movement which is supported only by a minority of Muslims. Citing the original, 7th-century Islam, Islamists call for the 'restoration' of an 'Islamic order', which in their view is the only legitimate form of government and society and should replace all other systems of government. Within this 'Islamic order', all areas of life are to be organized according to the Koran and the example of the Prophet and his early followers (Sunna)." (BMI, 2014: 167)

In this report, there is no direct statement about the mainstream Muslim organizations but it emphasizes some interconnections with radical activities among their members in the country. In search of the Muslim organizations in Germany, the official views released from the BMI and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*, BAMF) reports and discussions reflected in the media are analysed. The Muslim organizations in

Germany are mainly classified with respect to the number of mosques, religious centres and individual membership they represent also taking into account the religious movement and the country of origin to which they belong.

IV.3.2.2.1. The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs (DITIB e.V.)

The DITIB, established in 1984 to represent Turkish Muslims, is the largest Muslim organization in Germany. The Organization is directly sponsored by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, DIB). For this reason, it is often associated with the Turkish government because the DIB is a state organization subordinate to the Turkish Prime Ministry and financed by the Turkish government. Since the DIB aims to promote a form of Islam confined to the traditionally secular Turkish state, support for national solidarity and integrity based on the Turkish Constitution,[34] the DITIB inevitably moves in this orient. In this manner, the Turkish government yields its control on Turkish Muslims in Germany. The DITIB has achieved a significant role between Turkish migrants and the German governments and dealt also with technical matters including visas for imams, permission for mosques construction and authorizations of teachers for religious education in public schools (euro-islam.info). The DIB started to organize in Europe after the September 12 military coup of 1980 in order to accomplish the mission of counterbalancing the non-governmental Islamic and political formation, while promoting national solidarity and loyalty to Turkish state in Turkish communities (Yükleyen, 2007: 72). The support of the Turkish government is based not just on funding but also selecting imams for German mosques and religious teachers for public schools (Hussain, 2003: 233).

[34] Article 136 of the 1982 Turkish constitution defines the role and duties of the DIB as follows: “the Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey)

Actually it has more than 900 mosques and 130.000 members in Germany (DITIB, 2015). Since the beginning, the imams serve for three or five years in Germany yet they are educated in Turkey, are not competent in German language and have little awareness about the German society. Since 2009, the DITIB started to cooperate with the Goethe institute to educate imams in both German language and social characteristics of the German society. With this education, as the president of the BAMF stated, “Imams can play an important and integration-supporting role as bridge-builders and mediators between incoming migrants and the majority society” (Houlton, 2009).

The organization does not officially support any political activity in the country, but Turkish government promotes both national and religious identities at the same time. Therefore, the DITIB promotes the official view of the Turkish state in pursuing its mission which means that the organization has a political role due to its organic connections with the Turkish state. As in Turkey, the organization does not permit any radicalism which may conflict with democracy and secular state order.

The DITIB is not considered to be an Islamic community since it is a state institution aiming to represent Turkish Muslims and because its followers do not have a collective feeling of belonging as a separate community in Germany (Yükleyen, 2007: 28). There is no clear indication whether the organization has served other Muslims in Germany of different nationalities than Turkish.

The organization claims that it encourages integration of Turkish immigrants into the German society even though it promotes loyalty to the Turkish state. It is accepted that promotion of loyalty to the Turkish state is not an obstacle to such integration (Yükleyen, 2007: 74). Its interpretation of Islam is considered a liberal form which mentions that religious practices depend on individual conscience (Yükleyen, 2007: 77). In other words, it puts distinction between private and public spheres where Islam is practiced in the private sphere and does not have any claim in the public sphere. However, in their interpretations of Islam like *fatwa*, imams refer

to the DIB's official publications in Turkey. This situation paves the way for some questions about whether such activities are compatible with the conditions under which Muslims live in Germany.

The DITIB did not join the ZMD for legal reasons since it is a state sponsored organization. Although its liberal vision promotes a moderate form of Islam in Germany, the clear influence of the Turkish state deprives it of being capable of contributing to the institutionalization process through umbrella organizations in the country. Yet it has a significant potential in transforming Turkish Muslims in Germany in the case of integration issues.

A main concern for Euro-Islam is the political involvement of foreign governments in the affairs of Muslim immigrants in Europe. It might be considerable gesture for the promotion of Euro-Islam if the DIB –the Turkish government– empowers the DITIB as a relatively independent organization to cooperate with the umbrella organizations and the German government.

IV.3.2.2.2. Association of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIKZ e.V.)

The VIKZ was founded in 1973 as the oldest Turkish Muslim organisation. It is an umbrella organization for several associations throughout Europe including the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Switzerland; and has more than 100,000 members (euro-islam.info). It was established by a Sufi Muslim group called the *Süleymancı* movement among Turkish Muslims, which does not support any political view of Islam. The existence of the organization is based on the following background:

> "The *Süleymancı* movement was founded in the course of the secularization of the Turkish state when many Sufi monasteries were expropriated. The concentration of its members on the teaching of its preacher as the sole way to acquire knowledge led them to deny the principles of the newly-emerging secular Turkish state." (Herghelegiu, 2010: 59)

It has a clear commitment to the legal order of Germany in support of democracy and tolerance since it represents the spiritual side of Islam (euro-islam.info). The VIKZ initially had supporters among the first generation immigrants but is actually getting more popular with the second and third generations of Turkish Muslims with more than 300 offices and 250 prayer facilities; formally over 300 mosque communities count themselves as members of the organization (Spiegel Online, 2007). Among its activities, the organization trains imams and offers Qur'an learning courses. It represents the tradition of classical Islam and its activities tend toward the introverted. The VIKZ joined the ZMD in 1994 that was regarded as significant for religious institutionalization in the country.

It is claimed that Muslims in Germany are becoming more religious and more conservative through the activities of the Islamic organizations such as this, with their well-prepared work geared towards young people. In this case, the VIKZ undertakes significant role because among its activities, the organization develops dialogue with non-Muslim Germans. For instance, "Meetings with non-Muslim children are being arranged, [especially] from the local Social Democratic Party's youth division. Officials at VIKZ argue that this involves more contact with Germans than when the pupils lived with their families" (ibid).

The role of the VIKZ in religious education of Muslims in Germany has often been criticized for having close relations with the Turkish government especially in the last decade. Contrary to the previously exclusivist attitudes of the secular Turkish state towards the voluntary Muslim associations in Germany, the VIKZ has gained a growing political support from the Turkish government over the past decade. Ursula Spuler-Stegemann (2007), who has studied the subject of Islam in the modern world and sometimes puts forward her opinions in the German media about issues regarding the Muslim community, argues that the religious teaching of the VIKZ promotes only extreme conservative thought of Islam attributed to the conservative attitudes of the Turkish government:

> "One cannot help feeling that as part of his religious policy, Prime Minister Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan is consistently bringing together Islamic and Turkish

> nationalist forces not only at home, but in Germany too; this policy also involves the VIKZ."
>
> "Whilst hundreds of thousands are taking to the streets in Turkey to demonstrate against the candidature of a religiously motivated president, who, in a position of extraordinary power, is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces and could, in alliance with the head of the government, change the Islamic orientation of the entire country, the inhibitions of Islamic organisations in Germany continue to fall as their demands rise, and all in the safety of relative anonymity."

From this point of view, it is assumed that political developments in Turkey are far more likely to influence the attitudes of Turkish Muslims in Germany as if they become a proxy political community of the Turkish government that prevents integration and promotes the isolation of Muslims within the German society. Besides, the VIKZ has been criticized because of its close networks of religious teaching in hostels promoting a more conservative manner of Islam. These criticisms of the organization indicate that some Germans are precautious about its purposes in promoting religious teaching. Although the VIKZ claims legitimacy within the legal system of Germany about its activities, there is no clear proof that the movement has a perspective fully compatible with the German culture in its religious teaching.

In addition, the BAMF report (2010: 60) emphasizes that participation in the umbrella organizations is crucial to promoting religious institutionalization. At the beginning, the ZMD was regarded as an ambitious initiative in this manner. The VIKZ withdrew from the ZMD at the beginning of 2000. It is understood from this report that this withdrawal might pose as an obstacle to the institutionalization of Muslim communities at the state level.

IV.3.2.2.3. German Federation of Alevi Communities (AABF e.V.)

The initial forms of Alevi organizations were established in the mid-1970s and their leaders, names and aims did not use the Alevi word and did not refer to

Alevism explicitly because their members were afraid that the Turkish governments would keep a watch about their activities in Germany, in particular during the military regime following the 1980 coup d'etat in Turkey (Halm et al., 2012: 65). The current form of the organization took its name as the AABF (*Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu e.V.*) in 1998 transforming from the 1989 *Almanya Alevi Cemaatleri Federasyonu* which was renamed *Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu* in 1994 and has since functioned as an umbrella organization. It represents 120 local and regional member organizations and approximately 20,000 registered members in the country (DIK, 2010).

The organization in its official website clearly states that Alevism is a different and independent faith-based community than Islam in which it consists of between 500,000 and 800,000 fellows in Germany and it is the third largest religious community after Christianity and Islam in the country (AABF, 2011). Hence, the BAMF report (2009: 21) affirms this differentiation as follows: "…Alevis clearly differ from followers of Sunni and Shiite Islam in their spiritual orientation and religious practice." Alevis are regarded as a relatively more secular group within the spectrum of Muslim organizations since the report adds that "Not all five pillars of Islam play a vital role in defining the Islamic religion for Alevis, for example. Prayer and fasting at the time of Ramadan are of no relevance to Alevis" (BAMF, 2009: 138).

It established representations in each individual state for strong cooperation with the local communities in the country. The AABF states its main mission as revitalizing Alevi teaching in both Germany and Turkey, promoting multi-faith dialogue, fighting against discrimination and assisting with the problems of immigrants in Germany (AABF, 2011). After its foundation in Germany, the AABF became sponsor of the umbrella organization in Turkey, Alevi Bektashi Federation (*Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu*, ABF). Both organizations struggle for the official recognition of Alevism in Turkey and Germany (Halm et al., 2012: 66).

Even though Alevis share few precepts with Sunni and Shiite communities, the organization participated in the DIK and became part of the Muslim umbrella organizations. Among others, the AABF is the first organization that attained corporation status in establishing religious instruction in public schools under the legal system implemented in the German states since 2009 (Rohe, 2010b: 221). The organization gives priority to youth education and gender equality. The BAMF report (2012: 3) explains that women from the AABF tend more equally and actively to participate in the community activities than those of the other Muslim communities in the country.

The AABF has managed to be institutionalized in representation of the Alevi community in the country, but its differentiation from other Muslim communities with respect to the tenets of Islam makes it difficult to cooperate for the advancement of umbrella organization at the state level.

IV.3.2.2.4. The Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD e.V.)

Established in 1994, the ZMD actually transformed from the Islamic Working Group (*Islamischer Arbeitskreis in Deutschland*, IAK) which was founded in 1987 and composed of representatives from various Sunni and Shiite Muslim communities as an umbrella organization. The ZMD has 12,000 members and incorporates 33 umbrella organizations in approximately 300 mosque communities, including local Islamic centres and facilities (ZMD, 2015). The organization currently represents a wide range of Muslim communities in Germany, namely "Turks, Arabs (Moroccans), Germans, Albanians, Iranians, Africans and Bosnians and many others, as well as Sunnis and Shiites integrated, which is reflected also in the theological sense" (ibid).

The ZMD played a significant role in integrating immigrant Muslims from the Arabic countries since it has become a main interlocutor between the German state and its members. The BAMF report (2010: 155) points out its contribution in

this process as follows: “the ZMD, successfully tried to act as translators and mediators of Muslim concerns to the German public and succeeded in establishing a small but influential Muslim discourse in German language”.

At the beginning, the DITIB, the VIKZ and the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş*, IGMG) were represented in the IAK, but the DITIB and IGMG did not join the ZMD due to some legal reasons, they claimed. The ZMD includes the Islamic Community in Germany (*Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland*, IGD), as the largest organization of the ZMD, which represents Arabic mosque communities in Germany and other minor Muslim communities (Rosenow-Williams, 2012: 87). Due to its cooperation with the IGD, the ZMD was officially criticized of being a proxy organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Moreover, the domestic intelligence service, the BfV, has claimed that the ZMD has “financial ties to the Saudi-dominated Muslim World League and of ideological links to the Muslim Brotherhood”, but these claims have yet to be proven (euroislam.info).

In 2002, the ZMD declared an Islamic Charter to indicate the convenience between Islam and German democracy. In this Charter, the ZMD affirms its full compliance with the German legal system, pluralism and human rights. It asserts that Islamic tenets and principles of human rights do not contradict with each other and acknowledges that the commandment of Islamic law requests Muslims to comply with the local legal system (ZMD, 2015).

The Charter specified that the ZMD promotes “a contemporary understanding of Islamic sources which takes into account the background of the modern problems of life and the emergence of a separate Muslim identity in Europe”. The discourse of the organization pursues integration of Muslims in the country and calls for cooperation to fight against Islamophobia. However, since the withdrawal of the VIKZ in 2000, the organization has not had sufficient support among Turkish Muslims which reduces its capability to perform its representative function as a strong umbrella organization. The ZMD was a member organization in

the DIK, but since 2010 it has declared that it would no longer participate in its meetings citing the fragmented views among the participant organizations and inefficiency of its functions.

IV.3.2.2.5. The Islamic Community in Germany (IGD e.V.)

The IGD was established in 1982 by Sa'id Ramadan who is Hassan al-Banna's son-in-low and the father of Tariq Ramadan (Steinberg, 2010: 462). It is mainly composed of immigrant Muslims from the Arabic countries. The organization states that its activities and purposes are fully compatible with the German constitution and declares its understanding of Islam as follows:

> "for a peaceful coexistence of all people in Germany, whether Christians, Jews, Muslims or other / nonbelievers; for the freedom of the individual to respect the Basic Law; for a more just society can be realized even in the women; against violence, oppression and coercion in any form; against extremism and religious fanaticism." (IGD, 2014)

Representatives of the IGD emphasize the distinction between their activities and radicalism especially in the case of radical recruitments. After the Paris attack, its chairmen Samir Farah stated that "this appalling bloody attack on the offices of a newspaper is a heinous and barbaric terrorist attack that cannot be justified under any circumstances with religion" (IGD, 2015).

Contrary to such favourable declarations, the BAMF report (2010: 180) states that "the IGD [is] suspected by the German security to be the German wing of the Muslim Brotherhood movement." According to the report of the BfV, the BMI (2015) states the aim of the organization as follows: "The IGD relies on a strategy – based on the [Muslim Brotherhood] ideology – which consists of efforts to influence politics and society to obtain the freedom necessary for their adherents to live their lives in accordance with the Koran and the Sunna." However, the BfV report implies that the Muslim Brotherhood is based on Islamist ideology and therefore the IGD

pursues its political understanding of Islam in Germany through its mosques and schools.

It is often associated with the doctrine of *Salafi* Islam which was gradually understood in Germany. The movement's activities have been scrutinized since the 1980s, but the German governments' deal with this movement dates back to the 2000s. Guido Steinberg (2013: 90), in his interview with a senior German diplomat, mentions the reason behind this late awareness about their political Islam as follows:

> "…policymakers did not grasp the relevance of the Islamist movement because religion was widely considered to be an important factor for underdevelopment and the Islamists seemed backward-oriented while the dictatorships in the Middle East were seen as modernizing elements."

The BfV strictly scrutinized the relationship between the IGD and the Muslim Brotherhood after 9/11 and specified that there are direct relations between organized Islam in Germany and its connection with the radical Islamic movements in the Middle East (ibid). The BfV has not clearly stated specific claims attributed to the activities of the IGD but it warns that a radical Islam is more likely cultivated within its networks because of its direct connections with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, the debates about the activities of the IGD revealed in the case of its participation in the DIK which was officially initiated by the German government and the IGD became partner through the ZMD.

IV.3.2.2.6. The Islamic Centre Hamburg (IZH e.V.)

The IZH (*Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg e.V.*) is another active Muslim organization under the ZMD established in 1953 in Hamburg as an Iranian club to build a mosque, and transformed into a centre in 1961 (IZH, 2012). It is directly sponsored by the Iranian government. Its publications played a significant role in bringing about the political awareness of the Iranian people in Europe on behalf of the Iranian revolution in 1979.

The chairman appointed to the IZH must be a wise person and approved by the Iranian supreme leader. For this reason, the chairmen of the IZH have played a significant role in the perception of its mission in Germany. One of its prominent chairmen is the former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami who served from 1978 to 1980. During the Iranian Revolution, Khatami represented the new regime in Europe through the activities of the IZH which contributed to his fame in Iran and Europe (BBC, 2005).

The organization represents the official views of the Islamic Republic of Iran and promotes its political interests making it their most important representative body after the Iranian embassy in Germany. In this sense, the BfV report (BMI, 2008: 255) points out that the IZH acts as a religious organization towards the outside world, but in reality it is a promoter of the "Shiite teachings of Iranian brand" and one of "the most active centers of Iranian propaganda in Europe", that is correspondingly the "'subtle propagation' of an Islamic theocratic State after Iranian example".

The organization gives priority to youth education. The BAMF report (2009: 205) mentions that "the group of Iranian migrants possess by far the highest educational level. A major proportion of Muslims and members of other religions from Iran are qualified to enter higher education." After German authorities announced the restrictions on Saudi-funded academies, schools and mosques as a result of the BfV reports, the activities of the IZH are considered as a balance and are supposed to be supported by the German authorities.

In 2004 the Ayatollah Husseini Ghaemmaghami, considered a reformist Iranian scholar, became the chairman of the IZH. He contributes to the "development of a constructive dialogue with other religious, cultural and socio-political groups in Germany and Europe" (IZH, 2014). He often emphasizes the compatibility of their activities with the German constitution and most Germans think he is a reformist Muslim scholar in the country. During his time, the IZH contributed to multi-faith

dialogue and with his publications he calls Muslims to develop Islam in the German cultural context.

Since 2009, Ayatollah Reza Ramezani has been the chairman of the IZH. He described his role as the official representative of the Iranian government. The IZH was represented through ZMD in the DIK. It is the second largest state sponsored organization in Germany after the DITIB. Although the organization declares its mission is to represent Muslims without sectarian ambitions in the German context, it increases its influence through promoting the official views of the Iran Republic and Iranian Shiism over the Shiite communities mainly in Germany but also in Europe.

IV.3.2.2.7. The Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (IRD e.V.): The Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG e.V.)

The IRD as an umbrella organization was established in 1986. It has approximately 60,000 members. The largest member organization of the IRD is the IGMG which represents 323 mosques and more than 50,000 members (IGMG, 2015). The IRD is basically considered the umbrella organization of the IGMG.

Besides the IGMG, the IRD represents 35 minor associations and the Islamic Community of Bosnians (*Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland e.V.*, IGBD) the second largest organization, composed of 61 mosques communities. Until 2010, both the ZMD and the IRD included the IGBD, but currently it is not a member of the ZMD (Rosenow-Williams, 2012: 87).

As an autonomous Islamic Religious Community in Germany, the IRD declares its commitment to the Constitution and secular and pluralistic society structure. The primary aim of the organization is stated as seeking "recognition as a public corporation for Islam in Germany and has equality with the two Christian churches and the Greek Orthodox Church" (IRD, 2015). However, the

representatives of the organization often complain about discrimination towards the Muslim community in the country.

The IGMG has been evaluated since 1970s in line with the *Milli Görüş*[35] (National Vision) movement headed by Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey. It was established as a branch of the Turkish Union of Europe in 1976 and renamed the Islamic Union of Europe in 1983 and founded in the current form in 1995.

The evolution of the community was intertwined with political developments in Turkey. Its power reached a peak when the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party) formed a short-lived coalition government in Turkey between 1996 and 1997. The slogan of the party was "fair order" (*adil düzen*) in distribution of household income and economic resources in Turkey. Moreover, the party emphasized the unity among the Muslim countries through alliances against Western domination in the world politics.

After the Turkish Constitutional Court banned the Welfare Party on the grounds of its violation of the Constitution in 1998, the IGMG also started to be scrutinized in Germany. The BfV accuses the IGMG of having close links with the Milli Görüş in Turkey. Likewise, the BMI report (1999) points out that the characteristic of the Milli Görüş movement rejects Western democracies and promotes an anti-democratic and anti-secular form. In addition, the report explains the official view about the IGMG as follows:

> "IGMG has been under the observation for years by the German state because of its Islamist and antidemocratic goals and activities. IGMG strives

[35] The parties established by the former Prime Minister of Turkey Necmettin Erbakan representing the *Milli Görüş* (National Vision) are as follows: The *Milli Nizam Partisi* (National Order Party): 1970-1971, the *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party): 1974-1980, the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party): 1983-1998, the *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party): 1998- 2001, the *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party): (2001-present). The Turkish Constitutional Court consecutively banned these parties, except the *Saadet Partisi*, on the grounds of the violation of the Article 14 of the Turkish Constitution: "None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the state under the control of an individual or a group of people." (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey)

> to achieve the dominance of its Islamist doctrine over other religious communities, a goal that runs counter the freedom of religious expression granted by Germany's Basic Law." (quoted in Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2013: 139)

The IGMG often emphasizes that all its activities are compatible with the German constitution and therefore shows reactions to the allegations of corruption raised against its representatives by the German authorities. The current official view of the German authorities about the IGMG is stated in the BMI report (2015: 25) as follows:

> "IGMG is also affiliated with the Milli Görüş movement. Information available to security agencies proves that the IGMG still has links with some parts of the Milli Görüş movement. At the same time, it was established that the IGMG's ties with extremism are becoming weaker throughout Germany, although this varies in intensity."

The BfV regards the IGMG as anti-constitutional by assuming that it has promoted Islamist ideology for some years. The BAMF report's (2010: 177) statement attributed to the Islamist link of the IGMG is remarkable: "Muslim organisations like Milli Görüş or the Caliphate State of Cemaleddin Kaplan were seen as perfect examples of political Islam, without real differentiation between the two." In addition, the representatives of the IGMG are accused of tax evasion since 2009 and therefore its membership of the IRD was suspended from the DIK.

IV.3.2.3. A Comparison of Muslim Organizations in Great Britain and Germany

The Muslim organizations primarily act as interlocutors between Muslims and governments in order to promote the interests of their members. They have increasingly gained importance in communication with the official authorities seeking the integration of Muslim communities in both Great Britain and Germany.

In this sense, they are successful in representing the problems and demands of Muslims to the political agenda in both countries.

The search on the Muslim organizations of both countries indicated that there is a high degree of diversification among them and they pursue different ideological interests stemming from the cultural and ethnic community characteristics. This situation deprives the Muslim organizations of promoting sufficient representation capable of communication with the state.

It is inferred from the analysis of the Muslim organizations that the essential instruments for promoting organizational views are the religious centres, namely mosques and related foundations at the local level. In that regard, an organization that has the capacity to control such instruments has greater influence in the Muslim community in presenting their messages. Furthermore, these organizations have generally tended to adhere to their own discourse which might be seen as the essential arguments which lead to their distinguished positions in their respective societies.

In both countries, it is revealed from the official reports that some of these organizations have non-transparent organizational structures and membership relations. They are sometimes accused of being involved in illegal activities and thus they are often viewed with suspicion. Moreover, the strong influence of foreign governments on certain groups further fuels scepticism about their ultimate goals, most importantly in the eyes of the state.

In the British context, there is a liberal view assuming that religious communities can communicate with the state without an intermediary institution. For this reason, each Muslim organization directly contacts the state for its community interests. However, the British government implements a balance of engagement policy in relations with the Muslim organizations in order to encourage their self-control in the society.

In the German context, the picture is more complex because the corporatist view requests the Muslim organizations to constitute umbrella organizations. Although the individual German states perform their respective policies in relations with the Muslim communities, the German government requests a unified representation among them in communication with the state in order to ultimately achieve the recognition of Islam as a nationwide official religion.

There is a long-standing power struggle between the umbrella organizations in Germany because each one is pursuing different interests. The largest Islamic organizations in Germany indicate that diversity and ideological influence through membership directly affect the establishment of the umbrella organizations. Correspondingly, competition between the Muslim organizations causes a short-lived cooperation among them in elevating the umbrella organizations to the state level, and eventually nation-wide. In addition, it is difficult to determine whether these organizations pursue religious activities, corporation with the state for the sake of the eventual recognition of Islam as an official religion or other interests in their representation.

Besides, Muslims who are considered as the supporters of the established organizations that failed to change the negative perceptions about the Muslim community in Britain and Germany are seen by some as the source of problem in the achievement of a common voice for the Muslim community as a whole whereas those recently established nascent organizations are more likely to be viewed as organizations with legitimate prospects for pursuing the integration of Muslims into the host societies.

The search on the Muslim organizations indicates that since Islam is an indispensable part of both Britain and Germany, the role of the Muslim organizations has gradually contributed to this reality. Nevertheless, the current structures of these organizations have failed to remove the existing obstacles for the peaceful integration of their Muslim followers in both countries. Therefore, their contribution to the development of Euro-Islam has been, unfortunately, insufficient.

CONCLUSION

This study investigates the integration of Muslims in Europe, in particular the policies of Great Britain and Germany towards immigrant Muslims as two models of multiculturalism. Europeans' attempts to integrate Muslims in Europe fall into two categories: assimilation and multiculturalism. There is a lack of consensus on policy implementations towards immigrant Muslims at the EU level, while each country implements its national integration policies ranging from assimilation to multiculturalism. The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between the controversies regarding policies of multiculturalism and the rising trend of Islamophobia by focusing on the integration processes of Muslim immigrants in Great Britain and Germany, particularly in the post-9/11 era. This study argues that anti-Muslim attitudes undermined the notion of peaceful coexistence of people from different cultural backgrounds in both countries.

The implementations of immigration policy in Great Britain and Germany have always been represented by a sort of multiculturalism, irrespective of their official recognition of multiculturalist policies. In Great Britain, multiculturalism is an official policy and stated as the politics of recognition of differences in the society, while in Germany, although not officially stated, the country's long term implementation of foreigners policy through the evolution of citizenship laws is accepted as multiculturalism.

Both countries have significant histories of immigration after the WWII because of the need to fill worker shortages to build their economic infrastructures. The immigrants were primarily from the Muslim countries. They were treated as guest workers during the 1960s and 1970s and their religious identity was not a source of consideration. Since the 1980s, dramatic changes in world politics coupled with the fact that Muslims reached significant numbers in Europe and did not return to their homeland, has caused their presence to come to the forefront and their religious identity to be questioned tediously. During the 1990s, the same perception

increased gradually and reached its peak with the 9/11 events in the USA and the consecutive terrorist attacks in Europe.

The Europeans' initiatives to integrate Muslims in Europe have been the subject of discussions in academic and political environments. Since Muslims are ethnically, linguistically and culturally diverse in Europe, the common dominator among them is their religious identity. The association of Islam with terrorism after the 9/11 attacks cultivated exclusivist attitudes towards Muslims in the western societies. This situation set the groundwork for a politically constructed phenomenon: Islamophobia. Although systematic researches concerning this phenomenon have been emerging recently, the popular meanings of the term were shaped through media ushered in by political discourses. However, there is a consensus on the general definition of the term as hostility towards Muslims and thus, fear or dislike of all or most Muslims and Islam resulting in the stigmatization, marginalization and exclusion of Muslims and Islam through anti-Muslim/Islam discourses.

In the post-9/11 era, the European Muslims have been scrutinized in terms of their increasing presence and appearance in the European public sphere. While the European politicians are aware of the problems regarding the integration of immigrant Muslims at the national level, the EU could not produce a solution to these problems. Apparently, Europeans have almost established security measures towards the so-called Islamic terrorism since their main concerns have been shaped by the fear of Islam and Muslims that assumed to promote radicalism and extremism within the European societies.

Europeans' exclusivist treatment of Muslims has come to the fore in almost all political discourses over the last decade. Questions about the immigrant Muslims and their religious identity have been dealt with by the European states, particularly since 9/11. In this sense, some of the main concerns of the European states have focused on the essence of Islam and its political interpretation in the Muslim majority countries with respect to radical *Salafi* and *Wahhabi* forms of Islamic thought. These

radical forms are assumed to be the source of inspiration for the European Muslims and underlain the existing problems about the integration of Muslims in Europe.

The over-generalizations and stereotypical approaches and discourses of the ultra-right parties in some European countries towards Islam and Muslims exacerbate the Islamophobic sentiments within the European societies. This has constituted a misperception about Muslims and Islam since these discourses associate Islam with terrorism. They intend to exclude Muslims from the mainstream European societies by claiming that Islam represents a political threat for the European societies as an expanding religion enabling extremism and violence in the continent as a whole. Mainstream politicians also contributed to this misperception vis-à-vis the increasing support for the ultra-right parties.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric more or less overlaps with anti-Muslim rhetoric that makes Islamophobia commonplace in today's European public. There is a backlash against multiculturalism in Europe that coincides with the rise of Islamophobic attitudes. Discourses regarding the problems of integration of Muslims in Europe more than likely evoke Islamophobic sentiments, which are automatically translated into the exclusion of Muslims in European societies. Thus, this study reveals that there is a strong relation between the policies of multiculturalism and the rise of Islamophobia in Europe with references to the British and German cases.

The incumbent prime ministers of both countries stated that multiculturalism failed to integrate Muslim communities into their host societies and addressed the issues related to Muslim communities for being the source of the current problems. They were reluctant to mention that the source of the problems is also the source of the Islamophobia. It means that when they stated the failure of multiculturalism, they justified the increase of Islamophobia. However, they are unwilling to address the source of the problem out of the Muslim communities.

In both countries, Muslim communities are under attack in the official discourses for being sources of radicalism, extremism and terrorism within their host societies. Although the European leaders consecutively declared the failure of

multicultural policies in their societies by emphasizing radical and extreme tendencies within the Muslim communities, they did not offer any alternative in defining the current status of integration approaches towards the Muslim immigrants. The relation between the policies of multiculturalism and the rise of Islamophobia reveals that the boundaries of current policies of integration towards Muslim minorities in European societies became ambiguous.

Both Merkel and Cameron blamed multiculturalism for the rise of Islamic extremism and emphasized that Muslims did not embrace British and German values, and therefore, they declared the current status of multiculturalism as a failure. Their statements show that they could not be successful in integrating Muslims into the mainstream society by referencing radicalism, extremism and terrorism within Muslim communities. However, they did not mention the rise of Islamophobia. Islamophobia is accepted as a given in their discourses in which there is no mention that the anti-Muslim attitudes played a role in the failure of multiculturalism. The success of multiculturalism would be the integration of Muslims into the British and German societies. Their discourses imply that responsibility for everything which has led to the failure of multiculturalism belongs to the Muslim community. It seems as if the Europeans have no responsibility in this failure.

When the Prime Ministers David Cameron and Angela Merkel declared the failure of multiculturalism in their countries, their statements actually included many aspects of Islamophobia: radicalism, extremism and terrorism supposedly undertaken by European Muslims. They accused the Muslim immigrant communities of being responsible for the failure of multiculturalism. Cameron and Merkel did not mention the Europeans' responsibility in this process. In other words, European leaders did not mention that the reasons for the failure of multiculturalism also include the Islamophobic attitudes of Europeans towards immigrant Muslims. They imply that immigrant Muslims and their religious identity are the main obstacle to integration. That is the assumed reason of Muslims not integrating into the European societies. However, their discourses revealed the Europeans' fear that Muslims would likely not be integrated in the foreseeable future. When they declared the failure of

multiculturalism, they did not offer an alternative to the current policies. Thus, if the policy of multiculturalism has failed in both countries, offering an alternative policy for integration of Muslim minorities in these countries is required because there is a lack of policy regarding the integration of Muslim immigrants.

Pluralism and tolerance are the two inseparable tenets of European liberal democracies. Thereby, Europeans' treatment of immigrant Muslims is a litmus test for their consolidated democracies. In order to accommodate Muslims in Europe, the European states need to come up with a reasonable solution for the achievement of the peaceful coexistence of European Muslims and non-Muslims in accordance with these tenets.

In reality, there is no clear route for the European Muslims to follow. The overall European approaches indicate that they should either be assimilated into European societies or excluded. Europeans are proud of their democratic reputation throughout the world. If they promote democracy and pluralism, respect for human rights and the rule of law, then immigrant Muslims are a litmus test for their democratic tolerance. One may claim that tolerance can only be achieved in a democratic environment, but it must be described that how tolerance can work for people ascribing to different religious identities.

In parallel to the discourse of the failure of multiculturalism, some European Muslim scholars discuss the European Islam as a geographically adapted form of Islam inspired by the interpretations of Islam in different geographies over centuries. Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan are the two most prominent Muslim scholars in Europe representing two views of the Euro-Islam discourse. In general, their ideas oscillate between relatively two opposite poles, in particular their views of reforming in Islam, including the Qur'anic text.

Both Tibi and Ramadan more or less reveal the boundaries of Euro-Islam in their discourses: Tibi coined the term as a form of Islam that is compatible with the secular notions of European societies, which is deemed to be suitable in the secular

circles. In contrast, Ramadan represents a traditional form of Muslim identity that is more acceptable for devout European Muslims.

However, their views do share some common ground. Their common understandings of Euro-Islam proscribe that European Muslims have to obey the legal order in the country they live, while rejecting extremism and radicalism, and to articulate favourable attitudes in the society and contribute to it as much as the native people. They recognize a reasonable form of moderate Islam and reject all extremist tendencies. Hence, this moderate Islam means that Muslims have both European and Islamic identities that do not necessarily contradict each other. Both Tibi and Ramadan call for a new interpretation of Islamic sources in the European cultural context in order to prevent confrontational encounters between the identities, the religious notions and the secular legal systems in Europe. In this regard, the Muslim authorities in Europe have a significant role in this interpretation in order to exclude radical and traditional understandings from the Muslims' agenda.

Both scholars' common understandings of Euro-Islam constitute several aspects of this phenomenon in order to meet the demands of both European Muslims and non-Muslims. In this regard, both sides are initially invited to articulate favourable approaches to overcome the existing obstacles for the mutual recognition of their expectations. For this purpose, they should articulate their respective approaches which stipulate the fulfilment of a set of requirements satisfying the needs of both sides.

The fulfilment of the following requirements, inferred from the intellectual discourses and overall assessment of this study, can contribute to the role of European Muslims and their organizations for the advancement of Euro-Islam as a new paradigm in order to meet the expectations of both European Muslims and non-Muslims.

1. Recognizing democracy, rule of law and human rights while expressing loyalty to the existing legal system of the country they inhabit.

2. Supporting cultural integration through organizational activities including religious education and properly familiarizing fellow Muslims with the existing customs and norms of the host society.

3. Accepting separation of religion from politics and public affairs and seeking official dialogue to remove restrictions on religious practices, rituals and symbols of Muslims and hence, seeking public cooperation where it is possible.

4. Improving toleration based on human rights through inter-faith dialogue for expression of Muslims' concerns and vulnerabilities including theological grounds to prevent prejudices, misperceptions and discriminations towards Muslim community.

5. Declaring rejection of and cooperation against all forms of violent extremism and attitudes that encourage Europeans' fears in the form of Islamophobia.

6. Developing discourse compatible with freedom of religion to articulate equal rights as the principle of democratic pluralism and contributing to such discourse with those Europeans who converted to Islam.

7. Muslim organizations are principally requested to cooperate with the host state for education of imams in Europe and reduce foreign country influence.

8. Promoting strong umbrella organization(s) to increase functional representation at both national and European levels.

The discourses of both scholars function as an important analytical guide to understanding whether the Muslim organizations in Great Britain and Germany pursue common grounds on behalf of cultivating the European Islam through their organizational activities and purposes. The government approaches towards these organizations were analysed through official statements and reports and think-tank reports which are either for or against the purposes of the Muslim organizations.

In general, the official views of both countries towards Muslim organizations encourage them as the interlocutors between the Muslim community, society and government. Britain promotes a liberal view towards Muslim organizations for maintaining a balance of engagement among them, whereas Germany promotes a corporatist view encouraging Muslim communities for the institutionalization of public corporation with the state as an officially recognized group. Germany requests that Muslim communities be organized as a united group and refrain from representation in divisive forms.

In the case of Muslim organizations in both Great Britain and Germany, the official discourses are basically favourable about their roles when they represent constructive attitudes in the societies in which they reside. Nevertheless, the general perception of European societies about their mission remains suspicious since they are accused of being a center for radical and terrorist recruitment.

In Great Britain, although the government criticizes their statements, activities and links with radical groups, directly targeting them in some cases, the general approaches of the governmental reports on Muslim organizations examined in this study have a favourable attitude towards their organizational purposes. The wording of the reports contains positive connotations towards the perception of the Muslim organizations in the British society. In this regard, the reports prepared by the DCLG about Muslim communities represent how the aims of the Muslim organizations are regarded as compatible with the government expectations. However, they deliver reservations concerning the incompatibility between their discourses and practices over the past decade.

The British government actually pursues a good relationship with the Muslim organizations and encourages them to participate not only in community related problems, but in all aspects of society. The government determines the priorities of the balance of engagement through the reports of the DCLG so as to encourage them to develop a multi-faith dialogue. The language of these reports has

a significant influence on perceptions of the Muslim organizations in the British society.

On the other hand, the German state promotes religious pluralism and recognizes public corporation with the religious communities, so as to have official status under the principles of religious neutrality. In this regard, the Roman Catholic Church, the Protestant Church and the Jewish community are principally granted official religious status that confers upon them the right to collect religious taxes from their members for religious education and other religious services. These are well-organized religious communities in the country and therefore, they have been able to achieve a unified representation in public corporation. However, the Muslim community has not yet completed its institutionalization process in order to achieve an organized form of representation of Muslims in the country. There are hopeful expectations for German Muslims in satisfying the requirements for organizational representation since the recent initiatives conferred on Islam an official religious status in some individual German states.

The Muslim organizations are actually dominated by older generation Muslims with third generation younger European Muslims paying little attention to these organizations. This leads young Muslims to organize mainly through social media which offers them the opportunity to develop their individual understandings of Islam. This signals a decline of the classical understanding of organizations among Muslims which requires a new deal with the new generation. This situation challenges the governments' initiatives to communicate and cooperate with Muslims in a traditional manner.

Since globalization increases individualization among young European Muslims and leads them to cultivate new kinds of networks and communication channels, they have opportunities to improve their understanding of Islam that may fall beyond their genuine community. Therefore, traditional ways of connecting people and promoting unified notions of religious teaching are losing their capacity to control young people in the new era. This situation represents a significant

obstacle to the institutionalization of Muslim communities in Europe. It also indicates how coping with the current problems of radicalization among young European Muslims through the traditional way of cooperation between governments and the Muslim organizations is increasingly difficult.

Although the Muslim organizations are the only instrument in reaching Muslims and representing them in the country that they live, their current structures do not have sufficient capability to satisfy the expectations of European governments since institutionalization is growing weaker among young European Muslims. However, the Muslim organizations represent a different set of ideologies and interests because of the high level of diversifications among them. Thus, they are reluctant to pursue an umbrella organization as a representative body bringing together all Muslims, first at the national then the European level. For this reason, the current initiatives on Euro-Islam through organizational contributions are far from promising a full-fledged solution to the problems of integration of Muslims in Europe.

Euro-Islam is an under-researched phenomenon because it is a nascent initiative of the European Muslim intellectuals who have found common ground in their discussions of integration of the immigrant Muslims in Europe. In fact, there is not a clear consensus on the definition of Euro-Islam to come up with a full-fledged roadmap capable of achieving positive outcomes for the sake of peaceful co-existence of European Muslim communities and host societies.

The intellectual discussions surrounding the concept of Euro-Islam indicate that the European Muslim communities need to transform the existing inward-looking form of their organizations by making them more inclusive of the younger generations and improving their institutionalization capability. When these organizations were established, the European Muslim communities had almost nothing in common with their European host societies, but today there is much in common. This means that the future Muslim communities in Europe will likely be reasonably different than today's communities.

For peaceful resolution of the current problems regarding the integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe and the advancement of Euro-Islam in defining the status of the European Muslims in the future, some of the points this study suggests are as follows:

Firstly, European states can recognize Islamophobic messages in mass media and political discourses as crimes against human rights. This should be accompanied by the classification of them in a distinct category outside of the current forms of discriminations and other phobias within the legal order. The EU can take the initial step by forbidding Islamophobia (anti-Muslim/Islam) directly through legislations and the member states can follow suit. In this case, procedures concerning anti-Semitism can be a guide. Anti-Islamism can be declared illegal, in the same way that anti-Semitism is declared illegal, at the EU and the national levels.

Secondly, Muslims need to be recognized as minorities in European countries where religious groups are recognized as minorities. For instance, in the UK, Jews and Sikhs are recognized as the religious and ethnic minorities. This recognition can be extended for religious groups irrespective of their ethnicity and religion overlap as in the cases of Jews and Sikhs.

Thirdly, the language which is used to describe radicalism and terrorism needs to be revised making a clear distinction between Islam/Muslims and terrorism/terrorists and not to equate them by using the derogatory term of Islamic terrorism.

Fourthly, European Muslim intellectuals should undertake the initial responsibility to develop and make Euro-Islam a clearer concept in explaining the vulnerabilities of all European Muslims and promote it as a European form of Islam that is embellished with European culture. Muslim leaders should accept that, in the case of unintended conflicts between European and Islamic values, a new form of interpretation of religious sources in the European context is required. This is an effective way to make the universal principles of Islam meet the needs of European

Muslims by taking into consideration the requirements of existing social, economic and political conditions of the country in which they live.

Fifthly, the Muslim organizations in Europe should reduce foreign influence in their activities, especially in the case of home-grown imams. European Muslim individuals need to follow a discourse that is primarily developed by religious leaders, intellectuals and scholars who can more effectively improve Euro-Islam than the current status of the Muslim organizations.

Sixthly, in search of a comprehensive European Islam, European Muslims need to state their vulnerabilities with a strong voice encompassing all of the diversity among them in the form of unity in diversity within the European polity. If European leaders seek an alternative route capable of integrating Muslims into their societies, they should recognize that Islam is a persistent feature of European culture and Muslims are an integral part of the European societies. They must do what is necessary to prevent stigmatization, marginalization and exclusion of Muslims.

To sum up, promoting multiculturalism was previously a source of pride for Europeans as a way to promote social unity and to accommodate cultural diversity. In the new era, European states have generally criticized multicultural policies without offering any alternative. Thus, there is a gap in the integration policies concerning immigrant minorities in Europe. In the past, Muslim immigrants were few in number and were easy to manage, but in recent decades the situation has become chaotic for Europeans since Muslims have grown in number. The recent developments in the immigrant debate have compounded this problem. There is not a comprehensively evaluated method for Europeans to deal with this problem, now or in the foreseeable future. Immigrants have become a very extensive problem for Europeans in areas ranging from unemployment to education. Europeans see immigrant Muslims as an internal threat with Islam as an expanding religion in Europe that has external dimensions. Europeans need a new deal for the integration of immigrant Muslims since the problems have already grown beyond national boundaries and spread to the European continent as a whole. These problems have

worsened with the recent immigrant/refugee crisis from Syria to Europe, which gained impetus with the Arab spring. These dramatic developments constitute much material for the new research in this realm.

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