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ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CYPRUS ISSUE:
A NEOREALIST VIEW

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ABSTRACT

Cyprus has seriously been on the agenda of world politics ever since the start of a violent dispute between the two communities (Turkish and Greek Cypriots) broke out in December 1963. The island has always had one foot inside Europe throughout the history. However, when the Greek Cypriot administered Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union (EU) on May 1st 2004, self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was left out of the deal. Acquis communautaire has been suspended in the North ever since, even though it is not considered as an external border of the EU. In light of these developments, this thesis focused on the role and responsibilities of the EU in this protracted conflict with a neorealist perspective on how the other regional powers reacted to the EU's enlargement towards the Eastern Mediterranean and the conflict of interests over Cyprus.Consequently, it was found out that the EU has been insufficient in providing a faster settlement on the island. Occasionally,the EU has provided Turkish Cypriots with social and economic assistance projects after the positive reaction to the Annan Plan but these projects fell short because of political reasons. Furthermore, the EU accession gave Cyprus powers beyond its size and allowed it to influence politics in the region more than before, as well as changing the dynamics in the balance of power in the region on a greater scale.

Keywords: Cyprus Conflict, Turkish Cypriots, EU Enlargement, Neorealism.

ÖZET

Kıbrıs, Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rum toplumları arasında Aralık 1963'te baş gösteren toplumlararası çatışmadan bu yana dünya siyaseti gündeminde ciddi bir şekilde kendine yer bulmuştur. Tarih boyunca adanın bir ayağı hep Avrupa'nın içinde olmuştur. Fakat Kıbrıslı Rumlar tarafından yönetilen Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti 2004'te Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyesi olurken Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (KKTC) bu anlaşmanın dışında kalmıştır. O tarihten itibaren adanın güneyinde uygulanan AB müktesebatı, coğrafik olarak AB'nin dışında sayılmamasına rağmen kuzeyde askıya alınmış bulunmaktadır. Bu gelişmeler ışığında, bu tez, AB'nin Kıbrıs sorunundaki rolü ve sorumluluklarına, neorealist bir bakış açısıyla diğer bölgesel güçlerin AB'nin Doğu Akdeniz bölgesine genişlemesine verdikleri tepkiye, ve Kıbrıs üzerindeki çıkar çatışmalarına odaklanmıştır.Sonuç olarak Avrupa Birliği'nin Kıbrıs'ta çözümü hızlandıracak bir katkı sağlayamadığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Annan Planı'na verilen olumlu tepki sonucunda Kıbrıslı Türkler'e sağlanan ekonomik ve sosyal yardım projeleri siyasi sebeplerden dolayı yetersiz kalmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra, AB üyeliği Kıbrıslı Rum yönetimindeki Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ne boyundan büyük güçler vererek bölge siyasetinde eskiden olduğundan daha fazla söz sahibi olmasına yol açmıştır ve bölgedeki güç dengesi dinamiklerini büyük ölçüde değiştirmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs Sorunu, Kıbrıslı Türkler, AB genişlemesi, Neorealism.

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to all who suffered in relentless wars and conflicts all around the world. I would be the happiest person on the planet if this work could provide its field with the slightest of contributions and make the world a better place to live.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

EC: European Community

EOKA: Ethniki Organisos Kyprion Agonistos (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)

EU: European Union

IR: International Relations

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Non-governmental Organization

RRF: Rapid Reaction Force

TMT: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Resistance Organization)

TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WW1: World War 1

WW2: World War 2

INTRODUCTION

The European Union has been mostly reputable for and credited with bringing peace and democracy to Europe which had been devastated by destructive wars. This was a chance for the Unionto prove itself to the people of Europe from its foundation in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community to early 1990s. The end of the Cold War created a political environment where the EU could promote peace and democracy outside Western Europe as well. This meant an enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. Cyprus was a part of that group who became members of the EU in 2004. However, something was wrong with the Mediterranean island, Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities has been divided by a conflict since the break-up of the mutually founded Republic of Cyprus in 1963. The Republic of Cyprus arguably continued its existence, however there was a new de facto state called "the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", established in 1983, which is only formally recognized by Turkey up to this date.[1]

Negotiations between the two communities have been continuing since 1968 with ups and downs in certain periods (Dodd, 2010:92). Different political leaders had different impacts on the negotiations with their personalities and worldviews. One of the most notable leaders was Rauf Denktaş[2], who was a hardline politician always advocating the Turkish Cypriots' right of self-determination and allegience towards motherland Turkey, which was one of the guarantors, along with Greece and Great Britain, of the Republic of Cyprus. He had arguably been the most effective politician in the Cyprus Issue since the beginning of the conflict until the 2005 presidential elections in the TRNC, in which the people this time clearly calledfor the solution of the dispute and went for a more moderate leader, Mehmet Ali Talat.This call for solution was in great part thanks to the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004. The negotiation process has been run by the United Nations and the solution criteria[3]

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[1]United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 considers the declaration of independence legally invalid.

[2] Rauf Denktaş (27 January 1924 – 13 January 2012) was first president of the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established in 1983.

[3] United Nations calls for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution.

set by it, so there has always been an enthusiasm for solution especially in the isolated Turkish Cypriot community, but knowing that the solution will carry them into the European Union is an all-together different issue. Due to this reason, this thesis will be mainly focusing on the role of the European Union in the conflict and its impact on the negotiations. Therefore, the thesis will be conducted as a case study, taking a more in-depth approach to a particular issue rather than looking at it on a wider sense. This will allow the testing of narrowed down hypotheses to see whether it is plausible when put into practice, and will seek to clear the way for other ideas to elaborate the topic even further.

The main argument here is that the EU missed a historical chance in bringing a solution to the island through membership perspective to the Republic of Cyprus, which has been governed solely by the Greek Cypriots since 1964, thus the capacity of the EU to support and catalyze a solution on the island is debatable. Questions arise whether the EU has the capabilities, or whether it is sufficiently willing, to provide a complementary basis in support of the criteria set by the UN for a comprehensive solution. The EU could have very much accelerated the solution process by sticking to the Copenhagen Criteria's (1993) 'good neighbourly relations' clause and the lack of consent from the Turkish Cypriot community (Nugent, 1999), thus putting the solution as a pre-requisite to the membership.

The background of the relations clearly reveal the role of the EU. Relations with the European Economic Community first started out as an Association Partnership in 1972 which was mostly economically motivated. This made it clear that from the start, the European Union would be recognizing the Greek Cypriot dominated Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate authority on the island. The relations continued without the consent of the isolated Turkish Cypriot community from then on and turned into a full membership application on 4 July 1990 on economic, and more significantly, political grounds. The Turkish Cypriots were understandably disappointed:

> the Republic of Cyprus was founded on the existence of two separate and politically equal communities. Even if the Greek-Cypriot community has succeeded in assuming the mantle of "the Republic of Cyprus", that is not a consideration

that can now entitle it to represent the whole of Cyprus. Membership of the European Communities is unworkable in a divided island (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1990).

In spite of this resentment, the European Commission (1993) considered the application eligible and so the process has started:

Cyprus's geographical position, the deep-lying bonds which, for two thousand years, have located the island at the very fount of European culture and civilization, the intensity of the European influence apparent in the values shared by the people of Cyprus and in the conduct of the cultural, political, economic and social life of its citizens, the wealth of its contacts of every kind with the Community, all these confer on Cyprus, beyond all doubt, its European identity and character and confirm its vocation to belong to the Community.

This process led to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union in May 2004,[4] which will be further evaluated in this thesis study. However, just a month before, in April 2004, a referendum for the famous Annan Plan, which is considered to be the most comprehensive solution plan to this day, was rejected by the Greek Cypriots with a resounding margin of 76% against 24% yes votes(Greeknewsonline, 2004). Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, accepted the plan but their 65% yes vote was in vain, except for an appreciation from the United Nations Secretary-General Annan in a statement issued just after the referenda and congratulations for their desire to resolve the dispute from the rest of the world. The European Commission (2004) was another institution to congratulate, stating that it is ready to support the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community. In this thesis, the EU's attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot community after the referendum will also be evaluated to see whether they have been approached justly through instruments like the Financial Aid Programme or the Green Line Regulation.

After the internalization of the Cyprus Issue, the EU has been kept out of the negotiation table by Turkish Cypriot leadership (Akıncı, 2016). It does make sense because after the Greek Cypriot governed Republic of Cyprus became a member, the EU could no longer be impartial in its dealings with the problem. So the EU only provides technical assistance to the negotiations with the European Commission officials, with Pieter Van Nuffel being the most recent. His

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[4] Protocol No 10 of the accession treaty suspends the EU acquis on the northern part of the island.

duty is to provide legal and practical advices to the United Nations Good Offices Mission on European Union related matters in the negotiations with an aim to prepare and adapt the Turkish Cypriot community for a possible solution and European Union membership (SigmaLive, 2015). In any case, it is very much open to question whether the EU has a comprehensive and thorough strategy for the settlement of the dispute. This contested issue will also be further evaluated in the later parts of this study.

On the other hand, changing Turkish foreign policy preferences has also had a direct effect on the solution process. Traditionally, Ankara had been strict on the form of the solution to the conflict, until Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained victory in the December 2002 elections (Kyris, 2012: 90). The resilience brought by the AKP government to the Cyprus problem had been much in part to the candidacy status which was attained during the 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU. The new AKP government had been hoping to reinvigorate the European Union membership process which had been lost in the three years after the candidacy status was given. Nonetheless, certain circles were negative about these developments. Turkish Cypriot leader of the time, Denktaş, had accused the AKP government of "giving up Cyprus" for the European Union membership (Kızılyürek, 2009:96). This was the time when the competition between pro-EU and Eurosceptic groups of the Turkish Cypriot community was beginning to grow. Although the Turkish perception of the issue can be a whole different thesis topic, a short evaluation is necessary because of the status of Turkey for the Turkish Cypriot community as a guarantor state of the 1960-63 model Republic of Cyprus.

Lastly, although first in the layout, in the theoretical framework part, the main concepts and the theory which will be used in this thesis will be explained.Theories are needed to analyze how international relations work. In this part of the thesis, a compact definition of neorealism as a theory in IR discipline will be made, followed by how neorealism explains the way the EU behaved in the case of Cyprus. Furthermore, in the fifth chapter, the expansion of the European Union towards the Mediterranean will be assessed to see

whether it has provoked negative reactions from the regional powers who have been engaged in political activities in the area.Geopolitical importance of the area has made it the backyard of regional powers such as Turkey and Russia. Surrounded by all kinds of political activity, the Greek Cypriot administered Republic of Cyprus, by becoming an EU member, has strengthened its stance in the anarchic state system thus gained the upper hand in the negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus Issue.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ISSUE

This chapter focuses on the theory which will be used during the writing of this thesis. Neorealism will be highlighted with its main assumptions such as balance of power and state behaviours in the anarchic structure as it is the main ground which will be used in chapter five to explain the structural shift from bipolarity to unipolarity, and the regional power affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean specifically after the accession of Cyprus to the EU.

International Relations as a discipline was born right after World War 1, more specifically as an interdisciplinary discipline which includes many aspects such as politics, economy, law, human rights, et cetera. And to analyze the study of international relations, certain theories were developed, such as idealism and realism to name a few. Idealism was the prominent theory through the inter-war period, which emphasizes that cooperation between states is possible via international organizations and mutual understanding, as humans are inherently good and perfectible creatures. However the devastation brought by World War 2 was a major shock for the idealist assumptions and from then on, realism gained significance and dominance in how international politics was shaped, with the pioneering works of foremost political thinkers such as Hans J. Morgenthau and Edward H. Carr.[5]

Cold war years were the perfect environment for realism to transform and re-new itself. In this respect, contemporary realist theory is outlined by Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics(1979). Neorealism(or Structural Realism) is very much dependent on this study, as Kenneth Waltz has put a great deal of influence on International Relations theory. For Neorealists, human nature(as put forward by classical realists) does not have much to do with why states want power, it is the structure of the international system that forces them to seek power. Firstly, the structure of the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is absence of a higher authority to oversee how the states

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[5] Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace(1948) and Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations(1939) are the two most important studies starting the realist upheaval.

behave, which makes the system war-prone. To put it simple, wars occur because there is nothing there to stop them from occuring. Throughout the history, states have always had conflicting interests, and will continue to have conflicting interests. Sometimes these interests are so vital that there is simply no other choice but to go to war. States are rational actors, but sometimes their estimations are wrong and they make mistakes. Consequently, the international system becomes a self-help system. Actors always face the same objectives and their primary aim is to assure survival whatever the cost is, in other words, survival is the ultimate goal. In short, each state acts on its own without having any responsibility encumbered by any higher authority. This, in turn, forces the states to maximize their power relatively to the other because there is no guarantee that another state will not engage in a threatful behaviour. For great powers, this is more of a power maximization, however for smaller states, the issue is about survival. For Neorealists, states are functionally the same, that is why they ignore the differences in culture or the type of government. According to Mearsheimer, "Structural realists treat states as if they were black boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for the fact that some states are more or less powerful than others."(Mearsheimer: 2013, 78).Furthermore, states, especially the great powers, are the main actors in the system. Different than classical realists, they do accept that international organizations or transnational corporations are actors as well, although they have no real impact on how the international system works so they can be neglected.

Secondly, distribution of economic and military capabilitiesare the most important variables that constitute a balance of power between states, separating, even though they are still parts of the same system, each state according to how much power they have. Thebalance of powerconcept is one of the core assumptions of neorealist theory which argues that the states always seek to gain power against each other. According to Waltz, balance of power succeeds when"...two or more states coexist in a self-help system, one with no superior agent to come to the aid of states that may be weakening or to deny toany of them the use of whatever instruments they think will serve their purposes" (Waltz: 1979: 118). As there is no superior agent, states are forced to

take care of themselves and their self-interests, ultimately which is to survive. According to this logic,if state X, for example, starts to arm itself and increase its military capabilities, then state Y will also be seeking to increase its power either by arming itself with new weapons or form an alliance with another state, to balance state X (Bieler, n.d.). The 'pool table' image illustrates how these two assumptions work. The table consists of balls who are essentially the same (same shape and material), but their sizes are different. Smaller and medium sized balls often stay around the corners and usually do not move or interfere with the others. The largest balls, however, circulate on the whole table, interfering with the smaller balls, sometimes even knocking them over, thus controlling or deciding how the game is being played(Jakobsen, 2013). Another aspect of the balance of power concept in the anarchic system is that states usually avoid cooperating, or bandwagoning[6], because of the fear of 'relative gains'. They fear that the state that they are cooperating will get the bigger share thus alter the balance in its favour. This leads to a concept known as security dilemma. According to neorealist logic, its simple: the more a state is powerful, the less likely it is that other states will attack.This causes an unending competition for power, and states can never be sure of other states' intentions, thus cannot know whether its neighbors are pro status-quo or revisionist. In addition, a state may be pro status-quo today, or it may appear so, but this does not guarantee tomorrow. In the anarchic system with no ultimate authority, states will never be sure of others' intentions so they always assume and prepare for the worst case scenario. In essence, all the measures taken by a state to increase its own security decrease the other states' security. Self-interest always drives states for more security, which in turn ensures survival(Mearsheimer, 2013: 80-82).

In addition to the above-mentioned assumptions, there is the concept of polarity of the international system. Anarchic system changes in itself according to how many great powers it has. Whether a bipolar system (two great powers) or a multipolar system (three or more greatpowers) is more prone to war has been a debate between realists (Mearsheimer, 2013: 84). The world has seen

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[6] Bandwagoning: refers to forming alliances with the winning or "rising" state or states.

three types of systems since the start of the 20th century. Before the outbreak of the WW2, multipolarity was the order. WW2 produced other two great powers (USA and USSR) and the others were eliminated. According to this logic, the Cold War was not caused by anyone but was the natural result of bipolarity, because in a bipolar order each great power is the only security threat to the other so whatever their ideologies, cultures, or more generally preferences, they must balance against each other. After the end of the Cold War, it is widely argued that the system is unipolar(Donnelly, 2005: 36-38).

On the other hand, there is another disagreement in the realist realm about how much power states should aim for. This disagreement has separated realists into two: offensive realists and defensive realists. John J. Mearsheimer was the first to lay out offensive realism in his book *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*in 2001. While still supporting core neorealist assumptions, offensive realism argues that states always look to gain power and do so when it seems possible. States should look for the ultimate goal of global hegemony through constant power maximization as, according to Mearsheimer,primary motivation in great-power behaviour is survival. The anarchic international system causes the states to show aggressive behaviour to ensure survival (Mearsheimer, 2001: 30-32). In short, states know that the most effective way to ensure survival is to be the most powerful, and they do their utmost to stop possible competitors from developing. Defensive realists disagree however. They argue that it would be a strategic mistake to pursue hegemony, so they would not want to overexpand. They should not maximize their power, but work for what Waltz (1979: 40) called an 'appropriate amount of power'. Otherwise they would risk their own survival. Because when a state becomes too powerful, others state will look to balance it (Mearsheimer, 2013: 81-82).

2. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE

Even though its roots trace back to earlier times, it has been almost fifty years that the sides have been searching for a solution to this protracted conflict. Throughout the years, opportunities for settlement have been missed because of various reasons, may it be intransigence of the leaders, or the inconsistency of political environment for a solution. The whole history of negotiations may be best described as a "history of missed opportunities" (Kızılyürek, 2009:7). But before going in to the negotiations, it is best to take a look at the formation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the intercommunal violence between the two communities which broke out in December 1963and the developments afterwards.

2.1. 1960-1964: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

The period after the Second World War saw a great number of peoples seeking their rights of self-determination and freedom. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were part of that group who managed to gain their independence from their colonial power Great Britain on August 16, 1960. The total population consist of 77% Greek ethnic origin, %18 Turkish ethnic origin, while the remaining 5% are Maronites, Armenians, and other small ethnic groups[7] (Morelli, 2011:632). The big population gap between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots caused the Greek Cypriots to see the Turkish Cypriots as a minority group, which may be seen as one of the main reasons for the conflict (Tocci, 2002: 60).

Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus can also be seen as a means to remove the tension between the three NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) "allies", Turkey, Great Britain, and Greece. The continuation of the Republic of Cyprus was very much dependent on the good will of the two

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[7] Percentages are approximate.

communities and the guarantor states, especially Turkey and Greece. But nationalism was the popular mentality of the time and could be felt on the island indeed.For the Greek Cypriots, nationalism was a tool for unifying the island with Greece as a small part of the bigger plan, Megali Idea[8], and *Enosis*[9] was the only way out. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots were against *Enosis*. *Taksim*[10] was the main idea of the nationalist view, which came to fore after 1956. However, Cold war environment and the importance of NATO for the US at that point pushed the sides for a settlement to their bilateral problems and thus the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2009: 14-15). In two separate conferences in Zurich and London on February 11 and February 19 1959 respectively between Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain, progress was made and the path for the establishment was clear. In this respect, certain treaties were signed between the three guarantor states: The Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Allience, and the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. These treaties first and foremost established the Republic of Cyprus, ensured the renewed alliance and eased the tension especially between Turkey and Greece, ensured the protection of Cyprus against any threat from third states by granting Greece and Turkey the right to keep a small sized army[11] on the island, and satisfied the strategic interest of Great Britain in the region by providing two sovereign bases in Akrotiri and Dhekelia (Tamkoç, 1988: 56-59). On August 16 1960, the Republic of Cyprus was officially established and these were the basic documents which constituted it (Atun, 2001:35).

With the new constitution:

- A balanced power sharing and sovereignty between the two communities which make up the state was ensured.

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[8] Megali Idea: the Great Idea. It was firstly coined by Ionnis Kolettis in 1844. In a speech before the parliament, he stated that Greek Kingdom is the smallest and poorest part of the greater Greece. All the peoples living in places such as Constantinople or Crete, or any other Greek race or history associated lands are natives of the greater Greece (Clogg, 1992:48).

[9] Enosis: meaning union, union with Greece in this context.

[10] Taksim: meaning partition.

[11] The additional protocol to the Treaty of Guarantee states that: "The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men." (retrieved from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website)

- Any form of secession or unification with another state was strictly forbidden.

- To amend any article of the constitution, a consent must be reached not only between the two communities, but also between the guarantor states.

- President was always to be a Greek Cypriot elected by the Greek Cypriots, and the vice-president[12] was always to be a Turkish Cypriot elected by the Turkish Cypriots and they would both have veto right on decisions relating to foreign affairs, defence and security in the cabinet, which was one of the main points of contention between the leaders of the two communities.

- The cabinet would consist of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots.

- In the House of Representatives, the Greek Cypriots were represented by 35 members and the Turkish Cypriots by 15 members. They were elected on separate communal elections.

- And lastly, the Supreme Constitutional Court had consisted of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot judge, headed by a neutral president(Dodd, 2010: 42).

However, this "uneasy" partnership between the two communities was not to last long as the elites of both sides had not forgotten about their national objectives despite the establishment of the new independent state, mistrust was still the primary source of relationship between them. Especially President Makarios[13] was in the view that the current constitution was unworkable. He offered a thirteen-point amendment in November 1963 to the constitution which were (Ker-Lindsay, 2011:33):

1. The right of veto of the president and the vice president of the republic to be abandoned.

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[12] First vice-president was Dr. Fazıl Küçük (14 March 1906–15 January 1984). He represented the Turkish Cypriot community during the Zurich and London conferences resulting with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.

[13] Archbishop Makarios III (August 13 1913-August 3 1977) was the archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the first president of the Republic of Cyprus from 1960 to 1977.

2. The vice president of the Republic to deputise for the president of the republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

3. The Greek president of the House of Representatives and the Turkish vice president to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the president by the Greek members of the House and the vice president by the Turkish members.

4. The vice president of the House of Representatives to deputise for the president of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.

6. Unified municipalities to be established.

7. The administration of justice to be unified.

8. The division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie to be abolished.

9. The numerical strength of the security forces and of the defence forces to be determined by law.

10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the public service and the forces of the republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

11. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.

12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.

13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

Effort by president Makarios to amend the constitution met strong Turkish Cypriot objection and so the conflicts broke out in December 1963 (Michael, 2009:26-27).

2.2.   1964-1974:   INTER-COMMUNAL   VIOLENCE   AND NEGOTIATIONS

The hostilities were mainly between irregularly armed Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT)[14] and Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA)[15]. They were armed by their respective motherlands. TMT was a pro-partition national organization and the establishment of the republic had not stopped them from working towards their aims, just as EOKA had done for the Greek Cypriot side. After the beginning of the conflict, the Turkish Cypriots had been thrown/had withdrew from the government.[16] Undoubtedly, the beginning of the violence had ruined all kinds of relation between the communities. The Greek Cypriot aim to unify the island had been put in action through the infamous Akritas Plan.Its main aim has been described appropriately as follows:

> to subjugate the Turkish Cypriots before outside help could arrive to save them. The tactic was, first, to convince world opinion that the 1960 settlement was unjust and unreasonable, and that the Turkish Cypriots were intractable. Secondly, it was to show that the Treaty of Guarantee was therefore an intrusion into Cypriot affairs and should be annulled. (This would prevent any legitimate Turkish intervention). Thirdly, it was then intended to amend the Constitution without Turkish Cypriot agreement and, finally, to suppress quickly with the necessary force any opposition by the Turkish Cypriots before any international intervention could be organized. It would be a fait accompli difficult for the international community to do anything but accept (Dodd, 2010; 51).

It was a well-known fact that most of the Turkish Cypriot population wanted separation but this does not justify the Akritas plan put forward against them. In any case, the plan failed and the fighting continued. Turkey's lack of preparation had rendered an intervention almost impossible, but the fear of an escalation of tensions between Greece and Turkey showed that certain measures

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[14] TMT: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, meaning Turkish Resistance Organization, founded in late 1957 to 1958 (Kızılyürek: 2009; 17).

[15] EOKA: Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, meaning National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, founded in 1955. Retrieved from: (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/eoka.htm).

[16] This issue is still a source of disagreement between the two sides.

must be taken immediately. While the small contingents of Greece and Turkey remained stagnant, the British troops intervened as the guarantor powerwhich paved the way for the establishment of the Green Line (Dodd, 2010: 53). Meanwhile by 1964, as the Turkish Cypriots had started to withdraw/be forced out from the government mechanisms on safety grounds, the Republic of Cyprus began to become more and more a unitary Greek Cypriot state.[17] This would make it easier as a Greek Cypriot policy to go for enosis, or at least a state where the Turkish Cypriots would only be a minority group (Kızılyürek, 2009:22).

In the light of these developments, the guarantor powers attempted to re-establish peace and order by organizing an international conference in January 1964 which was unsuccessful in the end, because the Greek Cypriots asked for a revision of the previous order while the Turkish Cypriots requested separation. Subsequently, British and Cypriot governments brought the issue to the United Nations Security Council in February 1964, in which one of the most significant decisions throughout the conflict history was taken (Hoffmeister, 2006:15-16). March 4 1964 UN Security Council resolution 186 [S/5575] concluded that:

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, its Article 2 and paragraph 4, which reads: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of United Nations;

(2) Ask the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop the violence and bloodshed in Cyprus;

(3) Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

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[17]It should also be noted that some of the Turkish Cypriots, for instance in Famagusta where the local elites were more moderate than the others and the fighting was softer, continued working together for a little longer (Ker-Lindsay, 2011:36).

(4) Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus;

(7) Recommends further that the secretary general designate, in agreement with the government of Cyprus and the government of Greece, Turkey and the UK, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities;

Overall, the resolution recognized Greek Cypriot led government as the sole authority of the whole island. It entirely ignored the Greek Cypriot effort to unilaterally change the constitution and the attempt to oppress the Turkish Cypriots for Enosis. Now that the Turkish Cypriots were no longer in the government, the Greek Cypriot led government should have been declared illegitimate as the Republic of Cyprus was a bi-communal state. Nevertheless, with the resolution 186, the Greek Cypriot administration was now recognized as the government of Cyprus. Another significant development was the creation of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Its primary task was to prevent the fighting between the communities and as a secondary task help with the restoration and preservation of law and order. At the end of March, nearly 6000 UN soldiers had been deployed on the island, which could not prevent further fighting. On the other hand, the US was struggling to keep the two NATO member states, Greece and Turkey, away from a military conflict. As the Turkish jets were flying over the island, the US president Johnson warned Turkey to keep away from a unilateral intervention[18] (Hoffmeister, 2006: 16).

Despite UN objections, the US intervened and Dean Acheson was appointed as a mediator to the issue. Acheson offered what seemed to be a "double enosis", which more or less shared the island between Greece and Turkey which came to be known as the Acheson Plan. The plan envisaged unification of the island with Greece, however by granting Turkey a large military base on a thirty year lease. Furthermore, the plan would divide Cyprus into eight

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[18] On June 5 1964, Turkey was warned through the Johnson letter about the consequences of a unilateral intervention to Cyprus, involving Soviet threat (Letter to Prime Minister İnönü from President Johnson dated 5 June, 1964).

cantons in which two of them would be under full local Turkish Cypriot administration, and provisions would be made for the Turkish Cypriots willing to emigrate with an international body for monitoring the human rights conditions and ensure that no violations occur on the island. The plan was accepted by the Turkish side as a basis for negotiation, while the Greek side denounced and rejected it, arguing that a solution should be reached through the parameters set by the United Nations, ensuring the right of self-determination of the Cypriot people (Brinkley, 1989:13). After the rejection of the first proposal, Acheson offered a second plan in August 1964. Turkey was offered a smaller base of 200 square miles for a 50-year lease this time with no autonomous regions for the Turkish Cypriots but a Turkish Cypriot Administrative Office in Nicosia for educational, religious, and legal purposes. Eventually, the plan was rejected both by Turkey and Greece (Dodd, 2010: 70).

While the August 1965 House of Representatives elections were approaching, the Makarios government was enacting lawsthat were unamendable articles of the 1960 Constitution.

> Compulsory military service was introduced, the police force became completely Greek Cypriot, the judicial structure was changed, the separate municipalities were not to be allowed, the Public Service Commission (which regulated the Civil Service) was amended to exclude Turkish Cypriots, and the size of the House of Representatives was changed. The electoral law was also to be changed to abolish separate electoral rolls for each community. This abolished separate representation of Turkish Cypriots in parliament, and their election of the Vice-President (Dodd, 2010:72).

While Makarios was forcing the Turkish Cypriots to give up and co-operate, Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin declared that under these new circumstances, the Turkish Cypriots would not take part in the upcoming elections because the new arrangements would allow no separate representation for the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots agreed that under these conditions, they could not continue taking place in the House. This would later be put forward by the Greek Cypriot leaders as an evidence of Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from the government.In any case, Turkey brought the case to the UN Security Council on the grounds that the legislation was 'in flagrant violation of solemn international agreements'. In return, Greece called the Security Council

to action on the basis that Turkey was interfering with the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. Subsequently, the Security Council resolution reached a conclusion in December 1965, declaring that "...in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [the Republic of Cyprus] is entitled to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference". This was a big devastation for the Turkish Cypriots, and a diplomatic setback for Turkey (Dodd, 2010:75-77).

After this incident, the year 1966 was seen as a chance for rapprochment between Turkey and Greece. The two sides overcame the difficulties for the time being and engaged in a secret meeting while leaving Makarios out of the deal. On December 17 1966, two foreign ministers Çağlayangil and Toumbas met in Paris. In this meeting, Greece proposed a base for Turkey[19] on the island in exchange for enosis. Cyprus was to remain independent, but if not, a condominium was to be established by Greece and Turkey. Turkey was not against the offer of enosis in exchange for a base on the island, but demanded full sovereignty of the proposed base. Greece, however, was in a political turmoil and inconsistency, so the latest attempt to reach a settlement could not be concluded as the ones before. The government in Greece had resigned just after the meetings in Paris. The negotiations between Greece and Turkey raised suspicion among the leaders of the island. After the collapse of the mutually owned republic and the breakout of intercommunal violence, Rauf Denktaş was expecting an intervention from Turkey which would bring Taksim/Partition to the island. Makarios too was left out of this negotiation between Turkey and Greece and once he learned about it, he resented and did whatever he could do in his power to nullify it (Kızılyürek, 2009: 27-28).

The political inconsistency in Greece would lead to a coup d'etat, which is known as the Colonel's Regime, in April 1967. This in turn would lead to the return of EOKA leader Grivas to the island, undermining Makarios' authority (Hoffmeister, 2006:34).The military regime in Greece had seen the Cyprus problem as a case which could increase its prestige both internally and

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[19] Dhekelia, one of the British bases on the island, was allegedly the one which was proposed to Turkey.

externally. Furthermore, the military rule was a major encouragement for Greek Cypriots who were loyal to enosis thus in August 1967, the military junta chief Papadopoulos visited Makarios and declared after a long discussion that enosis was 'the only just and historically acceptable solution for Cyprus'. Makarios, even though he was not as enthusiastic of enosis, had seen this as a sign that he was still the accepted leader of the Greek Cypriots. Turkey's response to the determined enosis declaration by Greece was clear, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil declared that enosis would never be a basis for the solution (Dodd, 2010:80). The negotiations in September 1967 with Turkey, however, would once more bring the offer of enosis in exchange for a military base on the island to the table. Turkish Prime Minister of the time, Demirel, however, had once again declared that he would not even negotiate on these terms as he was strictly against enosis (Kızılyürek, 2009: 29).The negotiations ended in a fiasco as described by Clerides; 'It was an embarrassing fiasco; it revealed to Turkey the inexperience, the clumsiness and the naiveness of the Greek colonels … Mr Küneralp of the Turkish Foreign Ministry described it as the biggest farce he had ever witnessed'. Seemingly, during those years, Turkey's approach to the Cyprus problem could be summed up as follows:

1. The island could not unilaterally be joined to another state.

2. The international agreements on Cyprus could not be unilaterally annulled or changed.

3. There is no question of allowing one community to come under the rule of the other.

4. The balance established between Greece and Turkey by the Lausanne Treaty cannot be destroyed in favour of one party.

Both sides wanted a peaceful solution, neither wanted a war, but their views on the issue were ways apart. Turkey wanted to obtain the best out of the issue both for itself and the Turkish Cypriot Community, while Greece simply could not give up enosis (Dodd, 2010; 81).With these developments in hand, the fightings surfaced once again. Troops under the leadership of Grivas attacked

and killed 24 Turkish Cypriots in the village of Kophinou (Geçitkale). After this incident, Turkey started war preparations only to be stopped by the efforts of the US. It was after this incident that an actual expectation for the prospect of an intervention began to occupy Turkish agenda in the Cyprus issue. Makarios was aware of this so he made a change with the policy of enosis, at least on the rhetoric. Enosis was now more of an "efikton" (what is desired) than an "efkteon" (what is possible). The Greek Cypriot Community was evolving from a group who desired enosis to a group who now could distinguish dreams from reality, thus working for the independent Republic of Cyprus within a sense of Greek Cypriot nationalism. This view, in essence, was in line with the Turkish Cypriot view of "solution on the basisof an independent Cyprus", thus the intercommunal talks of 1968 would be based on this view.

The intercommunal talks, in which the Turkish Cypriots were represented by Rauf Denktaş and the Greek Cypriots were represented by Glafkos Clerides, continued from 1968 to 1974. Greek Cypriots argued that the rights which were given to Turkish Cypriots with the 1960 agreements were exceedingly high and needed to be restricted, and the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 should be abolished (Kızılyürek, 2009: 30-31). The embargoes on the Turkish Cypriot enclaves scattered around the island was mostly lifted by 1968, which was a rare good development on the island. They were allowed to move freely in and out of their enclaves as well. Another good news was that Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş returned to the island from Ankara with his prosecution threat being lifted.There were concerns about how he would be welcomed back to the island, especially by Dr. Küçük. Denktaş was self-assured that any disagreement, if there would be any, between him and Dr. Küçük would not damage the Turkish Cypriot cause. The first meeting was carried out in Beirut in June 1968 with an exchange of views between the parties. (Dodd, 2010: 91-93).Economical difficulties of the Turkish Cypriots meant that they would be pushing for an early agreement. Denktaş was prepared to make concessions in exchange for local government because of communal groupings in certain villages. Subsequent phases of the talks involved proposals on the executive government, police, legislature, and justice. Clerides offered Denktaş a package deal which in

principle accepted the communal groupings of the Turkish villages in exchange for 60:15 ratio in the legislature. Denktaş was ready to accept the abolishment of the vice-president's veto power. Furthermore, and most significantly, he proposed that the issue of local governance should be included in the constitution and should be regulated by central authorities (Michael, 2009:29-30). For Clerides, these proposal were worthy of consideration, but Makarios thought otherwise. He believed that they could lead to separation and partition so he demanded that control of local governance should be tied to the Ministry of the Interior. Denktaş, with the backing of Demirel, pushed for the seperate electoral roll for the legislature and a central government institution to control Turkish Cypriot local government institutions. These proposals, however, were too much for Makarios as his main aim was to reduce the Turkish Cypriots into a minority group, meaning that they could have the right to autonomy only on issues of religion, education, and culture, but not in local government (Dodd, 2010: 94-95). These talks continued until 1971 but to no avail. The sides could not come to a common point. The military rule in Greece was on a collision course with Makarios. Makarios was deeming enosis not possible while the junta was still after it, which was forcing him to reaffirm his view on enosis, while the Turkish side was protesting and occasionally suspending the negotiations. Eventually, the parties had no choice but to abandon the talks. (Kızılyürek, 2009: 32).

The talks restarted with the inclusion of two experts, Michalis Dekleris and Orhan Aldıkaçtı in June 1972 in Nicosia. When the first phase of the new talks were completed, theTurkish Cypriot side had made some concessions. On the local government issue, the Turkish Communal Chamber was to make regulations according to laws made by the House of Representatives. However in December 1972, Makarios still rejected this relatively more favourable proposal by the Turkish Cypriots. For Clerides, this 'uncompromising attitude' of Makarios was the only reason that a solution was not found to the Cyprus issue in December 1972. Meanwhile, by the start of 1973, the violence was still going on, especially with the promotion of Grivas, while The Turkish government was seeing no end to the dispute.The rise of Bülent Ecevit, in coalition with Necmettin Erbakan, to power in October 1973 in Turkey changed the balance of the dispute.

Turkey was now advocating the two separate communities on the island and the need for a federal solution (Dodd, 2010:98-99). On the other hand, the disaccord among the Greek Cypriot community was becoming more apparent. Hardline enosis supporters under the umbrella of EOKA-B[20] were still pushing for enosis with the backing of Greek military junta. Subsequently, their efforts paid off and on July 15, 1974 a coup d'etat against Makarios was organized. He was replaced by a pro-enosis leader, Nicos Sampson. Makarios had no choice but to flee. Five days after the coup d'etat, on July 20, 1974, Turkey carried out a military intervention on the island (Kızılyürek, 2009: 33-34).

2.3. 1974-1990: 1974 TURKISH INTERVENTION TO 1990 FULL-MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

The coup was a surprise for Turkey but something had to be done because there was a clear threat of enosis. 1960 Guarantee Treaty granted each guarantor power a right'to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty',after consultation among themselves. At first, to keep up with the terms of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey made an effort to persuade the United Kingdom to join them in the intervention. Ecevit argued that for a peaceful solution and to avoid bloodshed, the United Kingdom should allow Turkey to use its military bases, as Turkey did not want to act alone. In response, British Foreign Minister Callaghan stated that the bases were not meant for that purpose. Ecevit was well aware of the probability of a negative British response, but he needed to go through this path in order to oblige to the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee. The British suggested, instead, that the three guarantor powers should meet. This suggestion was strongly rejected by Ecevit, because he regarded Greece an aggressor nation.Ecevit, seeing this great chance to do something effective in the case of Cyprus, could not miss this historic opportunity to intervene thus the Turkish troops landed on the island on 20 July (Dodd, 2010: 110-114). Three days later, on July 23, Makarios desperately sent a message to Turkey claiming that he was

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[20] EOKA-B was formed by Grivas in 1971. They were an ultra-right wing nationalist group and had the ultimate goal of uniting the island with Greece.

ready to oblige to all the terms of the Treaties of Zurich and London but it was too late as a cease-fire had already been secured one day before between the sides when the guarantor powers met in Geneva (Kızılyürek, 2009: 35-36). Meanwhile in Greece, the Junta rule collapsed and Prime Minister Karamanlis returned from exile to ascend to power and at the same time in Cyprus, Sampson resigned from presidency and was temporarily replaced by Glafkos Clerides (Hoffmeister, 2006: 36). The negotiations in Geneva were carried out under the framework of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 353 which was adopted the same day Turkey intervened. The resolution, in summary;

> 1.   Called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;
> 2.   Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing..;
> 3.   Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus..;
> 5.   Calls upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government of Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;

The first phase of Geneva conference lasted between 25-30 July between the three Foreign Ministers of the guarantor powers, Calllaghan, Mavros, and Güneş in addition to the leaders of Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Clerides and Denktaş. The talks pointed out the "immediate return to constitutional legitimacy", the role of the vice-president, and "the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations." As Callaghan revealed afterwards, an atmosphere of stabilization was provided with the agreement which would prevent Turkey and Greee from going to war with each other. Ecevit, on the other hand,was satisfied because "Turkey did not lose at the conference table what it had gained on the field". For Ecevit, there was a need for the Turkish military presence on the island for the smooth re-establishment of the constitutional order(Michael, 2009:33).At the table,

however, it was agreed that the Turkish troops would not further extend other than the areas already under control. With these developments in hand, the second phase of the conference began on 8 August.

Basically, there were two significant and interrelated disagreement between the parties: that the areas controlled by Turkey should not be extended, and the Turkish enclaves captured by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces should be evacuated. Greek Foreign Minister Mavros complained that from the cease-fire on July 22 to 8 August, Turkey had expanded its area of control. In response, Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş claimed that the troops ensured the safety of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and that it would stay this way until the evacuation of the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces from the Turkish Cypriot enclaves.Eventually, Callaghan invited both sides to discuss on constitutional matters. It was realized by the Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives that Turkey would be urging for a geographically organized federal solution. Clerides thought that the divorce between the two sides was too difficult to overcome and he would definitely reject a federal solution (Dodd: 2010:119-122). Actually, there were two different plans for federation. First was the plan proposed by Denktaş to Clerides which outlines a bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal solution with 34% territory allocated for the Turkish Cypriots. Second plan which was proposed by the Turkish representatives, especially by Foreign Minister Güneş, envisaged a multi-cantonal federation with one large and five smaller cantons allocated for the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot side refused the first plan and demanded 48 hours to evaluate the second. Upon this request, Turan Güneş claimed that the conference was over, thus making the second phase of Geneva Conference unsuccessful, meaning that Turkey would continue its military intervention. Years after the incident, Clerides would admit that it was a mistake not to accept the multi-cantonal federation proposal, if it had been accepted, the second military intervention would have never happened, and Makarios and Greek Foreign Minister Mavros was to blame. Furthermore, after the completion of the second military intervention, Greek Cypriot side declared that they accept the multi-cantonal federation, Turkish side however was persistent on bi-zonal federation (Kızılyürek, 2009: 37-39).The renewed military intervention of Turkey started on

14 August and continued for two days. This action met a number of UN Security Council Resolutions[21]calling for a halt to fighting, 'the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government', and a 'formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus'.Moreover, the resolution of November 1, 1974 reiterated the previous resolution, as well as stating that 'all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end' (Dodd, 2010: 131).

In January 1975, Denktaş and Clerides decided to restart the negotiation process for the solution. They were to start with the power and authority of the central government of the envisaged federation. In this context, the Turkish Cypriot community proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on February 13, 1975 (Kızılyürek, 2009: 44-45). This incident received strong reaction from the UN Security Council, leading to the appointment of Perez de Cuèllar as mediator. The first and second round of talks could not make any progress, but Denktaş and Clerides[22] reached an agreement in the third round in August 1975.According to this agreement, Turkish Cypriots living in the south could settle in the north if they wished so. In the case of remaining Greek Cypriots in the north, they should be able to receive help to live their normal way of life, including education and religion, medical care by their own doctors, and freedom of movement in the north, but if they wished to move to south, they were free to do so (Hoffmeister, 2006: 61).Meanwhile, during these talks, Makarios and Mavros thought that Clerides is 'too open to compromise' and even mentioned as 'the Greek-speaking mouthpiece of the Turks'. He was replaced by Tassos Papadopoulos for the remainder of the talks starting from the fifth round and against this move, Denktaş also appointed a representative, Ümit Süleyman Onan, instead of attending himself (Dodd, 2010: 134).Fourth and fifth round of talks of 1976 were unsuccessful as well because of the uncompromising attitudes of both sides in the case of the nature of the envisaged federation. The Turkish

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[21] Resolution numbers: 357,358,359,360
[22] Clerides was no longer the acting president as Makarios returned to island in December 1974.

side continued to advocate bi-zonal federation, while the Greek side was adamant on the multi-cantonal proposal (Kızılyürek, 2009: 52-53).

After the failure of the Vienna Conference, there was a need for a new initiative at a time when there was little hope left for a solution. UN's Special Representative of Cyprus Perez de Cuellar's effort led to renewed negotiations between Denktaş and Makarios on 27 January, 1977, which later came to be called as the High Level Agreement of 1977 (Dodd, 2010: 134).On February 12, 1977, the two leaders agreed on four main principles upon Denktaş's insistence on bi-zonal federation. They were:

1.   Establishment of a bi-communal, independent, non-aligned federal state.

2.   The ratio of territory which would be granted to each community would be regulated by levels of economic viability, productivity, and land-ownership.

3.   The issues such as freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and right to property should be discussed by taking into account the bi-communal federal system and the practical difficulties it could bring to Turkish Cypriots.

4.   The powers and functions conferred upon the federal government should allow a bi-communal character and oversee the unity of the country.

This agreement between Makarios and Denktaş meant the admission of bi-communal federation idea by the Greek Cypriots, which they kept on objecting for so long (Kızılyürek, 2009: 56). The following rounds of negotiations in March and April did not succeed because of disagreement between the sides on territorial issues as the Turkish Cypriot side did not accept the Greek Cypirot offer of 20% to remain under their administration. It would take the passing away of Makarios on August 3,1977 to bring the talks to an end. From April to July 1978, his successor, Kyprianou, did not waste any time to reject the comprehensive Turkish Cypriot proposals of principle of both entities to constitute a 'federation by evolution', some small territorial adjustments, and the

return of Varosha (Hoffmeister, 2006:62).In November, The UN General Assembly, with the pressure from the Greek Cypriot side, released a Resolution[23] to 'deplore the continuing presence of foreign armed forces in Cyprus and all unilateral actions that changed the demographic structure of the island', and 'the institution of urgent measures for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety'. This incident worsened the relations between the parties. Embargo put by the pressures from the Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Cypriot Federated State were tightening as well. Tourist economy was weak, and they were also excluded from all sorts of international sporting organizations. It was at this time that a new plan emerged which was drafted by the American State Department Counsellor Matthew Nimetz (Dodd, 2010: 139-140). The arms embargo imposed by the United States on Turkey after the 1974 intervention had soured the relations between them as well as an increasing unrest within NATO. An initiative was formed by Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom to address the issue: A framework for a Cyprus Settlement, also known as the Nimetz Plan, was presented to each side's approval (Kızılyürek, 2009: 65). The plan envisaged an independent, sovereign Cypriot Republic. The two constituent states would be equally represented in the Upper House of the federal parliament, and would be represented according to the populations in the Lower House. In the territorial issues, factors such as economic viability, property, security, population and history would be taken into account. Furthermore, all the foreign troops other than the ones mentioned in the Treaty of Alliance would be removed. Refugees would return to their homes in a suitable way according to the Republic's bi-zonal structure, and the return of Greek Cypriots to Famagusta would be arrenged by the United Nations. Greek Cypriots did not accept this plan as a basis for negotiation and Turkish Cypriots were reluctant (Hoffmeister, 2006:62-63).

Rejection of the Nimetz Plan did not slow down the search for a solution. A joint attempt by the UN Secretary General Waldheim and Cyprus Foreign Minister Nicos Rolandis led to restart of negotiations. Denktaş and Kyprianou agreed to meet in the UNFICYP headquarters in Nicosia on April 11, 1979 for

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[23] UN General Assembly Res. 33/15

another high-level meeting. On May 18-19 they agreed on the 10-point agreement:

1. It was agreed to resume the inter-communal talks on 15 June, 1979.

2. The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 17 February, 1977 and the United Nations' resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.

3. There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.

4. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.

5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations' auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached, it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.

6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks and special importance will be given to initialpractical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.

7. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.

8. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.

9. The inter-communal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.

10. The inter-communal talks will take place in Nicosia.

After the completion of the 10-point agreement talks, the sides met again on June 15,1979 but the disagreement on the priority given to Varosha[24] and the discussion on the concept of bi-zonality led to the break down of the talks. If bybi-zonality it was meant that there will be borders between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot regions, then it was unacceptable for Greek Cypriots as it was against the nature of federation and resembled of partition.Greek Cypriots were quick to promote their cause in the non-aligned world through June-October. This effort succeeded in receiving a very one-sided response from the UN General Assembly with a resolution on November 20, 1979, which emphasized the right of the Republic of Cyprus to have full authority over the entire island and demanded immediate withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as calling for the return of refugees to their homes. Effects of this resolution, however, was minimal on the Turkish side as Turkey was under less pressure after the lifting off of the United States' arms embargo despite political instability from 1978 to 1980 when this instability would ultimately lead to a coup d'etat (Dodd, 2010: 141-143).

After the latest failure to reconcile the sides, renewed efforts by the UN Secretary-General Waldheim to attract the sides around the table achieved success. After an almost two year break the sides came together in October 1981. As his time in the office was nearing to an end, Kurt Waldheim came up with one last attempt for solution. Waldheim's suggestions, which acted as a sort of assessment report, envisaged:

- A bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal state which would be divided into three regions- north, south, and a third region in which the federal state organs would take place. North and south would be further divided into two and four administrative regions respectively.

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[24] Varosha was a very famous tourist attraction in Famagusta before the division in 1974. Its inhabitants, mainly Greek Cypriots, fled and it has been a ghost town ever since the fencing off of the Turkish military (Hooper & Venema, 2014).

- The Federal Council would be responsible for the executive of the state which would consist of two Turkish Cypriot and four Greek Cypriot members with compulsory representation for each region.

- Territorial question would be resolved with a ratio of 70% to 30%.

- The legislative organ would consist of: (1) the House of Representatives, with each region providing 10 representatives, and (2) the Senate, in which one representative for every 10,000 people would be elected.

- Waldheim also suggested that the arising difficulties about implementation of the new plan could be observed by establishing 'working groups' from both communities.

- Demilitarization with only a police force to exist on the island.

The report was rejected by both sides but it was significant in the sense that it laid out the matters of disagreement between the sides (Kızılyürek, 2009:68-69). Perez de Cueller, the Special Representative for Cyprus in the Waldheim era, became the new UN Secretary General in January 1982. This was an advantage as he had a deep knowledge about the issue. International repercussions of the issue took an important turn in May 1983 with another resolution from the UN General Assembly. Resolution 37/253. This resolution was even stronger than the one declared in November 1979. While repeating much of the previous one, it called for the respect for the freedom of movement, settlement, and property for all Cypriots. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots did not receive the resolution well. Denktaş was becoming increasingly uncomfortable about the situation, saying that an independence declaration is a possibility which should not be neglected. After this development, the Turkish Cypriot parliament in the North declared the right of self-determination of Turkish Cypriots. It also reaffirmed, however, that this declaration does not constitute an impediment to the establishment of an independent, bi-zonal federation (Dodd, 2010: 145-146). On the other hand, Secretary General de Cuellar proposed a new alternative for solution in August 1983. His proposal included a stronger step towards federation than the Turkish Cypriots would prefer. On the territorial

question, a percentage somewhere between 23% and 30% was envisaged. Turkish Cypriot response was to continue negotiations on the existing guidelines, while Greek Cypriots were divided on the issue which brought about the resignation of Foreign Minister Rolandis. Subsequently, Denktaş offered another high-level meeting with Kyprianou but the arrangements took time and it was too late. Turkish Cypriots were certain that Greek Cypriots would never treat them as equals (Dodd, 2010: 145-147).

Denktaş saw the opportunity to declare independence in late 1983, when there was a transition from military to civilian government in Turkey. He knew that if he had not taken the chance, he would be prevented in the future for sure. On November 15, 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established. Three days later, the UN Security Council condemned the declaration with Resolution 541. It deplored 'the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of the part of the Republic of Cyprus' and considered 'the declaration as legally invalid and called for its withdrawal', as well as calling all the states not to recognize the Turkish Cypriot state (Kızılyürek, 2009: 75). Turkey, on the other hand, would have prefered if a federal solution could be found before the declaration of independence, but it endorsed the decision and recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Greece and Greek Cypriots had strongly objected to the declaration. As the repercussions of the independence continued into 1984, Kyprianou presented new proposals to de Cuellar for a restart to the negotiations but first, he demanded that Turkish Cypriots should first comply with Resolution 541. Predictably, Denktaş, President of the TRNC, did not accept this condition. It took until September that the two sides met de Cuellar seperately in New York. Perez de Cuellar presented new proposals, which seemed acceptable for both sides. Pressure from the US President Reagan and newly elected Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal convined Denktaş to decrease his expectations in territory by 7% (from 36% to 29%). The constitutional model resembled closely of the 1960 constitution. The President was to be Greek Cypriot, while the Vice-President would be Turkish Cypriot with veto right on vital issues. The Council of Ministers would consist of 7 Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish Cypriots. Parliament would be

bi-cameral where the Lower House would consist of 70% Greek Cypriot and 30% Turkish Cypriot members while there would be parity in the Upper House. Secretary General de Cuellar was very hopeful of these proposals but it ended in a disappointment (Hoffmeister, 2006: 65). After slight changes from the initial proposal, de Cuellar engaged in two more attempts in 1985 and 1986 but yet to find a solution.

In 1988, more moderate Yorgos Vasiliou won the presidental elections which gave new hope to solution process. He wasted no time in calling de Cuellar and Denktaş for the restart of negotiations. The two leaders met in August 1988 in Vienna. The negotiations were based on the previous Security Council Resolutions and High-Level Agreements, and envisaged to reach a conclusion on June 1, 1989. Denktaş was adamant on a solution based on two separate states which would resemble more of a confederation. Vasiliou, on the other hand, insisted on federation based on the high level agreements of 1977 and 1979. Consequently, no process could be achieved on the first round of talks. Once again, de Cuellar took initiative and presented the sides with another set of proposals in July 1989. These proposals envisaged a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic with net majority in each region in terms of property and settlement. Federal government would have sovereignty on foreign affairs, but the constituent states could arrange agreements with other states provided that it would not conflict with the policies of the central federal state. Representation in the House of Representatives would be 30% to 70%, while in Senate, the two communities would be represented equally. President would be elected by the votes of all Cypriots, but Vice-President would be elected by the other community than the President's community (if the president is a Greek Cypriot, then the Turkish Cypriots would elect the Vice-President). Council of Ministers would compose of 7 Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish Cypriots, with one ministry out of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, andthe Ministry of Economywould be under Turkish Cypriot control. The two communities would cooperate on the matters of Foreign policy, and the Foreign Minister and the President would not be of the same community. Three freedoms of settlement, property, and movement would be regulated according to Denktaş-Makarios

agreements. Furthermore, ultimate goal was to demilitarize the island and all foreign military would leave, except the ones based on the island with the Treaty of Alliance of 1960. Turkish side did not even consider these proposals as a basis for negotiation. After a brief pause, negotiations continued in February 1990 in New York (Kızılyürek, 2009: 77-80).

2.4. 1990-2004: THE ROAD TO EUROPEAN UNION

Negotiations restarted on February 26. Denktaş was now seeking a partnership based on the recognition of two seperate peoples on the island, and stressing that a right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots should be acknowledged. He had an intention of establishing 'a Greek-Turkish partnership based on political equality, power sharing and equal and effective participation'. For Vasiliou, the word 'people' did not describe the Turkish Cypriot community. Secretary General de Cuellar agreed. Greek Cypriots, in general, argued that if every minority group in the world wanted secession, then the most states would break apart. Denktaş, however, was adamant on the issue. He argued that without self-determination, there could be no federation, and there was no point in continuing the negotiations. General reactions to Denktaş's statements were negative however. (Dodd, 2010: 163-165).But the Secretary General's attitude towards the issue was clear. The solution would be found on a basis of one state and two communities. The negotiations had come to a deadlock once again. There was, however, another important development in that period which further soured the relations between the sides.

On July 4, 1990, the Republic of Cyprus submitted an application to become a full member of the European Community (EC). Cyprus' ties with the European Community traces back to 1972 asit already had an association agreement with the EC since then, which regulated trade between the parties and would ultimately lead to a customs union. Apart from economic aspirations, there were also political motivation behind the application, as according to a poll in April 1991, 76% of the population in south Cyprus believed that membership would help a solution on the island. Stance of the EC on the Cyprus issue was on the line with the UN's. Upon the declaration of independence by Turkish Cypriots

and establishment on the TRNC, the EC reacted negatively. The Council of Ministers of the EC (Hoffmeister, 2006: 83-85)

> ...are deeply concerned by the declaration purporting to establish a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' as an independent State. They reject this declaration which is in disregard of successive resolutions of the United Nations. The Ten reiterate their unconditional support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The European Commission had the same opinion as well:

> The Commission deeply regrets and rejects the unilateral declaration of independence of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Government of Cyprus is the sole legitimate representative recognised by the European Community.

Turkish Cypriot side, on the other hand, had its own arguments. They objected strongly to the application as it was illegal, and against the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Article 1 of 1960 Treaty of Guarantee states that the Republic of Cyprus 'undertook not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever'. They pointed out that the Turkish Cypriot government was not against EC membership once a solution was found (Dodd, 2010: 166). Despite these objections, the European Commission found the Republic of Cyprus' application eligible, and the accession procedure was set in motion in September 1990. However, there was an inertia in the negotiation process in much of 1990 and 1991. With the start of 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali replaced de Cuellar as the UN Secretary General. He wasted no time in preparing the 'Ghali Set of Ideas' and meeting the sides in New York from June to August 1992.

Same as the previous proposals, there would be one Cyprus consisting of two equal communities. There would be two equal constituent states with equal powers and administration in their own regions. The Parliament would consist of two Houses and in some matters, separate majorities from Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would be required. The judiciary would compose of equal number of judges from both communities. On the issue of freedoms, free movement of persons was allowed but the right to property was restricted. And lastly, a balance of troops and equipment between Turkish and Turkish Cypriots, and Greek and Greek Cypriots should be established (Hoffmeister, 2006:68-69).

The Security Council met on August 26 and backed Ghali's proposals. There were difficulties between the sides mainly on territorial and refugee issues. When the sides met again in October, Ghali declared that out of 100 paragraphs, 91 was successfully agreed on but there were fundamental differences on the remaning ones such as the structure of the executive, the structure of the council of ministers, territorial and refugee issues, and resolution of economic differences, hence no agreement could be reached. Secretary General Ghali called on the Turkish Cypriot side to align some aspects of its negotiation policies, such as return of Greek Cypriot refugees, territorial adjustments, and its understanding of federation, with the framework of the set of ideas until the next meeting in March 1993 (Kızılyürek, 2009: 85-86). In February 1993, Glafkos Clerides beat Vassiliou and became the new president of the Republic of Cyprus. Clerides was against the set of ideas, as he claimed they do not respect human rights and violate international law. It was not possible to continue the set of ideas under these circumstances so it was abandoned in May 1993, and paved the way to 'Confidence Building Measures'. Secretary General Ghali proposed the joint use of Nicosia airport, which would ease the embargo of direct air travel to the North in exchange for the cession of Varosha by the Turkish Cypriots. Denktaş was not convinced at first and the Turkish Cypriot government was requesting the removal of all embargoes. It was argued that giving up Varosha would mean the loss of their best bargaining asset. Eventually, the Confidence Building Measures collapsed (Dodd, 2010: 175-176).

1993 was also the year when the European Comission found the Greek Cypriot application to the European Community admissible. Solution of the political conflict on the island was expected from the both communities, although it was not regarded as an official pre-condition. Turkish Cypriots in the North were mostly ignored. For the EC, the issue was simple. The only legitimate government on the island was the Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus, and human rights were protected by the 1960 Constitution. Cyprus conflict was not significant enough to get in the way. Greece, on the other hand, was very

actively lobbying for the Greek Cypriot membership. This became particularly obvious in the Corfu summit in June 1994. The European Council declared that Cyprus would be included in the next enlargement process (Dodd, 2010: 179-181).

After the European Union's[25] decision for Greek Cypriot accession talks, Turkish Cypriots were reluctant to hold negotiations for a while. It was in 1996 that the tension on the island increased once again, first with the Cypriot government's decision to deploy S-300 missiles on the island, and then in December with the shooting of two Greek Cypriot demonstrators on the border. In this difficult and tense period, Kofi Annan succeeded Ghali as the new UN Secretary General in January 1997. New round of talks between the sides upon Annan's request started in July 1997 (Hoffmeister, 2006: 97-98). Denktaş's insistence on a solution based on two peoples and two states was an idea that could not be accepted by the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, the UN made it clear that Cyprus could enter the EU without both Greece and Turkey, without making any remarks on the situation of Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2009: 89-90). Denktaş was continuously arguing that he could not negotiate as the Greek Cypriot application to the EU violates the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. However, in March 1998, the EU launched negotiation talks with Cyprus as scheduled in the Luxembourg European Council of December 1996.Shortly after this decision, a new initiative by the US to accelerate the peace talks emerged. Special Envoy to Cyprus, Richard Holbrooke presented his proposals to the sides. Holbrooke proposed a three region solution in which between the regions of the two sides, a neutral region for the federal government would exist. He also tried to make the two sides cooperate through EU accession negotiations by persuading Denktaş to participate in the talks. Another innovative proposal was that the leading figures from the two sides would come together and engage in fruitful economic and social relations.

Holbrooke's efforts were unsuccessful in the end. He claimed that Denktaş was the main reason if a solution had not been found. Turkish Cypriot

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[25] Maastricht Treaty re-established the European Community as the European Union in 1993.

community in general, however, had the impression that EU membership would prosper the North and protect them from Greek Cypriot domination. Turkey's exclusion from the list of candidate state status in the Luxembourg summit further worsened the relations between the sides.

There was a need for a new initiative, and a way to compromise, especially a formula that Denktaş would accept. A change in wording of the invitation was enough to attract him to the talks in New York in December 1999 (Dodd, 2010: 198-202). It was also in December when Turkey finally gained candidacy status from the EU in the Helsinki Summit. The EU also declared that solution to the Cyprus issue was not a pre-condition for Greek Cypriot membership. Turkey had gained what it wanted, but Denktaş was still insisting on a two state solution and he withdrew from the negotiations in early 2000.

The failure to find a solution to the Cyprus issue was bringing more and more pressure on Turkey, and Turkey was reflecting this pressure on Denktaş. He had to take a step back and invite Clerides to resume the negotiations. This was the process which led to the creation of the Annan Plan (Kızılyürek, 2009: 92-94).Denktaş also had a negative image internationally, and needed to take a new initiative to overcome it. After some hesitation, Clerides accepted the invitation and the two leaders met in Ledra Palace in December 2001. While the Turkish Cypriots were talking about partnership of two equal states, Greek Cypriots spoke of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Until the last meeting in February, the two sides discussed governance, distribution of powers, EU matters, and territory and security without any noteworthy result (Hoffmeister, 2006: 108-111). The negotiations were difficult and going slower than expected. The month of April 2002 saw the talks deadlocked once again and there was a need for a new initiative again. The international criticisms were on the Turkish Cypriot side because of Denktaş's "uncompromising" attitude. Turkey also wanted the talks in 2002 to succeed. The situation in Turkey did not look bright as the weak Ecevit government was about to collapse, and the most likely winner of the early elections in November 2002 was the Justice and Development Party. They were pro-EU and were more sympathetic towards a rapid solution to the

Cyprus question, as Cyprus was a major stumbling block standing between the EU and Turkey.

Wasting no time, Secretary General Annan put forward his plan for Cyprus on November 11. The plan had nothing similar to the previous proposals as it was a federal and presidential system with some features of a parliamentary system. The two sides had their doubts about the first draft of the plan. While Clerides wanted further explanation about the plan, Denktaş stated that there were 'serious areas of concern' (Dodd, 2010: 219-221). Annan came up with an amended version of the plan in December 2002, the same month Cyprus and other nine Central and Eastern European Countries were declared to become members of the EU in May 2004. Turkey was also expecting a date to start negotiations with the EU from the Copenhagen Summit in December, so it was further motivated to push for a solution in Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2009: 95-96). The amended version of the plan had support from the North, even from the people who would be displaced if the plan succeeded because a potential European Union membership was too good to turn down. Greek Cypriots, however, were against the plan as it restricted the return of Greek Cypriots to their properties in North. Consequently, the Annan Plan had to be revised and re-introduced to the two sides. The third version was put forward in February 2003. There was not much time before Cyprus signed the EU Accession Treaty in April. A solution had to be reached before this date in order to hold referenda in both sides for the membership (Dodd, 2010: 222).

February 2003 also saw the election of hard-liner Tassos Papadopoulos into presidency in the South. The two sides were asked to meet Annan in the Hague on March 11 to finalize the talks and hold referendum in each side on March 30, but the meeting was unsuccessful. Denktaş rejected the plan as he had 'fundamental objections to the plan on basic points' (Hoffmeister, 2006: 127-128). Denktaş started to lose power against the circles who wanted Annan Plan to succeed in Turkish Cypriot Community, as well as in Turkey. Elections in the North in December 2003 produced a coalition government headed by Mehmet Ali Talat, which was more conciliatory towards the Annan Plan. Turkish

Prime Minister Erdoğan took initiative and persuaded Secretary General Annan that another effort might convince the sides for a solution this time. It was this effort which brought Denktaş and Papadopoulos to New York in February 2004, but the process ended in March without any significant outcome. This would be the last formal appearence of Denktaş in the negotiations. Another round of negotiations continued in Burgenstock with the fourth version of the Annan Plan. The plan was satisfactory for the Turkish Cypriot side but disappointing for Greek Cypriots especially in territory and security issues (restrictions on property rights of Greek Cypriots in the North). There was a common opinion that the plan should be improved so the fifth and final version of the plan was introduced (Dodd, 2010: 242-250).Both sides approved the final version in March 31, 2004 and the plan was put to each community's approval in simultaneous referenda in April 24. Main points of the plan were as follows (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 64-66):

- Establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal republic based on the Swiss model.

- Two politically equal constituent states would form a single federal state.

- The constituent states would have the power to govern anything other than directly governed by the federal state. They would cooperate through agreements and laws which would ensure that they would not violate the authorities and functions of each other.

- A parliament would be formed made up of two houses: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Each would have 48 members. In the Senate, the communities would be represented equally at all times with 24 members each. The number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies would be determined according to the populations of the communities with each community represented with no less than 25%. Decisions would need a simple majority vote of both houses to pass.

- The executive would be composed of a six-member presidential council and their members would be elected by both houses of the parliament. The office of president and vice-president would rotate between the members of the presidential council every ten months.

Neither community could hold presidency for two consecutive terms and for the first three years after the establishment of the new state, Denktaş and Papadopoulos, as presidents of both communities, would be in charge as co-presidents.

- A Supreme Court would be established consisting of three Greek Cypriots, three Turkish Cypriots, and three non-Cypriots, a total of nine judges.

- Federal state would have a single international personality but everyone would hold two citizenships; one of the federal state and one of the constituent state in which they resided.

- The Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty of Establishment, and the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 would be maintained in accordance with the new situation.

- As the 1960 Constitution instructs, Cyprus may not unite with any other country in whole or partly.

- The island would become a member of the European Union and would constitutionally bound to support Turkey's EU accession.

- Each community would disband its defence forces, and Greece and Turkey would be able to keep up to six thousand troops on the island for seven years with the aim to gradually withdraw all of their forces. Furthermore, the government in Cyprus may not allow any international military operation to take place on the island without consent from both Greece and Turkey.

- Greek Cypriot people who lost their homes during the conflict would be compensated based on their values with inflation taken into account.

- Greek or Turkish Cypriots residing in the other consituent state would be given full educational and cultural rights.

The result of the referenda, however, was a huge blow to hopes of solution. Turkish Cypriots gave support to the plan with 65%, while Greek Cypriots reacted with a resounding 76% 'no'. The chance to join the EU as a united country was lost. After the rejection of the plan, Kofi Annan released a

statement, saying that '*…the goal of the effort over the last four and a half years has been to bring about reunification so as to enable a reunited Cyprus to join the European Union. That goal has not been achieved. A unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed.*'

3. THE "DIVIDED" CYPRUS AS AN EU MEMBER

After the failure of the two communities to reach an agreement in 2004, the Republic of Cyprus entered into the European Union as a divided island. The accession of the Greek Cypriots to the EU had significant impact on the peace negotiation process. Hopes were high that the accession would provide the much needed motivation for the both sides to accelerate a settlement but it did not, and in fact, it may even be argued that the sides have been demotivated ever since. This part of this study will look in detail on the impact of the European Union to a solution on the island considering its success in resolving other external disputes, its role in the dispute, relations with the TRNC, and the effects of its recognition of the Greek Cypriots as the legal authorityof the Republic of Cyprus on the Turkish Cypriots.

3.1. THE EU'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS TURKISH CYPRIOTS

The EU's stance on the Cyprus issue is in line with the UN's, that there is only one legitimate government on the island and secessionist endeavours should be avoided, as the declarations made by the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers following the declaration of independence by Turkish Cypriots stated (Hoffmeister, 2006: 84).From the very beginning, the EU took steps which further soured the relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The Luxembourg Summit in 1997, for example, called for the participation of the Turkish Cypriot representatives in the negotiation process. It was too late, however, as Turkish Cypriots argued that the Republic of Cyprus did not represent the whole island, and they were left out of the previous EU-Cyprus relations (Sözen, 2003:14). Delays and consolations soured the relations between the sides on the island, as well as the relations between Turkish Cypriots and the EU. Accepting the unilateral Greek Cypriot application eventually and the failure to progress on the peace negotiationsmade the TRNC integrate with Turkey even further, which was the price to pay for continuously neglecting the Turkish Cypriot community's objections.

Even though Cyprus entered the EU as a whole, acquis is suspended in the Northern part of the island and it remains outside the internal market as well. However, it is not considered to be out of EU territory thus making the issue quite complex. This makes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus a special territory within the EU that needs special arrangements, while making North Cyprus the only government which is not internationally recognized (Adaoğlu, 2009: 127). While the EU law is suspended in accordance with the Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty, it does not take away the personal rights of Turkish Cypriots as they still have the right to citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus.

While in the 1990s Turkish Cypriots were against entering the European Union before Turkey does, especially with the promotion from the leftist circles, Turkish Cypriots began to realize the benefits of a reunited island by the beginning of 2000s. Ties between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU started to become stronger with the European Commission's 'Special Aid Package' of 12 million € in June 2003. However, Denktaş regime was still strong in the Turkish Cypriot community and this endeavour from the EU was considered as an effort to trick to put the Turkish Cypriots under Greek Cypriot authority. When the officials from the EU started visiting north, holding meetings with the NGOs (non-governmental organizations), academics, and trade unions, views of the Turkish Cypriot community were bound to change, as these groups held very different opinions in comparison to Denktaş. These were days of utmost importance for Turkish Cypriots as they held meetings and signed petitions in support of the Annan Plan.

Eurosceptic government was replaced in December 2003 elections, with the pro-EU parties winning 25 out of 50 seats in the Parliament. Gunter Verheugen, the thenEuropean Commissioner for Enlargement, delivered a speech in the European Parliament, stating that 'the majority of Turkish Cypriots support the EU membership of an island reunited by the United Nations Plan. Genuine Turkish Cypriots declared their wish in Sunday's elections...it's apposite and logical to respect the majority's will.' (Beyatlı, 2011: 139-140). Despite their primary doubts and skepticism, Turkish Cypriot community soon came to realize

the advantages and benefits of an eventual EU membership through the reuinification of the island. Especially the Turkish Cypriot civil society membersembraced the idea of European integration mainly because it would facilitate their main goal which was to find a solution to the separation on the island. Even some of the Eurosceptic organizations turned pro-EU because European integration was considered as the way to achieve peace on the island faster (Kyris, 2013: 871-872).This was said to be the main reason for the support to the Annan Plan. Rejection of the plan, however, was a failure for the EU as it could not lend a helping hand in the search for a solution (Kyris, 2012: 92). As a reward for their positive attitude towards the Annan Plan, the EU was determined to support the Turkish Cypriots:

> 'The Turkish Cypriot community have expressed their clear desire for a future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community' (European Commission, 2004).

To strengthen the Turkish Cypriot community economically and to prepare them for a possible reunification and EU membership, a number of support deals were developed, namely: the Financial Aid Regulation and the Green Line Regulation. The Financial Aid Regulation, worth 259 million €, aimed at promoting economic and social development, preparation for the implementation of the EU acquis, and bringing Turkish Cypriots closer to EU citizens through exchange of information and contacts (European Council, 2006).Green Line Regulation, on the other hand, has the primary target of economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community through regulating the crossing of goods, services and persons, and trade between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (European Council, 2005).

The Direct Trade Regulation, which would serve to ease the embargoes and isolation on the Turkish Cypriots by regulating direct trade between the TRNC and the EU member states, could not be realized because of a veto from the Republic of Cyprus as it would associate the recognition of the TRNC(European Commission, 2004). A similar case was brought to the European Court of Justice in 1994, concerning the trade of goods produced in the North.

Goods such as potatoes, oranges, and lemons were exported to the EU directly from the TRNC and the Turkish Cypriot exporters could benefit equally with the Greek Cypriot exporters in selling their products to the EU countries. In 1994, the Republic of Cyprus claimed that the goods which were produced on the Greek Cypriot properties remaining in the North needs the approval of the Republic of Cyprus before exportation (Kyris, 2012:90). This incident resulted in the EU imposing embargo on most of these kind of goods, while allowing the importation of some goods only with higher import duties because of the non-recognition of the TRNC thus weakening the economy of the TRNC which was dependent mostly on tourism and trade. The TRNC could no longer compete in the European market and Turkey became the major trading partner of the TRNC, another reason for deeper integration with Turkey (Isachenko, 2012: 105).Similar disputes arising from issues of lesser significance worsen the relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. It is as though the two communities would throw every trump card against each other which would hurt the other.The EU needs to find a common ground on issues such as this one to improve, not worsen, the relations between both itself and Turkish Cypriots, and the relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Moreover, Turkish Cypriots gained the right to EU citizenship, which gave them opportunity to travel, live, or study abroad in the EU member countries, just like any other EU citizen. In spite of these advantages, however, there are still problematic areas for the Turkish Cypriots. For example, as Turkish is not considered as an official language of the EU, Turkish Cypriots need to speak one extra language for the European Union institutions to employ them.[26] Furthermore, they cannot send representatives to the European Parliament, have restrictions in freedom of movement of goods and face embargoes in all kinds of sports activities (Beyatlı, 2011: 142-143).

In spite of some negative points, through economic and social measures, the EU's popularity among the Turkish Cypriot community increased, as it was

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[26] There have been recent developments in the language crisis as the European Parliament has engaged in taking the necessary steps to make Turkish an official language of the EU (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B8-2016-0442&language=EN).

the first international actor to engage in bilateral relations with the isolated community. The help from the EU promoted essential domestic development, as the financial and technical assistance particularlyencouraged progress in agriculture, environment, statistics, financial activities, and competition law (Kyris, 2012: 94).It was clear, however, that ending the isolation which was imposed upon the TRNC and, practically, upon the Turkish Cypriot community would be harder than it first seemed. Still there are problems arising especially from the misinterpretation of the Green Line Regulation by the Greek Cypriot officials. Various Turkish Cypriot goods get blocked while passing the border to the Greek Cypriot side. Greek Cypriots blame the Turkish 'invasion' for restricting the passage of these goods, while Turkish Cypriots accuse Greek Cypriots of 'hiding behind the European Union' (Karaca, 2014). These routine incidents may not seem like much but they are a fine indicator of how the issue is made all the more complex by the EU's attitude as well as EU's incapability to provide an end to the isolations imposed on the Turkish Cypriot community, thus strengthen any argument that the Republic of Cyprus should not have become a member of the EU before a solution.

The continuing incapability of the EU to accelerate the solution process on the island has made the Turkish Cypriot civil society lose interest, the same civil society that showed so much enthusiasm prior to the failure of the Annan Plan. According to Karaca's (2014) article published on the Deutsch Welle based on his interviews, foremost civil society members state this fact. Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce President Fikri Toros notes that "The situation on hand is caused by the unilateral membership of the Greek Cypriots to the EU in 2004", while Prof. Dr. Niyazi Kızılyürek states that "The EU has lost its power of influence on the negotiations". Turkish Cypriot Human Rights Foundation President Emine Çolak, on the other hand, claims that "Nothing remained of our excitement which we used to feel towards the EU. Although EU membership is still the main goal, people lost their excitement".

Return of the hard-line parties to the power in 2009 shows this loss of excitement, as well as Derviş Eroğlu's rise to presidency in 2010. After an

unsuccessful period with Eroğlu, Turkish Cypriot electorate chose the more moderate Mustafa Akıncı with renewed hopes to lead them in the negotiatons. In any case, it is in the recent years that the political parties that have been more inclined towards a federal solution to the Cyprus issue came to be closely associated with pro-EU sentiments. It is the image created by the European Union that makes people associate them with peace. Hard-liners, on the other hand, who are more nationalist and mainly against the federal system, have been criticising a solution on federal terms as well as EU membership without the backing of Turkey.

To bring back the needed enthusiasm and excitement the EU should engage in taking new steps. The Direct Trade Regulation could be brought back to the agenda and as a sign of good will, promoted by the Greek Cypriot administration, at least for a closer relationship between Turkish Cypriots and the EU. Other than that, representatives of the Republic of Cyprus are not elected by Turkish Cypriots. This issue could be addressed as well which would strengthen the ties between EU citizens and Turkish Cypriots, and by this way, problems of the Turkish Cypriot people could be expressed in a more official manner (Adaoğlu, 2009: 145).There is one issue recently which could be an example to follow in this direction. The initiative which was started by the Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades in January 2016 gave way to the European Parliament's recommendation for Turkish to become an official language of the EU (Hurriyet Daily News, 2016). Actually, even though a positive effort from Anastasiades, according to article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960), Turkish is an official language of the Republic of Cyprus, and should have been included in the official languages of the EU with the accession of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004. In any case, it seems thatthe EU should fulfill the promised end of international isolation and should look to further strenghten its relations and with the Turkish Cypriot Community, not as a separate secessionist group but as equals with the Greek Cypriot Community to tell all communities on the island that they will be approached fairly and equally in the EU's efforts to support peace on the island. Turkish Cypriots have long believed that the EU will be the solution to their economic and political problems but it increasingly seems

that it will be more of a stumbling block rather than an accelerator to their problems and to the solution of the protracted Cyprus issue.

3.2. THE EU'S ROLE IN THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

For the time being, the Turkish Cypriot side does not truly believe in the EU's impartiality in the dispute as the Republic of Cyprus is a full-member of the EU, so the EU has been kept out of the negotation table and its contribution to the negotiation process only remains unofficial and heavily dependent on assistance in technical issues such as the Turkish Cypriot Community's adaptation to the acquis after a possible solution. Going back through the years, the European Union seemed as though it was trying to satisfy both sides at the same time until 2000s. However it appears that, whether intentionally or not, it has given the Republic of Cyprus an upper hand in the conflict by accepting the 'divided' Cyprus into the EU while neglecting the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot arguments (Baştürk, 2011: 18).This move by the EU strengthened the view which was preferred by the national Greek Cypriot groups which came to be called as the 'European Solution'. This view came up before the Annan Plan and argued that if a settlement could be delayed until the Republic of Cyprus became an EU member, then the Greek Cypriot side would rise as the advantageous side on the negotiation table, as the EU's three freedoms would ensure the Greek Cypriot political dominance on the island. Despite the fact that the 'European Solution' sounds like a positive name, its contents tell a different story. So it was a big misinterpretation of the EU laws by the nationalist Greek Cypriots (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, 99-100). Still, however, even the idea of becoming an EU member created the opportunity for the uncompromising circles in the Greek Cypriot community to make reaching a settlement harder for Turkish Cypriots.

Before the failure of the Annan Plan, there was an overly optimistic atmosphere that the EU accession process of the Republic of Cyprus would serve as a catalyst for the solution of the dispute between the two sides. When the European Commission delivered a positive opinion on the application of the Republic of Cyprus in 1993, along with the other EU institutions, it also claimed that the accession process would also help accelerate the solution process on the

island, benefitting both Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Christou, 2004: 61). The need for integration and economic advantages of joining the EU was supposed to speed up the reunification process. The EU's policy on the accession of Cyprus, however, had almost played a reverse role, meaning that it slowed down rather than speeding up the reunification. This negative impact happened through the accession of the island into the EU without reaching a settlement. While enlarging towards the Central and Eastern European Countries, the EU emphasized the significance of having good relations with the neighbouring countries and that solution has to be found to internal conflicts between ethnic groups within a candidate country before becoming a member. Estonia, for example, had to settle its internal problems with the Russian minority through institutional arrangements before having the approval of the European Commission in July 1997. In the case of Cyprus, however, where the problem could be considered both as an internal conflict, or an external problem of two neighbouring countries depending on one's perspective, did not affect neither the start of the accession negotiations nor the actual accession of the Republic of Cyprus. Even though Cyprus is an extreme case of conflict where foreign troops are present and an unrecognized state is established in the north, the EU, in other words, made the conflict an internal problem while ignoring its own way of doing things (Karataş, 2011: 13-14).

This was not the case at first. After the membership application in 1990, and the positive opinion of the European Commission in 1993, the EU clearly put the condition of solution or at least the solution being within reach before accession, as stated in 1993 opinion (Karataş, 2011: 26):

> ...the Commission feels that a positive signal should be sent to the authorities and the people of Cyprus as a country eligible for membership and that as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the EU is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession.

The condition for the reunification of the island must have changed until 2004 obviously, as the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU today. It is certain that the EU would have preferred to accept a unified Cyprus to membership but lifting the solution of the problem as a condition left Greek

Cypriots with no serious encouragement to continue chasing a solution. It was not changed out of nothing, however. Greece is a member of the EU since 1981, long before the application of the Republic of Cyprus in 1990.

Some fundamental issues such as, in this case, enlargement, is taken unanimously by the Council of Ministers of the EU.As Turkey was about to sign the Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995, Greece came up with the threat of vetoing the agreement because at the time, the EU was still holding the condition that a solution should be in sight before the accession. Its not just the Customs Union with Turkey, but other key policy issues including the whole enlargement process of 1995. Furthermore, there had been efforts by some member states and the European Commission at the time to separate the accession of Cyprus from other Central and Eastern European Countries but no legal way was found to do it (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 73). In any case, starting from the European Council meeting in Corfu in 1994, the EU began to drift away from its policy of solution before accession for this reason (Karataş, 2011: 27). Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos's statement in June 1994 depicts that:

> ...not only will there not be any further enlargement if procedures for Cyprus' accession do not commence and are concluded, but it might also be difficult for other Community developments to proceed, if those things which we have committed ourselves to doing are not done (Athens News, 1994).

Eventually, Greek veto was lifted after a date for the start of accession negotiations of the Republic of Cyprus was given by the EU, which would commence in spring 1998. It was in the Helsinki Summit in 1999, however, the EU for the first time separated the Cyprus issue with the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus by clearly lifting resolution as a conditionality for accession. While the EU welcomes the efforts of the UN to reach a settlement in the Cyprus issue, it continues by stating that: "...If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition" (Helsinki European Council, 1999). In the end, the Greek intergovernmental lobbying was successful in receiving a date for the start of the accession negotiations, as well as lifting resolution as a precondition for membership.

There is little doubt that the 2004 expansion was so significant for the EU. It was, in a way, strengthening the place of the EU in the new world order after the end of the Cold War. As the relations between Cyprus and the EU traces back to as far as 1962, when the Republic of Cyprus applied for European Coal and Steel Community membership with consent from both Turkish and Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives. However this application could not be taken further because of the intercommunal violance starting in December 1963. The political division afterwards did not stop the EU and Cyprus from signing and Association Agreement in 1972 (Sözen, 2003).

It is no suprise that the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU today even though it is politically divided. The EU had to realize this enlargement for political and economic reasons, and keeping Cyprus out of the equation would force Greece to veto the whole process. It was a logical move if looked in Greek and Greek Cypriot perspective but it makes no difference as it violates most of the rights of the Turkish Cypriot Community and violatesArticle I of the 1960 Treaty of Alliance, which states that:

> "It[the Republic of Cyprus] undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island".

However the objections of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were not seen as an obstacle. As a matter of fact, the TRNC does not even constitute an entity to deal with in the international arena. Greek Cypriots refer to it as the 'Occupied Areas of the Republic of Cyprus', while in a ruling in 1995, the European Court of Human Rights referred to it as 'a subordinate local administration of Turkey' (Isachenko, 2012: 158-159).

Originally, the EU's stance on the issue was neutral. There was a general belief among the EU officials that the accession would be in the interest of the both parties, and that the accession prospect would 'act as a catalyst' in finding a solution. The optimistic beliefs of mid to late 1990s turned into an incapability to provide a coherent and genuine strategy in early 2000s when the process of the next enlargement was drawing to a close. The EU had no strategy in particular to

a situation where Cyprus would enter the EU without a solution to the political divide on the island first because of two interrelated reasons: firstly, different ideas in the Council of Ministers about the issue, and secondly, the structural incapability of the EU external policy, which again implies the difference of opinions in the Council of Ministers between the member states (Christou, 2004: 72-73). AsTurkey and Turkish Cypriots were considered to be the uncompromising side of the period until the Annan Plan, the EU was at best in the hope that the Turkish side would come to realize the benefits of the process of becoming an EU member and take on a more understanding role towards a solution (Christou, 2004: 74). At last in the 1999 Helsinki Summit, a deal, so to say, was reached as mentioned before. Unlike the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, which saw the relations between Turkey and the EU freeze because of the decision of the EU not to declare Turkey as a candidate, this time Turkey was given candidacy status, while the solution of the political division on the island was no longer a precondition for the accession of the Republic of Cyprus.

The path granting the Republic of Cyprus the EU membership was not without obstacles. According to Karataş (2011), several member states, including the big guns France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, held doubts about the idea of admitting Cyprus as a divided state. For instance, in March 1998 just before the official negotiations began with Cyprus, a last minute effort was made to stop the opening of negotiations before a settlement was reached on the island.French and German comments on the issue was circulating around the same point; they did not want to accept a politically divided state and import its problems into the Union. Greece, however, was so determined to make Cyprus an EU member that all the attempts to convince Greece to abandon its veto policy had failed, showing that the EU's policy on the Cyprus issue was mostly determined by the veto threats of Greece rather than its own strategy. In any case,it would be insufficient and even insincere to try to explain the accession of Cyprus into the EU as a divided island merely through the veto threats of Greece. Until 2000s, Greece and Greek Cypriots were successful in convincing the EU that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are the side preventing a deal on the reunification with their intransigent policies towards the UN peace proposals. This

was a diplomatic victory on their part because it would be impossible to continue the veto policy without this 'moral superiority' as the other EU member reactions would have been bigger (Karataş, 2011: 31-32).

Another perspective on the issue is that declaring Turkey as a candidate in the Helsinki Summit in 1999 enhanced the relationship between Turkey and the EU, which would in turn push Turkey to put more pressure on Turkish Cypriots to reach a settlement of the conflict faster. As a matter of fact, the EU believed that a partnership with Turkey was more significant to maintain than its strategic interests in Cyprus, in spite of the threat of breakdown of the whole enlargement process. At that period of time, however, the EU had to make the enlargement happen and Turkey needed to find a way to the solution of the problem as the accession of a divided Cyprus into the EU could be the ultimate stumbling block for a potential Turkish membership (Christou, 2004: 88). It seems that Turkey had done its part, at least on paper, as Turkish Cypriots accepted the Annan Plan in 2004, it was the Greek Cypriot community who would say no and join the EU as a divided state. Furthermore, as it turned out to be one of the most impeding reasons in front of Turkey's path to the EU today, is the vetoes of the Republic of Cyprus in some issue areas. Not only the accession worsened the relations between Turkey and the EU, it also contributed to the de facto political partition of the island by suspending the implementation of the EU acquis with the inclusion of Protocol 10 in the accession treaty.

It seems that the addition of the EU dimension into the already complex Cyprus conflict changed the dynamics of the conflict by helping to consolidate the intercommunal divisions in social, political, and economic aspects. It is doubtful whether the EU could turn this around and contribute to peace as a secondary actor behind the UN. Even if it could not be a secondary actor, as it has become a side to the conflict in 2004, it could play a constructive rather than a destructive role in the process. While it now seems that the EU could not help reaching the settlement itself, it could still help with the functioning of a potential resolution. Tocci's two suggestions attract attention. Firstly, the EU could play a role in the defense and security of Cyprus. With the right approach to both

parties, the military forces in Cyprus could be incorporated into the European defense arrangements through the European Rapid Deployment Force which could be based on the British bases of Dhekelia and Akrotiri to observe the actions of the military forces of both sides. Because of the violence of the past, an arrangement in security, approved by Turkey, is a must for most of the Turkish Cypriots. An environment of cooperation would serve as an excellent opportunity for both sides to prepare themselves for a future agreement, and with the European presence on the island, the gradual transformation to a demilitarized Cyprus would be smoother. Secondly, the EU could help with the liberalization of the freedoms of movement, property, and settlement, and the refugee problem brought by the intercommunal conflict. Especially the restrictions in the freedom of property and settlement produced refugees on the both sides. These refugees are a bit different than the description for refugees mostly in the Middle East today, but they still had to leave their homes and start new lives in different areas of the island. Mostly Greek Cypriots suffer from loss of property during the 11 year period of hot conflict (Tocci, 2002: 79-80). This idea still needs high levels of cooperation from both sides to reach success, and the EU has the means to help provide the most needed ground for cooperation.

Nevertheless, the EU's previous record of implementing its intentions actually did not go beyond words. There is a need for high level of dedication as the previous examples of direct trade regulation and financial aid were blocked by the Greek Cypriots within the intergovernmental institutions of the EU.These incidents confirm once more the deficiencies entailed by the accession of Cyprus before political settlement on the island was guaranteed. The member states within the EU, as well as the supranational institutions within, are certainly run by top level officials, but whatever the intention was, miscalculations and mistakes are part of human nature. During late 1990s to early 2000s, the Turkish Cypriot community was represented by hard-liner leaders, or one leader in fact: Rauf Denktaş, and the EU might have believed that the prospect of EU membership could have convinced them to enhance their views into a more conciliatory one. That idea simply did not work, and now the EU holds the responsibility, as former president Mehmet Ali Talat argued, "*...for restoring*

equality to the political dynamics in the discussion and negotiation of the Cyprus problem that was harmed by the full-membership of the Greek Cypriot Administration in the EU on behalf of the whole island." (Talat, 2005: 2).

What is more, the rationale behind the EU's motivation of 'the catalytic effect of EU membership prospect' could be divided into two. Firstly, as mentioned before, there was a strong belief among the EU officials that the membership perspective could serve as a carrot for the Turkish Cypriot Community to push them towads a more conciliatory position on the negotiation table. The motivation of becoming an EU member would prove to be too strong to reject, especially with the economic benefits it would bring to the relatively poor Turkish Cypriot community. As soon as the Turkish Cypriots realized this, they would fall on the path towards a relatively smoother reunification. Secondly, as much as the EU's need for Turkey in its destination towards being a global player, Turkey needed the EU as well. It needed to show a more conciliatory role as well in order not to worsen its relatios with the EU. Giving Turkey the much sought after memhership candidacy further tied Turkey, through the election of the newly found Justice and Development Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)rise to power in 2002, to the EU's way of doing things during early 2000s. This would, in theory, lead to Ankara to withdraw its soldiers from the island, abandon its policy of territorial claims, and convince Denktaş to embrace the UN led solution effort. On the other side of the coin, Greek Cypriots were assuring the EU that they were certainly in favour of a solution sooner rather than later (Karataş, 2011: 34-36).

It is doubtful, however, whether Greece could keep its pressure on the EU in favor of the accession of the Republic of Cyprus if the Annan Plan fell apart before being realized with a referendum by Greek Cypriot intransigence. Most probably, the moral superiority of the Greek and the Greek Cypriot side would have failed to stay alive, and the EU member states would have stopped the accession process before the signing of the accession treaty in April 2003. While the EU concentrated too much on convincing the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot side, it failed to notice the problems of Greek Cypriots. Consequently, the logic of

'catalytic effect' could not deliver what was desired from it. Sometimes things do not go as they were planned. The EU could not foresee the election of a hard-liner in the Greek Cypriot side just as the Turkish Cypriot side was starting to conciliate and compromise (Karataş, 2011: 38-39).

4. A NEOREALIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

The end of the Cold War was a turning point for the European Union which empowered itself with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. It was the first and foremost candidate to fill in the power vacuum caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union in its easternboundaries. However, looking at the enlargement towards Eastern Mediterranean is necessary, with Cyprus in particular focus, in terms of a basic neorealist assumption; that an actor becomes more prone to conflicts when another actor engages in political activity in its close proximity. Eastern Mediterranean/Middle Eastregion is a perfect case study for this as it has become the playground of major international actors specifically after the end of the Second World War.

Furthermore, realist/neorealist theory also focus on states' role as the main actors in the international system. The European Union is not a state, but it is widely considered to be acting in state-like ways while dealing with external issues. It has a common foreign and security policy, a complex institutional structure, and a body of laws (the EU acquis) to name a few aspects making up a proper state. Neorealism argues that a state's ultimate objective is to ensure its survival, and as every other state, the EU, as a whole, shapes its policies according to this logic. It has to act rationally to stay alive. The end of the Cold War brought a change to the distribution of power in the international system. Central and Eastern European Countries gained actual independence and were new born democracies after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In this regard, the EU felt the need to expand eastwards into this region to maximize its security by bringing stability and filling the power vacuum. European Union's style of power, however, is soft rather than hard so it prefered to deal with the economic, social, and political sides of the transformation of these countries (Hyde-Price, 2006: 226).

The 2004 enlargement was the result of this process and Cyprus was also a part of it. The divide on the island did not constitute an impediment to membership because of the neorealist nature of the EU's widening policy towards Cyprus. Even though the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria which determine whether a country is eligible to be member or not also emphasize the need of good neighbourly relations of a country within its close environment. There is however, a political, social, and economic division on the island which has been going on for the last 53 years. The EU accepted the Republic of Cyprus into the union without the consent and approval of the Turkish Cypriot Community, as they are still considered to be the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. It has been argued that one of the main reasons for this is the Greek threat to veto the whole process of enlargement if the Republic of Cyprus was not one of the countries to join the EU (Emmert & Petrovi, 2014:1409). The EU largely neglected the Turkish Cypriot interests, mainly until 2004, in exchange for a smooth enlargement process as it was a vital interest to add the Central and Eastern European Countries into the Union.

In light of these primary evaluations, this chapter will try to assess whether the European Union's admission of Cyprus has provoked any negative reaction from the international actorscurrently occupied in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, such as Russia, Turkey, and even the US. Was it the right decision to accept Cyprus or would the EU be better off in the long run if it did not let Cyprus in? This chapter will attempt to make assumptions about the international system based on neorealist arguments, as well as occasional assessments on the difference between the discourses of the EU and how it actually behaves.

4.1. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: FROM BIPOLARITY TO UNIPOLARITY AND THE EU'S ROLE IN THE UNIPOLAR SYSTEM

Before the devastation brought by the World Wars I and II, greatpowers of Europe had to survive through a multipolar structured system full of conflict. Particularly the Second World War had brought inevitable changes to the international system. The former greatpowers of Europe had had to engage in an

integration project which would restore their economy, as well as protect themselves, with the help of the US, against the rising threat of the Soviet Union. Western European states were unable to provide sufficient security individually, thus causing the alliance with the US to be essential. On neorealist grounds, this action of the Western European states could also be interpreted as a precaution against provoking the Soviets and falling away with the US. In a way, the Soviet threat attached the US and Europe to each other.The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, switched the structure of the system from bipolar to unipolar. The United States had suddenly become, in neorealist jargon, "the hegemon". Consequently, there was no real threat which would necessitate the integration of the European powers. Therefore, according to neorealism, the European Union should have been disbanded and Europe should have fallen into anarchy again. According to Mearsheimer, *"the European state system has been plagued with war since its inception"* thus it would not have been a surprise if Europe returned to multipolarity again (1990: 11-12). However, it has not after 25 years, and has not even shown a single sign of returning into a multipolar system with conflictual potential thanks to the existence of the European Union.

Seemingly, the structural pressures have been putting the European Union not to disband but to integrate even deeper and stand up to challenge the hegemon, which is still the US a quarter of a century after the fall of the Soviet Union. This is the only possibility for the neorealist claim that the balance of power is still valid after the end of the Cold War. As Waltz argues, *"In our perspective, the new balance is emerging slowly; in historical perspectives, it will come in the blink of an eye"* (Waltz, 2000: 30). If so, then the European Union is probably the first among other candidates such as China and Russia to be the balancing power against the hegemon, the United States. It may not seem possible at first but that is what the structure dictates to the state system.

In this context, the EU has increased its efforts in reaching out to the conflicts and crises in different parts of the world. Global role of the EU has been a topic of high attention since the inception of the European integration process. To what extent the EU has been an effective and capable actor across the globe

in the unipolar system has been a contentious issue. During the Cold War, François Duchêne (1972) identified the EU as a 'civilian power', as it lacked necessary military capabilities and had to rely on economy and diplomacy to exert influence. More recently, Ian Manners characterized the EU as a 'normative power', which is neither a military nor an economic power but a power "*able to shape conceptions of the normal*" (2002: 239-240). According to Manners, the EU's normative power depends on the policies it follows worldwide, such as the fight to abolish death penalty and the budget available to the member states to stress and advocate the importance of human rights (Diez, 2005:618).

It is clear that the EU has a presence in international politics, as it is the largest trading bloc in the world and its internal policies affect other actors worldwide. However, Karen Smith argues that presence is a result of the EU's internal development not its external policies thus it is not always able to behave as a genuine actor in the international system (2006: 104-105).That is a direct result of the sui generis structure of the Union. Unanimity is the condition for decision making in foreign policy, security and defence affairs thus the member states have the competence in these areas and usually each act on the account of their national agenda, making an outcome difficult. Consequently, the reactions given by the European Union to the events in different parts of the world have been complex and diverse. The EU does not perform well when quick reaction is needed. Once the violence breaks out, economic sanctions and diplomacy are often not effective. Take the invasion of Iraq in 2003 for example. Whilst EU Member States such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain supported the US, some member states led by Germany and France opposed the operation (Hummel, 2007).

The divergent responses given by the member states to the end of bipolarity has a relation, according to Bretherton and Vogler, with their "*historical experiences and contemporary policy preferences*". Neorealism fails to take into account the economic and ideational power the EU possess as it focuses too much on military capabilities (2006: 25). When on its own, the EU attempts to influence international politics, not by force, but through economy and

diplomacy.The path chosen by to EU to deal with world affairs, however, is still open to discussion as to whether the normative or civilian power it applies is intentional or compulsory because of lack of military capabilities. To put it simply, would it be different if the EU had the military might the US has, as the Europeans resorted to all sorts of brute power when they had the capability before the two world wars exhausted them and the bipolar order took away their former strength?

4.2. CREDIBILITY OF NEOREALISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH THE US AND THE "OTHERS"

As mentioned in the previous part of this chapter, the accuracy of balance of power concept of the neorealist theory depends on the EU challenge on the American unipolarity, or an American anticipation of the challenge to the unipolar system and keeping it from happening. If neorealism is correct, then evidence could be seen on the relations between the EU and the US, with an increase in the relative capabilities as well as a decrease in the pro-American motives of the EU.Therefore, a comprehensive analysis on the transatlantic relations would provide sufficient evidence whether neorealism is capable of explaining regional power balancing policies on international level and the competition/cooperation between them in any part of the world in which they show political activity.Similarly, when the EU accepted Cyprus as a member in 2004, it has shown its expansionist side and have immediately provoked the likes of Turkey- who has been very firm over the Cyprus issue and the security of Turkish Cypriots, as explained earlier- and Russia- who has been a major partner of Cyprus because of its economic benefits.

4.2.1. Challenging the Hegemon

It is clear that the end of the Cold War has opened a new era of relations between Europe and the US. They increasingly become distant in their view of the world. While the European Union, according to Kagan (2002: 3), relies more on soft-power capabilities such as democracy, rule of law, cooperation, and the

significance of prosperity, the USpursued hard-power policies all over the worldwhere "*true security and the defence and promotion of liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might*". He also distinguished Europe and America as two diverging powers, presenting them as 'Kantian Europe' and 'Hobbesian America'.

The new world order which has emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union changed the way the transatlantic relations have been working for decades. It has proved to be unrealistic to expect the parties on both sides of the Atlantic to cooperate on every issue on the international level (Lewandowski, 2004: 4). Therefore, the question arises; is the collapse of transatlantic relations unavoidable?

During the Cold War, European states were dependent on American military capabilities against the common threat. Even during that period some member states of the then EC, such as France, attempted to constitute Europe's very own defence mechanism, on its own terms.[27]Eventually, the Treaty of Maastricht created the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was expected to cover the need of the EU member states to act alone at least to events in close proximity but the Yugoslavian crisis in the mid 1990s was an unpleasant failure. NATO was still the answer for the Europeans.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example, was a major disaccord between the Americans and the Europeans. The transatlantic tensions were strained before, as the Europeans find Americans too militaristic in its approach to crises like Kosovo (Kagan, 2002: 10). Still, however, the translatlantic bonds were very strong, yet, a conflict was never out of question. Unilateral actions of the Bush administration after the September 11 attacks forced its transatlantic counterparts to question the "*continued validity of an Atlantic community based on shared interests and values*" (Tocci & Alcaro, 2012: 5). The US seemed to recognize no bounds accordingly with their interests. Some have even argued that America and Europe belonged to different planets (Tocci & Alcaro, 2012; Kagan, 2003; Cooper, 2003).Consequently, the transatlantic tensions reached its

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[27]This attempt was to create the European Defence Community in 1950. However it failed in the end.

peak with the invasion of Iraq. The European citizens in general were firmly against a unilateral invasion, even the British and Polish citizens whose governments were in favor of an operation.Even though it is not the scope of this thesis to analyze the reasons of being in favor or against the war, the most significant excuse of the European powers like France and Germany was that the Americans had no vision for a post-war Iraq, as there were too many conflictual groups throughout the country, making it hard to convince and provide the environment for them to cooperate (Lewandowski, 2004: 19-20).

The main point here is that the Europeans attempt to sustain its influence on world politics through norms and values and the significance of international law. This is mostly because of the power gap between itself and the US. Americans can act one-sidedly even if the world is against them because of the massive military capabilities it possesses, but this is not the case for Europe (Duke, 2003: 6-7).Furthermore, if the US withdraws its military presence in Europe, the EU would need to bear the costs of improving its security on supranational level. This could be a threat to American hegemony and both the Europeans and Americans know it. Even if the Europeans had the will to challenge this hegemony, as Romano Prodi once argued "*we are still far from having the single telephone number Mr Kissinger once asked for*" (Prodi, 2001). In spite of the progress made, the EU is still far from being coherent in its external policy today as its decision-making mechanisms are still too complex and slow.

Recent decision by the British to exit the European Union will definitely cause changes and developments in this area as the United Kingdom (the UK) has traditionally been the closest ally of the US and the most suspicious state of European integration. In what direction these developments will lead the EU and its impacts over the Atlantic, however, is still ambiguous.One result of the UK's exit, however, will be the loss of a military power "*capable of operating and thinking on a global scale*" (Oliver, 2016: 12). Europe will find itself in a 'multipolar' environment. Russia and Turkey have already been constituting poles on their own, and now the UK will add another pole surronding the EU. Even

though it is a distant possibility, the exit of the UK, who has been an obstruction for deeper integration, could lead the EU to integrate more and form a more capable European military capability which would be an alternative to NATO (Oliver, 2016: 14). Therefore, Brexit will have serious implications on the European politics and the transatlantic relations.

It is not senseless to expect the EU to alter the balance in the transatlantic relations in its favour, but not to an extent to distance itself from the partnership which has been led by the US. Furthermore, it can even be said that the EU has taken advantage of the unipolar system, as a close ally of the hegemon, to strengthen its position relative to other actors. If a balance does occur eventually, it is highly likely to happen within the alliance, as the EU does not seek power but seek security. Despite anti-American sentiments in the post-Cold War period, the EU has developed some challenges to American leadership but only in areas where it has been doubtful of American motivation. The EU, for its part, has managed to build its own capabilities while keeping the transatlantic relations in one piece. It has only challenged or 'checked' the Americans when they showed lack of motivation, such as the creation of Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) after the US showed signs of disengaging from the Balkans thus the greater threat is not the EU wish to balance the US, but the isolationist policies of the US which threatens Europe to build greater capabilities (Norris, 2002: 153-157).

Even though it has shown some progress, the EU is still dependent on NATO for military operations. Lack of a real functioning European force has been the most significant element keeping the transatlantic relations going in terms of security. In this aspect, Europe seems to be more dependent on the US military capabilities rather than being able to challenge it. This is a direct result of the lack of will of the member states to integrate more deeper on security issues. To put it differently, most of Europe criticise Americans for being too militaristic not because of the values and norms they believe in, but the incapability of the European Union –and the member states individually- to act on its/their own. Therefore, it stands doubtful whether the EU wishes, or is capable, to gain the

world leadership through threatening its relations with its counterpart across the Atlantic. It has been 16 years since Waltz famously said the balancing will occur slowly but instantly in historical perspective, however there is still no sign by Europe in challenging American supremacy. Furthermore, if an external challenge arises, the Europeans would most probably look for American security. A European-American bipolarity does not seem possible without further integration on defence and security issues and increased military spending by Europe. A closer look at what the European Union has been trying to deal with in the recent years make military spending even more improbable.Neorealist assumptions are too simplistic and static to evaluate the changing relations over the Atlantic, as both actors determine their policies according to changes in each other's policies on each and every level. Furthermore, the conflicts in close proximity to Europe such as the Ukraine and Syria prevent the transatlantic relations to take a downturn as there are still other regional actors to stand together against.

4.2.2. Conflict of Interests in the Region

There are so many variables to think of when it comes to the complex relations of regional powers in the Eastern Mediterranean which has affected the EU in many aspects. The area has many unresolved and protracted disputes going on, in addition to terrorism, migration, and lately, energy security issue. The situation in which Cyprus has been recently is an instance, as it lays in the middle of a plentiful of political activities and conflicts. These conflicts include, for example, oil and gas disputes in the South-Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus issue with Turkey to the north, Syrian crisis to the east, and the attempts of Russia to increase its role in the whole region. Seemingly, Cyprus is the EU's "Levantine outpost" in the center of all these conflicts (Gorvett, 2016).

To start with, Cyprus has been offering legislative and tax opportunities for Russian investors but the European Union accession in 2004 and the bailout crisis in 2013 has been a challenge for these opportunities (Von Gersdroff, 2015: 2). Especially during the bailout crisis, there was a major concern among the European taxpayers that the bailout money would go to Russian oligarchs as Russian investments in the country is equivalent to 80% of the total foreign

investment (Russia Today, 2015).The impacts of these challenges threaten the relations between Russia and Cyprus. After the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades' special envoy to Russia, Sotos Zackheos emphasized *"We have a historically strong, friendly relationship with Russia economically and of course no one wants to see that damaged. This is not a question just of bilateral relations, but of EU-Russia relations."*(Tanas, 2014), a statement which indicates Cyprus' position on a greater scale of East-West relations but also reiterating the will to see the good relations continue.

Since the beginning of 1990s, Russia has been pursuing a policy of keeping good relations with Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. This is the way Kremlin has been attempting to ensure its influence in the region. However, this stance was bound to change because of two reasons. Firstly, the recent discovery of energy resources, Aphrodite and Leviathan gas fields, in the Eastern Mediterranean- which falls into the Exclusive Economic Zones of Cyprus and Israel- had once again soured the relations between the EU and Russia because of the way Russia has attempted to involve itself in the utilization of those resources. To stay active in the region, Russian energy companies have started to sign deals with states such as Israel, Syria, and Palestine (Karagiannis, 2016).As a continuation of its realpolitik, Kremlin's involvement can be seen as an attempt to exert influence in the region as the newly discovered resources are expected to lessen the EU's dependence on Russian energy. It should be kept in mind that Russia has been using the natural gas dependency of the EU for putting political and economic pressure on relevant EU member states for decades (Stergiou, 2012). Therefore, Cyprus might be in a key position to help keeping the balance between the EU and Russia in the coming period. More specifically, the solution of the Cyprus issue would most probably provide a much necessary environment to the extraction and utilization of the gas fields.

Looking at the issue from European perspective, the EU member states currently import their energy needs from unstable states such as Nigeria and Algeria (Karagiannis, 2016). Extraction of newly discovered energy sources in the

Eastern Mediterranean could boost the energy security of the EU, as these sources are of foremost importance for Europe because of its close proximity to the region. The European Council President Donald Tusk once suggested that an initiative to form an "energy union" where a single mechanism would be created to purchase natural gas for all member states at once. This way, member states could aid each other in times of scarce in supply (Mix, 2015). Through Greece, and especially Cyprus, the EU is directly involved in energy affairs of the region as well.

Secondly, the uprisings in the Middle East starting in late 2010 caused another phase of friction between the two parties. As Russian support to Bashar al-Assad's Syrian Government's repression of the opposition continues, the European Council, in May 2016, has renewed the sanctions against the Syrian regime for one year, stating that "…*the EU would continue imposing and enforcing sanctions targeting the regime and its supporters as long as repression continues*".Moreover, last year, Russia signed a deal which enables the use of Limassol port[28] by the Russian navy. Greek Cypriot President Anastasiades has stated that the deal has been approached delicately and without putting Cyprus in a "complicated position" with its EU partners, denying the possibility of a Russian military base in Cyprus (Saunders, 2015). The deal has surely caused some concerns in Brussels as Russia chases every opportunity to disturb the European unity in a period of conflict over the civil wars in Ukraine and Syria.

Every step taken by a regional power changes the dynamics of any given region as it takes that step after cost-benefit analysis of a rational mindset. Accession of Cyprus was the product of a delicate cost-benefit analysis as it would have serious impacts for the EU's relations with the actors in that region. Throughout the history, all regional and global powers have had interest on the Cyprus because of its geopolitical significance. The European Union too has a geopolitical interest on the island because of its position in the Mediterranean. The island offers a significant importance to the security of the European Union

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[28]Limassol is a city located on the southern coast of Cyprus.

in the Mediterranean. As its close proximity to Northern Africa and Middle East shows, the island serves as a static aircraft carrier.

Moreover, Cyprus has been affecting the foreign policies of the EU and the EU member states in spite of being a militarily and economically weak island. State behaviours such as balancing and mistrust assumed by the neorealist theory do not seem to have account in European integration process. Once a state successfully becomes a member, it can shape the policies of the union. The structure of decision making within the EU allows such small states to have big impacts on policy outcomes. When one takes a closer look, the accession of Cyprus has seriously undermined the EU's relations with Turkey, which in turn makes the cooperation harder between the parties in regional conflicts such as the Syrian case. As Turkey is at the doorstep of Syria, a closer cooperation of the EU with Turkey within Syria could have stopped the shattering civil war before it even started. This assumption is valid for all the other minor or dormant regional conflicts, even the Cyprus question. As discussed in the earlier chapters, the EU could have accelerated the settlement process in Cyprus through the catalyzing effect of membership prospect. The reality is just the opposite, however, as the EU membership strengthened the Greek Cypriot hand on the negotiation table.

Furthermore, Cyprus, through EU membership, has managed to influence the policies of a regional power like Turkey. First and foremost influence was the changing relations between the EU and Turkey. After the Cypriot accession, Turkey's EU membership prospect was practically over as the Republic of Cyprus has seized every opportunity to undermine Turkey's negotiations process through vetoing the opening of new chapters since the beginning (Sigmalive, 2016), thus force Turkey to make concessions. Failure of the application of the Additional Protocol which envisages Turkey to open up its ports to Cypriot vessels prevents opening and closing of certain new chapters in the negotiation process (Sözen, 2014: 46). It should also be noted that the external changes also shape a state's goals on national level. According to Waltz (1979: 72), structural pressures have influence on the foreign policy making, which national policies have to adapt. The recent Eurozone crisis which still has effects on the European economies and the

enlargement fatigue which has diverted EU's focus into internal matters, as well as Turkey-skepticism of member states such as France and Germany have all played a role in the changing relations and has drawn Turkish domestic opinion away from the EU. (Kyris, 2014: 20).

The hydrocarbon issue soured the relations even further within the Cyprus-Turkey-EU triangle. In 2012, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus began exploration in an intersecting area which was created by the division on the island. As a result, problems arising from the Cyprus question spread into a whole new level and became a regional dispute concerning all of the Eastern Mediterranean states, especially Israel. There were major expectations about the discovery of hydrocarbons in a very close proximity to the island as it would have a positive effect and accelerate the settlement of Cyprus issue. However, the failure of cooperation between the parties in exploiting the resources has made the issue even more complex (Sözen, 2014: 55-56).

These sorts of events bring actors who have regional aspires against each other.In addition, the refugee crisis and terrorism caused by the shattering civil war in Syria shook the very foundations of Europe. Unsurprisingly, the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels have failed to convince Russia to cooperate with Europe against the common enemy, the Islamic State, as both parties have differing interests in the conflict. For this reason, the two parties see each other as more of a threat than a partner in fighting terrorism (Lightfoot, 2016: 11-12). The EU and Russia increasingly diverge on the future of Syria which creates further tension in the region. While stating that the conflicts in Ukraine and Russia should be evaluated seperately, an easing on sanctions imposed upon Russia for its engagement in Ukraine is abandoned, forcing the EU to continue the sanctions as Russian bombing against EU backed opposition forces intensified (Baczynska & Irish, 2016). Relations between the parties could be further deteriorating which would have serious implications in the region.Seemingly, the actors engaged in the region have been unable to share a vision for the settlement of the conflict as the situation gets worse and coalitions are formed in each side supporting different groups. Therefore, it is crucial to remember that

regional powers who perceive a threat to their security are prone to take harsh decisions on the international level thus the deterioration of relations with Russia could constitute a major problem for the EU.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to evaluate the role and capacity of the European Union given the present situation on Cyprus as well as the Eastern Mediterranean region. The European Union has been insufficient in providing a faster settlement on the island thus far. Naturally, it could not remain as a third party in the conflict after the accession of the Greek Cypriot administered Republic of Cyprus in 2004. The catalyzing effect of EU membership prospect which was expected to improve the standpoint of both sides on the island, as well as Turkey, to the solution of the conflict does not exist anymore. True, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004 and the positive reaction of the Turkish Cypriot Community to the Annan Plan has forced the EU to take action against the isolations imposed on the Turkish Cypriots but these actions, such ascloser communication and financial assistance,have not been enough. Greek Cypriot officials have seized every opportunity to block the Direct Trade Regulationenvisaged for the Turkish Cypriots (Evripidou, 2014).The accession has made the EU a party in the conflict which has resulted in the unwillingness of the Turkish Cypriot Community for the EU to be present on the negotiation table. Akıncı, in an interview to Ortam Newspaper in September 2016, stated that there is no possibility that any EU official could take part in the negotiations as it is a side in the conflict thus it could only provide technical assistance as it has been with the appointment of Pieter Van Nuffel as the personal representative of European Commission President Juncker.

The history of negotiations, which has been going on since 1968, has shown that there will not be an externally forced solution. The struggle between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots roots in the competition among the communities especially after the Greek Cypriot efforts to force their Turkish counterparts out of all government organs to pursue enosis, which has resulted in Turkish military intervention in 1974. Efforts to this day to unite the island has not achieved success as of yet. Nevertheless,both communities have to put the griveances of the past behind if they wish to build a better future. The role of the EU in this future should be to protect the fair judgment of both sides towards

each other with objectivity to justify the norms and values it has been attempting to promote, bearing in mind that a successful settlement will not only be of good for the communities of the island but for the region as a whole.

From a neorealist point of view, the EU should have approached the Cyprus issue with more care. Eastern Mediterranean region has always been the playground of major powers since it is a crossing point of diverse cultures and has geopolitical significance. As the accession of the Republic of Cyprus has given it powers beyond its size, it has had unbearable consequences for Turkey. Contemporary balance of power politics does not affect the Republic of Cyprus as it did before 2004, thus it feels more secure and pursue a better solution for itself.Furthermore, the Cyprus issue constitutes the greatest stumbling block between the EU and Turkey.As the situations in Syria and Ukraine suggests, with the recently changing dynamics between the West and the East, the EU would face the threat of losing such a traditional partner if the deterioration of relations between the parties continue. Thus with thepolicies it has followed, the EU has indirectly made a choice between Cyprus and Turkey. In this situation, however, the EU should not be evaluated as a whole as individual member state interests exist owing to its unique policy-making structure.

In an ever changing political environment in the region, the EU's mission, as an advocate of peace, should be to find ways to ease the tensions. As the EU lacks a substantial military capability, it has been unsuccessful in intervening in violent conflicts. However, due to its economic and diplomatic power, it can play facilitating role in post-conflict environments (Sözen, 2003: 31). In this context, a historical chance was missed in 2004 with accepting a divided Cyprus into the EU.If one looks at the bigger picture, it can be seen that regional conflicts could have been dealt with easier if the EU could keep its relations with Turkey at least on the level of 2005 when Turkey has started its full-membership negotiation process. The civil war in Syria, especially, escalated further as the two parties failed to cooperate. This has shown once again, that the EU is incapable of intervening violent conflicts at the onset.

Traditionally, Turkey has been a bridge between the Arab and the Western World, while both Turkey and the EU seek a more peaceful and stable region as well. In the recent years, Turkish public opinion has started to turn away from Europe to its Middle Eastern neighbours (Kirişçi, 2014: 75-76). This should not, however, prevent the parties from engaging in positive dialogue regarding the regional issues. Developments in the solution of the Cyprus issue stands as one of the most significant milestonesto be reached in order to heal the deteriorating relations.

To build upon what this thesis has attempted to assess, there is room for further research particularly about the neorealist aspect. In the contemporary world politics, the unipolar system seems to be paving the way for a multipolar one with the recent rise of other major powers such as Russia, China, and the European Union even though it is still a strong ally of the United States. Russia and the US, for instance, have become more and more against each other through regional conflicts such as Ukraine and Syria, as well as the alleged Russian meddling in the latest US elections and the relations does not seem to be warming up anytime soon. These sorts of developments could be evaluated based on neorealist grounds for further contribution to the field.

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