

**T.C.  
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

**THE EU IN THE NEOREALIST INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**

**Birke BOYAT**

**İstanbul – 2017**

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**Danışman: Doç. Dr. Armağan Emre ÇAKIR**

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28 / 3 / 2017

ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı ~~Türke~~ / İngilizce Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencisi Birke Boyat'ın, "The EU in the Neorealist International System" konulu tez çalışması ~~28/3/2017~~ tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından **OYBİRLİĞİ** / ~~OYÇOKLUĞU~~ ile **BAŞARILI** bulunmuştur.

Onaylayan:

Doç. Dr. Armağan E. ÇAKIR

Danışman

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Selin Kılıç TÜRKEŞ

Jüri Üyesi

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Emirhan GÖRAL

Jüri Üyesi

Onay

Prof. Dr. Müzaffer DARTAN

Müdür



10/04/2017 tarih ve 2017-08 Sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararı ile onaylanmıştır.

## GENEL BİLGİLER

İsim ve Soyadı	: Birke Boyat
Anabilim Dalı	: Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Programı	: Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Danışmanı	: Doç. Dr. Armağan Emre Çakır
Tez Türü ve Tarihi	: Yüksek Lisans – Nisan 2017
Anahtar Kelimeler	: Avrupa Birliği, Neorealizm, Normatif Güç

## ÖZET

### NEOREALIST ULUSLARARASI SİSTEMDE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ

Çalışmada, Avrupa Birliği'nin neorealist uluslararası sistemdeki varlığı ele alınmıştır. AB'nin normatif güç olduğu iddiasına karşılık, çalışmada yer alan hipotez, AB'nin, daha doğrusu AB üye devletlerinin, belirlemiş olduğu normlar yerine, kendi ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda, neorealist sistemin kurallarına uygun bir şekilde hareket ettiğidir. AB'nin yapısı, normatif gücün ne demek olduğu, AB'nin belirlediği norm ve değerler, AB'nin normatif güç olduğu iddiasına yönelik karşı tezler, neorealist teorinin temelleri ve AB'nin bünyesinde barındırdığı neorealist özellikler açıklanmış ve tüm bunlar örnek olay incelemeleriyle desteklenmiştir. Çalışma, tamamen teorik bir çerçevede ilerlemiş ve bu teorik çerçeve uluslararası sistemde gerçekleşmiş olan pratik vakalarla da desteklenmiştir.

## **GENERAL INFORMATION**

Name and Surname	: Birke Boyat
Field	: EU Politics and International Relations
Programme:	: EU Politics and International Relations
Supervisor	: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Armağan Emre Çakır
Degree Awarded and Date	: Master – April 2017
Keywords	: The EU, Neorealism, Normative Power

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE EU IN THE NEOREALIST INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

The thesis analyses the European Union's existence in the neorealist international system. In contrast with the EU's claim of being a normative power, hypothesis in the thesis is that the EU, or the EU member-states, act(s) in favor their national interests according to the neorealist international system's rules, rather than norms that it set. The EU's structure, the meaning of normative power, norms and values that are set by the EU, counter hypotheses against the EUs claim of being a normative power, neorealist theory's basis and neorealist features that the EU has are explained and all of them are supported by case study analyses. The thesis is emerged of theoretical framework completely, and this theoretical framework is supported by case studies that are seen in practice in the international system.

## PREFACE

This thesis is made as a completion of my master education in Marmara University European Union Institute EU Politics and International Relations. The purpose of this thesis is to introduce a different point of view to the EU studies in terms of a theoretical framework.

I would like to thank so many people for supporting me in my thesis process. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Armağan Emre Çakır. He is a real intellectual and one of the best academic persons who I have ever met. I am proud to be working with him. Furthermore, I would like to thank my professors, who always support me in my education life, Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı Caşın, Prof. Dr. Emin Gürses, Asst. Prof. Dr. Selin Türkeş Kılıç, Asst. Prof. Dr. Bilgen Sütçüoğlu, Asst. Prof. Dr. Emirhan Göral, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yonca Özer, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Münevver Cebeci and Asst. Prof. Dr. Nedime Aslı Şirin.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for being helpful and supportive during my education life.

İstanbul, 2017

Birke BOYAT

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## INTRODUCTION

After the devastation of World War I and II, European countries sought to overcome the political and economic crises and avoid another war by establishing an entity that could maintain peace and economic growth in Europe. The European Union (EU) initiated as an economic project before growing into a political entity in the neorealist international system.

The shape of the emerging the EU hinged on a long history that includes the European integration process. Before looking more closely at the details of the European integration process, we will look at the first ideas related to integration and the Union in order to stop impending wars. Because Europe faced destroying wars such as the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) and Franco-Prussian War (July 1870-May 1871). Victor Hugo (1812-1885) called for a “United States of Europe”. In 1849, during an International Peace conference he used the term the United States of Europe. “He stated that: A day will come when we shall see... the United States of America and the United States of Europe face to face, reaching out for each other across the seas...” (Kirkland, 2011)

Aristide Briand (1862-1932), French Prime Minister, submitted the idea of federation European nations based on solidarity and on the pursuit of economic prosperity and political and social cooperation. In the presence of League of Nations General Assembly, in Geneva, on 5th September 1929, he stated that: A sort of federal bond should exist between the nations geographically gathered as Europe countries; these nations should have the possibility of establishing contact, of discussing their interests and common resolutions. (Ocaña, 2003)

Edouard Herriot (1872-1957), French politician, proposed the idea of ‘the United States of Europe’ in his book in 1930. Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986), one of the founding fathers of the EU, wrote the Ventotene Manifesto in 1941 together with Ernesto Rossi (1897-1967), a document which inspired the Maastricht Treaty.

The EU is a political and economic partnership that represents a unique form of cooperation among sovereign countries. The Union is the latest stage in a process of integration begun after World War II, initially by six Western European countries, to foster interdependence and make another war in Europe unthinkable. Today, the EU is composed of 28 member states, including most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and has helped to promote peace, stability, and economic prosperity throughout the European continent. (Archick, 2014, p. 2)

When we look for the beginning of European integration, we find it in the period of political and economic crisis after World War II. The Monnet Plan came into force at that time, tying together two powerful states of Europe -France and Germany- to create an economic cooperation. Jean Monnet, Commissioner-General of the French National Planning Board, considered closer economic ties between European States. The Schuman Declaration, announced by Robert Schuman and based on the Monnet Plan, sought to establish a new form of supranational entity through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with the Paris Treaty in 1951. Put into force in 1952, this was the first main step towards today's the EU and the first point of European integration. This step was economic and technical, because it included pooling production of coal and steel and established a high authority over the 6 founders – France, Germany, Italy and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) – to make a decision, creating a new European supranational structure. The high authority's representatives were expected to act in interests of ECSC and not be dominated by their national interests. Hence, as we see, the ECSC can be thought of as the first step of Europe becoming a *sui generis*<sup>1</sup> community.

At the same time, in 1950 the Pleven Plan established a supranational collective defense organization called the European Defense Community, which finally emerged in

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<sup>1</sup> Sui generis is a Latin word that refers the case which has its own specific qualities and these qualities cannot be seen in any other cases or examples. Thus, European integration process has specific case including its own economic and political motivations, technical projects, enlargement process, customs, taxes policies, trade policies, treaties and agreements, its institutions, its law, relations with countries and its integration path. In addition, "many scholars appear to agree, characterizing the European Union as "sui generis," "unique," "new," "exceptional," "hybrid," and differing from both federal states and international organizations. (Phelan, 2012, p. 367)

1952. However, the Plan came to an end in 1954 because France was not willing to allow the rearmament of Germany and did not want to share decision-making power and to give its sovereignty to the supranational system, all of which the Pleven Plan required. Hence the Pleven Plan was never implemented because it was a big step for Europe in that time, it is related to defense and countries were still wary of their neighbors after the wars and political strife, and refused to cede defensive powers to a supranational authority.

The ECSC, however, was a successful step towards integration and was built upon by the Rome Treaty, which established the European Economic Community as a common market and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and, also included some objectives of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The Common Agricultural Policy of 1962 was designed to implement a system of agricultural subsidies and other programmes across multiple countries in Europe to help alleviate some of the burden faced by countries rebuilding after the war. As we see, the developments such as the ECSC, the EURATOM and the CAP started to unite Europe in economic, agricultural or other important issues.

Despite these initiatives, it was difficult to unite Europe because of the *sui generis* nature of the community. France, led by Charles de Gaulle, was opposed to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system in the CAP. De Gaulle wanted each member state to have veto rights, which meant that France was able to block meetings; in fact, when France's representatives did not join the meetings, the Community faced what was called the Empty Chair Crisis, whereby blocking of the meetings. Then member states, excluding France, made a decision about the veto right on the legislation in the CAP, a move which was called as the Luxembourg Compromise and allowed France to return the meetings with its dignity intact. This conflict point was caused by a unique feature of the integration: member-states did not have a common view about the community's *sui generis* structure.

After the Luxembourg Compromise came the Merger Treaty of 1965, and four years later we see the end of the de Gaulle period of the integration process and the process

began to revive. In the same year, from the Hague Summit, emerged three principles: completion (for CAP), deepening (for new policy areas and cooperation) and widening (for enlargement and new members). In 1970, the Davignon Report was presented as a report about the future policy of the Community's member states; the Foreign Ministers of member-states came together in order to discuss foreign policy of the Community. This is an example of the principle of deepening.

The UK joined the community in 1973. In the beginning of the integration, the UK did not want to be a founding member of the Community, because its most important concern is about maintaining its sovereignty. The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 as a rival to ECSC. However, in 1961 it applied to the Community. Its first and second applications were rejected by France in 1963 and 1967. Finally, in 1973, the UK, Denmark, and Ireland became members. This was the first enlargement of the community.

With the UK's membership, the Community faced a crisis like that embodied by de Gaulle. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister of the UK, was nervous about the CAP's budget. According to her, the UK's payment is much more than it should be. The budget problems were ongoing until 1984, when the decision to reduce the UK's payment was made during the Fontainebleau Summit.

The second enlargement of the community took place in 1981 with Greece's membership. Greece had an association agreement called as Athens Agreement (1961) with the Community, which, together with Ankara Agreement that was signed with Turkey, was the first to be concluded by the Community with third-party countries. The third enlargement took place in 1986 and was called the Southern Enlargement, during which Spain and Portugal became new members of the Community. In the same year, after the Intergovernmental Conferences, the Single European Act was signed and it entered into force in 1987, starting the process of creating a single market. This is a huge step because it includes removal of economic and trade barriers and calls for the free movement of goods,

people, capital and services. Border controls, customs and physical borders were eliminated. In addition, the Schengen Agreement was signed as single visa regime in 1985.

In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty, which is known as the Treaty of the EU, was signed. This treaty is one of the most significant one in integration process, because the Community has a political dimension as well as an economic one. The Maastricht Treaty established a three pillar system. The first pillar was the economic integration of the Community until this time and it has supranational structure in decision-making process. The second pillar was the Common Foreign and Security Policy, clarifying that the Community was not only economic but also a political entity with a shared foreign policy and intergovernmental decision-making process. The third pillar was Justice and Home Affairs, establishing police and judicial cooperation such as security and freedom issues likewise structured by an intergovernmental decision-making process.

One of the most important developments of the Maastricht Treaty was creating a new concept of “European Citizenship”. In addition, we saw the first European citizens’ preference: when Denmark held a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty the Danish people rejected it. Hence, Euroscepticism is an important concept which refers having doubts regarding the supposed benefits of increasing cooperation between the member-states of the European Union. In this case, the doubt stemmed from people not understanding the *sui generis* and complex structure and treaties of the Union.

In 1993 during the progressive integration process, the Copenhagen Criteria was the fundamental point: new member states, especially countries from the former Soviet bloc, had to have a functioning free market, democracy, and a rule of law in place that protected human rights and minority rights. Only if these criteria were met could a new member be accepted. With these rules in place, the third enlargement of the EU welcomed Sweden, Finland and Austria as countries which easily met the criteria.

In 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty was passed to make institutions more efficient. Moreover, the Schengen visa was officially accepted by the main body of the EU. And in

2001 the Treaty of Nice was also passed as part of the on-going process of reforming the institutional structure of the EU. However, Ireland rejected the Treaty with a referendum because it was concerned about the possible effects of the Treaty on its foreign policy, critics of the Treaty contents, believing that it marginalized smaller states, and the impact of the Treaty on Irish neutrality.<sup>2</sup> Thus this referendum showed that European citizens could have a direct effect on European integration process, and after the second referendum Ireland signed the Treaty by the consent of the Dáil<sup>3</sup> for enhanced cooperation under the treaty and preventing Ireland from joining any EU common defense policy.

In 2004, the Eastern Enlargement came to the agenda in the process. In that time, the number of member-states increased from 15 to 25, with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta joining as new members of the EU. These were followed in 2007 with Romania and Bulgaria, and in 2013 with Croatia joining the EU.

The Constitutional Treaty, which was another development for the EU in 2004, was rejected by France and Netherland in a referendum. At that time, member-states did not trust each other enough to accept a common constitution.

By this time, there had been five main treaties including the Treaty of Rome, the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty, and the Treaty of Nice. These treaties, especially reforming treaties such as the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice, were developed to address the existing of institutional problems in the EU because of conflicting national interests of the member states. Intergovernmental Conferences emerged and the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, was

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<sup>2</sup> Irish neutrality means that the state shall not adopt a decision taken by the European Council to establish a common defense pursuant to Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union where that common defense would include the State. (European Council, 2002)

<sup>3</sup> Dáil Éireann is the lower house (Assembly of Ireland) of the Oireachtas (Irish legislature). Seanad Éireann is the upper house (Senate of Ireland) of the Oireachtas.

signed on 13<sup>th</sup> of December, 2007 and entered into force on the 1<sup>st</sup> of December, 2009. It abolished the three pillar system of the Maastricht Treaty, holding that the European Community is not separate body from the EU. The Treaty strengthened member states' authority with principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and introduced new policy areas such as humanitarian aid, sport, administrative operations first time. It also made co-decision the basic legislative process, now referred to as Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), European Citizens' Initiative and new rights to national parliaments were implemented, as well as significant institutional developments.

The Treaty of Lisbon has a tendency towards more supranational or federalist feature but still the EU is *sui generis*, with a structure both supranational<sup>4</sup> and intergovernmentalist.<sup>5</sup> In 2013 Croatia became the last country to join the EU, while some other states were recognized as candidate countries, such as Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, and as potential candidate countries, such as Bosnia and Kosovo.

The 28 member-states of the EU and European integration process have specific case including its own economic and political motivations, technical projects, enlargement process, customs, taxes policies, trade policies, treaties and agreements, institutions, law, international relations and integration path.

As we see, the EU has a significant historical background; however, this cannot make the unity of the EU a certainty because it still does not have a common foreign policy shared by its member-states in so many policy fields. This lack allows us to characterize the EU as having neorealist features in accordance with international structure: The EU has its own genuine characteristics and it is different organization from the others in the neorealist

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<sup>4</sup> Supranationalism refers to governance arrangements where states decide to delegate some responsibility for decision making to a body or decision-making forum that stands above the nation state. Here states lose the right to veto and agree to be bound by majority decisions of cooperating states and thus lose some control. (Nugent, 2010, p. 475)

<sup>5</sup> Intergovernmentalism is a theory and approach to regional integration proposed by Stanley Hoffman that treats states as the primary actors in the integration process. (Khorto, 2016, p. 3)

international arena. “The ambivalent nature of governance in the EU is a long-familiar theme. For example, the EU polity is said to embody a mixture of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.” (Çakır, 2009, p. 328)

A nation-state has a territory, population, sovereignty, government and centralized hierarchical authority. According to these criteria, when we look at the EU, it has territory consisting of the member states, it has population, and the pooled-sovereignty means that member-states transfer some aspects of their sovereignty to the EU. However, the EU has no hierarchical authority like state and member-states retain much of their autonomy. According to Brian White, “there is governance, not government in the EU. In this way the EU is not a state, but it acts in state-like ways.” (2001, p. 21). When we look at the EU, it has complex institutional structure, a wide range of responsibilities in realms such as energy, transportation, agriculture, human rights, and food safety, and it has a mode of decision-making beside unanimity. With these characteristics, the EU is a *sui generis* organization that shares features of both state and international organizations, making it both supranational and intergovernmentalist in nature.

The general trend in the literature can be said to vary between those theories that look at the Union through a state lens, attributing its features to state-like categories; and those having an intergovernmentalist perception of the EU, as being an international coordination system between the states. (Kılıç, 2012, p. 27)

The European integration process that created the EU is a unique model which influences Europe politically, economically and culturally. The motivation of the process was initially economic, with a focus on establishing a customs union, single market, single currency as Euro and eliminating trade barriers in the Union. After economic concerns come other motivations such as political organization, defense and security concerns. This thesis focuses on the EU’s international role because the EU is unique model that exists in the international system that shapes its policies according to the system’s rules that has neorealist structure.



The EU has a claim of having some norms and values including human rights, rule of law, democracy and minority rights and it claims that it acts in the international arena according to these norms. However, the EU exists in the neorealist international system where neorealist conditions dominate and actors' interests and power are the most important elements.

Although the EU argues that it always gives priority to the norms in the world politics, it acts in accordance with the conditions of the neorealist international system, which are maximizing power and concerning its member-states' national interests. The thesis argues that national interests instead of normative values stand in the forefront for the EU. For instance, we can see this in the examples of the EU's external activities in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and policy on migration. In addition, the EU cannot act like a union because its member-states act according to their own interests.

The EU is one of the most important entities in the world and it influences the world politics. Its behaviors and activities shape the international relations, despite the fact that the EU's member-states care about their own interests rather than the EU's. In the neorealist international system, the EU's member-states decide their policies according to the system's structure. The neorealist theory of international politics includes anarchical character and a state-centric approach of the system, nation-states' interests, the maximization of power, balance of power, security seeking approach and system's influence on the actors. Manners claims that "the EU has an international identity and role as a normative power." (2002, p. 236) The EU's member-states shape their policies according to an anarchic international system, although the EU's claim of being a normative power. Moreover, this comparative analysis is supported by some examples and cases, such as the EU's activities in the Middle East and the Balkans.

The thesis analyses some approaches to the EU and neorealism. For instance, Simon Collard-Wexler (2006, pp. 397-399) claims that "neorealism may not explain the EU and this dominant theory of international relations gives poor explanations about the EU."

However, the EU has some neorealist features. And the thesis's aim is to criticize the EU's claim of being a normative power.

The EU shows itself to be a normative power by influencing other countries' policies, as it did with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which provides cooperation, dialogue, peace and stability for Mediterranean countries. In addition, in relations with Turkey, the EU requires that Turkey adhere to some norms such as the protection of broadly agreed-upon human rights, the rule of law, democratization, and protection of minority rights, as established by the Copenhagen Criteria (Diez, 2005, p. 630).

The method that the thesis follows is testing a particular hypothesis offered by previous studies and contextualizing the analysis through a literature review of official documents, articles and a secondary analysis that using data collected by other researchers, which the thesis analyses and use to offer some critiques about the arguments and counter arguments, and provide new analysis about the subject. The thesis focuses on the theoretical background, where the thesis lays out the concepts of normative power and neorealist theory of international politics. Then, it analyses the EU as a normative power and the neorealist characteristics of the EU. The subsequent chapter will include three case studies – the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and migration issue. Finally, it offers concluding observations and analyses.

To sum up, the thesis highlights the claim that the EU's member-states care about their own interests rather than the EU's interests in the neorealist system, although the EU claims that it highlights the norms. Hence the question is, "Are norms or interests priorities for the EU?" In addition, "Does the EU act with neorealist features including relative gains, balance of power and anarchy?" Thus, the thesis focuses on "the EU in the neorealist international system" in order to highlight its importance in the literature.

## **1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

In this section of the thesis, the concept of normative power and neorealist theory of international politics are focused on. The EU has a claim of being a normative power in the world. However, it has neorealist features and it does not exist as a normative power in the international system, in contradiction to its claim of being a normative power. In order to analyse the EU's claim and its neorealist qualities, the clear definitions and analyzing of 'normative power' and 'neorealist theory' should be emphasized.

### **1.1. THE CONCEPT OF NORMATIVE POWER**

In order to analyse how the EU acts in the neorealist international system with its claim of being a normative power, firstly the thesis emphasizes on the meaning of the notion of normative power. "What is normative?", "What is power?" and also "What is norm?" are the main questions that the thesis answers and criticizes. Hence, in order to highlight the subject of the thesis, analyzing of the related concept will be focused, in terms of the EU framework.

"The idea of normative power in the international sphere is not new – there is a distinction between economic power, military power and power over opinion." (Carr, 1962, p. 108) "It is also interested in the normative power of the EC as an *idee force*, starting with the beliefs of the "founding fathers" and extending through its appeal to widely differing political temperaments." (Duchêne, 1973, pp. 2-7)

Duchêne described the European Community as a civilian power.

[T]he European Community's interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring international problems the sense of common

responsibility and structures of contractual politics, which have been in the past associated exclusively with “home” and not foreign, that is alien, affairs. (Duchêne, 1973, pp. 2-7)

“Some events such as the collapse of communism, the 2001 terrorist attacks, the 2008 global financial crisis, al-Qaida terrors in 2001, the emergence of new global agendas led to say something about the power of ideas and ideation in world politics.” (Manners, 2009, p. 2) Some of these new kinds of power ideas are civilian, military, normative or global power. Normative power is significant concept that became as a new notion of power for the EU by Manners.

According to Manners (2002, p. 239), “normative power can be described as an ability to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’. Thus, the notion of normative has the root from the concept of ‘normal’ and ‘norm’.”

“The instruments of normative power are defined as soft, non-coercive and positive in contrast to hard, coercive and negative military tools. Normative power is neither military nor purely economic but one that works through ideas and values.” (Manners, 2002, p. 238) Hence, normative power includes non-military and non-coercive, but persuasive norms and values. “There to, what is significant to the “Normative Power Europe” conceptualization of power is the absence of physical force.” (Björkdahl, 2007, p. 7) Normative power includes ideas and values, and absence of coercion and force. Moreover, the notion of normative has positive meaning.

[T]he prioritizing of normative power may help ensure that any subsequent use of material incentives and/or physical force is thought about and utilized in a more justifiable way. Finally, the concept of normative power with its emphasis on holistic thinking and justifiable practices raises the possibility that a more sustainable world politics embraces both the power of ideas, the “thinkable,” and physical power, the “material”. (Manners, 2009, p. 4)

“The concept of power describes the ability of an agent to act in some way. While this notion of power is critical in the context of organizational dynamics, and has been studied by others in this light, it must be constrained so as to be useful in any practical

application.” (Oren, Luck, & Miles, 2010, p. 1) Power can also be explained as the influence of Entity A over Entity B. If Entity A influences Entity B through persuasion or coercion, this is using of power.

“Manners argues that the EU is a normative power. He defines this as it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from bounded expectations of state-centricity, which are generally acknowledged to be universally applicable.” (Hardwick, 2011) Thereto, the EU is different from other actors because of its normative quality. The EU is normatively difference.

Normative power refers to particular means – it is not a power that primarily relies on military force but one in which influence is exerted by norms themselves rather than military arsenals or economic incentives. The normative power argument has a critical social-theory ring to it in that it is interested in the political consequences of the social construction of the EU in world politics. It focuses on the power of norms to influence actors’ identity and behavior. (Diez & Manners, 2007, p. 175)

Actors’ identity and values are related to their norms and normative basis, like the EU, and these norms define also behaviors of the actors in international arena. “Normative power Europe refers to the EU’s ability to shape conceptions of normal. The distinctive feature of this normative power is the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity.” (Manners, 2002, p. 239) Adler and Crawford also defines European identity like that:

Europeans, in the words of Graham Fuller (2003) have forged their homelands into a new cooperative whole and taken their power to be the power of a gradually expanding international community of consent, follow seemingly Kantian pacific community practices and conceive their security as the enlargement of a liberal democratic security community.” They thus have begun to practice, and would like the whole world to practice, cooperative security, which postwar Europe did so much to perfect. Based on concepts of pluralistic integration and inclusion, cooperative security is "comprehensive," for it links classic security elements to economic, environmental, cultural and human rights factors. It is also "indivisible," in the sense that one state's security is inseparable from that of other states. (Adler & Crawford, 2004, p. 10)

There is a confusion between the concept of normative power and the concept of civilian power. However, there is an important distinction between them.

Civilian power has an economic capability and non-military ways; but normative power has only norms, values and ideas, not economic capability. In addition, civilian power includes more national and owner perspective, but normative power has a cosmopolitan nature and more universal norms. (Manners, 2002, pp. 236-240)

Normative power is a theoretical notion. And it has social diffusion and normative practices. To sum up, normative power is a power that is able to shape conception of “normal” and it is a power that is not rely on military force, but with norms to influence.

## **1.2.NEOREALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

The main theoretical foundation of this thesis is neorealism. The thesis highlights the theory’s main framework, figures, claims and concepts in this chapter, because the EU acts in accordance with the expectations of neorealism despite its claim of being a normative power.

To begin with, the thesis explains classical realism, then the thesis focuses on the main theory of the thesis, neorealism. Classical realism is one of the international positivist theory of IR (international relations). One of its earliest proponents was Hans Morgenthau, who lived between 1904 and 1980 and was the first to use the name Classical Realist Theory. Another significant thinker for this theory is Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher between 1588 and 1679. Given his historical prominence, classical realism is sometimes called the Hobbesian system. Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 - 1527), the famous Italian historian, politician, diplomat and philosopher, is also linked to the development of the theory. The basis of classical realism is that without a state apparatus humanity would live in a “state of nature” which these thinkers believed was a state of continuous war among human beings. Their understanding of basic human nature was that humans are

selfish and warlike, but also rational. In a state of constant war, most individuals would fare very poorly, but the rational side of our nature would lead us to accept a “social contract”. Those who abide by the social contract recognize the power of a state which protects people’s right to life, liberty, and property.

According to classical realism, the state acts like an individual in the international system, mimicking the behavior of human beings in nature: selfish, but rational. This theory takes a state-centric approach and suggests that the international system is anarchical; there is no high authority to control the actions of individual states. In this system, the main concerns are intra-state rivalry, survival, the lack of trust between actors, and the acquisition and use of power, especially military power. War is natural in the international system, like in human nature, thereby perpetuating the lack of trust and ensuring the continuing anarchical nature of the international system.

Before moving on, it is important to consider why realism is state-centric, because we should understand that state is the main actor in neorealist system. The answer is that only states have monopoly and using of legitimate power. Because the social contract requires that those involved recognize a high authority as the only entity endowed with the legitimate use of force. As states have evolved as that high authority recognized by individuals, the state has been granted monopoly over the legitimate use of power.

The thesis emphasizes Morgenthau’s explanation of realism, which consists of six main principles. Firstly, he claims that political realism believes that politics is governed by objective laws which can be universally applied across space and time and have their roots in human nature. Human nature, this theory holds, has not changed since the classical philosophers of India and Greece, and thus these objective laws can be created. Morgenthau claims that one can separate the rational and the moral in political realism. At the same time, in realism, history repeats itself: there is a cycle which repeats. (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 7-8)

Having established the basis of his approach to realism, Morgenthau's principles extend into the decision-making processes of states. In foreign policy, according to Morgenthau, statesmen decide on foreign policy issues. They solve foreign policy problems and these solutions must be rational and statesmen search alternative solutions. If we try to understand statesmen's choices, the best suitable alternative, we can predict the outcome and consequences of their actions. Morgenthau holds that the main signpost that helps political realism find its way in international politics is the concept of "interests" defined in terms of power. While there are many definitions of interest including economy and religion, political realism defines interest in terms of power, to account for the anarchical nature of international politics. Because providing security is the most important thing for states to survive, so that they can continue to claim legitimacy, power is necessary in the anarchical environment. (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 8-10)

Morgenthau's third principle allows that the concept of interest can be changed according to time and place. From Thucydides to George Washington, interests can be different things according to the different factors and requirements. The fourth principle is that there is a difference between morality and policy, and that one of them should be privileged over the other. The fifth principle establishes the difference between a specific country's moral choice and universal moral laws. Nobody's morality is universal moral law; a specific morality cannot be universal. His final principle of political realism is that human nature is versatile. Political realists maintain the autonomy of political sphere that based on pluralistic conception of human nature. Thus, the political man must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature. (Morgenthau, 1973, pp. 10-13)

Where realism had Morgenthau, neorealism has Kenneth Waltz (1924 - 2013) an American political scientist considered the founder of neorealism. As in classical realism, neorealism holds that human beings are bad and warlike and the international system is anarchical. However, here, the anarchical nature of the international system determines states' behavior, making it a structuralist approach to international relations.



Classical realists believe that international outcomes are determined by the decisions of states, as they are held to be the actors. Neorealism turns classical realism upside down. Classical realism is behavioral: good states produce good outcomes; bad states, bad outcomes. Neorealism is structural: the outcomes depend not only, and often not mainly, on the qualities of states, but on variations in the structure within which their actions are executed. (Waltz, 2004, p. 3)

“According to neorealist theory, power is the key variable shaping international behavior. However, the concept of power has many different meanings. In its basic meaning, power is the ability of an actor to force others to do something they otherwise would not do.” (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 1)

According to Waltz, an international system is shaped by changes in the distribution of capabilities among the states. When the structure changes, interactive patterns among members and the outcomes of such interactions alter the international system. As the power dynamic between the states changes, so does the anarchical nature of the international structure and world order. (Özçelik, 2005, p. 92)

In neorealism, the anarchical nature of international system is the cause of war. States go to war each other in the pursuit of power and this creates a system characterized by war. There is no authority over states to control the system, thus war becomes natural. As Waltz says (2004, p. 2), “the structure of international politics is sparsely defined by anarchy, which is not the ordering principle of the realm, and by the distribution of capabilities across states”

Neorealism develops classical realist view and adds a different point of view to classical realism. Neorealism is based on the realist approach of IR theory. Its aim is to redefine classical realism in order to develop more empirical and systemic approach. Neorealism shares three most fundamental assumptions of classical realism: (1) States are the principal actors in international system (the state-centric assumption); (2) States are rational actors (the rationality assumption); (3) States seek power and they define their interest in terms of power (the power assumption). (Keohane, 1984, pp. 20-28)

In order to analyse international system, Waltz holds that there are three levels of analysis for international politics:

1. The level of individual or human nature, which refers to cause of war in nature of man.
2. The level of the state, which is the nature of state.
3. The level of the international system, which refers to the anarchical structure of international politics. (Waltz, 1959)

To Waltz, the first two levels can be explained with the particular wars, while the third level can be explained by looking at international war as a general pattern. (Waltz, 1959)

According to Waltz, the structure of international politics is defined by anarchy. In addition, he differentiates between domestic policy systems and the international policy system. A domestic policy system has a centralized hierarchy in which some are entitled to command and others are required to obey. On the other hand, the international policy system is characterized by a decentralized and anarchical structure comprised of formally equal bodies that must cooperate with each other, and by the existence of politics in the absence of government. Secondly, he offers distribution of capabilities among units outlined in the table below: (1959)

**Table 1. Waltz's System Analysis**

	<b>Structure</b>	<b>Interacting Units</b>
<b>International Policy System</b>	Anarchy	States
<b>Domestic Policy System</b>	Hierarchy	Governmental institutions and organizations

**Source:** (Waltz, 1979)

In terms of units, the international policy system is functionally non-differentiated, which means that every state is engaged in the same operations for security. The domestic

policy system is differentiated, which means that there is a high division of labor and integration. (Waltz, 1959) Table 1. shows both international policy system and domestic policy system, to Waltz's neorealist view. International policy system has states as interacting units and it is anarchical. Domestic policy system, on the other hand, has governmental institutions and organizations and it is hierarchical system.

Neorealism can be further divided into offensive and defensive neorealism. Offensive neorealism includes power maximization; in this view, states can be active agents only through having offensive capabilities. In defensive neorealism, power maximization brings insecurity and brings about a security dilemma. Rather than power maximization, defensive neorealism holds that states should focus on security and defensive power by limiting the offensive capabilities of other states. The security dilemma occurs when state A increases its weapons reserve, leading to state B feeling threatened and increases its weapons reserve in turn, leading to an arms race. In this way, insecurity in the international system exists. Hence, while the two aspects of neorealism have different views about power and security, their main concern is power.

“Hegemony, another significant concept in neorealist theory, is characterized by a combination of force and consensus without letting force subvert consensus too much, making it appear that the force is based on the consent of the majority.” (Bates, 1975, p. 363) Keohane also defines “hegemony as preponderance of material resources.” (1984, p. 28) These material resources may be media or interest groups in the society.

Another notion in neorealism is relative gains. “In international system, rational states seek to maintain their military and economic position relative to others. This focus on relative gains may hinder international cooperation when gains are unbalanced.” (Franzese & Hiscox, 1998) “As Waltz (1979) argues, when faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gains, states that feel insecure. They are compelled to ask not “Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?”” (Kegley, 2008, p. 30)

Balance of power is another key element of neorealist theory. “Balance of power theory is the belief that states balance against rising or dominant powers. Because of fear that a powerful ally of today could become a rival tomorrow.” (Collard -Wexler, 2006, p. 400)

As described by Morgenthau balance of power is only a particular manifestation of a general social principle to which all societies composed of a number of autonomous units owe the autonomy of their component parts that the balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations and that the instability of the international balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a society of sovereign nations. It signifies stability within a system composed of number of autonomous forces. Whenever the equilibrium is disturbed either by an outside force or by a change in one or the other elements composing the system shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new equilibrium. (1948, p. 237)

In other words, the balance of power can be explained through a “self-help” approach to the international system. The essence of the structural realist version of balance of power theory is power and possibility, not intentions. States are wise to be concerned about capability improvements and power increases. (Posen, 2010, pp. 154-155)

The international system is a ‘self-help’ system is obliged to look after themselves, because there is no one else to look after them. Waltz does not assume that states are self-aggrandizing, necessarily aggressive bodies, but he does assume that they desire to preserve themselves. This means that they are obliged to be concerned with their security, and obliged to regard other states as potential threats. They must continually adjust their stance in the world in accordance with their reading of the power of others and of their own power. The result of these movements is the emergence of a balance of power. It can be defined in terms of the number of ‘poles’ in the balance and the number of poles is defined by the number of states which can seriously threaten each other’s basic survival. (Brown & Ainley, 2005, pp. 42-43)

“Classical realism gives equal emphasis to anarchy and egoism. Neorealism has made a modest comeback, with Waltz’s influence, by analyzing the impact of anarchy and the distribution of capabilities among states.” (Burchill, et al., 2005, p. 35)

[Neorealist] international relations are usually associated with Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979). The book is a bold attempt to give realist thinking rigour and a parsimonious edge over rival perspective. More specifically, Waltz updates realist analysis by paying attention to the systemic level of analysis. The conduct of international relations cannot simply be explained with reference to human nature or the inherent properties of states. It must also take structure into account. Neorealism is thus a theory of how the structural properties of anarchy provide particular sets of limitations upon possibilities for action in international politics. (Rosamond, 2000, p. 132)

Thus, according to Waltz’s take on neorealist theory, the system dictates that states do not trust each other and instead pay attention to their own national interests and power. This unending competition is based on cause-effect relationship and leads inevitably to history repeating itself. Moreover, “state cooperation can therefore only be temporary, based on a common opposition to a third country condemns the world to endless conflict for the indefinite future.” (May, Rosecrance, & Steiner, 2010, p. 1)

As such, the neorealist theory seems to have explanatory power in explaining some key characteristics of the EU. In the next section, the thesis will examine this issue.

## 2. THE NEOREALIST CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EU

The EU has significant neorealist features that shaped its roots. It plays role on the international system in accordance with its neorealist characteristics because of the system's structure. In this part, the thesis will explain the EU's neorealist qualities.

According to neorealists, the absence of a world government or any arbiter in the international system will lead to anarchy. The EU has a kind of mixed hierarchical system within itself which serves to offset the possibility of anarchy. When we look at the policy architecture of the EU, there are exclusive, shared and supporting competencies. The realm of exclusive competency refers to the responsibility the EU has for directives, documents and regulations (*Acquis Communautaire*<sup>6</sup>); member-states only implement the EU level act if the EU authorizes them to adopt certain limited acts. This competency includes regulation of a single market, customs union, Eurozone policy, the CAP, and international trade agreements. In the realm of shared competency, both the EU and member-states have the power to enact laws, such as with social regulations of public health, gender and equality, environmental issues, consumer protection, food safety, transportation, energy, free movement of persons, and asylum. The realm of supporting competency, where member-states retain legislation power, includes macroeconomic policy, defense policy, policing and criminal justice policies, culture, health, education, tourism and sports.

Another example of mixed hierarchy in the EU is related to the procedure for negotiation of Simple Trade Agreements. The major decision-making body is the Council of Ministers while the other significant body is the European Commission. The proposal that is related to a trade agreement is offered by the European Commission to the Council of Ministers. The Ministers do not decide directly: They only discuss the proposal within the COREPER (the Committee of Permanent Representatives). The COREPER can change the proposal and then the Council of Ministers make a decision according to the QMV

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<sup>6</sup> *Acquis communautaire* refers to all treaties, EU legislation, international agreements, standards, court decisions, principles in the treaties which constitute of the EU-law.

(Qualified Majority Voting) system.<sup>7</sup> If the proposal is not accepted, it is cancelled. If it is accepted, it becomes a mandate and is sent to an ad-hoc committee assembled for the specific issue. Then the European Commission negotiates the proposal and finally the Council of Ministers signs an agreement according to the QMV system. Thus, the Council of Ministers has the last word in the negotiation of Simple Trade Agreements.


Another example is the OLP (Ordinary Legislative Procedure), which gives the same weight to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU on a wide range of areas, including economic governance, immigration, energy, transport, the environment and consumer protection. The vast majority of European laws are adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council (European Parliament, 2015). The EU's legislative procedure is changed with the passage of treaties, such as the Treaty of Rome, the SEA, or the Maastricht Treaty, although the Treaty of Lisbon emerged the last situation of legislative procedure called the OLP. According to OLP, the European Commission starts the procedure with a proposal, and the European Parliament offers its opinion about the proposal; then the Council of Ministers drafts the proposal, after which the European Parliament can offer its opinion a second time. Then the proposal goes to the Conciliation Committee that emerged with the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, both of which have equal power over the decision. Finally, the two bodies make a last decision.

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<sup>7</sup> From 1 November 2014 a new procedure for qualified majority voting applies in the Council. Under this procedure, when the Council votes on a proposal by the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a qualified majority is reached if two conditions are met:

- 55% of member-states vote in favour - in practice this means 16 out of 28
- the proposal is supported by member-states representing at least 65% of the total EU population (European Council, 2016)

Figure 1. Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP)



Source: Prepared with the reference to the treaties in question.

The figure above shows that the treaties effect the legislation process. For instance, with the Treaty of Rome, the final decision is made by the Council of Ministers. The SEA requires the cooperation of Parliament and the Commission, while the Maastricht Treaty requires a co-decision procedure that gives the Parliament and the Council of Ministers equal power in the decision-making procedure. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon changed the procedure's name to OLP, thereby giving the Parliament more power by extending the policy areas in the decision-making process.

As we see, the EU has a hierarchical system within itself. However, in the international system, member-states of the EU act according to their national interests rather than the EU's interest. For instance, there is no common energy policy or common



foreign policy of the EU. While its members act together on economic policies, in more important policies they cannot agree on a common decision. As such, both within the EU and in the international system, there is no universal authority to maintain order and no clear hierarchical system that leads to quick decision-making.

According to neorealists, states are dominant actors that are trying to survive in an anarchical system: they care about their own national interests and take a security-seeking approach. Achieving as much power as possible relative to their neighbors is states' main concern. The EU member-states typically act in favor of their own national interests. For instance, they do not trust each other on issues of "high politics"<sup>8</sup> such as defense policy. The Pleven Plan which was designed to create the European Defense Community in 1952, failed in 1954 because France did not trust Germany in high politics. Because of fear that a powerful ally of today could become a rival tomorrow, states balance against rising or dominant powers, thus, member-states of the EU will avoid giving another member-state the opportunity to increase its power.

In the neorealist view, cooperation is only possible for survival and against a common threat. The cooperation needed to form the EU was possible because of a collective desire to avoid another world war. While this shared goal has held the member-states together since 1951, in practice, they cannot completely trust each other. For instance, the EU has been in crisis since the failure of the 2004 Constitutional Treaty because of the rejection by France and the Netherlands in referendums. French and Dutch citizens did not want a kind of constitution because this is a big step, and they did not trust each other because of unique feature of the Union.

According to neorealist theory, international institutions play a minimal role in international issues, and states shape international institutions according to their interests and relative power. In the EU, there is unanimity that considers unanimous decisions. This

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<sup>8</sup> High politics refers to state's vital concerns such as national and international security or defense policy.

shows states' dominant role in decision making. On the other hand, some member-states in the EU (such as Germany and France) shape the EU's policies according to their own national interests thanks to the QMV system that requires that 55% of countries and 65% of the population agree with the decision being made. Thus, the countries with the highest populations, like Germany, has more power in the decision-making. Relative gain is the main issue for states, according to neorealism. The EU claims that this issue is unimportant in its case, but when we look at the EU's historical background, we see De Gaulle's opposition to QMV system in the CAP. De Gaulle wanted member-states to have veto power and boycotted the meetings, leaving the budding EU to face the Empty Chair Crisis. Hence for member states, relative gain is important issue, because states do not want that other states' power to increase. Another example is that the Community faced was in 1979 when Margaret Thatcher as the Prime Minister of the UK was nervous about budget issues of the CAP. According to her, the UK's payment was much more than it should be. Until 1984, the budget problems were going on and finally in the Fontainebleau Summit the problem was solved and the decision of reduction payment to the UK was taken. Hence, relative gain is still one of the most important issue within the EU. Especially with regard to the CAP issue, member-states seek to move the balance of power in favor of themselves.

There is reason to think that globalization or international institutions have crippled the state. Indeed, the state appears to have a bright future, mainly because nationalism remains a powerful political ideology. Even in Western Europe, where there has been unprecedented economic integration, the state is alive and well. (Mearsheimer, 2006, p. 86)

For instance, in the wake of September 11, 2001, realism played an important role in considering national interests of countries. Its resurrection was due in part to the fact that there was wide-spread opposition to the Iraq War among member-states, and despite that, the UK supported the US in what has come to be seen as a strategic disaster.

For structural realists, human nature has little to do with why states want power. Instead, it is the structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power. In a system where there is no high authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no guarantee that one will not attack another, it makes eminently good sense for

each state to be treaty powerful enough to protect itself in the event it is attacked. In essence, great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive. (Mearsheimer, 2006, p. 72)

To classical realists like Hobbes and Morgenthau, human being is selfish and states act like human being in the international system. This leads to the existence of anarchical system. “However, neorealists, like Waltz and Mearsheimer, claim that this situation is result of fear in anarchical system. This is structural and unchanging.” (Collard-Wexler, 2006, p. 401)

[T]he structural imperatives described above are reflected in the famous concept of the security dilemma, the essence of which is that usually when a great power enhances its own security, it decreases the security of other states. For example, any country that improves its position in the global balance of power does so at the expense of other states, which lose relative power. In this zero-sum world, it is difficult for a state to improve its prospects for survival without threatening the survival of other states, who in turn do whatever is necessary to ensure their survival, setting in motion an arms war. (Mearsheimer, 2006, p. 75)

Each member-state follows own interests in the EU and in the international arena. In every significant problem or issue, such as immigration policy or defense policy, member-states act according to their national interests. For instance, in the issue of the Lisbon Treaty, we see the Treaty fail because of the Irish referendum, which demonstrated a lack of knowledge and understanding of the text, Eurosceptic views, and local concern over the threat to the Irish ban on abortion, taxation issues, and the loss of an Irish commissioner. Thus, again, Eurosceptic views and national interest stalled the consolidation of a European Union, although the Treaty was ultimately accepted.

Furthermore, the thesis analyses neorealists’ view of international institutions’ minimal role in the international system, which holds true for the EU, with the critical review of Christopher Hill and Martin Holland’s “Capability-Expectation Gap”. This critical review discusses three studies that examine the capability-expectation gap of the European Community – or the European Union. In the *Journal of Common Market Studies*

article “the Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, Christopher Hill’s findings (1993) suggest that the capability of the EC is limited but there are high expectations of it especially until 1992, when the Maastricht process took place. The results presented by Christopher Hill (1997) “Closing the Capability-Expectation Gap” imply that since 1992 the high expectations of the EU began to decrease because of the limitation of the CFSP and the EU’s subsequently narrowed capability to apply the CFSP on the international issues, thereby narrowing the gap between the EU’s capability and our expectations of the EU. In the Journal of Common Market Studies article “Bridging the Capability-Expectation Gap: A Case Study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa”, Martin Holland (1995) suggests that the CFSP joint action on South Africa is an important empirical case for measuring the EU’s capability to effect to the international issues.

In “The Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”, it is suggested that the European Community is only civilian diplomacy, and does not have military force or the capability to produce collective decisions and see them through, rendering the EC an ineffective international actor. This claim is based on realist view which focuses on power, interests, and military strength in the international system; this view claims that the lack of military force or capability of the EC damaged its image as a powerful force in the international system. If this is the case, “What does the EC do in the world?” and “What is the EC’s role as an international actor?” In order to answer to these questions, we should first of all focus on the conceptualization and definition of Europe and the kind of organization the EC is. Hill focuses on these points in his article, analyzing the EC’s international role step by step and concept by concept. So, the main point is that international institutions have a minimal role in the international system, like in the EU example.

Europe is generally called as a cultural entity and is a grouping of developed capitalist economies. “Although there is no certain definition for the Europe, this explanation seems the most appropriate and encompassing. As a *sui generis* community,

the EC is less than state, but more than conventional international organization.” (White, 2001, p. 21).

For instance, Hill argues that the EU may be seen as the stabilizing power of Western Europe, managing world trade, and providing a principled voice of the developed world in relations with the South, as well as providing a second Western voice in international diplomacy. These are the functions by the EC, which, called as the EU today, is the third largest population and an economic giant, with 25% of the world GDP, 55% of the world’s development assistance and so many bilateral trade agreements with the South and other countries in the world. The EU is also an important voice in international issues with the USA in the West. Moreover, according to Hill, there are six functions the EC should be expected to perform, including being a replacement for the USSR in the global balance of power, a regional pacifier, a global intervenor, a mediator of conflicts, a bridge between rich and poor and a joint supervisor of the world economy. Hill’s predictions have come true to some extent: the collapse of the USSR provided breathing space to the EU and the EU was important in some international issues, such as the Ukrainian crisis in 2013-14. (1993)

Another article by Hill about the EC (1997) focuses on the Capability-Expectation Gap. The gap, he explains, is between our expectations for the EC, which are financial and political assistance, stability during crises, and aid in overcoming Third World poverty. However, the EC does not have enough resources and the political structure necessary to respond to all demands, leading to a gap between the EC’s capability and the international system’s expectation of the EC. Hill argues that external relations grow slowly but demands on the EC continue to be made. The source of this dilemma is the lack of trust between the EC’s member-states with regard to each state’s right to continue to maintain their own armed forces and the right to use them, suggesting that the gap is most clearly seen in the realm of defense. This situation may lead to serious danger for the EC, and according to Hill and there is a need for long-term efforts to strengthen the EC’s role in

international relations and improve cooperation within the EC among member-states and with outside states.

In Hill's article, we see the shifting relations between the EC's capability and expectations of the EC in the process of enforcing the Maastricht Treaty. To Hill, the Maastricht process marks a shift in the process of European foreign policy. Hill demonstrates the complexity of the external environment in the Maastricht process, which included the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, the replacement of the 1980s' mood of Eurosclerosis<sup>9</sup>, the EMU project and the development of a new integrated European foreign security policy. Moreover, at that time the EU came to have its first new responsibility regard to its Eastern border, while also dealing with the civil war in Yugoslavia and the reunification of Germany. In that time, the EU had a positive image and was an important civilian power, but not military force; that role was assumed by the US, which at the time was the dominant power and was central to European security thanks to NATO. There were few expectations of Europe to balance the USA as a player in the New World Order. Thus, expectations of the EU were decreased since 1992 because of limitations of the CFSP in world affairs and the capability-expectation gap was narrower than it had been. While this may seem like a good thing, the lowered expectations of the EU suggested that it may lose its image and its presence in the world. (1997)

Martin Holland's article "Bridging the Capability-Expectation Gap: A Case Study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa" (1995) presents the first CFSP joint action on South Africa in response to Hill's 1993 article on the capability-expectations gap. CFSP joint action on South Africa is an empirical study of the EU's progress towards successfully performing the role of an international actor through a discussion of Europe's changing relations with South Africa and the other regions regarding the joint actions of the EU's CFSP. The article claims that the joint action on South Africa shows how the EU is beginning to fulfill Hill's six future functions of the EC. The aim of joint actions is to

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<sup>9</sup> Eurosclerosis that was introduced German economist Herbert Giersch refers to the economic stagnation that can result from a government's overregulation and overly generous social benefits policies. (Investopedia, 2016)

promote peace and stability in Europe, the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia and South Africa. The joint action on South Africa is a demonstration of the EU's new approach to foreign relations with South Africa, including the replacement of sanctions with cooperation and development initiatives. The transition to democracy in South Africa is what allowed the EU to play a significant role as an international actor in this situation and the EU has had recognizable impact. This article is less pessimistic about the gap because the joint action on South Africa showed that the EU can be an effective actor in international issues.

However, although the South Africa case is a successful example of the EU's capability as an international actor, there are situations where the EU has been less successful. For example, the EU did not act effectively during and after the Srebrenica Massacre which occurred during the Yugoslavian civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. In the Massacre almost 8,000 Bosnian people were killed and the EU failed to intervene. Thus, the EU's capability to play a significant role on the international stage varies, and "Bridging the Capability-Expectation Gap: A Case Study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa" seems to be too optimistic.

To neorealists, states follow their interest and when we look at Table 2. which shows the policy areas of the EU, we see that in almost all policy areas, member-states cannot produce a single common foreign policy, such as war and peace, raising armed forces, immigration, cession or acquisition of territory, democratic accountability at the union level, a single ministry of foreign affairs, a single intelligence service, and a single set of armed service, because doing so would be against their own national interests.

Both Hill and Holland agree on the verity of the capability- expectation gap, regarding the narrowed gap of capability and expectations since mid-1990s, although Holland is less pessimistic about the gap. Hill's articles are more comprehensive and explanatory studies, which we can see by noting that Holland's article references Hill's work. The articles' methodologies, content, and styles can light the way for new studies

exploring the evolution of the EU as an international body in a neorealist international system. Both authors show us international institutions' minimal role in the international system, because states as main actors shape the world politics.

**Table 2. The EU's Situation on a Single Foreign Policy**

**Table : The Conditions of a Single Foreign Policy**

If the EC were to acquire its own foreign policy it would need to possess the following:

*(i) Basic Constitutional Powers*

*over:*

(a)	War and peace	(N)
(b)	Raising armed forces	(N)
(c)	Treaty-making	(N/Y-EC?)
(d)	Regulation of commerce (sanctions)	(Y?)
(e)	External borders (immigration)	(N?)
(f)	Cession or acquisition of territory (but for 'enlargement')	(N) (Y)

*subject to:*

(g)	Democratic accountability at the union level (cf states)	(N?)
(h)	Judicial scrutiny	(N/Y-EC)

*(ii) Mechanisms and Policies*

(a)	A single Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic service, with common missions abroad	(N)
(b)	A single intelligence service	(N)
(c)	A single set of armed services	(N)
(d)	A single development policy	(75%)
(e)	A single cultural policy (?)	(75%)

*Note:* ('Y' = broadly possesses these powers/mechanisms; 'N' = not yet near; figures in brackets suggest how far down the road the EC has gone in creating a common policy. The judgements – inevitably provocative – assume observation of the CFSP provisions of Maastricht, which leaves the three European Communities intact but changes the title of the 'EEC' to 'EC'.)

Source: (Hill, 1993, p. 317)



### **3. THE EU AS A NORMATIVE POWER?**

This section of the thesis analyses arguments in favour on the EU as a normative power and the challenges to the EU as a normative power. Despite the EU's claim of being a normative power, there are significant challenges against its claim. Before focusing on these challenges, the section emphasizes the main arguments in the literature about the EU's normative basis, such as Ian Manners's claims. Then, it offers contradictions on these claims, with significant examples.

#### **3.1.ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR**

This chapter of the thesis focuses on the normative power approach towards the EU. Led by Ian Manners, some scholars claim that the EU is a normative power in the international sphere and it has particular norms and values that shape the EU's identity in the global politics. In other words, the EU acts according to its own norms and values in the external relations. Hence, this part shows the EU's normative features and the main approaches in the literature.

There is a core reference in the literature about the EU as a normative power. The EU is called as a civilian power by Duchêne; and then it began to be called as a normative power. The reason is that the EU has non-military but civilian power and it has soft power to export its norms and values. It began to apply its norms and values in its member-states and then candidate states and other countries that has commercial or political relations with itself. For instance, the EU offers the Copenhagen Criteria to Turkey that has an aim to be the EU's member-state.

The EU began to be known as a normative power that has ideational impact in international arena by its norms and normative basis. When we look at the definitions of civilian and normative power, like Duchêne says, (1973, pp. 2-7) "the EU, as a civilian power, is a different kind of power that does not rely on military, but on civilian means."

Moreover, “normative power refers to particular means – it is not a power that relies on military force, but one in which norms in themselves achieve what otherwise is done by military arsenals or economic incentives.” (Diez, 2005, p. 616)

Together with Duchêne’s argue in the normative power of the EC as an *idee force* (1973, pp. 2-7), elements of this normative power can also be found in the critical perspective of Galtung when he says that “ideological power is the power of ideas.” (1973, p. 33)

Galtung argues that ideological power is “powerful because the power-sender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient” through the media of culture. He differentiated between channels of power (ideological power and structural power), a distinction he argues is fundamental, because it is on the latter that the EC is particularly strong, even more so than the United States. (1973, p. 36)

**Table 3. Concept of “Normative” to Carr, Galtung and Manners**

	<i>Civilian</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Normative</i>
Carr	Economic	Military	Opinion
Galtung	Remunerative	Punitive	Ideological
Manners	Ability to use civilian instruments	Ability to use military instruments	Ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’

*Source:* Manners (2002) based on Carr (1962, p. 108), and Galtung (1973, pp. 2, 7).

**Source:** (Manners, 2002, p. 240)

Like Manners says (2002, p. 239), “normative power is the power that is able to shape conceptions of the ‘normal’,” Table 3. shows Carr, Galtung and Manners’s “normative” concept. To Carr, “normative is related to opinion; to Galtung, it is ideological concept; and to Manners, it refers to the ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’.” (Manners, 2002, p. 240) And the EU, as a normative power, has its own norms, identity, ideas and opinions. Thereto, Manners began to rethink about both civilian and military

power Europe and considering the EU's normative power in the world. In this point of view, the EU's normative differences, its normative basis and examples of how its norms are diffused are the main focusing points.

The EU's normative difference comes from its historical background, hybrid political and legal basis and its constitutions. Because the EU has hybrid – supranational institutions and its particular political forms. There are some principles for its member-states, elite-driven and treaty-based legal order and universal norms that creates its own identity. (Manners, 2002, pp. 240-241)

The EU tries to spread its norms and values to other countries and regions. There is a significant example of the EU's act related to its norms, this is the abolition of death penalty in Turkey in 1980s. It has fought to abolition of death penalty in the worldwide. "It places universal norms at the center of its relations with its member-states and the world. There are references to the norms in the European Convention of Human Rights and Treaty on EU." (Diez, 2005, p. 618)

In the normative approach to the EU, there are some particular norms that are defined by the EU. In addition to the norms, there are the diffusion of these norms to the other countries and the world. The thesis emphasizes these norms and diffusion, in the light of Manners's references. There are nine particular norms of the EU. Five of them are the core norms and the others are minor norms. The core norms are peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. (Manners, 2002, pp. 242-245) The first core norms, peace is seen in the Preamble of the Schuman Declaration, the ECSC and the Treaty of Rome, officially the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. (Manners, 2002, p. 242)

In the Schuman Declaration, peace is the first word that is emphasized:

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has

always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. (European Coal and Steel Community, 1950)

In the ECSC Treaty, peace again is an important point: “The first Community organization was created in the aftermath of the Second World War when reconstructing the economy of the European continent and ensuring a lasting peace appeared necessary.” (European Coal and Steel Community, 1951)

Liberty, as the second core norm, located in the Preamble of TEU: (Manners, 2002, p. 242) “...Confirming their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law...” (Council of the EC; Commission of the EC, 1992)

“Democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights are seen in the Preamble of the TEU and the 1993 Copenhagen Summit Conclusions.” (Manners, 2002, p. 242)

#### TITLE XI/II Development Cooperation

##### Article 130

2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (Council of the EC; Commission of the EC, 1992)

The Community and its member-states are committed to supporting the democratization process which is gaining momentum in Africa, including support for good governance, sound economic management and respect for human rights. They recalled the resolution adopted by the Council (development) on 28 November 1991 on human rights, democracy and development. (European Council Conclusions, 1993)

The four minor norms are social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. (Manners, 2002, p. 242) “Social solidarity is selected as a minor norm because of showing a counter-measure to liberalization in the Single European Act and economic and monetary union.” (Manners, 2002, pp. 242-243)

It located in the Preamble of the TEEC and TEU:

...intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and overseas countries, and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations... (European Economic Community, 1957)

...recalling that Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community includes the task of promoting economic and social cohesion and solidarity between member-states and that the strengthening of economic and social cohesion figures among the activities of the Community listed in Article 3. (Council of the EC; Commission of the EC, 1992)

“Anti-discrimination is focused against racism and persecutions of minorities on 1990s.” (Manners, 2002, pp. 242-243) It is emphasized on the articles of the TEEC and the Copenhagen Criteria:

The TEEC focuses on discrimination issue:

Article 7

Within the field of application of this Treaty and without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited. The Council may, acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, lay down rules in regard to the prohibition of any such discrimination.” (European Economic Community, 1957)

The third minor norm, sustainable development was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and it is focused on the arts of the TEEC. (Manners, 2002, p. 242)

The Treaty of Amsterdam emphasizes sustainable development:

Article B

The Union shall set itself the following objectives:

— to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through

the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.’’ (European Council, 1997)

The TEEC includes these sentences about the third minor norm:

Article 2

It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of member-states, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its member-states.’’ (European Economic Community, 1957)

“Good governance came into account after the resignation of the 1999 Commission and it is seen in the 1993 Copenhagen Summit Conclusions and the 2001 White Paper on the European Governance’’: (Manners, 2002, p. 243)

## II. Principles of Good Governance

Five principles underpin good governance and the changes proposed in this White Paper: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Each principle is important for establishing more democratic governance. They underpin democracy and the rule of law in the member-states, but they apply to all levels of government – global, European, national, regional and local. (European Commission, 2001)

The EU core and minor norms shape its own identity and values. The EU’s normative basis is important part of the EU’s *acquis communautaire*. Table 4. shows the founding principles, task and objectives in order to understand the EU’s normative basis.

**Table 4. EU's Normative Basis**

<i>Founding Principles</i>	<i>Tasks and Objectives</i>	<i>Stable Institutions</i>	<i>Fundamental Rights</i>
Liberty	Social solidarity	Guarantee of democracy	Dignity
Democracy	Anti-discrimination	Rule of law	Freedoms
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms	Sustainable development	Human rights	Equality Solidarity
Rule of law		Protection of minorities	Citizenship Justice
Treaty base – set out in art. 6 of the TEU	Treaty base – set out in arts. 2 of TEC and TEU, arts. 6 and 13 of TEC	Copenhagen criteria – set out in the conclusions of the June 1993 European Council	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

*Source:* Manners (2002).

**Source:** (Manners, 2002, p. 243)

Furthermore, there are six diffusions of the norms, including contagion, informational, procedural, transference, over diffusion and cultural diffusion. Contagion diffusion is possible with integration process of the EU with the other countries. Informational diffusion includes strategic communications, new policies and initiatives. Procedural diffusion has the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and third countries. Transference diffusion includes commercial, trade, technical relations, aid and assistance. Over diffusion emerged with physical presence of the EU's in the third parties, such as the Commission's delegations and the embassies of the member-states. And cultural diffusion has international norms and policies that are learning in the third countries. Hence, these six factors contribute to the way in which the EU norms are diffused, but in order to get a sense of the extent to which these factors work it is worth

looking at one of the norms the EU seeks to “normalize” in international relations – the abolition of the death penalty. (Manners, 2002, pp. 242-245)

There are some diffusion strategies of the normative power, including the policy-making community, news media and the EU institutions. The policy-making community refers to the Nordic, pan-European and Brussels EU policy communities. These three communities suggest that while policy analysts and policy-makers were initially exposed to ideas about normative power. And, they include Nordic policy centers and policy communities’ ideas of normative power, such as Nordic peace studies institutes, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (CORPI). Pan-European policy communities, such as the European Policy Institute Network (EPIN) and the Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA); and Brussels policy centers, such as the European Policy Centre (EPC) have important roles on the diffusion of the normative basis. Diffusion of norms in news media includes international news media, newspapers and interviews. For instance, in his article published in Financial Times in 2008, Zaki Laidi asks “How Europe can shape the global system?” (Manners, 2015, p. 307)

The only credible scenario for Europe lies in its ‘normative power’ – promoting standards that are negotiated legitimized within international institutions. Norms aim to discipline the behavior of state and non-state actors. To be efficient, those norms should rely on soft and hard mechanisms of enforcement. Of course, those norms could be biased in favour of dominant powers, as some developing countries argue.

An editorial from the Frontier Post in Pakistan from May 2011, in the context of the Arab uprisings, illustrates the importance of normative power for those witnessing Turkey’s source of inspiration in terms of democratization and socio-economic transformation: Alienating Turkey from the EU track because of political short-sightedness of some member-states will not only discourage millions of inspiration for their own development and democratization, but will also damage the credibility of the Union that aspires to be a normative power embracing and promoting universal values of democracy, cultural diversity and pluralism. (Manners, 2015, pp. 308-309)



The diffusion of norms in the EU institutions have the important roles of the Commission and the European Parliament. Barroso, who is a Portuguese politician who was the 11<sup>th</sup> President of the European Commission, is an important figure here.

Barroso claims that the EU is one of the most important normative powers in the world. He talks about the abolition of the death penalty and adapting candidate countries' norms to the EU norms. The other important figure is Jacek Emil Saryusz-Wolski, who is a Polish diplomat, politician and a MEP: member of the European Parliament. He says that the EU's role as a peace-maker needed to include both the normative power of freedom, democracy and human rights promotion, as well as developing capabilities for physical force protection. (Manners, 2015, pp. 310-311)

Hence, the diffusion of norms has different kinds and ways that export the EU's values and priorities in the world.

The EU has norms and soft power mechanisms in order to spread its normative basis. It, firstly, applies its norms in its member-states' policies, candidate countries and the other regions in the world with trade, political and cultural relations. There is a different kind of view about the EU's normative basis. This is view of contradiction between the US and the EU. The US is a military power and it is seen as Hobbesian model that has a situation of a 'war of all against all' in the international arena. However, the EU has Kantian approach with its soft and civilian means. Kantian approach refers to liberal-idealist view and good-natured entity in the international relations. (Sjursen, 2006, p. 237)

There are important examples of the EU as a normative power. First one is the EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). This process began with the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and it includes an area of dialogue, exchange, cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity, economic and financial partnership and partnership in cultural, social and human affairs. All these developments are means of civilian power and an attempt to civilize relationship between countries around the Mediterranean. The other example is the relations with Turkey. It includes association agreement in 1963 and the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate states at the Helsinki

European Council in 1999. Turkey faced Copenhagen Criteria as the most important norm that Turkey should adopt. And other example is Austria, the case of the sanctions against Austria in 1999 because of the extremist position of the new junior coalition partner, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ), is a reminder that normative power not only works in external relations. (Diez, 2005, p. 630)

Furthermore, ‘the transformative power of Europe’ is a field of study about the EU’s diffusion processes. The interaction between the generation of ideas, social, political, economic, cultural and historical conditions facilitate and mitigate their diffusion inside and outside of Europe. Identity, ‘soft’ and more indirect diffusion mechanisms, such as socialization and persuasion, and the EU’s perceiving itself as a model for effective and legitimate governance to be emulated by other are the core points of ‘the transformative power of Europe’. (Börzel & Risse, 2009, pp. 14-16)

This chapter includes the particular references about the EU’s norms and the next chapter emphasizes on the challenges to the EU as a normative power.

### **3.2.THE CHALLENGES TO THE EU AS A NORMATIVE POWER**

In this part of the thesis, the thesis claims that the EU does not act according to the normative basis, in contradiction to Manners’s assertion that the EU is a normative power. One can see this in the extent to which the EU member-states care about their own interests, rather than the Union’s norms and values, in the international arena. The thesis reviews the challenges to the normative basis of the EU in the literature step by step, and provide examples of each.

According to Duchêne (1973, pp. 2-7), “the EU a civilian power because it lacks military power. The EU is a civilian power, true, but it is not a normative power.” “It began to be known as a normative power because of its ideational impacts. Normative power refers neither to military power nor to economic power, but to power that works through

norms.” (Manners, 2002, p. 236) “The EU has its own norms, identity, ideas and opinions, its member-states prioritize their interests rather than the EU’s norms and values. It has ideational impact and “power over opinion””, to Carr. (1962, p. 108) However, its impact is only in theory, and does not seem to be reflected in practice. In theory, it has priorities that it follows in the international arena, but in practice member-states follows their interests rather than shared norms and values upheld by the EU.

“The EU’s normative power is based on a rethinking of civilian and military power in Europe and the EU’s normative differences that are based on its historical background.” (Manners, 2002, pp. 240-241) However, the EU originated as an economic organization (ECSC) which did not give any importance to norms and values. The EU was established to prevent another war in Europe after two destructive world wars, a fact memorialized in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community written in 1951:

The first Community organization was created in the aftermath of the Second World War when reconstructing the economy of the European continent and ensuring a lasting peace appeared necessary. Thus, the idea of pooling Franco-German coal and steel production came about and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed. This choice was not only economic but also political, as these two raw materials were the basis of the industry and power of the two countries. (1951)

Although the EU is seen as a normative power in the literature, it is only a civilian power due to its hybrid political–legal basis, its decision-making procedures, the supranational institutions involved, and its particular political forms.

The abolition of the death penalty in Turkey in 2004 is one of the most important examples of the EU’s normative power to enforce respect for human rights. However, there are so many violent deaths in the world, such as in the Balkans in the middle of the 1990s or in the Middle East that the thesis analyses in another part of the thesis which the EU does not challenge. Even if the abolition of the death penalty is an important step for human rights, the EU does not extend its power to push other political entities to show the same respect for human rights, and hence the abolition of the death penalty is only for show.

Likewise, the references to its norms and principles in the European Convention of Human Rights and the Treaty on the European Union are also only for show, not for practice. (Manners, 2002, pp. 245-246) We can see this in current immigration issue that the thesis focuses on in Chapter 5. of the thesis.

Manners cites the “there are nine norms of the EU, core of which are peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights.” (2002, pp. 242-243) These norms are referenced in some treaties of the EU. For instance, “Preamble of the Schuman Declaration has references peace, beginning with this sentence: World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.” (European Coal and Steel Community, 1950) However, the EU does not appear to care about world peace, only its own regional peace, because if there is a war in another place in the world, such as the Syrian civil war which began in 2011, it does not seek to take meaningful action to promote its norms. It keeps itself out of these cases. The EU does not seem to struggle much to safeguard world peace.

There are references in the EU documents to liberty, democracy, and rule of law. However, these norms are only in written in these treaties and do not seem to extend into practice. For instance, there is significant democratic deficit in the EU. As Bellamy writes:

Abraham Lincoln famously defined democracy as ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. In many respects, the key debates over the EU’s democratic deficit can be categorised in terms of which of these three elements they focus on. Thus, the traditional debate has centred on whether the weaknesses of government ‘by’ the people at the EU level reflect the absence ‘of’ a European people with a shared identity and interests capable of ruling itself, or the absence of appropriate institutions with suitable powers through (or ‘by’) which such a people might rule. This discussion has given rise in turn to a second debate alleging that for the highly technical and limited policy areas covered by the EU, government ‘for’ the people need not involve government ‘by’ the people at all. Responsible and reasonable administration suffices, so long as the EU delivers policies that benefit all in an efficient, effective and equitable way, no deficit exists. (2012, pp. 64-65)

The EU started as an elite-driven project fueled by permissive consensus, thus people outside of this elite do not offer their opinions in the decision-making process throughout the 1950s and 1960s, causing democratic deficit. In 1979, the European Parliament took the representation right and direct elections were established. However, “the participation rate of the European Parliament elections has been declining steadily, from 62% in 1979 to 43% in 2009 and 2014.” (European Parliament, Election Results, 2016)

In the 1970s, the UK, Denmark and Norway became EU member-states despite being Eurosceptic countries, a term which means that their population and government have negative attitudes towards European integration in some cases. Moreover, many people do not feel themselves to be “European”. For instance, a German person identifies primarily as German, not European. All of this contributes to the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU. Hence, we can argue that the norms of democracy and democratic governance are not in practice in the EU.

“In a speech in 2013, Viviane Reding, former EU Justice Commissioner, drew an interesting parallel between Europe’s economic and financial crisis and what she viewed as an increasing number of “rule of law crises” revealing problems of a systemic nature.” (Kochenov & Pech, 2015, p. 2)

Three concrete examples were mentioned in her speech:

- The French government’s attempt in summer 2010 to secretly implement a collective deportation policy aimed at EU citizens of Romani ethnicity despite contrary assurances given to the Commission that Roma people were not being singled out;
- The Hungarian government’s attempt in 2011 to undermine the independence of the judiciary by implementing an early mandatory retirement policy; and
- The Romanian government’s failure to comply with key judgments of the national constitutional court in 2012.

These episodes have been often understood as demonstrating the increasing number of instances where national authorities were undermining key EU values such as the rule of

law. To give a single but representative example, in his 2012 State of the Union address, José Manuel Barroso, then the President of the European Commission, spoke of worrying ‘threats to the legal and democratic fabric in some of our European states’ which need to be brought into check. (Kochenov & Pech, 2015, p. 2)

The Hague Programme was approved by the European Council on the 5 November, 2004 with the hope that it would strengthen freedom, security and justice in the EU. Balzacq and Carrera analyse the concept of liberty in the Programme and conclude that it is not prioritized by the EU.

Security is a crucial aspect of the Hague Programme. In fact, textual analysis reveals that security provisions percolate through the justice and freedom sections. However, it is not entirely accurate to argue that freedom of movement subsumes security. In many cases, the only exception to freedom of movement, shared by all member states, is the call for security. Unfortunately, then, in the Hague Programme security does take priority over freedom. Moreover, the primary targets of border management and visa policy are illegal migration, terrorism, human and drug trafficking. (Balzacq & Carrera, 2016, pp. 2-6)

Social solidarity is claimed as the EU’s one of the normative elements which refers to welfare responsibilities between member-states. “Solidarity based upon a principle of subsidization, a proportion of the wealth generated by members of a group is placed at the disposal of public institutions in order to satisfy social needs of other members of the group.” (Dogan & Spaventa, 2012, p. 296) In the EU, for citizens, social solidarity exists not on the level of the EU, but on the level of member states. “How can the common identity provided by the EU citizenship justify welfare societies of the member-states? Because, the primary reference point for social solidarity, linked essentially to national identity.” (Dogan & Spaventa, 2012, p. 348) According to Eurosceptic views, the EU does not have a common identity to member-states’ citizens. Member-states’ own national identities become first, and social solidarity has a strong link with their own identity sense, not the Union’s one.

The EU claims anti-discrimination as its norm; however, there are many examples of discrimination in the EU. For instance, there is the securitization of migration issue, as

well as racist movements, xenophobic movements, extreme-right political parties' hostility against immigrants and Chauvinism, modern states' racist terminology and restriction policies. Especially Muslims and Muslim immigrants face serious discrimination in EU countries. "Migration is identified as being one of the main factors weakening national tradition. This discourse excludes migrants from the normal fabric of society, not just as aliens but as aliens who are dangerous to the reproduction of the social fabric." (Huysmans, 2000, p. 758).

Sustainable development is related to the economic, social and environmental developments such as poverty, income and financial situations. For instance, we can look to the high unemployment rate in EU countries such as Greece, Spain and Croatia according to data collected in 2016. (See the Figure 2.) The EU has failed to embody the norm of sustainable development.

**Figure 2. 2016 Unemployment Rate of Croatia, Spain and Greece**



**Source:** (The Statistics Portal, 2016)

The EU claims to uphold norms that are not reflected in their policies and actions. They are not active and efficient both within the EU and international system. This is likely because the EU has not been able to truly unite its member states, each gives priority to its national interests rather than these norms and values.

## **4. CASE STUDIES**

This section focuses on some case studies about the EU's neorealist behaviour and foreign policy. Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Migration issue are the cases of the thesis. They highlight challenges on the EU's claim of being a normative power and define the EU's neorealist point of view.

### **4.1.MIDDLE EAST**

The Middle East is a region that faced various conflicts in the history. It has not had permanent stability especially politically during so many years. The region has an important geostrategic location and preponderant role based on energy resources in the world. The Middle East has a significant role for the EU, because of its energy resources – oil and natural gas – security issue, stability, Islamic movements, terrorism and migration issue. Migration issue is one of the most important issues between the EU and the Middle East, because instability, civil wars or inadequate living standards in the region cause huge immigration flows towards the EU territory. This situation directly affects the EU member-states' policies, social and demographic situations.

This section of the thesis aims to focus on the EU's policy features and elements towards the Middle East and to show the EU's neorealist point of view in accordance with the international system. The thesis emphasizes on the foreign policy analysis, developments and historical background of the EU and the Middle East relations, general foreign policies of the big member-states of the EU – Germany, France and the UK's foreign policies – towards the Middle, and the theoretical background. The thesis uses Brian White's method of foreign policy analysis that emerged of four main parts, including context, actors – policy making, capabilities – instruments and outcomes. (White, 2001)

Firstly, the thesis focuses on both external and internal context. For instance, if there is an international crisis, like the oil crisis in 1973, the sides are affected in terms of both



external and internal means. In our cases, the proclaim of oil embargo by the OPEC affected the relations between the EU and the Middle East. After the oil crisis in 1973, Arab leaders came to the Council of Ministers meeting and political dialogue between the two sides began because of the sides' interests. In this case, Council of Ministers is the dominant actors in the EU foreign policy towards the Middle East.

**Figure 3. Middle East Map**



**Source:** (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016)

Capabilities and instruments are bilateral agreements, ENP, political, economic and cultural strategies that are belong to the sides' interests in the relations between the EU and the Middle East. And outcomes are final element of the EU foreign policy analysis. Outcomes are effectiveness of the relations between the EU and the Middle East. The thesis analyses outcomes in the historical developments.

The root of the relations between the EU and the Middle East based on the Barcelona Process that was launched on November 1995, between 15 EU members and 12 Mediterranean partners. It was called as the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EUROMED) and it formed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In that year, the Barcelona Declaration that was adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference was formed as a guideline of the process. In the Declaration, there are three main parts, including political – security partnership, economic – financial partnership and partnership in social, cultural and human affairs.

Political – security partnership refers to establish a common area of peace and stability. The peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region, strengthening political dialogue, internal and external stability with the essential principles of international law are emphasized as the main purposes in the Barcelona Process. Economic – financial partnership has the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity and sustainable and balanced economic and social development. According to the Declaration, the free-trade area will be established with the new Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, free-trade agreements, economic and financial cooperation. And partnership in social, cultural and human affairs includes the issues of recognizing the traditions of culture and civilization in the Mediterranean region, exchanging at human, scientific and technological level and dialogue and respect between cultures and religions. (Council of the EU, 1995)

The aim of the Barcelona Declaration is expressed as follows:

Annex : Work Programme

The aim of this programme is to implement the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, and to respect its principles, through regional and multilateral actions. It is complementary both to the bilateral cooperation, implemented in particular under the agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. (Council of the EU, 1995)

However, the Barcelona Process was not successful because of international atmosphere, the EU's and the region's internal problems. For instance, 9/11 Attacks shows that security issue is the main problem. Hence the European Security Strategy (ESS) called as "A Secure Europe in a Better World" adopted by the European Council on 12-13

December 2003. According to this approach, the main issues as threats are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.

The report includes sentences about neighborhoods and the Mediterranean:

Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered. (Council of the EU, 2003)

In 2004, there is one of the important enlargement flows into the EU. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus became as member-states of the EU with the enlargement. With this enlargement, some Mediterranean countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon were included in the definition of the neighbourhood of the EU.

The EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). “The Barcelona Process became the multilateral forum of dialogue between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. It has bilateral relations under the ENP and through Association Agreements.” (The EU External Action, 2016)

According to the European Parliament report on the European Neighbourhood Policy, the ENP aims of privileged neighbourhood relations with the EU's neighbours includes, as an essential precondition, an active and concrete commitment to common values in the fields of the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the principles of a transparent social market economy and sustainable development. (Tannock, 2004)

In 2005, the Barcelona Summit agreed on a five-year work programme.

The aims of the programme are to provide the basis for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation for the next five years, the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans, to help realise a region of peace, security, prosperity and opportunity for our present and future generations, to work towards creating more job opportunities for the increasing numbers of young people across the region, reducing regional poverty rates and Acknowledging that Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security are issues of common interest in the Partnership. (EUROMED Final Text: Five Year Programme, 2005)

The Barcelona Process continues with the Paris Summit that relaunched Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and focus on the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008. Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean aims to transform the Mediterranean into an area of peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity, agree to adopt the following joint declaration.

It has some significant points:

- The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations.
- Common objectives, such as to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding.
- Respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- To clear the Mediterranean Sea,
- Sea and land transportation,
- Civil security. (The Republic of Turkey, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011)

The Treaty of Lisbon that was signed in 2007 and got into force in 2009 is seen as the most important step for the EU foreign policy because it leads a 'single voice' of the EU in foreign affairs. The Middle East is one of the most important region for the EU in foreign affairs however, the region's complex structure, conflicts and instabilities may not let follow a common foreign policy towards it. In addition, the EU's member-states various interests prevent to emerge a 'single voice' towards the region.

In 2011, European Commission's A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean was seen.

A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity should be built on the following three elements: Democratic transformation and institution-building, with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption; a stronger partnership with the people, with specific emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts with a particular focus on the young and; sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development especially support to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving health and education systems and development of the poorer regions. (European Commission, 2011)

Although the EU developed so many policies, declarations, summits for the region, member states' different policies should be analysed. Thus, the thesis focuses on Germany, France and the UK's foreign policy towards the region.

#### **4.1.1. Germany's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East**

Germany has important national interests in the Middle East and it has strong economic relationship with the Middle East. "According to Report by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, in 2011, 42 percent of the Germany's arms export is carried to the Middle East countries, including the Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates." (Kaya, 2013)

Germany's policy toward the region is influenced by two major factors. The first factor is the 'historical responsibility' which grew out of the Nazi past. This explains Germany's strong commitment to a peaceful regional order where Israel not only claims the right of existence but also receives recognition by its Arabic neighbors. The second factor influencing Germany's policy has more to do with a classical "realist" argumentation and is based on economic and security concerns in terms of accessing to regional markets and

securing of access to the energy resources in the Gulf region. (Overhaus & Maull, 2002, pp. 16,17)

Furthermore, the thesis emphasizes on German and Israel relations because it is a vital point in Germany foreign policy towards the Middle East. “Germany has commitment to Israel’s sovereignty and security has historically been the strongest influence on its policy and a key factor in its cooperation with the United States in the region.” (Belkin, 2007, p. 1) According to Fikret Ertan, “economic and trade relations between Germany and Israel positively continue. Germany is the one of the biggest trade partners of Israel. Israel imports almost 2,5 billion dollars from Germany.” (2014)

**Table 5. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on its Policy on Exports of Conventional Military Equipment**

Licences for the Export of Military Equipment and War Weapons

Country	Licences Total	EL Item	Value	Designation	Unit	
Saudi Arabia	38	0001A-02	6,822,096	Rifles with war weapons list number	4,259	
			908,835	Requisite components;	11,578	
		0001A-05	1,520,417	Submachine guns	1,233	
			93,028	Requisite components;	21,235	
		0001A-06	7,120	Components for machine guns	8	
Serbia	4	0001A-02	9,060	Components for rifles with war weapons list number	120	
			59,950	Submachine guns	50	
		0001A-05	6,400	Requisite components	200	
Singapore	21	0001A-02	818,540	Rifles with war weapons list number	595	
			860,660	Requisite components;	10,420	
		0001A-05	90,020	Submachine guns	68	
			15,814	Requisite components	160	
		0001A-06	2,832	Components for machine guns	600	
Uganda	1	0001A-02	4,140	Parts for rifles with war weapons list number [UN mission]	108	
UAE	3	0001A-02	17,660	Rifles with war weapons list number	16	
			10,140	Requisite components;	184	
		0001A-05	33,810	Components for submachine guns	2,767	
Hong Kong	8		161,105	Submachine guns	106	
			33,630	Components for submachine guns	319	
St. Helena	1	0001A-02	3,300	Rifles with war weapons list number [police]	4	
			1,042	Requisite components [police]	20	
Taiwan	1	0001A-05	479	Components for submachine guns	33	
<b>Total</b>	<b>165</b>		<b>17,938,558</b>			

Source: (Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2011, p. 27)

With bilateral trade worth 3.7 billion Euros, Germany is Israel's second largest trading partner after the United States. There are some different views that is the given the comparatively small size of the Israeli market relative to Germany's main export markets, most agree that economic considerations do not play a decisive role in German policy towards Israel. (Belkin, 2007, p. 4)

There is another important point is that Germany did not support to the invasion to Iraq in 2003. Germany again shows its difference in foreign policy towards the Middle East. This shows that in the EU, there is no a "single voice" in terms of its foreign policy.

Germany has sought to strike a balance between the strong commitment for Israel's security and its acceptance of the Palestinian right of self-determination, a principle which was already captured in the EC's Venice Declaration of June 1980. It also reflects Germany's sense of responsibility for the persecution and extermination of European Jewry under the Nazis, and the special German-Israeli relationship that has developed over the last decades. (Overhaus & Maull, 2002, p. 11)

Germany foreign policy towards the Middle East is shaped dominantly by economic relations, political interests and energy needs.

#### **4.1.2. France's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East**

France has important relationship with the Middle East. After the World War I, France and Britain divided the region between themselves. Syria and Lebanon became colonies of France. "France aims to regain power in the Middle East and North Africa and be an influential actor within these regions in the aftermath of the Cold War. France's first project to regain its leadership status in the region." (Güler, 2014, p. 2)

France's aim of strenghtening its economic dominance in the region was seen in 2007, when Sarkozy declared the project of the Union for the Mediterranean. This project purposes to prevent economic disadvantages of France because of the USA project of establishing of the Middle East and Africa Free Trade Area in 2004. (Ferhavi, 2013, p. 5)

France has sometimes different policy from the USA that is dominant power in the Middle East towards the region. For instance, France refused the USA's invasion to Iraq in 2003. However, "because of maintaining its role in restructuring of Iraq, France supported the UN Security Council's decision on Iraq issue." (Ferhavi, 2013, p. 3)

France's interests shaped the EU projects towards the Middle East and France aims to be a dominant power in the region by using the EU policy. This purpose of France was seen in Chirac speech in 2007:

Chirac explained French's Arab policy as being based on four primary principles:

1. Equal dialogue and partnerships,
2. Dedication to the right of peoples to freedom and self-determination,
3. Support for Arab countries' aspirations towards solidarity, as well as French support for the Arab League and regional groups of the Maghreb and Machrek,
4. Support for the aspirations of the Arab world for openness and peace, to combat extremism and the fanaticism of forces of hatred in the world. (Jack Covarrubias, 2007, p. 29)

In addition, in his speech, he claimed that he did not just speak for France, but for the EU as a partner of the Arab world also. However, France has political and economic interests and it prioritizes its national interests rather than the EU interests in the Middle East.

#### **4.1.3. The UK's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East**

The UK has a colonial past, like France, with the Middle East. It has important links with Iraq, Jordan and Palestine because of the oil and natural gas sources. "There are British interests from the past that is unfettered access to the Suez Canal, the fundamental nature of oil financially, strategically, politically, and militarily, and to maintain regional stability." (Sedgwick, 2001, p. 6) "Through the Arab Partnership (AP), a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development (DFID) initiative,



the UK government is supporting political and economic reform in the region.” (The UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development, and Ministry of Defence, 2012)

The UK’s interests are interpenetrated with the USA’ ones in the region. “It shares concerns of its EU partners regarding post-war Iraq due to fears about security and instability. But, it supported the USA against the regime of Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War.” (Sedgwick, 2001, p. 8) Moreover, in 2003 Iraq War, the UK followed different policy than the member-states of the EU. When there is an issue about national interests, the EU member-states follow their own policy, like in Iraq War. Although other member-states like Germany and France did not support the US intervention to Iraq, the UK supported it.

“In order to maximize impact in the region, the UK should seek to feed its experience of decades of bilateral relations with the Gulf countries into the revision of broader EU policies that aim to support political transitions.” (Michou, 2012, p. 1)

The UK has vital interests over the Middle East because of its colonial past, the oil and natural gas sources. “Trade between the UK and the Middle East and North Africa that is significant part of the UK foreign policy towards the region exceeded £30 billion in 2011, and millions of British tourists visit the region each year.” (The UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development, and Ministry of Defence, 2012) France policy towards the Middle East based on its economic interests in the region.

#### **4.1.4. A Theoretical Analysis of the EU Foreign Policy towards the Middle East**

In the foreign policy towards the Middle East, the EU member-states act according to their national interests economically and politically, rather than normative basis. The EU developed some declarations, summits and objectives; however, member-states’ national interests are more dominant than the EU’s common policies and objectives in the region.

For instance, in 2003 Iraq War, the UK supported the USA intervention to the country, because the UK wanted to gain economic benefits and to maintain its dominancy in the region with the USA.

Although the EU has a feature of supranational organization, member states' different policies may not let the EU act like a "single voice" in the international arena. Member-states cooperated in establishing the peace process for the Middle East and emerged the Barcelona Process, however this cooperation is easily breakable when the issue is national interest. For member-states, their absolute gains and maximize their powers are the most important aims, thus there is member-states' egoism rather than keeping the Union's interests.

The Middle East is indispensable region for the EU in order to have both political and economic interests. The region is important because any instability or terror event influences the EU countries with increasing rate of the illegal immigration or racist movements in the EU countries. The EU member-states' purpose is to keep the region's stability politically and economically for their interests.

The EU has some development about its foreign policy towards the Middle East, including the Barcelona Process in 1995, the Barcelona Declaration, the ENP in 2004 and the Paris Summit in 2008. It aims to strengthen its relations with the Middle Eastern countries and to maintain its role in the region. However, these attempts are inadequate because the Union's foreign policy towards the region is so passive and inefficient. Furthermore, there are instability, Islamic terror movements and illegal immigration in the region. In the Arab Spring, the EU has a passive role. In the beginning of the riots, it followed "wait and see" policy. Then, in Libya, France has an active role, and in Syria issue the Union had some sanctions, however it cannot realize its main aims in the region.

Although the EU developed some policies towards the Middle East, it cannot be successful. Its policies and objectives are only nominally, they cannot get in practice.

[T]he EU, as a normative power defined by Manners, does not correspond. For example, the Iraq War highlighted differences between member-states and demonstrates how sovereign power and national self-interest is still relevant. The UK's prominent involvement in the conflict contrasted with Germany's and France's abstinence; if member-states are unable to form a coherent normative policy towards an issue as important as Iraq, then it must place severe doubt over whether the EU can operate as a normative power competing against member state self-interest. In this way, the EU's internal norms have not predisposed it to act in a normative manner and notions of normative power are acutely idealistic. (Hardwick, 2011)

In summary, the EU has passive foreign policy towards the region because of its member states' different policies and interests, and the EU cannot show its claim of normative basis in the region.


## **4.2. EASTERN EUROPE**

It seems that the EU member-states prioritize their own interests in Eastern Europe, rather than the EU's normative basis. This chapter focuses on the EU's 2004 enlargement and relations with Russia, in order to analyse member-states' interests and policies.

### **4.2.1. The 2004 Enlargement**

In 2004, the EU's fifth enlargement was seen as the Eastern Enlargement. In that time, the EU's number of member-states increased from 15 to 25. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta became as new members of the EU. Seven states of them were in the former Eastern Bloc: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania are from post-Soviet states; and Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are members of the Visegrád Group that was established in 1991 was an alliance of four Central European states that purposes to provide social transformation and join in the European integration process.

Figure 4. Eastern Europe Map



Source: (Hughes, Sasse, & Gordon, 2005, p. 9)

In addition to Eastern European countries, in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria's membership and in 2013 Croatia's membership to the EU was the next step of the Eastern Enlargement. However, 2004 enlargement is one of the most important one in the enlargement process because these new member-states are post-Soviet countries and the former Eastern Bloc countries. They are inadequate economically and non-democratic countries. This enlargement caused some problems in the EU, such as problems of providing coherent policy.

#### 4.2.2. Relations with Russia

The EU has strong link with Russia, and important policies over regions that related to Russia's foreign policy. 2004 enlargement has vital importance for the EU, because it could interfere to Russia's sphere of influence. The economic relations are the most important parts of the link between the EU and Russia. For instance, "imports into Russia between 2003 and 2011 from the new member-states such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary grew more than imports from most EU-15 countries." (The Russian State Statistical Service, 2014) Russia tries not only to maintain stable relations with the EU but also to continue its influence in the former Soviet area.

Ivanov (Rasshirenyi Evrosoiuz kak partner Rossii, in Rasshirenie evropeiskogo soiuz i Rossia, eds. Olga Butorina and Yuri Borko, 2006, s. 300-315) claims that EU enlargement has intensified the EU-Russian economic relations. It is often noted that the proportion of trade between the two partners has grown and that investment in both directions has increased. However, many Russian experts view the economic impact of EU enlargement as ambiguous – beneficial for some sectors, but potentially harmful for others.

To DeBardeleben (2009, p. 49), "growth in exports from Russia to the 2004 new member-states has been below the norm, and energy resources dominate. Enlargement does not seem to have produced a bonus in terms of Russia's non-energy export market."

In addition, by the 2004 and the 2007 enlargement, some protocols and statements emerged between the EU and Russia. These are Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 2004, Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russian Relations 2004, Protocol to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 2007 and Joint Statement on EU enlargement and Russia-EU relations 2007. "These protocols and statements include the interdependence of the EU and Russia, their proximity and increasing political, economic and cultural ties that reach new levels with the enlargement of the EU." (Council of the EU, 2004) "These enlargements demonstrated that the EU was willing to pay the cost of its eastern expansion, despite evident risks. This made geopolitical change an overriding fact governing EU-Russian relations." (DeBardeleben,

2008, p. 11) The EU member-states acted according to their economic and political interests with Russia in 2004 enlargement.

To sum up, 2004 Eastern Enlargement of the EU is made up for the EU member-states' political and economic interests. The EU did not prioritize its norms and values, but its international interests in the region according to neorealist system.

### **4.3.THE BALKANS**

The case of Srebrenica Massacre may illustrate the EU's approach to the situation was not based on normative basis. Firstly, the section focuses on "the importance of Srebrenica" and secondly, the massacre is analysed, in order to show the EU's act on human rights issue in the Balkans.

#### **4.3.1. The Importance of Srebrenica**

Srebrenica Massacre is aggravated event that occurred in 20<sup>th</sup> century in the full view of Europe and the world. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, Srebrenica Massacre occurred in Yugoslavian Civil War between 1991 and 1995.

Srebrenica is a town in the northeastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina near the Serbian border. Srebrenica means "silver mine". Population is about 37 thousands of people. During most of the 1992 and 1995 Balkan conflict it was an enclave under the control of Bosnian Army, housing thousands of Bosnian Muslims from surrounding areas. During the Bosnian War, the town was the site of the July 1995 Massacre, determined to have been a crime of genocide. The Srebrenica massacre was the worst genocidal atrocity in Europe since World War II. (Konokhovich, 2012, p. 3)

**Figure 5. Srebrenica Map**



Source: (Welch, 2014)

#### **4.3.2. Srebrenica Massacre**

In the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, a massacre was seen in the middle of Europe. For the EU, this is disgrace and is the contradiction to the EU's claim of being normative power.

The events in question took place in and near the Bosnian town of Srebrenica between July 11 and 19, 1995, as the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) occupied that town and fought with and killed many Bosnian Muslims, unknown numbers dying in the fighting and by executions. There is no question but that Bosnian Serb forces carried out executions, but even though only rarely discussed there is a major issue of how many, as numerous bodies found in local grave sites were victims of fighting, hard to differentiate from victims of execution, and many Bosnian Muslim men who fled Srebrenica reached Bosnian Muslim and Yugoslav territory safely. (Herman, 2011, p. 19)

This massacre occurred although there were armed Dutch peacekeepers in the region. Neither the UN nor the EU, that claims its normative basis including especially human rights, did not prevent this worst event. Hence, can we talk about the EU's "normative power"? In 1993, the UN Security Council declared that Sarajevo, Goradze, Srebrenica and other Muslim enclaves were to be safe areas, protected by a contingent of UN peacekeepers. "In July 1995, Serbs committed the largest massacre in Europe since World War II. 23,000 women, children and elderly people were put on buses and driven to Muslim-controlled territory, 8,000 "battle-age" men were detained and slaughtered." (Holocaust Museum Houston, 2011)

In 1994, NATO initiated air strikes against Bosnian Serbs to stop the attacks. In December 1995, U.S.-led negotiations in Dayton, Ohio (The Dayton Peace Accords) ended the conflict in Bosnia, and a force was created to maintain the ceasefire. Since the end of the conflict, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) at The Hague has charged more than 160 persons. In 2001, Former-President Milošević was captured, but he died in his cell in 2006. Radovan Karadžić, the supreme commander of the Bosnian Serb armed forces, was captured in 2008. Ratko Mladić, chief of staff of the Bosnian Serb Army, was captured in May 2011 and is charged with 11 counts, including genocide and crimes against humanity. (Holocaust Museum Houston, 2011)

European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2009 on Srebrenica was declared. It included the following sentences:

...whereas in July 1995 the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, which was at that time an isolated enclave proclaimed a Protected Zone by a United Nations Security Council Resolution of 16 April 1993, fell into the hands of the Serbian militias led by General Ratko Mladić and under the direction of the then President of the Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić,

...whereas, during several days of carnage after the fall of Srebrenica, more than 8000 Muslim men and boys, who had sought safety in this area under the protection of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), were summarily executed by Bosnian Serb forces commanded by General Mladić. Nearly 25000 women, children and elderly people were forcibly deported, making this event the biggest war crime to take place in Europe since the end of the Second World War... (European Parliament, 2009)



The EU could not do something to avoid this execution in 1995. It just declared the resolution in 2009. The EU and armed Dutch peacekeepers did not do anything to prevent the massacre in 1995. The EU's norms and values, such as respecting for human rights, are not seen in Srebrenica. Moreover, International Court of Justice (ICJ) on February 26 handed down a decision on the lawsuit filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia for genocide. "The lawsuit, filed in 1993 in the heat of war, finally was heard early last year. A year later, a majority of the Court's 15 judges agreed that Serbia was not guilty of genocide nor of complicity in genocide – but that it was guilty for failure to prevent genocide." (Lippman, 2007) The EU did not show its claim of being a normative power in this case. This massacre is clear example of human rights violation and the EU did not apply its normative basis in this case.

#### **4.4. MIGRATION**

This section of the thesis focuses on historical background of migration issue, Syrian civil war that leads important migration flow to Europe and relations between the EU and Turkey about migration issue. Then, it analyses the EU's reaction, including member states' different reactions, to the immigrants who want to escape from the civil war in their home country and immigrate to European countries in order to have peace and stability for their life.

##### **4.4.1. Historical Background of Migration Issue**

Europe faced significant migration flows in the history. The major periods are between the late of 1940s and 1950s; 1950s and 1973; 1973 and the middle of 1980s; the middle of 1980s and today. These huge immigration flows brought so many problems in Europe, such as economic crisis, poverty, inadequate living conditions, racist and xenophobic attitudes in the societies. In order to solve these problems, European countries

made some policies, such as integration policies towards immigrants of third countries. In order to have better understanding of migration integration in Europe, we should know the concept of integration. Integration refers so many aspects, such as social, cultural and economic. Generally, it means the way of adaptability of immigrants or non-citizens in the host society or country. "The main aim of integration policy in the EU is ensuring fair treatment of third countries nationals purposed at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of the EU citizens." (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003, p. 3) In this policy, social integration of migrants is necessary and member states of the EU have significant responsibility in the issue. In addition, acculturation is another important notion besides integration. It refers to take over certain major elements of immigrants surrounding cultural environment, without abandoning their original cultural identity. It is not unilateral process, so governments in Europe also have responsibility about it. Thus, acculturation is called with integration in the migration issue in Europe.

The EU follows restriction policy towards immigration issue. In 1940s and 1950s mass migration to Europe occurred, but this was not seen as a threat and security issue. In 1950s and 1960s recruitment of labor migrants and demand of labour migrants were existed in order to search for economic growth in the EU countries, especially in Germany. 1973 was the turning point because of the Oil Crisis. Closing gate for labour migrants in Europe was seen. In the middle of 1980s and 1990s, migration flows increased and migration became as important threat and security issue for the EU. Racist and xenophobic movements, extreme-right political parties' hostility against immigrants, chauvinism, modern states' racist terminology and restriction policies began to be seen in the EU countries against immigrants. For instance, "Communication from the Commission emphasizes on policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country nationals." (Commission of the European Communities, 2006)

The EU's significant developments about immigrant integration are the Fontainebleau Summit which is related to internal border control in 1984, the White Paper that is the Commission report on internal border control in 1985, the Guideline for

Community Policy on Migration in 1985, the establishment of intergovernmental ad-hoc working group on immigration in 1986, 1985 Schengen Agreement, 1990 Implementing Agreement of 1985, 1990 Dublin Convention that is related to asylums, and 1992 Maastricht Treaty which includes migration policy of the EU. One of the most important steps is the European Council meeting in 1999 in Tampere as a vital development that includes the objective of fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its member states. Following Tampere, the Commission presented a proposal to apply Open Method Coordination to Community immigration policy that includes the raising of integration strategies in 2001.

In 2002, JHA (Justice and Home Affairs) Council conclusions proposed establishing a group of National Contact Points on Integration, a network of experts drawn from the relevant ministries of each member state and it has the preparation of the Handbook on Integration that applies to facilitate the exchange of information among member states in the integration policy; and in 2003, there is Communication on immigration and integration is presented by the Commission. (Carrera & Parkin, 2011, pp. 158-168)

The other vital point is the Treaty of Amsterdam that transferred the third pillar which includes the issues of external border control, asylum, rights of third countries nationals to the first pillar that is supranational structure that has a high authority in order to make a decision. In addition, there is a good example of the Council of the EU about immigrant integration policy in the EU, Press Release, Justice and Home Affairs of the Council of the EU in 2004 that includes significant points and aims:

- Immigration is a permanent feature of European society. If the flow of is orderly and well-managed, Member States reap many benefits. These include stronger economies, greater social cohesion, an increased feeling of security, and cultural diversity.
- Developing a set of EU common basic principles on integration is essential, not only given the diversity of experiences and circumstances, but also given the shared interest that Member States have in agreeing upon shared goals on integration. (Council of the EU, 2004)

“In 2007, with the Commission proposal the European Integration Fund was established by aiming to enhance member states’ national efforts to enable integration policy.” (Carrera & Parkin, 2011, p. 173) Moreover, there is another EU document that shows the Union’s common principles in integration policy. This is the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy that was adopted by the JHA Council in November 2004 and form the foundations of EU initiatives in the field of integration.

It has these principles:

- Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states.
- Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation.
- The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law. (The Justice and Home Affairs Council, 2004)

#### **4.4.2. Syrian Migrants**

Syrian Civil War is important point in migration issue. By the beginning of Syrian civil war in 2011, huge migration flow began to spread through Europe. The event began with the nation-wide protests against President Bashar al-Assad's government and with demands for democracy, freedom and human rights in Arab societies. Many revolts were seen in Arab countries and so many leaders were abolished by citizens. Because there were some corruptions in Arab countries such as economic crises, limitations of freedom of speech, inflation, inadequate living conditions. These protests began in Tunisia in 2010 and Zeynel Abidin bin Ali had to be stand down after his at least 20 years in office. With spill-over effect, the revolts spread other Arab countries, such as Syria. With Arab revolts or Arab Spring, the world experienced the most active and dynamic rebellions and demonstrations in 21<sup>th</sup> century. Some of them claimed that Internet and social network,

such as Facebook and Twitter, facilitate spread of the revolts. People connected with each other with them. Arab people had demands for freedom, justice and democracy against non-democratic regimes.


Syrian civil war leads to huge immigrant flows to Europe and this problem still cannot be solved. Syrian immigrants have to leave their home country because of the war. They try to immigrate to European countries and they use some routes, such as Turkey and Greece. Turkey welcomed thousands of Syrian immigrants and the number of them is increasing day by day. “According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, 182,621 Syrian refugees were living in Turkey mid-February 2013 and Turkey is the largest host country with over 2.7 million Syrian refugees now.” (Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, 2016)

Officially, Syrians in Turkey are recognized not as refugees but as “guests.” Not being granted refugee status is an important factor that increases the vulnerability of Syrians who have fled their country for political and humanitarian reasons. Many Syrians have stated that their major complaint about the Turkish government is that they are not being granted refugee status and that “guest” status implies unpredictability about their presence in Turkey. The fear concerning the precariousness of their status is not unfounded. As a worker for one of the local authorities in Islahiye stated during my interview with him: The guest status means that Syrians do not have rights in Turkey and that the State has the right to make the decision to deport them at any time. In other words, the Turkish state has not carried out a policy towards Syrians based on a discourse of rights, but rather one based on generosity. (Özden, 2013, p. 5)

Syrian immigrants’ purpose is to find a way to immigrate to European countries that offer better life for themselves. For this reason, they try to use some ways, such as irregular or illegal migration. “As of February 2016, the United Nations (UN) has identified 13.5 million Syrians requiring humanitarian assistance, of which 6.6 million are internally displaced within Syria, and over 4.8 million are refugees outside of Syria.” (OCHA, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016) These immigrants face

people-trafficking and smuggling.<sup>10</sup> They use cheap quality boats and they want to cross the Aegean Sea to Greece.

**Figure 6. Migration Route to the EU Territory**



**Source:** (Chris Morris, 2016)

Police in Turkey say they have confiscated more than 1,000 fake life jackets made for migrants wanting to cross the Aegean Sea to Greece. More than one million migrants crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 and the majority went from Turkey to Greece. To the UN, 3,771 people were listed as dead or missing in 2015. (BBC News, 2016)

Syrian civil war caused a big migration flow to the EU territory. Syrian immigrants lose their lives and human rights violations are seen unfortunately in this case today.

<sup>10</sup> Smuggling is the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident. (The United Nations, 2000)

#### **4.4.3. Relations between the EU and Turkey on the Migration Issue**

Although so many immigrants lost their lives, the EU still throws overboard this issue and human rights; and tries to do deal on the migration issue, such as with Turkey. In 2014, Readmission Agreement was signed between the EU and Turkey. The agreement purposes to maintain cooperation in order to combat illegal immigration, and also to supply safe and orderly return of persons. The EU and Turkey continue to meet to deal with immigration issue. In 2015, EU-Turkey joint action plan came to the agenda. It aims to support the Syrians under temporary protection and their Turkish hosting communities and to strengthen cooperation to prevent irregular migration.

[T]he EU side intends the funds will be mobilized in the most flexible and rapid way possible, notably through the EU Trust Fund for the Syrian crisis; providing assistance, over and beyond the 4.2 EUR billion already mobilized by the EU, to Syrian refugees hosted in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, as well as to Syrians displaced within Syria with the aim to contribute, inter alia, to the weakening of push factors forcing them to move towards Turkey; supporting cooperation between EU member-states and Turkey in organising joint return operations, including reintegration measures, towards countries of origin of irregular migrants; increasing the financial assistance offered to support Turkey in meeting the requirement of the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue.

On the one hand, Turkey intends, in line with the Visa Roadmap requirements, pursuing the progressive alignment of Turkish visa policy, legislation and administrative capacities notably vis-à-vis the countries representing an important source of illegal migration for Turkey and the EU. (European Commission , 2015)

On 18 March, following on from the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan activated on 29 November 2015 and the 7 March EU-Turkey statement, the EU and Turkey decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. The EU and Turkey agreed that:

- All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey;

- Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU;
- The EU will, in close cooperation with Turkey, further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated €3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Once these resources are about to be used in full, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility up to an additional €3 billion to the end of 2018;
- The EU and Turkey will work to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria. (European Commission, 2016)

The EU makes an agreement with Turkey on immigrant issue by not prioritizing human rights, just caring about its member-states' interest. "The right to seek asylum is one of the most important rights in Europe, but refugees losing their lives show that the EU is not implementing this right in a correct way." (Yılmaz, 2014, pp. 13-14) The EU does not follow its "normative basis", especially related to human rights, in migration issue and its member-states prioritize their national political and economic interests.

[T]he EU has some common purposes in its integration policy, however there are differences among member states integration policies. We can look at these differences in three main dimensions of integration policies in Europe. First dimension is socio-economic. There is a need of the economy towards immigrants defined as temporary. Temporary residents, such as guest-workers, have no same degree of rights which state provides its own citizens like in Germany. Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal are countries that formerly labour sending countries on the one hand. The problem is that temporary labour migrants became permanent and this leads need of integration policies. The second dimension is legal-political one that includes two main approaches. One of them is *jus soli* system which based on that all people resident in a territory have the same rights, example of the UK. Other approach is *jus sanguinis* system that refers status-related rights, example of Germany. And final dimension is cultural. There are two modal including multicultural<sup>11</sup> like in the UK and assimilation<sup>12</sup> modal like in France. (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003, pp. 11-14)

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<sup>11</sup> Multiculturalism means the coexistence of groups and different identities in a heterogeneous stable society.

<sup>12</sup> Assimilation refers being indistinguishable from host society.



In conclusion, “immigrant integration policies are important, but they can be insufficient over the long run to realize the full economic potential and societal participation of immigrants and citizens with an immigrant background.” (Collett & Petrovic, 2014) The integration process faces several difficulties.

There is a lack of comparable statistics on immigrant integration in the EU but the Commission is trying to tackle the problem. However, it will take time before we can get solid and up-to-date statistical data on integration of immigrants in all spheres of activities and in all the member-states of the EU. (Martiniello, 1995, pp. 9-10)

The EU has also lack of normative bases on migration issue. It has political, economic and social interests and although it says that its norms are determining factor it follows its interests on the issue, not immigrants’ ones.

## CONCLUSION

The EU claims to be a normative power seeking to uphold norms and values, including respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in the international sphere. However, the international arena is characterized by neorealism and the EU or the EU member-states act(s) according to this system, which precludes the possibility of being a normative power.

Like Waltz's suggestion, there are only two kinds of system possible in a neorealist world – a hierarchical or an anarchical system. In a hierarchical system, different kinds of units are organized under a clear line of authority and units which are similar in nature, even though they differ dramatically in capabilities, conduct relations with one another. To Waltz, the present system is anarchical, and has been since its late medieval origins (Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 42).

The EU exists in the anarchical international system and it also has neorealist features. For instance, there is no clear hierarchy, states are dominant actors and they act in their individual best interests in order to survive, and there is no common foreign policy such as in migration policy.

The states that emerge in anarchy are unitary and rational, seeking above all to survive while maximizing perceived utility. They will naturally pursue their national interest defined in terms of power according to offensive neorealism, or in terms of security according to defensive neorealism. Due to the anarchic nature of the international system, and the absence of any recourse in the case of aggression, states have only themselves to rely upon to protect their interests, sovereignty, and indeed, their very survival. (Wexler, 2006, pp. 399-400)

Although there are some arguments contesting the EU's normative basis, it does not have the power to prioritize norms and values because the EU member-states follow their own national interests in order to survive in anarchical international system and maximize their power in order to maintain their political and economic stability. "In contrast to Manners's emphasis on the EU's norms, neorealism argues that values are a weak variable

that are unable to influence systemic structures in an anarchic international system.”  
(Jorgensen, 2006, p. 51)

In the case studies of the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Balkans and the migration issue, the EU's priorities are obvious, but its member-states act against the collective interest in order to try to gain stability and power politically and economically.

The Middle East case shows that big member-states of the EU – Germany, France and the UK – have different historical background, political and economic links and interests with the region. Thus, member-states can act in different ways in some political issues about the Middle East.

In the Eastern Europe case, the EU member-states acts accordingly their political and economic interests in 2004 enlargement. It shaped its policy to have close relations with Russia and, also to interfere Russia's sphere by using its enlargement policy.

Balkans case offers that the EU's claim of being normative power does not show the fact. Because it did not act in accordance with its norms and values, Srebrenica Massacre occurred, housing thousands of Bosnian Muslims from surrounding areas and crime of genocide was seen in 21<sup>th</sup> century in Europe.

Migration case also shows that the EU does not prioritize norms, such as respecting for human rights. Immigrants do not have adequate living standards and they lose their lives, however the EU just make some agreements about the issue and the problem cannot be solved.

The EU nevertheless tries to be seen as a normative power because this allows it to legitimize its acts in international arena. On the one hand, it has to obey the system's requirements and on the other, its member-states have to think about their interests in order to survive in an anarchic neorealist world system.

For instance, human rights is one of the most important norms of the EU, the norm cannot become a powerful influencer because “[w]hilst human rights may be considered an important aspect of EU foreign policy, aims are not alone in foreign policy and normative goals are argued to be constrained by structural dynamics of the international system” (Waltz, 2004, p. 5). The norms the EU purports to uphold are second in importance to the interests, political and economic stability for the EU’s member states. “As such the EU’s foreign policy will be primarily focused on rational decisions that pursue “political and strategic security, and [the] economic well-being of its member state.” (Tilley, 2012, p. 457).

It is difficult to agree with Manners that the EU is a normative power, due to discrepancies between what it says and what it does, the so-called capabilities-expectations gap. Being a normative power is perhaps unattainable if the interests of its member-states cannot be detached from EU foreign policy, and if the coordination of member-states is necessary. As this is the case, as demonstrated by Iraq, the EU is not acting as a normative power that is changing expectations of norms away from state-centricity; any assertion that it does is tied up in idealism. The EU, by using non-normative means to diffuse norms and by not being able to detach itself from state self-interest, has regressed from being a normative power as Manners argues. (Hardwick, 2011, pp. 13-14)

The EU’s policies can be criticized and its claim of being normative power can be rebutted, as is this thesis’s aim. However, it has to act according to the system’s neorealist features in order to have voice, power and authority in international relations. The EU may accept that it is not a normative power, but a civilian power and it has neorealist characters as the system.

The EU prefers to be seen as a normative power, as its legitimacy is based on its philosophical roots. However, the present international system makes its member-states neorealist actors. Hence, the EU cannot be a political unity and, according to the general argument in the literature, it is seen as an economic giant, but political dwarf. “Although the EU is defined as a region that increases its political basis, it is seen as economically

powerful, from / among four power perspectives, economic, diplomatic, normative and military.” (Dinç, 2015, p. 191)

The EU member-states avoid cooperation on “high politics”, however, they can cooperate in “low politics”.<sup>13</sup>

States are more reluctant to integrate their militaries rather than their economies. States cooperating with one must worry that their partners may cheat on their agreement to gain an advantage over them; thus, this fear is especially acute in military affairs because defection can happen quickly and the cost of being cheated on are potentially much graver in the military sphere than the economic one. (Rosato, 2011, pp. 20-40)

There are still some questions about the concept of Europe, European values, norms and identity; there is no clear definition of the EU. “What kind of power does the EU have?” There is no clear answer to this question. While there are these kinds of questions about the EU, it may not be called a normative power, because there are so many blurred notions about both the EU’s normative claim and the EU itself.

“European politics is seemed pessimistic or skeptical on the concept of the process of political integration itself. This being so, European political integration research would lose its subject-matter and remain as a mere empty shell.” (Çakır, 1995, p. 8) The EU cannot act like a union and a “single-voice” because of member-states different national interests. Moreover, it is under influences of big member-states, such as Germany and France. The obvious example of this is Brexit<sup>14</sup> which is the UK’s intend to withdraw from the EU. “In June 2016 referendum, leave won by 52% to 48%. The referendum turnout was 71.8%, with more than 30 million people voting.” (Hunt & Wheeler, 2016)

In sum, the EU – or more precisely, its member-states – may act in accordance with neorealist system consciously or unconsciously, undermining its claim of being a normative

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<sup>13</sup> Low politics refers to economic and cultural concerns, such as single market programme, social, cultural or environmental policies.

<sup>14</sup> Brexit is a portmanteau of "Britain" and "exit".

power. It tries to maintain its claim in order to save its legitimacy in international sphere; however, its normative basis is not seen in practice.

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