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MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

THE EU AND THE MEDITERRANEAN: A POSTCOLONIAL ANALYSIS

DOKTORA TEZİ

Efsun Çelik Yücel

İstanbul-2018

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ONAY SAYFASI

Enstitümüz AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Türkçe / İngilizce Doktora Programı öğrencisi Efsun Çelik Yücel'in, **The EU and The Mediterranean: A Postcolonial Analysis** konulu tez çalışması 21.05/2018 tarihinde yapılan tez savunma sınavında aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından **OYBİRLİĞİ / OYÇOKLUĞU** ile BAŞARILI bulunmuştur.

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28/05/2018 tarih ve 2018/10 sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararı ile onaylanmıştır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of this thesis could not have been possible without the expertise of Assoc. Prof. Dr. E. Münevver Cebeci, my beloved thesis adviser. I would like to thank my whole family, especially to my father, Mustafa Nuri Şener, without you none of this would indeed be possible.

Istanbul, 2018

Efsun Çelik Yücel

GENEL BİLGİLER

İsim ve Soyadı:	Efsun Çelik Yücel
Anabilim Dalı:	AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Programı:	AB Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler
Tez Danışmanı:	Doç. Dr. E. Münevver Cebeci
Tez Türü ve Tarihi:	Doktora – 2018
Anahtar Kelimeler:	Normatiflik, Neokolonyalizm

ÖZET

AB VE AKDENİZ: POSTKOLONYAL ANALİZ

Bu çalışma, postkolonyal dönemde Avrupa Birliği (AB) ile Güney ve Doğu Akdeniz Ortakları (GDAO) arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, AB'nin Akdeniz'de neokolonyal eğilimleri olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu anlamda, AB kendi çıkarlarını gözetmek ve nüfuzunu korumak için, Akdeniz politikaları aracılığıyla norm ve değerlerini bölgeye yansıtmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma, AB'nin esas olarak normatiflik iddiasıyla Akdeniz politikalarını sürdürdüğünü iddia etmektedir. Bu politikalar yoluyla AB, Güney ve Doğu Akdeniz'de demokrasi ve barış alanı oluşturmayı iddia ederken, bu politikalar aynı zamanda AB'nin bölgeye istikrar kazandırmasına ve bölgede avantaj kazanıp ve Avrupa hegemonyasının bölge üzerinde yeniden inşa etmesine yardımcı olmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Birliğin normatiflik iddiasıyla kendi menfaatine dayalı stratejilerini nasıl takip ettiğini göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, AB'nin neokolonyal politikalara sahip olduğunu, normları ve değerleri yalnızca çıkarları doğrultusunda sürdürdüğünü iddia etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Birliğin dış politika eylemlerinin normatif ve neokolonyal özelliklere sahip olabileceği iddia edilmektedir. Bu çalışma, AB'nin bölgedeki çıkar amaçlı, güvenlik odaklı politikalarının Birliğin normatif bir güç olarak hareket etme iddiasına zarar verdiği, ve AB'nin sömürge sonrası dönemdeki Akdeniz yaklaşımının neokolonyal olarak görülebileceğini savunmaktadır.

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

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Degree Awarded and Date:	PhD – 2018
Key Words:	Normativity, Neocolonialism

ABSTRACT

THE EU AND THE MEDITERRANEAN: A POSTCOLONIAL ANALYSIS

This study aims at analyzing the relationship between the European Union (EU) and South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners (SEMPs) in the postcolonial era. This study argues that the EU has neocolonial tendencies in the Mediterranean. In this sense, in order to seek its own interests and maintain its influence, the EU tries to project its norms and values to the region through its Mediterranean policies. This study claims that the EU is mainly pursuing its Mediterranean policies under the claim of normativity. It is argued that through these policies, the EU claims to create an area of democracy and peace in the South and Eastern Mediterranean, however, these policies also help the EU to stabilize, to gain advantage and rebuild European hegemony over the region. This study shows how the Union follows its self-interest driven strategies under the claim normativity. This study claims that EU has neocolonial policies and pursues norms and values only when it is in its interest to do so. In this sense, it is claimed that the foreign policy actions of the Union can possess normative and neocolonial features. This study asserts that the EU's self-interested, security-oriented policies in the region, undermines the Union's claim to act as a normative power, and therefore, the EU's Mediterranean approach in the postcolonial era can be regarded as neocolonial.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACPs	African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSF	Civil Society Facility
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMS	Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCECI	Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument
DCFTAs	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas
EC	European Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEA	European Economic Area
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EED	European Endowment for Democracy
EMAAs	Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
MEDA	Measure d'Accompagnement
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MNCs	Mediterranean non-member countries
NRCN	A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood

OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
HR	High Representative
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession
PfDSP	Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity
RMP	Renewed Mediterranean Policy
SEMPs	South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners
SMEs	Small and Medium size Enterprises
SPRING	Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth
TAIEX	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	UN Security Council
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WMP	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WU	Western Union

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s, the European Union has made an intensive effort to design approaches and to implement policies towards the rest of the world. The EU's most sophisticated external policies have been mainly concerned with neighboring regions especially the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. The EU has been trying to influence its neighbourhood by promoting certain values in its foreign policy, by exporting its own integration model as a recipe, and by pursuing its own interests. In this sense, the EU has given increased attention to its relations with the countries of the Mediterranean region. The EU has tried to assert its influence over the region and has aimed to strengthen its relations with the countries of the Mediterranean. It can be claimed that in the postcolonial era, the EU's Mediterranean policies aim to stabilize the Mediterranean region with political, economic, security and cultural tools and to help the development of the region. By claiming itself as a model to be followed, the EU expects its neighbours to emulate its model and embrace its values. In this sense, the EU's projection of its values can be considered neocolonial – as a new Western style of domination and a civilizing mission because this projection constitutes as an attempt to form a model as to how the world relations should be best organized. Fostering development in the Mediterranean region through trade liberalization, development aid, and exporting the European model of regional integration have been the policies used to further European interests that can also be interpreted as neocolonial.

In the postcolonial era, the patterns of dependence and domination between Europe and the Mediterranean continued in the form of an asymmetrical relation between the EU and the South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners (SEMPs)¹. This asymmetry provides the EU the opportunity to pursue its interests and design Euro-centric policies towards the Mediterranean where the EU generally operates as the center and disciplines its South and Eastern Mediterranean. Based on this center-periphery approach, the EU acts just like an Empire and tries to exercise its power over its periphery through silent disciplining, indirect influence and asymmetrical relations. In the postcolonial era, the EU's relationship with the

¹ Although the European Union uses the term “southern neighbours” or “Mediterranean partners” or “Southern neighbouring countries” when referring to its non-EU Euro-Mediterranean partners, these non-EU Euro-Mediterranean partners will be referred to as “the South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners” (SEMPs) throughout this study due to the fact that this study regards Israel and Turkey as different from the Southern partners because these two countries are geographically located in the East of the Mediterranean and they do not have a colonial past. The South and Eastern Mediterranean partners are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Syria, and Turkey. Libya has an observer status.

former colonies is mainly shaped by political conditionality, based on the criteria of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law; all imposed in an asymmetrical way. The EU has the claim that its Mediterranean policies are based on normative aims such as creating an area of democracy and dialogue, shared prosperity, and developing zone of peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. On the other hand, these policies provide the EU with an opportunity to control the region and re-build European hegemony over its Southern neighbourhood. Moreover, despite the normative rhetoric attached to them, due to the power asymmetries between the EU and the SEMPS, Euro-centric design of the policies, and the interest-driven rationale behind them, the EU's Mediterranean policies can be considered as neocolonial practices.

Regarding its policies on the Mediterranean, one may claim that EU usually acts as a magnet and attracts its neighbourhood towards its center (Waever, 1997; 1998b; 2000). Perceptions of the Union as a successful project create a magnet effect to the outside world. Through this magnetism, the EU finds itself a legitimate ground to promote its norms and values to the outside world, especially to its neighbourhood. The EU has imposed its own model and understanding of values towards its neighbourhood by persuasion, cooperation, and dialogue and wants its neighbours to emulate its model, norms and values unconditionally. Presenting itself as a model that needs to be followed unconditionally may be seen as an important aspect that justifies and legitimizes the EU's *mission civilisatrice*.² In this sense, Mediterranean policies are all implemented under the claim of normativity just like the European claim to civilize its others in colonial times. In the postcolonial era, the EU's Mediterranean policies can be considered as civilizing missions where the EU seeks to control its neighbourhood, maximize its economic gains and protect its own citizens from the potential threats generating from its neighbourhood through the rhetoric of projecting democracy and human rights i.e. through "civilizing them".

In the postcolonial era, the EU has mainly followed a twofold strategy towards the SEMPs. On the one hand, it presents itself as normative power, on the other hand, it seeks its political, economic and security interests in the region. As argued by Hettne and Soderbaum (2005: 536), the EU's foreign policy has been characterized "in sharply contrasting ways, from a distinctly European idealism (normativism) to traditional national interest policies

² See Cebeci: 2012, 2017.

hidden behind the rhetoric". On the other hand, Adler and Crawford (2006:38) argue that the policies of the Union towards the Mediterranean are caught between the "language of post-colonialism and the behavior of neo-colonialism". These can be regarded as important points for analyzing the EU's policies towards the South and Eastern Mediterranean as they reveal whether the EU's policies are based on an idealistic idea to create a zone of peace and prosperity in the region or it seeks to impose norms and conditions that benefit its self-interest.

Some EU members are former colonial powers. The British occupation of Egypt and Palestine, the French and Italian control over North Africa are still fresh in the minds of the South and Eastern Mediterranean societies. Therefore, it can be claimed that history has created an atmosphere of mistrust between Europe and the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries. In view of the historical developments in the region that range from conquests and crusades to colonialism, it can be contented that the nature of the relationship between Europe and the South and Eastern Mediterranean world has been based on hostility and mistrust.

In this study, the Mediterranean is illustrated as a constructed region and a postcolonial analysis of the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean is made. In order to make a postcolonial analysis of EU-Mediterranean relations, this study also scrutinizes the relations between the colonizer and the colonized countries of the Mediterranean when and where necessary without focusing specifically on them. The study examines the traces of colonialism in the region-building efforts of the EU in order to look for the continuities in the colonial logic in the EU's Mediterranean approach. It further evaluates the EU's Mediterranean policies to display the neocolonial tendencies of the Union in addressing the Mediterranean.

As the Middle East conflict affects the relations of the states in the region, most of the documents concerning the EU's Mediterranean policies refer to the conflict in the Middle East, especially to the Arab-Israeli conflict and suggest ways to strengthen the Union's role in the resolution of this conflict. The aim of the thesis is to make a postcolonial analysis of Euro-Mediterranean relations, and therefore, the EU's position on the Middle East conflict is deliberately ignored here since the Middle East conflict has a very long-standing history and complicated structure. Thus, the EU's position on the Middle East conflict is mentioned only when necessary. The analysis provided here does not include the period after the adoption of

2016 European Global Strategy for analytical utility as the EU's rhetoric has slightly shifted with the Global Strategy.

1. Main Aims and Research Questions

This study aims at analyzing the relationship between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners in the postcolonial era. In this sense, it relies heavily on postcolonial literature. However it does not adopt a critical or poststructuralist approach. Rather it adopts a positivist methodology, attempting to show how norms and interests are linked in the EU's approach to the Mediterranean and how these can be read as a continuation of the colonial logic. Thus, rather than relying on discourse analysis, this study looks into the EU's practice, trying to show how the Union pursues its interests through a normative coating just as it had been in the case in colonial times; through a logic of mission civilisatrice. On the other hand, this study does not also deny that the EU acts normatively in some cases, but it claims that it only does so when and where it can, depending on the member states' (especially former colonial powers') interests.

It is important to note that this study does not question or contest the EU's acts in some certain normative areas such as opposition to death penalty and eliminating female genital mutilation. The EU acts as a normative power in these areas undisputedly. This study evaluates the areas where the EU prioritizes its interests over its normative goals because those are the areas where the neocolonial nature of its acts can be traced. For example, while the EU's Mediterranean approach is essentially based of conditionality, with the criteria of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, the Union mostly exerts this conditionality selectively and inconsistently towards the SEMP's to seek European interests. Moreover, the EU claims the universality of the norms that it represents (including regionalism) and promotes them in its Southern neighbourhood with a one-size-fits-all approach. This study argues that by claiming that it is promoting universal rules, the EU justifies its interest-driven policies. In this sense, one can assert that the EU's presenting itself as a model and promoting universal norms and values in its neighbourhood is akin to the civilizing mission that might be perceived as neocolonial.

This study regards the Mediterranean as a constructed region and seeks to examine the EU's Mediterranean approach in the postcolonial era. It tries to find out the link between the

EU's policies in the Mediterranean and the neocolonial tendencies of the Union. The study examines the nature of the relationship that the EU establishes with the South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners and attempts to find out whether this relationship carries the characteristics of neocolonial practice or carries normative features. Regarding the EU's Mediterranean approach, this study argues that although the EU's objectives seem to be normative, the rationale behind these objectives is mainly for the EU's self interest. The study evaluates the EU's Mediterranean policies to reflect on the neocolonial tendencies of the Union and its members and argues that the normative rhetoric legitimizes these neocolonial tendencies. The analysis provided here mainly addresses the question of whether the EU's approach towards the Mediterranean is for seeking the Union's self-interest and re-building European colonialism over the South and Eastern Mediterranean through other means or for creating an area of democracy and peace; and, helping the development of the region. The supporting questions of this study are:

- 1- Do the EU's policies on the Mediterranean follow a neocolonial and quasi-imperial pattern or a normative one?
- 2- Do the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean display continuity with the colonial logic?

2. Main Arguments

This study mainly argues that the EU has neocolonial tendencies in the South and Eastern Mediterranean, and, when it projects norms and values in the region it mainly does so to pursue its own interests (and its member states' interests) and maintain its influence. In this regard, it is possible to observe a quasi-imperial logic in the EU's approach towards the SEMP. It can be asserted that this imperial approach displays how the Union pursues self-interest driven strategies under the claim of normativity. The EU as an Empire tries to control its neighbourhood and "establish its rule in a radial manner" (Waeber, 1997: 64) through differing policies. In this sense, the EU's Mediterranean approach can be seen as the Union's neocolonial attempt for dominating the SEMP. Therefore, the study contends that today the EU, just like the colonial powers did, supports mimicry and expects its neighbours to copy its norms and values. By using its attractive model of integration, the EU ties the Mediterranean countries into a system of center-periphery relationship and pursues its policies and projects its values to its neighbourhood and expects the SEMP to emulate them. The EU wants to

reproduce itself through promoting its integration model and norms in its own periphery. It further aims to secure its own interests in its Southern neighbourhood. In the postcolonial era, the Union tries to stabilize and dominate the South and Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, the Union's Mediterranean policies can be read in the context of the Union's efforts to civilize the SEMP. In this sense, the EU's projection of its values and norms towards the Mediterranean can be regarded as the EU's civilizing mission in the postcolonial era.

This study argues that in its approach to the South and Eastern Mediterranean, the EU acts as a neocolonial power. One may argue that this argument is not new. Nevertheless, the novelty of this thesis and the contribution that it makes to the literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations is that it takes the debate on norms and interests dichotomy in the EU's approach to a new level. It argues that the EU acts both normatively and in interest-driven ways in this relationship and this is natural because the EU has a neocolonial tendency. In the end, the norms and values that it projects mainly serve EU interests (and the interests of its member states). In other words, it is inherent in the neocolonial practice that the neocolonial actor/power in question claims to be acting normatively and helping others get civilized while pursuing its own interests, and, the EU acts exactly in the same way. Therefore, in order to legitimize its Mediterranean policies, it is normal for the EU to present itself as a normative power, and to seek its political, economic and security interests at the same time. Although the EU seems to promote human rights, the rule of law and democracy to the SEMP, the EU's major concern regarding the SEMP is the stability of the region and it aims at preventing the Southern Mediterranean problems from becoming European problems. In other words, the EU's self interest lies in having a secure and stable neighbourhood. The EU fears the spill-over of the conflicts of the South and Eastern Mediterranean into the Union. Therefore, it aims to protect itself from these problems in the region, and it considers that the region's prospects for peace, stability and prosperity will be challenged if the problems in the Mediterranean related to democracy, good governance, economic development, and security remain unsolved. For ensuring stability, the EU has generally supported authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, mostly pursued its own interests in the region, overlooking its normative aims. In this sense, there seems to be a conflict between the EU's aims and principles in its Mediterranean approach. Nevertheless, even though the normative aims of the Union are emphasized in rhetoric, in practice one may see that the rationale behind these aims are generally not normative and they are based on centre-periphery logic, they are Euro-centric and interest-driven and therefore, can be labeled as

neocolonial. In other words, in the postcolonial era, while the EU is adopting a normative language in its Mediterranean approach, it is pursuing policies that can be considered as neocolonial.

In the postcolonial era, by using an Orientalist approach, the EU presents itself as the superior part and tries to civilize the countries in the South and Eastern Mediterranean. Although the EU claims that it formulates policies that are based on joint ownership, the EU's Mediterranean approach is mainly based on one-sided policies in which the SEMP's do not have considerable voice in the decision-making processes. This shows that the EU's policies on the Mediterranean are Euro-centric. On the other hand, the EU's Mediterranean policies can be considered as tools for promoting EU interests in the region, and they can be regarded as neocolonial devices as much as they are instruments of projecting peace and security to the Mediterranean.

Surely, the foreign policy actions of the Union have both normative and neocolonial features and sometimes these cannot be differentiated from each other. This study regards the European Union both as a "sui generis political entity" and "(neo)imperial political construction" because, on the one hand, the sui generis identity of the EU helps one to understand how the nature of EU policies are varied and Euro-centric, and on the other hand, the EU's imperial/neocolonial identity helps one to understand how the foreign policy practices of the European Union follow a quasi-geographical pattern of concentric circles. There are different foreign policy contexts in which EU policy takes different shapes. Because the EU approaches each issue differently, one can claim that there is no one single interpretation of the EU's international identity. Therefore, it might be logical not to depict the EU as a solely normative or solely an interest-driven power. This study asserts that in its Mediterranean policies, the EU selectively decides whether it will act a normative power or pursue interest-driven policies and this is mainly because it has a neocolonial tendency.

3. Methodology

The methodology used in this study is applying theories of imperialism and postcolonialism to a specific case, the EU's policies on the Mediterranean; with an aim to evaluate the nature of the relations between the EU and South and Eastern Mediterranean. This study traces the sequence of events in the EU's approach to the Mediterranean which

have brought about neocolonial outcomes despite the EU's rhetoric of normative aims. This study aims to display the dynamics of the EU's Mediterranean approach and to link the causes with the outcomes. In this sense, a through process-tracing is made. This refers to a thorough policy analysis of the EU's approach to the Mediterranean. As mentioned above, this study adopts a positivist methodology with a social constructivist bend because on the one hand it looks at the cause and effect relationship in Euro-Mediterranean relations, on the other it argues that the EU constructs the Mediterranean, attempting to show how norms and interests are linked in the EU approach in the Mediterranean and how these can be read as a continuation of the colonial logic. In this sense, the postcolonial analysis provided here does not refer to postcolonial critique. This study aims at evaluating the relationship between the EU and Mediterranean Partners in the postcolonial era and claims that the EU's Mediterranean policies have neocolonial features. This study asserts that in the postcolonial era, previous forms of imperialist domination have been replaced by a new approach, which can be named as neocolonial. Therefore, it involves an analysis of the concepts of "imperialism", "postcolonialism" and "neocolonialism" in its analysis showing their differences and applying them to the case of European foreign policy. In order to provide the theoretical basis for analyzing the EU's approach to the Mediterranean and justifying its theoretical preference, the study portrays the controversies and the divide between the postcolonial theory and postcolonial critique. On the other hand, region building approach is referred to when necessary to show the relation between the region-building and neocolonialism.

In two chapters (first and third chapters), a detailed analysis of the concepts and theories that form the basis for the main argument of this study is made. In this sense, the theoretical parts involve a thoroughgoing review of existing literature on the theories and assumptions used with a view to shed light on the practice observed today. 110 books and 120 articles are reviewed in this regard. This study gives special attention to the works of Edward Said to display the asymmetrical relationship that the Union reproduces in its approach to the Mediterranean in the postcolonial era. On the other hand, the works of Manners and his critics are reviewed to analyze the nature of Union's foreign policy. Methodologically, a policy analysis is provided together with a textual analysis of wide samples of main policy documents of the EU on the Mediterranean. The EU's policy documents are scrutinized in such a way to reflect on the normative or neocolonial tendencies of the EU in its Mediterranean policies and this does not necessarily or deliberately involve content or

discourse analysis. Rather, the analyses of these texts are oriented towards seeking the normative and interest-driven/neocolonial elements in these texts. Among a reading of more than 150 EU documents, the study uses 36 EU documents as primary sources. Process-tracing is also used to highlight the outcomes of the EU's Mediterranean approach. Nevertheless, it is only made for explaining the EU policies better.

5. The Organization of the Thesis

The first chapter and the third chapter set the conceptual and theoretical framework of this study. The first chapter of the study aims at scrutinizing imperialism, postcolonialism, neocolonialism and region-building. "Postcolonialism" emerged in the context of decolonization, which marked the second half of the 20th century. Although the term of "postcolonial" has various contested meanings, two main interpretations can be distinguished. On the one hand, "postcolonial" may refer to the status of a land that is no longer colonized and has regained its political independence. On the other hand, postcolonialism may explain the new forms of economic, political and cultural domination that can be referred to as "neocolonialism"³. The postcolonial critique questions the inner logic of post-colonialism. Postcolonial critics see the postcolonial theory as the re-construction of the West's domination over former colonies. The controversies and the divide between postcolonial theory on the one hand and postcolonial critique, on the other, are discussed with a view analyzing the EU's neocolonial tendencies over the Mediterranean in the following chapters. Regionalism has constituted a remarkable feature of the EU's Mediterranean strategy over the years, as it represents a way to encourage its partners to follow the Union's own integration path. The EU aims at promoting regionalism as a norm for the SEMP. This promotion of its own model and the Union's values can be regarded as the EU's civilizing mission. In order to reveal the logic behind the EU's policies on the Mediterranean, (especially the Barcelona process, which is viewed as a region-building process⁴), region-building is analyzed in this chapter.

The second chapter addresses the significance of the Mediterranean as a region, analyzes the traces of colonialism, and questions the regionalizing efforts of the European

³ The term tends to point out that cooperation, assistance and modernization are the new forms of political and cultural domination.

⁴ See in Adler and Crawford, 2004; Attina 2003; Attina, 2004; Attina 2006; Bicchi, 2006; Gillespie, 2006; Missiroli, 2003; Moschella, 2004; Ortega, 2003; Tassinari, 2005; Tzifakis, 2007; Volpi, 2004.

Union in the region. This chapter analyzes the Mediterranean from an historical perspective in order to show the neocolonial tendencies of the European Union and to search for continuities in European colonial behaviour in the form of the EU's civilizing mission. At this point, it is important to recall that some of the EU member states are former colonial powers. In considering the current relations between the EU and these countries, it is important to see that these relations are largely based on ties established during the colonial period. Because this study regards the formation of the Mediterranean region as a process of social construction, the chapter illustrates how a region develops by a choice made on a specific and historical ground and argues that (today/in the postcolonial era) the Mediterranean as a region is not just geographical or given but it is constructed by particular interests of European actors, mainly by the EU.

The third chapter, as another conceptual chapter, aims at analyzing the nature of the European Union's foreign policy. This chapter is designed in a way to look into how the international identity of the EU is portrayed. This chapter also reveals how depictions of the EU as a specific type of power helps it pursue policies which are based on a centre-periphery logic, which are asymmetrical, interest-driven and which are mostly accompanied by a normative claim. The chapter makes a conceptual differentiation of the EU's normative power, civilian power and civilizing power in order to shed light on the nature of the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean. In this chapter, the disciplining power of the European Union is also scrutinized in a similar vein.

Creating an area of democracy and dialogue in the Mediterranean, stabilizing the region with political, economic and cultural tools and helping the development of the region can be considered as the main objectives of the EU regarding the Mediterranean in the postcolonial era. The fourth chapter attempts to analyze the EU's Mediterranean policies to show what policies it employs to pursue its goals in the region; depending on the issue, how the EU acts as a normative power or a neocolonial power; and how the EU tries to use its silent disciplining power in its Southern neighbourhood. It can be asserted that the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean have three main prongs: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that was established in 1995, which is also known as the "Barcelona Process", the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Although the Barcelona Process constituted the main framework within which the EU's relations with the Mediterranean countries were dealt with, it was not the only tool. The

Common Strategy (CMS) on the Mediterranean Region and the European Security Strategy (ESS) were the other tools that were used to tackle the Mediterranean countries. Therefore, these tools are also scrutinized in this chapter. Each of the European Union's policies towards the Mediterranean is portrayed in detail in this chapter to show how the EU sometimes acts as a normative power, and, sometimes as an interest-driven actor; how it establishes asymmetrical relations; and how it tries to discipline its Mediterranean partners.

Finally, in the fifth chapter of this study, the EU's approach to the Mediterranean during and after the Arab uprisings is evaluated. In this chapter the output of this PhD thesis is revealed and assessed through an analysis of the EU's Mediterranean policy in the specific case of Arab uprisings. This chapter is significant because it attempts to determine whether the EU's approach to the Mediterranean in the postcolonial era is for pursuing its own interests and re-building the European colonialism over the South and Eastern Mediterranean partners or if it uses this role for creating an area of democracy and peace; and, helping the development of the region. This chapter argues that EU's policies after the Arab uprisings still carry the neocolonial tendencies of the EU's previous Mediterranean policies despite its normative claims.

6. Contributions of the Thesis

A review of the literature on the EU's policies on the Mediterranean points to a gap in the literature on the neocolonial dimensions of the EU's Mediterranean policies. The existing studies generally evaluate the neocolonial dimensions of European policies on the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACPs). The EU is usually characterized as an ideal power that seeks to normatively shape the state of affairs in the world. There are some studies such as Cebeci, Del Sarto, Diez, Haukkala, Hyde-Price, Merlingen and Nicolaidis⁵ that question the normative power Europe discourse and normativity of the Union's policies over its neighbourhood. Some of these studies tend to associate normativity with imperial features. However, this study takes a different stand and claims that the foreign policy actions of the Union can be both normative and interest-driven at the same time, because this is an inherent feature of neocolonialism. The study looks at the EU's Mediterranean policies from a postcolonial perspective without using postcolonial critique and rather attempts to show how

⁵ Cebeci, 2012; 2017; Del Sarto, 2006; 2015; Diez, 2005; 2013; Haukkala, 2007; 2017; Hyde-Price, 2006; Merlingen, 2007; Nicolaidis, 2002; 2006; 2013.

the norms and interests of the Union are linked. It tries to reveal the link between Europe's neocolonial tendencies and its so-called normative policies over the Mediterranean. It claims that the goals and instruments of the EU's Mediterranean approach in the postcolonial era mostly reflects the Union's and its member states' interests. In this sense, this study aims to display how the Union's Mediterranean approach can be regarded as a continuation of the colonial logic of mission civilisatrice. Therefore, it attempts to fill the gap left open by contemporary literature on the field.



1. SITUATING IMPERIALISM, POSTCOLONIALISM, NEOCOLONIALISM AND REGION-BUILDING

This chapter provides definitions of the concepts of imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism in order to analyze the European Union's approach to the Mediterranean. In the postcolonial era, it can be claimed that the EU's Mediterranean policies cannot be explained without reference to the imperial interests of the EU. For Hettne and Soderbaum (2005: 536), the nature of EU foreign policy varies from "normativism to traditional national interest policies hidden behind the rhetoric". In this sense, the EU's foreign policy towards the Mediterranean is sometimes criticized as being neocolonial. According to Adler and Crawford (2006:38), EU's Mediterranean approach is caught between the "language of post-colonialism and the behavior of neo-colonialism". It can be asserted that on account of a painful colonial past, the relations between the European Union and the South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners are challenging. Colonial domination and exploitation by European powers have caused "deep-seeded resentment and created cultures of victimization" (ibid.: 35) in the South and Eastern Mediterranean, and, thus, the historical legacy of colonialism constitutes an important obstacle for implementing the EU's policies towards the SEMP. Economic inequality between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean area has also created a structure of asymmetrical relationship, giving the EU an important leverage in implementing its policies towards the region. The Union attempts to project its values to the South and Eastern Mediterranean in order to seek its own interests and maintain its influence. In this regard, it is possible to observe an imperialistic logic in the EU's foreign policy. While the EU as a peace project has brought stability to the European continent, this success has provided the EU with the desire to dominate and stabilize its frontiers, as the old traditional empires did, by imposing its values and norms on its neighbourhood.

This chapter aims at scrutinizing imperialism, neocolonialism, postcolonialism, with a view to revealing their link to region-building. In this endeavour, it starts with a review of the concepts of imperialism and colonialism. It further portrays the controversies and the divide between the postcolonial theory and postcolonial critique, to provide the basis for analyzing the EU's neocolonial tendencies over the Mediterranean in the following chapters. In order to scrutinize the logic behind the European Union's policies in the Mediterranean, especially the Barcelona process, which is viewed as a region-building process, and to show the link

between region-building and neocolonialism, the second section of this chapter elaborates on region-building approach through an analysis of the concepts of “region”, “regionalism”, “regionalization”.

1.1. Imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism

In the postcolonial era, the EU’s projection of its values and its policies employed with its aim to control its Southern and South Eastern neighbourhood can be considered as a new Western style of domination and a civilizing mission. In order to demonstrate how this imperialistic logic is followed and how new forms of economic, political and cultural domination are shaped, it is necessary to take a look at the concepts of empire, imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism as well as the postcolonial theory and its critique.

1.1.1. Imperialism

Different meanings are attached to the word “imperialism”, including political, military, economic, cultural and racial aspects of the concept. In 1972, West (1972: 275) claimed that the meanings of imperialism are extended “in the light of theories of neo-colonialism that are advanced by political leaders in the ex-colonial states of Africa and Asia”. It can be argued that a profound explanation of imperialism needs “to account for all of the interactions of the political, economic, social and cultural factors operating at both the local (periphery) level and within the metropolitan centre of imperial power” (Bush, 2007: 47). The complex terminology of imperialism “has been the basic method by which political scientists have managed to create a special academic niche for themselves” (West, 1972: 275). The different meanings given to the same term also reflects the different theoretical stances on imperialism.⁶ Surely, the emergence of the United States as the only global power “has hastened an inquiry into the historical significance of imperialism” (Ayerbe, 2005: 301). It

⁶Note that many theories see imperialism as the product of specific features of capitalist production and distribution. (Cain and Hopkins, 1986: 303-333) From the early twentieth century, theoretical debates were predominantly focused on the socialist/Marxist theories of imperialism associated with Rosa Luxemburg (who suggests ways in which capitalism will seek to offset a falling rate of profit) (Brewer, 1980: 61-76), Karl Kautsky (who see in the imperialism in 1920s as phase of “ultra” or “inter” imperialism is unique and characterizes by peaceful cooperation rather than military competition between expanding capitalist states) (Kautsky, 1970: 41-46); the Leninist thesis (which see imperialism as a specific stage of capitalist development) and its critics (such as John Willoughby who see Lenin’s theory as Eurocentric, unoriginal and weak) (Blaut, 1997: 382-393); and the new modern Marxist theories of neocolonialism and underdevelopment, which questions the impact of international capitalism on the structure of the underdeveloped world (Wolfe, 1997: 388-420).

can be stressed that empire and imperialism remain as relevant today as in the past. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001: xi-xvii) points out, imperialism may have passed but “empire is alive and resurgent in a new economic, cultural and political globalized world order”.⁷

Understanding the complex dynamics of imperialism, past and present, demands a multidisciplinary approach because it is defined and explained with reference to many internal and external factors that vary according to the nature of different empires, which are analyzed. At this point, it may be useful to have a look at how the term empire is used first. For Neil Smith (2009: 736), “empire is a deeply conservative project of economic expansion, power and control bound up with a social civilisational mission”. As Cannadine (1995: 194) points out, “the empire was always an imaginative construct, existing as much (or more) inside the minds of men and women as it existed on the ground and on the map”. The term “empire”⁸ has been widely used for many centuries without necessarily signifying “imperialism”⁹.

“Empire” is one but not the only form of imperialism, and a theory of imperialism embraces formal and informal empires (Bush, 2006: 45). Definitions of the imperial relationship thus differ according to whether one is analyzing informal or formal empires. A formal relationship exists when “the imperialized country gives up its sovereignty and is incorporated into the state or empire of the imperialist power”, as in the cases of British India or French Algeria (Bush, 2006: 45). An informal relationship exists when the imperialized country seems to preserve its sovereignty, however, “its freedom of political action is

⁷ They further claim that the concept of empire implies the construction of a new order, presented as “permanent, eternal, and necessary” and promised on a notion of right that “envelops the entire space of what it considers civilization, a boundless, universal space” and “encompasses all time within its ethical foundation” (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 11).

⁸ According to Saull, “empire refers to formal and direct rule, hierarchical domination of one polity/society by another, usually accompanied by direct extraction of surplus or tribute” (2004: 254). Donnelly describes empire “an extensive polity incorporating diverse, previously independent units, ruled by a dominant central polity” (2006: 140). Different meanings have been attributed to empire over time, including political, military, racial, and economic aspects of the concept. “Empire, imperium, reich, commonwealth, all imply expansion of states outside their territory, a widening of geographical space, either by land or sea, extending boundaries of power and influence. Empire, as a bounded geographical entity, is a less loaded term than imperialism, which inscribes the social, cultural and political relations of power between the empire and its subordinated periphery. Imperialism, then, is a subjective term that is ideologically loaded and conveys a range of conflicting means. The term was first used in Britain in the early of the 19th century in relation to hostile French ambitions and gained greater currency after 1850, but it was the emergence of anti-imperialism at the end 19th century that strengthened the negative connotations of the term” (Bush, 2006:1-2).

⁹ The original meaning of imperialism was not the direct or indirect domination of colonial or dependent territories by a modern industrial state, but rather the personal sovereignty of a powerful ruler over numerous territories, whether in Europe or overseas (Mommsen, 1977:3). The object of acquiring a colonial empire was usually to enhance the prestige of one’s own state, and ideally to raise it to the status of a world power (ibid.,5).

constrained by the presence of military bases and expatriate personnel (soldiers, sailors, merchants, missionaries)”, as in the case of China under Western dominance (1880-1914) or of Cuba under US dominance (1900-1959) (ibid.). In this context, as Bush (ibid., 46) assumes, “informal imperialism can exist without colonialism but colonialism cannot exist without imperialism”.

On the one hand, imperialism can be characterized by “the exercise of power either through direct conquest or through political and economic influence that effectively amounts to a similar form of domination: both involve the practice of power through facilitating institutions and ideologies”, which is “the deliberate product of a political machine that rules from the centre, and extends its control to the furthest reaches of the peripheries” (Young, 2001: 27). On the other hand, imperialism can be used as a description of a set of unequal relationships between the advanced capitalist and underdeveloped countries and much less often to imply a theory of international capitalist development (Bell, 1971: 74). There are also some analysts who claim that “imperialism itself is not a hierarchically structured system of global capitalism but as a relation of governance and occupation, between richer and poorer countries” (Ahmad, 1992: 41).

Although economic and racial oppression represent the uglier face of imperialism, “a utopian vision of purifying administration that obliterates corruption and inefficiency” is also common in the imperial discourse (Osterhammel, 2002: 108). For example, the Roman Empire presented itself as a unitary power promoting peace and justice (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 15). According to Said (2003: xvi), “every empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort”, which can be called as “mission civilizatrice”. One may argue that today the EU, as the old empires did, is presenting itself as a peace and stability project and promotes its own model for bringing peace and stability to its neighbourhood.¹⁰ The EU also has the discourse that it is “normatively different” as Manners and Whitman (2003) would put it. This “constructed” difference gives the EU the right to define what is “normal” for the others (Manners, 2002).¹¹

¹⁰ European Union has pursued two distinct approaches towards its immediate neighbours: an approach aimed at stabilizing its periphery and largely “keeping its neighbours at arm’s length” (Tassinari, 2005: 1), and a second approach aimed at “integration proper” (Missiroli, 2003: 11), i.e. bringing neighbouring countries into the EU.

¹¹ For a critique of Manners in this regard see: Cebeci, 2012 and Merlingen, 2007.

On the other hand, European identity reconstruction during the eighteenth century paved the way for to the creation of “implicit racism”¹² which was based on “the idea of the moral necessity of the imperial civilizing mission” (Hobson, 2004: 25). Constructing the East as backward, passive and childlike in contrast to the West, which is advanced, proactive and paternal, had been a pretext for Europeans to engage in imperialism (ibid.). Hobson states that while the European elites “sincerely” believed that they were helping to civilize the East through imperialism, they were, in fact, “inflicting considerable repression, misery, and unhappiness in all manners of ways – cultural, economic, political and military ways” (ibid., 220). While the Europeans have described themselves “as the progressive subject of the world history both past and present”, the Eastern peoples have been “relegated to its passive object” (ibid., 222).

A belief in the “contradictory difference” or “otherness” of subordinated peoples is also a constant feature of empires and essential to the superior identities of the powerful (Bush, 2006: 27). As Linda Tuhuwai Smith (1998: 25) puts it:

One of the supposed characteristics of primitive peoples was that we could not use our minds or intellects. We could not invent things, we could not create institutions or history, we could not imagine, we could not produce anything of value, we did not use land or other resources from the natural world, we did not practice the ‘arts’ of civilization. By lacking such virtues we [were] disqualified ... not just from civilization but from humanity itself. In other words we were not ‘fully human’; some of us were not even considered partially human.

It is this notion of seeing the Eastern peoples as incapable of achieving progress that led to Europeans to think that “only the West could deliver the gift of civilization to the East through imperialism” (Hobson, 2004: 223). The representation of the West “as a rational, independent and paternal man juxtaposed against the East as an irrational, dependent and helpless child or woman” is very important in promoting the idea the imperial civilizing mission as a moral duty (ibid.: 230). At this point, it is important to note that the East is also presented as a home of despotism that is economically and politically stagnant. In this sense,

¹² Implicit racism was observed in the eighteenth and in the first half of the nineteenth century. Implicit racism, contrary to the reference of explicit racism to “genetic properties”, puts “difference through cultural, institutional and environmental criteria” (Hobson, 2004: 220). Even so, implicit racism “embodies a racist power relationship that comprises Western superiority and Eastern inferiority”, therefore, implicit racism is far more dangerous than explicit racism since it operates at a much more hidden level (ibid.). While, “implicit racism assumes that civilizational inferiority can and should be remedied through the imperial civilizing mission” (ibid.).

the instability and backwardness of the East could threaten the economic and political progress of Europe. Presenting the East as a despotic threat is as important for the discourse of imperialism as the idea that the East is innocent, exotic and above all passive and helpless, since the latter idea is used to make imperialism appear as a “moral vocation” (i.e. it is the Western prince’s duty to liberate his Eastern sleeping beauty) (ibid.). When one looks at the current relations between the EU and the SEMP, he/she may argue that constructing itself as an advanced and powerful entity, the European Union claims that it knows better than its SEMP, and therefore it has a moral duty to impose and export the Union’s norms towards them. One may further argue that the EU tries to create a Mediterranean civilization and this civilizational thinking can be regarded as a new form of imperialism.

It can be argued that a common feature of imperialism is a divine right to rule for an imperial power that is rooted in ethical, moral, and/or religious superiority. In this context, civilization is “pitted against barbarism/paganism, order against disorder that threatens the civilized world, and the spread of a superior of civilization provides a common justification of empires” (Bush, 2006: 24). For example, as Bush (ibid., 25) points out, both Britain and France had claimed “humanitarian reasons, the elimination of slavery and barbaric cruelties, as a rationale for the colonization of Africa”, and moreover, a “similar humanitarianism has justified the Western recolonization of sub-Saharan Africa since the 1980s”.

This study uses the term imperialism in a generalized way to embrace a range of perspectives on the nature of Western influence, with a special emphasis on the West-centered context that sees imperialism as a civilizing mission, and uses the term colonialism as the practice of imperialism. Imperialism can be considered as one of “the most influential forces that has shaped, and is still shaping, the world” (Bush, 2006: 7). Furthermore, as a matter of fact, no sharp break with colonialism has occurred after decolonization. Therefore, EU’s Mediterranean policies cannot be explained without reference to the differing imperial interests of the former colonial powers of the EU.

At this point, it is also important to remember that imperialism is not a singular and homogenous concept; there are different types of imperialisms. According to Holsti (1998: 62), “the actual patterns of exploitation, economic development, and social policy varied greatly from colony to colony”. Moreover, Europeans had created different types of administrations to “pursue their multiple purposes” (ibid.). For example, the British and

French Imperialisms are not the same and the policies of these empires had caused different outcomes in their colonized lands. The next chapter shows how these two distinct forms of imperialism politically operated in the Mediterranean area and shaped the region. In this context, one may argue that the French and British colonization processes deeply impacted on the foundations of the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean in the modern era. These colonial powers shaped the economic, social, political and cultural development of their colonies. Even though their influence over these countries weakened after decolonization, especially their economic and cultural ties have remained strong.

While European empires exercised colonial rule in some parts of the world, they established informal links to control and secure their interests in others. “Imperialism is the concept that comprises of all forces and activities contributing to the construction and the maintenance of transcolonial empires” (Osterhammel, 2002: 21). “Imperialism” and “colonialism” are not one and the same but they were inevitably interlinked. “Imperialism” is in some respects a more comprehensive concept but it is also harder to define. For L. T. Smith (1998: 23), colonialism is “a particular realization of the imperial imagination”, and she further argues that colonialism becomes “imperialism’s outpost, the fort and the port of imperial outreach”.¹³ Nonetheless, some analysts claim that “any differences between what is now characterized as colonialism and imperialism had become blurred”; the former almost seemed “to have become the practice” of the latter (Young, 2001: 25).¹⁴

Young points out (2001: 16-17):

[...] a basic difference emerges between an empire that was bureaucratically controlled by a government from the centre, and which was developed for ideological as well as financial reasons, a structure that can be called imperialism, and an empire that was developed for settlement by individual communities or for commercial purposes by a trading company, a structure that can be called colonial. Colonialism was pragmatic and until the nineteenth century generally developed locally in haphazard way [...], while imperialism was typically driven by ideology from the metropolitan centre and concerned with the assertion and expansion of state power [...]. Colonialism functioned as an activity on the periphery,

¹³ According to Smith (1998: 23), the Western powers needed colonial outposts because they are the cultural sites that preserve “an image or represented an image of what the West or ‘civilization’ stood for”.

¹⁴ “While imperialism signifies an ideology and a system of economic domination, colonialism, by contrast, emphasizes the “material condition of the political rule of the subjugated peoples by the old European colonial powers” (Young, 2001: 26-27).

economically driven; from the home government's perspective, it was at times hard to control. Imperialism on the other hand, operated from the centre as a policy of state, driven by the grandiose projects of power. Thus while imperialism is susceptible to analysis as a concept (which is not to say that there were not different concepts of imperialism), colonialism needs to be analyzed primarily as a practice: hence the difficulty of generalizations about it.

1.1.2. Colonialism

The concepts of colonialism and imperialism are often used interchangeably. In relation to imperialism and colonialism, Said defines imperialism as “the practices, the theory and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory” (1993: 8). On the other hand, for Said, colonialism is seen as being “almost always a consequence of imperialism”, and is defined as “the implanting of settlements on distant territory” (ibid.). Today, it can be argued that while direct colonialism has largely ended, imperialism remains “in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic and social practices” (ibid.).¹⁵ “Colonialism” can simply be defined as “the conquest and control of other people’s land and goods” (Loomba, 1998: 1-2).¹⁶ However, colonialism in this context is not just the expansion of various European powers into Asia, Africa or America, it has been a continuing and common feature of “human history” (Loomba, 1998: 2). European expansion has generally been considered “as the fulfillment of a universal mission: as a contribution to a divine plan for the salvation of pagans, as a secular mandate to ‘civilize’ the ‘barbarians’ or ‘savages’, as a ‘white man’s burden’ that is privileged to carry” (Osterhammel, 2002: 16). One can argue that these attitudes are based on a belief in European cultural superiority. Osterhammel defines colonialism as (ibid., 16-17):

¹⁵ At this point, it is important to note that some forms of colonial relationship still exist around the world as in the case of Palestinians, Aboriginal Australians, Native Americans, which may be referred as “internal colonialism” (Weaver, 1997: 10). Internal colonialism is often referred to as “settler colonialism” in the postcolonial literature (Aschcroft, *et. al*, 2002: 24). Examples of overt forms of colonialism still practiced today are the causes of Ceuta and Mellila, Falklands etc.

¹⁶ “In contrast to other “isms”, colonialism is extremely difficult to place in the history of thought” (Osterhammel, 2002: 107). Osterhammel claims that all colonialisms have produced a variety of doctrines of justification and imperial visions, however they have seldom been recognized as binding principles and actually been put into practice, and rather than seeking out contemporary “theories” about colonialism, scholars generally examined the mentalities that are associated with the colonial situation (ibid.). In his view, recently, scholars are using the term “colonial discourse”, “which investigates in large range of source materials: missionary reports and administrative files, memoirs, travel accounts and fictional literature, the press, propaganda pieces, and academic investigations from many fields including geography, ethnology and oriental philology” (ibid.).

Colonialism is relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule.

As applied to a colonial system, the term “colonialism” was not used until after 1850.¹⁷ A colony may be defined as “a particular type of sociopolitical organization and ‘colonialism’ as a system of domination” (Osterhammel, 2002: 4). Sartre (2006) discusses colonialism as a system. According to him (2006: 37-38):

The fact is that colonization is neither a series of chance occurrences nor the statistical result of thousands of individual undertakings. It is a system which was put in place around the middle of nineteenth century, began to bear fruit in about 1880, started to decline after First World War, and is today turning against the colonizing nation.

Sartre (ibid., 175-223) claims that “colonialism denies human rights to people it has subjugated by violence, and whom it keeps in poverty and ignorance by force” (ibid., 58) and it creates social classes that serve its interests through introducing education and the division of labour. Thus, in his view, the colonial system is not an “abstract mechanism”, it “exists and it functions, and that the internal cycle of colonialism is a reality”, and this reality is alive “in a million colonialists, children and grandchildren of colonists, who have been shaped by colonialism and who think, speak and act according to the very principles of the colonial system” (Sartre, 2006: 51). Papastergiadis (1996: 188), further argues that colonial discourse produces the colonized as “fixed”, “entirely knowable and visible” reality. Therefore, as Bush (2004 132) argues, imperialism and colonialism “not only has had socio-economic consequences for the colonized” but has also created “psychological and cultural conflicts which remain unresolved”. In other words, colonialism/imperialism is a major tool for creating identities and pursuing power relations based on identities.

On the other hand, Spivak (1999: 203) asserts that in the colonial system, which is an “intimate” relationship, the colonizer constructs himself as he constructs the colony. For

¹⁷ Klor de Alva, J.J. (1995). “The Postcolonialization of the Latin American Experience”. In Gyan Prakash (ed.), *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 264-265. Quoted here from Bush (2006: 46).

colonizing nations, “it is right and proper to rule over other peoples in the colonies, and by getting colonized people to accept their lower ranking in the colonial order of things” (McLeod, 2000: 18). This is a process that can be called as “colonizing the mind” (ibid.). According to McLeod (ibid.), this operates “by persuading people to internalize its logic and speak its language; to perpetuate the values and assumptions of the colonizers as regards the ways they perceive and represent the world”. This is one of the most damaging legacies of colonial rule. Colonialism “is not just something that happens from outside a country, not just something that operates within the collusion of forces inside, but a version that can be duplicated from within” (Loomba, 1998: 12). Cultural oppression leaves a remaining psychology of inferiority and dependency, a problematic internalization of Western superiority (Bush, 2006: 135). One may claim that the colonial domination and exploitation by European powers have caused long-standing disputes, “economic backwardness and cultures of victimization” (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 27) in the Mediterranean region. Today, one can see the important consequences of the historical legacy of the colonial period in the challenging relations between the EU and the South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners.¹⁸

Although the term is often used in the singular, it is more accurate to talk of “colonial discourses” rather than “colonial discourse” due to its variations, which differ in time and space. While one can argue that each colonial case is different, there are also certain similarities. All colonial powers have generally been influenced by certain general European ideas of proper government; they have believed that the key justification of their position is that they bring internal peace and justice, and civilization to their colonies; they recognize their duty to defend them; they are eager to bring to their colonies their knowledge; they wish to develop their colonies for their own benefit; and, they teach their own language to the elite of their colonies (Zinkin, 1999: 17). Under colonialism, the colonizers, in a way, force the colonized people to respect and obey a world “that reflect and support colonial values” (McLeod, 2000: 19). In this context, “a particular value-system is thought as the best, truest world-view, where the cultural values of the colonized peoples are deemed as lacking in value, or even being uncivilized, from which they must be rescued” (ibid.).¹⁹ It was believed

¹⁸ The colonial past of the region and the postcolonial legacy of the EU are analyzed in the following chapters to show how the roots of the challenging relationship emerged between the EU and the SEMP.

¹⁹ Young (2001: 22) warns that although it is claimed that colonization is often associated with the notion of a civilizing mission, this cultural imperialism is really the later product of imperialism in the nineteenth century. Therefore in the beginning, the economic transformation of the colony in order to serve the colonial powers’

that the colonized people could “auto-generate into civilized modernity only by following the natural path that had been pioneered” by the Europeans (Hobson: 2014: 126). One can claim that today, the EU, just like the former colonial powers did in the past, is trying to export its model as the best particular value-system to the global world, especially to its neighbourhood. The notion of the EU as a model usually refers to the tendency of the EU as to “reproduce itself” in its neighbourhood (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002: 768). For Spivak (1999: 72), this can be regarded as an effort for extending the “Eurocentric normative narrative” into non-Europe. In her view, the Western societies implicitly support not just economic but also a political and cultural world system and want non-Western societies to adopt Western ways (Spivak, 1999: 377 [her footnote 76]). With its self-proclaimed “civilizing mission”²⁰, the EU tries to project its own understanding of norms and its own integration model with the discourse of bringing peace and stability to the various regions; conditionality based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This might be interpreted as a continuation of the colonial logic albeit through other means.

1.1.3. New Imperialism and Neocolonialism

With the acquisition of colonies in Africa and the Far East after 1870, “colonial rule without colonization” started with a “separate metropolitan authority supervising the administration of the periphery” (Osterhammel, 2002: 9-10). This new way of colony acquisition and exploitation can be described as “New Imperialism”. This New Imperialism consisted of “a combination of factors”, including “imperialism, nationalism and racism and the development of more sophisticated transnational capitalism” (Bush, 2006: 20). The appearance of the USA as an imperial power in the 19th century transformed the nature of imperialism from European imperialism to Western imperialism. Since then, imperialism has been characterized by the economic, military, political and cultural superiority of the Western civilization.

The New Imperialism ended with the disasters of the First World War “that precipitated the forcible decolonization of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman

acquisition of raw materials and markets was a first priority, and there was relatively little desire to bring about cultural and religious transformations of the local inhabitants (ibid., 24). “Colonization was not primarily concerned with the changing cultural values. They came as a by-product of its real objectives of trade, economic exploitation and settlement” (ibid.). In other words, cultural and religious transformation was used to sustain and legitimize the colonial practices.

²⁰ This reminds one of the “mission civilisatrice” of the colonial powers.

empires, and the decline of the British and French empires” (Bush, 2006: 21). Fascism, the global depression of the 1930s and the Second World War contributed the decline of European empires, but France and Britain had tried to hold their empires till 1960s. After 1945, the form of direct domination employed by the European imperial powers was no longer sustainable.²¹ The dissolution of the British Indian Empire in 1947 was a “key moment”, and “the process reached particular intensity in Africa, starting with the independence of Ghana in 1957 and the decolonization of Algeria in 1962” (Ahmad, 1992: 18). On the surface, post-1945 decolonization effectively demolished the old international system (Springhall, 2001: 4). The system broke up for three reasons: “resistance to the system from colonized peoples”; “inability of the European powers that were exhausted by the war”,²² and, pressure from the US, “which saw the colonial trading blocs as a barrier to its economic expansion” (Young, 2001: 44). Wallerstein (1974: 163) argues that according to the US, these countries had to be decolonized in order to mobilize the “productive potential in a way that had never been achieved in the colonial area”.²³ In other words, the neoliberal logic dictated a more profitable new way of exploitation than colonialism.

However, the new system that replaced colonialism, which one can refer to as neocolonial, was in many ways “a more subtle, indirect version of the old” (Young, 2001: 44). The 1960s and 1970s were the era of the newly independent Third World countries. In this period, there was the “unstoppable dynamic of decolonization” throughout Asia and Africa (Birmingham, 1995: 7). Ahmad (1992: 31) defines decolonization as “the process of the transfer of governmental power from the colonial to the postcolonial state of the (existing or emergent) national bourgeoisie” (ibid.).

On the one hand, for the colonized countries, decolonization refers to the “process of revealing and dismantling colonialist power in all forms” (Ashcroft, et. al, 1998: 63). Within

²¹ In the post-1945 era, “the idea that a developed nation should physically occupy and colonize another territory overseas simply because it had the power and resources to do so gradually became unacceptable to international opinion” (Springhall, 2001: 1).

²² Zinkin (1999: 17) states: “while the First World War ruined the myth of white, and particularly European, superiority, the Second World War undermined the colonial powers’ moral case. The colonial powers came out of the wars exhausted, and at that time being a colonial power/empire, which had always have burdens, had faced a greater responsibility than they were willing to carry. It was not just the exhaustion of wars, in some cases, they also faced revolts, and dealing with these revolts caused severe problems, especially in Algeria and Vietnam. The final destruction of the imperial/colonial idea came from the spreading realization of its costs”.

²³ As Wallerstein points out, “[c]olonial rule after all had been an inferior mode of relationship of core and periphery, one occasioned by the strenuous late-nineteenth-century conflict among industrial states but one no longer desirable from the point of view of the new hegemonic power”, which is the US (1974: 163).

this process political domination by colonial powers over certain territories end, and new possibilities for free political, economic, social and cultural development open for the colonized countries (Hillebrink, 2007: 8). This process includes “dismantling the hidden aspects of those institutional and cultural forces that had maintained the colonialist power and that remain even after political independence is achieved” (Ashcroft, et. al, 1998: 63). On the other hand, for those colonial rulers who lose or give up sovereignty, decolonization means “the attempt to replace imperialist control by some kind of commercial or strategic relationship” (Springhall, 2001: 3-4). In other words, they would no longer apply colonial practices but they would pursue the colonial logic through other means.

It was expected that the end of colonization “should have brought freedom and prosperity to the formerly colonized countries” (Memni and Bononno, 2006: 3). However, according to Memni and Bononno (ibid.), “in most cases, the long anticipated period of freedom, won at the cost of terrible suffering, brought with it poverty and corruption, violence and sometimes chaos”. After independence, “the hopes vested in decolonization were never realized” (Rogers, 1996: 108). In this context, as Betts (1998: 1) points out, decolonization “produced moments of inspiration and promise, yet failed to transform” most of the formerly colonized countries’ “economies and political structures to bring about true autonomy and development”. Moreover, the legacy of European dominance “remained evident in the national borders, political infrastructures, education systems, national languages, economies, and trade networks of each nation” in political, cultural, financial and military forms (ibid.). Cultural influence could be seen in the language, education and especially in “religion”²⁴. While the decolonization of political “institutions was often relatively rapid”, the minds of formerly colonized peoples “continued to work on colonial assumptions” (Birmingham, 1995: 6). Moreover, military influence could be felt in the formerly colonized countries. The newly independent states bought their “weapons and training programmes” from their former colonial powers (ibid.), which gave the former colonial powers an important leverage in gaining influence in their former colonies.

The financial legacies of colonialism are also “far reaching” (ibid.). While the postcolonial nations are technically sovereign in the economic sphere, and they can now

²⁴ “Christianity spread far beyond the colonial cities to affect the lives of rural peoples who still clung to their own languages and customs. When white political commissioners withdrew from Africa, many white missionaries remained and were supported by increasing numbers of black Christians” (Birmingham, 1995: 6).

determine their own currencies, finances and legal systems, this sovereignty has “rarely occurred to the fullest extent” (Osterhammel, 2002: 117). A postcolonial state is dependent on “international entanglements”, and, in this context, decolonization gives “the ex-colonies freedom of action, but seldom the opportunity to exploit it to the full” (ibid.). Osterhammel asserts that today’s postcolonial world has preserved its forms of manipulation, exploitation and cultural domination (ibid., 119). He further claims that “even if colonialism itself belongs to the past” (ibid.), this new world order can be described as neocolonial.

The transfer of power from colonial powers to local peoples in the Mediterranean technically took place between 1945 and 1965. Hawley (1996: iv) argues that this transformation should be referred to as “technical” because “the twentieth century has seen various of forms of neocolonization”, and, moreover, “it has not served to enhance personal freedoms”. When the colonial powers gave their colonies independence, they maintained economic influence or control, and this new kind of colonialism is renamed as “neocolonialism”.²⁵ In this context, the societies of the former colonies “are still bound to the continuing pressures of imperialism in its neocolonial form and to the continuing stratification and inherited elitism of post-independence societies” (Ashcroft, et. al, 2002: 129). In this sense, it can be claimed that independence in itself could not completely eliminate the influence of the colonizing powers.²⁶

The term neocolonialism was introduced in 1961. The Ghanaian leader, Kwame Nkrumah elaborated the term in theoretical terms in 1965, developing Lenin’s definition of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism. He suggested that, although countries like Ghana achieved technical independence, the former colonial powers and the US had continued to “play a decisive role through the international monetary system, by fixing prices in the world markets, and through multinational corporations and cartels and a variety of educational and cultural institutions” (Nkrumah, 1965). Nkrumah argued that neocolonialism was more dangerous and more difficult to detect and resist than the older explicit colonialism. Much of Nkrumah’s analysis “provides the basic understanding of the term and defines the assumed parameters of economic power in postcolonial theory” (Young, 2001: 46). Since then,

²⁵ Mommsen (1977: 57) argues that “since the Second World War, previous forms of direct, brutal, imperialist domination has been replaced by softer forms of purely economic and technological control together with the political influence, but the real situation was exactly as before”.

²⁶ According to Alemazung (2010: 64), after the colonialism period, some of the Western powers continue to influence politics and developments in the former colonies “where their political and economic relationship was based on their colonial ties on multilateral relations and engagements”.

neocolonialism has been widely used to refer to “any and all forms of control of the ex-colonies” (Ashcroft, et.al, 1998: 163).

In Nkrumah’s view, neocolonialism signifies the indirect exploitation of underdeveloped peoples by means of unequal trade relations, the export of capital on terms unfavourable to the receiving country, artificial manipulation of the terms of trade, and finally development aid (Nkrumah, 1965: ix-xvii). In Alemazung’s (2010: 69) view, neocolonialism operates in varying ways in postcolonial countries such as control over government in the new independent state “through foreign financial support for this state or through the presence of foreign consortium serving and upholding foreign financial interest”. He (ibid.) further claims that neocolonialism takes the place of old colonialism because the colonial powers have established “a dependent economic and political structure” in their former colonies. In Holsti’s (1998: 137) view, “the structure of international economic system not only created” this neocolonial structure, “but helps maintain it today”.

Neocolonialism is “based upon the principle of breaking up former large united colonial territories into a number of small non-viable states that are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial power for defence and even internal security” (Nkrumah, 1965: xiii). In this new form of imperial domination, the economic and financial systems of the newly independent countries are linked, as in colonial days, with those of the former colonial ruler. Therefore, independence can be considered as deception, and neocolonialism can be seen as a continuation of traditional colonial rule by other means.²⁷ According to Nkrumah (ibid., ix-x):

The essence of neocolonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. The methods and form of this direction can take various shapes. For example, in an extreme case the troops of the imperial power may garrison the territory of the neo-colonial state and control the government of it. More often, however, neo-colonialist control is exercised through economic or monetary means. The neo-colonial state may be obliged to take the manufactured products of imperialist power to the exclusion of competing products from elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial state may be secured by payments towards the cost running of the state, by the

²⁷ For Young (2001: 46—47), neocolonialism represents the “American stage of colonialism”, which is an “empire without colonies”.

provision of civil servants in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of banking system controlled by the imperial power.

The former colonial powers wanted to preserve their former colonial territories within their sphere of influence and they continued to exploit them from outside. In this context, Spivak (1999: 172) describes neocolonialism as the “dominant, economic, political and culturalist maneuvers emerging in our century after the uneven dissolution of territorial empires”. Spivak (*ibid.*, 3) further asserts that the colonialism proper “displaces itself into neocolonialism”, and in this form neocolonialism means “the largely economic rather than the territorial enterprise of imperialism”. For her, capitalism, as it did in the past, finds new ways to survive and new methods of extracting surplus value (Spivak, 1998: 148), and today this new form of imperialism can be called as “neocolonialism”. Neocolonialism imposes economic treaties and military pacts on countries, which limit their sovereignty; it exploits them by means of capital export, unequal trade relations, manipulation of prices and exchange rates, credits and various forms of so-called aid (Mommsen, 1977: 124). Nkrumah argues that “before the decline of colonialism what today is known as aid was simply foreign investment” (1965: 51).²⁸ Therefore, especially on the economic front, aid and investment can be considered as powerful neocolonialist tools.²⁹ For Alemazung (2010: 71), “foreign aid is a bribe given to poor countries by rich nations to enable the latter access resources and markets cheaply”, and moreover, it is “a bribe to poor nations to prevent migration of poor people to rich nations”. Today, some powers are using this foreign investment for the exploitation rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. In this sense, former colonial powers want to secure their access to the less developed areas of the world as the providers of cheap raw materials, spheres of investment, and markets for expensive finished goods and services. In this context, “investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than

²⁸ At this point it can be useful to note that since 2000s, even if the direct investment flows vary widely from one year to the next depending on the country concerned and the associated investment opportunities, the EU has accounted for an important amount of foreign direct investment (for example, in 2006, while the foreign direct investment from the whole world to Mediterranean countries was 40 billion euro, the EU’s share in the total amount was 15 billion euro) in the Mediterranean countries (EUROSTAT 106, 2008: 1, 5). The EU has invested in major projects in the telecommunication, banking and insurance sector (*ibid.*, 5).

²⁹ “All countries, even the most deeply involved in monopoly imperialism, have a state sector. Indeed, state involvement in private economy has become an essential part of its process. Therefore, the aim of the imperialist powers, in the application of their aid programmes, is to turn the state sector into an appendage of private capital” (Nkrumah, 1965: 55). In this context, aid assistance is used to encourage the development of the private sectors in the ex-colonies (*ibid.*). For example, the EU is the key player as regards international development aid. Development aid is financial aid given by the EU to support economic, environmental, social and political development of developing countries.

decreases the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world” (Nkrumah, 1965: ix).³⁰ For example, the gap between the continents separated by the Mediterranean has widened during the twentieth century.

Nkrumah also claims that although the aim of the neocolonialists is economic domination, they also use the old colonialist methods of religious, educational and cultural infiltration (1965: 35).³¹ In this sense, this thesis posits the idea that if a powerful country or entity establishes or maintains economic, military, political or cultural control over the postcolonial countries based on asymmetrical relationship and creates relationships of subordination and dependence, this entity or country can be labeled as a neocolonial power. Therefore, one can argue that if a trade agreement or foreign aid imposes political or economic conditionality, this agreement or aid can be used as a tool for establishing and maintaining control over receiving countries. One may further stipulate that the policies of international organizations that are dominated by the US (such as the IMF, the World Bank) or policies of political entities such as the EU create asymmetrical relationship in this regard and thus their policies can be regarded as neocolonial.

Nkrumah asserts (*ibid*, xi):

Neo-colonialism is the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the colony those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. With neo-colonialism neither is the case.

³⁰ On the other hand, Nkrumah asserts that this new system is the victim of its own contradictions. For Nkrumah, neocolonialism has to make itself “attractive to those upon whom it is practiced” and “it must be shown as capable of raising their standards, but this economic object of neocolonialism is to keep those standards depressed in the interest of developed countries. It is only when this contradiction is understood that the failure of innumerable aid programmes, many of them well intentioned, can be explained” (1965: xv). Moreover, he claims that “neocolonialism is a mill-stone around the necks of the developed countries which practice it. Unless they can rid themselves of it, it will drown them” (*ibid.*, xvi).

³¹ In this context, “friendly cooperation is offered in the educational, cultural and social domains, aimed at subverting the desirable patterns of indigenous progress to the imperialist objectives of the financial monopolists. These are the paraphernalia of neocolonialism, superficially proffering aid and guidance; benefiting the interested donors and their countries in old and new ways” (Nkrumah, 1965: 50).

According to Zinkin (1993: 356), neocolonialism may not be able to match the achievements of colonialism, but it will not risk its failures either, and, he further claims that neocolonialism cannot succeed to do what the former colonial powers did best: achieving peace and order. Zinkin (*ibid.*, 357) further claims that the real difference between today's neocolonial powers and the past colonial powers is in the willingness to take casualties because it is understood that colonialism was too expensive for the colonial powers because it costed them both money and manpower.³² Since the First World War and its casualties, even more since the Second World War, the countries that have the power to intervene can only exercise that power if the great majority of their people feel that they have a moral cause, good enough to justify their dying for it (*ibid.*). In this context, one can argue that the neocolonial powers, without risking themselves, will continue to try to exploit the postcolonial countries through new forms of economic, political and cultural tools. For example, one may claim that during the earlier stages of the Libyan crisis 2011, some of the EU member states such as France and the United Kingdom (UK) made a cost-benefit analysis and remained relatively silent in order to prevent a sharp increase in the energy prices (Dalacoura, 2012: 77). But upon getting some energy benefits from the opposition, they decided to intervene later (*ibid.*).

So, today neocolonialism still stands, although it operates regionally as well as in terms of specific colonial history (Young, 2001:52). For example, Ashcroft, et. al. (2002: 213) claim that the roots of contemporary environmentalism lie in neocolonialism, “often in association with the colonial past”, and it “continues to produce clashes of interest between the West and the Rest”. This is especially the case in areas of land and food scarcity, the formerly colonized “subaltern groups are usually accused of insensitivity to animal and land” (*ibid.*, 213-214), and they are forced to cooperate in environmental issues and to raise their standards to the Western level.

According to Spivak (1999: 356), today former colonial powers recode neocolonialism as “development”³³ just as they recoded capitalism as a “civilizing mission” in

³² “The colonial powers’ experience of colonialism was bad. Colonialism made these powers to extend their defence around the world, and fight among themselves. The money they invested in them was largely lost. They lost the talents of their some best men. The attention of their politicians was distracted from home affairs” (Zinkin, 1993: 358).

³³ “Development theory offers an explanation for the continued impoverishment of the formerly colonized Third World countries on the grounds that underdevelopment is not internally generated but is a structural condition of global capitalism itself” (Mommsen, 1977: 125). It thus presents a similar argument with world systems theory

the past. Moreover, she claims that development, in the forms of democratizing and modernizing the world, offers a general justification for neocolonialism (ibid., 366).³⁴ Hobson (2014: 131) asserts that in the postcolonial period one can see “subliminal Eurocentrism” in which terms such as empire, civilization are “dropped in favour of their whitewashed equivalences – hegemony, modernity versus tradition and core versus periphery”. For Iyer (1996: 123), the terms of modernization or development are the renamed versions of cultural imperialism; moreover, although these terms are seemed “innocent”, they “are loaded with colonizing baggage of which their users are often unaware”. On the other hand, Warren (1980: 207) argues that neocolonialism “is and has been a socially retrogressive force preventing or distorting economic development and thereby creating relationships of mounting subordination and dependence between rich and poor countries”. In this sense, as McClintock (1994: 297) argues, neocolonialism is not “simply a repeat performance of colonialism, nor is it slightly more complicated”, but it is a “merging of tradition and colonialism into some new, historic hybrid”. In this context, one may refer neocolonialism as a diluted version of old colonialism.

In sum, although it is usually assumed that imperialism ended with the disintegration of formal empires,³⁵ new strategies have been designed and employed by Western powers, during and after the decolonization period and in its aftermath to maintain Western power and influence over the non-Western World. Therefore, one may even claim that far from disappearing, imperialism and colonialism have simply been modified and transformed into the form of neocolonialism in the postcolonial era. In this context, postcolonial theorists and

in that it explains underdevelopment as consequence of the global structure of domination, rather than an early stage in the process of development (Brewer, 1980: 248). “Such underdeveloped countries are usually formerly colonized states that are actually prevented from independent movement by the global capitalist forces” (Brewer, 1980: 248-249). “The economic rationale of colonization” played an important part in “retarding the industrialization and development” of those regions (Wolfe, 1997: 394). However, “development theory has been criticized for a tendency to offer a static analysis of the relation between the developed and underdeveloped states and its inability to provide a convincing explanation of the Tiger economies of the South-East Asia” (Wolfe, 397-398). For detailed analysis see: Brewer (1980); Mommsen, (1977); Wolfe (1997).

³⁴ For example, for Spivak (1999: 223), democratization is a code name for the transformation of “state capitalisms and their colonies to tributary economies of rationalized global financialization”, and democratization “carries with it the aura of the civilizing mission of earlier colonialisms”. This also pertains to the definition of neoliberalism. See for example, Newsinger, 2008; Wolfe, 1997.

³⁵ Although historians argue that imperialism ended with decolonization, for some Third World nationalists and Western intellectuals, informal imperial power relations have continued through economic exploitation and political domination (Amin, 1977; Amin, 2002 and Sartre, 2006). World system theorists see capitalism, rather than imperialism, as the crucial dynamic in globalization and deepening inequalities. According to Wallerstein, capitalism distinguishes “the nature of the modern global order from earlier world empires, and the world capitalist economy does not permit the formal empire, hence the collapse of European empires” (1974: 144). For Osterhammel, imperialism is also associated with a “worldwide protection of interests and for capitalist penetration of large economic areas” (2002: 22).

their critics have questioned the divide between the colonial and postcolonial periods to analyze the relations between the West and the Rest. The controversial nature of the concept of imperialism is reflected in the debates over the neocolonialism in the postcolonial era.

1.2. Debates on the “postcolonial”

In general, one may claim that “postcolonialism” materialized in the context of decolonization, which marked the second half of the 20th century. Postcolonialism can be considered both as a “historical periodization and a particular form of theorization and analysis” (Bush, 2006, 50). For Uraizee (1996: 162), the term “postcolonial” means “historical, psychological, economic, and above all, political condition”. Although the term “postcolonial” has complicated and varying meanings, two main interpretations can be observed. On the one hand, the postcolonial refers to a period of time in which the status of a land is no longer named as colonized. In this regard, postcolonialism applies to the economic, political and social features of these countries. On the other hand, postcolonialism may refer to different “historically situated forms of representations, reading practices and values which range across the past and the present” (McLeod, 2000: 5). In this regard, postcolonialism pertains to the new forms of economic, political, military and cultural domination that have prolonged in the form of what may be called “modern colonialism”, which one can also refer to as “neocolonialism”. In this context, a country while being formally independent, can also remain politically, economically and/or culturally dependent, being subjected to neocolonial practices. Therefore, one may claim that postcolonialism is a wider concept than neocolonialism.

As mentioned above, the term neocolonialism tends to point out that if an asymmetrical relationship between countries creates a relationship of subordination and dependence, the tools of cooperation, development assistance and modernization can be considered as the new tools for political, economic and cultural domination. Hawley (1996: xi) argues that although the term “postcolonial” is usually applied to writing, “in this age of neocolonialism, of ethnic cleansing and brutal tribalisms it might be more productive to envision the era and circumstances that occasion this literature as ‘pre-’ something in yet another wave of narrow self-definition and time-honored xenophobia”. For Dirlik (1994: 329), the choice of the term postcolonial has its goal “to abolish all distinctions between center and periphery as well as all other ‘binarisms’ that are allegedly a legacy of colonial(ist)

ways of thinking”. Dirlik (ibid.) further asserts that this term has opened up for “critical inquiry”. In general, postcolonial critics see the postcolonial theory as the re-construction of the West’s domination over the former colonies and criticize the theory as being a new expression of the West’s historical power and its alleged superiority over the rest of the world. Therefore, one can assert that the postcolonial critique questions the “inner logic” of postcolonial theory. It can be asserted that the postcolonial theory builds on colonial discourses. Therefore, this study provides a detailed analysis of colonial discourses in the following sub-section. As Edward Said’s work, especially “*Orientalism*”, holds an important role in the development of postcolonial theory and its critique, it is also analyzed in a subsection.

1.2.1. The postcolonial theory

The end of the Cold War and the re-emergence of identity politics inspired the postcolonial theory and its theorists have begun to analyze the imperial legacy in Western Europe and in the formerly colonized world. Young (2001) provides an insightful account of postcolonial theory and its development. As a form of knowledge politics, postcolonial theory “has developed dialogically in a syncretic formation of Western and postcolonial thought, particularly anti-colonial emancipatory politics” (Young, 2001: 63). As a theory “still in the process of formation”, postcolonial theory has developed from diverse sources, and although it is largely based on cultural studies, it “has drawn its conceptual vocabulary from a wide range of disciplines and theoretical agendas, including anthropology, feminism, history, human geography, Marxism, philosophy, poststructuralism, psychoanalysis and sociology, and has been inspired by diverse groups of Western and radical postcolonial writers” (ibid., 67). Postcolonial theory has also developed new theoretical concepts and instruments, and has itself become a source of “inspiration and intellectual energy” (ibid.).

As mentioned above, there are different scholars, representing various disciplines, working on theories associated with postcolonialism, such as historians, anthropologists, literary scholars, political scientists and sociologists (Loomba, 1998: 14). However, the term postcolonial theory is used largely to “designate the body of work produced by a certain type of cultural analysis” (Bush, 2006: 53). In this regard, Bart Moore-Gilbert’s remarks can be regarded as useful. He defines the postcolonial theory as (1997:1), “work which is shaped

primarily, or to a significant degree, by methodological affiliation to French high theory – notably Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault”.³⁶

Postcolonial theory investigates earlier imperial and colonial periods and looks at imperial domination in other parts of the world, and it has also been used to examine “cultural encounters” (Young, 2001) other than those “provoked by the post-Renaissance expansion of Europe” (Ashcroft, et.al, 2002: 7). For Juan (2007: 99), postcolonialism is “the cultural logic of this mixture and multilayering of forms taken as distinguishing ethos of late modernity, a logic distanced from its grounding in the unsynchronized interaction between colonial powers and colonized subalterns”. In their influential book, *The Empire Writes Back*, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (2002: 2, 194) use the term postcolonial “to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day”.³⁷ In their view, the postcolonial “has arisen out of the experience of colonization and has asserted itself by emphasizing the conflict with, and differences from, the imperial power” (Ashcroft, et.al, 2002: 2). As they point out, it is concerned mainly with “defining the self and placing the self as precisely as possible” (ibid., 9), and this “involves an examination of the political, imaginative and social control/dominance imposed by the colonizer on the colonized” (ibid., 29), as well as by one” colonized group on another colonized group” (ibid., 31). In this context, the term postcolonial may give one “a different way of understanding colonial relations: no longer a simple binary opposition, black colonized vs. white colonizers; Third World vs. the West, but an engagement with all the varied manifestations of colonial power, including those in settler colonies” (ibid., 200).

As can be observed from what is mentioned above, the term postcolonial has been the subject of lengthened discussions. According to Young (2001: 57), “many of the problems raised can be resolved if the postcolonial is defined as coming after colonialism and imperialism, in their original meaning of direct-rule domination, but still positioned within

³⁶ “In practice, this will mean the work of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha. It is the intrusion of French high theory to postcolonial analysis that has perhaps generated the most heated of the many current critical debates, provoking extremes of both approval and disapproval” (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 1). Bush criticizes this and claims that “postcolonial theory, however, has located itself everywhere and nowhere, eclectically borrowing from other theories and disciplines regardless of their relevance to the colonial and postcolonial context” (2006: 57). Note that this thesis does not take the French line in its postcolonial analysis.

³⁷ “This is because there is a continuity of preoccupations throughout the historical process initiated by European imperial aggression. We also suggest that it is most appropriate as the term for the new-cross cultural criticism that has emerged in recent years and for the discourse through which this is constituted. In this sense, postcolonial theory is concerned with the world as it exists during and after the period of European imperial domination” (Ashcroft, et. al, 2002: 194). This is also the line taken in this thesis.

imperialism in its later sense of the hegemonic economic power". The postcolonial is a "dialectical concept", which symbols not only "the broad historical facts of colonization and the determined achievements of sovereignty", but also "the realities of nations and peoples emerging into a new imperialistic context of economic and sometimes political domination" (Young, 2001: 57).³⁸ Loomba (1998: 12) suggests that "it is more helpful to think of postcolonialism not just as coming literally after colonialism and signifying its demise, but more flexibly as the contestation of colonial domination and the legacies of colonialism". McLeod makes a useful distinction between these two by arguing that while "post-colonial" seems more appropriate to indicate a particular "historical period or epoch" (such as after colonialism, or after empire), "postcolonialism" refers to "disparate forms of representations, reading practices and values" that can "circulate across the barrier between the colonial rule and national independence" (2000: 5). He further claims that although postcolonialism "remains firmly bound up with historical experiences", it "is not contained by the tidy categories of historical periods or dates" (ibid.).³⁹ This is because there is no single post-colonial condition but rather, one can speak of many postcolonialisms as Uraizee (1996: 163) points out.⁴⁰ Therefore, McClintock (1994: 302-303) claims that postcolonialism is not a homogenous theoretical term across different societies or within a single one, but it refers to "a multiplicity of powers and histories" that need a proliferation of theories.

In sum, one can claim that postcolonial theory can be considered as one of the most varied and debatable fields in literary, political and cultural studies. In this sense, postcolonialism has become to mean many things to many people and "embrace[s] a dizzying array of critical practices" (Aschcroft, et. al, 2002: 193). Hawley (1996: xi) claims that postcolonial studies are "exciting and rejuvenating for its many disciplines". In this context, many other disciplines have adopted the term "postcolonial" in their studies such as politics,

³⁸ According to Young, "The experience of that new sovereignty typically encouraged the development of a postcolonial culture which radically revised the ethos and ideologies of the colonial state and, at the same time, reoriented the goals of independence movement towards the very different conditions of national autonomy. The postcolonial also specifies a transformed historical situation, and the cultural formations that have arisen in response to changed political circumstances, in the former colonial power. The term 'postcoloniality' [...] puts the emphasis on the economic, material and cultural conditions that determine the global system in which the postcolonial nation is required to operate [...]" (2001: 57).

³⁹ This study borrows from McLeod's (2000: 5) terminology and uses the terms "postcolonial" and "postcolonialism" when they refer to the forms of representation, practices and values that range across both the past and the present.

⁴⁰ "These postcolonialisms would include all the lingering legacies of the colonizer/colonized relationship, both positive and negative ones. Some negative legacies include economic and psychological dependency on the imperial power, cultural marginalization, and political tensions between imposed and experienced heritages. Some positive legacies include a welcoming of cross-cultural encounters, and a two-way traffic or cultural exchange by subverting imperial perspectives to create new forms and ways of thinking" (Uraizee, 1996: 163).

sociology, anthropology and economic theory etc. In fact, so many fields have adopted the term in so many different ways that postcolonial theory may face the danger of “losing sight of its actual provenance and intellectual history” (Aschcroft, et. al, 2002: 194).⁴¹

1.1.2.1 Colonial discourses and Postcolonialism

Theories of colonial discourses have mainly influenced the development of postcolonialism. These theories generally explore “the ways that representations and modes of perception are used as fundamental weapons of colonial power to keep colonized peoples subservient to colonial rule” (McLeod, 2000: 17). Frantz Fanon and Edward Said can be considered as the two most important figures in the colonial discourse analysis. In 1950s, Frantz Fanon wrote about the psychological damage of colonialism, specifically French colonialism. Fanon (1994: 36-52) explains “the consequences of identity formation” for the colonized subject who is “forced to the internalization” of the “self” as an “other”. “The Negro” is considered to symbolize everything that the colonizing “White” is not (ibid., 38). While the colonizers are civilized, rational and intelligent, “the Negro” remains the “other” to “all these qualities against which colonizing peoples gain their sense of superiority and normality” (ibid.). Fanon also argues that people who are colonized by the colonizers are “doomed to hold a traumatic belief in their own inferiority”.⁴² One response “to such trauma is to try to escape it by embracing” the ideals of the “motherland” – the land of the colonizer (McLeod, 2000: 18). However, even if the colonized people try hard to accept the education, the values and the language of their colonizers, in the end they will never be accepted as equals by the colonizers (Fanon, 1994: 40-42). For Fanon (ibid., 45-46), the end of colonialism means not just political and economic change, but psychological change as well. Furthermore, in his view, colonialism can be totally destroyed only if such thinking about identity is successfully challenged (ibid.). Therefore, one can further assert that political decolonization and psychological transformation have to be achieved before economic decolonization.

⁴¹ Postcolonial theory also “intersects with other European movements, such as postmodernism, poststructuralism, and with both contemporary Marxist ideological criticism and feminist criticism” (Aschcroft, et. al, 2002: 153).

⁴² Furthermore, when colonized people internalize this psychological victimization, the West uses the success of its colonial attitude “to confirm the racism and cultural bigotry that spawned it in an act of self-fulfilling prophecy” (Iyer, 1996: 123).

Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha have focused on the discursive production of colonialism, linguistic constitution of subjectivity, deconstruction of binarisms such as the colonized and the colonizer, dismantling of master narratives of imperialism and the deployment of strategies of subversion such as parody, irony and mimicry (Said, 1993, 2003; Spivak, 1994; Bhabha, 1994a, 1994b). In 1978, Said published his seminal work, *Orientalism*, which had a crucial impact on the rise of postcolonial theory and the analysis of colonial texts. *Orientalism* is regarded as one of the most important books of the late twentieth century.⁴³ Drawing on Michel Foucault on knowledge and power, Said points out that the West discursively produces the Orient in order to strengthen its hold and dominion over that territory, and reveals the complex interconnections between the production of knowledge of the Orient and the institutions of power (1993, 1994, 2003). This study gives special attention to the works of Said because he is regarded as the pioneer of the postcolonial studies. Nevertheless, it does not take the power-knowledge relationship as its basis and rather adopts a positivist approach. Furthermore, Said's work has influenced postcolonial studies to the extent that *Orientalism* has become the major source of reference for analysis in this regard. Said is important for this study to show the asymmetrical relationship between Europe and its Mediterranean others which has roots in the colonial era.

Gayatri Spivak on the other hand, sought to extend and widen the line of inquiry opened up by Said, drawing on the conceptual resources of deconstruction, feminism and Marxism. For Spivak (1999: 1), colonial discourse studies, “when they concentrate only on the representation of the colonized or the matter of colonies, can sometimes serve the production of current neocolonial knowledge by placing colonialism/imperialism securely in the past, and/or by suggesting a continuous line from that past to our present”. She is interested in exploring the “complex layers of colonial subjectivity and textuality”, and “the problematics of postcolonial representation” (McLeod, 2000: 191-195). For her, although it is “not possible to recover the voices”, which have been made subjects of colonial representation, particularly women, one can read colonial texts “as potentially disruptive and subversive” (Spivak, 1994, 1999). Therefore, Spivak “focuses on the cultural texts of those

⁴³ Said's importance is mainly driven from “his mediation of the critical methods associated with certain kinds of French high theory into the Anglo-American academic world” (Moore-Gilbert, 1994: 34). Furthermore, *Orientalism* provides “one of the first examples of a sustained application of such modes of analysis to Anglophone cultural history and textual tradition” (ibid.). More specifically, *Orientalism* adopts the elements of French high theory “to the study of the connections between Western culture and imperialism, to argue that all Western systems of cultural description are deeply contaminated with [...] the politics, the considerations, the positions and the strategies of power” (ibid.).

who are marginalized by dominant Western culture: the immigrant, the working class, women and other positions of the subaltern” (ibid.). If Said’s primary focus is on the Middle East, Spivak’s is on India. Spivak mainly concentrated on India, drawing attention to the problems of the subaltern in this country. Spivak’s works can display the asymmetrical relationship that the Union reproduce in its Mediterranean approach in the postcolonial era. The Union presents its South and Eastern Mediterranean as uncivilized, unstable and weak; as an area that needs European help and guidance. By exporting its integration model, the EU is trying to civilize its neighbourhood. For Spivak (1999: 91), this civilisational thinking can be regarded as a part of Europe’s “Eurocentric strategies of narrativizing history” where it portrays itself (EU) as superior and its other (Mediterranean) as weak .

The third scholar who has significantly enhanced the field of postcolonial studies is Homi Bhabha. Drawing on the different approaches to psychoanalysis, Homi Bhabha deploys psychological concepts such as “desire”, “ambivalence”, “mimicry”, “paranoia”, “repression” and “fetishism” as central tools in his analysis of colonial textualities (1994a, 1994b). In *The Location of Culture*, Bhabha argues that “the objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction” (Bhabha, 1994a: 101). McLeod stresses that “the discourse of colonialism attempts to domesticate the colonized subjects and abolish their radical ‘otherness’ bringing them inside Western understanding through the orientalist project of constructing knowledge about them” (2000: 52-53). In Bhabha’s terms, “colonial discourse produces the colonized as a social reality which is at once an ‘other’ and yet entirely knowable and visible” (Bhabha, 1994a: 101). Papastergiadis (1996: 188) assesses Bhabha’s analysis as “a step away from the binary opposition that separated the objective apparatus of domination from the subjective processes of power”.

Bhabha also contributes to the postcolonial studies by delineating the complex relationships that existed between the colonizer and the colonized in the form of the concept “hybridity”. This concept refers to the creation of “cultural forms within the contact zone produced by colonization” (Bhabha, 1994a: 162). Bhabha (1994b: 116-117) claims that even for the colonizer, the production of the “other” is by no means straightforward; there exists an “in-between” space that underlines the interdependence of the colonizer and the colonized and their mutual construction of their subjectivities. The concept of “mimicry” has also been crucial in the studies of Bhabha. The concept of mimicry can help to describe the ambivalent

relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. For Bhabba (1994a: 127), the mimicry is the process in which the colonized subject is reproduced as almost “the same, but not quite”.⁴⁴ The result of this process is “a blur copy of the colonizer”, which can be also quite threatening (Ashcroft *et.,al.*, 1998: 139). Moreover, according to Ashcroft *et.,al.* (ibid.) “copying of the colonizer’s culture, behaviour, manners and the values by the colonized contains both mockery and a certain menace”. Mimicry also reveals the “limitation” in the authority of colonial discourse (Bhabba, 1994a: 122) because “mimicry locates a crack in the certainty of colonial dominance” (Ashcroft *et.,al.*, 1998: 139). Mimicry constitutes important feature regarding the EU’s approach to the Mediterranean. The EU presents its integration practices as a model that should be followed. The EU expects its neighbours to emulate its model and embrace the Union’s values. This reminds one of the former colonial powers’ tool of mimicry (Cebeci, 2012; 2017). It can be argued that today the EU, like empires did, uses the tools of mimicry and want its neighbours to copy its norms and values without taking into consideration of their specific economic and political dynamics and the needs of their peoples.

1.2.1.2. Edward Said’s Orientalism and beyond

Said looks at the divisive relationship between the colonizer and the colonized but from a different angle. He, like Fanon, explores the extent to which colonialism creates a way of seeing the world. However, Said pays attention more to the colonizers than the colonized. In *Orientalism*, Said examines how the knowledge that the Western imperial powers construct about their colonies helps constantly to justify their suppression. Looking in particular representations of Egypt and the Middle East in a variety of different materials, Said points out that Western travelers in these regions generally do not try to learn much about, or from, the native peoples they meet. Instead, “they recorded their observations based upon assumptions about the Orient as a mystic place of exoticism and sexual degeneracy” (Said, 2003: 72). These observations (which cannot be accounted as true observations) were “presented as scientific truths” that “functioned to justify” colonial domination (McLeod, 2000: 170). Colonial power is strengthened by the production of knowledge about the

⁴⁴ According to Bhabba (1994a: 122), “the colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence, in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. [...] [M]imicry emerges as the representation of difference that is itself a process of disavowal. Mimicry is, thus the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power”.

colonized cultures that constantly produces a degenerate image of the Orient for those in the West (or the Occident). Thus one may claim that colonialism constantly reproduces itself.

In *Orientalism*, Said (2003: 1-28) argues that representations of the “Orient” in European literary texts, travelogues and other writings contribute to the creation of a division between Europe and its “Others”, a division that is central to the creation of European culture as well as to the “maintenance and the extension of European hegemony over the colonized lands”. For Loomba (1997: 44-45), “Said’s project is to show how knowledge about non-Europeans is part of the process of maintaining power over them; thus the status of knowledge is demystified, and the lines between the ideological and the objective are blurred”. For Said, since antiquity, the Orient has been a European invention that is “a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, and remarkable experiences”, which is now disappearing; in a sense that “its time is over” (2003: 1). According to Said (*ibid*, 4-5):

The Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not *merely* there, just as the Occident itself is not just *there* either. [...] Such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “Orient” and “Occident” are man-made. Therefore, as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other. [emphasis original]

Said defines Orientalism as a style of thought based upon “an ontological and epistemological distinction” made between the “Orient” and the “Occident”, and “as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (2003: 2-3). In this context, it can be argued that Orientalism constructs “a binary opposition” between the “Orient (East)” and the “Occident (West)”. Each is assumed to exist in opposition to the Other; as McLeod (2000: 175) points out, “the Orient is conceived as being everything that the West is not”. However, this is not an opposition of equal partners. Therefore one can assert that such binary construction makes the relations between them asymmetrical.⁴⁵ In this context, one may claim that the EU’s relations with the Mediterranean countries have mostly

⁴⁵ For some scholars, “just as the two geographical entities, the Occident and the Orient, in Said’s terms, support and to an extent reflect each other, so all postcolonial societies realize their identity in difference rather than in essence. They are constituted by their difference from the metropolitan and it is in this relationship that identity both as a distancing from the centre and as a means of self-assertion comes into being”. (Aschcroft, et.al, 2002: 165)

been based on such asymmetry, giving the EU an important leverage in implementing its policies towards the region.⁴⁶

Said claims that the relationship between the Occident and the Orient is a relationship of “power”, “domination”, of varying degrees of a “complex hegemony”. According to him, “The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be ‘Oriental’ (...), but also because it *could be* – that is, submitted to being – *made Oriental*” (ibid., 5-6). Orientalism can thus be considered “as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives and ideological biases apparently suited to the Orient. The Orient is thought, researched, administered and pronounced in certain discrete ways” (Said, 1994: 141-142). His contention is that Orientalism is “fundamentally a political doctrine that is forced over the Orient because the Orient is weaker than the West” (ibid., 143). Therefore, Orientalism can be assumed as an expression of the strength of the West and the West’s perception of the Orient’s weakness. For Said, “[s]uch strength and weakness are as intrinsic to Orientalism as they are to any view that divides the world into large divisions, entities that coexist in a state of tension produced by what is believed to be radical difference” (2003: 45).

Said also believes that the Occident’s interest in the Orient is not just political; it is culture that creates such interest (2003: 10). He further asserts that it is the culture that “acted dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales to make the Orient the varied and complicated place” (ibid., 12). In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said examines how the processes of imperialism had occurred beyond the level of economic laws and political decisions, and inflicted into the cultural formations (1993). For Said, the word “culture” has two meanings: First, it refers to “all those practices like the arts of description, communication, and representation”, which Said believes is deeply embedded in maintaining and sustaining the imperial project (1993: xii). These practices have “the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging” (ibid., xiii). Second and related, culture is “a sort of theater where various political and ideological causes engage one another” (ibid., xiv). Culture in this sense is inherently political, and its service to the imperial project is based on the forging of “us” and “them” (Chowdhry 2007: 110).⁴⁷

⁴⁶ For further info see chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis.

⁴⁷ “Culture is the fruit of a people’s history and a determinant of history, by the positive or negative influence that it exerts on the evolution of relationships between man and his environment, among men or groups of men

Dirks (1992: 3) emphasizes that “cultural transformations have characterized all the empires, ancient and modern, but it is the modern empires that develop the most sophisticated ‘technologies of governance’ and/or ‘cultural studies’”. Culture can be defined as shared values linking language, religion, kinship, work and the individual’s conception of the world around them. It is adaptive, dynamic and linked to power relations and, therefore, can generate tension, conflict and resistance (Bush, 2006: 115). In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said pioneers the analysis of narratives of empire in the fiction and history as they influence culture in the worlds of the colonizer and the colonized (1993: 1-15). Said argues that while the formal “age of empire” ended after World War II, imperialism has left a cultural legacy in the previously colonized civilizations that remains today. He furthermore argues that this legacy of imperialism or cultural imperialism is still very influential in international systems of power. He examines the power of representation in constructing colonial subjects. Furthermore, he displays the importance of anti-imperialist challenges to this culture of imperialism. The new imperial and postcolonial histories, with Said’s influence, emphasize “the invisibility of the civilizing mission in the metropole and in the colony in creating a bourgeois imperial culture” (Bush, 2006: 115). There is a greater focus on the nature of colonial societies and the impact of cultural imperialism on the colonizer and the colonized, and in this context, culture becomes “central to debates about the nature of colonial” knowledge (ibid., 115-116).

Chowdhry (2007: 110) claims that regarding the importance of culture in colonial knowledge, for Edward Said, “the imperialist juncture is foundational to the formation of the modern world as its global reach is enormous; the imperial political context plays a central role in the cultural production and circulation of the colonial and the colonized identities and representations”. It is assumed that a “cultural distance/cultural difference” exists between the West and the non-West that helped the legitimizing the idea of civilizing the colonies (Chakrabarty, 2000: 7, Spivak, 1999: 290). For Bush (2006: 122-123), “colonial and imperial domination” operate “through mechanisms of cultural imperialism” that result in cultural oppression, that is, a humiliation and refusal of the values of the colonized people that undermine their cultures. According to Cabral (1994: 57), the colonizer creates “a system to

within a society, as well as among different societies. Ignorance of this fact may explain the failure of several attempts at foreign domination, as well as the failure of some international liberal movements. To put it differently, culture is an essential element of the history of a people” (Cabral, 1994: 54).

repress the cultural life of the colonized people”, and furthermore, in order to justify exploitation, the colonizer “provokes and develops the cultural alienation of a part of the population, either by assimilating indigenous people, or by creating a social gap between the indigenous elites and the popular masses”. As a result of this process, a considerable part of the population “assimilates the colonizer’s mentality”, and “considers itself culturally superior to its own people and ignores or looks down upon their cultural values” (ibid.). In this sense, one may argue that colonial domination and exploitation of European powers have deeply influenced the cultures of South and Eastern Mediterranean countries; creating divisions in their societies between the locals and those elites who got assimilated, which can be referred as “the indigenous elites”.⁴⁸

In the logic of cultural imperialism one can argue that it is important to legitimize the colonial rule in order to keep the exploitative nature of the colonial administration quiet and to avoid the conflict of interests between the colonizer and colonized (Bush, 2006: 123). Cultural imperialism “involves a dominant power imposing aspects of its culture on a society, which is weaker or backward in military, economic or technological sense” (Said, 1993: 59). The concept implies a more conscious process of suppression of inferior cultures, and the cultural strategies are more delicate than the other forms of control, such as policing and the law (ibid., 60). Cultural imperialism, with the help of the “media”⁴⁹, has become “more powerful and sophisticated” as the twentieth century progresses and “now operates primarily through powerful multinational companies” (Bush, 2006: 136).⁵⁰

As mentioned before, one can define Orientalism as a worldview that claims the “inherent superiority of the West over the East” (Hobson, 2004: 7). Orientalism constructs “a permanent image of the superior West (the Self) against the negatively defined the backward and inferior East (the Other)” (ibid.). It was mainly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that this “polarized and essentialist” structure became fully apparent within the European imagination (Hobson, 2004: 219-242). Between 1700 and 1850 “European

⁴⁸ As Holsti (1998: 100) points out, colonizers favor some groups at the expense of others and sustain or create “ethnic elites to rule over supposed inferiors”. In this context, colonizers often create “divisions of labor along ethnic lines” (ibid.).

⁴⁹ Today, the media is central to the domestic culture. “Whereas a century ago European culture was associated with a white man’s physical presence”, today one has an international media presence in addition “that implies itself, frequently at a level below conscious awareness, over a fantastically wide a range” (Said, 1993: 352). According to him, the new electronics could be greater than was colonialism itself (Said, 1993: 353).

⁵⁰ As Bush points out, these companies “assert ‘soft power’ through marketing techniques to change culturally determined consumer tastes” (2006: 136).

imagination” forced to divide the world into two radically opposed camps: the West and the East, or the so called “the West and the Rest” (ibid., 7). The West perceives the East as “inferior” and “primitive” (Iyer, 1996: 123). In this new framework, the “imagined values of the inferior East” are constructed as “the antithesis of rational Western values” (Hobson, 2004: 7).⁵¹

As Hobson points out, the West has always been represented as superior because the West has supposedly enjoyed “dynamically progressive, liberal and democratic values and rational institutions from the outset”, which “gave birth to the rational individual, who facilitated economic progress and the inevitable breakthrough to capitalist modernity” (ibid., 8). By contrast, the East is branded as permanently inferior: It has supposedly “endured despotic values and irrational institutions” that caused a “cruel collectivism that strangled the rational individual at birth”, and in so doing “made economic stagnation and slavery its eternal fate” (ibid.).⁵² This argument forms “an eternal image of ‘dynamic West’ versus an ‘unchanging East’” (ibid.). At this point, it is important to remember the fact that “the West”, like “the East” is apparently an imaginary entity, but this does not reduce its power. For example, as Spivak (1999: 199) points out, Europe, by defining its colonies as “others”, consolidates itself as a “sovereign” and superior subject.

In Hobson’s (2004: 8-9) view, these binary opposites construct the identities of masculinity and femininity. In this context, colonial system is constructed “as gendered as to delineate the colonized” (passive, hence female East) “from the colonizing” (active, hence male, West) (Chancy, 1996: 58). Regarding this imagination, while the Western identity is constructed as “patriarchal and powerful masculine, at the same time the East is imagined as weak and helpless – feminine” (Hobson, 2004: 9). This categorization is important because branding the East as exotic, enticing and passive (i.e. as having no initiative to develop its own accord) produces “an immanent and ingenious legitimating rationale for the West’s imperial penetration and control of the East” (ibid.). If one analyzes these binary opposites in the context of current Euro-Mediterranean relations, he/she may argue that today the EU is

⁵¹ In other words, while the West is defined by “a series of progressive presences”, the East is constructed by “a series of absences” (Hobson, 2004:7).

⁵² “The West is proclaimed superior because it has supposedly rational institutions, while the East’s inferiority is presented as a function of its alleged irrational institutions. Thus while the West has for the last three centuries allegedly enjoyed *civilised* democracy/ liberalism/individualism/science, conversely, the East is said to have endured or suffered *barbaric* Oriental despotism, or simply the *savage* state of nature alongside authoritarianism/collectivism/mysticism” (Hobson, 2014: 123) (emphases original).

using an Orientalist approach in pursuing its Mediterranean policies. In this sense, the EU's Orientalism constructs a permanent image of the superior West (the EU/Self) against the negatively defined the backward and inferior East (South and Eastern Mediterranean/Other). One may further claim that in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, one side is represented as a model, and the other as a threat. In this context, it can be stated that on the one hand, there exists an alleged superiority on the part of the EU as a peaceful, civilized, developed region; on the other hand, there exists the construction of the Southern Mediterranean as backward, uncivilized, underdeveloped and conflict-ridden region (Cebeci and Schumacher, 2017). This is what directs and legitimizes the EU to adopt policies for the sake of civilizing, stability, democratizing the region through conditionality and region-building (Cebeci, 2012, 2017).

Said's *Orientalism* is an influential text that challenged the very foundations of Western knowledge. It is commonly believed that although he makes "a unique contribution" to the understanding of the cultural basis of imperialism and colonialism, his analysis can also be critiqued as "ahistorical and dependent on general abstractions" (Porter, 1994: 150-152). Mishra and Hodge (1994: 279) argue that "Orientalism's heavily skewed and ideologically marked discourses – the enterprise was never totally homogenous, and often contradictory – haunt the post-colonial in ways that make [...] the post-colonial itself post-oriental". McClintock (1994: 293) asserts that the "post" in the postcolonial studies "reduces the cultures of peoples beyond colonialism to prepositional time", and by conferring on "colonialism the prestige of history proper", non-European cultures become historicized with recourse to European chronology. In other words, the world's countless cultures "are marked, not positively by what distinguishes them, but by a subordinate relation" to Europe's linear time (McClintock, 1994: 293). However, she also argues that different countries have encountered decolonization at different times, while others have not experienced at all, and, furthermore, not all forms of decolonization are the same (ibid., 295). In this context, one can lose the opportunity to think about the historical differences that exist between the decolonized countries, if he/she, as Said does, considers them in Europe's linear time.

Said's *Orientalism* is mainly criticized because it makes totalizing assumptions about the representations. According to Porter (1994: 152), "Said asserts the unified character of Western discourse on the Orient over some two millennia, a unity derived from a common and continuing experience of fascination with and threat from the East". As McLeod (2000:

47) points out, “Said’s view takes in a broad generalizing sweep of history but attends little to individual historical moments, their anomalies and specifics”. For Bush (2006: 56-57), Said assumes “a unified imperialist/Orientalist discourse” and “a simple binary division between the Orient and Occident”. However, Lowe claims that “the Orient is not discrete, monolithic, essentialized formation” but it reflects “different socio-historical contexts that produce different formations of cultural difference”,⁵³ therefore, the assumption of a unified imperialist/Orientalist discourse fails to contain differences. Gewertz and Errington (1993: 637) also claim that Orientalism also fosters another “distortion”, the so-called “Occidentalism”. According to their view, in Western representations of the Other, the West is also understood in reified essentialist terms (ibid.). They conclude that misrepresentations of ourselves as well as the other can help sustain, rather than subvert, existing socio-political relationships (ibid., 637-638).

Said is also criticized for ignoring resistance of the colonized peoples.⁵⁴ According to Said, “Orientalism moves in one direction from the active West to the passive East”, however, he does not examine “how Oriental peoples received these representations” (McLeod, 2000: 48). In this framework, Williams and Chrisman (1994) scrutinize the ways that the colonized people responded to the Orientalist representations. According to their view, in Said’s work there is little notion of the colonized subject as a “constitutive agent” with the capacity for political resistance (Williams and Chrisman, 1994: 16). And in the words of Aijaz Ahmad (1992: 172), one of Said’s fiercest critics, Said does not think about how Western representations “might have been received, accepted, modified, challenged, overthrown or reproduced by the intelligentsias of the colonized countries”. In this context, Said is accused of not writing about the voice of the colonized peoples and one may even consider that Said, unlike Fanon, does not give enough attention to the colonized. It can be claimed that in doing so, his work is in danger of being just as “Orientalist” as the field he is describing by not considering alternative representations made by those subjected to colonialism. Moreover, although Said attacks US foreign policy statements and actions, especially with reference to Palestine and the Middle East, he is also criticized for neglecting US neocolonialism. For Juan (2007: 110) US neocolonialism is the “missing link in Said’s fugal charting of modern imperialism” (Juan, 2007: 110). Although Said is criticized from different angles, he is still

⁵³ Lowe, L. (1991). *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalism*. New York: Cornell University Press, 9-10. Quoted here from Bush, (2006: 57).

⁵⁴ See, Ahmad, 1992; Williams and Chrisman, 1994; McLeod, 2000.

regarded as the leading figure of postcolonial studies due to the fact that all the works concerning postcolonial theory usually take Said's Orientalism as their point of departure and make a critique of his work. In other words, the influence of Said to some degree can be felt in all postcolonial studies.

During the last decade of the twentieth century the term postcolonial has become one of the most powerful means of re-assessing the historical past. Aschcroft, et. al, (2002: 219) argue: "More than any other concept, the postcolonial has facilitated the gradual disturbance of Eurocentric dominance of academic debate, and has empowered postcolonial intellectuals to redirect discussion towards issues of direct political relevance to the non-Western world". As mentioned above, colonial discourses, especially Said's Orientalism, have a significant role in the development of postcolonial theory and its critique. Generally, postcolonial critics see the postcolonial theory as the re-construction of the West's domination over former colonies. Therefore, they question the colonial discourses and the assumptions of postcolonial theorists. At this point, it might be useful to have a look at the postcolonial critique.

1.2.2. The postcolonial critique

It is generally argued that the notion of "postcolonialism is merely an invention of Western academic institutions" (Ahmad, 1992, 1995; Dirlik, 1994, Young, 2001). Although postcolonial studies – "as a field of disciplinary study within the academia" – "has emerged from Anglophone universities around the world", the activists and intellectuals in or from the colonies and the newly decolonized are the ones that most effectively express the opposition to colonialism, imperialism and Eurocentrism (Young, 2001: 63).⁵⁵ Postcolonial theory and its critique "comprise a variety of practices", "performed within a range of disciplinary fields in a multitude of different institutional locations around the globe" (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 5). Thus, one can assume that the postcolonial theory and its critique do not possess a uniform theoretical framework.

⁵⁵ According to Young (2001: 68), in historical terms, "postcolonial theory has developed from Western and postcolonial anti-colonialism of the past. It is not in any sense simply a Western or even metropolitan phenomenon, but the hybrid product of the violent historical interactions of the West with three continents (Latin America, Asia and Africa) in historical, political, cultural and conceptual terms. Resistance against the West has always involved resistance from within it as well as outside it, that is, beyond its permeable and porous boundaries. Postcolonialism is neither Western nor non-Western, but a dialectical product of interaction between the two articulating new counterpoints of insurgency from long-running power struggles that predate and post-date colonialism".

Postcolonialism is perceived as the invention of Western intellectuals that “reinscribes their power to define the word” (Smith, 1998: 14). Thus, L. T. Smith (1998: 15-18) claims that postcolonial critique, on the one hand, marks “the moment where the political and cultural experience of the marginalized periphery took a well-structured position that could be set against the political, intellectual and academic dominance of the West”. A Young argues (2001: 10), postcolonial critique includes the “political and theoretical practices” of the colonial past and today’s practices that “seek to contest the legacies of that past”. Postcolonial critique focuses on “oppression and coercive domination that operate in the contemporary world: the politics of anti-colonialism and neocolonialism, race, gender, the role of religious and culture in nationalisms, class and ethnicities define its terrain” (ibid.: 11). Postcolonial theory operates in a dilemma that “the intellectual and cultural traditions developed outside the West constitute a body of knowledge that can be deployed to great effect against the political and cultural hegemony of the West” (ibid., 65). Therefore, as Young (ibid.) points out, postcolonial critique is “designed to undo the ideological heritage of colonialism not only in the decolonized countries, but also in the West itself”.

Postcolonial critique has been “increasingly preoccupied in investigating the complicity of a large part of Western culture in the attitudes” and “values underpinning the process of expansion overseas” (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 8). Attention is now being dedicated to “consideration of the interconnections between empire and literary production in the whole periods and movements” (ibid.). Postcolonial critics have “worked to break down the formerly fixed boundaries between the text and the context in order to show the continuities between patterns of representation of subject peoples and the material practices of the neocolonial powers” (ibid.). Postcolonial criticism forms “a part of critique of European civilization and culture from the perspective of the cultures” of the postcolonial world (Young, 2001: 66). Young (ibid.) claims that “for the cultures seeking to remove themselves from the history of imperial dominance”, postcolonial theory uses and strengthens “the resources of histories and political and intellectual traditions of European civilizations”. Therefore, postcolonial theory is criticized for being thoroughly complicit in the character and operations of the current neocolonial order rather than representing a radical or liberatory form of cultural practice (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 153). In other words, the postcolonial theory is accused of strengthening contemporary forms of Western hegemony.

Critics of the postcolonial theory argue that postcolonial theory is too much tied to Eurocentric ideas, lacks a political vision, pays inadequate attention to history, and is far more preoccupied with problems and debates in the metropolitan academia than the realities of the colonized countries. Aijaz Ahmad claims that postcolonial theorists ignore the history and the struggle for survival of colonized peoples and he states (1995: 12-13):

[W]ithin this context, speaking with virtually mindless pleasure of transnational cultural hybridity, and politics of contingency, amounts, in effect, to endorsing the cultural claims of transnational capital itself. [...] [I]t is not at all clear how the celebration of a postcolonial, transnational, electronically produced cultural hybridity is to be squared with the systematic decay of countries and continents, and with decreasing chances for substantial proportions of the global population to obtain conditions of bare survival, let alone electronic literacy and gadgetry .

In this sense, Ahmad is examining politics linked to postcolonial theory and the deficiencies in highly valorized concepts that are developed by postcolonial theorists (1995: 1-20). Bush (2006: 59) argues that the discourse of imperialism “was (and still is) expressed through tangible forms of power”. Ahmad (1995) stresses that by prioritizing culture, postcolonialism ignores the material impact of imperialism and the reality of people’s oppression. A similar point is made by Anne McClintock (1996: 296), who argues that “we may be in a postcolonial, but not a post-imperial age”; this is because, for people in many parts of the world, there is “no postcolonial condition”⁵⁶. An emphasis on an “undifferentiated postcoloniality” had turned the attention away from the continued dominance of Western capitalism and neutralized the historical break implied by the term postcolonial (ibid.). In this regard, McClintock (ibid., 292-293) claims that postcolonial theory does not distinguish “adequately between the different experiences of colonialism”. McClintock further asserts that, “the singularity of the term effects a re-centering of global history around the single rubric of European time” and, “colonialism returns at the moment of its disappearance” (ibid., 293).

Moore-Gilbert (1997: 153) claims that postcolonial critics also sometimes see the postcolonial theory as a practice that “appropriates the cultural production of the Third World, and refines it as a commodity for the consumption of a metropolitan elite, while allowing

⁵⁶ Today, in the cases of Palestinians, Aboriginal Australians, Native Americans, some forms of colonial relationship still exist.

some to trickle back for the edification of the national-bourgeois elites in the non-Western World". From this perspective, its practitioners are represented as intermediaries between the West and the non-West "who participate in the acculturation of the latter to the values and cultural norms of the dominant order" (ibid.). As Dirlik points out, postcolonialism, which appears to criticize the universalist pretensions of Western knowledge systems, "starts off with a repudiation of the universalistic pretensions", and "ends up not with its dispersion into local vernaculars but returning itself to another First World language with universalistic epistemological pretensions" (Dirlik, 1994: 342). This view enables one to locate the "postcolonial criticism in the contemporary First World" (ibid.). Dirlik sees postcoloniality as "a discourse that seeks to constitute the world in the self-image of who view themselves as postcolonial intellectuals" (ibid., 339).⁵⁷

Ahmad sees postcolonial theory "not as politically radical or even correct, but as deeply conservative in its ideas and effects" (Moore-Gilbert, 1997: 17). Ahmad (1992, 1995) even suggests that through postcolonial theory, the authority of the West over the formerly imperialized parts of the globe is currently being reestablished within a neocolonial world order and that can be understood as a new expression of the West's historical motivation to power over the rest of the world. In Ahmad's view, postcolonial theorists "reproduce within the academic sphere the contemporary international division of labour authorized by global capitalism" (1992: 93-94). He argues, "[T]he East, reborn and greatly expanded now as a "Third World", seems to have become, yet again, a career – even for the "Oriental" this time, and with the "Occident" too" (ibid., 94). In this context, one may claim that postcolonial critics question whether or not these binary divisions (such as the colonizer/colonized, Orient/Occident, East/West or North/South) of postcolonial theory are formed and stress that postcoloniality reconstitutes these binary divisions, instead of regarding them as a hidden agenda of a continued neocolonial domination.

Postcolonial critics also draw attention to the "inability of postcolonialism to address the issues economic power and social class" (McLeod, 2000: 255).⁵⁸ It is argued that

⁵⁷ "The postcolonial as a description mystifies both politically and methodologically a situation that represents not the abolition but the reconfiguration of earlier forms of domination" (Dirlik, 1994: 331). Ahmad also sees the term postcolonial as a "late-coming twin of that earlier colonial discourse" (1995: 1-2). For Juan, "postcolonialism is guilty of what it claims to repudiate: mystification and moralism" (2007:100).

⁵⁸ The inseparable relationship between colonialism and the expansion of Western capitalism and imperialism is mentioned before. One can claim that neither local nor global structures or nations can be thought about seriously without considering how they are shaped by the economic system. To ignore the economic dimension

postcolonial theory is missing “any historicized analysis of capital accumulation and crisis” (Persram, 2007: xxii). According to some analysts such as Dirlik, Ahmad, Young, McCintock, postcolonialism provides the requirements of Western capitalism in the present world just as colonialism provides capitalism in early times. Ahmad points out that the economic and social situation in some of the poorer nations of the world today reflects the chances of many countries with a history of colonialism (1995: 7).

[T]here have been other countries – such as Turkey which has not *been* colonized, or Iran and Egypt, whose occupation had not led to colonization of the kind that India suffered – where the onset of capitalist modernity and their incorporation in the world capitalist system brought about state apparatuses as well as social and cultural configurations that were, nevertheless, remarkably similar to the ones in India, which *was* fully colonized. In this context, we should speak not so much of colonialism and postcolonialism but of capitalist modernity, which takes the colonial form in particular places and at particular times. [emphasis original]

In his works, Ahmad criticizes “the capitalist modernity as having nothing to say about the contemporary global economic conditions, which can be described as neo-colonial” (1996:6). For Ahmad, postcolonial theory is entirely complicit with the globalizing, transnational tendencies of contemporary capitalism (ibid., 7-10). It does not criticize “the advancement of global capitalism” (ibid., 10-16), and it also “discredits the critiques such as Marxism” (1992: 4-7). Ahmad also argues that “postcoloniality is also, like most things, a matter of class”, however, “issues of class generally remain absent from the agendas of postcolonial theory” (1995: 16). Ahmad argues that the “globalized condition of postcoloniality” can be best described as postcolonial critique but it is not “fixed as a determinate structure of power against which determinate forms of struggle” (ibid, 9). Arif Dirlik (1994: 331) also makes similar claims to those of Ahmad:

The complicity of postcolonial in hegemony lies in postcolonialism's diversion of attention from contemporary problems of social, political, and cultural domination, and in its obfuscation of its

of the global order is to construct what Dirlik calls a “shapeless” world that is more or less postcolonial: “Postcolonial critics have engaged in valid criticism of past forms of ideological hegemony but have had little to say about its contemporary figurations. Indeed, in their simultaneous repudiation of structure and affirmation of the local in problems of oppression and liberation, they have mystified the ways in which totalizing structures persist in the midst of apparent disintegration and fluidity. They have rendered into problems of subjectivity and epistemology concrete and material problems of the everyday world. While capital in its motions continues to structure the world, refusing it foundational status renders impossible the cognitive mapping that must be the point of departure for any practice of resistance [...]” (Dirlik, 1994: 356).

own relationship to what is but a condition of its emergence, that is, to a global capitalism that, however fragmented in appearance, serves as the structuring principle of global relations.

Dirlik (1995: 353) argues that it is not just that postcolonialism originates in Western theoretical discourse; but also that it offers “no ways of critiquing global capitalism, and spreads its theoretical assertions throughout the academic world along the same neocolonial, transnational routes as global capitalism”. He points out: “postcoloniality is designed to *avoid* making sense of the current crisis and, in the process, to cover up the origins of postcolonial intellectuals in a global capitalism of which they are not so much victims as beneficiaries” (ibid.) (emphasis original). Dirlik views “postcoloniality as the condition of the intelligentsia of global capitalism” and hopes that the postcolonial intelligentsia “can generate a thoroughgoing criticism of its own ideology and formulate practices of resistance against the system of which it is a product” (ibid., 356).

In sum, it can be claimed that postcolonial critique emerges from one of the founding moments of postcolonial studies – “the history of revolutionary and/or nationalist anti-colonial movements and the deepening the theoretical elements of works of Said, Spivak, Bhabha, Fanon” (Persram, 2007: xxii), amongst others. Its “inherent criticism” is that despite the huge influence of Marxism and socialism, postcolonial studies “neglect class” (ibid.), capital accumulation and global capitalism. In this sense, as Persram (2007: xxii) argues, postcolonialism is charged with becoming a “synonym” or a “substitute for globalization”. Moreover, for postcolonial critics, postcolonial theory is serving to “recolonize the postcolonial world by re-incorporating its agendas into metropolitan academic concerns” (Ashcroft *et.al.*, 1998: 203). In this context, one may argue that postcolonial theory has to make a critique of the discourses of democratization, civil society and development to demonstrate how they aid the structural inequality of the world system. Moreover, with these critiques in mind, it can be stressed that the practices of postcolonial texts should be reread.

In the modern era, one may argue that postcolonial theory creates a new division similar to the one between the East and the West, this time increasingly named as “the North and South”. The West has been constructed as “a model and measure of the social progress for the world as a whole” (Slater, 2004: 9). According to Slater (ibid.), this East-West binary has been much more an imaginary thinking than a fact of geography (primary identity of the West and the secondary identity of the non-West). The non-Western societies have been

colonized “by a Western imagination that frames and represents their meaning as part of a project of rule” and expansionism is “justified in relation to a civilizing mission” (ibid., 9,38). Today, in the postcolonial era, it can be claimed that “the old divisions between the colonizer and the colonized have re-emerged in what is often referred to as the North-South relationship” (Said, 1993: 14).⁵⁹ It is argued that although the Western powers (the European i.e.) may have “physically left their old colonies in Asia and Africa”, they hold on to them not only as “markets but as locales on the ideological map over which they continued to rule morally and intellectually” (Said, 1993: 27). Today, the Western cultural forms can be taken out of the “autonomous enclosures in which they have been protected, and placed in the dynamic global environment created by imperialism” (ibid., 59).

For Hobson (2014: 131), the disintegration of the Soviet Union opened the way for the “reassertion of Western civilisational pride across the world”. In this context, “the Rest would gloriously be remade in the image of the West” (ibid.). Spivak (1999: 199-200) claims that in the postcolonial world, the European restores itself as a sovereign subject through defining its other by a “vague proper name – global South”. Moreover, the European further claims that it is the advocate of “social progress” in which “representative democracy, free markets, private property and individual liberty and responsibility are preconditions for civilization (Sheppard and Nagar, 2004: 558). In this context, one can assert that imperialism modified itself in the North and South relations – the metropolis and the periphery – whereas these relations can be characterized by asymmetrical power.

It is clear that a North-South divide emerges in the context of the new world order. While the North tends to stress “phenomena of speed and the dissolution of spatial borders”, emphasizing the positive potential of globalization, by contrast, the South is far more negative in its “diagnosis of globalization”, regarding itself as an “object of recolonization and global apartheid” (Slater, 2004: 171). For Spivak (1999: 6), in this new division, the North continues “ostensibly to aid the South” in order to keep the problems of the South away from itself. In the postcolonial period, Western writing on the societies of the global South associates the facts with that of societal chaos (Slater, 2004: 197). Huntington, for example, “in discussing

⁵⁹ Dirlik claims that “it may not be accidental that the North-South distinction has gradually taken over from the earlier division of the world, if one remembers that the references of North and South are not merely to concrete geographic locations but are also metaphorical” (1994: 351). According to Dirlik, the “North connotes the path – ways of transnational capital, and South, the marginalized populations of the world, regardless of their location – which is where postcoloniality comes in” (ibid.).

contemporary threats to civilization, notes that law and order in much of the world – Africa, Latin America, the former Soviet Union, South Asia and the Middle East – appears to be evaporating while the world as a whole would seem to be heading towards global Dark Ages” (1997: 321). In other texts, “the Third World or South is represented in terms of a perilous frontier land, or as the setting for the emergence of new wild zones in an increasingly dangerous world” (Slater, 2004: 197-198). This is also prevalent in the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations. One may claim that while the EU discourse presents itself as a zone of peace, it presents the Southern Mediterranean area as a zone of conflict that should be contained (Cebeci, 2006). The Mediterranean is seen as a region to be contained in order to secure the interests of the Union, based on the belief that “the zone of conflict can penetrate in to the zone of peace” (Buzan, 2000, 10-11) “through illegal immigration, terrorism, organised crime, etc.” (Cebeci, 2006: 5). In this context, when one looks at the relations between the EU and the SEMP, with the actual complexity and the diversity of European colonial legacy in the Mediterranean, he/she may see the ongoing neocolonial tendencies of the Union. In a sense, the relations between the EU and the SEMP can be considered as a continuation of the neocolonialism.

Therefore, this study searches for these neocolonial tendencies when it makes an analysis of the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean in the postcolonial era. Although postcolonialism is a wider concept than neocolonialism, in this study, neocolonialism is a more appropriate term to use in analyzing the EU’s relations with its neighbourhood because this term provides room for explaining the asymmetrical relations between the EU and the countries in its neighbourhood. This study claims that today although the formal imperial powers no longer exist, powers such as the EU have neocolonial tendencies especially in their neighbourhood. Just like imperialism had been essential in legitimizing its rule over the countries, today the EU is trying to project its integration model, its values and its own understanding of norms – as “the normal way” that has to be followed – to the world, especially to its neighbourhood. This is partly because it seeks to have considerable presence in international relations and partly because it aims to promote its interests. Therefore, by exporting regional integration as a prescription for peace and prosperity to its neighbourhood, the EU is, in a sense, trying to stabilize and gain control over target countries of regions. The EU’s projection of its values can be considered as a new Western style of domination and a civilizing mission based on the assumption that the EU’s model gives it the (legitimacy) authority to define what constitutes the best practices with

regard to region-building, protection and promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.⁶⁰ However the content of this projection's normativity, as one can see below, is very questionable. In the next section, the theoretical background of region-building is presented to provide basis on which the EU's normativity can be scrutinized.

1.3. The region-building approach: A form of neocolonialism?

Tassinari (2005: 11) argues that the emergence of the European Communities can be regarded as an "elaborated and sophisticated" form of region-building. Regionalism has also constituted a remarkable feature of the EU's policies regarding its neighbourhood over the years, as it is encouraging its partners to follow the Unions's own integration model. Regional cooperation is defined as a key aspect of the EU's identity and an objective of its external policy. The EU tries to promote its model of Western integration in its neighbourhood with an attitude of "one-size-fits-all and best" approach (Bicchi, 2006). This value projection takes place in an asymmetrical manner and can be regarded as the tool for the new Western style of domination. Before analyzing this strategic goal of region-building in the Mediterranean in the subsequent chapter, it is important to review the concepts relating to region-building first: region, regionalism and regionalization.

1.3.1. Region, regionalism and regionalization: A conceptual overview

Definitions of regions, regionalism and regionalization have long presented difficulties to scholars. The terms are not fixed and have been subject to multiple interpretations. History can be useful here to show how the vocabulary of regionalism has changed and evolved. According to Fawcett (2005: 23-24), "older ideas of geographically defined regions and state-based regionalisms have given way to more fluid and expansive understandings that aim to capture the new nature and the extent of regional domains, in which states compete with a long of other actors for command of regional spaces and policies". Today, understanding regions and regionalism needs to have a degree of flexible definitions.

In the IR literature, no standard definition of "region" exists. The concept of region stems from the Latin word "regio" which means direction and the Latin verb "regere" that

⁶⁰ For a similar view see Cebeci, 2012 and 2017.

means “to rule or to command a border or a delimited space”, often a province (Söderbaum, 2003: 5). For (Söderbaum (2003: 6-7),

Many disciplines and discourses have maintained a strong emphasis on territory and rule in the study of definition of regions that has resulted in a considerable degree of research capacity being devoted to determining what types of regions are the most functional, instrumental and efficient (to rule). Often, especially in political science and economics, regions have often been taken as *ipso facto* or (pre)-given, defined in advance of research, and simply seen as particular inter-state frameworks and intergovernmental regional organizations.

The concept of region has usually been “thought of in geographic terms as natural, real entity” (Pace, 2006: 26). A general understanding of region is often interpreted as “subsystems of states linked by geographical relationship, mutual interdependence and subjective perception of belonging to a distinctive community” (ibid., 27).⁶¹ With regard to region, a simple territorial definition may not be useful when studying regionalism, especially new regionalism. Therefore one needs to “refine regions to incorporate commonality, interaction and hence the possibility of cooperation” (Fawcett, 2004; 432; 2005: 24). For Holsti (1998: 142), one view is to see the regions as “units” or “zones” based on groups, states and territories, whose members share some political values and practices as well as have high level of interaction. As Hettne (2005: 269-270) points out, “regions are not simply geographical or administrative objects, but should be conceived of as subjects in the making (or-unmaking); their internal cohesion as well as their boundaries are as shifting, and so their capacity as actors”.

⁶¹ The generic “region” has been historically defined “first and foremost as a space between the national and the local (municipality), primarily within particular states” (Söderbaum, 2003: 6). “These types of region can be referred as micro-regions, and they can exist within a particular state or be cross-border in nature. The concept of region can also refer to macro-regions (world region) that are larger territorial (in contrast to non-territorial) units or sub-systems, between the state and global system level. Finally, between the two levels there are meso-regions; mid-range state or non-state arrangements and process” (ibid.). “The large majority of studies of regionalism in the field have been concerned with the macro-regions rather than meso- and micro-regions” (Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003: 219). “In the past, sharp distinctions have been made between micro- and macro-regions. But if regions are made up by actors other than states alone, and if even state boundaries are becoming more fluid, then it also becomes more difficult to uphold old distinctions between micro- and macro-regions. What is particularly important to acknowledge is that the various spaces are intimately connected; the latter can trigger reactions and responses at the former scale (or vice versa)” (ibid.).

According to the constructivist approach, regions come to life as we talk and think about them (Hettne, 2003: 27). Regions are always evolving and changing.⁶² From this perspective, a region can be understood as a process and as a social construction: Like a nation it is an “imagined community”⁶³ (Anderson, 1983; Neumann, 2003), and like a nation it has a territorial base (Hettne, 2003: 28). As Hurrell argues “all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested” (1995: 334). The constructivist literature on regions as security complexes also show that the “regional” constitutes a “distinct level of analysis” in international relations, situated between the local and the global (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 27).⁶⁴ Still, the extensive conceptual discussion provided by political geography on the definition of the “region” in the sub-national sense of the word, does not have an equivalent in international terms (Postel-Vinay, 2007: 557).

Theorists of new regionalism generally emphasize that “regions must not be taken for granted” and they are not “objective, essential or simply material objects” (Söderbaum, 2003: 7). This study shares a similar view and argues that the Mediterranean as a region is not natural or given but it is politically constructed by particular interests of external powers, namely the West and the European Union. Although the Mediterranean region politically and institutionally does not exist, it is constructed by the European Union mainly through the Union’s region-building practices in order to stabilize its South and Eastern Mediterranean.

Regional cooperation can be seen as an instrument for peace, democracy and stability and also as an instrument to rule. When policy makers believe that cooperation will enhance economic opportunities, they will probably engage in regional arrangements for particular purposes but they tend to disregard the rest (Schulz and Schulz, 2005: 201). Therefore, those initiatives regarding peace, democracy and stability may remain insignificant especially in

⁶² According to Katzenstein (1996: 125), regional designations are no more real in terms of geography than they are natural in terms of culture, and therefore geography is not destiny. As products of culture and economics, history and politics, geographically defined regions change over time (ibid.). Katzenstein defines a region “as a set of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimensions. This is often, but not always, indicated by a flow of socio-economic transactions and communications and high political salience that differentiates a group of countries from others” (ibid., 133).

⁶³ Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1983: 6). It is imagined because even though members of a community can hardly meet most of the other members, they still retain the mental image of their communion (ibid.). “A more traditional example of an imagined community is a nation-state, whose size generally prevents citizens from knowing each other in person. For this type of community, common identities and values are essential because ties between members cannot be based on face-to-face interactions” (Tusicsny, 2007: 427).

⁶⁴ Buzan and Waever define regions as a composition of “geographically clustered set of units”, where these “clusters are embedded in a larger system, which has a structure of its own” (2003: 27).

authoritarian regimes calculations about the benefits of regional cooperation. Those governments, which assume that negotiations for building good-neighbourly relationships, economic ties, knowledge transfer and policy coordination are the most preferable tools to cope with problems broadly caused by new global trends will tend to cooperate (Attina, 2003: 183).⁶⁵ The European Union aims to stabilize its South and Eastern Mediterranean, for bringing peace and stability to the region through conditionality on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and pursues an approach based on promoting regional cooperation and broad partnerships (regionalism). Furthermore, it does not only support intra-regional cooperation but it also attempts to establish inter-regional relations – between Europe and the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, these attempts are not solely value-driven. They are also the result of a rational calculation on the part of the EU and its member states, which also claim to meet their own interests. Supporting regional developments is also another tool for the EU both to stabilize the region and to pursue its own interests.

The process of regional development is often discussed with reference to two dimensions: “regionalism”, which proceeds top-down and is driven by national elites, and “regionalization”, which seen as a bottom-up expression of previously unresponsive identity and cultural similarity (Keskitalo, 2007: 187-188). There are different definitions of a region, and moreover, there are “many contrasting and not always compatible definitions and conceptualizations” of regionalism and regionalization (Söderbaum, 2003: 7). Therefore, as Söderbaum points out “it is not possible to come up with definitions that all theorists subscribe to” (ibid.).⁶⁶ However, for analytical purposes a general distinction can be made

⁶⁵ Uvalic (2002: 321) identifies a number of important and positive outcomes from processes of regional cooperation. “For instance, most of these initiatives have facilitated communication between participating countries, stimulating political dialogues and promoting the resolution of political and economic differences. They have contributed to cooperation in a number of areas, helping countries develop trust and confidence with other participating members (ibid.)”. Finally, “regional cooperation agreements have provided a framework for launching cross-border regional projects in important sectors such as infrastructure, transport, energy, and the environment” (ibid., 321-324). For weaker states, “regionalism has provided a point of entry into a Western-dominated order, in which their interests are often perceived as marginalized and also a forum where interaction and agenda-setting are possible” (Fawcett, 2004: 439; 2005: 30). Despite the types of success mentioned above, “regional cooperation initiatives are frequently criticized either because they have had little impact in key areas such as regional stability and intra-regional trade growth, or because, notwithstanding ambitious plans and declarations, concrete forms of cooperation fail to be implemented” (Uvalic, 2002: 324).

⁶⁶ For example, on the one hand, Gamble and Payne (2003: 47-48) define “regionalism as a states-led project, whereas regionalization is seen mainly as a societal and a non-state process”. On the other hand, Bøås, Marchand and Shaw argue that “regionalism is clearly a political project, but it is obviously not necessarily state-led, as the states are not the only political actor around [...] we clearly believe that, each regional project (official or not), several competing regionalizing actors with different regional visions and ideas coexist” (2003: 201). According to Rosamond, where regionalism describes state-led projects of institution building among groups of countries, regionalization is a term used to capture the emergence of a de facto regional economy, forced by the cross-border activities of economic actors, particularly firms (2003: 123).

between regionalism and regionalization. This study looks into various definitions of regionalism and regionalization with a view to pointing out the differences and similarities between these concepts so that what the EU does in its southern neighbourhood can be better understood. These terms can sometimes be confused and be used interchangeably. Therefore, in order to clarify these concepts, this study will now analyze the details of both concepts.

If regionalism is a policy or project, regionalization is “first and foremost” a process (Fawcett, 2005: 25). Regionalism refers to a programme, an ideology, “to a set of goals and values associated with a specific project” whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region (Hveem, 2003: 83). The aim of regionalism “is to pursue and promote common goals in one or more issue areas” (Fawcett, 2005: 24). Fawcett analyzes regionalism in two distinct categories: soft regionalism and hard regionalism. In his view, by consolidating regional groups and networks, soft regionalism promotes “a sense of regional awareness or community”, whereas hard regionalism forms “sub-regional groups” by using interstate arrangements and organizations (Fawcett, 2004: 433). Fawcett (2005: 25) argues that the relationship between the two is complex: “hard regionalism can precede or flow from soft regionalism”. Regionalism can thus be regarded as a policy and project that can operate both above and below the state level.

Uvalic (2002: 326) claims that regionalism can be generally defined as “a tendency towards some form of preferential trading arrangement between a group of countries belonging possibly to a particular region”. He further admits that “since economic cooperation and trade agreements are usually backed by important political motives and objectives”, regionalism also has a much broader meaning (ibid., 326-327). According to conventional economic theory, preferential regional agreements between the countries play a key role in the economic improvement of concerning countries (Hveem, 2003: 85). However, it is not always the case. The countries in a particular region may choose not to cooperate because of the political hostilities among them as in the case of Arab-Israel conflict. Moreover, as one can see in cases of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, the disintegration of countries can block possible forms of cooperation.

When one deals with the issue of regionalism, he/she can see that “definitional ambiguities are a striking characteristic” of the concept (Katzenstein, 1996: 129). Katzenstein (ibid., 134) argues that “regionalism is best captured by a perspective that combines both sets

of relationships within and beyond the region”.⁶⁷ Regionalism is often analyzed in terms of “social cohesiveness” (ethnicity, race, culture, religion, history, consciousness of a common heritage), “economic cohesiveness” (trade patterns, economic complementarity), “political cohesiveness” (regime type, ideology) and “organizational cohesiveness” (existence of formal institutions) (Hurrell, 1995: 333). The range of factors that can be “implicated in the growth of regionalism is very wide and includes economic, social, political, cultural and historic dimensions” (ibid.). Contemporary debates remind one that there are no natural regions, and “definitions of region and indicators of regionness vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation” (ibid., 333-334). Telo (2007: 109) claims that “a natural regional dimension evolved with the development of civilizations, trade, and increased economic and cultural exchanges between nearby countries”. In this context, one may claim that examples of this regionness include the Mediterranean area.

1990s and early 2000s have witnessed a renewed interest in regions and regionalism. When analysts tried to build a coherent classification of the complex phenomenon of regionalism, they paid attention to two dimensions: (1) the chronological one and (2) the qualitative one. It is also common in academic literature to mix a primarily chronological approach (identifying several successive “waves” of regionalism) with a qualitative one (making the difference between “old” and “new” regionalism) (Langenhove and Costea: 2004: 2). From a chronological perspective, some authors distinguish two waves of regionalism (old and new), “taking into account only the regional agreements developed world-wide after the end of the Second World War”, “while other authors see three distinct periods of regionalism, by including also the experiments carried out between the two World Wars” (Langenhove and Costea, ibid.).⁶⁸ The difference between “old” and “new” originates from the idea that it is “a qualitatively new phenomenon” (ibid., 3).

⁶⁷ Falk makes a distinction between positive and negative regionalism. “Positive regionalism refers to desired objectives such as the reduction of political violence, the attainment of economic well-being, the promotion of human rights and benevolent governance, the protection of ecological diversity, the safeguarding of health and renewable resources. Negative refers to the negation of these goals by warfare, poverty, racism, ecological decay, oppression, chaos, criminality. In the life-world positive and negative aspects are intertwined, and a given set of conditions associated with global market forces or authoritarian government may generate positive as well as negative outcomes” (Falk, 2003: 69-70).

⁶⁸ Langenhove and Costea (2004: 3) point out that in order to better grasp the complexity of regionalism one could speak of “generations rather than waves” that helps “underlining the coexistence of several kinds of regional agreements different in quality/content, while also acknowledging that some forms of regionalism build upon previous ones”. They state that “the first generation of regionalism is based upon the idea of a linear process of economic integration involving the combination of separate (national) economies into larger economic regions” (ibid.). The development of the political dimension of integration is the main characteristic of “second generation” regionalism, which coincides with what is generally referred to as “new regionalism”: a

Old regionalism and new regionalism are usually distinguished “by referring to waves or generations of regionalism” (Söderbaum, 2003: 3). The first wave had its roots in the “devastating experience of inter-war nationalism and the Second World War” (ibid.). It appeared in Western Europe in the late 1940s and exported to several other regions in the South, but it vanished in the late 1960s and early 1970s (ibid., 3-4).⁶⁹ “The second wave began to emerge in the mid-1980s, again starting in Western Europe, and gradually turning into a more widespread of phenomenon” (ibid., 4).

The new regionalism is based on the idea that “one cannot isolate trade and economy from the rest of society: integration can also imply non-economic matters such as justice, security and culture” (Langenhove and Costea, 2004: 5). When one compares the regionalism in the 1960s with today’s regionalism, it can be seen that “today’s regionalism is not only emerging more or less all over the world, but it is often taking different shapes in different parts of the world” (ibid.). For Hettne (2003: 26), “whereas the old regionalism was generally specific with regard to the objectives and content, and (often) had a narrow focus on preferential trade arrangements and security alliances, the number, scope and diversity of new regionalism has grown significantly” in recent years. In short, as Söderbaum claims, the new regionalism is both “global and pluralistic”, compared to the old regionalism, which was “Eurocentric and narrow” (2003: 4). New regionalism has emerged principally as a “states-led project” in the context of global transformation, and is distinguished from the “old regionalism”, which is based on “protectionism, sealed internal markets and security communities”, “by an openness to global capitalism and by the porosity of the emergent regionalist formations” (Grugel, 2004: 605). For Grugel, although the new regionalism can best be understood as an attempt at “regulation or regional governance”, the projects of

“multidimensional form of integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects and thus goes far beyond the goal of creating region-based free trade regimes or security alliances” (ibid., 5).

⁶⁹ The old regionalists identified two reasons for the awakening interest in regions; these themes tie the old to the new regionalism, which came to life again in the 1990s (Kelly, 2007: 202). First, decolonization brought a wave of new states into international politics and the UN. Fragmentation of the system continued in the 1970s with the Third Worldism of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). As exemplified notably by the Arab states in OPEC, which raised oil prices in response to the Arab-Israel war of 1972, regionalism became a “Southern” movement to protect recent independence, nonalignment, and resist overlay (ibid.). Second, the European Community (EC) generated enormous interest in regional integration. The EC (now the European Union) has served as a model for other regional integration efforts and frequently motivates regional theorizing in IR. Decolonization and EC integration generated interest in regional subsystems and regional integration, especially as a means for producing regional order, and created the notion of regions as “subsystems” (ibid.). The subsystem, which shares structural characteristics with the international one, is a new level of analysis, one between the individual state and the international level (ibid., 203).

governance that new regionalism encompasses are not identical (ibid., 606). The new regionalism is not limited with formal inter-state regional organizations and institutions. On the contrary, “the new regionalism is characterized by its multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and it involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions” (Söderbaum, 2003: 1-2). Therefore, Söderbaum (ibid., 2) claims that one can speak of regionalism in the plural forms rather than the singular.

In the new regionalism approach, as Farrell (2005: 7) points out, regions are regarded not “simply as formal organizations”, or as “a given but rather understood as constructed and reconstructed in the process of global transformation”. Therefore, regions are not regarded as fixed, but are regarded as dynamic in their development and open to change and adaptation. Regionalism is regarded as a multidimensional formal process of integration “embracing economic, cultural, political and social aspects, thereby extending the understanding of regional activities beyond the creation of free trade agreements or security regimes” (Farrell, 2005: 8). In broadly positive terms, regionalism is regarded “as a good that states and non-state actors desire and encourage, and one that merits promotion by regional and international communities” (Fawcett, 2005: 21). As regionalism has a strategic goal of region-building (establishing regional coherence and identity), “the region can be understood within the framework of a territorial entity that is continually changing and adapting through regionalization processes” (Farrell, 2005:8). Farrell (ibid., 8-9) claims that the regionalism approach encompasses a normative element, and in this context, regionalism can be conceptualized both as “a general and observable phenomenon and as an ideological project – the project being the construction of a regionalist order in a specified ‘region’ or a type of world order”.

Although it is claimed that regionalism encompasses a normative element, it is questionable that regionalism is a purely normative notion. Regionalism inevitably involves neoliberal and interest-driven elements too.⁷⁰ It is also important to distinguish between regionalism as description and regionalism as prescription. In the latter case, regionalism is regarded as a normative position, as a political programme, or as a doctrine as to how international relations ought to be organized (Hurrell, 1995:334; 2005: 52). Today, regionalism

⁷⁰ See Chapter 3 for an analysis of how the EU’s regionalism in the Mediterranean covers both normative and interest-driven elements.

is represented as a prescription for peace, economic development and prosperity for the troubled areas mostly by the EU. However, regional integration and cooperation are not universal and neutral, but they reflect European norms. As Bicchi (2006: 287) argues, “the EU aims at promoting regionalism as the normal way for neighbouring countries” and considers regionalism as a norm in the sense that the EU establishes a “standard of proper behaviour” regardless of its content (with one-size-fits-all and best approach).

Regionalization, on the other hand, is the “actual process of increasing exchange, contact and coordination and so on within a given region” (Hveem, 2003: 83). This “interaction may give rise to the formations of regions and in turn to the emergence of regional actors, networks and organizations” (Fawcett, 2005: 25). In this context, although one may claim that regionalization may result from regionalism, it is not necessarily, and it is not the only way.⁷¹ Moxon-Browne (2003: 86) defines “regionalization as a process that leads to cooperation and the adoption of common rules, regulations and policies between states in a region. This process can arise out of perceptions of economic advantage or enhanced security that are based on the logic of geographical proximity”. The process is not solely economic “but must be nudged forward by conscious political decisions taken by actors who perceive the national interest as being best safeguarded in a regional setting” (ibid.). Regionalization “refers to the growth of societal integration within a region” and to the indirect processes of social, cultural, political and economic interaction, and “this is what the early writers on regionalism described as informal integration and what some contemporary analysts refer to as soft regionalism” (Hurrell, 1995: 334). For Fawcett (2005: 25), regionalization is used to refer to regional responses “to conflicts that have themselves often become regionalized: where inter and intra-state wars spill over the borders and affect and draw in neighbouring countries and actors, attracting the attention of the international community”.

Hettne (2005: 270) claims that when different processes of regionalization “intensify and converge” within the same geographical area, the cohesiveness and the distinctiveness of the region in the making enhance, and “this process of regionalization can in general terms be described in terms of levels of ‘regionness’ – i.e. successive orders of regional space, system, society and community and institutionalized polity”. In his view, “increasing regionness

⁷¹ “Regionalism may fail to produce the results it intends. Moreover, regionalization – as increased emphasis on organizing cross-border transactions within a region – may be intended not as an end, but as a means to an end. The end may be the global market and the region may serve as a stepping-stone to it, as an adjustment to and preparation for globalization” (Hveem, 2003: 83-84).

implies that a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject – an actor – increasingly capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region” (Hettne, 2005: 270). In terms of regional coherence and identity, “the level of regionness defines the position of a particular region or regional system” (Hettne, 2003: 28). Hettne (2005: 270) further asserts that the political ideology of the regionalist project is to establish “regional cohesion” and “identity”. On the other hand, there are some analysts who take regionalism and regionalization as closely linked due to their normative element. Kelly defines regionalization “as a means for engaging in conflict resolution and resistance to global threats” (2007: 212). In his view, regionalism is not simply “an analytical approach”, but a normative, “order-bringing project”, which can be named as “regionalization” (ibid., 203). For Kelly (ibid., 213) peaceful order can be achieved by re-conceptualizing regionalism as regionalization and cooperation.

Whether in terms of regionalism or regionalization, regional integration and cooperation are usually seen to enhance peace, prevent conflict and promote cross-border problem-solving, and moreover, in this context, the EU sees itself as a model for the rest of the world, in particular “as the ultimate expression of conflict resolution by economic means” (Söderbaum, et. al., 2005: 369-370). The EU’s attempts to promote “interregionalism”⁷² can at least partly be explained by a self-image that leads it to ‘give’ the EU to a world “hungry for its presence” (Söderbaum, et.al. ibid., 371). In this sense, it can be claimed that reproducing Union’s image implies promoting region-building around the world. One can further assert that by using region-building and regionalism, the Union can strengthen its identity as a global actor. The EU tries to promote its integration model as the norm for region-building to the rest of the world, especially to its neighbourhood. As mentioned before, regionalism has a strategic goal of region-building, and this object can be regarded as politically programmed process. Since its inception of the EC (European Community), the EU has been regarded as a successful project that brings peace and prosperity to Europe, and it tries to export its own security-building model. Therefore, before investigating of the Union’s attempts to construct the Mediterranean as a region, it will be useful to make a brief analysis of the region-building approach.

⁷² Relations are region-to-region and can be understood as interregionalism.

1.3.2. Region-building

After the Second World War, state building came to the fore as a way of creating states built on the Western, modern, liberal democratic model. Moreover, states were also created in such a way to sustain the influence of the former colonial powers. When one looks at the EU's policies over the Mediterranean, she/he may claim that the post-1945 state-building mentality is replaced by a region-building mentality. In this context, the region-building approach can be seen as a tool not only for achieving regional cooperation but also for sustaining the EU's, and thus, the former colonial powers' influence in the Mediterranean region.

In 1994, Neumann published his influential article *A Region-Building Approach*. With this article, Neumann introduced the region-building approach to the field of IR. In his article, Neumann brings to light the role of political actors in the process of region-building (Neumann, 2003: 160-178). Region-building approach shows that how a region develops is not a given, but a choice made on specific historical and political grounds (ibid., 163-165). This is an approach that has been applied especially for the Baltics. Region-building focuses on the constructed, not the given, nature of regions and on the role of power/knowledge nexus in this construction (Neumann, 2003). The process of region-building (or region construction) “is linked to the politics of identity and discourse analysis: regions are formed through process of discursive practices that incorporate an ‘other’” (Pace, 2006: 38). Discourse is an important means of region formation because the regions are first constituted through language (Keskitalo, 2007: 188).⁷³ One may claim that region-building approach is significant with regard to culture and images of the self and the other. The ideational factors such as the emphasis on similarities between neighbours or creating transnational spheres are seen as crucial factors in building regions.

Keskitalo (ibid.) stresses that region-building approach also shows the path “in which people and geography are imagined as forming a unit or are defined by certain, often historically developed, characteristics or connotations that actors draw upon”. In this context, one may claim that a region, like imagined communities, is developed as the result of the

⁷³ “The region-building approach draws upon Foucauldian discourse analysis in placing the focus on how unequal power supported by different historically developed practices may create specific ways of conceiving, for instance, a region or geographical area” (Keskitalo, 2007:188).

efforts of different capable political actors. According to Spivak (1999: 243), if she wants “to imagine a fictive nation or region”, she can “give it an invented name and can isolate away some certain number of features and deliberately form a system”. In this sense, this region-building approach reminds colonial powers’ standard of civilization. It can be claimed that the EU, by using region-building approach, aims at establishing a “standard of proper behaviour” (Bicchi, 2006b: 287) in the South and Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, it can be argued that by promoting its model of regional integration, the EU takes on a civilizing role in its neighbourhood countries. Therefore, by exporting region-building as a prescription for peace and prosperity, the EU is, in a sense, trying to stabilize and gain control over the South and Eastern Mediterranean.

For Jones (2006: 416), region-building entails “the maintenance and construction of geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional, and cultural boundaries”. In this sense, Jones (ibid., 417) asserts that region building requires changes in political organization and in structures of meaning, which is “the development and redefinition of political ideas, common visions and purposes, codes of meaning, causal beliefs, and world views that give direction and meaning to capabilities and capacities”. Therefore, Pace (2006: 39) claims that the construction of a nation or region “is constantly produced and reproduced in social and institutional practices, including school education and media broadcasting, to which people are connected in their daily lives”.

Pace (ibid.) further claims that “boundaries play a crucial role in the construction of national and regional consciousness in that they attach the social distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ to the spatial ones between ‘here’ and ‘there’”. Thus regions can be constructed in response to the perception of an “other” (ibid.), and moreover, in this context, any identity, whether of a state or social group or entity, “is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized” (Connolly, 1991: 64).⁷⁴ For Pace (2006: 40), “when analyzing regions, one needs to acknowledge this relationality in the formation of identity (...) due to the fact that otherness is often treated as something significant only in relation to ourselves and from our perspective” (Pace, 2006. 40). For her (ibid.), the Other “is interpreted as an essential opponent when constructing the Self”.

⁷⁴ “These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in distinctness and solidity. (...) Identity requires differences in order to be, and it converts difference in otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” (Connolly, 1991: 64). See chapter 2 for an analysis of how the EU constructs the Mediterranean as its Other.

For Foucault (1980: 68), although a region is a geographical concept, it is “first of all a juridico-political” concept and refers to an area that is controlled by certain kind of powers. In this context, turning a geographical term into strategic term can be considered as “the indication of how the political, administrative and military powers can inscribe themselves on a particular soil” (Foucault, 1980: 69) Regarding this Foucauldian power/knowledge nexus one may claim that in case of the regions, it is possible to conceptualize them as military theatres or battlegrounds:

[...] certain spatial metaphors are equally geographical and strategic, which is only natural since geography is in the shadow of the military. A circulation of notions can be observed between geographical and strategic discourses. The region of the geographers is the military region (from *regere*, to command), a province is conquered territory (from *vincere*). (ibid.)

In the context of regionalism, regions are the products of identity construction in which the Self and the Other are constituted, and therefore, regions “are not natural entities but rather social constructs”, and they “function as a way of organizing the international system for political, economic or cultural reasons, a manner in which politics can be organized” (Pace, 2006: 41). Neumann claims that a region-building approach is “the application of a self/other perspective to the problematique of the literature on regions” (Neumann, 2003: 160). He further claims that “the existence of regions is preceded by the existence of region-builders. Region-builders are said to pick up specific features such as cultural, economic, geographical and/or historical ones” (ibid., 160-161). On the basis of these materials, they imagine a specific “spatial and chronological identity” for a region (Bull and Boas, 2010: 247). After deciding the relevant features; these actors disseminate their regional imagination to a maximum number of other people (Neumann, 2003: 162). Jones (2006: 427-428) argues that region-building “is designed to assist the realization of state political strategies”. Therefore, for Jones (ibid., 424), region-building involves the political assessment of the state interests and “the establishment of new ways of doing things”.

There are mainly two interdependent fundamentals in the region-building process: the ideational component (i.e. the discourse) and the material environment (Pace, 2006: 43). A region is “constructed materially and discursively in a process that is embedded within and facilitated by networks of power” (Foucault, 1980: 63-77). A region is furthermore an object

and a product of discourse (ibid.). As Neumann observes, “regions are defined in terms of speech acts; they are talked and written into existence” (2003: 162). Neumann further asserts that “cultural similarities are not politically relevant in and of themselves, but must be politically processed to become so” (ibid., 170). He (ibid.: 161) argues that “the region-building approach investigates where the interests of the region-builders are formulated, namely in discourse”. Neumann claims that where the goal of region-builder is “to make the region-building programme as natural as possible”, the approach aims to expose its “historically contingent”. According to him, “Where a region has been part of a discourse for so long that is taken as a given fact, the approach can show that structures which may at first seem to be inevitably given, will only remain so as long as they are *perceived* as inevitably” (ibid., 162) (emphasis original).

One may claim that region-building has long been a crucial goal for the EU activities. It can be argued that by bringing peace and stability to its neighbourhood, the EU wants to secure its own interests. Therefore, the region-building in the Mediterranean can be read in terms of security. Threats coming from Southern and Eastern Mediterranean are listed as illegal immigration caused by the socio-economic problems in the region, terrorism, social unrest, religious fundamentalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime and illicit drug trafficking (Cebeci, 2006: 1). Therefore, the EU, by exporting its model, tries to construct the Mediterranean as a region and engage in region-building practices to serve its strategic interests.

Jones (2006: 416) further claims that region building is now a primary goal for EU activities and therefore, it is a major objective for contemporary political actors. For Jones (2006: 416), the EU is using region building as a geopolitical tool because it is a response to globalization, it will “further the interests of dominant capital through the construction of new economic architectures”, it is “a facility for the promulgation of core beliefs and values through particular narratives”, and finally, it is “a political-administrative convenience” for the management and definition of geopolitical constructions. It can be argued that by reproducing itself in the world, the EU takes on a civilizing role in international relations. One can see the EU’s region-building attempt in the Mediterranean as part of Western style of dominating, restructuring and having influence over an area. In this context, the EU, by using the region-building approach, tries to promote a Mediterranean narrative and create a Mediterranean civilization. This civilizational thinking can be regarded as a neocolonial

behaviour of the EU. Therefore, one can argue that today, the EU is, in a way, acting as an empire and by using its diplomatic, economic and political tools, it is trying to dominate the Mediterranean through the legitimizing discourse of projecting its model and values to the Mediterranean.

Concluding Remarks

One may assert that since the Second World War, softer forms of economic, political control and cultural influence have replaced the previous forms of imperialist domination. This new system, which can be named as neocolonial, can be considered as a new (indirect) version of the old system. In order to understand the EU's approach to the Mediterranean in the postcolonial era, this chapter scrutinized the concepts of imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, and moreover, this chapter analyzed the debates on the "postcolonial".

This study claims that today although the former imperial powers no longer exist, the new powers such as the EU has neocolonial tendencies especially in their neighbourhoods. While values and norms legitimize the old colonial system, today the EU is trying to project its integration model to the world, its values and its own understanding of norms, as "the normal way" that has to be followed, especially to its neighbourhood. This is mainly because it seeks to have considerable presence in international relations and wants to seize power over its neighbourhood. The EU also sets its integration practices as a model that should be followed especially by its neighbours. One can claim that by declaring/representing itself as a model, the EU expects its neighbours to copy its model and to embrace the Union's values. This reminds one of the former colonial powers' tool of mimicry. It may be asserted that in the postcolonial era, mimicry shows itself in the EU's region-building approach to the Mediterranean. The EU tries to promote its values, norms and model in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries regardless of the needs of the locals in these countries and expect these countries to adopt them.

As the EU tries to export its own region-building model to its neighbourhood, the theoretical background of region-building was presented also in this chapter. One may claim that the region-building approach investigates where the interests of the region-builders are formulated. It can be argued that by trying to reproduce itself and by projecting peace and stability, the EU aims to secure its own interests in its Southern neighbourhood and become a

credible and an effective international actor. The EU constructs the Mediterranean region mainly based on two interrelated approaches: the civilization approach, which is concerned with constructions of self and other; and the security approach. The EU, by exporting its region-building model, tries to construct the Mediterranean as a region and engage in region-building practices to serve its strategic interests. This study argues that the Mediterranean as a region is not natural or given but it is politically constructed by the particular interests of external powers, in our case, the European Union. In the subsequent chapter, how the EU constructs the Mediterranean region is scrutinized.



2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A REGION FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

There is no commonly accepted definition of the Mediterranean as a region. However, one may claim that its space as a sea⁷⁵, climate and way of life provide the Mediterranean with some distinctive features. Although the Mediterranean has been a unique geographical space, it has been a divided region politically, economically and culturally (except for the Roman Empire). Therefore, for Brauch (2003:35), it is generally claimed that the “Mediterranean is characterized by both unity and diversity, by periods of cooperation and conflict, of tolerance and violent conflicts, by intensive cultural exchange and cultural clashes, of close economic cooperation, interdependence but also by exploitation, unequal exchange and dependence”.

This chapter addresses the significance of the Mediterranean as a region, analyzes the traces of colonialism, and questions the regionalizing efforts of the European Union in the region in terms of this significance. The first two sections of this chapter view the Mediterranean from an historical perspective in order to illustrate the formation of the basic characteristics of this region. In the third section, the colonial legacy in the Mediterranean is portrayed in order to see the continuity of some of the EU member states actions towards the region. At this point, it is important to recall that some of the EU member states are the former colonial powers. In considering the current relations between the EU and these countries, it is important to see that these relations are largely based on the ties established during the colonial period. These parts of this chapter help one understand the reasons behind the EU’s Mediterranean policies in the postcolonial era. Because this study regards the formation of the Mediterranean region as a process of social construction, the fourth section is employed to illustrate how a region develops by a choice made on a specific and historical ground. This section argues that (today/in the postcolonial era) the Mediterranean as a region is not just geographical or given but it is constructed upon particular interests by actors, mainly by the EU.

⁷⁵ For example, “while the Greeks referred to the Mediterranean as the ‘Sea over by Us’, the Romans more simply came to regard to it as *Mare Nostrum*” (Holden and Purcell, 2000: 23).

2.1. The Mediterranean: From Ancient Times to the Colonial Era

For Couloumbis and Veremis (1999: 1), as a “remarkable body of water”, the Mediterranean gave birth to some of the world’s greatest civilizations, religions and cultures. For Braudel (1995b: 826), historically, the Mediterranean had been a region that constituted as the center of the world. This had been the case until the rise of the Western nation-state in the seventeenth century, and this status was restored in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Mediterranean, as “the center of the world”, “was educating others, teaching them its own ways of life” (ibid.). In this context, “the Mediterranean was the donor, the transmitter and therefore a superior force, whose teachings, way of life and tastes were adopted in lands far from its shores” (ibid., 829). These influences underlined “the eminent position of the Mediterranean, as the cradle of civilization, in the building of the modern world on which it left so large a mark” (ibid., 835). Brauch et. al. (2003:34) claim that this region “has served as a crucible for a number of the world’s major civilizations in the past, and it is now a key region for demonstrating the possibilities for cooperation that could have significance for human communities across the world”.

Braudel asserts that the Mediterranean region has a unity and coherence; “the whole sea shared a common destiny with identical problems and general trends if not identical consequences” (1995a: 14).⁷⁶ However, one may argue that due to the complex and unique characteristics of the region, Mediterranean countries located on the Northern and Southern shores perceive the region differently. On the one hand, the Latin Arc (Spain, France and Italy) views the Mediterranean as *mare nostrum*, “as a whole unified conceptually, functionally, and in terms of historical evocation as part of our world” (Moulakis, 2005: 15). In this context, the Mediterranean Sea is seen as “an artery of contact” that is binding the states around them (Mieroop, 2005: 138). On the other hand, the traditional Arab view sees the Mediterranean Sea as “peripheral, inimical, alien and even dangerous” (Moulakis, 2005: 15). It is a place of “chaos and danger”, it is “a force that could not be easily controlled”

⁷⁶ He also mentions the complex and unique features of the Mediterranean. “It cannot be contained within our measurements and classifications. No single biography beginning with the date of birth can be written in this sea; no simple narrative of how things happened would be appropriate to its history. The Mediterranean is not even a single sea, it is a complex of seas; and these seas are broken up by islands, interrupted by peninsulas, ringed by intricate coastlines. Its life is linked to the land, its poetry more than half-rural, its sailors may turn peasant with the seasons; it is the sea of vineyards and olive trees just as much as the sea of the long-oared galleys and the roundships of merchants and its history can no more be separated from that lands of surrounding it than the clay can be separated from the hands of the potter who shapes it” (Braudel, 1995a: 17).

(Mieroop, 2005: 138,139). According to the Arab view, this sea can bring “all kinds of trouble”⁷⁷, and therefore the sea “does not bind, it separates” (Moulakis, 2005: 15-22).

The history of the region can probably provide an understanding of the whole region. The environment in question is “the product of a complex interaction of human and physical factors, not simply a material backdrop or a set up of immutable constraints” (Horden and Purcell, 2000: 9). According to Braudel (1995a; 1995b), the Mediterranean exists on two bases: the physical unit (climate and geography)⁷⁸ and the “human unit”⁷⁹. For him, on the one hand, the Mediterranean Sea “provides unity, transport, the means of exchange and intercourse, for a man who is prepared to make an effort and pay a price”; on the other hand, “it has also been the great divider, the obstacle that had to be overcome” (Braudel, 1995a: 276). The human Mediterranean only exists in so far as human creativity, work and “effort continually re-create it” (ibid.). “The different regions of the Mediterranean are connected not by water, but by the peoples of the sea” (ibid.). In this context, the movements of the people may create the Mediterranean unity. In a way, the Mediterranean’s history is a “social history” (ibid., 353), in which the subject is the human beings and how they create this unity. Therefore, one may assert that the Mediterranean region is a social construction.

As Bilgin (2004a: 272) argues “Mediterranean littoral peoples and societies were conceived as part of the total called the Mediterranean in ancient Greece”. The Mediterranean existed as a region in the Hellenic and Roman period (3000 BC – 565 AD). The eighth century saw the beginning of two hundred years of colonial expansion by the Greeks. From

⁷⁷ “Byzantines and Crusaders, the knights of Malta always mentioned with particular horror, later the sea-borne empires of the West, Bonaparte, the British, the Russians, the good ship Exodus, and the Sixth Fleet.” (Moulakis, 2005: 20)

⁷⁸ For Braudel, the Mediterranean has at least two faces: on the one side, to the South, the Mediterranean is a near neighbour of the desert (Braudel, 1995a: 23). From Southern Tunisia to Southern Syria, the desert directly borders the sea (ibid.). On the other side, to the North, lies Europe, which is “often shaken by Mediterranean influences” has had a great and “sometimes decisive” influence on the Mediterranean (ibid., 24). The Mediterranean Sea’s climate, with its two clearly defined (summer and winter) also regulates the Mediterranean life (ibid., 246). The history of the climate is the same throughout the Northern and Southern hemisphere, and moreover, “the case of the Mediterranean is linked to a series of problems on the same scale” for both hemispheres (ibid., 275). Therefore, one may argue that climate and geography bound the two shores of the Mediterranean people.

⁷⁹ “The Mediterranean as a human unit is the combination over an area of route networks and urban centers, lines of force and nodal points. Cities and their communications have imposed a unified human construction on geographical space. Whatever its shape, its architecture or civilization that illuminates it, the Mediterranean town creates roads and is created by them.” (Braudel, 1995a: 277) For example, the Mediterranean region in the sixteenth century (and it must be extended to its maximum when we are talking of towns) was “unique in its hugeness” (ibid.). In the sixteenth century no other region in the world had such a developed urban network (ibid., 277-278).

the end of the third century B.C. until the fall of Roman Empire, Rome “dominated the Mediterranean region and gradually extended its power beyond its boundaries” (Horden and Purcell, 2000: 23).⁸⁰ Rome was an empire “in which the of Greek and Roman language and culture and an economy of exaction and coinage were totally dependent on communications; and for all the fame of the Roman road, the most basic and the most vital lines of communication lay across the sea” (ibid.).

According to Horden and Purcell (2000: 224-26), fragmentation of the Roman Empire did not result in the complete disintegration of its system of governance in the Mediterranean area as long as the Roman institutions’ influence remained in the region. However, as Amin (1989: 2) argues, the political unity created at the time of Roman Empire was not restored by any of the succeeding hegemonies in the Mediterranean (nor Arabs, Italian cities or the Ottoman Empire).⁸¹ Nevertheless, “the absence of a unifying imperial power did not impede the intensive exchanges of every kind that the inland sea required” (Amin, 1989: 2). For example, the urban type of civilization that existed in the Mediterranean cannot be explained without the trading functions of the cities (ibid.).⁸²

During the Greek and Roman period, the Mediterranean was both culturally and politically united.⁸³ Couloumbis and Veremis (1999: 2) claim that after “the decline of Byzantium”, the region became a “frontier of hostile” divisions “or, at best, a junction of diversity expressed in terms of economic development, degrees of secular modernity and the nature of political authority” (Couloumbis and Veremis, 1999: 2). Between 600 and 1517, Rome’s system was replaced with a system that was bipolar in nature, “with the Christians commanding Northern shores of the Mediterranean and the Arabs controlling most of the

⁸⁰ Horden and Purcell claim that it was only the Roman Empire whose sphere of control or influence had embraced some Mediterranean shores, and which had “nearly all had centers of gravity well beyond the region” (Horden and Purcell, 2000: 23).

⁸¹ According to Calleya (1997: 62), “Indeed it can be stated that between the third century B.C. and the fifth century A.D., the Pax Romana (the longest in duration of its kind), was a federal empire that had a lasting influence in the area. Even when the Roman Empire was challenged and eventually overrun by other empires, the Roman level of transnational and political unity was not to be repeated.”

⁸² Amin claims, in this context, that it is important to point out that the urban culture of the Mediterranean cities, which was contrasted to the feudal and rural character of society in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe until modern times, formed an important feature of Mediterranean regionality (Amin, 1989: 2).

⁸³ “When the empires that had politically unified parts of the Mediterranean came to an end, the sea and the adjacent lands became the battlefield of disputes between great powers” (Couloumbis and Veremis, 1999: 1). “Later different parts went separate ways: on the Northern shore Italy, France and Spain had a common history with Europe; in the East Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and parts of the former Yugoslavia were part of the Ottoman Empire; the Maghreb countries with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia were former French colonies; Libya had a colonial history with Italy, and Egypt, Malta, Palestine with England. The more recent historical developments produced a diverse political map that contributed to different conflict cleavages” (Pfetsch, 2003: 145).

South and Eastern coastline” and the Mediterranean became “a boundary zone and later a conflict based region” between two civilizations (Calleya, 1997: 81, 82). “By the end of the eighth century, the Mediterranean came to serve as a boundary zone between the Christian North and the Muslim South” (ibid.: 83). This feature was predominant in the region throughout the following two centuries.

Nevertheless, the emergence of the Italian city-states in the eleventh century formed “an informal alliance by serving as an economic and political buffer between the two primary and contentious forces” and this helped to transform the Mediterranean from a boundary zone between the North and the South to an increasingly transnational area (Calleya, 1997: 69).⁸⁴ Connections between the peoples of the Mediterranean also evolved further during this period as a result of the Crusades to the Holy Land. One of the main inspirations of the Crusades (1095-1270), apart from the religious motivations, was conquering the maritime and commercial space of the Mediterranean (Braudel, 1996: 82). Abulafia (2005: 68) claims that “the Mediterranean possessed a basic commercial unity” and “the intense regional variety of the Mediterranean lands acted as a vital stimulus to the creation of lasting exchange networks”. Therefore, it is interesting to note that with the involvement of the Italian city states, when the military conflict between the Christians and the Muslims got intensified in early crusades, the trade routes linking the North and the South became ever more active, due to the involvement of the Italian city states, “sometimes as commercial intermediaries with Islam and sometimes as eager crusader who sought to prise the cities of the Levant from Islam” (ibid., 2005: 70). In this context, the vital point is that the unity of the Mediterranean Sea as a place of commercial exchange had been restored.

The Ottoman Empire conquered most of the Eastern Mediterranean and much of the North Africa in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. In the 16th – 19th centuries, European nation states had emerged and competition between nation states marked European politics, also affecting the Mediterranean. The interest in the Mediterranean had especially increased due to the increasing importance of oil in world trade and the region’s rich oil resources. In this context, starting from the sixteenth century, Mediterranean basin had turned into an area controlled by the outside powers. Before the sixteenth century, the Mediterranean

⁸⁴ For example states such as Naples, Amalfi, Gaeta and Salerno “played down the importance of religious differences, often aligning themselves with the Arabs” since they recognized the potential economic benefits that were available (Calleya, 1997: 68).

was regarded as the centre. Nevertheless, with this new century it became “a frontier zone between the new centre – European then Euro-North-American – and the new periphery – Afro-Asian” (Amin, 1989: 2-3). According to Scheffler (2003: 258), the region became “a subaltern part of large world systems”. Fenko (2009: 221) argues that this regional pattern of relations in the Mediterranean area had remained prevalent till the end of the Cold War.

Colonialism, the rivalry for colonies among the European nation states, and the rise of nationalism had been the main characteristics of Mediterranean politics in the second half of the nineteenth century. For Amin (1989: 5), colonization has opened a definitive divide and turned the Mediterranean into a frontier zone – “the main confrontation of our time: between North and South”, – and it has also exposed “a moral and political contrast, and given the religious dimension (of Christianity and Islam) a weight it did not have in the past and one now capable of nurturing fanaticism”. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, colonialism was widely accepted as the natural order of the international system, and as an expression of the white race’s destiny and duty to assume the guardianship of the non-white peoples (Sorensen, 2007: 362). European empires reflected the economic, cultural and racial superiority of Europeans (ibid.). The alleged right of the European powers to establish and maintain colonial empires was almost unchallenged until the first half of the twentieth century. However, today the right of the colonized peoples to self-determination and independence are regarded as important international values.⁸⁵ Although all sorts of colonial relations are condemned in the contemporary world, Italy, Spain, France and the UK continue to maintain a *de facto* colonial presence and interest in the South and Eastern Mediterranean, especially in North Africa.

⁸⁵ According to United Nations: “The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.” (General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted on December, 14 1960).

2.2. The colonial era in the Mediterranean

Beginning with the Napoleonic Wars, the Mediterranean area emerged as a zone of conflict among the European colonial powers. In this sense, “the Mediterranean became a new frontier zone between” a new Euro-North American center and a new Afro-Asian periphery, and a strategic zone for the others (Amin, 1989: 3). The strategic balance in the Mediterranean had shifted against the Ottomans by the time Napoleon conquered Egypt in 1798 (Lesch, 2006: 1). According to Moulakis (2005:33), “[t]he expedition of Bonaparte to Egypt created conditions of possibility for thinking of the Mediterranean as a coherent geographical and economic system, united as the object of European embrace”.⁸⁶

The Suez Canal had been crucial in the sense that it increased the importance of the Mediterranean for European powers. In 1869, with French partnership, Egypt built the “Suez Canal”. Moulakis (ibid., 33-34) contends that the opening of the Suez Canal made the Mediterranean “central again only in a mechanical sense, as a corridor”. For Moulakis, the opening of the Suez Canal is also considered “as a symbol of genuine desire to construct a region –to invent the Mediterranean” (ibid.: 32-33). Monroe argues that that Suez Canal played a speed factor in British imperial defence plans, and it contributed to imperial unity and to the prosperity of Britain (Monroe, 1938: 14).⁸⁷ In her view, as the Mediterranean was “the main artery of the British Empire” (ibid., 66), the opening of Suez Canal was central to British strategic aims. Apart from trade and shipping interests, Britain possessed investments in the countries of Levant.⁸⁸

In 1882, Great Britain occupied Egypt for strategic and economic motives. The British occupation of Egypt could be considered as one of the most significant stumbling blocks for colonialism in the Mediterranean. This occupation shaped the “Egyptian economic development for several decades, had an impact on the formation of the country’s political

⁸⁶ In Fenko’s view, “the expansion of the Latin idea for the Mediterranean was reflected in Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt” (Fenko, 2009: 222), resulting in the area’s representation as “a system of mutually beneficial exchanges” (Moulakis, 2005: 32).

⁸⁷ Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Great Britain “had a fright about the route to India” (Monroe, 1938: 5).

⁸⁸ According to Monroe (1938: 66-67), Britain’s main reason for “maintaining her Mediterranean strength is in order to increase her voice in the councils of Europe, and to uphold her prestige in a belt of territory where ‘face’ counts – namely in the desert region which she must cross in her day-to-day contact with her eastern Dominions and India, and which is one of the world’s great oil areas. Her second reason is strategic. In the event of war, her fortresses in the Mediterranean increase her mobility for purposes of imperial defence. (...) Her third reason is commercial; as one of the world’s greatest traders, she finds that it pays to advertise along one of the world’s main highways.”

leadership, and became the focus of an anti-imperial nationalist movement that affected Egyptian (and British) politics for the first half of the twentieth century” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 103-104). In this context, Yurdusev claims that some of the “elites in Egypt were subjected to direct European influence through various channels and they acquired some European ideas such as nationalism” (Yurdusev, 2009: 79, 81). Lord Cromer, who was the proconsul in Egypt from 1883 to 1907, “managed Egypt’s economic, political and social development so as to further British, not Egyptian, interests” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009:105; Osterhammel, 2002: 52-43).

Cleveland and Bunton argue that Britain occupied Egypt mainly for three reasons; safeguarding the Suez Canal; restoring Egypt’s political and financial stability; and finally, preventing France from occupying it first (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 104). In Newsinger’s (2008: 55) view, this occupation was to be a “temporary measure”, however, it lasted *de jure* until 1922 and was not completely finished until 1956 (British military presence continued until the Suez crisis).⁸⁹ Britain could not even officially define its relationship to Egypt until the break of World War I: the country was not declared a colony or a protectorate, but remained, in theory, an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire ruled by a hereditary khedive (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 104). In this context, the British presence was seen as a “veiled protectorate” (Osterhammel, 200: 52). In 1914, the protectorate was made official, and the title of the head of state, which had changed from pasha to khedive in 1867, was changed to sultan. Egypt acquired self-rule at the internal level in 1922 and independence in 1936.

French presence in the Mediterranean, on the other hand, can be traced back to 1830 when France occupied “Algiers”⁹⁰ and then proceeded to colonize the rest of Algeria and some parts of “North Africa”⁹¹, namely, Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912. In the Mashreq, “its influence was limited to the inter-war period when France was granted a mandate over Lebanon and Syria” (Pace, 2006: 94). Sartre (2006) argues that the French

⁸⁹ For Newsinger (2008: 55), the invasion was a temporary measure because the British people were assured that they would remove “a military despotism and usher in an era of freedom, liberty and good government”.

⁹⁰ By 1848 nearly all of northern Algeria was under French control, and the new government of the Second Republic declared the occupied lands an integral part of France. Algeria was not regarded as just a colony, but also as an integral part of the home country, “and that France, to make it so, peopled it officially and artificially with men of her own flesh and blood” (Monroe, 1938: 72).

⁹¹ The French ruled North Africa through separate three administrations: Algeria under the Ministry of the Interior, Tunisia and Morocco under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that led “parochial lives” (Monroe, 1938: 90-91).

colonial period saw progress in health, some infrastructures, and the overall expansion of the economy of Algeria as well as the formation of new social classes, which, after exposure to ideas of equality and political liberty, would help push the country to independence (Sartre, 2006). In his view, in a way, the French colonial system prepared the grounds for destroying its own system (ibid.).⁹² On the other hand, Tunisia remained under French protectorate from 1881 to 1956.⁹³ The protectorate authorities established French courts and schools. The French also undertook major development projects, including infrastructure (especially in building railroads), industry and the financial system (Perkins, 2005). “French capital investment channeled through large, specialized companies, created Tunisia’s colonial economy” (Perkins, 2005: 61). During the protectorate, “French officials and residents in Tunisia frequently referred to French policies and practices in Algeria, occasionally as models to follow, but more often as examples of what not to do” (ibid., 40).⁹⁴

European powers also showed a strong interest in Morocco since 1800s. In fact, it was seen as a “hinge” country squeezed between the Ottoman Empire and European colonial expansion (Barosio, 2001: 34). The power of the rulers in Morocco maintained to protect Morocco’s independence during the 18th and 19th centuries. For example, in 1844, the French tried to occupy Morocco, but the protests of the British did not let this situation develop into a colonial occupation. However, in late 19th century, Morocco could no longer resist foreign pressures and was forced to accept the Treaty of Madrid in 1880 that allowed Morocco to retain formal independence in return for opening its borders to European trade (ibid., 36). By the start of the 20th century, Morocco’s population began to suffer levels of severe poverty (ibid., 39). Using the excuse that it was necessary to protect its own citizens, France occupied Casablanca in 1907 and four years later entered Fez (Thomson, 1990: 509-510). On March 30, 1912, Morocco was forced to accept a French protectorate that safeguarded (though only formally) the autonomy of the state (Thomson, 1990: 510). By the same treaty, Northern Morocco was passed to the Spanish with the protectorate of Teutun and

⁹² “During the years of French domination, the struggles to survive, to co-exist, to gain equality, and to achieve independence shaped a large part of the Algerian national identity”(Sartre, 2006: 42-43). After the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), France declared Algeria independent on July 3, 1962.

⁹³ “Before the French arrived, Tunisia had begun a process of modernization and government reform, but financial difficulties increased until a commission of European creditors was installed. In 1869, Tunisia declared itself bankrupt; an International Financial Commission, with representatives from France, United Kingdom and Italy, in order to protect their foreign investments, took control over the economy “(Perkins, 2005: 31-32).

⁹⁴ The struggle of Tunisians for national independence officially began in under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba. After the World War II, the French took control of Tunisia back as well as other administered territories in North Africa. However, the struggle for national independence continued and intensified. Ultimately, after the decades-long struggle for independence, Tunisia became independent in 1956.

an international zone was created in “Tangiers”⁹⁵. From a legal point of view, the treaty did not deprive Morocco of its status as a sovereign state (Barosio, 2001: 39). Theoretically, the sultan remained in power, but he did not rule. Under the protectorate, while exploiting Morocco’s mineral wealth, “the French government promoted economic development, created of a modern transportation system, and the developed of a modern agriculture sector geared to the French market” (Osterhammel, 2002: 34-35).⁹⁶

For France, the Mediterranean has been a “Latin lake of a former colonial empire” (Pace, 2002: 202). Thus, the notion of the Mediterranean has carried the elements of power, security and cultural hegemony for France. In this context, France “provided itself with a Southern Mediterranean shore” and until recently dominated most of Northern Africa (Amin, 1989: 5). “The British balanced this French influence by strengthening its position of authority in Egypt in 1882” (ibid.). This allowed “the British to control the recently completed Suez Canal” that was of very important “strategic and economic value” (Calleya, 1997: 73). At that time, Italy too dreamed a *Mare Nostrum* and tried with “its insignificant means to put flesh and blood on this dream” (Amin, 1989: 5) and “to imitate the days of the Roman Empire by acquiring colonies for itself at the expense of the French” (Calleya, 1997: 74-75). European powers also competed with their each other over Tunisia (Perkins, 2005: 6).⁹⁷ Apart from disputing over Tunisia with the French, Italy took control of Eritrea in 1885 and captured both Libya and the Dodecanese in 1911-12. In order to enhance its national prestige, Italy wanted to colonize Libya (Thomson, 1990: 497).⁹⁸ As Italy dreamed of *Mare Nostrum*

⁹⁵ Tangiers is considered as a “gateway to the world” (Barosio, 2001: 87). Therefore, gaining and retaining the control of this strategically important port was vital for the European colonial powers.

⁹⁶ In 1955, under Mohammed V, “the monarchy negotiated the gradual restoration of Moroccan independence” (Barosio, 2001: 11). The sultan agreed “to institute reforms that would transform Morocco into a constitutional monarchy with a democratic form of government” (ibid., 11-12). On April 7 of that year France officially relinquished its protectorate in Morocco, and the “internationalized city of Tangiers was reintegrated to the Morocco on October 29, 1956” (ibid., 41). The “abolition of the Spanish protectorate” and the “recognition of Moroccan independence by Spain” were negotiated separately and made final in the Joint Declaration of April 1956 (ibid., 42). Through subsequent agreements with Spain in 1956 and 1958, Moroccan regain control over “certain Spanish-ruled areas” (ibid., 42-43).

⁹⁷ Italy was the country that demonstrated the most desire to have Tunisia as part of its own sphere of influence because of the investments, citizens and geographic proximity in the country (Perkins, 2005: 35). However this was rebuffed when Britain and France co-operated to prevent this during the years 1871 – 1878 (ibid.). “British interests in the Mediterranean, shifted eastward as the Suez Canal, which had opened in 1869, began to assume a dominant place in imperial thinking” (ibid., 35-36). As a result of this strategy changing, “Britain began to dissociate itself more or less entirely from Tunisian affairs” (ibid., 36) and supported French influence in Tunisia.

⁹⁸ The attempted “Italian colonization of the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was never wholly successful” (Thomson, 1990: 496). On 3 October 1911 the Italians attacked Tripoli, “claiming somewhat disingenuously to be liberating Libya from Ottoman rule”(Osterhammel, 2002: 56). “Despite a major revolt by the Libyans, the Ottoman sultan ceded Libya to the Italians by signing the 1912 Treaty of Ouchy” (Thomson,

and of the creation of an empire beyond Suez, Libya had a strategic importance for Italian settlement (Monroe, 1938: 160-161). In this context, Italy conquered Libya in 1911-12 for political, strategic and economic reasons – in “order to breathe freely in the Mediterranean and to avoid being stifled amidst the possessions and naval bases of France and Great Britain” (ibid., 163).

World War I transformed the political map in the Eastern Mediterranean. While France wanted to gain control over the coast Lebanon, where it had strong economic and religious interests, Italy wanted to gain a “foothold” in Anatolia (Lesch, 2006: 3). At that time, Great Britain was in the best position to seize the Arab provinces due to the facts that its army occupied Egypt and its navy dominated the Persian Gulf (ibid., 4). To achieve that objective, Britain concluded three diplomatic agreements: first with a leading Arab ruler (Sharif Hussein);⁹⁹ second with the French government;¹⁰⁰ and the third with the leaders of the Zionist movement¹⁰¹. One may assert that these contradictory promises have deeply affected the Middle East ever since. According to Lesch (2006: 8),

The three sets of promises contained deep contradictions. In brief, European colonial rule prevailed at the expense of Arab dreams of independence. Moreover, Jewish nationalism

1990: 497). Nevertheless, after the 2nd World War, under the terms of the 1947 peace treaty with the Allies, Italy relinquished all claims to Libya. In 2008, under a treaty signed by the Italian and Libyan leaders in Tripoli, Italy offered a formal apology and financial compensation for the poverty suffered by Libyans during the colonial era (Delany, 2008).

⁹⁹ In the first agreement, the Hussein-Mc Mahon Correspondence, July 1915 to May 1916, Britain persuaded Sharif Hussein to launch a revolt against Ottomans that the British claimed would lead to independence for the Arabs (Lesch, 2006: 4). In this agreement, the British openly excluded important territories from the area to become independent (Iraq and Aden) (ibid., 6). In the correspondence, the British government hinted it would allow France a special role in Lebanon, where France was already a guardian of the Maronite (Catholic) community and had extensive commercial interests (ibid.). As the correspondence did not explicitly mention Palestine, Hussein assumed that Palestine – especially its holy places in Jerusalem – would be integral to the independent Arab state (ibid.).

¹⁰⁰ The second agreement, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916 provided for Britain and France to carve up the Arab provinces, leaving only Hijaz under Arab rule (Lesch, 2006: 6). Under its terms, France would rule the Lebanese coast and would have indirect control over Syria. The British would dominate central and southern Iraq and it would have indirect control over Transjordan, east of the Jordan river (ibid., 7). Palestine would fall under international control. It is generally argued that the Sykes-Picot Agreement is one of the most controversial documents of the First World War: “The agreement recognized long-standing French claims over Syria by awarding France a large zone of ‘direct control’ stretching along the Syrian coast from Southern Lebanon into Anatolia. In addition, France was granted a sphere of exclusive indirect influence in the Syrian interior” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 163).

¹⁰¹ Third agreement was the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. In early November, “the British government informed the leaders of the Zionist movement that it favored the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. Britain hoped that the declaration would encourage American and Russian Jews to press their governments to fight harder” (Lesch, 2006: 7).

gained ascendancy over the rights of the indigenous Palestinian Arabs, Arabs felt betrayed by the carving up and colonizing of their lands.

At the 1920 San Remo Conference, the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into entities called mandates. It is argued that this new mandate system was “little more than nineteenth-century imperialism repackaged to give the appearance of self-determination” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 164). One can see the mandate system as a new form of colonialism. While the system supposedly prepared the conditions for independence and self-government for these new states, in practice, colonial powers used this system in order to control and exert influence over these new born states. In this context, the colonial powers changed the political map in the Mediterranean and created artificial state borders. This state-making project of colonial powers played a significant role in the characteristics of the region and had consequences that still affect and shape the present.

In this new system, while Britain received the mandates for Palestine, Iraq and “Transjordan” that did not exist at that time, France received the mandate for Syria. In this context one can see “the hasty creation of Transjordan” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 164) as an effort of Britain to counterbalance France’s influence in Syria. The mandate over Transjordan ended on May 22, 1946, and on May 25, the country became the independent Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. The League of Nations also gave France authority over Syria, “from which Lebanon was carved”, and confirmed Britain’s control over Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan (Lesch, 2006: 8). The League of Nations gave Britain and France “mandatory powers”. “The mandate system gave Britain and France an opportunity to secure their strategic interests in the Middle East while paying lip service to the widely publicized principle of self-determination” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 172). Within this mandate system, the mandatory powers were obliged to prepare their mandates for self-government and independence. According to Lesch (2006: 8), the two colonial powers had no intention of preparing the Arabs for independence, rather they wanted to control those lands for the indefinite future. After the First World War, following the peace settlement and the establishment of the mandates, a new regional state system came into existence, in which the Ottoman Empire was fragmented into six states: Turkey and the five new states of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. In this new regional state system, Arab provinces were divided into a group of regional states administered by Britain and France.

In the beginning France concentrated its money and energy in North Africa as long as it had a British ally looking after common interests at Suez, and therefore, a stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean (Levant) was not vital to its position as a power (Monroe, 1938: 76). However, this thinking changed over time. In this context, since then France tried to find a balance between its interests in Levant and North Africa. While in the Levant France had many concerns, it was mostly dependent upon her alliance with Great Britain for its security (ibid., 137). Economic gain and strategic motives encouraged France for a steady expansion on the other side of the Mediterranean (ibid., 108). In this context, Syria was perceived as an important asset for France's imperial thinking. For example, as regards Far Eastern traffic, Syria provided France "with a convenient halt for airliners, and with an imperial wireless station on the way to France's eastern colonies", such as Indo-China and Madagascar (ibid., 77-78).¹⁰²

Therefore, when an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria was established in March 1920, the French troops occupied Syria and ended the Kingdom's rule over Syria within a few months. Later that year, the League of Nations put Syria under French mandate. "Instead of encouraging the formation of indigenous administrative institutions to prepare Syria for independence" (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 218), the French adopted a divide and rule strategy that created the proper conditions for France to maintain its rule. It seems that a divide and rule policy was an appropriate strategy in order to control these newborn countries from the outside (Sheffler 2003: 266). Using this strategy, France "encouraged the existing religious, ethnic and regional differences within Syria" (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 218). This strategy prepared the conditions for the division of Syria and the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. For Sheffler (2003: 267), France has adopted "a mix of ethno-religious and territorial criteria to split Syria" and had to "give in and accept" the country's unity in 1942-43.

¹⁰² According to Cleveland and Bunton (2009: 218), "The French claim to Syria was based on a combination of religious, economic and strategic interests. As the self-proclaimed protector of the Christian communities in the Levant – especially of the Catholic Maronites of Mount Lebanon – France professed a moral duty to continue its long-standing religious and educational activities in the region. (...) The economic rationale for a French presence in the Levant stemmed from the extensive investments in railways, port facilities and commercial exchanges that French enterprises had undertaken during the last Ottoman decades. The strategic need to counterbalance British influence in the Middle East was intertwined with the belief held in influential French imperial circles that France would never be a true Mediterranean power until it acquired a Levant possession to go with its North African Empire".

With the creation of the Republic of Lebanon in 1926, the state of Lebanon came into existence under French mandate. France's interest in Lebanon was religious, economic and strategic. According to Zweiri et. al (2008: 12):

On a religious level, France professed a moral duty to protect Christian communities in the Levant, especially the Catholic Maronites of Lebanon. On an economic level, France considered development in Lebanon and throughout Levant as means to counter growing British influence in the region. Finally, on a strategic level, French imperialists sought colonial interests that expanded their power not only in North Africa, but as well into the Middle East and beyond.

Lebanon was “directly ruled” by France “through the presence of a large military troop and a complex hierarchy of French civilian administration” (ibid.). When French “political elites recognized that the complex social diversity of Lebanon” would be difficult to govern, they introduced a “confessional system”¹⁰³ that would “protect Christian Maronites” and “ensure that they would not be absorbed into a Syrian Muslim State” (ibid.). They wanted to develop Lebanon into a state that adopted a “Franco-Mediterranean cultural orientation” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 225). According to Cleveland and Bunton (2009: 225), for France, this orientation would turn Lebanon's face towards Europe and it would turn its back to the Arab World. However, the Sunni Muslims wanted to emphasize their Arabic cultural identity and wanted to unite with Syria (ibid.). In this context, it can be claimed that the complex administrative system that was based on the religious communities and “its uncertain relationship with its Arab neighbours” (Cleveland and Bunton, ibid.) created problems for having a cohesive national system of government in Lebanon.¹⁰⁴

On the other hand, the League of Nations granted the mandate of Palestine to Great Britain on July 24, 1922.¹⁰⁵ For the British government, a Jewish national home under British protection would provide an excuse to keep British troops in Palestine (Lesch, 2006: 7).

¹⁰³ In this system, the president was required to be a Christian (in practice, a Maronite), the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, respectively (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 227-228). This system would prevent a single community from achieving dominance (ibid.).

¹⁰⁴ “Because Lebanon, with its pro-French Maronite community, was more receptive to the mandate than was Syria, it experienced a smoother passage toward internal autonomy” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 226). Lebanon gained independence on November 22, 1943. The allies kept the region under control until the end of World War II. The last French troops withdrew in 1946.

¹⁰⁵ This mandate explicitly ratified the Balfour Declaration in the name of the world community and gave the mandatory power the responsibility of setting up a political, administrative and economic state affairs in the country such as to assure the establishment of the national home for the Jewish people (Rodinson, 1973: 55).

While keeping France out of Suez Canal, Britain would control the route to Sinai and the Suez Canal (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 244). One can claim that controlling the Suez Canal was a priority for British foreign policy. The British was able to control the main channel to the East even at the height of the First World War, and in 1922, “they reinsured it by acquiring Palestine among the spoils of victory” (Monroe, 1938: 5). In this context, it might be claimed that for the British, “Zionism had the potential to serve British imperial interests” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 244).¹⁰⁶ Cleveland and Bunton (ibid.: 254) resemble Zionism as “a project of settler colonialism” that was “undertaken at the expense of the local Arab population”. Moreover, according to Amin (1989: 4), the hegemonic powers of the capitalist center – Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States since the Second World War – have always wanted to prevent Egypt from becoming a “pivot of a revived Arab nation”, and, therefore, creation of an artificial European state in Palestine was planned to undermine such a possibility. The reason for the West’s interests in the Zionist plan was that it created a “rapid intervention force” that was permanently established close to Suez and the oil (ibid., 16).

It was, therefore, essential that Israel stubbornly refuse any ‘concession’, any recognition, even a partial one, of the right of Palestinians, and even of their Arab neighbours, to existence as an autonomous nation (or nations). The refusal ‘to accept established frontiers’, the constant raising of stakes in expansionist claims (half of the Palestine, then the whole of it, then Sinai and the Golan Heights, the Southern Lebanon, the West Bank of Jordan ...), these are the means by which Israel, in the eyes of Western imperialism, justifies its reason for being, as a perpetual pretext for military intervention for the sake of the possible needs of the West. (Amin, ibid.)

In this context, Rodinson argued that Israel could be classified as a colonial-settler state and the Palestinians as people colonially oppressed by Israel (Rodinson, 1973).¹⁰⁷ The creation of the state of Israel on Palestinian soil “the culmination of a process that fits perfectly into the great European-American movement of expansion in the nineteenth and

¹⁰⁶For Amin (1989: 15), “Zionism would never have seen the light of the day without imperialism. Even before the notion of Zionism emerged, imperialism had always planned the creation of a European state on Egypt’s eastern borders, capable of ensuring the West’s control over Suez and of ruining any chance of an Egyptian renaissance, the precondition for Arab unity. Without the British mandate in Palestine, there would have been no state of Israel”.

¹⁰⁷ For the Arabs, “Israel is an imperialist base set up in the Middle East by British imperialism in collusion with the others; it is part of a worldwide imperialist system; and therefore the activity it carries on throughout the world, whether on its own behalf or on behalf of American and European imperialism, is of an imperialist nature” (Rodinson, 1973: 29).

twentieth centuries whose aim was to settle new inhabitants among other peoples or to dominate them economically and politically” (Rodinson, 1973: 91).¹⁰⁸

Cleveland and Bunton contend: “The Arabs of Palestine recognized that the goals of Zionism represented a threat to their existence, and they opposed them by attempting to negotiate with Britain to restrict immigration and land transfers; when that tactic failed, they turned to armed revolt” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 254).¹⁰⁹ The creation of the state of Israel in the Palestinian homeland in 1948 triggered the long-standing Arab/Israeli conflict that involved, apart from the Palestinians, the neighbouring Arab countries (mainly Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon). These countries, in order to protect the rights of the Palestinians and to destroy the state of Israel, intervened in the conflict mainly by attacking Israel militarily and by trying to isolate Israel politically and diplomatically in the international arena.

When Britain supported the Jewish settlement in Palestine, it also established a modern economy in Israel and exported modern technology, from which Arabs were excluded (Rodinson, 1973: 78). Moreover, the Jewish settlement caused a majority of the native Arab population’s displacement from their own homeland. Therefore, creation of the state of Israel on Palestinian soil caused deep resentments among the Arab countries. The colonial nature of the creation of the Israel as a state and its technological and developmental superiority enable Israel to exert economic and technical pressure on the underdeveloped economies of the region (ibid., 89). As Abu Jaber (2003: 9) points out,

The military imbalance between Israel and its Arab neighbours has been further exacerbated by a political and economic imbalance, again largely due to the uneven Western input. More

¹⁰⁸ One can speak of colonization when there is occupation with domination; when there is emigration with legislation (Rodinson, 1973: 92). The Jews attracted by Zionism emigrated to Palestine, and then they dominated it (ibid.). They occupied it in deed and then adopted legislation to justify this occupation by law. So, the major criteria set by Rodinson for colonization were all fulfilled (ibid.). For example, in June 1967, Israel established a military government to control the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Within this government, Israeli army officers were able to run all of the Palestinian health, social and educational services; set and implement economic policy; and seize land for Jewish settlements and military installations (Lesch, 2006: 84)

¹⁰⁹ When several attempts to solve the problem diplomatically failed, the British asked the newly formed United Nations for a solution. On 15 May 1947 the UN appointed a committee (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine – UNSCOP), which recommended creating a partitioned state with separate territories for the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine. Although the UN General Assembly in November 1947 accepted this “two state solution”, the Arab states voted against (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 263-264; Lesch, 2006: 10-11). After the Second World War, and following the UN partition plan in 1947, Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, one day before the end of the British Mandate of Palestine (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 266-267; Lesch, 2006: 12).

important than this military and economic imbalance, is the psychological damage causing the Arabs to feel not only abandoned, targeted and friendless, but worse still, as helpless pawns in the grip of forces beyond their control. It is the sense of trauma and insecurity deepened over the decades.

Therefore, it can be claimed that Arabs perceive Israel as a colonial power, which oppresses Arab population, and a natural ally of the European and American powers (Rodinson, 1973: 89). They further question the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state. For example, for the Arab population, the occupied territories in the Golan, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank have been acquired and colonized illegally (Moller, 2003: 285). The Arab societies also claim that Israel has no right to have settlements and hold the right to protect its citizens there (ibid.). In this sense, one can argue that Arabs perceive Israel as a colonial settler country. Rodinson (1973: 89) claims that Israel participates in the economic exploitation of the underdeveloped countries alongside the industrialized European and American powers. One may claim that “the existence and mini-imperial policies” of Israel have an important impact on the dynamics of the region (Buzan and Gonzalez, 2009: 230). In this context, the establishment of the Israeli state with the support of the Western powers creates a major source of concern for the Arab states.

One may claim that the practices of European colonial powers deeply changed the dynamics of the region. As mentioned above, the French invasion of Egypt created the proper conditions for the European colonial powers to embrace the Mediterranean as a coherent unity. Although the formal colonial period in the Mediterranean was relatively short, it had important effects on the fate of the region. An analysis of this period could help one to see how European powers approached to the Mediterranean and how they tried to use the creation of a coherent geographical and economic system in the Mediterranean as a pretext to pursue their own interests.

During this period, the colonial powers tried to gain access to energy supplies and strategic routes in the region, to enhance their national prestige and they also dreamed of *Mare Nostrum*. The competition for gaining colonies among the European powers also determined the fate of the region. In this context, the rival powers tried to counterbalance each other's influence by creating countries such as Jordan and Israel. Nevertheless, one may assert that the borders, which were arbitrarily drawn after the World War I, and the mandate system

can be considered as suitable foundations for serving European imperial interests in the long-run. Furthermore, the adoption of a divide and rule strategy created appropriate conditions for European colonial powers to maintain their influence in the region. By encouraging, or sometimes creating, religious, ethnic and regional differences, the colonial powers justified and strengthened their political, military and economic presence in their colonies. Creating previously non-existent states and encouraging differences in the Mediterranean have also caused long-standing disputes in the region, and the consequences of these disputes can still be felt today.

The French and British colonization processes prepared the foundations of the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean in the modern era. These colonial powers shaped the economic, social, political and cultural development of their colonies. Although their influence over these countries diminished afterwards, their economic and cultural ties remained strong. The decolonization and colonial period, in a way, marked the Mediterranean identity. In this period, the European powers intentionally constructed a dependent and complex Mediterranean structure that could serve their imperial interests. This section, by analyzing the brief history of the colonial period, tried to give clues about how the colonial powers approached the region. The next section analyzes the legacy of this colonial period, in order to show its effects on the European powers' current approach to the Mediterranean.

2.3. The legacy of colonialism in the Mediterranean

Lesch (2006: 1-2) points out that after World War II, the European colonial powers left behind “a legacy of local conflicts as well as deep-set” resentment against all forms of foreign domination. As mentioned in the first chapter, imperialism originally symbolized a French political ideology. French imperialism was based on “the idea of an active development of national pre-eminence, an attempt to recover the grandeur of the Napoleonic Empire” (Young, 2001: 30). In this sense, Napoleon III pursued France's imperial ambitions though invading Algeria and Indochina, and then focused on the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, Lebanon, Syria and Polynesia. The new imperial ideology proposed “an image of a greater France through which the Mediterranean flowed in the same way as the Seine flowed through France itself” (ibid.). At this point, it is important to note that the French imperial ideology may still be alive today. In this context, former French President Sarkozy's attempt

of establishing a “Mediterranean Union” – although it did not come into life in its original terms – may be read as a reflection of the imperial ideology of Napoleon III. With this proposal, Sarkozy planned to renew the French influence in the area that it had dominated during the colonial times and to provide France with a more influential role in the EU by playing the initiating role in restructuring the Union’s Southern dimension.

The imperialist policies of Napoleon III helped France to expand to the world (Young, 200: 30). An ambitious policy of imperial expansion was justified by the invention of “mission civilisatrice”, the task of which was “to bring the benefits of French culture, religion and language to unenlightened races of earth” (ibid.).¹¹⁰ The “mission civilisatrice” was used by the other imperial powers as a moral argument for their imperialist policies. Cultural and educational imperialism were its essential attachments (Said, 1993).¹¹¹ Despite the fact that colonialism had become world-wide, different imperial powers had different ways in pursuing colonialist policies which were designed according to their own national identities and ideologies. For example, France and Britain pursued the two major alternative models of colonial systems and imperial government up until the twentieth century: the French system of assimilation and the British system of association. On the one hand, the French used “a rational theorized system” for its colonies “based on the doctrine of assimilation, whereby the colonies were integrated within France itself as *départments d’outre mer* and were thus not

¹¹⁰ As Young points out, “The mission civilisatrice was more central to French imperial ideology than any other account of the French colonial doctrine of assimilation. As the image of greater France implies, however far away the colonies may have been, they were administratively and conceptually treated as part of mainland France. The French colonial system of assimilation was originally derived, via the French Revolution, from an Enlightenment belief in common liberty, equality and fraternity for humankind. During the execution of French colonial politics, assimilation remained the effective basis of French colonial policy throughout the nineteenth century. There were many individual exceptions and modifications to this rule in practice, particularly in Indo-China and Algeria, but it remained the principle and agreed basis of French colonial policy right up to the twentieth century. As a result, the French colonies offered the best educational and cultural facilities, while at the same time also demanding that the colonized subject give up his or her own culture and religion in order to benefit from them” (2001: 30).

¹¹¹ Christian missionaries played their part too in the spread of colonialism. Britain and France sent organized missions into Africa to “convert the heathen to Christianity” (Thomson, 1990: 497). The Catholic missions of France under the Third Republic were “exceptionally active”, and provided two thirds of all Catholic missionaries (Thomson, 1990: 497). They were all over the world. For example, by 1875, the Society of African Missionaries, which was founded by Cardinal Lavigerie and was known as the ‘White Fathers’, spread from Algeria into Tunisia, and set up a religious protectorate that led to a political protectorate. It was believed that Cardinal’s presence in Tunisia was worth an army for France (ibid.). “Other French missionaries penetrated into all parts of Africa, setting up schools, medical services (...) Yet another element in the growth of colonialism was the administrator and soldier – the man with a mission, who was not a missionary but welcomed the opportunity to bring order and efficient administration out of muddle” (ibid.). Such men became the great proconsuls – Lord Cromer in the Egypt, Marshal Lyautey in Morocco (ibid.). “Without such men the extent and the consolidation of European control over South and Eastern Mediterranean would be impossible. (...) It was not just that trade followed the flag, but that flag accompanied the botanist and buccaneer, the Bible and the bureaucrat, along with the businessmen and the banker. (ibid., 498)”

technically colonies at all” (Young, 2001: 32). On the other hand, the British operated on the practice of “loose association of various forms”, in Britain, the imperial phase was essentially linked to the development of a cultural ideology of race from the 1860 onwards (ibid.). According to Young (ibid., 33), “the British system of relative non-interference with local cultures, which today appears more liberal in spirit, was in fact also based on the racist assumption that the native was incapable of education up to the level of the European”. While the French “colonial model of assimilation required an extreme degree of bureaucratic centralization”, the British colonial model was “carried out by private companies, and only subsequently placed in an *ad hoc* constitutional or administrative context by the state”, and almost every colony seemed to have a “different status”, and to be “run individually at the local level” (Young, 2001: 33)).

Nevertheless, without making any distinctions between different types of colonial regimes, the anti-colonialist movements in the Mediterranean challenged the colonies’ perceptions of European colonialism and its so-called “mission civilisatrice”. These movements were linked to the accelerating pace of decolonization period. During the decolonization period, colonialism and its representations were condemned, and it was also believed that nothing good could come from European colonial powers. European colonialism was considered as the primary culprit for world poverty and chronic underdevelopment.¹¹² Although their degrees are diverse, the legacies left by the former colonizers have at least one thing in common, “the colonized subjects and colonial masters created a vast and complex network of relationships” (Cosgrove, 1972: 53). Despite the fact that the political, economic and administrative structures left to the de-colonized states have undergone radical transformations since their independence, the newly independent states have intensely inherited colonial features. The most significant colonial legacies in this context are the political and economic structures, “education systems”¹¹³, and strong paternalist, regional and district administrations.

¹¹² Although it was generally believed that colonialism was bad and responsible for problems, not everybody saw the colonial powers as scapegoats. When the direct contact with the West attached the Mediterranean to Europe albeit through colonization, this experience also led some Arabs (such as the khedives of Egypt) to perceive “the Mediterranean not as a divider but as a link, a means of attaching the prospects of one’s own society to the Western vehicle of progress while maintaining a sense of pride in one’s own identity” (Moulakis, 2005: 33-34).

¹¹³ For example, if one looks at the education systems of the former colonies, he/she can see that the French, Spanish and British influence over them. The concept of Western education is perhaps destined to be one of the longest-lasting colonial legacies, and, to some extent, it has complicated the task of the new states in their drive towards modernization and economic development (Cosgrove, 1972: 64). “The French, particularly, have characteristically been able to continue to foster the intellectual orientation of the middle and sometimes upper class toward French culture in many areas of the world, especially in those areas that were formerly French

Holsti (1996: 100) emphasizes that the main legacy of European colonialism is “the idea that the new independent states should simply transform themselves from the territorial creations called colonies into modern states”. This is because the term “modern” itself is a European construct. Although the colonial powers no longer rule, their influence remains. The European powers try to maintain their influence in their former colonies, or at least on their rulers. The leaders of the new states are reminded of their European heritage in more immediate ways (Cosgrove, 1972: 56): “the premises upon which they built their struggle for independence are European in origin”; “the concepts of self-determination and the nation-state itself are European innovations”; “the technical and administrative tools” that they use in their activities to create feasible states are also European in origin.

The new elites in former colonies had direct experience of Europe and with the transfer of power, the new leaders moved into positions and the properties left by departing Europeans.¹¹⁴ At the same time, the state elites that came to power after independence did not successfully help the development of their countries either.¹¹⁵ Their way of ruling aggravated state weakness in the colonies. According to Holsti, weak states “emerged from colonialism, sets of practices and institutions that left important legacies for” the newly independent states (1996: 99-100).¹¹⁶ One can stress that states can be weak because they have – generally following the colonial practice – established systems of social, political, economic domination and injustice (ibid., 107). Therefore, it can be argued that the colonial legacy has mainly caused inadequate “stateness” in the former colonies. These weak internal structures, with the impact of the colonial legacy as well as the subtle influence of the former colonial powers, create instability in the Mediterranean region. These countries constitute suitable grounds for structural violence. For Galtung (1990: 291-305), structural violence means “the unintended

colonies, by making educational opportunities in French available to the local elite and by sponsoring the teaching of the French language. In most areas formerly under French rule, the preservation of an educational system along the French model continues to orient them towards French culture” (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970: 29-30).

¹¹⁴ For the new elites, the European legacy was “so recent and vivid” that Europe was almost the model, on which the postcolonial state was based, but it was also an available model as a “scapegoat”, when governments failed to bring peace and prosperity to their countries (Mayall, 2005: 293).

¹¹⁵ The predominant picture was “one of economic stagnation and continuing authoritarian rule” in the South and Eastern Mediterranean (Jones and Emerson, 2005: 2). While there has been some progress in economic reforms (with the pace of reform varying greatly among countries and being strongly determined by the political leadership’s perceptions of the extent to which economic reform can be undertaken without undermining the interests of the ruling elite), political development has been extremely limited. (Jones and Emerson, 2005: 2).

¹¹⁶ For Holsti (1996: 100), the main source of contemporary state weakness is colonialism. According to Holsti (1996), weak states, which emerge from sets of colonial practices and institutions, are internally unstable and prone to conflict (thus, they constitute zones of war).

and indirect constraints impeding people from their own self-realization when those structures themselves are not natural and immutable”. Structural violence entails great inequalities and tensions, and finds its expression usually in the issues of development and poverty (Oberg, 2006: 31). In this context, one may argue that most of the countries in the South and Eastern Mediterranean states fit the profile of the weak states where structural violence and problems have persisted.¹¹⁷

In the postcolonial period, the Arab countries still had essentially pre-colonial economic structures. During the period of colonization, each of the colonial powers pursued different colonial economic policies. Therefore, it would be misleading for example to suggest that Britain and France had coherent conceptions of their economic aims in their respective colonial territories (Cosgrove, 1972: 57). The philosophy behind particular colonial policies varied from one dependency or from one regional area to another and changed from one time period to another. Although the situation differs from one state to another, many of the Arab countries inherited underdeveloped and unbalanced economies. The major problems confronting these countries are the low development of primary industry, especially in agriculture and textile, and massive unemployment. The states “inherited little intermediate technology that would enable them to make the optimum use of a plentiful labour supply” (Cosgrove, 1972: 57).

For example, according to Sartre, Algeria is the “clearest and most legible” example of the colonial system (2006: 38). In his view, all the good land was already cultivated in Algeria, when the French troops first got there (ibid., 41). He argues that “the story of Algeria is the progressive concentration of European land ownership at the expense of Algerian ownership” (Sartre, 2006: 41). In “Frenchifying and dividing up the property, the structure of the old tribal society was broken without putting anything in its place” but this colonial system turned “the Algerian population into an immense agricultural proletariat” (ibid., 42-43). When “concentration of land ownership” led to the “mechanization of agriculture”, this mechanization created “technology-driven unemployment” where “agricultural labourers

¹¹⁷ Weak states are relatively free from serious external threat while simultaneously the weak state itself poses a serious security threat to major parts of its own population. This paradox is coming from the fact that weak states “are strong in the category of despotic powers, but weak in infrastructural power” (Holsti, 1996: 104). “In the domestic realm, civil society is divided among many different groups, and it is unorganized, with few possibilities of seriously challenging the holders of state power” (Sorensen, 2007: 365). The model of highly stable “personalized authoritarian” rule has been dominant throughout the Arab world (Jones and Emerson, 2005: 2).

were replaced by machines” (Sartre, 2006: 45). Clearly showing what colonial rule did to Algeria, Sartre argued (ibid., 45-46):

Nothing demonstrates better the increasing rigour of the colonial system: you begin by occupying the country, then you take the land and exploit the former owners at starvation rates. Then, with mechanization, this cheap labour is still too expensive; you finish up taking from the natives their very right to work. All that is left for the Algerians to do, in their own land, at a time of great prosperity, is to die of starvation.

A significant outcome of the colonial era was that it restructured the “core-periphery” relation. In the Mediterranean region, on the one hand, states on the northern shores can be considered as the core of the region. Cantori and Spiegel claim that within a given region, “the core consists of a state or a group of states that form a central focus of international politics” (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970: 20). On the other hand, the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries consist the periphery of the Mediterranean. In this case, within a given region, periphery includes all the states that are “alienated from the core sector in some degree by social, political, economic, or organizational factors, but which nevertheless play a role in the politics of” the region (ibid., 22) Hinnebusch argues that the fragmentation of the Arab world and “the creation of a perceived regional bridgehead of the core, Israel, which is kept a regional military superpower” (Hinnebusch, 2009: 204) help the colonial powers to maintain their spheres of influence in the South and Eastern Mediterranean area.

In the postcolonial period, the international community inserted itself in the “state-making process”, in which it was assumed that the new, young countries would duplicate European norms and “would ultimately develop into carbon copies” of European states (Holsti, 1996: 101). This state-making process reminds us the colonial powers’ tool of mimicry. In this state-making project, most of the borders were determined without taking due consideration of the ethnic, religious, political or social communities or political systems. In Holsti’s view this state-making project is an “enterprise” launched by the European civilization (ibid., 125). In this sense, the colonial powers generally tried to create weak and dependent state structures in their former colonies because these weak and dependent state structures could help the colonial powers to protect their accession to economic resources and to prevent the spill-over effects of the problems in these counties. Holsti (ibid., 137) further

argues that weak state structure is an important asset for Western capital because it assures the industrial countries access to Third world resources and makes the state governments dependent on outsiders, and this neocolonial system perpetuates state weakness.

For Holsti (ibid., 194), most weak states are “the features and patterns created and/or sustained by larger forces”.¹¹⁸ According to Zweiri et. al. (2008: 6), some of the nation-states in the Mediterranean “came into existence not as a result of naturally evolving and unique historical, social or political processes reaching a nexus of cohesion, but rather, they emerged as a manifestation of the fragility of colonial powers in the region” such as Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. In other words, border demarcation in the Mediterranean was “made-up by the colonial powers seeking a quick fix to the partition of the region” (ibid.: 21). During that process, the issues of ethnicity, class, religion or society were not given enough consideration. In this context, many states do not even recognize the legitimacy of others, and sometimes consider Israel, Lebanon and Jordan as “artificial creations of the colonial period” (Steinberg, 1995: 177). Valbjorn (2009: 151) claims that these states were constructed “without much historical legacy and with the borders cutting across existing communities” that make them a poor fit between states and their societies. For Holsti (1996: 131), one of the most important consequences of colonialism is “divided communities and/or artificially multiethnic societies”. The end of the Ottoman Empire order created new Arab states by new borders drawn by British and French officials to serve European imperial interests.¹¹⁹ Ever since, Arab leaders have had to cope with the consequences of those borders, which were arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ According to Holsti (1996: 104-106), most weak states share characteristics that are structural: first, in weak states there is the “low level or absence of vertical legitimacy”; second is the “personalization of state” where there is no distinction between the rule and the state; and third, “weak states lack horizontal legitimacy” where there are numerous communities and categories.

¹¹⁹ The most well-known example of conflicts that owe their origins to colonial rule is perhaps the Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine. The Arab-Israeli dispute could be considered as primarily a conflict between two state-building projects (Palestinian and Israeli) “in the same territory that inevitably came into clash with each other and, in the process, attracted the involvement of regional states as well as major powers” (Ayoob, 1999: 251). Another key example of a regional dispute that owed its origins to inadequate stateness and arbitrarily drawn boundary was the struggle between several regional contestants for the control of Lebanon’s destiny (ibid.). Although the Confessional system has ensured the representation of various religious and ethnic groups into the Lebanese political institutions, this formula has proven to be quite vulnerable to external manipulation (Selim, 2003: 337). Provoked in large measure by the weakness of the Lebanese state, this conflict involved not only a bloody civil war in Lebanon that raged for more than 15 years and included as protagonists several Lebanese factions and the Palestine Liberation Organization, but Syrian military intervention and Israeli invasion as well (Lesch, 2006: 42).

¹²⁰ “Indeed, the patterns of post-Ottoman history in the Arab Middle East have been shaped generally by responses to externally imposed conditions that were ill-suited to the needs of the region’s inhabitants.” (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009: 554)

Ayoob (1999: 251) claims that colonial legacies have led to the proliferation of contested demographic and territorial space, and to frequent interstate conflicts in postcolonial regions that “radically undermine regional order. The political, social and economic structures, the poor fit between postcolonial territorial demarcation and population distributions, which are mainly inherited from and result of the colonial era, can be considered as the most important colonial legacies that aggravated the backwardness and weaknesses of the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries. The psychological legacies of colonialism have to some extent hampered the economic development of these states. In fact one may claim that most countries in the South and Eastern Mediterranean have not yet recovered from the period of colonization. As Calleja (2007: 132) points out, the trauma suffered by populations in the region continues to persist beyond political independence. Waites and Stavridis (1999: 37) also contend that nearly all the Mediterranean states, sometimes at the expense of neighbours, have had periods of memorable history and have had periods of violent subjection to enemies in the twentieth century. In their view, this is why the Mediterranean states may understand each other very well but trust each other and also other states very little (ibid., 38). Moreover, some of the Arab Mediterranean states regard the existing states such as Israel as a “colonial fiction” as a Western’s hidden plan to divide and weaken them (Holsti, 1999: 111).

Thus, today there exists a problem of trust between the EU and the SEMP. In this context, colonial rule in the Mediterranean inevitably make the SEMP suspicious about EU’s policies towards themselves and view them as a new form of colonialism. On the other hand, the Union’s conceptualization of and asymmetrical approach to the Mediterranean can also be seen as a neocolonial attempt of the EU. As the former European powers had their state-making project, today it appears that the EU has its own project towards the Mediterranean region. The EU seems to aim at constructing a region that it can control and dominate. In this sense, EU’s region-building approach can be regarded as neocolonial.

2.4. Defining the Mediterranean as a region

As mentioned in the first chapter in details, regions are socially constructed and politically contested, and they come to life as we talk and think about them, in that they are always evolving and changing. From this perspective, a region can be understood as a process

and as a social construction – like a nation, it is “imagined” (Anderson, 1983; Neumann, 2003). Therefore, one may claim, following Braudel (1995a; 1995b), that Mediterranean will be a region if people are ready and able to create it. The Mediterranean, thus, is not a given region but it is constructed. Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis (2006: 337) argue that the Mediterranean is a “space of shared histories and shared conflict”. “For some, it is a beautiful idea; for others, it is a very bad headache” (ibid.). The Mediterranean has been called many things in its long history: “from a cradle of civilization to a cauldron of cultures, the soft underbelly of Europe, and most recently a sink of human-made pollution” (Tickell, 2003: 13). Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis state that the Mediterranean is “both Europe’s mirror and its extension, too close to ignore, too far to embrace” (2006: 337). It is the Other (Arab, Muslim) of Europe at the European Union’s immediate neighbourhood. The Mediterranean is presented as a place “where Europe is confronted with external threats coming from its Southern and Eastern neighbours that need to be contained”, and where the Mediterranean Sea “acts as a frontier and natural barrier” between these two civilizational entities (Volpi, 2006: 119).

Furthermore, the Mediterranean can be considered as a construct built on a physical basis. There is a unified climatic zone and relatively easy navigability, and the exploitation of the vine and the olive-tree seems to provide both unity and distinctiveness (Harris, 2005: 4). One may argue that all the countries of the Mediterranean have two things in common: the shoreline and the climate. However, geographical proximity and climatic similarities not by themselves constitute political entity. Moreover, “geographical definitions in themselves are not simply givens but reflect different modes of perceiving the world” (Moulakis, 2005: 11).

As with any geographical region, defining the exact limits of the Mediterranean region is difficult and challenging. The problem becomes more acute when one looks at the Mediterranean “as signifying the several countries on its shores and their immense cultural and sociopolitical variety” (ibid.). In this context, Christiansen et. al (2000: 401) assert that the common material culture of the Mediterranean (distinct geographic identity and its particular climatic conditions) have not been matched by the parallel emergence of a common shared political or ideational collective identity.

It can be argued that the region might seem to demonstrate the conventional distinction between a developed, peaceful and democratic North and an underdeveloped,

conflictual and undemocratic South. The Mediterranean basin has long been challenged with important cleavages: an economic divide (rich/poor or North/South countries¹²¹); cultural divide (especially after the events of 9/11, “alleged civilizational tensions” between Islam and the West (Solingen and Ozyurt, 2006: 52); a social divide (demographic trends, nutrition, housing, health care, literacy, etc.); a political divide (democracy versus authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian regimes). There is also the absence of regional identity and “we” feeling in the Mediterranean.¹²² At this point it is important to note that although the Mediterranean is described as “a fragmented region, full of conflicts, at the same time it is a transitional zone between the developed North and the developing South” (Pace, 1999: 224).¹²³

2.4.1. Mediterraneanism

One may claim that in the post-Cold War era, a fracture zone between the North and South has replaced the old East-West divide across the Mediterranean (Brauch, 2003: 39). In this context, the Mediterranean has been “presented as a category based on a variety of distinct cultures by the more advanced industrial (colonial) powers of Europe” (Herzfeld, 2005: 49). Horden and Purcell (2000: 20) argue that far from being a convenient geographical designation, the term Mediterranean can be used as a “delicate political weapon”: a means of distinguishing the self (advanced and integrated northern European) from the other (backward and diverse South and Eastern Mediterranean). In their view, by attributing some distinctiveness such as “honor and shame” to Mediterranean peoples, “the Mediterraneanist” desires to make the region be perceived as backward and exotic (Holden and Purcell, 2000: 522).

¹²¹ “The countries of the North are importers of raw materials (especially oil) and exporters of finished goods. The Southern Mediterranean countries are raw material and agricultural product exporters and they import (maintaining a sizable trade imbalance) finished goods. In the EU-North the economies are capital-intensive and the cost of labour is high while in the South the economies are labour-intensive and labour is cheap. Both in the North and South there are sizeable rates of unemployment, but the EU Mediterranean states afford safety net mechanisms and social welfare institutions that tend to cushion the shocks, tempering attendant challenges to political stability” (Couloumbis and Veremis, 1999: 3-4).

¹²² On the northern shore, the states of the Mediterranean share modern industrial and service-based economies, secular political traditions and liberal-democratic structures of government. These countries share a Mediterranean identity that is tightly located “within a broader and more encompassing definition as European” (Christiansen et. al, 2000: 402). On the south coast, collective identification is missing. Despite sharing some cultural identifiers, the states and peoples of the south and eastern Mediterranean appear to have a weaker concept of collective or shared identity (ibid.).

¹²³ Horden and Purcell argue that “[t]here may be cultural, ethnic or linguistic frontiers; but there are no natural ones. There are only frontiers that have arisen out of the interaction between political centers and peripheries. Frontiers are created slowly, not given; they are very often better be conceived as fluid zones of transition between jurisdictions than a clear-cut lines on landscape or map” (2000: 24).

Brauch (2003: 27) refers the Mediterraneanism as “close interaction between the physical and human realms influenced by the climate, the sea, the land, the vegetation, the long tradition of urban life and the resources offered by the Mediterranean environment”. Mediterraneanism is also defined as the idea of sticking to “distinctive characteristics, which the cultures of the Mediterranean have, or have had, in common” (Harris, 2005: 1). It is claimed that, “the idea of a vast Mediterranean culture has frequently served the interests of cultural imperialism” (Herzfeld, 2005: 51). Harris (2005: 38) sees this as a “quasi-Orientalist” desire to assert “cultural superiority and touristic nostalgia”. In his view, concentrating on the Mediterranean may be seen as a Eurocentric cultural imperialism and a cousin of Orientalism (Harris, 2005: 2). In so much as Mediterraneanism is “coined on the model of orientalism, it too can be treated as much more than an ideology –as, in fact, a programme of active political engagement with patterns of cultural hierarchy” (Herzfeld, 2005: 51). One may claim that by promoting a Mediterranean narrative, the powers such as the EU, in a way, re-emphasize its old discourse of European superiority and domination over the South. At the colonial period, this Eurocentric discourse was applied through colonial expansion, imperialism and civilizing mission. In the postcolonial era, it seems that the same discourse is applied by the Union’s policies towards its neighbourhood. Therefore, it is better to analyze the region-building project not simply as a functional project but also through power and culture paradigms.

On the other hand, there have been several problems in evoking the Mediterranean. The first one has been the lack of concerted action among the states in the region (Ferdiou, 2003). Tzifakis argues that the material culture of the Mediterranean region has not been enough for the development of a dense network of regular contacts, or any sort of interdependence among the people and the nations in the region (2007: 48). Calleya defines the pattern of relations in the Mediterranean region as fragmentation that indicates the separate and distinct path of evolution of each of its four sub-regions (2006: 117): the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), the Mashreq (Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority), the Balkans (Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania) and Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta).

The lack of Mediterranean identity or sense of belonging to a single region is generally explained by the complex and conflicting geopolitical history of the area (Christiansen et. al, 2000: 401). In its complexity, the geopolitical context of the

Mediterranean area turns these characteristics into political, economic, cultural and social divergences. As Calleja (2007: 128-129) argues,

Three monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), three forms of government (monarchies, presidential republics, democracies), three predominantly historical eras (the Greek/Roman legacy, Muslim expansion, and the colonial and postcolonial era) and three strong characters (centralists, authoritarians and conservatives) have left this part of the world with a 'divide syndrome'.

Second, Mediterraneanism could not be evoked because the geographical area covering the South-Eastern flank of the Mediterranean has usually been considered as a part of larger area, namely the Middle East. This distinction has given the EU the opportunity to suggest a different spatial representation, namely the Mediterranean. In contrast with the other spatial area of Middle East, in its region-building project, the EU can determine the parameters of the Mediterranean region by its own terms. For example, since its inception, the "Middle East" was used to define an area that has to be controlled and ruled, however, the EU forms its Mediterranean area with reference to dialogue and free exchange of ideas. Although this Mediterranean narrative seems "romantic", in Scheffler's (2003: 263) terms, the EU's region-building attempt has also implied the supremacy of the EU as a model and can be considered as a foreign policy tool of the Union for seeking its self-interests. At this point, it might be useful to have a look at the distinction between the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

2.4.2. The Mediterranean versus the Middle East

The term "Middle East" was invented in 1902 as a part of the British imperial strategy. In this context, one can stress that "the European penetration named" the Middle East and "shaped it in its present form" (Yurdusev, 2009: 83). The invention of the Middle East region is generally credited to the USA's naval power theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan. He used the term the "Middle East" to label the territories along the sea route from the Suez Canal to Singapore, the path to the Far East (Mahan, 1902: 27-45). In his article, Mahan (ibid.) suggested that "Britain should take up the responsibility of maintaining security in the Middle East". As Bilgin (2004b: 26) claims, "the term Middle East took off from then onwards but as time progressed, the area so designated shifted westwards". Scheffler (2003: 265) claims that

the Middle East is not “a historical region in itself, but rather an abstract space encompassing a heterogeneous blend of landscapes and countries” that designed for increasing the British impact over the area.

Creations and applications of the Middle East region by the policy-makers and academics reflect its subjectivity.¹²⁴ According to Bilgin (2004b: 27), “as the military strategic interests and capabilities of the major geopolitical actors of the time changed, the Middle East shifted in tandem with these changes”. During the First World War, the term was used as the “Middle East Command”, and gained prevalence in this framework (ibid.). During the Second World War, British policy-makers started to use the term “with reference to all Asian and North African lands to the west of India” (ibid.). As Bilgin (2005: 69) pinpoints, “towards the end of the Second World War, the United States got involved in the Middle East and adopted the British wartime definition”. Bilgin (2006:12) claims that “the origins of regions have had roots in the security thinking and practices of their inventors”, and that is “why the lands to the south–west of Asia and North Africa have been lumped together in the mind’s eye and labeled as the Middle East is because this particular representation helped British (and later US) strategists think about and organize action for maintaining security in the part of the world”. Although “external presence in the Mediterranean area was featured by reluctant replacement of Great Britain by the US after 1947 with an increasingly proactive foreign policy” (Calleya, 1997: 83, 169), US administrations addressed the area as the Middle East and not the Mediterranean.

According to Buzan and Waever’s “Regional Security Complex Theory”¹²⁵, the Mediterranean can not be considered as a regional security complex because the Mediterranean states are parts of several other regional complexes, and therefore their distinctive pattern of security interdependence cannot be marked, but Buzan and Waever rather take the “Middle East” as a regional security complex (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 187-218).¹²⁶ Fenko argues that “American policy makers appeared to have been engaged in a type

¹²⁴ According to Halliday (2009: 14), “the term Middle East has had relevance and validity as a region, that is partially integrated political and military space, for over a century, even as the definition of the countries comprising it has varied over time”.

¹²⁵ Regional security complexes can be defined as “a set of units whose major processes, of securitization and desecuritization, or both, so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from another” (Buzan, 2003: 141; Buzan et. al, 1998: 201; Buzan and Waever, 2003:44). According to this definition, the units can be states, but also other units can be predominant, and security complexes are not given but constructed in the process of securitization (Buzan, 2003: 142).

¹²⁶ See also Buzan, 1991: 199-200; Buzan, 2003: 144; Buzan et. al, 1998: 14.

of cognitive deconstruction of the Mediterranean, not as a region in the making, but due to the interstate conflicts and potential spill over from the neighbouring countries, as simply part of a regional security complex of the larger Middle East” (2009: 231). In this context, it is claimed that the US has a “Middle East” and the Europeans have a “Mediterranean” policy (Holden, 2010: 11). Therefore, although the Middle East preserved its position as the dominant representation, alternative spatial representations emerged as well, such as the invention of the Mediterranean region by the European Union.¹²⁷

2.5. The significance of the Mediterranean for the EU and EU efforts of region-building

Since the 1960s, the Mediterranean has been a flank of Europe with its regional conflicts and crises, the EU has an interest in regulating the Mediterranean. The end of the Cold War had a significant impact in international relations. In this context, the EU wants “to reproduce itself through encouraging regional integration around the world” (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002: 768) and most importantly in its own periphery. As one of the Union’s natural peripheries, the Mediterranean region is considered as an important element of the EU’s desire of reproducing itself. The Union also wants to stabilize the region and tackle the economic, demographic, and security divides in it. EU is aiming to construct a common vision for the Mediterranean region based on an imposition of European norms and values. This vision forms a significant element of the European’s idea of (re)constructing a Mediterranean region that contains both. For Jones (2006: 421).

The Mediterranean region is the focus for an international region-building project in which a rhetoric of cooperative development, partnership building, and mutual interest promotion veil European anxieties about political instability, the growth of radical terrorist groups, and prospective waves of illegal immigration from south to north. Moreover, the Mediterranean is a site for the reorganization of state power, practices, and activities through region-building processes.

¹²⁷ Some analysts argue that the EU’s invention of the Mediterranean region corresponds to a “Euro-Mediterranean region” because they regard the whole European Union and its Southern neighbourhood as a security complex (Biscop, 2005; Moulakis, 2005). Since many non-Mediterranean states in the EU does not have a special interest in the Mediterranean and since the EU’s Mediterranean policy mainly focused on stabilizing the Southern and Eastern partner countries, this study takes the Mediterranean as its major unit of analysis. It should be recalled at this point that some analysts also use the terms “Mediterranean” and “Euro-Mediterranean” region interchangeably without attaching any particular distinction to their meaning. See for example: Bicchi 2006a; Bilgin, 2004a, 2005; Calleya, 2006; Del Sarto 2006; Pace 2002; Pace, 2004; Pace, 2006.

Although the EU member states do not have the same policy preferences regarding the Mediterranean, they have managed to form some common policies towards the region. Many non-Mediterranean states in the EU usually neglect this region. However, this is not the case for Italy, Spain, France or Greece. There are also some members in northern Europe that have special interests in the region. On the one hand, for historical reasons, Germany is interested in stability in the eastern Mediterranean due to its immigrant Turkish population. On the other hand, the percentage of North Africans living in Belgium and Netherlands raise strong concerns for those EU member states with regard to the rise of Islamist fundamentalism. Moreover, after 2000s, Sweden has also become more interested in the cultural issues of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. In this context, the EU member states want to protect themselves from the spill-over effects of threats coming from the region, and they believe that the region's prospects for peace, stability and prosperity will be challenged if the continuing problems in the Mediterranean related to democracy, good governance, economic development, and security remain unsolved. Accordingly, the EU presents its integration process as a model and pioneers the region-building process in the Mediterranean. It can be claimed that the EU by presenting itself as a model, wants its neighbours to copy its model and to embrace the Union's values. This reminds one the former colonial powers' tool of mimicry, see for example (Cebeci, 2012; Cebeci, 2017). In this sense, one may assert that the mimicry shows itself in the EU's form of region-building approach to the Mediterranean in the postcolonial period.

The EU's attempts at region-building in the Mediterranean is not without problems, however. The patterns of interaction among SEMP's can be considered as more inconsistent and conflictual than cooperative in nature. They generally cooperate in limited fields such as energy or environment. In this context, an external actor's push can be feasible for achieving tighter regional cohesion (Ayoob, 1999: 258-259). Ayoob (ibid., 253) also names several crucial factors for "achieving tighter regional cohesion involving external actor activity": "the presence of a pivotal regional power, legitimate hegemonic or managerial aspirations within the region, insulation of the region from external intervention and undue extra regional influence". Cantori and Spiegel (1970: 25-26) describe two types of externally based regional participation: "politically insignificant involvement" and "politically significant involvement". While the former classification refers to those types of measures that are unlikely to influence the balance of power within a region such as the cultural and educational programmes, material aid, economic investment and trade, the latter classification refers to all

those circumstances where the influence of an outside actor will alter the balance of power within a particular region (Cantori and Spiegel, *ibid.*, 26). There are a number of ways that an external actor can have a direct impact on the evolution of a region such as the possession of a colony, direct military or financial aid, formal alliances or direct military intervention are just some of the options open to an external actor when attempting to gain a foothold in specific area (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970: 26). In this context, one can claim that both types of involvement can have an impact on the dynamics of region-building in the Mediterranean.

By promoting its own integration model, the EU has attempted to enhance its sphere of influence while using the rhetoric of bringing security and stability to conflictual regions. In this context, it has also tried to create a regional cohesion in its South through inventing a Mediterranean region. It can be argued that, in a sense the past unity of the Mediterranean is recalled in the EU's attempt to create a Mediterranean historical narrative, and then to construct a Mediterranean region. As Fenko (2009: 218) argues,

There are many forms of regional cooperation conducted by states, non-states actors and especially multi-actor collectivities that have since the end of the Cold War become important for regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. These regionalizing actors cooperate in many critical areas: environmental protection, culture, science, education, human rights, socioeconomic and security issues.

The EU has been the major actor in fostering regionalism in the Mediterranean, especially in the post-Cold War era. The establishment of the Barcelona Process has been crucial in this regard. Within the context of the Barcelona Process, “the attempts to shape, reinforce or alter the identity of the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries toward the emergence” of a Mediterranean region has mainly come from the EU as an outside actor (Del Sarto, 2006: 299). According to Moulakis (2005: 28), “[i]t would seem then that in all cases a Mediterranean worth conceiving as a meaningful region is always a Euro-Mediterranean. That, of course, is precisely the view advanced by the European Community and by the countries of the Latin arc in particular”. In this context, it seems that “the North seeks to integrate the Mediterranean on its own terms” (*ibid.*, 28-29). Therefore, EU policy makers have recurrently referred to the image of the Mediterranean as the “cradle of civilization”, the “birthplace of the three monotheistic religions” and the “area of cross-fertilization”,

stipulating unity and cultural coherence of the Mediterranean region (Del Sarto, 2006: 298).¹²⁸ Moreover, in this framework, the EU has frequently been emphasizing that “all participants in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership share common interests, namely stability, security and prosperity” (Del Sarto, 2006: 299). In this context, one may argue that by using such Mediterraneanism, the EU (especially the Southern members) wants to keep strategically and economically important countries in its Southern neighbourhood in its sphere of influence. In other words, the Union, in a way, uses Mediterraneanism for its self-interest.

On the other hand, the relationship between the EU and the South and Eastern Mediterranean states did not progress much during the Cold War because of the painful colonial past and also because of the overlaying impact of the superpower conflict. When the Cold War ended, some EU members reconsidered the unity of the Mediterranean and such reconsideration caused the re-emergence of the Mediterranean policy of the EU. Moreover, the events in the region influenced the “EU’s perceptions, discourse and its approach” to deal with the different security challenges in the region (Pace, 2002: 197). Increasing instability with the local regimes, including civil war in Algeria, the Gulf War and the launching of the Middle East Peace Process all contributed to a changing approach. In the post-Cold War era, a strategic definition of the Mediterranean has begun to emerge. With this strategic definition, a model of cooperative security, which would integrate the two shores in one structure, was envisaged for the Mediterranean region. This new environment provided the background for several trans-Mediterranean diplomatic initiatives directed towards region-building through the establishment of an institutional framework (Christiansen et. al, 2000: 402).

The first way in which the EC/EU has aimed at region building in the Mediterranean is conceptual, namely by “classifying neighbouring countries together under regional strategies” (Smith, 2003a: 69). The EC/EU has developed concepts “defining the scope of the Mediterranean and the commonalities that grouped the littoral countries together” (Bicchi, 2006a: 139). Although the process progressed through time, it is possible to identify a crucial period in which the idea of a Mediterranean region started. “The EEC long maintained highly differentiated bilateral relations with most of the countries bordering the Mediterranean for a long time” (Bicchi, 2006a: 139). At the beginning of the 1970s, with its Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), the Community began to “codify” its Southern neighbouring region as the

¹²⁸ “Past unity of the Mediterranean served as myths that bolstered EU policy-makers’ efforts to construct a security zone that includes Europe and the geographically closer North African countries” (Bilgin, 2004a: 273).

“Mediterranean” (ibid.). The Global Mediterranean policy, which replaced the “patchwork” of agreements with a proper “framework”, was “the first successful attempt by the EC at a self-styled foreign policy” (Gomez, 2003: 30-37). While it was not possible beforehand to differentiate between Mediterranean countries and other countries with which the EEC had trade agreements, with this new policy, the Community attempted to construct a region “with which to establish privileged trade relations and towards which a responsibility for development was acknowledged” (Bicchi, 2006a: 141).

The Southern enlargement was also very important for both the EC and the countries involved, and it led to the *de facto* and, in a way *de jure*, partition of the Mediterranean. Bicchi (ibid.) argues that while the Southern enlargement did most to stabilize and progress the development of Greece, Spain and Portugal, it also forced the policy makers to reassess the GMP. With the end of the Cold War, the old strategic considerations of securing the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were transformed into a more generalized interest in the stability of the zone and concern for immigration flows. Although the East-West dynamics were changing at the end of the Cold War, there were no signs of a return to a situation of Mediterranean-centricity. Nevertheless, the opening of the EU toward the East with Germany’s initiative “fueled a desire of the Southern/Latin countries of the Union to create a counterweight by emphasizing the links to the Southern periphery of the EU” (Moulakis, 2005: 30). The EU’s Southern members wanted to strike a fair balance between the North, East and South, and that is how they attempted to highlight the Union’s presence in the Mediterranean.

In this context, the broad idea of a Mediterranean region gained a new momentum with the Barcelona Process in 1995. Conceptualizing the Mediterranean is the first approach. Apart from that, there are two other approaches in which the EU has encouraged the creation of a Mediterranean region: “The first way is the construction of multilateral institutions in which all partner countries participate, and the second is setting the agenda so as to establish a diplomatic dialogue among all participants” (Bicchi, 2006a: 144). Both ways were introduced in 1995 with the launching of the EMP. Beforehand not only the dialogue was solely bilateral, but also the agenda was limited to specific trade issues. In this respect, the EMP can be regarded as “a true breakthrough with previous practices” (ibid.). Bicchi argues that the GMP was based on the “implicit premise that a Mediterranean region just needed to be acknowledged”, but the EMP “set out to actively build that region” (2006: 144). With the

signing of the “Barcelona Declaration” in 1995, the Mediterranean has been tackled as one region, to which the EU has wished to bring peace, stability and prosperity. For Vieira (2006: 8) this discourse led to an approach to deal with security threats from the Mediterranean in the form of dialogue and cooperation.

As Bilgin (2006: 68) argues, “defining and redefining regions are political processes that are continually” being redefined in line “with the changing security interests and concerns of the major actors”. In this sense, the EU’s notion of the Mediterranean has been constituted by the individual member states’ concerns and interests which range from Spain and France’s focus on the Maghreb to Italy’s (and Greece’s) focus on the Balkans. What unites these concerns and interests on the Mediterranean is security perceptions regarding the Mediterranean (as a zone of conflict), with which the individual member states cannot deal alone. Therefore, securitization seems to be the most important point in the member states’ approach toward the Mediterranean. Bilgin claims that the inventors of the Mediterranean region give “primacy to different kinds of threats depending on the security conceptions of their proponents” (ibid., 12). Because concerns and interests change over time, the ways in which these regimes are defined are also changed.

The EU’s conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a region does not involve Middle Eastern states which do not have Mediterranean shores (such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Gulf states and Yemen). The Mediterranean is constructed by the EU not as “a neutral reality but as a contested concept, the meaning of which is not fixed but fluid” (Pace, 2006: 117). This also reveals the importance of the speech act in the construction of the Mediterranean by the EU. On the other hand, the EU’s definition of the Mediterranean remains a flexible one. As Vieira (2006: 23) argues, “the EU gave a Mediterranean identity to a number of states, and by doing so it partially defined the borders of the Mediterranean”. For example, when the Union for the Mediterranean was launched in 2008, the Mediterranean identity has also been given to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro. For now, although its borders are not permanent and rather subject to changes, for the EU, there is a particular region called the Mediterranean.

Calleya (2006: 110) argues that “since the end of the Cold War, regionalism has been carried forward by the most powerful states as a means of promoting their own interests”. The EU’s self interest lies in having a secure and stable neighbourhood. The EU fears the spill

over effects of the conflicts of the South and Eastern Mediterranean to the Union. For Biscop (2005: 38), “the neighbourhood can also be seen as the area in which the EU deems it has a specific responsibility for peace and security, and therefore aspires to a directly leading role”. Thus, Pace (2006: 104) emphasizes that the “EU discourses on the Mediterranean highlight where EU interests lie rather than where the Mediterranean partners’ need are most urgent”. In this context, one may stress that the EU’s Mediterranean policies are formed to prevent the region’s problems from spilling over into the Union, not to helping its partners to solve their problems. In the European Union language, “fostering regional cooperation and partnership in its neighbours and especially the Mediterranean has been widely used as a way to cope with the Union’s security concerns”: for example, security issues linked to immigration – drug trafficking or organised crime – energy security matters, and spill-over effects from regional conflicts (Moschella, 2004: 60).

The EU’s region building approach can be viewed as its attempt to export its values and its integration model in order to stabilize its Southern periphery. The EU sees itself as a major stabilizing factor in its neighbourhood, not only because of its economic weight but also because of its normative power: i.e., “ideational projection” (Scott, 2005: 438). Thus, it is possible to interpret the EU’s region-building as the new civilizing mission of the Union, just like the old European colonial powers. In this context, it is possible to claim that the EU is not acting as a normative power, it is still acting as a civilizing power¹²⁹, and, thus, is projecting its own understanding of norms and its own integration model to the rest of the world. A significant component of the EU’s region-building endeavor in the Mediterranean is the attempt to form a shared Mediterranean identity for the South and Eastern Mediterranean states. For the EU, “being a Mediterranean country and belonging to a Euro-Mediterranean region are not only matters of culture and geography” but they also require “a particular regional order in political terms” (Del Sarto, 2006: 296). Therefore, one may claim that, with this region-building approach and with the promotion of the Mediterranean narrative, the EU attempts to shape how the South and Eastern Mediterranean states define themselves.

The EU constructs the Mediterranean region mainly based on two interrelated approaches: the civilization approach, which is related with construction of the self and the other; and the security approach. In this context, one can interpret these approaches as a

¹²⁹ On civilizing power see Hans Maull (2005), and on its interpretation in neocolonial lines see Bono (2006) and Onar and Nicolaidis (2013).

neocolonial reading of the region by the EU. Neocolonial here refers to the ongoing practices of constituting a Mediterranean narrative, which defined the Mediterranean as less than European as a region needs European guidance.

2.5.1. The civilization approach

Civilization approaches are concerned with the constructions of Self and Other “that describe and legitimate colonial powers” (Phillips and Jones, 2008: 730). Othering means that “collective identities are always constructed against the difference of an other” (Diez, 2005: 627). In this context, an identity can represent the other as an “existential threat” or as “inferior” (ibid.). In the either Orientalist version of othering, the self is simply constructed as superior to the other. As far as the relation between the EU and the Mediterranean is concerned, the EU is using both of these representations while constructing the Mediterranean region. The EU’s foreign policy towards the Mediterranean can be interpreted as a process of constructing the Mediterranean at the same time as it constructs Europe (Pace, 2002: 189).¹³⁰ In this context, the EU’s attempt to build a Mediterranean region is an activity that constructs the Mediterranean as its Other.

In the post-Cold War era, “the European Union sought to re-inscribe a European identity partly by inventing a Mediterranean other” (Bilgin, 2004a: 272). In a similar vein, Calleya argues that Europe cannot “neglect its southern flank without ignoring its proper roots and identity” (Calleya, 1997: 152).¹³¹ With its Mediterranean policies, the EU attempts to construct the Mediterranean as “something manageable, something to be treated in certain ways. In this context, Europe is constructed as democratic, progressive, advanced, Christian and civilized in comparison to the Mediterranean which is underdeveloped, lacking democracy (in parts), Muslim, etc.” (Pace, 2004: 302). Therefore, one may argue that the EU is using an Orientalist language in approaching and constructing the Mediterranean region. Such Orientalist language constructs a permanent image of the superior West (the EU/self) against the negatively defined the backward and inferior East (South and Eastern

¹³⁰ “On the one hand, the EU is constructing its political identity by a selective reading of its legacy of 2500 years of humanistic civilization, from the Greek polis to Roman law, from Renaissance republican culture and Enlightenment as a shared and secularized background for its unification process. On the other hand, it emphasizes the process democratic learning from the past tragedies and the aggressive policies implemented by Europeans (colonialism, intolerance, Fascism, etc.)” (Telo, 2007: 223).

¹³¹ In this context, the EU seeks its “supposed roots and ideological justifications in the ancient Mediterranean world that nurtured it”, however, for Amin (1989: 3), these “supposed roots are sought exclusively in the regions of the Mediterranean area that have remained Christian”.

Mediterranean/other). For example, Orientalists claim that the Arabs “show lack of coordination and harmony in organization and function, nor have they revealed an ability of cooperation”, and “[a]ny collective action for mutual benefit or common profit is alien to them” (Said, 2003: 110). One may claim that this view is still common today. The EU thinks that the South and Eastern Mediterranean (especially its former colonies) countries need European guidance for political reform and regional integration as well as trade liberalization. When one looks at the Union’s attitude towards the Mediterranean, she/he can see that by naming the region and by exporting its own integration model, the EU acts as a neocolonial power with the claim that it can bring peace and prosperity to the region. In this sense, the EU usually underestimates the organizational abilities, political skills and the internal and external problems of its South and Eastern Mediterranean partners.

According to Orientalist thinking, a hierarchy of “civilizations”¹³² exists. It is significant that the civilization approach reappeared in the modern period as a means of furthering cultural and political domination, as well as the economic exploitation in the past (Phillips and Jones, 2008: 731). Colonial powers deployed forces against states and populations in the periphery “in the service of the imperial project of extending European rule and social institutions to the rest of the world” (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999: 414), in other words, extending European civilization. In this context, European powers used their “standards of civilization” in order to deal with their colonies (Bilgin, 2009: 116). Braudel argues that “the mark of living civilization is that it is capable of exporting itself, of spreading its culture to distant places, and, therefore, it is impossible to imagine a true civilization that does not export its people, its ways of thinking and living” (1990b: 763). Today, the EU uses diplomatic and economic tools to extend its influence and to export its civilization to other countries.¹³³ This is also the case for its Mediterranean policy. In a way, the EU acts as an empire and tries to export its values to the Mediterranean region.

¹³² Civilization is often defined in vague terms. Huntington (1996: 42) defines civilization as “the inevitable destiny of a culture”. For Mozaffari (1998: 31), when “a specific world vision is realized through a historical system” or an empire, this system is called civilization.

¹³³ For Zielonka, “European norms and regulations are progressively being adopted across the world, prompting accusations of “regulatory imperialism” (Zielonka, 2008a: 474). “The Union looks and acts like an empire because it tries to assert political and economic control over various peripheral actors through formal annexations or various forms of economic and political domination” (ibid., 475). In Zielonka’s view, “this kind of imperial politics is most pronounced in the periphery of Europe, but one can also trace similar policy patterns towards more distant parts of the world” (ibid.).

Values such as progress, freedom, equality, justice, democracy, secularism, criticism, good governance, human rights and dialogue are usually constructed as basic representing characteristics of Western civilization. Identification with these concepts revive the European feeling: “‘our’ civilization is bigger, better, and more advanced than ‘others’, that ‘we’ have a right to invade annex and control territories (...) and that ‘we’ have a moral duty to export and impose our concepts of progress upon other civilizations whether they want it or not” (Boyle, 2008: 726). For example, during a press conference in Berlin on September 26, 2001, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi stated that “We should be conscious of the superiority of our civilization, which consists of a value system that has given people widespread prosperity in those countries that embrace it and guarantees respect for human rights and religion (BBC, 2001).”

The EU, by using the region-building approach, tries to create a Mediterranean civilization. Boyle argues that “old habits die hard” (2008: 725). In Boyle’s view, “once more the resurgence of colonial and imperial projects is being accompanied by the birth of a new genre of civilizational thinking in geopolitics” (ibid.). In this context, it can be claimed that this kind of “civilizational” thinking is a new form of imperialism, and in the case of the Mediterranean, as an advanced and powerful entity, the European Union acts with the assumption that it knows better than its SEMP, and therefore it has a moral duty to impose and export the Union’s norms towards them. One may argue that EU, in a way, sees itself as a model for the world due to its integration model and its norms that are based on democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. For example, in his speech Jose Manuel Barroso (2009) claimed that the EU’s original construction makes the Union a role model for a global world order in which “Europe is leading by example”, and the EU uses its model to regulate its neighbourhood

Moreover, it is claimed that the European Union, by (re)constructing the Mediterranean, “has sought to re-inscribe a European identity via foreign and security policy making” (Pace, 2002). In this context, the EU’s foreign policy towards its southern neighbours has served to make the latter foreign (Bilgin, 2004a: 275). Indeed, the EU’s differentiated approach to security in the Eastern and Southern peripheries that characterized the 1990s could be interpreted as “pointing a shift in the EU discourse towards civilizational geopolitics” (ibid., 276). When “the issue of the membership of the former Warsaw Pact “countries is discussed, they are presented as “returning to Europe” (Bilgin, 2004a: 275) and

uniting Europe, whereas Morocco's application for membership was rejected because it was not considered as European on geographical terms although it is 15 miles away from Spain. According to Bilgin (2004a: 276.), "such practices of the European Union have not only helped to shape European identity by identifying who is or is not European, but also hinted at a return to civilizational geopolitics".

In fact, in the EU discourse while the former Warsaw Pact countries' accession to the EU were presented as a return to Europe, the Mediterranean has been presented as a zone of conflict as opposed to peaceful Europe. In other words, while the EU presents itself as zone of peace, in order to secure the interests of the Union based on the belief that "the zone of conflict can penetrate in to the zone of peace" (Buzan, 2000, 10-11)¹³⁴, it presents the South and Eastern Mediterranean area as a zone of conflict that should be contained.¹³⁵ As far as Euro-Mediterranean relations is concerned, while the South and Eastern Mediterranean Other is represented with negative terms – an area of threat, instability and conflict – the EU is constructed positively as an area of cooperation and peace (Stetter, 2007: 58). In other words, in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, one side is represented as a model, the other as a threat. This brings us to the issue of the EU's security approach to the Mediterranean.

2.5.2. The security approach

The EU constructs the Mediterranean region by redefining it especially through security approaches. After the end of the Cold War new security threats emerged and, consequently, the Union has tried to address the root causes of these threats. It can be said that while doing this, the EU began a process of construction or reconstruction of the Mediterranean, "turning it into a geopolitical area of concern to Europe" (Bilgin, 2004: 270-273; Pace, 2004: 265). The EU member states aim to secure oil and gas supplies on which Europe is dependent. Moreover, in the long term, the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries are considered as large potential markets for European goods. In this sense, the EU's Mediterranean policies are designed to encourage economic development, promote the rule of law, seek the protection of human rights and support the growth of democratic

¹³⁴ For a similar study, which uses the same quotation see: Cebeci, (2006: 5).

¹³⁵ For those powers for which the Mediterranean has traditionally been the zones of "terrorist states, the mafia, and amoral familism", "all these characteristics interlinked as the basis of an explicit fatalism can be considered as the proof of supposedly inherent characteristics that justify paternalistic and oppressive responses" (Herzfeld, 2005: 57).

institutions in the region. Pace recognizes all of these objectives as the “regular security policies” of the EU (Pace, 2006: 113). Nevertheless, when the EU’s policy makers speak of security in the Mediterranean, the security referent “is not necessarily the Mediterranean but Europe” (Bilgin, 2004a: 274-275). Therefore, the EU aims to solve (or at least to freeze) some Mediterranean problems mainly through cooperation and dialogue so that these problems would not threaten security in Europe. According to the Union’s 2007-2013 Regional Strategy Paper for the Mediterranean:

The Mediterranean region is of strategic importance to the EU, in both economic (trade, energy, migration) and political (security, stability) terms. The political situation in the region is characterised by persistent tensions due to the Middle East conflict, the war in Iraq and its spill-overs to other countries, regular upsurges of terrorist activity, and in some countries domestic political tensions, lack of political openness and increasing popularity of political Islam movements. In the economic domain, a combination of fast demographic and labour force expansion and slow economic growth is resulting in high unemployment and stagnating incomes. The economic situation is aggravated by three socio-political “deficits”, the freedom deficit, the women’s empowerment deficit and the lack of access to knowledge and education. The prospects for long-term economic growth are further threatened by the non-sustainable management of the environment and natural resources (Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 3).

In this context, as Vieira (2006: 5) contends, “the EU perceives the Mediterranean as an area of insecurity from which threats emanate, posing a challenge to European security”.¹³⁶ This alleged insecurity has been an important reason for the region-building efforts in the Mediterranean. For Vieira (ibid.), “security is enough of a criterion to bind” the Mediterranean countries, which “supposedly belong to a coherent region” together. According to Pace, “the Mediterranean becomes more ‘real’ on the EU agenda when issues are conceived as a threat to Europe’s security [...] Thus, what unifies the Mediterranean in European eyes and the issues that make discourse of the Mediterranean ‘effective’ [...] are security matters”. (Pace, 2002: 203, 204). It is argued that “security concerns form a substantial part of EU regional creation in the Mediterranean”, and moreover, the EU is trying to create “an other characterized by elements of insecurity” (Vieira, 2006: 6).

¹³⁶ According to EU, “The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners” (Solana, 2003: 8) in order to prevent the spill over effects of these problems to the Union.

The interdependent nature of demographic, migratory and conflictual factors is also “equated to the structural instability and insecurity of the Mediterranean” (Pace, 2004: 293). In this context, one may claim that while the regional conflicts and the economic, political and social cleavages are the main sources of insecurity in the South and Eastern Mediterranean, the risks such as terrorism, immigration, etc. are considered as the major problems for the northern Mediterranean due to the trans-boundary effects of these type of risks. But at the same time, the security problems in the region provide a basis for the EU to form policies toward the issues. Issues that are considered as a threat to peace and stability in the region and a concern for the EU are the threats of immigration flows, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, regional conflicts and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMP). More importantly, European Union, with a scarcity of natural resources, attaches great importance to securing its energy supplies in the Mediterranean.¹³⁷ In this context, energy security for the EU can be regarded as sustained oil and natural gas supply at reasonable prices.¹³⁸

Most of the countries in the South and Eastern Mediterranean face huge social problems due to economic deficiencies, the rising unemployment and huge population growth. Moller (2003: 282) argues that population growth is the “most serious security problem for the North if resource depletion in the South should lead to a tidal wave of immigration to the North, especially affecting countries in the borderland between the North and the South such as the entire Mediterranean region”. In fact, the South and Eastern Mediterranean suffers from a negative image about the economic, political and social stability in the area “coupled with the cost related to corruption or inefficient administration systems that foreign investors have to face” (Pace, 2006: 59). In the medium to long term, the huge – and widening – “gap between haves and have-nots in terms of access to the public goods should be considered the primary security concern in the region” (Biscop, 2005: 38). In the European Security Strategy, Solana (2003: 7) emphasizes that it is in the EU’s self-interest

¹³⁷ As the ESS states, “Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.” (Solana, 2003: 3). Brauch (2003: 59) claims that “the advanced EU economies will depend on increasing *energy supply insecurity*” (emphasis original). Therefore, he believes that this growing dependence of Europe to the Mediterranean region requires developing “realistic goals for sustainable development strategies for the energy sector in enduring North-South partnership” (ibid.).

¹³⁸ It is important to note that energy supplies in the region can sometimes be used as a leverage by the Arab countries. For example, Arab states first used oil as a significant diplomatic tool during the 1973 October War.

that countries on its borders are “well-governed”.¹³⁹ In this context, the EU seeks to advance the conditions in Mediterranean countries in order to guarantee social and political stability in the area and indirectly in Europe, and aims to prevent internal and interregional conflicts.¹⁴⁰

The proximity of the Mediterranean countries, in a way, compels the EU to take into account perceived dangers so close at its borders. Reis (2008: 17) claims that “the ultimate European nightmare would see the cutting off of vital trade routes, particularly those supplying energy (oil/gas), accompanied by massive waves of refugees escaping from troubles across the sea – “boatpeople”¹⁴¹ who cannot be simply turned away, as happens with illegal migrants”. One may argue that the revolutionary conditions, regional and internal conflicts in the South and Eastern Mediterranean can cause (and have caused) massive waves of refugees flooding the Northern shores of the Mediterranean. In this case, these refugees can “destabilize social and political balances, leading to increased unemployment as well as the racist, exclusivist and chauvinistic political forces throughout Europe” (Coulombis and Veremis, 1999: 11-12). Moreover, Moller (2003: 282) argues that “if sufficiently massive, such migration flows might conceivably place national identity in the receiving countries at risk”.

Therefore, for the EU, the objective of ensuring stability and reducing immigration in the South and Eastern Mediterranean (Morocco is especially a significant source and a transit country for irregular immigration into the EU) is often highlighted as an important rationale underlying its Mediterranean policies (Khakee, 2008: 8). While in the early 1970s immigration was considered to be “instrumental to economic development” in Northern European countries and did not raise any “specific concern”, between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, a radical change took place in European perceptions (Bicchi, 2007: 134).¹⁴² In this context, immigration has been portrayed as a threat to the security of

¹³⁹ “Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe” (Solana, 2003: 7) and “Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries [...] on the borders of the Mediterranean” (ibid., 8).

¹⁴⁰ For European Union, the difficult economic situation had a significant impact on the domestic political conditions of the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries. Political authoritarianism, demographic growth and debt-burdened weak economies provided a suitable environment for socio-economic and political frustration (Haddadi, 2006: 169-170).

¹⁴¹ For example, “[f]rom 1992 the prospect of the advent to power of Islamists in Algeria, and the increase in daily violence, led French public opinion to fear an invasion of Algerian boat people.” (Meyrede, 1999: 49)

¹⁴² In 1970s, Europe was open to “massive importation of manpower” necessary to keep up with the rate of internal expansion, and, not by chance, this immigration was flowing from the areas of European dependence (the Arabs, the Africans) (Amin, 1989: 9).

European citizens because it was believed that through immigration not only people, but also the problems, which were associated with the South and Eastern Mediterranean societies could enter into the European Union. Today, it is believed that immigration poses severe economic and social challenges and becomes a cultural threat to European societies (especially to those of the EU's Mediterranean members).¹⁴³ Therefore, immigration has become a strong motivation for the EU when addressing the Mediterranean.¹⁴⁴

The Mediterranean is also a region, which suffers from the terrorist activities and organized crime. There exist, especially for the US, some states that are labeled as rogue states in the Mediterranean, which are sponsoring terrorism in their struggle to become a regional power. At this point it is important to note that EU avoids using the term “rogue states”¹⁴⁵ (Cebeci, 2004: 312). The US and some European powers such as Britain use this terminology. Instead, the EU uses the term “state failure” that is a more general phenomenon and refers to a state weakness as a “fertile ground for terrorism and organized crime” (ibid.). For example, some analysts consider Lebanon and Algeria as failed states in the Mediterranean because of “their inability to bring into appropriate balance the goals of sustainable state power, wealth and welfare” (Couloumbis and Veremis, 1999: 15). As Abu Jaber (2003: 10) points out, “the failure of the development efforts, coupled with the population explosion, have led to mostly frail and fragile economies and a social peace constantly threatened”. Moreover, the increasing unemployment and underdevelopment have also caused to expand the bounds of poverty in the South and Eastern Mediterranean. Terrorism is another challenge in the Mediterranean. Syria and Libya are the two Mediterranean states, which are cited in the American list of state-sponsored terrorism. The

¹⁴³ The accession of Spain into the EC alerted the Europeans to the potential dangers of illegal immigration. In this context, Morocco (the traditional channel for African immigration to Spain) was seen as the weakest link in EU's defences (Mayall, 2005: 312). As Hansen points out, Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, “have come to serve as hubs in the Union's escalating fight against the so-called mounting problem of illegal immigration from Africa and elsewhere” (2002: 488). For the sole purpose of preventing African refugees and immigrants from entering mainland Spain and the rest of the EU, with the support of Union, the Spanish government has invested some 120 million dollars in the building of a surveillance radar system in the Strait of Gibraltar (ibid.).

¹⁴⁴ It is quite interesting to note that during the colonial period, this immigration situation was vice versa. For a long time, the Mediterranean has been “a zone of both gaps and passages between the North and South” Wenden, 2003: 442. During the colonial period, “North-South migration has become dominant: colonizers, merchants, missionaries, military troops have invaded the Southern territories: France in Algeria since 1830, then in Tunisia and Morocco in the middle of the 19th century, Italy in Libya, Spain in Morocco (enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, Spanish Morocco of Southern Sahara), the United Kingdom in the Middle East (Egypt and Palestine), Syria and Lebanon by France after World War I as a mandate of the League of Nations” (ibid.). The South-North immigration has intensified especially between Maghreb and Europe in the postcolonial era (ibid., 443).

¹⁴⁵ States who are currently considered rogue states by the USA are Iran, North Korea, Syria and Sudan.

existence of such states and powerful terrorist organizations in the Mediterranean can be considered as an important factor for instability in the region.

Although since the late 1980s, terrorist activities in Europe had declined steadily, in the early 1990s, terrorism resurfaced in European debates, in the form of a possible attack by Islamic fundamentalists on European soil. The aspiration of fundamentalists to spread Islam “from below” constituted the perfect “seedbed for terrorist attacks” (Bicchi, 2007: 143). The terror attacks of 9/11, along with the Madrid (March 11, 2004) and London (July 7, 2005) terrorist bombings, “have shifted the coordinates of the complex system of Euro-Mediterranean relations; they have shaken up intra-regional relations and have influenced the evolution of domestic politics within the region” (Jünemann, 2003: 1). In the aftermath of the events of 9/11, “immigration related to Islam has been discussed as a security issue” (Wenden, 2003: 441) in the context of terrorism. In other words, immigration and Islamic fundamentalism are associated with terrorism. While the broad phenomenon of terrorism is not new, the EU member states face difficulties about how to fight with the roots of terrorism. Moreover, terrorism evokes issues of immigration when Europeans address the Mediterranean, and together with Islamic fundamentalism, constitutes a strong motivation toward the adoption of initiatives toward the area such as the Barcelona Process or the European Neighbourhood Policy. As the ESS points out,

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society. Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable. (Solana, 2003: 3)

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is also considered as an important threat to the Union’s security.¹⁴⁶ Despite the forces of globalization and interdependence, and the

¹⁴⁶ “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The

reduction of the European nuclear arsenal, the Euro-Med is a prime arena for storing and deployment of the WMD (Selim, 2000: 133).¹⁴⁷ One may claim that “the Euro-Med actors still view these weapons as an ultimate security guarantee, and whoever develops them first attempts to prevent others from pursuing a similar course of action” (ibid.). One may further assert that the number of regional conflicts in which chemical weapons are actually used is more threatening. Egypt used chemical weapons in the Yemeni Civil War in 1963- 69, and Libya used them in the war against Chad in 1987. These examples signal the possibility that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to increase in the future. Therefore, this situation is generally perceived as an important threat for the Union’s neighbourhood security.¹⁴⁸

Regional conflicts also exist in the European Union’s Southern neighbourhood. The Union’s “proximity and its magnetic power of attraction have created the potential for a constructive European involvement” in this region (Tocci, 2004). Although the regional conflicts in the Mediterranean do not threaten the Union’s security directly, its dependency on the region’s energy supplies, vulnerability to the threat of terrorism and its historical links force the EU to pay more attention to the regional conflicts in the Mediterranean area. For the EU, regional conflicts generally have an impact on European interests indirectly.¹⁴⁹ The long-standing “Arab/Israeli conflict”¹⁵⁰, perhaps the most important regional problem, and the Western Sahara conflict affect peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean region. Although the EU, in a way, tries to distance itself from the “Western Sahara problem”¹⁵¹, the EU is more

spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.” (Solana, 2003: 3-4).

¹⁴⁷ WMD are characterized by their accessibility, transferability, usability and ability to inflict unacceptable losses (Selim, 2000: 135). Therefore, “the existence and possible proliferation of such weapons within the Euro-Mediterranean region are undoubtedly perceived as threats for the states in the whole region” (Heller, 2000: 158).

¹⁴⁸ Thus, “the actors pledged in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, to incorporate the question of WMD in the Euro-Med projected security arrangements through a strategy of non-proliferation and establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East” (Selim, 2000: 154).

¹⁴⁹ According to ESS, regional conflicts “destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict” (Solana, 2003: 4).

¹⁵⁰ As Pfetsch, (2003: 150-151) emphasizes, “[t]he most war-prone and bloody conflict cluster of the Mediterranean region has been that between Israel and its neighbours. Since its foundations as a state in 1948 Israel has been engaged in one of the most complex conflict the world has known. Not only neighbouring countries are involved, but also regional and international powers”.

¹⁵¹ Despite its weight as “a potential broker”, the European Union “remained disengaged from the conflict (Darbouche, 2007: 2). The EU’s cautiousness and its will to maintain the status quo is based on the belief that a

interested in finding a peaceful solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict. For Gomez (2003: 121), the EU's role in the Arab/Israeli conflict is considered as a "benchmark" of the Union's status as an international political actor. The Arab/Israeli conflict provides the EU a significant opportunity to exert influence beyond its borders and shape the behaviour of the conflicting parties. Thus, one may argue that involvement in the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict may offer the EU to have a credible and effective presence both in the Mediterranean and in the international arena.¹⁵²

Before the Arab Uprisings, the existence of despotic/authoritarian regimes in the SEMP's was also an issue which raised expectations from the EU in terms of applying sanctions on the region. Nevertheless, due to the security concerns listed above, especially the fear that democratization in those countries might bring Radical Islamist rule and instability, which might cause more immigration, EU member states preferred to work with those authoritarian regimes without applying any sanctions on them against their human rights abuses. The Arab Uprisings that took place in those countries were rather a consequence of their own internal dynamics. The aftermath of the revolts, on the other hand, showed that the region has become open to many security challenges to a more intense level including instability, terrorism and immigration. This new and complex nature of the state of affairs in the Mediterranean creates cause of concern for the EU which will be analyzed in the final chapter.

Moulakis (2005: 13-14) argues that the Mediterranean region is "fractured along political, strategic, economic, and cultural lines that run both between and within states, often occasioning violent conflict". In the postcolonial era, "the socioeconomic and cultural rift that separates the North from the South seems indeed to grow ever wider" (ibid.:14). Within this

return to an armed conflict in the Western Sahara, especially in a context of international terrorism, would have serious negative consequences not only for the stability of the Maghreb but potentially for Europe as well.

¹⁵² The Balkan countries, because of their geographical proximity to EU, and their potential membership in the EU in the future, represent globally a contentious area for the EU member states. Although some of the Balkan countries are included in the Union for the Mediterranean, the regional conflicts in the Balkans are not addressed in this study due to the fact that these conflicts have mostly been tackled under the Union's Balkan policies to date. Also, the Cyprus dispute is not addressed in this study. This is mainly because the dispute has become an issue between an EU member country and a candidate country. On the other hand, the Arab-Israeli conflict is only mentioned when and where necessary. Therefore, it can be claimed that due to its focus on region-building rather than security, the dynamics of the conflict in the Mediterranean, in their current form, do not fit well in the scope of this thesis. This study is mainly about the EU's policies in the Mediterranean neighbourhood (i.e. the EU's policies and impact on those countries in the Mediterranean that do not have the prospect for EU membership) in the postcolonial era. Therefore, it is not about the EU's security impact on its neighbours, candidates or its own member states.

context, it can be argued that the gap between the Northern and Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean has rapidly increased since the end of the Cold War. For Henderson and Singer (2009: 295), this gap reflects, “not only the disparate economic fortunes of these two regions but their disparate politico-military fates as zones of peace and zones of war, respectively”. This gap and the belief of the Mediterranean as a zone of conflict prepare the foundations of EU’s policies towards the region. On the one hand, all those imbalances and state fragility have caused structural violence in the South and Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, the structural violence and state fragility in the region make the EU to securitize the issues of immigration, terrorism, etc, and make the EU to adopt policies to secure itself from the threats emanating from the region.

Concluding remarks

This study asserts that the term Mediterranean does not just refer to a natural region but further it is a political construction. The term is not defined according to the nature of the area or its political, cultural, civilizational and demographic characteristics but it is derived from concerns and interests of external actors. The Mediterranean is invented, not because this part of the world shares a common history and culture or has a strong regional consciousness and therefore constituted a region, but it serves as a convenient geopolitical concept to help some of the EU members to influence this part of the world and to describe a part of the world that is crucial to EU’s security concerns and interests. At the same time it is invented to construct an identity for the EU. After all, the Mediterranean region is a geopolitical invention of the EU designed to serve the EU’s security interests, mainly as an attempt to stop the South and Eastern Mediterranean problems from becoming European problems. Moreover, the security problems in the region provide the opportunity for Europe to control and influence the region.

In this context, the EU, by using the region-building approach, tries to promote a Mediterranean narrative and to create a Mediterranean civilization. This civilizational thinking can be regarded as a neocolonial behaviour by the EU through exporting its norms and its own integration model to the SEMP. Therefore, one can argue that the today, the EU is, in a way, acting as an empire and by using its diplomatic, economic and political tools, it is trying to export its values to the Mediterranean region. In this sense, it can be asserted that the European Union is creating a new type of civilization based on its values, norms and its own

integration model. In a way, the European Union, based on its values such as democracy, the rule of law or human rights and its model, attempts to civilize the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries. Therefore, one can argue that the EU is conceptualizing the region as an instable and weak area that needs European help, and where it can establish a strong and effective European presence. The EU also perceives the Mediterranean as a zone of conflict that should be contained. In this sense, the Mediterranean region is externally and politically constructed to serve the EU's interests.

The next chapter attempts to analyze the nature of the European Union's foreign policy. One can assert that regarding the Union's policies towards the Mediterranean, the EU can act both as a normative and a neocolonial power at different times. In this context, it is important to have a look at the EU's international identity in order to analyze the EU's approach to the Mediterranean. In the following chapter, a conceptual differentiation of the EU's normative power, civilian power and civilizing power is made and the disciplining power of the European Union is analyzed.

3. THE EU'S REPRESENTATIONS AS AN ACTOR/POWER IN THE WORLD: NORMATIVITY VS INTERESTS

The nature of the EU's policies on the Mediterranean cannot be understood without scrutinizing the nature of European foreign policy. This chapter aims at portraying the EU's role in world politics with a view to reflecting on its policies in the Mediterranean. This chapter looks into how depictions of the EU as a specific type of power helps it pursue policies which are based on a centre-periphery logic, asymmetrical, interest-driven and mostly accompanied by a normative claim; i.e. policies which are marked by a neocolonial tendency. The EU's imposition of its disciplining power on its neighbours, on the other hand, raises the questions if the European Union uses this role for gaining advantage and re-building European hegemony over the South and Eastern Mediterranean partners or if it aims to pursue a normative agenda to create an area of democracy and peace; stabilizing and helping development in the region.

This chapter is designed in a way to look into how the international identity of the EU is portrayed first, it involves a thorough review of the existing literature in this regard. There is no one single interpretation of the EU's international actorness. The EU is regarded by different analysts as a "civilian power", "normative power", "normative hegemon". "civilizing power" etc. Each of these concepts can refer to a different kind of power that the EU attempts to exert. Thus, the second section, after analyzing the notion of power, provides a conceptual differentiation of the EU's normative power, civilian power and civilizing power in order to shed light on the nature of the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean. The third section scrutinizes the disciplining power of the European Union in a similar vein.

3.1. International identity of the European Union

This part of the study investigates how the international identity of the EU is conceptualized. The first part looks into the representations of the EU as a distinct foreign policy actor. The second part discusses how the EU represents itself and evaluates what kind of an actor the EU is.

3.1.1. The EU's representation as a *sui generis* entity and the metaphors used for defining the EU

The EU has traditionally been considered as a “different” type of international actor in both academic debates and policy discourses (Manners and Whitman, 2003). Academics have tried to define the EU's foreign policy characteristics since it has become clear that the EU is an external actor in its own right. However since the EU is neither a state nor a classical international organization, this is not an easy task to accomplish. Therefore, defining the character of the EU becomes a contested issue. Holland (1995: 556) argues that the EU can be considered as a foreign policy actor, but one that operates within specific and *sui generis* constraints. Cameron (2007: 5) defines the EU as a “strange animal” not quite a state but with more powers than many nation states in the international system, and is increasingly recognized as an actor by third parties (which is important for the Union's prestige and ability to act). According to Lister (1997: 6), “the EU is best understood as unique type of institution rather than embryonic state”. Many analysts claim that the EU is less than a conventional state, more than an international organization, and therefore it can be considered as a *sui generis* identity (Hill, 1993: 309; Waever, 2000: 257). Hill (1993: 309) asks the question: if the EC/EU is less than a state, but more than a conventional intergovernmental organization; in what ways can it be termed a genuinely independent actor in international relations? A natural question that follows is: how can one understand the nature of the Union?

In order to understand the nature of the EU, it is common to compare it with two types of international actors, namely the state and the international organization. It has been frequently asked whether the European Union is an entity that can be analyzed in terms of the foreign policy behaviour of any state such as Japan or China. The state is “the political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders and exercises authority through a set of permanent institutions” (Heywood, 1997: 5). In other words, the conventional notion of a state mainly has three dimensions: the idea of an exclusive territorial entity; a centralized hierarchical structure of authoritative decision-making (government) acting on a wide range of issues; and, external and international sovereignty (White, 2001: 20). The state is a territorial entity in which “the jurisdiction of the state is geographically defined and it encompasses all those who live within the state's borders” (Heywood, 1997: 83). Although these features are essential for a state to exist, they do not all need to be present “in a pure, undiluted and contested form” (Nugent, 2003: 466).

The EU/EC is also a *territorial entity* in the sense that it has established stringent rules that apply in relation to the flow of goods and peoples into its territory (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 23). Nugent (2003: 466) claims that “territoriality is present in the sense that the EU’s territory is the sum total of the member states’ territory, however, the EU can hardly be said to ‘own’ that territory in the sense that member states can”. In the case of the state, a centralized hierarchical authority monopolizes public decision-making and enforcement (Heywood, 1997: 83). In the case of the EU, it does not have centralized hierarchical authority in the sense of a government, but it monopolizes governance in some policy areas, “and even then it is highly dependent on the member states for policy enforcement” (Nugent, 2003: 466). The state can exercise “absolute and unrestricted power” above all other associations and groups in society (Heywood, 1997: 83). The EU also enjoys pooled sovereignty which pertains to the member states’ transfer of some parts of sovereignty to the Union level. The primacy of EU law and EU jurisdiction applies to the whole populations within its borders. This sovereignty is confined to the policy areas “where the EU’s remit is established” (Nugent, 2003: 466).

White (2001: 20) also argues that using the criteria of statehood, one can find some features in which the EU is analogous to a state. Since 1957, Community Law has given the EC a *legal personality* (the ability to sign international agreements) which is an important characteristic of international actorness. For example, while under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) it was informally accepted as a player representing the contracting parties, with the creation of World Trade Organization, the EC acquired the right to sit alongside the member states as a party in its own right (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 15; White, 2001: 20). In other areas where a common policy applies, such as international fisheries agreements, the EC acts on the behalf of the member states (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 15; White, 2001: 20). However, it should be kept in mind that the Treaty of European Union (TEU), which created the European Union in November 1993, did not accord legal personality to the Union and only the EC (representing the first pillar) continued to hold legal personality (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 14). Therefore the Union, unlike the Community, could not conclude international agreements (*ibid.*) and only the EC had legal personality. The TEU showed the member states’ reluctance “to give the new Union legal status that would enable it to act legally on the world stage as a separate entity” and revealed the “continuing disputes about the degree of to which member states were prepared to give up

their sovereign rights” (White, 2001: 20). However, this situation changed when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. With the Lisbon Treaty, legal personality is given to the Union (Article I- II). The Treaty has abolished the distinction between the EU and the EC and removed the pillar structure.

Although the issue of sovereignty remains disputed, as White (2001: 21) argues, the EU “lacks statehood in terms of a centralized, hierarchical political structure (independent of member states) – government – that has exclusive control over territory and which can act authoritatively over a wide range of issues”. Therefore, it can be asserted that the EU is not a conventional state even if it can act in state-like ways in some fields (ibid.). On the other hand, Nugent (2003: 466) claims that although the EU cannot not be considered as a traditional state, attributing the EU the features of a state is understandable because the concepts of the state helps one to understand the nature of the EU because the Union presents some of the traditional characteristics of a state, and the developments of in integration process signify that these characteristics will strengthen. Kauppi, (2005: 43) regards the Unions as:

[a]supranational political authority in the narrow sense of the term (the European Union as a synonym for ‘Brussels’) and a relational power structure (the European Union as a multileveled political field) in which certain supranational groups and interests increasingly dominate the more established social-political units that compose parts of it.

When one asks the question if the EU is an international organization like the UN or NATO, the answer in legal terms is apparent: in international law, the EU is formally an international organization that has the right to exercise “certain agreed competencies”, even if not “the full range that a state might exercise” (White, 2001: 21). According to White (ibid.), the issue is not whether the EU qualifies as an international organization but whether it is overqualified. Some scholars argue that the EU is more than merely an international organization, and it is unique in three ways: “first, with its institutions, decision-making structures and policy actors, the “EU has a much more developed and complex institutional structure that goes far beyond the permanent secretaries and attached delegations of other international organizations”¹⁵³; second, it has a “wide range of policy responsibilities than

¹⁵³ Regarding the institutions, there are five core institutions (the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice) and a group of subsidiary institutions,

other international organizations”¹⁵⁴; and third, “the EU has incorporated many supranational characteristics into its structure and operation whereas international organizations are mainly intergovernmental in their structures and internal processes”¹⁵⁵ (Nugent, 2003: 512-513; White, 2001: 21). Thus, many argue that the EU has developed into a *sui generis* form of governance, and the main features that distinguish it from other international organizations are its supranational institutions (Forwood, 2001: 433) and its wide range of policy responsibilities. In other words, one may argue that although the EU is not a state, with its supranational institutions, complex institutional structure, and with a wide a range of policy responsibilities, it is overqualified as an international organization (White, 2001: 21). Therefore, it is rather labeled as a *sui generis*, multifaceted political entity; the identity of which is still under construction. Matlary (2006: 113-114) contends that “this governance system is distinct in its basis in treaty law and international legal norms”, and, it can be claimed that “the EU is based on and held together by law”. Such representations of the EU as a distinct international actor surely serves its foreign policy goals and legitimizes its acts.¹⁵⁶

Three geopolitical models (*Westphalian*, *imperial* and *neo-medieval* Europe) are frequently used for conceptualizing the nature of the EU and its evolution. The *Westphalian* model depicts the EU as uniting and assuming all the characteristics of modern statehood in a super state (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008: 521). Those analysts that use this model claim that sovereignty gradually moves away from the states to the Commission in Brussels (ibid.). In this model, power “is seen as held at the centre but as applied consistently over the territory up to the border, where one sovereign territoriality meets another” (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008: 521). On the other hand, the *imperial* metaphor is based on a different claim. “Unlike the Westphalian metaphor that depicts the EU as having clearly defined statist borders across which governance is relatively uniform, the imperial model depicts EU governance in terms of a series of concentric circles” (ibid.: 523-24). In this sense, power is “understood as located at the centre in Brussels and dispersed outwards in varying, multilayered and declining

including the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of Regions, and the European Central Bank. Regarding the decision-making arrangements, there are around thirty distinctive procedures laid down in the treaties (Nugent, 2003: 512), within which co-decision, qualified majority voting and unanimity are widely applied in various realms. With the Lisbon Treaty, these new structures were added to these such as the External Action Service.

¹⁵⁴ For example, the EU acts in almost every sphere of public policy from fisheries to transport

¹⁵⁵ This supranationalism can be seen most particularly in the frequent use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers, in the Commission’s wide-ranging executive powers, in the European Parliament’s (EP) legislative powers, and the primacy of EU law (Nugent, 2003: 513).

¹⁵⁶ See Cebeci, 2012.

degrees” (Wæver, 1997). Ole Wæver (2000: 264) calls Europe a regional “unipolarity, quasi-empire or integration in concentric circles”, and identifies the European Union as a “post-sovereign order”¹⁵⁷ because the EU is more than an international organization and less than a state. In this order, “overlapping and unsettled authorities” mark Europe, and the non-members are in an asymmetrical relationship, and they accept it because the EU holds legitimacy as representing Europe (Wæver, 2000: 257).¹⁵⁸ According to him, believing that they share a common political space and acting as if they do, Europe’s national states have entered a post-sovereign era (ibid.). Kupchan (1998: 3), on the other hand, arguing on similar lines, claims that the EU no longer consists of independent nation-states each concerned about its own welfare; instead, with the Franco-German coalition at its core and the other members arraying themselves in concentric circles around this power center, it is a “neo-imperial political construction”. This approach is useful in explaining the EU’s policies on the Mediterranean because of the core-periphery, asymmetrical characteristics that these policies display.

The third geopolitical model is that of a *neo-medieval* Europe. The neo-medieval metaphor describes power in Europe “as dispersed in a more radical fashion than that of the imperial or Westphalian models” (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008: 524). In this model, power is “no longer fixed on a single centre” in Brussels, but, depending on the particular issues at play, power is “far more regionalized” and corresponds “to logics of transnationalism and network governance” (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008: 524-525). Jan Zielonka (2001: 509) argues that the EU will resemble a “neo-medieval empire”, with “overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements, and multiple identities”, not a Westphalian model, with its “concentration of power, hierarchy, sovereignty, and clear-cut identity”.

Zielonka (2006: 1) also claims that the EU is not becoming “a superstate projecting its ever greater power all over Europe and beyond”, but it is becoming “a polycentric polity penetrating rather than controlling its environment”. In Zielonka’s view, the EU’s multilevel governance system of concentric circles, “fuzzy borders, and soft norms of external power

¹⁵⁷ “An emerging European post-sovereign complexity includes the EU [...], member states, nations as increasingly separate from states, micro-regions and trans-regions of various kinds, and non-members that relate to the EU not as to an external imperial threat because they see the EU as holding legitimacy on behalf of Europe [...]” (Wæver, 2000: 264).

¹⁵⁸ He contends that Europe is more than the sum of the state parts and the EU can act on behalf of Europe (Wæver, 2000: 257).

projection resemble the system” in Middle Ages (2006: 1). For him (ibid.;5), “while the Westphalian superstate is about fixed and relatively hard external lines, a neo-medieval empire is about soft border zones”. Christiansensen *et al.* (2000: 393) argue that the borders of the EU can be regarded as “fuzzy because they produce interfaces or intermediate spaces between inside and outside of the polity”. Waever (1997: 86) also stresses that the presently emerging European political structures can be seen as “neo-medieval in the sense that European political organization no longer fits into the format of territorial sovereignty and exclusivity”.

Looking at the EU’s international identity is essential for this study for analyzing the EU’s approach to the Mediterranean. It can be claimed that these representations of the EU as having a unique international identity is the premise on which its foreign policy goals regarding the Mediterranean are based and its acts towards the region are justified. This study assesses the international identity of the European Union both as a “*sui generis* political entity”¹⁵⁹ and “(neo)imperial political construction”. This is because on the one hand, the *sui generis* identity of the EU helps one understand how the nature of EU policies are varied, and, on the other hand, the EU’s imperial identity helps one see how the disciplining power of the European Union follows a quasi-geographical pattern of concentric circles. For example, one may claim that the EU is, in a way acting as an empire, trying to gain influence over the Mediterranean. The EU’s international identity is also very much related with its international actorness. Thus, the following section analyzes the debates over the EU’s representation as international actor. It discusses how the EU represents itself as an international actor so that its policies on the Mediterranean can be understood in a better way.

3.1.2. The EU’s representation as an international actor

When one analyzes the Union’s role in the international arena, using an actor-based approach can be very useful. “The European Union as actor” approach concentrates on the impact of the Union on world politics. Scholars have tried to identify what sort of an actor the Union is and what “has enabled it to be such an influential global player” (White, 2001: 28;

¹⁵⁹ There are also criticisms towards accepting the EU’s international identity as a *sui generis* entity. According to Manners and Whitman, the means and the mechanisms through which national and European identities are constructed and represented caused much difficulty to understand the notion of the international identity of the Union. They claim that it seems “simple and seductive to attempt either to compare the EU with other powerful states such as USA, or to argue the EU is unique and above comparison” (2003: 391-392).

White 2004: 17). This approach has made important “contributions” to the understanding of Union’s global role in “both empirical and conceptual terms” (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; 2006). First, it has gathered empirical data about the capabilities that the European Union can and does deploy at a global stage (White, 2001: 28; White 2004: 17). Second, analysts have not simply gathered data, they have also generated “debates about how best to characterize” the EU as an actor (ibid.).

In 1990s debates over the EU revolved around the question of whether it was best characterized as a presence or an actor in international affairs. The debate was about thinking of the EU and its international influence and to determine the unique features of its identity. On the one hand, David Allen and Michael Smith developed the notion of “presence” to define the Union’s tangible and intangible existence to the international arena (Allen and Smith, 1990). On the other hand, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006: 2) looked at the EU as a global actor in terms of autonomy, ability and legitimacy, and they saw the external roles of the EU as constructed by the interplay of external expectations and internal capability. Manners and Whitman (2003: 294) argue that while “studying presence tended to focus on the loose expectations of the EU’s negotiated order”, “studying actorness tended to focus on the construction of external roles of the EU”. Recent studies analyze the effectiveness of the EU as an international actor in terms of “goal attainment and/or outcome effects”.¹⁶⁰ For Brattberg and Rhinard (2013: 360), effectiveness is defined “as goal attainment and relates a polity’s ability to translate potential influence into actual effect”. Carbone (2013: 343) questions “how EU actorness (or internal effectiveness) translates into (external) effectiveness”, and claims that effectiveness as the ability to achieve desired goals is a “distinct variable, which may or may not be the result of actorness”.

A crucial part of the debate around the EU’s actorness revolves around the work of Bretherton and Vogler (1999; 2006). Bretherton and Vogler’s representation of the EU as an actor is based on the concepts of *opportunity*, *presence* and *capability* (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 17). In this context, an actor, on the one hand, can be defined as “an entity that is capable of formulating purposes and making decisions, and thus engaging in some form of purposive action” (ibid.). Actorness, on the other hand, “implies a larger scope for action and room for manoeuvre” (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2005: 537). Bretherton and Vogler’s (2006:

¹⁶⁰ See, for example: Brattberg and Rhinard (2013); Bretherton and Vogler (2013); Carbone (2013); Edwards (2013); Niemann and Bretherton (2013).

24) approach to the EU as an actor “under construction” pictures a complex set of interacting processes, based on the notions of opportunity (which refers to the external context captures the ability of the EU), presence (by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders) and capability (which signifies the ability to exploit opportunity and capitalize on presence). Their combination leads to varying ways in which the external activities of the Union is shaped.

Opportunity indicates “the factors in the external environment of ideas and events, which constrain or enable actorness”, this element also “signifies the structural context of action” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24; 2013: 78). For example, it can be asserted that the changes in the international system since the 1990s, such as the impact of the ending of the Cold War or the events of September, 11, 2001, have provided opportunities for the EC/EU to increase its involvement in world affairs, and to adopt new roles and responsibilities. However, opportunity cannot alone provide the Union with a role in international affairs, indeed, this role can be constructed through a process that takes account of its capabilities and its international presence (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 27). For example, although the Arab uprisings in its southern neighbourhood can be analyzed in terms of a failure of the EU’s Mediterranean policies, they provide new opportunities for EU to renew its polices.¹⁶¹

Presence refers to the ability of the EU to create an impact, only by its existence and usually unintentionally, to exert influence beyond its borders to shape the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others through the impact of this presence (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 27; 2013: 76-377).¹⁶² At this point, it is important to point out that “presence reflects two interconnected elements that determine the reputation and status accorded to the EU by external audiences” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 27). The first element of presence is the character and identity of the Union. “Character refers to the Union’s material existence, which is the political system comprising the member states and the common institutions of the EU” (ibid.). EU’s trade polices, common external tariffs and common commercial policy are more important than the Union’s material existence. Because they have a crucial impact on other countries which is not only confined to the realm of trade/economics but extends to the realm of politics. Identity refers to the “fundamental nature of the EU”; it refers to “shared

¹⁶¹ For a detail analysis see Chapter 5.

¹⁶² For Niemann and Bretherton (2013: 266), presence is “a passive concept that is manifested both directly, through the unintended external consequences of internal polices, and indirectly, through the subtle processes of structural power associated with perceptions of the EU’s reputation”.

understandings that give meaning(s) to what the EU is and what the EU does” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 27). The second element of presence refers to the “external consequences of the Union’s internal priorities and policies” (ibid.). For Bretherton and Vogler (2013: 377), the EU’s success is in its “significance” in the sense that perceptions of the Union as a community of security and prosperity creates a “magnet effect” to the outside world. One may claim that through this magnetism, the EU finds itself a legitimate ground to promote its norms and values to the outside world, especially to its neighbourhood.

It can be argued that the EU has considerable “presence” in international affairs. It is the world’s largest trading bloc, largest provider of development aid to the rest of the world, and its internal policies, such as agricultural, monetary, enlargement or defence policies affect other international actors (Smith, 2003b: 104). However, the EU is not “always able to translate its presence into actorness” (Smith, 2003b: 105).¹⁶³ “Presence is particularly strong in the neighbourhood” (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2005: 537). In general, it can be claimed that as a result of the expansion of its size and policy scope, the Union’s presence has improved over time. In fact, “the EU’s presence is felt more or less everywhere” in the world, and this presence can be felt “more in some sectors and regions than in others” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 28). For Bretherton and Vogler (2013: 386), presence is associated with the “single market” that is the “principal driver of external interest in the Union”, however, especially economic presence is has weakened as a consequence of the Eurozone crisis which causes recession in the Union.

Capability, which is the last element of actorness, refers to the “internal context of EU external action or inaction”; that is “the availability of policy instruments and understandings about the Union’s ability to utilize these instruments on presence or respond to opportunity” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 24, 29). The concept of actorness, with respect to the EU’s external policies, was first defined by Sjöstedt and further developed by Bretherton and Vogler. Sjöstedt as cited in Hill (1993: 315) explains the actorness of the Community “in terms of its ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at the EC’s disposal”.¹⁶⁴ Based

¹⁶³ According to David Allen and Michael Smith (1990), “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena”. *Review of International Studies*. 16(1): 19-37, “Western Europe is neither a fully-fledged actor nor a purely dependent phenomenon in the contemporary international arena. Rather, it is a variable multi-dimensional *presence*, which plays active role in some areas of international interactions and a less active one in others” (cited in Medrana, 1999: 175 [his endnote: 8]) (emphasis added).

¹⁶⁴ Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977). *The External Role of the European Community*. Farnborough: Saxon House.

on the Sjöstedt's notion of actor capacity, Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 30) identified four basic requirements for actorness regarding capability¹⁶⁵:

- Shared commitment to a set of overarching values.
- Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy.
- The ability to identify priorities and formulate policies – captured by the concepts of consistency and coherence, where: consistency indicates the degree of correspondence between the external policies of the member states and of the EU; coherence refers to the level of the internal coordination of EU policies.
- The availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments – diplomacy/negotiation, economic tools and military means.¹⁶⁶

The EU wants to enhance its “global role” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 381) and, therefore, the Lisbon Treaty provided the Union with “stronger international capacity and policy instruments” that may make it “a more effective international actor” (Edwards 2013: 276). The Lisbon Treaty includes two improvements for the EU’s effectiveness: the enhancement of the role and authority of High Representative (HR) accompanied with a change in the name of the post, and the creation of a new diplomatic service, responsible to the HR, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Although the Lisbon Treaty was “designed to bolster the EU’s willingness to act and play a ‘consequential role’”, according to Edwards, it did not satisfy the member states (ibid.: 285). Events such as the Libyan crisis in 2011 showed that the improvements brought by the Lisbon Treaty were not enough. During the crisis, the High Representative (Catherine Ashton) had to wait for the 27 member states to agree before she could act. Edwards (ibid.:286) considers “the limited and incoherent” response to the Arab uprisings, and especially to Libya, as “an indicative of the ineffectiveness” of the EU as an international actor. On the other hand, Bretherton and Vogler (2013: 387) argue that since the mid-2000s, the EU’s ability to exert its influence to the world, “which was at its peak in the post-Cold War period”, has decreased. In spite of this decline, for them, the EU will remain “an important global actor” (ibid).

¹⁶⁵ In their recent work, they consider two requirements as the most important dimension regarding capability: policy formulation and availability of instruments (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013: 381-386).

¹⁶⁶ In the first edition of their book, Bretherton and Vogler identified one more requirement that was “the ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system” (1999: 38). However, Hettne and Soderbaum argue that because any strong national actor can possess this requirement, it is a less important characteristic for the EU’s actorness (2005: 537).

Conceptualization of the Union as an international actor can help one understand its approach to the Mediterranean. It can be claimed that although the former imperial powers no longer exist today, the EU has neocolonial tendencies especially in its neighbourhood. In this sense, the EU's Mediterranean policies can be regarded as tools for promoting EU interests in the region, and they can be regarded as neocolonial devices as much as they are instruments of projecting peace and security to the Mediterranean. After studying how the international identity of the European Union is conceptualized in the first section, the following section elaborates on the debates over the EU's representations as a power.

3.2. The EU's representations as a power

There are various representations of EU as a power and these all can be applied to its relations with the Mediterranean. Therefore, these representations should be analyzed in detail. The European Union has usually been described as a "civilian power", "normative power" and "civilizing power". Such conceptualizations have generated intensive debate in the academic arena. Although they have some similarities, these concepts have been developed separately with reference to different cases and to different contexts. Conceptual differentiation is provided in this part to understand the role conceptions of the EU in world politics and their reflections in the case of its relations with Mediterranean partners. But before analyzing these concepts, one should answer the question of "what is power?"

3.2.1. The concept of power

"Power" can be defined as the ability to achieve a desired outcome, and it is sometimes referred to as the "power to" do something that includes "everything from the ability to keep oneself alive to the ability of the government to promote economic growth" (Heywood, 1997: 7). In politics, "power is usually thought as a relationship" in which power is "the ability to influence the behaviour of others in a manner not of their choosing" (ibid.). Power can also "be associated with the ability to punish or reward, bringing it close to force or manipulation" (ibid.). Scholars have generally focused on two forms of power: direct and institutional. On the one hand, in international relations, "direct power is seen as having the ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise" (Dahl, 1957). In other words, power can simply be defined as "the ability of A to get B to do something, which B would not otherwise have done" (Dahl, 1957: 202-203). On

the other hand, “institutional power resides in the capacity and authority of established collective groups to manage and manipulate situations in their interest” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962).

According to Edkins and Pin-Fat (2005: 4), following Foucault, power is constantly produced through certain forms of social relationship and it is not something that can be possessed and traded. In the Foucauldian sense, power is regarded as a web that infuses all kinds of relationships, institutions and bodies of knowledge, and it cannot be measured in a positivist sense (Sterling-Folker and Shinko, 2005: 637-638). In sum, it can be argued that power is the ability to demonstrate a change in outcomes, it is a “process of interaction whereby one is able to exercise influence over the actions of others” (Schmidt, 2005: 530).

Power is, thus a relational concept and it refers to a causal relationship between states in international relations. For Giri (2001: 251), “relational power refers to the ability to change outcomes or affect the behaviour of others within a given regime”. As Hannah Arendt (1969: 44) argues, “power is never an attribute of an individual, but exists when a group allows and empowers an individual to act in a particular way”.¹⁶⁷ For her, relational power is the ability of groups to act in concert. For Pustovitoskij and Kremer (2011:3), “power stems from the relationship between two or more actors and the context the actors are imbedded in”. Manners (2009: 567) claims that “in transdisciplinary European studies, relational power is to be found wherever such groups are taking concerted action”.

In this sense, that EU’s power can be analyzed within this conceptualization of relational power. Relational power is “based on an actor’s ability to effectively use material and nonmaterial resources” to enforce outcomes suiting his/her preferences (Pustovitoskij and Kremer, 2011:3). For example, Schilde (2017: 38) argues that “the material resources like military spending and capabilities are necessary but not sufficient” for the means of relational power. For her (ibid.), material resources “do not directly inform outcomes”, “but they can enable or constrain relational power”. According to Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 252) “most attention has been directed to the relational power capabilities” of EU. In this respect, the EU

¹⁶⁷ According to Hannah Arendt. “Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that [they are] ‘in power’ we actually refer to [them] being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with, disappears, ‘[their] power’ also vanishes” (1969). *On Violence* New York: Harcourt Brace p. 44. Cited in Manners (2009: 567).

remains a civilian power. They (ibid.: 252-253) argue that “in the exercise of relational power the EU remains exclusively reliant upon economic instruments across the spectrum of its policies”. Buteux (2001: 104) claims that the Europeans most likely “continue to be restricted to the exercise of relational power in many areas of interest to them and will be constrained by an international environment shaped by substantially by others”.

For Womack (2008: 266), “a relational perspective can highlight the role of power in asymmetric relationships”. Tocci (2008: 19) claims that “the ability to act is determined first by the material configuration of relations between parties, i.e., by the levels of dependence and interdependence between them”. If a foreign policy actor does not have sufficient relational power, it could face the difficulty to shape other actors’ behaviour. For example, in the case of migration, the “European concerns” over its “border security” “weaken the relational power” of the EU towards its North African neighbours (ibid.).

One can affect others’ behaviour in three major ways: “threats of coercion (sticks); incentives and payments; and finally, attraction that makes others want what you want” (Nye, 2008: 94). In this sense, one may assume that by using a mix of these features, the European Union imposes its power over its neighbourhood. Furthermore, Nye (2008) claims that there are three kinds of power: hard power, soft power and smart power. *Hard power* strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions to enforce national interests (Wilson, 2008: 114). In contrast to coercive power, *soft power* is the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants. The concept of *soft power* was first introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990 and developed in his later works. He defines *soft power* as the “ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye, 2008: 94). He argues that a country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture “(in places where it is attractive to others), political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2008: 96). According to him (2008: 94-95):

A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In this sense, it is important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic

weapons. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.¹⁶⁸

Recently, Nye also introduced the notion of “*smart power*”. He defined smart power “as the ability to combine hard and soft power effectively” (Nye, 2008). Wilson (2008: 115) defines smart power as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard and soft power “in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently”. He believes that smart power should be “the central framing concept under which hard and soft power are subsumed in policy analysis” (ibid: 122). Wilson further analyses the framework of smart power and identifies some considerations that a smart power should be built on (2008: 15):

- The *target* over which one seeks to exercise power – its internal nature and its broader global context. Power cannot be smart if those who wield it are ignorant of the attributes of the target populations and regions.
- *Self-knowledge* and understanding of one’s own goals and capacities. Smart power requires the wielder to know what his or her country or community seeks, as well as its will and capacity to achieve its goals.
- The broader *regional and global context* within which the action will be conducted.
- The *tools* to be employed, as well as how and when to deploy them individually and in combination. [emphasis original]

In Nye’s view, while hard power rests on carrots and sticks, soft power “convinces others that they should follow because of the allure of other’s way of life” (Mattern, 2005: 587). In this context, any country or any actor in world politics – which has the ability to do so – can use soft power “to achieve a greater degree of influence over the dynamics of world politics” (ibid.). It is possible to see these characteristics that Nye attributes to a state also in the case of the EU. Because countries outside the EU follow it, admire its values, emulate its example, it sets the agenda of world politics and attracts others, not necessarily forcing them to change. Therefore, the EU can also be defined as a soft power.

¹⁶⁸ It is the (neo)realist approaches that tend to emphasize hard power, especially the hard power of states, while liberal institutionalist scholars emphasize soft power as essential for states.

Wilson's points might also be helpful in assessing the EU's approach to the Mediterranean. Wilson (2008) argues that by combining hard and soft power strategies effectively, the EU tries to act as a smart power in its neighbourhood. On the other hand, Robert Kagan defines EU as a soft power. In his work, Kagan compares the Hobbesian-realist, military power of the United States with the Kantian "idealist avoidance of military means rooted in pacifist values prevailing in Europe" (2002). Kagan argues that the US and Europe live in two different worlds. In Sjursen's view (2006: 237), by arguing that the Europeans and Americans live in different worlds, "Kagan establishes a contrast between the US, which relies on military power (and subscribes to a perspective on international relations consistent with a so-called Hobbesian war of all against all)", and the EU, which has a "Kantian approach, focusing on 'soft', civilian means". It would be useful at this point to reflect on how the EU is defined as a "civilian power".

3.2.2. The EU as a civilian power

François Duchêne's notion of "civilian power Europe" had a dominating impact on the debate regarding on Europe's role in the world. The concept was developed mainly with the aim of characterizing the EC (Larsen, 2002: 289). In 1970s, Duchêne foresaw the EC's role in the international arena as follows (1973: 19):

It can even aim to consolidate the shift in Europe from a military to political analysis and to profit by it. Europe as a whole could well become the first example in history of a major centre of the balance of power becoming in the era of its decline not a colonised victim but the exemplar of a new stage in political civilization. The European Community in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power.

He (1973: 19-20) further argued:

The European Community's interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to *domesticate* relations between states, including those of its own member states and those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have in the past been associated almost exclusively with 'home' and not foreign, that is *alien*, affairs. [emphasis original]

In 1982, Hedley Bull responded to Duchene's suggestion that the EC represented a civilian power, rejecting the idea that "traditional military/political power" was giving its place to "civilian power", and especially to economic power in the Western world (Bull, 1982: 149). He noted: "'Europe' is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one (..)" (1982: 151). Bull claimed that the notion of civilian power of the EC is related with its "ineffectiveness and lack of self-sufficiency in military power". His solution was to turn the EC into a military power for Europe, which did not sound very tangible at that time. Bull (1982: 157-163) suggested seven steps through which the EC could become more "self-sufficient in defence and security": "the provision of nuclear deterrent forces; the improvement of conventional forces; a greater role played by West Germany; more involvement on the part of France; a change of policy in Britain; careful co-existence with the Soviet Union; and, finally, careful co-existence with the United States". At that time, Bull's suggestions to develop the Community's military capability did not seem very realistic. Although security and defence played an important role at the beginning of European integration, after the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC)¹⁶⁹, European integration became primarily an economic affair in the framework of the EEC. During the Cold War, security and defence were organized within NATO and WEU¹⁷⁰. Therefore, until the end of the Cold War, security and defence issues did not take place at the top of Community's agenda.¹⁷¹ So this shows that Bull's argument was not very realistic at that time.

¹⁶⁹ In the early 1950s, the project of a EDC was launched for three reasons: firstly, to establish a defence structure which would bring about peace to the continent through military integration among Western European states after two world wars; secondly, to defend Western Europe against the Soviet threat; and thirdly, to provide Western Europe an active role in world politics (Duke, 1996: 167). But de-colonization wars that France had to fight and "the demands of sovereignty and the complexity of European security problems ruined the first attempt of defence integration, the European Defence Community, and the treaty of EDC became dead letter in 1954" (ibid.).

¹⁷⁰ After the Second World War, the idea of defending Europe by Europeans themselves initially led to the Dunkirk Treaty concluded between France and England on 4 March in 1947. In addition, in response to the threat of the "division of Europe" into antagonist blocs, which became evident by the Berlin Blockade and Prague Revolt in 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed among Benelux countries, France and England, whereby they set up the Western Union (WU) on 17 March in 1948 (Duke, 1996: 168). Under the Treaty, the signatories pledged to give all military and other aid in their power to WU the member which would be subjected to an armed attack in Europe. To fill the gap in European security, which was left open by the failed EDC, the Western Union of 1948 was updated and transformed into Western European Union by the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954.

¹⁷¹ Except for the Single European Act (SEA), which stated that European Political Cooperation would also cover economic and political aspects of security in 1986 (Single European Act, OJ L No. 169/1 of 29.06.1987).

At this point it might be useful to have a look at the debate on what constitutes civilian or military power. In terms of the instruments that are used, civilian is defined as non-military and includes economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments, whereas military involves the use of armed forces. However, drawing the line between civilian and military power is not an easy task. For example, “peacekeeping forces are frequently considered to be a civilian power instrument, but peacekeepers are composed of troops that may or may not be armed” (Smith, 2005a: 2).¹⁷² Therefore, it can be claimed that it is not always possible clearly to classify an instrument as civilian or military.

According to Hanns Maull, being a civilian power means (1990: 92-93):

- the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives;
- the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and
- a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.¹⁷³

Karen Smith, on the other hand, argues that being a civilian power consists of four elements: civilian means; civilian ends; use of persuasion; and civilian control over foreign and defence policy-making (2005a: 65). Moreover she claims that although all four matter, in the last three elements (civilian ends, use of persuasion, and civilian control) “the line between what constitutes civilian and what does not is much harder to determine” than in the first one (civilian means) (ibid.). By combining these four elements, she also refers to an almost “ideal type” of a civilian power which she defines as “an actor that uses civilian means for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends and its foreign policy-making process is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny” (Smith, 2005a: 68-69). She also contrasts the ideal type

¹⁷² Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all parties to a conflict in order to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement (ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001: 5). This involves the deployment of military or police, and frequently civilian personnel to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between governments or parties who have been engaged in conflict (ICG Issues Report No 2, 2001: 5).

¹⁷³ In his article, Maull claims that the term “power” no longer means what it used to mean: “hard” power, the ability command others, rather it is increasingly being replaced by “soft” (persuasive) power. He further asserts that Germany and Japan are, in a sense, the prototypes of this new type of international power (civilian power) (Maull, 1990: 92).

of civilian power with its opposite of an ideal type of military power. In her view, a military power is an actor that uses military means, relies on coercion to influence other actors, unilaterally pursues military or militarized ends, and whose foreign policy-making process is not democratic (ibid.: 69). By constructing these two ideal types, Smith provides a spectrum with two ideal types located at either end. “The vast majority of international actors can be located along the spectrum between the two ideal-types of civilian and military power rather than being placed at the one end or the other” (ibid.: 70). For Smith (2005a), although the EU mostly uses civilian means and pursues civilian ends, it is not ideal civilian power. Civilian instruments are often referred to as soft instruments, are not necessarily non-coercive (Sjursen, 2006: 239). For example, economic sanctions towards governments can cause serious harms, their effects are usually indiscriminate over civilians.¹⁷⁴ Telo defines the EU as “an, at least, incipient, collective civilian power” for the following reasons (2006: 51-57):

- the process of European integration has produced increasing convergence around the European social model;
- the EU has an almost magnetic attraction to its neighbours;¹⁷⁵
- the EU develops its economic and political influence through common strategies and partnership agreements with surrounding countries;
- the EU contributes to global governance by collectively encouraging states in other continents to deepen regional cooperation and has developed a new dimension in international relations, or, to be more precise, in intercontinental relations: the so-called interregionalism;
- Though limited in comparison to its economic strength, the EU and its members are playing an increasing peacekeeping and peace-enforcing role and participate in many missions around the world.

Adler and Crawford, define the EU as a civilian power through a social constructivist approach, which “achieves security by instilling expectations and dispositions in near-abroad states, to the effect that adoption of EU norms and values will give them inclusion in the ranks of the EU” (2006: 10). Defining the EU as a civilian power may help one to evaluate the EU’s

¹⁷⁴ For example, when HAMAS, which is listed as a terrorist organization by the West, won the Palestinian elections in January 2006, international funds to Palestine were cut off for a while. However, after this aid embargo, the socio-economic situation deteriorated in Palestinian territories that caused serious harm over the civilians.

¹⁷⁵ This is also similar to what Ole Waever argues. See more on this below.

approach to its neighbourhood. In this context, the projection of EU norms and values can be perceived as extending the EU's influence in its neighbourhood through non-coercive instruments. This is a definition of civilian power which has close links with a normative power. It can be contented that a civilian power can be normative but this does not have to be the case to define a civilian power. In other words, civilian power can also pursue their interests rather than norms as it might use military means to project its norms and values. On the other hand, a normative power, by definition, does not necessarily have to be a civilian power as well.

3.2.3. The EU as a normative power

In 2002, Ian Manners published an influential article in which he defined the collective identity for the Union as a “normative power”. This notion seeks to avoid the civilian/military debate over naming the EU either as a civilian or a military power, in favour of a focus on the “ideational impact of the EU's international identity/role as representing normative power” (Manners, 2002: 238). Manners claims that although the Union's civilian power and “fledging military power” is not unimportant, one should give more attention to the EU's ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations through an ideational dimension (2002: 239). Manners (2002; 2006a; 2006b; 2013) argues that the EU's distinct normative characteristics predisposes it to act in certain ways.

In Diez's (2005: 613) view, describing the EU as a normative power “establishes a particular identity for the EU and it turns the third parties into ‘others’”. Cebeci (2012: 4, 9-10) further argues that this view creates “distinctions about what can be represented as normal and rational and what is to be considered as alien and threatening” and it also attaches a certain distinctive identity to the EU as an ‘ideal power’ “legitimiz[ing] the EU's policies on other regions”.

Manners builds his argument on Rosecrance's interpretation of Europe's achievement, where Rosencrance suggests:

Europe's attainment is normative rather than empirical [...] It is perhaps a paradox to note that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms.¹⁷⁶

One may assert that Rosecrance sees the EU as a new type of international actor, which is different from the traditional forms of power that have dominated international politics previously. Manners claims that the EU's normative difference emanates from three sources: its historical context¹⁷⁷, hybrid polity¹⁷⁸, and political-legal constitution¹⁷⁹ (Manners, 2002: 240). He argues that the central component of the EU's normative power is its difference from "pre-existing political forms and that this particular difference *predisposes* it to act" in world politics (ibid.: 242). Manners (ibid.) identifies five "core norms" that the EU promotes in the world – "peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights", and, four "subsidiary/minor norms" – "social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance".

Manners (2002: 244) argues that it is important to find out how the EU norms are diffused because accepting the normative basis of the EU does not make it a normative power. Therefore he suggests that the EU's normative power stems from six factors shaping norm diffusion in international relations: (1) *contagion*, which means the "unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU" to other parties, and such diffusion "relies on a number of mechanisms of imitation, emulation and mimicry/*mimétisme* including the persuasive attraction of ideas, as well as the prestige and status associated with regional integration organizations"; (2) *informational diffusion*, which occurs through references to "strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications, such as initiatives from the Presidency of the EU or the President of the Commission"; (3) *procedural diffusion* that involves the "institutionalization" of a relationship between the EU and a third party, such as

¹⁷⁶ Rosecrance, R. (1998). "The European Union: A New Type of International Actor," In Jan Zielonka (Ed.), *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 22. Quoted here from: Manners, 2002: 238.

¹⁷⁷ Its origin as an explicit rejection of divisive nationalism, imperialism and Europe's war-prone past (Manners, 2002: 240).

¹⁷⁸ The EU represents a new and differentiated political form (Manners, 2002: 240).

¹⁷⁹ The development of a body of values that are firmly embedded in successive Treaties and in the Union's practices over the past 50 years (Manners, 2002: 241).

inter-regional cooperation agreements, association agreements or enlargement of the EU itself; (4) *transference* that refers to diffusion of norms “when the EU is involved in the transfer of material and immaterial assets such as humanitarian aid and technical assistance” with third parties; (5) *overt diffusion* which “occurs as a result of physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations”, and “relies on a number of mechanisms of presence, diplomacy or actions” including peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions; and (6) *cultural filter* which refers the diffusion that affects the “impact of international norms” and construction of knowledge, adaptation or rejection of norms (Manners, 2002: 244-245; 2013: 315-318).

One can claim that all these types of diffusion of the EU’s norms help the Union to define what is “normal” in international relations. In this sense, the normative power Europe discourse legitimizes the EU’s acts towards its neighbourhood (Cebeci, 2012; 2017). Based on its integration model, the EU presents itself as a model, and tries to export its model and expects its neighbourhood to imitate it as the “normal way” to be followed. In this context, one may argue that Manners’ claim of diffusion of the norms through the mechanisms of imitation, emulation and mimicry provides the EU the legitimate and justified ground for promotion of its integration model, norms and values to its neighbourhood regardless of their content and without considering the needs of locals (Cebeci, 2012, 2017). For Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 43), the Union attempts to “project its values, and shape the practices of many of the third parties with which it interacts”.¹⁸⁰ According to Manners (2002: 252):

The EU can be *conceptualized* as a changer of norms in the international system: a positivist quantity to it – that the EU *acts* to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU *should* act to extend its norms into the international system. [emphases original]

Prodi and Solana also project the EU as a normative power, where values constitute significant importance in the EU’s foreign policies. In a speech to the European Parliament, then Commission President, Romano Prodi stated, “Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer (...). We have forged a model of development and

¹⁸⁰ For example, in his discussion, Manners identifies “opposition to death penalty” as an important example of the Union’s commitment to project its values externally.

continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity – and it is a model that works” (Prodi, 2000). Additionally, Javier Solana (2000), then High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) also argued:

“[European Union] offers a model for regional integration as a guarantee for peace. It is a potent symbol of reconciliation. By looking beyond its own frontiers, the Union can be a powerful catalyst for stability and peace. (...) [Ordinary people] want us to be able to support democratic government, to defend human rights and the rule of law”.

On the other hand, for Del Sarto (2015: 220), the EU has been involved in a “normative process” of gradually exporting its rules and practices to its neighbourhood.¹⁸¹ Del Sarto (ibid.: 221) further claims that EU rules and practices are “embedded in broader universal norms, thus justifying the normative power concept”. Del Sarto (ibid.: 216) conceptualizes the EU as an empire and regards “the EU’s exporting of rules and practices to neighbouring states as the modus operandi of empires in pursuit of their own interests; this modus operandi also serves the construction of a ‘normative’ identity”. In this sense, one may argue that the normative power concept of the EU helps the Union to describe itself and represent itself as a model that needs to be followed. Moreover, using this normative discourse legitimizes the EU to export its own model and helps it to impose its values and norms on its neighbourhood. For Delcaurt and Remacle (2009: 238), the normative power concept encapsulates an identity discourse that combines “multilateralism and cosmopolitan accounts of European foreign policy”. In Manners’ view, the EU is “normatively different” and promotes “universal norms and principles” in its relations with non-member states (2002: 241). Del Sarto (2015: 223) claims that exporting the Union’s rules and practices to neighbouring states “entails the reproduction of the EU’s normative identity”. With a similar view, Bretherton and Vogler argue that normative power “refers to the tendency of the EU to ‘reproduce itself’ in its relations with non-members” (1999: 249). They also argue that in some policy areas, “the EU has become a global regulator where it can write the rules by which others operate” (2006: 217). Lavenex (2004: 695) goes further and claims that “the EU addresses patterns of interdependence through external projection of internal solutions”. In

¹⁸¹ “However, these rules differ considerably from those norms stipulated in the ‘normative power Europe’ concept. Pertaining predominantly to the integration of third states into different aspects of the EU’s internal market, the transferred rules and practices focus on regulatory convergence and efficient economic governance, together with border control practices aimed at preventing unwanted migrants. Significantly, whereas neighbouring states are free to decide on the intensity of their ties with the EU, the rules and practices of co-operation are non-negotiable” Del Sarto (2015: 220).

sum, the EU is regarded as an entity that exercises normative power through projecting its core norms, and promotes “the establishment of related norms for the governance of international behaviour” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 42). In this sense, it can be claimed that by promoting its norms values to the SEMP through its Mediterranean policies, the EU wants to regulate them.

3.2.4. Assessing normative/civilian power Europe

Using the concepts of civilian and normative power as if they are interchangeable makes their use highly problematic. As mentioned above, the concepts of “civilian” and “normative power Europe” have been developed separately under different circumstances and in different global contexts. While Duchene (1973: 19) argued that the “EC’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” would provide it a distinctive role in external relations; Manners made a distinction between civilian power and normative power in conceptualizing the EU and presented the normative power Europe concept in order to “capture the movement away from Cold War (and neo-colonial) approaches to the EU” (2006a: 184) and to “develop as a response to the relative absence of normative theorizing of, and to promote normative approaches to, the EU” (2006b: 177).

It can be argued that there is an obvious postcolonial concern that civilian power Europe can be read as a neocolonial attempt to “civilize” the world. The “civilizing” aspect has an ambitious meaning that has negative connotations (as in France’s “mission civilisatrice”) (Bicchi, 2006b: 300 [her endnote, 3]). Postcolonial theory argues that the term “civilization” is a part of “Eurocentric strategies of narrativizing history, so that Europe can congratulate itself for progress”. This, in a sense, “invokes the culture of capitalism” (Spivak 1999: 91, 93) or in other words, the term signifies some form of cultural imperialism. For Del Sarto (2015: 222), “reflecting a certain civilizing mission” is “anchored in the EU’s own success story of peace and prosperity” and in this context, exporting its model to its neighbourhood “contributes to the EU’s perception of itself as a benevolent ‘normative power’”. As Diez implies, civilian power Europe is acting in an attempt to civilize international relations through the EU’s own experience, “its mission civilisatrice” (2005: 629). For example, according to Diez (ibid.: 630), the objectives of Barcelona Declaration can be considered as the Union’s effort to “civilize relationships between the countries around the

Mediterranean”. Historically, civilizing missions have been part of colonialist projects, and defined mostly in terms of military power.

Manners claims that his notion of normative power is “an attempt to escape civilizing missions by countering the neo-colonial discourses of claims implicit (or explicit) in civilian power” (2006b: 175). In her article, Mitzen opposes Manners’s view, and notes,

The EU need not become a ‘neo-colonial’ or ‘great power Europe’, because its collective identity as a civilizing power is anchored in intra-European foreign policy routines that permit deliberation and reflection, [...]. In other words, the EU’s civilizing identity is supported by healthy basic trust, which guards against the securitization of subjectivity that ‘great power Europe’ implies. Healthy basic trust implies that European foreign affairs cooperation might just continue to grope toward something new in world politics – perhaps what others have called the post-modern state (2006: 275).

This study does not agree with the views of Mitzen and Manners, and claims that the foreign policy actions of the Union can be differentiated between the normative and neocolonial features, and moreover, regarding its Mediterranean policies, the EU sometimes can both act as a normative and neocolonial power at different times. Therefore, one cannot claim that the EU is solely a normative or neocolonial power.

Some scholars, however, are in favour of assembling these two concepts. Diez (2005: 617) argues, based on Maull’s definition of a civilian power, where a civilian power is a state “whose conception of its foreign policy role and behaviour is bound to particular aims, values, principles, as well as forms of influence and instruments of power in the name of a civilization of international relations”¹⁸², the notion of civilian power, similar to the concept of normative power, describes a particular kind of actor, relationship and means. They, thus, “seem to be very close to each other” (ibid.). Furthermore, he claims that “in a sense, civilian power can be read as one specific form of normative power in that at its heart lie particular kinds of norms (namely, civilian)” (ibid.).

¹⁸² Hanns W. Maull. (1997) DFGProjekt ‘Zivilmächte’: Schlußbericht und Ergebnisse (Trier: Universität Trier, Lehrstuhl für Außenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen), 21. Cited in Diez (2005: 617).

Although Manners conceptualizes the civilian and normative nature of the EU in two distinct categories, this study agrees with Diez and claims that civilian power can be read as a specific form of normative power. However, a distinction is made between the “EU as a normative power” and the “EU as a civilizing power” in this study. This study posits the argument that there is a difference between “normative/civilian” and “civilizing power” because civilizing power denotes “neocolonial (imperialistic) tendencies”¹⁸³ of the EU. In this respect, one can ask the question whether the EU is a “normative power”, promoting universal norms, or a “civilizing power”, projecting its own understanding of norms and its own integration model to the rest of the world, especially to its neighbourhood. In this context, one can question the discourse of claiming the right to decide what is normal or not; because this also pertains to neocolonial practice. In this sense, one can argue that the EU’s presenting itself as a model and promoting alleged universal values in its neighbourhood is akin to the civilizing mission that might be perceived as neocolonial.

Nicolaidis and Howse refer to the EU as a civilian power that is capable of exporting its model to other regions around the world (2002: 782). They see the European Union model as the “biggest project of Europe” (ibid.). According to them, the EU’s biggest project of all, for better or worse, its mission *civilisatrice*, is to export its miracle to the rest of the world with the tendency of reproducing itself by encouraging regional integration around the world (ibid.: 768). They see this projection of Europe’s model on the rest of the world as an EUtopia (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002). For them, this projection has a long history and it can be labeled as “civic imperialism” (ibid.: 767). For Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis (2013), EU norms can generally be regarded as “impositions of a mission *civilisatrice*” because their “lack of reflexivity” undermines the aim of the norms. Fisher Onar and Nicolaidis (2013: 284) further claim that normative power discourse is a “sophisticated version of the Euro-centric narrative, in which Europe’s unique transcendence of the state of nature” is achieved by shaping and exporting alleged universal norms to its neighbourhood. Moreover, one may claim that by exporting its miracle, the EU is again trying to civilize its neighbourhood. Nicolaidis and Howse (2002), and, Fisher Onar & Nicolaidis (2013) also testify to this study’s claim that the EU’s behaviour can be regarded as neocolonial.

¹⁸³ Those tendencies are sometimes referred to as “soft imperialism” (Hettne and Soderbaum, 2005). From now on, the notions of “civilizing power”, “imperial power”, “neocolonial power” and “soft imperialism” are used interchangeably in this study in order to avoid any confusion over terminology.

On the other hand, Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 538) argue that the difference between civilian power and civilizing power/soft imperialism lies in the overall importance of values and norms, and also “whether negotiations are carried out in a symmetric, dialogical way rather than by imposition”. By soft imperialism, they refer to the “soft power applied in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialogue or even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather than for the creation of an actual dialogue” (ibid.: 539). This thesis puts forward the idea that if a powerful country/entity establishes or maintains economic, military, political or cultural influence over other countries based on an asymmetrical relationship and creates relationships of subordination and dependence between itself and its unequal counterparts, this entity or country can be labeled as a neocolonial power. Consequently, the relationship between these asymmetric countries can be labeled as soft imperialism. A reading on such lines brings about the interpretation that the EU forms asymmetrical relations with its Mediterranean partners and it is mainly for seeking its self-interests that it tries to stabilize the countries in its Mediterranean neighbourhood by exporting its own integration model as a prescription for peace and prosperity, by promoting universal norms and values, etc.

As Bicchi (2006b: 286) emphasizes, by using the criteria of “inclusiveness and reflexivity”, a distinction can be made between normative power Europe and Europe as a civilizing power. While “inclusiveness” is about involving non-members in EU decision-making, “reflexivity” is the capacity of the EU to adapt the policy by thinking critically according to the specific needs of the area targeted by the policy (Bicchi, 2006b: 288). She argues that cases where European foreign policy lacks one or both of these conditions comprise a distinct category that can be referred to as the “civilizing power Europe” (Bicchi, 2006b: 287). Therefore, she claims that (ibid.: 287), especially regarding the EU’s approach towards the Mediterranean, the Union can be characterized as a civilizing power because “much of the EU’s action can be characterized as an unreflexive attempt to promote its own model”¹⁸⁴. In this context, it can be claimed that the EU remains Eurocentric with its logic of “one size fits all” (Bicchi, 2006b) approach.

¹⁸⁴According to Bicchi (2006: 287), European foreign policy can be seen as “an unreflexive behaviour mirroring deeply engrained belief that Europe’s history is a lesson for everybody”. In other words, European foreign policy is partially shaped by the idea of “our size fits all” (Bicchi, 2006: 287).

In this perspective, EU “norms are exported not because they are efficient or have universal value, but because they are legitimated by the spread of Western culture” and as such, they are “embraced by third parties”, and, the direction of this norm diffusion tends to show the increasing dominance of a Western world (Bicchi, 2006b: 292-293). In this sense, one may claim that the EU’s projection of its own norms and values can be considered as a new Western style of domination and a civilizing mission/act because this projection can be regarded as an attempt to form a doctrine as to how domestic structures as well as international relations should be best organized. However, the content of this projection’s normativity is questionable.

One may claim that there is “something distinctive” and normative about the EU’s foreign policy when he/she considers the issues regarding the EU’s policy of democracy promotion, its introduction of human rights clauses in trade agreements, the emphasis on encouraging regional cooperation and its focus on strengthening institutions (Sjursen, 2006: 235-236). On the other hand, according to Sjursen (2006: 236), “the above conceptualizations lack sufficient accuracy and they do not provide any criteria or assessment standards that would make it possible to qualify, validate or reject their implicit claim that the EU is ‘force for good’”¹⁸⁵. Merlingen (2007: 449) further claims that the EU’s norms do not mean that normative Europe is bad but rather the notion that everything else is dangerous is problematic. Thus, for Merlingen (ibid.: 446-449), the EU may sometimes promote European norms and values at the expense of local norms. Therefore, normative power Europe can be regarded as a form of “Eurocentric cultural imperialism” (Sjursen, 2006:248). Sjursen (ibid.) claims that in order to determine what is right, fair or just and to keep this separate from Eurocentric imperialism, one can apply the principle of “universalization” to the notion of normative power. For her (ibid.), universalization could be the core feature for a power such as the EU to “act in order to transform the parameters of power politics through a focus on the international legal system”.

¹⁸⁵ According to Hyde-Price (2006: 223), “member states explicitly see the EU as a ‘force for good’ in the world, committed to furthering shared European political values such as democracy, multilateralism and human rights”. Hyde-Price further suggests that EU member states, by committing themselves to an “ethical” foreign policy, may want to intervene in parts of the world where the great powers have no significant strategic interests (such as parts of Africa) (2006: 223). For example, it has already led the EU to advocate the end of capital punishment (Manners 2002) – “a policy, which has no impact on the balance of power and minimal impact on trade promotion” (Hyde-Price, 2006: 223).

While the concept of humanity can also be used as an ideological instrument of cultural imperialism, Eriksen (2006: 255) stresses that “as long as human rights are not positivized and law is not made equally binding on each of the member states, human rights politics may easily degenerate into empty universalistic rhetoric”. In some cases, some states may go on “to violate human rights with impunity, and some may use this behaviour for self-serving purposes” (Eriksen, 2006: 255). Regarding this perspective, Sjursen (2006: 235) argues that one possible critical standard might be that a “putative normative, civilian or civilizing power would act in order to transform the parameters of power politics through a focus on strengthening the international legal system”. To specify, Sjursen (2006: 248) argues that one might expect that a normative power would develop standards, mechanisms and policy instruments that might ensure that its own policies are consistent with principles such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, but the crucial point here is that this normative power “would bind itself and not only others to common legal principles”. She goes a step further by suggesting that “a core distinguishing feature of a ‘normative’ power might be that it seeks to overcome power politics through strengthening not only of international but cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of the individuals in the international system” (2006: 236). Eriksen (2006: 252) agrees with this claim and argues that the criteria for judging an actor’s normative quality may be derived from “cosmopolitanism”, i.e. whether the actor subjects its actions to the constraints of higher-ranking law.¹⁸⁶ From this perspective he emphasizes that “it is only by subjecting its actions to a higher ranking law” – to human rights and criteria of justice – that the EU can assert its normativity (2006: 253).¹⁸⁷

As Diez (2005) claims, normative power Europe constructs an identity of the EU to the outside world. This normative power Europe discourse envisages the EU as a model and

¹⁸⁶ It is debatable whether cosmopolitanism only means acting according to the constraints of a higher ranking law. However, this not the place to discuss this further. For various definitions of cosmopolitanism see, Gerard Delanty, “The Cosmopolitan Imagination”, *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, núm. 82-83: 217-230; Luke Martell, (2011), “Cosmopolitanism and Global Politics”. *Political Quarterly*, 18(4): 618-627; Vivienne Jabri, (2011), “Cosmopolitan politics, security, political subjectivity”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(4): 625-644.

¹⁸⁷ At this point it should be noted that although the EU promotes itself as a normative power, and despite the suspension clause, some the member countries do not implement the EU’s norms and even in some cases, such as in the Western Thrace problem, international and national guarantees. For example, the reforms in the Central and Eastern European countries slowed down or even stopped after their EU membership. In Western Thrace, the North-Eastern part of Greece, the Greek government refers to the Turkish community as Greek Muslims or Hellenic Muslims or even Muslim gypsies, and does not recognize a separate Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Moreover, in spite of international treaties and acts (such as Lausanne Treaty, the European Convention for Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act etc) that would guarantee Greece to respect the ethnic and religious rights of the Turkish minorities, the Turkish minority is suffering from serious human rights abuses in Western Thrace. For detail analysis see: Oran (1991).

its best practices as practices to be imitated by its neighbours.¹⁸⁸ This reminds the discourse of Orientalism whereas the EU puts itself to a superior position and claims that with its own successful experience and values, it is a civilized and developed model that needs to be followed by its less developed neighbours regardless of their local needs. Presenting itself as a model that needs to be followed unconditionally may be seen as an important aspect that justifies and legitimizes the EU's *mission civilisatrice*. One may argue that today the EU, like empires did, uses the tools of mimicry and want its neighbours to copy its norms and vales regardless of their content.

On the other hand, it can be argued that as long as the EU aims at “strengthening the international legal system”, “strengthening the cosmopolitan law”, and aims for “promoting universal norms” (not the norms that the EU thinks should be promoted, such as regionalism), its behaviour can be labeled as normative. Such an attitude seems to mark the distinction between the actions of “normative power Europe”, on the one hand, and historical empires and other international actors, on the other.

Bicchi (2006b: 299) regards the promotions of EU model with an “our size fits all and best” approach as “a dominant cultural paradigm” that reminds the former colonial powers’ tool of mimicry. In this context, one may assert that mimicry shows itself in the EU’s promotion of its best practice to its neighbourhood. Bicchi (ibid.) further claims that the “EU does not promote (neutral) norms, but promotes ‘Europe’ (in the forms of European norms)”. In this sense, regionalism represents a norm that is promoted by the EU and it is not universal.¹⁸⁹ On the other hand, Lenz (2013: 213) perceives the EU’s promotion of regionalism as the most distinctive feature of its policies that has a potential extensive impact of the Union as a normative power. Lenz (ibid.: 213-216) considers the EU’s normative power as a form of “ideational diffusion”, in which Europe’s “ideational impact” on regionalism works mostly “indirectly” and often in “diffuse fashion”.

Smith (2003a: 69) defines regional cooperation as a key feature of the EU’s identity; “both an objective and a means of its external policy”. For her (ibid.) the EU promotes regionalism “vindicating the regional approach” as one of the Union’s foreign policy objectives. In this context, the EU promotes regional political stability and contributes to “the

¹⁸⁸ See Cebeci, 2012.

¹⁸⁹ This interpretation underlines the “dark side” of the EU’s actions in its neighbourhood (Bicchi, 2006b: 299).

creation of political and/or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation or moves towards regional or sub-regional integration” (Smith, 2003a: 13). Thus, the Union’s support for regional cooperation could be viewed as “a form of narcissism” (Smith, 2003a: 70).

3.2.5. Norms versus interests in the EU’s definition as a power

Another discussion is about norms/values (the normative) versus interests (the non-normative) that set up the motivations of the actors employing foreign policy. Diez (2005: 625) states that “strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished, and that the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical”. On the one hand, some scholars, such as Youngs, claim that the EU’s human rights policies actually rest on “strategic considerations” and can be explained as the “outcome of rational utility calculations” (2004: 420). He observes that the EU’s approach to human rights initiatives in third countries is inspired by a “gradualist philosophy” that seeks to control the change in the target countries (Youngs, 2004:422). Some scholars, such as Lucarelli, do not agree with scholars who argue that the EU’s aim to spread democracy and human rights in its neighbourhood is more about its security interests rather than its normative attitude (Lucarelli, 2007). According to Lucarelli (2007: 254), this is a “misplaced criticism” because, “the very decision to deal with a security problem through democratization practices is a political choice pointing to a specific normative framework; it would be hardly thinkable in another context”. On the other hand, Manners adopts a different view and argues that the Union’s external policies are not solely derived from a desire to promote its own interests, but are a reflection of what should be done in the interacting countries (Manners, 2002; 2006a; 2006b). It can be argued that the EU can be normative when it exports its rules and practices, however, if the promotion of these rules and practices to its neighbourhood serves the economic and security interests of the Union, one may see the imperial logic in the EU’s policies.

Another problematic distinction is about normative goals and strategic ones. For Michael Smith (2004: 79), “whereas normative goals include the promotion of peace, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, international law and sustainable development; strategic goals would include the protection of commercial interests, preventing migratory movements or energy security”. However it is not always easy to make a distinction between

the strategic and normative goals. On the one hand, “the pursuit of strategic objectives is not necessarily ‘un-normative’”, on the other hand, “the pursuit of allegedly normative goals may underlie strategic objectives” (Tocci, 2008: 6). For example, “waging war in the name of democracy can cover strategic aims such as advancing energy security or pursuing hegemonic control” (ibid.). Similarly, “the promotion of the normative goal of multilateralism may conceal a mid-level power’s strategic objective of asserting its power and promoting multipolarity within the international system” (Tocci, 2008: 6-7).

At this point, Wolfers’ definition of “milieu goals”, in contrast to “possession goals” may help one distinguish between the normative and strategic goals. Wolfers defines the *possession* goals and *milieu* goals as follows:

One can distinguish goals pertaining, respectively, to national possessions and to the shape of the environment in which the nation operates. I call the former ‘possession goals’, the latter ‘milieu goals’. In directing its foreign policy toward the attainment of its possession goals, a nation is aiming at the enhancement or the preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value. The aim may apply to such values as a stretch of territory, membership in the Security Council of the United Nations, or tariff preferences. Here a nation finds itself competing with others for a share in values of limited supply’ [...] ‘Milieu goals are of a different character. Nations pursuing them are out not to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries. If it were not for the existence of such goals, peace could never become an objective of national policy’[...] ‘Similarly, efforts to promote international law or to establish international organizations, undertaken consistently by many nations, are addressed to the milieu in which nations operate and indeed such efforts make sense only if nations have reason to concern themselves with things other than their own possessions.¹⁹⁰

As Smith notes, while possession goals are dedicated to the maximization of the agent’s welfare and protection of its economic assets, milieu goals are dedicated to the promotion of external conditions in which these possession goals can best be pursued (Smith, 2004: 80). While “milieu goals aim to shape the environment” in which the state operates, “possession goals further national interests” (Smith, 2003b: 137). Although it is not quite easy to determine whether an actor pursues possession or milieu goals, in order to provide as

¹⁹⁰ A. Wolfers, (1962). “The goals of foreign policy”. In *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Quoted here from Tocci, 2008: 8.

“sound a definition as possible”, Tocci (2008: 7) claims that that normative foreign policy goals are those that aim “to shape the milieu by regulating it through international regimes, organizations and law”. It is argued that the EU has both possession and milieu goals (Rynning: 2003: 483) In Karen Smith’s view (2003b: 107), although the EU does seek to protect its external interests, especially in the field of international trade, it has consistently articulated a broader range of foreign policy objectives, such as the encouragement of regional cooperation, the promotion of human rights and democracy. Rynning (2003: 483) further asserts that the EU increasingly has the milieu goals where the Nice Treaty talks about “strengthening internal cooperation” and “developing and consolidating” democracy. On the other hand, in 2010, Manners considered this distinction as false dichotomy. For example, for him (ibid.), the ENP remains caught in conflicts between the interests and values of the Union.

One may easily claim that the line between milieu goals and possession goals is very thin and blurred. It is not an easy job to distinguish between these goals. According to Manners (2010:40), normative power Europe has to analyse “the legitimacy, coherence and consistency of the principles the EU seeks to promote, and it would then turn to looking at the actions taken by the EU in the neighbourhood”. Therefore, even though it is not completely possible, one needs to have some kind of a criterion in order to make a possible distinction between these two types of goals such as looking whether these goals have normative or interest-driven – or even neocolonial agenda. This study argues that the EU perceives its neighbourhood as a source of instability for Europe. Therefore, the EU is trying to influence its neighbourhood by promoting certain values in its foreign policy, by exporting its own integration model as a recipe, and by defending its own interests. The EU pursues norms and values only when it is in its interest to do so. In that sense, one may claim that the EU is trying to shape its milieu in order to pursue its possessions goals.

3.3. The EU’s disciplining power

Since its inception as the EC, the EU has been represented as a successful project that brings peace and prosperity to Europe and as a “security community”; attracting its neighbours towards itself. In 1957, Karl Deutsch theorized the concept of security communities, and defined a “security community” as “a group of peoples that have become

integrated and considered war as an obsolete instrument of conflict resolution”¹⁹¹. Integration of a group of people is defined as “the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population”¹⁹². Adler and Barnett (1998b: 34) call the EU a security community because it has made war unthinkable between its members and have thus maintained dependable expectations of peaceful change. It is believed security can generally create magnetism around themselves (Adler and Barnett, 1998b; Waever, 1998a). The EU as a security community can act as magnet and draw its neighbourhood towards itself. It is through this magnetism, the EU can discipline its neighbourhood.

In this context, Ole Waever has used an “imperial analogy” to describe the European Union and its security functions. According to Waever, the EU Empire can “establish its rule in a radial manner” through differing zones of order (1997: 65). The EU has not become an empire “by traditional means of conquest, but rather by means of invitation” (Haukkala, 2003: 8-9). Haukkala (2003: 9) argues that the EU has some empire-like qualities, “as each successive enlargement creates new borderlines beyond which the EU order has to be imposed so that the European Union can feel secure and be able to do business with its new neighbours”. For Browning and Joenniemi (2008: 524),

[A]n imperial logic has been evident in the EU’s foreign policy in at least two respects. First, the notion of the EU as possessing a ‘peace mission’ to bring stability throughout Europe has provided the EU with both moral and identity prerogatives to try and organize the space beyond its borders and to spread the ‘European values’ to those outside the Union. (...) Second, this desire to foster stability and security through the spread of “European values” and practices is also enhanced by ‘security discourses’.

In this context, as the old colonial powers did, the EU justifies its position by claiming that it is trying to bring internal justice and peace to its neighbourhood while seeking its own

¹⁹¹ Karl W. Deutsch., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee Jr, Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagenen (1957) *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, paraphrased here from: Adler and Barnett, 1998a: 3-28.

¹⁹² Karl W. Deutsch., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee Jr, Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagenen (1957) *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p.5, quoted here from Nathan, 2006: 275-276.

interests.¹⁹³ According to Waever, the EU, “as traditional empires did, appears to be engaged in a pacification and stabilization process of its frontiers, through which the Union exports its norms and rules in a radial manner” (1997: 59-93). In his view, the European Union has three security functions (2000: 260; 1998a: 99; 1998b: 54-56 1997: 68-72; 1996: 228-233):

- the primary function of *keeping its core intact*, ensuring that there is one center rather than several in Europe;
- the *silent disciplining power* on its ‘near abroad’; the magnetism that worked in East Central Europe;
- the potential role as *direct intervener* in specific conflicts.

Waever (1997: 68; 2000: 260) stresses that the above functions follow a quasi-geographical pattern of “concentric circles”¹⁹⁴: the first is about the core itself; the second is about the close outsiders; and the third is about those peripheral actors that circle around this center at a larger distance, geographically and politically (1996: 228; 1997: 68; 2000: 260). While the two first functions are non-military and primarily structural and pre-emptive, the third function, largely military, is mostly reactive (Waever, 2000: 260-261).

¹⁹³ The history of European integration shows how the EU has paid a special attention to its relationship with neighbouring countries. Until 2004, the EU addressed the neighbourhood challenge essentially “by oscillating between two ends of the integration and security spectrum” (Tassinari, 2005:1). The EU has pursued two distinct approaches towards its immediate neighbours: an approach aimed at stabilizing its periphery and largely “keeping its neighbours at arm’s length” (Tassinari, 2005:1), and a second approach aimed at “integration proper” (Missiroli, 2003: 11), i.e. bringing neighbouring countries into the EU. The first policy approach “is based on promoting regional cooperation and broad partnership (regionalism) while bringing peace and stability to the region concerned through conditionality on human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (Missiroli, 2003: 11; Moschella, 2004: 58). It is the approach that the “EU employs in the Mediterranean”, through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The second policy approach makes “use of conditionality as the instrument to pave the way for integration” (Missiroli, 2003: 11). The integration goal is based on the membership incentive: “extending the Union’s norms, rules and opportunities and constraints to successive applicants has made instability and conflict on the Continent decreasing likely” (Moschella, 2004: 58). However, “as the boundaries of the EU extend to the geographical and political limits with the last enlargement, the need to address the security-integration nexus has come forward” (Tassinari, 2008). The challenge is “how to promote stability and security without having to rely on the carrot of future enlargement” (Browning and Joenniemi, 2008: 529); therefore, the European Neighbourhood Policy is designed to fill this gap. In the subsequent chapters of the thesis, the policies of the Union towards its neighbourhood are discussed in detail.

¹⁹⁴ Scholars argue that different forms of the international system’s organization can be arranged on a “temporal continuum”, or on a “spatial dimension” which is articulated in “concentric circles”, in which “the inner represents the imperial dominance and the outer rings the intermediate forms” (Moschella, 2004: 64). Emerson (2004: 8) defines this “concentric model as a cobweb model”, in which “the centre seeks to simplify and order the system with the neighbours according to their shorter or longer geographic/political distance from the centre, with elements of multilateralism or standardization for each group”. In practice, the EU has tended towards the concentric circle (cobweb) model, “both internally”, for example with the Euro and Schengen groups, and “externally” with the European Economic Area EEA, the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) groups” (ibid.).

For the purposes of this study, it is especially important to see how the EU's own integration process ("keeping its core intact") gives it the ability to impose a "silent disciplining power" on others. Read through the concentric circle approach, the first security function of the EU, "keeping its core intact" is about the maintenance of peace and stability in the core of the system. This is the most important security function for the EU because it is the precondition for all other functions. This function refers to "the general political and symbolic importance of the Community as such, as it exists or as it could be (the strength of the process of integration)" (Weaver, 1996: 229; 1997; 69).

Before 1945, each of Europe's major states constituted an independent center of power, and, fragmentation and conflict resulted from competition among these poles (Waever, 1998b: 53). Integration and the establishment of the Franco-German coalition have created a single center.¹⁹⁵ According to Waever, "the gradual process of centering has replaced the fragmentation associated with multipolar competition with a cohesion resulting from Europe's new core-periphery structure" (1998b: 55). He claims that the process of integration has succeeded in "transforming Europe from a balance-off-setting to a neoimperial structure" (1998b: 55). While the Franco-German axis constructs the core, the other powers gather in concentric circles around this core, with each circle trying to move closer to the center (Waever: 1998b: 55).¹⁹⁶ While the member states are located in the inner circle, a group of other states that are waiting to join the EU, such as Turkey and the Balkan states, and states that want to deepen their relations with the Union, such as the EU's Southern and Eastern neighbours (the ENP countries) form the circle closer to the inner circle. In this context, following Waever, one may claim that by keeping its core intact, the EU is having a considerable presence in the international arena, and with the help of its presence marked by peace and welfare, the Union can act as a magnet towards its neighbourhood.

¹⁹⁵ "While France and Germany retain separate national governments and capitals, they engage in practices (joint decision-making, a single market, etc. within the EU) that pool sovereignty and effectively provide Europe with a single power center" (Waever, 1998b: 54-55). "Indeed, most of Europe's major initiatives have emerged as the product of the dialogue between and the joint efforts of Paris and Bonn" (Waever, 1998b: 55).

¹⁹⁶ On the other hand, Delanty claims that "as the geopolitical weight of the Union shifts eastwards with the enlargement, Europeanization will take a more diffuse and multicentric role, and unlike in earlier times of the European Union's history, the center (core) will not succeed in totally dominating the periphery" (2003: 14). If "the existing tensions of a polynational and polyethnic polity will be complicated by a more multicentric and transnational political order", for the first time the periphery may impose itself on the center (Delanty, 2003: 14). In this context, one may take a middle stand and claim that this shift of geopolitical weight will depend on the policy issues of the European Union. For example, while Poland's initiative of Eastern Partnership can be regarded as a reflection of the influence of the periphery, the French initiative of the Mediterranean Union can be regarded as the dominance of the core.

It is due to this magnetic effect of EU integration that the EU can impose its silent disciplining power on other countries. Waever argues that “the EU not only acts as a magnet, as pulling Europe’s periphery toward its center, but also it induces the periphery to resolve preemptively issues that would otherwise be likely to produce security competition” (Weaver, 1998b: 55) due mainly to the fact that these problems in its periphery may have spill over effects for the EU itself. Therefore, the EU exercises a silent disciplining power in parts of Europe and in regions of its proximity, which remain outside of its boundaries and in its neighbourhood which are “most prone to conflict” (ibid.: 56). The EU exercises its power over the candidate countries and its neighbour countries “through discreet disciplining or indirect influence” (Waever, 1996: 228) or through “asymmetric dependence” (Waever, 1997: 69). In other words, “implicit disciplining refers to the role of the EU in exercising ‘power’ through its attractiveness” to the candidate countries and to its neighbouring countries (Waever, 2000: 261).¹⁹⁷ It is this attractiveness of the EU, which ties the candidate and neighbourhood countries into a system of concentric circles.

Waever claims that the silent disciplining power can only work when the countries concerned move closer to the EU at a speed that is neither too fast nor too slow (Waever, 1996: 231; 1997: 71; 2000: 262-263). In his view (2000: 262-263):

Ideally, the EU grows at the slowest possible speed. It must never stop (or *give the impression of stopping*); it has to move, but almost the slower the better. [...] If the EU expands too fast and/or is watered down internally, it will lose the use the very value that in the first instance made it attractive and kept the [...] core together, while on the other hand, if widening slows down, countries might start to fall off the magnet. [...] The EU policy – which reflects the basic concentric circles pattern – is to avoid ever saying ‘no’. The answer is always ‘not yet’ or ‘yet but’. [emphasis added]

¹⁹⁷ For Maull (2005: 778-779), “it is this attractiveness, the ‘gravitational pull’ of the EU is based on the weight of its markets, capital and technological resources as well as on the attractiveness of the European way of life. The candidate countries and the neighbours are thus expected to fulfill conditions set by the EU for closer ties with the Union; in other words, they are disciplined. By its attractiveness, the EU can impose “its way of doing things on others by ‘shaping their milieu’ or by strengthening the ability and/or the inclination of others to conduct themselves in a civilized way”. (Maull, 2005: 779). The logic which follows is that “through its force of attraction”, the EU has “succeeded in stabilizing the European continent”, and “the shift may be reproduced” in a far wider environment, one determined by the European Union being “inevitably a global player” (Joenniemi, 2007a: 139; Solana: 2003: 1). It should be noted at this point that Maul’s reference to the attractiveness of “the European way of life” and especially the EU’s “helping others to conduct themselves in a civilized way” are all rhetoric similar to the colonial civilizing discourse.

In this context, the imperial analogy can help one picture the nature of the future EU borders. As Haukkala (2003: 9) claims, these borders can “either be hard, like traditional borders of nations state (Westphalian state)”, or they can be “soft and flexible”, “allowing for significant interaction and transaction with the outsiders”. Waever’s model tends to point to the latter alternative. The imperial analogy can also be useful “in highlighting the fact that the EU perhaps needed not have to accept new members perpetually in order to impose its order on others” (Haukkala, 2007: 5). As Polosaari (2001: 213) contends, “the EU is seeking to use the creation of the new ‘grey zones’ in Europe in order to control the problems that stem from neighbouring areas without having to grant them full membership and European identity”.

A security community approach would also help one to see the relationship between the first and second security functions of the EU better. As mentioned above, it is a common feature of security communities to create of magnetism around themselves (Adler and Barnett, 1998b; Waever, 1998a). This also means the creation of concentric circles around the core. Since the European Union as a security community attracts the outsiders towards its center, the notion of “security community” has a considerable role regarding the first and second security functions of the Union. Recalling the concentric circles and that the first circle concerns the member states and the second circle concerns the near non-members, Waever argues: “between these two are the outer layers of members whose ‘peacefulness’ is secured through a security community of a Deutschean type of which the EU is the core. Thus, their security is also to some extent secured through the EU” (1996: 254 [his endnote 25]). Such a concentric circles approach where the security of the periphery is also defined and provided by the core also refers to the idea of an empire.¹⁹⁸

Bellamy, on the other hand, believes that the proliferation of security communities “could create stable peace in international society” (2004: 52-53). In the development of a security community, power can be understood as an important factor “by virtue of a core state’s ability to nudge and occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance” (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 39). Therefore it can be asserted that in a security community, power can function as a magnet. In Adler and Barnett’s view, power can also be understood as “the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the “we-feeling” and practices of states

¹⁹⁸ See chapter 1 of the thesis.

and the conditions which confer, deter, or deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members” (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 39). According to them:

[...] power can be a magnet; a community formed around a group of strong powers creates the expectations that weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community. Thus, those powerful states who belong to the core of strength do not create security *per se*; rather, because of the positive images of security and material progress that are associated with powerful and successful states, security communities develop around them. (Adler and Barnett, 1998b: 39-40)

It seems that the EU, as a security community, can act as a magnet and attract the outsiders especially its periphery towards itself. Therefore, the positive image of the EU as a materially developed peace project can help to justify the EU’s policy of exporting its own integration model to its neighbourhood. It also legitimizes the EU’s policies. In the Mediterranean case, in order to serve its own strategic interests, the EU tries to engage in region-building practices and attempts to achieve security and stability.¹⁹⁹ In this sense, it can be argued that the EU, as a strong partner, creates such expectations that the weaker neighbour countries feel the need to join or be closer to the Union. This surely gives the EU the legitimacy to impose a silent disciplining power on them.

The disciplining function on the periphery, like its centering function, occurs silently and invisibly and without resort to the traditional instrument of security policy, which is the use (or threat of use) of military force (Waeber, 1998b: 56). Considering the completion of the enlargement process (apart from Turkey and the Balkan countries), one can mainly focus on the relation between the Union and neighbouring countries. Some of the countries at the borders of the enlarged Union may also be potential future members. In this framework, the logic of empire partly works because “the EU is a reluctant empire, ever aware of the dangers posed by the entry of newcomers into the club” (Haukkala, 2003: 2). The Union’s policy objectives “are realized through the tool of asymmetrical interdependence” (Moschella, 2004: 64), which helps the EU exert its silent disciplining power. Although the EU shares the costs of economic, political and social interdependence with its neighbours, the problem is that generally these costs are higher for neighbours than for the Union (Moschella, 2004: 64). In

¹⁹⁹ See for example, Youngs, 2004: 415-435.

other words, neighbouring countries are more vulnerable than the EU in their relation of mutual interdependence (Moschella, 2004: 64). Therefore, it can be claimed that, at this level, taking advantage of its mainly economic and commercial power as well as its political power of attraction, the EU can exercise a silent disciplining power on its neighbourhood. In this relationship, the EU sets the rules and others have to follow (Cebeci, 2012).

In this context, while the EU is trying to influence its neighbourhood by promoting certain values in its foreign policy, by exporting its own integration model as a recipe, and by defending its own interests, it can either act as a normative or neocolonial power. One may claim that in the post-Cold War period, with its notion of “integration as security”, the EU has proved that it is a pole of attraction to its immediate neighbourhood. Regarding the Mediterranean countries where the Union’s membership is not an option, the EU is increasingly replacing its policy of “integration as security” with the policy of “association/partnership as security”. In this context, what is important is how the EU identifies its possession and milieu goals in the Mediterranean because this identification will help one to determine whether the EU can be labeled as a normative power or a neocolonial power. Apart from EU’s centering function and its disciplining function on the periphery, the EU has a third security function that needs to be analyzed thoroughly. This third function can help us to better understand the EU’s intentions and its influence over its neighbourhood.

3.4. The EU as a direct intervenor

The EU has a role (a potential role as Ole Waever suggests) in specific conflicts in the Union’s near abroad. In order to become an effective power, the EU tries to develop both a military and a civilian capability to intervene in conflicts that may destabilize the continent. Ole Waever refers to this as the EU’s function as direct intervenor. However, it can be claimed that the military area is where the Union’s role seems rather weak.

Waever (1998b: 56) claims that the absence of a greater EU role in traditional military matters is not so much troubling because the EU can contribute to security largely through its other security functions, stabilizing the core and disciplining the near abroad, rather than through coordinating deterrence and conducting military actions. Moreover, it can be claimed that developing military capabilities can have a negative impact on the relations with the Mediterranean. Some of the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries may perceive the

development of these capabilities as an attempt of the European Union to directly intervene in the internal affairs of their countries. In this context, the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries may fear becoming the target of the EU's near abroad interventions. As Attina (2003:187) notes, "Indeed, the Mediterranean area, as the most troubled zone of the areas surrounding Europe, is the most probable zone for humanitarian and peacekeeping actions and any other intervention of military forces about which the Med-partners are worried." Therefore, developing capabilities for direct intervention most likely create suspicions among the Mediterranean countries and create a perception about the Union as a neocolonial power.

Moreover, in general, these interventions are not exempt from critique. There are debates about the nature of these interventions such as peacebuilding. There are debates about whether "peacebuilding is an efficient, well-coordinated and viable project, a cover for neo-colonial pacification projects" (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2013, 1) or whether it is a norm "that informs the normative underpinning and legitimisation of particular types of intervention" (Jabri, 2013: 3-4).²⁰⁰ For Kaldor, external peacebuilding operations are morally necessary and legitimate and international peacebuilding norms that could universally be applied are emerged.²⁰¹ Jabri (2013: 4, 14) claims that peacebuilding suggests a term of architecture or even design, it is "a project of institution-building, or more specifically of statebuilding". Therefore, Jabri (2013: 10) argues that peacebuilding goes hand in hand with the concept of the "failed state". She (ibid.: 14) further claims that peacebuilding's imperatives of "reshaping and the redesign of societies and their institutions", creates "the conditions assumed to underpin what is referred to as sustainable peace". Chandler (2013: 17) stresses that peace is "narrowly understood in terms of exporting democracy and good governance".

Richmond defines the EU's peacebuilding as a liberal peace framework which suffers from a top-down approach. Richmond (2009: 559) argues that the liberal peace framework rests upon conceptions of institution building, good governance, democratisation, rule of law programming, human rights, reconstruction, development, and free market reform. Richmond also claims (ibid.: 558) that liberal peace framework creates an international-local relationship

²⁰⁰ "Peacebuilding is now a norm structured into the very fabric of the international. This is both a discursive and an institutional fabric, so that what began life as a concept is now an internationally accepted norm that informs the decisions and conduct of global institutions" (Jabri, 2013: 9).

²⁰¹ Mary Kaldor. (1999). *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: 13-30. Cited in Chandler, 2013: 18.

that can be configured “as managers and subjects”. This surely refers to a postcolonial critical reading. Similarly, Jabri (2013: 3) asserts that peacebuilding operations “can be interpreted as being driven by a colonial rationality wherein the imperative to govern precedes and informs practices on the ground”. In this sense, its recipients perceive these operations as neocolonial and identify them “as representative of dominant Western culture and ideology” (Richmond, 2009: 568, 2010: 682).

For Cubitt (2013: 94), international peacebuilders use Western interpretations of developed democracies as basic pretexts in their operations, and they attempt to “civilize” locals. In this sense, one may claim that this framework may be regarded as a new for civilizing mission of Western powers. The EU’s projection of its values and norms to the Mediterranean can also be considered as the EU’s *mission civilisatrice*. By exporting its model as the best particular value-system to the Mediterranean, the EU wants to civilize its less developed South and Eastern Mediterranean partners regardless of their local needs.

According to Cubitt (ibid.: 97), peacebuilding is based on the attempt “to centralize and formalize state/society relations” by copying their “best practice” to all problematic places regardless of their histories, cultural and political contexts. This one-size fits all approach reminds us the colonial tradition of mimicry.²⁰² In this sense, it can be claimed in order to gain influence and protect its own interests, the EU is promoting its best practices to its Southern neighbourhood regardless of their content. If the EU further acts as a direct intervenor in its Southern neighbourhood, the Union’s claim of normativity would be questioned.

In this classical liberal view, “liberal states and peoples are effectively superior in rights and status to others, and extended these arguments to allow for the justification of direct or subtle forms of colonialism and interventionism” (Richmond, 2009: 565). The basic assumption in this view that “indigenous civil society lacks the quality of rationality”, (Cubitt, 2013: 91-92) and therefore, it needs to be assisted by Western powers, which may be considered as a form of cultural imperialism. In this sense, one may claim that by developing direct intervention capabilities, the Union can be perceived as having neocolonialist intentions. As Cebeci (2012: 581) emphasizes, it is not easy to make a distinction “between

²⁰² For Cebeci (2012: 583), “the EU-as-a-model discourse supports mimicry”, it also legitimizes the projection of its model, values and norms and “reinforces the Union’s asymmetrical approach” to its neighbourhood.

the normative intentions and neo-colonial tendencies of major European powers” such as in the Libyan case and in EU missions in Congo where the EU’s usage of coercion, conditionality and intervention “have served as legitimating factor for the member states’ acts”.²⁰³ One may argue that by using its silent disciplining power and by acting as a direct intervenor, the EU claims to create an area of democracy and peace in its Southern neighbourhood. However, these powers also help the EU to gain advantage and re-build European hegemony over its Southern neighbourhood.

Concluding Remarks

This third chapter has attempted to analyze the nature of the European Union’s foreign policy. It has portrayed the international identity of the European Union both as a “*sui generis* political entity” and “(neo)imperial political construction” because on the one hand, the *sui generis* identity of the EU helps one to understand how the nature of EU policies are varied, and on the other hand, the EU’s imperial identity helps one to understand how the foreign policy practices of the European Union follow a quasi-geographical pattern of concentric circles, in which the EU exports its norms and rules in a radial manner, which might be seen as an imperialistic neocolonial attempt.

It can be claimed that there is no one single interpretation of the EU’s international actorness. Therefore, it might be logical not to depict the EU as a solely normative/civilian power or solely a civilizing power. One could claim that due to its *sui generis identity*, the EU may act as a normative power or a neocolonial power. Thus, the foreign policy actions of the Union can possess normative and neocolonial features. It can also be asserted that regarding the Union’s policies towards the Mediterranean, the EU sometimes can act both as a normative and a neocolonial power simultaneously.

As one can see in the next chapter, there are different foreign policy contexts in which EU policy takes different roles. Since the EU displays different behaviour according to the related issue, one can argue that the EU cannot be characterized as a single type of power. In this study, it is argued that the EU acts differently, depending on the merits of the issue at

²⁰³ For a detail analysis see Chapter 5.

hand, either as a normative power or a neocolonial power as is the case in its Mediterranean policies.

It is argued that EU presents itself as a model and wants to promote its values and norms in its neighbourhood. The EU has achieved its integration, and this has stabilized the European continent. Its focus has then shifted from Europe into a wider framework, and the EU is using its magnetic force in its neighbourhood. As traditional empires did, the Union tries to be engaged in the “pacification and stabilization of its frontiers” (Waeber, 1997). Taking the advantage of its political, but mainly economic and commercial power, the EU exercises its power over its periphery through silent disciplining, indirect influence and asymmetric dependence. The EU conceives the problems in its neighbourhood as a source of threat to the Union itself because of the possible spill over effects of these problems, such as terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration. One can argue that today the EU securitizes its neighbourhood in such a way that the neighbourhood is constructed as a source of instability for the EU. Therefore, the EU is trying to influence its neighbourhood by promoting certain values in its foreign policy, by exporting its own integration model as a recipe, and by defending its own interests. In other words, the EU is trying to shape its milieu in order to pursue its possessions goals.

It can be asserted that by claiming itself as a model that needs to be followed, the EU expects its neighbours to copy its model and to embrace its values, which reminds one of the former colonial powers’ tool of mimicry. In the postcolonial era, the mimicry shows itself in the EU’s approach to the Mediterranean where it tries to promote its values, norms and model to its South and Eastern Mediterranean partners mostly overlooking the needs of the locals in these countries and expects these counties to adopt them unconditionally. In the following chapter, the EU’s policies towards the Mediterranean are analyzed with a view to how the EU defines its possession and milieu goals in the region, what policies it designs to pursue these goals, and depending on the issue, how the EU acts differently either as a normative power or a neocolonial power.

4. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S POLICIES TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN

This chapter analyzes the European Union's Mediterranean policies with a view to portraying how the EU acts either as a normative power or a neocolonial power in addressing the Mediterranean (depending on the issue at hand), and it tries to use its silent disciplining power in its Southern neighbourhood.²⁰⁴ In the postcolonial era, the EU's Mediterranean policies aim to stabilize the Mediterranean region with political, economic and cultural tools and to help the development of the region. By claiming itself as a model that needs to be followed, the EU expects its neighbours to copy its model and embrace its values. In this sense, one can consider the Mediterranean policies as tools through which the EU seeks to control its neighbourhood, to bring stability (and may be peace) to the region, to maximize its economic gains and protect its own citizens from the potential threats generating from its neighbourhood. To achieve these it employs its "silent disciplining power" (Wæver, 1997: 66-72)

In the postcolonial era, the patterns of dependence and domination between the EU and the Mediterranean create an asymmetrical relation between the EU and the SEMP and also provide the EU the opportunity to pursue its interests in the Mediterranean through Eurocentric policies where the EU operates as the center and disciplines its Southern neighbourhood. This refers to a center-periphery approach, which is a significant characteristic of empires. The EU claim is that its policies have normative aims such as creating an area of democracy and dialogue, shared prosperity and developing zone of peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. Despite the normative rhetoric the EU uses in pursuing them, due to the power asymmetries between the EU and the SEMPS, the Eurocentric design of the policies and the interest-driven rationale behind the policies, the Union's Mediterranean policies can be considered as neocolonial practices.

Regarding the Mediterranean policies, one may claim that EU usually acts as a magnet and attracts its neighbourhood towards its center. Contrary to the old empires, the EU has not coercively imposed its own model and understanding of values towards its neighbourhood. It

²⁰⁴ The uprisings in the Southern neighbourhood will be analyzed in the next chapter. This chapter only analyzes the EU's Mediterranean policies prior to 2011.

has imposed its model by persuasion, cooperation, and dialogue. Nevertheless, the Union wants its neighbours to copy its model, norms and values usually overlooking of their local needs. Presenting itself as a model that needs to be followed unconditionally may be seen as an important aspect that justifies and legitimizes the EU's *mission civilisatrice*. The Union tries to be engaged in the "pacification and stabilization of its frontiers" (Waever, 1997) through its policies. Moreover, the Union's Mediterranean policies can be read in the context of the Union's efforts to civilize the SEMP. In this sense, the asymmetrical relations between the EU and the Mediterranean, Euro-centric and interest driven Mediterranean policies are all implemented under the claim of normativity just like claim to civilization in colonial times.

The European Union's policies towards the Mediterranean have three main prongs: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that was established in 1995, which is also known as the "Barcelona Process", the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Each of the European Union's policies towards the Mediterranean is portrayed in detail in this chapter. In these policies, the EU sometimes acts as the centre and through the asymmetric interdependence, it tries to discipline its periphery. In order to understand the logic behind the EU's Mediterranean policies, it is beneficial to look at the relations between the EU and the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries in the postcolonial era first.

4.1. Relations between the EU and the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries in the postcolonial era

On account of a painful colonial past, the relations between the European Union and the South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners are mainly shaped by distrust which make them rather challenging. Although the colonial period – which started in late 19th century and could only last till the midst of the 20th century – was rather short, it has had important consequences in these Euro-Mediterranean relations. Roots of the long-standing disputes in the region such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or Western Sahara can also be found in Europe's colonial past. Therefore, it can be argued that today there exists a problem of trust between the EU and most of the SEMP. In considering the current relations between the EU and these countries, it is important to recall that these relations are largely based on the ties established during the colonial period. As Lister argues (1997:42, the post-war relations between Europe and its former colonies still "resemble those of the nineteenth century era of colonialism", that

may be termed as neocolonial. The relationship between the European Union and the South and Eastern Mediterranean still resembles the old division between the colonizer and colonized. There exists an asymmetrical relationship based on an alleged superiority on the part of the EU as a peaceful, civilized, developed region and the European construction of the Southern Mediterranean as an uncivilized, underdeveloped, backward and conflict-ridden region.

In this sense, the relations of the EU with the developing countries of the South and Eastern Mediterranean are, in a way, still built on the foundations of the colonial relationship. “At the heart of the colonial relationship lie patterns of dependence and domination both between the centre and its periphery and within the colonial territory itself” (Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis, 2006: 363-364). While the powerful, northern shore countries constitute the centre, less powerful states of the southern shore form the periphery. Therefore, Lister argues that the centre will probably decide the future shape of Euro-Mediterranean relations (1997: 76). The different levels of development in the Northern and Southern Mediterranean shores put any kind of cooperation in danger of being dominated by the North. As Adler and Crawford (2006: 20) argue, “the economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the Mediterranean has created a structure of asymmetrical interdependence, giving the EU the upper hand in all negotiations” in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and in the European Neighbourhood Policy processes.²⁰⁵

In order to understand the current relations between the EU and the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries, a brief look to the relations between the European countries and the former colonial world in the Cold War environment could be useful. The European Community established a “pyramid of privilege”²⁰⁶ within the broader system of North-South relations (Mayall, 2005: 298). In this period, the pyramid of privilege had been designed with economic and developmental, rather than security issues in mind (Mayall, 2005: 298). One may claim that with its pyramid of privilege system, the European Community tried to build a

²⁰⁵“Currently, the pattern of socioeconomic, political and military relations between the EU and the Mediterranean are ‘all EU dominant’. Brussels continues to dictate the pace and the scope of European and Mediterranean interaction that has developed since the early 1970s” (Calleja, 1997: 194).

²⁰⁶ The first tier was formed by the African, Caribbean and Pacific states. The second tier “was formed by the non-member Mediterranean countries, whose strategic proximity and traditional economic ties led to the negotiation of a series of bilateral trade agreements to protect market access in both directions, and to cushion these effects and slow the pace of adjustments made necessary as the result of European integration” (Mayall, 2005: 298). At the base of the pyramid was the rest of the developing world, all those countries that were eligible for Generalized System Preferences (GSP) (ibid.).

neocolonial regime and to maintain its influence in the Third World.²⁰⁷ Within this system, the EC defined its interests and established relations with the countries based on asymmetrical ways.

The EU/EC has been constructing a Mediterranean policy since 1957. As Lister (1997: 76) argues, “the modern history of European involvement in the Mediterranean contained traumatic incidents, especially for the British and the French”. In 1956, when the US and the Soviets opposed the invasion of Suez by British and French forces, this caused “humiliation of the European powers and marked the end of European dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Lagrou, 2009: 321). The Suez debacle in 1956 showed that “the option of a European defensive colonial cartel was a hopeless strategy” (ibid.). For Hansen (2002: 491), the Suez debacle would soon “convince Paris that its ambition to remain a world power would be best served by a French-led European integration”.²⁰⁸ France’s long war with Algeria also “struck deeply at European sensibilities” (Lister, 1997: 78).²⁰⁹ For Amin (1989: 8), by constructing a French-led European integration, France was aiming to establish a neocolonial system that would replace the former imperial colonialism. Within this system, France has retained a de facto privileged status in the former colonies.²¹⁰ Hansen and Jonsson (2013: 10) further claim that such an integration was “the first step in a process leading a common exploitation” of old colonies’ resources and was “seen as a sure gateway to new and larger markets”.

Following the Algerian War and the Suez debacle and during the Cold War, the Mediterranean became “a superpowers’ lake, with the Europeans having only a marginal role” (Lister, 1997: 78). However, when the Cold War ended and a massive shift occurred in the international relations, the EU had to reconsider its relations with the former colonial world.²¹¹ Since the end of the Cold War (and with the impact of Spain’s membership in

²⁰⁷ For a similar agreement, see: Amin (1989); Hansen (2002).

²⁰⁸ In this context, while France saw European integration as the only option to seek its neocolonial interests, Britain feared that the European integration would hamper its Commonwealth ties and trade relations, its standing as an independent world power, and its neocolonial interests. However, when the global conditions changed, Britain had to reconsider its relations with the EEC.

²⁰⁹ The Algerian war was considered as death throe of colonialism (Amin, 1989: 8).

²¹⁰ “Moreover, the kind of unequal relations renewed in this framework did not represent progress towards the liberalization of Africa and development of its peoples; on the contrary, their restriction to obsolete mining and agricultural specializations was to Europe’s advantage” (Amin, 1989: 8).

²¹¹ The main consequences of the end of the Cold War were to weaken the ACP countries’ special relationship with the EU, while simultaneously politicizing it in new ways; and to increase the political salience of geopolitical considerations in the EU’s emerging foreign and security policy (Mayall, 2005: 300). The Central

1986), the EU has given increased attention to its relations with the countries of the Mediterranean region, has tried to stabilize the region and has aimed to strengthen its relations with the Mediterranean. In this regard, the EU has tried to reassert its influence over the whole Mediterranean region in political, economic and military terms. Fostering development in the Mediterranean region through trade liberalization, development aid, and exporting the European model of regional integration have been the strategies or policies used to further European interests that can also be interpreted as neocolonial interests. In the post-Cold War period, the EU's relationship with the former colonies is mainly shaped by political conditionality, based on criteria of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law; all imposed in an asymmetrical way.

The intensity of relations maintained by the EU with the Mediterranean partners has been highly varied. The Maghreb states of "Morocco", "Algeria", "Tunisia" were former French colonies and remain highly dependent on European economy. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia had constituted the French North Africa and the EU's relations with these countries are mainly based on economic relations, i.e, trade and development. The other states of the Mediterranean – Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Israel as well as the Palestinian Authority – "make up a complex geopolitical constellation where economic ties, while important, tend to be overshadowed by security issues of larger international impact" (Scott, 2005: 443). In this part of the Mediterranean, the EU is trying to take a leading role in promoting peace and stability in the region. Finally, there is Turkey, a candidate for EU membership.²¹²

France, Spain and Italy have been the main actors in developing policies towards the Mediterranean region because of their proximity as well as because of colonial ties.²¹³ The importance of developing a cooperation agenda with the poorer states of the Mediterranean is mainly due to close economic dependency, geographic proximity and strong postcolonial ties. Pressures originating from illegal immigration, illicit trade, terrorism and fundamentalism have also highlighted the sensitivity of the EU's Mediterranean borders. Furthermore, Scott

and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States replaced the ACP countries on the top of the pyramid of privilege as the primary focus of EU aid and trade diplomacy. However, the Mediterranean states retained their position. Indeed, the relationship was strengthened with the introduction of the Barcelona Process in 1995. Although there have been many developments regarding the Mediterranean, since 2000s EU's focus has mainly shifted towards the CEECs.

²¹² Because it is in a different track of relationship, this study deliberately ignores Turkey in its analysis.

²¹³ Note that Spain still has colonies in North Africa.

(2005: 443) argues that “fears that eastward enlargement would divert attention and resources from the specific problems of the Mediterranean area created pressure for a more decisive community approach to the region”. These states, especially France, use the EU in order to have more influence on the region. In this context, when one looks at the driving force behind the evolution of the Union’s postcolonial relations, as Mayall (2005: 313) claims, he/she can see that “the long shadow cast by Empire has receded but not disappeared”. One may consider the EU as an Empire which tries to control its neighbourhood and “establish its rule in a radial manner” (Waeber, 1997: 65) through differing policies. By using its attractive model of integration, the EU ties the Mediterranean countries into a system of concentric circles. Conceptualizing the EU as an empire, brings about the argument that the EU exports rules and practices to its neighbourhood just like the empires did in pursuit of their own interests. In the subsequent sections as well as in Chapter 5, the EU’s Mediterranean policies are analyzed with a view to revealing whether the European Union develops these policies for gaining advantage and re-building European hegemony over the SEMP or it develops these policies, based on normative aims, for creating an area of democracy and peace; stabilizing; and, helping the development of the region.

4.2. The EU’s Mediterranean policies prior to 2004

In this section, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region of 2000 and the European Security Strategy are analyzed. After assessing the evolution of the EMP, the section focuses on conditionality and dialogue through the Barcelona Process in order to evaluate the Union’s approach towards the region. This section further lays down the weaknesses and strengths of the Barcelona Process. Although the Barcelona Process constitutes the main framework within which the EU’s relations with the Mediterranean countries are dealt with, it is not the only tool. The Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region and the European Security Strategy are the two Common Foreign and Security Policy tools that are used in this regard. On the one hand, the CMS was adopted in order to address the opportunities and challenges of the EMP. On the other hand, the ESS drew the general framework within which the Mediterranean should be dealt with. Hence, these two CFSP tools are briefly discussed in this section.

4.2.1. Background and evolution of the EMP

Since the inception of the European Union as the European Economic Community, European integration included the Mediterranean dimension within its framework. The Rome Treaty, which established the European Economic Community, left its doors open to other European countries that wished to become members. Greece and Spain joined the Community in 1981 and 1986 respectively, Cyprus and Malta joined the Union in 2004, and Turkey has been a candidate country negotiating accession with the Union since 2005. The Rome Treaty also contained a provision that pertained to the relations with non-European countries and territories, which have special relations with the founding members conducting mainly through economic assistance, trade and association agreements.

Prior to 1989, the European Community addressed the Mediterranean only in the context of its bilateral relations with third countries. Throughout the 1960s, the EEC signed trade agreements with various Mediterranean countries. These agreements regulated trade relations, had limited duration and lacked regional objectives (Nsouli et. al, 1996: 14). In 1972 the European Community adopted its Global Mediterranean Policy and continued to sign co-operation agreements with various Mediterranean non-member countries (MNCs): Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in 1976 and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in 1977. At this point, it is important to note that during the GMP period, the EC tended to regard Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (the Maghreb) as a grouping, differentiated from Eastern Mediterranean countries such as Jordan (Pace, 2002: 197; Pace, 2006: 72). The Global Mediterranean Policy was centered on “Cooperation Agreements” that covered financial, technical and social matters as well as the “geographical scope of the associative network” (Gomez, 2003: 30). In other words, the GMP, which mainly concentrated on financial and technical cooperation, envisaged a more comprehensive region-wide strategy aimed at establishing a free-trade area between the European Community and the signing countries in the Mediterranean (Nsouli et. al, 1996: 14). In addition to traditional trade provisions, the new agreements included a financial component in the form of five-year protocols designed to support the process economic development in the recipient countries (Pace, 2006: 72).

By the early 1970s, European powers needed to secure Arab oil supplies especially after the Arabs imposed an oil embargo on some European countries during 1973 October war. At that time Europe was importing %80 of its oil from Arab exporting countries

(Dannreuther, 2004: 154). In this sense, the oil crisis constituted a crucial reason for the development of the relations between European and Arab countries. Significant European statements, such as the “Brussels Statement (Copenhagen Declaration)”²¹⁴ of 1973, were to set up a distinctly pro-Arab orientation (Dannreuther, *ibid.*). In the Declaration, the EC recognized the “legitimate rights” of the Palestinians. The Declaration also “agreed to the Arab League’s proposal for what became in the Euro-Arab Dialogue in 1975, which was designed to promote Arab-European cooperation” (Ginsberg, 2001: 113). In order to strengthen the relations, the Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Co-operation and the Euro-Arab Dialogue were launched after the 1973 oil crisis.²¹⁵

Events in the mid-1980s had a direct or indirect impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations: European littoral countries, Spain (1986) and Greece (1981) became the members of the EC, the Communist bloc disintegrated and the Berlin Wall fell (Pace, 2002: 197; Pace, 2006: 72-73). On the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean, there occurred several challenges such as a rise of social, political and economic crises in several countries of the Southern Mediterranean (“as in the case of Algeria where increased activism by fundamentalist movements led to an overturning of the election results in 1992 with the resulting outbreak of a civil war”); the outbreak of the Gulf War (*ibid.*); and the launching of the Middle East Peace Process. The Gulf War renewed the anxiety in Europe about the security of energy supplies from the Middle East. Furthermore, significant population growth in North African and Middle Eastern states sparked fears about the potential for a rise in illegal immigration into Europe. In response to these developments, EC felt the need to revise its Global Mediterranean Policy, and eventually adopted the Renewed Mediterranean Policy (RMP – is also known as the “New Mediterranean Policy”) in 1990 (Pace, 2002: 197; Pace, 2006: 73). In addition to the traditional financial protocols, a new facility was introduced to promote regional and decentralized co-operation through projects that involved two or more Mediterranean non-Member Countries (MNCs) (Pace, 2006: 73). The RMP can be considered “as a mixture of promises to improve the terms of bilateral agreements, additional funding and new financial instruments” (Gomez, 2003: 50). Pace regards this new policy as an attempt

²¹⁴ 9 members of the EC issued the Brussels Statement (Copenhagen Declaration) in November 1973, which called for a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Security Council resolution 242. The statement went further to stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation, which it had maintained since the 1967 conflict, and its recognition that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be taken into account in the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

²¹⁵ Although Euro-Arab Dialogue is an important framework, for analytical utility it will be taken into consideration with its relevance to Euro-Mediterranean relations.

to add a “trans-regional” approach to certain questions (2002: 197; 2006: 73). However, this policy still lacked a truly multilateral forum for the Mediterranean dialogue (Sabic and Bojinovic, 2008: 326). This was because “the dialogue was solely bilateral” and “the agenda was limited to specific trade issues” (Bicchi, 2006a: 144). Although the EU, with this new Mediterranean policy, “had put all the non-members on the same ground and set the same limited agenda with all of them, it then pursued policy of hub and spoke in terms of institutions” (ibid.).²¹⁶ Therefore, one may argue that until the 1995 Barcelona Process, the relationship between the EU and the non-member Mediterranean states remained mainly on technical, financial and trade cooperation, and the political cooperation was not thoroughly debated.

The Corfu European Council in June 1994 proposed that “the future relations with the MNCs “should go beyond the financial sector and economic sphere to include a political dialogue between the parties that might create an area of cooperation guaranteeing peace, security, stability and well-being” (European Council, 1994a: Article II. A.). The Essen European Council of December 1994 examined these recommendations and restated the “European Union's willingness to support the Mediterranean countries in their efforts progressively to transform their region into a zone of peace, stability, prosperity and cooperation, and to this end its willingness to establish a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, develop appropriate agreements, progressively strengthen trade relations between the parties” (European Council, 1994b: Annex V). Furthermore, a declaration was made in Essen for the EU's support for “Spain's intention to convene a Euro-Mediterranean Conference in the second half of the 1995 to carry out a review of all major political, economic and social issues of mutual interest and to work out a general framework for permanent and regular dialogue in these areas” (ibid.). The Cannes European Council of June 1995 adopted a document under the title of “Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona: Position of the European Union”. In this document the “EU's position towards the Mediterranean partners” was defined (European Council, 1995). The EU agreed to a strategy which it termed a “Partnership with the MNCs” to realize “its stated objectives of immigration management, trade, prosperity and peace” (Pace, 2002: 198; Pace, 2006: 74). “This approach sought to provide a framework where the MNCs and the EU could work as full and equal partners towards achieving mutually beneficial goals” (ibid.). This partnership was defined and adopted by the Euro-

²¹⁶ “The EMP, on the contrary, started from the implicit premise that severe cleavages existed in the area and thus set as its objective the creation of peace and prosperity.” (Bicchi, 2006a: 144).

Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in November 1995. At the close of Barcelona Conference, the partners of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership adopted an executive agreement made of a Declaration and a Work Programme, which is known as the “Barcelona Declaration”.

It is argued that at the end of the Cold War, when Germany initiated the opening of the EU toward the East, the Southern/Latin countries of the Union tried to counterweight this initiative by emphasizing the links to the South and Eastern periphery of the EU. The EU’s Southern members wanted to build a balance between the North, East and South, and at a same time highlight the Union’s presence in the Mediterranean. In this sense, one may argue that the Mediterranean area is used for proving the Union’s credibility in the international arena. Therefore, France, Spain and Italy have been the main actors in developing policies towards the Mediterranean region for a number of reasons. These states, especially France, are using the EU in order to have more influence on the region and to counterweight Germany’s role in the Eastern periphery. For Scott (2005: 443),

The urgency of developing a cooperation agenda with the poorer states of the Mediterranean results partly from the close economic dependency, geographic proximity and strong postcolonial ties of the Maghreb and other countries in the region to the EU. Pressures originating from illegal immigration, illicit trade, terrorism and fundamentalism have highlighted the sensitivity of the EU’s South and Eastern borders.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was planned “as a novel and ambitious attempt to construct a Euro-Mediterranean region” (Barbe and Surralles, 2010: 129). The Barcelona Declaration was described as a “multilateral, comprehensive and lasting new initiative” (ibid.: 134).²¹⁷ In this context, “there is little doubt that the EMP is the initiative that best fits with the notion of region-building in the Euro-Mediterranean area so far” (ibid.). It was “the first attempt to create a Euro-Mediterranean region through purposeful promotion of economic, political, social and cultural interaction” (Calleya, 1997). For Bicchi (2006a: 144), “whereas the GMP was based on the implicit premise that a Mediterranean region just needed to be acknowledged, the EMP set out to actively build that region”. For Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis (2006: 344), “the originality of the EMP process lies in its ability to bring together countries

²¹⁷ Bicchi claims that the dialogue between the EU and the SEMP was bilateral and the agenda was limited to specific trade issues, however, the EMP, by its multilateral and comprehensive nature represented an important breakthrough with previous practices (2006: 144)

of the South and the North in a dialogue about a shared political space”. In this sense, one can stress that with its holistic, region-building and normative endeavors and its success to convey all the countries, even the conflicted ones, in a given region, make the EMP powerful and dynamic project that has many potentials.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which is also known as the “Barcelona Process” was “introduced to complement and not replace the existing or forthcoming bilateral agreements linking the EU to individual MNCs” (Pace, 2005: 66). Since it was launched, the Barcelona Process has been the foundation of the EU’s relations with the Mediterranean. The EMP is composed of three baskets: the political and security partnership, an economic and financial partnership, and partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. Creating a zone of peace and stability through political and security partnership; developing an area of shared prosperity through economic and financial partnership; and establishing a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in order to promote understanding between cultures have been the main objectives of the EMP. The Barcelona Process brought together the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 15 EU Member States and 12 Mediterranean non-member countries; namely, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The League of Arab States and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) were also invited, as was Mauritania (as a member of the AMU).²¹⁸

Regarding the first basket, the participants in the Barcelona Conference agreed “to conduct a strengthened and regular political dialogue, based on observance of essential principles of international law, and the participants endorsed a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 2). The parties undertook “to act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, as well as “other obligations under international law”, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party (ibid.). The parties agreed “to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms” (ibid.). The parties undertook “to respect

²¹⁸ Barcelona Declaration. Accessed through: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf. Retrieved on 1 January 2012

their sovereign equality and the equal rights of peoples and the right to self-determination” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 3). Respect for territorial integrity, the principles of non-intervention in the international affairs of another partner and the peaceful settlements of disputes were highlighted as key elements of the Barcelona Declaration. The parties also agreed “to combat terrorism, organized crime and drug problems in all aspects” (ibid.).

One can argue that, regarding the first basket, whereas Islamic fundamentalism, immigration, drug trafficking, weapons of mass destruction are seen as threats for European countries, social disruption and regional conflicts are seen as threats to the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries. As mentioned before, this perceived insecurity has been an important reason for the region-building efforts in the Mediterranean. It seems vital for the EU, especially the Southern members, to protect themselves against threats emanating from the South. One may claim that the EU tries to construct the Mediterranean region through security approaches. The EU aims to solve (or at least to freeze) some Mediterranean problems mainly through cooperation and dialogue so that these problems would not threaten security in Europe. In this context, one may claim that the principal stake in the Mediterranean area had lied in the preservation of the internal stability of the regimes there. As Meyrede (1999: 45) argues, “the stability of these regimes determines the security of the Mediterranean common space”. Moreover, it is vital for the EU to secure access to energy resources and to expand markets through free trade agreements. For Cavatorta and Durac (2010: 4)

Although the EU tries to present itself as normative actor, it can be claimed that far from being a uniquely good and moral citizen selflessly promoting human rights and democracy, the EU is also a realist actor, which utilizes its best assets, namely reputation and money, to achieve very concrete realpolitik interests such as conquering new markets, strengthening its own internal security, preserving its borders and marginalizing in the process issues of democratic governance and respect for civil liberties.

Regarding the second basket, “the development of an area of shared prosperity in the Mediterranean requires sustainable and balanced socio-economic development, improvement of the living conditions of the populations, increase in the employment level, reduction in the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and encouragement of regional cooperation and integration” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 3-4). With a view to achieving

these objectives, the EU and its partners agreed “to establish an economic and financial partnership based on: the progressive establishment of a free trade; the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas; and a substantial increase in the European Union’s financial assistance to its partners” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 4). One may argue that the second basket constitutes basic foundation the EU’s promotion of its integration model. By encouraging sub-regional and regional economic cooperation, the EU is exporting its own integration model. Although all the baskets are interrelated and important, especially the first basket, the second basket is easier to implement because of its technical nature. One may argue that by exporting its best practice to its Southern neighbourhood, the EU wants the SEMP’s to follow its path regardless of its content. Moreover, regarding the first and second basket of the EMP, although by adopting a normative language, the EU seems to act as a normative power, the promotion of its values and practices towards its neighbourhood mostly serves the economic and security interests of the Union.

Regarding the third basket, the partners agreed “to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs with a view bringing peoples closer together, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 6). To this end, the Barcelona Declaration emphasizes: the importance of “intercultural dialogue”, and of “dialogues between religions”; “the importance of role media” can play in the “reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures”; “the development of human resources” in the area of culture: cultural exchanges, “knowledge of other languages, implementation of educational and cultural programmes that respect cultural identities”; the essential contribution of civil society in the development process of the EMP, and the need to strengthen “the instruments of decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between those active in the development”; “the importance of social development and respect for fundamental social rights”; and cooperation in the field of illegal immigration, the fight against “terrorism, drug trafficking, international crime and corruption” (ibid.: 6-7). One may claim that the idea of partnership in the third basket refers implicitly to the French historian Braudel’s definition of the Mediterranean as the cradle of three grand civilizations that creates a cultural melting pot. For Holm (2004: 10), the EU is using this cultural and historical heritage as a means “to confirm identity but also to demonstrate mutual understanding”. In this context, one may argue that the third basket, along with the other baskets, plays a vital role in the EU’s Mediterranean narrative. It can be claimed that by promoting a Mediterranean

narrative, the EU has attempted to enhance its sphere of influence while bringing security and stability to its neighbourhood. It can be argued that, in a sense the past unity of the Mediterranean is recalled in the EU's attempt to create a Mediterranean historical narrative, and then to construct a Mediterranean region.

4.2.2. An assessment of conditionality and dialogue through the Barcelona Process

As mentioned above, at the close of Barcelona conference, a Work Programme was adopted. The aim of the Work Programme is to implement the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, and to respect its principles, through regional and multilateral actions. It is “complementary both to the bilateral cooperation, implemented in particular under the agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, and to the cooperation already existing in other multilateral fora” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 10). The innovation of the EMP was the “introduction of a multilateral or regional dimension completing and reinforcing the bilateral dimension” (i.e. the bilateral agreements) of the Euro-Mediterranean relationships (Lannon and Elsuwege, 2004: 34). The Barcelona Declaration is an executive agreement comprising a set of general principles and common objectives in 40 sectors or so (Philippart, 2003a: 1; Philippart, 2003b: 202). The Barcelona process is based on three main guiding principles: “equality in partnership; complementing rather than displacing bilateral activities; comprehensiveness, decentralization and gradualism in the approach” (ibid.). It operates through at least three organizational levels: multilateral structures, bilateral structures and unilateral (intra-EU) mechanisms established to channel funds made available to support the process (ibid.).

As mentioned before, the Barcelona process operates through multilateral structures. Through the multilateral structures, the “Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs” and the “Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process” (the Euro-Med Committee) monitors the implementation of the Work Programme of the EMP. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs met periodically in order “to monitor the application of the Barcelona Declaration and define actions enabling the objectives of the partnership to be achieved” (Barcelona Declaration, 1995: 7). The Euro-Med Committee, set up at “senior-official level”, consisted of the “Union troika and one representative from each Mediterranean partner” (ibid.). “At the request” of the SEMP, “member states not represented in the troika

were all invited, from 1997 on, as observers” (Philippart, 2003a: 2; Philippart, 2003b: 202). Meeting six times a year, the Euro-Med Committee mainly discussed and analyzed the agenda and the Work Programme of the Partnership. Ad hoc sectoral meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts provided “specific impetus and follow-ups for the various activities listed in the work programme” (ibid.).

The unilateral structure of the EMP is mainly centred on the European Union as the only decision-maker (Bicchi, 2006a: 144). One may claim that this structure gives the EU an asymmetric leverage on the partnership process, and makes, contrary to its normative rationale, the partnership EU-centric. The legal architecture of this unilateral structure is based on six main political and legal instruments (Lannon and Elsuwege, 2004: 58-59):

- the Barcelona Declaration and its Work Programme defining the general objectives of the regional and bilateral cooperation;
- the provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) defining the bilateral contractual framework of the cooperation;
- the MEDA I programme based on a regulation adopted by the Council of the EU in 1996 (regulation No. 1488/96), and the MEDA II programme based on a second regulation adopted by the Council in 2000 (regulation No. 2698/2000);
- Country and Regional Strategy Papers: defining the long-term operational objectives;
- National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) elaborated within the framework of a dialogue within the Mediterranean partner;
- Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) covering the multilateral activities of the EMP.

The EU is the major trading partner of and the biggest provider of financial aid to the Mediterranean (Gomez, 2003: 171). For Cebeci (2006: 7), this gives the Union a unique strength in shaping its relations with the countries in the region. The EU has attempted to increase economic and social stability in the region through intensive foreign aid and trade benefits (ibid.). “MEDA”²¹⁹ was the main economic and financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It was launched in 1996 (MEDA I) and amended in 2000 (MEDA II). It enabled the EU to provide financial and technical assistance to SEMP. The first legal basis of the MEDA I programme was the 1996 Regulation

²¹⁹ The acronym MEDA means “financial and technical measures to accompany the reform of social and economic and structures in the Mediterranean non-member countries”. Starting from 2007, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) has replaced the MEDA Programme.

for the period of 1996-2000 (a first five-year programme) (Regulation (EC) No. 1488/96, OJ L 189 of 30.07.1996). On November 2000, a new regulation establishing the MEDA II programme for the period of 2000-2006 was adopted (a seven-year programme) (Regulation (EC) No. 2698/2000, OJ L 311 of 12.12.2000). The funding of the new programme amounted to 5.35 million Euro. The three main priorities of the MEDA programme were the economic transition of the MNCs and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area; sustainable economic and social development; and, regional, sub-regional and cross-border cooperation (Regulation (EC) No. 1488/96, OJ L 189 of 30.07.1996).

For Lannon and Elsuwege (2004: 51), the new generation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements constitute an essential part of the implementation of the EMP as their bilateral structure is considered as being complementary to the multilateral one (the Barcelona Process). The provisions of the EMAAs vary from one SEMP to the other but are based on a similar model with common objectives. According to Haddadi (2006: 181), “by virtue of the association agreements, institutional provisions are made for the creation of common bodies “for monitoring the implementation of the partnership priorities”. The institutions and bodies of the EMAAs can be listed as: the Association Councils (ministerial level) that monitor and discuss implementation of the agreements; the Association Committees (senior official level); and, the Association Sub-committees. Lannon and Elsuwege (2004: 52) refer to three different types of arrangements that constitute the network of bilateral Euro-Mediterranean relationship:

- the old Association Agreement concluded with Turkey (this candidate country is however included within the pre-accession strategy);
- 8 new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements having the objective of establishing FTA with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia for the Maghreb and Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon for the Mashreq and finally with Israel (while negotiations with Syria are still ongoing);
- the very specific Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation between the European Community on the one part, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part. This agreement is not a mixed agreement; therefore no national ratifications were required for its implementation.²²⁰

²²⁰ Agreements are in force with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. An agreement has been negotiated but not signed with Syria. Libya is not formally part of the Barcelona Process and has therefore not entered into negotiations for an Association Agreement.

As Haddadi (2006: 174) points out, the new generation of EMAAs “contains provisions for the establishment of a political and security dialogue that is based on the promotion of respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law as essential components of the association agreement”. Constituting the bilateral aspect of the EMP, the Association Agreements signed with the SEMPAs have “provided significant incentives to the region” (Cebeci, 2006: 8). Among many others, these steps have helped the Mediterranean countries in controlling inflation, lowering foreign debt and balancing budgets (ibid.). For Haddadi (2006, 76), the signing of the EMAAs can be seen as a general agreement on “what needs to be done within the political and security remit”, but, it is also claimed that regarding this agreement, there seems to be an “ambiguity and misunderstanding on how this is to be carried out and, more important, on the speed with which it is to be undertaken”. Moreover, the EU’s protectionist policies in the fields of agriculture and textiles have had a “negative impact”, as these are the main sectors, which constitute the major areas of production in the SEMPAs (Cebeci, 2006: 8).

All the Association Agreements with the SEMPAs include an essential element clause (Article 2), which makes the sustainability of the Agreements conditional on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the countries concerned. As Cebeci (2006: 8) contends: “similarly, financial aid and other trade benefits available to the SEMPAs also involve the condition of political and social reform and economic liberalization”. However, it should be noted that the essential element clause has never been “invoked” and the EU’s relations with some SEMPAs have continued despite significant human rights violations in some countries (Cebeci, 2006: 8). As Stavridis and Hutchence (2000: 61) claim, despite its commitment to supporting the peace process and democracy, “it appears that the EU’s promotion of human rights has not had the same priority”. For example, there has been some limited conditionality over aid provided to training the PA police in human rights, but the majority of EU funding has not been made conditional on the implementation of human rights (ibid.). In this context, one may claim that the limited conditionality problem remains a problem for the Mediterranean. The EMP was thus criticized by some analyst as being a “passive” way of engagement (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 22). In this context, this passive way of engagement can cause one to question the normative pretensions of the EMP and wonder if the EU is sincere about the bringing human rights, democracy and rule of law to the region or the real motive behind the Union’s policies is preserving the status quo.

It should be noted that the structure and philosophy (the spirit of partnership) of the Barcelona Declaration was influenced by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (now the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe/OSCE) (Lannon and Elsuwege, 2004: 35-36). The political basket of the Barcelona Declaration includes a list of principles concerning respect for democracy and the rule of law, human rights, the right of self-determination, non-interference in the international affairs of the other states, and peaceful resolution of disputes (Barcelona Declaration, 2005:3). It also requires cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism (ibid.). Concerning the economic basket, the Barcelona declaration provides for a regional partnership to promote economic development by means of a free trade zone to be created by the year 2010 (ibid.; 4). The third basket of the Barcelona Declaration refers to the building of cultural bridges between the Mediterranean civil societies (ibid.;6).

The record of three baskets of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is not on equal footing. “Progress is strongly correlated with areas where the EU has a significant competence, weight and expertise” (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216). The first basket has “very limited concrete achievements to show, but as often mentioned, it has the great merit of being the only regional scheme where Arab countries and Israel are side by side” (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216). “It has also become the only place where the Israeli government tolerates the EU as a partner in the Middle East security and political matters” (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216). For Tovias (2006: 206-207), “the main obstacles that have precluded the 1995 EMP initiative to act as a possible anchor to economic and (political reform)” in SEMP’s have been that: the “carrots” offered by the EU have not been enough to make it for an authoritarian regime in the Maghreb and the Mashrek to make substantial changes; the EU’s financial sacrifices to anchor Maghreb and Mashrek countries are not sufficient enough;²²¹ and the commitments made by the EU have been “weak and reversible”. Moreover, the Middle East conflict has proven to be one of the main “stumbling blocks” for progress in the Barcelona Process (Asseburg, 2003: 174).²²² For Emerson and Noutcheva, “success in achieving a peace settlement could provide the impetus

²²¹ “There has not been a “demonstration” effect. There has not been any “we-are-in- the-same-boat” effect.” (Tovias, 2006: 206)

²²² With regard to the EU’s role in the Middle East, as Ginsberg (2001: 105) contends, “the EU played second fiddle to the United States, who provided much of the leadership and mediation in the Israel-Palestinian track of negotiations”. According to Gorman (2004: 136), the establishment of the EMP can be regarded as an attempt to provide the EU with a role in the region in which the EU is not playing “second fiddle” to the United States.

for a concerted regional move towards democratization and better governance” in the Mediterranean region.

The second basket has a better record. “The record of socio-economic programmes (classical development assistance) is admirable, considering the intensity of the problems and limited amount of funds available for each recipient country” (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216). For Tovias (2006: 207), the second basket cannot in a considerable way “attain its own declared objectives, namely the stabilization and growth of the Mediterranean Arab economies” because of the EMP initiative “has not led to real economic integration” of SEMP in the “European hub”. “As for policy changes at the regulatory, economic and social levels, results were slow to come but, since 2000, important steps have been taken” (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216). This is mostly accurate “regarding the development of an enhanced framework for Euro-med trade” (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216). Third generation association agreements were signed with all SEMP in but one (Syria). The Valencia Action Plan adopted in April 2002 signaled a further move towards deeper integration, with the launch of the “Euromed Internal Market Programme” (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216; European Commission, 2002: 12). The Valencia ministerial conference also endorsed “the principle of the participation of the SEMP in the system of pan-European culmination of origins” (European Commission, 2002: 9). According to Philippart, the “advances towards the Euromed Free Trade Area have contributed to the reactivation of South-South schemes” such as the Agadir process (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216). The “Agadir Agreement”²²³ constitutes a major step forward in their economic integration and for the completion of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt decided in May 2001 to create a South-South Free Trade Area on the basis of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and to develop inter Arab integration in order (Lannon and Elsuwege, 2003: 64):

- to counterbalance the enlargement of the EU and avoid an economic marginalization of the Arab MNCs;
- to avoid the intra-Maghrebi problems (the Arab Maghreb Union cannot work properly because of the tensions between Algeria and Morocco);
- to render the Arab markets more attractive for foreign investors.

²²³ Agadir Agreement established a Mediterranean Free Trade Area between Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt in July 2006.

One may claim that a sub-regional initiative such as Agadir can facilitate the regional cooperation in the whole Mediterranean area. Calleya (2006: 130) argues that this initiative “could even facilitate the more efficient operation of other sub-regional groupings by compartmentalizing the Israeli-Arab conflict”. In this sense, it can be argued that such initiatives will have impact on South-South cooperation as well as North-South cooperation. Moreover, if the EU wants an actual progress in the economic aspect of the relations with the SEMP, it will have to consider more determined measures that are beneficial for the SEMP, for example by opening up to agricultural exports, textiles or planning major infrastructure projects such as road or rail communications.²²⁴ One may claim that if the EU lifts its protectionist policies on the fields of agriculture and textile, this may help to the economical development of the SEMP.

Regarding the third basket, “many programmes were set up, some now being completed or extended” (Philippart, 2003a: 12; Philippart, 2003b: 216). However, results are relatively “modest” (ibid.). The decisions of opening the Tempus programme (university programme) to Mediterranean Third Countries and launching of the Erasmus World Programme (student exchanges) can be considered as important innovations (ibid.). As mentioned above, the EMP followed the steps of the CSCE and “developed a cultural basket, with the purpose of breaking the barriers between cultures around the Mediterranean, and promoting a dialogue between civilizations” (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 26). The Union tries to create room for political and cultural exchange between the SEMP themselves as well as between the EU and the SEMP (Cebeci, 2006: 9). Therefore, the establishment of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures can be regarded as a crucial step in the third basket. This Euro-Med institution is the first institution that was “created not to manage economic aid or security cooperation but at the softest end of the spectrum: culture” (Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis, 2006: 354).²²⁵ Its goal, for Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis (ibid.), “to promote a culture of peace and to achieve mutual understanding, bring peoples closer, remove the threats to peace and strengthen exchanges among civilizations” can be seen as “a sign of heightened awareness on the EU's behalf of the necessity to bring

²²⁴ For Ortega (2003: 9), “the future of the Euro-Mediterranean relations will hinge on economic aspects, and the question is political rather than technical”.

²²⁵ “As the first and only institution to have been created as part of the EMP process, it is poised to serve as a regional catalyst for a movement of multi-faceted recognition of overlapping identities in the region, both through the empowerment of civil society actors and through state channels.” (Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis, 2006: 372)

some ‘identity content’ to the Euro-Med project, by facilitating contacts at the civil society level”.

The EU has made important attempts “to strengthen the civil society” in the SEMP and supported various regional programs (Cebeci, 2006: 9). The EU has further taken important steps in the fields of justice, security and freedom, and, social integration of immigrants (ibid). The adoption of a “Framework Document” on regional cooperation in the “field of justice, in combating drugs, organized crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movements of persons at the Valencia Conference and the implementation of other regional programmes are considerable in this respect” (European Commission, 2002: 2-3).

After analyzing the baskets of the EMP, as Tanner (2004: 140) claims, the basic problem the EMP is that it “contains a conflict between the principles and objectives it seeks to promote, on the one hand, and the tools and actors that are supposed to uphold those principles and achieve those objectives, on the other”.²²⁶ Therefore, for Tanner (2004: 140), the EMP has an “implementation gap” between rhetoric and policy. For example, “the EU, internally constrained by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and farmer lobbies from South European states, restricts the import agricultural products from the South and applies free trade only to oil, gas and industrial products” (Joffe, 2001: 39). Even in the textile sector, the South has been pressurized to accept “voluntary restraint agreements”, while exposing previously protected domestic sectors of “to the full force of European competition” (ibid.).

4.2.3. An overall assessment of the EMP

The Barcelona Process, which was launched in November 1995, “has been the foundation” of the EU’s relations with the Mediterranean as a region (Cebeci, 2006: 6). For Balfour (2004: 3), the Barcelona Process is an appropriate framework for deepening relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean. In general it can be stressed that contrary to other policies such as the Global Mediterranean Policy and the Renovated Mediterranean

²²⁶ According to Chourou (2001: 73), “[r]esolving this internal inconsistency will be a difficult and time-consuming task, but the rewards amply justify the efforts it requires.”

Policy, the EMP is perceived as a holistic and normative framework.²²⁷ Moreover, one may argue that the most material and complex area of cooperation is the economic and financial area, but the process also provides an institutional basis for intensified multilateral dialogue on political and security issues and the promotion of social and cultural exchange. For Balfour (2004: 3), its strengths lie in its “comprehensive security approach” that “binds together economic reform with development, cultural exchange with political dialogue, human rights with security, and in the conceptualization of comprehensive security that underpins the EMP”. Joffe (2007: 91) perceives the EMP as a design that aims to serve “the objective of European security through Europe’s preferred diplomatic instruments” by promoting “economic, political and social change within established boundaries”. Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis (2006: 356, 357) consider the EMP as “an ideological tool of normative power” Europe, and claim that by using the EMP the EU builds “a rekindled neocolonial relationship” with the SEMP. As mentioned above, patterns of dependence and domination between the centre and periphery constitute the base for neocolonial relationship. In this sense, although the EMP was “initially designed symbolically on the principles of regional multilateralism and formal equality between states” and against the “colonial paradigm”, the relationship established between the two shores of the Mediterranean has still been “one between the object and subject” (ibid., 364).

According to Adler and Crawford (2006: 38), the EMP is caught between the “language of post-colonialism and the behavior of neo-colonialism”. On the one hand, the EMP, inspired by the OSCE process, is based on the idea of regional multilateralism, which is based on the idea of building a Euro-Mediterranean region together (incorporating but not defined by the EU), can be regarded as a postcolonial discourse. On the other hand, despite its claims of being a multilateral process based on equal partners, it becomes Euro-centric, solely designed and financed by the Union, and therefore, the EMP can be regarded as a neocolonial practice caught in a postcolonial discourse. It can be claimed that through the Barcelona Process, the EU tries to promote a Mediterranean narrative and to create a Mediterranean civilization. One may further claim that the EU’s region-building attempt of promoting Mediterraneanism can be seen as part of Western style of dominating, restructuring and having influence over an area. In this sense, one may see this civilizational thinking as a

²²⁷ “Therefore, the EMP was conceived with a strong normative rationale in the sense that regional cooperation efforts were supported by dense institutionalization at different levels with the aim of creating, in the long run, conditions for the emergence of a sense of common purpose and, for most optimists, even shared identities, myths and narratives.” (Barbe and Surraels, 2010: 135)

neocolonial behaviour by the EU through exporting its norms and its own integration model to the SEMP. One may further regard the EU's projection of its own norms and values as the civilizing mission of the Union. By promoting its model, values and norms, the EU engages in region-building practices in its southern neighbourhood.

For Barbe and Surralles (2010: 134-135), the EMP is "mainly a top-down region-building project steered by political elites through intergovernmental settings, but also comprised a bottom-up component through encouragement of civil societal encounters". In this context, the EU is externally participated in the Mediterranean region. One may claim that although the EMP can be read in normative pretexts and milieu goals such as creating peace and prosperity in the region, the EU has possession goals such as entering new markets, strengthening its own internal security, preserving its borders and guaranteeing its access to energy supplies.

It is generally argued that the results of the Barcelona Process are neither entirely positive nor completely negative, but the very existence of the process provides an important contribution by the EU to stability and prosperity in the region (Ortega, 2003: 90). One may argue that the achievements of the Barcelona Process are first; all the SEMP countries have negotiated Association Agreements with the EU. Second, in 2004, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan signed a free trade agreement (Agadir Agreement) that provides for free trade by 2006. The Association Agreements together with the Agadir Agreement have "considerable potential in encouraging more intense trade relations between SEMPs and EU countries as well as between SEMPs themselves" (Cameron, 2007: 112). Third, "there has been an expansion of regional arrangements including a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, a cultural dialogue and a cultural foundation" in the Mediterranean (ibid.). Fourth, the two sides have held a multitude of meetings, seminars and workshops (ibid.). For Cameron (ibid.:113), this "flurry of meetings" and "reciprocal visits" has had a "useful socialization effect", even if there have been only modest results .

As Balfour (2004: 7) claims, since the launch of the EMP, relations between the EU and the SEMPs have been progressively institutionalized, in the search of means to address hard as well as soft security challenges, such as legal and illegal immigration and fight against terrorism, to enhance economic development and market integration, and to encourage cultural dialogue. It has also been a useful opportunity for Arabs and Israelis to sit together.

One can argue that one of the major accomplishments of the EMP is that the political dialogue between the all parties (including the countries such as Israel and Syria) has continued within the Barcelona Process even during the periods of crisis in the Middle East Peace Process (there was however an exception during the 2000 Marseilles conference when Syria and Lebanon boycotted the meeting because of the Israeli-Palestinian situation in the context of the second intifada). In this context, as Balfour (2004: 8) argues, “the EMP provides the only forum in which Israel and the Arab countries can sit around the same table”.

The Barcelona Process “was not itself an instrument for EU foreign policy but rather served as the foundations for a long-term exercise in soft power projection, to deal with soft security issues, such as economic failure, migration, smuggling” (Joffe, 2001: 31-32). Tanner (2004: 137) claims that while “the formal objective of the EMP was to create a zone of peace and stability, and shared prosperity, the unofficial objective was to defuse migratory pressures from the South by creating stability and supporting economic development”. In this context, one may assert that although the alleged objective is normative, the rationale behind this objective is not and it is for the EU’s self interest.

Despite these achievements, it can be argued that there had been some serious problems within the Barcelona Process. “The weaknesses of the EMP are situated at various structural and procedural levels” (Philippart, 2003a: 11; Philippart, 2003b: 214). The Union’s protective external trade regime and the chronic problem of Arab-Israeli relations seriously hamper the implementation of the EMP. The “one size fits all” approach of the EMP affects the progress of the second basket. The EMP also suffers from the asymmetries in the multilateral structure, which contradict the “partnership spirit” (Philippart, 2003a: 11; Philippart, 2003b: 215). In this sense, strong dependence of the SEMP on the EU and the unfavourable power distribution cause one to regard the nature of relationship between the EU and the SEMP as a soft form of hegemony, which one may define as neocolonial, rather than to a partnership.

A number of serious obstacles have emerged that block the achievements of the EMP. A first obstacle lies in the divergence of expectations and goals of the EU member states and the SEMP. For Cebeci (2006: 9-10), the SEMP and the EU regard the EMP in different terms. “Whereas the EU sees the EMP as mainly a political and security framework, the SEMP tend to view it as mainly an economic initiative, which provides financial and trade

benefits to their countries”. A second obstacle is the persistence and strengthening of authoritarian regimes in the SEMP (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 27). These regimes reject the “liberal orientation” of the Barcelona Process and resist any kind of “conditionality” imposed upon them (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 27). The political elites in the SEMP have been reluctant in adopting political reforms and improving their human rights record for fear of Islamic fundamentalism (Cebeci, 2006: 10). For the same reason, the EU Member States have also refrained from pushing the SEMP for more reform in the fields of democracy and human rights (ibid.). Cavatorta and Durac (2010: 4-5) further stipulate that the EU needs authoritarian rulers that can give guarantee to secure access to energy resources and to expand markets through free trade agreements. In this context, one may claim that although the EU genuinely seems to promote human rights and democracy to the SEMP, it generally prefers to support the status quo in the area in order to maintain the stability of these regimes. For Bosse (2013: 98), the EU’s policy towards authoritarian regimes “highlights double standards” and harms the normative claims of the EMP.

Another obstacle is that the EMP is “not a partnership among equals” (Philippart, 2003a: 6; Philippart, 2003b: 208). The economic inequality and the unequal power distribution between Europe and the rest of the Mediterranean have created a structure of asymmetrical interdependence, giving the EU the considerable leverage in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The EMP reflects the asymmetry of dependence and “power distribution among parties” in which the SEMP have “little room for maneuver” at that level (Philippart, 2003a: 6; Philippart, 2003b: 208). In this context, it is claimed that “the EMP suffers from the asymmetries in the multilateral structure that contradict the partnership spirit”, where “partnership is more than an objective than reality” (Philippart, 2003a: 11; Philippart, 2003b: 215). In this sense, one may assert that although the term partnership signifies equality in rhetoric, in reality due to the asymmetrical difference between the concerned parties and EU-dominated decision-making structure and institutions in the EMP, the term partnership does not come into practice in every aspect, and cause one to question the normative pretext of the EMP.

According to some analysts the principle of regionalism on which the EMP is based can constitute a fourth obstacle (Johansson-Nogues, 2004: 243). This policy deals with all of the partners simultaneously without attaching any importance to their peculiarities. With this “one size fits all” policy, the most advanced partners had to wait for progress among their

neighbours. To put bluntly, this principle made the establishment of a Free Trade Area by 2010 “dreadfully slow” (Johansson-Nogues, 2004: 243). A fifth obstacle is the EU’s has not opened its market to the agricultural exports of SEMP’s (Ortega, 2003: 93). A sixth obstacle is that even though the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements contained the essential element clause that the agreements may be suspended if the partners violate the human rights, the EU has been unable to transform its rhetoric into action. One may also argue that the incapability of the Union’s transforming its rhetoric into action may be read in terms of reluctance. The EU, in order to preserve the status quo in the SEMP’s, intentionally has not invoked the essential clause.

In sum one can conclude that the results of the Barcelona Process can be considered as having mixed results. If the standard of assessment is that the Barcelona Process has already been “transforming the region’s economic and political trends, then it has not succeeded” (Emerson and Noutcheva, 2005: 6). If the standard is whether or not the Barcelona process has created “a constructive political and institutional infrastructure of comprehensive partnership between the region and Europe”, then it can be argued that the Barcelona Process has already made considerable achievements (ibid.). As Emerson and Noutcheva contend (ibid.,: 6-7), “the EU’s initiative is surely not in the category of a strategic mistake that has had unexpected and counter-productive effects, such as causing conflict, destabilizing societies or aggravating tensions between the European and Arab communities”. Moreover, it can be claimed that the Barcelona Process is not completely a failure or a complete success. It contains both weaknesses and strengths. As can be seen below, the Union’s other Mediterranean policies were designed in ways to correct the shortcomings of the EMP and to enhance the strengths of the Barcelona Process.

4.2.4. 2000 EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region

Since the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, EU has continuously developed several initiatives and designed ways to improve the relations between the Union and the SEMP’s. In June 2000, the EU adopted the “Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region”²²⁸, stating

²²⁸Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region. 2000/458/CFSP. Accessed through: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:183:0005:0010:EN:PDF>. Retrieved on 20 January 2011

that the strategy should be based on the existing EMP and work for the latter's implementation (European Council, 2000: Article 4). The shortcomings of the EMP were implicitly acknowledged by the EU's adoption of a Common Mediterranean Strategy. The CMS was adopted to support the EMP further (Cebeci, 2006: 10). The CMS laid the guidelines of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as "developing good neighbourly relations; improving prosperity; eliminating poverty; promoting and protecting all human rights and freedoms, democracy and good governance and the rule of law; promoting cultural and religious tolerance; and developing cooperation with civil society, including the NGOs" (European Council, 2000: Article 3). The CMS, which is one of the several "common strategies under the umbrella of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy", puts forward "many of the same goals of the EMP and adds little terms in substance" (Heller, 2001: 79). However, its clarification as a unilateral EU document seems to be EU oriented and betrayed the notion of partnership by "viewing programs as things that Europe does for the Mediterranean rather than things that Europe and the Mediterranean do together" (ibid.). The document clearly emphasizes EU's interests in the opening statement that "[t]he Mediterranean region is of strategic importance to the EU. A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region, with an open perspective towards Europe, is in the best interests of the EU and Europe as a whole" (European Council, 2000: Article 1).

The CMS can be perceived as an exercise in highlighting and building on the strengths of the Barcelona, while stressing areas where future actions might be concentrated, as well as incorporating new areas that did not exist at the time Barcelona was launched (Spencer, 2001: 42). In the CMS, it is stated that the EU, together with its Mediterranean partners, undertake a comprehensive review of the Barcelona Process with the aim of reinvigorating the Process and making it more action-oriented and results-driven (European Council, 2000: Article 11). The CMS makes a number of explicit references to the Barcelona Process in its text – including repetition of the EMP's "three basket" approach (European Council, 2000: Article 7) – but excludes the EU's bilateral relations with those non-member Mediterranean partners who are candidates for EU membership (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) (European Council, 2000: Article 6). For Tanner (2004: 139),

On the positive side, the CMS does provide a more explicit basis for the EU to strengthen the Barcelona Process in areas going beyond the Barcelona Declaration. This is particularly

relevant with regard to the involvement of the EU and the EMP in peace building efforts in the Middle East in the eventuality of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

The CMS also requires the EU presidency “to evaluate the EU’s progress in the Mediterranean region, on a regular, not less than annual basis” (European Council, 2000: Article 33). The CMS addresses the opportunities and challenges of the Euro-Mediterranean relationship. At the European internal level, the CMS aims at streamlining the “European foreign policy decision-making while on the external level it defines the EU’s vision, objectives, areas of action and the instruments and means made available by the European Council” (Pardo and Zemer, 2005: 55). The CMS does comment on security, which has a defining role in terms of the ESDP’s Mediterranean dimension (Vasconcelos, 2002: 11). It states one of its primary objectives to be as establishing “a common area of peace and stability through political and security partnership”, and confirms that “the European Union intends to make use of evolving common European policy on security and defence to consider how to strengthen together with its Mediterranean partners co-operative security in the region” (European Council, 2000: Article 7 and Article 8). Therefore, the CMS is regarded as an important comprehensive guide in the Union’s security policies towards the region (Vasconcelos, 2002: 11-12). Theoretically “the CMS offers a new instrument for collective foreign policy action” (Pace, 2004: 305). However, the politics of the Mediterranean are so complex, as in the case of the Middle East, and therefore member states may “prefer to adopt policies alone unless a unified strategy is in place” (ibid.).

The Common Mediterranean Strategy exposes an “added emphasis on the Middle East Peace Process, which prior to this strategy, was conceived as a process in parallel to the EMP but not directly forming a part of it” (Pace, 2004: 306). The CMS represented the first formal acknowledgement that the Barcelona Process could not be isolated from the Middle East Peace Process (Gomez, 2003: 136). There were provisions in the document where special attention was given to the Middle East Peace Process (European Council, 2000: Article 5, 9 and 15). The CMS states:

The EU is convinced that the successful conclusion of the Middle East Peace Process on all its tracks, and the resolution of other conflicts in the region, are important prerequisites for peace and stability in the Mediterranean. Given its interests in the region and its close and long-standing ties with its constituent countries, the Union aspires to play its full part in bringing

about stability and development in the Middle East. The cooperation that has already been initiated in the framework of the Barcelona Process is a determining factor in laying the foundations for after peace has been achieved. The Union will therefore support the efforts of the parties to implement the peace agreements.. (European Council, 2000: Article 5)

The Union set itself objectives in the CMS to play its full role in the Middle East Peace Process as: “to promote conditions which will help the parties implement agreements concluded among themselves; to develop the basis for normal good-neighbourly relations and encourage the parties to engage in regional cooperation; and to contribute to the consolidation of peace in the region, including economic integration and mutual understanding between civil societies” (European Council, 2000: Article 9). The EU’s willingness to “promote progress on the multilateral track of the Peace Process drawing also on synergies with the Barcelona Process” was also mentioned in the CMS (European Council, 2000: Article 15). However, “the Union was careful to avoid any reference in progress in the EMP being conditional upon a settlement in the Middle East” (Gomez, 2003: 136). The CMS states that this strategy will cover “the EU's contribution to the consolidation of peace in the Middle East once a comprehensive peace settlement has been achieved” (European Council, 2000: Article 6). The CMS’s strength is that it has emerged at a time when the EU recognizes that the Barcelona Process needs “reviewing and reinvigorating” (Spencer, 2001: 42). The EU also recognizes the fact that the Union has “to increase the effectiveness, impact and visibility of its actions and initiatives in the region” (European Council, 2000: Article 10). However, the CMS does not “propose any fundamental re-evaluation of how the Barcelona model may have failed in its conception as well as in its execution” (Spencer, 2001: 42). As Spencer (*ibid.*: 48) points out, the main weakness of the CMS is that it does not read as a strategy at all. Apart from stating that the Mediterranean region is of a strategic importance to the EU (European Council, 2000: Article 1), the document does not establish a clear hierarchy of short, medium and long-term objectives towards achieving a prosperous, secure and stable region (Spencer, 2001: 48). “Article 3”²²⁹ of the CMS’s vision gives a list of desired “end-goals” rather than a substantive definition of the EU strategic interests in the region (Spencer, 2001: 48)).

²²⁹ “The EU's Mediterranean policy is guided by the principle of partnership, a partnership which should be actively supported by both sides. The EU will work with its Mediterranean partners to: develop good neighbourly relations; improve prosperity; eliminate poverty; promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, good governance and the rule of law; promote cultural and religious tolerance, and develop cooperation with civil society, including NGOs. It will do so by supporting the efforts of the Mediterranean partners to attain the goals set out by the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, by using its bilateral relations to pursue these objectives, and by contributing to the creation of a peaceful environment in the Middle East.” (European Council, 2000)

According to Tanner (2004: 139), the strategy amounts to not much more than repetition of existing EU documents.²³⁰

The CMS is not a substitute for the Euro-Mediterranean frameworks, but rather it aims to provide the Euro-Mediterranean relationship “a longer and broader horizon” (Pardo and Zemer, 2005: 55). The deterioration of the Middle East Peace Process, with the rise of the new intifada in September 2000, overshadowed the intentions of the Common Mediterranean Strategy. Moreover, SEMP’s “felt and complained that they had barely been consulted on the Common Strategy during the drafting process” (Köhler, 2003: 208). The CMS, which was envisaged to improve the EMP, did not make any outstanding differences (Balfour, 2004: 7). On 5 November 2004, the European Council extended the period of Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region of 19 June 2000’s application until 23 January 2006 (Decision 2004/763/CSP of the European Council, OJ L 337/72). It is claimed that the CMS “enhanced awareness for security in the Mediterranean as a common task of the entire EU” (Köhler, 2003: 208).

The EU’s Common Strategy on the Mediterranean essentially confirmed the objectives of the EMP and addressed the opportunities and challenges of the Barcelona Process. The CMS identified the weaknesses of the process and outlined some recommendations to strengthen it. The CMS, which was envisaged to improve the EMP, seemed to have brought about little change. It can also be argued that the CMS was EU-centric and the self-interest of the EU was clearly emphasized in the CMS. It has already been claim of this study that although in some ways the EMP practice can be regarded as neocolonial, its rhetoric has been normative. The CMS can thus be regarded as a shift from this normative rhetoric as well, because of its emphasis on EU interests.

4.2.5. European Security Strategy

On 12 December 2003, the Heads of States and Government at the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a better world’, which was prepared by Javier Solana. The document is “the first common strategic vision of the member

²³⁰ For Tanner (2004: 139), the CMS document “is not much more than a combination of the Barcelona principles, the Berlin Declaration of the Middle East of March 1999 and the Tampere European Council Conclusions of 1999 concerning justice and home affairs”.

states”, which aims to fill the vacuum that had existed since the beginning of the ESDP in the late 1990s (Biscop: 2004: 25). The ESS provides guidelines for the future development of CFSP and ESDP. European Security Strategy outlined a comprehensive strategic framework, which would influence the formulation of any European foreign and security policy in the years to come. Theoretically, for Whitman (2006: 1), the ESS would “provide the EU and the member states with the road map for a route march to greater political impact”.

The ESS offers “an ambitious agenda with a global scope that, because of its comprehensive approach to security, had the potential to serve as a reference framework and a driving force for policies in all fields of external action, from trade and development to the CFSP and ESDP” (Biscop, 2004: 25). Building security in the EU’s neighbourhood is among its explicit objectives (ibid.). The ESS affirms the comprehensive approach to security that is underlying the EMP and makes it into a general strategy for EU external action (ibid). With regard to the Mediterranean specifically, the ESS, under the heading of “Building security in our neighbourhood” (Solana, 2003: 7-8), draws the general framework within which the Mediterranean should be dealt with. The ESS stipulates that European Union's “interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process” due to the serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts in the region (Solana, 2003: 9). With the ESS, the EU explicitly declares its interest in the Mediterranean region.

For all the Arab countries including the ones outside the EMP as well, the ESS states “broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered” (Solana, 2003: 8). This sentence can be regarded as the extension of the EU’s definition of its neighbourhood. As Biscop (2004: 34) argues, “these countries would not be included in the European Neighbourhood Policy or the EMP, but an additional framework was envisaged that closely linked to both existing frameworks”. Therefore, a strategy document was adopted by the June 2004 European Council, the “EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East”²³¹.

²³¹ In the text of the Strategic Partnership, the EU defines its relations to the Arab world on the basis of already existing agreements and frameworks of cooperation like the Barcelona Process and the agreements with the GCC, intensifying relations with all countries of the region (Final Report, 2004: 10). The objective of the Strategic Partnership is defined as the development of a prosperous, secure and vibrant Mediterranean and Middle East (ibid.: 4). The Strategic Partnership identifies a number of challenges common to the majority of the

The self-interest of the European Union is emphasized in the ESS, by stating that it is in the EU's interest that countries on its borders are well governed (Solana, 2003: 7). "Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe" (ibid.). The European Union aims at creating areas of stability particularly around its borders, "transforming the potential areas of chaos into regions of security" (Vieira, 2006: 19). This objective was made specific within the European Security Strategy, especially in the case of the Mediterranean: "Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries [...] on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (Solana, 2003: 8).²³² For Cebeci (2004: 304), promoting a ring of well-governed countries in and around Europe can be regarded as "the indicative of the fact that the EU is more concerned about its own integration than anything else".

The EU strategy is characterized by the importance of neighbouring regions and the importance of the Mediterranean for EU security (Aliboni, 2005: 8). The security challenges posed by the region, however, are not so much terrorism but regional conflicts, particularly Arab/Israeli conflict (ibid.). Significant steps towards a settlement of the Middle East conflict are a *conditio sine qua non* for the establishment of any durable security arrangement in the Mediterranean (Biscop, 2004: 33). As the ESS itself states: "Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East" (Solana, 2003: 8).

Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries (ibid.: 2). These challenges cannot be confronted effectively by maintaining the status quo; political, social and economic and institutional reform is required (ibid.). As specified by the Strategic Partnership, the EU will seek to play its part in addressing these challenges through "partnership and dialogue" (ibid.: 3). The responses to these challenges comprise "a wide range of measures, from promoting a WMD-free zone in the Middle East and preventing proliferation to ensuring economic growth and stability, managing and addressing migration issues, ensuring security of energy supply, promoting sustainable development, promoting the rule of law, respect for human rights, civil society and good governance" (ibid.). The Strategic Partnership refers to "shared security concerns" that are to be addressed through an EU partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (ibid.: 5). The Strategic Partnership is based on the close relations between Europe and the region, and the Union's engagement in a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As regards the debate on priorities – the Middle East conflict or socio-economic development of the region – the Strategic Partnership declares: "progress on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be a precondition for confronting the urgent reform challenges facing our partners, nor vice versa" (ibid.).

²³² The notion of the creation of "a ring of well governed countries" around the EU also forms the basis of the ENP – a policy designed for the EU's immediate neighbourhood, which also includes the Mediterranean.

In the ESS, the EU laid out a foreign policy framework based on effective multilateralism and preventive engagement to bring stability and prosperity to its neighborhood, while recognizing the necessity of the use of force in certain situations. Therefore, it can be argued that the EU finally has a brief document that offers a coherent assessment of today's security threats and Europe's policy responses with the ESS. With this document, one can regard that the EU wants to take a role in specific conflicts in the Union's near abroad and in an way, tries to as a direct intervenor and claims to create an area of democracy and peace in its neighbourhood. The ESS also can be regarded as a Euro-centric document in which, the self-interest of the EU is highly stressed. One may claim that with this document the EU, in terms of its security discourses, discursively constructs its neighbourhood, which is prone to various threats. In this context, it can be considered that the EU mainly wants to prevent its neighbourhood countries' problems to become European problems. The EU approaches its neighbourhood as something manageable, something to be treated in certain ways and therefore, it wants to create a ring of well governed countries around its borders. One may claim that within this approach the EU puts itself in a position where its acts as a centre and wants to discipline its neighbourhood. As mentioned, the self-interest of the EU is evident in this document, and therefore, one may claim that the normative language that is used regarding the EMP has shifted with the adoption of the CMS and the ESS towards a neocolonial rhetoric. Nevertheless, the ESS provides the basic objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy that will be examined in the subsequent sections.

4.3. The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Mediterranean

The EU's 2004 enlargement was remarkable both in size and scope. It brought the Union's borders closer to potential areas of instability. As a result, the EU did not only have to address the internal questions brought about by enlargement but it also had to develop a comprehensive and consistent external policy especially towards its neighbourhood. In this context, finding new ways to engage its neighbourhood has become one of the major challenges facing the European Union today. The enlargement process is regarded as the most successful foreign policy tool of the Union with which to promote peace, prosperity and stability in its close neighbourhood.²³³

²³³ As Zielonka (2008b: 69-70) points out, although enlargement is not the Union's only foreign policy, it "has proven to be a most effective foreign policy – despite public anxiety".

Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008: 180) argue that the “attractiveness of EU membership and the strict conditionality” attached to the accession process have provided the Union with “considerable transformative power” in the applicant countries. According to Emerson (2004), after enlargement, the EU faced an “existential dilemma”. The dilemma was “about how the EU should define the nature and extent of its future frontiers, which means defining its very essence and identity” (Emerson, 2004).²³⁴ In this context, one may argue that the EU wants to influence its neighbourhood by promoting certain values in its foreign policy, by exporting its own integration model as a recipe, and by defending its own interests. In the post-Cold War period, with its enlargement policy, the EU has proved that it is a pole of attraction to its immediate neighbourhood (Eastern Europe) and is a model that is followed. As it has become obvious that further enlargements beyond Turkey and the Balkan countries are not foreseen in the near future, it is questionable whether the EU can promote its certain values, own integration model and can have an impact on its neighbourhood without ongoing enlargement? This situation has forced the EU to find alternative ways of inclusion. In this context, the ENP is designed to “anchor the neighbouring countries to a stable and comprehensive framework of relations” (Balfour and Rotta, 2005:7) through which the EU can pacify and stabilize its frontiers.

4.3.1. Evolution of the ENP

The European Neighbourhood Policy, which was first outlined in the Commission Communication on Wider Europe in March 2003, “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, was presented as an answer to the problems resulting from the enlargement. This new initiative is considered as an attempt to offer a “consolation prize” to the EU’s neighbours (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 17) that were not given the prospect of membership. It was introduced by the Commission as “a new framework for relations with the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours” (European Commission, 2004a). The method proposed was to define a set of priorities with partner countries, which would be incorporated into jointly agreed Action Plans covering a number of key areas for specific action (ibid.). The objective was defined as

²³⁴ As Emerson points out (2004: 1), “The EU now faces an existential dilemma in the apparent choice to be made between over-extending the enlargement process to the point of destroying its own governability, versus denying one of its founding values to be open to all European democracies and possibly generating negative effects from the exclusion of countries in the neighbourhood.”

“sharing the benefits of EU enlargement” with the neighbouring countries and “preventing the emergence of new dividing lines” between the enlarged EU and its neighbours (European Commission, 2004a). Therefore, the ENP was launched as new foreign policy tool for the Union.²³⁵ As Senyücel et. al. point out (2006:5), on paper, the ENP has ambitious goals, especially in the areas of security, energy, and stability. Before focusing on the major characteristics of the ENP, it is necessary at this point to have a closer look at the developments that paved the way to the initiation of this policy.

The first sign to form the ENP emerged in 2002 “when the key EU actors expressed the need for a specific policy tailored for the future Eastern neighbours” (Comelli, et. al., 2007:211), namely, the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia. The origins of the ENP date to early 2002, “when the UK pushed for a substantive ‘wider Europe initiative’”²³⁶ back to be aimed at Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia (Smith, 2005b: 780). The first steps towards establishing the ENP were taken following a letter from the UK Foreign Minister to the then Spanish Presidency of the European Union in January 2002 (ibid.). In this document, the British Foreign Minister Jack Straw suggested to offer Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova “clear and practical incentives for proceeding with political and economic reform” (Ganzle, 2007: 116-117). At this stage, the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, which would join the accession process after the completion of the Stabilization and Association Process), the official candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Croatia), and the more distant western former Soviet Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) were not addressed as potential candidates for targets of this new policy. A successive Swedish proposal in March that year reflected the content of Straw’s letter. “While highlighting the need for the EU to devise alternative means to induce the progressive transformation of Eastern neighbours”, the Swedish proposal also “added the imperative to extend the same logic to the Southern Mediterranean” and Russia (Comelli et. al, 2007: 212). In this context, one can argue that the EU tries to find a broad solution to the challenges coming from its neighbourhoods.

²³⁵ “Within this context, the ENP was proposed with the aim of developing a zone of prosperity and friendly neighbourhood with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations. This policy would not provide any prospect of membership for the countries concerned but eventually this new ring of friends could participate in every field of EU activities except its institutions “(European Commission, 2004a).

²³⁶ “The name of the initiative has been changed as many times as the list of neighbours included in it: from ‘wider Europe’ to ‘proximity policy’ to ‘neighbourhood policy’, and finally to ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’” (Smith, 2005b: 759 [her footnote 3]).

In 2002, Romano Prodi elaborated his views on a comprehensive framework for the EU to deal with all neighbours in a speech “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability”. He stressed the “need for a new political perspective on relations with the Union’s southern and eastern neighbours” (Prodi, 2002) and claimed that “[...] We need to find solutions that will allow us to share the advantages of enlargement with our neighbours. [...] I want to see a “ring of friends” surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea” (ibid.).

The Commission President also envisaged of some kind of a “Copenhagen proximity criteria”²³⁷ and underlined that “progress cannot be made unless the countries concerned take adequate measures to adopt the relevant *acquis*” (Prodi, 2002). In this context, as Armstrong (2007: 98) claims the proximate “neighbourhood states must accept European values in terms of governance and economic policy to enable them to become friends and neighbours”. As Tocci (2005: 30) argues, “through a process of positive conditionality, neighbourhood states are encouraged to apply the European *acquis communautaire*, on the assumption that this will reduce potential security threats as well”. In a sense, one may argue that a comprehensive approach to all neighbours based on the prospect of “sharing everything but institutions” (Prodi, 2002) can be defined as the core objective of Prodi’s proposal.

The Presidency Conclusions of the following Copenhagen European Council of December 12-13, 2002 devoted specific attention to relations between the enlarged Union and its neighbours. In general terms, the heads of state and government declared: “The Union remains determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” (European Council, 2002: 6). They also declared “their support for the further development of cross-border and regional cooperation” among neighbouring countries, “but said nothing whether they would be willing to contribute financially to this” (Wallace, 2003: 6).

In March 2003, the European Commission released its Communication on “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern

²³⁷ Prodi draws analogy to the accession criteria of the EU determined in 1993 for enlargement. When Prodi emphasized the need to set benchmarks to measure the progress of the Union’s neighbours, and visualized some kind of “Copenhagen proximity criteria” (Prodi, 2002), this was perceived as a “sporadic reference” to the Copenhagen criteria that were created in 1993 as a thresholds of political standards for membership (Kelley, 2006: 32).

Neighbours”. In this document the Commission stated: “[...] Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)” (European Commission, 2003a). This offer reflects the objective of Romano Prodi’s discourse (Lannon and Elsuwege, 2003: 43-44). According to Lannon and Elsuwege (ibid.: 44): “The strategy is clearly global, encompassing political, economic and human issues. The influence of the Barcelona Declaration is obvious here”. Wallace (2003: 19) claims that the Wider Europe and the related speeches can be seen as a choice of the EU either “importing insecurity from its neighbours, or of exporting to them security — which necessarily involves prosperity and stability”. Moreover, as Biscop (2010: 73) asserts the ENP can be regarded as the operationalization of the strategic objectives of the ESS, “translating the holistic approach to foreign policy advocated by the ESS into a concrete policy framework for relations with the Union’s periphery”. In this context, the EU, by linking its neighbours to market success and economic and financial support, aims to address the root causes of conflicts and to control the crises in its neighbourhood. For Tocci (2005-22), the ENP, like other EU external policies, “aims to establish closer relations with third states as both an end in itself and a means to contribute to structural change within and between these countries”.

These features, which were taken up in the Commission’s Wider Europe – Neighbourhood Communication of March 2003, were adopted by the Council in June 2003. The Commission services and financial instruments for external relations were reorganized accordingly. In July 2003 the Commission tabled a Communication ‘Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument’ (European Commission, 2003b), and established a Wider Europe Task Force and a Wider Europe Inter-Service Group (European Commission, 2004a). While in the years 2002-2004, DG Enlargement had initially worked on the ENP under the Barosso Commission, the ENP was transferred to the DG External Relations. The official title of the Commissioner was changed into the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. The reform of external financial instruments, which took effect in January 2007, “reinforced the categorical difference between accession and non-accession countries, by rescaling the instruments from around thirty to three: the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) for accession countries; the European Neighbourhood Policy

Instrument (ENPI) for the neighbours; and the Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument (DCECI) for developing countries” (European Commission, 2004b).

In May 2004, the European Commission published its Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy, which laid out the principles and objectives of the policy. In June 2004, after intensive “lobbying by the Caucasian Republics”, the Council extended the ENP “further to Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Russia has declined participation, preferring to develop cooperation with the EU on a more ‘equal’ basis, developing four ‘common spaces’ (economic freedom; security and justice; external security; and, research and education)” (Smith, 2005b: 759). The 16 participants in the ENP are listed as: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Libya, Syria, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia and Egypt. There are no agreements yet with Syria, Libya and Belarus because the ENP status requires a contractual agreement such as partnership and cooperation agreement or an association agreement, and none exists with these countries. In December 2006, the Commission suggested ways to upgrade the ENP. It proposed that all partners be given a “clearer perspective of a deeper economic and trade integration with the EU”; it further stipulated improved “visa procedures for certain categories of visitors; strengthened political cooperation and more systematic association with EU initiatives”; “a more active role in conflict resolution; and a strengthened regional approach” (European Commission, 2006). After making a brief analysis of the evolution of the ENP, the next section looks at framework of the ENP in detail.

4.3.2. The basis, objectives, capabilities and instruments of the ENP

Dannreuther (2006: 190) claims that there are some potential assets within the ENP that can be said to provide “added value” to existing policies towards the Mediterranean, and it is hoped to “convert the legacy of failure to success”. The ENP offers a bigger prize to its partner countries falling short of membership. Moreover, the bilateral and differentiated approach may be advantageous for both the EU and the SEMP. For the EU, dealing with each SEMP on a one-by-one basis certainly allows a far greater opportunity of exerting its political and economic influence in the neighbourhood (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 28). On the other hand, as Del Sarto and Schumacher (ibid.: 29) point out for the SEMP, some of these states such as Israel, Morocco and Egypt, do not appreciate being put into the group southern Mediterranean states, which are their real or potential rivals. In this context, as

Dannreuther (2006: 190) argues, the shift towards a more selective and differentiated approach in the ENP reflects the identification of the “great diversity of countries included in the ENP, and that ‘one size fits all policy’ is counterproductive and frustrates the ambitions of those actually seeking to engage substantively with the EU”.

As mentioned above, the basic principles and objectives of the ENP are laid down in the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper. The ENP’s ultimate objectives can be listed as follows (Biscop, 2005: 40):

- preventing conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood and acts of aggression against the EU itself;
- setting ongoing disputes and conflicts;
- establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security;
- controlling migration and all forms of illegal trafficking into the EU;
- protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad.

The European Neighbourhood Policy rests upon several key principles. First, the ENP builds on existing legal and institutional arrangements (Association Agreements, Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs), and Barcelona Process) with a respective ENP partner country. This prevents the ENP from duplicating the existing institutional structure (Ganzle, 2007: 120). Second, the ENP has a differentiated and more flexible approach through which the speed and degree of relations between the EU and the neighbouring countries are shaped according to each neighbour’s own circumstances and capacity, and to the extent of their progress in carrying out political, economic and social reforms (European Commission, 2004a: 8). The “tailor-made” approach of the ENP permits the neighbour countries to develop bilateral relations with the EU according to each country’s “specific circumstances and accompanied by sound macroeconomic, social and structural policies” (European Commission, 2004a: 14). The third point is, on the other hand, the absence of the EU membership objective. The ENP does not offer any possibility of membership. Instead, the ENP offers the neighbour countries several carrots: a stake in the EC internal market; the upgrading of political cooperation; provision of additional financial assistance through the ENPI.

The fourth point is the “strong conditionality” that “means that in order develop further bilateral relations with the EU, the neighbour countries are expected to follow stringent political conditionality which focuses on implementation of common democratic and rule of law values. The process of effective implementation of the common values is to be closely followed by the EU” (Petrov, 2007: 12).²³⁸. In this context, the EU sets up a procedure to monitor the successes and shortcomings of agreements that are made under the ENP. Fifth, the Commission has declared that the ENP constitutes a case for “joint ownership of the institutions and of the process in general – even though this ownership is basically based on the awareness and of shared values and common interests” (European Commission, 2004a: 8). As Ganzle (2007: 120) indicates, “although the European Union does not explicitly state that the normative model is to be taken from the EU itself, it is quite clear that the ENP countries are expected to converge towards the normative model of the Union”. In this sense, one may claim that this convergence can be regarded as the promotion of EU’s model to its neighbourhood.

As mentioned above, the ENP is carried through the implementation of Action Plans. The EU’s relations with the neighbouring countries involved are governed by “contractual arrangements” (European Commission, 2003a: 15). On the basis of the Action Plans and in order to address the particular the needs of the different partners, the European Commission drafts individual “Country Strategy Reports”. These reports assess the current state of relations as well as the political, social and economic developments and identify a first set of issues that will have to be addressed. When the Country Reports are submitted to the Association Council, and the Council decides whether to proceed to the next stage of relations.

²³⁸ “Drawing on the lessons of enlargement, the ENP aims to support long-term domestic reform, regional cooperation and peacebuilding in its proximity by providing new incentives to its neighbours. Underlying the language of incentives is the logic of conditionality. Yet with the ENP, the Union is faced with a dilemma. During the accession process, conditionality, despite its limits and highly intrusive nature, was a pivotal element in the successful transformation of the eastern European countries. It was the necessary and accepted means for fulfilling the goal of full membership. This was not only because of the legally binding nature of the accession process, but also because the process retained an ultimate element of democratic legitimacy through popular referenda. In the case of the ENP countries, hardly any of the above conditions apply. Reforms induced or imposed by EU conditionality would have no democratic accountability. Nor would the people be called upon to ratify the process, nor would their elected leaders be represented in EU institutions in future. Furthermore, particularly in the political realm, many of the reforms called for by EU conditionality are viewed as existentially threatening to the domestic elites of third countries.”(Tocci, 2005: 25)

The ENP Action Plans are negotiated with and tailor-made for each country, based on the respective country's needs, capacities and interests, as well as the EU's interests. They jointly define an agenda of political and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term (3-5 years) priorities. The ENP Action Plans are similar in outline, but the content is specific to each country. They include: political dialogue; economic and social cooperation; trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform; cooperation in justice and home affairs; sectoral issues such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development; and the human dimension, including people-to-people contacts, civil society, education and public health (European Commission, 2004a). The Action Plans offer a series of incentives in return for progress on relevant reforms. These incentives can be listed as (Kelley, 2006: 37): a "perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration" including a stake in the EU's internal market and opportunity to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes; an "upgrade in scope and intensity of political cooperation"; opening of economies, reduction of trade barriers; increased financial support; participation in Community programmes promoting cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links; support for legislative approximation to meet EU norms and standards; deepening trade and economic relations.

The Action Plans cover two types of commitments: "first, commitments to specific actions that confirm or reinforce adherence to shared values and to certain objectives in the area of foreign and security policy; second, commitments to actions that bring partner countries closer to the EU in a number of policy fields" (European Commission, 2004a: 9). These priority fields are defined in each action plan "in a precise way (referred as benchmarking)" and the implementation of the Action Plans is "monitored and evaluated according to benchmarks" (European Commission, 2004a: 9). The implementation of the mutual commitments and objectives contained in the Action Plans is "regularly monitored through sub-committees with each country, dealing with those sectors or issues, and then the Commission will issue regular progress reports" (European Commission, 2004a: 10). On the basis of those reports, the EU can decide "to offer a neighbour a more wide-ranging contractual framework, a 'European Neighbourhood Agreement'" (European Commission, 2004a: 9). 12 such ENP Action Plans are being implemented – with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Tunisia and Ukraine since 2005 and with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lebanon and Egypt since end 2006/beginning 2007.

According to Smith (2005b: 765), the Action Plans are outstanding for at least two reasons. The first is the importance of the political objectives, including – most notably – respect for human rights and democratic principles, in the Action Plans (ibid.). The second outstanding aspect of the plans is that, with one exception, they “reflect a rather plenty dose of EU self-interest” (ibid.). For instance, action plans with Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine, “insist that the neighbours must conclude readmission agreements with the EU” (ibid.). The exception is Israel’s action plan, which is “less a list of things for Israel to do, and more a list of things for the EU and Israel to do together” (Smith, 2005b: 765-766). This situation can be regarded as an indication of the more equal standing of the two sides (ibid.:766). The Action Plans with the other neighbours are much more “commanding and can be perceived as a inconsistency in the EU’s treatment of its neighbours, which could reduce its credibility and its legitimacy in the eyes of its neighbours” (ibid.). At this point, Tocci (2005: 30-31) reminds that although “the danger of political discretion exists with each and every neighbour, this danger becomes critical when a third country has influence over the Union itself” such as Israel. In Israeli case, proceeding on the ENP track carries an important risk for the EMP. The ENP create sufficient conditions for Israel to engage in deeper socioeconomic integration with the EU while, in a way, bypassing the multilateral influence of the Barcelona Process.²³⁹

Since 2007, the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument replaced PHARE, TACIS and MEDA and could allow for more flexibility in terms of funding priority programmes. This is a much more “flexible, policy-driven instrument” (European Commission, 2004b, Article 3). It is designed “to target sustainable development and approximation to EU policies and standards, as well as supporting the agreed priorities in the ENP Action Plans (as well as

²³⁹ One may claim that organizing the EU-Israel relations in the context of the ENP also has risks from the European side. As Tocci (2005: 31) points out, “first, there is the consistency of Europe’s political message. In October 2004, the Commission in Brussels was working on finalising the Israel Action Plan the same week as the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg strongly condemned the Israeli incursions in Gaza. While the EU is reluctant to sanction any state (not only Israel), the non-conditional extension of additional benefits to a country the EU ha harshly condemns in its declaratory diplomacy is paradoxical to say the least. Second and most important, there are the legal repercussions of extending additional benefits to Israel. To date, the EU has been aware of but has failed to rectify Israel’s material breach of its association agreement, a breach deriving from the fact that Israel has applied its preferential trade agreements to the territories it has occupied since 1967. In order to rectify this problem without antagonising Israel, the Commission has sought a “technical arrangement” to lighten the administrative burdens on the customs authorities of both sides, without requiring Israel to end its malpractice. However, accepting this arrangement and proceeding on this basis to upgrade the bilateral relationship, particularly on trade-related matters (for example by including Israel in the system of pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation) could entail the Union’s legal acceptance of Israel’s current breach. This would, in turn, make EC law and practice incompatible with both international humanitarian law and the stated objectives of the ENP and the European Security Strategy”.

the Strategic Partnership with Russia)” (European Commission, 2004b, Article 2 and Article 5). The Commission adopted a “two-step approach” to create this instrument: “increasing coordination between EU structural funds and external funds with a special emphasis on cross-border facility, and a single regulation for EU external assistance, including the ENPI” (European Commission, 2003b; European Commission, 2004b). The ENPI also envisages extending forms of technical assistance to partner countries that had previously been used in the process of the Central and Eastern European Countries’ rapprochement towards the EU, such as Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), long-term twinning arrangements with EU member states’ administrations (national, regional or local), as well as participation in Community programmes and agencies (European Commission, 2004b). For the budgetary period of 2007-2013, approximately €12 billion in EC funding are available to support these partners' reforms (European Commission, 2004b).

The ENP, which also includes Southern neighbours, has an important dimension that regards the Union’s security (Sasse, 2006:12): the EU is concerned about illegal immigration, organized crime, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental disasters and ethnic conflicts destabilizing or spilling over its borders. In the ENP, neighbouring countries are invited “to take political and legislative measures to enhance economic integration and liberalization, and measures to promote human rights, cultural cooperation and mutual understanding” (Attina, 2004: 22). Moreover, as Attina (ibid.) points out, as well as the EU, “neighbouring countries are explicitly invited to make steps towards regional security co-management and to participate in initiatives aimed at improving conflict prevention and crisis management; and, strengthening cooperation to prevent and combat security threats”. The Commission states:

The EU should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Palestine, the Western Sahara and (...) (in support of the efforts of the OSCE and other mediators). Greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2003a: 12).

In 2007, the Commission further stipulates the EU's interest in resolving the conflicts by stating (European Commission, 2007: 6):²⁴⁰

The number of (...) *conflicts* in the neighbourhood remains high: (...) the Middle East and Western Sahara. The EU has a direct interest in working with partners to promote their resolution, because they undermine EU efforts to promote political reform and economic development in the neighbourhood and because they could affect the EU's own security, through regional escalation, unmanageable migratory flows, disruption of energy supply and trade routes, or the creation of breeding grounds for terrorist and criminal activity of all kinds.

In 2011, regarding the developments in the South and Eastern Mediterranean, which one can see in the next chapter, the Commission states that

The overthrow of long-standing repressive regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; the ongoing military conflict in Libya, the recent violent crackdown in Syria, (...) the lingering protracted conflicts in the region, including in the Middle East, require us to look afresh at the EU's relationship with our neighbours. (European Commission, 2011b: 1)

The EU worries the destabilizing effects of the developments and expresses its concern by stating that

The persistence of protracted conflicts affecting a number of partner countries is a serious security challenge to the whole region. EU geopolitical, economic and security interests are directly affected by continuing instability. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other conflicts in the Middle East, (...) and Western Sahara continue to affect sizeable populations, feed radicalisation, drain considerable local and international resources, and act as powerful impediments to reform. (European Commission, 2011b: 5)

Biscop argues that the ENP has a "stabilizing and preventive scope" by linking the benefits to political and economic reform through the process of positive conditionality (2005:

²⁴⁰ At this point, it is important to remind that although the Commission encouraged the EU to "take a more active role to facilitate the settlement of the disputes" over the Palestinian and Western Sahara, interestingly the ENP Action Plan with Morocco does not contain any reference to the Western Sahara (Ganzle, 2007: 118). "Whereas Spain, followed by the most of the EU member states, would have liked to put this issue on the EU's agenda, France, in opposition, adopts a pro-Moroccan stance and opposes giving the ENP any particular role in solving the conflict" (ibid.) This situation reflects both the divisions between the member states and the Commission in the development of ESDP related features, and the divisions between the individual member states (ibid.).

39). The ENP is designed according to the three related concerns of the EU (Sasse, 2006:12): the desire for political stability on EU's borders, the wish to ease the real or perceived negative effects of enlargement on neighbouring countries, and the attempt to define an alternative to full EU membership. In this sense, for Sasse (ibid.), the ENP is located in the "fuzzy space" between the EU's partnership and full membership.

As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, the Commission claimed that the ENP scheme is "compatible with, and complementary to", the Barcelona Process (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 20-21). Thus, the Commission declared that the ENP "should not override the existing framework of EU relations with (...) the southern Mediterranean Partners. Instead, "wider Europe" would supplement and build on existing policies and arrangements" (European Commission, 2003a: 15). The Commission also declared that regarding the Mediterranean, the ENP would be "implemented through the Barcelona Process and the Association Agreements with each partner country" (European Commission, 2004a: 6). To put it in a different way, the ENP does not aim to replace the existing frameworks for relations, such as the EMP, rather it wants to supplement or build on them. Moreover, one may claim that most of the measures that are proposed in the framework of the ENP are "already among the established objectives of the EMP" (Biscop, 2005: 40). The idea is to find a balance between the bilateral Action Plans and the Barcelona Process. As Biscop (ibid.) points out, on the one hand, with bilateralism, the EU "benefits and benchmarks for progress can be tailored to specific needs and circumstances" with the individual partner countries, and, on the other hand, with the EMP, the EU "deal with regional issues and to promote regional integration between the partners". In this context, it can be stressed that differentiation would allow the EU to reward those partners that are making more progress.²⁴¹ In the Mediterranean context, "this would help unhinge the Barcelona Process from the stalemate in which it has often found itself, allowing some countries like Morocco and Jordan to progress more rapidly than others" (Balfour and Rotta, 2005: 11). However, the differentiation approach carries the risk of privileging the bilateral dimension over regional frameworks, such as the aforementioned EU-Israel case.

²⁴¹ According to Balfour and Rotta (2005: 11), "[a]s progress towards reform depends largely on the internal political conditions of a given country, this means policies tailor-made to meet such conditions, rather than an abstract one-size-fits-all shopping list of reform priorities"

One may argue that the ENP differs from the EMP in at least three important points with regard to the Mediterranean (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 21- 24). First, the ENP abandons the principle of “regionality” that was inherent in the Barcelona Process, and replaces it with “differentiated bilateralism”. Although the EMP already incorporated a bilateral dimension through Association Agreements, this was based on rather similar association agreements with the individual SEMP’s (ibid.: 21). Conversely, the ENP is based on an “explicitly differentiated and bilateral approach” (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 21). As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, the Commission declared that the regional dimension of the EMP should be maintained to promote sub-regional cooperation in the South (European Commission, 2004a: 22). But the ENP “no longer relies on the EMP’s idea of an encompassing Euro-Mediterranean region” (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 22). Manners (2010: 41) argues that “the ENP has abandoned the one-speed regionality of the EMP for differentiated bilateralism based on action plans and benchmarking”. As mentioned before, the EMP’s regional and multilateral framework provides the only forum in which Israel and its Arab neighbours meet. This is regarded as an important achievement in problematic Middle East Peace Process. Moreover, as Balfour and Rotta, (2005:12-13) stipulate, “regional policies seem to be the most appropriate way to encourage regional cooperation on common challenges such as infrastructure development or cross-border crime”. In this context, one may claim that there could be a tension in the EU’s Mediterranean policies between differentiation and regional cooperation.

Second, the transition from the EMP to the ENP seems to imply a shift regarding the principle of conditionality (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 22). Thus, while the Barcelona Process introduced the principle of “negative conditionality”, the European Neighbourhood Policy is explicitly based on the “positive conditionality”. This principle goes hand in hand with the differentiated approach of the ENP (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 22). Indeed, in the framework of the EMP, Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements contained the clause that the agreements may be suspended if the respective partner state violated respect for human rights. However, the EU has never made any use of this principle in practice.

Third, in the framework of the ENP the EU is much more straightforward regarding the question of what its actual interests are (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 23). While interests of the EU and of its member states initiated the EMP, “the Barcelona Declaration was much more careful on this issue” (ibid.). While the EMP “relied on the logic of region

building and recurrently referred to allegedly shared values”, the ENP is “framed in terms of ‘interests’” (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 23). In almost every official text regarding the ENP, the EU makes an explicit reference to the EU interests as well as the interests of European citizens (Cebeci, 2006: 13). The European Commission (2003a: 3) confirms the importance of EU interests by stating: “Over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours”.

4.3.3 An overall assessment of the ENP

In general as Tassinari (2005: 7-8) points out, the ENP does not “quite resemble any of the existing strategies, but picks elements from many of them and attempts to complement their inputs”. The ENP aims to introduce elements of the EU enlargement strategy within those of traditional partnership, and while it offers a degree of integration, it does not promise of a membership. In sum, it promises to “blur the contraposition between the inside and outside” (ibid.: 8). In this context the objective of establishing a ring of friends can be read as an “attempt to buffer” the EU’s external borders (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 19-26). It can also be argued that the ENP offers a set of weak tools, a “softened and diluted” version of the enlargement model (Gebhard, 2007:16). For Jesus (2010: 248), the ENP sets up a “reordering of priorities resulting from greater EU coherence and a clearer collective sense of EU interests”.

The notion of the creation of a ring of well-governed countries around the EU “forms the basis” of the European Neighbourhood Policy – a policy designed for the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, which also includes the Mediterranean (Cebeci, 2006: 11). The ENP is the first effort of the EU to build a single framework for engaging in dialogue and cooperation with a set of widely different neighbouring countries. The “tailor-made” approach of the ENP, the principle of “positive conditionality”, the absence of membership objective, and the introduction of the principle of “joint ownership” can be regarded as the basic important points on which the ENP is based on.

According to Johansson-Nogues (2004: 241), the European Neighbourhood Policy “represents a way to safeguard” two of the Union’s main “foreign policy priorities in terms of its neighbourhood: how to stay clear of further enlargements and how to manage the new

external borders”. Until recently, the EMP was main the framework for regulating relations between, and affecting political, social and economic reforms in the Mediterranean partner states. The ENP offers the Mediterranean partner countries the possibility of deepening their relations with the EU on a bilateral basis. The EU offers them all, without their becoming full members, that which is encapsulated in the four freedoms (freedom of capital, persons, services and goods). As far as the ENP’s Mediterranean partners are concerned, “the ENP could be regarded as a pragmatic way of activating the plugged goals of the Barcelona Process” (Senyücel et. al., 2006: 8). According to Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005: 28-29), although the ENP initially “was not designed to address the socio-economic problems in the EU’s periphery”, “as far as the Mediterranean is concerned the EU’s new approach does correct a number of shortcomings of the EMP”.

On the one hand, as Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005: 19) claim, the ENP, with regard to the Mediterranean, “rather unintentionally than deliberately”, corrects a number of deficiencies of the EMP. The ENP, by using differentiation and benchmarking, can reward those partners who are making more progress. In the Mediterranean context, this would help release the Barcelona Process from the deadlock in which it has often found itself, allowing countries to progress more rapidly than others (Balfour, 2004: 9). One may stress the fact that the most important innovation contained in the ENP is the introduction of “differentiation” approach. This could allow the use of political conditionality, which is a method the EU has rarely resorted to in the South and Eastern Mediterranean context. Balfour and Rotta (2005: 10) claim that “conditionality essentially ties the benefits a donor country offers a partner to progress in economic and political reform”.²⁴² Moreover, the introduction of the principle of “joint ownership” can be considered as a positive development for the EU-SEMPs relations. In the framework of the EMP, SEMP repeatedly complained about the lack of sufficient consultation and involvement in the formulation of the country-specific priorities of MEDA funding (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 29). The ENP aims at correcting this flaw (ibid.). The ENP also proposes that it will be better resourced than the pre-ENP neighbourhood

²⁴² “So far, enlargement has been the process through which conditionality has been exercised the most, thanks to the final incentive of EU membership. Nonetheless, the EU has a wide range of economic, political and aid tools with which to exercise conditionality even without the accession carrot. These can be positive, involving incentives, or negative, involving forms of ‘punishment’ such as withdrawal of aid, postponement of a summit, or even suspension of an agreement. All agreements that the EU has concluded with its neighbours to date contain an article allowing either party to take “appropriate measures” should the obligations of the agreement not be fulfilled. But it does not specify what the ‘appropriate measures’ are and under what conditions they should be resorted to. If conditionality is to be successful, its objectives must be clear and its implementation transparent” (Rotta and Balfour, 2005: 10-11).

policies (Dannreuther, 2006: 190), which will in turn, believe to give the partner countries enough incentive to implement the commitments that are indicated in the Action Plans.

The adoption of the positive conditionality in the ENP could also be regarded “as a result of the lessons taken from the EMP and its ineffectiveness in imposing sanctions” (Cebeci, 2006: 13). Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005: 28) argue that on the one hand, according to this principle, “reform-reluctant states” may “not benefit from increased aid or trade concessions”, on the other hand, if implemented, positive conditionality could “encourage the reform-willing states such as Morocco to further pursue their reform agenda” (ibid.). For example, at the seventh meeting of the EU-Morocco Association Council on 13 October 2008, the EU approved a package of measures designed to strengthen the partnership with Morocco.

These measures concern in particular cooperation in political and security matters, the preparation of a comprehensive and deeper free trade agreement, the gradual integration of Morocco into a number of EU sectoral policies, and the development of people-to-people exchanges. They are intended to provide material support for the modernization and democratic transition process that Morocco has been engaged in for a number of years and for which Morocco is requesting more substantial backing from Europe.²⁴³

Although the ENP would not put an end to or replace the Barcelona Process, “it is hoped among European politicians” that the ENP could offer a new dynamism in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Johansson-Nogues, 2004: 243). In this context, it can be argued that with regard to Mediterranean, what the ENP did offer was “an opportunity to re-launch the EMP”, “the possibility to have a fresh start” (Biscop, 2005: 41). To have this opportunity, the member states should “invest sufficient means and offer the neighbouring states real benefits” (Wallace, 2003: 23). “Even if membership is not on offer for the remaining Mediterranean partners – except Turkey – other, ‘silver’ carrots can be devised “(Missiroli, 2004: 23). For Bishop (2004: 28; 2005: 42), “opening up to agricultural exports”, “subsidizing major infrastructure projects”, and “perhaps a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the Mediterranean could be the next grand project of the EU after enlargement” in the longer term. Johansson-Nogues (2004: 243), argues that the ENP can be regarded as a pragmatic recognition of the existing situation

²⁴³ IP/08/1488, 13 October 2008, Brussels, Accessed through: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1488_en.htm?locale=en. Retrieved on 25 May 2012.

of a “multiple-speed Mediterranean”, and this flexibility is hoped to revitalize the Euro-Mediterranean relations where other attempts have failed.

Although the ENP could address some of the shortcomings of the Barcelona Process, it is quite clear that the Neighbourhood Policy also has its own internal and external challenges. On the other hand, despite these positive expectations, the ENP has some various shortcomings. One may consider the abandonment of the regional rationale in the Mediterranean in favour of a tailor-made approach as one of the main strength as well as the main weakness of the ENP. The ENP can be regarded as a departure from the rationale and guiding principles of the EU’s Mediterranean policy maintained thus far, and more importantly, “it contradicts the regional design of the EMP and its inherent region-building logic” (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 24-25).²⁴⁴ One may argue that the ENP overemphasizes bilateral relationships and overlooks the fact that many of the SEMP’s problems require a regional approach. It is important to note the fact that the regional approach should not be abandoned in EU’s policies regarding the Mediterranean. Strengthening the multilateral and/or regional elements in the ENP would help to tackle not just the cross-border problems that affect the EU but also those that affect all of the neighbours (Smith, 2005b: 773). For Balfour (2004:4), “rather than seek radical change to revamp the EU’s Mediterranean policies, a ‘modus vivendi’ between the achievements of the EMP’s comprehensive approach with the new concepts of differentiation and benchmarking introduced by the ENP should be found, allowing individual countries to make progress without jeopardizing the entire regional approach”. One may claim that if the EU does not find a strike balance between regionalism and bilateralism, this may harm the EU’s influence in the Mediterranean.

Açıkmeşe (2005: 24) further claims that some of the promises of the ENP are unrealistic, “such as the plea of free movement of people at a time when the Europeans are firmly against the idea”. In this sense, Cebeci (2006: 14) argues that offering a stake in the internal market (i.e. four freedoms) and further economic integration does not also seem very realistic as the EU still applies strict quotas to third countries especially in the sectors of

²⁴⁴ For Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005: 22-36), although “one size fits all” approach of the EMP can “no longer successful” and the “tailor-made” approach of the ENP may provide better advantages for both the EU and the Mediterranean partners, it is believed that the bilateral and differentiated nature of the ENP may harm the region-building approach of the EMP by reducing the Barcelona Process into a “intra-regional trade and sub-regional cooperation”.

textiles and agriculture and the fear of illegal immigration would hardly let the EU Member States to decide on applying the freedom of movement of people/labour to any SEMP. As Cebeci (2006: 14) points out:

Furthermore, without any decision-making rights, further integration into the EU internal market would bring great costs to the SEMPs, which cannot be compensated through limited EU resources directed towards these countries in the form of economic assistance and development aid.

The EU is also “vague in defining the modalities of the so-called stake in the internal market, which is seen as the most innovative dimension” of the ENP (Emerson et. al, 2007: 15).²⁴⁵ Even though the ENP promises to the neighbours “everything but institutions”, it does not give them what they really want. For some countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia, access to the EU’s agricultural markets would create a valuable economic opportunity (Grabbe, 2004: 3). However, the ENP does not tell anything about these forms of trade concessions (ibid.). Last but not least, although the financial sources of the ENP to support regional and bilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean are much more promising than the previous arrangements, the ENP countries also fear that these resources will still remain inadequate.

In general as Balfour and Rotta (2005: 19) claim, if well implemented, the ENP can be considered as a strong signal in which the EU attempts to “consolidate its position as a regional power”. A failing neighbourhood policy would have “decisive impact on the credibility of the EU as a global strategic actor and significantly compromise its international standing and acceptance” (Gebhard, 2007: 16). According to Seidelman (2009: 264):

Defining the ENP can start with a reference to its official definition, which is based on the fact that it deals with EU-neighbouring countries, that it defines neighbours predominantly by geographic proximity, and that it limits itself to a relation between the EU as a supranational and the neighbours as nation-state actors. In addition and following the idea of the EU’s

²⁴⁵ A clearer incentive structure, attached to “clearer and well-ordered priorities”, would give the EU better tools for fostering fundamental reform in the neighbours (Smith, 2005b: 773). “The conceptualization of the economic content of the ENP is headlined with a vague promise of ‘a stake in the internal market’, without this being seriously defined. The Action Plans have set out catalogues of 300 bulleted action points, many related to the EU’s internal market acquis, but with little indication how these should be operationalized, or how the EU might contribute” (Emerson et. al, 2007: 15). Therefore, the EU needs to make a clear definition of the incentives that the ENP proposes.

foreign policy as based on the model of concentric circles, the ENP has to be regarded as a horizontal link between membership as the ultimate option for neighbouring countries and non-membership for the foreseeable future combined with cooperative relations and close ties.

In this context, it can be claimed that hierarchy of interests in the EU is generally based on geographical proximity. As Armstrong (2007: 3) indicates, the neighborhood states “will form a cordon sanitaire around the EU against an unstable and allegedly threatening world”. Therefore, the ENP was created as a “strategic approach to the post-enlargement situation, with redrawn boundaries between the EU insiders and the outsiders on the EU’s borders” (Whitman and Wolff, 2010: 3). With the ENP, the Union intends “to advance the EU’s interests in creating a stable regional environment for European integration, and to mitigate challenges to EU security and stability” (ibid.). As mentioned in the previous chapter, according to the imperial analogy, borders become fuzzy. In this sense, it can be claimed that this fuzziness may help the Union to exert its influence in the periphery.²⁴⁶

Moreover, within the framework of the ENP, when compared to the other Union’s Mediterranean policies, especially the EMP, it can be argued that the self-interest of the EU is much more clear. If the ENP is compared to the EMP, the principles of the ENP “reveal a new dimension of how the European Union considers itself and looks at the world” (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 27). On the one hand, although there was an inconsistency between the theory and practice, the EMP emphasized the importance of the notion of partnership; on the other hand, the ENP explicitly suggests a “centre-periphery approach”, with the EU standing at the centre (ibid.). For Joenniemi (2007b: 156), the ENP is based “on a radial centre-periphery model”. It can be claimed that in the ENP, the EU tries to act as the centre and through the asymmetric relations, it tries to discipline its periphery. With the ENP, the EU in order to pursue its own interests, invites its neighbourhood countries to join some parts of the Union. In this context, one may assert that within the ENP, the EU in a way, creates the centre-periphery relationship between itself and its neighbourhood.

One may argue that this centre-periphery model implies about the Union’s neocolonial intentions in its neighbourhood where the core of the peaceful EU seeks to insulate itself from the dark zones of its periphery, and moreover the EU seeks to control this trouble

²⁴⁶ “The EU’s external borders, rather than being simple line on the map, more closely resemble a system of concentric circles and buffer zones.” (Busch and Kryzsanowski, 2007: 109).

neighbourhood. The EU tries to exercise its influence and power in its neighbourhood through asymmetric relations, cooperation, limited invitation, negotiations, and persuasion, which may be called as neocolonial. In this context, one can observe some features of neocolonial tendencies in the EU's Mediterranean policies. Especially one can see the ENP seen as setting up asymmetric relations among and between states in the EU's Southern neighbourhood. By using the EMP and more importantly the ENP, the EU attempts to establish its rule in particular zones of interest or influence. Such an asymmetric power enables the EU to impose its own understanding norms, regulations and model to its neighbourhood. In this context, one may claim that there exists a real asymmetry in the Euro-Mediterranean relations. It is the EU – and not the countries of the region – “that sets the norms, objectives, patterns and modes for policies” (Seidelmann, 2009: 264). It is claimed that the asymmetric relation between the EU and the SEMP is coming from the “existing interests and power hierarchy in Europe” and its neighbourhood (ibid.). Seidelmann explains this asymmetric structure as follows:

- On the one hand, the EU as a European supranational actor; and on the other hand, the neighbouring nation-states of which abroad majority is not affiliated or part on equal supra-or even multinational actor.
- On the one hand, the EU as an economic superpower; and on the other hand, the neighbouring nation-states not only with a much smaller power base but in general highly dependent on EU economy.
- On the one hand, the EU as an attractive model both for the idealists as well as realists; on the other hand, the neighbouring nation-states with limited or declining acceptance and legitimacy. (2009: 264)²⁴⁷

If one looks at the imperial analogy behind the EU's Mediterranean policies (especially to the ENP, where the self-interest of the EU is more evident), he/she can see the ideology of these policies. Just as empires seek to establish and maintain a zone of peace to enhance trade opportunities and generate wealth (Weaver, 1997: 63), the Mediterranean policies, especially the ENP can be understood as a peace project with a similar mission, where the EU seeks to control its neighbourhood, to maximize its economic gains and protect its own citizens from the potential threats generating from its neighbourhood. One may claim that the approaches the Mediterranean region mainly based on two interrelated approaches:

²⁴⁷ For Joenniemi (2007b: 145), “the EU is not merely using its magnetism to impact potential members; it now also feels obliged and entitled to reach further out”.

the civilization approach, which is related with construction of the self and the other; and the security approach. In Euro-Mediterranean relations, while the EU is presented as an area of cooperation and peace, the South and Eastern Mediterranean Other is presented as an area of threat, instability and conflict. In other words, in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, one side is represented as a model, the other as a potential threat. As mentioned in the one of the main objectives of the ENP is to develop a zone of peace and stability – “a friendly neighbourhood”, a “ring of friends” – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations in an otherwise conflict-ridden neighbourhood (European Commission, 2003a: 4). Thus, the EU is “represented as open and vulnerable to trans-boundary threats ranging from illegal migration to organised crime, and from energy security to terrorism” (Dimitrovova, 2010: 8). One may see the ENP as an attempt of the Union’s aim to protect itself and to extend its influence to its neighbourhood while keeping its boundaries with the neighbourhood states not so open but also not so close.²⁴⁸

The EU’s presentation of itself in the neighbourhood is focused on exporting and sharing its values with outsiders and hence “the ENP can be read as a carrier of the values of modernity” (Dimitrovova, 2010: 8). In this sense, one can claim that the ENP can be regarded as Eurocentric and it often ignores the needs of the participant countries, and promotes its own model and its values. One may claim that in order to gain influence and protect its own interests, the EU is promoting its best practices to the SEMP’s regardless of their content. Moreover, although the EU appeals conditionality in its relations with the SEMP’s, it exerts this conditionality selectively and inconsistently. Such an approach causes one to question the integrity of EU’s policies. Furthermore, as Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis (2006: 346) points out, the EU acts as a “benign patron” in its relations to the South and with the ENP, this relationship turns into an actual “centre-periphery relationship”.

To conclude, although the EU used and is still using (as in the Balkan countries) the case of “integration as security” for providing order and stability in the European continent, when the neighbouring countries are concerned, the EU is increasingly replacing its policy of

²⁴⁸ On the one hand, Waever (2000: 263) argues that EU’s neighbourhood policies, which reflect “the basic concentric circles pattern”, are “to avoid ever saying ‘no’”, and the answer should be “‘not yet’ or ‘yet but’”. On the other hand, scholars like Smith (2005b: 773) claims that “[i]t is also important that the EU should try to resolve the hardest dilemma of all: where its borders will stop moving outwards. Ambiguity is not working. Either the EU should say ‘no’ to further enlargement, so that the ENP becomes the only framework for relations with the neighbours for the foreseeable future; or it should say ‘yes’ to letting in (eventually) a specified number of neighbours, which then move out of the ENP, but no one else.”

“integration as security” with the policy of “association/partnership as security” just as in the EMP and the ENP. One can argue that “the ENP seems to suffer (still) from being neither enlargement nor foreign policy proper” (Missiroli, 2010: 262). For Missiroli (ibid.), the ENP “cannot exercise conditionality as effectively as” the enlargement, “nor does it bring to bear all the political tools and levers of” the foreign policy proper. The ENP incorporates elements of both policies. In this context, the logic behind the ENP is integrating without enlarging. As Balfour and Rotta (2005: 8-9) point out, the ENP’s “rationale follows the logic of enlargement: the greater the integration and cooperation between countries, and the wider the area of peace, economic development and democracy, the more stable and secure the entire community”. For Gebhard (2010: 100), the ENP is “the most ambitious plan of external governance projection the Union has envisaged so far”. One may assert that the ENP is mostly an interest-driven policy where the EU acts as a centre that wants to discipline its periphery. It can be claimed that under the ENP, EU borders are primarily represented in terms of security, in which the goal of the policy is to protect the EU and its citizens and to maintain or even to gain control in the neighbourhood countries. Moreover, it can be claimed that by seeking its self-interest, the EU tries to pursue its possession goals in its neighbourhood under the framework of the ENP. Moreover, one can argue that, on the contrary to the normative language of the Barcelona Process, the EU adopted a neocolonial language in the ENP framework.

4.4. Union for the Mediterranean

The decision of the Brussels European Council on 12-14 March 2008, to approve the principle of a Union for the Mediterranean is potentially an important turning point in the Barcelona Process. Arising from Sarkozy’s call for a Mediterranean Union (MU) in 2007, the idea has been diluted during a year of negotiations. In the Euro-Med summit, which was held in Paris on July 13-14, 2008, the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean was launched. This section analyzes the transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean from a French initiative to a European-led policy.

4.4.1. From a Mediterranean Union to the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

Nicolas Sarkozy, first proposed the idea of a Mediterranean Union on February 7, 2007 in Toulon “as he campaigned for the French presidential election of that year”, and “the idea has drawn much attention on the Euro-Mediterranean political scene” (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 3). The proposed union would consist of sixteen southern European, Middle Eastern and North African countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. In his speech, the goals of the Mediterranean Union were stated as the following: to devise a policy of “immigration choice”²⁴⁹, to address the environmental challenges of the Mediterranean; to create joint venture companies; to negotiate and regulate free trade; to achieve joint management of water resources; to establish an investment bank; and to emphasize the importance of education (ibid.). At this point it is important to remind that although the Mediterranean policies are necessary for the European Union as a whole, “a game of relations and interests exists” (Delgado, 2011: 39) in which some of the member states such as France want to play a central role.

At first, the idea was seen as another field for the election campaign. But the time has shown that the proposal was also a reflection of the France’s strategic position in the Mediterranean (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 1). It is generally agreed that the idea behind the Mediterranean Union project is based on a triple diagnosis made by Sarkozy: “the inadequacies of the EU’s Mediterranean policies, especially the EMP, the erosion of France’s role as a geopolitical actor in the Mediterranean, and the marginalization of the Mediterranean in the world economy” (Aliboni, et. al, 2008: 5). The French proposal was viewed as (Gillespie, 2008: 278-279):

[a] plan to renew the French influence in an area that it had dominated during colonial times; an initiative to rebalance the French-German relations, and acquire France a more influential role in the EU by playing the initiating role in reshaping the Union’s southern dimension, to offset the pre-eminence of Germany in relation to the East; as a part of a commercially-oriented drive to make France the main provider of nuclear energy infrastructure in the

²⁴⁹ The concept of “selected immigration” was one of the pillars of Sarkozy’s campaign, and it gives the host country the right to select the immigrants on the basis of its needs and interests (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 3 [their footnote 5]).

southern Mediterranean; as a response to the air of disappointment that had affected the EMP; (...) and as a 'big idea' for the French Presidency of the EU during the second half of 2008.

Duna (2009: 17) emphasizes that “although there have been several attempts to institutionalize a Southern dimension” within the Union, since the EU focused on the enlargement policy and “has been involved in the process of stabilizing and securing the Western Balkans and South-Eastern Europe”, the results of this have been relatively modest. Therefore, Duna (ibid.) argues that the “Southern Dimension” is not common in the EU official documents as is the case of the “Northern Dimension”. In this context, one may claim that in his speech, Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a more clear definition of the EU Southern Dimension. The proposal got a cool reaction, both from the European Commission and the non-Mediterranean members of the EU, which felt excluded, and from the SEMP members (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 3). The latter did not seem to like the emphasis on “immigration and the defence of French colonialism” (ibid.). But in the Mediterranean members of the EU, the reaction was mixed. On the one hand, “countries saw an opportunity to boost relations” with the states of southern rim of the Mediterranean (ibid.). On the other hand, there was a concern over the possibility of a Mediterranean Union reducing the impact of the Barcelona Process “without contributing anything concrete to replace it” (ibid.). Nevertheless, after the French proposal, many French Foreign Ministry Officials started to work on the issue of the Mediterranean.

After the speech Sarkozy made in Toulon, the French diplomats worked in details to improve the proposal. Sarkozy developed these details in the speech he made in Tangier on October 23, 2007, according to which only the coastal states of the Mediterranean would aim at “a political, economic and cultural union” (Emerson, 2008: 1). These countries would form a cooperative body with a rotating presidency to deal with topical issues such as energy, security, counter-terrorism, immigration and trade. The structured proposal that is given in the Tangier speech was different from the initial French proposal.

First, it seeks to amend some of the elements that are mostly criticized by countries of the southern rim, Brussels and the rest of the member states: it endorses the principle of ‘equality’ to avoid the colonialist-sounding connotations, it avoids the issue of immigration, it foresees participation by the European Commission and it presents the Mediterranean Union as a common project that does not seek to replace the EMP or the ENP. Secondly, it adds some

features that are general but do provide some specific points, albeit conceptual and not at the operational level: it proposes a Mediterranean Union that is pragmatic and with variable geometry, gives priority to sectors such as culture, education, justice and health (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 3-4).

It was asserted that France wanted regional cooperation based on five institutional initiatives with a highly symbolic content (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 4): a Mediterranean Investment Bank similar to the European Investment Bank; an environmental agency with the task of overseeing management of water resources; a nuclear energy agency; an exchange programme for university students along the lines of the Erasmus programme and designed to encourage cultural exchanges; and the creation of a shared audiovisual sector.

The proposal was intended to involve “those European partners that were seen as having direct interest in Mediterranean affairs because of their geographical position and historical commitment to the southern dimension of the EU’s relations with its neighbours” (Balfour, 2009: 100). The proposal was met with considerable skepticism. Turkey immediately rejected the idea that this might be interpreted as an alternative to Turkish membership of the European Union (Emerson, 2008: 1). Germany had expressed “the strongest opposition to the project” and was concerned that the project would exclude northern EU member states and might therefore lead to a division in the EU (Balfour, 2009: 100; Emerson, 2008: 2). The prosperous northern EU member states such as Britain had manifested their reservations and criticized the idea to fund a French-led Union in which they would not have a voice (Balfour, 2009: 100; Gillespie, 2008: 279). There was also criticism from the Mediterranean members of the EU. Yet Spain and Italy, even without explicitly turning down the project, were both concerned with its impact on the EU (Balfour, 2009: 100). Spain and Italy articulated their opposition on the Mediterranean “basis of the proposals and were concerned that France’s own interests might overshadow their own” (Gillespie, 2008: 279). Spain also feared that the Barcelona Process was being called into question (*ibid.*). The countries of the Southern Mediterranean were also left with many unanswered questions, such as whether the new Mediterranean Union would have an impact on the bilateral financial support given by the EU within the framework of the Barcelona Process and under the European Neighbourhood Policy (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 1). Emerson (2008: 1) argues that Sarkozy’s project would have implied marginalizing the EU’s major policy investments in the region (the EMP and the ENP). For Tasinnari (2008), “Sarkozy had

envisioned something that would do to the Mediterranean what Monnet and Schuman did to Europe in the 1950s”.²⁵⁰

Here that I wanted to issue to all the Mediterranean peoples the urgent, solemn appeal to unite around the finest and greatest of human ideals. I want to say that the time has come to put all their energies and their whole hearts into building the Mediterranean Union, since this region is absolutely crucial for world balance. (...) It is Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the civilizations and religions will wage the most terrible of wars. Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the North and South are going to clash, Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not terrorism and fundamentalism will succeed in imposing on the world their violence and intolerance. It's here that everything will be won or everything lost. (...) Since Europe's future – I have no hesitation in saying – is in the South. By turning its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral and spiritual sources, but also from its future. Since it's *in the Mediterranean that Europe will secure* its prosperity, ensure its security, that it will regain the momentum given it by its founding fathers. (...) I call on all those who can do so to join the Mediterranean Union because it will be the linchpin of Eurafrika, the great dream *capable of enthusing* the world. (emphasis added) (Sarkozy, 2007)

In Rome, on December 20, 2007, France, Italy and Spain adopted the “Appel de Rome”, “in which the French initiative was turned into a Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), excluding the possibility of their membership, but making room for some participation of the Commission and of non-Mediterranean EU countries willing to play a role in the area” (Aliboni, et. al, 2008: 5). Although, the Spanish, French and Italian prime minister “managed to achieve a commitment that the project would not jeopardize EU policies” (Balfour, 2009: 100), German Chancellor Merkel also vetoed this version of “strengthened cooperation” whereby only the southern EU countries were to be involved, though drawing on the EU budget for funding (Marchi, 2008: 3). Thereafter, at the March 3, 2008 meeting in Hanover between Merkel and Sarkozy, it was decided that “the EU members would not be divided into Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean, nor given different roles with respect to the Union for the Mediterranean” (Aliboni, et. al, 2008: 5). The eventual compromise presented to the European Council by France and Germany on March 13, 2008 transformed the Mediterranean Union/UfM into the “Project of Barcelona: Union for the Mediterranean” (Marchi, 2008: 1).

²⁵⁰ “Let's do what Europe's founding fathers did. Let's forge between us ever-closer practical solidarity on pragmatic projects which involve all our peoples' vital interests.” (Sarkozy, 2007)

The Union for the Mediterranean would involve all 27 member states and “set the priority of turning the Barcelona Process into full scale integration, resting on specific projects and linking the two shores of the Mediterranean” (ibid.).

The Brussels European Council of March 13-14, 2008 approved the principle of the establishment of a Union for the Mediterranean and invited the Commission to present proposals defining the modalities of that would be called “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” (European Commission, 2008: 2). According to the European Commission, the purpose of the renamed “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” is to make improvements to the framework of multilateral relations, to strengthen its working methods, to increase co-ownership of the process and to put greater emphasis on south-south regional cooperation. As the Commission (2008: 4) states:

It should build on and reinforce the successful elements of the existing Barcelona Process. Thus the Barcelona Declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain valid and its “three chapters of cooperation” (Political Dialogue, Economic Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, Social and Cultural Dialogue) will continue to constitute the backbone of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

In other words, the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, most of its goals and areas of cooperation remain valid and the structures created continue their work. The novel structures of the Union for the Mediterranean are biannual summits at head-of-state level, a co-presidency, a joint secretariat and a joint permanent committee made up of the partner countries’ representatives in Brussels.

4.4.2. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

The Euro-Mediterranean Summit that France held in Paris on 13-14 July 2008, took the formal decision to launch the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean and established its structure, functions and main goals. The July Paris Summit launched the UfM “with the objectives of providing new political impetus for the EUs critical relationship with its Mediterranean partners” (Dolghi et. al., 2009: 7). The Union for the Mediterranean is based on three simple but essential principles: “a political mobilization at the highest level through Summits of Heads of State and Government every two years; a governance on an

equal footing, in the form of a North-South co-presidency and a permanent secretariat with equal representation; and a prioritizing of concrete projects with a regional dimension that create de facto solidarity” (European Commission, 2008: 5-8). As defined in the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, “building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion” (Joint Declaration, 2008: 8). In the Joint Declaration, Heads of State and Government also reassert “the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries”, and they stress “the need for better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance and visibility for the citizens” (ibid.).

The Union for the Mediterranean encompasses all EU Member States and the European Commission, together with the other States (members and observers) of the Barcelona Process. The Arab League is to be invited to the meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, in pursuance of its participation in the Barcelona Process. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean also welcomes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro, which have accepted the acquis of the Barcelona Process. “Individual projects are to be open to participation by other willing countries as well” (Joint Declaration, 2008: 8).

The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean gives a new impulse to the EMP in at least three very important ways: “by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners; by providing further co-ownership to multilateral relations; and, by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region” (European Commission, 2008: 5; Joint Declaration, 2008: 13). Although it may be quite soon to make an assessment about the Union for the Mediterranean, one can assert that rather than renew or replace the substance of the EMP, as Gillespie (2008: 277) argues, “the outcome is likely to be the addition of a new track to the Barcelona Process”.

The heads of state and government decided to hold “biennial summits” (European Commission, 2008: 5; Joint Declaration, 2008: 13). The summit meetings should take place alternately in the EU and in Mediterranean partner countries (European Commission, 2008: 5;

Joint Declaration, 2008: 14). The host country should be selected by consensus (Joint Declaration, 2008: 14). All countries party to the initiative are to be invited to Summits, Ministerial and other plenary meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2008: 5; Joint Declaration, 2008: 14). The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly remains “the legitimate parliamentary expression” of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2008: 5; Joint Declaration, 2008: 14). The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, as a Euro-Mediterranean institution, is “to contribute in an effective manner to the cultural dimension of the initiative in cooperation with the UN Alliance of Civilizations” (Joint Declaration, 2008: 14).

Johansson-Nogues (2011: 22) argues that “as the UfM began to take shape, ‘co-ownership’ emerged as a distinctive feature of the new initiative”. As the Barcelona Process has generally accused of being excessively EU-oriented and depending on the Union’s structures and preferences, it is hoped that co-ownership innovation will entice SEMP’s “enough to turn them from ‘unhappy laggards’ into ‘low profile supporters’ of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation under its new guise and give relations a new boost” (ibid.). In this context, one may claim that co-ownership is presented as a remedy to the Euro-centric aspect of the EMP.

Heads of state and government also agreed on “the creation of a co-presidency in order to improve the balance and the joint ownership of their cooperation, and they also decided to establish a joint secretariat” (European Commission, 2008: 6; Joint Declaration, 2008: 14). Participation in the co-presidencies and the secretariat is open to all members. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU and the other from the Mediterranean partner countries (ibid.). They also agreed to establish a joint Secretariat, with a key role within the institutional architecture. The Secretariat is expected “to give a new impulse to this process in terms of identification, follow-up, promotion of the projects and the search for partners” (Joint Declaration, 2008: 15). The funding and implementation of projects are to be pursued on a case- by-case basis (ibid.). The Secretariat is supposed “to work in operational liaison with all structures of the process, including by preparing working documents for the decision-making bodies” (Joint Declaration, 2008: 15). The Secretariat would have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status (ibid.). A Joint Permanent Committee is created in Brussels to assist and to prepare the meetings of the Senior Officials and to ensure the

appropriate follow-up. It may also “act as a mechanism to react rapidly if an exceptional situation arises in the region that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners” (ibid.).

It is also decided by the heads of state and government “to mobilize additional funding for the Mediterranean, mainly through regional and sub-regional projects” (Joint Declaration, 2008: 17). It is believed that the capacity the of Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean “to attract more financial resources for regional projects” will constitute its “added value” mainly through the following sources, *inter alia*: private sector participation; contributions from the EU budget and all partners; “contributions from other countries” international financial institutions and regional entities; the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP); the ENPI Euro-Med envelope, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the cross-border cooperation instrument within the ENPI, as well as the other instruments applicable to the countries covered by the initiative, “for which the usual selection and procedural rules will continue to apply” (ibid.).

One may claim that the project dimension is another innovation and has a very important place in the Union for the Mediterranean. The projects that are developed under this initiative should intend “to promote regional cooperation and cohesion and design to have an immediate impact on the living conditions of the people of the Mediterranean area” (European Commission, 2008: 7-8). The Joint Declaration (2008: 19-20) lists the first “six pilot schemes” as: de-pollution of the Mediterranean; maritime and land highways; civil protection and disaster rescue cooperation; A Euro-Mediterranean University for higher education and research; creation of a Mediterranean Solar Plan for alternative energies; launching a Mediterranean Business Development Initiative for supporting the medium-small businesses.

On November 3-4, 2008, Foreign Ministers from the EU and the Mediterranean states came together and agreed on the institutional structures, the work programme for 2009, “the fields of cooperation to be pursued and the state of progress in the implementation of projects decided” (European Council, 2008: 12-25). One of the decisions taken at the Marseille meeting was to rename the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean as Union for the

Mediterranean” (European Council, 2008: 12-25). They also decided that the League of Arab States would participate in all meetings at all levels (European Council, 2008: 12-25).²⁵¹

It can be argued that the Paris Summit of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean added a renewed political momentum into Euro–Mediterranean relations. Gillespie (2008: 77) argues that “rather than renew or replace the substance of the EMP, the outcome is likely to be the addition of a new track to the Barcelona Process. Nonetheless, this could involve some qualitative change as well as new projects so long as new institutional arrangements remain on the agenda”. As mentioned before, the new initiative will focus on specific projects in areas such as energy, environment, and transports. Two rotating consul-like figures, one from Europe and one from a North African country will chair it. However, for Tassinari (2008), “it is more logical to imagine these personalities speaking for their respective constituencies than on behalf of the Mediterranean as a whole”. In this context, Tassinari (ibid.) claims that rather than indicating a new era of Mediterranean unity, the UfM “will at best provide substance to some sector-specific cooperation and counter Brussels’ centralizing tendencies”.

4.4.3. An assessment of the Union for the Mediterranean

Bicchi (2011: 219) claims that the Union for the Mediterranean signals “a new development in the Barcelona Process”. For Johansson-Nogues (2011: 35), the launch of the UfM is “supposed to mark a before and after in Euro-Mediterranean relations” and for the EU, the new institutional structure will enhance co-operation with the SEMP’s and “motivate a greater commitment from non-EU partners to UfM projects”. According to Aliboni and Ammor (2009: 13), the added values of the UFM to the EMP are “political significance and economic effectiveness”. The logic of the newly created UFM institutions (such as the addition of the Secretariat, co-presidency and top level meetings) can provide “equality in the cooperation between the EU and the non-EU partners”, “in a far more stringent way than was

²⁵¹ “In March 2010, the Barcelona Headquarters of the UfM’s Secretariat were inaugurated. The headquarters are housed in the emblematic Palacio de Pedralbes, once the Barcelona residence of the Spanish royal family. On the same day the first Secretary General of the Secretariat, Ahmad Masa’deh, was presented. Ahmad Masa’deh resigned in February 2011 and Dr. Lino Cardarelli was appointed interim Secretary General of the UfM Secretariat. A Euromed Local and Regional Assembly (ARLEM) and a Joint Assembly of EU and Mediterranean Civil Society have also been set up to support this initiative and have a voice in developments. Moreover, since the launch of the UfM, a number of meetings have been held on a ministerial level, to agree on policy priorities. At the same time, the Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM (PA-UfM) has continued to meet on a regular basis”. <http://www.enpi-info.eu/medportal/content/341/Union%20for%20the%20Mediterranean>.

the case of the EMP” (Aliboni and Ammor, 2009: 10). Johansson-Nogues (2011: 35) argues that the UfM can correct “the perceived EU bias in the Barcelona Process by introducing the notion of co-ownership” because the Barcelona Process is generally “accused of being an EU-centric exercise”.²⁵² Under the UfM framework, it seems that the EU is “no longer running a policy of its own”, and it has “to negotiate policies with its non-EU partners and also modify its own policies to account for the UfM” (Aliboni and Ammor, 2009: 10). Nevertheless, one may claim that although the UfM could not come into life as France envisaged, the UfM gives a new momentum to the Barcelona Process and one again, brings the Mediterranean region into the Union’s agenda.

Aliboni and Ammor (2009: 8) argue that under the Barcelona Process, “Euro-Mediterranean relations were developed under the umbrella of the EU”, whereas “these same relations will take place in a non-communitarian, inter-governmental framework” in the UfM. Moreover, as Bicchi (2011: 9) points out, in at least two ways, the UfM “represents a further step towards bilateralism and away from regionalism”: first, a key aim of UfM is “to promote projects among groups of willing countries, especially in geographically contiguous areas”; and second, “the increase in the number of participants further contributes to the dilution of regionalism” because if reaching a consensus in the EMP was difficult, with the member of over 40 members and the addition of three South-eastern European countries, the range of diverse interests increase and reaching a consensus is not going to be easy.²⁵³ One may claim that the UfM reinforces rather than replaces the EMP. One can see “the shift from a more regionalist to a more bilateral and intergovernmentalist approach”(Bicchi, 2011: 11) in the UfM.²⁵⁴ This bilateral framework provides European states an important leverage over the South and Eastern Mediterranean partners. Furthermore, Bicchi (2011: 3, 17) argues that “as national interests have come to the fore and democracy and human rights have receded”, and under the UfM framework “the dialogue on democracy and human rights is silenced”. According to Bicchi (ibid.: 14), “the UfM has marked the depoliticization of one of the very

²⁵² “The UfM promised to make a clean break with the past by introducing the notion of greater parity among all participant states” (Johansson-Nogues, 2011: 35).

²⁵³ “The institutional logics embedded in the new structure mark a further shift away from the region-building strategy of the EU, which characterized the EMP. As the emphasis falls on sub-regional projects and the participants’ number increases, the political project of creating a region in the area is diluted and political ambitions downsized”. (Bicchi, 2011: 16-17)

²⁵⁴ While the UfM de facto continues the EMP’s structures and its agenda, it has undermined its multilateral component in the way that the “substance of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is thus no longer bloc to bloc (EU-Med) as in the EMP, or bloc to single country (EU-single Med countries) as in the ENP, but single country to single country” (Bicchi, 2011: 10).

few progressive chapters in Euro-Mediterranean relations, namely human rights and democracy”. In this context, it can be asserted that the political project of constructing a Mediterranean region based on democracy and human rights has been largely abandoned at the expense of good governance, cooperation on financial and technical issues.

It can be argued that the original French project did not center on a Euro-Mediterranean region; it just involved countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. In this context, one can assert that this project was a regional one, and therefore, it can be considered as an actual region-building effort of an EU actor, namely France. Delgado (2011: 48, 54) further asserts that the Mediterranean Union project that was proposed in Sarkozy’s speeches “was very vague and idealistic”, it recalls “the civilizing mission of France”, and it seems as part of French plans for *Mare Nostrum*. French initiative can be regarded as a French quest for renewal of its hegemony in an area that it had dominated during colonial times.

However, as mentioned above, the Mediterranean Union as a project has gone through different stages, it has transformed from a French project of “Mediterranean Union” to a European-led policy of “Union for the Mediterranean”. This was also accompanied by a “transformation of the French role” (Delgado, 2011: 49). Although France put a lot of effort to become the leader in the project, as a result of German’s opposition, French diplomats have to adopt “a collaborative attitude while trying to maintain their status as *primus inter pares*” (ibid.). One way or another, one can claim that the Mediterranean is back on the European Union’s agenda.

As critics claim, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was not an actual partnership. According to Bechev and Nicolaidis (2008: 13):

Most of the talking was done by Brussels types, while the EU’s southern members, though ostensibly friendly towards their fellow Mediterraneans in North Africa and the Middle East, were far from generous when it came down to lifting barriers to agricultural produce or labour-intensive services. The high hopes for building a region of peace and economic prosperity fell hostage to the conflict in Palestine, reignited with the second Intifada, the Algerian-Moroccan rivalry exacerbated by the deadlock in Western Sahara, and [...].

Balfour (2009: 99) claims that although polluted, despite Sarkozy's reassurances to the contrary, "the vision of grandeur of the Mediterranean" organized the existing EU relations with its Southern neighbours around two main pillars: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established in 1995, and the European Neighbourhood Policy. She further argues that the UfM was "motivated by domestic politics and rooted in national foreign policy priorities"; it also "challenged the degree of political consensus, which had gradually been built within the EU around these two pillars" (Balfour, 2009: 99). Although "the plan was a product of Sarkozy's self-promotion and France's misplaced pursuit of grandeur and/or a revamped mission civilisatrice in the former colonial possessions"; it was diluted "due to intra-EU haggling" (Bechev and Nicolaidis, 2008: 17). In this context, one may assert that the UfM is based on the traditional agenda that aims at preserving the status quo in the Mediterranean area and prevents the Mediterranean problems to become European problems.

For Bicchi (2011: 5), the issues addressed in the multilateral discussion of the UfM "also continue to largely reflect the agenda of the EMP". But at this point it is important to remember that the multilateral character of the EMP has changed, under the UfM framework, relations will probably work between single country to single country, and therefore, the region-building approach of the EMP will be undermined. It is also argued that the UfM has some unintended consequences (Bechev and Nicolaidis, 2008: 17). For Balfour (2009: 105), "at best, the UfM simply adds a further layer of activities or strengthens aspects of existing ones; at worst, it could lead to the erosion of some of the conceptual underpinnings of the EMP and ENP without offering an alternative analysis of the problems in and with the region". As Delgado (2011: 14) points out, Sarkozy's plan was seen as "the return of a policy with more traditional and realist flavour". This may be seen as the ending of the normative policy that underpins EU relations with the Mediterranean under the framework of the EMP. In this context, although the French initiative is perceived as the neocolonial attempt of France, the revised version seems to be aware of the suspicions of its partners, and therefore, by being self-reflexive, it tries to legitimize itself in the eyes of SEMP. That is why the wording chosen in the key documents of the UfM, is different from the other Union's documents such as the ESS, the CMS and the ENP's key documents where the EU's interest is clearly emphasized. The terms such as "mutual interest", "interests of the people of the Euro-Med Region", and "interest of all parties" "common interest" have been contentiously

emphasized in the key documents of the UfM.²⁵⁵ The language that is used in the key documents of the UfM may signify the EU's attempt to justify its policies towards its southern neighbourhood and may be regarded as a revisit to the normative rhetoric of the Barcelona Process.

Concluding remarks

This chapter has argued that in the postcolonial era, the European Union's policies towards the Mediterranean have three main prongs: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Union for the Mediterranean. It is claimed that through these policies, in the postcolonial era, the EU presents itself as a model that needs to be followed. In this sense, one can see an imperial analogy behind these policies. One may argue that today the EU, like empires did, uses the tools of mimicry and want its neighbours to copy its norms and values regardless of their content. It can be claimed that despite the claim of normativity and formal equality, the Union's policies are mostly Euro-centric and based on a center-periphery approach where the relations between the EU and the SEMP are asymmetrical and the EU standing at the center and tries to discipline its periphery.

It is also affirmed that depending on the issue, the EU can act differently either as a normative power or a neocolonial power. Therefore, in each policy, one can realize the different approach of the Union to its Southern neighbourhood. For example, the Barcelona Process adopts a normative language and the EU's intention seems to be normative. However, in practice mainly due to the asymmetrical differences between the shores of the Mediterranean, the EMP becomes one-sided policy that the EU has voice. Even though the EMP stresses the notion of partnership, the theory does not come into in practice. Therefore, the EMP can be regarded as a neocolonial practice caught in a postcolonial discourse. Moreover, the EU uses the CMS and then ESS to deal with the Mediterranean. In both of the documents, one can clearly see the emphasis of EU-interest regarding the Mediterranean. One may consider the altering language of EU as a shift from the normative power Europe to a neocolonial Europe. On the other hand, imperial ideology behind the European Neighbourhood Policy, where the self-interest of the EU is more evident, can be seen. On the contrary to the normative basis of the EMP, the ENP is mostly an interest-driven policy and

²⁵⁵ For further information see European Commission (2008), European Council (2008) and Joint Declaration (2008).

security oriented policy, and thus, it can be regarded as neocolonial. In the Union for the Mediterranean, the Union tries to legitimize itself in the eyes of SEMP's. The UfM's language is different from the other Union's documents where the EU's interest is clearly emphasized. In this sense, one can assess this change as a return to the normative rhetoric of the EMP. However, as in the EMP's, in practice, as it forms a project-based policy, the normativity of the UfM has not been realized.

This chapter analyzes the EU's approach to the Mediterranean until 2011. The next chapter evaluates the impact of Arab uprisings and the implications for the EU relations with the SEMP's. The output of this study is also revealed and assessed in the final chapter.



5- EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY ON THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE CASE OF ARAB UPRISINGS: NORMATIVITY VERSUS NEOCOLONIALISM?

In the previous chapters, it is argued that in the postcolonial era, the EU tries to control its South and Eastern neighbourhood mainly by promoting its values. In this sense, the EU's Mediterranean policies can be considered as a new Western style of domination and a civilizing mission of the EU. The uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East have changed the EU's Southern neighbourhood and, therefore, challenged the EU's Mediterranean approach and caused the EU to revisit its policies towards the region. It can be claimed that the EU was not expecting such a change in its southern neighbourhood. Therefore, it seems that the EU was caught by surprise. The uprisings also challenged the Western perception that Arab culture was to some extent incompatible with democratic practice. As a response to uprisings, the EU initially adopted a wait-and-see approach towards the Arab uprisings, and then, it redefined its Mediterranean approach. This chapter is significant because it attempts to determine in the postcolonial era, whether the European Union approach to the Mediterranean is for gaining advantage and re-building the European hegemony over the South and Eastern Mediterranean partners or if it uses this role for creating an area of democracy and peace; stabilizing; and, helping the development of the region. This chapter reveals that the EU's approach to the Mediterranean after the uprisings, still carries the neocolonial tendencies of the EU's previous Mediterranean policies despite the revised Mediterranean approach's normative claims. The chapter also shows how the European Union promotes its own understanding of values and norms towards its southern neighbourhood regardless of the needs of their content.

The European foreign policy on the Mediterranean is evaluated in this chapter. In this context, in this chapter the output of this PhD is revealed and assessed through a reading of the EU's Mediterranean policy in the specific case of Arab uprisings. First, the nature of Arab uprisings and EU stance before the uprisings are evaluated. Second, the EU's response to the developments in the Southern Mediterranean countries is analyzed. Finally, the last section makes an assessment of the EU's Mediterranean approach, and it further reflects on whether the EU uses its Mediterranean policies to implement a normative agenda or to seek its self-interests in its southern neighbourhood in the postcolonial era.

5.1. Understanding the Arab Uprisings and EU stance before the uprisings

The EU is mainly pursuing an Orientalist approach in its policies regarding the Mediterranean. According to the Orientalist view, Arab people have been labeled as immune to the waves of democratization (Dalacoura, 2012: 71) and Arab exceptionalism was thought to “[stem]s from the assumption of a static Arab politics, whose authoritarianism is both persistent and resilient” (Korany and El-Mahdi, 2012: 8). This view reminds us of the European vision of a world that sees its “others” through a Eurocentric²⁵⁶ lens with neocolonial underpinnings.

On the other hand, Dabashi (2012) argues that Arab uprisings, in a way, challenged this Orientalist view and showed the world that Arab people are not immune to democracy and universal values. Noutcheva (2014:19) regards Arab uprisings as “a massive outcry against authoritarianism, while the protesters’ slogans calling for human dignity, equal opportunities and equality before the law sounded like a classical call for liberal democracy”. Pace (2014: 976) also argues that Europe’s southern neighbourhood has shown the world that they have a quest for democracy and they are “very ripe for democracy – but their own democracy, not that imposed from outside”. Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 128) further claim that “the Arab Awakening” has shown that “ordinary Arab citizens rose up against precisely those rigged neo-liberal reforms” imposed by Western organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, which they thought, caused “an even more unequal distribution of wealth in their countries”. For Dabashi (2012: xviii), “the revolutions are not driven by politics of replicating the ‘West’ - rather they are transcending it”.²⁵⁷

According to Beck and Hüser (2012, 4), the Arab uprisings can be “understood as a process of political change” in a region “where authoritarianism persisted unchallenged for decades”. For Eduard Soler i Lecha (2011), there is a growing consensus that the Arab

²⁵⁶ For detail analysis see: Bilgin, 2016.

²⁵⁷ On the other hand, Alessandri and Altınışık (2013: 5) warn us that the narrative which formed after the uprisings about “the end of the Arab exceptionalism”, is also “superficial” and is “Western-centric”. One may claim that with this narrative the West is once again, in a way, wants to shape the minds of Arab people and determines the nature of that uprisings in its own terms.

transformations are an open-ended process that, independently of its outcome, can be regarded as an event of global and historical significance. As Soler i Lecha (2011: 1) claims,

“The transformative wave in the Arab World has reached a point of no return, which will have major consequences for Western Mediterranean security and could alter cooperation dynamics among the countries of the region as well as with the transatlantic allies.”

During the uprisings, Arab people stood up against authoritarian rule and called for freedom, social justice and dignity. After the protests in Tunisia in December 2010, most of the Arab world entered into a transition and made constitutional reforms, which were supposed to bring democracy. It can be claimed that political change in the Arab world is an indefinite process that has ups and downs. The EU/Europe did not expect such intense and dynamic quest for freedom and democracy could occur in Arab countries that had been subjected to years of authoritarianism. As Martin and Arribas (2013: 70) stress, “the so-called Arab Spring has created a new political reality that has brought winds of democracy to the front line of politics”. Nevertheless, the EU did not have mainly other choices rather than facing this new reality of its southern neighbourhood. In the initial years of the uprisings Vasconcelos (2011) underlined this need as follows:

“It is time to put an end to the pervasive fear of democracy in North Africa that exists in Europe. There must be a break from the stagnant mindset whereby authoritarian, so-called secular regimes – however corrupt and oppressive – are seen as a bulwark against the radical Islamists. It is no longer tenable to view democracy as fostering stability in the Eastern neighbourhood but as a source of instability in the Southern neighbourhood”.

5.1.1. The “Arab Spring” vs the “Arab Uprisings”

There has been an intense debate on how to label the events that have been occurring in the Arab world since December 2010. The people around the world use different terms to describe the events. The term “Arab Spring” has gained much attention across the Western world. This study claims that in the postcolonial era, the Union presents its southern neighbourhood as uncivilized, unstable and weak; as an area that needs European help and guidance. The discourse that the EU uses for its southern neighbourhood, helps the EU to justify its policies. In this context, it can be claimed that the term “Arab Spring” has

Orientalist implications. The term, in a way, suggests that “all Arabs think and behave the same way” (Korany, 2012: 272-272). In a similar view, one may claim that by using the term “Arab Spring”, the West makes a generalization and disregard the different causes and dynamics behind the people’s efforts against their authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the term has been criticized for being simplistic.²⁵⁸ For example, Rami Khouri (2011) has argued that “Arab Spring” underemphasizes the agency of the protesters, therefore, he prefers to use the term “Arab revolution”, “revolution” (*thawra*, in Arabic) that the protesters themselves have most often used to define their collective activities. On the other hand, some authors (Meyersson et.al., 2011; Dalacoura, 2012) claim that in many countries “it is not clear that the events of 2011 have yet met the threshold of “revolution” in the way that many social scientists use the term” (Brynen et. al.. 2013: 11). Dalacoura (2012:63) claims that there had not been any “serial collapse of authoritarian regimes leading to a democratic future”, therefore, she considers the events in the Arab world as “uprisings” or “simply crisis”. Behr (2012c: 39) argues that portraying the events “as revolutions against the Arab world’s western-dominated postcolonial systems” is misleading because it provides an important role to the West in shaping “the outcome of most of the revolutionary uprisings”.

In order not to enter into a definitional debate, most of the authors use the terms “spring”, “revolutions”, “revolts” and “uprisings” almost interchangeably. Rather than employing of a single term, authors may prefer to use several terms (including “Arab Spring”) depending on preference and context (Brynen et. al., 2013). For Korany and El-Mahdi (2012: 1), although the term Arab Spring is controversial, it has been widely used to represent the events that affected the region deeply. Korany (2012: 272-273) claims that the term Arab Spring could be regarded as “simplistic” because it gives the false impression of sameness as if all the protests and contexts are exactly identical. The term has been popularized especially by the Western powers to symbolize “an urge for change and the beginning of a transition process – revolutionary or evolutionary” (ibid.: 273). On the other hand this can be read on postcolonial lines and it can be argued that Western powers acting according to their national interests (mainly economic and energy), as Dabashi (2012: 35) argues, they have expected that they could shape and control most of the Arab world within the climate of a “Spring”. By referring to the events in the region as “Arab Spring”, Western powers, in a way, downsized

²⁵⁸ This study uses the term “uprisings” in order to define the events in the Arab societies since 2011 because the term “Arab Spring” has Orientalist connotations.

the importance of the events in the Arab region and reformulated their policies in order to regain their control over the Arab world.

Nevertheless, there are also some analysts such as Dabashi (2012) who prefers to use the term “Arab Spring”. For him (2012: xviii), the term both marks the time of the year it begins and “metaphorically announces a season of hope, trust, fecundity, and rebirth”. Adib-Moghaddam (2011: 2) further claims that the “Arab revolts” can be regarded as a “spring but the nature of that spring needs to be determined by Arab societies and on their own watch”. Adib-Moghaddam (ibid.) reinforces this assertion by explaining that the Arabs were subjugated and colonized for years, and now they are “witnessing independence and transformation into a non-colonial order”. On the other hand, Dabashi (2012) argues that the term “Arab Spring” represents the end of postcolonial ideological formations in the Arab societies. Dabashi (2012: 15) regards the autocratic leaders such as Mubarak, Ben Ali and Gaddafi as the leaders of the postcolonial nations in the Mediterranean and therefore, according to him:

In the blossoming of the Arab Springs we are all liberated from that trapping map of our universe and reaching far beyond the very presumption of that coloniality. In place of that presumption, and the ideological formations of subservient knowledge that sustained the falsifying phantom of the ‘West’ in order to subjugate the liberating imagination of the ‘Rest’, we are finally witnessing the epistemic end of that violent autonormativity whereby ‘the West’ kept reinventing itself and all its inferior others.

This study does not share the views of Dabashi and Adib-Moghaddam that Arab uprisings signify end of postcolonialism. Although the uprisings may challenge the policies of Western powers regarding Arab people, have so far caused an uncertain transition period in the region and their consequences in the long-run are yet to be seen. It is argued that in the postcolonial era, the EU has exercised its “silent disciplining power” (Waeber, 2000; 1998a; 1998b; 1997; 1996) over its southern neighbourhood through conditionality, and asymmetrical relations. Adib-Moghaddam (2011: 3) argues that in the postcolonial era, the West established its hegemony over the Arab people and has tried to re-inscribe its policies that will make the Arab people dependent on the West. The Arab “intifada”, as he calls it, signals the end of dependency on the West (ibid). In this sense, Dabashi (2012: 252) regards Arab uprisings as an answer to the West’s new version of mission civilisatrice, which he

defines as exploitation of human rights and democracy discourses in order to dominate the Arab societies. Behr (2012a: 25; 2012b: 84-85) also claims that the Arab uprisings have been partly driven by the Arabs' desire for national autonomy and, moreover, they have demanded a break with the postcolonial policies of the Western world.

It can be claimed that there is an impression that the uprisings are made against the West. However, it is important to note that these uprisings are mainly made against the authoritarian regimes and the former colonial powers that cooperates with these regimes. In this sense, Arab uprisings can be seen as resistance of Arab people against their authoritarian rulers and as a call for freedom, democracy and justice. Although Western powers try to present these values as basic characteristics of Western civilization, these values do not solely belong to the West; it can be claimed that they are universal values. Moreover, the factors that prepare the grounds for Arab uprisings also stem from interest driven policies of the West. Therefore, Arab uprisings can also be regarded as resistance towards the neocolonial policies of the Western world.

5.1.2. The Political, Economic and Social Dynamics of the Arab Uprisings

Meyersson et.al., (2011: 7) argue that the Arab uprisings mark “a watershed event”, in which “the social contract between the ruling classes and their populations” has been changed. This contract required Arab populations would give up their rights such as freedom of speech and political activism to authoritarian regimes in exchange for a given level of living conditions (ibid.). On the other hand, Noutcheva (2014: 22) claims that even though she does not expect a “speedy transition to democracy”, the uprisings raise “hopes for democratic change in the Arab world previously seen as immune to democratic governance”. For MacKenzie, et.al., (2013: 138-139), “the precise endpoint and the direction of the Arab Spring revolutions remains to be identified” where the Arab world faces a period of social protest and change that challenges the dynamics of the region. It can be claimed that although the Arab uprisings raised hopes for democratic change in the EU's southern neighbourhood, they could not provide a complete democratic transformation.

Arab uprisings had different basis and outcomes and therefore, each uprising was dissimilar. On the other hand, Dalacoura (2012:63) claims that although the Arab world is not

a “unified entity”²⁵⁹, Arab societies also share some important common characteristics such as they have “exemplified the negative consequences of combining authoritarianism with market liberalization and privatization”. Del Sarto (2015: 224) also emphasizes the widening gap between the rich and poor in the Arab societies as a result of clientelism and rampant corruption as an important common feature. For Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 128) these reasons “remained hidden for a long time and that eventually drove so many young people, who were assumed to be de-politicized, to overcome their fear of the brutal and long-standing regimes and go out into the streets en masse to demand social justice, dignity and real freedom”. For Dabashi (2012: 238), the uprisings were “more socially based and economically predicated than simply politically driven and they [were] nonviolent”.

Wouters and Duguet (2013: 19) claim that the Arab uprisings “originated from a combination of an economic deficit, a political deficit, and a dignity deficit”. According to Dabashi (2012: 238), the uprisings were “predicated on the factual evidence of the economic malaise, social alienation, political corruption and cultural anomie”. Socio-economic deprivation, persistent and gross disparities in wealth, the longstanding structural problems that the Arab world suffered from, such as high unemployment, especially among youth (and mostly educated youth, widespread corruption, demographic growth, internal regional and social inequalities, poor governance standards, resource insecurities, and a further deterioration of economic conditions because of the global (especially European) 2008 financial crisis and related food price increases all played role in the Arab uprisings (Dalacoura, 2012: 66; Del Sato, 2015: 224; Grevi, 2013: 15; Hollis, 2015: 81). “An explosive mix of socio-economic problems and widespread and deepening political grievances” can be considered as common behind all the uprisings (Del Sarto, 2015: 224). For Del Sarto (ibid.), the Arab uprisings “debunked the myth of the automatic process by which economic liberalization would lead to democratic reforms”.

According to Dalacoura (2012: 67-68), the socio-economic grievances were “inextricably linked with and fuelled political demands”, and “the rebellions were a call for dignity and a reaction to being humiliated by arbitrary, unaccountable and increasingly

²⁵⁹ Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 135) contend: “What is equally relevant and interesting is that the Arab Spring did not occur across the entire Arab world and that, where it occurred, it still faces considerable obstacles before it succeeds in transforming authoritarian regimes into more accountable ones”.

predatory tyrannies”. Alessandri and Altınışık, (2013: 7) contend that with the “butterfly effect, the protests [...] spread and differentiated the region”. The Arab uprisings were a “revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests” (MacKenzie, et.al., 2013: 138). However, despite the success of some uprisings so far in Egypt, and Libya, in toppling down their authoritarian regimes; these revolutions have not led to a complete democratic transition of power with the recent exception of Tunisia. As in the cases of Morocco and Jordan, the ruling monarchs have also been forced to make moves in the direction of democracy, however, those monarchs have tried to do gestures rather than real reforms, which can be considered as top-down reforms.²⁶⁰ In Tunisia and Egypt, relatively peaceful revolutions have led to a toppling of the existing authoritarian regimes and a following bottom-up transition process; although the Egyptian transition ended with a coup d’etat. In Libya and Syria, “civil wars have set in motion national fragmentation processes and a loss of central control that represent a real threat to regional stability in the Sahel and the Levant” (Emerson, 2011:3) as has been evident in the emergence and rise of the Islamic state in Syria and its variants in Libya. Events in Algeria did not unite into a noteworthy movement for change. Lebanon, Iraq and the Occupied Palestinian Territories remained stuck “in their own webs of internal and geopolitical problems, which isolated them from developments in the Arab region” (Dalacoura, 2012: 66). Emerson (2011) has further argued that the changing regional situation has contributed to a collapse of the peace process of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

For Behr (2012a: 4), “balkanization” of Arab societies and conflicts in Syria and Libya cause “state weakness” in the Arab region. Arab society has become “increasingly fragmented” (ibid.).²⁶¹ Isaac (2013: 41-42) further argues that “the transitional ruling civic and military elites in these countries could be considered to a certain degree –particularly in what regards their foreign orientation – a continuation to their collapsed predecessors”. In this sense, it can be claimed that today the Arab world is more fragmented than ever. What is more, it should also be kept in mind that the Arab uprisings did not occur across the entire Arab world. The outcomes of the uprisings differ according the internal dynamics of each country and they have not succeeded to transform all the authoritarian regimes into more democratic and accountable ones.

²⁶⁰ For Dalacoura (2012: 66), the monarchs in Morocco and Jordan “diffused pressures by announcing reform measures”.

²⁶¹ Behr’s analysis of state weakness in the region may also indicate an Eurocentric/Orientalist view that this study does not share.

The Arab uprisings encompassed most of the Arab the region. The uprisings were not coordinated but they were not isolated like the “bread riots”²⁶² that took place in Egypt in 1977 and in the Maghreb in the 1980s. The uprisings were large-scale social movements that demanded change. Although it remains to be seen whether these uprisings will lead to democratic transformation in the long term, it seems that the region will not be the same any longer. At this point, it could be useful to have a look at the uprisings briefly.

The self-immolation of Muhammad Buazizi on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia has been the major event, which triggered the uprisings.²⁶³ Buazizi set himself on fire to protest the confiscation of his produce cart. The demonstrations that followed spread to neighbouring cities and when a general strike outspread on 14 January, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia (ICG, 2011a: 2-3). The uprisings in Tunisia also had political, economic and security implications for its neighbouring countries. Thus, the uprisings spilled over from Tunisia to Egypt after the overthrow of Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. In the demonstrations that took place in Cairo, on 25 January, around 20,000 participants gathered upon the calls from society and opposition. Protestors named the day as the “Day of Rage” and openly denounced the Mubarak regime (Dabashi, 2012: 19) and they chanted and waved placards that called for aish (bread), karama (dignity) and hurriya (freedom) (Lesch, 2012: 17). Protests spread in Cairo and throughout the country. On 29 January President Hosni Mubarak announced a new government. However, protesters were by then demanding Mubarak’s resignation (ICG, 2011b: 5). On 11 February Mubarak resigned and transferred his powers to the military (Ibid.:13). In the view of Dabashi (2012: 19), some of the Arab world learned from the fall of Ben Ali’s and Hosni Mubarek’s regimes.

Events in Tunisia and Egypt spread to the rest of the region. A few days after Mubarak’s fall, protests against Muammar Qadhafi broke out in Benghazi on 16 February. Although “the protests remained relatively small-scale” in the capital, Tripoli, they “quickly spread across the whole of the east and to some parts of the west” of Libya (ICG, 2011c: 1-3). On March, the UN Security Council legitimized a military intervention to protect the civilian population of Libya under the mandate of United Nations Security Council Resolution

²⁶² Bread riots refer to protests and civil unrest attributed to popular outrage against food shortages and high or rising prices of food.

²⁶³ For a detailed analysis of Arab uprisings, see Dabahshi, 2012: 17-40; Korany & Mahdi, 2012: 1-16.

(UNSCR) 1973 (2011). NATO took the command of military operations in Libya.²⁶⁴ By early September 2011, after months of “apparent deadlock and a war” (Dalacoura, 2012: 65), Qadhafi’s regime demolished and he was killed on 20 October.

On 5 February 2011, Syrians, following the Egyptians, declared a “Day of Rage”, using Twitter and Facebook. A massive uprising started in March in the southern city of Deraa. Bashar al-Assad’s regime responded harshly and its security forces killed demonstrators that initiated more protests and organizing counter-demonstrations (Dabashi, 2012: 22). Although Assad administration “sent out feelers to Islamist opinion leaders and some minority communities”, unrest continued to spread (Hinnebusch, 2012: 108). Assad’s political concessions were not regarded as enough and “reforms gave the impression of incompetence and division” (ICG, 2011d: 8). The Syrian government announced some measures that can be considered as “traditional attempts at appeasement and cooptation: giving pay increases to public employees, ceasing to enforce regulations, granting privileges to tribal, religious or communal notables” (Hinnebusch, 2012, 109). As Hinnebusch (ibid.) argues, “promises of limited political reform remained largely on paper” and Bashar al-Assad “refused to concede democratization as a legitimate way out of the crisis or to accept the opposition as a legitimate partner; instead, it continued with its unilateral top-down constitutional changes, which won it little credit”. For example, while on 21 April, the Syrian government formally declared the abolishment of the emergency law that had been in place since 1963 and that allowed the government sweeping authority to suspend constitutional rights, the same month the Syrian government sent tanks into cities where security forces opened fire on demonstrators (ICG, 2011d: 12-14). Syria’s ethnic divisions further complicate conflicts in Syria.

5.1.3. The EU stance before the Arab Uprisings

Del Sarto (2015: 222) claims that the Arab uprisings were popular revolts against the political and economic order existing in the region. The EU had supported that same order by “co-opting authoritarian regimes while pushing for economic reforms under the neo-liberal banner” (Del Sarto, 2015: 223-224). According to Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 130), there are three key European assumptions about the politics of the Arab world and “can also partly

²⁶⁴ The military intervention against Libya showed the disagreements between the EU member states. The different stances that the member states took are analyzed in the next section.

explain the West's failure to deal with the Arab uprisings coherently": First, there has been an "inherent belief" that economic development would bring political change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)²⁶⁵; second, there has been the Eurocentric/Orientalist view that "the Arab world has somehow missed its rendezvous with modernity"; third, the West has believed that the potential alternative to authoritarian rule in the region was the Islamist parties, whose "democratic credentials" the West was suspicious about. In this sense, the EU has been criticized for its support for authoritarian regimes "as protection against the potential instability if Islamic extremist gained power" and for not challenging the established authoritarian regimes (Freyburg, 2012: 560) before the Arab uprisings. In this sense, the EU has been criticized for having valued short-term political stability over long-term democratization in an attempt to protect its interests in its Southern neighbourhood.²⁶⁶

Behr (2012b: 77) further claims that the EU "had long forgone its ambitions to foster change in its southern neighbourhood".²⁶⁷ As Hollis (2012: 81) argues, "while declaring its commitment to promoting human rights and democracy, by its actions the EU has favoured regimes and practices that ultimately proved intolerable to a broad stratum of Arab society". Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011: 948) similarly claim that the EU's promotion of democracy and human rights in its southern periphery were "thus not only seriously flawed but also counterproductive, as they signal[ed] to autocratic governments that they [could] get away with repressive policies and the infinite postponement of democratic reforms". In this regard, the EU has also prioritized security and economic development at the expense of political reforms.²⁶⁸ As Behr (2012a: 3) argues, the Arab uprisings show the failure of the "EU's neo-

²⁶⁵ "It is often argued that processes of political liberalization and democratization have served to bring about peaceful co-existence within Europe and that these successful processes can be emulated elsewhere" (Pace, 2010: 611). In other words, the neoliberal model of development.

²⁶⁶ For detail analysis see: Behr, 2012a:2012b; Del Sarto, 2015; Isa an Nogal, 2016; Lehne, 2014.

²⁶⁷ For example, "Egypt's rigged parliamentary elections in November 2010 were a case in point. Although the elections were anything but free and fair and there had been reported numerous cases of voter buying and ballot stuffing, the EU decided to turn a blind eye. Given Egypt's role as the Co-President of its already ailing Union for the Mediterranean and Mubarak's importance as a partner for the EU in the Middle East peace process, political realism prevailed" (Behr, 2012b: 77).

²⁶⁸ Del Sarto's (2015: 224) following remarks on the EU's approach to individual Arab countries testifies to this argument: "Indeed, notwithstanding its grim human rights record, Tunisia under Ben Ali was the model student of market reforms. While also co-operating with the security services of some Member States in the fight against terrorism, Tunis became a major beneficiary of EU funds. Similarly, Libya under Qaddafi, although not interested in EU trade agreements, co-operated in the prevention of unwanted migration to Europe. In return, it obtained substantial financial support and technical assistance, which also increased the country's leverage over the EU and its members. Morocco, for decades heralded in Brussels and other European capitals as an example of democratization in respect of tradition, also followed the path of economic reforms, albeit without seriously democratizing. As the largest recipient of EU funds among MENA states, Brussels rewarded Morocco, together with reform-resistant Jordan, with 'advanced status'. Egypt similarly showed remarkable economic growth. However, in the absence of meaningful political reforms, its process of economic liberalization led to the

liberal development approach” for its Southern neighbourhood. This is because, although Egypt and Tunisia were considered as economic tigers of the Mediterranean, “high unemployment, growing inequality and faltering education systems” opened the way for the uprisings in these countries (ibid.)

According to Wouters and Duguet, (2013: 28), “cultural understanding, poverty reduction, the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and human rights have been present in EU discourse on the region, but a yawning gap existed between theory and practice”. For Hollis (2012: 83), the EU Mediterranean policies, especially the EMP, can be regarded as a “bold initiative” which promised “to turn the Mediterranean into a shared geopolitical, strategic and economic space” and through this the EU aimed “to address some of the very problems that in the end led to the Arab revolts”. However, these policies “cemented the political status quo and reinforced the EU’s ever growing dependency on Arab dictators”(Behr, 2012: 78). For Behr (ibid.) these policies, instead of promoting change, “provided autocratic Arab regimes with valuable additional support”. One can argue that EU’s stance before the uprisings did not promote democracy, prosperity and peace in the region. The EU’s support of status quo in the Mediterranean in the postcolonial era helped the ruling autocrats to preserve their authority.

It can be claimed that EU’s approach to the Mediterranean is mainly based on EU’s self interest. In its southern neighbourhood, the EU has so far pursued policies with a similar effect to the *mission civilisatrice* of colonial times. It has aimed to construct a common vision for the Mediterranean region based on an imposition of European norms and values. But more importantly, the Union has sought to stabilize the region in order to stop the Mediterranean problems from becoming European problems. Hollis (2012: 94) claims that EU policies did help “to trigger the Arab revolts, but by default rather than design” and that EU policies have “betrayed the professed European values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law rather than exporting them” as “they have prioritized European prosperity and stability at the expense of both in the Arab world”. In other words, before the uprisings, the EU turned a blind-eye on violations of political freedoms and human rights of the peoples in the region and, for preserving stability, in a way, it implicitly supported the authoritarian regimes. Thus,

emergence of new economic elites, linked to political power through a complex patronage system”. Behr (2012b: 77) also points to this contending: “By early 2011, the EU was in the process of forging a closer relationship with Qaddafi’s Libya, which had refused the EU’s advances for many years, and had initiated so-called advanced status talks with Ben Ali’s Tunisia, after laying aside years of human rights disputes”.

Wouters and Duguet (2015: 39) argue that the EU cannot take credit for the democratisation processes in the Arab region despite its rhetoric promotion of human rights and democracy. For Bicchi and Voltolini (2013:80), “it is impossible to claim any direct effect of the EU policy on them”. On the other hand, the Arab uprisings brought new challenges and concerns for the Union to deal with.

5.2. The EU’s Response to the Arab Uprisings

EU’s concerns about its Southern neighbourhood have not faded away after the Arab uprisings. Rather, they persist even more severely after the uprisings. Hence, these concerns seem to form the basis for the EU’s review of the ENP. Although the overthrow of dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya initially generated hopes for sustainable processes of democratization; authoritarian tendencies reemerged right after the uprisings. Moreover, civil wars and economic depression in the region strengthened the EU’s fears of instability and insecurity. As Schumacher (2015: 382) pinpoints; after the uprisings, the Europeans feared that Europe would be exposed to negative spillovers arising from “turbulent or failing transitions” of Arab countries.

It can be claimed that the EU has basically three major concerns after the Arab uprisings that need to be dealt with: the flows of illegal migrants and refugees; increased energy concerns; and finally the rise of political Islam. The EU has concerns about migration flows from the neighbourhood, both before and after 2011. Immigration has been portrayed as a threat to the security of European citizens because it was believed that through immigration not only people, but also the problems, which were associated with the South and Eastern Mediterranean societies could enter into the European Union. In this sense, ensuring stability and reducing immigration in its South and Eastern neighbourhood has played a vital role in designing Mediterranean policies of the Union. The Arab uprisings in 2011 “have induced significant population movements” in the Mediterranean and created “highly complex and heterogeneous migratory tendencies” (Seeberg, 2013: 157). Therefore, the EU’s immediate response to the post-Arab uprisings migration influx was holding “a defensive stance” against the Arab uprisings and to “push for tightening migration controls” (Isaac, 2013: 50) “through the involvement of the EU border agency Frontex; putting pressure on the new governments in North Africa to contain illegal immigration at the source”; and providing “humanitarian assistance to resolve the refugee crisis in the region itself” (Noutcheva, 2014: 25).

As Bauer (2013: 14) emphasizes, “securing access” to the region’s energy sources and “keeping their prices stable has always been considered as a crucial” concern of the EU. Europeans faced also with a “scarcity of natural resources, attaches great importance to securing its energy supplies in the Mediterranean” (ibid.). The high level of dependence of Southern European countries on North African energy resources is essential to explain the nature of the Euro-Mediterranean relations (Santori, 2014: 2). In this context, energy security for the EU can be regarded as sustained oil and natural gas supply at reasonable prices. The EU feared a potential spread of Arab revolts to Algeria or even to the Gulf due to the fact that any disorder in the production of oil and gas or instability in their prices would seriously affect the EU’s economy. In this sense, one can claim that the political changes in the region may represent a significant challenge for the EU. Therefore, during the earlier stages of Libyan crisis 2011, some of the EU member states such as France and the UK made a cost-benefit analysis and remained relatively silent in order to prevent a sharp increase in the energy prices. They decided to intervene later when they gained some energy benefits from the opposition in the country.

The increasing popularity of political Islam has also presented a problem for the EU. For Behr (2012a: 4), Europeans think that Islamic groups may pursue policies that can “clash with EU values and policies” on issues such as gender equality, religious freedom and free speech and pursue “a foreign policy that is sometimes at odds with the EU”. Isaac (2013: 52) claims that although “well-educated Arab youth, who are mostly secular and identify themselves with the universal values of democracy, governance, and human rights” were behind the Arab uprisings, “lacking organization and experience, youth forces were rapidly fragmented and appeared too fragile to challenge the well-organized Islamists”. In this sense, for Isaac (2011: 18), Arab uprisings “turned out to be a Islamic winter”. For a while after the Arab uprisings, it seemed possible that Islamist groups could dominate much of the political space in the region and could fill the gap left by the ruling monarchs. The EU has feared that the Islamist groups would hinder liberal democratization in the region. Moreover, most Europeans have thought that some of the policies of Islamist groups were incompatible with the norms and values of the Union, and therefore, the EU could face more difficulties in imposing its *mission civilisatrice* towards its southern neighbourhood.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁹ For similar view see: Tocci and Cassarino, 2011

It can be claimed that after the Arab uprisings, the EU's concerns towards the region has not changed. Issues that are considered as a threat to European interests are still immigration, and Islamic fundamentalism. Furthermore, the European Union still attaches great importance to securing its energy supplies in the Mediterranean. These concerns provide a basis for the EU to form its policies toward the region. The Arab uprisings demonstrated the limits of the EU's projection of its values and norms in the region and showed the need for a review of existing EU policies. In this sense, the uprisings in the Arab region made the EU to revisit its Mediterranean approach although such reconsideration did not resonate with significant policy change.

5.2.1. The EU's initial response to Arab uprisings

The Arab uprisings occurred suddenly. However, "reactions in Europe were initially slow and reluctant, in sharp contrast with the attention they subsequently received" (Wouters and Duguet, 2013: 19). One may claim that the Arab uprisings have resulted in new lines of conflict in the southern neighbourhood and created new challenges to European foreign policy. Noutcheva (2014: 25) claims that on the one hand, the Libya case has shown the EU's inaction, on the other hand, in Syria, "the EU has struggled to respond in a coherent and adequate way to the escalating civil war, ultimately adopting a comprehensive sanctions regime, but failing to take more decisive action to halt the bloodshed". One can claim that the EU was caught off guard by the uprisings, mainly embraced a wait-and-see approach and failed to deal with them. As Jünemann (2012:1) pinpoints, the EU was caught off guard by the uprisings because it believed that "Arab autocracies were 'extremely stable'". For Johansson-Nogues (2013: 85), the EU did not expect the uprisings in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and elsewhere because it believed that the Arab culture was to some extent incompatible with democratic practices.

Dalacoura (2012:77) argues that the uprisings have had a "multifaceted impact on" the member states' interests and policies in the region, and the member states have reacted in "diverse ways" to the events. Wouters and Duguet (2013: 26) evaluate the actions of the EU and various Member States as "European reluctance and indecisiveness". As Johansson-Nogues (2013: 90) claims, "it was just after the toppling of the authoritarian leaders that the EU reacted with a renewed approach, while its attitude remained closer to the status quo in

those cases where the protests did not bring a real change”, such as in Jordan and Morocco. The EU announced its full support to democratic reforms in the region when the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions succeeded in overthrowing the dictators (although the Egyptian revolution resulted in a coup d’etat in the end. For Isaac (2013: 42), the initial EU reaction “was slow and hesitant, cautiously trying to figure out where the public revolts were going with Europe’s best autocratic friends”. With a similar argument, Behr (2012b: 78) contends:

The EU’s initial reaction to the Arab Spring uprisings needs to be understood as a combination of the EU’s long term preference for regional stability and its more short term institutional shortcomings and divisions in this context. Inevitably, the resulting EU policy was both cautious and confusing.

Member states’ special ties and interests in the Arab countries can explain the lack of consensus among European capitals on how to react to various events in the region. The EU Member States had (they still have) special ties with the Arab countries and they sought to pursue their own national interests when reacting to the Arab uprisings.²⁷⁰ Isaac (2013: 44) claims that these special ties and interests can explain “much of the initial confusion and discord” in the EU. For example, Britain and France intervened in Libya only when the opposition promised energy benefits and for these benefits Sarkozy and Cameron even visited Libya.

The Tunisian case is an important example to see both the EU’s initial hesitance and the Member States’ national interest-driven policies regarding the uprisings. In the case of Tunisia, after a few days of confusion, the EU started to support the protests and demonstrations. Upon the uprisings in the country, the EU “was called upon to actively support democratic transition in Tunisia” and “radically change its policy of supporting the *status quo* in the Southern Mediterranean” (Vasconcelos, 2011:3). However, two incidents damaged the EU’s credibility: First, in order to deal with the Tunisian influx, France and Italy “called for a temporary suspension of Schengen and pressed the EU to review the Schengen treaty”. (Isaac, 2013: 43) Second, when it was “revealed” that French Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie spoke to Ben Ali while she was on vacation in Tunisia during anti-government protests in December, and flew twice on a jet owned by one of Ben Ali’s close

²⁷⁰ For a similar argument, see Hillion (2013: 16) who argues that the member states want to pursue their own agenda towards the Southern Mediterranean, particularly in the context of the Arab uprisings.

friends also “reated suspicions on French government’s claim to be supporting the revolution in Tunisia” (ibid.). Dalacoura (2012: 77) regards France’s “initial support” for Ben Ali as a “*faux pas*”.

In the case of Egypt, “Europe was particularly hesitant in explicitly siding with public protests” (Isaac, 2013: 44). Initial EU statements did not demand the removal of Mubarak; “rather they called on the Mubarak regime to stop violence against peaceful protesters and to undertake necessary reforms” (Bauer, 2013: 10). Even, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (2011) celebrated Mubarak on February 4, saying: “I hope that in Egypt there can be a transition toward a more democratic system without a break from President Mubarak, who in the West, above all in the United States, is considered the wisest of men and a precise reference point”.

In the case of Libya, “disagreements on how to react undermined the actual existence of a Common European Foreign and Security Policy” (Dalacoura, 2012:75). On the one hand, Britain and France were enthusiastic for intervention. In this sense, they tried to push the international community for intervening militarily to protect Libyan civilians. On the other hand, “Germany strongly opposed and even removed its ships from a naval blockade in the Mediterranean and pulled its crew out of NATO support aircraft” (ibid.). Italy, a country that has “economic ties with Libya and a number of agreements aiming at controlling the flow of illegal migration with the ex-Gaddafi regime, considered the loss of Gaddafi as catastrophic” (ibid.). Italy initially opposed intervention and according to Isaac (2013: 45), preferred the adoption of a “cautious stance”. A few weeks later, Britain, France and Italy became the part of NATO’s military intervention in Libya. Especially, Britain and France conducted and directed the operation.

In the case of Syria, the response has been more uncertain. The web of historical, political and economic relations, which ties it to Europe, and its sensitive geopolitical position, in Dalacoura’s (2012: 77) words, “ma[d]e al-Assad less expendable than Qadhafi”. As Isaac (2013: 46) points, “the EU continued its already initiated policy aiming at isolating the Assad regime through increased sanctions”. The Syrian case was the only one on which the member states more or less had the same stance. However, they all refrained from outright military intervention. As one can see, the EU’s special ties with the Arab countries challenged

the Union to take a consistent and coherent stance towards its neighbourhood. In this sense, the EU evaluated each uprising separately and practiced different acts.

For Dabashi (2012: 24), the changes in the Arab countries had the potential to “challenge the EU’s attempt to dominate the Mediterranean basin”. The EU declared that its neighborhood policy in the Southern Mediterranean should be essentially altered after Mubarak stepped down and before the start of public revolts in Libya. The Arab uprisings undermined the paradigm of stability that had long been the basis of EU policies and caused the EU to revisit its policies towards the region. With two texts, the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” (PfDSP) and the review of the ENP in the framework of “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” (NRCN), the EU tried to revisit its Mediterranean approach and to solve inconsistencies of its previous approach.

5.2.2. The EU’s “New” Approach to the Mediterranean and the Revised ENP

One may assert that changes in the Arab countries have deeply affected Euro Mediterranean relations, which have made the EU policy makers reconsider the Union’s approach and to design inclusive policies regarding the Arab world. According to Bauer (2013: 6), Arab uprisings have questioned authoritarianism and societal problems that could constitute risks for the Arab society and the EU as well, however, in this context, the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings fell short of directly addressing the changing environment in the Mediterranean, rather, it has emphasized “democracy and civil society but it has not taken up the potential risk discourses”.²⁷¹ The declarations made by EU officials after the Arab uprisings, demonstrate that the EU acknowledged its mistakes in its previous policies. The EU admitted that for preserving stability, the EU did not take the necessary steps to support the values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the region. The EU was making self-critique of itself, and it seemed that from then, the Union would design more reflexive and inclusive policies regarding the region.

²⁷¹ Bauer (2013: 1) further concluded that “concerning violent conflicts, the EU as a community is not at all active in the region but leaves this field to its member states, NATO, the Arab League, and the United Nations” (Bauer, 2013: 1)

In 2011, the EU responded to the political uprisings “with a striking *mea culpa*” (Burke, 2013: 1). In a speech to the European Parliament, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle (2011), admitted:

“First, we must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even *realpolitik*. It was, at best, short-termism – and the kind of short-termism that makes the long term ever more difficult to build”.

Commission President José Manuel Barroso (2011) also argued: “I think it is our duty to say to the Arab peoples that we are on their side! From Brussels I want to say this particularly to the young Arabs that are now fighting for freedom and democracy: We are on your side”. The EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Affairs, Catherine Ashton, promised that the EU would support democracy more forcefully across the region and declared: “[O]ur response (...) is built on the need to acknowledge past mistakes and listen without imposing. We are doing exactly that and it requires perseverance and sustained commitment. Success should translate into what I have called ‘deep democracy’” (Ashton, 2011). In her speech (*ibid*), she announced a threefold response by the EU to the developments in North Africa: “deep democracy”, “economic development” and “renewed people-to-people contacts”, which could create “sustainable stability” in the Mediterranean. This threefold response, in a sense, formed the core of the renewed ENP.

In this threefold approach, first, the EU sought to support transition towards deep democracy amongst the southern partner countries. According to the EU, the establishment of deep democracy “requires not only regular elections, but also demands a broader set of preconditions, such as freedom of association and expression, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and democratic control over security forces” (European Commission 2011b: 3). Second, the EU pledged “to build people partnerships that would focus on civil society cooperation and development as an essential part of this process” (*ibid.*). “Fostering pluralistic and inclusive civil societies” is therefore considered to be a central priority for the new ENP (*ibid.*: 4). Finally, the EU sought “to promote inclusive growth and development amongst its partner countries, which had been suffering from high levels of unemployment and inequality. Sustainable development and socio-economic equality are seen as key ingredients in order to

foster open societies and create deep democracies” (European Commission 2011b: 6). One may assert this threefold approach as continuity in neo-liberal policies of the Union. In this approach, it was believed that political change would foster economic development in the region. It can be claimed that after the Arab uprisings, the EU was still trying to promote its norms and values in order to create stability in the region which would mainly serve its own interests.

Shaped by these principles, “the EU’s strategic response to the momentous changes in the southern neighbourhood” (Noutcheva, 2014: 20) came with the launch of the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” on March 8, 2011 (European Commission 2011a). For (Isaac, 2013: 46), this new initiative was “criticized for being significantly under-funded and hastily adopted without adequate study of the situation”. Maybe as a response to those criticisms, it was followed by a strategic review of the European Neighbourhood Policy namely “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood of May 25, 2011 (European Commission 2011b). With the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, the High Representative and the Commission expressed support for the peoples of the southern neighbourhood who took to the streets with “the demand for political participation, dignity, freedom and employment opportunities” (2011a: 2). Partnership would be “built on three elements: democratic transformation and institution-building; a stronger partnership with people; and sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development” (ibid.).²⁷²

The review of the ENP was mainly launched in reaction to the Arab uprisings. The EU realized that its neighbourhood policy had clearly not led to a ring of well governed countries, “ring of friends”, around its borders as hoped for when it was first launched in 2004. The review of ENP was initiated when the EU recognized what happens in the neighbourhood can have a direct and major impact on the EU. An unstable neighbourhood challenged the EU to develop new policies regarding its neighbourhood. However, the question remains whether the review of ENP is equipped to deal with its changing neighbourhood.

²⁷² As Schumacher (2011: 110) claims, “the partnership is centered around a renewed emphasis on democratic transformation and institution-building”, envisages targeted people-to-people contact, and focuses on urban and rural economic development underpinned by an improvement in educational and health systems. Further areas of engagement are fundamental freedoms, constitutional reform, reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption”.

In the ENP review, the “deep democracy” concept mainly consists of the explicit inclusion of civil society. In addition, as Bauer (2013:7) points out, the “more-for-more” or “extended positive conditionality offers a clarification of the former ENP approach”. Differentiation, conditionality and partnership between European and Mediterranean societies were defined as the main themes to constitute the basis of the new ENP (European Commission, 2011a: 3). In this document, the Commission and the HR did not only admit the previous failures of the EU’s approach to its neighbouring states but also committed to “greater flexibility and more tailored responses in dealing with rapidly evolving partners and reform needs – whether they are experiencing fast regime change or a prolonged process of reform and democratic consolidation” (European Commission, 2011b: 1). The EU promised to respond to the situation in the region in a “more focused, innovative and ambitious” way, “addressing the needs of the people and the realities on the ground” (European Commission, 2011a: 5). As Lehne (2014:11) argues, the new policy put “stronger emphasis on building deep and sustainable democracy” and “reformulated EU conditionality in the form of the more for more principle, which promised closer partnership and more incentives for countries that made progress on reforms”.

The “more for more” principle was presented as the main innovation of the new ENP. The principle presupposed that countries of the region that went further and faster with the reforms would be able to receive greater support from the EU, based on greater differentiation. Simultaneously, it was mentioned that “support [could] be relocated or refocused for those who stall[ed] or retrench[ed] on agenda reform plans” (European Commission, 2011a: 5). This approach has been sometimes referred to as a “less-for-less” policy, aimed at “punishing democracy laggards” (Behr, 2012b: 82). “A commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections” was defined as the major requirement for the Partnership (European Commission, 2011a: 5). In this sense, the EU stipulated its commitment to the political reforms of the neighbourhood through: supporting “deep democracy”, “establishment of which requires free and fair elections, freedom of association, expression and assembly, free press and media, the rule of law, fight against corruption, security and law enforcement reforms; strengthening partnerships with the civil society; and intensifying political and security cooperation” (European Commission, 2011b: 1).

The new ENP introduced three types of rewards the partner countries could count on, if they embarked on a successful democratization journey: mobility, money, and markets,

often referred to as the 3Ms. To manage the movement of persons between the EU and the MENA, the document envisaged Mobility Partnerships, and promised to enhance mobility for particular groups such as students, researchers and business people. What is more, the Communication recognized the need to overcome economic difficulties as one of the major conditions for improving the democratic situation in the region. The EU showed particular concern over the development of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), which were meant to play an essential role in job creation (European Commission, 2011a: 7). After the Arab uprisings, the EU has “championed” (Noutcheva, 2014: 26) the concept of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs)²⁷³ which were designed before the uprisings, mainly pursue the EU’s and its Member States’ trade interests while offering incentives to Arab partners (as well as the Eastern partners of the ENP) which were mainly ruled by authoritarian regimes back then. The DCFTAs were seen as a model for wealth generation in the southern neighbourhood. While the Association Agreements will remain in place for those countries, which are unwilling to reform (Balfour, 2012a: 21), the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas will be offered for the countries demonstrating commitment to the implementation of democratic and economic reforms.

If one analyzes DCFTAs, he/she can see the continuity of the Mediterranean policies of the Union. The DCFTAs can be regarded as a new version of Barcelona Process’ goal of establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. Once again, the EU is trying to impose its own integration model to its neighbourhood. The neighbourhood countries are expected to adopt the EU’s integration model and its neo-liberal policies without questioning them. The Union’s support for regional cooperation can be viewed as the EU’s quest to reproduce itself in its relations with its neighbours which is a characteristic of empires. As Del Sarto (2015: 226) points, “regulatory convergence” characterizes the new ENP; for instance, the DCFTAs are based on the EU’s *acquis communautaire*, “requiring an even more rigorous adoption of EU rules by MENA states”. With the conclusion of the DCFTAs, the EU aimed at a better competitive position of the Union and the Mediterranean countries in the world through the “highest possible degree” of Euro-Med liberalisation of goods, services and capital (Pieters, 2013: 96). However, the EU’s purpose of the DCFTA changed ever since the EU has fallen into an economic and financial crisis (Pieters, 2013: 96-97). “What is more

²⁷³ A DCFTA is “the long-term incentive on offer by the EU”, an upgrade compared to the Free Trade Areas”, which constitute “the ultimate aim of the Association Agreements set in motion with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (Balfour, 2012b: 21).

debatable with regard to the DCFTA formula is its potential to generate economic growth in the neighbourhood in the short run” (Noutcheva, 2014: 26).²⁷⁴

Together with the revision of the already existing policy, the EU managed to offer a new support package for the Mediterranean, with the programme “Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth” (SPRING). The flagship initiative with the budget of EUR 350 million, adopted on September 26, 2011, was designed to provide individually tailored support to the southern neighbourhood countries in the spheres of democratic transformation, institution building and economic growth (European Commission, 2011b: 2). However, as Behr (2012b: 84) argues, the programme was very unlikely to have a noticeable impact on the region since its budget was very modest. One may claim that this support package can be considered as a neocolonialist tool of the Union if it is not used for normative purposes such as supporting the partners’ progress in democratization, rule of law, and human rights. On the other hand, if this support package is mainly used in order to control the problems that stem from southern neighbourhood countries and to reinforce the asymmetrical interdependence between the EU and the SEMP, the Union could be labeled as neocolonial. In this sense, one may argue that the critical issue with the SPRING is for what purposes the EU is using it, not the amount of its budget.

Civil society was also identified as an indispensable requirement for the reformation of the Mediterranean.²⁷⁵ To intensify the ways of promoting “deep democracy” in its vicinity, the EU also devised two new tools: the Civil Society Facility (CSF) and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). The CSF is aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil society (both in the East and in the South) to promote reform and increase public accountability in the neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011b: 2). The EED is also established in order to support the political parties and non-registered NGOs or trade unions and other social partners that are seeking for democratic change in the neighbourhood countries (European Commission, 2011b: 4). Initially, it was also believed that this Endowment would bring greater influence and consistency to the efforts of the EU (ibid). For

²⁷⁴ “First estimates of the DCFTAs suggest that they result in a very costly regulatory convergence for the neighbours in the short term, and while countries from the eastern neighbourhood may have an implicit incentive to adopt the EU acquis in the hope of acceding to the EU one day, the Mediterranean neighbours have no such prospect, not even in theory. The euro crisis has in the meantime shaken the image of the EU as an economic model worthy of emulation for the sake of its superior economic results” (Noutcheva: 2014: 26).

²⁷⁵ The Communication states that “a thriving civil society can help uphold human rights and contribute to democracy building and good governance, playing an important role in checking government excesses” (European Commission, 2011a: 5-6).

Behr and Siitonen (2013: 22), the EED had “an explicit aim of promoting deep and sustainable change” in neighbourhood societies.

There are different views regarding the CSF and EED. On the one hand, Balfour (2012b: 11-12) claims that these new tools represent an important shift “towards a more vigorous support of civil society”, and, “the branching out towards understanding forgotten, marginalised or new political actors in the region all represent a departure from paying lip service to the previous regimes’ justification of its repression”. Noutcheva (2014: 24) emphasizes that these tools symbolize “a clear departure from previous policies focused on dealings with governments only, at the expense of engaging societal actors and fledgling opposition forces”. On the other hand, for Behr and Siitonen (2013:22), this cannot be considered as a clear breakthrough from former policies because the EU’s new strategy avoids the “issue of religious, traditional, and tribal organizations that are playing a key role in the transition processes” and it does not offer a clear agenda on how the EU can engage with this “the loose and broad-based social movements”. Dias (2014: 52) further argues that “by providing a stronger support to governmental and nongovernmental actors”, the EU wants to engage in the internal affairs of the SEMP. In this sense, the EU creates these new tools. These tools can be regarded an EU attempt to intervene the internal affairs of the SEMP which can deepen the mistrust of SEMP towards the EU.

In the revised policy, the EU wants to portray itself as self-critical, claims that it would not repeat its past mistakes and would listen without imposing its norms and values. In this sense, one may argue that the EU tries to legitimize the new ENP in the eyes of SEMP. However, the revised ENP cannot be considered as a breakthrough when compared to the Union’s previous Mediterranean policies. It does not offer major new innovations. Rather, it combines and makes little revisions of some features of both the Barcelona Process and the ENP. For example, the DCFTAs can be regarded as a version of the Free Trade Areas of the Barcelona Process. Moreover, the “more for more” principle, which is presented as the main innovation in the new ENP, can be regarded as a reformulation of EU conditionality.

In the ENP review, the EU tries to support political reforms leading to “deep democracies”. For Balfour (2012a: 7), the Arab uprisings provided “a unique opportunity to revise the European Union’s languishing relations with North Africa and the Middle East” and, in this sense “much emphasis has been placed, in speeches and in re-inventing the

European diplomatic narrative towards the region, on the EU's new listening mode, and on its humility and modesty in its dealings with reforming Arab leaders". In the revised approach, the countries which decide "to embark on a path of democratisation and modernisation can choose the level of engagement" with the EU (Balfour, 2012a: 7). For Dias (2014: 50), these documents "represent a clear mea culpa on behalf of the EU, recognizing the double standards that imprinted its relations with its southern neighbours and its connivance with political repression and violation of human and civil rights in the region".

For Bauer (2013: 7), this revision can be regarded as "a fundamental turn in the Mediterranean policy towards a more intense reflection and handling of domestic affairs of the Southern Mediterranean partners", in which the logic of the ENP, economic cooperation leading to democracy, is reversed. As Burke (2013: 3) argues, before the Arab uprisings, Europe's ambitions to reform the southern Mediterranean were principally limited to the economic sphere, where, on the surface, economic growth figures looked like remarkable; but in reality, "they masked a deep political and social malaise among southern Mediterranean countries". The revised ENP regards "democratization as a cause of economic growth" (Teti, et.al; 2013: 71). In this new framework, "the conditionality for a closer cooperation and association to the EU is clearly linked to democratization not to economic reforms as in the years before" (Bauer, 2013: 7). In these documents, as Behr (2012a: 8) emphasizes, the EU sketches out a new approach towards its southern neighbourhood and "promises to unambiguously support the ongoing democratic transition processes".

In its formal declarations and new initiatives, the EU has welcomed the transition of the countries in its southern neighbourhood, and declared that it wants to be on the side of the people in their call for freedom. Hollis (2012: 81) further claims, "it even [went] so far as to acknowledge that its policies hitherto need[ed] revisiting, and that there should be more outreach to Arab civil society as opposed to government-to-government relations". However, as noted by Hollis (ibid), the EU had to take more responsibility because the outbreak of Arab uprisings "actually demonstrated the failure of EU policies". In this sense, it can be claimed that the EU has to develop more comprehensive policies in order to remedy its failures in its southern neighbourhood. The Union has to do more than combining and repackaging its existing policies.

In the ENP review, the Union promises its support to the countries regarding their political and economic reforms based on the individual aspirations of each country. One may argue that putting “deep democracy” in the centre of this policy could allow the EU to amend its past mistakes and significantly improve its democracy assistance efforts. However, it can be claimed that the change in the rhetoric of the Union does not alter the fact what the EU is presenting is not new. Blockmans (2013: 56) further claims that the new ENP “stands in the tradition of old bilateral action plans, representing nothing more than a vague and incomplete catalogue of reforms”. Using a “softer language”, the EU is again trying to impose its own model as a prescription to its neighbourhood (Cebeci, 2017). In this sense, one may argue that the EU’s interests and its geopolitical considerations once again drive its policy.

As in the original ENP, the revised ENP is based on the principle of positive conditionality: the more governments in neighbouring countries implement reforms in the sectors outlined in the EU strategy paper, the more assistance the EU will offer. As Balfour (2012b: 7), EU policy-makers “have been working on improving conditionality” since the Arab uprisings. For Blockmans (2013: 54),

Rebranding the incentive-based principle of conditionality as ‘more for more’ cannot disguise the fact that the EU is essentially promising more of the same, thus reincarnating a weak pledge that has still not been reciprocated by commitments of the region’s leaders to democracy, the rule of law and political reforms.

The revised ENP indicates that “the EU will restructure or even reduce financial aid and sectoral support for those governments of neighbouring countries which delay, impede or abandon reform plans” (European Commission, 2011b: 3). This also reflects the ways in which the EU intends to strengthen its differentiated relations with the countries in the region (Balfour, 2012a: 30). In this sense, the revised ENP is applying “less for less”. Nevertheless, whether the EU applies “more for more” principle or “less for less”, it can be claimed that the EU is not presenting a brand new attitude. This incentive-based principle of conditionality in the revised ENP can be regarded as reformulation of existing structures.

As mentioned above, the Union wanted to design more reflexive and inclusive policies regarding the region after the Arab uprisings. In order to put the relationship on a more equal footing, the new ENP introduced the notion of “mutual accountability”, in which the EU too

can be made to keep its promises (European Commission, 2011b: 3). However, as Balfour (2012a: 30) points out, “the EU has tools and procedures to use negative conditionality if it wants to use (regardless of the fact that in practice it rarely does so), but there are no mechanisms for the EU’s partners to hold it accountable for delivering on its promises”. In this sense, it can be claimed that, in theory, the notion of “mutual accountability” supports the EU’s normative claims, in practice, this notion does not automatically provide an actual equal footing between the EU and the SEMP.

In general – and not limited to the ENP – “it is also questionable whether the focus on conditionality is relevant in itself” (Balfour, 2012b: 26). As Martin and Arribas (2013: 68) argue, conditionality can be viewed as “creating asymmetric relationships”. In the postcolonial era, the economic inequality between the EU and the rest of the Mediterranean has created a structure of asymmetrical relationship, giving the EU an important leverage in implementing its policies towards the region. Although the EU is offering its support to the region, this support comes with the attachment of conditionality. This conditionality often has failed to be aware of “local cultural norms and traditions” (Richmond, 2009) of the SEMP. The EU wants them to copy its best practices in all problematic issue areas regardless of their histories, cultural and political contexts. In this sense, conditionality can be regarded as an interruption to national sovereignty of the southern neighbourhood countries. One may assert that sovereignty has always been a central issue in the postcolonial Arab world, especially after the Arab uprisings.²⁷⁶ For Behr (2012b: 85), the Arab countries are “striving for autonomy, and, by no means, are looking for a new binding relationship, especially not with a ‘declining Europe’”. Positive conditionality, presented as a major innovation of the new ENP, does not help in this respect either. It is very vaguely defined. The PfDSP and the NRCN promise closer political cooperation to those Mediterranean countries that advance towards higher standards of democracy and governance (European Commission, 2011a; 2011b). The performance of each country is supposed to be measured on the basis of “a set of minimum benchmarks”. Schumacher (2011: 111) claims that neither of these documents identifies these benchmarking criteria, nor explains how they could be evaluated or enforced, “what they do, however, is state vague policy goals that leave much room for speculation”.

²⁷⁶ While Tunisia has been enthusiastic in accepting EU policies and international advice (for example, through consultations with the Council of Europe on drafting the new constitutions), other countries have been more suspicious about EU involvement (Balfour 2012a: 27).

The “3 Ms” – more money, market access and mobility – as additional incentives are offered to the countries only if they are making actual reforms. The SPRING programme complements this with additional funds of 65 million in 2011 and 285 million in 2012 (European Commission, 2011c). “Support will be tailored to the needs of each country, based on an assessment of the country’s progress in building democracy and applying the ‘more for more’ principle” (ibid.). Tunisia and Egypt, for example, are to receive additional financial resources (160 million and 449 million for 2011-2013, respectively) (European Commission, 2011c). However, as Isaac (2012: 32) points out, these figures are far from the expectations of the new governments in these countries.

“Mobility partnerships” are considered as “the final leg of this ‘more for more’ package” that aim “to make population movement easier for some citizens from the region” (Balfour, 2012a: 31). Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco have been indicated as the first countries to benefit from these advantages. Mobility Partnerships will be devised to cover visa and legal migration agreements; legal frameworks for (economic) migration; capacity building to manage borders, etc. (European Commission, 2011a: 7). In general, they are meant to enhance the mobility between the MENA and the EU, i.e. one of the incentives, offered by the Commission that bears special value for the citizens of the Arab countries. However, the attractiveness of the offer is reduced to some parts of the society such as skilled workers, business people and students. For Del Sarto (2015: 225), the so-called Mobility Partnerships are offering visa facilitation for “desired migrants”, and in return the EU demands “substantial co-operation from third governments in the so-called readmission – that is, expulsion – of unwanted migrants from Europe”. Massive waves of peoples who are escaping from trouble areas have always been the nightmare of the European Union. Therefore, the EU is designing policies to prevent and reduce illegal migration. One can claim that by using mobility partnerships, the Union is applying selective immigration in which the EU selects the immigrants on the basis of its needs and interests that can be regarded as neocolonial. Moreover, as Balfour (2012a: 32) indicates, “there could be some strings attached such as third countries’ citizens will be offered legal channels to the EU member states if their governments cooperate in preventing and reducing irregular migration”.

In 2015, the EU adopted another review of the ENP. The 2015 ENP Review has wanted to assess what has and what has not worked between the EU and its neighbourhood countries. For Delcour (2015: 1), “the Review released on 18 November 2015 offers the most

extensive re-assessment of the policy ever since its launch". One can claim that emphasis on stability, more differentiation in relations with neighbouring countries²⁷⁷, and emphasis on shared interests rather than on the Union's own values constitute the core of the 2015 ENP Review²⁷⁸. The Review states that:

The purpose of the current review of the ENP is to propose how the EU and its neighbours can build more effective partnerships in the neighbourhood. In doing so, the EU will pursue its interests which include the promotion of universal values. The EU's own stability is built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness and the new ENP will take stabilisation as its main political priority in this mandate. Differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognising that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with the EU. (European Commission, 2015:2)

The 2015 ENP Review gives special emphasis to "stabilization" in the neighbourhood.²⁷⁹ As Cebeci and Schumacher (2017: 11) contend, the EU's "interdependence with its neighbours" is emphasized, "with reference to the security challenges such as growing refugee flows, energy crises and terrorism (especially related to the rise of ISIL/Da'esh and extremism)" in the 2015 ENP Review.²⁸⁰ In this sense, stabilization is referred as "the most urgent challenge" for the Union's neighbourhood (European

²⁷⁷ "The public consultation has demonstrated that while the offer of a closer relationship with the EU for those countries which have undertaken governance reforms has encouraged change in some countries, current practice and policy has been regarded by other partners as too prescriptive, and as not sufficiently reflecting their respective aspirations. The consultation has further indicated that ownership by both partners and EU Member States needs to be stepped up; that cooperation should be given a tighter, more relevant focus; and that greater flexibility must be sought to enable the EU and its partners to respond to ever changing needs and circumstances." (European Commission, 2015:2-3)

²⁷⁸ "The EU proposes to start a new phase of engagement with partners in 2016, consulting on the future nature and focus of the partnership. The expectation is that different patterns of relations will emerge, allowing a greater sense of ownership by both sides. The EU is ready to discuss the possibility to jointly set new partnership priorities, which would focus each relationship more clearly on commonly identified shared interests". (European Commission, 2015:4)

²⁷⁹ According to Blockmans (2015 :3), the stabilization concept is "translated in at least five ways. First, more focus on cooperation in security sector reform, mainly in the areas of conflict prevention, border protection/management, counterterrorism and anti-radicalisation policies. Second, greater efforts to support inclusive economic and social development, with the creation of job opportunities for youth among the key objectives of 'economic stabilisation'. Third, greater crisis-response capacities by deploying the available financial resources in a more flexible manner. Fourth, safe and legal mobility on the one hand, and tackling irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling on the other. And finally, greater attention to working with partners on energy security and climate action".

²⁸⁰ "[T]he EU's own interdependence with its neighbours has been placed in sharp focus. Growing numbers of refugees are arriving at the European Union's borders hoping to find a safer future. Energy crises have underlined the EU's need to work with neighbours on energy security, including diversification of energy sources, routes and suppliers. There have been acts of terror affecting the EU and the neighbourhood, most recently the heinous terrorist attacks in Paris on 13th November". (European Commission, 2015:2)

Commission: 2105: 3). For Delcour (2015: 4), “the clear priority given to stabilisation in the neighbourhood obviously coincides with the EU’s own interests; yet, to be sustainable, stability should be built – just like inside the EU – on democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. Prioritizing the stability and security in the southern neighbourhood and promoting its best practices can show one the continuities in the EU’s Mediterranean approach in the 2015 ENP Review.

Although the 2015 ENP Review has tried to identify the policy’s shortcomings and limitations, and the Review does not provide a strategic vision for the Union’s neighbourhood in the future due to the fact that the Review does not translate these shortcomings and limitations into the essence of EU policies. The 2015 ENP Review, in Delcour (2015: 4) words, “falls short of defining a clear way forward”. For Blockmans (2015: 4), “the 2015 ENP Review represents neither a complete overhaul of the old ENP nor a fully fledged strategic (re)vision of the EU’s relations with its neighbours”. It can be claimed that while the Review signals a reassessment of EU’s approach to its neighbourhood, it is unlikely to result in radical developments in the EU’s Mediterranean approach. Blockmans (2015: 3-4) further asserts that

[T]he new ENP represents little more than an elegantly crafted fig leaf that purports to be a strategic approach to the EU’s outer periphery, but masks an inclination towards a more hard-nosed Realpolitik. However, in the absence of the necessary funding to tackle the region’s multiple crises, and without a strategic vision to guide relations with the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours, the new ENP remains in suspended animation. In order to shape relations and meet more realistic objectives that are shared with individual neighbours, Union policy will now turn to pragmatism (the new ‘P’ in ENP).

In this context, it can be claimed that a more pragmatic approach is adopted in the 2015 ENP Review. According to Cebeci and Schumacher (2017: 15), “such a pragmatic approach carries the ENP’s differentiation vis-à-vis the neighbours to a new level”, and it is “criticized as a retreat from the EU’s so-called normative stance”. By supporting the idea of “principled pragmatism”, this pragmatic approach is also reflected in the 2016 Global Strategy (ibid.). In 2016, 13 years after the adoption European Security Strategy, the EU adopted A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”. The EU Global Strategy defines the EU’s

interests and principles for engaging in the wider world. The document targets to make the Union stronger and an influential actor on the world politics²⁸¹ where it keeps its citizens safe, preserves its interests values and promotes its rules and values.²⁸² The document also refers to the Union's request in promoting a rule based-global order with multilateralism and principled pragmatism as guiding principles.

The EU will promote a rules-based global order. We have an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core. We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead. (EEAS, 2016: 8)

In this sense, it can be claimed that with the Global Strategy, the EU, in a way, abandons the idealistic goals regarding its neighbourhood and adopts a realist approach which is mainly based on pragmatism. The Global Strategy also mentions how European security order has been violated by the developments in its neighbourhood (EEAS, 2016: 7, 13). According to Cebeci and Schumacher (2017: 12),

The document's choice of words such as 'acute' and 'plague' – markers of sickness – to predicate the EU's neighbourhood and especially North Africa and the Middle East is especially significant as it inevitably brings about the depiction of the target societies as defected and weak, unable to take care of themselves (i.e., pursue reforms or resolve conflicts) and thus in need of the EU's help. One is reminded of the colonial logic – the *mission civilisatrice*.

The 2015 ENP Review and the Global Strategy can be considered as the two other tools of the Union in which the EU pursues its interests and tries to identify its neighbourhood policy's shortcomings and limitations. However, as mentioned, especially the 2015 Review does not translate these shortcomings and limitations into the essence of EU policies. In this

²⁸¹ “The Strategy nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union. This is necessary to promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values”. (EEAS, 2016: 4)

²⁸² “Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order are the vital interests underpinning our external action.” (EEAS, 2016: 13)

sense, it can be claimed that these documents do not make substantial changes in the EU's revised ENP. Furthermore, it can be claimed that regarding the SEMP's in need of guidance and presenting them as a threat to European security, the EU is still reproducing asymmetrical relations of power. In this sense, the EU's approach to the South and Eastern Mediterranean can be regarded as neocolonial.

In sum, after the uprisings, the EU mainly offers the "three Ms" to the ENP partner countries. However, for Lehne, (ibid.), the tools of the revived ENP are also flawed because "the EU's instruments to deliver on these offers are designed for a more stable environment". This revised version of the ENP is also modeling the EU's own experience of integration. The methodology is again drawn from "the EU enlargement process, which had a proven track record in supporting successful political and economic transitions", however, what is on offer for the neighborhood is "a diluted version of the original without the promise of accession and with a much weaker commitment on the side of the EU" (Lehne, 2014: 4). While democracy promotion has been "central to EU external relations, particularly after the Lisbon Treaty, all post-Arab Uprisings key statements of the EU regarding the Southern Neighborhood emphasize the innovative nature of the organization's stance, specifically with respect to democracy assistance" (Teti, et.al, 2013: 63). However, when the innovation is analyzed, as Teti, et.al (2013: 63-64) claim, several of the elements of the new ENP, "albeit couched in slightly different language", are already present in the previous policies. In Teti et.al.'s words (2013: 75),

As with [Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity] before it, the analysis of [A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood], which is intended to frame the EU's reaction to the so-called Arab Spring, suggests considerable skepticism regarding the claims to a qualitative break with earlier policy strategy. Rather, in relation to its three key themes of democracy, development, and delivery, the [A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood], like [Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity], is best viewed as articulating rhetorical variations on themes already present in pre-2011 policy documents. Specifically, [A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood] as much as [Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity] appears to settle on a consensus framework for the definition of democracy which is over-reliant on narrow, procedural criteria prioritizing elections and civil-political rights over and above social and economic rights.

In the ENP review, the EU re-emphasized, regional cooperation, negative conditionality, the notion of partnership, “a set of policy measures first formulated in the framework of the EMP but more or less abandoned after the introduction of the ENP” (Tömmel, 2013: 24-25). As Tömmel (ibid.: 25) indicates, this might be regarded as the EU is reestablishing its original ambitions and adopting a normative language. On the other hand, the revised ENP cannot be considered as a fundamental revision of the European approach to Mediterranean politics because it cannot go beyond the current needs of the Arab region though it provides “medium- and long-term normative orientation for the development of the relations” (Bauer 2013: 14). In Bauer words,

Though the EU endeavored to adapt to the new situation in the Mediterranean, the new approach of the “partnership for democracy and shared prosperity” is not directly targeting the most serious problems and security needs in the Arab Spring countries. In cases of violent conflicts, the EU has applied civil measures and left military conflict intervention or transformation missions to other organizations. Neither has the EU elaborated on the democratization agenda in a way that could be applied to the profound societal problems of security provision, welfare production, and political power formation. (2013: 13)

In the ENP review, there are some modifications regarding change in the procedures of policy implementation and in the amount of financial assistance. However, as Lehne (2014: 5) argues, the EU’s policy shift is inadequate. For Wouters and Duquet (2013: 42), “despite new rhetoric, in human rights and democratization policies, the EU has not been distancing itself from old politics and attitudes”. Tömmel (2013: 25) further argues “the Union’s new policy is not much more than ‘old wine in new wineskins’ where the policy priorities and measures are rather ‘old wine’, while implementation methods and particular conditionality comes about as a ‘new wineskin’, linked firmly to democracy promotion”. As Behr (2012a: 17) claims, “the conceptual foundations of the EU’s new approach remain extremely fuzzy and incoherent”, because they can be regarded as “partial readjustment of the EU’s previous goals and priorities”, rather than a “fresh start” and “new thinking”. In this sense, the ENP review does not represent a paradigm shift in EU foreign policy. Furthermore, it can be argued that the revision of the ENP pertains to change in the appearance of the existing policies but it does not bring new policies which are fundamentally different from previous ones. Moreover, it can be stressed that this fuzziness helps the EU to practice its Eurocentric approach to the Mediterranean.

As mentioned before, the EU has been selective and inconsistent in applying conditionality clause towards its southern neighbourhood.²⁸³ “In the wake of the Arab uprisings, the EU declared a renewed emphasis on promoting ‘deep democracy’ and pledged to apply conditionality more systematically” (Lehne, 2014: 10). However, in practice this is not very easy for the EU to achieve this intention. For Behr (2012a: 21), “there is little evidence for a sea-change in the EU’s use of positive conditionality”, only “those countries that are willing and able to pursue closer ties with the EU will be rewarded, by obtaining new contractual relations and funding”. The countries such as Tunisia and Morocco with the closest and most developed trade and aid relationship with the EU after and before the uprisings are same and in this sense, and, most probably, more-for-more approach will not provide significant changes. As Lehne (2014: 10), pinpoints, “the application of the ‘more for more’ approach (which also implies ‘less for less’) would mean that the EU’s relations with most countries of the Southern neighborhood, possibly excepting Tunisia, would have to be frozen, as there is insufficient progress and even regression on democratic reforms”. As mentioned above, some of the SEMP’s have suspicions over the EU’s policies and they do not want to emulate the European model. It can be argued that although the EU has admitted its past mistakes and set new goals with its renewed ENP, the Mediterranean partners’ reluctance to cooperate with the EU has not disappeared. In this sense, for example, “more for more” conditionality could increase the reluctance of Arab countries towards the EU’s policies.²⁸⁴

After the Arab uprisings, “the EU has presented itself as a listening partner, willing to communicate with Arab partners, to better understand local dynamics and build personal relationships that can help the EU to regain the trust of Arab societies” (Wouters and Duguet, 2013: 46). In this sense, the concepts of democracy and stability have been relabelled. Democracy, which had been defined as shared value, has been reframed as “deep democracy”. This is important in the sense that before the Arab uprisings the “D word had

²⁸³ For example, the essential element clause of the Association Agreements has never been invoked and the EU’s relations with some SEMP’s have continued despite significant human rights violations in some countries (Cebeci, 2006: 8).

²⁸⁴ For Behr (2012b: 85), “All of this suggests that the EU has not yet managed to define a new role for itself when it comes to the democratic transition processes in the region. While it acknowledges that its previous model of supporting gradual top-down reforms has failed, its current proposals lack the necessary resources and political will to steer the democratic transition processes across the region. And with the attraction of the Euro-Mediterranean project clearly waning, the EU has little to offer to a region that is bent on reclaiming its international independence and own identity. As a result, the EU has remained an impotent bystander to the seismic events that are reshaping its southern neighbourhood”.

virtually disappeared even from the lexicon of the EU in its dealings with the Arab world” (Emerson, 2011). The D word has been brought back in the joint Barroso/Ashton document of March 8, 2011 (Isaac, 2013: 57), proposing a new Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity within the Southern Mediterranean. The translation of this statement to solid structure came with the review of the ENP in May.

For Emerson (2011), the most important question was whether the democracy promotion was really to be “brought back onto the front-burner after years of virtual neglect”. For him (ibid.), democracy promotion was diluted if not banished from the mechanisms of the neighborhood policy, while it was deliberately excluded from the Mediterranean Union initiative of Sarkozy. However, this has not also changed after the Arab uprisings. Although it defined “deep democracy” as its main priority in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the European Union has not been able to turn its promises into action so far. What is presented as a strategic response to the uprisings turns out to be a version of the old approach to its southern neighbourhood which is security oriented, geopolitical, asymmetrical, and far from grasping the dynamics of the Arab world. Alessandri and Altınışık (2013: 5) further suggest that this new approach almost as a “conversion to democracy” is risking “transiting from one stereotype and prejudice – Arabs do not do democracy – to another superficial characterization – time has come for Arab democracy”.

One can claim that EU’s support for the democratic transition processes can be considered central to the revised ENP. However, as Isaac (2013: 49) claims, the EU “is not presenting an authentic change to its democracy promotion policy in the Southern Mediterranean”. Hüllen (2011: 125) further argues that “despite the reference to ‘deep democracy’ in the latest reforms, little then has changed in terms of the EU’s conceptual approach: a generically liberal, albeit fuzzy at the edges, democratic capitalist model still forms the core of the efforts to build ‘deep democracy’”. For (Isaac, 2013: 57), the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings can be considered as a “hollow revision of the ENP”:

The EU response to revolutionary events in the Arab region results weak. After a series of perplexed reactions and embarrassing disagreements among European Capitals, the EU came up with a hollow revision of the ENP, claiming that it represents a fundamental review of its previously ill-thought-out democratization policy toward the Southern Mediterranean. The new ENP does not specify in practical ways how the EU is going to assess its partners’ reform

progress and their actual implementation of proclaimed reforms; EU assessment of its partners' progress in democratization, rule of law, and human rights is simply scheduled to take place too late, as it is not until 2014 that the EU is going to actually consider applying its conditionality clause; and the new ENP is awfully underfunded, which signifies that offered assistance does not represent a real incentive for countries in the South to undertake reforms.

On the other hand, for Kurki (2012: 1), it was unclear what type of democracy the EU supported before the Arab uprisings, and what the EU meant by democracy remained a mystery. Even though upon the lessons taken from the uprisings, the new ENP moved away from the "one size-fits-all approach" (Bicchi, 2006b), little has changed in EU approach to the political reforms. As Behr (2012a: 15) asserts, the EU is unable "to offer a comprehensive explanation of the main concepts it promotes". For Blockmans (2013:55-56),

The revised neighbourhood framework relates to what has already been noted in passing, i.e. that the EU's key documents still pack the diplomatic *langue de bois* which characterised the 'old' ENP, in which the ill-defined terms such as deep democracy, rule of law, governance reform or democratization, democratic transformation, transition are sometimes used interchangeably.

According to Behr (2012b: 77), with the revived policy, the EU wants "to refashion its role from that of a stability promoter to that of a democracy promoter". Regarding this purpose, the EU has adopted this concept of "deep democracy" as an indication to remote itself from its previous focus on political stability. However, the EU's vision of democracy has not actually changed. "Its emphasis remains on an increase in EU financial support" (Pace, 2014: 979). As Pace (ibid.) claims the EU's language "changes from democracy promotion to democracy support to protect the EU from any kind of criticism of imposition of its policy on the region". In this sense, for Pace (ibid.), the ENP's review can also be read "as cover up of the EU's basic failure to understand the core issues at the heart of the Mediterranean people's frustrations about their autocratic regimes and their relations with external actors such as the EU". In this sense, it can be argued that there has not been a substantial change in the EU's definition and implementation democracy promotion policies in its neighbourhood and, as Behr (2012a: 15) argues, the EU "continues to draw on the same conceptually fuzzy and methodologically incoherent toolbox.

In sum, it can be claimed that the ill definition of the new EU priorities in its neighbourhood and using the terms interchangeably can prove that ambiguity is still inherently present in the EU's Mediterranean policies. Moreover, this ambiguity helps the EU to legitimize its approach to its Southern neighbourhood. For example, the EU's democracy promotion after the Arab uprisings can also be seen as an objective and a tool of EU to pursue its economic and security interests just as it had been the case before the uprisings. It can be claimed that while the EU's goals and rhetoric might be considered as new, its instruments have only slightly changed from the past. The incentive-based logic and the "more for more" are not new, they have been applied under different names for supporting them through incentives etc. These all seemed like mechanisms introduced with normative aims. However, they mostly worked in ways which legitimized the EU's interest-driven policies in its neighbourhood. The next section tries to make an assessment of EU's Mediterranean approach and to question whether the EU adopts a normative agenda or pursues its own interests in the region in the postcolonial era.

5.3. An assessment of EU's Mediterranean approach

This study claims that the EU conceives the problems in its southern neighbourhood as a source of threat and tries to seek its own interests. The EU's approach to the SEMP shows that the EU is pursuing a twofold strategy where the Union identifies itself as normative power, on the one hand whilst, trying to realize its political, economic and security interests, on the other. The challenges of this twofold strategy may explain one some of the inconsistencies and dilemmas in the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Moreover, the Union regards the Mediterranean as a constructed region where it can use its disciplining function in exercising power through the attractiveness of its model and economic welfare. In this sense, the EU is trying to promote its own model to control its neighbourhood. Since some of the EU countries are former colonial powers, the EU, like an empire, has reinforced an EU-centric vision of the world, which divides countries along concentric circles drawn around Brussels.

Conceptualizing the "EU as an empire" (Del Satto, 2015; Zielonka, 2001, 2006, 2008a) may help one to analyze the logic behind the EU's Mediterranean policies. In this context, the imperial approach can explain the EU's self-interest driven strategies under the normative claims toward its neighbourhood. The Mediterranean polices of the Union can also been seen as the continuation of imperial policies of the former colonial powers of the EU.

The EU's imperial identity helps one to understand how the foreign policy practices of the European Union follow a quasi-geographical pattern of concentric circles, in which the EU exports its norms and rules in a radial manner, which might be seen as an imperialistic neocolonial attempt. As Del Sato (2015: 229) argues, the EU has "continued to operate according to the logic of empire toward its borderlands" that "entails a continuation of the basic idea that neighbouring countries should gradually accept a pre-defined set of EU rules and practices, without being offered any say in the EU's decision-making processes". In this sense, for her (ibid), "Brussels' response to the Arab uprisings also displays the same old primary concern for stability in the periphery, together with the prioritization of the security and economic interests of the EU and its members". Therefore, in theory, although the EU policies are reviewed in a normative rhetoric after the Arab uprisings, in practice, the new approach does not seem to differ significantly from the previous one where the EU sees the Mediterranean as a source of instability and tries to stabilize and dominate.²⁸⁵

In the EU's Mediterranean approach, the EU tries to "domesticate" (Alessandri and Altınışık, 2013: 3) its Southern neighbourhood according to its own integration model, through which the SEMP's are regarded as subject of Europe. One can claim that the EU is mainly pursuing an Orientalist approach in its policies regarding the Mediterranean. In this view, the EU (the Self) sees the SEMP's (the Other) through a Eurocentric lens where a neocolonial Europe can dominate its Southern neighbourhood. For Lehne (2014: 7), with its Eurocentric attitude towards the Mediterranean, "the EU initially saw itself at the center of its universe". It can be stressed that putting the EU at the centre is very problematic approach because it creates asymmetrical relations of power and it assumes that Arab societies want to emulate the EU model. Bilgin (2006: 2) considers this Eurocentric approach as the product of the "coloniser's orientalist gaze toward non-European 'others'". On the other hand, the EU's Mediterranean policies lose their legitimacy among the Arab societies when they regard policy concepts referring to "democratic reform and cooperation with civil society" "as undue interference into internal affairs" (Tömmel, 2013: 32). Moreover, Arab nationalism has been on the rise after the uprisings, leading to a "heightened mistrust of western policies and a greater emphasis on national sovereignty" (Behr, 2012: 4-5) that will challenge to the EU's

²⁸⁵ The European Commission's document of early 2013 on the "state of play" after two years of Arab uprisings mentioned five concerns: uncontrolled waves of migrants and refugees towards the EU and the neighbours of the neighbours; internal security threats; growing polarization in transition societies mainly between secular and Islamist forces; a deterioration of socioeconomic conditions; and instability in more general terms (European Commission, 2013). For Schumacher (2015: 383), "the Commission's decision to single out these challenges" can be regarded as "securitizing logic" still shapes EU policy-making in Euro Mediterranean relations.

Eurocentric Mediterranean policies. For example, countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and Lebanon do not trust EU border management policies and regard them as a pretext of EU's neocolonial aspirations (Schumacher, 2015: 396). Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapters, Arabs perceive Israel as a colonial settler country, the close relations between the EU and Israel also creates a major source of concern for the Arab states. In general, it can be claimed that the Arab societies are doubtful regarding the Union's purposes Mediterranean policies and consider its efforts neocolonial.

Neo-liberal policies can be considered as an important aspect of the EU's Eurocentric policies. Pace (2014: 976) argues that the EU has "the vision of its potential neo-liberal approach" in which the economic development will bring political change in the region. In this sense, it can be argued that the EU has been trying to reconstruct the region with its own image, according to its liberal values. However, as mentioned above, the Arab uprisings show the failure of the "EU's neo-liberal development approach" (Behr, 2012a: 3) for its Southern neighbourhood. Social tension has increased between the winners and losers of the neo-liberal reforms, and as a result, Arab citizens stood up against the imposition of Western organizations' neo-liberal reforms. Moreover, the European crisis deeply affects the Euro-Mediterranean relations. After the Arab uprisings, although the EU remains a critical market for Arab countries, Arab societies are disturbed with the consequences of European crisis. For example, North African countries, after the adoption of EU Association Agreements, have become more dependent on the European market, and which made them more vulnerable to external shocks of global economy. In this sense, as Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 129) indicate "liberal democracy per se is in a state of crisis across the West and might not be as attractive a model as it was in the past for those aiming to build new political systems in the Arab world". Therefore, it can be claimed that most of the authoritarian regimes of the Southern Mediterranean seems are highly reluctant to implement neo-liberal European policies.

5.3.1. Norms versus Interests

Although Diez (2005) claims that it is very hard to distinguish norms and interests, in the case of the Mediterranean and as has been obvious in the EU's support for authoritarian regimes in the Arab world before the uprisings, the EU has mostly pursued its own interests in the region, overlooking its normative values. For example, "when the EU member states realized that their interest in a stable neighbourhood could no longer be guaranteed by

authoritarian Arab regimes” and these regimes had “become part of the problem”, they decided to support the democratic transition processes in the Mediterranean (Behr, 2012b: 81). As Behr (ibid.) argues, the EU thinks that “in order to restore stability, an orderly transition to democracy of those countries” is “now in the EU’s best interests”. For Behr (ibid.: 81-82), this policy shift can be regarded as an ending signal of EU’s long standing “democratisation-stabilisation dilemma” in the region and allows for “a realignment of European values and interests”. In this sense, the Union reformulates its neighbourhood policy and as Tömmel (2013: 34) argues, “promises a more effective and efficient implementation; particularly in the area of democracy promotion” through a sequence of documents.

However, it can be claimed that the self-interest of the Union is emphasized in the EU policies repeatedly. In the revised ENP of 2015, the Union’s quest for pursuing its interests is quite evident.²⁸⁶ In Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016: 8, 13), the EU also mentions its interests and request in promoting rules-based global order to contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. Moreover, the document clearly emphasizes that it is in the interests of the EU’s citizens “to invest in the resilience of states and societies in its neighbourhood” (ibid.: 9). For Cebeci and Schumacher (2017: 15), the ENP review of 2015 and the Global Strategy refer “to a more a pragmatic approach” which is criticized because it is regarded as a shift from the normative rhetoric of the revised ENP to a neocolonial language.

In this sense, as Isaac (2013: 58) claims, “a proactive and agile EU role in the Arab region after the uprisings should not be considered as derived from a moral stance. Rather, it is urgently required as it is in Europe’s own interest”. Moreover, it can be claimed that in the postcolonial period, especially after the Arab uprisings the threat perceptions such as migration plays as a crucial role in the EU’s revised approach. Actually, the migration threat has been the main factor behind the EU’s Mediterranean policies. The possibility of massive waves of peoples who want to escape from the SEMP, further aggravates EU concern for designing policies to prevent and reduce illegal migration. In this sense, as Seeberg (2013: 160) argues, reformulation of EU policies are founded “on a conceptual widening of migration related to the European refugees and asylum regime, but also on problems related to illegal and irregular migration”. One may argue that the change in some authoritarian

²⁸⁶ “[T]he EU will pursue its interests which include the promotion of universal values. The EU’s own stability is built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness and the new ENP will take stabilisation as its main political priority in this mandate. (...)The ENP should reflect EU interests (European Commission, 2015: 2,4).

regimes after Arab uprisings has not actually led to a decrease in the strategic and security concerns of the EU regarding the region, and, therefore, these concerns and considerations have refigured themselves in the revision of the EU's Mediterranean policies.

If one analyzes the EU's approach to Mediterranean after the Arab uprisings, he/she can claim that the EU has externalized its internal security goals and pursue its own interests through the ENP's review. In this sense, by continuing projecting its model on its southern periphery through minor revisions in its approach, the EU still pursues its interests and establishes asymmetrical relations of power. One can claim that the goals and instruments of the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean in the postcolonial era reflect the traditional realist interests. Thus, the analysis of EU policies shows the contradiction between the EU's interests and its normative rhetoric.

The EU offers to its partners a stake in its internal market and provides financial support to stimulate economic, political and social modernization in SEMP. In exchange, the Union expects the countries in its neighbourhood to emulate its integration model. In this sense, it can be claimed that the EU tries to export its own model to its southern neighbours in order to seek its own interests. For (Hollis, 2012: 81), the SEMP have to take the reforms that "best suit the EU's interests". As the NRCN reemphasizes, "a prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region" (European Commission, 2012b), with an open perspective towards Europe, is in the best interest of the EU and for the EU's own security as well. In this context, the EU presents the Southern Mediterranean as its dangerous and threatening "other", a source of insecurity and instability that poses a challenge to European peace and prosperity. As NRCN contends:

It is in the EU's own interest to support these transformation processes, working together with our neighbours to anchor the essential values and principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, a market economy and inclusive, sustainable development in their political and economic fabric (European Commission, 2012b: 21).

Pace (2002: 202-203) further suggests that the Union portrays the southern neighbourhood "as a lesser and frantic region" that should be civilized by the superior EU by adopting the values and norms of the EU. As Arribas et.al (2013: 7) mention "a stable and secure Mediterranean region is in the best interest of the EU" and this is mainly because of

the belief that conflicts and instabilities in the Mediterranean region have direct consequences for political and social stability in the EU. As a response to uprisings, the EU has tried to reframe its policy toward the Southern Mediterranean region and adopted a normative discourse. For Del Sarto (2015: 219-221), in the EU's involvement in a "normative process", the EU justifies its alleged normative policies by claiming that it is promoting universal rules and practices to its neighbourhood. For example, EU generally regards democracy as a necessary and a universal good.

As Pace (2010: 616) claims, for EU "democracy is valued for its intrinsic peaceful implications, and it is also taken as the solution to economic underdevelopment, instability, and insecurity". However, "while there is an extensive debate on whether good governance and the rule of law are essential for democracy, it all depends on how they are defined" (Del Sarto, 2015: 221). The EU's best practices in one area cannot does not automatically have to be beneficial in another area. For example, "supporting rule of law may be conducive to a good business environment", but it does not per se automatically advance democracy (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2011: 936-938). Moreover, one can question the content of EU's projection of its rules and practices' normativity. For Bicchi (2006b: 292-293), norms can be exported not because they are efficient or have universal value, but because they are legitimated by the spread of Union's values.²⁸⁷ For Hollis (2012: 87), the EU "has failed to understand that the *acquis communautaire* does not embody universal goods". The laws and regulations involved are "value-laden and expressive of European priorities that make sense within the Union—with all the benefits of membership—but not necessarily beyond it, especially when adopted piecemeal and selectively" to its neighbourhood (ibid.). On the other hand, for Cebeci (2017, 66), "the claim to the universality of the norms that the EU represents is also problematic" because "the rhetoric of universality empowers the EU and legitimizes its acts in world politics – especially in its neighbourhood policy; original and revised". In this sense, it can be argued that by using normative discourse, the EU is exporting alleged universal norms to the SEMP.

Gordon and Pardo (2013: 100) further suggest that the EU considers itself a normative power that "disseminates and helps uphold universal human rights norms and values and promotes global democratization", however, there is an "increasing divergence

²⁸⁷ For example, as Pace (2007: 64) pinpoints, Europe's successful model regional integration "has been taken as a norm to be emulate" in Euro-Mediterranean relations.

between EU's rhetorical normative goals and the Union's conduct on the ground". For example, Dias (2014: 55) regards the suspension of the Schengen agreement in order to prevent instability on the southern shore of the Mediterranean from spilling over into the Union as an indication of EU's failure of managing the migration flows. This case clearly contradicts the "normative power" discourse of the EU. This approach damages the EU's normative rhetoric of its revived policy and that makes the principle of "mobility partnerships" hollow as if it does not have any real content. Moreover, it can be asserted that that by using mobility partnerships, the Union is applying selective immigration in which the EU selects the immigrants on the basis of its needs and interests. In this sense, mobility partnerships can offer opportunities for desired migrants, on the one hand, it evicts the unwanted migrants from Europe, on the other.

5.3.2. EU as an Empire

One may claim that in the postcolonial era, the North/South has replaced the old East/West divide across the Mediterranean. The socioeconomic gap that separates the North from the South seems indeed to grow ever wider in the postcolonial era. This North/South divide, in a way, keeps the problems of the South away from the North. In this context, the Mediterranean is presented as a problematic and an uncivilized place where the EU faces up to external threats coming from its Southern and Eastern neighbours that need to be contained. This gap and the belief of the Mediterranean as a zone of conflict prepare the foundations of EU's policies towards the region. In the past, the Mediterranean was seen as having a commercial unity and therefore, keeping the unity of the Mediterranean sea and securing trade routes were important for the colonial powers' commercial exchanges. Today, one can see similar concerns regarding the EU's Mediterranean policies. The Mediterranean has carried elements power, security and cultural hegemony for the former colonial powers of the EU. Therefore, the imperial interests of former colonial powers of the Union have tried to form the EU's Mediterranean policies in the postcolonial era. For example, one can see the reflections of the France's strategic position in the Mediterranean regarding the EU's Mediterranean policies such as the Sarkozy's initiative of the Mediterranean Union.

It can be asserted that the EU as an Empire tries to control its neighbourhood and "establish its rule in a radial manner" (Waever, 1997: 64) through differing policies. By using its attractive model of integration, the EU ties the Mediterranean countries into a system of

concentric circles and promotes its practices and values to its neighbourhood as the method of empires in pursuit of their own interests. Perceptions of the Union as a successful project create a magnet effect to the outside world. Through this magnetism, the EU finds itself a legitimate ground to promote its norms and values to the outside world, especially to its neighbourhood. It is due to this magnetic effect of EU integration that the EU can impose its silent disciplining power on its neighbourhood countries. Old empires presented themselves as a unitary power that promote peace and justice, today the EU, like them, is presenting itself as a peace and stability project and promotes its own model for bringing peace and stability to its neighbourhood. In this sense, the EU's Mediterranean policies can be seen as a project, where the EU uses its disciplining power to dominate its neighbourhood and to pursue its interests.

Zielonka (2001, 2006, 2008a) argues that the EU as an empire adopts a *mission civilisatrice* towards its neighbourhood. Presenting itself as a model that needs to be followed unconditionally may be seen as an important aspect that justifies and legitimizes the EU's *mission civilisatrice*. One may argue that today the EU, like empires did, uses the tools of mimicry and want its neighbours to copy its norms and values regardless of their content. In this sense, the EU's Mediterranean policies can be understood as civilizing missions where the EU seeks to control its neighbourhood, to maximize its economic gains and protect its own citizens from the potential threats generating from its neighbourhood through the rhetoric of projecting democracy and human rights i.e. through "civilizing them". By exporting its norms and values, the EU is again trying to civilize its southern neighbourhood. In this context, the EU puts itself to a superior position and wants its less developed southern neighbours to emulate its model. The EU's projection of model to the Mediterranean can be recognized as the EU's *mission civilisatrice*. In this framework, one may claim that the EU wants to civilize its less developed South and Eastern neighbours regardless of their local needs.

Colonization has opened a definitive North and South divide in the Mediterranean. Moreover, European colonialism was considered as the primary reason for world poverty and chronic underdevelopment in the SEMP. One can claim that inheritance of underdeveloped and unbalanced economies have aggravated the backwardness and weaknesses of the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries. The colonial legacy of the political, social and economic structures, the poor fit between postcolonial territorial demarcation and population distributions in the SEMP has created conflicts and problems in the region. Del Sarto (2015:

221) claims that the history of European colonialism makes the “EU’s supposedly benevolent rule transfer to the south particularly problematic”. Del Sarto (ibid.) considers “the Union’s traditionally protectionist trade policies on agriculture, the prioritization of energy security over reforms, and its weakness in resolving conflicts” in its wider neighbourhood as the evidences of her claim. Pace (2010: 618) further argues that Western colonial rulers left its print on Mediterranean region by political, economic, cultural, and military manifestations. The imperial approach of the Union’s policies rather than remedying the legacy of colonialism, in a way, further exacerbates this legacy.

The EU’s export of its rules and practices, just like an empire, can be regarded as imposing its model and its way of doing things over its neighbourhood. After the Arab uprisings, at least in rhetoric, as Behr (2012b: 77) claims, the EU has altered “its role from that of a ‘stability promoter’ to that of a ‘democracy promoter’” with the aim of creating a “democracy partnership” in its southern neighborhood. With this policy change, the EU tries “to avoid the accusations of double standards that it often encounters regarding its Southern neighbourhood” (ibid.). However, what the EU aims to support is still unclear and the “deep democracy” concept “has been defined in various and rather vague terms” (Wetzel and Orbie, 2012: 2). Wetzel and Orbie (2012: 2) claim that “whether the EU aims to promote a certain democratic model”, and “what the EU promotes in practice” is still unclear. In this sense, if the EU wants to avoid the accusations of double standards and one-sided, it should alter its relations with the SEMP’s and build the relations based on partnership where the SEMP’s have equal voice, and reference to universal principles rather than European norms. The relationship should not be based on asymmetrical interdependence and the EU’s exercise of political conditionality.

5.3. Normativity versus Neocolonialism

One may claim that the goals and instruments of the EU’s policies towards the Mediterranean in the postcolonial era reflect the neocolonial tendencies of the European Union. One can assert that the EU pursues policies which are based on a centre-periphery logic, asymmetrical relations and mostly accompanied a normative claim; ie policies marked by a neocolonial tendency. In this sense, the EU’s Mediterranean policies contribute to the strengthening of authoritarianism against terrorism and control of migration flows. Authoritarian regimes were considered as essential to keep the things in order in the SEMP’s.

That is basically the reason that the EU turned blind eye on the violations of the norms that the EU promoted. As Dias (2014: 40) argues in the end, the EU contributes to the “reproduction of the status quo” in the region, and it further creates “insecurity and instability” in its southern neighbourhood. For Cavatorta and Rivetti (2014: 621), that is why “the EU is far from being a normative actor”.

If one analyzes the EU’s Mediterranean approach after the Arab uprisings, she/he realizes that the EU is quite replicating the previous policies. Security concerns, including migration issues, and the EU’s self interest remain at the top of the EU’s agenda towards its southern neighbourhood. Therefore, the revised version of the EU’s Mediterranean policies still reflect interests of the Union and its “vision on how the region should evolve” (Blockmans, 2013: 57). Generally, it can be claimed that the EU tries to act as a political guider to its neighbourhood and wants to reproduce itself through promoting its integration model and norms to its own periphery. In this sense, the EU acts to influence and change the behaviour of its periphery in its own interests. The EU is aiming to construct a common vision for the Mediterranean based on imposition of European norms and values. For Pace (2007: 666), “this constructed power is made possible through repeated reference to norms”. The EU’s projection of its southern neighbourhood can be seen in the EU’s Mediterranean policies prior to 2011 as well as in the revised ENP and in 2016 Global Strategy.

In the postcolonial era, it can be claimed that the EU forms its policies towards the Mediterranean mainly based on the civilization approach, which is related with construction of the self and the other; and the security approach. In this context, one can interpret these approaches as a neocolonial reading of the region by the EU. By promoting a Mediterranean narrative, which defined the Mediterranean as less than European as a region needs European guidance, the EU has attempted to enhance its sphere of influence while bringing security and stability to its neighbourhood. The EU also perceives the Mediterranean as a zone of conflict that should be contained. In this sense, the Mediterranean region is externally and politically constructed to serve the EU’s interests. The EU’s region-building attempt of invoking Mediterraneanism can be seen as part of Western style of dominating, restructuring and having influence over an area. In this context, the EU, by using the region-building approach, tries to promote a Mediterranean narrative and to create a Mediterranean civilization. The EU’s region-building attempt has also implied the supremacy of the EU as a model and can be considered as a foreign policy tool of the Union for seeking its self-interests.

Moreover, the EU may sometimes promote European norms and values at the expense of local norms. Therefore, normative power Europe can also be regarded as a form of Eurocentric cultural imperialism. One may claim that by promoting a Mediterranean narrative, the powers such as the EU, in a way, re-emphasize its old discourse of European superiority and domination over the South. At the colonial period, this Eurocentric discourse was applied through colonial expansion, imperialism and civilizing mission. In the postcolonial era, it seems that the same discourse is applied by the Union's policies towards its neighbourhood. Therefore, it is better to look the EU's Mediterranean policies through power and culture paradigms.

The EU's neocolonial approach can be traced in its trade agreements or foreign aid and its imposition of political or economic conditionality because these are tools for establishing and maintaining control over receiving countries. These tools can be used for the interests of the former colonial powers of the Union to secure their access to the SEMP, to prevent unwanted migration and to gain power in the region. In this sense, the EU wants to promote its norms and values beyond its borders and persuade its neighbours to take the reforms that best suit the EU's interests. It can be claimed that the EU acts as a neocolonial power and by using its leverage, it tries to project its integration model and attempts to dominate its southern neighbourhood. One may argue that by means of interest-driven policies, the EU claims to create an area of democracy and peace in its Southern neighbourhood. However, these powers also help the EU to gain advantage and re-build European hegemony over its Southern neighbourhood.

The EU's self-interested approach to the region is rooted in contradictions and creates a democratisation-stabilisation dilemma. Before the Arab uprisings, the EU contributed to reproduce the status quo in the region by turning a blind-eye on violations of political freedoms and human rights of the peoples of the SEMP. The EU could not promote security in the region, on the contrary, in a way, it facilitated instability. After the Arab uprisings, although the language adopted by the EU has changed, in practice, as mentioned above, ambiguity in the EU's democracy promotion policy raises questions about whether the EU can overcome democratisation-stabilisation problem. The EU's self-interested approach to the region shows that the EU is still reproducing asymmetrical relations of power and is regarding the SEMP as uncivilized in need of guidance and presenting them as a threat to European

security. In this sense, in the postcolonial period, the EU has to make substantial changes in its neighbourhood policies, wherein it has to be aware of that relations are a two-way process in which interests and needs of its partners have to be taken into consideration. A more equal relationship should be established to end the legacy of colonialism.

It can be argued that although the uprisings may challenge the policies of EU regarding Arab people, no fundamental change can be seen in the EU's approach towards the Mediterranean. The EU is still pursuing a twofold strategy where the Union identifies itself as normative power, and attempts to realize its political, economic and security interests. Therefore, one can see similar inconsistencies and dilemmas in the revived ENP. Moreover, in the postcolonial era, some see the uprisings as a response to the EU's attempt of dominating Arab societies through its alleged civilising mission and as a sign of ending postcolonialism. However, the region has entered into an uncertain transition period after the uprisings. The consequences of these uprisings in the long-run cannot be seen and therefore, it can be claimed that there may not be a break from the postcolonial era. Besides, after analyzing the EU's policies following the uprisings, one may see the neocolonial tendencies of the Union more clearly.

One may further claim that despite the rhetorical turn in the EU's political discourse, there is not a paradigm shift in EU's Mediterranean policies after the Arab uprisings. Moreover, while the revived ENP is more detailed than in the past policies and reflects a renewed concern with democracy promotion in the region, neither its language nor its substance seems to differ fundamentally from the EU's approach towards the region prior to the Arab uprisings. The EU is still attempting to prescribe its own integration model and promote its rules and values in its neighbourhood. As Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 134) argues "there does not seem to be any serious reflections on lessons learnt from past mistakes of supporting authoritarian regimes in the name of stability at the expense of the protection of human rights and civil liberties". Grevi (2014: 21) further claims that the EU is "taking stock of the geopolitics and geo-economics of its neighbourhood as a starting point for defining how best Europe can legitimately uphold its values and interests throughout those regions". Therefore, the EU's Mediterranean policies can be viewed as a one-way projection of Europe's interests and ideas upon others. It is thus top-down and Euro-centric.

When one analyzes the EU's approach to the Mediterranean after the uprisings, he/she can claim that despite the revised ENP's normative claims, the top down and Euro-centric attitude of the EU has not substantially changed. The EU still wants its neighbours to emulate its model and to embrace its values regardless of the needs of the locals in these countries and expect these countries to adopt them unconditionally. It appears that it is only in rhetoric that a change has taken place and the EU's policies on the Mediterranean have largely remained intact. It seems that the EU wants to portray itself as self-critical i.e. that it learned from its past mistakes and it is not trying to present itself as a model like it did in the past.²⁸⁸ However, in practice, the EU is presenting the same prescriptions in the existing frameworks with a make-up. Although the normative aims of the Union are emphasized in the rhetoric of its new Mediterranean approach, one may see that the rationale behind these aims are generally not normative and they are interest-driven and built on security concerns. Thus, the EU can better be understood as a neocolonial power that imposes its own model and establishes an asymmetrical relationship in a radial manner. One may claim that the EU's projection of its own norms and values can be considered as a new Western style of domination because the Union attempts to form a model that should be emulated by its neighbours.

²⁸⁸ "The EU does not seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for political reform, but it will insist that each partner country's reform process reflect a clear commitment to universal values that form the basis of our renewed approach. The initiative lies with the partner and EU support will be tailored accordingly" (European Commission, 2011b: 2-3).

CONCLUSION

This thesis has provided an analysis of the relationship between the EU and the South and Eastern Mediterranean Partners in the postcolonial era. It has shown how norms and interests are linked in the EU's approach to the Mediterranean and how these can be read as a continuation of the colonial logic – i.e. as neocolonial. This thesis has proceeded from the idea that if a country or entity establishes or maintains economic, military, political or cultural control over the postcolonial countries based on an asymmetrical relationship and creates relationships of subordination and dependence, this entity or country can be labeled as a neocolonial power. This study has revealed that in the postcolonial era, the relations between the EU and the SEMPAs reflect a neocolonial tendency because the EU acts with the assumption that it knows better than its SEMPAs, and therefore it has a moral duty to impose and export the Union's norms towards them.

The study has questioned whether the EU's Mediterranean policies serve the neocolonial interests of the Union and, how the normative rhetoric legitimizes these neocolonial tendencies. In the postcolonial era, the North/South divide has replaced the old East/West divide. In the Mediterranean, this division has made the North design policies for keeping the problems of the South away from itself. This study has attempted to find out the link between the EU's policies in the Mediterranean and the neocolonial tendencies of the Union and its member states. It has argued that the EU is following a twofold strategy towards the SEMPAs: it identifies itself as normative power, and it tries to realize its (and its member states') political, economic and security interests, at the same time. In this sense, the EU's interests and its normative rhetoric usually go together in its Mediterranean policies. This study has argued that although the EU seems to promote human rights, the rule of law and democracy to the SEMPAs, the EU's Mediterranean approach is mostly based on the traditional agenda that aims at preserving the status quo in the Mediterranean and protects itself from the spill-over effects of Mediterranean problems. In this regard, it can be claimed that the Union's main concern is stability of the SEMPAs; in other words, it pursues its own interests. By supporting the status quo, the EU could not put its normative rhetoric into action in its Mediterranean policies. Therefore, the normative claims of EU's Mediterranean approach have been questioned here.

As old empires presented itself as a unitary power promoting peace and justice, in the postcolonial era, the EU also presents itself as a peace and stability project and promotes its own model for bringing peace and stability to its neighbourhood. In this sense, the EU can be understood as a neocolonial power that imposes its own model and establishes an asymmetrical relationship in a radial manner. Just like imperial powers legitimized their rule over the countries, today the EU is trying to project its integration model, its values and its own understanding of norms – as “the normal way” that has to be followed – to the world, especially to its neighbourhood. The imperial approach can explain the EU’s interest-driven strategies under the coating of normative aims in its neighbourhood. The EU’s projection of its values can be considered as a new Western style of domination and a civilizing mission based on the assumption that that the peaceful, civilized, developed regional integration model of the EU gives it the (legitimacy) authority to define what constitutes the best practices with regard to region-building, protection and promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. However, this projection’s normativity is very questionable.

Today the EU has its own project towards the Mediterranean region where it aims to construct a region that it can control, just like European powers did in colonial times. This study has argued that this region-building project reminds colonial powers’ standard of civilization, and, the EU, by using region-building approach, aspires to establish a standard of behaviour in the South and Eastern Mediterranean today. This project can be regarded as the contemporary “Western style of dominating, restructuring and having authority and influence” (Said, 2003: 2-3) over an area, i.e. it amounts to a new type of colonialism which can be named as neocolonial. In this context, the EU, by using the region-building approach, tries to regulate the Mediterranean through setting its own model of integration as a model to be followed and transform the region in civilisational terms. In a way, the EU, based on its values such as democracy, the rule of law or human rights and its model, attempts to civilize the South and Eastern Mediterranean countries. In this sense, this civilizational thinking can also be regarded as the Union’s neocolonial behaviour in which the EU sees itself as a model for the world due to its integration model and its norms.

In the postcolonial era, the EU presents itself as the superior part and presents the South and Eastern Mediterranean as weak and in need of its guidance. This study has asserted that the EU is using an Orientalist approach in pursuing its Mediterranean policies. Through these policies, the EU constructs an asymmetrical relationship based on an alleged superiority

on the part of the EU as a peaceful, civilized, developed region while constructing the Southern Mediterranean as an uncivilized, underdeveloped, backward and conflict-ridden region (Cebeci, 2017: 60). The EU's projection of its values and norms to the Mediterranean can be seen as an important aspect that justifies and legitimizes the EU's mission civilisatrice. With its self-proclaimed civilizing mission, the EU tries to project its own understanding of norms and its own integration model with the discourse of bringing peace and stability to various regions; conditionality based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This might be interpreted as a continuation of the colonial logic albeit through other means.

On the other hand, contrary to the old empires' coercion in their policies, the EU pursues its Mediterranean policies through persuasion, cooperation and dialogue, and it promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In this sense, depending on the member states' (especially former colonial powers') interests, the EU acts normatively in some cases. The assessment of EU's policies towards the Mediterranean shows that the EU both acts as a normative power and pursues interest-driven policies, and this means that it actually acts neocolonially. This study has portrayed the international identity of the European Union both as a "(neo)imperial political construction" and "sui generis political entity". It has claimed that the EU's identity displays how the EU's Mediterranean approach of the European Union follows a quasi-imperial pattern of concentric circles, in which the EU exports its norms and rules in a "radial manner" (Waeber, 1997: 67), which might be seen as a neocolonial attempt.

One can argue that in the postcolonial era, the relationship that the EU establishes with its Mediterranean partners carries the characteristics of neocolonial practice as this relationship is mainly based on asymmetrical, Euro-centric, centre-periphery, and, interest-driven logic. This study has also revealed the EU's neocolonial intentions in its Mediterranean approach. The EU seeks to control this neighbourhood and to exert its influence in the SEMP through negotiations, persuasion, cooperation, limited invitation and asymmetric relations, which may be called as neocolonial. This study has argued that that the Union pursues policies which are mostly accompanied by a normative claim. The EU's policies in the South and Eastern Mediterranean display how the Union pursues its interests through a normative coating just as it had been in the case in colonial times; through the logic of mission civilisatrice.

This thesis has provided an analysis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which may be considered as a region-building process, designed on the principles of regional multilateralism and formal equality between the states. It has claimed that, within the EMP framework, although both the EU language and its intentions seem to be normative, in practice, mainly due to the differences between the shores of the Mediterranean, the EMP became a one-sided policy where only the EU had voice. Even though the EMP stressed the notion of partnership, this did not come into in practice. In general, the EMP was designed, implemented and financed by the EU. Therefore, the Euro-centric nature of the EMP can also be considered as neocolonial. In this sense, the EMP can be regarded as a neocolonial practice caught in a postcolonial discourse.

On the other hand, in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the self-interest of the EU is more evident. With the ENP, the EU seeks to reach out across its borders and to influence its neighbours by offering a stake in the internal market, without having a voice in the decision-making processes, depending on their performance and ambition. Within the ENP, the EU in a way, creates the centre-periphery relationship between itself and its neighbourhood. Moreover, it can be argued that contrary to the normative pretext of the EMP, the ENP is mostly an interest-driven policy. In this sense, one may claim that the ENP can be regarded as neocolonial because of the relationship of subordination and dependence, the interest-driven logic, and Euro-centric design of the policy.

The third policy that the EU uses to deal with the Mediterranean is the Union for the Mediterranean. The initial design of Sarkozy's plan of Mediterranean Union can be regarded as the neocolonial attempt of France to gain control over the Mediterranean. Therefore, this design was against the normative rhetoric that underpinned the EU's relations with the Mediterranean under the framework of the EMP. Nevertheless, the Mediterranean Union in Sarkozy's terms was not accepted as such and finally it was transformed into the UfM. The UfM's rhetoric is different from the Union's ENP documents where the EU's interest have been clearly emphasized. In this sense, one can assess this change as a return to the normative rhetoric of the EMP. However, as in the EMP, the normativity of the UfM has not actually been realized in practice, mainly due to the fact that the UfM has become a project-based policy between the EU and the SEMP.

This study has also claimed that after the Arab uprisings, despite the revised ENP's normative claims, the top down and Euro-centric attitude of the EU has not substantially changed. Although the EU wants to portray itself as self-critical regarding the Arab uprisings, in practice, the EU has presented the same prescriptions in the existing frameworks with some minor changes. In this sense, although the EU emphasizes normative aims in its new approach towards the Mediterranean, the rationale behind these aims can mostly be regarded as interest-driven and built on security concerns. The study has considered the revised ENP of 2011 as a combination and repackaging of the existing policies. Moreover, with the 2015 ENP Review and Global Strategy, the EU has moved further away from its normative claims by adopting a pragmatic approach. One may see the EU's self-interest in these frameworks where the EU is still regarding the Mediterranean as a source of instability and tries to stabilize and dominate it.

The norms and interests are closely linked in the EU's approach in the Mediterranean. After analyzing the EU's Mediterranean policies, this study has claimed that despite the normative aims of the Union being emphasized in the rhetoric of the EU's Mediterranean policies, in practice one may realize the motive behind these aims are interest-driven and therefore, can be considered as neocolonial. Despite the claim of normativity and formal equality of the partnerships, the policies are mostly Euro-centric and based on a center-periphery approach where the relations between the EU and the SEMP are asymmetrical. Such an asymmetry enables the EU to impose its own understanding norms, regulations and model on its neighbourhood.

The Union's successful project creates a magnet effect to the outside world. It is due to this magnetic effect of EU integration that the EU can impose its power on its South and Eastern Mediterranean and attempt to civilize the SEMP. The EU, by projecting its practices, tries to reproduce itself and aims to secure its own interests in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, and in this sense, it demands the SEMP to fulfill the conditions which are set by the Union itself. It can be claimed that representing the South and Eastern Mediterranean as in need of the Union's guidance for peace and prosperity can be considered as similar to the colonial, civilizing discourse. Thus, the imperial ideology behind the EU's Mediterranean policies can easily be seen. In this sense, the EU, acting as a quasi-empire, tries to control its neighbourhood and establish its rule in a radial manner through differing policies. By using its attractive model of integration, the EU ties the SEMP into a system of concentric circles and

promotes its practices and values in its neighbourhood, which resembles the method of empires in pursuit of their own interests.

This thesis has claimed that in the postcolonial era, the EU's Mediterranean policies cannot be explained without reference to the neocolonial interests of the EU. Although the EU does not apply colonial practices, it continues to act with the colonial logic through the use of other means. In this sense, the EU is mainly pursuing its Mediterranean policies under the claim of normativity, just like the European claim to civilization in colonial times. Adopting a normative language does not automatically make the EU a normative power, as in the case of the EU's practices regarding the SEMP. If the EU wants to avoid the critique of being a neocolonial power in its Mediterranean approach, it should not impose its model and best practices as a value system on the SEMP without full consideration of their local characteristics, and, moreover, it should not see itself as the superior part in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The EU has to become genuinely self-critical, design self-reflexive and inclusive policies regarding the South and Eastern Mediterranean, and establish a new relationship based on equal footing between the Union and the SEMP. This thesis suggests that future research should focus on the critique of the EU's Eurocentric approach towards the Mediterranean.

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