

**T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ**

AB SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI

THE ENP AS A PART OF THE EU'S SECURITY POLICY

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

ESENGÜL GÜLLER

İSTANBUL-2019

T.C.

**MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AB SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM
DALI**

THE ENP AS A PART OF THE EU'S SECURITY POLICY

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

ESENGÜL GÜLLER

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. EMİRHAN GÖRAL

İSTANBUL- 2019



TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Müdürlüğüne

Enstitünüz, Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı ~~Türkçe /~~ İngilizce Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencisi **Esengül Güller**, tarafından hazırlanan, “**The ENP as a Part of the EU’s Security Policy**” başlıklı bu çalışma, ~~27.11.2019~~ 27.11.2019 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda **OY BİRLİĞİ / OY-ÇOKLUĞUYA BAŞARILI** bulunarak aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Jüri Üyeleri:

Doç. Dr. Emirhan GÖRAL

Danışman

Prof. Dr. Münevver CEBECİ

Jüri Üyesi

Doç. Dr. Catherina Macmillan

Jüri Üyesi

Onay
Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Dörtan
Müdür
ENSTİTÜSÜ

27/11/2019.....tarih ve 2019/30 sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararı ile onaylanmıştır.

ABSTRACT

The main aim of this study is to find out whether or not, and to what extent the European Neighbourhood Policy contributes to European security in the light of effects of changing international structure on European scale. To that end, a neo-realist approach is applied in the study, and it is argued that in which ways the changing political structure affects foreign and security policies and security perceptions of European great powers since the end of the Cold War, and in which ways the European Neighbourhood Policy, especially its sub-policy the Eastern Partnership, has influence on these perceptions.

The first chapter of the thesis defines basic neo-realist assumptions and two other important concepts, namely security and neighbourhood, in order to draw a framework for evaluate European security. Following part of the first chapter analyses the current political structure in multipolar Europe and policies of European great powers to examine the environment in which the European Neighbourhood Policy/the Eastern Partnership is pursued. The second chapter defines main motivations, aims and tools of the Policy from neo-realist perspective, and its geopolitical components. In light of assumptions of these chapters, the last chapter argues role of the European Neighbourhood Policy to provide European security by evaluating the recent Ukrainian crisis, taking Russia's policies and perceptions on the Policy into account.

To conclude, this study claims that the European Neighbourhood Policy in multipolar structure of contemporary Europe is counter-productive for European security, creating geopolitical competition and new threats based on the traditional understandings of security.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın öncelikli amacı, değişen uluslararası sistemin Avrupa ölçeğindeki yansımaları ışığında Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın Avrupa güvenliğine ne derecede katkı sağladığını ve/veya katkı sağlayıp sağlamadığını ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, tez neo-realist bir yaklaşımı kullanmakta ve uluslararası sistemin çok-kutuplu yapısının Avrupa'nın büyük güçlerinin dış politika ve güvenlik politikalarını ve güvenlik algılarını Soğuk Savaş'ın bitiminden beri nasıl etkilediğini ve Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın buna nasıl etki ettiğini tartışmaktadır.

Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde, Avrupa güvenliğini incelemek için kullanılan neo-realist teorinin temel varsayımları ve çalışmanın eksenini oluşturan iki önemli kavram, güvenlik ve komşuluk, incelenmiştir. Sonrasında, ise Avrupa'nın çok kutuplu yapısı ve Avrupa'nın büyük güçlerinin politikaları açıklanarak Komşuluk Politikası'nın yürütüldüğü politik ortama ışık tutulmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci bölümde ise Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın oluşumu, amaçları ve araçları neo-realist varsayımlar ışığında incelenerek, içerisinde barındırdığı jeopolitik unsurlar ve Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkelerin politika üzerindeki etkileri tartışılmıştır ve politikanın yürütüldüğü çok-kutuplu sistem mevcut güvenlik politikalarını göz önünde bulundurarak incelenmiştir. Bu tartışmalar ışığında, dördüncü bölümde örnek olay üzerinden, yani Ukrayna krizi üzerinden, Rusya'nın dış politikası ve güvenlik algılamaları ışığında Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın Avrupa güvenliğine katkı sağlayıp sağlamadığı incelenmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma günümüz Avrupa'sındaki çok-kutuplu sistem içerisinde Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası'nın, Rusya ile jeopolitik bir rekabete yol açarak modern güvenlik anlayışına dayanan yeni tehditler yarattığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure to thank my thesis committee and its respectable members who made this thesis possible.

I would like to express my deep appreciation to Prof. Dr. Münevver Cebeci. Despite her very intensive schedule, she spared time to review my study. I am grateful to her for the contributions she displayed through encouragement and constructive comments. Her precious advises enriched my study.

I am also grateful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Catherine Macmillan for her invaluable contributions for the study, and for her supportive and encouraging attitude. This thesis was inspired by her valuable advises.

And, I wish to express my sincere and deepest gratitude to my adviser, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emirhan Göral. He has been a constant source of inspiration. I will always appreciate his irreplaceable academic assistance and support for my thesis from the beginning. Without his patience, kindness, encouragement and support, this thesis would have been impossible to finish.

I also owe my sincere gratitude to all respectable members, academicians and instructors of Marmara University- Institute of European Studies since they shaped my academic development through the invaluable knowledge they provided.

Finally, my most enduring debt is to my mother and sister for their esteemed support and understanding in my times of turbulence, and to my late father whose memory has always given me courage in my most desperate times.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	ii
INTRODUCTION	1
Research Question and Methodology	7
CHAPTER 1: NEOREALISM AND THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF EUROPE	11
1.1. Neorealism’s Basic Assumptions	11
1.1.1. International system is anarchic	11
1.1.2. States are the primary international actors	13
1.1.3. States are functionally similar	14
1.1.4. States are Rational Actors	15
1.1.5. Significance of Power	16
1.2. Security; A subjective concept	20
1.3. The Notion of Neighbourhood	27
1.4. The New Geopolitics of Europe	33
1.4.1. The US: Offshore Balancer in Multipolar Europe	38
1.4.2. The European Union in Multipolarity	41
1.4.3. The Russian Federation as a Part of Multipolar Europe	44
CHAPTER 2: THE ENP: AN OVERVIEW	48
2.1. Creation of the ENP	48
2.2. Instruments of the ENP	53
2.3. Geographical dimensions of the ENP	55
2.3.1. Union for Mediterranean	55
2.3.2. Eastern Partnership	56
2.4. Neo-Realist Explanations of the ENP	59
CHAPTER 3: THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ENP AND EUROPEAN SECURITY	65
3.1. The Significance of the Wider Europe As A Geopolitical Space	69
3.2. European Neighbourhood Policy: A Geopolitical Strategy	72
3.3. Wider Europe- The ENP and European Security	76
CONCLUSION	81

INTRODUCTION

Shortly after the Second World War, continental Europe, like the whole world, entered completely new era shaped by the rivalry between two superpowers, the United States (US hereafter) and the Soviet Union (USSR hereafter). Throughout that era, named as the ‘Cold War’, the sense of security and threat perceptions of the states were shaped under existing circumstances in a divided and polarized Europe, and revolved around the conflict between the Western Bloc led by the US and the Eastern Bloc led by the USSR (Cottey, 2007). Since during the Cold War the superpowers’ rivalry was intense and the danger of war was real, the European security agenda was dominated by highly militarized confrontation between these superpowers (Buzan, 1991). In parallel with this atmosphere, European security was defined in military terms and generally evaluated from the realist perspective (Gartner& Hyde-Price& Rietter, 2001).

However, the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, led the sense of international order as well as the European security to be reshaped fundamentally. The end of the polarisation between two blocs and the disappearance of the USSR threat meant the disappearance of the military threat as well for the Western Europe. Many interpreted this as a beginning of a new era in which Europe was flourishing ‘whole and free’, leaving its history marked by conflict, violence, and war behind. The peaceful and democratic German unification, the demise of the East-West conflict, withdrawal of military forces from Central Europe and decrease in defence budgets of states, for optimists, were signifying the end of international politics dominated by Realpolitik (Hyde-Price, 2007).

Within this peaceful atmosphere of the early 1990s, another propulsive force has become more visible; globalisation (Hyde-Price, 2007). Under the roof of globalisation, increasing and deepening interdependence in terms of economy and politics and intense transnational social transactions, it was argued that the traditional sense of identity and feeling of belonging have transformed to a new global understanding. Moreover, for some, these

circumstances also referred to the collapse of the Westphalian sense of the nation state surrounded by territorial borders and based on a strong sense of sovereignty by eroding the distinction between domestic and international politics.

Under these circumstances liberal/idealist assumptions about European security and politics have gained dominance. According to liberal thinkers, European states have taken lessons from their bloody and hostile past, and they have been able to change for the better. From then on, in their view, war was unthinkable between European powers, assertive nationalism and strong sense of sovereignty in the age of globalisation have been mitigated by pooled sovereignty, multi-level governance, highly institutionalised economic and political relations, and powerful multinational cooperation. As in the entire world, liberals argued, security could be achieved by soft power and consensus, not by military confrontation and war (Hyde-Price, 2007).

Actually, the collapse of the USSR was regarded as not only the end of the Cold War, but also the victory of Western values and norms, of a liberal/idealist world order, rendering the logic of balance of power, accumulating power, brutal anarchy, the self-help system and other Realpolitik concepts meaningless.

Indeed, through the end of the Cold War, realists expected that the European Community (EC hereafter) would disintegrate in the absence of a common enemy that had kept them together, pushing to cooperate under the US security umbrella during the Cold War. Because, the EC was a product of the Cold War bipolarity. Moreover, most of realist thinkers assumed that the world, specifically Europe, would turn its unstable past in the shadow of multipolarity that it had experienced before the Second World War. For example, one of the leading realist thinkers, Mearsheimer (1990) argued that it would be witnessed an intense security competition between European powers in the lack of balancing rivalry of the Cold War, and the transition from bipolarity to unbalanced multipolarity would bring about instabilities in Europe. On the other hand, Waltz (2000) predicted a form of modified multipolarity resulting from the collapse of the USSR, leaving the US as the sole superpower. He also argued that bipolarity would continue to exist 'but in altered state' because of the presence of Russia as the successor of the USSR (cited in Hyde- Price, 2007: 4).

However, contrary to realist predictions, the EC has successfully managed to deepen its cooperation with the entrance of the Maastricht Treaty into force in 1992, turning it to the European Union (EU hereafter) on a three-pillar structure. On the other hand, the EU has enlarged to the east with the accession of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs hereafter) from the former Soviet bloc. Even though Europe lost its traditional enemy with the collapse of the USSR, Russia as the successor was still an important actor for Europe. After the demise of the USSR, relation between Russia and Europe have changed radically. Shortly after coming to power, President Yeltsin, who was the first president of the Russian Federation, adopted a strong pro-Western attitude and initiated domestic reforms aiming at a Western-style democracy and free market (Flenley, 2005). To provide closer relations had importance for Yeltsin in his foreign policy. As a consequence of this type of change in Russia's attitude towards the West, Russia was not seen as a military threat to European security and order any more. As Baranovsky (2000: 447) states that 'for a time, yesterday's foes were regarded as the reliable friends'.

Despite all these peaceful developments flourishing liberal/idealist hopes for 'perpetual peace', Europe has not turned into a post-modern Kantian paradise of peace (Hyde-Price, 2007). The end of the Cold War, instead, was followed by a number of new challenges. First, the conflicts that broke out in the Balkans in the early 1990s led Europeans to understand all military threats had not disappeared with the end of the Cold War. For instance, the Yugoslavia crisis was the first major security problem that Europe faced after the Cold War (Bowker, 2012). Apart from the Yugoslavia crisis, the world has witnessed several other internal conflicts within states like Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Afghanistan and countries of the Caucasus and West Africa since the 1990s. As Cottey (2007) claims, in the post-Cold War era wars between major European countries or superpowers was replaced by these 'new wars', and these new wars with their regional and international effects began to pose challenges to the European security.

On the other hand, despite improvements in the relations with Russia witnessed throughout the 1990s the 'new partnership' between Russia and Europe remained limited because of both Yeltsin's reaction to NATO's eastward enlargement, and Russia's policy towards and interventions in its neighbours, like its brutal war in Chechnya or annexation of

Crimea. Under the leadership of Putin, relations became much closer but remained still limited. Since 2000, Putin began to pursue more a pragmatic and assertive foreign policy based on shared interests and economic priorities towards Europe (Flenley, 2005). The second element which has reshaped the relations is Russia's re-emergence as an energy super power under the Putin's leadership. Europe's high dependence on Russian energy resources has appeared as a problem for the Europe (Baran, 2007), because Putin uses Russia's advantage as a political tool of his assertive foreign policy in order to preserve Russia's 'privileged interests' in its 'near abroad', and also to affect European countries manner, preventing them from speak with one voice with regard to their national interests. While Russia has risen as one of the great powers of Europe, the increased power of regional actors like China, Japan or Brazil has been witnessed, or of intense regional cooperation movements as a reaction to eroding effects of globalisation within the evolving post-Cold War structure of the system.

Although the demise of the organisation was expected, NATO remained its existence by transforming itself in accordance with the new security environment, taking new roles evolved around 'out-of-area' operations (Bowker, 2012). However, it has lost its clear purpose and strategic rationale in the absence of concrete enemies. Therefore, compared to the Cold War era its role in Europe's security architecture has been greatly reduced.

Another certain feature of that period of uncertainty after the Cold War was the 'war on terror' led by the US in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks which targeted itself. The following military operations towards Afghanistan and the American invasion of Iraq without regarding international society and international rules has undermined the trust in international organisations and in liberal norms like the rule of law, respect for sovereignty, democracy, independence, freedoms, and so on. These developments have also caused to questions about the validity of pooled sovereignty, multi-level governance and the competence of the EU, creating a difference in opinion and manner of member states towards American policy in accordance with their national interests. On the other hand, the process starting with the motto of the 'war on terror' triggering a new polarisation based on cultural and regional differences among civilisations.

Under these circumstances and in this atmosphere, America's attention has shifted from Europe to a wider world scale as a sole superpower. The US is playing a role of 'off-shore

balancer' rather than being an onshore power in Europe (Hyde-Price, 2007: 4). In this emerging atmosphere, European security is essential but no longer vital for the US (Biscop, 2019). Therefore, European powers, especially great ones- France, Germany, Russia, the UK- have taken new roles for themselves in the emerging post-Cold War system, finding wider ground for seeking their national interests. In contrast to realist predictions, the new international system is not based on a harsh anarchic structure in which unbalanced multipolarity flourishes, creating severe security competition. Instead, as Buzan (1991) identifies it, under the mature anarchy and in the absence of potential hegemon Europe can be characterised as a 'balanced multipolarity' (Hyde- Price. 2007).

In this period of ambiguity, in contrast to realist expectation, the EU has taken steps towards both deepening and widening. What is generally named the 'big bang enlargement' took place in 2004 with the accession of ten CEECs, and it was followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. After the accession of the new ten members, the sense that the Union has reached its membership limit, and that both the EU and the new member states would need a long time to adapt themselves became more widespread (Dannreuther, 2008). Until then, enlargement was used as a successful foreign policy tool for providing stability and security in Europe, as clearly stated in the 2002 Wider European Initiative; 'The current enlargement is the greatest contribution to sustainable, stability and security on the European Continent' (European Commission:3). However, after the fifth enlargement wave, a general opinion became more visible that the promise of membership was not sustainable and the EU would need ways for the coming decades to export the prosperity, stability and security created within the Union (Dannreuther, 2008). Moreover, a need for a new policy that would serve the EU is aim to expand security and stability to its neighbours was also underlined in the EU's first security strategy, the document approved in 2003 by the European Council that defines the major threats and security objectives of the EU (Smith, 2005& Comelli, 2007). According to the European Security Strategy, building security in the EU's neighbouring countries was one of the ultimate objectives of the EU to provide its security because of geographical proximity (Comelli, 2007). In other words, the countries on the borders of the EU were suffering from the problems that were defined as major challenges and threats to the EU's security, so the EU needed a strategy to deal with these threats in its neighbours; 'even in the era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interests that countries on our borders are

well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in crime flourished dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe' (European Commission, 2003:35).

In the end, in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP hereafter) was launched to meet the needs for exporting security, stability, and prosperity to EU's neighbours and, by so doing, for providing the EU's security. Through the ENP, the EU aims at providing security and prosperity in its neighbours by creating 'a ring of friends' and preventing the emergence of a new division in Europe without offering membership (Smith, 2005). Since the ENP emphasises permanent prevention and stabilisation and gives importance to geography, it cannot be seen separately from European security. In addition, contrary to the general view that gained support especially after the end of the Cold War that a territory and territory-based security notion had lost its importance, through the aims and motivations of the creation of the ENP it can be seen that territory and geographical proximity are still important.

The ENP, indeed, was launched after the fifth enlargement to deal with relations between European and non-European countries without creating new dividing lines as those of the Cold War. Initially it was assumed to go beyond traditional geopolitics when establishing intensified relations with the countries on the EU's periphery. However, in emerging new international system, circumstances have proved that; 'geopolitics still matters, and great powers are still playing power politics' (Biscop, 2019). Therefore, through its widening borders and effects of transformation in the European balance of power, the EU has have increasingly geopolitical overtone in its foreign policy, especially towards three regions in its periphery: the Western Balkans, the Eastern neighbourhood and the Mediterranean basin. The ENP was a designed policy targeting neighbour countries, namely outsiders or 'others', with its sub-policies the Union for Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. When considering changing political atmosphere and balance of power in the post-Cold War Europe, the Eastern Partnership has had a special importance for European security because of the presence of another great power in the continent, Russia. This is because, the Eastern Partnership covers the post-Soviet countries which are in-between states or overlapping neighbours between two great powers. That is, the EU's eastern periphery is the western periphery of Russia as well. Since these two actors as great powers of the new emerging European political structure have different

ideological, political, economic and security interests move beyond their borders including the post-Soviet area, the Eastern partnership has started to create the dynamics of spatial competition of geopolitics over the region based on power struggle, zero-sum logic, security dilemma, and so on. It was proved firstly by the Russian-Georgian war and then enhanced by the recent Ukrainian crisis, providing the EU to highly realised 'the dark side of force' (Biscop, 2019).

Research Question and Methodology

In light of the situation witnessed after the Cold War, the main question of this thesis is to what extent the ENP serves to European security within the emerging multipolar structure on the European continent, taking its sub-policy, the Eastern Partnership, into account. While doing so, the question of to what extent the Eastern Partnership reflects geopolitical implications will be examined from a neorealist perspective in order to evaluate whether the policy, as it stands, is a useful tool for providing European security in the EU's eastern neighbourhood or it is a counterproductive initiative creating geopolitical competition based on traditional security understandings by considering Russia's attitude towards region and the policy.

Realist theories evaluate international politics considering relations and interactions among powers, especially great powers. States, for realists, are the unitary actors playing key roles in international system while other actors like international or intergovernmental organisations are secondary with less importance. From a realist point of view, these kinds of entities are used by the unitary actors as a tool for facilitating the achievement of national interests or for maximising their relative power. The international system is anarchic in nature. There is no higher authority, namely world government, which states can apply to solve problems among them. Within this anarchic structure, even if there no is no higher arbiter, rules are set up by the stronger actors and obeyed by smaller ones. However, since each actor seeks to maximise its power to its survival, actors tend to conflict rather than cooperate. Similarly, rules in international organisations are created by the stronger members even if smaller actors have a right to speak, a chance to play greater role in international arena. The EU is, on the other hand, a federal structure nor only an intergovernmental entity, but it has a unique presence having supranational and intergovernmental features together. Therefore, in the contemporary

international system the EU is a hard case for realism, especially, considering its self-identification and emphasis on its 'normative' and 'civilian' power, aiming at overcoming the militarism and nationalism.

During the Cold War period, evaluating the EU from a realist lens was easier because there was intense rivalry between the world's two superpowers, the danger of war was real and polarisation on ideology and military was at the peak. The main threat to European states' security was Soviet aggression. Even the historical rivalry between France and Germany had a lower priority. After the devastating Second World War, all European countries were exposed to a harsh debacle in terms especially of their economic and military power. In that atmosphere, after taking the US's security guarantee under NATO's roof, European states had a sound basis for cooperation. From a realist perspective, Europe's rational actors pursued rational policies in accordance with their main national interests, such as survival and sovereignty.

However, since the end of the Cold War the international political structure has transformed to a completely different appearance. With the demise of bipolarity, and in the absence of a hegemonic effect of the US in Europe, the European security structure turned more to self-help system again in which states must look to their own resources and capabilities to safeguard their security and national interests. From a neo-realist point of view, in the system distribution of power can be changed from time to time, but the anarchic structure of the system endures. In the existing era, the sole superpower status of the US is certain while Germany and Russia beside France, and the UK have emerged as great powers in European scale, leading to a new multipolar structure on the continent. Although the EU has attempted to widen its presence in the new structure, its stronger members has begun to pursue more assertive and sometimes more independent foreign policies. Especially, Germany has emerged the strongest great power of the Union, and had dominance on decisions and policies of other members in accordance with its own interests. Therefore, in the thesis the ENP will be evaluated in parallel with the claim that 'the EU is as a lowest common denominator outcome where the real system reflects the interests of the predominant member states' (Duke & Vanhoonaeker, 2017:41), taking other European powers' policies and effects into account.

On the other hand, in the early post-Cold War period, due to the dominance of liberal/idealist assumptions and effects of globalisation it was argued that power politics and

geographical calculation about the balance of power, borders and sovereignty had been eroded. In parallel with this, the EU has been identified as a liberal norm maker and soft power. Thus the ENP has been highly regarded as a part of the EU's identity and politics with its tools, methods and aims. However, the ENP's geographical dimensions and motivations behind their creation arising from national ambitions and its thematic scope, on the one hand, recent developments like Russian aggression towards countries included in the ENP, on the other hand, have proved that geography still keeps its importance. Especially, the Russian annexation of Crimea was termed by Kaplan that 'geography's revenge' against post-Cold War Western idealism, and as the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, stated it: 'Politics has returned to Europe. History is back' (cited in Browning, 2018: 106). As a result, in the thesis the importance of geography and geographical proximity in the scope of the ENP will be questioned with regard to great powers' approaches in Europe from the neorealist perspective. Especially the Eastern Partnership of the ENP will be evaluated in terms of its geopolitical dimension for the purpose of examine the ENP's contribution to European security by comparing the EU's and Russia's objectives, interests and perceptions over the eastern overlapping neighbour countries. Therefore, the recent Ukrainian crisis will be argued with regard both to roles of the EU via its Eastern Partnership and motivations behind Russia's reaction as another great power of European multipolar system.

The main research method of this study will be literature-based research method, so primary and secondary sources will be used in order to identify the main concepts and evaluate the argument. The official EU documents will be used to examine the political priorities of the EU on the matter of its security and the ENP. Furthermore, related books, articles, and journals will be used to analyse dimensions of the EU's neighbourhood policy taking Europe's great powers' attitudes into consideration. On the other hand, the ENP is an active policy initiated in 2004. Thus, the current developments about the policy will be regarded and used as a living laboratory for the analysis, choosing the Ukrainian crisis to make assumptions.

The first chapter of this dissertation will be devoted to the theoretical explanation, that is, main neorealist assumptions for examining the current structure of Europe emerging from the end of the Cold War. Moreover, in the dissertation the other main concepts will be neighbourhood and security. Thus, a broader definition of security will be made, and then

neorealist security understandings will be tried to explain. Next, the concept of neighbourhood will be evaluated in geopolitical terms depending on the traditional security understandings of European powers. Besides, the concept will also be examined 'as a kind of relationship that removes threat' but keeps the distance (Kahraman, 2006:12) between insiders and outsiders or 'self' and 'others'. Then, in order to argue in which ways the EU conducts those concepts when pursuing its neighbourhood policy, the changing political structure and geopolitics of Europe on three main actors- the US, the EU and Russia- will be studied by considering neorealist assumptions.

In the second chapter, the creation of the ENP and motivations behind its creation will be studied. The ENP's geographic and thematic dimensions will be examined with a lens of neorealism after demonstrating its tools and methods. And then, it will be tried to make a neorealist explanation of the ENP on the basis of the Eastern Partnership, stressing its geopolitical implications.

The following part will cover evaluations on the Eastern Partnership, making comparison between its aims, effects and results in the light of Russia's perceptions about and reflections to the policy. Therefore, the Ukrainian crisis will be studied from a neorealist point of view to make evaluations about its contributions to European security on the basis of eastern neighbourhood.

Finally, in the conclusion part of the dissertation it will be tried to find out answers to the question whether the ENP is a useful foreign policy tool for providing Europe's security, or to what extent the policy has achieved security purposes of the EU in its eastern periphery.

CHAPTER 1: NEOREALISM AND THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF EUROPE

In order to evaluate to what extent the ENP contributes to European security from a neorealist perspective, in this chapter basic assumptions of neorealism will be argued. Then, two important concepts; security and neighbourhood, will be tried to explain. Later, to make assumptions in the following chapters about the link between the ENP and European security, current political structure in Europe will be examined.

1.1. Neorealism's Basic Assumptions

Realism is based on mainly four assumptions: states as unitary actors are the central units in the international relations; these actors seek power in the structure; the sphere of domestic politics is separate from the sphere of international relations; finally, anarchy is the determinant in the relations among states. Similarly, Guzzini (1993) summarises the basic realist assumptions as state-centrism, power, security, anarchy, and conflict rather than cooperation.

1.1.1. International system is anarchic

According to Waltz, anarchy is a line of demarcation between international and domestic politics, because domestic politics is implemented hierarchically (vertically) while international politics anarchically (horizontally) in the absence of a world government (Waltz, 1979). Anarchy in international relations means the lack of a higher authority or a supreme government, disorder in interstate relations, and horizontal relations among nominally equal sovereign states. As seen, anarchy is also related to sovereignty since international relations are actually external relations of sovereign states based on equality.

From a neorealist perspective, threats result from the anarchic structure of international system and also from the 'self-help' order which is the natural outcome of that system (Schweller, 1996). The anarchy is the main determinant in terms of emergence of security threats. For Waltz (1979), in international system, the absence of a higher authority that prevents states from using force against each other refers to anarchy which is principle feature of the system. Contrary to international level, in the hierarchical order, namely at national level, a legitimate authority exists. However, the lack of such an entity at international level leads states to protect their interests on their own, resulting in the self-help pattern.

Within the self-help system, since there is an absence of a central higher authority that prevents states from attacking each other or that regulates relations among them, states worry about their survival and security. Therefore, the self-help system creates an atmosphere of mutual insecurity and mistrust. Thus, states are in search for the ways which enable them to attain, protect and increase their security by increasing their power and capability. That is to say, the anarchic system forces states to pursue strategies for achieving security based only on their capability/power (Aydın, 2004). At that point, the security dilemma emerges.

Herz (1950) describes the situation of security dilemma as an atmosphere in which states tend to power maximisation because of not being sure of intentions and capabilities of others (Rynning & Guzzini, 2001). This attempt of a state to increase its power triggers other states' concerns about their security. As a result, reciprocal attempts for accumulating power bring security dilemma into existence, in which no party feels itself in security. According to Jervis (1999), even if parties do not aim at threatening each other, in this condition their feeling of insecurity is triggered. Mearsheimer (1994-95: 10), also, states that 'the most basic motive driving states is survival, and none of the states can never be sure about the other state will not use its offensive military capability'. As a result, the most important feature of the self-help system is uncertainty, and fear and concern which it brings along. Similarly, Stephen G. Brooks (1997) claims that the security dilemma arises from the 'worst case scenario'. According to Brooks (1997), the state as a rational actor would take the worst possibilities into account on the next steps taken by the state seeking power maximisation, and so would pursue policies in accordance with those.

This anarchic structure of the system, for neo-realists, is the main source of conflicts and wars as well. Nevertheless, states in anarchic system can cooperate with each other, establishing organisations in which there are hierarchical elements. Even in these kinds of organisations, states try to obtain their interests, because they are self-interested political identities. Moreover, establishing those organisations does not alter anarchic structure of the system, anarchy remains in larger scale. These institutions do not have independent power and autonomy, or effect on state behaviour, if so, they would be limited.

Griffits (2002:82) underlines that 'anarchy is a constant condition that explains continuity, not change', but distribution of power which determines the polarity of the system

can change over time. In parallel with this change, security competition among states can vary, but it will not be eradicated. According to neorealism, the most peaceful and stable structure under anarchy is the bipolarity. Waltz (2000) clarifies that by pointing out the Cold War period. During that bipolar system, the US and the USSR with their strong military capability and nuclear weapons had contributed to stability by setting up rules, and smaller and weaker states had obeyed them. Rather, he adds his predictions about the post-Cold War era that; ‘that unipolarity will fade and be replaced by a more typical multipolarity (2000:27). Nevertheless, multipolarity, for neorealism, is the most dangerous and unpredictable type of the distribution of power, creating instability and conflict. On the other hand, Buzan (1991) opposes these predictions of neo-realists’ about the post-Cold War era, and identifies the new era with the ‘mature anarchy’. Under mature anarchy, increasing number of strong states, which are characterized by high political cohesion and legitimacy, would have stable relations with each other (Buzan, 1991 cited in Öztürk 2014).

1.1.2. States are the primary international actors

Regardless of diversification in Realist theories, they declare the state as the main actor of international relations, and so main subject of security because of the central role that it performs in international politics. Kolodziej (2009) describes the modern states as the main actor having monopoly and legitimacy for applying legal violence.

There are two main reasons make states the main actors of international relations and so of the security relations. First and foremost, states have been the basic political structure of the world population. That is, without considering national, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural differences, people have preferred the state as the form of political organisation conducting and managing interactions among them (Kolodziej, 2009). These constituted forms in states have also been given the authority and legitimacy for use of force on behalf of individuals who have devoted themselves to those with loyalty. In this framework, states have undertaken the role for providing internal and external security and order by means of the legitimacy for use of force. This is the second main reason turning states into primary actors of the international relations from the realistic point of view.

Apart from being basic form of political organisation and having monopoly over legitimate use of power, there are two secondary reasons strengthening this central role of states.

In the first stance, as Kolodziej (2009) states, the recognition of states with their legality for use of force monopoly providing internal and external security and order is consolidated the primary positions of states by the international law. That is to say, states have sovereignty, legitimacy and authority over their territories divided by boundaries from each other, and this situation has legal base provided by various international legal documents. The second supportive reason behind the main positions of states arises when they fail to implement their main political and security functions on those issues. In concrete terms, there is no alternative construction or organisation that can perform those duties instead of states (Kolodziej, 2009).

As all branches of realist theory, neorealism also accepts states as the primary actors of the international relations even if it approves the presence and importance of other actors of international political system like international organisations, but giving them secondary positions. According to Waltz (1979), the structure of international politics is centred on the states. He claims that in order to identify a certain system, one or more units have to be chosen, and that is the state. What is more, because of requisites of political science, he consider states as the main actors with their determined characteristics. For neo-realists, international relations/politics are actually relations of states, especially of great powers. Rules in the system for other non-state actors including international organisations, the EU, the UN or the OSCE are defined and directed by states. Hyde- Price argues that: ‘International organisations are not actors in their own right, but they can function at times as vehicles for the collective interests of their most powerful member states’ (2007: 31).

1.1.3. States are functionally similar

Another basic assumption of neorealism is that states are functionally similar. This is closely related to the anarchic structure of the system, because all states are legally equal and relations between them are structured by the acceptance of sovereign independence on a horizontal base. Therefore, under anarchic circumstances all states exhibit similar functions, seeking to preserve their own national interests and security through attaining power (Guzzini, 1993).

The anarchic international system shapes and constrains states’ behaviours. However, under the same conditions of the system, all states react equally to systemic pressures. Neo-realists explain this using ‘billiard ball model’ (Mearsheimer, 1994-94:48). Hence, they ignore

any cultural differences among states, differences in regime types like democratic or non-democratic. That is, states are like billiard balls crashing into each other and react equally to the other states and to the pressures of the anarchic system, even if they have different functions in the international system.

1.1.4. States are Rational Actors

Anarchic international system creates both constraints and opportunities on states' behaviours. States, over time, learn how to deal with those problems and how to utilise advantages of the system in which they perform. That is, they experience a process of 'strategic learning'. What is more, states become aware of to what extent that their behaviours affect others', and in return how theirs are affected by those of others.

In the anarchic self-help system, states as rational actors aim mainly at providing their security, survival and sovereignty. 'Security is best assured by maximising power so as to be able to eliminate or neutralise all potential rivals and establishing hegemony over one's region' (Hyde-Price, 2007:33). To that end, states, as rational actors, pursue strategies for maximising their power under systemic pressures posed by anarchy. Nevertheless, states are rational actors, they take into account that their strategies for maximising power would might be counter-productive, that is, would might lead to the creation of a hostile counter balancing attempts by others. Thus, states are not always in aggressive manner to maximise power. Instead, regarding cost-benefit account, they wait for an opportunity created by the system to maximise their power.

In the anarchic self-help system, the need of states for maximising their power prevents them to cooperate. Therefore, states, especially great powers, refrain from cooperation with the logic of relative gains. However, at times there is a low intensity security competition they tend more to cooperation rather than conflict. Such a situation is more probable when there is a hegemonic power in the system. Neo-realists describe this situation through the 'hegemonic stability theory'. According to this theory, international system is more likely to remain stable when a hegemon exercises leadership, either with diplomacy, coercion or persuasion (Sönmezoğlu & Bayır, 2014). This is because, the hegemon power with its supreme power has the ability to dominate the rules and arrangements of international political and economic relations. This is same in case of bipolarity when there are two superpowers that cannot surpass

each other. Therefore, these superpowers determine the rules and norms of the international system via institutions, organisations or alliances, and other powers in the system follow these rules as it happened in the Cold War period. At such times, small powers, since they are rational actors, find cooperation more beneficial for their interests. Since they lack the power capabilities in order to influence international order, smaller powers pursue policies enhancing their relative influence through cooperation.

1.1.5. Significance of Power

Unlike classical realists, neo-realists regard power as a tool rather than the final objective of states. Since the principle motivation of a state is to survive in the anarchic international system, that is to say, having power provides the state ways to attain circumstances in which it maintains its existence. Moreover, according to neo-realists, power has two important aspects; relational and relative. It is relational because it gains a sense if there are other actors that the actor is in competition with. It is relative because power gains importance and becomes measurable when compared to others' relative power. In concrete terms, having power is senseless in the absence of presence a rival threatening the survival of the actor.

What is more, according to classical realists, having power for a state equals to having military power. However, structural realism regards power as capabilities that the states have, and as composition of other elements beside military capability. For instance, Waltz (1979) describes power as a basket of capabilities consisting of military, economic and technological elements which are based on; size of population and territory, resource of endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence. Military capability of a state locates on the top rank of the power description, especially in that anarchic self-help international system. Nevertheless, military power cannot be attained or sustained without a strong economy or an effective and stable political structure. All these components and resources constitute one nation's potential power.

Actors seek to use their power potential to affect the conduct of others by threat or use of force directly, if they are capable, or they can try to use their potential indirectly by shaping the structural and situational context in which others perform and they have interests. While doing so, they try to affect preferences and behaviours of others, exercising some forms of influence to conduct an interaction that others would have not done otherwise. This is parallel

to overriding concern with security and survival in an anarchic self-help system. Therefore, through their power potential and capabilities, states aim to shape their external environment with regard to their national interests. This indicates that power not only refers to have military power bringing along the threat or use of force but also is a combination of other material capabilities for the purpose of exerting influence and control over others to affect their behaviours, preferences and foreign policy manners.

To what extent a state has power potential determines its place and role, and also its objectives in the system. In the international relations, according to distribution of power capabilities, there are some categories describing states; superpowers, great powers, middle powers and small powers. Small powers, in the system, are more vulnerable to systemic changes and worries more about their survival. Since they are aware of that they cannot obtain their security by relying solely on their limited capabilities and cannot affect the international system alone, they tend generally to cooperate with other states. Moreover, within the international organisations and alliances they are able to benefit much more from relative gains than the bigger states (Toje, 2010). Because they suffer from the lack of the ability to project their interests on a global scale with their limited capacities, they have high degree of support for international organisations and cooperation. Even though this kinds of actions broaden the field of manoeuvre and choice and minimize the cost of conducting foreign policies, they have some size-related obstacles within the international organisations or cooperation in the decision-making processes. For instance, in the EU, the system of weighted voting gives bigger members a greater political leverage. Rather, their smaller budget contributions compared to larger states make small states less influential while larger states have better position to influence outcomes both in weighed and equal weight voting system (Toje, 2010). On the other hand, geographical location of a small power is very important for its survival; locating between two rival super/great powers, being regarded as a 'buffer zone' can decrease the likelihood of its survival (Fazal, 2004).

Great powers, on the other hand, have the ability to exert their influence on a global scale with regard to their interests. They characteristically have military and economic strength along with diplomatic and soft power generating a certain degree of influence which is taken into consideration by small and other great powers before conducting their foreign policies.

Contemporarily, the US, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom are accepted as great powers because of their political, economic and military strength on a global scale. They are, moreover, the only states having permanent seats with veto power in the United Nations (the UN hereafter) Security Council. What is more, they are 'Nuclear Weapons States' meeting conditions to be considered so and to maintain their military expenditures. Even though Germany and Japan do not have permanent seats in the UN Security Council and nuclear weapons, they are among great powers of the world due to their large advanced economies and political leverage arising from their economic strength.

Besides having substantial power resources, mainly military and economic, there are some other characteristic features to define great powers. First, unlike small powers, great powers have interests going beyond the survival. That is to say, they take responsibility to shape their external environment within which they have interests, so they aim to direct, manage or at least to affect preferences and choices of other actors who perform in that environment, namely so-called their 'near abroad'. The second feature belonging to great powers' characteristics is a willingness to play a role for a collective good including their vital or non-vital interests, using their power capabilities (Hyde-Price, 2007). For instance, the EU starting from the 1990s has embraced the mechanism of 'conditionality' in order to shape its near abroad, considering long-term strategic and economic leverage on the post-communist East (Hyde-Price, 2007). After the Eastern enlargement, the conditionality mechanism was injected to its neighbourhood policy as the notion of 'more for more'. By doing so, the EU began to impose its political and economic order, especially addressing political and economic concerns of its most powerful member states, to shape its regional neighbourhood. Thus, the result has been an 'imposed' rather than 'mutually negotiated' (Browning, 2018; Haukkala, 2010).

Another categorisation to define a state's position and role in the international relations is superpower status. A superpower is a preeminent state among other great powers with its extensive ability to exert influence on the global scale that is arising from its combined-means of economic, military, technological, diplomatic and cultural strength. Superpowers have the capacity to project their interests anywhere in the world, are able to determine norms and rules of the international system, and able to attain the status of global hegemony (Krauthammer, 1991; Huntington, 2006).

In this changing status of the distribution of power capabilities, the balance of power is one of the core tenets both for classical and neorealist theories. Under the self-help anarchic international system, all states mainly aim to ensure their survival. Therefore, they attempt to prevent a potential hegemon, which could be a threat to them, from arising by balancing against it or against a coalition of states. Balancing could happen into two ways; internal and external. Internal balancing involves any efforts to increase the state's own economic, military or other capabilities in order to cope with its peer rivals while external balancing entails forming alliances or cooperating with other states to increase security. External balancing, on the other hand, takes place into two ways; hard and soft balancing. While hard balancing refers to military expansion, alliance building or financial support to allies, soft balancing is associated with cultivating potential strategic partners, building diplomatic understanding or cooperating with others in the international organisations against potential hegemon (Hyde-Price, 2007). Soft balancing is generally seen as involving soft power, namely power of persuasion, whereas hard balancing is based more on hard power. Hard power, according to Nye (2003, 2012), refers to threat or use of economic pressure, economic sanctions and even armed forces. Having hard power capabilities gives the state the ability to change other actors' domestic affairs and also foreign policy choices in parallel to its preferences. According to Joseph Nye (2012), hard power can be exerted through using 'carrots and sticks'. In contemporary Europe, regarding with the EU and the ENP, carrots involves the reduction of trade barriers or opening large European market as well as offering EU funds, while sticks are to implement economic sanctions, to exclude neighbours from huge European market, and so on. In doing so, actually the EU exerts its hard power on its neighbours to coerce them to act in ways which are different from the Union's preference. Mearsheimer argues that hard power is used as a way to balance of power in international system. Using hard power to shape the actor's external environment is closely associated with creation of 'sphere of influence'. The concept of sphere of influence refers to a region outside the borders of a political entity in which it intensifies its economic, military, diplomatic or cultural activities to establish a control over others to accommodate its interest. When considered the ENP, Pop (2009) claims that Russia regards the ENP and notably the Eastern Partnership as an attempt of the EU to establish and expand its sphere of influence against Russian national interests.

1.2. Security; A subjective concept

The only certain definition on the concept of security is that there is no common understanding agreed on (Dedeoğlu, 2014& Öztürk, 2014). As Gallie (1964) stresses, security is considered among ‘essentially contested concepts’, and these kinds of concepts are based on notions which do not bring out any common or certain outcome as a consequence of any discussion. That is, its meaning differs from any actor, unit, player and individual to another and even from one period of time to another. Its scope gets wider and deeper over time, covering individuals, societies, minorities, genders, information, environment and so on besides states and nations (Çıtak, 2014). This indicates that security is a multi-dimensional concept; each international relations theory analyses it from different perspective, considering its different dimensions (Baldwin, 1997). In other words, as Dr. Theresa Callan told in a lecture at the Portsmouth University (May 1, 2012), security is a subjective concept. In parallel to its subjective nature, the matter of what constitutes the threats to security is also subjective, and so the answer depends on the perceptions (Cottey, 2007). For instance, for examining security in terms of its referent object, some theorists place individuals or states in the centre of their analysis while others put the whole system. This situation is stated by Rothschild (1995:55) in the framework of ‘extended sense’; from 1990s, namely after the end of the Cold War, security concept has been broadened vertically from states to groups and individuals while horizontally from military threats to political, economic, social, environmental and humanitarian concerns with new subjects apart from nation-states, like regional/local governments, international and non-governmental organisations, markets, etc.

It is possible, however, to draw a general framework including some common aspects of different security definitions. Firstly, security is a term used as a crucial part of every individual and social phases of the human life. As Wolfers (1952:484) characterizes, security is ‘the absence of threats to acquired values’. With this aspect, it is regarded as a vital necessity for attaining and maintaining the existence and survival. That is, providing security means removing any possibility of insecurity targeting the survival of the referent object, ranging from deprivation, poverty, being exposed to violence, exploitation, to use of violence, torture, war, and so on (Dedeoğlu, 2014). These possibilities of insecurity bring along risks; depending on their perceived prospects of realisation, risks cause doubt and fear; every situation leading to fear is perceived as dangerous, and so dangers are considered as threats whether they are based

on reality or on perceptions. At that point, it is clear that making a definition of security separated from risk, danger, and threat cannot be possible. Especially, there is a close tie between concepts of security and threat. Most scholars argue that in case of the absence of a threat or 'other', the concept of security becomes pointless (Lipschutz, 1995). Like security, threats derive from facts, on one hand, and from perceptions, on the other hand. This, as well, leads to uncertainty of what security means.

Security, moreover, makes a sense related with objectives. In other words, the concept of security can be given a meaning according to how a subject identifies itself, what it aims to be and under which circumstances it can achieve its purpose. That is to say, perception of security is actually associated with how the subject defines its existence, its identity, survival and goals, and those of 'other'. Therefore, as these definitions change, meaning and perception of threat and security change as well, and this situation leads to new search for measures with the purpose of providing security. All in all, this underlines the one of the most important part of defining security; the answers to the questions of 'security for whom?' and 'security for which values?' (Baldwin, 1997). According to Buzan (Buzan& Hansen, 2011), without specifying security subject, namely the referent object, any attempts to define security would be pointless. Similar to the security concept, there is no agreement on the referent objects.

Each actor having presence in the international system has different security understandings and threat perceptions in accordance with their greatness, power and their purposes. Although they are players of the same international system, they can determine various roles to themselves arising from their place and importance in the system. In the light of these different self-positioning, as Dedeoğlu (2014) points out, the sense of security of actors is reflected into several levels; the security of the whole global system; the security of regions, a certain geography or a sub-system; state or national security; security of society; security of minorities; and last the individual security. There is an interaction or reciprocal influence between these separate pillars. That is, any actor's approach to security or efforts to give a sense to its security is shaped into the closest pillars. For instance, state security makes a sense if the geography to where it belongs or its society, regime or government are in security.

Apart from these, the concept of security is considered and measured through power. Components of power can determine objectives of an actor, in this manner it can also formalize

the actor's self-identification and so its threat and security perceptions. As security and threat, the definition of power itself also not concrete, namely, it is not measurable with any certain criteria. However, it can be said that it gains a meaning when comparing the others' capability. This capability becomes more visible in case of affecting other actors' behaviours in the system by means of some assets like military power, intelligence, communication technologies, economy, geography, neighbours, proximity to stable or instable regions/states and proximity to seas, and population, demographic features or natural resources.

As a consequence, regardless of which perspective the security is approached in, it should be evaluated in accordance with the time period that is observed. Because of that, changing time and conditions convert its meaning. For instance, from the 1940s to 1980s the concept of security had been associated with power politics pursued by the states within a framework of affairs shaped by military issues only concerning states (Buzan, 1991). As Buzan (1991:3-9) claims, security was an 'underdeveloped concept' during the pre-1980s period. The main reason behind this was the Cold War that flourished in Europe first and then spread over the whole world, partly because of the state-centric security approach. Because during the Cold War superpowers' rivalry was intense and the danger of war was real, the European security agenda was dominated by highly militarized confrontation between them. In parallel to this, European security was defined in military terms and generally evaluated from the theories placing state and military issues in the centre of their analysis.

Through the end of the 1980s, however, non-military security problems (poverty, rapid population growth, environmental deterioration, economic instabilities, illegal migration, organized crime, etc.) began to be discussed more visibly with a relief in tension between the superpowers. Indeed, these had been existing threats for years but they stayed in the shadow of the possibility of war between two rival blocs.

Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War, symbolized the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, led the sense of the European security, and international security as well, to be reshaped fundamentally. Some suggested that the end of the polarisation between two blocs and the disappearance of the Soviet threat meant the disappearance of military threats as well for the Western European security. In spite of this, the end of the Cold War also raised new uncertainties for the European security. On the one side, some claimed that demise of the

bipolar system would cause Europe to turn its pre-Cold War situation and so would increase the likelihood of war in the continent (Mearsheimer, 1990, cited in Cottey, 2007). On the other side, critics of this view pointed out the 'security community' that had been created during the Cold War between the Western European countries. According to those, the emergence of the security community would transform the nature of security in Europe in the post-Cold War era.

In the changing international environment, the understanding of security was not based just on the territorial defence or military security. This differentiation from traditional state-centric security approach has become more visible especially after the end of the Cold War. According to critics of traditional/narrow definition of security, wars and invasions are no longer the only potential and the most serious threats. Instead, they are in favour of broadening the definition of security to 'soft' security challenges or non-military sectors (Cottey, 2007). Because, the security is not only relevant to survival (albeit it is the bottom line of security), but it also includes concerns about the conditions of existence (Buzan, 1991). In this framework, Buzan advocates that security should be analysed within five sectors; the military sector (about relationship of forceful coercion), the political sector (about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition), the economic sector (about relationships of trade, production, and finance), the societal sector (about relationship of collective identity), and the environmental sector (about relationship between human activity and the planetary biosphere).

In the closing years of the Cold War, a diversification not only of threats but also of the security subjects became more visible. That is, security agenda has begun to cover different actors of the international politics including individuals, minorities or the whole system apart from the states. Moreover, dominant position of the states in the international relations during the Cold War had been discussed by the increasing presence and roles of non-state actors in the international political arena.

As a result of the efforts to redefine security, it can be said that the definition of the concept has two common points; first, security is an essentially contested concepts, and second security is a multi-dimensional concept. Although the presence of this common framework in which the security concept is defined, there are problems arising from the subjective nature of security on defining issues as threats to security. At this point, the concept of securitisation,

which was developed by the Copenhagen School, is presented as a solution (Gartner & Hyde-Price & Rietter, 2001).

Securitisation in international relations is a process in which an issue is represented as an existential threat to the survival of referent object. Throughout the process, that issue is drawn from the matters of politics, and is transformed into the matters of security. In doing so, the issue gains priority over other issues, and it is allowed for the use of extraordinary measures in order to cope with this existential threat.

Securitisation approach offers a general framework to all other international relations theories to use in their studies rather than constructing a separate theory. However, it is generally seen as a synthesis of constructivism and political realism because of giving more importance to the state as an actor than others in its approach (Williams, 2003). In the framework of securitisation, Buzan (1998) locates the issue on a spectrum covering three different spheres; non-politicised, politicised and securitised. Non-politicised sphere is located on the one edge of spectrum and consists of the issues which the state does not deal with and not requires to be a part of public policy, and any government decision. When any issue in non-politicised sphere is raised into the realm of politics, that is, it is made a part of public policy, requiring government decision and attention like resource allocation, that issue is politicised. This politicised sphere of issues locates in the centre of the spectrum. On the other hand, securitisation, as Buzan (1998: 23) claims, 'can be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation'. In more concrete terms, securitisation means to present an issue as an existential threat to security requiring emergency measures that allow actions to break the rules of normal political procedures, laws and rules in order to deal with it.

The placement of issues on that spectrum depends on circumstances, ranging from a state to another, and also across time. Actually, that is not to say securitisation always goes through the state even though there is close tie between politicisation and securitisation. As Buzan (1998) demonstrates, both politicisation and securitisation can be implied in other fore of international relations. It is also possible for other actors to raise an issue to public sphere by drawing general consideration.

Securitisation is a process that involves four main components; a securitising actor/securitiser, an existential threat, a referent object, and an audience. The process of securitisation starts through a speech act, namely, 'it is utterance itself that is the act' (Buzan, 1998:26). This speech act is performed by a securitising actor which is an agent having authority or power to make the securitising move by presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object. Here, the existential threat can be an object or an ideal, or an act that is considered as potentially harmful to the survival of the referent object. Since the security as a self-referential (subjective), it is not necessary whether that object or act is real threat or not. However, that the issue is presented as a threat to the referent object is important. The referent object, on the other hand, is an object that is threatened and needs to be protected. In Buzan's own words (1998:36); 'the referent object is that to which one can point and say it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to...'. Depending on the subjective nature of security, the referent object can range from state, nation and identity to environment, minority rights or to whole system of the world.

Finally, one of the most important components of the process of securitisation is the audience, which is the target that needs to be persuaded to accept the given issue as a security threat. Each securitisation act cannot result in a successful securitisation even if it is performed by a recognised securitising actor. On the contrary, the issue can be securitised successfully only if and when the audience accepts it as an existential threat to the referent object like any shared value. In concrete terms, a successful securitisation is achieved through the audience's acceptance. After providing support and gaining enough resonance by the audience, the securitising actor can claim legitimacy in order to cope with the existential threat through extraordinary means like raising taxes, allocating national resources for a specific task, suspending some freedoms and rights, restricting free press, devoting more finance to armament, even declare war, so on. To that end, the securitising actor can propound the issue not to be dealt with the normal way, presenting it as an issue of supreme priority. Therefore, securitisation process is fulfilled with legitimating the breaking of rules.

Traditionally, the referent object has been the state, that is, the survival of sovereignty and nation. Hence, common players in securitising role are political leaders, governments or bureaucracies. In parallel to the referent object, the existential threats are considered any

attempt, policy and act targeting the state sovereignty, state system, regime, nation, civilisation, economic system, national interests, etc. In case that the state is seen as the main actor of international relations, it is easier to present any security issue as an international security issue which is directed to national security and which is more important to other issues, requiring to be given absolute priority. Even though, as stated previously, securitisation is not unique to the states, it can be enacted in other fora. Thus, the issues which can be securitised spread to a large scale, reflecting multi-dimensional nature and broadened meaning of security.

Although the securitisation theory provides a framework to international relations theories in order to explain the meaning of security by answering the questions of ‘security for whom’ and ‘security for which values’, it brings about another problem that gives a chance to the securitising actor to present any issue as an existential threat and, by so doing, to cause extreme securitisation which results in a security dilemma. Thus, that created security dilemma, which is identified by realist theories, creates new necessities for securitisation, highlighting new real or perceived threats. Because of this, the more security is not the better. ‘Basically, security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics...But de-securitisation is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as threats against which we have countermeasures but to move them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ (Buzan, 1998:29). That is, while securitisation leads the issues to be drawn from the sphere of normal politics and to be raised into the realm of security policies and practices, de-securitisation means to lower issues back into the realm of normal politics, or to remove those issues completely from the political agenda or from the realm of security policies. That is to say, de-securitisation is more preferential act for providing security than the securitisation act.

Weaver (2000) identifies a number of options in order to achieve de-securitisation; not to talk about issues in terms of security, to keep responses to securitised issues in forms that do not create security dilemma, and to move security issues back into normal politics. Besides, de Wilde (2008) stresses that de-securitisation can be achieved by the de-securitising actor by opposing directly securitising moves, or emphasising competing threats. He also adds, security policies should aim at de-securitisation as the solution to the threatening situation. However, de-securitisation can happen when the security problem is solved, when the discourses change,

for example, with the loss of interest of audience, and when the original referent object is lost. On the other hand, Hansen (2012) has identified four ideal type for the de-securitisation. Firstly, a particular issue is presented with the terms other than security, even if the issue of concern, the status of enmity, and the possibility of a larger conflict still exist. This refers to 'change through stabilisation'. Second type identified by Hansen (2012) is 'replacement' that means to replace another issue with the previously securitised issue. Rather, 're-articulation' takes place when the originally phrased threat is resolved. Lastly, it is witnessed 'silencing' when the potentially insecure subjects are marginalised through de-politicisation. As Weaver (2000) demonstrates, silencing can be a strategy used in pre-emptive manner before the securitisation happens. Like de Wilde, Hansen notes that as well; 'a key concern for political moves that form de-securitisation has been to avoid security responses by authorities' (2012:536). Therefore, that building good-neighbourly relationship and partnership with the neighbours is actually a way to de-securitise the issues and works to alleviate security concerns of neighbours, preventing security dilemma that creates new concerns for both self and others. Consequently, there is no end-point for both securitisation and de-securitisation to point as political and social situations are evolving. Thus, as Buzan (1998) claims, 'although in the obstruct de-securitisation is ideal, in specific situations one can choose securitisation...it is always a political choice to securitise or to accept securitisation'.

1.3. The Notion of Neighbourhood

In order to evaluate the relation between the ENP and the European security, neighbour/neighbourhood is another concept that should be stressed. To that aim, other concepts related to neighbourhood like the 'other', self-identification and European identity will be touched briefly in connection with the security understandings that mentioned previously. In doing so, how the EU uses its neighbourhood policy as a tool of its foreign and security policy will be tried to explain in the following parts of the study.

Security, in the most comprehensive sense, is also 'the absence of threats to acquired values', mainly to the survival, as Wolfers (1952) describes. With this regard, neighbourhood has close ties with providing security since it refers to a kind of relations that removes threats as Kahraman (2006) demonstrates. From his point of view, there are two states of neighbourhood; one is neutral while the other is active. In the neutral case, neighbourhood takes

place when two subjects come side by side, it is not necessary the presence of relations and interactions among subjects. This positional and geographical neighbourhood is, in the modern era, is a concept managed by civil law.

Beside the purely geographical/positional dimension creating neutral state of neighbourhood, the concept has also a more active form that creates indeed a passive atmosphere in which neighbour states do not harm each other, appeal use of force, and the stronger states do not oppress the weaker ones, responding their sovereignty and territorial integrities. Even though this form seems as passive, it is active in neighbourhood relations. What is more, Kahraman (2006) introduces a more active, with his own words, 'real active', situation including a type of relationship that presupposed the interaction of subjects, namely states, is based on voluntariness and friendship. Rather, he (2006:4) adds that; 'it is difficult to imagine a neighbourhood based on enmity, hostility and conflict, and friendship may be seen, at least, as a determinant of the boundary of mutual reconciliation in neighbourliness'. Any situation which is in contrast to is determined along the lines of aggression and defence, and can be defined as the enmity.

Neighbourly relations in international policy are based on polarisation as defined by Schmitt (1976 cited in Kahraman, 2006). That is, they require division between friendly and hostile camps. What is more, since nation states with closed boundaries exist only within their borders, physical proximity can lead to enmity and otherness as well as an opportunity and a threat in the shadow of polarisation. Therefore, neighbourhood relations based on friendship can be thought as a shelter to end war or a way to prevent war (Kahraman, 2006). Since the neighbourhood itself is restrictive, isolationist and hegemonic, it has limiting dimension creating the 'otherness'. This 'other' can be an enemy, a foreigner or a friend as well. On condition that the dimension of negative otherness in neighbourhood is eliminated, the neighbourhood relations prevent wars. Because, according to Zygmunt Bauman (1991), neighbours refers to friends while others to enemy or stranger. That is, former does not exist in the absence of the latter. Moreover, depending on the changing circumstances of international politics with regard to the polarisation, the position of a state could turn from a friend to an enemy or vice versa. After the Cold War, for instance, the changing understanding and perception of security and threat led to a change in the sense of neighbourhood in parallel to the

changing definition of enemy. The old 'enemies' of the Cold War period, namely the Central and Eastern European countries, became a part of 'Europe', that is a part of 'self' from the EU member states' perspectives, while the neighbourhood notion placed out of the formal borders of the Union.

Since the ENP was launched for the purpose of dealing both with Europeans and non-Europeans, namely the Union's neighbours, it is required to examine, at that point, the identification of Europe or more clearly the answers to the questions of 'what Europe is' 'where it is' in order to clarify how the EU defines and determines its neighbours and decides which country can be accepted as a member whereas others are left outside as neighbours. As Avery (2015) claims, it is important to define Europe to understand who is 'like us' not 'one of us' in the light of EU's approach in the framework of its neighbourhood policy. This is also important for the EU's security perception since security is, as explained previously, related to how the subject identifies itself. This self-identification process brings about the positioning of the 'other' which is all that the 'self' is not, and determines objectives, policies and interests in the subject's foreign policy.

The Treaty of Rome, through its Article 237, states that; 'any European state may apply to become a member of the Community'. Then, the Copenhagen European Council held in 1993 added that; 'The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is also an important consideration in the general interests of both the Union and the Candidate states', while the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty has brought along new criteria for membership. On the other hand, with the introducing the ENP in 2004, it was clearly stated that the policy would address all neighbouring countries of the EU that would not have a mid-term perspective for accession, underlying the motto of 'more than partnership, less than the membership'. With the ENP, the Union was aiming to counter the emergence of new dividing lines like those throughout the Cold War while leaving outside a number of states that were unlikely to become candidates for membership. That is, 'Europe's neighbourhood policy would have to deal with both European and non-European states' (Tonra, 2010:57). Therefore, it is clear that there is a division between Europeans and non-Europeans from the Union's points of view. Thus, the question of who European is gains importance.

There is a common idea that the term of 'Europe' is generally used as a synonym of the EU and its member states. However, some writers like Hyde-Price points its incorrectness, giving Norway and Switzerland as examples which are as European as Finland and Sweden, even though they are not EU member states. Indeed, it is difficult to arrive at an agreed definition on what Europe is. It is clear with the view that has been taken by European Commission (1992):

'The term European has not been officially defined. It combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of proximity ideas, values and historical interactions cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation.' (cited in Avery, 2015: 117).

Even though the definition of Europe is still contested, Tonra (2010) claims that conception of Europe can be traced back the ancient world in writings of Grotius, Sully, Montesquieu, Rousseau, etc, underlying the possibility of resting European character upon a number of different foundations; geographic, cultural, historical, and shared values and norms. Since in thesis the EU will be considered, Europe and European will refers to the Union and its member states when examining all these dimensions.

Firstly, defining Europe in terms of geography is the most obvious when compared to other foundations even if there are some uncertainties on its eastern and southern boundaries. Geographically, borders of Europe are drawn by the Atlantic Ocean in the west, the Ural Mountains in the east, the Barents Sea in the north and the Mediterranean and Bosphorus in the south (Hyde-Price, 2007). Nevertheless, this geographical definition hosts some ambiguities as a result of that the Eastern border of Europe is not made definite by any political boundary, reaching far Eastern plains of continental Europe. Rather, 'in geographical terms the Mediterranean is an internal European lake, while its southern shores remain defined as being both within and without the European heartland' (Tonra, 2010:58). In this manner, as seen, geography with its uncertainties is insufficient in defining the extent of Europe.

Another definition of Europe can be tried to be in terms of culture. However, this cultural definition is also not obvious to produce clear external borders of Europe for including complex patterns of the parameters of language (Romance, Slavic, and Germanic), religion (Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox), and ethnically which many European conflicts centred

around. Though, these patterns can reify cultural borders between Europe and its 'others' whereas cannot exactly explain what Europe is (Tonra, 2010).

On the other hand, common history can be seen as another foundation for the definition of Europe and Europeans. Even though they had different impacts ranging from a region to another of Europe, Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment beside shared sets of mythologies, symbols and the breaking points of history occurred in Europe have served to create solid and similar political communities in the form of modern European states. Despite this shared history, 'it is difficult to draw these strings together into a tightly woven cloth' (Tonra, 2010:58).

Finally, shared values and norms can be seen as a part of European identity. Europe resorts itself to rule of law, democracy, free market economy, respect to human rights, equality, non-discrimination etc. while defining itself. Though these values and norms are, in fact, not unique to Europe, Europeans claims them as being recognizable 'ours'.

These foundations are fuzzy for the idea of the EU's insiders and outsiders. Therefore, as Avery (2015; 199) claims; 'the final limits of the European Union are likely results from the course of events and successive political decisions'. Although the Union is a unique structure, neither a state nor a federation, like all states it needs boundaries to function. Since the Union is based on laws, it needs a territorial definition for the operation of its policies. Thus, a territorial distinction between members and non-members is necessary. Through its neighbourhood policy, the Union gives a message to its neighbour countries included in the ENP that; 'you are like us but not one of us' (Avery, 2015:197).

When taking subjectivity and fuzziness of all these foundations of Europe, it becomes more evident that the EU makes a distinction between insiders and outsiders, self and others, as a result of political decisions and its interests. With regard to the ENP, especially within the Eastern Partnership, geopolitical concerns of the EU determine the 'other' which is left outside. For instance, as Romano Prodi (2002:3) stated in his speech that; 'The integration of the Balkans into the European Union will complete the unification of the continent, and we have held out this prospect to them. Although there is still a long way to go, the Balkans belong to Europe'. Similarly, Biscop (2019) claims that;

‘All countries of the Balkans will eventually join the EU-that is not very controversial. Geographically, they are already surrounded by the EU anyway. There is no need to rush things though: no accession before they are ready, in political, economic and in the security area, which will take quite a few years yet...Beyond the Balkans, if ever Norway or Switzerland were to apply for membership, they would not have to wait long before they would be accepted. But the story ends there...Never say never, but offering EU membership to the countries of Zwischeneuropa (in-between countries) would mostly just create problems’.

Similar to the Balkans, eastern countries are regarded as backward in terms of economic and political development to catch up the EU. However, they are not given a chance to be ready to accession, eliminating the possibility of membership. That is to say, they are neighbours and will remain as neighbours (Browning, 2018). Moreover, even though some eastern neighbours included in the EaP like Ukraine, Moldova and, to a certain extent, Georgia and Belarus are seen as a part of Europe historically, culturally and geographically, and with their feelings of belonging to Europe beside a large share of population support to the European aspirations (Biscop, 2019), they are excluded from being a part of the EU, from joining the self. This is because mainly of geopolitical considerations. As Biscop (2019) claims that moral values do not affect geopolitics since geopolitics based on entirely objective and neutral facts of an actor’s geographic environment which has inevitable influences on the actor’s interests. Thus, the EaP highly reflects geopolitical considerations, concerns and directions of the EU when deciding its ‘others’ in the region. This is because, the region covered by the EaP is ‘Zwischeneuropa’, namely in-between or overlapping neighbours, between the EU and Russia (Biscop, 2019 & Sakwa, 2015).

This geographic feature of those countries, therefore, separates them from the 1989 countries (the CEECs) which are currently members both of the EU and NATO. According to Sakwa (2015), the idea of ‘Wider Europe’ is highly associated with the year of 1989. At that time, joining Wider Europe, which is centred on Brussels emanating from the Western European heartlands by concentric circles, was the natural outcome and the inevitable way to ‘return to Europe’. There was a consensus in the CEECs in favour of that direction, and a lining up for political, social and geopolitical goals (Sakwa, 2015). The EU, on the other hand, gave a priority to its political considerations over the formal criteria for accession (Biscop, 2019). What is more, there was no opposition or resistance by Russia since that eastward enlargement did not pose threat to itself. However, the situation for the 1991 countries, which are countries

dismembering from the USSR except the Baltic states that are currently members both of the EU and NATO, were different. ‘Above all, the fundamental difference between 1989 and 1991 lies in contrasting geopolitical perspectives’ (Sakwa, 2015:135).

In the year of 1991, through dissolution of the Communism and the USSR, Russia had lost its great power status and international influence. However, with its size, autonomy, legacy and aspirations for great power status, Russia would not able to slip into the ‘Wider Europe’ dominated by the Euro-Atlantic community as a junior player. Russia, however, was regarding itself as a great power having privileged and exclusive rights in its near abroad. In concrete terms, the EU’s eastern periphery was also western periphery of Russia. Thus, as Mearsheimer (2014:84) identifies: ‘This is geopolitics; great powers always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory’. This has kept validity for Russia as well. It could not allow the in-between countries to join Euro-Atlantic structure which Russia was not included, and in which it cannot affect decisions. Therefore, Russia for regarding the region as its exclusive sphere of influence, attempted/attempts to prevent these countries from shifting towards the EU and NATO as well. ‘The EU does not have to accept that, but it should try to avoid that its relations with the states concerned provoke another clash with Russia’ (Biscop, 2019). To sum up, division between ‘self’ and ‘other’ from the EU’s point of view in the region depends highly on geopolitical considerations. That is also the main difference between the Union for Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership, which are sub-policies of the ENP, that; ‘whereas UfM sought to forge links between hitherto disparate countries and where was no putative alternative hegemon, the EaP had a profound geopolitical logic from the first’ (Sakwa, 2015:179) due to presence of a great and competitive power, Russia. With regard to this geopolitical competition in the region with Russia, firstly Russian-Georgian war and then Russian annexation of Crimea has proved that; ‘geopolitics still matters and great powers are still playing power politics’ (Biscop, 2019), stressing the ‘dark side of the force’.

1.4.The New Geopolitics of Europe

‘Bipolarity is gone. If there is any direction in international politics today, it is toward multipolarity’ (Westad, 2012). Even in this globalised multipolar world, geography and geopolitics keep their importance. Actually, as Kotkin (2018:10) claims; ‘Geopolitics did not return, it never went away’. It is a reality of world politics that states rise, fall and compete with

each other, and the competition among them determines the rules of the international system. The relative power capacities of the competitors, especially of great powers, drive events, direct the ways of international policy practices.

The end of the Cold War, was not only regarded as the end of the bipolar world system posing great tension but also a triumph of liberal world order led by the West. Many Westerners seemed to think that the biggest issues in the world politics would no longer concern boundaries, military rivalries, national assertiveness of the sphere of influence associated with geopolitical and Realpolitik thinking, even though it was witnessed some minor problems, such as disintegration of Yugoslavia and the following wars or Israeli-Palestinian dispute, etc.

In this positive atmosphere, Europe has achieved to become 'whole and free' with the unification of Germany, the dismembered of the USSR, and the integration of the former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic Republics into NATO and the EU. This situation was not limited within Europe. In the Middle East, alliances were established between the West led by the US and the dominant Sunni powers, containing Iran and Iraq. In Asia, again under the leadership of the US, close security and economic relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia and other allies were established.

In the shadow of these developments, the temporary geopolitical conditions of the post-Cold War were conflated with the final outcome of the ideological, military and economic struggle between liberal democracy/order and the Soviet communism, and all unnatural forms of adverse order as it was reflected in Francis Fukuyama's statement that the end of the Cold War meant 'end of history' (cited in Mead, 2014:70). That is, the collapse of the USSR did not only mean that humanity's ideological struggle was over for good but also all modern understandings on territory, security, and politics reflecting conflict, rivalry, war, etc. had come to a permanent end. In the post-Cold War world, it was argued, states could adopt the principles of liberalist/idealist thoughts which naturally arise from this new post-modernist necessities and situation. This is because, progressive nature of human-being requires so. Therefore, closed, communist, autocratic societies would be too uncreative and unproductive to compete with liberal states (Mead, 2014). In this highly liberalised world led by the West, in order to compete with liberal states successfully, it was necessary to become like the West. If so, states out of the Western world become democratic, pacifistic and even peace-lover that would not want to fight

about anything at all. If not, they would remain as dangers to world peace, be excluded as rogue states willing to challenge the West, and ‘universal values’ advocated by them for a common good. Therefore, the world outside the West faced a choice; either to transform themselves towards more liberal, open and pacifist or to keep being modernist by obliging themselves to fail as the world passed them by. This also meant, it was argued, that classical geopolitical and realist understandings were replaced with economic and soft security issues crossing boundaries while international political agenda was occupied the issues such as climate change, environment, migration, trade, human rights, etc.

This era, rather, was regarded by many as unipolar of the US dominance with economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological and cultural power, and with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests (namely global values) in every part of the world (Huntington, 2006). At the very beginning of the post-Cold War era, it all seemed to work. The US took a leading role with most important priorities involved promoting the liberal world order as the remaining sole superpower in the system. As Stoner (2014:86) states, ‘great powers assert themselves where they see their interests’ existing. The US, as the sole superpower, pursued to assert its power in the entire world. However, unlike previous hegemon or superpowers, the US did not establish direct colonial rule over foreign territories to exert its control. Instead, the US advanced and pursued its interests and imposed its control over along the world throughout voluntary alliances, multilateral institutions and free trade, resulting from its enlightened self-interests rather than being altruist. Therefore, those multilateral bodies and processes of the post-Cold War system has become mechanism for organising and extending the US’ sphere of influence (Kotkin, 2018:13). Thus, Western-led liberal values like democracy, the rule of law, free trade, etc. reflected as global values for good have gained global popularity, giving the power to the US and European examples in the early post-Cold War years (Kotkin, 2018). The liberal order seemed to set out the rules for the entire international system (Niblett, 2017).

On the other hand, globalisation, as many thinkers advocate, has been the driving force behind this spill-over of liberal order. Under the roof of globalisation, increasing and deepening interdependence in terms of economy and politics, intense transactional social links were argued that traditional sense of identity and feeling of belonging have transformed to a new

post-modern global understanding. Moreover, for some, these circumstances also referred to the collapse of the Westphalian sense of nation state surrounded by territorial borders and based on strong sense of sovereignty by eroding the distinction between domestic and international politics.

The following years, however, it has been more visible that a post-modern Kantian paradise of peace has been established neither in Europe nor in the rest of the world as expected by the Westerners. The end of the Cold War was followed by a number of new challenges. First, the conflict broke out in Balkans; Yugoslav crisis was the first major security problem that Europe faced after the Cold War (Bowker, 2012). Apart from the Yugoslavia crisis, the world has witnessed several other internal conflicts, which had international effects, within states like Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Afghanistan and the countries from the Caucasus and the West Africa since 1990s. Another feature of that period of uncertainty after the Cold War was put forward by the ‘war on terror’ led by the US in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks targeted itself. The following military operations towards Afghanistan, and the American invasion of Iraq without regarding international society and international rules have undermined the trust to international organisations and to liberal norms like the rule of law, respect to sovereignty, democracy, independence, freedoms, and so on. For the EU, these developments have also caused to question the validity of pooled sovereignty under international organisations and cooperation, multi-level governance and the competence of the EU, creating a difference in opinion and manner of member states towards American policy in accordance with their national interests.

The process starting with the motto of ‘war on terror’, on the other hand, triggered a new polarisation based on cultural and religious differences among civilisations. Under those circumstances and in that atmosphere, the US’ attention has shifted from Europe to wider world scale as a sole superpower. The US, thus, has started to play a role of ‘off-shore balancer’ rather than being a hegemon in Europe (Hyde-Price, 2007:4). Therefore, European powers, especially great ones- France, Germany, the UK and Russia- have taken new roles for themselves in the emerging post-Cold War system, finding wider ground for seeking their national interests. That is, through the end of the Cold War, international political structure has transformed to completely different appearance. With the demise of bipolarity, and the absence of hegemonic effects of the US in Europe, European security structure turned more to self-help system again

in which states must take to their own resources and capabilities to safeguard their security and national interests. Nevertheless, in contrast to realist predictions, the new international system is not based on harsh anarchic structure in which unbalanced multipolarity flourished, creating severe security competition. Instead, as Buzan (1991) identifies it, under the mature anarchy and in the absence of potential hegemon, Europe can be identified with 'balanced multipolarity' (Hyde-Price, 2007:6).

From a neo-realist point of view, in the system distribution of power can change from time to time, but anarchic structure of the system remains enduring. In the existing era, the sole superpower status of the US is certain while Germany and Russia beside France and the UK have emerged as great powers in European scale, leading to a new multipolar structure on the continent. Although the EU has attempted to widen its presence in the new structure, its strongest members have begun to pursue more assertive and sometimes more independent foreign policies. Especially, Germany has emerged as the strongest great power of the Union, especially after Brexit it would remain to be so, and has had dominance on decisions and policies of other members in accordance with its own interests.

With regard to globalisation, after the finality of intense polarisation, many liberal/idealist convinced themselves that globalisation would diminish differences, provide a wide-range sameness that would promote solidarity and peace on the ground of high degree of interdependence. However, as Huntington (2004) pointed out, such a deep integration has made clearer differences rather than dissolving them both at home and abroad (cited in Kotkin, 2018:12). Rather, globalisation has shifted wealth and investment by richer countries from richer to abroad, creating domestic inequality of opportunity and dissatisfaction inside the richer countries. Alongside this situation, financial crises happened firstly in states adopting liberal economic rules have prompted populist insurgencies, have bolstered the resurgence of authoritarian powers even in the Western countries. All great powers, Westad (2012) claims, has begun to stress identity and national interests as main features of their international affairs.

What is more, contrary to liberal expectations, there are other powers increasing and challenging the West and the Western values without being like them. For instance, China has been asserting itself as a new global economic power. It is now the second-biggest economy of the world after the US. And soon, it will probably have an economy substantially larger than

that of the US. Though it is still politically communist, it is keener to play greater role on the world scale. At least in Asia, ‘the rise of China threatens to challenge US military and economic hegemony, as Beijing seeks to draw American allies such as the Philippines and Thailand into its orbit’ (Niblett, 2017:17). It has now central role in the Asian balance of power contrary to the past when Japan did so. Rather, Japan is not a military threat today, but it has increasing economic power making it one of the world’s great powers. On the other hand, India, Brazil, and the South Africa have been increasing their influence in their regions. In the wake of Arab Spring, conflicts and ongoing Syrian crisis proved again that the US and its European allies have not achieved to construct the region in more liberal and peaceful form. What is more, however tough the Westerners imposed sanctions on Iran, it maintains to be ambitious to replace the current order in the Middle East dominated by Sunni Arab states. It has been developing nuclear weapons regardless of opposition of the world, and challenging imposed Western values and order. The last but not least, Russia has modernised its military and asserted its regional and geopolitical interests, challenging the current Western-led international and regional order. Moreover, it has built institutions with China like the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in order to project its interests on wider range and to reaffirm its great power status.

As a result, in the whole world advocated liberal order was undermined. This is firstly because, durability of the current system is dependent on the US as the master promoter of this. However, the US does not seem likely to do so in the new emerging international era (Westad, 2012). In the light of these circumstances, the world system is no longer bipolar or unipolar. While Huntington (1999:36) describes the current situation as ‘uni-multipolar’, many others claim the world today has a multipolar structure. In European scale, on the other hand, Hyde-Price (2007:12) supposes that there is a balanced multipolar. However, it is clear that in contemporary international system, Europe is witnessing uncertainties arising from policies pursued by the US as an off-shore balancer, by the EU in which Germany is the most powerful actor, and by assertive Russia.

1.4.1. The US: Offshore Balancer in Multipolar Europe

The strategy of offshore balancing is a great power grand strategy concept used in realist analysis in international relations. Adopting the strategy of offshore balancing requires

a great/superpower to withdraw from onshore positions (that briefly means exhibiting physical military existence by deploying ground and air forces, forging military alliances and stationing military forces in regions and countries beyond national borders) from key regions, where it has vital interests, and to focus its offshore capabilities especially by using favoured regional powers to check the rise of potential hegemon and hostile powers. Offshore balancing enables a great power to maintain its power and influence over key strategic regions or over the world without the cost of large military deployment. That great power adopting offshore balancing strategy prefers to intervene only when the threats posed by potential hegemon or by an assertive state is too great for other powers of the region to cope with (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016). The US, not immediately after the Cold War but contemporarily, has adopted this strategy towards the Western Hemisphere, the Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, concentrating on preserving US dominance with regard to its high interests and security. This tendency of US foreign policy towards playing the role of offshore balancer has become more evident under the Trump presidency with his 'America first' strategy, though it showed its indications during the President Obama's term.

During the Cold War, for instance, the US' military presence in the Western Europe with large number of ground and air forces under the roof of NATO was in evidence. It was an onshore actor since European states could not contain the USSR by themselves. 'The end of the Cold War made Europe less central to US national security interests, as shown by 75 percent decrease in US troop presence in Europe since then' (Haddad & Polyakova, 2012).

The approach adopted by the US in early periods of the post-Cold War era reflected itself as using American power not only solving global problems but also promoting a world order based on international institutions, representative governments, open markets and respect for human rights (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016). Shortly after the demise of the Cold War, allies together initiated NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia, and enlarged both NATO and the EU eastward by underestimating Russian reactions. Nevertheless, during the term of President George Bush tension in transatlantic relations reflected itself on many issues ranging from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol to the Iraq War. In this period, the US was increasingly willing to take unilateral actions while the EU was keener to play greater role on world scale. Yet, signals of being offshore balancer were strongly given during the President Obama's term. From then

on, the US has been more inward-looking and preferred to encourage allies in Europe, the Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf to take greater responsibility for their own security instead of taking it alone. Rather, the focus of the superpower has sharply shifted from Europe to Asia.

Europe and the Northeast Asia are two of the key regions with regard to offshore balancing strategy because of being centre of industrial powers and home to the world's other great powers and potential superpowers while the last one, namely the Persian Gulf, supplies about 30 percent of the world oil which is vital for American economy. The main concern of the superpower in Europe and the Northeast Asia is to prevent the rise of any potential hegemon that could challenge American interests. Therefore, in these regions the US aims at maintaining the current balance of power. On the other side, in the Persian Gulf motivation behind the US' pursuing that strategy arises more from economic concerns; that is, to guarantee the flow of oil from that region by blocking the rise of any challenger, and by keeping the current order.

Offshore balancing strategy facilitates for the US both to preserve American interests along the world and to strengthen liberty and prosperity at home. By virtue of the strategy, the US could remain powerful and secure without pursuing costly and offensive security policy. The shift in the American foreign policy in favour of offshore rather than onshore balancing does not indicate that the US has given up promoting stability, but instead it means the US is less keen to use only its military forces and to shoulder all burden alone for that purpose to discourage war and conflicts. 'If there is no potential hegemon in sight in Europe, the Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, then there is no reason to deploy ground and air forces there' (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016:73). Instead, it prompts the regional allies and powers to take responsibility of upholding the balance of power in their regions and neighbourhood. When they are incapable to deal with these, the US is able to deploy its military assets to shift balance of power again in its favour. Therefore, the US has become;

'a mercenary superpower, protecting only those countries that pay (for their security), so that it can focus on making itself great again at home, in doing so, Trump ignored the hard-won lesson that investing in the security of US allies is the best way to protect the US' own security and economic interests' (Niblett, 2017:17).

Today, the EU is seen from American side of the Atlantic as an unreliable ally not to invest its defence (Haddad & Polyakova, 2012). That the EU and the US perceive new emerging world in different ways did not start with the Trump Presidency although this has reached its

peak in that period: ‘From Trump’s tariff to his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris Agreement to calling the EU a foe, no president since the Second World War has appeared so distant, even hostile to European interests’ (Haddad & Polyalova, 2012).

1.4.2. The European Union in Multipolarity

When regarding Europe, existing changes in international environment have reflected themselves in the European continent. Firstly, in EU Europe, developments witnessed from the demise of the Cold War have prepared the ground of current situation. With the end of the Cold War, realists expected dismembering of the European Community (used to called so) in the absence of a common enemy. Contrary to realist expectation, member states continued both deepening and widening, and turned the Community to a Union by the Maastricht Treaty with a claim of having increasing presence on the world scene.

Although today’s EU is an outcome of the Cold War, the presence of the enemy Soviets was not sole motivation pushing Western European states to integrate under NATO’s security umbrella. As Kagan (2019:108) claims:

‘American and European established NATO after the Second World War at least as much to settle the German problem as to meet the Soviet challenge, a fact now forgotten by today’s realists, to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down as Lord Ismay, the Alliance’s first secretary general, put it’.

That is, the long-standing German question led to creation of today’s Europe. Free from fear of German resurgence, the Western European states were able to establish and deepen cooperation under NATO security guarantee. The main aim was not to create a new supranational power at the expense of replacement of nation-states as that time’s founding elites argued. Instead, in a more realist perspective, ‘they realized that if their countries were to survive, they would need some degree of continental coordination to help provide economic prosperity and political stability’, which are necessities to have power for security and thus survival, and ‘increased European cooperation required some surrender of sovereignty, but not the wholesale replacement of nation-state with a new form of supranational governance’ (Mathijs, 2017:87). Therefore. NATO security guarantee made possible for Western European states to survive, develop and cooperate. In that environment West Germany anchored itself strictly into the EU for firstly purpose of getting rid of Yalta arrangements dividing the country

into spheres. Then, the US security guarantee, international free-trade regime, the democratic wave and suppression of nationalism which were provided by the US dominated liberal order contributed to the democratic and peace-loving Germany's growth, and to the presence of the EU on the Franco-German axis. Because, the US security guarantee through NATO to Europe made recovery and reintegration itself into European system and world economy possible and acceptable for Germany while the liberal free-trading international economic system established by the US gave a non-militaristic West Germany a chance to flourish without threatening others. Rather, in post-War (World War II) era, the increasing strength and prosperity of the Western democracies not only provided mutual reinforcement but also produced a sense of shared European and Transatlantic values, creating a new European identity that the Germans could embrace. Thus, Germany was able to suppress nationalist passions and ambitions into such institutions as NATO and the EU. That is, long-standing German question led to creation of today's Europe. Free from the fear of German reassurance, Western European states were able to establish and deepen their cooperation. As a result, 'it has been an unusual set of circumstances, abnormal, and ahistorical. And so, Germany's part in it' (Kagan, 2019:114).

The changing circumstances of today, however, are very different from times in which peaceful European cooperation flourished. The balance of power has been changing anywhere in the world and liberal order has been shaking. Given these realities, the EU itself accepts the need of more realist assessments, and adds that: 'the purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned' (European External Action Service/EEAS, 2016:3). This is particularly because, the EU seems to be in perpetual state of crises arising from economic, political and security driven events and crises that the EU has ever faced. Firstly, for instance, the Eurozone debt crisis hit Europe's economies and left them fragile while Germany has remained as the most powerful and so the most dominant member with its huge economy. Then, the UK voted to leave the EU. It was probably the biggest political crisis of the EU's history. This raised the idea that European integration process is not irreversible, and nation states as rational actors behave in ways that their national interests require. Despite its reluctance during the all integration process and its opt-outs on many issues, the UK's leave (so-called Brexit) will weaken the EU's role on world scale. Because, the EU will lose its largest military power and one of two nuclear-weapon states as well. Rather, the EU will lose influence with the leave of

one of its two largest economies. Internally, the Brexit will contribute to Europe's destabilisation and imbalance of power, leaving relatively weak France alone to curb a powerful Germany.

The other element that enabled European cooperation was the flourishing democracy across the Western Europe. Nevertheless, today's Europe has been struggling with the rise in illiberalism, even authoritarianism, for instance, in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (Kagan, 2019). What is more, the EU Europe has been getting renationalised. In Germany, France, Italy and other member states, less or more, anti-establishment or nationalist parties of both left and right wings have been coming to power. In light of these circumstances, resistance from both ordinary people and politicians to deeper political integration has grown, and so European leaders in order to gain support appear to give up, or at least weaken, relinquishing their countries' sovereignties. Especially after the Eurozone crisis, the richer members appear less willing to pool their financial resources. Also, ongoing refugee crisis resulting from challenged liberal order and conflicts has led to deep division in opinions and political manners of member states over migration policies (Mathijs, 2017). In parallel with those, many European governments are in favour of more national sovereign control over the application of the EU laws and rules. That is, values and purposes on which the Union gained ground is being questioned.

Last but not least, EU Europeans have highly realised that their optimistic post-modern understanding arising from US-led liberal order during the Cold War is not shared by others, and also left them vulnerable in the face of the rest realist world. The reason behind this as Kagan (2019:118) claimed that: 'Europe was able to become Venus thanks to historical circumstances-not least the relatively peaceful liberal order created and sustained by the US', and so they 'criticised Americans for their reliance on hard power'. This is mainly because, Europeans regarded the collapse of the USSR as a triumph of liberal order leading old-fashioned geopolitics and realpolitik to go away, not requiring the use of hard power (Mean, 2014). However, that post-modern appearance has been challenging and the Union itself accepts that hard power beside soft power is needed to cope with today's challenges (EEAS, 2016:4). Therefore, it is argued that, if today's pacifist, peace-loving Union was an outcome of liberal cooperation under NATO's security umbrella and the US' leadership, all these changing

circumstances could lead each European country, firstly Germany, to return to the power politics, and to use military force individually as a tool of international influence.

The most of the member states, however, is increasingly aware of that their 'wider region' has become more unstable and more insecure, and as stated in 2016 Global Strategy of the Union that: 'we live in times of existential crisis within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned' (European Commission, 2016: 3-7). And it is continued: 'None of our countries has the strength nor the resources to address these threats and seize opportunities of our time alone' (European Commission, 2016:3). What is more, the EU itself accepts the necessity of a more realistic assessment of the current strategic environment to advance a better world arising from idealist aspirations (European Commission, 2016).

1.4.3. The Russian Federation as a Part of Multipolar Europe

Another great power playing increasingly assertive role in multipolar European system is the Russian Federation. Russia, actually, never gave assent to geopolitical settlement founded after the Cold War, and has been in a situation to overturn it. As a matter of fact that, the Russian Federation as the successor of the USSR took over the permanent seat in the UN Security Council and possessed Soviet nuclear weapons making it one of the Nuclear Power States even though it has lost its superpower status and nearly half of the USSR's territory with declaration of independence by fourteen states which were formerly parts of the USSR. However, in the emerging era after the collapse, Russia's fear was initially to be 'outsider' of Europe (Sakwa & Stevens, 2015). This is especially because, in the early years of 1990's new world order, economically and politically exhausted Russia was really in need of support of the West to survive. Therefore, the first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, pursued policies called as 'Atlanticism' in order to liberalise the state (Güneş, 2014). In compliance with that political attitude, the President tried to make extensive cooperation with the North America and the Western Europe, making the West accept Russia as a part of Europe. Therefore, Russia could maintain its existence within Europe where Russia were an equal part. Beginning of the Boris Yeltsin's presidency, it was accepted in Russian foreign policy concept that Westernisation would be a strategic objective and so Russia would be a 'normal Western state' (Tsygankov, 2012 cited in Güneş, 2014). Such a political manner was an outcome of Russia's

economic and political weakness. Though, soon after it became clear that Europe was not regarding Russia as an equal and essential part of itself. Leaving Russia outside, both NATO and the EU enlarged eastward. These prompted Russian reaction and directed its political manner towards more Eurasianism. Here, Eurasianism refers to identify different civilizational and ideological world from Westerners', and a tendency in accordance with this since being as a non-Western state with its different historical and social backgrounds and distinct interests (Güneş, 2014). In this direction, it was begun to pursue a foreign policy named as 'multi-vectored' aiming not to locate the West at the opposite pole but to improve closer relations with other powers out of the West, and to attain influence in near abroad (Güneş, 2014). This political attitude of Yeltsin's term, that is, aiming at obtaining greater role and place for Russia in the new system together with the West, would be called as 'Russian de Gaullism' (Güneş, 2014).

In the following years, through Putin's coming to power, Russia has begun to pursue increasingly assertive foreign policy on the world scale. Initially, it was aimed to create stronger Russia in terms of economy, politics and military under the Putin's presidency. And, while Russia was increasing its influence firstly in its near abroad and then in wider world, principles of Russian foreign policy became more apparent. To begin with, the strategy of Eurasianism has gained momentum. Both Russian government and public have increasingly identified Russia as a Eurasian state, that is neither European nor Asian but a sui generis fusion (Kotkin, 2016), different from European ones with regard to its distinctive history, culture, norms and values, and it should develop according to its own rules (Haukkala, 2010). Thus, the state has considered itself as an exceptional member of international relations with special mission, and the West has been supposed to underestimate Russian uniqueness and importance (Kotkin, 2018 & Haukkala, 2015). Regarding this, Russian foreign policy has been based on three pillars; near abroad policy, anti-hegemonic manner and multi-vectored attitude (Güneş, 2014 & Oktay&Cerrah, 2018).

Russia, from the beginning of its history in the system, has always been concerned its security because of its geographical location. In other words, 'buffeted throughout its history by often turbulent developments in East Asia, Europe and the Middle East, Russia has felt perennially vulnerable' (Kotkin, 2016:4). As a result of its geographic location, Russia has tried to exert dominance beyond its borders and to create buffer zones (Oktay & Cerrah, 2018),

moving onward with the purpose of pre-empting external attacks. That is, having geographic/strategic depth has been traditional security strategy. However, independence of fourteen states from the USSR left Russia in the lack of such depth, and so Russia began to see smaller and nominally independent states on its borders as a potential which could be used by other powers against itself. Shortly after, Russian politicians had realised that they would not be able to integrate with the West in the new system, it was tried to be established and strengthened Russian influence in states on Russian borderlands. To that end, it started to use a number of strategies ranging from keeping its military bases in those countries, supporting separatist movements or pro-Russian political figures, making economic cooperation or imposing sanctions to threat or use of military force. In contemporary Europe, moreover, Russia desires the West to recognise Russian sphere of influence as a great power of European continent and system.

Russia, on the other hand, has always seen the post-Cold War settlement as unbalanced and unfair, evaluating Western policies as attempts aiming to reshape world in which they could serve their interests alone (Kotkin, 2016). Hence, it has challenged the current system and over time tried to overturn and balance the Western hegemony at least in its periphery, allying other powers suffering from it, for instance, in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In connection with this, Russia seeks to diversify the levels and dimensions of its relations on multi-vectored basis. In doing so, it aims to have a great power status and equal ground in multipolar system.

To sum up, Russia has determined its foreign policy on four dimensions after the Cold War (Hyde-Price, 2007). Firstly, the state has focused on economic recovery by having control over key energy sources and routes. Secondly, Russia has tried to establish close economic and political relations with Europe. Because, weak economic situation was underlying Russia's strength and place in the world affairs. Hence, cooperation with Europe was crucial for domestic recovery of Russian economy. Thirdly, Russia sought a pragmatic interest-driven relations with the US. Finally, it has tried to consolidate its dominion over neighbours, namely its near abroad, trying to maximise its leverage, and profiling itself as a great power with its own foreign policy agenda. 'In essence, Russia acted as an security maximising defensive positionalist for much of the time in its relations with the US and European powers, whilst seeking to exploit

opportunities for power maximisation when favourable situations presented themselves-particularly in the near abroad' (Hyde-Price, 2007: 152).



CHAPTER 2: THE ENP: AN OVERVIEW

In this chapter of the thesis, main motivations behind the creation of the ENP and its aims will be studied from a neorealist perspective before touching on the policy's instruments and geopolitical dimensions. Then, geopolitical explanation of the ENP, focusing on the EaP, will be argued to make an evaluation in third chapter that whether or to what extent the ENP contributes to European security while considering Ukrainian crisis from a neorealist point of view.

2.1. Creation of the ENP

The ENP is, actually, a direct result of the 'big bang' enlargement toward the East including ten CEECs. Through this enlargement, the Union both widened its borders and increased its geographic proximity to unstable countries. Until then, the EU used enlargement as a foreign policy tool in order to export security and stability which had been created inside. The enlargement was not only a foreign policy tool but also was the most successful one. There were economic, political and security motivations both of member and candidate states behind the happening of all enlargement waves. However, acquisition of new members, first and foremost, was in accordance with the member states' national interests. The enlargements taking place in the shadow of the Cold War were relatively less problematic and as responses to necessities of the current circumstances. Despite that, the Eastern enlargement became more problematic and controversial because of the changing atmosphere after the Cold War.

The German unification, however, brought along concerns of a shift in balance of power in the Union in favour of Germany among other member states, making it the most powerful member. Thus, the Union's agenda was occupied by the necessity of deepening integration to anchor Germany more strictly to the Union. The Maastricht Treaty was entered into existence as a main result of these concerns. On the other hand, the removal of the common enemy and the changing political atmosphere in the entire world prompted the Union to play a more active role in the world affairs. The first step to that end would be providing the CEECs to 'return to Europe' through membership.

Like all previous enlargement waves, the great powers had dominance on enlargement decision, pursuing their interests. Germany, for instance, was the keenest member for enlargement, its commitment was based mainly on security and economic considerations. The

reason for this that after unification Germany was again a central European country having borders with unstable states as Poland and Czech Republic. Therefore, 'instability in the region would be right on Germany's doorstep, and admitting its nearest neighbours to the EU was seen a way of guaranteeing their stability' (Bache & George & Bulmer, 2011:173). Apart from this, Germany had economic interests from the eastern enlargement. After the demise of communism, Germany began to invest in the region on a large scale, and so Germany regarded admission of the CEECs as a way of guaranteeing the security of its investments. The UK was another major member supporting enlargement. The reason behind this support was mainly economic. Unlike Germany, as an island country, the UK had not territorial borders with the CEECs. Nevertheless, like Germany, the UK had economic interests from enlarging capitalist market. Besides, from the beginning of her membership the English had been reluctant to deeper integration, putting forward exceptions on issues like monetary union or Schengen arrangements. For this reason, such a large-scale enlargement covering high number of new members would be able to loose EU integration (Bache & George & Bulmer, 2011). On the other hand, France and other Mediterranean member states were less keen on enlargement with apprehension of the shift in the balance of power and redistribution of Union's funds to central and eastern European economies (Bache & George & Bulmer, 2011). Notwithstanding, aspirations for anchoring united Germany to the EU and playing more active role in the world scene made this enlargement attractive for them, especially for France (Bache & George & Bulmer, 2011).

The main motivations behind the need of such a policy to deal with the third parties instead of enlargement were, internally, the ideas of that adaptation of new member states (the CEECs) to the Union's system and institutions would take long time, that the EU would not maintain to use enlargement as a foreign policy tool(regarding the end lines of Europe), and that deepening EU integration rather than further enlargement was more crucial necessity for the Union under those international circumstances. Externally, on the other hand, there were motivations pushing current member states towards creating such a policy that would be used to manage relations with countries and regions surrounding the Union. Firstly, it was witnessed rise of violence in the Balkans reaching its peak with Kosovo crisis that took place at the very doorstep of the EU. Like the Balkans, the Middle East was struggling with instabilities and violence raising demonstrations which resulted in the outbreak of the Second Intifada in late

2000. Following, September 11 terrorist attacks were seen as a breaking point for all international political atmosphere which had been regarded as post-modern era in which all traditional understandings of nation-state, security and politics had been wiped out. Unilateral actions by the US in purpose of the 'war on terror', globalisation of threats with the borderless of terrorism and other dangers, and deep division in both opinion and manners of the EU and the US on variable international issues pushed the Union to take more assertive role in the world affairs. However, enlargement as a foreign policy tool could not be used any more in order to achieve this end and to meet the need of developing closer relations with the regions surrounding the EU.

In the shadow of Eastern enlargement, relations especially with post-Soviet countries excluded from membership would gain priority for the Union, particularly for Germany. Common Strategies were firstly introduced in parallel with concern, for providing a new strategic approach to deal with relations with third countries. They were issued first with Russia and Ukraine in 1999 and in 2000 other non-EU Mediterranean countries were included. With the Common Strategies, the EU aimed to manage existing bilateral and regional relations. However, 'Common Strategies also accentuated the simmering rivalry between member states regarding the EU's prioritisation of different neighbourhoods' (Barbe, 1998).

In order to take a step forward for dealing especially with former Soviet Republics on the eastern border, several proposals were drafted. In 2002, Commissioner Romano Prodi proposed, offering 'a kind of special neighbourhood status' to these countries which would be based on a differentiated and long-term approach focusing particularly on Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine (Haukkala & Moshes, 2004). Following his proposal, more extensive proposal envisaging more effective approach and policy towards countries from Russia and Ukraine to the Mediterranean was brought to the EU's agenda. That the geographic and thematic scope of relations was too large raised the necessity of more specified and tailored policy. As a result, in March 2003 the Commission presented to the EU Council its communication named as 'Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with the Eastern and Southern Neighbours'. Through this communication the EU outlined the basic principles of the ENP, emphasizing that the policy would not aim at further enlargement.

The ENP is composed of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (in the East); Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia (in the South). Even though Russia did not accept to be involved in the ENP, relations between the EU and Russia are conducted under the 'Common Spaces' agreed in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 2003 as Russia aspires to be an 'equal partner' instead of being a 'junior partner' in the ENP. These include the four common spaces: a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of cooperation in the field of external security; and lastly a space of research, education, and cultural exchange.

Initially, the policy focused on Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, but the Commission in Wider Europe Communication of 2003 has widened its geographical scope, covering the Barcelona Process partners. The reason behind this decision was also a solution to compensate EU's southern member states' concerns on a more intensive cooperation shift to the Eastern neighbours in the post 9/11 environment (Cremona, 2004).

As seen, there was a close and deep tie between creation of the ENP and the EU's security concerns in the changing international environment. Hence, the notion of 'neighbourhood' was a strategy to meet the EU's needs to secure its close environment (Lynch, 2003). With the ENP, the EU aimed to stabilise its peripheries, on the one side, and to keep its neighbours at arm's length on the other side (Tassinari, 2005). As Cremona (2004) claims, there were two choices for the EU leaders; to export stability and security to its near abroad or to import instability from them. Therefore, the ENP would a strategy towards outsiders of Europeanization without accession (Balfour& Rotta, 2005). As Kahraman (2005) put forward: 'it (the ENP) offers privileged partnership, as which is less than full membership but more than associate membership, in exchange for their commitment to shared values' (p.2). The ENP would seek to strengthen both the presence of the EU in wider Europe, targeting changing neighbourhood and international actorness of the Union (Kahraman, 2005). All these concerns on security were clearly stated in the paper on the European Security Strategy by Javier Solana that:

'It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflicts, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The

reunification of Europe and the integration of acceding states will increase our security but they also bring Europe closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations' (European Commission, 2004:2).

As a security component of the ENP, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy also underlined that: the ENP 'pursues the primary goal of creating stability, security and welfare on the EU's eastern and southern borders through positive interdependence. The fight against common threats such as international terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration as well as cooperation with the resolution of regional conflicts are at the forefront' (2003: 7-8).

Besides tackling with those threats, the ENP was also drafted to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines as those in the Cold War era. Enlargement had been seen by countries left outside as a form of exclusion which isolated them from the rest of Europe (Emerson, 2005). At that time, it was clear that the EU would not be able to enlarge 'ad infinitum' (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006), however, the ENP would be a tool for keeping the door permanently open, offering advantages of the last enlargement to neighbour countries, as Prodi's famous promise (2002); 'everything but institutions'.

Through the ENP, the EU offers financial and technological assistance, to open EU market, to decrease trade barriers and such economic advantages in exchange for commitments to political, economic, trade or human rights reforms by the neighbour countries.

The ENP was first outlined in 2003 and entered into force in 2004. Later, in parallel to international atmosphere it was renewed and set out in the Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, under the title of 'A New Response to A Changing Neighbourhood'. With renewed policy, it was aimed to strengthen individual and regional relationship between the EU and neighbour countries on the basis of 'more funds for more reforms' approach, briefly 'more for more'. Recently, the ENP has been renewed in 2015 for the purpose of 'stronger partnership for a stronger neighbourhood'. The latest review of the ENP focuses on four priorities; differentiation, focus, flexibility, ownership and visibility. High representative/ Vice President Federica Mogherini explains the revival as that:

‘A stronger partnership with our neighbours is key for the European Union, while we face many challenges within our borders and beyond. The terrorist attacks in Paris on Friday, but also recent attacks in Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey and Iraq, show once more that we are confronted with threats that are global and have to be tackled by the international community united. We have to build together a safer environment, try to solve the many crises of our common region, support the development and the growth of the poorest areas, and address the root causes of migration. This is precisely the purpose of the current review of the ENP which will promote our common values and interests, and will also engage partners in increased cooperation in security matters. The measures set out today seek to find ways to strengthen together the resilience of our and our partners’ societies, and our ability to effectively work together on our common purposes.’(European Commission, 2015:1)

2.2. Instruments of the ENP

The Strategy Paper is the root of the ENP. Through the Strategy Paper, principles, policy tools, policy-making procedures and the scope of the policy are determined, focusing on geographic coverage and existing relations with the neighbours of the Union. Priorities and needs of both parts, the EU and the partner country, are also framed into the Paper.

In the same line with the Strategy Paper, Country Reports and Actions Plans/ Association Agendas are among other instruments of the ENP. While Country Reports provide a detailed data and analysis about the partner country, Action Plans aim at monitoring the improvements on commitments to common values or main objectives of the policy, and implementation of priorities agreed by partners. Both the Country Reports and the Action Plans are drafted and entered into force for each individual ENP partner.

The Country Reports analyse the existing political, economic, social and institutional situation in the partner country, and enlighten the capacity for implementing expected reforms by the Union. Therefore, Reports cover an evaluation of relations between the EU and the country in their introduction part, and its following parts are devoted to analyse the weakness and strength of the country in terms of politics, economy and social, underlying the following issues: political dialogue and reform; economic and social reforms and developments; trade, regulatory and institutional measures; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society; environment, research and innovation; social policy and people-to-people contact. The Country Reports provide fundamental data and information which is used to draft the Action Plans/ Associate Agendas.

The Action Plans detail the main instruments and priorities which are negotiated and agreed by the parties. However, first and foremost, the Action Plans promote the EU's values and interests alongside its security concerns, that is so-called shared values including good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, economic development for stabilisation arising from market liberalisation; security issues underlined lately in the EU's Global Strategy; migration and mobility. Although these Plans are legal but not binding international documents, implementation of reforms agreed in them sets out the parameters of the Union's relations with its neighbours.

In the formal documents related to the ENP, it is specified that each Action Plan adopts the principle of differentiation (tailor-made structure) requiring the bilateral relations to take specific needs, situations and priorities of each partner country into consideration with respect to its geographical location and the level of relations with the Union as being projected within three to five-year periods.

There are also joint bodies which are Association and Cooperation Councils, Committees and sub-committees that bring representatives of member states, of the partner countries, the European Commission and the related bodies of the Union together in order to evaluate the implementation of issues involved in the Plans. To what extent the partner country achieves the expected reforms and transformation is reflected in the Progress Reports which are annually published. According to the level of achievement by the partner country, a step forward to deeper relations and new contractual framework, and funds provided by the Union are determined. All in all, in the all documents related to the ENP, the key principles of differentiation, flexibility, joint ownership and shared responsibility are adopted.

The EU provided its financial support to the partners under the ENP in the neighbourhood regions mainly through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI hereafter), with over 15 billion euro for 2014-2020 period. The funds provided by the Union are based on the principle of the 'more for more', which means that more achievement for implementation results in more financial support by the EU.

2.3. Geographical dimensions of the ENP

Though the EU adopts the bilateralism in its neighbourhood policy, multilateral and institutionalized relations are conducted by specified regional dimensions called the Union for Mediterranean (UfM hereafter) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP hereafter) under the roof of the ENP.

2.3.1. Union for Mediterranean

Union for Mediterranean or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, is formerly known as the Barcelona Process, was initiated in 1995 as a result of a conference held in Barcelona with the participation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of European and the Mediterranean countries under the Spanish Presidency. At the end of the Conference, the Barcelona Declaration was projected, that was aiming at promoting security and stability in the Mediterranean; fostering shared values and cooperation; upholding democracy, good governance and human rights; and achieving mutually satisfactory trade for both sides. According to the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, the Union aimed at developing good relations with their North African and the Middle Eastern neighbours, turning the region into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was included in the ENP in 2004, and was re-launched as the UfM in 2008. Contemporarily, the initiative includes 15 countries from the EU's south in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans regions along with the 28 EU member states. These are Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Palestine, Syria (suspended), Tunisia and Turkey, and Libya is an observer. Unlike the EaP, the UfM has its own secretariat, and provides a forum discussing regional strategic issues with priorities such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration, education and social affairs. The policy is based on the principles of co-ownership, co-decision making and shared co-responsibility between two sides of the Mediterranean. Rather, it is conducted by a co-presidency: the High Representative takes the Northern co-presidency in the format of Foreign Ministers Meetings, the Commission for Ministerial Meetings, and the EU External Action Service for Senior Official Meetings.

Promoting economic and social development and ensuring stability are the main objectives of the UfM. Besides bilateral relations based on the Association Agreements of the

ENP, regional dialogue and multilateral dimension of the policy are distinctive aspects and have strategic impact for dealing with the common problems of the regions.

Initially creating a Union for the Mediterranean region was supposed and used by the French President Nicola Sarkozy as its election campaign since the region had been important historically, culturally and economically for the country. However, other member states of the EU were cautious about the creation a separate Union covering only member states which had shores to the Mediterranean for the fear of duplication of the EU's institutions and competence while leaving other member states out. Thus, Italy, Spain and Greece were supporting that proposal, but Germany and the Commission were more suspicious. Germany, especially, were worried about the initiative would risked the core of the EU, shifting the balance of power inside (Sakwa & Stevens, 2012). What is more, Germany was reluctant to spare EU funds for a project which would not include all of the current members.

As a result, in early 2008 Sarkozy modified his proposal, and the initiative was discussed at the European Council. Next, the UfM was officially initiated. According to Sakwa (2012:71), 'it is clear the inclusion of the Mediterranean and Eastern European states within the same policy framework owed more to the political dynamics of the EU itself than an objective assessment of the respective needs and interests of the target countries...this was the product of the need to build consensus within the European Council'.

3.2.2. Eastern Partnership

The Eastern Partnership constitutes a specific sub-policy and geographic dimension of the ENP, consisting of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in its geographic scope. The policy is dealt both with multilateral and bilateral relations and negotiations. It is also a complementary policy with the UfM. Through the EaP, the EU aims at development at an institutionalised forum in four priority areas of cooperation: strengthening of institutions and good governance; economic development and market opportunities; interconnectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change; mobility and people-to-people contacts. In parallel to these priorities, the policy supports the modernised transport connections; increased political ownership of energy efficiency; easier access to finance, including to lending in local currency; establishing ways of reducing tariffs between partners by conducting a study; increased trade opportunities; greater outreach to grassroots Civil

Society Organisations; more support for youth (EEAS, 2016). The Union, however, avoids to discuss the controversial topic of accession to the EU, its main aim is to achieve societal and state resilience based on shared democracy, prosperity, stability and security.

The projecting of the policy goes back in May 2008 when Poland and Sweden drafted a joint proposal for an Eastern dimension of the ENP including Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia, and in some aspects with Belarus and Russia. Even though Belarus was included in the policy as a full member, Russia rejected to be a part of the policy at all. Next, that proposal was discussed at European Council in June 2008 together with the UfM.

From the Polish point of view, the EaP could create a possibility of EU membership for the partner countries. Therefore, the Polish Foreign Minister states Poland's expectation in this direction that: 'We all know the EU has enlargement fatigue. We have to use this time to prepare as much as possible so that the fatigue passes, membership becomes something natural (2008-05-07). On the other hand, particularly France and Germany and Bulgaria and Romania were cautious about the initiative. While former two were worried about the possibility that the initiative could be seen as stepping stone to accession to the EU by the partner countries, especially by Ukraine, the latter two were fearing of that the EaP would lead the Union to put the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation on the back burner.

The EaP, despite all contradictions between member states, was officially launched in May 2009 with the invitation the leaders of six countries by the Czech Republic. Like the ENP, the EaP mainly intended to prevent creation of new dividing lines, and to improve political, economic and trade relations with the six post-Soviet countries having strategic importance. These relations would be based on shared values including democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, the principles of market economy, sustainable development and good governance, that is, on the Western values. But, unlike the UfM, as Chifu (2006:3) claims: 'the biggest difference between Southern and Eastern neighbours is related to Eastern neighbours' feeling of belonging to Europe and their attitudes towards being a part of the EU'. Indeed, this feeling was one of the main reasons to make Poland so ambitious to see the initiative to lead to membership of those countries. Because, especially after the eight CEECs- Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia- joined the EU in 2004, the inclusion- exclusion problem became a concern of the EU, and so the ENP was created to avoid

new dividing lines. Nevertheless, the ENP and then the EaP underlined that there would be no possibility for membership in foreseeable future for those countries which had been left outside the fifth enlargement, but it was made a commitment to offer opportunities of the enlargement to those partners, while from the starting of the ENP it was stated by Romano Prodi (2002:3) that: ‘The Balkans belong to Europe. The integration of the Balkans into the European Union will complete the unification of the continent, and we have held out this prospect for them’. Therefore, leaving those countries outside as being regarded non-European made Poland and other Eastern members worried about that with the feeling of exclusion could get those post-Soviet states closer to Russia.

That is why it was claimed that the initiative had its roots since the Cold War. From the beginning of the 1970s, Germany started to pursue an Eastern policy called as Ostpolitik aiming at including Poland into Western institutions, NATO and the EU, since the country was on the border with unstable regions and countries. After accession of the CEECs, Poland took the mission of Ostpolitik (Johnson, 1996). While accession negotiations were proceeding, Poland intended to initiate an Eastern partnership leading the EU to enlarge further east, particularly including Ukraine. This country and others as well had importance for Poland and other CEECs. This is because, as Hyde-Price (2007:157) points out: ‘Sandwiched between Germany in the west and Russia in the east, these lands between have been vulnerable to the shifting sands of great power politics... historically, the countries of East Central Europe have been dominated by one or the other of the region’s flanking powers, generating a deep-seated sense of insecurity in the region’. Thus, the CEECs had desire for the EU to become more engaged in the post-Soviet space, turning the region into a buffer zone for fear of Russia’s intentions (Nitoiu, 2016).

As a result, after accession of ten CEECs the EU’s eastern border moved to Poland’s border. At that point, Ukraine became the biggest and crucial neighbour country of Poland sharing the same concerns of being squeezed between the West and the East as a buffer state. Therefore, Poland was regarding that there could not be secure Poland without independent and secure Ukraine. Hence, in 2003 Poland did put forward a non-paper proposal to create an Eastern cooperation. Then, in 2008 it became the initiator with Sweden of the EaP.

There were other fundamental reasons pushing the EU to create this policy. The EaP covers Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (namely Eastern European countries), and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (the Caucasian countries). That is, the initiative focuses on the countries which are located on the key energy routes to Europe. Since the Russia has been assertive with the Putin's presidency on energy sources and routes, and after its policies over Ukraine using energy as a foreign policy tool have promoted the EU to take more decisive step on the eastern relations for the purpose of providing its energy security. When considered the Union's high dependency on the imported energy, the region and relations with the supplier and transit countries have crucial importance for EU's security. Thus, the EaP was drafted to encourage the partners to make a European choice (Browning, 2018). Apart from this, the other main argument on launching the EaP was claimed to balance the EU's UfM launched originally by the French Presidency, keeping the Union on the Franco-German axis (Sakwa & Stevens, 2012).

From the Russian perspective, on the other side, the EaP is seen as an attempt by the EU to expand its sphere of influence. Thus, 'it has deep suspicious about the EU's motives with regard to what it calls its neighbourhood and what Russia believes is its legitimate area of privileged interests', and Russia believes that 'the EU deliberately seeking to extend its civilizational reach into countries that it believes are by virtue of history, culture and economic interests its natural allies' (Sakwa & Stevens, 2012:75). Since Russia regards so, it is in a competitive state with the EU for influence over these in-between countries. Thus, this competition by Russia is a challenge to 'the idea of one Europe united on a basis of EU norms and value' (Sakwa & Stevens, 2012:75). In the changing international atmosphere, increasingly assertive Russia is rejecting the claim that the EU equals Europe, and so it is trying to offer an alternative to EU's policies towards its near abroad.

2.4. Neo-Realist Explanations of the ENP

The EU, it is argued, is a symbol of a postmodern realm of globalisation and liberal interdependence which have gained speed especially after the end of the Cold War. The postmodern reality or postmodern order here refers to a new order in which nation-state, national borders and traditional notions of sovereignty, power politics, and geographical calculation about the balance of power, border and war have lost their importance in favour of

openness, and have replaced by globalisation and market logics of social interactions and exchange (Luttwak, 1990). It is underlined by Guzzini (2012:62) for the EU as well; 'it has staked its reputation on being an anti-geopolitical unit...a peace organisation, a civilian or normative power, aimed precisely at overcoming the militarism and nationalism, historically associated with classical geopolitical thought that had plagued Europe's early twentieth century'. Thus, the policies pursued by the EU, such as the ENP, are also seen in accordance with this logic of postmodern realm which supersedes modern and geopolitical understanding.

In contrary locating the EU firmly within the postmodern world, the environment outside the EU, that is, the regions surrounding the Union are seen the sources of modernist threats that the EU should cope with. For instance, Russia, it is seen, is an actor not recognising the postmodern and post-geopolitical world of the EU Europe and pursuing geopolitical aspirations in a competition with Europe. It was proved by its military actions in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014, and its assertive actions in Syria. All these challenges by Russia took place in the EU's near abroad was commented as 'geography's revenge' against the post-Cold War Western idealism (Kaplan, 2014:32), and as the president of the European Council Donald Tusk expressed; 'politics has return to Europe, history is back' (quoted in Youngs, 2017:68), while the expectations from the EU to embrace geopolitics have raised (Auer, 2015).

From a neorealist perspective, geopolitics has importance due to its close ties with power political understandings emphasising on the balance of power, resource capture and the logic of relative gains of competition (Browning, 2018). Geopolitics requires geo-strategies. According to Grygiel (2006:27) geo-strategy is that: 'the geographic direction of a state's foreign policy and it describes where a state concentrates its efforts by projecting military power and directing diplomatic activity'. When a state suffers from the limited resources or capability for supposing a hegemonic leadership to play a role in the world scene, it focuses on the specific areas which have priority for that state, and geo-strategy is a foreign policy used to achieve its objectives. Therefore, the EU was and is already a geopolitical actor having geo-strategies aiming at the ordering the space beyond its borders in parallel to its member states interests. Thus, as Benito Ferrero-Waldner (2008) stated that the ENP is the EU's key geo-strategic project. Through the ENP, the EU tries to influence its partners and routinize the regions according to its preferences.

It should be focused on some aspects of that description. Firstly, the EU is not a state but composed of nation-states pooling some degree of their sovereignties. Neorealism puts forward that in the anarchical environment the interests of survival determines states' actions to protect themselves and maximising their powers. Rather, concerns of relative gains rather than absolute ones prevent states from long-term cooperation or from establishing alliances. However, as Hyde-Price (2007) claims when competition among states is mute, as in the post-Cold War environment in which there are several great powers having deep interdependence, states tend more to cooperation, and their concerns about relative gain are modest. Also, such entities, like the EU, give possibilities to its small powers a speech right while great powers follow their interests which they cannot accomplish alone. Moreover, within this kind of cooperation great powers determine rules, others follow. Therefore, when regarding the creation of the ENP, there were motivations of great powers of the EU. For instance, with regard to the Union for Mediterranean:

'it is France that had most often taken the lead in European initiatives in the Middle East. Since the late 1960s, France's policy has been characterised by a clearly been the promotion of closer relations with Arab states. French government have promoted the EU's international activity as a vehicle for those initiatives France alone accomplish...the EU presence is particularly useful in those areas if the world where French influence is weak...France has sought to project a strong European political voice, to complement and amplify its national voice' (Musu, 2007:89).

The same logic is valid for other dimensions of the ENP like Eastern Partnership which was proposed by Poland and highly supported by Germany.

The second point underlined within the realist geopolitical description of the EU's actorness towards its neighbours via the ENP is that the 'sphere of influence'. The EU, it is argued, rejects the idea of sphere of influence and the need to exert control over its neighbours. Although, geopolitical aspirations and geo-strategic manners are evident in the official texts that are basis of the ENP. In the Commission's initial communication on the ENP, and then the latest reviews of documents, it underlined the statements of 'developing of a zone of prosperity', 'creating a ring of friends' (European Commission, 2003:35). 'Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important' (Council of the European Union, 2003:35). Especially, the 'ring of friends' is seen as a 'buffer zone' to more threatening countries beyond the EU's borders (Browning, 2018:108). In parallel to this, the Global Strategy of 2016 of the EU stressing the importance of 'resilience' for European security, and points out;

‘It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience-the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises- benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy’ (European commission, 2016:23)

According to Biscop (2019), societal and state resilience aimed by the Union through its neighbourhood policy carries rather a defensive notion which aims to provide neighbour countries the means to deal with their own problems in order not to be affected by them. In more concrete terms, the EU regards that transformation and reforms in compatible with its norms and rules will prevent spill-over of potentials problems to the EU (Nitoiu, 2016). As it stands, ‘in more classical geopolitical terms, a resilient neighbour would simply be called a buffer state’ (Biscop, 2019). With the ENP’s regard, for instance, the CEECs have always supported increasing presence of the EU via the EaP in the post-Soviet region, especially in frozen conflicts, since they consider this region as a buffer zone with Russia (Nitoiu, 2016).

Another dimension of the policy which can be evaluated from a neorealist perspective is the conditionality. With the conditionality, it can be understood both how the EU exerts its power on neighbours and how the Union identifies threats from its neighbours. Conditionality with regard to EU’s threat and security perceptions is in parallel to the model of ‘concentric circles’ which was a model stated by the former Commission President Jacques Delors (Browning, 2018). While Delors regards that model as a useful tool to proceed economic and political integration and to designate relations with the non-EU countries (Smith, 2005), Ziolenka (2001) considers this model as a way of establishing hierarchies of otherness. Within the model, the EU is located in the pole of stability, security and prosperity with its norms and practices, that is, its self-narratives. According to their distance to the core, neighbour countries are located on the circles- inner or outer- by the EU. That distance, on the other hand, is determined in accordance with the adaptation of EU norms and practices, namely objectives of the ENP, by the neighbour countries. Conditionality mechanism with this respect is a hierarchical logic of spatial ordering the neighbours in line with the EU’s interests. In the framework of conditionality with the promise of ‘more for more’ (European Commission, 2011) is a mechanism of strategic leverage on neighbours (Browning, 2018). As Kahraman (2005) describes the neighbourhood that is a kind of relationship that removes threats. Thus, the friend-enmity notion also depends on the places of neighbours on circles- inner or outer.

However, there is an asymmetry within these relations. With reference to Prodi's statement (2002:5) of 'everything but institutions', under the roof of the ENP, rules are created by the stronger party, namely the EU/ EU's institutions, and are obeyed/adopted by the weaker side, namely the neighbour countries.

This situation clarifies second dimension of the conditionality mechanism; how the EU exerts its power over the neighbours. Different from classical realism, neorealism sees power as a combination of military, economic, and political capabilities, which enables to direct and affect other parties' foreign policy choices and manners. With respect to 'more for more' conditionality, the EU uses its economic power to export its norms and practices into its neighbours, that is, the Union imposes its rules. With the principle of 'more for more', the EU makes commitments for market access (economic integration and development), mobility of people, and a greater share of the EU financial support (European Commission, 2015) in return for more change from the partners in line with the EU's preferences. This means, any failure or unwillingness in order to accomplish EU directives will result in reduced EU funding. In doing so, the EU creates a strategic leverage over its partners. Therefore, indeed, the Union tries to shape its periphery in which it acts and performs, and also in which it has priorities and interests.

The mechanism of conditionality, on the other hand, reflects realist geopolitical aspects of the ENP which is closely tied power politics, emphasising on the balance of power, resource capture, and zero-sum logic of competition. Even though the Union itself claims that it 'invest(s) in a win-win solutions and move(s) beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game (EEAS, 2016; 3), it attempts to create 'Europeanization' without accession, exerting control over its neighbours. That means, in the EaP's regard, for instance, the Union tries to encourage the post-Soviet neighbours to make a 'European choice' (Browning, 2018). Although the EU claims its eastern neighbours have the right to choose their future freely and to determine freely their approach towards the Union, this 'choose' brings about an 'exclusivity', creating a power struggle with zero-sum logic over spatial ordering in the region, and so a security dilemma with Russia. It is summarized by Biscop (2019) that:

'A major trade agreement is anyway not possible with the countries that have joined Russia's own multilateral scheme for the region... But the EU can be strict once a country has opted for cooperation with us in a certain area, has accepted the aims and conditions of such cooperation, and

has been granted EU means to that end. Then it must either stick by rules or accept that assistance will be halted; you cannot have your cake and eat it, too...but once that choice is made, they cannot at the same time make a big show of welcoming Russia.'

In doing so, the EU creates a geopolitical competition with Russia based on exclusivity separating insiders and outsiders, raising a process into zero-sum game between Russia. At this point, an 'integration dilemma' emerges. Similar to security dilemma, which means one state's efforts to increase its power (even it is in defensive purposes) is regarded as a threat by others, the integration dilemma creates a condition perceived as a threat to itself by a country when its neighbours take part in military and economic alliances which are closed to that country (Charap & Troitskiy, cited in Sakwa, 2015). That is why the 'choice' based on exclusivity arising from the mechanism of conditionality reflects geopolitical dimension of the EU' neighbourhood policy, partially of the EaP. For instance, the Association Agreements, which were expected Ukraine to sign before Russian aggression, were incompatible with the existing trade agreements between Russia and Ukraine. Rather, after the entry the Treaty of Lisbon into force, it was required associated countries to align their defence and security policies with the EU, and so with NATO as well. Hence, Ukraine had to make an exclusive choice, creating a gain for the chosen part while a lost for the other actor.

The other method adopted in the ENP is 'differentiation'. This means all individual neighbour countries are approached with a tailor-made policy which regards their needs, aims and potentials. However, this differentiation method is criticised as being standardisation and homogeneity. That is to say, the EU expects all neighbours to adopt the same norms and practices, to change in same direction compatible with the EU preferences. In parallel to differentiation, bilateralism is argued to reflect the same intention; meeting specific needs of individual countries. However, from a more realist perspective, bilateralism intensifies the existing power asymmetries between the Union and its weaker neighbours, disguising the EU's unilateralism (Valh & Tassinari, 2005).

CHAPTER 3: THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ENP AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Within the emerging and changing atmosphere after the Cold War, the Russian Federation has been increasingly powerful actor playing assertive role in European multipolar system. In this part of the study, how Russia as a great power pursues foreign policy, how it identifies itself and what this self-narrative means for the EU Europe, and in which aspects Russian foreign policy affects European security system will be evaluated in order to comment to what extent the ENP contributes to the EU's security. In doing so, especially Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 will be examined, considering the motivations pushing Russia to military intervention. While evaluating the case, principles and goals of the ENP, and the ways Russia perceives it will be pointed out.

'Russia's willingness to violate Ukraine's territorial sovereignty is the gravest challenge to the European order in over half century' (Krastev, 2014:79). After Russia's intervention, indeed, the EU needed to revise its Security Strategy. That intervention was not the sole reason, of course. The EU has been in a perpetual state of crisis, ranging from Eurozone debt crisis, terrorism, immigration to increasing nationalism, illiberalism and also Brexit, etc. However, Russian challenge has reminded the EU Europe once again that modern political understandings with its components such as territory, nation, balance of power, power politics, sphere of influence, hard power and so on have remain enduring even in the so-called new world order. Thus, the EU was counting measures to deal with the changing world while assessing it a realist perspective, targeting Russia's action as a big challenge to European security in the Global Strategy of 2016 (EEAS, 2016).

Russia's annexation of Crimea, on the other hand, was not an instantaneous reaction, an opportunistic power grab, imperialist aspiration or just an impulsive decision (Treisman, 2016& Krastev, 2014). Instead, this was an action having sound ground from Russian perspective, and resulting from the order led by the West since the end of the Cold War. That is, it was a defensive reflection and politically, culturally and militarily resist to the West and the Western order which Russia perceives it as being dictated (Krastev, 2014). Though Russia had many other options to reflect its inconvenience, it preferred to use of force to show its

determination to take an equal place as a great power in the changing international system. Indeed, it projected that the current game had changed and Russia was back (Treisman, 2016). When considered the circumstances that pushed Russia in that direction, there were firstly national security concerns and then other vital reasons related to its security and national interests.

After the Cold War, the Russian Federation as a former superpower found itself in economically, politically and militarily weak position. Therefore, while struggling with the challenges posed by the post-Cold War system, it focused its attention mainly on its near abroad, that is, its post-Soviet neighbours. The collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of fourteen states from it left successor Russia in a new geostrategic environment surrounded by a plurality of small and medium-sized states on its western and southern borders. As being a state of plains, Russia has long seen building 'strategic depth' as the major way to its survival and security, and so it has tried to expand the space around itself for centuries (Lukyanov, 2016:32). Therefore, in this new geostrategic environment Russian politicians determined Russian foreign policy towards the near abroad basically on priorities that: projecting Russia's dominion over states around its borders which Russia regarded as the buffer states; reintegrating former Soviet states in an economic cooperation and gaining control on the key energy sources and their transit routes; guarding the Russian minorities remained in the post-Soviet countries; and suppressing and blocking threats like Islamic terrorism, transnational crime, arm smuggling, narcotics and illegal immigration flourishing in its near abroad (Hyde-Price, 2007).

As Russia pursued to regain its dominion on its near abroad, albeit it was relatively weak, it tried to use its current military power as an instrument of coercion. Its preponderant military power compared to small and medium-sized countries in its periphery and the network of Russian military bases throughout the post-Soviet space facilitated to re-establish Russian influence in some degree. For instance, Russian military interventions took place in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. Over time, especially after Putin's accession to power, Russian control on key energy sources and pipelines contributed to manipulate economic dependencies of Soviet successor states on Russia. On the other hand, Russia has successfully used Russian minorities and border disputes as a tool of its leverage, for example in Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan. Nonetheless, Russia was not strong enough to overturn Western actions taking

place in the Eastern and Central Europe. The West, therefore, exploited or at best misinterpreted Russia's inaction and maintained EU consolidation and NATO expansion. These became the main motivations pushing Russia to assert itself militarily, and its reaction broke out in Ukraine, annexing Crimea.

This is mainly because, Ukraine has always had privileged importance for Russia, and Russia's main concern in its near abroad after the Cold War has been Ukraine (Hyde-Price, 2007). It has been regarded by Russians that loss of Ukraine and emergence of independent and sovereign Ukraine on Russia's border were the most significant geostrategic developments witnessed within the post-Cold War order for the following reasons. To begin with, Russians traditionally accept the capital city of Ukraine, Kiev, as the mother of Russian cities as being the oldest city of ancient Russia. Thus, loss of Ukraine was unacceptable for Russia and also unnatural. Rather, Russians have seen Ukraine as a natural part of any future 'slavic union', which would enable Russia to re-emerge as a new superpower in the emerging multipolar system, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan (Hyde-Price, 2007). What is more, strategically Crimea, which was formerly a part of Ukraine, had importance as the home port for the Black Sea fleet. Apart from these, Ukraine along with Georgia located on Russia's European borders and composed crucial part of Russian strategy toward Europe being a transit route for pipelines to European states. Therefore, in terms of Russian politics, economy and security Ukraine had vital importance. That is why, Russia's foreign policy goal in its near abroad has been to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence since the end of the Cold War, and to prevent it from joining both NATO and the EU for the fear of confronting US-led Western power and influence into Russia's doorstep.

Not only membership of Ukraine to them, but even also dominant Western influence which would lead Ukraine to break away from Russia's orbit or sphere of influence was not acceptable. Thus, Russia has tried several means before resorting to the use of force to keep Ukraine in its orbit. For instance, in 2000 Russia imposed economic pressure, halting the flow of oil and gas, and repeated this during the winter of 2005-06. To the same end, Russia has always supported pro-Russian political elites and governments politically and economically. This political manner prompted and was prompted as well by the West an intense security competition between Russia and the West, resulting in the 'Orange Revolution' following the

Ukrainian Presidential election in 2004 during which Russia and the West backed rival candidates. Despite all reactions by Russia, neither NATO nor the EU ceased their expansionist policies towards Russia's near abroad, continuing attempts to insert Ukraine in their orbit. At that time, Russia appealed military force in Georgia in 2008 as a resist to the West. That was a message for not only the West and Georgia but also for Ukraine. Hence, Ukraine has become an arena for security competition between Russia and the West.

According to Krastev (2014:82), however, Georgian War of 2008 was different from Russian intervention in Crimea in 2014, because on Georgian dispute, according to him, 'Moscow used force to draw a red line that it insisted Western capitals not cross', however, 'in Crimea Moscow demonstrated its readiness to cross the red lines drawn by the West- to question legal norms and the structure of the post-Cold War European order', challenging: 'is the US still ready to guarantee the security of European democracies, or does it prefer offshore balancing and pivoting Asia; is Germany powerful enough to deal with a Russia that is uninterested in being European?'

Russia, indeed, had plenty of other ways to put pressure on Ukraine and so to prevent it from joining the Western side, such as using Black Sea fleet, playing with gas prices or halting the all flow, demanding Ukraine to pay back government debt to Russia, and provoking anti-Ukrainian demonstrations among Ukraine's sizeable population for creating instability. Nevertheless, as Stoner states, 'great powers assert themselves where they see their interests being threatened', so Russia has chosen the dangerous way, asserting itself. It was dangerous because Ukraine was a big country with its population which was still in revolutionary and patriotic feelings. This intervention could provoke tough anti-Russian reactions in Ukraine, bringing the country much closer to the EU and NATO. On the other hand, the use of force in Crimea would lead to Russia's political isolation on the world scale, and even has resulted in some economic and political sanctions, endangering Russia's stagnating economy. In spite of that, Russia has proved its intention to sacrifice some economic interests to achieve its indispensable goals.

3.1. The Significance of the Wider Europe As A Geopolitical Space

After Russian annexation of Crimea, the idea that Putin's Russia aimed to resurrect the Soviet Empire through imperialist aspirations has gained dominance, and the West regarded the main reason of the crisis as Russian revisionism threatening world peace, and could probably level at other countries in Eastern Europe. But, Mearsheimer (2014) disagrees with this idea, claiming that the US and its European allies paved the way to Ukrainian crisis, endangering European security. According to him, main reasons inciting Russia were NATO enlargement aiming at moving Ukraine out of Russian sphere of influence, and at the same time the EU's efforts to expand eastward its influence by promoting Western values which began with the Orange Revolution in 2004 (Mearsheimer, 2014). Krastev (2014) supports this idea and adds that Russia perceives Western mores and institutions as real dangers to Russian state and security.

The roots of these threat perceptions date back to the 1990s. During the 1990s two events highlighted Russia's weakness in its external environment; NATO's first eastward enlargement and the Kosovo War (Hyde-Price, 2007). In the shadow of these events, Russia determined its security strategy and threat perceptions in its 2000 National Security Concept of Russian Federation, which is a document composing the basis of Russia's foreign policy since the beginning of the century. That is, this document is significant for understanding perceptions and evaluations which Putin's foreign policy is based on. In the first part of the document self-perception on Russia's place and role in the world is given place, and then Russia is described as one of the most important powers in new multipolar world with its unique strategic and geopolitical location, and it is pointed out the importance of relations firstly with the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS hereafter), and then with the other regional powers (Güneş, 2014). In the next parts of the document, threats to Russian national security are counted as follows: unilateral actions by some states through breaking existing norms, rules and mechanism of the UN and the OSCE; deterioration in Russian military and economic power and influence in the world; emergence and building-up of new military-political blocs and alliances, especially eastward expansion of NATO; possibility of foreign military base deployments on Russian borders; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems; any fading in integration and cooperation with the CIS; an increase in conflicts on both Russian and the CIS' borders; and any territorial claims from Russia (Güneş,

2014). When taking Russian security and threat perceptions and priorities into account, starting from the early 1990s the West has paved the way, or at least, contributed to Russian aggression and foreign policy manner today.

The early periods of the post-Cold War era, the West was regarding itself as the undisputed champion of the East-West conflict (Hyde-Price, 2007). Therefore, while the Cold War was coming to an end with the collapse of the USSR, the presence of NATO was expected to end, regarding its founding purpose by mainly successor Russia. Conversely, NATO maintained its presence, stayed on task. At first, Russian leaders appreciated that US forces remained in Europe with the thought of keeping reunified and powerful Germany down and pacified. But Russians did not want NATO to enlarge any longer, reaching Russian front yard and undermining its strategic depth (Mearsheimer, 2014). However, the Clinton administration ignored Russia's this concern and began pushing NATO to expand eastward beginning from the mid-1990s, and so its first enlargement took place in 1999, admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Together with this, another event became a turning point from the Russian point of view; NATO's intervention in the Kosovo War in 1999.

In the War, NATO's Operation Allied Force started a bombing against Serbia, which was a country having close political and cultural ties with Russia, and forced the Serbs to capitulate in their fights against Kosovar separatists. This intervention clearly showed Russia that NATO was not a purely defensive alliance with providing Article V collective defence guarantees for its members, and it was now a fighting group which it had not been during the Cold War (Lukyanov, 2016). In this sense, for Russia not only expansion of NATO but also its transformation became the main sources of its concerns. NATO, from that time, would seem a tool of efforts to reshape the international order unilaterally by overleaping the UN Charter and international law. 'They (the NATO's eastward expansion and the Kosovo War) were also closely intertwined in Russian minds, conforming suspicions that the United States was using NATO to impose a unipolar order on the international system that would further marginalise Russia influence, NATO enlargement was also perceived as a clear manifestation of the US-led power maximisation at Russia's expense (Hyde-Price, 2007:150). In the following years, through the military operations of NATO or its leading members made clearer in Russian

thinking about the post-Cold War international system that the West had been trying to keep Russia out.

NATO kept enlarging in 2004 with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, even though Russia had harshly criticised from the start. At the time, Russia was too weak to challenge to all these developments, also no new members except small Baltic States had territorial borders with Russia, so none of Russian reactions seemed so threatening for the allies. Therefore, NATO and its members did not see any harm to look further east, and at the end in 2008, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. This decision, then, caused a controversy among allies, because the George W. Bush administration was supporting to admit both countries while some of leading members such as Germany and France were worried about antagonising Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014). As a result, the decision was reached to declare that two countries would be member of NATO though the alliance did not initiate the formal process for membership. This statement prompted Putin's harsh criticism and led him to declare that admitting these countries to NATO would present a direct threat to Russia. Next, in August 2008, Russian invasion of Georgia took place. Taking control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia has showed its determination and given a clear warning to the West. As stated previously, through invasion of Georgia, Russia drew a red line that it insisted the West not cross (Krastev, 2014). Nevertheless, the Western allies did not clearly declare the abandonment of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, and continued to expand NATO, admitting Albania and Croatia in 2009.

From the Russian point of view, it is unacceptable to tolerate any military alliance that was Russia's enemy previously. It is also intolerable for Russia to allow the West helps install a government which is determined to integrate Ukraine or Georgia into the West, firstly into NATO. As Mearsheimer (2014:84) identifies: 'This is geopolitics; great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory'. Although the US and its European allies have repeatedly claimed that NATO's expansion was not aimed at containing Russia, Moscow's message was clear; they considered NATO's expansion into Georgia and Ukraine was unacceptable as much as any effort to turn these countries against Russia. None of the measures taken by the West, such as not deploying military forces in NATO's new members and creating a body called NATO-Russia Council to foster cooperation in 2002, has achieved

to remove Russia's concerns about NATO enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine, because 'it is the Russian, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them' (Mearsheimer, 2014:83). However, actually, by virtue of the dominant belief supported by the West that the end of the Cold War had transformed international politics and the new postmodern order had replaced the realist logic, the West expected Russia to become a part with a limited niche of 'Wider Europe', as Lukyanov (2016:33) demonstrates; 'a theoretical space that featured the EU and NATO at its core but that also incorporated countries that were not members of those organisations by encouraging them to voluntarily adopt the norms and regulations associated with membership'.

3.2. European Neighbourhood Policy: A Geopolitical Strategy

Reasons behind the Russian challenge to European security by using force and military power were mainly about Russia's security concerns and then its suspicions associated with national security and interests. As NATO's eastward enlargement has levelled threats to Russia's territorial security, NATO's transformation and its new doctrine of international community, humanitarian intervention and promotion of Western-led world order instead of principle of respect for state sovereignty have raised crucial threats from Russian point of view. Apart from these, EU's enlargement wave towards the post-Soviet states and the following policies, the ENP and Eastern Partnership, have been seen being associated with the Western policies targeted to Russian's near abroad. As Hyde-Price (2007:150) states, from Russian perspective, EU's expansion through membership or influence by the ENP 'is a stalking horse of NATO expansion', and an effort to keep Russia down and prevent it from regaining its proper status in the new world system (Lukyanov, 2016). For liberals/idealists of the West, these developments, namely EU's enlargement and NATO's transformation, were natural outcomes of the new post-modern world order in which there was the transcendence of the balance of power by cooperative security, and in which the creation of a Europe whole and free would be possible. Nevertheless, from Russian part these developments seemed to be attempts to impose Western hegemony eroding the principles of balance of power, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in other states' internal affairs and the need to obtain the UN Security Council's approval before use of force. And, within this new world Russia was given a secondary position with limited influence. This is because, the West has regarded the end of the Cold War as the triumph of theirs. In concrete terms, while US President George Bush was announcing that

‘America won the Cold War’ in 1992 (cited in Lukyanov, 2016:31), the Russian Federation has been regarded as the defeated rival of the War. And this meant that ‘a new world order no longer meant an arrangement between equals; it meant the triumph of Western principle and influence’ (Lukyanov, 2016:32). With this regard, Western powers started to pursue policies aiming at bringing countries ‘the right side of the history’ (Lukyanov, 2016:32).

In parallel to that end, the EU enlarged eastward in 2004, providing ten CEECs to return to Europe, and continued its efforts with the ENP. Contrary to Gorbachev’s proposal to create a common European home where the USSR’s successor Russia would be an equal part and co-designer of a new world order, Russia has been expected to give up its great power aspirations and to obey the Western-led rules without playing a part in devising under the concept of ‘Wider Europe’.

While ‘the EU has staked its reputation on being an anti-geographical unit...a peace organisation, a civilian or normative power, aimed precisely at overcoming the militarism and nationalism, historically associated with classical geopolitical thought (Guzzini, 2012:62), Russia has found itself an excluded position and considered EU’s actions with enlargement and then the ENP as tools of EU Europe to create and expand its sphere of influence, imposing or even dictating Western values by suppressing Russian influence firstly in its near abroad.

The EU, however, has its self-narratives as being a post-Westphalian actor of the new world system, it is argued that, it is already a geopolitical actor having geo-strategies aimed to reshape the countries beyond its borders in accordance with its preferences. Rather, it tries to influence the countries’ sense of geopolitical liaison and belongingness with its instruments of the ENP (Makarychev& Denyatov, 2014). With its geo-strategies, which are central for its ability to engage in world politics, the EU has been trying to routinize its periphery. Therefore, geopolitical aspects of the ENP are closely tied to Realist power politics, emphasising on the balance of power, resource capture and zero sum logic of competition. Hence, it is argued, the EU tries to place its norms, rules and preferences beyond its borders on the one side, and it attempts to create Europeanization without accession of countries on the other side, even though it rejects the claims of creating sphere of influence and exerting control over its neighbour spaces (Makarychev& Denyatov, 2014). That is to say, the Union considers the space surrounding itself as its near abroad and the ENP, is claimed, is a tool of EU’s ambition to act

as an interventionist actor in neighbour countries (Charillion, 2004). That the EU sees neighbour countries as its near abroad or sphere of influence is clearly evident in Romano Prodi's speech explaining the Proximity policy (2002:3) while describing new neighbours (currently ENP partners) as 'the countries in our future backyard', the concept that refers in political science and international relations to the surrounding area or neighbourhood within which competing powers might be seen concerning. What is more, the Commission's initial communication on the ENP in 2003 clearly reflects the Union's aspirations of geopolitical ordering, calling for development of a zone of prosperity and a ring of friends with whom the EU enjoys close relations (Browning, 2018). Thus, it is claimed that the ENP/EaP signifies a geopolitical vision of how the countries included in the policy should be ordered in accordance with the EU's interests and preferences. Moreover, Browning (2018) puts forward that creating a ring of friends surrounding the Union could be viewed as founding a buffer zone between the EU and more threatening space with regard to ENP/EaP's geopolitical ordering. This clearly shows that geography and geographical proximity keep importance for the EU's security even in the new emerging international environment.

Within this geopolitical vision of the ENP, moreover, hierarchies of otherness and threats are created based on the concept of concentric circles according to partner countries performance on adopting and applying EU's rules, norms and reforms. Also, as the EU locates at the core, degrees of security, stability and order decrease when moving away from the core, namely the EU (Ziolenka, 2001). This is closely related to another aspect of the policy; conditionality.

The mechanism of conditionality has been transferred from the enlargement policy to the ENP, and now constitutes a hierarchical logic of the EU's ordering in line with its preferences. For instance, in the regions and countries included in the ENP, the EU promotes institutional, economic, civic and political reforms, emphasising mainly on economic liberalisation along the EU's own lines, and in turn the Union promises closer relationship and more financial assistance. This is the logic of 'more for more' and depends on the resilience of the partners, and so the conditionality is 'as a mechanism of strategic leverage over the partners; as is the threat that failure to reform will potentially resulted in reduced EU funding' (Browning, 2018:108). When considered from this point of view, the EU as an actor of international

relations, exerts its hard power to shape its periphery. According to Joseph Nye (2003), as described previously, hard power is composed of the ability to use military and economic means or the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to influence others' behaviours and preferences. The EU does not use force, but through its attraction of economic power tries to remake its neighbourhood in its own image, and to keep them in its orbit dominated by the Western values and rules.

On the other hand, applying conditionality and attempts to create a ring of friends by promoting adoption of EU norms and practices are associated closely with how the EU conceptualises its security. In other words, 'threat and security become functions of how far the partners have been willing to become like the EU... reluctance, or a slow pace of change, has the effect of constituting them as unwilling and hence less friendly, whereas outright rejection of the ENP carries to danger of identify the partner as even potentially threatening...this is because it entails a rejection of what we might term the EU's totalising liberal security discourse towards the neighbourhood' (Browning, 2018:109). That is why the EU points out societal and state resilience for providing security within the documents related to the ENP.

Through the Wider Europe Strategy, for instance, the document which is basis of the ENP, it is underlined that the EU would enhance its relations with its neighbours on shared values, avoiding to create new dividing lines (European Commission, 2003:4). Here, shared values refer to the Western values and avoiding new dividing lines means European intervention 'beyond the new borders of the Union' (European Commission, 2003:4). Another official document framing the neighbourhood policy of the Union is the European Security Strategy of 2003. This document also highlights the importance of geography 'even in era of globalisation', and focuses on promoting a ring of well governed countries around Europe, beware of dividing lines (European Commission, 2003:35). And, 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper and the ENP, which were created in line with these requirements, emphasise on the 'privileged relationship with neighbours' built on mutual commitment to common values such as rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, the promotion of democracy and the principle of market economy and development (European Commission, 2003:3). However, close relations with the EU are conditioned the partner countries' 'degree of commitment to common values', their will and capacity to

implement the agreed priorities (European Commission, 2003:8). Then, it is stated that ‘there can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities’ (European Commission, 2003:8). Despite this, toughness of the conditionality of the ENP has been getting increase within the revisions of the policy in 2011 and 2015; i.e. principle of ‘more for more’. This is because, societal and state resilience in neighbour countries are seen as pre-condition of the European security as stated that ‘security at home depends on peace beyond our borders’ (EEAS, 2016:7). Therefore, the Union’s new security strategy paper named Global Strategy of 2016 stresses the importance of resilience that;

‘fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests... by contrast, resilience-the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crisis- benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions... together with its partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions... a resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy.’(EEAS, 2016:23).

In light of these statements of the EU’s security strategy, it is evident that the Union regards social, political and economic reforms in the neighbours in line with its preferences as the core of the security. The document also focuses on the Ukrainian crisis, identifying Russia’s annexation of Crimea as violation of international law and the top challenge to European security order. Then, it continues that: ‘the EU will stand united in upholding international law, democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country’s right to choose its future freely... we will strengthen the EU, enhance the resilience of our eastern neighbours and uphold their right to determine freely their approach towards the EU.’ (EEAS, 2016:33).

3.3. Wider Europe- The ENP and European Security

The ENP is a wide-ranging policy in terms of its geographic and thematic scope in order to evaluate whether or not it contributes to European security or to what extent it provides European security. However, as the EU states that: ‘peace and stability in Europe are no longer given. Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilisation in Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European security order at its core’ (EEAS, 2016:33). That is why, Ukrainian crisis enables to evaluate the ENP and its contributions to European security with regard to the changing international system, taking European actors’ understandings into account. Thus, in the triangle of the US, the EU and Russia on the European continent, Russia’s reflections and manners gain importance, and provide an opportunity to make some assumptions on the policy.

In light of all previous evaluations, it could be said that Ukrainian crisis was a symbol of, from Russia's perspective, that the current system and everything about this are wrong with today's Europe. And so, Putin's Russia has signalled that Russia would not stand for it anymore (Krastev, 2014). Russia through use of force in Crimea has showed that it is ready to abandon to expectation that Russia would be a European country in good standing in the line with Western preferences, sacrificing its economic interests to that end. As Mearsheimer (2014:86) underlines: 'History shows that countries will absorb enormous amount of punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represent an exception to this rule'.

Russia, indeed, has refused to play by the Western rules in the emerging multipolar system, resisted to post-modern European values and attempted to draw a clear line between Russia's world and Europe's. And, the ENP/EaP has played a crucial role prompted this reaction for some reasons. Russia, for instance, was defeated several times in Ukraine, starting from Orange Revolution in 2004 and the final was, just before annexation of Crimea, with the February 2014 ouster of Ukrainian pro-Russian President Victor Yanukovich by pro-Western forces. This, in sense, was the final straw for Russia, leading to military operation in Crimea. As a result, Russia gave a respond to the EU's persistent eastward expansion and its possibility for NATO enlargement. In concrete terms, Russia rejected the further extension of EU's influence by way of particularly of the ENP/EaP into the former Soviet space, and so it projected its anger in the most decisive way, namely, with the use of military force.

This is not because, Russia has ambitious to re-establish the Soviet Empire, but it regards these spaces, firstly Ukraine and Georgia due to their historical and cultural ties and their geostrategic importance as well, and then possibly Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Moldova as its (Stoner,2014). In Russia's opinion the EU and the US as well claims the right to change not only the world order but also the internal orders of individual states in line with their interests and preferences, and the ENP- EaP and NATO are the tools of their aims. Russia's this deep-rooted suspicion is based on the idea that the West not only seeks to continue geopolitical expansion in its classical form but also wants to everyone to be like itself by persuasion, coercion and by force when necessary(Lukyanov, 2016). Similarly, Haukkala (2010) claims within the Wider Europe, which includes 'the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, Russia

and everything in between', the EU deliberately chooses to maximise its leverage over its neighbours. While the EU is establishing and improving its relations with its neighbours in the shadow of conditionality mechanism, 'the neighbours are not likely to have a large say in matters that will have a profound effect on their future development and place in Europe' (Haukkala, 2010: 164). It seems evident in European Commission President Romano Prodi's expression in 2002 with the formula 'everything but institutions' (cited in Lukyanov, 2016:34). That is to say, including Russia new neighbours of the EU after big bang enlargement would adopt EU rules and regulations but would not be able to influence their development. That is why, Russia from the start refused to be included in the ENP. Instead, it proposed to be a strategic partner on common spaces on the more equal base. Furthermore, through the manner adopted by the EU in its neighbourhood policy, especially in the aftermath of the Eastern enlargement, 'in certain respects the European Union might prove to be more serious challenger to the Russian position in the East than the traditional adversary NATO (Haukkala, 2015: 168). Therefore, there seem to be a growing understanding that Russia is not regarded as co-designer of this new European order.

That is why, Russia evaluates the ENP-EaP towards its near abroad as the EU's regionalist policies with the logic of zero-sum competition as attempts for its geopolitical expansion aiming at building an EU sphere of influence (Pop, 2009 & Makarychev, 2012), even though the Union rejects the claim that the ENP and its sub-policy EaP are directed to anyone, particularly to Russia. Rather, for Russia, the EaP rests on encouraging post-Soviet neighbour countries to make a European choice, and so marginalizes Russia (Browning, 2018), despite the Union itself claims to stand for those countries' freedom to choose their future (EEAS, 2016). However, it was evident from the starting of the policy while Romano Prodi (2002:2) stating that; 'they (post-Soviet countries) want benefits that led them to choose the EU as their political heaven; stability, prosperity, solidarity, democracy and freedom'.

Russia, is argued within this framework, does not recognise the post-modern and post-geopolitical world of the EU, and has always been in a competition with the EU Europe. Thus, Russia's military actions firstly in Georgia and then in Ukraine together with its deployment nuclear capable missiles in Kaliningrad, its last minute intervention in Syrian war and its support for right wing nationalist political parties in the European democracies could be seen

‘a battle for European soul, European peace and democracy on the continent (Harding, 2015 cited in Browning, 2018:107). That is, the ENP/EaP has contributed a security challenge of Russia for the EU, prompting Russia’s refusal to accept the universalist presumptions of the EU, and to a diminished and subordinate standing in relation to the EU and for shaping Europe.

As stated previously, states determine their security and threat perceptions according to their self-identification. Russia identifies itself as a Eurasian country with culture, history and statecraft different from the West, so it rejects imposed so-called universal European values. Rather, as a great power Russia has interests beyond its borders, this space beyond its borders is composed of the neighbours which Russia regards as its near abroad. And according to the concept of neighbourhood as described by Kahraman (2006), friend- foe description depends on the active state of the neighbourhood, namely, the level of good relations with neighbours. Thus, with the ENP the EU tries to draw countries from Russian orbit, leading to deterioration in their relations with Russia. Hence, Russia’s foreign policy actions and reactions to the EU’s policies are not only a rejection of EU norms but also a direct challenge to its universalising aspirations.

The EU, with the ENP and the EaP, not only moves Russia away from European system but also paves the way for competitive actions. For instance, the initiation of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or much closer relations between Russia and China, all these are recognised by the EU as developments making ‘the EU less attractive as a model and partner’ (EEAS, 2013:22). The EU, moreover, underlines its awareness of that: ‘the lure of anti-democratic models promoted from outside’ and adds that ; ‘turning away from the EU, and looking for inspiration and support elsewhere’ as a real threat for the Union itself arising from ‘lost confidence’ (European Union, 2015: 134-5, 146 cited in Browning, 2018:112).

In sum, Russia as a great power of the emerging multipolar European system, asserts itself where it sees its interests being threatened (Stoner: 2014). The Ukrainian crisis was just a symbol showing Russia’s determination and readiness to challenge the Western-led European and possibly world system. Russia has drawn a red line to stop European powers from gradually closer to Russia which has ‘dreams of the pre-1914 days when Russia was autocratic but

accepted, revolutions were not tolerated, and Russia could be part of Europe while preserving its distinctive culture and traditions' (Krastev, 2014: 81-82), as an equal actor as a co-designer.



CONCLUSION

In the light of given evaluations in the previous parts, the main aim of this thesis is to evaluate to what extent the ENP contributes to European security in the emerging multipolar structure in Europe from a neorealist perspective. In parallel to that end, firstly some basic components of neorealism and the concepts of neighbourhood and security are identified in the first chapter in order to draw a general framework on which main assumptions of the thesis are based. After identifying the main concepts, European political system emerged after the Cold War is examined on the triangle of the US, the EU, and the Russian Federation. The study reaches a conclusion that the new political system of the post-Cold War Europe is multipolar. It is, rather, assumed that contrary to liberal/idealist expectations, Europe has not turned into a Kantian paradise of peace; the current political structure in Europe has increasingly been showing evidences of a more realistic structure in which geography, geopolitics, sovereignty, nationalism, balance of power, national interests, logic of zero-sum competition and similar Realpolitik understandings keep their importance, and are reflected in policy making processes and in actors' foreign policy manners. In this political atmosphere arising from multipolar structure, Europe's three main actors, namely the US, the EU, and the Russian Federation, have taken new roles and adopted new foreign policy attitudes different from the Cold War period.

To begin with, it is argued that European peace and the EU's integration used to base on the superpower rivalry, the US security guarantee for the Western European states, and the US' hegemonic presence in the European continent during the Cold War. However, today while the US pursues the offshore balancer strategy, it demands the EU to spend more on military power and defence without developing more autonomous security interests and foreign policy preferences by still following the US' lead without decoupling NATO. Otherwise, Washington's reaction varies from defining the EU as an unreliable ally to as a foe. This mainly because, in the early years of the post-Cold War, as the sole superpower, the US has shifted its attention from mainly Europe to wider world; the Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf alongside the Western Europe. That is, European security is essential but not vital any more for the US.

Another great power playing increasingly assertive role in multipolar European system is the Russian Federation. Russia, actually, has never given assent to geopolitical settlement

founded after the Cold War, and has been in a situation to overturn it. Russia has always seen the post-Cold War settlement as unbalanced and unfair, evaluating Western policies as attempts aiming to reshape world in which they could serve their interests alone. Hence, it has challenged the current system overtime tried to overturn and balance the Western dominance at least in its periphery. Thus, especially after Putin's coming to power, the state has started to pursue increasingly assertive foreign policy in order to attain its proper status, namely great power status, firstly in Europe and then in the whole world.

The shift in the US foreign policy and assertive Russian policies have contributed to the current political structure and balance of power of Europe beside other international developments. Therefore, the changing political structure are very different from times in which the Western European countries were able to peacefully cooperate on the ground of the EU. The EU has highly realised that its optimistic post-modern understandings arising from the US-led liberal order are not shared by others, and also left them vulnerable in the face of the rest realist world. Therefore, that post-modern appearance has been challenged, and the Union itself accepts that hard power beside soft power is needed to cope with today's challenges. The EU, rather, accepts the necessity of a more realistic assessment of the current political environment. Therefore, the Union stresses the necessity to evaluate the world after the Cold War from more realist perspective in its Global Strategy.

The ENP's contribution to European security, therefore, is made in the light of this political structure based on multipolarity in the thesis. Thus, in the second chapter, the ENP is tried to be explained from a neorealist perspective, focusing especially on geopolitical dimensions of the EaP. It is argued that the ENP is the key geopolitical project of the Union, and the Union aims to create a European sphere of influence through its neighbourhood policy. Rather, the ENP/EaP shows geopolitical features based on balance of power, power struggle, logic of zero-sum competition, etc. arising from its 'more for more' conditionality, demands for state and societal resilience in line with the EU's preferences and values. Therefore, the EU expects its eastern neighbours to make a European choice. At this point, the ENP gains more importance for European security from a neorealist perspective when considering the Union's eastern periphery and the countries covered by the EaP. This is because, the EU's eastern periphery is the western periphery of Russia as well.

In parallel to geopolitical and neorealist evaluations of the ENP/EaP, in the third chapter to whether and to what extent the ENP contributes to European security is examined, evaluating Russian perceptions of and reflections to the ENP/EaP by studying Ukrainian crisis of 2014. Therefore, it is come to a conclusion that Russia perceives the EU's policies toward the post-Soviet region, namely its near abroad, as a threat to its security and interests, and the ENP/EaP is a part of those policies. Because, as explained previously neighbourhood is a kind of relations that removes threats and neighbourly relations are based on friendship, and so however intense the relations are, actors accept themselves as friends. However, the EU, is argued, forces in-between countries, namely overlapping neighbours, to make a European choice between the EU and Russia by using its economic hard power. Therefore, Russia regards the ENP/EaP as a geopolitical challenge by the EU. Thus, Ukrainian crisis was a reflection to the EU's, indeed the West's, policies as a whole. When considered from a wider framework, Russia's reaction is not only to the ENP/EaP, but was a reflection to European states' predetermined positions inherited from the periods of bloc confrontation, to dictated structure led by the US and shepherded by the EU, to effects by the West to isolate Russia from the international community without regarding its great power status and claimed rights arising from that status. Hence, Russia has violated European security as stated in the EU's Global Strategy of 2016, partly because of the policies projected by the ENP/EaP as well.

As a result, the thesis claims that the ENP, especially the EaP, reflects highly geopolitical dimensions, creating geopolitical competition with Russia. With this regard, the thesis argue that in multipolar Europe the ENP does not contribute to European security since its aims and implications create rising challenge from Russia. In other words, instead of providing and consolidating stability and prosperity in the EU's periphery and so in European continent, the ENP leads to instability in the covered geography, and so it becomes counter-productive for European security, creating new threats in this new multipolar European structure, which result from traditional understandings of security like power struggle, balance of power, zero-sum competition, security dilemma, and so on.

Beyond the assumptions taking the ENP into account for European security, this study might raise new questions about European security for further studies, considering European multipolar structure. That is to say, the ENP is just a part of the EU policies aiming at security.

The EU, for instance, stresses the necessity to evaluate the world after the Cold War from more realist perspective in its Global Strategy and highlights the importance of cooperation with NATO while member states try to increase in their budget to establish and develop much stronger military power and more autonomous defence structure. This leads both to consensus and contradictions with the US. For instance, despite all economical disadvantages the EU has imposed tough sanctions on Russia upon its annexation of Crimea. Yet, on the case of Iranian nuclear deal, the EU has not given up trade relations with Tehran for the purpose of keeping the country in deal even if the US has levelled harsh criticism to the EU, so the Union has shown its ability to pursue more independent policies from the US even on such a crucial international issue. Therefore, the US policy-makers would have to make a choice; whether they prefer a Union which is weak and divided in terms of its security and foreign policy and military power but is dependent on the US power and pursues policies consistent with its interest or stronger and more autonomous EU which follows its path and sometimes goes against the US' favoured policies. It is unrealistic for the US to expect the EU to both increase its defence spending and at the same time remain politically passive. This choice gains importance when regarding the current circumstances and political atmosphere in Europe and in the world as well.

From the EU's part, there is similar choice to make: whether the Union would rely on the US for its security, including in its immediate neighbourhood or would be a place in which great power competition occurs or would develop a more autonomous policy and forceful defence to meet the growing economic, security and political challenges and instabilities in its periphery and especially from China and Russia. To make a choice for the EU without a clear common vision for defence and foreign policy and with weak military power against destabilising pressures on its periphery seems tough. For instance, the Syrian civil war has shown that many EU states lack the military capacity and also political will to do so, even if after Ukrainian crisis European states has started to devote more budget to defence. On the other hand, within the emerging system Europe turns more self-help structure leading member states to pursue freer policies in accordance with their national interests. Italy, for instance, has been the first major European economy taking part in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, or Germany and Austria are moving toward completing the controversial Nord Stream 2 Pipeline that will increase dramatically Europe's dependence on Russian gas undermining the interests

of the Union as a whole. Therefore, all these lead a question to emerge; whether the less US presence in the European hemisphere would prompt a deeper division in the EU and result in finding itself at the mercy of opportunistic great powers or would lead the EU to get stronger to develop the ability to better defend itself and pursue common Western interests even if it sometimes goes against US preferences.

As a result, choices made by European and American policy-makers could determine the future structure of Europe, paving the ways actors follow. At this point, for Russia as one of the great powers, the question is that whether Russia would go further challenging that if the US is still guarantee the security of European democracies or it is off-shore balancer or the EU Europe is powerful enough to deal with a Russia which is uninterested in being European and which is getting more assertive in the international politics.

REFERENCES

- Akgül Açıkmeşe, S., (2011). Algı mı Söylem mi? Kopenhag Okulu ve Yeni-Klasik Gerçekçilikte Güvenlik Tehditleri. *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 8(30)
- Asle, T., (2010). The European Union as a Small Power. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49(1), 43-60
- Auer, S., (2015). Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: The Ukraine Crisis and the Return of Geopolitics. *International Affairs*, 91(5), 953-968
- Avery, G., (2015). EU Expansion and the Wider Europe. In D. Kenealy& J. Peterson& R. Corbett (Eds.), *The European Union: How Does It Work?* (4th ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 183
- Aydın, M., (2004). Uluslararası İlişkilerin Gerçekçi Teorisi; Kökeni, Kapsamı, Kritiği. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, 1(1), 33-60
- Bache, I., George, S. & Bulmer, S., (2011). *Politics in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Baldwin, D., (1995). Security Studies and End of the Cold War. *World Politics*, 48(1),117-141
- Balfour, R. & Rotta, A., (2005). Beyond Enlargement. The European Neighbourhood Policy and Its Tools. *The International Spectator- Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 40(1), 7-20
- Baran, Z., (2007). EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage. *The Washington Quarterly*, 30(4), 131-144
- Baranovsky, V., (2000). Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?. *International Affairs*, 76(3), 443-458
- Barbe, E., (1998). Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions. In J. Ziolenka (Eds.) *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, La Haya: Kluwer Law International
- Bauman, Z., (1991). *Modernity and Ambivalence*. New York: Cornell University Press

Behnke, A., (2006). No Way Out: De-securitization, Emancipation and the Eternal Return of the Political; A reply to Aradau. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9(1), 62-69

Bilgin, P., (2010). Güvenlik Çalışmalarında Yeni Açılımlar: Yeni Güvenlik Çalışmaları. *SAREM Journal of International Relations*, 8(14), 69-96

Biscop, S., (2005, April). *The European Security Strategy and the Neighbourhood Policy: Anew Starting Point for A Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership?*. Paper presented at the EUSA ninth Biennial International Conference

Biscop, S., (2015). *Peace Without Money, War Without Americans: Can European Strategy Cope?*. London: Routledge. Retrieved from <https://www.kobo.com/tr/tr/ebook/peace-without-money-war-without-americans-1>

Biscop, S., (2019). *European Security Strategy in the 21st Century: New Future of Old Power*. London: Routledge. Retrieved from <https://www.kobo.com/tr/tr/ebook/european-strategy-in-the-21st-century>

Booth, K., (1991). Security and Emancipation. *Review of International Studies*, 17(4), 313-326

Bowker, M. (2012). European Security. In R. Sakwa & A. Stevens (Eds.), *Contemporary Europe* (3rd ed.). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 217-234

Breedlove, P.M., (2016). NATO's Next Act: How to Handle Russia and Other Threats. *Foreign Affairs: Struggle for Israel*, 98(4), 96-106

Brooks, S. G., (1997). Duelling Realism. *International Organisations*, 51(3), 445-477

Browning, C.S., (2018). Geostrategies, Geopolitics and Ontological Security in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The European Union and the 'New Cold War'. *Political Geography*, 62, 106-115

Buzan, B., (1991). New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century. *International Affairs*, 67(3), pp.431-451

Buzan, B., (1991). *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publish

Buzan, B., Weaver, O. & Wilde, J., (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publish

Buzan, B. & Waver, O., (2009). Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitization Theory. *Review of International Studies*. 35(2), pp.253-276

Buzan, B. & Hansen, L., (2011). *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Çaşın, M.H., (2017). Ukraine Crisis Impact on NATO and European Security. In R.K. Karaca & F.Z. Öztürk (Eds.), *New Concepts and New Conflicts in Global Security Issues* (pp.25-65). İstanbul: İstanbul Gelişim University Press

Charillon, F., (2004). Sovereignty and Intervention: EU's Interventionism in its Near Abroad. In W. Carlsnaes & H.Sjursen & B. White (Eds.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, London: Sage Publisher

Chifu, J., (2006). The Eastern Dimension of the ENP- Romanian Approach. *Journal of foreign policy of Moldova*. 10 (3). 2-17

Cotter, A., (2007). Security in the New Europe. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. In W. Carlsneas, H. Sjursen & B. White (Eds.), *Contemporary European Policy* (pp.252-264), London: SAGE

Comelli, M., (2007, May). Building Security in Its Neighbourhood through the European Neighbourhood Policy?. Paper presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference

Cremona, M., (2004). The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional Issues. *CDDRL Working Papers*, No.25

Çıtak, E., (2014). Yeni Gerçekçilik ve Güvenlik. In E.Çıtak and O.Şen (Eds.), *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenlik: Teorik Değerlendirmeler* (pp.33-47). İstanbul: Tarcan Matbaası

Dannreuther, R., (2008). The European Security Strategy's Regional Objective: The Neighbourhood Policy. In S. Biscop, J. J. Andersons (Eds.). *The EU and The European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe* (62-81).New York: Routledge

Dannreuther, R., (2017). *International Security: The Contemporary Agenda*. Cambridge: Policy Press

Dedeođlu, B., (2014). *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Stateji*. İstanbul: Yeniüzyıl Yayınları

European Commission. (2003). *Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. Brussels

European Commission Strategy Paper of December 12, 2003. *A Secure Europe in a Better World- European Security*

European Commission Strategy Paper of May 5, 2004. *European Neighbourhood Policy*

European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joint Communication of May 25, 2011. *A New Response to A Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood*. Brussels

European External Action Service Strategy Paper of December 15, 2016. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe- A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. Brussels

Farrands, C., (2017). Dilemmas of Regional Security and the Regional Securitization Debate: Mediterranean Energy Security. In R.K. Karaca& F.Z. Öztürk (Eds.), *New Concepts and New Conflicts in Global Security Issues* (pp.25-65). İstanbul: Istanbul Gelişim University Press

Fazal, T. M., (2004). State Death in the International System. *International Organisations*, 58(2), 311-344

Flenley, P., (2005). Russian and the EU: A Pragmatic and Contradictory Relationship. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 6(3), 435-461

Fukuyama, F., (1992). *The End of History and The Last Man*. New York: Macmillan

Gallie, W.B., (1964). Essentially Contested Concepts. In W.B. Gallie (Eds.), *Philosophy and Historical Understandings* (pp. 157-191). London: Chatto& Windus

Galtung, J., (1969). Violence, Peace and Peace Research. *Peace Research*, 6(3), 167-191

Ganzle, S. (2007). The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Strategy for Security in Europe. In S. Ganzle (Ed.), *The Changing Politics Of European Security: Europe Alone?.* London: Palgrave

Gartner, H., Hyde-Price, A. & Reitter, E., (Eds.). (2001). Europe's New Security Challenges. London: Lyne Rienner Publishers

Ghazaryan, N., (2010). The ENP and The Southern Caucasus: Meeting Expectations?. In R. G. Whittman, S. Wolff (Eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact* (pp.3-29). London: Palgrave Macmillan

Glaser, C., (2010). Realism. In A. Collins (Eds.), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Glaser, C., (1997). The Security Dilemma Revisited. *World Politics*, 50(1), 171-201

Griffiths, M., (2002). *International Relations: The Key Concepts*. London: Routledge

Grygiel, J. J., (2006). Great Powers and Geopolitical Change. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press

Guzzini, S., (1993). Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis. *International Organisation*, 47 (3), 443-478

Guzzini, S., (2012). *Return of Geopolitics in Europe: Social Mechanism and Foreign Policy Identity Crisis*. London: Cambridge University Press

Güneş, H.,(2014). Rus Federasyonu Dış Politikasının Çeyrek Yüzyılı. In F.Sönmezoğlu& Ö.E. Bayır (Eds), *Dış Politika: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Bakış* (pp.465-487). Istanbul: Der Yayınları

Haddad, B. & Polyakova, A., (2018). Is Going It Alone the Best Way Forward for Europe: Why Strategic Autonomy Should Be the Continent's Goal?. *Foreign Affairs*,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-10-17/going-it-alone-best-way-forward-europe>

Hansen, L., (2012). Reconstructing De-securitization: The Normative- Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply It. *Review of International Studies*, 38(6), 525-546

Harding, G., (2015). Russia: Half-Hearted EU Propaganda No Match for Robust Policies. EUObserver, 23 March 2015. Available at: <https://euobserver.com/opinion/128101>

Haukkala, H. & Moshes, A., (2004). Beyond Big Bang: The Challenges of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy in the East. *Finnish Institute of International Affairs Report 9*

Haukkala, H.,(2010). Explaining Russian Reactions to the European Neighbourhood Policy. In R. G. Whittman & S. Woltf (Eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective; Context, Implementation and Impact* (pp.161-181), Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

Haukkala, H., (2015). From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU-Russia Relations. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23(1), 1-26

Herz, J., (1950). Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma. *World Politics*, 2(2), 157-180

Huntington, S. P., (1999). The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(2), 35-49

Huntington, P.S., (2004). Who are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity. *Political Science Quarterly*, 199(3),521-522

Huntington, S.P., (2006). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New York: Yale University Press

Hyde-Price, A., (2007). *European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity*. New York: Routledge

Jervis, R., (1999). Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate. *International Security*, 24(1), 42-63

- Jervis, R., (2001). Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma? *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3(1), 36-60
- Johnson, L., (1996). *Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbours, Friends*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Kagan, R., (2019). The New German Question: What Happens When Europe Comes Apart? *.Foreign Affairs: Searching for a Strategy*, 98(3), 108-122
- Kahraman, H.B., (2005). Turkey-European Union: Are We Just Neighbours?. *Varlık*, Vol:12
- Kahraman, S., (2005). The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement Towards Wider Europe. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*. 10(4), 1-28
- Kahraman, S., (2006). The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Critical Assessment. *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 5(3), 13-46
- Kaplan, R. D., (2009). The Revenge of Geography. *Foreign Policy*, 96-105
- Kolodziej, E.A., (2009). Security Theory: Six Paradigms Searching for Security. In M. Brechter& F. Harvey (eds.), *Millennial Reflections on International Studies* (pp.547-568). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
- Kopecek, V., (2011). European Neighbourhood Policy; Does the Tool Work? Area Study of the South Caucasus. *Contemporary European Studies*, 1, 5-22
- Kotkin, S., (2018). Realist World: The Players Change, But The Game Remains. *Foreign Affairs: Which World Are We Living In*, 97(4), 10-16
- Kotkin, S., (2016). Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern. *Foreign Affairs: Putin's Russia: Down But Not Out*, 95(1), 2-10
- Krastev, I., (2005). Russian Revisionism: Putin's Plan for Overturning the European Order. *Foreign Affairs*, 79-85. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-03/russian-revisionism?fa_anthology=1113997

Krause, K. & Williams, W., (1996). Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods. *Mershan International Studies Review*, 40(2), 229-254

Krauthammer, C.,(1991). The Unipolar Moment. *Foreign Policy Magazine*. 70(1),23-33

Lipschutz, R. D., (1995). *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press

Lukyanov, F., (2016). Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia's Rightful Place. *Foreign Affairs: Putin's Russia: Down But Not Out*, 95(3), 30-38

Lutwakk, E. N., (1990). From Geopolitics to Geoeconomic: Logic of Conflict, Grammer of Commerce. *The National Interest*, 20, 17-23

Lynch, V. (2005). Security Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. *International Spectator*, 1, 33-43

Makarychev, A. & Denyatov, A., (2014). The EU in Eastern Europe: Has Normative Power Become Geopolitical. *Eurasia Policy Memo*, 310(1), 1-5

Matthijs, M., (2017). Europe after Brexit: A Less Perfect Union. *Foreign Affairs: out of order? The Future of the International System*, 96(1), 85-96

Mathews, J.T., (1989). Redefining Security. *Foreign Affairs*, 68(2), 162-177

Mauritzen, H., (1980). Selecting Explanatory Levels in International Politics: Evaluating a Set of Criteria. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 15(1), 169-182

McDonald, M., (2008). Securitization and the Construction of Security. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(4), 563-587

McFaul, M., (2018). Russia As It Is: A Grand Strategy for Confronting Putin. *Foreign Affairs: Which World Are We Living In?*, 97(4), 82-92

McNamara, K.R., (2005). The EU After Ukraine: European Foreign Policy in the New Europe. *Foreign Affairs: Crisis in Ukraine*, 104-109

Mead, W.R., (2014). The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers. *Foreign Affairs: Big Fracking Deal; Shale and the Future of Energy*, 93(3), 69-80

Mearsheimer, J., (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. *International Security*, 15(1), 5-56

Mearsheimer, J., (1994-95). The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*. 19 (3), 10-17

Mearsheimer, J. J., (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusion That Provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 95(3), 77-90

Mearsheimer, J.J. & W, M. S., (2016). The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior US Grand Strategy. *Foreign Affairs: Struggle for Israel*, 98(4), 70-84

Miller, B., (2001). The Concept of Security: Should It Be Redefined. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24(2), 13-42

Musu. C., (2007). The EU and the Middle East Peace Process: A Balance. *Studia Diplomatica*, 60(1), 11-28

Niblett, R., (2017). Liberalism in Retreat: The Demise of a Dream. *Foreign Affairs: Out of Order? The Future of the International System*. 96(1), 17-25

Nye, J., (2003). Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power. *International Herald Tribune*, January 10, 2003, available at: <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/propaganda-isnt-way-soft-power>

Nye, J.S., (2018). How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence. *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power>

Oktaç, H. & Cerrah, U., (2018). *Uluslararası Politikada Kafkasya*. Ankara: Hitapevi

Orenstein, M.A., (2005). Get Ready for a Russo-German Europe: The Two Powers That Will Decide Ukraine's Fate- and the Region's. *Foreign Affairs: Crisis in Ukraine*, 109-114

Öztürk, Z. A., (2014). Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenliği Yeniden Düşünmek: Geleneksel ve Alternatif Yaklaşımlar. In T. Arı (Eds.), *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri 2: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Eleştirel Yaklaşımlar* (pp.149-179). Bursa: DORA

Panke, D., (2012). Small States in Multilateral Negotiations: What Have We Learned?. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(2), 387-398

Pop, V., (2009). EU Expanding Its Sphere of Influence: Russia Says. EUObserver, 21 March 2009. Available at: <https://euobserver.com/foreign/27827>

Prodi, R., (2002). *A Wider Europe- A Proximity policy as the Key to Stability*. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release SPEECH-02-619_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm)

Rotschild, E., (1995). What is Security?. *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 124(3), 53-98

Rynning, S. & Guzzini, S., (2001). Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis (Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers No:42/2001). Retrieved from ResearchGate [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237465426 Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237465426_Realism_and_Foreign_Policy_Analysis)

Sakwa, R. & Stevens, A., (2012). *Contemporary Europe*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

Sakwa, R., (2015). *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in Borderlands*. I.B. London: Tauris & Co. Ltd. Retrieved from <https://www.kobo.com/tr/tr/ebook/frontline-ukraine-1>

Sakwa, R., (2017). *Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from <https://www.kobo.com/tr/tr/ebook/russia-against-the-rest>

Sarotte, M.E., (2014). A Broken Promise? : What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(5), 90-98

Schweller, R.L., (1996). Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma. *Security Studies*, 5(3), 90-121

Schwenninger, S., (2003). The Multipolar World vs. the Superpower. *The Globalist*

Smith, K. E., (2005). The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy. *International Affairs*, 81(4),757-773

Sökmen, A. İ., (2017). Recent Conceptual Developments in Security Studies. In R. K. Karaca & F. Z. Özkurt (Eds.), *New Concepts and New Conflicts in Global Security Issues* (pp.1-25). İstanbul: İstanbul Gelişim University Press

Sönmezoğlu, F. & Bayır, Ö., (2014). *Dış Politika: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Bakış*. İstanbul: DER

Steinmeier, F.W., (2016). Germany's New Global Role: Berlin Steps Up. *Foreign Affairs: Struggle for Israel*, 98(4), 106-114

Stoner, K., (2014). Putin's Search For Greatness. Will Ukraine Bring Russia the Superpower Status It Seeks?. *Foreign Affairs: Crisis in Ukraine*. 83-87. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-02/putins-search-greatness?fa_anthology=1113997

Tanrısever, O.F., (2005). Güç. In A. Eralp (eds), *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar* (53-71). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Tanrısever, O.F., (2005). Güvenlik. In A. Eralp (eds), *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar* (107-123). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Tassinari, F., (2005). Security and Integration in the EU Neighbourhood: The Case for Regionalism. *CEPS Working Document*, No: 226

Toje, A., (2010). The European Union as a Small Power. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49(1), 43-60

Tonra, B., (2010). Identity Construction Trough the ENP: Borders and Boundaries, Insiders and Outsiders. In R.G. Whitman & S. Wolff (Eds.), *The Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective; Context, Implementation and Impact* (pp.51-73). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

Treisman, D., (2016). Why Putin Took Crimea: The Gambler in the Kremlin. *Foreign Affairs: Putin's Russia: Down But Not Out*, 95(3), 47-56

Trenin, D., (2016). The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded. *Foreign Affairs: Putin's Russia: Down But Not Out*, 95(3), 23-30

Tsygankov, A. P., (2012). Change and Continuity in Russia's Foreign Policy. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 109 (1), 7-25

Tymoshenko, Y., (2005). Containing Russia. *Foreign Affairs: Crisis in Ukraine*, 20-35

Ullman, R.H., (1983). Redefining Security. *International Security*, 8(1), 129-153

Valh, M. & Tassinari, F., (2005). The EU and the Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Some Challenges for BSEC. *CEPS Commentary 15*. Brussels: Centre of European Policy Studies

Vanhoonacker-Kormoss, S. & Duke, S. (2017). The European Union as a Subsystem of International Relations. In C. Hill, M. Smith & S. Vanhoonacker (Eds.), *International Relations and the European Union* (3rd ed., Pp.23-42). (The New European Union Series). Oxford

Weaver, O., (1995). Securitization and De-securitization. In R. D. Lipschutz (Eds.), *On Security*, Chapter 5 (pp.46-86), New York: Colombia University Press

Waltz, K., (2000). Structural Realism After the Cold War. *International Security*, 25(1), 27

Westad, O.A., (2018). Has A New Cold War Really Began? : Why the Term Shouldn't Apply to Today's Great-Power Tensions. *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-27/has-new-cold-war-really-begun>

Whittman, R. G., Wolff, S., (2010). Much Ado about Nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in Context. In R. G. Whittman, S. Wolff (Eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact* (pp.3-29). London: Palgrave Macmillan

Williams, M.C., (2003). Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), 511-531

Wilson, E.J., (2008). Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 110-124

Wolfers, A., (1952). National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Quarterly*, 67(4)

Youngs, R., (2017). *Europe's Eastern Crisis: The Geopolitics of Asymmetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Zielonka, J., (1991). *Europe's Security: A Great Confusion*. *International Affairs*, 67(1), pp. 127-137

Zielonka, J., (2001). How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(3), 507-536



