

**T.C**  
**MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ**  
**AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AVRUPA SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

**AN APPLICATION OF THEORIES OF EUROPEAN  
INTEGRATION TO THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION:  
IN SEARCH OF UNIVERSAL PATTERNS IN REGIONAL  
INTEGRATION**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**

**Rashid MAMMADOV**

**İstanbul - 2019**

**T.C**

**MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**AVRUPA SİYASETİ VE ULUSLARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

**AN APPLICATION OF THEORIES OF EUROPEAN  
INTEGRATION TO THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION:  
IN SEARCH OF UNIVERSAL PATTERNS IN REGIONAL  
INTEGRATION**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**

**Rashid MAMMADOV**

**Danışman: Doç. Dr. Armağan Emre ÇAKIR**

**İstanbul - 2019**



## TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

### Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Müdürlüğüne

Enstitünüz, Avrupa Birliği Siyaseti ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Türkçe / İngilizce Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencisi **Rashid Mammadov**, tarafından hazırlanan, “**An Application of Theories of European Integration to the South Caucasus Region: in Search of Universal Patterns in Regional Integration**” başlıklı bu çalışma, 25.11.2019 tarihin de yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda **OY BİRLİĞİ / OY ÇOKLUĞUYA BAŞARILI** bulunarak aşağıda isimleri yazılı jüri üyeleri tarafından Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Jüri Üyeleri:

Doç. Dr. Armağan E. ÇAKIR

Danışman

.....

Doç. Dr. Armağan GÖZKAMAN

Jüri Üyesi

.....

Doç. Dr. Emre ERŞEN

Jüri Üyesi

.....

Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Dardan

Müdür



27/11/2019 tarih ve 2019/30 sayılı Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararı ile onaylanmıştır.

## ÖZET

Bu tez, bölgenin tarihini, özellikle de geçen yüzyılı inceleyerek Güney Kafkasya'da muhtemel bir entegrasyon sürecinin olanaklarını tartışmaktadır. Bölgenin tarihini, sosyal ve kültürel dokusunu dikkate alarak Avrupa Birliği entegrasyon teorilerinin ve aynı zamanda bazı yeni yaklaşımların bu doğrultuda taşıdıkları potansiyeli değerlendirmektedir. Bu teorilerden Yeni İşlevselcilik, Avrupa Birliği'ni açıklamakta sergilediği uzun vadeli başarısından dolayı seçildi. Sosyal İnşacılık bölgedeki etnik gerilimler nedeniyle, Liberal Hükümetlerarasıcılık ise Yeni İşlevselciliğe karşı etkili bir anti-tez olması nedeniyle seçildi. Eştoplumsalılık ise etnik, dini ve bölgesel uyuşmazlıklara idari bir çözüm olarak incelenmiştir.

Tezin hipotezi, Güney Kafkasya halklarının bir entegrasyon projesini desteklemek için gerekli olan temel ortak değerleri paylaştıklarıdır. Ancak, bu tür zorlu bir projenin başlatılması için bazı kronik sorunların çözülmesi ve somut adımlar atılması gerekmektedir. Yeni İşlevselcilik, Liberal Hükümetlerarasıcılık ve Eştoplumsalılık bu konuda bir dereceye kadar örtüşen çözümler sunmaktadır. Bu çözümlerden bazıları tüm bölgeyi ilgilendirirken, bazıları ise belirli ülkelere özgüdür. Özellikle Liberal Hükümetlerarasıcılık, ülkelere özgü sorunları ele almakta eşsiz bir araç işlevi görmektedir. Güney Kafkasya devletleri arasında siyasi entegrasyon zor olmakla beraber mümkündür. Böyle bir girişimin başarısı ise büyük ölçüde temel bölgesel sorunların ve toprak anlaşmazlıklarının çözümüne bağlıdır.

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis discusses the possibilities of a probable integration process in South Caucasus by examining the history of the region, particularly the last century. It primarily evaluates the potential of integration theories of European Union as well as some new approaches by taking into consideration the history, social and cultural texture of the region. Among those theories, Neofunctionalism was chosen for its long-term success in explaining European Union. Social Constructivism was chosen due to ethnic tensions in the region and Liberal Intergovernmentalism for being effective anti-thesis of Neofunctionalism. Consociationalism was also studied as an administrative solution to ethnic and religious problems and territorial disputes.

The hypothesis of the thesis is that South Caucasus peoples share basic common values that are necessary to support an integration project. However, some chronic problems need to be solved and concrete steps must be taken in order to launch such a challenging project. Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Consociationalism offer somewhat overlapping solutions regarding this issue. Some of these solutions are issues that concern the whole region, while others are specific to certain countries. Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in particular, serves as a unique tool to address country-specific problems. Political integration among South Caucasus states is difficult to succeed although possible. The success of such an initiative mainly depends on overcoming major regional problems and resolving territorial disputes.

## **PREFACE**

The enthusiasm and the passion that my teacher Armağan Emre Çakır has shown in his lectures are one of the main reasons why I decided to write this thesis. I am grateful for his guidance and time in the writing process as well.

I would also like to thank my parents and my wife for their support and understanding.



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	1
<b>1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND</b> .....	3
1.1. Ancient and Medieval History.....	3
1.2. Modern Era.....	4
1.2.1. Georgia.....	5
1.2.2. Azerbaijan.....	12
1.2.3. Armenia.....	20
1.3. Traces of Integration in the History of South Caucasus.....	22
1.3.1. Soviet Model of Integration.....	23
1.3.1.1. History of the Federal Structure in USSR.....	23
1.3.1.2. The Functioning of the Federal Structure in USSR.....	25
1.3.2. Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic.....	26
1.3.2.1. Basic Features of Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic.....	26
1.3.2.2. History of Transcaucasian Federation.....	26
1.3.2.3. Evaluation.....	29
<b>2. PROMINENT THEORIES APPLICABLE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION</b> .....	31
2.1. Constructivism.....	32
2.1.1. Main Arguments of Constructivism.....	32
2.1.2. Criticisms.....	34
2.2. Functionalism.....	35
2.2.1. Main Arguments of Functionalism.....	35

2.2.2. Criticisms.....	37
2.3. Neofunctionalism.....	38
2.3.1. Main Arguments of Neofunctionalism.....	39
2.3.2. Criticisms.....	41
2.4. Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism.....	43
2.4.1. Main Arguments of Classical and Liberal Intergovernmentalism.....	43
2.4.2. Criticisms.....	46
2.5. Consociationalism.....	46
2.5.1. Main Arguments of Concosociationalism.....	47
2.5.2. Criticisms.....	48
<b>3. INTERPRETATION OF SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EU INTEGRATION THEORIES .....</b>	<b>49</b>
3.1. Constructivist Interpretation of the South Caucasus Region.....	49
3.1.1. Implementation of Constructivist Assertions.....	51
3.1.2. The Possibilities of Integration in South Caucasus in the Light of Constructivism.....	52
3.2. Functionalist and Neofunctionalist Interpretation of the South Caucasus Region.....	53
3.2.1. Implementation of Functionalist and Neofunctionalist Assertions.....	54
3.2.2. The Possibilities of Integration in South Caucasus in the Light of Functionalism and Neofunctionalism.....	64
3.3. Liberal Intergovernmentalist Intepretation of the South Caucasus Region.....	65
3.3.1. Implementation of Liberal Intergovernmentalist Assertions.....	65
3.3.2. The Possibilities of Integration in South Caucasus in the Light of Liberal Intergovernmentalism.....	71



3.4. Consociationalist Interpretation of the South Caucasus Region.....73  
3.4.1. Implementation of Consociationalist Assertions.....73  
3.4.2. The Possibilities of Integration in South Caucasus in the Light  
of Consociationalism.....77

**CONCLUSION.....79**

**BIBLIOGRAPHY.....86**



## INTRODUCTION

Transcaucasia, or South Caucasus, is a geopolitical region that in contemporary world includes Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The region is known as Zakavkasia (beyond Caucasus Mountains) in Russian sources (Gvozdetsky, Howe and Bruk, 2011). Geographically, it is located on the southeastern border of the European continent. While the Greater Caucasus Mountain ranges, which make the south-eastern borders of the European continent, include the northern part of Azerbaijan and part of Georgia, the entire Lesser Caucasus Mountain ranges remain within the borders of the Southern Caucasus. It spreads from the Black Sea in the west, to the Caspian Sea in the east.

Petroleum, precious stones, tea and wine are widely produced in South Caucasus. The region is culturally one of the most complex regions in Europe. Although atheism was supported by state under the Soviet rule, Islam (mostly Shia and some Sunni), Orthodox Christianity and Gregorian Christianity are still three common religions in the region. There are three languages spoken at state level: Georgian, Azerbaijani and Armenian. However, many local languages such as Talish, Ossetian, Lezgi, Mingrelian and Abkhazian are still spoken by minorities. Nakhchivan and Adjar Autonomous Republics are two autonomous structures in the region.

The rich cultural formation has resulted in increased political tension in the region. There are several frozen conflict zones in South Caucasus, such as Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. From time to time they turn into hot conflicts and even war. Traditionally Iran, Turkey and Russia have been trying to strengthen their influences in South Caucasus, while the US and the EU are new significant actors.

Among those powers, only the European Union is known as a sui-generis formation with its supranational structure. Although there are different international organizations all around the world, none of them has internalized the organizational law as much as

the EU has and could not convert the alliance into social institution. South Caucasus is an interesting case for evaluating the European integration theories with its ethnic struggles that have not been resolved since the beginning of the 20th century. Ethnic tensions, which intensified since the end of the 19th century, did not diminish until the day when the region was occupied by Soviet Russia in 1920-21. When Azerbaijan was occupied by the Red Army on April 28, 1920, most of local army was still fighting against Armenian mobs in Karabakh (Van Der Leeuw, 2000, p.52). During the Soviet period, the military phase of territorial disputes between nations was over. But the solution did not come in a pluralistic way, it came behind closed doors among communist party bureaucrats. The re-escalation of ethnic struggles towards the end of 1980's also demonstrated the failure of this solution. Hereby, these problems, which cannot be solved by the statist-communist approach, require a new perspective. Otherwise, long and violent wars are inevitable. Moreover, it can be predicted that the war will be much harsher considering that states are now financially wealthy, equipped professionally with more destructive weapons than before.

Can European integration theories or theories of international relations in general provide a solution to the problems of South Caucasus ongoing for 100 years?

Although there are several international theories in literature, Functionalism, Neofunctionalism, Social Constructivism, Consociationalism, Intergovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism has been chosen in this thesis by considering the ethnic and cultural diversity of the South Caucasus and for well-known reputation of these theories in explaining European integration.

While these theories are useful in explaining a number of key issues, Liberal Intergovernmentalism in particular stands out and serves as a kind of guide for identifying specific problems. In order to determine the roadmap for integration, it is vital to reveal these issues. From this perspective, it is quite clear that Liberal Intergovernmentalism can make unique contributions to any project that aims to integrate the peoples of South Caucasus.

## **1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Although Caucasus is not very large in terms of territorial size, it contains dozens of different ethnic groups and have rather rich history. The area, as old as Greek mythology, was, according to legend, one of the pillars that kept the earth on its feet, and Zeus chained Prometheus in this place, who brought the fire to humanity. Some associates Kaf Mountain in Eastern mythology with Caucasus (Beckford, 2013, p.112).

While there are more than 50 ethnic groups in Caucasus, they belong to 4 different language families: Caucasian, Indo-European, Turkic and Semitic. Arab geographers called the region Jabal Al-Asun (Mountain of Language) (Britannica, 2019). Of these, the most common ones in South Caucasus are Azerbaijani, Armenian, Georgian, Talish, Lezgi, Abkhazian and Ossetian.

The fact that so many people live in such a limited area inevitably cause ethnic tensions in the region. It should be noted, however, that the wars that have taken place in the region throughout the history have been mostly caused by attacks of external forces rather than stemming from local conflicts. Having said that, the reflections of nationalism which have been popular since the French revolution, constitute the main cause of the present day conflicts. It would be useful to take a glance at the history of the region in order to understand the nature of today's disagreements.

### **1.1 ANCIENT AND MIDDLE AGES**

The Southern Caucasus has been under the influence of many empires throughout history. Iran, which located in the south, and the Roman Empire in the west are the oldest of them. However, there were also states established by local people in the region. Iberia, Caucasian Albania and Armenia are the oldest of them. While the region was previously under the influence of Iranian Zoroastrianism, Christianity began to become a dominant religion in the 300s (Stringer, 2005, p.92; Toumanoff, 1967, p.83-84). This continued until the invasion of the South Caucasus by the Arab Caliphate in the 800s. But, especially the Turkmen raids starting with 1000s, resulted in the

Turkification of some parts of the Caucasus (Golden, 1992, pp. 385–386). The Caucasian Albanian identity, already weakened by Sassanid and Muslim attacks, was completely dissolved and the demographic structure of the kingdom began to change. As of this period, South Caucasus became an area of intense struggle between Muslim Turks and Christian Byzantines. Although territorial power of Byzantium shrank gradually, its ties with the South Caucasus as a religious center remained strong until 1453 when it was completely destroyed (Toumanoff 1967, p.202). The princes of Georgia and Armenia had a close relationship with the Byzantine royal family through marriage.

Mongolian attacks on the South Caucasus caused great destruction. From the 1500s onwards, the region became the field of battles between the Ottomans and the Safavids. This long-lasting struggle began to change only when the Russians appeared in Caucasus in the 18th century. Russia first expelled Iran from Azerbaijan and Armenia, its traditional sphere of influence, and then forced out the Ottoman Empire from Georgia, becoming the sole sovereign power of the region by the 19th century. Although this situation sparked hope in Georgia, which lost its traditional Christian ally in 1453, but it did not last long. After all, Russia was not looking for an ally in the region. Even the local kingdoms which were semi-independent during the Iranian period were completely abolished by the Russian authorities and the South Caucasus became part of Russian Empire.

## **1.2 MODERN ERA**

It should be noted that peoples of the region were not unfamiliar with nationalist and liberal ideas which spread to Europe by the French revolution. Especially in 19th century, Southern Caucasus witnessed the Enlightenment movement. Intellectuals such as Ilia Chavchavadze, Akaki Tsereteli and Mirze Fethali Axundov tried to create national consciousness by working on liberal ideas (Kinzer, 1998; Иовчук, Ойзерман and Щипанов, 1971, p.48). This struggle was not useless. However, nationalist

awakening caused intense Turkish-Armenian and Georgian-Armenian clashes at the beginning of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 created a chance to become independent again for Southern Caucasus people, after hundreds of years. South Caucasian intellectuals seeing an opportunity, declared Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic and shortly after the republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia have emerged. By doing this, they created modern states governed by parliamentary democracy. But global conditions and Soviet aggression resulted in the occupation of these republics by Russia in 1920. Democracy was shelved, and all three South Caucasian states were registered as members of the USSR in 1936. During Soviet period, these countries became part of the socialist system under the strict control of Moscow. This situation continued until the national awakening process in the 1980s. The politics of Glasnost and Perestroika, proposed by Gorbachev, gave people the opportunity to make their voices heard in Soviet Union for the first time. The process resulted in the complete dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the establishment of three independent states in South Caucasus. However, before declaring its independence, the region again witnessed violent ethnic conflicts. While Nagorno-Karabakh was occupied by Armenia, Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatist declared their independence from Georgia. Even though the conflicts stalled in the mid-90s, the ultimate peace still has not been achieved. The chances of frozen conflicts turning into large-scale warfare in a short period of time is not eliminated.

### **1.2.1 Georgia**

Georgia has welcomed Russia's entry into the Caucasus at the beginning, as it has been an area of contention between the two Muslim states, the Ottoman and Safavid empires. In fact, the King of Kartli-Kaheti, Irali II, wrote a letter to the Tsar for the protection of his country. Other Georgian kings followed the same path. In 1783, Georgievsk agreement was signed between Irali II and Empress Catherine. According to this agreement, in exchange to Russian protectorate, kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti announced its commitment to Russia. During the Ottoman-Russian wars in 1787, the Russian army withdrew from the region and Iran seized the area. However, after the murder of Agha

Mohammed Shah Kajar in Karabakh, Iranian positions weakened. On September 12, 1801, the Russian tsar abolished the status of Kartli-Kaheti (East Georgia) as kingdom and put the region under direct rule of Moscow. From this date on, Russia would use this region as a base to occupy the rest of the South Caucasus.

In 1804, the Imereti kingdom of Western Georgia came under Russian rule. King Solomon II tried to resist but did not succeed and died in Trabzon.

It should be noted, however, that there were ties between the Russian and Georgian aristocracy. Pavel Tsitsianov, the commander responsible for the invasion of the South Caucasus, was originally Georgian. Both peoples were Christian orthodox and had aristocratic ruling class.

The tsar, who abolished the serfdom in Russia, also reached an agreement with the local feudal class to do the same thing in Georgia. But the abolition of serfdom did not make life easier for the peasants and aroused dissatisfaction among the aristocrats as well. In the cities, especially the Armenians engaged in trade and prospered, however Georgian peasants and nobles whose income was dependent on the land became poor (Jones, 2005, p.8). It set the stage for the establishment of both nationalism and socialist ideas in Georgia. After the 1905 uprising, the leading political party in the country was the Menshevik Social Democratic Party.

The intellectual pioneers of the nationalist awakening were Akaki Tsereteli, Niko Nikoladze, Yakob Gogebashvili, and prince Ilia Chavchavadze who supported the establishment of new Georgian schools, local theater and newspapers.

In the aftermath of the October Revolution and civil war, a number of places on the periphery of Russia declared their independence. Transcaucasia was among them.

The Transcaucasian Commissariat was established at a meeting held on 11 November 1917. Attendees were previously elected representatives from the region, in elections held throughout Russia. The Bolsheviks were minorities at the meeting because they performed poorly in elections. As a result of the meeting, the decision was, not to recognize the Soviet administration. The Bolsheviks left the meeting. The

Transcaucasian commissariat was active throughout the Southern Caucasus, with the exception of Baku which was under Soviet rule. As the decision-making body of the Commissariat, on 12 January 1918, the Caucasian Sejm was established. This institution would serve as some kind of parliament.

On 23 February 1918 Sejm made his first meeting. There were 3 large parties in the meeting. There were 32 deputies from the Georgian Social Democratic party, 30 from the Azerbaijani Musavat party, and 27 from the Armenian Dashnak party. Apart from these, there were several smaller parties.

One of the main problems facing the Union was the attitude towards the Brest-Litovsk agreement which was signed between the Ottomans and Russia. According to this agreement Russia had to leave Kars, Ardahan and Batum to Turkey.

After negotiations failed in Trabzon, short-term war happened between sides and Turkey took control of Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Sejm was having trouble adopting a common stance on this and other issues. The Georgian Mensheviks started secret negotiations with Germany in order to make peace with Turks. As a result, Transcaucasia lasted only one month. On May 26, 1918, Georgia declared its independence. The Mensheviks who established Marxist albeit multiparty system were recognized by both Soviet Russia and Western countries. In 1918, she entered into conflict with Armenia due to Lori and Jawakheti regions.

Georgia was first recognized by Germany and the Ottoman Empire. In particular, Germany emerged as the protector of this new republic. Even though Georgia had to leave predominantly Muslim regions as Batumi, Ardahan, Artvin, Ahalkelek regions to the Ottoman Empire, it suppressed the communist uprising in Abkhazia with the support of the Germans. However, after the defeat of Germany in the First World War, British forces entered the country. The government of the newly established Republic came to terms with Britain.

During this period, Georgia's relations with its neighbors were not easy. In particular, Armenians with their territorial claims and the White Army under the command of Denikin were threatening the country. This led Georgia to form a defense alliance with



Azerbaijan (Sicker, 2001, p.120). The Soviet administration offered joint action against the White Army, but it was rejected. On May 3, 1920, the local communists in Tbilisi attempted a coup, but army repressed the rebels. In the course of these events, Azerbaijan and Armenia were already occupied. Georgia's independency was recognized by Moscow Agreement signed on May 7, 1920. However, it did not last long. In March 1921, Georgia was occupied by the Red Army.

**South Ossetian Conflict.** The main source of the current problems lies in the 1918's. When the Democratic Republic of Georgia was established, South Ossetia had higher Bolshevik support than the rest of Georgia. In June 1917, the Ossetians held a National Council in Java and declared self-government in the regions where they were majority. The Council had people of various political views, but generally the Bolsheviks were the most active ones. Bolsheviks wanted South and North Ossetia to unite and join the Soviets. On 15 March 1918, while the clashes still was going on between Turkey and the Transcaucasia, peasant uprising took place against the central government in the region. However, the rebellion was suppressed by the Georgian army. The brutal approach against the local people created even more sympathy towards Bolshevism in the region (Cornell, 2002, p.141).

In October 1919, when the Georgian administration rejected to become an ally of Bolsheviks against the White Army, a rebellion took place in South Ossetia. The Ossetians demanded the same extent of autonomy which was given to Abkhazia and Adjara. The Georgian administration rejected this request.

The last large-scale uprising took place in May 1920. Russians actively supported Ossetians and demanded the withdrawal of Georgian army from the region. On May 8, 1920, in the Roki region on the Georgian-Soviet border, Ossetians declared Soviet rule. However, the Georgian troops under the command of Jugheli harshly repressed the rebellion. 3000 to 7000 people were killed during the operations (Lang, 1962,p.228). Thousands had to flee north.

When the Red Army entered Georgia in February 1921, there were voluntary Ossetians among them as well. In 1922, the Soviet government gave autonomy to Ossetians.

This autonomous region included not only the Ossetian villages, but also the regions composed of Georgians. In the same way, some regions which were populated mostly by Ossetians, were excluded from the autonomous region.

When ethnic tensions increased in the region in the 1980s, the old quarrels have surfaced again. On September 20, 1990, the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia described the events of 1918-1920 as genocide against the Ossetians. The unrecognized state of Abkhazia took the same decision in 2006 (PIA Новости, 2006).

In the late 1980s, Georgian nationalism began rising under the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia, which strained the relations with other ethnic elements in the country.

During this period, the nationalist movement of Ossetian Adamon Nikhas (Voice of the People) was formed. On November 10, 1989, the Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia made the decision to transform its status into an autonomous republic of Georgia. However, Tbilisi rejected this decision and besieged Tskhinvali on 23 November 1989. Georgian nationalists, led by Gamsakhurdia, came to the region and tried to organize demonstrations. But they were not allowed to enter the city. Six people were killed in clashes between demonstrators and local police. On September 20, 1990, South Ossetia declared its independence and boycotted the elections for the Georgian parliament. On the other hand, the Georgian parliament completely abolished the autonomy of South Ossetia. On May 4, 1991 South Ossetia decided to unite with North Ossetia.

As the ethnic tension between people intensified, the conflict turned into war when the Georgian army entered Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. 2000 people died in clashes (Walker, 2008). The separatists were supported by the former Soviet army. Hundreds of thousands people have become refugees. On June 24, 1992, the Sochi Agreement was signed between the sides. The Russian, Georgian and Ossetian Peacekeepers were deployed in the region. In South Ossetia, de-facto administration, independent from Tbilisi took control. The Peace Corps were only active at the border. From 1992 to 2004 the ceasefire has been preserved. Ergenti bazaar was open where

two sides could trade. Apart from this, illegal trade took place among people, especially with the participation of the military and police authorities of the two sides. (International Crisis Group, 2004).

In 2004, when Mikheil Saakashvili was elected as a president, the frozen conflict began to spark again. Saakashvili was determined to strengthen the central authority and he made it his political goal to make it happen (Rutland, 2008). From this time on, the tension between Georgia and South Ossetia (and Russia) began to climb.

On August 1, 2008, the Ossetians attacked the Georgian military vehicle and injured five soldiers. Georgia responded by killing 4 Ossetian militants (Champion and Osborn, 2008). South Ossetia kept shelling Georgian villages around Tskhinvali. On August 8, 2008, the Georgian army advanced towards Tskhinvali and seized the city. Russia accused Georgia of aggression and launched a large-scale operation. Within 5 days Russian forces recaptured the capital of South Ossetia and repelled the Georgians. It also launched air strikes all over Georgia, targeting military infrastructure. Simultaneously, Abkhazia attacked the Kodori Valley and captured it (Kachayev, 2008). The Russian army advanced into Georgia and seized Poti, Zugdidi, Senaki and Gori. Russian fleets in the Black Sea besieged the country from the sea (Allison, 2008).

As a result of the war, nearly 200,000 people had to leave their homes. While some of them returned after the war, around 30,000 Georgian refugees could not go back (BBC, 2009).

On 12 August 2008, ceasefire talks were held through French officials. On August 17, 2008, Russia announced that it would withdraw its troops. Russia officially recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states shortly after the war.

**Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict.** Since Abkhazians were Muslims, the relations between Abkhazia and Russia have been challenging since the beginning. As Russia appeared in Caucasus, local Georgian authorities have allied with Russia, meanwhile in Abkhazia the Turkish influence has been strong for religious reasons. The first Abkhazian leader who built diplomatic relations with Russia was Keles Ahmet Bey Shervashidze. But he was killed by his son Aslan Bey, who was close to the Ottoman Empire. However, the

political struggle for power has started between pro-Turkish Aslan Bey and his brother Sefer Ali Bey, who acted in alliance with Mingrelians, a Georgian sub-ethnic group. Russia supported Sefer Ali Bey in his fight. In July 1810, the Russian army raided Suhumkale and Aslan Bey was forcefully dismissed from power. The Russians established a military base in Suhumkale and used it as a headquarters to combat the people of Dagestan. Abkhazia has completely fallen into Russian influence only after the war between Russia and North Caucasian peoples in 1864.

After the war, the strategic importance of Abkhazia has diminished, and Russia has decided to restrict the jurisdiction of local Abkhaz administrators. This development was met with objection among the Muslim people of Abkhazia and led to uprising. Russians who suppressed the uprising, has forced the majority of the Abkhazian population to migrate to Turkey, and the Christian Georgians, Russians and Armenians were brought into region to replace them. In 1881 only 20,000 Abkhazians remained in Russian empire. Most of them lived in the mountains while fertile lands remained empty.

Abkhazia was ruled by Russian Suhumi Military Unit at the beginning, and was later made part of Kutaisi Gubernia. This increased the Georgian influence in the region.

***Abkhazia in Soviet Russia.*** After the October revolution, Abkhazia became part of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In 1921, Russia invaded Georgia. At the end of the negotiations which were held on March 4, 1921, have been decided to make Abkhazia an independent Soviet Socialist Republic. On December 16, 1921, Abkhazia united with Georgia and in 1922, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federation was incorporated into the Soviet Republic. In 1931, the status of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia was lowered, and it was made part of Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia as an autonomous republic (Saparov, 2015, p.60). As the autonomous regions were regarded as an integral part of the republic to which they were affiliated, they had no right to leave the Soviet Union. In the same year, this development was protested. In 1957, 1967, 1978 and 1989, the Georgianization of Abkhazia was protested (Hewitt, 1993, pp.267-323).

***The 1992-1993 War.*** In August 1992, a 13-month war began between Georgia and Abkhazia, latter being supported by Russia. Armenians and Russians living in the region also joined the Abkhazian separatists. (Krag and Funch, 1994, p.36). During the war, due to internal turmoil in Georgia, as well as ongoing conflicts in South Ossetia, Georgia had hard time to fight. On September 27, 1993, Abkhazians captured Sukhumi. Hundreds of thousands of Georgians were evacuated and thousands were killed. In total, 250,000 Georgians have become refugees. In 1993, a ceasefire was signed.***War of 2008.*** In 2008, during the war between Russia and Georgia, led by Saakashvili, Abkhazians opened a second front and seized the upper part of the Kodor Valley, which has been under Georgian control since 1993. Thus, the Georgian forces were completely removed from Abkhazia. On August 26, 2008, Russia officially recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. On the other hand, Georgia cut diplomatic relations with Russia and left the Commonwealth of Independent States.

### **1.2.2. Azerbaijan**

Nation building took much longer time for Azerbaijani Turks, considering its ethnic ties with broader language family which lies in vast lands from Central Asia to Balkans. The turning point in this process took place during the Safavid empire in the 16th century. During this period, Shah Ismail established a state that encompassed all of Azerbaijan and Iran and united them into a single empire by eliminating the competing Turkmen states such as Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu. This is significant because of two reasons. First of all, the long-lasting administration has resulted in long-lasting borders and thus the idea of common homeland was reinforced. Secondly, during this period, Shiism, which spread through violence and propaganda, became the common belief of the majority of the people. In this empire, Azerbaijani Turks were predominantly active in the military field (Sümer, 1976, pp.15-42). However, in the following period, ruling class was intensely influenced by Persian culture.

In 1736, Afshar dynasty took control of the empire. However, after the assassination of Nadir Shah Afshar in 1747, the influence of the empire in Azerbaijan weakened and semi-independent khanates emerged. In the north of Aras river Baku, Ganja, Guba, Talish, Ganja, Javad, Derbent, Irevan, Karabakh, Nakhchivan, Shamakhi, Shaki, Shirvan khanates were established. While in the south, Ardabil, Maraga, Maku, Karadağ, Serab, Tabriz, Urmia, Hoy, Zanjan, Khalkhal khanates have appeared. Of those khanates, those in northern Azerbaijan were occupied by Russia in the 19th century. When the Russians attacked Ganja in 1804, the city has been seized only after violent clashes. In 1806, Derbent and Guba khanates were occupied. In the same year, Russians, who attacked the Baku Khanate, faced an unexpected resistance and had to retreat. General Tsitsianov was also killed in front of Baku. Reinforced Russian army took over the city in 1807. The Russian forces who attacked the Taslish Khanate also faced resistance and the general Kotliarevsky was massacred. In 1812, Talish Khanate was occupied. Soon after, Sheki, Shirvan and Karabakh khanates were captured. Khan of Karabakh, Ibrahim Khalil Khan called for help from both Ottoman and Iran but could not get the support he expected. Karabakh Khan was murdered along with his family. In 1825, Nakhchivan and in 1826 Irevan was seized by Russians. Thus, the occupation of northern Azerbaijan was completed. After the Russian-Iranian war of 1826-1828, the Turkmenchay agreement was signed and it was decided that the north of the Aras river would remain in Russia and the south in Iran.

Russian-dominated regions were governed by military officers of empire. The application of imperial laws has caused unrest in the region (Alstadt, 1992, pp.18-19). At the end of this military period, secular laws became applicable in all spheres of life and the religious influence has diminished.

With the introduction of oil wells at the second half of the 19th century, the whole country and especially Baku, witnessed rapid economic development. Moreover, the common currency and the ability to trade directly with other areas of the empire, contributed to this situation. The first oil refinery was commissioned in 1859 in Baku. However, the vast majority of the oil fields were in the hands of Russians and Armenians. In 1888, only two of the 54 oil companies in Baku, belonged to the

Azerbaijani Turks (Alstadt, 1992, pp.20-21). The petroleum industry soon led to the development of other industries. Especially the railways and maritime transportation has developed rapidly, due to urgency of oil transportation. In Baku, there were telegraph lines in the 1860s and telephone lines in the 1880s. Baku's population increased to over 250,000. There were workers from all over Russia and from Iran. During this period, a nationalist intelligentsia was formed in Azerbaijan. Intellectuals such as Hasan bey Zardabi, Mirza Fatali Akhundov, Jalil Mammadguluzadeh, Mirza Alakbar Sabir, Ali bey Huzeynzadeh took a pro-Western, reformist and populist attitude. The support of oil-millionaires like Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev also played a role in this struggle.

In 1904, workers in the oil fields went on a general strike. In 1905, an ethnic conflict arose between Armenians and Muslims. The secular and Pan-Turkist Musavat party was founded in 1911 (Landau, 1995, p.55). After the October Revolution in 1917, Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic was founded, followed by the Republic of Azerbaijan, led by Musavat.

On May 28, 1918, the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was established, which is known as the first secular democratic republic in Islamic world. However, Baku was still under the control of the coalition composed of Bolshevik, Menshevik and Armenian Dashnak parties. These forces, which were hostile to each other in Georgia and Armenia, were united in Baku under the name of the Baku Commune and engaged in a common struggle against the Caucasian Islamic Army consisting of Ottoman and Azerbaijani volunteers. At the end of March 1918, with the support of Bolsheviks, Dashnaks massacred Muslims in Baku, killing 12,000 people. On September 15, 1918, the Caucasian Islamic Army under the command of Nuri Pasha entered Baku. This date is still considered significant in today's Azerbaijan.

The newly established Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was de-facto recognized by the Entente powers at the Paris Peace Conference. The parties that participated in the new government included: Musavat, Socialist Bloc, Liberals, Hummat, Union and Independents. There were representatives of Armenian, Russian, Jewish and German minorities in parliament. Women were granted the right to vote during this period. This

was not only a first in the Islamic world, but also a rare case throughout the world as well. Baku State University was founded on September 1, 1919. About 100 students were sent abroad by state-funded scholarship (Turan, 2012).

On April 28, 1920, the Red Army invaded Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, a large part of the Azerbaijani army was fighting against Armenian gangs in Karabakh. However 20,000 Azerbaijanis were killed by fighting during invasion (Pope, 2006, p.116).

There were various uprisings against the Bolsheviks after the occupation. The most influential of these was the Ganja Rebellion, organized on 24 May 1920 by Azerbaijani republican officers. Among the leaders were General Mirza Kachar, Cevad Bey Shikhlisky, Cahangir Bey Kazimbeyli. Red Army was able to enter the city only after heavy shellfire. According to Soviet sources, 920 Soviet soldiers and 1,000 rebels were killed (Кондратов, 2008).

Regarding the Ganja Rebellion, Mehmet Emin Resulzade, one of the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan writes: (Resulzade, 1990, p.89):

People were tolerating Russian army because they thought the army was heading to Turkey. However when they saw the depravement caused by them, people couldnt stay quiet anymore, they rebelled. It started in Ganja. The city of Javad Khan who once heroically resisted general Tsitsianov, has sparkled again.....Azerbaijani officers who refused to hand over their guns have played critical role in this revolt. It lasted a week. Rusians lost their divisions here..

The Ganja revolt also triggered a series of rebellions against the Bolsheviks in other parts of Azerbaijan. Smaller resistance took place in Shusha, Zakatala, Lenkeran, Quba and Karabulak (Swietochowski, 1985, p.121).

**Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.** Nagorno-Karabakh is the historical region which is still a cause of dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is thought that the first known people of the region were not from the Indo-European language family (Hewsen, 1982, pp.27-40). It is considered that the region fell under Armenian influence in 2nd century BC and they've got mixed with Armenians soon after. (Hewsen, 2001, pp.32-33). Nagorno-Karabakh has been part of the Caucasian Albania since the 4th century. Although Albanians were Christian, the church and culture of Albania differed from



Armenian Grigorian Christianity. As a result of the Arab invasions that started to change in the 7th century, Albania has not only disappeared but Albanian identity has completely dissolved and Karabakh fell under the religious influence of Armenia. The kingdoms of Khachin and Syunik were established in the region. Nagorno-Karabakh was invaded by Mongolians in the following periods and has been part of Turco-Mongolian empire of İlhanlılar. The region enjoyed autonomy under control of Hasan Jalal family, however 5 separate Melikdoms were established later. These melikdoms were collectively called Hamsa. In the 14th century, the Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu states were founded. In the 16th century, when the Safavids established a central empire by uniting territories of Iran and Azerbaijan. Ganja beylerbeyliği was founded in the region. However, after the death of Nadir Shah Afshar, Iranian influence in the region decreased gradually. Ganja and Karabakh khanates were established in the territory of Ganja beylerbeyligi. Penah Ali Bey was in charge in Karabakh. However, as soon as Russian impact occurred, the Armenian influence in the region began to strengthen again.

Throughout history, the ethnic structure of Nagorno-Karabakh has constantly changed according to political aims of the states which had control in the area. In 1783, Russian Knyaz Potyomkin wrote a letter to the Tsar of Russia recommending “to put Karabakh under Armenian control immediately, and thus to establish a Christian state in Asia”(Armenian Academy of Sciences, 1967, pp.204-205). According to Shavrov, Russia has started to colonize Caucasus by bringing Armenians into the region not Russians. Between 1828 and 1830, 40.000 Armenians from Iran and 84.000 Armenians from Ottoman Empire have been brought to Elizavetpol (Ganja), Yerevan, Borchali, Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe (Шавров, 1911, pp.60-64).

In 1871, according to the census conducted by Russia, there were 878.000 Azerbaijanis (called Tatars back then) and 292.000 Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh (Swietochowski, 1985, p.14).

**1905-1907 Conflicts.** In 1905, after the defeat of the Russian army against Japan, protests and strikes burst out throughout Russia. Tsar Nikolai II had to go through a series of reforms to protect his throne. In this process, lack of authority occurred in the

Caucasus and there were clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis (which were called Caucasian Tatars at the time) resulting in the deaths of thousands (Zürcher and Shendel, 2001, p.43). Despite the calls of the clergy of both sides, the conflicts did not stop (Malkasian, 1996, p.14). 128 of Armenian and 158 of Azerbaijani villages were burned down during this time (Swietochowski, 1995, p.40).

According to British diplomats, the cause of the conflict was Russia's policies which antagonized the two peoples (Lieven, Bourne and Watt, 1983). The Armenian Dashnak party was responsible for most of the attacks. Indeed, the Dashnak gangs have been organized by the refugees from Minor Asia in a similar way they had in their homeland. Azerbaijani side on the other hand had no such organizational experience and they were acting scattered (Kazemzadeh, 1951, p.19).

***The Conflicts of 1918-1920.*** In March 1918, tension began to escalate between Muslims and Armenians in Baku. During this period, Baku was under control of Bolsheviks. On March 9, 1918, Azerbaijani general Talisinsky and some officers arrived in Baku and were immediately arrested by the Soviet authority. This caused objections among the Azerbaijani people of Baku. The event that triggered massacres was the arrival of 50 Azerbaijani officers to Baku on March 27, 1918 to attend the funeral of their fellow soldier and being arrested by Bolsheviks. The Armenians and the Bolsheviks were very uncomfortable about the arrival of this group (Минц and Городецкого, 1940).

On 30 March 1918, around 6 pm, armed clashes began in Baku (Tchalkhouchian, 1919, pp.85-86). On the morning of March 31, the arrest of Azerbaijani officers in Baku was protested. Soviet organization led by Armenian Bolshevik Stepan Shaumyan understood that the large-scale civil war was about to begin. Shaumyan, who knew that his forces will not be enough to beat Azerbaijanis led by Müsavat, made an alliance with the Mensheviks, SRs, Kadets (right-liberal) and Dashnaks (Baikov, 1923, pp. 91-194). This was reported by the pro-Musavat newspaper "Açıq Söz" as "Bolsheviks and Mensheviks who fought each other all year round were willing to make alliance with each other and even with the Dashnaks and Kadets (right-wing liberals) against Musavat" (Ratgauzer, 1927, pp.143).

This is how Shaumyan describes what happened in those days (Shaumyan, 1959, pp.63-67):

We needed to give a rebuff, and we exploited the opportunity of the first attempt at an armed assault on our cavalry unit and began an attack on the whole front. Due to the efforts of both the local Soviet and the Military-revolutionary committee of the Caucasus Army, which moved here (from Tbilisi and Sarikamish) we already had armed forces – about 6,000 strong. Dashnaksutiun also had 3,000 – 4,000 strong national forces, which were at our disposal. The participation of the latter lent the civil war, to some extent, the character of an ethnic massacre, however, it was impossible to avoid it. We were going for it deliberately. The Muslim poor suffered severely, however they are now rallying around the Bolsheviks and the Soviet.

It should be noted that before the events, Shaumyan received even a letter from Lenin which was advising him to learn diplomacy. (Shaumyan, 1924, p.224).

After the armed clashes in the city, the Dashnaks attacked the Muslim neighborhoods of Baku and burned it down. According to Hopkirk, “Armenians were finally seeking revenge on their ancient enemies” (Hopkirk, 1994, pp.281-287).

The attacks only ended on 3 April. Around 12,000 Muslims lost their lives, while thousands left the city.

Six months after the March massacre, the Islamic Army of Caucasus, composed of Azerbaijani volunteers and the Ottoman soldiers, led by Nuri Pasha took Baku back from the Bolsheviks. The battles between Armenians and Muslims have started again and around 10,000 Armenians lost their lives and thousands of them had to flee from Baku (Marshall, 2010, p.96).

***The War of 1988-1994.*** Although the fight between Azerbaijanis and Armenians ceased during the Soviet period, nationalist tendencies throughout the alliance increased again during the reform attempts in the USSR in the 1980s. The main trigger of the events was the decision of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Assembly to unite with Armenia in February 1988. Before this decision, however, nationalist demonstrations had already started in the streets of Yerevan. In November 1987, Gorbachov's Armenian adviser Aganbekyan told the French newspaper that Karabakh could be

united to Armenia. Such interview made Azerbaijani side to believe that Gorbachev was acting in cooperation with Armenians and caused rage . Later, Gorbachev met with two leaders of the Armenian nationalists and asked them for moratorium. After the meeting however, these leaders declared that “Armenians won”. On March 10, 1989, Gorbachev declared that the borders could not be changed under the current constitution of Soviet Union (Rost, 1990, p.17).

Ethnic tension soon turned into mutual assaults in Karabakh. In 1987, Azerbaijanis living in Ghafan and Megri villages of Armenia were expelled from their homes. This was the first refugee entry to Baku.

On February 20, 1988, two Azerbaijani female students were reportedly raped by Armenians (Waal, 2004). On 22 February, the police had to intervene the events between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Askeran. 2 Azerbaijanis died during the occasion. Askeran events caused pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijan. 26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis were killed in in Sumgait (Remnick, 1989). Almost all Armenians living in Sumgait were forced to leave their homes. Similar events were repeated in other cities of Azerbaijan and Armenia. 33 Azerbaijanis were killed in Spitak, Gugark and Stepanavan in Armenia and 20 Azerbaijanis in Vartan (Waal, 2004). There were pogroms against the Armenians in Ganja and Nakhchivan. 48 Armenians were killed in the attacks in Baku. In order to suppress the events in Baku, state of emergency was declared and heavy armed units of Soviet Interior Ministry entered Baku on the night of January 20, 1990. According to the report of the independent Shield organization, the city residents did not own any firearm (Shield Union, 1990). Nevertheless, the army acted brutally and 120 people were killed. This made Azerbaijani people to lose their trust and expectation in Soviet authorities at solving problems in Karabakh and strengthened the idea of independency.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, military mobilization took place in both countries and the conflicts turned into widespread warfare. The Khojaly Massacre, in which 613 civilians, 189 women and children were killed by Armenian forces, was the most brutal slaughter in the course of the war (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p.6).

During the war, the government has changed as a result of the military coup in Azerbaijan. In 1994, Heydar Aliyev signed the Bishkek Protocol, which brought a ceasefire between sides. As a result of the war, Azerbaijan lost control in Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding 7 regions. Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was established in Karabakh, which was not recognized by any country, including Armenia.

### **1.2.3. Armenia**

First known Armenian state is the Orontid dynasty which was established under the Achemenis state of Iran in B.C 6th century. In B.C.190 king Artaxias founded his own dynasty and left the domain of Seleucid Empire. Between B.C 95 -66, Armenia had its golden period under the Great Tigran. In the following centuries it fell under the influence of the Parthian empire. Throughout history, Armenia has been governed by Assyrians, Medes, Achemenis, Parthians, Greeks, Rome, Sassanids, Arabs and Turks.

The first known religion in Armenia was Zoroastrianism due to the influence of Iran. However, this situation changed after the emergence of Christianity. In 301, Christianity became the official religion in Armenia. In 428, the Kingdom of Armenia dissolved and became part of the Sassanid empire.

After the destruction of the Sassanids by Arabs, Ermeniyye was established by Khalifate. This province also contained the territory of Georgia and the Caucasian Albania. When the Abbasid Caliphate weakened in 884, the Armenians gained independence under the leadership of Ashot I. In 1045, the Byzantine Empire seized Armenia. However, this did not last long. In 1071, the Seljuks defeated Byzantium at the battle of Malazgirt and took control of Armenia. After the Seljuk rule weakened, Armenia became the suzerainty of the Georgian Kingdom. With the Mongol attacks in the 1230s, Armenia came under Mongol rule. Mongols followed by the Turkish states. Armenia remained under the sovereignty of Akkoyunlu, Karakoyunlu and Timur states for a long time. From the 16th century to the modern times, the region has been the battlefield of two empires: Ottoman and Safavid (later Afsharid and Qajar). After the emerging of Russia in Caucasus, Iran was forced to leave the South Caucasus. In 1828,

Turkmenchay treaty was signed and muslim Irevan Khanate, where Armenians lived as well, fell under control of Russia.

A significant amount of Armenian population continued to live in Ottoman Empire, enjoying cultural autonomy to some extent. Armenians who lived in harmony with other ethnic groups and ruling class for a long time have started to rise up by forming committees at the end of the 19th century, when Ottoman Empire started to lose power. Particularly, Dashnaksutyun was the instigator of the process. Allying with other revolutionary elements in the empire, Dashnaks also attempted to assassinate Sultan Abdulhamid.

In 1908, the Young Turks overthrew Sultan Abdulhamid. The Armenians who have cooperated with the Committee of Union and Progress, have entered the elections in alliance with them. However, relations began to get tense after a while. In 1912, Dashnaksutyun published a statement criticizing the Committee of Union and Progress (Avagyan and Minassian, 2005, p.189). As World War I approached, these relations became vital. The Russian threat coming from the East worried the government and it wanted to make sure that Armenians will stay loyal to the state. The Armenian Hinchak Party convened on 24 June 1914 and the establishment of armed organizations against the Committee of Union and Progress was determined as the main goal of Armenian community. On the other hand, Dashnaksutyun held a meeting in Erzurum in August 1914 in order to take a common stance. Many Armenian delegates attended the congress from abroad and inside. This process was carefully monitored by the Ottoman government as a decisive moment. Minister of Internal Affairs, Talat Pasha told Erzurum deputy Vartkes Serengülyan that Armenians will face severe measures if they engage in any kind of rebellion against the state (Kabacalı, 1994, p.71). Enver Pasha also met the Armenian Patriarch, complaining about the devastating activities of the Armenian gangs and stated that they expect loyalty from Armenians. Dashnaksutyun Congress did not end up with satisfying result for Ottoman government either.

As the World War started, Armenian gangs joined Russia and the government issued a decree on April 24, 1915, demanding the arrest of Armenian leaders and the closure of the committees. On May 29, 1915, Tehcir Law was enacted and the Armenian

population have began to be massively expelled from Anatolia. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives in this process and the Armenians accept it as an act of genocide against them. This occasion is still the most important determinant of Armenian-Turkish relations. Not only Armenians who fought in Caucasus in 1918, but even in Karabakh War in 1990s, they associated Azerbaijanis with the Panturkists, whom they regarded as perpetrators of the genocide, and sought revenge (Cheterian, 2018, pp.884-903).

Although the Russian and Armenian troops took over Eastern Anatolia in the First World War, Armenians could not keep their trophy after the October revolution. Transcaucasian Democratic Federated Republic was established during this period but it lasted only a month. Dashnaksutyun declared the independence of Armenia on 28 May 1918.

With the loss of World War I, Entente states have decided to divide Ottoman lands among each other. With the Treaty of Sevres, Eastern Anatolia was left to the Armenians. In Cilicia, on the Mediterranean coast, Armenians declared de-facto autonomous Armenian state under French protectorship as well. (Depoian, 1964, p.186). However, the Turkish revolutionaries who started the War of Independence refused to accept the Treaty of Sevres and these promises have never been realized.

In 1920, Turkish forces under the command of Kazim Karabekir Pasha took the Eastern Anatolia back and entered Gyumri. Armenians had no way but to negotiate peace. Only a few days later, the Red Army entered Armenia and the newly formed Armenian republic has been dissolved.

### **1.3. TRACES OF INTEGRATION IN SOUTH CAUCASUS**

Two main cases in the last century which involves integration of South Caucasus can be reviewed in order to examine the theories have been mentioned above:

1. Transcaucasian Federation, whose life lasted for 1 month (April 22-May 26) in 1918
2. The Soviet Union that existed between 1922 and 1991.

### **1.3.1. Soviet Model of Integration**

USSR was supposed to be the voluntary union of various socialist states. However, there are strong objections to this claim. Nevertheless, it was composed of 15 republics which was mostly populated by non-Russian people. Therefore it might present deeper understanding regarding South Caucasus as well.

#### **1.3.1.1. History of the Federal Structure in USSR**

Historically, there was no such foresight as federation in Marxist literature and centralized unitary state has been preferred as most suitable tool for the dictatorship of proletariat. Lenin himself was against any kind of federation until 1917. As he wrote to Stepan Shaumyan in 1913 (Lenin, 1918):

We are certainly in favour of democratic centralism. We are opposed to federation... We are opposed to federation in principle, it loosens economic ties, and is unsuitable for a single state. You want to secede? All right, go to the devil, if you can break economic bonds, or rather, if the oppression and friction of "coexistence" disrupt and ruin economic bonds. You don't want to secede? In that case, excuse me, but don't decide for me; don't think that you have a "right" to federation.

Soviet government even called itself "Russian Republic" in the beginning. However, soon after the October Revolution, independent states have emerged in former Russian empire as a fait accompli and Bolsheviks had to make peace with it. There are also some other explanations about this change of attitude towards federation. According to Tadevosyan, there are several reasons. Firstly, by establishing federation Lenin was planning to attract non-Russian masses. Secondly, considering that each republic were in different stage of development, federal approach would better suit. And finally, Lenin



adopted the idea of federation as the best tool to prevent potential conflicts between Moscow and others (Тадевосян, 1964, pp.3-35).

“Declarations of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia” was accepted on November 1917, which emphasized the right for self-determination, including secession (Tewatia, 1975, p. 179). But attempts for centralization have never stopped. In 1923, Stalin proposed to make all the non-Russian regions part of the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics, but met strong objection from Ukrainian, Belorussian and Transcaucasian representatives (Zlatopolsky, 1954, p.132). One of the stubborn opponents of centralization was Tatar Bolshevik Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev. Galiev’s arrest became the beginning of the strict central rule in USSR under Stalin’s leadership. Only after the WWII, some powers were transferred to Union Republics. Especially after Stalin’s death, this trend has increased. The management of national economy which was mostly centralized before, has been given to local organizations of Union Republics. 15.000 factories was left under the direct control of ministries of Union Republics in 1956. Sovnarkhozy (Regional Economic Soviets) were established in order to empower the economic rights of Union Republics. Almost all the industrial plants were put under control of this newly formed organization (Юдельсон, 1959, p.13). There were some developments in judicial system as well. Many functions which previously belonged to USSR Supreme Court have been given to Presidium of the Union Republican Supreme Courts. However, the state prosecutor’s offices in the Union Republics remained directly attached to USSR Chief Prosecutor’s in Moscow.

This tendency has not lasted long. In 1960’s there were obvious signs of centralist will. Central Asian Bureau of the Communist Party has been created in 1962, which was administrated by Russians and had direct power over political, economic and cultural spheres of Central Asian countries. The ministries which previously were controlled by Union Republics such as education has been put under jurisdiction of all Union organs in 1966 (Tewatia, 1975, p.186).

### **3.1.2. The Functioning of the Federal Structure in USSR**

According to Article 13 of the Soviet Constitution in 1936, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a federate state, formed on the basis of voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights ([Stanford University](#)). In theory, it gave states the right to secede and become independent state. It was the federation of the nation states. According to the same constitution, the states had rights to make their own constitution, establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries and even to form own militaries.

However, there are strong doubts over its actual implementation in real life. According to some authors, Soviet Union was not really a federation, but was imitating it. According to Towster, the authority that was given to the centre was so great that it did not really leave any space to the Union Republics (Towster, 1952, pp.163-174). Moscow had full authority on constitutional changes. Moreover, there was no independent court which could solve conflicts between Moscow and Union Republics. Therefore, such disputes have always been settled under the strong influence of Moscow and damaged the supposedly federal spirit of the constitution. Even though the Union Republics had rights to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries, it only served to get more seats in the United Nations. The Union Republics were also given rights to form their own army, however it has never been implemented in practice (Tewatia, p.182).

It has not been any different in South Caucasus. During the Soviet period, integration was achieved through Moscow, and therefore there was no practical cooperation and “international bargaining” between the governments and bureaucrats of South Caucasus. The needs and functions were defined and distributed by Moscow. As Thomas de Waal states (De Waal, 2003, p.21):

A lack of interest in the views of your neighbors was inherent in the rigidly vertical structure of the Soviet system, where Union Republics like Armenia and Azerbaijan never talked to each other directly, only through Moscow.

### **1.3.2. Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic**

Transcaucasian federation which was founded in 1918 offers valuable data, even though it is short-lived. This is because the federation had much more progressive atmosphere than the current political climate of the South Caucasus.

#### **1.3.2.1. Basic Features of Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic**

Its features can be listed as follows:

1. This federation was founded by the independent will of the peoples of South Caucasus.
2. The legislative power of the institution was a common assembly called Sejm.
3. There were 33 Mensheviks (Georgians), 30 Musavatists (Azerbaijani) and 27 Dashnak (Armenian) deputies in the Assembly. There were also members of some other small parties. All members were elected (СЕМЕНОВ, 1949, p.122).
4. The Transcaucasian federation was not based on economic motivation, but the founding elite have gained its legitimacy from the people, and “international bargains” were conducted among these elected persons (Zenkovsky, 1960, p.257).

In order to reach the most appropriate theory that can explain the federation process, we need to examine the motivation that established and ended the Transcaucasian Federation.

### **1.3.2.2. History of Transcaucasian Federation**

After the February revolution, the provisional government in Russia assigned Special Committee of Transcaucasia (OZAKOM) to administrate South Caucasus. The members of this committee included Georgian, Azerbaijani and Armenian members who would play an important political role in the following period. But this committee had no legislative power and was directly subordinate to the central government. Therefore, it was far from playing a dominant role in the political events in the region. (Hasanli, 2009, p.15).

After the October revolution, Russia's influence in the South Caucasus was further diminished. In this process, politicians from South Caucasus formed the Transcaucasian Commissariat on their own initiative. Shortly after this, elections were held throughout Russia. Despite all their claims, Bolsheviks were able to win only 4.4% of the votes in South Caucasus and got one seat. However Mensheviks, Musavatists and Dashnaks were able to win 11, 10 and 9 seats respectively. (Беленький and Манвелов, 1927, p. 219).

There were differences of opinion on foreign policy issues within Transcaucasian Commissariat from the first day on. It has been the subject of discussion until the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Federation. The peoples of South Caucasus were particularly hesitant about independence. As the domestic turmoil continued in Russia, the effects of this were also seen in the Russian army. Transcaucasian Commissariat has decided to establish an army to protect itself from the Russian army retreating from Turkey. Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis have began to form militias separately. During this process, there were clashes between Russian soldiers and the forces of South Caucasus. The most important of these took place in January 1918 at the Shamkhor train station.

Although the Caucasian Sejm was formed in February 1918, the independence of the federation was declared on 22 April (Swietochowski and Collins, 1999, p.127-128). The distribution of seats in Sejm has been organized according to the results of the Russian Constituent Assembly electon. But every political party has increased its seats by 3

times. Thus, Georgian Mensheviks obtained 33 places. Azerbaijani Musavatists and Armenians Dashnaks had 30 and 27 deputies respectively.

Russian empire withdrew from the World War I by signing the Brest-Litovsk treaty and left Kars, Batumi and Ardahan to Turkey. However, Caucasian Sejm refused to accept it.

In fact, even during the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, Turkey has asked Transcaucasian Commissariat to participate and promised to support its independency. Turks have aimed to remove Russia from South Caucasus completely by including South Caucasus representatives as independent actors (Hasanli, 2009, p. 29). But the Transcaucasian Commissariat was too cautious to make such a bold move. One of the reasons for this was the continued belief that power struggle in Russia will eventually end and territorial integrity of Russia will be preserved. Another reason was the hesitations of Commissariat regarding Turkish intentions. Especially Armenian and Georgian deputies were reluctant to cooperate with Turks.

Transcaucasian Commissariat, who chose not to participate in Brest-Litovsk negotiations, paid a heavy price. Bolsheviks represented whole Russia and agreed to leave Kars Batumi and Ardahan to Ottoman Empire. However, it caused great anger in South Caucasus, especially among Georgians and Armenians. South Caucasus people, who did not participate in the negotiations, had to bear its consequences.

Transcaucasian Commissariat, who held talks with the Ottoman representatives in Trabzon, requested the correction of Brest-Litovsk agreement, but such requests were rejected by Turks. Moreover, South Caucasus had still not declared its independence, which undermined the legitimacy of its representatives in Trabzon . After all, the Brest-Litovsk treaty was signed between the Ottomans and Russia, and South Caucasus was still de-jure part of Russia.

In the negotiations held in Sejm, Azerbaijani members declared that the conditions of Brest-Litovsk should be respected, while Armenians and Georgians were in favor of war. Georgians insisted on keeping Batumi and the Armenians insisted on Kars and Ardahan. Azerbaijani representatives also agreed with the Georgians on Batumi.

Because this region was the only exit of the South Caucasus to the high seas. However, Azerbaijan refused to take part in the war against Turkey. Sejm declared war on Turkey on 13 April 1918. But the war lasted only 8 days. As a result of the short-lasting war the Ottoman Empire defeated Armenian-Georgian forces.

On April 22, 1918, the establishment of Transcaucasian Federation was announced. On April 28, the new state was recognized by Ottoman Empire. The parties resumed peace negotiations in Batumi on May 11, 1918. Turkey demanded new lands claiming former proposals are not valid anymore because of the war. These included Akhaltsikhe, Gyumri and Akhalkalaki (Hasanli, 2009, p.62). General von Lossow, representing the Germans, was present at the Batumi conference as well. Although the armistice was signed, the clashes flared up again in May. On the night of May 26, 1918, Ottomans and Germans demanded the dissolution of the Transcaucasian federation. On the same day, Georgia withdrew from the federation and declared its independence. Two days later, Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independences. Georgia asked for help from Germany for the solution of its problems with Turkey and peace was achieved in a short time.

### **1.3.2.3. Evaluation**

When this process is examined, following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The fact that the peoples of South Caucasus form a federation instead of declaring their independence when they leave Russian empire shows that despite all disagreements, a common Caucasian identity was strong in the early 1900s.
2. Another reason for the creation of a federation was due to security concerns against external threats. Declaring their independence through the federation enabled them to share the responsibility at overcoming possible reactions from Russia, and create a defense alliance against the Ottomans.

As a result, it has been seen that external threats plays an important role both in the emergence and dissolution of the Transcaucasian Federation. External threats still

continue to exist today. However, there is no impulse towards a new integration. After 1990, the most significant cooperation took place between Azerbaijan and Georgia was Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. However, this was almost limited to the energy issues and did not trigger any kind of integration in other areas. The reasons for this can be listed as follows:

1. Even though it remained mainly only on paper, 70 years of experience as national states during the Soviet period, deepened the perception of “independent identity”. Currently, this national identity has largely completed its formation and embodied in the state.
2. In 1918, the main motivation was security. Economic interests are not enough to be the main pillar of integration, as liberal intergovernmentalists argue.
3. However, even security concerns alone are not sufficient for integration unless there is a perception of “common identity”. The fact that there is no desire for integration even though external threats continue today, confirms this thought.
4. There is no elite who consciously aspires integration. In 1918 however, there was such elite and will for alliance. The main motivation for the establishment of ECSC was to achieve lasting peace rather than to gain economic profit. As Jean Monnet stated in 1943:

There will be no peace in Europe if the states rebuild themselves on the base of national sovereignty, with its implications of prestige politics and economic protection... The countries of Europe are not strong enough individually to be able to guarantee prosperity and social development for their peoples. The States of Europe must therefore form a federation or a European entity that would make them into a common economic unit (Lessambo, 2010, p.5).

This fundamental case shows that economic interest is not enough to trigger such integration.

## 2. PROMINENT THEORIES APPLICABLE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

International Relations, by definition, focuses on inter-state relations (Rosamond, 2000, p.157). The dominant tendency towards the European Union from the international relations perspective has been summarized by Paul Pierson as (1996, p.124):

Despite significant internal disputes, the dominant paradigm in IR scholarship regards European integration as the practice of ordinary diplomacy under conditions creating unusual opportunities for providing collective goods through highly institutionalized exchange. From this 'intergovernmentalist perspective, the EC is essentially a forum for interstate bargaining. Member-states remain the only important actors at the European level. Societal actors exert influence only through the domestic political structures of member-states. Policy making is made through negotiation among member-states or through carefully circumscribed delegations of authority. Whether relying on negotiation or delegation ... Chiefs of Government are at the heart of the EC, and each member-state seeks to maximise its own advantage.

According to Martin Griffiths, the realist approach in International Relations is based on two assumptions: There is a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign policy, and this distinction determines the long-term behavior of countries. The claim here is that interstate politics is quite different from politics within the state (Griffiths, 1992, preface). But according to Hix, politics is not important among the member states, as it is within the system of the European Community (Hix, 1994, pp.1-30). However, there are some authors who argue that the theories of international relations remain valid because states still play a central role in European Union (Hurrell and Menon, 1996, pp.386-402).

Apart from IR theories, even the theories of European integration itself have different understandings when it comes to analyze the EU. While intergovernmentalists examine cooperation between sovereign countries, Federalists are concerned with supranational structures (Çakır, 2001, p.2).

One of the reasons for the difficulties in this area is the lack of a common judgment on the nature of the European Union. In order to facilitate this, relevant views can be



reduced to four basic approaches (Rosamond, 2000, pp.14-18). According to the first view, the European Union is an international organization in which states come together based on common interests. According to second view, the European Union is an example of regionalism. The third approach examines the European Union in terms of Comparative Policies. One of the most well-known figures of this view is Simon Hix. According to Hix, the way to understand the European Union should not be the methods of international relations but comparative policies (Hix, 1994). The last approach examines the European Union as a unique phenomenon.

In this thesis, Constructivism, Functionalism, Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Consociationalism have been examined by taking into consideration the history, cultural texture and political life of the South Caucasus. In doing so, both the general assertions of the theories have been included and a number of assumptions which put forward by these theories have been applied to South Caucasus.

## **2.1 CONSTRUCTIVISM**

Until recently, the main debate in mainstream International Relations was between realism and liberalism. Constructivists claim that both approaches are rationalist and they assume that interests are given (Rosamond, 2007, p.116). Many constructivists, working in the field of contemporary International Relations, agrees that the social structure of world politics is not material but social (Checkel, 1998, pp.324-348). This means that structural features such as anarchy, are not fixed and external.

### **2.1.1. Main Arguments of Constructivism**

According to constructivists, identities are socially constructed and developed through mutual interaction (Wendt, 1992, p.417).

European enlargement is a good example of the process of mutual interaction. According to constructivists, this process cannot be explained only by rationalist

arguments (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p.49). Membership criteria played an important role in this process. The norms of the European Union such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law have been shaping this framework (Fierke and Wiener, 1999, pp. 721-742).

According to Nicholas Onuf, one of the first constructivists, we live in the world of our making and define the goods in the way we perceive it. Events are not predetermined by non-human factors (Onuf, 1989).

Alexander Wendt, on the other hand argues that states actively build anarchy (Wendt, 1992, pp.391-426). According to Wendt, anarchy is not a given situation, not only does anarchy condition the behaviour of states, but states form anarchy as well (Brown, 2005, pp.40-43). According to Constructivism, it is possible for norms to emerge within the anarchic framework (Brown, 2005, p.50).

Despite the realist and neorealist views which claim that behavior of state stems from human nature or the nature of international relations, social constructivism argues that state behavior is constructed by internal and external factors.

According to Alexander Wendt, who advocates systemic constructivism, states have social and corporate identities. The identity that attributed by international community is called social identity. Identity, originating from internal law, culture and norms of societies however, makes the corporate identity (Wendt, 1999, p.139).

Unit-level constructivism however argues that domestic policies are more important in the construction of identity than the international system. According to Reus-Smit, unit-level constructivism is about “the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states” (Reus-Smit, 2005, p.200).

The main success of constructivism was to re-evaluate the state-centered concepts.

Norms are particularly important in constructive literature. Norm is defined as framework in which actors with given identities acting in accordance with collective expectations (Katzenstein, 1996, p.5). By internalizing norms, actors determine their identities and interests. This is what constructivists call constitutive effect.

Social Constructivism coincides with Neorealism when it claims that international system is anarchic and states are the main actors. However, it denies that anarchy necessarily transforms states into self-help actors. Social Constructivism do recognize the existence of anarchy, but also claims that anarchy is perceived depending on the social identity and interests of states.

### **2.1.2. Criticisms**

The main criticism raised against constructivism is about their claims which are difficult to empirically test and also their tendency to make broad and interpretative explanations rather than making clear hypotheses (Moravcsik, 1999, pp. 670-677; Pollack, 2001, pp.221-244). As Moravcsik writes (1999, p.670):

Constructivists, to judge from the volume, have contributed far less to our empirical and theoretical understanding of European integration than their meta-theoretical assertions might suggest – certainly far less than existing alternatives. This disappointing finding may simply reflect the modest role of ideas in the process of European integration, but I doubt it. My analysis of this volume suggests that the true reason lies instead in a characteristic unwillingness of constructivists to place their claims at any real risk of empirical disconfirmation.

In addition, some critics define two different kinds of Constructivism: one more Rationalist, the other more Reflectivist (Smith, 1999, pp. 482-491):

This split is necessary because the approaches adopt fundamentally different epistemological assumptions: the foundationalist, or modernist, constructivists can debate easily with rationalists because they share epistemological assumptions, whereas constitutive constructivists cannot do so... At present social constructivism contains both sorts of stories, yet I believe that the future of constructivism in European studies, and in IR more generally, will be one of a division between at least these two camps with the new core debate in IR being between rationalism and 'reasons as causes' constructivism.

## **2.2. FUNCTIONALISM**

Functionalism is a theory that emerged between the two world wars and arised from the concern that the states are inadequate social organization. For some, it is an approach rather than a theory (Taylor and Groom, 1975, p.1). In the process of global integration triggered by the decline of state sovereignty, it focuses on the common interests and needs of states rather than their own interests (Rosamond, 2000, p.32). Paul Taylor defines functionalism as the intellectual root of not only the neofunctionalist theory, but also of recent approaches such as interdependence theory and world society (Taylor, 1994a, p.125).

It dates back to the liberal / idealistic tradition that began with Kant. Functionalism has a positive view on man's possibilities and to some extent on his nature. Rational and peaceful progress is possible and conflicts are not endemic to humanity (Rosamond, 2000, p.31). Like federalism, functionalism was able to find intellectual space in the turbulent climate of the 1940s, in search of theory to end wars.

### **2.2.1. Main Arguments of Functionalism**

Traditionally, states established their sovereignty based on borders and territories. State-centered theories have defined sovereignty based on these lands (Held, 1987, p.130). Functionalism on the other hand, offers a different concept of sovereignty, which is based on functions and needs and is provided through supranational organizations. According to Mitrany, the question should not be about finding the ideal form of international community, but to define its basic functions (Mitrany, 1933). The functionalist agenda is about human needs and prosperity, rather than the sanctity of the nation-state or the defense of any kind of ideology. For this reason, they are very skeptical about abilities of nation-states to meet the needs of humanity as a structure. This is not only because some of the needs of humanity transcend national borders, but also because functionalists believe that the very existence of nation-states gives birth to certain dogmas and leaves the actual problems of societies unresolved (Rosamond, 2000, p.33). Mitrany provides a largely technocratic model of governance. In fact,

Ernst Haas pointed out that functionalism resembles Marxist-Leninism by substituting “administration of goods” for “people's management” (Haas, 1964, p.9).

According to the functionalist approach, when the integration based on collective management and material solidarity takes place in certain areas, it creates its own dynamic. As international organizations based on knowledge and expertise meet the needs of people, they will gain the loyalty and support of the masses and this will trigger the continuation of integration. As a result of this, international conflicts will decrease (Rosamond, 2000, p.33).

However, Mitrany does not defend the idea of world state. According to him, such designs are equivalent to the search for an empire and contains the contradictions and weaknesses that eventually destroyed the empires (Mitrany, 1933, p.135). The basic motto of functionalism is “form follows function”. As Mitrany writes:

Here we discover a cardinal virtue of the functional pattern, what one might call the virtue of technical self-determination. The functional dimensions, as we have seen, determine themselves. In a manner the function determines the its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice the nature of the action required under given conditions and in that way the powers needed by the respective authority. The function, one might say, determines the political instrument suitable for its proper activity (Mitrany, 1966, pp.72-73).

Human needs can change over time, so the structure of corporate solutions must be flexible. Accordingly, activities should be selected specifically and arranged separately. The aim is to meet human needs, not to achieve any institutional integration. Mitrany’s main interest was to break the state-centered thinking.

Functionalism also opposes the territorial approach envisaged by regional integrations (Mitrany, 1933, pp.111-118). There are several reasons for the objection here. First of all, the definition of Europe is ambiguous and the Pan-European ideals in 18th century were essentially universal, not territorial. Secondly, Mitrany believed that regionalism based on territorial logic would reproduce the state-like structures in the continental scale and would foster inter-regional contradictions:

Between the conception of continental unions and that of a universal league there is a difference not merely of degree but of essence. The one would proceed in the old way by a definition of territory, the other by definition of functions; and while the unions would define their territory as a means of differentiating between members and outsiders; a league would select and define functions for the contrary purpose of integrating with regard to the interest of all (Mitrany, 1933, p.116).

Moreover, regional structuring not only ensures the reproduction of state-like functions, but also results in the dominance of the most powerful countries in the union (Mitrany, 1966, pp.45-46). Regional unions are established through processes similar to state building, but do not contain natural unity and solidarity which is typical for nation states. In Anderson's (1991) words, it is very difficult for them to realize the imagined community (Rosamond, 2000, p.38).

However, Mitrany respected EURATOM and ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community). He could see the clear functional logic in these organizations (Mitrany, 1975, pp.69-70).

Functionalism offered a different alternative to the classical Westphalian world. It provides an origin not only for neofunctionalism but also for other non-state-centered International Relations studies (Forsyth, 1996, p.29).

### **2.2.2. Criticisms**

Criticisms of functionalism can be examined under four headings (Rosamond, 2000, p.39). The first criticism questions the objectivity of the process which determines needs. Even if the appropriate coordination for railways, maritime routes and airlines do realize, it will be inherently more complicated to do so in areas such as production and trade (Mitrany, 1966, p.71).

The second criticism is about functionalist belief which assumes that people make rational decisions. This claim of functionalism, which argues that integration will proceed in technocratic way and rational tendency will overcome political decisions, is problematic. Technocracy itself is profoundly political, and it is impossible to isolate

certain issues completely from politics and technically separate them (Navari, 1995, p.234).

The third criticism is on the weakness of functionalism's ability to predict. After all, international developments did not proceed exactly as Mitrany imagined (Haas, 1975).

Finally, the inadequacy of the theoretical infrastructure of functionalism and the lack of methodology are criticized. However, as Navari notes, methodological punctuality was not common at the time of when functionalism emerged (Navari, 1995, p.234).

Before evaluating this theory in terms of South Caucasus, it would be useful to take a look at Neofunctionalism first, which originated from functionalism.

### **2.3. NEOFUNCTIONALISM**

Neofunctionalism was first introduced in 1958 by Ernst Haas in his book “The Uniting of Europe” (Cini, 2004, p.81). His aim was to explain the integration in the European region after the Second World War.

Haas wanted to study the European Coal and Steel Community in order to formulate its theoretical infrastructure and to create a grand theory that could explain regional integrations elsewhere in the world. However, neofunctionalism soon became specifically related to European Community and its specific integration process (Jensen, 2007, p.86).

The main argument of neofunctionalism is that states are not the only actors on the international stage. Therefore, neofunctionalists focus on supranational institutions and non-governmental actors such as interest groups and political parties, and regard them as the driving force of integration (Jensen, 2007, p.85).

While functionalism predicts the result of integration as separate institutional organization independent from the state, neofunctionalists claims that new political community will emerge as a result of integration and all power will be concentrated in

this new center (Haas 1958). European integration has been accepted as the cornerstone of peace by Jean Monnet. According to neofunctionalists, nationalism and statism will fade in the light of the rising supranational organization.

Although neofunctionalism is accepted as the best theory at describing the formation of European Union, it is also its weakness being able to do it only in single case. In the mid-1960s, "empty chair" crisis by de Gaulle led to a situation which neofunctionalists could neither foresee nor explain. After this crisis, Haas declared that the theory was obsolete (Haas, 1975, p.5). Later, the theory was updated by Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet et al. (Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998; 2001).

### **2.3.1. Main Arguments of Neofunctionalism**

Neofunctionalism explains the process of integration by expressing three key factors (Haas, 1958):

1. Positive spill over
2. Transfer of domestic alliances
3. Technocratic automaticity

1. Positive spill over. It is the idea that the development of integration in a particular area between states will cause a strong urge to spread integration in other areas related to that area (Hooghe and Marks, 2007, pp.1-23)). According to Lindberg, spillover is the result of political cooperation for a specific purpose which leads to the emergence of new common goals (Lindberg, 1963, p.10).

Schmitter describes it as follows (1969, p.162):

Spillover refers ... to the process whereby members of an integration scheme- agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals- attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment), or both.



According to Wallace, when the areas such as coal and steel are managed by a central institution, it creates pressure to integrate in other areas of interest as well, such as taxes and salaries (Wallace, 2005, p.15). Cini defines spill over as a process that creates new political goals (Cini, 2004). Three different kind of spillovers have been defined (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, pp.1-22):

1. Functional spillover: As it has been seen in Single Market case, cooperation in one area functionally spreads to other areas.
2. Political spillover: It occurs when actors consciously look for solution directly from the Union rather than their national state.
3. Cultivated spillover: Supranational institutions such as the European Commission take an active attitude towards integration in intergovernmental negotiations. In such cases, the commission not only acts as an intermediary, but also as a political entrepreneur. The spillover process may, in part, emerge as a side effect of completely different goal. As Lindberg and Scheingold write (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, p.117):

We do not assume that actors will be primarily or even at all interested in increasing the scope and capacities of the system per se. Some will be, but by and large most are concerned with achieving concrete economic and welfare goals and will view integration only as a means to these ends

2. Transfer of domestic alliances. According to neo-functionalists, different national interest groups will realize that supranational institutions are better tools than national states to achieve their goals and therefore they will shift their loyalty towards supranational institutions. This will lead to the formation of a new national elite that is bound to the united European values (Cini, 2004). The integration will thus proceed by the initiative of interest groups rather than any ideological vision. As Haas states (Haas, 1958):

Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of

a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones

3. Technocratic automaticity. Neofunctionalists argue that as integration progresses, supranational institutions will become more powerful than the states and will be able to manage the process all by itself. As Rosamond put it, political integration will be the inevitable consequence of economic integration (Rosamond, 2000, p.52). Experts and executives assume the silent approval of European peoples as they advance towards integration (Jensen, 2007, p.87).

According to Haas, regional integration has three basic conditions: social structure, economic and industrial development and ideological order. The first few European countries forming the Union were similar to each other in these respects. According to Haas, countries with a non-pluralistic social structure are not good candidates for integration (Haas, 1961, pp.366-392). Haas and Schmitter later introduced “size and power of unit”, “rate of transactions” and “elite complementarity” as well. (Haas and Schmitter, 1964, pp. 259-299).

### **2.3.2. Criticisms**

There have been various criticisms of neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalists are often compared to federalists because they work on political integration and outline the advantages of this process (Jensen, 2007, p.92). Haas disagrees, however. According to Haas, while federalism is a political stance, neofunctionalism is a scientific approach that offers theoretical background (Haas, 1970, pp. 607-646). Neofunctionalism has been criticized both empirically and theoretically. From an empirical point of view, the absence or slow progress of integration especially in the 1970s has been presented as the incompetency of the theory (Jensen, 2007, p.93). Moravcsik (1993, p.476) writes:

Despite the richness of its insights, neofunctionalism is today widely regarded as having offered an unsatisfactory account of European integration. The most widely-cited reason is empirical: neo-functionalism appears to mispredict both the trajectory and the process of EC evolution. Insofar as neo-functionalism advances a clear precondition about the trajectory in the EC over

time, it was the technocratic imperative would lead to 'gradual', 'automatic' and 'incremental' progression toward deeper integration and greater supranational influence.

There are also theoretical criticisms. The first one of them is about the basic assumptions of neofunctionalism. For example, Taylor questions the elite socialization thesis, which claims that the bureaucracy will develop loyalty towards supranational institutions. However, according to him, this is not the case in EU. States are tended to increase their civil servants in institutions like European Commission to protect their national interests and Europeanization of bureaucracy do not progress accordingly (Taylor, 1990, p.180). Furthermore, it has been observed that European bureaucrats prioritize national interests when vital issues are raised.

Moreover, according to Risse, if the neofunctionalist claims were correct, the people most supportive of the European Union would be farmers and women, but this is not the case (Risse, 2005, p.297):

Haas seemed to have assumed . . . that those who profit most from European integration are also most likely to shift their loyalties toward Europe than others. If this were true, two groups should be more supportive of European integration than they actually are. First, farmers are arguably the one professional group who profit most from the EU ... Yet, there is no indication that farmers identify with EU to any considerable degree. Their satisfaction with the EU's performance appears also to be rather low. Second, we would expect women to be in general more supportive of European integration than men, given that it was EU that pushed gender equality, particularly equal treatment and equal pay in the workplace ... But there is a gender gap in support for the EU, with men being in general more supportive of integration than women.

A second criticism comes from Haas himself. According to Haas, the political spillover replaces the original functional spillover. In addition, he also points out that the theory focuses on the region as an isolated structure and ignores external factors (Haas, 1976, p.209). Moreover, the democratic deficiency of the theory has been criticized within the neo-functional community as well. After all, referenda on EU treaties have shown that the people do not follow elites without question (Jensen, 2007, p.95).

## **2.4. INTERGOVERNMENTALISM AND LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM**

In the 1960s, there was not only a slowdown in the integration process, but also an increase in nationalist tendencies in Western politics. Charles de Gaulle was the symbol of this development and in some way, demonstrated the intergovernmental dominance over supranationalism. Therefore even neofunctionalists were aware that this was not something to be taken lightly (Haas, 1968, preface).

### **2.4.1. Main Arguments of Classical and Liberal Intergovernmentalism**

Intergovernmentalism was first presented by Stanley Hoffman in response to the neofunctionalist approach (Moga, 2009, pp.796-807). It focuses on the role of states and governments in international relations. Hoffman accuses neofunctionalism of focusing solely on internal dynamics of the integration process. In his opinion, integration should be assessed in a global context, not regional (Bache and George 2006, p. 12). Ignoring the influence of the outside world will lead to a collapse of any predictions about integration. Hoffman argues that national interests may require integration to some extent, but would never include high politics such as state security.

According to Hoffman, low-level politics such as removal of tariffs are part of the negative integration. National elites prefer certainty or controlled uncertainty over uncertainty when it comes to vital interests which might jeopardize their power (Hoffman, 1966). On the other hand, the co-operation in low policies increase their power in the areas where previously nation-states had only limited control.

According to neofunctional logic, the existence of supranational institutions would eventually eradicate nationalism. According to Hoffman however, Monnet-Haas logic can only be applied in areas where integration guarantees profit. These areas are mostly covered by economic integration. Political integration, in which it is not possible to guarantee a final victory, is unlikely to happen. Any moment when uncertainty arise, conflicts will show up between governments (Hoffman, 1966, p.886):

The functional process was used in order to "make Europe"; once Europe began being made, the process collided with the question: "making Europe, what for? The process is like a grinding action that can work only if someone keeps giving it something to grind. When the users start quarrelling and stop providing the machine stops.

Moreover, the progress of integration increases the uncertainty not only among the member states but also in the eyes of the outside world. Hoffman recalls some of the concerns raised in the United States, in this respect (Hoffman, 1964, pp.85-101).

Hoffman denies the claim that industrialism and technology are the guidelines of Western societies, as neofunctionalists have consistently emphasized. The importance of this issue reveals in comments on the spillover. Hoffman says that spillover is not only influenced by political variables, but that functional logic is not as decisive in general as the neofunctionalists argue (Rosamond, 2000, p.78).

According to Intergovernmentalists, integration happens because governments want to protect the national interests, not because of the pressures coming from interest groups. Therefore, governments determine the scope and speed of integration. Governments are the only elected institutions in the integration process and thus their legitimacy is much stronger (Bache and George, 2006, p.13).

It should be noted, however, that Hoffman does not see national interests as predetermined as in classical realism. According to Hoffman, national interests are built by past experiences of countries, internal dynamics and ideals (Hoffman, 1995, p.5). By analyzing the De Gaulle phenomenon, he also sought to achieve general conclusions regarding the nature of the international system.

Hoffman's claims, especially his differentiation regarding low and high politics were criticized after the establishment of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Economic and Monetary Union. Nevertheless, Hoffman's writings paved the way for new criticisms of neofunctionalism (Rosamond, 2000, p.80).

In 1993, Moravscik has developed this theory and introduced liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravscik explains the European integration through intergovernmental bargaining in the council of ministers, based on the economic

interests of the states. Unlike the realist and intergovernmentalist approach, it does not ignore the influence of institutions, but accepts this platform as a tool to reduce bargaining costs. According to Moravcsik, the main motivation of integration is economic and it does not replace the states but saves them. Therefore Moravcsik rejects the federalist approach (Bache and George, 2006, pp. 13-15).

Moravcsik's theory consists of two levels: the first one is about the internal political dynamics of states, in which interests are getting determined, and second phase is about international bargaining, based on those interests. It differs from the classical realism which accept the interests as given. Moravcsik explains the formation of interests as follows (Moravcsik, 1993, p.481):

National interests are [...] neither invariant nor unimportant, but emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence, national and transnational coalitions form and new policy alternatives are recognized by governments.

In terms of international negotiations, he makes three assumptions in particular. Firstly, these negotiations are done voluntarily, without coercion. Secondly, these negotiations take place in an information-rich environment. Thirdly, bargaining costs are very low (Moravcsik, 1993).

According to Moravcsik, states do not give up their independence by entering the European Union, on the contrary, they use the union as a means to increase their autonomy within the country (Moravcsik, 1994, p.1). In other words, what Moravcsik attributes to institutions has gone beyond being just bargaining platform. There are also different considerations as to why states voluntarily compromise their sovereignty. According to Geoffrey Garrett, the environment created by intergovernmental institutions allows some states or alliances to prioritize certain interests. He reminds how Germany and France have gained high economic benefits after the implementation of qualified majority voting and Single European Act (Garrett, 1992, pp. 533-560). Such thoughts attributed to institutions are often called functional, as states use institutions. But this functionality should not be confused with the functionalism advocated by Mitrany and Haas.

### **2.4.2. Criticisms**

Lindberg draws attention to the role of the Commission in the formation of national interests and claims that neofunctionalism has similar assumptions in this respect. (Lindberg, 1994, p.83). On the other hand, Wincott accuses Moravcsik of focusing more on the supply side of Liberal Intergovernmentalism rather than the demand side. Furthermore, Wincott describes Liberal Intergovernmentalism as an approach rather than a theory. It is not likely to be empirically refuted because it does not come up with particular conditions. According to him, Moravcsik's work explains the overall functioning of integration rather than the governance of the EU (Wincott, 1995, p.603).

On the other hands, Smith and Ray criticize the two-level analogy of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and argue that non-EU and non-state actors should be considered in this process as well. (Smith and Ray, 1993, pp. 8-9).

## **2.5 CONSOCIATIONALISM**

According to Reut Institute, consociationalism is “a form of democracy which seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a state that comprises diverse societies (distinct ethnic, religious, political national or linguistic groups) by allocating these groups collective rights”. Consociationalism is a conception against majority democracy (Mainwaring, 2001, pp 170-175). Consociationalism, just as federalism and confederalism, is not a theory but a form of government.

The review of Consociationalism in the European Union framework is often associated with Paul Taylor's work (Taylor, 1994b). This idea was developed by political scientists interested in the question of how societies with deep divisions can live together. In particular, Lijphart's work (1977) shows that political culture based on judicious institution-building and consensus among the elites may just be sufficient for such governance (Rosamond, 2000, p.149). Lijphart's model presupposes a government based on the grand coalition and communities, each having right to veto. Power should

be divided among the elites according to the size of the groups they represent. Also, for this system to work, society must be divided and there must be minimal communication between segments. So communication exists basically on two levels: between the elite and the society they represent, and between the elites of different communities.

### **2.5.1. Main Arguments of Consociationalism**

Consociationalism has four main characters (Bligh, 2003, p.2):

1. Executive power-sharing: There is a grand coalition which represents the basic layers of society. It is usually formed as multi-party cabinet.
2. Mutual veto: All groups have the right to veto decisions made by government on vital issues that concern them (Norris, 2005, p.3-4).
3. Proportional representation: All groups are represented in the government according to their size and have a share in public resources and expenditures.
4. Autonomy: Groups are given autonomy within the boundaries of the state, especially in cultural areas.

Lijphart (1977, pp.53-103) also mentions certain “favorable conditions” in order for consociationalist system to work (Kerr, 2006, pp 27-28):

1. Isolation between communities
2. Multiple balance of power
3. An external threat to all communities
4. Communities having common overarching loyalty towards state
5. Traditional harmony between elites
6. Socio-economic proximity between communities



7. Less population

8. Multi-party political system covering all layers of society

According to John McGarry and Brandon O'leary, three basic requirements must be met (McGarry and O'leary, 1995, p.339): Elites should be able to work with each other in resolving disputes, elites should be able to lead groups to which they belong, and multiple balance of power should be provided.

### **2.5.2. Criticisms**

Some authors however, criticize Consociationalism for fueling conflict cleavage, thus solidifying the underlying problem. According to them, Consociationalist structure promotes the conflict-based political order and therefore dissolves of other dimensions of the political spectrum. This causes ethnic issues to dominate political competition and gives advantage to hard-line parties. (Horowitz, 2002, pp.123-136; Tilley, Evans and Mitchell, 2008, pp. 699-717).

But according to John Garry, this is only true at the beginning (2009, p. 459):

Once the conflict cleavage has become the dominant dimension for within-community party competition, parties are incentivized to move position on this dimension in order to capture votes. Assuming that voters in each bloc are moderate (an assumption empirically tested below for the Northern Ireland case), 'extreme' parties are incentivised to move to the position of the 'moderate' party.

### **3. INTERPRETATION OF SOUTH CAUCASUS POLITICS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EU INTEGRATION THEORIES**

While one of the aims of the thesis is to determine the extent to which the peoples of the South Caucasus are compatible for integration, the other is to clearly identify the problems that may be faced in the event of a possible integration process and present solutions. Accordingly, each theory was evaluated in the context of South Caucasus politics and the resulting problems were examined one by one. While Social Constructivism was used as a mean to assess harmony among the peoples of the region, the other theories were studied in order to determine the concrete steps which need to be taken.

#### **3.1. CONSTRUCTIVIST INTERPRETATION OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION**

South Caucasus has long been an area of struggle for different empires. Short period of time between 1917 and 1920, when the order established by external powers disappeared, provides us interesting data in this respect. Apart from Safavid ancestors of Azerbaijani Turks, it was the first time after a long period of time that local peoples established independent states and became international actors.

Security and interest perceptions of these states should be examined at two different levels. At first glance, conflicts between states that lead almost to genocide give the impression that identities are irreconcilable. During this period, no agreement was reached on the borders of the states, and there were violent clashes between Turks, Armenians and Georgians. In 1918, with the support of the Bolsheviks in Baku, massacres were carried out by the Armenians against the Muslim people and about 12,000 people were killed (Smith, 2001, p.228). When Baku was liberated by the Ottomans, there was retaliation against the Armenians. After the withdrawal of the Ottomans in 1918, Armenians attacked Lori and Borchali regions of Georgia and clashes lasted until December and thousands of people have been killed (Andersen and Partskhaladze, 2015). These conflicts did not stop even when the region was attacked

by Russia in 1920-1921. While Baku was occupied by the Soviets, Azerbaijani army was still fighting against Armenian gangs in Karabakh.

These conflicts cannot be ignored, but also this should not cause us to overlook the basic foreign policies pursued by these states. In this period, the main political objectives of South Caucasus states can be listed as follows:

1. The establishment of western-style Republican regime. When Russia invaded the region, there were khanates and principalities in South Caucasus. However, when Russia left the region in 1917, no revival of feudal order has been observed.

2. Adoption of democracy. Despite all the conflicts and anarchy, elections were held, parliaments were formed, and deputies elected by the people came to power.

3. To be able to enter Western organizations. The newly established states not only adopted the Western political order, but also established close alliances with Western states. While Georgia founded close relations with Germany, Azerbaijan developed good relations with the Ottoman Empire and then with Great Britain.

4. To establish peace in the region. Relations between the countries of South Caucasus were not composed of just conflicts. As a matter of fact, even though half of the population consisted of Turks, the fact that Azerbaijan accepted to leave Yerevan legally to Armenia shows that the countries had the motivation to live together (Qafarov, 2011, p.164). The armed Armenian nationalist gangs in Karabakh did not completely submit to the authority of the Armenian state. While the clashes continued in Nagorno-Karabakh, there was an Armenian faction in the Azerbaijani parliament. This point shows that it is wrong to see the conflicts only in ethnic framework.

The political objectives cited above are essentially derived from two main concerns: Westernization and the security of the state against Russia (and Ottomans to some extent).

The desire for westernization did not arise from just external and material reasons. The identity that these states express themselves through is European and it did not just appear suddenly in 1918. At the end of the 1800s, enlightenment movement emerged in

South Caucasus, which was quite attached to the ideals of French revolution. This movement was not political at first, and it manifested itself through translation of western literature. By the 1900s, intellectuals in South Caucasus began to reflect these ideas at the social and political level.

### **3.1.1. Implementation of Constructivist Assertions**

From systemic constructive point of view, the existence of South Caucasian identity should be noted. Despite its internal differences, South Caucasia is generally approached as a whole in contemporary political literature. In other words, states in South Caucasus are usually perceived as common body by outside world. This is not observed only in geographical level but in political level as well. The resolution of European Council in 1994 indicate that:

In view of their cultural links with Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia would have the possibility of applying for membership provided they clearly indicate their will to be considered as part of Europe. However, a new iron curtain should not be drawn behind these states as this would run the risk of preventing the spread of the Council of Europe's basic values to other countries. Neighbouring countries of "geographical" Europe should, if they so wish, be viewed as possible candidates for suitable co-operation (Parliamentary Assembly, 1994).

Another example of this, from European point of view, was the acceptance of Azerbaijan and Armenia simultaneously as member of the Council of Europe. This situation has begun to change only after the revolution in Georgia in 2003 (BBC, 2014).

From the perspective of unit-level constructivism, there are sharp differences between the peoples of South Caucasus in terms of religion, language and history. The angles that these people tended to look at their history and geography from, are quite different from each other. While Armenia and Georgia emphasize their Christian identities, Azerbaijan defines itself by its Muslim and secular identity. According to Svante Cornell:

Azerbaijan can rightly claim to be among the most progressive and secular Islamic societies. Aside from having been the first Muslim country to have operas, theater plays, and a democratic

republic, Azerbaijan today is among the Muslim countries where support for secularism is the highest, and where radical ideologies have met only very limited interest. (Cornell, 2006, p.8)

Georgians use a unique language and alphabet that has not been seen in any other part of the world. As one of the first Christian communities in history, it had close ties with Byzantium until the conquest of Istanbul.

The Armenian alphabet and language is also unique. In this respect, it is similar to Georgia. However, Armenians were much easily adapted to foreign interventions and was able to establish deeper cultural relations, especially with Muslim societies (Amurian and Kasheff, 2011). These good relations lasted until the rise of nationalism in the early 20th century (Kirakossian, 2003, p.58).

Azerbaijan is more open to the outside world in terms of language, alphabet and culture, unlike the other two countries. It has cultural ties to a wide geographical area, from Europe to China. The ethnogenesis of Azerbaijani people was completed much later than its neighbours. While Oghuz Turks have arrived in South Caucasus in 900's, it has differentiated from other Turkic communities and formed a distinct nation only in 16<sup>th</sup> century (Алаев and Ашрафян, 2002, p.360).

### **3.1.2. The Possibilities of Integration in South Caucasus in the Light of Constructivism**

Based on this information, what is the probability of integration in South Caucasus? The best way of evaluating this is to look at the developments after 1990. Two of Wendt's criteria for identity change are sovereignty and evolution of cooperation (Wendt, 1992, p.395). The most significant development in this respect was the installation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The agreement, signed in 1994, had political implications as well as economic benefits. Both countries, having common security concerns, were trying to guarantee their independence against Russia (Cornell and Ismailzade, 2005).

Nevertheless, we can say that the existence of dictatorial regime in Azerbaijan constitutes a serious obstacle to the spread of cooperation in non-energy fields. The obstacle does not end there. It also slows the Westernization process, which the country has been aiming for since its existence. Although no visa required between these two countries today, if Georgia keeps moving towards Europe and the Azerbaijani government does not abandon its authoritarian route, it would not be surprise if the cultural closeness seriously deteriorate in near future. While the erosion of democracy and civil society already cripples the “secular and western” side of identity in Azerbaijan, it is likely that the “Iranian” and “Shiite” identity imposed by Iran will gain more space. As Arzu Geybullayeva indicates:

Today, radical Shi'a Islam is more popular than ever as a result of effective and tactful methods used by Iranian mullahs. While southern regions of Azerbaijan, the IDP camps, and the Absheron peninsula remain the heart of the Iranian Shi'a Islam, the main stronghold of radical Shi'a Islam in Azerbaijan is the village of Nardaran on the outskirts of Baku (Geybullayeva, 2007).

Constructivism provides valuable data to understand the identity of the peoples in South Caucasus and helps to observe the basis for possible integration in the region. However, functionalism and neofunctionalism offer more concrete suggestions in terms of the path to be achieved for integration.

### **3.2. FUNCTIONALIST AND NEOFUNCTIONALIST INTERPRETATION OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION**

Ending long-standing conflicts and establishing permanent peace was the most important source of motivation for European integration. Thus, some might claim that there is a certain similarity between South Caucasus and the Europe in the late 1940s, at least in terms of motivation that lead to integration.

As it was pointed out above, functionalists were particularly opposed to territorial-logic, rejecting the definition of sovereignty over land (Laroche, 2017, p.36). Considering that the biggest concrete obstacle to peace in South Caucasus is the border disputes, it can be said that this new understanding of sovereignty over functions and needs gives a new perspective to the solution of the problems.

Functionalists refuse to put the organization under political authorities. Considering that in all three states of South Caucasus the nationalists came into power in 1990's and pursued populist policies at the expense of damaging their economy and democracy, some might say that giving functions up to supranational technocratic institution would not be the wrong choice.

### **3.2.1. Implementation of Functionalist and Neofunctionalist Assertions**

Haas and Schmitter talk about some background conditions for the application of neofunctionalism including economic and industrial development, ideology, social pluralism, size of unit, rate of transactions and elite complementarity. Given these conditions, are South Caucasus countries really suitable candidates for neofunctionalist integration?

**Economic and Industrial Development.** Although Azerbaijan is rich in oil and gas, there are no sharp differences between the countries of South Caucasus.

*Azerbaijan.* Azerbaijani economy is highly dependent on the export of energy resources. Oil sales increased the Gross Domestic Product in the 2000s. It became the second highest growth rate in the world in 2005 and the highest growth rate in the world in 2006 (The World Bank, 2019). 2/3 of the country is rich in natural gas and oil. The areas which include Lesser Caucasus Range are rich in minerals and metals. In 1994, an energy agreement was made with Western companies and new technologies have been used to discover new fields of natural gas and oil, which were unknown during the Soviet period. Thus, it became the most attractive country for foreign investors among the Commonwealth of Independent States. (Jafarova, 2014).

Due to its oil-dependent economy, the country has been greatly affected by the falling oil prices in recent years. The budget surplus has been replaced by a budget deficit and the state had to restrict public expenditures. This has led to a decline in many areas where the state was an investor and therefore industrial development has been affected.

In addition to the decline in oil prices, the lack of diversification in the industry and the fact that foreign investment was mainly concentrated in the field of energy had a negative impact on the economy. The national currency, which was held stable against the dollar for many years, was devalued and the average income per capita decreased. The State Oil Fund, which was established to create funds for future generations, started to be used to cover the budget deficit especially after the fall in oil prices. While in 2007, the money which was transferred from the State Oil Fund to the state budget was less than \$ 1 billion, in 2015 it was \$ 9.3 billion (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

*Georgia.* Although Georgia is not as rich as its neighbor in terms of natural resources, it is trying to improve its economy by making investments in two areas. The first one is about its strategic location in energy pathways. With the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan agreement signed in 1994, Georgia became an alternative line for Western countries who were seeking energy routes which does not involve Russia. In this way Georgia has gained both economic and geopolitical benefits.

The second important feature of Georgian economy, which separates it from its neighbors are the reforms it has made to increase economic and financial freedom.

When USSR collapsed, economic growth of Georgia had been severely wounded and it could only started to recover in the beginning of 2000's. In particular, reforms after the Rose Revolution have been vital in this respect (U.S. Department of State, 2014, p.1).

In 2007, the World Bank declared Georgia the most successful country at reforming the economy (RT, 2007). In addition, it has been frequently ranked as one of the best countries regarding to the ease of doing business index. Georgia is the least corrupt country compared to the countries in Black Sea region and even some EU countries in Eastern Europe (Transparency International, 2019, p.9). Since 2016, Georgia has established a Free Trade Zone with EU under the EU Cooperation Agreement. Soon



after, trade relations with the European Union has increased and relations with CIS countries decreased (Civil.ge, 2016).

The most important problem of the Georgian economy still appears to be unemployment. Until recently, the money sent by Georgian workers living in Russia lightened this problem to some extent and provided regular cash flow to the country. However, the problems with Russia made the situation worse. While the official unemployment rate is 13.4%, people who identify themselves as unemployed is about 66% (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

*Armenia.* Although there was a certain industrial production during Soviet period, it still was depended on foreign countries in terms of raw materials as it is today. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the economy has started stumbling both because the flow of raw materials to the country stopped and it has been excluded from regional energy projects because of the war against Azerbaijan. Currently, budget deficit in Armenia is high, and it tries to compensate it by getting international aid and using the money sent by Armenian workers working abroad. Corruption also worsens the situation. Although anti-corruption programs were inadequately implemented during the long-lasting rule of the Republican Party, it is hoped that this situation will change after the velvet revolution that took place in May 2018.

**Ideology.** All three countries of South Caucasus share socialist political past. After the collapse of Soviet Union, these states switched to free market order. However, it should be noted that serious problems have been observed during implementation of the liberal economy in Azerbaijan and Armenia, including widespread corruption and powerful oligarchy (Freedom House, 2015).

*Azerbaijan.* After the dissolution of USSR, the nationalist tendency has increased in Azerbaijan, and soon after the Khojaly Massacre in 1992, the communist government had to resign. The People's Front, led by Elchibey, remained in power for less than a year, but managed to achieve significant transformations in the country. Censorship was removed and free media has been established (Tahirzadə, 2015). Elchibey's main goal was to build a system based on the separation of powers. As for foreign policy,

while he tried to have close relations with the West, especially with Turkey, positioned himself against Russia and Iran. Russian military base in the country was shut down. However, as soon as Heydar Aliyev came into power much softer approach was adopted in foreign policy. While economic relations with the West continued to be developed, he tried not to confront Russia. Although there were some geopolitical imperatives forcing this decision, there were personal reasons as well. Former Soviet politician Aliyev was not willing to establish a truly Western-style liberal administration in the country, therefore he found much easier to deal with the Russian government. As a matter of fact, before his death, in 2003, in order to prepare his son for his place, he made him prime minister.

Heydar Aliyev abandoned the Pan-Turkist approach which was popular during Elchibey's presidency and replaced it with Azerbaijani nationalism. The principles of the New Azerbaijan Party established by Aliyev included lawfulness, secularism and Azerbaijani nationalism (YAP, 2019). According to some politicians however, the party is united around the cult of Heydar Aliyev and has no real ideology. The New Azerbaijan Party is defined as the typical post-soviet government party (Herron, 2009, pp.86-87).

*Georgia.* As the Soviet Union disintegrated, nationalists who started the struggle for independence under the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia were effective in the early 1990s. However, these groups, which also fought among themselves, often clashed with each other. The first president Gamsakhurdia was dismissed from power in 1992 as a result of this power struggle. He first fled to Azerbaijan, then to Armenia and then to Chechnya. In 1993, he returned to Georgia to fight again, but he was unsuccessful and was killed, especially because of Russian opposition and resistance from other nationalistic paramilitary groups.

During Gamsakhurdia's presidency, anti-Russian and nationalist tendencies were popular in Georgia. Both of these contributed to the escalation of ethnic tensions in the country. According to Khutsishvili, hysteria which resonated as "Georgia for Georgians" by Gamsakhurdia followers played a critical role at pushing country into Bosnian-like ethnic violence (Khutsishvili, 1994, pp.2-6). Tensions have increased

among ethnic groups during this period of time. While more than half of the Bolnisi and Dmanisi regions were formed by Azerbaijanis in 1980's, 800 Azerbaijani families were expelled from their homes in Bolnisi in 1990's (International Crisis Group, 2006).

After Gamsakhurdia's fall, Eduard Shevardnadze came to power. Shevardnadze has ruled Georgia during the Soviet period, and also served as a foreign minister in USSR for many years. During Shevardnadze's presidency, softer line was adopted both inside and outside of country. Opposition against Russia has diminished and Georgia became a member of Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States. He also had to fight against the paramilitary forces that carried him to power and prevent the chaos.

However, Shevardnadze's name has constantly been associated with corruption and rigged elections. Especially in the late 1990s, he tried to develop closer relations with United States of America. In 2002, hundreds of American officers came to Georgia as part of the "Train and Equip" program. It was during his presidency when Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project was implemented.

After the parliamentary elections in 2003, protests broke out against Shevardnadze due alleged fraud. Opposition, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania, overthrew Shevardnadze with the bloodless Rose Revolution and has renewed parliamentary elections. The coalition of opposing forces won the renewed elections and Saakashvili became the new president.

Saakashvili era was new and different experience for the entire post-soviet region. During his reign, Georgia's two main goals were integrating to West and ensuring the territorial integrity of country. Accordingly, Aslan Abashidze, who maintained semi-independent rule in Adjara, was dismissed from the office and the central administration has been strengthened. Georgia ranked 133th in the world according to the corruption index in 2004, however managed to rise to 51st in 2012 ([Transparency International](#), 2012).

During Saakashvili's presidency, Georgia cooperated closely with the United States and fought Russia in 2008 over South Ossetian conflict. Georgia joined the coalition forces

during the Iraq War and sent hundreds of troops to Iraq. Attempts were made to establish closer cooperation with NATO.

Saakashvili's United National Movement Party is the center-right party which advocates political, economic, cultural liberalism and civic nationalism, and has been an observer member of the European People's Party (EPP) since 2007.

Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgian party, founded by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and its allies have won the parliamentary elections in 2012. The coalition initially composed of six political parties. It included the supporters of free market and Western values, radical nationalists, and those who had power during the Shevardnadze's reign but lost it after the revolution of Rose (De Waal, 2012).

*Armenia.* After the dissolution of USSR, the nationalist Pan-Armenian National Movement was the most active political organization in Armenia and played a major role in Karabakh conflict by advocating for unification of Karabakh to Armenia. The movement was led by Levon Ter Petrosyan and won the elections in 1990 and became the ruling party in Armenia. Petrosyan, who was in office until 1998, has been dismissed for his stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations with Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharyan, who worked with nationalist organizations during the Karabakh War, came to power.

During Kocharian's presidency, no progress has been made on the Karabakh conflict. Political pressure and terror was increased within the country. An armed attack on the Armenian Parliament was carried out on 27 October 1999 and many of Kocharyan's rivals were killed in the parliament. According to official results, Kocharyan won the elections in 2003. But the opposition went out on the streets, blaming him for fraud. Kocharyan, did not have the right to run again for presidency in 2008, therefore this time, he chose to support his old friend Serzh Sargsyan. Again after the election, street demonstrations were held and 10 people were killed in these events.

In the recent years, Armenia's politics have been dominated by two parties. One of them is the Republican Party of Armenia, which was founded in 1991 and is the first political party of independent Armenia. The party is the largest right-wing party in

Armenia that operates on a nationalist-conservative line. It claims to have 140,000 members.

The party advocates Nzhdeh Garegin's racist "tseghakron" ideology. Garegin fought against the Ottoman Empire during the Balkan War and the World War I. He later participated in World War II as well, serving Nazi Germany. Tseghakron means carrier of the race. It claims that Armenian nationality and Armenian state should be treated as religious sanctity by every Armenian (Hetq Online, 2003).

However, the Republican Party of Armenia is defined as the typical post-soviet party of power and, according to some political commentators, has no real ideology (Iskandaryan, 2012, pp.2-4).

"Prosperous Armenia" is the second powerful party in parliament since 2007. Some commentators argue that the party is directly influenced by Kocharyan (ARKA, 2015). The party advocates economic liberalism, social conservatism, and is known for its pro-Russian stance in foreign policy (Матевосян, 2010).

There is another party in parliament which its influence and significance goes much beyond the parliament: Dashnaksutyun. It has been found in Tbilisi in 1890. Dashnaksutyun was very active in Ottoman Empire, especially in the 1900s, and still has political ties in all the countries where the Armenian diaspora exists. The party's goals are to establish a united Armenia which include eastern Turkey and Nakhchivan, to promote Armenian genocide and receive compensation, and to strengthen independent Armenia (AYF, 2019). It was a member of the Socialist International until 1960, but left the organization and became a member again in 1999.

After the velvet revolution in April 2018, radical changes took place in the political scene of Armenia and former journalist Nikol Pashinyan became the prime minister. Pashinyan, who was a long-time supporter of Levon Ter Petrosyan, founded the Civil Contract in 2013 and, together with the other parties he allied with, won 8% of the vote in the elections in 2017. Pashinyan, who became popular with his fiery speeches during the revolution, has gained the support of all the opposition parties in the parliament.

Although Pashinyan's political views have been described as liberal and centrist in some Western sources, Pashinyan refuses to define himself as liberal and claims that his political stance is “post-ideological” (Atanesian, 2018). Pashinyan supported Ter-Petrosyan and advocated peace at the beginning but became more aggressive as his political reputation increased. He stated that they have no territory to compromise (RFE/RL, 2002; De Waal, 2018).

**Social Pluralism.** Pluralism in political sciences is a view that in liberal democracies, power should not be concentrated in the hands of an elite group but should be shared among different economic and ideological pressure groups (Britannica, 2019).

Countries of South Caucasus demonstrates poor performance when it comes to pluralism. Although Georgia quickly left the Soviet political tradition and adopted Western, pluralist political and social order, decisions in Armenia and particularly in Azerbaijan are still largely taken by the government and civil society is excluded from decision-making process (Mammadov, 2016).

According to the democracy index of 2018, published by The Economist, which was based on five indicators, Azerbaijan ranks 149th among 167 countries. Moreover, there is a decline in every indicator compared to 2006. According to the same source, Armenia ranks 103rd and there is an improvement in indicators compared to 2006. Georgia ranks 89th and indicators have improved compared to 2006. The journal evaluated the countries by examining their electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of the government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties (The Economist, 2019).

According to the Freedom House, political rights and civil liberties declined in Azerbaijan and Georgia and progressed in Armenia (Freedom House, 2019).

**Size of Units.** Although Azerbaijan is the biggest country in South Caucasus, there are no sharp differences in terms of territorial size.

*Azerbaijan.* Azerbaijan has 86,600 km<sup>2</sup> of area with 10 million population. 20% of the country has been occupied by Armenia.

Territories of South Azerbaijan or Iranian Azerbaijan, including West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil and Zanjan provinces is about 122,660 km<sup>2</sup> and have 15 to 30 million Azerbaijani population (unpo.org, 2017). In addition, around 233,000 Azerbaijanis live in Georgia.

*Georgia.* It is the second largest country in South Caucasus with 69,700 km<sup>2</sup> area and 3,718,000 population. 20% of Georgian territory has been occupied.

*Armenia.* Total population of Armenia is around 3 million while its area is about 29,743 km<sup>2</sup>. In addition, around 200,000 Armenians live in Georgia.

As it is seen, South Caucasus countries meet the conditions in terms of territorial size.

**Rate of Transactions.** There is rising economic exchange between Azerbaijan and Georgia, especially in the field of energy. However, there is no economic exchange between Azerbaijan and Armenia due to the war (Van Moorsel, 2017).

The trade volume between Azerbaijan and Georgia exceeded \$ 1.1 billion in 2018. Azerbaijan is the third largest trade partner of Georgia after Turkey and Russia. Georgian exports to Azerbaijan include cement, railway materials, mineral waters, medicines and other items. Azerbaijan exports oil and petroleum products, electricity and natural gas to Georgia (Mammadova, 2019).

The trade volume between Georgia and Armenia is around \$ 250 million, according to the Armenian Statistical Committee, which accounts for 3.9% of Armenia's total foreign trade. While Armenia mainly exports mineral products and concentrated copper, cigarettes and ethyl alcohol, Georgia exports electricity, nitrogen fertilizer and alcoholic beverages to Armenia. Georgia is vitally important for Armenia for another reason as well. 70% of Armenia's product shipments goes through Georgia, including natural gas from Russia (Gasparyan, 2018).

Armenia has been isolated from regional projects because of its territorial claims against Azerbaijan. On the other hand, it separates Nakhchivan from the rest of Azerbaijan, therefore leaves the area totally depended to Iran. Georgia lacks resources in terms of underground wealth but it is the only country among them which has access to the

Black Sea. Especially Armenia is severely affected by economic blockade and would benefit greatly from regional integration.

**Elite Complementarity.** Elite complementarity is defined according to the common values and goals shared by the elites from different countries (Renninger, 1979, p.54). While assessing the compliance of the elites, taking a glance at the perception of threat might also be helpful. In the political spectrum of Azerbaijan and Georgia, Russia is still perceived as the main foreign threat. Even though they have different religions and denominations, the mainstream religious groups of all three countries accept secular political order (AZERTAC, 2017).

*Azerbaijan.* The political elite of Azerbaijan has strong roots in Soviet nomenklatura (Perkin, 1996, p. 204). They did not get involved with nationalist movement and have no military background. However, there is a widespread network of political patronage in Azerbaijan, which was built by Heydar Aliyev during his reign as secretary of communist party and later as president of independent Azerbaijan. This network is based on regionalism and kinship. Especially the clans from Nakhchivan and Yerevan, where Aliyev family had strong ties, still constitute an important part of Azerbaijani political elite (Meissner, 2011, pp.6-9).

Still, there was relatively pluralist system until Heydar Aliyev's death, and Azerbaijan has become member of Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2001). However, balanced policy is main objective Azerbaijani foreign relations (Rahimov, 2019).

*Armenia.* The political elite of Armenia was born through the nationalist movement in 1990's and has military background (Waal, 2004). Many of contemporary leaders of Armenia were born in Soviet Azerbaijan, and their bilateral relations with Azerbaijanis goes decades back. However, this did not prevent them from taking a pro-war stance when ethnic tension started to increase in Nagorno Karabakh. On the contrary, they took an active role in the war and benefited from it as well. Former presidents like Robert Kocharyan, Serj Sargsyan and the leaders of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Bako Saakyan and Arkadi Gukasyan are some of them. Of these, Sargsyan and former defense minister of Armenia, Ohanyan, played a direct role in the



ethnic cleansing and massacres in Karabakh (Gut, 2018). The Karabakh clan, which rose with the help of nationalist wave in the late 1980s, established a monopoly in the political and economic fields in Armenia after the war (Whitmore, 2008).

*Georgia.* The political elite in Georgia is completely new and has grown in democratic political environment established after the revolution in 2003. Starting with the Saakashvili's presidency, old nomenklatura have been removed from power and replaced by young people. The current president of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, is the descendant of a Georgian family who emigrated to Europe after the Soviet invasion in 1921. She served as French ambassador in Georgia until 2003. In 2004, she was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs by Saakashvili. Mamuka Bakhtadze became Prime Minister of Georgia at the age of 36.

### **3.2.2. The Possibilities of Integration in South Caucasus in the Light of Functionalism and Neofunctionalism**

When all these conditions are taken into consideration, it is seen that South Caucasus countries have basic infrastructure in terms of economic and industrial development, while their ideological orientations and profile of political elites are quite different.

Although Azerbaijan has always played a major economic role in South Caucasus due to its natural resources, it would be fair to claim that all three countries have certain industrial infrastructure. If the Karabakh problem gets solved, economic isolation of Armenia will come to end and cooperation in the region will reach new heights. However, as long as there are no fundamental changes in Azerbaijan and Armenia, political contradictions will not end in the region in the near future. Afterall, the political environment in all three countries of the South Caucasus is quite different.

In this context, it becomes clear that especially the political elite in Georgia share different values and history from their neighbours. Although the face of politics in Armenia has started to change especially after the revolution in 2018, it is difficult to say for now, how far this change will actually take place and how long the old regime

will resist, considering it still has powerful connections in Nagorno Karabakh. (Mejlumyan, 2018).

While territorial sizes are close to each other, economic transactions between these countries are highly affected by regional conflicts. It has also been seen that Armenia and especially Azerbaijan fails when it comes to social pluralism. Social pluralism is vital for any integration attempt in the region. If this requirement is not provided, neither social dialogue nor sincere exchange of ideas between peoples of South Caucasus is possible. Although Georgia has made significant progress, no country has yet to catch up with Western pluralism.

### **3.3. LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST INTERPRETATION OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION**

When evaluating liberal intergovernmentalism in the context of South Caucasus, it is necessary to examine the two phases of the process separately. The first step is the formation of national interests by the interaction between the government and the society at home, and the second step is the negotiations between the countries based on those interests.

#### **3.3.1. Implementation of Liberal Intergovernmentalist Assertions**

The process of formation of national interests in South Caucasus countries are quite different from each other. Moreover, the diplomatic instruments used by these countries and the implications of the national interests in foreign policy also differ. It is therefore necessary to examine each country separately.

**Azerbaijan.** The lack of democratic and pluralist political order in Azerbaijan has caused the interaction between the government and the society to exist in a rather

primitive and poor way, except for some basic issues (Human Rights House Foundation, 2008). However, by looking at the foreign policy pursued by these countries and the statements by their leaders, we can have an idea of what their national interests might be.

Issues frequently mentioned by Azerbaijani diplomats in relations with other countries of South Caucasus include security of energy roads, liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the sustaining stability in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Despite the lack of democratic order, it would not be wrong to claim that these interests are the priorities of Azerbaijani society as well, although citizens have little opportunity to interact directly with the government. However, this gives us a limited picture. Although these are the policies that society approves, it does not cover all the demands coming from the society, considering the government rarely establishes dialogue with the rest of the people. There are clues of it in several cases. Despite the ongoing peace talks since 1994, there is no sign of solution in Nagorno Karabakh. This makes people more sympathetic about military solutions, now and then, in spite of government (Brown, 2002, 66-74). The fact that a sergeant crossed the front line and engaged in combat with enemy by disobeying his superiors in 2010 or pro-war demonstrations held during April War in 2016 shows that the public's belief in the peace negotiations which government has maintained for many years has diminished. (BBC, 2016).

It should be noted, however, that the militarist mood is not adopted by all the segments of Azerbaijani society, nor does it show continuity at the same intensity over the years. In 2006, Azerbaijani writer Akram Aylisli wrote a novel about the pogroms which was held against Armenians in Baku in 1989. The novel caused fiery discussions in Azerbaijani society. Campaigns were launched against the author, especially by pro-government media. However, literary community has criticized the attempts to make a political target out of a novel and limit the author's freedom of expression. (RFE/RL, 2013). Although the opposition criticized some of the events attributed to Azerbaijanis in the novel, they also condemned the smear campaigns orchestrated by the government (Azadliq, 2013).

The government's attitude seems to be not due to a particular ideological obsession, but to the need to keep all political behaviors under its control, regardless of the worldview.

The human rights issues in South Azerbaijan is another area that has been in the interest of Azerbaijani society since the 1990s, but the government chose to avoid the problem after Heydar Aliyev came to power, in order not to infuriate Iran. (Aslanlı, 2012).

**Armenia.** Since the day Armenia was established, Russia's influence has been strong in the country. There is a Russian military base in Armenia and it is one of the founding members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Other members of the organization are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It is also a member of the Eurasian Economic Alliance, another organization led by Russia. Allying with Russia has so far been an indispensable national need for the Armenian political elite. This has not yet been questioned by Pashinyan administration either, which came into power after the velvet revolution in 2018. Pashinyan declared that there would be no fundamental changes in Armenia's foreign policy after the revolution. He expressed his thoughts on this subject as follows (Balayan, 2019):

After a number of well-known revolutions, which are commonly called color revolutions, anti-Russian sentiments have appeared in these countries. It is very important for us to state, and I have repeatedly said that there were no geopolitical contexts in our revolution.

Some might say allying with Russia is a national demand in Armenia, coming from the bottom. After all, it is in war against Azerbaijan and has no diplomatic ties with Turkey. However, although the Armenian governments decisively repeat that the alliance with Russia is their own choice, it is not as clear as it is stated at a grassroots level. The presence of the Russian military base in Armenia was criticized by many people especially in 2015, after the massacre of the Armenian family by the Russian soldier serving in 102nd Russian base in Gyumri. Demonstrations have been held in front of the Russian embassy in Yerevan demanding the removal of the Russian military base from Armenia (Vestnik Kavkaza, 2015). People with the same demands clashed with the police in Gyumri. Protesters attacked the embassy in Yerevan and tried to burn the Russian flag (RFE/RL, 2015). Russian soldier was arrested on base after the massacre and was not handed over to the Armenian authorities. Armenian public prosecutor's

office announced that the incident was within the jurisdiction of Russia and Armenian leaders refrained from making statement about the massacre (Grigoryan, 2015).

According to Thomas de Waal, the protests showed that Armenian society has a much wider spectrum of opinions than their political rulers do. The political consequences of the massacre will not lead to strategic alienation from Russia, but will dissolve social support to the Sargsyan government. (De Waal, 2015).

Nagorno-Karabakh inevitably remains as the most important issue in Armenia's foreign policy. But it would be misleading to claim that political elite act on social expectations. In particular, the fact that the ruling elite in Armenia have been shaped by people from Karabakh for many years and the fact that they owe their leap in their political career to the Karabakh War, shows that these people, in addition to national reasons, also pursue their personal interests in this matter. When Ter Petrosyan had made considerable progress in resolving the Karabakh conflict at the end of 1990's, the pressure have been made by Karabakh clan and he was forced to resign. Soon after, some other popular figures were massacred during the Armenian parliament shooting and Kocharyan became sole actor. Karabakh clan has never lost its power since then. Such resilient struggle for power suggests that there is something more than sincere concern about national interests of Armenia.

Armenian diaspora is another factor that has an important role in foreign policies of Armenia. Armenian diaspora has played an active role in Armenia since the 1980s. This role has emerged in three ways. Firstly, it supported Armenia in Karabakh War by directly participating in war. ASALA terrorists with military training in Palestine and Lebanon voluntarily fought in Karabakh. The most famous of them was California-born Monte Melkonian (Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 1988, p.32; Zürcher, 2007, p.177).

The resentment of the diaspora was effective in removing Ter Petrosyan from his post in 1997. Ter Petrosyan was aware of the influence of Armenian diaspora in Armenia and was trying to limit it on Armenian politics. For this reason, in 1995, he ensured the prohibition of dual citizenship. In Armenian diaspora, some interpreted this as

“milking” the diaspora for assistance without being willing to take its advice (Libaridian, 1999, p.103). Diaspora was not satisfied with the peace talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. After Petrosyan's dismissal, he was replaced by a more radical candidate, Robert Kocharyan. Zurich protocols, which was supposed to resume relations between Turkey and Armenia had also angered many people in the diaspora. Such situations show that the Armenian community and politicians are still not the only policy makers in their countries. Whether this status quo will change during Pashinyan administration is yet uncertain.

Secondly, it created political pressure abroad against the newly established Republic of Azerbaijan. The most well-known example of this was the 907th article, which completely banned U.S. aid to Azerbaijan as a result of the lobbying of the Armenian diaspora (Gregg, 2002, p.22). Armenia, however, has received the highest amount of aid from United States, among all the former Soviet countries.

Thirdly, diaspora has provided financial support and investment for Republic of Armenia (Atabekyan, 2017).

**Georgia.** Georgia has the strongest relations with the US and the EU in the region and fought against Russia in 2008. Therefore, although the West has gained a special place in the foreign policy of Georgia after the revolution in 2003, this tendency has already been visible during Shevardnadze’s presidency. Increased Russian attention in Caucasus and its support for separatists forced Shevardnadze to establish close relations with the United States. During his tenure, Georgia received significant foreign aid and military training support from the United States (The Telegraph, 2014). These relations have increased rapidly when Saakashvili became the president. Georgia has sent troops to Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. It has been interested in joining NATO and the European Union (Champion, 2008). In the post-Saakashvili period, the country's course did not change either. In 2014, the Association Agreement was signed between the European Union and Georgia. Georgia's new president, Salome Zourabichvili, sees Brexit as an opportunity for Georgia to join the European Union (Bedwell and Halpin, 2019).

Although there was an expectation that Georgia's relations with Russia would improve after Saakashvili leaves his post, there was no notable development about it.

Even though close relations with the West continued, there was an effort to improve relations with Russia, especially after the Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia came to power. The billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili is the one who founded the Georgian Dream and still supports it financially. However, this effort aroused different repercussions in Georgian society. According to the survey conducted in 2018, 85% of the Georgian population still considers Russia as a threat to their country (Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2018). On June 20, 2019, after Russian deputy sat in a chair which belonged to the Head of Parliament, demonstrations have been held in Tbilisi that continued for days and injured dozens of people.

It has been seen that the internal policy order in countries of South Caucasus is quite different from each other. But what about the international bargains, which constitutes another important part of the liberal intergovernmentalism?

There is no direct relation between Azerbaijan and Armenia due to the war. The negotiations on Karabakh conflict is held through the Minsk group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The co-chairmen of the group are composed of the representatives of USA, France and Russia. Although there were some promising statements, no concrete progress has been achieved so far. This shows that OSCE is not very functional as a bargaining platform.

The relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia have been developing since their independence. Although there were occasional short-term disagreements between countries, this was usually resolved by gestures of mutual goodwill. In particular, the most well-known debate recently is about the monastery complex named David Gareji or Keşikçidağ (Petriashvili and Ismayilov, 2006), which is located in both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Georgia proposes land exchange in order to obtain rest of the complex, however Azerbaijan refuses. The problem has continued since 1991. On May 29, 2019, Georgians held a demonstration against Azerbaijan. Politicians state that the

problem will be solved by diplomatic efforts. Azerbaijan and Georgia are both members of GUAM.

Relations between Georgia and Armenia have been developing since the 1990s. Although Armenia's closest ally is Russia and it has a Russian military base in its country, this did not cause any serious problems between two countries. However, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and South Ossetia and Abkhazia caused concerns in Georgia. Another controversial decision was made by Armenian Apostolic Church when it decided to leave Armenian churches in Abkhazia under the jurisdiction of South Russian Eparchy instead of the Church's Eparchy of Georgia.

Samtskhe-Javakheti in Georgia, where majority of population composed of Armenians, has been cause of ethnic tensions between two countries. The nationalist Javakhk organization advocates the unification of the region to Armenia, and established a government independent of Tbilisi for a short time in 1991. The organization came to the brink of conflict with Georgian soldiers in 1998 (Cornell, 2002, p.167). The leader of the organization, Vahagn Chakhalyan, was arrested in 2008 and sentenced to 10 years. Chakhalyan was pardoned in 2013.

### **3.3.2. The Possibilities of Integration in South Caucasus in the Light of Liberal Intergovernmentalism**

In South Caucasus, national interests are perceived differently by each country, and this is only natural. However, the factors that shape national interests in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia are different and this makes it difficult to evaluate the region in terms of Liberal Intergovernmentalism.

The absence of liberal democracy in Azerbaijan limits people's ability to participate in policy making process. Furthermore, since the existence of civilian pressure groups is not allowed, there is no legitimate way for social negotiation in the process of the formation of national interests. This led to the perception of national interest, which



was discussed and shaped in the short-lived democratic environment in the early 1990s, to remain unchanged until today. This means that even the formation of national interest, the first stage of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, is problematic in this country.

The presence of democratic institutions in Georgia ensures that the policy-making process meets at least the minimum requirements of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In other words, there is an exchange of information between the government and society during the formation of national interests in Georgia. The demonstrations that began on June 20, show that at least a certain part of the society is not satisfied with the foreign policy that government is trying to impose. However, as long as the electoral institution and other democratic structures remain solid, such protests will enable governments to correct themselves and work better with society.

In Armenia, there was an opportunity for the establishment of democratic institutions and traditions in 2018 after the velvet revolution. But how this opportunity will be used depends on the new government. The record of the new political elite so far suggests that Armenia has not yet acted solely and directly on the wishes of Armenian citizens in the process of policy-making. The political-military circles of Nagorno-Karabakh origin, Armenian diaspora and the Russian influence are the elements which prevent this. What all three of these have in common is that they are originated from outside of Armenia. It would be pretentious to claim that current perception of national interest in Armenia will definitely change if the outside forces are eliminated. However, even in order to start evaluating, the impact of these elements must be restricted.

Today, there is no tripartite organization that unites Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia around the same table. Although the most important obstacle to this is the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the fact that the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies are still under heavy pressure of governments and external factors also deepens the problem. Only if these problems are resolved, the initial conditions for the implementation of Liberal Intergovernmentalism will be provided.

### **3.4. CONSOCIATIONALIST INTERPRETATION OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION**

South Caucasus region seems to be a good candidate for the Consociationalist solution, especially because of the longstanding conflicts between different ethnicities. However, we have to take into account the unique characteristics of the region when adapting this system, which has been successfully implemented in some parts of the world, to the South Caucasus.

#### **3.4.1. Implementation of Consociationalist Assertions**

The implementation of this system among South Caucasus states is unlikely for two reasons. Consociationalism is not an integration theory. Therefore, it does not explain a process between actual states, it can redistribute the political power of communities within the state. Secondly, Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians have completed the formation of their national identity a century ago and have already own nation-states with certain borders. It would be unrealistic to expect any sudden changes regarding this status-quo.

However, consociationalism can be applied to frozen conflicts within the boundaries of these states, although not between the states. This means that consociationalism cannot be applied to relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but it can be applied to Armenians and Azerbaijanis within Azerbaijan. But the question is: are Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia suitable candidates for consociationalist system? In order to answer this question, the favorable conditions proposed by Lijphart should be evaluated in terms of the South Caucasus region.

**Population.** According to data from 2015, the population of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is about 145.000 and there is no Azerbaijani left (Artsakh Republic National Statistical Service, 2019). Whereas 40,688 Azerbaijani and 145,450 Armenian lived in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in 1989 (Stanton, 2016, p.236). The Azerbaijani population living in the provinces around Nagorno-Karabakh,

which is under occupation now, was recorded as 363,588 in 1979. Today, the total number of people who has been expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding regions have reached to 603,251. Based on these figures, it's assumed that the population of both sides does not exceed a few hundred thousand people.

Georgians accounted for 25-30% of the population in South Ossetia before the war. According to the census conducted by the South Ossetian administration in 2015, the population of the region is about 53,532 and only 4,000 of them are Georgians (Svanidze, 2016).

While Azerbaijani population have increased in South Caucasus since the 1990s, the population of Armenia and Georgia have decreased. Population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia decreased as well, however the proportion of ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetians among local people has been increased. Despite the changes, there is no significant difference between the numbers of the peoples of Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

**Socioeconomic Proximity.** Socioeconomically, the region has been under Soviet influence for a long time, and there are similarities between the peoples in this respect. At the beginning of the 20th century, the communist regime aimed to create a New Soviet Man in all Soviet countries, independent of its cultural, economic and social background (Устрялов, 1934). This person was aimed to be healthy, disciplined and intellectual, who does not surrender to his primitive impulses and enthusiastically spread the revolution. This new man was intended to be free from any nationalist sentiment. In 1935, Alexey Stekhanov was presented as a prototype of this new man, who extracted mines 14 times more than daily quota. The Stekhanovite movement have emerged and the other workers were encouraged to follow him. Religion, which makes an important part of the national identity, has also been banned or ignored at the best. Although atheism was propagated aggressively until the 1940s, it lost its intensity later (Pospelovsky, 1987, p.65).

As a result of the Soviet policies, socioeconomic variables became similar in the South Caucasus. Therefore Lijphart's condition regarding "socioeconomic proximity" is met, more or less.

**Isolation between Communities.** The population living in Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were relatively heterogeneous during the Soviet period. However, the size of ethnic communities were not equal. While Armenians composed %76.9 of population in Khankendi, in Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijanis constituted more than 90% of population in Shusha (Turner, 2016, p.202). While almost 2/3 of population in South Ossetia were of Ossetian origin, the rest were mainly Georgians (International Crisis Group, 2010). While the Georgians were the majority in the eastern regions of South Ossetia, including Akhalkori and its environs, the number of Ossetians were higher in the central and western regions. This led to the violence and looting of minority groups when the war has begun.

Since the nationalism was banned during the Soviet period, there was no intentional policy towards isolation. However, due to cultural differences between ethnic groups, marriages were still happening largely within the group. The sense of national belonging in Nagorno-Karabakh has never been diminished, especially since Azerbaijanis and Armenians had their own national states.

**Harmony between Elites.** Compatibility among political elites is not easy because of the ideological, cultural and external factors mentioned earlier in the thesis. However, even if it was only episodic, there were times when the political elite have met on common ground. The negotiations between Heydar Aliyev and Levon Ter Petrosyan at the end of the 1990s was an example of it. However, as seen in this example, it is difficult to maintain such initiatives unless other variables are corrected. In Armenian case, these variables are the oligarchy of Karabakh origin, Armenian diaspora and Russia. However in Azerbaijan the most threatening factor is the political system which is becoming more authoritarian, sinks into nepotism and suppresses civil society. In Georgian case, Russia is the key obstacle which supports and controls the separatist regions.

**Common External Threat.** As long as Russia supports the separatists in the conflict zones, the perception of common external threat is unlikely. Treaty has been signed between Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, and Russia guaranteed military support in case of war (The New York Times, 2008). According to the treaty, 3700 Russian soldiers were deployed in South Ossetia. There are 4,000 Russian soldiers in Abkhazia as well (Astamur, 2016). Georgia however, has close ties with United States, and Russia is still seen as the biggest external threat. Georgia has sought to become a NATO member but has not succeeded due to Russian objections (Tsygankov, 2013, pp.179-188).

The relations between Russia and Armenia is quite advanced. There is Russian 102nd Military Base military base with 3000 military personnel in Armenia. Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization headed by Russia. Commander-in-Chief of the 102nd base Andrei Ruzinsky stated that “Russia could intervene in accordance with the Collective Security Treaty if Azerbaijan tries to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh by force (RFE/RL, 2013). While Azerbaijan and Turkey are considered as main foreign threat by Armenians, Russia remains as the most important ally. (Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2018).

The Azerbaijani government follows balanced path in its relations with Russia. There is neither a pledge of alliance like Armenia nor an open hostility, as in the case of Georgia. Russia is still seen as an external threat due to the role of the Russian 366.Motorized Regiment in the Khojaly Massacre and atrocities that have been carried out by Soviet army in Baku on January 20, 1990. In 2008, Russia transferred 800 million dollars’ worth of arms to Armenia, and the Russian ambassador was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, regarding this issue (The Guardian, 2010).

In Azerbaijan, Armenia is considered as an enemy, while Russia and Iran are perceived as countries supporting the enemy. Only Turkey is considered as an ally, while United States is generally perceived as a country which supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (Brown, 2002, 66-74).

According to the survey conducted in 2016, 21% of Azerbaijanis and 37% of Georgians find NATO useful for the defense of their country, while only 8% of Armenians share this thought (Smith, 2017).

**Overarching Loyalties.** Ethnic massacres and oppressions carried out in 1990s have caused people to look at each other with suspicion. However, this is not immutable. Azerbaijani officials often state that the highest autonomy can be granted to Nagorno-Karabakh, within the framework of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. As president Ilham Aliyev states (Azadliq, 2011):

There are positive examples of autonomy in Europe. I think this is an attractive plan, because it would be difficult for us to invent a new form. For example, South Tyrol or other places in Italy. Here, central governments pay more attention to regional autonomy and the higher living standards of the people there provide much more financial support. We can do the same. Azerbaijan is a country with extensive economic resources and it is not a big problem for us to implement serious social and economic development programs in Nagorno-Karabakh.

In 2004, Georgia implemented humanitarian aid and cultural programs as a sign of goodwill to South Ossetia. Authorities considered these programs as the first steps in re-integration of the region into Georgia. However, these attempts have been prevented by South Ossetian security forces. Some considered Saakashvili's attempts to be a hasty show and reported that no results could be achieved in such a short time (Freese, 2004).

### **3.4.2. The Possibilities of Integration in South Caucasus in the Light of Consociationalism**

In general terms, the disputed areas in South Caucasus look suitable for Consociationalist system in terms of low population, socioeconomic proximity and isolation between communities. However it does not look qualified in terms of elite compatibility, external threats and overarching loyalties.

The lack of trust between people is not something that can be abolished in a short time. But beyond that, the initiatives of two sides are not enough to establish mutual trust. The presence of a third mediator may help, however, even though it is willing to have

such role, Russia is not seen as a safe intermediary, particularly in Azerbaijan and Georgia, which have lost their territory by the groups supported by Russia.

Two kind of practices may help to reduce the suspicions in the region to a certain extent. The first one is the establishment of democratic, liberal values and institutions that will maintain the rule of law in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. Countries based on values and laws create a much more reassuring image than the authoritarian regimes.

The second step would be the development of the relations between South Caucasus and the West. The West can succeed as a mediator better than Russia did. The intention here should not be to form a delegation like the Minsk group, but to take institutional steps such as membership to the European Union. Such steps would help to build trust again, considering separatists have trouble to rely on their former homelands.

## CONCLUSION

South Caucasus still has frozen conflicts today due to disagreements dating hundred years back. Global political conditions and ethnic tensions demand for non-military solutions. Long and lasting peace is only possible with the agreement of all the parties. These parties should include civil society and people, not just bureaucrats, as it did in Soviet period. Since the European Union stands as the most successful example of such compromise, theories of European integration and theories of international relations in general have been examined in this thesis and the prospects of a possible integration in South Caucasus have been discussed.

For this purpose, the theories of Functionalism, Neofunctionalism, Classical and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Social Constructivism and Consociationalism were examined and the application possibilities in the region were evaluated. Two problems have mainly been taken into consideration during this process. The first was to determine whether the peoples of South Caucasus shared basic common values regarding history, culture and identity in order to initiate a process of EU-like integration. The existence of these values is vital to any integration initiative. The second problem was to discuss concrete steps that should be taken to achieve such goal and to reveal the specific problems which countries of South Caucasus constantly face.

Two sources have been used in order to solve the first problem. First of all, the history of the region and the integration attempts in the past were examined in order to determine the compatibility of the peoples of the South Caucasus in terms of integration. Secondly, Social Constructivism was examined in the context of South Caucasus region for the same purpose.

Today, unresolved conflicts appear to be the biggest obstacle to possible integration of the region. The history however, clearly indicates that those conflicts have started in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, mainly with nationalist quarrels. In other words, the conflicts between these peoples, who lived together peacefully for centuries is relatively new and therefore not irreparable.



Social Constructivism was another tool used in assessing the suitability of the peoples of the region for integration. From the systemic constructivist point of view, the region is still perceived by the world as a whole. The unit-level interpretation of the region however, seems to require a more complex approach. By definition, this approach includes historical and cultural elements. Therefore previous integration projects in the region provide valuable data in this respect.

The USSR, which existed between 1922 and 1991, did not allow any independent integration mechanism to operate in South Caucasus especially due to the intense influence of Moscow. However, since they have been members of a totalitarian alliance for almost 70 years, the peoples of the South Caucasus have become much more similar to each other than they were 100 years ago in terms of lifestyle, economy and culture. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the USSR has managed to instill a certain culture of living together although it did not allow any member to develop independent and democratic reflexes. The best example of it is the present Georgia, where hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Georgians continue to live under the same government. A similar situation existed in Azerbaijan and Armenia before the Karabakh War. If territorial conflicts are resolved, the peoples of the region have strong potentials and opportunities for cooperation.

On the other hand, Transcaucasian Federation, which lasted only one month in 1918, was a project that the peoples of the South Caucasus engaged in directly at their own will. It enables us to examine the motivation and conditions necessary for possible integration process. Three important factors were found to play a role in the establishment of the Transcaucasian Federation: common external threats, common Caucasian identity to some extent, and the presence of a political elite that consciously desired an alliance. Today, the first of these factors is still present, while others seems disappeared. Although it is impossible for the Caucasian identity to become strong enough to suppress the national identities, it is also not realistic to expect it to be completely dissolved in a such short period of time. Likewise, considering the fact that the ultimate goal of an integration today will not be a federation, the suppression of national identities is not a prerequisite for any integration attempt.

As a result, the history reveals that the conflicts in the South Caucasus are relatively new. The region is still perceived as a whole by the world and it contains certain common cultural elements. However national identities have become much stronger and decisive than they were 100 years ago. While it is clear that the countries of the South Caucasus are far from being ideal candidates for integration, they do have the potential to maintain an integration project in the region in the presence of determined political will and democratically elected governments.

The second problem that the thesis aimed to solve was to determine specific problems and the paths to be followed in possible integration process in South Caucasus. Functionalism, Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Consociationalism were examined in this regard and their viabilities in the region were assessed. It was found that these theories actually are quite complementary regarding South Caucasus case and often present overlapping solutions. Given that these approaches are set at different theoretical ends, some might find such claim rather odd. But in practice, Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Consociationalism all require certain democratic and pluralist bases in order to function. This necessity inevitably forces these theories to deal with similar problems.

Functionalism offers a certain perspective regarding integration rather than providing practical and concrete solutions. Functionalist theory provides useful ground for compromise in South Caucasus by redefining the concept of sovereignty. Considering that the region has witnessed border disputes for decades, taking territorial and political framework out of issue would present a new perspective. In this respect, it might be possible to develop a specific integration project based on functionalist claims and therefore provide concrete suggestions. But such an effort will go beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis.

As for neofunctionalism, when compared with the six countries that made up the core of the European Community, it becomes clear how insufficient the South Caucasus countries are to meet the background conditions. But such a comparison would not be fair. The peoples of the South Caucasus have been acquainted with the liberal economic system for only a few decades and have no democratic experience at all other than short

period of time between 1918 and 1920. Therefore, the region should be evaluated according to its own conditions.

Neofunctionalism is a very rich area in terms of theoretical studies. In South Caucasus context however, two important tools stand out particularly. The first tool is the Background Conditions which lists the prerequisites for a successful integration process. The second tool includes the key concepts that can trigger integration after those conditions are met. Some of these concepts are known as positive spillover, technocratic automaticity and transfer of domestic alliance.

Although all the other relevant tools have been mentioned, the thesis focused specifically on Background Conditions. This is because the political and socio-economic structures of the South Caucasus countries necessitate such an approach. It is not possible to apply and understand other concepts without reviewing Background Conditions. Economic and industrial development, ideology, social pluralism, size of unit, rate of transactions and elite complementarity were examined and evaluated in South Caucasus context.

When the region is evaluated in terms of economic and industrial development and rate of transactions, it is seen that the Azerbaijani economy is largely based on oil and natural gas exports. This is the main factor determining the economic development not only of Azerbaijan but also of Georgia and Armenia. While Georgia has increased its economic and strategic importance by joining the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Armenia faced serious economic challenges because it was left out. Energy projects not only determine the economic and industrial development of South Caucasus, but can also turn into a key element in a possible integration process.

Rapid changes in terms of ideology and elite complementarity were observed in the region. In the early 1990s, the nationalist forces have seized the power in the region. Soon after the ethnic tensions have increased in the region and tens of thousands of people were killed or became refugees. However, more moderate but authoritarian people came to power in Azerbaijan and Georgia in the following period while hardline

nationalists in Armenia were able to remove all of their rivals and monopolize political scene.

Although it seems like different ideological groups dominate in South Caucasus countries, the situation is getting changed lately. Democracy was established in Georgia in 2003 after the Rose Revolution and liberal reforms were implemented. A similar initiative took place in Armenia in 2018 and former radical nationalist circles have finally began to lose power.

Democratic order and social pluralism has not yet reached Western levels in South Caucasus countries. However, there are clear signs of change in this direction in the region. Although there are problems regarding several issues in South Caucasus as mentioned above, these issues are not insoluble, as it was seen in Georgian case. Neofunctionalism may find itself a space to function in the region if these conditions are met even to a minimum. This can be achieved either under European Union umbrella or just among South Caucasus states, if, of course the external impacts are removed. Especially the energy projects may form the core of such integration.

As for the territorial conflicts, Consociationalism may present an alternative way to solve it. The realization of the cultural and administrative autonomy of local people in conflict zones can be the key to long-term peace.

At first glance, Consociationalism stands out as an administrative solution to conflicts rather than as an instrument of integration among the peoples of South Caucasus. However, the resolution of these conflicts can eliminate the biggest obstacle to integration, and the solution itself may become part of the integration or even the initiator of the process.

In this respect, there are a number of conditions that are recommended by Consociationalists called Favorable Conditions. The chronic problems of the region, which were frequently mentioned when describing other theories, emerge here as well. The lack of pluralist democracy and the lack of harmony among political elites are the main problems. Solving these problems will create significant impulse towards integration and resolution of conflicts.

However, promises and even a strong desire are not enough to achieve this. The effects of internal and external factors, which were frequently mentioned in the thesis, should be broken. Liberal Intergovernmentalism in particular allows us to make clear and concrete determinations in this area. The systematic approach of Liberal Intergovernmentalism regarding formation of interests provides fairly objective way to assess policy making process in South Caucasus countries. In this respect, number of internal and external factors have been detected which are currently effective in the policy formation process in the region. Some of them are organic demands coming from the people, while others are imposed by internal and external repressive forces. The crucial point here is not what national interests are, but that the process of formation of interests is distorted and does not reflect solely the will of the people.

The elimination of Russian influence and the military circles of Karabakh origin in Armenia, the change of authoritarian rule in Azerbaijan, and protection and development of the liberal democratic institutions in Georgia would play vital role in such process and would also create solid ground to observe liberal intergovernmentalist dynamics. Elimination of these impacts will lead to a healthier functioning of the social contract within the country as well as more effective international negotiations between the countries of the region.

From this point of view, it has been clear that Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in particular, can serve not only as a theoretical guide for possible integration initiatives but also as a highly objective tool at detecting essential problems. Identifying and solving country-specific chronic problems is critical to the success of any integration process. In this respect, liberal intergovernmentalism makes more concrete and sophisticated contributions than any other theory.

To sum up, the prospect of integration in South Caucasus is not finished yet. The history and the social constructivist evaluation of the region shows that the peoples of the South Caucasus do share basic common values. On the other hand, in order to take concrete steps towards integration, the countries of the region have to overcome some substantial problems. Some of these problems have universal characteristics, while some of them are caused by conditions specific to the region. These problems are what people of

South Caucasus are responsible for and also have capabilities to solve. What they are not capable of accomplishing all by themselves is defying Russian impact. Russia and Russian-dependent Armenia poses a serious obstacle to such process. Since they have small population and limited military power, integration of South Caucasus countries depends on the presence and support of the third powerful mediator forces in the future. Even though EU or USA might provide such service, it is yet uncertain whether they have such will and intention or not.



# Bibliography

Allison, R. (2008). Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to 'coerce Georgia to peace'. *International Affairs*. 84.6, 1145-1171.

Alstadt, A. (1992). *The Azerbaijani Turks*. California: Hoover Institution Press.

Amurian, A. ve M. Kasheff. (2011). Armenians of modern Iran. *Encyclopædia Iranica*.  
<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/armenians-of-modern-iran> (15 August 2017)

Andersen, A. ve G. Partskhaladze (2015). Armeno-Georgian War of 1918 and Armeno-Georgian Territorial Issue in the 20th Century. *Academia.edu*.  
[http://www.academia.edu/10176756/Armeno-Georgian\\_War\\_of\\_1918\\_and\\_Armeno-Georgian\\_Territorial\\_Issue\\_in\\_the\\_20th\\_Century](http://www.academia.edu/10176756/Armeno-Georgian_War_of_1918_and_Armeno-Georgian_Territorial_Issue_in_the_20th_Century) (17 June 2019)

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Armenian Academy of Sciences (Armenian S.S.R.). (1967). *Armenian-Russian Relations during the First Third of the Eighteenth Century*. Vol:2. Yerevan.

Artsakh Republic National Statistical Service. (2015). *The Results of 2015 Population Census of The Republic of NKR*. <http://stat-nkr.am/en/-2015/-2015> (9 May 2019)

ARKA. (13 February 2015). Ashotyan: speech of Armenian president came as response to blackmail, ignorance and stupidity.  
[http://arka.am/en/news/politics/ashotyan\\_speech\\_of\\_armenian\\_president\\_came\\_as\\_response\\_to\\_blackmail\\_ignorance\\_and\\_stupidity/](http://arka.am/en/news/politics/ashotyan_speech_of_armenian_president_came_as_response_to_blackmail_ignorance_and_stupidity/) (7 January 2019)

Aslanlı, A. (4 April 2012). Azərbaycan-İran Münasibətləri və Cənubi Azərbaycan Məsələsi. *GünAz Tv*. <https://www.gunaz.tv/az/meqaleler/azerbaycan-iran-munasibetleri-ve-cenubi-azerbaycan-meselesi-m10193> (4 May 2019)

Astamur, A. (1 September 2016). Abkhazia – Russia’s tight embrace. *European Council on Foreign Relations*.

[https://www.ecfr.eu/article/essay\\_abkhazia\\_russias\\_tight\\_embrace](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/essay_abkhazia_russias_tight_embrace) (16 April 2019)

Atabekyan, H. (23 March 2017). The Armenian Diaspora: Exploring its Legacy for the Future. *EVN Report*. <https://www.evnreport.com/economy/the-armenian-diaspora> (14 June 2019)

Atanesian, G. (23 May 2018). Young activists and regime veterans: Armenia’s new compromise government. *Eurasianet*. <https://eurasianet.org/young-activists-and-regime-veterans-armenias-new-compromise-government> (5 January 2019)

Avagyan, A and G.F. Minassian. (2005). *Ermeniler ve İttihat ve Terakki: İşbiriliğinden Çatışmaya*. İstanbul: Aras.

AYF. (n.d.) History of the AYF. <https://ayf.org/history/> (20 June 2019)

Azadliq. (24 June 2011). President Ilham Aliyev: Azerbaijan is ready to grant highest possible autonomy to people who live in Nagorno-Karabakh and who will return to Nagorno-Karabakh. <https://www.azadliq.az/xeber/370550/news/> (9 October 2018)

AZERTAC. (15 March 2017). Bakıda “İslam həmrəyliyi - zamanın çağırışı” mövzusunda keçirilən beynəlxalq konfransda mühüm məsələlər müzakirə olunub.

[http://azertag.az/xeber/Bakida\\_Islam\\_hemreylilyi\\_\\_\\_zamanin\\_chagirisi\\_movzusunda\\_kechirilen\\_beynelxalq\\_konfransda\\_muham\\_meseleler\\_muzakire\\_olunub\\_YENILANIB\\_VIDEO-1043444](http://azertag.az/xeber/Bakida_Islam_hemreylilyi___zamanin_chagirisi_movzusunda_kechirilen_beynelxalq_konfransda_muham_meseleler_muzakire_olunub_YENILANIB_VIDEO-1043444) (12 April 2019)

Bache, I. and S. George (2006). *Politics in the European Union, 2nd ed*. United States: Oxford University Press.

Vaikov, V. (1923). Воспоминания о революции в Закавказии. In (Ed) И.В.Гессен. *Архив русской революции*. Berlin: Слово, 1923, 91-194



BBC. (7 August 2009) Georgia marks anniversary of war.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8188904.stm> (20 May 2019)

BBC. (27 June 2014). EU signs pacts with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28052645> (15 April 2018)

BBC. (7 April 2016). Bakıda gənclər "Qarabağ bizimdir" şüarı ilə aksiya keçirib.

[https://www.bbc.com/azeri/multimedia/2016/04/160407\\_baku\\_karabakh\\_demo](https://www.bbc.com/azeri/multimedia/2016/04/160407_baku_karabakh_demo) (8 February 2019)

Balayan, A. (25 April 2019). Pashinyan: Russia is our strategic ally indeed. *Arminfo*:

[https://arminfo.info/full\\_news.php?id=41630&lang=3](https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=41630&lang=3) (16 January 2019)

Beckford, W. (2013). *Vathek*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bedwell, H. and A. Halpin (5 April 2019). Brexit Is Georgia's Chance to Push for EU Membership, President Says. *Bloomberg*.

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-05/brexit-is-georgia-s-chance-to-open-eu-entry-door-president-says> (22 May 2019)

*Bertelsmann Stiftung*. (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report — Azerbaijan. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

*Bertelsmann Stiftung*. (2018). BTI 2018 Country Report — Georgia. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Bligh, A. (2003). *The Israeli Palestinians*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Brown, C. (2005). *Understanding International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brown, C. S. (2002). Observations from Azerbaijan. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*. 6.4, 66-74.

Britannica. (n.d.). Caucasian peoples. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Caucasian-peoples> (22 May 2018)

Britannica. (n.d.). Pluralism. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/pluralism-politics> (18 February 2019)

*Center for Insights in Survey Research.* (2018). Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia. Washington D.C.

*Center for Insights in Survey Research.*( 2018). Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia. Washington D.C.

Champion, M. (30 August 2008). U.S. Ally Proves Volatile Amid Dispute With Russia. *The Wall Street Journal.* <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122006041734285393> (21 February 2019)

Champion, M. and A. Osborn (16 August 2008). Smoldering Feud, Then War. *The Wall Street Journal* <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121884450978145997> (16 January 2019)

Cheterian, V. (2018). The Uses and Abuses of History: Genocide and the Making of the Karabakh Conflict. *Europe-Asia Studies.* 70.6, 884-903.

Checkel, J. (1998). The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. *World Politics*, 50.2, 324-348.

Civil.ge. (2016). Georgia's 2015 Foreign Trade. <https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28924> (2 October 2019)

Cornell, S. (2002). *Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Case in Georgia.* Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

- Cornell, S. (2006). The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan. *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program*. Uppsala and Washington D.C.  
[https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2006\\_10\\_SRP\\_Cornell\\_Islam-Azerbaijan.pdf](https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2006_10_SRP_Cornell_Islam-Azerbaijan.pdf) 15 August 2018
- Cornell, S.E. and F. Ismailzade (2005). The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Azerbaijan. *The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program*. Stockholm.  
<http://www.silkroadstudies.org/component/jifile/download/MTc3NTAwNDI4NGJjMzMxODZiMmM1MmQxOGJiMGRINjU=/btc-4-pdf.html> (4 July 2018)
- Council of Europe. (2001). *Azerbaijan // 47 States, one Europe*.  
<https://www.coe.int/web/portal/azerbaijan> (7 May 2019)
- Çakır, A. E. (2001). *Avrupa Bütünleşmesinin Siyasal Kuramları*. İstanbul: BETA.
- De Waal, T. (22 May 2018). Armenia's Revolution and the Karabakh Conflict. *Carnegie Europe*: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/76414> (22 January 2019)
- De Waal, T. (26 September 2012). Georgia Holds Its Breath. *Foreign Policy*.  
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/26/georgia-holds-its-breath/> (19 January 2019)
- De Waal, T. (28 January 2015). Armenia: Aftermath of a Massacre. *Carnegie Moscow Center*: <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/58848> (19 January 2019)
- De Waal, T. (2003). *Black Garden*. New York and London: New York University Press.
- Depoian, B. (1964). *Mihran Damadian, 1863-1945*. Beirut: Zartonk Press.
- Fierke, K., & A. Wiener. (1999). Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 6.5, 721-742.
- Forsyth, M. (1996). *The Political Theory of Federalism: The Relevance of Classical Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freedom House. (2019). Freedom in the World 2019. Washington D.C.

Freedom House. (2015). Azerbaijan. Washington D.C.

Freese, T. (16 June, 2004). Will Ossetians embrace Georgia's initiatives? *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*. <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/field-reports/item/9092-field-reports-caci-analyst-2004-6-16-art-9092.html> (14 February 2019)

Garrett, G. (1992). International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: the European Communities Internal Market. *International Organization*. 46.2, 533-560

Garry, J. (2009). Consociationalism and its critics: Evidence from the historic Northern Ireland Assembly election 2007. *Electoral Studies*. 28.3, pp. 458-466

Gasparyan, N. (5 December 2018). Armenia-Georgia: Political Will and Deepening Economic Relations. *EVN Report*. <https://www.evnreport.com/politics/armenia-georgia-political-will-and-deepening-economic-relations> (19 January 2019)

Geybullayeva, A. (2007). Is Azerbaijan becoming hub of radical Islam? *European Stability Initiative*. [http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi\\_turkey\\_tpq\\_id\\_110.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_110.pdf) (15 August 2017)

Golden, P. B. (1992). *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.

Gregg, H. (2002). Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States. *Rosemarie Rogers Working Papers #13*. Cambridge: Center for International Studies (CIS)

Griffiths, M. (1992). *Realism, Idealism and International Politics - a Reinterpretation*. London: Routledge.

Grigoryan, A. (16 January 2015). Murder of Armenian Family by Russian Soldier Severely Strains Moscow-Yerevan Relations. *The Jamestown Foundation*.

[https://jamestown.org/program/murder-of-armenian-family-by-russian-soldier-severely-strains-moscow-yerevan-relations/#.VLp\\_b9LF-WE](https://jamestown.org/program/murder-of-armenian-family-by-russian-soldier-severely-strains-moscow-yerevan-relations/#.VLp_b9LF-WE) (14 December 2018)

Gut, A. (23 February 2018). Act of genocide in Khojaly - When will the moment of justice come? *The Jerusalem Post*. <https://www.jpost.com/Blogs/News-from-Arye-Gut/Act-of-genocide-in-Khojaly-When-will-the-moment-of-justice-come-543326> (7 May 2019)

Gvozdetsky, N.A., G. M. Howe and S. I. Bruk. (15 April 2011). Transcaucasia. *Encyclopædia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Transcaucasia> (24 April 2019)

Haas, E. B. (1968). *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Haas, E. B. (1970). The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing. *International Organization*. 24.4, 607-646.

Haas, E.B (1961). International integration: the European union and the universal process. *International Organization*. 15.3, 366-392.

Haas, E.B (1975). *The obsolescence of regional integration theory*. San-Fransisco: Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Haas, E.B and P.C. Schmitter. (1964). Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America. *International Organization*. 18.4, 259-299.

Haas, E.B. (1964). *Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Haas, E.B. (1976). Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration. *International Organization*. 30.2, 173-212

Hasanli, J. (2009). *Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Xarici Siyasəti (1918-1920)*. Baku: GARISMA MMC.

Held, D. (1987). *Models of democracy*. California: Stanford University Press.

Herron, E. (2009). *Elections and Democracy after Communism?* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hetq Online. (15 May 2003). Our ideology is based on the Tseghakron doctrine of Njdeh. <https://hetq.am/en/article/6953> (4 May 2019)

Hewitt, B. G. (1993). Abkhazia: a problem of identity and ownership. *Central Asian Survey*. 12.3, 267-323.

Hewsen, R. H. (1982). Ethno-History and the Armenian Influence upon the Caucasian Albanians. In T. J. Samuelian (Ed). *Classical Armenian Culture: Influences and Creativity* (pp. 27-40). Chicago: Scholars Press.

Hewsen, R. H. (2001). *Armenia: a Historical Atlas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hix, S. (1994). The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics. *West European Politics*. 17.1, 1-30

Hoffman, S. (1964). The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 3.2, 85-101

Hoffman, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe. *Daedalus*, 95.3, 862-915

Hoffman, S. (1995). *The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994*. Boulder: Westview.

Hooghe, L. and G. Marks. (2007). A Postfunctional Theory of European: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*. 39.1, 1-23.

Hopkirk, P. (1994). *Like hidden fire. The Plot to bring down the British Empire*. New York: Kodansha Globe.

Horowitz, D. (2002). Africa: The limits of power-sharing. *Journal of Democracy*. 13.3, 123-136.

Human Rights House Foundation. (2008). OSCE: No Pluralism in Azerbaijan. <http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/5061.html> (16 December 2018)

*Human Rights Watch*. (1994). Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. New York.

Hurrell, A. and A. Menon. (1996). Politics Like Any Other? Comparative Politics, International Relations and the Study of the EU. *West European Politics*. 19.2, 386-402

*International Crisis Group*. (2004). Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia. Brussels. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/georgia-avoiding-war-south-ossetia> (9 June 2019)

*International Crisis Group*. (2006). Georgia's Armenian and Azeri Minorities. Brussels. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/isolation-post-soviet-conflict-regions-narrows-road-peace> (11 June 2019)

*International Crisis Group*. (2010). South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition. Brussels. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/south-ossetia-burden-recognition>

Iskandaryan, A. (2012). Armenian Elections: Technology vs. Ideology. *Caucasus Analytical Digest*. 39.3, 2-4.

Jafarova, A. (1 October 2014). Azerbaijan leading country in CIS for foreign investment per capita. <https://www.azernews.az/business/71413.html> (15 May 2018)

Jensen, C. S. (2007). Neo-functionalism. In M. Cini (Ed). *European Union Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jones, S. F. (2005). *Socialism in Georgian Colors: The European Road to Social Democracy 1883–1917*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Kabacalı, A. (1994). *Talat Paşanın Anıları*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Kachayev, I. (9 August, 2008). Abkhaz separatists strike disputed Georgia gorge. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-abkhazia-kodori/abkhaz-separatists-strike-disputed-georgia-gorge-idUSL932653720080809> (21 December 2018)

Katzenstein, P. (1996). *Introduction: alternative perspectives on national security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kazemzadeh, F. (1951). *The struggle for Transcaucasia (1917—1921)*. New York: Philosophical Library.

Kerr, M. (2006). *Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.

Khutsishvili, G. (1994). Intervention in Transcaucasus. *Perspective*. 4.3, pp.2-6.

Kinzer, S. (7 may 1998). Saguramo Journal; On the Tallest Pedestal, a Man for All Georgians. *The New York Times*.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/07/world/saguramo-journal-on-the-tallest-pedestal-a-man-for-all-georgians.html> (14 May 2019)

Kirakossian, A. (2003). *British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question: From the 1830s to 1914*. London: Gomidas Inst.

Krag, H. and L. Funch (1994). The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Crossroads. *Minority Rights Group International*. Manchester. p.36.



Landau, J. M. (1995). *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lang, D. M. (1962). *A Modern History of Georgia*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Laroche, J. (2017). *The Brutalization of the World: From the Retreat of States to Decivilization*. Switzerland: Springer.

Lenin, V.U. (2 March 1918). A Letter to S. G. Shahumyan. *Bakinsky Rabochy no:48*.

Lessambo, F. (2010). *Fundamentals of European Union Direct Tax*. Pittsburgh: Rosedog Books.

Libaridian, G. (1999). *The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking Since Independence*. Watertown: Blue Crane Books.

Lieven, D., K. Bourne. and C. Watt (Ed). (1983). *Russia 1905—1906 British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part I: From the Midnineteenth Century to the First World War. Series A: Russia, 1859-1914*. Michigan: University Publications of America.

Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lindberg, L. N. (1963). *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lindberg, L. N. and S. A. Scheingold. (1970). *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*. N.J: Prentice-Hall.

Lindberg, L. N. (1994). Comment on Moravcsik. In S. Blumer and A. Scott (Eds). *Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Mainwaring, S. (2001). Two Models of Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*. 12.3, pp 170-175.

Malkasian, M. (1996). *Gha-Ra-Bagh: The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Mammadov, M. (17 October, 2016). 25 years of independence in Azerbaijan: a paradox of freedom. *Open Democracy*. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mammad-mammadov/democracy-in-azerbaijan-25-years-later> (16 August 2018)

Mammadova, L. (22 January 2019). Trade turnover between Azerbaijan, Georgia hit \$1 billion in 2018. *Azernews*. <https://www.azernews.az/business/144341.html> (7 February 2019)

Marshall, A. (2010). *The Caucasus under Soviet rule*. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd.

McGarry, J. and B. O'Leary. (1995). *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Meissner, H. (2011). Informal Politics in Azerbaijan: Corruption and Rent-Seeking Patterns. *Caucasus Analytical Digest*. 24.1, 6-9.

Mejlumyan, A. (3 December 2018). Pashinyan clashes with Nagorno-Karabakh leaders. *Eurasianet*. <https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-clashes-with-nagorno-karabakh-leaders> (4 August 2018)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2017). "New priorities ahead of our Diplomacy: From the historical heritage to the future". <http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/882/5042> (6 June 2018)

Mitrany, D. (1933). *The progress of international government*. London: G. Allen & Unwin.

Mitrany, D. (1966). *A Working Peace System*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Mitrany, D. (1975). The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional. In A.J.R Groom, and P. Taylor (Eds). *Theory and Practice in International Relations*. London: University of London Press.

Moga, T. L. (2009). The Contribution of the Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist Theories to the Evolution of the European Integration Process. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Science*. 1.3, 796-807.

Moravcsik, A. (1994). Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation. *Harvard University Center for European Studies(Paper no:52)*. New York.

Moravcsik, A. (1999). Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*.6,4, 670-677.

Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studie*. 31.4, 481.

Navari, C. (1995). *David Mitrany and International Functionalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Norris, P. (1 September 2005). Ethnic Pluralism and Consociational Democracy Revisited. *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*. Washington D.C. p. 3-4.

Onuf, N. (1989). *World of our Making*. University of South Columbia Press.

Parliamentary Assembly. (1994). *Enlargement of the Council of Europe*.

<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=15281&lang=en>  
adresinden alındı (15 August 2017)

Perkin, H. J. (1996). *The Third Revolution: Professional Elites in the Modern World*. London and New York: Routledge.

Petriashvili, D. and R. Ismayilov (3 November, 2006). Georgia, Azerbaijan debate control of ancient monastery's territory. *EurasiaNet*.

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/46a4854dc.html> (24 April 2019)

Pierson, P. (1996). The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*. 29.2, 124.

Pollack, M. A. (2001). International Relations Theory and European Integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 39.2, 221–244

Pope, H. (2006). *Sons of the conquerors: the rise of the Turkic world*. New York : The Overlook Press.

Pospelovsky, D. V. (1987). *A History of Soviet Atheism in Theory, and Practice, and the Believer Vol 1*. New York: St Martin's Press.

Qafarov, V. (2011). *Türkiyə-Rusiya münasibətlərində Azərbaycan məsələsi (1917-1922-ci illər)*. Baku: Azər nəşr.

Rahimov, R. (2019). A Year in Review: Azerbaijan Optimizes Its Balanced Foreign Policy in 2018. *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16.2. <https://jamestown.org/program/a-year-in-review-azerbaijan-optimizes-its-balanced-foreign-policy-in-2018/> (6 Temmuz 2019)

Ratgauzer, I. A. (1927). *Революция и гражданская война в Баку, 1917–1918*. Baku: Красный Восток.

Remnick, D. (6 September 1989). *Hate Runs High in Soviet Union's Most Explosive Ethnic Feud*. The Washington Post. adresinden alındı

Renninger, J. P. (1979). *Multinational Cooperation for Development in West Africa*. New York: Pergamon Policy Studies.

Resulzade, M. E. (1990). *Azərbaycan Cumhuriyeti Keyfiyyəti Təşəkkülü və Şimdiki Vəziyyəti*. İstanbul: İrfan yayınevi.

Reus-Smit, C. (2005). Constructivism. In Scot Burchill and others (Ed). *Theories of International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

RFE/RL. (2 November 2002). Press Review.

<https://www.azatutyun.am/a/1566573.html> (23 January 2018)

Azadliq. (2 February 2013). Əylisli ətrafında qalmaqal səngimir.

<https://www.azadliq.info/26774.html> (14 June 2019)

RFE/RL. (31 January 2013). Əkrəm Əylislinin qalmaqallı romanına reaksiyalar.

<https://www.azadliq.org/a/24889205.html> (4 May 2019)

RFE/RL. (15 January 2015). Protesters Try To Burn Russian Flag As Armenians Mourn Family. <https://www.rferl.org/a/protesters-russian-embassy-yerevan-guymri-killing/26795585.html> (18 August 2018)

RFE/RL. (31 October 2013). Russian Base In Armenia Signals Role In Possible Karabakh War. <https://www.azatutyun.am/a/25154047.html> (16 February 2019)

Risse, T. (2005). Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 12.2. pp.291-309

Rosamond, B. (2000). *Theories of European Integration*. New York: PALGRAVE.

Rosamond, B. (2007). New Theories of European Integration. In M. Cini (Ed). *European Union Politics* . New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp 104-122

Rost, Y. (1990). *The Armenian Tragedy: An Eye-Witness Account of Human Conflict and Natural Disaster in Armenia and Azerbaijan*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

RT. (17 June 2007). Georgia's reforms please World Bank.

<https://www.rt.com/news/georgias-reforms-please-world-bank/> (14 April 2019)

- Rutland, P. (12 August 2008). *A Green Light for Russia*. Transitions Online: <http://www.tol.org/client/article/19836-a-green-light-for-russia.html> (21 December 2018)
- Sandholtz W. and A. S. Sweet. (1998). *European integration and supranational governance*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sandholtz W. and A. S. Sweet. (2001). *The institutionalization of Europe*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Saparov, A. (2015). *From Conflict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the making of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh*. New York: Routledge.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*. 55.1, 49.
- Schmitter, P. (1969). Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration. *International Integration*. 23.1, 161-166.
- Shaumyan, S. (1924). *Articles and speeches of the Bolshevik Extraordinary Commissar for the Caucasus*. Baku: Bakinski Rabochii.
- Shaumyan, S. (1959). *Letters 1896–1918*. Yerevan: State Publishing House of Armenia.
- Shield Union*. (1990). Report of Shield. Moscow.
- Sicker, M. (2001). *The Middle East in the Twentieth Century*. London: Praeger.
- Smith, D. L. and J. L. Ray. (1993). The 1992 Project. In D.L. Smith and J. L. Ray (Eds). *The 1992 Project and the Future of Integration in Europe*. New York: M. E. Sharpe
- Smith, M. (10 February 2017). Most NATO Members in Eastern Europe See It as Protection. *Gallup*. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/203819/nato-members-eastern-europe-protection.aspx> (23 February 2019)

- Smith, M. (2001). Anatomy of Rumor: Murder Scandal, the Musavat Party and Narrative of the Russian Revolution in Baku, 1917–1920. *Journal of Contemporary History*. 36.2, 228.
- Smith, S. (1999). Social Constructivism and European Studies: A Reflectivist Critique. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 6.4, 482-491
- Southern Azerbaijan*. (2017). <https://unpo.org/content/view/7884/144/> (6 June 2019)
- Stanford University. (n.d.). 1936 Constitution of the USSR. <http://large.stanford.edu/history/kaist/references/marx/beard/c2/> (20 June 2019)
- Stanton, J.A. (2016). *Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Stringer, M. D. (2005). *A Sociological History of Christian Worship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sümer, F. (1976). *Safevi devletinin kuruluşu ve gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin rolü*. Ankara: Güven Matbaa.
- Svanidze, T. (12 August 2016). South Ossetian Authorities Release Results of 1st Census in 26 Years. *Georgia Today*. <http://georgiatoday.ge/news/4450/South-Ossetian-Authorities-Release-Results-of-1st-Census-in-26-Years-> (12 June 2019)
- Swietochowski, T. (1985). *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of a National Identity in a Muslim Community* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Swietochowski, T. (1995). *Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Swietochowski, T. and B. C. Collins. (1999). *Historical Dictionary of Azerbaijan*. USA: Scarecrow Press .

Tahirzadə, Ə. (24 June 2015). Əbülfəz Elçibəy haqqında: "Onun dövründə mətbuat olduqca sərbəst idi". *BBC*.

[https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan/2015/06/150624\\_abulfas\\_elchibey\\_int](https://www.bbc.com/azeri/azerbaijan/2015/06/150624_abulfas_elchibey_int) 25 April 2019)

Taylor, P. (1990). *Regionalism and Functionalism reconsidered, Frameworks for International Co-operation..* London: Pinter.

Taylor, P. (1994a). *Functionalism: the Approach of David Mitrany.* London: Pinter.

Taylor, P. (1994b). Consociationalism and Federalism as Approaches to International Integration. A. Groom, & P. Taylor içinde, *Frameworks for International Cooperation.* London: Pinter.

Taylor, P. and A.J.R. Groom. (1975). *Functionalism and International Relations.* London: University of London Press.

Tchalkhouchian, G. (1919). *Le livre rouge.* Paris: Veradzenout.

Tewatia, T.C. (1975). Soviet Theory of Federalism. *The Indian Journal of Political Science.* 36.2, 177-191.

*The Economist.* (2019). Democracy Index 2018: Me too? London.

The Guardian. (2010). Embassy cables: Truth about Putin and Medvedev – over a bottle of vodka. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/197735> (27 April, 2019)

The New York Times. (17 September 2008). Russia signs pacts committing itself to defense of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/world/europe/17iht-georgia.4.16247629.html> (4 April 2019)



The Telegraph. (7 July 2014). Eduard Shevardnadze - obituary.

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/10950980/Eduard-Shevardnadze-obituary.html> (2 June 2019)

The World Bank.(2019). *GDP growth*.

[https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=AZ&name\\_desc=true](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=AZ&name_desc=true) (16 May 2019)

Tilley, J., G. Evans and C. Mitchell. (2008). Consociationalism and the evolution of political cleavages in Northern Ireland, 1989-2004. *British Journal of Political Science*. 38.4. pp. 699-717.

Toumanoff, C. (1967). *Studies in Christian Caucasian History*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

Towster, J. (1952). Recent trends and strategies in Soviet Federation. *Political Quarterly*. 23.2, 163-174.

Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991). Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*. 20.1, 1-22.

Transparency International. (2012). Georgia 51st in 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. [https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20121205\\_transparency\\_international\\_georgia\\_51st\\_in\\_2012\\_corruption\\_percept](https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20121205_transparency_international_georgia_51st_in_2012_corruption_percept) (13 June 2018)

*Transparency International*. (2019). Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. Berlin.

Tsygankov, A. P. (2013). The Russia-NATO mistrust: Ethnophobia and the double expansion to contain 'the Russian Bear'. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 46.1, 179-188.

Turan, A. (26 July, 2012). Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti dövründə xaricə göndərilən tələbələr və onların taleyi barədə qeydlər. *Xalq qəzeti*, p.6.

Turner, B. (Ed.). *The Statesman's Yearbook 1998-99*. London: Springer.

U.S. Department of State. (2014). 2014 Investment Climate Statement. Washington D.C.

Van Der Leeuw, C. (2000). *Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity*. Richmond, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Moorsel, Jim. (1 March, 2017). Economic and geopolitical partnership in the Caucasus: The Azerbaijani-Georgian-Turkish approach. *Regional Dialogue*.  
<http://regional-dialogue.com/en/economic-and-geopolitical-partnership-in-the-caucasus-the-azerbaijani-georgian-turkish-approach%E1%83%90/> (26 December 2018)

Vestnik Kavkaza. (2015). Armenians demand Russian forces leave their territory.  
<http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/politics/64591.html> (17 June 2019)

*Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism*. (1988). Terrorist Group Profiles. Washington.

Walker, S. (9 August 2008). We are at war with Russia, declares Georgian leader. *The Independent*. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/we-are-at-war-with-russia-declares-georgian-leader-889266.html> (19 May 2019)

Wallace, H. P. (2005). *Policy-Making in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wendt, A. (1992). *Anarchy is What States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*. International Organization. 46.2, 391-426.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Whitmore, B. (5 March 2008). Armenia: Crisis Spotlights 'Karabakh Clan'. *Radio Free Europe*. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1079586.html> (22 February 2019)

Wincott, D. (1995). Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 33.4, 597-609.

YAP. (n.d.) . The Program of the New Azerbaijan Party.  
<http://www.yap.org.az/en/view/pages/9> (18 June 2019)

Zenkovsky, S. A. (1960). *Pan-Turkism And Islam In Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Zlatopolsky D. L. (1954). *Образование и развитие СССР как союзного государства (The Formation and Development of the USSR as a Union State)*. Moscow: Gos. izd-vo yuridicheskoi literatury.

Zürcher, C. (2007). *The post-Soviet wars: rebellion, ethnic conflict, and nationhood in the Caucasus*. New York & London: NYU Press.

Zürcher, E. J. and W. V. Shendel (2001). *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century* . New York & London: I.B. Tauris.

РИА Новости. (2006). Абхазия признала "грузинский геноцид" в отношении осетин. <https://ria.ru/20061102/55332590.html> (8 September 2018)

Алаев, Л.Б и К.З. Ашрафян .(2002). *История Востока : Восток в средневековье*. Москва: Восточная литература

Беленький, С и А. Манвелов. (1927). *Революция 1917 года в Азербайджане: хроника событий*. Баку: ИСТПАРТ. Отдел ЦК. и Б. К. А. К. П. б

Иовчук, М. Т, Т. И. Ойзерман, И. Я. Щипанов. (1971). *Краткий очерк истории философии: Философская и социологическая мысль народов СССР в XIX в*. Москва: Мысль.

Кондратов, С. А. (2008). Революция и Гражданская война в России: 1917-1923 гг. Vol.1, pp. 492-493. Moscow: Terra.

Матевосян, Г. (5 June 2010). Партия "Процветающая Армения": РФ всегда была верным другом Армении. *RIA News Agency*.  
<https://ria.ru/20100605/242904278.html> (16 June 2019)

Минц, И. and , Е.Городецкого. (1940). *Документы по истории гражданской войны в СССР. Т.: Первый этап гражданской войны (Vol 1)*. Москва: Политиздат.dg

Семенов, Ю. (1949). *Закавказская республика (The Transcaucasian Republic)*. Paris: Возрождения (Vozrozhdeniye).

Тадевосян, Э. В. (1964). Ленин о государственных формах социалистического решения национальных вопросов. *Вопросы философии*. 44, 3-35.

Устрялов, Н. (1934). From NEP to Soviet Socialism. *Novgorod State University*.  
<http://www.novsu.ru/npe/files/um/1412/bg/shell/arh/stat/staty/%D0%A3%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D1%8F%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%9D.%20%D0%9E%D1%82%20%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BF%D0%B0%20%D0%BA%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%83%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC%D1%83.htm> (1 June 2019)

Шавров, Н.Н. (1911). *Новая угроза русскому делу в Закавказье: Предстоящая распродажа мугани инородцам*. Санкт-Петербург: Рус. Собрание.

Юдельсон, К. С. (1959). *Правовые вопросы организации и деятельности совнархозов*. Москва: Госюриздат.