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**U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS VENEZUELA IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY**

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Venezuela in the Context of the National Endowment

for Democracy

Semih Erdoğan

The concept of democracy is used in a very different meaning in the modern period. Emphasis is placed on democratic institutions and organizations in the speeches of the policy makers, in the formation of the foreign policies of the countries, in the institutional governance structures, and in democratic institutions and organizations. But it is perceived as a coincidence of the concept of freedom in widespread use today.

The concept of democracy has taken place in world politics as a foreign policy goal of the United States, which assumed the leadership of the Western bloc with the collapse of the post-World War II European economy and the formation of the communist bloc. After the war, the European economy was rebounding and the Western bloc was widened against the threat of communism. It is known that studies on the country where it is desired to be influenced by different methods are carried out in the process of foreign policy making based on the development of democracy. It is already known that prior those attempts carried out by the CIA's secret operations and the later ones are state-sponsored or independent democratic institutions and organizations. The rise of the effectiveness of non-governmental organizations, the initiatives of think tanks and non-governmental organizations, and the initiative of a better work, the policy of dissemination of democracy. The establishment of the NED is the most important step towards the democratization of democracy. It was one of the important steps.

When the U.S. foreign policy of Venezuela is analyzed in the context of NED, which is the subject of this thesis, it is revealed how important the democracy expansion and economic freedom are in the United States, especially after the Cold War period. NED's institutional structure, its role in U.S. foreign policy, and its place in U.S.-Venezuela relations are analyzed in detail, while NED and U.S. Anti-Chavez Venezuela associations, which form the focal point of the thesis, are analyzed separately.

In the first part, it will be discussed how the United States understood the concept of democracy by referring to the perception of democracy in the U.S. foreign policy that took shape during the Cold War period. The democratization efforts aimed at the Marshall Plan took different forms in the later phases of the Cold War. The transition phase will be analyzed to provide a better understanding of the relationship between democracy and foreign policy.

In the second part, the place and policy of democracy development policy in the U.S. foreign policy is discussed. This section will provide the concept of the idea that the development of democracy is part of the operations of the CIA operations covered by U.S. foreign policy and the operations carried out with democratic institutional structures.

In the third part, we will talk specifically about the NED in conjunction with the changing perceptions, methods, and actors of democracy in the 1980s. The organization, purpose, structure, methods, and relations of NED will be discussed. Analyses we will make in this chapter will give us a better understanding of NED's role and value in American foreign policy. The information in this section will help us to better understand our developments in the Venezuelan file, especially in the fourth section, and to establish better ties between the analyses.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, the Chavez-U.S.-Venezuelan relations and the crises experienced during this period will be examined, and the role of the NED in U.S. foreign policy will be actively analyzed and the people living in the mentioned period will be evaluated from a different point of view.



ÖZET

NED Bağlamında ABD' nin Venezuela'ya karşı Dış Politikası

Semih Erdoğan

Günümüzde demokrasi kavramı çok farklı bir anlamda kullanılmaktadır. Politika yapıcılarının konuşmalarında, ülkelerin dış politikalarının oluşturulmasında, kurumsal yönetim yapılarında ve demokratik kurumlarda ve kuruluşlarda demokratik yapılar ağırlık verilmektedir. Fakat günümüzde yaygın olarak kullanılan özgürlük kavramının eşanlamlısı olarak algılanmaktadır.

Demokrasi kavramı, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Avrupa ekonomisinin çökmesi ve komünist bloğun oluşmasıyla birlikte batı bloğunun liderliğini üstlenen Birleşik Devletlerin bir dış politika hedefi olarak dünya politikasında yerini almıştır. Savaştan sonra Avrupa ekonomisi toparlanmış ve batı bloğu komünizm tehdidine karşı genişlemiştir. Farklı yöntemlerle etkilenecek ülkelerle ilgili çalışmaların, demokrasinin gelişimine dayanan dış politika oluşturma sürecinde yapıldığı bilinmektedir. CIA'nin farklı yöntemleri olduğu ve daha sonraları devlet tarafından desteklenen veya bağımsız demokratik kurumlar ve kuruluşlar eliyle yapıldığı bilinmektedir. Sivil toplum kuruluşlarının etkinliğinin artması, düşünce kuruluşlarının girişimleri ve sivil toplum örgütleri ve daha iyi bir çalışmanın başlatılması, demokrasinin yaygınlaştırılması politikası. NED'in kurulması, demokratikleşmeye yönelik en önemli adımlardan biriydi.

ABD' nin Venezülla' ya karşı dış politikası, bu tez konusu olan NED bağlamında incelendiğinde, özellikle Soğuk Savaş döneminden sonra demokrasi genişlemesinin ve ekonomik özgürlüğün Birleşik Devletler'de ne kadar önemli olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. NED'in kurumsal yapısı, ABD dış politikasındaki rolü ve ABD-Venezüella ilişkilerindeki yeri ayrıntılı bir şekilde analiz edilirken, tezin odak

noktasını oluşturan NED ve ABD' nin Venezuela 'da Chavez karşıtı kuruluşlara olan desteği ayrı ayrı analiz edildi.

İlk bölümde, Soğuk savaş döneminde şekillenen abd dış politikasındaki demokrasi algısından bahsederek, abd nin demokrasi kavramından ne anlaşıldığı tartışılacaktır. Marshall planıyla hedeflenen demokratikleştirme çabaları soğuk savaşın ilerleyen dönemlerinde farklı biçimlere bürünmüştür.1980 lerden itibaren değişen demokrasi algısıyla yeni aktörlerin devreye girmesi Amerikan dış politikasının yönünü ve yöntemini değiştirmiştir.

İkinci bölümde ABD dış politikasında demokrasi geliştirme politikasının yeri ve önemi tartışılacaktır. Bu bölüm demokrasinin gelişimi politikasının, ABD dış politikasının kapsadığı CIA operasyonları ve demokratik kurumsal yapılarla gerçekleştirilen operasyonların bir parçası olduğu fikrini sunacaktır.

Üçüncü bölümde, 1980 lerde değişen demokrasi algısı,yöntemleri ve aktörleriyle birlikte özel olarak NED den bahsedeceğiz.NED nin kuruluşu, amacı, yapısı, yöntemleri ve ilişkileri ele alınacaktır. Bu bölümde yapacağımız analizler NED'in Amerikan dış politikasındaki rolünü ve değerini daha iyi anlamamızı sağlayacaktır. Bu bölümdeki bilgiler, özellikle dördüncü bölümde çalışma konumuz olan Venezuela dosyasında göreceğimiz gelişmeleri daha iyi kavramamıza ve analizler arası bağları daha iyi kurmamıza yardımcı olacaktır.

Son olarak, dördüncü bölümde, Chavez dönemi ABD- Venezuela ilişkileri ve bu süreçte yaşanan krizleri ele alınacak, bu süreçte NED' nin Amerikan dış politikasındaki rolünü, görevlerini ve etkinliklerini aktif bir şekilde analiz edilerek bahse konu dönemde yaşananlar farklı bir bakış açısıyla değerlendirilecektir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAFLI	: Asian American Free Labor Institute
AALC	: American Association of Lutheran Churches
AFL-CIO	: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AIFLD	: American Institute for Free Labor Development
ALBA	: Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
APF	: American Political Foundation
CFD	: Center for Democracy
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CIPE	: Center for International Private Institutions
COPEI	: Socialist Christian Party of Venezuela
CTV	: Confederation of Venezuela Workers
DEA	: Drug Enforcement Administration
FARC	: Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces
FMLN	: The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
FTUI	: Institute for Free Trade Unions
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
IFES	: International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IMF : International Monetary Fund

IRI : International Republican Institute

MBR 200 : Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200

NDI : National Democratic Institute

NED : National Endowment for Democracy

NRI : National Republican Institute for International Affairs

NSC : National Safety Council

OAS : Organization of American States

ONA : Anti-Drug Organization

OPEC : Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PdVSA : Petróleos de Venezuela, Venezuela Petroleum

URD : Democratic Republican Union

USIA : United States Information Agency

USIP : United States Peace Institute

USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

In the post-Cold War world, U.S. foreign policy sharply evaluated new strategies like supporting democracy promotion and economic freedom in the rest of the world. Therefore, foreign aid has become the most important instrument for these policies. Besides, new generation aid programs, think tanks and organizations have become vital instruments for this. In addition, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has had a key role as an organization for the realization of democracy promotion and economic freedom.

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was established by the U.S. Congress in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the world. Through a worldwide grants program, NED assists those working abroad to build democratic institutions and spread democratic values. NED's four affiliated core institutes: the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, the Center for International Private Enterprise, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, represent public American institutions working in sectors critical to the development of democracy. NED also supports initiatives of nongovernmental organizations fostering independent media, human rights, and other essential democratic elements.

In this regard, the objective of this thesis is to execute the U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela after the 1980s in the context of the NED and to show how democracy promotion and economic freedom has become a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. The question of "How did NED affect the Venezuelan political system?" is crucial. In this framework, my argument is that Latin America is a significant region for the United States in the way of controlling their politics and economic resources by the quasi-governmental organisation, NED. In this regard, and

in the context of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez's government policies have confronted with U.S. government's benefits since his first coup try in 1992. Today, these actors still confront each other in the region.

The scope of this thesis is to explain NED's role in the U.S. foreign policy towards Latin American countries, mainly Venezuela, and to define impacts of promoting democracy and economic freedom policy and focus on expectations of U.S. administrations and Chávez's challenges.

In an attempt to create and verify the argument of the study, I have sought answers to the question of "What basic interest does the United States support opponents in Venezuela by NED, and how are these interests affected by the interests of and relations with Venezuela?" I chose this combined question as my research base, as there are few studies in the literature focusing on this issue. Many of the studies just include a one-sided perspective. In this regard, my study constitutes a basis and offers answers for these issues.

My hypotheses are:

1. U.S. foreign policy has started to use foreign aid for democracy promotion and economic freedom in Venezuela by NED.
2. U.S. administration supported opponents of Chávez in 2002 coup by NED.
3. National Endowment for Democracy has initiated anti-democratic executions in Venezuela.

For the purpose of designing this thesis, a detailed literature review is made through academic articles, books, reports, and previously published theses and dissertations. In this thesis, I used books, periodicals, reports, official declarations, press declarations, noted publications and articles that focus on and analyse U.S.-Venezuelan relations. My main focus while analysing the sources was the

interpretation and comparison method. After collecting the information, I interpreted the whole data and compared and contrasted them on the basis of U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela in the context of the NED. That being the case, I used qualitative method for the most part. Thus, there is no statistical data and analysis in my research, other than some examples supporting my findings. Generally, I questioned the events and phenomenon and tried to find out what happened, when, and why; which actors were involved, how and why; what consequences were drawn and what responses were given by the actors, what behaviour and attitude they adopted, and why.

This study is a moderate attempt to explain U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela in the context of the NED. In this regard their relations, NED's structure, and its way of working has been analysed. That is why this study does not offer a detailed and historical explanation of the events. Furthermore, the relations among the other Latin American countries in the region are not included in the study.

CHAPTER 1

The Concept of Democracy in American Foreign Policy and Relationship With Foreign Policy

1.1 “Democracy” as a Concept

The concept of democracy is currently used in meaning outside its usual meaning. Democracy and democratic structure are often emphasized in the foreign policy goals of countries, in the speeches of politicians, and in institutional structures and organizations. The concept of democracy derives from the Latin words *demos* (people) and *crails* (management). Democracies existed both in Greece and Italy in BC 500. Democracy is a term that comes from the Greek that means the sovereignty of the people. Although the concept of democracy literally means of the people’s administration, a perception has been formed that the concept of freedom is the same in the present day.

Thus, today democracy emerges as a difficult concept to describe. It is an abstract term that can have different meanings according to the context in which it is used. In its most widespread use, democracy generally refers to a political system with certain minimum elements: effective participation in governance (either directly or through representation) by the people in accordance with a constitution, respect for human rights, and equality for all before the law.

Some writers have simply defined what democracy is not: “No one can give up an unconditional and unlimited power because democracy is a system by which no one can choose itself and no one can do it himself” (Sartori, 1987, p. 206).” Other writers have proposed various definitions for the concept of democracy. In the impressive 1943 definition by Schumpeter, the “democratic method” was described as “an institutional arrangement to bring political decision-making powers of individuals

to decide for the people through a competitive struggle” (p. 269). Schmitter and Karl (1996) defined democracy in the following way: “Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (p. 50). Samuel Huntington (1991)

defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. (p. 7)

The attempts to define democracy are even more complex because of the differences between ancient Greek democracy and contemporary democracy. The classical Athens democracy was based on the ideals of full political participation of all citizens, a strong sense of community, popular sovereignty, and equality of all citizens with the law. On the other hand, modern democracy, which tends to distinguish between elected representatives and public and private spheres, erodes community ties and encourages individualism.

Most of the definitions of contemporary democracy have many common elements. First, we can say that democracies are the institutions that allow people to choose their leaders, that is, the countries where the elections are held. Second, potential leaders in democracies compete with each other to get support from the people. The third, the government’s power is limited and supervised on the basis of the public accountability principle. We can define these three elements as indispensable qualities of political democracy.

Some authors talk about the need for different criteria for a political structure to be democratic. According to Diamond (1959), a democracy needs to have “broad

freedom (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of organization and freedom of association)” (p. 10). Huntington (1991) stated that democracy requires “the publication, assembly and organizing of the existence of civil and political freedoms necessary for the exercise of political debate and election campaigns in order to be able to speak freely” (p. 7).

These attempts to extend the criteria of democracy make it more meaningful, not to mention the democracy ratios of countries and political structures rather than to separate countries into different democracy definitions (Lynn-Jones, 1998). Grades according to various criteria may result in some states being considered more democratic than others (Lynn-Jones, 1998).

1.2 Foreign Policy and Democracy Relation

States create foreign policy in order to be able to pursue their own interests and to gain a more effective position in international politics. In this context, we can define foreign policy as the attitude that a state has shown to protect its interests in the outside world and to gain a stronger and prestigious position in international politics.

In this process, many factors, such as demands of civil society, the pressures imposed by the international system, and the structure of political institutions affect how governments execute their foreign policies (Hook & Spanier, 2015). Each government adopts a peculiar approach to world politics, taking into account such shared factors. Its own foreign policy is highly diverse, and while each government reacts to developments around it, it exhibits its own style (Hook & Spanier, 2015).

1.3 Perception of Democracy and Foreign Policy in the United States

On the basis of the power of American foreign policy, there is the idea that a more democratic world will become more peaceful and that the United States will be more secure in this environment. Thomas Jefferson’s America’s “ownership of the

empire of liberty,” Woodrow Wilson’s “vow to make the world safe for democracy,” and Ronald Reagan’s definition of the Soviet bloc as the enemy empire are concrete examples of U.S. foreign policy thinking (Hook & Spanier, 2015, pp. 7-8).

The United States embraced liberal internationalism during the Cold War era, building on one side liberal economic systems such as the United Nations and Bretton Woods and on the other, supporting democratic reforms in other countries in an efficient manner. In this process, it can be said that rather than deepening the global governance structures, the democratic order scene is pursuing the expansion of the field.

As a result of the United States’ political and military historical separation from European powers, its national style is shaped more by its own internal experiences and cultural traditions than by other powers. Such a divergence has enabled the United States to strengthen its management system, create a strong market economy, and expand its territory throughout North America.

It is a shallow point of view to only use geopolitical positioning, or the country’s distance to Europe, to explain how the United States can continue to move away from the great power politics for a long time. In this process, the nature of democracy must also be taken into consideration. The United States viewed itself as the first country to hold its leaders accountable for all of its people (Lipset, 1979).

The perception that Americans exceptionally or quantitatively consider their countries to be different from others is based on shared thought, which is not shared on a common ethnic identity, language, or religion, but rather is based on individual freedoms, limited government, and a strong civil society. Such principles constitute a civil religion in the United States that defines the relationship between the state and society and provides the basis for American nationalism.

Said summarized this perception of “civil religion” as follows:

The United States emerged by internalizing the belief that Americans are a chosen people, American order and state is a unique experience that God has revealed to the earth and that spreading it on earth is a divine mission to the good of man. Later, it was believed that you had the divine power necessary to fulfill this divine mission. Destruction of those who opposed the American way of life was wajip . . . judged to be the enemies of humanity. (as cited in Gerger, 2007, p. 520)

This moral “civil religion” perception has affected American foreign policy since the day it was founded (Hook & Spanier, 2015). The influence of this situation became particularly important in the attitude of the people regarding the use of force. U.S. forces need to be a fair force to destroy the enemy that threatens the integrity of the country. Accordingly, the United States could only use this power to achieve salvation. Although the involvement of the United States in the two world wars of the 20th century may have been related to geopolitical problems, the perception of this divine mission in foreign policy has also affected the behavior of American governments (Gerger, 2007).

CHAPTER 2

Democracy Promotion in American Foreign Policy

2.1 As a Policy: Democracy Promotion in U.S. Foreign Policy

The development of democracy has clearly taken its place in American foreign policy. From its inception, it was based on the ideal of the untouchable rights of the person, assuming that the United States is an exceptional country. For America's founding fathers, this notion was the bounty of creation for strengthening the rule of democracy (Dalacoura, 2005).

American foreign policy has been shaped on the basis of democratic peace theory (Forsythe, 1992; Hermann & Kegley, 1995). Democratic peace theory is the argument that democracies do not go to war against each other because of shared norms, economic trade relations, and/or the power of the executives, as well as institutional and social controls. It is believed that the public's belief that the impact on political behavior or the necessity of legislative leave for executive action or disagreement should be resolved through subsidiary mechanisms is considered to be favorable for resolving the conflicts between democracies in cooperation. Although democracies rarely have significant evidence that they are engaged in massive wars with each other, it appears that they are able to intervene militarily against other democratic countries and to engage in covert actions against them in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives (Forsythe, 1992; Hermann & Kegley, 1995).

Democratic peace theory assumes that people are potentially rational and virtuous and that the differences and problems between them can come from reasonably negotiating and moral stimuli (Forsythe, 1992; Hermann & Kegley, 1995). Americans generally believed that peace, a consequence of human compatibility, was a natural

phenomenon. On the other hand, they believed that man who confronted someone was, in fact, a deviation of morality and reasoning from the corrupt malignant leaders. On the basis of this opinion on American foreign policy, there was the idea that a more democratic world would be a more peaceful environment and that the United States would be safer in such an environment (Forsythe, 1992; Hermann & Kegley, 1995).

American foreign policy has always had strong idealist elements (Cox, Smith, & Ikenberry, 2000). Democracy promotion in other countries has been one of the foreign policy objectives since Wilson's time. The term "democracy" has been a part of foreign policy in the era of President Roosevelt, after the United States became a global power, in the process that began to make the world that Wilson declared in World War I to be "safe for democracy" (Cox et al., 2000, p. 10). Since that time, the promotion of democracy has become an indispensable word for every American president.

In this process, questions are being raised about the role of the United States in promoting democracy. Why should the United States be interested in establishing, disseminating, and supporting democratic values and institutions? Is the real aim to promote democracy in the real sense of freedom for the individual, the determination of the nations' self-destiny, or the possibility of being friendly to American interests? Are there any significant international impacts associated with the spread of democracy?

On November 3, 1970, Salvador Allende in Chile was the first Marxist president to come to power with democratic elections in Latin America. Fearing the spread of the left-leaning leadership, President Nixon commissioned Henry Kissinger to make a major effort to remove Allende from power by establishing alliances with

military officers, supplying dissident politicians and media with secret funds, and applying diplomatic pressure (Kornbluh, 1999). More recently, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents confirmed that Nixon ordered “make the economy scream” to take over from the CIA’s democratically elected president (CIA, 1970). After three years of intense pressure, the Allende government took over in September 1973 with a coup that brought General Pinochet’s bloody dictatorship to power (Thyne, 2010).

According to academics such as Cox et al. (2000), both Democrats and Republicans are interested in the development of democracy and its definition of the American role in the world. Ikenberry and Carothers (2003) noted that democracy has been intertwined with American economy, security, and sociopolitics; every American president of the last 30 years has completed his presidency emphasizing the promotion of democracy. Democracy promotion is a reflection of America’s local political culture and ideology (Carothers, 2003).

The development of freedom and democracy and the protection of human rights in the world have long been the main goals of American foreign policy (Wittes, 2008). With these goals, the United States aims primarily to establish security and order for the welfare of the world by promoting the development of democracy. Secondly, it should be helped to set democratic order and principles in new democracies. Thirdly, it is aimed to reveal and define the regimes which are supporters of democracies in their own countries to be established, and finally do not choose their leaders by free, fair, and transparent elections. These goals have been part of the legitimacy of the United States to intervene in the governments of the target countries since the First World War (Wittes, 2008).

In a historical context, if we consider that U.S. leadership is showing a strong and sustained tendency towards democracy promotion policy: (a) The United States has the task of spreading democracy and becoming a liberal political model for target countries; (b) for non-democratic countries, national security is a potential hazard; (c) democracies are more stable and better at commercial and military partnership and more responsible members of international organizations; And (d) democracy establishes human rights, economic development, and development (Bouchet & Sedaca, 2014). According to the American-centered view, democratization within the framework of democratic peace theory provides international peace and order, which contributes to American national security, market liberalization, U.S. investment, and opening trade (Bouchet & Sedaca, 2014).

Although the policy of democracy promotion is based on the basic policies of U.S foreign policy, it is sometimes behind the national security and economic goals (Huntington, 1991). But in the past 30 years, democracy promotion has come to the forefront of other foreign policy instruments. Initiatives to better align democracy promotion with other foreign policy goals began before the Berlin Wall was demolished, better institutionalized and operationalized. The establishment of the promotion of democracy has emerged, in part, with the birth of human rights in the 1970s as a policy. This was also the result of a wave of third democratization in southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. The destruction of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Brazil and the failure of communist or anti-American governments to act have contributed more to democratic development initiatives. Moreover, in most of Europe's countries, the third-wave experience was a challenge to the poverty of democracy deprivation and showed little

help since these external factors played a large role in the third-wave transformation (Huntington, 1991).

In the development of democracy, as a way of intervention for the United States, political and moral sources of the target country are integrated into the global system in an open or implicit way (Hamid, 2007). This notion is referred to as “liberal interventionism” or “muscular Wilsonianism” (Hamid, 2005, para.1). The development of democracy has been intertwined with development and intercivilizational dialogue and has provided U.S. foreign policy with operational tools such as intervention in the internal affairs of target countries, leadership training, military power control, regime restoration, and country building.

The absence of feudal social relations was the greatest reason for the development of U.S. democracy. This definition is commonly known as American exceptionalism. The collapse of the Soviet bloc led to the politics of the use of soft power tools in the American foreign policy of liberal capitalism. According to the Gramscian viewpoint, this refers to new forms of transnational supervision that accompany the rise of global capitalism.

After World War II, with the collapse of the old colonial empires, the United States had many military and political interventions in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. In this way, the United States had a pivotal role in the development of the political system in the peripheral countries in the post-Cold War period.

After that period, the United States maintained its motivation for democracy development from the Cold War to the present day (Robinson, 1996a). During the Cold War, many American academics and policy makers have come to a consensus on projects in the development of democracy to remove economic aid and non-

democratic conditions from Third World countries, even though American foreign policy dominates theories of realism and modernism. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States helped repress newspapers and bureaucrats to support democratic movements in Europe (Robinson, 1996a).

2.2 Formation of Democracy Promotion

By confidential methods, it restricts the influence of the operation of controlling and directing the internal world of the countries in relation to semi-secret and certain organizations. The emergence of semi-secret relations can lead to the return of the people of the country who are devoted to their independence and dignity against the United States. It is both risky and costly to gather information with the old methods or with secret relations; to put the information out to the media and other institutions; and to place party leaders, secret directors, and provocateurs in the new order. Policies of democratic development are positioned at the forefront in this direction. Therefore, support for the countries that the U.S. wants to influence has been differentiated, with efforts to exert influence through more open approaches and relations.

Supporting a government that is aligned with U.S. interests is burdensome both in terms of material and public support. Direct involvement with masses such as NGOs, foundations, and institutes, which are the means of democracy development policy, is more attractive in terms of both economic and public support. For this reason, this policy, which was followed by implicit CIA-supported operations, became the United States' new foreign policy.

It was for the first time in the Johnson administration that the establishment of a public-private mechanism for overcoming democracy development in overseas countries was made clearer and more transparent (Yildirim, 2005). In 1970, during the

Carter administration, the Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Bureau was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the development of democratic values was realized for the first time under the roof of an institution (Yildirim, 2005).

2.3 Tensions Between Democracy Development and National Security in U.S.

Foreign Policy

Tools and strategies for the reduction and implementation of limitation have had sufficient space since 1967 to increase the importance of new paradigms for U.S. foreign policy, including the promotion of democracy (Pee, 2013). The essence of the strategy was the prevention of political change that would increase the strength of the USSR or otherwise harm U.S. security and economic interests. Geopolitically, as the country developed, it faced three problems: the rise of Soviet power; the weakness of Western Europe in the face of this power; and especially in the end of the 1940s and early 1950s, after the beginning of the Cold War, the power vacuum in the Third World arising from the collapse of the European colonial empires (Pee, 2013). This latest development has brought greater instability in the Third World and increased the threat of independent nationalist leaders to follow foreign and domestic policies that are incompatible with U.S. interests.

The strength that U.S. foreign policy has as a framework was the construction and explanation of this geopolitical anti-communist strategy as a defense of freedom opposing a totalitarian slave state (U.S. National Security Council, 1950). This public account of the doctrine has alleviated acceptance with wider foreign policy. By using the U.S. nationalist tradition of doubling the fate and power of the elite and U.S. civil society and the United States with the fate and expansion of democracy, U.S. foreign policy provides “an understandable and compelling reflection of the domestic society’s dominant norms” (Melanson, 2000, p. 32). However, the defense and

dissemination of U.S. democracy and security policies were not simply deployed by U.S. bureaucrats to legitimize a policy shaped by realistic security and economic concerns. Rather, the United States has served as a filter of perceived ideology and security by the current liberal democratic ideology and threat from the USSR (Hunt, 2009; Quinn, 2010).

Therefore, ideology and security concerns are combined in the creation of the framework of limitation (Macdonald, 2000). As a practical consequence of this fusion, there has been a construction of a liberal foreign policy that supports U.S. foreign policy, both aimed at preserving U.S. national security and freedom. This elite consensus projected the democratic ideology with leaders and members of U.S. civil society organizations that stretched out to U.S. civil society and cooperated with the CIA and embraced academics who brought U.S. policy makers design proposals for political reforms in the Third World. Nevertheless, although democracy may be ideologically compatible with national security concerns, the construction of democracy support has not served to consistently limit the national security objective to pragmatic terms. U.S. policy makers have had to admit that at the beginning of the Cold War, little could be done to liberate, because it is possible to make propaganda for the Soviet bloc, in practice, due to the strong political control that governments are applying (Lucas, 1999). Democratic processes in the Third World have not always produced leaders who are willing to fuse the interests of their countries and their peoples into U.S. national interests. This led to tension at the strategic level of the national security policy of the implementation of democracy. These were repeated at organizational and tactical levels when the democratic ideology was followed by the state-private network and in the attitude of the United States towards democratizing the Third World dictatorships (Pee, 2013).

The tension between democracy and national security at the organizational level arose in attempts to project democratic ideology through groups of U.S. civil society financed and governed by the CIA: the state-private network (Mickelson, 1983; Puddington, 2000). This network consisted of civil society groups such as anti-Soviet committees and radio stations established by “immigrant guards and secret government guards from Eastern Europe immigrants, intellectuals, women’s groups, African-American groups, students and trade unions receiving covert guidance and . . . assistance from the Government” (Kennan, 1948, n.p.), usually the CIA.

These groups took part in the dissolution of anti-Soviet propaganda and in the training of political education and of colleagues in other countries (Wilford, 2008). Special groups lacking a clear strategic plan that exceeded democratic ideology or the needs of a particular civil society department developed a political framework within a strategic framework created by the state. State institutions acted as coordination centers for private groups that were not members of a broader network independent of these institutions and that did not have a clear strategic framework of the network. This network was based on the political influence of Communist forces in Western Europe and the common democratic ideology of the West. The projections of this democratic ideology aimed at making it difficult for the Soviets to control Eastern Europe and its own population. In the 1950s and 1960s the network expanded its activities to cover key developing countries and areas.

Nevertheless, the role of the state in the network gave rise to ideological and organizational tension. The state tried to use the democratic structure of the groups to present the freedom movement as an attractive alternative to totalitarianism by presenting examples of democratic actions (Lucas, 1999). At the same time,

democratic ideology has also played an important role in rationalizing and alleviating the rapprochement between special idealists. Thus, the reconciliation of democracy and U.S. national security at a strategic level was repeated at the organizational level and the idea of linking state and private forces was united. However, the coordinator role of state organizations was not in line with the democratic ideology that holds it together.

This cooperation of state and non-governmental organizations created an organizational tension. The groups' special opponent was the key to operational events in overseas countries. While the actions of the U.S. government could be denied because of the U.S. government's secret funds, the groups were more credible than the U.S. government. Thanks to these credits, American representatives were more likely to cooperate. However, a measure of state guidance was needed to ensure that the groups were "anti-communist foreign policy" in which "actions were compatible with the United States" and that they were a consistent part of this broader strategy (Lucas, 2003, p. 60). This tension arose in connection with state-private disagreements over whether to pursue a policy of Liberation against the Soviet Union in the early 1950s (Lucas, 2003). Splits between government officials and the leaders of state-private organizations were seen at the Princeton meeting on psychological warfare strategy in 1952 (Lucas, 2003).

An autonomy/control dilemma existed for the state (Carew, 1998; Wilford, 2008). A measure of government control was needed to manage conflicts between ideology, cross-interest, and national security policy; nevertheless, too much control of these groups by the government would continue to question the private entity's status and thus remove its usefulness for the state. Wherever the government-private network was present, this tension would never be completely solved. The state had to

rely on “long control methods,” such as coordinating group officials, leaking out their representatives to groups, and controlling funding by distributing or linking it in small quantities without sacrificing its private allies (Wilford, 2008, p. 65).

These tactics were not intended to control all the actions of a particular group of specialists; rather, it produced a “public autonomy” in which group members moved within certain boundaries but could push this autonomy to the point where it conflicted with U.S. national security interests (Lucas, 2003, p. 25). This could have resulted in the withdrawal of funds. Control tasks were not open to temporary observers; private groups opposed the limits imposed on freedom of action and often clashed with strategy and tactics with covert action executives (Lucas, 1999).

Despite the tensions that private nongovernmental organizations have experienced in their democratic ideology project in the context of national security, there have been potentially more detrimental tensions between democracy and geopolitics in developing countries, and colonialism has opened a new field of action (Cammack, 1997). The diversion of a developing country that is strategically important because of its successful revolutions in these regions, due to its location or resources, could have caused significant damage to the United States and could have caused changes in the course of the Cold War. This has led to a discrepancy between a policy that is hostile to the interests of change and a policy focused on preventing the democratic ideological basis of politics, as it is uncertain whether democratic political change or democratic regimes in developing countries can produce governments that will adapt to the U.S. government (Saull, 2005).

In light of these facts, U.S. policy makers faced two decisions. The first was to increase the likelihood that the United States would be able to safeguard the interests of the support of the global south anti-communist dictators more effectively in order

to begin some degree of political reforms in pro-U.S. states to curb Soviet influence or to reduce more radical change demands. When the United States decides to go for political reform, policy makers have to decide how far these reforms are going to be taken before weakening the security and economic interests they are trying to disrupt or preserve friendly states. It was not merely a matter of making a choice between basing politics on ideology or on national security; instead, the question was whether the establishment and formation of democratic systems would help the United States in a strategic sense by using revolutionary forces.

The United States could not make a definitive decision on these questions before 1967 and could not form a comprehensive policy framework for the global south that precisely reconciles national security objectives and ideology at the strategic level. Rather, it oscillated between dictatorial support and reform assistance, using different regions and different means and tactics at different times. This defended the controversy created by the ideological reason for the restriction, supporting the authorities in order to prevent the totalitarians from seizing power (U.S. Department of State, 1959; U.S. National Security Council, 1959, June 18). However, these governments tended to lack the legitimacy that made their long-term stability dubious. The support given to the dictatorships tended to reveal a long-term strategic weakness, as if such a regime collapsed and was often taken down by revolutionary forces hostile to the United States (Schmitt, 2006).

The alternative policy of promoting modernization was based on the idea that the developing countries could gradually turn into a political, social and economic modernity state without disturbing the geopolitical balance and leading to major distortions that could provide an alternative to radical revolutions (Guilhot, 2005). The end point of a democratic society in modernization models is that policy makers

want to show to the population that “humanity is an unsatisfied longing for economic progress and that social justice can best be achieved by free men” (Rabe, 2012, p. 87).

This understanding represented a stimulus to stabilize geopolitical and ideological groups, which could not be consistently deployed as a consistent framework for the U.S. policy towards developing countries, although Castro’s Cuba Special groups were deployed in countries and regions believed to be at high risk for a successful radical revolution in Latin America. With the approach taken from the theory of modernization, developing countries, as they imitate the developmental stages of the United States and Western Europe, could turn it. This approach imitated the stages of development and followed it from the Third World states of the United States and Western Europe, These steps have been identified by the development theorist and consultant to President Kennedy, Walt Rostow, as the traditional society whose developmental stages are the preconditions for development, departure, transition to maturity, and high mass consumption.

Rostow’s (1990) interest in research has been valued by bourgeois social scientists for the formation of modern society. He believes that he has found a method to draw general conclusions from observations on the formation of modern society and wants to complete a general theory of economic growth-based development. Modern society from traditional society recognizes more than one progressive stranger and acknowledges that all nations are obliged to transform from traditional society to modern industrial society, if delayed. The stages of Rostow’s economic growth are also the stages of social progress (Rostow, 1990). The work of Rostow is also a political precaution. This provides a legitimate justification for the aid programs that the United States has prepared for the development of underdeveloped countries during the Cold War. The author talks about the following five stages,

arguing that underdeveloped countries can catch up with the economic development and growth of the developed Western societies on their way: traditional society, preparation phase, economic takeoff phase, maturity level, and phase of mass consumption (Rostow, 1990).

This interest in modernization envisaged a wide range of social and economic transformations that could not be achieved through a state-private network political intervention model that envisaged a democratic ideology and strengthened U.S. civil society groups within the target country, but many of these programs were also part of the Third World. Instead, the necessary transformation will be implemented by utilizing the services of U.S. technocrats to implement U.S. foreign aid and socioeconomic reforms such as land reform, tax, and U.S.-style democracy, which will lead to the emergence of a strong middle class. It has emerged that, due to the reform paradigm, the United States is closely following these processes. This is problematic because it contradicts short-term national security concerns, in the process of forming in areas targeting such democratic regimes. The channeling of many elements of the reform programs through existing political and social structures meant that their implementation was often based on the cooperation of local ruling elites who were afraid and resisted their dilution of power through large-scale socioeconomic transformations. The lack of a holistic endeavor to strengthen the political forces that the United States wants to keep in power in the existing dictatorships has not shared the agenda of the more radical reformers of the United States, which accompanies it, for their own societies. Thus, the last point of modernization, with a broader ideological framework for U.S. foreign policy, became more tense with geopolitical pursuits in the short span. This tension has returned to the support of authoritarian governments as an obstacle to radicalism (Saull, 2007;

Taffet, 2007). The problem also occurred in South Vietnam, where U.S. support of Diem, who in turn relied on the landlord class as the social base of his power, translated into the thwarting or dilution of reform programs, such as land reform (Saul, 2007; Taffet, 2007).

In order for the democracy promotion strategy to be effective, it will need to be implemented in a tactical and organizationally sound and convincing manner to democrats in overseas countries. The best organizational structure for such an effort would be a “new semi-private foundation for political work abroad” (Ish-Shalom, 2006, p. 295), which could serve as an “umbrella organization” for several U.S. specialist groups running democracy promotion programs (Taffet, 2007, p. 48). Almost all of the funding for this foundation would have to be provided by the U.S. government (Ish-Shalom, 2006). As Samuels and Douglas (1981) could attract opportunists thought to be entirely in financial support, the foundation would provide training instead of giving financial support to foreign political parties. The committed democrats wanted to take advantage of the program financially. For example, the U.S. encouraged the Brazilian army to seize power from President Goulart in 1964 due to its unease concerning his planned reforms and supposed Community sympathies (Rabe, 2012; Schmitz, 2006). The United States also made little protest when the democratically elected reformist president of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch, was overthrown in 1963 and dispatched marines to prevent his restoration during a popular rebellion in 1965 (Rabe, 2012; Schmitz, 2006).

2.4 Discussions on Democracy Promotion Policy

American policy makers often mention that the United States has a duty to support and protect the spread of democracy. Nevertheless, U.S. movements to support dictatorships and demonstrate against democratic regime hostility make the

democracy in American foreign policy unclear. This uncertainty has also manifested itself in the academic world. While some consider democratic development as the main element of American foreign policy, the more critical group sees democratic retribution as a tool for legitimizing other foreign policy instruments (Pee, 2013).

Democracy-centered viewpoints are more often expressed by liberals or neo-conservatives. Liberal-minded Smith described the importance of democracy in the following way: “The most consistent tradition in American Foreign Policy . . . is that the nation’s security is to be protected by the widespread dissemination of the best democracy. . . . [this is] the greatest ambition of the last hundred years of U.S. foreign policy” (Smith, 1993, p. 10). Neo-conservative Muravchik (1991), who does not think differently from Smith, opined that America is “the engine of change” (p. 221) in much of the world under more democratic rule. Liberal scholar Ikenberry regarded democratic development as a component of the Great Liberal American Strategy and as a component of international institutionalization and of the open world economy after World War II (Cox, Smith, & Ikenberry, 2000). According to these liberal and neo-conservative scholars, democracy development is “evolving, sophisticated understanding of how to create a stable international political order” (Ikenberry, 2000, p. 103). Bruce Russett (1994) observed that “for modern states, democracy is usually identified with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of citizens, a government brought to power in contested elections, and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to an elected legislature, often also with requirements for civil liberties such as free speech” (p. 14).

Realist Carr stated that “the Hegemonic forces are turning the idea that what is best for humanity is best for them, turning them into the most beneficial for mankind” (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2013, p. 76). According to Strauss, as cited in Insel (2003),

there are good and bad regimes in the world. The American regime is the worst among the existing regimes. The task of good regimes is to defend themselves against the evil. Because neo-conservatives viewed the United States as a representative of good, they had to fight against the bad regimes of the United States to protect its own security and world peace (Insel, 2003).

Some political ideologies are more successful for humanity than other systems. According to Fukuyama (1989), liberal democratic political systems are the most appropriate form of government. Although authoritarian governments provide partial economic growth in the short run, they cannot provide the conditions necessary for human beings to live humanely. Because of these shortcomings, there is no chance for authoritarian regimes to live in the face of the liberal democratic revolutions of the crisis they are in (Fukuyama, 1992).

Names such as Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Joshua Muravchik, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitz have argued that they should stop supporting dictators in the name of stability and thought that the spread of democracy could fill the ideological void in foreign policy. It is argued that the struggle against communism is not just an act of defeating communism, but an attempt to shape the destiny of the world at the same time, and that the United States should now go even further, as the winner of the Cold War, to shape the world on the axis of American-style democracy. This group emphasized that democracy is a belief that can not be given to the United States, that all people deserve a democratic life, so they must think how they can help them achieve it. For this reason, he stressed that the world needs the military, political, economic and cultural leadership of the United States and thus tried to develop a new ideological language for the spread of democracy in the context of American global leadership (Dorrien, 2004; Ish-Shalom, 2007). On the contrary, academics with a

democracy-focused narrowed thought, leftist/progressive or conservative/realist viewpoint, and rhetorical behavior of democracy development can be considered as the “soft power” element of the United States, both locally and internationally (Perlmutter, 1997, p. 8).

According to Nye’s famous definition, power is the capacity to influence the behavior of others in the direction of the desired outcome (Nye & Ikenberry, 2004). It is possible to say that it examines the more abstract and unobtrusive elements in terms of resources and at the same time, Nye defined soft power as providing co-operation and using charm elements to do what he wants. In other words, it emphasizes the second side of the power as an indirect way of doing what you want. There is no coercion, threat, or deception when applying power. For example, others like to admire and follow the moral values, prosperity, or cultures of an ethnic country. This is the second face of power and in some cases this power is not even noticed. So soft power is to summarize others’ wishes in the direction of their own desires. Nye (2003) associated soft power with hard power, two different forms of skill of someone to reach their goals by influencing their behavior. The difference between them is the concrete method and resources used. While military and economic power are used for hard power, attracting elements are used for soft power. But in some cases it can be powerful, it can also be a source of attraction. A country that has experienced economic and military deterioration may lose its ability to shape the international agenda (Nye, 2003). Legitimacy is important to have soft power. If a country can legitimize its power and its aims in the eyes of others, it will face less resistance. The most appropriate resources for hard power are pressure, sanctions, payments, and bribery, while the spectrum of strenuous force behavior is also convincing. The best

sources of soft power are the spectrum of behavior, agenda creation, attraction, and appeal, while being shown as values, culture, politics, and institutions (Nye, 2003).

Using soft power sources is slower, widespread, and heavier than using hard power sources (Nye & Ikenberry, 2004). However, where the use of soft power is successful, the gain is more permanent and longer lasting. As we have already mentioned, elements such as culture and history, values, internal and external politics, institutions, economic development, science, art, and literature advancement are considered important sources of soft power (Kalathil, 2011). In foreign policy there are certain ways to follow soft power strategy using these resources. Having and spreading statutory values that may be global or regional norms, conveying messages through well-known celebrities or heroes, making discourses that are attractive, nationally or globally are just a few of them (Lee, 2009).

Scholars such as Williams (1959), Kolko (1988), and Chomsky (1991) noted that democracy does not define American foreign policy. Rather, they stated that American foreign policy, foreign market security, investment opportunities in the world, and the supply of raw materials determine U.S. foreign policy. Chomsky noted that “the factors that have typically driven policy in the postwar period are the need to impose or maintain a global system that will serve state power” (p. 2). Ryan (2000) and Schmitz (1999, 2006) expanded their discourse by incorporating other factors, such as security, into these economic discourses. Ryan pointed out that democracy is often the second planet alongside American initiatives such as stability, order, and hegemony experiments. Schmitz argued that the discourse of democracy and human rights supports an active foreign policy by supporting authoritarian regimes involving Marxist structures and establishing a supportive environment for American investments abroad.

During the Cold War, Kinzer (2006) said that America was actively opposed to those who did not serve American interests, such as the demolition of democratic or constitutional governments in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, etc. According to Perlmutter (1997), “Wilson’s legacy of democracy and the right to self-determination . . . are far from rooted in action in philosophy” (p. 134). According to Haass, former Foreign Ministry official and External Relations Council President, democracy is more than election; A group of people in a society is a distribution of power in which political life is not excluded from full participation. Democracy requires balances within the government, governance and balance between governments at various levels (national, state and local), government and societies. Independent media control community power through elements such as trade unions, political parties, schools and democratic rights for women. Protection of individual rights, such as freedom of speech and worship, is essential for democracy. Moreover, a democratic government must face the control of the electoral opposition, and the leaders must deliver power to each other in peace (Congress Research Service, 1997).

Laurence Whitehead, a scientist, argued that the various academic initiatives on democracy identification point out that the definition is different over time and between cultures and that the external boundaries of the democracy concept vary and are negotiable to some extent (Congress Research Service, 1997). “Democracy has indispensable elements; the concept can be emptied, but these indispensable elements are intact and can be arranged in various possible configurations in any case” (Congress Research Service, 1997, p. 7). Democracy, as explained by other scientists, also encompasses the minimum procedural requirements of free and fair elections, freedom of speech and freedom of association, protection of the integrity of the bureau.

Showing the political effects of the former colonial world, which abandoned the vast majority of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes after World War II, in the 1980s and 1990s U.S. policy makers began to encourage polyarchism through new means of political intervention (Robinson, 2004). This political change emerged in the context of globalization and in response to the crisis of the rule of exclusivity emerging in the majority of developing countries in the 1970s. The idea behind the new politics has been to integrate new global capitalism, to seize and direct mass democratization movements, to reduce public demands to make more radical changes at the social level, and to secure the power of the state with controversial transitions of the new supranational centered elites. The more theoretical policy anxiety was a symbol of the efforts of the transnational elites to restructure hegemony with a poliarchic-based, more compromise-based management of authoritarian and dictatorial governments. The transnational elites expect popular classes to be made even more dysfunctional by direct pressures, instead of the willingness, ideological mechanisms, political consensus and irregularity, and restrictions imposed by the global economy (Robinson, 2004).

Poliarchy has been promoted by the supranational elite as a political opposition to neoliberalism, structural adjustment and the free encouragement of transnational institutional accumulations. The United States' democracy promoting intervention in this context facilitates the passage of local- and regional-oriented elites to new groups that are more favorable to the transnational agenda. Under the title "promoting democracy," countries are often targeted by the political intervention of the United States.

Washington wants to disrupt the stability of countries such as Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua in the past years. Groups and individuals who have

contributed to the disruption of the stability of the Jean Bertrand Aristide government and are now in power in Haiti are those who have been looked after and raised by U.S. democracy incentive programs, whose roots date back to the late 1980s, and who have consistently opposed the government of Hugo Chávez. The United States has consistently undertaken this role since the end of the Cold War, with a network of democracy promotion in March 2004 in Venezuela.

The stable dominance of popular, nationalist, revolutionary and other progressive forces, pro-U.S. elites or neoliberal regimes countries that are threatening for. In these countries, neo-liberal elites are supported by political intervention programs. In El Salvador, for example, democracy promotion programs, which took place in the 1990s and early in the 21st century, expanded in 2003 as presidential elections approached. These programs have provided various forms of support to civil and political groups that dominate the governing ARENA party and marginalize the FMLN (Robinson, 2003). Such programs are carried out in dozens of countries.

Change in state and government structures are targeted for transition, ie U.S.-backed and often organized. South Africa and Eastern Europe have entered this category in the 1990s, just as it is now in Iraq. Since the 1980s, the United States and other Western powers have opted not to draw attention to the fact that they promote polyarchic organizations in Latin America (the original testing ground for strategy), Eastern Europe, Africa, and some Asian countries, but so far, monarchies and authoritarian regimes still dominate much of the Middle East.

For example, in the widespread political intervention activities in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the U.S. democracy development apparatus worked through a number of Venezuelan political and civil organizations. The Venezuelan ambassadors were, indeed, responsible for the conduct of some programs in Nicaragua. Like Spanish-

speaking Latin Americans, these operators have succeeded in reaching a level that is impossible for legitimacy, penetration, and gringo.

Washington hopes to integrate global capitalism as desired by the political establishment of the country involved in the intervention through agents affected by programs of democracy promotion, promote local liberal perspectives, and defend policies by local political and civic leaders. These representatives are expected to compete and hold with individuals who may have a separate agenda for more popular, independent, progressive, or radical groups and countries.

It is important to emphasize that many who enter the U.S. democracy promotion programs are not simple puppets of U.S. politics and that their organizations are not necessarily “fronts” or “interruptions,” in the CIA jargon (Robinson, 2004, p. 441). Often they include their own interests and projects in the context of internal political competition and conflict and the true local leaders who want to be influenced by the United States on the domestic scene. Moreover, the old and new middle classes can define their interests in the professional and bureaucratic layers by integrating or reintegrating their countries’ global capitalism under the U.S. canopy. These classes can be politically dispersed or under the influence of opponents and nationalist, popular or radical ideologies. These classes will become a social basis for the internationally elite agenda and become the most urgent targets of a democracy promotion (Robinson, 2004).

CHAPTER 3

Process From the Development of NED With the Democracy Development in the American Foreign Policy

3.1 1980s: Democracy Promotion in Ronald Reagan Period and NED

A U.S. democracy foundation is changing the political landscape of a nation by providing training for party leaders and activists and by organizing political parties, instead of just funding (Samuels & Douglas, 1991). The new foundation is a new democratic organization that also promotes U.S. special groups that have previously participated in state-specific network operations, such as the AFL-CIO and the U.S. business community (U.S. Department of State, 1975). Samuels and Douglas (1981) were trying to make these effective sectors participate in democratic incentive campaigns, advocating that they should focus on disseminating the political model they claim to support the economic framework rather than expanding U.S. economic practices. Although the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is active in defending its economic value in its message and its publications, there is not much discussion about the idea that free trade enterprise can develop under the best pluralist democratic structures. Free business venture is a part of pluralism, but all authoritarian managers prefer hierarchy, centralization, and attestation.

Similarly, much work was done abroad by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)'s American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in Latin America, as well as the American Association of Lutheran Churches (AALC), and by a similar instrument for Asia, the Asian American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI). For these educational programs, "foreign trade unions tended to focus more on the economic role of trade unions than on their political roles and provided adequate ideological guidance" (Samuels & Douglas,

1981, p. 55). On the contrary, “those who graduated from communist training courses had no such doubt” (Samuels & Douglas, 1981, p. 55). In this case, foreign operations were re-politicized and included in a wider democracy project as a result of their inclusion in the new state-private network that the authors wanted to build.

The format of the proposed organization was ideologically coherent, such as Soviet Communism, which separates democracy from its competitors as a project to be governed by private groups rather than government bureaucracies or intelligence agencies: the individual citizenship’s autonomy and the vitality of the civil society arena. In the same vein, CIA officials established a state-specific civil society network before 1967. There were significant differences between the new political intervention model and the proposed new network (Samuels & Douglas, 1981). First, while the private groups have been tactically deployed in a strategic framework established by the state, this strategy is based on the priorities of non-executive intellectuals, not the state.

It is clear that democracy supporters defend the program of democratization between El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua’s 40 geographical points of direct destination for democracy promotion in Central America and the geopolitical concerns of the Reagan administration (Samuels & Douglas, 1981). The goal of democratizing pro-U.S. authoritarian regimes and the attainment of U.S. national security objectives are not the same as in many countries, particularly in the United States. In addition, Samuels and Douglas (1981) have not expressed concern that the Reagan administration is a reflection of the democratic ideology in Western Europe, and that the Reaganites want to support the anti-communist political movements behind Iron Curtain. The neglect of these plans for activities in the Soviet bloc prevented the two sides from proceeding with a truly universal view of all non-

democratic countries. These strategic differences between state and private priorities translated into organizational differences between old and new networks, because the introduction of democracy will work for a more autonomy of democratic incentives for autonomy than earlier autonomies in a strategic framework that does not immediately coincide with national security concerns. While Samuels and Douglas acknowledged the introduction of democracy as “the entry of government policy,” the new democracy promotion agency was said to be “independent of government control” (p. 62). This points to an independent foundation, not a government agency.

Another important distinction between the old and new state-specific organizational models was that the new democratic incentive would be openly supportive, not implicit, to foreign groups. “Obviously, the implicit political aid provided by the U.S. government is limited in its effectiveness, because political movements are disturbed by such direct contacts, fearful of their independence being put at risk” (Samuels & Douglas, 1981, p. 54). As demonstrated by the AFL-CIO’s response to the proposals of the CIA cooperation on Poland and the possible response of Solidarity discussed in the previous section, it is certainly true. However, in common with the previous state-private network, almost all of the funding for the foundation was expected to be provided by the U.S. government. This led to the question of the openness of a private group of government money distributors and the question of why U.S. government officials might be more trustworthy than a pre-1967 organizational model for the introduction of a policy. Samuels and Douglas (1981) did not discuss this situation in depth, but there were some indications of the ideas in this regard. “It is believed that an institution dependent on foreign funds will be more credible to foreign populations than just funding, because it can be difficult to convince local groups that they are speaking locally and that they are interested in the

interests of their country, not foreign interests” (Samuels & Douglas, 1981, pp. 61-62). In addition, there are other entities in which foundations and state funds are brought together and actively functioned, such as the Asian Foundation, the Inter-American Foundation, and the party foundations in West Germany.

Reagan’s speech to the English Parliament on June 8, 1982 followed the strategic and organizational course set out at NSDD-32 in May 1982. The speech was to promote democracy with the support of overseas special groups as an objective of U.S. foreign policy:

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means. (Reagan, 1982, para. 40)

Democracy supporters and organizations trying to create wider foreign policies also decided that the best implementing mechanism for the campaign would be a special structure similar to party foundations in West Germany. Taking the democracy campaign away from the government makes the effort more credible to external democrats and also institutionalizes a wider approach, not the NSC’s narrow anti-communism. In a newspaper article by William Brock at the end of July 1982, the APF provided an organizational model for a specially implemented effort, promoting the advantages of the western German party foundations (Brock, Manatt, & Richards, 1982). According to Brock et al. (1982), such an organization would be more effective than existing foundations and tools in promoting democracy:

West Germany has many other institutions, such as the United States of America, which work in the fields of academic, business, church, labor and

foreign cultural and social development. However, party-related foundations have motivation and expertise to help them escape abstention from other organizations with political venue critical prescriptions. (p. 2)

Although Brock referred to the fact that West German foundations helped democratic parties against the Portuguese Communists in the 1970s, the debate about the benefits of foundations was mainly about the construction of democracy, not just against communism. This approach was in line with the narrow anti-communist suspects characterizing Congressional Democrats. Senator Edward Kennedy's deputy, Brock, briefly stated: "Our concern is that it not become an exercise in Reaganites. . . . We want to see the sophisticated European model adopted and not a return to the 1950s hardline antiCommunist politics" (Brock, 1982, para. 2).

It was seen as a possibility to solve bureaucratic management and credibility, especially to solve problems with clearer political programs, after Reagan's speech, that there was special financing by William Clark (Funigiello, 1988). This idea of a Democracy Fund was put forward by the Ministry of Gerald Helman to be donated by important industrialists and foundations towards the end of November. Helman argued that government funds should go largely to government-backed and controlled projects, but that a special Democracy Fund could be used to finance civil society organizations. The fund must be created using a fund-raising campaign led by the President, along with letters distributed to potential donors. After a core group was formed, there would be a conference in the White House.

This option was supported by the USIA, which believes that it can solve the problem of bureaucratic necessity and provide a way to solve the problem of reliability. USIA argued that the Fund should be used for programs that would be "legally uncertain" if it was enacted by the U.S. government (Kiernan, 1982, n.p.). In

addition, this arrangement will increase the credibility of more controversial projects by minimizing their links to the U.S. government; the USIA stated that “any link between the government and these projects should be avoided for reasons of open credibility” (Kiernan, 1982, n.p.). The lack of direct funding of the U.S. government would increase the credibility of some of the more controversial programs listed for private funding. This organization, including the Free Market Institute, which later became the NED’s International Private Initiative Center and the Central American Democracy Institute, was portrayed as NED’s Democracy School in Venezuela (Funigiello, 1988; Schweizer, 1994).

After this point, it was unlikely that the Democracy Project would be approved by the Congress. Opposition to this was expressed by legislators; the tension between democracy and the promotion of U.S. national interests could not be resolved by the administration. This failure stems from the bureaucratic constraints faced by management in attempts to portray a state-private network previously administered in the CIA and to explicitly implement it through bureaucratic structures not designed to manage such a program. The incompetent nature of a leading agency, whose funding was distributed under the supervision of two committees of different levels to different participating institutions, gave rise to the feeling that such an organizational framework would simply not work in Congress. The government’s financing and coordination of the project also had the risk of destroying its reputation as a serious initiative to promote democracy, rather than an attempt to propagate the propaganda for the interests of the United States. There was no guarantee that foreign private groups or political movements would be willing to accept state resources distributed by a coordinated effort managed by the U.S. national security bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, the main reason for the failure of the Democracy Project was that there was no consensus among Democrats, especially the Executives and Congress members, on how democracy incentives are related to U.S. national security objectives. The campaign offered by the Reagan administration used legitimate propaganda and political initiatives that were hardly dependent on democratic systems in dictatorially governed countries, such as the concept of democracy development to fight the spread of Soviet communism and programs that focused on Western Europe. The narrow nature of this campaign required the establishment of a command center to oversee and limit the actions of the special groups, which proved to be damaging to the credibility of the project and acted in accordance with these priorities. Conversely, Congress preferred a broad campaign aimed at creating democracy in the United States and at the same time friendly dictatorial regimes (USSR) and private groups believed that this campaign would be best implemented in the Reagan administration. Along with the problems that the Democracy Project has experienced, it has opened up an area for promoting private democracy to highlight the democracy promotion's National Endowment for Democracy, which is linked to a broad campaign (USIA, n.d.). Although the USIA document is undated, references within it to Wick's briefings of Congressional committees and the questions they raised about Project Democracy place it as having been drafted after the hearings (Gailey & Rosellini, 1982).

After ten years of failure following a successful foreign policy renewal, President Ronald Reagan began his 8-year mandate, which was determined to return to the traditional Cold War origins of the U.S. policy. The Reagan administration had clearly rejected Nixon's détente and Carter's emphasis on human rights and had begun to seek a full return to a traditional Cold War foreign policy (Anderson &

Kernek, 1985; Williams, 1987; Zakaria, 1990). The power of the Sandinists in Nicaragua and the powerful communist movements in Guatemala and El Salvador convinced Reagan to apply his old foreign policy.

Despite the fact that the Soviets attempted to undermine U.S. security by ideologically capturing Central America, friendly relations were established with anti-communist dictators, whom President Carter discussed in the late 1970s on human rights issues, to combat the aggression of Soviet influence. Reagan's foreign policy in the mid-1980s valued anti-communism over democracy and free markets, as it was during the days of the other U.S. Presidents during the Cold War, and focused externally on keeping Soviet influence under control.

The main foreign policy doctrine for the struggle with Soviet expansion was the Reagan Doctrine. The United States has said it will aggressively support anti-communist revolutionary movements in developing countries. In doing so, the Reagan administration hoped to "turn-the-tables" in the Soviet Union and put forth the threat of the same expansion against the Soviets towards the United States (Cox, 1990, p. 34; Lagon, 1992; Williams, 1987). In the eyes of many observers, the aggressiveness of the Reagan Doctrine and the intense anti-Soviet explanations of President Reagan initiated a second Cold War (Ward & Rajmaira, 1992).

In the second period of Reagan, a more moderate U.S. foreign policy emerged. As relations with the Soviet Union developed, the government's modest support for anti-communism in Central America was modeled as a genuine boost to democracy and economic freedom in the region (Anderson & Kernek, 1985; Lafeber, 1984; Zakaria, 1990). Reagan was the center of the democracy promotion in Central America. The first use was in 1982 when the United States automates electoral enrollment in El Salvador's election to the Constituent Assembly. In the mid- and late

1980s the United States expanded the use of electoral assistance and provided assistance to Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, and Chile (Carothers, 1991).

The Reagan administration extended this pro-democracy aid to a few countries outside of Central America. The most notable example is the Philippines. The U.S. election aids helped to create the illegal structure of the elections and led to the defeat of the Marcos regime in later elections. Because the U.S. electoral aid was influential in the collapse of an enthusiastic, anticommunist U.S. allies, the international community gave a great deal of faith, seeing it as a legitimate tool to encourage open and honest choices for future U.S. election aids. In other Asian countries, however, the United States has worked hard to promote democracy, and whether it is democratic or non-democratic has pursued the Cold War strategy to support anti-communists (Carothers, 2003; Jacoby, 1986; Zakaria, 1990).

The real support for the Reagan administration's democracy and economic freedom in the second half of the 1980s was not surprisingly the international gathering. During his first term, Reagan spoke openly to the British Parliament that the United States would go to the aid of reformers around the world in the struggle for democracy and economic liberty, and that it would be "a crusade for freedom" (Kondracke, 1989, p. 10; Weigel, 1993). Reagan followed this by offering two conferences to the Congress, which aimed at realizing this crusade. The first proposal was entitled Project Democracy. This comprehensive program was to be coordinated by (USIA) and would be the center of U.S. democracy and economic freedom-promoting efforts. The second proposal was to build a structure that would coordinate and provide democracy and a means to promote free markets in a more indirect, non-governmental way. The book aims to create NED, a foundation that will encourage

democracy by buying and disseminating films and other materials to reformers around the world (Palmer, 1993).

Ironically, Project Democracy, despite being a more comprehensive proposal, failed (but was later accepted), as well as the second proposal, NED, which passed immediately (Carothers, 1994). This resulted in the NED becoming the main focus of the United States' efforts to promote democracy and economic freedom around the world. As a semi-official organization, the activities of the NED are separate from the U.S. government and the details of its activities are not publicly available. While the Reagan administration used formal U.S. foreign policy in the late 1980s to promote democracy and economic freedom in Central America and other countries, the NED is already active in promoting democracy and free markets around the world. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the NED was helping reformers in the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (Carothers, 2003), although the U.S. official foreign policy did not allow the United States to participate in these communist countries.

3.2 The NED as a Democratic Corporate Umbrella

The idea of democracy promotion is different from the efforts to shape interventions or developments in other country policies, such as secret CIA operations, nation building politics originating from modernization theory, and human rights campaigns. The groups supported by the CIA focused on strengthened and coordinated civil society to combat communism. The aim of modernization policies was to create modern, anti-communist states (socioeconomic transformation of rapidly decolonized third world countries with democratic reforms), and human rights campaigns aimed at oppressing existent governments based on social and economic rights and popular freedom. The development of democracy has focused on the

establishment of democratic systems in overseas countries with specific political elites, supporting foreign political actors.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the American democracy initiative became an institution that was institutionalized in American foreign policy in order to support democratic structures in eastern Europe and to promote the liberal system. For the United States, democracy aid is a national security issue. According to the theory of democratic peace, democratic countries do not fight each other. For this reason, the support of democracy has become indispensable for U.S. national security (Robinson, 2004).

There are two models of institutionalization for the promoting of democracy. The first is the field-based structures, such as the NDI, which are centralized in Washington and the other countries, and the second is the independent grant-making organizations that have only a central office and work with local partners such as the NED (Haring, 2013).

According to William Robinson (2004):

The aim behind the new politics is not to try and to use, to mislead and direct the struggles of collective democratization, to reduce the demands of the people to make radical changes in the social order, to secure the state power through the highly controversial transitions of the rising transnational oriented elites. (p. 442).

Robinson (2004) described democracy promotion as “the power to integrate (or reintegrate) the new global capitalism” (p. 442). The policy concern in the more theoretical abstracts represents an effort to transform hegemony by a transnational elite with a change in political dominance, evolving from systems of compulsory

social control imposed by authoritarian and dictatorial regimes to systems based on more polyarchic consensus.

The debate about the promotion of democracy at the beginning of the 1980s constitutes a case study that can be used to examine the comprehension and functioning of democracy as an element of national security strategy. The concept of democracy development was different from earlier attempts to intervene in the politics of foreign countries and it shaped the development of foreign nations carried out with earlier methods such as secret CIA operations, nation building politics informed by the theory of modernization, and campaigns for Human Rights. The support given by the CIA to foreign groups focused on strengthening and jointly monitoring civil society to launch an ideological war on foreign civil society to protect against communism. Modernization policies aimed at creating modern and anti-communist nation states in the rapidly decolonizing Third World, with a wide range of measures aimed at socioeconomic transformations as preconditions for democratic reform. The Human Rights campaign was based on a widespread conceptual understanding of social and economic rights and civil liberties and was often made operational in an attempt to force the most oppressive practices of the in-service governments to scale. These policies, unlike previous tactics and paradigms, focused on the creation of democratic systems in other countries by attempting to make narrow political changes in target countries with the support of political groups abroad. These old policies were often concerned with the place where democracy was approaching a certain entity or region in the United States, and the United States generally did not fully comply with other national security interests. In contrast, the debate on democracy promotion has given a different perspective to the re-evaluation at the strategic level between democracy promotion and U.S. national security.

The need for such a reassessment was influenced by two trends that developed in the 1970s: first, the emergence of a more threatening strategic environment in the United States, due to the increasing power of the Soviet Union and the wave of Third World revolutions since the Vietnam War; the second trend was that there was no consensus among American elites on U.S. foreign policy or how to confront it, because of the fragmentation of ideological reconciliation that previously legitimized an activist foreign policy as a defense of democracy.

These trends were important during the Reagan administration, which firstly hampered the activist national security strategy, attempts to justify democracy as a projection against communism, internal criticism from other elite groups about how domestic divisions and democracy relate to U.S. interests. It was the creation of a new vision of the promotion of democracy by a network of U.S. special groups and individuals, who seemed able to resolve these tensions. Rather than addressing this network with an in-case approach, the government has offered an element that lacks – a strategic framework that can integrate and integrate these problematic cases into a wider vision that addresses democracy, incentives and national security at a strategic level. The following discussion and negotiation process constituted the first serious attempt by policy makers and private groups in the United States and brought a strategic approach to the development of democracy for the benefit of national security.

This process also led to the emergence of new organizational dynamics among state and private groups dealing with foreign political intervention institutionalized in an organization that focused on introducing new tactical approaches to the promotion of democracy and promoting democracy abroad as overseas mission abroad: National Support for Democracy. This period of formation was largely neglected by academics

who had favored the introduction of U.S. democracy after the founding of the NED in 1983, but it was important to examine the relationship between the strategic, tactical, and bureaucratic / organizational dimensions of the problem by providing democracy and national security in U.S. foreign policy. Is a case study.

In this process, the role of private powers and scholarships linked to the state-private network also offer the opportunity to expand on the elite in U.S. foreign policy formation. While the state-private network means the co-financing of political activities by the U.S. government and private groups and the general direction of government, private groups provide the necessary credibility and reasonable denial to engage with overseas groups. This network is less likely to engage directly with the American government. This concept applies to the NED, which is legally controlled by special forces but funded by the U.S. government. However, much of the academic work on the state-private network has been a temporary effort by the CIA to develop anti-communist propaganda operations in Western Europe and the Third World from 1940 to 1967 concentrated on the series of hidden alliances (Robinson, 2006). These works usually end in 1967 and are often conceptualized as a final point of a public-private network, which is generally caused by the discomfort of the public's implicit operations and the cancellation of such secret relations by the Johnson administration. While the NED's state-private network perspective broadens this area chronologically, at the same time, the interaction in the mission of promoting the creation of democratic political structures in offshore countries, a more radical goal in U.S. political culture, to confront the state-specific relations that transcend the mission of focusing on the perceived state-specific area.

However, the biggest difference between the two networks was that unlike in the 1950s and 1960s, in the 1970s and early 1980s groups were temporarily hired to

take strategic and tactical decisions already made by the authorities, mandated by the CIA. Special forces also participated in the strategy and network shaping process in this sense. This puts forth a second general question: a political/propaganda campaign based on a narrow anti-Sovietism of the Reagan administration, where an elite section of the United States set the democratic incentive agenda (Robinson, 2006). Such a view is that the strategic long-term options of U.S. foreign policy is based on how the power is exercised in the United States. It is a distinguished network of political discussion groups, think tanks, and institutional structures.

Finally, when the origins of the NED are examined, it is possible to participate in academic discussions on whether the political reform that the United States promoted overseas is limited to the interests of the United States. Some scholars have argued that the U.S. democracy promotion has resulted in “low intensity democracies” in which the active forces are exercised by the elite, and that socioeconomic reforms such as land reform can not be sustained (Robinson, 2004 , p. 441).

3.3 The NED’s Founding Dynamics and Foundation

On June 8, 1982, United States President Ronald Reagan spoke at the English House of Commons. In his speech, Reagan argued that the United States would go to the aid of democrats around the world in the struggle for freedom, and that for this a “crusade for freedom” should begin (Kondracke, 1989, p. 10; Weigel, 1993). Following his talk, the Reagan administration presented two policy suggestions to the Congress aimed at achieving this crusade.

The first proposal was the Democracy Project. This comprehensive program will be coordinated by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and will be at the center of U.S. efforts to promote freedom (Carothers 1994). The second proposal meant to

promote Project Democracy by providing a means to encourage freedom more indirectly, nongovernmentally. The proposal sought to create the NED, a foundation that promotes democratic publications, books, films and other materials to free reformers around the world free of charge and to promote political and economic freedom by spreading them (Palmer, 1993). Both proposals were first discussed at the Congress in 1983. Ironically, the broader proposal, Project Democracy, failed (but was later congressional). However, the second proposal, NED, has just passed (Carothers, 1994). This resulted in the NED becoming the primary focal point of the United States' efforts to improve the world's freedoms.

The National Democracy Fund (NED) is a semi-public entity that promotes democracy and economic freedom in the world. Since its inception, the organization has been subject to much controversy. This section will elaborate on the root, mission, history, and controversies surrounding the NED. It shows that further research on the purpose, organization, and activities of the department is required.

It is difficult to compile an objective overview of the NED because a great majority of information about the organization comes from sources that are extremely critical to the organization. Unfortunately, as NED critics are criticized, the NED and its supporters are not loyal to the organization. This is because the negative information on the NED is abundant and there is little positive information. The following overview attempts to fairly represent both the NED's critics and supporters, but a lack of positive information about the organization makes it extremely difficult.

Finally, the NED began to organize regular conferences that allow democrats to communicate with each other. At these conferences, a face-to-face interaction is expected, allowing a greater link among democrats who feel a sense of solidarity with the democratic movement (National Endowment for Democracy, 2016). As a result of

these efforts, the NED has become a “democratic ideology center” that puts most of the intellectual thinking about democratization into practice and serves as an important source of many democracy movements (Robinson, 1996b, p. 99). Partly due to the work of the NED, a more unified movement for democracy can be seen in the world; a “democratic international” is beginning to emerge (Diamond, 1992, p. 41).

NED appeared in 1983. Its mission is to help “develop democratic institutions, procedures and values” in other countries (National Endowment for Democracy, 2016, para. 2). This means that the NED financially supports projects that are trying to expand political and economic freedom in countries around the world. The NED defines democracy in the following way:

The right of people to determine their own fate freely: The application of this right requires a system guaranteeing freedom of expression, freedom of belief and association, free and competitive choice, freedom to respect the indivisible rights of individuals and minorities, free communication media and the rule of law. The NED argues that the open-minded competition in society for adaptation of a democratic system to “local needs and traditions” and the development of freedoms must be in groups and in ideas. The NED is a kind of political aid that aims to improve the mechanism of democracy in a society. While a “political aid” is used to describe the activities of the NED, a more accurate and clear account of the activities of the NED will be “to help democratic consolidation” because all NED activities have encouraged democracy by helping an entire country become a fully fledged country (Carothers, 1995, p. 66).

The assistance of the NED usually takes three forms. First, it helps to develop the political institutions necessary for democracy, focusing on the development of

meaningful political parties. (Diamond, 1995). Second, it helps to prepare, implement and monitor elections to ensure fair results (Diamond, 1995). This “election aid” is the most common form of assistance provided by the NED in the last decade (Carothers, 1995, p. 66). The third, the NED, helps civil society strengthen by helping the development and development of independent organizations. These independent organizations help to promote public awareness of both their rights and their actions, encourage a tolerant political environment conducive to concessions, and mobilize groups outside the political arena – usually women and minorities (Diamond, 1995).

In addition to political assistance, the NED also offers ideological assistance to democrats around the world. The aim of the NED (2016) was to create a “worldwide democratic society” (para. 2) that shared ideas, experiences, and resources on how democracy can be achieved and sustained since its foundation. To achieve this goal, the NED began publishing the *Democracy Magazine* as a resource that democrats could use to provide the latest information on the latest academic work on the struggle for democracy and democratization around the world. It established the Democracy Resource Center as a center of information and communication that would be useful for those struggling for democracy.

The NED is financed by an annual Congress fee, which is in direct contact with the U.S. government. There is an independent board that controls day-to-day operations (Carothers, 1994; Diamond, 1995; Muravchik, 1992). The financing of the NED and consolidation of the private control led to the classification of a controversial issue.

The NED is perceived as follows by Washington DC, although it does not claim to be an arm of the U.S. government (Muravchik, 1992; NED, 2016) by supporters of NED (Carothers, 1994; Robinson, 1996), and more importantly, by the

leaders of every part of the world. Correct representation of the NED's status means that the establishment is completely dependent on the U.S. government and can not be categorized completely independently of the U.S. government. The NED should be classified as a non-governmental organization (Robinson, 1996a; Weigel, 1993), because it has freedom to be independent of the U.S. government, in order to decide whether or not to use the fund for funding.

3.4 Political Interventionism in the U.S. Foreign Policy and the NED

Democracy promotion programs involve several stages in policy design, finance, operational activity and influence. The first includes the top levels of the U.S. state apparatus, the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and some other government branches. The need to undertake political intervention through promoting democracy in particular countries and regions is generally defined at this level as a component of the general policy towards the country or region in question. Such democracy development programs never stop themselves; they are always only one direction of larger U.S. foreign policy operations and are synchronized with military, economic and other dimensions. In particular, Washington's economic policy implications in relation to the development of democracy include the implementation of economic policies, the various carrot programs and sanctions, and the stick embargo. In the second stage, hundreds of millions of dollars are allocated to the U.S. International Development Agency (AID), either directly or through the National Democracy Foundation (NED), or from time to time, the U.S. Peace Institute (USIP), with seemingly private organizations closely linked to the policymaking organization and in line with U.S. foreign policy. The NED was created as a central body or exchange center in 1983 for new forms of democratic political interventions abroad. Prior to the establishment of

the NED, the CIA regularly provided funding and guidance for U.S. political parties, business councils, trade unions, students, and civilian groups.

In the 1980s, a significant number of these programs were shifted from the CIA to AID and the NED, and the CIA was often much more sophisticated than its hard operations. Among the organizations that receive AID and NED funds, among them are the NRI, the International Institute of International Studies (IRI) and the International Relations National Democratic Institute (NDI), also known as the International Republic Institute or IRI, (IFES), the Center for Democracy (CFD), the Center for International Private Institutions (CIPE), and the Institute for Free Trade Unions (FTUI). For example, on March 20, 2004, the *Los Angeles Times* linked to the new political intervention Larry Diamond, who reported that he brought democracy to Iraq in January to tell “the leader of the 700 Iraqi tribal leaders,” most of whom “wore western workwear underwear” (*Los Angeles Times*, 2004, March 20, n.p.). These private organizations are likely to be in Iraq, although sponsored by the Pentagon Iraq Media Network, which launched a \$200 million initiative by Pentagon contractors to establish a network of pro-U.S. and soft media organizations and contribute to national and international reporting on events in the country. In the third stage, these U.S. organizations provide donations through funding, guidance, and political sponsorship to a number of organizations in the intervening country. These organizations may have existed before and may penetrate through democracy development programs and may have new paths to U.S. foreign policy designs, or they may have been created entirely from scratch.

These organizations include local political parties and coalitions, trade unions, trade councils, media organs, professional and non-governmental organizations, student groups, peasant groups, and human rights groups. Most of these groups can

define themselves as non-partisans (Robinson, 2004). They may be related to local political trends, but not in terms of general U.S. policy objectives. When elections are made, the network of interventions always finances electoral observations and forms groups of self-interested who appear as local non-partisan democratic citizen groups, but play a central facilitator and legitimate role in the program (Robinson, 2004).



CHAPTER 4

During Chávez Administration Venezuela-U.S. Relations Context of the NED

Instead of just changing the “communist threat” in post-Cold War U.S. politics, new threats such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorism have emerged. But the most important issue that determines the United States’ Latin American policies continues to be the “security” issue. (Crandall, 2008, p. 6). The promise of security is better understood in an interview with Tim Reiser, Foreign Policy Advisor of the Democratic Party Senator Patrick Leahy, in 2007: “Post-Cold War developments, the most important thing about US governments in Latin America is that they can increase the profits of US companies” (Crandall, 2008, p. 6). In 2008, U.S. firms made \$273 billion worth of investment in Latin America. These figures constitute 20 percent of the total exports of the United States and are equivalent to four times the U.S. exports to China (Lowenthal, 2009). Latin America is also the main source of energy for the United States, because the United States meets more than a quarter of its energy needs from Latin American countries. From this point of view, the decisive factors in U.S. policy towards Latin America, even though it has its own dynamics in every period, are mainly economic.

Latin American countries have significant consequences in terms of their political history of having the United States in the same hemisphere. The United States and Latin American countries that won the struggle for their independence against Europe share a common history in this sense. However, with the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, a new era has begun to eradicate the sovereignty of the European states in the region and to elevate the United States as a judge. According to this foreign policy understanding, which was born out of the

message that Congressman James Monroe, the 5th President of the United States, presented on December 2, 1823, European countries would not be allowed to acquire new colonies within the Americas, and they would also be opposed to interfering with the governments in the region.

The Monroe Doctrine, in this regard, was preparing the region's administrations for the confusion of the European states and the United States for its involvement. Because, as is clearly stated in his doctrine, any colonial attempt would find the United States against European states (Kelly & Romero, 2002). Indeed, during the 19th century, the U.S. administration often interfered with the Latin American countries by resorting to the Monroe Doctrine.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Theodore Roosevelt's administration extended the scope of the Monroe Doctrine to explain that if any state in Central and South America could not gain U.S. confidence in terms of social and political structure, the United States would intervene. The result of Roosevelt's departure from the Monroe Doctrine is called the Roosevelt Corollary, and it is known as the Big Stick (political force based on force) if it is hegemony connected with this politics. The big-stick policy has stiffened the U.S. presence in the region; American intervention on the continent was driven by Nicaragua in 1912, Haiti in 1914, and the Dominican Republic in 1916. These interventions were later called Banana Wars. For this reason America's geography began to be defined as the back garden of the United States.

The American administration adopted a policy in 1934 that promoted pro-U.S. movements, instead of direct intervention in southern countries after Franklin D. Roosevelt declared good neighborliness with Latin American countries. However, U.S. politics for the region, shaped in the direction of the struggle with security and

communism during the Cold War, brought hard interventions again. Following the destruction of the Batista dictatorship supported by the United States in 1959 by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, many Latin American countries were subjected to direct intervention by the US administration, which did not want another Cuba in the region. At the beginning of the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy declared Latin America “the most dangerous region in the world” (Rabe, 1999, p. 7). As a result of U.S. policies, this “dangerous zone” became one of the most intense regions of the Cold War. The Missile Crisis that broke out in Cuba in 1962 is considered to be the pinnacle of the Cold War, as it threatens the entire world by bringing two super powers to face (Rabe, 1999, p. 7).

4.1 Venezuela -U.S. Relations to the Chávez Period from the Punto Fijo Pact

In Venezuela, the Punto Fijo governments have always been in close contact with the United States, as opposed to other Latin American countries. Rómulo Betancourt had developed a friendship relationship with Nelson Rockefeller, one of the most important figures of the U.S. foreign policy, during the triennial period in power between 1945 and 1948. Betancourt, who resumed his presidential seat at the beginning of the Punto Fijo era, was in close contact with U.S. President Kennedy. Especially during the 1960s, no Latin American leader saw the pro-U.S. democratic style and politics as he did (Ellner & Salas, 2007). So, with the decision known as the Betancourt Doctrine, he declared on February 13, 1959, that he had abandoned all the diplomatic relations with Cuba and that Venezuela would not have diplomatic relations with any government that is the product of the coup (Ellner & Salas, 2007; Groscors, 1999). During the Punto Fijo period, governments tried to exploit the benefits of being close to U.S. hegemony, while the U.S. administration offered

Venezuela as a “model democracy” for regional countries (Ellner & Salas, 2007, p. 7; Lombardi, Ellner, & Hellinger, 2003).

4.1.1 The Rise of the U.S. Opposition in Latin America in 1990

When the 1990s came to an international environment reshaped in the post-Cold War era, while the United States continued to be active in Latin America, mutual relations were dragged into a more complex structure. A new national security perception has developed in U.S. foreign policy, which has abandoned a security approach based on anti-communism, through the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime and the policy towards regional countries has shaped this framework.

Because the Latin American peoples were directly influenced by the economic and political policies of the United States throughout their history, the anger and imperialism opposition to the direct United States was much stronger in this geography. There was a great deal of anger against U.S. policies, especially the free market policies of the Washington Consensus, since many Latin American countries had been the scene of massive uprisings, popular uprisings, and general strikes since the late 1990s (Topal, 2007). The economic and political restructuring process deepened the economic crisis in the 1990s and increased inequalities in income distribution, which accelerated the anti-neoliberal social movements (Topal, 2007). In the post-Cold War international arena, there was a great opportunity for populist leaders like Chávez to use this anti-U.S. opposition.

Chávez’s rise to power can also be considered as a breaking point when one looks at the history of Venezuelan-U.S. relations. As such, Venezuela, which has been regarded as one of the closest allies of the United States throughout history, has become one of the countries where the United States has had the most tension in bilateral relations since the development of Chávez’s power.

4.2 Conjunctural Factors in Chávez 's Power

Analyses to understand the dynamics that brought Chávez to power in Venezuela are usually handled in the context of the new international climate that emerged after the Cold War and the populist left wave rising in Latin America in the 21st century. However, in order to explain the rise of Chávez, it is necessary to consider the socioeconomic and political conditions unique to Venezuela before regional and international conditions. It is no coincidence that an actor like Chávez appears in Venezuela, not in any Latin American country.

4.2.1 Socioeconomic and Political Situation

Venezuela is generally distinguished from other Latin American countries in terms of many facts and processes, such as the dictatorship, military battles, the transition to democracy, and relations with the United States. This has a great effect on the specific socioeconomic conditions caused by Venezuela being the only major oil state in the region. Since the late 1950s, the 40-year political tradition of the ongoing nation has created a political system unparalleled in the political history of the region. The resolutions that started in these systems at the end of the 1980s laid the groundwork for the emergence of new political actors such as Chávez.

4.2.2. Political Process and Reflections of “Exceptional Democracy”

Experience

Venezuela had a stable democratic system since the 1960s, while most Latin American countries were ruled by military dictatorships during the 1970s, and Latin American politics was the scene of the shocks and crises that followed. This process, which began with the signing of the Punto Fijo Pact in 1958, has been shown as an exemplary democracy in all Latin American countries. The first experience of democracy in Venezuela came between 1945 and 1948 in the three-year period called

trienio, under the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt in the ruling Social Democratic Party AD (Party of Democratic Action). In 1945, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, who came to power with the help of a military coup d'état, was removed from power after three years by Pérez Jiménez on 27 November 1948 (Ewell, 1977). The military junta, which seized power for many reasons, including the fall in military expenditure, Pérez Jiménez was declared president on April 19, 1953, although he lost in the elections. Pérez Jiménez, who acquired a dictatorial power with the amendments he made to the Constitution after his arrival, had to leave the country after the rebellion of the generals in January 1958.

Shortly before the elections in December 1958, Venezuela's three major parties signed an agreement on October 31, 1958 called the Punto Fijo Pact, in order to prevent further retaliation of the impacts that led to the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. According to Pact, who was signed by AD leader Rómulo Betancourt, leader of COPEI (Socialist Christian Party of Venezuela) Rafael Caldera and leader of URD (Democratic Republican Union) Jóvito Villalba, the winning party will include other party representatives signing the agreement and a broad coalition government. The Punto Fijo Pak, which seemed to have an inclusive feature, was inherently exclusive. In time, the center left party URD was excommunicated from the Pact, so that Venezuelan politics had for centuries been the center right party; The Social-Christian party has progressively moved away from the COPEI and Social-Democratic identity, guaranteeing the rule of AD, which pioneered neoliberal policies in Venezuela in the late 1980s. One of the distinguishing features of this period was that most of the leftist party in the country, especially the Communist Party, was being repressed (Hellinger, 2003). The president of the triennial period known as the father of Venezuela democracy and the first president of Punto Fijo, Rómulo Betancourt, During the

1960s (Levine, 1999). Throughout the Punto Fijo period the idea of Venezuela being different from other Latin American countries in terms of political maturity and economic sufficiency was put forward (Naim & Pinango, 1984). Later on, exceptional democracy and Venezuelan exceptionalism, distinguishing Venezuela from other Latin countries was that it had a healthy, Western-style democratic system and a strong political culture, no class divisions, no fascist conflicts, no ultranationalist and populist administrations (Ellner, 1989). The Punto Fijo regime operated smoothly from the 1960s to the political crisis at the end of the 1980s, during which there were no military impacts and the AD and COPEI together reached rates of up to 90 percent (Ellner & Salas, 2010). Since the mid-1980s, political parties failed to respond to economic problems. The ending of the Punto Fijo system began, and this process led to a massive popular uprising and social polarization after the economic crisis in Venezuela. Since this date, political parties have become unable to represent the people, and the exceptional democracy theory, which emphasizes that Venezuela should be an example to other Latin American countries politically and economically, was completely shaken.

4.3 The Dissolution and Collapse of “Exceptional Democracy” and Punto Fijo Process

In Venezuela, political parties have a traditionally rigidly structured hierarchy and an extreme discipline; So small groups with different ideas within large parties often caused internal conflicts and divisions (Tanaka, 2006). The parties that separated as thoughts and could not express them clearly in the party or lost their internal fighting and weakened their position at the party preferred to try their luck outside the party. This process of struggle and separation in the big parties has accelerated since the early 1990s, facilitating the rise of new political actors such as

Chávez and accelerating the transformation of the current political and institutional order.

In addition to this, some of the basic features that provided the continuation of the Punto Fijo system during the period of 1958-1988 include the dynamics that brought about the same system. According to scholars such as Ellner (1997) and Crisp and Levine (1998), this experience of democracy in Venezuela from the 1960s to the late 1980s contains elements that explain the political crisis of the 1990s and the emergence of new political actors. Above all, the elitist structure has led to the formation of a highly centralized and isolated political structure (Ellner & Hellinger, 2003). Again, according to Ellner and Hellinger (2003), political leaders have tried to establish a strong central government with the rhetoric of lecturing from the past and failing to parade down the opposition voices that want political reforms to be left out of the decision-making process. However, in the mid-1980s, the necessity of a number of political reforms came to the fore, and in 1984 the Commission for the Reformation of the State (Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado) was established. Targeting to open a closed and oppressive political system, controlled by political parties, called the Partyocracy, the Commission has made many important structural institutional changes, leading party leaders to lose their power.

The direct election of state directors and mayors in 1989 was by appointment; in 1993, voting in the National Assembly was provided. All these reforms have been one of the reasons for the collapse of the party system in the long run, increasing tensions and conflicts within the party. The ongoing economic crisis along with the political tensions caused by party reforms has also accelerated Chávez's process of power.

Moreover, according to Tanaka (2006), one of the most important factors we need to consider for the process of bringing Chávez to power is that he should return to the political scene as Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989 and Rafael Caldera's president in 1993. According to Article 185 of the 1961 Constitution, the president could only be re-elected ten years later. The reason for the inclusion of such material in the Constitution is that the dictatorial troops, called caudillo, have been in power for a long time. The passivity of Pérez and Caldera, who, after ten years of sitting in the chair of the presidency again, lost its former political powers, created a favorable environment for the rise of new political actors. Moreover, control of petroleum income was one of the most important factors that provided the continuity of the Punto Fijo system, and the 1980s government's loss of control of oil revenues was one of the most important factors bringing the end of the current system.

In Venezuela, oil has always been politics-based, playing a big role in determining the politics of governments. Throughout the 1970s, when oil prices reached record levels, the Punto Fijo governments achieved a great deal of excellence, benefiting from every area of increased oil revenues. Oil revenues in Venezuela rose from \$ 1.4 million in 1970 to \$9 million (Mommer, 2003). On October 15, 1973, OPEC members doubled Venezuela's oil revenues in the face of rising price increases as Arab countries declared oil embargo on the United States (Wilpert, 2010). In Venezuela, Has launched a development plan with the project named "La Gran Venezuela" (Grand Venezuela) by Andrés Pérez government, which benefited from these unexpected price increases. In order to maximize oil revenues under this scheme, the process of publicization of the petroleum industry was initiated on 1 January 1976 and the state-owned oil company PdVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, Venezuela Petroleum) was established. However, as oil prices began to fall sharply in

the 1980s, the situation turned out to be reversed and the public financing provided by the “oil state” resources began to come out of control. In 1983, PdVSA was the only large and powerful institution in the country, and the government wanted to take advantage of PdVSA’s investment funds to combat the financial crisis. But the company executives have invested outside Venezuela to protect their incomes, opening the company to the international market (Mommer, 2003). In this case, the government could not control the petroleum industry when it expropriated, nor could it reach the oil revenues, which had already declined as the oil prices began to fall. The struggle to control the oil revenues between the government and the PdVSA executives has made PdVSA managers one of the biggest opponents of the Punto Fijo system. If Chávez is thought to organize the Bolivarian movement in 1982, it can be said that these two fractures in the Punto System are synchronous.

4.4 The El Caracazo Uprising Against Neoliberal Politics

The 1980s were difficult not only for Venezuela, but for all Latin American countries, with many economic tribulations, such as financial meltdowns, debt crises, and excessive inflation, and were thus called lost periods. Starting in this period, many Latin American leaders throughout the 1990s had to accept the U.S. administration’s neoliberal economic reforms implemented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank programs. Prepared by former IMF consultant John Williamson in 1989, known as the Washington Consensus, this 10-point economic program included reforms that needed to be followed by countries under large external debt. The Washington Consensus, which envisages arrangements in areas such as fiscal discipline, restraining the budget deficit, reducing public expenditure, setting interest rates on the market, switching to competitive foreign exchange, liberalizing trade, inviting foreign direct investment, privatizing state-

Venezuela was one of the first countries to implement it. The first steps towards market economy in Venezuela were neoliberal reforms implemented by shock therapy by Carlos Andrés Pérez, who, for the second time, was sitting in the seat of the presidency in February 1989 (Ellner, 2001). Pérez accepted the program of the IMF and the World Bank because of the depletion of the country's central bank foreign exchange reserves. This widespread change in economic policies was referred to as the *gran gravey* (great turn). Within the context of this great return, the oil industry of the country opened again with foreign investors. Thus, in the first period when he was in power, Pérez, who had a period of prosperity and expropriated the oil industry due to the increase in oil revenues, now had to privatize the oil industry to get out of the economic crisis. Pérez's decision to reform the market was also diverging from his own party AD, which has followed an economic policy since 1958 to protect the statist, the interventionist and the national industry. As a result, there were many problems within the party (Tanaka, 2006). As a result of the implementation of the economic program called neo-liberal reforms in the fields of trade, budget deficit, finance and labor and the implementation of the economic program called *El Paquete* (package), inflation rose to 84 percent in 1989 (Perez, 2006). Gasoline prices have begun to rise. Since the country is in the position of an oil producer, the rapid increase in gasoline prices, which are always below international prices, has also been reflected in the public transport system (Ellner & Hellinger, 2003). A group protesting the hikes of 30 to 100 percent of public transportation vehicles in Caracas on 27 February 1989 itself spontaneously turned into a major uprising. Raise was the only trigger of this uprising (Norden, 2003).

Because of the financial crisis, unemployment, diminished job opportunities, increasing crime rates, the middle class began to shrink gradually and the inequalities

in income distribution increased rapidly. In 1989, the poorest 20 percent of Venezuela had 4.8 percent of national income, while the richest 20 per cent held 49.5 percent of national income (Marquez, 2003). For all these reasons, people living on the border of extreme poverty led to this rebellion, and this rebellion showed itself exacerbated after the last set times.

The journalists described the day of the uprising as “the day the slums came down from the hills” (Marquez, 2003, p. 201). For five days, the Venezuelans made street shows, looted their shops, and smashed windows. Pérez wanted Defense Minister Italo del Valle Alliegro to come into action when the police could not manage the uprising. Alliegro used the armed forces of the country against the people, and 396 people lost their lives in Caracas according to official figures during the suppression of the rebellion (Maya, 2003). Thousands of people were murdered when soldiers were sneaked into squatter houses, surrounded by governmental lodgings. The bodies were buried before identification and the great human loss in the uprising only occurred after mass graves were opened. *Newsweek* announced the uprising, known as El Caracazo, as “the most stable democracy in Latin America has exploded” (*Newsweek*, 1989, n.p.). Such a revolt in a democratic regime has deeply shaken many fundamental ideas about the current system in Venezuela. The uprising showed that in Venezuela there was a deep social polarization that was deeply growing behind the increasing political polarization in the 1980s.

February 27, 1989 was a major breakthrough in both political and social space. During the 1990s, social polarization has begun to manifest itself in many areas. As the informal economy grew and social inequality grew, social classes began to approach each other with anger and hatred (Ellner, 2003). In addition, the government’s use of the army against the people led to a rage in the army led by

Colonel Hugo Chávez (Ellner, 2003). Chávez's Impact Initiative Chávez's exit to the political scene occurred on February 4, 1992, with a coup attempt against the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez (Norden, 2003).

Hugo Chávez was born on July 29, 1954 as a child of a provincial, lower-middle class family, and in 1970, at the age of 17, he entered the Military Academy. Chávez, who graduated from military school as a lieutenant in 1975, was sent to combat a small guerrilla organization on the eastern border of Venezuela that same year. Chávez began to sympathize with the guerrillas and question the role of the army during his mission. In the following period Chávez, Alfredo Maneiro, and Douglas Bravo came up with many guerrilla leaders (Raby, 2006). On December 17, 1982, three of his friends, Captains like him, together with Jesus Urdanita Hernandez, Felipe Acosta Carles, and Raul Baduel, formed the Bolivarian Army-200 (Ejercito Bolivariano-200). The organization then expanded to MBR 200 (Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200, Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200). The ideology of movement originated from the revolutionary ideology of Venezuela and Latin America, based on the ideal of popular sovereignty, social justice, and corruption. El Caracazo mobilized the MBR-200 to suppress the popular uprising and bloodshed, establishing relations with civilian groups. Under Chávez's leadership on February 4, 1992, the members of the MBR-200 took control over almost every part of the capital Caracas, but failed to reach the Presidential Palace (Maya, 2003). This coup attempt was wounded by Chávez's coup attempt, supported by those people who blamed politicians for failing economics, and the first major blow to the popular uprising. The Punto Fijo government's speeches have called the people to be a whole against the coup plotters by developing a discourse that the democracy is in danger after the coup d'état. But Chávez's actual defeat has already turned him into a folk

hero. Chávez, who assumed responsibility for the coup after he was arrested and said that he had failed for now, gave birth to a new hope for the masses. The sympathies of Chávez were increasingly spread among the popular segments that supported AD and COPEI.

On November 27, 1992, a second coup attempt was made. Unlike the first, the commanders (air, land, and naval forces and national defense associations) from all military units acted to kidnap Chávez and capture the Presidential Palace. This coup attempt also failed, but the legitimacy crisis has deepened; Pérez clearly showed that the social and political divisions of the politics of the Pérez government were exacerbated (Maya, 2003). Following the popular uprising and coup attempt, Pérez was removed from office in 1993, gradually losing his support within the party.

Rafael Caldera, the architect of the Punto Fijo System, who promised to put an end to the IMF policies with his populist remarks and made another impression on him, won the December 5, 1993, presidential elections in this setting. Former COPEI leader Caldera, sitting on the presidential seat for the second time on February 2, 1994, tried to reduce the political tension in the country and try to maintain its current position. First of all, Chávez made amnesty for those who participated in 1992 coup attempts, in particular. Although neoliberal economic policies were maintained, they were smoother. Caldera's initiatives provided a temporary recovery for the Punto Fijo system, but the economic crisis and social polarization persisted (Hellinger, 2003). In this period when the Punto Fijo system was beginning to unravel, three different social forces moved in order to fill the gap that would arise as the present order collapsed (Hellinger, 2003):

- i. Causa R., representing the labor movement,

ii. The administrative staff, which is organized within the state-owned oil company PdVSA,

iii. MBR 200, organized by the Army, led by Chávez.

It was evident that these three different organizations also found support in the community that the traditional Punto Fijo parties were rejected by all social strata; Every segment supported its independent candidates. Chávez declared his candidacy in the 1998 elections by establishing the MVR (Movimiento V [Quinta] República, Fifth Republic Movement) in the MBR 200 Congress in June 1997. According to the constitution of Venezuela, any political party is prohibited from taking the name of Simón Bolívar. So the party took the name of the Fifth Republican Movement. The reason he took the name “Fifth Republic” was that Chávez promised to build a new republic with a new constitution leaving behind the four republics established in Venezuela.

In the December 6, 1998 elections, AD and COPEI underwent a major defeat and were under 4 percent of the vote. After leaving prison, Chávez said, “Where are you going now?”, Who replied, “I’m in power.” Chávez was elected president with 56 percent of the vote. How the security of the Venezuelans tried to demolish the democratic order in a coup d’etat is clearly seen in the surveys conducted between 1995 and 1998. Chávez supporters in the elections are citizens who hate the exceptional democracy of the Punto Fijo era or who have mixed feelings about the old democratic order (Canache, 2002).

One of the most important reasons why Chávez won the competition between the different sectors that can not be integrated into the Punto Fijo system is that the political and social polarization in Venezuela takes place not through direct production relations but rather through life standards and poverty (Hellinger, 2003).

In 1997 the country suffered from extreme poverty of the population living on the border (Hellinger, 2003). Chávez, who won the sympathies of the people by the coup attempt he carried out under these conditions, took a liberating role to bring prosperity to the country through his populist rhetoric. After Chávez's rule, the ruling elite of the working class and Pdvsa emerged as the greatest opponents of Chávez, and the social polarization in the country continued to increase. In this setting, Chávez's appeal to populist rhetoric directly to the poorer people, unlike the traditional parties, disturbed the middle class and the elite, causing social classes to move further apart. In other words, the fact that Chávez is fed from the existing social polarization has exacerbated class-based political divisions and polarization. As Roberts pointed out, Chavismo (Chávez's movement) actually means the re-politicization of social inequality in Venezuela (Roberts, 2003). In the 1980s, while social polarization reinforced political polarization, social polarization in the 1990s The inequalities are revived. While the middle class, consciously raised throughout the Punto Fijo order, constituted 60 percent of the population in 1982, in 1997 it accounted for only 33 percent of this population (Riutort, 2001). Thus, the increasing class differences and the class divisions being attempted to be suppressed during the Punto Fijo period, Politics with the discourses of the political polarization, has reproduced in a sense.

One of the most important consequences of Chávez's development for power in Venezuela in 1998 was the definitive end to the 40-year Punto Fijo political tradition. Born as an alternative to the Punto Fijo project, Chávez's Bolivarian Project has succeeded in transforming the structures and institutions of the old system to a great extent; The anger of the old political tradition created an important social ground for Chávez's movement.

In the 20th century, Venezuela was seen as a possible candidate for political turmoil and economic turmoil. Venezuela, which has large energy resources and is not affected by serious ethnic, regional or cultural distinctions that have been a barrier to governance in many parts of Latin America, has relative stability and refinement. Following the 7-year dictatorship of General Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958, two leading Venezuelan political parties agreed to offer a minimum common program to voters and respect the results of the presidential elections. The result was a “pact democracy” that effectively allowed the Party of Democratic Action (AD) and the Christian Democrats (COPEI) to occupy the presidency palace. By managing and embracing political competition, pacts between leading parties and interest groups have created state-led industrialization, especially in Venezuela’s major oil sector. In order to stabilize oil prices, Venezuela pioneered the establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Between 1973 and 1978 the price of oil and the increase in profits were the embargo of Arab oil. Extension of the financial resources allocated to foreign oil companies and the taxes allocated to them have led to the creation of a comprehensive government bureaucracy. Over time, however, Venezuela’s democracy suffered corruption and rooted in popular support. As AD and COPEI parties provided privileged access to state resources, social assistance began to intensify among well-organized urban workers of these political parties. As a result, the people’s confidence in the political system has diminished. The fall of international oil prices in the early 1980s made it difficult for government officials to maintain patronage networks and social programs to support political stability. By 1988, Venezuela’s current account deficit had reached 9.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while net international reserves were negative of U.S. \$6.2 billion. The official Venezuelan estimates were that

Venezuela's overwhelming majority of 19.5 million people were involved in relative or critical poverty (DiJohn, 2004; Schuyler, 1996).

The Carlos Andres Pérez government has put in place a series of unpopular structural adjustment measures, initiated with the support of the International Monetary Fund, in order to get rid of the rising financial pressure. In February 1989, the increase in bus tariffs caused by interruptions in domestic gasoline and motor subsidies triggered massive uprisings in which hundreds of people lost their lives. From Caracazo, the name by which these tragic events became known, the people increased their discontent and made it easier for them to gain the support of nationalist and left wing groups. Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez ruled the Venezuelan armed forces at the beginning of such a group and increased his plans to capture the coup d'état. In February 1992, the coup began to take place, and although the coup failed, the national preliminary hearing came after a brief television speech shortly after Chávez's arrest. While in prison from 1992-1994, Chávez began re-eyeing *golpismo* (a belief in the coup d'état's effectiveness), and in 1996 he decided to pursue his political goals through voter processes. Chávez has experienced a meteoric rise, with support for the dissolution of traditional parties and political disillusionment with the growth of the founding (Lapper, 2006).

4.5 Analysis of Venezuela-U.S. Relations in Chávez Administration

During the Punto Fijo era, Venezuela's "having the most stable economic and political order in the region" thesis brought with it the desire of the United States to be a reliable ally. In terms of the United States, Venezuela is a country with a political stability compared to the countries of the region and thus a reliable source of oil. During this period Venezuela-U.S. relations were much more cooperative than disagreements, and regionally, bilateral issues came to the fore (Kelly & Romero,

2002). In the 1990s, during the political turmoil that resulted in Chávez's power in Venezuela, some problems began to arise in relation to the United States. In 1994, President Caldera's removal of Chávez from the imprisonment initiative increased the U.S. administration's concerns, causing concerns that Chávez would make a similar attempt to establish a radical system. But Chávez explained that he will play according to the rules of the game and be a candidate for the elections. The end of the Punto Fijo order with Chávez's power was a turning point in relation to the United States.

In Venezuela-U.S. relations in Chávez power, every prospect of tension and conflict has come to the forefront. The traditional friendship between the two countries has ended. In order to understand the causes of tension in relation, firstly it should be determined which points are broken. It should also be noted that while the relations between the two countries are analyzed, it is not always clear that the Venezuelan-American relations are always an unequal relationship and that the problems stemming from this relationship continue.

4.5.1 Interdependent Relations

The Chávez period represents a radical regime change for Venezuela, not an ordinary change of power but a transformation of social, political and economic structures in the country. Therefore, the continuity stemming from the internal dynamics, especially in the foreign policy of the state, has largely taken off. This radical change in foreign policy marks a period when Venezuela redefines its international relations position and begins to take an active role in the world economy by taking advantage of being an oil producing country. The foreign policy change that Chávez was leading as an authoritarian leader manifested itself in transforming Venezuela into a rising power with Latin America and challenging U.S. hegemony.

The only continuity in the relations with the United States during the Chávez period was the economic interdependence of the two countries. But in terms of Venezuela, this continuity must be considered a necessity rather than an election. Since mutual dependence is so strong, it has become costly and even irrational to break this dependence, so it has remained a continuity item. It should also be noted that Venezuela's dependence on the United States on petroleum trade is much greater than its dependence on Venezuela, as it is an asymmetric dependency on the basis of interdependence between the two countries.

In the relations between the two countries, the economy has always played a decisive role, and oil has created a special relationship. While Venezuela is the fourth largest oil exporter in the United States with 1.5 million barrels of oil sales per day, the U.S. and Venezuela are trade partners not only in petroleum but in general trading. Venezuela's oil exported countries account for 43 percent of the world's first rank. Since more than 80 percent of Venezuela exports are oil exports, the size of dependence on exports to the United States in general emerges at this point. Thus, the most important product in Venezuela exports is oil, and the most important market is the United States. The share of the United States in Venezuela imports is more than 70 percent. 14 percent of U.S. daily oil imports meet more than 6 percent of daily petroleum consumption from Venezuela. In addition, there are many factors that make the oil relations between the two countries more advantageous for both countries. The low cost of transportation due to geographical proximity is a major advantage for the United States. On the other hand, the U.S. petroleum demand keeps oil prices high and falls in the interests of Venezuela. Another important factor is that the treatment of Venezuelan crude oil, called "sour" because it contains about 4 to 5 percent sulfur, is more difficult and requires a more costly process. Most refineries in Europe and

Asia can only refine low sulfur crude oil, while U.S. refineries refine sour crude oil. Thus, the most important component of the U.S.-Venezuelan oil relationship is the CITGO refineries of Venezuela in the United States, the refining capacity of sour crude oil (Erikson, 2006). In terms of Venezuela, there is no other market with large, geographically close and crude petroleum refining capacity like the United States.

In September, 1986, Southland sold a 50 percent interest in CITGO to Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the national oil company of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. PdVSA acquired the remaining half of CITGO in January, 1990. With a secure and ample supply of crude oil, CITGO quickly became a major force in the energy arena. Today, CITGO employs approximately 4,000 workers in the United States and, through its vast network of retail locations, indirectly employs roughly another 100,000 people who work hard every day. To provide the energy needed to fuel the nation's economy and the American way of life, CITGO owns strategically located deep conversion refineries in Texas, Louisiana, and Illinois, which have a total capacity of approximately 750,000 barrels per day. These refineries are among the safest and most environmentally sound and sophisticated in the nation.

CITGO's parent company, PdVSA, wholly or jointly owns additional refining capacity of more than 2 million barrels per day in Venezuela, the Caribbean, and the United States. A large portion of this capacity is available to and purchased by CITGO (CITGO, 2006).

Besides, Venezuela is not only dependent on the U.S. market but also on private companies investing in its own oil industry. U.S. oil companies are making the most investments to develop the technological infrastructure in the Venezuelan oil industry. Chávez has largely removed these companies in order to make them dependent on private oil companies and has not been able to make the necessary

investment in other ways, resulting in a serious decline in oil production. Despite worsening bilateral relations, the United States continued to be the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil. In other words, economic dependence has shadowed ideological differences between the two governments. Despite so much dependence, the high tension between the two countries seems to be a contradiction. But as Sander (2007) has pointed out, interdependence alone does not lead to sleep. Unless the equilibrium, less dependent and noncompliantly less harmful, parties can gain power from threats and use dependency for their own advantage. Chávez attempts to reduce dependence on the U.S. market in petroleum, given that Venezuela is largely dependent on the U.S.'s understandable effort. Although Chávez's share of oil exports has fallen from 80 percent to 40 percent, the United States' priority position does not change and dependence can not be broken.

On the other hand, the United States is also somewhat dependent on Venezuelan oil. Chávez is therefore convinced that he will not apply an embargo or direct military intervention to Venezuela as the United States has applied to Cuba. Chávez's anti-American retreat is the safest factor that makes it possible.

4.5.2 Changes in Venezuelan-U.S. Relations

Along with Chávez's rule, the main determinants of Venezuelan foreign policy have been to defend a multi-polar world order against a unipolar planet under US hegemony and to pursue 21st century socialism against neoliberalism in order to provide political and economic union of Latin American countries. This change reflected both practice and retribution in relation to the United States. Chávez's counter-hegemonic model of change in the bilateral relations of the Bolivarian business policy will be examined under two main headings.

4.5.2.1 End of Cooperation in Latin America Between Venezuela and the United States

Between 1994-1998, negotiations between Venezuela and the U.S. governments have been carried out and agreements on fight against drug trafficking, defense, customs, energy and many issues have been signed. After Chávez won the elections on December 8, 1998, the White House spokesperson congratulated him for his “impressive victory” and stated that the United States had always had a good relationship with Venezuela and that they wanted to work with the Chávez government as well (Perez, 2006, p. 82). The U.S. government predicted that the development of Chávez would not change the bases on which the bilateral relations were based, and that common interests would remain the same. But Chávez refused to cooperate in the United States, even in the arena of humanitarian aid, in the aftermath of the 1999 referral. While Venezuela and the US governments were in tight contact even during the toughest times of the Cold War, Chávez ended this friendship relationship, He declared the biggest enemy of not only Venezuela but all Latin American countries. The Washington administration, on the other hand, followed the radical policies of Chávez’s former political actors and institutions, which dismantled the institutions, with a wait and see policy (Perez, 2006). But by the end of the 2000s the gathering of power in the hands of Chávez has begun to increase concerns in the United States; The Caracas administration’s criticism of U.S. policies in Colombia and the development of close relations with Cuba have led to concerns that the balance in the region may change against the United States. One of the most important debates in the Venezuelan-U.S. relationship since this period has been how to control the drug trade in the region. Washington’s struggle against the problem of drug trafficking in Latin America began with the invasion of Panama in December

1989. The U.S. administration has reduced Panamanian President Manuel Noriega from power by former CIA officials accused of drug trafficking. The occupation continued until the control of the Panama Canal was reassigned to Panama in 2000; the U.S. military forces withdrew from Panama have to find a new base for drug-fighting activities (Perez, 2006). The South Command of the U.S. Army SOUTHCOM has concluded agreements in March 2000 for three regions to replace the Panama base (Perez, 2006).

Accordingly, the Andean Operations Center in Ecuador; the Northern Territorial Operations Center in Aruba and Curaçao, two islands very close to Venezuela; and the Central American Operations Center in El Salvador were established (Perez, 2006). These centers operate in international airports. However, when Chávez closed Venezuela's airspace to U.S. military aircraft, it was a huge obstacle for SOUTHCOM, because the routes of U.S. aircraft that could not pass through Venezuela, which is between the Aruba and Curaçao islands and the Andean region, were too long. The U.S. administration tried to persuade Chávez, but Chávez responded with the words "We have a common interest in fighting drug trafficking, but we will give it ourselves" (Soto, 1999, n.p., as cited in Bonilla, 2004). The "war on terrorism" after September 11 gave the United States a new dimension to its regional policies. General James Thomas Hill, SOUTHCOM commander, spoke at the Congress on March 12, 2003, saying that radical Islamist organizations have engaged in a number of illegal activities, especially in Latin America, including human, weapons, and drug trafficking. The "narco-terrorists" gathered, particularly in the triple border region of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina, the Margarita island of Venezuela, and the Maicao region of Colombia (U.S. Department of State, 2003). General Hill also annually reports to Latin America on al Qaeda, Hamas, and

Hezbollah. A sum of 300 million to 500 million was transferred (Oppenheimer, 2003). Despite this, the U.S. State Department's Global Terrorism Samples report in 2002 explicitly stated that there is no knowledge of al-Qaeda presence in Latin America (U.S. Department of State, 2003). Again, reports that the government did not support fighting terrorism and that it provided weapons for the FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), which was declared a terrorist organization by the United States. It was one of the criticisms of the FARC, which was established as the military wing of the Communist Party of Colombia in the 1960s and started trading in cocaine to continue its activities in the 1980s, using the Venezuela-Colombian border as a rapport to Venezuela. In this process, although the Caracas administration does not admit that it is linked to the FARC guerrillas, there are documents that help the guerrillas to regulate arms contracts and to move to Venezuelan territories (Romero, 2009).

On March 9, 2005, General Bantz J. Craddock, a SOUTHCOM commander, voiced concerns about Venezuela's failure to cooperate with terrorism. Chávez's U.S. anti-narcotics organization, in August 2005, ended its RIA activities in Venezuela has been perceived by the United States as a direct threat to security interests. While accusing Washington of using RIA to spy on the Venezuelan government, Chávez condemned Caracas as refusing to cooperate with fighting drug trafficking by rejecting charges. The Venezuelan government annulled the diplomatic immunity of the Venezuelan government after the U.S. administration canceled the visas of six Venezuelan officials in Washington in August 2005 (BBC News, 2005). While Venezuela claimed that important steps had been taken in fighting drug trafficking after tearing up ties with DEA, it has been evaluating the anti-drug trafficking program in Venezuela as unsuccessful. According to Venezuela's Anti-Drug

Organization ONA, on the contrary, 6,136 people were arrested and 202,5 tons of drugs were seized during the 2002-2005 period of drug-related crimes. In 2006-2009, 22,333 criminals were arrested and 233,3 tons of drugs were seized in the drug struggle independently of DEA (Suggett, 2010).

The security policies that the United States has identified through its struggle against drug trafficking and expanded under the Colombia Plan (Plan Colombia) appear to be the most important regional issue that creates tensions with Venezuela. Since the 1990s, Venezuela, an important regional actor who has an important position in terms of the strategies of the United States in the region and can directly influence the conflicts in Colombia, is a major problem for the United States. In addition to cooperating, Venezuela has become the biggest opponent of the Colombian Plan. Venezuela, which has a long tradition with Colombia, perceives its neighbor's close relations with the United States as a threat to regional security.

The formation of a strong U.S. military presence in Colombia, the strengthening of the Colombian army with the military support of the United States, the replacement of the power balances in the region against Venezuela, and the spread of drug and guerrilla operations into Venezuela's territories are fundamental concerns of Venezuela regarding U.S. policies in the Andean region (Perez, 2006). In summary, the plan foresees that military intervention in the regions under the control of revolutionary organizations that direct narco-trafficking, particularly the FARC, will be carried out as part of the "war on drugs" policy. Under this plan, Miguel Uribe was brought in power in Colombia during the 2002 elections, and Uribe, the only Latin American leader to support the US occupation of Iraq, became an important ally of the Bush administration. Under this plan, the United States had seven military bases in Colombia in 2009, and these bases attracted Chávez's great reaction. These

bases were a big part of the crisis that brought Colombia and Venezuela to the brink of war in 2010. Following the announcement of Colombia's U.S. ambassador that "Venezuela is hosting the FARC's guerrillas," Chávez has moved his troops to the Colombian border and voiced the possibility of war for the first time, saying he would cut off oil shipments if the United States were involved.

According to Chávez, President Uribe, who has been loyal to the Colombian Plan for eight years, has brought two countries to the brink of war. Indeed, relations between the two countries have entered the process of normalization as Juan Manuel Santos, the same partyer as Uribe, came to power in the June 2010 elections. And while the U.S. administration accuses Chávez of fighting drugs and not cooperating with terrorism, Chávez does not find the U.S. fighting terrorism sincere. As a matter of fact, Chávez considered the non-extradition of Luis Posada Carriles, which was held responsible for the bombing of a civilian Cuban plane in 1976 and illegally entered the United States from Mexico in May 2005, as a double standard imposed by the U.S. administration. Posada Carriles, a Venezuelan citizen who escaped from his prison in Venezuela in 1985, is responsible for the explosion of a civilian Cuban plane that killed 73 people in the air, the bombing of Cuba's houses in 1997, and the assassination attempt against Fidel Castro in Panama in 2000. The Washington administration, which holds Posada Carriles in the criminal immigrant unit, does not extradite the country to torture in Venezuela (BBC News, 2005). A court in Texas province, in April 2011, acquitted Posada Carriles for illegal entry into the country. While the Castro government's decision was considered a "disgraceful mockery," Chávez noted that the United States has defeated a well-known terrorist and rebuilt a historic shame (BBC News, 2011, n.p.). As a result, cooperation between the two countries has been ongoing for many years.

For decades, the United States and Venezuela have enjoyed Venezuelan oil and trade relations, which represent one of the top five sources of imported oil for the United States for decades until the late 1990s (Energy Information Administration, October 2002). In addition, Venezuela has weakened OPEC's efforts to maintain high international oil prices, favoring several U.S. governments. In 1992, the representative of the United States Organization referred to Venezuela as "the flag carrier of democracy in Latin America" (Romero & Cardozo, 2002, p. 158). That year the democracy of Venezuela was threatened by a series of coup attempts (led by Hugo Chavez), and the United States condemned the initiative and argued that "the basis of the US policy in the region is the support of democracy and even Venezuela has passed through a difficult period between other nations. It is not the solution" (Romero & Cardozo, 2002, p. 158).

Republican foreign policy advisors have emphasized the importance of separating Chávez from other Latin American nations and liaising with Venezuela. In response to criticism by Chávez of the U.S. government's decision to bomb Afghanistan and refuse to inform the U.S. government about Venezuela's major Arab community, representatives of the U.S. National Security Agency, the Pentagon, and the U.S. State Department came together on November 5, when the Venezuelan situation was debated. At a meeting between the Boards, the Venezuelan government stated that the clear condemnation of terrorism required the U.S. ambassador to temporarily consult the United States and freeze some developmental credits (Busby, Turck, & Mitchell, 2002; Hallinan, 2002). U.S. Department of State's Latin American expert Peter Romero, who followed the inter-agency meeting, blamed Chávez's government for supporting terrorism in Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Hallinan,

2002). Finally, on February 5, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell was concerned about Chávez 's understanding of “democracy” (Easton, 2002).

In the meantime, various agencies and actors in the U.S. government supported different groups in Venezuela who took action to remove Chávez from power. An investigation into the role of the U.S. government in the narrowing of the Department of State inspector general led to the conclusion that the NED, the Pentagon, and other aid programs “provided training, institutions and support to individuals and organizations that appeared to be actively involved” (Jones, 2004, para. 20).

4.5.2.2 2002 Coup d’etat Attempt in Venezuela and the NED’s Secret Connections and Relations

Towards the end of 2001, the political situation and internal disturbances in Venezuela reached a critical point, and the strife between the government and the opposition climbed into street demonstrations. In April 2002, Chávez government’s reform plans for the petroleum industry and oil company PdVSA went into many opposition movements. To protest this reform, Pedro Carmona Estanga, president of the employers’ union Fedecámaras, and Carlos Ortega, leader of the Confederation of Venezuela Workers (CTV), made a call for a strike on 11-12 April. The strike decision will only be lifted with the resignation of Chávez; In other words, to ensure that the main purpose of the strike was to overthrow Chávez. On the morning of April 11, 2002, tens of thousands of people took action to walk to the Presidential Palace Miraflores, led by Pedro Carmona. Conflicts broke out between Chávez supporters, who were fewer in front of the Miraflores palace, and at least 20 people lost their lives (Golinger, 2007). Then a few officers led by former Nazi warfare commander General Nestor Gonzalez demanded Chávez resign. Chávez wanted to launch a military

operation called Plan Avila to protect the palace and resist the insurgents, but when a commune with the Fuerte Tiuna military base headquarters was issued to give the necessary orders, a high-level group learned that they were planning to arrest him. He called the high commanders of the army to the presidential palace, but the call was rejected.

However, the media's support for the opposition in this process has put Chávez in a very difficult situation. The four major private channels broadcast Chávez's speech to the nation, while sabotaging the conversation by showing clash images halfway across the screen. Canal Ocho, the only television in government control, was cut off by electronic means. He also alleged that the protesters were fired and called on Chávez to resign, releasing images of private television channels firing Chávez supporters from a bridge. But the images do not seem to indicate to whom the camera is fired. Later, when the cameras were viewed without recording the events from different angles, it was understood that the street opened fire was empty; The protesters have never crossed that path (Stoneman, 2008). The news was deliberately misleading, as Venevisión channel correspondent Luis Alfonso Fernández later confirmed. After all these events Chávez said he was ready to resign and set four conditions: to be presented to the Parliament, to respect the Constitution, to ensure the security of life in the Miraflores palace, and to ensure that everyone can leave the country. In order to assess Chávez's resignation, opposition leaders met at the Defense Ministry at midnight. Among them were Pedro Carmona, Colonel James Rodgers, and Colonel Ronald McCammon, officers of the U.S. military mission, and General Medina Gomez, the military headquarters of the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington that day, who were on the forefront of the coup leader (Boudin,

Gonzalez, & Rumbos, 2006). They refused to accept Chávez's terms and unconditionally they have to resign.

Chávez informed him that he had withdrawn the conditional resignation proposal on the morning of April 12, 2002 and that the officers had to arrest him and agreed to go to the Fuerte Tiuna military base. At the same time, private television channels Chávez announced his resignation and a ceremony was held in the Miraflores palace to bring Pedro Carmona to the presidency. Carmona reported that the new government was established, that the National Assembly and the Supreme Court were closed, that the Constitution remained in force and that the word "Bolivarian" in the name of the Republic of Venezuela had been laid. Carmona's aggressive attitude and harsh statement frightened many people in the anti-Chávez movement (Crandall, 2008). Even Caracas newspaper editor Teodoro Petkoff, who was in the harshest criticism of the Chávez government, was worried by this rapid change, "Chávez 's resignation letter is absent. So that's a darn" (Forero, 2002, n.p.). Chávez reached his wife and daughter and asked them to resign and announce that they were arrested. As Chávez has not resigned, Chávez supporters have begun to take action. On April 13, 2002, tens of thousands of Chávez supporters learned that Chávez did not resign, surrounded the presidential palace and demanded that their president be returned. Chávez-led officers led by General Garcia Carneiro explained that they would not accept Carmona as president, but Chávez would do anything to come back to power. No reports of growing demonstrations and loss of Carmona's support have been published by any private television channel (Crandall, 2008). Still, the widespread public sentiments say "Chávez, no se va! (Chávez, do not go!)" Chávez arrived at the Presidential Palace in Miraflores, where he was taken by helicopter from the headquarters where he was imprisoned by officers in the morning

of April 14, 2002. The coup collapsed in two days; Chávez returned. The opposition insisted that it was not a coup attempt, but that there was a power shortage for only a short period of time (Boudin et al., 2006). But a previously planned coup d'état was the subject of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency CIA's "Venezuela: Conditions for a coup attempt" and is clearly stated in a report:

"Opposition military forces, including some disappointed top-ranking officers and a group of small-rugged fundamentalist officers, are probably accelerating their efforts to prepare a coup against President Chávez this month. The level of detail of the reported plans is aimed at the arrest of Chávez and the top ten officials. . . . The coup plotters may try to exploit the chaos arising from the demonstrations of the opposition in order to provoke military action in a given date this month" (Gott, 2008, p. 233).

The report clearly shows that the U.S. government knows in advance that the coup was prepared in Caracas (Democracy Now!, 2004). However, there is no evidence that the United States directly participates in the coup. The coup against Chávez differs from the cold war style of the CIA in 1973 in Chile. He is the Venezuelan opposition person who prepares Chávez to the coup. However, the Washington administration has not informed the Caracas administration in the wake of the coup, and has openly supported the opposition and the post-coup government. Pedro Carmona, Isaac Pérez Recao, and Daniel Romero, who organized the coup a few months before the coup, visited Washington. During the coup, the U.S. military sent an airplane to the waters of Venezuela and the U.S. air force entered Venezuela's airspace without Venezuela's permission (Boudin et al., 2006). Again, reports that the U.S. government had met Otto Reich, chief consultant on Latin America, with two prominent Venezuelan businessmen against Chávez. According to this, Gustavo

Cisneros, a close friend of the Bush family, and Luis Giusti, former owner of PdVSA, who owns one of Latin America's wealthiest and largest media groups, has been in contact with the Reich during the coup (Perez, 2006). In addition, Pedro Carmona said that he was seeing the United States and the Spanish expedition immediately after the coup (Carmona, 2004). All this shows that the U.S. government has played a vague and controversial role in this process which resulted in the coup attempt against Chávez on April 11, 2002.

Immediately after the coup, the statements made by the U.S. administration show the satisfaction of the situation. The White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said in a statement he made on April 12 that "the Chávez government has suppressed peaceful demonstrations, has opened fire on unarmed protesters, the media has been trying to prevent them from transmitting these events" and that Chávez withdrew from his presidency and that the U.S. newly established government The White House also interpreted Chávez's removal from office as "the victory of democracy." (Crandall, 2008, p. 127). Nevertheless, Crandall argued that in the U.S. administration, Chávez appeared to have voluntarily withdrawn from his post as a result of the coup organizers' explanation of Chávez's resignation. But the fact that the CIA report predicts the coup in advance, and that there is constant contact with strong Venezuelan opponents, and that the presence of two American colonels among the coup leaders, who refuse Chávez's resignation if necessary, is the news of the U.S. administration.

The Spanish and U.S. governments made a joint statement on the days following the coup d'état, demanding that "the extraordinary situation in Venezuela should soon return to normal democratic status on the basis of protection of national unity and fundamental freedoms" (Crandall, 2008, p. 247). Aside from this, the OAS

Declaration on the Inter-American Democracy clearly prohibits the recognition of de facto regimes. For this reason, contrary to the U.S. administration, no Latin American country has recognized the new government in Venezuela. The OAS, at an extraordinary meeting, condemned the coup by announcing that the democratic order had been interfered. The presidents of Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Panama also supported Chávez. This has left the Bush administration in a state of distress and forced the OAS to sign the condemnation declaration. Gary Prevost considers the Bush administration's support for Chávez's coup attempt to be a direct reflection of the Bush Doctrine to Latin America (Prevost & Campos, 2007). The fact that the U.S. administration is in close contact with military coups and businessmen and supports the post-coup government, It was one of the greatest sources of tension between. Washington has held responsible Chávez's provocative policies from the outset, and his opponents have continued to support. After Chávez's referendum, Condoleezza Rice was quoted as saying, "I hope Chávez has received the message that people have sent to him, and his policies are working for the Venezuelans" (*Financial Times*, 2002, n.p.). The White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer likewise said that the Chávez government incited all these incidents (Crandall, 2008).

On the other hand, Buxton (2005) pointed out that the problems of the Chávez government's legitimacy and the factors that led to this whole political crisis are inherited from Punto Fijo. Chávez maintained his authoritarian nature, even though he changed the regime while opening the Fifth Republican era by closing the Punto Fijo period. During the legitimacy crises of Puno Fijo governments, the U.S. government's failure to question democracy in the country is due to its good relations with the Caracas administration (Buxton, 2005).

4.5.3 Financial Coup Attempt

In the months following the coup attempt of April 2002, opposition protesters continued their uncertainty. In this process, the opposition put the general strike strategy into practice and called for 2 December. The general strike began with the initiative of the employer union Fedecámaras, who had a large share in the April 2002 coup d'état, and developed as a lockout at the same time as many of the workers were on strike. The intention of the strike and lockout, especially in the oil industry, was to bring PdVSA to a halt and to resign Chávez. The strike really impressed the tanker fleet of the oil company PdVSA with the participation of many tanker captains in the first weeks. Besides, INTESA, the information and technology company which is defined as "the brains of PdVSA," has played a key role in the encroachment of the petroleum industry. INTESA employees not only grew stronger, but also sabotaged the computer networks and systems necessary for the industry to work, preventing access to computers, machines and other refinery tools by altering access codes and programs (Golinger, 2007, p. 34). The biggest problem in the strike process was therefore to secure computers and protect them from sabotage. The production of PdVSA decreased by 90 percent. In Venezuela, oil production is shown for four months in the 2000-2007 period. In the period when the strike began, in December 2002 total production decreased from 3 million per day to almost 500 thousand, and remained at this level until April 2003. In the course of the strike, oil consumption in the country has fallen to almost zero; in other words, it has become impossible to reach the oil, and life and electricity have been paralyzed as electricity and gas production have fallen in the same way.

Considering that the portion between production and consumption is exported, the decrease in exports can also be observed in the same period. Venezuela's

economy, which is 80 percent of its exports, is heavily damaged, and the cost of the strike is over \$ 7 billion. Venezuela has had to import oil from other countries in order to meet international oil contracts. Thus, the strike aimed to create the impression that Venezuela needed a new leader to ensure that the international scene Chávez had lost control and provided order (Golinger, 2006).

Ali Rodríguez, who was brought to the presidency of PdVSA in this process, has tried to reconcile with INTESA, 60 percent of his shares belong to the United States' Scientific Practices International Association SAIC and has direct ties to the U.S. government, but the company has refused to abolish sabotage. Chávez then commissioned senior officers in January 2003 to strike and protect facilities, ports and pipelines. After a 64-day chaos, opponents in February 2003 ended the strike. Following the failure of the strike, Chávez made a cleanup as he wanted to do for a long time in PdVSA's staff, knowing the opportunity, and put the oil company under government control. The U.S. administration called for early elections for the end of the political crisis in the country starting in the first weeks of the strike. In a statement from the White House on December 13, 2002, it was reported that it would be possible to peacefully end the crisis only with early elections (King, 2002).

It should be noted, however, that the international environment during the strike differs from the process that led to the coup attempt. The Bush administration, which was on the eve of the Iraqi occupation in the years following the coup attempt in Venezuela, chose to pursue a policy similar to the Clinton period, which is less noticeable than Chávez's earlier days (Crandall, 2008). Yet the Washington administration's eyes are on Chávez. Shortly after April 2002, the U.S. Department of State's transfer of the \$1 million "Special Fund for Venezuela" to the NED (National Fund for Democracy) and the distribution of these funds to non-governmental

organizations playing key roles in the coup attempt (Golinger, 2006). Asamblea de Educación president Leonardo Carvajal was appointed Minister of Education in the one-and-a-half-day government of Carmona with \$57,000 of NED funds; supporters of Carmona, Fundación Momento de la Gente, directed by Mercedes de Freitas, \$64,000; Oscar Garcia Mendoza's Asociación Civil Liderazgo y Visión, the non-governmental organization who signed the declaration that they recognize Carmona as the Venezuelan legitimate president, was transferred \$42,207; and CIPE (Center for International Private Enterprise) president Rocio Guijarro, who signed the same declaration, was transferred \$116,558 from the NED funds (Golinger, 2006). Since 2001, the Bush government has transferred over \$20 million to opposition groups through NED. Chávez said that these activities seem to support democracy, but he was in fact a kind of democratic imperialism developed by the United States to help oppose movements against him (Crandall, 2008). According to Golinger (2006), it should be questioned why these funds were used to promote another democracy rather than to recognize democracy in Venezuela. Sullivan and Olhero (2008), on the other hand, acknowledge that the NED funds transferred to Venezuela have increased since the Chávez government, but argue that these donations would not mean that the Washington administration would interfere with Venezuela's internal affairs.

4.5.4 2004 Constitutional Coup Attempt

In January 2003, United States, Portugal, Spain, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile came together on a platform called Friends of Venezuela to help solve the political crisis in Venezuela, and to Venezuela, Jimmy Carter's crisis suggested a prescription for their situation (Forero, 2003). Accordingly, early elections or a referendum would be held. The Venezuelan constitution did not foresee early elections in crisis situations, but it allowed a referendum. Chávez accepted this proposal and on 23 May

2003 an agreement was reached between the government and the opposition.

According to Article 72 of the Constitution, the people, whether or not the president will continue to relate, will be determined by name. If the signatures of 20 percent of the voters can be collected, a referendum will be opened. According to this, about 2,400,000 citizens needed signatures.

Súmate, a non-governmental organization founded by NED funds in 2002 by Maria Corina Machado, who participated in the coup attempt against Chávez, launched a big campaign for the referendum. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) met the expenses of the campaign, which promoted itself as a voluntary group controlling the political rights of citizens, controlling the elections (Golinger, 2006).

USAID is a safe electoral process in IRI (International Republican Institute) and NDI (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, National Democracy Institute affiliated to the Democratic Party). In Venezuela, Súmate received \$769,000 from the NDI and \$450,000 from the IRI, the other institution affiliated to the Republican Party, for the referendum campaign (Golinger, 2006).

In December 2003, the opposition signatures began to be collected with campaigns, and 3,477,000 signatures were collected within four days. Examining the National Election Council signature lists, only 1,911,000 signatures were valid. As a result of controversial discussions between the government and the opposition, the Electoral Council decided in May 2004 to confirm the signatures, which were considered suspicious, by their signatories and declared that on June 3, enough signatures were collected for the referendum (Gott, 2000).

Chávez explained that he welcomed the referendum and launched a big campaign in the country's time. Chávez's creation of new voters, who would probably

vote for him, influenced by a campaign to give citizenship rights to immigrants without citizenship. The fact that oil prices rose by U.S. \$50 per barrel through Iraq's invasion of the United States and the transfer of money to the education and health missions of these oil incomes were the major factors that gave Chávez a vote (Gott, 2000), in addition to the political implications of Coordinadora Democrática (Democratic Coordinator). The fact that a leader could not compete with Chávez from the opposition led the opposition to fail. On August 15, 2004, a referendum held under the supervision of OAS observers won 59 percent of the votes (by the vote of 5,800,000 voters). After this date, Chávez increased his authority, deepened the Bolivarian revolution program, and strengthened his opposition to the rhetoric. Chávez first survived a military coup, took control of the oil industry after the strike, and finally took public support behind the referendum. The opposition boycotted the 2005 parliamentary elections and gradually reduced political participation in the following period and began to weaken in the elections.

Chávez also held the Bush administration responsible for all attempts to reduce him from power, and he hardened his foreign policy tenet toward the United States. On February 17, 2005, Chávez said that Bush was responsible for the 2002 coup attempt. U.S. military officials met with coup leaders, and the White House congratulated the coup d'états (Boudin et al., 2006). Especially after September 11, 2001, the policies towards the Middle East were called an encouragement of democracy. The Bush administration's welcoming of the coup attempt in Venezuela undermined America's moral authority in Latin America. In addition, the funds Washington transferred to the opposition in Venezuela for democracy promotion before the coup eventually contributed to a coup attempt.

Also, as McCoy (2009) pointed out, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), established at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas in June 2002, created the impression that the Bush government expected a regime change in Venezuela. As a matter of fact, these offices were established to assist democracy transition in the former Soviet societies since the beginning of the 1960s and have been operating in the countries experiencing rapid political and economic transformation to overcome the regime change without crisis. OTI, which is based in USAID in Caracas, has been the Office of Transition Initiatives, the longest open in the United States. Finally, in 2004, the referendum itself became the strategy of the United States against Chávez. It was hard to argue that Chávez was not a legitimate and democratic leader in Washington, and Chávez was perceived as a great threat (Crandall, 2008). In addition, the Bush administration failed to convince the international public that they were not involved in coup plans (Lapper, 2006). After Chávez's re-election of 62.8 percent of the vote on December 3, 2006, the Bush administration found Venezuela in a dialogue call to soften tense relations between the two countries. Although Chávez said that they were ready for dialogue, in a 2007 speech, he said, "Can we coexist with the U.S. government? Yeah. Well, can we agree with each other? Never!" (Romero & Corrales, 2010, p. 220). At this point, Chávez would not recognize the United States as a hegemonic power and would not consent to it.

4.5.5 U.S. Threats Perceived by Chávez Administration and Its Influence to the Relations

It is not possible to speak of the existence of a single Latin American left over a left-wing rising to Latin American politics in the 21st century. The governments of the region, which is defined as the Left, generally act in two main lines. Lula da Silva and his follower Dilma Rousseff in Brazil, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and then

Sebastián Piñera in power, and Tabaré Vázquez and successive José Mujica governments in Uruguay are closer to the cooperation with the United States and left governments. We can see that these governments are most prominent as the left governments in the market economy, closer to the cooperation with the U.S. Most of these leaders are leaders who define themselves as socialists and have an active left background. For example, Michelle Bachelet is the daughter of a general who was arrested and killed during the Pinochet period. Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva is an old unionist and José Mujica is an old backlit that joined the armed action Tupamaros, inspired by the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. Nevertheless, these leaders preferred to pursue a more tolerant and reformist leftist policy towards U.S. policies.

On the other hand, there is a more radical left that sets up alternative agendas for neoliberalism such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Fidel and Raul Castro in Cuba, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. The governments involved are noteworthy. The goal of this radical left-leaning leadership in the Chávez region is to ensure that other moderate left governments, at least in economic relations, are closer to the United States than Latin America. However, in order for Latin America to rise as a counterhegemonic bloc, these two leftovers need to reconcile an extrovert against neoliberalism.

To this end, Chávez was trying to develop relations with the Brazilian, Chilean, and Uruguay governments, especially through energy-based bilateral agreements, while supporting the election campaigns of the left governments and the government programs after the elections, which he saw as close to his own political line, with both investments and donations. Since 2005, Chávez's support was influential in winning elections for radical left-wing candidates in many regional

countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina. In this way, a bloc near the left understanding of Chávez was formed in the left bank of Latin America. The most obvious common feature of these left governments is anti-U.S. During the Chávez era, Venezuela became one of the largest financial providers to invest in the region among Latin American countries. Venezuela's investments in Latin America and Caribbean countries accounted for more than 8 percent of the country's GDP in 2007 and 2008. This shows that the share of Venezuela's budget for regional investments is greater than that of the two major economies of the region, Brazil and Mexico.

Venezuela's foreign investments have two distinctive features: They are carried out directly by private state firms and they include large-scale development targets and projects (Corrales, 2009). Chávez denied the left-wing governments in the region, especially in the new constitution-making process, supported by these investment and co-operation agreements, but there were assertions that these candidates financed their election campaigns. Nevertheless, Chávez's open support for the candidates whom he saw close to the countries in the region and his increased investment in that region was considered as interfering with the electoral process during the opposition of the respective countries, and Chávez's strategy was a serious source of tension for Washington administration. Chávez left governments in the region, supported by these investment and cooperation agreements, especially in the process of building new constitutions, but these candidates financed their election campaigns. Evo Morales, one of his closest allies, was openly supported by Chávez both in the electoral process and in the reform process after the elections. In Bolivia, the poorest country in South America, the uprisings that began in 2001 against the censorship of coca by the U.S. pressures and the privatization of natural gas and water were exacerbated especially in 2005, causing serious disturbances in the country. Evo

Morales, leader of the Coca Warriors' Union, attacked the coca destruction programs carried out by the United States with the farmers, so the U.S. government declared *persona non grata*. In this process, many claims were made that Chávez financed the indigenous uprisings in Bolivia, and in the 2002 presidential elections it was alleged that Chávez offered \$300,000 for the election campaign of Evo Morales (Kozloff, 2008). Although Chávez rejected these claims, he did not hide close ties. In the December 2005 elections, Morales won a 52 percent high, drawing attention to the issue (Manwaring, 2005). The result was a big surprise for U.S. observers, who wrote that Morales would vote in the 30 percent band and reported that he could not come to power alone.

Washington was disturbed by the inauguration of Morales, one of the Aymara natives and the first indigenous president of Bolivia, to provoke indigenous uprisings and social movements in the region. The U.S. administration held Chávez in Bolivia responsible for 5 years of turmoil as far as Morales was in power and voiced concerns about Chávez transferring money to pro-violent indigenous groups in Bolivia (Manwaring, 2005). Chávez, who openly supported Morales, has continued to support Morales's constitutional process of explaining that he would initiate a radical revolution in the country after he came to power and would expropriate all natural resources. In 2006, he offered \$30 million for Morales' social programs and 150,000 barrels of oil for agricultural products (Kozloff, 2008). Along with this, Bolivia, which has joined ALBA, signed many agreements in agriculture, commerce, education, and health. The country has invested \$670 million for the joint oil and power company they will build with the name of Petroandina.

Another close ally of Chávez is Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, whom he supported in the election process. In the October 2006 elections, Correa identified

himself as a socialist of 21st century socialism, promised the country a new constitution and a reform of the oil industry and thus won Chávez's support. He also described Chávez as a close friend, who interpreted Chávez as a devil to Bush calling it unfair. Thus, although no claim to Chávez's involvement in the elections in Ecuador's case came to light, Correa's re-election of Chávez's rhetoric was judged to have affected Chávez factor in some way or another in regional elections (Padgett & Alvaro, 2006). In Ecuador, the United States worried about resolving several issues such as the administration of a radical, anti-Americanist, anti-neoliberal government like Venezuela, the Colombian Plan, and fight against drugs, indigenous upheavals, and energy security. Correa received Chávez's support during the 2007-2008 constitutional reform process and has also become a member of ALBA and OPEC in Ecuador 2007. In March 2008, in the tension between Ecuador and Colombia, Venezuela supported Ecuador, thus creating an axis in Venezuela and Ecuador against the United States and Colombia in the Colombian Plan.

In addition, the Chávez government created a million dollar economic and social aid package to support former guerrilla leader Daniel Ortega, who won elections in Nicaragua in November 2006, 17 years after his return to the presidency (Thomson, 2007). Socialist party Sandinista National Salvation Ortega, leader of the Front (FSLN), supported both energy deals and social assistance programs. For example, in Nicaragua, similar to the hunger and poverty program launched by Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2002, approximately 49,000 families living in rural areas benefited from a \$2,000 aid package consisting of agricultural and livestock products.

In Paraguay, former psychopath and socialist Fernando Lugo won the April 2008 elections and claimed that Chávez intervened in the elections after the center-right party, the Colorado Party, ended the 60-year rule. "We are accused again for

interfering in the affairs of a neighboring country in the election process. The reason for these accusations is their fear of us and the revolution” (Fox, 2008, n.p.). In the March 2009 elections in El Salvador, leftist candidate Mauricio Funes won elections with 51 percent of the vote, and his assertion that Chávez is similar to the process.

Another country that Venezuela openly supported, where very serious allegations about election campaigns were put forward, was Argentina. During 2005-2006, Venezuela purchased \$3.1 billion in state bonds from Argentina, helping to restructure the country’s debts (“The Chávez play: Venezuela’s president tries his hand at financial arbitrage,” 2006). Argentina purchased a \$9.8 billion record-setting debt to the IMF on June 3, 2006 to buy Venezuela A total of \$5 billion has been a major contributor to the state’s monetary contributions. Chávez had developed close ties with Argentine President Néstor Kirchner (Forero, 2006). There were allegations that Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the wife of the president of the Venezuelan government, who was a candidate for the general election in Argentina in October 2007, financed the election campaign of Venezuela.

Another crisis that raised blood pressure was a suitcase scandal known as Maletinazo. Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson, a Venezuelan-American businessman from Argentina, came to Argentina on August 4 , 2007. It started with trying to bring in an undeclared \$800,000. Wilson demanded protection from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), claiming that the money was not his own and that the Venezuelan government sent Cristina Fernández de Kirchner as a donation for the election campaign. Franklin Durán was convicted and sentenced to four years in prison in March 2009 (Romero & Corrales, 2010). Allegations brought by the scandal to the agenda by both sides of Venezuela and Argentinean governments have been falsified and the FBI arrests have been criticized. In response, Chávez urged U.S. ambassador

Patrick Duddy to leave the country within 72 hours of proclaiming himself as non-grata and urged his Washington ambassador, Bernardo Álvarez, to his country. The U.S. administration declared the ambassador Álvarez, who had already been invited to his country, to be non-human. Thus, the diplomatic crisis between the two countries added to the situation.

Besides, there were some tensions between Venezuela and the countries that Chávez-sponsored candidates could not win. For example, although there is no clear indication that the Caracas government directly interfered with the 2006 elections in Peru and Mexico, Chávez backed the candidates whom he saw as a potential ally in these elections. In the presidential elections of Peru in 2006, Chávez supported the Peruvian Nationalist Party leader Ollanta Humala, an ex-soldier who launched a riot against Alan García in October 2000 against Peruvian dictator president Alberto Fujimori. García won the elections and then reacted to Chávez by calling the Peruvian ambassador in Caracas after he came to power (BBC News, 2006). In June 2006 elections in Mexico, Chávez left-wing Democracy against Felipe Calderón, the follower of Mexican President Vicente Fox, identified as being a puppet of U.S. imperialism. The candidate of the Revolutionary Party supported Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Chávez allegedly financed the campaign of López Obrador, but it was rejected by the parties. For example, according to the document published by WikiLeaks, on October 19, 2009, Mexican President Calderón, U.S. National Intelligence Director (DNI), met with Dennis Blair, one of the executives, expressing concerns about Chávez financing López Obrador's campaign and interfering with regional elections. The U.S. State Department and the Mexican government did not comment on the documents ("Chávez Habría Financiado la Campaña de López Obrador," 2010). It should be noted that the President of López Obrador and

Venezuela's ally Mexican governor could seriously change the balance of the U.S. administration against the region (Kozloff, 2008). As a matter of fact, the signing of strategic energy deals by Venezuela and Mexico could have caused a significant increase in the price of imported oil for the United States.

Chávez transferred an estimated \$16-25 million in similar policies to the left governments of the region between 1999 and 2007 (Crandall, 2008). The sum of direct and indirect investment, subsidies, aid, donations, and grants made to the region in the same period amounted to \$43 million (Corrales, 2009). Chávez explained that investments in the region are aimed at preventing poverty and developing, and that this was a priority foreign policy goal. However, these investments, referred to as "investment in social services" (Corrales, 2009, p. 101), went directly to pro-Chávez social movements. Chávez tried to earn his alliance in this way by allocating a large part of his budget to these investments by putting these investments at the center of foreign politics. Corrales (2009) defined this policy as "exports of bribery" (p. 101). This policy has given Venezuela a tight ally in the region, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, or at least governments that have not criticized Chávez.

Increasing oil revenues had a crucial role in the emergence of social aid and investments as a foreign policy instrument in Venezuela between 2004 and 2008. Chávez claimed to the people of Venezuela that it was difficult to explain why the petroleum incomes of the country were being transferred to other governments, thus claiming that these funds go to social projects, not to election campaigns.

The allegations and suspicions that Chávez has transferred money from illegal ways to the elections of the countries of the region have become a growing concern for the United States. The U.S. administration accuses Chávez of taking a role in demolishing the balances and damaging democracy in the region. In addition, leaders

such as Morales and Correa were often referred to by U.S. politicians as Chávez's puppets and the elections they won were considered Chávez's elections. If Chávez-like leaders in the region continue to be elected in this case, it will probably be difficult for the United States to tolerate those democratically elected governments, and the politics for the region will become harder. Because, through the NED, the U.S. administration transferred more than \$ 93 million for democracy promotion to Latin American countries between 1985 and 2000 (Clement, 2005). During the George W. Bush period, the democracy incentive for Venezuela increased, especially as the annual budget for NED funds remained unchanged. The failure of this strategy, or even increasing tension with Venezuela, may lead to some measures, including U.S. administration of Cold War style military methods and the support of dictators (Clement, 2005). Chávez's social projects, on the other hand, It is the same strategy that the United States has criticized for interfering.

As a result, the Chávez administration, both bilateral relations both in and out of the region, is closely related to the goal of establishing a multi-polar world order against the U.S. hegemony determined by the Bolivarian foreign policy. Thus, U.S. politics has led Chávez to form alliances against the hegemon, while Chávez's developments in the other direction have led Washington to take tougher measures against the region, apparently contrary to the interests of the United States. Thus the tension between the two countries arises from this dialectical interaction between the hegemon and the counter-hegemon power, and this dialectical relationship continues to supply tension.

4.6 The Role and Implications of the NED to the U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Venezuela as Foreign Policy Actor

Venezuela has had a multi-faceted political system since the 1958 Punto Fijo treaty. However, the depletion of the political and economic model arising from the aforementioned negotiations led to the crisis of the polyarchic system in the 1980s and 1990s. This oligarchic power crisis could not be prevented when Caracazo in 1989 and the popular classes began to feel their political heroism. This political hero eventually united around the rise of Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian government. So the purpose of the U.S. supranational project in Venezuela was to try to identify and demarcate new groups that could liberate and modernize the oligarchic power and reintegrate popular classes into an elite hegemony and apply neoliberalism. But this project could not be implemented. Instead, it was the emergence of a popular project that violated the interests of the transnational elites and local colleagues. The Bolivarian project collapsed with the prevailing hegemony in Venezuela, and the primitive U.S. goal was to rebuild it. This is the context in which U.S. strategists have passed the democracy promotion in Venezuela.

As is known, the NED has significantly expanded its programs in Venezuela since Hugo Chávez was elected to power in 1998. The NED and related AID programs for anti-Chávez forces have been extensively documented and include, among others, the development of media strategies for these forces; opposition visits to Washington regularly for politicians, businessmen, and trade unionists; new spending for CTV; a series of workshops for opposition groups; and financing for many anti-Chavista groups. In the pre-crisis period of the NED 2002, he made nearly \$1 million dollars for groups involved in the abortive coup. The Bush administration gave silent support to the coup. Following the collapse of the coup d'état and the anti-

Chavista forces winning the August 2005 referendum, Washington turned to a continuing deterioration strategy involving a strategic shift from a maneuver war that was being abolished quickly. Chávez struggled to get the government (coup, work strikes, referendum) to reach a broad war position. Now the effort is to re-group opposition forces and develop plans in and after the November 2006 elections, without missing any opportunity. To weaken the government constantly and to disturb the stability. In line with these goals, democracy promotion programs have been greatly expanded and tens of millions of dollars have been included (Robinson, 2006).

It was the Clinton administration's new strategy to encourage democracy and strengthen democratic institutions with financial assistance, as well as the end of the Cold War. But the NED has financed millions of dollars to promote democracy in third world countries.

Since its founding, the NED has used the financial resources and soft policy tools to carry out CIA secret missions at the beginning of the 1980s. The rise of new left governments in Latin America led to the questioning of free market based trade and economic integration models. In this context, we will discuss how the U.S. government tries to intervene with the NED in the Venezuelan domestic policy.

We can question why Venezuela is a vital country for the United States: oil comes to mind first. Venezuela is one of the top five oil imports of the United States. Approximately 500 U.S. companies are represented in Venezuela. The direct investment the United States has made in Venezuela is concentrated in the oil and manufacturing sectors. Another factor is that Venezuela has started its political transition period earlier than other Latin American countries, and believes that the US administration can easily be controlled by Venezuela itself.

In 1948, George Kennan, a Cold War policy maker, said:

We have 50 percent of the world's wealth, but only 6.3 percent of the world's population. . . . In this case, we can not take ourselves away from jealousy and anger. The main task in the coming period is to design a relationship model that will ensure that this inequality will protect our situation. (Robinson, 1999, pp. 111–112)

This view led U.S. interventions in Haiti, Cuba, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, primarily to capitalist development during the Cold War era of the United States, to preserve their economic interests and/or to obtain the raw materials and markets needed.

In 1998, Hugo Chávez, who had already made a coup attempt, won a presidential election in Venezuela at the head of a personal movement called Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario (MBR). Many factors contributed to Chávez's victory, including extreme party and extreme customer relations, corruption practices and increasing social and economic inequality in the country (Buxton, 2001). For example, 2 percent of the population has 60 percent of the land, 80 percent of the population live in poverty, and in 1998 unemployment reached 16 percent. As an additional factor, it was a declining distribution of the petroleum presence of the country relative to the Venezuelan population. Voters, increasing poverty, and economic inequality have blamed the politics of traditional political parties, and in particular the neoliberal economic model that these parties imposed (Ellner & Hellinger, 2003).

Venezuela's focus on oil-based development did not change under the Chávez administration, but the direction and control of the industry changed. Chávez pledged to push the government to increase the amount of revenue the state receives from the petroleum industry and to struggle to privatize certain sectors of the industry. In

addition, Chávez increased Venezuela's effectiveness in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to increase its price by reducing international supplies of oil (Mommer, 2003). These policies were the reverse of the Venezuelan petroleum industry's direction of Chávez in previous years. The management of PdVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., Venezuela state oil company) was undertaken by a neoliberal elite that committed to reducing the role of the central government to regulate or make the industry profitable (Mommer, 2003). Market-based decision making, more direct foreign investment and the reduction of the role of the state have been highly valued by these managers. The Chávez administration changed the neoliberal elite with its own supporters and increased the amount of state funding to increase the share of the state. Moreover, in his leadership, Chávez acted to reduce the corruption of the central petroleum workers' union in the country in order to increase the number of its supporters. Seeing neoliberalism as a major source of Venezuela's economic and social problems, Chávez wanted the implementation of the "third way" of economic development. The government's policy on the petroleum industry was an important example of this approach (Buxton, 2001; Gott, 2000), including the new constitution created by supporters of the Chávez government in 1999, the expansion of public welfare and labor protection areas and the rejection of PdVSA privatization. Among other initiatives that were not friendly to foreign investments were doubling of intangible rights paid by ExxonMobil and other oil operators, from about 16 percent to about 30 percent on new discoveries (Palast, 2003). Finally, landowners who did not use more than 80 percent of their land were subject to a "no-till tax" and possible expropriation (Palast, 2003, p. 129). The political opposition to Chávez saw this land reform as a threat to the economic system and its economic prosperity (Wilpert, 2003). Many of these policies conflicted with

the solutions of the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. government. In fact, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a semi-official organization with a commitment to support democracy in the international arena in the second half of the 1990s, has provided financial support to various groups in Venezuela who advocate neoliberal reform (Romero & Cardozo, 2002). This economic and political policy accompanied the idea of anti-United States. We can count the public criticism of the Chávez government's diplomatic visits to Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar al-Qaddafi, and U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, on the rhetoric and anti-Americanism allegations. The government was against the U.S. Free Trade Area and was banned from U.S. forces to prevent drug traffickers from following them. Finally, the prohibition of the privatization of the state-owned industry was contrary to the United States' advocacy for the privatization of oil industries all over the world (Isacson, 2000; Mommer, 2003). For example, an energy report at the Bush administration stressed the importance of opening up markets around the world to invest more in the oil industry and improve the energy investment climate in South America (Lobe & Aslam, 2001; National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001). It was at the urging of oil production and supply to expand as a strategy to address concerns about U.S. energy consumption.

Both George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were in close contact with the petroleum industry before they come to relative opinion. In addition, the petroleum industry contributed greatly to the political campaigns of the Republican party; ExxonMobil and its employees contributed more than \$ 1 million in the 2000 election (National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001). The Center for Public Integrity reported that Bush was the recipient of campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry between 1997 and 2003, and that Republican politicians, who

received \$13.9 million in 1998, earned \$3.2 million for the Democratic party (Williams & Bogardus, 2003). On the order of FEDECAMARAS, CTV was on a series of strike calls to protest changes in the oil industry on April 9, 2002. These strikes catalyzed violence among supporters and opponents of Chávez, resulting in the deaths of 19 Venezuelans. The opponents in the military held Chávez responsible for all of the deaths and pointed to the necessity of forcibly removing them (Ellner & Hellinger, 2003; Hallinan, 2002; Lander & Maya, 2002). FEDECAMARAS president Pedro Carmona Estanga announced that Chávez resigned and that he would lead a transition government until a new election is made in a year (Tamayo, 2002).

Other members of the economic organization of Venezuela joined Carmona's transition government, including Ignazio Salvatierra, president of the Venezuelan bankers' association, and Gustavo Cisneros, Venezuela's largest media conglomerate (Palast, 2003). Cisneros has taken over the management of the Cisneros Group, a transnational corporation that has made numerous joint ventures with transnational corporations in the United States (Klein, 2003) and George H.W. Bush and other links to the U.S. political and economic establishment (Isikoff & Contreras, 2002). The television station and other media have contributed to the weakening of the Chávez government by the blind attacks (Adams & Gunson, 2002; Klein, 2003; Lemoine, 2002). Before and during the coup, Cisneros' television station and others changed the place of regular programming to ads that attacked Chávez and asked people to challenge the streets (Klein, 2003). Carmona's first decision as president was to sympathize with Chávez, the public broadcaster.

In addition, it abolished the legislative organ (which includes the majority of selected Chávez supporters) and canceled many of the Chávez government's land reform and oil reform policies (*The New York Times*, 2002). He led the security forces

to raid the offices of pro-Chávez supporters, to arrest mayors and governors attached to the movement, and to retain several members of the National Assembly, which had recently been resolved. He stopped oil deliveries to Cuba, withdrew OPEC support, and reintroduced PdVSA managers (Lander & Maya, 2002), which have long supported the policy of market opening and privatization of earlier administrations. In response to this policy and refusal to accept the allegation that Chávez had resigned, mass protests were held across the country against the coup. Thousands of people participated in this protest and there were significant sympathizers in the armed forces. In response to the popular opposition statement, military groups supporting Chávez sent him back to power in the morning of April 14, 2002 (Adams & Gunson, 2002).

CONCLUSION

The concept of democracy has existed either directly or indirectly in American domestic and foreign politics since the establishment of the United States. Democracy has emerged as a foreign policy instrument due to the influence of the conjuncture formed in the global sense after the First World War. Democracy emphasis and democratic propagation policy have continued at an accelerated pace with the effects of the devastation of the world war and the emerging new two-bloc world politics. During the Cold War, various attempts were made to ensure that the confidential operations carried out by the CIA, the public response of the world, and the conditions change and the countries to be intervened can be influenced.

In the 1980s, with the process of the neoliberal economic system, the interventions made by democratic institutions and organizations came to the forefront. Especially in the Reagan era, the democracy development policy with the establishment of the NED became indispensable for U.S. foreign policy. In this context, the increase in the effectiveness of civil society organizations, the attempts of think tanks and non-governmental organizations, and the initiatives of a better work have enabled the spread of democracy.

Political processes, economic crises, and U.S. attitudes toward regional countries in Latin America, along with the 1980s, have increasingly triggered U.S. antagonism. The developments experienced until the late 1990s indicate that tensions between continental countries and the United States are increasing. In Venezuela, the left wing spreading across the continent with Hugo Chávez's mandate came along with the intervention of political developments in the backyard of the United States. The Bush administration's stance against Hugo Chávez tightened and Chávez's harsh rhetoric led to the collapse of bilateral relations. Especially in the coup attempt in

2002, the appearance of the economic support provided by the NED to the anti-Chávez groups shows how the United States implements the democratic development policy. In the political process in Venezuela, the intervention of the local political elites and the United States by the NED, Chávez's 21st century socialism has prevented the passing of life (Wilpert, 2007). Instead of democracy, the U.S. policy of democracy development has led to economic crisis, political crisis, and chaos spreading to the country. The NED's active support for local NGOs is still ongoing. It is obvious that the people of Venezuela will not gain anything from the living, but will cause deep social injuries.

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