



**THE DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND  
DEMOCRACY IN AFGHANISTAN WITHIN  
THE CONTEXT OF POST-WWII ERA**

(Master's Thesis)

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Master's Thesis

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AFGHANISTAN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF POST-WWII ERA**

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## **Resume**

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**ABSTRACT****THE DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN  
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Afghanistan is located in the heart of Asia with over 99% of the population Muslims, most of whom are conservative and religious. Islam has an influence on politics in Afghanistan from the long past and religion is an integral part of politics. Democratic wave in Afghanistan has seen in the years of 1963-1973, but could not continue as a result of coups, interventions, and wars caused by Islamists and communists. Political Islam movements emerged in Egypt and India via the establishing social and political groups by some individuals as a reaction to the abolition of the caliphate, the new world order, and Muslim backwardness in various fields. Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jamaat-e Islami of Mawdudi, who are known as predecessors of Islamist movements influenced politics in Afghanistan after the 1960s. Afghanistan is a country with a long history of instability, and political Islam is one of the major players in the situation.

This study aims to fill the gap in the literature area about political Islam and democracy in Afghanistan and their relation and influence on each other within the context of post-WWII era. Democracy is defined and discussed widely in the first chapter. Political Islam and its characteristics are discussed with details in the second chapter and the aim is to find suitable answers about Islam and democracy and type of governance in Islam according to the ideas of different Muslim and non-Muslim movements and authors. The third and last chapter focuses on Afghanistan history before emerging of Islamist movements, the formation of political Islamic movements in the 1960s, and the situation caused by these movements and others after the 1960s.

**Keywords:** Islam, Political Islam, Democracy, Government, Politics, State, Afghanistan

## ÖZET

### AFGANİSTAN'DA İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI SONRASI DÖNEM BAĞLAMINDA SİYASAL İSLAM VE DEMOKRASİ TARTIŞMASI

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Afganistan, çoğu muhafazakar ve dindar olan Müslüman nüfusun % 99'undan fazlası ile Asya'nın kalbinde yer almaktadır. İslam'ın Afganistan'daki siyaset üzerinde uzun geçmişten beri bir etkisi vardır ve din, siyasetin ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Afganistan'da 1963-1973 yıllarında görülen demokratik dalga, İslamcılarının ve komünistlerin neden olduğu darbeler, müdahaleler ve savaşlar sonucunda devam edemedi. Mısır ve Hindistan'da, halifeliğin kaldırılmasına, yeni dünya düzenine ve çeşitli alanlarda Müslüman geri kalmışlığına tepki olarak bazı kişilerin sosyal ve siyasi gruplar kurmasıyla siyasal İslamcı hareketleri ortaya çıktı. İslamcı hareketlerin öncülleri olarak bilinen Mısır Müslüman Kardeşleri ve Mevdudi Cemaati İslami, 1960'lardan sonra Afganistan'da siyaseti etkiledi. Afganistan, uzun bir istikrarsızlık geçmişine sahip bir ülkedir ve siyasal İslam, bu durumun en büyük oyuncularından biridir.

Bu çalışma, 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde Afganistan'da siyasal İslam ve demokrasi ve bunların birbirleriyle olan ilişkileri ve etkileri ile ilgili literatür alanındaki boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Demokrasi ilk bölümde geniş bir şekilde tanımlanmış ve tartışılmıştır. İkinci bölümde siyasal İslam ve özellikleri ayrıntılarıyla tartışılmış olup amaç, farklı Müslüman ve gayrimüslim hareketlerin ve yazarların fikirlerine göre İslam ve demokrasi ve İslam'daki yönetim türü hakkında uygun cevaplar bulmaktır. Üçüncü ve son bölüm, İslamcı hareketlerin ortaya çıkmasından önceki Afganistan tarihine, 1960'larda siyasi İslami hareketlerin oluşumunu ve bu hareketlerin ve diğerlerinin 1960'lardan sonra neden olduğu duruma odaklanmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İslam, Siyasal İslam, Demokrasi, Hükümet, Politika, Devlet, Afganistan

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**THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO MY FATHER ‘MOHAMMAD ASEF’, THE BEST FATHER  
IN THE WORLD**



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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AD</b>	Anno Domini
<b>Af</b>	Afghanistan
<b>AIS</b>	Afghanistan Intelligence Service
<b>AKP</b>	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalınma Partisi)
<b>BBC</b>	British Broadcasting Corporation
<b>BC</b>	Before Christ
<b>CHP</b>	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>HDP</b>	Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)
<b>IMA</b>	Islamic Movement of Afghanistan
<b>ISI</b>	Inter-Services Intelligence
<b>KGB</b>	Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti)
<b>MB</b>	Muslim Brotherhood
<b>MYOA</b>	Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organization
<b>PDPA</b>	Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan
<b>UAE</b>	United Arab Emirates
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>WASP</b>	White Anglo-Saxon Protestant
<b>WRE</b>	Western Roman Empire
<b>WWI</b>	World War First
<b>WWII</b>	World War Second



**THESIS TEXT**

## INTRODUCTION

In this framework “The Discussion of Political Islam and Democracy in Afghanistan Within the Context of Post-WWII Era” is the main concern of my thesis.

Why is the above topic selected as the thesis subject? It is a fact that there are lots of academic works and studies about both Democracy and Political Islam. Examples for Democracy are countless, and there are hundreds of Thesis’s, books, topics, and researches about Political Islam too. Most of these writings are about well-known Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and Arabic countries together with Turkey and Iran. Academic writings about Political Islam in Afghanistan refer to foreigners, and there are no much academic studies about Political Islam in Afghanistan done by Afghans who know the situation of their country better and can have deeper analyze of the current situation to understand reasons of the previous failed experiences and assume the predicted results of the current situation in the future.

According to the above information, this topic was selected as thesis subject and I hope that this study will be one of the first works that focus on both Political Islam and Democracy in a country which suffered a lot in last four decades as a result of wrong understandings and misusing of these terms.

Which methods were used to write this Thesis?

1. I had interviews with many professors and Islamists in Afghanistan who has a better view of the subject especially about Political Islam in Afghanistan and the situation of the country.
2. I have done researches in many different libraries in Afghanistan, Turkey, and Italy and found good sources to use them during writing my thesis.
3. Online libraries and academic sites are the other precious part of my thesis sources as I could have access to hundreds books, topics, and projects from these sources online and used them in my thesis.

In this context, my thesis and the main argument being that “Democracy can be implemented in Islamic countries, including Afghanistan as Islam does not contradict democracy”. The two main movements, in addition to the governments of the time, became involved in Afghan politics two decades after World War II, influencing the

public, politics, and especially the war environment more than others: the first group is the People's democratic party of Afghanistan (PDPA) who are known as communists, and the second one is Islamism who we will examine. Both movements have fought against each other and government and damaged democracy in Afghanistan a lot. Our main topic is Political Islam and democracy and their relation and influence on each other. Political Islam emerged in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and changed to political movements in Egypt and the Indian subcontinent, after World War First and abolition of the caliphate in 1924 by Mustafa Kamal Atatürk and influenced Afghan politics from the 1960s until today. Our topic is to analyze democracy, Islamism, the impact of Islamist thought on democracy, and in the final analysis, we come to debates about political Islam and democracy in Afghanistan by examining the last 60 years of Afghanistan's political history.

My sub-hypotheses and assumptions are listed below:

1. "There is no specific type of government-imposed by Islam". We can see that there are some general rules for governing like being fair, but some see every issue from a religious perspective even when it has nothing with religion. The value that Islam gives to the Shura is considered an important source to prove that it coincides with democracy and elections. Although democracy as a controversial and debated issue is widely considered as the most convenient and ideal form of government for humanity in modern times, the subject becomes complex when it comes to the relation between religion and politics. Some refuse democracy, especially some Islamists who believe that governance is part of religion and it should run due to Islamic principles, with which democracy is in full opposition. These criticisms and controversial subjects become more complicated when we examine the issue of democracy from the perspective of politicized Islam, whose target is to seize political power from the top, not by social and cultural reforms in the society. Democracy and political Islam are two different issues that have separate bases and targets. Most of the Political Islam movements accept democracy when it is not in obvious contrast with Islam, and the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna did not refuse parliamentary system in Egypt, but some Islamic movements refuse democracy from the base, for instance, Sayed Qutb, who refused all systems and forms of government originated in the



modern world including democracy, and Hizb ut-Tahrir, whose obvious goal is to reestablish the caliphate also refuse democracy.

2. "Political Islam is a side effect of modernization, not a product of Islam itself". Political Islam emerged after Muslim failings in various areas and failing in adaptation to the new world order and modernization created by Europe after WWI. According to this characteristic political Islam is said to be a reactionary movement, not an action of modernism. Political Islam as a modern and reactionary issue is in center of focus in most Islamic countries, especially in Afghanistan where Islam politicized and used as a tool to get power by various movements even those who had no Islamic base. Political Islamic movements have not a specific and same character, they are divided into many classes and those who support democracy are more than those who opposite it.
3. "Our subject is not democracy and Islam, but an orientalist discussion of political Islam and democracy in Afghanistan". Political Islam, as a modern and reactionary movement, tries to find a suitable place for itself between modern ideologies of governing, where it has no specific procedures and many groups emerged have different policies toward issues, especially politics and governance. The issue of Political Islam in Afghanistan and the role of this movement in political changes in Afghanistan is discussed. Islamists reached their main target which is control of political power in 1992 in Afghanistan, but could not form a national and stable government as there were more than four governments only in Kabul. Taliban, who are known as products of the Salafi Islamic thought has emerged as a result of Islamists' struggles for power and the civil war.
4. "Foreign interventions and occupations have influenced political and Islamic thought in Afghanistan very negatively". Afghanistan had the earliest independence, modernization, political stability, and state structure movements in the region and among Muslim countries, but its geographic conjuncture, emerging of political ideas with foreign influence, the presence of different ethnic identities, external interventions, and irresponsible and hasty behavior of the rulers cut this stability and development.
5. "Afghanistan as an Islamic country with a conservative society, has experienced political Islam in its most failed, most rudimentary, and most primitive form in

the past 60 years”. Political Islam together with communists who founded instability and regime changes via a bloody coup in 1978 damaged democracy in the post-WWII era in Afghanistan. Islamists in Afghanistan are those who are under the influence of several foreign religious and political movements. In the first years of their formation, Islamists stood against king Zahir Shah and then Dawood Khan’s republic and tried to overthrow his government with Pakistan’s support who was Dawood Khan’s and Afghanistan’s main rival in the region. Islamists stood against communists and drove out the Soviets, but they could not play a positive role in state-building and preventing civil war after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988. The civil war started between Islamists and Najibullah’s government, after the Soviets withdrawal, and become more bloody when Islamists took power in 1992 and they fought against each other for near a decade till late 2001. The stability in Afghanistan was lost after emerging of leftist and Islamist movements in the 1960s, and Afghanistan did not see any stable regime until today. Political Islam is a major player in these events.

6. “Democracy, human rights, peace, liberty, and similar concepts are tools used by super-powers as tackles for their ambitions, not their main target which should be achieved”. 9/11, 2001 was the turning point in Afghanistan’s politics and expectations aroused for new, democratic, and stable Afghanistan after the Taliban regime was destroyed by the USA, but the war continues until today and Afghans did not witness a stable situation. One of the reasons for instabilities after 9/11 in Afghanistan is using the upper mentioned terms as a tool.

This study attempts to contribute and focus the attention over the conformity and opposition of democracy with Islam and examines political Islam and its influence on democracy in Afghanistan in the post-WWII era, which is a good and obvious model country, where Islamists fought politically and armed for decades with others and among themselves to control the power.

My study entitled “The Discussion of Political Islam and Democracy in Afghanistan Within the Context of Post-WWII Era” is made up of three chapters as explained:

- I. Democracy, its definitions, characteristics, historical process, basic elements, types, models, Islamic democracy, classification of countries according to democratic peculiarities, criticisms, and all that are related to representative democracy and modern form of governance.
- II. Political Islam, in which I examined the religion of Islam, history of Islam, the situation of Muslim societies before emerging political Islam, types of Islamist ideology, some important terms related to political Islam, the form of government in Islam, Islam and democracy, experiences of Islamists in power (failings), and other related topics.
- III. Political Islam and Democracy in Afghanistan, the general outlook of Afghanistan, the history of Afghanistan before emerging political Islam, new political order in the 1960s, invasion of Afghanistan by USSR, Mujahedin and the civil war with the reach of Islamists to the power and fall of democracy, and finally 9/11 and start of a new era in Afghanistan.

The study will be completed with a general conclusion which will include further suggestions and recommendations for solving the potential problems that will arise during the examination of the relation of Islam with democracy, type of government in Islam, Afghan instability and its reasons, and Afghan Islamist movements with their influence on democracy.

The reasons for Afghanistan's disasters in the past and the present situation belongs to many elements:

Geographic location in a region that connects global and regional powers and because of this characteristic Afghanistan is called as start and endpoint of civilizations. This location of the country caused many problems and endless interventions of the superpowers in different time eras. If Afghanistan's location was in a region like Latin America or somewhere in Africa it would not face all these interventions, but locating in a crossroads between superpowers in the past and now caused this horrible situation. Britain and Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, USA and USSR in the post-WWII era, and now the west under the leading of the USA is competing with Russia, China, and others in one side, regional powers and neighbors in another side like Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and

India are in conflicts with each other in Afghanistan and caused the continuation of war and prevented a long-lasting peace in the country.

Continuous regime changes have occurred in Afghanistan, which has caused instability and chaos. The last one occurred after 9/11 and the USA attacked Afghanistan under the name of war against terrorism. The negative point of this war is that it has not caused a stable situation for Afghans, in which the main victims are Afghan civilians, not the terrorists who caused the situation, and the Taliban become more powerful day by day, and the situation for Afghans became more bloody and complicated. After 9/11, the Bush administration tried to impose American values on the world with either you are with us or with terrorists, speech of Bush. After these events, some western sources claimed that Islam and democracy are incompatible therefore Islam creates radical and terrorist thoughts. According to some the reason for this anti-Muslim strategy is the collapse of the Soviets, and the west, especially the USA needs a new enemy to find an excuse and reason for their interventions in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country that could not form a successful national identity until now. The Pashtuns have been the politically dominant group since the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, but Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek are also large ethnic groups who influenced government and politics. The absence of a powerful central government caused a feudal and tribal system of governance and these different ethnic groups caused more instability together with religious and ideological factors in the past forty years of Afghan wars.

Not having standard centers for learning religious sciences and different understandings from religion is a key point for struggles. Many go to Pakistan to learn about religion, where they study very radically and against Afghanistan's interests and become tools for extremist groups. The number of religious schools for Afghan youth increased dramatically during Afghanistan invasion by Soviets, publications with fundamentalist content by various Mujahedin parties, as well as institutions that came to their aid, are widely circulated and published free of charge, ideological books and treatises were also widely printed and distributed, the experiences of Arab and Pakistani fundamentalist groups were also systematically transferred the Afghan youth. The Pakistani intelligence service played an important role in this game and prepared the situation for emerging radicals who then fought in the Afghanistan civil war against each

other more than their struggles against the Soviets. The rise of Wahhabism and Ahle-Hadith movements in Afghanistan, where Sufism and Hanafism are well rooted, has led to religious strife in the society.

Afghan people have tried to reach democracy for a long time before emerging political Islam, and communist movements in the 1960s and country became a real constitutional monarchy after the constitution of 1964, but the situation changed with the coup of 1973 and establishing the republic by Dawood Khan. Hopes for democracy came to zero after 1978 bloody coup of communists and then invading the country by Soviets in 1979. 1988 is the year of Soviets withdrawal and emerging of new hopes toward peace and democracy, but had no result as president Najibullah's proposal for peace and reconciliation was refused by armed Islamists, and the situation became worsen with taking control of Afghanistan by Islamists in 1992 and continued in a dark period till 2001. After 9/11, there was a good opportunity to establish a democratic order, but the necessary exploitation could not be made because democracy, human rights, and such concepts were used as a tool of foreign policy by super-powers.

Religion has always been part of politics and this is not limited to Islam. The thirty years' wars in Europe in the past and now strong political Hindu movements in India, religious politics in different countries, Evangelical movements that support Christianity, and are anti-Muslims are still in a strong position in the West including the USA and some Latin American countries. The desire among Muslims for democratic order is very strong, even stronger than some non-Muslim societies because Muslims especially Islamists are the primary victims of authoritarian regimes in most Middle Eastern and Middle Asian countries.



**FIRST CHAPTER**  
**DEMOCRACY**

## 1.1. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

When we start to find a suitable definition for Democracy we are facing some difficulties because from the very beginning till now democracy is a controversial and disputable word.

First, we should look at the structure of the word Democracy that originates from "Demos" which means people and "Kratos" which means governance in ancient Greek language and the combination is the word "Demokratia" which can be translated as "government of people", but it is not the only definition we need to know. Some words are related to the term democracy: Rule of the majority, Liberty and individualism, Freedom of speech, Equality, etc.

The word 'Demos' has different meanings. Demos was used in Athens to mean Athenians or similar communities gathered in the (Ecclesia) on the people's assembly in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC. However, 'demos' can also be associated with all of the society, with the heap, or mostly, or with a corrupt crowd (Sartori, 1996: 23). The definition of 'Demos' by Aristotle has more elements. Demos encompasses not only the crowd & the masses, but also the poor and the people who are characterized by lawlessness and other defects (Sartori, 1996: 22). Sartori is defining the word Demos with its six important characteristics:

1. Demos means everyone
2. Demos represent a large number of people, but not a definite number
3. Demos means lower class
4. People are indivisible and organic as a whole
5. People are those who appear with the principal of majority
6. People are the segment that appears with the limited majority principle (Sartori, 1996: 23).

Plato's and Aristotle's saying about governance types and Abraham Lincoln's speech can lead us to the definition of democracy in different phases of time. Democracy was first exercised in the Greeks, Plato had an attack on it and Aristotle defended it: democracy is simply, 'demos' meaning the many and the mob and 'Kratos' meaning rule (Crick, 2002: 11). According to Aristotle, democracy is the administration of free and wealthy majority. This is a management in which the majority of the people took

decisions and implemented their interests (Aristotle, 2018: 221/2). It can be interpreted that democracy is good but not for everyone. According to Plato, democracy is the result of a strong tendency to be rich and hunger for insatiable goods. In a democracy, every person organizes his life as he wants, everyone is free, he is not caring about moral values, for a statesman to come to power is enough to make himself look like a friend of the people (Platon, 2019: 282/291). Many meanings are related to the word democracy. Its true meaning in ancient times is expressed by Plato that democracy is, stored in heaven, but unfortunately, we have not yet been informed (Crick, 2002: 1). Despite Plato's important theories about governance and the relevant issues, some do not consider his statements about democracy serious, because he is disgusted with democracy, as he was defending Aristocracy. Held has an observation about ancient Greek democracy: The development of democracy in Athens has been a central source of inspiration for modern political thought. It's political ideals-equality among citizens, liberty, respect for the law, and justice have influenced political thinking in modern times in the west (Held, 2006: 13).

Plato's and Aristotle's definitions for democracy have been interpreted according to ancient Greek democracy, so they are far from and not related to modern democracy. In 1863, US President Abraham Lincoln emphasized the importance of democracy and delivered his Gettysburg speech, he defined democracy as: "government of the people, by the people, for the people" (Lincoln, 1 June 2010). Economist Schumpeter emphasizes on being competitive for a system to count it as democracy, he is adding: The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide through a competitive struggle for the people's vote (Schumpeter, 1947: 269).

Huntington emphasis on trustworthy, honest, and regular elections in which candidates freely contend for votes and in which almost all the grown-up population is competent to vote to its potent heads (Huntington, 1991). According to Hook, Democracy is a form of government in which citizens govern themselves. It is a political system in which absolute power resides with the people, who have the right either to vote individually or to elect people to represent them and vote on their behalf in fair, competitive elections (Hook, 2011: 10). Moheq is defining democracy in terms of its main duty, which is controlling of power. According to him, today's democracy which is



widely debated, is nothing but a mechanism for controlling power. A solution that transforms this phenomenon from a wild and rebellious state to a domestic and tame one. All said other than this is secondary, not the principle. So there is no any negative relation between Islam and democracy, because controlling power and establishing state form are issues related to this world (Moheq, 2011: 63). Definition given by Moheq and other definitions about modern democracy have direct relation with our subject and the situation of Afghanistan too.

Democracy is a system that has various meanings and we cannot have only one specific definition and should admit that it is a very partisan word, but the most important and common object in all definitions is the ‘public importance’ & ‘Public Sovereignty’ which no one can ignore it in a democratic system.

Democracy has many important principles and elements but the most important of them are Liberty and equality. Aristotle emphasized on these two principles more than others, when describing democracy. “For if liberty and equality are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost” (Aristotle, 2018).

This study will focus more on Modern democracy because it is our main subject, not Athenian democracy which has nothing to do with contemporary democracy and is not raised in Afghanistan as well. The main difference of contemporary democracy from Athens’s democracy is that every person is regarded as a citizen without any discrimination and almost everyone has the right to choose and to be chosen. In today’s world, democracy is a way of life for some people.

## **1.2. HISTORICAL PROCESS OF DEMOCRACY**

When we start analyzing the history of the world and governments which took place in various regions and different historical periods, it is seen that most of them were nondemocratic regimes as most of them ruled their regions without any limitation of power. But what we cannot ignore is that the majority of governments, even those that were undemocratic, had a series of democratic aspects.

There are some difficulties during setting a starting point for the history of democracy, like which of the governments and emperors can be called democratic? which

type of democracy is our aim? was the democracy in Ancient Greece similar to democracy nowadays or not? and what about Ancient Rome, Ancient Egypt, and some other empires in world history? which of these time phases influenced democracy and politics in Afghanistan? Etc.

### **1.2.1. Ancient Democracies**

Democracy has a long and debatable history. We will start with Ancient Greece without focusing on details, because direct democracy is not our main subject. We will pursue Roman Republic/democracy as it is a turning point for world history and has much to focus on, but we will analyze it generally, without much going to deep points as it is also not our premier topic. Middle Ages will also be analyzed to understand the reasons for destroying Roman civilization and clashes between the church and other dominant groups in Europe for controlling power. Middle Ages will be described more than previous phases, as it has similarities with the situation in Afghanistan because of the feudal society and the role of religion in politics. In the end, it is time to have a careful review of emerging and progressing of Modern democracy. We will chew over modern democracy more, as it is our main subject, and will discuss its historical background and other reasons for its emerging in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century with the American and French Revolutions.

#### **1.2.1.1. Ancient Greek Democracy**

When examining the history of democracy, it would be correct for many reasons to treat the ancient Greek city-states as a starting point in history. Roper addresses the years of 507-8 BC as the time of introducing democracy to the Athenian City-state with the reforms of Cleisthenes. Reaching to its height was a time when Pericles was a leading political figure in years of 461 to 429, and finally suppressed in the wake of the defeat of Athens by the oligarchic city-state of Sparta in the Peloponnesian war in 404. It was soon revived, however, in 403 and persisted in a modified form until 322-1 (Roper, 2013: 14). Ancient Greek has many democratic experiences, but Athenian democracy is the most important of them which constitutes the first example of participatory democracy (Dahl, 2017: 20). The primary unit in ancient Greek democracy was freedom, but political freedom, not the economic one. Athenians were giving much importance to the freedom

of their city from foreign invasions too. The Athenian democracy is a tremendous example, but today it can only be an inapplicable memory.

Ancient Greek democracy had many organs, but the most important among them was Ecclesia of 500. Hook confirms the situation of Ecclesia as an Assembly, which was made up of all the citizens of Athens, approximately 6,000 free men. On a weekly basis, the Ecclesia met at the Pnyx, a huge ground incised into the side of a hill just west of the Acropolis. There were 500 members of the council who proposed new laws to the Ecclesia and suggested changes and improvements in government (Hook, 2011: 21). Ancient Greek democracy is known as the first democracy in the world. This first democracy weakened and ended as a result of the disagreement between Athens and other city-states.

Like all other systems democracy also has positive and negative sides. The best aspect of Greek democracy is that it was direct, not representative, and the main reason for its possibility is that the population, which was considered a citizen, was very small in number. Because of this small number of citizens, T calls ancient Greek democracy as “community democracy” (Koker, 2008: 169). One of the worst characteristics of ancient Greek democracy is that only certain groups could use its advantages, not all of them could participate in democratic processes because the people in the ancient Greek were divided into three main groups: slaves, foreigners, and citizens. Participation in Ecclesia was closed to women and slaves, only men aged twenty and over were granted the right to participate as citizens. There is a huge disparity in this issue, even free people were not equal among themselves in terms of status, wealth, position, knowledge, influence, and power (Toktamis, 1994: 35). There is a lot to be said about the ancient Greek democracy, but none of its features has anything common with Islam and the situation in Afghanistan, as Islam emerged very later than these times, so the above basic aspects sufficient in order not to deviate from the main subject.

#### **1.2.1.2. Ancient Roman Democracy/Republic**

It is necessary to talk about the basic features of the Roman period, as it created innovations for democracy and the republic played a guiding role in laying the foundations of modern democracy. After ancient Greek democracy, Roman democracy

can also be counted in the list of ancient democracies, but we should not forget that democracy in Rome can never reach to Greek democracy.

The situation in Rome was a kind of transition from Democracy to the Republic of that time. We can say that democracy was suppressed in the Roman Republic. A Greek historian (Polybius) describes the Roman Republic as a mixed constitution. Crick is stating this form as a good government inherited from Aristotle's theory, good government is a mixed government, but that the democratic popular element could give greater power to a state (Crick, 2002: 12). The state of affairs in Rome was mixed which was not possible even for a domestic to say with assurance whether the whole system was aristocratic, democratic, or monarchical (Mann, 1986: 259). Even we can say that the government in Rome was a form of oligarchy or aristocracy than a democracy because Rome had a centralist structure of power and the population was not as less as it was in Greece, so implementing democracy, which was direct in that time was not possible, and the regime speedily becomes totalizer. There were some democratic elements in the Roman Constitution but in practice, the oligarchy was very powerful. But some argue the opposite as Millar claims that all officials could only be elected through direct elections, in which all adult citizens, including free slaves, had the right to vote, and all regulations were made by defining the issue of direct popular voting. He is surprised that, it is difficult to know why the Roman Republic is not recognized as democracy (Millar, 2002: 11).

It is acknowledged that republican Rome applied far greater influence than democratic Athens over the revolutionaries who overthrew the rule of absolutist monarchies and established representative democracy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Sellers interprets the situation as: the vocabulary of the eighteenth-century revolution rebounded with decisive reflections of republican Rome as political activists modestly assumed the Roman mantle. The primary authors and advocates of the United States Constitution like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, wrote together pseudonymously as 'Publis' to defend their creation, associating themselves with Public Valerius Poplicola, founder and first consul of the Roman Republic. At every opportunity, American and French revolutionaries proclaimed their desire to re-establish the stupendous fabrics of the republican government that fostered liberty at Rome. American and French republicans thought of themselves as part of a 2,000-year-old tradition originating in Rome (Sellers, 2014: 347). With the collapse of the Roman Empire, suitable

opportunities have emerged for the rise of feudalism, and democracy was greatly weakened.

Although the Roman Empire witnessed the decline in terms of democracy, it was very important in terms of state administration and managing large masses and had a great political and cultural influence in all world, especially in Europe's history.

### **1.2.1.3. Middle Ages and Feudalism Period**

Although the Middle Ages period is not important in terms of democracy, it should be mentioned to understand the decline of Rome and transition to renaissance and modern democracy. There are similarities between Afghan society now and the Europe of the Middle Ages in terms of feudal society and the role of religion in politics, so it is important to focus on and understand the role of religion in politics and their influence on each other too. We know that the Middle Ages is a dark period and has nothing brilliant for democracy, but we will have a pause on it to discuss some of the issues that took place in this period and make clear some of the important events which are related to the ruling of societies and state types. This dim era has passed with struggles for gaining power and the church was an important player in these struggles, which is political Islam today in Muslim countries, but of course, the roles are not the same. Generally, the period from 476 to 800 or till Renaissance is named as the 'Dark Ages' due to the collapse of Roman civilization and major historical retrogression. But what caused the situation in these years and what are the characteristics of the Middle Ages? Wickham explains it as follow: Foreign invasion, bubonic plague epidemics beginning in Constantinople in 541–2 and recurring periodically during the sixth to eighth centuries, deteriorating medical knowledge and treatment, reduction in the economy, and the, restriction in village population's births, caused in a real demographic decline (Wickham, 2005: 50).

Roper cites the invasions of the kingdoms of Western Europe and the British Isles through land and sea by Vikings, Hungarians, and Muslims from the north, east, and south as reasons for this substantial decline (Roper, 2013: 65). As a result, the powers of kings decreased and feudalism raised and got stronger in this period. Anderson marks the beginning of the eleventh to mid-fourteenth centuries as the period of the growth of feudalism in Western Europe economically, demographically, and territory (Anderson, 2013: 182). By the end of the eleventh-century feudalism had become dominant

throughout Western Europe. Feudalism was strong between the 10<sup>th</sup> to 13<sup>th</sup> centuries but as the 13<sup>th</sup> century came to an end, feudalism became weak and could not reconcile with the political, economic, and agricultural situation in Europe.

After that, there were wars between England and France and some civil wars in these countries. These wars together with some other factors caused the collapse of feudalism and this slump had some outcomes, which were different for every country. In England, the result of feudalism's crumble brought capitalism to the country, but it just changed the form as feudal lords successfully transformed themselves into capitalist landlords, and started collecting commercial rents from tenant farmers producing for the market. But in France after the collapse of feudalism, there was class struggle that caused the emergence of an absolutist state.

During these dark years, England had a very significant development towards democracy, and the Magna Carta Libertatum was signed by King John. As a result of the signing of this document, the power of the king was limited for the first time, but the English parliament was still not sovereign in all issues. The effects of this development were not limited to Britain and later played an important role in the emergence of the renaissance movement in Europe and the church's weakening in the political sphere. In the Middle Ages, city-states emerged and they were consulting with certain individuals, but these centuries also could not be a good example of democracy because these particular individuals were from specific social groups that had a series of privileges, not everyone. Religious leaders and rich people can be given as good examples of these certain groups. While those who were members of these categories had some rights as citizens but the rest of the people had no rights to play an active role or to declare their opinions.

The aristocracy was the practical government form of the time. Roper describes the situation after the collapse of the western Roman empire to the crumble of Feudalism (476 to 1640) as follows: The first was to highlight the extent to which the collapse of the WRE (Western Roman Empire) was historically regressive, centrally involving social, economic, demographic, and intellectual decline. Among other things, this decline highlights the fact that when civilizations collapse, the outcome can be disastrous for the majority of the population, and the negative effects can persist for centuries. Second, an

understanding of the specific features of the societies of the barbarian kingdoms that came to occupy the British Isles and Western Europe after the collapse of the WRE is necessary to understand the emergence of feudalism. Third, feudalism centrally involves forms of surplus extraction that necessitate extra-economic coercion of a politico-military nature. It thereby entails an even more vigorous suppression of democracy than that which prevailed in the Roman Empire. The only partial, but important, exception was the cities that became increasingly independent throughout the feudal era (particularly those in northern Italy). In short, feudalism is inherently undemocratic (Roper, 2013: 85).

Ancient Greece is the founder of democracy in the world, but democracy in ancient Greece was in direct form, not representative, and was limited to some of the specific classes of the society. Although democracy was weakened during the Roman Empire and the form of government changed, it still has a place in terms of European civilization. With the disappearance of ancient Roman civilization in Europe, the Middle Ages full of negative marks for societies started. Europe moved far back in terms of the government system, economy, and culture. Europe entered a completely undemocratic situation, feudalism and absolutism ruled for centuries except for the renaissance period in some regions.

After the ancient Greek democracy, the Roman republic/democracy, and very little democratic developments after the Middle Ages, we need to wait a long time to see modern democracy and its formation as a result of various movements that took place in different regions, especially in England, France, and the USA.

Before analyzing modern democratic movements, it should be mentioned that the renaissance movement in different parts of Europe, especially in northern Italian cities has a precious place in democratic movements. Renaissance movement in some European parts, especially in northern Italy, had some moves through democracy.

### **1.2.2. Magna Carta and Britain Parliamentary Democracy**

Analyzing events that resulted in the democratization of state and governance in Britain is important, as it took place more than a hundred years before the American and French Revolutions and settled a democratic process of ruling the country. Parliament was built and provided through democratic methods in this period and Britain became an

instance for parliamentary democracy in the world by establishing a constitutional monarchy without changing the regime to a republic.

The signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 in England, a treaty between king and barons giving very little rights to the public, 1640-1689 revolutions, and some other movements towards the limitation of the king's power are some important phases in England democracy history. Hook states the path towards Magna Carta as: On June 15, 1215, English nobles took King John to a large tent in a rural meadow called Runnymede. There, they forced him to put his seal on the Magna Carta, a handwritten document that proclaimed certain rights for all free men of England (Hook, 2011: 33). England moved toward stable democracy via strengthening parliament. According to Hook, English nobles continued to work toward democratic concepts for their country. England's first parliament, held in 1246, changed gradually, from an advisory body to controlling authority. In 1258, members of Parliament forced King Henry III to allow them to meet every three years to discuss and decide national issues (Hook, 2011: 34). The importance of England's first democratic movements is in its permanency and strengthening the power of parliament without any major confusion and sudden changes in society. Another important development in the history of British democracy is the idea of separation of powers, which later deeply influenced American democracy.

Most writers call the events between 1640 and 1689 a revolution, as men and women from the lower classes raised their voices to achieve democratic rights, which was a real change in society, but some conservative writers and intellectuals do not accept it as revolution, according to them it was a series of changes and evolutions in the society not a full cycle of revolution. English society during these years was deeply religious.

Similar to all other revolutions, the English revolution also has a background and series of events which caused it and the most important of the events are as follow: When Queen Elizabeth died in March 1603 leaving no heirs, the Scottish king, James VI, succeeded her as James I, king of England. James's proposal in 1604 to integrate the Scottish and English kingdoms was rejected by Parliament, and his relations with Parliament were not harmonious throughout his reign, with Parliament being suspended for most of the period from 1610 to 1621. A clash between the king and Parliament early in his reign, concerning whether the king had the right to exclude MPs from the



Commons, caused the House of Commons to declare that their privileges were due to inheritance of right, not due to the King's grace. A second important event was that there was a struggle between parliament and the king on English foreign policy as the parliament forced the king to take part in the Thirty Years' war beside protestant Bohemia against Catholic Spanish-Austrian-Habsburg Alliance and put a condition for the taxation which is taking part in the war, his response was the dissolution of the parliament. The conflict between king and Parliament raised speedily when Charles I became king, with Buckingham as his chief adviser, following the death of James I in 1625. Charles was uncompromising and had none of his father's political ability. Coward names him as the most inept monarch to have occupied the English throne since Henry VI in the fifteenth century (Coward, & Gaunt, 2017, 158). According to Hill these conflicts has some reasons: First, England's protestants did not view positively Charles's marriage to the catholic sister (Henrietta Maria) of King Louis XIII of France in 1625. Second, Charles committed England to a series of unsuccessful and costly military adventures which greatly exacerbated his financial problems and fiscal dependence on Parliament. Third, the imprisoning of five wealthy financiers for their refusal to provide him with a loan (the Five Knights case) led parliament to pass the Petition of Right in 1628, which declared illegal both arbitrary imprisonment and the collection of taxes without parliamentary consent (Hill, 2002: 12).

Some developments in Scotland has also effects on England in this phase of time. According to Roper, the abolition of bishops by the Scottish Parliament in 1638 is the main reason for military intervention by Charles, known as the First Anglo-Scottish Bishops War (Roper, 2013: 98). After this a strong relation was built between the English parliament and Scotland, even Scotland sent troops to back up the English parliament against the king in the civil war. Between the events of 1640 and 1688-1689, the last one was a real revolution than some events which happened in the 1640s.

The English revolution was not only for democracy, people who played role in these movements fought for their religion, liberty, and stood against the absolutist policies of King Charles I. The British Revolution had many national and international effects in the future, but the most important was the bourgeois characteristics and the transformation from feudalism to capitalism. Today Britain is known as the founder of parliamentary democracy in the world.

### **1.2.3. Modern Democracy**

The historical process of governance until the American and French revolutions is important for democracy, but since the main issue is related to modern and representative democracy, we need to examine the American and French revolutions and their results in more detail. American and French revolutions are the most important among all historical phases of democracy, because modern democracy started with these revolutions at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and spread to all world. Democracy has changed and new concepts have emerged, with the American and French revolutions.

#### **1.2.3.1. American Revolution/Democracy**

American independence/revolution was the starting point of this definitive movement towards modern democracy in 1776. They declared the bill of rights soon after independence. This was the starting point for modern democracy which shares a lot with liberalism, different than previous democracies. Modern democracy emerged at a time when most of the world was in control of absolutist regimes. Constitutional state, separation of power, citizenship, pluralist system, free elections, and accountability of power are some of the most important achievements and innovations of modern democracy started by the American Revolution in the late eighteenth century.

Democracy which formed with the American constitution showed its effects in many of the new constitutions in Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and many new democratic constitutions after WWII. Before its other features, the first characteristic of the American Revolution is that it brought a constitutional redefinition of democracy for the first time which was followed by the rest of the world soon after that. The basis of the American Revolution can be found in the war of independence which was started in Lexington in April 1775. Americans after the military victory against British forces and passing a series of steps, under the leading of their founding fathers were able to make a new constitution in 1791 in Philadelphia. This constitution had lots of democratic improvements which were the first in their type in the world, but not solving the issue of slavery was a huge failure for the first written constitution in modern times and base for the civil war of 1861-1865 between some southern states and the federal government.

The revolution has some reasons and steps which are discussed as follows: first, as Mann claims: The 3,000 miles' distance between Britain and America had naturally given a high degree of political and economic independence to the colonies. As a result, under eighteenth-century communications, it was not possible to rule the United States from London (Mann, 1993: 137). Most of the population living in America before independence was busy with their land and farming. But the situation was not fair as Bonwick pointed out: The wealth from capitalist agriculture was distributed unequally. The richest 10 percent of the colonizers had more than fifty percent of their total physical wealth, and among them, the richest 1 percent owned almost 15% (Bonwick, 1991: 31/2). Among key figures which influenced the American Revolution, John Locke has a special place, and liberalism stated by Locke was the source of inspiration in the declaration of independence of 1776 drafted by Thomas Jefferson as it is asserted that men are endowed 'with certain unalienable Rights' including 'Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness'. When coming to the type of society, we can say that it was mostly protestant religious as Bonwick says: American society was highly religious at the time of the revolution and predominantly protestant (Bonwick, 1991: 42). This protestant ethic was in full coordination with Locke's liberalism.

Just a few years before the revolution, the clash between Britain and France was an important issue which resulted in the victory of Britain in North America over France forces in 1763. During the years 1760 to 1775, there was a general social and political unrest against the British government and some internal elements. Among the events which increased the unrest against the British government was the "Stamp Act" which was passed by the British government on 22 March 1765. It emerged resistance in all colonies but the strongest one was in Boston on August 14 when an angry crowd of Bostonians hung the stamp collector (Andrew Oliver) in effigy from a Liberty Tree and burned his house. The Hudson valley revolt was another significant point. Zinn is stating it: Tenant farmers rebelled against their owners in the Hudson Valley in May 1766. The movement, which began in North Carolina, then spread to South Carolina (Zinn, 1999: 63). Extreme tensions in Boston peaked between British and civilian forces on March 5, 1770, when the troops opened fire on a group of boys who had been harassing them verbally and throwing snowballs at them. The result of this firing was the killing of five boys what became known throughout the colonies as the 'Boston massacre'. This murder

further radicalized the people of Boston, numbering around 16,000 at this time, and generated the cadre who played a key role in the Boston Tea Party, which took place on December 16, 1773. Tea imports and its taxes in the 1760s have been a constant source of conflict (Roper, 2013: 131).

While the events mentioned upper were in progress, an important decision was made. Finally, the war of independence began. A Second Continental Congress held several weeks later on May 10, 1775. It quickly evolved into a de facto national government. It resolved on May 15 to put the colonies in a state of defense, and formed the Continental Army, appointing George Washington as commanding general. The navy was formed on November 28. On August 23, King George III proclaimed the colonies in “open and avowed rebellion”, declaring the die is now cast. The colonies must either surrender or triumph (Greene, & Pole, 2008: 727).

The war of independence had some peculiarities and results as: It was a major conflict and took about 8 years and lots of Americans perished in it. It had strong effects on the centralization of the continental country for upcoming years. Roper points to lengthy discussions in the first half of 1776, which resulted in proclaiming the final decision of seceding from Britain, declaring independence on July 2, and issuing the declaration of Independence on July 4 (Roper, 2013: 134). The declaration of independence was written in 1776 as Brown stated: We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in general congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name, and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, that these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved (Brown, 2000: 172).

The Philadelphia Convention, which met from May 25 to September 17, 1787, draft a new constitution for America but all of the attendees were white wealthy men. Roper has the following statement on the convention: The proceedings of the convention were conducted in secret and behind closed doors. While these 55 rich white men from twelve states debated the best constitutional framework for the United States, others were excluded and unrepresented. Amerindians, women, slaves, laborers, small business

owners, small farmers, and westerners were not present. We shall now consider the extent to which these 'men of property' really did act in the interests of all of the interests of their class (Roper, 2013: 139). Serious debates took place in the convention for various subjects especially central federal or less federal government type, the division of power between states and federal government, how to elect president? should he run for only one long term (7 years) or two short terms (4 years)? how to form a parliament? should it be bicameral or with a single unit and the number of senators which the states will send to parliament and the role & structure of the judiciary branch were debated a lot. Government type was one of the most debated issues. Roper describes the general situation at the time of the passage of the Constitution as follows: The Federalists, led by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, James Wilson, and others, had major advantages in campaigning for the Constitution. The bulk of the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention supported ratification, and they had developed strong informal ties with each other that enable them to coordinate their activities on a national basis. The Constitution was supported by a majority of the wealthy Patriot elite, and consequently, the bulk of the newspapers were biased in favor of Federalist arguments. The Constitution itself constitutes a positive plan for creating a strong national union of the United States. The opponents of the Constitution, who became known as 'Anti-Federalists', promoted the idea of a much more limited form of federal government in which the powers of the federal government would be greatly diminished, and the rights of the states enhanced considerably. To many, it appeared as if this would merely recreate a weak federal government suffering from all of the disabling weaknesses that had afflicted the old Congress (Roper, 2013: 143). The reason why anti-federalists were opposite to central federalism is that they were considering that republican democracy can only be influential when the population is small just like the states, which can not be very possible for larger organizations.

The behavior of revolution leadership with Blacks and locals was unfair from the start of the events as Zinn says: Almost every white man had a gun and could shoot. The revolutionary leadership was distrustful of the mobs of poor. But they knew that the revolution had no appeal to slaves or Indians. They must destroy the white-armed people (Zinn, 1999: 78). Just three weeks took the time to get a final decision about slaves in the convention. Finally, it was not prohibited by the constitution and southern states gained

the right to import slaves till 1808, and slaves will be returned to the states from where they escaped.

Some argue that representative democracy is an American invention because it first took place in America after the revolution. Mann expresses the government structure after the revolution as follows: The production of a distinct central state designed to prevent authoritarianism and the sudden expression of popular will to resort to radical decentralization as well as conservatives (Mann, 1993: 156). The system of check and balance was well established and power was divided among the president, state governments, and parliament which all can have their influences on each other and no one was so strong to defeat all the rest. But the federal government was the strongest among all. States did not split only according to the area, different circumstances played a role, having slaves or not, north and south, and even climate had a role in this fraction.

After independence, validation of the constitution, and forming new federal government major events related to democracy and human rights took place but the most significant one was the electing of the Republican Abraham Lincoln as president in 1860. Although he had declared before the election that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with slavery in the states where it exists, the slave states of the lower south responded to his election with frenzied and ultimately violent hostility. To defend their rights under the constitution and not to lose their benefits seven slave states (South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas) seceded from the Union between December 20, 1860, and February 1, 1861, and started for military preparations against northern states. War broke out on April 12, 1861, when Confederate forces attacked Fort Sumter at Charleston, South Carolina. War ended four years later in 1865. Finally, Robert E. Lee was surrendered, but America got deep wounds. McPherson is stating the cost of civil war for America as follows: More than 620,000 soldiers lost their lives in four years of conflict 360,000 Yankees and at least 260,000 rebels. The number of southern non-combatants who perished as a direct or indirect consequence of the battle is not recognized; what is clear is that the Civil War's cost for Americans was as broad as in all of the nation's other wars combined through Vietnam. Was the liberation of four million slaves and the integration of the Union worth the cost? That question too will probably never cease to be debated, but in 1865 few black people and not many northerners doubted the answer (McPherson, 2003: 854). Once the war ended, the

Constitution was duly altered by the Thirteenth Amendment of 1865, which stated 'Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the United States'. After the dissolution of slavery in the United States, the general situation of blacks also improved, 20 congressmen and 2 senators were elected from Blacks. But discrimination in various forms against blacks has never stopped completely. According to Ínac, slavery in America has not been abolished as a sign of respect to democracy and human rights, but because the production system has changed (Ínac, 2020).

American independence has both revolutionary and democratic consequences. America became a state of constitution soon after independence. French writer Alexis de Tocqueville confesses that what he saw in America was more than America. It means that he was affected deeply by American democracy. An important feature of American democracy is that it is liberal from the very beginning and we cannot see any conservative or social trend on it. American democracy, of course, is the most important and influential democracy in the world. Locke's views influenced the logic of the founding fathers of the USA. The Declaration of Rights issued by the Philadelphia Congress of 1771 appealed to the immutable laws of nature and claimed the right to life, liberty, and property (Birch, 2007: 182).

The beginning point of this democracy was with the liberty movement started by George Washington and other founding fathers of the country. This movement quickly got results and every state formed its parliament but a general fact in all states was that blacks and women had not accessed their democratic rights for a long time. Then women got/were given the right to vote and to be selected in 1920 (Giddens, 2001: 373). Of all these democratic experiences, the situation of blacks in the USA until the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and even now will remain a shame to American democracy history.

### **1.2.3.2. French Revolution/Democracy**

The French Revolution, though mixed with political confusions in the country for years, is the first important and major development for the history of democracy in Europe. Although the French Revolution has raised many important issues, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Equality, Freedom, etc., it has failed to provide a consistent and successful alternative to the old system, led to instability and painful events for the upcoming years. One of the most important developments caused by the

French Revolution has been equality against the law. French Revolution, brought the country closer together as it becomes more centralized after the revolution, and of course, the rising of nationalistic ideas during and after the revolution played an important role in the union of the country. Nationalism emerged after the French Revolution and influenced all world, especially the Muslim communities as the Ottoman Empire became weak in the next years and some of its parts separated and some of them were colonized by the West, and political Islam emerged as a result of these events after the WWI. According to Crick, the main difference between American and French revolutions is that democracy in America after the revolution moved towards liberalism that guaranteed the rights of citizens. But democracy in France after revolution never quite lost the rougher, republican edge of popular power (Crick, 2002: 56).

The French Revolution is a series of events that took place in many years. Roper divides these events to four main phases: The first phase is the revolt of the nobility from 1787 to May 1789; the bourgeois revolution of 1789, the second phase occurred during culminating in the liberal Constitution of 1791; third was the rise and fall of the Jacobins from September 1792 to July 1794; and the reactionary, but not counter-revolutionary, the last phase was Thermidor from July 1794 to 1799 which culminated in Bonaparte's coup d'état (Roper, 2013: 161/2). Among revolutionary events, the capture of Bastille has invaded a dominant place and we can say that it was the first major insurrection of the revolution. After this event, the revolution spread from Paris to most of the regions located in different parts of France. According to Rude the capture of Bastille was the responsibility of the people of Paris as a whole. The number of armed Parisians on that day is estimated between 180,000 and 300,000 (Rudé, 1991: 56). After seizing of Bastille the revolutionary government established constitutional principles and settled in the rights of Man declaration and settlement for the 1791 constitution. This declaration included liberty, equality, and fraternity, but only through the limited application of these principles. The separation of powers was not real because the main powers were entrusted to the assembly. The check and balance system was not very successful and the parliament was a unicameral body. The French Revolution was a series of instability and confusion in which women were excluded from citizenship and democracy.

It was the first revolution in the world in which masses of the people interfered directly in most of the phases. Lewis argues it as below: The French Revolution was a



bourgeois revolution in the fuller sense that the bourgeoisie itself played a key and leading role, although not as a united entity but rather as an internally socially differentiated and politically factionalized class that was still in the early stage of its historical formation. To a greater extent than either the English or the American revolutions, it was also a genuinely mass revolution, involving the bulk of the population, estimated at around 28 million by the 1790s (Lewis, 2002: 73). It was not similar to the English revolution because of not being limited to just some elite men and nor to American as people who played a role and participated in the revolution were from very different social groups and were not led from the top.

To assess the reason and background of the revolution it is needed to understand different social groups and estates which were in French society before the revolution. Generally, these groups are divided into three: the first group is the Clergy, second is the nobility, and the last one is the rest of the people which was the biggest by population. The relationship between these strata and the monarchy before the revolution was full of struggle, especially the relation of the monarchy with nobility. The estates were not separated by certain lines as the upper class of clergy was part of nobility as well and people with good economic situations were among the nobility and the third class. Soboul's argument about social strata and the situation before the revolution is as follows: A distinctive feature of French society was the existence of the bourgeoisie on both the small and middle classes. Most local production was still in the hands of artisans, independent producers, and dealers. But the class of artisans was characterized by extreme diversity and legal and social status; an infinite number of gradations separated the middling bourgeoisie from the 'little people' who worked with their hands (Soboul, 1977: 17/8).

The ideas of some important French authors which are related to the enlightenment especially the ideas of Montesquieu (rule of law and separation of executive, legislative and judicial power in a constitutional monarchy) and Rousseau (active citizen involvement in determining the general will, majority rule, popular sovereignty, separation of executive and legislative functions, the inalienable right of the people to change the government) was the path to revolution. Therefore, it can be said that both the short-term and the long-term factors of the political and social conditions in which the previous regime was, led to the revolution. The inability of the French state for

linking bourgeois states in England and Holland is a fundamental cause of the crisis which resulted in the revolution. But we should not forget that like all revolutions this one also had a strong internal basis as France remained an essentially agrarian society, albeit one in which there was growth in manufacturing and growing reliance on international trade.

The Jacobins club which dominated France for one year after the revolution was an organization that originated from revolution but acted violently, caused more terror, and gave a bloody color to the revolution. The Jacobins executed the king on January 21, 1793, too. Jacobins declared a new constitution in 1793 that was more liberal than the first one and the rights of the previous constitution were extended. The rights which were guaranteed for all Frenchmen by the constitution are listed by Hardman: equality, liberty, safety, the rights of property, the inviolability of the national debt, freedom of worship, a common education, public assistance, unlimited freedom of the press, the right of petition, and the right to assemble in popular societies and the enjoyment of all the rights of man (Hardman, 1988: 169). Jacobins abolished feudalism and armed most of the men to defend France and took steps to establish direct democracy. After passing some time and improvements especially in the military Jacobins were defeated from the revolution scene too.

After the Dutch and American revolutions in the last decade, the early French Revolution of 1789-1793 established one of the most influential models of the national democratic government in history (Tilly, 2007: 33). According to Birch, the English, American, and French revolutions have resulted in different consequences as American founding fathers focused on creating a republic based on representative institutions; the leaders of the French Revolution also emphasized on republic but; in Britain, people defined their systems as representative and responsible government (Birch, 2007, 109). The evolution of the democratic rule in Britain discords from the French one in three points. First, Britain had a liberal way of life and a constitution based on the parliamentary principles for almost two hundred years before the system became democratic. Second, British elites discussed a debate over the extent of the charter for the greater part of the nineteenth century. Third, British liberal theories were more individualistic in their assumptions than French theories (Birch, 2007: 120).

### 1.2.3.3. Modern Democracy in The 19<sup>th</sup> & 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries

After the English revolution of 1688, American and French revolutions, the most important waves for democracy were seen on the revolutions of 1848-9 which involved almost all Europe except few countries such as Britain, Holland, and Belgium. Although not very successful, these revolutions are one of the biggest revolts against monarchs in world history. These revolutions were in the form of transmission from feudalism to capitalism in all Europe. Beyond this important effect, these revolutions had some other effects as the 1848 revolutions had a decisive impact on the future development of socialism in Europe, both as a political movement and concerning its intellectual development. After the revolutions of 1848, the rulers of Western Europe ruled in a traditional absolutist way, justified by religion as divinely ordained, and assuming the admiration and consent of their subjects.

After the revolutions of 1848 in Europe especially in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, capitalism spread to all over the world, especially most of the Muslim countries in Africa and Asia were occupied by European capitalist countries, who introduced themselves as the premiers of democracy and human rights, had turned into a fearful dream for the rest of the world, and they did not grant a right to life for anyone but themselves. This is the time when the base for political Islam movements was laid by Jamaluddin Afghani and some other Muslim individuals as a response to European colonials in the Islamic countries. On one hand, the world was suffering the oppression of capitalism on the other hand Marxism was spreading. After this spreading, Marxism tried to define itself as a more participatory democracy. The Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian revolution of 1905, and the most important one Bolshevik revolution of 1917 are the significant examples of the participatory democracy which were introduced by socialists and Marxists. But the opposites do not accept it as democracy and saying how can a system full of oppression, in the absence of liberty, and many other undemocratic factors can be called democracy.

After these important events, most of the European countries started to move slowly towards democracy. From the starting of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the beginning of the WWI countries were busy with different political issues. One of these important issues was emerging new political ideologies. When Wilson got the decision to take part in the

war then it got the name of war to save democracy. After winning the WWI by Allies (USA, UK, France ...) new nation-states were built instead of emperors in defeated countries such as Turkey republic instead of the Ottoman Empire, Germany formed a new government, Tsarist Russia became the Soviet Union after the 1917 revolution. It means that the first wave of modern democracy started immediately after WWI. Urbanization, economic development, industrialization, the emergence of the middle class, and the falling of emperors played an important role in the emergence of the first wave of modern democracy.

The second wave began with the defeat of totalitarian and fascist regimes during WWII. The second wave of democracy has been largely through the pressure of the victorious states and the independence of the colonies (Huntington, 1991: 12). Establishing of United Nations and declaring the universal declaration of human rights by this organization is one of the most important improvements in the second democracy wave as it was copied to lots of countries' constitutions as well.

The victory of the third wave of democracy is the years of the 1970s and 1980s when authoritarian regimes like Spain, Portugal, and Greece transmitted to democracy and democratization occurred in East Asian and Latin American countries too. Between 1974 and 1990, the number of democratic countries doubled and at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy (Huntington, 1991: 21). The fourth and last wave of democracy realized after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries' independence (Yoldas & Becerik, 2010: 582). According to Birch, the interest of scholars increased in the process of democratization as a result of increasing the number of countries that claimed to be democratic in the years of the 1990s (Birch, 2007: 128). After the Soviet Union collapsed, the world became unipolar and globalization and neoliberalism gained momentum. America has now tried to rule the world unrivaled for several years.

Hook summarized the democratic situation from WWII until the end of the cold war as follows: Following WWII, toppled dictatorships in Western Europe and Japan gave way to democracies. Communism, however, was also spreading. The Soviet bloc became stronger after taking control of the Eastern European countries. South Vietnam and Cambodia was another victory for Communism in the 1970s as a result of the USA's

defeat. But the 1970s, are years in which democracies rose immovably. The dissolution of the USSR was a huge achievement to democracy via transforming 15 totalitarian countries to the democratic government (Hook, 2011: 13).

Democracy grew and raised further in the 21st century. According to Freedom House, there were 116 democracies as of 2009, approximately 60 percent of the world's countries (Freedom House, 2010). According to some, democracy is the best system of governing in history. Amartya Sen, a Nobel prize winner has picked up the rise of democracy as the most important development of the twentieth-century (Sen, 1999: 3-17).

#### **1.2.4. Democratization Trend in Modern World**

According to Vanhanen (Vanhanen, 1997: 251–271) the process of democratization in different regions occurred as follow:

##### **1850–1899**

**Asia-Pacific:** None

**Europe:** Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

**Americas:** Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Uruguay

**Africa:** None

##### **1900–1949**

**Asia-Pacific:** Australia, Japan, New Zealand

**Europe:** Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom

**Americas:** Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, United States, Uruguay

**Africa:** Egypt

**1950–1979**

**Asia-Pacific:** India, Israel, Lebanon, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey

**Europe:** Greece, Portugal, Spain

**Americas:** Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela

**Africa:** Egypt, Morocco, Zambia (Tilly, 2007: 42).

By expressing the history of democracy as above, we meant to briefly show the main historical stages without going into too many and unnecessary details so that the questions about democracy in minds have already been solved and will make the reader easily understand the next sections. As it is mentioned before democracy has a long and debatable history. Ancient Greece is mentioned as the founder of democracy because the word democracy and its foundations are first laid in ancient Greece society. The Roman Republic is known as the second stage in the history of democracy after the abolition of democracy in ancient Greece. At this stage, the state administration has undergone changes and democracy has changed form. Rome is not a small society like the Greek city-states, and so the method of its administration is very different, and in some ways, democracy is just a name and it has been crushed thoroughly. Middle Ages is the time when democracy is completely pressed and we should wait a long time to see new democratic movements. In the Middle Ages, not only democracy, but also the legacy of the civilization left by the Roma has turned towards disappearance, and this is why it is called the Dark Age.

Britain has been pushed toward democracy by signing the Magna Carta in the 13th century and some valuable political changes in the 17th century that resulted in installing a strong parliamentary democracy without going rapid changes in administration and society. But Most significant movements toward democracy are the revolutions of America and France in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. Representative democracy was established with its republic character for the first time after these revolutions. More than 200 years passed after establishing modern and representative democracy but the word famed after the First World War and became more notorious during the Cold War in the

bipolar world order. Democracy became prominent in the 1970s when Portugal, Spain, and Greece transmit to democracy and became dominant in the 1990s when the Soviet Union slumped. Today democracy is one of the most leading ideologies in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **1.3. BASIC ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRACY**

The implementation of democracy depends on its elements. The basic elements which democracy are as follows:

#### **1.3.1. Pluralist System**

The pluralist system means having more than one party and other civil society organizations. An active, literate, and educated citizenry is a key component of democracy. Without an effective and involved citizenry, democracy will fail because it is a government-driven by the people.

Political parties are one of the most important and most needed elements of democracy as the main actors of democratic politics. According to Resende pluralism shows two distinguishing characteristics, one is that system should be multiparty, second, it also includes parties that represent genuine alternative policy options (Resende, 2011: 11). Effective opposition is also a key condition for democracy. This opposition should be active both inside and outside the parliament. No government can call itself democratic if all power is in the hands of just one party. So governments ruling by one-party regimes are nondemocratic even if they have the word of democratic in their formal country names. Governments in Middle Asia and most of the Middle Eastern governments are not democratic because there is just one party/person who rules the country and the chance to get to power for other parties/individuals is zero. Next to political parties the presence of parliament and devolution of power is also needed in a pluralist system and democracy.

In today's societies only having more than one party is not sufficient. To have a democratic system, governments should be in good relation with civil societies. Civil society represents freedom of speech in a democracy. Democracy becomes more institutionalized when some organizations struggle for basic rights and freedoms. The presence of these organizations causes limitation of power. Civil societies encourage

people to take part in democratic processes but it is not compulsory. According to Birch, pluralism is an American theory about the impact of sectional and group conflict on policymaking (Birch, 2007: 217).

### **1.3.2. Free Elections**

Elections in democracies should be free, fair, frequent, and general. Elections systems and procedures should be democratic. A system can be called democratic when there are at least free elections. Free elections mean that everybody who fulfills the basic conditions can vote and can be a candidate. Free elections mean that nobody can be in power till his/her death even if he/she comes to power by democratic procedures like Hitler in Germany who took power democratically. Free elections mean that there is a chance to opposition to get the power legally. Free elections mean one person one vote. Free elections mean that nobody can compel a citizen to vote. According to Yayla, democracy is possible at any moment by turning the minority to the majority and the majority to the minority (Yayla, 2016: 157).

### **1.3.3. The Right of Ruling of Majority Which Respects Minorities Rights**

Democracy of course is a system in which the majority is taking the main power, but it never means that majority can do everything in their favor. Politics in a democracy is a fair contestant game. Democracy is not the game of winner wins all and losers lose all. There should be some red lines which power can never cross it because the sovereignty of people has limits.

### **1.3.4. Constitutional State**

A constitutional state means a government that is formed and works according to the rule of law. Rule of law means having a wide theoretical framework that links it to human rights and democratic order. Rule of law means the emergency state should not be declared except very necessary and short-term conditions. In a democracy, there are some restraints and both the government and the opposition have to act in the framework of the law. Nobody even the government can not apply everything which they want. No democratic power can enter arbitrary practices. Crick points out the point that law can be both customary and statutory, but new laws are made by a representative assembly or



parliament in modern democracies (Crick, 2002: 97). Civil-political rights, liberty, the right to have property, and freedom of speech should be under constitutional guarantee. In democratic regimes, people are considered equal under the law. All citizens are subject to the same laws, and no individual can legally receive special privileges.

### **1.3.5. Freedom of Press**

Freedom of the press plays a vital role to guarantee freedom of speech and information. It is not possible to have freedom of expression and information without guaranteeing freedom of the press first. A free press encourages citizens to participate in democratic processes. Freedom of the press does not mean dominating the situation by pro-government channels, a problem found in most of the Islamic countries.

### **1.3.6. Accountability of Power**

Accountability of power includes transparency too. Accountability has a close relation with elections and rule of law. Accountability inside government make executive organ accountable to both legislative and judiciary organs. The concept of transparency is promoted by freedom of expression and freedom of information. Freedom of expression and information are meaningful as they are closely linked to government performance, elections, and public awareness. Responsibility against the public is one of the most important elements of democracy. There should be constant communication between the public and the government, and the public should always have the right to criticize the government. Transparency and accountability in public administration are essential to democracy.

### **1.3.7. Separation of Power**

Modern democracies developed on the principle of separation of power and the main difference of contemporary democracy from ancient democracies is the presence of this principle. All democratic governments have three main bodies: Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. Resende is setting two main principles for separation and balance of power. First, the competencies of the three branches of governmental power must be delimited and defined. Second, all branches of government are bound by the rule of law . The separation of power is most clearly defined concerning the judiciary, which must be

independent of the other branches (Resende, 2011: 8). The relation between the three main government organs is important. The relation between executive and legislative depends upon the type of government, which is Presidential, semi Presidential, or Parliamentarian. It can work without facing a big problem in many cases, but the relation of the judiciary with the other two, especially with the executive is more complex and debatable, as we see it is always accepted, but not respected that much. For obeying this rule, most of the legislation should be elected, while a small percentage that will be no stronger than those who are elected can be appointed in bi-cameral parliaments. Finally, we can say nobody can rule all the three main organs at the same time even if he/she got most of the votes in elections.

The separation of power between the three main organs is not adequate. The independence of the judiciary should be respected. An independent judiciary means that it has the same approach to authority and opposition, and that, as we see in most immature democracies, it should not violate its principles in favor of authority. The problem of non-democratic and less-democratic governments is that the judiciary's status is changing according to who they are approaching. Having a strong and independent supreme court for an independent judiciary is needed.

### **1.3.8. Human Rights**

Human rights and respecting it in all stages is the founding element of democracy. Birch defines human rights as rights in respect of all human beings (Birch, 2007: 181).

## **1.4. TYPES AND MODELS OF DEMOCRACY**

### **1.4.1. Types of Democracy**

Democracies have been classified into three compartments: direct, indirect, and semi-direct. While semi-direct democracy is not very known, it is a combination of elected representatives voting in a legislature and citizens voting directly on some issues and referendums. Switzerland has this system to a point.

### 1.4.1.1. Representative Vs. Direct Democracy

An issue that is discussed a lot in the subject of democracy is the types of democracy whether it is direct or representative. Democracy has begun with direct form in Ancient Greece and has continued in that form for a long time. After passing several phases democracy become formally representative after the American Revolution in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century and continued to be representative till now for most of the time and in most of the democratic countries. Direct democracy is a form in which all citizens participate in related topics directly without any representation by their parliamentarians in the parliament. Maybe there be assembly but that is not permanent and nobody is representing the rest of the people.

Our main issue is representative democracy, which is the only applied form of modern democracy, so we will focus on representative more than direct one. Representative democracy was founded very later than Ancient Greek, Ancient Roman, and other phases of democracy. It is a type of democracy in which citizens took part in politics by their parliamentarians in parliaments or through general elections. There is a general misunderstanding about representative and parliamentary democracy from the beginning, as most of the people understand parliamentary democracy from the word representative democracy. Democracy can be represented without being in parliamentary form like American democracy is a good example for representative democracy but it is not parliamentary and even in parliamentary democracies all related to representation is not operating just in parliaments. So we can have a result as: not every representative state is a parliamentary state, a parliamentary state may very well not be a representative state, parliaments existed before representative democracy and England is a good example of the case. So parliamentary and representative democracy are different terms but of course, parliamentary democracy is the clearest and well-known example for representative democracy.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues that 'sovereignty can not be represented' which means a political system can only be called a democracy when it is direct. However, Rousseau was also convinced that 'no true democracy has ever existed nor ever will', because it presupposes several conditions which are unlikely to prevail simultaneously, but he has set up some rules for being a democracy and Norberto Bobbio is stating them

as follows: Firstly, it presupposes a state sufficiently small to make it possible to call the whole people together without difficulty and each citizen must be in a position to know all of his neighbors. Secondly, manners must be so simple that business will be kept to a minimum and thorny questions avoided. Furthermore, it requires considerable equality in fortune and rank. And finally, there must be little or no luxury (Bobbio, 1987).

There can be just some exceptions for implementing direct democracy in today's world in extraordinary situations like referendums for important issues but none of the referendum can cause to name contemporary democracy as direct democracy. Today direct democracy can only be possible in countries and regions which are small in population and have very advanced living conditions like the democracy of cantons in Switzerland but even that is not a real direct democracy like the one which was in Ancient Greece. The most important thing for the implementation of direct democracy is the time. To do it possible, all adults should take part in politics which is impossible today. So now we have representative democracy to focus on and to implement it. As time passes, there are some improvements in the mechanisms and ways of implementing representative democracy which should not be understood as new forms of democracy. Pluralism in representative democracy especially for today's version of the representative democracy plays an important role. According to Bobbio pluralism is the instrument that informs a fundamental distinction of modern democracy when compared to ancient democracies (Bobbio, 1987: 60). Some discuss the presence of semi-direct democracy but it is not a well-known form so we can neglect it now. In a representative democracy, representatives use sovereignty in the name of the people, not their own because people and the public are the main in democracy.

#### **1.4.2. Models of Democracy**

Although it is not very related to our topic, we will have a short pause on models of democracy. Models of democracy mean how democracy is implementing. There are many theories about models of democracy, but we will focus on models that are related to our subject. In general, we can divide models of democracy into four main categories: Liberal democracy, Social democracy, Majoritarian democracy, and Participatory democracy.

### **1.4.2.1. Liberal/Social Democracy**

Liberal democracy is the most famous democracy type, especially it became important after the American revolution and still is one of the most important models for contemporary democracy.

Of course, democracy and liberalism are two different issues but for having a lot of similarities sometimes democracy is used to mean liberalism and liberalism means democracy too. The relation between democracy and liberalism can be explained as the relation between equality and freedom, while democracy emphasis on equality, freedom is indispensable for liberalism.

Individual freedom, human rights, and separation of power are the most important elements of liberal democracy. A system can be called democratic when it involves at least some liberal elements. Liberals argue that liberal democracy is the most applicable form of democracy.

Social democracy emerged later with the uprising of socialism in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. This is a controversial model of democracy, even it is debated whether it is a democracy or not. Opposite to liberal democracy, this model emphasizes equality and encourages the state to take an active role in its citizen's rights.

Social equality is important for this type of democracy. It can be discussed as the combination of the equality principle of socialism with the freedom principle of liberalism too. It is against both intense capitalism and absolute socialism/Marxism. It rejects dictatorship and does not accept revolution too. In a social democracy, the state/regime should be democratic and constitutional.

### **1.4.2.2. Majoritarian/Participatory Democracy**

Although it does not have much to do with our subject, there will be short definitions for majoritarian and participatory democracy types too.

The rule of the majority is the main point of the majoritarian model and inspired by the Westminster system in the UK. The two-party system is a good example of majoritarian democracy. The negative point of this model is that opposition has no chance to play a role in the political sphere of the country in which democracy is not settled well.

the participatory model targets to increase the citizen's effectiveness in political life. Local governance is important in this model. According to participatory democracy, just elections are not sufficient for this model, so citizens should take part in most of the political issues of the society.

### **1.5. WHAT IS ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY?**

It is a new term, emerged after forming democratic or semi-democratic governments in countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Tunisia and, others. Hook divides democracy in Islamic countries to two main groups: the first type recognizes Islam as its national religion, but religion does not interfere with the affairs of the state. Countries with this type of democracy currently include Kazakhstan, Tunisia, and Turkey. In these countries, the principles of Islam are applied only to personal and family matters. The second type of Islamic democracy is a combination of Islamic religious law and constitution. Sometimes Sharia, the religious laws and principles based on the Quran, have more authority than the constitution. As of 2010, countries that combine a constitution with Sharia include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, Sudan, Mauritania, Malaysia, and Iran (Hook, 2011: 69). Afghanistan is the most well-known example of the second type of Islamic democracy, as its constitution is the most democratic among this category and has compatibility with Islam too.

### **1.6. THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRACY TO THE EXISTING GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM**

Democracy has some achievements. The most important of them are listed below: Modern democracy brought many significant terms to governments. A new term after emerging of modern democracy is having a constitution. In democratic regimes, the constitution has to protect government structure and preserve the rights of people as citizens. Democratic constitutions are based on human rights, freedom, and check and balance of power. The American constitution is the first written and democratic constitution in the world. Poland is the first European country, which drafted a constitution in 1792, other countries joined this process in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

One of the shortcomings of modern democracy in the first years of its emerging was the lack of rights for women for many years, who, after much struggle, gained their

democratic and civil rights after the First World War in some countries, and in many cases, this trend was later realized. Racism was another problem standing against people's democratic rights in democratic countries such as the USA. There is still racism in some countries and some of the specific groups such as Blacks, Muslims, and other minorities are facing these problems in western countries.

The kind of economic system in democratic countries is important and sometimes it is a controversial and negotiable issue. As we see all democratic governments accepted market economies, and all of them try to grow up their economies through capitalism. According to Hook capital is in two forms of wealth: money or property. In a capitalist economy, industries compete with one another for their financial gain, and the government is not controlling businesses in a capitalist economy, citizens are owning and controlling businesses themselves. Prices of goods and services are determined by business owners according to supply and demand (Hook, 2011: 106).

The principles were mentioned, but globalization is an indirect outcome of democracy together with modernization. Globalization means that the centers of power have shifted and it promotes democracy indirectly. According to Cunningham the topic of citizenship shades into that of globalization (Cunningham, 2002: 199).

### **1.7. CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO DEMOCRATIC PECULIARITIES**

There is no obvious standard on how to count a government system is democratic or not. But it can be understood that which countries implement the basic elements of democracy and set them in a democratic or undemocratic category. Freedom House has listed some elements for counting a system as electoral democracy:

1. A competitive, multiparty political system
2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens
3. Frequently combative elections accompanied in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that yields results that are unrepresentative of the public will

4. Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and generally open political campaigning (Piano and Puddington, 2004: 716).

The establishment and rooting of democracy depend on the active participation of citizens in political issues. Birch lists the main forms of political participation in eleven steps: 1. Voting in local or national elections 2. Voting in referendums 3. Canvassing or otherwise campaigning in elections 4. Active membership of a political party 5. Active membership of a pressure group 6. Taking part in political demonstrations, industrial strikes with political objectives, rent strikes in public housing, and similar activities aimed at changing public policy 7. Various forms of civil disobedience, such as refusing to pay taxes or obey a conscription order 8. Membership of government advisory committees 9. Membership of consumers' councils for publicly owned industries 10. Client involvement in the implementation of social policies 11. Various forms of community action, such as that concerned with housing or environmental issues in the locality (Birch, 2007: 145).

According to Tilly, a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the government and its citizens have broad, equal, protected, and binding consultation (Tilly, 2007: 13/4).

## **1.8. CRITICISM OF DEMOCRACY**

While democracy is a widely accepted phenomenon, some reject and criticize it fundamentally, while others criticize the indirect consequences of democratic processes.

The tyranny of the majority is a well-known critique of democracy. The tyranny of the majority is a problem in all democracies, but it becomes serious when we consider countries where democracy is not settled well. Nazi Germany in the past and some governments that came to power democratically today are prominent examples of this category. As it was seen in the example of Germany, the persecution by the majority can cause disasters and bloody consequences for societies. Misuse of democratic values and noncompliance with the rules after coming to power is the main source of this problem. It generally occurs in countries where democracy does not have a strong base. In some cases, democracy becomes a mask for oppression, because it is considered just as a power gaining device. According to Cunningham socialist, feminist, and antiracist theorists have



typically criticized Schumpeterian revisionism and favored approaches to democracy involving much more citizen participation than just voting (Cunningham, 2002: 20).

Although the establishment of nation-states is one of the concepts brought by modern democracy, some consequences of these nation-states are against democratic values. Racism is another criticism of democracy, which is related to the theory of nation-state. In countries where racism is influential in governing systems, society is divided into two main groups. The first group becomes the main citizen and enjoys more of their normal citizenship rights, but those in the other category are secondary in most matters and are crushed directly by governments or through the major bodies of society. In USA, WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) is category who are in a better position than others, but Blacks, Muslims, and natives are suffering problems in their daily life as results which are originated from the governing system and social structure. The USA is not the only country where racism turned to a significant political and social problem, Blacks and Muslims are still facing problems as minorities in most of the western countries, and minorities in most of the Islamic countries face racism.

The homogenizing feature of nation-states harms democracy, and this homogenization prevents the emergence of different identities and is against multiculturalism. As a result, although the administration is democratic, the rights of minorities will be violated. This problem exists in both the Islamic and other societies. But in countries with undemocratic governments, this issue has taken away the most basic rights of people as a result of hard pressures. Millions of Pashtuns and Balochs, who live in Pakistan, have been targeted by state terrorism and their basic living rights have been taken away for decades. As a result of many massacres and pressures, a movement under the leadership of Manzoor Pashteen promoting peace and human rights against war to protect the rights of Pashtuns has emerged in recent years. Pakistani intelligence and the army are using terrorist and extremist groups to silence the Pashtuns through state terrorism and tens of thousands of Pashtuns are killed or are lost as a result of Pakistan's anti-Pashtun strategy for decades. Regarding the terrorism implemented by the states, unfortunately, Islamist groups are used as a tool. Since the emergence of the Pakistani state, it has supported Islamist and extremist groups against neighbors, especially against Afghanistan. According to the commission of Human Rights Watch Muslims are facing serious racist problems and ethnic cleansing by China, Burma, and some other countries.

Democracy has been used by large and global powers as a tool for national and capitalist interests. This was frequently used against the Soviets after WWII. Soviets responded to the USA by naming pro-Soviet countries as democratic republics which Birch defines as a misleading term and says: The term 'people's democracies' is an essentially misleading one that was coined in the aftermath of the Second World War. No sensible person has ever been deceived by this into thinking that these Soviet-controlled states were democratically governed in the accepted sense of the term. The citizens of the states themselves had no such illusion (Birch, 2007: 110).

The USA and the West started misusing democracy against Muslims in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq were under the fight against terrorism, but both countries became more unstable and chaotic after the attacks. In Afghanistan, the Taliban regime collapsed, but still, 18 years after the attack, the war in the country is not over, and the USA signed a deal with the Taliban to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, but Afghans are still dying as a result of terrorism and intelligence war of other countries. Birch points to Bush's repeated assertion of promoting democracy in Muslim communities since 2003 (Birch, 2007: 130). The Saddam administration was destroyed by the USA as Bush claimed that Saddam has biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons that should be destroyed, but after the invasion, this argument could not be verified and Iraq was dragged into endless disasters. As a result, both Afghanistan and Iraq have turned into playgrounds by international and regional powers.

Communists and anti-western countries with undemocratic and oppressive regimes argue that democracy is serving exclusively for capitalist interests.



**SECOND CHAPTER**  
**POLITICAL ISLAM**

## 2.1. THE DEFINITIONS OF THE POLITICAL ISLAM

There is no commonly accepted definition of political Islam because the term has controversial issues, everyone has a different understanding of the term as Hatina claims: Political Islam issue is likely the most misunderstood factor in the Middle East (Meir, 2007: 44).

Some of the well-known definitions of Political Islam are as follow: Political Islam is related to the movements and forces within the religious communities in respect of the religious law, as more prominent than other dimensions, especially the moral dimension. Therefore, being a good Muslim requires the implementation of the Sharia law, which is possible by the ruling political system, as well as the current problems can be solved just with Sharia law. Political Islam considers all other reforms and developments in various cultural, social, and moral spheres as a subset of change in the political sphere of Muslim life, and in this regard, consider the effort to achieve the government as one of their religious obligations. Muslim Brotherhood groups in the Arab world, like-minded people and their followers in non-Arab countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir branches in various countries, jihadist Salafism, al-Qaeda and their allies in our region (Afghanistan), are cooperating in this regard, although they are different in some details, including the way of reaching the desired government and also ways of implementing the Sharia, but all of these groups are classified under the name of Political Islam (Moheq, 2011: 6/7). Moheq's definition applies to most of these groups, but Afghan Islamists are more likely to follow suit, as they have worked hard in the past to gain state power, even via bloody mechanisms against nationalists, lefties, and even each other.

Islamism is an intellectual, moral, social, economic, political, and interstate movement targeting a new human, society, politics/state, universal Islamic union, and world model based on a new social organization model, which is the main reference source of Islam. In other words, it is an ideal and effort to bring Islam to life, to implement its provisions, and to reconstruct it according to Islam (Bulac, 2012: 16). Bulac's definition is listing the general characteristics of the movement which are founded in most of the groups, especially the moderates.

Fuller focuses on the subject from another point of view and emphasizes the separation of the religion of Islam from the word Islamism in his definition. Islam is a

religion, not a political ideology but Islamism is different, it has aspects of political ideology, that takes various forms. Islamism is a broad term embracing a body of quite variegated and even contradictory political, social, psychological, and economic, even class functions. It is represented by different types of movements that draw general inspiration from Islam (Fuller, 2003: 14). Kara observes it as a total of various subjects get together with the emergence time. Islamism which emerged in XIX-XX centuries, is a thought and movement which is dominating Islam as a whole (faith, worship, morality, philosophy, politics, law, education) political, intellectual and scientific studies, seeking to liberate, civilize, unite and develop Muslims, from the western exploitation, cruel and obscene administrators, captivity, imitation, superstition, to reanimate with a rational method (Kara, and Oz, 2013: 17).

Gencer is defining it with its revolutionary side. According to him, Islamism is the idea and act of stripping from the existing social order or disorder, freeing from traditional false assumptions, and creating a different social model by removing the previous one. With this definition, Islamism is an ideology as well as a movement that carries the core of the revolution (Gencer, 2013: 72). Mozaffari defines Islamism with its conquering characteristics. Islamism is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means (Mozaffari, 2007: 21).

Iscan defines Islamism, by differentiating the religion of Islam from the ideology of Islamism that emerged in the last two centuries to defend Muslims against new world order and to put its formula on how to solve existing confusions. Islamism is also called Islamic modernism. This modernism embodies a process built by Afghani, Abduh, and subsequently Hasan al-Banna. According to these thinkers, Islamism is a recipe for salvation from the situation in which the Islamic world has been subjected. In this sense, it is possible to call Islamism an ideology and a worldview with what this ideology brings (Iscan, 2002: 03).

To sum up the above definitions, Political Islam/Islamism can be defined as a versatile movement that emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as a result of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire and having backward of Muslims in comparing with the west in respect of education, technology, and other fields, as well as a reaction to western occupation of the Muslim lands. It had more strength after the WWI and abolition of the Caliphate. To

get stronger once again and evolve, it suggests embracing the religion of Islam, by referring to the happy past, and uniting of the Muslims by using different methods. These methods are not fixed and each group has its strategy, some want to reestablish the caliphate, some desire to establish an Islamic state, and those who like to seize power through democratic principles. As moderate movements, a few groups of them militarized after the WWII, as a reaction to the establishment of Israel state, Afghanistan invasion by Soviets, and the emerging of authoritarian and secular regimes in the Middle East. Finally, we can say that Islamism is one of the modern interpretive ways of Islam, which combines both traditional and revolutionary characteristics in its structure.

### **2.1.1. Using of The Term “Political Islam”**

There is so little consensus about the correct use of the word (political Islam), and some criticize the use of the term because of the separation of Islam as religion and Islam as politics. According to them, Islam is a collection of principles that includes religion, politics, ethics, daily life, and all things related to human life. So naturally, it involves politics in itself, and using the word ‘Islamism’ is just an instrument of anti-Muslims or democrat/secular Muslims to display Islam as apart from politics. According to them, Islam can not be separated from politics. This category strongly opposes to the terms such as Laicism and Secularism and most of the Islamists refuse to use such terms drastically. While others argue that Islam is a religion, not an ideology, but Islamism that had emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries as a result of some political innovations in Muslim communities is an ideology. According to this category, religion is different from governing and politics. Afghanistan and Islamists in that country are a clear example of the category that refuses the division of Islam as religion and Islamism as a political ideology.

## **2.2. RELIGION OF ISLAM**

Before describing ‘Islamism’, it should be understood that it originates from the word of ‘Islam’ itself. So what is Islam and what does it mean? Islam is an Arabic word which means surrendering to God, to comply with truth and right, to be in peace, rest, salvation, and similar meanings, which we can derive these meanings from the Quran and Hadiths of Prophet Mohammad peace be upon him. Today Islam, with 1.5 billion its

believers, is a source of inspiration, explanation, guidance, solace, and fulfillment for life in this world and beyond. Islam contains all sides of life from daily life to politics and religion of course. Between these parts, the most important for Muslims are religious affairs. Roy argues that Islam, as an agent of establishing social justice, does not have an anti-government project (Roy, 1990: 50). In comparing with other religions, as Birch stated, Islam has a universal character as those Christianity and does not allocate to any particular ethnic group or territory (Birch, 2007: 75).

To comprehend the sources, motives, and objectives of different messages of Islam, the meaning of Sharia should be understood first of all. As it is mentioned in the Quran, Hadith, and many other important Islamic sources, the Sharia means path or way to be followed. According to Lobban, Mohammad Said al-'Ashmawy, a specialist in comparative and Islamic law, claims that the term Sharia, as used in the Qur'an, refers not only legal rules but also to Islamic approach toward three streams: 1) the worship, 2) ethical code, and 3) social transactions (Fluehr-Lobban, 1998: 91). Qarzawi considers that sharia allows different interpretations only in detail, not the main structure body (Qarzawi as quoted in Esposito and Voll, 1996: 45).

Islam is not simply a religious faith or compound name for a few forms of prayer, but an extensive network which predicts to eliminate all tyrannical and evil systems in the world and enforce its program of reform which it deems best for the well-being of mankind (Mawdudi, 1939: 16/7). According to Mitchell, radical Islamists tend to consider without the principal of the sharia as a mere project rather than a corpus (Mitchell, 1993: 239). Some Islamists put their agenda before Sharia, as Khomeini declared in his speech in 1989 that the logic of the revolution took precedence over the application of the sharia. For Islamists, the Islamic nature of the state is important, even more than the strict application of Sharia. Sharia for them has meaning just in a full Islamic society.

There are some accusations to Islam about the freedom and rights of women. When we examine it deeply, we see that it is not true as Fuller claims: women keep their names in Islam even after marriage, which is a tradition adopted by a handful in the West, inheritance rights in Islam were legally open from the beginning, while women did not have the right to independent legal inheritance in the West until the last century (Fuller, 2003: 37).

Today Islam is a dominant religion in the world and has followers from all around the world, but mostly from the Middle East and South Asia. Roy categorize Muslims into three main regions: The Sunni Arab Middle East, the Sunni Indian subcontinent, and Iran-Arab Shiism; Turkey is different than all these regions with its circumstances (Roy, 1994: 02). It is a political division than the region.

### **2.2.1. Emerging of Islam**

Islam has a history of more than 1400 years and began with appointing of prophet Mohammad (PBUH) in 610 as Allah's last messenger to humankind. Prophet Mohammad served as Muslim's state and religious leader for 23 years until his death. Prophet Mohammad of course is the most influential person in the world's history and even most of the non-Muslim historians and authors accepted this fact. Mohammad ruled a society for 23 years and changed it to an unbelievable degree.

Although the Magna Carta Libertatum dated 1215 is accepted as the first written constitutional agreement today, the Madinah agreement is a much earlier and much more comprehensive constitutional agreement. According to Armağan, Madina's constitution was signed in the second year of the hijrah after the war of Badr and is the first written constitutional document that fascinates lawyers today (Armagan, W. date: 107).

According to the Armağan, the Madinah document included justice, nature of crime, citizenship, defense, freedom of religion, etc (Armagan, W. date, 109-112). This document is signed by both Muslims and Jewish living in Madinah city and constituted subjects that humanity did not reach even in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in terms of freedom.

### **2.2.2. Four Caliphs (Rashidun Caliphs)**

After the death of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), Abu Bakr, Omar, Osman, and Ali, were appointed as leaders of the Muslim community through electing by Shura/council. It means they were elected through semi-democratic procedures. The period in which Muslims were led by prophet Mohammad and these four figures is called as the most brilliant, precious, and fair time in Islam's history, because of the distinguishing characteristics which were never repeated after them.



The successors of the Prophet, the four caliphs, conquered large areas in different continents, from Damascus to Egypt, North Africa to the Carthage gate, Iraq, and Iran to Afghanistan's border and established a unique government from 632 to 661 in 30 years. The characteristics of this powerful state so far have been: consultation with elders in matters of affairs, simplicity of court, piety in word and deed based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, equality before Islamic law, and jihad to secure the principles of Islam in the world. However, this feature of the government did not last long for various reasons and was destroyed with the rise of the Umayyad dynasty (Ghubar, 1996: 154/5).

### **2.2.3. Umayyad's/Abbasids**

After the last caliph (Ali), the type of government changed with the Umayyad's family in Islam and continues until today in various forms and different regions. Umayyad governed Muslim society around 130 years and then the Abbasids family took the government. Umayyad's formed a family government and the person who inherited the government in his family for the first time in Islam is Muawiyah, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty. According to Ghubar, the Abbasids dynasty came to power on 750 and ruled Muslims till 1258. Unlike the Umayyad's, who was an Arab state, the Abbasids formed a multi-ethnic state in which Arabs, Turks, Afghans, and Iranians played a role, as Abu Muslim Khurasani supported them to seize power (Ghubar, 1996: 157). Opposite to Umayyad's, the Abbasid government worked on science and culture instead of conquests, and it is a brilliant period in the history of Muslims in terms of science and culture.

### **2.2.4. Post Abbasids till Twentieth Century**

After falling of Abbasids by Mongols, Muslims formed different governments in different parts and ruled Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the Middle East, some parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa with tolerance for all religions. The most important, longest, and last one of these governments is the Ottoman Empire, which ruled large areas of Asia, Africa, and Europe for more than 600 years till the first world war. Ottoman Empire ruled both Muslims and non-Muslims for long period and everybody was free to worship his/her religion with full independence and respect. After WWI and abolition of the caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, most Muslims gained their

independence from European invaders and formed different governments according to their nationalities and region which they are living on in more than 50 different countries.

According to historians, except for Omar bin Abdul-Aziz, who had similar characteristics to the Rashidun caliphs, the remaining 13 rulers of the Umayyad dynasty lacked the attributes of the Rashidun caliphs. The Umayyad government was a victorious state, and in that era, the religion of Islam and the Arabic language and culture spread to large parts of the world.

### **2.3. ISLAMIC SOCIETY BEFORE EMERGING POLITICAL ISLAM**

To understand the present situation of Muslims and their communities, it is better to understand their historic achievements and failures which cause the present situation. According to Fuller, the current backwardness of Muslim societies is a fact recognized by all, including Muslims (Fuller, 2003: 02). According to many Muslims, especially Salafi Islamists, the backwardness of Muslims lay on their distance from the religion and not obeying the Islamic rules, as they were obeying by their past generations before these disasters. Muslims now are suffering a failure which started many centuries before. But the Muslim community in the Middle Ages, when Europe and other parts of the world were in their dark ages was living their brilliant time and had many achievements in different areas. According to Fuller, whatever Westerners may think about Islam, we can not ignore the fact that Islam is politically and socially wider, longer, and more diverse than any other religion (Fuller, 2003: 04).

Some of the factors of the Muslim backwardness are internal and some are external as well. Fuller listed the external factors as follows: Destroying of libraries with some of the great urban centers by Mongols, which never quite recovered. Colonialism, which caused huge destructions, demolishing traditional institutions and failing to provide functional organic alternatives. Muslim societies today are still concerned with external domination, even if that domination no longer takes classic colonial shape (Fuller, 2003: 05/6). Beyond many internal reasons for the Muslim's failure in the modern world, one is sectarian division as Sunni and Shia. Fuller, mentions this factor with the emergence of a Shi'ite state in Iran at the start of the sixteenth century, which caused the physical division of the Muslim world (Fuller, 2003: 05).

The most important reason for the backwardness of Muslims is their decline trend in terms of thought, a trend that had made Muslims possess various scientific and intellectual schools and centers before the 14<sup>th</sup> century, various sciences and techniques preceded it. Europe in this time went through the dark years of the Middle Ages when the church was a ruling figure of European society. Before the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Muslims presented the world with different scientists and scholars in various fields. Mawlana Balkhi, Ibn Khaldun, Farabi, Ibn Sina, and others were among the pioneers of that era in several fields. But this trend did not continue after the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Europeans in this time started waking from their deep nap and moved forward in distinctive disciplines. Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands each made significant strides in naval exploration and the discovery of a new world. France and England joined the convoy after a while. Russia, Germany, and Japan did not lag in the modern world.

Regarding the general situation of Muslims before and after the 14<sup>th</sup> century, Moheq says: At that historic time, called the Middle Ages, Muslim countries flourished in civilization. The surviving works of that time can still be seen in Spain, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, India, and elsewhere. But with the passing of those days, and the beginning of the decline that is known as the decline of the Muslim civilization and is often considered from the 14<sup>th</sup> century, Islamic lands began a period of intellectual and cultural stagnation. One of the main consequences of this situation was that scientific and philosophical traditions collapsed, and the intellectual dynamism that requires critique, revision, and renewal disappeared. The works that have emerged in this period show that the flow of thinking has been painful and the spirit of innovation and creativity has moved away from it. This period, which has lasted for several centuries, has brought Muslims a narrow mind, a static culture, and limited knowledge, along with religious and ethnic prejudices. In the intellectual productions of this period, there was no place for a universal view, acceptance, and recognition of the other, active dialogue, civilized trade, constructive criticism, and many other elements that were effective in the flourishing of civilization (Moheq, 2015: 41). But what Muslims did in this time phase was concentration on sectarian and internal differences.

### 2.3.1. Emerging of Salafism

The period of Muslims declining caused the emergence of two well-known Islamic movements, both are called Salafists as their main target is a return to the past and paying attention to the appearance of religious texts more than their deep meanings. The first group was led by Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahab, known as Wahhabism. The second group was founded in the Indian subcontinent by Shah Waliullah Dehlavi. Both are Salafists and their most important feature is returning to back, it means return to first years of pure Islam. These schools do not care about theology, philosophy, and intellectual foundations established by Muslims throughout history.

The difference between both movements is in their geographic location, as Saudi Arabia from that time until the 20<sup>th</sup> century was in primitive and unaware culture from other worlds. So Abdul Wahab's understanding of religion was limited as geography is an important element in getting the message of religion. Moheq is stating the situation: Since there was no friction with the external culture in this experience, and no new knowledge was encountered, until the middle of the twentieth century, a completely tribal and local color prevailed over it. In his discourse, there was nothing new except the repetition of the words of Ibn al-Taymmiyah and Ibn al-Qayyim against the superstitions and imitations of the jurisprudential religions at a level that is consistent with the human mind and intellect of the tribe in Saudi Arabia (Moheq, 2015: 44). The situation in India was very different from Arabia and Waliullah Dehlavi's movement and Deobandi madrasas emerged as a result of the British invasion of India. After the British occupation of India, the students of Shah Waliullah Dehlavi started to fight British militarily, but they were failed and then Darul-Uloom (Religious school) of Deoband was founded to fight them via learning classic Islam's thoughts and standing against all including knowledge brought by British to India.

The Deoband school, which advocates Pan-Islamism, opposed the creation of Pakistan as an independent state, even Mawdudi thought so, because they think that creating Pakistan would stop the development of Islam in the Indian subcontinent and cause nationalism, but in a single India, it is very important to try to re-establish Muslim sovereignty (Roy, 1990: 93). But Ali Jinnah, with the cooperation of Britain, managed to break up India and caused a large crisis in the region. Moheq sees al-Qaeda as a product

of Wahhabi Salafism and the Taliban movement as a product of Deobandi Salafism, which most Taliban have graduated from the branches of Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan.

According to Birch, Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahab from Saudi Arabia (1703-87) is the most influential fundamentalist Sunni theologian (Birch, 2007: 75). He is known as the founding father of Arab Salafist movements. According to Roy, this movement left its mark on all twentieth-century fundamentalist reformists, particularly since Shaikh Abduh served as Grand Mufti of Egypt for several years (Roy, 1994: 34). According to Birch, Wahhabism became dominant in Saudi Arabia when the Saud family took control of all the country in 1926, who made good relations with Abdul Wahab in the past and were supporting each other with Wahhabi religious practices in political communities controlled by Saudis. This agreement between Abdul Wahab and the Saud family developed a comprehensive system of state schools in which the Wahhabi form of the Muslim religion is taught (Birch, 2007: 80).

It is enough for introducing Salafism and Wahhabi movement. Deobandi movement, al-Qaeda, and Taliban will be discussed in the related part of the next chapter with details.

#### **2.4. BACKGROUND OF EMERGING ‘POLITICAL ISLAM’**

Ottoman Empire was an important player during Muslims backward from 14<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, but it can not play a creative role in knowledge and thought as Europeans did it. Ottomans were busy with battles against European and conquering new areas on different continents. This was the first time in Muslim history when ajamis (non-Arab) established the organization of caliphate which was in the position of all Muslim defender. By invading their lands and increasing colonialism they woke up, but this wakening was in the form of reaction, not an action in improving themselves. This wakening up was first started by Jamaluddin Afghani, Mohammad Abduh, Rasheed Reza, and some others. These figures were to give life once again to Muslim-thought, but this time politics were heavier in their movements than past and their followers like Hasan al-Banna, Mawdudi, and others started their activities on base of reaction.

So when and how Islamism emerged? Answers are different, but all accept that Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani (1838-1897), played an important role in emerging Islamism

and his activities were then named as Islamist movements by western countries. He is known as the first Muslim thinker in modern time and founder father of modern Muslim individuals who started to make Muslims awaken and aware of the dangers of European Colonialism in the Islamic region in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He is the person who influenced Islamist movements through his ideas, especially the emerging of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He started to fight with Colonialism via different procedures and had traveled from Afghanistan to Iran, Turkey, and Egypt to encourage Muslims of different sects and nationalities toward unity against Colonialism. Most of the Muslim individuals following him emphasized on issues which were a type of repeat and expansion of his ideas. His student Mohammad Abduh tried to inform Muslims too. Rasheed Reza spread it more and influenced Hasan al-Banna more than others through his ideas. So we see that Islamism emerged in a period when the west was in an attacking position to take control of and colonialize the Islamic territories.

Roy addresses the second half of the nineteenth century, as the time when a current of thought within the framework of Islam endeavored to address the backwardness of the Muslim world, which he is calling it 'the salafiyya', the "return to the ancestors" typified by its three canonical authors, Jamaluddin Afghani (1838-1898) Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Rasheed Reza (1865-1935. Reform (Islah) did not assume ratifying modernity, but returning to the heritage of the Prophet, which would enable one to conceptualize this modernity. Salafism pushed the logic of reformism to its furthest: it desired the right to individual interpretation (ijtihad) of the founding texts (the Quran and the Sunna) without regard to previous remarks. The reopening of the right to ijtihad marked a significant rupture with ten centuries of orthodoxy (Roy, 1994: 32/3). According to Fuller, the first series of body blows to the Muslim world in the nineteenth century was delivered by the West. The dawn of the twentieth century began with deep Muslim anxieties over the catastrophic weakness of the Muslim world, generating such thinkers as Jamaluddin Afghani, Mohammad Abduh, Rasheed Reza, and Said Nursi Badiuzzaman, who sought ways to reverse this course of Muslim decline through examination of weaknesses in Islamic intellectual practice itself (Fuller, 2003: 7/8).

The word Islamism was used mostly by western politicians, while authors in their writings were not using it frequently until the Islamic revolution of Iran. After the Islamic revolution of Iran and forming the Islamic government in Sudan and

overthrowing Soviet Union forces from Afghanistan, this word began to be used more by both west and Muslims as well. After 9/11 and starting of America's war against Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam in Iraq, under the name of operation for freedom and anti-terror war, the term using expanded more and became an instrument for all who wanted to imply their anti-Muslim and xenophobia strategies in America, Europe, China, Russia, and some Muslim dictators who want to use the term and keep their reign.

#### **2.4.1. Entering of Islamism to Political Sphere**

When Islamism entered to political sphere? Moheq, answers this question: when the Ottoman government collapsed as a symbol of Muslim power and what was known as the caliphate was abolished, many religious people have been assured that they and their religion have become defenseless, and that there is no longer any strong support for defending them and their ideals. This incident was symbolically unfortunate for parts of the Islamic society, especially for those who were not yet familiar with the modern concepts of the nation-state, and the same classic notion of nation and Emamat (Imamate) prevailed in their minds. In this situation, efforts were made by some religious groups to launch religious movements to create a religious government, which they had no clear idea of, and these movements stated that their goal was to restore the Islamic Caliphate. The two prominent Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir have been among the most prominent in the group. Similar groups have sprung up in other areas, with the common denominator being religious activists seeking political power (Moheq, 2011: 113/4). Roy claims that the great period of political Pan-Islamism lasted from the Balkan Wars of 1911 to the disappearance of the Caliphate by Ataturk in 1924 (Roy, 1990: 99). It was time when there was still the Ottoman caliphate and Islamist movements in the form of parties did not emerge.

Some argue that Islamism entered the political sphere formally after the formation of Jamaat-e-Islami by Mawdudi in India. Nasr illustrates the situation as follows: A key turning point came in 1941 when a young Indian Muslim journalist, Abu A'la al-Mawdudi, conceived the idea of forming a political party specifically to promote the Islamic agenda. This was a major innovation in the relationship of Islam to contemporary politics: Islam had previously been mobilized to serve the state. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s had called for political action in the name of

Islam, but Islam had never functioned as a player in the form of a political party in the arena of modern politics. No political party had existed before which institutionally linked politics and Islam. Thus, Mawdudi's Jamaat-e Islami (Islamic Association), which later took root in Pakistan, broke new ground and served as the forerunner to a series of Islamist political parties to be created later in different regions (Nasr, 1994: 15). Roy has a similar answer as: The Islamist movements have begun in the 1940s. Notions have evolved, historical incidents have changed, cracks, and divergences have brought diversity. Nevertheless, there are a conceptual matrix and a sociological base common to all the groups (Roy, 1994: 03).

As Islamism is a new and modern ideology the reasons of its emerging can be count as follow: the final collapse of the greatest Islamic empire: The Ottoman government, struggles against Colonialism and emerging independence movements in different Muslim societies, establishing of the state of Israel within the heart of Muslim world, and finally, presidents for life regimes in the Middle East accelerated this movement. According to Moheq, political Islam, born in modern time as one of the side effects of unsuccessful civilization in Islamic-Eastern societies, and mainly the ideology of the lower urban classes and rural groups not absorbed in urban life, reflects the collective consciousness of these classes despite the deep and widespread crisis in these countries. This awareness, which has remained untouched and acquainted with modern knowledge of social, economic, political, cultural, etc., suggests in a simplistic analysis that the secret of all the backwardness and failure of Muslims is the corruption of the political systems of these countries, which has come to power with the help of non-Muslims and most Westerners (Moheq, 2011: 08).

The conditions after the WWI changed a lot. World War First and abolishing the Caliphate in 1924 were major events that pushed some Muslims to find new ways to continue their struggle and ride out of the situation. Amanullah Khan in Afghanistan, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, Reza Shah in Iran, and others in their lands tried to form national and independent governments. But Islamists and fundamentalists opposed them because of the modern and western characteristics of these governments. Just a few years after abolishing of caliphate and forming these governments, Islamic movements formed in Egypt, India, and other areas that influenced other Muslim societies too, except for Turkey till 1950. According to Kutluer, the most important way to disentangle is for



Muslims to cling to the concept of return to essence and what it requires. In this sense, Islamism has emerged as a self-return movement and project (Kutluer, 2001).

#### **2.4.2. Muslim Brotherhood**

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the biggest and oldest Islamic group/party, which is in the scene and influenced politics in most of the Islamic countries since its establishment in 1928 by a young teacher Hasan al-Banna. In the modern world, the Muslim Brotherhood is known as the first group which politicized Islam and this politicization was in the form of implementing Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani, Mohammad Abduh, and Rasheed Reza's ideas. The Muslim brothers are the first to cast some ideological Islamic rumors into practice. According to Enayat, the ideology of Islamism before Hasan al-Banna did not carry the spirit required for a revolution. The opposite stance remained at the intellectual level as the idea started by Jamaluddin Afghani and Mohammad Abduh. Hasan al-Banna, who was affected by Rasheed Reza, realized the first breaking point in Islamism and formed Brotherhood. The most concrete example of Rasheed Reza, who is the closest person to Hasan al-Banna among the previous Islamists, was that he founded the magazine *Al-Menar* in 1898, unlike his predecessors (Enayat, 1997: 179). Muslim Brotherhood is like an academy to other Islamic movements that emerged in different regions. Some call Brotherhood as Salafist movement as its founder, al-Banna confirms this, but it is a break from Salafists and differ in some points.

To understand the Muslim Brotherhood more, we should focus on the political and social situation of Egypt before 1928. Egypt is the biggest and one of the most important Arabic countries invaded by British forces in 1882, then got its independence in 1922, however, it was just formal independence. British had still influence in most of the country's issues. As I evaluate, the economic, social, and cultural situation of Egypt caused by British intervention and abolition of the caliphate in Turkey prepared the ground for forming this organization in Egypt. According to Enayat, Muslim intellectuals after the invasion of Egypt by the British, started to encourage the public so that the Egyptian people do not feel under the feeling of helplessness. Jamaluddin Afghani, also saw the British as enemies of the Muslims and stated that the British had hostility to them only because they were Muslims. As the British seized the resources of the Egyptian people and had influence in management, a growing opposing stance developed. This

opposing stance also led to the development of some radical ideas among Islamists. Afghani focused on the issue of jihad as a result of his anti-British view. According to Afghani, the most important way to deal with British hostility towards Muslims is to use force against them (Enayat, 1997: 119/20).

As a response to the intervention and pressures of the British, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna. According to Lia, Hasan al-Banna was born in October 1906, in the small town of Mahmudiya, in the province of Bhayra, approximately ninety miles north of Cairo. His father Abdurrahman al-Banna es-Saati was a mosque imam and teacher, who wrote several works about Hadith. He was educated at Al-Azhar University during the period of Mohammed Abduh (Lia, 2014: 45). Undoubtedly, the most important event that affected him in his youth was the public's uprising with the nationalist reflexes against the occupation of the British in 1919. The actions and the confusion that took place in Egypt affected the young population of the period. According to Al-Banna, 1919 was a year of revolution. Leaving his father's effort to raise himself as a scholar, Al-Banna revealed his own revolutionary identity. It is also possible to define this period as a reflection of the revolutionary aspect of Al-Banna's identity. In this period, the desire to establish societies and organizations in their places is also an indication of the belief in mobilizing their ideas (Lia, 2014: 46-49).

The years when Al-Banna started to speak in coffeehouses were the years when new foundations began to be laid not only for Egypt, but also for the whole Middle East. In his observations in Ismailiya, his new city, Al-Banna realized that the city was completely under the influence of Western culture. The main reason for this situation was that the people of Ismailiya mostly worked with the British. People who were in constant contact with the Westerners also had to deal with their way of life (Dağ, 39: 2007). Since Islamism is a movement against the colonials, they have members from different social classes, a lot of Islamist leaders came from the intellectual part of the society, as they are doctors, engineers, academics and politicians. Dekmejian is stating it: Ekhwan was a brotherhood that included people from all segments of society. The organization, which started from coffee shops and reached teachers, bureaucrats, workers, and students, was working with a strong propaganda (Dekmejian, 2003: 112).

The organization extended its activities speedily. With the positive effect of being a teacher, Hasan al-Banna was addressing people from different parts of society, spreading his ideology, and educating his followers. He was giving his speeches via conferences and not opposing the government. According to Lia, parallel with the increase in the number of members, the center of the organization was moved from Ismailiya to Cairo in 1932. Meanwhile, there has been a significant increase in the number of branches, and in 1936 the organization has been active with approximately 150 branches (Lia, 2014: 135). Hasan al-Banna was not spending his time on small issues and details, we can not see anything in his writings about sectarian subjects in Islam. According to Dekmejian, the reason for this state of Al-Banna was that he chose not to deal with the ideological turmoil that Egypt was in at that moment, or sectarian differences. His goal was to create a movement that covers the entire Islamic world (Dekmejian, 2003).

The movement was busy with its social and religious affairs and was not so active in the political and military ground till the formation of Israel, killing of Hasan al-Banna, and some radical changes in Egypt's internal politics. Brotherhood militarized and started fighting against Israel together with Egypt's army after establishing Israel in the neighborhood. Muslim Brotherhood had good relations with Egypt's military especially Jamal Abdul Nasser who then took the power after the 1952 coup against the king with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood. But soon after getting the power, Jamal Abdul-Nasser started to centralize the power and put pressure on both president and Muslim Brotherhood and the relation between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser got worse. According to Aboul-Enein, the movement met with the strict Wahhabi line of Salafi ideology after Nasser's pressures against them which caused the escape of some of their members to neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia (Aboul-Enein, 2003: 29).

According to Moheq, Egypt society has two important political players which are stronger than the rest of the groups. One is military and the second is the Muslim Brotherhood. This organization had good relations before Nasser's pressures on them and they made good relations before the Arab-Israel war of 1947-8, and Brotherhood fought together with Egypt's military against Israel. They had coordination in the coup against the king and canceling other parties after the 1952 victory of Jamal Abdul Nasser, but

relations started to worsen when Nasser got the decision to ignore all other sides including Brotherhood (Moheq, 2014: 85/6).

According to Sander, the political bipolar world order and the cold war concept that started in World War Second and beyond and the establishment of Israel in 1948 started a turbulent period in the Middle East countries. The oil, which emerged abundantly in the region, which is the subject of the domain struggle of the super-states competing for world domination, has further exacerbated the struggle and increased the region's importance and influence in world politics (Sander, 2001: 295). This situation influenced the Brotherhood too. The organization radicalized more with the writings of its well-known member Sayed Qutb who then was executed by Nasser. Sayed Qutb was claiming that Nasser's government is not Islamic and it is in ignorance (Jahiliya) period as all other Islamic governments.

Muslim Brotherhood found a chance to appear again actively during Sadat years in power and took part in politics in some cases. Sadat did not close political parties fully, he was controlling them as much as possible including the Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat's good relations changed when Sadat signed a peace agreement with Israel. After his assassination by a member of a movement that separated from the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak got the power and ruled Egypt in an emergency until the 2011 Arab protests. During Mubarak years in power, Brotherhood had some moves towards democratization and participated in many elections, but they could not get the power which was impossible under Mubarak. There were no real elections so none of the parties had the chance to get the power except Mubarak himself.

“The solution is in Islam” is the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood's movement emerged in Egypt, but they are following a universal target, which is the unity of Muslims in an Islamic base and to implement Sharia. Kose argues that the Brotherhood's target is the establishment of a world where Islamic laws, Islamic power is established and the caliphate is reestablished. The first task for this is to teach people the religion of Islam completely and without excess (Köse, 2014: 95). They have their ideology and this ideology was drafted by the founding leader Hasan al-Banna.” Our aim is Allah, our leader is Rasulullah, our constitution is the Quran, our path is Jihad and our greatest ambition is to die in the way of Allah” is an expression said always by

Brotherhood (Ghadban, 2016: 22). In his speech in 1928 Hasan al-Banna, declares his feelings as follows: I feel the first signs of success, and I can smell the greatness of awakening in spiritual guidance, and make intimate invitations that penetrate the spirit of the youth (Lia, 2014: 78).

Banna does not accept violence but is warning the power holder that the revolution is unavoidable if they emphasize on this unaccepted way. Banna has paid much attention to the education of society and tried much to be far from violence and his successor followed his moderate way, but this changed with Sayed Qutb, who put new standards and a new set of norms to the Muslim society and most of them are unrelated with Banna's education system.

Muslim Brotherhood had many leaders and important figures till today. Among these leaders and their ideas, two of them are the most known and have influenced the movement in Egypt and the Islamic world more than others. They are Hasan al-Banna and Sayed Qutb. Hasan al-Banna is the founder and first leader of the movement, who we talked about enough. But who is Sayed Qutb and why is he so famous and important among Islamists? He was not the formal leader of Brotherhood but is known for his ideas which he discussed in his different writings. Sayed Qutb is the ideal for many extremist movements across the Islamic world. After his writings, a wave of extremists come to the scene in many different forms and different countries. Unfortunately, Afghanistan was one of the most affected areas of Sayed Qutb's radical sayings as there was war against Soviet forces across the country and civil war which took place soon after that. Afghan Mujahedin fighters were so extreme and in some cases, they were calling the word of Kafir (infidel) to those who were working with the pro-soviet government. Thousands of people were killed as a result of this extremism emerged between Afghan mujahedin groups after spreading of some radical ideas by non-Afghan organizations and Pakistan's intelligence.

According to Sayed Qutb, there are just two situations in which a society can live in. One is Islam and the other is ignorance (out of Islam or Jahiliya) and today, all world is in an ignorance period. There should be just Allah's rule in the world, no other option can be together with Islam, no problem if it is western democracy or eastern communism as he claims: Today, the whole world is in ignorance in terms of the origins

of the foundations and systems of people's lives (Qutb, 1999: 04). He continues by saying the reason for today's world ignorance: today's ignorance delegates sovereignty to mankind and makes some gods of others. This ignorance is not in its simple form that existed in pre-Islamic times, but in the form of claiming the right to make insights, values, laws, systems, and situations, and to set aside God's plan for life in some ways which God has never prescribed. Certainly, this aggression against God's rule on earth also results in aggression and oppression against God's servants(worshippers). Therefore, all the humiliation that human beings endure in collectivist systems, and all the oppression that goes on individuals and nations with the domination of capital and colonialism in capitalist systems, are merely traces of the effects of this aggression on God's sovereignty and denial of dignity that God has ordained for man (Qutb, 1999: 05).

Sayed Qutb offers a full and fundamentally change in the current situation of society. We have to fundamentally change this state of ignorance, because it is fundamentally opposed to the Islamic program and worldwide view of Islam, it is always trying with violence not to let us to live according to the will of the divine program (Sharia) (Qutb, 1999: 13). According to Sayed Qutb, a society can be called Islamic just if it recognizes Allah's sovereignty in all areas and implement his rules fully, not in some mixed form as democracy, communism, or any other form. According to him, all non-Muslim communities are in ignorance, as they are worshiping each other instead of God in various forms. The communities which they call themselves as Muslims are also in ignorance category because the fact that Islamic societies are placed in such a framework does not mean that they believe in a non-god deity or perform devotional rites for a non-god. Rather, it is because they do not fall under the burden of worshiping God in their life system. Therefore, although they do not believe in a non-god deity, they give the greatest characteristics of the deity to a non-god and follow the non-god sovereignty and take their system, laws, values, standards, habits, and almost all the principles of their life from this sovereignty (Qutb, 1999: 76). Sayed Qutb refuses the view which Jihad is a defensive act too. He explains his view about religion and politics: The law of Allah is a comprehensive and perfect system for human life. As it is suitable for regulation and development, it encompasses every aspect, every state and condition of the human life. It is a complete system based on absolute knowledge about the reality of human existence

and needs, the truth of the universe in which man lives, and the nature of the laws of changes that rule the human (Qutb, 2012: 103).

According to Moheq, some extremist groups, such as al-Jihadul-Islami, al-Jamaatul-Islamiyah, and al-Jamaatul-Muslemin (al-Takfir wal-Hijra), is made up of people who have previously been members of the Brotherhood. They were Salafi-Orthodox idiots who turned to the Brotherhood in the hope of advanced Salafism compared to traditional Salafism, and when they saw that they would not achieve this goal, they separated, and this time, instead of returning to traditional Salafism, which did not have much of a traditional theme, they established jihadi Salafism, the most important embodiment of which is al-Qaeda, with a new model for reforming Muslims. Those who joined the Brotherhood in the hope of a renaissance gradually realized that a civilizational transformation required deep theoretical efforts in various fields of, ethics, social, political, scientific, cultural, and so on, which in turn gave priority for cultural infrastructure changes and the discoloration of political activities, and as they did not find such a tool in movement, they have resorted to new diligence, including the project "Islamization of Knowledge" and a collection of "Progressive Islamists" 'Al-Ummah Magazine, Al-Ijtihad Magazine and individual efforts of many Muslim scientists are examples of these type efforts and all of them, are more or less on the path of religious modernity with the differences between them (Moheq, 2014: 21/2).

### **2.4.3. Iran and Shiism**

Iran is the only Islamic country, where Islamists get the power through revolution and are still in power for more than forty years. It is the only country where the formal religion is Shia Islam. What is Shiism? The simple answer is: one of the two sects in Islam, which is in minority in population to the mostly Sunni Muslim population. Iran and Iraq are with the most Shia population, but they are living as minorities in most of the Muslim countries. It is based on the belief in the legitimacy of the Prophet Mohammad's family, giving especial importance to Ali, the fourth and last caliph of Muslims, most of the holy sites of Shiism are on Arabic countries, especially Iraq not in Iran.

But how the Shia factor emerged in the political scene and when Iran converted to this sect? Roy is stating it as: Shiism influenced politics in Iran with the foundation of

the Safavid dynasty in the early sixteenth century with the spiritual guide of a sect combining Shiism with shamanism that had become established among Turkman people (the Qizilbash) and took control of the territory that is now Iran. The new sovereigns, who spoke Turkish, had to purge themselves of their tribal and sectarian origins to build a stable government. They chose as their State religion "Twelver" Shiism (which awaits the return of the twelfth imam, a direct descendant of Mohammad who is absent but not dead, who may at any moment reappear and establish justice on earth), which was closer to Sunnism than the faith of their troops (Roy, 1994: 169).

It can be observed from many religious and political sources including Ali Shariati's writings, Shiism in Iran emerged as a state apparatus. This apparatus was used against the Ottoman Empire in the west and sometimes against the Afghan government in the eastern border, and Iran's borders with Ottomans and Afghanistan are divided according to religion in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, not according to the nation. Qajar government had secular background and had not shared more with Shiism, but Shia improved in Iran's society and Shiism become part of Iran's nation after the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The clergy class of Iran become part of Iran's politicians and they supported the 1906 revolution as well. According to Roy, as a result of this politicization the concept of velayat-e faqih, elaborated by Khomeini, would serve to mobilize Shiite communities beyond nationalist references and state apparatuses (Roy, 1994: 172).

Khomeini developed the term 'Velayat-e faqih' in the 1960s, which is the Shia Islamist model that there can not be an Islamic society without an Islamic state, which differs from the Islamic State in Sunni ulama writings. What is Velayat-e faqih and how the clergy is governing? the clergy; who is representing all, not just clergy class is located above all institutions, they are representative of the hidden twelfth imam. But most of the Grand Ayatollah's living in that time rejected the term of Velayat-e faqih or took their distance from the revolution and Khomeini. Iran's Islamic revolution was a result of coordination between Clerics, Islamists, and anti-Shah pro-democracy movements in the political sphere, where clerics under Khomeini got the main power and excluded others from power after the setting of the new regime as a result of the revolution.

Putting revolutionary logic even before Sharia is one of the most important critics toward Iran's Islamists. According to Roy, the constitution in Iran sets the place of



the sharia, not vice versa. So it is said to be a secular model (Roy, 1994: 177). Contrary to the general view, Iran is paying attention to its Iranian culture more than Islamic values in practice. Former Iranian politician Jalaluddin Farsi could not become a candidate for the 1980 presidential elections, because of his father's birth country which was Afghanistan. As a result, foreign Muslims have no priority than foreign Christians in Iran. Because of these characteristics, many called Iran's constitution as secular. Iran's Islamic movements are parts of its foreign policy to Iranianise Shias out of Iran and emphasis on Shiism more than Islam as a total. Islamic Revolution of Iran caused instability in the region and made Muslims far from each other, as we saw it in war with Iraq, Iran's destructive role in internal affairs of Islamic countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and, others. Iran from its Islamic revolution until today is interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by using religious and ethnic elements.

#### **2.4.4. The Comparison of Democracy and Islamism in Turkey with The Rest of the Muslim Countries**

An important issue in the discussion of Muslims/Islamists and democracy is the difference between the current situation in Turkey and other Islamic countries. Some argue that Islamic countries will get rid of this clutter situation by copying Turkey's model as a democratic and leading country among the Islamic world. According to Inac, Turkey achieved to harmonize Islam and democracy within a melting pot (Inac, Unpublished Essay: 1). The problem of Islamic countries stems from the fact that there is a big gap and inconsistency between the state and society and as we see, Turkey has managed to alleviate this problem to some extent as a result of its long democratic experience and promoting organizations instead of individuals for long-life stability. According to Berting, there is inconsistency between the state and society, governing and governed, and elite and ordinary people in respect of their norms, values, perspectives of life as falling into instability in the Middle East (Berting, 2006: 76). We see that Turkey is the only Islamic country that solved the problem of inconsistency between the state and the society to a point. Turkey has the longest democratic experience in the Islamic world. According to Budak, Turkey as a country which never exploited by the foreign powers is a unique inspiring state with its democracy experiment for almost two centuries, an emancipatory approach which transformed the secularism being a sphere for social

conflict and strengthening the structure of civilian political life in the region (Budak, 2017: 32-36).

We know that Turkey is in a better position in terms of democracy than other Islamic countries. Now the question is what parameters make Turkey different from the rest of the Muslim Society in respect of internalized, mature, and working democracy? Inac, answers this question: The first parameter is the internalization of the secularism within every stage of the daily life to prevent the identity politics categorizing the people depending upon their beliefs and sectarian choices. In the geography where the sectarian identities and cleavages become the struggle for representation and existence, it is easily understood that the task of the state is just to contribute to elucidating, transferring, and sharing the commonly accepted Islamic values to the different segments of society. Consequently, what we mean by the concept of secularism is not referring to the French radical laicism, contrarily to the Anglo-Saxon secularism opening an extensive area of individual freedom for all beliefs without exception. As a matter of fact, the ruling party in Turkey defines itself as “conservative-democratic” without referring to any religious attribution by placing itself a catch-all party appealing to various ideas and approaches. The second parameter which makes the Turkish democracy experiment authentic and functional is the network of exclusive relations with the international institutions and organizations (Inac, Unpublished essay: 2/3). He gives Turkey’s participation and cooperation with the UN, NATO, and EU as an example of this participation. These parameters made Turkey’s democracy so deep-rooted and strong that is not possible to reverse simply.

One point which is ignored by most authors and researchers, is the role of Ataturk in the establishment of Turkey’s democracy, who founded modern Turkey on the basis of a very strong and forward-looking approach. The form of regime in Turkey as a whole has never changed after Ataturk, despite coups, and is not possible to change easily. Turkey is the one of the rare countries in the world that, despite experiencing several coups, has never changed its form of government from a republic to another, and has gradually turned to elections and democracy a few months/years after each coup. Afghanistan, Iran, and Egypt are countries that started their modernization movements almost at the same time and in a similar way with Turkey, but none of the leaders in these

countries could catch Ataturk. The reason for this huge victory of Ataturk is his decisive decision not to return to the former systems that had failed.

According to Inac, there are three main characteristics of Turkey's democracy, which can be a source of inspiration for the Middle East. The first criterion is social experience inherited by past history, the second one is will to be a source of inspiration and the last one is reliability and prestige (Inac, Unpublished essay: 3). A fact which proofed during the comparison between Turkey and others democracy experience is that secularism or laicism has no value without putting strong practices of liberal democracy, as many Islamic countries are secular in the Middle East and Middle Asia but none is democratic.

The failed experiences of fascism in Europe and the founding of democracies after World War II in Europe pushed Turkey toward the Western bloc and practical democracy, where real elections were first held in 1950. Prof. Inac is stating it: In this context, newly established Turkish Republic during 1923 and onwards, with the influence of the anti-democratic structure of Europe which is composed of Nazis, socialist, and fascist governments were favor of the radical laicism borrowed from France. Nevertheless, in line with the democratization of Europe and the EU membership process of Turkey, Turkey shifted from the radical laicism into the democratic secularization process (İnaç, 2016: 77-79). According to the French version of laicism, the state is bound to press and control the religion. The citizen should believe and pray in accordance with the principles determined by the state (İnaç, 2012: 202).

As a result, Turkey can be a source of inspiration for the Muslim community, but the democracy and stability in Turkey can never be achieved by other Islamic countries without experiencing a series of efforts which Turkey did it. The main problem here is that the majority of Muslims cite the current state of Turkey as a model and discuss it as a source of inspiration, but they do not follow the path that Turkey has taken, and some even equate it with infidelity and anti-religion. Examples of these paths are the Laicism/Secularism of state, respect, and belief in the sovereignty of the people, and not making religion as a source of hate. Aras states it as: This character of Turkey may make Turkey a role-model for the Arabic countries which seek a more democratic and comfortable life. Nevertheless, this discussion has occurred in Turkey within the extent

of “moderate Islam” and in the Middle East, the people had some hesitations against the word laicism (Aras, 2003: 16-18).

Turkey is not different from other Islamic countries just in terms of democracy, it is also different in its Islamic movements. Both political and social Islamic movements in Turkey are moderate and modern as well. Turkey has no experience of violence by its Islamist parties and movements. Turkey like other Islamic countries has long experience of Islamist parties. Najmuddin Erbakan was a Turkish politician who can be named as the founder of Islamist politics in Turkey. He participated in many elections and led many Conservative-Islamic parties from the 1970s till his death in 2011.

According to Moheq, the first characteristic of Turkey’s Islamist movement is that it has nothing in common with Salafism (Moheq, 2014: 127). Other characteristics that make Turkey’s Islamists modern and moderate, can be listed as follow: 1. Islamists in Turkey have no problem with the secular character of the government, even they are protecting it, including Recep Tayyip Erdogan, president and one of the most important figures among Turkish Islamists is defending laicism of state. 2. They are moderate and modern in practice too. They have never spoke of secondary issues, which are frequently discussed in other Islamic countries, like the importance of having a beard or way of clothing of society, especially women. 3. Islamists in Turkey are defending the right of having Hijab, not mandating it for all. This is the reason for their acceptance by wider groups in society, even some secular Kemalists. 4. They are not anti-west and have no problem with the modern world’s identities of democracy, laicism, human/women rights, and integration with the world, especially the west. 5. They have reconciled their national interests with their Islamic identity. They nurture their national values as well and have a strong belief in their flag, borders, one country, and military as well, but most of the Islamists in other countries are seeking an Ummatist ideology, where there is no place for national identities and borders. 6. They have no problem with founding characteristics of the country, which were drafted by Ataturk, a century ago. 7. Islamism in Turkey has risen to demand rights, not to impose its views on others.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan has defended secularism and laicism of state in many of his speeches. One of them is his talk with an Arabic channel. As he gives his advice to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and says: They must realize that secularism does not

mean irreligion, but respect for all religions and the granting of freedom to all. They should state in their constitution that the government has the same attitude towards all religions. Secularism does not mean that people should be secular, I am not secular myself, but I am the prime minister of a secular state. When the government has such a position, everyone feels safe, even those who do not have a religion, because the government has to respect for the unbelievers to the extent that it respects believers. Ninety-nine percent of Turkish people are Muslims, and there are minorities of Jews, Christians, etc., but the government has the same relationship with all of them, and this is what Islam wants and the history of Muslims emphasizes (Erdogan, 2011).

While we listed these positive characteristics for Turkish, and Islamists, who are now in power for a long period, their opponents and especially Kemalist politicians (CHP) who are known as protectors of country's identity of secularism and Ataturk's ideology, and Kurdish politicians from (HDP) party blame them in many fields for various respects.

1. Islamists, including Erdogan, are accused of using religion as a tool for gaining power and controlling the country
2. His opponents call him dictator for his serious behaviors
3. They are accused of their anti-Kurdish policies and ignoring Kurd identity by HDP, a well-known party of majority Kurdish politicians.

Democracy in Turkey has also problems and pro-Ataturk parties and politicians are accused of applying strict state laicism caused violating fundamental rights of citizenship and freedom before 2003, where women with Hijab could not perform some jobs and participate in schools and universities as well.

Islamism in Turkey passed different stages. According to some authors, it started in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century by the Ottoman Empire to avoid break of state. Buluç is dividing Islamism in Turkey to three main time phases: The first generation of Islamists in Turkey emerged with the edict of reform in time between 1856 and 1924, when the west progressed and the Islamic world remained behind. The second generation of Islamists appeared between the years of 1950-2000 with a founding task. The second-generation Islamists returned to the goal of establishing an Islamic state because of failing in making an improvement and deprivation in the state. The third generation emerged after 2000- in Turkey after the completion of the process of urbanization (Bulac, 2004: 48/9).

## 2.5. TYPES OF ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY

### 2.5.1. Islamism and Radicalism

Fuller's idea about the issue of Islamism's relations with radicalism is that the logic and ideological basis of radicalism is taken from the Islamist ideas and writings of Sayed Qutb, whose views are of special importance in creating a modern radical view. Qutb, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, used the concept of ignorance, first used by the medieval Islamist Ibn Taymiyyah to classify the Muslim community as living in "ignorance" rather than true ignorance. In Islamic writing, the term "state of ignorance" actually refers to the pre-Islamic polytheistic community in Saudi Arabia. But "state of ignorance" in the writing of Ibn Taymiyyah and Sayed Qutb refers to contemporary Muslim society which ignores the true message of Islam and still lives in "ignorance". Contemporary Muslim society itself can thus be blamed as "infidel" (kafir), leading to a process of anathematization or ex-communication (takfir) of society. When the state itself is perceived to be effective in the hands of "unbelievers" (unrighteous, irreligious, corrupt, arrogant puppets of the West), then nearly all means are justified to overcome the state including armed struggle, which they refer to in this context as jihad (Fuller, 2003: 52).

Roy classifies Islamists as moderate and radicals by examining their party names, as parties that have the words such as (Jamiat) are moderate and those who include the word of (Hizb) are radicals (Roy, 1994: 46). Radicals even stand against forming a political party to compete with others in political issues. According to Sivan, the radical Egyptian leader Farag criticized those who wanted to establish an Islamic party as a party among others to compete in the political arena (Sivan, 1990: 129). Radical Islamists can be distinguished from conservative and modern Islamists according to their approach to women and their idea about Sharia, as we see pro-Islamic authorities in Iran is different than in Turkey and Tunisia. According to Mitchell, Islamists see women as human, and no longer as mere instruments of pleasure or reproduction (Mitchell, 1993: 254/5). The moderate Islamists do not encourage women to sit on homes, but that the sexes be separated in public. According to Roy, Islamists always speak of the weakness of women as inherent in their nature ("her sensibility is greater than her reasoning power; she is physically weaker") (Roy, 1994: 59).

Some Islamists emphasize the violent form of Jihad that emerged after the 1960s by some radical and fundamentalist Islamic organizations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. But it does not mean that all Islamist groups are violent. Most of the Muslim Brotherhood branches in different countries play a vital role in the democratic scene of the countries and never selected violent methods, even when they were persecuted by the rulers. Islamists in Turkey, Tunisia, and the Muslim Brotherhood after the 1980s did not have any record of violence. As all other ideologies, political Islam also has moderate, violent, and democratic forms, but Afghan Islamists have more record of radical activities than moderate. Secular movements also have different forms and they are also violent and fundamentalist in some cases more than Islamists. Ultra-nationalists/Far rightist parties, which are in some rise in these days in many regions are non-Islamic groups who are in some cases more radical and violent than radical Islamists.

### **2.5.2. Islamists and Conservative Traditionalists**

There is also a non-end struggle between Islamists and the conservative traditionalists. Islamists challenge the traditional basis of Muslim state power as bereft of morality, legitimacy, and even competency. Afghanistan was ground for these competitions for years and still has problems from this point. There is a clerical class of Sufism too in Islam. According to Fuller, fundamentalist Muslims are hostile to Sufism, seeing it as an impure tradition, compromising Islam with local religious practice, and tainted by an inclination to deemphasize the requirements of Islamic law and an engagement in saint worship, strongly offensive to fundamentalists (Fuller, 2003: 51). There is much difference between Islamists and Fundamentalists at some points. According to Roy, three points separate the Islamists from the fundamentalism of Ulamas: first is the political revolution, the second point is the sharia, and the last one is the issue of women. The Islamists reproach the Ulamas for two things. One is their servility to the powers in place, which leads them to accept a secular government and laws that do not conform to the sharia. The other is their compromise with Western modernity: The Ulamas have accepted modernity where the Islamists reject it (acceptance of the separation of religion and politics, which necessarily leads to secularization) and maintained the tradition where the Islamists reject it. Sharia and women are two more issues that divide Islamists and Fundamentalist Ulamas strictly. Islamists generally tend

to favor the education of women and their participation in social and political life, but in the hijab. Islamist groups include women's associations. The Iranian constitution recognized the right to vote for women without provoking much debate among constituents (Roy, 1994: 36-8). While Islamist parties emphasize a lot on Sharia and Islamic knowledge, but most of them have no council of Ulama. Afghan Islamists have no good relationships with Ulama, except the Taliban who is formed of radical madrasa students.

### **2.5.3. Fundamentalism, Radicalism, And Takfir**

Today we can not deny, that there is a wave of fundamentalism and even Takfir among some Muslims, which is used and is still using by some movements as a tool to eliminate the opponent from the political scene. According to Islam's principles, no one can call a Muslim, as an infidel, nonbeliever, or non-Muslim because of his/her attitude and behavior even if it is against Islam. The only thing which is needed to count as Muslim is to bring Shahadah. Of course, Islam has its principles and specific worships to be done but, some call their rivals as non-Muslim and giving fatwa to be killed because of thinking differently than them in some religious and political issues.

Takfir was first used by the Kharijites (Khawarej) against some of the Companions, and even the fourth caliph of Islam, Ali, was killed by this weapon. Muslim scholars at various stages of history have struggled with this tactic and tried to eradicate it, the most important of which is Abu Hanifa, who says: we can not call any Muslim as an infidel who is praying towards qibla. At various points in history, this tactic was used against political opponents. According to Moheq, the first time a new wave of Takfir started with the writings of Mawdudi and then Sayed Qutb (The four terms in the Qur'an) (The signs of Path) in the 1970s (Moheq, 2014: 34/5). Afghanistan is one of the countries, which is influenced the most by these radical thoughts and movements.

### **2.5.4. Ummatist or National Islamism**

(Ummat means all Muslims as one nation). Are Muslims/Islamists working really for all Ummat's interests or not? It is a solved question for most of the Islamic movements as everyone has their policy according to their national interests. Iran has an Islamic regime and it is protecting Palestinians against Israel, but it never protected the



simplest human rights for Uyghurs against Communist China. Most of the Pakistani governments and their military claim themselves as protectors of Muslims in the region, they support Kashmiri people against their rival, India, but they have never backed Uyghurs, Rohingya Muslims against the brutality of Burma government, or any other Muslim minority under the pressure of the states which Pakistan has good relation with. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are also moving according to their national interests. The reason can be described as putting national agendas always before Ummat's interests as a whole. Some Muslims showing a united caliphate as the only solution, where they are not able to unit Muslims in a simple union like the EU.

Among Islamists, some of them defend Ummatist Islam, while some are acting according to National Islam interests. Some of the moderate Islamists as the ruling party in Turkey (AK party), Alnahda in Tunisia, and some others are active in a national and democratic base, but some refuse this view and concentrating on a single Ummat idea, which introduces all Muslims just as Muslims, not as Arab, Turk, or Afghan. Hizb ut-Tahrir is an Islamic organization working for re-establishing the caliphate and refuses national movements, even if it is Islamic. While national and democratic movements seek their national identities, some of the Islamist groups forage to develop a single Islamic identity that takes superiority, in one's moral life, over even the national identity. According to Fuller, Islamism as a political vision is supra-national, even while it works on a practical basis within the confines of individual states. To most Islamists, Islam is the first and foremost identity but not the sole identity. However, Islamists call for a single Islamic identity, the implications and results of giving that identity priority are uncertain (Fuller, 2003: 17).

### **2.5.5. Islam/Islamism and Nationalism**

After the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, various movements such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Turkism emerged in Muslim societies, and when the Ottoman caliph saw that none of these ideas would prevent the collapse of his government, he proposed the Pan-Islamism theory which was supported by a mass of Muslims even out of Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman government left the scene as a result of the WWI. During the last century of the Ottoman Empire, some individuals like, Jamaluddin Afghani proposed and raised the theory of Pan-Islamism to stand against European colonialists, but it did

not work and had no touchable result for Muslims as Ottoman Empire collapsed. But that theory did not materialize, and some Muslims, unaware of the conditions of the modern world, began to fight for the establishment of the caliphate, and it continues until now. Proponents of the caliphate's theory see nationalism as a tactic created by the West to weaken Muslims, and it is dishonest to express it from a religious point of view, so they strongly oppose it. The Islamist ideology was expounded on the Indian sub-continent by Abu'l ala al-Mawdudi who founded the Jamaat-e-Islami (Society of Islam) in 1941. He rejected the nationalist and secular ideology of Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League, even opposed to the division of India. Mawdudi insists that God is the only sovereign and therefore the source of all authority and law. Humans had no right to pass laws in place of God.

From the very beginning, Islamists are opposing nationalism in many fields as Fuller explains: Islamists will reject comparison with nationalists, however, and do differ from nationalists in several important respects. • Islamism has a strong moral component that is not an integral feature of nationalism. • Islamism perceives its goals as far loftier than nationalism and insists that, in the absence of transcendental and universal moral values, nationalist movements cannot be considered as having much to do with Islam. • Nationalism is not inherently related to the concept of good governance but simply to power; Islamism in principle rejects the concept of power without moral purpose and good governance. • Islamism condemns in principle the narrow and parochial vision of nationalists and believe that nationalism is a dangerous force within the Ummat because it serves to divide it (Fuller, 2003: 22).

## **2.6. TYPE OF GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM**

This is also a controversial subject among Muslims, and there are different ideas about it, but two of them are notable. The first category defends the idea that Islam does not impose a specific government structure and there is no obvious instruction in the Quran or Sunnah about the subject. Seculars, Liberals, and modern/moderate Islamists, all defend the above idea with giving their reasons from Quran, Sunnah, and history as well. According to Akbulut, the Quran did not make orders that contain clear provisions for humanity regarding the administration and political issues. These provisions are related to the general characteristics of the managers. In the 58<sup>th</sup> verse of Surat al-Nisa,

giving the jobs to the people is determined as the main criterion. In addition, it has been stated that people who have consulted between them and reached a verdict and act in this way in cases where there are no definitive provisions in Surah Shura and Al-Imran. Again in Surat al-Nisa, the 58<sup>th</sup> verse states that the ruler should be fair, it is ordered to obey Allah, the Prophet, and the believers (Akbulut, 1992: 17/8). Hadith (Prophet Mohammad's Speech and guidance) is also not imposing a specific form of governance. According to Çaha, in addition to the Qur'an, information about the forms of administration or state systems is not available in Sunnah, such situations are left to the societies within the framework of concepts such as justice, mercy, and compassion. Although the form of administration encountered in the period of the Four Caliphs led to a confusion of reducing the form of Islamic administration to a single form, it can be clearly seen that the management of the caliphs was the result of the will of the Companions (Çaha, 1999: 55/6). Those who claim that Islam did not specify a form of government indicate, that when the Companions asked questions to the Prophet about how he was appointed governor from the Companions, he suggested the Qur'an, Sunnah, and his personal opinion. After this issue, we see that Muslim rulers, who take the views of the Prophet, use their own discretion within the framework of the Qur'an and Sunnah. This situation, of course, manifested itself not only in the forms of administration, but also in Islamic law.

Governance is not part of religion at all. When it is time for prayer, the Prophet did not consult with anyone to recite three rak'ats or five rak'ats, but when it was time for war and peace, the Prophet consulted with his companions and Quran is ordering to consult and talk about. This means that the government is free from devotional and otherworldly issues and is merely a matter of this world (Moheq, 2020).

Opposite to the above idea, there are Muslims who claim that Islam has a specific governing form. Hizb ut-Tahrir advocates the caliphate as the only and must form of the governance. As a large Islamic organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir refuse democracy and other forms of governance except the caliphate which will govern all Muslims under one flag. According to Zallum, former leader of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, it is not permissible to rely on Western civilization and the system from which it originates, because these laws are in conflict with Islam, but there is no problem in taking over the system and administrative laws (Zallum, 2012: 41). From here we can get the result that they count governance as

part of religion. Salafists, some Islamists, and some traditionalists put forward the Islamic government, Islamic Republic, and Islamic Emirate as government form which Islam suggested for Muslims. Taliban in Afghanistan governed under name of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan for five years with the influence of Deobandi madrasas formed by Shah Waliullah Dehlawi in the Indian subcontinent with Salafi thinking and we will discuss it more in the related part of next chapter. Iran has a government form mixed of democracy and “Velayate Faqih”, theory and others have similar theories as well.

There is no one and united idea among those who want to establish an Islamic government. Islamists, who were on the lines of names such as Jamaluddin Afghani and Mohammad Abduh have no problem with the type of western government if they are compatible with Islam. Islamists at the line of Tahrir party and Sayed Qutb refuse the governance systems of the West. Islamists who accept West form government type, especially democratic regimes defend their thesis with an example from the Islamic culture of Shura/council. But those who are opposite, say that Islam is a complete religion, we have no need to get anything from anyone in governing except Islam itself, so we should implement our own religion no less and more.

How a government should form? There are various answers as Hizb ut-Tahrir claims that there is no way except establishing a caliphate which will govern all Muslims. According to Hizb ut-Tahrir, other forms are not supported in Islam and have no base in the Quran and Sunnah. But there are masses of Muslims who support the idea of getting power through elections or electing by a council which is called Council of Dissolve and Contract. Elections do not need to explain as everyone has basic information about it. So what is (حل و عقد) or council of dissolve and contract? It is a method which is used in some cases by Muslims to choose their leader and government. Some people argue that Elections are not permitted/preferred in Islam because there is no example about it in Muslim history and Council of dissolve and Contract is preferred, but they forget that both election and Council method are not mentioned in first degree Islam sources which are Quran and Hadith. Most of Muslim scholars have the idea, if there is no obvious idea in the Quran or Hadith about a subject, it means people can make their decision according to their benefits which are not in opposition to the main sources of Islam. So both election and Council methods are choices and people can select one of them which is more advantageous to them.

Who opposes democratic governance formed through elections today in the Islamic world and why? The answer is some radical groups which have their reasons as:

- ✓ Elections and democracy in general have no place in the Qur'an, hadith, and the way of the predecessors.
- ✓ The general public, from a scientific and intellectual point of view, is not in a position to make its decision, so a council must do so.
- ✓ In elections, only those who are financially well off have a long chin, and piety is not considered an element of choice.

But most Muslims support elections, which are moderate/modern Islamists, most of the traditional Muslims, liberal, modern, and other Muslims. They express their objectives as:

- ✓ Islam did not impose a specific form of governance and way of getting power, so these issues related to people, and they can solve it according to their will.
- ✓ The dissolution council that the predecessors did is a kind of ijthihad (jurisprudence) itself, and today, given the conditions of the modern world, this ijthihad can be done in terms of democracy.
- ✓ If piety is important for choosing a leader, this element is not something that we can prove or measure it, only the person himself and God know, to what extent the person is pious and faithful.
- ✓ Elections is a better convention for today's world needs, because it is the improved form of choosing leader by the council and it has its conditions, as we see everyone can not be a candidate for important and leading posts of state, age, wisdom, education degree, experience, and other factors are needed.

Most Islamists, especially in recent years participate in elections and try to gain power democratically. Turkey, Tunisia, Afghanistan, and many other Islamic countries are examples of the case. Most of the Islamic movements want democratic elections, defend democracy and human rights as they are the primary victims of the non-democratic ruling regimes. According to Fuller, Most Islamists consider it the best tool to present the agenda of democratization to the public and gain power. Islamists (out of power) are becoming prime supporters of concepts of democracy and human rights, precisely because they are the main victims of its absence. Islamists, as the major opposition to

entrenched regimes, languish in prisons in the Muslim world more than any other political group. It would not be excessive to state that today the Islamists are among the most insistent activists on behalf of introducing liberalization and democratic reform into the political order (Fuller, 2003: 29). Today Islamists are in power in some of the countries which are democratic and liberal.

Moderate Islamists encourage elections, polarity in society, and democracy as a whole. Rashed al-Ghanushi leader of Alnahda party and chairman of the Tunisian parliament is one the protecting figure of the case. In the absence of democracy, there will be absolutism as most of the Islamic countries have the experience of it. Absolutism in its many directions is alien to Islamic thought of politics. Fuller claims the rough line of Islamist modernists in five parts: **1.** God granted upon mankind the power of intellect, rationality, and freedom of choice, which he intended for humans to employ, even at the risk of erring periodically. **2.** Each individual must find his/her way to the awareness of God and the message of Islam. No one can be compelled into belief by anyone including state (Qur'an: La ikrah fi 'l-din, there is no compulsion in religion). An understanding of God's message and a willingness to live in His way can only come through personal awareness, choice and, conviction. To follow Islamic rituals under compulsion destroys most of the merit and value of those rituals for the individual because they were not freely and willingly chosen. **3.** Human understanding of God's message in the Qur'an has changed and grown over time, but is never perfect. Just as today's knowledge and understanding of God's creation and plan is richer today than it was in seventh-century Arabia, mankind will have a still better understanding of God's message in the future than today. It will also be understood in different ways in accordance with the needs, concerns, and circumstances of each generation and people. **4.** No one possesses a full understanding of God's message and purpose. Even though advances will be made, no one ever will attain perfect understanding. Therefore, no one can claim to possess a monopoly on understanding God or Islam; indeed, no one has the right to make such claims, which can only be self-serving. **5.** A democratic state provides the highest possibilities for freedom of study, discussion, and debate of religion. (Fuller, 2003: 55/6).

The main difference in political thinking between Islamists, especially the radicals and others is that Islamists look to the issues of this world and the future (Akherat) from the same point of view, which is religious, but according to others these

two are different fields and each has their own rules and logic to achieve them. According to Moheq, political Islam, while fulfilling the great promises of this world, also guarantees the happiness of the other world and promises that if people turn to this ideology, moral excellence, spiritual piety, nearness to God, and whatever that is, will be achieved together, and the world will witness the presence of a new man and a new world in which no trace of the ignorance can be seen, whether ignorance of the twentieth century or ignorance of other centuries. Dealing with all issues from a religious point and expecting to deduce and extract worldly, political, economic, social, legal, industrial, scientific, artistic, etc. programs from an apocalyptic text is one of the mistakes that some people have made in the past, but for the first time, it was political Islam that was presented in a molded and ideological way and caused a wide range of surprises in contemporary Islamic thought (Moheq, 2011: 9/11). According to Roy, proponents of political Islam either do not understand or do not want to accept that solving worldly problems depend on giving into another logic, which, in the language of religion, has been interpreted as divine evolutionary traditions, and in non-religious language, the logic of rationality. Nothing can mean good for Islamists, till forming a full Islamic society. The essential premise of the Islamist movement is that the political model it proposes presupposes the virtue of individuals, but that this virtue can be acquired only if the society is truly Islamic. All the rest is plot, sin, or illusion (Roy, 1994: 27). Islamists consider that the society will be Islamized only through social and political action: it is necessary to leave the mosque. The Islamist movements intervene directly in political life and since the 1960s have attempted to gain power. The economy and social relationships are no longer perceived as subordinate activities that grow out of pious acts or the sharia, but are considered key areas (Roy, 1994: 36).

According to Roy, Islamism assumes the classical vision of Islam as a complete and universal system, so it does not have to “modernize” or adapt. But it applies this model to a "modern" object: to society, or more exactly, to a society defined in modern terms. Whether the Islamist ideal aims to bring these different segments of society together to recreate the unity of the original community, or whether it views history as decadence and not as an agent of modernity, Islamists make modern society the focus of their actions, of which they are products (Roy, 1994: 37).

### 2.6.1. Caliphate or Modern Government

Those Muslims who refuse nation-states defend the theory of Caliphate. Hizb ut-Tahrir is one of the leading organizations working for re-establishing the caliphate. According to some, the theory of the Caliphate has glitches and issues itself. Moheq is listing these problems as: First of all, it saw the problems of the Islamic world as political rather than cultural and structural, and it thought that by removing the existing borders and establishing a unified political system, if not all, at least the major problems of this nation would be eliminated. This theory has been around since the time of Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani and then continued with a slight difference by Islamic movements. While scientific, especially sociological studies, prove the priority of culture over politics and emphasize that until a culture of solidarity is established and the internal barriers to unity are removed, political change can not lead to lasting unity. Second, in this theory, nationalism is equated with primitive tribalism, which means racism, along with irrational boasting and the humiliation of rival tribes. Of course, nationalism may sometimes have such consequences, but this is not inherent in the theory of nationalism. In environments that have successfully passed this trade, nationalism means the creation of a macro-social unit that accommodates different ethnicities, parties and currents within itself, and in this sense has no contradiction with a larger unit called the Ummat. Rather, the natural process of forming a nation is to follow such a path.

Third, reviving the caliphate in its traditional sense and placing the entire Islamic Ummat under its banner, given the developments that have befallen nations, seems an unattainable dream, because today's societies have undergone fundamental changes compared to past societies. The formation of social parties and institutions, the emergence of the free press and media, the belief of nations in the necessity of the rule of law, the realization of the natural potential and economic potential of the people of each region, the awareness of their historical past along with its ups and downs, and there are dozens of other factors that make the old patriarchy difficult and less permissible. It does not allow an individual to have exclusive legitimacy as in the past and to acquire all authority by religious justification. Moreover, it is not desirable for the caliph to come to power with the same shape and form as in the past, because the historical memory of the Muslims testifies that except for the period of the Rasheda Caliphs and the few other sects, the caliphs have considered the lives of Muslims as their property and have seized them



without any legal restrictions, from their unnecessary campaigns to their relaxation and the shrines. Or they were weak and showy supporters who used their name and approval by powerful local government officials to expand their sphere of authority until the other ruler or other dynasty succeeded in dismantling the rival, and this time he endorsed the caliph's approval. The caliphs, however, appeared to be the most ineffective in the most critical of the Ummat, during the Crusades, the fall of Andalusia, the Mongol invasion, and the arrival of colonialism in the Muslim world (Moheq, 2015: 215-18).

According to Moheq, reviving the caliphate in that style is not the way to make a union of Muslim Ummat, but to strengthen civil institutions, create strong national structures and then equal and conscious participation of all Muslim nations in a large-scale combination called it the Islamic Ummat, a combination that has the capacity of all religions, ideologies, ethnicities, tastes, parties, national and religious institutions, and is based on the public interest, and that's it! (Moheq, 2015: 218).

Nationalism is something that has existed among human beings for centuries, and its complete elimination is never possible. Throughout the history of all governments, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, each has been as nationalistic as the feeling of being close to a fellow human being, language, or someone living in the same place is a natural and undeniable fact. But after the formation of modern governments, and especially after the French Revolution, having a policy according to national interests became one of the most important principles of governments, and in some cases, even this nationalism became too fascist. The history of Muslims, except for the Prophet Mohammad and the first four caliphs, have all had a degree of nationalism. During the rule of the Umayyad's and Abbasids, the Arabs were in a better position than other Muslims, as the Turks took this stage during the Ottoman period, while these governments were directly responsible for all Muslims. If we ignore these issues and come to see what Islam thinks about this? We see that Islam does not see ethnocentrism as good, but love of country, love of close relatives, and neighborliness have even encouraged by Islam to look at it, a small example of which we see in the case of zakat. As a result, defending national interests is not against Islamic values and is needed nowadays for everyone to do it for his/her country. Afghan Islamists stood against Dawood Khan in Afghanistan and one of their reasons for this standing was Dawood Khan's national policies.

### 2.6.2. Islam and Democracy

Muslims have different ideas about democracy. According to some, democracy is the closest system to the Islamic form of Shura, but some oppose and reject it from the base. In their view, democracy is opposite to the sovereignty of Allah and is not acceptable. According to Zallum, it would be an expression of irrationality and misguidance, which considered democracy as a part of Islam and called it the same as the council (Zallum, 2012: 63). Al-Ghanushi responds to them as: The negative attitude of Islamic movements toward democracy is holding it back. We have no modern experience in Islamic activity that can replace democracy. The Islamization of democracy is the closest thing to Shura. Those who reject this thought have not produced anything different than the one-party system of rule (al-Ghanushi, 1999). According to Fuller, no religion is inherently compatible with democracy: Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam are all concerned with issues that have little to do with democracy (Fuller, 2003: 121).

Shahroor a well-known Syrian Islamic intellectual, also emphasizes that there is no alienation between Islam and democracy. Democracy, as a mechanism, is the best achievement of humanity for practicing consultation (Shura). Democracy is the best mechanism for organizing opposition and power relations. Democracy has both negative and positive aspects. Whatever the negative side is, there is no justification for abolishing democracy and replacing it with the absolute rule of one person, one party, or one elite (Shahroor, 1999). Kubba also protects democracy and states that democracy is not to complement or replace Islam, but it is necessary to improve the management of the Muslim world. Democratic societies may or may not be Islamic but I can hardly envisage an Islamic society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century without it being democratic and respectful to basic human rights. Democracy has many mistakes; it is not perfect; it is open to abuse. But all other man-made or man-derived systems are so. This observation includes systems derived from the values of Islam and systems that govern Muslims in the past 1400 years (Kubba).

The issue of Islam and democracy is a long endless subject and ideas about these subjects are also as divergent. Among these thoughts, one of the modernist and positive views belongs to ‘Mohammad Moheq’, as he has an essay with the title of, ‘Democracy is a religious duty’. Moheq describes democracy and its relations with Islam in a different

method than both acceptors and rejecters. He started the subject: I believe that democracy, in the sense that it is presented today in political science, is a completely new concept belonging to the New World, whose birth does not go down historically from the Renaissance to the present, and even to democracy in the sense of Greece which has been discussed for a long time and in the writings of the philosophers of that time, has a fundamental difference than today's democracy. Hence, it does not accept the claim that Islam is the founder of democracy, and not only that, but also believes that the concept of the state in its modern sense was not present in human past culture and belongs to the modern era and any theoretical effort on the relationship between religion and politics that ignores this fact will come to a standstill. Democracy, while being modern and belonging to the new world, if understood properly, is not in conflict with the goals and objectives of Islam, but is an efficient way to realize the ideals that Islam has for the collective life of human beings (Moheq, 2011: 54/6/7).

Moheq is making clear the subject via a distinct view, seeing democracy as a tool to control the power. What is called democracy today, and there is a lot of discussion about it, is nothing but a mechanism for controlling power. A solution that transforms this phenomenon from a wild and rebellious state to a domestic and tame one. All said other than this is secondary, not the principle. The reason why some people think that democracy is incompatible with Islam is due to their ignorance of this issue. They think that democracy is equal to drinking wine, homosexuality, and atheism and other matters that have nothing to do with the principle of democracy or are its transverse consequences, not its nature, and therefore they are at war with it because it conflicts with religious values. On the other hand, some others according to given the historical course of the emergence of democracy and its cultural context and philosophical underpinnings, it is thought that democracy can not be witnessed in a religious society, as long as a society adheres to certain religious values and principles, it can not be democratized, and to be democrat, the bondage of religion must be abolished. Because of being impossible of getting rid of religion so they say they are incompatible (Moheq, 2011: 63).

According to Moheq, power is not always bad, it can be good when it is under control and democracy is the only route to control power. If democracy has no other good but to restrain power in the collective life of human beings, and by law, it will step on the lips of such an unbridled force, it does the best services to human beings and at the same

time, it provides the best way to realize a part of the concept of monotheism in human life, there is a famous rule of jurisprudence in Islam, ‘‘ If obligation can not be fulfilled without it, it is also obligation’’. Democracy is a religious necessity and an Islamic duty, given the long experience of human beings in the functioning of power, and those who sincerely strive to institutionalize democracy in Islamic societies are committed to achieving one of the fundamental goals of Islam (Moheq, 2011: 70/1).

Those who oppose democracy among Muslims belong on different groups of Salafists, Hizb ul-Tahrir, Islamists under influence of Sayed Qutb’s ideas, and some other movements. Their argument for expressing such ideas is that highlighting any will other than monotheism falls into the category of polytheism, which Islam opposes it decisively. According to Islamists, who are opposing democracy, power should run according to religious orders, but the opposition says that power has its logic and it is other than religion. According to Zallum, former leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Democracy is an infidel system and has nothing to do with Islam. This system is in complete contradiction with the rules of Islam in generalities and details and in the source from which it originated and the belief from which it originated and the basis on which it is based. That is why it is forbidden for Muslims to choose, accept, adapt, and call people to it (Zallum, 2012: 5).

The main struggle between Islamists and others is the point which Islamists claim that government should rule the society/country in the form which they suggest, and they are not suggesting a specific form, every group and party has their understanding of Islamic government, Caliphate and Democracy, but implementing the Sharia is the common point of all.

## **2.7. SOME IMPORTANT TERMS**

### **2.7.1. 9/11 and Islamism**

A new phase for the Islamic world, especially Afghanistan started after 11 of September, 2001. We will examine the event with details in the related part of the next chapter. Now it is enough to explain that, the USA attacked Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban regime as protector and supporter of Usama bin Laden the founder of Al-Qaida who then was killed in Pakistan. According to some, Western countries started an undeclared war against Muslims via their media and other channels after 9/11. The

responsible for these attacks was just a group, who had good relations with the USA once upon a time but unfortunately, all Muslims, especially Afghans become the target in the international scene and the world started acting with Muslims as terrorists in some cases. West started using the word of Islamic terror after violent events which were done by Muslims, but never spoke of Christian, Jewish, Chinese, Hindu, or some others as terror in events in which Muslims and others were targeted by some of the extreme groups/persons in different parts of the world. According to Fuller, many Muslims perceive the war Against terrorism to be in reality a war against Islam. Since Muslims were held responsible for the attacks on 11 September, Muslims became the exclusive targets, both in the Muslim world and within the United States and Western Europe as objects of investigation. Muslims were affected by the event more widely afield. Key leaders in Russia, India, Israel, China, and other countries took advantage of the U.S. policy to declare their war against terrorism locally and to put down with ever greater force and justification for their Muslim minorities, Chechens, Kashmiris, Palestinians, Moros, and Uyghurs. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon declared that Yasir Arafat is Israel's, Bin Ladin. Other regimes also took advantage of the incident to crack down with greater violence on their Islamist groups as in Uzbekistan, Egypt, the Philippines, Malaysia and Algeria (Fuller, 2003: 85). Pakistan as a Muslim country used extremes and terrorists against Afghanistan in out and suppressed Pashtun and Baloch people inside the country via these groups and state terrorism.

#### **2.7.1.1. Terrorist or Freedom Fighter**

Who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter? This is the question that has no specific answer and everyone has a reply according to his/her policy. Unfortunately, after 9/11, most of the Muslims who are struggling for their basic rights are introduced as terrorist in media, regardless of their target, position, and method of their combat. If we define terror as 'Intentional targeting of civilians for political purpose'. According to this definition, the terrorist attacks in the past twenty years are not as much as they were shown in media. Today, China calls those who stand for their rights among Uyghurs as terrorists, Israel is calling Palestinians even children who are raising their voices for their rights and freedom as terrorists, the USA is using this term to those who oppose their interests in some cases. Former Afghan president, Hamid Karzai criticized the USA in one of his

interviews with Tolonews, and claimed that the USA is not honest in the subject of war against terror as he gave an example from one of his meetings with American authorities in which he asked them why Americans are not fighting directly with terrorists and destroy their bases in Pakistan where Taliban and other anti-Afghan movements are supported by Pakistan's government? Americans replied to him with a shocking answer which is: we define just those as terrorists who are standing against us not much than this (Karzai, 2015).

Islam condemns all types of violence and terror more than any other religion. Jihad's mean is "to struggle." The "greater jihad" in Islam is the struggle of the individual to overcome one's own baser instincts; "lesser jihad" is the use of force to defend one's family or the community from others attack. But nowadays the term became very complicated and is in use according to political interests of organizations and countries including non-Islamic countries as we see some countries support a group against their opponent and named it as Mujahedin or freedom fighters, but when they reach their purpose, the same group name is changing in their media as terrorist which should be killed.

### **2.7.2. Islamism/Secularism**

One of the issues which Islamists oppose a lot is "Secularism". what is secularism and is it opposite to Islam? There is no certain academic approach to the subject, as in the case of democracy. Secularism in the USA, UK, and other anglo Saxon countries represent a stern separation of religion and state, but as Inac pointed out, the French version is different and the term is laicism, a product of the French Revolution, whereby the state controls religion and its institutions (Inac, 2012: 202). Islamists in Turkey are one of the few and maybe the only model of political movements, which are not opposing a democratic order based on secularism and laicism. According to some, secularism of state has no problem with Islam as Erdogan states in many of his statements which we will give the details later in my topic related to Turkey.

### **2.7.3. Religion Renewal and Islamism**

In the struggle between different thinkers and scholars of Islam, there is a subject by name of renewing of religion. There is a reliable Hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah in

‘Abu Dawood’ one of the most trusted Hadith books which says: ‘‘At the beginning of every century Allah will send to this ummah someone who will renew its religious understanding’’ (Sunan Abu Dawood). Most Muslims, including Modern and democrats, interpret this Hadith as a sign of assent of Islam religion with new things that are not opposite with Sharia, like technology, democracy, and others. According to modern Muslims, democracy is one of those things which is new to Muslims even to all humanity, so Islam accepts it as a form of government and there is no opposition between democracy and religion. Famous Islamists as Mawdudi and Hasan al-Banna do not reject this modernization as it is needed and inevitable for today’s societies, but Sayed Qutb and Hizb ut-Tahrir refuse it. Religion Renewal is accepted almost by all Muslims, but its interpretation is differing among them. According to traditionalists and fundamentalists, the renewal of religion means a return to the original and the past, the same past that Muslims call that golden age, the era of the righteous Rashidun caliphs. According to them, the reason for Muslim’s failings is adding new things that have no base in Sharia and is called as innovation (bedat) in Islam, so religion should become pure again. Fundamentalists emphasizes on superstition and heresy, they forget all other economic, educational, and political reasons of Muslim’s backwardness.

According to Moheq, with a noticeable simplification, these movements completely omit the political, social, economic, cultural, geopolitical, and psychologically influential factors in macro-historical developments and reduce all problems to the issue of superstition and heresy. Therefore, all their emphasis is on returning to early Islam stems from heresies, and they think that all the problems of Islamic lands will end with the removal of the additional appendages built by the sects, and the revival of Orthodox Islam. They call this process as religion renewal, which they believe is the key to solving each problem in this part of the world (Afghanistan), and the whole world. These movements accept that religion needs to be renewed, because in the explicit phrase of that narration, religion has been spoken of, and there is no room for denying it, but what they forget is that renewal of religion does not mean to make it old, it's about making it new, and that's what they've neglected so much. Religion renewal certainly does not mean the renewal of the Quran and Hadith, that is accepted by all sects and movements. From the time of compilation to the present day, Quran and Hadiths have been available to Muslims in writing and have the same authority and validity for all

spectrums and movements, and because they are not old-fashioned, they don't need to be renewed, so the subject of the discussion is transferred to two other levels, one is the level of interpretations and interpretations of the Quran and Hadiths and after compiling it, it has acted as an ideology of different sects and movements, and the other is the practical level and its cultural evolution (Moheq, 2011: 30/1).

Some ask what should we do to get out of the current situation and get better? There are multiple answers as 'Moheq' describe: If we want to consider a role for religion in the modern world so that human beings can overcome part of their mental or behavioral problems with the help of its teachings and use it in their spiritual excellence, the way is not to live the pattern of old life and consciousness and make the centuries-old ones the basis for understanding and interpreting religion, or should we expect to achieve this by printing or reproducing the works and thoughts of past scholars, rather, the key is to bring ourselves to the level of human consciousness and ability today, modern-day human beings who play a role and are the main actors in today's scene, and human beings who are the continuation of the pre-modern era for a long time, they have remained and choose a passive role for themselves and only can define themselves in response to them (Moheq, 2011: 42).

#### **2.7.4. Islamism and The Islamization Process of Society**

According to Islamists, the nature of government determines the nature of society, not the reverse one. Therefore, they distinguish between the Muslim state and the Islamist state, but most of the Muslim scholars do not accept such a thing. In this regard, Mawdudi states: The goal of Muslims should be to establish an Islamist state, not a national Islamic state (Roy, 1990: 124). We knew that all Islamists accept and work for the Islamization of society and seizing political power, but methods of Islamization of society and getting power is differing among them. While some moderates try to re-Islamize the society from bottom to up by establishing social and political organizations and influencing power, as Mawdudi and Hasan-al-Bana were following this path to some extent and revolution was not needed in this phase. They accept the revolution and stand against power only if the state actively moves against Islam. A well-known Sudanese Islamist, Hasan al-Turabi explains the idea of revolution in Islam as: If the government is strange enough to violate the Sharia, then one has the right and duty to rebel against it



(Al-Turabi in Adams and Esposito, 1983: 248). But radicals oppose this idea and consider directly of revolution and refuse the system totally, because it is impossible to have compromise with the situation of Islamic societies as they are part of Jahiliya illustrated by Sayed Qutb. According to Roy, radicals are even using words of Taghut and Takfir, or ex-communication, which means declaring that someone who professes Islam is an infidel and kafir because of his way of life which is not according to Islamic principles. But most Islamists refuse this term (Roy, 1994: 42).

"The Quran Is Our Constitution" is the slogan of most of the Islamists. According to Mawdudi, the sovereignty belongs only to Allah, the Islamists reject the notion of popular sovereignty and accord only contingent value to the elective principle. If no individual comes forward as the evident Amir, then he can be elected by an advisory assembly (the Shura) or even by universal suffrage, both of which, in this case, do not express sovereignty, but simply the principle of community consensus (Mawdudi, 1960: 240, al-Turabi, in Adams and Esposito, 1983: 243). According to Roy, two concepts recur constantly among most Islamist theoreticians: that of the leader (Amir) and that of the advisory council (Shura), around which both the Islamic political party and the future Islamic society are structured (Roy, 1994: 42).

Unlike the ulama, Islamists do not seek to solve a political problem in the Qur'an and Sunnah, what they are doing is discussing controversial questions such as what is society? What is a government? and others say that this was the case in France in the eighteenth century (Roy, 1990: 125).

What methods should be used to establish an Islamic society? According to Islamists, gaining political power is needed to do this. Mawdudi points to political power, as an essential element in achieving the purpose of establishing an Islamic society which can do the reforms that Islam wants to bring (Mawdudi, 1960: 05). Mawdudi also defends being impossible of living in an Islamic way under non-Islamic rule (Mawdudi, 1939: 19). So establishing fully Islamic society is a priority for Islamists. Roy focuses on the non-democratic characteristic of Islamization of society and says: A successful re-Islamization would bring an end to political society. If everyone is virtuous, why should institutions be necessary? (Roy, 1994: 63). An Islamic form of government exists when

its members are Muslims, abide by their Islamic duties and religious obligations, and do not disobey the Islamic laws (Jamiat-e Islami of Afghanistan).

Islamist parties in many cases are similar to communist parties according to the organizational structure of their parties. Roy named Hizb-e Islami of Hekmatyar in Afghanistan as the most Leninist of all the Islamist parties, which was strongly influenced by the communist organizational model as a result of the long history of interaction between Islamist and communist students in Kabul university (Roy, 1994: 68). Any party can be more similar to Leninist form in which the main power is with leader and Amir, and Shura becomes just an instrument. Most of the Islamic parties have this character, but Hekmatyar is ruling his party according to his ideas, and lots of his followers left him because of Hekmatyar's ignorances of Shura's decisions and other members ideas.

To become a member and play an active role in Islamic parties, they have generally 4/5 steps, as Hizb-e Islami of Afghanistan has four steps: sympathizers, members, pillars, and the Central Council, which is the most important organ and select the Amir. Preaching (Dawa) is the obligation of every Muslim but in Islamist parties preaching is the instrument of the march to power. While moderate and modern Islamists seek to create a synthesis, a compromise between modernity and Islam, which is rejected by neo-fundamentalists (Roy, 1994: 82). Radical Islamists reject this compromise.

There is a general misunderstanding about Islamist movements who form the government. People generally think that they are from the clergy class of Muslim societies, but it is not true except Iran. Most of the Islamists are from different parts including intellectuals of the society. According to Roy, Islamist movements are products of the modern world. The militants are rarely mullahs; they are young products of the modern educational system, and those who are university educated tend to be more scientific than literary; they come from recently urbanized families or the impoverished middle classes (Roy, 1994: 03).

#### **2.7.5. Amir, Shura, And Intra-Party Democracy in Islamic Movements**

Shura is an important organ in the Islamic tradition of government and according to 'Rabbani' a well-known Afghan Islamist the Shura can take the form of a parliament (Rabbani, 1986). Shura, elder members of Islamic councils, and other organs are never as

important as Amir (leader) in the Sunni Islamic approach. Roy is stating it: All Sunni Islamist thought expresses a strong disgust for translating the concepts of the Amir and the Shura into terms of autonomous institutions capable of effectively producing a stable political practice independent of the individuals who compose it. The Sunnis stop at the slogan "The Quran Is Our Constitution." What specific form the executive and "legislative" branches will take does not appear essential (Roy, 1994: 45). Turabi states this approach: Whatever form the executive may take, a leader is always subject both to the Sharia and to the Ijma [the consensus] formulated under it (Al-Turabi, in Adams and Esposito, 1983: 248). According to Mawdudi, Islam does not prescribe any definite form for the formation of the consultative body or bodies for the simple reason that it is a universal religion meant for all times and climes (Mawdudi, 1960: 260). Why the form of Shura is not very important? Because the main sovereignty & power belongs to Allah. Whatever human agency is constituted to enforce the political system of Islam in a state will not possess real sovereignty in the legal and political sense of the term, because, its powers are limited and circumscribed by a supreme law which it can neither alter nor interfere with (Mawdudi, 1960: 218).

Who can be select as Amir or Muslim leader? There are many certain qualities but Mawdudi's criteria for this position is: must be Muslim, male, adult, healthy, and have performed hijrah, that is, he must belong to the community of followers who have separated themselves from a corrupt society; he must fear God, be wise, worthy of trust, and he must not aspire to the position (Mawdudi, 1960: 243/4). According to Hizb-e Islami of Afghanistan, the Amir must abstain from sin and from all that is "religiously forbidden," must incarnate "sincerity, equity, justice, purity" and surpass all members of society in the qualities that are required of a believer (Responsibilities of Member). Who can be members of the Shura who is selecting Amir? Mawdudi's view is: they should be such whose sincerity, ability, and loyalty above reproach in the eyes of the public (Mawdudi, 1960: 238). The discussion of who should be the leader consists of sketching the portrait of the ideal sovereign according to Quranic norms (Mawdudi, 1960: 261, Roy, 1994: 62).

What about the inter-party democracy in Islamist parties? Some of them who have no belief in democracy, of course, are not practicing democracy in their parties too, but those who claim of being democratic are differing from each other in practice. Some

of them are democratic but most have no inter-party democracy as the majority of Islamist groups are led by its founders, and after the death of the founder, the new leader is elected by the council, but the likelihood of his removal after the election is very low until his death, and in some cases, his son or close relative is replacing him as it occurred in Afghanistan after Rabbani's death, whose son had no competence of the post but was selected as chairman of the party just because of being Rabbani's son. It means that most of them are serving as Amir (leader) forever. One of the big problems for Islamists is the ambiguity of their plans. Roy is stating the situation as follows: Speeches such as monarchy belong only to God, the Amir has only representation, and legitimacy is religious legitimacy. The way Amir is elected is the consensus of the Islamic Ummat, which is practically possible through elections. On the one hand, the principle of elections is very common among Islamists. Amir has considerable authority, but there is also a council, and Amir does not have general authority (Roy, 1990: 127). But when we see it in practice, Islamists have generally behaved in a very contradictory way, and the person who founded the party has not left the leadership until his death, and there have been very few intra-party elections.

Which social classes form Islamist parties, or are members of these parties? Most of Islamist cadres are from urban areas, Hekmatyar, Rabbani, and other Afghan Islamists are mostly university-educated of different branches. Other leaders in different areas of the Islamic world are also those who came from urban areas and are part of the modern class of their societies, so Islamism is known as a product of modernism and most of their members are not from religious class of Mullahs or ulama.

#### **2.7.6. Islamization After 1980s**

An Islamization wave was started by most of the states in the 1980s, even by secular states like Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and even the Afghan government under Najibullah. This Islamization was to control Islamists via government reforms and by establishing religious organizations such as Diyanet (religious affairs department) in Turkey to show themselves as rulers who want to implement Islam in social and personal life. Some of the Islamist movements by states are as follow: The communist Afghan government started some religious programs in 1986 and the new Afghan constitution of 1987 specified Islam as the state religion. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq also put some Islamic laws

into adjustment. Ben Ali former Tunisian president who was repressing Islamists, started some programs to save the country's Arabic and Muslim identity in the 1980s.

### **2.7.7. Islamic/Islamist Union**

One of the issues which both Islamists and others stand on is making a union between Islamic countries or at least among Islamic movements. As we said before the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Indian Jamaat-e Islami of Mawdudi are the founding fathers of Islamic movements. According to Mitchell, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood organized a section by name of "Section for Liaison with the Islamic World" who had nine committees (Mitchell, 1993: 172). The main function of this office was to make relations with other Islamic movements in different Islamic countries. According to Sivan, Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jamaat-e Islami of Mawdudi are two different movements which are recognized as mothers of Islamist parties having different strategies, but they made the connection with each other through a student of Mawdudi, Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, who undertook the translation of Mawdudi into Arabic and met with Sayed Qutb (Sivan, 1990: 23). Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were established in many Arabic and Muslim countries after its formation in Egypt. In some countries, these branches stood close to states and participated in governance and elections, like Jordan or Kuwait. In some countries, Islamic movements were suppressed by dictators like Syria and in some countries, these movements started military struggle against states like war of Islamists against different governments in Afghanistan. Niyazi, the founder of the Afghan Islamic movement was influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood during his studies in Egypt in the 1950s. Rabbani, another leader of the Afghan Islamic movement undertook the translation into Persian of Sayed Qutb's (In the Shadow of the Quran) book. Muslim Brotherhood could never open a branch in Shia Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have their Islamic agendas other than Brotherhoods. Islamic movement in Turkey is completely different and modern, which has no common points with others.

Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabi movement are different at their origins and have little in common. But they had coordination in supporting Afghan Islamists against Soviet forces with coordination of Pakistani army and ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). Roy states the situation as: The MB and the Saudis cooperated to rally the Islamist sphere

first around Sayyaf, then around Hekmatyar. The training camps of the Afghan mujahedin trained Islamist groups from Kashmir, Philippine, and Arabic countries as well. Yasser Arafat, who was an MB member in his youth, attempted to act as a liaison between Hekmatyar and the communist regime in Kabul, from a base in Bagdad (Roy, 1994: 118).

Finally, in today's conditions, the Islamic alliance between Islamist movements and Islamic countries does not seem very likely. Each group has its distinct program and moving forward, Islamists in Afghanistan even have no coordination among themselves and are the main rivalry of each other in the political scene, the Brotherhood in Egypt, the Shiites in Iran, the Turks, and the Saudis all act and works separately and individually.

## **2.8. EXPERIENCES OF ISLAMISTS IN POWER (FAILINGS)**

To understand political Islam better, governments formed by Islamists in different countries, especially in Afghanistan should be examined. Till now we have just a few examples of forming a government by Islamists through democratic processes. Turkey after 2002, Egypt from 2012 to 2013 for a short and unsuccessful era, and Islamists in Tunisia are examples of formed governments by Islamists or by those who have Islamic roots democratically. Others like: Iran after the Islamic revolution, Sudan, and Afghanistan are all examples of getting power through non-democratic processes by Islamists. Turkey is a distinguished and separated example than all other Islamic countries in forming a democratic government that is successful than others and has its reasons and conjunction which was discussed above. Iran and Sudan both had not succeeded in forming a democratic government after getting the power and are still in crisis both internally and externally.

Why are Islamists unsuccessful in various areas, including the formation of the government? It is a long debatable subject and some of the reasons are discussed in follow: Not welcome by Muslim societies and it is due to failed and unpleasant experiences of Islamists which they had in some countries, especially Afghanistan. The second reason for their failings is that Islamists have made gaining power their main goal, even their only goal, which is inherently problematic. According to Ghanushi, the Islamic movement must not have the government as its priority. The takeover of the government should not be the biggest achievement possible. A bigger achievement would be if the people would love Islam and its leaders. The most dangerous thing is for the Islamists to

be loved by the people before they get to power and then hated afterward (Al-Ghanushi, 1999). This prediction of Ghanushi happened in Afghanistan during the Mujahedin and Taliban era as people first welcomed them, but hated them during their rule and have not any positive memory from that time. The third reason for their failings and presence of undemocratic situation in Islamic countries is the state manipulation of the democratic order. Fuller, counts these manipulations as: Restriction of access to media, Cooptation, Libel and security laws, Gerrymandering, Limitation of parties on ideological grounds, Manipulation of electoral procedures, NGO controls and finally harassment and arrest (Fuller, 2003: 139/40). Most states in the Middle East, North Africa, and Middle Asia are manipulating democratic order to maintain the power of presidents for life. In Islamic countries, authoritarian regimes oppose democracy more than Islamists, as they know in case of free elections and democratic order they will lose their power. When they lose power among groups who will attend in elections, Islamists have more chance to gain the power than others. So we can say that Islamism is the only democratic option for authoritarian regimes in some countries as we have seen it for a short period in Egypt. The fourth reason I think is their radical movements as some of them try to destroy the current democratic order in countries and people are afraid of the irregularity and disorder after seizing power by Islamists. The last reason for their failings is relating everything to religion and politics, this caused them to ignore culture, society, and technology as well.

According to researches I had about the subject, the presence of authoritarian regimes in most of the Islamic countries, not having powerful democratic culture, civil wars, and struggles among themselves, ethnic and sectarian conflicts, and failure in the nation-building process in some of the Islamic countries are the internal reasons of this failure. Among external reasons; the intervention of some of the Islamic countries by foreign forces, for which Afghanistan is a good example, not protecting real democratic movements by international community, seeing Muslims as enemies by some countries or at least by some strong movements among these countries which see Muslims as a threat to their civilization and culture.

Moheq describes the failings of Islamists in politics as follow: The major theoretical drawback here is that Political Islam in terms of intellectual maturity has not yet reached the point where it can seriously consider the fundamental category of

expectation from religion, and set the ceiling for this expectation to focus on in the light of the methodical scientific analysis in academic centers, not in street demonstrations or provocative statements. That is why, over the course of nearly a century, this movement has led Muslim masses to promise to solve their problems with the help of religion, but as time has passed, no coherent theoretical plan for the fundamental problems of societies has emerged, and a successful practical plan is not yet achieved, where they were in power, in some countries, except in cases where it has benefited from the experience of non-Muslim nations and has succumbed to the logic of rationality (Moheq, 2011: 14). Some of the Islamic countries are in the category of those who appear democratic but is ruling by dictators, and presidents for lives. The government is based on the theory that the interests of the individual and the state are the same and the right for voting is not practiced truly. The accusation of this kind of democracy is also made against political Islam, a clear example of which is the Iranian government.

The Islamists failed both in theoretical and practical models. Roy illustrates some dimensions of theoretical failure as: first, in terms of texts: since the founding writings of Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna, Sayed Qutb, Mustafa al-Siba'i (Syrian MB), Ali Shariati, Rohullah Khomeini, Baqir al-Sadr, all before 1978, in all the languages of the Ummat there are nothing but brochures, prayers, feeble glosses and citations of canonical authors. Second, it is failed, in terms of concepts, which are reaching a dead-end: for the Islamists, Islamic society exists only through politics, but the political institutions function only as a result of the virtue of those who run them, a virtue that can become widespread only if the society is Islamic beforehand. It is a vicious circle. Finally, it has broken down in terms of action, the success of which might have enabled people to forget the impoverishment of the discourse; but neither the Islamic revolution in Iran, mired in economic crisis and infighting among factions, nor the liberated zones of Afghanistan (Afghan-Soviet battle era), torn apart by clannish and ethnic conflicts, furnish a model for what an Islamic society should be (Roy, 1994: 60).

The Islamist model has failed in practice too. According to Roy, first, it failed with the Iranian model as this model caused Arab nations to try to be far from this model because of seeing this model as Shiism and Iranian nationalism more than being an Islamic revolutionary movement. The Sunni Islamic movement was even less successful, as in the case of Afghanistan, Mujahedin parties gained power but the treatment increased



more as a result of ethnic and tribal conflicts among Islamist parties. Finally, Islamism could not play a unifying role between Muslims, as we saw it in Gulf wars and using Islamic and fundamentalist groups against each other by several states in the Middle East (Roy, 1994: 107-109). In the recent past, Islamism could not play a successful role in Arab spring/conflicts too. Only the Al-Nahda party in Tunisia could gain some power and took Tunisia toward democracy to a point, others like Egypt have felled to civil conflicts with military and other parties after gaining power and some were put to long wars like Syria and Yemen. It has not even been able to offer the Muslim masses a concrete political expression for their anti-colonialism because of their failings in Politics. Islamists in Afghanistan are of course the most failed and disordered among these movements. According to Roy: Islamism has failed and will neither unify the Muslim world nor change the balance of power in the Middle East (Roy, 1994: 194). Islamists emphasizes on repeating failed experiences, except for Turkey. They do not propose turning back to the golden Islamic civilization times, instead, they emphasize on pure Islam.

According to Roy, Islamism is an agent in the secularization of Muslim societies, because it brings the religious space into the political arena. There is a big difference between the victory of Islamism and living daily life according to Islam. Islamists are ruling Iran with strict Islamic laws, but one rarely sees a person praying in the street, and the new Islamized neighborhoods of otherwise secular republics (Tunisia, Turkey), where certain streets are practically closed to cars by the crowd of men in prayer. The political victory of Islamism is the end of true devotion. Mosques are packed in places where they have become sites of mobilization in opposition to a state perceived as particularistic, client-oriented, and repressive; but they empty when Islamism takes power (Roy, 1994: 199).

### **2.8.1. Positive and Negative Roles Played/Playing by Islamism**

Standing against Colonialism, supporting Pan-Islamic movements, Uniting Muslims around the world seems as their achievements. There are long lists of negative role played by Islamists too. Separating Muslims to many sects, accuse and denounce Muslims who are not in the same idea with them, bringing security problems, becoming an instrument of the governments, region's intelligence, and even a toy of global politics in some cases.

A sad fact about the Islamic world is that most of the leaders in Islamic countries use religion as a tool to strengthen their power. Both Islamist and non-Islamist governments move in the same pattern. According to Fuller, most Islamists would charge that the several Pakistani regimes that advocated Islamization, most notably General Zia al-Haq (1977–1988), imposed only symbols and not the spirit of Islamization (Fuller, 2003: 131).

As a result of weak and corrupt governments in Muslim countries, Islamists support the society in various areas. This seems positive but can emerge problems in some cases as the ruling class can see them as a parallel government in their countries. Unfortunately, some of the Islamist movements become the instruments of foreign policy of the large states, as we have seen it in Afghanistan and during Arab uprisings in the Middle East.



**THIRD CHAPTER**  
**A VIEW TO POLITICAL ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN AFGHANISTAN**

### **3.1. GENERAL OUTLOOK OF AFGHANISTAN**

Some consider Afghanistan as one of the Middle Eastern countries, and some observe it part of Central Asia, but its more precise location is the western part of South Asia, for which the term "heart of Asia" is sometimes used. Afghanistan is a landlocked country that borders Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in the north, Iran in the west, Pakistan in the south and east, and China in the northwest. Because of its location, sometimes it is said that Afghanistan made crossroads of cultures. Afghanistan covers an area of about 650,000 KM<sup>2</sup>, but its population has never been counted accurately due to unrest and war. According to Afghan historian, Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar, Afghanistan's population was 15271687 in 1962 (Ghubar, 1996: 72). CIA estimated the population of Afghanistan to be 28,513,677 in July 2004. The Pashtun have been the politically dominant group since the mid-18th century (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 16). Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group of the country followed by Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, and others. According to 2020 estimates, the population is about 35 million.

Afghanistan's Main Ethnic Groups, 2002:

Pashtuns: 44%, Tajiks: 25%, Hazara: 10%, Uzbeks: 8%, Minor Ethnic groups: 13% (Rubin quoted in CIA, 2003). But we should not forget that these are just estimates, and unfortunately, there is no exact information about Afghanistan's population.

Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic with a presidential system that provides extensive power to the president. It has 34 provinces with Kabul as the capital and largest city of the country. It became the capital of Afghanistan in 1775 by Timur Shah, son of the great Ahmad Shah Baba. Kandahar is the first capital of modern Afghanistan served between the years 1747 and 1775 and is one of the most important cities of the country. Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, and Herat are other famous cities of the country.

### **3.2. AFGHANISTAN BEFORE AHMAD KHAN ABDALI**

Afghanistan has a long history of more than 5000 years. There is a general belief that Afghans became Muslim during Hazrat Osman, the third Muslim caliph. According to Erman, Arab armies first appeared in Afghanistan after they defeated the Sassanids in two battles in 636 and 642 Hijri years (Erman, 2017: 482). Wahab, points out the year of 700 when an Arab army moved through Herat and Balkh and another to take Kandahar

and Kabul (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 54). More than 99% of the Afghan people are Muslims. Islam has proven to be the strongest and sometimes the only unifying factor for various ethnic groups in Afghanistan. As Afghanistan became part of the Abbasid government, Islam spread further in the country, and before the establishment of modern Afghanistan by Ahmad Khan in 1747, Ghaznavids, Ghuris, Timurids, Hotakis, and others ruled Afghanistan and part of the region.

### **3.2.1. The History of Modern Afghanistan**

Modern Afghanistan was established by Ahmad Khan Abdali, known as Ahmad Shah Baba (The founder father of Afghanistan) in 1747 as a result of a council (Loya Jirga) held by different tribes that selected Ahmad Khan as their leader in Kandahar city. According to Ghubar, Ahmad Shah was born in 1722 in the city of Herat. At the age of 20, he was appointed as an officer at the Nader Afshar's military. With his special merit, he was appointed as the commander of Abdali and Uzbek forces and remained with Nader Afshar until Nader's murder in 1747 (Ghubar, 1996: 354). Ahmad Khan founded an empire which was the largest Islamic empire of the time after that of the Ottoman Turks.

Ghubar states electing of Ahmad Khan as the king of Afghanistan as follows: As soon as Nader Shah (Iranian king) was killed, an Afghan army of 4,000 Ghaljais (one of the Pashtun tribes) and 12,000 Abdali (another Pashtun tribe) and Uzbeks led by Nur Mohammad Khan Ghaljaei and Ahmad Khan Abdali marched on Kandahar. In Kandahar, Noor Mohammad Khan Ghaljaei suggested to the Ghaljais, Abdali, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Baluchis, and Tajiks to form a Loya Jirga (High Council) and elect a king to run the country independently. The Jirga was convened in October 1747, and after nine days of negotiations, no agreement was reached because each tribe had the desire to seize the power. Finally, one of the Sufis (religious leader), Saber Shah Kabuli, was elected to rule on the matter. Saber Shah selected a young 25 years old man (Ahmad Khan), as the king, who then approved his competence of administrating the country (Ghubar, 1996: 354/5).

According to Wahab, when Ahmad Khan established a national Afghan government, there was no strong Muslim government in the region except for the Ottoman empire, which was no near to Afghan borders. Ahmad Shah extended his rule to most of Afghanistan in the first two years of his government and took Ghazni, Kabul, Herat, and Peshawar as well. Ahmad Shah Baba captured Delhi in 1757 too. The wheat

which was put to Ahmad Shah as a sign of his government is depicted in Afghanistan's flag (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 72). This wheat is a symbol of forming the first national and independent Afghan state.

Ahmad Shah Baba, the founder of Afghanistan, is an exceptional figure with qualities endorsed by most and well-remembered by Afghans. Ghubar, introduces Ahmad Shah Baba as follows: Ahmad Shah was a pious person and did not wear a crown. He was in direct contact with the people and was humble. He seriously obeyed the rules and avoided revelry. He did not run away from any war and considered justice in cases. Except for Timur, his successor kept his family away from the affairs of the state (Ghubar, 1996: 357). Ahmad Shah Baba ruled Afghanistan for 25 years till his death in 1772. Modern Afghanistan experienced a brilliant time during Ahmad Shah Baba rule.

### **3.2.1.1. From Ahmad Shah Baba's Death in 1772 Until The 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

Timur, succeeded Ahmad Shah Baba in 1772 and governed Afghanistan till 1794 in a peaceful and stable situation. After the death of Timur in 1794, his sons entered a civil conflict to seize power and also experienced the problem of being neighbors with the superpowers (England and Russia). According to Elmi, while the struggle for the throne between the sons of Timur Shah dragged the country into complete chaos, Dost Muhammed Han, who was from the sub-tribe of the Abdali dynasty, Barakzai, took advantage of the situation and declared his sovereignty by seizing the capital Kabul in 1835 (Elmi, 2011: 21). Britain tried to invade Afghanistan three times, and as a result of these attacks, Afghanistan has lost a significant part of its territory (Pashtunistan which is now under Pakistan's control) that it has not yet regained. According to Ghubar, the British wanted to reach the Amu Darya before the Russians reach the Central Asia, the British governor-general of India, set out on a voyage to Afghanistan in 1838 (Ghubar, 523: 1967). Afghanistan experienced many difficulties and lost an important part of its territory in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Timur's sons competed for power among themselves and this competition caused the weakening of state and interventions of foreigners.

### **3.2.1.2. First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars**

One of the most important factors in Afghanistan politics especially in the 19<sup>th</sup> century is its two powerful neighbors (Britain and Russia) and their competition for

controlling the region. Afghanistan became the primary victim of this competition through Britain's direct interventions for three times, but Afghans beat them in all battles and gained its full independence in 1919.

Britain as the superpower of the time planned to take control of Afghanistan and have control of whole the region against Russians. British got the decision of invading Afghanistan in 1838. According to Ghubar, British Army entered Kabul through Kandahar on August 7, 1839, and their second army reached Kabul via Jalalabad on September third of 1839 (Ghubar, 1996: 533). British invaded Afghanistan and were planning to stay forever, but Afghans started fighting them, which was not so successful in the first two years as Afghans could not manage a good resistance till 1841. The main war against invaders started in 1841 and the number of British forces according to Ghubar was 50000 (Ghubar, 1996: 543). Struggles continued in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, and other parts of Afghanistan against British forces and finally, they left Afghanistan in 1842 with much destruction of the country. Beside many fighters, Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan is one of the most known heroes of the first Anglo-Afghan war. Mohammad Akbar is the son of Dost Mohammad Khan, who then took command of the resistance against the British. According to Wahab, the English Macnaghten was the main ruler of Afghanistan during the first war and invasion, who was murdered during negotiations, probably by Ghazi Mohammad Akbar (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 84). According to Farhang, the first Anglo-Afghan war started in 1839 and ended in 1842 when the British withdrew with a great defeat and the pro-British Shah Shuja was brought to the throne in place of Dost Mohammad Khan (Farhang, 2012: 263).

Afghanistan was largely able to maintain its independence between the two wars of 1840 and 1880, and was the border region between the two superpowers, Russia and Britain. Amir Sher Ali Khan, who was a shrewd and progressive king, played a major role in maintaining this independence. As a result of Sher Ali Khan's policies, Afghanistan was able to maintain its independence, but the British started once again their interventionist policies against Afghanistan in the 1870s. According to Ghubar, the second Anglo-Afghan war started in 1878 when Afghanistan was in a weak position and finished in 1880. The second Anglo-Afghan war is another form of the first war, as the main target for the British was the same, which was controlling the region and avoiding Russia's influence. They entered to Afghanistan in November of 1878 from three

different points (Ghubar, 1996: 616). As a result of the second Anglo-Afghan war, Britain could gain an influence on Afghanistan's foreign policy until the third and last Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. Gandamak treaty was signed between Yaqub Khan under pressure and Britain in 1879 and the result was taking control of some eastern Afghan provinces from Afghanistan and Britain's influence on Afghan foreign policy till 1919 (Farhang, 2012: 361). Youngerman has the same idea that the new Afghan king, Yaqub Khan was compelled to sign the unequal Gandamak Treaty on May 26, 1879 (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 90).

Durand treaty was another loss for Afghans as it was signed in 1893 between Abdul Rahman Khan, the Afghan king, and Britain. Afghanistan lost significant regions in the east and south of the country and the issue is still unsolved between Afghanistan and the newborn Pakistan. Britain gave control of these areas to Pakistan in 1947, but people of the region which are Pashtuns/Afghans refused it as the Afghan governments never accepted the Durand Line as the official border and is still part of the problem between Afghanistan and new formed Pakistan. Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Mir Bacha Khan, and others are some of the important Afghan figures, who lead Afghans bravely against invaders during the second Anglo-Afghan war. One of the most important battles of the Second Anglo-Afghan War took place in the Maiwand region of Kandahar under the leadership of Ayub Khan. The brave Afghan women took part in the war alongside the men, and the brave lady named Malalai played an important role in the war that Afghans are still proud of.

Amir Abdul Rahman Khan who is known as the Iron Amir is the person who centralized the power for the first time in Afghanistan's history and defeated all who oppose the central government. Because of this, some call him the founder of the modern state in Afghanistan too. According to Rasanayagam, Abdul Rahman Khan sought to legitimize his power in Islamic terms by assuming the role of Imam, or spiritual leader of the Afghan nation, in the faithful Afghan society (Rasanayagam, 2003: 11).

### **3.2.1.3. Religion Role in Governance Until the Twentieth Century**

As we mentioned before Afghanistan is a country with a Muslim population more than %99, and the society was/is religious for centuries. Afghan emperors and governments fought a lot to spread the religion of Islam in the past and the founder of



modern Afghanistan (Ahmad Shah Baba) was also a person obeying religious rules as well. From the establishing of modern Afghanistan in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century till the twentieth-century, religion played a significant role in rescuing the country and maintaining its independence against colonials especially the British who tried to invade Afghanistan for many times.

### **3.2.2. Third Anglo-Afghan War (War of Independence)**

The third and last Anglo-Afghan War began with the announcement of full independence of Afghanistan by Ghazi Amanullah Khan soon after getting power as a result of dying his father in 1919. Amanullah Khan announced Afghanistan's full independence in both internal and external issues and fought with Britain in 1919 and succeeded as well. This battle started by Afghans under Ghazi Amanullah Khan in April 1919 and defeated the British forces on many grounds. According to Youngerman, Amanullah Khan, after receiving a vague answer from Viceroy Chelmsford, declared jihad and sent his troops to the British-Indian border, capturing the British with surprise. The army took the region of Torkham near the Khyber Pass on May 3, and army commander Nadir Khan overran several British posts in the central sector. The British also moved their forces to the borders, and the Third Anglo-Afghan War, or Afghanistan's War of Independence was started, border tribes also revolted against the British (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 103). Afghans finally won the battlefield and the British were forced to negotiate.

According to Ghubar, the Rawalpindi peace agreement was signed between the Afghan government and Britain on August 8, 1919. While Afghanistan was victorious on the battlefield, it accepted Britain's condition to agree on the former borders, which did not include Pashtunistan (Ghubar, 1996: 774). One of the criticisms leveled against Amanullah Khan is that why he did not resolve the Durand Line issue at the negotiating table after his victory over the British. After all these wars and negotiations, Britain finally recognized the independence of Afghanistan, but it did not stop the destruction of Ghazi Amanullah Khan who defeated them militarily and politically. Afghanistan became the first Islamic country that overthrow Britain from its country in the twentieth century and formed an independent and modern nation-state. According to Rasanayagam, Afghans marched from three sides against British India. Finally, after the Rawalpindi talks,

Afghanistan was released to conduct its foreign affairs too independently (Rasanayagam, 2003: 19).

### **3.2.2.1. Amanullah Khan Era**

After the death of Amir Habibullah in 1919, Amir Habibullah's brother, Nasrullah, and Son of Amir Habibullah, Amanullah, each declared their governments separately, where competition between the traditionalists who supported Nasrullah and modernists, who supported Amanullah Khan started for the first time. Finally, with the rise of modernists, the young Amanullah was chosen as Amir.

Amanullah Khan started to form a modern government soon after independence. According to Rasanayagam, Amanullah Khan had established a council of ministers, appointing Tarzi as the first foreign minister in Afghanistan history. In 1923 a constitution, modeled on the Persian constitution of 1906 and inspired also by the modernizing decrees of Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, was promulgated. He announced himself as (king) and made the office hereditary. Under pressure from conservative religious and tribal leaders, Amanullah was obliged to call the traditional Loya Jirga to review the constitution, and to amend some of its provisions, particularly those that restricted the wide discretionary powers of the religious judges (qazi) (Rasanayagam, 2003: 20). According to Wahab the constitution of April 9, 1923, is the first constitution of the country which was, a basic secular document (non-Muslims had equal rights) (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 106).

After a secure settlement, Ghazi Amanullah Khan entered into relations with various countries around the world and signed peace and cooperation agreements with the newly established governments of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey, which was at war with the occupiers. According to Ghubar, new established Soviet government of Russia was the first state, which knew Afghanistan as an independent state on the 27<sup>th</sup> of March 1919. Then Afghanistan and Soviet Russia signed the Afghan-Soviet friendship treaty on the 28<sup>th</sup> of February 1921. Good diplomatic relations were also established with Iran, which was an important neighbor. Afghanistan started diplomatic relations with newly founded Turkey's republic and signed a treaty on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1921 (Ghubar, 1996: 785-8).

Amanullah created a new form of state bureaucracy, independent of tribal or ethnic networks of power and authority (Rasanayagam, 2003: 14). According to Gubar, one of the issues for which Amanullah Khan worked most is national unity and he was the first king in Afghanistan's history who eliminated the ethnic and religious discrimination (Ghubar, 19: 794). Ghazi Amanullah Khan had trips to some countries and was accepted in the East as the hero of the liberation struggle and in the West as a leader who beat the British Empire (Ghubar, 1996: 798). King Amanullah Khan Ghazi was warmly welcomed by Ataturk in Turkey and Ataturk called him the leader of the independence of the Eastern Nations (Panjsheri, 1999: 64). Amanullah is the first Afghan ruler who attempted to take his nation to the twentieth century (Rasanayagam, 2003: 17). In short, Ghazi Amanullah Khan is the most progressive, modern, and one of the fairest rulers in Afghanistan's history.

### **3.2.2.2. Failings and Collapse of Amanullah Khan's Government**

According to some sources, Ataturk has warned Amanullah Khan that a large-scale political and social reform program is not possible without a strong and well-educated army (Rasanayagam, 2003: 21). It seems that this warning was very well calculated and Amanullah Khan's final collapse was due to not having a well-organized army. But this is not the only reason for his falling, according to Ghubar, Amanullah Khan after return from his trips was no longer the former king, was very proud and arrogant. He made hasty and thoughtless decisions that led to his downfall in the next months as foreign enemies were waiting for this chance. All this occurred after his return from his several-month trip to Europe, Turkey, Egypt, and Iran (Ghubar, 1996: 812).

But how a strong and modern government fallen? The obvious answer is Amanullah Khan's hurry in doing reforms. Amanullah's reforms were welcomed up by intellectuals and many other urban residents, but traditionalists and most of the rural population stood against him. Why some Afghan turned against Amanullah Khan's reforms? There are many reasons, but the main issue is Britain's conspiracy who could organize non-educated masses against him and used the weapon of Takfir against a Muslim by Muslims as always. According to Rasanayagam, in November 1928 Shinwari tribesmen burned down the king's winter palace in Jalalabad the British consulate marched on Kabul. In the north, a bandit known as Bacha Saqqao (son of a water carrier)

rallied toward Kabul under the name of the defense of Islam, forcing Amanullah to leave Kabul to Kandahar, and finally went to Italy (Rasanayagam, 2003: 22). According to former Afghan leftist politician (Panjsheri), the third decade of the twentieth century began with the most glorious historical events of the Afghans, the May 1919 armed uprising, the expansion of independent cultural, administrative, economic and political institutions, and the crisis and the catastrophic defeat of the national movement (Panjsheri, 1999: 58).

Many conspiracies took place against Amanullah Khan and most Afghans claim that the British had supported the rebellions. Amanullah Khan died in exile in Zurich in 1960. It was the first time in Afghanistan's history who was overthrown by his people as a result of foreign powers conspiracy against him by using religion as a tool.

### **3.2.2.3. Short Era of Habibullah Kalakani**

Who is Kalakani and how he got the power? According to Roy, Habibullah Kalakani who ruled Afghanistan for 9 months, from January 1928 to October 1929 was an active imposter, attacked Kabul, and captured the city when Shinwari people rebelled against Amanullah Khan. The short period of his governance represents the emergence of the deep-rooted structure of the fundamentalists as a transient event (Roy, 1990). Kalakani was the first ruler of Afghanistan who was fully illiterate and understands nothing of governance. He stopped all reforms of Amanullah Khan's era and destroyed Afghanistan's achievements which were gained by Amanullah Khan's government in the last ten years.

According to Panjsheri, to legitimize his government, Kalakani issued a proclamation similar to a religious fatwa one day after seizing power on January 18, 1929, in which Amanullah Khan was ex-communicated for his reforms (Panjsheri, 1999: 75). According to Khalili, the movement started by Kalakani was spontaneous which began in January 1929 and ended in October of the same year (Khalili, W. date: 127). Finally, he was overthrown and executed by Nader Shah in 1929.

#### **3.2.2.4. Nadir Khan**

Who is Nader Khan and how he captured the power for his family? His family is known as Musahiban, who made good relations with former Afghan kings Habibullah Khan, father of Ghazi Amanullah Khan, and Amanullah Khan himself too. As we mentioned before, Nader Khan was one of the top commanders of the independence war against Britain under Amanullah Khan. Then he took significant positions in Amanullah Khan's government, but he was in France at the time of the fall of Amanullah Khan's government. He came to the Paktia province and started fighting against Kalakani to restore Amanullah Khan's government. He did not surrender power to Amanullah Khan, and organized several conspiracies to prevent him from returning to the country and to rule Afghanistan himself. There are various opinions about his rule. Many criticize him for abusing Ghazi Amanullah Khan's name to take power and create a brutal government. According to Rasanayagam, in the new constitution prepared in 1931, it was decided for the first time and officially that the religious law of the Sunni Islamic Hanafi school was the law of Afghanistan (Rasanayagam, 2003: 23). But he did some positive moves too, according to Youngerman, Nadir Khan reopened many schools and built new ones too. He founded a literary academy and a medical faculty (1932), which later evolved into Kabul University. He completed a modern road from Kabul to the north through the Shibar Pass, built several irrigation dams, and drained northern swamps to promote cotton cultivation (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 111). But his rule was authoritarian, his policies were in favor of and influenced by Britain, and ruled Afghanistan for four years until he was shot by a student and died in 1933.

#### **3.2.2.5. Zahir Shah**

His son the young Zahir Shah came to power after Nader Khan's death in 1933 at the age of 19 and ruled Afghanistan for forty years, but historians consider Nader Khan's three brothers to be the main rulers of the first 20 years of Zahir Shah's rule. His uncle Hashim Khan ruled Afghanistan till 1946 in a brutal way. When king's other uncle Shah Mahmud became prime minister in 1946, one of his first moves was to release political prisoners. But opposites read it as changing in form, not in action, as the brutality of regime continued. Zahir Shah is the last ruler of the 226-year Durrani Pashtun dynasty. He was the last king of Afghanistan who was overthrown by his cousin in 1973.

Democratization in Afghanistan started after the second world war, but it was very slow and under government control. Many political and social activities took place under some organizations. In 1947, the Awakened Youth (Wikh Zalmyan), a political movement originally emerged in Kandahar, had members of a variety of dissident groups and called for legal rights for women, parliamentary government, free political parties, and other reforms (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 117). Most of the members of this party were arrested in the upcoming years. Politicians who then played an important role in the future politics of Afghanistan, like Nur Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Ghulam Mohammad Niyazi, Rabbani, Sayyaf, and Hekmatyar all took part and played an active role in activities held by different groups in the 1950s and 1960s.

### **3.2.2.6. Sardar Mohammad Dawood Khan as Prime Minister**

Sardar Mohammad Dawood Khan who is Zahir Shah's cousin and took different responsibilities in high positions during Zahir Shah's first twenty years in power, became the prime minister after his uncle Shah Mahmud's resignation of the post in 1953 and served in this position for ten years. He ruled Afghanistan as prime minister and signed important economic and social achievements, but his opponents accuse him of being an authoritarian politician. According to Wahab, Dawood was a modern and revolutionary person, who attend with women of the royal family and other prominent figures unveiled at the August 1959 ceremony marking the 40<sup>th</sup> year of independence, just 30 years after King Amanullah Khan had tried to do the same (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 122). A serious and decisive person, Dawood did not pay attention to democracy and freedom of parties, but he implemented many programs in the economic sector.

Dawood paid much attention to resolve the Pashtunistan issue but to no avail. What is the Pashtunistan issue that caused tensions between Afghanistan and Britain in the past and Afghanistan and Pakistan now, which is still not solved? The Pashtunistan issue originated from the British invasions of Afghanistan and signing a treaty with Abdul Rahman Khan by force in 1893. According to this treaty, Afghanistan lost significant parts of its territory and a line by name of Durand became the border between Afghanistan and British India of the time. Amanullah Khan tried to gain the lost territories but failed as a result of Britain's colonialist policies at that time. According to Tanin, the partition of India and forming a new state (Pakistan) by Indian Muslims influenced Afghanistan a

lot (Tanin, 2005: 92). India and Pakistan gained their independence and former India divided into India and newborn Pakistan. Before Partition in 1947, the British sponsored a spurious referendum in Pashtunistan, giving them the choice of joining either India or Pakistan, which Pashtuns were opposite to both and wanted freedom or joining to Afghanistan once again. It means they were pressured to join Pakistan.

Pashtunistan issue was important for the Afghan government and none of the Afghan governments till today accepted the Durand Line as a permanent border with British India/Pakistan and large areas of the Pashtun dominant population were part of newly established Pakistan and Afghanistan tried to take back those areas. According to Wahab, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations, because of its invaded territory (Pashtunistan) which was now under Pakistan's control. The Afghans based their position on the principles of self-determination; their opponents feared that their real goal was to annex the Pashtunistan and possibly even Baluchistan, which would give their country access to the sea (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 119). According to Rasanayagam, the struggle of Afghanistan and Pakistan on the issue of Pashtunistan intensified in March 1955 when Pakistan announced the One Unit Plan to create the single province of West Pakistan including Pashtun regions in Pakistan, symmetrical to the existing single province of East Pakistan (Rasanayagam, 2003: 32). Dawood counted this as a provocation against Afghanistan and Pakistan's try to introduce Durand Line as an international border. Large demonstrations took place in several provinces of Afghanistan against Pakistan. Dawood came to seek the assistance of the USA and buy weapons but the USA refused it. He started to make good relations with the USSR and India and this causes him to depend on Soviets against Pakistan. According to Rasanayagam, from 1956 to 1978 which is the year of the communist coup in Afghanistan, Afghanistan received the equivalent of \$1240 million in military aid from the USSR (Rasanayagam, 2003: 34). Pashtunistan's leader, Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan who fight nonviolence for Pashtun's rights against Britain India and then Pakistan for decades has the idea of the issue: After the partition of the Indian subcontinent to India and Pakistan, stone-throwing took place against the sovereign rights of the Pashtuns and Balochis, and the two options of India and Pakistan were raised, but the two important questions of unification with Afghanistan or independent Pashtunistan were never raised (Khan, 1983: 738/9). In a radio statement in 1961, Afghan Prime

Minister Dawood Khan stressed that the interests and sympathy of Afghanistan and Pashtunistan could not be cut off today or tomorrow (Yearbook 1960/1: 272). On July 26, 1968, the Afghan National Assembly announced the abolition of colonial treaties (Panjsheri, 1999: 199). Durand treaty is one of those colonial treaties and has no meaning to the Afghan people and government.

### **3.3. NEW POLITICAL ORDER IN THE 1960S**

Afghanistan changed much with the resignation of Dawood in 1963 and constitutional monarchy started. According to the new constitution, no one can become prime minister from the royal family. The years 1963-1973 in Afghanistan are known as a new democratic period (Democracy Decade) as prime ministers were out of royal family and political parties had more chances to play an active role in society. King Mohammad Zahir Shah became active in politics as well. Afghanistan started moving through democracy in this period and the year of 1964 is highly important in the modern history of Afghanistan. King Zahir Shah invited a Loya Jirga from different parts of Afghanistan including all minorities and women. They made a new constitution which was democratic than all others in the past. According to Rasanayagam, the 1964 Afghan constitution was characterized by some writers as perhaps the finest in the Muslim world (Rasanayagam, 2003: 40). But opposites criticize the king for strengthening his power as this constitution banned electing prime minister from the royal family so Dawood was displaced and the king caught the chance to have direct intervention in governance. Opposites refuse to be democratic of this constitution and claim that it was a trial of the royal family to adapt themselves with the new order of world after a wave of independencies and democratization in the post-World War Second era. It is time when Islamists and Communists found the chance to start their activities obviously in society and Kabul University became a scene for political movements against and pro-government movements.

An important improvement for democracy was the elaborate Press Law which was promulgated in 1965, in line with the constitutional undertaking to guarantee freedom of expression, but with provisions to protect the Islamic basis, the constitutional monarchy, and other principles revered in the Constitution. There were no real parties to represent the nation, but still, the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) of 1965 was the most



representative of the 12 Afghan parliaments that had sat since 1931. Babrak Karmal and Anahita Ratebzad, two prominent Afghan communists selected from Kabul to Wolesi Jerga, but most of the representatives were pro-government individuals from different social groups including nationalists (Afghan Mellat).

### **3.3.1. Democracy Decade: 1963-1973**

Unlike most Third World countries, modernism in Afghanistan is an emerging phenomenon (Roy, 1990: 235). Roy stated that modernism started later and the decade of the 1960s can be seen as a time when some new and modern trends showed themselves in Afghan politics and society as well.

The decade of 1960 is important for Afghanistan as thousands of students enrolled in Kabul University and some graduated from other countries and came back to Afghanistan. Much of these students involved in politics and social affairs, and demonstrations by students become part of normal life in Kabul. Students had different political ideas, but Islamists and leftists were the most dominant among them. 1965 is the most important year of the decade, where two movements that were active in daily issues turned to political parties. People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was established under Nur Mohammad Taraki, then divided into two parts of Khalq and Parcham. Parcham was under Babrak Karmal's command and Khalq's ruler was the founder of the party Noor Mohammad Taraki. The 1965 elections were Afghanistan's first free and democratic elections. Three Afghan communists, Babrak Karmal, Anahita Ratebzad, and Noor Ahmad Noor, entered parliament in this elections (Hekmatyar, W. date: 85).

1965 is the year when Islamists turned their movement of the Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan to a political party with the name of the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Nahzate Islami Afghanistan) under Ghulam Mohammad Niyazi, an Afghan Islamist who educated in Al-Azhar of Egypt and influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. This party also divided into two main sections after Niyazi's death, Hezb-e Islami under Hekmatyar and Jamiat-e Islami under Rabbani were formed. Most of the members of these Islamist parties were students and professors of Kabul University, graduates of Al-Azhar, and those who were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e Islami of Mawdudi in Pakistan. The last years of the 1960s and first years of the 1970s spent in crisis as the economy was not good and society was in a deep crisis as a

result of competition between Islamists, leftists, and government. According to Wahab, Islamists became stronger in 1970 and defeated leftists in student elections at Kabul University for the first time. It followed student strikes and protests against government educational policies, and the university was closed for six months in 1970 (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 125/6).

### **3.3.2. People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)**

What is PDPA, when it formed, who were important figures, and which role it played in Afghanistan's politics? These are questions in the mind of those who try to understand the reason and background of Afghanistan's instability and competition for power among different movements. According to Panjsheri, the first congress of PDPA was held at 2:00 pm on January 1, 1965, at the house of Noor Mohammad Taraki, located in Shershah Mena, Kabul. Because the parties' law had not yet been drafted by the government, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, started with the name of the Democratic People's Assembly of Afghanistan (Panjsheri, 1999: 151/2).

The general principles of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan concluded in six main points, and the most important points of them are as follow:

1. Defending territorial integrity, independence, and national sovereignty.
2. Establishing the sovereignty of the nation by creating a government of national democracy.
3. Extensive provision of democratic rights and freedoms for the people without special distinction and with more attention to the lives of peasants and workers.
4. The development of the national economy through the planned state economy and further strengthening of the state economy, land reform and nationalization of important and national resources.
5. Defending the right of the people of Pashtunistan to self-determination, not recognizing the Durand Line as a border, and resolving this issue at the request of the people of Pashtunistan and Afghanistan.
6. The pursuit of an independent and peaceful foreign policy and the support of a policy of positive neutrality and the fight against old and new colonialism, non-participation in the aggressive military, political, and economic blocs and the approval of the liberation movements of the nations (Panjsheri, 1999: 167/8).

Soviets increased their influence in Afghanistan by establishing good relations and supporting Afghanistan in many fields. Between 1965 and 1978, about 750 Afghan graduates were sent to the USSR and returned with higher degrees. About 850 had graduated from the Kabul Polytechnic, set up in 1967 as a symbol of Afghan-Soviet friendship, and staffed by some 50 Soviet instructors.

There were different sections among Afghan Communists. PDPA was established under Taraki, but then split to Khalq under Taraki and Parcham section under Karmal. Shula-e Jawid was another leftist movement, who was pro-Mao. There were some other small left-wing groups such as Setam-e Melli lead by Taher Badakhshi from Badakhshan province of northern Afghanistan, who wanted to break the domination of Pashtuns on Afghan politics, but Panjsheri refuses the presence of an organization under name of Setam-e Melli and says: The fact that some writers describe Taher Badakhshi as the leader of the National Oppression Movement (Setam-e Melli) is an obvious lie, and there has never been an organization in Afghanistan called Setam-e Melli (National Oppression). Taher Badakhshi was one of the founders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and its spokesman, and was the leader of the organization (SAZA) (Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Afghanistan) after the split (Panjsheri, 1999: 178). But Khalq and Parcham sections of PDPA were the most powerful among them. According to Rasanayagam, the political program of the PDPA was contained in documents and articles published in the party organ (Khalq), which started publishing in April 1966. The objective was to resolve problems of Afghan society through socialism, and by the constitution of a national government (Rasanayagam, 2003: 48). According to Islamists, PDPA was campaigning obviously for establishing a pro-Soviet type of socialist regime.

### **3.3.3. Islamists and Formation of the Islamist Party**

Reliance on the Islamic Ummat plays a major role in Afghanistan, but until the early twentieth century, Pan-Islamism was not a political doctrine but an ideological support when it came to foreign aggression. Until the time of Amanullah Khan Pan-Islamism, was a means of giving legitimacy to Afghan kings. Amanullah Khan followed the Pan-Islamist policy as part of the struggle with the British, then left it and started his reforms to modernize Afghanistan. Amanullah Khan gained unprecedented popularity by

declaring the independence of Afghanistan, declaring his support for the Indians against the British, and recognizing Turkey in 1921 as the holder of the caliphate on behalf of the clergy and supporters of the caliphate. The movement for the caliphate began in 1919 on the Indian subcontinent, but with the abolition of the monarchy and the caliphate by Ataturk, the movement ceased to exist (Roy, 1990: 97-100). The relationship between the defense of Islam and modernity is an unresolved issue among Muslims, the lines of which have not yet been properly identified. This problem caused stopping Amanullah Khan reforms in the country as well. As we mentioned before, the years of the 1960s were the starting point of increasing influences of both Islamists and leftists in Afghanistan. They were competing with each other and with the government in all fields, especially military and academic environments were grounds for these tensions.

Who are Afghan Islamists, what they were fighting for, when, and who established it? Some Afghan students that graduated from Al-Azhar in Egypt and were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood during their studies, together with Kabul University students established the Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan in the late 1950s. Niyazi was the leader and Hekmatyar, Rabbani, Habib-ur-Rahman, Nasratyar, Sayyaf, and Massoud were the prominent members, and this movement evolved to political party in 1965 under Niyazi. Political Islam movements in Afghanistan accelerated in the 1960s with the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jamaat-e Islami of Mawdudi in Pakistan.

According to Hekmatyar, the following eight individuals gathered in one of the rooms of the Faculty of Education of Kabul University and laid the groundwork for the Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan:

1. Abdul Rahim Niyazi who then became the leader
2. Habib-ur-Rahman
3. Saifuddin Nasratyar
4. Abdul Qader Tawana
5. Ghulam Rabbani Atish
6. Gul Mohammad
7. Sayed Abdul Rahman

8. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hekmatyar, W. date: 134). All of them except Hekmatyar, died during struggles against Dawood Khan, Communist government of Taraki and Amin, and Soviet forces.

The general view is that the Afghan movement of the Muslim Youth Organization founded in 1965 and led by Niyazi shared its ideology with both the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Pakistani Jamaat-e Islami of Mawdudi. The Split among Afghan Islamists occurred after Niyazi's death and successful coup of Dawood, while most of the Islamists leaders escaped to Pakistan as police were to arrest them. Today both Hezb-e Islami of Hekmatyar and Jamiat-e Islami of Rabbani proclaim that their party is the main body and the other separated from the movement. Roy illustrates the reasons for the split in two points. First one is different backgrounds and relating to different tribes of the leaders. The second reason is the way of thinking as Hekmatyar is a radical person. This is not the only split, Hezb-e Islami then split to Hekmatyar and Mawlawi Yunus Khalis branches in 1979 (Roy, 1990: 121-123). The Theology Faculty of Kabul university become center and a training ground for Afghan Islamists, where the dean of faculty (Niyazi) was the founder of the Afghan Islamic movement too. Afghanistan Islamists had no good relation with the ulama whose role was decreased by Dawood's modern policies during his first era as prime minister from 1953 to 1963. Why didn't the Ulama do anything special in politics? Roy answers that they have nothing to say about real politics (Roy, 1990: 80). If we look closely, we see that religious scholars in Afghanistan, except for a few cases (1929), have not influenced politics and power.

Roy describes the general situation of Afghan Islamists after the formation of the party as follows: From 1970 onwards, the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan noticed the influence of the communists in the Afghan government. In 1972, they decided to move their small nuclei into the army. Engineer Habib-ur-Rahman takes responsibility for this task and elected Massoud as his deputy, and after Habib-ur-Rehman's death, Hekmatyar takes over for some time. After Dawood's coup, the situation changed a lot, and Dawood, a nationalist, opposed the Islamists. Although Niyazi and Rabbani express their support for Davood against communists, this fails, and the majority of the movement's members, except for its founder (Niyazi), escaped abroad. After this incident, the movement was divided into Hizb and Jamiat branches. The fugitive members, who were in Peshawar, were carrying out covert activities with the support and encouragement of the Pakistani

army. Massoud in Panjshir, Habib-ur-Rahman in Laghman, Dr. Omar in Badakhshan, Nasratiyar in Herat, and Hekmatyar in Paktia. They launched a military operation in 1975, but the people did not follow them, and their operations against Dawood failed, and many of them were arrested and executed. Professor Niyazi with some other members were killed in jail (Roy, 1990: 117-119).

According to Hekmatyar, Gahiz was the first Pro-Islamic journal in Afghanistan, but stopped after killing of Minhajudin Gahiz in 1973. Minhajudin Gahiz, who runs the Islamic magazine Gahiz, was martyred in 1973 in front of his home by an unknown person who had come by a Russian jeep. Some blamed the government and some communists of the Parcham (flag) side for the killing (Hekmatyar, W. date: 125/6).

Afghanistan is in an endless disaster since 1978. The roots of this situation turn to the years of the 1960s when Islamists and leftists started influencing government and society during the last years of 'Mohammad Zahir Shah' the last king of the country, who was then overthrown by his cousin and former prime minister 'Sardar Mohammad Dawood Khan'. Dawood Khan become Afghanistan's first president in a white coup with support from leftists in 1973. Both superpowers of the cold war had good relations with the Afghan government as USSR was trying to increase their influence in the region and especially in Afghanistan through leftists who were part of Dawood Khan's government and they were very active in the military. The complexity became double when religion politicized.

Roy's view about political Islam in Afghanistan is as follows: What we call political Islam is a new phenomenon in Afghanistan, and despite the influence of Mawdudi, it is more influenced by the movement of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. All its members are graduates of public universities, not madrasas, and considers themselves as intellectuals, not scholar/ulama. The Islamist movement was founded in 1958 by Dr. Ghulam Mohammad Niyazi, head of the Kabul Theological Faculty, on his return from Egypt. The group's core is mostly Egyptian, where they have ties to the Brotherhood, and in the following years, some members of the group translated books of Mawdudi and Sayed Qutb, and confront new ideologies (communism). The movement calls itself the Islamic Movement but was not a political party at first. Their academic department is active and anti-communist youth who have been protesting against them

since the founding of the Communist Party of Afghanistan in 1965, and in 1970 they won a majority in Kabul University and clashed with university Maoists. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Massoud, Saifuddin Nasratiar, and Sayyaf are active in public universities as students and professors (Roy, 1990: 110-113).

As we discussed in the previous chapter, the Muslim Brotherhood is the first and most important Islamic organization that emerged after the abolition of the caliphate in 1928. For the first time, the Afghanistan Muslim Youth organization was founded in the late 1950s or the start of the 1960s and evolved to a political party in 1965, by students of Kabul University and their professors in Kabul. Most of the important members including Ghulam Mohammad Niyazi, Rabbani, and Sayyaf were those who studied in Egypt and were introduced and influenced by Brotherhood ideas in Egypt. Jamaat-e Islami of Mawdudi and some other Islamic groups also had their influence, but as we told the most important of them was the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Sometime Islamist parties of Afghanistan found in the 1960s are called as Brotherhood of Afghanistan, it means they are recognized as representative of Muslim Brotherhood in Afghanistan and two of them are well known for all: Jamiat-e Islami of Rabbani and Hezb-e Islami of Hekmatyar. According to Roy, Afghan Islamists took the slogan of "The Quran Is Our Constitution" from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. But what institutions are to be derived from this generality? Two concepts recur constantly among most Islamist theoreticians: that of the leader (amir) and that of the advisory council (shura), around which both the Islamic political party and the future Islamic society are structured (Roy, 1994: 42). Early Islamists were using terms of Caliph to their leaders, then it disappeared and words of Amir and Murshed become visible after the 1950s.

Afghanistan's Brotherhood was active but they escaped from Afghanistan when they failed in a coup against first president Sardar Mohammad Dawood Khan in 1974, who is known as a national and modernist politician in Afghanistan history. According to Moheq: When Afghan Nationalist President, Mohammad Dawood clashed with the Muslim Youth Organization and, after a failed coup of a branch of the movement against him, turned his back on repressing their supporters, many leaders who had escaped the regime's ties to other elements of the Brotherhood, which now has a free and respectful presence in the Holy Land (Saudi Arabia) thanks to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, has inadvertently severed ties with the original Egyptian movement (Moheq, 2014: 99). It

means that Afghan Islamists started making relations with Saudi Arabia in this time phase.

As we mentioned in the previous chapter, according to Islamists, the nature of government determines the nature of society, not the reverse one. Therefore, they distinguish between the Muslim state and the Islamist state, but a Muslim scholar does not accept such a thing. In this regard, Mawdudi states: The goal of Muslims should be to establish an Islamist state, not a national Islamic state (Roy, 1990: 124). Afghan Islamists are among those who emphasize the most on governance and take the political power and they did whatever they can to take the power in the past forty years.

After the Afghanistan invasion by Soviet Forces, Afghan Islamic parties found a chance to make relations with different Islamic organizations, some of them were fundamentalist and Jihadist as al-Qaeda and Jihadist organization of Egypt. This was the time in which Muslim Brotherhood's members released from jails in Egypt as turn in Anwar Sadat policies and USA pressures, so Afghan Islamic parties connected once again with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. As result, the second generation of Afghan Brotherhood emerged in the 1980s as Moheq claims: Some of the young people who received religious education during this period were influenced by extremist groups and later became soldiers of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and another part tended to be critical of existing jihadist parties, but not of a liberal position, but an orthodox religious one. The second generation of Afghan Brotherhoods was born during this period, this time not only symbolically looking at the Brotherhood movement in Egypt and the Arab world, but also at attracting their message and discourse more frankly and integrating it into the cultural body of Afghan society (Moheq, 2014).

Unfortunately, the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan has been one of the most failed Islamic movements in the world. They become part of problems not solver, soon after their establishment in the 1960s. Moheq, criticizes the movement as: From the beginning, the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan had no understanding of national interests and could not provide any significant doctrine in this regard. The movement's extreme theoretical poverty left no room for such important and decisive cases, and its ranks were filled with slogans and sentiments. Therefore, opposition to the ruling regime and its overthrow, instead of trying to reform it, was at the forefront of the work of the



movement, especially in the youth wing, which played the most important role in its management (Moheq, 2015: 219).

### **3.3.3.1. Waves of Islamism in Afghanistan**

The issue of Islamism in Afghanistan will be discussed in the next chapter and here we will mention just some general information on the subject. Afghanistan is a country with a population of Muslim more than %99. Its modern history started with Ahmad Shah Baba from 1747 and continued till the 20<sup>th</sup> century with governments and kings who claim themselves as protectors of the religion of Islam in most cases. The issue changed with Ghazi Amanullah Khan, who gained Afghanistan's independence and established a modern and progressive national government in 1919. Some traditional Mullahs rebelled against his reforms with the provocation of Britain and finally, he was forced to leave the power in 1929.

According to researches I did, political Islam movements in Afghanistan can be divided to four main phases: First, it started in the last years of the 1950s with establishing 'organization of Muslim Youth of Afghanistan' by Kabul university students and some of their professors under Niyazi who were affected by the ideas of Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (Hasan al-Bana and Sayed Qutb) and Mawdudi. Among them, there were Niyazi, Sayyaf, Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and others who then become leaders of the Islamists against in the struggles against Dawood Khan, Communist regime, and Afghan-Soviet battle. They stood against the state and communists from the mid-1960s to 1978, and after 1973 they even attempted an armed coup against the Dawood's government, but failed and escaped to Pakistan.

The second phase of Political Islam in Afghanistan started after getting the power by pro-soviet lefties (People's democratic party of Afghanistan) and invading Afghanistan by Soviet Union forces and starting Jihad against them. This is the time which Afghanistan was thrown to endless wars. Political and Jihadist Islam was one of the main actors during these wars. They fought against the Soviets and the Afghan communist government for more than a decade and eliminate Dr. Najibullah's government in 1992 with the backing of the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and some other countries.

The third phase is the most complicated and full of negative impacts in the mind of the Afghan nation, which started in 1992 with seizing of power by different Islamist parties and accelerating civil war among them. This was the first time in Afghanistan's history where Islamists took control of the country but there were several governments. Emerging of Taliban and getting power in 1996 transferred this phase to a little and relatively calm situation but the civil war did not stop as most of the Taliban were the remains of the old Mujahedin groups but now fighting against them. Taliban emerged to put an end to the civil war and centralize the power in Afghanistan, so they were first welcomed by most of the Afghan people.

The fourth and last phase started in 2001 after 9/11. This phase is divided into two main groups. Taliban fighting with the Afghan government is the radical group of the last phase and most of the previous Mujahedin groups who are now part of the Afghan government are the other and relatively moderate groups of the third phase of Political Islam movements in Afghanistan.

#### **3.3.4. Coup of 1973 & Establishing of Republic**

Dawood, a powerful former prime minister from the royal family, waited ten years for a suitable opportunity to remove Zahir Shah permanently after he was ousted as prime minister from power in 1963. But how Dawood took the power and abolished the royal regime in Afghanistan forever? According to Tanin, conflicts between Islamists and those who support the communist ideology started to grow across the country in the 1970s and serious unrest started in the country. Taking this opportunity, Mohammad Dawood Khan took action in 1973 and ended the 40-year rule of his cousin, Mohammad Zahir Shah, with a bloodless coup and established the first Afghan Republic (Tanin, 2005: 169). According to Wahab, Dawood staged a coup On July 17, 1973, while King Zahir Shah was visiting Europe, and proclaimed a revolutionary republic, with himself as president, prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of defense at the same time. He ruled Afghanistan for five years until his assassination by communists. It is known as the second Dawood era (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007, 128). According to Arney, Dawood promised a revolution at his first conference after the coup by saying: 'whenever a nation verges on disaster, and corruption in government institutions reaches its highest, and hope for reform is lost then a resort to revolutionary reforms must take place (Arney, 1991:

67). Dawood established a republic, but he is accused of not being a democrat politician, the last ten years of king Zahir Shah (1963 to 1973) were more democratic than his rule. According to Tanin, Dawood Khan, who knew the influence of religion well in Afghanistan society, said in his first speech that the new republic established instead of the old regime would act in line with Islamic values (Tanin, 2005: 169).

According to Rasanayagam, Karmal, leader of the Parcham section of PDPA supported Dawood, with the prevailing Soviet line, that the road to socialist revolution lay in the politics of the 'united front' (Rasanayagam, 2003: 61). Dawood left some of the important positions to the Parcham side of the Afghan Communists in his first years as a result of their coordination with Dawood in overthrowing Zahir Shah. Dawood had good relations with USSR in first years of his presidency. According to Akhgar, religious movements emerged as a political actor in Afghan politics in this period and according to these movements, it was not considered appropriate to pursue a close policy with a non-Muslim state (Akhgar, 2001).

When the leader of the Islamists, Ghulam Mohammad Niyazi, was detained for no reason in the early days of the Dawood government, other members of the movement escaped to neighboring countries, especially Pakistan, and declared that they are against the regime (Farhang, 2012: 801/2). Dawood arrested hundreds of Islamists besides their leader Mohammad Niyazi. According to Wahab, Islamists planned uprisings against Dawood with Pakistan's support in retaliation for Dawood's support to the Pashtun separatists, the Afghan president arrested Islamist leader Mohammad Niyazi and hundreds of his associates. Many of them were executed; and the rest of them escaped to Pakistan (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 131). According to Edwards, Dawood increased repression of Islamists, the Islamist leaders who had escaped earlier detention, or had been released within the chaos of Dawood's coup fled to Pakistan (Edwards, 1993: 618). According to Tanin, Islamist movement, acting in the name of religion, attempted a coup against the government in 1974. However, Dawood Khan, who was aware of the situation, caught and imprisoned coup attempters, and the survivors fled to Pakistan. Sultan Mohammad Bunyad, who participated in the coup attempt and was a member of the Islamists, explains the coup plan as follows: In 1974, Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan (MYOA) plotted a coup plan against Mohammad Dawood Khan in Kabul. However, when the plan was exposed by agents before the coup took place, some of our

brothers were caught and jailed by the government, and some of them saved themselves (Tanin, 2005: 179/80). According to Farhang, after this unsuccessful coup, there was a conflict among the Islamists and they established political Islamic parties instead of MYOA (Farhang, 2012, 803).

According to Colonel Imam, a prominent in Pakistan military, the story of Afghan struggle started as follows: When Sardar Dawood came to power in 1973 with a coup and his relations with the Soviet Union became closer. Some students staged a series of activities in response to the killing of Niyazi, but Dawood blocked their activities, and they fled to Pakistan, including Rabbani, Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, and Massoud, but Sayyaf was arrested and detained on the way. Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto has instructed Naseerullah Babar to meet with them. It was 1973 when Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan, India and Afghanistan both put pressure on Pakistan, but the arrival of these individuals to Pakistan was a good opportunity for Pakistan to take control of Afghanistan. In 1975, we launched a limited number of military training courses for anti-Dawood Afghans. Hekmatyar, Massoud, and Din Mohammad were among them. If we had not used these people against Afghanistan, Kabul would not have had to compromise with us because Dawood Khan wanted to recapture Pashtunistan. In a call to Bhutto, Dawood called on Pakistan to stop its anti-Afghan activities, and Bhutto acknowledged this, but we could not miss this opportunity and our military planned to continue using every opportunity against Kabul (Tarar, 2012: 10-17).

After a while, problems arose between Dawood and the Communists, and Dawood began to oust them from government positions and confine them. Dawood's relation with USSR became worsen after his second visit to Moscow and started close relations with the USA. According to Wahab, Dawood was unhappy about Soviet efforts to reunite the Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA and complained to the Soviets. Brezhnev on his side condemned the rightward shift in Dawood's government and demanded that Afghanistan expel the NATO and UN experts working on projects there, some of whom were stationed north of the Hindu Kush. Dawood is said to have rejected the demands in anger and walked out of the meeting. To make matters worse, the Afghan president announced plans to visit Washington, D.C., in the spring of 1978 and relations with internal Afghan communists and Soviets worsen as well (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 133). The two factions of PDPA joined in March 1977 and it is alleged that PDPA

decided to overthrow Dawood Khan in a party meeting after joining of two separate factions (Bradsher, 1983: 54). According to Vogelsang, Dawood had initially supported the communists, who had operated out of Kabul University, he soon initiated a crackdown on his former communist allies after getting power in 1973 (Vogelsang, 2002: 301).

### **3.3.5. 1978 Bloody Coup**

It is generally agreed that PDPA had an anti-Dawood coup plan for late 1978, but the murder of Mir Akbar Khyber, a well-known Afghan communist leader caused them to change their decision and overthrow Dawood before coming to their term for assassination. The coup began on the morning of April 27 and ended successfully on April 28 with the assassination of Dawood and his family in the presidential palace. Vogelsang states the murder of Khyber as a reason for the communist coup against Dawood: Afghan Communists under Taraki and Karmal decided to overthrow Dawood after the assassination of their elder member Mir Akbar Khyber in 1978 (Vogelsang, 2002: 307). There is no evidence to prove Soviets support to Afghan communists in seizing power through a coup, but there is a general belief in Afghans about Soviets support to Afghan communists as Dawood had refused their request to decrease the level of relations with West during his state visit in 1977 with Brezhnev.

When the communist regime settled in the country, it started to a series of reforms which were opposite to Afghan culture and religious values. These reforms were imposed by force in many cases and responded uprisings from different parts of society. According to Bradsher, as soon as Taraki came to power, he introduced new reforms and the society reacted because reforms were against religion (Bradsher, 1983: 77). According to Farhang, the most important reforms in the social field were: Men and women are equal in all areas, the prohibition of girls' marriage under 16, the restriction of the bride price and making education in the village and city compulsory for all women regardless of their age (Farhang, 2012: 866).

Regime started brutally killings of the opposition and was not killing only those who were opposing it, they got target everyone who had relations with former regimes of Dawood or Zahir Shah or has any link with Islamists, who started armed opposition as well against the communist regime. Islamists who were waiting for this chance to find a religious reason to start the battle against the government caught a brilliant chance and

announced Jihad against settled regime because it was communist and in fight with basic Islamic values. This was not the first time when Islamists were taking weapon against government in Afghanistan, they tried to overthrow Sardar Mohammad Dawood Khan too by uprisings which were not successful. A few months after the establishment of the communist regime, there were uprisings against the regime, the main reason for which was the introduction of forced reforms by the communist regime. According to Roy the repression of various groups, especially Islamists, Ulama, tribal elders, supporters of the former regime, and even the Maoists and communists by the communist regime, began in the first year and increased in the second year. Tens of thousands of people will be executed and disappeared (Roy, 1990: 146).

The first actual crisis which the communist government faced is the Herat uprisings in 1979. This event was a response to communist's brutality against their opponents and even civil people. Roy is stating the uprising of Herat and other uprisings after that as follows: Before the uprising began, dozens of fighters of Jamiat-e Islami entered Afghanistan from Iran and contacted some members of the Jamiat, including Ismail Khan, who were inside the military. The uprising begins on (Hout 24) 15 March 1979 in the corners of the city of Herat, and members of the Communist Party, were massacred along with Russian advisers. The next night, the entire city fell to the rebels, who took control of the city for a week. The government sent troops backed by helicopters from Kandahar, suppressing the insurgency, killing thousands of people (5000 to 25000). The survivors fled to the mountains and their surroundings. There were some more uprisings against the communist regime before the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviets. Uprisings in Badakhshan and Panjsher were organized risings took place in spring of 1979 and rebellions took control of some part of cities for a while. Roy is stating it as follows: In the spring of 1979, organized uprisings took place in Badakhshan and Panjshir. The Badakhshan Uprising, was started by one of Rabbani's former students. Uprising in Panjshir carried out by Massoud (Roy, 1990: 167-170).

What was other countries reaction to the communist coup of 1978 in Afghanistan? Soon after the communist coup, Afghanistan became ground of international repercussions. Soviet Union recognized and supported the new regime, but the USA and other western countries were in doubt what to do. Pakistan started militarizing Afghan Islamists to fight against the Afghan leftist government. According

to Ewans, in January 1979, Zia allowed 5,000 rebels under Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami to cross into Afghanistan's Kunar Province and attack the local garrison, but they were defeated by government forces under Abdul Rauf. Soviet helicopter gunships were needed to suppress rebellions in April in Gardez and Jalalabad by Pakistani-supported rebels (Ewans, 2002: 195) After getting power, competition between two sections started once again. Taraki was known as supreme leader, but Amin and Karmal were thinking differently in most of the issues. Sending Karmal and other leading Parchamis to other countries as ambassadors was a politic exile to the Parchami section and Amin was able to control most of the issues. Taraki and Amin both had a visit to Moscow in December 1978. They signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. It seemed a routine renewal of the 1921 treaty signed by king Amanullah Khan after independence, but it had a different provision related to calling for the Soviet military if needed. This provision was put by Amin himself which caused his death and overthrowing from power a year later. Signing this treaty was a warning to both USA & Pakistan that the Soviets will intervene if needed and Pakistan should stop assisting Afghan Islamist insurgents. Pakistan did not care and sent thousands of trained Afghan fighters to Kunar province. Taraki and Amin, leaders of the Khalq section had problems among themselves as well. According to Anwar, tensions accelerated after August 1979. On 15 September Amin announced to the Central Committee that Taraki had proposed his resignation on grounds of ill health. Moscow had a disturbed relation with Amin and murder of pro-Soviet Taraki was the last straw. The precise circumstances of Taraki's death on 8 or 9 October whether he was hanged in prison or suffocated with a pillow at the ARG palace have not been elucidated (Anwar, 1988: 165-81). Amin could not build good relations with Soviets as it was during Taraki's era in the past one year. According to Farhang, Hafizullah Amin stopped the implementation of the old reforms and tried not to get too close to the USSR, unlike Nur Mohammad Taraki (Farhagn, 2012: 919). According to Roy, in the dawn of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, three-quarters of the country revolted (Roy, 1990: 155). During Amin's three-month rule, Afghanistan was in a state of turmoil until he was assassinated by Soviet forces and Babrak Karmal came to power in December 1979.

### 3.4. INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN BY USSR

Two-thirds of the country joined the opposition, and Amin's government was near to collapse, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, the attack had two consequences: one was that the areas and groups that had not yet joined the opposition had joined the opposition, and the Peshawar parties that had been in the early stages of the formation (except Hizb and Jamiat) grew further. It was the situation of the country before the Soviets invasion. After the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets did not face any resistance in the first two months of winter, but after the winter, girls and boys in Kabul demonstrated that they were brutally repressed and nationalist officers in the army who were not Islamists, left the army and joined opposition or left the country, because they consider Babrak Karmal as Soviet Puppet. In February 1980, the Soviets attacked Kunar, Badakhshan, Takhar, and Ghazni to destroy the core of the resistance. Kandahar, the country's second most important city, also revolted (Roy, 1990: 188-190).

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the West changed its view of the Peshawar-based parties and decided to provide financial and military assistance to them in Washington, Riyadh, and Cairo, through the Pakistani government, which is careful to not deliver advanced and large-scale weapons. The United States and Saudi Arabia wanted a coalition of parties based in Peshawar, but Pakistan opposed it (Roy, 1990: 193). The reason for Pakistan's opposition is that they wanted to have control separately on each party and do not want to see a powerful unity of parties who can refuse Pakistan's decisions about Afghanistan struggle.

Why Soviets got the decision to invade Afghanistan? It is a debated issue and has many objectives. It has no relation to border disputes as Fitzhardinge is saying: The borders between Russia and Afghanistan were largely demarcated through negotiations between Russia, Britain, and Afghanistan in 1873 and 1887 (Fitzharding, 1998). The most known answer is to rescue the communist regime in Kabul and to protect them against Islamists, who were protecting by the USA and Pakistan and fighting against the communist government. According to Maley, the Soviets decided to invade Afghanistan during a meeting of Politburo on December 12, 1979, in which Communist Party General Secretary Brezhnev, KGB Chairman Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Gromyko



participated and decision about Afghanistan was made (Maley, 2002: 33). Afghanistan was invaded two weeks later after this meeting and Amin was killed.

How other countries reacted to the Afghanistan invasion by USSR? Every country acted of course according to their national interests. Most of the western countries and their allies along with most of the Islamic countries condemned the invasion, but Eastern bloc countries and those who were against the USA or Pakistan supported USSR or preferred to be neutral. The United Nations opposed the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, but since the Soviet Union had the right to veto the Security Council, no decision has been taken against the occupation. Realizing that a good trap had been set for the Soviets, the United States assessed the warming of the oven of war against them. Shortly afterward, Western allies, including Arab states, turned their attention to the issue, and a flood of financial aid flowed to Pakistan. Some of this aid went to the Afghan Mujahedin, and some of it was spent on ideological and religious teachings in a fundamentalist style.

World become shocked by hearing news of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. According to Ewans, News of the Soviet invasion stunned the world and appalled most of its leaders. U.S. President Jimmy Carter called the attack an extremely serious threat to peace” and “a violation of the United Nations Charter”. He called Brezhnev’s explanations in their private communications as “completely inadequate and completely misleading. (Ewans, 2002: 207). The Carter administration responded severely and started backing Afghan Islamists and those who started fighting against Soviets, but Brzezinski in 1998 confirmed that the USA’s support to Afghan Mujahedin parties who were against communists started 6 months before the Afghanistan invasion. This may be one of the factors which caused the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets as well. The USA boycotted Olympics of 1980 was held in Moscow as a reaction to Afghanistan’s invasion by USSR. But Colonel Imam a well-known supporter of Afghan Mujahedin in Pakistan’s army is refusing the USA’s support before and at the first months of the invasion and describes the situations as follows: When the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan, we shared our concerns with the United States, but they said that we have nothing to do with the Soviet Union because those who lost to the Vietnamese could not have imagined that they could not do anything against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. But we decided to confront the Soviets by backing the Afghan Mujahedin. When the

United States saw the progress of the Mujahedin against the communist government and the Soviets, they offered supporting Afghan Mujahedin via Pakistan. Among those whom we educated during the war are Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden too at our camps (Tarar, 2012: 18-23). According to Rasanayagam, from 1981 to 1985 annual US military aid to the mujahedin carried through Pakistan's ISI grew from \$30 million to \$280 million, making it the biggest single CIA covert operation anywhere in the world (Rasanayagam, 2003: 105). President Reagan signed a National Security Council directive in April 1984 calling for efforts to drive out the Soviet forces from Afghanistan by all means available. In the autumn of 1984, the US Congress started voting huge increases in funds for the covert CIA operations in support of the Afghan resistance. President Reagan raised the stakes for the Soviets still higher by authorizing the delivery of Stinger surface to air missiles to the mujahedin, thus making the Soviet forces dangerously vulnerable in the air for the first time since the war began. All pretenses that the United States was not directly involved in the Afghan war were thus dissipated at a stroke (Rasanayagam, 2003: 116).

Pakistan especially its intelligence and army were the most important players during the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviets and after that too. Pakistan, because of competition with India and its interests, and not for religious reasons, hosted almost all Afghan Islamist groups. It made very close relations with these groups, and Pakistan's role in this was vital because Pakistan was transferring all aids of Western and Arabic countries to these groups. According to Roy, Pakistan's strategy until 1983 was concentrated in 3 main points: 1. Supervise the supply of weapons and ammunition for the Mujahedin and keep it at a level that does not endanger the strong reaction of the Soviet Union 2. Prevent the emergence of an Afghan government in exile and foment divisions among jihadist groups 3. Assign political initiative to the Pakistani government (Roy, 1990: 318). Colonel Imam is describing Pakistan's support to the Afghan Mujahedin and their target as follows: One night, General Zia-ul-Haq invited some of the high-ranking officers to dinner and said that the United States appreciates the activities of the Afghan Mujahedin and calls them true defenders of Islam. We all laughed when we heard this. The 1980s were a time when Pakistan hosted many Islamic groups, including Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden (Tarar, 2012: 34/5). He adds: As we thought, a pro-Pakistan government would be formed under the leadership of Jamiat and

Hezb in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan will be like Pakistan's fifth state. But that did not happen, and we had to support the Taliban to secure Pakistan's interests (Tarar, 2012: 43/4). Commenting on who taught and trained the Afghan Mujahedin in Pakistan, Colonel Iman says: Some of the ISI officers I saw at night drinking wine and preaching religious teachings to the Mujahedin in the morning. When I asked them how could you be so hypocritical? They said that we are Mullah only in the time of training and teaching, and that's it (Tarar, 2012: 51). It was not Pakistan's first aid to Afghan Islamists, they were backing Afghan Islamist insurgents since their failed coup of 1975 against Dawood. According to Yusuf, Pakistan's intervention on Afghanistan's affairs increased after the Soviet invasion, as director-general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, advised the president Zia that there would be a convergence of religious, political and strategic gains if Pakistan were to assume the role of an Islamic champion against communist aggression (Yusuf and Adkin, 1992: 25/6).

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and their stalemate as a result of the Afghan resistance and the involvement of the United States and Pakistan, the situation became more complicated. The Soviet Union, which had lost hope of victory militarily, set out to negotiate, but the Mujahedin were not acting as the main opponent of the Soviet Union and the Karmal government, Pakistan served as the group's all-powerful representative, as it did not want lasting peace in Afghanistan. The talks started by the United Nations in 1981 failed and had no consequence till 1986.

Saudi Arabia was another country that played important role in the jihad in Afghanistan because a large part of the Mujahedin was funded by the money of this country, but this country similar to others was pursuing its goals and trying to reach out to the groups that tend to Wahhabism and in opposition to cultural Afghan Hanafi school and Sufism.

Iran has declared its support for the Afghan Mujahedin, but only with the help of Shiite groups that follow Khomeini and some of the Persian speaking Sunnis. According to Roy Iran helped only those groups that fall into the following three categories: 1. Be Shiite 2. They have accepted Khomeini's leadership and 3. In the end, only those who joined the Revolutionary Guards of Iran (Roy, 1990: 322/3).

### 3.4.1. Mujahedin Fighting Against Soviets

Who fought against the Soviets? Afghans generally stood against Soviet invasion of the country as a nation but parties that had already established offices in Pakistan especially Hezb of Hekmatyar and Jamiat of Rabbani were more active as they had lots of material possibilities, support from Pakistan, Arabic countries, and the west and were well-known among Afghans too. The parties and groups who took part against Soviets are discussed in follow:

Hezb-e Islami is an important Islamist party under the leadership of Hekmatyar. It was first composed of different ethnicities and individuals, but later it becomes weak as a result of Hekmatyar's oppressive policies. According to Roy Hezb, has not several networks as Jamiat and is composed of only Islamists. The structure of the party has been at odds with the structure of Afghan society since its inception, and is a real party in the modern sense that has targeted power by dominating other Islamist parties. The party's aggressive policy had two consequences: one is the unification of rivals such as Sayed Mansour Naderi who joined Massoud, and the other is the disobedience of some members and their separation from the party. The separation of the Mawlawi Yunus Khales and Amin Weqad and the establishment of separate parties by them is an example of the second case. Some of Hezb's local commanders joined other parties, especially Jamiat and it lost its international status too when coming to the year 1985 (Roy, 1990: 210-213).

According to Magnus, the failed Islamist coup is a major focal point in the development of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami. In 1975, the Islamists attempted to overthrow Dawood's regime with spontaneous acts of violence across the country, hoping to ignite a revolution. While other leader Rabbani spent the summer in Saudi Arabia, Hekmatyar and the younger, more radical members commenced a series of simultaneous uprisings, all failing. Following training by the Pakistani military, in Peshawar, the Islamists crossed the border and initiated uprisings across the country. In 1977, Dawood called a Laya Jirga, in which the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was banned from attending (Magnus, 2002: 118-9).

Jamiat-e-Islami, which was formed after the assassination of Mohammad Niyazi and the dispute between Rabbani and Hekmatyar, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, an Al-Azhar graduate from Egypt and a professor at Kabul Theological Faculty, is one of

Afghanistan's most prominent Islamist parties. According to Roy, Jamiat's growth during struggle with Soviets is related to two factors: One is the existence of networks and the second is having figures such as Massoud, Zabihullah, and Ismail Khan as commanders (Roy, 1990: 206). Jamiat is a party that was active in the North-east and West of Afghanistan. Most of its members are from Tajik ethnicity along with some Pashtuns and Uzbeks.

There was a group/party split from Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami in 1978. The leader of this party was Mawlawi Yunus Khalis influenced by the views of Deobandi madrasas from eastern Afghanistan. Sayyaf, who is a well-known Islamist educated in Saudi Arabia and Egypt founded a party by name of (Etihad-e Islami) the Islamic Union, but, it did not have a large base and influence as Hizb and Jamiat. There was a party founded by Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi, and most of the members were Afghan Ulama/Mullahs, not Islamists.

The Gailani and Mujadedi's parties were not very active and are the smallest Islamist parties in Afghanistan. At the time of the jihad, they had a few active offices and communication with some of the tribal leaders and their followers. The last two of these groups are related to Sufi movements and are not fundamental/strict Islamists as others. Sebghatullah Mujadedi of the Naqshbandi, and Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani of the Qadiriya sect. Both had good ties with former king Zahir Shah and were not part of anti-government violence before the Communist coup of 1978.

Several groups, such as Nasr, Shura, and other Shia groups have generally supported Khomeini were active in central Afghanistan during the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviets. According to Roy, Soviet forces prefer not to attack the Hazarajat area, and internal clashes between Shiite groups based in the Hazarajat area negate the need for such an attack. The Harakat-e Islami Party, led by Shaikh Asef Mohseni, is the only Shiite party that was fighting the Soviets. The party's relations with the Iranian ayatollahs were good, but its relations with Khomeini were tense. The Afghan Shiite Resistance Movement is not considered in any part of Afghanistan, except Hazarajat (Roy, 1990: 230-232). In mid- 1979 the leaders of the Hazara resistance formed an alliance called the Council of Harmony (Shura-ye-Ittefaq) led by the sayeds who, unlike the khans whose influence was limited to their local fiefs, developed a network of followers throughout

the Hazarajat. The Shiite parties formed an alliance called the Hezb-e-Wahdat after Soviets withdrawal. Abdul Ali Mazari of the Hazara nationalist Nasr Party won control of the alliance after defeating Akbari's Sepah. Another important Shiite party, the Harakat-e-Islami, which was formed by a Sayed religious scholar, the Ayatollah Asef Mohseni, did not participate in the alliance, but eventually lost its Hazara members to the Wahdat (Rasanayagam, 2003: 31/2). They established their autonomy and this situation continued till 1998/9 when the Taliban took control of the region.

The beginnings of an active Iranian role in Afghan affairs after the end of the Iraqi war in 1989 was a new source of worry for US policymakers. As we have seen, Iran had applied pressure on the feuding Shiite Hazara parties to form the Wahdat alliance to which it was now assisting. At the same time, Tehran encouraged the Wahdat to seek a rapprochement with Kabul, and signaled to Moscow and the United Nations its support of a political settlement (Rasanayagam, 2003: 138). Sunni and Shiite Afghans both took part in the battle against the Soviets and they made contacts among them during the war but according to Roy, these relations were non-religious and based on political moves as Nasr's organization unites with Hekmatyar against the Shura, and the Shura unites with Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami against Nasr (Roy, 1990: 233).

The war in Afghanistan made the Jihad term an international tactic against the Soviets. According to Sahin, those who fought against the socialist regime were ideologically filled with the flame of holy war and trained in guerrilla tactics. These warriors were seen as holy warriors not only of the Islamic world but also of the Western world (Sahin, 2008: 46/7).

One of the questions about the Afghan-Soviet war is the number of Afghan fighters, who fought against the Soviets? Roy answers this question by dividing the fighters into three groups: the first group, which in 1983 numbered about 150,000, about the size of the Soviet occupying troops in Afghanistan. These are permanent and organized fighters who are constantly fighting against the Soviets. The second group are those who are called part-time fighters and do not fight other than in times of danger, and in addition to the war, they also carry out their agricultural work and belong to the Jihadist party committees. The third group includes all Afghans who have weapons and live in free zones (Roy, 1990: 266).

What tactics and methods of war did the Afghan Mujahedin use against the Soviets? Roy answers this question as follows: They avoid regular wars and prefer to sit in ambush, harass checkpoints, and engage in political terrorism. Unexpected attacks are carried out by one or two groups, and the others remain in a state of support. After 1984, the Mujahedin began digging trenches on the ground and using anti-aircraft shelters. The groups of some commanders, such as Abdul Haq and Massoud, were more efficient (Roy, 1990: 280-282). The Mujahedin used various light and heavy weapons in the war, but the most famous of which has become a standard weapon for Afghans is the Russian AK.47 Kalashnikov, which was present along with a large number of Afghans even non-Mujahedin during the war. Interestingly, an important and large part of the weapons used by the Mujahedin is made by the Soviet Union itself, many of which were imported from abroad, and other quantities were looted by the Mujahedin. The other two weapons most commonly used alongside the Kalashnikov are the 12/7 caliber known as Dashaka and RPG missiles. According to Roy Mujahedin, after 1985, acquired various advanced weapons, and the first American anti-helicopter stinger fell to the Mujahedin in 1986 (Roy, 1990: 285).

What was the role of the Afghan communist government during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? One of the first duties of Soviets after the Afghanistan invasion was to reunite and restructure the PDPA as Vogelsang mentioned it (Vogelsang, 2002: 310) Babrak Karmal brought to the presidency by the Soviets. Karmal tried a lot to gain people's trust. According to Rasanayagam, Karmal, declared a general amnesty, promising exiles that they would be given back their houses, lands, and properties if they came back to Afghanistan (Rasanayagam, 2003: 94). According to Wahab, Karmal declared an amnesty and promised to release prisoners held at Pul-e Charkhi. Refugees were invited to return and reclaim their property. A new provisional constitution was already prepared, he reported, giving pride of place to Islam via a Department of Islamic Affairs (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 157). But his efforts failed, the war intensified and more people were displaced. One of the most active organs against Mujahedin which is known as responsible for the massacre of thousands of people during the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was the Afghan Communist Military Intelligence Office, which was established in 1980 and was headed by Dr. Najibullah until 1985. Afghan intelligence service was a wide organization but not independent totally, and

some even argue that it was direct reporting its activities to KGB. Afghan communist government and its intelligence were trying to weaken Mujahedin by contacting tribal leaders and having them in government side. According to Maley, Faiz Mohammad, minister for tribal affairs was murdered during a meeting with the Zadran tribe in 1980 (Maley, 2002: 97). He was trying to weaken Mujahedin by putting distance between people and Mujahedin.

As Afghan resistance with support from many countries was increasing, the Soviet system was facing more strain in many respects. First of all, the Soviet economy was in a slowdown mode for years and this had effects on politics and military as well. Soviet relations with the West, especially the USA become much worse than they predict as a result of the Afghanistan invasion. USSR was losing in the third world and Islamic countries which were pro-Soviet before the 1980s, like Egypt, who made good relations with the West under the USA. The Soviet Union after the 1980s lost some of its tremendous masterminds and elite as Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikhail Suslov, and Andropov which caused in not being in a good state of turmoil. Uprisings in eastern Europe communist countries were another point causing the weakening of the USSR. Outcomes of war between Soviets and Afghan Mujahedin was a surprise of the late twentieth century for all world, causing the collapse of Soviets at the end together with other factors. War was speeding day by day. Soviets became shocked when they see Afghan resistance in future years and they increased their fighting helicopters, tanks, and soldiers in future years. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed by both sides, mostly by Soviets and more than six million Afghans left the country to live as refugees in other countries. According to Ewans, in March 1985, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) reported “serious and widespread” abuses. Soviet troops had deliberately bombed villages, massacred civilians, and executed captured fighters. The commission reported that the government had jailed 50,000 political opponents. A later report claimed that torture had become routine and that mines disguised as toys had been laid down around the country (Ewans, 2002: 227). 1984 was the year of increasing Mujahedin resistance and increasing in Soviet brutality as well. Afghan Mujahedin received Millions of Dollars from the USA, Saudi Arabia, and other countries through Pakistan intelligence service and they were donated by modern and improved weapons as well.



### 3.4.2. Doctor Najibullah and Soviet's Withdrawal

As the Afghan-Soviet struggle was causing more losses and bleeds to the Soviets, they saw no improvement with Karmal. According to the Soviets he was not a successful leader to control Afghanistan. Karmal left General Secretary of PDPA and presidency apparently on health problems, but the reality is that Gorbachev requested him to leave his position and Afghanistan and give chance to a strong and young leader (Dr. Najibullah).

Who was Najibullah before getting the presidency of Afghanistan? He was a young doctor with leftist ideas who was active in the 1970s protests against government/Islamists with the power of speech. He was a member of the Parchami section under Karmal, not the Khalqi branch which seized the main power after the coup of 1978. Taraki sent him to Tehran as an ambassador and took the responsibility of the Afghan Intelligence Service in return to Afghanistan. His opponents call him a brutal communist figure who is accused of tortures against and brutality against Mujahedin and other prisoners as a former chief of intelligence. He came to power in 1986 after Karmal and this was the first time that Soviets started discussing their withdrawal from Afghanistan safely. He tried a lot to convince armed opposition to peace talks but failed. What he did in the military field was establishing militias which were different from the formal military based on geographic and ethnic bases to avoid falling of government, but the result was falling off his regime as some of these militias joined some Islamist opposition groups as General Dostum, a well-known militia commander under Najibullah joined to Massoud and backed him seizing Kabul in 1992. The difference between armed forces and militias is that organized forces are under the hierarchically structured command and related formally to the state, the word militia related to those armed groups who serve the government, but at a distance and in such a way as preserved the autonomy on which key militia leaders tended to insist. Esmatullah Muslim, Rasul Pahlawan, and Abdul Rasheed Dostum were the well-known militia leaders of the time.

The era between 1988 and 1992 is called as the first step of the second phase of the Afghanistan struggle and start point of civil war. There were no foreign forces and war continued between Najibullah's government and Mujahedin forces for four years. Some expected quickly falling of the Najibullah government after the Soviet's

withdrawal, but it was not a realistic expectation as Najibullah had still USSR support and militarily was in better position than Mujahedin parties. Najibullah used militias from different ethnicities in support of his government for a long time.

Najibullah's main policy against armed Islamists was named as national reconciliation as he made much effort to solve problems with Mujahedin through peace talks. In one of his speeches in 1987, he said: I want to emphasize particularly that during the nine years of the fratricidal war we have not been able to resolve even one of the issues which caused the war, not one. Now it has become clear that we can not resolve these issues by military means (BBC, 17 July 1987). Gorbachev supported his national policies. But Mujahedin did not accept Najibullah's plan for peace and blamed him for selecting the peace process because of being in a weak position and his fear of collapsing his government. National reconciliation is not the only change that came with Najibullah's government. He held a Loya Jirga in 1987 which introduced a new constitution with some democratic and Islamic values as Islam became the country's formal religion for the first time after the communist's coup of 1978 and the country's official name changed to the Republic of Afghanistan from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Later he changed the name of PDPA to the Watan party and tried to show it has no links with communism and Soviets. He brought some non-party individuals to significant positions instead of his old communist colleagues. Finally, as part of the 'national reconciliation' policy, Najibullah announced a 'ceasefire' of six months from 15 January 1987, which in July he announced would be extended for a further six months. But he could not gain touchable outcomes of these policies as there were obstacles that caused the failure of Najibullah's policies. Foreign powers, especially Pakistan, the USA, and some others were opposite as they did not want peace and stability in Afghanistan. Najibullah's government faced a problem of credibility too. His background as chief on intelligence was a reason for Mujahedin not to believe in his peace process.

Before the Soviets' full withdrawal from Afghanistan peace talks were held by the UN known as the Geneva Accord among the Afghan government under Najibullah, Pakistan, USA, and USSR. This accord has four main parts: 1. The first agreement between the Afghan government and Pakistan was based on non-interference and nonintervention 2. The second was about international guarantees, signed by the USSR and the United States 3. The third was the voluntary return of refugees, signed between

Afghanistan and Pakistan 4. The final text was simply entitled agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. There are some criticisms to the Geneva Accords as Maley observe it: First, the Afghan resistance groups were neither parts of the Accords, nor involved in any serious way in the negotiation process (Maley, 2002: 142).

Invasion of Afghanistan cost too much for USSR. Thousands of soldiers had perished in a harsh land for little gain. During nine years of intervention, the Soviets confirmed about 15,000 dead and more than 37000 wounded, although most observers believed the true numbers were higher. Thousands of mujahedeen and government troops also died, but civilians were the main victims with more than a million dead. The war in Afghanistan struck a fundamental blow to the Brezhnev Doctrine. But the main damage was seen by the Afghans. Their country was devastated, about six million Afghans were displaced to other countries, and Afghanistan suffered scientific, cultural, infrastructure, economic, and other damages. According to Khalidi a result of an analysis of data collected in refugee camps relating to patterns of war-related mortality concluded that between 1978 and 1987, unnatural deaths in Afghanistan amounted to 876,825 (Khalidi, 1991: 107). Education was in one of its poorest times.

But the USA and its allies forgot Afghanistan when they reached their target which was beating of the USSR in Afghanistan. Moheq describes the situation: From the moment the defeat of the Soviet Union was confirmed and its troops were to leave Afghanistan, the collapse of the socialist camp became apparent, Afghanistan has lost its importance to the Western world, and Pakistan, who was Afghanistan's full-fledged lawyer, has had the opportunity to carry out its plans with open arms and to get closer to the dreams that its generals have been dreaming of for years. When the Mujahedin's house-to-house wars broke out in Kabul and plunged the country into a vast abyss of chaos, the United States and its allies did not express further concern about the situation and did not consider it possible to turn it into a nest for extremists. This blatant disregard for the destiny of a nation at the expense of a powerful opponent was a serious mistake for which the history of punishment was costly (Moheq, 2011: 134).

Najibullah emphasized more on his reconciliation policy after the Soviets withdrawal but Mujahedin and their supporters focused on how to take over Afghanistan

after the expected collapse of Najibullah's government. Mujahedin started establishing their government in exile. According to Maley: In 1988, an effort had been made to put together an 'Interim Government', with members being announced on 19 June (Maley, 2002: 149). ISI played a vital role in forming this exile government as Khan claims: There is no doubt that the ISI was heavily involved in orchestrating the entire process (Khan, 1991: 259). Mujahedin formed a Shura based in Pakistan which organized a new Islamic government in exile. Mujadedi was elected as president, Sayyaf as prime minister, Hekmatyar as minister of foreign affairs, and Rabbani as minister of reconstruction. Afghan government's isolation became more palpable as Soviets withdrawal was done. Most of the Western countries closed their embassies which were not open again until the end of 2001.

Najibullah's national reconciliation policy, proclaimed on 1 January 1987 had three parts: a six-month unilateral cease-fire, the formation of a government of 'national unity' and, the return of over 5 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran. Afghans all over the country especially refugees welcomed this policy of Najibullah, but Pakistan and Mujahedin parties opposed. Afghan refugees all over the world especially those who were living in worse conditions in Pakistan and Iran hoped a lot to return to the country and Arney quotes an Afghan refugee official in Peshawar as saying: You get the impression in the camps these days, that if anything happens, ninety percent of the refugees are ready to move (Arney, 1991: 195).

United Nations accelerated to its efforts of settling peace after Najibullah's policy for national reconciliation and made good moves, but it was failed too as a result of Afghan insurgents' opposition and Pakistan's interventions and plans for future of Afghanistan which was establishing a government loyal to Pakistan and anti-India in the region. There are many reasons why Pakistan has opposed to intra-Afghan peace talks between Mujahedin and Najibullah. According to Rasanayagam Zia confidently expected the Najibullah regime to fall soon after the departure of Soviet troops. He was therefore in no hurry to promote an intra-Afghan dialogue that would include Najibullah. The incompatibility of the alliance of the seven parties, which can only agree on the withdrawal of the 'infidel' forces and the unconditional surrender of the 'infidel' regime, was done by Zia (Rasanayagam, 2003: 123). Pakistan brought seven Afghan parties settled in Peshawar together in a meeting in Islamabad to form an interim government in

early 1989. There was no confidence in each other even before seizing power by Mujahedin. According to Arney, it has taken thirteen days for the Shura held in Islamabad to select the seven leaders they have already had (Arney, 1991: 234).

Najibullah forces were in defense position for months. They changed their behavior after Mujahedin and Pakistan's direct attack on the eastern city of Jalalabad and defeated them in both Jalalabad and Khost. Najibullah was now in a better position because the spirit of jihad was also draining away after Soviets withdrawal, now that Afghans were being called upon to fight Afghans. But Islamists claimed Najib and his government as non-Islamic and should continue to Jihad as well as it was against Soviets. Interparty rivalries of Khalqi side was another treat to Najibullah. In December 1989, Najibullah arrested 100 Khalqi officers who were charged with plotting to overthrow the regime. Finally, in March 1990, defense minister General Tanai attempted a coup against Najibullah. Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami was accused of organizing the coup together with Tanai, as Tanai tried to open the way of Kabul to Hekmatyar's forces to seize the power. But the coup was not successful and caused a new purge. Zeray, Gulabzoi, Panjsheri, and Asadullah Sarwari were all expelled from the party. According to Rasanayagam, The ISI and the Saudis pressured the other mujahedin parties to support the coup, reportedly paying their commanders as much as \$15,000 each. The coup failed, and Tanai fled to Pakistan (Rasanayagam, 2003: 139).

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, competition between Mujahedin groups, especially Hezb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami, escalated to seize power, and they began to disperse. The attack on the city of Jalalabad and its massive defeat is a clear example of these efforts, which led to further mistrust among the Mujahedin, and Najibullah defended the city and did not allow the city to fall. This defeat brought the Mujahedin very low due to the lack of victory. According to Bradsher, the decision of attack on Jalalabad was not made between Mujahedin, it was taken in Islamabad on 5 March at a meeting of Pakistani officials attended by United States Ambassador Robert B. Oakley (Bradsher, 1983: 346).

After Soviet withdrawal, a new improvement was establishing unity between Shia groups under the name of Wahdat-e Islami party which was announced on 16 June 1990 in Tehran. It did not reflect total unity among Shia. A significant bloc of the Harakat-

e Islami of Asef Mohseni opted not to join (Maley, 2002: 178). According to Rasanayagam, the nationalist Hazara 'Mazari' from Nasr party became the leader of the alliance after defeating his rival Akbari (Rasanayagam, 2003: 31/2).

On 21 May 1991, following extensive discussions between Afghan actors and Benon Sevan, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar issued a new statement on Afghanistan (Cuéllar, 1991). This was a plan to put an end to the civil war and establish a broad government including all sides. President Najib welcomed this plan, but significant Mujahedin leaders refused it. According to BBC, Sayyaf demanded that 'Najibullah step down, power be delegated to a regime acceptable to the mujahedin, Zaher Shah remain in exile and elections be held within a year after the formation of the transitional government' (BBC, 3 March 1992). Massoud also opposed the plan. Massoud, in an interview with a French journalist, remarked that 'UN efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan are appreciable, but as long as Najib is in power or has a share of power, in one form or another, UN efforts will not succeed' (AFGHANews, 15 July 1991). The United States, which provided significant assistance to the Mujahidin during the Soviet era, was reluctant to cooperate with the group after leaving the Soviet Union, and President Bush's new administration was busy with other issues. In August 1991, Najibullah reiterated that he would not resign to allow an interim government to be established before elections, a consistent demand of the Americans' (Christopher, 1991).

### **3.5. ISLAMISTS IN POWER**

#### **3.5.1. Mujahedin and Civil War**

Mazare Sharif an important city in the north fall into insurgents on 18 March 1992 as a result of joining Dostum, Momen, and Naderi to the opposition, who were part of government till 1992. Najib in March announced that he will quit from his position on the first day of forming the interim government according to the resolution plan by the UN. After Najib's announcement for resigning, competition between Hekmatyar and Massoud for taking control of Kabul city increased and Parchami commanders with Tajik ethnic background like Baba Jan who was chief of Kabul garrison, foreign minister Abdul Wakil and a well-known communist Farid Mazdak joined to Massoud and open Kabul doors to him. On the other side, some Khalqi generals joined Hekmatyar. The government

finally collapsed on 15–16 April 1992. On Wednesday 15 April the airport had changed hands. Azimi, possibly in cooperation with Karmal's brother, had flown almost 1000 of Dostum's troops from Mazar-e Sharif to Kabul to seize it.

Peshawar Accord of April 1992, signed by several Mujahedin parties set structure of new government. Sebghatullah Mujadedi was elected as president for two months and Rabbani was taking this responsibility after him for four months. Hekmatyar was elected as prime minister and Massoud as minister of defense, who was opposed by Hekmatyar and caused tensions among them which lasted for years and increased the civil war. The Mujahedin captured Kabul in April, and with the capture of Kabul, civil war broke out between them, and Kabul experienced its wildest, ugliest, and darkest period in history, as each party had its independent state. The first president of the Mujahedin era was Sebghatullah Mujadedi, then Rabbani took the power and claimed himself as president of Afghanistan till late 2001 even at the time he had no capital and control of Afghan soil less than % 5. According to Tanin, Rabbani was elected as head of state by a council of Mujahedin for six months. However, the clashes became more violent when he said that he would not withdraw from the seat, taking advantage of the anarchic situation in the country when his time expired (Tanin, 2005: 401). It was planned that after six months a council of supreme popular settlement will convoke an interim government which will hold elections after 18 months, but it did not work because Rabbani held a council without participating of other parties and announce himself as president for 18 months which was boycotted by other parties, especially Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami. These improvements increased the civil war and it was the time that Hezb-e Islami, Hizb-e Wahdat of Mazari, and Junbesh party of Dostum were not part of the government and made a coalition by name of Council of Coordination against Rabbani government. Rabbani gave no position to others, even to Dostum who changed his side from Najibullah and supported Rabbani in seizing Kabul in 1992. There is no exact number of killed Afghans during the civil war in Kabul. According to some reports, more than 50000 Afghans were killed just in Kabul and thousands were tortured and raped by different sides of civil war. Some are giving killed numbers as 70000 but others say it as 30000. Some international news channels proclaimed the deaths of civilians in this war around 60000 just in Kabul city. According to a representative of the Afghan Red

Crescent Society reportedly concluded that 10,000 had been killed in 1993 alone (United Nations, 1993).

One of the consequences of these long-lasting wars is the situation of Afghan refugees. According to UNHCR, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan had risen from 400,000 in 1980 to 2.7 million in 1983, 2.878 million in 1987, 3.156 million in 1988, 3.255 million in 1989, and peaked at 3.272 million in 1990. The Afghan refugees in Iran increased too as a result of the long duration of the war. Afghan refugees in Iran were 200,000 in 1980, 1.2 million in 1983, 2.221 million in 1987, 2.7 million in 1988, 2.9 million in 1989, and 2.94 million in 1990 (UNHCR, 1997: 108).

The various Mujahedin groups, especially the Jamiat-e-Islami under the leadership of Rabbani and the Hizb under the leadership of Hekmatyar, did not reach an agreement and a civil war broke out between them. Afghanistan had more than four governments just in Kabul in the civil war of 1992-1996 and every region had its government, and the country was going through one of the most terrifying periods in history. Once war began in earnest, there were some grisly massacres during the course of combat in the city. One was the Afshar massacre of 11 February 1993, which claimed the lives of hundreds of Hazaras. Mousavi quotes an estimate of 700 dead, has stated that the forces who carried out the massacre were under the direct order of President Rabbani and his chief commander, Massoud (Mousavi, 2018: 198). But the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission reported between 200 and 300 people killed in west of Kabul (United Nations, 58). The Afshar massacre of 11 February 1993 was one of the shameful crimes of the civil war.

By taking power by the Islamists, they showed their permanent behavior. No group cooperated continuously, and each sought to destroy the other and provide religious reasons for eliminating the opponent. According to Carpenter, the Mujahedin carried out theocratic and oppressive practices especially against women in the regions they had control of (Carpenter, 1994: 76).

### **3.5.2. Taliban**

The Taliban, about whom no one had ever heard before, emerged as the mysterious new actors in the political chaos of Afghanistan in November 1994, rescuing



a commercial convoy of 30 Pakistani trucks in the way from Quetta city of Pakistan to Turkmenistan (Rasanayagam, 2003: 141).

What is the Taliban's ideology, are they similar to other Afghan Islamists and who influenced them? According to Rasanayagam, the main influence in the Taliban's ideological arrangement was Pakistan's Jamiat-e Ulama-e Islam (JUI), which has a network of madrasas (religious schools), including those where some Taliban leaders were educated in Pakistan. The JUI is ideologically linked to the Muslim theological school of Deoband in central India, which also educated generations of Afghan Ulama. This feature was characterized by its fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, its opposition to *ijtihād*, its orders against any meaningful role for women outside their homes, and its opposition to feudal and tribal structures (Rasanayagam, 2003: 143/4). Roy has similar observation and adds: From ideological prospect, the Taliban represent the militarist aspect of Ajami Salafism, which is the movement of Shah Waliullah Dehlavi and the established schools of his intellectual current, while al-Qaeda belongs to militarist aspect of Arabic Salafism, which is the Wahhabi movement. The Deoband School is separated from the Wahhabi movement for accepting Sufism (Roy, 1990: 92). Moheq's idea about the Taliban's ideology is as follows: The Taliban are not the only ones who have taken up arms and are fighting the government of Afghanistan now. Part of the force that contributes to the survival of this group in society are the groups that, by spreading Taliban ideas, have blocked the way to a broad cultural transformation that can connect us to today's world. Whether these groups are within the system or outside, maintaining their ambiguous and dual-position on many of the key concepts that affect the modernization of Afghan society, and even on militant positions on some of the fundamental categories of civilization, the new generation has become accustomed to the Taliban discourse and have reconciled with some of the Taliban ideas (Moheq, 2011: 170).

Many Afghan ulama received their theological training at Deoband (Rashid, 2010, 89). According to Rasanayagam, the effects of these madrasas reflected both in Mullah Omar's 'decrees' and in the aberrant behavior of the religious police in enforcing the strictures imposed on women, especially in the cities (Rasanayagam, 2003: 180). A clear difference between the Taliban and other Afghan Islamists (Mujahedin) is that the vast majority of the Taliban lack modern education, and almost all of them are students

of religious schools. According to Wahab, the Taliban reflected the puritanical orientation of the Afghan and Pakistani madrasas, made more extreme under Saudi Wahhabi influence in the 1980s and 1990s (Wahab and Youngerman, 2007: 217).

Some information about Deoband Madrasas and their thought was provided in the last chapter and now we will have some more details about them. According to Metcalf, the term 'Deobandi' derives from the town of Deoband in India, wherein 1867 an institute by the name of (Dar-ul-Ulum of Deoband) was established (Metcalf, 2014). But how Deobandi madrasas became active in politics. According to some, it is Pakistan's military and ISI, who are backing these kinds of groups to use them against others, specifically India and Afghanistan as a tool of pressure. Taliban, Lashkar-e Taiba, and Sepah-e Sahaba are some of the groups used by Pakistan against India and Afghanistan as well. According to Zaman, the number of madrasa students in Punjab increased nine times between 1960 and 1995 (Zaman, 1998: 322). The number of these madrasas increased more than ten times in Pashtunistan and Baluchistan as well as Southern Afghanistan too during these years.

How the Taliban emerged and took control of most of the Afghanistan territory in 1996? Answers are different and a simple answer to the above question can be given as follow: Taliban is a radical Islamic group that emerged in 1994 and rule Afghanistan from 1996 -2001, fought with Americans for 16 years in Afghanistan, and is still fighting with the Afghan government for near two decades in different parts of Afghanistan. Some claim that the Taliban are products of a complex intelligence game started by Pakistan and supported by the USA, UK, and Saudi Arabia. Some believe the Taliban as a spontaneous radical Islamic movement emerged as a result of Mujahedin disorders to strengthen a powerful government in all Afghanistan. According to Muzhda, the Taliban are part of those Afghan students who received religious education in Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan between the years of 1973 and 1994 (Muzhda, 2002: 36). The Taliban soon gained Pakistan's support, and with the support of the general public, they soon took control of much of Afghanistan. Taking control of Kandahar, other southern provinces, Herat in the west, and Jalalabad in the east make them one of the most significant elements to catch the power and overthrow all Mujahedin groups out of power. The Taliban quickly gained control of Ghazni and Maidan Wardak provinces from Hekmatyar after gaining

control of the south, west, and east of the country. Finally, they captured control of Kabul in September 1996.

One of the theories suggests looking back to the year 1993 when Benazir Bhutto took power in Pakistan and select Naseerullah Babar as her interior minister, who is known as Godfather of the Taliban as well. According to some, the Taliban came to the scene as a result of the intelligence activities of the West together with Pakistan to prevent establishing an Afghan government that will not accept their control on Afghanistan's policies. Before the Taliban, Pakistan supported different Mujahedin parties against each other but none of them could take all power, so Pakistan started controlling Afghanistan by a force that will be fully in their control. According to Sirrs, the Taliban started the movement under Mullah Mohammad Omar formerly attached to the Hezb-e Islami of Yunus Khalis. Mullah Omar's wish was to clean Afghanistan from warlords and set order (Sirrs, 2001: 08). They were successful on their target to bring peace and stability to the country as most Afghans were seeing stability and peace for the first time in years.

What was Pakistan's role in emerging of the Taliban? Colonel Imam is answering it as follows: When I was in Kandahar and Taliban group was emerging, I was urgently asked to go to Pakistan, to a meeting with the members of the Pakistani government, the ISI, and the military asked me about the Taliban. I told them not to worry, the Taliban are our people, and they will never be against Pakistan's interests, and you can see documents of each of their leaders with us. They were very pleased to hear this and their concerns were allayed. It was then that all Pakistani departments cooperated with us on the Taliban (Tarar, 2012: 77/8).

Imam's statement about the Taliban's first days and their relation with other Islamists in Afghanistan is as follows: Before the Taliban captured the city of Kandahar, Hekmatyar made harsh statements about the Taliban in the media, but Rabbani and Sayyaf expressed sympathy for the Taliban. This was a good opportunity for us and I called Rabbani on November 1, 1994, and said that the Taliban need your assistance to bring stability, but Hezb-e Islami members are preventing them in Kandahar. Rabbani said that he would contact with Mullah Naqib, who was Rabbani's top commander in Kandahar. The Taliban attacked on November 3, 1994, and the Pakistanis were at the forefront of the war with them. The Taliban captured most of the areas without much

resistance and Mullah Naqibullah gave up his base to the Taliban (Tarar, 2012: 83/4). Rasanayagam has a similar opinion about the Taliban's relations with other parties who were in a fight since 1992 as the main target was Rabbani's competition with Hekmatyar and Mazari. Hekmatyar left his base at Chahar Asyab in February 1995, which was quickly captured by Rabbani soldiers. But at the request of the Taliban, the base was handed over to them. On March 6, 1995, Massoud launched a major offensive against Mazari. Mazari turned to the Taliban after two days of heavy fighting and agreed to hand over his heavy weapons to the Taliban to take up positions along the front line west of Kabul as a buffer force. Massoud's forces opened fire when the Taliban began moving into the Shiite neighborhood. When Mazari's troops refused to surrender their weapons and joined the pro-government forces of the Wahdat's pro-Iranian splinter faction led by Ali Akbari. The defection of his forces to Akbari was not part of Mazari's calculation, but the Taliban regarded it as a betrayal. Mazari paid for his miscalculations with his life. According to the Taliban, Mazari was killed after an attempt to seize a guard's weapon on a helicopter flight to Kandahar (Rasanayagam, 2003: 148).

Rabbani and Massoud tried a lot to have negotiations with the Taliban and make a united government but the Taliban refused. According to Maley, the situations in Kabul was critical, and at 3 pm on 26 September, Massoud was forced to leave the capital. The door was open for the Taliban, and they roared through it. On 27 September 1996, Kabul awoke to a new era (Maley, 2002: 178). Taliban killed and hanged the previous president, Dr. Najibullah on their first day of government in Kabul, on 27 September 1996. This turned the hopes of the general public, who had for the Taliban to order and security, into despair, and they saw that they were heartbroken than the Mujahedin. Finally, it was the first time in Afghanistan's history that Mullahs took power directly.

The war did not stop with capturing of Kabul by the Taliban. They started following previous warlords and continue their battle against them in northern Afghanistan. This was the third phase of the civil war and forces who have fought each other except Hekmatyar, now joined and made a coalition against the Taliban, but the Taliban defeated all of them and took control of more than %90 of Afghanistan in upcoming years. Iran started supporting anti-Taliban forces especially Massoud and Taliban killed 11 Iranian spies in Mazar-e-Sharif, but Iran claimed that they were diplomats. Rashid states that Mullah Omar himself had given the go-ahead for the

murders when contacted by Dost Mohammad (Rashid, 2010). According to Rasanayagam, Iran became very active in Afghanistan, supporting the non-Pashtun parties the Jamiat, the Wahdat, Junbesh of Dostum, and the Ismailis against the Taliban who were known as Pro-Saudi Arabia (Rasanayagam, 2003: 168/9). According to an American diplomat quoted by Rashid, 'the Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis did. There will be Aramco, pipelines, an Amir, no parliament and lots of shari'a law. We can live with that (Rashid, 2010: 179). It means that the USA had no negative thought of the Taliban during their first years of governing.

One of the ambiguous issues is the role of the United States in the emergence of the Taliban. Some believe that the Taliban is the product of a joint Pakistan-US project. However, the Clinton administration did not comment on the Taliban until the issue of Osama bin Laden came up and everything changed. According to Maley, the Clinton administration argued that the Taliban deserved to rule Afghanistan because they are Pashtuns and Sunnis, and because they were opposed to Iran and had no position against the United States, they should be released (Maley, 2002: 228). According to Mousavi, it is not a surprise that the Western Bloc, especially the USA supported the Taliban, to reach the Central Asian energy resources on a global scale, to pressure the pro-Russian leaders in Central Asia, or to reduce the growing economic power of China (Mousavi, 2018: 231).

The situation changed for the USA after the suicide car bombers blew up the USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998 (Bergen, 2001: 105–26). USA blamed Bin Laden for bombings who was in Afghanistan. USA responded on 20 August, President Clinton ordered that terrorist training camps run by Bin Laden near Jalalabad be hit with 'Tomahawk' cruise missiles. The strikes killed several militants who were from different countries including Afghans, Arabs, Pakistanis, and Kashmiris, but Bin Laden escaped safely. According to Bergen, it was the time that Bin Laden turned from a marginal figure in the Muslim world into a global celebrity (Bergen, 2001: 125). On 7 July 1999, the Clinton Administration imposed a range of unilateral sanctions on the Taliban, freezing all Taliban assets in the USA and banning commercial and financial ties between the Taliban and the USA (Federal Register, 64, 29: 7 July 1999).

1999 and then were years when the Taliban had northern Afghanistan too in their control, but Massoud was still fighting in some districts against them. The killing of

Massoud was a turning point in the Afghan civil war between the Taliban and different parties. But how was he killed? According to Dugger, some Arab journalists carrying Belgian passports arrived at Khwaja Bahauddin region of Takhar province in northern Afghanistan and had an interview on 9 September 2001 with Massoud, who was known as the biggest enemy of Taliban at that time. They asked different questions, but two were different than others: ‘Why do you call Osama Bin Laden a killer?’ and ‘If you take Kabul, what will you do with him?’ But nobody spotted anything out of the ordinary, until the Afghan Ambassador to India, Masood Khalili, noticed that the cameraman had a ‘nasty smile on his face’. It was too late and a bomb hidden in the camera exploded. Khalili said that he saw ‘a dark blue, thick fire rushing towards us (Dugger, 2001). Massoud was killed but his friends ignored it for some days.

### **3.6. 9/11, AND STARTING OF NEW ERA IN AFGHANISTAN**

At 8.45 a.m. on 11 September, three airplanes were kidnapped and one of them crushed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. Two others could not reach their target, as their destination was the White House and Pentagon. USA, blamed Al-Qaeda as responsible and declared war against terrorism internationally. Who did this and what was their aim? the obvious answer is Al-Qaeda, a jihadist group who fought against Soviets in Afghanistan with the subsistence of the USA, Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, and many other countries. But there are still some complicated theories about this event. Some even indicate the USA as the main actor of the events who had a controlled move to find a reason to invade Afghanistan and announce war against Muslims under the name of war against terrorism. We are not here to judge who and why did this, the important point for us is that the USA attacked the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, because Bin Laden a Saudia Arabian was living in Afghanistan and had close contact with the Taliban as well. Before attacking Afghanistan, the USA warned the Taliban to turn in them Bin Laden or expel him from Afghanistan but they refused.

Who is Osama bin Laden and why he attacked the USA? He is a Saudia Arabian citizen and was born in a wealthy family in 1957 in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He studied in Jeddah and came to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets and made close relations with Afghan Islamists. He established al-Qaeda in 1989 and went back to his country Saudi Arabia. According to Maley, after leaving Saudi Arabia, he revisited

Afghanistan and Pakistan, before making his way to Sudan, where he settled in late 1991. In April 1994, he was deprived of Saudi citizenship; in May 1996, he left Sudan for Afghanistan to support the Taliban in their push to Kabul (Maley, 2002: 254).

How and when the Taliban regime was overthrown? According to Washington Post, the USA launched a massive attack on Taliban and Al-Qaeda bases on 7 October 2001 called 'Operation Enduring Freedom' British forces backed the USA in their targets (Ricks and Loeb, 8 October, 2001). According to Maley, on 17 October, President Bush stated that the Taliban's air force and air defenses were being demolished, and the way is open to prosecute al-Qaeda for surrendering to justice (Maley, 2002: 263).

Taliban during their escape from Afghanistan murdered a prominent jihadi Afghan leader, Abdulhaq on 26 October 2001, who was supposed to play a significant role in the post-Taliban era.

North alliance forces entered to Mazar-e Sharif in north Afghanistan On 9 November, Maimana fell on 11 November, and Herat on 12 November. On the same day, the Jamiat forces launched an attack on the frontlines north of Kabul. According to New York Times, forces loyal to Hamed Karzai, who had succeeded his father Abdul-Ahad Karzai as Popalzai tribal leader following the older Karzai's assassination in July 1999 formed one bloc threatening the city, from the north; besides, forces still loyal to Haji Abdul Latif's son Gul Agha took up positions to the east. Finally, on 9 December, exactly nine weeks after the bombing campaign had begun, Karzai entered Kandahar in an unarmed convoy (Rohde and Schmitt, 10 December, 2001). American Secretary of State Powell announced the destruction of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Afghanistan is no more heaven of terrorist activities (Schmitt, 2001).

After falling off the Taliban, it was time for Afghans to form a new government. They meet in Bonn for this purpose. The meeting was composed of four groups: The United Front know as North alliance, who fought with the Taliban, The Rome group associated with former king Zahir Shah, The Peshawar group under Gailani, and the small group of Cyprus under Humanyun Jareer. The North alliance was the biggest and the most active group during the Bonn conference. This meeting held in Bonn city of Germany from 27 November-5 December 2001, but the Taliban and Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami were not part of the meeting. They agreed to form an interim administration under Hamed

Karzai. Fahim, Qanuni, and Abdullah took the most significant positions of Defense, Interior, and Foreign ministries. All these figures were close colleagues of the late Massoud. Other ministries which were not so important were divided among other parties. Finally, Hamed Karzai took the responsibility of the new government as president on 22 December 2001 in Kabul (Associated Press, 22 December 2001). On June 2, 2002, a Loya Jirga was duly convened in Kabul, with about 1500 delegates from all Afghanistan. Women were an important part of this Jirga. Interim President Hamid Karzai was elected as president for the next two years. This Jirga accepted the presidential system with strong authority for president and a bicameral parliament. Islamic republic became the country's formal name and no law in contrast with Islam can be accepted. This is the most democratic constitution in Afghanistan's history and among neighboring countries too. The first time in Afghanistan's history, President elected through general elections which were held peacefully on October 9, 2004, and Karzai won it by %55 of the total votes in the first round. Parliamentary elections were held in September 2005. More than 5,000 candidates competed for the 249 seats in the Wolesi Jirga (elected camera of parliament) and former warlords and Islamists got most of the seats in parliament. Hamid Karzai was elected as president for the second term in 2009 elections. Presidential elections were held for the third time in Afghanistan in 2014 and the National Unity government was formed by two candidates who got most of the votes. President Ashraf Ghani was elected as president for the second time in 2020 and is ruling Afghanistan.

Those who had hopes for reestablishing democracy once again were happy of the situation and Afghans formed their new temporary, transitional, and permanent governments under Hamid Karzai till 2014. In 2002 president Bush said: "The global expansion of democracy is the ultimate force in rolling back terrorism and tyranny." (Dunn, 2005: 158/9). But democracy, human rights, and war with terrorism are elements used as a tool of superpower's foreign policy. Taliban came back to the scene and still fighting against the Afghan government. Some accuse the USA of not being serious in destroying terrorist's nests which are still active out of Afghanistan (Pakistan). The peaceful environment after the Taliban's fall in late 2001 changed in 2006 with the Taliban's attacks in southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand and then spread to the whole country. Taliban created a huge security problem for the country which accelerated more and more in upcoming years and now is in its worst of all the times. Another



problem was bombing Afghan civilians by American forces under the name of fighting with terrorists. Former president Hamid Karzai condemned it seriously and his relations with the USA broke down because of American's brutality against Afghan civilians. Taliban and al-Qaeda forces continued to enjoy the hospitality of Pakistan and started war once again against Afghanistan. Billions of dollars were donated by international society to Afghanistan mostly by USA, UK, EU, Japan, and India but most of these donations reached the pockets of certain people and it was not used well for Afghanistan's reconstruction as it should be.

Now after the two-decade war the USA, signed a peace agreement with the Taliban, which USA forces will leave Afghanistan according to the agreement, and the Taliban will have peace talks with the Afghan government.

## CONCLUSION

The philosopher Karl Popper says that history has no meaning but that we can give it a meaning (Popper, 2020: 278). The reason to remember this sentence is that we have to learn a lesson from the bloody history of our country so that we don't see such things in the future, otherwise everything we read will be of no use, and history will repeat again and again. The relationship between religion and governance is one of the most important results we can get from the history of Afghanistan. Whenever religion becomes a tool of politics, then we should not expect development and prosperity. We should learn how to act when want a basic change in society or politics. It means that spontaneously and revolutionary changes are not key to stable success as we saw it in Afghanistan.

The findings of this study examined the relationship between Islam and democracy in terms of political Islam movements within the context of the post-World War Second era in Afghanistan. The debate on Islam and democracy is very complex for many reasons. Both subjects are completely different, Islam is a religion and democracy is a political system of modern governing. Democracy is secular by nature because it does not commit to any particular faith, and it is liberal by circumstance as it respects individual freedoms that will cause the forming of a liberal society. The basic presupposition of democracy is that everybody is right in their faith, or at least it does not judge who is right and who is wrong, and there is no recognition for superiority or inferiority of any particular people and faith. The debate on Islam and democracy is a reaction to a fundamental transformation in Muslim societies and a struggle by the religious to reform their political system. Some individuals think that Islam is compatible with democracy, they refer to verses in the Qur'an and Sunnah of Prophet Mohammad and favorable views in the significant Islamic writings that can support their theories. There are several verses in the Qur'an, that can be the base of religious tolerance and even very similar to a liberal democracy. For example, verse 99 of Surah Yunus, where Allah asks the prophet if he was forcing people to become faithful and says that all people would have been faithful if God wanted. Several other verses in the Quran imply that it is a matter of choice for everybody to be a Muslim or not and nobody including the Prophet Mohammad is allowed to force anybody to become a Muslim. Illustrations of the life of the Prophet Mohammad can drive us to understand that Islam provides a rich resource for the development of societies that promote the general well, recognize the need for

consultation, and respect the human dignity of all persons and groups. These are all examples of the conformity of Islam with democracy. But many think that democracy is not compatible with Islam and they describe some verses from the Qur'an, like verse 32 of Surah Yunus which says: (That is Allah, your true Lord. There is only perversion after Allah (Right), so how is it that you are turned away (from Allah?), and many others which describe incompatibility of Islam with any other form of governing than Islam according to opposites. Writings of Sayed Qutb are also full of ideas that claim the incompatibility of Islam with democracy.

The discussions of political Islam and democracy, type of government in Islam, compatibility of Islam with democracy, and other related issues emerged in a period when Muslims lost their previous power in various fields and style of governing changed which they had in past, under name of Caliphate or emperor built by Muslims. Europeans and others successfully evolve to a new and modern form of governing which is a representative democracy in form of nation-states, but Muslims after falling off Ottoman caliphate/empire faced many problems which caused emerging of political Islam and the reason of this emergence is the disintegration of the Islamic societies that had either been colonized by the Western powers or ruled by authoritarian regimes, kings, and ethnic dynasties. Political Islam emerged as a crippled response to modernity and disabilities of Muslims in the new world order and failed to present a stable and successful model to the Muslims. The discussions about governance among Muslims before and after emerging political Islam changed fundamentally, as it was focusing on general perceptions before emerging Islamist movements and the political debates had been centered mainly on how the rulers should rule; for instance, rulers should be just, wise, and so forth and the ruled were to obey "God, the Prophet and those who represent him", but all these changed with forming Islamist movements in different areas especially the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jamiat-e Islami of Mawdudi in India. Muslim Brotherhood is the first and most significant Islamic movement established in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna with a moderate view of the politics but it sharpened in the person of Sayed Qutb. At the time of the emergence of the Islamists, the anti-imperialist rhetoric was very important and influential, that is, it had a great influence on rallying the people around itself, and the main reason for this was the imperialist occupation of the Muslim countries, especially the Egyptian at that time.

Afghanistan is like a bridge that connects different regions. Due to its geographic location, Afghanistan has always been a place of competition for great powers, and it has suffered greatly in this regard from the past to the present. Modernization and nationalization attempts in Afghanistan were not successful in the past as a result of Russian and British pressures and competitions. Lately, besides the internal factors being more intense, it has become a field where different forces play their intelligence games. Politics over religion in Afghan society has caused more conflicts and instability than any other country. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the influence of religion has increased in Afghan politics, especially with the independence of Afghanistan, the first reactions in the modernization process came by the Mullahs and conservative fundamentalists. From the second half of the twentieth century, religious groups emerged and began to be seen in Afghan politics as political actors. Besides the internal and external factors caused by superpowers, the birth of Pakistan as a Muslim country in 1947 and the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1978 are regional factors that caused an increase in Islamist activities in Afghanistan. As a result of the politicization of Islam in Afghanistan, it has started a radicalization process under Islamists.

The year 1964 is important in Afghanistan's history. This is the year of a new democratic order in the country with the most democratic constitution until that time, although the state form was still a monarchy, for the first time, members of parliament were elected through democratic elections, and progress was made towards creating a real constitutional monarchy. As these advances were taking place, many political and social actors appeared on the scene that political Islam and communists are considered the most important, and both have dealt major blows to the well-functioning democratic order. Dawood Khan's 1973 coup changed the political environment. After Dawood Khan's coup, the Islamists became even more active in politics and mobilized against Dawood Khan's modern and leftist stance. Dawood Khan needed foreign aid to modernize the country and USSR found the chance to make relations more closely with him. During this period, while Afghan-USSR relations rose to the highest level, Islamists responded with harsh policies in 1974, the Islamists attempted a coup attempt against the Dawood khana, and a year later organized armed attacks against the state in the provinces and thus, for the first time in the history of Afghanistan, there has been an armed conflict between

Islamists and the state. With the communists' 1978 bloody coup, Afghanistan entered the longest-running instabilities and wars in its modern history.

With the occupation of the USSR in Afghanistan, the influence and unifying power of religion increased. While resistance against a non-Muslim force is seen as the duty of every Muslim in terms of religion, a global call for jihad has been made. Global jihad has left deep marks on Afghan politics. The 10-year occupation and war shaken the foundation of the country in all areas, including democratic institutions of the country. Most of the patriotic Afghans, including the elite cadres of the society, left their country. The expulsion of the Soviets and the peace and reconciliation policy pursued by the Doctor Najibullah's government have been a good opportunity to re-build democracy and order in Afghanistan, and some pro-democracy international organizations, including the UN, have made efforts for peace, but the Islamists declared the overthrow of Najibullah's government via armed struggle as their only target. They finally, took control of Kabul and Afghanistan with Pakistan's backing in 1992. Their civil war has been intensified by both the different interpretations of religion and the struggle of ethnic elements for supremacy, but selfishness among Islamists was in front of all factors. The prestige of Islamic movements and even religion in Afghan politics was damaged due to the civil war that started with the hegemony of the Islamists. Afghanistan has suffered in various fields in this period, on the one hand, Afghanistan's material and spiritual assets were plundered, tens of thousands of innocent people were killed due to the civil war between the Islamists, and while this mixed period continued, a group of new and more fundamentalist Islamists broke up in the name of the Taliban in 1994 and were able to banish the old Islamists and control Kabul and then the whole country in 1996. Because the Taliban Movement is strictly Sunni, it has been supported by states such as Saudi Arabia, which is strictly Sunni due to regional and global rivalries, to pressure states such as Iran. Besides, this movement was supported by Pakistan to keep Afghanistan under control and to reduce the influence of India, which is causing trouble to the USA and especially to Pakistan in reaching the energies of Central Asia. Afghanistan has entered one of the darkest periods in history, when Islamists took control of the country. In the end, after staying in power for 5 years, the Taliban were removed from the administration by the United States, and new hopes for democracy and peace emerged and some positive steps were taken. These steps are as follows: the most democratic constitution in the

region was drafted. For the first time in the history of Afghanistan, the president was directly elected by popular vote, and the parliament was reopened democratically after about thirty years. But this peaceful and democratic environment changed dramatically at the end of 2006 when the Taliban reemerged as an armed group and got stronger day by day. Finally, the USA and Taliban signed a peace agreement in the spring of 2020, and according to this agreement, the USA will leave Afghanistan in the next months and the Afghan government and the Taliban will start inter-Afghan peace talks in near future.

All societies also have an element of religion in politics, and in some places, they have maintained their relations with each other in a compromising way, and in others, it caused controversy and tensions. It means that there is no society where one of these elements is ignored completely even in most fundamentalist secular countries. So the solution is to make a convergence among them not to cause a situation like in Afghanistan. The relation of state and religion can be rational and advantageous to the Afghan society via some democratic parameters. In a country like Afghanistan, it is very difficult to keep religion away from politics, but can prevent the misuse of religion as a tool in politics and promote democratic institutions.

Why Afghanistan faced all these problems in the past forty years and still have problems from the prospect of religion and government's relation? There are many elements and some of them are related to religion and its role in politics, which will be discussed in the following:

As our topic is about political Islam, so a general view of the roots of Afghanistan disaster which belong to Islamists are as follows: Most Afghans are Hanafi Sunni Muslims, which attaches the greatest importance to logic and wisdom, so they are opposite to fundamentalist ideas naturally. But how were Afghan people influenced by fundamentalist and Political Islamic movements? It had two main parts not just for Afghan Islamists, these two movements influenced most of the Islamic countries as well. One is Deobandi Madrasa, which was originally built by Hanafi Muslims to fight against the British in India, and the second is the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, both were discussed in the previous chapter. Both had their influences on Afghan people as well. Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e Islami of Mawdudi influenced the formation of the Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan in the 1960s. Deobandi movement was a

response to modern education and lifestyle which was started by the British in India. Overtime Deobandi Madrasas spread to Pakistan and some parts of Afghanistan, and they were radicals and against any modern moves, which later caused the emergence of the Taliban movement. Deobandi education is the ideological base for the Taliban movement, which are the most radical Islamists among Afghans.

One of the reasons is related to political Islam and the use of religion in politics: Radical movements are under the problem of insecurity in Afghanistan today. Radicalization has reached this position by going through the politicization period of religion. When we look at the reasons for politicization of the religion, the intervention and occupation of foreign powers come to the fore due to the strategic location of the country. There has been a relationship between political Islam and democracy from the very beginning, and in our analysis, Afghanistan was unable to establish a proper connection between Islam and democracy as a result of continuous external interventions, import ideologies including political Islam, who all tried to be imposed on the society. Democracy can be applied in Afghanistan as it is possible in every other Islamic country, but these interventions and orientalist logic prevents the creation of harmony between the state and society so there was not the right environment for democracy to grow and settle. As a result of this inappropriate situation a vicious circle was founded, it means the state could not be democratic because of foreign interventions and imported ideologies including political Islam on the one hand, and on the other hand, because of the lack of democracy, the people could not choose the administration they wanted. The new constitution of Afghanistan drafted in 2004 is a tremendous example of a system where Islam and democracy conform very well and as a result, the religious and the liberals could work together for the future of their country. The constitution forbids any law that is against Islam and in the meantime it recognizes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and equality of men and women.

One of the main reasons for Afghanistan's instability and failure to enter the democratic order is that those who are in power have undergone rapid and fundamentally reforms before the society is ready, which has always garnered reaction and thus led to the establishment of a negative and undemocratic order. It is very important for the permanence of democracy and for the building of order to create the necessary grounds with cultural and social activities, but rapid democratization steps are full of risks and

harmful as we can see it in Amanullah Khan's case. Modernization process should be convenient with the social structure. To be democratized you should prepare the social order. This can be applied to the Islamists too as we saw in two different examples of Turkey and Egypt, where both Islamists or those who are pro-Islamic ideas at least got the power democratically but had different results: the Turkish model has shown that political Islam can be applied as a long-term strategy, which can exist alongside democracy, but Islamists in Egypt, especially president Morsi had a different approach and acted spontaneously to seize all the power and did not wait for a suitable chance in the long-term future. The example of Alnahda in Tunisia under Ghanushi is also a different case than most Islamists who failed in politics even after getting the power democratically, but Ghanushi accepted and promoted democratic values and could even attract non-Islamist to the party. The greatest evidence of Sayed Qutb's radicalism is that he rejects the western and non-Islamic systems fundamentally and uses the concept of ignorance for those who live in these systems, including most Muslims, but Hasan al-Banna does not have such a radical statement and even accept parliamentary democracy which was Egypt's formal governing system in that time, if it is not in obvious conflict with Islam.

One of Afghanistan's biggest problems is that there are no standard centers for learning religious sciences, so many go to Pakistan to learn about religion, where they study very radically and against Afghanistan's interests and become tools for extremist groups. The number of religious schools for Afghan youth increased dramatically during Afghanistan invasion by Soviets, publications with fundamentalist content by various Mujahedin parties, as well as institutions that came to their aid, were widely circulated and published free of charge, ideological books and treatises were also widely printed and distributed, the experiences of Arab and Pakistani fundamentalist groups were also systematically transferred to the part of the Afghan youth. The Pakistani intelligence service played an important role in this game and prepared the situation for emerging radicals who then fought in the Afghanistan civil war, more than with the Soviets.

A source in the Afghan conflict is the difference in understandings of religion. As Maley claims that the Islam of the intelligentsia is different from the Islam of the village prayer-leader or mullah (Maley, 2002: 10). As we mentioned in the previous chapter Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabi movements are different at their origins and



have little in common. But they had coordination in supporting Afghan Islamists against Soviet forces with coordination of Pakistani army and ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). According to Roy, Wahhabi, and Ahle-Hadith activities in Afghanistan, where Sufism and Hanafism are well rooted, led to religious conflicts among the population (Roy, 1994: 119). Nowadays Ahle Hadith and Wahhabi movement become stronger in Afghanistan especially in the east of the country in some regions in the border with Pakistan who are initially Hanafi Muslims are now under influence of Wahhabi and Ahle hadith thoughts.

One of the problems of religiosity in Afghanistan, especially among Afghan Islamists, is that they care a lot about appearance and subdivisions. Moheq classifies religiosity according to moral values to two main types. One is to believe in the superiority of religion over morality, which means that our actions are not inherently good and ugly, and are only considered good or ugly when we have a reason from Sharia for it. But in the second approach, morality takes precedence over religion, and religion derives its legitimacy from its morality, and its validity stems from the fact that its message is moral, and we accept it because its guidelines are based on morality, and this is a subtle and important point. Because of the different interpretations from Sharia, the first approach has its problems. For example, suicide attacks in Afghanistan are good but bad in Pakistan (according to many Pakistani mullahs) or, armed jihad is necessary to eradicate denial in Afghanistan and is forbidden in Egypt (according to many Egyptian Islamists). Or silence against vulgar series in Afghanistan is forbidden and permissible in Syria, United Arab Emirates, and other Islamic countries (Moheq, 2011: 50/1) Moheq emphasizes, that the most important message that the Qur'an has for its reader is morality. Of course, the examples are given in the Qur'anic language and discourse maybe the color of certain historical conditions or the minds and languages of the audience of that period may be more consistent, but the moral generalities of the Qur'an are compatible with the universal standards of morality, which is a common thread between religions and major cultures are assembled and adaptable (Moheq, 2011: 52). Mawdudi's idea about moral is: 'Islamic ethics is part of ethics, not all of it' (Mawdudi, 1982).

One of the issues in Afghanistan is the ideology of Jihadism as it is in some Islamic countries too. When we mention the word Jihadism, we do not mean the word of Jihad in Islam, we mean the ideology which emerged after the 1960s. Writings of Sayed Qutb and some other radicals can be count as a source of this ideology as well. According

to Moheq, today the word Jihadism has some characteristics which are as follows: 1. Jihad is the meaning of armed struggle 2. In this sense, it is considered as the most important pillar of Islam and possibly in the post-monotheistic degree 3. It considers any other effort, such as scientific activities, social services, political efforts, cultural reforms, etc., to be insignificant in the current situation, along with the armed struggle 4. It considers this method to be the only way to save Muslims from countless problems 5. In this regard, it does not consider legitimate defense to be sufficient and considers the aggressive war to be an important part of jihad 6. In this battle, if necessary, there is no obstacle to killing civilians (Moheq, 2014: 41/2).

Now we will examine the ideology of Jihadism in Afghanistan. Afghan people's Jihad against Soviet occupiers in its first years had no relation with the ideology of Jihadism which was discussed above. After passing some time thousands of young fighters with Jihadist ideology mostly influenced by Sayed Qutb came to Pakistan from different Arabic and other countries to fight against Soviet forces beside Afghan Mujahedin parties. These fighters and some of their leaders like, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abdullah Azzam spread their fundamentalist ideologies among anti-Soviet Afghan fighters. This was the time when an informal base for both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban was established in Pakistan. The military and intelligence of Pakistan had the most important role in the formation of these movements, as they were teaching and coordinating them against the Afghan leftist government and then used these Islamic groups against each other.

Takfir, is another problem caused by Islamists and in Afghanistan. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, Takfir was first used by the Kharijites (Khawarej) against some of the Companions, and even the fourth caliph of Islam, Ali, was killed through this method. Muslim scholars at various stages of history have struggled with this tactic and tried to eradicate it, the most important of which is Abu Hanifa, who says: We can not call any Muslim as an infidel who is praying towards qibla. At various points in history, this tactic was used against political opponents. According to Moheq, the first time a new wave of Takfir started with the writings of Mawdudi (The four terms in the Qur'an) and then Sayed Qutb (The signs of Path) in the 1970s (Moheq, 2014: 34/5).

There was no matter of Takfir in Afghanistan till the 1960s, where the majority of the population is Hanafi, founder of which was very opposed to Takfir. So when and why this problem emerged in Afghan society? There are different views on the subject as some claim, this tool was used first time in Afghanistan's history against Amanullah Khan, who started a wave of modernization after declaring Afghanistan's independence. Afghanistan's society was religious and conservative so they did not welcome these modernization movements by Amanullah Khan, even some of them started a battle with him as a result of some provocations and he left the country. Moheq claims that Takfir has two stages in Afghanistan, first, it was used against leftist parties in the 1960s (Moheq, 2014: 34/5). This wave of Takfir emerged against leftists and communists when Islamists and leftists started their efforts to gain power in the 1960s, as Islamists were those who were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and especially Sayed Qutb's views on Islamic subjects.

Takfir become public and normal when leftist Afghans got to power through a bloody coup against Dawood Khan. One of the reasons for the increasing Takfir and hate of people to the government was that the left-wing parties in power suppressed their opponents very strongly in brutal methods and the general public forced to join the jihadist parties. This was the time which most Islamists counted all those as non-Muslims which should be killed who were working with the Afghan government of the time. There was an increase in this issue as the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, even people who were not on the same side with Islamists and working with government or living in cities were counted as communists who should be killed and thousands of civil Afghans were killed as a result. The situation was worsening, when Arabic and Pakistani religious books with political aims were distributed among Afghans in Pakistan. The first wave of Takfir continued after Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan against Dr. Najibullah's government by Islamists. This wave did not stop even when Islamists got the power in 1992, different Islamists and warlords used the term during the civil war against each other as well. According to Moheq, the second wave of Takfir began when NATO forces launched attacks on the Taliban and their government collapsed (Moheq, 2014: 40). This time, Takfir was used against all those who supported the USA and NATO against the Taliban regime by both al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Some people who used this tool against left-wing parties in the 1980s like Rabbani and Sayyaf were now targeted by the Taliban

through this weapon. Their fault was eliminating an Islamic government (Taliban) in cooperation with non-Muslims.

Different solutions are suggested to get rid of this situation. Moheq emphasizes on rational solutions, providing a pleasant interpretation of religion, and criticize its extreme and insane statements (Moheq, 2011: 03). Afghanistan is a religious society and every effort for the stability of the country should contain the element of religion on it as the last 40 years is the best explorer of the situation. When we tell about the religious element, it does not mean to provide fundamentalists or do something resemble the past failed experiences that had no positive consequences for Afghanistan during the last forty years of different regimes, especially the era in which Islamists were in power. The element of wisdom and modern logic should not be ignored as Moheq points it out: any society that has been able to use the element of religion with developed rationality has brought peace, affection, and positive emotions to the lives of its people, and any society that has lacked such an element has caused great confusion and scope for it has become. The most important conscious action that some societies have taken in the field of their religious tradition and culture has been to correct it. Religion can not have an existence and presence outside and independent of the interpretations and perceptions that religious people have of it and express it in their speech and behavior. Reforming religion means reforming religious thought and, in general, reforming the cultural mechanisms that result from individual and social behaviors (Moheq, 2011: 139). Most Muslim and non-Muslim authors indicate extremism and fundamentalism as a reason for putting Afghanistan to all these struggles, but they are not something that comes into being overnight. So familiarity with theology and historical background of fundamentalism in Islam is one of the most important ways to understand the role of Islamists in Afghanistan's long period struggle.

After its emergence in the 7<sup>th</sup> century, Islam saved millions from slavery, idolatry, and other misery. But why are Muslims, especially Afghans, now in such a misfortune situation that they have not been able to find a logical solution for 40 years? This question has not been resolved, and I hope that this thesis will help us to do things that are good for the future of religion, the country, and humanity by using the history and experiences of the last forty years.

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