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BRANCH OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

LIBYAN SPRING OR FALL:
FOUR DECADES OF TYRANNY AND UNITY
FOUR YEARS OF FRAGMENTATION

MASTER'S THESIS

PREPARED BY
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

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to my country, Libya, which lives difficult times of its history, and to my Libyan brothers and sisters. I also would like to dedicate it to my late father and mother who planted the seed of patriotism in me. I would also thank and dedicate this research to the esteemed Staff Members of Karabük University, especially my respectful mentor and supervisor Prof. İsmail Şahin. To Military Attaché at the Libyan Embassy in Ankara, and to the Libyan Defense Ministry I aspect of sincere gratitude and thanks alonge with my dedication. Last but not least, I thank all my friends and brothers here in Ankara who supported me especially my good friend Yousef Alsatum.

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Abbreviations

NTC: National Transitional Council
GNC: General Congress Council
HoR: House of Representatives
SC: Supreme Court
GNA: Government of National Accord
RCC: Revolutionary Command Council
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USA: United States of America
UK: United Kingdom
ASU: Arab Socialist Union
GPC: General People's Congress
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSLC: People's Social Leadership Committees
NFSL: National Front for the Salvation of Libya
NCLO: National Conference for the Libyan Opposition
LLHR: Libyan League or Human Rights
LCU: Libyan Constitutional Union
LIFG: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LNA: Libyan National Army
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN: United Nations
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LPA: Libyan Political Agreement
PC: Presidential Council
UAE: United Arab Emirates
KSA: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
BP: British Petroleum
PFG: Petroleum Facilities Guards
LCB: Libyan Central Bank

1. Research's Problem Statement

The sorry aspects of Libya's transition with the current failure in creating a stable political body of the had changed Libya to unstable country after 2011 featured with chaos. It is not a change that is happening at the level of state institutions only, and it is hard to see its fruits in the short term. This process of more positive change is unfolding, rather, at the level of individual and small-group attitudes and behaviors, and it is mostly visible through civil society organizations and initiatives. Despite the fighting and division affecting Libya, the country possesses a surprisingly vibrant civil society that has been largely overlooked.

This research may also provides an assessment of the potential role and importance of Libyan civil society today. It first identifies some key requirements of a democratic polity. For some political thinkers then highlights three deficits Libya faces in its possible democratic transition: the failure of its politics, the lack of state institutions, and a narrow communalism. But in every uprising, civil movement or revolution ,through the history,there were deficits but there were also profits, yet in the Libyan case the profits is very invisible compared to the deficits that are clearly present in the daily news from Libya. When highlight what happened after Gaddafi's era in parallel with the era of his rule we hope to reach results at the end, such results can decide wither the Libyan Uprising was a failure or triumph.

2. Research Scope

I presented slight study upon Gaddafi's political system in 42 years of governance that was characterized with tyranny and oppression for the Libyans. Then, the major aspects of the Uprising in 2011, besides the events that occurred that led eventually for the Libyan people and armed opposition in Libya to overthrown Gaddafi. Yet, our main concern in the research still in the five years that followed the revolution, when the Libyan political society has been dealing with the process of democratic transition. The difficult transition period that Libya has been going through revealed many important factors affected the slowness of this process, many of them considered to external and regional. Nonetheless, the transition in the country also depended on the decision-making from the major politicians that hold power in Libya till now.

3. Research Objective

The research try to shed light on the Libyan experience of the Arab Uprising, and whether it was fruitful for Libyan citizens or not. For 42 years, Gaddafi has been ruling, and at February 2011 people all around Libya, inspired by events in Egypt, decided to rebel against their leader. But actually by 2015 two parliaments and two governments were holding power, and neither of which was exercising any significant control over people and territory; two coalitions of armed groups confronting one another and conducting multiple overlapping localized conflicts; thriving organized crime, kidnappings, torture, targeted killings, and suicide bombings; and an increasing number of armed groups claiming affiliation to ISIS (also known as Da'esh): These are powerful reasons to portray Libya as the epitome of the failure of the Arab Spring, as some claim. The country slide into a civil war in 2014 the reason of which was to take over the politics of the country, until the mediation of the international community . By all measures and standards, the Libyan democratic transition appears to have been derailed. Libya has been for almost four years after liberation under the custody of its National political elite of the country. Thus, the research objective is to highlight all of the previous events and their fallouts to conclude the ultimate defects of the Libyan transition.

4. Research Questions

- What is the Libyan Uprising?
- What affected or contributed to the Libyan civil community to revolt?
- What differentiate the Libyan Revolution from its other Arab counterparts?
- Did the uprising in Libya improved the civic situation or made it worse?
- What are the political changes and did they were better than before?
- Were the political changes in the favor of the whole population or in the favor of the elite only?
- What is the role of the National Transitional Council in all of the goings on in Libya?
- What are the bases of the economy of Libya?
- How was the economy before the revolution and did the victory of revolution improved the economy?

- Did the uprising affected the whole economy in the country entirely, partially or neither of which?
- If the economy changed after Qaddafi's era, how then did it change?
- In what terms did the economy situation affected Libya?
- How was the reputation of Libya internationally under Qaddafi?
- How did the Arab and international situation contributed to the spark of therevolution?
- What is the international respond to the Libyan Uprising?
- How is the international position of Libya after its victory over Qaddafi?
- Did Libya's position as a state and a country in the world changed after the Qaddafi?
- How did the world look at Libya now and did the international and the regional players affect what is going on Libya or are they parts of what happens in Libya?
- Is the LibyanUprising a successful example of the Arab Spring after the political, economic and international study of Libya in this research?

5. Importance of Research

This research may contribute in understanding the current politics in Libya after the revolution that reached to intractable situation these days. The leading fact-finding to the complicated situation in the Libyan Uprising case contributes in showing the results of Arab Spring on Libya as a special case and on other Arab revolted countries – not necessarily all the cases – that experienced the factors, effects and results from 2011 till now.

6. Significance of Research

Many political researchers and thinkers are trying to look at the Arab Uprising as a sudden and unexpected movements, but by the study of the aspects that holds a state; politics, economy and other international and regional matters related to that state's success in transition after its uprising and what causes the profits and damages, its advantages and its disadvantages, and in this case Libya, we try to cumulative reasons behind an uprising success or failure. In studying

the cause and effects of the Libyan case we detected many social and political aspects affected directly for the Libyan Uprising to be successful.

7. Research Limitations:

7.1 Methodology

Concerning answering the research questions, discussing the whole matter related to the history of the country in its four decades under Qaddafi or at least studying the three concepts that we will focus on (Libya's policy, economy and international factors related to the matter) would be the best to start our argument with, which will go progressively toward the revolution and its four years of ruling elite on the crown. The larger argument would appear to be the Libyan state and its current components under the rule of one National Council, two governments, ISIS and many other more Islamic groups and military troops.

The mixed-method analysis would be appear more appropriate to the fact that our study will include a lot of historical events and statistics that will help us ,on one hand, comparing Libya before the revolution to the time being, and those rely on the qualitative method of study. And ,on the other hand, the quantitative method will help the major part of our study which are current statistics, opinions, agencies and more reliable sources and observers of the current goings on in Libya after the uprising.

Actually, the sources that I gathered so far and what news agencies, international organizations and local organizations, and agencies declarations and publications can provide a good material to the hypotheses that we offer in this study. Those are also reliable sources to provide evidence that Libya after the revolution is different from Libya before wither it is a better example of democracy and freedom in its political ,economic and international aspects ,or wither it is just a temporary situation needs time and patience ,or wither it is a total failure and bad example as a social movement.

7.2 Literature Review

Without a doubt, Libya today is a fractured country without any central government. Instead, it has had two quarreling governments — one in Tripoli recognized by no other state, and another in the city of Tobruk ,which enjoyed useless international recognition, this situation followed by creating a Government of Accord in Tripoli surrounded by support of the international group.

This Accord Government is still facing similar challenges in the still-presence of Tobruk's Government which hinder the new government, not to mention trying to arrange the mess that the two former governments caused in their terms, such as terrorism, of dispute. At the same time, different terror groups are making retreat in Libya. The most dangerous of them is the *Islamic State* (IS), which has so far has expanded into three cities: Derna in the east, Sirte in the middle and Subratha in the west.

So many Libyans share such beliefs nowadays, as they compare their country and indeed their lives today to how they were under Gadhafi's rule, and usually they find themselves confronting the fact that they fought Gaddafi for in vain results.

Compared to a year ago, life for ordinary Libyans in the capital might have improved a little, but it is still far from normal — and normal here is in comparison to what it used to be under Gadhafi. People still lack security and struggle to make ends meet, with skyrocketing prices and little subsidized basic food available. Basic medical services are almost nonexistent, forcing people to seek treatment in neighboring Tunisia. Those with financial means seeking to go to Europe for whatever reason find it even harder, since all Western embassies have long since closed; to apply for a visa, any Libyan citizen must travel to Tunisia.

Oil production, the main source of government revenue, is down by three quarters, and the country now pumps less than half a million barrels a day, denying the treasury much-needed cash to pay the thousands of civil servants on its payroll. Government salaries are at least three months behind payment schedule. All major infrastructure projects that were in progress when the unrest started four years ago have been on hold since all major foreign companies left, leaving behind rusting building cranes dotting the Tripoli skyline. Thousands of Libyans are still displaced inside the country, with an estimated 1 million citizens forced to seek security abroad — particularly in Egypt and Tunisia.

Can we deny the fact that Libya has liberated from more 40 years of tyranny? Of course not, but looking closer to what we mentioned before we can conclude that our study will focus first on the political situation being split apart not working as a one unit or one body as before under Gaddafi. Such a fact promises the country with more splitting in the future in case if the people are not gathering under one government.

Second, the economy of Libya is one of the strongest economies in the region, how can for a country such as Libya can delay the salaries or produce less than its half production of oil this year after 4 years of Liberation?. The assumption of “the situation in the country being unsafe for the prosperity of its economy” will bring us to study the economic atmosphere besides the political one. If the political free well for a country cannot maintain a good basis for a strong economy, then there are political deficits either in the elite or in the process of leading the country after its liberation itself.

Third, as we mentioned before, the international recognition, for example, for one government and support it and turn on the other, such a simple example prove that country is more affected by international well and its players in the world. This instability in the decision making can affect the more stable countries in the world, then how is Libya?.So, during the lack of security in Libya, population will tend of course for more safer zones or seeing themselves forced to leave the country temporarily toward neighboring countries that they are economically troubled themselves, like Tunisia and Egypt, or to Europe where refugees are not welcome all the time. Then, the problem will not be in its borders within the country but also it may affect other states and countries in the region or outside it.

Libyan Spring or Fall

Four Decades of Tyranny and Unity

Four years of Splitting

Abstract

Many questions raised by modern researchers upon the Arab Spring cases in terms of their success, benefits for their populations, and what may have been achieved for the future for their nations. The Libyan case was more interesting in the Arab-African part than Tunisia and Egypt, in the sense that the Libyan Revolution has succeeded in the swift national gatherings and the regional and international support to its cause.

The facts that I try to present are made on basics deal with Libyan society itself and its ability to customize the country to transition, along with many perspectives of common Libyans ,like myself, and their feelings about the status quo in their country that the politicians have sophisticating its transition to witness dangerous path without prominent successful results. Therefore, Libya was the first country from the Arab Spring Countries that is facing a challenge between cutting the thin line of the uprising success, and enhancing that bond. I usually think of this bond that gathered us as nationalists, Islamists, and liberalists all together for overthrowing Gaddafi, as if it is the same true reason for the Libyan community to turn on itself when our political elite nowadays separated between their chaotic political agenda.

The ambitious dream of creating a democratic, just, and true state was confronted with many obstacles far beyond the apprehension of ordinary Libyans that many of them went out to the streets to achieve the democratic dream. Yet, the facing of today's reality for Libyans became normal with the politicians shaped the society's orientations into parties disputing upon power.

To support the facts as they are in the Libyan Uprising case, I presented a history of the country under Gaddafi's rule with all its failures and flaws, and at the other bank I showed what could the uprising until 2015 brought upon Libya.

Introduction

Libya began an upheaval against a long term of governance was admittedly tyrannous manage for the people, yet in the sentiments of many had picked up a frail nation from within by reproducing it from zero up in essential perspectives; legislative issues, economy, armed force and even its worldwide place between alternate nations. No establishment matters more to a state's survival than its military, and no upheaval inside a state can prevail without the support or ,if nothing else, the passive consent of its military. It is not necessarily the case that the armed forces support is adequate to make an effective unrest; surely, upheavals require such a large number of political, social, monetary and worldwide acknowledgment strengths to arrange perfectly, and at simply the correct minute, that upsets infrequently succeed.

The Middle Easterner Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 set off a wide arrangement of social developments and administration change over the Center East and North Africa. While interconnected, uprisings in every country took distinctive structures and achieved fluctuated impacts. This paper concentrates on the improvement of contention in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi and the consequences for the state and its development before (a very slight audit) and after the defiance to what are identified with its rudiments to end up distinctly a state; governmental issues, economy, worldwide environment.

As the first flames of the 2011 “Arab Spring” swept from Tunisia through North Africa and the Middle East, authoritarian regimes thought invulnerable to protest and impossible to oust began to cede to massive protest. Attacks on governmental institutions and elite leaders ensconced from public opinion developed divergently in each nation, employing tailored strategies to mobilize the public and reap key support. This paper focuses on the nature and development of this Arab Spring uprisings in Libya, centering on the former regime history and civil war concerns in this nation. I seek to identify the factors that influenced the 2011 conflict in Libya to evolve from uprising into recognition as a civil war, and how in turn the Civil War of 2012 and the Second one of 2014 affected the political process in the country .We cannot forget today that also the regional actors in the Libyan matter have the upper hand for the situation to reach to this extent in Libya.

The contention in Libya changed into what was internationally perceived as common war because of the nearness of mutually fundamental and adequate factors. Unforgiving crackdowns, absence of common society, and estrangement of protestors by the Gaddafi administration exacerbated the grievances felt by revolt drives and covered up ethnic, religious, and tribal pressures. Militarization of coalition revolt powers and limitation of the battle to characterized regions made the open door for characterized revolt and follower troops. At long last, worldwide mediation and preparing, local dismissal of Gaddafi's administration, positive media scope, and acknowledgment of the National Transitional Council as true blue together pushed the contention in Libya into common war.

The known Libyan Uprising of 2011 was expected by many to unleash potential growth and prosper politically and economically speaking. Between 2011 and 2012, the country was complicated on the state level in issues of rebuilding the state institutions, economy, infrastructure, and responding to the new requests and demands of people, especially when it comes to the process of democratization. The conflict that accompanied the revolution had a severe impact on the economy, which is heavily dependent on hydrocarbons, but the contraction was expected to be temporary, until the political disputes between the politicians who runs the country have occurred, in addition to the War of 2014 along with the unrest conflicts in the country in confrontations with ISIS and al Qaeda's hidden barracks. The restoration of oil production faces difficulties, especially the political ones, unless the situation can be settled in the next years, the production would face dangerously damage effects on the economy, respectively, the non-hydrocarbon output growth cannot witness true results until the political disputes and the armed conflicts switch off. Libya's wealth opens a choice of paths for the future: it can fall into the trap of many resource rich countries that have become overly reliant on revenues from finite natural resources and failed to diversify their economies, or it can pursue a course of sustainable, inclusive development led by increased private-sector activity.

The National Transitional Council (NTC) has taken steps to promote a peaceful political transition, to normalize economic conditions, and to set out a national reform agenda. In the short term, the authorities must restore security, bring hydrocarbon production fully online, exercise

fiscal discipline, resuscitate the banking system, and maintain macroeconomic stability. But Libya also faces the formidable challenges of responding to the underlying causes of the revolution and building a democratic regime in the midst of heightened regional risks and global uncertainties. Therefore, medium-term efforts should focus on capacity building, infrastructure renewal, private-sector development, improving education, job creation, and putting in place an effective social safety net, within a framework of transparent and accountable governance.

At the request of the Libyan authorities, international financial institutions are engaged in policy consultations and technical assistance, aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and developing an institutional infrastructure to promote economic diversification and employment growth.

Internationally speaking, Libya is not vital to the US strategic interest -- the country is primarily within the European strategic orbit. But Libya is an important energy exporter and the NATO intervention in the Civil War resulted with important regional and international ramifications, especially for the US. Once commenting on the Libyan crisis, White House report noted, stability in Libya is essential to —limit the spread of violence and instability in a region pivotal to our security interests, particularly while it is undergoing sensitive transition, as well as —to prevent an imminent humanitarian catastrophe. The things that had been expected to occur and may hinder the transition from fulfilling was mostly from fears related to jihadists and al Qaeda to appear in the country while the process of transition still fragile.

As for the political issues, so many events has been shading the revolted country and its future, over 6.4 million Libyans are living out a historic transition: emerging from 42 years of harsh authoritarianism towards a democratic state wherein the people are the source of authority. There is urgent need for the international community to understand the country's immediate governance issues in order to effectively support the people of Libya.

Since the uprising began February 17, 2011 ongoing fighting between forces loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and opposition forces connected with the National Transitional Council (NTC) has created a chaotic governance context. NTC leadership is focused first and

foremost on resolving the military conflict, then on holding the opposition actors together and guiding the nation towards a transition that has been indefinitely delayed; civil society is striving for a system that ensures trust and prevents a backslide towards old patterns.

The widely held notion that appointing “honest people” will address the corruption rampant under Gaddafi and bring about profound change falls short of an effective strategy for improving governance. And still the country and its events has speeded up its ongoing when other factors took place in the political transition to lead eventually for the international sponsors to enforce for Government of Accord. The factors that has been present on the ground in Libya until now, honestly, is not encouraging; ISIS and the new political players inside the region, Tobruk and Hafter's natural supporter vs GNC's supporters, and outside of it like the NATO's strikes against ISIS, Thus, people and politicians questioning themselves, if it was a revolution against Gaddafi, why would its results seem to be unsuccessful? Did it change the things to their better forms or did it worsen them? Did it achieve what the people seek or led to a mass intervention in their affairs and lost its chair between countries of the region?. All those are questions for what we hope to find answers for in this paper.

Chapter 1

Libyan Uprising

Definition, Cause and Events

1. Historical Key-facts

For quite a bit of their history, most Libyans were only onlookers as undertakings unfurled at the national level. A progression of nearby and outside rulers formed an exceptionally tyrant framework that was held together through mind boggling instruments of support and cronyism. Even through the history after the independence, the Monarchy and the Gaddafi period, the spending and misusing of state assets served to keep a painstakingly made system of administration supporters¹ set up and common nationals voiceless –all to secure administration survival. For a considerable length of time, it was ‘problematic to even consider Libya’s people truly as citizens’.²

Libya's characteristic riches allowed the rise of such a framework. From the time that noteworthy oil stores were found in 1959, the Sanusi Monarchy and Mu'ammarr al-Gaddafi both utilized the incomes from oil (and later additionally gas) to rehearse exclusionary and now and again outlandish arrangements, and to support the systems of followers that kept them in power.³ In addition, incomes from regular assets permitted the administrations to give sponsorships and to back the bloated open part that kept standard Libyans utilized and 'noiseless'. Gaddafi's Jamahiriya totally depended in its prolonged existence on the state's capital inflows.⁴

To comprehend the difficulties and chances of the current political culture in Libya, a careful comprehension of its authentic roots is fundamental. Libya's current political history clarifies how the unstable relationship between the middle and the fringe was molded; how

¹Mekrief, Mohammed Yusuf, “الغذافي البليونير الفقير”, Oxford, Libyan Studies Center, 2010, p. 12.

²Vandewalle, D. “*A Modern History of Libya*”. London: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 p. 1.

³Makrief, op. cit, p.14.

⁴Vandewalle, D. “*Libya Since Independence: Oil and statebuilding*”. London: Cornell University Press, 1998, p. xiii.

Libyans came to depend on individual associations instead of on formal positions; and why outer impact on the nation is to a great extent, however not generally, rejected.

Former of the transformation against Gaddafi, Libya's up to date political history might comprehensively a chance to be broken down under two parts. Those unintentional state alludes all the of the period from claiming Italian provincial occupation, and the Sanusi Monarchy, in which the United Kingdom about Libya might have been made out of the three provinces: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica Furthermore Fezzan. This might have been accompanied by what will be maybe best depicted Likewise a period from claiming in-stroke statelessness, whose onset might be dated from the 1969 military Revolution or Coup, and the start of the administration of Mu'ammār al-Gaddafi, which consolidated uncommon political experimentation with instead more ordinary severe and restrict to claiming civil argument. This chapter will finish by examining the circumstances which led to the overthrow of Gaddafi's regime and the inception of the Libyans.

2. The Italian Era :The Pursuit of State Formation

The very nature of territoriality goes back onto the last century, when Libya –Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and one more Fezzan –shared minimal basic history alternately physical contact. To centuries, 'Libya's history might have been a story about locales.' The Ottoman Rule (1551–1911) brought some of the modern state aspects that the Empire maintain at the time, it additionally permitted neighborhood power structures on demonstration semi-autonomously. A large portion illustrative of this approach might have been those rise of the Sanusiyya movement, an pentecostalislamic development that secured a amount about religious lodges and made a simple structure of governance over Cyrenaica eventually; gathering taxes, giving social administrations on tribes, furthermore administering peace in the region. Besides confronting the Italian colonialism¹, Sunusiyya maintained some of the economic and political organization while preserving the Islamic and tribalism in the region.

In the mid twentieth century, when European pioneer powers developed their ranges of prominence in North Africa, Libya was focused by the colonial arrangements of Italy. In 1911, the three regions were attacked by Rome, which consented to a mystery arrangement with the Ottomans. Local Libyans were totally sidelined by the Italian colonizers, in a merciless time of

¹Pargeter A, "Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi," New Haven: Yale University Press, June 26th 2012 ., p. 19.

national history that remaining parts a profoundly imbued piece of aggregate memory. For Libyans, the main experience with the components of a cutting edge state was that of a dictator and oppressive organization that could be utilized, apparently unchecked, to enslave and regularly seize them¹.

The approach of independence for Libya became close when Italy lost the country in World War II for the British in 1940s. But federalism imposed latched itself on the scene when Sayyid Idriss, the Grandson of Sanusi had already declared the Eastern region to be free and autonomous for the Sanusies to rule, while the Tripolitarians were for the unity as whole influenced by the Pan-Arabism that was likely fashionable between the Arab Countries' youth.² Hence, after struggling with international community issues and desires, Libya won the undiminished state with the forming federal Monarchy in 1951 with Idriss al-Sanusi as a King of the United Kingdom of Libya.

Not to blame who rises the motto that Libyans were with ' a low level of national consciousness or national identity'³, because this is a truth Libya suffers from till present days, but the independence and unity story of Libya was different from other Arab countries, in the sense that external Great Power was involved. Therefore, to exert power over the country, King Idriss tried the best to gather around himself a mixture between tribal and commercial figures divided in origin between Tripoli and Barqah (Cyrenaica),⁴ While the King's royal office ,the *Diwan* – which is a center of authoity and power – became the place to bargain loyalty with those to hold the Kingdom from collapse.

Nevertheless the Kingdom shaped a unity between its three provinces, yet the lack of experience in how to run one central administration affected the role of the state. Italians apparently had left Libyans with lesser means of governance, and prevented intentionally for the people to emerge with one national identity, or as St. John discribed as 'politically active [Libyan] citizenry'.⁵ So, King Idriss made a kind of boycott with the country's colonial past starting from cleaning the state of the urban elite that was in connection with Italians, and hence

¹Vandewalle 2012, op. cit., p. 34.

² King Idriss was the grandson of the founder of the Senussya movement.

³ St. John, "Libya: From Colony to Revolution," Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, April 1st 2012, p. 109.

⁴Pargeter, op. cit., p. 39.

⁵ St. John, R. B., op. cit, p. 81.

deprived them of political and economic privileges. Instead he substituted them with loyals from the *Diwan*, especially from some Barqah's powerful families. Gradually, this new elite ended up in high positions like the Council of Ministers and the diplomatic corps.¹ The consequences were to enhance the role of powerful families and tribe or region loyalties², which did not create much enthusiasm for the King's policies in the local level. Hence the early years of independence in Libya were dependant on weak state governance and institutions, political and economic avoidance of Italian associates, and a weak national sense of belonging.

Abundantly changed for Libya when expansive stores of high-quality oil were found in 1959. 15 Foreign oil organizations were welcome to the nation, and the focal state now delighted in an unfaltering pay. The non-centralized power essentials such as tribal influence of Barqah, power families, loyals at the *Diwan*, or being from Senusi origins or families became privileges in order to access the economic and political bureaucracy, because literally those members of the elite were the controllers over authorities in Libya at the time. What made it so was the oil wealth that pumped out a new blood of authority in the state and strengthened the role of the Monarchy's rule. Thus, the growing Arabism that hates monarchies rule in the region found its way in the Libyan youth by 1960s. The movements against the Monarchy was in fact before 1969 when the Monarchy was accused by many Libyans of being elitism, self-enrichment, corrupting the state by putting it under intrigue and patronage.³

3. Monarchy Overthrowing : The *Jamahiriya*

By 1969 a group of low ranking officers in the army – the most prominent of them was lieutenant Gaddafi – changed the regime of the state under the need for change felt by the people, so to speak.⁴ The headleaders started immediately organizing their movement by initiating a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which succeed in the coup of 1969. Nevertheless, if we consider it as a coup politically speaking, puplically it was felt as real revolution for Arabism in Libya, because even Libyans did not sympathize with the King or the Monarchy as if they waited for the coup to happen. Furthermore, the coup went smoothly with not difficulties ditected by the

¹ Ibid, p.50.

² Vandewalle 2012, op. cit., p. 41.

³ Gaddafi, Muammer, "*Escape to Hell and Other Stories*"

⁴ Pargeter, op. cit., p. 59.

people, and Gaddafi – in spite his young age (27) – became swiftly the head of RCC and the new republic.

The specific vision that Gaddafi tried to apply on Libya helped him create what is known as *Jamahiriya*¹ considering Libyan masses are the true governors of themselves. Gaddafi's theories of governance were dependant on feeding the public some sort of non-active mottos like 'People Power' (*Sultat al- Sha'b*), in which he explained it by handing the control in the grips of the 'masses'. In his Green Book Gaddafi provided alternative or contradictory system against the known Capitalism and Marxism, this called 'Third Universal Theory'². He also did not grant himself the name of president or head of state, instead he chose Guide of the Revolution, or Brother Leader. As if Gaddafi tried to convince the people that Libya would be stateless society with no president, yet he contradicted this fact when he made the state responsible and inhibitor of every step taken in the country whether economic or political, from the simple upto the complex.³ So, Libyans tried hard not to focus on the Leader's policies and payed less attention to their country's political affairs.

The apparent policy of Gaddafi made him the sole representative of his own-creation *Jamahiriya*, thus the democratic practice of the representative bodies for the Libyans were not actually functional or in active.⁴ Those bodies were General People's Congress and other public and local committees, still the real controller of them all was Gaddafi and his inner circle including family, revolutionary leaders, and powerful tribal families. The surrounding of those allowed him the wide-control of key decisions. As the Monarchy before him excluded the Italian associates, Gaddafi also cleaned the state positions of the former elite and followers of the Monarchy. In his forming of Revolutionary Committees, Gaddafi created much-feared intelligence directed against the people, take control of activities like media, inner affairs, and

¹ The country's official name was changed into *Al-Jamahiriyya al-Arabiyya al-Libiyya al-Sha'biyya al-Ishtirakiyya* (the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya).

² Muammar Gaddafi. *The Green Book*: Translated from Arabic by Kovalev NG - Moscow: Infra, 2003, p. 10.

³ Vandewalle 2012, op. cit., p. 98.

⁴ These bodies of state actually they do not function without the permission of the Head of State, in this case Qaddafi. In the states that socialist-like the democratic institutions of the state are like puppets in the hand of the intelligence (Istikhbarat) and they had been acting as they were told.

state or public institutions and companies, which planted the culture of intimidation and fear in the society.¹

The Revolutionary Committees (*lijan al-thawriyya*) were considered to be the arbitrary hand of Gaddafi, and their courts above the justice system and separated from it. Truly even other committees were never less important, much of them were established to maintain the security of the system:

- Intelligence Bureau of the Leader,
- Military Secret Service,
- The Jamahiriya Security Organization,
- Purification Committee.

Thus the role of the national army and the regular forces was reduced, because Gaddafi would not trust the forces thus mostly formed from ordinary people, while the security organizations were carefully selected mostly from loyal tribes and supporters. Therefore, the army remained marginalized, weak, and ill-equipped forces.² Interestingly, the regular army sharing in the conflict of 2011 proved itself to be weak with outdated arsenal.³

The overwhelming rule of Gaddafi became the real power carrier over the formal structure of government, which its institutions barely operate in the presence of the ruler of the state; the Leader. This informal structure of governance was headed of course by Gaddafi himself, and others from the inner circle of supporters and confidants who was left for them the running of security affairs and institutions that keep the survival of the regime by repression. Even on the level of government positions, the high posts (senior positions of responsibility in the state) were rarely changed in such long-term of 40 years, and if one senior would be exempted, he would be for another post awaits him. Hence no new change on the circle of Gaddafi from the outside that might promise the least reformation.⁴

¹Mekrief, Mohammed Yusuf, “جرائم اللجان الثورية في ليبيا من المسؤول عنها”, Libyan Studies Center. Oxford. 2009, p.12.

²Vandewalle 2012, op. cit., p. 146.

³ The defection in the early time of the revolution in 2011 was caused because Qaddafi himself created the regular army of the state lacking leadership, cohesion and purpose, in return the army was not ready to face the mount of people protesting against the regime because only few were having loyal sense for Qaddafi.

⁴Pargeter, op. cit., p. 194.

Gaddafi played a shrewd role in positioning all the institutions under his sight while preventing them from operating separately as entities. Even his most powerful arm – the Revolutionary Committee – was not granted the privilege to be connected as separate political entity with other institutions. Furthermore, the thing that supported the pillars of Gaddafi's rule was his gathering the strongest Libyan tribes under his wings granting them of many wishes of power and money. In fact the leader characterized himself as the father of all those tribes,¹ while these were left struggling to win the position of confidant to the Brother Leader. Yet the tribes were only means to sustain the stability, not to approximate them with authority positions.

The enormous oil revenues were a source for the regime to plan projects (mainly with political purposes in the essence) referred to as adventurous and bizarre, and were not only inside the country but also abroad, especially in Africa. Gaddafi thought that through such projects and spending money grants on the people in some occasions he can buy the population off.² Respectively, Gaddafi created a system in running the state similar to socialism. Depending mostly on his Third Universal Theory he prevented the private sector from existence, while the oil and gas industries in much need for private companies to run this business, Gaddafi abolished the private commerce along with the state companies taking over the function of private sector. This policy actually forced many of well-educated Libyans – who were hoping for private companies opening in the country – to leave the country, while the rest turned to the state for a living and support. Thus the public sector became the hand that feeds the Libyans³, even though much of the employees not properly qualified. Virtually every family depended on the state for nearly every aspect of life, notably housing and food; and in return for political quiescence, aspect of life, notably housing and food; and in return for political quiescence, the state took care of Libyans' daily needs.

Vitality, this dependence on the state to support a job has survived the 2011 Uprising, and still commands open desires towards the state today. Gaddafi's govern made a 'stateless society,

¹ Even Qadhafi was a tribe man (Al Kadadifa tribe) and his tribe was living its prime days of wealth and support in the state. Qadhafi behaved mostly likewise with all the tribes to ensure that his back was backed up in the local majority.

² Pargeter, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

³ In the late 1980s, between 70% and 75% of working Libyans were employees of the state. Vandewalle 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

[in which] the state had ended up everything'.¹Colossal measures of wealth were spent on endowments for ordinary people without trying to qualify the state to take the responsibilities needed toward them, and keeping up the fortunes of favored gatherings, however Gaddafi neglected to rebuild and improve the essential oil and gas division. After some time, Libya has disguised a significant number of the qualities of an asset rich however seriously oversaw renter express that relied on upon talented ostracize work force.²

In the late 1980s, splits began to frame in Gaddafi's progressive examination. Due to the administration's support for global terrorist based oppressor assembles and claimed inclusion in psychological militant action, chose administration targets were bombarded by the US military in 1986. From 1992 Libya was subjected to a substantial universal assents administration until its rapprochement with the West, which started in 1999 and was fixed in 2003, when the nation formally denied all enthusiasm for creating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The authorizations and sanctions left Libyans totally disconnected from the outside world, and the oil and gas area attempted to work the same number of global organizations left the nation. With an end goal to enhance the economy, Gaddafi's administration set out on a privatization drive called the 'infitah', which mindfully allowed the development of a private area. In actuality, in any case, more liberal financial approaches were controlled in order to profit exclusively the administration's favored gatherings. The business benefits and individual extravagances stood to Gaddafi's own particular family would later get to be, as on account of other Bedouin administrations, a wellspring of profound mainstream grievance.

Those flows in the Libyan regime performance and the outer interests that Gaddafi was obsessed with rather than the internal affairs fuelled resentment among many parts of society, but in particular Islamist groups in Barqah who already had long-standing reservations about Gaddafi.³ Since this rush of Islamist activism was established in a global belief system (numerous Libyan Islamists had battled in the Soviet–Afghanistan war), Gaddafi saw it as an extraordinary risk to his upset. All through the 1990s, the administration severely put down a progression of

¹Pargeter, op. cit., p. 113.

² The dependence on the foreign labor and high skilled experties of the western mind, many workers were from outside of the country like Egyptians, Algerians and many more nationalities were seeking to work in Libay and even on the education, Libyans depended sometimes on Syrian and Iraqi teachers to fill the gaps in the schools. Respectively, they depended on militarily experties from the soviets in which the Libyan military officers were recieving their training either in USSR or an USSR ally states in the Arab region like Syria.

³Particularly because Qadhafi sidelined the traditional religous scholars (*'ulama*) in his revolutionary version of Islam.

Islamist revolts.¹To make the message considerably more clear, the east of Libya was considered rebuffed and kept in a changeless condition of underdevelopment.

4. The Revolution in 2011

Enlivened by occasions in Libya's neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt, a gathering of youthful Libyans sorted out a Day of Anger in Benghazi in February 2011. Their underlying requests included financial and political changes, for example, the presentation of a constitution –though not the topple of the Gaddafi's regime. Despite the tranquil character concerning these protests, the regime's protection capabilities hit back hard, opening fire on the crowd. Other spontaneous eruptions concerning masses jib quickly regarded elsewhere, or were similarly suppressed. But the method no longer worked. Libyans were sooner or later expressing their pent-up pain and resentment towards the regime, yet specifically the broken assignment concerning limit then wealth. The eastern state of Barqah, which had suffered the almost beside Gaddafi's policies, 'was equipped in imitation of explode'.²The history over armed emulation within the East, from the anti-colonialist guerrilla about Umar al-Mokhtar in imitation of the insurgency concerning the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, came after reverse as each a symbol yet a sensible example on warfare in imitation of the state.

Gaddafi severely put down the turmoil, relying on his security strengths and pockets of followers in the West³ to stay with him until the end. All things considered, Cyrenaican urban communities fell under the control of the agitators with astounding pace. In the freed regions, the oil and gas area went ahead to work sensibly untouched by the political conflict, while in the East powerful economic figures chose to join and fiscally bolster the uprising against a framework that extremely constrained the degree for private monetary open door.

It was additionally in the East that the revolutionary armed groups went ahead to set up an organizing body, the National Transitional Council (NTC). The rudder of the NTC was comprised of technocrats and individuals from the administration who had abandoned, a large portion of them from the military. A considerable lot of them had endeavored however had been neglected to present changes under the Gaddafi administration. The NTC quickly proclaimed its

¹ In 1996, the regime turned against the best-known Islamist group, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG, founded in 1995) after an assassination attempt against Qadhafi.

²Pargeter, op. cit., p. 216.

³Mekrief, "جرائم اللجان الثورية", p.70.

vision of a free, vote based and joined Libya, and embraced the standards of political majority rule government. Be that as it may, the genuine power-agents amid the upheaval were the equipped units, a hefty portion of which were connected to a city or district. Upheld in their battle by the NATO military intercession that depended on the questionable Security Council Decision No.1973, the detachments could unleash a hard and fast military crusade against Gaddafi's regime fortresses, (for example, BaniWalid and Sirte) until Tripoli tumbled to the revolutionaries in August 2011. Individuals from the armed factions in the end executed Gaddafi on 20 October 2011 in the skirmish of Sirte. The removed ruler's last fortress.

Shortly after Gaddafi's demise, the huge assortment of scattered and contending groups' interests in Libyan culture, which had for quite some time been smothered, started to discover new types of expression. The fall of the weird "state" uncovered the generally established discontinuity of Libya, additionally encouraged gatherings that were resolved never to be underestimated or rejected again.¹ Most striking in this regard was the antagonistic vibe between the opposition powers, especially the ones who overthrown the regime, towards anything and anybody that could be connected with the former regime. The dislodging and emptying of pockets of Gaddafi followers and confidants by the detachments gave early proof of this element. A moment prompt consequence of the Uprising was the pressure inside the NTC between the political administration and the revolutionary base. NTC "government officials" were high-positioning administration authorities who had deserted, and in addition once in the past ousted restriction individuals. Many detachment pioneers, who as they would like to think did the 'grimy work', detested the NTC's aristocratic feature. Third, not long after the removing of Gaddafi, liberal-patriot parties likewise showed worries about Libya's Islamist camp and its ideological motivation. The nearness of Islamist vigorously furnished gatherings in Libya, and their conceivable transnational associations with different nations in emergency and tumult (most importantly Syria and Mali), stressed numerous Libyans. At long last, the repercussions of the Uprising was set apart by proceeded with contradiction about who effectively took an interest and battled in the struggle against Gaddafi, and who joined just once Gaddafi was executed. Maintaining and shielding the insurgency against "fakery" turned into a genuine matter.

¹ Sabra, op,cit, p.45.

The removing of the joint foe and the collapse of the Jamahiriya has drastically adjusted the way of political power in Libya. The Jamahiriya was so overwhelmingly brought together, that when it caved in, the whole state broken down with it.¹ Under Gaddafi, there was no such thing as common society or civil commonness. Political gatherings, community clubs, commerce unions, even apparently innocuous common activities, for example, parent–teacher associations, were illegal. Denied common associations, Libyans were adapted to swing to family and tribe for social support and cooperation. It is accordingly scarcely amazing that in the post-Gaddafi control vacuum, nearby figures –be it tribal pioneers, volunteer army boss, or Neighborhood Board of trustees individuals –moved into reestablish a feeling of association and power.

¹Pargeter, op. cit., p. 254.

Chapter 2

Libyan politics

1. Gaddafi's political Ideology

When Gaddafi took the power, he tried to arrange a situation which was very unstable: on the one hand, the oil discover brought wellness and money, but, on the other hand, problems such as illiteracy, unbalance between riches and paupers and among the Libyan regions remained.

Gaddafi took the power on first September 1969, when he was twenty-seven years of age. By this he was born in 1942, amidst World War II. He guaranteed that he could recall the awful World War II fights between the Germans and Italians and the Allies Forces of English and American troops over the abandon of North Africa, as he claimed. These battles in North Africa occurred in 1943, so infant Qaddafi would have been not more than a toddler, making it impossible to really recollect that them. Genuine or not, the weight on a memory that he really could not have underlines what amount was vital to him seeming supreme before individuals. Lying about his actual date of birth with a specific end goal to attest to recollect war scenes which really happened however that he could not physically have seen in view of his age, presumably implied demonstrating a feeling of incomparable energy to inspire Libyan populace and made Libyans trust that he was genuinely powerful. Gaddafi's tribe and family's religion was fundamentalist Islamic, which implies they clung entirely to the Prophet Mohammed's Suna teachings. Gaddafi's folks were ignorant and the parents passed their child the historical backdrop of their family and tribe's past orally. This is a critical entry in Gaddafi's life, since these stories affected profoundly and helped shape his ideological thinking.¹ He discovered that their country had dependably been controlled by outsiders. At the point when Gaddafi was born, Libya was an Italian province - as the Italian themselves intended to make Libya. It was the longest and latest occupation by a remote nation. Gaddafi learned like any son in occupied country would learn; the torments and slaughters which had been executed by those intruders'

¹ Oakes J., *"The History of Gaddafi's Pariah State"*, Gloucestershire, The History Press, 2011, pp. 112/113.

forces. He recognized that in 1911 his grandfather was killed by an Italian officer and that his father and uncle had been prisoners in an Italian jail for quite a long time.¹In the long run, Libya won its freedom from the Allies in 1951. Be that as it may, as expressed over, the infant Libyan kingdom required Western support keeping in mind the end goal to achieve the progressions that were essential with a specific end goal to render Libya assteadier nation. Hypothetically, Libya was free. Truthfully, it actually relied on upon English and American forces. In 1951 Gaddafi did not saw the autonomy of Libya that he had longed for.

In the mean time, Gaddafi was sent first to Sirte and afterward to Sebha, southwestern region of Libya, with a specific end goal to be taught. Amid the school's years, he started to demonstrate his initiative ability enlisting his group. He shaped numerous cells, whose individuals knew only few members' personality. The framework was very basic: every cell was shaped by four individuals; each of them needed to select three others, shaping a moment gathering, etc. Along these lines, each part knew just the character of two cells' associates and not that of all the "association". In the interim, Gaddafi started to make talks against Israel and praise Egypt, drawing the consideration of the police and his school's head-staff. Because of his warmed talks, he was ousted from school in 1961. Now he kept on learning at the College of Libya in Tripoli, where he went to a military instructional class and he got a law degree. Since he had as of now acquired many evaluations, he chose to go to the Benghazi Military Institute keeping in mind the end goal to seek after the military vocation. There, he disdained numerous of colleagues with him due to their rich backgrounds and their luxurious way-life. A large portion of the cadets originated from rich families, connected specifically to the rulers, or were children of men who were with good connections and deals with foreign organizations. They making the most of their abundance burning families' richness for every one of the indecencies which were against the Islamic principles, for example, smoking, drinking liquor, engaging in sexual relations before the marriage. Gaddafi got to be companion with the individuals who shared his same family's conditions. Once graduated, Gaddafi turned into a lieutenant of the Libyan Armed forces: with a specific end goal to go to a propelled flag corps instructional class, he was sent to Britain for six months. There, he got loathed by Western life, which he characterized atheist and wanton. In 1966 he came back to Libya, where he started selecting individuals for his main operation against the Monarchy: toppling Lord Idris I to reestablish the social, political and

¹ Lange B, op. Cit, pp. 34-35.

monetary request of his nation; taking out Western impacts; and presenting another solid way of life, in similarity with the Islamic convention.

And so Gaddafi by the beginning of September became the real ruler of Libya: in what should be a preparation work out, the Free Officers, whose pioneer was Gaddafi, planned and executed the military overthrow that toppled Idris I while he was in Turkey. The overthrow was absolutely military imagined, both in arranging and execution: in actuality Gaddafi and the RCC did not have any desire to include any regular citizen gather. The RCC was a twelve-man administering power set up by Gaddafi, whose administrator was Gaddafi himself. The board was imagined to be at the leader of the new framed Socialist Libyan Arab Republic, while the Free Officers turned into the new Libyan military constrain, supplanting the Barqah Defense Force. The last was the Libyan equipped constrain which should guard the nation from any counter-overthrow; nonetheless, it did not intercede. Furthermore, additionally the international community had no troubles in perceiving the new shaped Libyan Republic: on September 7, 1969, the Assembled Conditions of America perceived Gaddafi as the new Libyan pioneer.¹ It is conceivable that USA at first upheld the political change likewise in view of Gaddafi's leaning toward Socialism which is one of stepsons of Communism: these are the focal years of the Cold War, the time of showdown and test between the USSR and USA.² Extraordinary England acknowledged the change without troubles as well: in spite of the way that between the Libyan government and England there was an understanding as indicated by which the Western nation would have mediated on the off chance that the government was being debilitated, it did not. Moreover, Prince Hassan Rida, King Idris' nephew and beneficiary, declined to make a case for the position of authority; he even bolstered the change.³

Gaddafi became Prime Minister of the Socialist Libyan Arab Republic, head of the armed forces and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. Basically, Gaddafi had control over every government body of the country.

When the overthrow came about to be fruitful, Gaddafi made his first discourse by means of the Libyan radio station:

¹ Oakes J., op. cit, p. 126.

² Boyle, Francis A, " Destroying Libya and World Order: the Three Decade U.S. Campaign to Terminate the Qaddafi Revolution ", Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A. Charity Press, March 2013, p.28.

³ Lange B., op, cit, pp. 40/42.

“[...] From now on, Libya is deemed a free, sovereign republic under the name of the Libyan Arab Republic, ascending with God's help to exalted heights. [...] Libyans, stay together against the enemy of the Arab nation, the enemy of Islam, the enemy of humanity who destroyed our holy places and shattered our honour [...]”¹

2. Gaddafi toward Arabism and the Green Book

As for Gaddafi's ideology, he felt very close to Nasser, the Egyptian leader. Gaddafi grew up listening to the Egyptian radio and its program the Voice of the Arabs, which encouraged Arab nationalism. His life was very like Nasser's: the last went to the Egyptian Military Foundation in 1937 where met and knew the individuals who turned into the individuals from the military gathering called the Free Officers (it is no fortuitous event that Gaddafi picked a similar name for his armed force). Nasser was profoundly persuaded that the Egyptian King Farouk needed to leave the position of royalty; besides, he felt that the English military occupation must be expelled and feudal system must be completed to return land to its rightful owners. The similarity is proved to be very self-evident: Gaddafi needed to evacuate the Libyan King and loyal staff, free the nation from British and American influence and from the grasp of the oil organizations. At the point when Nasser took the power in 1952, the Egyptian Free Officers set up a Revolution Command Council same as did: once more, Gaddafi grabbed a similar name for his legislative body (RCC). In 1954 Nasser distributed The Theory of Revolution, while Gaddafi his work in 1975, the Green Book, where his political and financial thoughts were assembled. Nasser's venture of the Aswan Dam had numerous similarities with the Gaddafi's Extraordinary Man Made River project, a long haul dare to supply the water nation's need.² the similarities between the two leaders reached the utmost belief in the Arab Unity; they sharpened a strict adherence to the Islamic lessons; and were foes of the Israeli State. The Palestinian question was pounding the Middle Easterner district since the Israeli State was formed in 1948.³ Jews were seen as the "intruders" of the area. With respect to the Libyans, they didn't generally comprehend and know Jewish history because of some issues related to the distance and lack of education on the society and state levels.

¹Ivi, p. 42

²OAKES J., op. cit, pp. 116/117.

³Sabra, op. cit, p. 65.

Nasser Played an important role in the Creation of non-aligned movement, when in the 1950s negotiations between twenty-nine Third World Nations met in Bandung, Indonesia, with a specific end goal to talk about the part that they would have had wide open to the Cold War.¹ The principle issues were self-assurance; non-animosity; common regard; correspondence; and nonintervention in inside issues; these inquiries were essential in light of the fact that a large portion of the member nations were previous colonies of the Western nations. They attempted to make sense of an approach to diminish the Western impacts. Gaddafi had the same accepts of this development in creating such an organization.

Like Nasser did for the Suez Canal, also Gaddafi wanted to ensure Libya to have control of its most important sector, the oil one, cutting off the Seven Sisters² cartel. Eventually, Libya was the only country non-monopolized by the cartel³: the result was that it had one of the best oil apparatus of the region⁴.

Gaddafi's Revolution of first September has not to be viewed as a fixed and momentary point of Libyan history which "finished when it started": it was a much more extensive occasion. It denoted the start of the fight against imperialism and Zionism. Pan-Arabism and glorification were at the center of Gaddafi's belief system: as per him, Arab-speaking countries were better thought and superiority about than the others. Since Gaddafi designated himself as the guard of Arab patriotism, Libya would have been the nation pioneer in the battle against remote interruptions.⁵ For example, he closed the military bases for the British and Americans as part of his appease to Arabism and his Revolution. Yet Gaddafi did not consider the consequences for such doing, for he left the country without military assistance of the West, thus he turned to France and Egypt for this.

At the point when Gaddafi took the power, the Egyptian military troops were conveyed all through the Libyan region keeping for the one purpose of Nasser's mind, which is not touching the revolutionary achievement in Libya. Yet after the rule stabilized the Egyptian troops reduces

¹ Boyle, op. cit, p.31.

²"**Seven Sisters**" was a term coined in the 1950s by businessman Enrico Mattei, then-head of the Italian state oil company Eni, to describe the seven oil companies which formed the "Consortium for Iran" cartel and dominated the global petroleum industry from the mid-1940s to the 1970s.

³ Oakes J., op. cit, pp. 131/132.

⁴Vanderwalle D., op. cit, p. 89

⁵ St. John R. B., *Libya: Continuity and Change*, University of Durham, Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2010, p. 50.

to 2000 just as instructors, then withdrawn in October War 1973.¹ Arab Countries' near history had been portrayed by stagnation under the Ottoman era, misuse by colonial powers and defilement by the Monarchy. The Libyan Revolution of 1st September would have spoken to the typical chance to be cured from those periods. With a specific end goal to underline that Arabs are better than others, Gaddafi utilized some typical demonstrations. For instance, the Gaddafi's government made many procedures to insure the Arab identity; such as documents must be composed in Arabic only; the reports included tickets, cards, visas, street signs. Every one of these activities served to legitimize the rule of Gaddafi in the eyes of Libyans. Trading liquor and tobacco products were non-allowed in light of the fact that those contradict the Islamic teachings; even entertainments for the population considered profane and revolting were precluded as well. Gaddafi's support and contribution for the Arab renaissance reached even to encourage open facilities focusing on the Arab and Libyan culture and history on Libyan history; like the Libyan Studies Centre.

If Arab nationalism and Islamic religion were the theoretical elements of Gaddafi's ideology, jihad was the action one². The term jihad is a standout amongst the most misjudged of the Islamic religion: it does not allude entirely to the sacred war, however more to an inside "exertion", "effort". Essentially, the term alludes to the individual and social push to expel the ill aspects from the general public. Muslims trust that for the good reasons to enhance the general public the exertion must be financial, political and social. Jihad can likewise interpreted to use force methods, however just to defend the Islam and Muslims. This does not imply that jihad can't be utilized to legitimize military assaults. Gaddafi was persuaded that through jihad he could free the persecuted and enslaved Arabs, above all else Palestinians. To enhance the jihadist thinking and bolster the significance of jihad, Gaddafi funded the Palestinian Organizations in order to uphold the outfitted battle for the freeing the Arab usurped lands by Zionists.³

Gaddafi firmly reprimanded both Communism and Capitalism, contending they were two appearances of a similar coin. Communism was considered as the restraining infrastructure of State proprietorship, while private enterprise as the syndication of organizations and people

¹ Oakes J., op. cit , pp. 143/144.

² St. John R. B., op. cit , pp. 50/51.

³ St. John R. B., "*Libya: Continuity and Change,*" University of Durham, Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2010, p. 51.

groups. Gaddafi asserted to convey another Socialist theory to Libya: it was not the same as the Western one, since it was considered in term of social equity. Regardless of not concurring with both USSR and USA belief systems - and not linked strongly to both, Gaddafi was occupied with keeping up business binds with them to buy military and mechanical gear. Gaddafi sold oil to Europe and used their money to purchase technologies¹. Europeans themselves reported that Libyan military contracts with the West reached \$ 28 Billion. Gaddafi gave outright need to the buy of arsenal and military furniture, which findings on more than on citizens. From 1972, he started to utilize a more hypothetical way to deal with his philosophy, instituting what turned into the Third Widespread Hypothesis, an option approach to bipolar system of the world. The two powers which were at the base of Gaddafi's hypothesis were patriotism and religion, since they were thought as the two powers aspiring mankind and history. With respect to religion, Gaddafi's conviction was fixated on the prime significance of Islam and Koran. Islam was imagined to be the last expression of God on earth: consequently, there could be nothing in life which could not be found in it. The embodiment of religion rested in the solidarity of God, so that the supporters of Jesus, Moses and Muhammad were all adherents of a similar God. So, regarding to this vision, there was just a single genuine religion, Islam: along these lines, all monotheists must be viewed as Muslims. Gaddafi encouraged (verbally) for a recovery of Islam, contending that Muslims had moved far from God and Islam. At first, Gaddafi's way to deal with religion was extremely moderate, almost fundamentalist. At that point, his approach got to be distinctly reformist, practically common. Thus, patriotism was considered as a vital and gainful constrain of the mankind. He contended that Arab Nationalism was established in a grand past and that Arabs were the means for sublime past.²

The Third Universal Theory began to show the first signs of contradiction from the very beginning³: in actuality, at to start with, his way to deal with this hypothesis was more implanted with Islamic religion. He contended that the hypothesis itself was conceived in Islamic religion. Since the 1980s, in any case, he recommended that the Theory was not identified with Islam and, in this manner, had not an Islamic feature and shape. Gaddafi considered his Theory to be the center of the making of an all inclusive Arab society, focused on Arabism; since the most

¹ Oakes J., op. cit, pp.,144-145

² El- Kikhia, Mansour, " Libya's Qaddafi: The politics of Contradiction", Florida, University Press of Florida, March 1997, p.25 – 27.

³ El- Kikhia, p.28.

common religion in Middle East was Islam, it stayed fixing to Gaddafi's addresses on patriotism, however just comprehensively.¹

The date of transferring the Libyan Arab Republic into the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was March 1977; the term fabricated by him was referred to the Libyans to govern themselves, so to speak, through the so-called democratic institution that is already represent only him. By the end of 1980s Gaddafi announced himself Guide of the Revolution and self-designated Head of the State, without authority obligations. By 1975, Green Book's populist mottoes, for example, expression like 'Committees in everywhere', started to show up wherever in Libya. The primary volume of the Green Book is known as The Solution of the Problem of Democracy: "The Power of the People". Here he portrayed which he accepted to be the best instruments of representing. For him, political gatherings, plebiscites and parliaments must be rejected; just a type of direct majority rule government, in light of an arrangement of congresses and committees, could speak to the most ideal approach to represent the world.² Regarding to this point, he wrote that:

“[...] the democratic system is a cohesive structure whose foundation stones are firmly laid one above the other, the Basic People's Conferences, the People's Conferences, and the People's Committees, which finally come together when the General People's Conference convenes. There is absolutely no conception of democratic society other than this[...]”³

The second volume of the Green Book is called The Solution of the Economic Problem: "Socialism". Here, he critiqued the modern ideologies, Capitalism and Communism, arguing that Socialism could be the only valuable alternative to them. He stated that true human freedom, an important economic problem, remained unsolved. According to Gaddafi, a human being has got certain needs, which are: a house, an income and a vehicle; both Capitalism and Communism could not provide human beings of these needs because they are not based on the right principles. Furthermore, Gaddafi argued that private property represented the property of the society and not of individuals, therefore it was to be eliminated. In this volume, Gaddafi outlined the theory of natural socialism: he described it as the three key-economic factors which move

¹ Sabra, op. cit, p. 57.

² St. John R. op. cit, p. 60.

³ Roberts, Andrew. "Top 10 Quotes from Gaddafi's Green Book," The Daily Beast, 3/3/2011, available at: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/02/gaddafis-green-book-the-top-10-quotes.html>

production, that is to say the producer, the means of production and the equality of raw materials. These socialism is natural because keeps in consideration in an equal way all the three factors, while other forms of socialism concentrate on some or one of the factors. The key problem is the production. According to Gaddafi, wage and profit systems had to be dismantled: employees had to become partners in the process of production. In the third volume of the Green Book, named *The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory*, he deepened some aspects of his social theory. When he took the power, Gaddafi made clear how much he was committed to the Islam cause, arguing that Islam was the real and unique religion. Despite these statements, in this volume Gaddafi stated that everyone had to be entitled to his own religion. Here, he developed also some social topics, such as women, minorities, and black people. He based all of his propaganda on the concept of an egalitarian society, leaving no space for any form of discrimination, in particular the sexual one¹. Especially about women, Gaddafi wrote “[...] Motherhood is the female's function [...]. While man is strong and though because he is created in that way, woman is gentle not because she wanted to be, but because she is created so. There is no absolute equality between men and women [...]”². Gaddafi explained for the population that he is against any kind of distinguish between man and woman. Furthermore, Gaddafi was trying to gain the women side to his side by asserting that they have a big role in the society, and promised them economic prosperity. Thus, he granted them educational privileges to win their trust.

Yet the contradiction in Gaddafi’s policy cannot hide itself every now and then; when the freedom granted to women, some Islamic behaviorism changed with it, on which he mentioned often and declared the importance of adherence to Islamic teachings. This appeared especially when many women, for example, started to avoid wearing the veil to show themselves as independent³.

3. Fundamental Changes on Policy

The fundamental changes on policy were clear and obvious from the beginning when the new regime and its RCC canceled the 1951 Constitution in the favor of a new one that gave birth to an authoritarian state. As part of the pretext of Arab Unity and fight colonialism in all its forms, the new mottos of freedom, socialism and unity were preamble shown to attract the

¹ St. John R. B. op.cit, p. 61.

² Lange B., *Major World Leaders: Muammar Gheddafi*, Philadelphia, Chelsea, House Publishers, 2005, p. 47.

³ Ibid. P. 47.

population. The unity part was mentioned in the first article to indicate that Libya is ready to unite with other Arab countries. In the second article the Revolution recognize the rights of other religions even if Islam is the official religion of the country, which contradicted the policy of Gaddafi in claiming that Islam is the sole and real religion of all others. Some parts of the 15 Article reconfirmed socialism of Libya, and defined its aspects to the citizens in order to apprehend it. The Constitution also pointed to the economy's freedom from subordination from influences outside the state limits; means the state became the only controller. Article 12 declared the homes to be inviolable, while 14 and 15 reassured the population for the health and educational rights providing. The shape of the government was also the subject of Article 15, which showed almost that the RCC had have the authority of both the executive and the legislative powers: the thing that granted the RCC limitless power in the state, in other words, the most important and powerful institution in Libya.¹

The RCC with superior authority planned to rearrange the influence map in Libya. For the purpose of strengthen the new state, the RCC reduced the influence of the tribes on their regions where the authority of the state became the new and only dominant with the tribes included under the wings of the regime as pawns proofing their loyalties. Thus the regime excluded the old regime's policy in depending on the old families, while the ancient tribal areas were re-distributed according to the rules of the big change in the country. However, the regime was considered the main sponsor for all the tribes as long as they remain working within the agenda of the regime. Nonetheless, the division confused between the distributed zones of the tribes, thus created problems of coexistence in the view of regional differences. This was the way the new regime decided to defeat regional and tribal differences. RCC in 1971 tried to create a new organization concerns the population and communicate with their problems and quests. Such institution was under the name of Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Yet this body was put in difficult position where either to sympathize with people's needs, or pursue the regime's policy, thus the union failed towards the people.²

Since the administration was not happy with the objectives fulfilled by the ASU, the year 1973 brought Gaddafi to announce another well known revolutionary declaration: he encouraged the citizens to participate in the power through the election of mainstream boards and of trustees

¹ St. John R. B., pp. 53/54.

² El- Kikhia, op, cit p. 54/55.

in schools, organizations, towns. Individuals who were chosen soon supplanted those in the local known organizations who had been designated by the RCC. So as to keep this well known transformation for the people, it was considered prohibited to object to the revolutionary practices. The reasons why Gaddafi chose to start the 1973 Revolutionary transformation are a few: to start with, the ASU failure in substituting conventional initiatives; giving more energy to new individuals, permitting them to choose their own particular delegates, was a smart move. Truth be told, the RCC would have liked to pick up support from chosen individuals. The second reason, the arrangement of advisory groups allowed to the RCC to segregate the individuals who were against the Gaddafi's administration and make them turn out away from any detectable hindrance. Truth be told, many individuals having a place with Marxist or Baathist gatherings were captured and sent to political prisons. The enormous change for Libya was, actually, that there had never been a framework in which individuals could be chosen to speak for themselves and their needs. The committees accepted local managerial control, and their administrators turned into the boss regulatory authorities for their bodies. The effect of the boards of trustees' framework on the populace was very positive. This can be viewed as one of only a handful couple of objectives of the revolution's move that had been accomplished solidly.¹

Thus, and as a result, the ASU in 1976 was substituted by the GPC, while Gaddafi formed the core as a general secretary and the individuals from the RCC formed its general secretariat. The GPC met yearly: it was essential since it was where strategies and thoughts of the RCC, alongside those created by the lower-rank of officials, were talked about and sanctioned.²

1976 represented a quantum leap when the GPC was promoted by the RCC, hence it could expel and delegate government associates with some of the powers that belong to foreign policy. In 1977 the RCC announced the Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority", a recognition for the structure and power of the GPC was placed in that declaration. Furthermore, the authority of the GPC enabled it to declare a formation of the General People's Committee, a bureau in which the secretaries of agribusiness, health, lodging, industry, were built up. The regime constituted a new political framework, coordinate political power was in compel in Libya; be that as it may, individuals, keeping in mind the end goal to appreciate this privilege,

¹Mekrief, Mohammed Yusuf, "مأساة ليبيا ومسؤولية القذافي", Oxford, Libyan Studies Centre, 2010, p.31.

² St. John R. B. op.cit, pp. 58/59.

needed to practice it through affirmed official associations.¹ It was apparent that the regime had given the means without showing the real source in one way or another the regime shared the political life with Libyans: that was a flat out constructive part of the change; the problem was that actually this is what Gaddafi planned for his people to think so. as if those means were just to dump their political opinions, giving thoughts regarding strategies and political issues, Libyans needed to have the opportunity to utilize the channels they considered the most proper for them, and not just the official associations since it implied that really the populace was not free at all to give its own add to the movement guarded by the revolution power.

The progressions which were presented in the period between 1970 and 1978 expanded desirable preparation and cooperation, yet the main operator of the country's policy was Gaddafi and behind him the RCC.²

if the arm of the RCC presented in the Revolutionary Committees was delivered authority on many institutions, this influence had been reduced in 1987 by Gaddafi. Yet their individuals were still utilized in some key-services of the nation, with the goal that they could control Libyans.³

Alongside these refinements connected to the political framework, the Green Book of Gaddafi tried to show the people some reforms concerning the fundamentals for the people, but actually fundamentals such as education, health sector, housing and illiteracy had never seen actual change in Gaddafi's era. The thing mostly desired by Libyans was those reforms and changes presented in the earlier years of the revolution when the RCC was promising, full of energy and not corrupted.⁴ When it comes to education, the RCC interfered in the educational process by abolishing any reform done by the prior regime. Thus the education since 1970 was subject to the changes that reached even the Higher Council of Education and Teaching and played with the school curriculum. The genuine and valuable changes came in 1975, when the time of obligatory school was reached out from six to nine years. This change positively affected the general public, particularly on women: in actuality, earlier the change, young ladies used to drop school after the six obligatory years. The new change permitted girls to go to the school for

¹Mekrief, "مأساة ليبيا ومسؤولية القذافي", p. 33.

² Ibid. P. 62.

³Vanderwalle D., *Libya Since Independence*, London, I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998, p. 102.

⁴ Oakes J., op.cit , p. 134.

a more extended period, so some chose to proceed and go likewise to the college. Keeping in mind the end goal to cover every one of the parts of the instructive change, the regime chose to construct more schools and bring more teachers to service. It wanted the educational field to be modern. With the developing significance of government funded schools, the religious ones began to decrease. Second, the part of women turned out to be more dynamic step by step. Obviously, the way that young ladies could go to class for a more drawn out period was conclusive: there were more educated ladies who were eager to work and be free. They were utilized in gifted fields, particularly the nursing one. With a specific end goal to enhance the status of women, the regime took some steps to discourage the early marriages for young women. One of the privileges granted to women was military access to some army academies. Additionally, the administration chose to build up the Department of Women's Affairs as a major aspect of the secretariat of the GPC and study center for women. The formation of these new offices for women and their expanding instructive level made a colossal gape between women under thirty-five years of age, taking an interest in the general population circle, and the more established ones, who favored remaining at home and appreciating lower levels of training. In spite of the actual changes and reforms, the quality of the education stayed in low presence: according to the 2009/2010 Global Competitiveness Report, in the Middle East Libya is at the eighty-eighth place¹.

The reforms in health sector was not that different from any other Arab country, in the fact that they were identical. The right for treatment for the citizens was granted from the government for almost free from payments. The responsibilities towards this sector were mainly concerned with superficially improving it. In the initial 20 years of the Revolution, the administration actualized 103 doctor's facilities, 40 polyclinics and 248 social insurance focuses. Besides, the quantity of essential social insurance units expanded from 414 to 1038 in 1988. Future is one of the most astounding in the district, however stays well underneath the normal in the OECD nations.².

The housing had its share in the reform project in the mentality of the Revolution of September. In truth it arranged the development of 80,000 new houses. Yet the law rearranges

¹ The Global Competitiveness Report, 2009-2010, at:
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2009-10.pdf

² St. John R. B , p. 67.

the possession status of the houses, in which no family can own more than one house. Some exceptions were considered such as widows, who couldn't keep up themselves if not with a lease. The outcome was that individuals who were leasing a house turned out to be quickly proprietor of the place, without having paid for it.¹

The Revolution undeniably brought some reforms on the economic status. Some of them reached the agricultural part, when at the end of 1970s Gaddafi ended the last existence of feudal remains and redistributed many land from Monarchy's bestowal to some rich families. Besides, Gaddafi just homesteads of an estimated which could manage a family and that did not have to utilize laborers to keep up it could be worthy. In 1980, the administration pronounced that all paper charges which esteemed more than one dinar were void and invalid and individuals had one week to change their cash. The administration's radical socialist program negatively affected nation's improvement: to begin with, the end of the private part contributed the general population one of a significance which it couldn't manage. Truly, the general population part needed in staffing and preparing. The circumstance was bothered by the way that in 1979 enrollment got to be distinctly obligatory: indeed, numerous youngsters who could be utilized needed to make to military administration.² The next thing, the lodging change offered houses to who did not have one, but rather had serious outcomes on the land improvement, which encountered a sharp stop. Third, the coin change prompted to a liquidity emergency. The radical changes that the administration was applying had, as an outcome, an augmentation of the restriction, additionally activating torpid resistance in the area. As a conundrum, the white collar class, which had benefices the most from Gaddafi's changes, was the most dynamic in this sense. Then again, Gaddafi kept on having an impressive support from Libyan youth. Truth be told, amid the Eighties numerous youthful Libyans appreciated a more elevated amount of training and of medicinal services and they could claim a house. Since, around then, the dominant part of Libyan populace was fifteen years of age, it had never encountered another type of government.³

Another critical perspective which ought to be considered is Gaddafi's way to deal with Islam. Amid the Seventies turned out to be truly evident that his approach was turning out to be more common than religious. For instance, in 1975 Qaddafi advised the imam to focus their

¹Mekrief, "القذافي الليبيونير الفقير", op. cit, p.40.

² El- Kikhia, op.cit, p. 83.

³ Sabra, op.cit, p.53.

Friday's sermons on religious inquiries and not on unremarkable and every day issues. Amid the following three years, Gaddafi's origination of Islam's birthplaces, Islamic law and the part of Islamic legal advisers changed profoundly: he started suspecting that God was supernatural and, subsequently, did not required the nearness of mediators. In 1978 Gaddafi openly contended that the Koran was composed in Arabic dialect so everyone could comprehend it without the assistance of the ulema. Obviously, the religious group reacted to these assaults testing Qaddafi: the result was a cleanse of every one of the individuals who challenged taking part in the test. The religious powers announced the Green Book contrary with the Islamic standards; accordingly, Gaddafi expressed that the fundamental component of the Islamic religion was the Koran and that the others, for example, shari'a or hadith, were most certainly not. As indicated by him, each individual had the privilege to translate the Koran in an autonomous way. Doing as such, Gaddafi disposed of and pulverized the force of religious elites who had constantly considered the understanding of Islam as a need. In 1990 Qaddafi made another association named the People's Guard: it was a kind of military establishment. Its primary undertaking was that of confronting the various activist Islamists and to control the mosques with a specific end goal to anticipate Islamist disturbance.¹

Amid the years, Gaddafi kept making new boards of trustees and foundations so as to keep control over the country: for instance, in 1994 he set up the purging councils that is to state associations which needed to find each one of the individuals who made resistance towards the upset and dispense with them. Around the same time, Gaddafi brought forth another across the nation body, the People's Social Leadership Committees (PSLCs). The aim was that of fusing the tribal initiative into national basic leadership. The individuals from this new association were heads of tribes, families' pioneers and vital individuals of the nation. The point of the PSLCs was that of setting up social security, keeping the tribes and the imperative families to contradict the administration and looking after control. Moreover, it additionally needed to circulate State's appropriations and issue authoritative reports. In 1996 Gaddafi made the PSLC, assembling every one of the parts of the PSLCs, changing the last in a national association.

¹Mekrief, "جرائم اللجان الثورية", op.cit, p.76.

During his rule, Gaddafi kept creating committees which carried the name of “people”¹, probably in order to underline that what he was doing was intended to make Libyan people's life better. The ideology that he brought in the country appeared to be innovative. However, what he did was mixing already existing ideologies (socialism, pan-Arabism, Nasserism), manipulating them².

At the mid eighties and nineties, Libya became excluded by the international community because of the Lockerbie event and supporting terrorist activities and organizations, thus became sanctioned in 1992 by almost all of Europe besides USA. But the sanctions came to their end in 1999 after Libyan acceptance of handing over the two suspects of Lockerbie. At this point, Libyan policy inclined to the inner affairs rather than the outer ones, more opening on the world and more reforms on economic appeared to be urgent, and those new visions of Libya was adopted ,we may say basically, by Gaddafi’s eldest son Saif al Islam. Saif al Islam was looking into the heart of the Libyan community after the seven years sanctions and found that the people lost a lot and entrust whispers about the dictator started to show. He tried to give a push for the economical life in order to gain the people’s trust again. Nearly, his intention to reform was most of the time opposed by Gaddafi.

4. Gaddafi’s Opposition Movements

The political opposition to Gaddafi’s policy and behavior started long back to the 1980s, they were, politically speaking, mostly outside Libya because Libya was governed in a way that nobody can talk in an ill manner about the regime and the leader’s policy.

There were numerous small groups opposed to the Gaddafi regime both within Libya and outside. The two most important groups in the external opposition were probably the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), the last made out of nonconformist previous Libyan POWs in Chad. The NFSL's significance mirrored its money related quality. It sorted out the 1984 assault on Gaddafi's living arrangement at the Tripoli Bab Al Azizya sleeping quarters. Inner resistance was not evident. Various inside Islamic resistance

¹ Green Book, p. 36/43.

² Human Rights Watch, *Libya. Words to Deeds*. The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform, vol. 18(1E), January 2006, p. 1.

bunches developed in the 1990's, to a great extent in the eastern area. Critical aggravations occurred in the East in 1993 and 1996, yet protesters generally had little effect. Just a couple restriction individuals were accepted to be on the loose.¹

By the break of 1980s, rivalry developed between the official Libyan Government and military pecking orders and the progressive councils. A failed overthrow endeavor in May 1984, clearly mounted by Libyan outcasts with inside support, prompted to a fleeting reign of fear in which thousands were detained and grilled. An obscure number were executed. Gaddafi utilized the progressive advisory groups to look out affirmed inward adversaries taking after the upset endeavor, along these lines quickening the ascent of more radical components inside the Libyan power chain of command.²

By the late 1980s, some observers believed that Gaddafi's hold on the Libyan public had waned, owing to his radical and sometimes bizarre policies in the name of the Libyan revolution. However restriction bunches, comprising generally of Libyan outcasts, have been insufficient. The principle danger to Gaddafi's proceeded with run originated from the armed force itself. Various plots and upset endeavors had been revealed, the majority of which have not genuinely debilitated Gaddafi's power. Wary of the expert military, Gaddafi frequently moved senior officers starting with one post then onto the next to keep the officer corps from moving in. Likewise, he endowed his own security to a handpicked separation from his own particular area. A far reaching interior security framework including police, mystery administration, and local Revolutionary Committees were alarmed at any signs of traitorous movements.³ Any type of difference from the approaches of the legislature was esteemed in opposition to the upset and subject to extreme corrective measures.

Before the 1990s, Gaddafi started to seek after a hostile to Islamic fundamentalist approach locally, seeing fundamentalism as a potential reviving point for adversaries of the administration. Ecclesiastical positions and military commandants were as often as possible rearranged or set under transitory house capture to diffuse potential dangers to Gaddafi's power.

¹ St. John R. B., *Libya: from Colony to Revolution*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 247.

² "Libya Before and After Gaddafi: An International Analysis", 2012, available at: <http://dspace.unive.it/bitstream/handle/10579/2506/817727-1165480.pdf?sequence=2>.

³ Sabra, op.cit, p. 28.

Aside from clashes with the conventional religious progressive system, Gaddafi had a longstanding clash with the Muslim Brotherhood and other fundamentalist gatherings, whose enrollment went into outcast or underground amid Gaddafi's residency. In March 1987, it was accounted for that nine Muslim nonconformists, individuals from somewhat known gathering called Holy War, were executed for plotting to kill Soviet counsels. A progressive advisory group part was killed in Benghazi in October 1986 by the up to this point obscure Hezbollah (Party of God)¹. Accordingly, the progressive boards of trustees started to screen more intently than before the exercises of the mosques, the imams, and the fundamentalists. The nation's forty-eight Islamic foundations purportedly were shut in late 1986, evidently to stem the tide of religious, especially fundamentalist, resistance.

In 1988, confronted with rising open disappointment with deficiencies in shopper products and misfortunes in Libya's war with Chad, Gaddafi started to control the influence of the progressive boards of trustees and to organization some household changes. The administration discharged numerous political detainees and facilitated confinements on outside go by Libyans. Private organizations were again allowed to work.

In spite of these measures, inward dispute proceeded. Gaddafi's security powers propelled a preemptive strike at asserted overthrow plotters in the military and among the Warfallah tribe in October 1993. Far reaching captures and government re-rearranging took after, joined by open "admissions" from administration rivals and assertions of torment and executions. The military, once Gaddafi's most grounded supporters, turned into a potential danger in the 1990s. In 1993, after a fizzled overthrow endeavor that ensnared senior military officers, Gaddafi started to cleanse the military occasionally, killing potential adversaries and embeddings his own particular steadfast adherents in their place.

Gaddafi experienced proceeded with issues with Islamic fundamentalists, most strikingly the Libyan Islamic Group, and it endeavored to kill him in 1997. Based essentially in the United Kingdom its impact inside Libya does not have all the earmarks of being significant.

Many Libyans trusted that the inward restriction, both liberal (mainstream) and religious, was extremely powerless. Gaddafi had long taken a reliably unforgiving perspective of religious

¹MacFarquhar, Neil, *"The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You Happy Birthday"*, New York, Public Affairs, April 2009, p.13.

fundamentalism, and there were no reports of this state of mind evolving. There was clearly some political strain between the western and eastern areas of the nation, most likely incompletely in light of the fact that fundamentalism was more grounded in the east of the nation. Improvements since 11 September 2001 and the across the board global assault on psychological oppression most likely added to an underestimation of fundamentalist inclinations in Libya.¹ Certain restriction against Gaddafi and his administration exists outside Libya, fundamentally in Egypt and the UK. Most specialists did not consider this restriction extremely solid, and absolutely not dynamic and strong. The administration was not thought to consider it to be a genuine risk at present.

Many observers believed the US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices regarding Libya did not provide a wholly accurate and up-to-date picture of current conditions in Libya in all respects.

Libya's tribes were arranged in a pyramidal lineage scheme of sub-tribal, clan, and family elements. Before Libya's independence in 1951, the tribes operated as autonomous political, economic, and military entities. Tribalism remained a key determinant in political allegiances in Libya. Neither oil wealth and modernizing influences nor Gaddafi's revolution altered the web of kinship-based loyalties that characterized Libya's domestic political scene for centuries.

5. The Opposition and The Revolution in 2011

The link between the opposition to Gaddafi and the Revolution goes way back in history especially in 1996. The genesis of the Libyan revolution has to be found in the massacre of the Abu Salim prison in 1996². The real story that one day, with evident no reason, around one thousand and two hundreds detainees (the number is not exact in light of the fact that it was never archived) were killed by the watchmen of the jail.³ One day to another the families who needed to visit their relatives in the Abu Salim jail, were said that they were not permitted to do it because of security reasons. Just in 2000, 2001, reality weaves up: the detainees are dead. The moms and relatives of the detainees started to assemble in Benghazi each Saturday keeping in

¹ Boyle, op.cit, p.40.

² Ivi, p. 15.

³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), Libya: June 1996 Killings at Abu Salim Prison, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/06/27/libya-june-1996-killings-abu-salim-prison>.

mind the end goal to challenge the absence of data in regards to the passing of the detainees and sobbing for their misfortunes. Obviously, they were subjected to the dangers of the State's officaries and the Libyan media did not manage it. The families requested the compensation of their relatives' bodies, since likewise the Libyan law gives that, in these cases, the cadavers must be come back to the families to be covered.¹In 2004, Saif al Islam, one of Gaddafi's children, formally educated the groups of the casualties of the demise of their relatives in the jail, without giving any detail of their passing. Around the same time, in one of his discourse, Gaddafi educated people in general of the slaughter, maintaining that the gatekeepers needed to shoot to keep arrange in the jail.²On September 25, 2011, the National Transitional Council reported the revelation of the mass grave of the Abu Salim jail, where more than one thousand and two hundreds carcasses were found. The committee has asked help toward the West with a specific end goal to handle the DNA of the bodies so they can be come back to their families to be covered. The Libyan upset broke out as an outcome of the detainment of FathiTerbil on February 14, 2011, the lawyer who lawfully spoke to the groups of the casualties of the Abu Salim jail.³His capture came after the Libyan government demand to end the indications which have been happening each year by the groups of the casualties. The lawyer reacted that he was not the promoter of those appearances, in this manner he couldn't request that the families not assemble and show.⁴On February 17, 2011, numerous protests went ahead in the nation. Gaddafi's progressive councils composed counter-indications: understudies were compelled to convey a picture of the despot and to walk alongside servicemen of the panels dressed with green outfits.⁵ (Green was the color of the Libyan flag).

The insurgence started likewise on account of the Gaddafi's restriction amasses abroad. On January 2, 2011, a gathering of Libyan educated people in a state of banishment in Great Britain assembled in Manchester keeping in mind the end goal to bring forth a program of protection of the Abu Salim families who continued showing in Libya. On January 10, 2011, the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition was reached by this gathering, with an interest for a

¹ Ibid.

² Adly F., *“La Rivoluzione Libica. Dall’Insurrezione di Bengasi alla Morte di Gheddafi,”* Milano, Il Saggiatore Ed, 2012, p. 16.

³ Adly F., op.cit, p. 25.

⁴ Ibid, p. 25.

⁵ Ibid, p. 25.

preparation of all Libyans living abroad.¹Both in Libya and abroad sit-in before Libyan international safe havens and appearances against the imprisonment of the lawyer happened. The Libyan government started to take careful steps keeping in mind the end goal to maintain a strategic distance from an unrest as it was going on in Tunisia and Egypt. To start with, on February 1, 2011, Jamal al-Hajji, a human rights dissident, was captured for an infraction of the Highway Code. Amid the previous days, the extremist had instigated an assembly to approach more opportunity for Libyan individuals through web.²Hajj was kept amid all the Libyan unrest and discharged just the day of Tripoli's freedom. Second, on February 10, 2011, amid the meeting of the National Conference for Libyan Tribes, Gaddafi himself interceded, promising another Constitution, the arrangement of another administration, and an arrangement of ventures for the advancement of the nation.³

The critical defining moment was the capture of the lawyer FathiTerbil on February 14, 2011. The news was spread on the web. The following day, a sit-in was sorted out before the Benghazi Tribunal.⁴Alongside the groups of the casualties of Abu Salim, numerous different residents accumulated before the tribunal, battling for flexibility. Different indications happened in Libya, however this was distinctive: many thousands partook in the show for the casualties of the Abu Salim jail.⁵They requested the quick arrival of the lawyer and equity and opportunity for for all Libyan individuals. That same night the pictures of Gaddafi conveyed by the understudies constrained by the legislature to show for the administration, laid broken in the city, while the workplaces of the progressive boards of trustees had being decimated. A few mottos started to be sung by the dissenters; one of them was "Ya Gaddafi barra, Libya hurra", that is to state "away Gaddafi, Free Libya".⁶In spite of being a pacific sign, the security administrations assaulted the nationals with truncheons and weapons. Amid the night, the police made watches keeping in mind the end goal to capture learned people known for their human rights activism. One of them was IdrissMismari, captured for having discharged a few articulations to an Arab broadcasting station by means of phone. The State TV reported that master Gaddafi indications were

¹ West, Johnny, "Karama!: Journeys Through the Arab Spring", Quercus, August 2012, p. 103.

² Mekrief, "مأساة ليبيا ومسؤولية القذافي", p.76.

³ Ibid, p.77.

⁴ Webb, Brandon, "Benghazi: The Definitive Report", edition 1, William Morrow, February 2013, p.58.

⁵ Ibid..

⁶ West, op.cit, p.26.

continuing, demonstrating pictures of nonconformists conveying green banners. Gaddafi made his first discourse after the fall of Mubarak: he declared that every one of the administrations maintained by West nations, similar to Egypt, were bound to fall since they have engaged tranquil relations with Israel. He included that the West couldn't obliterate the Libyan State and that every one of the Muslims needed to battle against it. He additionally guaranteed that the masses were exhibiting against the Western imperialism. It appears glaringly evident that Gaddafi did not comprehend what he was discussing: the demonstrators were challenging his administration.

The versatile communication organization continued sending messages to its supporters, where it was composed not to overwhelm the four red lines depicted by Seif: the Islam religion; Libyan security and strength; the solidarity of the nation; and Muammar Gaddafi. On February 16, 2011, the indications spread everywhere throughout the nation, both in known protester urban areas, similar to Al Bayda and Tobruk, and follower ones, as BeniUlid. Then, the State press kept on portraying the exhibitions as appearances master Gaddafi's administration. More understudies were compelled to walk hollering at the West. The lawyer Terbil was discharged trying to end the appearances at the same time, in the meantime, Gaddafi started to send his powers, alongside his brother by marriage Sanussi, known for having being the head of the Libyan knowledge and wedded to Gaddafi' sister. Regardless of the arrival of the lawyer, the dissents did not end. By February, 17, 2011, the Libyan security powers were not ready to control the circumstance any longer. On Thursday, February 17, all the number of inhabitants in Benghazi is assembled before its tribunal. The funerals of the day preceding casualties turned into a savagery: the security powers started to shoot the general population, killing twenty-four individuals in Benghazi, forty-five in the nation. Close to the bleeding restraint of the dissents, the administration chose additionally the cut each station of data, for example, web and the telephonic lines, and to interfere with the renovation of power and fuel.¹ This was the beginning of the Libyan insurrection.

The challenges spread everywhere throughout the nation: initially, in the Oriental locale of Libya, Cyrenaica. In Tobruk, the most Oriental urban areas of the nation, the landmark of the Green Book was even obliterated. As indicated by a portion of the dissidents, the head of the

¹ West, op.cit, p.25..

military station of Tobruk guaranteed the populace he would have not assaulted them. Also, he involved the air terminal, so that the legislature couldn't send any military guide.¹ Following three days of grisly constraint, all the waterfront Oriental territory was freed. Most of the military strengths passed in favor of the dissidents. In every one of the urban areas transitional congresses were built up by the natives. In the interim, the administration enticed to bomb Benghazi, however the pilots declined to do it. Along these lines, Gaddafi procured hired fighters who could take after his requests.

The opposition outside Libya and inside were working together when it comes to political efforts and field work in the streets. Then the people actually looked forward for the political opposition and its elite to form a political institution can be their voice for the first after 42 years of oppression, and indeed that political body was found under the name the National Transitional Council which is a temporary in action till the formation of a real and more effective government and head of state can lead the country. Therefore, it was necessary to give birth to an organization which could reorganize the everyday life of Libyans. The strong point which facilitated the birth of the council was the defection of Mustafa Jalil and Abdelfattah Younis, who were respectively the former ministers of justice and home office².

Benghazi turned into the linchpin of the uprising: from one viewpoint, the square before the tribunal was always possessed, day and night. Then again, the authorities of the Libyan armed force made themselves accessible for the National Transitional Council and compose the resistance of the city. On February 26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council received res. 1970, denouncing the conduct of the Libyan government and connecting with an arms ban, a travel boycott and the advantage solidify over the region.³ According to Human Rights Watch, by February 19, 2011, Libyan forces had already killed eighty-four protesters⁴.

The turning point of the revolution was the intervention of the international community in the country: res. 1973 authorized the use of force in order to halt the massacres in Libya in the

¹ Boyle, op.cit, p62.

² Ibid, p.63.

³ Res. 1970, United Nations Security Council, February 26, 2011, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011)).

⁴ Human Rights Watch (HRW), Libya: Security Forces Kill 84 Over Three Days, February 19, 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/18/libya-security-forces-kill-84-over-three-days>.

name of the responsibility to protect and established a no-fly zone over the country. The resolution was adopted on March, 17, 2011¹. Thus on March of the same year, NATO started to bomb Libya: the objectives were army installations. In any case, there have been dissensions about the NATO mission: it appears that occasionally the air strikes missed the objectives and murdered regular folks or Libyan guerillas rather . On May 15 Misrata, a coastline city controlled by Gaddafi's strengths, was freed. On late April NATO planes started shelling the city focusing on followers' tanks and big guns . Before the end of July the dissidents had picked up control over the principle boulevards which connected Tripoli with Tunisia, encompassing Gaddafi. Tripoli was unquestionably separated on August 16, 2011. After four days agitators' cells in Tripoli propelled "Operation Mermaid Dawn", bolstered by NATO. On August 21, 2011, Tripoli was involved by the agitators experiencing little resistance.

The struggle came to its end and Tripoli was captured by the rebels and afterward Colonel Gaddafi was found and killed to death by one of the rebels. He thought in one of his speeches that he will not be captured like Ben Ali and Mubarak, but it appeared to be otherwise. Yet the new era of freedom was carrying alot of troubles for the Libyans and they would not think that the quest for democratic state can cost them more than the bill for freedom vs Gaddafi. It is possible to assert Libyan revolution has been very peculiar: unlike its “sisters”, the Tunisian and Egyptian one, in Libya a real civil war broke out in the county. It needed also the intervention of the international community. Although the struggle ended yet the political immaturity of the political personals elite in Libya have made it difficult for a smooth transition to power with elections after another and no real government was decided. Many political forces appeared with many loyalties and military branches eager to fight each other to hold power or to support a political agenda of party or another.

In the next chapter we will deal with these political differences that occurred in Libya which made it difficult to hold the stability of the country that is now at stake, and how the Libyans manage to hold the daily life of the people without central government appear in the horizon.

¹ Res. 1973, United Nations Security Council, March 17, 2011, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973\(2011\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)).

Chapter 3

The Revolution and Current Libya

I. Through the Uprising

1. The Political Life During and Post-War

What happened during the opposition fighting Gaddafi's resistance, the opposition political elite agreed on the foundation of a political body can guarantee the unity of the country. An Interim National Council has been founded in 27th February of 2011 in Benghazi where the head leaders of the military militias and defected units of the army, state officials, and even the powerful tribes which have a strong effect on the Libyan Society, since most of the population belong to tribal groups, all gathered for a political purpose of establishing a new future for the political life in the country¹.

Then this body updated itself to become the National Transitional Council, and it was struggling to seek international recognition until a new body of governance can replace it. The council was calling for free election as civil society and drafting a new constitution in a way a new political life can be established with the recognition for democracy with the separation of powers. Yet The Council was dominated from political elite. Its members originated from the country's northeast at the beginning due to the ongoing war in the other areas, so nobody could Join the Council except the North-Easter elites. Temporarily the Chairman of the Council was recognized for many Libyans who wanted to reform, he is Mustafa Abdel Jalil, from Al Bayda. He resigned from Gaddafi's government when he was serving as a Justice Minister².

He was one of the first opposition members that joined the Rebellion, as we mention some names of them. In addition Abdul Jalil there were a lawyer from Benghazi Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, and Mahmoud Jebril³, who was for his defection from the regime a key role in the favor of the opposition. Jebril who is known for his good relations with the West tried hardly to get the

¹Lacher, Walfram: "*Libya After Gaddafi: State Building or State Collapse*", SWP German Institution for International and Security Affairs, March 2011, P.2.

² Ibid, P.2,3.

³ Ibid, P.4. See also :*Libya Challenges after Liberation*- Libya Working Group Report: MENA Programme, P.4,5.

recognition of many Western Countries for the NTC. Jebril was graduated, academically speaking, from the US and headed reforming committee between 2007- 2009 in an unsuccessful efforts to reform the Libyan economy. Even we talk about the Revolutionaries of 17th February movement we cannot just drop off mentioning other academics who were of much significant representation as good as the defectors, like Ghoga and FathiBaaja. Later, of course, after the entire liberation finished, the council accommodated representatives of other political backgrounds, tribes and regions¹.

2. The Tribal Importance

The Libyan society - as we mentioned before - is a tribal Society where loyalty play a great influence on the victory of social movement. Prior to the revolution, Gaddafi as a tribe man and a leader at the same time understood the essentiality alltribes and their loyalty for his rule. So, he gained an alliance with two major tribes in Libya: the Warfalla, where its population distributes Tripolitania region, and the Magarha in Fezzan, in addition to this tripe which is small compared to the other two. The tribal alliances where mainly concerning the insurance of loyalty and maintenance of stability in the regions. The tribes also functioned as Networks through which the Gaddafi regime distributed patronage².

From the first two weeks of the revolution the opposition political groups trying to open connection lines with tribes members and leaders knowing the importance of the tribes in winning the conflict. Number of the leading tribes and numerous of other belonged to smaller tribes begin to support the Rebellion directly or secretly, and some of them announced publicly their defection from supporting Gaddafi and his regime³.

We can numerate the foremost ones: The northeastern tribes, Berber tribes (Amazigh Minority) of JabelNafuza, the Toubou minority in the south, some parts of the Warfalla. As a proof to the social overlap between the population and the tribe, and the tribes importance in the Libyan society, there were (are still) many important names in the opposition belong to them like Abdel Jalil, former Interior Minister Abdel Fattah Younis, and ambassador to Washington Ali Aujali, all of the those three members of the northeastern tribes. In spite the revolution against

¹Alaadin, Ranj:” *Libya Defining its Future*”, Final LSE Ideas, P.34.

²Lacher: *Libya After Gaddafi*, P.2.

³ Ibid. P.3.

Gaddafi united the society to democratize the state and although the tribes do not have loyalties in the large cities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Misurata, yet indicators appeared earlier that the next level of the Civil War would appear as a clash between tribes under the color of the state¹.

Consequently, the transition was also likely to unleash power struggles within the tribes—such as, rivalries between opponents and Loyalist of Qaddafi among the Warfalla, Magarhaand Qaddadfa. This can explain part of the current struggle between the disputants in Libya next to the issue of terrorism.

3. The Defected Elite

The changing of the equation for the rebels were also favored by the defection of some State senior officials in the first few weeks of the uprising in the country. They were former Elite and played a great role in supporting the righteous demands of the revolution. They also contributed in the formation of the Interim National Council in the readiness phase for the post-Gaddafi era. In addition to names of Abdel jalel (former Justice Minister) and ambassador to India Ali Al Essawi, and Mahmoud Jebri, there were also former ambassadors to the UN and USA, AbderrahmanShalgam, Ali Aujali, Omar Al Hariri and Abdel Monem Al Houni the last two names were friends for Gaddafi and participated in the Coup of 1969 with him, but later in 1975 exiled for treason in the failed attempt of a coup in that year. Of course for the revolutionaries who is carrying so much hate for Gaddafi and his staff, there would be suspicion about some of those defectors. For example, there was an accusation for the former Interior Minister Younis for his participation in killing and torturing people in the prisons in 1990s².

Younis who was not convicted or proved for unofficial charges against him, was killed by unknown assailants in August 2011 believed to be Islamist (Younis was the Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Liberation Army at the time).

¹Bahrdawaj, Maya: *“Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War”*, 2012, P.77.

² Mahoney J, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” *American Journal of Sociology* (January 1999), pp. 1154-1169; Ragin, Charles C., *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 13-43.

Talking about defection inside the family circle surrounding Gaddafi, there were two major incidents, the first was about Gaddafi's cousin who was an Envoy to Egypt in Gaddafi's staff, but apparently he resigned and fled to Syria and kept on supporting his cousin. The second was about Gaddafi's brother-in-law, Abdallah Senoussi. Although he was not from the leader's tribe, he was very close to him, yet it was said that Gaddafi had dismissed him from his responsibilities (he was the head of the Secret Service) assigned another one for the task¹.

It appeared that defection in the government was politically important for the revolution to success. The majority of the defected personnel helped Libya later to build political strategy for the future, and the others like Younis helped organizing the rebels' fractions and what was left of the regular army until his death.

4. The Origins of the Opposition Groups

If we track the opposition to Gaddafi, we find unorganized groups and they varied in their backgrounds. We mention the most functioned ones before the Revolution²:

- 1- the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL).
- 2- National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO).
- 3- Libyan League of Human Rights (LLHR).
- 4- Libyan Constitutional Union (LCU).
- 5- Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

Those were all fighting to change the regime, yet most of them failed in their backgrounds to finish the regime. For example, in 1980s and 1990s the opposition consisted of exiled parties with narrow support.

In 2011, we found that what actually happened at the streets of Benghazi, Tripoli or other cities were spontaneous movements of ordinary People, they could be unemployed young men without any political affiliation. They took on their behalf to face death to claim their Liberty, I

¹Zenko, L, "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East: Making Sense of Libya." *International Crisis Group*. Middle East/North Africa Report, 6 June 2011.

²Wehrey, Frederich: "*Ending Libya's Civil War: Reconciling Politics, Rebuilding Security*", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Development Research Centre, Sep 2014, P.4.

mean Libya was a real impressed nation for a long time and the people inspired of the Revolutionary climate in the region¹.

Politically, yes we can find an organized group of men in the streets and they turn to be following a specific agenda better organized political body. Such a opposition we found it in the Muslims Brotherhood² stands out with organizational structures, plans and significant support. They operated most of their movement in northeastern parts or the country. Among their ideologies is to create a moderate standard of political Islam in line with the modern challenges of current life, hand by hand for the construction of a strongest state. They believe that Islamic form of the state can fix money deficiencies in the society and even in the state. In addition to that, political Islam forms the solution for the Arab world which is being stroke by weakness in the late century. The Muslim Brotherhood also distinguished from its antagonists over the power by its ideologically defined programmed in political context. Social base rose (and still rise) among those urban middle classes and tribal transcendence. Their great contribution to the uprising was linked even to the initiation of the uprising itself; from the very beginning they called for protests in the streets and rallies in the major squares³.

Later, because of the extreme use of force by Gaddafi regime to end the protests, and because of the militarization of the conflict many of its protesters and members turned to the military action with the Islamic fractions that fought against the regime⁴.

When the conflict settled they supported the NTC which agreed to include all the political forces of Libya, but they found that inappropriate to include deserters from Gaddafi's inner circle and opposing the restoration of the same elite even if Gaddafi is gone⁵.

When political life started to establish itself, that Islamists are divided into two kinds: The moderate Islamists and extremists Islamists. In the history of the Legion of position many extreme Islamists were fighting with the former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), and they were active in the northeastern region where Islamists flourished in 1990s. Abu-Salim prison incident was related to their fighting against the regime and many of them either killed or

¹Lacher: Libya after Gaddafi, P.4.

² Ibid. P.4,5.

³Alaadin, *Libya Defining its Future*, P.33.

⁴Wehrey: "*Ending Libya's Civil War: Reconciling Politics, Rebuilding Security*",P.6.

⁵Lacher: Libya after Gaddafi, P.5.

prisoned for life. Now, the Libyan Jihadists who are originally from the LIFG and North-East of Libya released those and suggested that they can be repositioned in the North-East where they once belonged¹.

These between 2011 and now either join the Islamist forces with the Rebellion and later joined the National Army, or they reorganized their fractions during the transition and seek to expand their influence which majorly led for ISIS to exist in the region. These groups believe not in a democratic state but in what is called original-Islam-state (old Islam Doctrines of the state).

As for the Islamists who supported the monarchy and the great nephew of King Idris they are barely existed in the political level. Although the current Libyan flag was once referred to the kingdom of Libya, yes it does not mean the Libyans dreamt for the monarchy to return, it was merely just a symbol for the Libyan Revolution and Gaddafi-free Libya. Besides, from the 1960s most of Arab countries faced waves of changes like Arabism that changed many regimes and enlarged the political ideologies of the Arab people - not just in Libya. The modern systems of governance have been changing in the world and the Libyans fought more likely for a modern and democratic style of a state; the monarchy can eliminate their dreams in criticizing the head of the state, if necessary, in fighting corruption, for example. In addition to the freedom that they want to witness, the monarchy system would not guarantee (in Arabic countries) a fully free elections on English manner in the parliament and other state facilities in a democratic state. The monarchy is distinguished in just a few countries like in the United Kingdom of Britain which hardly you can find a similar system².

5. State Destruction Vs State Construction

The state destruction aspects would have strongly appear in the Libyan Style of revolution. Till now the success of the uprising suffers from the results similar to the dissolution of a state³:

a. Inefficiency:

The late regime was suffering already the lack of efficiency toward the responsibilities of the state. System of control that Gaddafi created drove Libya into economic distress, in addition

¹Toaldo M, " A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players", available at:

http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict

²Sukar M, "نقاط تشرح لك ماذا يحدث في ليبيا" Elbadil Website, available at:<http://elbadil.com/2016/03/15/5>

³Lacher: *Libya after Gaddafi*, P.4,5.

to the continuous need for experienced workforce and intellectual and scientific expertise from outside of the country. This was because of weakness in the state in fields like educational qualification systems, social rehabilitation, human rights and individual and social freedom. Such a policy in Libya can leave the country without enough intellectual minds to chase the great responsibilities of the next level of the state-rebuilding¹.

Even politically, the long-term of Gaddafi rule with his closed circle of politicians, Leave no space - under such repressive regime - to practice politics or to upbringing of new generation of politicians can construct even the least method of democratic state. The situation above looks not very encouraging without doubt, but if we look at the current status of Libya, much of the politicians are either defectors old personal or younger who did not practice enough politics to qualify them as elite of the country. The true and real examples of the political and social inefficiency in Libya would appear in the lack of agreement upon one government to run the state, ending the civil dispute between the political parties, and finally fighting terrorism which took advantage of the situation. These issues are till now stuck in the unknown future of the country.

b. Territoriality:

In the uprising the social movement appeared to be taking shapes of territorial divisions. Even in the names the divisions took regional shapes for instance "Benghazi Rebels", "Misurata Fractions" and "Tripoli Rebels". In the Civil War with the regime Libya parted into rebel-controlled and loyalists-controlled cities. While pre-existing tribal division were only temporarily subdued under the NTC's anti-Gaddafi platform². What came next was the NTC tried to control divisions as many as it can in the loyalists areas. The loyal areas like Tripoli and Sirte was the harder parts for NTC and revolutionary troops which developed it into a civil war. Yet the problematic point was that the Revolution was somehow imposed itself on those loyalists from the fractions of Gaddafi and other tribal militias, so only to discover that the uprising was not Nationwide request or acceptable³. Later, some territories turned into loyalists for the former style of the region or at least bringing back the old principles of reconstructing it. The supporters

¹Combaz E, "*Political Economy of Libya aftreQadhadi Regime*", GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report, 14-2-2014, P.2.

²Bahrdawaj, op. cit, P.82.

³ Ibid, P.82,83.

this idea would mainly appear in the eastern part of the country and not satisfied about the current goings on in the country¹.

That might led eventually to some serious issues for Libyans like the rivalry between those territorial divisions and the Civil War in 2014 and ISIS existence in Libya.

c. Militarization of the Movements:

Due to the heavy use of violence on behalf of the regime, the militarization of the revolutionaries became a need and kept the NTC as a powerful representative of the revolution². Even when the NATO intervened to prevent the situation from worsen, they supplied the rebels fractions with weapons and military training, which played a great role in violent development inside the country. Even in the black market arms trade and mercenaries became number one on the Libyan grounds.

The NTC seemed to create mass militarization that changed the balance from peaceful protest to armed conflict. Figuratively, the NTC was ready to make a pact with the devil to get rid of Gaddafi's regime regardless of the consequences that may appear in the near future in downfall of the state³.

Militia formation started to take a place in the Civil War of 2011 with regional and tribal loyalties⁴. Those procedures allowed many parties to have arms with immunity in the absence of the government and state systems. Gradually after Gaddafi's overthrowing, Libya became like a forest of weapons. When National cause brought them together in the past, Libyans turned to fight each other in 2014 when politics divided them in the favor of pursuit greedy ambitions to seek Power over the government. Later, militarization of the 17th February Revolution was considered to be a mistake by many officials in some of NATO's countries Because militarization made plenty of guns enough available for extreme Islamic groups to flourish like

¹Harris G, "The Libyan Quagmire." The Middle East Institute, 4/29/2011. P.30.

²Harris; Brancati, Dawn, and Jack Snyder. "The Libyan Rebels and Electoral Democracy." *Foreign Affairs*. 2 September 2011.

³Lacher: *Libya after Gaddafi*, P.5.

⁴ Ibid, P,5.

jihadists with LIFG, ISIS and Ansar Al-Sharia to bump out as regional claimers of land in Libya between 2014 and 2016¹.

d. Non - Patriotism (National Morals Vulnerability):

When Libya started to recover from the war that stroke the country from east to west, the political actors of the country within NTC and outside of it, did not act within the framework of national awareness which by turn to the lack of national awareness within the society and among the public unity in the country. Frankly such awareness slightly shown from time to time in some occasions like fighting ISIS².

In Libya there are very few truly National actors the major rest of them are either local players³, regional leaders or representatives of specific tribes, regions or political orientations and agenda. The least number of political actors in NTC, parliament and later three disputed governments were hardly have a common national sense of responsibility toward the country and the people.

For example, from 2014 onward the political Elite in Libya has been split between supporting or legitimize recognition the government in Tripoli or the one in Tobruk, except the fact that the latter one enjoyed International recognition and parliamentary support in Tobruk even before the creation of what is called "Presidential Council"⁴ in 2015. Yet the other government does not even recognize the elected Parliament and will not quit to be active in the presence of a legitimate government in Tobruk. That is because several types of actors scramble for power in today's Libya: Such as armed groups (major cities) other Islamic armed groups (west) and tribal activity in the east and center of the country. Thus, unfortunately the political agenda for each group imposed itself by replacing the national concern or interest for the whole country⁵.

¹Aljazeera "اتفاق مؤتمر الصخيرات" : <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic>

²Toaldo M, "A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players".

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵Wehrey: "Ending Libya's Civil War: Reconciling Politics, Rebuilding Security", P.7.

II. Current Libya

1- What Really Happened:

The Libyan people was expecting a lot of hopes from the Revolutionary wave that the country and the Arab region - in general - was experiencing. After the Gaddafi killed, the political crisis within the country began to widen until it formed a gap between the Libyans. Military actions took place in the country to develop later into a Civil War in 2014. The beginning of the political life was when the National Temporary Council was the first political body in the country, which is recognized by all Libyans. The NTC supervised the formation of the first free Constitution of free Libya with a next promising step to form a parliament for all Libyans¹.

The Libyans were watching the process with hope of a new democratic state, yet what came after disappointed many. At that time Benghazi was under military survey because some of Gaddafi's tough remaining resistance still functional. The NTC at the time was setting its conferences in Tobruk and elections were ready to proceed².

In 2012 the NTC dissolved and another body had been formed which is the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli. This body took the responsibilities to continue the political process held in Tobruk. As we mentioned before, the Constitution had been constructed along with a temporary government to run the country also formed through the process of uprising³.

In that government there was an Islamic presence and members of the Islamic movement who helped to win the war against Gaddafi, they have a lot with what to come as we mention afterwards⁴.

In 2014, the elections came with its results to constitute the House of Representatives (HoR or the parliament). The results were not pleasant for the Islamic parties and Islamic influence within the running process¹.

¹Alaadin, *Libya Defining its Future*, P.34.

² Ibid. P.34.

³ *Libya: Challenges after Liberation*, P.4,5.

⁴ Naser, Abdul Rahman. "ما الذي يحدث في ليبيا؟ خمسة أسئلة توضح", Sasa Post, November 7, 2014. Available at: <http://www.sasapost.com/what-is-happening-in-libya-five-questions-to-explain-to-you/>

The objection from the Islamists (Justice and Construction Party plus Muslim Brotherhood) and other Islamic currents) came first as a shape of argument. This argument said that in one of the Articles of the Libyan Constitution no session of the parliament shall be held except in Benghazi city, so to speak.

It means under the Constitutional proclamation and as Islamists objected, the parliament must officially been delivered the power in Tripoli and start its task and sessions in Benghazi. Many suggested this is a "lame excuse", because the Islamists lost the election. What if we talked fairly, the legislative power is important for a democratic state to be run correctly, and when the Islamic bloc required the parliament to hold its sessions in Benghazi, that was under legislative rule under constitutional authority.

The Islamists (Fajer Libya) were at the time indulged in military struggle with a retired General Haftar's forces (*Karamet Libya*; Operation dignity) who was fighting against the Islamic influence in Benghazi and Darna cities. Here comes the answer to the “why did they not object to the internationally-recognized Parliament?”.

Actually the beginning of the original conflict was complicated with other Arab countries and Regional influence imposed itself on the Libyan grounds. Gen. Haftar was nominated by many of his officers to be the head of the Libyan Army until later officially granted that position by the government rent. Haftar showed his support for the elected Parliament and any government may emanate from its power. In fact this was a good reason for the HoR and the government to trust him, but not the GNC².

The GNC who stood with Islamist against the parliament announced that the parliament should dissolve itself because of the Constitutional error that occurred and because of the object or the constitutional claim by the Islamists that once the session held in another city than Benghazi, then the parliament shall be revoked. Because the parliament holding sessions in Tobruk not Benghazi meaning violation of the Constitution. By the way, the GNC task was to supervise the formation of the Constitution and the legislative task of creating the parliament through elections. Once those tasks are fulfilled, the GNC must cease to function. Yet the GNC

¹Sukar M, “نقاط تشرح لك ماذا يحدث في ليبيا”.

²“What is Happening in Libya”, Reuters Agency, at:<http://www.reuters.com/news/world>

never recognized the HoR for the reason that the Islamists involved about the violation of the Constitution¹.

In fact the request for held the sessions in Benghazi was impossible at that time. The major reason was that Gen. Haftar has announced, 16th July 2014, the Dignity of Libya Operation against Fajer Libya² forces (who were mostly Islamist and supporters for the Islamic bloc) under allegations of fighting terrorism, blaming Fajer Libya for the failure in and blocking off the re-formation of the army and police forces. Other accusations were obstruct the handover of power, seeking to divide the country and distract its unity. The thing that angered the GNC and the islamist bloc was Tobruk's HoR support for Hafter and confirming his accusations to Tripoli, which escalated the situation for GNC not to dissolve itself and not to recognize the parliament in Tobruk³.

In addition to all those complexities, where is the International and Regional factors as we mentioned earlier, and in fact this influence might even change the whole equation for Libya for the last five Years and maybe more to come. As many political analysts also believed, Hafter with his forces (Counter-Revolution as many suggested) was supported by some Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) with Egypt⁴, while the Islamic bloc was favored by the support of Qatar hand Turkey. This played a great role in the conflict that is taking place in Libya now. Many Blame those countries for the responsibilities of what is going on, and others blame one side without the other and vice versa. But actually who is to blame? If there is a free people and free political Elite of the country, many Libyans ask themselves why should there be ties to the interests of other countries rather than the national interest of all? Why one side should not accept defeat in elections and respect Democratic results? Why the voice of the people cannot be delivered anymore?. Such questions actually one cannot answer by himself, but all Libyans can answer and they deserve an answer from their political Elite.

Where there is HoR and caretaker government in Tobruk internationally recognized and supported by Gen. Haftar, there is also another newly formed government in Triple with fully functional GNC (that is supposed to be non-functional with the existence of the parliament) as a

¹Lacher: *Libya after Gaddafi*, P.5.

²Toaldo M. Op.cit.

³Combaz: "*Political Economy of Libya aftreQadhadi Regime*", P.5,6.

⁴Toaldo M. op.cit.

parliament for that government. This happened when the GNC announced the assignment of a Prime Minister, Ahmed Maitek, as a head for the government and elected by voting in GNC¹.

The HoR and the anti-islamist voices in Tobruk's Government accusing his election with falsehood and that he is a member of the Islamic bloc. Thus, Abdullah el Thinni, the Prime Minister of Caretaker Government in Tobruk refused to deliver his powers. Unfortunately, the situation went on complicating itself by GNC assignment of a new Prime Minister, Omar el Hassi, for his government, yet the government of the HoR in Tobruk continued with her same Prime Minister el Thenni² to assure that their government is legitimate government for Libya (we are sure that both government claimed the same thing). So, we have two governments with two military forces support each one and acclaimed war against each other.

Legislatively speaking, the Supreme Court (SC) in Tripoli had looked into the claims of both sides and consider it afterwards, officially, that all the HoR decisions and actions considered Canceled and non-functional if it is not behaving according to the Constitutional order³.

The same SC approved earlier for el Thenni Government when it was in Tripoli not to invalidate the legitimacy when he was elected in GNC for another government in Tripoli. Of course el Thenni defected from Tripoli to go to Tobruk where he was elected from the HoR to be the head of Tobruk's government later.

The HoR in Tobruk refused the SC judgment on the basis that it was considered to be under threat of "terrorists", in an indication to Tripoli's Government⁴ (because the court is located in Tripoli). Thus, the struggle between the powers in the East and the West continue to exist, not against each other only, but sometimes also inside each one of them there is separate conflict between its members came out regarding to their assessment of their political interests⁵.

Let me explain, for example Tobruk's government has chosen Haftar to be the General Commander of the Libyan National Army⁶ and later the initiator and the leader of Operation

¹Bahrdawaj: "Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War", P.84.

²Naser, Abdul Rahman. "ما الذي يحدث في ليبيا؟ خمسة أسئلة توضح"، op.cit.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵Al Delu, NurAnuar. "ليبيا، ماذا حدث، وما الذي يحدث" Ommah Post, December 29, 2015, available at: <https://ommahpost.com/libya-what-happened-and-whats-going-on/>

⁶Sukar M, op. cit.

Dignity which fights every fraction and militia that does not combine under the National Army and serve specific political purposes and agenda, for this an argument has been risen about that ambitious general who Tripoli called his movement the Counter-Coup against the Revolution¹ and the free will of the people. Also they accused him of bringing the country to another phase of new-Gaddafi regime, even in Tobruk's government there were some voices raised inquiries (members in Tobruk'sHoR) about his unexplained future and some doubted his intentions.

The other example about conflict within Tripoli's government would appear between members of the GNC. Some members of GNC do not welcome all the time the increasingly strong influence of Islamic bloc upon the leadership of the council. They objected to the behavior of some of the Islamic factions in Tripoli and its other cities. Those factions who were acting in opposite to setting-peace-process and try to escalate the situation.

Sometimes the fractions of the Islamic bloc are the most problematic in Tripoli. For example last year raided on some government headquarters or re-position forces in locations without taking the security issues in consideration.

2- One More Government:

This time the formation of a new government was a result for the international awareness of the crisis that tearing Libya to pieces, which is feeding the Islamic State (known as ISIS, Arabic; *TanzimAldawlla*) the terrorist fear that is knocking at the door of every European country nowadays, not only the Middle East. The UN with other powerful countries in the matter have sponsored the efforts in reaching a settlement for the crisis².

It took the International Community in addition to State Secretary of the US John Kerry months to convince some members of both parties that the only way for better Libya is to agree on the formation of accord government. The actors had been assembled in Rome earlier in December 2015 for Libya and continued their support for a peaceful settlement between the parties. The same conference in Rome³ concluded to the agreement for Accord-Government formation that can end the political crisis and face the threat of terrorism which became the main concern of the European Group and the other international players.

¹ Aljazeera, op. cit.

²Toaldo M, op. cit.

³Ajazeera, op. cit.

Since ISIS has struck cities in France and Germany with terrorist attacks, the issue of ISIS in Libya became more urgent to tackle. Even more urgent than fighting the State Organization in countries like Syria and Iraq, because Libya is far from the European borders (less than 200 miles from the Italian Coasts). Thus, Libyans are forced to reach a solution, if not for their sake, then for other countries of the world. Therefore, the conflict as it was and as it is became International and Regional issue¹ regardless of the fact that the conflict should be settled by Libyans themselves.

The unseen point that the International Community is bearing in mind that you cannot drag the parties to sign an agreement without reconcile them with each other. In other words, both Tripoli and Tobruk were not ready to reconcile because one of them (Tobruk) holding the international recognition and the other one has zero-recognition except for very few countries who are playing according to their interests. How for the other party (which is Tripoli) who fought, as his supporters suggest, Gaddafi and their fractions liberated the country could stand such bias toward the other government?. In that respect the international actors were naturally neutral in the crisis as they should be. Many inside Libya wondered if the Supreme Court has falsified the HoR in Tobruk, shouldn't the elections be redone for the sake of the democracy in the country that paid thousands of lives for it? In fact, the answer of this question interrupted by many Regional interests, and by Regional interests we mean every country involved or stands behind the scenes of the ongoing conflict (we deal with this subject in another paragraph).

Anyway, the conference agreed to be set in Skhirat, Morocco² with the presence of some of the Libyan parties (not all the members of both Tobruk and Tripoli) who decided to respond to the efforts and agreed upon the formation of Government of National Accord (GNA). Both parties in Libya did not welcome the conference when the president of the GNC and the head of the HoR both rejected what resulted from Skhirat Agreement³.

The conference was with the presence of important players in the Libyan in matter like the UN Envoy for Libya Martin Kobler and many Arab and European foreign ministers. The Libyan delegation was with both GNC and HoR members who wanted for the negotiations to continue

¹ Christopher S. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 53–55.

² Aljazeera, op. cit.

³ Ibid

and for the settlement to be fruitful. Yet Nuri Busahmain, the Head of the GNC, and Akyla Saleh Head of the HoR said “that the members who signed the Accord they only represent themselves” in reference to their rejection of the agreement.

The parties in Skhirat agreed on nominating Fayiz al Sarraj to be the Prime Minister of this Accord-Government¹. The task of this agreement to lead a temporary phase in which a new legislative election (parliamentary elections) shall be set. Although both Saleh and Busahmain rejected the Accord in meeting set for them in Malta, they assured the continuing negotiations to reach a national solution can guarantee the formation of a national government that embrace all distributed parties. But they rejected Skhirat Conference results because the members of both GNC and HoR that attended the Conference were not assigned from the headquarters.

Anyway, the new Government and the results of Skhirate Conference were successful not by the compatibility between the Libyan disputants, but by the international recognition that the Accord-Government held. The new government with GNC or HoR liked it or not, it became a new reality for Libya with now the international recognition being withdrawn from Tobruk's government and parliament.

Although both GNC and HoR agreed on the new names for the government and the terms on which it began to function, both of them tried to delay the process of delivering or giving up their powers. According to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) the Presidential Council (PC) (which is headed by Fayiz al Sarraj) presides over the newly-born government which is the Government of National Accord² (GNA) and shall be delivered power in its headquarters in Tripoli. GNA should be endorsed by the HoR in Tobruk for the agreement to success in its results and the government to begin to function, yet the HoR till now did not vote on the GNA³ though many of its members have expressed their support if the matter came for voting.

The GNC later delivered its headquarters in Tripoli for the favor of the GNA in hope the other party (HoR) may also do the same and give up his powers and everybody can enter

¹Libyan Political Agreement, 17 Dec. 2015, P.6,7. Available at:

<https://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=miXuJYkQAQg%3D&tabid=3559&mid=6187&language=fr>

² Ibid, P.6.

³ Nasser, Abdul Rahman, op. cit.

elections within two years¹ of GNA's governance. But until now the HoR in Tobruk did not vote (or voted with rejection) which made the whole process more difficult for the new government.

So, lately on October this year some of GNC's supporters and fractions tried to make a coup against the GNA in its headquarters in Tripoli as a response to the rejection of the others in Tobruk on the reason that they are not serious about cooperating with the new government and that they do not want for the matter to be settled diplomatically, so to speak. Many of the former GNC accused the headquarters in Tobruk and Gen. Haftar of having no intention of delivering their powers and that they want to drive the country to another civil war.

While writing, the matter now appears to be suspended between the west and the east with the fully recognition of the International Community to the GNA which most of the HoR members supported and agreed in many occasions that they can vote on giving confidence for the new government, yet the leadership contradict what they are saying. The situation seem to be more complicated then we think of it. There are “hidden hands”² behind the failure in reaching fruitful end of the crisis. This bring us to the regional actors and the factors behind the ineffectiveness of any peaceful settlement. Those regional actors who stand in the back lines and the Libyan political players who stand in the front lines play a role in the happenings.

3- The Regional Actors:

a. Egypt:

The role played by Egypt in the Libyan equation made analysts to think of it as the most powerful hand appeared till now after former President Murssi overthrown and the anti-Muslims Brotherhood president Sissi appeared in the political scene. Even for a closer look, regular flights from Tobruk's headquarters toward Cairo became often and normal. But behind masks there are weapons deliveries to Haftar³, intelligence presence and cooperation and heavy Egyptian Air Force flights in the skies of Benghazi⁴, Tripoli and other cities and towns. Egypt have an enhancement of its political project in the region which aims to eliminate political Islamism with efforts to fight back the Muslims Brotherhood where ever it is just for sake not to cross the

¹Kadlec A, “A Stable Transition in Tripoli, Actually,” The Daily Star, February 21, 2012

² Osborne P, “With Gaddafi Gone, Who Will Run the New Libya?” The Telegraph, October 20, 2011.

³Toaldo M, op. cit.

⁴ David D. Kirkpatrick, “Suspect in Libya Attack, in Plain Sight, Scoffs at U.S.,” The New York Times, October 18, 2012b, p. A1.

Egyptian borders¹. Egypt tried to create a region in the east with a leader allied to Egypt to hinder ISIS or any Islamic current from entering Egypt through the Eastern borders with Libya. yet Egypt did not admit any of the accusations directed to her in supporting the East to split from the West, and assured many times that Egypt want for the diplomatic efforts of the UN and the International Group to be fruitful. On the ground Egyptian support for Haftar is clear even if his Forces were on collision course with UN-backed Unity efforts².

b. United Arab Emirates (UAE):

The UAE involvement in Libya is less than the Egyptian influence especially because Egypt is a neighbor country. The UAE goals is not different from Egypt's³. The UAE support to Tobruk and Haftar would mainly appear in weapons. Some analysts think that the UAE influence should not be underestimated because it is a reflection of the KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) vision on the situation in Libya. True that the KSA is not in the political forefront of the matter, but it remains so because of some political sensitivity between Libyans and Saudis for a while. Anyway the UAE and KSA policies toward Libya would appear as two sides of the same coin.

c. Turkey and Qatar:

The influence of those two countries, according to observers, would also appear even less on their ally the GNC than Egypt and UAE influence on their ally in Tobruk, because the political decision and Elite in Tripoli is more solid and solo. Yet the two countries believe that they hold the key in Tripoli. Although in the beginning of the Revolution Ankara supported the rebels with arms, and although Qatar has links with one of the great politicians in the Muslims Brotherhood and a former jihadist against Gaddafi regime AbdulhakimBelhadj⁴, yet it appears that there is no direct influence from Duha or Ankara on Tripoli like the influence of Cairo on Tobruk.

4- Interests' War (Proxy War):

There are two wings of conflict struggle each other in Libya. They appear as two key engines to the ongoing situation in Libya. The first wing of actors include Turkey, Qatar and

¹ Reuters, op.cit.

²Toaldo M.

³ Ibid. See also Nasser Abdul Rahman op.cit.

⁴Chivvis; Christopher S, Martini; Jeffrey: *"Libya after Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for The Future"* International Security Research Division, Library of Congress, ISBN: 978-0-8330-8489-7, 2014. P.25.

Sudan which they support the Islamic bloc with its government in Tripoli (not recognized internationally). This GNC and its militias fought Gaddafi and won the war for the Libyans to be free, as their supporters say. The actors supply those militias with money and arms using Sudan as a transmit base through the corner that Sudan share its borders with Libya¹.

In fact this is an assumption and there is no strong proof of this suggestion. Yet the military presence of Turkey and Qatar in Libya goes back to 2011² when the revolution began, because cutter had participated in bombarding some of Gaddafi's forces gatherings and vital targets for the regime in the West. Qatar also logistically and financially supported the Islamic fractions on the ground till they overthrown Gaddafi.

Some believe that Qatar was the first reason behind the Islamic dreams to spring up in the region, and the supporter of ISIS to flourish; by suggesting that Qatar funded the extreme Islamist groups and jihadists, and later by some intermediaries with ISIS. Still, in fact, Those are just assumptions the purpose of which is the exchange of accusations between the two parties of conflict.

Turkey was present in Libya also from 2011, but the presence enhanced after Gaddafi's downfall. Politically, Turkey supported the Justice and Construction Party in Libya which is the Libyan arm of Muslims Brotherhood.

When GNC constructed its government, Turkey was from the few countries that recognized this government. Turkey even assigned an Envoy to Tripoli in 2014 under the pretext that this is a part of the Diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement between the disputants.

Turkey actually has received a slap after former President of Egypt Murssi and the Muslims Brotherhood had been overthrown in Egypt by the Military Coup in 3 July 2013, since Ankara was one of the great supporters of Murssi. The military staff of the Coup, head by its Leader President Sissi, later classified the Muslims Brotherhood a terrorist organization and panned its existence in Egypt. Turkey was preferring for this experience not to expand beyond the borders of Egypt. "Terrorizing the Muslims Brotherhood" Egypt is working on exporting this term to other countries like Libya to fight the Turkish influence in the region and to end political Islam

¹Chivvis and Martini: *Libya After Qaddafi*, P.25,26.

² Mohamed E and Arfaoui J, "*Libya: Ultimatum Issued to Militias*," Maghrebia, June 13, 2013.

movements. By doing that, the Turkish support for the moderate Islamic movements in Libya portrayed as support for terrorism in some news agencies.

So, new rumors began to spread that Turkey support for Tripoli became a fact even by Turkish Officials comments themselves. For example, in one of the televised interviews with Turkish President Erdogan on Al Jazeera Channel, said that” he does not accept for the parliament to be in Tobruk and that this is a “mistake”, as he said. “Whythe HoR should assembles in Tobruk not in Tripoli” he added, “we do not accept that, we are here facing and an inappropriate situation”¹. This statement for many analysts suggested - even confirmed - that Turkish support for Tripoli’s Government is undeniable.

El Thenni, the Prime Minister in Tobruk expressed that Turkey is untrustworthy for them, and accused Turkey for many times of being supply the Islamist in Tripoli with arms². While many reports from other countries like Egypt and Greece seemed concerned about finding arms deliveries going through their Territorial Waters, US sources were either divided between supporting the suspicious feeling about Turkey's dealings in the region or confirming that those are just another "assumptions" about the Turkish role in Libya the purpose of which accusing Turkey by its opponents.

The second wing, or the opposite actors, are Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE which support Tobruk's side³. Many times those countries promoted the Tobruk's Government as the legitimate and internationally recognized Government of Libya, but many inquiries imposed themselves on why design a government exclude the Islamist Bloc who have had a heavy weight publicly and in the liberation of Libya from Gaddafi?

These actors supported the liberal parties because they afraid of the political Islam may reach the power in the region. Anyway such equations may be complicated and not understandable till now. Egypt has been also supporting the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its leader Gen. Haftar with arms and intelligence coordination.

This is shown clearly when Egyptians Air Force initiated many airstrikes against many locations of terrorists in Eastern Libya after the Massacre of the Egyptian Copts in 2015 at the

¹ Aljazeera.

² Al-Shaheibi R, “*Eastern Libya Pulls Away from Central Government,*” Associated Press, March 6, 2012.

³ Ibid.

hands of ISIS. UAE sent many military equipment and vehicles to support the LNA and the other militias with Tobruk. Reuters Agency confirmed more than once that both Egypt and UAE Air Forces participated in operations for strikes in Eastern Libya. The New York Times confirmed from a high senior official of US Government the UAE and Egypt have initiated secretly many airstrikes against the moderate Islamist militias of Tripoli which are doing the task of protecting the government of Tripoli. Although the US government did not know of this, but those airstrikes with accordance to the Western Alliance interests, the Alliance that is formed of France, UK and US Forces, that is since the Western Forces nature of airstrikes are targeting the so-called " Militant Islamic militias". The war against ISIS gave the opportunity to both the West and the Arab countries called "Moderate" like Egypt and UAE to strike any other Islamic militia that is belong to Tripoli headquarters and Muslims Brotherhood which are by their turn supported by the first wing of actors that we dealt with earlier.

Thus, these are the major actors in The Libyan scene. Situation in Libya can complicate the political efforts in approximating the interests between disputants in the shadow of hidden conflict between other countries. This conflict suggests that in the absence of reconciliation of interests between those countries, the matter in Libya may continue without knowing a fruitful, unless the disputants in Libya decided to forget any allegiances may tie them to other than the Homeland and public and national interest.

5- ISIS Existence and Nature of Western Existence:

a- ISIS in Libya:

ISIS is the short form of the currently most known terrorist organization in the Middle East and the world the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in Arabic known as *Tanzim al Dawla*.

Due to the ongoing changes in the Arabic World especially in the Middle East from 2011 till now, and regarding to the political split in Iraq and the Civil War in Syria (Syrian Revolution), many Islamic groups have been waiting for the opportunity to be on the ground with many foreign remembers entered the Middle East chasing their beliefs in Jihadism¹. Those members originated mostly from countries that suffer from either oppression against Muslims like Chechnya and Afghanistan, of course beside a lot of members from the countries of the region

¹ Christopher Chivvis, "A Year after the Fall of Tripoli, Libya Still Fragile," CNN.com, August 23, 2012.

like Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Libya, some other Gulf Countries, Yemen and others from European countries.

Their doctrine of sect is Sunni sect of Islam. What enhances their existence was the regional sectarian war that is going behind the scenes against Sunni people in Iraq and Syria that is initiated by Assad regime in Syria supported by Iran, Russia, Hezbollah from Lebanon and other militias from Shiite backgrounds; the war against Sunnis in Syria and Iraq is practically a Shiites war against Sunnis in the region.

Later, those parties fighting with Assad regime and Assad himself took the presence of ISIS as pretext to continue their War in the region. The members of ISIS that are from Libyan nationality returned from Syria to their country in Hope of transferring the experience to their country. The main principle upon this group to exist, in their beliefs, re-bringing the first and the true days of Islam; working within the rules of Islam, so no committing sins or punishment awaits every sinner. This system works by force and coercion¹. This work hand by hand in establishing this Islamic State on every piece of land fall in the hands of these people². Other principles related to Jihad, supporting Muslims everywhere and face the Injustice done to Muslims³.

So, those Doctrines and principles were ready to transfer to other countries in the region, and the next stop was Libya. The Libyan returnees from Syria found what they want in a Country politically divided by conflict of power, divided regionally by the Civil War that just began in 2014 and frustrated people who hope for a slightest change, an excellent climate for terrorism to flourish indeed.

Their first start was in 2014 from the East where a town of Derna located (it has been believed that they are members of al Qaida and they start gathering in Darna in 2013⁴). Many of them fought in Syria and wanted to replicate with help from non-Libyan ISIS figures. Whether it is Syria or Libya the leadership of emirates or Wilayas (states) non-duality was the share of foreigners, and the name of ,as called, "al Amir" (the prince) is in charge of any land controlled by ISIS in Libya.

¹ David D. Kirkpatrick, "*Libya Democracy Clashes With Fervor for Jihad*," The New York Times, June 23, 2012, p.A1.

² Goodspeed P, "*Libyan Weapons May Soon Be in Terrorist Hands*," National Post, September 9, 2011, p. A1.

³ Ibid.

⁴Chivvis and Martini, P.27,28.

Abd al Qadir al Najdi may suggest a non-Libyan figure, probably from Saudi origins. The prince or the governor of state followed to the "Caliph" the main head of ISIS. Nobody knows exactly where Caliph's headquarter is, weather in Syria, Iraq or another country, but he is certainly Iraqi because of his name, Abu Bakir al Bagdadi.

Anyway, the Caliph Abu Bakir "preached" in one of his clips that the presence of ISIS in Libya in 2014 started to be working on, and that the vital provinces are included in the presence of ISIS in Libya. He declared three Wilayats: Barqa (east of the country), with Darna as its headquarters; Tarabulus (Tripoli), we Sirte as its headquarters; and Fezzan (desert province southwestern Libya).

Worth mentioning that Isis first base in Libya, Derna, included many of the forces that are not pleased about the general situation of the country. Those were either militias of LIFG and veterans all other fighters from Jihadism backgrounds who fought under the LNA and then rejected what Gen. Haftar has been doing of Operation Dignity, when they discovered that is most of the Operation was merely designed against Islamic orientation in Libya. Those groups in 2015 has been listed and included under the umbrella of what is called "DernaMujahideenShura Council" and we can call it the first Alliance that gathered some militant islamists with ISIS base and helped ISIS continued efforts in controlling the rest of the outskirts of Derna.

As for Sirte, the influence of Isis reached it in 2015, and what is known about this city is that Sirte the hometown of Gaddafi and the last to resist the Revolution in 2011 and the last to defect from the regime or fall in the hands of the revolutionaries. It considered one of ISIS fortresses in the Middle East after Musil in Iraq and al Rakah in Syria. After the control over Sirte, many ISIS senior figures began to show themselves in clips after taking over the city. One of the important reasons behind easily taking over the city was after the locals became frustrated and felt aggrieved because of the City's marginalization in post-Gaddafi Libya. This marginalization seemed for a lot of locals in the city that the new authorities are trying to take revenge over the former era because the city is the hometown of Gaddafi.

Yet the resistance against ISIS came from number of residents in summer 2015, when they attempted an uprising, but the consequences were brutal and the attempt failed. Since then ISIS initiated a new kind of governance. For example, they set some public executions against the involved people in that attempt in order to extend fear in the hearts of the public. ISIS also tried

to make it impossible to connect with the outside of world of the City by expanding in the outskirts of the city like taking control over some other towns and villages east of Sirte and attacking some oil facilities. However, al Najdi admitted in an interview with an ISIS application, that the armed groups within ISIS are suffering from some tensions and rivalries, in addition to other difficulties, prevent the organization from initiating other operation to expand much beyond Sirte.

Some of the surrounding areas of Sabratha is also enlisted as smaller parts in the existence of ISIS, yet earlier strikes of US Air Force this year in addition to some of the attacks that the jihadists who fought Gaddafi initiated (*al Bunyan al Marsus* Operation) succeeded in uprooting the militants from the outskirts of Sabratha.

To add up, there is also Libyan and foreign groups of ISIS are fighting Hafter's operation Dignity, it means that not only Fajer Libya is struggling back the Operation. This might leave us with some conclusions based on some of CIA suggestions that there are many sleeper cells of ISIS outside of Sirte region, they could be distributed in Tripoli and other cities to surprise their enemies. The intelligence reports of the Pentagon may underestimated the number of ISIS Fighters to 6000, that is because many locals and Libyan reports suggested that the number is much more than that and might likely to rise because of the continuing absence of the state and political concord within the country.

b- Nature of Western Existence:

The nature of Western existence goes back five years earlier when NATO intervened with the Revolutionary fractions¹ against Gaddafi's forces in airstrike and logistic and military support. But after the situation settled Western presence began to change to forms of economical shapes of existence. That happened when the Western insurance companies flowed to the Country with the Western military presence. Most of those are British and the French with some mercenaries who work on ensuring that the Western interest of oil are untouchable. In addition, we have the mercenaries that deal with protecting the VIPs of those companies in the shadow of Security absence and war. Some examples of all those companies are as the British Commonwealth Office suggested are "Control Risks", "Tango Special Projects" and the "Black

¹ Slobodan Lekic, "NATO Urges Libyan Authorities to Seize Arms Caches," Associated Press, October 3, 2011.

Water"¹ Companies. According to the Office the amount of dealing with one of them has reached 8 million Euro. This was the first step for the West in the region, until the challenges began to spread with ISIS existence in Libya. The thing that changed the West strategy in the region with suggesting to enhance their military presence in spite some regional countries opposition to that existence.

The Arab refusal for the Western military presence was clear and they showed it as a Western intervention in the Libyan affairs. Many Western newspapers like the French "Le Monde" and the British "Telegraph" admitted that some special forces of France, UK and USA are present on the ground to give some logistic and military support for the fractions that are fighting ISIS, like training and intelligence information which can help cooperation with the fighting forces on the ground in their operations against the Organization. This either appear as a pretext or justification for their military interference.

But let us be more rational in this discussion, what do we expect when a French city like Nice and another one in Germany has been struck by ISIS?. Even Egypt, which considered less powerful than France and Britain, when felt threatened by terrorism Egypt enhanced her military presence on the western borders with Libya and helped Haftar with his Operation Dignity with airstrikes. Yet many see that the presence of the French and British troops or Special Forces was even before ISIS start functioning in Libya, so there is no comparison.

Even Michael Fallon, the British Defence Minister, talked earlier about 1000 Soldiers with military advisor might be sent to Libya to help fighting ISIS. While "Le Monde" suggest that France is involved in a secret war against the head leaders of the Organization². The things that really happened when last January a French special force carried an operation along with airstrikes in Sirte has cost ISIS 14 members some of them were leaders in the Organization.

As for the US, the airstrikes appeared more veracious than their sisters in the French and the British side. But the US military involvement keep to be eliminated by striking just the precise locations that suggest terrorist activity by ISIS whenever requested. For example, last February US F-15s bombarded specifically an ISIS military training camp in Sabratha that cost 50 kills from the Organization.

¹ Nasser, op .cit.

²Chivvis and Martini, P.29.

So, that is the way is going: The French and the British are on the grounds and the Americans are in the air while Italy is a base for all.

But what distinguishes the running operations against Isis militant militias by France, UK and USA is the secrecy and the intelligence coordination operations not to be official because of some Arab countries refusal to their presence. Yet some Libyan parties seem to be satisfied or at least not minding their presence while they eliminate their opponents. In fact, this is because some of the airstrikes that has been done on some of the Tripoli supporters' militias which their opponents accused of being militant, for Tobruk it can be considered as a victory.

Although the Western military operation against ISIS is eliminating and enclosing ISIS power and help neighboring countries on non-proliferation of terrorism, but many Libyans inquire and wonder about the political tax and financial benefit might be reaped from such intervention.

6- Oil Facilities:

What should be worth mentioning that Libya considered to be one of the richest countries with oil and petroleum products; like natural gas. The known about the Libya's oil reserves are estimated to be 46.6 billion barrels, which made Libya the biggest Reservoir of Africa¹.

Locally, the body that was holding the responsibilities toward the oil sector was the Petroleum Facilities Guards² (PFG). Those are group of revolutionaries headed by Ibrahim Jathran³ with his militias took control in 2013 over the main oil export terminals in eastern Libya and later attempted to sell oil in a mercenary way made many people call him "opportunist". But the PFG has fallen apart yet the term remained to refer to his forces.

Jarthan's place in the political conflict was too narrow; he is not known or popular in the political map of Libya. Some parties best described him as a "federalist", while others find the term "political pragmatist" is best fit him. We mean by that he was trying to stick with the winner side of the political struggle, and which was earlier before al Sarraj's Government was

¹Sukar, op.cit. See also <http://www.sasapost.com/what-is-happening-in-libya-five-questions-to-explain-to-you/>

²Essul S, "Oil Exports Down to 160,000 Barrels per Day: Oil Ministry," Libya Herald, September 1, 2013.

³Toaldo, op. cit.

constructed when he inclined toward Tobruk's HoR. Nonetheless, he also tried to ally himself with Tripoli. He also enhanced his position with Haftar when he supported Operation Dignity that was before he accused him of trying to assassinate him.

He created financially a sort of balanced relationship with the two governments. There were some opposition to him in the PFG, but entirely not confirmed.

ISIS has tried many times to take control over the oil facilities or at least tried to strike in attempt to create some kind of distortion in the region. Yet the PFG and NATO airstrikes had repelled several ISIS attacks on oil facilities in the east of Libya. The possible explanation about ISIS attempt to control the oil fields in Libya was the continuous restrictions that imposed themselves on the Organization's oil sources in Iraq and Syria. With the increase of Western presence in the region, ISIS had no chance of coming near the oil facilities again. That is because, as we discussed earlier, the military existence of Western countries would be only to protect the Western interests in the region, which include oil interests as well.

This is by turn explained some of the quick Western military decisions about fighting ISIS which took control over Sirte's oil fields in 2015¹, but actually the richest part is in the East of Libya. Lately, ISIS presence in Sirte has been reported to be few days would be finished by the Operation "al Bunyan al Marsus" by the Accord Government Forces against the Organization, in addition to the airstrikes that ISIS is receiving from NATO that killed many of its leaders.

Current Libya learned a good lesson by the split that happened geographically and politically speaking. The country has been an open land for Terrorism taking advantage of the current conflict on power. ISIS progress on the ground in 2015 was not to be successful if the National Unity preserved to fight back the threat that made the West intervene. The weakness of the National Unity on Libya made it difficult for the Libyans to establish a new State to protect the riches of their land. Even the West took advantage of the ongoing War and political emptiness for the sake of the future interests. The coming scenarios are divided between: Either trend towards reconciliation of the two disputants under their new Government of Accord or the conflict will grow like cancer in the cells, the thing that may threaten the country to split into smaller parts, even smaller than the current circle of disputing; West Libya and East Libya.

¹ Nasser, Sasa Post, op. cit.

Chapter 4

The Libyan Economy in the Shade of Uprising

1. Economic Studies on Libya and the Uprising

Many researchers indicated that Libyan economy witnessed many factors affected the economic life in the country; the first and foremost was the 17th February Revolution. Earlier studies upon the Libyan Uprising case was expecting many good aspects of the future for Libya. Some studies explained their optimism on the basis of NATO and International Community interference; some explained that if NATO solved the struggle for the revolutionaries, and the new government after Gaddafi gained the credibility and the legitimacy of both the people and the international actors with supplying of the needs for the country after War, then the economic future of the country would be bright. Despite this fact, they forgot that Libya is extremely poor country when it comes to demographic concept of the state. But this was not the only and sole problem, Libya under Gaddafi was sanctioned more than once and wasted millions on failure projects and alliances. Yet, Libya is not a poor country as the statistics about its oil treasures suggest, but what came after the Revolution was the most complicated scenario for the country¹.

During and shortly after the Revolution, Libyan economic status looked shiny for those who analyzed its future on the basis "if it falls for the good hands". The UN statistics suggested a good high rate of household income a year, while the World Bank estimated the other aspects of economy such as literacy which has got 89 percent, and suggested youth could help build a new state. Of course with high percentage of the wealth the country could grow more than the Libyans themselves expect, especially after Gaddafi failed strategy of economic governance demolished. The British Petroleum Company (BP) estimated that before the War of 2011 the Libyan oil wells were drilling in a capacity of 1.6 million barrels a day, and suggested that with proper care of the new government the rate would go up. The oil production in Libya is about

¹Vira, Varun & Cordesman, Anthony: "The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory," CSIS, 20 June 2011, p.70.

2% of the global supply, which is a respectable level of production that is guaranteed to continue even for eighty years to come¹.

The Libyan opposition relations with the West has grown more promising after the NATO sided with the revolutionaries. Unlike Gaddafi any new government in Libya would ensure the good relations with the West, because the West marketing with Libya expected to be in its best days, and the new head body of Libya can notice that the few years after the revolution would reap the benefits of the development of such relations. The world marketing of oil would be also promising with those relations to improve the price of the Libyan oil, with expectation of opening a new era of investments that was not existed in Gaddafi's Libya. In Africa Libya considered one of the richest countries, yet during the revolution turned to be one of the countries that we call the "recipients of foreign aid"².

The good relations with the US would appear clearly in the intention of the US Government ,according to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declaring, "would help the Libyan people" by releasing the 37\$ billion of Libyan State assets that was frozen in the Revolution period. There appeared to be a great deal of money for Libya, such as foreign reserves for Libyan investment and funding overseas amounted to 110\$ billion. Those numbers were estimated with the early days after the Revolution, but how much of them are in the Libyan hands nobody can know or investigate. But we do know that although the wealth of Libya is exists, yet the country suffers consequently of shortage in home-funding; providing salaries, and besides the Libyan Central Bank (LCB) these days is nearly bankrupt due to ,some analysts suggest, the insecurity and the political issue that is still stuck in the unknown. Not to mention also that the economy in Libya suffered dangerous damages in the 40-years-term of governance that was famous for sanctions against the Libyan State affected the people and some vital institutions in the 1990s. Additionally, the Civil Wars in 2011 and 2014 affected the production of oil, especially in 2011.

The economy during the Revolution nearly stopped due to the oil industry shutting down. Although many predicted the hydrocarbon sector would witness a growth after the Revolution, but the sector went down to nearly 200,000-250,000 barrels in days of insecurity and wars. This

¹ Dmitry Zhdannikov, Regan E Doherty and Mohammed Abbas, "Special Report: Qatar's Big Adventure," Reuters, June 9, 2011 available at: <http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/idINIndia-57601120110609>

² Varun & Cordesman, p. 70.

type of production continued to exist during the political dispute in the country and the new Civil War in 2014¹.

The demographic insufficiency in Libya made it a country with population matches the economic richness of the country, but in fact Libya is highly dependent on migrant workers when it comes to social labor and even other fields like teaching, technology, construction and the hydrocarbon sector. The migrant work force estimated, before the War of 2011, to be 2.5 million, which relatively a great level for the population that were 5 million at the time. The migrant labor force in Libya was majorly from poor countries from Asia and Africa, and their numbers decreased starting from the War in 2011 up till now because of the instability in the country².

Furthermore, the long term of Gaddafi rule was known for its dictatorship when it comes to the resources and wealth that reaches the population. Billions of dollars were concerning the inner circle of the rulers at the time, while Libyans had been suffering unemployment reached the third of the population. Anyway, the recent years of Gaddafi rule witnessed well percentage of investment and economic reformation had been taken care of by Gaddafi's own son Sayf el Islam, yet the unemployment was dangerously clear, and the income of the individual was less than 200\$ per month with public-sector wages unchanged in almost 30 years. The reform of the public sector and the private sector was slow and in the beginnings, but as a result to the War in 2011 the reform witnessed a cut from that continuous process of reformation³.

Between 2011 and 2016 the unemployment turned out to become migration of many families because of the ongoing conflicts and wars either with ISIS or between the political parties themselves. The ill-equipment state in Libya along with the split-up in the political decision made it difficult for the economy even to match the period before the Uprising. The percent of rate of growth in 2010 was estimated to be 7.4, where in other statistics after the war the Libyan economy shrank to 19-20 percent in 2011. This shrinking continued to rise sometimes or showed no improvement in the following years of the military and political dispute between the parties on the ground.

¹ Davidson A, "Economists Diagnose Libya with Resource Curse," NPR, February 25, 2011. Available at: <http://www.npr.org/2011/02/25/134048260/Libyas-Economy>

² Gurman, Hannah, "Migrant Workers in Libya," Independent World Report, April 25, 2011.

³ Varun & Cordesman, p.71.

The educated youth of the country continued to suffer from the unemployment and migration toward Europe, Turkey or other countries to avoid the conflicts in Libya¹. Many Libyans of the educated class preferred to continue their lives always from the complicated situation in their country. Lack of opportunity for those has affected the economy by not using their skills and experiences in vital fields in economic development, in a sense that the political scene has overwhelmed the country by disputing.

Even there appeared to be a phenomenon of the Hidden Economy, where illegal deals of economy can be made without being registered in the state, and money reach groups of people in the end without being registered. We are here not even talking about small illegal businesses that simply being initiated in the absence of the strong state presence, but about some illegal resources smuggling from Libya toward unknown destinations; it has been reported that between 2013- 2015 some oil ports witnessed shipping oil in steamboats. These ports were either controlled by The PFG, ISIS or some other jihadist or radical groups such as Ansar al Sharia or LIFG. Such deals damaged the Libyan economy and took advantage of state-non-controlled resources in the lack of State security presence and inefficiency in reaching true state-building².

Earlier researches upon the Libyan economy suggested that if a good environment along with security and political stability can be found in the country, a true development of other aspects of economy can flourish. For example, Libya is not a country that is so dependent on its oil resources, there are many well-preserved Roman and Greek archaeological sites that help the tourism sector to reopen again and attract many tourists from Europe and other countries. Additionally, many of the Libyan cities are Mediterranean coastline sites, which are ready to become serviced to the tourist industry with cooperation between the private and public sectors. Therefore, we are not mentioning only income of tourist sector, but also domestic income that contribute in the country's economy. One more investment can be made in thousands of acres of undeveloped arable land³. Not to mention also the existing domestic industries that are not

¹ Varun & Cordesman, p.71.

² Toaldo, Mattia, "A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players", ECFR Report. Available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict

³ Walt V, "The Post-Gaddafi Boom in Libya, Foreign Bankers See a Coming Bonanza," Time Magazine, June 9, 2011.

related to oil industry; petrochemical, iron and steel, and some traditional industries which contributed already in Gaddafi's era domestically in the general income¹.

2. The Regional Influence and Recent Status of Libya's Economy

The Qatar-Turkish economic influence in post-Gaddafi Libya appeared from the first year of the Revolution in 2011. Qatar has its issue with political influence in the country because Qatar is extremely wealthy state, thus the ambition of Qatar was to gain political influence by supporting, economically, specific political parts. In its earlier support in 2011, Qatar provided significant support to Eastern Libya including funding estimated to be between 400- 500\$ million, without knowing that this part of the country may turn one day against her wishes.

The Turkish ambition appears to be both economic and political, in the sense that Turkish companies of construction, as many analysts' opinions suggest, would be ready to reap the political support for the revolutionaries in gaining the reconstruction tenders and contracts. Such contracts was promising for the Libyan economy given the scale of infrastructure damage that the 2011 War had left behind. But the political conflict development in the country that led to another War in 2014, and even now the political instability is holding the process of growth back to extremely dangerous future for Libya.

In 2015 the GNC's Oil and Gas Minister estimated the damages of hydrocarbon sector to 60\$ billion between 2013-2014 because of the security chaos and armed conflicts, in addition to the falling prices of oil globally².The oil ports witnessed shutdown between 2013 and 2014 because of foreign parties interference cooperated with domestic parties. Many believed that the stability of Gaddafi's era was at least holding the oil production to fixed points of 40-45 billion dinar annually. In 2010 the revenues which mainly was contributed by the hydrocarbon sector (around 96 percent of general revenue) reached 46 billion dinar annually. Nevertheless, the Revolution of 2011 had decreased the hydrocarbon revenues to 17 billion dinar. Yet, the year 2012 was a year of refreshing for the market after the war when the revenue jumped to 60\$

¹ Varun & Cordesman, p.72.

² Ahmad al Khumaisi, "خسائر النفط الليبي تتجاوز 60 مليار دولار", Alaraby, 28 January, 2015.

billion, while it was expected to be fixed, the revenues started to decline in 2013 to 40 billion dinar, and continued to decline till it reached 15\$ billion in 2014¹.

The Oil and Gas Minister of the GNC confirmed that the oil wells turned to be conflict zones between the Revolutionary "Libyan Dawn" Forces, GNC forces and Haftar's forces (Dignity of Libya Campaign). The Minister clarified that this situation worsen in shadow of the lack of central government in the country. He added also that the initiation of a new National oil facility in eastern Libya and another Central Bank there has caused a lot of economic confusion in the country. The political issue in the country is immersing the national economy in the political bickering that cost the country billions, while the economy construction is suffering failure to compensate even the domestic damages and responsibilities. Thus, the democratization of the economy suffered from holding due to the political planners' argument about the political benefits that they intend to reap.

In other words, Libya turned from the tremendous waste for the benefits of a narrow ruling elite in Gaddafi's Libya to another waste through the further fragmentation and instability caused by political split-up. The state economy construction is suffering from political immaturity failed even in establishing one economic body that can exclude political affairs from the economic ones.

¹ Al Khumaisi, Ibid.

Conclusion

The quiet conclusion upon the Libya uprising case stands according to the conclusion of what will happen then in the status quo. The observing on the Libyan democratization of the state faced an existing issue of long-term oppression shaded the Libyan society for decades, blocked the process of shifting to a successful experience of uprising. Amid of all the sorry aspect of the Libyan transition and policies change, there are other helpful aspects in terms of civil rights and society. Although the civil society in the country is suffering from exclusion, the shifting from the dark ages under Gaddafi's rule has changed this fact but not to the extent required. The fragmentation in the country's politics may either lead to unite the Libyans for demands of stopping the political ridiculousness, or to lead for the divide in the country continues; leading to disintegration of the community; risking the future of Libya. All scenarios are expected, but none of the deficit choices must be the doom of a country paid many lives for the freedom claim which is in the civil right of every community.

More than five years have passed and the political elite of the country till now suffers from the lack of the will to respected the civil society, crafting the legitimate and democratic institutions that could be able to fulfill the aspiration of every Libyan fought for better future after Gaddafi's Libya. The Libyans should be interested in the process of democratization and involving themselves in solving and providing the solution for the political crisis that blocks the transition. I strongly presume that in the shadow of political division that effect both the political elite and within them the people, there might not be another Uprising in Libya can pave the way for the required transition, unless the Libyans forget their loyalties to the disputed parties and preferred to support the greater good in a national request ending the armed conflicts and the political argumentation.

The democratic governance in Libya required aspects are not present in the Libyan society - not yet- which can determine how newly empowered citizens shape their polity. The first one appeared clearly in the 17th Feb Revolution when citizens came out unified with their National demands; this what we call it "national identity awareness". The case these days that the trumping of narrower communal identities is triumphing in the face of national identity, which is somehow is forgotten by the political majority since Libya is more tribal country than a civic one.

The second one is the civic and political engagement that the people witnessed in their early days after the Uprising victory. But those experiences in their engagement shaped their political orientations and interactions without the awareness of what might be the outcome a political stubbornness. Libya was already a fragile country without a state governance on the country, so when the political elite rose in the beginning of the process the people should choose carefully. But what happened in Libya is that every political party chose himself and behind him popular incubator shaped by their colors of communal identities.

The third aspect is both intellectual and educational, which is the “democracy” idea. The Libyans practiced their demands in 17th February Revolution with words of freedom and democracy, yet when they came to the practical part they failed to analyze the notion of democracy. When we watched the 2014 elections, we found that two poles of political elite in Libya struggled to reach the power. The problem in their process of election was that in both; did not respect the Democratic process; and did not apprehend the outcome of not respecting democracy.

In my explanation, the Islamic bloc lost the election in 2014 but invented a constitutional flaw in the Parliament procedures - which is according to the Constitution was right - to prevent the parliament from being legitimate; political competition followed democratic elections, where by the release of the results the competition is done. Yet, many of Libyan politicians think of democratic competition as the means to obstruct the competitor government's performance. Nonetheless, the Liberal bloc that controlled the parliament after the elections refused to admit the Constitutional request in spite of the Supreme Court (the Supreme Constitutional Court) ruled to dissolve the parliament. But the Parliament of Tobruk(HoR) continues to function which complicated the matter, and this is also considered to be a flaw in respecting democracy.

The fourth aspect is the trust and the social cohesion; this type of integrity inside the Libyan society is affected by loyalties to ones political representative. The politics must not divideThe community, because when Libyans trust each other with the responsibilities, they may be able to cooperate with in one society to overcome the challenges that facing their country whether they are external or internal. For example, the lack of cohesion in the political and social community affected the rebuilding of one state to hold the responsibilities in the shadow of regional alliances

and even Libyan-Libyan alliances that tear the country apart into disputed regions inspired by not the unity of the people and the country, but by the blind seek of control over Libya.

The Libyan Uprising or the experience of rebuilding of a new state has been facing serious deficits since the early years after the Revolution. Those deficits are crucial for the establishing not even a new state, but also the society awareness of national identity. The deficits that are really present in the Libyan Uprising nowadays considered to be the ultimate outcomes of the Libyan experience of the Arab Spring so far, and they are:

- Political Failure:

After the revolution, the risen politicians of Libya and the decision makers has proven themselves to be the major responsible of the ongoing split in the political decision in the country. By the end of the Civil War with Gaddafi regime, the holders of power has been ineffective in managing the needed change in politics, and unwilling - or unable - to handle what is necessary for the process of socialization of the people that can guarantee their unity, plurality and inclusiveness as a nation. The policy that the political elite practiced starting from 2011 has been featured with stubbornness, intolerance, a lack of dialogue, and exclusionary procedures; such policies enhanced the popular communal attitudes along with sabotage of political and social diversity. What is discussed in these earlier lines can best be explained by three decisions had been made on behalf of the Libyan political elite that changed the face of political activeness.

On April 2012, the NTC founded the Integrity and Patriotism Commission to scrutinize the public officials who participated in the political process. This process of scrutinizing has prevented numbers of ministers and members of parliament from entering the political stage on the basis that they have suspicious backgrounds related to the Late regime. Unfortunately they were at the time representatives of some regions in the country. So, those regions have been left without representatives according to principles and decisions considered to be vague even without making this explained or public to the people.

The second one happened in 2013, when the GNC as the parliament at the time excluded many prominent political figures and even some high-ranking state officials occupied a

prominent positions in Gaddafi's era by political isolation law. This decision was against part of the people who might be of great experience in the state.

The Third incident was on February 2014, when the parliament criminalized any public or political opposition that can be thought to be glorifying Gaddafi's regime, thereby this was an extension to a law passed by the NTC in 2012 considered to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the same year. So, the case was not even excluding the political bloc that has been considered supporters for the former regime, but also not trying to reconcile or include them in the political future of the country. The procedures that have been taken place on the ground was even worse, where many of the neighborhoods and cities that was accused of being pro-Gaddafi had been ,under duress, evacuated with a displacement of its population and panned from returning to their homes.

Even the minorities in the country faced ignorance by the authorities in their failure to provide protection for the Tubu, Tuareg and Amazigh minorities are forming 10-15 percent of the population. Even in the political process the minority has been affected by refusing to grant calls of respect for their rights to be included in the Constitution. Consequently, this led by turn for the minority groups to boycott the elections in 2014.

Thus, the decision-makers in the country has trapped the political process in a narrow and shallow horizons by squandered the opportunity to gain the people's trust, credit, and support in building democratic state. The Libyans by and by have lost their faith in the authorities and their election, because they realized the fact that what is happening in the country cannot be called "democracy".

The dramatic shifting appeared in the elections between 2012 and 2014 when the number of voters dropped from 50% in 2012 to 18% in 2014. This was caused when the people felt many major deficits roam around the politicians behaviorism; lack of progress in the political transition, the lack of response to the public demands, and the absence of the transparency in the democratic process, have all led to alienate the voters from casting their votes, as if they lost the desire in practicing democracy by beholding the floundering political scene of the Democracy that they once dreamt of.

Furthermore, the successive parliaments and governments of Libya have had a narrow vision of the role of youth and women in the political process. The number of the representatives of youth and women is not enough despite the opportunities and the political space granted by the Revolution, yet the decision-makers kept their ears deaf to the voice of the public.

Generally, the earlier chaotic climate in Libya led to the current unrest and the breakdown the weak state institutions which is characterized by unwillingness to settle the crisis in the country and make any concessions for the sake of the greater good. Gradually, in 2014 the essence of the political crisis in the country started to show up when Gen. KhalifaHaftar initiated the military campaign to rid Libya of Islamists starting from their political Islamic Bloc headed by the Muslim Brotherhood to the Islamic militias that participated in the liberation in 2011. Following that, after two months, the elections that did not satisfy the Islamic bloc and some other parties. While they refused to recognize the HoR, they hung their trust in the GNC which was the parliament of 2012 election, and sat up their alliance in Tripoli with the Islamic militias. As for the other party, they chose Tobruk to be their headquarters with the most international legitimacy (this was before the Government of Accord was formed). Each part of these political actors counts on their regular or irregular armed forces and external patrons.

The response to their regional planners regardless of the national orientation reminds me of a line written by Gustave Flaubert¹ maybe irrelevant but significant when he said " one becomes a critic when one cannot be an artist, just as a man becomes an informer when he cannot be a soldier". In other words, even when the things started to settle for a new Government of Accord establishment by International sponsors in 2015, both parties continued to refuse the political solution, criticizing it, and listening to their external patrons, as if they do not believe that they can be the founders of state of theirs and their own people; and as if they lack the self-esteem to be the hope for all Libyans in a democratic and stable transition.

- Failure in Creating New State Institutions:

We already defined the Libyan State in Gaddafi's era as an extreme central-power-state. The institutions were directly follow to the inner class of Gaddafi's circle, where ineffective and

¹Gustave Flaubert: (1821-1880) was an influential French novelist who was perhaps the leading exponent of literary realism in his country. He is known for many novels touched the reality and attracted the readers for his scrupulous devotion to his style and aesthetics such as *Madame Bovary*.

responsible only to the needs of the bureaucratic circle of Gaddafi, except for other institution dedicated to overseeing investments and oil extraction. The Jamahiriya of Gaddafi was created under stateless facts, where the majority of the officials were nominated or assigned for their positions without elections and without being skilled for the tasks. The stateless system created hollow state institutions dependent on the local traditional loyalties and personalizing of the rule. Thus, the outcome of this today is the lack of experience in handling the State affairs, along with failure in carrying out the state functions by the bureaucratic Libyans which form the major officials in the state these days.

The bureaucratic failure caused the ineffective work of the transitional governments between 2011- 2014. The transitional governments' effectiveness came directly from the lack of specialized staff and the lack of experience which blocked the system from providing the public needs. This was hand by hand with bureaucratic issues such as multiple signatures from various parties in the state. After 2014, the situation continued to exist but in two bodies of State, which complicated the process and confused the citizens.

According to the current status of the state bodies and the political instability, the economic development suffered from paralyzing the investments along with depression struck the domestic market, which made a lot of wealthy Libyan businessmen to allocate their trust and investments elsewhere due to the effectiveness of State institutions. The inability to handle issues of economic development, security, justice, or any other basic services have made Libyans to turn their trust from the bodies of the state; and forced them to resort to the alternative of local leadership to run their affairs.

- Resorting to Communal Identity:

The 17th February Revolution assembled the Libyans in a national request; it was the first time for every Libyan to feel that he is a citizen of Libya. In the sense that all Libyans gathered for one purpose regardless of the communal backgrounds. Nevertheless, the Libyans related to the communal background at the end, and this was present even when Libyans formed the armed militias to fight against Gaddafi. Militias were basically depending on the tribe or town reality, even neighborhood members formed armed groups of their own. Although all of them fought to rid of the tyrant regime, many of them fought independently to liberate their own territories

without the "team work" as a nation. This was enhanced more after the Revolution when the armed groups began to provide the security in their territories in the absence of a national army.

In other words, Libyans turned toward the clans and tribes they are originally from and seek their shield and protection. The local community became their reality and not the state that is hardly run its own affairs, and so busy indulging with disputes upon power.

Thus, the Libyan Uprising was semi-success in terms of liberating the people from tyrannous, oppressive, and personalized regime, in a sense that Libyans are no longer suffering from a repressive rule that can drag their sons to jails or executions to keep the people silent for his rule. But, and by all other aspects until now, the Libyan experience of the uprising was a complete failure in terms of democracy, justice, politics, economy, and civil service interests. Even in the regional dimension, Libya is like a pawn for external parties' interests, when once was one of the important regional actors in the Arab World and the African Continent.

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ÖZET

Çalışma, "Arap Baharı" döneminde Libya deneyimini vurgulamaya çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca, çalışma Kaddafi'nin uzun vadeli planları, siyasi statüsü, sivil ve insan hakları statüsü, Kaddafi'nin politikasına muhalefet ve 17 Şubat Devrimi'nin gidişatı hakkında bir inceleme sunuyor.

Araştırmamın ikinci kısmı, Libya'nın yüzleştiği siyasi krizle ilgilidir; siyasi parçalanmalar, terörizm sorunları, vatandaşlık meselelerinde başarısızlık ve devlet kurumlarını oluşturma ve çatışmanın 2014 yılında bir iç savaşa dönüşmesinin incelemektir. Çalışmadaki son bölüm, şuanda Libya'da olup bitenler için bölgesel oyuncularla birlikte uluslararası oyuncuların rolünün ne olduğuna dairdir.

Sonuç olarak, sırasıyla olayların önceki seyrine, devlet politikasının istikra eksikliğinden etkilenen ekonomik korkunç duruma odaklanma ve bunların değerlendirmesini yapmaktadır.

ARŞİV Kayıt Bilgileri :

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ABSTRACT

My research try to highlight the experience of Libya in what is called "Arab Spring" period. In addition, the research provide a review about Gaddafi's long-term rule, politics status, civil and human rights status, the opposition to Gaddafi's policy and the course of the 17th February Revolution.

The second part of my research concerns the political crisis that faced the Libyan transition; political disputes, political fragmentation, terrorism issues, failure to citizens' affairs and creating state institutions, and development of the conflict into a civil war in 2014.

The last interest in the research was specified for the role of the international players along with the regional players as responsible for what is happening in Libya currently. Finally, and respectively to all the previous course of events, the economic terrible situation which affected by the lack of state political instability.

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RESUME

Ali Eltweni was born in 7/4/1968 Zuara – Libya. After he graduated from al Nikat al Khams High School he joined the Military Academy in Tripoli in 1987 and graduated in 1988 as officer in the Libyan Army. In 1993 he finished Diploma in Telecommunications Engineering from Ulyanovsk University in Russian Republic. In 2003 he received a Degree in Political Science from al Zawiya University (Ibn Rushd formerly). His main interests are the current crisis in his homeland Libya, and the part of international relations in ongoing dispute.

