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**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY**

**BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND LIBYA**  
**1951-2018**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

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## THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

### To Karabuk University Directorate of Institute of Social Sciences

This thesis entitled "Bilateral Relations Between Turkey And Libya 1951-2018" submitted by Haifa Mohamed Frjani HOSEN was examined and accepted by the Thesis Board unanimously as a MA thesis.

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
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## DECLARATION AND COPYRICHT

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10/01/ 2019

Haifa Mohamed F. HOSEN

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'haifa F. HOSEN', enclosed within a large, irregular oval scribble.

## **THANKS AND APPRECIATION**

In the beginning, I would like to thank my father, who has my life with many sacrifices and care me. Who are the greatest dad in the World, I love you and thanks for everything you have done for me.

I would like to thank my husband for helping me; I also would like to say thank my friends or others who gave me support.

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## **ABSTRACT**

Turkey has played a crucial role in history at the regional and global levels. It was the intersection of the various ancient civilizations in the heart of the ancient world. Istanbul was the capital of three of the greatest and most powerful empires from Roman to Byzantine to the Ottoman Empire. These empires developed, weakened and replaced by another. Islamic Caliphate inherited from the Ottoman Empire was abolished in 1923 with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The aim of this study political relations between Turkey and Libya, is to analyze the strategic and commercial dimensions. Significant challenges and opportunities encountered in this analysis will be evaluated and tried to reveal the nature of the relationship over Turkey's role in Libya. The study was based on the method of research and analysis in the history of Libyan-Turkish relations in order to identify the Turkish role in Libya in terms of opportunities and challenges.

**Keywords:** Libya-Turkey relations, bilateral relations, Arab-Turkish relations, the September Revolution, national independence.



## ÖZ (ABSTRACT IN TURKISH)

Türkiye, bölgesel ve küresel bir aktör olarak tarihte önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Antik dünyanın kalbindeki çeşitli medeniyetlerin kesiştiği bir coğrafyada bulunmuştur. İstanbul; Roma, Bizans ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu gibi üç büyük güce başkentlik yapmıştır. Bu imparatorluklar gelişmiş, zayıflamış ve yerini bir diğerine bırakmıştır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğundan miras alınan İslam Halifeliği 1923 yılında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasıyla ortadan kalkmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı Libya ile Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin politik, stratejik ve ticari boyutlarını analiz etmektir. Bu analizde karşılaşılan önemli güçlükler ve fırsatlar Türkiye'nin Libya'daki rolü üzerinden değerlendirilecek ve ilişkilerin doğası ortaya konulmaya çalışılacaktır. Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin Libya'da karşılaştığı fırsatlar ve zorlukları belirlemek amacıyla iki ülkenin ilişkilerinin analizi ve araştırması üzerine kurulmuştur.

**Anahtar Kelimeler (Keywords in Turkish):** Libya-Türkiye ilişkileri, ikili ilişkiler, Arap-Türk ilişkileri, Eylül Devrimi, ulusal bağımsızlık.

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## ARŞİV KAYIT BİLGİLERİ (in Turkish)

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## INTRODUCTION

Turkey has played a crucial role in history at the regional and global levels, and being as a model for Islamic countries reemerged with more force (Altunisik, 2005). Istanbul was the capital of three of the greatest and most powerful empires from Roman to Byzantine times to the Ottoman Empire, which weakened, collapsed and ended the Islamic Caliphate and declared the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923.

The Turkish foreign policy readers for decades has observed that secular Turkey with a Muslim majority has moved in its policy towards the West as a member of the Council of Europe in 1949. Its active participation in NATO in 1952 and the Western trend on a permanent basis. The Ankara Agreement between the European Community and Turkey 1963, in which they agreed on the possibility of Turkey joining the European Union in the future and continued to strive in the framework of its long-term strategy to become a full member of the European Union. Since the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Eastern Camp (the Soviet Union and its allies), Turkey is trying to find an effective regional role in the region. Turkey has tried to prove its ability to revitalize the Turkish role in the regional environment surrounding Turkey and to influence the surrounding conflicts in neighboring countries. Turkey is an accepted Arab mediator in Arab conflicts and internationally in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the issue of modernization, Turkey's relevance in Libya and the Islamic world is not entirely new, in fact, it has a historical dimension (Meliha Benli Altunışık, 2008; Koloğlu, 2007).

The new role in foreign policy is focused on the importance of internal transformation, especially the consolidation of political and economic stability in the country. Where Turkey's internal reforms and growing economic capabilities have emerged as a sponsor of peace in the countries of the region, Turkey's leaders have shown willingness to actively pursue diplomacy in the Middle East; they tried to reduce problems with neighboring countries, as well as in Libya especially after recent developments in Libya.

In order to achieve its regional role in the Middle East, the Turkish policy found that it must adapt its foreign policy to the international and regional situation in light of the international and regional changes that have taken place in Libya and the

Middle East, especially the developments that took place after the events of September 11, 2001. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab Spring revolutions, as well as the emergence of Iran as a regional power with a sense of influence of the Arabian Gulf, and therefore, these variables were imposed on Turkey reshape its policy towards these regional variables (Altunışık, 2009; Kardaş, 2010).

In addition, the new Turkish role in Libya and the Middle East comes with a strategy and foundation stemming from its weight and political and economic size, which enable it to change and reverse balances (Meliha B. Altunışık & Martin, 2011).

### **THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDY AND ITS QUESTIONS**

The problem of the study lies in the opportunities and challenges that facing Turkey's aims to play a distinguished role in Libya, as well as the opportunities that can be invested to achieve its endeavors in the internal, regional and international changes.

Through this problem, the following questions arise:

1. What is the new role played by Turkey in Libya?
2. What are the opportunities for Turkey in Libya now?
3. What are the challenges facing this role and the chances of its success?
4. What are the political dimensions of the new Turkish role in Libya and the Middle East?
5. Can the great trade cooperation between Turkey and Libya contribute to the consolidation of the political relationship?

### **OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

This study has some objectives, which can be concluded as follows:

1. To identify the nature of the Turkish role in Libya and the Middle East in light of the opportunities available.
2. Statement of the most important challenges facing Turkish-Libyan relations.
3. Reading and analyzing the political dimensions of the Turkish role in Libya.

4. Reading and analyzing the economic dimensions of the new Turkish role in the Libya and Middle East.
5. Explain the impact of the leadership variable in Turkey and Libya, as well as its formulation of its strategic role on Turkish-Libyan relations,
6. Try to draw the paths of this relationship in the current and future stage.
7. Statement of the determinants of the Turkish foreign policy, which highlight the points of convergence and diffusion in Turkish-Libyan relations.
8. Trying to identify the conditions, methods and tools that can drive Turkish-Libyan interactions to establish a situation
9. Of harmony and consensus on common issues contributes to the creation of rapprochement and cooperation.
10. Clarify the nature of the interactions in the Turkish-Libyan relations. In order to indicate whether there is a possibility of joint action at the official and popular levels to become a means of communication and understanding that will lead to the activation of performance and the achievement of mutual gains.

### **THE IMPORTANT OF STUDY**

The feasibility of studying the subject of the Turkish-Libyan relations at this stage is of special importance and well-founded. It is worthy of research at the theoretical and practical level in the light of the structural changes in the region. At the internal level and cast doubt on the future stage on international relations, hence the idea of this study, which highlights its importance in:

Scientific importance (theory):

1. The roots of the Turkish-Libyan relations are rooted in ancient times and are due to history. They are the result of the interaction of geographical, human, economic and political factors. They are based on a historical background that can contribute to deepening ties between the Turks and the Libyans. Islam, with its supreme principles and tolerant values can play

a role in the transformation of geographical reality data into cultural interaction, an industry of history and interdependence of interests.

2. In addition to the geographical and historical factors, the economic factor plays an important role in this field, so that it gives this interaction a special and distinctive form.

3. Since the Turkish-Libyan relations are manifested through direct bilateral with Libya or Arab League contacts. In parallel with other interactions at several levels related to the international system, we are examining these relations in history from 1951 to 2018 Which serve the subject of the research, as well as gives a perception of its development in the current and future.

### **THESIS LIMITATIONS**

The study limits were as follows:

#### Time limits

This study covers the period from 1951 to 2018 by divided to three periods:

1. From 1951 to 1969
2. From 1969 to 2011
3. From 2011 to 2018

#### Spatial boundaries

This study is limited to studying and analyzing Turkish-Libyan bilateral relations.

### **METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH**

The descriptive and explanation approach will use in this research. Which based on the descriptive of the subject explanation and evaluating of the various concepts. By identifying the nature of the Turkish role in Libya in light of the opportunities available to this role, and the most important challenges facing the Turkish role in Libya, and aimed at reading and analysis the political, strategic and commercial dimensions of the Libyan-Turkish relations. The study was based on the method of research and analysis in the history of Libyan-Turkish relations to identify the Turkish role in Libya in terms of opportunities and challenges.

## **SCOPE OF WORK**

This research aims to study and evaluate bilateral relations between Turkey and Libya from 1951-2018 by utilizing descriptive and explanation approach. This work divided to five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction, it includes research problem, aim and importance of the research, as well as thesis limitations and methodology. The second chapter focuses on the Libyan-Turkish relations in the royal covenant between "1951-1969", which includes Libya's independence and Turkey's stance of it, Libya's case in the international community and focuses on political relations. Than Turkish support for Libya, such as economic support and cultural support. Third chapter study Libyan-Turkish relations in between "1969-2011" includes the Libyan revolution of 1969, The Turkish position of the revolution, political relations, Arab - Turkish relations and Libyan support to Turkey. Fourth chapter focuses on the Libyan-Turkish relations after 2011 that includes the Libyan revolution, the Turkish position of the revolution, political relations, Turkish- Libyan relations, Turkish support to Libya in various fields. Last chapter includes conclusions, recommendations and references.



## **CHAPTER 1**

### **LIBYAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ROYAL COVENANT 1951-1969**

#### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

Turkey strongly supported Libya's independence as a result of the deep historical relations between the Libyan and Turkish peoples, especially after the Democratic Party came to power in Turkey in 1950. The independence of Libya was achieved on 24 December 1951 by the United Nations, of which Turkey was an active member, and supported the cause of Libya's independence in all its aspects. Because Libya was a poor country at the time, it did not have the economic resources to rely on, a number of countries such as Turkey, UK, the United States of America, Pakistan, Egypt and France have provided political, economic and social support to this young country. The aim of this chapter is to examine and evaluate the details of Turkish and international support for the issue of Libya's independence from 1951 to 1969. This period of time in the Libyan state is a great importance, which it was able to build its independence and sovereignty by building its political, military, economic and social institutions. Many historians see Turkey as having a clear role in Libyan history (Dirioz, 1980).

In fact, Libya was one of the states of the Ottoman Empire for a long period of time, extending from 1551 until 1912, when the Ottoman Empire lost it to Italy under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1912, and thus ended the official role of the Ottomans in Libya (Alzawyi, 1984). However, the treaty did not end the communication between Libya and the Ottoman Empire until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924. The years of World War I, witnessed close cooperation between the people of Libya and the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Turkey regards Libya as the only Arab country, which stood by Turkey until the last moment. Libyan King Idriss Senoussi confirmed this. In addition, even the leaders of the Libyan offered the interests of their country to the great risks in order to stand by the Turks in their plight (Robins, 2003; Sayari, 1997).

## **1.2 LIBYA'S INDEPENDENCE**

When the Second World War was about to end, where the victory was very close to the Allied countries, Allied leaders gathered at a conference in Potsdam in July 1945 to discuss the issue of the colonies of the Axis Powers and to put a mechanism under the tutelage of the major countries. But the meeting did not reach a final solution to this issue, so it was referred to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which contained ministers of the four major countries, which were the United States of America, Britain, France and the Soviet Union (Muthafri, 2011).

The Council of Foreign Ministers convened their conference in London September 1945. The conference dealt with the issue of the peace treaty with Italy, as well as the issue of its colonies in Africa. In fact, expressed its inclination to restore the colonies to Italy, while the Soviet Union wanted to put them under the joint administration of the four major powers countries. When the United States proposed to put it under the tutelage of the United Nations provided that we grant Libya independence after ten years, when no agreement on this issue, it was referred to the agents of foreign ministers to discuss it. The discussions between the victorious states over the Italian colonies, including Libya, which had been the subject of great disagreement between them, have been unresolved. In early 1947, a conference was held in Paris with 22 countries to reconcile with Italy. February 10, 1947 confirmed that Italy was stripped of all its colonies occupied before 1943. Article 23, of the Treaty referred to the Italian colonies on the African continent. Stating that (Italy renounces all rights and authorizations in Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somalia, and that the final fate of its former property will be decided jointly by the governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, The United States and France during the entry into force of the Peace Treaty). The annex to the Treaty contains a number of annexes that emphasized how to resolve the issues relating to the Italian colonies. Annex XI states that if the countries concerned fail to resolve the issue, they will be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for appropriate decisions. The four major powers countries had to reach a solution before September 10, 1948. Otherwise, the case will be referred to the General Assembly of United Nations and, after failing to reach meaningful solutions, it is decided to refer the case to the General Assembly on 10 September of the same year (Alzawyi, 1984; Muthafri, 2011).

The case of the Italian colonies was first presented to the General Assembly in April 1949. The Libyan case was brought up on the sixth day of the same month, and many countries under the General Assembly called for Libya to be granted independence. Among them is Turkey, whose delegate (Adnan Kural) was a member of the delegation committee formed to find solutions to the issue of the Italian colonies (Schlüter, 1980).

The General Assembly held its meeting in November 1949, in an atmosphere of optimism. Especially after the agreement of the Libyans to reject division and guardianship. In addition, the position opposing the Asian and African countries from the division of Libya and the imposition of protection on them, and declare their support for the independence of Libya. Turkey expressed its full support for independence through its representative in the General Assembly, (Adnan Kural) and stressed that his country follows with great interest the political development-taking place in this part of the country. It is about the Libyan people's national aspirations; it is a source of pride and pleasure for his country (Halim, 1992; Muthafri, 2011).

The representative of Turkey strongly criticized the continuation of the Western military occupation of Libya and stressed that his country as one of the countries of the Mediterranean is directly concerned and affected with developments in the region. Moreover, the refectio to the British claim that Libya has not reached the maturity of political to grant independence and manage its own affairs. This claim contradicts the facts, stressing that the Libyans can manage themselves, and they have good administrative experiences under the Ottoman Empire, as many of them participated in the administration during the days of the Ottoman Empire, whether in Libya or in other parts of the State. As well as he added that Turkey has at the same time the willingness, his country is providing assistance to Libyans in various fields. The rivalries of Libya's independence continued in the corridors of the United Nations General Assembly until August 21, 1949. The call for independence has been on the shoulders of States calling for protection. Turkey called for the need to grant independence to Libya as soon as possible after giving them a simple transition to help it in independence. The representative of Turkey stressed that the issue of the form and type of government should not be left to the Libyan people alone (Halim, 1992).

The position of Turkish public opinion was not different from the official Turkish position in supporting Libya. Since 1948, the Turkish newspapers have expressed their support for Libya's independence through its editorials and interviews. It has conveyed to the public opinion, and what is going on in the street to focus on praising the friendship between the Turkish and Libyan peoples. In addition, expressing their happiness for Libya's independence. It seems that the Turkish representative in the General Assembly has gone beyond the issue of friendship between the two peoples, as he was talking about Libya as if talking about his homeland. However, Turkey had a long-term strategic vision of Libya, and its support was not only due to its belief in the right of peoples to independence and freedom. Also to the exclusion of Soviet influence from the region, because of its national security risks. The secretary-general of the Turkish Foreign Ministry that his country is open with Libya, but at the same time, it is working in various ways to prevent the arrival of Soviet influence in Libya if independence cannot be achieved. Aid and assistance to Libya in accordance with this vision (Halim, 2003).

After examining the issue of independence in all its aspects, the Assembly reached the recommendation to grant Libya independence on 21 November 1949. Extending a transitional period that does not exceed on 1 January 1952. The recommendation also confirmed the appointment of a delegate to the United Nations, The Council consists of representatives of the three Libyan regions and a representative of the minorities, as well as representatives of France, Egypt, Italy, Pakistan, Britain and the United States of America. The representative of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Council of the United Nations, a report on the progress in Libya to the General Assembly. 49 countries voted in favor of independence, while one against was Ethiopia and nine abstained, including the Soviet Union and France. Turkey was among the first countries to vote for Libya's independence (Halim, 2003; Muthafri, 2011).

The General Assembly appointed Dr. Adrian Pelt, a Dutch national, as its representative in Libya. He arrived in Libya on January 18, 1950. In fact, he faced great difficulties, the most important of which was the difference in visions between the representative and the representatives of the Trusteeship Council. In the end, these differences were overcome after the Libyan National Assembly was able to draft a

constitution on November 7, 1951. Which drew the form of the state and its system of government. The constitution included 213 articles. On December 24, 1951, on the day set for the Declaration of Independence, King Idriss Al-Senussi announced the establishment of the Libyan State under the name of the United Kingdom of Libya (Ziyada, 1958).

The announcement of the independence of Libya was not easy. It was the result of difficult labor, because of the different orientations and visions at the internal and external levels. However, the Libyans eventually declared their independence with the help of the United Nations and friendly countries, but the difficulties did not end with the declaration of independence. Briefness and maintaining of independence was much more difficult than independence itself because of the economic, social and military conditions in which the country lived. Perhaps what King Idriss Al-Senussi said after the declaration of independence is evidence of what we have noted (Maintaining and briefness of independence is harder than getting it). The country was unable to rise on its own resources. Therefore, it is possible to say that Libya needed to finance its budget and to consult the establishment of state institutions, as well as the need for foreign investments, as well as the need for educational, health institutions, agricultural and industrial projects. Libya needed people who could manage the country and have the ability to build international relations. For support and funding in all areas of state building. Turkey was in the eyes of Libyan politicians and its demand to help build Libya, as these two countries have historical ties and friendly relations (Muthafri, 2011; Ziyada, 1958).

### **1.3 LIBYA'S INDEPENDENCE AND TURKEY'S STANCE OF IT**

Democratic Party governments continued to support Libya's independence after the party took power in Turkey, after many years of Republican People's Party (CHP) rule. The Turkish position is even stronger than before, especially at this stage. Turkey has shown its readiness to support Libyan economic and social independence after its previous support was limited to the political side. It also announced its readiness to provide the necessary assistance to this young state in all fields to build state institutions and facilities. The Turkish government, headed by Adnan Menderes, sent a telegram to the Libyan Prime Minister Mahmud al-Montasser, which included the

official recognition of the Libyan state and Libyan king (Halim, 2003; Muthafri, 2011).

The President of the Republic of Turkey Celal Bayar also sent a cable of congratulations on the same occasion to the Libyan king and his people. The Turkish Foreign Minister also sent a cable of congratulations on the occasion to Libyan Foreign Minister. It seems that Turkey was looking with satisfaction and gratification at the independence of Libya, especially that the latter was Turkey's all friendliness, and the Libyan people chose the same symbol in Turkish flag as a symbol of their new knowledge. Which shows the depth of relations between the two peoples, especially since Turkey was for many years the center of the Islamic caliphate. The Turkish people received the news of independence with great joy. Peaceful demonstrations swept the streets of some Turkish cities, expressing their solidarity with the Libyan people and their participation in the celebration of their independence celebrations.

Turkish newspapers have been interested in the Libyan issue and have published their independence news in their main headlines, with friendly articles and comments expressing their hope for success in this emerging country. The Cumhuriyet newspaper initiated to send one of its editors to Libya to cover this event, and their participation of the country's citizen's suit. "We are bound by fraternal ties with Turkey, and we will not forget the relationship, Turkey showed when we took independence. Turkey, with whom we have long lived (has a love) and Libya asks for brotherly assistance when it starts laying the foundations of their formations, as we ask specialists" as the newspaper said (Halim, 2003).

From another side, Libyan newspaper quoted the Turks' feelings towards the Libyans by "This gives us - the independence of Libya - a great pleasure and gladness in watching the brave and our brothers in religion, those we have lived together for nearly four centuries and we are bleeding together the freedom and independent. We want all our efforts to see a new Islamic state that lives successfully forever". The students of Istanbul University expressed their joy for the independence of Libya and offered congratulations to the Libyan people, "... while we offer the sincere and welcoming affection of the youth of the University of Istanbul to the youth of Libya, the brothers who have gained independence, we want to see happy days of peace and quiet".

Although the Turkish newspapers were expressing their joy and happiness of independence, they feared that Libya would fall under the control of global imperialism. Because, Libya did not have sufficient financial resources and administrative experience to rely on at that time. Therefore, it pointed to the possibility of the country falling under the influence of the major powers, and pointed to the possibility of introducing Libya to the League of Arab States to be the first Arab country to join it after its establishment in March 1945. The University is helping them in various fields to avoid being under the control of the world's major powers. Turkish newspapers have expressed concern about this (al-Rubaie, 2000).

The building of state institutions in Libya needs experienced politicians and specialists, and it is in dire need of sufficient funds. Libya had no recourse but to use other countries, as well as the Libyans, who spent a long period of their lives abroad during and after the Italian occupation. Has greatly influenced the management of government institutions with all the experience they have gained in the countries where they were located. They also had a clear interest in establishing diplomatic and economic relations with those countries. Turkey was one of the important countries that welcomed the Libyans at that time and worked in Turkish state institutions for many years.

Turkey thus contributed directly and indirectly to the building of the institutions of the Libyan state by embracing the Libyans during the Italian occupation and their work in their institutions and then their return to Libya after independence and active participation in building the institutions of the country. The Libyans formed the first provisional national government on March 1, 1951, before the declaration of independence to run the country during the transitional period to prepare the requirements for independence. The government included some of important figures, some of whom worked in the institutions of other countries and were called upon to contribute to the building of the state. I worked in Turkish state institutions (al-Rubaie, 2000; Halim, 1992).

#### **1.4 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS**

Tripoli went under Ottoman control since 1551 (Koloğlu, 2008). The official diplomatic relations between Turkey and Libya date back to 1953. In this date, Turkey requested the Libyan government to establish diplomatic relations. This request was

greatly welcomed by the Libyan government. The first Turkish commission was opened in Benghazi city. Celal Tevfik Karasapan was appointed as ambassador in Libya, and he started his work in September 1953. Tevfik Karasapan at the start of his work, he met with the King Idriss Al-Senussi and handed him a letter from the Turkish President Celal Bayar. The letter confirmed Turkey's readiness to provide technical assistance, experts and specialists those Libya need them to building its institutions. The Libyan government appointed Asaad al-Jerbi as its appointed minister in Ankara.

Turkey was one of the first countries that raised the level of diplomatic representation in Libya to the level of the embassy. Although the extend of economic relations, social and military between the two countries had not reached a stage requiring the opening of an embassy. Turkey wanted to play a significant role in this region many of which are related to the deep relations between the Libyan and Turkish peoples, as well as the strategic importance of this region in terms of Turkish raise their representatives to the level of an embassy at December 11, 1954. The Turkish government has agreed that the Libyan Minister Plenipotentiary Asaad al-Jerbi will be the first Libyan ambassador to the country. The Libyan government has also agreed to appoint the Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary Tawfiq Qara Saban as its first Turkish ambassador.

Officials of the two countries exchanged official visits at high levels. Significantly, visits by Libyan officials to Turkey were more than visits to Arab countries, indicating the strength of their relations. Libyan King Idriss Alsanusi was scheduled to visit Turkey in June 1954, at the official invitation of the President of Turkey, but a health problem prevented him from doing so. Prime Minister Mustapha Ahmed Ben Halim visited Turkey on June 21, 1954. It is useful here to clarify that the visit was on behalf of the King, which came at the invitation of the President of the Republic of Turkey to King of Libya. However, the disease prevented him from doing. This is evident in the speech of thanks by Ben Halim to the Prime Minister of Turkey and its members during the party held by. When he said "The warm welcome you have shown to my brothers and me is proof of the friendship and brotherhood that Turkey has for Libya, and I am very grateful to the Turkish nation for its generosity and appreciation for the invitation to the Turkish nation". Ben Halim also confirmed in a television interview that the visit was on behalf of King Idriss Al-Senussi.



Turkish officials were happy with this visit, which contained a sincere brotherly dimension, and they hoped to keep this area away from the influence of the Soviet Union, which was gradually entering the region. Turkish welcome to the Libyan delegation was at the highest levels, and made the historical relations the best entrance to document those relations. The Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, while welcoming the Libyan delegation said "I greet you from the core, a greeting worthy of brotherhood and your visit to us a great honor. We are pleased to have you as one of the men of Libya (chosen) our country since ancient times is associated with the bonds of brothers and we have lost our blood together in the battlefields. We were friends in the days of adversity. We will stay as we are and we have many families that keep these memories. It occupies a chosen place in the heart of every Turk. Our Libyan brothers have a great share in shaping the history of Turkey, and Turkish-Libyan cooperation will be a means of good for all countries on the Mediterranean basin, and we wish with all our heart the well-being and happiness of Libya and always see it as results of this Libyan-Turkish cooperation". The visit was aimed at strengthening diplomatic relations between the two countries and Libya's access to economic and military assistance and technical expertise in various fields, as well as get benefit from the Turkish experience in building the state. Such visits cannot be considered a courtesy visit, as some historians have pointed out, because it was not a response to a visit by a Turkish official at the level of the President or the Prime Minister. Moreover, this visit opened wide prospects for closer relations by increasing Turkish assistance to this emerging country, as shown in chapter 3 and 4.

The purpose of the visit was not only to obtain economic, military and social support, but also to seek political support for Libya's foreign relations. Turkey has an influence on the prominent members of the international community, especially as it enjoyed excellent relations with Western countries, especially the United States of America. This visit gave a strong impetus to the Libyan-Turkish relations, opened the doors of cooperation and support in full, and achieved concrete results on the ground. Left a good impact on the same king and the Libyan people. The Libyan King, during his inauguration of the National Assembly on "9 December 1954", expressed his gratitude to the Government and the people of Turkey for their support for Libya and their role in consolidating the historical relations between the two countries. By invitation of Excellency the President of the Republic of Turkey and the warm

welcome of the Government and people of Turkey to our official delegations which visited the Turkish country (Kologlu, 1993).

The circumstances in which Libya was passing were prompted by the UN Economic and Social Council's demand that the international community continue to provide supports to Libya. As recommended by the United Nations representative in Libya, on the advice of a number of experts, to build two institutions to operate the funds received by Libya from foreign aid to invest in projects that will bring new resources to the country. The Libyan Development and Stabilization Agency was established on March 6, 1952" with the assistance of many foreign countries, foremost of which is the United States of America. Its objective is to promote the development of Libya economically and socially by financing and implementing technical assistance projects, developing Libya's resources and trading. The agency was funded by assistance from Libya to foreign countries. Turkey, Britain, France, Italy and Egypt contributed thousands of pounds sterling to each country. The funds are allocated to the Libyan government to oversee the program of development projects for the Libyan economic resources.

### **1.5 TURKISH SUPPORT FOR LIBYA**

The Libyan-Turkish relations were not at an escalating pace, at sometimes they faced real obstacles that were not easy to overcome in the light of developments on the international scene, especially in the Middle East at the time. The decline in Libyan-Turkish relations was neither demand for Libya nor Turkey, but caused a chill in bilateral relations, despite the fact that the visits of the officials did not stop. The visits were exchanged at different levels of Turkish economic and military support to Libya. In fact, back to normal state after a short period, and only a gesture from one side was needed. Turkey sent an official invitation to the Libyan king to visit to break the deadlock in relations between them. The President of the Republic of Turkey Celal Bayar, issued an official invitation to King Idriss Al-Senussi in mid-1956 to visit Turkey. The invitation was welcomed by Libya, and for preparing for that high-level visit, the President of the Royal Court Abdul Salam Boussiri, arrived in Turkey on June 13, 1956, From the Libyan king to the head of the Turkish government, he met with a number of Turkish officials to make arrangements for the visit.

On August 4, 1956, King Idriss Al-Senussi left Libya on a visit to Turkey, headed by a large delegation including Prime Minister Ben Halim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Royal Court of Cassation, Royal Viceroy, Acting Royal Director of the Royal Armed Forces and the Mayor of Tripoli. External and Finance. The King and his delegation were formally received in Istanbul on August 6, 1956, by the President of the Republic of Turkey, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Speaker of the National Assembly, a large number of ministers and civil and government officials, as well as representatives of Arab embassies and missions in Turkey.

The visit of the Libyan king and his accompanying delegation to Turkey has restored relations to normal course, and we can say that the political chill that dominated the atmosphere of political relations between the two countries during the city from 1955 to 1956 has not been removed permanently in the political relations. Despite the exchange of visits and the continuation of Turkish support for Libya in many fields. The statements of the officials of the two countries during the first five years of independence referred to more than the relations of the interests of their home. The common history and religious and historical ties had an active presence there.

The Libyan delegation returned to the country aboard the Turkish yacht on August 28, 1956, accompanied by the Turkish ambassador in Libya and a Turkish military mission composed of a number of officers and experts to provide assistance and advice to the Libyans. The visits exchanged by officials of the two countries have played a major role in the development of relations, and the reason for Libya's obtaining Turkish support to contribute to the building of the Libyan state and to preserve its independence by supporting its military, economic and social institutions.

### **1.5.1 Turkish Support for International Agreements**

It is fair to deny that Libyan thinking of concluding agreements with foreign countries was a difficult choice. At the same time, however, the Libyan options were very limited in their foreign relations. They were fully aware of what those treaties meant, but they also realized that there was no way for revival and preservation to independence without entering into such treaties. Therefore, Libya chose to enter into agreements and treaties with foreign countries to address the general situation in the country. The Libyan government reached a treaty of friendship with Britain on July 29,

1953. Basis on the financial agreement attached to the treaty, Britain provide annual financial assistance to the Libyan government from January 1, 1951, (1,750,000 pounds) as financial aid to the state budget, as well as other financial assistance as required by the country in agreement with the Libyan government (Halim, 2003; Muthafri, 2011).

After Mustafa Ahmed Bin Helm assumed the post of Libyan Prime Minister on April 11, 1954, he added a new paper to Libya's foreign policy by establishing a permanent relationship with the United States of America, with an agreement to obtain financial and technical assistance. Its outstanding problems with France, Italy and neighboring countries. British aid barely meets the state budget, while Libya needs to set up investment projects and sufficient capital to finance it, so it sees the United States as a good leader as a world leader at the time. The US presence in Libya dates back to 1943, when the British government allowed US forces to establish an air traffic control airport near Tripoli, to be a base for US forces, known as the Hoiles base, which later opened an international airport known as Maetiga international airport. After the Libyan interim government was formed in 1951, the general framework was established with the US authorities to sign an agreement to regulate the presence of these forces on Libyan lands. It was signed in December 1951, on the day of Libya's declaration of independence. The agreement for 20 years included 27 articles, the exemption of US forces from duties and taxes, and the non-applicability of the Libyan law to these forces, in return for financial aid of one million dollars paid by the US government annually to the Libyan Treasury and with the approval of the Libyan National Assembly (Halim, 1992).

The American government, in accordance with the agreements referred to, did not suspend the US government's request in August 1952 to increase aid and reduce the duration of the military agreement in preparation for its submission to the National Assembly. However, the US government apologized for responding to the Libyan request unless approved by the Council. In fact, the Libyan claims were repeated without results (Muthafri, 2011; Osman, 1994).

The Libyan King proposed to ask Turkey to pressure the United States to resolve this issue, because of their distinguished relations. He said, "Turkey's relations are strong and friendly with the United States. Turkey is a prominent member of the

Atlantic Alliance, and the United States relies heavily on it. The Turks have long experience in dealing with America, which has many bases on Turkish soil" relations. The Turks will do their best to urge the Americans to respond to the Libyan demand, so the king advised a prime minister to contact the Turks.

The USA-Libya negotiations on the agreement proceeded smoothly, as a result of the Turkish efforts and the intervention of the American vision, which eventually resulted in the removal of all obstacles that stood in the way of signing the agreement. The United States made a generous offer to the Libyan side to pass the agreement and its ratification. Forty million dollars in twenty years is the period specified for the validity of the Convention, as well as four million dollars instead of two million, which is scheduled for six years from 1955 to 1966 payments in the following years by one million dollars with the provision of an assistant. Which is presented each year in the form of projects prepared by a Libyan American committee, approved by the US administration for funding within the scope of foreign aid adopted by the US Congress. The two sides agreed that the final signing of the agreement in Libya would be for the approval of the Libyan National Assembly. The treaty was already signed in Libya, which ratified by the Libyan Parliament on October 30, 1954. On the same Day, it was appointed by the Libyan Senate and ratified by King (Idriss Al-Senussi) on the same day (Muthafri, 2011; Osman, 1994).

### **1.5.2 Military Support**

The establishment of the security institutions was one of the first priorities of Libyan government, because the country lacked organized military forces, suffered from a lack of trained officers and a large shortage of weapons and military equipment. Therefore, on October 10, 1952 the Libyan government set the first steps for establishing the Libyan army. The government sent various missions abroad to join international military academies and colleges. Libyan officials also visited various countries for military aid even before the formation of the Libyan army that states, which have purposed Libyans in their visits for this purpose. It should be noted that the Libyan government has allocated a ministerial portfolio of defense even before the formation of the army in the preparation of training for the establishment of the army, while the government vacated the seat of the Ministry of Interior, which shows the importance of the army in the accounts of the state. On July 22, 1952, Libyan Minister

of Defense Asaad al-Jerbi visited Turkey. It was his second visit to this country since the formation of the Libyan government. He spent three days in the hospitality of the Turkish government. He received an official reception and an official ceremony was held in his honor attended by the Turkish Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs the Chief of Staff of the Turkish army. Asaad al-Jerbi visited several Turkish army institutions to find out the structure of the Turkish army. As well as, take advantage of the formations in the construction of the Libyan military forces, also visited the headquarters of the automatic force and the school of infantry and the school of communication and the school of war and other sites related to the army, and systems of the Turkish army. During his visit, Al-Jarbi also met a number of senior figures in the country, headed by President Jalal Bayar in Istanbul and a number of members of the Turkish government in Ankara. The Turkish government gave two guns from the Turkish industry as a symbol of bilateral cooperation. In addition, to assist his country in building the Libyan military institution along the lines of the Turkish military establishment, by sending Turkish military experts and trainers to Libya, and supplying the Libyan army with some light weapons surplus to the needs of the Turkish army as assistance to the Libyan army (Habib, 1981).

In October 3, 1955, another Turkish Air Force delegation, consisting of 20 officers headed by Turkish Air Force Commander General Ihsan Albe, visited the Libyan military establishments. The delegation also visited Libyan political officials with the Turkish Ambassador including the head of the royal court, Abdul Salam al-Busiri. The delegation talked about the military capabilities of the Libyan forces, especially in the airspace. The delegation expressed its readiness to provide technical assistance for the development of Libyan forces.

The Turkish military assistance to Libya includes all fields, including the training of the Libyan forces, and the reception of faculties and military academies of the Libyan trainees in the form of missions. However, the Libyan politicians were not satisfied with the training in Turkey, because they were not ambitious. A British document on the Libyan prime minister in June 1956, said that the experience of training the Libyans in Turkey and Iraq was not successful. For hopes especially in Turkey. In fact, Libya was aiming to send more military missions to Britain. Many of the Libyan political maneuvers, including the proximity to Egypt, the claim to develop

and expand relations with the Soviet Union, and the acceptance of offers of assistance by the latter, were aimed at pressuring Western countries and countries that support their policies as Turkey for further support and assistance, including military assistance (Michael, 1970) (Halim, 1992; Shedid, 2001).

The largest military aid received by Libya from weapons left was the shipment of arms that the Turkish government gave to Libya in 1957, following the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Mendales in January to Libya. Military to the Libyan army, as approved by the Turkish National Council, in May of the same year to give Libya a shipment of war materials and weapons as a gift to the Libyan army in the framework of strengthening cooperation between the two countries. A Turkish ship arrived at the port of Tripoli on November 8, 1957, loaded with a shipment of weapons donated by the Turkish government to the Libyan army. The vessel was received from the Libyan side at a formal ceremony held for this purpose, and the value of this shipment is estimated at 5 million dollars.

### **1.5.3 Economic Support**

Turkey, which stood in a distinguished position in the cause of supporting Libya's independence in international forums, had another stand with Libya represented by providing economic assistance and technical expertise to build economic institutions. The first was the participation of other foreign countries in financing the general budget of the Kingdom of Libya in the amount of 10 thousand pound. Nevertheless, this amount did not meet the aspirations of the Libyan people. The Libyans were looking for greater economic support from a country like Turkey, based on the historical relations and positive attitudes of the Libyan people during World War I and beyond.

Baraka deputy Saleh al-Boussiri in the House of Representatives on April 13, 1955, the amount provided by some countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Italy is not acceptable because it is very small and does not leave a good impact in the development of the country. When he said, "this amount is provided by an individual to other not from state to state". The Baraka deputy pointed out the need to find other ways to support the budget to rely on the reliance on such amounts. However, the deputy of Sirte, Noureddine Ben Qantash to reverse what went to his colleague. Stressed the need for Turkey to continue to provide economic assistance to his country,

said, "We have to receive every help that would raise our economic level, especially from dear Turkey, which links with us with the bonds of friendship and history in which we fought the enemy side by side to liberate our homeland." It is important to say here that the volume of Turkish financial assistance is small, but it has high political and moral value, especially as Turkey was providing such aid at a time when it was experiencing economic crises and a large deficit in its budget. Therefore, the Turkish assistance came as a commitment moral understanding of the historical relations between the two countries and our recognition of the positive attitudes of the Libyans towards Turkey (Esposito, 2002; Halim, 2003).

The independence of Libya's fiscal and monetary policy was an important part of the integration of independence in the country. The banks in the country before its liberation in "1943" belonged to Italy, but later became the British economy, or rather it was linked to the pound sterling. After the declaration of independence at the end of "1951", the Libyan Monetary Law was promulgated. The Libyan pound became the national currency, but the currency remained linked to the British currency. Thus, the national demands to liberate Libyan cash from foreign domination and establish a central national bank increased. The end to the issuance of a law establishing the National Bank of Libya in 1956. It was not easy for the Libyans to place the banking system based on Libyan competencies. Because this financial institution important and complexity. It needs experts, technicians and administrators to lay the foundations for its establishment. Therefore, it relied on foreign experts to establish and manage this financial institution in the first stage, so that the Libyans can take over their own management. Therefore, the International Organization of Foreign Countries stressed the need to send experts in this field to Libya. Libya also asked friendly countries to assign a number of their experts To Libya to help to do the job (Shedid, 2001).

Turkey was keen to have a role in this field. The Turkish government assigned one of the country's most important experts in the field of banking to Libya, Yazi Dunkir, as part of its continuous support to Libya in various fields. Denker arrived in Tripoli on June 8 1955, and worked in the management of the Central Bank of Turkey, to participate other experts from other countries in the affairs of the Central Bank of Libya as well as the Agricultural Bank. Dunkir has actively contributed to the development of internal laws and regulations of the Libyan Central Bank , as well as



its role in developing mechanisms for dealing with countries, companies, individuals and the management mechanism of the bank. The bank started its operations in "April 1956", with a capital of 700 thousand Libyan pounds provided by the Libyan-American Construction Committee, and opened three branches in Tripoli, Sabha and Benghazi during the first year of his life. Turkey's economic support to Libya continued at one pace, but it gradually receded, especially in 1958, when the Americans replaced other countries in providing aid to Libya. Turkey was in financial straits, and its positions were somewhat affected by the rift which affected political relations during that period (Osman, 1994). In 1958, the oil discovery in Libya, which changed the national economy from mostly agriculture oriented to the oil exporting country (Elbeydi, Hamuda, & Gazda, 2010).

#### **1.5.4 Cultural Support**

The social and cultural situation in Libya was difficult, as the number of graduates at the time of the Declaration of Independence was not more than dozens. Technical education was limited to the School of Arts and Crafts in Tripoli, an old school. The number of pupils in all of Libya was 25 thousand, of the population of the country, and the illiteracy rate reached 90%. This deteriorating social situation was accompanied by a scarcity of talent and a shortage of cadres and administrative and technical bodies to build and manage the state's social institutions. Turkey received several Libyan scholarships at various levels at its own expense in another gesture to support the young Libyan state. The first Libyan mission received by Turkey in support of cultural relations between the two countries. Which was in November 1954, consisting of 20 students, Another Libyan mission traveled to Turkey in "5 October 1955", consisting of 8 students from the School of Arts and Crafts, to attend industrial secondary schools in Turkey at the expense of the Turkish Government as well. The duration of the study for this mission was five years, with a number of months being devoted to a Turkish language-training course, and then students began their studies in Turkish schools (Halim, 1992).

In another Turkish initiative, the Turkish government announced that its ambassador in Libya was prepared to receive a diverse Libyan scholarship to study in universities, high schools, vocational. The Turkish ambassador also stated that the expenses of the mission would be borne by the government as its predecessors, 20

Libyan students in the faculties of medicine, law, engineering and others, according to the priorities set by the Libyan Ministry of Education. Turkish vocational schools will accept seven students, as these schools are important in the technical and industrial progress. The Turkish Ambassador confirmed that Turkish assistance in this The side comes within the framework of "enabling friendship and friendship between Libya and Turkey, which is a pure treatment of friendship and love between the two countries and it is evidence of Turkey's appreciation and affection for this country". In order to maintain friendly relations between the two countries and strengthen them in cultural attraction. Where the establishment of cultural associations, the Libyan-Turkish Friendship and Culture Association was established on "28 October 1955 in Tripoli". A large number of senior officials, including Libyan Prime Minister Mustapha Ben Halim and his deputy Abdulmajem Kaabar, Minister of Communications Mohamed Gamal Eddin Wali Tripoli, attended the opening. Turkish Ambassador Jalal expressed his pleasure at the opening day of the opening ceremony, stressing that the birth of this association is a result of the solid foundations on which Libyan-Turkish relations are based (Halim, 1992; Muthafri, 2011).

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LIBYAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE GADDAFI COVENANT 1969-2011**

#### **2.1 THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION AND THE POSITION OF TURKEY**

##### **2.1.1 Revolution of September 1, 1969**

A number of factors contributed to the revolution of 1969 in Libya. The country was experiencing exceptional circumstances. The most prominent among these factors was the administrative corruption rampant between the footnote of King Idriss Al-Senussi and the ageing of the king and his failure to follow up matters of government directly. To the transfer of power to the hands of the influential, especially the family of the Chalhi, including Omar Chalhi adviser to the King and his brother Abdul Aziz al-Shalhi, chief of staff of the army in the final days of the royal era and Prince Abdul Senoussi, nicknamed the Black Prince. As well as the phenomenon of political instability, especially after the war of June 5, 1967, and the defeat of armies Land by the Israeli forces, and the emergence of mass demonstrations in Libya demanding the participation of Libya in the war and help the Arab armies. The Libyan government has responded by force, and generated the masses a sense of the need to attack US military bases in response to the United States of assistance to Israel in War. In recent years, intense conflicts have raged in the Libyan armed forces, and the emergence of centers of power within the military formations. Which, contributed to the weakening of the army and its division, began from the coup attempt in 1961 (Halim, 2003).

The king was powerless, and this was evident by his resignation several times, most recently in August 1969, which created a political vacuum in the country. It can be said that the authority in Libya was in a state of indifference, "In the face of the terrible vacuum in the political arena, the indifference and the regime's failure to fight the battle of survival, the way to fill the void has become easy," said Mustafa bin Halim. A facilitator in front of adventurers and coups, received power and they did not win.

In the turbulent situation of the country, in general and the Arab world as well, an organization called the "Free Unionist Officers Organization" was established in the ranks of the army. It was preparing itself to wage a revolution against the monarchy. It continued to work in secret for almost ten years. The only solution to save the country, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi said in this regard, "The people and people in the armed forces believe that the solution cannot be through demonstrations, and cannot be through protests, and cannot be through the National Assembly ... I realized their sons in the armed forces that the right solution lies in arms" (Ziyada, 1958).

Muammar al-Gaddafi intensified his meeting with the "Free Officers since the beginning of 1969". He set up to set a date for the declaration of the revolution. The month of September preceded the announcement of the revolution, but the circumstances prevented the implementation of the revolution. It was decided that the first day of September would be the date of the revolution. In order to avoid a counterrevolutionary coup, as well as to take advantage of the efforts of a number of free officers, the number of thirty officers, who was scheduled to send them to Britain for in September 2, 1969, it was decided that the date of the revolution would be on the first morning of September 1969. At the time of the revolution, the military units led by the Free Officers moved to control the centers of power. The military tasks were successfully carried out with fight within a few days.

The public and a number of officials, giving it legitimacy, soon endorsed the revolution. The first of these was Nasah al-Qadhafi, the last president of the government in the royal era, and Hassan Al-Redha, the crown prince who broadcasted his vote from Radio Tripoli. To the Libyan people and to the whole world, my resignation from all my constitutional powers in the Kingdom ... and I call upon all citizens to support the new regime as I support it myself ... "In fact, this has led to the stabilization of the situation of the revolutionaries. These actions and popular support for the revolution contributed to the failure of a counter-revolution and the efforts of Omar Al-Shalahi failed to restore power by foreign powers. King Idris Al-Senussi rejected any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the country (Halim, 2003; Shedid, 2001).

### **2.1.2 The Turkish Position of the Revolution**

At the outbreak of the revolution in Libya, King Al-Senusi was out of the country on June 12, 1969, he left for Greece, accompanied by his wife, Queen Fatima and several of his entourage, and then went to Turkey for rest and medical treatment in Bursa "August of the same year". The king often spends one month of summer each year in Turkey for recreation and healing.

King Al-Senusi was staying at the big hotel in Bursa, when he heard the news of the revolution. Where the Libyan royal flag was flying over the hotel. The flag of the state is raised above the building where every head of state is located. This news had its effect on the same king, while Turkey found itself in a very difficult position and could not take a clear position on the "New Testament" as well as from the intentions of revolutionaries (Halim, 2003).

In September 1969, the director of the Grand Hotel in Bursa received a telephone call inviting him to go immediately to the town hall in the city, where the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Has sent a number of senior officials from Ankara to the city, and had taken a decision on the presence of King Idriss in the country. After deliberation in the meeting room of the municipal hall in Bursa city, one of the Turkish protocol officers read the ministry's decision to remove the Libyan flag from the building of the hotel where the king is staying. The decree reads "The flag is raised only to Heads of State, The King of the Republic of Turkey has denied the news and despite the lack of explicit recognition by the Turkish Foreign Ministry of the new regime in Libya. However, this procedure got maintained and continue to maintained the relations between the two countries under the new situation, the while maintaining those relationships in the event of the return of the monarchy.

It seems that this Turkish position was the reason for the isolated king to go to Greece. He arrived in Athens on "September 4" with his family and a number of his companions. The king announced that he would return to Tripoli as soon as possible. He sent a letter to the "Revolutionary Command Council" requesting the return of troops and promised to achieve reforms in the hope of maintaining the monarchy in Libya after the rebels announced the establishment of the Republic and the elimination of the rule of the Senussian family. However, the response of the Revolutionary Command Council came quickly. A number of senior army and homeland security

officers loyal to the king were arrested, including Major General Senussi Shamsuddin, the chief of staff, and General Salem Bin Taleb, director of the Internal Security Forces. After the king lost hope of returning to Libya, especially after Greece officially recognized the republican regime in Libya on September 9, he was thinking of leaving Greece. After obtaining official approvals from Egypt, the isolated file left the Greek city of Kamina Forla for Egypt, on November 2, 1969, for the rest of his life (Shedid, 2001; Ziyada, 1958).

According to the Egyptian International Policy Journal, Turkey officially recognized the republican regime in Libya on September 6, 1969. This news was also confirmed by the Turkish sources, but Turkey reverted to the decision to recognize it after learning that the leaders of the revolution were influenced by the ideas of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser dealing with the new regime with great caution. It is worth mentioning that the leaders of the revolution were known not only abroad, but also at the local level at the beginning. A few weeks after the revolution, the Turkish government decided to dispatch the Turkish Foreign Ministry Secretary General Orhan Eralb, carrying a letter from Turkish President Cevdet Sunay to Colonel Muammer Al-Gaddafi to learn about the objectives of the revolution. After meeting the Libyan officials, The Turkish government announced that it would continue its relations with the new regime in Libya, which became a reality. But this relationship did not live up to the level, it was in the royal era. In addition, continued until 1974, when Turkey entered its armies to the island of Cyprus, to put an end to the conflicts in it. As the Libyan position on the Cyprus, issue gave a new dimension to relations between the two countries, and was the first sign of the return of relations between the two countries, the renewal of the Trade Agreement of 1968 in November 29, 1980 (Halim, 2003).

## **2.2 ARAB - TURKISH RELATIONS**

Turkey has an important geographic location, three continents and several seas, especially the Mediterranean Sea. This is important for international relations and military aspects, which has given it a prominent place in global political and economic activity as well as alliances and treaties with them.

The Arab-Turkish relations have been negatively and positively affected by several factors, foremost of which is the historical factor and hence the economic

factor. The Turkish rapprochement with the West and its entry into the military fodder, the volatile position on the Palestinian issues. In the first stage, since the establishment of the republican regime in 1923 until the end of the 1940s, Turkey was preoccupied with organizing its internal affairs and turned its back on the Arab countries, considering that it had conspired against the Turks during the First World War. Moreover, Turkey left the Arab countries significantly when it was officially recognized on March 28, 1949 State (Israel). In addition, the third phase, which began since 1950 has not seen a close relationship because of Turkey's entry into military alliances with a number of countries in the region and countries west, facing Communist threat, as well as standing against issues and Arab liberation movements. These, such as the tripartite aggression against Egypt in 1956, and the revolution of the July, 14 1958, Iraq and the Algerian Revolution from 1959 to 1992. Turkey's policy of positive change towards the Arab countries since 1965 is looking for friends and support from the international community in order to protect its vital interests and security. The Turkish Foreign Minister declared in February 1965, that Turkey's policy on issues of common interest with Arab countries has been misunderstood and given a place of views that did not agree with reality and promised to improve and correct Turkey's policy towards the Arab countries. The new trend in Turkish policy is due to several reasons, foremost of which are the repercussions of the Cyprus crisis from 1963 to 1964 (Qanous, 1994).

The Arab national project, after the Arab-Zionist War of 1967, the transformation of the former Soviet policy towards Turkey. Turkey's need for Arab markets, and Turkey's support of the Arabs until 1971. Especially its support for the Palestinian cause. It supported the Arabs after the war of June 1967. Opposed the Israeli takeover of the Arab territories and demanded its withdrawal and no change in Jerusalem, as well as its refusal to allow the United States to use its military bases in Turkey in the 1967 and October 1973 wars. In 1975, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, as stated at the Arab summit held in Rabat in 1974. In 1979, Turkey opened the office of the Organization in Ankara. The Office was opened in October of the same year By Yasser Arafat, head of the investigation Palestine (Halim, 2003; Koloğlu, 2007).

There were new positive aspects of Turkish policy towards the Arab countries in the 1980s, as they declared that Israel's decision in 1980; to make Jerusalem the capital of Israel was not recognized. Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel expressed this explicitly, when he said, "Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, is a step against Islam. We deplore this step and we absolutely do not agree to be placed in the fait accompli. As an Islamic state, we join the wave of protest against this step". In addition, reduced diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv. The Zionist nuclear reactor in Iraq in "June 1981", and constantly condemned bombing Israeli the Palestinian people, and the closer of Islamic countries has developed its membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Which acceded in 1974, take the Istanbul headquarters of a number of economic and cultural committees of the Organization, as well as its neutral position of the Iran-Iraq war.

The policy of Turkish rapprochement towards the Arab and Muslim worlds since the mid-sixties did not come from accidentally but came according to the circumstances required. Therefore, it is cautious in its relations. On the Arab side, it is looking for friends for political and economic reasons among the Arab countries without being involved in Arab conflicts internal or regional conflicts. Therefore, Turkey has always sought to establish bilateral relations with the Arab countries and has succeeded to some extent in achieving this goal, as in the case of relations with Egypt during the days of the Arab boycott, because of the normalization of relations with Israel, and then the problems that surfaced about water and borders with (Iraq and Syria).

Turkey has defended its policy towards Islamic countries in the past on the pretext that their own circumstances did not help in opening such channels at the time. Moreover, this is evident in the talk of Turkish President Cevdet Sunay to an official of the League of Arab States in the past without opening to the outside and could not as a result to move closer-to-closer relations with the countries of the world. especially the Arab countries. but Turkey has been able in recent years after dealing with most of its internal problems, filling the vacuum that existed in relations with these countries, To further strengthen these relations has developed Turkish pile this goal in mind the, and is working to achieve as evidenced by my visit to Pakistan, Iran, Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and finally Iraq.



Iraq and Afghanistan are a clear example of Turkey's policy towards the Arab and Muslim worlds. The change in Turkish policy was evident to the Arab countries. Nevertheless, that does not mean that Turkey has severed relations with Israel, Egypt welcomed the visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem as "a positive step in the right direction, provided that Israel renounces the Arab territories occupied since 1967, and recognizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Including their right to establish their state" (Safwan, 1982).

It has expanded its relations with Arab countries, driven by several factors, including the realization of Turkish officials that the Turkish-Western alliance is not the only solution to the problems of their country, especially economic problems. The growing Arab economic power in the international arena has played a key role in changing the Turkish position. Mainly on Arab oil because of the global energy crisis in 1973, due to high oil prices and the inability of Turkey to buy because of the lack of hard currency because of the state of inflation experienced by the country. Therefore, the economic relations grew along with the relations. The Cyprus issue was the core of the issue, because the Turks were working to win friends to support their position on this issue in international forums (Altunisik, 2005; Halim, 2003).

The impact of the Arab issues on Arab-Turkish relations was evident in the Arab-Turkish rapprochement. However, Turkey has always tried to distance itself from Arab conflicts and regional conflicts in an effort to establish balanced regional relations with the Arab states such as Iran and Israel have maintained good relations with these two countries. Therefore, it has invested in the factors that serve its strategic interests in the Arab region. It was keen not to undermine the basic principles of the foreign policy of the Arab countries. Arab countries, including Libya, especially if they do not touch the essence and constants of Turkish foreign policy, as it became imperative for Turkish politicians to match the Arab countries to gain them politically and economically, Libya, this vital country for them, was the focus of the Turks.

Libya did not need much effort to strengthen its foreign relations. It has many elements to win friends, especially after the September Revolution. "Libya is one of the few countries in the world that has a foreign policy like most governments. It has to take countless factors into consideration, but Libya is free from all these

restrictions," as says one Western author. Has claims on its territory and no one can threaten its independence (Halim, 2003).

In fact, Libya is rich, and they do not need to worry about picking the fruits of its foreign friends. Libya, is in fact a perfect country for a man like Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to govern. This means that Libya is free in its political moves and is a magnet for countries because of its oil wealth, and this is a factor encouraging Turkey to re-strengthen its relations with Libya. That including the Libyans has a different view of the Turks compared to the population of the Levant. The Arab Maghreb was not affected by the nationalist fanaticism exercised by the federations in the Arab Mashreq as a result of their adoption of the Transit movement (Shams, 1982).

As well as that, the Maghreb region emerged from the sphere of Ottoman influence before the strengthening of the help of the federalists. Tunisian researcher Ali Mahjoubi, in commenting on one of the researches presented to the "Arab-Turkish Relations Conference in 1995 confirms this". He considers that the nature of the Ottoman-Maghreb relations is different from its relations with the Arab Mashreq. Because, the Ottoman control came to rid them of the Spanish hegemony, and the Ottoman control of the region did not last long because of the emergence of the self-governing countries. Therefore, it came as a refuge, especially under the threat of France. In the framework of the Islamic University, which had a repudiation In the Maghreb, hence the factors affecting the conduct of Libyan-Turkish relations during the period of research (Robins, 2003; Shams, 1982).

### **2.3 POLITICAL RELATIONS**

In Libya, the Libyan military elite adopted a new direction in the country's foreign policy, unlike in the days of the monarchy. This was evident from the very beginning of the revolution of September 1969, demonstrations in different parts of the country brought revolutionary support, not to mention the nationalist principles of the revolutionaries, especially its leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Libya's foreign policy was based on three basic pillars:

- Arab nationalism,
- Islam,
- Socialism.

This approach was evident in Gaddafi's speech when he said in 1972 "People, tear up all important books that do not advance forward, evaluate the Arab heritage and the heritage of Islam in socialism and progress ". On the national side, Gaddafi was influenced by the personality of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who advocated Arab unity. Even the organization of the Free Unionist Officers was modeled on the Free Officers Organization in Egypt. Therefore, Libya stood by the fateful Arab issues, Libya's foreign policy, Colonel Muammar Al-Gaddafi, and then regarded nationalism as an engine of history by saying. "The engine of human history is the social factor ... that is the national, the social association that binds the human groups separately ... from the family to the tribe to the nation is the basis movement of History" (Dirioz, 1980).

As for the second pillar Islam, Libya has been committed to this aspect since the beginning of the revolution. The Leader of the Revolution stated, "Libya is following in the footsteps of Islam." The reason for Gaddafi's adoption of Islam was influenced by his personal religiosity and social realities in the country. "Islam was and will remain the basic fabric of Libyan society, religion as the primary unity of allegiance and identity." Gaddafi was heading towards Islam to legitimize the revolution and win the Arab and Islamic worlds.

This trend has had a clear impact on Libya's policy of defending the issues of the Islamic world and strengthening foreign relations with Islamic countries. Thus, Libya's attempt to highlight its defensive positions on the Arab and Islamic world and to stand up to its plans, especially the United States, little by little. "It is necessary to prove that religion is an influential factor in human life and that the world in its long history has been driven by religion and plays a fundamental role alongside the national factor. It means that nationalism and religion which are moving history and making the human march". The first Article of the Libyan, interim constitution states that Libya is an integral part of the Arab world (Dirioz, 1980; Halim, 2003).

### **2.3.1 Libyan - Turkish Political Relations**

Libya had good relations with Turkey before the revolution, and it developed significantly in the late sixties of the last century after the economic factor took its role in strengthening relations between the two countries, and oil was the key role in this, along with the convention. Which was held between the two countries in January

1968, with a period of one year renewable automatically. The Turkish-Libyan relations were a bit of a chill after the regime changed in Libya. Turkey was unaware of what was happening on the Libya at that time when it had good relations with it before the revolution, so it wanted to realize the objectives of the revolution and the policy of the new regime. Any step is not calculated results, while Libya was also busy in the order of its internal situation. In additional to the conflict entered by the country in order to get rid of foreign influence represented by foreign military bases and the exploitation of oil companies, so relations needed to push to restore them to normal. Although it did not reach the breaking point, but did not recover until 1974, when Turkey dropped its armies in Cyprus (Dirioz, 1980; Shams, 1982).

The first years of the republic's life witnessed some diplomatic moves aimed at activating the relations between the two countries, with several factors, as well as previous factors contributed to the lack of development of relations. Despite the need of both countries, including the statements of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 1971 his dissatisfaction with the situation that was experienced by Libya during the days of the Ottoman Empire. In an interview after the success of the revolution, said that his country was handed over from one occupier to another. In addition, "and continued these invaders The Knights of St. John govern this country, and this people refused and resisted until 1551, where he handed it over to another colonizer, her Turkish colonialism, and continued the Turkish colonial controls in this country and enslave its people ... and hit around the siege of isolation. We have resisted this people, the Turkish colonial rule of the reactionary obnoxious and provided thousands of victims of his sons in several battles in history letters of light ".

It seems that this statement contradicts the basic principle of the Libyan policy, which is the Islamic religion a cornerstone, and that the population in the Arab Maghreb were an extension of the Ottoman Empire of the former Islamic countries. While recognizing the existence of many errors and can say that this in a university meeting held in 1974, at a Libyan university in the presence of Colonel Gaddafi. One of the students addressed the Ottoman rule in the country, describing it as colonial. "No one will ever repeat these historical errors and the fabrications fabricated by the colonists. The Turkish rule was not a colonial period. We have always fought and stand together against enemies. The Turks and the Libyans lived a common life". He

told the crowd brotherhood. "Gaddafi has ordered the repeal of these slurs from textbooks. In his letter to the Turkish presidency on May 4, 1978, Gaddafi asserted that his people's view of the Ottoman Empire was no different from that of the Umayyad and Abbasid. Which was an extension to the Islamic countries, and that the Libyan revolution began to correct many of the misconceptions Gaddafi promised those concepts of colonialism, which tries to distance the Arab and Turkish peoples from each other (Dirioz, 1980; Halim, 2003).

However, such statements did not concern Turkish officials, because they gave priority to the economic factor, and although repeated on several occasions, where the Turkish press referred to these issues as well. The Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* reported that the Libyan authorities deliberately removed the effects and the monuments dating back to the Ottoman era. Through the demolition in 1981, of such monuments as the Ottoman market in Tripoli and the demolition of the castle and around the shrines of some of the leaders of the Turks and Libyans, and the removal of the tomb of the famous Turkish poet Fuzuli, became a paved road.

Diplomatic moves played an important role in removing obstacles to the development of bilateral relations from the revolution to the end of the study period, when the government sent its representative to Libya to know the objectives of the revolution. Libya also wanted to continue relations between the two countries. On July 28, 1970, the talks focused on strengthening relations between the two countries and the most important developments in the Middle East. The visit also resulted in the conclusion of a trade agreement on the 29th of the same month. The agreement was renewed in September 1971. The bilateral relations witnessed a remarkable development in that year and in many fields, especially in the field of trade and general contracting. The relations also included the military aspect. A group of Libyan officers has been sanded to receive military training at the hands of Turkish experts, and reports that Turkey provided assistance for the development of the arms industry in Libya. The two countries also signed another trade agreement in 1972 (Halim, 2003).

The re-establishment of relations between the two countries had some problems when Libyan President Muammer Gaddafi stipulated that Turkey should adhere to the Islamic cause in line with the fundamental principle of Libya's foreign policy. In order to reach an integrated interaction between the parties. This requirement of course

meant the withdrawal of Turkey from NATO and Treaty Central Treaty Sento, to become a non-aligned Turkey. Fayrouz Ahmed believes that "it is not dream or possible for political decision makers in Ankara to take such calls seriously at all. However, it is not possible to envisage such steps and a sharp change in Turkish policy. The revolution was at the beginning of the era, and need to be installed, as well as the entry of the new regime in the problems with the superpowers, especially the United States of America".

Turkey ignored the Libyan condition, but at the same time worked to take advantage of the positive aspects of its relations with the Muslim world. Especially the Arab countries, including its sympathy for the Palestinian cause and its support in international forums. This is in line with the aspirations of Libya. The first of the revolution, which contributed to the continuation of relations between the two countries despite the failure to implement the Libyan condition. Especially if we know that the essence of those relations was based on economic matters, and it is supported that Turkey did not change the parameters of its policy even after Libya returned to urge Turkey again to return to the Islamic world. Promising that Libyan aid would then be available to overcome Turkey's economic troubles, and at the same time proposed the establishment of an economic grouping, as well as the two countries, to meet all the needs of the three countries (Dirioz, 1980).

Turkey did not want to stand up to the Libyan demands, it was not willing to implement them. Therefore, they tried to reassure them of their positions when they made it clear to the United States in the same year that it was unwilling to use its military bases under US rapid intervention forces. In NATO, the military operations in the Middle East conflict with its relations with the countries of the region. The move was a clear signal to the countries of the region that oppose US policy and to remove its concerns about its membership in the alliance and US military bases on its territory. Turkey has realized that US relations with several countries in the region are at a critical stage, particularly with Libya.

It should be noted that Libya called on the countries of the Mediterranean basin within NATO to remove the NATO military bases on its territory and withdraw from the rear as a threat to the security of the region and promising it with assistance. Such a request has been repeated on other occasions. Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, issued a

joint communique of the two countries on 20 January 1977, in which both parties affirmed, "European security is closely linked to the security of the Mediterranean basin and demands the liquidation of foreign military bases in this basin until it becomes a lake of peace ". Has been confirmed The Libyan leader calling for the removal of military bases, especially those on Turkish soil. In a letter sent by President Muammar Gaddafi to the Turkish presidency on May 4, 1978, when Gaddafi expressed his gratitude for the rapid development of Libyan-Turkish relations, The positive role played by Turkey towards the Palestinian cause, which has contributed to the strengthening of relations with the Arab world. Therefore, Libya will help Turkey overcome its crises, and Turkey to save itself from American imperialism by removing US military bases on its territory (Dirioz, 1980; Muthafri, 2011).

The state of tides in the relations between the two countries has increased the visits of Libyan and Turkish officials to strengthen the links and deal with the problems related to them. Therefore, the diplomatic record is full of visits and at the highest levels. The 1973 energy crisis and the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus had the greatest impact. A new breakthrough in bilateral relations was the visit of the Libyan Prime Minister Abdel Salam Glud to Turkey on January 2, 1980" which opened new horizons for bilateral relations and was the basis for the establishment of friendly cooperation between the two sides. Turkish officials welcomed that warmly (Muthafri, 2011).

The visit lasted four days, during which he met President Fakhri Korutürk, Prime Minister Sadi Irmak and Chief of Staff Sancar. The two sides also discussed the bilateral relations between the two countries in various fields, as well as the economic and social potentials and how to utilize them and employ them to develop cooperation between the two countries the expertise, manpower and financial possibilities. In the course of his talks on the situation in Cyprus and the Mediterranean region, he also praised the role played by Libya in defense of Islamic peoples everywhere.

The visit resulted in the signing of several agreements, including the agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement, the Labor Force Agreement and the agreement to establish a joint committee at the ministerial level to follow up the common interests between the two countries. The establishment of a joint chamber of commerce between the two

countries aimed at developing trade relations and meeting the Turkish oil needs. The two parties agreed to conclude a convention in the field of civil aviation within from the end of the visit (Dirioz, 1980).

On the first day of his visit, the Turkish press focused on the historical relations between the two countries. The statements of Abdulsalam Ghalud occupied the front pages of the Turkish newspapers. These newspapers continued to publish the results of the visit and ways to develop relations between the two countries. Until "the end of January", the Turkish press promised that the visit was very important not only on the level of the two countries, but also on the level of Arab-Turkish relations. It also praised Libya's courageous stand with Turkey in the Cyprus issue. Personalities and different organizations in the country, including a meeting with political personality prominent Bulent Ecevit and members of the faculty, including Nevzat Gene Tach, which has become a major role in the development of the Libyan-Turkish relations through the Turkish brothers Libyan Association also Suleyman Yalcin, and others.

In addition, the most important newspapers focus on this visit with great interest such as Cumhuriyet, Gun Aydin, Tercüman, Mili Gazette and others. During his visit, Gholud met with the leader of Turkey's Islamic political movement and the head of the National Security Party Necmettin Erbakan. He promised to help Turkey in all fields. This made Turkish leaders turn to Libya in times of crisis. Erbakan, who made Libya one of his priorities, visited Egypt on March 2, 1975, during which he met with Prime Minister Abdulsalam Glud and President Muammar Gaddafi. Erbakan carried letters to the Libyan leadership from Irmak November 9, 1974 to March 21, 1980. General Sancar, Gaddafi has expressed his pride "Turkish officials have not translated the feelings of the Turkish people towards the Arab people, and promised to help if people who understand us come to the head of the administration in Turkey, and then the two peoples will unite and reach the Turkish people not to worry about the American pressure. In the past, the Turks were with us and today we are with them hand in hand ... and our weapons are ready for war". The Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil, responded to the visit of Libyan Prime Minister Abdel Salam Glud on August 7, 1980, to translate the agreements reached by the two sides in various areas of cooperation, especially economic cooperation (Dirioz, 1980).



This detente in the relations between the two countries made Libya one of the first countries to help Turkey when a violent earthquake that destroyed many villages in December 1976, hit the eastern region of the country. A Libyan delegation arrived in the affected area and began to provide assistance. The Libyan government also presented a proposal for the employment of Turkish workers from the affected area of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the establishment of a village in the area to house some residents whose houses were destroyed. The Turkish government praised the efforts of the Minister of Industry and Agriculture Minister Shouket Kazan. Libya provided financial assistance of \$ 1 million to Turkey at the end of "1980", when a similar earthquake hit it that year. The educated class and a number of officials in the country from both sides to invest that development in the relations between the two countries. To guide it more positively to all aspects, as well as consolidate the spirit of brotherhood inspired by the distant past and the sacrifices made by the Turkish and Libyan people for economic, social and cultural cooperation. In accordance with these principles was announced the establishment of the Turkish brothers Libyan Association in 1976, in Istanbul to be a bridge connecting the two countries in various fields, particularly in the scientific side (Dirioz, 1980; Shedid, 2001).

Relations between the two countries have been growing steadily since the mid of 1970s and early 1980s, and officials' visits continued. On March 27, 1977, Turkish Minister of Industry and Technology A. Dođru arrived in Tripoli. During his visit, Dođru held lengthy talks with Libyan officials on industrial issues. The implementation of industrial projects agreed upon by the two countries in the previous agreements. On February 22, 1978, the Secretary of the General People's Committee, Abdulsalam Ghalud, arrived in Ankara and discussed with Turkish official's ways of developing bilateral relations between the two countries, which appeared to be a priority in bilateral relations. It seems that this visit came at a time when the Turkish-US relations have been a breakthrough. The United States has expressed its desire to help Turkey overcome its economic problems, hoping to restore relations to normal after being strained during the Cyprus crisis, As well as the preservation of the western orientation of Turkey (Qanous, 1994).

The Turkish consul in Iran, who met his visit to Ankara and the presence of Abdel Salam Ghalud, said that Ajawid called for the provision of Libyan economic

support to Turkey. In addition, Nimitz confirmed that Ajawid was proud of this visit; Iran in the office of the Iranian Foreign Ministry in Ankara believes that Ecevit was attracted somehow to the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. He also noted the large number of voices calling for arranging relations with the Soviet Union, and whatever is not from these political disputes between those parties. The aura that Ecevit gives about this visit is to obtain economic support from Libya, as well as exert more pressure on the United States to provide more financial and military assistance, which did not hesitate to provide, especially after the emergence of another party is the Soviet Union, it was The United States looks suspiciously at Libyan-Turkish relations.

In March 1978, the American economic attaches in Ankara met with the Director General of Economic Affairs of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, H Hazar to know the economic aspects of Abdul Salam Ghalud visit to Ankara. Hazar assured the American consul that the talks were about Turkish imports in general. He said, "We will not ask them - the Libyans - for charity again, or we will change our view of this country,". Therefore, he did not meet Gould's demands in support of the Egyptian-Israeli peace issue. Arab rejection of the environment Egyptian Minister of State Anwar Sadat, as well as the emphasis on the development of relations in the field of military industries. While Ecevit stressed the establishment of joint investment projects relying on the Turkish labor, and during the visit by the Turkish Minister of State Hikmet Cetin to Libya in April 1978, Libya again raised the idea of establishing projects in the field of military industrialization and a range of political issues related to the Arab countries. Turkey did not reject these projects directly, but postponed them in a flexible political manner (Dirioz, 1980).

The visits were not limited to political and economic officials, but rather to military officials. On August 31, 1979, the head of the Turkish Army General Staff, K. Evren, arrived in Tripoli, in a special visit on the Libyan celebrations of the September Revolution. A group of Libyan officials, including President Muammar Gaddafi, Prime Minister Abdel Salam Ghalud, met with him and expressed their wish to see Turkey, which is far from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "NATO" and the United States of America. In the same year, the two countries discussed the possibility of investments in the defense industry and in secret. In that year, one of Turkish foundation established a military seaport in Libya.

At the beginning of 1979, the Libyan-Turkish relations had wider horizons. On January 29, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit arrived in Tripoli to discuss Libyan leaders. He met his Libyan counterpart Abdel Salam Ghalud, on the same evening. The agreement stipulated the establishment of joint projects in the field of agricultural and industrial techniques, in the technical and scientific fields, as well as labor and banks, and the increase in quantities of oil exported by the two sides. Libya and Turkey, after the signing of the agreement reached dozens of contracts in the construction of dams, ports, hotels and roads to Turkey. As well as the Libyan promises to provide loans convenient to them and indicates the selection of Ecevit the date of his visit to Libya on the political skill to exploit the international conditions for the benefit of his country. That includes aid and opened wider horizons for relations with rich countries such as Libya, and the latter has welcomed the guest, provided great assistance, and opened its doors to Turkish workers and companies in an attempt to win alongside the Islamic world at a time when the Western cordon around them.

#### **2.4 LIBYAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER THE COUP OF JULY**

**1980**

The political and economic conditions in Turkey have worsened and many political movements and trade unions have emerged. The voices calling for the application of the democratic system have increased, and large demonstrations have taken place, including many cities, and have spread the phenomenon of political violence in the country. All those, causing the army to send several warnings to the government threatening to intervene militarily in case of the government's ability to impose order and law to operate the democratic system. However, the failure of the government led to the intervention of the army on "September 21, 1980". In fact, control of the rule did not affect the coup in July 12, 1980, in Turkey in the foreign relations. Especially relations with Arab and Islamic countries. The new Turkish government on the same policy as was the previous governments, which emphasizes the need to find new outlets for Turkish exports in the Middle East and the Maghreb. Especially as some countries in those areas were planning to establish large development projects, including Libya. On this basis, bilateral contacts between the two countries continued to develop cooperation and try to establish a framework for it. Libya viewed Turkey as a close Middle Eastern and Islamic country that could help it

emerge from its isolation and give it various kinds of technical assistance and military (Dirioz, 1980; Halim, 2003).

The tension between Turkey and the European Common Market after the coup was strained. European officials threatened to freeze several loans that were to be granted to Turkey in early 1982, which were about \$ 950 million. West Germany also threatened to freeze another \$ 205 million loan due to the military situation in Turkey, the absence of democracy and the arbitrary arrests of Turkish politicians. These measures strengthened the conviction among European officials of the return of the dictatorship to Turkey. Turkey was seeking to strengthen ties of Arab and Muslim countries to compensate the loss with the common European market countries.

In the spring of 1981, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Özal visited Libya to discuss economic relations and expand the volume of trade exchange between the two countries. During the visit, a comprehensive protocol for economic and service cooperation was signed. After the 1983 elections, which resulted in the victory of Özal and the assumption of the presidency of the government. Özal stressed that Turkey will witness an economic recovery in the era of closer ties with the Arab and Islamic countries. In addition, translated his work already through the visits he took immediately after his judgment to those countries, he firstly visited Iran and then visited Pakistan, and was his third visit to Libya (Koloğlu, 2007).

The Iraq-Iran war was of concern to the Turks, because of the economic importance of these countries. Özal declared in Libya that he was looking at the situation in the Middle East with concern and expressed his hope that the war would end. Where, the Arab countries a keen interest. This visit came to restore the Libyan-Turkish relations to normal and push them forward after having witnessed a decline in the last two years following the suspension of the work of a number of Turkish companies in Libya. As a result of the economic crisis experienced by the latter during that period , due to the decline of Libyan income from oil and the deterioration of relations with the United States of America significantly (Dirioz, 1980).

The visit of the Secretary of the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Ali Abdulsalam Triki to Ankara on "January 23" of that year to discuss obstacles and find suitable solutions to more cooperation. He met several officials in order to overcome the problems that caused the relations. According to

Turkish officials, it seems that the visit did not achieve its goal completely, which led the Turkish government to send the Minister of Industry and Technology to Tripoli in June 1985, carrying a letter from Turkish Prime Minister Özal to President Muammar Gaddafi. Received on his behalf Abdul Salam Ghalud. The situation continued until the Secretary General of the General People's Committee, Muhammad Ragab Al-Marzouq, visited Ankara on September 23, 1985. The two parties reached an agreement on 29 July, in which the differences and problems between the two countries were resolved until 1986, because of the American military assault on Libya in April of that year and the Turkish position on it (Dirioz, 1980; Qanous, 1994).

The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi expressed concern at the weak Turkish position. The relations between the two countries have been seriously strained and other issues have been put on the line to further aggravate relations such as the Kurdish issue in Turkey. On August 18, 1989, President Muammar Gaddafi sent a strong message to the Turkish president Kenan Evren and Prime Minister Turgut Özal, prompting the Turkish government to move quickly. Only four days after the Turkish government handed over the letter of President Gaddafi, Trade Minister Jahid Aral to Tripoli in the west carrying a message from Özal to President Gaddafi. To persuading President Gaddafi and change his thoughts toward what he sees for the Kurds in Turkey that the bilateral relations between the two countries faced complex problems during the second half of the eighties of the last century. However, the diplomatic delegations have stepped up their efforts to get rid of all obstacles and resolve the outstanding problems, especially in the last three years of that decade.

Turkish President Kenan Evren visited Libya in 1987, and his visit had the greatest impact in resolving the existing problems between the two countries. The visit was aimed at strengthening bilateral relations. "I think this visit will open new horizons for the strong friendship and ties between our two countries," he said. In which a clear confirmation of the historical relations between the two countries. Those differences are eliminated by virtue of those relations and common interests. The results of the visit appeared in the following year, as the number of Turkish workers coming to Libya began to increase and the Turkish companies in Libya to get new labor contracts and number of tourists has been increased as well. It seems that the visit of Turkish President Evren has left a good impact among Libyan officials, the tone of an

interview with the Libyan president towards Turkey has changed from the attack to blame and praise at other times.

In a meeting with a number of representatives of Turkish companies operating in Libya and some officials of the Libyan-Turkish Brothers Association on March 14, 1988, Gaddafi expressed his happiness for this visit, stressing that the Arabs and especially the Libyans view the Turks as their brothers and not as friends. In addition, joint struggle and the two peoples made great sacrifices together. Gaddafi said that the separation of the two peoples is due to the plots that were the movement of foreign forces, in order to avoid all problems and return relations to the past. Turkish companies welcome in Libya and is a bridge linking the Turkish and Arab peoples. President Gaddafi expressed the hope that Turkey stands by his country in its claim to the Italian government to pay compensation to his country for the years that ruled the country and the devastation suffered by the exploitation of its experience in favor of Italy. Where, Turkey bears a large part of the responsibility because it handed the country to the Italian occupier in the Treaty of 1912, against a number of islands in the Aegean Sea (Boll, 1979; Koloğlu, 2007).

Gaddafi said that the Turkish support for his country would make the position of the Italians difficult. The moral and historical duty calls on them to stand by Libya, and that this has a significant impact on the development of relations between the two countries. He also praised the role of the Libyan Turkish Brothers Association and invited them to play a major role in the field of The Turkish-Libyan rapprochement, once again stressed that this assembly was founded based on brotherhood and not friendship because friendship is between foreign countries. While, Turkey is a sister country and not a foreign country. However, he expressed regret for the policy adopted in Turkey because it does not adopt the principle of fraternity with NATO, and Libya does not wish her to be a member of the alliance hostile to the Arabs, noting President Gaddafi to support the alliance of the Israeli entity usurping Arabian land (Boll, 1979; Dirioz, 1980).

He also pointed out the obstacles put by the Turkish government in front of fellowship instead of supporting it, although it poses no danger to any party. He called on the attendees to join the association to be strong and perform its tasks better, stressing that the Turkish and Libyan people are connected and that his country will

adopt the will the people as a principle in their relations with Turkey. At the end of his speech, President Gaddafi discussed the visit of Turkish officials to his country, starting with his desire to visit Turkey at the earliest possible opportunity. He concluded by asking the Turkish people and his government that the Museum of Hagia Sophia be a collector of the clinic as before, dissatisfied with the situation to the mosque. That visited by tourists from different religions and is condemned by them and shows the religious aspect in the entirety of Gaddafi's talk without giving any importance to the other interests of the two countries. However, in his speech many indicators that indicate that relations between the two countries depend on this aspect. Nevertheless, has given many signs of the return of relations to normal, and did not exceed requests for wishes, which gave another space for diplomatic action (Dirioz, 1980).

In "May 1988", the Turkish a newspaper reported the intention of the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal to visit Libya at the head of a delegation comprising Turkish Minister of Industry and Trade Şükrü Yürür and a number of deputies of the Turkish National Assembly. The visit begins on May 28 and lasts for three days. On the invitation made by Secretary of the General People's Committee Omar Al-Montasser.

Turkey has been keen to attend national events and celebrations held by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with high-level delegations in order to maintain good relations with Libya. Turkish officials often used their presence in Libya to hold talks with Libyan officials on the economic and political relations between the two countries. In the presence of the studies ways to develop relations more positively, a delegation from the Turkish National Council, headed by the Vice-President of the Council Halim Aras in "1988" in Nisan in the celebrations held on the conference the Libyan year, the anniversary of the removal of British military bases on Libyan territory.

President Muammar Gaddafi and Secretary of the People's Committee Omar Al-Montasser received Aras and his accompanying delegation. After the end of the ceremony, Aras held talks with the President of the General People's Congress and other Libyan officials. He discussed economic, political and cultural relations between the two countries. Aras expressed his satisfaction with the atmosphere in which the

talks took place and the results reached. The exchange of official visits between the two countries led to the conclusion of several trade deals during 1989, which gave strong support to bilateral relations, especially after the visit of Secretary of the General People's Committee Omar Al-Montasser to Ankara. He said upon his arrival in Ankara that the aim of this visit is to develop economic relations. Also to the attention paid by President Muammar Gaddafi to Turkey.

The bilateral relations reached their highest level in 1989, and Turkey took the religious factor in Libya's foreign policy in the hope of gaining support in the Turkish minority cases in Bulgaria and Cyprus. The visit of the secretary of the People's Committee for Foreign Affairs, Jadallah Azzouz al-Talhi, to Turkey on August 8, 1989", was received by the Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz for four days. During the visit, he also met with President Kenan Evren and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal. This is indicative of the importance that Turkey attaches to Libya (Dirioz, 1980).

Although relations between the two countries were discussed in the talks, they focused mainly on the problem of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, Yılmaz said during his speech at the dinner banquet held in honor of the Libyan guest, "Your visit to Turkey coincides with events and developments in Arab and Islamic countries. To express my appreciation to Libya, which plays a constructive role in relation to these developments and events, "Yılmaz noted that the friendly relationship between the two countries is a model of Turkey's relationship with other countries.

In the Libyan celebrations on the twentieth anniversary of the September Revolution of 1989, a Turkish delegation headed by Turkish Minister of State Işın Çelebi participated. The delegation included a number of representatives of the political parties represented in the Turkish National Council. The Libyan officials officially received the delegation. The ceremonial ceremony, held in the presence of Libyan officials, was attended by the Libyan officials, which met on the 15th session of the Joint Turkish-Libyan Economic Committee scheduled for September 11, 1989. To discussion the relations between Libya and Turkey, Cyprus and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, as well as the Turkish position on the American aggression on Libya, These issues have left their mark on bilateral relations. The bilateral relations



between two countries reached their highest level and continuously until 2011, when a new chapter in Libya has been started (Dirioz, 1980; Holley, 1976).

## CHAPTER 3

### LIBYAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER 2011

#### 3.1 CHANGES IN THE ARAB REGION AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE TURKISH POSITION

The Turkish policy is a distinguished school in foreign policy. It is currently playing a role in the role of firefighters, as it is quick to engage in the problems of neighboring countries for fear of reaching them in order to achieve stability in order to achieve Turkish national security and Turkish national interest as well. In the presence of a ethnicities or sects in both, such as Alawites and Kurds who are partners with Syria and Iraq.

"In order to analyze the course of deep-rooted historical relations in the daily strategic balances of Turkish-Arab relations, we should not only address the existing political parameters, but study the ground in which they were purified," says Ahmed Davutoğlu. Turkish foreign policy architect and author of Strategic Depth. These political measures are also multi-faceted. Any definition that does not take into account the historical, psychological, social and cultural elements that determine the strategic mindset, which is automatically analysis (Alwan, 2012; Davutoğlu, 2010).

The Turkish-Arab relations, with their negative and positive historical background, have been a rarely vital path in terms of their cultural and political influences. We can point to a similar situation in German-Romanian relations in Europe and Japan-China relations in Asia. Germans, who formed more dynamic societies in terms of political construction, accepted the Christianity of Rome. The Japanese embraced the Buddhism of China and formed a global culture. The Turks, who came as religious groups from Central Asia to the Arab-controlled areas, entered Islam and engaged in a multi (Ennis & Momani, 2013; Mohammed, 2014).

##### 3.1.1 Changes in Tunisia

The Tunisian revolution was launched in late 2010, and the direct motive was to burn the young man Mohammed Bouazizi himself, following the sources of the police forces, which made the young man feel injustice, contempt and oppression. This led him to express his indignation against the Tunisian regime. He protested by the fire

that ignited the body, where Bouazizi was the spark that ignited the revolution against the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and shook the pillars of his regime and toppled him on January 14, 2011.

The Turkish issue touched upon the changes in the Arab region, which started from Tunisia, as this revolution came as a surprise to the Turkish government, as Turkey watched the situation closely and neither side supported and remained silent and pursued a policy of delay. The remarks focused on Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in the early days of events, certainly the need for the development of democracy in the Arab region. The official position announced by Turkey was the brief statement of the Turkish Foreign Minister after the flight of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in which he stressed his country's readiness to support democracy of Tunisia and expressed hope that the transfer of power with respect for the principles of democracy (Dalacoura, 2012).

Turkey's conservative attitude towards the events in Tunisia was the result of several factors.

- First, it is not a strategic partner in the region for Turkey.
- Second, Tunisia is linked to the former colonial, economic and cultural relations of France.

There was no improvement in relations between the two countries until 2005, But this agreement did not produce the desired results and the last factor that shaped you in the Turkish heritage of the events in Tunisia is that the number of Turks living in Tunisia is very small.

After the success of the revolution, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed at a press conference held on February 21, 2011, at the Turkish Embassy in Tunis on the legitimacy of the demands of the Tunisian people and their aspirations for democracy, freedom and respect for human rights. Considering that, the Tunisian revolution is important not only for Tunisia, in promoting various forms of cooperation with Tunisia, especially in the economic and tourism fields. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said during his visit to Tunisia and his meeting with Prime Minister Baiji Caid al-Sibsi that his country would strengthen relations with Tunisia as well as work to lift trade exchange between the two countries. He also

stressed during the visit that Turkey respects the choice of the Tunisian people and works to have relations with Tunisia in all fields, whatever the results of the election. During his meeting with Foreign Minister Mohamed Mouldi Kafi, Ahmed Davutoğlu, stressed that Tunisia has the right to be proud of being the first country in the Arab Spring and that the success of the Tunisian revolution will serve as a model for other experiences in the world.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Turkish National Assembly Speaker Cemil Çiçek visited the Supreme Council for Strategic Cooperation under the supervision of the heads of the two countries' governments. One of the first tasks of this council, which is being held for the first time in an African or Maghreb country, will be to deepen political consultation and strengthen cooperation between the two countries in various sectors.

The visit also culminated in the signing of a bilateral agreement in the fields of education and culture. Al-Jabali's visit took an economic character. He met Turkish businessmen, businessmen and addressed the General Assembly of the Federation of Turkish Chambers of Commerce. He expressed the importance of establishing the Supreme Council for Bilateral Cooperation. New relations in bilateral relations that are rooted in the common history of the two countries. "He said that cooperation between Turkey and Tunisia would be the beginning of a cultural pole that would give a greater balance to international relations because of Turkey's ties with Russia, Europe and America, as well as the Balkan region, on the one hand, and Tunisia's special relations with EU and African countries". He did not forget to mention the improvement of the security aspects in Tunisia and the government's keenness to overcome a range of challenges and difficulties during the transitional period (Davutoğlu, 2012).

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Tunisia and met with President Moncef Marzouki. The Turkish Prime Minister announced that his visit to Tunisia after the second revolution has enabled him to examine the great changes and the quality that has been achieved. He confirmed his confidence in Tunisia's progress in a steady pace the establishment of freedoms and the establishment of values of justice and ensure all components of dignity, noting that democracy is clear, and visible in Tunisia. That its leadership would be strengthened more and more to be a real and stable position will benefit the next generations and reviewed. Mr. Erdogan by

the occasion Measures and actions taken by the Turkish government in order to facilitate the smooth flow of achieving efficiency diversified cooperation relations between the two countries from granting economic privileges and results in the context of the intensification of trade and called Turkish businessmen to go to invest in Tunisia. Especially in construction and contracting areas and all related infrastructure and tourism.

### **3.1.2 Changes in Egypt**

Before studying the Turkish position of the Egyptian revolution, we must know the reasons for its inception. As one of the causes of the Egyptian revolution, the changes that took place in Tunisia and the end of the rule of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali gave a strong impetus to the Egyptian youth to bring about a change in the system of government and its end. There is no doubt that there are direct and indirect reasons were behind the Egyptian protests against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak and ending his rule. The most prominent of these reasons:

#### **A. The Emergency Law Act No. 192 of 1958,**

Which has been in force since 1967, with the exception of an 18-month break in the early 1980s. Under this law, the police authority increased constitutional rights, enforced and severely restricted any non-governmental political activity such as organizing demonstrations, officially prohibit any unregistered donations. Under this law, in between 17,000 political prisoners were held at the highest estimate of 20,000 under the Emergency Law. The government has the right to detain any person indefinitely for or without a clear cause. Also under this law, a person can not defend himself and the government can imprison him without trial. The government is working to maintain the emergency law on the pretext of national security and the government continues to claim that without the emergency law, opposition groups the Muslim Brotherhood could come to power in Egypt. Supporters of democracy in Egypt say this goes against the principles and foundations of democracy, which include the right of citizens to a fair trial and their right to vote for any candidate or party they deem fit to serve their country.

#### **B. President Hosni Mubarak has been in power since 1981.**

His government has been criticized in the media and local organizations and supported by from the West, and thus continued massive US aid from the United States. His government is known for its campaigns against Islamic militants, so the US has been silent in its initial responses to Hosni Mubarak's abuses. It has been rare for the American press to mention in its main headlines the ongoing social and political protests in the country. The Mubarak regime has had a significant impact on the economic and social deterioration on the Egyptians. In addition, to the marked decline in the level of education and high unemployment rates, in addition to the spread of crimes in the country.

#### C. Corruption and poor economic and social conditions

During his rule, political corruption in the Mubarak administration of the Ministry of the Interior increased significantly, because of the increasing influence on the institutional system that is necessary to secure the presidency for a long time. This corruption led to the imprisonment of political figures and young activists without trial, and the existence of undisclosed, undocumented and illegal detention centers. Any individual or officer could violate the privacy of any citizen in his or her area by arresting him unconditionally because of the Emergency Law.

#### D. The increase in the number of population and the increase in poverty rates - The export of Egyptian gas to Israel

Since "2004", four contracts have been signed under which Egypt exports natural gas to Israel. These contracts extend until 2030. These contracts have caused major political crises for the Egyptian government because of its restrictions. Oil experts and former ambassadors where export starts in the case of surplus, which is not available in Egypt. They considered these contracts a waste of public funds and a compliment to Israel (Ameen, 2013; Mohammed, 2014).

The direct causes: The most prominent reasons for the direct launch of the revolution can be summarized by:

#### A. People's Assembly elections

The People's Assembly elections were held at the end of 2010, two months before the outbreak of protests. The ruling National Democratic Party won 95% of the seats in the Council, meaning that the Council was devoid of any little opposition, and the citizens were frustrated. In the Egyptian street, especially that these elections took place away from judicial supervision.

#### B. The rise of the Tunisian popular revolution

There is no doubt that the outbreak of the revolution in Tunisia and the end of Ben Ali's rule were the main motives for sparking protests against the Egyptian regime.

#### **3.1.2.1 Turkey and the Egyptian Revolution 2011**

With its political, humanitarian and economic status, Egypt is a key gateway to both the Middle East and the African continent. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has exerted many efforts under the rule of ousted President Hosni Mubarak to consolidate and strengthen relations between the two countries in many areas in order to establish a strong strategic alliance in the region. However, the nature of the Egyptian-American relations and their association with the Israeli interest have been a major obstacle to the development of Turkish-Egyptian relations (Mohammed, 2014).

As for the Turkish position of the Egyptian revolution, it was based on a clear and clear strategy in which there is no conflict and no variation. Turkey has taken a unified stance and has not changed at all during the stages of the revolution in Egypt. This position was based on those bases and extractions that Turkey has established for itself to achieve cooperation and solidarity and consolidate fraternal relations and friendship with Egypt and the Arab countries. With each development of the revolution, we found a statement to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reflecting Turkey's great interest in this revolution. At the beginning of the revolution, Erdogan called in his speech to respond quickly to demands the people and work to provide a democratic climate that guarantees freedom of opinion and expression. With the height of the demands of the revolution to demand the resignation of the Egyptian president.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a statement as if he were addressing a letter to former President Hosni Mubarak saying, “The world is free and the shroud is without

pockets, it will not take anything from the heritage of the world." He called again to listen to the demands of the people quickly. Immediately the Egyptian Foreign Ministry is asked the Turkish Foreign Ministry to do not to interfere in matters and internal affairs, and although this statement or similar has been issued by America and most European countries have not taken on this procedure. Here, if we ask if the Egyptian Foreign Ministry considers this interference in internal affairs, why did not the same objection to all, which was made by its officials with such a statement. Following this, Erdogan issued a statement warning of foreign intervention in Egyptian and Tunisian affairs using the saying of Mohamed Farid that Egypt is for Egyptians. Adding that Tunisia is for Tunisians and Libya, Interference in the affairs of Egypt and refuses to enter any other country in its affairs, and reaffirms the friendship and brotherhood between the two countries (Mohammed, 2014).

After the military took over Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak stepped down, Erdogan said in a speech in a February 2011 conference, "free and fair elections must be held immediately to prevent a crisis and unrest caused by external incitement and the establishment of constitutional democracy. In addition, to hold an international meeting to put each of us contributions to help Egypt to overcome this crisis. If the problem in food, treatment and dress we can involve the Turkish Red Crescent and the cost of the availability of those needs and provide them with a helping hand. We did not look at the demands of the Egyptian people to ascend and did not say as some said they are not worthy of democracy or they are not ready for it has erupted this people and demanded democracy as a natural". In addition, he said, "When democracy opposes their interests, they say: Democracy is a human right." When their interests are opposed to silence and condescension, the pain and worries of the Egyptians and Tunisians are our pains and concerns. We look at the events in the region and demanded. We listened to the voice of the people, we went out and talked out of fraternity, and we are a people who recognized the rule of law. We presented some brotherly advice to Egypt. We did not look at events in Egypt from the perspective of personal interests. We will continue to support stability and internal security in Egypt. From here I will send my peace and popular peace from the Sakarya River to the Nile and to Cairo".



The visit of President Abdullah Gul to Egypt left its mark on this line of relations; it was then established with the President of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The visit of the Prime Minister's trip to Egypt was symbolic after Arafat's death in December 2011 at the time of June 2011.

In addition, to stand on this visit, its goals and objectives to adopt a strategic approach that allows it to overcome geopolitics and geo-economic and enable it to keep the region fully integrated. Turkey must also apply this approach in stages and flexibility in learning English. The strategic objectives should be defined from Erdogan's visit to Egypt in the following points:

A. Export the Turkish experience

An attempt by the political movement in the Arab world, a model promoted by the media Western and Arab strongly in a recent interview of scholars and Islam.

B. Strengthening Turkish influence in the region against Israel and Iran.

C. Enhancing economic cooperation with Egypt.

The second chapter in the re-success of the economic results throughout the world, at the time, and the evolution of the economic renaissance of Turkey and the Arab world.

Thus, during his visit to Egypt, Erdogan accompanied six of his ministers and several a large number of officials and political advisors and more than 250 businessmen and a Turkish investor, which gave the visitor the nature of the economic visit in the first place. Where the ten agreements of cooperation between the two countries in the fields of industry and trade and education. Announced the increase in the volume of trade exchange between Egypt and Turkey from \$ 35 billion this year to 5 billion in 2014 to become 10 billion by 2015.

The economic factor is a central part of Turkey's foreign policy. With the face of more and more political and economic relations with the Arab countries over the past five years. Turkish capital has poured into many Arab and Islamic countries, especially Syria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Sudan. The outbreak of the Arab revolutions and the stand of Turkey in addition to these revolutions against their

traditional systems Turkey has lost a lot of investment. Exposing the businessmen and investors plant clear because they stand in the side of Turkey's policy towards openness to the Arab world and it can be said that these the visit seeks to increase Turkish economic influence in post-change countries.

### **3.2 LIBYAN REVELATION, 2011**

The first decade of the third millennium was the first real exit of the Turkish foreign policy from the West Atlantic and European circles especially after the occupation of Iraq and the emergence of a security dilemma for Turkey on its southern border. The Turkish geostrategic lens focused on the Middle East circle as an effective circle in its multidimensional policies. Turkey has achieved a qualitative leap in the development of relations between it and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Especially with regard to the level of trade and economic cooperation with this country. Where, the Turkish role was welcomed and popular acceptance of cultural considerations. The Turkish trend reflected on the relations with Libya, the level of trade between them in 2010 amounted to 18 billion dollars. Libya announced that it would provide investments of 100 billion dollars for Turkish companies until "2013". Announced investments in the construction sector worth up to 15 billion dollars have been granted to Turkish companies in this area. Since 2010 entered into force 100 legitimate investment Turkey in Libya (Muthafri, 2011).

On the political level, Turkey has been associated with Gaddafi with relations that can be described as historic. From its important stations, Colonel Gaddafi stood with Turkey in the wake of the 1974, military intervention in Cyprus and the strengthening of Libyan-Turkish relations in the era of the Justice and Development Party. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan adds a participant to the Arab summit in Sirte 2010, and has worked on Gaddafi's symbolic investment and the presence of Erdogan to publicize his three-dimensional Arab-African, Islamic.

In the first weeks of the Libyan revolution, Turkey made sure not to issue any official position defining its options with one of the parties. In dealing with the Libyan crisis, it used the principle of not producing a reaction. Despite the general opinion of the AKP public support for the movement of February 17, 2011, this did not make the AKP government compatible with the political and media campaign against the Gaddafi regime inert after the massacres committed against the Libyan people.

Because of the increasing Turkish effectiveness in the North Africa, at the expense of the traditional countries like France, Turkey will seek NATO military intervention as an opportunity for the big powers. Especially France, to regain its traditional influence in North Africa. Which threatens the interests of Turkey and the Turkish international in this region, especially in Libya. After France has been to be the main basis to oppose any progress in the Turkish efforts to join, the previous statements of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu can evidence the European Union late in the year. When he said, "we are the new Ottomans - in reference to the growing role of Turkey in North Africa at the expense of the major powers".

In a tone of defiance, Davutoğlu said in 2010, "I have been given my orders to the Turkish Foreign Ministry to find French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as he raised his head in Africa, a Turkish embassy with Turkish flag". The AKP recognizes that its position on the developments in Libya will lead to a negative reaction among the people who support the revolution of February 17. Especially since Erdogan took an advanced, position during the Egyptian revolution and was one of the first figures to step down from the popular support of the revolution In Turkey. Overall, the pragmatism of the Turkish position is a result of the reality of the Turkish foreign policy, which, like Western countries, seeks to balance the profit and loss accounts in their national interests before producing any interventionist position in Libya. In the revolution in Libya has caused damage in Turkey when the Arabs and after sustained progress in the era of Erdogan himself.

At the beginning of the Libyan revolution, the Turkish leaders opposed any international military intervention against Libya. Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered to mediate with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to agree to the cease-fire. This was attributed to some observers of the Turkish issue to the keenness of the Turkish roads to protect its interests in Libya. Where, there were about 20 thousand Turks and Turkish workers and technicians, as well as the presence of more than 200 Turkish companies. However, Turkish officials reject the view that they provide Turkish interests on the principles their position on the wave of Arab revolutions. Although, their positions were known as confusion the Turkish government does not want to appear as a force to participate in the external military intervention against Libya, because it violates the principles and principles that it set for its foreign policy

towards the Arab revolutions. It also had to engage in competition with the French position on foreign intervention, based on the calculations of France's influence and interests in the region of the south of the Mediterranean, so the Turkish position was firm on the military intervention of NATO; Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan initially rejected any NATO.

Turkish politicians demanded that Erdogan take a firm stand against Gaddafi, but Erdogan merely demanded that Gaddafi respond to the demands of the people and not to use violence. Considered that Turkey's national interests before anything else, which made Turkey, seem to stand between the two sides of the principled positions and Turkish interests determine Turkey's positions. However, Erdogan himself has agreed to NATO's intervention under the influence of Western pressure and stipulated that Turkey should not participate in military operations. Which is to say that he agreed to Turkey's background participation in the Libyan situation. Turkey offered mediation that took into account all the components of Libyan society, including Gaddafi and his family, and called for parliamentary and presidential elections, but it did not accept the Libyan parties and did not take its share of interest. The Western pressure on Erdogan and his government increased, which made him change the Turkish position in the crisis in Libya. Where, the Turkish government began to contact with members of the National Transitional Council of Libya, without severing contacts with Gaddafi.

The Turkish position on Libya was also discussed when the Turkish officials called on Gaddafi to greet him and invited the Libyan Transitional Council President Mustapha Abdul Jalil to visit Ankara. The President of the Republic, Education, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs received him, and with the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Libya met with officials and stressed the need to support Libya to achieve what its people aspire to. There is no doubt that Turkey fears for its interests in this country, especially from the control of the European countries on the Libyan economy and the striking of its interests. Especially by France and Italy, which played a major role in the fall of the Gaddafi regime and thus could control these two countries on economic sources, Play a major role in the reconstruction of war-ravaged Libya.

### **3.3 TURKISH POSITION OF LIBYAN REVOLUTION**

The Libyan revolution, when it erupted, represented a major challenge to Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's reluctance to support the revolution in its early stages and opposition to NATO intervention led to widespread criticism of it, because of what was perceived as double standards and a pragmatic by giving priority to its economic and political interests. Tunisia and Egypt have shown their beginnings decisively. Despite its subsequent bias towards the support and support of the Libyan revolution and its recognition of the Transitional National Council as the sole representative of the Libyan people. Turkey's policy towards Libya has aroused international and regional criticism in light of its full bias one side in between the two parties to the internal split that took place after the Libyan parliament elections in "June 2013". While the government formed by the House of Representatives has gained international recognition, especially from neighboring countries such as the EU and Egypt, As well as from most of the Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain. Turkey, along with Qatar, has become the international front-line supporter of the Government of the General National Congress in Tripoli, to preserve its influence and interests.

As the Libyan crisis worsened and other parties entered into it, such as the Daesh organization, the escalating threats facing its allies in Tripoli, and the growing European pressure to find a Libyan settlement, Turkey realized the importance of isolating its isolation from Libya and integrating again into international efforts. Recognized the reconciliation government headed by Fayez Al-Sarraj and pledged to provide full support for it, despite the continued opposition of some of its Libyan allies to this government.

At the beginning of the Libyan revolution in February 2011, Turkey sought to avoid a similar position to its critical conciliators over the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. It tried to make diplomatic efforts to prevent the departure of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, while at the same time intensified contacts with the latter to urge him to respond to the demands of the demonstrators and make concessions. This position gave the impression initially that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had sided with Gaddafi.

As a result, criticism of Turkey has begun. Some argue that the Turkish-Libyan relations under Muammar Gaddafi have been positive for decades that they have witnessed a significant upsurge in the AKP government. Under the rule of this party, Turkey became the second country in the world after China in the field of contracting in Libya until 2014. The value of projects amounted to 28 billion dollars and the volume of trade between the two countries before the revolution in "2010" about 10 billion dollars. When the revolution took place in 2011, Turkey had actual contracts worth \$ 15 billion distributed to hundreds of Turkish companies, with equipment worth it. 5 billion dollars and about 160 projects. There were about 30,000 Turkish citizens working in Libya, "he said, stressing the depth of bilateral relations between the two countries. France to regain its traditional influence in North Africa, so I felt that this intervention threatened Turkish interests and role.

The Turkish rivalry with France existed before the Libyan revolution, through the tone of challenge highlighted by then-Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. In November 23, 2009, he said: "We have an inheritance from the Ottoman Empire; they say they are the neo-Ottomans. Yes, we are neo-Ottomans and find ourselves obliged to pay attention to the countries in our region. We are open to the whole world, even in North Africa. The superpowers are following us with astonishment and wonder, especially France, which is looking for us to know why it is opening to North Africa. I have given my orders to the Turkish Foreign Ministry to find Sarkozy whenever he raises his head in Africa, a Turkish embassy with Turkish flag".

"Turkey interprets NATO's military intervention as an opportunity for the great powers, specifically France, to return to its influence in North Africa. But as the revolution against Gaddafi intensified, Turkey put an end to its diplomacy and chose," as he said. In July 2011, he announced that this council was the sole representative of the Libyan people. Turkey granted \$ 200 million of Libyan funds frozen to it and promised to provide \$ 100 million others and participated in the development of a map the road to Libya.

Turkey became a member of the Libyan Contact Group. "Turkey will make the appropriate and necessary contribution to the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the no-fly zone over Libya and the measures that guarantee the protection of civilians," said Davutoglu. This position explains that Turkey does not want to be

outside the policy direction Turkey wants to be part of Libya's decision-making process. At the same time, Turkey has realized that there are risks that would have been expected if it were not consistent with the intervention, risking not only credibility, but also denial of access to the Libyan economy after Gaddafi.

### **3.3.1 The government of reconciliation and Turkish Supporting**

The continued political division and the presence of two governments and two parliamentarians on the ground have exacerbated the Libyan crisis and the country's slide towards civil war has no sign of decisiveness. The situation has become increasingly complicated with the emergence and expansion of the Daesh organization in many parts of Libya, the threat of neighboring countries, and the increasing influx of refugees towards European countries, estimated to have about half a million migrants in Libya, waiting for the opportunity to rent by boat. Moreover, the sensitivity of Libya's position and its strategic resources of energy have made the negative repercussions of the state's failure not only on the Libyans, but on all neighboring countries and those with oil ties with Libya.

Instead, the option of dialogue to find a political settlement is no longer just a Libyan wish but an international and regional necessity that has been honored by the United Nations' lofty efforts to push the parties to an end to the political crisis and war.

Despite the failure of several attempts by the United Nations, the current Secretary-General's envoy, Martin Kobler, succeeded in continuing the negotiations of the Skhirat in Morocco. Through a parallel effort, reached an agreement on "17 December 2015" between political figures from both sides of the conflict in Libya one government is the government of national reconciliation. "the legislative in one parliament is the" House of Representatives ", in addition to the unification of the army, and the establishment of a higher council of the state consists of members of the General National Congress in Tripoli, and his duties are to express the opinion of the Government of reconciliation in draft laws and decisions before forwarding to them. The House was formed actual government headed by a member of the House of Representatives for of Tobruk named Faez Al-Sarraj, and soon gained international recognition, despite the lack of confidence in the House of Representatives so far, and the continued refusal or reservation by the figures in the General National Congress.

Turkey considered accord the government a suitable way out of the Libyan crisis, after European countries, the United States and most of the world recognized the government of the House of Representatives. Turkey was one of the first countries to host the winner of Al-Sarraj after the agreement and expressed support for the formation of his government. It was received in Ankara by former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu on January 11, 2016, which confirmed that Turkey will contribute to the economic renaissance and reconstruction of Libya. Al-Sarraj's government to Tripoli, Libya's Amrullah Al-Shallar, visited Tripoli on April 4, 2016. He invited Libyans to support this government and met Al-Sarraj. He said: "It is time to unite and unite in Libya, at this stage in a spirit of compromise, give Momentum to achieve security on Libyan territory, and invited the Libyans, to provide government support National Accord".

The visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Tripoli on May 30, 2016, the first visit to him after the formation of the new government headed by Ben Ali Yildirm. Turkey takes its policy in Libya of great importance in the next phase, said Çavuşoğlu that his visit comes to support the government of reconciliation, that Turkey wants to be the first country to reopen its embassy in Tripoli, and that it is used to rebuild Libya again.

Through its new policy, Turkey tried to mediate with its allies in the National General Conference. For example, it sought to receive the President of the National Congress, Nuri Abu Sahmin, in Ankara, at the same time that Al-Sarraj was received in January 2016. However, did not succeed because of Abu Shmin's insistence on rejecting the national reconciliation government.

On the other hand, Turkey is also trying to pressure the opponents of the Government of the accord from its allies by recognizing this government as the representative of the Libyan people and inviting the Libyans to recognize and support it alone. This means that Turkey has implicitly recognized the Government of the Conference; it also exempts the lifting of political and financial support if it continues to reject the new reality. It is important to be aware of the Turkish policy's caution in this regard, as its pressure has not reached its peak or has not yet taken very clear action against the Government of the Conference or the rejectionist members of the Conference. Because it is still waiting for the international efforts to pressure the



House of Representatives and Army Commander Khalifa Hafter to recognize the government of consensus. Fearing that it will put strict pressure and sanctions on some of its allies who reject, at a time when the international pressure may not result on the House of Representatives result, and then lose some of its allies without the government of consensus Libyan or legitimate consensus of the House of Representatives.

The United States and the European Union have imposed sanctions on al-Ghawil - along with House Speaker Aqila Salih - for obstructing the reconciliation government. Including the Grand Mufti of Libya, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ghoriani, who said that the presidential council of the government of the accord to return from where they came and demanded the need to amend the agreement political agreement before accepting the government of reconciliation, as well as the foreign minister of the conference government Ali Bouzouk and others.

## CONCLUSIONS

This research aimed to study the bilateral relations between Turkey and Libya between "1951-2018". The feasibility of studying the subject of the Turkish-Libyan relations at this stage is of special importance and well-founded. It is worthy of research at the theoretical and practical level in the light of the structural changes in the region. At the internal level and cast doubt on the future stage on international relations, hence the idea of this study, which highlights its importance.

The historical Libyan-Turkish relations, rooted in the days of Ottoman domination of Tripoli in the west, as well as the positive attitudes of Libya and its people during and after the First World War, have left a positive impact on the relations between the two countries. The Libyan side is in a position of strategic independence on the Mediterranean Sea, which makes it impossible for the Soviets to reach this region, which has serious dimensions on Turkish national security (Dal, 2012).

Especially since the Soviet Union was the biggest threat to Turkey during that period. Therefore, Turkey has supports Libya in the political, economic and social aspects so that this young country can stand on its own and keep it away from the trap of foreign countries, especially the Soviet Union. The Turks' treatment of the Libyans did not differ despite the change of their governments and the transfer of power to the Democratic Party Three decades under the Republican People's Party, and even Turkish support increased during the Democratic Party.

Democratic Party governments continued to support Libya's independence after the party took power in Turkey in 1950, after many years of Republican People's Party CHP rule. The Turkish position is even stronger than before, especially at this stage. Turkey has shown its readiness to support Libyan economic and social independence, after its previous support was limited to the political side. It also announced its readiness to provide the necessary assistance to this young state in all fields to build state institutions and facilities. The Turkish government, headed by Adnan Menderes, sent a telegram to the Libyan Prime Minister Mahmud al-Montasser "December 14, 1951, February 18, 1954" which included the official recognition of the Libyan state and its king Idriss Al-Senussi (Center, 2016; Dal, 2012).

During the period from 1969 to 2011, Libya enjoyed good relations with Turkey before the revolution, and it developed significantly in the late sixties of the last century after the economic factor played its role in strengthening relations between the two countries, and oil played a major role in it. This breakthrough in the relations between the two countries made Libya one of the first countries to help Turkey when a violent earthquake that destroyed a number of villages hit the eastern region of the country. By the beginning of 1979, Libyan-Turkish relations had a broader horizon.

The two countries have been able to achieve a qualitative leap in the development of relations between them and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, especially with regard to the level of trade and economic cooperation with this country, which found the Turkish role and popular acceptance of many cultural considerations. The Turkish approach to relations with Libya was reflected in the level of trade exchange between them in 2010, to 1 billion dollars. Libya announced that it will invest 100 billion dollars for Turkish companies until 2013 and announced investments in construction worth 15 billion dollars. For Turkish companies in this area. Since 2010 entered into force 100 legitimate Turkish investment in Libya.

At the beginning of the Libyan revolution in February 2011, Turkey sought to avoid a similar position to its critical conciliators over the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. It has tried to make diplomatic efforts to prevent the departure of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Turkey considered the Accord government a suitable way out of the Libyan crisis, after European countries, the United States and most of the world recognized the government of the House of Representatives. So Turkey was one of the first countries to host the head of government Faiz Al-Sarraj (Center, 2016).

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