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NGOH NLEM ANNE PAULE

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NGOH NLEM ANNE PAULE

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NGOH NLEM ANNE PAULE

APPROVED BY:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sinem AKGÜL AÇIKMEŞE (Advisor) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Dimitrios TRIANTAPHYLLOU (Jury Member) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Fulya Ereker (Jury Member) _____

APPROVAL DATE: 19/09/2016

"I, NGOH NLEM ANNE PAULE, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis."

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Ngoh Nlem Anne Paule

ABSTRACT

THE COMPARATIVE ROLES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE AFRICAN UNION IN PEACEKEEPING

Ngoh Nlem Anne Paule

Master of Arts in International Relations

Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sinem AKGÜL AÇIKMEŞE

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The concept of peacekeeping has been the subject of several studies specifically since the end of the Cold War. This thesis focuses on the evolution of peacekeeping both at the conceptual and the practical level by looking at the comparative roles of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) in the African continent through three case-studies in order to test the capabilities and effectiveness of the EU and the AU in dealing with conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur and the Central African Republic. In this context, this thesis compares and contrasts the effectiveness of these two institutions in peacekeeping; bearing in mind the fact that peacekeeping is also about diplomacy and it must not always be about the use of force. Accordingly, this thesis argues that although the AU is younger and has less experience in peacekeeping when compared to the EU, both institutions which are considered not to be entirely successful in their peacekeeping functions face several challenges in ending the current conflicts and preventing further ones.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, European Union, African Union, Africa, Conflict Resolution

ÖZET
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ VE AFRİKA BİRLİĞİ'NİN
BARIŞI-KORUMADAKİ KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ROLLERİ

NGOH NLEM ANNE PAULE
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Anahtar kelimeler: Barışı Koruma, Avrupa Birliği, Afrika Birliği, Afrika, Çatışma Çözümü

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List of abbreviations

AMIS   AU Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan

APF   African Peace Facility

APSA   African Peace and Security Architecture

ASF   African Standby Force

AU   African Union

AWACS   Airborne Warning and Control System

CADSP   Common African Defense and Security Policy

CAR   Central African Republic

CEOM   Civilian Electoral Observer Mission

CEWS   Continental Early Warning System

CFSP   Common Foreign Security Policy

CHG   Civilian Headline Goals

CNP   Congolese National Police

CPA   Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CSDP   Common Security Defense Policy

DPA   Darfur Peace Agreement

DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

ECCAS   Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States

EDA   European Defence Agency

EDC   European Defense Community

EEAS   European External Action Service

EPC   European Political Community

ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR RCA	European Union Forces in Central African Republic
EUFOR RDC	European Union Forces in RD Congo
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUSEC RDC	European Union Security Reform Mission
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JEM	Justice Equality Movement
JVM	Joint Verification Mechanism
MICOPAX	Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique
MINUSCA	Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies Pour la Stabilisation en Centrafrique
MISCA	Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MSC	Military Staff Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTC	National Transitional Council
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCR	United Nations Hugh Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Missions in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
WEU	Western European Unio

Introduction

African continent has been facing several challenges one of which is its constant conflicts and the inability of its governments and institutions to remedy the situation. Conflicts in Africa is a proof that history keeps repeating itself no matter the lessons to be learned. The conflicts have the same causes, course and effect. The conflicts are either multiethnic, religious or emerge due to ineffective governments. The repetition of the same conflicts raises alarm bells on the capability of the main institution set to assure the cooperation of African countries and their collective security.

Since the 1960s the period when most African countries regained their independence till present times, no lessons have come out from the conflicts in Africa. The main institution which could help Africans to solve their problems is the AU, a continuation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). However, since the creation of the AU in 2001, the organisation has not proven the capability of handling the security problems of the continent. This is what draws us to the following research question of this work: Compared to the EU could or would the AU assume a full-potential peacekeeping role in Africa?

In this context, the aim of this paper is to compare the peacekeeping role of the EU and the AU in Africa. Since 2003, the EU has been taking part in peacekeeping operations in Africa. This thesis therefore examines the concept of peacekeeping per se as well as the peacekeeping instruments employed by the two organizations as part of their operative role in the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur and Central Africa Republic.

Specifically, the effectiveness of these organisations will be compared in relevance to second generation peacekeeping. This is because this form of peacekeeping is more present to an extent in contemporary times compared to first

generation peacekeeping. Both the EU and the AU have shortcomings in their missions no matter their years of experience, and this thesis will mainly assess the primary role of the AU in comparison to the EU's secondary role in peacekeeping, specifically in the conflicts in the DRC, CAR and Darfur with a particular focus on the causes and the nature of these conflicts.

After a thorough examination of the causes of each conflict, the mechanisms used by the EU and the AU in the civilian and military missions will explained. The organisations are expected to not only look for a way to end the conflicts, but prevent further conflicts by encouraging democracy, diplomacy, dialogue, by providing the wellbeing of citizens and the protection of their lives, and by ensuring post conflict rehabilitation and humanitarian aid. It is the contention of this thesis that although the AU faces structural, internal, regional and financial challenges, it has come a long way in peacekeeping and it is slowly proving its capability to lead operations with support from other institutions especially in hard times. The EU on the other hand faces its own challenges, but does not abandon the AU during tough times.

Chapter I

Conceptual Framework of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is an evolving concept in International Relations. This chapter explains the evolution and the forms of peacekeeping as well as the role of some peacekeeping actors and the criteria for a successful peacekeeping operation.

1. Definition of Peacekeeping

According to the UN, peacekeeping is defined as the "field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under the UN command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary" (Goulding 1993: 455). This definition by Goulding brings out three important points in peacekeeping: the consent of the parties, meaning that the parties involved should accept to take part in the peacekeeping operation; impartiality which means that the body carrying the peacekeeping operation should be a referee and treat each party equally; and the use of force which should be used in respect of the agreement or for self-defense and not in any form abusing of the civilians. Similarly, Fortna also brings out a definition of the term which she points to be "the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security" (Fortna and Howard 2008:285). Looking at these two definitions, it can be perceived that these scholars focus on the intervention of an international body in order to maintain peace.

On the other hand, some scholars define peacekeeping not necessarily mentioning the international bodies' intervention. De Conning, for instance, defined

peacekeeping as a method through which peace agreements can be controlled in order to prevent conflicts and this should be done when consent has been provided by the warring bodies (De Conning 2001:17). Also, Berman and Sams define peacekeeping as a term used to indicate the deployment of military or police order following the request of either a government or a group of actors who are recognized at the international level (Berman and Sams 2000: 25). These definitions do not rely too much on the importance of international organizations but are similar to the first one as they accentuate on the role of consent and the ceasing of conflicts. Therefore, peacekeeping can be considered as to be any movement which is set to end conflicts with an accord from the parties willing to arrive at peace and maintain it.

All these definitions of peacekeeping boil down to the same point, though they have different approaches. For a clearer understanding of the term peacekeeping, important concepts like peace-making, conflict prevention and crisis management have to be explained.

Peacemaking is defined as "all the activities which shift anger to understanding and transform conflict to cooperation" (Kahn 1988:5). The similarity between peacekeeping and peacemaking is that they both point at already existing conflicts; but the peculiarity of peacemaking is that it is aimed at "peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms" (Bredel 2003:9). On the other hand, peacekeeping also aims at preventing conflicts, not only at solving them.

Also, conflict prevention and conflict management are often used interchangeably. While conflict prevention deals with a set of instruments which aim at solving problems before they eventually grow to bigger disputes or conflicts, conflict management deals more with the alleviation and reduction of already

existing conflicts, not necessarily by focusing on solving them (Hoffman, Nolkaemper and Swerissen 2012:115).

According to Thakur, the two forms of peacekeeping are traditional or classical peacekeeping and modern peacekeeping (Thakur 2005:3-7). Classical peacekeeping is often associated with the first generation peacekeeping because it came about around the end of the Cold War. Modern peacekeeping is also referred to as second generation or post-Cold War peacekeeping. They differ from each other in the sense that classical or first generation peacekeeping is involved in only ending conflicts, but second generation peacekeeping evolved with the use of humanitarian efforts as well as the use of military and civilian deployment. Apart from the two forms mentioned above, some scholars added another form of peacekeeping known as civilian peacekeeping.

A. First Generation/Classical/Traditional Peacekeeping

Diehl defined first generation peacekeeping as "the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved" (Diehl 1994:13). This definition of first generation peacekeeping confirms the way peacekeeping was used in the Cold War era, just as the use of army to prevent further conflicts and provide a convenient environment for peace agreements to be concluded. Other scholars like Hill and Malik classified classical peacekeeping into three periods; the period between 1947 and 1956 in which operations were characterized by the birth of the UN, the period of 1956-1974 which was marked with determination and the period from 1974 to

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1984 which referred the dormant period (Hill and Malik 1996: 26). The first period was marked by unarmed observers that is why it is linked with the birth of the UN. The organization was still young. The second category started with the emergence of armed observers such as the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF1) and this is why this period is known as the determination period. The third period is known as the dormant since the only peacekeeping operation was in Lebanon in 1978.

Therefore, the classical peacekeeping operation was mainly categorized with the use of army as observers for the implementation of peaceful agreements for the prevention of further conflicts. This form of peacekeeping had two main functions; observation and interposition. Through observation, peacekeepers had to analyze the parties concerned to make sure they do not violate the agreements and also tried to solve little aggressions or manifestations to make sure they do not grow to something bigger. On the other hand, armed peacekeepers could also prevent any disasters by interfering between hostile groups (Fortna 2014: 5).

The first two peacekeeping operations held by the UN, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), had as tasks to control and observe the ceasefires between Israel/Palestine and India and Pakistan respectively (Iribarnegaray 2002: 6). With the next peacekeeping operations-the UNEF1 and UNEF II, it was different due to the evolution of peacekeeping because the operations were established in order to forcefully secure the ceasefires. The UNEF II's purpose was to reduce the tensions between the Egyptian and Israeli forces which further on led to peace. The United Nations Assistance Group (UNTAG) added some responsibilities to peacekeeping operations of the UN because it was the first UN operation to monitor elections as

Namibia was just gaining its independence. Even though there was such a simplicity that characterized traditional peacekeeping, it did not always lead to the success of the operations. Johansen argues that this form of peacekeeping succeeded based on the limitation of armed conflict and the promotion of conflict resolution and went further to argue that all the operations during this period were not successful except for the UNEF II which succeeded in promoting conflict resolution and peace in the borders of Egypt and Israel (Johansen 1994:307).

B. Second Generation/Modern Peacekeeping

By the end of the Cold War, the demand and need for more peacekeeping arose. This urge was due to the end of the hostilities between the superpowers which made all other conflict areas to turn to the UN peacekeeping mechanisms (Macqueen 2006: 129). This was because the superpowers decided to reduce their influence and stop dealing with the security issues of the countries they dominated. Therefore, these countries had no other choice than to turn to the UN because they felt abandoned and needed a body to help them in time of conflicts.

The UN increased its peacekeeping policy and sought for ways to make the maintenance of peace and security more effective in the areas affected by conflicts. These ways were established in the "Agenda for Peace" (UN Documents Gathering a Body of Global Agreements 1992). The methods implemented were: i) preventive diplomacy which has to encompass ways of avoiding future conflicts through the measures for building confidence, fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment and demilitarized zones, ii) peacemaking which brings the conflicted parties to an agreement through world court, amelioration through assistance sanctions and special economic problems, use of military force and peace

enforcement units, iii) peacekeeping in order to bring and maintain peace with the establishment of new rubrics like new departures in peacekeeping, personnel, logistics, post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building, cooperation with regional organizations, the safety of personnel and financing.

This shows an actual increase in the responsibilities of the UN and the evolution of the concept of peacekeeping. It shows a transition from the processes of just military observers to one with the promotion of democracy, humanitarian aid, reconstruction and ensuring human rights be respected. Adding new aspects to peacekeeping means that the organization concerned in peacekeeping will be more "interventionist" (Schnabel 1997: 563). This is because they also have to reconstruct the society after the war.

In Cambodia in 1992, a second generation peacekeeping operation was held known as the UNTAC which had to deal with issues such as the refugees, human rights, reconstruction and the use of the military abilities (Moore 1996: 32). UNTAC was tasked to disarm 70 per cent of the parties' military force and build a political situation which would be regarded as neutral, to rebuild the country, to repatriate and bring back around 350,000 refugees from Thailand and as well to protect the borders. It had a budget of around 3 billion US dollars; and 5,000 UN soldiers, 5,000 officials from 32 countries and around 3,600 police were financed by the international community (Moore 1996). Would it be right to claim that all the peacekeeping operations after the first generation were all successful because the operation in Cambodia was? Not all the peacekeeping operations of the second generation have been successful. Considering the conflict in Srebrenica in 1995 which will be examined subsequently, the peacekeeping operation was not successful as the UN did not succeed in preventing the conflict, even recently, the crisis in the Democratic

Republic of Congo cannot be considered a total success which will also be explained in the next chapters.

Second generation peacekeeping still does not guarantee successful peacekeeping. With the use of force and the emphasis laid on post-conflict building still does not confirm successful peacekeeping, even though some scholars decided to privilege the role of the civilians, reducing the use of the army and giving the primary role to communication.

C. Civilian Peacekeeping

Civilian peacekeeping is a new mode of peacekeeping which privileges communication skills instead of the use force to create and maintain peace. Schirch defines civilian peacekeeping as a mechanism which deals with unarmed individuals seeking to reduce conflicts with international endeavors. This can also be called "third party nonviolent intervention" and is set to perform identical missions as the army (Schirch 2006: 16). Rachel Julian and Christine Schweitzer propose another definition which they label to be the "work of trained civilians who use non-violence and unarmed approaches to protect other civilians from violence and the threat of violence as well as to support local efforts to build peace" (Julian and Schweitzer 2015: 1). Both definitions suggest that civilian peacekeeping encompasses the quest and maintenance of peace without the use of force which does not exclude the role of the army in second generation peacekeeping. The article goes on to trace the origin of the concept as far back as Gandhi's idea of a Peace Army which later on became defense force in 1957. From there, Europeans attempted on several occasions to build such armies in order to interfere in some conflicts (Julian and Schweitzer 2015: 2). The peculiarity of civilian peacekeeping is the importance it gives to community

and those at the ground level of the society. In using this form of peacekeeping, the local community leads while the international civilian peacekeeper is just there to support and assist (Tshiband 2010: 4). Tshiband further outlines some tasks of civilian peacekeeping as to protect, to oversee and support human rights, prevent conflicts, dialogue, provide humanitarian assistance, monitor elections and ceasefires.

Furthermore, the three main principles of peacekeeping (impartiality, consent of parties and non-use of force) do not all suit the rules of civilian peacekeeping. Impartiality does suit, although it is very challenging because the local organizations can ally with one side of the conflicting parties and it will be difficult for impartiality to be present. Thus, civilian peacekeeping employs the principle what is known as non-partisanship. As concerns consent, the opinion of the local communities is also important, not only the opinion of the government. Moreover, civilian peacekeeping does not deal with the use of force instead of negotiation. Scholars like Sir Urquhart hold that the actual greatness of a peacekeeping mission is not its ability to use force instead it is how it cannot use force but still achieve and maintain peace that is important (Urquhart 1987: 178-179). Findlay also supports this argument by claiming that the main weapons of peacekeeping are the proper use of negotiation and the ability to persuade (Findlay 2002: 14).

Moreover, civilian peacekeeping cannot be a sufficient method for most of the conflicts the world has been undergoing. A clear instance of the effectiveness of this form of peacekeeping was experienced during the Bosnian crisis in the 1990s. Where Colonel Bob Stewart commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) force was stopped by some Bosnian civilians though he had all the military power needed to crush them, he decided to avoid further conflicts and called

BBC to interview them. Though there was the use of media, it was done through negotiation and persuasion and he found his way by avoiding further peace and maintaining the little peace that already existed (Carriere and Julian 2010: 29).

Therefore in understanding peacekeeping, it is important to mention the importance of this form of peacekeeping advocated by some scholars who view it to be important, although not in terms with what the UN calls as peacekeeping.

2. The UN as an Actor in Peacekeeping

The UN adopted peacekeeping in an unprepared manner, what Berman and Sams refer to as an "impromptu reaction" because it was difficult to put in place an army that will have to be called each time there is a problem especially with the beginning of the Cold War. Failure to establish a plan of collective security for the international scene, peacekeeping was adopted as a backup plan (Berman and Sams 2000:26). The UN's body responsible for overseeing world peace is the Security Council made up of five permanent members which are Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States and ten rotating members. It is this body which determines the deployment of a peace operation. The form of peacekeeping held at this time was classical peacekeeping, first of which was in 1948.

Nevertheless, it was not until 1956 with the establishment of the UNEF that term "peacekeeping" was employed by Dag Hammarskjold when the UN deployed 5000 observers for the Suez Crisis (Oakley1998: 21). Due to the Suez Crisis caused by the invasion of Egypt by France and Britain in 1956, Dag Hammarskjold, the then UN Secretary General, called the respective governments to establish peacekeeping forces (Mehta 2008: 2).

Peacekeeping started growing around 1965 when a special committee on peacekeeping operations was established with 33 member states with the aim to evaluate peacekeeping operations and to reduce the financial difficulties faced by the UN at the time (Hanrahan 2007:29).

Following the problems and the difficulties faced by the UN in 2000, the Brahimi report was written with proposals to improve certain aspects of peacekeeping though second generation peacekeeping was already in practice. The report proposed improvements on fast deployment of staffs, strategies and doctrines of peacekeeping and managements and reinforcement of the operations (Durch, Holt, Earle and Shanahan 2003:10). Thanks to this report, the UN's peacekeeping was broadened and strengthened.

According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, peacekeeping is a framework used to keep peace and assist the implementation of the agreements if the peacemakers involved in the agreement are willing to consign to. It goes further to assert that there has been such an evolution in the concept of peacekeeping that it no longer deals only with military interventions trying to monitor ceasefires after wars or it no longer only entails military operations, but has gone further to add the police and the civilians in modern peacekeeping, all of which work together to build long lasting peace (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008:18). Therefore, the foundation of any peacekeeping operation is the agreement that has been signed. Three important aspects of peacekeeping must be highlighted from this definition: Military intervention, reconciliation through agreements and the role of the civilians and their protection.

The UN's first peacekeeping operation was the (UNTSO) which was an observer mission. This mission was set up in 1948 in Palestine, followed by the

(UNMOGIP) established in 1949 to monitor their actions in Jammu and Kashmir. After then was the (UNEF 1) between November 1956 and May 1967 between Israel and Egypt. From 1973 to 1979, the UNEF II was launched for the conflict between Israel and Egypt. Yhe next UN peacekeeping operations were not more only between states but also within the states, such as the (UNTAG) in Namibia from 1989 to 1990, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in Cambodia from 1992-1993, the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) in Kosovo from 1990 (Iribarnegaray 2002: 4-5). This shows how the operations led by the UN multiplied themselves and touched other aspects like the conflicts within countries commonly called intra-state conflicts. This gave more light to international peace not only dealing with conflicts between countries but also conflicts within countries that could be solved by peacekeeping operations.

With a brief introduction to the origins of the UN peacekeeping, the functions of the UN in peacekeeping have to be examined in further details. The UN as an international organization has to foster and encourage the implementation and maintenance of peace in the international arena. With the amount of conflicts in the world, it is relevant for the UN to take a stand to help the countries in conflicts among other regional organizations and coalitions.

With the evolution of UN peacekeeping from traditional to multidimensional, the Capstone doctrine provides the functions of the UN in peacekeeping which are; i) designing a suitable environment for international cooperation and helping to fortify the states concerned to ensure its citizens protection and respect for human rights, ii) encouraging reconciliation and dialogue in order to establish efficient governmental bodies to ease the political procedure towards peace, iii) establishing a system that will ensure that the UN and all other actors willing to operate in the peacekeeping

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process do so in a harmonious way. These are the main functions of the UN in peacekeeping, and they work along monitoring, supervision and observation (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support 2008: 23).

Moreover, the UN's Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) makes provision for its member states to benefit from UN training assistance. Along with other organizations, standard modules have been established dealing with the training guidelines and resources (Berman and Sams 2000: 32).

The role of the UN in peacekeeping today has been drastically reduced because of the emergence of other actors which for divergent reasons take over some of the peacekeeping missions in conflicting areas. Some of these actors can be countries, coalition of countries and even regional organizations. Nevertheless, the UN still keeps its leading role in peacekeeping, as it strives to prevent further conflicts, ensures the transition from war to peace and also ensures the maintenance of long lasting peace. It therefore assumes the role of a diplomatic, political, military and humanitarian support actor. This is done through the deployment of troops, humanitarian assistance and also the implication of sanctions. However, this does not mean all its operations have been successful.

3. Other Peacekeeping Actors

The difficulties faced by the UN in dealing with military-humanitarian crisis like the ones in Rwanda and Srebrenica, proved that the organization could not deal properly with other conflicts in the rest of the world due to insufficient resources and the fact that regional organizations could be better in handling such issues. As a result, the UN's then secretary-general Boutros Boutros Ghali appealed to some regional

organizations to help in peacekeeping either independently or under cooperation's with the UN (Dhanoa 2003:3). This appeal instigated other actors to respond to conflicts in the world such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union and the African Union.

Firstly, Robert Jackson, points out three main characteristics of what defines an organization: purpose, membership and goals (Jackson 1993:3). Under these characteristics, the role of NATO, European Union and the African Union in peacekeeping will be examined.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an organization of 28 member states which was established in 1949. The member states cannot be said to be bound by a specific region or culture, instead by their common security interests. The organization came about as "a collective defense alliance" as a result of the threats to the world posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War years (Oertel 2008:2). NATO has a reputation and prestige as the principal military custodian of security and peace in Europe which it has to preserve. When the UN failed in the protection of civilians in the Bosnia and Kosovo crisis, NATO has decided to intervene (Lemos-Maniati 2001: 3). The role of the organization was indispensable because of the new challenges the world was facing.

In cooperation with the UN, the first peacekeeping operation of NATO was in Bosnia in 1992 where it focused on conflict management and post war building through humanitarian assistance. It was the case in Pakistan following the request of Pakistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) after an earthquake in 2005, NATO made provisions for assistance with medical specialists and engineers. Also, in response to the crisis in Sudan, NATO provided humanitarian assistance under the mechanism of the Assistance Mission in Sudan

(AMIS) set to better the condition of the citizens of the region and put an end to the violence (Oertel 2008: 5-6).

On the other hand, scholars like Von Seherr-Thoss claim that NATO is "purely military" but its instruments like consultation, training, assistance, capacity building which are all linked to security can be used in peacekeeping especially in collaboration with other organizations (Von Seherr-Thoss 2006:38). Apart from military and humanitarian assistance, NATO also engages in training as in the case in Iraq under the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) (Oertel 2008:6). The organization trained military personnel and supported the improvement of security in the region.

Therefore, NATO's approach to peacekeeping operations can be viewed from a military point of view because it mainly focuses on security issues and marginally from a civilian point of view. The use of humanitarian assistance can be considered for the betterment of the civilians under civilian protection and crisis management (Tardy 2006a: 28). Its capabilities can be relevant to stabilize countries under conflicts no matter the zone of conflict. As mentioned earlier, it has operated in Pakistan and in Sudan both of which are not member states of the Alliance. An increase in its capability comes from the US' expertise thanks to its precision weapons, high technology knowhow and the organization can even benefit some assets like the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) (Drent 2014:57). The presence of the US in the alliance is a major advantage which other organizations do not have and face difficulties in its military deployment.

Moreover, regional organizations like the EU and the AU can perform peacekeeping functions. The EU is an intergovernmental organization made of 28 member states while the AU has 32 member states.

The EU emerged as an organization to merge and share the interests of its member states, but this does not mean it does not intervene in other countries or continents other than Europe. The EU has to preserve its prestige due to its economic grandeur and peace promoter which permits the organization to help afflicted countries. Also, its member states assure their interests by intervening in other countries. Its peacekeeping policy is based on the Common Foreign Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP).[1] The organization stations both civilian and military personnel for its operations. As part of the ESDP, the Petersberg tasks was established which broadened the function of the military and added humanitarian aspects to EU peacekeeping. The EU therefore sets for training, observation and monitoring, military and humanitarian operations. Thanks to its economic success, the EU has in practice the civilian, military and humanitarian capability to handle a peacekeeping mission.

Magriet Drent asserts that the strength of the EU's peacekeeping is its capability in managing hybrid missions-which are missions encompassing the merging of civilian and military personnel and also for its ability to deploy diplomatic, financial and economic aids (2014:55). The EU also works in cooperation with other organizations. The EU contributed to 38 percent of the UN's budget in order to support UN peacekeeping (IPP 2016). Also, in support to the AU, the EU established the African Peace Facility which has received around 740 million euros (Stock 2011:8).

The AU on the other hand is a new organization established in 2002. Due to many constraints like financial and logistic failure, the AU cannot operate out of its region of origin. African peace operations emerged as a result of the failures of the

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[1] ESDP is known as CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) since the Treaty of Lisbon which came into force in 2009.

UN to tackle the crisis in Africa like the one in Rwanda in 1994. The failures instigated the AU to cooperate with other organizations to secure its continent (Hengari 2013). The peacekeeping role of the AU is defined under its Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2002 which aims at preserving peace and stability in Africa. The PSC works with other bodies of the AU like the APF, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), Continental Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise, each of which aims at preserving long lasting peace (Aning 2008:4-5).

The African Union contributes to the maintenance of peace and security in its area of concern with the use peacekeeping and agreed interventions and peace negotiations. The formation of the African Union has commendably contributed to the maintenance of peace and security in the African region, through peaceful negotiations, peacekeeping and consensual interventions (Kabau 2012:59).

Moreover, the increase in the capability of the AU is not sufficient for accomplishing successful peacekeeping operations. The UN has been recommended to help the AU to train more military and provide civilian experts until the AU can actually provide its own capacity both at the military and civilian levels. The UN assists the AU with some representatives of the DPKO through planning and consultations (United Nations 2005: 60).

Other actors in peacekeeping operations are unilateral actors like the USA. As mentioned earlier, the body of the UN that takes care of international peace is the Security Council. The USA being one of the five permanent members is a pass to access any peace operation or refuse any (Vuong 2003: 808).

Unilateral actors may get involved in peacekeeping operations because the country in need of help may be a former colony and they still keep close ties like

social, economic and political ties, and feel they have to protect the country's interest, this was the case of the US with Liberia when George Bush made provision for offshore support for the deployment of the United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003 (Bellamy and Williams 2010:44).

The US contributes to peacekeeping through UN support in 2009, the government provided $721 million as support to UN missions (Hannum and Kehmna 2011:12). Apart from financing, the US provides training for the military in conflict zones, air lifts and even equipment's like was the case for the African Union during its missions in Somalia and Darfur (Smith 2014). The US' intervention like the above regional organizations in peacekeeping is a profitable one because it works with other organizations and supports them.

However, Bellamy and Williams claim that the most important organization in peacekeeping is the UN because of its "functional and normative advantages" (2010:67). The UN stands as a predominant organization because of its status of legitimate peacekeeper and its ability to create new rules in the international scene.

4. Criteria for Success in Peacekeeping

The evolution of peacemaking has seen many torments both successes and failures in its operations. The question now is what makes a peacekeeping operation successful? Darya Pushkina propounds that to measure the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation, two factors have to be considered; the evaluation of the peacekeeping mandate and an evaluation of how the mandate got completed (Pushkina 2006: 133). This means evaluating the mandate as it is going on and at the end evaluating what it achieved. Pushkina goes on to pose four criteria which can be used to call an operation successful; i) it has to reduce violence since its task is to

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achieve and maintain peace in the conflicting region, ii) be in accord with human rights norms, iii) reduce human suffering by providing humanitarian assistance and protect the civilians, iv) prevent the diffusion of conflicts, this is because conflicts often leads to refugees and it may affect neighboring countries and increase the intensity of the conflicts and it has to promote the resolution of conflicts done through diplomacy, negotiation and limited use of force. It is very important because it is from conflict resolution that all other aspects can come in like the transition to peace cannot take place if the conflict has not been solved (Pushkina 134-135).

Barbara O'Dwyer also gives a few more points to how successful peacekeeping can be arrived at: Firstly any operation should stand in need for reconciliation. In other words, the purpose for a peacekeeping operation should be to bring the war parties to a consent which should be done through conciliation not only by seeing force as an end to the means. Moreover, the magnitude of an operation should not be through how well the operation has been going according to a specific mandate but how the acquisition of long lasting peace will be acquired. This is because the role of peacekeeping is to bring a quite unbiased agreement between the parties. Also, the aim of peacekeeping is not only to stop fights between warring parties in order to use its diplomatic, political, humanitarian or economic missions instead the operations should be to keep long-lasting peace and prevent further conflicts. Preventing conflicts is very important because it reduces the chance of suffering from the reintegration problem, the struggle to build an economy after a conflict and even trying to rebuild another law system (O'Dwyer 2003:6-7).

On the other hand, Gürol Baba and Stephen Slotter, unlike the previous scholars, lay more emphasis on the role of the organization handling the peacekeeping operation and not the nature of the operation. They argue that an

effective peacekeeping operation has to have a clear and well defined mandate with specific objectives taking into consideration the deployment and the norms that govern the local population of the host state, have international legitimacy and work in conformity with the UN. Moreover, the organization's military capability has to be adequate in order to enforce and maintain peace and if the operation entails other actors, there is need for cooperation, cohesiveness and commitment among themselves. The organization handling the operation has to have a good organizational plan and structure (Baba and Slotter 2014: 4-20).

Other scholars like Caroline Hartwell, Matthew Hoddle, and Donald Rothschild encourage the use of third parties in order to enforce peace after conflicts. These third parties can be regional organizations or even countries. They can do this by changing the perception of opponents by showing them they have the support of one party and sanctions can be taken if the agreement is not respected. The third party can go as far as promising to come in between in case of any insecurity measure which gradually reassures the weaker side of the conflict. The use of this third party can make the peacekeeping successful by creating some sort of environment for long lasting peace in the case where agreements are respected (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001:193).

Although third parties are sometimes welcomed in assuring peacekeeping after conflicts, sometimes even insiders come in as a threat to the peacekeeping operation either leaders or parties. These outsiders are known as "spoilers" according to Steve Stedman (Stedman 1997:5). These are forces who try to hint peace. They have two ways of going about it, either by not even being concerned by the peace operation but still finding openings to cause troubles from an external way or by being in the peace operation and being scared of the peaceful outcome as seen to be a

threat to them and decided to act in disfavor of the acquisition of the intended peace. They therefore, make it difficult for peacekeeping to be a success as they create a negative environment because they consider the interests not matching with theirs. These spoilers therefore render peacekeeping a failure. The case of Angola in 1992 which was a total failure can be taken as an example which found itself in conflict after the elections though were monitored by the UN.

With an elaborate explanation of the concept of peacekeeping, it is important to mention that the evolution of peacekeeping has not always brought good news. Maggie Dwyer holds that while peacekeepers are supposed to take part in solving conflicts, their interventions can also be the cause of new problems and aggravate already existing conflicts especially within the host country's military (Dwyer 2015:207). Together with the above criteria and the roles of the organization in peacekeeping, the effectiveness of the EU and the AU will be compared in the following chapters.

After an examination of the various forms of peacekeeping and the role of different bodies, the form of peacekeeping used in this work will be second generation peacekeeping. This will be used to evaluate and assess the role of the EU and the AU in conflicts.

Chapter II

Peacekeeping Mechanism of the EU

This chapter is about the peacekeeping functions of the EU. It looks at the need for the EU to conduct peacekeeping operations specifically in Africa and the evolution of its peacekeeping mechanism.

1. The Essentiality of Peacekeeping for the EU

The conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s triggered the EU's will for involvement in peace operations. The conflicts made the EU realize that it could not tackle any security difficulty. This was because of the lack of the absence of a European military establishment, no political institution to oversee conflicts, no experience in the field, disunion in interventions and the influence of the international community which did not allow peacekeeping partnerships within actors (Belloni 2009:314-317). But with the economic difficulties and the ethnicity crisis faced in Kosovo in 1998-1999 showed that Europe as a region may face several forms of instability in its own backyard. In the quest to avoid further crisis, the EU decided to present a hope for membership which entailed economic development, improvement of legal system, political reforms, and democratic transition for the Western Balkans and most importantly encouragement of regional cooperation which is an efficient step towards reducing ethnic differences among neighboring countries (Skara 2014:27). This was a means used by the EU to bring peace. Therefore, the EU's decision to be involved in peacekeeping operations is in relation to the continent's interest for economic and institutional development which cannot be acquired without peace and stability.

With the devastation caused by the Cold War and the failure of the UN in peace operations in Africa notably in Rwanda, the EU saw the need to intervene in peacekeeping operations in Africa. This is because conflicts in Africa can also affect Europe through trade. The EU is Africa's largest partner in terms of trade as 85 percent of the exports from Africa are made to Europe; therefore, it is also in the EU's interest to help maintain peace and stability in Africa in order to boost international trade.

Apart from the EU's interests in trade, Yasin Kerem Gümüş sees other reasons for which the EU needed to be involved in peacekeeping out of Europe (Gümüş 2011:141). He emphasizes the prosperous nature of the EU as one of the greatest in the world which possesses the capability contribute to the development of Africa. The colonial ties have led to powerful cultural and diplomatic links between some European countries and African nations, and these European nations have an ideal mission of helping the African nations when they are in need.

Moreover, there is the issue of building the security of Europe considering its neighborhood (European Security Strategy 2003:7). This is the reason for which the EU felt it was necessary to act in the Mediterranean countries and some parts of the horn of Africa like Somalia. If these neighboring regions are affected by conflicts, not only will it lead to a refugee crisis in Europe but also the spread of piracy and terrorism which will affect the stability of the continent and the world.

The aspect of world prestige too is a reason for which the EU is involved in peace operations widely. As the EU serves the world as a global actor, the Union feels concerned in international affairs that is why it is involved in peacekeeping and trade affairs across its borders. Although its interests are gained too in assisting other

states the important point is that the EU feels the need to give a helping hand to countries other than its member states.

2. Evolution of EU Peacekeeping

The EU's peacekeeping policy and institutions have evolved over the years. Its tools towards peacekeeping will therefore be chronologically examined and its basic tasks towards Africa in the sense of peacekeeping will be examined below:

The roots of the notion of a common defence policy could be traced back to 1952 when the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) was signed. The Treaty was abolished in 1954 because of the French domination which disrupted integration in terms of a common defence policy. By the end of the 1960s, with the growing of the integration process of the European Union, it was expected to increase the role of the Union in international relations and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was adopted in 1970 providing a framework for foreign policy issues (Acikmese 2004:121-122). The EPC was put in place to give permission to the member states to harmonise their foreign policies when it seems advantageous to the rest of the member states. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty was signed and brought the establishment of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The part of the CFSP that covers crisis management, military and defence issues is known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) established in 1999.

An important aspect to note is that the peacekeeping policy of the EU is associated with the CFSP/ESDP[2]. In this context, the main mission of the EU in peacekeeping is to resolve conflicts, provide and protect the civilians affected by the conflict.

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[2] EPC could be regarded as the forerunner of the CFSP.

According to Zoltan, the main aims of this Treaty of Maastricht in establishing the CFSP were; "

> to safeguard the Union's common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity, to strengthen its security, to preserve peace and strengthen international security, to promote international cooperation and to consolidate democracy and the rights of law, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedom" (Zoltan 2014:488).

The ideas of the CFSP were based on foreign policy and security issues of the EU member states and issues concerning their nations too. The tasks of the CFSP was to be reached at by using common positions, joint actions and strategies. The CFSP constructed a legal mechanism which enabled the EU to be able to interfere in international affairs. Since there was nobody who could represent the EU abroad, reaching a consensus concerning foreign and security issues was difficult for the EU (2014:488).

The CFSP faced some shortcomings in 1997 which include: the lack of political will to act as a Union, decision making was based on unanimity which led to the fact that actions can be taken not only by the well-equipped and financially strong states but also the weak ones and the funds needed to sustain joint actions were insufficient (Duke 1999:125). Following these failures, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997.[3] The Treaty laid emphasis on joint actionS and even held that if a state does not want to participate in a given action and does not want to obstruct it either, the other states can go ahead and take the joint action. The post of High Representative for the CFSP was also created in order to have a foreign body representation of the EU (Zoltan 2014:491-493).[4]

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[3] The Treaty came into force in 1999.
[4] Javier Solana was appointed as the first High Representative of the EU.

The Petersberg tasks formed a big part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The tasks which were added in the Treaty of Amsterdam basically defined the framework of the military functions during the crisis. [5] (Zoltan 2014:500). During the Cologne Summit of 1999, the EU took into hands the will to be able to have an autonomous military action which created the European Security Defence Policy after to the crisis in Kosovo with the aim of having a military arm of the EU. The ESDP emerged as a result of the Saint Malo Declaration 1998 which required that the EU needs to have independent actions supported by a military force (Grev 2009:21).

> In terms of ESDP, this capacity entails five key functions: the ability to agree on common political and strategic priorities, to develop the conceptual framework for EU crisis management, to collect adequate information and generate joint analysis, to harness and expand the military, civilian and financial resources available to the Union, and to carry out crisis management operations. The institutional framework of ESDP is meant to ensure that these functions are effectively fulfilled, while pursuing the convergence of national positions and improving the coherence of EU action"(Grev 22).

In 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted. With the invasion of the US in Iraq in 2003, the EU member states all had their opinions about and were divided in their ideas and had to urge for a common strategy to ensure togetherness at the level of the EU (European Union External Action 2016a). Javier Solana then had to draft a strategy that will suit all the member states. This strategy's task was to address the security problems and the political effects they may have on the EU. The five main threats identified were: terrorism, traffic of weapons, mass

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[5] The Petersberg's task emerged from the Western European Union (WEU) created in 1954 in the modified Brussels Treaty. Through the WEU the Petersberg tasks were defined as to include humanitarian missions, rescue tasks and crisis management forces of defence.

destruction, regional conflicts, problems at state level and organized crimes. An important step towards EU's involvement in peacekeeping through the ESS is the strategy's insistence on preventive measures in order to avoid future conflicts. This is important because the term of peacekeeping aside all the military and humanitarian work also incorporates the prevention of future wars or genocides. The strategy also emphasizes on the urge for international cooperation because the EU cannot handle all the conflicts alone.

In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty established the EU's diplomatic arm, the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Lisbon treaty actually widened the Petersburg's tasks outlined previously and it now includes: "humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, peacemaking joint disarmament operations military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilization tasks" (European Union External Action 2016b). Civilian and military capacity and mechanisms of the EU have been laid by the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) established by the Lisbon Treaty, which gives the Union to assume a functional role and capacity to run operations abroad to maintain peace, prevent conflicts with relevance to the UN principles (Ramadani 2015:4).

Decision-making under the CFSP is quite ambiguous. The European Council which possesses the greatest political authority made up of Head of States of Member States and the President of the European Commission has a say on the CFSP in collaboration with other bodies. The Council of the European Union or Council of Ministers assures the running of the decision making process under the CFSP. Also, the Foreign Affairs Council made up of the foreign ministers of the member states headed by the High Representative of Foreign Affairs eases

agreement between the members because they usually have divergent opinions, supported by two bodies the European External Action Service (EEAS) whose role is to implant, represent and manage the decisions of the CFSP and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) made of ambassadors of the member states, evaluates the international happenings with regard to the CFSP and checks the implementations of decisions (Mix 2013:5-6).

3. Types of EU Peacekeeping Missions

Since 2003, the EU has conducted different types of peacekeeping missions worldwide, and those civilian and military missions will be explained below.

A. Civilian Missions

Civilian missions of the EU are defined to be "all non-military instruments or policies of the EU dedicated to crisis management" (Gourlay, Helly,Ioannides,Khol and Nowak 2006:17). This means that what is considered civilian missions of the EU works hand in glove with civilian peacekeeping explained previously, which exempts the use of military tools to arrive at the maintenance and prevention of conflicts under the ESDP. Therefore what matters in a civilian mission is the diplomacy and the cooperation between the EU and the host state.

At the Feira European Council meeting in 2000, the EU started to initiate civilian potentials for EU peacekeeping and emphasized by then four civilian capabilities which are the use of police, civil administration, civil protection and rule of law and in 2004, supporting representatives and monitoring were added to the framework of civilian missions (Christopher 2010:6).

Also, there are frameworks which have constantly been improved regarding the EU's civilian missions called the Civilian Headline Goals (CHG). These goals contain the setting up of adequate and specific targets in areas where peacekeeping is required, the goals are set through conferences in order to point out the failures of the previous missions and set up new plans to ameliorate the upcoming. The latest was updated in 2010 (Domisiewicz 2012:6). The CHG of 2010 emphasizes on ameliorating the following: the design of simultaneous civilian missions, training civilian staff for deployments, fast deployment of police force and data allocation (Giegerich 2010:49). In terms of civilian capabilities, the EU is said to be ready and advantageous because it gathers civilian resources from its 28 member states. Some member states provide training and planning structures with the aid of mandate examinations of the mission. Civilian capabilities of the EU are split among many bodies of the EU like any other foreign policy mission explained previously.

Civilian missions also create problems to the EU because they need volunteers who are ready to leave their country of origin and those already having jobs when going for the mission creates a vacancy which is not always easy to fill back in their home states. These problems can reduce the EU's member states wish to continue engaging in civilian missions. Also, the EU faces problems in its civilian missions because the amount of personnel pledged is not always the exact number deployed. For example in July 2010, the European Union Police had the capability of 285 personnel who were deployed while the personnel pledged were of 400 (Giegerich 53).

Nevertheless, in 2010, there were eleven ongoing civilian missions by the EU- four in Europe, three in Africa, Three in the Middle East and one in Asia, in 2013, the EU completed seven of these missions the four in Europe, two in Africa

and the one in Asia. With the largest deployment being in Kosovo with 1900 personnel for the Rule of Law Mission (Kirchner 2013:110). Now in 2016, the EU has 16 ongoing missions and 17 completed missions.

B. Military Missions

The EU in its quest to manage crisis at the international and regional level had to adopt military capabilities with the necessary decision-making body. This led to the creation of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the adoption of the Headline Goals following the Helsinki meeting in 1999 (Borragan 2007:245).

Some of the functions of the EUMS under the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) are to oversee crisis, conduct and evaluate the military features of crisis management, take part in the military aspects of the ESDP, fight terrorism and organizing missions with national and multinational headquarters of organizations like NATO (EUMS 2016). The EUMS also has as function to solidify the cooperation between NATO and the EU in military operations. Under this cooperation framework, the EU could make use of the resources of NATO and also choose not to make use of the NATO when it deems it necessary (Manrique de Luna Barrios 2015:65). The EUSM works with the European Defence Agency (EDA) who has as function to support – 'whose role is to support Member States' development of capabilities whilst ensuring coherence with the EU concepts and EU military requirements, and concurrently promoting the development of the EU defence industrial sector (Van Osch 2012:111). In other words, it has to monitor the relationship between the EU policies of defense and the requirements available.

On the other hand, The Headline Goals pointed that by 2003, the EU would have the capacity to deploy 60,000 troops within a period of two months with the

sustainability of 12 months, this was not achieved and the goals were revised in 2010 (Borragan 245). The headline goals in 2010 sought for the EU to be able to carry out stabilization and reconstruction operations at the same time with 20,000 troops with a civilian body eligible for a minimum of two years, EU battle groups making use of rapid-response operations, a maritime or air surveillance operation and a humanitarian assistance made up of both civilian and military personnel for 90 days or about twelve civilian missions with one main operation with 2,000 personnel (Griegerich 2010:46).

Furthermore, the EU military capabilities entail evaluating and intervening with the use of a rapid and permanent force, use public diplomacy and also cyber defence, partnership with other organizations be it regional or international, rule of law, fast deployments through air, army and navy, respect for human rights and logistics (Solana, Blockmas and Faleg 2015:11).

The EU's effectiveness in its military missions will be examined below, but it is important to note that in 2013, ten years after the EU launched its first military operation, it registered six successful missions which led to secure peace to a certain extent in the Balkans, stopped the eruption of conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), helped refugees in Chad and reduced piracy in Somalia (Engbergm 2013:1).

4. Effectiveness of Both Types of Peacekeeping

There is a similarity between the military and civilian missions of the EU. Both types of peacekeeping have their staff derived from member states and the cost of the operations are split between the budget of the organization and its member states

which make the operations to be a kind of combination of national states with identical purposes under the coverage of the EU (Chivvis 2010:5).

Although civilian missions are considered to be less efficient than military missions, the body coordinating the operation should be effective and possessing all the instruments needed. For instance looking at the creation of the Police Unit which was made up of six people only had a strong platform to plan its operations (Mattelaer 2010:7). This is trying to put the civilian missions at the same level with the military missions because it reduces the use of arms.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the EU's peacekeeping missions leads us to the fact that the EU usually has joint civil-military cooperation missions. According to Emma J. Stewart, these missions are carried out simultaneously meaning that both the military and the civilian missions operate at the same moment in order to manage the crisis better. Furthermore, Emma Stewart holds that in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the EU's peacekeeping missions, the EU has to stick to its joint operations and other tools like communication, intelligence , training, planning all of which can lead to an effective EU mission.

Moreover, the case studies explained further will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of these two forms of peacekeeping used by the EU and if really the joint missions have been more successful as the work sets to compare the roles of two organizations in their effectiveness.

5. The EU and Peacekeeping in Africa

Firstly, the EU has opted for "interregional dialogue" with the AU instead of one to one dialogue with countries. This is because according to the EU enhancing regional integration leads to productive peacekeeping. The EU took a big step towards its partnership with the AU in 2007 with the signing of the "Africa-EU Strategic

Partnership" which set the basic principles for their cooperation in peacekeeping through intensifying the intervention of both organisations on time (Sicurelli 2010:45-46).

Based on the reasons for the EU's intervention in Africa explained previously, the organisations basic policies in regards to peacekeeping and handling conflicts will be outlined below:

With the cooperation of other organisations like NATO, the UN and sub regions in Africa, the EU tends to support the AU in order to prevent and solve conflicts by helping to build the capacity needed for this either through deployments, humanitarian aid, training and other means mentioned earlier.

Moreover, the EU sets to use an integrated means to organize its relations with its member states in their policies and efforts towards Africa to use the best tools possible to understand the causes of the conflicts in order to prevent similar cases (Faria 2004:32). In other words, the EU puts forth strategies, policies and instruments to understand the foreign policies of its member states and even that of African countries at war for a better prevention of further conflicts.

Finally, the EU seeks to encourage and enhance the AU's supremacy in managing and preventing conflicts in its region. This means that the EU gives a helping hand to the AU and to Africa but still wants the AU to maintain its leading role and the prestige it has in Africa.

Chapter III

Peacekeeping Mechanism of the AU

Explaining the structure of AU peacekeeping is important because the capacity of this institution will be weighed in contrast to that of the EU. Prior to that, the essentiality of the AU to carry on peacekeeping operations and the main steps towards a peacekeeping mechanism for the AU will be explained in this chapter which will be concluded by a comparison of both institutions' peacekeeping capacities.

1. Importance of Peacekeeping for the AU

The conflicts faced by Africa in the first ten years of the 21st century urged changes in the mechanism of the running of issues at the regional level. It raised alarms to African leaders to turn to the ideas of Pan-Africanism as a means to solve problems regarding the continent's economy, peace and security. This led to the instigation of the African Union replacing the Organisation of African Union (OAU) and continuing from where it stopped to pursue its objectives (Murithi 2009:4).

The AU's main objective is to encourage the rise of a peaceful, successful and integrated Africa (Williams 2011:3). The problem is the fact that it is difficult to or rather impossible to have peace, stability, success and integration when the continent is suffering from conflicts, and this made the AU grow the envy for peacekeeping.

John Peter Matthews Kobbie explains that the AU felt the importance of engaging in peacekeeping operations with the changes in international security after the Cold War prompted the UN to accept the intervention of regional organisations in

peacekeeping among which the AU plays a part. The complex environment in which Africans live give rise to multiple conflicts from ethnic and religious differences, civil wars, natural disasters, interstate conflicts and conflicts due to border issues made it difficult for the UN to intervene successfully; especially as the UN could not understand the roots of these conflicts better than a regional organisation experiencing the conflicts from a closer point of view. On another note, the AU decided to initiate a peacekeeping mechanism because one of the conditions for UN intervention at the time was the signing of an agreement of ceasefire between the warring parties but most African countries did not always accept that clause (Kobbie 2009:1-6). Also, the UN ignored its role in enhancing and maintaining peace and security in Africa (Oguonu and Ezeibe 2014:325). This failure from the UN was a call to the AU to rise and take care of its member states in order to reassure Africans that they will be taken care of and try to be prosperous.

Moreover, after colonialism, independence left nations in a weak state which led to poor social amenities, insecurity, uprisings because the states could not reach the needs of its people and sometimes neighbouring countries tend to intervene which leads to the spread of conflicts in the continent like wild fire. There is also the influence of big African states like Nigeria and South Africa who have through one way or the other tried to impose their influence at the sub regional level which they usually extend to peace and security issues. This therefore, calls for the AU's attention to be a leader and merge its member states to prevent conflicts and manage the existing ones (Mathiasen 2006:1-2).

2. The Evolution of AU Peacekeeping

According to Kelsi Aning, "the AU's new security regime is premised on several norms which are both old (based on the Charter of the OAU) and new ones emanating from the Constitutive Act (Aning 2008:2-3). This means that some of the principles established in the AU's peace and security framework have been inherited from the charters of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) which is the organization from which the AU came about. He also asserts that the main platforms of the AU's security mechanism are the equality of the member states, the non-intervention by member states, the notion that disputes should be solved peacefully without force, states preserve their boundaries after conflicts, and the AU's legitimate right to intervene in a conflict within its member states. These are the principles through which the AU intervene in its peacekeeping operations. Therefore the emergence of the AU's peacekeeping bodies will be chronologically examined below:

A. Constitutive Act 2000

First and foremost, the Constitutive Act which was signed in 2000 in Togo has three key principles to be followed by the AU as to what concerns peacekeeping: to restore the collaboration with international and sub-regional organizations to maintain peace and security as well as to preserve peace at a global level and to enhance the security mechanisms of African countries. It lays emphasis on the importance and sees the creation of a security mechanism to achieve peace and security to be the most important issue in trying to create long lasting peace in Africa (African Union 2000). This act can be considered as the basis of the peacekeeping policy of the AU because all other signed documents came to add more aspects to it.

Moreover, the Act provides for member states to perceive human rights, illegal changes of governments and democracy. If any member state does not respect the former, it will be attributed both economic and political sanctions. It also provides that the Union has the right to intervene in member states in difficulties and these states equally have the right to request for an intervention bundled in what is known as the right of intervention (Kioko 2003:807).

B. Protocol 2002 and the Peace and Security Council 2003

In 2002, in South Africa more precisely in Durban, the head of states of the AU member states sat to ratify the "Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union". Article 4 of the protocol lists the main objectives as

> To promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development; anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence; co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects; promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts (African Union 2002).

Apart from resolving conflicts and preventing them, it also supports the idea of the AU to provide humanitarian assistance. 15 member states of the AU make up the PSC (African Union 2002). Also, the PSC is the strongest institution in the peace

framework of the AU. The objective of the PSC can therefore be summarized as to be a body set for the provision of "collective security", the disposition for the Union to intervene on time and to act efficiently with regards to conflicts and crisis management in the continent. The PSC evaluates conflict circumstances and sends missions to check areas in violence and warrant the Union's intervention when it is necessary for collaboration with the right of intervention of the Constitutive Act (Bah, Nyangoro, Dersso, Mofya and Murithi 2014:36). With the huge responsibility of the PSC in trying to prevent and solve conflicts in Africa, it is supported by other institutions like; the Commission of the African Union, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Peace Fund (Aning 2008:4-5).

C. Common African Defence Security Policy 2004

Later in 2004, the Solemn Declaration which gave birth to the Common African Defence Security Policy (CADSP) was established. The main task of this mechanism is similar to the tasks of the protocol mentioned above but with a little change as it applied the importance of rebuilding the troubled area once the conflict is over, disarmament and also the reintegration of civilians with one another. This shows a change and the inclusion of new aspects in the AU's peacekeeping framework. The CADSP is based on what has to be done by African states in order to have a collective African peace and security to make sure that Africa's common objectives as regards security and defence are attained to avoid "common threats" to the integral continent (Juma 2006:84).

D. Ezulwini Consensus 2005

Moreover, in understanding the regular peacekeeping framework of the AU some cases receive violent measures like the instance of illegal constitutional changes of government, the delimitation of boundaries, genocides, rigging of elections and massive human right abuses (Konare 2004:3). With the endeavor to fortify a common African stand on the reformation of the UN, the AU Summit met in Swaziland in 2005 and the result was the Ezulwini Consensus adopted one year after which stipulated that the African states to indulge more in protection and adopt it as a responsibility (Murithi 2013:199). The part of the consensus that deals with peace and security is labelled 'Collective Security and the Use of Force'. The four main functions of this consensus are explained below (African Union 2005:6-9):

The Security Council should use force in accordance with the criteria of the panel with respect to aid from international organizations. Regional organizations which are beside any area of conflict can act with the approval of the Security Council but in precipitating situations necessitating immediate actions, the UN can intervene and take financial responsibility for the peacekeeping mission. Also, states keep their independence and sovereignty in their duties to protect their citizens no matter which organization intervenes in time of conflicts.

In line with the article 51 of the UN charter, the legitimate use of force is in the case of self defence. Also, the Constitutive Act allows intervention in the case of extreme danger like conflicts and genocides. Any use of force apart from these is not allowed.

The UN has to finance peacekeeping missions done by regional organizations as a contribution and aid to the AU. Therefore, the UN together with other developed

countries and some regional organisations had to support the AU especially in the strengthening of the African Standby Force for it to start being functional by 2010.

A peacebuilding commission should be established when there is a conflict and its mandate and structure should be revised. Peacebuilding also entails the prevention of further conflicts. Cooperation between member states, the AU and regional organization should be strong in order to create a good transition from managing conflicts to building long lasting peace.

It is actually this consensus that fostered the duty of the AU to intervene in a member state who demands the decision from the Assembly in the case of the situations mentioned previously (Aning 2008:7). This incorporates the AU's policy of non-intervention which does not exclude non-responsiveness. This means that the AU acts when there is a political will from the member state in question, but when these violent measures are to be taken sometimes they weigh more on the states which are small in size.

3. The AU's Mission Capacity

The AU in dealing with conflicts needs the use of military intervention. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) made up of senior military officers from the PSC advice the body on the initiatives to be taken and member states have to send both military and civilian delegates for meetings (Williams 2011:16). The MSC works with the African Standby Force (ASF) created under the provisions of the protocol to support the PSC. The ASF is not a standing army but an arrangement with member states and sub-regional organizations set for rapid deployment. It is made of multidisciplinary civilian and military groups from member states with the main purpose to safeguard training of troops and to make them available on time for any AU peace operations.

The ASF therefore indulges in observation and monitoring missions, missions under the request of a member state, preventing the spread of conflicts to neighbours, post-conflict building, and humanitarian assistance (De Conning and Kasumba 2010:13). It also encompasses ways of conflict prevention, the spreading of conflicts and even disarmament (Abdulqawi and Fatsah 2012: 322). Under the framework of the ASF, civilian missions have a head known as the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) who commands a team with a chief of staff, the Force Commander, senior civilian heads of departments, Head of Mission Support and the Police Commissioner. The body therefore supports the running and coordination of operations (De Conning and Kasumba 30).

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which is a body in support of the AU can be considered to be dealing with civilian operations because it is responsible for observing and monitoring conflicts, collecting and analyzing necessary information concerning a conflict and giving room for early intervention (Abdulqawi and Fatsah 2012: 321). The CEWS collects information to analyze situations in the region with the aim to notify the bodies concerned with peace and security issues. The chairperson analyses the information and plans the next step with the use of the Commission for Peace and Security, then advises the PSC on the threats and gives some recommendations to extinguish the conflict (Dersso 2010:6).

The ASF's troops are set to be ready to be deployed within 14 to at most 90 days depending on the nature of the conflict. The ASF's troops are in standby brigades in each of the five regions of Africa-North, East, South, West and Central Africa made of military, police and civilian personnel (Weller 2015:322). These military brigades are the heaviest and more furnished in terms of resources, meaning all the resources needed for any deployment are based there. This therefore makes

the AU to always wait for the regional brigades to be ready before any operation can start (Cilliers and Pottgieter 2010:113). The AU's military has to ensure security while the police has to make sure a good legal system is reinstalled, civilians have to take care of administration and the development of the civil society. A structure made of experienced and civilian professionals is set for peace operations in order to train and ameliorate their skills which is different from the military and the police who have their special standby units (Alghali and Mbaye 2008:36).

Generally, the AU's military is made of a contribution from a few member states notably Nigeria, Senegal, Rwanda, South Africa, Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Ghana out of the 54 member states (Williams 2011:14). This handicaps the AU's military and civilian capability in intervening in its region. The organization therefore has to look for external assistance, since it lacks both the necessary personnel and equipment to handle peace operations. Even the amenities owned by the AU cannot be taken care of by the member states and are still sponsored by external sponsorship. For instance, there exists some Peacekeeping training centers for the AU but they are all supported by "foreign sponsorship" especially from the UN, EU and NATO member states (Malan 2008:104-107).

4. Comparing the EU and the AU

The differences between the EU and the AU regarding peacekeeping and the way they handle security operations will be briefly elaborated below:

First and foremost, the AU inherited most of its mechanisms and policies from the OAU which makes it different from the EU who handled its integration process from step to step since 1957. The AU member states have still been following the path of the OAU and insist on respecting state sovereignty and not implementing any

authority or head for the organisation. The EU on the other hand though it was difficult has succeeded in convincing its member states to surrender some of their authority to the Union (Sore 2010:9).

In regards to deployments, since 2003, the EU has deployed troops for more than 30 peace operations in the world, most of which have been successful and a good number of them in Africa (Pirozzi and Godsäter 2015:9). While the AU also started in 2003, it has not operated as many missions as the EU but is said to deploy more personnel than the EU. In 2007, the AU was said to have deployed "7371 for three operations" while the EU deployed 2819 personnel for 10 operations. This means that the difference between both institutions lies in the means of operation, the EU can be said to support more financially than with deployment (Soder 2008:113).

Moreover, another difference affecting their foreign policies is the number of meetings they hold to discuss issues. The AU's PSC which is the main body for peace and security issues with its 15 members meets only twice a year (Williams 2011:3). While the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) which is the main panel for the EU's security issues meets every month and the foreign ministers also meet in international conferences and summits to discuss the developments of the world at the security level (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014:66). The method used by the AU is not a good one because meeting twice a year makes it difficult to check the daily evolution of the continent, while the EU has monthly reports and discussions on its regions of concern.

The AU as a young institution with all its challenges from governance, finance, lack of equipment, reluctance from leaders and member states, drags the institution's security policy down, the AU leans on other organizations for support be

it financial or with resources, which is not the case of the EU which rather provides the support, even though the AU has more member states than the EU.

More of these differences will be seen in the next chapters, while evaluating the roles of these institutions in Africa in the three case-studies.

Chapter IV

Comparative Peacekeeping Roles of the EU and the AU in Africa

After explaining the peacekeeping mechanisms of the EU and the AU, this chapter focuses on the way both organisations operated in the three different African countries/crisis zones. The main missions and operations used by the organisations will be examined and analyzed at the end of each case study as regards to their capacity by employing the conceptual framework of the second generation peacekeeping.

1. EU and AU in the Democratic Republic of Congo

A. Causes and Nature of the Conflict.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country located in Central Africa and like many other African countries, has been subjected to several crisis. The main crisis to be looked at was the crisis in 1998, but to understand the causes of the crisis in 1998, it will be important to go back to the roots of the crisis which is linked to Congo's colonial history and the conflict in 1996.Congo was colonized by Belgium in the 1880s ruled by King Leopold II; he took absolute control of the territory and did not miss in exploiting all the huge natural resources the country had with his difficult system of ruling (Vogel 2011:6). In 1960, Congo finally had its independence but the government established was not appreciated by all and as such separation movements were created.

In 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko the dictator replaced Kasavubu (The Enough Project 2005). As president, his is reign was known for corruption, dictatorship but

he also gave his assistance after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 to the refugees who fled to Congo. In providing shelter for these refugees he also welcomed the Rwandan Hutu army those who were actually masterminding the Rwandan genocide. By accepting the Hutus in Congo, Mobutu caused the invasion of neighboring countries like Uganda and Rwanda too in Congo to follow the Hutu and extinguish the military force, this was the cause of the first DRC conflict in 1996 (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2015:14). He was overthrown in 1997 with the aid of neighboring countries like Eritrea, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the following leader was not a better one- According to Peace Direct, in 1997 the country had a new president-Laurent Desire Kabila (Dagne 2011:2).

In 1998, another conflict arose as Kabila was trying to cut ties with his regional allies who helped him get to power and had started by expulsing the Rwandans from his government (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2004). This was the outbreak of the deadly conflict in DRC. The Rwandan and Ugandan forces once more invaded Congo and supported the rebel groups against the second dictator. On a first note, the neighboring forces wanted to chase the Hutus but ended up exploiting and controlling the resources of the eastern regions of Congo. Kabila on the other hand, had his support from other neighboring countries like Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola and they succeeded in stopping the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion. Their invasion was characterized by brutalizing and terrorizing the civilians. Over 5.4 million people were killed; some during the invasions, others from hunger, diseases and some fled their homes. Kabila was killed in 2001 and was replaced by his son-Joseph Kabila and the crisis stopped in 2003 (Peace Direct 2014). Nevertheless, the DRC is facing a difficult period because its President is trying to change its

constitution again so he can stand for the upcoming elections, this has caused a huge manifestation on the side of the Congolese

Therefore, the main cause of the DRC crisis was an accumulation of colonial history which led to dictatorial rules and further emerged to regional intervention which caused the crisis. Organizations like the UN, AU and EU developed interests in helping the country. This was the EU's first peacekeeping operation in Africa. Its capability and that of the AU's will be explained below although more is expected from the AU since it is a regional organisation

B. EU Security Missions

The EU through the ESDP commenced its security plan of action in DRC through four missions which can be divided into military and civilian missions (Consilium Europa 2015). As concerns the military missions, they were two; the EU-led mission (Artemis) and the EU forces deployed in DRC through the European Forces in RD Congo (EUFOR RDC). On the other hand, the civilian missions included the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Kinshasa and the EU Security Reform Mission (EUSEC RDC). Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sent his assistant Aldo Ajello for peace talks with the leaders of Uganda, DRC and Rwanda, in trying to solve the conflicts the EU made sure the interests of the states concerned were protected (Boin,Ekengren and Rhinard 2013:85).

Operation Artemis was an operation under the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in 2003. This operation was a coordinated action by the member states of the EU and its tasks were to play a part in the steadiness of the already insecure region affected by the crisis and to better the conditions in which

they lived through humanitarian aids and to protect the airport, the civilians, and if need be ensure the protection of the personnel from the UN and other humanitarian organizations (Jahier 2010:82). The operation was launched from the 12th of June to the 1st of September 2013 in the town of Bunia in Eastern DRC .Its main aim was to stabilize the country and improve the social condition of the citizens, protect the airport and the humanitarian personnel from the UN (Vlassenroot and Arnould 2016:9). The operation was made up of about 1800 personnel most of which came from France who was acting as a 'framework nation' (Tardy 2006b:8). The troop sent was made up of French troops who incorporated up to 90 percent of the military personnel, a special operation force from the UK and a medical support team from Belgium. The operational headquarters was in Paris with 80 officers from European countries while the force headquarter was in Entebbe which was used as a logistical spot to deploy to the conflicting areas (Homan 2007:152). To enhance the airlifts and strategic operations, engineers were equally sent. By early July, the operation was fully set and was managed by French Major-General Neveux who was the operation commander and French Brigadier General Thonier who was the force commander (Homan 153). The operation was thought to be successful because of the disarmament of the rebels through thorough checks which reduced the rebels' supplies. The atmosphere was becoming less dangerous as 60,000 refugees returned, and 3000 tonnes of humanitarian assistance were perceived (Homan 153).

As earlier mentioned, the second military operation was the EUFOR RD CONGO from 12 June to 30th November 2006 in line with a request from the UN and with accordance with the Congolese government in order to check the smooth running of the electoral process and to assist the Congolese army, police and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUC) (Vlassenroot and Arnould). The headquarters was established in Kinshasa (the capital) with soldiers from supporting countries meanwhile a larger part of the army force was stationed in Libreville (capital of Gabon a neighboring country) to ease the deployment when they are needed. The operational headquarters was in Germany the strategic spot from where specialists coordinated the operation. The mission was meant to have a 4 months duration. The EUFOR therefore, can be called a temporary military support set to oversee the elections.

The EUPOL operational from 2005-2007 composed of 50 police officers experts, with the headquarters in Kinshasa and permanent supervisory stands in Goma and Bukavu.[6] It had to assist in the creation of the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) and help in its   integration to the Congolese National Police (CNP). The integration of the IPU was trained enough to secure the elections in 2006 thanks to the 4.3 million euro and the 30 experts given by the EU for local training. The mission was later extended to 2009 to ameliorate the judiciary and to create a linkage between the new judiciary unit and the police in order to encourage peace (Carbone 2015:69).

Furthermore, the EUSEC was made of sixty people established in 2005 in Kinshasa and also had agencies in Goma, Bukavu and Bunia like the EUPOL. The EUSEC came as a response of the EU from the request made by the DRC to receive aid in ameliorating its security reforms. This mission therefore had to provide viable support in order to help merge good governance and the Congolese army to ameliorate the security principles of the country. The mission helped by creating a system of census which was biometric in order to identify the member of the armed forces. Therefore, the EUSEC was primarily aimed at ameliorating Congo's security reform. The operation ended in June 2009 (Bello and Gebrewold 2009:100).

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[6] Cities in eastern DRC

C. AU Security Missions

The AU as expected participated in eradicating the crisis in the DRC. Although the role of the AU was not as brilliant and heavy as expected, the following were steps by the AU to arrive at long lasting peace in the country.

The Lusaka agreement was signed in 1999 between the heads of state of Angola, Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Its main task was to implement a ceasefire to end the conflict by monitoring the rebels, making them leave the borders, disarm them, resettle the refugees and help towards the achievement of democracy (Peace Dırect 2014). This made the forces of the neighboring countries which had come to either invade the east region in search of resources or the ones who were in support of the government to withdraw from the territory. But for Rwanda who still had a problem because the "Interahamwe" were still harbored in Congo.[7] In a nutshell, the Lusaka agreement sought for national reconciliation and forged the countries to have peace talks in respect to Congo's security.

In 2002, the Sun City Agreement was signed between the opposition movement- "Mouvement de Libération du Congo" (MLC) and the actual government (Peace and Security Council 2006:1). The agreement aimed at uniting the opposition and the ruling government and it was done through the separation of responsibility posts between the opposition and Kabila's government as Kabila remained president and Jean-Pierre Bemba-leader of the opposition became Prime minister. Other rebel groups were not included and recognized in this agreement and this made the conflict to start again. All these agreements were signed under the supervision of the AU.

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[7] Interahamwe is the ancient Rwanda army made of the rebels who caused the genocide in 1994.

With the reoccurrence of the conflict in 2003, the MONUC was created by the UN in order to stop the conflict and to improve on the security strategies. The MONUC was assisted by the AU and the PSC asserted that the presence of armed groups in East DRC required the intervention of the international community and also in Africa (Peace and Security Council 2005). Therefore the AU called for disarmament and AU member states to send troops and other forms of assistance.

Furthermore in 2004, the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) was acknowledged between Rwanda and DRC and 11 military observers were sent to North and South Kivu (Peace and Security Council 2006:10). The military observers from the EU worked with the MONUC and the governments of the DRC and Rwanda. The JVM therefore restored trust between both countries because lack of trust was among the causes of the tensions (Dindelo 2006:49). Under the supervision of the AU observers, the elections were supervised by the Civilian Electoral Observer Mission (CEOM) in order to regulate the electoral process.

The role of the AU in this conflict is more like a stepfather to DRC, it came in as an assistance force not like a body who had to take premium care of Congo in such harsh periods. The AU sought for disarmament and neutralization of armed groups and played a major role in diplomatic talks it presided several meetings with the leaders of Congo and its neighboring countries, the USA, EU and military experts.

D. Analysis

Unlike the AU, this was the EU's first peacekeeping operation in Africa but it handled the operation in a better way compared to the AU. The capacity was present with the military and civilians missions outlined previously. The EU went as far as

providing humanitarian assistance which the AU did not do. The operations by the AU were more for the political transition and diplomatic talks but did not incorporate post conflict missions. Both organizations assured prevention of further conflicts by the deployments of their military observers. There is therefore a huge gap between what is expected from the AU and what the reality was since the AU did not have a standing army that could be deployed and as such the problem of lack of personnel, finance and logistics can be questioned. The EU assured more in collaboration with the UN. By trying to bring peace and reconciliation between Rwanda and DRC showed both the EU and the AU tried to solve the problem from its roots.

Therefore, second generation peacekeeping has been used in the DRC although the role of the AU has been limited in that respect. The EU deployed both military and civilian personnel, post conflict rehabilitation and humanitarian aid all of which constitute second generation peacekeeping. Therefore in comparing the effectiveness of both organizations in peacekeeping in Congo, emphasis should be laid on the fact that more is expected from the AU, better than presiding meetings but looking forward to taking post conflict resolutions and involving more of conflict management and looking for ways to avoid further conflicts. Following the previous analysis it can be said that the EU accomplished the criteria for second generation peacekeeping to an extent with this conflict which is not the case of the AU which is limited to diplomatic talks and missionary observers. Looking at the time of intervention it is clear that the intervention of the AU in the DRC can be traced as far back as 1999 with the Lusaka Agreement but the EU intervened in 2003 a while after the AU so if the AU was effective the subsequent conflicts could have been avoided.

2. EU and AU in Darfur

A. Causes and Nature of the Conflict

Darfur is a town in the western region of ancient Sudan. Sudan was a country with a double identity composed of black Africans and Arabs. With close to a hundred square miles, Sudan was the largest country in Africa and in the Arab world (Baltrop 2011:13). This dual identity makes Sudan to have a huge ethnic diversity as well as a lot of tribal groups. It is this multi-ethnic identity that posed Sudan into series of conflicts.

The crisis is said to be a conflict of "black African versus Arab" due to ethnical differences between the Arabs and the Darfur cattle rears and farmers often labelled as black Africans (Herlinger 2005:12). The Arabs being the pro-government group against the rebel groups who were non-arabs.

In February 2003, the Darfur conflict started when the two rebel groups Sudan People's Liberation Army (SLA- the first Darfur Liberation Army) created by John Garang Mabior and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) founded by Khalil Ibrahim attacked the government in the capital of North Darfur-EL Fasher. The rebels destroyed bombers and seized weapons. The rebels' reasons for the attack were because they wanted to be identified as a political movement and wanted a federal system that will according to them make Darfur developed. They complained of being oppressed by the Sudanese government because they were non-arabs. The response of the government was far from negotiation instead they fired back by bringing together their Air Force and military from the Arab tribes of Sudan which became the "Janjaweed". This caused the outbreak of the conflict which opposed the

non-Arabs made up of the rebel groups and the newly formed "Janjaweed" (Powell 2005:31).

Apart from the multi ethnicity of Sudan, Young and Osman points the causes of the Darfur conflict which are explained as such (Young and Osman 2006:10-11): In the nineteen century, Darfur was a kingdom who was powerful both economically and politically like its other neighbors. Then the "Turkish economic colonial model" marginalized Darfur. The Turks during the colonial era brought together local kingdoms with conflicting habits without even trying to make them bury their long lasting inborn hostilities (Ray 2009:36-39). This state of inhabitation stayed and became Darfur and the system brought about economic dis functionality of the government system even after independence. The inequalities that existed between those originating from Darfur and the government created a sort of political and economic marginalization and this slowed down the development process of the country because of the poor policy implementations, the poor judicial systems, favoritism of some groups overs the others. Also because the government was too centered in Khartoum (Capital of Sudan.) and there was no decentralization.

Environmental and ecological problems too caused the Darfur crisis. Darfur faced a lot of environmental and ecological menaces from strong rains and droughts which led to serious famine created a lot of problems and pressures on the government to act especially with the increasing population. This made the population feel insecure and blaming the government for being incapable.

The government incited ethnic conflicts by its inaction and even when the government acted it reinforced the already existing tensions between the tribes. For instance the drought in 1984 caused a gross famine in Darfur and affected the lives of cattle rearers and farmers. Around 1988 farmers were able to recover with a big

harvest season but it was more difficult for the cattle rearers to recover. In the mid 90's, another conflict arose in West Darfur between the Arabs and the Masalit.[8] The government always showed more favor to the Arab population. An accumulation of these conflicts with the incapacity of the government caused the outbreak of the crisis.

The regional level was also a cause of the conflict. The neighboring countries of Sudan like Central African Republic, Chad and Libya had some rebel groups who have been consistently fighting in Darfur. They used Darfur as their countries like Chad and Libya had been fighting for the Darfur territory and as such the crisis also came as a result of their interests.

With all these atrocities, the crisis broke out in 2002 and around 200,000 to 2 million dead and refugees (Aliprandini 2013:4).

B. EU Security Missions

On the 28th May 2004, the AU sent a funding request to the EU concerning the crisis in Darfur and later, the EU financed a large part of the AMIS (over €305 million) through the African Peace Facility (APF) which is managed by the Commission (Gya 2010:12). In 2005, the EU decided to be more committed to the crisis in Darfur and decided to assist the establishment of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and to arrive at conflict resolution in Darfur. The EU was therefore a helping hand as it acted as a supporter to the ceasefire commission and the AMIS, when AMIS II was launched, with over 7000 policemen, the EU too sent some civilian-military support (Ferhatović 2010:6). The CPA actually reduced the tensions so the EU had to assist Sudan to achieve and maintain peace by applying the CPA

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[8] Masalit in habitants of West Darfur.

completely. The EU therefore played a major role in the implementation of the CPA by: Pursuing cooperation links with North and South Sudan, ensuring political dialogue with all parties in order to encourage democracy, human rights and good governance, appointing an envoy to check and ease the implementation of the peace talks, this envoy was called the European Special Representative (EUSR) and continue humanitarian aid (EEAS 2016).

Moreover, the EU supported the establishment of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) which was signed between the Sudanese government, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the SLM in Abuja to put an end to the conflict. The EU's support towards the AMIS II was to make sure it became effective and supported the military, political struggles of the AU to put an end to the crisis. The main support from the EU coined as support to the AMIS both the first and second can be summarized as such: Police, military and defence support: to strengthen the AMIS II civilian police, assist the AU in broadening its abilities and efficiency in police operations, provide military observers, and also provide airlifts and the vice chairman of the CFC (Tardy 2006b:9).

Planning, logistics and financial support: to work with the AU's member states and choose well experienced officers for the mission, issue logistic planner for the AMIS II headquarters in EL Fasher, Addis Ababa and Khartoum. Provide vehicles and other materials also the provision of aerial observation. Moreover, help the AU to develop its media capabilities. Supplementary €1 million in order to ameliorate civilians' lifestyle, €57 million from the APF to assist the strengthening of the AMIS II.

Training assistance and management: provide teams to help the AMIS II to prepare and train pilots and also to allocate a management coordination cell to

accentuate reliable information between the EU and the AU's headquarters. The EU allocated 92 million euros for humanitarian assistance to the victims and 400,000 euros to ease diplomatic talks between the government and the rebels (Sicurelli 2010:48).

Conclusively, the EU's support mission to the AU was quite a complete one because it provided equipment, technical assistance, and military observers and trained the African troops, it ended in 2007 when the AMIS operation became a joint operation with the UN known as the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The EU therefore emphasized more on financial assistance and diplomatic talks (Maru 2007:16).

C. AU Security Missions

This was the through which it had to prove its commitment, maturity and strength to handle a conflict in the conflict and at the same time prove the capacity of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) because it was the first peacekeeping mission it planned and executed together with its member states (Kobbie 2008:13).

The AU had a capital role in implementing the Ceasefire Agreement in Darfur. In line with the AU's duty to maintain peace and security in the continent, with the crisis in Darfur, the organization established the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 which incorporated a ceasefire commission made up of 120 people and 5000 AU peacekeeping forces which later expanded to 7000 around September 2005 (Sharamo 2006:51). The AU worked with NATO for the provision of both equipment's and logistical assistance. The AMIS was later reinforced to AMIS II in 2005 with the aim to be effective and efficient, the role of both operations were to disarm the rebels, encourage humanitarian ceasefire and protect the civilians. In

2005, the CPA was signed between the Sudan's Liberation Movement (SLM) and the government of Sudan which was made of a series of agreements meant to put an end to the conflict. Apart from the peacekeeping missions, the AU strengthen peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SLM which started diminishing by the end of 2003. A new ceasefire agreement came about in March 2004 with Chad included which led to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA)- made of 136 military observers and 300 protection force both from the AU and a protocol for humanitarian assistance, peace talks took place like the peace talk in Ethiopia and the one in Nigeria where more 3500 African troops and 800 police officers were added to Darfur in order to enhance the security (Golaszinski 2004:9-10). They had to look over the weak ceasefire that had been incorporated between the government and the rebel groups.

By April 2006, the AU's mission had deployed 7,271 personnel made of military observers, protection force and civilian police from African countries, the USA, the EU and the Sudanese parties involved the mandate ended in December 2006 (GAO Reports 2006:85-86).

Most of the accomplishments of the AU during the Darfur crisis were pushed forward and assisted by the EU (European Commission 2004).

D. Analysis

The AU faced a lot of challenges most importantly were the financial instabilities, the AU did not have enough finances to support the crisis and that is why it had to stretch for international assistance. It was a good idea for the EU to intervene because it is thanks to its enforcement of the CPA that the tensions were reduced to a larger extend. Both the AU and the EU ensured in the prevention of further conflicts

which is an important aspect in peacekeeping to a certain extend. This was done by the troops sent who had to look over the weaken ceasefire agreements and ensure the protection of the civilians of Darfur. Although the EU and the AU cooperated to put an end to the war, it can be seen that they laid more emphasis on the political aspect of the cause of the crisis. The environmental and ecological cause of the crisis was not really touched and there is a lack of emphasis on humanitarian assistance.

Considering second peace generation to evaluate the role of these organizations, both organizations were up to expectations as this was the first AU-led operation all the EU had to do was to reinforce the AU capabilities at it did not wish to take any major decision concerning the crisis. All features of second generation were present from protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance and preventive talks which are good signs the AU could lead an operation. It is very important to note that the Darfur crisis broke out around the same period with the crisis in DRC this might have been exhausting on the part of the AU to handle together with other issues regarding the continent. In this case, the EU was more of a supporter and the AU had to take the lead which was the opposite in the previous case, at least it gave the AU a sense of leadership. The peculiarity of this mission is the evolution of the AU in its operations the capabilities and effectiveness were established and can be granted a plus for the AU.

3. EU and the AU in CAR

A. Causes and Nature of the Conflict

Central African Republic as its name holds is a country in Central Africa, one of which cannot boast of a decade without conflicts. The recent conflict in 2012 broke

out due to an accumulation of interwoven factors. The citizens complained of an ineffective and poor system of governance characterized by weak institutions, corruption, poor economy and other societal vices. The poor system of governance led to underdevelopment marked by the lack of education and unemployment with civil servants to receiving their salaries. The citizens since 2003 were living in continuous political instability and insecurity due to the overthrow of the then president Patassé. What can be considered as the immediate cause of the crisis is the marginalization of Muslims as they were not represented as they ought to in the government which made the country not to have a common goal and no political arrangement was made to remedy the situation (International Monetary Fund 2016:2).

The coup in 2003 was chaired by the following president General François Bozizé which did not help a lot in the restoration of peace in the country. After continuous frustrations, the crisis in 2012 started when the inhabitants of the North Eastern region of the country felt abandoned by the government and a group of Muslims who were against Bozize's government created a rebel group which they called "Seleka".[9] Their main purpose was to destabilize the Christians and the pro-Bozize government (International Organization for Migration 2014:13). A peace agreement was signed in 2008 between two main rebel groups and the government to end the conflicts but was not respected by the government and the president was overthrown around March 2013 by the head of the rebels - Michel Djotodia who auto proclaimed himself president of the country (Welz 2014:603). This did not still bring peace because the Seleka group was not totally extinguished and another group made up of Christian youths who lost their families during the Seleka manifestation

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[9] Which means alliance in the Sango language-originally from some people in CAR, DRC and Chad.

evolved "Anti-Balaka" who reportedly received support from the Bozize's accomplices and ex-military officers (Arieff and Husted 2015:1). In January 2014, leaders of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) succeeded in making the president to resign and be replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza as interim president elected by the National Transitional Council (NTC). They thought the president's resignation would be a good solution to the conflict but the rebel group could not be controlled and the conflict continued. Later on around February 2014, the conflict subdued with the group of young rebels who calmed themselves because the Muslim government had stepped down. The conflict reduced the number of Muslims in the country Martin Welz held that Yakole's (a town in west CAR) Muslim population reduced from 30,000 to 500 and over a million people displaced since the Muslim leader-Djotodia took power (Welz 604).

B. EU Security missions

The CAR received military, humanitarian and financial aid from the EU. They will be explicitly outlined below.

After six years without sending a major army in mission in Africa, on the 20th January, 2014, the Council gave its consent for the establishment of a military force made up of 500-600 soldiers for a period of six months to regulate and stabilize the situation in CAR (Cirlig 2014). With the authorization of the UN, the EU forged an operation called the European Union Forces in the Republic in Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) established on the 10th February, 2014 with aim improve the environment in which the country lived for it to be suitable for humanitarian aid operations, protect the populations secure the capital-Bangui (Koivula 2016:89). The troop was finally made up of about 800 soldiers for a period of six months who had

the authorization to work with the 2000 French troops (Operation Sangaris) present as a bridging force because it had to be taken over by the AU after its estimated time (Weber and Kai 2014:4).

Moreover, the EU provided humanitarian aid for the CAR. The country was undergoing refugee crisis, starvation problems and even health deficiency during and after the conflict. 4.6 million (European Commission 2014). The EU gave its financial support to the AU with a donation of 125 million euros from the African Peace Facility (APF), to cover the social amenities of the AU's troops deployed and covered humanitarian assistance with 150 million euros aid from 2013-2014 to support transition and operate post conflict reconstructions (Furness and Olsen 2016:119).

Once more the EU acted as an assistance body to the AU and did not deploy a lot of military troops but contributed hugely in finance, humanitarian and the transition to peace with its military support too.

C. AU Security missions in CAR

The PSC took its first measures on the crisis in car in the beginning of the year 2013. This was through a sanction on those who boycotted the Libreville Agreement placed in January 2013 between the head of rebels and the then president –Bozize to call an end to the conflict in the country. The agreement was signed in Gabon with some regional leaders. The AU therefore decided to implement a "travel ban" on all the citizens who did not respect the agreement and continued with the conflict (Welz 604). Their assets were actually frozen as they could not leave their country and were not free of movement, two days after the coup d'état that ousted Bozize, CAR was suspended from the AU. This was a disciplinary peacekeeping sanction taken by the

AU, knowing all the political and socio-economic loops it will cause the country who is still in conflict.

Moreover, there was a mission led by ECCAS countries in order to bring peace in CAR, this mission was called the "Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en Centrafrique" (MICOPAX), the AU was asked to assist the mission and decided to take care of the mission and modified it to "Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduit Africaine" (MISCA) with great support from France and with the authorization of the UN Security Council. The mission had a duration of 12 months with 1,800 police men and 10,000 military troops and was supported by the EUFOR RCA with 75 million euros through the African Peace Facility (APF) with the encouragement of the AU to take care of the conflict itself (Weber and Kai 5). MISCA troops came from ten African countries sent to twelve locations in the North West with the aim to protect the civilians, stabilize the country and bring public order, assure the return of state authority and prepare a better atmosphere for humanitarian assistance (Barbelet 2015:11). It also had a civilian mission to oversee humanitarian activities and encourage the respect of human rights (Peace and Security Council 2009:6). The AU had to use the suitable means to assure the protection of the population and restore long lasting security and public harmony, create good conditions suitable to meet the humanitarian needs the population need and most importantly, disarm the rebels.

The mission was made up of troops from willing African countries which later on turned into a UN peacekeeping mission called" Mission multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Centrafrique" (MINUSCA).

D. Analysis

The conflict was an accumulation of past differences which caused the outbreak of the serious crisis in the country. The CAR's government seriously touched could not help but need regional and international assistance. Due to financial failure, the AU received help from the EU and the UN who did not stop at financing the peacekeeping missions. It is one of the conflicts where the EU is seen clearly cooperating with the AU in order to help it fly by its own wings. The EU was present both in terms of military, finance and humanitarian aids, but was the EU present in trying to prevent the war? The EU did more of crisis management than conflict prevention in this case. The AU's capacity cannot be weighed because it was more supported than it acted individually. The root of the problem was not really touched as both organizations tried as they could to change the leader in order to brighten the atmosphere but prevention of further conflicts was not really present. Now CAR has a newly elected president (Faustin Archange Toaudera) and it can be said the country has been experiencing peace for the past few months. Unlike other conflicts, this conflict is more recent and it shows how slow the AU is still taking the lead to solve the problems of its member states, ten years after the conflicts in Congo it still faces the same problems.

Once more the AU was grossly assisted and it cannot be considered to have taken initiatives or ran missions on its own. Nevertheless, the intervention of the AU in this case brings hope for a better future because from the crisis in DRC to the one in CAR it can be said that the AU is progressing and now needs assistance as it is trying to solve its problems.

Conclusion

The term peacekeeping has been transformed over the years, but its three main characteristics have maintained: consent, impartiality and limited use of force. Moreover, second generation peacekeeping added new dimensions such as post conflict reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to what was originally called as peacekeeping.

There has been an evolution on the way both the EU and the AU approach the conflicts in Africa from a peacekeeping perspective. Looking at the conflict in DRC, the AU was still a young organization and did not have as much experience as the EU. During the Operation Artemis the EU provided military assistance, but not its European military troops. The EU has been criticized for not deploying its military to combat the rebels in Africa. On the other hand, the AU privileged disarmament and electoral processes instead of sending troops to the DRC to combat the rebels who were causing the conflict. This showed the point at which both organizations were not well used to peacekeeping operations and even after their intervention, the conflict did not come to an end immediately.

Looking at the case in CAR, more troops from the EU military were deployed, and these troops had to fight the rebels and assure the security of the country. It is important to precise that the EU provided military assistance in DRC to stabilize the situation, to find a sort of peaceful environment. With time, the EU even provided financial and humanitarian support as seen with the case in CAR. This therefore means that there is an evolution in the process of peacekeeping with the EU. With the conflict in CAR, both the EU and the AU sent military troops to fight the rebels and ensure peace. The assistance of France in these cases as seen as neocolonial and seen to ensure its interests in the countries concerned which are its ex colonies.

Moreover, with time there were some other peacekeeping operations in Africa led by the EU, for instance in dealing with the crisis in Mali, Somalia. All these crises before the conflict in CAR cost money to the EU and spending on all these conflicts with the increasing number of conflicts in Africa is not an easy task. Therefore, is there any betterment in the way the EU addresses the problem of conflicts in Africa since 2003? Yes there is. This is because both the EU and the AU now send military troops. They have both grown and added more measures like the AU who used the sanction method in the case of CAR.

On the other hand, the EU has been criticized for its economic and diplomatic sanctions implemented when intervening in Africa. The EU sanctioned the Zimbabwean president with a travel ban and freezing his assets in 2002 accusing him of human rights violation and election malpractices. With the case of Congo, CAR, Sudan, they all had sanctions regarding freezing of funds and economic resources. These sanctions on conflicting countries were not appreciated by most AU countries. They held that the countries were already suffering from poor democratic systems and other negative issues having an impact on their countries and these sanctions by the EU were not welcomed (Fioramonti 2009:8).

Moreover, the EU has been accused of being inconsistent and reserved in its effectiveness and as such has to put in more efforts in its internal cohesion during its peacekeeping missions (Sicurelli 2011:188). An example was the case in Darfur, as the rebels still exist years after the conflict broke out. The EU has been pointed out for not taking into consideration the solidarity it has to have with the countries at war. If the EU had more togetherness with the Sudanese rebels trying to arrive at a consensus for both parties, the rebels might have been dissolved.

The AU sees the EU as a model when it concerns its peacekeeping policy. But the problem is that both organisation face challenges, the EU faces a lot of challenges both at the intergovernmental and at the national level which makes it difficult for the organization to grow and expand like the AU.

The answer to the main research question of this work leads to a negative balance sheet for the AU because it does not fill the capability gap in peacekeeping operations in Africa. With reference to the previous case studies it can be drawn that the AU fails because it privileges communication through diplomacy and signing of agreements but does not add adequate civilian, military and humanitarian support to its operations.

Moreover, the participation of its member states is very limited, out of 54 member states there is a constant participation of Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Uganda and Burundi for deployments and financial aids which handicaps the Union. Which is different on the side of the EU where most of the member states are set to participate.

Also, till now, the AU has not proven to be sufficiently autonomous in handling any peace operation as it receives support from organisations but the EU in supporting the AU still makes sure it leaves some space for the AU's leading role. The AU is so fund of receiving support that it is not conscious enough to build up an effective and well equipped military because it knows another institution either the EU or the UN will come in to take over the mission.

Furthermore, the problem with the AU is that it does not anticipate and prevent conflicts as stated in its peacekeeping mechanism regulations, it rather acts when the conflict has already broken out and when the situation gets critical. All the conflicts examined previously all broke out because of accumulated differences and the AU

did not intervene when the broken parts were still identifiable instead when the conflict had reached its climax. This is not an effective second peacekeeping method because it fails to prevent conflict and makes the AU not to fill its expectation gap towards its member states while the EU who acts as a support and not as a leader assures its role.

Therefore, the EU is more effective in its approach towards peacekeeping operations in Africa because it has more participation and logistical and personnel resources which are unlike of the AU whose operations survive thanks to assistance and lacks both the means and strength to handle security problems. This makes it to secure resources from abroad. The greatest defiance of the AU in terms of peacekeeping is leaving Africans solve their problems themselves.

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