KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
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Islam in the United States after 9/11: A Foucauldian Reading of the Lives of the Muslims in the United States, in Dearborn, Michigan.

DISSERTATION

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Murat Aras

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

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

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ABSTRACT

Islam in the United States after 9/11:
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January, 2016

Michel Foucault puts power at the center of his thinking, regarding the relations between society, individuals, groups and institutions. (Foucault 1972, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1995). By studying how various institutions exert their power on groups and individuals, and how individuals affirm their own identity and resist the effects of power, Foucault concludes that considering power as something that institutions possess and use oppressively against individuals and groups is completely wrong. (Foucault 1995, 194). According to Foucault, we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms; it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals." For Foucault power is not only oppressive but also productive, producing positive effects even in its most radical form. (Ibid.)

Following 9/11, Muslims in Dearborn gained their individuality, became self-aware and elevated their identity to a new level despite the stigmatization, exclusion, discrimination, prejudice, violence and Islamophobia that they experienced. Unlike the previous generation who wanted to stay quiet and assimilate into American life (Ali-Karamali 2012), the new generation of Muslims are more active than ever. Residents of a city often called "The Islamic Capital of the United States", a center

of attraction and a must-visit location on the newly established anti-Muslim protest circuit (Denvir 2012), Muslims in Dearborn resisted the effects of 9/11 by establishing their own institutions, social services and media channels, and acting collectively in social and political issues (Ewing 2008, 6) despite their differences as Shia and Sunni Muslims. As a result, they succeeded to elect their first Muslim candidate as the President of the Dearborn City Council and the majority of the council members. Time Magazine believes both results to be milestones, given the complicated racial history of the city. (Dias 2013). In this regard, the lives of Muslims in Dearborn following 9/11 is a demonstration of the positive effects of power and the confirmation of Foucault's assertions.

Keywords: Michel, Foucault, Power, Power Relations, Effects of Power, Resistance to the Effects of Power, Positive Effects of Power, 9/11, Muslims in Dearborn, Muslims in the United States, Islamophobia, Panopticon, All American Muslim.

ÖZET

11 Eylül Saldırıları Sonrası Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinde İslam:
Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinde, Dearborn, Michigan'da Yaşayan Müslümanların
Foucauldian Bir Okuması

Murat Aras

Amerikan Kültürü ve Edebiyatı, Doktora

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Ocak, 2016

Michel Foucault, toplum, bireyler, gruplar ve kurumlar arasındaki ilişkiler açısından, düşünce merkezine güç kavramını koyar. (Foucault 1972, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1995). Foucault, kurumların gruplar ve bireyler üzerinde gücünü nasıl uyguladığı ve bireylerin kendi kimliklerini doğrulayarak gücün etkilerine karşı nasıl direnç gösterdiğinden hareketle, gücün kurumların egemenliğinde olan ve birey ve gruplara karşı baskıcı bir şekilde kullanılan bir olgu olarak değerlendirilmesinin yanlış olduğu sonucuna varır. (Foucault 1995, 194). Foucault'ya göre gücün etkileri asla "dışlayan", "bastıran", "sansürleyen", "soyutlayan", "maskeleyen", "gizleyen" gibi olumsuz terimlerle nitelendirilmemelidir. Çünkü Foucault için güç, en radikal biçiminde dahi olumlu etkiler üreten, sadece baskıcı değil aynı zamanda üretken bir kavramdır. (Ibid.)

11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında Dearborn'daki Müslümanlar yaşadıkları damgalanma, dışlanma, ayrımcılık, önyargı ve şiddete rağmen bireyselliklerini ve öz-farkındalıklarını kazandılar, ve kimliklerini yeni bir seviyeye yükselttiler. Sessiz kalmayı ve Amerikan hayatına asimile olmayı tercih eden bir önceki neslin aksine (Ali-Karamali 2012), yeni nesil Müslümanlar sosyal hayatta aktif roller almaya başladılar. Sık sık "Birleşik Devletlerin İslam Başkenti" olarak adlandırılan bir şehrin

ve yeni kurulan Müslüman karşıtı protesto güzergâhında mutlaka ziyaret edilmesi gereken bir çekim merkezinin sakinleri olarak (Denvir 2012), 11 Eylül'ün etkilerine kendi kurumlarını, sosyal hizmet ve medya kanallarını kurmak, ve Şii ve Sünni Müslümanlar olarak farklılıklarına rağmen sosyal ve politik konularda topluca hareket etmek yoluyla direndiler. (Ewing 2008, 6). Sonuç olarak, aday gösterdikleri ilk Müslüman Kent Konseyi Başkanını ve meclis üyelerinin çoğunluğunu seçmeyi başardılar. Time Dergisi, her iki sonucun şehrin karmaşık ırksal tarihi göz önüne alındığında birer kilometre taşı olduğuna inanmaktadır. (Dias 2013). Bu bağlamda, Dearborn'daki Müslümanların 11 Eylül sonrası yaşadıkları gücün olumlu etkilerini ispatlamakta ve Foucault'nun iddialarını doğrulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Michel, Foucault, Güç, Güç İlişkileri, Gücün Etkileri, Gücün Etkilerine Direnç, Gücün Olumlu Etkileri, 11 Eylül, Dearborn'daki Müslümanlar, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerindeki Müslümanlar, İslamofobi, Panoptikon, All American Muslim.

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Finally, I would like to thank my wife, daughter and family for their ongoing support. Without their presence I wouldn't make it this far at the first place.

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List of Abbreviations

7/24:	7 days, 24 hours
9/11:	The September 11 Attacks
ADC:	American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
ASARB:	Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies
CAIR:	Council on American-Islamic Relations
CBP:	Customs and Border Protection
CBS:	CBS Corp. (formerly known as Columbia Broadcasting System)
CD:	Compact Disc
CEO:	Chief Executive Officer
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
DAWN:	Detroit Anti-War Network
DC:	District of Columbia
DHS:	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ:	Department of Justice
Dr.	Doctor
ESTA:	Electronic System for Travel Authorization
FBI:	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GOP:	Grand Old Party (The Republican Party)
Ibid:	Latin, ibidem (in the same place)
ICA:	Islamic Cultural Association
IAU:	Islamic American University
ISIS:	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known as ISIL)

Jr.	Junior
MAS:	Muslim American Society
MI:	Michigan
MMCC:	Michigan Muslim Community Council
MPAC:	Muslim Public Affairs Council
MSA:	Muslim Students Association
NSA:	National Security Agency
PBS:	Public Broadcasting Service
PIPA:	Program on International Policy Attitudes
sic:	Latin, sic erat scriptum (thus was it written)
SOM:	State of Michigan
TLC:	The Learning Channel
TM:	Trademark
TSA:	Transportation Security Administration
TV:	Television
UK:	United Kingdom
UN:	United Nations
US:	United States
USA:	United States of America
USA PATRIOT Act:	Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
USS:	United States Ship
US-VISIT:	U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology
SEVIS:	Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
SWAT:	Special Weapons Attack Team

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview

> Personally I think it's better to be a Muslim here because you are more aware of who you are as a Muslim. You have more of a reason to go out and gain more knowledge. You have more of a reason to figure who you really are. You have more of a reason to strengthen your identity. And I think it's a great thing. I think it's like a *Rahmetullah.* I think it is a mercy. I think it's a mercy from the Lord. I think he is giving us this opportunity like, I put you on this earth here in Michigan with all these Americans so you can learn more about yourself and learn more about Islam.

These are the words of Anna, a senior at the University of Michigan in Dearborn studying psychology who I interviewed over a decade after 9/11. She is a Muslim. With her own words, she is worshiping Allah to the best of her ability, following everything that he says correctly and making sure that she has a strong connection with God. She is also an American. In other words, her chances of being blown up by a terrorist attack is exactly the same like any other American (Memon, 2011). Unlike other Americans, she is going through a very radical experience since 9/11; she is being discriminated in job applications because of her hijab, verbally abused because of her identity and continuously surveilled as a potential terrorist. Still, when asked to put things on a scale, Anna responds that Dearborn has positive influences on her life as an individual and identity as a Muslim without hesitation.

She uses a very strong word to interpret the greatness of the positive effects of her experience; *Rahmetullah* (God's blessing). The strength of her expression is a disclosure of the positive effects of power even in its most radical form.

In this dissertation, I will study how Muslims in Dearborn experienced the radical effects of power after 9/11. By describing how each of these effects unintentionally and even unwantedly produce positive effects on behalf of the Muslims in the city, I will demonstrate that power as Foucault asserts, is not only oppressive but also productive. (Foucault 1995, 194). It is not possible to reduce power relations between individuals to an oppressor versus victim connexion (Foucault 1978, 85). Power relations tend to be more productive because they imply resistance, without which no power relation can be conceived. (Foucault 1980, 142).

Following 9/11, Dearborn became a city stigmatized as The Islamic Capital of United States and turned into a center of attraction and a must-visit location on the newly established anti-Muslim protest circuit. (Denvir 2012). Muslims in Dearborn experienced the effects of this stigma radically in various forms exclusion, discrimination, prejudice, violence and Islamophobia. However, it happened to be the same stigma that brought a very diverse community of Shia and Sunni Muslims together, led to their self-awareness and elevated their identity to a new level. Unlike the previous generation who wanted to stay quiet and assimilate into the American life, the new generation of Muslims became more active than ever. (Ali-Karamali 2012). They resisted the effects of 9/11 by establishing their own local institutions, social services and media channels, and acting collectively in social and political issues (Ewing 2008, 6) despite their differences and diversity. As a result, they succeeded to elect their first Muslim candidate as the President of the Dearborn City Council and the majority of the council members, an accomplishment which Time

Magazine qualifies as a milestone, given the complicated racial history of the city. (Dias 2013).

The disciplinary mechanisms of power unintentionally led Muslims in Dearborn through a transition and experience Islam in a new and active way. The effects of power which were rather intended to normalize Muslims caused them to gain their individuality. In this respect, the identity, self-awareness, unity, integration, pride, transparency and participation of Muslims in Dearborn despite their radical experience following 9/11 is a demonstration of the positive effects of power and a confirmation of Foucault's assertions.

1.2. Research Aim

The purpose of my dissertation is two-fold. Firstly, I will study how Muslims in Dearborn experienced the radical effects of power in various forms of stigmatization, exclusion, discrimination, prejudice, violence and Islamophobia following 9/11. Secondly, I will analyze in this context how the disciplinary mechanisms of the state, and the binary operations, technologies and procedures of power affected Muslims in Dearborn.

By analyzing how each of these effects unintentionally and even unwantedly produce positive effects on behalf of the Muslims in the city, I will propound a non-reductionist understanding of power and its relations which has been overly-simplified into an oppressor versus victim connexion. I will demonstrate that power relations are not only oppressive but also productive, producing positive effects even in its most radical form. (Foucault 1995, 194). As Foucault states, "to find out what our society means by sanity, perhaps we should investigate what is happening in the

field of insanity. And what we mean by legality in the field of illegality. And, in order to understand what power relations are about, perhaps we should investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations." (Foucault 1982, 211). From a Foucauldian point of view, I believe that analyzing Muslims in Dearborn is one of the most constructive methods to understand power and its relations.

1.3. Research Questions

The research aim gives rise to the question "how did the radical effects of power that Muslims in Dearborn experience following 9/11 produce unintentional positive effects in their favor?" To have an integral understanding of the issue, this question encompasses three crucial analysis. The analysis on how Muslims in Dearborn experienced the radical effects of power, its disciplinary mechanisms, binary operations, technologies and procedures following 9/11 is essentially first to be conducted. This analysis will be followed by a study of the end results which these effects produced. Finally an examination of the intentions behind these end results will be performed. Together, these analyses will demonstrate the outcomes of the effects of power in Dearborn, Michigan that affected Muslims in the city, a verification of their unintentionality and a possible confirmation of Foucault's assertions.

1.4. Notes on Methods

The theoretical framework of this dissertation is largely based on Foucault's works on theory of power. By investigating power historically and critically (Foucault 1972, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1995) and studying how various institutions exert their power on groups and individuals, and how individuals affirm their own identity and resist the effects of power, Foucault concludes that considering power as something that institutions possess and use oppressively against individuals and groups is completely wrong. According to Foucault, the effects of power shouldn't be described in negative terms. (Foucault 1995, 194). For Foucault power is not only oppressive but also productive, producing positive effects even in its most radical form. (Ibid.)

Putting this this idea into practice, the dissertation focuses on Muslims in Dearborn and their radical experience of effects of power following 9/11. Implying the principal idea in Foucault's theory that the right place to observe power in action is the relations between the individuals, the society and its institutions (Bălan 2013, 37), the study examines the Muslim society in Dearborn, residents of a city stigmatized as The Islamic Capital of United States, their institutions, their interior relations as a community, and exterior relations with non-Muslims and the state. The term "state" is based on Foucault's conceptualization of the state as a fragile abstraction; not mainly something that owns power but rather something which builds a system of relations between individuals (Foucault 2007, 220).

To identify the radical effects that Muslims in Dearborn experienced after 9/11 in various forms of Islamophobia, the study refers to Edward Said's Orientalism. According to Said, although Islamophobia is a contemporary term, it is

not a new term in such essence of receiving new information. It is not a new interpretation or judgement of Islam either. (Said 2003, 59). Islamophobia is a series of repetitive incarnations in the United States of rather narcissistic Western ideas about Muslims that had always been present in its collective unconscious, elevated to a phobia rapidly after 9/11. (Said 2003, 71)

1.4.1. Power and Its Unintentional Disciplinary Effects

Power is one of the outcomes of social asymmetry. (Magee & Galinsky 2008, 16). As simple as this definition may appear, power – almost mystical – is very difficult to observe and has a complicated structure. (Karlberg 2005, 4). Often mixed with money and wealth, power is not a commodity that can be bought by one person and used against other. As Frank Underwood states it in The House Of Cards; "Money is the McMansion in Sarasota that starts falling apart after 10 years. Power is the old stone building that stands for centuries. I cannot respect someone who doesn't see the difference." (*House of Cards* 2013).

In its most simple and fragile form, power is the outcome of social asymmetries embodied on an individual. (Anderson & Berdah 2002, 1362 - 1377). As it gets institutionalized, it takes on a more complicated form. Some individuals are given the privilege of resorting to power while some are not. (Magee & Galinsky 2008, 5 - 22). The decision of who are invested by power and how much of it constitutes a hierarchy. (Emerson 1962, 41), while the disputes over who gets power and how much of it causes social conflicts. (Bachrach & Baratz 1962, 947-952). However, as much as these disputes and their consequences are clear, the subject of power relations, how these hierarchies are constituted, how power becomes

institutionalized and the complex nature of power itself is not certain. (Karlberg 2005, 4).

As a result of this uncertainty a number of inconsistent and contradictory definitions of power emerge. Some of these definitions operate on the level of the individual such as “repeated interactions among individuals, rather than a property of any single individual” (Emerson 1962, 31-41) or “the probability of individuals realizing their own will and interests in a communal action even against the resistance of others.” (Weber 1946, 180).

Definitions of power that operate on a social level describe power as “social cognition” (Smith & Bargh 2008, 1 - 4), “social attention and perception” (Copeland 1994, 264-277) or “the use of coercion and sanctions.” (Weber 1946, 77 - 128).

“Affect and emotion” (Anderson & Berdahl 2002, 1362-1377) is an example of definitions of power that operate on an intrapersonal level. Other definitions operate on both levels such as “a relational concept” (Ogilvy 1978, 129-144), “a kind of a social currency that symbolically stands for established, underlying agonistic asymmetries but is not identical to them” (Parsons 1963, 232-262) or “the ability to control others, events, or resources.” (Weber 1946, 180).

In contrast to these definitions, Karl Marx uses the concept of power in relation to social classes and social systems rather than individuals. Marx argues that there is a limited amount of power in the society which can only be only be held by one person or group at a time. These groups are the working class *(proletariat)* and the ruling classes *(bourgeoisie)*. Marx claims that power rests in a social class’s position. Power does not lie in the relationship between individuals, but in the domination of the ruling class and the subordination of the working class based on their relations of production. (Marx & Engels 1848, 14-24).

Michel Foucault puts power at the center of his thinking, regarding the relations between society, individuals, groups and institutions. His investigations of power reflect critical and historical viewpoints. (Foucault 1972, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1995). The principal idea in his works is that the right place to observe power in action is the relations between the individual, the society, its institutions and the discourses it generates. (Bălan 2013, 37). By studying how various institutions exert their power on groups and individuals, and how individuals affirm their own identity and resist the effects of power, Foucault concludes that considering power as something that institutions possess and use oppressively against individuals and groups is completely wrong. (Bălan 2013, 38).

Foucault suggests that the definition which can be summarized as "power is oppression" should change, because even in its most radical form oppression is not just repression and censorship, but is also productive causing new knowledges to emerge. (Foucault 1995, 194). With this point of view, Foucault is less concerned with the oppressive aspects of power, but more with the resistance of those the power is exerted upon. (Bălan 2013, 38).

According to Bălan, Foucault proposes an alternative model in which power relations dissipate through all relational structures of the society. (Bălan 2013, 38). This enables him to build a model of the daily and mundane manners in which power is exerted and contested, as well as an analysis centered on the human individual as an active subject, not as a simple object for power. (Bălan 2013, 38). Before Foucault, power was understood as the capacity of an agent to impose his will over the will of the powerless, or the ability to force them to do things they do not wish to do. In his own words, "it was a phenomenon of one individual's consolidated and homogeneous domination over others, or that of one group or class over another."

(Foucault 1980, 98). In this understanding, power was a possession owned by those in power. Foucault not only questioned the opinion that power was something that can be owned, but also criticized the Marxist conception of power, something with an economic functionality. (Bălan 2013, 39).

Objecting to the Marxist foundations of a certain economism in its conceptualization of power, Foucault denied the definition of what he called the "classic, juridical theory of power", in which power is viewed as a right, which one can possess like a commodity and transfer or alienate through some act that establishes a right (Kelly & Foucault 1994, 26). According to Foucault, Marxists conceived power "primarily in terms of the role it plays in the maintenance simultaneously of the relations of production and of a class domination which the development and specific forms of the forces of production have rendered possible." (Kelly & Foucault 1994, 27). According to them, power is possessed by the wealthiest class of a society and is used to maintain the status quo. Foucault does not accept the narrative that power is in the service of economy. He rejects the essentiality of power as a consolidative function with outputs that are appropriate to the economy. (Foucault 1980, 89). Although he does not deny that power is enmeshed in and with economic relations, Foucault denies its centrality and criticizes how it is reduced to the state or class. For him Marxism is condemned, because Marxism like liberalism, fails to take power seriously as a level on which things happen. (Foucault 2003, 12 – 19).

Conducting an anti-Marxist analysis of power (Foucault 2003, 12 - 19), Foucault argues that power must be conceptualized as something which circulates or as something which only functions in the form of a chain. (Foucault 2003, 29). It is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised and only exists in

action. In this definition of power, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. (Foucault 1980, 98).

Through this new understanding of power, Foucault defines Power as a "system." It is not a thing but a relation. For Foucault, Power is a network of relations encompassing the whole society, rather than a relation between the oppressed and the oppressor. He characterizes Power in a much more empirical and fluid way. (Foucault 1997, 176). For Foucault, "power" itself is not the object of analysis but "power relations" are, (Foucault 1982, 339) because for him power is not an entity, either philosophically abstracted or ideologized; it can only be manifested as a way in which some act on others. (Ibid, 340). Thus, Power is omnipresent, not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next and not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. (Foucault 1978, 389). Individuals in the society are not just the objects of power, but they are the center where power and resistance to it are exerted. (Mills 2003, 35).

In The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, Mark G.E. Kelly extrapolates five characteristics of power that Foucault conceptualizes both in his works The Will to Knowledge and Discipline and Punish. First, the impersonality, or subjectlessness, of power, meaning that it is not guided by the will of individual subjects. Second, the relationality of power, meaning that power is always a case of power relations between people, as opposed to a quantum possessed by people. Third, the decentredness of power, meaning that it is not concentrated on a single individual or class. Fourth the multidirectionality of power, meaning that it does not flow only from the more to the less powerful, but rather comes from below, even if it is

nevertheless nonegalitarian and finally fifth, the strategic nature of power, meaning that it has a dynamic of its own, is intentional. (Kelly 2008, 37-38).

Kelly describes that, from the first feature in his list above, to say power is decentered is implied by its impersonality, since any center, whether it be an individual or an elite, would be a subject, since power cannot be possessed, it can only be relational, residing in the interstices between individuals, since if it resided in individuals, they would possess it. If it is relational and decentered, then it must be multidirectional, because, since it does not have a center, yet clearly must have form if it is to be anything at all, it must be organized autonomously around its own tendencies and directionality, rather than those that individual subjects might have. It is strategic by nature and has its own dynamics. (Kelly 2008, 37 - 39).

Conceiving power as a "relation" and "strategy", and not as a possession means that it is something that has to be diverted and not something that can simply be acquired. It is not localized exclusively in certain institutions or individuals, but it is rather a set of relations dispersed throughout society. (Bălan 2013, 39). Foucault describes this definition with the words;

> I am not referring to Power with a capital P, dominating and imposing its rationality upon the totality of the social body. In fact, there are power relations. They are multiple; they have different forms, they can be in play in family relations, or within an institution, or an administration.
> (Foucault 2013, 38).

This view again contradicts the Marxist definition of power, which defines power as a form of repression or oppression. Foucault thinks that power must be

understood differently than repression, which simply forces individuals to obey. “If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no”, Foucault asks, “do you really think one would be brought to obey it?” (Foucault 1978, 36).

Answering the above question “no” is a demonstration that power is not merely a form of repression. Power is not only oppressive but also productive, producing positive effects just as well, so that individuals tend to obey. The question also remarks that power is coextensive with resistance, that it shares the same domain, scope and boundaries as resistance; that there is always a possibility that it might be resisted. (Foucault 1978, 36).

In the first volume of History of Sexuality, Foucault says that “where there is power there is resistance.” (Foucault 1978, 95). For him it is not possible to reduce power relations between individuals to a master versus slave or oppressor versus victim connexion. Power relations tend to be more productive because they imply resistance, without which no power relation can be conceived. According to Foucault where there is power, there will always be someone who resists it. (Foucault 1978, 95 - 96). These relations are multiple and have different forms. Between every point of a social body, between a man and a woman, between the members of a family, between a master and his pupil, between everyone who knows and everyone who does not, there exist relations of power which are not purely and simply a projection of the sovereign’s great power over the individual. (Foucault 1980, 201).

1.4.2. State as a Fragile Form of Abstraction

Foucault conceptualizes the state as not mainly something that owns power, but rather something which builds a system of relations between individuals so that the political system works. (Foucault 1995). By analyzing how power was exerted in various stages of European history and showing how the monarchic power system was replaced by the democratic one, Foucault draws an expressive depiction of the punishment imagery. (Foucault 1995, 3 - 32). According to him, the symbol of monarchic power was the public execution "in front of public eyes." This was an external symbol of royal power, used from top to bottom. During the years 1769 to 1837, public executions gradually disappeared and punishment instead became hidden and concealed. (Foucault 1977, 7 - 8). The torture of the body was replaced by the surveillance of the soul. The symbol of Democratic power became discipline; imprisonment "away from public eyes", an internal symbol that now power was exerted by the people. (Foucault 1977, 10 - 15).

The exercise of discipline of the state is not limited to punishment. As a type of self-regulation encouraged by institutions, discipline becomes the norm in the state and acts as for the individual as an instrument to change the reality and himself. According to Foucault, we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms; it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals." "In fact", Foucault says, "power produces; it produces reality. It produces domains of objects and rituals of truth." (Foucault 1995, 194).

But how are these discourses of truth produced? That is the very question that Foucault is concerned with. In Lecture Two of his Two Lectures in Power /

Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972 - 1977, he tries to answer this question.

According to Foucault, in any state, the relations of power cannot be established, consolidated nor implemented by themselves without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. (Foucault 1980, 49). There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. Therefore, we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth. Foucault simplifies this description with a triangle: power, right, truth. (Ibid.)

Foucault believes that in the Western societies the relationship between power, right and truth is organized in very zig-zag fashion. (Foucault 1980, 94). He characterizes, not its mechanism itself but its intensity and constancy, that we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need in order to function. We must speak the truth. We are constrained or condemned to confess or to discover the truth. Foucault reveals that power never ceases its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth. Power institutionalizes, professionalizes and rewards its pursuit. (Foucault 1980, 93).

"We must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place", says Foucault. (Foucault 1980, 93 - 94). In other words, we are also subjected to truth in the sense in which it is truth that makes the laws, that produces the true discourse which decides, transmits and extends itself upon the effects of power. In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or

dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power. (Foucault 1980, 94).

At this point, Foucault performs a historical analysis of how the "power of true discourses" emerge. He uses the terms "rules of right", "the mechanisms of power", "the effects of truth" simultaneously as synonyms in this analysis. (Ibid.)

Foucault asserts that the mechanism of power changed with the disappearance of the monarchy. This new type of power was a complete anti-thesis of monarchy, where the Divine Right of Kings was the theological justification for absolute sovereignty. Monarchs could claim supreme autocratic sovereignty by divine right and their subjects had no right to limit this sovereignty. As monarchs started to disappear one after the other, power could no longer be formulated in terms of sovereignty. (Foucault 1980, 91 – 105).

Calling it "one of the great inventions of bourgeois society", Foucault argues that this new type of power was a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism and of the type of society that is its accompaniment. This non-sovereign power, which lay outside the form of sovereignty, is "disciplinary power." (Foucault 1980, 105).

In Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault describes discipline as a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of "instruments", "techniques", "procedures", "levels of application", "targets." It is a "physics" or an "anatomy" of power, a "technology." (Foucault 1995, 215). While sovereign power permits goods and wealth, disciplinary power permits time and labor to be extracted from bodies. It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by means of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner through levies and obligations over time. (Foucault 1980, 104). It is substantial how Foucault uses the

term “bodies” rather than “people” in his description. With this term, he is referring to the human body both as an object and subject to be acted upon. It is a material that can be tortured, surveilled, arranged, regulated, and supervised. (Foucault 1995, 10).

At first sight, the intention behinds these surveillances, arrangements, regulations and supervisions is to produce regularity, compliance and conformity. (Foucault 1980, 98). But when I look at the lives of Muslims in Dearborn, I see that the end results are almost the opposite of what is intended, which brings me to the subject of my dissertation. Beyond any stereotypical and monotonous description, Muslims in Dearborn are a compound of very distinctive communities, each consisting of very unique, contrarian and almost “irregular” individuals that have embraced their religious identities and individualities, on the contrary.

These end results are no surprise to Foucault who sees a “fragile” form of state, with a great potential of change, unlike the Marxist understanding which accepts institutions such as the state to be nothing but oppressive, permanent and solid. (Foucault 2007, 248). In his article Governmentality, Foucault asserts that overvaluing the problem of the state is paradoxical because it is apparently reductionist. (Foucault 2007, 220). It is a form of analysis that consists in reducing the state to a certain number of functions, such as the development of productive forces of the reproduction of relations of production. This reductionist vision of the relative importance of the state’s role, nevertheless invariably renders it absolutely essential as a target needing to be “attacked” and a privileged position needing to be “occupied.” (Ibid.) But according to Foucault, the state, no more probably than at any other time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality or this importance. For him, the state is no more than a composite

reality and a mythicized abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. (Foucault 2007, 220).

For Foucault, the state is not a super-human agent, as Sara Mills explains it, having will and intentions analogous to those of people. "However", Mills says, "Foucault does not simply want to dispense with the notion of the state in all of his work or to argue that the state is not important." (Mills 2003, 49). Rather, in analyzing the relations of power, it is necessary to extend that analysis beyond the limits of the state. (Foucault 1979).

In Truth and Power Foucault argues that the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations (Foucault 1980, 122). Thus, relations between parents and children, lovers, employers and employees – in short, all relations between people – are power relations. In each interaction power is negotiated and one's position in a hierarchy is established, however flexible, changing and ill-defined that hierarchy is. (Mills 2003, 49).

Mills explains that in conclusion, Foucault analyses the relations between the individual and the wider society without assuming that the individual is powerless in relation to institutions or to the state. (Mills 2003, 52). He does not minimize the restrictions placed on individuals by institutions; in much of his work, he is precisely focused on the way institutions act upon individuals. However, by analyzing the way that power is dispersed throughout society, Foucault enables one to see power as enacted in every interaction and hence as subject to resistance in each of those interactions. This makes power a much less stable element, since it can be challenged at any moment and it is necessary to continuously renew and maintain power relations. (Ibid.)

In the following pages, as I build my study on this concept, I will study Muslims in Dearborn not as a random result, or an accidental occurrence, but as an unintended and even an unwanted effect of the initial disciplinary project. In simple terms, being asked the question why Muslims in Dearborn are different than Muslims in the rest of the world, my response would be; because they exist in Dearborn. This description is more than a static answer but the definition of mutual, dynamic and continuous relations of power on the social spectrum, which both the effects of power and the state contributes in the identity and the individuality of each Muslim in Dearborn in each interaction and resistance to those interactions.

1.4.3. Islamophobia as an Incarnation of Orientalism following 9/11

In Orientalism, Edward Said discusses Orientalism as a corporate institution for dealing with the Orient. (Said 2003, 20). He explains the phrase "dealing with" in a number of ways; by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, teaching it, settling it, ruling over it. He explains Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient. (Said 2003, 21).

According to Said, Orientalism is a Western style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and most of the time "the Occident" that has accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, mind, destiny and so on. (Ibid.) It is a historical and traditional structure of thought, imagery and vocabulary that has given reality and presence in and for the West. The Orient is an

integral discourse within the West's material civilization and culture to exclude the "other" and construct what it is to be Western (Said 2003, 22).

In 1971, Dutch philosopher Fons Elders conducts an interview in preparation for a debate between Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, broadcasted on Dutch television. In this interview Foucault expresses his wonder if the Westerners are readily deceiving themselves greatly, readily imagining that they are a very tolerant society that has welcomed all the forms of the past and all the cultural forms foreign to it. He believes that the universality of the knowledge of the West has been acquired at the cost of exclusions. (Foucault 2014).

Borrowing this concept from Foucault, Said argues that Orientalism is not only an elaboration of a basic distinction that the world is made up of two unequal halves; the reasonable, scientific, individual and capitalist West versus the unreasonable, spiritual, totalitarian and terrorist East. (Said 2003, 28). It is also of a whole series of interests which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description. (Ibid.) It is a network of exclusions which the West intends to gain self-knowledge, strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self. (Said 2003, 21).

Its understanding of one kind of Oriental culture, "the Islamic", is complex but mainly ignorant. (Said 2003, 65). Almost from the earliest times in Europe, the Orient was something more than what was empirically known about it. For certain associations with the East which are not quite ignorant yet not quite informed, always seem to have gathered around the notion of an Orient. To the Orient were given the feelings of emptiness, loss and disaster that seem thereafter to reward

Oriental challenges to the West and also, the lament that in some glorious past Asia fared better, was itself victorious over Europe. (Said 2003, 65).

This notion exposes the superiority of the Occident. It exceeds the hegemony of a puppet master, to the divine domination of a genuine creator, whose power gives life, represents, animates and constitutes the otherwise silent and empty space beyond the Occident. It is also undergirded with the feeling of the Orient as an insinuating danger. The West is warned to take The Orient and its mysteries seriously, because they challenge the rational Western mind to new exercises of its enduring ambition and power. (Said 2003, 65 - 66).

Said's words disclose about Orientalism that it is as much a discourse, a feeling; a lasting trauma. Although it is an imaginative geography it has substantial psychological and social aspects. Two of these aspects that set the Orient off from the Occident are its defeatedness and distance. While the West is portrayed as powerful and articulate, the East is mentioned as defeated and distant, lost and disastrous. (Said 2003, 66).

9/11 happened to be a shocking incident that recalled this trauma. Had there not been any incidents and causalities before in the late American history? In 1979, fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were taken hostage for not 4, 44 but 444 days in Iran. Their rescue attempt Operation Eagle Claw had failed, resulting the destruction of two helicopters and the death of their crews. (Saas 2012). In 1987, USS Stark was struck by two Exocet anti-ship missiles fired from the Iraqi Air Force during the Iran-Iraq War, killing 37 U.S. Navy sailors. (Hughes 2015). At least 148 U.S. soldiers had died during the operation Desert Storm. (Tucker 2010, 265). Of those, 27 lost their lives when an Iraqi Al Hussein missile hit a U.S. military barrack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. (Apple Jr. 1991, 14).

But it wasn't until the clouds of black smoke blew out of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, a nation which had been in "active" war in the Middle East for over 40 years, became "actively" aware of its consequences. For the first time in history, their ancient fears were beyond familiar boundaries. Their hegemony as a puppet master had ended. The puppets had rebelled (Said 2003, 66). 9/11 showed the Occident that both aspects of the Orient had vanished before they could even notice. The Orient was not as defeated and distant as they had imagined anymore, nor the West was as powerful. After the incident, the willful ignorance of Islam in the United States became more refined, complex (Said 2003, 70) and phobic. The feeling of the Orient as insinuating danger became marginalized to a contemporary level: Islamophobia. Following 9/11, Islamophobia became the central discourse in the United States consumed especially by the right-wing media and politics in depicting the Orient to frame their very own purposes.

Although Islamophobia is a contemporary term, it is not a new term in such essence of receiving new information. It is not a new interpretation or judgement of Islam either. (Said 2003, 59). According to Foucault it is not easy to say something new. It is not enough for us to open our eyes, to pay attention or to be aware, for a new meaning of the word "Muslim", for a new statement of Islam, suddenly to light up and emerge out of the ground. The idea of a single break suddenly, at a given moment like the result of a battle or a geological catastrophe, dividing all discursive formations, interrupting them in a single moment and reconstituting them in accordance with the same rules is not a sustainable idea. (Foucault 1972, 175).

Therefore, "Muslim" is not a temporal figure that imposes its unity and empty form on all discourses. Similarly, 9/11 does not play the role of an event exterior to discourse. It does not connect concepts like Islam and terrorism, or words like 9/11

and Muslim with one another. It does not establish a deductive or rhetorical structure between propositions or sentences. (Foucault 1972, 105). Like every word, the word "Muslim" circulates. It is used. It appears and disappears. It allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves or resists various interests. It participates in challenge and struggle and becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry. (Ibid.) When it is discourse that we are speaking of, Foucault warns us that the irruption of a real event that beyond any apparent beginning, there is always a secret origin, so secret and so fundamental that it can never be quite grasped in itself. (Foucault 1972, 25).

Islamophobia's secret origin appears to be a new version of some previous experience; of Christianity. In the Middle Ages, a bundle of attributes were heaped onto the word "Muslim." Muslims were viewed as the followers of a false revelation. After 9/11, they became as well the epitome a whole battery of assorted contemporary treacheries, all of which derived logically from modern doctrinal impostures. (Said 2003, 70). Following self-appointed leaders, they were hateful against America's democratically elected government and freedoms; freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom to vote, and assemble and disagree with each other. (Bush 2001, 1). Their intention was to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They were dreaming to drive Israel out of the Middle East. Their ambition was to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. (Ibid.) On a local scale, they were intending to invade American soil, ambitious for Muslim colonization. (Jenkins 2015; Urbanski 2015). In this sense, Islamophobia had always been present in the collective unconscious of the West in form of Orientalism, (Said 2003, 71) but gained consciousness and elevated to a phobia rapidly after 9/11. Once started, this practice could not be stopped. 9/11 became a strong source of rather narcissistic

Western ideas about Muslims in this series of repetitive incarnations in the United States. (Said 2003, 62).

The Runnymede Trust, an independent research and social policy agency established the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, identifies eight effects of power in Islamophobic context. (The Runnymede Trust 1997).

In my dissertation I will explain how Muslims in Dearborn experienced each of these effects and demonstrate with examples how each effect led to unintentional positive outcomes on behalf of the Muslims in the city;

1. Monolithism: Muslims seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities, ignoring its diversity and overlooking its progressiveness with internal differences, debates and development.
2. Separation: Muslims seen as separate and other.
3. Inferiority: Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist.
4. Manipulation: Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage rather than a genuine religious faith practiced sincerely by the Muslims.
5. Enmity: Islam seen as an evil, violent and threatening religion supportive of terrorism, engaged in a clash of civilizations.
6. Rejection of the Criticism: Criticisms made by Muslims rejected out of hand, without consideration or debate.
7. Defending Discrimination: Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.

8. Naturalization of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and normal.

   (The Runnymede Trust 1997, 3).

1.4.4. Fieldwork

The fieldwork of this study took place in Dearborn, Michigan. The purpose of the fieldwork was to have a closer look at the lives of the Muslims in the United States, their experience of the radical effects of power following 9/11 and the end results of these effects. During my stay I gathered insight and information from a number of sources by observations, mosque visits, participation in communal prayers and activities, visiting Muslims at their houses, schools and workplaces and interacted with over 100 Muslims.

Most of the initial interactions were with groups in the form of organic and mutual conversations that took very long, usually 3 to 4 hours and once all day long. I took notes of the highlights of these conversations and asked for permission to record parts that were significant for my study. During this process, I used the general trends that unfolded during the interactions to construct more structured interviews. The interviews that are present in the text are based on these structured interactions that took place towards the end of my field study, which covers the majority of the trends that I observed, relevant to my dissertation.

Among these interviews I selected the inputs of Muslims in the city and members of MSA (Muslim Students Association) at the University of Michigan – Dearborn who had been outside the United States multiple times and on long

occasions. This selection provided me inputs about the differences of being a Muslim in America and in countries where Muslims are the majority.

To be able to focus, I eliminated parts of the interviews that were loosely attached with my research aim. I also removed the interviews in my text about All American Muslim, the series that took place in Dearborn due to its common criticism as a misrepresentation. This finding also gave cause to the exclusion of the series from my primary resources in understanding Muslims in Dearborn.

1.5. Chapter Breakdown

My dissertation starts with a partial overview of the Muslims in the United States and Dearborn, Michigan. Following this overview, the discussion will take place in Chapter 3. In this chapter I will narrate the effects of power on Muslims in Dearborn following 9/11 to demonstrate that power is not only oppressive but also productive, producing positive effects even in its most radical form. I will approach the issue from two directions.

First in Chapter 3.1., I will look at Muslims in Dearborn from an external direction and on an interpersonal level. I will describe how they experienced the effects of power after 9/11 and illustrate how each of these effects unintentionally and even unwantedly produce positive effects. Later in Chapter 3.2. I will take an internal position and elevate my analysis to the state level. I will explain how the state's disciplinary mechanisms turned Dearborn into a panopticon following 9/11 and how the same panoptical structure unintentionally amplified the positive effects of power.

Additional to these directions, in Chapter 3.3., being a city located at the northern border of the United States, I will mention the experiences of Muslims in Dearborn at the ports of entry. I will explain through their experience how the binary operations and procedures of power at the borders contributed in the individuality of Muslims in the city. In the remaining chapters I will support my thesis with a critical study on All American Muslim, the TLC series that took place in the city and interviews that I performed in Dearborn.

2. A PARTIAL OVERIVIEW OF MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND DEARBORN, MICHIGAN

2.1. Muslims in the United States

Muslims in the United States are a very diverse population originating from at least 77 different nations. 65% of American Muslims are first generation immigrants who are born outside the United States. 15% are second generation immigrants who have either one or both parents born outside the country. (Pew Research Center 2011, 8).

The gender distribution of Muslims in the United States is 55% male and 45% female. The adult population is younger than the US average (38,4 versus 46,5). 83% of American Muslims are American citizens. (Pew Research Center 2011, 13).

Pakistan	14 %
Sub-Saharan Africa	11 %
Europe	7 %
Iran	5 %
Palestinian	5 %
Bangladesh	5 %
Yemen	5 %
Jordan	5 %
Iraq	4 %
Other Middle East / North Africa	22 %
Other South Asia	7 %
Other Countries	10 %

Table 1. Birth places of foreign born Muslims.

Although various statistics demonstrate that they are a growing population, the exact number of Muslims in the United States is an ongoing dispute. Next to immigration, this growth is related to conversion. (Neal 2012; Moses 2014; Rozemberg 2005). Following 9/11, the conversion rates in the United States reached a record high. At least 40% of Muslims in the United States are predicted to be converts who are not raised with Islamic faith. (Pew Research Center 2011, 24). Due

to the high rates of conversion in prisons, 10% of the Muslim population is incarcerated. 80% of the prisoners who find faith while prisoned, convert to Islam. (Downing 2011, 2).

Estimates on Muslim population vary from 1,349,000 to 7 – 10,000,000. A global study conducted by the Pew Research Center found out that the Muslim population is 2,454,000, (Pew Research Center 2009, 25) indicating the presence of a minority that is less than 1% of the population of the United States. Around 200 – 400,000 of this population (10 – 15 %) are Shia Muslims. (Pew Research Center 2009, 10). The 2010 U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations & Membership Study sponsored by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies, shares a similar number of 2,600,082 Muslims. (ASARB 2010).

2.2. Dearborn, Michigan

Dearborn is the eight largest city in the State of Michigan, located in the Detroit Metropolitan Area in Wayne County with a population of 98.153. (SOM 2012, 10). The city is only 15 kilometers away from Detroit and Windsor, Canada's southernmost city across the Detroit River. Due to its close proximity to Detroit, Dearborn is both culturally and economically attached to the city. Also it has intensive socio-economic and cultural trans-border relations with Windsor. For instance, University of Michigan-Dearborn and University of Windsor have partnership programs between campuses. (University of Michigan - Dearborn & University of Windsor 2012, 1 - 2).

Dearborn's biggest employer is Ford Motor Corporation. Ford is the biggest of the three car manufacturers in the region (Big 3) in front of General Motors and

Chrysler and the third biggest in the world after Toyota and VW. (Muller 2013). The company employs 164.000 people nationwide. (Ford Motor Company 2012, 11). In 2012, Ford employed 39.134 people in Dearborn, indicating a 36% decline in only eight years. Similarly, employment generated by the Big 3 in the region dropped 30% from 337.000 to 235.000 in less than five years. (Detroit Regional Chamber 2005 & 2010).

The numbers disclose two facts. First, they disclose the massive economic and cultural influence of the automotive industry over Dearborn. It is impossible to narrate the Muslim history in Dearborn without mentioning Ford. Second, they expose that the city is in decline. Combined together, these two facts are the reasons of the dense population of Muslims in Dearborn.

Ford founded Ford Motor Company in 1903. By 1907 his $600 Model N had become the best-selling car in the country. But he had a bigger goal. He wanted to turn motor cars from a luxury to a utility that every American family can enjoy. (Ford 2005, 37).

To realize his goal, Ford had to increase production and decrease expenditures in a great scale to drop unit costs. To do this, Ford standardized the entire production process. Instead of producing multiple models built on multiple chassis, he focused the entire plant to a single model built on a single chassis with only one color. (Ibid.) But the continuous and repetitive work on the assembly was no easy labor for the workers. The turnover rose to a record 378% which meant that Ford had to hire almost 4 people to fill a single position every year. Realizing that the turnover costs had exceeded employment costs, Ford took a bold move in January 1914 and raised the wages to $5 per day. (Ford 2005, 148).

At the time Ford offered $5, an average industry worker was earning $2.2 per day. (Lebergott 1960, 462). Ford's offer attracted thousands of immigrants and African Americans who wanted to benefit the opportunity of earning twice the daily wage. By 1916 Ford was employing people from 62 nationalities as well as more than 900 people with disabilities. (Pulimood 2009, 5).

In 1917 World War I started. Ford switched its assembly to war production. In the meantime, as a human cost of war, more people from the Middle East were coming to Detroit to work for Ford thus increasing the density of the Muslim population in the city. Detroit's early Muslims were either from countries under Ottoman control, which had started to collapse or African Americans from the Deep South. The majority of the immigrants were from Bosnia, Albania, Greater Syria and Turkey (Anatolia). (BIID 2011).

By 1920's Ford Motor Company had more African American employees than any other automotive company. This caused the Muslim population in Dearborn to reach 16.000. (Ibid.). As a social necessity, Muslims opened their first mosque on Highland Park next to the Ford factory and attended their first prayer on June 9, 1921. The Highland Park mosque closed in 1923, but by the mid 1930's Muslims had their prayer spaces on Hastings Street. (Ibid.)

Image 1. First mosque in Dearborn.

Ford's production plants made Dearborn a center of attraction for American Muslims. However, it is not the sole reason of the high concentration of Muslims in

the region. The increase in concentration of Muslims is also related to the decline of the White population in the area after the1950's.

The industrial plants in Michigan were providing African Americans jobs but not housing. While the white residents were continuing to benefit from the economic opportunities and the quality of life, the conditions for African Americans were remaining poor. Police abuse had become an ordinary part of their lives. (Shay 2012).

Meanwhile, the compelling conditions of post-war economy were affecting other cities as well, in outbursts of intolerance. Race riots were erupting one after the other in Los Angeles, Mobile, Alabama and Beaumont, Texas. It was only a matter of time for Detroit to follow. (PBS 2012).

On July 23, 1967, police officers raided a drinking club where a large group of African Americans were celebrating the homecoming of two Vietnam veterans. After police arrested 82 people, a small group of onlookers who had been kicked out of the club broke the windows of a nearby clothing store. Looting and fires quickly spread across the city. Within 48 hours the National Guard had been mobilized followed by U.S. Army troops. (Shay 2012).

The riot lasted for five days. 43 people died, mostly African Americans shot by police and National Guardsmen. 1189 got injured and over 7000 people got arrested. (Listverse 2011). The incident not only accelerated the decline but also changed the demographics described as the White Flight. White residents of the region left their homes and settled in more racially homogeneous suburban communities. (Seitles 1996).

As a result of the White Flight, the White population in the region including Dearborn dropped from 90% to 10%'s. Today 41,7% of Dearborn's population is of Arab Ancestry and 10,9% of the population is composed of African American, Asian, Hispanic and other ethnicities. (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).



Graph 1. Population and White Population in Detroit Metropolitan Area.

The decline brought many socio-economic problems which led the region to bankruptcy in the long-term. Today, Detroit has an estimated debt about $18–20 billion. (Davey & Walsh 2013). The city has one of the highest rates of violent crime in the US affecting its surrounding. Majority of crime is drug related. (Fisher 2012, 2015). The region is full of empty lots and abandoned houses mostly burnt down. 500 fires are set down in the city each month, which is 10 times more than New York, for a city one tenth the size. (LeDuff 2010). Some 50.000 dogs are roaming in the streets and abandoned buildings, menacing humans. (Christoff 2013). As the municipality operations have practically stopped except emergency services, most of these problems are on standby. The City of Dearborn is implementing several internal programs to combat the effects of vacant, abandoned and sub-standard structures. (City of Dearborn 2011, 16). Additional to their radical experience of exclusion, discrimination, prejudice, violence and Islamophobia following 9/11, Muslims in Dearborn are being equally affected by the socio-economical struggles that takes hold of the region.

Today Dearborn is home to 32.000 Muslims. For Nancy Kaffer, it is a sedate suburb where people really care about school districts, property values and code enforcement. It is more prosaic than revolutionary. The most remarkable thing about the city is its unremarkability; for generations, bored teenagers have called it "Deadborn." (Kaffer 2015). The Muslims in the city constitute a little less than one third of the population and 0,5% of the entire Muslim population in the United States.

However, since 9/11 it is being portrayed otherwise; as a city dominated by Muslims. According to right wing critics, the entire city is subject to Sharia Law who warn that the rest of America might soon be too. (Denvir 2012). For them, Dearborn has a central role in a larger conspiracy theory as a no-go zone where non-Muslims aren't welcome and as a breeding ground for terrorists. (Clancy 2006; Jolly 2015). For this reason the city is stigmatized as "The Islamic Capital of United States", having become a must-visit location on 21st century America's newly established anti-Muslim protest circuit. The effects of this stigma in various forms of Islamophobia has become part of the daily experience of the community. (Denvir 2012).

Unlike the rest of the United States where the majority of the Muslim population is Sunni, the majority of Muslims in Dearborn are Shia Muslims. Islamic Center of America, the biggest mosque in the United States which was built in the city in 2005 is affiliated with Shia Islam. Unlike most places in the world, Shia and Sunni Muslims in the city have developed tolerance among societies and managed to act together as one community, again a demonstration of positive effects of power. (Borka 2012). In this regard, the city once an icon of bigotry in one of America's most segregated regions is now a beacon for diversity. (Denvir 2012).

3. UNINTENTIONAL POSITIVE EFFECTS OF POWER IN DEARBORN

3.1. Unintentional Positive Effects of Islamophobia in Dearborn

According to Said, although Islamophobia is a contemporary term, it is not a new term in such essence of receiving new information. It is not a new interpretation or judgement of Islam either. (Said 2003, 59). Islamophobia had always been present in the collective unconscious of the West in form of Orientalism but gained consciousness and elevated to a phobia rapidly after 9/11. Once started, this practice could not be stopped. 9/11 became a strong source of rather narcissistic Western ideas about Muslims in this series of repetitive incarnations in the United States. (Said 2003, 62).

But there was a missing link in this practice. "Where" exactly was this Orient that had incarnated? Not being an inert fact of nature the Orient was nowhere. The Orient which Said describes as the foundation of a heavyweight theoretic framework of ontological and epistemological distinctions was not merely there, just as the Occident itself was not just there either. (Said 2003, 21 - 22).

The trauma that 9/11 recalled made this perception impractical. The Orient had no longer the luxury to be nowhere. It had to be somewhere – somewhere close – thus it had to be found. As Giambattista Vico describes in his masterpiece Scienza Nuova, in describing unknown or distant things, in respect of which they either have not had the true idea themselves or wish to explain it to others who do not have it, men make use of the semblances of things known or near at hand. (Vico 1744, 254).

Fortunately, the Orient was found in a city very near at hand with a vast number of semblances, in Dearborn. Orient that had been nonexistent as a natural fact for many generations was no longer a fantasy. Dearborn had it all; a dense population of newly arrived Lebanese, Iraqi, Yemeni, and Palestinian immigrants. Authentic mosques that appeared well in both distance and close shots. An awkward looking crowd speaking an ancient language with each other. Women walking in the streets wearing headscarves. Antique looking stores selling Halal products. Arabic signs in front of stores. A society caught in confusion and conflict, unprepared for any kind of mainstream attention. It had all the décor, props and figurants to provoke how the magnitude and the proximity of the so called danger had been all along and this was all just in America's backyard. A created body of theory and practice in which, there had been a considerable material investment as Said asserts (Said 2003, 23), had found an opportunity to solidify these investments in a small industrial town at the Canadian border. These investments made Dearborn the legacy of a system of knowledge and an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient following 9/11 into the American culture. (Ibid.)

Foucault claims that in any state the relations of power cannot be established, consolidated nor implemented by themselves without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. (Foucault 1980, 93).

The most important discourse produced in this regard was the stigmatization of the city as the "Islamic Capital of the United States." This investment turned a city with no significant notion of primacy for Muslims in America into a center of attraction for radical anti-Muslim advocates. As Daniel Denvir describes in his

article “Dearborn: Where Americans Come to Hate Muslims”, the city became a must-visit location on the newly established anti-Muslim protest circuit. (Denvir 2012). Those Americans, each time they yelled “Go home! Do you understand English?”, brought their hate speech and Orientalist understanding of Islam and Muslim cultures.

Islamophobia in Dearborn feeds from this discourse and amplifies its effects into various forms of social anxiety towards the Arab residents of the city. It is a feeling, a type of anxiety disorder, a persistent fear of the Orient and its aspects in which the sufferer has committed to great lengths in avoiding, sociologically speaking for centuries long. In practice, what is experienced in Dearborn is not solely a fear of Islam. It is part of a wider fear of the Orient, its insinuating danger, its mysteriousness and the risk of its possible superiority over the Occident in terms of social, cultural, political, intellectual, moral and military power. (Said 2003, 66, 188 - 189).

Although it might seem the opposite due to its effects, Islamophobia in Dearborn is existentially more concerned with the Occident. As a matter of fact, it almost has no interest in Dearborn itself. Islamophobia is more likely an internal anxiety. It leans on personal concerns and agitations as a society and an unspoken self-dissatisfaction, self-displeasure, self-disapproval, that the West somewhat ignored the ancient-old warnings and allowed the East to challenge the rational Western mind to new exercises (Said 2003, 58). Dearborn in this context is the epitome of the conservative radical right-wing discourse shouting “look what you did!” to the rest of the United States.

But as Foucault points out, discourse is both a plenitude and endless wealth. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and

exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart. (Foucault 1978, 101). In Dearborn, every discourse invested to reinforce the anti-Muslim expression within the mainstream context also rendered itself fragile. Particularly, the stigmatization of the city as the Islamic Capital worked both ways. The discourse was so mainstream that it left no room for discussion or rejection. But this rigidity, undermining itself, also acted in means of transmitting and producing power which through the process turned Dearborn into an Islamic Capital for the Muslims in the city in real terms. Muslims in Dearborn, with no power to resist or reject being stigmatized, embraced their stigma and by time founded an entire identity upon the discourse produced to demolish them. Over this identity, each time the right-wing media exposed the presence of a no-go zone in America's backyard in support of terrorism, it not only reinforced Islamophobic anxieties but also the level of importance of the city for Muslims in Dearborn. Each time the media reporters explained their audience how "big" and "close" the danger was, they helped the Muslim community in Dearborn to become "bigger" and "closer".

This identity became solidified with the construction of America's biggest mosque, Islamic Center of America. In Muslim countries the biggest mosques are located in the capitals as an expression of the importance of the city and the demonstration of its power. Embracing the idea that Dearborn is their Capital, Muslims in Dearborn decided to build the biggest mosque in America in their city in 2004. When the 11.000 meter square building which included a school, a library and a conference center was finished the next year, not only it iconized Dearborn's Capital status for its residents, but also its $14 million budget exhibited how the community had gathered around an identity and gained power in the wake of 9/11. (Norris 2005).

In an interview prior the opening, Imam Hassan Qazwini, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of America summarized the mission of the mosque with the following words;

> I believe that the major challenge for Muslims in this country is the type of stereotype that we go through. We are always being singled out; we are always being stereotyped. And I believe that this is our task, our challenge as Muslims to go out and educate others about our religion. I believe the center itself, the new center, will give an excellent opportunity for the Muslims to reach out to others and ultimately give a more accurate image about the faith of Islam. (Norris 2005).

His words were a summary of the new level of identity and the new set of assignments that came with this identity on behalf of Muslims in Dearborn. Victims of stereotyping and Islamophobia, the members of the community were earning their courage to take more active roles to resist the effects of power.

The Runnymede Trust, an independent research and social policy agency established the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, identifies eight effects of power in Islamophobic context. Following 9/11 all of these effects and resisting to these effects became part of the daily experience of Muslims in Dearborn, the Islamic Capital of the United States. (The Runnymede Trust 1997).

3.1.1. Positive Effects of Monolithism

> *Monolithism: Dearborn seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities, ignoring its diverse community composed of different Shia and Sunni Muslims, overlooking its progressiveness with internal differences, debates and development.*

Following 9/11, Muslims in Dearborn started to become the subjects of verbal abuse. As seen in the example below one of the common attributes of these abuses is their intentional monolithism.

> Hey! Muslims! Sunni and Shiites alike. We were here before you were. Take your ugly women, children and your toys and go back to your sandbox. (Newhon63 2014).

However, unlike the impression invested following 9/11, Dearborn is not a monolithic community. Arab Americans in the city including Muslims are estimated to be about 1/3 of the population, around 32.000. (Dias 2013). Muslims compose less than half of the Arab Americans. In other words, despite the image which Dearborn is portrayed as a Muslim dominated city, Muslims are not a majority inside the population. In fact, they are not even a majority among Arabs.

In Dearborn, Christians compose 58% of the Arab population. Among Arab Christians 73% are Catholics, followed by 24% Orthodox and 3% Protestants. (Ewing 2008, 51). The Muslim population is around 13.000 composing only about 0,5% of the Muslims in the United States.

56% of Muslims in Dearborn are Shia Muslims while 35% are Sunni Muslims unlike the rest of the United States where Shia Muslims compose 8 – 10% of the population. At least 40% of Arab Americans in Dearborn are of Lebanese origin, indicating the highest concentration in the United States. (Ewing 2008, 51). They are followed by Palestinian / Jordanians (Palestinians from the east and west banks of River Jordan), Yemenis, Iraqis (predominantly Christian Chaldeans) and several smaller groups such as Egyptians, Kuwaitis, Moroccans and Jordanians. (Ibid.) From this perspective Dearborn could have been better described as, "The Arab Capital" or on a closer view the "Lebanese Capital" of the United States.

But all these facts are deliberately ignored in Dearborn. Victims of a very broad stereotypification and othering, individuals of the city including the Christian Arab majority are treated equal in terms of being labeled as potential terrorists or active supporters of certain terrorist groups. (Schlussel 2006a; Torriero 2006). Although they do not share the same nationality with the hijackers of the 9/11 attacks, they are treated as if they were their brothers, sisters or close relatives. The voices of the community leaders who share these facts are tuned out. (Denvir 2012).

Muslims in Dearborn resist monolithism with unity despite their differences and diversity as Shia and Sunni Muslims. In his first Friday speech at the opening ceremony of the Islamic Center of America, Imam Qazwini concentrated his sermon on unity among Muslims which he believed to be the first thing to be focused on. Secondly he emphasized how to continue building bridges with their non-Muslim brothers and sisters, especially that they live in this very diverse society here in the United States. (Norris 2005). Founded on this understanding, unity, diversity and building bridges became one of the central discourses in Dearborn.

The Capital has experienced a number of provocations since, to test the strength of its unity. In February 2007, in parallel to the escalating tensions between Shiites and Sunnis across the Middle East, vandals shattered windows at three mosques and a dozen businesses popular among Shiite Muslims along Warren Avenue. The incident appeared in the media as a widening split in Dearborn under Iraq's shadow. (MacFarquhar 2007). However, the provocation turned out inspiring positive effects, forcing Muslims in Dearborn to start a dialogue about their differences. (Ibid.) Dr. Adil Akhtar, chief of oncology at Troy Beaumont Hospital and president of the Pakistan American Association describes;

> There is [sic] definitely differences (between Shia and Sunni Muslims). But in my opinion, the differences are healthy because if there is discussion and difference of opinion it is healthy as long as it is used to have a positive impact in our lives." (Borka 2012).

Akhtar believes that despite the hate in some countries there is no hate among Shias and Sunnis in the community. According to him the single most important reason why they don't hate each other here is the tolerance for each other, explaining that people develop intolerance in societies where there is only one side of the story. (Borka 2012).

On May 10, 2007, only three months after the provocation, every Imam in Michigan signed an intra-faith code titled Muslim Code of Honor.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Council of Islamic Organizations of Michigan

Preamble

Reports of sectarian tension overseas, particularly in aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq, have prompted the Muslim American leadership to speak out against communal divisions and all sectarian violence. Such expressions of sectarianism, if unchecked, may add fuel to the fire, engulfing the Community in historical grievances that tragedy theological differences and minimize the common "Pillars of Faith" on which all Muslims agree, irrespective of their school of thought (*madhhab*).

As Muslim Americans who live and struggle for a dignified existence for Islam and Muslims in a spirit of peaceful coexistence and respect for all, we believe that the practical challenges of the future supersede the ideological differences of the past. Moreover, in recognition of our communal duty to promote goodness and peace, we remain eager to offer any help we can and to join hands with all those who wish well for the Family of Believers (*Ummah*) in stopping the senseless, inhumane violence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world.

In our view, we must begin by preventing such tragic sectarianism from spilling over into our Muslim communities in the United States. As a first step toward this goal, we agree to live in peace and respect each other in accordance with a 'Muslim Code of Honor.' We remain committed to this Muslim Code of Honor not only during times of agreement and ease but, more importantly, when faced with contentious issues and in times of mutual disagreement.

Muslim Code of Honor

- No group or individual should use, spread or tolerate the rhetoric of *takfir* (branding others nonbelievers) against anyone who believes in the oneness and supremacy of God, the prophethood of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd Allah, peace be upon him, at the last of God's messengers, and in the reality of the Last Day, agreeing on the authenticity of the Holy Qur'an and facing Mecca (*qibla*) in daily prayers.
- Muslims should respect one another and the people, places and events that any Muslim group or individual holds in esteem, even when they disagree about the relative importance of such people and events. Such disagreements, moreover, should only be expressed in a respectful manner, avoiding inflammatory language and insulting verbiage.
- As to differences in the performance of worship (*'ibadat*), we agree to respect the rules in effect and the authority of the leadership that endorses them in the particular mosque or religious institution where they are the norm.
- We agree that steps should be taken to protect the general Muslim population in America from the distribution of divisive, inflammatory or irrelevant literature, primarily from overseas, in order to maintain the integrity and protect the future of Islam in America and curb the spread of harmful and misleading propaganda.
- We support the establishment of objective, scholarly study groups (*halaqat*) to examine Muslim history, creed and law, in an effort to increase our knowledge and understanding of one another and to aid in mutual reconciliation. In the event, however, that problems should arise in this regard, a joint body of Muslim scholars from both Shia and Sunni traditions should be consulted in order to prevent schism.
- Finally, we encourage all Muslims in the United States to work to emphasize their commonality, in accordance with God's statement:

  "And hold fast, all together, to the rope of God, and be not divided among yourselves. And remember with gratitude God's favor upon you, when you were enemies and He joined your hearts in love. Thus by His grace you became brethren. And you were on the brink of the Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth God make His Signs clear to you, that you may be guided. So let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. They are the ones to attain felicity. And be not like those who are divided amongst themselves and fall into disputations after receiving clear signs. For them is a dreadful penalty." (3:103-05)

We, the undersigned, on 10 May, 2007 (22 Rabi'II, 1428), endorse the contents of this Code of Honor and commit ourselves to upholding it. We encourage, moreover, all Muslims to honor the terms set forth herein to the best of their ability. We ask God the Exalted to aid us in this and all our efforts to conduct ourselves in a manner that is most pleasing to Him (*in alphabetical order*).

Image 2. Muslim Code of Honor signed on May 10, 2007.

The code requires all groups of Shia and Sunni Muslims to respect each other's beliefs and take steps to protect Muslims from inflammatory literature, being an exceptional example among the entire Muslim World. Among the leading signatories include the Michigan chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-MI), the Detroit chapter of the Muslim American Society (MAS-Detroit), the Islamic Center of America and the Islamic House of Wisdom. (MPAC 2007; Islamic Organization of North America 2007). Muslims in Dearborn have not encountered any splits since.

At the press conference held on The Code of Honor in Ann Arbor Trail, Dearborn Heights, the Council of Islamic Organizations of Michigan made the following statement;

> As Muslim Americans who live and struggle for a dignified existence for Islam and Muslims in a spirit of peaceful coexistence and respect for all, we believe that the practical challenges of the future supersede the ideological differences of the past. In recognition of our communal duty to promote goodness and peace, we remain eager to offer any help we can and to join hands with all those who wish well for the Family of Believers (ummah) in stopping the senseless, inhumane violence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world.
>
> In our view, we must begin by preventing such tragic sectarianism from spilling over into our Muslim communities in the United States. As a first step toward this goal, we agree to live in peace and respect each other in accordance with a 'Muslim Code of Honor.' We remain committed to this Muslim Code of Honor not only during times of

> agreement and ease but, more importantly, when faced with contentious issues and in times of mutual disagreement. (MPAC 2007).

According to Imam Achmat Salie, one of the signatories of the code from the Sterling Heights' American Muslim Diversity Association, differences are normal and a non-issue. Faiz Ahmed from Oakland University explains why, exposing another positive effect of power even in its most radical form.

> When you come to realize that there is a bigger problem than petty differences, people tend to assimilate into groups and work together. (Borka 2012).

3.1.2. Positive Effects of Separation

Separation: Muslims in Dearborn seen as separate and other.

On September 20, 2001, four days after 9/11, George W. Bush spoke to the people of America in his Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People. As the President of United States and the Spokesperson of the American Government, he declared on behalf of the government and Americans that now everyone had a decision to make with his words "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." (Bush 2001, 1).

According to Katherine Pratt Ewing, people in Dearborn were quite sure that this final emphasis was targeting their community. In Being and Belonging, Ewing narrates that when President George W. Bush uttered his famous challenge to the

people of America, many in Michigan felt that the statement targeted their community quite specifically. The words initially triggered a binary operation on an ethnic level. Were local "Arabs" with the Americans, or with the terrorists? (Ewing 2008, 48).

Ewing describes how county, state and municipal officials, business leaders and clergy rushed in to assure Arab Americans that their loyalty was not in doubt and that discrimination against local Arabs and Muslims would not be tolerated. (Ibid.) The Arab community donned protective American flags and held large services. They organized and participated in memorial events like Peace and Unity Candlelight Vigil at Greenfield Village in Dearborn. (Wood 2011). The participants issued strongly worded condemnations of the attacks and the motivations behind them. Ewing reports that although thousands of suddenly vulnerable Arabs suffered insults or abuse at the hands of their fellow citizens, thousands more received gestures of goodwill and support from their non-Arab neighbors. (Ewing 2008, 48).

Image 3. Members of Arab community participate in Peace and Unity Candlelight Vigil at Greenfield Village in Dearborn, MI, September 19, 2001. Photo by Jeff Kowalskys, AFP/Getty Image.

However, these local experiences of protection and solidarity contrasted sharply with events transpiring on the national stage, where the President's speech appeared to elicit a different response, where the USA PATRIOT Act was swiftly passed by Congress and where Arab and Muslim Americans, as well as those who resembled them, suddenly found themselves humiliated on airplanes, detained and

deported without legal counsel and subjected to unprecedented surveillance and governmental scrutiny. (Ewing 2008, 48). Ewing believes that it appeared that the federal government had a less certain and certainly less affirmative answer to the President's challenge than the community leaders did. (Ibid.) Until today, despite the efforts to prove otherwise, the public image of Dearborn as separate and other has hardly changed.

A second level of binary separation that was triggered with George Bush's words operated on a religious level leading to a supposedly distinction among good Muslims and bad Muslims. In his book Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, Mahmood Mamdani decodes this operation. According to him, the central message of the government response was that unless proved to be "good," every Muslim was presumed to be "bad". (Mamdani 2005, 15).

> Listening to the public discussion in America after 9/11, I had the impression of a great power struck by amnesia. Acknowledging the epochal significance of the event should not necessarily mean taking it out of a historical and political context. Unfortunately, official America has encouraged precisely this. After an unguarded reference to pursuing a 'crusade,' President Bush moved to distinguish between 'good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims.' From this point of view, 'bad Muslims' were clearly responsible for terrorism. At the same time, the president seemed to assure Americans that 'good Muslims' were anxious to clear their names and consciences of this horrible crime and would undoubtedly support 'us' in a war against 'them.' But this could not hide the central message of such discourse: unless proved to be 'good,' every Muslim was presumed to be 'bad.' All Muslims were

> now under obligation to prove their credentials by joining in a war against 'bad Muslims' judgments of 'good' and 'bad' refer to Muslim political identities, not to cultural or religious ones.
> (Mamdani 2005, 15).

As much as the public discussions sought to resolve a separation among Muslims, the truth is; there are no readily available good Muslims split off from bad Muslims. (Mamdani 2005, 15 - 16). There is no such distinction which would allow for the embrace of the former and the casting off of the latter, just as there are no good Christians or Jews split off from bad ones. According to Mamdani, the presumption that there are such categories masks a refusal to address the failure to read the ideological codes of contemporary times. (Mamdani 2005, 16).

But this failure gained persistency and continuity in Dearborn. The Muslims in the city "had failed to prove" that they were good Muslims. They hadn't demolished their terrorist breeding mosques. They hadn't delivered the authorities the list of terrorists that were hiding in the city. They hadn't closed their business operations that were financially supporting terrorist organizations. They hadn't even abided by their own faith. By supporting those who committed evil in the name of Allah they had blasphemed the name of Allah, becoming traitors to the good and peaceful teachings of their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. (Bush 2001, 1). As a result, the entire city became categorized with a number of adjectives ranging from "bad" to "evil" and beyond, separated as a No-Go Zone which terrorist groups came to do their laundry (Clancy 2006) and othered as an un-American land taken over by the Muslims where even the SWAT teams don't have access. (Jolly 2015).

The official website of the Tea Party, a formal political movement known for its conservative positions and its role in the Republican Party, describes Dearborn in an article titled Arab Street Signs in Michigan Show Muslim Takeover with the following lines, written in 2015, 14 years after 9/11.

> How would you feel if you drove into a town here in the United States and found that many of the street signs were in Arabic only with no English wording? Then you look around and discover that many of the signs on businesses were also in Arabic. Not possible you say? Think again! Welcome to Dearborn, Michigan. (Tea Party 2015).

Sharing the impressions of author and speaker Steve Tarani during a ride with a member of the Detroit Metro SWAT Police as they drove around Detroit and into Dearborn, the article continues.

> The street signs suddenly went from English to Arabic. There wasn't a single English word on any shop or any street sign. And in fact, these little yellow signs were posted all along the edges. Jeremy said to me, 'this is it. We don't go past this line.' And I said to Jeremy, 'what do you mean? You guys are Detroit Metro. You're the SWAT team. You can go anywhere you want. What if you get a call over there?' He said 'this is it, it's hazardous for our team if we go past this line.'
>
> I have seen it with my own eyes, witnessed it in the backseat of a car and it is for real. No-go zones exist in the United States. Dearborn, Michigan is not the only place that these settlements exist. They are spread out over the country in various cities. There's an estimate of

> over 5,000 known terrorist cells in the United States. However our most persistent and significant threat, right now, to us here today this morning, is the homegrown violent extremists. (Tea Party 2015).

The article narrates Dearborn as if it were a separate settlement where even the police force has no access and a potential terrorist cell, accusing that any group of Muslims in the city is essentially a terrorist. Below the article, there exists a moderated comment section. Here are a few of these comments moderated by the Tea Party.

"I understood that Sharia Law was voted down in Dearborn MI. And if Muslim's have taken any part of Dearborn MI over. Dearborn Michigan will very soon be taken back into American Territory. Time to get the Pork Wagon out. God Bless America." (Mark R Huss, Retired).

"Cut off water - electricity - and every other essential from them and starve the basturds [sic] out." (Bill Messacar).

"Sounds like a good idea to me! God bless America!" (Dianna Zerbe, Fort Cobb High School).

"We need to send in the army kill and deport this trash. This is America! Bob Nelson." (Gina Miranda, MLQ University).

"You can thank the brainless people who voted the Muslim in chief into office twice. Now he's brining even more of these useless un-American Islamic things into our country. There will be war on American soil soon if this is allowed to continue." (Rob Premo).

"Sharia Law is used extensively in Muzzrat communities like Dearbornistan! They have their own 'courts', they don't even bother contacting anyone outside of

their evil religion. They operate entirely outside of our laws, with the total consent of the satan worshiping citizenry!" (Darren Thornton, MGCCC).

"Michigan the Motor State, I thought you had some guts but apparently not if you let these Muslims take over one of your towns!" (Debbie Bartlett, Central High School, Carrollton, GA).

"This will be a relatively easy civil war; look for Bagdad and all black Muslims; easy targets." (David Peacock, Owner-Operator at River Rat builders Inc).

"… how about a small Nuke and be rid of the whole damn area." (John Maybrier, Consultant: Workover Drilling Completion Control Cementing at Maybrier Well Service).

"If I didn't know any better I'd say there is another Holy war about to happen in our own back yard." (Timothy Murray, Freelancer).

"Muslims… Get the hell out of our country… Go back to your sand castles!!!" (Marlon Zmuda).

"You must be 'F***n' me! Why isn't ALL the Muslims dead & Dearborn burned to the ground?" (Anderson Marshall, Retired).

(Tea Party 2015).

While the comments are clearly Islamophobic and fear mongering, they are sufficient to expose the effects of separation and othering that Muslims experience in Dearborn while they try to integrate into the society. Thus, as if it is a self-fulfilling prophecy, the separation is mostly executed by the same society that accuses Muslims of not wanting to integrate who fuel Islamophobia instead.

Separation in Dearborn forced Muslims to resist with better integration into the society. Soon, the Islamic Capital of the United States became an exceptional

case having established its local institutions, various social and educational services and its own media channels. (Ewing 2008, 6). Major Muslim organizations in the United States started to open chapters in the city one after the other. Muslim student associations took particularly active roles in integration holding regular events on a weekly basis. Some of these organizations are listed below.

a. CAIR Michigan, Council on American-Islamic Relations:

   CAIR promotes Islamic perspectives to the American public, and social and political activism among Muslims in America. (ADC 2014). CAIR Michigan has filed lawsuits against CBP and FBI over the repeated detention of Muslims in Dearborn at and inside the US - Canada border. (U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 2013).

b. ADC Michigan, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee:

   ADC is the nation's largest Arab-American grassroots organization dedicated to protect the civil rights of Arab-Americans and promote their rich cultural heritage. The ADC-Michigan is the largest and most active office outside of Washington D.C. (ADC 2014).

c. Muslim Students Association:

   Muslim Students Association (MSA) is a non-profit, student based membership organization established in Dearborn to promote understanding and cooperation between members of the Muslim and non-Muslim communities on college campuses. (MSA 2015).

d. MMCC, Michigan Muslim Community Council:

   MMCC aims to build wider community relations and respond to various needs of the Muslim community as a result of growing concerns about media portrayal of Muslims after 9/11. (MMCC 2015).

e. ICA, Islamic Cultural Association:

   ICA aims to develop and maintain positive relations between its members and other local Muslim communities, as well as regional and national organizations. (ICA 2014).

f. IAU, Islamic American University:

   IAU is a non-profit organization that aims to educate Muslims and attract both Muslims and non-Muslims to pursue Islamic studies. Although not been accredited by Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), IAU provides associate, bachelor and master degrees in Islamic studies. (IAU 2015).

3.1.3. Inferiority

Inferiority: Dearborn seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist.

During his address on September 20, 2001, George W. Bush asked a rhetorical question on behalf of Americans as the spokesperson of The American

Government; “Americans are asking, why do they hate us?” (Bush 2001, 1). Bush answered this question with the following words;

> They hate what we see right here in this chamber, a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms. Our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. (Bush 2001, 1).

Later in his speech, Bush stated that he was going to use every resource and every necessary weapon of war to fight this hate. Elevating his call to a global and civilizational level, Bush declared that this was not just America’s fight. What was at stake was not just America’s freedom. This was the world’s fight. This was civilization’s fight. This was the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. (Bush 2001, 1).

Long before Bush, neo-conservatism in American foreign policy had begun to take shape in the 1970’s as an anti-Stalinist ideology. During the 1980’s, neo-conservatism heavily manipulated the foreign policies of the Reagan administration. (Goldberg 2003).

The core policy of neo-conservatism depended on the absolute connection between a democratic regime and heightened security for the United States. (Ibid.) From its earliest days, Americans have supported the promotion of democracy around the world, arguing that it was their mission to lead the way to the universal restoration of power to the governed and their duty to share liberty, this most precious gift, with the rest of mankind often by force and without undue heed to

international institutions. America's forcible promotion became successful in Germany and Japan and unsuccessful in Vietnam. (Goldberg 2003).

Nourished from a neo-conservative ideology, the main agenda of George W. Bush's speech was to announce a declaration of a new war against a new threat to democracy, in the name of Americans and all who believe in America's values. His speech was a declaration of war between civilizations, between enemies who hate democratically elected governments, freedoms and all those who expose a threat to their way of life and allies who lay claim to these values. (Rubin 2011, 96).

To be able to interpret the codes behind a war among civilizations, it is necessary to remember Samuel P. Huntington's hypothesis on The Clash of Civilizations. According to Huntington, the fundamental source of conflict in the new world will not be primarily ideological or economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. (Huntington 1993, 22). Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. As the clash of civilizations start to dominate global politics, the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (Ibid.)

Huntington describes ideology as an Iron Curtain and culture as a Velvet Curtain. According to Huntington, following the end of the Cold War, The Velvet Curtain of culture replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. International politics moved out of its Western phase and its center piece became the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations. (Huntington 1993, 22 - 23).

From this perspective George W. Bush's speech is a requiem for the Clash of Civilizations. With his words "this is not, however, just America's fight. This is the

world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom", (Bush 2001, 1) Bush opens the veils of the Velvet Curtain. Following this speech, in every speech that Bush was going to claim that there was currently no clash of civilizations, he was going to conclude his speech with the need for a Civilized World and the necessity of a union against Rogue Civilizations. Every time he took a neutral position for Muslim cultures and beliefs, he was going to force Muslims to decide between two options; whether they want to be part of the civilized world or get stuck with the uncivilized. (Bush 2004a; 2004b)

However, according to Edward Said, it is not the clash of civilizations but the clash of ignorance that is the fundamental cause of conflict. (Said 2001, 11 – 14). The irresponsible use of labels "the West" and "Islam" has produced a climate of ignorance between the so-called West and Islam. (Said 2001, 12). Said discloses that reformulating the cold war opposition, the basic paradigm of West versus the rest remained untouched and this is what has persisted, often insidiously and implicitly, in discussion since 9/11. (Ibid.) Instead of seeing it for what it is, the capture of big ideas by a tiny band of crazed fanatics for criminal purposes, international luminaries have pontificated about Islam's troubles, and in the latter's case have used Huntington's ideas to rant on about the West's superiority, how we have Mozart and Michelangelo and they don't. (Ibid.) Uncountable are the editorials in every American and European newspaper and magazine of note adding to this vocabulary of gigantism and apocalypse, each use of which is plainly designed not to edify but to inflame the reader's indignant passion as a member of the West and what is needed to be done. (Said 2001, 13). According to Said, the problem with unedifying labels like the West and Islam is that they mislead and confuse the mind, which is

trying to make sense of a disorderly reality that won't be pigeonholed or strapped down as easily as all that. (Ibid.)

Following 9/11, Dearborn became the homeland of this clash of ignorance amplified to a phobic level. Ignoring the differences between cultures, every social aspect in the city, became interpreted through an Orientalist understanding and superior attitude to allege Dearborn as an inferior to the West; barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist.

The Tea Party movement believes that Muslim influence in Dearborn is so strong that the high schools hold "girls only proms" because Muslim girls are not allowed to socialize or dance with boys. (Tea Party 2015). According to them, as a violation of church and state, these proms are based on religious values. Comparing Islam in the United States to Islam in England, the movement believes that Islam is a cancer that continues to spread and contaminate everything it encounters. (Ibid.) According to Tea Party, in time, Islam in Dearborn will spread to the point that the country dies from it and becomes the home of a religion that teaches hate, bloodshed and Sharia law. Like a cancer, the only way to save the nation is to stop the spread of the religion of terrorism. In their modern and sophisticated world full of freedoms and rights, it's impossible to stop the spread of Islam without igniting a worldwide religious war. (Ibid.) Certain residents of the region such as Debbie Schlussel, who have devoted themselves to provide 7/24 surveillance from the city, are broadcasters of a similar ignorance about Dearborn over the social media. (Schlussel 2006b).

3.1.4. Positive Effects of Inferiority and Manipulation

Manipulation: Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage rather than a genuine religious faith, practiced sincerely by Muslims in Dearborn.

When America announced "War Against Terror", it gave start nevertheless to a military action, a tactical operation and a martial combat. Attributing holiness to its cause, the justification of this war was elevated to a divine level, grounding on the declaration of a Holy Crusade. America had championed a sacred cause; freedom against fear, justice against cruelty, truth against lie and good against evil. (Bush 2001, 1). The 1.300 year old conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations was reviving. (Huntington 1993, 31).

After Islam, the Arabic and Moorish surge towards the West and North ended at Tours, France, in 732. Until then the Islamic Caliphate had dominated Northern Africa and had spread to Portugal and Spain over the Gibraltar Bay. The Battle of Tours brought this expansion to an end. (Huntington 1993, 31).

In 1095 Pope Urban II proclaimed the first crusade to restore the Christian access to the holy grounds in and near Jerusalem. From the 11th to the 13th century the Crusaders achieved temporary success to bring Christian rule to the Holy Lands. However, from the 14th to the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire reversed this balance. (Huntington 1993, 30 -31). In 1453 Fatih Sultan Mehmet captured Constantinople and brought the Byzantine Empire to an end. The borders of the Empire covered the entire Middle East and the Balkans, and reached Vienna. As the Ottoman Empire started to lose its power in the 19th century, Britain, France and Italy

started to establish Western dominance over most of North Africa and the Middle East. (Huntington 1993, 30 - 31).

Following World War II, Western dominance started to vanish. First, the colonial empires disappeared. Arab nationalist and Islamic movements became more prominent. As the West became more dependent on the Middle Eastern oil, oil producing Muslim countries became rich and stronger. (Huntington 1993, 32). The West reacted to balance this change by military means. France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria in 1950. British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956. American forces went into Lebanon in 1958 and have deployed a permanent existence in the region since, including active military presence in Libya and The Gulf War. (Huntington 1993, 31).

Roughly 5 years before the War on Terror, Samuel P. Huntington, warned that the relations could become even more virulent. (Huntington 1993, 31 - 32). Huntington noticed that The Gulf War had left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, its overwhelming military dominance and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. (Huntington 1993, 32). Many Arab countries – in addition to the oil exporters – had reached levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government became inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy became stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems had already occurred. Islamist movements had become the principal beneficiaries of these openings. Shortly, in the Arab world, Western democracy had strengthened anti-Western political forces. Huntington had seen that the relations between Islamic countries and the West were about to get complicated. (Ibid.)

As if it was assembled to realize his predictions the “War Against Terror” walked exactly on Huntington’s footsteps. Exactly like Huntington had envisioned, its championship was inter-civilizational. (Huntington 1993, 22 - 49). It was a war between the civilized worlds against the uncivilized and had rehearsed the never ending battle among civilizations and religions. Its championship was interregional. The lines of the battlefield was addressed as the West against the Middle East and the vast regions of Asia and Africa (Bush 2001, 1). Its championship was interreligious. The Christian and Jewish faith was standing against the teachings of Islam. (Bush 2001, 1). It was a declaration which any Muslim would interpret not as a war against terror, but against their own land, their own civilization and most importantly their own religion; Islam.

Even back in 2004, 2 Muslims out of 3 believed that the American government was at war with the religion of Islam. Only one in four was considering the U.S. war on terrorism a sincere attempt to curtail international terror. (Pew Research Center 2007, 5). In no longer than six years, the ratio among American Muslims who believed that U.S. was fighting a war against terror had dropped from 67% to 26% and the ratio who believed that U.S. was fighting a war against Islam rose from 18% to 55%. Correspondingly, the support for U.S. military actions in Afghanistan dropped from 52% to 35% and the support for actions in Iraq never rose over 13%. (Pew Research Center 2007, 50).

Dr. Pavez Ahmed is one of those Muslims. According to him the Global War on Terror became a thinly veiled excuse to wage a global war on Islam with increased arrests of Muslims, calls for regime change in Muslim countries and racial profiling.

> The tactic of terrorism - and yes it is a tactic, not an ideology - has been deployed by a multitude of groups of different religions, ethnicities and ideologies and yet the Islamic faith, unlike any other, is erroneously and incessantly associated with terrorism. The association of a faith practiced by 1.2 billion people worldwide to terrorism creates the perception that the Global War on Terror is a war against Islam. (Muhammad 2008).

Steven Kull, the director of University of Maryland Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), is another. According to Kull, while U.S. leaders may frame the conflict as a war on terrorism, people in the Islamic world clearly perceive the U.S. as being at war with Islam. He narrates the psychology of Muslim civilization with the words; "there's a feeling of being under siege." (Kull 2007b, 4).

According to Edward Said, the bombing that started in Iraq following 9/11 was a fateful moment because of its deeply unpopular and reckless war that a small group within the American administration decided to wage against Iraq and in a way, against the whole Arab world. (Elbendary 2003). At a roundtable organized by the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly, Said shared his thoughts that although he didn't have any proof in the classical sense of the word, he believed that America wanted to change the entire Middle East and the Arab world, perhaps terminate some countries, destroy the so called terrorist groups they dislike and install regimes friendly to the United States. (Ibid.) But for him, this was a dream that had very little basis in reality. Referring to Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami mainly, Said remarked that the knowledge Bush administration had about the Middle East was, to say the

least, out of date and widely speculative, judging from the people who advise them. (Elbendary 2003).

This remark is equally valid for the Muslim community in Dearborn. The knowledge Americans have about Dearborn is to say the least out of date and widely speculative, judging from the media who inform them. It is the repetition of the same conservative and defensive interpretation. (Said 2003, 67). Islam's novelty and suggestiveness as a threat is handled and brought under control in similar terms as in the past. Therefore, Dearborn vacillates between the West's contempt for what is familiar and its fear of novelty. (Said 2003, 68).

According to Said, where Islam was concerned, European fear, if not always in respect was in order. As the military and later the cultural and religious hegemony of Islam grew enormously, Europe could respond with very little except fear and a kind of awe to this extraordinary assault. (Said 2003, 68). What Christians typically felt about the Muslim armies lies in the texts of Erchembert, a cleric in Monte Cassino in the eleventh century; "all the appearance of a swarm of bees, but with a heavy hand, they devastated everything." Not for nothing did Islam come to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians. (Ibid.)

After 9/11, Dearborn symbolized nothing but the same terror, devastation and the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians for Islamophobic Americans. (Said 2003, 68). For them never again was Islam seen a religious faith, practiced sincerely by Muslims in Dearborn but an inferior political ideology, used in service in the invasion of Christianity and the United States. Incidents like the Boston Marathon bombings, the Charlie Hebdo attack and ISIS's video footages constantly contributed to the manipulation and inferiority against Muslims. For instance, in November 2015, the Dearborn police investigated a threat by a Michigan woman who wrote on

Twitter: “Dearborn, MI has the highest Muslim population in the United States. Let’s f*** that place up and send a message to ISIS.” (Weaver 2015).

But when ISIS claimed the responsibility for the San Bernardino shootings where 14 people were killed and 21 wounded on December 2, 2015, (Karimi, Hanna & Basil 2015) the discourse turned to outrage. Controversy clung when Donald Trump, 2016 Republican Presidential Candidate, called to temporarily ban Muslims from entering the United States. Trump contributed his own controversy with his comments on Syrian refugee crisis, declaring that he will kick all Syrian refugees out of the country regardless of their religion and allow no more to enter. (J. Johnson 2015). “If I win, they’re going back. They’re going back. We can’t have them”, Trump said. (Ibid.)

Apprehending the support for Trump’s stance on social media and far-right news sites, two sheriff’s trucks were deployed outside the Islamic Center of America additional to increased security measures. (Weaver 2015). “We have a school here next door. Obviously parents are worried for their children. We have to take precautions” Kassem Allie, head of the Islamic Center of America explained. (Ibid.)

Saeed Khan, a Middle East history professor at Michigan’s Wayne State University, shares how the son of one of his friends now gets bullied at school. Other kids chant “Trump for president” and “Allahu Akbar” as he walks down the halls. “Every single day there is a new post about a new hate crime,” Rashida Tlaib, the first Muslim American woman to be elected to the Michigan House of Representatives complains. (Weaver 2015).

Some Dearborn residents believe Trump’s comments will end his chances for the Republican nomination, noting that most GOP leaders have denounced his remarks. But they say the repercussions could go much further. (Ibid.) “What worries

me is not Trump. What worries me are the people cheering for him" says Osama Siblani, publisher of the Arab American News in Dearborn. "The base is there and it's not going away." (Weaver 2015).

Muslims in Dearborn are trying to resist the extremely radical effects of perceived inferiority and manipulation with pride. A crowd of Muslims and supporters withstood in front of the Islamic Center of America on December 19 to celebrate their religion and their American citizenship while denouncing terrorism and hatred directed at their community. Explaining the purpose of the gathering was to rally people and remind them to be proud of who they are, "very simply, we will not bow to hate," Dr. Ali Dabaja, one of the organizers said to the crowd. (Schaefer 2015). Dabaja continued his speech with the following words;

> We will not be defined by fear and we will not be subject to savage speech that separates the heart of our community and the community of Americans, that causes us to be suspicious of one another and our neighbors. Hate and fear only cause our collective resolve to be weak. And today we come together as an Islamic faith with our partners across ethnic and racial lines. (Schaefer 2015).

Dearborn Mayor Jack O'Reilly Jr. also spoke at the event, saying he has lived with Muslims in the community his whole life, with nothing but positive experiences. (Ibid.) O'Reilly believes simplistic solutions to a complex problem is not worth spending any time and energy on;

> We need to be having real dialogue. That's what we're doing in Dearborn: We're talking about how we can discover people who are being radicalized if it's happening and how we can get support from

> all communities in order to identify these people and try to intervene, try to deal with it ahead of time. That's the task. (Hicks 2015).

Another group of Muslims and supporters including Brian Stone, 2016 Democratic candidate for Michigan State Representative, gathered outside the Dearborn Centennial Library to respond to a recent resolution introduced to the Michigan State Senate. (Thibodeau 2015). The resolution introduced pauses the relocation of Syrian refugees into the state of Michigan until the Legislature affirms by resolution of their resettlement, to prioritize the safety and wellbeing of Michiganders. Calling the resolution anti-immigration, the group decried the resolution comparing it to Trump's recent stance on immigration. They expressed their pride as a community despite his rhetoric. (Ibid.) Michigan accepts about 4,000 Syrian refugees a year. (Ibid.)

Although they are continuously experiencing the radical effects of power, it is a common view among Muslims in Dearborn that controversies like Trump's Muslim-ban proposal is also causing positive effects, strengthening the bonds that hold the community together to start with.


Detroit Free Press

FREE PRESS EDITORIAL

WE STAND TOGETHER

Vile bigotry against Muslims is an assault on our freedom, our community and the diverse fabric that makes up Michigan

Image 4. Detroit Free Press cover on December 9, 2015.

Kassem Allie, shares that the mosque has garnered unprecedented support since the proposal. "The silent majority is starting to speak out against the hatred", he says. (Harb 2015).

Allie was surprised when a white, middle-aged veteran from The First Gulf War wearing American-flag cowboy boots entered the mosque for the first time. A

Texan who dislikes Hillary Clinton and worries that Barack Obama might impose martial law to extend his presidency, Sean Green, had been driving by when he decided to offer his support because Donald Trump's comments about barring Muslims from the U.S. had repelled him so much. Green added that the next time the mosque held a peace rally, he wanted to be there to show his support. Explaining his experience as a blessing, Allie notes that numerous people and religious groups had offered support to the Muslim community. (Weaver 2015).

Najah Bazzy, founder and executive director of the humanitarian nonprofit Zaman International in Dearborn and Inkster approves Allie's opinions;

> I'm happy people are speaking out, because it shows the values we were founded on are still there. (Hicks 2015).

Fatimah Farooq, 23, insists to resist to the effects caused by Trump. "To be completely honest, I think he's an idiot," Farooq says, adding that Trump's rhetoric is divisive and dangerous. "If you give into it, if you're getting upset over what he's saying, you're giving into what he wants. We have dreams and expectations and I'm definitely not going to let this rhetoric or anything Trump says stop me from reaching that." (Stafford 2015).

Shaffwan Ahmed, 26, makes a more proactive interpretation of Trump's words; "it's sad, it's disheartening, but at the same time, it shows us how much more work we have left to do. It speaks volumes about how racism and prejudice hasn't gone away." (Ibid.)

Khadije Alaouie, a soccer coach and mother of four, narrates the positive experiences she has personally encountered following Trump's statements. While waiting on an oil change in Dearborn Heights, Alaouie overheard a woman

discussing Trump's position and how that encouraged her to vote for him. Alaouie turned this occasion into an opportunity by asking to talk to the woman about her concerns. "By the end of the conversation, she was so grateful," Alaouie explains. (Hicks 2015).

Calling it "a blessing in disguise for Muslims", (Face The Nation 2015) one of the interviewees invited by host Frank Luntz to CBS shares his opinions about the positive outcomes caused by the effects of Trump's words, confirming Foucault assertions.

> That's why we're here, Frank. I would not be sitting here right now if this wasn't happening. A lot of our voices would not be out – out here because of him. We are now in the public spotlight. Let's use this to talk about who we really are, all right, let's use this to be like, "Hey, America, we're Americans. Don't fear us, okay. Fear your crazy politicians who are trying to buy your votes." And I think this gives us a great chance, you know. (Face The Nation 2015).

3.1.5. Positive Effects of Enmity

> *Enmity: Dearborn seen as an evil, violent and threatening city ruled by Sharia Law, supportive of terrorism, engaged in the invasion of Christianity and the United States.*

Following 9/11 various forms of "evil" became part of the mainstream discourse. One example of these forms of evil was pictured in demonic images that circulated in the social media. Among these, the illustration of the "smoke demon"

that rose from the dust cloud from the Twin Towers, a pareidolic anthropomorphic religious figure became particularly famous. The figure was interpreted as a primordial warning from God and a deity itself that had silenced the nation. (Gunn 2004, 3).

The other form of evil, which became more dominant as a discourse was personified in the body of the "terrorist" and its resembling within multiple levels of meanings. In these levels of meanings, the terrorists' intents and motives were interpreted as "evil," reducing human action to inhuman motion and thereby dehumanizing the racial / religious other as monsters controlled by a malevolent force. (Ibid.) Unfortunately, this othering was only going to lead to a massive stereotyping and alienation of the fictional evil that was going to hold base in Dearborn against anyone who resembles a terrorist racially or religiously. More unfortunate, the malevolent force behind this religious other will be presumed to be Islam, making it impossible to separate the War Against Terror from the War Against Islam, leading to a cultural conflict among civilizations.

By personifying evil in the body of the terrorists, the term "terrorist" became a cultural signifier where both its creation and destruction was a deeply penetrated narrative form in American popular culture. This narrative was a unique American pedagogy of fear that justified otherwise unacceptable violence by de-humanizing and demonizing the other. (Gunn 2004, 4). This justification was going to provide a legitimate basis for the unacceptable treatment (Ibid.) in Guantanamo, the legitimacy of using waterboarding as a torture technique, countless scandals and crimes against Muslims and humanity as well as the protests that exceeded the boundaries of freedom of speech in Dearborn.

Declaring something or someone as evil or possessed by evil is part of the American political fantasy that establishes or prioritizes certain beliefs, attitudes and values in relation to some governing norm and through the destruction of the "abnormal" (Ingebretsen 2001, 3). The Salem Witch Trials and Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign maybe the best known examples of this fantasy. During the cold war, although an orientalist stereotype of the Arab had been present, the "evil" narrative was hovering around a Communist Witch Hunt. (Gunn 2004, 4). Following 9/11 the Muslim portrait in Dearborn became the primary evil domestic non-hero engaged in the invasion of Christianity and America.

The iterations of religious transformation against evil are exorcism and conversion. (Ibid.) Following 9/11, Muslims in Dearborn experienced both iterations. As it was declared in Mathew 12:30; "whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters", this was a binary operation in social practice. Extremist Christians wasted no time in interpreting this verse into the government's imposition on Muslims to choose sides whether they were with or against the terrorists. Now residents of Dearborn had another decision to make; to choose between Shariah and the Constitution.

This effect of power which reduced Muslims in Dearborn into multiple levels of binary operations turned the city slowly into a must-visit location on 21st-century America's newly established anti-Muslim protest circuit. First individuals, later small groups and finally larger groups of Christian protesters started to make appearances in Dearborn.

On July 12, 2010 Terry Jones, announced his plans to burn Qurans in Dearborn, outside the Islamic Center of America on Twitter. Once the tweet was promoted on the social media, the discussions and protests contributed to extensive

media coverage. (Cockburn 2010). Politicians and religious leaders made statements against the protest. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated "it's regrettable that a pastor in Gainesville, Florida with a church of no more than fifty people can make this outrageous and distressful, disgraceful plan and get, you know, the world's attention." (Ibid.)

With rising protests, Jones decided to cancel his event. He was banned from entering the U.K. and Canada afterwards. (Peralta 2013). On September 11, 2013 Jones was arrested in the Polk County town of Mulberry with 2,998 kerosene-soaked copies of Quran, one for every 9/11 victim. He faced a felony charge of unlawful conveyance of fuel and unlawful open-carry of a firearm. (Peralta 2013).

In 2011, Roger Stockham a 63-year-old Vietnam veteran with previous crime records was arrested while traveling with explosives in his vehicle with the intention of blowing up the Islamic Center of America. According to Michigan authorities, Stockham was planning to attack when mourners had gathered for a funeral. He had a large but undisclosed quantity of explosives. (Karoub 2011). Officials shared that the quantity of explosives was substantial enough to do harm. (E. Johnson 2011).

Next to personal appearances, Arab International Festival, an annual event organized by the American Arab Chamber of Commerce which highlights the Arab-American Culture, became the center of collective tensions. Although it was a cultural event, not a religious celebration, anti-Islamic groups approached it otherwise. Starting from 2009, the event became the center of systematic harassment and negative propaganda. In 2012, the tension grew when a California based missionary group called Bible Believers pushed the limits of freedom of speech offending participants among which were many children and minors. They were asked to leave with the subject of disturbing the peace. (Warikoo 2013).

After the event, members of the group Ruben Chavez, Arthur Fisher and Joshua DeLosSantos sued Wayne County claiming their First Amendment rights were violated. On May 14, 2013, Federal Court dismissed the case, giving a verdict that no rights were violated. Regardless of the result, the American Arab Chamber of Commerce decided to cancel the event in 2013. (Burns 2013).

The cancelation of the event did not end the protests. Most recently on October 10, 2015, protesters who gathered for "Global Rally for Humanity", an event targeting mosques in various states, carried more than just signs in Dearborn. Members of open carry groups such as the Oath Keepers and The Three Percenters attended the event with their rifles claiming that humanity was attacked daily by radical Islam. (CBS Detroit 2015b). Michigan Law permits open carry. (Ibid.)

Image 5. Protestors with guns in front of Henry Ford Library in Dearborn.

One day prior to the event, responses including "bomb the whole town" poured into the social media after Fox News aired a report about Dearborn that heavily referenced Sharia law and claimed that there happened to be recent stonings of women and an honor killing over condoms in the city. The News Network claimed the City Council was controlled by Muslims and the Police Chief Ron Haddad was also a Muslim. At one point, host Jesse Watters responded a man who said he was from Yemen, with the words "gotta watch out for drone strikes." The news which

was interpreted as the bombing of Dearborn threatened, increased tensions prior the event. (Stawser 2015).

According to Heidi Beirich who tracks hate groups at the Southern Poverty Law Center, this was the biggest event targeting mosques in this national scope. Beirich described that the mix of racist groups, anti-Muslim groups and anti-government groups was basically a recipe for disaster. (Markoe 2015). The presence of guns at the protest only made things worse increasing the chance of a gun being fired. (Bouffard 2015).

The Council of Islamic-American Relations (CAIR) warned mosques before the event to consider instituting additional safety measures in response to hate rallies by possibly armed anti-Muslim extremists targeting mosques. In an email statement, CAIR Michigan urged residents to participate Saturday in community service projects and said "people are discouraged from engaging the armed protesters." CAIR noted anti-Muslims vitriol could be heightened by several recent Islamophobic statements made by Republican presidential candidates Donald Trump and Ben Carson, the latter of whom said he would not support a Muslim candidate for president. "The anti-Islam rallies come at a time of increased hate-motivated crimes and bias incidents nationwide targeting persons and property associated, or perceived to be associated, with Islam and the American Muslim community," CAIR's statement read. (Jenkins 2015).

Despite having concerns about their own safety and their loved ones, Muslims in Dearborn resisted enmity with peace. In a statement before the open carry protest, Dearborn Mayor Jack O'Reilly reminded residents to go about their usual business and ignore the visitors. "We cannot let them succeed in creating a false image of who we are that goes out all over the media," the Mayor said. "They

will ultimately leave our community and we can use the experience to strengthen our resolve to be one community supporting all of its members." (Bouffard 2015).

The residents of the city heeded city officials' requests that they stay away from outside the Henry Ford Centennial Library in Dearborn. The rally with the motto "as this invasion of Muslim colonization continues unchecked on American soil, we can only expect the same suffering now endured by Europe. Now is the time to act" ended without causing any harm but coming to an unlikely conclusions instead. (Urbanski 2015).

Ali Harb & Hassan Khalifeh use the phrase "there were handshakes" to describe the unlikely conclusion. Towards the end of the protest, a Dearborn resident suggested an armed demonstrator who was carrying a sign that read "Stop radical Islam," to add a statement against radicalism. The demonstrator, handed his sign to the woman who suggested the idea. She wrote, "Stop radical Christianity." Later, while the protesters walked back to their cars some Dearborn residents shook their hands and expressed their love to them. Ali Naji, one of the residents explains why. Ali expresses that he respects the protesters' free speech rights, but their perception of Islam is wrong. (Harb & Khalife 2015).

> Islam and Muslims here in Dearborn, we work hard every day; we're not radicalized at all. So the way we look at it and the way they look at it is a little different, but they have their right to come and protest peacefully. (Harb & Khalife 2015)

According to Carol Kuruvilla from The Huffington Post, the open carry protests ended up inspiring acts of love and service throughout the country, (Kuruvilla 2015) verifying Foucault's notion that power is not only oppressive but

also productive, producing positive effects. (Foucault 1995, 194). Narrating the protests in Dearborn, Washington, D.C., Seattle, Kentucky and Florida, Kuruvilla argues that the rally strengthened bonds between interfaith allies and inspired numerous acts of community service around the United States instead of dividing the communities they targeted. (Kuruvilla 2015).

3.1.6. Positive Effects of Rejection of Criticism

> *Rejection of Criticism: Criticisms made by Muslims in Dearborn rejected out of hand, without consideration or debate.*

In The First Decade of Islamophobia: 10 Years of the Runnymede Trust Report, Chris Allen puts forward that even after a decade after the publication of the initial report, Muslims are still being blatantly established as distinctly separate and other from the West, referring to Said's "us" and "them" dualism. (Allen 2007, 21). In the report Allen shares two examples.

In the first example a photograph is taken shortly after a Friday prayer where a man is selling books, tapes and CDs of Osama bin Laden. The photo is clearly framed so that the Arabic is central to the focus and as worshippers are leaving the mosque, so the image would suggest that they are all queuing for the material that the seller has to offer. The short text accompanying the photograph suggests that Muslims through their apparent interest in these materials can be easily interpreted as being threatening and supportive of terrorism, especially directed towards Western powers. (Allen 2007, 20 - 21). In this example Islam is implicated as being largely synonymous as a political ideology, where any criticisms that Muslims may

justifiably have of the West are rejected out of hand, and also where any hostility towards Islam or Muslims could be construed as finding justification in this piece from a culmination of the other closed views highlighted. (Allen 2007, 21).

The second example is a cartoon from a daily newspaper. The cartoon itself is simple; it illustrates a group of stereotypical Muslim men, standing in front of the Parliament, the symbolic and iconic home democracy and freedom, protesting against Britain and the United States in support of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. On a visual level, the cartoon is immediately readable and clearly taps into the growing climate of fear and suspicion in the aftermath of 9/11. The caption below the cartoon reads: "Parasite: (Chambers English Dictionary) a creature which obtains food and physical protection from a host which never benefits from its presence." (Allen 2007, 22). It would seem quite clear from this illustration that the cartoonist is not only referring to those individuals that make up the subject matter of his drawing. Instead it can be better read as analogously stating that any Muslim that is anti-Western and indeed voicing these sentiments are not only hypocritical, but also parasitic. In this image Muslims are seen largely as a single entity as the satire suggests little differentiation between Muslims in Europe, the United States and those mediatized Muslims from Afghanistan. At a time when very few commentators would air opinions counter to those of either the American or British governments, Muslims are presented as being quite separate and other. Inferior through the presentation, they are portrayed overtly barbaric, irrational, aggressive, threatening, by default primitive, clearly violent, supportive of terrorism and willingly engaged in a clash of civilizations. (Allen 2007, 22). Criticisms being made by Muslims, even in the democratic form of protests are clearly being rejected entirely out of hand and without any consideration. As Muslims are mediatized as a homogenized entity, the

value-loaded assertions and accusations made about them become also homogenously similar. (Allen 2007, 23).

Both operations in the examples act harshly on Muslims in Dearborn. While any photograph taken in Dearborn is interpreted to reveal the "hidden agenda" of the local residents, any criticism that Muslims may justifiably have about the photo is rejected out of hand. Few commentators ask and air their opinions. Moving through preconceptions, assumptions, assertions and accusations, any opinion Muslims might have is rejected entirely out of hand and without any consideration. Any event in Dearborn is invested to contribute the anti-Muslim expression within the mainstream context. As Allen suggests, these events become an opportunity to construct exaggerated overstatements and blanket accusations, and gives credence to segregationist theories and extremist ideas that would otherwise have been easily and clearly dismissed. (Allen 2007, 14 and 24).

The consequences of rejection of criticism has forced Muslims in Dearborn to be more transparent and open to dialogue to resist overstatements, accusations and extremist ideas both internally and externally. Internally, the first priority of Muslims in Dearborn is the younger generation. Imam Al-Qazwini shares how he would like to see the youth empowered and assuming a leadership role in the Muslim community. "If we, the moderate Muslims, do not reach out to our youth, we are going to run one of the two risks," Al-Qazwini says. "Either those youth will be assimilated in the big society where they will not be able to identify with Islam anymore. The other risk that we may run into if we do not reach out to our youth is the radicalization. More and more Muslim youth are joining ISIS." (Warikoo 2015).

Externally, Muslims in Dearborn, exactly the opposite of how they are being portrayed, have become more open to critique and welcoming to visitors, eager to

reflect good examples of what Islam is and who they are. The community approaches resisting rejection of criticism as an Islamic obligation, to teach others about Islam. According to Eli Clifton, Co-Author of Islamophobia Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America what people actually see in Dearborn is Muslims responding with the teachings of their own faith, with the core teachings of what Islam is. (UPF 2015).

In one of the recent occasions, Muslims approached a protester who showed up at Noor Mosque with signs protesting about murder and beheadings. When Muslims wanted to talk with the protester her first reaction was to request "thee Satan" to get away from her and get to their side of the block. Rejecting any sort of criticism whatsoever, the protester refused to communicate with the Muslims, adding that she doesn't believe in such a thing as a peaceful Muslim and she wants the beheading to stop. (Klausner 2015). After attempting to start a conversation over 45 minutes and transparently answering the hateful accusations of the protester, Muslims finally convinced her to visit their mosque and see what was going inside with her own eyes. By the end, the protester, expressing that she didn't expect the events the way they did, was giving hugs and having breakfast with the community. "Super funny look on the cops faces when they saw us walking her in. It was a sort of a beautiful thing", Micah, one of the supporters recall the scene to the news reporters. (Ibid.)

Resisting rejection of criticism by becoming a more transparent, welcoming and educative community, increased conversion rates in Dearborn following 9/11. Correlatively, while Americans who are affiliated with any particular religion as well as those who describe themselves as Catholics are dropping, the rate of converts to Islam in the United States since 9/11 has doubled. (Pew 2007). Most of the converts

narrate their first contacts with Islam and Muslims was to confirm their criticism of Islam as a patriarchal and violent religion. In some cases, this contact leads to conversion, propounding another positive effect of power on behalf of Muslims in Dearborn. (Sacirbey 2011).

3.1.7. Positive Effects of Defending Discrimination

> *Defending Discrimination: Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims in Dearborn and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.*

Dearborn does not have a positive history when it comes to discrimination. Most of this reputation is caused by Orville Hubbard, who served as mayor for 36 years from 1942 to1978. For some, Hubbard was a pioneer who delivered a wide range of services to the city. For others he was an outspoken segregationist who made no apologies for his views. He was the chief architect of a campaign called "Keep Dearborn Clean" that actually was a euphemism widely interpreted to mean "Keep Dearborn White". (McGraw 2015).

In an interview with The New York Times in 1969, Hubbard stated that he didn't dislike African Americans, but if whites didn't want to live with racial slur, they sure as hell didn't have to, as dammit, America was a free country. He defended his opinion on discrimination with the following words;

> I favor segregation. Because, if you favor integration, you first have kids going to school together, then the next thing you know, they're grab-assing around, then they're getting married and having half-

> breed kids. Then you wind up with a mongrel race. And from what I know of history, that's the end of civilization. (McGraw 2015).

The New York Times wrote after the interview that "Hubbard's Dearborn is a symbol of the deep-seated racism of the North." (Ibid.)

Even nearly 40 years after his death, Hubbard is still at the center of discussions related to discrimination. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) is resisting his 3 meter bronze statue to be removed from public property suggesting that it is a Relic of Racism. ADC is also requesting Dearborn City Council to formally acknowledge and disavow the city's racist past of segregation and intolerance. (ADC 2014).

ADC reports that Muslims have been suffering severe discrimination since 9/11. Identified as one of the two top breading grounds for terrorism by the government next to New York, the committee has steadily observed a rise in reports and complaints of discrimination in Arab communities in Dearborn. (ADC 2008).

Their call for the statue's removal comes at a time of a cultural shift that, though sudden, has been decades in the making. Pictures showing Dylann Roof, the suspect in the Charleston church massacre, brandishing the Confederate flag have renewed long-standing debates over whether the flag honors the South's history, or flies as a snapping reminder of war fought largely to guarantee the continued enslavement of African-Americans. (Dalbey 2015).

According to ADC's Executive Director Fatina Abdrabboh, while Dearborn does not have a Confederate flag waving atop its buildings, the larger-than-life statue of Hubbard memorializes and celebrates a man who symbolizes the same kind of intolerance for many. (Dalbey 2015). Abdrabboh believes that Dearborn shares her

call for the city to follow in the steps of other cities nationwide and remove the symbols from the public sphere that stand as a reminder of racism. “The danger of normalizing such symbols is that by tolerating racism we run the risk of enabling dominant culture to embed and justify deep inequalities in our society”, she explains. (Dalbey 2015).

3.1.8. Positive Effects of Naturalization of Islamophobia:

Naturalization of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim hostility in Dearborn accepted as natural and normal.

In her article Islamophobia? Hell Yes! Lauri B. Regan describes how she felt as if she had been dropped into a Middle Eastern country on an evening walk in one of her family trips to Santa Monica where 90% of the people strolling down the bustling walkways and lounging at the cafes were Muslim. Women were dressed in either burqas, niqabs or hijabs and the few younger women who were not, were speaking Arabic. This experience followed a trip to Maine where she found herself encountering an unusually large number of Muslims on the streets of several cities and learned of the mini-Dearborn. (Regan 2014).

Regan does not mention any negative incidents that she witnessed in any of these trips, but the Muslim population that has been growing exponentially over the past several years has been enough to convince her that somethings are going wrong in America. She believes that although the left commands them to believe that Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance, and yet, despite the fact that they have welcomed

these vast Muslim communities into their country with open arms, the reality is something quite different. (Regan 2014).

Referring to protests in the United States calling for a third intifada against Israel and Muslim violence in Europe, Laurel asks where Obama is on this existential issue while Radical Islam is growing by the day. Finding it disturbing to recognize the extent to which American courts are recognizing Sharia as the governing doctrine in their decisions, she asserts that if they are going to defeat the terrorists, they must become Islamophobes, as known as "non-Muslims who know more than they are supposed to know about Islam." (Regan 2014).

Her final definition is one of the sarcastic mottos that is used as an ideological brand to normalize willful Islamophobia. Although it conflicts in logic, it is a continuation and the supplementary of the "all I ever need to know about Islam, I learned on 9/11" motto of willful ignorance about Islam. (Ibid.)

After 9/11 both the willful fear and ignorance not only became normalized but embraced. (Condell 2011, 2014). Following The Charlie Hebdo attack, those embracing Islamophobia became encouraged to express themselves more openly in public. Two days after the attack, Bob Beckel, Fox News's token liberal host, declared himself as a proud Islamophobe on the air. (Thompson 2015). To a comment "there is a bigger army out there that is potentially bigger that terrorism, that is the army of tolerance" Beckel responded; "I just wrote a piece for USA Today that'll be in next week. It said, 'I am an Islamophobe.' That's right, you can call me that all you want." Later "how can you possibly not call these Islamist terrorists?" he

asked. “You’re making us the enemy. We’re the enemy because we’re Islamophobes, apparently.” (Thompson 2015).

Hosting thousands with similar expressions, Dearborn has become the rendezvous point of this normalization and the must visit location of this embracement. It has become the very ground that Islamophobes come to prove their commitment and adequacy to their cause. Following the controversy led by Donald Trump, Muslims in Dearborn fear a new wave of naturalization.

Image 6. Protestor with “Islamophobic and Proud of It” banner in Dearborn.

According to John L. Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin the naturalization of Islamophobia has consequences which concern both Muslim-West relations and the larger debate about multiculturalism. (Esposito & Kalin 2011, 3 - 20). They believe that it prevents Muslims from fully participating in the political, social, cultural and economic life of the societies in which they live. It makes them feel foreign, distant and unwelcome. It creates parallel societies both conceptually and physically, whereby the civic cohesion of different ethnic and religious communities within the society becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. (Esposito & Kalin 2011, 16).

Muslims in Dearborn are resisting the effects of naturalization of Islamophobia with exactly the same arguments. They are fully participating in the political, social, cultural and economic life, achieving civic cohesion of different ethnic and religious communities within the society.

Following 9/11, the civic cohesion among the Shia and Sunni Muslims, non-Muslim members of the community and voice at the local level due to well-

established institutions became exceptionally high. The members of the society began to act together in social and political issues. (Ewing 2013, 6). 2013 was a turning point in this cohesion.

On November 5, 2013, two historic elections happened in Dearborn. In the first, Susan Dabaja, an Arab-American Muslim attorney, became the first Muslim elected as president of the Dearborn City Council, having ousted Thomas Patrick Tafelski by 32 votes, a Polish Catholic incumbent for the post. (Dias 2013). She had promised her voters after years as a practicing attorney in the city and a lifelong resident who understands the daily struggles Dearborn families' face, to do her part in making sure Dearborn continues to be a place where families can live and grow. (Dabaja 2013).

In the second, Dearborn voters elected a majority of the city council members – four of seven – from their own community, also a first. Dabaja and her new colleagues Mike Sareini, Robert Alex Abraham and David Bazzy all share Lebanese heritage. (Dias 2013).

Time Magazine believes both elections to be milestones, given Dearborn's complicated racial history. Dearborn's Irish Catholic mayor John O'Reilly, who easily won his own reelection race, supported Dabaja's campaign and endorsed all incumbents. The Arab American Institute also worked this election cycle to register and inform Arab-American voters about Arab American candidates through its nonpartisan project "Yalla Vote!", which means "hurry up and vote" in Arabic. (Ibid.)

Maya Berry, the executive director of Arab American Institute says the election results are about the community coming of age politically in Dearborn.

“There is great pride in this victory”, Berry says “not just because of the impressive electoral win, but also because it shows how far we’ve come.” (Ibid.)

After years of exclusion, discrimination, prejudice and violence, Muslims in Dearborn were experiencing the “best of times” and “worst of times.” They had become the subjects of an exceptional experience as Katherine Pratt Ewing defines. (Ewing 2008, 48).

In Being and Belonging, Katherine Pratt Ewing, borrowing the term American, Exceptionalism, explains the environment in Dearborn with the term Detroit Exceptionalism;

> Borrowing loosely from recent scholarship that challenges the concept of American exceptionalism, we argue that Detroit’s exceptionalism is a double-edged sword. It does not imply a simple binary wherein Arab Americans are either proof of the American dream, of egalitarianism, the rule of law, and tolerance, or proof of the American nightmare, of discrimination, violence, and bigotry. Rather, it suggests a complex amalgam of both realities, in which ignorance and fear live side by side with solidarity and progress. (Ewing 2008, 48).

What Ewing describes as a complex amalgam are the power relations between the state and individuals of Dearborn and the contrast between national responses and local ones. (Ewing 2008, 47 - 80). On one side stands relations with the State, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, humiliation at the airports and immigration points, detention and deportation without legal counsel and unprecedented surveillance which I have previously described. On the other side stands individual relations as a resistance to these power relations, in which Arabs in

Detroit generally felt safer from retaliation and discrimination than Arabs in other parts of the country did. (Ewing 2008, 47 - 80). These relations as Ewing descries are far from being simple, solid and durable. Of what Ewing calls a double edged sword, she describes a very fragile, unstable and irregular network. (Ewing 2008, 48). Amazingly, it is the same fragility, instability and irregularity that creates the safe environment in Dearborn, the Islamic Capital of the United States, (Ibid.) turning the city into a demonstration of the positive effects of power, confirming Foucault's assertions.

3.2. Unintentional Positive Effects of Dearborn as a Panopticon

According to Foucault, power is basically less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of "government." (Foucault 1982, 794). He suggests that this word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. (Foucault 1982, 789 - 790).

> Government did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people.
>
> To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. The relationship proper to power would not therefore be sought on the side of

> violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of power), but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government. (Foucault 1982, 790).

In this definition, government is not only a term of politics, but also of sociology, religion, philosophy, medicine and pedagogy. Foucault's conduct of government starts elementarily with the self and expands to include others and the entire society which both the individual and the state are dependent on each other. (Foucault 1982, 790). Additional to the struggles of management and administration of the state, this dependence signifies problems of self-control, of providing direction, supervision and control of the community, family and the children as well as consulting ones physical and psychological health. (Ibid.)

The government's interpretation of 9/11 caused many political, sociological, religious and philosophical problems in form of struggles, not only in the lives of Muslims in the Dearborn, their community, families and children, but minorities all around the United States, both Muslim and non-Muslim. From a Foucauldian point of view, which might be rendered from his work The Subject and Power, these struggles had the following patterns in common.

First, they were transversal struggles. (Foucault 1982, 780). They were not limited to one city. There were certain cities such as Dearborn, Michigan where these struggles developed more easily and to a greater extent, but they were not confined to a particular group of minorities (Ibid.)

Second, the aim of these struggles were the power effects as such. (Foucault 1982, 780). The government was not criticized primarily because of its concerns

about its national security, but because it exercised an uncontrolled power over people's rights in Dearborn, their liberty, their life and death. (Foucault 1982, 780).

Third, these were immediate struggles. In such struggles people criticize instances of power which are closest to them, those which exercise their action on individuals. They do not look for a "chief enemy" but for an immediate enemy, nor do they expect to find a solution to their problem at a future date. (Foucault 1982, 780 - 781). With the government's call for immediate action, this operation harshly impacted Muslims in Dearborn. The presence of an immediate enemy in America's backyard made it impossible to debate permanent solutions rather than temporary precautions.

Fourth, they were struggles which questioned the status of Muslims in Dearborn. On one hand the government asserted Muslims the right to be different and underlined everything which made individuals truly individual. On the other hand, it attacked everything in Dearborn which separates Muslims from others, broke their links with others, forced individuals back on themselves and tied them to their own identity in a constraining way. (Foucault 1982, 781).

Fifth, these struggles revolved around the question of who Muslims were. They were a refusal of the abstractions which ignored who Muslims in Dearborn were and forced them to make a choice between their religion and nationality. (Foucault 780 - 781).

Finally and most importantly, they were an opposition to the effects of power which were linked with knowledge, competence and qualification; struggles against the privileges of knowledge. (Foucault 1982, 780 - 781). They were opposition against secrecy, deformation and mystifying representations imposed on Muslims in Dearborn (Ibid.)

Right after 9/11, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act signed into law, which gave the government enormous privileges of "knowledge" and access to personal information with extreme "secrecy." (Cornehls 2003). The Act which passed the House on absolute majority 357 to 66 and the Senate almost on consensus by 98 to 1 allowed law enforcements and intelligence agencies all aspects of power for the surveillance of those who were "qualified" as terrorists, by removing or violating at least 6 of the 10 original Bill of Rights (1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), and the 13. and 14. Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Ibid.)

The Act granted the government the following instruments, procedures and technologies of power against the privileges of knowledge;

1. With the sneak and peek provision of the law, FBI can enter a house, search through the personal effects and confiscate any personal property without informing the occupant.
2. FBI can visit the places of employment, demand personal records of suspects and question their supervisors and colleagues without notification and without disclosing what information they seek or why. People questioned are obligated under penalty of law, not to tell the suspects or anyone else about this questioning.
3. Government agencies can obtain access to all personal records including personal medical records, school records and any other private information.
4. On mere designation by the Attorney General, anyone can be detained and questioned, without the government having to show probable cause that they have committed any illegal act.

5. The government, by simply informing a magistrate that you are part of an ongoing intelligence investigation, can obtain a warrant giving them access to personal records. Magistrates are required to sign the warrant.
6. The government can designate a United States citizens as enemy combatants and incarcerate them indefinitely without right to an attorney and informing their family members.
7. The government can secretly demand to see records of books or magazines being checked out or read in any public or campus library as well as internet sites being visited on a computer. It can also demand the same information from private booksellers.
8. The government can investigate the activities of anyone who uses the internet and intercept their email on mere suspicion of a connection with terrorism.
9. As the act redefines terrorism very broadly to include a new range of activities that may be considered domestic terrorism, many non-terrorist political protest activities, marches, demonstrations and civil disobedience can be considered as terrorist activities.
10. People who are in the USA on immigrant visas can be summarily arrested and incarcerated on mere suspicion by someone in law enforcement that they might have some terrorism connection.
11. Law enforcement agencies can now share information obtained via a limited wiretap in an unrelated investigation with any other law enforcement agency.

12. Grand jury testimony, long considered inviolable and not subject to subpoena, can now be obtained by the government on a claim that it might be useful for intelligence in an investigation.
13. CIA, which because of past abuses, was banned from spying on Americans in the United States, can again perform many of FBI's tasks and share information obtained by other law enforcement agencies.
14. The scope and power of a secret court originally created to hear matters pertaining to foreign intelligence, is expanded to include domestic investigations that the government claims to be related to terrorist activities. (Cornehls 2003).

The government wasted no time putting the act into practice subjecting more than 80.000 Arab and Muslim immigrants to fingerprinting and registration. FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) surveilled 8.000 Arab and Muslim men for interviews and imprisoned over 5.000 foreign nationals in anti-terrorism preventive detention compounds. (Cole & Lobel 2007, 11 - 12).

Being one of the four cities next to San Francisco, California, Tallahassee, Florida and Richmond, Virginia who voluntarily agreed to implement racial data collection systems even before 9/11, Dearborn was one of the cities who suffered the most from racial profiling. (Ramirez, McDevitt & Farrell 2000, 2).

On November 29, 2001, less than 3 months after 9/11, residents of Dearborn marched in front of Dearborn City Hall to voice their opposition against racial profiling ordered by the U.S. Justice Department against the Arab-American population in a demonstration organized by the Detroit Anti-War Network (DAWN).

In their statement, DAWN announced that 5,000 Arab men who arrived in Dearborn last year were to "voluntarily" report for questioning at local law enforcement departments. Those interviewed were subjected to highly personal questions, such as their political and religious beliefs, information about their family and friends, where they work, where they live and where they go to school. Some 200 Arab men in Dearborn alone received letters from the Justice Department seeking cooperation. The number of reports citing discrimination and ethnic intimidation fielded by the Michigan chapter of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee increased from an average of 20 per week to well over 200. This was a nationwide trend, according to the ADC. (Marzolf 2001).

In only in 3 months, the Arab community lost all its trust in the U.S. government. As the Vice President of American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Khalil E. Jahshan condemns, racial profiling to be a short-sighted public relations gimmick that was destined to fail because the trust needed to secure Arab participation in such a program no longer existed. (Ibid.)

> The trust between the U.S. government, including law enforcement agencies, and the Arab community has been further eroded over the past few weeks by denial of due process, by revoking of attorney-client privileges, by arbitrary and extended detention, and by casting the investigative net so broadly as to implicate thousands of innocent people. (Marzolf 2001).

The practice not only affected Muslims in Dearborn, cost their trust, but failed the entire country, as if the terrorist had won by losing, as if they became victorious by defeat. America's reaction to 9/11 alone did more harm to its own

citizens' lives and their personal freedoms than terror might have done or even anticipated. As I will explain in more detail in the following pages, these practices turned United States into a panopticon where those who were "assumed" potentially dangerous faced constant surveillance. Regretfully, it also failed in making America safer.

According to David Cole and Jules Lobel, authors of Less Safe, Less Free: Why America Is Losing the War on Terror, The Bush Administration's "War on Terror" which adopted coercive preventive measures not only sacrificed some of the deepest commitments of America's democracy, but garnered few terrorists and actually made American citizens less safe. The ideology that treated the rule of law as obstacles that prevent the fight with terror, created much bigger problems than America faced on 9/11 sacrificing some of its most important liberties. (Cole & Lobel 2009).

It sacrificed the rule of law to begin with. American people gave the state the authority to lock themselves up, to fine themselves and to execute themselves on the condition that it abide by certain basic principles of the rule of law without solid evidence except suspicion. (Ibid.)

It sacrificed equality; the notion that everybody is equal before the law no matter what their religious and cultural identities are. (Ibid.)

It sacrificed transparency; the notion that legal procedures must be open to public, so people can make sure their government is following the rules. (Ibid.)

It sacrificed fair process; the notion that to take away their liberty, life or property, the government has to provide a fair hearing where one can defend oneself. (Ibid.)

It sacrificed checks and balances; the notion of separation of powers so that each of the branches can check each other. Finally it sacrificed the commitment to fundamental human rights; the notion which collective commitment to respect for human dignity relies on. (Cole & Lobel 2009).

In a conference at the University of Central Missouri, Cole decoded Bush administration's actions in comparison to Steven Spielberg's famous science fiction movie Minority Report which takes place in a not-so-distant future in Washington D.C., at a time when the government has miraculously solved the problem of crime by predicting the future with almost perfect accuracy. According to Cole, the Bush Administration has adopted a similar strategy since 9/11, which relied on the ability to predict the future with incredible accuracy, except there is no such technology to put this strategy into practice. (Cole 2008, 2).

What is to understand from Cole's words is that each of the 5,000 men in Dearborn who were surveilled and profiled by the FBI in preventive detention antiterrorism measures, were indeed the victims of an absurd prosecution. (Cole 2008, 3). They were surveilled solely for the sake of surveillance; not because they were responsible for things that they had done or on any kind of evidence of a wrongdoing in the past but only because of a prediction. Their surveillance was based on a possibility, that they might commit a terrorist act in the future, depending exclusively on their religious and cultural identity which summed up as their racial profile (ACLU 2011, 17). In the aftermath of 9/11, the government with the signing of USA PATRIOT Act into law, had expanded its power of surveillance to the limits of science fiction.

Julian Sanchez, from the libertarian think tank Cato Institute believes the government, through those laws, has created its own panopticon. "Coercive power is

not just about actually having information recorded and disclosed," Sanchez argues. "It's about the effect of knowing that you always could be." (Fox 2012).

Image 7. Presidio Modelo prison, Cuba, designed as a Panopticon.

The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham revolutionized prison surveillance in the late 18th century through simple architecture; he made it impossible for prisoners to see the guards. His creation, the panopticon, was a circular prison design featuring a guard tower in the center with tinted windows that allowed guards to observe without inmates knowing whether they were being watched. (Foucault 1980, 200).

The panopticon and its architecture became a disciplinary structure described by Foucault, as well as by other thinkers who studied power. The word is a reference to Panoptes from Greek mythology, a primordial giant described having 100 eyes. (Black 2013).

Foucault describes the panopticon in his interview titled The Eye of Power;

> Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition. We know the principle on which it was based: at the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is

> needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of the dungeon; or rather of its three functions - to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide - it preserves only the first and eliminates the other two. Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap.
> (Foucault 1995, 199 - 200).

This special spatial arrangement means exposing the individuals to maximum visibility, which brings up a new form of internalized disciplinary practice. (Foucault 1995, 200). The individuals inside the panopticon are forced to behave as if they are possibly being watched by someone, even if this is just a prediction or based on a prediction as the government has implied in Dearborn. They are seen, but they do not see; they are the objects of information, never subjects in communication. (Ibid.) They are forced to internalize the disciplinary “gaze” so that they, who are subjected to a field of visibility know it and assume responsibility for the constraints of power. (Foucault 1995, 202). This makes them play spontaneously upon themselves, inscribing themselves the power relation in which they simultaneously play both

roles; they become the principles of their own subjection. (Foucault 1995, 202 - 203). Thus a new form of power is born; instead of power being enforced directly upon the body of the victim by the owner of authority, now the individuals themselves play both roles. In this setup, the oppressor may well be absent, because the prisoners have internalized the imposed behavioral code so well that they behave as if the oppressor were always present. (Bălan 2013, 5).

Although it might be constructed by the government, the observational center of the panopticon is not necessarily composed of government agencies like NSA, FBI or CIA. The panopticon enables the government to perform a very cost-efficient form of surveillance. In Foucault's understanding, the observer in the center has a broader identity than a governmental institution. From his perspective, any individual may be an operational component of the panopticon. In fact, as the number of anonymous and temporary observers increase, the homogeneous effects of the panopticon increases. (Foucault 1995, 202).

> Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine: in the absence of the director, his family, his friends, his visitors, even his servants. Similarly, it does not matter what motive animates him: the curiosity of the indiscreet, the malice of a child, the thirst for knowledge of a philosopher who wishes to visit this museum of human nature, or the perversity of those who take pleasure in spying and punishing. The more numerous those anonymous and temporary observers are, the greater the risk for the inmate of being surprised and the greater his anxious awareness of being observed. The Panopticon is a marvelous machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces homogeneous effects of power. (Foucault 1995, 202).

9/11 increased the number of anonymous, temporary and voluntary observers in the United States to a massive size. It allowed organizations like Homeland Security to recruit an endless resource of individuals to operate the machine in their absence. With its famous slogan "If You See Something, Say Something™" the agency engaged the entire public in protecting their homeland by reporting any suspicious activities anonymously their fellow Americans might be participating.

Image 8. Homeland Security's advertisement in Michigan.

Their slogan might be read on many levels. It can be read as a proof of how once-policed communities have gradually lost faith in the police as a sovereign institution. This transformation has helped the constitution of a panoptical environment in which the kind of vigilant lateral surveillance can thrive, as citizens adopt preventive peer monitoring as a means to strive for security in their communities. (Reeves 2012, 239). Homeland Security's current attempt is only elevating this function to a new level and on a broader scale.

It can be read as the death of domestic sovereign institutions that has left a gulf of responsibility that private citizens are being forced to address, what may be called the responsibilization of the public. (Ibid.)

According to Foucault this change is not an expression of the death of sovereignty, it would be an overstatement of the decline of sovereignty to believe so. He argues that sovereignty still exists but its role in governance has evolved. It is rather, as the domestic institutions in which sovereign power once resided deteriorate, formerly public responsibilities are being infused into the population via

newly redistributed policing practices as executed by the Homeland Security. (Reeves 2012, 239).

These redistributed policing practices have created a society of fear and paranoia, and has given birth to many new John Doe's. Michele Malkin, a commentator for Fox News Channel and a regular guest host of The O'Reilly Factor is one of them. Having written The John Doe Manifesto, a declaration of principles, she is a good expression of how certain Americans have interpreted these policing practices.

Opening her Manifesto with; "Dear Muslim Terrorist / Plotter / Planner / Funder / Enabler / Apologist", Malkin continues;

> You do not know me. But I am on the lookout for you. You are my enemy. And I am yours. I am John Doe. I am traveling on your plane. I am riding on your train. I am at your bus stop. I am on your street. I am in your subway car. I am on your lift. I am your neighbor. I am your customer. I am your classmate. I am your boss. I am John Doe. (Malkin 2007).

Reminding a number of incidents in the past, Malkin declares that she will act when Homeland Security officials ask her to report suspicious activity and she will embrace her local police department's admonition; "if you see something, say something." The remaining of her manifest is full with examples of what motive animates the observers in the panopticon;

> I will protest your Jew-hating, America-bashing 'scholars.'
>
> I will petition against your hate-mongering mosque leaders.

> I will raise my voice against your subjugation of women and religious minorities.
>
> I will challenge your attempts to indoctrinate my children in our schools.
>
> I will combat your violent propaganda on the Internet. I am John Doe.
>
> I will support law enforcement initiatives to spy on your operatives, cut off your funding and disrupt your murderous conspiracies.
>
> I will oppose all attempts to undermine our borders and immigration laws.
>
> I will resist the imposition of sharia principles and sharia law in my taxi cab, my restaurant, my community pool, the halls of Congress, our national monuments, the radio and television airwaves, and all public spaces.
>
> I will not be censored in the name of tolerance.
>
> I will not be cowed by your Beltway lobbying groups in moderates' clothing.
>
> I will not cringe when you shriek about 'profiling' or 'Islamophobia.'
>
> I will put my family's safety above sensitivity. (Malkin 2007).

Michele Malkin, a 44 year old American citizen of Filipino ethnicity, whose parents immigrated to the United States on an employer-sponsored visa, finishes her manifesto with the following lines;

> I will put my country above multiculturalism. I will not submit to your will. I will not be intimidated. I am John Doe. (Malkin 2007).

Although Malkin's words are marginal, they can't be understated. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2013 shows that a majority of Americans (56%) say the National Security Agency's (NSA) program, tracking the telephone records of millions of Americans, is an acceptable way for the government to investigate terrorism. While the public is more evenly divided over the government's monitoring of email and other online activities to prevent possible terrorism, these views have largely unchanged since 2002. (Pew Research Center 2013).

A higher proportion of participants (62%) say it is more important for the federal government to investigate possible terrorist threats, even if that intrudes on personal privacy. Only 34% say it is more important for the government not to intrude on personal privacy, even if that limits its ability to investigate possible terrorist threats. Again, these opinions have changed slightly since the attacks. (Ibid.)

Gilbert Caluya interprets this environment in his study Foucault and Everyday Security: Lessons from the Panopticon. "What struck me most in the post-9/11 environment", Caluya says, "was not the government and media responses; after all, government lies and distortions and media moral panics are hardly a new phenomenon. What struck me instead was the willingness displayed by the public to return to a McCarthy era of suspicion, a willingness in which the public believed paradoxically that civil liberties, like the phoenix, would rise from the ashes of its own demise." (Caluya 2009, 6). Local residents like Debbie Schlussel who have assigned themselves the mission of providing 7/24 surveillance in Dearborn are examples of this willingness.

The radical experience of Muslims in Dearborn following 9/11 can only be accurately portrayed after this much information. Currently, the city is second only to New York with residents on the federal government's terrorist watch list. (Scahill &

Devereaux 2014). The city is under surveillance with spy planes as in war zones in Afghanistan and Middle East linked to FBI Programs. CBS Detroit has reported planes with capabilities to monitor cell phone signals and take high-definition photos flying over Dearborn various times. (CBS Detroit 2015a). Highly motivated observers broadcast 7/24 anything that happens in the city fueling Islamophobia into the social media. For example, when Muslim high school students make foul to a quarterback in a football game. (Pepper 2012; Chodun 2012; Schlussel 2012; Spencer 2012). Or a university installs two foot baths for Muslim students, so that they don't wash their feet in bathroom sinks before prayers. (Huffstutter 2007; Lewin 2007; Schlussel 2007; Spencer 2007). They become mainstream instantly followed by controversy and lawsuits.

From any perspective, the lives of Muslims in Dearborn is a harshly constructed panopticon. It is a panopticon not only because they are under constant surveillance and surrounded by fearful and paranoid John Doe's, but also because they are divided into cells; into cities, into neighborhoods, into sects, into nationalities, into socio-economic classes and more. In my first visit to Dearborn, I was expecting to see a centralized neighborhood much like the many Chinatowns in the United States. With specific images in my mind, I was very surprised to find a highly distributed alignment of Muslim population along the city.

A panopticon; not only because they are regularly observed, but because of the two windows they have; one looking to their outside "American" and one looking to their inside "Muslim." They are like the sole actors of a one man theatre, a solo performance, an improvised play, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. How can they not be? With their irregular outfits and style, invisibility is impossible,

yet it is a choice of their own; being seen constantly, being recognized immediately and somewhat voluntarily.

But, it is at the same time a panopticon with unintended effects. A panopticon which contributes in the individualization of its inmates and turns them into active subjects. Which as if by depriving light leads to their enlightenment and by hiding to their exposure. A panopticon which Muslims identify not as an *Azabullah* (God's punishment) but as a *Rahmetullah* (God's blessing).

Before 9/11, American Muslims were excessively cautious, as they describe it. Having doubts about whether or not they were secretly being followed, a sense of insecurity, a feeling they could not describe, a suspicion; they were careful about their words and behaviors as if they were being watched. Staying away from contradiction and conflict, they were choosing their positions carefully and wisely during the Iraq War and events as such, not to be categorized. (Ali-Karamali 2012). Principles of their own subjection, they had developed a considerable sense of self-discipline, isolation and auto-control as a community. Sumbul Ali-Karamali, recites those days;

> My father always told me never to talk about religion, politics, or other people's children. He was part of a generation of American Muslims who wanted to stay quiet and assimilate into American life and not rock the boat. Growing up in Southern California, I tried to follow his advice. (Ali-Karamali 2012).

After 9/11, their suspicions became obvious. Surveillance was no longer a question, it was a fact. It had become a part of their lives. It was inevitable. Keeping a low profile were no longer in their control. They were categorized, othered and

stereotyped no matter what. Keeping away, behaving cautiously, staying quiet; these tactics were no longer working the way they used to. No matter what careful position they would take, they were relocated at a designated position away from their comfort zone. (Ali-Karamali 2012).

After a short span of confusion and partial separation among the society, not only Muslims in Dearborn, but Muslims all over the United States went through a transition. (Sacirbey 2011). According to Omar Sacirbey from Huffington Post, Muslim Americans became more assertive of their identity after 9/11. Sacirbey, states that while some Muslims sought invisibility after 9/11, others did the opposite. They grew beards, donned headscarves and skull caps and made sure people knew they were Muslim. (Ibid.)

More active than ever, they started participating in organizations, taking part in protests and elevating their Muslim identity to a new level. "After 9/11", Ali-Karamali states, "I found that I, along with other American Muslims, have had little choice but to talk about religion." (Ali-Karamali 2012). She is currently the writer of two books, The Muslim Next Door and Growing Up Muslim, and an active member of Muslim organizations.

Israr Haq, a 48-year-old database administrator originally from Pakistan and his wife Samina Nazir, a mail carrier for the U.S. Postal Service are among the two who went through a similar transition. They talk about their experience to The Denver Post.

Before 9/11, the Northglenn couple had started to be late with their prayers. Nazir stopped wearing her hijab while out shopping. "We could feel it happening slowly", they describe. "Our faith was slipping." (Gorski 2011).

After 9/11, things changed. The couple got rid of their inertia, recuperated their faith, overcame their fear and started taking active roles within their community. Haq began volunteering at his sons' Islamic school and became chairman of the board of directors. (Gorski 2011).

"I thought that somebody has to step up, I guess", he describes. "The second reason was, if I am a citizen of this country, I have rights. I'm not doing anything wrong so I shouldn't be afraid of anything." (Ibid.)

His wife started wearing her hijab again, including on the job delivering mail for the U.S Postal Service. "After 9/11, it was like, I am a Muslim, I should not hide myself", she says. "I'm not a bad person." She expresses her pleasure when people on her route greet her in Arabic, "Salaam Alaikum", as a gesture. (Ibid.)

Other Muslims share similar experiences. Dilsher Nawaz, a cardiologist in Denver Colorado describes his panopticon as a little sphere. "We were relatively comfortable in our little spheres all these years", Nawaz says. "We never thought there was any conflict or contradiction living in America. Then 9/11 brought this sudden jolt to us that there are people among us who do not feel as integrated, who feel disenfranchised." (Ibid.)

The panoptical form of the city was forcing Muslims in Dearborn to learn more about their religion. Constant surveillance and the presence of anonymous observers that threw random questions at random times about Islam, in form of interviews, or rather interrogations, concerned with the irregularities of the individual – in other words the reasons that make an infant "a child", the symptoms that make a patient "sick", the traumas that make a madman "insane", the crimes that make a prisoner "guilty", the origins that make a man "Arab", the faith that makes a woman "Muslim" – forced Muslims to resist and urged them to search for answers to these

questions. Through this continuous resistance, in front of the cameras each time some news about Islam hit the headlines, they became more aware about their childhood, sickness, insanity, guilt, nationality and religion. They became more aware of Islam. Religious knowledge became something they independently sought out for themselves. One after the other, schools, courses and lessons for all ages started to appear in Dearborn.

Syed Ali, sociology professor from Long Island University, shares his observations that many young people, especially college and high school students, are seeking Islamic knowledge on their own, something their older siblings in their late twenties and early thirties never did. (S. Ali 2005). As I will take a closer look to this attitude during the interviews, his observations are coherent with my picture of Dearborn.

Ali commentates this individuality as a new trend among younger Muslims. According to him, the rediscovery of religion to define collectively for themselves what it means to be Muslim and the study of Islam among the young Muslims is at a new high in the United States. For the older ones, religion was something their parents and others regularly taught them and they had no choice but to learn. It was a chore. But for many of the younger Muslims, religious knowledge is something they individually seek out for themselves. There are many study groups formed and run by students, something quite irregular just a decade before. Students participating these groups are not taking their older imams very seriously, since their regular teaching style is rooted in Old World practices like rote memorization. They are questioning everything instead, always asking “why?” and not accepting regular answers such as “you just do as you are told.” (S. Ali 2005).

This end result would be no surprise for Foucault. According to him through the exercise of disciplinary power, the effects of various forces that attempt to produce regularity in individuals can end in just the opposite. As such, the effects of the panopticon can unintentionally lead to the building of an individual's self through internal discipline that can lead to different identities. (Foucault 1980, 98).

> This is an unintended, even unwanted effect of the initial disciplinary project; the individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. (Foucault 1980, 98).

Having no ability to speculate what the state was trying to regulate or normalize in Dearborn, as Foucault has formulated, it indispensably worked otherwise. Assuming that the state wished Arabs in Dearborn to be more American, they began to identify more strongly with their cultural heritage. Assuming that the state wished Muslims in Dearborn to be less concerned with Islam, they became more aware of their religious values. All these end results were unintended and even unwanted effects of the state's disciplinary mechanism that acted in favor of Muslims in Dearborn that led them to go through a transition, experience Islam in a new and active way, and turn them into who they are today.

3.3. Unintentional Effects of Border Controls on Individuality

Even before 9/11, American's perception about the role of immigrants, whether or not the influx of newcomers from other countries strengthens the United States, was a heated debate. (Jones, Cox, Gaston & Dionne Jr. 2011, 4). After each incident including and following 9/11 both in and outside America such as Boston, San Bernardino, Paris and Syria, issues of security, tolerance, religious freedom, and pluralism – matters that lie at the heart of what it means to be American – were discussed repeatedly. On each cycle of these discussions, opinions on the issue converged towards the Republicans who cast immigration in a more negative light than Democrats and independents. (Jones, Cox, Gaston & Dionne Jr. 2011, 19 - 23). Especially with the Tea Party movement after 2009 (Moffet 2015) and Donald Trump's candidacy for President of the United States, hardline policies towards illegal immigrants and border control came to be more out-spoken. Gradually, the United States moved away from its commitment to its core principle and nationality-based policies to a Republican point of view towards a redesigned immigration enforcement machinery that is conceived, driven and funded with the central goal of advancing national security. (Chishti & Bergeron 2011).

Borders are not only geographical entry points of a country, but also social identifiers of its ideological codes by segregating and disaggregating all those who pass through. (Chacón 2012). In Bushian terms borders manifest distinct and exclusive practices of power to render who is "good" and "bad." One of the first state responses to 9/11 was the implementation of new forms of border controls. (Sharma 2006, 135). According to Nandita Sharma, these controls strengthened the common sense association between terrorism and migration, not just of any people but of non-

White men, the not-so-new "barbarians" of Western civilization. (Ibid). According to her, border checks that are seen as protecting the nation, are largely ideological. (Sharma 2006, 136).

Supporting Sharma's assertions, Steve Cohen argues that border controls are the further entrenchment of a global apartheid where ones nationality, and nationality alone, is seen as a legitimate instrument of discrimination calling it "the passport culture." (Cohen 2003, 125). Like Sharma Cohen also believes that, in the camouflaged politics of the War on Terror where immigration controls and border checks are seen as protecting the nation, such measures hide from view the fact that border controls are largely ideological. By naming certain people as non-Americans, what is accomplished is the naturalization of their degradation and lack of entitlement in spaces where they are cast as both existential and juridical foreigners. (Cohen 2003). As such, border controls operate both as signifiers and barriers that struggle to separate America's own ideology and ideas from others, sometimes by force but constantly in the form of social isolation. (Chacón 2012). As Edward Said describes; struggle over geography is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imagining. (Said 2014, 7).

Due to its close proximity to Canada, residents of Dearborn have close socio-economic and cultural trans-border relations and cross the border regularly. Following 9/11, discrimination because of their nationality and naturalization of their degradation during these crosses have become part of their regular experience. Living in the Islamic Capital of the United States, they were aware of their panopticon, that they lived under constant surveillance. What border controls made them equally aware that they were under constant suspicion. It was their responsibility to prove that they were harmless and not the other way around unlike

regular citizens of the United States, which became an open declaration of their supposed foreignness and otherness.

The Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) reports a significant increase in problems facing Arab Americans at points of ingress and egress from the United States which include issues with watch, inexplicably prolonged stops and the apparently arbitrary nature of many detentions and delays. (ADC 2008). Most of the problems involve officers with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) services. Among the ongoing problems with CBP has been a lack of outreach from the service itself to the general public. Very few travelers have a complete understanding of CBP procedures and regulations, and therefore those caught up in enforcement procedures often experience heightened levels of alarm and panic. Additionally, unlike Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Department of Justice (DOJ) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CBP has no office where civil rights or any equivalent grievances can be addressed. ADC reports that the U.S. - Canada border crossing near Detroit, Michigan has been particularly noteworthy in terms of difficulties for Muslims using this crossing. (Ibid.)

Dearborn resident Ali Nasser is one of the many individuals that has experienced ideological sanctions while crossing the Canadian border. Ali took a family trip to Canada with his wife and two young children on April 2012. Both he, his wife and children were American citizens, had proper identification including their passports, driver's licenses and birth certificates with them. Still, none of these were enough to prevent him from being arrested, detained and handcuffed allegedly because officers were looking for someone else with the same name as him. He stayed in custody for three and a half hours while his wife and two children waited in

another room. He was asked whether he financially contributed to the political groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. He was questioned about everything from where his other children went to school to why he had moved to Michigan. His wife was carrying her daughter's homework in her purse written in Arabic. Officials made copies of the homework because of the writing on it. They removed the chip from their camera and looked through the family photos from the trip where they visited Niagara Falls. (Dado 2012).

"I hear more horror stories about crossing the border than I do about airports. I try to avoid going to Canada", Ali says. His wife agrees that she wouldn't visit Canada for another family trip." (Ibid.)

Wissam Charafeddine, a business owner in Dearborn with no criminal history and a liaison for a public school district, is another case. Between 2008 and 2012 Wissam drove to Canada five times and during each of his visits, he was handcuffed and detained at the U.S. - Canada border on his way back home for three to eight hours. As a result of this repeated experience, he learned the names of CBP officers at the border and even how to properly apply the procedures. During one of his trips, he directed a rookie officer on how to take his fingerprints. (U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 2013, 4 – 5).

Wissam says that he was given the same excuse every time he asked why he was stopped at the border. Officials told him it was part of their standard procedures. While in custody, items inside his car were investigated, he was forced to undergo a body search, his relatives were placed in a separate room with security officials and he was asked up to 100 questions. He was asked whether he was a Shiite or Sunni Muslim, what Mosque he prays at, who the Imam there was, whether he has contributed to any political groups and who he was affiliated with in Dearborn. He

says that he felt like he was being interrogated. “Even the officer was rolling his eyes because of the questions he had to ask me”, he describes. (Dado 2012).

His problems don’t end with CBP. His detentions which are part of his official records cause airport security to take extra precautions each time he travels by plane. (Ibid.)

Abdulrahman Cherri (22), another Dearborn resident born in Ohio, experienced an incident during his trip to his fiancée in Windsor, Ontario, when he was stopped at the American side of the U.S. - Canada border on his way back home. His car was searched with dogs. The officials took his picture and fingerprints. “A male officer touched my male body parts and squeezed them”, says Cherri. (Brand-Williams & Esparza 2011). His detention and prolonged questioning about his religion on when he prayed, where he worshiped and whether he knew any terrorists lasted several hours. Abdulrahman passed the border six more times the following year and each time this practice was repeated. (U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 2013, 3 - 4).

Dr. Ali Suleiman Ali, a Muslim religious leader, imam, scholar and community advocate originally from Ghana is another example. Dr. Ali crossed the U.S. - Canada border and a number of U.S. international airports. Both at the Canada border and airports, Ali was handcuffed, subjected to prolonged detentions and hours of questioning about his religious philosophy, religious views, religious practices and the locations at which he worships. Officials have not provided him a reason for being subjected to the above treatment. (U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 2013, 5 - 6).

Kheireddine Bouzid is another Muslim who experienced disturbing border control practices. On August 24, 2008, Kheireddine crossed the U.S. - Canada border

to reenter the United States. His vehicle was surrounded by armed CBP Agents with their guns drawn. He was handcuffed, subjected to an invasive body search, a prolonged detention lasting several hours and questioning about his religion and religious practices. (U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 2013, 6 - 7).

After that day Kheireddine crossed the same border more than four times until July, 2010. Each time, his vehicle was surrounded by armed CBP Agents with their guns drawn. Bouzid was handcuffed, subjected to an invasive body search, fingerprinted, detained for several hours and questioned about his religion and religious practices including his place of worship, whether he prays five times a day, which Islamic sect he follows and whether he prays his early morning prayer at his primary place of worship. (Ibid.)

At the moment, Abdulrahman Cherri, Wissam Charafeddine, Ali Suleiman Ali and Kheireddine Bouzid are plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit that Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) filed against U.S. CBP and FBI over the repeated detention of Muslims and their religious beliefs and practices by federal agents at and inside the U.S. - Canada border. (U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 2013).

CAIR is filing the lawsuit on behalf of American citizens who reported that CBP and FBI agents detained and handcuffed them without evidence of wrongdoing and questioned them about their religious beliefs and worship habits. The suit claims that the four plaintiffs' first amendment rights were violated. (U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division 2013, 8 - 9).

On June 11, 2013, Federal District Court gave green light to the case ruling that parts of the case can go forward, despite the government's attorneys attempt to have the case tossed. The case is still in progress. (Silver 2013).

The ideological sanctions implied on Muslims at the U.S. - Canada border are not a perplexing outcome according to Nandita Sharma. In her article White Nationalism, Illegality and Imperialism: Border Control as Ideology she explains the disciplinary techniques and procedures applied that caused this situation.

According to Sharma, the fact that the War on Terror is being fought on civilizational terms became starkly evident with major legislative changes in Canadian immigration policy following 9/11. One of the first changes was the December 2001 signing of a Smart Border Declaration between Canada and the United States. This declaration harmonized the entry visa requirements between the two countries resulting a greater number of people needing visas to enter Canada. (Sharma 2006, 136). Moreover, information exchanges and coordinated intelligence activities to screen travelers were brought into force and airlines were compelled to hand over passenger lists to the government. (Sharma 2006, 136 - 137). This led to the practice of radicalized profiling of air travelers where many non-White men, in particular those "perceived to be Muslim" were routinely and disproportionately targeted for extra scrutiny at both national and international transit points; the experience of harassment known as "travelling while Brown." (Sharma 2006, 137).

Sharma explains that in concordance to the Smart Border Declaration, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that failed refugee claimants facing torture or death in their country of origin could be legally deported if deemed to be a serious risk to national security without the need to demonstrate the specificity of the threat or reveal the sensitive information used to come to this conclusion, thereby giving the

state new and arbitrary powers of deportation. Until this date in Canada, those who have been detained and threatened with deportations to places where they will likely face torture or execution have all been non-White men. (Sharma 2006, 137).

In March 2002, again under the rubric of the War on Terror, Canada and the United States agreed to deploy joint customs teams to screen shipping containers at ports in Canada, thereby extending the reach of the state's border controls. During this legislative fury, the Canada - U.S. border became increasingly militarized. (Sharma 2006, 137). In April 2002, a new U.S. military zone stretching from the Arctic to Mexico was created. Called the "Northern Command", its head was empowered to deploy armed troops, tanks, warships and combat aircraft in defense of the borders. (Sharma 2006, 136). Together, these changes in citizenship and immigration policy along with the heightened attention paid to border controls are a significant aspect of the Canadian State's interpretation of "this is not, however, just America's fight" and its support to the United States for the War on Terror. (Sharma 2006, 122 and 128).

In Foucauldian terms, Sharma's explanations are an extension of the panopticon created following 9/11, implementing certain policies, programs and technologies in particular that of data collection, surveillance, documentation and processing of individual information, and classification of various categories of immigrants. The information captured, which now includes biographic, immigration and criminal histories of individuals, are shared among law enforcement agencies in a fashion unprecedented before 9/11. (Chishti 2013, 1). These data collection and interlinked database technologies give the power to the disciplinary society to "examine", "document" and perform a "binary operation" on individuals in a number of ways and in a number of places; before they are granted a visa to travel to the

United States, at the points of entry and after their entry to the country. (Chishti & Bergeron 2011).

Chishti & Bergeron summarize these technologies of power below;

1. Visa Security Program: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's program screens visa applications against terrorist watch lists and other intelligence data.
2. US-VISIT: The U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology program, collects biometric information for all noncitizens admitted to the country. The program which has been in place since 2009 in almost all land, sea and air ports of entry has over 108 million individual fingerprint records.
3. SEVIS: The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System checks the biographical information of foreign students. Schools are required to report when a student applies for classes, drops out or changes a major.
4. ESTA: The Electronic System for Travel Authorization requires foreign travelers who are permitted to enter the United States without a visa to submit their biographic information before boarding a U.S. bound plane, with the data screened against watch lists and other databases. (Chishti & Bergeron 2011).

Additional to these technologies of power, a number of procedures and levels of application were launched as disciplinary exercises following 9/11.

5. The National Fugitive Operation Program launched in 2003, examines and removes noncitizens who had failed to depart the country after

final orders of removal. Between 2003 and 2010, the program's annual budget grew from $9 million to $230 million. More than 104 fugitive operation teams are active today, up from 8 in 2003, which arrested over 35,000 individuals in 2010.

6. Secure Communities launched in 2008 identifies removable immigrants when they are booked into local jails for criminal offenses. In 2010, 90.937 noncitizens were arrested or booked through this identification.
7. Most criticized, The 287(g) Program launched in 2013 deputizes state and local law enforcement officers to perform the functions of federal immigration agents granting them access to federal immigration databases.

   (Chishti & Bergeron 2011).

Again, like the other methods of discipline, most of these technologies, procedures, applications of disciplinary power and examination, failed to achieve what was intended in Dearborn. Rather than normalizing the individuals, they amplified the positive effects of power described in the previous chapter contributing in the development and individuality of the Muslims in the city.

In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes how this dilemma operates. According to him, "infinite examination" in the modern age results in the development of the individual and not otherwise. (Foucault 1977, 186 - 194).

Examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, classify and punish the individual. It establishes over individuals

a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them. (Foucault 1977, 184). Border controls, a form of discipline, enforcing its qualification, classification, differentiation, judgement and punishment processes, asserts the principles of how individuals should behave or isolates them if they behave otherwise with permissive and restrictive instruments.

The examination during the border controls also introduces the individual into the field of documentation. Border examination leaves behind itself a whole meticulous archive constituted in terms of bodies and days. The examination that places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents that "capture" and "fix" them. The procedures of border examination simultaneously accompanies by a system of intense registration and of documentary accumulation which constitutes a "power of writing", an essential part in the mechanisms of discipline. The power of writing makes the formalization, correlation and the accumulation of documents possible and allows the organization of comparative fields, making it possible to classify, form categories, determine averages and fix norms. (Foucault 1977, 189).

Having once examined at the border and surrounded by all its documentary techniques, each individual becomes a case. The ordinary, the everyday individual no longer remains below the threshold of description (Foucault 1977, 191). This again points out a change in history. During the era of the sovereign, the regular person was by no means an individual. It was only the privileged who were able to "document" any semblance of individuality or rituals of their power for future memory, may it be a chronicle, a historiography, a monument, a painting or a biography. The more one possessed power or privilege, the more one was marked as an individual. (Foucault 1977, 191 - 192).

The end of the monarch disbanded ascending individualization as well as its forces of surveillance. Descending individualization replaced the old model. In this model, documents were no longer a monument for future memory but references for possible use. Instead of those with the most power receiving the greatest individualization, it became those who are lacking power that become highly individualized. Calling this "the reversal of the political axis of individualization", Foucault describes this concept as a procedure of objectification and subjection; (Foucault 1977, 193).

> The child, the patient, the madman, the prisoner, were to become, with increasing ease from the eighteenth century and according to a curve which is that of the mechanisms of discipline, the object of individual descriptions and biographical accounts. This turning of real lives into writing is no longer a procedure of heroization; it functions as a procedure of objectification and subjection. The carefully collated life of mental patients or delinquents belongs, as did the chronicle of kings or the adventures of the great popular bandits, to a certain political function of writing; but in a quite different technique of power. (Foucault 1977, 192).

What Foucault tries to mention in this description is that in a disciplinary regime, individualization is descending. As power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualized. In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than the adult, the patient is more individualized than the healthy man, the insane more individualized than the sane, the prisoner more individualized than the freeman.

(Foucault 1977, 192). In this sense, following 9/11 Muslims in Dearborn became more individualized than Christians. Through their experience of the effects of power, Muslims in the city gained their individuality, became self-aware and elevated their identity to a new level despite the exclusion, discrimination, prejudice and violence that they experienced both inside and outside the borders, confirming that power is not only oppressive but also productive, producing positive effects even in its most radical form.

3.4. All American Muslim: Success in Failure

All American Muslim, is a Reality Show about the lives of Muslim families from Dearborn aired on TLC, The Learning Channel, between November 13, 2011 and January 8, 2012.

"What's it like to be a Muslim and living in the United States?" TLC claims to find out, as the series offers sections of the customs and celebrations of American Muslims, as well as the misconceptions, conflicts and differences they face both outside and within their own community. Each episode follows the daily lives of six "ordinary" American Muslim families in Dearborn;

- Amen, Shadia & Jeff:

  Shadia who calls herself an outspoken Muslim decorated with piercings and tattoos, gets married to Jeff, an Irish Catholic converting to Islam.

- Aoude, Nawal & Nader:

  A newlywed couple expecting their first baby, Aoude's work to strike the right balance between their traditional Muslim roots and American culture.

- Bazzy-Aliahmad, Nina & Ali:

  Nina who defines herself as an attractive and strong woman, not satisfied running a wedding hall, tries to venture off on her own to open a nightclub in Dearborn.

- Fawaz, Samira and Ali:

  Struggling with fertility issues, Samira considers putting on the Hijab in order to be closer to God and hopefully blessed with a child.

- Jafaar, Angela & Mike:

  Angela and her husband Mike, a deputy chief sheriff, juggle their careers with raising their four children in a modern Muslim family.

- Zaban, Zaynab & Fouad:

  As coach of a football team, Fouad, who later gets invited to Iftar by President Barack Obama at the White House, shifts his team's summer practice schedule in Ramadan by flipping to night workouts since a majority of the players are Muslims. (TLC 2011).

In Orientalism, Edward Said narrates that until the end of the seventeenth century the Ottoman peril lurked alongside Europe to represent for the whole of Christian civilization a constant danger. In time European civilization incorporated that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues and vices, as something woven into the fabric of life. (Said 2003, 68). In Renaissance England alone, as Samuel Chew recounts in his classic study The Crescent and the Rose, "a man of average education and intelligence" had at his fingertips, and could watch on the London stage, a relatively large number of detailed events in the history of Ottoman Islam and its encroachments upon Christian Europe. (Ibid.) He argues that, what remained

current about Islam was some necessarily diminished version of those great dangerous forces that it symbolized for Europe. Like Walter Scott's Saracens, the European representation of the Muslim, Ottoman or Arab was always a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient. (Said 2003, 68). To a certain extent the same is true of the methods of contemporary learned Orientalists, whose subject is not so much the East itself as the East made known, and therefore less fearsome, to the Western reading public. (Said 2003, 60).

Said's arguments is also true of the methods of contemporary learned Orientalists post 9/11, whose subject is not so much Islam itself. TLC's All American Muslim is the output of this methodology; to make Islam known and therefore less fearsome to the American television audience. The reception of Islam in the series does not tend to understand Islam by putting how it is mentioned in the Qur'an or referred in the Hadiths into consideration. It does not get concerned about how Muslims in Dearborn think or what they do either. TLC's methodology, which is also its marketing strategy, is producing an analogues and sympathetic form of "domesticated" Muslimness represented in a form that would convince, please and relieve Christians. The network predicts to benefit from this strategy by commoditizing this relieving representation, which is presumed to attract the network's viewers and consequently advertisers who wish to reach to these viewers.

The methodology of making Islam known and less fearsome can be noticed by how the show is introduced in the media. Below is New York Times' introduction of the series;

> Any reasonably sentient person who watches 'All-American Muslim' will get the point: It's silly to think that these hard-working, family-oriented Michiganders – whatever their political views or feelings

> about Israel might be – represent some sort of danger to the republic. (Hale 2011).

What we read in this summary is various effects of power on multiple layers. On one layer we read about a strategy to please and relieve the Christian TV audience by making Muslims less fearsome. On another layer we read about various tactics to attract Muslim viewers. Above all layers we read the construction of an idea of Muslims, an operation to show what the perfect or acceptable Muslim looks like. But the series succeeded none of these; to convince, please or relieve the Christian audience, attract Muslim viewers or construct its idea. The show got canceled due to low ratings only after airing eight episodes failing its strategies, tactics and operations.

Critics began when a Christian conservative individual from Tampa, Florida named David Caton who calls himself the Florida Family Association, warned that the TLC show "hides the Islamic agenda's clear and present danger to American liberties and traditional values." Complaining in a way that the show was not "stereotypical enough", Caton announced that The Learning Channel's propaganda was clearly designed to counter legitimate and present-day concerns about many Muslims who were advancing Islamic fundamentalism and Sharia law. (Kenally 2011). According to Caton the show profiled only Muslims that appeared to be ordinary folks while excluding many Islamic believers whose agenda posed a clear and presented danger to liberties and traditional values that the majority of Americans cherish. The program was attempting to manipulate Americans into ignoring the threat of jihad and to influence them to believe that being concerned

about the jihad threat would somehow victimize these nice people in this show. (Tashman 2011).

Caton's criticism could have been easily ignored, if it had not gained the support of other religious right groups and corporate advertisers. Only a few examples of this support; Bill Johnson, the president of The American Decency Association, argued that the show was a complete whitewash designed to make Muslim community appear attractive. He told OneNewsNow "and that's what makes it so dangerous, we've been watching it over these several weeks that it's been broadcast and they stay very conveniently away from jihad or anything of that nature." (Groening 2011).

Director of Jihad Watch Robert Spencer shared that although it would never happen for obvious reasons, All-American Muslim would be much more interesting if it tracked one of its secular, attractive nominal Muslims as he decided to get more serious about his faith and ended up participating in jihad activity or Islamic supremacist efforts to demonize and marginalize those who resist that activity. "Instead all that All-American Muslim gave us is a denunciation of Islamophobia featuring Muslims who could never have conceivably inspired any suspicion of Islam in the first place", Spencer said. (Spencer 2011).

Pamela Geller, the author of Stop the Islamization of America: A Practical Guide to the Resistance argued that the danger of the show was in the deception and obfuscation of the truth, which resulted in the intellectual disarming of the American people. All-American Muslim was trying to show nominal Muslims as the norm, as if their existence took away the threat from devout Muslims. (Krepel 2011).

Lowe's Home Improvement, the world's second-largest home improvement retailer, pulled their advertisements from the show following Caton's

announcements, but the company found itself facing a backlash. Celebrities like Russell Simmons, Kal Penn and Mia Farrow condemned Lowe's. (Adams 2011). Jon Stewart and Aasif Mandvi mocked the company in their late-night talk The Daily Show. (Martel 2011). Representative Keith Ellison from the District of Minnesota, the first Muslim American elected to Congress, issued a statement condemning Lowe's for deciding to "uphold the beliefs of a fringe hate group and not the creed of the 1st Amendment." (Li 2011). Calling Lowe's decision "un-American" and "naked religious bigotry", California Senator Ted Lieu requested a formal apology from Lowe's to Muslims and told he would consider legislative action otherwise. As a result, the company shared that they had a strong and longstanding commitment to diversity and inclusion, and apologized if they have made anyone question that commitment. (Ibid.)

Kayak, an online traveling website was another company to pull its advertisements from the show. Later the company CEO and Cofounder Steve Hafner published an apology titled "We Handled This Poorly." Hafner concluded his apology "lastly, I watched the first two episodes. Mostly, I just thought the show sucked." (Hafner 2011). As a matter of fact, Hafner was not alone in his feelings.

The show didn't get off to a terrible start. Lowe's backslash and the controversies about the show attracted viewers' attention. The premiere earned a 0.9 rating among adults 18-49 and 1.74 million viewers. (O'Connell 2011).

Laila Lalami talks about how she gained interest towards watching the series as a result of the controversies. At first, since the ordinariness of a Muslim life is something she experienced every day, she felt no need to have it demonstrated for her on television. But Lalami shares that all of that changed when she heard that

Lowe's had decided to pull its advertising from the show. Her curiosity was piqued. (Lalami 2011).

But the majority of Muslim viewers who felt the need to watch the show detached from the series following right after the first episode, dissatisfied with the way Muslims were represented. They criticized the show of drawing a monolithic portrait of Muslims in the United States, reducing the lives and beliefs of a very diverse community to the representation of Shia, who are a minority constituting less than 10% of the entire Muslim population in the country. As a result of this detachment, on its second episode the number of the show's viewers dropped more than half. Failure was inevitable. TLC had no chance but to cancel the show as early as its eighth episode.

According to Sohrab Ahmari, a Shia American himself, the TLC reality show didn't do enough to display the theological and intellectual diversity of Islam in the U.S.;

> If you've recently started a new job or embarked on a graduate degree, chances are you've had to engage in some sort of cultural-sharing exercise designed to promote diversity and inclusion. You know the drill: sitting in a circle, each person tells his or her story — or, to use the proper nomenclature, offers his or her narrative. Participants from 'subaltern' backgrounds are expected to tell stories of repression and exclusion; those who come from the 'dominant culture,' meanwhile, must 'unpack' their own privileges and wicked biases in front of the group.
>
> …

> In some ways, All-American Muslim, TLC's new reality-TV show documenting the lives of five families in the Arab enclave of Dearborn, Mich., is this culture-sharing exercise writ large. As the title suggests, the show aims to expose a broad audience to the day-to-day lives of American Muslims who, while assimilated into the culture, must nevertheless balance the various aspects of their identities.
>
> …
>
> But the show does not go nearly far enough in terms of exposing American-Muslims' ethnic, theological, and intellectual diversity. For one thing, most of the show's characters are Lebanese Shia. And just as The Real Housewives of D.C. intercuts the ladies' drama with shots of the Capitol and the White House, so does All-American Muslim establish its setting by repeatedly cutting to the Islamic Center of America, a Shiite place of worship – in effect implying that the mega-mosque is American Islam's capital. The clerics who advise the characters on doctrinal matters, too, are invariably Shiite.
>
> …
>
> More troubling still is the show's overemphasis on theological matters and its overly deferential editorial attitude toward the Shia clerical class. (Ahmari 2011).

The show's misrepresentation of Muslims was unacceptable for the majority of Muslims. For Ali Aman, the co-creator of 30 Mosques in 30 Days who drove over 25,000 miles with his friend Bassam Tariq to each of the 50 states to tell unfiltered stories about Muslim Americans, the show didn't speak for them, nor did it speak for

him. According to Aman the stories bore little resemblance to the narratives of his own or the ones he has stumbled across in his community. “TLC has disappointed me”, he offered. (Aman 2011). Thousands of viewers shared similar views that the show was hardly about Islam.

It wasn’t until the final episode that one of the cast members, Suehaila Amen, revealed that the show was not about Islam after all. When asked about her thoughts on whether the show was an accurate portrayal of Islam in America and was it even possible for one show to represent all Muslims in America, Suehaila responded that people need to understand that the show wasn’t representative of the entire Muslim community. “The show wasn’t about Islam.” She explained that the show was about American families who happen to be Muslims. (D. Ali 2012).

Still, All American Muslim did contribute to the Muslim community in a number of ways. According to Sohrab Ahmari the show deserves praise for capturing at least some of the internal debates within Western Islam. (Ahmari 2011). Also, the controversy about the show allowed the community a precious insight. Laila Lalami expresses her gratefulness for the show for this reason;

> What this makes quite plain is that, in this great nation of ours, you can have a television show about little girls whose eyebrows are waxed in preparation for a beauty pageant, about a Mormon polygamist with four wives and seventeen children, about sixteen-year-olds who get pregnant, and about heiresses who can’t spell a word that doesn’t have the letter K in it. There won’t be a campaign against advertisers. But a show about ordinary Muslims? Stop with the crazy! David Caton won’t have it.

> In a way, I'm actually grateful for this controversy because it reminds me, in case I had allowed myself to forget, that the very idea of Muslims' ordinariness is subject to debate in this country. By denying their Muslim compatriots the right to be boringly normal, what TV-bashing bigots do is restrict and define for the rest of us what it means to be All-American." (Lalami 2011).

The show also mediated as an additional source of motivation for Muslims in the United States with its misrepresentation of Islam which took the form of actionable discourse. Answering the question "is the show a perfect cross-section of the American Muslim demographic and a good representation of the Muslims in the United States", "no", Khurram Dara advises Muslims who don't think that the show represents them, to go out into their community and show people what being Muslim is all about, from their perspective. According to Dara whether it's a book club or a basketball league, Muslims can all have their own "All American Muslim" moments. (Dara 2011).

But the biggest success of the show lies in its failure. Before the show aired, the cast of TLC's All American Muslim addressed the TV press to give a singular message: "we're just like you." In this meeting Suehaila Amen from The Amens said "people have been waiting 10 plus years to show the world that we're just like you. They love the fact that they're given the opportunity. They feel like they're misrepresented." (L. Rose 2011).

The show's failure showed that it turns out they weren't waiting for anything such. What the producers and the isolated cast of the show had failed to comprehend, that Muslims had walked a long way to earn their individuality following 9/11.

Incurably, TLC was trying to re-animate Muslims before 9/11, the previous generation of American Muslims who, as Ali-Karamali describes, wanted to stay quiet and assimilate into American life and not rock the boat (Ali-Karamali 2012). Following 9/11, Muslims in the United States had started actively participating in organizations, taking part in protests and elevating their Muslim identity to a new level. Either with their Hijab, their beard, their outfit or by openly expressing themselves by other means of communication, they made sure that they were "known" as Muslims. They gained their individuality in the process. For them, the show's message "we're just like you" was highly dissatisfactory. In fact, what they really felt was that "no two Muslims were alike."

It also turned out that Muslims in the United States were not desperately in need of a TV medium to "communicate." They were interacting quite effectively in the public and especially the social media in their own terms. Hence, they were not desperately waiting for 10 plus years to be misrepresented; they were not "ok" for one stereotype to be replaced with another. As much as they didn't want to be perceived as "terrorists", they didn't want to be counter-stereotyped as hookah smoking, party planning, overly spending, fashion obsessed, pierced and tattooed consumerists. They not only rejected the show, but also successfully managed to convince the show's target audience that they were watching a monolithic and reduced misrepresentation, affecting the show's ratings directly.

In this context, the failure of TLC's All American Muslim should be interpreted as a success for the Muslims in the United States in terms of resisting the effects of power. It should be regarded as a proof of the elevated identity, growing self-awareness and increasing individuality of "All American Muslims" following 9/11.

3.5. Interviews with Muslims in Dearborn

To have a closer look at the lives of Muslims in Dearborn, their experience of the radical effects of power following 9/11 and the end results of these effects, I performed various interviews with Muslims in the city and the members of MSA (Muslim Students Association) at the University of Michigan - Dearborn. I selected the inputs of Muslims among the participants who had been outside the United States multiple times and on long occasions to get their opinions about the differences of being a Muslim in America and in countries where Muslims are the majority. Their answers bear definite traces of the positive effects of power, confirming Foucault's assertions. Following is a selection of these interviews.

3.5.1. The Participants

Anna: Anna is 19 years old. She is a psychology senior at the University of Michigan.

Amal: Amal is from India, raised in the United States.

Amina: Amina is 18 years old. She is a student at the University of Michigan studying optometry, involved in Muslim Students Association (MSA).

Amira: Amira is from Yemen, raised in the United States.

Bukhari: Bukhari is 20 years old. She is a junior at the University of Michigan studying marketing. Bukhari is involved in MSA.

Farah: Farah is 20 years old. She is a pharmacy student at the University of Michigan.

Mariam: Mariam is 21 years old. She is in her fifth year at the University of Michigan doing a travelling graduate and coordinator. She is planning to get a master in social work and do family counseling with her degree.

Madinah: Madinah is a psychology student.

3.5.2. The Meaning of Islam for Muslims in Dearborn

After getting to know the participants I initially asked what Islam meant for them and where they positioned it in their lives. Islam plays a central role in the lives of all participants in terms of structure, guidance and perspective.

> **Anna:** Being a Muslim means worshiping Allah to the best of my ability and making sure that I follow everything that he says correctly and making sure that I have a strong connection with God.
>
> **Farah:** I would say that Islam is like a structure of your life, in that whenever you have a question, it kind of answers it. And it gives you a stability in your life and it also helps you when you don't know what to do, I guess.
>
> **Mariam:** I agree. I would say it's kind of a guide in your life. If you don't know what else to do with your time, if you don't have anything like to believe in it.
>
> **Amina:** I value it a lot, and yes, it is a guide for me, of course. And I feel like the more I learn about it, the more I love it and the more I practice it, the happier I am.
>
> **Madinah:** What does Islam mean? I think firstly it's the oneness of Allah, and valuing that at the top. I want to say it's a complete role,

but obviously we go up and down with in throughout my life and at times it would be the first, sometimes it would be third. Being honest. And, yes, that's it basically.

Bukhari: Okay. So, for me – absolutely I think everyone here – I was born Muslim. I went to an Islamic School. Islam to me, it kind of serves in my life the kind of lens that I look through to view the universe, and religion and God. Like, that was the view point I was given. So, it's kind of like the perspective I was given to stand out to look at whatever I'm looking at. And for me, it serves as a place to ask a lot of questions and to answer some of my questions, in terms of the universe, God, religion, in that sense. Where it stands in my life. I'm at a place in my life, I'm young. I'm meeting new people from the university and stuff. Having a lot of questions and it's serving as a kind of forum to begin that search, I guess. For some people think that they found but for me it's like a tool that for me to search.

3.5.3. A Regular Day of Muslims in Dearborn

"A regular day in the lives of Muslims in Dearborn" was one of my first set of questions. Most participants responded to this question that besides being a Muslim, they had a regular life. Muslim students, organizing constant events on different issues during the school term, expressed their tight schedule. Their activeness was an example how Muslims in Dearborn rid themselves of their inertia, recuperated their faith, overcame their fear and started taking active roles within their community resisting separation with integrity.

Anna: My regular day? I don't know, it's just, I mean I guess it depends if its summer. But I mean in the fall or in the winter I just like get up, I go to school. I have meetings. I organize.

Me: You have a tight schedule?

Anna: I do. I do have a tight schedule and it's not normal at all. I do a lot of, I organize a lot of events, so I'm part of the Muslim Students Association.

Me: I know you are very active. You have like at least three events every week, one after the prayer, one for girls, almost a few lectures every month.

Anna: Yes, we make sure to have constant events on different issues.

Me: Do you usually meet at the mosque or other places? I just want to know what the importance of the mosque in Dearborn is.

Anna: The mosque is used for like a meeting point, we have a lot of events there. I am also part of the youth group, so I help facilitate groups, events for little girls and they have prayers and fundraising dinners. I mean I am really like going to the mosque all the time.

3.5.4. Being a Muslim in Dearborn

Asked about their experiences on being a Muslim in Dearborn both Amira and Amal shared that it wasn't too difficult to be raised as a Muslim in the city.

Amal: There's a lot of Muslim people in Dearborn.

Me: Yes, so it wasn't that difficult?

> **Amal**: No, it wasn't too difficult. I went to a private school when I was younger, then at some stage I went to a public school where I was not the only Muslim. One of a few Muslims were wearing hijab in the whole school. And usually in a lot of my classes I was the only one. So when I was there and then I came here, it was a big difference. And I feel like when I was there I have to worry a lot more about being a representation of Muslims. And I feel like a lot of the Muslim girls that I talk to and Muslim guys – they feel the same way – that they've had to sort of carry the burden of representation in a way. I don't know if you had to feel it like that because you feel like everyone you talk to you have to be, "See me. I'm Muslim. See what I'm like."
> **Amira:** Like for me, I went to a private school since Kindergarten up to 12th grade. I went to three different ones. I don't know, when I came out, it was easier for me. I do feel that I do have to represent Muslims. Alhamdulillah I don't feel that it's a burden. It is what it is. It's what I've always done.

It is substantial how Amal uses the phrase "see me, see what I'm like" as she is forced to internalize the disciplinary "gaze" of the panopticon. They both unite over the "feeling" of constant surveillance. Although they don't agree whether it is a burden or not, both Amal and Amira express how they have assumed responsibility for the constraints of power being exposed to maximum transparency.

Feeling safe from retaliation and discrimination in Dearborn compared to other parts of the United States is a common opinion. Both participants indicate that

being a Muslim on campus is especially a lot easier, where things are familiar, they feel they can interact, and are tolerated.

> **Amal:** But it's a lot easier on campus. I don't feel that way on the campus anymore because I feel like everyone else has interacted with other Muslims. We meet so many Muslims on campus. Everything is already familiar. We already kind of understand a lot of things about you that you don't feel you have to explain as much. And then I also feel like here, if I do something it would be like more representing me as an individual than of Muslims because people have other Muslims to compare me against. I'm glad I came here.

The group cheers and shouts "yes!" all at once when asked whether they feel like they are a close community. Despite their radical experience following 9/11, it seems that Muslims in Dearborn are enjoying all aspects of the city but the weather.

> **Bukhari:** When I moved to Pakistan I was depressed, and then I came back here and I was very depressed, because it was just high school and high school really sucks for the most part and the whole thing, and I was like "we could have moved anywhere." We could have moved to Florida. We could have done California. Anywhere with nicer weather and all that stuff, but there was sense of community at least in our most of the area in our community, and in Dearborn, too. Since I go to University of Michigan Dearborn. When we were here the other day, you just text up some of the people, the Muslims that you know from Dearborn, and we just go and hang out for lunch. That's what I did the other day.

Farah: And there is actually people who moved out of Michigan and no matter what kind of community they move to and no matter what close ties, they've formed there in the new community, they miss Michigan Muslims so much. Because it's kind of just different here for some reason.

Amina: I mean, you know with each person. We're not saying that we're all happy, like all hugs and everything.

Farah: It's not literally, you just have that great sense of feeling welcome in the community and an acceptance and stuff. You just don't find that even 20 miles away.

Amina: Maybe because in Michigan, we don't have the good weather. In general we don't have that much fun stuff. All you have is just people. So, you might as well be nice to each other.

[Laughs.]

Mariam: I love Michigan. I love it, though. I can't ever hate on it.

Amina: I love Michigan in the summer. The past two weeks we had before it was rainy.

Mariam: It was beautiful.

Amina: It was awesome.

Mariam: It was like three weeks almost. It was gorgeous. And we took, was like why is the weather so good when it's good?

3.5.5. Being a Muslim Outside Dearborn

Understanding that their lives are relatively safe in Dearborn where they feel themselves at home and safe, I ask the participants about their experiences once they leave the city.

> **Amira:** I went to Boston. Spent some time over that weekend of bombing event. I was almost getting ready to cancel our trip, we weren't going to go any more, but we did go in the end. I felt like everywhere I go, I felt like I had to be hiding all the time.
>
> **Amal:** No, no. You honestly feel that way. Like when you're introducing yourself to people, you're like, "Hi, I'm not a terrorist." Like it kind of influences everything that you say. Not as much anymore, but when I was younger I saw that all the time.
>
> **Amira:** Yes. Definitely.
>
> **Amal:** When we go anywhere, when we go to the mall. If you go to a mall that's really far away or really upscale, and so, I feel like I had to be careful – not really careful – but just be aware of what I'm doing and what I'm saying in public.
>
> **Me:** Yes?
>
> **Amira:** I know that when I'm driving, it's particularly hard for me.
>
> **Me:** When you're driving? Why?
>
> **Amira:** I'm an aggressive driver.
>
> [Laughter.]
>
> **Me:** Really?

Amira: But I can't show it because when I get angry, I'll just, to myself I'll be like, "Oh my God, get out of the way," or whatever. But if someone is being aggressive, I can't be mad at him. I can't yell at him out the window even if he's totally wrong because I don't want to seem like that person, that angry Muslim, you know? But I'm not.

Amal: It's in that specific context.

Amira: Yes. And you know what people see on TV and on the Internet and everything and you're kind of like working to counteract it.

Amal: Yes. Counter balance it.

Amira: One thing that did surprise me, I have to say at the college, that high school that I went to where there weren't a lot of Muslims. I had thought that everybody, if they haven't met Muslims and they don't have an idea and they think that they're like some people, I guess they really didn't know about Muslims which is surprising to me. One time I was sitting in class and a girl was just like, "What do you call yourself?" There are still a few people who don't know anything good or bad, just don't know.

[Laughter.]

Listening to Amira and Amal I empathize with the pressure on them; trying to be a perfect example all the time so that everyone they interact with has a good impression about Muslims, while on another level resisting the effects of Islamophobia trying to prove that they are not terrorists. Having inscribed themselves in the power relations in which they simultaneously play both roles (Foucault 1995,

202 - 203), Amira and Amal have become the principles of their own subjection. They describe how they have internalized the imposed behavioral codes of the disciplinary society (Bălan 2013, 5), restraining them to yell out of the window while driving or step out of the line at the mall. In the meantime, they feel responsible to counteract and counter balance the prejudice in the media, urging to resist enmity with peace and rejection with understanding.

The rest of the group share similar experiences. Having internalized the disciplinary effects of power, they describe themselves almost as actors putting a solo performance into act, highly aware, perfectly individualized and constantly visible. (Foucault 1995, 200). Although the group expresses that they don't relate about this aspect of stereotyping anymore, being stereotyped into what people think of a Muslim, they complain that anything they do eventually becomes Islam.

> **Amina:** I've been to California and I've been to New York, and it's different. And I've been to North Carolina and they stare. And you don't want to make them uncomfortable by staring back, and you don't want –
>
> **Bukhari:** – No, you make them uncomfortable.
>
> [Laughter.]
>
> **Amina:** No, you just kind of, in a way you become what they think of a Muslim. So anything you do automatically becomes Muslim. So you have to watch what you're doing every single time, and like anything you do. Like instead of walking around and just being angry, you're on the phone and instead of being angry on the phone, you have to all of a sudden put on a smile and pretend like you're happy all the time.

But it is different, and it is more of an effort, and you realize how important it is to be a good role out there for being a Muslim.

Me: So, all the time you're acting because you have to be a good role model?

Amina: Not acting but you're more aware of what you're doing.

Me (referring to Amira): Sometimes, it might be acting, like you're angry in the traffic but you can't scream like you just–

Amina: Exactly.

[Laughter].

Me: But also when you're in Kansas you scream at people?

Amina: I don't scream at anybody. But yes, there are people blah, blah, blah, you are a Muslim, while I'm travelling, but I don't know, I don't see it that way, maybe I should, maybe I shouldn't. But to me, I am who I am.

Bukhari: Like when I was younger I didn't grow up around a lot of Muslims I lived in South but I just felt like when I went out there weren't a lot of Muslim schools there. And so then, I would be very nervous of when I went out in public. I would be very cautious of what I said, what I id. I would just be aware, and not myself. But then after I came to Canton with a lot of Muslims, and after I came to Dearborn with a lot of Muslims –

Amina: –Then it's just like whatever.

Bukhari: Yes, and then when I went out into a non-Muslim community, and when I got a lot of stares, it was easier for me to be myself, because I was so used to it.

Amina: Yes.

Bukhari: And I just, I couldn't care less, I'm just going to be who I am. So after I moved to Canton and Dearborn, I went to places like California, and Pennsylvania and Kentucky. Oh my God! That is where there were so many, I felt like there was just white people there it was hard to see anybody that was not white. And they would stare. There like it was, I felt Texas was going to be bad but it's so diverse, but Kentucky was like, I feel like it was hard for them, like oh my God, Muslim and like a family of eight people or seven when we walked into a restaurant everybody stared at us. But then I was so comfortable with who I was I didn't care. But I think if it happened before I moved to Canton, I would be like, I have to make sure I'm being good Muslim, or I have to make sure I'm portraying myself as good enough for them to generalize Muslims.

As members of MSA who take active roles in the community, the group rejects my opinions that their efforts won't change the negative opinions about Islam even if they reflect the best examples of Muslims that they can ever be. Although they agree on the difficulties of being held responsible for a whole group of people and that progress takes time, the group is very optimistic and keen that their efforts do make a difference.

Bukhari: It might, I mean I have no idea.

Amina: I think so. I think it does.

Me: It does, you think?

Mariam: I think it's the wrong idea that we have to act a certain way, that's the wrong idea. That's not fair for, because there have been a lot of Christians that have done terror, and we don't call every Christian a Terrorist. That's not fair for us to be like, "Oh, we have to act a certain way so they don't call us terrorists." In my opinion that's not fair, I'm not responsible for whole another group of people.

Bukhari: I think that they do change. I'm not saying "in one day." I'm saying if they see you repeatedly and they are always like, "Oh she's friendly", they're not going to be quick to say that all Muslims are terrorists, they will be like, "Well I know a Muslim, she's not bad," kind of thing. Because I know people who are like that. Who have gone from being super against it and who but then say, but I know a Muslim and they're not bad, so therefore, not all Muslims are bad.

Me: Sure. Yeah. It requires multiple contacts to work. I don't think it will change in just one day.

Bukhari: No not one day.

Mariam: I think it depends on what kind of mindset they have--

Bukhari: Yeah it depends on the person.

Mariam: And what they've been exposed to like thus far.

3.5.6. The Negative and Positive Effects of Power Following 9/11

Victims of Islamophobia, every Muslim I talked with in Dearborn has faced some sort of negative experience because of their identity following 9/11. (Svokos,

2015). The Runnymede Trust Report propounds that Muslims are exposed to violence of verbal abuse, vandalizing of property and physical assault. They are being excluded from government and politics, discriminated in provision of health and educational services and in employment. Their employment applications are being rejected and if employed they are excluded from management and responsibility. (The Runnymede Trust 1997). The group, emphasizing their relatively safely environment in Dearborn where they have found shelter, share how they confronted verbal abuse and discrimination, and were excluded from employment.

Me: Okay then. Did you encounter anything negative just because you are a Muslim?

Anna: Yes, for sure [laughs].

Me: Like?

Anna: I mean there is a lot of discrimination in terms of jobs applications. It is really hard to get a job when you are wearing a scarf, especially when you want to work with kids and they are like, "We are not going to let you get near to the kids." And like a lot of times you just get like ignorant people yelling things out, like, "You are a terrorist or you did this or you are the reason 9/11 happened" or whatever it is. But at the same time you have those negative people but they are so many more positives experiences and so many more people who are open minded and people who are willing to accept you that the negative things don't even count.

Buhkari: I want to say one specific thing. Honestly, growing up for the whole 20 years, I've never really experienced any real negative things from being Muslim or wearing hijab or anything, but the one

situation that I can say that I know I was discriminated against, or that was like a negative situation, I look back on it and I kind of laugh about it. But I probably shouldn't, but whatever. That's just my personality. I laugh at everything.

So, I was really young and I wore a hijab. I don't know if I was like 10 or 12. I might have been in middle school and I was with my cousin and we both were wearing hijabs and we were at her neighborhood and we were playing in the park and this one guy who was in his backyard, backed up to the park. We were climbing a tree, and the tree was near his house, but it was on the park property. He came and he got out, and he was really angry. And then he started yelling at us and they were like "What the heck, man?", and he goes "Why don't you go back to your country, why don't you take those rags off your head?" and we were mostly just really surprised, because he was just so angry and then he blurted that out and we were just like "okay, we're going to go home now." It didn't really upset me as much as it upset her. I was mostly just shocked, and just like "oh, there are people who get angry like that." But, that was the most negative thing. Other than that, everyone's been mostly gracious and, inquisitive if anything or they just avoided it if they felt awkward, I guess.

Farah: Again, I feel very privileged to be living in Michigan and here in Dearborn. I feel like we don't have to worry about people reacting in a bad way and sometimes, I just feel it's so great, I'm just like,

"wow." You know, I mean, I can't feel that I'm a minority and I just feel like that's so great. Because I guess on this campus, I'm not a minority. I don't know, but you know, it's just great to be treated like everybody else. But one time, me and my sister – this was in high school – we had to do community service hours for our high school, head of department. And so we went to the senior home and we went a few times, and then like the fourth or fifth time we had gone there, the manager or something, he finally saw us, and he was asking the people around "what are they doing here?" And then eventually came to talk to us and we were doing volunteer work, this was in a senior home and things run slow I guess, and so we were just doing whatever we had to do and obviously, we weren't like constantly going to be doing something, but after we had done our work, we just like kind of went to the side, and he came to us, and he was like, "What are you doing? Are you volunteering? Do you know what volunteering is?" And I was just like "Oh my God, are you serious?" And I think that was like my first time facing something one on one. And I was just like "Gosh."

Bukhari: Did he do that because you were Muslim or –

Farah: Yes. And I don't know how I could tell it, but that was apparent. But, yes, it wasn't just, because there were other kids that were volunteering there too. Not along with us at that time. But no, yes, there was one other guy. I think he was an older, Muslim guy. But you couldn't tell he was a Muslim boy. He was like a white person and he wasn't gone. But we were the ones that got rebuked and I just

remember feeling. I just remember people didn't – I don't want to say it was everybody – but you can tell when you're talking to a stranger that they just, or even for customer service, they just ignore you, or they just give you the cold shoulder, and they're attending to other customers.

Madinah: I got discriminated against once. I wasn't in Michigan, though.

Me: And how was that?

Madinah: I was young. I was like 15. And I wanted to use the bathroom. The lady was like "no." And my aunt, who was white with blond hair and blue eyes asked the same question and she got to go to the bathroom.

Bukhari: I'll just go behind, okay?

[Laughter.]

The group has mixed thoughts on whether being a Muslim is easier for boys or girls in terms of religious and racial profiling.

Me: Is it a little easier for the boys, because they don't have to wear a hijab and they can just, you know, camouflage in some way around the conversation?

Amina: I think so.

Bukhari: Yeah I don't know.

Me: Well, what's your opinion? I asked them also, and they said, no it isn't easier because people expect men to be terrorist rather than women, so we're having a harder time.

Madinah: Are you asking them in the context or Dearborn or just in general?

Me: In general. It's easier for everyone in Dearborn, I get that, but once you get outside the city it gets, I think, a little tougher.

Madinah: I guess it might depend on if you look like stereotypical Muslim.

Group: Yeah.

Madinah: Because, if they look like regular white boys, I don't think they have a problem with that.

Farah: Yes, I guess it depends on the whether or not you have white features or not, the brown and like okay, if six people are Hindu people because they are brown people, so they associate them with terrorism, or terrorists. Because you know, most people think that Muslims are terrorists, so I feel that would be a hard. Then I guess people look Arab and I guess facial hair too that they have like immigrant looking features or if they speak a different language, or if they don't speak English well, they're like. Or if their name is like Muhammad or Ahmed or like—

[Laughs. Crosstalk.]

On the other hand they all agree that the hijab attracts significantly more attention from curious observers. The group shares that next to hijab, they get a lot of questions about their marital status and are being stereotyped with other ethnic groups who resemble Muslims in some ways such as their outfits. A certain level of

self-confidence and an impression that they have passed beyond these issues can be sensed in their answers.

> **Amira:** There was one time where we were at the mall. And there was kind of one kid, he's Arabic. The guy's Arabic and he was asking my mom why my little sister – she was nine or 10 – wearing a hijab. And he asked her why my mom was forcing her to wear a hijab when she was that young. He was like, "let her get older." That was it. I don't even know if the guy was Muslim. I know he's Arabic.
>
> **Amal:** I feel like I'm a bit more sheltered than other people. I have been. Just because I have been mostly a part of Muslim communities growing up and diverse communities even like the towns and the cities that I've lived in, they've been diverse. So I don't feel that I have.
>
> **Amira:** People occasionally ask me, "Are you hot?" questions. But I don't think it's meant for that, really. Honestly. Some people say, "I would say hell is hotter." But, why would I say that? I feel like if somebody is brave enough to ask a question, I kind of respect that, honestly. Because I would rather that somebody asked me a question than just come up with their own assumptions.
>
> **Amal:** Sometimes people say it in a way that it's mean. We would just answer them like, "Thank you for your concern, no fuss. My skin's protected from UV rays." Also, me I tend to be a little bit more naive. Like, if somebody is mean to me, I don't assume it's because I'm Muslim. They've probably had a bad day. Or they're just a terrible

person. There's a million reasons why somebody could be that way. I do feel like some Muslims have a bit of a chip on their shoulder.

Amira: There's probably one or two who are not racist, but have prejudice against Muslims.

Amal: A lot of people, really, are unintelligible a lot. I would say, especially probably if you go to a place where there are fewer Muslims, you'd encounter that more

Me: So what kind of questions do you usually get? You said curiosity. Do you all agree that they ask you because they are curious?

Bukhari: I got asked the other day by a Walmart lady. She was like, "What is this called?" And I said, well the formal Arabic name is a hijab, but you can call it a scarf. And she goes, "So it's not a Turban?" [Laughs.]

Bukhari: I am like no, it's not a turban.

Amina: A lot of the question I would get is, if I were in the bathroom and I was fixing my scarf, and some woman would be like, how long do you take to put that on, or how do you wear it that way. It's mostly curiosity.

Me: Yes. What else except the scarf, what kind of questions do you get?

Farah: I've gotten questions about, how you get married.

Group: Yes! [Laughter.]

Farah: It's like you have a boyfriend, and I'm like, no, I don't date, and they're like oh why not. Because I'm Muslim and we don't do that.

Amina: And like do you get to choose who you get married to.

Me: Any of you are married here?

Group: No.

Me: None of you are married?

Amina: That's another thing. They are surprised when you say that you're not.

Me: Really?

Amina: Oh yeah, one day I went to my friend's house and she was like funny and it was my birthday when I went to her house, and then her mom came downstairs and I said, "Hi," and she was like, "Hey Mom, it's Amina's birthday today," and she was like, "Oh happy birthday, how old are you?" "I'm like 20," and she was like, "Oh, when are you getting married?" Right when she knew I was 20 she was like oh so you're getting married now right? Like that was the first question. It wasn't how has your birthday been, do you have any plans. She was like, "oh, are you married yet."

Me: Well.

Amina: It's probably like mostly for a Muslim woman a lot of the case.

Madinah: Yes, it's highly regarded.

Buhkari: I never get, like I don't have a frequently asked question, but I do remember somebody asked me, do you marry those guys with the "thing".

[Laughter.]

Buhkari: And they ask the question about Sikh people. They have to I guess. We wear something on our head and another time, and I

> explained we're a different religion. A couple of times people ask me what I'm doing in the bathroom when I'm making with that. They just kind of look at you and then when they know it's become too obvious, they just go ahead and ask, and I say thank you for asking. No matter what the question is, whether it's about prayer or what it is, I always make sure, to thank them for asking. Because I really, sometimes when I walk around or when I'm praying, I wonder if they know why I do what I do, and I think it's better for them to know from, you know, from a Muslim rather than to hear from the media. They have access to that far more than just a face-to-face individual contact.

I start questioning the negative and positive effects of power following 9/11 by asking if the participants have experienced drastic changes before and after the incident. They respond to my opinions about the pressure Muslims are facing, that they are feeling less of it lately. Also they put forward that although there had been a backlash in the beginning, 9/11 has led to more people asking questions about Islam and as a result to conversion. Their verification of the increasing rates of conversion in the United States (Neal 2012; Moses 2014; Rozemberg 2005) affirms another unintentional positive effect of power.

> **Amira:** I don't remember. I can't really make that comparison because I was so young. People who are older than me say that there was a change or at least what we thought it was I think. You'd probably want to go to some Muslim mosque and ask older people than us about that. They would be the ones to know, because they

would be interested in that more. We were still small. It wouldn't be the same.

Amal: We were at large dependent to our parents. We didn't even suffer things from our peers or anything because all our peers were Muslim.

Amira: I know some of my friends who were in public high school at the time; they said there was kind of a backlash.

Amal: Not that there was a backlash. My sister, she's older than me. She once told me that after that she got more questions from her classmates. I think she was in eighth or ninth grade at the time. And she was like, there's more people asking her questions that are not Muslim. They just want to know.

Amira: People have even converted to Islam because they started asking questions about Islam.

Amal: Yes.

Amina: I was in third grade. I remember I was in Islamic school. It was always interesting to me because from my view point, I did not really know of it like against a Muslim thing because when I saw it, when I experienced it, I came in from recess and my teacher was crying.

Me: Yes.

Amina: She's a Muslim and she was crying. She came in and we had surprised her. I don't if it's from recess or from gym or something but we're all going back. And she was really upset and then she did not want to tell us because she was like, "Okay, you're parents are going

to tell you." And we all got picked up. And then I saw it on the news. And my first instinct was not, "This is Muslims." It was more like, "Who is attacking us?"

Group: Yes.

Me: Yes?

Bukhari: Same here.

Amina: No, it wasn't like "Who is attacking us like Muslims?" it was like, "Who is attacking us as Americans?"

[Crosstalk.]

Me: As Americans, yes.

Amina: Yes. Like what's happening? And then, slowly, I became to realize that. And then I went to Islamic school. So maybe I didn't get as much of a backlash. In Islamic school, it was totally against what we were taught, so it was never a question of, "What have we done?" It was always like, "Look at these horrible people."

[Crosstalk.]

Amina: It was never like, "Look what you people have done."

Bukhari: Yes, I can remember. I just remember that, I think, I was going to fly that year later on. So I remember I was like, "Oh my god." I was very scared about going to India that year and I don't go that often. But I was like, "Oh my god. How did they know if the plane is going to crash or not?" I just remember when I went to our school, a lot of people like my friends' mom and my teachers that talk about if they had backed hijab. And there are people who didn't wear it for a few days. And so, I've heard those kinds of things. I don't

> remember. I can't remember if my mom flipped later on. I don't know if she did anything besides staying. I think we were just like, "Okay, we have to stay at home." My dad, probably just did like grocery shopping and stuff like that. And so, I think we just tried to stay in the house and I know security outside the school. There was probably like a police car outside the school every single day, especially during dismissal.

The groups' personal experiences on 9/11 reflect how they identify themselves as Americans. It is staggering to hear these experiences first hand which third grade students are trying to understand who attacked "them." The aftermath of the incident also includes heartbreaking personal details. Yet, the group shares that it were the same negative details that changed them in positive ways and strengthen their identity as Muslims. I listen to how the presence of a bigger problem than petty differences (Borka 2012) and the inevitability of coexistence has transformed Dearborn into a very civil, humanitarian, tolerant and understanding community where diversity is celebrated. (MPAC 2007).

The community is especially proud about the integration among Shia and Sunni Muslims despite globally escalating tensions, and are taking active roles to sustain different methods of Islam under the same roof. I believe that this integrity is one of the best illustrations of the positive effects of power even in its most radical form, knowing the challenges of achieving the same integration here in the Middle East.

> **Bukhari:** But you know what? I remember how it actually changed me personally because I always felt, as a Muslim, I felt cautious about

stepping out. But I was a fourth grader then. It was probably like you're maturing somewhat.

But yes, the thing I want to mention was that on this campus you have to go on like in Michigan. When I get to the US, we're able to discuss matters that are against our opponents most of the time very civilly, whereas overseas, if you don't agree with somebody, you'd probably going to get in a fight, like a physical fight.

Me: Yes, probably.

Bukhari: And I know that here you can trust somebody. But you know there are debates and props debate. But when somebody just like will be sitting here and they're just arguing. But then at the end of the day, they're still friends. And then there are debates that are held for an audience to watch and people are like, "You have your view, I have my view." And at the end of the day they're still going to try to coexist because that's inevitable.

Me: I can say this. In the Middle East we are less tolerant to different opinions, yes. I think that would be a fair critique. You're more open to debates and more socialized discussions.

Bukhari: Yes.

Amina: That can also come from I guess our MSA in general. It's highly interfaith influenced because we have a Unity in Diversity Dinner every year. That's really important to us where we have all three faiths common. We have big and small, three faiths, and also like us both. Like for her, specifically, she's in the organization for

interfaith called SINS. So, that could be one thing allowed event that we go to are very about interfaith and are very about diversity.

Bukhari: Humanitarian, diversity, yes.

Me: Awesome.

Amina: We have an association for diversity over here that most of us are in.

Me: Also by means of interfaith you also have different methods of Islam under the same roof. Some of you are Shia, some of you are Sunni. It's also difficult to get people under the same roof, Sunni and Shia, particularly also in the Middle East.

Bukhari: In the Middle East, definitely yes.

Amina: Yes.

Bukhari: I tell you from last year, it's really great here.

Amina: It's not like ideal, but –

Bukhari: Yes. Shia and Sunni get along so well but Alhamdulillah. We can get along, so well. Like we have discussions and we talk about our differences and we're still friends.

Amina: But yes, there are these basic things that we didn't know about them. They don't know about us. But just like communicating each other, we learn so much and it's great. I feel like the more that we learn about each other, the more understanding we become.

Me: More tolerant.

Amina: And more tolerant.

3.5.7. The Differences of Being a Muslim in Dearborn and the Rest of the World.

The entire group having been outside the United States, I use the opportunity to ask for a comparison about the differences of being a Muslim in Dearborn and the rest of the world.

> **Anna:** Well, in America you have to be a lot more self-aware of what you are doing and how you are doing it, just because you are representing all the Muslims here, because they are such a minority. But when you go to, say Turkey or Malaysia or Yemen it is very different because it is just the norm. It is something everybody does. Nobody thinks twice about it. So praying, making sure your food is halal, saying Salaam Alaikum, wearing a scarf, all of that stuff is – you are not drinking – those stuff is just normal over there. So over here it's, you have to make sure that you know why you are doing these things because people will ask you and so you have to be like super sure, super confident of your own identity in order to practice well in America.

Anna expresses how the effects of power following 9/11 have increased her self-awareness and elevated her identity as a Muslim to a new level. Subjected to a field of visibility and knowing it (Foucault 1995, 200), Anna assumes responsibility on behalf of all the Muslims in the United States. Having internalized the disciplinary effects of power (Foucault 1995, 202), it is remarkable to hear how Anna practices even the most basic activities of life such as eating, drinking and greeting with an extreme self-awareness and upmost confidence of her identity as if someone

is always watching. On the other hand, the presence of continuous observers who question her irregularities has increased both her theoretical and practical knowledge about Islam, a common feature I observed in Dearborn. Anna explains why.

> **Me:** So, in each case that you have to be aware, do you get questions like why do you eat halal? Why do you not drink? Why do you wear headscarf?
>
> **Anna:** All the time.
>
> **Me:** All the time?
>
> **Anna:** All the time, which is like one of the differences. Over here you need to know why. Over there it doesn't come up as much so it's not really a matter, like I need to know why I don't do this. But over here a lot of people ask you and so you need to know why not only for yourself but also to tell other people.
>
> **Me:** Yes, and these questions are usually in what term? Are they offensive or are they just curious?
>
> **Anna:** It's all mostly I think maybe 99% of the time it's just people are curious. They want to know why you do these things. There are very few cases when someone is just weirded out that they are like "I don't know why, let's stop doing it", so most of the time people are just curious they want to know.
>
> **Me:** Yes, and what do you answer when they ask you why do you wear a headscarf for example?
>
> **Anna:** Well for the headscarf, I have like my own personal reasons and then there is the religious reason. So the religious reason is to keep to be modest and to make sure you are kind of, you're pure I

> guess. And then I have my personal reasons for it. Because it's just a reminder for me of who I am, so they can always see my scarf so at all times I am always reminded, I am constantly reminded I'm Muslim, whatever I do it's because I'm Muslim. So it's a reminder for me.
>
> **Me:** And you have to explain this each time they ask you?
>
> **Anna:** I do and it's not, I mean I like explaining it because I would rather someone know the right thing than question it themselves and assume the wrong thing.

For Anna, unlike the Muslim countries she has been where people mostly just do as they are told, knowing the foundations of each practice to satisfy the curiosity of the observers (Foucault 1995, 202) is an obligation in Dearborn. She believes that the anonymous, temporary and voluntary observers' motive is mostly curiosity and enjoys interacting with them. Through this process each effect of power operates as a reminder contributing to Anna's identity, individuality and progress. For Anna, like other Muslims who grew beards, donned headscarves and skull caps and made sure people knew they were Muslim after 9/11 (Sacirbey 2011), wearing the hijab which exposes her to utmost visibility is the strongest among these reminders.

The group have strong opinions about being a Muslim in Dearborn compared to Muslim countries. Sharing a wide range of different experiences from Pakistan to Palestine, Lebanon, India and Qatar, the group reflects the diversity of the Islamic Capital.

> **Amina:** Okay, I want to go with this one. Only because in Dearborn you don't see it as much because being Muslim is more common, so being Muslim is just something you do. It's not really that different,

but if you leave Dearborn, you see how people do say and people appearance, so it's like a whole different world than what we're used to in Dearborn. And compared to outside, it's more like, people don't feel as such a big deal of "Oh, yes. I'm Muslim. Of course, I am." And here we understand, "Yes, I'm Muslim," and we really value it. But it's more of a common thing outside of the world.

Bukhari: Okay. I can answer to that. So, actually really a big part of my life because when I was in my freshman's year in high school, I moved to Pakistan for an entire year and I lived there. So I was born in Dearborn and I lived in Canton, Michigan for most of my life until we moved to Pakistan. So growing up in Canton, there is quite a large Muslim population – not as much as in Dearborn – Dearborn has a very large Muslim population coming to the University of Michigan, Dearborn. It's not even really that much of a, it's not really like, "Oh, look at, she's a Muslim," it's mostly just like, yes, because you come there and everyone, most people are Muslim.

But in Canton there's a large Muslim population and we live right next to the mosque there, and I went to an Islamic School. So, it wasn't really that much of an identity crisis, or so I thought [laughing] when I was younger because it kind of made sense to me; it kind of was my life. All the people I knew were Muslim and going to the Islamic School and a lot of the surrounding people, there's a large Indian, Indo-Pak population there. So, a lot of them are Muslim too in the Canton. But then when I moved to Pakistan, everyone there is

Muslim and you go to school and even in the school they have an Islamic study class.

And it was a very interesting change because, even though everyone was Muslim, there I was like expecting it to be more of an Islamic culture, but it seems that since everyone was Muslim there was not really even that question in the mind, "Oh, so what's your name? Oh, so what is your religion?." Everyone's a Muslim so we didn't have to prove anything. And in that way it seems like their religious practices were much more relaxed and their cultural practices were much higher. So, things that I would not consider a religious thing they would consider much more important, and what I would consider a religious thing it was just like a little part of their life that wasn't really that important. Then I moved back here and you get like questions like, generally, they are more curios for the most part, that I was here, not necessarily like against it.

Farah: I've visited Gaza, Palestine, that's where I am from. Every time, we stay like a few months at least. In Palestine, just like in Pakistan everyone is Muslim, everyone I've encountered. I don't know even when I compared to Pakistan because like the culture there, isn't like, I don't know, we don't have much like a culture in Islam. It's like a city, more of a modern thing but it's not like, I don't know how to explain actually, what it is there is like, the way they live is hard because you feel it's so limited. There's no electricity, there's

no hot water, there's all that stuff but they still live in houses and stuff. It feels weird.

I grew up in Dearborn for half of my life and I moved up to Canton and I didn't feel much different living in Dearborn and Canton because most of the people knew a Muslim there. I don't know, I guess, I didn't feel different because everyone is Muslim and everyone live here, everyone learned to pray. Here, it is definitely harder to be a Muslim.

Bukhari: Like Lebanon, when I was down there, is very liberal. People are not boisterous, they can't involve boisterous, whatever happens. The thing that I noticed in Dearborn, if you go to Friday prayer, it's like, "Oh, I went to Friday prayer." But in Lebanon you go there and you don't have to talk about it. You just go and then you leave it's a normal thing but here it's kind of like, "oh, look I went out of my way to go to Friday prayer."

I've seen it. Some people kind of like, "oh, I went to Friday prayer why didn't you?" Over there it's natural. Okay we go, we come home. That's what I noticed here. If you do anything big it's, "I did it, look at me" type of thing.

Mariam: Yes. Kind of what she's explaining. It seems that, I feel here, like Muslim Americans, that are American Muslims. We hold on to our religion. Over there everybody like is a Muslim.

I went to India, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And over there everybody shares the same culture and whatever religion you are everybody is familiar with it somehow. Over there, there are a lot of

Hindus but in the city I lived there, there were a lot of Muslims, which is Hyderabad.

There, everybody should practice the same culture and then religion is highly integrated within the culture. But a lot of the time things happen, a lot of countries where people say that religion is one thing when it's actually the culture that influence that religious practice, then it's not really religion.

But over here we share the same culture with people of other beliefs but in religion we are all minority. And in practicing, it is not the same over there. Over there, you can do it freely, you go to a mosque. Yes, there are conflicts unbeknown but you can get around, and you see the mosque every week in India, or Hyderabad at least. And here it's hard.

Me: It's a challenge? Everything you do is a challenge.

Mariam: Yes. Obviously over here when people aren't familiar with Muslims, then they see what we do and they remember, "Oh, I saw a Muslims doing this." And they probably generalize. But over there, you don't have to worry about, that so it's.

Bukhari: Can I just add something? A lot of them said that it's harder to be a Muslim in America as opposed to oversees. I have a different opinion of that.

I really liked growing up in this culture in America, religiously. Because I feel we have the freedom of religion. Obviously in the

media, yes, Muslims are portrayed poorly. But I think that it strikes a lot of places where there's not that many Muslims. And even though we are a minority here we're not a very small minority. We have sort of a voice.

At least in the Midwest or at least South Eastern Michigan, people are much more accepting of the Muslim practices. And not just that, but overseas. How she was saying that there's a blur between the religious and the cultural. I think it's a lot easier to be a Muslim here because you can develop your own ideas about Islam. Whereas over there if you think of something that's slightly different in terms of how you should wear your clothing or how you should pray in a certain way or how you should conduct yourself. How you interpret it. It becomes a big deal. The culture and religion, the lines are blurred a lot. So it becomes a conflict if you have a different belief than the common people. But over here, even amongst a lot of my Muslim friends I have, we do have different opinions in our religion and that doesn't seem to be much of a conflict.

Mariam: I'm really grateful that I grew up here. I'm so glad I didn't grow up overseas.

[Laughter.]

I think it was actually easier to formulate my identity here than it would have been over there because over there it would have been more about, "what kind of Indian are you?" I don't know, it would

feel like okay, am I being a good Indian. But here I'm trying to be a good Muslim.

It's not that religion wouldn't matter at all it's just that here it's sure easier to distinguish religion with culture. Our culture is influenced by a Christian religion and so we know what to not practice and what we can practice as Muslims. We know what American culture is. Over there Hindu religion can be integrated with Muslim religion and it could be either Islam or it could be Indian culture. But it would be a mix, I feel it's harder to do because of the minority. I'm still trying to find out how that works but I just feel, here I know why I do what I do. But over there I probably wouldn't have found the answers to that as easily.

Me: Yes, I heard it from a lot of people. People there are Muslims but mostly because of tradition –

Group: Yes.

Me: – And maybe they don't know what they're doing and why they're doing it. But here, because you're distant you have to study, read about it and get to the core so you really know what you're doing here. I heard it from lot of the people.

Bukhari: I guess I'd say that it's easier to be a Muslim over there because over here there are so many distractions. But then again I'm thinking about our family because my family culture is a lot different. It is really like even when I talk to people like my brother, "What do you think?", it's still very different from their culture.

The participants share examples of how the effects of power have contributed to their self-awareness and identity as Muslims in positive ways. Dissatisfied in many ways with how Islam is practiced in their homelands and the sense of its ordinariness for the local people, their comparisons reflect how the effects of power have forced Muslims in Dearborn to be more concerned with their religion, more aware of its values, more consistent about its practices and more proud about their identities. (Foucault 1980, 98). Among these comparisons, I find the transition as a result of the unintended and unwanted effects of power, which Islam started to become formulated in a more active way in Dearborn especially important. The group defines this experience as the religious and cultural codes becoming distinguished from each other.

What the participants express through their local experiences in Muslim countries they have been is the blur between the religious and the cultural which operates in a constraining way. They share how Islam, a highly individualistic religion that rejects any mediatory and disallows any class of clergy, moved away from these notions under cultural pressures which freedoms became restricted and contrarian voices muted. In this traditional interpretation, where people are expected to just do as they are told, developing individual ideas about Islam that are different in terms of conduct, practice or interpretation – within the framework of Islam – is a big deal. Any different beliefs individuals have from the common conduct may turn into a source of conflict.

Muslims in Dearborn, while resisting the effects of power in various forms of Islamophobia; monolithism with diversity, separation with integrity, inferiority with pride, enmity with peace, rejection with understanding, went through a natural transition. They resisted rejection of criticism by becoming a more transparent,

welcoming and educative community both externally and internally. They transformed from being Muslims in Dearborn into "Dearborn Muslims." On the other hand, through the exercise of disciplinary power, the effects that attempted to produce regularity in the city induced Muslims to become more individualistic, leading to different identities. (S. Ali 2005). As a result, borrowing the term from Katherine Pratt Ewing, Dearborn became an "exceptional" example where provocations led the community to start a dialogue about their differences, (Ewing 2008, 48) where in an age of ongoing conflicts Shia and Sunni Muslims signed and intra-faith code to respect each other's opinions and beliefs (MPAC 2007; Islamic Organization of North America 2007), and where open-carry protests against Islam ended with handshakes. (Harb & Khalife 2015). In general, the city became a proof of Foucault's assertions that the effects of power shouldn't be described in negative terms; it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals." (Foucault 1995, 194).

As the participants narrate, this assertion becomes highly evident each time they visit their homelands where, although Muslims are majority and Islam is the norm, different opinions in religion cause conflicts and answers at hand aren't found so easily. To their surprise and disappointment, with each interaction, they become more aware of the presence of various forms of exclusion, repression, censorship, abstraction, masking and concealing in their homelands that they don't experience in Dearborn even as minorities. That is why although some members of the group mention being a Muslim abroad is easier in terms of the ease in performing religious practices, on the bottom line they all agree on the gratefulness of growing up in Dearborn and not overseas.

Me: So when you put it on a scale, which gets heavier the positive things or the negative things?

Anna: The positive for sure.

Me: Really?

Anna: Yes, like there are way more positive things, and well you have a lot of people who are very open minded and people who want to learn and people who, they don't care if you don't drink, they don't care if you don't date, they don't care whatever. They are like, "Okay this is what you do, that is fine, let's do what you do." For them it doesn't really matter and I think that is really valuable especially. I feel like especially here in the school, it's very-very diverse and so you have people from all over the world, like different ethnicity, different believes, different backgrounds. Like you have people from the rich suburban areas. You have people from like down town Detroit which is not that really great. But we can all like seat next to each other and work on the same project together and it's fine.

Me: So can you say that it's better to be a Muslim in the United States than in the rest of the world? Would it be a mass generalization?

Anna: Personally I think it's better to be a Muslim here because you are more aware of who you are as a Muslim. You, like you have more of a reason to go out and gain more knowledge. You have more of a reason to figure who you really are. You have more of a reason to strengthen your identity. And I think it's a great thing. Like I think it's like a *Rahmetullah* (God's blessing). I think it is, I think it's a mercy. I think it's a mercy from the Lord. I think he is giving us this

> opportunity like, I put you on this earth here in Michigan with all these Americans so you can learn more about yourself and learn more about Islam. If I was in Yemen for example which is where, that's my nationality, I don't think I would really care. I wouldn't be eager to learn because there's no reason to.
>
> **Me:** Well, that's a bold point. But I'm not surprised because it's not the first time I'm hearing this. I've heard it from all of Muslims. They say, "Yes. We started practicing our religion better and with understanding." Most of them say "There we just practice what we saw from our fathers, mothers."–
>
> **Anna:** Without really understanding.

Despite experiencing the negative effects of power in various types of verbal abuse and discrimination in employment, when asked to put things on a scale, Anna responds that the positive experiences in Dearborn have stronger influences on her life as an individual and identity as a Muslim without hesitation. She externalizes how the Islamic Capital of the United States has unintentionally contributed in the individualization of its inmates and turned them into active subjects. In the form of a panopticon, the city has given Muslims purpose, opportunity and "reason"; to gain more knowledge, to have an understanding about themselves and Islam, to figure out who they really are, and to strengthen their identity. In a way by depriving light, Dearborn has led to their enlightenment. For these reasons, Anna uses a very strong word to interpret the greatness of the positive effects of her experience; Rahmetullah (God's blessing), a blessing which she believes she would never have found in Yemen or elsewhere.

Asked about the best and worst things about being a Muslim in the United States, the group compares ignorance versus diversity and tolerance, the magnitude of the distance to their homelands versus the closeness of the community, and the fact that being a minority versus the feeling of being a majority describing a complex amalgam of simultaneous realities, in which ignorance and fear live side by side with solidarity and progress. (Ewing 2008, 48). Moving on, the group relates the subject to the Arab Festival which apparently has become a source of disappointment and sorrow for the community.

> **Me:** So what's the best thing about being a Muslim in the U.S. and what's the worst thing about being Muslim in the U.S.?
>
> **Amina:** Somebody else want to go first?
>
> **Me:** Yes, sure any of you can go first.
>
> **Madinah:** I think the worst about living here is the ignorance. The best part about living here, the amount of differences in people, like people you meet, people from all shapes and sizes, whereas if I was in Lebanon, there is just basically Christians and then Muslims. They're basically like they all follow the same kind of culture and tradition.
>
> **Marian:** I guess everybody understands you and you understand them, and so that maybe makes you feel like you're at home.
>
> **Bukhari:** Yes, and I think for me distance is a big thing. Down there everything is so kind of small, and everyone is close to one another and the community and communal and family, all that's really played over there. Here, I mean it's just within your family, but the community, here and there. Did you know the Arab Festival got canceled?

Amina: Yes, I was going to bring that up when they were talking about the political aspect of it. It got canceled because last year, there was like protesting–

Bukhari: Yes.

Amina: I was there when it happened. I was in Greenland Market.

Bukhari: We have this Arab Festival –

Me: What is it?

Bukhari: We have this Arab Festival every year and it's on the same exact street. How long has it been there? For like five years, maybe more?

Amina: For a while.

Bukhari: Yes, for a while and this is the first year that it's not happening, because there is a Christian group that's causing, I guess, fear and a lot of Muslims.

Amina: They were doing protests last year.

Bukhari: It's an Arab Festival to celebrate Arab culture, but –

Amina: But it's open to everybody.

Bukhari: Yes, it is open to everyone.

Amina: But they thought it was a good place to, what do you call it? Rebel against Islam.

Bukhari: It's like a family tradition.

Amina: Until it starts up again.

Me: Okay, from this question, I'd like to jump, how are your relations with non-Muslims? Like they made you cancel your festival. What else?

[Laughter.]

Farah: I think. Sorry. Is it okay if I go? I think it makes a difference where in the U.S. you live, because it's just different from city to city, but living here in Michigan, I feel in this part of Michigan, I feel that it's easy to communicate with non-Muslims and it's easy to again not feel like a minority and people just treat you they do like a majority, like the population in the town, like a white person. So, I don't like treating anybody differently. I try to treat each person how Islam says to treat them, which is with kindness. Even if somebody responds harshly, or just talks to me harshly, you know, I'm just like, "okay what do I with pathetic character." I want to react in the right way, not like my impulses say, like attack. I just try to do what Islamically, I should do. And that's what makes me feel most content afterwards. I just feel satisfied. Not as if I would attack, I don't. I wouldn't do that, but getting mad or striking back or even just yelling back at them, that's what would make me feel bad afterwards, but just remaining patient.

Mariam: I would also like to just add that, we treat others just like we want to be treated. So just because a few people did this thing to the Arab Festival, doesn't mean all non-Muslims, just like, you know, a few Muslims, whatever, it doesn't mean all Muslims did it, so just because someone did that at the Arab Festival, my neighbors are okay.

Bukhari: Just like with anything, all be treated, we all have stories and so just because those people treat us that way doesn't mean anything. It was those people. And that's like one person, or two or

three people out of the entire population, how you are going to generalize.

Amina: And if we generalized, that would be hypocritical, yes.

Mariam: There was the question about the best part and the worst part. Yes, I didn't even answer that.

Me: Yes, please do, please do.

Mariam: Yes, I think I just got sidetracked and went on to something else and went off on a tangent, but I like what they add, because honestly, I can't think of the best part and the worst part, but I guess what I was trying to say is the fact that I can distinguish Islam from my Indian culture, that's probably the best part. I just love being Muslim here, because I can find out what Islam is and not what Islam is to a certain type of culture. So especially as I said, it's a great benefit that culture isn't incorporated into my perception of religion.

Amina: Okay, so I said, I got the worst part first, probably the worst part of being Muslim here, If I've had to choose one, I don't really feel like I grew up with that much of a negative; most of the things I've retained are positive. But, one thing would be that being Muslim here, it comes with like, an asterisk; like you have to, like, you're Muslim and then you have to, it's like, "Okay, yes" , you have to define what it is, what you do –

Bukhari: Explain yourself.

Amina: Yes, explain it. Kind of like, on the defensive, I guess. We have to be on the defensive about it. But then, the best part, I'd say, about being Muslim here, specifically, is that it has given me, like of

how I said, the perspective I've gotten more of, the lens that I look through, it has given me, like, the empathy. Being a minority, it's given me the empathy to understand and not generalize other people.

Group: Yes. That's so true.

Amina: And I feel very thankful for that because one's hearing on the news about very negative things. I never, my first thing is to never be like, "Yes, that person is so bad"; my first sense is like, "What did the media do to this poor person?"

Bukhari: Yes, it's exactly, It's, you can't trust the media because if the people trust the media about Muslims and it's like.

Amina: Yes, or if they show up, it's like on the news, they show, like, some black person acting crazy. It's like, "Because all black people are like this." I'm just like, "No they were probably just having a bad day." I don't know, they don't even do that. So, it's given me that opportunity to connect on that level.

Mariam: That's so true, I'm really glad about that, too. The fact that, I guess I don't know how to describe it, but I feel like, it's given me--

Madinah: Compassion.

Mariam: Yes, compassion. And I guess, a deeper way of thinking about things. Like, because I've struggled as a minority and other things. I guess being, I forget which generation I'm supposed to be, but, my parents moved here as immigrants.

Bukhari: First generation?

Mariam: I don't know but the troubles that come with that, they helped me care about, I guess, I feel like, what were bigger things in

life. Like, rather than, I can chase after things that really are not important. It helps me grow as a person maybe not so clear, but easily.

Me: I think it has enriched you in so many ways, even some of those you don't know yet.

Group: For sure, yes.

3.5.8. Thoughts About the Future

My final question to the participants is about their thoughts and predictions about the future. The group is not fully optimistic when talking about the future. Although they accept that they have come a long way in social means such as people appearing in the media defending their community, Muslims getting better educated, better integrated into the society and becoming more involved in the media, they are also aware about the challenges especially in political means. Still, they strictly reject my opinion that the community wouldn't survive another 9/11.

Anna: I think we have a lot more trouble coming our way.

Me: Really?

Anna: Yes. I think that we have got it easy right now. Unfortunately, I don't think we really realize how hard it really is. I think one day we are going to, but I think in the end, it's going to get easier. I just think it's going to get harder than it's going to get easier for some reason. You know the Marathon, the Boston Marathon? I feel like things are going to happen like that and whatever happened in the UK recently. Unfortunately, it's going to happen and it's going to keep hurting us. I

also think that it's going to make the Muslim Community a lot stronger.

Mariam: Well, that's so hard still.

Me: These problems you face, will it be better. Will it be worse?

Mariam: Well for once, I don't have an answer for that, yet. But, I know that I'm really grateful for the fact that the media. Even though, they're still being portrayed badly, I don't know if I should say we've come a long way but, it's about being Muslims. I know Muslim doesn't have anything to do but, there are news anchors that are defending Muslims. That was, I feel like, unheard of 10 years ago, five years, after 9/11 that was unheard of. It was like, if you are defending Muslim, you are going to be killed, too. But today, there are people that do that.

Amina: Jon Stewart?

Mariam: He was such a big public figure constantly defending Muslims and constantly throw out like, the Ground Zero mark event. That was just amazing. Like we had opportunities and then when the Boston bombings happen, people, some news anchors often – not on Fox News – were reiterating the fact that this was not an Islamic act, it wasn't something done by a Muslim, that was an extremist. And we don't even know, like, what really happened.

Amina: I am an optimistic person; I feel like we're like, it's hard to like this time period when you're in it. When you go and study Civil Rights movement, when it was happening, it was its own thing and

that was the reality and then after this, “Look at this huge movement”, like it was amazing.

Mariam: That happened.

Amina: Like that happened. I feel like now, Muslim are a very educated group of people in the United States. We’re becoming more involved in the media, and we’re becoming more integrated into the society. There’re Muslim news anchors. There’s one in particular, a news Hijabi Muslim and they’re getting more involved in the media. And then people are having a more relaxed view towards Muslims in the media because of poking fun like how Jon Stewart does. He is ridiculous.

Group: Yes.

Amina: And for me growing up with a diverse background, like interracial mixing and stuff like that. That can also help connect I guess and interfaith. I don’t know. What I’m saying is it is happening.

Group: Yes.

Amina: And a lot of wedding events that have recently happened between an interracial and inter-faith that I know personally, a few years ago, it was uncommon. This is for my view point like that is in my mind more so than others because I come from the hood on background. So, I think it’s helping to roll the wheels turn up.

Me: Yes. Of course, but the thing is not every one is as optimistic as you.

Amina: Yes. I know.

Me: Because I don't think the community would survive another big incident like 9/11. If something like that would happen, I don't know, would you survive?

Amina: Yes.

Bukhari: I think, we would.

Amina: Yes, I think. I don't know.

Me: Okay, so the mosquitos are urging us to go, to leave. Are there anything that you'd like to ask or want to say also that you think important?

Amina: Yes. About the whole, for how the future will be, in terms of politics, I think it's going to have a negative impact for the most part. The government and politics, and how they intertwine religion to it, it's a control mechanism that they use to kind of divide and to kind of keep people. Like people that conform for it in America to being in America and being loyal to America as opposed to emphasizing what's the situation and kind of Othering people.

It is kind of Othering, that causes the conflict. But I feel like the more diversity we have here. I think, like with the Arab spring, the Syria situation, Palestinian conflicts, there's not going to be any pretty into that. And there's not going to be any pretty resolution in America too, even though it's different. It does affect us because a lot of the situations are influenced by America, even started by America, the government because we are so relying on oil from that place and so many other things. I don't think that it's going to be any time in the near future that we'll be solved. But hopefully, in a social level there

will be positive things. I'm not necessarily sure about the political level.

Bukhari: I think, as I said, we have progressed. Those situations have progressed. People who didn't know anything about Islam, instead of seeing a negative plate; they learn more about it and they see it positively. And so, I feel like, it's gone better from the past few years or since 9/11. And so, each time I feel that if Muslims continue to work hard in eliminating the stereotypes, we can reach an even higher level in understanding and power in America.

Me: Well, by the way, I agree with both of you. I think the future, the social aspects and the political aspects will debate with each other.

Group: Yes.

Me: Yes. And I hope you come to Turkey someday.

Group: We will. I think we all have to.

4. CONCLUSION

In this dissertation I narrated how Muslims in Dearborn experienced the effects of power after 9/11 from various perspectives to demonstrate that power, as Foucault asserts, shouldn't be decreased to a simple understanding of oppressive and repressive relations. (Foucault 1978, 85). Even in its most radical form power can be observed not only causing negative effects that excludes, represses, censors, abstracts, masks and conceals but also being productive causing positive effects. (Foucault 1995, 194).

To narrate the positive effects of power on Muslims in Dearborn, I looked at Dearborn from an external direction and on an interpersonal level. I described how the city became stigmatized as the Islamic Capital of the United States following 9/11, as a center of attraction and a must-visit location on the newly established anti-Muslim protest circuit. (Denvir 2012). Muslims in Dearborn, with no power to resist or reject being stigmatized, embraced their stigma and founded an entire identity upon the discourse which was invested against them. This identity became solidified with the construction of America's biggest mosque, Islamic Center of America, an icon of Dearborn's Capital status for its residents and the exhibition of how the community had gathered together and gained power in the wake of 9/11. (Norris 2005).

Being the residents of the Islamic Capital of the United States, I presented how Muslims in Dearborn experienced radical effects of power in various forms of Islamophobia; monolithism, separation, inferiority, manipulation, enmity, rejection of criticism, defending discrimination and naturalization of Islamophobia. (The Runnymede Trust 1997). I gave examples of how they resisted monolithism with

unity despite their differences and diversity. A city composed of both Shia and Sunni Muslims, managed to learn to respect each other's beliefs, signing an intra-faith code titled Muslim Code of Honor with the participation of all Imams in Michigan (MPAC 2007; Islamic Organization of North America 2007), being an exceptional example among the entire Muslim World.

Through this experience, Muslims in Dearborn transformed into a more tolerant community where enmity was responded with peace; which open carry protests against Islam ended with handshakes. (Harb & Khalife 2015). They resisted the negative effects of power with integration, establishing their own institutions and acting together in social and political issues. (Ewing 2008, 6). As a result, they succeeded to elect their first Muslim candidate as the President of the Dearborn City Council and the majority of the council members in 2013. Time Magazine believes both elections to be milestones, given Dearborn's complicated racial history. (Dias 2013).

Following my external analysis, I took a more internal position and elevated the analysis to the state level describing how Dearborn turned into a panopticon following 9/11. (Fox 2012). I represented the lives of Muslims in the city as a harshly constructed panopticon, regarding the city being under constant surveillance, its residents being on the federal government's terrorist watch list second only to New York (Scahill & Devereaux 2014), its streets being spied by planes as in war zones (CBS Detroit 2015a) and anything that happens in the city being instantly broadcasted into the social media fueling Islamophobia giving rise to controversies. But a panopticon with unintended and even unwanted effects; which has contributed in the individualization of its inmates. Which as if by depriving light has led to their enlightenment and by hiding to their exposure. A panopticon which the Muslims I

interviewed with identified as a *Rahmetullah* (God's blessing). I demonstrated that whatever the State was trying to normalize in Dearborn, its disciplinary mechanisms, as Foucault has formulated, worked otherwise (Foucault 1980, 98). Assuming that the state wished Arabs in Dearborn to be more American, they identified more strongly with their cultural heritage. Assuming that the state wished Muslims in Dearborn to be less concerned with Islam, they became more aware of their religious values.

Additionally, as a city located at the northern border of the United States with intensive socio-economic and cultural trans-border relations, I mentioned the experiences of Muslims in Dearborn at the ports of entry. I described how border controls, through its disciplinary effects of power, enforcing its qualification, classification, differentiation, judgement and punishment processes on Muslims in the city (ADC 2008; Dado 2012), have led them to gain their individuality (Foucault 1977, 186 - 194), confirming that power is not only oppressive but also productive, producing positive effects even in its most radical form. (Foucault 1995, 194).

During my analysis, while studying the disciplinary mechanisms of power, its instruments, procedures and technologies, I eventually disclosed how the United States turned itself into a panopticon following 9/11, sacrificing some of its deepest commitments for its own people and their most important liberties irrationally; the rule of law, equality, transparency, fair process, checks and balances and human rights. (Cole & Lobel 2009). A country which once asserted the right to be different and underlined everything which made individuals truly individual, attacked everything which separates the individuals from each other, broke their links, split community life, forced the individuals back on themselves constraining them to their own identity. (Foucault 1982, 781).

This picture inevitably gives rise to the question "how power should be dealt", if it could be dealt all, as power has a complex structure (Karlberg 2005, 4), and a relational and strategic nature of its own. (Foucault 1997, 176). As I have described in detail, power can't be acquired, at most diverted, (Bălan 2013, 39) which always comes with a cost; it works both ways. Any synthetic intervention with power leads to unintentional effects. Oppression leads to resistance. (Foucault 1978, 36). Puppets eventually rebel. (Said 2003, 66). Thus, power relations are fragile; there are no simple solutions, no shortcuts and no certain results in the game of power. Considering this complexity and fragility, how should the state be taken care of its self and managed not only in favor of the majority, but also in favor of the minorities such as Muslims in Dearborn, embracing and preserving their diversity, individuality and differences? How should communities be taken care of their selves, in a Foucauldian sense (Foucault 1982, 790); politically, sociologically, religiously, philosophically, medically and pedagogically?

In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, referring to Plato's Apology, Foucault interprets a speech between Socrates and Alcibiades which they meet for the first time. (Foucault 2005, 32). Alcibiades is young and ambitious. He wants to turn to the people and take their destiny in his hands. He wants to rule Athens. (Foucault 2005, 33). His family, status in the city, ancestral privileges, beauty and fortune places him above others. But he does not want to be satisfied with what he has. He is someone who wants to transform his statutory privilege and preeminence into political action, into his effective government of others. (Foucault 2005, 32 - 33).

"Now", asks Socrates in the speech, "if you are to be able to govern the city, you must confront two sorts of rivals. On the one hand there are the internal rivals you will come up against in the city, because you are not the only one who wants to

govern. And then, when you are governing them, you will come up against the city's enemies. You will come up against Sparta and the Persian Empire." (Foucault 2005, 34). Socrates asks Alcibiades to take a look at himself and consider his resources, demonstrating his lack of education with a series of questions about what consistent, recognizable, definite and harmonious government is. At the end of the demonstration, Alcibiades, failing to answer any of the questions admits that he may have lived for a long time in a state of shameful ignorance without even being aware of it. (Foucault 2005, 35 - 36).

To this Socrates responds: "don't worry; if you were to discover your shameful ignorance and that you do not even know what you are saying when you are fifty, it really would be difficult for you to remedy it, because it would be very difficult to take care of yourself *(epimeleia heautou)*. However, here you are at the time of life when one ought to be aware of it." (Foucault 2005, 36).

Foucault gives great importance to this dialogue for a number of reasons. First, it shows that the exercise of power is linked to need to the care of the self *(epimeleia heautou)*. One cannot govern others, transform one's privileges into political action on others, into rational action, if one does not take care oneself. (Foucault 2005, 36). Second, it clarifies that this notion of care of the self, is linked to the inadequacy of Alcibiades's education, thus is inscribed not only within the political project, but also within the pedagogical lack. (Foucault 2005, 36 - 37). Third, something as important as and immediately connected to the former feature is the idea that it would be too late to rectify matters if Alcibiades were fifty, indicating that one must learn to take care of oneself before a critical age which remedy is difficult. (Foucault 2005, 37).

At the end of the dialogue in which Alcibiades is encouraged so insistently to take care of himself by Socrates, he makes a promise. For Foucault, this promise is even more important than the entire dialogue itself. What promise does he make to Socrates? Does he say that he will begin straightaway to *epimelesthai*, to take care of himself? No. His promise is remarkable; *dikaiosunes*, "with justice." (Foucault 2005, 71).

According to Foucault, this may seem paradoxical given that the whole dialogue is concerned with the care of the self and the need to take care of the self. At the point at which the dialogue comes to an end, Alcibiades who has been convinced, promises to concern himself with justice. For Foucault, precisely, there is no difference. Consequently, taking care of oneself and being concerned with justice amount to the same thing. As the text unfolds, the fact that *epimeleia heautou* is to care about justice becomes evident. (Foucault 2005, 71 - 72).

The United States, is very much like Alcibiades. It is a beautiful country with a huge fortune and ambition that wants to transform these statutory privilege and preeminence into political action, into the effective government of the world. Like Alcibiades, it has internal rivals as well as external enemies. Like him, since 9/11 it is going through a crisis of well, consistent, recognizable, definite and harmonious government. It is dealing with transversal and immediate struggles that revolve around the questions of its exercise of an uncontrolled power over people's rights, their liberty, their life and death, the privileges of knowledge and self-identity.

But like Alcibiades it is not late for the United States to become aware of its ignorance. Leading with justice and concerning primarily with taking care of its own self, it can once again transform its privileges into political action on others and into rational action. By removing the pedagogical lack, it can raise a new generation of

Americans with a great potential of change. That is, the rejection of Western style of dominating, restructuring and authority based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between “us” and “them.” (Said 2003, 21 - 22; 2001, 12). Muslims in Dearborn particularly deserve to be treated with such justice to the full extent, not as a kind gesture or a compensation to heal the wounds of 9/11, but as a growing community of American citizens who have proved their true identity multiple times and in multiple ways by exposing exceptional examples of diversity, integrity, unity, transparency, peace, understanding and tolerance under extremely radical circumstances.

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