



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DISCIPLINE AREA

**ADAPTATION AND CHANGE OF MULTIPOLARITY IN  
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1991 AND 2014**

EMİNE GÜLNİHAL YOLCU

SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. MİTAT ÇELİKPALA

MASTER'S THESIS

ISTANBUL, SEPTEMBER, 2018

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MASTER'S THESIS

Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master's in the Discipline Area of International Relations under the Program of International Relations

ISTANBUL, SEPTEMBER, 2018

I, EMINE GÜLNIHAL YOLCU;

Hereby declare that this Master's Thesis is my own original work and that due references have been appropriately provided on all supporting literature and resources.

NAME AND SURNAME OF THE STUDENT

EMINE GÜLNIHAL YOLCU

DATE AND SIGNATURE

04.09.18



## ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

This work entitled **ADAPTATION AND CHANGE OF MULTIPOLARITY IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1991 AND 2014** prepared by **EMİNE GÜLNİHAL YOLCU** has been judged to be successful at the defense exam held on **4 SEPTEMBER 2018** and accepted by our jury as **MASTER'S THESIS**.

Prof. Dr. Mitat Çelikpala (Advisor)

Kadir Has University




Prof. Dr. Serhat Güvenç

Kadir Has University



Assist. Prof. Dr. Duygu Öztürk

Medipol University



I certify that the above signatures belong to the faculty members named above.

Prof. Dr. Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe  
Dean/GSSS

DATE OF APPROVAL: 4/9/18

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## **List of Abbreviations**

ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

EEU: Eurasian Economic Union

EU: European Union

GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GPM: Great Power Management

KGB: Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti – Committee for State Security

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WTO: World Trade Organization

## ABSTRACT

YOLCU, EMINE GULNIHAL. *ADAPTATION AND CHANGE OF MULTIPOLARITY IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1991 AND 2014*, MASTER'S THESIS, Istanbul, 2018.

This research aims to enlighten Russian foreign policy in the context of emphasis on multipolarity beginning from end of the Cold War. Russia as newborn state lost her identity and tried to integrate herself into new world order. In order to adjust herself, Russia embraced the concept of multipolarity but gradually understanding of multipolarity changed. Russia was in favor of pro-Western multipolarity and supported the world of Western ideas until the United States started to dominate the world order. Starting from 2003, Russia changed her stance and in 2007 clarified how international system should be based on.

This work aims to answer how Russia adopted multipolarity as a foreign policy strategy and why Russia changed her perception of multipolarity. In order to answer these questions, this thesis will be based on qualitative research. Constructivism will be used to explain Russian interests and identity for Russian foreign policy goals. Also, structural realism will be used realism as to identify multipolarity and Russian behavior in the international system. The data will be derived from primary and secondary resources. Official state documents and presidential speeches will be the primary resources. Books and articles from social sciences databases will be the secondary resources.

Russia believes is she is destined to be a great power and she is persuaded for this claim for a long time. Now, Russia is a key player in the international system owing to her continuing effort by challenging the world based on Western ideas. This thesis aims to enlighten this claim.

**Keywords:** Russia, Russian foreign policy, multipolarity, Cold War, constructivism, identity, structural realism, great power, Western ideas

## ÖZET

YOLCU, EMINE GULNIHAL. *ADAPTATION AND CHANGE OF MULTIPOLARITY IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1991 AND 2014*, YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İstanbul, 2018.

Bu araştırma çok kutupluluk bağlamında Soğuk Savaş'ın bitişinden başlayarak Rus dış politikasını aydınlatmaya amaçlamaktadır. Rusya yeni doğan bir devlet olarak kimliğini kaybetmiş ve kendisini oluşturan yeni dünya düzenine entegre etmeye çalışmıştır. Uyum sağlamak adına Rusya çok kutupluluk kavramını benimsemiş fakat kademeli olarak çok kutupluluk anlayışı değişmiştir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri dünya düzenini domine etmeye başlayana kadar Rusya Batı yanlısı bir çok kutupluluktan yana oldu ve Batı yanlısı bir çok kutupluluk düzenini benimsedi. Rusya 2003'ten başlayarak bu düzene karşı duruşunu değiştirdi ve 2007 yılında dünya düzeninin neye dayanması gerektiğini ortaya koydu.

Bu çalışma Rusya'nın çok kutupluluğu nasıl dış politika stratejisi olarak benimsediği ve neden çok kutupluluk anlayışını değiştirdiği sorularına cevap aramaktadır. Bu sorulara cevap verebilmek adına bu tez nitel araştırmaya dayanmaktadır. İnşacılık Rus dış politikası hedefleri için Rus çıkarlarını ve kimliğini açıklamak için kullanılacaktır. Aynı zamanda yapısal gerçekçilik, uluslararası sistemde çok kutupluluk ve Rus davranışını tanımlamak için gerçekçilik kullanılacaktır. Veriler birincil ve ikincil kaynaklardan elde edilecektir. Resmi devlet belgeleri ve devlet başkanına ait konuşmalar başlıca kaynaklar olacaktır. Sosyal bilimler veri tabanlarından ulaşılan kitaplar ve makaleler ikincil kaynaklar olacaktır.

Rusya kendisinin büyük bir güç olacağına inanıyor ve uzun bir zamandır bu şekilde ikna edilmiş durumda. Rusya şimdi, Batılı fikirler üzerine kurulan dünyaya meydan okuyarak gösterdiği çaba nedeniyle uluslararası sistemde kilit bir oyuncu. Bu tez, bu iddiayı aydınlatmayı amaçlamaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Rusya, Rus dış politikası, çok kutupluluk, Soğuk Savaş, inşacılık, kimlik, yapısal gerçekçiliği, büyük güç, Batı fikirleri



## INTRODUCTION

Today, international system is constituted by different poles and Russia became one of them. When Russia annexed Crimea, she was excluded from international society. NATO-Russian Council was suspended and Russian membership of G-8 was suspended right after Crimean referendum in 2014. For Russia, Crimean referendum was rightful and there was no interference from Russian side. Crimean people demanded to join Russian Federation. Since 2014, world has become changed and post-Cold War era ended for the West. In the meantime, Arab uprisings had been resonating since 2011 and as continuation of uprisings, unrest escalated between government and opposition parties in Syria. Soon after, Syria became war zone among different groups and Syrian government asked for Russian assistance. Since 2015, Russia has been actively part of international system again and now she is one of the important decision makers in the international system.

The details of Syrian crisis will not be given because it is ongoing issue and it would not be proper to discuss in detail since my subject is Russian behavior towards international system starting from dissolution of Soviet Union until Russian interference in Syrian crisis. Russia has motivations for her every actions and when we looked at the past there can be seen that what happens now is just a consequence of what happened in the past. In this sense, introduction will consist my conceptual framework, theoretical approach and hypotheses.

### *Conceptual Framework*

The main concept of this work is multipolarity because this thesis' main idea is to focus on Russian view of international system which is multipolarity. But before that it is suitable to explain what system is. James E. Dougherty defines system as "how units interact with each other" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr., 2001, p. 110). Similarly, Karen A. Mingst adds to definition as "an assemblage of units, objects, or parts united by some form of regular interaction" (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. 108). John Burton also

illustrates system as “relationship between units. The units of a system are of the same ‘set’, by which is meant that they have features in common that enable a particular relationship” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr., 2001, p. 108). In this context, I will elaborate relations among units which are constituted by states. Robert Mundell and Alexander Swoboda defines the system as “an aggregation of diverse entities united by regular interaction according to a form of control” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 26) .

These definitions are important for explaining multipolarity. Because polarity “means distribution of power in the international community, thus describing the nature of the international system and the consequences that come from it” (Tomja, 2014, p. 58). Since Gilpin describes system as form of control where power is sought through parties’ actions; in other words multipolarity is defined as balance of power as expressed by Morton Kaplan which is three or more powers seek to control others’ actions (Gilpin, 1981, p. 29; Flood and Carson, 1988, p. 160). Kenneth Waltz explained polarity as a distribution of power in which one state exercises most of the cultural, economic, and military influence in international politics; it is a structure in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced (Waltz, 1979, p. 131). In this context, multipolarity is that international system has various axis in economic, political or cultural spheres in which different units have power whether they are states or international organizations. For example, United Nations Security Council together with permanent and non-permanent members becomes a polar in the system because these members have right to take important decisions with veto power. On the other hand, NATO, EU or even BRICS together with their members are important in terms of being power in the system.

For Russia multipolarity became as a way of overcoming her existential problems in the new international order. Because there was no more bipolarity represented by two poles which includes Soviet Union as a one of the main poles. But after collapse of Soviet Union, new state Russia found herself surrounded by new states that were once dominated by her ancestor Soviet Union. Moreover, those states were under influence of West, just like any other state in the world. After Cold War, Western bloc announced its victory over Eastern bloc and world started to be dominated by liberal ideas represented by United States of America.

Disappearance of Eastern and Western bloc brought globalization with itself. In this context, Fyodor Lukyanov focuses on relations between globalization and Russian foreign policy. According to Russia, globalization had some impacts but it didn't bring any other solution for international system. States had weakened but they had not lost their dominance in the system as explained by Lukyanov (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 23). Lukyanov examines multipolarity on Russian foreign policy firstly as from break-up of Soviet Union to 2007 and secondly after 2007. First period includes Russian inclusion to international platforms such as Council of Europe, the Group of Seven, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and reformation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 26). Second period is related to Putin's Munich Speech in 2007. In this speech Putin expressed disappointments about Russian former decisions on foreign policy. Russia wanted to be recognized as equal partner by West but this request was rejected by West. This speech implied the problem which stems from initiation made by Russia about being partners with West is used as an advantage by especially US' unilateral purposes (Putin, 2007; Lukyanov, 2010, p. 27).

Foreign Policy Concept that was accepted in 2000 indicated that "Russia would seek to achieve a multipolar system of international relations that really reflects the diversity of modern world" (The Russian Federation, 2000b). In Munich speech Putin also stated that unilateral model is not just acceptable but also impossible because one leadership could not provide any other states' need. He added that a place where exists one sovereign states could not be named as democratic which necessitates "power of majority" (Putin, 2007).

After break up of Soviet Union, there was no value or identity of Russia to be represented by Russia. Because all values were depended on communism that vanished after the cold war. But, this didn't prevent Russia from taking a stance in the world politics since she inherited permanent seat at United Nations Security Council.

Since Russia rejected ideological foreign policy of Soviet Union, she dedicated herself to balance of power system and also tried to avoid and prevent "liberal interventionist" West. Because West and especially United States of America dictated their own model of democracy under the name of unipolarity (Krastev, Leonard and Wilson, 2009, p. 65). In this sense, legacy of Soviet Marxism helped to shape identity of Russian foreign policy.

Russia might have let go Soviet Union behind but Russia could define statist position of Russia in the system as “self” that is Russia and the “other” that is West (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2004, p. 6). In this context, Putin stated four elements that will shape Russian foreign policy: patriotism that is feeling of pride about one’s state, great power status that is to defend Russia and her interests in international arena, statism that is to guarantee order and finally social solidarity that is collective mentality against Western liberalism (Sakwa, 2008b, pp. 322, 323; Ziegler, 2016, p. 564). Russia continued to assert these elements on justifying annexation of Crimea and compared it with independence of Kosovo (Ziegler, 2016, p. 566). Because according to Russia, Crimea herself has decided to join Russia and it is similar to decision of Kosovo’s independence. Russia opposed Western rejections because of sovereign democracy claims which gives right to states’ dominance in their internal affairs. In this context, sovereign democracy becomes free from foreign interference, strong authority with Russian culture (Ziegler, 2016, p. 565).

Russia did not just try to find an identity, also she had to re-conceptualize Russia within a territory for which there are few historical antecedents (O’Loughlin and Talbot, 2005, p. 23). Even if there is no clear definition for Russian identity, it includes “Little Russians (Ukrainians), the White Russians (Byelorussians) and the Great Russians (ethnic Russians)” (Zevelev, 1998, p. 17). In this sense, Russia formulated concepts of near abroad and far abroad. These concepts helped Russia to improve relations with former Soviet states which include compatriots who are former Soviet citizens. Also, these concepts showed that how Russia is fragile in the system. Because it revealed that Russia moved with the sense of protection of her boundaries. Together with multipolarity, near and far abroad policies helped Russia to balance her relations with other states. Russia built relations with Common Independent States except Baltic States. In the far abroad, Russia approached to West very carefully after NATO expansion and also unexpected outcome which caused by Western behavior against Russia (Light, 2014, p. 224).

Elena Chebenkova explains multipolar world order with main ideas in Russian foreign policy. Also, she clarifies why multipolar world theory is evoked in the first place. First of all, unipolar world order became desperate in order to solve a crisis with the effort of single force. Secondly, there is no institutionalized frame for unipolarity which will clarify question of legitimacy. United States created series of concepts which was questioned by Russia. Such as humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect etc.

Thirdly, there are emerging alliances around the globe. Formation of BRICS, integration of Latin America and post-Soviet State, partnership among Asian countries started to defy Western dominated world (Chebankova, 2017, p. 225).

Thomas Ambrosio explains Russian perspective of world politics via Russian foreign ministers. In the time of first foreign minister of Russia as Andrei Kozyrev put it, Russia tried to align and get along with West and especially America because of Russia is Western state. Later, during period of second foreign minister of Russia, Yevgeny Primakov, Russia was set for promoting global multipolarity as a corrective to American-dominated unipolarity and Russia had to promote its own great-power interests, not to desire to be part of West (Ambrosio, 2005, p. 1194; Tsygankov, 2005, p. 136). But also, there was no choice other than supporting unipolar system led by US for Russia. This situation continued until US invaded Iraq in 2003. Russia saw that United States as acting just on her behalf. Putin himself stated that Iraqi war is unjustified because it was not authorized by United Nations Security Council (“*Iraq War Was Unjustified, Putin Says,*” 2003). After this “unjustified war”, Russia turned her back to Primakov’s doctrine which is “promoting multipolarity and seeing Russia as the center of a global movement against American hegemony” (Ambrosio, 2005, p. 1206).

Albeit Putin followed Primakov’s understanding of multipolarity, there is a difference between Putin’s and Primakov’s. The difference is sense of threat which comes from not United States but stems from falling behind in economic development (Tsygankov, 2005, p. 138). Putin attached importance of “gloeonomic rather than military struggle” (Tsygankov, 2005, p. 138). Second threat derives from the sense that terrorism has an interest on attacking Russia as Tsygankov put it. For example, activities in Chechnya or 9/11 attacks were seen as threat not just to Russia but also to international system (Tsygankov, 2005, p. 139).

Ray Silviu focuses in his article, multipolarity was accepted by Russia because of ambiguity in its meaning which is “fluidity of which enables disparate groups to ascertain and support it irrespective of its internal inconsistencies” (Silviu, 2016, p. 5). He lists four segments of multipolarity. First one is appeal to civilizational diversity against US hegemony. Second is to oppose US hegemony geopolitically. Third thought is related to dispersal of economic and political power beyond the Western states because of

globalization that caused states lost their dominance. Final one is that Russia sees multipolarity as a solution for dilemmas of governability and global security (Silvius, 2016, pp. 5–7).

L. N. Klepatskii focuses on how Russian Federation adopted multipolarity gradually. According to Klepatskii, multipolarity gained importance together with globalization. Multipolarity became compulsory way in the direction of globalization. Author touches upon how multipolarity is realistic view by saying that multipolarity is not an “ideological scheme but also as an objective condition of international relations, which gradually ripened even at the height of Cold War but which became clearly manifested only after its end.” (Klepatskii, 2003, p. 4). Article focuses how Russia followed globalization’s rules by applying multipolarity and how multipolarity is appropriate for Russia since it plays the game by the book.

Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov argue that multipolarity was adopted by Russia against the US’s collective unilateralism. They compare multipolarity and multilateralism in the context of GPM which is fifth institution that is combination of war, diplomacy, international law and balance of power identified as four institutions of international society by Hedley Bull (Astrov, 2013). But also multipolarity has found its root in Russian foreign policy thinking. But multilateralism is promoted and founded by the EU and it is not suitable for Russia (Makarychev and Morozov, 2011, p. 369).

Martin A. Smith explains how multipolarity evolved beginning from collapse of Soviet Union. He identifies three kinds of multipolarity. First one is confrontational multipolarity which opposes US hegemony and focuses on creating a new world order led by Russia after Cold War. This thinking has a suspicion about international system because it can lead to new bipolarity (Smith, 2013, p. 37). Second one is competitive multipolarity. In this sense, Vladimir Putin tried to strengthen state’s its own power and its status in the international system. Final multipolarity is named concert-based multipolarity which implies that Russian leaders’ position in “developing co-operative and inclusive forms of multipolarity, more closely akin to their understanding of the nineteenth century concert system” (Smith, 2013, p. 44).

After the dissolution of Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the world system became closer to the United States of America and the Western ideas. In meanwhile,

Russia as a formerly one of the dominant powers in the old bipolar system was trying to adopt herself into the new system which becomes more unipolar. Russia was experimenting the new world with the Western ideas but also discovering the same world with Russian ideas. In this context, Russian foreign policy was shaped by pro-Western understanding led by Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev in 1990s. The West was described as “one of the most important centers of the world economy and international relations [and] the global civilizational process” in Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 (Kassianova, 2001, p. 829). In the first place, Russia achieved “main civil and economic characteristics associated with the constitutive qualities and values of ‘the West’” (Kassianova, 2001, p. 829). During 1990s, Russia was eager to adjust herself into Western world as Soviet Union was in Gorbachev era or as Russian Empire was in Peter the Great era. Russia adopted liberal market economy but Russian system has already been collapsed therefore new strategies ended with economic crisis in 1998. On the other hand, Russia started the negotiations with EU and signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994, also with NATO which is a military alliance of former Western camp in Cold War and joined NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994. These two organizations were two important representatives of Western camp. Under Yeltsin period Russian behavior towards the West was optimistic because Russia was looking for her future in Western world. In 1997, Russia changed this perception with the approved National Concept. Unlike pro-Western approach, Russia decided to care about maintaining “equal distance in relation to the global, European and Asian economic and political actors” in the National Security Concept (Kassianova, 2001, p. 832; Zarakol, 2011, p. 227).

Despite Russian willingness about integrating into the Western dominant system, there was growing disappointment on Russian economy and also growing frustration between the United States and Russia over Bosnia and Kosovo (Zarakol, 2011, p. 228). Liberal economic reforms did not work because of decadent Russian economic system in 1998. Also, the US-led NATO’s unilaterally intervention on Kosovo and Bosnia frustrated Russia. In the meantime, Andrei Kozyrev was replaced by Yevgeny Primakov and Primakov changed the direction of Russian Foreign Policy towards more anti-American understanding focusing Russian “great power status”. This great power status defines Russian ultimate goal which is to be key player and independent sovereign state in the

system which defines *derzhava*. Later, multipolarity became more visible in accepted Foreign Policy Concepts with Vladimir Putin's presidency. Beginning from 2000, seeking for multipolar world order became one of the most important goals to be achieved in the documents. Because according to Russia, multipolar system reflects "the diversity of the modern world with its great variety of interests" as explained in Foreign Policy Concept in 2000 which is updated version of Foreign Policy Concept in 1993 (The Russian Federation, 2000b) and a unilateral action taken by any state can destabilize this international situation and aggravate tensions and contradictions among states (The Russian Federation, 2000b). When the United States was attacked by Al-Qaeda, Russia supported the US in terms of fighting against terrorism in all over the world until the US decided to invade Iraq unilaterally in 2003.

Foreign policy accepted in 2008, indicated that multilateralism is going to be improved in relations with other states in the context of being recognized by other states (The Russian Federation, 2008). One of the objectives of Russian foreign policy was "to influence global processes to ensure formation of a just and democratic world order based on collectiveness in finding solutions to international problems and supremacy of international law" (The Russian Federation, 2008). Here, Russia especially underlined importance of equal partnership under the UN and its principles. Year of 2008 also indicated that Dmitry Medvedev's presidency and Vladimir Putin's premiership until 2012. Russian search for multipolarity against the US-led NATO continued especially in near abroad. NATO's expansion towards Georgia and Ukraine were perceived as one of the major threats against Russia and it ended with the Five-Day War in August 2008. This period was relatively compatible with the Western camp apart from the war in August. Because Dmitry Medvedev was seen as more moderate in contrast to Vladimir Putin by the West. Also, Medvedev set five principles which will guide Russian foreign policy after the Georgian War; emphasizing international law, multipolar world order, protection of Russian citizens and their dignity, Russian privileged interests and the prevention of any confrontation with the other countries (Medvedev, 2008) (Reynolds, 2008).

Besides approved Foreign Policy Concepts, Vladimir Putin's speech at Munich Security Conference in 2007 and speech at the Valdai Club in 2014 proved above-mentioned argument. Munich speech showed that Russia is eager to challenge US hegemony and defended multipolarity. Vladimir Putin stated that "unilateral -also illegitimate- actions



did not resolve any problem but created new centers of tension and caused new human tragedies” (Putin, 2007). At the Valdai Club, Putin continued to defend his opinion on unipolarity. Putin said that the “unipolar world is simply a means of justifying dictatorship over people and countries” (Putin, 2014b). Putin also expressed that unlike West Russia has not special place in the world or Russia is not exploiting other states’ needs. All Russia wants is that protection of her needs and her position in the world. This speech has importance because it was made after annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation. Russia wanted to be recognized as a power who has capabilities and power in the system.

Russia that lost her identity after dissolution of Soviet Union and with the fall of communism. This loss created an ambiguity and forced Russia to find a direction in Russian foreign policy. In this context, Russia firstly adopted Westernism in her economy and politics, then started talks with the West. When Russia realized she was abused by the Western ideas and not considerate as an equal partner by the West besides shrank economy, Russia started to use and defend the concept of multipolarity. Multipolarity was used pragmatically mostly, since Russia was still trying to solve her issues like her economy, war in Chechnya etc. For example, Russia used 9/11 attacks to justify her actions against Chechnya by representing the event as a ‘global Chechnya’ and Russian 9/11 discourse helped Russia to become civilized power within the West rather than having civilized/barbarian identity which was opposed by the West (Loughlin and Tuathail, 2004, p. 4).

Until 2007, multipolarity became mostly pragmatic, because Russia was not ready to take active role in international system. After economic boost in 2005, Russia improved herself and found a courage to challenge the Western hegemony with Putin’s Munich speech in 2007. Because Vladimir Putin has expressed his thoughts and concerns about unipolar world order by the US and defended that unipolar order led by one sovereign state is not related to democracy which is “power of majority” (Putin, 2007). After this speech, Russia started to assert the Russian interests and values combining them with the modern Western values accepting sovereign democracy. From that time, Russia strictly opposed to NATO’s expansion towards Ukraine and Georgia, and these territories were recognized as special interest by Russia. Any unilateral action by the West is perceived as a threat against integrity of Russia. Russian near abroad has been already under

influence of the West because of color revolutions and Russia felt targeted by the West. All these actions alarmed Russia and Russia had to develop her own terms for international system. Multipolarity became way out for Russia.

### *Theoretical Approach, Methodology and Hypotheses*

International system does not have clear definitions made by realists but all of them agree on that international system as anarchic. But there is difference of understanding between classical realists and neo-realists in terms of how system is anarchic. Classical realists says that international system is anarchic because of the nature of system based on human nature which is defined as evil and selfish by Thomas Hobbes. On the other hand, neo-realists examine the states behavior upon international system. According to Kenneth Waltz, there are two things determines the system; hierarchy and anarchy. In the first situation, “the units perform different functions which means that they are structurally dependent upon each other.” In the second situation, “the units relate to each other as independent agents, and so must be functionally autonomous in order to avoid structural dependency” (Waltz, 1979, p. 114; Buzan and Little, 2000, p. 40).

Liberals have different understanding of international system. According to them, there are three conceptions for international system. Firstly, they see the international system as “an independent interdependent system in which multiple and fluid interactions occur among different parties and where various actors learn from the interactions” (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. 116). There are various actors other than states. Second conception is specific international order based on “tradition of Immanuel Kant and U.S. president Woodrow Wilson” (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. 116) On contrary to realists, liberals conceive “liberal international order governs arrangements among states by means of shared rules and principles, similar to the principles that realists see under varying conditions of polarity.” Third and final concept is held by neoliberal institutionalists which is “international system as anarchic and acknowledge that each individual state acts in its own self-interest, similar to realist thinking” (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. 117). But different from realist thinking, in this system cooperation is possible among actors.

Constructivists look at system as anarchic but socially constructed. Individuals are important for them in terms of “how they affect discourse (how we frame and understand our world in talking, writing, and performing).” Constructivists focus on “identity, culture and social purposes of actors” (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. 124). Despite the fact that both constructivists and neo-realists see system as anarchic, Wendt criticizes Waltz because Waltz did not explain what determines states’ behavior in the system. According to Waltz, states are striving for obtaining power and this is the ultimate goal for states. Because, there is always possibility of occurring war and there is nothing to prevent them (Waltz, 1959, p. 232). According to Wendt, did not put introduce what constitutes anarchy as classical realists did. Also, Waltz states that behavior of states are dictated by the anarchic system but he does not explain which factors affect the behavior of those states in the system (Buzan and Little, 2000, p. 39). In this context, Wendt says that Waltz’s definition of structure cannot predict the dynamics of the system without assumptions about the structure of identities and interests in the system (Wendt, 1992, p. 396).

Radicals such as Marxists believe that international system is stratified by group of states according to who has valuable resources such as military strength, oil or economic power (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft, 2017, p. 118) and stratification is caused by the capitalism.

In this research neo-realism and constructivism will be used. Because polarity is a distribution of power and Russia desires to be represented as a pole which exercises cultural, economic and military influence in the international system. Russia does not have a position of creating a hegemony as United States did but she has a position of representing herself in the system because of a seat at the United Nations Security Council inherited from USSR. On the other hand, constructivism is a useful theory in terms of explaining Russian foreign policy decisions. Because, neo-liberalism is not efficient for explaining what determines states’ behavior whereas it asserts that states’ behavior is shaped by structure. At this point, constructivism helps us to understand what affects states’ behavior which are interests and identity. Soviet Union’s foreign policy was determined by communism and communism helped to identify Russian decisions on foreign policy. After dissolution of USSR, Russia had hard time in identifying her interests and also Russia was not able to represent herself as a pole in the system. In order to deal with this complexity, Russia adopted “near abroad” concept which is sphere of

influence identifies former Soviet space. By applying this policy Russia tried to overcome impact of dissolution of Soviet Union. In 2000s, Russia adopted sovereign democracy concept as opposition of Western interference in former Soviet sphere. One of the reasons for applying constructivism in this work is that Charles E. Ziegler's explanation on sovereign democracy in terms of constructivism, "key structures in the states' system are intersubjective rather than material and state identities and interests are in large part constructed by those structures" (Wendt, 1996, pp. 47–48; Ziegler, 2012, p. 403). According to Wendt, sovereignty is "an institution dependent upon the implementation of rules that exist "only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations" (Wendt, 1992, p. 412). Eventually, intersubjective understandings and expectations shape the identity of interest and then structure of the system (Buzan and Little, 2000, p. 43). Also, Russia has been believing the fact that she is destined to be great power as a sovereign and independent state. In order to achieve this goal, Russia gradually combined the multipolarity with the sovereign democracy. Russia is not in a position of rejecting values of current Western dominant international system, but she is in a position of developing her own values and terms uniting them with the Western values. In the 1990s, Russia has no option other than accepting the Western values because, communism has already been collapsed. Russia changed her behavior towards the West and other states. Then, Russia started to perceive other actors' behavior towards herself as a threat, she changed her behavior in which she can defy unilateral actions and defend her interests. Russia was benign towards the Western states but in late 1990s, this behavior has been changed because of the unilateral actions of NATO and the West. As a consequence, Russia perceived actions of the West as a threat against her existence and started to be more precautious. Because, as Wendt put it, before they know with each other, states cannot estimate how they can interact with each other. Because, they cannot calculate whether other state is hostile or not.

Russia accepted near abroad policy in order to define her security in terms of persevering their property rights over particular territories which are former Soviet States as Wendt described as a first step of transforming the understanding of security and power politics in context of sovereignty (Wendt, 1992, p. 414). In the second phase, Russia internalized sovereignty by asserting sovereign democracy developed by Vladimir Surkov. Sovereign democracy helped Russia to oppose color revolutions supported by the Western states

and institutions in near abroad. Russia had right to claim that her interests and domain were targeted by external forces and Russia was not recognized as a sovereign independent state and a power in the system. As a final phase, starting from 2007 with Vladimir Putin's speech in Munich Security Conference, Russia realized that she should start to defy the ongoing Western dominant system. In this way, Russia could make recognizable herself in the system. Russia started to defy unilateral system by putting her position in the UNSC and using her veto power. Other than that, Russia has already started to join established Western institutions from the beginning of Russian Federation like G7 and WTO. She has built economic and political relationships with former Soviet States, Eastern countries and other developing countries. Because, as Wendt put it, this kind of socialization and recognition by other states could be more reliable rather than just using individual national means (i.e. military power) in order to protect the security (Wendt, 1992, p. 415).

Following these explanations my hypotheses are first, Russia embraced the multipolarity in order to overcome tragedy of the dissolution of Soviet Union and to survive in an unknown international order. Second, Russia supported a world order led by the US in late 1990s and early 2000s but later on Russia felt threatened by West and Western institutions and their actions such as NATO enlargement, the EU enlargement and color revolutions. In this context, my thesis will be based on qualitative research and qualitative data which are primary and secondary sources: interviews, speeches, official documents, books and articles. Finally, I will try to answer following two questions: (1) Why did Russia adopt multipolarity as a foreign policy strategy? and (2) How did Russia change her perception of world order?

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **TRANSITION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNIPOLARIZED AGE**

Last decade of 20<sup>th</sup> century has witnessed enormous change in the international system. Bipolar system controlled by two major poles came to an end and liberalism announced its victory over communism. Mikhail Gorbachev resigned and all states within Union of Soviet Socialist Republics gained their independence by accepting Gorbachev resign. Afterwards Commonwealth of Independent States has been established and it has been followed by Alma-Ata Protocol which makes dissolution of Soviet Union official among eleven states (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 200).

In the following process, new episode has begun with Russian Federation. Russia lost most of her territory and suddenly became stranger to the former Soviet States including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Georgia. O’Loughlin and Talbot explain this loss as “existence at smallest territorial extent since the time of Peter the Great three century ago” (O’Loughlin and Talbot, 2005, p. 25). Fall of Soviet Union created uncertainty in terms of governing the new state. Communism was defining every segment of state such as economy, foreign policy, governance etc. But after dissolution of Soviet Union, communism was abandoned in every area. This first chapter will try to elaborate this new established state and its position in the changed environment during 1990s.

#### **1.1. IDENTITY OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CHANGED ENVIRONMENT**

It is common idea that Russia has not just lost her territory, she has lost also her status with the identity defined by communism. In the last decade of 20<sup>th</sup> century, bipolarity was gone together with collapse of Soviet Union and it caused “radical change in the foundation of world order” (Lukyanov, 2010, pp. 19–20). It was radical change indeed, it caused that millions of Russian citizens became outsiders in the lost territories. On the other hand, Russia followed rules of communism and her foreign policy was based on

communism. When communism was gone, determinants of foreign policy were gone. Russia might have lost her status in international system but there was one thing left. Russia was still permanent member of United Nations Security Council.

Collapse of Soviet Union was considered mostly as defeat because there was a common idea that liberalism has won and history came to an end as Francis Fukuyama pointed in his article (Fukuyama, 1989). But, Russia didn't see herself as defeated opposed to West because of that she gave up her ideas of world communism which takes other states under influence of Russia (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 20).

There were options for Russia to make decisions for foreign policy. Thought of lost identity made Russia turn for three traditional schools of thought in Russian foreign policy making. Westernism, Statism and Civilizationalism are the traditional ideologies in Russian international relations and Russian foreign policy making is based on these three main ideologies (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010, p. 664). Russia developed different views of "self" and "other" for each these theories. In the first one, Russia became self as part of West and non-Western world became the "other" as a consequence Russia pursued process of integration with West as Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010, p. 668). Secondly, Russia adopted statism by acknowledging "self" independent and *derzhava* which means a "holder of international equilibrium of power" (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 99). In this thought "other" became states that threaten Russia's independence" and Russia tried to "build normal great power". Last one explains "self" of Russia is independent civilization and also superior to "other" which includes Western and non-Western civilizations. As a result in this last diagram, Russia tried to develop relations with other civilizations by resisting Western superiority (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010, p. 669). In order to interpret post-Cold War Russian foreign policy, it is possible to state that Russia made use of Westernism in order to part of the Western dominated world established by Western ideology also she used statism as to oppose unipolar world order which was tried to be created by Western ideology again.

Ayşe Zarakol makes broader classification on which camps shaped Russian foreign policy after the demise of Soviet Union. First camp is pro-Western group asserting political and economic integration with the West. Because, Russia has already been part

of the Western civilization and that Western world is the congruous for the Russian evolving identity (Tsygankov, 1997; Zarakol, 2011, p. 221).

Second camp is “those holding middle-ground which are moderate liberals and moderate conservatives who also may be called statist or liberal nationalists” (Kassianova, 2001, p. 825; Zarakol, 2011, p. 221). Moderate liberals are also known as defensive realists because they assert that the Western intentions are inherently hostile and they are not willing to preserve Russian strength (Tsygankov, 1997, p. 258; Zarakol, 2011, p. 221). According to moderate liberals, Russia stabilizes and organizes heartland of the continent and serves buffer between European and non-European civilization as a great Eurasianist power. Moderate conservatives agree on that Russia should hold onto her “sphere of influence” as a great power while not abandoning cooperation with the West (Arbatov, 1993, p. 13; Kassianova, 2001, p. 825; Zarakol, 2011, p. 222). Both moderate liberals and moderate conservatives emphasized the “cultural uniqueness of Russia and its independent, autarchic and Eurasianist civilization which are suited for imperial organization” (Zarakol, 2011, p. 222).

Third camp is ultra-nationalist group. According to ultra-nationalists (and also revolutionary expansionists), Russia is anti-Western state and she should expand into Europe, China and Muslim world (Tsygankov, 1997, p. 256; Kassianova, 2001, p. 825; Zarakol, 2011, p. 222).

## **1.2. ADJUSTMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIPOLARITY**

In this environment, constitution of 1993 became important element in terms of governing Russian Federation. President gained remarkable power over decision making and foreign policy became one of those areas in decision making. There was no determined identity over foreign policy, but strong statist rule inherited from Soviet rule made possible for Russia to take coherent decisions by time. Certainly, new state and new rule brought complexity. Despite strong presidency, there was no clarification about how authority is given to government and president differently and how administrative departments served



to presidency. In 1995, by legislative changes, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs became committed to presidency (Light, 2014, p. 212).

In this sphere, Russia launched her first Foreign Policy Concept in 1993 in order to establish her identity by defining foreign policy principles (Light, 2014, p. 215). Lomagin compiles main objects of this concept. Firstly, Russia started to secularize her foreign policy separating Russia from “special spiritual mission”. Secondly, Russia accepted herself as Russian state once thought that it is inseparable from Russian Empire. Finally, Russia started to prioritize economic progress and democratic stabilization beside national security and foreign policy (Lomagin, 2007, p. 34). But more importantly, Russia accepted the concept of near abroad which will determine her next move about Russian Foreign Policy. It was difficult for Russia to integrate into world without her territorial power and her Russian citizens became minorities in the new independent ex-Soviet States. This term was meant that “new arrangement of sovereignty and an old familiarity, a longstanding spatial entanglement and a range of geopolitical emotions” (Toal, 2017, p. 3). Geopoliticians, geostrategists and nationalists accepted that Russian security interests should be preserved in the near abroad. Although nationalists said that security issues are first priority for Russia without West’s approval, geostrategists and geopoliticians argued that security problems could be clarified by being part of Western alliance (Buszynski, 1996, p. 38). Later, one of president’s foreign policy advisors also critic of Kozyrev’s policies, Andranik Migranyan stated that concept of near abroad is Russian version of Monroe Doctrine (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 155). With this concept, Russia wanted to secure her borders against external threat as the United States did same against colonization of countries in her borders in 19<sup>th</sup> century. Russia claimed she had special interest over post-Soviet states in Baltics (later Russia excluded Baltic states), Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Russia did not want to give up her status immediately in former Soviet sphere. Also, later this concept has been used against actions of the US-led NATO and the EU. Russia determined first phase of her sovereignty claiming that she has a property rights over specific territory (Wendt, 1992, p. 414).

During highly unipolarized age, Russia also tried to integrate herself into West. In order to make this element concrete, multipolarity became an important tool for Russia. Especially, during Boris Yeltsin period and Andrei Kozyrev’s foreign ministry,

integration into West by adaptation of multipolarity was important issue. Andrei Kozyrev was eager to build strategic partnership with West, it was strategic because Russia and West were sharing common values (Mikhailenko, 2003, p. 202). Boris Yeltsin stated that relations of Russia with outside world will be based on “the recognition of the norms and principles of international law” and Russia will defend her “legal interests” by virtue of “these universal principles” in his Federal Assembly speech (Buszynski, 1996, p. 39). Also, Yeltsin stated that Russia “has a special responsibility for stability in the multipolar world” because of her geopolitical position (Buszynski, 1996, p. 39).

While Russia was trying to develop relations with West, she did not avoid Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia founded tools for integration with former Soviet States. First one is Economic Union in 1993 and second one is Free Trade Area which is approved by all members but Russia in 1994. Third one is Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union in 1995 later became Eurasian Economic Community in 2000 together with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (Light, 2014, p. 218). In order to develop common defense which Russia is eager about it, Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent in 1992 by Russia, Belarus and Armenia. Moldova, Ukraine and Turkmenistan joined in 1993. Collective Security Treaty became effective in 1993, when treaty was reviewed in 1999 and it was upgraded to Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2002. Besides CIS, Russia also improved her relations with China starting from mid-1990s. Shanghai Five group including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was founded in order to secure Sino-Soviet border on 1996, later Shanghai Five became Shanghai Cooperation Organization with joining of India and Pakistan. In 1997, one of the most improvements between China and Russia was established, which is “Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration about a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New World Order”, in 2001 relations were deepened by 2001 ‘Sino-Russian Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation’. This rapprochement with China has an importance because Russia was motivated by counterbalancing United States of America (Lo, 2008, p. 25). In 1999, Bishkek Declaration was signed by Shanghai Five emphasizing “a commitment to political and military cooperation in the ‘general trend’ towards multipolarity” (Silvius, 2016, p. 7).

Specifically, Kozyrev indicated that world will not be bipolar or Pax-Americana which United States tried to accomplish (Kozyrev, 1994, p. 13). From the beginning Russia

desired to be taken serious and seen as equal to West. Thus, Russia could put herself in her way in the new world order. But, hopes of Russia were crushed soon. Russia was optimistic about her transition period, since West has been investing on Russia to overcome for her economic problems. Later, it occurred that West was trying to destroy the economic system and destabilize Russia herself by meddling Russian internal affairs instead of providing healthy “social safety net and the rule of law in the process of fundamental structural transformation” (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 91).

This naïve attitude towards West did not just engender that Russian internal affairs were interfered in but also it did cause NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to take decisions about expansion throughout Russian borders. During Bill Clinton’s presidency, United States stepped back from recognizing Russian interest in her close sphere which is defined as near abroad. Bill Clinton administration later approved that NATO could expand through former Soviet States’ allies and even former Soviet States’ themselves (Smith, 2013, p. 40). Potential threat showed by Western front alarmed Russia. These threats were tried to be avoided when NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was established in 1997. In May 2002, it was replaced by NATO-Russia Council. But this council was suspended due to Ukraine Crisis on 1 April 2014. Russian-US relations started to normalize when second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed in 1993 (first one signed in 1991). Until United States’ withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM), this treaty was maintained.

### **1.3. CHALLENGES OF FOREIGN POLICY**

At the same time, ethnic and military conflicts started to emerge both in Russia and in former Soviet States. Moldova, South Caucasus region, Tajikistan witnessed major conflicts after Soviet Union dissolved. Transdniestria declared its independence and soldiers led by General Lebed mostly native of Transdniestria from Russian 14<sup>th</sup> Army were accused of fighting with separatists (Light, 2014, p. 220). Later, Mircae Snegur and Boris Yeltsin signed a ceasefire and Russia kept her troops in order to protect the peace (Herd, 2007, p. 84). Russia helped Tajikistan as to protect the Tajikistani borders from Islamic insurgency by deploying her army troops and also she mediated peace agreement

(Light, 2014, p. 220). South Caucasus region is the most conflicted area because problems continued to 2000s. First conflicted zone is Nagorno-Karabakh which is Armenian dominated area in Azerbaijani. Nagorno-Karabakh is under Azerbaijani control since Soviet constitution gave the right to govern. But after USSR dissolved, Armenians annexed the Azerbaijani and one of the major wars occurred. In 1994, ceasefire has been achieved but there is no clear resolution yet. The other South Caucasus state that has conflict is Georgia. There were two secessionist movements in Georgia when USSR disintegrated. South Ossetia and Abkhazia wanted to be separated from Georgia and Russia had to intervene and send her troops to Georgia. Russia had already forces in order to protect Georgia from NATO but in reality these forces helped to support separatists in Georgia. Because of that problem, these separatist movements continued until Five-day War broke out in 2008 (later will be discussed). These unresolved issues created area of frozen conflict. Generally, it is because of that Russia supported these separatist movements in South Caucasus in order to take control of her influence areas.

There was another security threat for Russia, moreover this threat was stemmed from inside of Russia: Chechnya. 1994-1996 was challenging period for Russia that defines herself great power which tries to be comply with Western values. Chechen government stand out against Russia by putting Russia a weakened center and disregarding sovereignty of Russia (Smith, 2012, p. 48). First Chechen War became one of the most significant tests that Russia put her military effort even so succeeded in terms of protecting her borders and sovereignty. This war showed that Russia had limited military power which will not be a threat to world and also Russia is criticized especially by European Union (Smith, 2012, p. 49). Another reason for why this war is critical to Russia is that Chechnya is Muslim populated country and it is under influence of Islamic extremism. Russia had to be careful in order not to confront with Muslim populations in both Russia and other states (Legvold, 2007, p. 256).

In 1996, Andrei Kozyrev was replaced by Yevgeny Primakov. Although Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev cooperation led to confrontation with West, they declared the policy of “reintegration of the countries of the former Soviet Union, first economically, but then militarily and perhaps even politically” (Legvold, 2007, p. 67). This policy continued to be applied by next foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov. Also, Russia recognized

independence and sovereignty of former states in order to protect Russians and other minorities (Legvold, 2007, p. 67).

Previous chapter on Russian foreign policy was based on leadership of West which caused new unipolarity in international system. Together with Primakov, Russian policies towards West began to change. Russian understanding of multipolarity changed from “Russia’s eager embrace of Western civilization, institutions, and norms” to “a more independent statist position in which Russia sought greater autonomy in global affairs vis-a`-vis institutions” and practices associated with American hegemony (Silvius, 2016, p. 6). Also, Russia started to define herself as great power and saw herself as both in Asia and in Europe as Primakov stated himself (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 96). In this period, statism was improved. Primakov tried to develop balance and diverse foreign policy between liberal values and Eurasian identity of Russia (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 19). On the other hand, pragmatism was embraced by Primakov. Russia encountered with sort of duality which has result in two levels: “what Russia really wanted (foreign policy A), and what it was forced to do (foreign policy B)” (Sakwa, 2008a, p. 242). Therefore, Russia developed “multi-vector” policy which is based on having good relations with West (especially America) but not “letting it walk on over Russia”, on the other hand. Also, Europe became important element in order to build multiple relations because it was easy to develop relations with Europe rather than America which insists on her hegemony and unipolarity (Smith, 2013, p. 42).

While Russia was figuring out about how relations would be pursued with other states, Kosovo crisis occurred in 1998. Yugoslavia led by Slobadan Milošević who is Serbian nationalist eliminated autonomous status of Kosovo which consists of Albanians, then Kosovo rose against Yugoslavia. Yugoslavian troops suppressed Kosovan forces by ethnic cleansing. When the war became more heated, NATO forces started to bomb Yugoslavia in order to stop the conflict. Russia did not approve the use of force by UN Security Council also did not ratify NATO’s decision on bombing. NATO’s and West’s actions caused that Russia was threatened by the “other” again. NATO started to threaten her existence again by being one and only security provider by reproducing Cold-War type policies in Europe other than OSCE, EU, The Council of Europe, The Council of Baltic States (Sergunin, 2016, p. 153).

In this chapter, I tried to explain Russian foreign policy behavior through new established identity after communism was abandoned. Russia as a protective state of her existence had suspicions about new world order. Because Russia was not a game changer and major pole anymore as bipolarity was pursued by two prominent ideologies. There was common opinion about winner of the Cold War which is United States and her liberal views. Even if it is not clarified, world became unipolar under the umbrella of United States. Russia completed 20<sup>th</sup> century by trying to applying multipolarity and adjusting to new world. It was rough test for Russia, because her economy was about to collapse and yet defended the sovereignty of Russia against Chechen uprisings. Also, “near abroad” was full of conflict zones, Russia tried to control the conflicts over the former Soviet States. Russia was disappointed by NATO’s actions on Yugoslavia. Because, NATO started to act like political-military organization and it became major security provider in Europe.

Russia entered the millennium together with unresolved issues and economic difficulties. Boris Yeltsin resigned and showed Vladimir Putin as his successor. Next year, Vladimir Putin was elected as president.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONTINUATION OF MOVING WITH THE WEST

Russia chose a different way for herself when Vladimir Putin was elected. He was out of nowhere, seemingly. He was operative KGB agent and known as deputy of St. Petersburg's Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. He was ambitious and determinant about strengthening Russia. In order to assure people of Russia, he argued that Russia's weakness is "not just about economic but also political, spiritual and moral" (Ziegler, 2016, p. 564). Then, he listed four elements which will be vital for future Russian foreign policy: patriotism, greatness of Russia (*derzhavnost*), statism and social solidarity. Patriotism is "feeling of a pride in the one's country, its history and accomplishments" (Sakwa, 2008b, p. 322). Patriotism is a way of connecting people to their country, because people's praise to country provides source of courage for the country's continuity. Russia has always been destined to be great power. But this thought should be improved with "new ideas, advanced technologies, high level of popular wellbeing, upholding of national interests and reliable protection of country's security" because greatness of a country can only be measured with these elements (Sakwa, 2008b, p. 323). Statism relates to Russia's position in the world order. But this position will be defined when Russia is able to combine her traditions with modern Western values such as democracy, law-based state and freedom. Social solidarity is based on merging traditional Russian values with Western liberalism. Russian people are depended on their collective consciousness rather than their personal efforts. But, according to social solidarity, Russia will adjust herself by applying Western values and protecting the traditional values at the same time (Sakwa, 2008b, p. 324).

New president of Russia had several problems to be solved: rebuilding Russia as an international actor with more or less credibility, ensuring to have constructive relations with West while retaining "its trumps elsewhere (developing ties with China, India and Iran) (Lo, 2003, p. 16). Yeltsin had though rhetoric on foreign policy but later he acted more benign towards West. In this period, Putin started to act more benign towards West but later Russia took the chance of confronting with West especially when Russia rejected to support US during her invasion of Iraq. It is true that economic considerations was one

of the priorities for Russia, but it is wrong to say that Russia is benign and has “positive-sum view of world and it is driven by only economic considerations” (Lo, 2003, p. 16).

Through these elements, Russia started the millennium and updated her foreign policy. Russia focused on the future threats of unipolar structure pushed by United States such as destabilization of international structure, provoking the tensions and arms race, aggravations of contradictions among states because of national and religious strife (The Russian Federation, 2000b). Russia was named as great power despite the decreasing population, down of GDP to 1.5 percent comparing to United States' 21 % GDP (Legvold, 2001, pp. 62, 63). There were still issues in the near abroad and inside of the country. Chechens triggered the second war in late 1999, together with rise of Islamic extremism in North Caucasus, Russia was alarmed again. One thing was certain, Russia had the permanent seat at UNSC and knew her weaknesses and strengths. Also, Russia aimed to be more active in the international community in 2000s. Globalization became more obvious in Russian actions. Russia developed her foreign policy in the direction of globalization and pursued supporting multipolarity in every sphere.

## **2.1. 9/11 ATTACKS AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US**

World Trade Centre was attacked by Al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001. This attack was breakthrough for international system because America which is hegemon in the system was threatened by terrorist organization and it became a turning point for Russia. Because Russia stood by America and supported America to fight with terrorism. Russia looked for “a military alliance against a common military enemy” (Ambrosio, 2005, p. 1189). America obtained two military bases in Central Asia in order to assist for attacks on Afghanistan. One was Karshi-Khanabad air base in southern Uzbekistan and other one was the Ganci air base at Manas International Airport near the capital Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan (Cutler, 2007, p. 120).

September 11 attacks were marked as a real end of Cold War because of Russian unconditional support for US (Pravda, 2003, p. 39) Tony Blair and George W. Bush were enthusiastic about Russian support and welcomed overcoming issues of remaining from



previous era. Beginning of the strategic partnership between these former enemies was expressed in gratification.

Russia was seeking to be recognized as a great power and cooperating with United States was the only way that will lead to it. In order to realize this idea, Russia fully supported America against terrorism. This period can be named as honeymoon which lasted only couple of years until US intervention of Iraq and color revolutions (Tsvetkov, 2017, p. 381,382). But, there was still a chance to improve good relations with West for Russia at least. Russia tried to bandwagon with US which gave up when US decided to invade of Iraq (Ambrosio, 2005, p. 1189) rather than balancing the US. This was a chance for Russia to step up to next level. Because, Russia had advantage to prove herself to the world by being side by side United States.

Also because of securitization of foreign policy terrorism became prominent element to be eliminated in every sphere and Russia emphasized issue of terrorism in terms of territorial integrity and national sovereignty (Lo, 2003, p. 15). Chechnya continued to be internal threat because of its ties with Islamic extremism. On the other hand, there was September 11 attacks caused by Al Qaeda which was under influence of Islam. In that sense, Russia identified terrorism as “main threat to the security of Russia and blamed militant Islamic networks for destabilizing the north Caucasus as well as Central Asia” (Pravda, 2003, p. 43). Secondly, Russia continued to be suspicious about American actions on developing a strategic defense missile system and its implications for strategic stability (Lo, 2003, p. 15). These two issue determined Putin’s foreign policy vision for Russia at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The relationship between Russia and America was perceived as equal partnership by Russia. Because these two states were collaborating about top secret issues and flow of valuable information was establishing. Also, Russia gained both national and international advantages from this cooperation. Since Moscow banned Taliban as a main threat to its security with any other Islamic insurgences because of what happens in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Russia made easier for herself justifying her actions in Chechnya. Cooperating with America helped to improve Russian security.

In this environment, United Nations Security Council passed a resolution about disarmament of Iraqi government in November 2002. Bush administration made possible

to get unanimous vote. Although, this decision was seen as success by Russia, but later Russian Defense Minister stated, decision was perceived as “absolutely unlawful to carry out the (military) operation against Iraq” (Ambrosio, 2005, p. 1199) and President Putin also kept up this thought and claimed unjustifiable and unnecessary (“*Iraq War Was Unjustified, Putin Says*,” 2003). According to Putin, Iraqi war was against the system of international security and he asserted that if stronger one was allowed to do whatever it wants, sanctity of sovereignty of all states which is a key principle of international law came into a question (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 2003; Ambrosio, 2005, p. 1202).

Decision of invasion of Iraq and events followed by the decision changed Russian thinking again. Russia returned to language of multipolarity sharply and left the idea of bandwagoning. For Russia, there were no any advantage to stand against America. Because Russia had just closed a billion dollars economic and trade deal with Saddam government back then. Also, supporting America gave Russia sort of strength. Rejecting American hegemony became one of the daring move Russia had ever made. America and any other state did not expect this refusal. It was just abrupt. Also, Russia did not need to oppose America immediately, she could play double game. Domestically, Russia could stall her people and then could support America again (Webster, Watson and Hurst, 2003). But problem was related to status of Russia in international system as Ambrosio stated: “genesis of Russian people, state and empire has been connected to Russian great power status” and Russia was seemed to be destined to shape “geopolitics of international system” (Ambrosio, 2005, p. 1206).

Russia was not alone in opposition of Iraqi invasion. France from Western front opposed to America as Russia did. Putin asserted that Russia and France had common goals for international security which is establishing multipolar world order (“Interview Granted by President Vladimir Putin to France-3 Television,” 2003). Also, Germany opposed to Iraqi invasion. This small alliance helped Russia to overcome American hegemony and it helped that how Russian behavior would be towards West. Because Germany and France were on the same page about that UNSC system which is only true “key arbiter regarding the legitimacy of the use of military force” (Legvold, 2007, p. 427). Russia did not prefer to deal with European Union as an institution but she preferred bilateral relations with European countries. These bilateral relations (“especially with Germany

and France because of historical and economic reasons”) helped Russia to become regional player (Legvold, 2007, p. 426).

Without doubt, after Cold War, systemic problems could not be solved. America became volunteer as a “protector” of the international system and took the control of the system as a hegemon. America has seized global power status for the first time and the status came surprisingly (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 21,22). When power of Soviet Union vanished which no one was expected to be that soon, America had no choice other than being global leader (Lukyanov, 2010). After World War I, America became determinant of global politics again. Apparently, because of this pre-given power, America intervened to make world unipolar during Kosovo intervention in 1990s and at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century, she was interfering again about making world unipolar led by her hegemony. But unipolarity has limited lifetime because “new great powers will emerge as the uneven growth process narrows the gap between the hegemon and the eligible states that are positioned to emerge as its competitors (Layne, 1993, p. 10).” In this environment, Russia had two options and she chose to be create her own way.

9/11 events, discourse of “War on Terrorism” and Russian rejection of American hegemony caused another problem in the international system after the end of Cold War. Because, Russia is searching for her next mission with unsettled existential problems declined to be part of international system led by United States. According to Lukyanov, problem was “how to integrate the founder and the leader of the outgoing, the US, into the emerging multipolar system” (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 26). Because the United States could establish smooth transition from unipolar world to multipolar world with her unique status and this changeover could provide positive role for the United States. But in an actual situation, unique status of America led that America used her privileges and coerced the other states to comply with US (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 26). But according to Richard Sakwa, situation was just the opposite. Russia had weaknesses about two structural issues firstly Russia had own domestic problems such as “criminality, corruption, increasing political monocentrism and economic statism” and secondly “a profound resistance on the part of Western institutions to allowing Russia’s integration during complex social transformation” in which Russia experienced at that time (Sakwa, 2008a, p. 248). There occurred a question of how to integrate a rising power into existing system.

Putin tried to bring Russia “from periphery to the core in international politics” and “according to neo-realists, this aim was Russia’s recognition of the actual distribution of power in the international system” (Sakwa, 2008a, p. 247). According to liberal realists, liberal values are “positive attraction” as long as the United States enjoys her hegemony in a “consensual manner” (Sakwa, 2008a, p. 247).

## **2.2. GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMY**

Dissolution of Soviet Union, end of Cold War and disappearance of bipolarity caused occurrence of diversity. Many of states were dictated by confronted two ideological camps found themselves in an awkward position (Klepatskii, 2003, p. 4). Nationality and national interest gained huge importance. When it comes to Russia, it was necessary to develop some kind of reaction for changing environment. World was becoming globalized, classical Westphalian world system was questioned because borders between states were about to disappear (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 22). As well as states, non-governmental organizations were beginning to be influential in world politics.

Elections in 1999-2000 remarked a change in Russian economic system. Russia adopted a policy which was called “Moscow Consensus” combining of old and neo-liberal approaches; “continuation of engagement with international economic and financial organizations regular debt repayments, the maintenance of macroeconomic stability by necessary fiscal measures, the end of threats to renationalize industry, and the gradual modification of protectionism” (Sakwa, 2008b, p. 242). Later, Putin’s desire for turning Russian economy into liberal economy was “state capitalism conversion of the centralized Soviet economy and the wild privatization of the 1990s” (Sakwa, 2008b, p. 249).

In this environment, multipolarity was started to be catchphrase for Russian politics. Russia which lost huge territory with strategic importance besides millions of her citizens did not react as a state that cares about global diversity. Russia reacted as a state that lost her status and power in the system. Russia is a state that has historical importance in the history but also it is a state that cares about unity in every sense which can prevent splitting up. For that reason, multipolarity became easy way for Russia to speak up as a

pole in the system. Also, multipolarity is a continuation of history which makes coherence between past and now so that she can challenge to globalization and its consequences (Klepatskii, 2003, p. 4).

European Union and its way of gathering more than one state's sovereignty voluntarily brought about the issue of whether it is the new world order (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 22). Also, global economy and global information environment increased their impact on domestic affairs starting from 1990s. In that sense, globalization played an important role on "economic and financial spheres" by affecting national interest and transforming them but globalization did not eliminate or replace them (Klepatskii, 2003, p. 5). As Lukyanov put it, globalization changed "global landscape and weakened the capabilities of states but it has not created any new structural units that could serve as a foundation for building some other well-ordered system" (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 23). Network theory which can be alternative to horizontal (balance of power) and vertical (hegemony) systems but it reminds of political version of free market dominated by invisible hand (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 23). According to advocates of network, business, war, diplomacy, media or any other important concepts that shape international politics are networked. For example, media is networked which is depended on its viewers and feedbacks (Slaughter, 2009, p. 94). But network theory also foresees that United States can be at the center that is most networked country and it is not much different from a vertical system (Slaughter, 2009, p. 113). It is reflection of globalization.

In the globalized age, state sovereignty became easily intervened. What it means is here that any humanitarian reasons caused intervention of other superior states. Humanitarian intervention experiences failed to create optimism in Somalia, Haiti and Yugoslavia and it was difficult to establish a legitimacy of these actions because it caused a division rather than unification of international community (Lukyanov, 2010, p. 23). As it was mentioned before, for example Russia strongly opposed intervention in Yugoslavia. Humanitarian idea became controversial.

In order to protect her stance, Russia chose multipolarity in case of losing her new credibility against possible danger of globalization in the international system. But before multipolarity became permanent concept for Russian foreign policy, adjusting Russian economy became priority for national security which adopted in 2000. "Condition of

national economy” took part in list of “threats to the national security of Russian Federation” (The Russian Federation, 2000a). But economy is not just an “intrinsic good” for Russian politics, it is also a “springboard from which to restore Russia’s international fortunes” (Lo, 2003, p. 20). Economic development was as a means to end which was external security (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 31). Russia ensured her security by improving economic relations with European Union, CIS and EEU states.

In 2003, Russia joined a group of emerging economies consisting of India, China, Brazil and South Africa (BRICS). Shanghai Five (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) became officially Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with joining of Pakistan and India. These two economic organizations became one of the most important tools for Russia. Especially, idea of Shanghai Five was based on desire of multipolarity, which revealed that there is a world apart from Atlantic dominated world. Especially, China and India became important partners in order to build multipolar world. Main problem was that these states were former enemies and neither of China and India would want to be led by Russia. Furthermore, their economies are integrated into the Western economy and are far closer to the United States rather than being close to Russia (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 36). This is why Russia created Eurasian Economic Community and CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). She tried to establish efficient relations with CIS. Main purpose has been to prove that Eurasia is capable of forming efficient institutions like the West. Also Russia was trying to decrease the impact of NATO and the EU in her former sphere of influence since these two institutions started to be interested in encompassing the states in former Soviet Space.

After 1990s, Russia started to integrate her economy into the market economy by applying shock therapy implying the privatization of state commodities. The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not cause soft transition in Russian economy. Even if it is peacefully ending, Russia had hard time dealing with its economy. Her political, social and economic infrastructure was disintegrated and “GDP plummeted by nearly half and capital investment by 80 percent” (Cohen, 2006). As a result, financial crisis hit Russia in 1998 and then there emerged a need for economic recovery. Because, globalization “punishes economically weak and not merely the economically undeveloped” (Legvold, 2001, p. 68). Putin clarified situation of Russian economy by comparing Russia to

Portugal which is EU's poorest member: "It would take us fifteen years and an eight percent annual growth of our GDP to reach the per capita GDP level of present-day Portugal" (Putin, 1999). Russian economy had grown "on average by 6 to 7 percent annually since 1999, its stock-market index increased last year by 83 percent and its gold and foreign currency reserves are the world's fifth largest" (Cohen, 2006).

2004 remarked change in economic elites of Russia. While private companies were making profit, state-owned companies were useless in the beginning of 2000s. Oligarchs which had these profited companies were not just rich people who were in charge of "major economic decisions" but also they were influential in Russian politics. Although corruption has been always matter of fact in Russia since Stalin era, it became more legal in 1990s. New state allowed privatization of wealth in order to gain loyalty of elites by empowering formerly influential Soviet elite (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 181). Russia became "organized crime" scene and "hostage of oligarchs" (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 181). After he became president, Putin dissolved power of oligarchs and empowered siloviks which were former Soviet or KGB officials like Putin himself (Tsygankov, 2014).

When Putin filled the boards of directors with people from his circle such as Gazprom and Rosneft became competitors to private owned companies (Krastev, Leonard and Wilson, 2009, p. 32). In the 2000s, thanks to rising oil and gas prices Russian economy started to boost, Russia was able to pay off her debts and Putin consolidated domestic stability (Hill, 2015, p. 50,51).

Russia as a giant energy and a major energy transit country" is "the number one natural gas producer and exporter in the world and is producing about as much energy as Saudi Arabia" (Cohen, 2009, p. 91). European Union and former Soviet states constituted huge importance in terms of trading partners dominated by energy. One quarter of European Union's gas supply stems from Russia and also oil plays important role too (Nies, 2010, p. 266). Apart from the EU itself, Russia has reliance on cooperation with the EU states such as Germany, France and Italy (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 35).

Being energy rich country made Russia exploitive of energy dependent countries. CIS whose industries are dependent on energy consuming pay lower prices for oil and gas since Soviet times. For Russia, control over oil and gas pipelines and European gas market became important. Even if Russian economy is dependent on money coming from energy

trade, this did not stop Russia from being advantageous against states (especially Baltic and the EU states) that need gas and oil (Oldberg, 2010a, pp. 50–51). In order to embody this advantage, Russia built some ports from Russia to Western states directly apart from the EU.

Russian relations with some European countries started to be based on integration into European economy. Putin's emphasize on improving decision-making with European countries became understandable especially when it was taken into consideration that France and Germany did not support military operation led by United States as Russia did not (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 145).

In order improve relations with the EU states, Russia used her leverage on “energy position in world markets by building pipelines in all geographic directions, purchasing shares abroad, raising energy prices for its oil and gas dependent neighbors” (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 148), also Russia was controlling the transportation networks and coordinating the activities with other energy producers in former Soviet States (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 148). In 2005, Russia and Germany agreed to build gas pipeline called Nord Stream in which Russian company Gazprom holds 51 per cent between Russia and Germany under the Baltic Sea (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 52; Tsygankov, 2014, p. 145)). It was negotiated to extend Blue Stream pipeline from Turkey to Hungary via Bulgaria and Romania through Black Sea which is called South Stream (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 52).

### **2.3. REACTION ON ENLARGEMENT OF NATO AND THE EU**

Disintegration of Soviet Union caused liberal Westernizers to become effective in Russian politics. Liberal Westernizers were blamed for giving “too many concessions to the West by encouraging Western politicians to take further advantage of Russia” (Light, Löwenhardt and White, 2003, p. 63). At first, Russia was deeply concerned about NATO's further expansion through Baltic States and Ukraine but there was nothing Russia could do about it as liberal Westernizer politicians claimed because of economic problems (Light, Löwenhardt and White, 2003, p. 65). Concerns about the enlargement of NATO is not that NATO posed a military threat to Russia. Real concern is that Russia would be isolated from the West and “cut out from crucial security decisions” as a



consequence this would “aid the rise of extremist nationalists inside Russia” (Marten, 2017, p. 10). On the other hand, European Union was more benign according to Russia and it was more acceptable to Russia (Light, Löwenhardt and White, 2003, p. 66).

In 2001, Putin stated that NATO was not considered as an enemy organization but also it was not needed anymore. Because NATO was founded as a counterpart of Warsaw Pact. Since Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union were gone there was no need for NATO, but NATO continued to exist and grow (Sakwa, 2008a, p. 257). In 2004, NATO enlarged to encompass seven new countries that had earlier been part of the Soviet bloc and Russia did not make sound when NATO enlarged (Sakwa, 2008b, p. 281). 2004 became also a year for enlargement of EU. The EU enlarged through former Eastern bloc states and some of them were also part of former Soviet states. Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) became only former Soviet states member of the EU and NATO. Baltic States were not member of CIS and because of their new membership were left out of near abroad.

NATO enlargement was first announced in 1990s during Bill Clinton’s administration. This announcement created sense of threat in Russian administration but Russia continued to be cautious. Beginning of the 2000s implied new partnership between Russia and West which is against terrorism. In the short term Russia gained support for second war in Chechnya and war against Taliban regime which threatens Russian ally’s Tajikistan (Sakwa, 2008b, p. 281). First Chechen war was a humiliation and it was not supported by West because discourse of first war was internal threat. Discourse of second war in Chechnya became that there was an “international threat in form of international terrorism” (Smith, 2012, pp. 50–51). Also second war united all political fractions and people in Russia: “liberals, communists, the army and security organizations (Smith, 2012, p. 51).” Second Chechen War brought respect back to Russia and Russian army. Russia was acting as a great power in the international system (Smith, 2012, p. 52).

Although there were several initiatives between former Soviet Union and formerly European Economic Community, there needed to make new arrangements between new state Russia and new European Union. Russia and European Union took old Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement and amended it with GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) (Romanova, 2017, p. 358). As a result since 1997, there has been

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which was signed in 1994 (Nies, 2010; Romanova, 2017, p. 358).

Russian turn from American dominated system started with Iraqi invasion but it continued with color revolutions. In his second term, Putin faced problems in Russian near abroad. Color revolutions were seen as threat to Russian security and Moscow blamed especially United States for meddling in the region. Russia found herself “in danger of being encircled by pro-western countries, and expanded the US reach to Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Slavic heartland” (Mitchell, 2012, p. 93). Rose Revolution in Georgia, Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and Orange Revolution in Ukraine became main source of dispute between Russia and the West. Rose Revolution increased the tension between Georgia and Russia, their intense relationship erupted in 2008. Orange Revolution was unexpected for Russia and had impact on Russia as September 11 attacks had on Russia because Russia had to reassess her position in the near abroad and perceived revolution as threat (Mitchell, 2012, p. 93). Tulip Revolution had different impact on Russia other than Orange and Rose Revolutions. Because, Kyrgyzstan continued to stand by Russia unlike Ukraine and Georgia while still permitting the US air force at Manas (Mitchell, 2012, p. 96).

Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani regimes were under Communist era rulers. These regimes were “characterized by corruption, a history of election fraud and economies which improved from 1990s but still widespread poverty and joblessness” (Mitchell, 2012, p. 44). These regimes did whatever it took to stay in the power and they became authoritarian eventually. Color revolutions in general were “actions of people who are tired of the corrupt or otherwise static government that precluded further human development” (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 163). People in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were basically looking for a change in their governments and seeking for democratic rights. These revolutions alarmed Russia and evoked that Russia might be next one and US backed the revolutions. That is why Russia harshly criticized and opposed revolts in these states.

When Russia faced difficulties in her near abroad and felt threatened by initiatives of pro-Western governments in near abroad, Russia embraced the term of sovereign democracy in mid-2005. Sovereign democratic state is “politically and economically independent

thanks to both a strong military and state control over key strategic economic states in the international system” (Herd, 2007, p. 59). It is argued that transition from bipolar world to unipolar post-Cold War era caused non-polarity because power is diffused among various actors possessing and exercising various kind of power (Herd, 2007, p. 59; Haas, 2008, pp. 44–45). Russia emerged as “a center of global power to constitute one of independent poles” (Herd, 2007, p. 60).

Sovereign democracy occurred as a response to upheavals in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and it stems from Russian political culture as a rejection of Western forms of liberal democracy (Surkov, 2008, p. 92; Ziegler, 2016, p. 65). Vladislav Surkov explains the reason for why this term is unique to Russia. Firstly, it justifies “centralization of nation’s material, intellectual and power resources for the purposes of self-preservation and successful development of each citizen in Russia and of Russia in the world” (Surkov, 2008, p. 92). According to Russia, globalization and sovereignty, rights and duties, competition and cooperation can be reachable without division (Surkov, 2008, p. 92). Secondly, concept of sovereign democracy is “flexible, dynamic and receptive” for Russian society in terms of causing positive changes in the society. At the end of loosening of political structure, this will not cause any damage in the society as it was before. Thirdly, “Sovereign democracy is personified inasmuch as it is described by Vladimir Putin” (Surkov, 2008, p. 92). Finally, it is a promising concept for Russia and the world but also it is utopian because of that it is desired (Surkov, 2008, p. 92). Sovereign democracy is “open, self-confident and globalist narrative, underpinned by a notion of Russia as a strong and natural regional hegemon and center of global influence” (Herd, 2007, p. 60).

Russia does not oppose to “European cultural heritage and its affinity with the Westphalian model of Europe of nation states” which referenced frequently. But, Russia embraces her own values and Russia does not want to replace them with values that does not fit Russian culture. Russia emphasizes her own history and values and she wants to move forward gradually with her own terms. Shortly, Russia defends “conservative modernization” which oppositions mostly called “authoritarian modernization” (Herd, 2007, p. 66)

The concept of sovereign democracy is important in order to explain Russian foreign policy. Because it implies another rejection of Western dominated world order. Russia was damaged by NATO's actions in Kosovo, Iraqi intervention and finally color revolutions. In some way, Russia could handle these first events. But color revolutions harmed Russian status in near abroad. Russia was still adjusting herself into system and trying to create for her own. Color revolutions and Western attempts to create new order in South Caucasus and Central Asia were not acceptable for Russia. Because these attempts undermined Russian status and Russian sphere of influence which Russia did not want to face. Sovereign democracy made possible for Russia to face with consequences of these revolutions and prepared the ground for Russo-Georgian War and annexation of Crimea.

In this chapter, I tried to analyze transition period in Russian foreign policy. In the beginning of the millennium, Russia was hopeful in terms of cooperating with the West. But, Invasion of Iraq and Color Revolutions reduced Russian hopes on establishing multipolar world order with equal terms. When Russia noticed how her situation was in danger, she started to determine her own way.

## CHAPTER 3

### BREAKTHROUGH IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

2007 implied the change in direction of Russian foreign policy. President Putin made a speech in Munich Security Conference and he pointed that “there is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centers of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity” (Putin, 2007). He criticized unipolar world order which was dominated by United States harshly. He also added that there is no moral background for unipolarity in this modern era. Putin stated that “Russia was back as a major international actor and would not follow the lead of the West in terms of security and foreign policy issues” (Kanet, 2017, p. 181). Putin made sovereign democracy an official policy of Moscow in this speech.

Putin also criticized NATO expansion saying that “NATO expansion has nothing to do with modernization of alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe and it causes destruction of mutual trust” (Putin, 2007). He questioned of NATO expansion against whom. A few months later, Putin spoke at NATO Summit in Bucharest. This time he questioned existence of NATO itself. Also, Putin found a chance to clarify Russian opposition against NATO. Russia had withdrawn her troops from European part of Russia, but later Russia found herself in a position that Russia caused Eastern European to become “American missile defense area” (Putin, 2008).

In 2008, Russia went for change in president. Dmitry Medvedev who was former prime minister was elected as president and Vladimir Putin was elected as prime minister of Russia. Western politicians were hopeful for Medvedev’s election for president. Because he was benign and had liberal views on politics comparing to Putin and West was tired of Putin’s assertive foreign policy (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 112). In 2008, United States also elected her new president. Barack Obama was elected as president after President George W. Bush. Russia was not only which created optimistic environment also Barack Obama created a sense of optimism in both inside and outside of America. United States started to modify her foreign policy beginning from withdrawal her troops from Iraq.

In this era, Russia and United States reset relations between each other. Obama was the third president who initiated reset process after Clinton and Bush. United States and

Russia supported each other in United Nations for example applying sanctions on Iran. In the meantime United States was not first concern of Russia. There were pivots that motivated Russia. Russia was itself a pivot in terms of sovereignization. Secondly, Eurasia was a pivot through “integrationist projects of the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union” and thirdly Asia was a pivot “by means of development projects in Siberia and the Far East and an outreach to the leading economies in the region, starting with China” (Trenin, 2015, p. 33). But this honeymoon did last until 2012. Military intervention in Libya, Arab Uprisings increased tension between these two states.

But these were not only problems. Medvedev had to deal with impact of global financial crisis in 2008. But, Medvedev’s vision and response to global crisis was mostly liberal. He asserted “an economy liberated from dependence on energy exports, a more open political system, and stronger ties with Western nations” (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 112). In his article of “Go Russia!”, Medvedev advocated modernization of economic and political system of Russia (Medvedev, 2009). But, most importantly Russian economy was tested during financial crisis. Energy exports which Russian economy was depended on “fell by around 9% in 2009, while China and India continued to grow, albeit at a slower pace” (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 128). Russian Gazprom and Rosneft companies became indebted to foreign companies but Russia survived from crisis by using monetary reserves and Putin-Medvedev tandem. After survival from financial crisis, support for regime increased.

In 2008, Russia updated Foreign Policy Concept. Foreign Policy Concept asserted “stable system of international relations based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and mutual beneficial cooperation as well as the norms of international law” (The Russian Federation, 2008). The Concept clarified that United Nation System has to be protected and Russian position in the United Nation Security Council in terms of strengthening effectiveness of the work of the UN Security Council (The Russian Federation, 2008).

Arab uprisings which are given general name unrests against undemocratic governments in Middle East started in 2010 and it spread from Tunisia to other undemocratic regimes in Middle East. Libya was one of those undemocratic regime under Muammar Qaddafi had witnessed these uprisings which later led to civil war. Many civilians had lost their

lives because of the regimes actions. International community started to discuss about putting sanctions against Libya. The UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose military and financial sanctions against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi on 26 February 2011 (Jankovski, 2016, p. 740). Also, G8 countries failed to agree on no-fly zone or any other military operation to help Libyan opposition and passed the problem to the UN Security Council (Erlanger, 2011; Jankovski, 2016, p. 740). Security Council also was divided on “over a proposed draft resolution that calls for a no-fly zone over Libya and authorizes the use of force to halt the bombing of civilians by forces loyal to Col. Muammar Qaddafi” (Bilefsky, 2011; Jankovski, 2016, p. 740). Russia strongly opposed Security Council resolutions because she thought that intervention in any state is impinge on another [state’s] affairs, also she had serious questions about “how a no-fly zone would operate and who would enforce it” (Bilefsky, 2011; Jankovski, 2016, p. 740). Finally, after negotiations, Security Council authorized the Member States, “acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country”, including Benghazi with 5 abstentions (Russia, China, India Brazil and Germany) and 10 votes in favor (United Nations Security Council, 2011; Jankovski, 2016, p. 741).

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev expressed his concerns about saying that Russia hoped Libyan problem could be settled through peaceful means rather than military operation. Because Russia tried to negotiate with Libyan leader and also condemned the leader’s actions against his people (Medvedev, 2011). On the other hand, Russia correlated Kosovo and Iraq with Libya. Because Russia realized that agreed UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was used as a mandate to support rebel forces in overthrowing Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi (Radin and Reach, 2017, pp. 65–66). Russia could not succeed to settle down Qaddafi government and later he was captured and murdered in 2011. In 2014, Vladimir Putin criticized the United States and her actions in Libya, also he blamed that the United States caused her ambassador was killed and UN Resolutions was violated (Putin, 2014b).

This intervention proved that how the US and Russia perceived sovereignty differently. The US emphasized sovereignty conditionally, she has used “military action to prevent mass atrocity, without a UN mandate” (Radin and Reach, 2017, p. 90). On the other hand

Russia emphasizes “the norm of noninterference and demands exclusive authority to intervene in its own region” (Radin and Reach, 2017, p. 90). These interventions in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya made Russia to be alarmed on her own region. Because, the United States might take military action in Russia’s near abroad or any other region (Radin and Reach, 2017, p. 91).

In this context, this section will focus on two important cases which caused dispute between the West and Russia. It was announced that Ukraine and Georgia would be eventually admitted into NATO alliance in Bucharest Summit where independence of Kosovo was recognized (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 331). This decision triggered firstly Five Day War with Georgia and later indirectly annexation of Crimea which are the two events that caused the change of Russian behavior towards the West and Western institutions. But, as it was mentioned before the Western interventions alarmed Russia and Russia started to secure her near abroad in her own terms. Concepts of sovereign democracy and near abroad became prominent tools that were taught by Russia to the world in Russian foreign policy.

### **3.1. GEORGIAN WAR**

In 1990s, several conflicts could not be ended. These conflicts were named as frozen conflicts and South Caucasus witnessed one of the important frozen conflicts which have taken place. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia. War in Georgia has taken different place in Russian politics because it was different from war with Chechnya for Russia. This war was outside of Russian borders (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 331). Also, for Russia this was not a war between Georgia and Russia because there has already been a war between Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia (Smith, 2012, p. 52). Russian position on this war was to help the weaker side.

In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected as president after Edvard Shevardnadze’s resign because of Rose Revolution. Saakashvili was seemed benign and he asserted one of the priorities of Georgia is to establish “much closer, warmer and friendlier relations” (Lambroschini, 2004). For example, Saakashvili accepted presence of Chechen warriors



in Georgian territory and would fight them, unlike Shevardnadze who denied this presence (Tsygankov, 2012, p. 237).

Economic ties have been improved between Georgia and Russia. Open labor policy and market policy were adopted and Russia helped Georgia to restructure her debts and provided Georgia “energy subsidies and electrical supplies” (Tsygankov, 2012, p. 238). Also, visa regime was improved between Russia and Georgia. Russia helped Saakashvili in terms of gaining his sovereignty in Georgia by defusing Adjara uprising in May 2004 (Tsygankov, 2012, pp. 237–238). These attempts on cooperation between Georgia and Russia created positive environment. But it did not last long. Saakashvili expressed his willingness on joining the EU and continuation of NATO-Georgia partnership in 2004. Russia continued to keep her troops in Georgian borders in case of terrorist strikes. In February 2005, Russia raised price of gas and this decision.

Georgia started to suspect Russia because Russia was hypocrite on actions of separatists. Russia did not let any action of separatist in Russia but on the other hand Russia was supporting separatist movements outside of Russia (*Georgia Accuses Russia Of Abkhazia Double Standards*, 2004).

Gradually, Russian-Georgian relations started to deteriorate. Georgia began to oppose the Russian peacekeepers and accused Russia of violating Georgian airspace (Tsygankov, 2012, p. 239). Later, Georgia declared to end Russian existence by accepting parliamentary resolution in 2006. This decision frustrated Russia and she decided to stop issuing visas, ban Georgian wine and Georgian natural water. Russia went further by closing Georgian-Russian border temporarily (Tsygankov, 2012, p. 239).

Georgian-Russian relations continued to be upside-down. Georgia arrested four Russian spies, even she released them Russia did not forget this arrest. As a result, “all transport and postal links between the countries were severed, Georgian- run businesses inside Russia were scrutinized and harassed, and many Georgians in Russia were rounded up and deported” (Tsygankov, 2012). Russia continued to support Abkhazia and South Ossetia despite the fact that Georgia was uptight about it.

Russia has been maintaining four bases to protect her borders against NATO in Georgia since 1991. But, in reality these bases for supporting separatists regions (Oldberg, 2010a,

p. 45). Even Russia promised to close the bases but Russia left the naval base placed in Batumi which was closed after the war erupted between Georgia and Russia (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 45). On August 2008, Mikheil Saakashvili decided to launch his own operation against separatists in an attempt to restore control over the rebellious province Tskhinvali and ten Russian peacekeepers were killed there (Tsygankov, 2012, p. 242).

Two sides of the conflict accused each other of committing genocide, “of carrying out “zachistki” (“cleansings”) of civilians, and of military crimes (Kropatcheva, 2009, p. 46). Dmitry Medvedev asserted that Russian mission was to “prevent humanitarian disaster and save the lives of people for whom we are responsible, all the more so as many of them are Russian citizens” (Medvedev, 2008). Russian troops entered Tskhinvali to stop the violence (Kropatcheva, 2009, p. 47) and also they entered Georgian territory to “suppress the Georgian military’s aggressive designs” (Medvedev, 2008).

After the war, Russia recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Despite Georgia’s effort on Georgian aggression was a response to Russia; various sources, organizations were convinced that first assault came from Tbilisi not Moscow (Tsygankov, 2012, pp. 241–242). But, Russia proved that Russia would not be hesitant to use force and Russian military presence became permanent in Caucasus. Russia deployed 3700 troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia also built a naval base in Abkhazia (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 45). Russia turned her “peacekeeping existence into military base and took over the border control” (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 48).

After the war, the US and NATO sent humanitarian aid to Georgia which caused huge discussion in Turkey NATO ally. Turkey having close relationships with Georgia did not become a side of NATO and did not let warships move on Georgia immediately because of 1936 Montreux Convention (Ikinci and Schwarz, 2008). In return, “Russia sent her warships and aircraft to the Caribbean Sea for exercises”. It was clear that this was a message for the US and NATO to stay out of Russia’s sphere of influence (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 46). On the other hand, Russia-Georgia war undermined the West’s monopoly in the use of force in world politics (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 210).

After this war, Russia did not occur as victorious side. She lost credibility, because she insisted that SCO and CSTO countries recognized independence of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia. But, no other states wanted to take risk their relations with the West. Also, Russia entered country without invitation and motivated Georgia becoming Western ally (Oldberg, 2010a, p. 48). This intervention damaged Russia's reputation and Georgia left CIS.

### **3.2. ROAD TO ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA**

Without doubt, color revolutions affected and changed Russian view of the West. Every revolution had own significant. But, Orange Revolution had other importance because it had been taken place in Ukraine which was "smaller version of Russia" (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 306) and now Russia was in danger of be shaken by a revolution as happened in Ukraine.

Ukraine went for presidential election in 2004. Victor Yanukovich, Victor Yushchenko and Leonid Kuchmo became candidates for upcoming election. But, it occurred with effort of Yushchenko that Yanukovich won the elections by fraud. Media or other resources were under control of Kuchmo and he used this power for benefit of his candidacy. On the other hand, Yanukovich was not as popular as Kuchmo and he had no chance to win by himself. Another candidate Yuschkenko's campaign was not heard or was not become news. He was simply tried to be ignored. After first round, elections became suspicious and in the end of second round, candidates' votes were close to each other and results were pointing victory of Yanukovich. Ukrainians started to take the streets and led to Orange Revolution (Mitchell, 2012, pp. 51–52). Despite of Russian support for Yanukovich, people who gathered in Maidan Square of Kiev demanded new elections (Legvold, 2007, p. 432). Together with new election, Yushchenko became new president of Ukraine.

Russia is known as major energy supplier was applying reasonable price for former Soviet states. This was also leverage for Russia in order to increase dependency of states to herself. In 2006, Gazprom and Ukraine could not settle on adjusting prices and Gazprom was trying to raise the prices. Ukraine did not pay price for the gas and Russia literally cut off the gas. This did not just affect Ukraine but also Germany and other European countries. 80 percent of Russian gas was transmitting to Europe via Ukraine (Legvold,

2007, p. 425). In the end, Russian reliability and her seeking for energy dominance was questioned.

Because of color revolutions Ukraine-Russian relations were shaken and Ukraine had willingness to join the EU and NATO like Georgia had. Under Yanukovich presidency, Ukraine was moving more towards the West and Russia was not pleased about it. In 2010, Russia supported Viktor Yanukovich became president. Yanukovich did not maintain his quest for NATO membership and signed an agreement on “letting Russia its naval base in Sevastopol for another 25 years” (Oldberg, 2010b, p. 13). Yanukovich’s intention was to run Ukraine as “family business and he “was not interested in dealing with the business of economic and political reform laid out by the European Union” (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 360). Russian-Ukrainian relations started to change again in favor of Russia.

In the meantime, Putin announced his candidacy for presidency after Medvedev’s four year term. Medvedev’s four year term created sense of hope in the Western world because of Medvedev’s liberal understanding comparing to Putin. In 2012, Putin returned to presidency but Russian people was unsettled because of “disputed legislative elections” (Kalb, 2015, p. 13). United States did not let go the chance of condemning Russia for undemocratic behavior and stood by demonstrators (Kalb, 2015, pp. 13–14). In 2011, opposition against Putin occurred amid Arab Uprisings which people revolted against their undemocratic governments in Middle East. Russian demonstrators and Western press made connection between upheavals in Russia and Middle East. In Russia, demonstrations were not just about disputed elections (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 245). One of the most prominent opposition leaders, Alexei Navalny was asserting nationalistic ideas such as consisting “Stop feeding the Caucasus” or “Russia for Russians” (Ryan, 2017).

During these protests, Russia could not deal with Ukraine in where Yanukovich lost control. Also, Russia was trying to convince the countries to join Eurasian Union instead of finalizing to their agreements with the European Union in Vilnius Summit (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 359). Ukraine took “Putin’s economic bailout and did not sign the association agreement at Vilnius” (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 361). Yanukovich’s decision on the EU caused at first small but later huge opposition because he did not proceed his

promise of joining the EU. Yanukovich could not handle to take under control of demonstrations. At the same time, Putin was seen as partner of Yanukovich in crime. Later, Putin had to clarify his stance on Yanukovich saying that “Yanukovich might be legal president but had no political power” (Putin, 2014a). On February 2014, Yanukovich was going to be impeached from power by Ukrainian parliament.

When Yanukovich left the presidency “unidentified armed men started to seize control of strategic side of Crimean peninsula, Crimean parliament voted for snap referendum on independence and the probability of joining Russia on March 2014.” (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 5). This referendum gave Russia a reason to justify annexation of Crimea. Russia was strongly condemned by annexation but this action definitely changed the current international system. “Putin dealt the blow to European security since the end of Cold War” (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 5).

Crimea has been one of the most contested territories on earth. It has strategic and historical importance for Russians. “Russian defended Crimea against Turks and Germans. It is also where Stalin negotiated to shape post-World War II” (Kalb, 2015, p. 148). This is not only reason of importance for Russia. Putin who emphasizes his Orthodoxy proudly made another connection between past and present saying that “Vladimir the Great who Christianized medieval Kievan Rus’, was baptized in Crimea where Russia derived religion from” (Putin, 2014c; Kalb, 2015, p. 148).

Yanukovich was going to be “kicked out” from power by “anti-Russian, pro-Western protesters”, then even fascists or right wing regime which easily will be align itself with NATO or the EU could come to power (Kalb, 2015, p. 148). In this case, Russia could be threatened by the next regime. This next regime might be convinced on removing naval base at Sevastopol which would definitely threaten Russia (Kalb, 2015, p. 149). These possibilities were enough to secure Crimea itself and also to protect Russians in Crimea for Putin. In this context, Marvin Kalb sorted two reasons; diplomatic and domestic reasons. Domestic reason is that “retaking Crimea demonstrated national pride” and it will be clear message to Kiev’s new leaders about not messing with Russia. Second reason is diplomatic reason that will empower Russian status in the region (Kalb, 2015, p. 149).

Russia was again criticized because of double standards which applied on Crimea. But, Russia compared Kosovo and Crimea. Because, Kosovo was given the right of self-

determination by the West and any state or institution did not stop it (Nalbandov, 2016, p. 124). On the other hand, Russia again changed her direction in Russian foreign policy. Putin dared the international system and the values which the system was based on. Annexation of Crimea indicated radical departure from revisionist power to being status quo oriented in Russian foreign policy (Light, 2015, p. 27).

Russia did not think that Ukraine is an independent state, Ukraine was treated as extension of Russia. Putin was very frank when it comes to Ukraine. In Bucharest, Putin directly told Bush that “part of Ukraine’s territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from Russia” (Marson, 2009). Despite this harsh inveighing against the US, Kiev was seen mother of Russian heritage and Ukraine and Russia have common history and destiny (Kalb, 2015, p. 23). Crimean accession to Russia unveiled this nationalistic and religious bond of Russia with Ukraine. But Ukraine was losing her Slavic soul by establishing close relationship with the West and Western institutions according to Putin (Kalb, 2015, p. xii). Putin was losing Russian past to the West and he was going to let go easily. Putin took Crimea as Russian tsarist Catherine the Great did two hundred years ago.

After annexation of Crimea, Russia was not a state that was “in transition to become a Western European-style liberal democracy and market economy”, as once Western scholars had thought in the 1990s (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 262). Yet, Russia could be still in favor of cooperation with the West but she will not build strategic partnership with NATO or the EU which are two major pillars of post-Cold War order (Hill and Gaddy, 2015, p. 263).

Annexation of Crimea was harshly criticized by international community and perceived as illegal. Russian actions was seen as “deliberate destabilization of neighboring sovereign country that cannot be accepted in 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe” by European Union (European Commission, 2014). Following the annexation of Crimea, “the EU banned all commercial operations of the EU companies in Crimea” (Romanova, 2017, p. 360). Various sanctions on “Russian financial, banking, oil, and military sectors were approved” in 2014 (Romanova, 2017, p. 360). Russian-EU relations started to deteriorate. Deterioration of EU-Russian relations was not only reaction that Russia encountered. Russia was dismissed from G-8 and NATO alliance decided to suspend cooperation with

Russia including NATO-Russian Council (NATO, 2014). America strongly condemned this accession and announced that “travel bans and assets freezes would be applied on several Russian officials but not Putin” (Kalb, 2015, p. 162).

This chapter focused on two major cases in Russian foreign policy after 2007 when Russia criticized unipolar world order. Since the end Cold War, Russia was trying to be pole in the system and also preserving her interests against the West. When Russia annexed Crimea, Russia was tired of being ignored and Russian accession was the last step for the West which invades Russian sphere of influence. On the other hand, annexation of Crimea became “ultimate act of state restoration for Putin who set out goals for himself” in his Millennium Message in 1999. (Hill, 2015, p. 57).



## CONCLUSION

Crimea witnessed major meeting which shaped the Cold War order after the World War II and again, Crimea was the one and only place that formed the international system 25 years after the end of the Cold War. Russia has become a crucial international actor on these two very different time zones.

The Cold War emerged on the basis of bipolarity occurring due to the ideological confrontation between two superpowers. That ideological confrontation which defined the Cold War era has come to an end when Communism fell, and accordingly the Soviet Union was dissolved and bipolarity was gone. In the end, the Soviet Union transformed into the Russian Federation and Western victory was declared which had never been accepted by Russia. Russia found herself in a world led by the West and Western ideas. In other words, “self” and “other”.

It was not easy to adjust herself into the new world for Russia owing to the fact that she lost her identity, territory and her citizens. This was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of 20<sup>th</sup> century as Putin addressed at his speech in 2005 (Putin, 2005). As it was expressed by Putin, Russia was under influence of this major national tragedy. In order to overcome this trauma, Russia gradually adopted herself into system. First of all, Russia’s permanent seat at UNSC which was inherited from USSR was a considerable chance for Russia because permanent seat was approving Russia’s great power status.

Russia had not a status which used to have during the Cold War, but she intended to have it again. Therefore, Russia adopted multipolarity as a foreign policy strategy in 1990s. Russian understanding of multipolarity was pro-Western in the beginning. Russia seemed to accept Western domination in the system and adopted multipolarity in accordance with Western ideas. In the meantime, Russia tried to integrate into liberal market economy but it was difficult for her to integrate into the market economy since Russian social, economic and political system was devastated. That is why, Russia faced economic crisis in 1998.

Russia was trying to build a state from the ashes and she was not just dealing with herself. As Russia, former Soviet states were having hard time during transition period and there were problems stemming from minorities in former Soviet space. Russia did not want to



lose her effectiveness over this space and was dealing with these states having problems. 1990s were difficult times for establishing security both inside and outside for Russia. Chechnya, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were just the beginnings. Nevertheless, Russia did not lose her operative existence over former Soviet states owing to her “near abroad” policy and organizations established with ex-Soviet States.

Russia pursued her pro-Western multipolarity strategy until the NATO announced its enlargement process. This announcement was followed by NATO’s unilateral action in Kosovo which Russia strongly opposed it. NATO’s action threatened Russia, because United Nations did not ratify this intervention.

When Putin came to power, discourse of multipolarity was not different from Kozyrev’s pro-Western understanding. 9/11 attacks created opportunity between the West and Russia. Russia gained advantage that she does not have before against terrorism and cooperated with the US. This strategic partnership continued until the US decided to invade Iraq.

The invasion of Iraq caused significant changes in perceptions of multipolarity. The vision that was previously pro-Western altered. Because, the US forced other states to follow herself and this decision damaged Russo-American relations. Russia embraced the Primakov doctrine which is to promote multipolarity globally. Russia changed her direction again.

But Russian stance on multipolarity was clarified when Putin spoke in Munich Security Conference. This speech was the turning point and a message for the future. Despite of Russia’s stress on multipolarity in Foreign Policy Concepts approved since 1993, 2007 speech had frank intention on building multipolar world order and unacceptability of unipolar world order led by the US.

Russia did not just oppose Western domination, she also made an effort for establishing her own values against Western ideas. Russia as a defensive state against “other” embraced the concept of “sovereign democracy”. Frequently, Russia used her own values against Western actions in near abroad. Because, Color Revolutions have already damaged Russia and threatened her security. Also the EU and NATO decided to enlarge further towards Georgia and Ukraine which are strategically important to Russia.

Russian-Georgian War and annexation of Crimea are the most important cases in Russian foreign policy. Until this time, Russia was trying to be perceived as equal to other Western states and also wanted to be respected on her near abroad. These did not happen and NATO and the EU decided to be close to Russian borders more. Once, NATO promised not to expand and would take Russia's interests serious but NATO decided to expand further and Russia was not taken into account (Klußmann, Schepp and Wiegrefe, 2009).

This thesis focused on multipolarity in Russian foreign policy and tried to analyze why multipolarity has been adopted and why Russia has changed her perception of world order by analyzing with qualitative method. While I explain and analyze these questions I benefited from structural realism and constructivism. Russia adopted multipolarity as a foreign policy strategy because it was suitable for Russia as a new state intending to be polar in the system. Russia believes that there are different polars in the system which distributes power as Kenneth Waltz described it. Also, in Russian view, world suffers from unipolar world order led by one power because it is unjustifiable and Russia is the one that is harmed from unipolar world. That is why, Russia strongly defends the UN Security Council and its power. On the other hand, Russia changed her pro-Western understanding of multipolarity to a more pro-Russian version of multipolarity. This answer is related to constructivism because Russia identifies her foreign policy on the basis of her identity and interests and changed her behavior in line with defined interests and identity as Russia confronted with the West. Concepts of near abroad and sovereign democracy are product of this kind of understanding. Russia uses phrase of "compatriots abroad" frequently to remind that Russian interests extend to where Russians are. Crimea and Georgia are important cases in that sense which explains Russian interest best.

Russia wants to be known that Russia is a pole in the system and owns special domain. Georgian War and annexation of Crimea proved that. Although annexation of Crimea was strong message for the West, it caused that Russia was almost expelled from international system. But Russia did not step back. Putin became the savior of Russian nation and people made proud of Putin. Putin's justification of annexation showed that Russia would never give up her stance against Western dominated system and Russian interest will be preserved. Russia maintained to defy the post-Cold War order.

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## CURRICULUM VITAE

### Personal Information

Name/Surname : Emine Gülnihal Yolcu  
Birth of Place/Date : İnebolu – 01/06/1993

### Education

Bachelor Degree : Marmara University (2012-2016) – Political Science and International Relations  
University of Regensburg (04/2015-07/2015) – Political Science (Erasmus+ Student Exchange Program)  
Anadolu University (2013-2016) – Local Administrations (Associate Degree)

Graduate Degree : Kadir Has University (2016-2018) – International Relations

Languages : English (Advanced), German (Elementary), Spanish (Beginner)

### Work Experience

- International Relations Studies Association- Center of Eurasian Research (TUIÇ – AVRAM): 15/11/2015 – 15/06/2016
- My Language Skills S.L.U. (Erasmus+ Traineeship Program): 16/07/2018 – 15/12/2018

### Contact:

Telephone : +90 505 949 03 72  
E-mail address : eminegulnihalyolcu@gmail.com