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**NATURAL GAS RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN  
UNION: AN ASYMMETRICAL INTERDEPENDENCY**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

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
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
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2. Alıntılar hariç
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“Başkent Üniversitesi Enstitüleri Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Usul ve Esasları”nı inceledim ve bu uygulama esaslarında belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

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## ÖZET

Rusya ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki doğal gaz ilişkisi, her iki tarafı da uzun vadede etkileyen önemli bir konudur. Rusya, enerji kaynakları ve doğal gaz rezervleri bakımından zengin olan taraf iken, AB ise sınırlı enerji kaynakları ve genişleme sürecinde artan enerji talebi nedeniyle bağımlı taraftır. Bu ikili ilişkinin bazı uzun vadeli ve kısa vadeli sonuçları olduğu gibi, doğal gaz diplomasisinde de bir derece bağımlılık analizi yapmayı gerektirmektedir. Rusya, AB ile doğal gaz ihracatına devam etmek ve hatta diğer komşu ülkeler dahil yeni rotalara doğal gaz ihraç etmek istemektedir. Öte yandan AB, Rusya'nın enerji politikaları karşısında güvenlik politikalarını güçlendirme eğilimindedir ve her zaman AB'nin gündeminde yer alan bu doğal gaz bağımlılığı azaltmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bir ülkenin kendi sınırlarındaki doğal gaz boru hatları sadece ülke içi tüketimi ilgilendirdiği için bir sorun teşkil etmez fakat sınırlar ötesi doğal gaz boru hatları için tüketici ülke ile ihraç eden ülke arasında düzenlenecek enerji diplomasisi gerektirir. Ayrıca, doğal gaz ticareti sadece birbiriyle ticaret yapan iki ülkeyi değil, komşu ülkeleri ve Ukrayna, Türkiye gibi transit ülkeleri de ilgilendirmektedir. Bu değişkenler ortaya çıktıkça, tarafların birbirlerine karşı uyguladıkları (bu tezde Rusya ile AB ülkeleri arasında ele alınacak) enerji politikaları incelenmelidir. Bu argümanlar, ikisi arasındaki ilişkinin yapısı ve açıklaması için uygun bir uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi ile desteklenmelidir. Politik ekonomide çok söz edilen karşılıklı bağımlılık ilişkisi, Rusya ile AB arasındaki doğal gaz ilişkisinde açıkça görülmektedir. İki tarafın birbirine bağımlılığı, iki tarafın birbirlerinin çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket ettiği anlamına gelir. Bununla birlikte, adından da anlaşılacağı gibi, iki tarafın birbirine bağlı olması, ancak üstün bir devletin varlığı varsa, bu ilişki asimetric bir bağımlılık olarak açıklanabilir. Bu tezde, Rusya-AB doğal gaz ilişkilerinin asimetric olarak birbirine bağımlı olduğu öne sürülmektedir ki, burada daha az bağımlı olan aktör (Rusya), bağımlılık ilişkisini daha bağımlı olan aktör veya AB'den kaynaklanan bir konuyu tehlikeye sokmada güç kaynağı olarak sıklıkla kullanmaktadır. Neoklasik gerçekçiliğe vurgu, uluslararası ilişkilerde güvenliği ve politikayı ön planda tutmak ve Rusya'nın AB'ye yönelik dış doğal gaz politikasını etkileyen bir iç düzey değişkeninin (Gazprom) varlığından söz edilmektedir. Rusya-AB doğal gaz politikalarını analiz ettikten sonra varılacak nihai sonuç şöyledir: Rusya ile AB arasında doğal gaz ilişkisi açısından asimetric bir karşılıklı bağımlılık olması mümkündür ve bu bağımlılık, ikisi arasında alternatif projeler olmadığı sürece uzun vadede devam edecektir. **Anahtar kelimeler:** Doğal Gaz, Rusya, Avrupa Birliği, Neoklasik Realizm, Asimetric Karşılıklı Bağımlılık, Gazprom

## ABSTRACT

The natural gas relationship between the Russia and the European Union is an important issue affecting the long-term and bilateral relationship of each party. Russia is the party that rich in natural gas reserves and resources, the EU is the more dependent party that due to the limited energy resources and demand of its enlargement process. This bilateral relationship has some long-term and short-term consequences as well as it requires a degree of dependency especially in natural gas diplomacy. Russia is willing to continue its natural gas exports with the EU and even export natural gas to other neighboring countries. The EU tends to strengthen its security policies and aims to reduce this dependency, which is always an issue on EU's agenda. While natural gas pipelines in a country's domestic borders do not pose a problem only because they concern domestic consumption, energy policies to be arranged between the consumer country and the exporting country are required for cross-border natural gas pipelines. In addition, natural gas trade concerns not only the two countries that trade with each other, but also the neighboring countries and transit countries like Ukraine and Turkey. As these variables emerge, the policies implemented by the parties against each other (which will be considered between Russia and the EU) should be examined. These arguments should be supported by an appropriate theory of international relations, which is important for the structure and explanation of the relationship. The relationship of interdependence, which is highly mentioned in political economy, is clearly observed in the natural gas relationship between Russia and the EU. The interdependence of the two sides means that the two sides act in the interests of each other. However, as the name suggests, the fact that the two sides are connected to each other but if the existence of a superior state exists, this relationship can be explained as an asymmetric interdependence. In this thesis, Russia-EU natural gas relations are claimed to be asymmetrically interdependent in which less dependent actor (Russia) can often use the interdependence relationship as a source of power in compromise an issue of more dependent actor (EU). The emphasis on neoclassical realism is emphasized in terms of keeping security and policy ahead in international relations and the existence of an internal level variable (Gazprom) that affects Russia's foreign natural gas policy towards the EU. The conclusion after analyzing the Russia-EU natural gas policies is: It is possible that there is an asymmetrical interdependence between Russia and the EU in terms of natural gas relationship and this dependence will continue in the long term unless alternative projects between the two are realized. **Keywords:** Natural gas, Russia, European Union, Neoclassical realism, Asymmetric interdependence, Gazprom

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

Bcm: Billion cubic meters

COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

EU: European Union

IEA: International Energy Agency

LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Tcm: Trillion cubic meters

UGS: Unified Gas System

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



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## INTRODUCTION

“A nation that can't control its energy sources can't control its future”.<sup>1</sup>

Energy is an important resource for the sustainability and development of states. In this direction; sustainable energy relations, security of energy supply and using energy policies effectively are among the superior policies of states' agenda. Energy relations should be evaluated from two aspects. The first is the party that has reserves, production and rich in energy resources, while the other are countries that are dependent on other countries in terms of energy supply with little or no reserves. In fact, since the concept of energy concerns both sides (as the supplier and the consumer party), the issue of energy security arises in international relations. The IEA defines energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.<sup>2</sup> In addition to IEA's definition, it can be said that; the uninterrupted energy supply in energy security, energy must be provided from adequate, affordable, reliable, timely, clean and diversified sources.

This thesis focuses on Russia and EU relationship in different perspectives. First, the theory that will explain the natural gas relationship between the two will be explained. Starting with the theory of "Realism" in which the states adopt the concept of "state" and power in their foreign policies, the selection of the related theory has been investigated. Then, it was seen that only a realism theory was not sufficient and other assumptions of the realism theory were investigated. Finally, this theory has been focused on because of the assumption that the 'neo-classical realism' theory, which argues that the internal level variables are effective in the foreign policies of the countries, will be the proper theory explaining the Russia-EU natural gas relationship. Briefly, in this thesis there are theoretical approaches which are applied in detail. There is a comprehensive historical background which comprises the Russia-EU political, economic and energy relations. While explaining the energy relations between the two, natural gas will continue by focusing on the energy source. There is a detailed explanation of relations and official energy agreements which supports the dependency between them.

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<sup>1</sup> Bob Neer, Barack Obama, “Barack Obama for Beginners: An Essential Guide”, The Presidential Edition, 2019, p.68.

<sup>2</sup> IEA, “Energy security Ensuring the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”, <https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work/ensuring-energy-security>, last accessed 24.12.2019.

The primary research method for this study is qualitative method, statistical data, interviews and descriptive analysis. The descriptive analysis, which is one of the research methods, is used in explaining the Russian-EU natural gas relations. In this context, books, journals, various national and international articles, data from scientific web sites and statistics were used to strengthen the perspectives for the topics were discussed. Literature review is the very first step of the Master thesis because it was a very important issue and getting ideas from other sources contribute to think analytical for the selection of the topic. This research consists of qualitative methods in which there is conceptual and methodological data. The main bibliographic data bases for this master thesis are articles composed of information conveyed by valuable academicians and experts directly related to the subject, books dealing with the subject from a wide perspective. Also, it consists of interviews with graphics and maps transferred from BP and Eurostat and valuable opinions of my two valuable teachers, expert Necdet Pamir and Mr. Ali Arif Aktürk.

Since the main issue of the topic is energy, this thesis will look at the statistical data from official websites like BP, Eurostat etc. Also, it is very important for my thesis in the statistical information given by Mr. Necdet Pamir about Russia-EU natural gas. Statistical data from official websites is not only essential for support arguments but also need for to clarify the energy dependency rates between Russia and EU. In addition, in order to present the statistical data in a more descriptive way, some tables and maps are included. These figures, tables and maps are intended to make statistical data more descriptive.

This master's thesis had some limitations during the writing phase. First of these restrictions; The final result of the thesis is that the concept of "asymmetric interdependence" is not included in the literature. In other words, although this concept is included in some articles and books, detailed and exemplary narratives are not encountered. Secondly, although the energy dependence between Russia and the EU is a very important issue, there are still not many detailed and conceptual articles classifying the degree of this dependency. Finally, despite the desire to have more than one interview in the field of energy, many people in this field could not be interviewed and the number of interviews was limited to two.

This thesis is a unique form of a study to examining the Russian Federation and the EU in natural gas relations from a different dimension. The statistics mentioned and used in this thesis include 2019 data. Also, this thesis identifies neoclassical realism and put the principles of this theory into the natural gas diplomacy of Russia and EU. Finally, this thesis, unlike other theses, argues that the natural relationship between Russia and the EU is asymmetric interdependent.





## **CHAPTER I THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: FROM REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL REALISM**

In International Relations, the realist approach emerged in response to the failure of the liberal approach that prevailed between the first and second World War, and a return from liberalism to realism took place during this period. The outbreak of World War II emphasized that the most important actor in the international system was the 'state', eliminating the applicability of liberalism, a popular theory of the period. Two important issues to be examined in realism are power and balance of power. According to realism, states, which are the main actors of the international system, live in an anarchic system; they try to maximize their power to survive. Some of the states that have selfishly increased their powers to ensure their safety in an anarchic system may increase their power to threaten the system, either to prevent the system. Thus, the concept of balance of power emerged. In such a situation, realism assumes that other states will unite and maintain their balance of power in the face of the state threatening the system.<sup>3</sup> Among the realist advocates of the twentieth century are Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, E. H. Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr. In the history of Western political thought, the thoughts and assumptions of Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes were very influential in the formation of Realism.<sup>4</sup>

### **1.1. Realism**

The events of history, wars and different policies of leaders have led to the emergence of different types of realism. Realism, which is the main theory of international relations, has many types and approaches in both due to historical events and wars. Realist thought that emerged until the middle of the Cold War can be classified as 'classical realism'.<sup>5</sup> Classical realists emphasize the nature of anarchy without denying its importance. Classical realists make inferences about the state based on human nature. Thomas Hobbes is a philosopher with thoughts of human nature, and he argues that people are innate equals and that equality also applies to desiring something. He underlines that if two people desire something that they cannot have at the same time, distrust will arise, these people will become enemies to each

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<sup>3</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "Uluslararası Politika Teorisi" Saltzman Savaş ve Barış İncelemeleri Enstitüsü, 2015, p.102.

<sup>4</sup> Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Peterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri", Küre Yayınları, 113. p.50.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen Walt, "US grand strategy after the Cold War: Can realism explain it? Should realism guide it? Harvard University", 2018, p.7-8.

other, and they will try to destroy or take control of each other.<sup>6</sup> In addition, Hobbes argues that the concepts of "competition", "insecurity", "glory and honor" are the three main causes of conflict in man's nature. Since the day the man was born, he competes for his earnings, wants to ensure his safety because he does not feel safe and finally struggles for glory and honor. Classical realists argue that the state competes with other states to earn in the interests of its interests, cannot trust other states, and is constantly struggling to achieve its interests. Hobbes argued that in the absence of the state, everyone is at war with everyone.<sup>7</sup> He argues that the state is a general force that can keep people in fear. Classical realists set out from this statement when defining the nature of the international system and argue that there is no general power in the international system, as Hobbes mentioned, and that every state in the system has the freedom to act in its favor. According to classical realism, the international system is anarchic. But Hobbes argues that this anarchic order does not create chaos. It is clear that anarchy exists, and states act equally and struggle to survive on this anarchic system. According to the theory, one of the ways for the state to achieve its purpose of survival is to be strong. For this reason, in addition to addressing the state as the unit of analysis, classical realists have placed the concept of 'power' in the center of the studies. Thucydides (was an Athenian historian) has been so influential in the discipline of international relations, and especially in realism, that his work, *The History of Peloponnesian Wars*, has maintained its priority position even in the long-term and devastating period of mutual challenge known as the Cold War.<sup>8</sup>

Realism assumes that states are the main actors in the international system and that international policy is a struggle between states. Realist theories can seriously strengthen foreign policy analysis if applied to the complexity and uncertainty of the real political world.<sup>9</sup> States which are the main actors of the international system, exists in an anarchic system; they try to maximize their power to survive. For this reason, the concept of power has a high place in the realist approach. Some of the states that have selfishly increased their powers to ensure their safety in an anarchic system may increase their power to threaten the

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<sup>6</sup> Ahmet Yurdusev, "Thomas Hobbes and international relations: From realism to rationalism", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 2006, p. 305-321.

<sup>7</sup> UK Essays, "The Analysis Of Thomas Hobbes And The Government Philosophy Essay", 2018, Retrieved from <https://www.ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/the-analysis-of-thomas-hobbes-and-the-government-philosophy-essay.php?vref=1>

<sup>8</sup> Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, 1988, p.591.

<sup>9</sup> Steve Smith, Tim Dunne, Amelia Hadfield, "Dış Politika Teoriler Aktörler Örnek Olaylar", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Kütüphanesi*, 2016, p. 89.

international system. Realists assume that states are trying to survive in an anarchic international system. In an anarchic system which refers the absence of central authority, each state acts selfishly and tries to maximize its power in order to survive and ensure its own security.<sup>10</sup> Since there is no central authority that provides order in a situation where human relations are determined by groupism, selfishness and power centrism, the relations of states with each other will be in constant conflict. In international arena where there is no authority to enforce agreements, that is, in anarchy, any state can resort to 'power' to achieve what it wants. There is no guarantee that one state will not resort to it later, even if a state is certain that it will not use the weapons of other states today. Because states can use all means to maximize their power. Since no state can ignore such a destructive possibility, states will tend to arm themselves against such a possibility. When all states go to arms in this way, politics becomes different. If there is no authority that states can rely on to ensure the implementation of agreements, disputes that are not easy to resolve may turn into war. According to this assumption; Anarchy, which makes the security of states problematic and confrontational, is the main cause of conflicts and even wars between the state.<sup>11</sup> Realism is based on three basic assumptions when explaining the international system, and these assumptions can be summarized as follows. Being power-centered, selfishness and grouping. Under the assumption of groupism, states can come face to face with each other as groups. They need the unity of group solidarity to survive at the minimum subsistence level. But the same group unity reveals the potential for conflict with other groups. When groupism is interpreted by realism, it assumes any social formation in which the most important groups of people are states and states are in interrelation. On the assumption of selfishness, the actor's own interests are ultimately in the view that directs political behavior. Although certain conditions may facilitate self-sacrifice behavior, selfishness is a deep-rooted feature in human nature. When compulsions arise and there is a conflict between collective interest and individual interest, selfishness puts heavy pressure on altruism.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Mehmet Keyik and Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, "Realizme göre güç ve güç dengesi kavramları", Power and Balance of Power Concepts in Realism", Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2019, p.20.

<sup>11</sup> Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis, Security Studies", 2009, p. 587-623.

<sup>12</sup> Howard Rachlin, "Altruism and selfishness", Behavioral and Brain Sciences" p.260-262.

On the other hand, neorealists also strongly advocate that anarchy exists. Waltz claims that anarchy largely eliminates functional differentiation between units. In anarchic international orders, each unit must be able to take care of itself<sup>13</sup>. The differences between states are not about function, but about power and abilities. International politics consists of similar units that take off each other's activities and behavior. Waltz realized that the policy dynamics of states in the international system differ and that they exist in important variables. Different dynamics between states have led to the emergence of two different sub-concepts based on the basic view of neo-realism. One of them is Aggressive Realists and the other is Defensive Realists.<sup>14</sup>

John Mearsheimer, the most important name of aggressive realism, states that the most important structure that can provide balance in the short and medium term in the context of the international system is bipolarity, and sees unbalanced multipolarity as a process that feeds the element of conflict. Mearsheimer notes that, within the context of the international system, regional hegemonies have very important roles in achieving the status quo, and if the implementation of this role can be successful, regional hegemons have a high chance to evolve into global hegemony.<sup>15</sup> According to Mearsheimer, the state or states that have the feature of being great power can act more aggressively. Because this means that the state or states have the capacity to realize their threats. The fact that a state does not have information about the real purposes of other states and the plans that these goals reveal show a constantly changing character, pushes the state to focus not only on the super powers that exist, but also on the potential superpowers. Realists also went to the classification of defensive and aggressive realism by examining states' survival and domination, defensive and expansionist orientations. Aggressive realists argue that anarchy has a structural potential for causing conflicts. Where there is no authority to enforce agreements, states doubt whether the conditions leading to peace will be effective. Even if it seems difficult to occupy a country, there is no guarantee that a state will not develop ruthless means to overcome these obstacles. Because of this ambiguity, states can never be sure of their security. In addition, states must always follow suspiciously the power increase of other states. Hence, states tend to spread or strengthen themselves or weaken others in order to survive in the long run. As a result, it should be taken

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<sup>13</sup> Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True, "Theories of International Relations", 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 37.

<sup>14</sup> Glenn Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay. International Security", 2002, p. 160.

<sup>15</sup> Randall Schweller and David Priess "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1, May, 1997, p.22.

into consideration that states always exhibit conflicting policies regardless of their internal structures.

Defensive realism tries to express that the anarchic environment, which is the primary actor in the international system and faced by rational states in the context of the international system, makes them addicted to their security. The international systemic instability caused by the security dilemma constitutes the basic direction of defensive realism. According to the defensive realism, which was envisaged especially by Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervis and provided significant legitimacy in the conceptualization of the systemic balance factor, the states that are the main players of the international system have a military, economic, technological power that does not risk their own national defense and security and they also closely follow other players in the system. They argue that under common conditions the potential of anarchy to cause war will be reduced. Where seizures are more difficult, all states can be more secure. This situation can be exemplified as; it is unlikely to consider occupying states capable of reacting to the attack with nuclear weapons. Thus, under certain circumstances, states could be expected to find ways to defend themselves without threatening others, leading to the emergence of an international system that had the potential for peace within it, unlike many realists' previous assumptions. In summary; In order to determine the internal / thought causes of war and peace, important variables and internal dynamics of states have been started to be examined.

International law and international organizations are not things that can be considered by countries, and unless countries recognize them, they can act as if they are not. In addition, for Realists, another dilemma in power is "the relative power versus the absolute power". Absolute power arises when a country needs to use absolute power and endeavor to achieve as much or as much as possible. In relative power, the two states have reached a commercial agreement can be made in the military field, but this can be observed in cases where the economic interest of one country is greater than that of the other so the weaker state must be vigilant and skeptical because the greater powerful state has had relatively great advantage over the weaker and there is still the possibility of attacking the weaker state. Therefore, it does not matter how much power a state has. The important thing in the international arena is that this concept of power or the policies of states are compared with the concept of 'power' of other states or 'how much of their real power' is. The concepts of power and balance of balance are very important concepts for the realist approach. States, which are the main actors

of the international system according to realism, constantly seek to increase their power in an anarchic system in order to ensure their security. In this respect, when it comes to power for realism, military power comes to mind first. However, various realist writers defined the concept of power in different ways. Some have focused on the deterrence of power, while others have stated that power is not a goal, but a tool, while others have defined it as a key element of international policy. In other words, realism has brought a multi-dimensional perspective to the concept of power. The concept of balance of power is one of the dominant concepts of realism. States that maximize their power to ensure their security cause the system to be a field of power struggle. In such an environment, some states increase their powers more than others from time to time and begin to aim to dominate the system. In this case, realism assumes that other states will form an alliance between them and block the state in question and maintain the balance of power. Therefore, the concepts of power and balance of balance are complementary concepts in realism.<sup>16</sup>

The basic assumptions of realism can be explained as follows in order <sup>17</sup>. According to Realism, human is a bad being by nature. There are many examples of this in history. The worst part of this nature of man is his ambition for power and his desire to dominate people. If this situation is understood, it can be prevented by the evil actions mankind performs instinctively. In this context, international politics can be summarized as a struggle for power, where everyone is fighting each other. The main actors of the power struggle in question are states. In international politics, states try to protect their interests by having power. All actions taken by states to protect and sustain their existence are a result of national interests. As a result of the structure of international policy, no state trusts another. Therefore, states do not rely on international organizations or international law to protect their assets. The development of military capacity against a potential enemy is a result of national interests. States can also support their defense capacities with alliances they have established. If each state acts as described above, there will be a balance of power in the system between states. Thus, peace and stability can be established in the international system. <sup>18</sup> According to Realism, international relations are a power struggle between states trying to maximize their national interests. The implementation of policies to maximize the interests of states by

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<sup>16</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Uluslararası İlişkilerin "Gerçekçi" Teorisi: Kökeni, Kapsamı, Kritiği", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 1, Sayı 1, Bahar 2004, p. 40.

<sup>17</sup> Martin Griffiths, "Order and International Society: The Real Realism?" Review of International Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1992, p. 220.

<sup>18</sup> Martin Griffiths "Order and International Society: The Real Realism?" Review of International Studies 18, no. 3, 1992, p. 230.



rationalizing is the reason why the international system is anarchic. In this anarchic system, where everyone protects their national interests, states do not trust each other; even a state is afraid that another state will attack them. Although states sometimes form alliances to protect their interests, their interests always come before the alliances they establish.<sup>19</sup> States that are the main actors of the international system, which we can call "selfish" in such an international system based on insecurity and anarchy, are aware that the only way to survive is to be powerful. The logic here is that the stronger a state is compared to its competitors, the lower the probability of being attacked.

Realists assume that states are trying to survive in an anarchic international system. In an anarchic system without central authority, each state acts selfishly and tries to maximize its power in order to survive and ensure its own security. The power that realism means within this framework is mostly military power. However, Morgenthau used the concept of power in many ways. It has given multidimensional meaning to power by defining power as both a type of relationship, the main goal of international politics, and a means to fulfill the goal. In this context, Morgenthau also touched on the material aspects of power, but placed a special emphasis on military power. There is also an assumption in realism that power basically relies on deterrence. States living in an anarchic system can achieve their national interests only by deterring the attacks of rival states. Morgenthau also attributes a primary importance to military power, while emphasizing the importance of military power in terms of deterrence capacity. Similarly, Carr stated that power is based on deterrence. According to Carr, the importance of military power stems from its use as a last remedy. Because the use of military force is a phrase that proves that deterrence has failed.<sup>20</sup>

Another important element about the concept of power is capacity. Although military power comes to mind first when it comes to capacity, we can say that the usage area of military power is limited and expanded to include many elements in the concept of power. In the International Relations literature, Joseph Nye made one of the most important contributions to the concept of power with the concept of "soft power". Nye explained the concept of soft power by comparing it with hard power, and brought a brand new perspective to the concept of power. According to Nye, hard power is based on the military and economic

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<sup>19</sup> Brett Ashley Leeds "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties", *International Organization*, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2003, p. 820

<sup>20</sup> Hans Joachim Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace", McGraw Hill 1993, p.126.

power of a state. States' hard power "reward" and "punishment"; that is, it uses it based on the "carrot" and "stick" method. The soft power concept that Nye expresses as “the second face of power” is based on the ability to shape the choices of others. In this context, soft power is closely related to a country's culture and political ideas. In this context, states can direct the behavior and actions of other states in their own interests by using the institutions they create. Britain in the 19th century and the USA in the second half of the 20th century increased their soft power by creating a structure of international rules and institutions that are compatible with the liberal and democratic nature of their economic systems. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and the United States are examples<sup>21</sup>

### **1.1.1. Important Representatives of Realism**

Events in history form some perspectives and theories. Realism is a theory from the past, although worldviews have been shaped along with some events, and have always managed to preserve its fundamental features. Realism, which was the absolute ruler of the discipline from the 1930s until the 1980s, has always been expressed as a theory of international relations, not an explanation or perspective compared to other theories. Realism, self-determination, security and common law in the discussion of how the political behaviors of individuals and states and the anarchic structure of international politics can be transformed into a regular structure developed upon the inability of the liberal view prevailing in the discipline after World War I to prevent the emergence of World War II and the liberal perspective that emphasizes the rationality of the individual.<sup>22</sup> Thucydides has defined human beings as an egoistic entity, which likens the state and human nature. According to him, the state wants to be strong and sovereign, just as one wants to be selfish. When Thucydides lost the war in Athens, he was exiled. According to him, the cause of the Peloponnesian War was the deterioration of the balance of power between Athens and Sparta and security concerns between them. In the study he produced as a result of Thucydides' observations, the foundations of realism were laid. Among these observations, the concepts of arms race, alliance, deterrence, balance of power, strategy and security, which are assumed by Realism.

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<sup>21</sup> Joseph S. Nye “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”, New York: Public Affairs, 2004. p.122.

<sup>22</sup> Eugen Zelenak, “Historical Fact, Realism and Constructivism”, 2009, p. 630.



The basis of classical realism has been observed in British philosopher in Hobbes' 'Leviathan'<sup>23</sup> Thomas Hobbes is an important English philosopher who lived in the 17th century and deeply influenced realism. In his book titled Leviathan, published in 1651, Hobbes stated that people are selfish, and defined human nature as a state of war. Therefore, in the case of nature, people are at war with each other. According to Hobbes, equality of people means that the weakest have the power to kill the strongest through intrigues or collaboration with others.<sup>24</sup> The feeling of insecurity in anarchy environment is due to the lack of an authority that can protect people from hazards. In this case, the person must protect himself. The best form of defense is an attack. In Leviathan, there are assumptions that emphasize both human nature and international anarchy. According to Hobbes' three assumptions, people are equal, people interact with each other in an anarchy environment, and people are mobilized by competition, insecurity and pride.<sup>25</sup> The combination of these three conditions leads to a war. Therefore, the person may be aggressive because of the insecurity he experiences, and this can shake the existing order. Hobbes' assumptions have been applied in the most important parts of international relations. However, it has been observed that it has different perspectives in its realism in international relations, which are moving from different directions and always open to the development of different factors. The relative effects of the internal variables, namely the factors included in the theory and the external variables, led to the emergence of new types of realism. In particular, the following arguments have paved the way for current neo-realism.

The Italian-born philosopher Machiavelli had an innovative approach to International Relations. He sees moral and unethical values as insignificant tools on the road to success and power while emphasizing the need to adopt higher morality in power politics. This immoral, or rather unethical, approach has become increasingly dominant in Western policies after him, and the idea that " the purpose makes the tool legitimate " is a political one, ignoring the demonic actions taken to achieve the ultimate goal of 'power' became the opinion. The effect of this thought can be seen in bloody wars and conflicts in modern Europe, which do not care about the norms of justice and create a socially disruptive concept of ethics between social and personal ethics. In short, Machiavelli's assumption is that all people in politics are bad

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<sup>23</sup> A. Nuri Yurdusev "Thomas Hobbes and international relations: from realism to rationalism", 2006, p.310.

<sup>24</sup> Adewunmi James Falode, "The Theoretical Foundation of Realism", Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2009, p.43.

<sup>25</sup> Mareike Oldemeinen, "The Political Realism of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes", 2010, E-International Studies, p.2-3.

and there is always a possibility of exposing evil within them when appropriate. It allows power struggle to be decisive even in the absence of anarchy, aggression or similar factors. 'Structural realism' is the standard characterization given to such realist explanations that strongly emphasize international anarchy.<sup>26</sup> 'Neo realism' is another standard term referring to more complex and eclectic realists than the previous generation.<sup>27</sup>

Hans J. Morgenthau is one of the most important representatives of the contemporary realist approach in international politics. Morgenthau, II. After World War II, he published his work called "International Politics" in 1948. In this work, which is seen as the basis of contemporary realism, Morgenthau also benefited from the views of realist thinkers such as Thucydides and Machiavelli. In his work, Morgenthau introduced the six principles of political realism, the basis of contemporary realism. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws with roots in human nature. To improve society, first of all, it is necessary to understand the laws in which society lives. The concept that enables political realism to find its way within the framework of international politics is the interest defined as power. This concept provides the link between the reason that tries to understand international politics and the facts that need to be understood. It positions politics as a separate field of action and understanding from other fields such as economics, ethics or religion. Realism assumes that the concept of power, defined as power, is an objective category that is universally valid. However, it does not fix this concept once and for all with a fixed meaning. Interest and power are truly the core of politics and are not affected by the conditions of time and space. Political realism is aware of the moral importance of political action. However, he is also aware of the inevitable tension between moral imperatives and successful political action. In this context, realism defines itself outside of morality. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aims of a particular nation with the moral laws governing the universe. Because all nations try to adapt the moral aims of the universe to their own special requests and actions. The difference between political realism and other areas of thought is real and profound. In this context, the political realist wants the political field to be accepted as an independent field.<sup>28</sup> Although the approach to the necessity of being strong was based on Thucydides, it was Hans J. Morgenthau who provided the central position of the

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<sup>26</sup> Christopher Lloyd, "Realism and Structurism in Historical Theory: A Discussion of the Thought of Maurice Mandelbaum", *History and Theory*, Vol. 28, No. 3, Oct., 1989, p. 303.

<sup>27</sup> Scott Burchill et al, 2009, p.51.

<sup>28</sup>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Political Realism in International Relations", 2017, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/> last accessed: 14.12.2019.

concept of power in classical realism. According to Morgenthau; the social world is nothing more than a reflection of human nature on the collective plane. The origins of conflict and war are inherent in man. Classical realists frequently emphasize the role of statesman and the analysis of the qualities of state power. According to Kenneth Waltz, one of the pioneers of classical realism, the strong ideas of classical realists regarding the functioning of international politics are weakened because there is no clear distinction between the arguments about the nature of man, the internal features of states and the system of general states. It emphasized that states' existence within anarchic structure can cause strong competitive pressures and war.<sup>29</sup> States, as Morgenthau points out, attempt to maximize their military forces to create deterrence. This puts states in a cycle of power maximization that is defined as the 'security dilemma'<sup>30</sup> and makes anarchy more tangible in the international system. The reason for the security dilemma lies in the nature of man.

Kenneth Waltz can be considered an important representative of the contemporary realist approach. However, it is not generally included in the scope of classical realist writers. Because Waltz looked at realism from a different perspective and was described as the founder of neorealism. Waltz puts a different meaning on the anarchic international structure of classical realism. Although he accepted that the international structure is anarchic like classical realists, he argued that, unlike other realists, the international structure affects and limits state behavior. Therefore, states that adopt different political systems and different ideologies may exhibit similar behaviors due to the international structure. According to Waltz, power is a tool to be used only when needed.<sup>31</sup>

Edward Hallet Carr presented the first contemporary assessment of the realist approach in international relations. Carr comments between the two wars; that is, it produced during the period when liberalism was most popular and in his work *Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939* he directed the heaviest criticism of the liberal approach. In the work in question, Carr described the liberal approach as a utopian and accused liberals of trying to establish an unrealistic utopian world system. It emerged as a critique and alternative of self-determination, collective security, democratization, common law structure and liberal perspective that emphasizes the

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<sup>29</sup> Craig A. Snyder , “Contemporary Security and Strategy”, 2011, 3rd Edition, Red Globe Press, p.136.

<sup>30</sup> “Security dilemma, in political science, a situation in which actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security”. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/security-dilemma> last accessed 22.12.2019.

<sup>31</sup> Hugh C. Dyer, “Moral Order/World Order The Role of Normative Theory in the Study of International Relations” Palgrave Macmillan Press, 1997 , p.38.

rationality of the individual.<sup>32</sup> As a matter of fact, the League of Nations, a transnational structure, was established with the proposal of the President of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, in order to help the states solve the problems between them and provide an international peace environment. The rise of the Fascist National Socialism movement in Germany in the 1930s and the emergence of authoritarian states in the world led to the gradual loss of liberalism in international politics and the rise of realism. II. The emergence of World War also accelerated the process in question and caused the belief in the peace promises of liberals internationally to collapse. The belief that a permanent peace can be achieved in the international system advocated by the liberals has lost its effect with the World War II. Thereupon, those who expressed themselves as "realists" started to make their voices heard in the international system. According to realists, there should be factors that determine interstate relations that should be examined in international politics. These factors are the concepts of power and national interest for realists. International Relations can be summarized as the struggle for power and interest between nation-states. At this point, when looking at the conditions of the subject period, to increase the power of international organizations and alliances, and to maximize the power of each state; In other words, it can be stated that it tries to protect its national interest. In such an environment, war is inevitable. Therefore, peace is not with disarmament; it can be achieved by states being ready for war in any case. Although the ideas of realists were subjected to a lot of criticism afterwards, even if realism had a transformation in itself with Kenneth Waltz, the approaches and ideas established by realists after World War II dominated international politics and international relations discipline from 1940s to mid 1980s. and has survived to the present day by undergoing various transformations.<sup>33</sup>

In short; according to Waltz, the founder of neorealism, power is basically not a purpose; is a tool. In addition, Waltz defines power in terms of the distribution of abilities. According to him, talents are not equally distributed in the international system. This is the most important factor that power can be identified. According to Morgenthau, national power makes one nation strong against others. National power is relatively stable; that is, quantitative elements and those that are constantly changing; consists of qualitative elements. The quantitative ones are geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness and population, and qualitative ones are national morale, national character,

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<sup>32</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Uluslararası İlişkilerin "Gerçekçi" Teorisi: Kökeni, Kapsamı, Kritiği", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 1, Sayı 1, Bahar 2004, p. 35.

<sup>33</sup> Ken Booth, "Realism and World Politics", Routledge Taylor&Francis Group London and New York, 2011, p.36.

diplomacy and the quality of the government. It is military preparation that gives real importance to geography, natural resources and industrial capacity elements and the power of a nation. Military preparation also requires a military institution that can support the foreign policies pursued by the country. In this context, the fact that a country has technological weapons, quality leaders in military cadres, and armed forces that are high in quality and high in quality fills the national power element.

The concept of balance of power has a very important place in realism. According to realism, states, the main actors of the international system, see increasing their power in an anarchic order as a necessary action for their survival. For this reason, the international system becomes a field of power struggle. As the states, who want to maintain or destroy the existing status quo, constantly want to gain power, a compulsory power balance and policies appropriate to this situation are formed. According to Morgenthau, the balance of power has 4 different meanings. These; the policy pursued by the state in order to achieve a goal is the real relations of the state, equal distribution of power and distribution of power in any form. The division and rule understanding that Morgenthau assumes as one of the basic tools of power balance policy is the most classical method of power balance.

Economics and politics can be called economic politics in international theory.<sup>34</sup> As mentioned earlier, energy policies can be classified as high policy, but it has been observed that they are separated from each other as they are evaluated in the respect of economic relations for two reasons. First, states with low energy resources towards among other states with high energy resources are the target for in the process of security supply. The result of this asymmetry states that lack of energy resources are always fragile for the others who are rich in energy resources. Another reason is the insufficient supply of energy can lead directly to security weakness, and also to a decline in living standards when there is a interruption of the energy supply. As a result, the rise of energy security in international politics and that it is much more appropriate to classify it as a 'high policy'. Politics is an important tool of power struggle, and the theory of a detailed realism that prioritizes the power struggle in Russia-EU natural gas policy will clearly explained. The relevant theory which suits the natural gas diplomacy between Russia and EU will be analyzed in the next section.

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<sup>34</sup> Robert Gilpin, "Global Understanding Political The International Economy Economic Order", Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2001, p.11-12.

## 1.2. Theoretical Outcomes in Relations between Russia and EU

The main changes in the international system towards the end of the 20th century could not be explained by neorealism, which focused on states exhibiting similar and repetitive patterns of behavior.<sup>35</sup> While this situation brought non-paradigm criticism to neorealism, it enabled the birth of neoclassical realism within the paradigm that focused on the processes of change at the level of foreign policy analysis. Neo-classical realism emphasizes that internal structures and internal structure variables of states should also be included in the analysis. In the policy formation of state behavior, the state includes the internal factors that are seen as decision-makers and institutions. It tries to explain why the states in the same system display different policies by taking into account the internal dynamics. In the neoclassical realism view, leaders define the national interest and execute foreign policy, based on the relative power assessment and intentions of other states.<sup>36</sup>

Russia's foreign policy in international relations is supported by many insights that it behaves according to the characteristics of Realism. Within the discipline of International Relations, the issue of 'security' is considered a 'high politics'.<sup>37</sup> Considering the situation between countries, the concept of security among countries is always at the forefront. Such that societies give priority to living in a safe and stable country. Energy security is as important as a country's own security. Given the energy policies of a state, it would be appropriate to evaluate this within the framework of high policy than low policy, such as economy and politics can be evaluated within security issues. While explaining the natural gas policy, the security and political aspects are the most prominent aspects, but another important aspect is the economic aspect for the Russia in terms of export revenues. From this point of view, it is accepted that energy policies constitute a kind of complex interdependence between states because it consists of many other dimensions that will be explained in detail.

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<sup>35</sup> Helen Miner "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", Vol.17, No. 1, 1991, p. 78.

<sup>36</sup> Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy", 2009, p.68.

<sup>37</sup> Sinem Kara, "The impact of the European Union-Russia relations on creating a common EU energy policy", Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara, 2008, p. 6.



The main feature of neoclassical realism is that it brings the level of systemic analysis formulated by Kenneth Waltz to the level of foreign policy analysis. According to neoclassical realism, systemic analysis suggests that state behaviors are shaped in this direction and states exhibit similar behavioral models, considering the anarchic structure of the international system. Significant changes in the international system, such as the fall of the USSR, which is one of the two opposing actors of the Cold War, without any military intervention, could not be explained by the view of the system analysis.<sup>38</sup> In other words, neorealism could not explain the behaviors of a country in anarchic environment by focusing only on survival, self-help and state characteristics regardless of their internal structure. Thus, it should focus on the adoption of different foreign policy strategies of different states or each state in different periods, and in this context, it is necessary to include both internal and external factors in the analysis process.<sup>39</sup> The main distinction is; While realists examine the impact of the international system on state behavior, neoclassical realism focuses on the fact that systemic pressures in foreign policy can transform at state level with intermediate variables. Internal level variables must also be taken into account when analyzing a country's foreign policy. Neoclassical realism focuses on the impact of internal political pressures and systemic pressures on perceptions of interest and opportunity, and explaining the sudden foreign policy change shaped by filtering this effect in the perceptions of policy makers.

As mentioned in the section above, the continuous search for power and the aim of maximizing power of states can be best explained by the theory of Realism. According to this thesis, it is envisaged that a theory that not only the concept of power is dominant but exists in other internal level variables can explain the Russia-EU natural gas relationship. The theory that includes these features is neoclassical theory. When the environment in which the theory emerged is evaluated in general, the fact that the structural realism (than neorealism) of Waltz, the dominant theoretical approach of the discipline, does not have sufficient theoretical notions to explain the end of the Cold War, and the failure to analyze such an important development is in the foreground<sup>40</sup>. Neoclassical realism is evaluated by the effect of the international system on the foreign policies of the states depending on the local dynamics of the relevant system and as a result of this evaluation, foreign policy strategies of the states are

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<sup>38</sup> Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "The New World Order": An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era", Vol 7, No:4, 2008, p.48.

<sup>39</sup> Gideon Rose, "Review: Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" Vol. 51 No.1, 1988, p. 154.

<sup>40</sup> McGlinchey, Stephen, Walters, Rosie and Scheinpflug Christian, "International Relations Theory" E-International Relations Publishing, 2017, p.7-8.

determined. According to assumptions, where foreign policy behaviors are claimed to occur as a synthesis of systemic elements and determinants of local dynamics, these factors should be evaluated separately and analyzed. Rose argues that while determining the foreign policies of states, it does not have to produce similar policies as a result of the orientation of the international system, as in structural realism, and that the local dynamics of the relevant states are determinative in this process. According to Neoclassical realism states are consider interest of states and ambition, cultural aspects, economic dimensions, ideology and socio-government dimensions.<sup>41</sup> Neoclassical realists argue that states are using their power to directly to international system which is related to their own preferences and goals. In other words, the effect of internal social factors such as interest groups, the degree of autonomy of the state from the society, and social cohesion, which the country analyzed sees as an effective factor in the adoption of different policies over time. Also in international arena, the foreign policy of a state have effects of the way of its relative power but there are some effects of indirect constitutions which have direct control over states.<sup>42</sup> When it comes to Russian foreign policy the scenario is clear that the ever developing domestic issues and attempt among state instutions have materially have an important influence on the foreign policy.<sup>43</sup>

During the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the principles of neoclassical realist theory are clearly seen despite the small tensions of developing within the nationalities sectors in a consequence of competition and rise in modernization. Another issue that Russian foreign policy attaches importance to be the targets which is focusing more on security by using its power and this led attach importance to military and defense industry. Oil and gas sector in Russia have started a new area of strengthening in domination of Gazprom.<sup>44</sup> This increasing tendency diminishes the military power.<sup>45</sup> And this leads to prioritize maximizing political power and economic interests. For Russia security is still the most important and critical point and in 2012 with the retrieval of World Trade Organization, Russia showed its willingness to previous economic interest. Based on this, Russia started to pay special attention to gain much more profit from oil and gas trade.

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<sup>41</sup> Randall, Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing. *International Security*", 2004, p.178.

<sup>42</sup> Philip Kitchen, "The Emergence of IMC: A Theoretical Perspective", 2004, p.26-28.

<sup>43</sup> Trenin, Dmitry, Lo and Bobo, "The landscape of Russian foreign policy decision-making Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center. *Russia and the North*", 2005, p. 204-210.

<sup>44</sup> Yıldırım, Emek, "Sovyet Sonrası Rusya'da Toplumsal Muhalefetin Ekonomi Politği", 2018, p.140-145.

<sup>45</sup> Viktorovich, Surikov, "Evolution of policymaking models in the Russian Federation", 2016, p. 45-59.



In Russian domestic policy it is clear that the domestic level variable is having an impact upon the policy of Russia towards EU which is no other variable than gas and the gas owner Gazprom.<sup>46</sup> Gazprom is the world's number one natural gas production company of Russian origin. In other words, states are considering Gazprom's actions rather than Russia. This means, Gazprom has a strong impact upon the foreign gas diplomacy of Russia. Also, through state-owned Gazprom and Rosneft, Russia abuses its dominant market position to support foreign policy targets in cross-border natural gas pipelines policy.<sup>47</sup> According to neoclassical realism; the pressure of the international system on the foreign policies of the states is evaluated depending on the local dynamics of the related state and foreign policy strategies are determined as a result of this evaluation. Gazprom is an important internal dynamic that affects and even determines Russia's foreign policy when it comes to natural gas in both local and cross-border issues in Russia. Neoclassical realism, which aims to explain the foreign policy behaviors of the states by evaluating the pressure of the international system through the factors that determine the local level, therefore accepts the foreign policy strategies and outputs of the relevant state as a dependent variable.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Dominique Finon, and Catherine Locatelli "Russian and European gas interdependence. Can market forces balance out geopolitics?", 2007, p.12.


<sup>47</sup> European Parliament, "Energy as a tool of foreign policy of authoritarian states, in particular Russia", 2018, p.4.

<sup>48</sup> Sami Kiraz, "Dış Politika Analizi Modeli Olarak Neoklasik Realizm: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasındaki Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi", 2018, p. 422.

**CHAPTER II: ENERGY POLICIES OF RUSSIA AND EU**

Within the understanding of international relations, the concept of security is regarded as a high policy. This means that security is a very important issue in international relations. While explaining energy relations, it is necessary to refer to many other dimensions. These dimensions can be classified as economic, political and security concerns.<sup>49</sup> When examining the energy relations of states through these dimensions, it can be assumed that these relations creates an 'complex interdependence'.<sup>50</sup>

Figure 1: World Primary Energy Consumption



Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy p.10

In the world primary energy consumption, the most consumed energy source after oil and coal is natural gas with a rate of 24%<sup>51</sup>. The aim of this study is to explain the importance of natural gas, which has a special place among the primary energy sources in the world, for the relations between Russia and the EU and in this context, an evaluation on the concept of asymmetric interdependency. Fossil fuels are the most used among the primary energy

<sup>49</sup> Per Ove Eikeland, “The Third Internal Energy Market Package: New Power Relations among Member States, EU Institutions and Non-state Actors?”, 2011, p. 56-60.

<sup>50</sup> An economic transnationalist concept that assumes that states are not the only important actors, social welfare issues share center stage with security issues on the global agenda, and cooperation is as dominant a characteristic of international politics as conflict. Retrieved from: Rana, W. Theory of Complex Interdependence: A Comparative Analysis of Realist and Neoliberal Thoughts p.291.

<sup>51</sup> BP, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy”, 68th Edition, 2019, p.10, <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf> , last accessed 21.12.2019.

sources in the world. Another fossil fuel that has an important place in energy consumption besides oil and coal is natural gas. There is an issue that Necdet Pamir emphasized and overlooked that the EU is an externally dependent in both in oil and natural gas. However, coal is also highly dependent on foreign countries, which is often not mentioned.<sup>52</sup> As seen in Figure 1, In the second half of the 20th century, natural gas, which was widely used in electricity production, industry and residences, has gained an important place among primary sources. According to BP Statistical data, natural gas consumption has grown rapidly since 1984 and reached 3848.9 bcm at the end of 2018 with a growth volume of 5.3%<sup>53</sup>. Natural gas is considered as a very important and strategic energy source not only for the economy of the states but also for the foreign policies of the states because it has a decisive force on states' energy policies. Also, it has a determinant role in world politics in which natural gas is mandatory for economic development. Supply of the enough energy for low cost and steadily is important for the wealth of the states.

The share of natural gas in world primary energy consumption is gradually increasing. One of the most important reasons for this is that natural gas is a clean and more efficient energy source than other fossil fuels. Natural gas is used in electricity production, fertilizer industry and even coal production rather than its use as fuel in residences and industries. Referring to energy, the most strategic sources of energy are oil and natural gas, and indisputable Russia is the main gas producing country due to its largest natural gas reserves.<sup>54</sup> The energy sector is one of the main instruments of the Russian political economy, energy and foreign policy. Therefore, it is very important that countries supply natural gas in a safe and stable manner.

In terms of natural gas production volumes, the USA ranked first with 831.8 bcm, followed by Russia with 669.5 bcm , Iran with 239.5 bcm and Qatar with 175.5 bcm , which contributing to this growth in with the rate of 5.2% in 2019. This ratio will increase in next years because countries sets policies to use more efficient and cleaner energy resources which led to an increase in the inter-regional natural gas trade volume<sup>55</sup>. According to the BP Statistical report of 2018, Russia has a proven natural gas reserve of 38.9 tcm with a rate of

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<sup>52</sup> Necdet Pamir, "Original Document of Interview 1" 2020.


<sup>53</sup> BP, "BP Statistical Review of World Energy", 68th Edition, 2019, p. 34.

<sup>54</sup> EIA, "Country Analysis Brief: Russia", U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2017, p.16-17.

<sup>55</sup> Necdet Pamir, "Enerjinin İktidarı. Enerji Kaynaklarını Elinde Tutan Dünyayı Elinde Tutar", p.112.

19.8%.<sup>56</sup> Russia’s main gas consumer is EU due to the Union’s large population, limited resources, lack of gas storage and production area. Russia's main natural gas export destinations are the member states of the EU and the EU is highly dependent on Russian natural gas, especially in industrialized countries such as Germany, Spain, France and the Netherlands. Russia is the main EU’s foremost external supplier of energy goods like crude oil, natural gas and some other fossil fuels in the first semester of 2019, Russia remained the largest supplier of natural gas and petroleum oils to the EU, ahead of Norway.<sup>57</sup>

**Figure 2: EU Imports of Natural Gas**



Source: Eurostat Statistics Explained(<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/>)

According to the data in Figure 2 with an export volume of 40.5% in 2018 and 39.4% in 2019, Russia has been the EU's largest natural gas supplier for the past 2 years. The only other partner that had a significant share in the EU's total natural gas import is Norway and, to some extent, Algeria, Qatar and Nigeria. The high degree of this dependency constitutes the issue of energy security for the EU. Another important aspect is that the export revenues from EU countries’ create an important revenue generation in terms of the Russian economy and the income that Russia will receive from natural gas export revenues. In this case, it is

<sup>56</sup> BP,2019, p. 30.

<sup>57</sup> Eurostat, EU imports of energy products - recent developments, [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU\\_imports\\_of\\_energy\\_products\\_-\\_recent\\_developments](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments) last accessed: 24.12.2019

possible to mention the existence of an interdependence as this interdependence is thought to have another dimension due to the differences and regional economic disparities between Russia and the EU. Because of these assumptions the aim of this thesis is to analyze Russia-EU natural gas relations with the framework of asymmetric interdependence rather than interdependence.

## **2.1. Energy Policy of Russia**

The share of the Russian energy sector in the Russian economy is considerable due to the large reserves of Russia, its production capacity and the storage area. The accommodating geopolitical approach is a moderate nationalism consisting of Westernism, Nationalism and Eurasianism. This model also aims to strike a reasonable balance between Russia's historical role and current situation. This model advocates Russian foreign policy to be based on realism and the effective use of the country's existing opportunities to affect global conditions. The main goal is to strengthen Russia and its position in the international arena, to oppose making concessions for the geopolitical independence of their countries and against economic sanctions and integration into Europe. In other words, strengthening Russia's leading position in the former Soviet space, especially by using economic tools.<sup>58</sup> Russia foresees to benefit from the export and transit of natural resources in foreign policy. For States like Russia, their position in the international system is of paramount importance. As a matter of fact, with Putin's second presidency, Russia's anxiety about geopolitical siege became more evident and the effects of the Realist movement were more seen in Russian foreign policy. According to the advocates of Realism, which came to the fore in Russian foreign policy together with Yevgeny Primakov, Russia should primarily protect its own interests in multipolar world politics and international relations.<sup>59</sup> It is possible to reconcile with Realism in energy policy, which has an important place in Russia's foreign policy. Although Europe is considered liberal in many internal and external issues, it is assumed that Europe's relationship with Russia is directed towards Realism.<sup>60</sup> According to the assumption in this thesis, the internal level of neo-classical realism is explained by Gazprom, which influences Russia's foreign natural gas policy and determines and monopolizes all natural gas pipeline policy. When a relation concerned to Russia's natural gas policy, Gazprom, is the guide of the countries and

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<sup>58</sup> Sait Sönmez, "Moskova'nın Kutuplaşma Çabaları: Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası", International Cooperation and Development Agency, 2010, p.43-44.

<sup>59</sup> Bobo Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 58-59.

<sup>60</sup> Maria Loredana Simionov, "The European Union and Russia, Cooperation or Competition?", 2014, p.237-240.

natural gas relations. Gazprom is the institution that regulates Russia's natural gas relations in its foreign policy. Furthermore, intercalarily neoclassical realism states that states can cooperate and compete at the same time as they can see each other as both economical and also as two competing parties.<sup>61</sup> The internal factors that determine a country's foreign policy are in this anarchic international system, and at the same time, the behavior of a country is focused on adaptation rather than being cooperative or non-cooperative.<sup>62</sup> In Russia and the EU natural gas relations, which are in a complex response relationship, this issue of adaptation can be clearly seen. As Kropatcheva states that “In neorealist classical approach it is possible for irrational national collective identity politics to coexist with rational self-interest”. To mention that the identity of these two sides is different from each other, that is, the asymmetry in relations. Based on this assumption, it is possible that the two sides differ from their formations and structures. To put it simply, Russia is a country established after the fall of the Soviet Union. The EU, on the other hand, is the whole of the countries where many countries meet on the common ground for economic purpose since the 1950s.<sup>63</sup>

Russia has always managed to exploit its vast rich natural resources in its favor. In fact, it was Russia's energy and mineral resources that allowed Russia to repay its domestic and foreign debts, regaining its power. Russia's expansionist approach is dominant in this area as it wants to keep in touch with the EU, which is currently the most profitable customer from its natural gas. Russia is currently quite available from existing natural gas pipeline projects as it is evident in its purpose in its historical background, is always trying to be at the top of the world economy in terms of every area. Russia manages this purpose and the best source to achieve is to supply energy to other routes by using energy resources. Russia has a desire to open its natural gas pipelines to other routes. Among these networks the pipeline network wants to stay allied with the Middle Eastern countries in order to extend towards the Eastern countries and not to be rivalry with them<sup>64</sup>. While aiming to establish a connection between Europe and Asia Pacific by using the transit possibilities of Russia, it is planned to host the energy corridor and to transport Caspian oil to the Western markets.

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<sup>61</sup> Randall Schweller, “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*”, Volume 11, Issue 1, Spring 2018, p. 23–48.

<sup>62</sup> Elana Kropatcheva, “Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism”, 2012, *Journal of Eurasian Studies* p. 31.

<sup>63</sup> Elena Kropatcheva, 2012, p.38

<sup>64</sup> Russian Strategic Intentions “A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) White Paper” 2019, p.27-28.



### 2.1.1. Energy Sources of Russia

The energy sector is the most important resource of the Russian economy. The main focus of this thesis which is natural gas; one of the main tools of Russia's integration into global trade and the source that provides the main economic income of Russia. Russia is among the world's leading countries not only in natural gas but also in oil production and export. The driving forces of the Russian economy are maintained by energy resources due to the high reserves, production capacity, installed pipelines and high storage capacity. Oil and natural gas export revenues constitute one third of the Russian national budget and one fourth of the domestic gross national product.<sup>65</sup> At the end of the 2018, from the statistic of BP Statistical Report 2019, Russia's latest proven natural gas reserve is 38.9 tcm and with 19.8% share of total world. On the other hand, the data towards the end of 2018, with the ratio of %17.3, Russia has 669.5 bcm natural gas production. Again in 2018 Russia's total natural gas export including via pipeline export and LNG<sup>66</sup> ratio is %26.3.<sup>67</sup>

**Map 1: Map of oil and gas pipelines of Russia**



Source: Energy Mix in Central European Countries of the V4 Group: The Quest for Stability<sup>68</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Henderson James. and Pirani Simon “The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets are Driving Change”, The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies, The University of Oxford, 2014, p. 116.

<sup>66</sup> Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a composition of methane and some mixture of ethane used to convert natural gas to liquid form for ease and safety of storage transport, retrieved from [https://giignl.org/sites/default/files/PUBLIC\\_AREA/About\\_LNG/4\\_LNG\\_Basics/Ing\\_1\\_-\\_basic\\_properties\\_7.2.09\\_aacomment-aug09.pdf](https://giignl.org/sites/default/files/PUBLIC_AREA/About_LNG/4_LNG_Basics/Ing_1_-_basic_properties_7.2.09_aacomment-aug09.pdf) last accessed 10.11.2019.

<sup>67</sup> BP Statistical Review, 2019, p.116.

<sup>68</sup> Miroslava Smítková and Juraj Kubica, “Energy Mix in Central European Countries of the V4 Group: The Quest for Stability”, XXIst World Energy Council Montreal ,2010, p.12.

As shown in Map 1, Germany Nord Stream 2, Stream Turkey and China Power of Siberia gas pipeline through EU countries of the European Union, Turkey and Russia are increasing geoeconomic and geopolitical events over China. In particular, along with the Turkish Stream and Germany North Stream 2 natural gas pipelines investment projects, the ongoing transit gas transportation disputes between Russia and Ukraine are also disappearing. Until the year 2000, uninterrupted economic growth has been realized in the Russia from its energy sources. Despite the increase in the price of Urals oil, one of the most important export goods of Russia since 2013, the desired growth rate in Russia's energy policy could not be reached. For this reason, the IEA commits that Russia cannot sustain its economic growth over the high course of oil prices and that it needs structural reforms and stable export revenues.<sup>69</sup> From the perspective of Sharples<sup>70</sup>, Russia's domestic and foreign energy policy when it comes to with any country, is take form by its national interest and also security, economic well-being, autonomy and collective self-esteem.

Trying to make Russia a regional superpower and energy power in the international arena, the Putin administration has redefined Russia's policy towards the 'close environment', the Balkans, the Far East and other regions. Putin's foreign policy approach in general; Russia's becoming a power in a multipolar international system dominated by interest-based cooperation and civilized competition. It also made the control of energy a key element of its foreign policy, taking into account the rising oil prices. To overcome economic problems, the Putin administration primarily mobilized the military-industrial complex and energy raw material resources in Russia. The most important reasons for Russia's economic development are instability in the energy regions of the world, rising oil and natural gas prices, increasing exports of Putin to existing markets in the energy field and finding new markets. The Putin administration also demanded that American companies increase their investments in Russia, especially in the field of energy, in exchange for support to the USA.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries “ Agence Internationale de l'Energie” 2014, [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/energy/energy-policies-beyond-iea-countries-russia-2014\\_9789264211506-en](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/energy/energy-policies-beyond-iea-countries-russia-2014_9789264211506-en) last accessed 16.12.2019.

<sup>70</sup> Eduard Khusainov, “Avrupa Birliği ve Rusya Federasyonu Güvenlik İlişkileri” Ankara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü 2014, p.75.

<sup>71</sup>Robert O. Freedman, “Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Under Putin”, Vol 2, No:2, 2003, p.67-68.



In order to analyze Russian energy policy, it is essential to understand Vladimir Putin's "Mineral Natural Resources in the Strategy for Development of the Russian Economy".<sup>72</sup> It is a unique opportunity to examine how he viewed Russia's most important economic sectors. In this dissertation, Putin stressed that the continuous raw material and mineral resources of a country (the energy sources mentioned here) should be increased in order to develop the Russian economy and increase the welfare level of the Russian political power. Putin's thesis also includes sentences that emphasize the existence and sustainability of Gazprom. Putin said that the establishment of large-scale industrial companies supporting energy investments is very important for the Russian economy. These companies must be sufficiently advanced to compete with, or even surpass, those that are owned by the West. Another important topic is that Vladimir Putin mentioned in the dissertation is that the existence of such institutions would also strengthen a country's defense industry which he emphasizes the power of the energy sector of Russia is equal to defense power of Russia.

Since the end of the Cold War period, the Russian government has been acting in the direction of raising the country's economic interests and strategic interests by increasing Russian global gas exports. The main export revenues of the Russian economy are energy sources, as can be seen from figure 3. the chart above includes the most recent data for the Russian economy. It shows the countries that Russia exports the most, and the EU is at the top. Export revenues from energy sources are an important source of income for the Russian economy.

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<sup>72</sup> Vladimir Putin, "Vladimir Putin's Academic Writings and Russian Natural Resource Policy Mineral Natural Resources in the Strategy for Development of the Russian Economy", 2006, p.50-54

**Figure 3 : Russia Exports by Category**

Russia Exports by Category	Last	Previous		
Total Usd	101916.00	99723.00	USD Million	Sep/19
Crude Oil	90435.30	79907.90	USD Million	Sep/19
Petroleum Products	49901.40	43933.40	USD Million	Sep/19
Natural Gas	31089.50	28410.10	USD Million	Sep/19
Diesel Fuel	21481.90	18947.60	USD Million	Sep/19
Machinery & Equipment	18318.20	16254.30	USD Million	Sep/19
Liquid Fuels	15531.60	13590.50	USD Million	Sep/19
Ferrous Metals	14157.70	12829.70	USD Million	Sep/19
Coal	12335.30	10970.50	USD Million	Sep/19
Semi-finished Prod. of Carbon & S	4693.30	4212.00	USD Million	Sep/19

Source: Trading Economics. Russia Exports 1994-2019 Data

According to Figure 4 from BP Statistical Review, Russia's Natural gas rational trade increased especially in pipeline exports with the rate of %23.6 at the end of 2018. Exports in Russia averaged 247.9 bcm including pipeline exports and LNG exports. Russia's export in natural gas reached 37739.00 USD Million. More than half of the revenue of the Russian federal budget comes from oil and natural gas export revenues <sup>73</sup>.

**Figure 4 : Russias Total Imports and Exports in terms of LNG and Pipeline**

Russia														
Pipeline imports	74.4	38.5	33.4	41.2	39.7	32.9	33.1	26.5	24.3	28.6	25.2	-12.1%	-7.8%	2.7%
Total imports	74.4	38.5	33.4	41.2	39.7	32.9	33.1	26.5	24.3	28.6	25.2	-12.1%	-7.8%	2.7%
Pipeline exports	251.7	189.6	194.0	210.6	201.5	210.7	189.6	194.2	202.0	219.7	223.0	1.5%	-0.8%	23.6%
LNG exports	-	6.8	13.5	14.3	14.3	14.5	13.6	14.6	14.6	15.4	24.9	61.5%	n/a	2.6%
Total exports	251.7	196.5	207.5	224.9	215.8	225.2	203.2	208.8	216.7	235.2	247.9	5.4%	-0.2%	26.3%

Source: BP Statistical Review

Income from energy sources creates significant financial resources for manufacturers and service sectors, also stimulates domestic demand and provides infrastructure investments for both domestic and natural gas pipeline construction. At the same time, income from energy resources is important in the expenditures made for the Russian Defense Industry. <sup>74</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Trading Economics, Russia Exports, 1994-2019 Data, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports> last accessed: 24.12.2019.

<sup>74</sup> Necdet Pamir, "Enerjinin İktidari", 2017, p.137.

**Figure 5: List of export countries of Russia**

	Last	Previous		
European Union	139590.60	124207.80	USD Million	Sep/19
China	40372.70	35637.00	USD Million	Sep/19
Netherlands	34497.60	30646.10	USD Million	Sep/19
Germany	20533.30	18489.00	USD Million	Sep/19
South Korea	12829.50	11183.40	USD Million	Sep/19
Italy	10754.90	9676.70	USD Million	Sep/19
United States	9471.50	8335.10	USD Million	Sep/19
Poland	8845.00	7578.60	USD Million	Sep/19
Japan	8664.90	7172.60	USD Million	Sep/19
Finland	7757.40	6993.00	USD Million	Sep/19
Belgium	5116.00	4694.60	USD Million	Sep/19
France	4535.10	4003.60	USD Million	Sep/19
Latvia	3747.40	3326.30	USD Million	Sep/19
Czech Republic	3633.10	3214.10	USD Million	Sep/19

Source: Trading Economics, Russia Export Data 1994-2019 Data.

In recent years, Russian natural gas sector has shown significant advances in both the exploration and production sub-sectors and sub-sectors such as transportation. The Russian energy sector has undergone significant developments and changes, particularly in the exploration and production sub-sector and in the sub-sectors such as transportation. Russia's development in these areas has resulted in both being sufficient in its domestic market and becoming more competent in its foreign market. Gazprom is undoubtedly responsible for such a major development in the field of energy.

### **2.1.2. Russia's Pricing Policy**

In the international arena, oil has a fixed price. However, although the prices in the natural gas markets are not wholly dependent, they depend to some extent on oil prices. While Russia sells its natural gas at very reasonable prices in its domestic market, it sells very expensive to the countries it exports to. Therefore, the pricing of natural gas varies depending on the negotiations between the supplier and the seller. Furthermore, natural gas trade agreements are long-term agreements, which distinguishes natural gas agreements from oil agreements. Natural gas policies are very sensitive to fragility and this highlights the importance of the issue.

As mentioned earlier, the sustainability of Russia's economy is highly dependent on export revenues from energy sources (mainly oil, natural gas and coal). Among these energy sources, Russia's natural gas policy is kept separate from other energy sources (oil and coal). This situation affects the pricing policies of the Russian economy in international markets. This is important for the preservation and integrity of Russia's social stability. The government is now trying to increase the importance of electoral assurances in accordance with oil and gas sector. This is a direct significance for national security is attributed to all events in Russia's key economic sector.<sup>75</sup>

### **2.1.3. Russia's Energy Security Doctrine**

Ensuring energy security is one of the most important aspects of Russian state policy. In Russian foreign policy, natural gas is an effective and political weapon in its domestic and foreign policy. In national security issues, the use, distribution and procurement of energy resources come to the forefront. Russia's energy security is as important as the countries from which it exports natural gas. European countries, which become more dependent on Russia in energy imports due to increasing energy consumption, are becoming deprived of political negotiation power while trying to maintain their relations with Russia. Problems are seen as legitimate in the relations of supplier countries, transit countries and energy consumers with their close and distant neighbors, which are naturally different in terms of their interests. In this regard, Russia contributes greatly to ensuring global energy security through diplomatic efforts.<sup>76</sup>

Russia's energy policies threaten the EU's energy security and increase the dependence on Russia in EU-Russia relations. It has been determined that Russia generally applies different energy policies according to regions. From the Putin era, Russia has increased its effectiveness again by skillfully using its energy resources that can ensure both national security and economic development. When the new foreign policy discourses of Russia and the National Security Doctrine are analyzed, it is striking that the Eurasian discourse is predominantly involved. According to Neo-Eurasianism; Russia should form an alliance with

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<sup>75</sup> Svetlana Nosova, Ivan Macdulyak and Svetlana Lyubimtseva "New Management Model of Modern Russian Economy Regional Aspect", 2016, p. 22-23.

<sup>76</sup> Aleksei Valentinovich Bogoviz, Svetlana Vladislavlevna Lobova, Yulia Vyacheslavovna Ragulina, Alexander Nikolaevich Alekseev, "Russia's Energy Security Doctrine" p.2-4.

independent states in its immediate vicinity, and apply strategic pressure in its immediate vicinity, using military and economic means.<sup>77</sup> The foreign policy being implemented by the Putin Administration is carried out in accordance with the "National Security Doctrine" and the "Foreign Policy Doctrine".<sup>78</sup>

In many cases, Russia is also aggressive by threatening to cut or cut off the energy supply to countries with economic or political problems. Russia thus uses its natural gas as a political weapon.<sup>79</sup> It is possible to say that the gains of oil and natural gas exports in the last decade have made Russia more confident against Europe and encouraged Russia to enter other markets.<sup>80</sup> As mentioned earlier, Putin's rhetoric is an important source both for understanding Russia's foreign policy and seeing how energy policy works. Putin supports it is essential to create a cartel or consortium in the countries like Iran and Qatar. While many scholars and energy experts do not see this idea as realistic and in favor of Russia's interests, including some leading Russian officials, and argue that these plans have increased the discomfort that Europe has already accumulated against Russia.

#### **2.1.4. Putin's Effect on Russian Foreign Policy**

Putin's period , which is trying to make Russia a regional and energy power and energy power in the international era, is a period in which Russia's 'near environment' policy has been redefined. Unlike in the late 80s , the Putin administration focused on benefiting from the West rather than partnership. The Putin period had a very sensual period with high oil prices and high natural gas export pricing. However, this has resulted in the Russian economy becoming dependent on the export of energy raw materials and revenues from the pipelines and the cash flow needed for the construction of other pipelines it plans. The country that officially has a Foreign Energy Strategy Policy in the world is Russia. To understand Russia's energy policy, it is essential to analyze the 'Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030'. In this document, Russia's energy policy, using Russia's natural

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<sup>77</sup> Akgül, Fatih, "Rusya'nın Putin Dönemi Avrasya Enerji Politikaları'nın Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerine Etkileri", 2007, p. 132 -140.

<sup>78</sup> Alexander Sergunin, "Russian post-Communist foreign policy thinking at the cross-roads: Changing paradigms", 2000, p.26-30.

<sup>79</sup> David Ostergren, "A Political Economy of Russian Nature Conservation Policy: Why Scientists Have Taken a Back Seat", 2002, Global Environmental Politics, p.102-124

<sup>80</sup> Jeronim Perovic, "Russian Energy Power, Domestic and International Dimensions (Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, Routledge, 2009) London and New York, 2009, p 6-12.

resources to provide the most efficiency in economic growth, integrating energy potential in the world market in the best way and at the same time the most effective way to meet the needs of the national basis.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, as mentioned in the 2020 Strategy, the innovation and energy efficiency constituent Russia is seeking new routes like eastern directions like China, Korea and Japan.<sup>82</sup>

Russia's own energy policy is, as can be seen in every theory of International Relations, and assuming that each actor actually acts in the direction of his own interests; it is driven by national security, autonomy, physical security, collective self-esteem and economic prosperity.<sup>83</sup> As Vladimir Putin stated in his 1997 thesis, he stressed out the mineral resources in the increase of Russia's economic growth rate and strengthening its political power was vigorously emphasized. In the same thesis, it was emphasized that the establishment of large financial industrial companies that could compete equally with the international companies of the West, and the importance of Gazprom natural gas, Russia's largest natural gas company, should be strengthened. Here, Russia's ideas about future plans are noteworthy.

### **2.1.5. Meaning and Importance of Gazprom**

Russian natural gas pipelines are owned by Gazprom on behalf of the state. According to the law enacted in 2006, Gazprom owns all shares of the Unified Gas System (UGS) in natural gas pipelines and exports. While Gazprom continues its production from the well-known old sites, it also increases its production from new and undeveloped regions. The production of Russian companies has the potential to provide more than the demand of the domestic and foreign markets. This has strengthened the view that Gazprom is not only a commercial company, but also operates for Russia's interests, as the Russian state became a real partner in the company in the 1990s at 41%, and since 2005 this share rose to 50% majority stake.<sup>84</sup> In fact, Gazprom's internal pricing strategy requires the approval of the

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<sup>81</sup> Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation Energy Strategy of Russia. For the period up to 2020, 2010, p.10. last accessed 24.10.2019 [http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030\\_\(Eng\).pdf](http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf)

<sup>82</sup> Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, "Energy Strategy of Russia, for the period up to 2030", 2009 p. 3-5.

<sup>83</sup> Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West", 2010 p. 548.

<sup>84</sup> Simon Pirani, "The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Russian and CIS Gas Markets", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies", 2009, p.30-36

Russian Ministry of Economy.<sup>85</sup> Gazprom's role in international gas pipelines, as an International Relations theory, illustrates the link between how Russia's neoclassical realism approach best aligns with the EU in its gas pipeline relationship.

**Map 2: Gas Pipelines to Europe**



Source: Archipelago Gazprom, “Selected Maps and Schemes of Gas Pipelines of Russia and the FSU”, <https://egas.com/maps.htm>.

Gazprom is taking many steps to keep gas exports from Central Asia under control and to ensure that exports from this region to Europe pass through Russia without a direct connection<sup>86</sup>. Therefore, Russia is now moving to buy cheap gas from Central Asia and sell it to the EU at a higher price, which clearly means that Russia becomes thoroughly monopoly

<sup>85</sup> Nina Poussenkova, “The Global Expansion of Russia’s Energy Giants”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2, Rethinking Russia, p.110-120.

<sup>86</sup> Agata Loskot Strachota and Georg Zachmann, “Rebalancing the EU-Russia-Ukraine Gas Relationship”, 2014, p.2-11.



and the security of supply to the EU is reduced due to excessive dependence on Russia.<sup>87</sup> This situation leads Gazprom Russia's international gas policy very successfully and shows that neoclassical realism is classified in this relationship.

According to data from Gazprom website, Gazprom Export LLC exported 200.8 bcm natural gas to European countries at the end of 2018.<sup>88</sup>

**Table 1: Gazprom Export in bcm (outside the former USSR)**

Year	1973	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total	6.8	19.3	54.8	69.4	110	117.4	130.3	154.3	138.6	158.6	178.3	192.2	200.8

Source: Gazprom Export, Delivery Statistics. <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/>

In 2018, the Western European market consumes the majority of Russian exports and Gazprom supplied 162.39 bcm of gas to markets in the region. The largest importers are Italy, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey.<sup>89</sup>


<sup>87</sup> Dominique Finon and Catherine Locatelli, “Russian and European gas interdependence, Can market forces balance out geopolitics?”, Laboratoire d'Economie de la Production et de l'Intégration Internationale Département Energie et Politiques de l'Environnement (EPE), 2007, p.7-8.

<sup>88</sup> Gazprom Export, Delivery Statistics, Gas supplies to Europe, (2020) last accessed 24.12.2019 <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/>

<sup>89</sup> Gazprom Export. Delivery Statistics. <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/> last accessed: 20.08.2019.



**Figure 6 : Gazprom Exports Market in Europe**




Source: Gazprom Export, Delivery Statistics. <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/>

As seen in Figure 6; the Eastern and Central European natural gas market is particularly important because of its geographical proximity to Russia. In 2018, Gazprom Export LLC sold 38.38 billion cubic meters of gas on the market. The largest importers are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>90</sup> Gazprom Export, Delivery Statistics, 2006-2020, <http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/statistics/> last accessed 11.12.2019.

Gazprom is the sole owner and operator of the Unified Natural Gas System. Gazprom carries out its transportation activities to Russia and other countries through its 18 transmission companies. Russia exports 90% natural gas and 80% oil exports to European countries. About half of the natural gas exported to Europe is realized through natural gas pipelines through Ukraine. In addition to Europe, Russia's most important gas exporter, natural gas markets for the Asian market are expected to gain importance.

**Map 3: Russian Gas Exports to World**



Source: Uluslararası Politika Akademisi <sup>91</sup>

Natural gas exports not only provide economic power for Russia, but also provide a very serious geopolitical power, with access to many countries and regions in the world, especially EU countries. By sorting the countries first Germany with the percentage of 16%, secondly Ukraine %15, Turkey %13., Belarus %10 and Italy %7. <sup>9293</sup> The only way for Russia by exporting natural gas is via pipelines. In the Map 3, the Russian Gas exports to world are showed. As Necdet Pamir mentioned in the interview, each EU member is dependent on Russia at different rates. The EU wants to act in its foreign policy as a

<sup>91</sup> Europe, Semi Changed by Russian Gas Dependency and Vulnerability <http://politikaakademisi.org/2017/09/01/europe-semi-chained-by-russian-gas-dependency-and-vulnerability/> last accessed: 24.05.2019.

<sup>92</sup> PJSC Gazprom Annual Report 2018 <https://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/67/776998/gazprom-annual-report-2018-en.pdf> last accessed 10.06.2019.

<sup>93</sup> Mesut Hakkı Çaşın, "Rus İmparatorluk Stratejisi", 1. Baskı, ASAM, p. 38-52.

community policy. However, due to the diversity of the dependency ratios of each member country, the reduction policies in their dependence on Russia are not successful. The economy of many countries is quite integrated with the Russian economy, especially Germany. There exists interdependence and even overlapping interests between the Russia and EU. The relations of Germany and Italy with Russia are not as negative as small countries, and it is possible to talk about reverse integration.

Russia's export revenues from energy sources (oil and gas), 15 billion dollar in 1999 and 140 billion dollar for just oil, the high amount of Russia's export revenues has made Russia more confident towards the EU and with this economic increase, Russia has tended to enter the world markets. It is observed that Russia is competing with Iran and Qatar as an economic power.<sup>94</sup> Russia wants to manage its natural gas policy well in order to become one of the leading parties in the world economy, because Russia's energy resources are now the country's most important means of economic income. Although it is a very unrealistic hope for Russia because of the Russian aggressive economic interests.<sup>95</sup>

#### **2.1.6. Problems of Russian Gas Sector**

There are also some problems that the Russian economy will face in terms of energy. One of these are shale gas and oil, which is considered as an alternative energy resource of Russian natural gas. Another problem is that almost all of the fields where natural gas is produced are old sites discovered during and before the Soviet era. Modernization of pipelines in old sites requires significant costs. Russia needs new fields to be discovered for the sake of its new pipeline routes. Energy policies, which provide high income to the national economy, are always among the most important issues for the authorities of the country. The partial liberalization policies observed in the energy sector after the disintegration of the Soviets are increasingly being replaced by policies in which the state stands out and Gazprom.

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<sup>94</sup> Filippou Proedrou "The EU–Russia Energy Approach under the Prism of Interdependence, European Security", 2007, p.346.

<sup>95</sup> Pami Aalto, "Russia's Energy Policies. National, Interregional and Global Levels", Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012, p. 226-229.

Another important natural gas problem of Russia is the excess consumption in its own country. This is due to the weather of Russia, which has severe cold weather for 6 months.<sup>96</sup> Although Gazprom is a monopoly for gas exports, there are other local gas producers other than Gazprom like Rosneft, but they now have a very low surface. Russian natural gas and oil giant Gazprom Vice President Vitaliy Markelov stated that Gazprom is planned to produce 495 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 41 million tons of oil in 2019.<sup>97</sup> In the Russian energy sector, oil pipelines are under the monopoly of Transneft and natural gas pipelines are under the monopoly of Gazprom. Gazprom is also close to monopoly in natural gas production in Russia, and by purchasing Sibneft, it also aimed to grow in the field of oil production.

Diversification appears as one of the most important elements in terms of Russia's energy policies. While Russia plans to reach different energy markets that can export energy resources outside of Europe, it also aims to diversify its energy transmission routes in Europe and plans to create new energy transmission lines that will disable transit countries where it has problems. Thus, while trying to guarantee energy demand security, it aims to reduce its fragility that affects the costs of interdependence with other countries. In this context, it decreases the natural gas exports to Europe through this country due to the crises it has experienced with Ukraine in 2006. Especially the introduction of the Northern Stream, which reached Germany from the Baltic Sea, significantly reduced Russia's dependence on Ukraine. Another project that Russia aims to reduce the role of Ukraine is Turkish Stream (details will be explained in Turkey and Turk stream section), which has replaced the canceled South Stream Natural Gas Pipeline (South Stream) project. With the Turkish Stream Project, Russia wants to exclude Ukraine, which it previously perceives as a problem, from the natural gas transit country. So that is intended to supply natural gas to the European countries and Turkey more confidence. Gazprom is a very influential actor and policymaker for gas pipeline policy. This shows that neo-classical realism plays an important role in this case.

Russia aims to balance its dependence on a single market or region and reduce its limit its vulnerability in crisis situations that may diversify the markets and countries to which it exports energy. In this context, instead of being dependent only on the European energy market, it diversifies the countries to which it exports energy by making energy agreements

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<sup>96</sup> Braun, T.F. and Lisa M.G. Understanding Energy and Energy Policy, 2014, p. 176.

<sup>97</sup> Gazprom, <https://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2019/september/article488424/> last accessed 24.12.2019.

with Central Asian countries such as China. Thus, it tries to balance the demand dependence on the European energy market by opening it to the Central Asian energy market and wants to increase its bargaining power against European countries<sup>98</sup>.

Russia attaches great importance to energy resources policy in order to increase its rich energy resources and energy policies in the world economy, to ensure stability in its country and to gain superiority in foreign policy. As mentioned in other sections, the Russian economy is highly dependent on the amount derived from energy export revenues. This addiction has positive and negative consequences for the Russian economy. As it is mentioned in the section called “Energy Policy of Russia”, the export revenues provide a financial source to support Russia's own domestic needs (strengthening the industrial and military infrastructure) and then its aim of becoming a global power in its foreign policy. However, in addition to these contributions, excessive dependence on export revenues is a factor that increases the 'future risk of fragility' for a country<sup>99</sup>. The reliance on energy resources is an important risk factor for the Russian economy in case of uncertainty in oil and natural gas prices in terms of power and sectors, or if the production potential of existing sites is reduced. In addition, the difficulty of new exploration sites and the modernization process of natural gas pipelines increase the sensitivity of this dependency for Russia, which has a large production capacity.

The fact that the energy sector was taken under the control of the 3 main state companies has provided a great advantage for Russia. Although the EU does not regard this situation warmly, it is under the monopoly of companies such as Gazprom in natural gas field, Rosneft in oil field and Transneft in pipeline transportation. Gazprom is criticized that it still does not provide sufficient infrastructure and does not provide the necessary technological developments in an environment where it has superior competition. In addition, Gazprom is not able to maintain investor relations with the West very well, in order not to deviate from the policies it wants to implement most of the time.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Cemal Kakışım, “Karşılıklı Bağımlılık Kapsamında Türkiye-Rusya Enerji İlişkilerinin Analizi”, *Uluslararası Siyaset Bilimi ve Kentsel Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Cilt 7, Sayı 1, 2019, p.70.

<sup>99</sup> Necdet Pamir, 2015, p.333.

<sup>100</sup> Anders Åslund, “Gazprom: Challenged Giant in Need of Reform”, p.160.

## 2.2. Energy Policy of the EU

The EU is considered to be integrated in many areas with its 28 member states and candidate countries. The EU's economy has a leading economy in the world together with the developing countries. Many factors stemming from their geographical proximity, common characteristics, and common histories are actually taking the EU to the top in the world economy when taken as a whole. As of 2019, the total population of the 28 member states of the EU has reached 513.5 million. The EU's population growth was due to approximately 1.1 million immigrants.<sup>101</sup> With its economic structure, political system and common institutions, the EU has a unique structure that has never been seen before. Since 1951, the EU has been constantly renewing itself and showing a dynamic structure with its new agreements and efforts to improve both its economic structure and its relations with other countries.

EU energy policy can be summarized in general with the following articles<sup>102</sup>;


1. Ensuring the functioning of the energy market,
2. Ensuring supply security in the EU through increased solidarity,
3. Increasing energy efficiency and energy saving and developing new and renewable energy types,
4. Finding alternative sources to reduce excess energy dependence,
5. Being economically competitive,
6. Ensuring energy supply security.

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<sup>101</sup> Eurostat, Statistics Explained (2019) Population and population change statistics. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population\\_and\\_population\\_change\\_statistics&oldid=442219](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_and_population_change_statistics&oldid=442219) last accessed: 24.11.2019

<sup>102</sup>European Parliament, European Parliament Fact Sheets on the European Union <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/68/energy-policy-general-principles>

**Figure 7: Gross Inland Energy Consumption EU-28 1990-2017.**



Source: Eurostat Statics Explained, Energy Statistics- an overview.<sup>103</sup>

From the Figure 7, consumption of oil and natural gas seems to be the main sources of consumption among EU countries. One of the most important reasons for this is the fact that EU countries have a developing dynamic and industrial-based service-exporting economy. EU is highly dependent on natural gas imports, especially Russia. Figure 8, shows share of Russia in national EU imports of each member state in EU imports and exports of petroleum oils and natural gas.

<sup>103</sup>[https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Energy\\_statistics\\_\\_an\\_overview&oldid=4449](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=Energy_statistics__an_overview&oldid=4449)

**Figure 8: Share of Russia in national EU-28 Imports**

Country	Share (%) of Russia in national extra-EU-28 imports	
	Petroleum oils	Natural gas
Belgium	25-50	0-25
Bulgaria	50-75	75-100
Czechia	25-50	75-100
Denmark	0-25	0-25
Germany	25-50	50-75
Estonia	75-100	75-100
Ireland	0-25	0-25
Greece	0-25	50-75
Spain	0-25	0-25
France	0-25	25-50
Croatia	0-25	0-25
Italy	0-25	25-50
Cyprus	0-25	0-25
Latvia	0-25	75-100
Lithuania	75-100	50-75
Luxembourg	0-25	0-25
Hungary	50-75	75-100
Malta	0-25	0-25
Netherlands	25-50	25-50
Austria	0-25	75-100
Poland	50-75	50-75
Portugal	0-25	0-25
Romania	25-50	75-100
Slovenia	0-25	75-100
Slovakia	75-100	75-100
Finland	75-100	75-100
Sweden	25-50	25-50
United Kingdom	0-25	0-25

Source: EU imports of energy products – recent developments, Statistics Explained.

Because of this high level of dependence, it exposes member countries to gas supply cuts for political and commercial reasons. In particular, the natural gas shortage between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 created an alarm for the EU energy security. Because of these interruptions, many EU member states have experienced serious problems. After these interruptions, the 'Energy Strategy Document' was published by the European Commission in 2014.<sup>104</sup> In general, the aim of this document was to have stable and sustainable energy sources and to ensure stable energy supply through stable agreements in order to prevent disruption of the economies of EU countries.<sup>105</sup> EU Energy policy includes a policy that is economically competitive, supply security and environmental sustainability. Although the EU's energy policy includes reducing its dependence on natural gas, its current development

<sup>104</sup> European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council", 2104, p.4-17.

<sup>105</sup> European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. p.5-20. <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/european-energy-security-strategy.pdf> last accessed: 16.08.2019



does not support the long-term prospects of this plan. For parties that become extremely dependent on Russian natural gas, such as Germany; it has been observed that Germany's policy is integrated with the Russian economy. In fact, Northern Stream 2, which will leave Russia's Narva Gulf on natural gas pipelines and extend to the town of Lubmin, near Greifswald, Germany, makes an important contribution to the supply of natural gas, but only meets part of the EU demand. Emphasizing that North Stream 2 will play a complementary and complementary role in other supply routes, the Russian government maintains that the relations between Russia and the EU are balanced and interconnected. The biggest buyer of Russia in natural gas exports is still the EU and Northern Stream 2 is developed in full compliance with EU regulations.

There is a high risk of dependence, since it is practically impossible to develop an alternative in the short term, instead of the natural gas to which all industrial, residential and electricity generation systems are connected. The EU is highly dependent on natural gas consumption (some of the member countries completely, and some of them to a large extent) to gas imports from Russia. The EU's dependence on Russian natural gas makes it very vulnerable to gas supply cuts from member states due to political and commercial infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, the natural gas shortage crisis of Russia with Ukraine in 2009 had a serious impact on many EU member states. Due to these interruptions, the EU started to take measures and on the other hand, the European Commission issued the Energy Security Strategy document in 2014 as a monopoly against Russia.<sup>106</sup> The purpose of this published Energy Security Strategy is; 'to provide stable and sufficient energy for European citizens and the European economy'. The Energy Security Strategy included both short-term and long-term goals. The EU needs a lot of natural gas from Russia. When it comes to reducing Russian natural gas imports to the EU in the Energy Security Strategy, especially Eastern European countries and Energy Community countries will be seriously affected. On the other hand, if all countries cooperate, even in the case of a 6-month interruption, their protections to consumers, gas supply can be sustained uninterruptedly. In the Energy Security Strategy, It was decided that the EU should follow a market-based policy to ensure security of supply. In order to increase the cooperation of the countries, especially in the field of energy,

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<sup>106</sup> EU Energy Security Strategy  
[https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/European\\_Energy\\_Security\\_Strategy\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/European_Energy_Security_Strategy_en.pdf) last accessed 01.09.2019

the interconnection capacities between the member states should be maximized and the obstacles to cross-border energy trade have been raised.<sup>107</sup>

The EU offers some options in almost every Energy reform to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. These options primarily include the renewal of natural gas infrastructure and legislation in a way that facilitates gas flow among member countries. The capacity to store natural gas is very important for natural gas sustainability. It aims to increase gas storage opportunities among its alternative solutions in the EU. Thus, it will be able to keep the natural gas supplied from outside Russia for a longer period of time. Another alternative is the establishment of energy policy research centers on the discovery of new EU gas production potentials. In addition, the EU concentrates on supplying natural gas from different geographies and focuses on the production of energy sources such as alternative shale gas instead of natural gas to reduce the demand for natural gas. However, many years of instability, drought, civil wars and occupations in the Middle East and Africa geography, which include countries that can be considered as alternative sources, show that these options are not safe for the EU in the long term.<sup>108</sup> Under the EU Primary Legislation, the Union bases its energy policy on two treaties that form the basis of the EU<sup>109</sup>. The first is the Treaty that defines the functioning of the EC, while the other is the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. These agreements aimed to operate the European Energy Market, ensure the energy supply security of the union, improve energy efficiency, save energy and develop alternative renewable energy sources. With this legislation, it is also aimed to integrate the European energy policy's internal market, to protect the environment, to promote solidarity among member countries, and to connect and integrate energy networks.

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<sup>107</sup> EU Energy Security Strategy “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council” p. 8-19.

[https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/European\\_Energy\\_Security\\_Strategy\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/publication/European_Energy_Security_Strategy_en.pdf) last accessed: 18.11.2019.

<sup>108</sup> Necdet Pamir, 2015, p. 364.

<sup>109</sup> European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union, last accessd. 16.12.2019  
<http://europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/68/energy-policy-general-principles>

### 2.2.1. EU Energy Package and 20-20-20 Slogan


The 20-20-20 slogan of the EU Energy policy is a slogan that contains important goals that need to be studied to understand this policy.

Briefly, the items of this slogan can be listed as follows<sup>110</sup>;

- Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20%,
- Increasing the share of renewable resources in the energy mix to 20%,
- Energy consumption 20% reduction.

EU's 20-20-20 slogan is very important for EU energy policy. With this slogan until 2020; 20% reduction in GGE, promoting the share of renewable resources in the energy mix to 20%, and energy consumption (which is a goal in reducing dependence on Russia). The most important of these objectives is to reduce energy consumption.

**Figure 9: EU 20-20-20 Slogan**



Source: Ghent University, Low carbon business park manual: A guide for developing and managing energy efficient and low carbon businesses and business parks, 2014, p.17.

<sup>110</sup> European Commission [https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2020_en)

As stated in the Figure 8, the EU has stated that it will meet the target for 2 of the 3 main policy targets set by 2020. However, it is seen that if the current trends in the target of reducing energy consumption by 20% continue, they can only achieve half of this target. The most important reasons are; The enlargement of the EU is that the supply-demand relationship is not in balance and the policy measures cannot be taken jointly. Once these results have been achieved, the EU has set 2030 targets for energy. 2030 targets; reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 40%, the share of renewable energy sources in total is at least 27% and energy consumption is reduced by at least 27%.<sup>111</sup> The European Commission advocates the joint action of the member states to achieve these objectives. If the 2030 targets are met; energy consumption on the one hand and a significant reduction in carbon emissions on the other, which is an important feature of the EU energy policy.

In 2015, the European Energy Union declaration, an important concept in terms of the 'security' dimension of EU Energy policy, was published.<sup>112</sup> The purpose of this declaration; The EU's insecure position in the field of energy; The problem was the lack of integration of the European energy market and the cuts in energy imports.<sup>113</sup> The most important objective of the European Energy Union defined as the reduction of excessive natural gas dependence on Russia. As a matter of fact, it is understood by the EU that Russia is not a reliable partner after the 2006 and 2009 Ukrainian crises whose effects will be discussed in more detail. It has been proposed to create regional gas commercial centers with four alternative routes and different gas sources as a solution to possible gas cuts.<sup>114</sup> But, EU's single market, common interests and co-decision-making mechanisms are still not completed in unity.

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<sup>111</sup>European Parliament. European policies on climate and energy towards 2020,2030 and 2050. Last accessed 12.12.2019

[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/631047/IPOL\\_BRI\(2019\)631047\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/631047/IPOL_BRI(2019)631047_EN.pdf)

<sup>112</sup> European Commission, Energy Union. <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/energy-union-0> last accessed: 12.12.2019

<sup>113</sup> Necdet Pamir, 2015, p. 368-370.

<sup>114</sup> World Energy Council,, "World Energy Resources"

<https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/images/imported/2016/10/World-Energy-Resources-Full-report-2016.10.03.pdf>

### 2.2.2. Background of Russia-EU Relations

No significant relationship was observed between European countries and Russia between 1947 and 1980 under the name of European Community at that time. There are two main reasons for this. First; It is that the EC does not want to recognize COMECON as an international organization and the USSR does not see the EC as the economic pillar of the Western alliance. With the 8th and last leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, a new era and relations began between the USSR and the West side.<sup>115</sup> Gorbachev started to implement “perestroika” which means the reconstruction of USSR’s economy including political and economic reforms. In addition, with these reforms, relations with countries with geographical proximity and countries that will generate income for the economy have been increased.

Although Europe is part of the capitalist West; it has begun to be seen as an important strategic partner of the USSR, as it is the most important door to opening up to Western European markets and the only source of technical cooperation necessary for the success of the reform process in USSR’s domestic policy. With the idea of the 'Common European Home', which was announced by Gorbachev in 1985, the relations between European countries and Russia started, although not official. Instead of behaving as an aggressive policy towards other countries, the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev explained its willingness to cooperate and cooperation policy to improve the Russian economy its foreign foreign policy.<sup>116</sup>

The common European House was expressed by Gorbachev with the following words:

“We assign an overriding significance to the European course of our foreign policy.... We are resolutely against the division of the continent into military blocs facing each other, against the accumulation of military arsenals in Europe, against everything that is the source of the threat of war. In the spirit of the new thinking we introduced the idea of the "all-European house"... [which] signifies, above all, the acknowledgment of a certain integral whole, although the states in question belong to different social systems and are members of opposing military-political blocs standing against each

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<sup>115</sup> Marina Lazareva, “The European Union and Russia: History of the Relationship and Cooperation Prospects” p.37.

<sup>116</sup> Milan Svec “The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later”, Foreign Affairs,1988, last accessed: 11.10.2019 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/czech-republic/1988-06-01/prague-spring-20-years-later>

other. This term includes both current problems and real possibilities for their solution...<sup>117</sup>»

With these words of Gorbachev, the EC gradually began to take part in Russian foreign policy and in 1989 the legal recognition between the USSR and EC was established with Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the European Economic Community.<sup>118</sup> The 'Trade and Cooperation Agreement' signed between the bilaterals and provisions to facilitate trade between included. The 'Trade and Cooperation Agreement' signed between the bilaterals and provisions to facilitate trade between the bilaterals were included. With this agreement, the general framework of Russia-EC relations was determined and consensus was reached on how to regulate the political, economic and cultural relations between the two. In addition, respect for democratic elements and human rights between the two (no matter how much this article is not applied at the moment) is emphasized in this agreement. Some articles of the agreement include articles for the purpose of providing some basic conveniences between the bilateral commercial agreements.

After the Cold War period, many events occurred that would affect both the USSR and the EC. After the collapse of the USSR, the member countries of the EC started to implement policies on how to shape their relations with Russia. On the other hand, the EC became the Union on 1 November 1993 with the disintegration of the USSR and the Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the Treaty of the European Union, to become a stronger and single voice on the post-war European side. With the Maastricht Agreement, issues such as EU common foreign security policy, restructuring in the institutions of the Union, cooperation and harmonization in social policies, economic and monetary union, energy, environment, cooperation in health and industry were discussed.<sup>119</sup> Following these developments in 1992, the EU wanted to continue its relations with Russia, which did not declare to be a member but could be a good geopolitical partner. While the EU aims to be both a political and economic partner with Russia, it has foreseen to increase both the number of members of the Union in post-Cold War

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<sup>117</sup> Dutch Culture “The Russians and the Dutch: the history of relations between the Netherlands and Russia, 1600-1917” <https://dutchculture.nl/nl/russians-and-dutch-history-relations-between-netherlands-and-russia-1600-1917> last accessed 21.12.2019.

<sup>118</sup> Marina Lazareva, p.40.

<sup>119</sup> Ekrem Akçay, Çiğdem Argun and Elvettin Akman, “AB’nin Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Ortak Dış Güvenlik Politikası”, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Vizyoner Dergisi, 2011, " p.123.

Europe and to prevent new divisions on the European continent that may occur with the enlargement of NATO.<sup>120</sup>

For the EU, Russia has two important dimensions in which became a new Union at that time, trying to adapt its economy and seeking cooperation. The first is that after the collapse of the USSR, a country like Russia exists and this situation has a large geography with important energy reserves that will threaten the Union in the future. The other is the awareness that the Union is still insufficient among the energy resources and the need to prepare partnership agreements with Russia. There are also developing countries in the EU that need investment. Russia was a good investor for Western countries, both for its overpopulation and for future investments. But as it is now, at the time, the West regarded Russia as a cooperating partner, while also taking into account some threats. Therefore, apart from the need to act in line with the international conjuncture, short-term problems and long-term hopes have created the EU's need to develop a strategy for Russia.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1998, was officially signed in 1994 after 2 years of negotiations under the name of the Association and Cooperation Agreement considering that it was between the EC and the USSR of that period, and that it needed to be revised due to the events that followed. Approval of the Agreement was suspended due to Russia's Chechnya problem and the Political Dialogue in the agreement. Until 1997, a Temporary Trade Agreement was signed between the Union and Russia. One of the most important articles of this agreement is that the EU tries to see Russia as a strategic partner rather than encouraging Russia for membership. Political Dialogue was the setbacks of all the member states mentioned and the Russian parliament having to ratify the agreement. However, the continuation of the partnership relationship is subject to the fulfillment of the obligations of the Agreement. This is a direct reference source for the observation of human rights and democracy in Russia. Legal obligations have been created to establish political and economic cooperation between PCA and Russia and EU member states. The continuity of the agreement is bound by the condition of the parties' respect for democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the market economy<sup>121</sup>. Also, one of the most important aspects of the agreement is the institutionalization of the relationship between the two. The long-term aim of the agreement is to establish a free trade zone between the parties. In addition, Russia is

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<sup>120</sup> Congressional Research Service “The European Union: Questions and Answers”, 2019, p.8-9.

<sup>121</sup> Eur-Lex “Access to EU law” [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:21997A1128\(01\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:21997A1128(01))



aimed to become a member of the WTO in the long term. The Agreement also ratifies regional cooperation with the former countries of the USSR to ensure stability and prosperity in the region. In the long term, the main contribution of the Agreement in integrating the Russian economy into a wider European economic area is the provision to harmonize legislation to remove non-tariff barriers in trade. <sup>122</sup>

It can be seen that among EU member states, they tend to improve their relations with neighboring countries. The country that could be regarded as geographically important was Russia in the late 1999. Prior to this, during the Yugoslavia crisis in 1996, it was observed that the EU could not pursue a Common Foreign Policy. <sup>123</sup> After the steps towards the Common Foreign Policy were accepted as the new foreign policy instrument in the Amsterdam Treaty (1992), the first strategy was prepared for Russia. <sup>124</sup> The EU is aware that it is necessary to strengthen cooperation with Russia in all areas of European security. In addition, another important reason for the preparation of the First Common Foreign Policy for Russia is the desire of a developing country like Germany to maintain good and safe relations with its eastern neighbors. The Strategic Partnership, which started between Russia and the EU after the early 1990s, has turned into Strategic Depression in the early 2000s<sup>125</sup>. In 2000, Russia announced its strategy for the EU. Events after 2000 will be described in the next section.

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<sup>122</sup> By M. Webber *Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation?* p.76.

<sup>123</sup> Harun Arkan, "The European Union Policy towards the Balkan States in the Post-Cold War Era", *SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Social Sciences, Special Issue on Balkans*, p.16-20.

<sup>124</sup> Hiski Haukkala, "The Role of Solidarity and Coherence in EU's Russia Policy", *Vol 59, No. 2, the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood: Peace and Justice*, 2006, p.50.

<sup>125</sup> Neziha Musaoğlu and Uğur Özgöker, "Rusya-AB İlişkilerinde Stratejik Ortaklıktan Stratejik Depresyona", p.82.



## CHAPTER III A NEW TREND IN RUSSIA-EU NATURAL GAS RELATIONS

### 3.1. Natural Gas Trade Between Russia and EU

Geographically, Russia is the EU's most important neighbor in the east before assessing the relationship between Russia and the EU. Apart from the energy relationship between the EU and Russia, there are many institutionalized, educational, cultural and political relations and collaborations. Russia has mentioned European Security in its European Security Strategy, and after the fall of the USSR, Russia has started to take significant steps towards close relations with the EU.<sup>126</sup>

Russia aimed to establish a new order within the country and to keep its economy alive by using its foreign policy effectively as mentioned in the section of historical background of Russia-EU section. The 'restructuring' included in the agenda is valid for the natural gas policies. The EU spent the natural gas market with liberalization efforts and published the First Gas Directive in 1998.<sup>127</sup> During this period, Russia's interests and prospects for pipelines, including the EU, focused on the Energy Charter Agreement and the Transit Protocol. Gazprom began to focus more on EU-side developments until the publication of the 'Second Gas Directive' by the EU.<sup>128</sup> Gazprom accused the Union of suggesting that the EU's initiative to liberalize gas markets is a process that threatens EU energy supply security in the final analysis. Russia's concerns about the liberalization process were further exacerbated in 2005 when more than 100 companies applied to the tender for the expansion of the Trans Austria Line.<sup>129</sup> The disputes between Russia and the EU concerning natural gas transportation began after the release of the EU 3rd Energy Package in 2009 and reached its highest level in the 2010s. The 'Third Gas Directive' issued by the EU contained Regulation 715 regulating natural gas relations.<sup>130</sup> With this arrangement, it included new issues for all stakeholder groups of the natural gas market. The most important of these was the separation of gas supply and transportation services from the new national but especially EU legislation on cross-border trade. According to this, the European gas transportation

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<sup>126</sup> Esta Hatipoğlu, "EU-Russia: Partnership and Cooperation", *Cilt 5, Sayı 1-2*, 1997, p. 190-194.

<sup>127</sup> Nadine Haase, "European Gas Market Liberalisation: Are regulatory regimes moving towards convergence?", *The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*, 2008, p. 57-60.

<sup>128</sup> Briefing. EU Legislation in Progress. Common rules for gas pipelines enterint the EU internal markets.

<sup>129</sup> Extending Russia. Competing from Advantageous Ground.

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614673/EPRS\\_BRI\(2018\)614673\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614673/EPRS_BRI(2018)614673_EN.pdf)

Last accessed: 18.10.2019

<sup>130</sup> Hancher L. and Marhold A. (2019) A common EU framework regulating import pipelines for gas? Exploring the Commission's proposal to amend the 2009 Gas Directive, p.289-303.

system had to be transferred from a certain inter-point system at the borders of previous countries to a new system, defined as input / output, where capacity allocation would be made and different and virtual entry and exit zones would be established. The delivery of natural gas would take place at the Virtual Trade Point or hub at these virtual trade points where connections were established. This new system has created a problem for Gazprom, which is the largest exporter of gas to Europe. This is because there is an excess volume of Russian gas, which must be communicated to European consumers and whose conditions are set by long-term contracts. At the same time, the Russian natural gas, which has to be transmitted, has to cross the borders of the country, which many Gazprom would not want, both on the north-south and east-west axis. This is problematic for Russia because about a quarter of the Russian natural gas exported to the EU passes through the territory of many countries and more than 50 billion cubic meters per year passes through at least 3 countries.<sup>131</sup>

From Gazprom's point of view, another problem caused by the new implementations introduced within the scope of the EU 3rd Energy Package stems from the fact that this company is planning new and high capacity pipeline projects for the EU market. The long-term natural gas contracts signed by the EU are based on gas supply carrying capacity.<sup>132</sup> With the new system, Gazprom has to negotiate and make agreements with 2 different companies in order to separate the transportation and sales services from the companies controlling the gas supply and owning the transmission lines. In terms of Gazprom, there was a mismatch between the contractual periods. If the transport contract expires in less time than the gas supply contract, Gazprom may have problems in fulfilling this obligation, as its' carrying capacity may remain inadequate while maintaining its obligation to supply the gas. In summary; As the most important problems arising from the new system for Gazprom; loss of existing capacity in the previous system, the possibility of not getting new capacity and increased transportation costs.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Naumenko, Dmytro "Russian Gas Transit Through Ukraine After Nord Stream 2 Scenario Analysis", 2018, p.11-18.  
<https://www.kas.de/documents/270026/0/Russian+gas+transit+through+Ukraine+after+NS2.+Scenario+Analysis.pdf> last accessed: 28.10.2019.

<sup>132</sup> IEA "Global Gas Security Review 2019. <https://webstore.iea.org/global-gas-security-review-2019> last accessed 12.05.2019.

<sup>133</sup> The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2019) <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Russia-Ukraine-gas-transit-talks-risks-for-all-sides-Insight-60.pdf> p. 2-16.last accessed: 28.11.2019.

The EU has some alternative projects to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas.<sup>134</sup> These projects can be summarized as follows. First of all, renewing the natural gas infrastructure and legislation in a way to facilitate the gas flow between the member states, increasing the potential of new gas production within the EU, turning to different gas import sources and managing the demand side by reducing the gas demand as much as possible.<sup>135</sup> The policy of reducing dependence on Russian natural gas, which is part of the EU's continuous objectives, is not seen as highly applicable in the short term. Because, as the International Energy Agency has stated, the instability and civil war tension in the Middle East and Africa, where alternative source countries are located, do not make these options sustainable, and their dependence on Russian natural gas will not be possible unless there is an effective alternative.

EU Energy relations are a complex structure with quite different dynamics. The authority in the energy relations in the EU is shared between the European Commission and the member states. In 2011, with the EU's Energy Policy and the<sup>136</sup> Cooperation with Cross-Border Partners policy, the Commission's strategy was delegated to the Commission to negotiate energy security agreements that would come into force between the member states and third states. It was undoubtedly that the natural gas flow was stopped in 2006, which envisaged different policies in this direction. With this development, the EU has started initiatives to ensure that its energy requires a common solution.

Although efforts to establish a mutually beneficial relationship bring advantages, as of 2005, the EU and Russia have visibly disagreed on key energy issues. The size of Russia's power available from energy sources is considerable. As mentioned earlier, Russia has extensive energy resources and is largest the producer and exporter of natural gas. Russia has 9 export pipelines. The ownership of several pipelines connecting Russia to the Caspian, the Baltic region and Europe is presented in detail in the graph below:

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<sup>134</sup> The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2014) Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics. p. 9-25. <https://oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NG-92.pdf> last accessed: 08.09.2019.

<sup>135</sup> European Commission (2017) Energy Union: Commission takes steps to extend common EU gas rules to import pipelines. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_17\\_4401](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_4401) last accessed: 25.09.2019.

<sup>136</sup> European Commission (2015) Energy Union Package. A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. p. 12-21.

**Table 2: Gas Export Pipelines to Europe**

Central and Western Europe	Turkey	Caucasus
Yamal Europe 1	Blue Stream	North Caucasus and Magomed
Northern Lights	West Line	North Caucasus and Magomed
Soyuz		
Brotherhood		
Nord Stream		
Route-->Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic Sea	Route--> Turkey	Route--> Caucasus

Source:Necdet Pamir, 2017, p.158.

The economic dimension of Russia's energy involves serious monopoly problems on the European side. It is argued that Gazprom, a state-owned company, continues to operate as 'agents affecting government's gas policy'.<sup>137</sup> It is believed that Russia uses its reserves and natural gas agreements as a means of pressure and that Russian energy policy serves political purposes. The elements of power in the nature of Europe's energy is much more dispersed, and it is impossible for Russian beings to compete together.<sup>138</sup> This indicates the asymmetric connection between the two sides. The EU does not have self-sufficient reserves and, unless there is an alternative, it is the most important objective to secure the natural gas that will reach them smoothly and uninterruptedly from the external reserves.

<sup>137</sup> Atlantic Council "Russia gas pipeline sanctions legislation (PEES Act): A way ahead", 2019, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-gas-pipeline-sanctions-legislation-pees-act-a-way-ahead/> last accessed: 26.11.2019.


<sup>138</sup> Finon, D. and Locatelli C, 2007, p. 7-15.

90% of Russia's natural gas exports are to Europe, and about half of the natural gas exported to Europe takes place via pipelines over Ukraine. Russian gas passing through Ukraine; It is transported to Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and South East Europe<sup>139</sup>. North Stream is transported to Europe, which is an important for region Russia. Europe, the largest supplier of Russian natural gas, has intensively sought diversification of resources. The crisis of Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 has in fact been a stimulus for natural gas security for EU member states. With the Crimean crisis in 2014, this situation reached its highest level. In the short term, it is not possible for the EU to supply its large volume needs from the countries it considers as an alternative (Africa, Norway gas) in a short time. The economic dimension as well as the geopolitical dimension should be taken into consideration in a procurement.

**3.1.1. Importance and Function of Countries Affected By Pipelines**

It is necessary to explain the geography of the road of the pipelines about its transportation process. Russia transports natural gas through pipelines and because of its geographical location, the pipeline option is the easiest way for Russia. Very few attempts have been made to ensure that the Russian-owned pipelines, which cross transit countries other than Russia, will become joint owners.

**Map 4: Transit Routes of Russian Gas**



Source: S&P Global Platts

Source: Data Journalism Agency TEXTY (Kyiv, Ukraine)<sup>140</sup>

<sup>139</sup> Pierre Noël “Nord Stream II and Europe’s Strategic Autonomy, Survival”, 2019., 61:6, p. 90.

<sup>140</sup> <https://ukraineoffice.blogactiv.eu/2018/09/10/commercial-makeup-of-geopolitical-projects-how-russia-builds-infrastructure-to-re-route-transit-of-natural-gas-via-ukraine/> last accessed 06.09.2019.

Among these natural gas pipelines, the current that draws attention with the subject of the thesis is North Stream. The Northern Stream is of strategic importance for Russia because it does not pass through Ukraine. North Stream has a feature that contributes to the subject of the thesis. This project, which is both in the general energy agenda of the European Commission and among the 20-20-20 strategies, aims to reduce the dependency on Russian natural gas, while this project will increase Europe's dependence on natural gas and is supported by Germany in the first place. The 15% of the Nord Stream is owned by a German company called Wintershall<sup>141</sup>. Despite its sensitivity on energy supply security and its efforts on alternative energy sources, and even proposing not to exceed 30% in energy resources imports from a non-EU country, it was observed that Germany behaved the opposite. This is due to the fact that the EU still cannot set Common Strategies as a community and Germany sees itself superior to other countries. The table below summarizes Russia's natural gas pipelines, transit countries and destination routes in detail.

**Table 3: Russian Gas Routes to Europe**

Name of the Pipeline	Destination Country/Countries	Additional Notes
Brotherhood (Bratstvo,Urengoy,Pomary,Uzhgorod)	Ukraine, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Austria,Italy,Hungary,Slovenia, Croatia	The longest gas transmission pipeline in Russia.
Yamal-European Pipeline	To Germany via Belarus and Poland	
Northern Lights	Urengoy -> Vuktyl-Ukhta-Grtaovets-Torzok-Smolensk -> Belarus -> Minsk	Also Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania
Soyuz Pipeline	Ukraine-->Central and Northern Europe	
Trans Balkan West Pipeline	Moldova, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria -> Turkey	Disabled when Turkish Stream occurs

<sup>141</sup> Nord Stream, Secure gas supply for Europe, <https://www.nord-stream.com/about-us/our-shareholders/> last accessed. 06.09.2019.

Blue Stream	Turkey	
Nord Stream	Germany and Western European countries under the Baltic Sea	

Source: Necdet Pamir. 2017. p. 298.

### 3.1.2. The Case of Ukraine

Ukraine is the most important transit country for the transport of Russian natural gas to Europe. The first country in the example and the transition country is Ukraine. Although Ukraine has some gas and oil reserves, Ukraine is extremely dependent on Russia for these two energy resources. This position, on the other hand, causes domestic policy to be influenced both by Russia and the West. The Russia-Ukraine gas shortage crises was a clear example of how Russia effectively uses its natural gas as an energy weapon<sup>142</sup>.

The US has also been very open to the issue, and US Senator John McCain made a speech at Independence Square, which became the center of the demonstrations in Kiev, saying that ‘‘Ukraine's future is in Europe’’.<sup>143</sup> Following this speech, anti-government street movements in Ukraine accelerated and the first phase of the clashes resulted in Yanukovich's leaving the country. Prior to these developments, according to the agreement between Gazprom and Ukraine, Russia agreed to reduce the price of gas sold to Ukraine by 30%. Ukraine, in turn, promised to extend the lease agreement of Russia's Black Sea Fleet based in Sevastopol.<sup>144</sup> The tension between Ukraine and Russia began when Crimea decided to connect to Russia by referendum. While the US and the EU decided to impose an embargo on Russia, NATO was involved in this process. In response, Russia announced to Ukraine that given up his previously promised natural gas discount. Immediately afterwards, the price of natural gas sold to Ukraine increased twice in two days. After the decision of unilaterally connecting the Crimean Autonomous Republic of Ukraine and the city of Sevastopol with

<sup>142</sup> Nazar Kholod, ‘‘Improving Ukraine's Energy Security: the Role of Energy Efficiency’’, 2018, P.16.

<sup>143</sup> Andrew Gardner, Politico, <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines-future-lies-with-europe/> last accessed. 24.08.2019

<sup>144</sup> Par Philippe Conde and Vasco Martins, ‘‘Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol beyond 2017’’, 2010, <https://www.diploweb.com/Russia-s-Black-Sea-fleet-in.html> last accessed 12.12.2019.



special status to Russia unilaterally, Russia decided to abolish the natural gas discount agreement and increased the price of the natural gas it gave to the Kiev administration.

From the example of Ukraine, it seems that Russia uses natural gas prices not only as an economic weapon but also as an effective foreign policy power. Shale gas production is a source that will affect the world natural gas markets and other alternative energy source markets<sup>145</sup>. However, shale gas production is a thought-provoking and contradictory resource especially for EU member states. The exploration and production process of Shale gas is of considerable size to the environment. This process is very costly and is harmful to the environment unless the necessary controls are taken in the production process. LNG demand has also gained importance for Russia. Russia meets the EU's demand for natural gas at a rate of 48%, including LNG<sup>146</sup>. Assuming that currently alternative natural gas pipelines are not more active, Russia carries 60 percent of its natural gas through natural gas pipelines over Ukraine. With the new pipelines, Russia wants to reduce its dependence on Ukraine.<sup>147</sup> In order to avoid losing the EU, Russia's largest natural gas customer, it includes proposals and solutions including transit risks to Europe, diversification of routes, the construction of new pipelines bypassing high-risk transition countries, and the development of the LNG market, has released a strategy<sup>148</sup>.

Russia's Energy Strategy until 2030 contains the objectives mentioned above<sup>149</sup>. In fact, Russia had made clear its intention to bypass Ukraine completely by 2019-2020<sup>150</sup>. But still cruel actions of Russia like the Ukraine gas crisis and Crimean annexation and other actions that is so aggressive, has occurred a threat in security and enhanced EU regarding the natural gas imports received by Russia. On the other side, Russia still want to annihilate the risks caused by transit countries, and mainly the risks bear from Ukraine. Thereby, Russia aims to abandon gas transit from Ukraine completely until 2021 and by this Russia seeks to export more natural gas to EU via its future planned pipelines like Turkish Stream. Also, it should be noted that, neoclassical realist approach as the main of this theoretical framework, supports that the meaning and the importance of Gazprom is widely accepted as it is a very

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<sup>145</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Today in Energy" last accessed: 14.09.2019 <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27512>.

<sup>146</sup> BP Strategic Report (2014) p.20.

<sup>147</sup> Finon, D. and Locatelli C., 2017, p. 24-32.

<sup>148</sup> Piotr Kosowski Katarzyna Kosowska, "The geopolitics of Gazprom's pipelines", 2016, p.132.

<sup>149</sup> Kosowski, Piotr & Kosowska, Katarzyna. (2016). The geopolitics of Gazprom's pipelines. p. 757-766.

<sup>150</sup> Euractiv About: 2015 European Year for Development. <https://www.euractiv.com/topics/2015-european-year-for-development/> last accessed. 12.11.2019.



effective and also effective in policy making for the Russian foreign policy and foreign energy decisions but more about natural gas. The Ukraine-Russia crisis, the embargoes applied to Russia or the oil prices not developing as expected, cause concerns in EU energy management. Moreover, in the crisis period, which affected the supply security of EU countries negatively in the other crisis in 2009, the need for modernization of the existing natural gas infrastructure on the one hand and the insufficient measures to be developed increase the concerns.

### 3.1.3. The Case of Turkey

With the Turkish Stream Russia is trying to exclude the routes which is making its natural gas exports to Europe and Turkey, away from countries where political problems, and aims to increase and diversify the available volumes on the new routes. For this purpose, an agreement was signed between Gazprom and BOTAS in 2014 and the Turkish Stream was completed in 2020. With this project, Russia will end its dependence on Ukraine, which is a transit country, and will provide more gas to the central and southern regions of Russia and accelerate industrial development and export natural gas to Europe. The route of the Turkish Stream project is as follows.

**Figure 10: South Stream and Turkish Stream**



Source: Vestnik Kavkaza, <http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/Hungary-joins-Turkish-Stream-pipeline.html> last accessed 08.12.2019.

The clashes between Russia and Ukraine, the referendum held in the Crimean Autonomous Republic, and the majority of the people's side on behalf of unification with Russia, and the subsequent tensions, the EU and the US embargo on Russia may be listed as the main reasons for the Turkish Stream Project.. However, the Russian authorities in general stated that, the dependence between Russia and the EU, Russia's gas income from the West can continue for at least a year without gas, but Europe cannot last more than a month without imports of gas from Russia, which also an example of the asymmetric interdependence. The asymmetric interdependence between Russia and the EU will be explained in detail in the next section.

#### **3.1.4. The Cases and The Asymmetrical Interdependence between Russia and EU**

It is not easy for two different parties which are governed by very different political systems, to pursue a common policy in an area where different interests such as energy. Russia tried to solve the problems that emerged after the fall of the USSR in 1990. For Russia, where restructuring policy is the most important, it is undoubtedly the energy sector. In those years, the EU took steps to liberalize its natural gas policy. In this thesis, the factors that shape political cooperation processes under asymmetrical interdependence conditions are explained by the neoclassical realism theory.

Interdependence, in its simplest definition, means a costly form of relationship for the parties to fail or terminate.<sup>151</sup> As Demiryol pointed out, the costs in question can be assessed in a framework that includes social, economic and political problems caused by the loss of the value produced by economic relations, and by cuts in the supply of strategic goods such as oil and natural gas<sup>152</sup> Unlike the approaches in the literature, the fact highlighted by this study is the EU, which is subject to more damage than the asymmetric interdependence relationship, although Russia and the EU have obtained absolute benefits from the natural gas trade. The main element of the asymmetrical relationship observed between Russia and the EU is energy imports.

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<sup>151</sup> Waheeda Rana, "Theory of Complex Interdependence: A Comparative Analysis of Realist and Neoliberal Thoughts", Islamabad & Assistant Professor at International Islamic University Islamabad, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2015, p.291.

<sup>152</sup> Tolga Demiryol, "Türkiye-Rusya İlişkilerinde Enerjinin Rolü: Asimetrik Karşılıklı Bağımlılık ve Sınırları", Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences, p. 1439.

In order to talk about reciprocity in an interdependency, the cost of the relationship must be equal or at least balanced for the parties. The primary factor that determines cost is whether there are any alternatives that the parties can put into use in case the trade is interrupted. It can be argued that the actor with limited alternatives (the EU mentioned in this thesis) is in a “more dependent” position and thus a disadvantage. The relative highness of the cost will be an obstacle in the bargaining for the dependent party and can be used as pressure in political relations. In case the natural gas coming from Russia is cut due to a technical failure or a political crisis, the EU does not seem to be able to supply this amount from alternative sources in the short term. The amount of gas that can be supplied to countries such as the Middle East, which is planned by the EU, is not yet at an alternative level to Russia. On the other hand, although the European market is important for Gazprom, Russia's vulnerability is much less if the economic relations with the EU are disrupted. In addition to the European market, whose natural gas demand has increased again in recent years, various Asian markets, especially China, are part of Gazprom's demand diversification strategy. In summary, Russia is also advantageous compared to the EU in terms of the economic impact of possible disruptions in gas trade, meaning that the asymmetry between the two is economically obvious. European imports are very important for Russia and Russian imports are important for the European Union. At the same time, Russia is an extremely important actor compared to other alternatives for Europe. As Necdet Pamir says, there is definitely a interdependence between the two. An example that can be given to the phenomenon of securitization from the field of energy is the transformation of the EU's perception of energy import dependency in the last decade. The changing threat perception after the 2006 Ukrainian crisis highlighted the security risks brought about by the asymmetrical structure of the Russian-EU relations.<sup>153</sup>

It is obvious that the natural gas mentioned in Russia's energy foreign policy is used by Russia as an effective economic and political weapon. All of Russia's income from natural gas and all activities related to natural gas is the most significant items of Russia's integration with global trade and the planned natural gas pipeline projects in the future. With the partnerships Russia has with other countries, the Russian economy is intertwined with the global system. Natural gas exports and gas projects have made it a strategic method to increase its political influence, especially in countries that dependent on Russian gas. Russia,

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<sup>153</sup> Tolga Demiryol, p. 1438.

by keeping the natural gas prices low depending on the situation, initially makes the countries that buy natural gas from it extremely dependent on itself, but it cuts gas supply for technical or other reasons in conditions where the political environment does not develop in its favor. In spite of all these, it is a fact that there is a developing and continuing trade relationship between Russia and the EU. However, since the two sides are not equally dependent on each other, the relationship between Russia and the EU is considered ‘asymmetric interdependency’. In an asymmetric interdependence, the security threat size of one side is quite high and has costly effects for both sides. Also, in the definition of asymmetrical interdependence from Keohane and Nye “asymmetries in interdependence are more likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another”<sup>154</sup>.


It is necessary to examine the costly effects of trade relations between Russia and the EU and the consequences of trade relations to each other. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed between Russia and the EU in 1997 was a very important agreement in terms of trade and investment relations between two parties<sup>155</sup>. After 2009, Russia and EU trade volume increased considerably. This is because with the participation of Russia in the World Trade Organization in 2012, the intense interdependence between Russia and the EU and the increase in competitiveness have led to increased political relations. Negotiations between the two gained momentum with Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2012, and thus intensified interdependence and political relations between Russia and the EU. Economic and political asymmetry can be clearly seen in the difference of the normative values of the parties. Simply, there are two parties with different populations and geographic sizes. There is also an imbalance between the parties as a political power. Accordingly, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy failure to implement prevents him from being an international political actor. Russia is still strong in international politics, albeit economically weak.

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<sup>154</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr “Power and Interdependence”, 2008, p.148-156.

<sup>155</sup> European Commission, Countries and regions <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/>

**Figure 11: EU Import/Export Balance**



Source: Michalis Mathioulakis, “Asymmetrical interdependence and competition between EU and Russia”, MA International Studies Major in Strategic Studies and International Policy, 2014, p.2.

The trade balance between the two is in favor of Russia's trade with the EU is very important for Russia's economy. It is also possible to say that the EU is an important trading partner for Russia. When the partnership rates among them are ranked, Russia is the EU's third most important trading partner among other EU trade partners. From the Russian side, the EU is Russia's most important trading partner, which ranks 1st in the ranking. The fact that the commercial partnership between the two is in different ranks can be seen by the fact that their shares in the trade volumes follow different proportions. While trade with Russia represents less than 10% of the total volume of trade for the EU, for Russia the trade with EU holds more than 40% of the total volume of Russian trade value thus making Russia extremely sensitive to its trading relations with EU and to the political relations that might affect them. When the total economic volume figures between Russia and the EU are evaluated, it is also observed that asymmetric effect of between emerges.

It shows that it is an asymmetrical interdependence between Russia and EU in all sense that Russia's economic stability is extremely tune into the volume of trade that it maintains with the EU. On the other side EU is pretty much dependent on Russian energy, initially natural gas and oil. Both trading partners seek ways to overcome the limitations arising from this dependency. Russia works methodically in establishing bilateral relations with various EU member states to gain bargaining power in trade relations between Brussels and Europe developed a detailed plan to diversify the energy framework and reduce its

dependence on Russian energy sources.<sup>156</sup> A slowdown has started in the nuclear sector in world politics. Factors such as the decline in the nuclear sector, the decline in gas production in Europe and the fact that some new sectors create gas demand are the factors that have a positive effect on Russian natural gas in the European market. While such a decline has been experienced by Europe, Russia turns it into an advantage, asymmetry between the two is observed in almost every field. Russia wants to make the EU dependent on itself, but the EU is already dependent on Russia is an asymmetric interdependency.<sup>157</sup>



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<sup>156</sup> Michalis Mathioulakis, “Asymmetrical interdependence and competition between EU and Russia”, 2014, p. 3-12.

<sup>157</sup> Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, “A power Audit of EU-Russian Relations”, Policy Paper, European Council on Foreign Relations 2007, p.157.

## CONCLUSION

In explaining the complex interdependency natural gas relationship of Russia and EU, the main driving force in the natural gas diploma is explained. This thesis claims that the political and security dimensions of relations surpasses over economic aspects which are effects of cross-border gas pipeline decisions. This thesis argues that in order to analyses the natural gas relationship between Russia and EU, it is necessary to understand neoclassical realism theory because this theory is the best describes the diplomacy and relationship between them. Neoclassical realism, which is the chosen theory, has been adequately reconciled and the proper application of the substances envisaged by observed.

Neoclassical realism shows that state power has become a function of state-leading institutions and ideologies, thus shaping the state's foreign policy. The best example of such an institution in understanding the diplomacy of Russia's gas relations with other parties is apparently Gazprom. The arguments support that Gazprom is for certain gives direction to the Russian foreign policy especially in the natural gas related relations. Furthermore, neoclassical realism argues that states can be in cooperation and in competition at the same time which supports this thesis' argument of asymmetric interdependency where Russia and EU see each other as a security threat but in the same time that are economic partners. This situation is clearly observed in the bilateral relationship between Russia and the EU, the two actors of the thesis. Russia-EU is more likely to use alternative ways to decrease its over dependence on Russian gas. But on the one hand, it has been observed that shares are purchased from the pipeline projects, as seen in the Cooperation Agreements and even in the case of Germany. Another important issue is that the EU excludes energy issues from these sanctions when it comes to sanctions against Russia. On the other hand, in Russia, it keeps natural gas separate from other energy sources in its pricing policy. Russia uses impact-response analysis in a very professional way in foreign policy and even shapes its projects in this direction. For example; After the political crises with Russia, Russia realized the Turkish Stream Project and lost the status of Ukraine's transit country. A good example for this is that Russia indeed do not want to detract from the West because when it comes to the issue of modernization of gas pipelines, Russia needs export revenues from the EU.



Russia shapes the abundance of energy reserves, production capacity and the advantages of storage capacity in every sense in its favor. In domestic politics like other states Russia give importance to economic and environmental concerns but when the cross-border natural gas pipelines matter, the security and political dimensions of the issue are more important. Russia still has important power over these two because of increasing energy resources and income especially from natural gas. This example shows that, as Necdet Pamir states, a country rich in energy resources is also a strong country in its foreign policy.

The natural gas relationship between Russia and the EU has a wide range of complexity and intensity. Such an intense relationship in the international system results in a structure and complexity involving multiple actors. According to this thesis, there is an asymmetric interdependence in the relationship between Russia and the EU. One of the main reasons for this asymmetric dependence is that the two sides are different in every sense and that Russia uses natural gas as a "natural gas weapon". Russia's economic power is very sensitive to its trade volume with the EU and is also highly dependent on Russia's natural gas and oil imports in the EU. Although they are bilateral business partners, they cannot maintain a common interest policy and aim to avoid this asymmetric interdependence. While Russia is trying to make bilateral agreements with EU member states, the EU is looking for various methods to reduce its dependence on energy policies. Russia can maintain its economy for at least 1 year without export revenues from the European customers, but the EU has no alternative to survive without Russian natural gas for more than 1 month, and this imbalance between the two creates an asymmetric interdependence. Consequently, the relations between Russia and the EU is asymmetrical and there can be talk of strategic alliance rather than strategic partnership between the two.

In an interview with Necdet Pamir, an expert in the field of energy, both energy sector and Russia-EU natural gas relations were evaluated. In contrast to my thesis arguments, Necdet Pamir mentioned that the energy relations between EU and Russia is not only dependent in natural gas. Another important energy resource that should be take into consideration is coal. This is because the EU is a serious foreign-dependent community, both in oil and natural gas, and in general, often in distracted coal. According to Pamir, the EU has long been trying to reduce its natural gas dependence on Russia. But this is not realistic. Because the economic development of many states, especially in Germany, is quite integrated with the export of natural gas from Russia. It is possible to talk about the interdependence



between the EU and Russia. In terms of Russia, the EU is the most important export market in Russia. Russia is trying to diversify its natural gas market and diversify its resource alternative. At the same time, Russia has started to make investments in LNG export. When the dependence between the two is graded, an asymmetric-interdependence can be mentioned. The most important gas supplier in Europe is Russia. Both prices are very reasonable and have a reserve to meet the EU's natural gas demand in terms of production capacity. Russia can shape its pricing policy in its favor. However, the EU is unable to diversify its natural gas exports. Alternatives include eastern Mediterranean gas, African gas or LNG, but in the current situation, no gas has reserves, capacity or storage to rival Russia. Pamir argues that there is a strong relationship between the State administration and the managers of Gazprom. According to the decision of the European Parliament, this rate should not exceed 30% when the EU imports energy from any foreign country. However, this rate is above 30% per year. It is the storage capacity of the importing country in a factor that can change the fragility of countries in natural gas consumption and imports.

Natural gas storage rates of countries are different from each other. Countries with little storage capacity are more vulnerable to pressure from Russia. For countries that lack storage capacity in the EU, Russia uses the 'natural gas weapon' as a means of pressure. The Ukrainian crisis is the clearest example of this. While Russia sanctioned its conflict with Ukraine, it did not consider the consequences of the interruption of EU members. With North Stream 1 and 2, some member states have expressed discomfort, but in terms of asymmetry, Russia's hand is strong in many ways. Russia can shape natural gas prices in favor of both reserves and production capacity. In other words, it has the power to turn the situations against it in its favor and this clearly shows the asymmetry in the use of force between the EU and Russia.

It is clear that the EU has weakness on Russian natural gas. Laying natural gas pipelines or finding an alternative energy source to natural gas is a costly and long-term goal. In the above interview, despite the thoughts that the EU may reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas with the LNG option, this thesis considers this option too costly and the EU economies are not ready for this situation. For example; the production of natural gas or LNG from the US is very costly. Even though the EU wants to impose sanctions on its uncomfortable issues, Russia is able to suppress these sanctions with alternative pipelines. According to Pamir, if the EU can replace natural gas consumption with alternative renewable

energy sources, it can reduce its need for natural gas. However, the current situation does not indicate that the EU's policy of reducing natural gas imports to Russia is feasible.

Russia will continue to be a major player in EU natural gas exports in the long term. Neither natural gas to be supplied from Africa nor LNG or Eastern Mediterranean natural gas to be supplied from America is in a position to rival Russian gas. It is true that Russia needs export revenues for the modernization of natural gas pipelines to the EU, but investments between Russia's current natural gas pipelines and the rather than export revenues for this modernization process the investments will bring more revenue. In conclusion, it can be said that the neoclassical realism theory is the most appropriate theory that explains this thesis on the basis of natural gas diplomacy in between Russia and Eu. Consequently, there is a disagreement between Russia and the EU, especially in relation between natural gas relationship, but the policies implemented by the two sides to each other need to pursue cooperation and common benefit policies in the short term. EU and the natural gas relationship between them can best described in asymmetrical interdependency. The EU should maintain its relations with Russia in a more real political manner and in line with its own interests. Unless the EU finds a radical alternative, it will remain highly dependent on Russia in its relations with Russia and especially in terms of natural gas. This master thesis has also shown that EU and Russia find themselves in a state of asymmetrical interdependence where Russia's economic potential is extremely sensitive to the volume of trade that it maintains with the EU, and the EU is highly dependent on Russian energy sources. The main conclusion of the study is that energy-based asymmetry between Russia and the EU indicates a hierarchical relationship between the two actors and is a factor that fosters competitive dynamics in the long run.

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## APPENDIX

### Interviews

Interview 1: with Necdet Pamir.

#### *Brief Story About Necdet Pamir*

Ahmet Necdet Pamir was born in 1954 in Ankara. He graduated from METU Petroleum Engineering in 1980. He has many Turkish and English articles and books. Written and visual broadcasting organizations both at home and abroad frequently use and publish their information on the energy policies of Pamir. Since Pamir has valuable information in the field of energy, it is believed that his valuable knowledge in the field of energy will give a good perspective on the conclusion of the thesis.

Bengü: What do you think about the Russian-European Union natural gas trade?

Necdet Pamir: Now, first of all, the EU is a serious foreign-dependent community, both in oil and natural gas, and often in coal, which we often miss our attention. Each EU member state is dependent on different proportions. Russia is the most important actor. In general, it is dependent on Russia at the level of 30% in the import of petroleum and crude oil products. Most natural gas is dependent on 39-40%. 39% depend on coal. In general, everyone is focused on oil and natural gas, but coal is also an important dependency. The important thing is; Determination of the current situation. For a long time the EU has been trying to reduce their dependence on Russia as a community policy for many years, as many countries as individual bits of paper remain on paper but the reason is; many countries, especially Germany and their economies are highly integrated with Russia in general and in the energy field, where we can talk about interdependence or overlapping interests. Germany, Italy's relations with Russia are not as negative as other big and small countries, and even reverse integration is possible. The whole EU is committed to reducing dependence on natural gas, in particular, after the deep crisis of Gazprom with Ukraine in 2005, there were certain cuts. The EU's need for Gazprom has dropped to some extent, but has increased significantly in recent

years, and in 2018 Gazprom's exports to the EU exceeded 200 billion cubic meters. In terms of Russia, the EU is the most important export market. He's trying to diversify it with China. After long negotiations. Power of Siberia. The source is trying to diversify. It is generally exported via pipelines but has also started to invest in LNG exports. In other words, Russia is a very important actor for the EU, but it will continue to be an important actor in the coming period. Having very rich reserves. Today, Iran and Russia are always in front of the proven reserves in the first place. According to the latest BP statistical review of world energy 2019, it was released in June. Russia is still the first. In the last 2 years, Iran was in the first place. North Stream 1, -North Stream 2 pipelines (1 is already working) has realized more than 300 billion cubic meters of gas exports. A capacity of 55 billion cubic meters per year. Line 2 is activated. Despite objections, Line 2 is near completion. In Turkey stream for which there via Turkey.

The most important gas supplier in Europe is Russia. The prices are very reasonable because production costs are quite low. In natural gas, the gas it sells for \$ 65 per 1000 cubic meters of gas in the domestic market (the costs below it, though many countries are suspected to suppress social upheavals or discontent like Iran) give it to the domestic markets at a fairly low cost but Gazprom gives to the domestic market for \$ 65 in 2018 but for example Germany It's \$ 175. (October 2019 price) So it sells almost three times the price. The costs are very reasonable. At the point of diversification, Can there be Eastern Mediterranean gas? Which is continuously repeated. Neither the African gas nor the liquefied gas from the US LNG nor the Eastern Mediterranean gas is in a position to rival Russian gas in terms of different reasons, some cost and some expected investments. Therefore, the EU's relations with Russia are a bit more rational in terms of keeping relations with Russia properly unless we can find a more radical alternative in the interests of real politics, wisely. This is expected to increase in the years ahead. European market for Russia on both sides European market is very important. At the same time, Russia is very important for Europe when we consider other alternatives. There is definitely a mutual dependency. The theory of neoclassical realism Looking at the dynamics of the international system and the dynamics of the future, it is necessary to make a decision by balancing the two by looking at the demands of their society on the dynamics of national power on the other. But here, as a subheading, it is necessary to say that more leaders are decisive.



In this respect, when the Russian side is taken into account, excluding the taxes on the income side of the Russian budget, i.e. on the profit side, only the oil and natural gas revenues constitute 36%, 40% more than 1/3, so another subheading should be mentioned here. The largest manufacturer Gazprom. Apart from this, there are gas producers in Russia, but when we look at it, almost half of the gas produced by Gazprom goes to the domestic market and half to exports. Exports mainly go to European countries and the European Union.

Therefore, the average price of 2018 65 dollars (1000 cubic meters) inside the domestic market you sell 175 dollars out gives. Almost 2.5 times. Actually, he's trying to balance both sides. In order to maintain its power, it is almost 1 in 3 that it gives to the domestic market from outside without increasing these figures. He's giving it out too high. If it gives \$ 120 to the domestic market, it may be much better to strengthen its domestic economy in order to strengthen its budget, but this situation may deteriorate the internal balance if considered in terms of maintaining its power. This may cause unrest. This is usually the case of subsidizing already. There is a situation like this; When you keep the natural gas, oil, and so the costs low, you increase the chances of competing in the international market for many industrial products that you get from them.

In other words, there are a lot of events that the International Trade Organization opposes. but the United States is doing the same. In the US, production costs are very low, sales prices in the market are low, so many products that are produced in oil in natural gas, in other words, how many products are created from oil. Glasses frame, fertilizer, fertilizer, materials used from computers. Oil and natural gas are used as input in many products. Petroleum derivatives are used in aspirin etc. As an input to all of this, you sell it in Russia at a very low price of \$ 65, which also provides a serious advantage in the export of industrial products. Such a balance economy exists. It is said to balance both. Again, as a subheading in accordance with this theory, I would say that the leaders have the St.Petersbug school from the intelligence organizations of Medvelev and Putin rather than the role of the state. They have their own people in the management of these big companies. Miller, for example, on top of Gazprom, Putin's team. In a certain time, they do not break apart. In other words, the state administration and the managers of oil and gas companies are mostly formed as 1-1 networks. Therefore, their decisions are important. The current state system does not allow this in Russia because they use the money as an alternative to power, when 36% of the income

comes from oil and natural gas. Therefore their top managers are composed of their own men and their decisions are also effective in government administration. There is such a balance.

B: Does Russia use natural gas as a means of pressure on the EU?

Even though the EU is composed of 28 member states, there are examples such as Germany which act completely independently and keep their interests separate from those of the EU. In Russia, it is necessary to make a realistic assessment of whether the power is sufficient or not. He can install this pressure, for example, in Poland'. He is not a member of the EU, but he can establish it in Moldova. It could be Armenia. Although the others are asymmetrical, there is still a mutual interdependence. There are certain risks for TR because you are troubled in creating alternatives and the dependency rates are much higher. The EU is the European Parliament's recommendation that its dependence on natural gas should not exceed 30% in the case of any energy imports. Lu moment 40%. He wants to take it down. But TR is dependent on 52% as of last year in its reduced form. Gazprom is important in these figures in export figures. TR can be considered as a European country. When we look at it, we are much more dependent on Europe. When we try to diversify, we cannot find the balance with neither Iran nor Azerbaijan. On the other hand, TR is a NATO member. Your weapons, etc., are connected to the US, but on the other hand 52 natural gas 32 oil 39 coal 100 nuclear you are also dependent on Russia. You are trying to balance foreign policy, but this is a weakness. It is a fragility, but when it comes to the German economy, Germany does not have an easily bendable structure by Russia. The German economy is strong here, it is necessary to talk about a more mutual balance. There is a serious dependence on the countries integrated into the former Soviet geography when the EU is considered as a community. There is a work done with the consent of the heart. Mutual looking at the event. It buys natural gas without interruption with much more reasonable price.

Russia has a superiority over other alternatives; There is an expression in oil 'swing producer' he is Saudi Arabia. Looking at the markets, Saudi Arabia is the most important actor who can activate much more oil production without making a new investment in a very short period of time. Therefore, it is an actor in decreasing the oil price by increasing the supply or increasing the oil price by reducing it. In Russia, more than 100 billion cubic meters of natural gas production, which can be put into operation in a very short time if necessary, so an actor with high export potential has the potential to easily repel other actors that can create

an alternative to itself. In terms of their small states, we can speak of such a thing. Apart from the EU, the pressures on countries like Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine are more severe. For the EU, a more rational balance-based policy is mentioned. Some EU countries, for example, Greece, are 100% dependent. Voluntary Orthodox addiction can be talked about through different relations with Greek Cypriots. Base chase in the Mediterranean. Both air and naval bases chase. I cannot speak of using a force to bend their arms there too, but it is undeniable that Russia's Gazprom is a power policy in particular.

The natural gas agreements between the two are long-term agreements. 25-year contracts. Go to international arbitration Cannot be arbitrarily done. Not all countries are in the same position. Countries have storage facilities. One of the biggest deficiencies of TR is its natural gas storage capacity. However, this situation can be used indirectly (technical breakdown, winter conditions, etc.). Then we need to look at individual countries. Countries that do not have storage capacity are more fragile and can easily use it as a means of pressure for countries that lack it in the EU. He did not think of other EU countries to punish Ukraine. North Stream 1 55 miles. Not enough EU Stream 2 some EU members can say that Poland, Denmark feeling uncomfortable but in terms of asymmetry Russia is stronger in many sense. Both reserves, production capacity and lower prices if necessary. For example, in oil, Saudi Arabia, in order to squeeze Iran, why would the US and the Saudis reduce Iran's revenues so that Russia's revenues could fall? Who would be bad for gas prices in Ukraine and the Crimea? Iran, Russia, Venezuela. Saudi's biggest enemy is Iran. More production was made to lower prices. Prices fell down. Economies fell down. There's a limit to that. The IMF warned the Saudis. So you can go bankrupt. Russia and the Saudis came together to agree on the lower limits of prices. These situations should be considered country specific. Russia's hand became much stronger for the EU. Each has its own weaknesses. You can't push the button and lay the pipeline. You say it's coming from the US, but it costs a lot. LNG you say something that costs more than the pipeline you are producing natural gas from the point of production to the LNG plant to a pipeline to LNG plant need to convert natural gas to liquefied gas will be reduced to 600 times on the basis of a chilling process diro you need to regasify where you take it, so you need to re-convert to gas, which basically brings 25% more cost to the pipeline than power, which means both time and cost compared to Russian gas. A radical change that will not be easy from today to tomorrow. In this sense, it is possible to talk about asymmetric interdependence. Russia is superior in many respects.

B: Is it possible for the EU to impose sanctions against Russia?

As long as there is interdependence, there is mutual pleasure. Particularly in the big countries of the economy like Germany have integrated the economy. Looking at the more general picture, Germany is more uncomfortable than the US, not Russia. So Europe has a serious reaction to the US against the Trump administration. In terms of approaching from one side to the other, Russia is viewed more warmly, especially when it is considered on the basis of effective countries for the EU.

B: There is a sanction in the report on Russia. How did the embargoes against Russia, Gazprom affect?

Most of them won't get anywhere in the final analysis. Things to soften up after a place. Gazprom manufactures and supplies Ukrainian pipelines as well as transmission / transportation. He has shares in the pipelines. It receives distribution commission in the country it is exported. In order to prevent this, the EU issued a package in 2015. Gazprom is trying to break this monopoly, but the individual countries do not follow Gazprom, despite the EU's restrictive decisions. So this is an example of NS 2. For a long time the countries, especially Poland, tried to resist, but when you look at the other countries, Germany is going over it, etc. In the final analysis, Russia is able to direct these demands according to its own interests, and this advantage will increase its exports in the future.

B: Can the EU reduce its dependence on natural gas?

There are some positive options for those who can reduce it. EU general energy policy. Renewable resources as much as possible. What is the share of resources in energy consumption in the energy mix; such as oil, coal as much. There are projects to increase the share of renewables as much as possible in this energy mix, but to increase energy efficiency and lower energy density, which is just as important. It has the purpose of reducing demand. In the coming years of the EU, the population is increasing, and energy consumption is increasing. However, this is not the case in countries that use energy efficiently in saturated economies. On the contrary, as the population does not increase much, it is expected that energy demand and natural gas demand will decrease.

## Original Document of Interview 1

Bengü: RUSYA –AB Doğal gaz ticareti hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

Necdet Pamir: Şimdi her şeyden önce AB hem petrolde hem doğal gazda genelde de çoğunlukla dikkatimizden kaçan kömürde de ciddi oranda dışa bağımlı bir topluluktur.

Her bir AB'ye üye olan ülkeler farklı oranlarda bağımlıdır. Rusya en önemli aktördür. Genel hatları ile bakıldığında petrol ve ham petrol ve petrol ürünleri ithalatında %30'lar seviyesinde Rusya'ya bağımlıdır. En fazla doğal gaz %39-40 arasında bağımlıdır. Kömürde %39 oranında bağımlıdır. Genelde herkes petrol ve doğalgaza odaklıdır fakat kömür de önemli bir bağımlılıktır. Önemli olan;

Mevcut durumun tespiti. Uzunca bir süredir AB bir topluluk politikası olarak tek tek bir çok ülke Polonya gibi uzunca yıllardır Rusya'ya bağımlılıklarını azaltmaya çalışıyorlar kağıt üzerinde kalıyor ama nedeni; çünkü birçok ülke başta Almanya olmak üzere ekonomileri hem genelde hem enerji alanında Rusya ile hayli entegredir burada karşılıklı bağımlılıktan söz edebiliriz ya da örtüşen menfaatlerden bahsedebiliriz. Almanya, İtalya'nın Rusya ile ilişkileri diğer irili ufaklı ülkeler kadar olumsuz değil hatta tersine bir entegrasyondan söz etmek mümkündür. Bütün AB'ne özellikle doğal gazda bağımlılığı azaltmaya çalışan, Özellikle Gazprom'un 2005'teki Ukrayna ile yaşanan derin krizden sonra belli kesintiler oldu. AB'nin Gazprom'a ihtiyacı bir nebze düştü fakat son yıllarda gene önemli miktarda arttı ve 2018 yılında Gazprom'un AB'ne olan ihracatı 200 milyar metreküpü geçti. Rusya açısından AB en önemli ihraç piyasası. Bunu Çin ile çeşitlendirmeye çalışıyor uzun müzakerelerden sonra. Power of Sayberia boru hattı gündemde. Kaynak çeşitlendirmeye çalışıyor. Genelde boru hatları ile ihraç ediliyor ama LNG ihracatı konusunda da yatırımlar yapmaya başladı. Yani Rusya çok önemli bir aktör halen AB için ama onun yanısıra önümüzdeki dönemde de önemli bir aktör olmaya devam edecektir. Bunun temel nedenlerinden biri;

Çok zengin rezervlere sahip olması. Bugün sürekli İranla Rusya 1.lik konusunda ispatlanmış rezervler hep birbiri önüne geçmektedir. En son BP Statistical review of world energy 2019 verilerine göre Haziran da yayınlandı. Rusya yine 1.liği sürdürmektedir. Son 2 sene İran 1.

Sıradaydı daha önemlisi her ne kadar Rusya'ya Amerikan ambargosu varsada Rusya Avrupa ile ilişkileri nedeniyle, coğrafi yakınlık nedeniyle, döşenmiş bir çok boru hattının yanı sıra; North Stream 1, -North Stream 2 boru hatları ile (North Stream1 çalışıyor zaten) 300 milyar metreküpten fazla gaz ihracatı gerçekleştirmiştir. Yılda 55 milyar metreküp taşıyabilecek bir kapasite. 2. Hattı devreye giriyor birtakım itirazlara rağmen 2. Hattı tamamlanmak üzere. Türkiye üzerinden olan Türk akımında var.

Bunlara bakıldığında Avrupa'nın en önemli gaz tedarikçisi Rusya'dır. Fiyatlarda çok makuldur çünkü üretim maliyetleri oldukça düşüktür. Doğal gazda 1000 metreküp gaza iç piyasasında 65 dolardan sattığı gazı (maliyetler bunun altında gerçi birçok ülkede İran gibi sosyal ayaklanmaları veya hoşnutsuzlukları bastırmak için süsbansiyon vardır) oldukça maliyetinde oldukça altında fiyatlarla iç piyasalara verirler ama 65 dolara 2018 yılında iç piyasaya veriyor Gazprom ama buna karşılık örneğin Almanya'ya 175 dolardan veriyor. (Ekim 2019 fiyatı) Dolayısıyla neredeyse 3 katı fiyatına satmaktadır. Maliyetler çok makul. Çeşitlendirme noktasında ise sürekli olarak tekrarlan 'Doğu Akdeniz gazı olabilir mi?' Zaten Cezayir başta olmak üzere Afrika'dan da ithalat yapmaktadır. Ne Afrika gazı, ne Amerika'dan gelen sıvılaştırılmış gaz LNG ne Doğu Akdeniz gazı farklı farklı nedenlerle kimi maliyet kimi miktar beklenen yatırımlar açısından Rus gazına rakip olacak konumda değildir. Dolayısıyla bu AB'nin Rusya ile ilişkileri biraz daha reel politik daha akıllıca kendi menfaatleri doğrultusunda, tam da radikal bir alternatif bulamadıkça Rusya ile ilişkileri düzgün tutma noktasında akılcı bir yöntemdir. Önümüzdeki yıllarda bunun artması beklenmektedir.

Her iki tarafta Rusya açısından Avrupa piyasası Avrupa Birliği piyasası çok önemli. Aynı zamanda Avrupa açısından da diğer alternatifleri göz önüne aldığımızda Rusya son derece önemlidir. Karşılıklı bir bağımlılık kesinlikle söz konusudur.

B. Neo-klasik realizm teoriyi güçlendirecek örnekler ?

Neo-klasik realizm teorisi Uluslararası sistemin mevcut dinamikleri ve gelecekteki dinamiklerine bakarak öteki taraftan ulusal güç dinamikleri beklentilere kendi toplumunun taleplerine bakarak ikisini dengeleyerek bir karar vermek gerekir, öyle açıklanabilir. Fakat burda bir de alt başlık olarak daha çok liderlerin belirleyici olduğundan söz edilebilir. Böyle

bakıldığında Rusya tarafı ele alındığında Rusya'nın bütçesinin gelir tarafında vergileri dışarda tutarak yani kar tarafına bakıldığında sadece petrol ve doğal gaz gelirleri %36'sını, %40'ını 3'te 1'inden fazlasını oluşturmaktadır dolayısıyla burada bir alt başlık daha inilmelidir. En büyük üretici Gazprom. Bunun dışında Rusya'da gaz üretenler de mevcuttur ama bakıldığında özellikle Gazprom'un ürettiği gazın neredeyse yarısı iç piyasaya yarısı ise ihracata gitmektedir. İhracat da ağırlıklı olarak Avrupa ülkelerine ve Avrupa Birliği'ne gitmektedir. Dolayısıyla 2018 ortalama rakamları 65 dolarını (1000 metreküpünü) içerde iç piyasaya satıyorsun 175 dolarını dışarıya veriyorsun. Bir taraftan iktidarını sağlamak için o rakamları çok yukarıya çekmeden iç piyasaya dışarıya verdiği için 3 te 1 i fiyatına veriyor. İç piyasasına 65 dolardan değilde 120 dolardan verse kendi ekonomisini toparlama ekonomisini güçlendirme daha iyi bir yere gelebilir ama bu da bir taraftan iç dengeleri bozabilir iktidarı koruma açısından huzursuzlukları sübvans etme açısından. Neredeyse 2.5 katı. Aslında iki tarafıda dengelemeye çalışıyor. İktidarını sürdürmek için o rakamları çok yükseltmeden iç piyasaya dışarıdan verdiği için neredeyse 3 te 1 i. Dışarıya çok yüksekten veriyor. İç piyasaya 120 dolardan verse kendi iç ekonomisini bütçesini düzeltmek güçlenmek adına çok daha iyi bir konuma gelebilir fakat bu durum iktidarlığını korumak açısından düşünülürse iç dengeyi bozabilir. Bu durum huzursuzluk çıkabilir. Genelde zaten sübvans etme olayı budur. Birde şöyle bir durum vardır; doğal gazı, petrolü yani girdileri maliyetleri düşük tuttuğun zaman bunlardan elde ettiğin bir çok sanayi ürününü de uluslararası piyasada rekabet şansını arttırıyorsun bir de bu durum var. Yani Uluslararası Ticaret Örgütü'nün karşı çıktığı bir sürü olay var zorlamalar var vs. fakat benzer şeyi ABD de yapıyor. ABD'de üretim maliyetleri hayli düşük, piyasadaki satış fiyatları düşük dolayısıyla petrolde doğal gazda ürettiği bir çok ürün yani petrolden ne kadar çok ürün yaratılmaktadır. Gözlük çerçevesi, fertilizer, gübre, bilgisayarlardan kullanılan malzemeler. Petrol ve doğal gaz bir çok üründe girdi olarak kullanılmaktadır. Petrol türevleri aspirinde vs kullanılmaktadır. Bütün bunlara girdi olarak çok düşük fiyatta 65 dolardan Rusya içerisinde satıyorsun ve bu durum sanayi mamüllerinin ihracatında da çok ciddi bir avantaj sağlamaktadır. Böyle bir denge ekonomisi mevcuttur. Her ikisini dengelediğinden söz edilmektedir. Gene bu teoriye uygun olarak bir alt başlık olarak liderlerin rolleri. şunu söyleyebilirim liderlerin devletin rolünden ziyade Medvelev ile Putin bir istihbarat örgütlerinden gelen St.Petersbug ekolu var. Bir taraftan bu büyük şirketlerin yönetiminde kendi adamları da var. Miller mesela Gazprom'un tepesinde, Putin'in ekibi. Belli bir zaman içerisinde bunlar birbirinden kopmuyolar. Yani devlet yönetimi ile petrol ve doğal gaz şirketlerinin yöneticileri çoğunlukla 1-1 network olarak oluşturuluyor. Dolayısıyla bunların kararları önemli oluyor. %36'sı gelirlerin petrol ve doğal gaz oluşturuyor derken işin



tabiatı bu ama bir de bu petrol ve doğal gaz şirketlerinin başında mevcut yöneticilere alternatif birileri çıktığı zaman bunlar o parayı iktidar alternatifi olarak kullandıkları için mevcut devlet sistemi Rusya'da buna izin vermiyor dolayısıyla bunların tepe yöneticileri kendi adamlarından oluşuyor bunların kararları devlet yönetiminde de etkili oluyor. Böyle bir denge var.

B: Rusya doğal gazı AB üzerinde bir baskı aracı olarak kullanıyor mu?

AB dediğin 28 üye devletten oluşsa da bunun içerisinde tamamen bağımsız hareket eden, kendi çıkarlarını AB çıkarlarından ayrı tutan Almanya gibi örnekler vardır. Rusya'nında gücü yeter mi yetmez mi noktasında gerçekçi bir değerlendirme yapmak gerekir. Bu baskıyı kurabilir mesela Polonya'ya kurabilir. AB üyesi değil ama Moldova'ya kurabilir. Ermenistan olabilir. Ötekiler asimetrik de olsa genede bir karşılıklı bağımlılık olduğundan söz edebiliriz. TR için belli riskler var çünkü alternatif yaratmada sıkıntılısın ve bağımlılık oranları çok daha yüksektir.

AB doğal gazda Rusya'ya bağımlılığını herhangi yabancı ülkeye bir enerji ithalatı söz konusu olduğunda bağımlılığın %30'dan daha fazla olmaması gerektiği konusunda Avrupa Parlamentosu tavsiye kararıdır. Şu an %40 bağımlı. Bunu aşağıya çekmek istemektedir. Ama TR azaltılmış haliyle geçen yıl itibarıyla %52 oranında bağımlıdır. Gazprom ihracat rakamlarında bu oranlarda önemlidir. TR de aslında Avrupa ülkesi gibi değerlendirilebilir. Bakıldığında Avrupa genelinden çok daha fazla bağımlıyız. Çeşitlendirmeye çalışıldığında ne İran'dan gelen ne de Azerbeycan'dan gelen alternatiflerle ile dengeyi yakalayamıyoruz. Bi tarafta TR NATO üyesi. Silahların, savunma sanayin vs ABD'ye bağlı ama öbür taraftan %52 doğal gaz %32 petrol ve petrol ürünlerinde %39 kömür %100 nükleer de Rusya'ya bağımlısın. Dış politikada denge oluşturmaya çalışıyorsun fakat bu durum bir zaaf. Bir kırılma ama Almanya ekonomisine bakıldığında Almanya'nın Rusya tarafından kolayca kolu bükülenebilir bir yapısı yok. Almanya ekonomisi güçlü burada daha karşılıklı bir dengeden söz etmek gerekir. AB topluluk olarak bakıldığında eski Sovyet coğrafyasından entegre olan ülkelere bakıldığında burada ciddi bir bağımlılıklar vardır tek tek ülkelere bakılırsa onlarda kırılma ve Rusya'nın etkisinden söz edilebilir fakat doğal gazı silah olarak kullanabilme kapasitesi açısından Almanya üstünde böyle bir şey yok. Karşılıklı gönül rızası ile yapılan bir iş var. Karşılıklı bakılıyor olaya. Kendi çıkarına bakıyor. Çok daha makul fiyat ile doğal gazı kesintisiz alıyor.



Rusya'nın diğer alternatiflere göre bir üstünlüğü de şudur; petrolde bir deyim vardır 'swing producer' diye bu Suudi Arabistandır. Piyasalarda bakıldığı zaman çok kısa bir sürede yeni bir yatırım yapmadan çok daha fazla petrol üretimini devreye sokabilecek en önemli aktör Suudi Arabistandır. Dolayısıyla arzı artırarak petrol fiyatını düşürme veya kısarak petrol fiyatını yükseltme noktasında bir aktördür. Rusya'da 100 milyar metreküpten daha fazla gerektiğinde çok kısa bir sürede devreye sokabilecek doğal gaz üretimi olan dolayısıyla ihraç potansiyeli yüksek olan bir aktör çok rahatlıkla kendine alternatif oluşturabilecek diğer aktörleri püskürtebilecek potansiyele sahiptir. Ufak devletleri açısından böyle bir şeyden söz edebiliriz. AB dışında Ermenistan, Moldova, Ukrayna gibi ülkelere baskıları çok daha şiddetlidir. AB için daha akla dayalı dengeye dayalı bir politikadan söz edilmektedir. Bazı AB ülkeleri örneğin Yunanistan %100 oranında bağımlıdır. Gönüllü Ortodoks bağımlılığı Rumlarla bambaşka ilişkiler üzerinden bahsedilebilir. Akdeniz'de Rusya'nın deniz üsleri kovalaması. Hem hava hem deniz üsleri kovalaması. Orada da çok da onların kolunu bükecek bir güç kullandığından bahsedemem ama Rusya'nın Gazprom'u özellikle bir güç politikası olduğu da yadsınamaz.

İkili arasındaki doğal gaz anlaşmaları uzun erimli anlaşmardır. 25 yıllık kontratlardır. Uluslararası tahkime gidersen, keyfi bir şekilde yapılamaz. Her ülke aynı konumda değildir. Ülkelerin depolama olanakları vardır; olmalıdır. TR'nin en büyük eksikliklerinden bir tanesi de doğal gaz depo kapasitesi var. Fakat bu durumu dolaylı yoldan (teknik arıza diyebilir, kış koşulları vs. İran'da yapıyor TR'ye) kullanabilir. O zaman zaafa uğrarsın O zaman tek tek ülkeler bazında bakmak lazım. Storage capacity'si olmayan ülkeler daha kırılığandır ve AB içerisinde bu durumdan yoksun ülkeler için rahatlıkla baskı aracı olarak kullanılmaktadır. Ukrayna'yı cezalandırmak için diğer AB ülkelerini düşünmemiştir.

North Stream 1 55 milyar metreküp. Yetmedi North Stream 2 bazı AB üyeleri Polonya, Danimarka rahatsızlık duydu fakat asimetriklik anlamında Rusya'nın elinin birçok anlamda daha güçlü olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Hem rezervleri, hem üretim kapasitesi hem de gerektiğinde fiyatları aşağıya doğru çekebilme. Bana ne kadar zarar verecek sana ne kadar zarar verecek meselesi .Örneğin petrolde Suudi Arabistan İran'ı sıkıştırmak için ABD ve Suudiler petrol fiyatlarını aşağıya çekebilmek için neden İran'ın gelirleri azalsın Rusya'nın gelirleri neden azalsın? Ukrayna ve Kırım meselesinde doğal gaz fiyatları düşerse kim için kötü olur? İran, Rusya, Venezuela. Suudi'nin en büyük düşmanı İran. Fiyatların aşağıya

düşmesi için daha çok üretim yapıldı. Fiyatlar aşağıya düştü. Ekonomilerde bu aktörlerin aşağıya düştü. Bunun da bir limiti var. IMF Suudileri uyardı.nPetrol fiyatları böyle giderse iflas edebilirsin diye. Rusya ile Suudiler bir araya gelip fiyatların alt limitleri konusunda anlaşdı. Bu durumlar country specific değerlendirilmeli. Rusya'nın elinin AB açısından çok daha güçlü olduğu doğrudur. Hepsinin ayrı ayrı zaafı mevcuttur. Düğmeye basıp boru hattı döşeyemezsin. Amerikadan gelecek diyorsun fakat çok yüksek maliyetleri var. LNG diyorsun boru hattına göre daha fazla maliyeti olan bir şey sen doğal gazı üretiyorsun diyelim ki Nijeryadan gelecek yada Amerikadan gelecek ürettiğin noktadan genelde bu deniz kıyısı olmuyor LNG tesisine kadar bir boru hattına taşıyacaksin. Sıvılaştırılmış gaz tesisi lazım. LNG tesis lazım doğal gazı sıvılaştırılmış gaza çevireceksin 600 kez küçülecek temelinde bir cooling process chilling process diyor soğutma eketi 60 kez hacmi küçültüyorsun ve özel lng tankerleriyle o götürdüğün yerde regasify etmen lazım yani yeniden gaza çevirmen lazım. Temelde %25 boru hattına göre daha fazla maliyet getiriyor, yani Rus gazına göre hem zaman hem de maliyet getiriyor. Bugünden yarına çok kolay olmaz köklü bir değişim. Bu anlamda asimetrik karşılıklı bağımlılıktan söz etmek mümkündür. Bir çok açıdan hangisi daha üstün dersen Rusya daha üstün.

B: AB'nin Rusya'ya karşı bir yaptırımını mümkün müdür?

Karşılıklı bağımlılık olduğu sürece yani karşılıklı bir keyif söz konusu. Özellikle Almanya gibi ekonomisi büyük ülkelerde ekonomi entegre olmuştur. Daha genel resme bakıldığında Almanya Rusya'dan değil ABD'den daha fazla rahatsızdır. Dolayısıyla Avrupa ABD'ne Trump yönetimine karşı ciddi bir tepkisi var. Birinden öbür tarafa yanaşmak anlamında, AB için özellikle etkili ülkeler bazından düşünüldüğünde Rusya'ya daha sıcak bakılıyor. Rusya'ya ile ilgili raporda sanction kısmı var. Rusya'ya, Gazprom'a karşı ambargolar nasıl etkilemiş.Çoğu son tahlilde bir yere varmayacak. Bir yerden sonra yumuşacak şeyler. Gazprom hem üretiyor Ukrayna boru hatları açısından hem transmission/transportation yapıyor. Boru hatlarında da hisse sahibi. İhraç ettiği ülkedende distribution companidende hisse comission alıyor. Bunun önüne geçebilmek için 2015 yılında AB bir paket çıkardı. Bu monopolinin kırılması için karşılıklı bir mahkemelerle uğraşılıyor ama tek tek ülkeler AB'nin kısıtlayıcı kararlarına rağmen Gazprom buna uymuyor. Yani North Strem 2 örneği budur. Uzun süre başta Polonya olmak üzere ülkeler direnmeye çalıştı fakat diğer ülkelere bakıldığında Almanya üstünden gidiyor vs pek önemsenmedi. Son tahlilde Rusya bu isteklerini kendi çıkarlarına göre yönlendirebiliyor ve bu avantajı ihracatı ilerde de artacak.

B: AB Rusya doğal gaz bağımlılığını azaltabilir mi?

Azaltabilmesi yönünde olanlar bazı olumlu seçenekler var. AB genel enerji politikasına bakıldığında mümkün olduğunca yenilenebilir kaynakları energy mix içerisinde enerji tüketiminde kaynakların payı nedir...şu kadar petrol, şu kadar kömür gibi. Bu energy mix içerisinde mümkün olduğu kadar renewables'ın payını artırmak ama en az bunun kadar önemli olan enerji verimliliğini artırıp enerji yoğunluğunu düşürmek yönünde çok başarılı projeleri vardır.20-20-20 projesi 2020 yılında renewablaların payını 20 ye çıkarmak, energy efficiency'ı 20 arttırmak, consumption'ı azaltmak gibi.

Talebi azaltma amacı var. AB'nin önümüzdeki yıllarda, nüfus artıyor, ekonomik büyüme artıyor dolayısıyla enerji tüketimide artıyor. Fakat doymuş ekonomilerde enerjiyi verimli kullanan ülkelerde bu böyle değildir tam da tersine AB'de nüfus da çok artmadığı için enerji talebinde ve doğal gaz talebinde düşüş beklenmektedir. 2040 da mesela. Sistemli gidelim. Elektrik de bir şeyden üretiliyor. Çin enerji tüketiminde %65 oranında kömür kullanmaktadır. Yani çevre açısından elektrikli araçlar Çin için elektriğin ne ile ürettiğine bakılır.

AB nin doğal gaz tüketimi azalıyor. Renewabaların payının artması ve onda da başarılılar, 2020 hedeflerini fazlasıyla tutturdular. Doğal gaza ihtiyaçları azalıyor. Doğal gaz talepleri düşmekle beraber iç üretimde düşüyor. AB ülkelerinin doğal gaz üretimi de düşüyor. Dolayısıyla geneden belli bir miktar ithalat gereksinimi var. Doğal gaz talebi düşüyor demek eksik bir değerlendirme. Süresi biten kontratlar mevcuttur onların yenilenmesi gerekmektedir. Bu bağlamda hangisi alternatif oluşturulabilir? Rus gazı var? Doğu Akdeniz var? Afrika? Katar LNG'si? Amerikan LNG'si? Dünya'da doğal gaz arzında fazlalık var. Son yıllarda doğal gaz fiyatlarında arz fazlalığından aşağıya doğru bir seyir var. Müzakere gücünü artırıyor ama bunların hiçbir tanesi Doğu Akdeniz gazı miktarı sanıldığı kadar fazla değildir. Avrupa'ya boru hattı döşemek için LNG yatırımı için şu anki tespitlere göre feasible gözükmemektedir. Rus gazı ile rekabet etmek kolay değildir. Mısır (Zori Nuhr sahası henüz rezervi rakamsal olarak kanıtlanmadı fakat geniş bir sahası var) önümüzdeki yıllarda yeni bir kaynak olarak Avrupa'yı besleyebilir. Ama Gazprom'un yerini dolduracak bir konumda olamaz. Hem üretim maliyeti çok düşük. Denizden gelen bir şeyin LNG olarak gelmesi çok mümkün değil. North Stream 1 NS 2 altyapıları var. İnsanlar kalkıp sadece Rusya'yı cezalandırmak için kendi ekonomisinden feragat edecek değil. Rusya bu oyunu çok

profosyonelce oynuyor. Ukrayna hariç diğer müşterilerilen olabildiğince güvenli bir aktör olarak algı yaratıyor. En önemli aktörleri arasında bir problem yok. En çok Almanya'ya ihraç etmektedir. Rusya dominant aktör olmaya devam edecek. Hollanda'nın üretiminde belli düşüşler mevcuttur. Onu ikame edecek ne var? Norveç önemli bir ihracatçı AB açısından fakat üretimde azalmalar var. Mevcut keşfedilmiş sahalar doğal olarak rezerv ürettikçe basınç düşüyor ve üretimde düşüyor ve sonunda bunlar terkedilen sahalar haline geliyor. Mevcudun üzerinde daha fazla ihraç edecek kapasitesi olan önümüzdeki yıllarda da devam edecek. Ayrıca Rusya'nın AB'den gelen ihraç gelirlerine boru hatları modernizasyonu için ihtiyacı var. Daha yepyeni 2 tane 55 milyar metreküplü doğal gaz boru hattı döşedi. Ukrayna'yı by-pass etmek istiyor. Çok ciddi bir ihraç hattı olan. Tamamen devre dışına çıkarmak istiyor.

Türkiye'yi Batı hattı dediğimiz Rusya'dan çıktıktan sonra Ukraynadan geçen Romanya-Moldova- Bulgaristan üstünden Trakya boru hattını devre dışı bırakıyor Türk Akımı ile. 16.5 milyar metreküp TR'ye gaz ihraç edecek. Bazı boru hatlarının yenilenmesi için yapacağı yatırım bu yatırımlar yanında devede kulak. Rusya'ya hem petrol hem doğal gazda mevcut infrastrukturaları obselete çok ciddi yatırım lazım gibi yorumlar var fakat fakat Rusya ekonomisi ciddi anlamda toparlandı. Petrol fiyatlarına bağlıdır doğal gaz fiyatları anlaşmaların birçoğunda . Rusya'nın gücü eskisine göre daha iyi önemli bir aktör.

Interview 2: with Ali Arif Aktürk.

Bengü: What are your general opinions about Russian-EU natural gas dependency?

Arif Aktürk: Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, has been supplying European gas since the 1930s. For example, Russia is known to supply gas to several industrial plants in Poland before World War II. This gas supply continued throughout the war. Of course, the most important supplier of Europe has been Russia. Later, Algeria, Norway, and the Netherlands Groningen field became the 4 biggest suppliers of Europe. By the 1980s, before the European Union, the most important gas supplier of Europe in general was the Soviet Union at that time. And it is envisaged that the private sector will be in the hands of the private sector in its services such as gas, electricity and water, which can be regarded as natural monopoly, with the condition of a procedural rule regulated by the state through regulation.

The US story is another story, but the gas law was enacted in England in 1984. British gas was privatized in 1986. Sub-activities of natural gas are distribution, transmission, trade etc. opened to competition. This period was only discussed in England until the late 80s and early 90s. With the 1st Gas Directive in the European Union at the beginning of the 90's, this issue was included in the EU's agenda. Later, with the 2nd Generation Gas Directive, the 3rd Generation Newspaper Directive and the Gas Supply Security Directives, this issue became very controversial in the EU. Until 2008, trade centers in Europe and the USA did not have much weight. There was the UK MBP-powered gas market. TTF very poorly in the Netherlands and Belgium. After the economic crisis in the world and in Europe in 2008, the EU made serious radical changes. Europe, which bought gas from Algeria with long-term contracts before 2008, increased the depth of hubs and commercial hubs after 2008, and a significant portion of whoever sells gas in Europe today is determined by the supply and demand in hubs, including Russian contracts, including long-term contracts. it purchases gas with a price structure where consumer demand is effective. Although Russia reacted to this in the first place, it is now accepted.

While these developments are happening, there is the introduction of 'shale gas' in the world to the world, and there is a gas that comes out with oil in America. If you cannot put this gas on the market, if you cannot commercialize it, it is a big problem for the oil producer. Especially in recent years, since the regulations for the disposal of this atmosphere do not

allow in the USA, gas is also produced from the oil producer and it is necessary to dispose of it in some way. If you can not sell. Indeed, in the US this year, many oil producers in the US put money on the natural gas transmission distribution system to eliminate the gas that comes with oil, which drove Henryhub prices down. Henryhub HH (Natural gas price index in America) Brand oil. The development of the gas and spot LNG market, which has come to Europe with prices, has developed trade centers in Europe.

Currently, gas dependence on Russia is foreseen with the EU supply security directive. As of today, if we divide Europe into three regions; Northern and Northwest Europe, Southern Europe (Italy, France) and Southeast Europe. The dependence of Northwest Europe and South Europe on Russia is less compared to other regions. Newly activated energy terminals. Purchases from Algeria below, Groningen field etc. The degree of dependence on Russia varies. But Romania, Bulgaria and partly Greece are still still physically dependent on Russia. For example, Greece has an LNG terminal to reduce this dependency. About to decide on Greece's 2nd LNG terminal final investment. However, Bulgaria and Romania have problems in this regard. To eliminate this, various scenarios have been pursuing various projects for years to create an alternative to natural gas coming through Ukraine. But emerging TANAP LNG in Greece, with the establishment of a number of enter-connect system in Turkey think that they can reduce its dependence on Russia.

**B: Is Russian gas used as a pressure tool on the EU?**

Yes, Russia was using natural gas as a means of pressure on the EU. However, with the EU supply security directive and the use of the 3rd parties in the gas and the use of the use it or lose it principle in the natural gas distribution and transmission system, the supplier willing to transmit gas to the public from here with open-season optining will not be long-term. The pressure of Russian gas in EU countries decreased after creating the possibilities of transporting gas through tender.

LNG arriving at the procurement point goes to EU diversification with the newly established LNG terminals. Therefore, I think that the possibility of pressure has decreased. On the contrary, I can say that the EU and the European Parliament have started to pressure Russia. Russia has almost started to shape its relations with Brussels in a good way, especially with the use it or loose it principle and decisions prohibiting the allocation of large capacities to be

used with long term contracts. Whether North Stream, North Stream is subject to EU legislation after Germany leaves. The newly developed Turkish stream is also subject to EU legislation when it crosses Bulgaria after the TR borders. Russia is always very willing to use the capacity here, but the EU wants to reduce dependence. The Turkish stream is now in use. The Russians received the capacity in Bulgaria through tender through transparency and they carry some gas up there.

Bengü: Could EU-Russia reduce its gas dependency by 100%?

The EU has already wanted to reduce this dependency over the years, and their chances are in this regard. The world is now transitioning to the LNG period with Liquefied natural gas period with technological developments. Today, LNG projects are treated like spot oil in natural gas.



## Original Document of Interview 2

Bengü: Rus-AB doğal gaz bağımlılığını hakkında genel görüşleriniz nelerdir?

Arif: Rusya eski adıyla Sovyetler Birliği 1930'lardan beri Avrupa gaz arzını sağlamaktadır. Örneğin 2. Dünya Savaşı öncesinde Polonya'daki birkaç sanayi tesisine gaz arzı sağladığı bilinmektedir. Bu gaz arzını savaş boyunca da kesmemiştir. Tabii yıllar itibarıyla Avrupa'nın en önemli tedarikçisi Rusya olmuştur. Daha sonra Cezayir, Norveç bir miktar ve Hollanda Groningen sahası Avrupa'nın temel 4 büyük tedarikçisi olmuştur. 1980'lere gelindiğinde Avrupa Birliği'nin öncesinde genel olarak Avrupa'nın en önemli gaz tedarikçisi o dönemde Sovyetler Birliği idi. Fakat 1980'lerin başında 1970'lerin sonunda Amerika'da Ronald Reagan, İngiltere'de Margaret Thatcher ile başlayan Neo-liberalizm rüzgarlarıyla doğal tekel tanımını değiştirilmiştir. Ve gaz, elektrik, su gibi hizmetlerinde doğal tekel sayılabilecek hizmetlerinde özel sektör ile regülasyon vasıtasıyla devletin regüle ettiği bir usul kural şartıyla özel sektörün elinde olması öngörülmüştür.

ABD hikayesi başka bir hikâye ama İngiltere'de 1984'de gaz kanunu çıktı. 1986'da British gaz özelleştirildi. Doğal gazın alt faaliyetleri dağıtım, iletim, ticareti vs. rekabete açıldı. Bu dönem 80'lerin sonu 90'ların başına kadar sadece İngiltere'de tartışılıyordu. 90'lı yılların başında Avrupa Birliği'nde 1. Gaz Direktifi ile bu rüzgâr AB'nin gündemine girmiştir. Daha sonra 2. Nesil Gaz Direktifi, 3. Nesil Gaz Direktifi ve Gaz Arzı Güvenliği Direktifleriyle AB'nde bu konu çok tartışılır oldu.

2008'lere kadar Avrupa'da ve AB'nde ticaret merkezlerinin ağırlığı çok fazla yoktu. İngiltere MBP ile çalışan gaz piyasası vardı. Çok zayıf bir şekilde Hollanda ve Belçika'da TTF. 2008'de Dünya'da ve Avrupa'da yaşanan ekonomik kriz sonrasında AB çok ciddi radikal değişimler yaptı. 2008 öncesinde uzun vadeli kontaklarla Ruslardan Cezayir'den gaz alan Avrupa 2008'den sonra ticari merkezlerin, hubların derinliğini artırdı ve bugün Avrupa'da kim gaz satarsa satsın önemli bir kısmı uzun vadeli sözleşmelerde dahil, Rus kontratlarında dahil hublarda oluşan arz ve talebe göre belirlenen özellikle tüketicinin talebinin etkin olduğu bir fiyat yapısıyla gaz almaktadır. Rusya buna en başta reaksiyon gösterse de şu anda kabul etmiş durumdadır.



Bu gelişmeler olurken Amerika'da 'shale gazı'nın dünya piyasaya girmesi bir de Amerika'da petrol ile birlikte çıkan gaz mevcuttur. Bu gazı piyasaya süremezseniz, ticarileştiremezseniz petrol üreticisi için büyük sorun oluşturmaktadır. Özellikle son dönemlerde bunun atmosfere atılması regülasyonları ABD'nde izin vermediği için petrol üreticisinden gaz da çıkıyor ve bu gazı bir şekilde bertaraf etmek gereklidir. Satamaz iseniz. Nitekim bu sene ABD'nde birçok petrol üreticisi petrole birlikte çıkan gazı bertaraf etmek için üzerine para vererek doğal gaz iletim dağıtım sistemine soktular ve buda Henryhub fiyatlarını aşağıya çekti. Henryhub HH (Amerikadaki doğal gaz fiyat endeksi) Brand petrolü. fiyatlarıyla Avrupa'ya gelen gaz ve spot LNG piyasasının da gelişmesi Avrupa'daki ticaret merkezlerini geliştirdi.

Şu an için AB arz güvenliği direktifiyle zaten Rusya'ya gaz bağımlılığı öngörülmüştür. Bugün itibarıyla aslında Avrupa'yı üç bölgeye ayırırsak; Kuzey ve Kuzeybatı Avrupa, Güney Avrupa (İtalya, Fransa) ve bir de Güneydoğu Avrupa. Kuzeybatı Avrupa ve Güney Avrupa'nın aslında Rusya'ya bağımlılığı diğer bölgelere kıyasla daha azdır. Yeni devreye giren enerji terminalleri. Aşağıdan Cezayir'den alımlar, Groningen sahası vs. Rusya'ya bağımlılık dereceleri değişkenlik göstermektedir. Fakat Romanya, Bulgaristan ve kısmen Yunanistan Rusya'ya fiziki olarak oldukça bağımlıdır. Bu bağımlılığı azaltmak için mesela Yunanistan'ın LNG terminalı mevcuttur. Yunanistan'ın 2. LNG terminalı nihai yatırımının kararını vermek üzere. Fakat Bulgaristan ve Romanya'nın bu konuda sıkıntıları mevcuttur. Bunu bertaraf etmek için, Ukrayna üzerinden gelen doğal gaza alternatif yaratmak için yıllardır çeşitli senaryolar, çeşitli projelerin peşinde koşmaktadırlar. Ama yeni gelişen TANAP, Yunanistan'daki LNG, Türkiye'deki enter-connecte sisteminin kurulması ile bir miktar Rusya bağımlılığını azaltabileceklerini düşünüyorlar.

B: Rus gazı AB üzerinde bir baskı aracı olarak kullanılıyor mu?

Evet Rusya doğal gazı AB üzerinde bir baskı aracı olarak kullanıyordu. Fakat AB özellikle arz güvenliği direktifi ile ve gazdaki 3. Tarafların erişimi ve doğal gaz dağıtım ve iletim sisteminde use it or lose it prensibini etkin bir şekilde kullanılmasıyla, buradaki kapasitelerin open-season optining ile herkese açık şeffaf buradan gaz iletmek isteyen tedarikçi ihale uzun vadeli olmayacak ihale vasıtasıyla gazın taşıma imkanlarını yarattıktan sonra Rus gazının AB ülkelerindeki baskısı azaldı.

Tedarik noktasında gelen LNG, yeni kurulan LNG terminalleriyle AB çeşitlendirmeye gitmektedir. Dolayısıyla baskı imkanının azaldığını düşünmekteyim. Tam tersi AB ve Avrupa Parlamentosu Rusya'ya baskı yapmaya başladığını söyleyebilirim. Özellikle Use it or loose it prensibi ve büyük kapasitelerin uzun vadeli kontratlarla kullanılmasını tahsis edilmesini yasaklayan kararlarla Rusya neredeyse Brüksel ile ilişkilerini iyi yönde şekillendirmeye başlamıştır. Kuzey Akım olsun, Kuzey Akım Almanya çıktıktan sonraki AB mevzuatına tabi. Yeni geliştirilen Türk akımı keza TR sınırlarından sonra Bulgaristan'a geçtiğinde AB mevzuatına tabi. Rusya buradaki kapasitenin uzun vadeli kullanılmasına her zaman çok istekliler fakat AB bağımlılığı azaltmak istemektedir. Türk akımı şu an devreye girdi. Bulgaristan'daki kapasiteyi Ruslar şeffaflık vasıtasıyla ihale vasıtasıyla aldılar ve oradaki bir miktar gazı yukarıya doğru taşımaktadırlar.

Bengü: AB-Rusya doğal gaz bağımlılığını %100 olarak azaltabilir mi?

AB zaten yıllar itibariyle bu bağımlılığı azaltmak istemektedir ve bu konuda şansları da yaver girmektedir. Dünya artık Teknolojik gelişmeler ile LNG dönemine Sıvılaştırılmış doğal gaz dönemine geçiyor. Bugün gelen LNG projeleri ile doğal gazda spot petrol gibi işlem görüyor. LNG sıvılaştırılmış gazı tankere yüklüyor tanker Afrika'dan Akdeniz'e destinationa bir noktaya giderken ticari olarak satılıyor, yön değiştiriyor ve başka bir pazara gidebiliyor. Bu ileride de daha da yaygınlaşacak ve bence AB'nin Rusya'ya olan doğal gaz bağımlılığı her geçen gün azalacak.

Güneydoğu Avrupa'da Bulgaristan ve Romanya, Sırbistan ise yeni güzergâh bağlantı iletim hatlarıyla fiziki ve teknik olarak doğal gaz bağımlılığını azaltmayı hedeflemektedir. Ve bu konuda çok ciddi çalışmalara başlamışlardır.