

SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF EU'S APPROACH
TO THE CRISIS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

147008

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
THE IZMIR UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS


BY

DRAGOȘ CONSTANTIN MATEESCU

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ART
IN
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES


JUNE 2004

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences




Prof. Dr. Nejat TENKER
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis
for the degree of Master of Science.



Prof. Dr. Haluk GÜNUĞUR
Head of Department


This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our
opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for
the degree of Master of Science.





Prof. Dr. Haluk GÜNUĞUR
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

(Title and Name in alphabetical
order of last name)

of: Dr. Haluk Günüğur 

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gün Öter 

Asst. Prof. Dr. Siret Hünersoy 

.....

.....


ABSTRACT

SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF EU'S APPROACH TO THE CRISIS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

European Studies, Department of International Relations and European Union

Research Coordinator: Prof. Dr. Haluk Günuğur

June 2004, 124 pages



The thesis analyses the claimed post-modernity of the EU's supranational polity. After the understanding of the *political* in the post-modern age is clarified, the thesis presents the involvement of the EC/EU in the Yugoslav conflict as a confrontation of the modern discourse of Balkan nationalism versus the supposedly post-modern, supranational discourse of Western Europe.

The practical consequences of such a confrontation are analysed and this leads to the conclusion that, indeed, the West European polity has not yet entered its post-modern age. The profoundly *modern* nature of concepts along which this polity still defines itself is also demonstrated in connection with the analysis in question.

Keywords:

- supranationalism, post-modern, nationalism, nation-state, common foreign and security policy, territoriality, sovereignty, recognition of new states, political (concept), national liberation, ethnicity, communism.

ÖZET

ESKİ YUGOSLAVYA KRİZİNE AB'İN YAKLAŞIMINDA ULUSLARÜSTÜLÜK

Mateescu, Dragoş Constantin

Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Avrupa Birliği Bölümü

Araştırma Koordinatörü: Prof. Dr. Haluk Günügür

Haziran 2004, 124sayfa

Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği'nin uluslarüstü politik sisteminin post-modern olma iddiasını incelemektedir. Post-modern çağda politikanın anlamının açığa kavuşturulmasından sonra tez, AT/AB'nin Yugoslavya'daki ihtilafa, Batı Avrupa'nın post-modern varsayılan uluslarüstü söylemine ile Balkan modern milliyetçilik söyleminin çakışması bağlamında içiçe geçmesini anlatmaktadır.

Bu tür bir çakışma pratik sonuçlar ortaya çıkarmakta ve bu da bizi başka bir sonuca götürmektedir ki, o da, Batı Avrupa politik sisteminin henüz post-modern çağına girmemiş olduğudur. Bu politik sistemin kendisi tamamen modern olan kavramlarla anlattığı, söz konusu inceleme ile de görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

- uluslarüstülük, post-modern, milliyetçilik, ulus devlet, ortak savunma ve güvenlik politikası, ülkesellik, egemenlik, yeni devletlerin tanınması, politika, ulusal bağımsızlık, etnik kimlik, komünizm.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am particularly grateful to Prof. Dr. Haluk Günüğur and Asst. Prof. Çınar Özen for their guidance and constructively critical insight throughout the research. Thanks also go to the other faculty members, Prof. Dr. Alfred Reisch, Lecturer İtir Ok and Dr. Brian Colbert for their suggestions and comments. The technical assistance of Mehmet Öncü, Hüseyin Oylupınar, and Ozan Arslan was also of real help. I thank my fiancé for her patience and outstanding support throughout the making of this thesis. My parents, who have been encouraged me from thousands of kilometers away deserve a special mention here. Their support has been extremely valuable.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
INTRODUCTION	1-3
I. THE NEW EUROPEAN POLITY BETWEEN MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNITY	4-34
II. THE BALKAN CHALLENGE TO THE POST-MODERN EUROPEAN POLITY	35-62
II. 1. Glimpses of Balkan Modernity	36-49
II. 2. Ethnic Mosaic and the Birth of Post-Communist Nationalism in Yugoslavia	49-58
II. 3. The Modernity of 'National Liberations' in Yugoslavia	58-62
III THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE BALKAN DILEMMA	63-88
III. 1. A Few 'Minor' Mistakes	63-68
III. 2. The Collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	68-71
III. 3. The Recognition of the New States	71-77
III. 4. The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Suggested Consequences of the European Approach	78-88
IV. THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND SUPRANATIONALITY	89-109
IV. 1. The Emergence of a Common Foreign and Security Policy	89-96
IV. 2. The Principles of the CFSP	96-102
IV. 3. A Possible Understanding of the 'Supranational' within the Context of a Foreign Policy in Europe	102-109
CONCLUSION	110-116
BIBLIOGRAPHY	117-124

INTRODUCTION

The debate around the approach of the international community to the conflict ravaging the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s tends nowadays to go in the footnotes of academic literature while the common foreign and defence policy of the European Union (EU) together with Union's future constitution already took over the stage. This thesis represents an approach to the role played by the Western Europe in the Balkan conflict viewed as extremely important for the new context. The analysis of various official positions, declarations, and documents relevant for this purpose, coupled with an approach to fundamental concepts of political theory employed in that context will contribute, I hope, to the clarification of certain aspects of Western Europe's *presence* in its outside in general, and in the outside identifiable as the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in particular. Moreover, it is hoped that the analysis will manage to provide answers for a few questions viewed as crucial for the future of Europe and not only. The first of them is related to the Union's allegedly supranational character and attempts at somehow defining it. Second, the chance for a European common foreign policy to emerge in the supranational spirit is also investigated. Consequently, the final question to be answered here is the following: How would the international relations look with the presence on the international stage of a polity with a marked supranational character? The approach of the Western Europe to the Balkan conflict being the starting point of the entire argument here, this approach places inevitably the debate within the broader context of the modernity – post-modernity dichotomy analysed in the first chapter which suggests that the European Union seems to be, indeed, a polity sketched along the imperatives of post-modernity as opposed to the ones of modernity. The second chapter offers a picture of the nationalism as a Balkan challenge to the very post-modern understanding of political becoming and this is what it tries actually to prove. The third chapter

analyses then the response of the EC/EU to this challenge. In its conclusion the response of the EC/EU to the Yugoslav conflict will be placed under a new perspective resulting from these efforts at practically multiplying the angles under which the issue can be viewed. The fourth chapter, in turn, will sum up the various manifestations of West European supranationality versus Balkan nationalism in the conceptual emergence of Europe's common foreign policy. The principles on which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is founded will thus be placed face to face with the practical expressions of the European 'supranational' identity in its particular Balkan *outside*. The Conclusion of this thesis will offer, I hope, the new perspective under which I try to portray Europe's future on the international scene. The detailed elaboration of the required philosophical approach to the newness of the perspectives proposed here is not the aim of this thesis. Consequently, only a few suggestions regarding this issue can be found in the Conclusion, while much more elaborated work will be done in the near future.

Due to geographical more than political considerations, the following countries are viewed in this work as part of the Balkan region: Bulgaria and Romania, Greece, Albania, and the former republics of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia respectively. Few or no remarks will be made in this chapter regarding current developments in the countries outside the former Yugoslav space and that is only because the conflicts of the 1990s happily did not spread throughout the region. Since the European approach to those conflicts is the object of this analysis, the argument is focused with predilection in that direction. The main premise of the argument developed here is that the nationalist discourse employed in the Yugoslav conflicts in the 1990s and still heard there is the mere manifestation of a prolonged reflex of modernity. In the former Yugoslavia, the unconventional political message of EC/EU and the significance of its making produced almost no echo. And, when the EC finally reacted to the spread of violence in the region, it was apparently so late and in such a misconceived manner that it was not trusted, not supported, not welcomed. It was a reputed historian

like Hobsbawm who was heralding in an extremely optimistic and enthusiastic keynote in the beginning of the 1990s that the post-communist world “will see ‘nation states’ and ‘nations’ or ethnic/linguistic groups primarily as retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by, the new supranational restructuring of the globe.” At the same time, Hobsbawm considered that the very fact “that historians are at least beginning to make some progress in the study and analysis of nations and nationalism suggests that, as so often, the phenomenon is past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism” (Hobsbawm 1990: 182-3). This optimism was soon to be contradicted by the apparently illogical and barbarous developments in the former Yugoslavia: nationalist political action was rapidly gaining momentum right in the beginning of the 1990s and, one more time, scholars of most fields and sides were to be taken by surprise.

The collapse of communism facilitated free way to the public realm for alternative political discourses to crystallise throughout all Europe, especially east and southeast of Berlin. This occasioned in the former Yugoslavia, as it should have been expected, the reverberation of people’s concerns about their present and future. These are effects that have been pictured repeatedly in all academic research on transition. In the case of Yugoslavia, the first free elections in around fifty years in each of the republics making the federation brought the victory of nationalist parties exactly in the year of 1990, when Hobsbawm was manifesting his enthusiasm as mentioned above. Slobodan Milošević’s stance in defence of a Yugoslavia he portrayed as a victim of ethnic terrorism that only Serbs could defeat and only if fully united was followed, in a reflexive response, by the Croatians’ option for Franjo Tudjman’s conservative and nationalist HDZ party. From that moment on, those conflicting ideologies did nothing else but to prepare the grounds for what was to degenerate in physical violations of both law and human security and dignity. This thesis represents only a modest contribution to the general effort made to prevent that from happening again on our continent.

THE NEW EUROPEAN POLITY
BETWEEN MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNITY

In 1993, a new book describing the people and countries in the Balkan Peninsula was published: Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts*. The book was a success. The paperback became a bestseller and Kaplan a worldwide known writer. One can find inside characters that are in fact familiar to any student of the Balkan phenomenon: the Romanian Dracula, Dušan of Serbia, the hero of the Vatican and anti-communist but first of all Croat Cardinal Stepanic, Tomislav of Croatia, aristocrats and bourgeois from the east and the west, military and journalists living on the various conflicts in the region, gypsies, Ottoman customs and, of course, a lot of coffee and plum brandy. Most of the people described in the book speak of what *other* people (that is, people of a different *ethnie* or a different religion or both) did to them or to their ancestors. They also talk about what those *others* would anyway do to them in the future – bad things, ancient hatreds. And Robert Kaplan opens his book with a foreword in which there is inserted the following fragment:

“The book sold well in hardcover and has been a paperback bestseller. In 1993, just as President Clinton was contemplating forceful action to halt the war in Bosnia, he and Mrs. Clinton are said to have read *Balkan Ghosts*. The history of ethnic rivalry I detailed reportedly encouraged the President's pessimism about the region, and – so it is said – was a factor in his decision not to launch an overt military response in support of the Bosnian Moslems, who were being besieged by Bosnian Serbs” (Kaplan, 1994: x).

News of the massacre in Srebrenica would have made Mr. Kaplan most probably retract at least this fragment from the book. The sad truth is that the West learned about what was really happening in the former Yugoslavia only when it became too late and only after horror was already staged. Had views been more rational and realistic, as urged by the Moslems crying for help in Bosnia not long

after similar episodes happened in Croatia, the Western reaction would not have been so late to come, the United States would have probably launched a decisive military response, and thousands of lives would have been saved. Instead, a disastrous pessimism dominated rationality in Europe and elsewhere. This paper is intended to determine exactly the opposite effect on its reader. It is fundamentally based on the assumption that the pessimism around and about a possible and rapid solution over the Balkan *issue* practically closed the debate and left no chance for many possible alternatives that could have been tried. Instead, this pessimism left the door half-open for only one dangerous alternative that led, eventually, to yet another horrible page in European history.

During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a particular story became very popular. The story is about a graffiti duel that took place on the walls of a post office in Sarajevo. One day, the story goes, a message was found on one of that building's walls reading THIS IS SERBIA. Some time later that message was erased and replaced with one saying THIS IS BOSNIA. Soon, this message too was to be replaced by a third one proclaiming THIS IS A POST OFFICE. The aim of this paper is, metaphorically, to offer a possible answer to a fundamental question within this context: How can we keep post offices clean in the Balkans? An important aspect of my argument is that it is based on a view of the Yugoslav conflict as much more than horrible: it was trivial; it trivialized humanity itself as much as all conflagrations in the previous blood-stained century marked by the buffoonish seriousness of those starting them. The responsibility of the international community for the escalation of the conflict cannot be denied. It has been proved by an overwhelming majority of scholars subsequently and this is also a point to weigh significantly in the building of my argument here.

The novelty of my thesis will derive from a different perspective upon the developments in the former-Yugoslavia, that is, from an alternative theoretical approach to the concept of the political and to the understanding of international relations as unveiled by that episode in European history. Another important premise is that the current situation in the Western Balkans represents a crucial

provocation for the very political being of Europe and, more specifically of course, of the European Union (EU). The collapse of the former Yugoslavia occasioned the outburst of a major conflict in South Eastern Europe, one marked by all horrors of the previous century and, interestingly enough, demanding intervention from a Europe committed to a political future profoundly different from any polities existing today or in the past. Moreover, it was an answer expected to come from a European polity built on the fundamental principle according to which military and economic competition between nation-states cannot lead eventually but to dramatic conflicts as the ones experienced on the Old Continent during the first half of the XXth century. The respective answer, late as it came, contained the same, unfortunate and decrepit message: national self-determination and recognition of nation-states.

This hilarious attitude can, of course, be explained. The Yugoslav conflict found the Western Europe at a time of profound transformations. In November 1993, in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community became the European Union, with all the structural changes implied. The Union's policies, which were anyway not clearly performed as community policies, entered a process of restructuring and one of the most disfavoured was to be the foreign policy that eventually came to be known as Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. As the events in the 1990s in South Eastern Europe showed, and the current developments around the Iraq issue in 2003-2004 fully demonstrated, the EU is still far from a situation in which it could manifest its options in the international arena in a coherent, *community* manner. However, most of the discourse around the EU is more or less centred on its newness and, specifically, around its supranational character. The tension between these two issues will also be approached in this paper as one with very important implications for the developments in the former Yugoslavia during the last decade of the last century.

The irony is that it is precisely the Common Foreign and Security Policy where the *supranational* is practically unperceivable. It is within this context that concepts potentially describing the future identity of the EU become devoid of

essence; it is at this very passage from EU's inside toward its outside that the intended supranational identity of the Union leaves its content in suspension and wraps itself in the old and dusty coat of worn out political reflexes that have little to do with the supranational character more and more obvious in the internal workings of the Union. What happens and continues to happen in the former Yugoslavia is genuinely a mirror in which even the most insignificant wrinkles of the Old Europe can be seen – a wound on the freshness of one which is undoubtedly a maiden, no matter what some may say. What presses for such a debate mostly, in my opinion, is the mere observation that scholars focus mainly on the question of *how* when they come to analysing the EU's short and long term future, that is, the focus falls on *how* to enlarge the union and *how* to integrate the member countries. The purely theoretical *what* inevitably implied by both enlargement and integration seems to be left outside the serious academic debate. This happens, in my opinion again, simply because *what* exactly the EU will be or, better said, *what* exactly we are going to become in Europe is a question which can be addressed only from perspectives as new as the object of these questions. And new perspectives can be conceived of only from fundamentally new angles opened by a political philosophy in tone with the newness of the polity it should try to explain and define. The upheavals in Western Europe after the World War II meant a gradual but dramatic change in the polities of that region. Alexander Somek, for instance, insists that there is a need for a "public philosophy" as to explain the institutional order emerged and only through the perspective opened by such a philosophy could the profound meaning of Europe's "final goals" be grasped (Somek, 2001: 5). If we are to accept the fact that the EU is or at least tends to become a totally new type of a polity as the outcome of a totally novel approach to politics in Europe, then a new understanding of this phenomenon should accompany and explain it. On the other hand, if we are to accept that the EU's polity is still in the project phase, than the opportunity for rethinking our fundamental concepts in political thought is immense: we might even have the chance to open a truly new page in human history, one less bloodied than the

previous ones. Hannah Arendt would praise this attempt as the living proof of the aptitude for new beginnings as defining humanity. In either of these cases, deep inquiries into our current evolution from the political perspective are welcome. What is extremely important to notice within the context of contemporary European politics is that most developments demand an attitude from the European Union right when they occur, that is, long before scholars and politicians could agree on the definition of Europe as a political entity. This might actually *be* the identity of the united Europe: the prosperous ready and able to export stability and prosperity under its own terms. Unlike in the American proposal, there is no word yet about security. Prosperity, this rationale suggests, *is* security.

The post-1989 events, the developments in the former Yugoslavia in particular, asked for an attitude from the, then, European Community. That attitude was notoriously late in crystallising and proved wrong by a significant number of scholars. This thesis is based not only on the criticism dedicated to those developments, but also from the clear view of the Balkans not as a territory on the current south-eastern borders of the European Union, but as a geographical region *in* Europe with all expectations and responsibilities deriving from this aspect for all sides. The discussion will take us inevitably in the zone of a heated debate around fundamental concepts, particularly concerning the national-supranational dichotomy within the context of post-modernity. That *is* at least because in the last instance the Yugoslav conflict was more than 'interethnic;' the stated need for a European response implied an attitude from the European Community and this fact brought that entity inevitably into the conflict. In other words, especially after the European vacillations and the involvement of the United States in Bosnia and Herzegovina, conflict management in that region became a sort of *ménage a trois* in which the sides were, first, the directly conflicting groups employing nationalist discourses, another one being the United States with their potentially traditional answer given the lack of supranational experience, and the last being the potentially non-traditional, European, supranational attitude. This traditional – non-traditional dichotomy helps, I hope, the understanding of the perspective

under which I place the respective developments. The *telos* of nationalism is intimately related to the establishment and perpetuation of the nation-state as based on an ideological reasoning rooted in the essential ideas of modernity while the supranational polity is viewed as 'post' such a phenomenon. Ernst Gellner indicated very clearly that nationalism, understood here as a political option, "is an inherently modern phenomenon." Indeed, "it believes both culture and power to be perennial, but to be related to each other in a new way in the modern age, a way which then engenders nationalism" (Gellner, 1998: 92-3). The intimate relation between nationalism, nation-state, and territory as the place that makes the nation-state's sovereignty possible completes this modern holy trinity. John Gerard Ruggie, points out, indeed, that "[...] disjoint, mutually exclusive, and fixed territoriality most distinctively defines modernity in international politics [...]" (Ruggie, 1993: 174). The European Union, with its lack of territorial reference points on its agenda comes here in contrast with the territorial sovereignty of the national state as established throughout the centuries of modern political thought, from Machiavelli to our contemporary realist scholars. Ruggie maintains then that in the field of politics, especially in the field of international relations, post-modernism has not even begun seriously (Ruggie, 1993: 144, 146). And he goes even further by asserting that there is no theory able to describe transformation in international relations (Ruggie, 1993: 152).

Indeed, the international relations theory is basically limited at its descriptive function in spite of quite serious attempts of various scholars in the respective field at somehow foretelling the future. And even that foretelling is based on the knowledge of particular cases and causes that contributed to particular changes of attitudes of particular actors in the international relations arena. There is, indeed, no theory explaining change beyond such particular causalities and, thus, capable of theorising *a priori* and beyond deterministic interpretations. In other words, there is no abstract understanding of change in the international relations theory, one similar to what Martin Heidegger developed decades ago in the central nerve of philosophy itself when demonstrating that Being and Becoming (as

the essence of change) are perfectly synonymous (Heidegger, 2000: 100-2). One cannot say, for instance and by paraphrasing a famous Heideggerian example, that the European Union is an entity in the Western Europe provided that the European Union literally '(be)comes' in Western Europe, and so on. In spite of Ruggie not suggesting this direction of research for those interested in developing a theory of change in international relations to follow, the idea might be useful as a possible guiding line. The main aspect Ruggie insists on is that the territorially constituted sovereign nation-state was the product of a modernity incapable of seeing beyond its own determinants. In line with Garrett Mattingly, Ruggie points out rightfully that, "the modern state did not *evolve* from those [medieval] experiences; rather it was invented by the early modern Europeans" (Ruggie, 1993: 166; italics in original). However, I would rather insist that only after the international relations theory assimilates intellectually the Heideggerian interpretation of change could it pass into its post-modernist age.

It is, indeed, the very novelty of the European supranational polity that recommends it, at least in theory, as a serious candidate for the position of the main character on the stage of such a debate. As Haas warned, the regional integration theory has become outdated due to the very developments in European politics (Haas, 1976; quoted in Ruggie, 1993: 140), and the contemporary European political system "may constitute nothing less than the emergence of the first truly post-modern international political form" (Ruggie, 1993: 140). As a reason behind this assertion, Ruggie indicates the fact that the new European polity is not territorially based, with territory being, once again, the very mark of the socially constructed system of states characteristic of modernity. Modernity is defined, in Ruggie's view, by differentiations as expressions of territorial, political rule, and materialised in the boundaries of the national states. In this thesis I suggest that there exist also alternative ways for political thought to escape from modernity as understood along the lines indicated above. Moreover, since Ruggie points at the territorial conception of politics as the problem of modernity without making it clear *how* exactly are political thought and the international relations theory to pass over

this hurdle, I suggest with this thesis a way to fill in this apparently blank space. The theoretical context sketched by the ideas indicated above lead us to a potentially central idea which can be expressed in one single sentence: the Balkan conflict of the 1990s may be understood as the first armed, physical confrontation between modernity and post-modernity. With this in mind the exploration of various interpretations of the politics of post-modernity could not but aid the argument developing throughout the following chapters.

The story of post-modernity is as exciting as that of any young girl struggling against the traditional views of her family concerning almost everything, from sex to politics. The antagonism grows gradually so intense that the young girl eventually leaves her own home looking for other horizons of understanding. After wandering for a while in the Far East and after entering contact with very unfamiliar cultures, the young girl finds herself half lost, relying on and happy mostly for one single conclusion she could draw after all this time: that there exist alternative perspectives on almost anything, including humanity and human condition. Her family and her culture in general do not hold the holly and exclusive secret of these things. Other 'truths' are possible. The traditional understandings are rigid and disastrous due to the very rigidity of those understandings, bloody due to the tension that rigidity implies. She then comes back home where she faces a criticism harsher than expected. The main accusation: relativism inductive of scepticism. In other words, the little young girl is suspected for having lost faith in the traditional values, in the traditional God, for losing that fixed point around which the entire axiological system of her society has been built – she is believed lost and must swear again allegiance to her society's holly relics as the only way to redemption. Notice that in this modern age she is not accused of heresy any longer. Things have changed historically. She just needs to think more over her own new beliefs and judge by herself whether the step she has taken is worth giving up that whole system of beliefs. However, she is keen in defending her new stance at least for one reason: from her new perspective, she can see the rigidity of the previous, traditional one and the bloody conflagrations it led to. She may feel regrets for this

manifold uncertainties she sees, but one thing is clear: going back would be unacceptable; going forward and building an alternative world is the only way, even if she does not know much about how to build things now anew. She is confident that she will know in the future and trusts her human instincts. She is happy that, eventually, she has come to at least feel that humanity.

Modernity in political thought is said to have been founded by a line of prodigious thinkers such as Nicollo Machiavelli (1460-1527), Martin Luther (1483-1546), Jean Bodin (1530-1596), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and numerous others (Voegelin, 1999). It represents an impressive accumulation of knowledge and, implicitly, beliefs stimulated by the Enlightenment and its strong message about the extraordinary capacity of human beings to control the world they dwell in. The scientific and industrial revolution, the secular philosophies of Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Locke, or Hume to mention only a few, all contributed to the emergence of new perspectives in the European political thought which became gradually more and more open to ideas of equality among people, enlightened government (even as still confined at that time to limits of absolutist vein), social emancipation and against imperial oppression. It has become so popular a concept that it has been even turned into a verb, 'modernize,' one indicating an action or a process aiming at reforming an old thing (be it a system of thought, a building, a state, a weapon, a kitchen, or a ministry), that is, turning it from an unfashionable and, most often, inefficient thing into one fitting the needs of an already changing social, political, cultural, economic, or even religious context.

The fact that nations and nation-states are generally viewed as creations of a wave of changes inspired by modernity and taking place in the wake of the Enlightenment has been underscored by numerous scholars (Anderson, 1991; Hastings, 1997; Hobsbawm, 1990; Gellner, 1983, 1998; Greenfeld, 1995; Renan, 1996). Moreover, Max Weber contributed decisively to the theory when he proved the existence of an important distinction between state and nation. The state is a political entity expressing its attributes through concrete institutions and communication channels. The nation, on the other hand, is merely a cultural

community and an idea (Weber, 1978). According to the Weberian theory and in line with a centuries old understanding of sovereignty starting with Jean Bodin and Montesquieu, a state is basically a set of institutions that exercise supreme political authority within a geographically defined territory (Greenberg, 1990: 12-3). Ethnic groups enjoy separate attention and, consequently, a different legal approach by scholars and politicians alike. In the words of Anthony Smith, whose definition has been generally accepted, an ethnic community or *ethnie* is “a named human population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories and elements of common culture with a link to a specific territory and a measure of solidarity.” Moreover, Smith also completed the definition of nation and nationalism with clearer attributes. He stated that a nation is “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties,” while nationalism is “an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population some of whose members deem themselves to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (A. D. Smith, 1996: 447). It is obvious, under the particular perspective of this immense definition, that a ‘nation’ is much closer to political identity than an ethnic community. Not accidentally, then, the first tension encountered usually is that deriving from attempts of ethnic groups at gaining the recognized status of ‘nations.’

Another authorised voice in this particular and extremely rich academic field pictured nationalism in quite a plastic way as “a political ideology that claims that the world is divided into nations and only into nations; and that each individual belongs to a nation and only to one nation” (Schöpflin, 1996: 219-20). Schöpflin also underlines the intimate link between nation and territory as a crucial characteristic defining nations but adds another essential element when stressing the fact that “membership of the nation is the medium through which rights are exercised, although this goes hand-in-hand with citizenship, but one of the crucial tensions in modern politics revolves about the relationship between the two. In other words, nationalism is inextricably involved with the political process

and must be interpreted in the same way as other facets of politics are” (Schöpflin, 1996: 219-20). The possibility for nationalism to avoid the responsibility for the atrocities done under its own name is therefore excluded. The nationalist political discourse with its essential offensive orientation cannot but assume this responsibility and come to the fore with an explanation of its consequences. Since never ever were nationalist politicians heard doing so other than in discourses demonstrating their positions ‘right’ and legitimate in spite of the dramatic consequences they had for human individuals, this stance should be viewed as irrational *in principle*. By politicising practically a community’s culture, nationalism also claims that “that these cultural characteristics take precedence over all other claims and that they should receive political protection” (Orridge, 1981: 39-58, quoted in Scöpflin, 1991: 52). Hence the apparent perfection of the mechanism by which nationalism gains legitimacy in spite of being apparently at least irrational.

Nationalism, on the other hand, is understood strictly as an ideology, that is, as a particular conception of nation as such and of its relation with politics. This view also links nationalism and the nation with the idea of nation-state. In the now famous words of Ernst Gellner, ‘nationalism’ usually refers to “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.” Gellner moves further to define a nationalist argument as a “political doctrine” based upon three essential aspects: ”a. There exist a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; b. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; c. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty” (Gellner, 1983). The appearance of most nations on the stage of history as encapsulated in the respective nation-states’ sovereignties has been accompanied by revolutions, political and military conflicts, or political and armed rebellions. Therefore, David Campbell seems right to suggest that ethnicity and nationalism can be interpreted as manifestations of “history violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals” (Campbell, 1998: 86). This is also to suggest that the affirmation of an ethnic or national identity as a denial of the sovereignty of another

ethnic or national group over a particular territory is provocative of conflict within the context described by the understanding of sovereignty as consecrated by the modern political thought. The supranational political discourse, on the other hand, maintains that territories and borders are not essential for the making of the polity, that the emergence of a nation-state presupposes assuming responsibilities not anymore worth sacrifices. However, not few are those who point at nationalism as still a force threatening the new European polity. As Collins wrote in 1992, “the citizens of the very small countries such as Monaco and Liechtenstein are envied their lack of international responsibilities and correspondingly low taxes, but the most powerful argument of those who believe the drive toward Western European unity is dead is that nationalism is too strong” (Collins, 1992: 8).

Gellner suggests that the conceptualisation presented above draws inevitably the attention toward the very modernity of nationalism. Indeed, the tremendous impact of the French Revolution in Europe as flying on the wings of Napoleon’s *La Grand Armée* undoubtedly shook the political authority of empires in the European political arena at that time. More and more ‘nations’ discovered or simply invented their identities which coagulated around cultural and political movements throughout empires. They were claiming each nation’s right to self-determination and thus projecting *a priori*, as Hobsbawm would like to say, the image and the very being of those nations into the imperial European political space as potentially powerful actors. In less than fifty years, national liberation candles took light from the western torch and thus the world could hear the demands for self-determination coming from Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, or Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire, Czechs and Slovaks, Polish, Romanians and Serbs again, together with Slovenes and Croats in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and many, many others. The 1860s and 1870s saw the establishment of the ‘modern’ Italy and the Second Reich of Germany respectively. They followed the establishment of the first Romanian state and, earlier, the independence declarations of the Greeks, Serbs, and Belgians in the first half of the XIXth century. All these were the practical results of escalating movements forging the

very creation of those nation-states from above and, in line with one of Hobsbawm's main arguments and contrary to the dominant view in Gellner's writings, gaining legitimacy also from below, from the peoples who consented to support and even die for such 'national' ideals (Hobsbawm, 1990). However, the main idea to be stressed here is that nationalism as a political ideology and the establishment of nation-states as, at least declaratorily, its objectives, are products of the modernity. Probably politicians of nation states should not forget the words of Richard Handler: "It is only slightly less customary to point out that states have created nations perhaps more frequently than nations states; in the classic nation-states of Western Europe state-building bred national identity rather than simply following from it" (Handler, 1988: 6).

Ernst Gellner, with whom I incline to agree in principle, maintains that it was a profound change in the European conception of morality that had exceptional influence all throughout the continent as to make the emergence of nationalism and nation-states possible. According to his thesis, morality passed in Europe through three stages. The first was the one originating, he believes, in Plato's understanding as illustrated in the *Republic*. It was a rather pragmatic morality within the context of which men performing their individual duties were guarantors of a type of human progress that presupposed no linkage between culture of any kind and morality, as we are inclined to believe in our modernity. Indeed, as E. R. Dodds famously pointed out more than half a century ago, human evolution was judged rather in terms of the evolution of the individual members of a particular society and the idea of success in its peculiar ancient Greek understanding was decisive in the conclusion of moral judgements (Dodds, 1951). This ancient type of morality, according to Gellner, was to degenerate in dramatic forms of oppression especially with the advent of the Christian intolerant views and to be practically replaced by what Gellner calls the morality of the Enlightenment. This second type facilitated the emergence of nationalism as the waving of the national idea by simply undermining the logic of the imperial political system of the pre-nationalist age. The most important aspect of this 'morality' is that it was still

based on the rationalist spirit of that age, one subordinating almost all aspects of life to the *cogito ergo sum* logic. The ground was being actually prepared, even unconsciously, for the subsequently devastating control of man over everything else, including his own humanity. Almost naturally, Gellner suggests, the third type of morality was to be a mere reaction to Enlightenment as it manifested in art and literature – it was the morality of Romanticism and the conflict became open as “Roots against Reason” (Gellner, 1998: 63-8). The departure from rationality that this change announced was decisive for the subsequent historical evolution of the continent and, if we are to agree with Greenfeld, it was even more decisive for the Eastern Europe, the South East included. Romanticism, with its stress on the volcanic force of human nature, on the ancient, historical roots of that force, coupled with the Herderian view of national cultures as sources of eternal perpetuation of particular societies and their values, meant that the spirit of the Enlightenment was deposed of its rational impulse for national liberations. Confiscated by Romanticism, this impulse was to be literally turned into the explosive mix still to be heard blasting in the Eastern and especially in the South Eastern Europe, in the seemingly eternal wave of national liberations arising there from time to time.

In Greenfeld’s view, unlike in the West where nationalism took a civic form with an almost Platonic emphasis on nationhood resting in the individual experience of each member of the national community, the Eastern nationalisms tended to rest on an idea of ‘root’ determined genetically and encroaching individuality in an exclusive conception. Thus, the nationally constituted club in the Eastern Europe was founded upon the idea that only those corresponding to the exclusive principle of chosenness could be rightfully considered members of the respective club, that of the chosen ones (Greenfeld, 1995). Or, in Gellner’s words, “Rationality cannot, simply cannot, define the membership of exclusive clubs: feelings [only] *can*” (Gellner, 1998: 68). In other words, it is strongly maintained that the rule of reason proclaimed by Rationalism and propagated throughout the entire age of Enlightenment was subdued by the “Roots against Reason” morality of

the Romanticism. This taking place on the quick sands of politics, there should not be any wonder that the subsequent ideologies invoking the nation and the good in its name tended to encroach individuality more and more as the only source of reason, one capable of opposing the irrationality of the romantic form of nationalism. Peter Loizos, faced with analogous instances of genocidal violence in the Cypriot context (Loizos 1988: 651), argued that ethnic violence develops in an antagonistic political rhetoric around a very specific set of subjects. The horrors of the XXth century could have been possible only as a prolongation of this reflex of modernity. If critics of modernity tend to focus on the territorial aspects of its proposed political project as literally destructive of the human ones, I am tempted to agree with those, extremely few if any, who see the problem located in deeper strata of our approach to politics, that is, in the very Gordian knot made around individuality in its political appearance. However, I shall come back to these aspects in the conclusion to this thesis.

Post-modernism, on the other hand, challenges fundamental premises of modernity, that is, of the entire tradition of human thought developed throughout history and blooming over the last four centuries, starting in particular with the Cartesian thought. And, indeed, it does not recognize the positive aspects of the Enlightenment as suggested above. Moreover, post-modernism points even at the dissolution of those forms of social aggregation associated usually with modernity (Sarup, 1993). An interesting and almost classical (sic!) view of how such positions can be attacked from a post-modern stance is the one of Edward Said who, in his *Orientalism*, claimed that Western thought manufactured an understanding of its own colonial world in terms of knowledge built in a process developing broadly along the following stages: the forceful entrance in that particular world (most often by military conquest), the superficial examination of the cultures encountered, the extraction and simplification through abstractisation of particular aspects of those cultures, and the production of 'knowledge' based on those aspects. The process culminated invariably with the usage of that superficially built knowledge as a mark of superiority of the conquering colonial power over the subdued cultures. In

other words, Western colonialism was legitimized for centuries in the Western mind by an imagined superiority over other societies simply because the West *knew* all that it accepted as essential about them (Said, 1978). Needless to say that most of the cultural features invoked here were totally irrelevant for a profound understanding of those societies but very convenient for building the feeling of superiority, so necessary for legitimizing and creating the momentum for domination. In a keynote that will reverberate insistently throughout this thesis, post-modernism attacks precisely this imagined superiority of the modern human mind (European in particular) over the surrounding world confined into a box where *humanity* put everything it can know and make. Hannah Arendt, for instance, built her entire view of human condition on a particular understanding of the world as the *making* of humans understood as *animal laborans* who can not conceive of anything that surrounds them, including things human, but as the products of their labour (Arendt, 1998). According to the post-modern thought, consequently, its predecessor presumed that knowledge of a *thing* literally makes possible the being of that thing and justifies man's domination over the knowable, the non-human rest, since man was viewed as the only being capable of knowledge.

When the knowable is also organisable and politically identifiable, this domination becomes destructive of beings of things and, implicitly, of beings of people. This tension, the post-modern argument suggests, is enhanced when identities become subject of a hot discourse such as that of Herder, or Hegel, or the even hotter political discourse of the late romanticism. It was, indeed, at that point in human history when the ancient 'personal glory' turned in to the collective 'national glory' and the concept of hero was confiscated from individuality by the nation and turned inevitably into a 'national hero.' Jean-François Lyotard, from his position as one of the leading figures of post-modernist thought, is harshly critical of what he termed as "metanarratives", or "grand narratives" of the modern world. On a path specifically relevant for the context of this thesis, he explicitly refers to the "grand" ethnographies of the last centuries marked by the modern idea of nation and self-determination in a world dominated by various empires. By

invoking a perfectly logical rationale, Lyotard maintained that an all encompassing account of a culture is simply impossible. Thus, the narratives suggesting grand pasts of perennially unitary nations in their struggle against alleged enemies leave the realm of rationality and venture into becoming metanarratives with all conflictual risks implied (Lyotard, 1984). A metanarrative is practically an imagined account of the self and, in the case of cultures, it is the story a culture tells to itself about its own values, beliefs, and the practices associated with and built on those values and beliefs (Sarup, 1993). This is plain 'nationarcissism.' It is the imagined self of a culture and one can hear and see it proclaimed at this very moment of writing in innumerable languages throughout Europe, from Jirinovski's Moscow to Le Pen's Paris, from Heider's Vienna to Vadim's Bucharest, from Finni's northern Italy to (still) Milošević's Belgrade. Post-modern political thought claims it attempts at cleaning human conscience of this trash.

Critics of the post-modernist stance raise first of all the question about the apparent negative relativism implied by this attitude. In other words, they wonder what is left in place if we just follow the apparently destructive direction indicated in the post-modern discourse. Leo Strauss was one of those prominent voices in contemporary political thought who, in line with the otherwise well-intended neo-Arsitotelianism of the twentieth century, believed that the crisis the West entered in the beginning of that century originated mainly in the profound changes taking place in the Western political thought at that time. That allegedly well structured philosophy was challenged by "specific doubts about the particular premises of the modern project, such as the worth of universalism, the connections between affluence and justice and happiness, and the understanding of science as the conquest of nature in the service of human power [...]. But even more fundamentally, doubt about the superiority of the purpose of the West rested on late modern doctrines that denied the possibility of rational knowledge of the universal validity of any purpose or principle" (Tarcov and Pangle, 1987: 908). The early post-modernist, or the "late modern doctrines" invoked here, are in other words to be blamed for not seeing the project of modernity in its splendour. The

truth is that they do see that project too well; post-modern thought simply views the teleology implied by that project as stained with the blood of two world conflagrations followed by at least two global-scale criminal dictatorships, and a multitude of other horrors done in the name of perfectly modern concepts such as nation-state, social or national liberation, social classlessness, self-determination, to enumerate only a few. The defendant is *already* known for its malfunctioning and is offered only the chance to defend itself while everybody knows the outcome: the defendant will use a discourse *already* catalogued as pathetic, outdated and, many would say, criminal. Consequently, the defendant is found guilty *a priori*, that is, with its own language as a prosecutor.

Post-modernism, however, is built around the criticism of modernism and they can not live but contextually together. In a remarkable article published in 1993, right at a time when the former Yugoslavia was burning, Noel O'Sullivan suggested that each and every age of our history had its moment of 'modernity' as well as its rebellious 'post-modern' thinkers. The examples given are the sophists in the ancient Greece, Lucretius for the Hellenistic period, St. Augustine for the early medieval West, Pascal and Hume toward the age we commonly denominate as 'modern,' and Nietzsche at the turn of the ninetieth toward the twentieth centuries (O'Sullivan, 1993: 2). Indeed, in claiming that there is something wrong with what was understood to be modern, post-modernism of all ages employs an essentially prophetic discourse to be found in the works of all these heralds of change (Cutrofello, 1993: 93). However, the fundamental difference between post-moderns from the past and those of recent times can be found in their approach. While the revolutionary thinkers of previous ages built their theories as continuations and corrections of the main trends that they could come in contact with at that time, the contemporary post-modern philosophy resorted to what has been rightfully denominated as 'deconstruction,' a term suggesting an attempt at literally dismantling concepts, theories and beliefs into pieces, the candid contemplation of their splendid nakedness/emptiness, and the subsequent reconstruction of understanding as starting from a minimalist, extremely critical, acceptance of what

was left after that process. As we shall see later in this thesis, a similar approach is taken by David Campbell when he analyses the developments in the former Yugoslavia in a regrettably singular work, *National Deconstruction*, which justifies, one more time, the approach take here.

However, the 'reconstruction' element implied by the post-modernist deconstruction is not recognized by some critics. It is suggested that post-modernist thinkers are in "no position to offer a constructive solution because [post-modernism] fails to recognize that what is really required is a massive recovery exercise, aimed at rediscovering spiritual resources within modernity which sheer illiteracy has led post-modernism to ignore" (O'Sullivan, 1993: 26-7). Indeed, the effort of reconstruction would be a much more logical and advantageous reflex as compared with a deconstructive intellectual act leading, at least apparently, to nothing but contingency. As Noel O'Sullivan rightly puts it, "It is, indeed, the experience of contingency above all else that creates the problem which lies at the heart of post-modernism." Moreover, and in line with my argument, "This is the problem of identity in its most radical form" (O'Sullivan, 1993: 26). Undoubtedly, contingency or uncertainty as "dependence on chance or on the fulfilment of a condition," comes as the logical consequence of post-modern thought.¹ However, it is precisely 'contingency' that post-modernists consider as preferable to the, say, territorially bound political imaginary of modernity coagulated around the rigid and tension prone conceptualisation of the whole we presumably are, in the political sense. It is exactly this aspect that Lyotard denounced as an oppressive intellectual obsession with totality and called for a war on it, on the whole *per se* (Lyotard, 1984). A meaningful expression of such a revolt can be found, for instance, in R.B.J. Walker's identification of universality – a theoretically omniscient form of 'wholeness' – as the problem and not the solution to shortcomings in the working of various polities throughout history. In other words, the appeal to supposedly universally accepted solutions in particular

¹ At least this is the definition given for the word *contingency* in the *Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*, Gramercy Books, New Jersey, 1994;

political situations might not solve but even aggravate those problems. They could generate such complications that the problem might be proved to be the universal 'wholeness' itself (Walker, 1993: 77). The West European approach to the political developments in the former Yugoslavia might be indeed, as suggested by extremely numerous scholars, the best example of the sad consequences of the belief in and the proposition of 'universally recognized' principles where the situation on the ground was governed by challengingly original particularisms. But virtually no concrete examples of constructions of alternative polities are there offered or suggested. How, then, can post-modernist political thought escape the accusation that, in plain words, is good at deconstructing but very inefficient when it comes about reconstructing?

Noel O'Sullivan suggests at this stage an alternative that might look logical for some people but unapproachable for the so-called 'realists': "To be precise, the recovery exercise they have in mind will not succeed unless it is underpinned by a new perspective, involving a more modest way of thinking about man and his place in the world than has been usual during the past two centuries or so" (O'Sullivan, 1993: 27). That is, the aspects of the modern polity that post-modernism criticises could not be overcome unless man simply acknowledges that those polities have been conceived as to serve ideals and dreams of particular societies that now should simply give up dreaming so high and turn back toward the fate of their individual members much more carefully. Contingency is a reality and man cannot govern it simply because no one can govern contingency – in life, everything is possible and post-modernists just say, "Thank God! We aren't blocked in archetypes!" Only with this perspective in mind could man come to terms with contingency and identity; only when we fully realise that the best we can do is to seize the opportunities offered sometimes for adapting ourselves to the multiple facets and possibilities of contingency could we feel free of this permanently constraining imperative of modernity stating that man can and must control contingency. Machiavelli could very well enjoy his jubilation. This is also the direction suggested by the Heideggerian interpretation of humanity when the

philosopher states that, “Man is not the lord of being. Man is the shepherd of Being” (Heidegger, 1993: 245).

The problem here might be, as already suggested above, that post-modernism did not really incorporate the Heideggerian thought and that philosopher’s practical political stance eventually mattered more than his findings. ‘Shepherding’ in the Christian tradition means not *ruling* but *servicing* the herd. Apostles and Jesus himself did not rule anyone – they simply ‘washed the feet’ of those who would accept it and the message of that ritual (much older than Christianity) was about them being *ready* to wash believers’ feet, ready to serve and not to rule over humanity. Modesty is, indeed, the message of that particular religion and, truly, of all religions. The trend contrary to this teaching simply could not be fully explained yet, no matter what other scholars commented over this issue. Both the East and the West slipped historically into what Heidegger called the ‘forgetfulness’ of Being. In O’Sullivan’s words, “In spite of the rise of modern science and the concomitant Galilean revolution, which decentred man’s position in the scheme of things, the old view of the privileged nature of the human self for long survived into the modern period in a secularized form, finding supreme expression in ideologies which found the meaning of history in a movement towards the realization of man’s dreams” (O’Sullivan, 1993: 31). It is precisely this stubbornness that human mind encounters when approaching not deconstruction but reconstruction. Deconstruction, in other words, could be acceptable since it is not a full stop to the sentence of modernity as much entrenched in its belief in the human superiority over the ‘scheme of things’ and in progress toward a never fully defined sense. It is easy, we would say to our children, to just dismantle a toy. Reconstruction, conversely, presupposes logically that the edifice of modernity with all its ancestry is put down to earth and built anew – such a possibility is, indeed, unacceptable for any modernity, proud as it usually is of its irreplaceable and undisputable achievements. Thinking they have already become mature, our children simply cannot accept that something went wrong in the process of their

own maturation and, moreover, reassembling the toy back in one piece is, indeed, not that much attractive a thing to do.

Post-modernism therefore encourages, among other attitudes, man's modesty about both human creations and human dreams. Man's relation to contingency in the Machiavellian thought presupposed a pro-action attitude on behalf of man; seizing the opportunity offered by *fortuna* was the best one could and should do when pursuing a specific goal, particularly when acting as a 'prince.' Man's relation to contingency in our post-modern age seems to presuppose mere adaptation to conditions which simply cannot be always foreseen, while the goal to be pursued is not just *any* goal derived from a Hobbesian search for personal security, but a rationalized set of goals specifically identified by a post-modern polity that, if we are to agree here with Ruggie, may have found practical expression in the European Union. More than two millennia ago, Plato suggested that justice *per se* as an essentially political category means that each member of the community performs his/her own role within that community (Plato, 1997). It might be, then, that the Platonic definition of justice will finally find its temporal expression in a European polity in which previously politically defined community reflexes by the central bodies of the Union determine a sort of community life in which men feel free to follow their own vocations. Meanwhile, what we traditionally understand as politics and the political processes associated with it seem to withdraw in the foggy, apparently unaccountable decision-making systems based in Brussels. At that level, the new, 'post-modern' alternative to the traditional checks-and-balances system seems to be replaced gradually by the fogginess of a political process so complex that, it is hoped, no group of people would ever bother to take it under control. Counterrevolutionary as it might seem from such a perspective, this post-modern polity is recommended by its partisans as fitting a stage in European history when individuals can tell, with long practiced pragmatism, which are the advantages and disadvantages of various policies. Thus, it is believed, previously political bodies can just focus on the technical aspects of governance while the old sources of legitimacy become, step by step, outdated. 'Good government for a good

life' and old-fashioned politics can go to the trash bin – this seems to be the slogan of post-modernity. Isn't this, however, like a return to the spirit of Aristotle?

Michel Foucault especially, as another prominent figure of post-modernity, insisted on the sensitive aspects of modernity that make it particularly vulnerable to post-modern critique. A crucial one is about the way 'truth' is formed historically as a socially constructed interpretation of particular contexts to eventually become what Foucault calls 'episteme.' Progress then, in the Foucaultian interpretation, comes to mean not a step-by-step building of 'episteme' but literally the elimination and replacement of one socially constructed 'episteme' by another one, another 'truth' as arbitrarily constructed as the one before (Foucault, 1970). However, the millenary system of knowledge thus built claims irrefutability exactly in the name of its presumed endurance in time – it does not even admit challenge since it is *the* truth. It is not difficult to understand what Heidegger meant by forgetfulness of Being itself. Originally genuinely perceived 'truths' about almost all aspects of life (not only human) have been covered with thick layers of various socially constructed truths beyond which the reality of our surrounding world is lost. For instance, the idea of a good government in the name of a good life is not anymore an aim for our modernity but a matter of fact, an 'implicit' goal lost under other stated ones such as, for instance, the security of human individuals lost long behind the more profitable national security.

It is also not difficult to understand that the very formulation of an ultimate 'truth' presupposes an act of oppression not necessarily of *other* truths but, even more importantly, the oppression of the very possibility for the emergence of alternatives; it simply kills the idea of alternative and, thus, the possibility of change or becoming. Since this comes contrary to nature's very definition *as* change, the formulation of definite truths is at least ridiculous. However, it could be heard in the political discourse of colonialism, imperialism, nationalism, fascism, communism, and reverberates nowadays again in nationalist speeches as proclaiming the perennial 'truth' of a particular, socially constructed image of a nation. Milošević was only one of the many such voices in Europe and it was

practically his lack of oratorical success among the non-Serbs that unleashed the dogs of war in the former Yugoslavia. The political in that region was simply a regrettable prolongation of modernity in Europe.

Since these absolute truths refuse cohabitation with alternatives, this ridiculous oppression calls inevitably for its rationality analysis. In what concerns nationalism as such, Isaiah Berlin had demonstrated clearly in an outstanding essay that the political message it promotes instigates at the total elimination of the border between the culture and the polity of a nation. Ernest Gellner also confirmed this aspect when he stated that, “the nationalist principle requires that the political unit and the ‘ethnic’ one be congruent” (Gellner, 1998: 45). Since the two concepts are obviously different in both definition and realm, what nationalism militates for is senseless and proves it, as a political movement, simply irrational in principle (Berlin, 1990). However, it is also maintained that, “mythic and symbolic discourses can thus be employed to assert legitimacy and strengthen authority. They mobilize emotions and enthusiasm. They are a primary means by which people make sense of the political process, which is understood in a symbolic form” (Schöpflin, 2000: 89) That is, the political process leaves the realm of life and enters the one of Anderson’s imaginary, far away from man and his much more prosaic needs. Needless to say that these judgements suggest that modernity itself, at least under these perspectives, can be viewed as irrational and the political arrangements it proposed as urgently replaceable. The process is claimed to have already started in the Western Europe, that is, exactly at modernity’s own point of origin. Ernest Renan was also right when asserting that a “spiritual principle,” more than race, language, religion or geography lies at the core of “nation” (Renan, 1990). The instrumental rather than essential role played by history in this making of a nation has become an accepted idea in the scholarship about nationalism since Herder. And it still plays this role in our ‘modern’ politics. Other than Milošević, it was also Ceaușescu, as I have personally experienced in Romania, who stilled his leadership according to this formula which was already a stereotype in East European and, especially, Southeast European politics. He engaged on a systematic programme of

domestic “working” visits in the countryside to show that the leader stays close to the people and each of those visits was an opportunity for the leader to pay tribute to the nation’s ancestors at various monuments and historical sites across the country (Petrescu, 1998).

Our contemporary system of states has been built, historians say, since Westphalia on sharply delimited territories never fully coinciding with the actual location of various members of the same nation or *ethnie*. It should then not be a surprise to anybody that the congruence invoked by Berlin, Gellner and others contained in it from its very beginning a permanent tension caused by all arguments pro and against that congruence itself; they have been overtly expressed by means of national liberation movements and revolutions, ethnic conflicts, anti-Semitic violence and crimes, all in the name of the same irrefutable truths proclaiming that one and only one ideal is tolerable in a particular society. Interestingly enough, none of these acts were declared to aim exclusively at conquest as perceived in the West; all of them followed the much more brutal cleansing principle according to which there is a land that belongs to the *right ones* and that within the borders of that sacred land none of the *others* should dwell or even be seen. Examples abound here: Kosovo for Serbia, Transylvania for Romania, and Macedonia for Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, and even Albanians. This suggests exactly the congruence between political units and ethnic, religious or racial units in the name of a mythical wholeness.

That the sense of territoriality is stronger for people as members of nations than when they only claim a particular ethnic, cultural identity within another nation has been pointed out repeatedly. As Frye indicated, actually “the sense of a nation has a territorial aspect absent from ethnicity, since a member of an ethnic group living abroad can share a sense of identity with a co-ethnic in the home country quite apart from feeling an attachment to a nation-state” (Frye, 1992: 602). Indeed, ethnic groups should not necessarily be attributed a vocation of statehood in the sense of an inclination to think of themselves entitled to the recognition of their sovereignty over a specific territory. Magyars in Transylvania, for instance, are

not unanimously supporting those political factions seeking sovereignty to the detriment of the Romanian one. Conversely, many of them, and that means up to around 6% of the total population of the country sympathise with the Democratic Union of the Magyars in Romania (UDMR) which represents politically the respective minority in a way considered as a model of civic and civilised politics. It is the 'nation' that invokes its own, most probably sacred, territory as undisputable homeland. It is the nation or in the name of the nation that the nationalist political discourse claims political relevance and recognition of nation's primordality, thus placing itself deliberately in a competition with other nations. The price paid for it has been proportionally huge over the last Westphalian centuries. As some scholars have been insistently suggesting, the national identity, out of all other possible forms of political self-identification, was the one directly deriving from the conception of the system of states and international relations beginning with the Peace of Westphalia. It also presupposed inevitably that any further establishment of a sovereignty throughout Europe was to be made and, even more dramatically, remade after the Westphalian design of state entities within territorially strictly defined borders (Held, 1993).

According to Ruggie, "The Enlightenment was animated by the desire to demystify and secularize, to subject natural forces to rational explanation and control, as well as by the expectation that doing so would promote social welfare, moral progress, and human happiness." However, the apparent solidity of this project was to be dramatically altered by Romanticism as already suggested here. Moreover, it was to be shaken in its essential "categorical fixity" by people and events of tremendous significance in recent human history. Ruggie enumerates, "Nietzsche, Freud, Wittgenstein; Darwin, Einstein, Heisenberg; Braque, Picasso, Duchamp; Joyce, Proust, Becket; Schoenberg, Berg, Bartok; two World Wars, a Great Depression, Nazi death camps, Stalin's Gulags, Hiroshima, Nagasaki [...]" (Ruggie, 1993: 145). The list is frightening and cannot be justified and explained but in one way. The Enlightenment's effort at demystification and secularisation simply led to the replacement of what we traditionally understand by religion with

'modern' religions within the context of political discourse. These new religions tended to fill up the vacuum left with the demise of the traditional religion by following old paths previously experienced: liberation of nations replaced liberation of souls; priests were replaced by nationalist, or communist, or anti-Semitic agitators; the king or the pope left room for messianic heroes of national liberation movements or of radical social and political movements such as the ones promoting the communist chimeras. And all these on the indispensable stage made by human masses specifically located within clear cut territorial borders inside which was possible for those modern religions to build their own altars. The cathedrals of these new religions were to be, unfortunately, the very government buildings which Hobbes viewed as depositaries of an imaginary but truly sacred compact to legitimise and justify government itself, the Leviathan thus rationally constituted. The religious processions of modernity, more dramatically, were to take humanity through death camps, gulags, and other such lugubrious alcoves.

It is then explicable why recent scholarship tends more and more to view the Yugoslav conflict not as one around religious dissensions between Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosnians. Frye, for instance, suggests that, "[...] church-state relations and the legacy of the outgoing regime loaded the dice in favour of ethnicity rather than class or religion as a basis for mobilization," while the "relative economic development" and the "degree of cultural differentiation from the dominant ethnic group" weighed considerably in the shaping of this landscape (Frye, 1992: 600). The conclusion of Powers comes to confirm such a view. He maintains that, "religion has contributed to the conflict, but mostly indirectly. Weak and marginalized at the time of the collapse of Yugoslav communism, religion has been susceptible to manipulation by communists-turned-nationalists who harbour mostly disdain for things religious, but cynically enlist religion in the cause of their virulent nationalisms" (Powers, 1996: 252). The role of what we traditionally understand as religion was taken over by nationalism as a way of being 'political' in opposition, this time, not only with a particular religion but also with the territorially expressed nationhood that that religion was identified with. The

Leviathan was thus projected from the Hobbesian practical necessity into a Hegelo-Herdarian dangerously mystical teleology.

It is not accidentally then that theorists such as John Gray suggest the name of Thomas Hobbes as possibly linked with attempts at reconstruction in the aftermath of the post-modern deconstruction (Quoted in Ruggie, 1993: 37). The basic idea here is merely that a model, be it Hobbesian or not, of civil association could make possible a much better working mechanism of political integration of different cultures and thus one of the most dramatic consequences of the modern political project could be overcome. It is suggested that a rationalisation of our political space is possible, and that it would entail a re-actualisation of an association ritual to remind each of us from time to time what the purpose of *our* government is and what *our role* within that government is. This, as it has been already suggested and will be approached again later, presupposes in turn the full and true secularisation of politics. Indeed, as O'Sullivan also interprets the idea, the crucial point here is that, "The function of this sovereign is not to impose an ideology, religion, overall economic plan, or comprehensive ideal of social justice, but to provide an impersonal and formal framework of law" (O'Sullivan, 1993: 37).

Post offices must, indeed, remain clean for government to be possible and this seems to resemble actually the minimal government already proposed by Adam Smith and the liberals in his camp. If we accept the EU to be, as Ruggie claimed, the first post-modern polity, that would imply that its post offices could also be cleaned of all slogans of modernity linked with territorially identifiable polities throughout the continent. On this issue, Ruggie is categorical. Within the European Community, the non-territoriality bound movement of goods and work force becomes much more important and relevant politically than the territorial logic of nation-states (Ruggie, 1993: 172-3). William Wallace, too, maintains that, especially in the post-Maastricht period, West European states have continuously changed in the sense that they tended to gradually leave aside traditional state functions such as national defence, with its essentially territorial forms of expression, and embraced more and more roles limited to the pursuit of prosperity and the

regulatory tasks related to it. This is what makes Wallace characterise the new Western European states, in almost one voice with Ruggie, as the first “post-modern states” (Wallace, 1995: 29-30). Here it can also be argued that even the European federalist scholars (that is, those most confident of the important role nation-states will continue to play in Europe) state very clearly that the cause of international anarchy was “the absolute sovereignty of national States, which is the source of power-politics in the international sphere and of totalitarianism in the national one” (Bosco, 1992: 52). Moving above the national territorial bounds is, it is suggested, the future of us all. Other academics also argue insistently, like Zygmund Bauman does, that the Holocaust was a crude test of our modernity. He asserts that, in the absence of the politics of modernity, “the Holocaust would be unthinkable. It was the rational world of modern civilization that made it conceivable” (Bauman, 1989: 12-3). Irrational, criminal, inefficient, limited, imaginary, false, blind, antihuman – these are only a few of the harsh epithets attached to the modernity of nation-states. Even those who see the current European project as one difficult to control agree that the continent’s past was not a positive model and that was because of particularly negative aspects contained in the competition between the sovereignties of nation-states as prevailing in the pre-European Community age.

It is true however that, focused more and more as it is on the minimal objectives of government exclusively as suggested above, the post-modern state would eventually tend to become an impersonal, technically defined Leviathan. O’Sullivan points at the problem of legitimacy arising from this context: a government devoted to mere government and not preoccupied with the spread of a particular ideology or religion would also feel so free when pursuing its objectives that it might simply step over the limits of its assigned power. That government would therefore become eventually illegitimate. In O’Sullivan’s words, “the danger is that the post-modern state will predominantly concern itself with policy issues, and ignore the conditions of legitimacy which are the foundation of limited politics” (O’Sullivan, 1993: 41). However, the argument goes on, this is no news since there

are clear signs starting even from the end of World War II that, at least in the Western Europe, people's concerns about governments' legitimacy tended to diminish within a context more and more dominated by pressures (terrorism, criminality, unemployment, etc.) which determine in turn "the formulation of policy solely in the light of administrative considerations" (O'Sullivan, 1993: 42). In other words, there might be a problem with legitimacy in the European Union but it seems that Europeans themselves do not take legitimacy seriously anymore since it brought so much trouble and conflict the past. Indeed, the legitimacy of the European states up to the end of the Second World War rested on a political discourse in which the outside enemy and the mobilisation of the national effort toward the achievement of wealth from outside sources was predominant. This led, inevitably, to conflict in the international arena and to losses much higher than gains.

The technical fulfilment of individuals' expressed needs, as a source of legitimacy seems to be, indeed, the mark of political post-modernity. Crucial steps taken by the European Union indicate that such a transformation is real in that particular political entity. In line with William Wallace and Alexander Somek I also maintain that the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was, indeed, a milestone for the making of the European supranational polity. It basically made possible a superior level of European integration by setting the principles and institutions related to the common currency and the foreign and security European policy (Somek, 2001: 1). However, as scholars of economics maintain, the Maastricht Treaty was only an official act that followed much older tendencies in the same direction. Stephen Haseler, for instance, points at the entire process starting with the Rome Treaty of 1958 as relevant within this context. The Single European Act of 1987 was also an important moment for the integration since the establishment, on that occasion, of the Single Market represented a decisive blow to nation-states' sovereignty. The adoption of the common currency is also mentioned as a crucial step in that direction while, in fact, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Community had been operating before the Maastricht Treaty and limited severely

the capacity of national governments to manipulate interest rates and the rates of the Euro-currencies in accordance with electoral purposes. National polities have thus been continuously under a supranational pressure (Haseler, 1992: 23-4). The process moved, indeed, toward a general coordination of policies with one single aim: prosperity. The technical definition of European 'government' in terms of its ability to ensure that prosperity becomes crucial within this context. Moreover, the traditional political discourse proposed by the national polities becomes more and more senseless and not a long time will pass, optimists say, until it will find itself in an illegitimate position. It is very difficult therefore to imagine the nationalist political discourse as successful in Western Europe nowadays, at least for practical, administratively defined reasons. However, this European, allegedly post-modern supranational project found itself face to face with the challenge posed in the 1990s by a 'modern' nationalist discourse and political action nowhere else but in the old European 'powder keg,' in the Balkans. The following chapter represents an attempt at clarifying the significance and consequences of that quite unusual confrontation. I hope this will aid in building a more profound understanding of Europe itself in the twenty-first century. As Dimitris Chrysochoou asserted not a long time ago, "having welcomed the new millennium, and after nearly five decades of uninterrupted theorising about European integration, international scholarship is still puzzled as to what exactly the EU is or may come to resemble in the future" (Chrysochoou, 2001: 1). It is my belief that the Balkan mirror contains some clues about that future.

II

THE BALKAN CHALLENGE TO THE POST-MODERN EUROPEAN POLITY

The first chapter of this essay suggested that nationalism – as a political ideology in support of national emancipation and the establishment of nation-states – is an ideology with deep roots in modernity. The nation-state, implicitly, can be viewed from this perspective as a product of modernity, as a descendant of its predecessor, the multinational empire, from which the nation as such got ‘liberated’ and, at the same time, the nation-state was practically born. On the other hand, it was agreed that the supranational European project is unmatched in the perimeter of modernity. On the contrary, EU’s supranationality could be understood as the post-modern answer to the horrors of modernity and gradually constitutes itself as a denial of nation-states’ claim to rational legitimacy. It can be viewed, in this sense, as a proposal of a political organization breaking with tradition and changing the very meaning of legitimacy as transmitted to us by modernity. As it will be shown in this chapter, the recent conflicts in the Balkan Peninsula brought into light latent forces which both politicians from Western Europe and academia thought as dormant and lacking the energy necessary for them to be able, one more time, of penetrating deep into peoples’ consciences at the turn of the previous century. These forces come from the darkness of an understanding of politics inherited from old Western political thought but which have been overcome there in the meantime, especially with the spectacular upheavals taking place after World War Two, with the establishment and subsequent development of the European Community.

What follows could not cover all aspects of the Balkan conflict in the 1990s and that is not the purpose of this thesis. Instead, it will be only a selective approach to events and phenomena in that region’s recent political upheavals that

illustrate their very modernity as interpreted in the previous chapter. The unilateral proclamation of independence by the Slovenes and Croats put both Belgrade and the international community in a very difficult situation. International accords guarantee the territorial integrity of states' frontiers and they were expected to be invoked in favour of Yugoslavia in the sense that any modifications of that country's borders could have been done only by peaceful means and following the expressed options of the people living on the respective territories, in referendums (Thomas, 1997). It was not to be like that. How did all this happen and with what consequences is still a matter of academic and profane debate. A brief inventory of explanations is offered in what follows.

II. 1. Glimpses of Balkan Modernity

The general temptation to explain the convulsions in the Balkan Peninsula as related to a "history of ethnic rivalry" notwithstanding, it is at least puerile to resort directly to such superficial preconceptions. Literature on the issue abounds with "absolutist generalisations" such as, "backward, foreign, barbaric, uncivilized, fundamentally different, our 'orientalized others'" (Campbell, 1998: 90). Indeed, as David Campbell stresses in his deconstructivist analysis of the events concerning the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, "Violence, history, and ethnicity are concepts central to the conventional narrativizations of the conflict in Bosnia" (Campbell, 1998: 92). This arsenal of negative adjectives can at least be suspected of being contaminated by a backwardness and narrowness similar to the ones attached to the Balkan people. Moreover, there is also manifest a tendency to somehow justify such beliefs by forcing a visceral relation between past and future in the South Eastern Europe, a relation very rarely invoked when similar events in the Western Europe are approached analytically.

The crisis of the 1990s was, beyond any doubt, one provoked by actions of political actors *present* at that specific time on the ex-Yugoslav public stage. They

made use, indeed, of a political discourse invoking historical rights of their nations over particular territories but they were not history; they were there, present in the time of those dramatic events, and manipulating history to serve their own interests. The international court constituted to judge their actions does not indict King Alexander, or Dušan, or Tito, but the very actual responsibility of politicians who ordered mass killings at the end of the twentieth century with very precise and 'modern' objectives in mind. Madeleine Albright's feared that "a failure in Kosovo would have made the fiftieth anniversary of NATO look ridiculous, since the organization's alleged readiness for the challenges of the twenty first century would have proved empty words in the face of a conflict that started in the fourteenth" (Albright, 2003: 391). This shows, probably, not the most profound understanding of the issue. Scholars could, of course, intonate with William Hagen, for instance, the old score about the Balkan dissensions as "as old as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of nationalism" (Hagen, 1999: 52). By resorting to such rationale one cannot but absolve morally the real culprits who could thus be able to invoke history in order to be pardoned.

However, those scholars insisting on this view are not to be fully disqualified from the debate. The political actors in the ex-Yugoslav space acted within the specific context of a communist polity in a process of dissolution and made use, indeed, of the 'Balkan ghosts' at hand, the 'ethnic rivalry' Glennly mentions, in order to legitimise those actions in public. Up to this point, scholars on the Hagen side are right. However, the fact that those politicians employed a nationalist and exclusive political discourse with frighteningly great success does not necessarily imply the fact that the targeted public *was/is* a nationalist one, too, dominated by interethnic hatred. I would rather prefer to consider it only *vulnerable* to such discourses. As David Campbell also stresses, an insistence on the historical projection of conflict in the Balkans presupposes that, "the conflict was constituted *in history*, which implies that the hostility has an identifiable point of origin and is transmitted from generation to generation until it reaches the present. A deconstructive reading would open the way for suggesting that the conflict is

constituted *in the present*, and that 'history' is a resource in the contemporary struggle" (Campbell, 1998: 84). Deconstructive or not, the developments in the Balkan politics must be understood not as results of historical determinants since those envisaged determinants are history, that is, past. The real authors are to be looked for in the present, on all sides of the conflict, in Belgrade, Zagreb, Pale, Krajna, Priština, Ljubljana, Brussels, Moscow, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Washington, and elsewhere in the world.

The 'historicist' view of the conflict in the Balkans is legitimate only if viewed from inside the region as such. One of the most common themes in the Balkan political discourses for the last centuries was not that of ethnic hatred and rivalry but that of 'national liberation.' Aleksandar Pavkovic views the phenomenon as one at least two centuries old and estimates that its beginning can be traced back in the first Serbian uprising against the Ottoman Empire, in 1804 (Pavkovic, 2002: 227). The idea of liberation makes sense only if the liberated ones are under the yoke of an oppressor and, indeed, this was undoubtedly the case with the South Slavs, Greeks, Albanians, Romanians and others in the Balkan Peninsula under the rule or strong influence of relatively powerful empires such as those of the Ottomans, the Hapsburgs, the Romanoffs, and that is not to underestimate here the French, the British, or the German interests in the region. While this idea deserves serious consideration, not few are those who conceive of the national liberations in the Peninsula as much, much older. In fact, that is the essence of the political discourse in discussion here. National ancestries invoked by local patriots as dating back to the Byzantine times are not uncommon and so are accounts of national liberations even during those times, from the various dominators in the area. Romanians, on the other hand, are convinced that they are the direct descendants of the Roman colonizers of the ancient province of Dacia, in the beginning of the IInd century, A.D., long before the emergence and flourishing of Byzantium. The discourse of their liberation in the XIXth century though is different from that of the others in the region only in its interpretation of the 'yoke.' A reputed Byzantinologist, H el ene Ahrweiler, is of the opinion that the Byzantine

view of politics had also tremendous influence on the formation of the Balkan political psyche. The state formation process started in the area at a time when the Empire was collapsing. Thus, states were built temporarily on its ruins and, most dramatically, in its name. This resulted in a competition among the local rulers over the title of follower of the Byzantine Emperor and defendant of Empire's holy lands from the Ottoman threats (Ahrweiler, 2002). It is suggested that the political upheavals in the region since the establishment of the Eastern Roman Empire were marked with an interesting constancy by the political ideology of Byzantium within which Ahrweiler finds as central the idea of the universal empire.

According to the medieval understanding, each state had a specific rank in a universal hierarchy of nations in which Byzantium was situated at the top of this pyramid (Ahrweiler, 2002: 45). After the fall of the Empire in the fifteenth century, its past glory was to exalt the imagination of most of the military and political leaders in the region. Their virtually all attempts at domination over their own territories and expansion over others were done in the name of the very *universality* of the Byzantine Empire and Orthodoxy. They were constantly claiming to be restoring the rule of those two myths as against the Ottoman Turks all along the centuries of Ottoman domination. This situation practically lasted roughly until the end of World War I. The political speech was therefore dominated by a theme whose message addressed any other military or political rival who would pretend the same glory, at the same time. It should not be surprising that one of the names under which the Byzantine Empire was known to its inhabitants and even to its enemies was *Romania*. This appellation was intended to remind of the Roman sources of capital city's authority. Hence, the name adopted for their country by the dwellers north from Danube in the XIXth century was neither accidental nor innocent, notwithstanding the true Latin origins of the Romanians, practically the only ones in the region that could claim such an illustrious ascendancy. One could rightfully make the supposition that the respective name implied a more or less overt claim that the people from the territories north of Danube were somehow legitimately entitled to be the sole inheritors of the Byzantine imperial aura. It was and it

continues to be therefore extremely dangerous to attach denominations and labels to various political actions even long before the Ottomans imposed their reign in the region together with what was to be called, later in our times, *Pax Ottomana*.

All Balkan history from 1453 (the official date known for the fall of Byzantium under the Ottomans) and until the final crises of the Ottoman Empire is merely about local military and political leaders trying to impose their domination over their Balkan peoples in the name of the old Byzantine glory. Andrei Pippidi, author of intricate studies of the Byzantine political establishment and influence in the Balkans, pointed insistently at the political discourse and terminology of Byzantine origin as contaminating first the Slavic state formations in the peninsula and, later, being transmitted to the various principalities north from the Danube. This was a complex process which contributed to the melting of leaders' political aspiration into one, pan-Balkan, ideal centred on the mythical capital of the eastern Roman Empire and lasted for centuries after its fall under the Ottomans (Pippidi, 2001). Consequently, as Barbara Jelavich suggested, the political loyalties in the Balkans were hardly oriented toward these leaders and there are strong reasons for us to believe that the people, who were mostly peasants, were much more emotionally oriented toward their families and the small universe of the regions where they inhabited (Jelavich, 2000: 214).

Since the leaders of the political entities established in the Balkans after the fall of the Byzantine Empire claimed in almost all cases the right to the imperial crown, the reputed Romanian historian Alexandru Madgearu feels entitled to assert that one cannot talk of the emergence of national states at that early age in history (Madgearu, 2001: 108). Language, for one, was only a premise of political establishment; rule was simply facilitated by a common language among the ruled and in the government as a practical instrument. It did not have the messianic attributes it is endowed with nowadays in the nationalist political discourse in most countries in the Balkans. Moreover, had the language been an important factor at that stage in the formation of the political states in the Balkans, the pan-Slavic movement directed from Moscow in the two centuries before the fall of the Ottoman

Empire should have been more successful than it only occasionally was. But how could people who would not trust their local leaders trust, in exchange, an alternative coming from thousands of kilometres away? Language as an agent of political identification of various entities was hardly present at that time. This heterogeneous picture of government-governed relations made political development much more sinuous and made the western Europeans look with puzzled and, unfortunately, despising eyes at the Balkans as the depository, like the Orient, of all negative characteristics of the society that Europeanism positioned itself against ever since (Todorova, 2000: 294). This negative image was to mark the east-west relations to this day.

The Ottoman domination in the Balkan Peninsula left mixed memories. On one hand, there was the strong belief that the Muslim 'infidels' were the enemies of local Christians and that they had to be resisted to and, eventually, defeated. This eventually happened with the conclusion of the Second World War but many continue to view the cultural leftovers of the Ottoman rule in the region with reticence even now, when Muslim political entities knock at the doors of the European Union from both inside and outside. On the other hand, there are those who see beyond this predominant veil and can point at positive aspects of the Ottoman domination in the Balkans, among them being the *millet* system which contributed to a great extent to the preservation of a sort of cultural and religious unity on economic basis *inside* the various Balkan communities, the very essence of the *Pax Ottomana* invoked here. This guaranteed a kind of personal autonomy for those communities (Hannum, 1990: 50-1). The fact that unity *among* those various communities could not be promoted under that system is another story and should be viewed in connection with the competing aspiration to the exclusive Byzantine glory as suggested above as a political pretext for domination on behalf of various leaders, and also in connection with the small leaders' interest in just paying their communities' tributes to Istanbul without any concern about *others'* capacity to do so. In Romania there is a saying that runs like this: 'the interest wears the fez.' The political culture is, of course, only part of a broader understanding of the idea of

culture and in the Balkans the Ottoman Empire definitely left its mark in this respect.

However, a crucial point here is that, as this time William Hagen rightfully points out, “from the viewpoint both of the Ottoman Empire and the various religious hierarchies, personal identity was, so to speak, extraterritorial” (Hagen, 1999: 53). In other words, the dwelling place of individuals was of little importance to the authorities; the Ottomans were interested only in receiving the tax money which the local leaders, be them political, religious, or military, were supposed to pay and that is what was requested from them in exchange for their relative economic independence. The local leaders, on the other hand, could not coagulate energies in an anti-Ottoman front even if they contemplated such an idea at least because of two reasons: the Sultan’s regime was not very oppressive, at least not until the crises of the empire became serious in the end of the seventeenth century, and the leaders themselves were not interested in overthrowing a regime which granted them enough economic liberty to become rich. Consequently, the extraterritorially organized *millet* system resisted time successfully.

This is also the view of Linz and Stepan who praise the ‘rich experiments’ of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires in the region. During those times, their reportedly non-religious and non-territorial administrative approaches to the Balkan region in the form of *milletler* or *national curias* respectively were simply more productive of peace than our modern approaches based on the concept of territorial sovereignty of states. The two scholars suggest that, “these mechanisms will not eliminate conflict in multinational states, but they may moderate conflict and help make both the state and democracy more viable” (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 34). To make a long story short, recent scholarship already started suggesting that political models predating the eruption of national movements in the modern age of the Balkan Peninsula might have been more adequate than blind multicultural models promoted as they were with obstinacy as solutions to the Yugoslav conflicts in the 1990s, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, as Linz and Stepan suggest, “Before the conscious use of ethnic cleansing as a strategy to construct

nation-states in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo was a multinational urban area, whose citizens had multiple identities and one of the highest rates of interfaith marriages of any city in the world” (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 35). Only that *how* multiculturalism was to be promoted in the political field did not seem at all to be clear for its own proponents.

The saga of Ottoman and Hapsburg domination in the peninsula is, however, not as simple and positive as suggested up to now in these pages. A look from above at these details of the imperial administrations reveals the fact that, indeed, the formation of national states as a step through which most of the western nations were passing at that time was dramatically halted. Hagen is again right when asserting that, “Premodern state-formation in the Balkans was short-circuited by the Ottoman Turkish conquest of the region during the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries” (Hagen, 1999: 52). Local lamentations about this aspect tend, indeed, to confirm this view. An overwhelming majority of historians from the region point at the Ottoman rule, specifically with its administration system, as a decisive hurdle in the way of nation and state building.

Another negative aspect underlined by various analysts is that the Ottoman elite were constantly opposing any attempts at reformation. While tremendous technological and economic upheavals affected most of the other competing empires, and while sultans aspiring at upgrading the Ottoman edifice in accordance with those developments were not totally absent, the elite positioned itself staunchly on the other side. Controlled by the ‘wise men,’ the *ulema*, the elite preferred to focus on its own private interests to the disadvantage of the imperial system as a whole. In the words of Misha Glenny, “Watching from the wings as Spain, Britain, Holland and France developed their great commercial empires, they ignored the influx of large amounts of gold and silver into European markets. Such fundamental shifts in the global economy, they assumed, were of no concern to the protected markets of the empire. This was a serious miscalculation. In the two centuries since the colonization of the New World, the impact of European mercantilism promoted inflation, famine and political instability in the Ottoman

Empire” (Glenny, 2001: 3). Therefore, while already being in impossibility to build their own states, the Balkan nations could only wait for the collapse of the empire they were part of and, provided that they were interested, not even capable of influencing its political and economic trajectory. This so-called *Pax Ottomana* was to be followed by the *Pax Communista* with almost similar effects, especially on the western side of the Balkan Peninsula, in the former Yugoslavia.

There was literally no time and space for the constituting nations of the Yugoslav federation to build their identities and states on a path similar to that of western nations. Instead, as Barbara Jelavich suggests, the Balkan conception of nationality remained to be based on three fundamental factors: common language, common history, and common religion (Jelavich, 2000: 167). No political constitutive principle can be found among these factors. By contrast, the western nations lived and build their history based on Principle, most often on the contractualist principle as developed in the early Enlightenment age. That is most probably how history was less exposed to being politicized there. Very early in their history the westerners could start becoming *citizens* of their countries at a time when, in the Balkans, villages were still robed by their own masters. The incubatory effect of imperialism, Ottoman, Hapsburg, or communist in the Balkans led eventually to the preservation of a sort of pre-nation-state “siege mentality” and mistrust of the outside, or “mistrust of international community,” which had allegedly an immense say in the 1990s (Powers, 1996: 244). Indeed, as Schöpflin put it, “the Cold War acted as a kind of discipline and constraint on both the West and the East of Europe, locked as they both were in a political, cultural and ultimately a civilisational confrontation” (Schöpflin, 1996: 219). Lacking the political principle to help building their national establishments, the nations in the Balkans simply had to resort to ‘other’ alternatives such as a permanent focus on leadership with the consequence that personalized politics became the rule for the centuries to come. Moreover, the outside help coming from the successful nations in the west also weighed constantly in the delicate balance of power in the region. As Pavkovic stresses, outside military and diplomatic intervention is a crucial

element for the success of any national liberation movement in the Balkans” (Pavkovic, 2002: 246). Moreover, their strategic position on the main communication roads between Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean and the Black Seas turned the Balkan states into perennial pawns that “required the protection of an external power to survive, be it the Austro-Hungarians, the Ottomans, or a federal Yugoslavia” (Glenny, 1995: 99). This whole mosaic of potential loyalties to and expectations from alliances with various outside powers brought with them, naturally, the possibility of suspicion about the opponents of those alliances and loyalties. That is one explanation for the ‘hatred’ between the Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Serbians, and the Moslem Bosniaks more than a presupposed explosive mixture of understanding/hatred of the religious messages as such. In other words, there is a small probability that those people know much about the *others* as to justify a comprehensible feeling of aversion; it is suggested that a totally negative perception of foreign interests in the region led to the emergence of narratives of enmity at an extra-regional level. Those who called for foreign support were nothing but enemies of the local, pastoral peace. This being most probably true in what concerns the viewpoint of the common people, it becomes extremely dangerous when such feelings are confiscated by local political and military leaders with totally different aspirations than their country fellows. I suggest that ignorance rather than a superficially labelled and understood ‘ethnic hatred’ should be thought of as the staunchest enemy of peace in the Balkans. As Srdja Pavlovic maintains, “the insufficient knowledge of that *other*, poor level of communication and exchange between the different groups in the region constitute the core elements of nationalistic fear and hate” (Pavlovic, 2000: 122). The responsibility within this context of those who ‘historicize’ identities instead of simply narrating their story is immense. As Levy put it, “vested with legitimacy imparted by expertise, historians are important players who help shape collective identity by connecting past and present, providing continuities and a memory repertoire upon which the national collectivity may draw to define itself” (Levy,

1999). National identities are built in a social construction reflex salutarily unmasked by post-modern thinkers.

It is in precisely this direction that recent scholarship indicates as a way of comprehending the Balkan puzzle. For a long time, the religious institutions in the Orthodox South Eastern Europe were viewed as depositary of a memory of resistance to various challenges, ranging from the strictly religious ones as posed by the Catholicism and Islam, to the cultural and, above all, political ones as posed by the leaders of those rival communities in the region. Few saw also the Orthodox Church's historical reflex of incorporating itself forcefully in what is generally accepted as the collective memory of communities, especially of national/ethnic communities. In other words, and by virtue of the local Orthodox churches' autocephaly (unlike the more rigorous Catholic Church with doctrinarian lines drawn in one coordinating point) these local patriarchies and episcopates developed in time a sort of patronage over history and over people's being in history. The rivalry between various military/political leaders of the small communities in the region was constantly dependent on the endorsement of these churches at a time when help from the skies was more important and comprehensible than cooperation between people. No wonder, then, that cultural and political identities in the region were formed around small religious communities in a permanent state of rivalry and confrontation much more complex than elsewhere. The Ottoman *milletler* came, indeed, only to aid this process of small identity formation and, when the modern idea of 'national liberation' emerged on this stage, both political and religious establishments rushed to confiscate it at a time when above them in political hierarchy was nothing but empires which anyway 'enslaved' nations.

Barbara Jelavich also underscores the fact that within that context the Orthodox Church had major political responsibilities in the sense that it kept, indeed, those communities of Christians in the Balkans united. However, that was in many instances done with the purpose of making those communities able, eventually, to satisfy a very demanding system of tributes and taxes that the empire put in place for the financing of the enormous bureaucracy in Istanbul (Jelavich,

2000: 215). This turned into a political reflex on behalf of the local Orthodox churches in the Balkans to which the atheist view of communism added a new dimension of legitimacy. Once again the 'nation' (*narod* means both the political nation and the common people communism pretended to emancipate) had to be liberated and the only institution with historical continuity in this business was the church but fragmented as it was for centuries along ethnic lines. No wonder then that, in the 1990s, the role of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches in the inflammation of the conflict was to be invoked on numerous occasions. Indeed, as Srdja Pavlovic insists, "Religious institutions in the former Yugoslavia can not evade raising the issue of their responsibility in the process of the destruction of the former Yugoslavia. Viewed as institutional frameworks for the notions of a collective spirit of the nations, each institution (the Catholic Church in Croatia and Slovenia, the Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as the Islamic religious institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) had, in various ways and to various degrees, contributed to the creation of the general climate of intolerance" (Pavlovic, 2000: 120). However, I would rather prefer not to approach this aspect in detail here and assert, together with Gerard Powers, only that "if there is a religious dimension to the conflict, it is found more in the integral link between religion and national identity than in religious-cultural differences" (Powers, 1996: 228). As suggested in the first chapter of this thesis, the profoundly secular message of the communist ideology led to a strange replacement of the traditional 'religion' by the religion of the national roots with all its dramatically exclusive reflexes. Indeed, had it all been about religion in the traditional sense of the word, the territorial aspects invoked in absolutely all political discourses and peace treaties would have made little sense. As T.M. Frye put it, "In Yugoslavia, religion continues to play an important definitional role in ethnic identity, dividing Catholic Slovenes and Croats from Orthodox Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians, but weak religious beliefs among the populace makes solely religious appeals a non-starter" (Frye, 1992: 604). However, a change was to occur toward the end of the twentieth century with

the appearance of new vehicles of opinion when the public stage was invaded by the new media means.

The already complex European landscape was to be once more instigated by new challenges and, not accidentally, the most vulnerable turned out to be the same 'ignorant' South East Europeans who cared much more than other European peoples about the steps taken by the 'neighbours' in the context of the political psyche sketched above. As Simon Titley suggested recently, the 1990s were marked by a gradual blurring of major differences between political ideologies. Instead, the new technologies facilitated a much faster distribution of the political message from candidates in democratic elections to voters. Thus, promptness tended to replace substance in a Europe badly in need for urgent solutions to its various social and economic problems, especially after the collapse of communism in the east became evident. These electoral techniques replaced an ideological approach with a consumerist one, characterized by emotional appeals to the self, to identity. This trend has been reinforced by more intense competition between media caused by a proliferation of media outlets. Moreover, the media no longer has the patience to provide space for lengthy rational argument but instead relies on emotionally appealing "soundbites" (Titley, 2003: 85). The nationalist political discourse so much favoured in the Balkans could therefore not find a better context for flourishing. The old 'ghosts' could easily be brought back to life and, in the competition context configured in the former Yugoslavia with the emergence of the nationalist political discourses of Milošević and Tudjman, it was almost natural that ancient stereotypes rather than ancient hatreds were to be massively popularized.

The Croat political discourse in the beginning of the 1990s pointed at the 'legitimate' right of the Croatian nation to establish its own sovereign state as deriving naturally from a historical right to sovereignty and based on "the millennial national identity of the Croatian nation." This old-modern dichotomy was therefore to erupt in region of related unfulfilment. Franjo Tudjman, as the President of Croatia, mentioned explicitly that his country's strive for independence

was legitimate in the face of “greater-Serbian-hegemonistic forces” (Trifunovska, 1995: 238, 244-5, 249, 251-2; quoted in Pavkovic, 2000). This, indeed, followed the accession to power of Slobodan Milošević with his pro-Yugoslav political message that I shall approach again later in this thesis. What must be underlined at this point is that such discourses were not born out of history but were simply manipulating history and people’s superficial, partisan knowledge of it. Indeed, as Gerard Powers underlines, in Serbia “there is a strong sense that one who is not Orthodox is not Serb, and that all Serbian Orthodox should live in the same state” since Serbian Orthodoxy is seen traditionally as a defender of [South] Eastern European Orthodoxy against Catholicism and of European Christianity against Islam (Powers, 1996: 239). However, the physical site of such an identity was subject to competing views. Where exactly was to be the territory of the ‘Serbian Orthodoxy’ and where the one of the Catholic or the Muslim units? Contemporary politically motivated and history manipulating scenarios competed to answer this question. As it could be perceived from the developments in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the respective answer suggested that Orthodoxy and Serbia tended to be viewed as intimately connected and this, in turn, had to become a reality on the ground, with all dramatic implications it presupposed. However, it must be kept in mind that it was the political discourses and not the historical events they invoked that caused the trouble.

II. 2. Ethnic Mosaic and the Birth of Post-Communist Nationalism in Yugoslavia

This is not to eliminate totally the negative effects of misconceived political decisions in the recent past, especially during the Yugoslav communist times. In the words of Aleksandar Pavkovic describing the communist, post-1945 federal state, indeed, “Like its model, the USSR, Yugoslavia was a centralized one-party state displaying the trappings of a federation based on the fictitious self-

determination of its nations” (Pavkovic, 2002: 234). In the period before the World War II, the Yugoslav communists preferred to recommend themselves as standard bearers of a new ideology rather than emphasising nationalist projects (Djilas, 1995: 118). However, things were to change in just a couple of decades as a result of a set of badly administered policies by Tito himself. The ethnic complexity of the country so much invoked by analysts of all backgrounds and all times was to play its part, indeed, in the subsequent developments. Migrations determined by war or economic considerations, deportations during the Ottoman rule and other specificities of the region had led inevitably to the constitution of an ethnic mosaic of a particular nature in the Balkan Peninsula. As an overwhelming majority of scholars insist, the incredible number of ethnic groups sharing that small area makes it difficult in principle “to find a formula to satisfy all of them” (Frye, 1992: 618). Yugoslavia was also to pass, as all Eastern Europe, through its own modernization process which, in turn, contributed to the further mixing of those populations. The forced industrialisation promoted by the communist regimes altered decisively the ethnic composition without leading to the blurring of the borders between national and religious identities as it happened elsewhere in Europe (Hammel, 1993). Freezing those identities was a job intellectual and religious elites were doing tremendously well. This inevitably made most of those interested in Balkan politics look first and foremost at the ethnic mosaic there and make any other judgements on the assumption that any attempts at putting order in the political structure needed adaptation to the respective mosaic. Communists did exactly the same. Nevertheless, as Banac stresses, “the Yugoslav peoples, in perspective, could have been better understood in terms of their differences, rather than in terms of their similarities. Even the common emphasis on cultural diversity *among* ethnic nationalities frequently overlooked the dissimilarity of peoples *within* each nationality” (Banac, 1996, xii-xvii). This was to turn against *Pax Communista*, too, as it happened with other ‘peaces’ before.

On the other hand, the Yugoslav ‘melting pot’ was conceived by the communists as based on the mythical origins fictitiously attributed to the five

nations constituting the new federation of Southern Slavs (Yugo-Slavia), the Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes respectively. "According to this fictitious account, the five nations – or their members, irrespective of the federal republic in which they lived in Yugoslavia – exercised once and for all their right to national self-determination by uniting in the federation finally established in January 1946" (Pavkovic, 2002: 233). The figure of Josip Broz Tito dominated this strange making of the Yugoslav identity and many believed until quite recently that communists were trying successfully to keep under control the nationalist 'powder keg' in that part of Europe. However, as Alexandar Pavkovic observed, "such discourse is based, at least in principle, upon the presupposed notion of a non-nationalistic nature of the Yugoslav communist elite." The scholar then argues that, on the contrary, "the communist elite in the former Yugoslavia was as nationalistic as their royalist predecessors had been but the manifestations of their nationalist sentiments had acquired new ideological frameworks, thus, creating a new form of nationalism that combined the elements of the old nineteenth century nationalist thought together with the new ideology of the *Yugoslav supranationality*" (Pavkovic, 2000: 118; italics in original).

Coupled with Tito's already mentioned preference for a federation of distinctively identified nations, this approach was bound to fail in case the communist system as a whole was to fail economically or otherwise. And this is exactly what happened in the end. Indeed, Tito's initial intelligent moves in support of Yugoslav unity notwithstanding, the perpetuation of separate ethnic or national identities throughout the country maintained the possibility of old bills being paid in the context of ethnic rivalry, or of new demands to be aired especially following the natural modifications in the ethnic configuration. As one scholar suggests, "examples of this could be seen in the Serbo-Albanian conflict in Kosovo-Metohija from the 1950s, and the Croatian uprising of 1971 which demanded greater autonomy. The League of Communist in Yugoslavia continuously promoted the ideal of 'brotherhood and unity', a slogan which supposedly represented the

cornerstone of Yugoslav national identity and community. Ultimately, this slogan was to fail dramatically” (Tsoungourou, 2002: 67).

First, the identity of the Yugoslav nations was not quite clear. The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, could identify themselves on religious grounds rather than ethnic since their language was Serbo-Croatian and practically did not have a territorial base. Their very religious particularity, originating in the late South East European Middle Ages as a solution those people found to be exempted from payment of taxes to the Grand Porte, made communist authorities give them a national status. However, that took place very late, in 1968, and in order “to remove them from the competition to demonstrate their ‘real’ identity as either Serbs or Croats ... [so as to] neutralize the territorial aspirations of either with respect to Bosnia” (Allcock 1992: 283). While Montenegrins, Croats and Slovenes did not need such ‘efforts’ Macedonians were on a different track. Indeed, Macedonian revolutionaries acted for many years toward the destabilization of the region after the Treaty of Neuilly (November 1919), when a part of Macedonia inhabited by ethnic Bulgarians was attached to Serbia (Gargas, 1995: 4). Their identity has for ages presupposed conflict involving the competing interests of Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks, while Albanians make a significant minority subject of the Albanian state’s concern. Conflicts often involved armed uprisings against the Ottomans, terrorism, and four wars in the Balkans (Kaplan, 1991). Once part of Serbia in the beginning of the twentieth century, the Serbs viewed it as belonging to their historical motherland but the establishment of Macedonia as a federal unit within the federal state of Yugoslavia in 1914 was to contribute decisively to the Serbian suspicion about the communist design. Macedonia was, indeed, part of the pre-1914 territory of Serbia under the royal regime but the communist regime, after defeating the Chetnik and the Ustashe resistance, decided that it was time for the constituting nations of the federation to be given a proof of the wide range of liberties they were to enjoy in the new, communist state. Therefore, in the late 1940s Macedonia was established as a republic within the federal system, while Vojvodina and Kosovo were to become autonomous provinces. The tendency was

not singular in the communist bloc since the establishment of the autonomous Magyar zone in the very heart of the communist Romania was to follow soon after. However, for the Serbian public opinion that was used to the image of itself as patronizing South Slav Orthodoxy this seems to have been not an easy decision to digest and determined the subsequent Serbian suspicion about the central, federal, communist government over the next decades.

Until then, the communists were busy to propagate their political message about a just society for all working people regardless of national and religious cultural boundaries in the spirit of the so-called *international proletarian solidarity* as inspired by Moscow. It was within this context that the idea of a *Yugoslav supranationality* started being viewed as a panacea for all previous problems caused by nationalism throughout the region. However, analysts have pointed out repeatedly that this idea was not at all as innocent as it seemed. As Srdja Pavlovic maintains, "Preserving the power of the central authority was another strong motive." In this way, only a different type of nationalism was born and "this *new nationalism* was the curious mix of traditional nationalistic notions of home and belonging, on the one hand, and the ideology of the *separate road to socialism*, on the other. Such positioning of the opposites served as justification of the rhetoric of a constant change in the society." Society was to function according to the famous principle of *unity in diversity* with the six constitutive republics understood as distinct and equally represented in the local and federal governing bodies which, in turn, formed an "essentially uniform structure" at the federal level. However, what seemed to be the perfect solution to an incendiary national/ethnic mix could not stop eventually the outburst of nationalist discourse. Pavlovic suggests at this point that, imposing these principles meant actually "suppressing the voices calling for national identification and differentiation, and marginalizing the elements of national distinctiveness, culture, and tradition" (Pavlovic, 2000: 116).

The Serbian leading position in the federation turned out to be fatal, especially since Serbs themselves viewed the federal polity as suppressing their own national identity. As suggested above, the autonomous status given to Kosovo and

Vojvodina on largely religious grounds and the federal status offered to Macedonia represented a wound in the Serbian collective conscience for which the communist regime at the federal level was responsible. Since Tito was not a Serb, all non-Serbs, the political discourse went on, must have conspired against Serbia. Indeed, as Alexandar Pavlovic indicates, “this *ressentiment*, especially over the creation of the two provinces, displayed openly only by a few dissident intellectuals in the 1960s, became the major driving force behind the spread of Serb nationalism in the 1980s” (Pavkovic, 2002: 236; italics in original).

To all this must be added that the republics forming the federation were more and more separated toward the end of the 1970s and not only at the formal political level. Aleksa Djilas points out, for instance, that the education system simply was not designed as to support Yugoslav unity. The existence of a unified Yugoslav educational programme notwithstanding, cultural relations between republics were at a low level of development or inexistent in some cases, there was no pan-Yugoslav university and no policy to determine both students and teachers to study or work in other republics than the one they lived in. Djilas calls this “cultural and intellectual autarky of the republics” and suggests it had a major impact for the preservation of nationalist feelings throughout the communist era in Yugoslavia (Djilas, 1995: 120). The role played by the Orthodox parishes of the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman times was taken over by local communist governing bodies propagating the new religion of ‘Roots against Reason’ which in the former Yugoslavia changed, as elsewhere in the Balkans, into ‘roots against any other roots’ as a recipe for identity survival. Education in the spirit of the *Yugoslav supranationality* would have definitely convinced both outsiders and insiders of the good intentions of the communist federal government but in the former Yugoslavia that was never on the political agenda. As Djilas insistently points out, “while a common Yugoslav school program was created, cultural exchanges among Yugoslavia’s six republics were not intense and with time became rare. It was rare for a Croatian professor to teach in Belgrade or a Serbian one in Zagreb. When the media did advocate all-Yugoslav ideas, it was an exception to the rule. This cultural

and intellectual autarky of republics helped preserve the traditional nationalisms of various groups” (Djilas, 1995: 120). The public floor was left free for the nationalist speech to flourish as it deeded toward the end of the 1980s.

This was a process inflamed by particular political actions attributed especially to Tito who, it is suggested by contemporary historians and analysts, ceased to believe in the multicultural Yugoslav project and took a very ambiguous stance starting especially with the 1960s. The economic reforms implemented in 1965 and aiming at stimulating economic development had already meant a serious step away from the communist-type centralized economic planning but, at the same time, affected dramatically the Yugoslav state as a whole. “Republics and autonomous provinces began developing their own autarkic economies, duplicating each other’s industrial enterprises, and inefficiently employing large foreign credits and loans” (Djilas, 1995: 121). This simply contributed to the acceleration of what was to be seen two decades later as the dramatic decline of the Yugoslav economy and state as a whole. Djilas and others view the adoption of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution as the final blow dealt by Tito to his own state because it virtually made Yugoslavia a confederation of states and altered even the last traces of federalism with all it presupposes regarding an effective role of the federal, central authorities (Djilas, 1995: 121; Russinow, 1985: 136-7).

The full self-determination of the basic national units became almost a reality indeed with the invoked 1974 constitution. It was the world’s longest constitution and it basically created new representative bodies with an extremely complex system of checks and balances which in the end aimed at strengthening the position of the communist party throughout the Yugoslav federation. At the same time, the fundamental act maintained the provisions of the 1971 amendments to the former Constitution that practically enhanced particular roles of the republics in the local implementation of policies. This was in turn detrimental to the central, federal government that remained to control only the real mechanism of power. Within such a political context, no wonder then that nationalist discourse became more active than ever and it contested exactly the

right of the Belgrade based federal government to take decisions that affected the entire Yugoslav establishment, especially in what concerned economic development. In the Balkan region, indeed, it is common for people to talk about Transylvania, Croatia, or Slovenia as “traditionally enlightened and prosperous while all the other countries or sub-regions in the South Eastern Europe make an amorphous and poor rest” (Garges, 1995: 3-4). Blaming the less competitive ones for the failures of the entire Yugoslavian economy only waited for the best time to come to light. The new constitutional arrangement favoured the development of national identities but disfavoured their economic development. The republics forming the Yugoslav federation had been free for at least twenty years after 1974 to pursue their own policies, especially regarding education and the occupation of the positions in the republican apparatuses of the communist party. The communist Yugoslav policy of equality among the constitutive nations, as designed by Tito, meant that recruitment of cadre presupposed only temporary transfers to central federal offices. The same political office holders paying much more attention to the developments in their own, republican constituencies, especially after the adoption of the 1974 constitution, this meant that the local, republican political structures became in time more and more credible as sources of legitimacy than the federal structures of the communist party. Career and political interests would gravitate more and more at the local level, a fact that found logically the support of members of the various national groups. All this led to a situation in which, “the republics (and, to a lesser extent, the provinces) became both the sources of state sovereignty and centres of political power” (Pavkovic, 2002: 236). Recognition of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty can be then well imagined as depending upon the consent of the member-nations of the federation.

Moreover, the loyalty of the local communists to the federal authorities rested almost exclusively on their true loyalty to Tito personally. Aleksandar Pavkovic suggests here that when Tito died in 1980, “the office of the President of Yugoslavia which he held was abolished, and the republican and provincial communist elites were thus left in full and undisputed control of the country”

(Pavkovic, 2002: 236). The dissolution of the federation was, indeed, strongly determined by economic failings that affected the entire communist bloc but, in the particular case of Yugoslavia, it was marked by profound challenges coming from inside its own political setting. The constitution of 1974 seems to have been designed by Tito as to strengthen the communist control of the Yugoslav state and that was the crystal clear sign that things were not working quite well on that side. Srdja Pavlovic observes that the 1974 Constitution represented “an indication of two major shortcomings of the Yugoslav model of the *separate road to socialism*. First, it was an indirect admission of failure on the part of the federal communist authorities to maintain the positive image of brotherhood and unity. Second, it was an admission of the fact that the communist elite adopted the logic of nationalism and embraced the issues of the nationalist policy in their respective republics” (Pavlovic, 2000: 117-8). Yugoslav ‘unity,’ it is asserted, seems to have been more declaratory in nature, in line with the other ‘achievements’ of communist regimes in other East European countries where only the eventual collapse of the entire system could make them believe that things were simply not working well. Ideology, one more time, was to pretend not only the right to represent identities, but even the right to create them in the name of its declared ideals. Precisely the same happened with the invented Soviet identity under the policies directed for seventy years from Moscow. Unity was unfortunately, in Yugoslavia like in the USSR, a simple, secondary aspect of the “ideological umbrella” (Pavlovic, 2000: 115). Another imagined community was to vanish by virtue of its own vaporous nature.

The picture of the collapse of the Yugoslav idea becomes then ridiculous and irrational. As Aleksa Djilas puts it bluntly, that idea was possible only as safeguarded by its only guarantors, the communist police and army, while Tito distinguished himself only with his impotence in the face of developments contrary to the artificiality of the Yugoslav idea. While Serbs and Croats had been fighting since the foundation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia over the nature – centralized or federal – of their new state, Tito probably had to admit that that was no easy issue to be solved by reinventing some national identity on the basis of communist

ideological ideals. Consequently, he eventually opted for pursuing his personal political objectives. As in the words of Djilas, "Tito's Yugoslavia was undoubtedly not a totalitarian state of mass terror, but merely a moderately authoritarian, semi-efficient, corrupt, and somewhat farcical state, similar to many others in the world. The main guarantors of Yugoslavia's unity were the communist police and army." And the author goes on with his portrayal of the Yugoslav leader: "His talent was for nonsolutions that partly worked, provided he was at the centre of the polycentric Yugoslav federation and the West provided huge credits" (Djilas, 1995: 122). This is harsh but, in the end, the final dissolution of the Yugoslav dream proves that neither in its form as a pre-communist polity, nor as a communist or as a post-communist one could it resist. Since this chapter has suggested possible explanations for the question *why* about Yugoslavia's collapse, *how* it collapsed is quite a different story addressed in the following chapters.

II. 3. The Modernity of 'National Liberations' in Yugoslavia

For now, let us just try to have a look from the above. Aleksandar Pavkovic maintains that the events of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia represented actually the fourth wave of national liberation movements, after the one in 1804, the second Serbian uprising in 1814 and the gaining of autonomy by Serbia within the Ottoman Empire in 1830. The third wave was the one starting with the first Balkan war in 1912 that, "led to the liberation by the Serbian and Montenegrin armies of Kosovo and the 'old Serbia' (present-day Macedonia) from Ottoman rule." This fourth round is the one starting in 1991 and, in the author's words, it is "still underway" and there are reasons to think that this will not be the final round (Pavkovic, 2002, 227-8). Indeed, at least the large communities of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia suggest that the time is not far when those populations will openly demand the secession of the territories they live in from Serbia and Macedonia, respectively, with or without the final aim of uniting those territories

with Albania. "The Kosovo Albanians staged uprisings against the Yugoslav authorities in 1918, 1941, 1944/45 and in 1998/99. Only in 1941 and in 1999 were they successful: in 1941 the defeat by the Axis, and in 1999 the NATO air bombing enabled the Kosovo Albanian political leaders to take over Kosovo province from the Yugoslav government" (Pavkovic, 2002: 228-9). A multitude of other 'national' revolutionaries, to include Macedonians, Croatians, or Slovenes also contested continuously various sovereignties established through international treaties in the region (Garges, 1995).

Oscar Halecki indicated decades ago that the strive for self-determination in the Balkan region, complex as it was due to reasons partly suggested here, encountered for centuries the opposition of all major actors on the European political stage who feared the "Balkanisation" of the continent through the proliferation of small states. 'National liberations' were therefore legitimate and the nations in the South Eastern Europe continued stubbornly to struggle for self-determination throughout history until they finally gained it (Halecki, 1963: 335). Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians, and even the Turks managed to establish their national states as a coronation of national aspirations for full self-determination. It was only in Yugoslavia that the different nations labelled politically as South Slavs remained under a cosmetically designed Yugoslav Federation which, under both the royal and communist authority, proved eventually to be only a mechanism through which Belgrade would exert its own domination in the area. This domination was then naturally contested by those nations within it perceiving what was difficult to be perceived by outsiders: that Yugoslavia was a multinational empire in miniature. Therefore, rebellion against it and, implicitly, national liberation, were perfectly legitimate.

However, the problem deriving from those 'national liberations' of the past is practically identical with the one indicated by recent scholarship and it refers to the limits within which such uprisings remain legitimate. Many scholars, Raju Thomas and David Campbell among them, disagree with the proliferation of national sovereignties in the region and point at what Pavkovic already predicted, that is,

the outbreak of a fifth and even a sixth wave of national liberations in the future. In other words, since it is admitted that the main challenge to political stability is, of course, the ethnic composition of the region, finding a political solution will always be difficult if not impossible (Frye, 1992: 618). The statistical data, its reliability questioned as it so often is, indicates that in the three decades prior to 1980 the Serbian ethnic group in Yugoslavia dropped 13 percent (from 41.7 to 36.3) while the Albanian population increased by 175 percent (from 4.4 to 7.7) (Curtis 1992, 274; 292). In Kosovo, for instance, this shift coupled with the Serbs leaving the province “partly to seek a better life in more prosperous parts of Yugoslavia, partly due to their discomfort with the growth in the size and politicization of the Albanian majority, and partly in reaction to anti-Serb acts of violence” (Judah, 1997: 152-3). Considering the tradition of armed uprising in that part of Serbia, a victorious ‘national liberation’ is to be expected and it would be perfectly legitimate. The manpower necessary for such an attempt is already prepared to fight since the unemployment rate among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo is estimated at 70 percent and “this pressure, coupled with the highest birth-rate in Europe (23.1 births per 1,000) has created a deep recruiting pool for the KLA. Seventy percent of the population is now under-30” (Hedges, 1999: 31). If Kosovar Albanians demand self-determination and independence from Serbia and if they succeed, who would then follow? Montenegrins are anyway on the list while the Albanians in Macedonia simply have to wait until they outnumber the Slavs in the country and all the eyes then focus on Bosnia which, as both scholars and politicians warn, is a Yugoslavia in miniature. How could the Western model of democracy be applied to such a mosaic?

The peoples in the Balkan Peninsula are anything but dead instruments of various policies. They act and react to stimuli and tended to manifest an increase in this receptiveness especially with the upheavals during the communist times when, throughout the entire block behind the Iron Curtain, a massive effort toward the ‘ideologisation’ of a society of peasants managed to produce enormous changes. The Balkan people are simply more vulnerable to the antagonism of various

ideological arguments when it comes about national identity and territorially defined self-determination because of the historical reasons partly suggested here and that is *why* conflict is possible at any time on these grounds. The discourse of nationalist politicians that led to the Yugoslav drama simply took advantage of such vulnerabilities. Scholars from this field and political decision-makers should be aware of the fact that not long ago, in the 1960s, the new national ideologies of the Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians were effectively created “on the very same model of national liberation from the rule of the centralising and Belgrade-based state apparatus, and were used extensively for creating new constituencies for the Bosnian Muslim and Kosovo Albanian communist elites who came to power after 1966” (Pavkovic, 2002: 237). The model is easily identifiable in the political discourse of modernity placing obviously the nation-state at the top of all priorities of a particular nation regardless of the territory it is spread on at the moment of speech. Moreover, since the respective message was meant only to divert the attention from economic shortcomings and from governmental incapacities concerning reform, the conclusion cannot be but, as one leading voices of the Romanian cultural elite put it, that one of the main causes of nationalism is the mere curiosity of the young people regarding the past viewed as glorious when compared with a present ravaged by economic and political crises (Manolescu, 2002). People look, indeed, at their neighbours and are capable of envy. This apparently simple fact has unimaginable political consequences when efficiently used as the typical nationalist extremist does and he/she simply takes advantage of, most often, economic realities and long time embedded preconceptions in the collective memory of their communities.

At the same time, reforms do not seem to change fast people’s economic situation in the less developed parts of the region and foreign aid coupled with the European integration efforts, as it will be pointed out throughout the next chapters, suffer from the lack of a supranational vision of Europe as a whole. While this does not seem to foster the revival of nationalism, it does not remove the grounds that a nationalist political discourse can grow on. And, as some already warned, most of

the parties in the Western Balkan political spectrum still engage electoral competitions by employing a nationalist discourse which has not vanished yet. Moreover, the situation is continuously under a pressure posed by the fact that all successor states of the former Yugoslavia have endorsed constitutions informed by nationalist ideologies as a new political attitude labelled by Robert Hayden as “constitutional nationalism” (Hayden, 1996; Belamaric, 2003). Throughout the rest of this thesis the argument is built around the idea according to which only a doctrinally well defined, supranational approach from the European Union to its outside would represent the only rational form of *presence* on the international stage that the united continent could adopt in its post-modern age.



III

THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE BALKAN DILEMMA

III. 1. A Few 'Minor' Mistakes

The Western, particularly West European answer to the Yugoslav drama in the beginning of the 1990s puzzled many, scholars and politicians alike, and continues to receive criticism. In this chapter I attempt at presenting a view of the Western attitude toward the former Yugoslavia as to facilitate a better understanding of the modernity/post-modernity dichotomy within the context of the European presence in the Balkans. Instead of starting from the beginning of this another sad episode in the continent's history, I propose to take a look first at a passage from an official report on the situation in the post-Dayton Bosnia, two years after the conflict ended and the international community started working, together with the local political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the stabilisation of that young state. The respective passage runs as it follows:

“Nevertheless, while the task of implementing the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement has begun, transition to an effective multiethnic government had not occurred. Bosnia remains politically and ethnically divided, freedom of movement across ethnic boundaries is still very constrained, and economic activity is still at a low level. The limited progress to date has been due principally to the failure of the political leaders of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups to embrace political and social reconciliation and to fulfill their obligations under the Dayton Agreement. Major obstacles to the vision embodied in the Dayton Agreement remain, particularly the lack of cooperation of Bosnia's political leaders, and experts say full political and social reconciliation in Bosnia

will be a long and difficult process.”²

Such reports come to confirm the opinion of those observers who view pessimistically the international community’s approach to the situation in the Western Balkans. This criticism points insistently at the Western attitude to the region from the very moment when the Yugoslavia started showing signs of possible dismemberment and on many occasions it also becomes an accusation that Yugoslavia’s self-destruction would not have started in the absence of the misconceived Western implication in the region. As it was suggested in the previous chapter, the main, essential message coming from the Yugoslav conflict was that invoking the right to and the specific need for achieving ‘national’ sovereignty by all constituting nations of the former federation. It was also pointed out that such a discourse comes from an understanding of the nation-state building strongly rooted in modernity and that, in principle at least, this is an anachronistic reflex that the EU as a supranational polity is supposed to be positioned against.

The European response to the Yugoslav dilemma, instead, was from the very beginning one obviously permeated of an understanding of international relations as ‘old’ as the repeatedly invoked backwardness of the Balkans. It first passed through a period of profound and sometimes embarrassing contradictions demonstrating a superficial memory of the lessons to be drawn from European history (Ramet, 1991). The obvious unawareness in the case of Robert Kaplan, as suggested in the debut of this thesis, is not singular. James Pettifer, for instance, mentioned the belief that Bulgaria would most probably continue to perceive a *need* for annexing Thessalonica and a preconception according to which, “these countries would try as much as possible to gain economically profitable territories” (Pettifer, 1992: 484). A very superficial look at the post-1989 Bulgarian official positions in the international arena would categorically disqualify such opinions. Moreover, one of the initial steps taken in the first phase of the conflict was the

² “Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement’s Goals,” Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, United States General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO/NSIAD-97-132 Bosnia Peace Operation, 1997, p. 4;

decision of the UN's Security Council to support an embargo on any delivery of weapons to Yugoslavia. However, that decision did not take into account that the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) benefited from the national resources managed from Belgrade while the Croat and Bosnian insurgents were limited precisely to external aid. As the former US Secretary of State admits, "the Serbs in Bosnia had ample arms and could be resupplied when necessary from Belgrade. The Croats had help from Zagreb in circumventing the embargo. The Muslims were relatively defenceless" (Albright, 2003: 179). Over another continuously misunderstood and misinterpreted issue, Barry Posen maintains that Kosovo is "hardly a treasure" for Serbia, with "a little mineral and agricultural wealth" (Posen, 2000: 42). At the same time, Chris Hedges points out that "Milošević, presiding over a decaying economy, clung to the millions of dollars a year in hard cash brought in by Kosovo's Treпча mine complex, valued at \$5 billion" (Hedges, 1999: 33). Decision-makers in Western foreign affairs offices might rather want to go there and check information themselves.

It has become also notorious that the Western solutions to various conflicts were built around the democratic model presupposing the imposition of democratic rules of the game to polities ravaged by various conflicts. Rule of law installed, various local personalities were to be given the chance to compete democratically in free elections and become in this way legitimate managers of the political life in those societies previously affected by conflicts. This in turn presupposed choosing those personalities that could help the intervention forces in building the conditions for such democratic developments to take place. In the case of Yugoslavia, the confusions and mistakes made within the context of the political approach were, again, notoriously hilarious. Isa Blumi stated very strongly in 2002 a position according to which, "in light of what happened over the last ten years in the Balkans, and the changes in the world's geo-strategic configuration, policy makers should not return to this sort of dependency on personalities. Kosova's problem grew out of control because Western policies relied on individuals who were alienated from their own populations, rather than engage the components of

conflict. That, unfortunately, is exactly what appears to be happening again as current Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, Serb Prime Minister Djindjic and Rugova are promoted by Western policy-makers to resolve the inherently complex issues in Kosovo today” (Blumi, 2002: 36).

The very support granted to Slobodan Milošević in the very beginning of the 1990s which was to cost a lot in human lives subsequently was one of those fatal mistakes of the kind. The West simply believed that the Serbian people “*needed* an authoritarian and nationalist leader” while conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could have been stopped only if Serbia’s control over the situation was supported; that explains the Western support for Milošević over the Dayton arrangements (Mertus, 2001: 494; italics in original). In the case of Ibrahim Rugova, his almost passive attitude during the negotiation of what was to become the Dayton Accord for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Accord itself not mentioning anything eventually about the fate of Kosovo led to a dramatic fall in Rugova’s credibility back in the autonomous province. Moreover, as Madeleine Albright herself admitted in her recently published book, the international community itself contributed irresponsibly to the alteration of Rugova’s credibility at least on one very embarrassing occasion. It happened in 1998, when the US brought the Serbian and the Albanian sides to negotiate the launch of a political process that was intended to reinforce the autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia. From the Albanian side, the one elected was Ibrahim Rugova, despite his many opponents from the KLA and other political forces in Kosovo. But the solution turned out to have been not the best one. Rugova finally accepted, in May 1998, to lead a delegation at a meeting with Milošević in Belgrade, after having refused to do so on many other occasions. In the words of the former US Secretary of State, “this proved a false step. The Serb press seized the opportunity to publish pictures of Milošević and Rugova sharing a laugh. Coming at a time when Serb police were pillaging Albanian villages, the photo further damaged Rugova’s standing among his own people” (Albright, 2003: 384). Another mistake done by the West, through the attitude of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), and indicated by Isa Blumi was when

promoting hand-in-hand with Belgrade the victory of Ibrahim Rugova in the November 2001 elections in Kosovo. The results of that election turned out to be not as overwhelmingly in Rugova's favour as claimed by the UNMIK and Belgrade simply because both sides failed to take seriously into account the influence held by important Albanian opposition groups in Kosovo (Blumi, 2002: 37).

The confusions do not stop here and they can be found deep into the debate around major decisions to be taken at that time. Albright, for instance, accuses the opposition to NATO air strikes in the US Congress when they seemed urgently necessary to protect the Kosovars and mentions the position, for instance, of US Senator Donald Nickles of Oklahoma who expressed the following opinion over the issue: "I don't think we should begin bombing unless and until the Serbs really begin a very significant massacre" (Albright, 2003: 405). It did become a massacre eventually and the international community's reaction was, one more time, too late, too weak, and too contradictory to do anything else but to postpone a long waited decision on Kosovo's status. Contradictory attitudes not informed by a true commitment to stopping the Yugoslav conflicts were expressed also in the various views about the significance of those conflicts for European security. John Kerr, the British ambassador to the United States during the Bosnian conflict, considered that the war in Bosnia, even if lasting for years, could not have affected directly Western Europe's security (Carpenter and Perlmutter, 1996: 53).³ At the same time, Albright maintains that the US Clinton administration saw things in a different way. Accordingly, what was happening in the Balkans was a conflict in Europe and, therefore, had to be considered a threat to the European security and, implicitly, to the American interests on the continent (Albright, 2003: 180). Jean-Yves Haine, on the other hand, admits that the conflict in the Balkans and especially the one over Kosovo showed the European incapacity to address problems concerning its own security which had to be eventually solved with US involvement. Moreover, he

³ Quoted from Stephen Chapman, "Will Bosnia Save NATO – or Destroy It?" *Chicago Tribune*, November 23, 1995, p. A 27;

confirms that that episode has marked profoundly the Europe and transatlantic relations.⁴

The drama was taking place, indeed, on European soil, two to four hours drive from the European Community/European Union's border and on the wings of slogans contrary to the very identity, even as ambiguous as it still is, of the 'post-modern' European polity. David Campbell, on the other hand, points at an apparently less visible mistake done in Bosnia but with incalculable consequences for the fate of that new state and the stability in the region. He asserts that, "perhaps the most startling policy of the international community [in the region] however, was its funding of political parties regardless of their policies." Indeed, around \$5 million in aid was distributed on the single criterion of "free speech," while not taking into account which of those parties was employing offensively nationalist political discourses or not. Moreover, the real destinations of the funding were hard to track and, Campbell suggests, that is how even a character whose identity was built only as related to ethnic cleansing, the famous Arkan, could benefit from the 'aid' (Campbell, 1998: 223).

III. 2. The Collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The generally accepted story about the outbreak of violence in the former Yugoslavia starts with the accession to power of Slobodan Milošević in 1987 following the orchestrated purge of his own protector, Ivan Stambolic, from the position of president of the Serbian League of Communists in the beginning of the so-called 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' (Nielsen, 2001: 527). After Tito's death, in 1980, the country was ruled by a collective presidency gathering the leaders of each of the republics forming the Yugoslav Federation. Poor economic performances and the increasing isolation from each other of those federal units, as indicated in the previous chapter of this thesis, had facilitated the emergence of profound

⁴ Jean-Yves Haine, "ESDP: an overview." Internet source: <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf>;

dissentions between the nations inside the federation, with the consequence that political discourse blaming always the *others* for the lack of economic performance was common place throughout Yugoslavia (Gallagher, 2003; Steil and Woodward, 1999; Rieff, 1995; Woodward, 1995). Since the Serbs were convinced that Yugoslavia resisted due to their strength and considering also the aura of defenders of Orthodoxy and Christianity in general as against Catholic Croats and Slovenes, or against Muslims in Yugoslavia respectively, it is not difficult to imagine that they were the ones suspected of having the most violent nationalist ambitions by the other nations in the federation.

The dissentions between the Slovenes, Croats and the Serbs, in spite of being insistently described as dating back some number of centuries ago, were actually caused by very contemporary and pressing problems. The economic situation was obviously bad and, with the dramatic changes throughout Eastern Europe and, it is suggested, especially after the fall of Ceaușescu in Romania, the League of Communists in Yugoslavia gave up its monopoly over the Yugoslav political establishment. However, the attempts at modernizing the League as promoted by the Slovenes were constantly resisted by Milošević's supporters. With the Slovene representatives walking out of the process, Milošević's side entered the fatal period of isolation which eventually led to the collapse of the entire establishment (Remington, 1995: 275). In 1990, the elections in the Yugoslav republics brought to power centre-right parties in Croatia and Slovenia, and nationalist coalitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia while Slobodan Milošević remained Serbia's President and retained the political control of his restyled Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Moreover, the alliance with the Montenegrin Communist Party of Momir Bulatovic maintained the possibility of working together for the two republics (Remington, 1995: 276). However, when Serbia amended the constitution as to increase control over Kosovo in 1989, the act led to massive public protests by Albanians in that province and the consequent intervention of Yugoslav troops. This proved right nationalist opponents in Croatia and Slovenia who had already promoted separatist movements sparked by the Serbian

manifestations of nationalism. The stage was ready, again, for what Pavkovic called the fourth (but not the last) wave of 'national liberations.' The 1990 elections in both Croatia and Slovenia brought in power the reformed communists but all of them were playing the separatist ticket. From that moment on, the general impression in Europe was that Yugoslavia was on the verge of an inevitable collapse.

What followed has been subject to immense coverage and analysis. The international community tended to sympathise with the Slovenes and the Croats when they made it clear that they were determined to gain and defend their independence. Moreover, the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, saw eventually the success of his strategy to convince the European Community's member states, through the aid of Germany, that Croatia was a historical part of the civilized Catholic Central Europe and had to be protected from the backward, Orthodox and orientalist Serbia. As a consequence, "Hans-Dietrich Genscher [the German Foreign Affairs Minister] had made the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia his personal crusade" (Glenny, 2001: 637). In Slovenia, a national referendum on December 12, 1990 showed that more than 80 percent of the people supported the establishment of an independent and sovereign Slovenia. Therefore, independence was declared on June 25, 1991. Two days later, around 2000 troops from the Yugoslav National Armed Forces (JNA) came from the barracks across Slovenia to occupy the border with Serbia. In between June 27 and July 6, 1991, a so-called Ten Days War followed, with the JNA soldiers still on the border but actually blocked in their barracks, with almost 100 people dead, out of which 57 were from the JNA (Grefenauer, 1991: 181-182; quoted in Pavkovic, 2000). The similar referendum in Croatia in May 1991 showed that 93 percent of the Croats (Serbs excluded) voted for the independence of that state from the Yugoslav federation. Independence was declared by the Croatian Diet on June 25, 1991, invoking the totalitarian system of the Yugoslav federation that hindered the cultural and economic development of the Croatian nation (Trifunovska, 1995: 302). The recognition of these new states was to provoke headaches in Europe, the United

States and the rest of the world because of the specificity of these cases. The next subchapter tries to explain this situation.

III. 3. The Recognition of the New States

On December 16, 1991, the then European Community (EC) invited the Yugoslav republics to specify officially their position over independence but the invitation was exclusively made to the federal units of Yugoslavia (Trifunovska, 1995, p. 431). This implied the fact that the sub-federal units of Yugoslavia were not considered as potential subjects of that action. An Arbitration Commission was established by the EC and that Commission's "studied avoidance of the question of secession (and of this very word) is, perhaps, no accident: the secessions in former Yugoslavia present, perhaps, a 'hard case' for any reasoning about or theory of secession and state-creation" (Pavkovic, 2000: 486). Some scholars suggest that the recognition of the republics seceding in Yugoslavia was late and that caused eventually the outbreak of violence. It is also suggested that there was no provision in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution to allow those republics to secede (Djilas, 1995). However, as Roland Rich and Saskia Hille among others pointed out, there was, indeed, no *mechanism* in the 1974 constitution to allow for secession but its first Basic Principle begins with the explicit formulation of the constituent republics' "right of secession" (Rich, 1993: 38; Hille, 1995: 2). The EC's hesitance seems to have been related rather to the fears that a potential proliferation of sovereignties in the Balkans would have also ravaged the USSR, a legal and political bomb considered much more dangerous than Yugoslavia. However, the decision of the Ukrainian leaders not to take into account international rules regarding secession and state recognition led to a change in the general landscape with essential consequences for Yugoslavia (Rich, 1993: 38, 39). The European countries though warned Belgrade repeatedly about the fact that the developments in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were an international concern. The US government, on the other hand, aligned itself to the warnings of the European

Community (EC) very late, when the senior Bush administration decided to make a clear commitment toward the issue right before leaving the office. On 25 December 1992, it informed Slobodan Milošević that the United States would be prepared to respond militarily if the Serbs initiated an armed conflict in Kosovo” and the Clinton administration reconfirmed that warning after entering office (Albright, 2003: 379-380; Carpenter and Perlmutter, 1996: 56).

In spite of other accusations regarding the slowness of the European response (Blumi, 2002: 39; Woodward, 1995: 15; Clarke 1993, 66), it is often forgotten the fact that, as suggested above, any intervention would have presupposed the use of a foreign military force on the territory of a sovereign state, member of the UN, that the SFRY continued to be without the recognition of the newly self-proclaimed states. In order to address this issue, and after the outburst of violence in Croatia over the Krajina region inhabited by Serbs, the European Community announced on 27 August 1991 that it was establishing a Peace Conference on Yugoslavia and an Arbitration Commission. The Arbitration Commission consisted of five Presidents from among the various Constitutional Courts of the EC countries and “became known as the Badinter Commission after the name of the French gentleman appointed as its president” (Rich, 1993: 40; Hille, 1995: 3).

Scholars intrigued by the recognition policy of the EC pointed at the fact that “there were no killings or even human rights violations taking place in any of the ‘republics’ [of the former SFRY] of Yugoslavia when Germany, the Vatican, and Austria began to promote the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, or in Bosnia when the United States promoted the secession of that province” (Thomas, 1997: 18; Campbell, 1998: 9). Indeed, Germany admitted that the pressure it posed to favour the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was not the best step and not in conformity with its real interests in Europe (Schloer, 1996: 315; quoted in Thomas, 1997: 18; Stark, 1993: 215). However, the recognition process was much more complex than anyone could have imagined initially. While the political need to take action in both the Yugoslav and the Soviet Union situations was becoming more and more

obvious, it was also quite clear that “the application of the traditional criteria for statehood would not provide the European Community, the principal mediator in the Balkan crisis, with a sufficient choice of diplomatic tools with which to work. Recognition as a simple declaration of an ascertainable fact did not provide sufficient means to allow the EC to influence the situation” (Rich, 1993: 42). That was mainly because it was considered that the mere application of the Montevideo criteria for the recognition of new states would have been difficult in the new European and particularly Balkan context.⁵ It seemed like the recognition of the states resulting from the collapse of the former Yugoslavia was subject to a much more complex process due to its ethnic mosaic and the fears from a subsequent proliferation of sovereignties determining thus a Balkanisation of all Eastern Europe.

In his *Balkan Odyssey*, David Owen mentions the fact that all other European Community member states objected to the Dutch Presidency proposal, in the second half of 1991, regarding the drawing of borders in the Western Balkans along ethnic lines simply because all of them considered such an approach as “out of date” (Owen, 1995: 33). Moreover, the Secretary-General Report on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia envisaged a future Bosnia and Herzegovina for which it rejected “any model based on three separate ethnic/confessionally based States” on the grounds that “a confederation of three such states would be inherently unstable”⁶ (Quoted in Campbell, 1998: 136). However, the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb sides refused to support these proposals since they did not grant any protection to their own interests (Campbell, 1998: 136). The possibility of a ‘supranational’ approach was, therefore, present at least as an idea around the negotiation tables in Europe to adjust the old

⁵ The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States concluded that the state as a person of international law should possess: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Article 1). Article 3, however, states that “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states” and this clause was used when China was established after the fall of its empire. (Source: <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/montevideo01.htm>) However, it is suggested, small states such as the ones in the Balkans or the Northern Cyprus saw that this idea applies only when the state in question is strong enough to sustain itself.

⁶ See “Secretary-General Report on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, November 11, 1992,” *International Legal Materials*, No. 31, 1992: 1552;

Montevideo criteria for state recognition to a new world order that the EC was part of. Thus, the Foreign Ministers from the European Community met on 16 December 1991 in Brussels and issued a 'Declaration on the Guidelines for the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union' and a more specific 'Declaration on Yugoslavia' addressing the delicate case in the Western Balkans. These Declarations added a new type of conditionality to the Montevideo criteria and implied issues such as the protection of minorities and human rights. As Roland Rich points out, "these two documents were significantly to influence international reactions on the issue of recognition of the newly emerging states of Eastern Europe and, arguably, transform recognition law" (Rich, 1993: 42). The EC, basing its judgement on the opinions of the Badinter Commission and under pressure from both the violence in Krajna and the German front, decided to extend recognition to Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992, while Germany had already recognized Croatia and Slovenia on 19 December 1991 but was wise enough to postpone sending its ambassadors to Zagreb and Ljubljana until 15 January 1992 in line with the EC.⁷

Two other former Yugoslav republics announced the international community that they demanded recognition, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, respectively. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, independence had been declared by the government on 3 March 1992. However, the Badinter Commission considered that since there had not been organized any referendum there as to show the "the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute [the republic] as a sovereign and independent State," no decision could have been taken regarding the recognition of that republic's sovereignty by the EC (Rich, 1993: 50). Eventually, a referendum was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in March-April 1992 but it was massively boycotted by the important Serbian minority representing 31% of the population of that republic. However, the results of the referendum showed that, with a turnout of 63.4%, approximately 99%.63 of the

⁷ See Patrick Moore, "Diplomatic Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 4, 24 January 1992; quoted in Rich, 1993: 49;

participants voted in favour of the republic's sovereignty as independent from the federal Yugoslavia. The United States and the EC countries recognized the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 5, 6, and 7 April 1992 and on the 6th of April, practically, the war in Bosnia begun. The problems started here, as in Croatia, from the existence of the significant Serbian minority and from the fact that, like in Croatia, the JNA forces were "primarily motivated by the defence of the interests of the Serbian minorities outside Serbia" (Rich, 1993: 50). Nevertheless, since it was considered that the international recognition of Croatia and the establishment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) were the major reasons why the situation in the Krajina region of Croatia was calmed, the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina became more and more a real possibility for both the EC countries and the United States. Roland Rich, whose analysis places these developments in a clear light, mentions that, "in a press conference accompanying the decision Portuguese Foreign Minister Deus Pinheiro, whose country held the rotating EC Presidency, said that Bosnia and Herzegovina had met all the criteria set by the EC including the holding of a referendum, in response to a question as to whether recognition would simply aggravate the conflict, he then added that 'we felt we should not give arguments to the radicals who are not in favour of the independence of the republic'" (Rich, 1993: 50).

Macedonia encountered problems due mainly to its name implying, especially in Athens' view, cultural property and territorial claims from a neighbouring state. The arguments involved came even close to ridiculous when Greece advanced the idea according to which it could even change its identity at the United Nations from Greek into Greek-Macedonian, forcing the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by this way to "negotiate a first name qualifier before the name Macedonia" (Parkas, 1997: 108). Moreover, Macedonia will probably always have to face the adversity of the non-official political discourse in her neighbouring countries since Bulgarians view Macedonians as natural members of their broad community by virtue of the strong linguistic similarities, while for the Serbians the territory of the current FYROM is practically what they call the 'South Serbia' while

the people living there are understood to speak Old Serbian (Perry, 1992; Pettifer, 1992).

Serbia and Montenegro did not ask for the recognition of their federal state and claimed, in April 1992, that the newly constituted Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the legal successor of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with all rights derived from this. The Badinter Commission reacted by stating that the process of dissolution of the SFRY had been practically completed with the secession of the other four republics formerly members of the SFRY and that the initial federation no longer existed. The Commission also pointed out that other aspects of its Opinions issued on July 4 led it to conclude that "the FRY is a new state which cannot be regarded as the sole successor state of the SFRY and that the recognition of the FRY should be subject to general principles of international law and to the EC's Guidelines of 16 December 1991." Of course, the new state inheriting the identity of the old SFRY would have made any secessionist action subject to Serbian military response. One of the essential conclusions of the Commission's opinion was that, "the FRY should not automatically succeed to the SFRY's seats in international organisations or to title to the SFRY's property abroad" and that "the property would need to be divided equitably between the SFRY's various successor states by agreement or arbitration" (Rich, 1993: 53-4). Since the UN gave a similar answer, the only way Serbia could have entered in possession of those territories in Croatia and Slovenia inhabited by Serbs and now considered *abroad* would have been through aggressive action against that *abroad*. Here is where the entire intellectual and media arsenal of nationalism could have come strongly on the stage and it did not waste time at all. And that came especially after the Serbian leaders realized that meeting the EC's conditions for recognition would be difficult and politically too costly for them since it would have presupposed giving up exactly what their agendas stand against. Below we have Roland Rich's view of the Guidelines:

"The Guidelines describe the candidates for recognition as those new states which 'have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed

themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations'. The Guidelines then list the following requirements:

- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights
- guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE
- respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement
- acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability
- commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes" (Rich, 1993: 43).

The traditional principles expressed through the Montevideo criteria for the recognition of new states, it is suggested, are fundamentally changed and, indeed, confirm the EC's position against proposals such as the one made by the Dutch Presidency in 1991 concerning the drawing of borders along ethnic lines in the former Yugoslavia. However, the Guidelines add conditions regarding tolerance toward ethnic minorities, the protection of human rights, commitment to democracy and rule of law that most new states are incompatible with. These criteria were also viewed as "improper because they implied a value judgement about how the new state should be organized" (Rich, 1993: 56-7). States *are* established to turn such values into reality simply because, it is claimed, in the previous form of statehood that was impossible. Situations like these do not change over night and need the sovereignty of those new states for them to be able to be in control of the domestic political and economic developments. Thus, the stage was ready for competing nationalist discourses to start their work with the dramatic consequences which both Bosnia and the international community had to face, not to mention the prolongation of that reflex in the future in the case of Kosovo and even, maybe, Macedonia. As Pavkovic warned, there are still national liberations to erupt in the Balkans while the West European newly invented *supranationality* was present in intentions but totally absent from the official positions which came along conceptual reference points still anchored in the age of national sovereignties.

III. 4. The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Suggested Consequences of the European Approach

That the political situation in the western countries influenced recognition policies is not a secret and is also perfectly natural. However, the perpetuation of old perspectives about the South East European challenge is to be condemnable. As Misha Glenny and others put it, solutions to the Balkan puzzle have been traditionally centred on efforts to redraw, on each occasion, the map of the region as to create by this way supposedly mature and modern states (Glenny, 1992: 9-10). Strange western perceptions of the local realities, as already suggested in this chapter, have also marked region's drama. A notorious one was in the case of Serbia itself. In spite of believing, in the beginning of the conflictual situation, that region's stability depended on Serbia's capacity of control, there was also a tendency to ignore Belgrade, that is, the very capital of the collapsing country. As in the words of Glenny, "during the Bush administration and the first half of President Clinton's term, there were indications that the policy was also informed by a desire to isolate Serbia. During that time US policy makers appeared to believe that the spark could light a wider Balkan war was not Macedonia but Kosovo. This was due in part to the misperception that irrational blood lust rather than calculated territorial expansion was the cause of the Balkan conflict. [...] The US stress on Kosovo was due in part to the pronounced Albanophilia and Serbophobia within State Department ranks" (Glenny, 1995: 106). Coupled with the other misperceptions already indicated here, it is no wonder that an extremely complex case such as the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to eventually show the international community's poor capacity to approach it.

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose development in the field has been covered enough in detail and needs not be analysed here, ended with the Dayton Accord of December 1995 which created two entities of roughly equal size, one for Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the other for Serbs, while an international

peacekeeping force was deployed. David Campbell's deconstructive analysis of the process leading to the Dayton Accord is inspiring in the sense that it opens a particularly original perspective on the issue. He suggests that the initial plan negotiated by the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY) under Lord Carrington's chairmanship (and known therefore as the Carrington Plan) in November 1991, as a general framework for a European approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina, was an attempt at preserving some sort of sovereignty for Yugoslavia but, at the same time, left the door open for the affirmation of sovereignties inside the federation (Campbell, 1998: 126-7). Indeed, the provisions stipulate that the relations between those republics be under principles such as the one according to which the new state will be "a common state of equal Republics for those Republics which wish to remain a common state." In other words, it was up to the peoples to decide eventually the fate of their republics' sovereignties. Considering the ethnic mix in the region, it became extremely difficult for anyone to foretell what the consequences of such an approach would be. However, Campbell suggests, a careful reading of the plan by connoisseurs of Balkan politics would make it clear that, political action strictly in the limits of the Carrington plan "meant that from the outset the international community's response to the crisis embodied the criteria and terms by which republics could be unraveled along ethnic and national lines" (Campbell, 1998: 128). One more time, it must be observed here that the approach was not built out of a principle of supranational conception and was tributary to the modern understanding of sovereignty on national basis. Practically, the clause quoted above do not alter at all the Montevideo criteria but only add a conditionality for the recognition process, according to the Montevideo criteria, to proceed in the old form.

The Carrington plan was followed, in March 1992, by the first proposal to deal exclusively with Bosnia, the "Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina" which was adopted under the Portuguese Presidency of the European Community in Lisbon on 23 February

1992. Since it makes it clear that “Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a state, composed of three constituent units, based on *national principles* and taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria,” and it announced that future decisions will be taken according to the definition of Bosnia’s territory by means of “a map based on the *national absolute or relative majority* in each municipality,” it becomes obvious that the approach of the *supranational* Europe was quite “out of date” in spite of initial commitment to truly positive solutions. And, since the map invoke was the one that recorded the 1991 census figures, this meant that borders were to be drawn by the international community as they were before the conflict started and represented the precise reason for the outbreak of that conflict (Campbell, 1998: 129; my italics). Indeed, as Gow bluntly put it before the West was even fully aware of what was happening in Bosnia, when radical groups in the Balkans demand territorial statehood for their people, the international community rushes to look for ways to redraw the map of the region and thus give satisfaction to various incompatible nationalisms (Gow, 1994).

Since the strategies of ethnic cleansing became top priority in Bosnia, the realities on the ground changed and maps had again to be redrawn according to the new ‘conquests’ made by the Serbs. Consequently, a new initiative of the EC and the UN materialized with the establishment of the International Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ICFY). The first session of this conference was held in London, in August 1992, and represented a progress when compared with the previous proposals. As Campbell notes, “unlike the overtly ethnic and separatist logic of the Statement of Principles, the London Principles asserted the priority of individual rights and the importance of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity”. However, along with other human rights was included the “right to self-determination.” The London Principles therefore “contained the conflicting imperatives of a unitary polity, on one hand, and the recognition of forces that could undermine that unity, on the other” (Campbell, 1998: 133). And that is while the term ‘Balkanization’ literally denominates the

proliferation of sovereignties of small states with the alleged anarchical consequences it leads to. It must be clear that the nationalist speech running in the former Yugoslavia at that time was feeding itself on such proposals by pointing at the 'West's' diabolic plans for the region as it happened so many times throughout history and explained previously in this thesis. Indeed, as Alexandar Pavkovic and many others insistently pointed out, it is essential for the international community to understand one for all that intervention from the outside in Balkan politics has always been crucial for anything to succeed. (Pavkovic, 2002: 246). Besides, as Campbell suggests, in spite of being much closer to a good solution than the Statement of Principles, the practical process by which the London Principles was implemented under the Vance-Owen Peace Plan of 1993 "was taking the talks back to Lisbon" (Campbell, 1998: 134).

In January 1993, the ICFY was materialized in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in Geneva. It failed lamentably as it brought back into discussion the necessity for the criterion of "ethnic homogeneity" to be met in the establishment of sovereignties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the idea was supported according to which the boundaries in the new state would follow principles similar to those from the Statement of Principles and considering ethnic viability (Campbell, 1998: 136-7). Supporters of the "ethnically pure" principle in the establishment of territorial sovereignties were not necessarily bad intentioned. As Chris Hedges puts it in favour of the principle, "The refusal to accept the creation of ethnically 'pure' enclaves – a decision that is strategically and morally understandable – leaves diplomats paying homage to multiethnic institutions, however hollow, and lofty democratic ideals that nearly all Balkan states detest. [...] Given that between 1966 and 1989 an estimated 130,000 Serbs left the province because of frequent harassment and discrimination by the Kosovar Albanian majority, this is at best naïve" (Hedges, 1999: 37-38). Fearing reflexes of political actors and population in the region, western politicians, too, tended eventually to opt for the "ethnically pure" principle as a potential cure to the old disputes. This sort of 'contextual'

politics eventually led to the fall of the European negotiators into the complex net of approaches imposed by the conflicting territorial demands so much characteristic for the region. Since never ever was everybody happy with various solutions throughout history and since the foreign powers have always been condemned for the Balkan misfortune, the EC/EU and the US were in the end to be blamed again. Moreover, the developments on the ground were encouraging for such a view. The US, EC/EU and Russia not agreeing on a coherent military response made the UN forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina face alone the spreading violence triggered by the Croatia's alliance with Serbia as concluded in Karadjordjevo between Tudjman and Milošević in 1991. In the words of Misha Glenny, "outgunned, demoralized, and subject to the most inflexible bureaucracy in military history, this [UN] force became a convenient scapegoat for everybody" (Glenny, 2001: 641). A clear set of principles of foreign policy above the competing claims invoked here would have most probably set the stage for a different political discourse but no side was prepared for it and, besides, there was no alternative philosophy suggested as to encourage a different approach. As Ruggie rightfully suggested, the international relations theory had not yet entered its post-modern age. This thesis suggests that an expressed *supranational* attitude by means of agreed principles for a pan-European approach to the Balkan crisis would have made possible, in spite of the still intergovernmental substance of Community's foreign policy, a projection of a different, truly post-modern message with potentially better results.

Instead, the subsequent attempts of the EC/EU at solving the crisis in Bosnia followed the same lines of political discourse promoting national territorial sovereignties. The Union of the Three Republics Plan of September 1993, the European Union Action Plan of November the same year, the Washington Agreements of March 1994, the Contact Group Plan of July 1994, all culminating with the General Framework Agreement concluded in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 represented mere reflexes of the traditional judgement of the case, based on the understanding of the region in

terms of national territorial sovereignties. As Campbell puts it, in spite of the position of the Bosnian government itself which proposed that the country be organized as a federation but based on the principle of *equal rights for all citizens and the member nations* with the federal units not established exclusively along ethnic lines, the Union of the Three Republics plan continued the Statement of Principles philosophy. Indeed, “no effort was being made to fundamentally alter the parameters of partition, as the London Principles required” (Campbell, 1998: 147). Since it did not satisfy anyway the territorial claims of the Bosnian government, the plan was replaced by the European Union Action Plan of November 1993. Other than signalling the European entity’s name change, this new plan aimed at pushing the sides to accepting the Bosnian demands. The principle behind this move was, as Campbell suggests, one “which was designed to be an element in the realization of common foreign and security policy for the EU” and it presupposed basically the acceptance of any decision agreed upon by the Moslem Bosnians, Serb Bosnians, and Croat Bosnians without pressures from Western Europe (Campbell, 1998: 149). It was practically the first time that ‘new principles’ were thought of regarding the outside projection of EU’s identity in the international relations arena.

The American support for a partition of Bosnia between Moslem/Croats and Serbs and the Bosnian government accepting this solution made possible then the Washington Agreements of March 1994. It became more and more clear that the only problem was the one regarding the amount of territory to be assigned to each of the units in the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Agreements practically meant the reconfirmation of the fact that the country was to consist of “cantons” organized along geographical lines. Moreover, even the word “Muslim” was replaced with the word “Bosniacs,” an old denomination of that population. The Serbs, on the other hand, were to be practically excluded from the Bosnian (Bosniac-Croatian) decision making since they were also to have their own territory, the Republika Srpska respectively. However, the partition of the territory (58 percent to the Bosnian Federation, 42 to Republika Srpska) was the most difficult decision to

implement since, following strong military offensives backed by Belgrade, the Serbs had already occupied around 70 percent of the territory (Campbell, 1998: 150-1). The dramatic bombing of an outdoor market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994 by the Serbs with a death-toll that reached 68 determined the United States to call for an emergency meeting of NATO countries' foreign ministers "who demanded that the Bosnian Serbs withdraw all their heavy artillery surrounding Sarajevo within ten days." The surprisingly supportive new proposal of Boris Yeltsin to send troops as to protect Sarajevo also managed to help negotiators and ease the tension (Glenny, 2001: 646). Moreover, a Contact Group formed ad hoc by the US, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France and met for the first time at the end of April 1994 to "give the impression of EU and NATO involvement." The Plan it issued in July 1994 offered the parties a 51:49 territorial partition of Bosnia but failed to satisfy Bosnia's need for international guarantees of security (Campbell, 1998: 152-3).

The Croatian military success during the summer of 1995, culminating with the control gained over the Krajina region, changed again the map on the ground and left room also for a change at the negotiation tables. However, since the plans were already done and negotiators blocked in the 51:49 arrangements, the negotiation maps did not suffer any major alterations. The talks held at that Wright-Patterson Air Base (Dayton) in November 1995 led to the adoption of the eleven articles of the General Framework Agreement that form even today the basic document attesting Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty, with the state being a loose federation between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina proper and the Republika Srpska. This Agreement, like the ones preceding it, was also following the principle of boundaries along ethnic lines since the working map to be employed was, again, the one based on the 1991 census. As Campbell describes it,

"For the international community, Bosnia is more often than not a seamless, ethnically ordered world. This was indicated by the terminology of the peace plans, the openly articulated identity assumptions of the ICFY process and its negotiators, and the connection made between those identity assumptions and their

spatial organization" (Campbell, 1998: 157).

Campbell's mechanism of judgment is based on the fundamental idea according to which the categories of political identities are socially constructed. In line with Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and other illustrious exponents of post-modernity in political thought, he maintains that, as Ruggie would also say, most destruction in the former Yugoslavia came as a result of irrationally defined, imagined political (national) identities competing for territories by a reflex designed in the West with the definition of state sovereignty in territorial terms. Such a trap the Balkan people could not avoid and this eventually placed them in a continuous struggle marked by ignorance about concepts they did not invent. By playing with 'identity assumptions' and recognition policies, the argument goes, the US, the EC/EU and the rest of the international community simply poured gas on a fire already burning in the area and their responsibility is enormous. One of the main messages in Campbell's book is that, "there was a substantial body of sentiment within Bosnia against division that, given a chance to be expressed, could be mobilized in opposition to exclusivist policies. The regrettable fact is that at almost every juncture, the international community's initiatives have been allied with nationalist logics and thus worked against a radicalized multicultural ethos" (Campbell, 1998: 221). Besides, as both David Campbell and Raju Thomas have strongly pointed out along with many other scholars, Bosnia and Herzegovina's very existence depends highly on the commitment of its constitutive parts to the federal establishment and, since observers appreciate that the respective commitment is rather inexistent, the state resists on the map simply due to the 'carrots and sticks' approach of the US and the EU (Campbell, 1998: 156; Thomas, 1997: 26). That makes the country, indeed, a hot subject of EU's integration policies.

It is interesting to note at this point that, in their 2002 Reports to the European Parliament, the Office of the High Representative and the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina indicate as positive the fact that, for instance,

“No person who has been removed from public office by the Provisional Election Commission or the Election Appeals Sub-Commission, or been removed from public office by the High Representative shall be permitted to be a candidate, to hold an elected mandate or an appointed office. As a result of these decisions, the main Bosniac and Croat nationalist parties, i.e., the SDA and HDZ respectively, resolved to replace some influential people in their leadership structures. The Serb Radical Party (SRS) also undertook to renew partly its governing body. All these parties have been authorised to run for the elections.”⁸

While this measure may seem proper in a Bosnian political environment dominated for recent years by nationalist speech, in the long run it does not bring any healing to the real problem, that is, the fact that such nationalist speech becomes possible at times in the respective political environment. It is ridiculous to think that the removal of a few nationalist leaders could ever heal these wounds in a region where the axe of war was waved in the air again in the 1990s, after decades of relative peace during the communist times. This type of understanding places nationalist leaders in a position of illegality which is incompatible with the legitimacy they manage to gain periodically. The tension implied here would not vanish, this thesis suggests, but in the absence of the context and possibility of the nation-state's existence on the continent, the only reality left to make virulent nationalism possible. Such threats should be viewed uninterruptedly as potential until fundamental features of the political environment, which will be indicated in the conclusions to this thesis, become evident in Balkan politics. Bosnia is anyway already a case of “controlled democracy,” one in which the EU especially exerts a decisive influence while Bosnia and Herzegovina has very little of its own ‘sovereignty’ under control (Bojkov, 2003: 42). One could easily make the case that EU membership is a fact only waiting the blessing of a written act. Why, then, a supranational approach to the establishment of that state (one so much similar to Europe as a whole in what concerns its ethnic mosaic) was not envisaged? Why was

⁸ Report to the European Parliament by the OHR and EU Special Representative for BiH, January – June, 2002; Internet source: http://www.ohr.int./archive/rep-eu-parl/default.asp?content_id=30141

the entire Yugoslavia subject to a different approach in line with the very European declared intentions? Instead, a recognition policy based on a century old perspective with an upgraded conditionality that further complicated the issue was left at the centre of all developments, with dramatic consequences that became visible not long time after Dayton and not far away from Sarajevo and Western Europe.

Moreover, the non-inclusion of the Kosovo issue on the negotiations agenda, as one from which all the trouble started in the former Yugoslavia, practically started the clock of that other bomb to explode, once again, just few years later (Hedges, 1999: 30). In the words of Isa Blumi, Kosovo's exclusion from the negotiations, "was a short-term resolution to what was then a major policy concern: ending the Bosnian war. Unfortunately such an approach of exclusionary diplomacy has been repeated over and over as Belgrade (and Skopje), in their dealings with Western officials have successfully dictated with whom they will negotiate over the issues in Kosova, [...]" (Blumi, 2002: 38). Indeed, the logic behind Kosovar actions from that moment on could be summarised by what Chris Hedges heard a member of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) saying: "the Dayton peace negotiations, which dealt with Bosnia but not Kosovo, 'taught us a painful truth, [that] those that want freedom must fight for it. This is our sad duty'" (Hedges, 1999: 29). Having to correct map lines drawn by or under the patronage of West European countries has played a crucial role in shaping the Balkan perception of its more fortunate cohabitants on the continent. Alexandar Pavkovic described the international community's approach as one marked by an 'encourage and suppress' type of policies, very much similar to Tito's policy of 'encouraging' the manifestation of national differences throughout the federation while at the same time 'suppressing' attempts at contesting the control of the political life by the communist regime. Thus, in the scholar's words, the EC and the US chose to pursue "policies of support for selected national liberation movements", that is, the Slovene and Croat against Serbia, or Kosovar and Bosnian against Serbia and

Serbian against Bosnian (Pavkovic, 2002: 242). Indeed, awkwardness was to persist in the international community's approach even long after Dayton when, as in the words of Chris Hedges, "the U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard gave what many have interpreted as a green light to Belgrade to go after the rebel bands by announcing in Priština on February 23, 1998, that the KLA 'is without any question a terrorist group.' He went on to add that the United States 'condemns very strongly terrorist activities in Kosovo.' Within two weeks Serb forces had turned Prekaz into a smouldering ruin, killed close to a hundred people, and ignited the uprising" (Hedges, 1999: 36). The 'encourage and suppress' idea is ideally illustrated by these declarative attitudes. Moreover, as Susan Woodward put it, while the conflict was not concluded and especially in Croatia, "the EC decisions did hand the victory in the political and propaganda side of the war, which reverberated deeply into the domestic conflict." (Woodward, 1995: 221). The Western encouragement for the Croats and the lamentable forgetfulness by the international community of the fate of Serbs almost eliminated from Croatia that Pavkovic decries (Pavkovic, 2002: 243) only add to the impressive choir of critics arguing in quite a coherent way that, indeed and hopefully without intention, the international community continued the 'encourage and suppress' manifestations of national identity throughout the former Yugoslavia. An old game too well known by the peoples in that region came to be played by an entire respectable international community. The reason for such a situation, it is maintained here, is related to the lack of a doctrinal coherence in the foreign policy, one that could not have come from the US as a power solidly entrenched in the modern understanding of international relations, but from the EC/EU as the potential exponent of a post-modern understanding. Since at a time when Yugoslavia was in war the debate in the EU over a common foreign and security policy was boiling high, let us see, in the next chapter, what that process presupposed and which principles were to prevail in the elaboration of that crucial policy for the EU's very *presence* outside its own self.

IV

THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND SUPRANATIONALITY

IV. 1. The Emergence of a Common Foreign and Security Policy

In the previous chapter a few lines only pointed at the possibility of developing a foreign and security policy doctrine on the basis of supranational principles. One was the answer of the EU members to a proposal regarding the establishment of sovereign states in the former Yugoslavia along ethnic boundaries. The respective answer was that such an option would be merely “out of date.” The second instance in which a supranational principle was a little more visible was in the European Union Action Plan (EUAP) of November 1993 and it suggested that the Western Europe would simply accept any agreement reached by the parties in the respective conflict. While this might sound quite confusing, it must be remembered at this point that the perception of the international community in the region is one according to which outsiders are to blame for whatever befalls the region’s peoples. A sort of ‘withdrawal’ was therefore envisaged, one leaving room for the actors to negotiate and reach the respective agreement. Of course, the more concerned attitude of the US and the apparently lowering level of violence that year (news about what was really going on in Bosnia were hard to confirm) must have determined this attitude. However, no sign was in Brussels or elsewhere in Europe to indicate that, as claimed subsequently by scholars, the approach to the Yugoslav crisis would revolutionize the Montevideo criteria, except for the controversial conditionality added by the EC’s Guidelines for the recognition of the new states in the Balkans. And nor was there any relevant indication of intense work being done

for the elaboration of a political philosophy of international relations to characterise the new, post-modern and possibly post-national environment.

Ruggie's warnings about the post-modernism of the new European polity support such a statement while David Campbell and deconstructivism in general offer very little beyond the sincere sympathy for multiculturalism. In spite of offering solutions in tone with the Balkan realities, Campbell's proposals as possible alternative solutions to the Balkan conflict do little to alter the essence of the European approach in the former Yugoslavia. He first invokes Anthony Borden's 'emancipatory intervention' urging for a new "vision of civil and democratic politics in the region," coupled with trans-national zones to make possible the democratic process at a non-territorial level and, thus, far from the traditional understanding of sovereignty and relying more on local autonomies. The civil society is disqualified by Campbell since in Croatia and Slovenia it was precisely civil society that hosted a nationalist political discourse (Campbell, 1998: 235-6). Moreover, I should say, civil society is, eventually, only a way to and a context of change rather than 'change' in itself. That is probably why Campbell prefers to imagine solutions in any Balkan potential conflict as rather non-territorial and is less concerned with and confident in the capacity of humans to comply to new rules of the game. Campbell reaches then a rather sensitive and at the same time exciting issue by asserting that, "Given the enthusiasm among more progressive thinkers for proposals such as a 'Europe of the regions,' the dismemberment of Bosnia into plural entities might be read as a step in that direction" (Campbell, 1998: 238). However, an analysis of the strong language of the treaties and agreements that the EU eventually managed to define itself through would most probably suggest that regions confronting ethnic or territorial disputes are not considered eligible for EU membership. The potential validity of such a view is not to be excluded though. Indeed, the almost 'virtual' government at the Union level (when compared, of course, with the traditional understanding of 'government' in the nation-state) seems suspended away from the territorial demarcations of the sovereignty as inherited from the last centuries. Within this

context, 'regions' might indeed become basic territorial units uncharged with identity exponents and thus determining the decisive step toward an understanding of the political beyond modernity. The problem is just that the EC/EU negotiators could not keep that in mind when dealing with the Balkan demands in the 1990s.

The enthusiasm invoked here is understandable and that is especially on behalf of scholars viewing the EU's supranational definition as possible only in the context of a European polity in which territorial units different from the national states become relevant. However, and except for the unconditioned but unexplained support for a multiculturalist approach in politics and a vague last word on new articulations of "the political" (Campbell, 1998: 243), no clue is suggested about *how* such an idea would be put into practice. It has been stated on many occasions throughout this thesis that only a clear view of the supranational nature of the new European polity could make possible positive transformations in and outside the Union. Only such a view could act as a guide for Union's post-modern and above-national approach to its both interior and exterior. The challenge posed by the Balkans simply continues to be the supreme test of this aspect in the unfortunate case in which the pessimist predictions about the region's explosive prove right. Nevertheless, a coherent answer to this problem must be in a doctrinal form and the principles of that doctrine must obviously accommodate both a Europe of regions, a non-nation-state Europe, and its relations with its neighbourhood. Since the *being* of a political entity is perceived in its relations and interaction with the environment within which is present, EU's foreign policy should have been among the first common policies contaminated by these principles. The Yugoslav episode of the 1990s proved that it was too early for such expectations. What follows is a brief introspection in the workings around the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in search for glimpses of supranationality there.

Jean-Yves Haine, for instance, admits that a huge responsibility hangs over Europe's commitment outside the Union's boundaries due to the 'ambivalence' showed in the Western Balkans. However, he points at the following causes for that ambivalence:

- Europe was not sharing a “common strategic culture;”
- The absence of a structure of organizations to anticipate events from the perspective of European security;
- Europe’s incapacity to project military threat abroad; lack of a credible ability to use force;
- Small defence budgets;
- The “technology deficit” as compared with the United States.⁹

At the same time, as Javier Solana, the EU’s appointed representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, asserted publicly on March 1, 2000, “the development of the CFSP reflects the very credibility of the European Union” (Groves, 2000: 13). In my opinion, the absence of a European credible military force in the early years of the CFSP can act as an excuse for failures but not for the generally erroneous approach. The absence of a supranational set of principles for EU’s *presence* in the international arena is the main culprit here. But even in defining those principles the main hurdle would be that of defining first how that presence is to be developed. Will it be a presence opened to the exterior, or rather following the traditions of the theory of international relations in its realist form? As one analyst from EU’s outside remarked about the continent’s choices over this fundamental issue, “the EU is actually at the point of crucial choice between an ‘integrationist approach to security,’ and ‘traditional realist/neorealist thought.’ The result of this choice will determine the future of European security in theory and in practice” (Özen, 2002: 129). In other words, and in line with a central idea of my thesis, the Common Foreign and Security Policy had to be conceived of either as an inclusive reflex aiming at providing security to all actors within its spectacular economic integration, or simply copy the ‘traditional realist/neorealist’ model as consolidated through the propagation of antagonistic and exclusive sovereignties in modernity.

The concrete work on the CFSP started practically in the 1970s. More specifically, as Douglas Hurd points out, it was right in 1970 that the six foreign ministers of the then members of the European Community (EC) decided to work

⁹ Jean-Yves Haine, “ESDP: an overview.” Internet source: <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf>;

together in meetings every six months as to analyse foreign policy issues of interest to Western Europe and a “Political Committee of senior diplomats was established to prepare these meetings.” Subsequently, the European foreign policy received the first treaty form in the mid-1980s when the Single European Act contained it under the name of the “European Political Cooperation (EPC)” and that was to become the CFSP as described under Title V of the Treaty on European Union (Hurd, 1994: 421-2). During the war in Yugoslavia, therefore, the European foreign policy was still a project and represented rather strictly the result of intergovernmental negotiations together with the Justice and Home Affairs Policy. Germany’s admitted error in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia and thus legitimizing Serbia’s military reaction together with the proliferation of sovereignties in the region cannot be placed exclusively under Berlin’s responsibility. There *was* a political framework, that of the European Political Cooperation which finally obtained a legal basis with the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1987. That framework was, however, still an intergovernmental process of a gradual transfer of powers that started in the 1970s. Germany, therefore, adopted what seemed to be an optimum solution unilaterally within a context in which, anyway, the foreign and security policies of national governments would have had to converge for a common solution to be taken. The German side can easily invoke the fact that the respective crisis did not leave time for negotiations. This is not to excuse German diplomacy, but to merely say that, logically, the respective *presence* of Germany on the international stage was made possible by the very *absence* of the common attitude of Europe.

While the ambiguity of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty over the European foreign policy was almost natural considering the still strong national sensibilities at that time, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 marked a decisive step when the so-called Petersberg Tasks were incorporated in the treaty and, thus, “the Union finally became a military actor” (Treacher, 2004: 49). The Petersberg Tasks bear a particular significance here, even more than the Franco-German or Franco-British attempts at building the continent’s military capability in the spirit of a solid reconciliation. That is because the Petersberg Tasks underlined a conceptual

particularity extremely important in the configuration of what I would prefer to call here the security identity of the Union or, in other, much more consecrated words, the 'common strategic culture.' The respective 'tasks' were agreed upon and formulated at a meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) Council held in Berlin, in June 1992, at the Petersberg Hotel. They were defined on that occasion as "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping" and represented practically the incorporation of the WEU into the CFSP (Missiroli, 2003: 493). The Petersberg Tasks also signify a compromise between two important views about the European security. One is the view of the Nordic countries as expressed in a draft report by the Finnish Presidency for the European Council Summit of 1999 in Helsinki. According to this view, non-military capabilities for crisis management had to be approached at least with the same preoccupation as the military capabilities (Groves, 2000: 7). This was in line with the idea according to which the EU's civilian power dimension as far better placed NATO's to address the non-military dimensions of security (Özen, 2002: 132). The other view was that according to which the military capacities of the Union deserved by far more attention and it "reflected the pressure of the European powers – France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy" (Groves, 2000: 7).

In his recent analysis, Adrian Treacher concludes that up to now, in the new context of the post-war developments, "The Union's key contribution to European security was the socio-economic provision and extension of stability through democratization and the liberalization of the market" (Treacher, 2004: 52). However, the conflict in Bosnia especially tested the EU's capacity to quickly react by employing at least some sort of peace and law enforcement military capabilities and the Union had failed the test lamentably. In spite of avoiding "the disastrous rivalries of western powers in the Balkans" and notwithstanding the aid provided for negotiations to be possible over Bosnian issue, the frustration provoked by the clear incapacity of the Union to take a more decisive position and stop the war is beyond any doubt (Hurd, 1994: 424). That failure created the impression that only

after the establishment of a significant common military force could the EU present credibility as an actor in the international context. With the Petersberg Tasks of the WEU incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty, it looked like that credibility was achievable. However, these developments took place in parallel with the ones in the Balkans and lead to no substantial European involvement in stopping the war in Bosnia which eventually made the role of the US-led NATO presence essential within the European strategic context.

The timid steps taken by Western Europe for building its foreign and security dimension contributed to the creation of the impression that it was acting contingently upon developments in the political and military arena of the time. As Adrian Treacher observes, “the creation of a military dimension to Union activity is largely attributable to certain exogenous shocks. The story of the ESDP process has thus been a *reactive* one that developed in the context of a certain set of circumstances” (Treacher, 2004: 50; italics in original). Indeed, the conjunctures invoked here were the Yugoslav crises to which the EU could have reacted only by employing its civilian capability but even there it failed simply because it could not rely on a unity of opinion. It is evident here that the lack of a set of principles fully agreed upon by the EU members and doctrinally defining EU’s position as an international actor was imperatively necessary. That doctrine had not been built and, forced by external shocks indeed, the Union jumped over natural stages toward the creation of a military capability without previously agreeing upon the principles according to which that force would be engaged. At the same time, it became obvious that the Union already became a *presence* in the international arena through aspects of its activity mentioned by Adrian Treacher in his very inspiring article. He suggests, indeed, that “trade with third countries, development policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Single Market, humanitarian relief and the single currency, not to mention enlargement” contributed to the constitution of the EU’s unquestionable presence in the world as an actor of international relations (Treacher, 2004: 51). These aspects inevitably put the EU face to face with international responsibilities and it should have been ready, if not

militarily, at least doctrinally for articulating coherently that *presence*. In the particular case appearing at that time in the Balkans, the very invocation of ancient trouble originating there eliminates any excuse for non-action as ultimately ridiculous. At the same time the simple definition of types of threats to the European Union as viewed by each of the members would have had to include potential ethnic conflict fuelled by a nationalist political discourse as literally defining the position of a 'post-modern,' supranational polity against threats from its own past. Instead, as it was shown in the previous chapter, the European response to such threats was a chaotic, anachronistic one which led to accusations of subjectivism, imperialism, and incited to violence. That answer literally created the conflict out of a misunderstanding of European history, if the Balkans are accepted as part of Europe.

IV. 2. The Principles of the CFSP

With the launch of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as envisaged in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in 1991, an unprecedented process of economic integration was started. This, on the other hand, contributed decisively to the emergence of a more integrated conception of the European foreign and security policy under the ECP "that henceforth would be termed CFSP (Common Foreign and Security policy)" (Treacher, 2004: 53). Indeed, the now famous Title V of the new Treaty established the CFSP as to replace ECP but the new policy took the shape of a new, intergovernmental pillar in the Community. Article 11 of Title V in the Treaty on the European Union states also the main principles of the CFSP:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of United Nations Charter;
- To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well

as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;

- To promote international cooperation;
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.000501.html#anArt11)

Articles 12-28 then come to specify the role of the Council in defining the principles mentioned above and the technical details regarding voting in EU's bodies over issue concerning the foreign and security policy, with the unanimity rule clearly stated. The role of the Council in framing the CFSP is stressed subsequently in the Treaty of Amsterdam which entered into force in 1999 and, in its Article 17, states that the European Council decides upon the development of a common defense out of a progressive framing of a common defense policy. However, while the Treaty on the European Union stipulated in Article 2 of the common provisions that one of the objectives guiding the foreign policy is the assertion of Union's "*identity* on the international scene, *in particular* through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy" (my italics), the Treaty of Amsterdam fails to continue this direction by indicating the principles along which that policy would develop. Since that is indicated as the job of the Council, let us see what results are there from the Council's approach to the issue.

The *European Security Strategy* issued by the Council in December 2003 under the title "A Secure Europe in a Better World" contains the identification of 'key' security threats for the European Union, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime (European Security Strategy, 2003: p. 3-5). Fundamental principles on the basis of which a common foreign and security policy could address these threats are not suggested, while the Union' commitment "to upholding and developing International Law" is viewed in a context in which "The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter" (European Security Strategy, 2003: p. 9). Corroborated with the provisions in Article 11 of the Treaty on the European Union, a broad picture emerges in which the doctrinal definition of the

EU's foreign policy is rooted in the already existing international treaties mentioned here. Among them, the United Nations Charter reigns as the main source of principles while the Security Council of the United Nations was criticised on some occasions, as underlined in this thesis, for its incapacity to perceive the real weight of its decisions in Yugoslavia. At the operational level, the embargo imposed by the UN on the delivery of weapons to Yugoslavia literally made Bosnia a victim of the Serbian forces. At the same time, the very judgment of the term "genocide" in the inter-national debates under UN's patronage misguided the international community to consider ethnic cleansing for most part of the Yugoslav conflict as only one of its side effects with territorial claims being viewed as the main concern of the sides. As David Campbell fully demonstrates, for instance, the UN's Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which was signed in 1948 and entered force in 1951 does not facilitate rapid intervention on behalf of the international community in case genocide becomes obviously the aim of factions in a particular state. And that proved to be fatal not only in Rwanda (Campbell, 1998: 99-114). Indeed, the cynicism of the Convention was clear particularly in the Bosnian case.

According to the Judge Elihu Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), based on the findings of the UN Commission of Experts on Yugoslavia, the identification of the Bosnian people as a 'nation' was made difficult by the fact that the population inhabiting the territory of that republic was made up of Serbs, Croats, and a Muslim population. Since the Genocide Convention protects "national, ethnic, racial or religious" groups, and since at that time evidence of the scale of the massacres was extremely scarce, it was not practically clear who was killing who in a *territorially defined* Bosnia. As a consequence, while Bosnia and Herzegovina originally applied to the ICJ claiming the fact that the state was partitioned by an external enemy through genocide, Judge Lauterpacht answered that, technically, the respective territory was in a conflictual process partitioned without a particular nation being the main target. The term *nation* or *ethnic minority* could not have been applied to the Muslim population. Therefore, while the

Bosnian government was perfectly entitled to defend its population, that did not include the right of that government to act militarily as to protect the territorial integrity of the state as such since significant parts of the entire population of the territorially defined state of Bosnia and Herzegovina were obviously for partition. "In other words," as David Campbell ironically points out, "because the Bosnian 'nation' was multinational and multireligious, it could not be the subject of protection under the Genocide Convention" (Campbell, 1998: 108). Consequently, the misperceived attempts of Serbs at partitioning the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina could continue on the ground, while only after the Dayton accord analysts could prove that those Serbian military actions were precisely aiming at the elimination of the Muslims. The market place explosion in Sarajevo and Srebrenica were to teach the international community an extremely bitter lesson about all these and about how concepts of modernity can play in the hands of mass murderers.

The eventual acceptance of the fact that ethnic cleansing was the real objective of the Serbian attacks in Bosnia led eventually to different approaches as described in the previous chapter of this thesis. However, as also pointed out there, the possibility for such horrors to repeat in the future is not eliminated. A supranational approach, within this context, would have to be a non-territorial, non-national, non-religious and, in one word, non-imagined identity type of an approach. Instead, the very principles of the EU'S Common Foreign and Security Policy seem to remain in a sort of pre-elaboration phase, as based on the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter.¹⁰ According to the principles expressed in the Amsterdam Treaty as already listed here, the UN Charter is invoked two times in connection with CFSP's values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity, the preservation of peace and strengthening international security. The 'principle' of the Helsinki Final Act and the 'objectives' of the Paris Charter are invoked in support of CFSP's principle 2 regarding the

¹⁰ The versions of the three documents analysed here can be accessed easily on the internet sites of the UN, the OSCE, or the through the entries on the EU's internet page dedicated to the Overview of the CFSP, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro;

preservation of peace and strengthening of the international security. A look at the respective aspects as envisaged in the three capital documents of the post-World War Two international scene reveals without much difficulty the fact that, first, all of them are treaties agreed upon by nation-states. Second, since all of them (including the Amsterdam Treaty) confirm the authority of the UN Charter over the basic principles of their texts, the conclusion is that the UN Charter provides the fundamental philosophy of approach, especially with its Chapter I entitled 'Purpose and Principles'. In Article 1, Chapter I, it is stated that one of the Purposes of the UN is "to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends" listed above this statement and including maintaining international peace and security, or developing "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples." Article 2 defines the Principles that members of the UN must act in accordance with as to pursuit the Purposes mentioned above. Below are these Principles as listed in the Charter:

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

The first principle points at equality among sovereign members of the UN. And while membership is conditioned by both articles so that only recognized nations represented by sovereign states can achieve it, only such constituted members shall benefit from the rights suggested by Article 2. Among those rights is that of protection from threat and the existence of such a threat, according to Chapter VII, Article 39, is determined by the Security Council which, following an 1963 amendment to Article 23, consists of fifteen members, one group of five permanent members and another of ten periodically elected by the General Assembly. Since Germany is not a permanent member of the Security Council, that country's representatives can easily invoke this status as determining them to take initiative and recognize Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 in face of 'threats' to their security from a neighbouring state. Moreover, these principles are fully adopted in both the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. In the Paris Charter it is affirmed the right of every individual to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly, or movement under the title "Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law." However, the text of the Paris Charter starts by confirming the full adherence of the signatories to the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act which are the following:

- I. Sovereign equality, respects for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
- II. Refraining from the threat or use of force;
- III. Inviolability of frontiers;
- IV. Territorial integrity of states;
- V. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
- VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs;
- VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief;
- VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- IX. Cooperation among states;
- X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

It is interesting to notice that only Principle VII deals with a non-collective identity issue, while all the rest presuppose the identification of individuals as members of particular communities residing in particular territorially defined units.

Even Principle VII does nothing but to express the 'respect' for human rights and fundamental freedoms, that is, an attitude towards identity markers confirmed therefore as politically relevant aspects. Moreover, how can these principles accommodate the non-national, Muslim population of Bosnia whose 'sovereignty' is highly dependent on the international community's military presence in that state, as mentioned throughout this thesis? And, in case the Serbian and Croatian people manifest their will to make use of the right to self-determination as envisaged by the seventh Principle of the Helsinki Final Act, by virtue of which principle are the Muslim people of Bosnia entitled to establish their own self-determined sovereignty and where? A multiculturalist approach, as suggested by David Campbell would work within this contest only if promoted by a governmental agency designed to that purpose and supported by other state structures. Since such structures practically do not function for reasons suggested in the beginning of Chapter III, the void must be seriously filled by a state structure and that must be, it seems, the EU. However, the principles according to which the EU tends to manifest its *presence* in the international arena appear, even in this to brief an analysis, incompatible with the potential challenges coming from the Balkan realities.

IV. 3. A Possible Understanding of the 'Supranational' within the Context of a Foreign Policy in Europe

It is generally or implicitly accepted that the supranational aspect invoked throughout this thesis was absent from the approach of the EC/EU to the Balkan conflict. Various definitions of supranationality, on the other hand, tend to suggest that there is no comprehensible link between supranationalism *per se* and the respective attitude of the EC/EU toward the proliferation of sovereignties and the outburst of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, definitions of supranationalism are not abundant at all. The following is rather a very orthodox

one, meant to decipher the concept for didactical purposes but its merit is that it is simple and quite clear:

“The concept of ‘supranational’ appeared in the Paris Treaty of 1951 and the EDC [European Defence Community] Treaty of 1952, although after the EDC debacle it disappeared from the treaty lexicon. Literally *above* national, supranationality, like other concepts, has been defined in a variety of ways but in essence it suggests that central authorities have real authority to deal directly with the citizens and economic agents of the society and make decisions affecting them on some matters traditionally handled solely by the state” (Nicoll and Salmon, 2001: 68).

The above text suggests a rather technical understanding of supranationalism according to which the ‘above national’ is to be viewed as ‘above the technical means of the nation-state in exerting its sovereignty.’ Not accidentally, then, the concept of ‘pooling’ sovereignty was to replace the ‘making’ of a supranational polity in a gradual process with the same objective. A look at the way in which the European Political Cooperation was viewed in the 1980s might be useful for understanding the transformations of the idea of supranationality within the context of Europe’s foreign policy. The idea of a supranational approach to foreign policy gained a significant impetus, as already suggested in this chapter, with the signing of the Single European Act and, even more important, with the establishment of the Single European Market. The Single European Act incorporated the amendments to the Treaty of Rome and an international treaty on political cooperation among the members aiming at correlating to a greater degree the foreign policy. In other words, the European Union could “engage in two processes at once, intergovernmental cooperation and supranational integration” (Serre, 1988: 194). An emergence of a supranational foreign policy was conceived as depending on the results of a slow process of intergovernmental cooperation with the pooling of sovereignty gradually, on behalf of the member states of the European Union. Here, also, the supranational aspect seems to be strongly related to the foreign policy understood as an instrument in promoting Union’s specific interests and not promoting the EU’s *presence* as such and in general in the

international arena. Moreover, as Joseph Weiler and Wolfgang Wessels clearly pointed out, the EPC eventually became less and less credible because it lacked a founding principle. In authors' words, the EPC was "a mechanism to coordinate, or even, in the stronger language of the Single Act 'to formulate and implement a European foreign policy.' But what that policy might be, or even on what foundations it will rest, is never specified" (Weiler and Wessels, 1988: 236). Failing to build first a theory and place it at its own foundations, the EPC eventually disappeared from actuality and was to be replaced by the EU Treaty with its Article V, in 1993. The five principles of the CFSP created with that Treaty do not represent, then, the result of a continuous process of elaboration of solid theoretical grounds for the European project of a common foreign policy.

The concept of supranationality as such was to resist time under another form, called *subsidiarity*, in the beginning of the 1990s. With the Commission President using it ten times in a 1989 speech, the principle came to be invoked in Article A, second paragraph of the EU Treaty where it is defined as a system "in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen" (Nicoll and Salmon, 2001: 68). It is interesting to see also the very subtle debate provoked by the attempt at interpreting the concept. In the words of Nicoll and Salmon,

"Subsidiarity is part of the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. According to this doctrine, the people should be closely involved in decisions that affect them. It might be basically expressed as the principle that decisions should be taken as low in the political hierarchy as possible. It could be regarded as another way of expressing one version of the federal principle of decentralisation. [...] The Union has gone through endless contortions since 1992 as it has tried to put flesh on what subsidiarity actually means. Interestingly, and in the light of the politico-social arguments of German Catholic theologians after the popular revolution of 1648, subsidiarity can also be interpreted to mean respect for higher authority rather than power to the people. The people decide what they can, but some decisions are properly beyond their reach. They are 'subsidiary' to higher levels" (Nicoll and Salmon, 2001: 68).

The latter idea is in conformity with the general tendency among both scholars and EU politicians to conceive of supranationality as specific *way* in which national-states' sovereignty over policies is to be taken away from them by gradual pooling of sovereignty in the imaginary hands of the Union. Here, too, the very change of the nature of those policies is not envisaged and, thus, the call of Weiler and Wessels for a theoretical foundation of a policy seems to be still valid.

Another feature of supranationality suggested by scholarship has been revealed within the context of its relation with democracy as the political system of the modern nation-state. Alexander Somek analysed admirably the issue in a paper covering most of the aspects involved here. Supranationality as "rational bypassing of democracy", in Somek's words, "is, above all, a perfect system of negotiation among national governments. It rests on the institutionalisation of a mode of problem-solving that is unavailable to the nation-states acting alone, unavailable for the simple reason that the problems concerned are of a transnational scope." The 'bypassed' one here, Somek makes it clear at this point, is the national democracy and the negotiation mechanism presupposed is nothing but a more radical form of supranationalism (Somek, 2001: 6).

The other type of supranationality envisaged by Somek is supranationality as "boundary patrol," as described in the writings of Joseph Weiler for whom supranationality does not imply necessarily unity (Weiler, 2000). The boundary invoked here is the very one between the nation and the state which becomes practically subject of abuse by political actors on the state scene who, as it happened in Yugoslavia or in the case of fascism, pervert the essential telos of politics, that is, the realisation of the good of the individuals. (Somek, 2001: 9). Imagined identities are attached to social groups and thus they become collective subjects of policies instead of policies serving the good of man understood as an individual. Somek suggests, therefore, that supranationality comes at this point to practically erase that boundary between the nation and the state and make appeals to ethnicity, for instance, non-feasible sources of legitimacy. The respective boundary must not be abused and protecting it is the mission of the European

supranational institutions together with its more comprehensive mission regarding the redefinition of the boundary itself (Somek, 2001: 10).

As a replica to these understandings of the supranational, Alexander Somek proposes his own alternative under the title “work in progress.” The concept is placed under the constitutional perspective according to which there are, practically, three types of constitution: the constitution of liberty, the constitution of inclusion, and the constitution of anti-discrimination that characterises, in Somek’s view, supranationality (Somek, 2001: 11). The constitution of liberty is a liberal one and presupposes the administration of justice and the emancipation of social segments. However, this presupposes in turn an exclusive reflex in the sense that it defines itself in terms of principles of adherence and because, in my opinion, it presupposes the creation of identities to inhabit it. The ones not adhering or incapable of adhering to this constitution of liberty are, of course, to be considered excluded from the respective political constitution. Somek defines the constitution of inclusion as one based on the adoption of protective legislation as it happened with the spread of the Scandinavian model of leftist vein. The two ways of constituting political orders presented above coexist at the same time in the same polities. As an example, the constitution of inclusion so much associated with the Scandinavian countries contaminated in time much of the Western Europe and can be perceived nowadays in the EU’s legislation.

The constitution of anti-discrimination comes then to address shortcomings of the other two constitutions and tends to be perceived as a touch of the future in governmental affairs. It is expressed precisely in the EU’s legislative reflex correcting national policies of and approaches to, say, social and economic change. In Somek’s words, within this context, “supranationality can then be understood as protecting individual agents against disadvantages arising systematically from the co-existence of nation-states” along the lines described by the constitution of liberty and the constitution of inclusion. “In fact, nationality is the only ground of discrimination to which a liberal society, confined to national bounds, cannot respond without denying itself. As a consequence, it is rational to elevate this

aspect of anti-discrimination to a level beyond the nation-state” (Somek, 2001: 12). Moreover, the constitution of anti-discrimination, with its strong stance against encroachments of human rights by national states, as stressed in all programmatic policies of the EU, seems to be much closer to inclusion rather than to liberty (Somek, 2001: 14) and “overcoming the weakness of a system of nation-states with respect to inclusion is the greatest challenge lying ahead of European integration” (Somek, 2001: 15). Here, Somek refers to the bulk of social policy legislation already enforced in a majority of European states but not yet able to solve all the problems. Additionally, he underscores the fact that more and more means are transferred from the nation-states to the EU, less and less instruments and resources are left at the hands of the nation-states as to pursue social policies. However, at the European level there have been done little efforts to replace the social policy mechanisms of the nation-states. Somek suggests that this might degenerate into “growing popular estrangement” (Somek, 2001: 15). That is simply because, as it was suggested by Françoise de la Serre, the hard policies of the Union are still working, as in the pre-1989 period, in the slow speed of sovereignty pooling at the level of intergovernmental cooperation that creates even more slowly the conditions necessary for the emergence of supranational political bodies able in turn to replace ‘the social policy mechanisms of the nation-states.’

Besides, as Inglehart pointed out after concluding his research on European integration, post-materialist values as advocated at the level of the Union act toward replacing the national concerns in people’s conscience and support EU integration. On the other hand, the national states are portrayed as too materialistic and inevitably having to face the ‘silent revolution’ of the people who are more and more attracted by those post-materialist, integrative concerns such as concerning the environment or the quality of life, issues that encourage what Inglehart called the ‘socialisation of states’ (Inglehart, 1977, 1990). These values are much more down to earth than the irrational ones proposed by the nation-state, especially in the Eastern and South Eastern Europe, such as independence, sovereignty, exclusive cultural, economic or political rights, etc. Those ‘values’

represent an important capital for the states themselves in terms of legitimacy but tend to mean less and less to people.

'Values' and 'anti-discrimination' put together, the picture of supranationalism as sketched above seems to indicate that it is still a desideratum more advanced in the realm of expectation than in that of concrete developments. It is viewed more in relation with the development of a technical apparatus of the new European polity able to make useless the similar instruments of the nation-states and thus turn their legitimacy into an empty concept. However, the ambiguity that anyway characterises the supranational politics at work in the EU becomes critical when the policy in question is not, say, the Common Agricultural Policy but the Common Foreign and Security Policy. That is because while the former can work even without been *seen*, the latter is *about* the very presence of the Union in its outside. The absence of a coherent supranational message was, in my opinion, an essentially missing aspect from the international community's approach to the Yugoslav conflict. In other words, only a message above the nationalist logic could have made claims from the region invoking national sovereignties look 'out of date' and possibly retreat from the political discourse of the negotiations. Instead, the EC/EU gave in to the old score without any chance subsequently to regain a truly objective position. The political discourse in the region was one deeply rooted in a modernity of national sovereign states that also gave birth to the United States. That is why the diplomatic approach of the White House cannot be blamed without doing injustice to history. The only entity that could have reacted reasonably within the Balkan context would have been one capable of a political discourse from *above* the Balkan disputes and that could have been only a supranational one as the EU claims to be. The most serious aspect in connection with supranationality here is that it is perceived rather as a space of cooperation than as an attitude, that is, a space to be filled with new instruments of performing the same policies rather than a new attitude to political categories and issues. The Balkan conflict and the possibility that it could explode again in the future is not something foreign to the European continent but seems to be foreign to segments of the European polity

that should be concerned. Only a new political theory based on an understanding of fundamental concepts away from tradition could make possible the perception of political alternatives beyond the trappings of the nation-state's horizon. Only when such alternatives are sketched could choices be made about approaches to be taken in situations in which our traditional pacts, treaties, constitutions, and conventions do not seem to work, as it happened in a historical perspective in Yugoslavia. A foreign policy anchored in such a new, vigorous terrain, would be the only way out of the labyrinth in which political engineers feel lost, between the walls of a tradition and the still poorly comprehensible skies of a naturally blurred future.



CONCLUSION

While most analysts of the events connected to the Yugoslav conflict in 1990s tend to point at the misconceived intervention of the international community in general, my opinion is that, as Raju G. Thomas pointed out, “in reality, Yugoslavia was dismembered through a selective and prejudicial international recognition policy of its internal republics” (Thomas, 1997: 17). However, as stressed in this thesis, I view the responsibility of the European Union as much more evident than that of the *rest* of the international community due to reasons explained in detail here. This thesis aimed at giving an answer to that rather tragic/comic question mentioned in the first chapter: How can we keep post offices clean in the Balkans? This metaphorical expression of a legitimate need for a solution points basically at irrationality as affecting political discourse both inside and around the Balkan issues. It was also indicated that *irrationality* here can be viewed as associated with and rooted in a sort of religiously interpreted identities, much more seriously taken in the Balkans in general and the former Yugoslavia in particular than in other regions of Europe. That is because identity as such ensured for centuries the political survival of the Balkan peoples. The mysticism that such a hypothesis implies is fundamental for an understanding of multiple aspects of Balkan politics such as reliance on charismatic leaders holding supposedly secret keys to complex problems, the essentially anti-political and divisive discourse of the Orthodox Church of the South Slavs, or the persistence of ‘national liberations’ as political desiderata as a permanent potential source of legitimacy. Only demystification through secularisation of the political *per se*, this thesis suggests, would bring the political closer to rationality. Efforts in this direction as made to secularise political establishments in France and, even before France, in Turkey should be seriously examined.

The 'roots against reason' logic proposed by the Romanticism did not vanish from such a context simply because, unlike in the Western Europe, its final aim, related to the emancipation of particular national groups from a perceived oppression, was not reached. As Alexandar Pavkovic maintains, 'national liberations' would be even now actual in the Balkan political psyche. While the Enlightenment was animated, as Ruggie pointed out, by a desire to demystify and secularise the political discourse in Europe, this thesis suggests in line with Gellner that the romanticised and irrational appearance and development of the nation-state altered fundamentally that intention in the political space. Continuing that true reform of the political proposed by the Enlightenment would be the only rational answer we could offer to a tradition that continues to message us with graffiti on our post offices. Demystification and secularisation, that is, doing away with all forms of 'religiousness' would be the only way to liberate not imagined nations but the very stage where human individuals could come free in the light of true politics.

Supranationality, indeed, does not easily destroy both material and cultural borders but it can devoid them of sense. In a new, post-modern polity developed under its principles, it seems that extremism of any kind would be left not outside but without support and also without its main source of legitimacy: identity as the very essence of the concept of border. Viewed, as Somek proposes, in terms of a constitution of anti-discrimination, the political entity born out of such a perspective would reorient, indeed, the political *per se* from its current objects, the collective identities of socially constructed dependencies, to what Aristotle understood as the *telos* of politics and defined it simply as the 'good of man' more than two millennia ago. Within the context of this idealisation, the thesis developed here suggests that only an understanding of man's 'politicalness' as residing in his or her individuality could make possible a withdrawal of the political from the physical and theoretical space where the irrational discourse and practice addressing identifiable communities could confiscate it. In the words of David Campbell, people are constituted as 'populations' and only in this way can they be

approached as 'policy issues' (Campbell, 1998: 119). It is clear then how 'policy' becomes much more important than 'politics' simply because fundamental principles have died in the petrified status of the contemporary political thought. It becomes also clear why Ruggie cannot find a solid ground for the development of a post-modern theory of international relations. While the non-incorporation of the Heideggerian view of change is one reason, the perception of the political itself as conditioned by the identification of collectives of people in terms of nationality, religion, sex, ethnicity, or anything else has made the mission impossible before even being stated. And not only the theory of international relations cannot jump over this hurdle, but political thought as such could not do it as well. That is actually the cause why the theory of international relations could not move away from modernity. It has been developed on the conceptual foundation built by political philosophy and without a major change at that level, no change is possible in any of its expression, including the theory of international relations.

The European approach to the Balkan conflict as viewed in this thesis is relevant within this context for at least one reason. It shows that the type of conditionality added to the Montevideo criteria for recognition of states in EU's Guidelines for the recognition of the new states in the former Yugoslavia expressed a kind of supranational attitude. This was clear since the respective conditionality points at a non-discriminatory constitutional framework to be built in those countries potentially seeking EU's recognition. However, by interpreting recognition according to its traditional attributes, that is, in terms of territory and national identity, the approach moved back to a situation in which, in order to benefit from the supranational and non-discriminatory conditionality, the new states had to resort to the old strategy of cutting up 'national territories' and thus give shape to nation-states along borders enclosing identifiable ethnic groups. And those borders, as Campbell pointed out, were never eliminated from the debates of the successive negotiations in which the EU was constantly involved. Moreover, the local political actors could legitimate their nationalist programmes by virtue of these very approaches of the 'international community.' In the mean time, individuals were

dying simply because they were assigned an identity literally killing them, with the repeatedly confirmed recognition of that identity by the very 'international community' proclaiming that respect for particular identities should be the rule in recognizing the new states. It can be then said that this gross difference between asserted principles and applied principles contributed to the general tension that made the war possible in the former Yugoslavia.

This approach also indicates that the supranational intention of the EU comes, on the international scene, in fundamental contradiction with the principles expressed in the UN Charter and *that* is precisely the reason why it had no chance to be materialised in the Yugoslav conflict. Based as it currently is on that fundamental document of the last phase of modernity, the EU's doctrine of foreign policy will continue to cause more and more trouble and pose a great obstacle to the very pan-European consensus regarding the development of a common foreign policy. The position of various national governments throughout the continent could not fully converge but toward a doctrine based on a constitution of non-discrimination, one to make collective identities futile and human individuality politically relevant. The terms of conditionality regarding not only the recognition of states, but also as already employed in the enlargement policy are the only ones defining in a non-discriminatory way the supranational polity of the EU.

The argument could continue here with the *application* of such principles in practicality. At this point, an effort at educating the European people in the spirit of such principles would be a fundamental starting point of any attempt at developing a political psyche of supranationality. The Yugoslav case is, even here, extremely relevant as it was suggested throughout this thesis. Yugoslavia's own supranational entity failed eventually to resist time due, in the view of Aleksa Djilas, to the cultural and economic autarky of the federation. In other words, there were little efforts done to teach Yugoslav people the course on *Yugoslavia* and inefficient efforts at building a solid Yugoslav economy. This left the door open for the 'roots and reason' discourse enter the stage and exploit nationality, religion, ethnicity and all other markers of imagined collective identities to its own advantage. Only a

massive effort at building an education system based on principles of supranationality could make such acts impossible. In this context, too, those principles should be developed away from any type of collective identity and centred on an understanding of the Union and its supranational character as the expression of the final recognition of the political relevance of human individuality regardless of any marker of identity.

The political philosophy beyond modernity that Ruggie is actually looking for could contribute alone to the making of a horizon of understanding as to eventually make possible supranationality. It has been insistently suggested in this thesis that the incorporation of the Heideggerian thought into it becomes more and more an imperative for this generation of political philosophers. That is because Martin Heidegger was the first and, in my opinion, the last to prove that the place of humanity is right at the very opening of Being toward perception. Moreover, a very careful reading indicates that Heidegger's conception of man *per se* is, in its fundamentally abstract context, free of any markers of identity. While, as stated in the Introduction to this thesis, this is not my aim here, it is necessary that I point out at this moment that with Heidegger was posed, seriously for the first time in the history of philosophy, the question about the meaning of the verb *to be*. For instance, one can say that 'the pen *is* on the table' but this very assertion eliminates the perfectly possible alternative in which, simultaneously, the pen can *be* 'in the room' or 'not under the table.' The idea of *being* as such becomes in this way problematic. The answer to such a question, Heidegger believed, would give us an incredibly deeper understanding of our existence and he pointed out that Man has *forgotten* asking it because the question in itself had been given an answer long ago by Aristotle whose philosophy consecrated Being as the Eternal and the particular beings (the *being* of pen, of red, or the being of *man*) as only particular manifestations of that Being. And in this way the answered question was to be forgotten, as a perennially solved problem. For example, this is how religion, among other expressions of human civilization, was possible. The interpretation of Being as the Eternal made it easy for apostles of all religions in history to give the Eternal

a name and proclaim it God, while humanity itself became, automatically, just an inferior manifestation of that Eternal.

By giving such an answer to the fundamental question of being, Heidegger asserts, Aristotle (and Plato before him) practically closed the debate and determined the mankind to forget the very possibility of such a question. Moreover, this led to what Heidegger called the *withdrawal* of Being which he considered to be the very essence of Western civilization as illustrated by the emergence, at that time, of moral nihilism and its political expressions, Americanism, Nazism, and Marxism (Heidegger, 1957). He considered all the three to be forms of political life at the end of modernity and, thus, mere expressions of nihilism. As Leo Strauss pointed out in his monumental *History of Political Philosophy*, all these three political regimes “are characterized by the dictatorship of the public over the private, and by the predominance of natural science, economics, public policy, and technology,” which in turn leads to “the consequent reduction of man to a socially produced being” (Strauss, 1987: 898-9). Hence, the relevance of Heideggerian thought for the philosophical approach to the political itself within the context of this thesis. This must be coupled with the understanding, underscored in a previous chapter, of man as the *shepherd* of Being of all beings by virtue of the fact that, to come back to my example, it is the individual man who decides second after second whether the pen is on the table, under table, black, or merely small, and thus assigns a potentially permanently changing identity to the pen. Such a view would help the reader grasp the huge responsibility human individuals have when also deciding, by their own nature as the Heideggerian argument goes, that people speaking Colloquian *are* Colloquians and that they should live *on* (and not *under*) a specific territory which thus becomes by roots, obviously not by reason, a Colloquian territory. The argument of this thesis, in spite of wandering in the politically defined territories of the Balkan Peninsula, tried to move ideas away from the current political identification of those territories. It offers a potentially viable clue about how alternatives can be build. In the last instance, it represents only an attempt at placing concepts and principles strongly entrenched in tradition in a

new light. In doing so, it also identified principles that could guide us in developing theoretical foundations on which the alternatives suggested here could be at least hypothetically erected. The step it makes being far too little compared with the perspective it opens, much more elaborated work will follow it on the same path.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adevărul*, Romanian daily (2003) "Regiunile înființate pe criterii etnice – o soluție periculoasă," ["Regions Established on Ethnic Criteria – A Dangerous Solution"], No. 4165, 18 November;
- Ahrweiler, H. (2002) *Ideologia politica a Imperiului Bizantin* [English: *The Political Ideology of the Byzantine Empire*], Corint, Bucharest. The original French edition: Helen Ahrweiler, *L'Idéologie Politique de l'Empire Byzantin*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1975;
- Albright, M. (2003) *Madam Secretary*, Miramax Books, New York;
- Allcock, J. (1992) "Rhetorics of Nationalism in Yugoslav Politics," in J. Allcock, J. Horton and M. Milivojevic (eds.) *Yugoslavia in Transition: Choices and Constraints*, Berg Press, Oxford;
- Anderson, B. (1991) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London;
- Arendt, H. (1998) *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London;
- Banac, I. (1996) Introduction to *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Civil War*, 2nd edition, Westview Press, Boulder, Col.;
- Bauman, Z. (1989) *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Polity Press, Cambridge;
- Belamarcic, B. (2003) "Attempting to Resolve an Ethnic Conflict: The Language of the 2001 Macedonian Constitution," *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 25-40;
- Berlin, I. (1990) "The Bent Twig: On the Rise of Nationalism," in Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, Murray, London.;
- Blumi, I. (2002) "A Story of Mitigated Ambitions: Kosova's Torturous Path to its Postwar Future," *Alternatives-Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1, No.4, pp. 30-52;
- Bojkov, V. D. (2003) "Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-1995 Political System and Its Functioning," *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. IV, No. 1, May, p. 41-67;
- Bosco, A. (1992) "The Federalist Project and Resistance in Continental Europe," in A. Bosco (ed.), *The Federal Idea*, Vol. II: *The History of Federalism since 1945*, Lothian Foundation Press, London and New York;
- "Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's Goals," Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, United States General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO/NSIAD-97-132 Bosnia Peace Operation, 1997;
- Campbell, D. (1998) *National Deconstruction – Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis & London;

- Carpenter, T.G. and Perlmutter, A. (1996) "Strategy Creep in the Balkans," *National Interest*, Summer, Issue 44, pp. 53-59;
- Chrysochoou, D. N. (2001), *Theorizing European Integration*, Sage Publications, London;
- Clarke, J. (1993) "The Conceptual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Atlantic Monthly*, September, pp. 54-56;
- Collins, M.J. (1992) *Western European Integration – Implications for US Policy and Strategy*, Praeger, New York and London;
- Curtis, G.E., (ed.) (1992) *Yugoslavia: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office;
- Cutrofello, A. (1993) "Must We Say What 'We' Means? The Politics of Postmodernism," *Social Theory & Practice*, Vol. 19, Issue 1, pp. 93-110;
- Daadler, I.H. and Froman M.B. (1999) "Dayton's Incomplete Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 6, pp. 106-113;
- Djilas, Aleksa, (1995) "Tito's Last Secret," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 4;
- Dodds, E.R. (1951) *The Greeks and the Irrational*, The Regents of the University of California Press, San Francisco;
- European Security Strategy (2003) "A Secure Europe in a Better World," European Council. 12 December, Brussels. Internet source: <http://ue.eu.int>;
- Foucault, M. (1970) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, Pantheon, New York;
- Frye, T.M. (1992) "Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transitions from Non-Democratic Rule," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 599-623;
- Gallagher, T. (2003) "The Balkans since 1989: The Winding Retreat from National Communism," in Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (eds.), *Developments in Central and East European Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York;
- Garges, L. (1995) "The League of Nations' Predicament in Southeastern Europe", *World Affairs*, Vol. 158, No. 1, pp. 3-17;
- Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca;
- Gellner, E. (1998) *Nationalism*, Phoenix, London;
- Glenny, M. (2001) *The Balkans – Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999*, Penguin, New York;
- Glenny, M. (1992) "The Wheel of History Turns Full Circle," *New Statesman and Society*, 28, April;
- Glenny, M. (1995) "Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, May/June, pp. 98-108;
- Gow, J. (1994) "Serbian Nationalism and the Hisssing Sssnake in the International Order: Whose Sovereignty? Which Nation?" *The Slavonic and East European Review*, No. 72, July;

- Gray, J. (1988) "The Politics of Cultural Diversity," *The Salisbury Review*, Issue 7;
- Greenberg, E. S. (1990) "State Change: Approaches and Concepts", in Greenberg, E. S. and Mayer, T. F., (eds), *Changes in the State*, Sage, London;
- Greenfeld, L. (1995) "Nationalism in Western and Eastern Europe Compared," in Stephen E. Hanson and Willfried Spohn (eds.) *Can Europe Work? Germany and the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London;
- Grafenauer, N. (ed.) (1991) *The Case of Slovenia*, Nova Revija, Ljubljana;
- Groves, D.M. (2000) "The European Union's Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy," Research Report 00.3, November, Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS); Internet source: www.bits.de;
- Haas, E.B. (1976) "The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory", *Research Monograph*, No. 25, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley;
- Hagen, W.W. (1999) "The Balkan's Lethal Nationalisms", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4, July/August, pp. 52-64;
- Halecki, O. (1963) *The Millennium of Europe*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind.;
- Hammel, E. A. (1993) "Demography and the Origins of the Yugoslav Civil War," *Anthropology Today*, Vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 4-9;
- Handler, R. (1988) "Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec", in *New Directions in Anthropological Writing: History, Poetics, Cultural Criticism*, George E. and Clifford M. J. (eds.), The University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin;
- Hannum, H. (1990) *Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self Determination*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia;
- Haseler, S. (1992) "Is the Nation-State Over?" *World Affairs*, Vol. 155, No. 1, pp. 23-26;
- Hastings, A. (1997) *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York;
- Hayden, R. (1996) "Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia," *American Ethnologist*, No. 23, pp. 783-801;
- Hedges, C. (1999) "Kosovo's Next Masters," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 3, May/June, pp. 24-42;
- Heidegger, M. (1993) *Basic Writings*, David Farrell Krell (ed.), Harper, San Francisco;
- Heidegger, M. (1959) *An Introduction To Metaphysics*, Yale University Press, New Heaven;
- Held, D. (1993) *Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West*, Polity Press, Cambridge;
- Hille, S. (1995) "Mutual Recognition of Croatia and Serbia (+ Montenegro)," *European Journal of International Law*, 6, pp. 1-14;

- Hobsbawm, Eric (1995) *The Age of Revolution 1789-1848*, Abacus, London;
- Hobsbawm, E. (1990) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge;
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (1997) "The Making of a Polity: The Struggle over European Integration," *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 1. Internet source: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-004a.htm>;
- Hurd, D. (1994) "Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy," *International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 421-8;
- Inglehart, R. (1977) *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton;
- Inglehart, R. (1990) *Culture Shift in Advance Industrial Society*, Princeton University Press, Princeton;
- Jelavich, B. (2000) *Istoria Balcanilor, Secolele XVIII si XIX* [English: *The History of The Balkans. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*], Vol. I, translated by Mihai-Eugen Avadanei, European Institute, Iasi;
- Judah, T. (1997) *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Yale University Press, New Haven;
- Kaplan, R.D. (1991) "History's Cauldron," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June, 92-104;
- Kaplan, R.D. (1994) *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*, Vintage, New York;
- Laffan, B. et al. (1999) *Europe's Experimental Union: Rethinking Integration*, Routledge, London and New York;
- Levy, D. (1999) "The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel," *History and Theory*, Vol. 38, No. 1, p. 51 – 52;
- Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. (1996) *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore;
- Livezeanu, I. (1995) *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca;
- Loizos, P. (1988) "Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus," *Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, pp. 639-653;
- Lyotard, J.-F. (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Manchester University Press, Manchester;
- Madgearu, A. (2001) *Originea medievala a focarelor de conflict in Peninsula Balcanica* [English: *The Medieval Origins Of The Conflict Centers In The Balkan Peninsula*], Corint, Bucharest;
- Malcolm, N. (1998) *Kosovo: A Short History*, Macmillan, London;
- Manolescu, N. (2002) "Despre nationalisme" (English: "On Nationalisms"), in *Cuvantul*, Year VIII (XIII) Nr. 4 (300);

- Mertus, J. (2001) "Serbia: Remaining Europe's Outlaw Nation," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 399-505;
- Missiroli, A. (2003) "The European Union: Just a Regional Peacekeeper?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8, pp. 493-503;
- Mueller, J. (2000) "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. ;
- Nicoll, W. and Salmon, T.C. (2001) *Understanding the European Union*, Pearson Education – Longman, Harlow;
- Nielsen, C.A. (2001) "The Butcher of the Balkans," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 527-540;
- Orridge, Andrew (1981) "Varieties of Nationalism," in Leonard Tivey, ed., *The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics*, Martin Robertson, Oxford, pp. 39-58;
- O'Sullivan, N. (1993) "Political Integration, the Limited State, and the Philosophy of Postmodernism," *Political Studies*, No. XLI, pp. 21-42;
- Owen, D. (1995) *Balkan Odyssey*, Victor Gollancz, London;
- Özen, Ç. (2002) "The Integrationist Approach to Security and the New Security Role of the European Union," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 1, Nr. 3, pp. 119-35;
- Newman, B. I. (1999), *Mass Marketing of Politics: Democracy in an Age of Manufactured Images*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA;
- Parkas, C.C. (1997) "The United States, Greece, and the Macedonian Issue," *World Affairs*, Vol. 159, No. 3, pp. 103-8;
- Pavlovic, Srdja (2000) "Understanding Balkan Nationalism: The wrong people, in the wrong place, at the wrong time," *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 2, December, pp. 115-124;
- Pavkovic, A. (2000) "Secessions in Former Yugoslavia: Too Hard a Case for Theories of Secession?" *Political Studies*, Vol. 48, Issue 3, pp. 485-503;
- Pavkovic, Aleksandar (2002) "National Liberations in Former Yugoslavia: When Will They End?" *East European Quarterly*, XXXVI, No. 2, pp. 227-48;
- Pentland, C. (1973), *International Theory and European Integration*, vol. 1, Free Press, Macmillan, New York;
- Perry, D. (1992) "A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma," RFE/RL Research Report 1 (June): 35-45;
- Petrescu, C. (1998) "Vizitele de lucru, un ritual al 'epocii de aur'" ["Working Visits: A Ritual of the 'Golden Epoch'"], Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, Bucharest;
- Pettifer, James, (1992), "The New Macedonian Question," *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 476-85;
- Phinnemore, David, (2003), "Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western Balkans?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8, 77-103;
- Pippidi, A. (2001) *Tradiția politică bizantină în țările române [The Byzantine Political Tradition in the Romanian Principalities]*, Corint, Bucharest ;

- Plato (1997) *Republic*, John Llewelyn Davies and David James Vaughan (trans.), Introduction by Stephen Watt, Wordsworth Classics, Hertfordshire;
- Posen, Barry R. (2000) "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4, Spring, pp. 39-84;
- Powers, Gerard F. (1996) "Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 1, Summer, pp. 221-252;
- Ramet, S. (1991) *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Meaning of the Great Transformation*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina;
- Ramet, S. (1992) *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia: 1962-1991*, Second Edition, Indiana University Press, Bloomington;
- Remington, R.A. (1995) "The Collapse of the Yugoslav Alternative," in Zoltan Barany and Ivan Volgyes (eds.), *The Legacies of Communism in Europe*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London;
- Renan, E. (1990) "What is a Nation?" in H. K. Bhabha (ed.) *Nation and Narration*, Routledge, London;
- Renan, E. (1996) "What is a Nation?" in Geoff Eley and R.G. Suny (eds.) *Becoming National: A Reader*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford;
- "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 19 and 26 March, 2004. All RFE/RL reports, news and feature articles can be found in the respective archives at <http://www.rferl.org>;
- "RFE/RL Newline," 23 and 26 March 2004. All RFE/RL reports, news and feature articles can be found in the respective archives at <http://www.rferl.org>;
- Rich R. (1993) "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union," *The European Journal of International Law*, 4, pp. 36-65;
- Rieff, D. (1995) *Slaughterhouse*, Simon and Schuster, New York;
- Ruggie, J.G. (1993) "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organizations*, 47, p. 139-174;
- Russinow, Denison, (1985) "Nationalities Policy and the National Question," in *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, (ed.) Pedro Ramet, , Westview Press, Boulder Colorado;
- Said, E. (1978) *Orientalism*, Routledge, New York;
- Sarup, M. (1993) *An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism*, University of Georgia Press, Atlanta;
- Schloer, W.F. (1996) "Germany and the Breakup of Yugoslavia," in Raju G.C. Thomas and H. Richard Friman (eds.) *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Garland Publishing, New York;
- Schöpflin, George (1991) "Nationalism and National Minorities in East and Central Europe," *Journal of International Affairs*,
- Schöpflin, George (1996) "The Politics of National Identities," *International Review of Sociology – Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, Vol. 6, No. 2;

- Schöpflin, George (2000) *Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe*, Hurst, London;
- Serre, F. (1988) "The Scope of National Adaptation to EPC," in Alfred Pijpers, Elfriede Regelsberger, Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) *European Political Cooperation in the 1980s. A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?* Martinus Nijhoff Publishers & Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), Dordrecht, Boston, London;
- Smith, A.D. (1991) *National Identity*, Penguin, London;
- Smith, A.D. (1996) "Culture, Community and Territory: the Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, p.445-458;
- Somek, A. (2001) "On Supranationality," *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 5. Internet source: <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-003a.htm>;
- Stark, H. (1993) *Les Balkans: Le retour de la guerre en Europe*, Dunod, Paris;
- Strauss, L. and Cropsey, J. (1987) *History of Political Philosophy*, Third Edition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago;
- Steil, B. and Woodward, S.L. (1999) "A European 'New Deal' for the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 6, November/December, pp. 95-105;
- Tarcov, N. and Pangle, T.L. (1987) "Epilogue: Leo Strauss and the History of Political Philosophy," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), *History of Political Philosophy*, Third Edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London;
- Thomas, R.G.C. (1996) "Competing Nationalisms," *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 18, Issue 3, pp. 12-17;
- Thomas, R.G.C. (1997) "Self-Determination and International Recognition Policy: An Alternative Interpretation of Why Yugoslavia Disintegrated," *World Affairs*, Vol. 160, No. 1, pp. 17-33;
- Titley, Simon (2003) "How Political and Social Change Will Transform the EU Public Affairs Industry", *Journal of Public Affairs*, Vol. 3, no. 1;
- Todorova, M. (2000) *Balcanii si Balcanismul* [English: *Balkans and Balkanism*], Humanitas, Bucharest;
- Treacher, A. (2004) "From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistable Transformation," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9, pp. 49-66;
- Trifunovska, S (ed.) (1995) *Yugoslavia Through Documents From Its Creation To Its Dissolution*, Nijhoff, Dordrecht;
- Tsoularou, P. (2002) "The Continued Relevance of Sovereignty in a Globalising World: Yugoslavia and its Successor States," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1, No.3, p. 64-88;
- Voegelin, E. (1999) *Religion and the Rise of Modernity*, edited by James L. Wiser, University of Missouri Press, Columbia;
- Vulliamy, E. (1994) *Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War*, Simon and Schuster, New York;
- Walker, R.B.J. (1993) *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge University Press, New York;

Wallace, W. (1995) *Regional Integration: The West European Experience*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.;

Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society*, Vol. I, University of California Press, Berkley;

Weiler, J. and Wessels, W. (1988) "EPC and the Challenge of Theory," in Alfred Pijpers, Elfriede Regelsberger, Wolfgang Wessels (eds.) in collaboration with Geoffrey Edwards, *European Political Cooperation in the 1980s. A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?* Martinus Nijhoff Publishers & Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), Dordrecht,;

Weiler, J. (1999) *The Constitution of Europe: "Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?" and other Essays on European Integration*, Cambridge University Press, London;

Weiler, J. (2000) "Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg," *10 Jean Monnet Working Paper 2000*. Internet source:
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/001001.html>;

Weller, M. (1992) "International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 36, No. 3, July, pp. 569-607;

Woodward, S. L. (1995) *Balkan Tragedy – Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.;