EVALUATING THE ROLE OF IDENTITY IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FROM A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

GÜNEŞ BECERİK

JUNE 2006

EVALUATING THE ROLE OF IDENTITY

IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FROM A

CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OF

IZMIR UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS

BY

GÜNEŞ BECERİK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ART

IN

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

JUNE 2006

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

_____
Prof. Dr. Tunçdan Baltacıoğlu
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art.

_____
Prof. Dr. Erhan Ada
Acting Head of Department

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art.

_____
Asst. Prof. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

(Title and Name in alphabetical
order of last name)

Asst. Prof. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu   _____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Brian Colbert   _____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Öncü   _____

....   _____

....   _____

ABSTRACT

EVALUATING THE ROLE OF IDENTITY
IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FROM A
CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

Becerik, Güneş

MA, Department of European Studies

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu

June 2006, 102 pages

This thesis evaluates the process of European integration by making use of the constructivist perspective, with a specific focus on the concept of identity as the point of departure. The processes of integration and enlargement are increasingly being shaped along the lines of culture and identity, and the definition and interpretation of European identity have a very important role in the future of the EU. The foreign policy decisions of EU member states and the attitude towards non-members are determined by the conception of identity, which has a direct influence on the enlargement process. The post Cold War period, the accession of CEECs with the latest enlargement, and the problematic accession process of Turkey are presented as specific supporting arguments.

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ BÜTÜNLEŞMESİNDE
KİMLİĞİN ROLÜNÜN
SOSYAL YAPILANIMCI PERSPEKTİFTEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Becerik, Güneş

Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu

Haziran 2006, 102 sayfa

Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği'nin bütünleşme sürecini, sosyal yapılanımcı perspektiften yararlanarak, kimlik kavramını çıkış noktası alarak ve bu kavram üzerinde yoğunlaşarak inceler. Bütünleşme ve genişleme süreçleri, giderek kültür ve kimlik ekseni üzerinde şekillenmeye başlamış olmakla beraber, Avrupa Kimliği kavramının tanımı ve yorumu, Avrupa Birliği'nin geleceği üzerinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Avrupa Birliği üyesi devletlerin dış politikaları ve üye olmayan devletlere karşı tavırları, kimlik kavramı tarafından şekillenmekte ve genişleme sürecini doğrudan etkilemektedir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem, son genişleme sürecinde Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olmaları ve Türkiye'nin sorunlu üyelik süreci, destekleyici örnekler olarak sunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Yapılanımcılık, Avrupa Bütünleşmesi, Genişleme, Kimlik, Kültür, Fikirler, Normlar, Çevre, Teori, Uluslararası İlişkiler

Dedicated to my grandfather Fuat Becerik,
the sincerest and cleverest person I have ever known…

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 4
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

LIST OF FIGURES

ABBREVIATIONS

CEEC : Central and Eastern European countries
CFSP : Common Foreign Security Policy
EC   : European Community
ECSC : European Coal and Steel Community
EEC   : European Economic Community
EFTA : European Free Trade Association
EP   : European Parliament
EU   : European Union
IR   : International Relations
NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PHARE : Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
US   : United States of America

INTRODUCTION

The European Union is by far the most complex integration framework existing in world politics. It is an "entirely new kind of organization for which most of the standard theories of International Relations provide only a partial explanation."[1] The EU is more than the sum of its parts, and it has become more than a mere political entity, intergovernmental network or an institutional body. In fact, the EU is being transformed into a socially constructed polity with supranational characteristics. European integration is an ongoing process that is affected by various factors such as economics, foreign policy and security concerns, history, religion, culture and identity. Each stage of European integration serves as an important case for competing theories of International Relations, while the focus on culture and identity forms a suitable ground for explaining and bringing new insight to the integration process through the theory of social constructivism.

This study will try to evaluate the process of European integration by making use of the constructivist perspective, with a specific focus on the concept of *identity* as the point of departure. In my thesis, I argue that European integration and foreign policy are increasingly being shaped along the lines of culture and identity, and that the definition and interpretation of European identity have a very important role in the integration process of the EU. The foreign policy decisions of EU member states and the attitude towards non-members are determined by the conception of identity, which has a direct influence on the enlargement process. The post Cold War period, the accession of CEECs with the latest enlargement, and the problematic accession process of Turkey are presented as specific examples to support my argument.

The key concept and the dependent variable in this analysis, which is bound to change with regard to context, will be *identity*. An approach set out to explain European integration that ignores this aspect would be incomplete. Besides taking into account the *acquis communautaire* of the EU, we also need to consider "informal modes of behavior which are reproduced every day in the political and administrative practice of the EU."[2] The place and role of the concept of *Europeanness* should also be studied within this debate. The level of social

---

[1] John McCormick, *The European Union*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p. 23.
[2] Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen, Antje Wiener, "The Social Construction of Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1999), p. 539.

interaction between the people of European has increased considerably over time. However, national priorities still continue to shape the behavior and foreign policies of member states. "This close association between the principles of 'citizenship' and 'nationality' in the domestic context leads us to interesting questions about identity, community and inclusion/exclusion that can be addressed through constructivist research."[3]

"The real world of politics has always been one of layered, overlapping."[4] The task of theories "is to explain that most defining characteristic of politics: the manner in which individuals come together (or are brought together) to behave collectively."[5] The behavior of different states and organizations may be explained by using different theories, which can be defined as abstract categorizations or simulations of real life and politics. Kenneth Waltz defines theory as "a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity."[6] Theories serve a special purpose in the sense that they aim to define a general framework to assess historical and political events. Just like a chess player tries to guess his competitor's next move, theorists try to predict the state of world politics by making several assumptions and propositions. However, theories become insufficient as their subject matter continues to evolve. "Since both world politics and our values keep changing, there is no guarantee that even a well-tested theory will remain valid in the future."[7]

So far, competing theories of International Relations have attempted to explain European integration, each of them approaching the integration process from a different perspective. Neorealism, neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and neoliberalism have been the dominant schools of thought, until the dynamics of integration began to change after the 1980's. These theories have been useful in explaining the initial stages of integration, with an effort to evaluate the changing role of the nation-state in Western Europe, and the establishment of a supranational institutional framework. Nevertheless, following the Single European Act, European

---

[3] Ibid., p. 540.
[4] Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory" in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil, (Colorado: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 43.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), p. 913.
[7] Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics" in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 5.

integration took on a pace of integration that could be hardly reversed. Thus, the prevailing theories have been unable to grasp the changing and transforming nature of European integration.

Especially the latest enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has generated new debates regarding the theoretical foundations of integration. Possible stagnation scenarios arising out of the reluctance of some member states to advance European integration to a further point have necessitated a new theoretical framework, which evaluates the integration process from a social outlook that considers factors beyond the nation state, institution making and power calculations.

Conventional theories mostly concentrate on the elements of institutional structures, national and supranational governance, economics, and security issues; but they cannot catch up with the dynamics of the element of social construction. After the 1990's, there has been a sociological orientation in International Relations, which has led to the emergence of constructivist approaches. This suits the efforts of conceptualizing the EU quite well, because it is more flexible, it accounts for more space for human interaction and social elements. Today's EU cannot be explained only with a balance of power politics or maximization of gains, or by economic factors. At this point, the Social Constructivist theory provides a missing piece of the integration puzzle; the role of social construction in European integration, the part left unanswered by previous theories. "In opposition to the methodological individualism and static conception of identity transformation in international politics offered by rationalists, constructivists emphasize the co-constitution of the material and social worlds and the significance of norms, rules, and values in the international arena."[8]

Constructivism has a philosophical background, and it is a multidisciplinary school of thought that is applicable to more than one social science. The adaptation of social constructivism to International Relations and political science is an exciting combination offering a different outlook, which other schools of thought fail to capture. The application of this approach to the integration process of the EU is

---

[8] John O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", Accessed from http://www.unige.ch/ieug/B6__O'Brennan.pdf on August 23, 2005, p. 161.

especially worth examining. Constructivism is trendy,[9] because it fits very well into the fluctuating nature of the European Union and integration process.

There is no doubt that the European Union is a *sui generis* organization. Despite the fact that the idea of enlargement has been present in the Union structure from the beginning, member states have pursued their national interests in a determined manner.[10] Can one European culture be founded upon a plurality of sub-cultures and national identities? The institutional mechanisms and machinery of the EU proves that the efforts so far have been partially successful. Whether the EU will succeed in carrying this cooperation and community spirit to the next level of increased social and political interaction remains to be seen. This will depend on the attitudes of member states, national governments and the orientation of citizens at large. Today, even though the EU operates under highly supranational institutions and community law, member-states are still relevant. Then, how will the integration and enlargement process of the EU continue within an increasingly diversified context? The answer to this question can best be explored by the social constructivist perspective, which examines the interplay between actors and their context. Relying on only traditional approaches and excluding the social dimension would not be sufficient in explaining European integration. "The social constructivist focus on the role of ideas, identities, and norms offers a way to explain change in world politics, a noted weakness of mainstream approaches."[11]

This study will begin by reviewing the major theories of International Relations. It is necessary to understand the legacy constructivism tends to challenge or build upon; before we attempt to evaluate its relation to European integration. The first chapter will offer an historical overview of major theories, and define constructivism which better relates to European integration. In Chapter 2, we will define the concept of European identity and what it takes to be European. Chapter 3 will form the link between European enlargement and identity by focusing on the post Cold War period and Turkey's accession process to the EU. Chapter 4 will try

---

[9] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Social Construction and Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1999), p. 1.
[10] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 181.
[11] Alice Ba and Matthew J. Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 4 (2003), p. 15.

to shed a light on the future of the EU by focusing on the debates of supranationality and identity, and offer a final evaluation regarding integration and enlargement.

The assumption that identity is a significant element which shapes European integration is by no means an effort to reject or underestimate the previous paradigms, which have dominated the literature so far. "Which hypothesis is more appropriate in a given context is an empirical question that may change over time."[12] European integration has so many variables that it cannot be explained by using only one theory or approach. Therefore, social constructivism is offered as a complementary paradigm, which better corresponds to the *current* dynamics of the integration process and enlargement.

---

[12] Alexander Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid, Friedrich Kratochwil, (Colorado: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 58.

CHAPTER 1
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THEORY

A.   Classical Theories

1. Realism and Neorealism

All ancient and modern political thinkers have expressed their views on the relationship between the state, people and politics. "There have been many thinkers over the centuries who have emphasized anarchy, reliance on self-help, the utility of military force, and the importance of balance-of-power calculations. The oldest and one of the most debated theories of International Relations has been realism. Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes are frequently cited as intellectual ancestors of realism."[13] But in terms of creating a science of international politics, Hans Morgenthau played the most influential role.[14]

Realism has its roots in the rational choice theory, which is built on the assumption that actors try to maximize their interests in their relationships with others. This selfish attitude of actors forms the basic element of realism. Realists assume that world politics is a struggle for power, and that the behavior and actions of states could be rationally calculated and would tend towards equilibrium[15], preserving the balance of power. In a state of continuous lust for power, war at any time between states is inevitable, and a possibility of cooperation is not even mentioned.

Kenneth Waltz's interpretation of the realist tradition can be labeled as neorealism. Waltz makes great effort to distinguish between old and new realists. Even though Morgenthau took the lead in raising important questions about the relationship between power, states and war, "his definition of power was murky, since he failed to distinguish between power as a resource and power as the ability to influence others' behavior."[16] As mentioned in the article titled *Evaluating Theories*,

---

[13] David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 11.
[14] Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", p. 10.
[15] Robert Geyer, "European Integration, the Problem of Complexity and the Revision of Theory", *JCMS*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2003), p. 16, 17.
[16] Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", p. 11.

Waltz believes that classical realists like Hans Morgenthau "took power to be an end in itself."[17] Classical realists had a pessimistic view of human nature and assumed that people and states were bound to become evil, with a continuous lust for more power, emphasizing the darker side of human nature. In contrast, Waltz builds structural realism on the assumption that survival is the goal of states and that power is one of the means to that end. To be more explicit, neorealists like Waltz approach the concept of power from a security perspective, associating power with the survival of a state. Neorealism concentrates on the changes in the distribution of power, and maintains that the primary interest of a nation-state is to protect its physical and political integrity. According to the neorealist paradigm, balances form over time and states find their way through. Maintaining the balance of power is not the sole goal of a state or organization; they are formed naturally and spontaneously.

Classical realists "attributed egoism and power politics primarily to human nature, whereas neorealists emphasize anarchy."[18] According to Waltz, "unlike democratic political systems, international systems are decentralized and hierarchic. Therefore, anarchy is the ordering principle of the system."[19] Actually, one of the most problematic aspects of the realist theory is the absence of an agreed definition of "anarchy." Classical realists like Hobbes define anarchy as chaos and disorder, as a war of all against all.[20] Neorealists are not that pessimistic, they agree that the world order exhibits some kind of an order. For a neorealist, anarchy means the absence of a government, or a defective government unable to fulfill its functions.

Neorealism assumes that states have egoistic identities and interests.[21] States are bound to survive within a 'self-help' system. From a neorealist point of view, international organizations are marginal entities, and only a tool for great powers to advance their interests. The impact of international organizations on states is temporary and not of crucial importance, because they tend to disintegrate after they have fulfilled their functions. Under an anarchic setting and fixed interests, organizations are interpreted as short-lived creations, formed to serve state interests for a certain interval. This assumption "presents a pessimistic analysis of the

---

[17] Waltz, "Evaluating Theories", p. 913.
[18] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 395.
[19] Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 13.
[20] Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, p. 14.
[21] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 14.

prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions"[22]; which makes an ongoing cooperation almost impossible to achieve.

Waltz is quite rigid in his analysis about international politics. According to Waltz, "the texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly."[23] Even though this observation may be true for issues regarding foreign policy and security decisions, it does not leave enough room for the possibility of cooperation. Speaking of international structures, Waltz argues that "no state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained. International political systems, like economic markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended."[24]

Consideration of balance of power politics seems to be inevitable in a multipolar world. For instance, the United States can be said to act according to power politics, assuming that a benign hegemon can bring peace and harmony to the world. However, it takes more to explain the unique level of integration and activity the European Union has reached today. Especially, if we take the ambiguous concept of anarchy to mean the absence of government, the neorealist paradigm has difficulty in explaining the overlapping functions of national governments and institutions that governments participate in. "Many of the activities carried on by governments have counterparts at the international level,"[25] and the EU is such a good example for this dichotomy.

"The European Community provides fairly clear grounds for a comparative test between strong realist contentions, based on anarchy and relative gains, and institutionalist arguments."[26] The ECSC, which marks the beginning of European integration, emerged in a highly 'anarchic' setting, under the auspices of World War II, and the growing Soviet threat. The ECSC started out as a peace project between France and Germany, designed to keep the much feared repetition of German anger under control, while sharing resources and encouraging economic cooperation; thus

---

[22] Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 116.
[23] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories" in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 53.
[24] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures" in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 85.
[25] Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, p. 14.
[26] Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War", in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 289.

using balance of power politics as a means of reaching the goal of a peaceful and prosperous Europe.

The concept of *power* was present in the sense that a cooperating Europe would have a stronger stance in the post-war period and have a better chance of survival. Nevertheless, the ensuing stages of integration cannot be explained only by the neorealist approach. Neorealism "cannot account for deep levels of institutionalized cooperation that have evolved over time nor for that matter why states have been willing to make important concessions of sovereignty in the absence of serious threats to their survival."[27] When we try to associate Waltz's pessimistic outlook with European integration and the EU, we see that none of the qualities that Waltz attributes to an international system seem to match. The founding members of the ECSC willingly agreed to delegate some of their powers to a High Authority, which in a way constrained them. And, if we were to describe European integration with the nearest adjective possible, *unintended* would be the last one. Right from the beginning, European integration was a planned project, and could live up to this day with the intentional efforts of its member states, despite periods of decline and setbacks.

Since integration is a form of cooperation, the realist paradigm is not suitable for explaining European integration. The neorealist argument that institutions have a minimal effect on their members is hardly true in the case of the EU, where the institutional mechanisms have been structured in such as way that they have direct applicability and implementing power over member states. "The proliferation of international institutions during the Cold War, and most notably the history of the European Community, show that anarchy does not necessarily prevent cooperation."[28]

---

[27] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 166.

[28] Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War", p. 287.

2. Neofunctionalism

"The relationship between social, economic and technological change on the one hand, and political change on the other, has long been a major concern of political theorists."[29] The examination of this potentially promising field has been first explored by a group of theorists called functionalists, best represented by David Mitrany. The crux of the functionalist school of thought is that "the modern technology of communication, industry and warfare, as well as the growth of economic, ecological and social problems on a regional or global scale, present irresistible pressures toward international cooperation and ultimate political unity."[30] At the basis of the functionalist theory lies the assumption that the development of international economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and the elimination of war. "The essential principle, writes Mitrany, is that activities would be selected specifically and organized separately, each according to its nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and the needs of the moment."[31]

Integration as seen by functionalists means a gradual shift from a balance-of-power system, to a system whose units are nonterritorial organizations performing functions irrespective of national divisions.[32] "Functionalists argue that perception of an increasing number of problems, needs and trends outstripping national capacities is bound to result in pressure towards international cooperation."[33] In that respect, the functionalist integration theory of the 1940's, and the neofunctionalist version of the 1950's and 1960's are extensions of the liberal tradition, which has been the main challenger of the realist school of thought.

Neofunctionalism rejects "realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics."[34] "The neofunctionalist paradigm attempts to explain the effects which supranational institutions, in particular regional economic

---

[29] Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 64.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid., p. 68.
[32] Ibid., p. 75.
[33] Ibid., p. 77.
[34] Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", p. 116.

organizations, have on the attitudes and behavior of member states."[35] "The whole purpose of the neofunctional approach is precisely to relate existing national and regional characteristics in something approximating a probabilistic model of international system transformation."[36]

Neofunctionalists draw our attention to the distinction between *high politics* (military and security matters) and *low politics* (economics and trade) and concentrate on the role that low politics play in promoting cooperation among states. Most significantly, they argue that international institutions can help states cooperate.[37] One of the main traits of neofunctionalism is that institutions or groups act "above the state"[38], thus creating a supranational setup.

Western European integration provides a suitable framework for commenting on the interplay between social, economic and political factors. Neofunctionalism is unique in the sense that it is the first theory designed specifically to explain the dynamics and the future course of European integration. Jean Monnet can be named as an early neofunctionalist, who truly believed at heart in the European peace and integration project prompted by economic cooperation. French foreign minister Robert Schuman, who found Monnet's ideas applicable and took the initiative to implement them, had said in his famous Declaration of May 9, 1950 that "Europe will not be made all at once."[39] This implied a cooperation framework that was planned to advance incrementally. The launching of the neofunctionalist analysis of Ernst Haas, one of the major scholars in the field corresponded to the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958.

Neofunctionalism was well suited to the incremental logic of integration proposed by Monnet and Schuman with the foundation of the ECSC. The forward-looking fate of the EC was explained with neofunctionalism, "which saw European integration as a self-sustaining process driven by sectoral spillovers toward an ever-

---

[35] Peter Katzenstein, "Hare and Tortoise: The Race Toward Integration", *International Organization*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1971), p. 290.
[36] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration", *International Organization*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Winter 1969), p. 164.
[37] Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", p. 116.
[38] Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community", *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 24.
[39] Robert Schuman, "Declaration of 9 May 1950", Accessed from http://europa.eu.int/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm on January 3, 2006.

closer union".[40] "In the early optimistic years of the European Community, it was generally assumed that the terminal point of the integration process would be some sort of federal state in Western Europe. Those involved in the Community often described themselves as working toward a European federation by functional means. This self-image, combined with the early successes of the Community, tended to reinforce neofunctionalist theory and practice."[41]

Neofunctionalism explained the motives for deeper cooperation among member states with the spill-over effect, predicting that economic cooperation would eventually lead to political integration. The core claim of the neofunctionalist argument about European integration was based on the assumption that the cooperation in the economic field would spillover to other areas as well, such as security and foreign policy. Neofunctionalists described European integration as a "gradual and self-sustaining process."[42] "Haas and other neofunctionalists predicted that sectoral integration would produce the unintended consequence of promoting further integration in additional spillover issues."[43] They viewed integration as an incremental process in which the naturally expected developments would fall into place eventually. They also believed that the transfer of domestic powers to supranational institutions would facilitate integration.

In his famous work titled *The Uniting of Europe*, Haas argues that "political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones."[44] Drawing a distinction between *low politics*, the incremental decision-making processes of the economic and technical spheres, and the *high politics* of diplomacy, strategy and national

---

[40] Mark Pollack, "Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 8 (2005), p. 359.
[41] Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, p. 106.
[42] Mark A. Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 2001), p. 222.
[43] Pollack, "Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?", p. 359.
[44] Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, p. 101.

ideologies, Haas argues that European integration can be expected to progress in the context of *high politics*.[45]

Even though neofunctionalism was popular in the late 1950s, it entered a period of crisis in the 1960s, marked by Eurosclerosis and stagnation in European integration. This temporary slowdown in European integration made it obvious that "the extent to which the process of incremental integration, from economic to political unity, can occur, depends on the state of relations in the *high* political sphere."[46] Neofunctionalist analyses incorrectly assume an automaticity of integration through the concept of spillover, based on an objective economic rationale, and neglect the wider world within which integration takes place.[47]

After Haas, Leon Lindberg introduced a milder approach toward integration compared to Haas, by arguing that political cooperation can be achieved without actually moving towards a political community. Lindberg's political community is simply a legitimate system for the resolution of conflict.[48] According to Lindberg, "the essence of political integration is the emergence or creation over time of collective decision-making processes, i.e. political institutions to which governments delegate decision-making authority and/or through which they decide jointly via more familiar intergovernmental negotiation."[49]

Today, even though the EU has reached an advanced level of cooperation, the sovereignty of member states and national priorities are still relevant. As optimistic as it can be, neofunctionalism remains insufficient in explaining European integration, because member states are not so eager to cooperate in foreign policy or sensitive security related issues, as they had cooperated in the field of economic integration. Haas's definition of integration resembles an almost federal union, which is not likely to be achieved so readily in the case of the EU, due to national priorities and security concerns of member states. Integration occurs when the interests of the actors involved at that particular time and political setting converge. For this reason, we should not disregard the nation-state as a unit of analysis in a

---

[45] Ibid., p. 109.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Andreas Bieler, "The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration", *Journal of European Public* Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4 (August 2002), p. 577.
[48] Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, p. 104.
[49] Ibid., p. 105.

cooperation framework, and we should also focus on the cooperation efforts of member states at an intergovernmental level.

3. Intergovernmentalism

The nearly federal cooperation model proposed by neofunctionalism was challenged by intergovernmentalism, which describes the process in which member states that are part of an international organization still retain their power, but come together at a governmental level to take decisions. This approach can be defined as a middle way between the realist and liberal traditions. Intergovernmentalists neither regard states as solitary actors within a system, nor place too much value on international institutions. They believe that states can meet, bargain with each other and cooperate on a state-to-state level. Indeed, even though the EU is a highly supranational institution, most issues are resolved at the intergovernmental level between member states, during intergovernmental conferences.

Intergovernmentalism is coherent with realism in the sense that "states are the principal actors in the international system"[50], and that "interstate bargains reflect national interests and relative power."[51] However, the importance that intergovernmentalism places on the state as a unit is not as far stretched as the realist paradigm. "State interests change over time, often in ways which are decisive for the integration process but which cannot be traced to shifts in the relative power of states."[52]

Intergovernmentalism rejects the neofunctionalist tendency of overvaluing supranationality. It also rejects the spillover effect that has been foreseen by neofunctionalists. Instead, intergovernmentalism keeps the national governments as the basic units of analysis and asserts that nation-states determine the pace of integration. "Intergovernmental institutionalism is based on three principles: intergovernmentalism, lowest-common denominator bargaining, and strict limits on future transfers of sovereignty."[53]

---

[50] Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community", p. 27.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid., p. 25.

Intergovernmentalism explains European integration not as a self-sustaining process proceeding with inevitable spillovers; but rather as a bargaining process conducted between the national governments of member states. "European integration did not proceed steadily and incrementally; it proceeded in fits and starts."[54]

> "While spillover and forward linkages may in some cases suffice to prompt the intensification of international decision making under a specific mandate within a given sector, they play a minimal role in the processes of opening new issues, reforming decision-making procedures, and ratifying the accession of new members. Movement in these areas requires active intervention by heads of state and a considerable amount of nontechnocratic interstate bargaining."[55]

The 1960's witnessed the uncompromising policies of De Gaulle, and a temporary halt in the progress of integration. Neofunctionalism appeared to be anachronistic during this period, which was marked by De Gaulle's uncompromising nationalist policies and the 'empty chair crisis.' Two decades later, other neofunctionalists were optimistic enough to predict that the wave of eagerness and motivation, which was revitalized with the SEA that took member states out of Eurosclerosis and relaunched the integration project, would work out in other spheres as well. But they neglected the fact that economic cooperation was in everybody's interest, therefore member states accepted to forego national policies. Therefore, a liberal intergovernmental approach better corresponds to the backstage of SEA rather than neofunctionalism. Another crucial point which neofunctionalism fails to address is the case with security and foreign policy, where member states keep their national preferences above the EU, as opposed to the important role neofunctionalism places on supranationalism.

When the integration trend started to falter in the 1960's and 1970's, intergovernmentalism "emphasized the gate keeping role of EU member governments and their resistance to any wholesale transfer of sovereignty from the member states to a new center in Brussels."[56] During these years, "the core European integration debate involved intergovernmentalists, who saw the EU as an intergovernmental extension of a fundamentally realist international order, and

---

[54] Ibid., p. 48.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Pollack, "Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?", p. 359.

functionalists/neofunctionalists, who saw the early EU as possessing the ability to reshape functionally the realist international order. Debates raged over the degree to which early EU policy developments were determined by intergovernmental bargains or functional spillover. The fates of the theories were tied to the success or failure of the integration process. When it succeeded, neofunctionalists boasted. When it faltered, intergovernmentalists exulted."[57]

Intergovernmental institutionalism does not totally disregard the effect of supranational institutions on states, but questions its relevance in comparison to nation states that make them up. Instead, intergovernmental institutionalism "accords an important role to supranational institutions in cementing existing interstate bargains as the foundation for renewed integration."[58] Rather than placing an important role on the spillover effect that is said to exist by neofunctionalists, intergovernmentalism stresses the pressure that institutions exert on states. States cannot risk being excluded, and they are compelled to agree on a lowest common denominator that will be beneficial for them in the long run. As Moravcsik points out, "the decision to join a regime involves some sacrifice of national sovereignty in exchange for certain advantages."[59] This again takes us to the distinction between selfish and collective interests. Even though states may have selfish interests and national goals, they also have collective interests in an international organization, which they have willingly agreed to participate.

While intergovernmentalism challenges neofunctionalism, it tends to have a close link with liberalism. In fact, the two paradigms have converged in the literature of theories as *liberal intergovernmentalism*. The reason for this closeness is that the drive of nation-states to cooperate in the field of economics can be done at an *intergovernmental* level.

Intergovernmentalist approaches, including the most developed liberal intergovernmentalist variant, consider states to be the most important actors at the international level and, consequently, overlook the importance of supranational institutions, transnational actors and the independent role of ideas. Moreover, they incorrectly concentrate on inter-state negotiations as the most important instances of integration. Both neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches are unable to

---

[57] Geyer, "European Integration, the Problem of Complexity and the Revision of Theory", p. 18.
[58] Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community", p. 56.
[59] Ibid., p. 26.

account for structural change, because they take existing social and power structures as given.[60]

4. Liberalism and Neoliberalism

"IR theory in the early post-World War II period was dominated by the theory of realism."[61]   The dreary Nazi experience in Europe had confirmed the realists, showing that the lust for power can still be a reason for war. However, the liberal tradition and school of thought started to reassert itself in the post World War II era, where cooperation was the only viable solution to revitalize a devastated Europe. The traditional liberals of the 18th century are remembered by the famous motto *laissez faire, laissez passer*. The application of this economic principle to the field of political science allows for greater flexibility to explain why cooperation among states is easier than realists would argue. Institutions increase the possibility of cooperation by eliminating the risk of conflict and cheating between states. So, as opposed to realism, the liberal tradition attributes a great deal of importance to institutions, due to their ability to provide a platform for states to cooperate. In doing so, liberalism does not challenge the individual power of states.

Neoliberalism goes a step further than realism by arguing that "process can generate cooperative behavior, even in an exogenously given, self-help system."[62] "Neoliberalism also describes the context of world politics as anarchic, but differs from realism in important ways. Neoliberals ascribe importance to actors other than states (especially international organizations) and they are less pessimistic about the effects of anarchy - they see cooperation being possible when international organizations can help states achieve mutual interests."[63] It is possible for states to work together, "especially with the assistance of international institutions."[64]

"Neoliberals assume that states have many mutual interests, economic gains from trade and cooperation being among the most important. Rather than ensuring

---

[60] Bieler, "The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration", p. 577.

[61] Geyer, "European Integration, the Problem of Complexity and the Revision of Theory", p. 17.

[62] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 392.

[63] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 19.

[64] Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", p. 117.

constant, deadly competition, neoliberals claim that anarchy makes it difficult for states to achieve these interests because without an authority to enforce rules, cheating on "deals" will be rampant, and uncertainty will make cooperation difficult. The neoliberals claim that the EU, and other organizations, play a crucial role in helping states to overcome this fear of cheating."[65] "Liberalism would claim that the real issue is the economic benefits that EU provides its members."[66] The origins of the European Coal and Steel Community actually support this approach, and the existence of Single Market and Euro confirm it. Economic cooperation has been one of the strongest driving forces of European integration since the beginning.

Following the Single European Act and right before the Maastricht Treaty which transformed the EC into EU, Andrew Moravcsik wrote that the EC was "experiencing its most important period of reform since the completion of the Common Market in 1968."[67] The 'relaunching' of Europe as called by the French was unexpected, after periods of Europessimism and Eurosclerosis, which marked the late 1970's and early 1980's.[68] But the idea to use economic cooperation as a tool or drive to advance the integration process was appealing to governments of member states. The SEA linked liberalization of the European market with procedural reform[69], giving member states an incentive to cooperate.

However, liberalism becomes insufficient in explaining why the EU struggles to move beyond economic incentives and extend cooperation to the fields of security and politics. "According to liberals the EU will persist because it facilitates economic cooperation by supplying transparency and avenues of communication, but it will not influence the fundamental nature of the European states or their interactions. The evidence from the 1990's and early 21st century suggests that we may need a different perspective to understand the EU."[70] It can be observed that "states will continue to value institutions like the EU even if the circumstances that brought them together in the first place have changed. Nevertheless, neoliberal approaches are also limited, not so much because what they describe does not take

---

[65] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 24.
[66] Ibid., p. 18.
[67] Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community", p. 19.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 18.

place in the EU, but because they do not capture *all* that is taking place."[71] At this point, "constructivism might contribute significantly to the strong liberal interest in identity and interest formation."[72]

B.   Defining Social Constructivism

1. The Rise of Culture and Identity in International Relations

So far, we have tried to explain the major theories attempting to analyze European integration. However, we see that neither of them can provide a satisfactory evaluation by itself. This is because European integration involves other dynamics besides security, economics and politics. Established approaches concentrate on the institutional development of the EU, i.e. the form of the EU, but not the content. The social purpose, underlying European integration, is overlooked. Besides economic prospects, democracy, rule of law and human rights, European integration has come to be associated increasingly with culture and identity. "The problem of explaining international order can be thought of as a subtype of the general problem of explaining social order. Social science theories developed outside the field of International Relations may provide helpful insights.[73]

"Deriving its elements from social psychology, political science, and social theory, constructivism constitutes an alternative research program to the study of international politics and foreign policy."[74] In its simple sense, the essence of social constructivism is derived from "the power of ideas, the interplay between actors and their social context, the notion that actors' words, deeds, and interactions shape the kind of world in which they exist, and that the world shapes who actors are and what they want."[75] Constructivists believe that there is a two-way interaction between actors and social context, and they examine the "origin and reconstruction of identities, the impact of rules and norms, and the role of language and of political

---

[71] Ibid., p. 24.
[72] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 394.
[73] Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, p. 15.
[74] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 22.
[75] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 15.

discourses."[76] On the one hand, actors and states adjust and modify their behavior according to the context. That is, context influences and shapes their behavior. On the other hand, actors create their own context or change it. This second point is especially contradictory with the realist approach, which takes the context as given.

Alexander Wendt, one of the main architects of the constructivist approach rightly argues that "we cannot study society in the same mechanistic, rule-governed way that we study nature"[77] and defines the core claims of constructivism as follows:[78]

1. States are the principal units of analysis for international political theory.
2. The key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material.
3. State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.

Wendt brings a more sophisticated explanation to the relationship between actors and context. He argues that the main debate is "concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by 'structure' (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus 'process' (interaction and learning) and institutions."[79] In that respect, Wendt takes a state-centric approach[80], which previous theorists have avoided due to their concentration on the concept of anarchy and international context.

Wendt has two reasons for concentrating on the state: "First, notwithstanding the growing importance of nonstate actors in world politics, states remain jealous of their sovereignty and so may resist collective identification more than other actors. Second, collective identification is an important condition for the emergence of 'international states', which would constitute a structural transformation of the Westphalian states system. In effect, constructivism shows how the concern of

---

[76] Christiansen, Jørgensen, Wiener, "The Social Construction of Europe", p. 538.
[77] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 179.
[78] Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), p. 385.
[79] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 391.
[80] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p. 385.

integrationist theories with the formation of community can be addressed from a state-centric perspective."[81] What differs from a realist or rationalist perspective regarding the state is that constructivists believe that "state interests do not exist to be 'discovered' by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction."[82]

Figure I summarizes the interplay between actors and context:

FIGURE 1. The Interaction of Actors and Context [83]

"The identities of states emerge from their interactions with different social environments, both domestic and international."[84] The sources of conflict between different civilizations and states have differed from time to time, ranging from territorial or imperial aims, economic gains and colonialism, to religion. "Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment."[85] The 20th century has witnessed the general trend of world politics being situated on ideological conflicts. "As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia

---

[81] Ibid.

[82] Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press: 1996), p. 2.

[83] The figure is taken from Alice Ba and Matthew J. Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 4 (2003), p. 22.

[84] Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 24.

[85] Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 29.

continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines."[86]

Speaking of culture and identity, we should make the distinction between *personal / corporate* and *social identity* at this point. *Corporate* identity refers to the physical, psychological characteristics, qualities and interests of an actor. "*Social identities* on the other hand, are categorizations of the self into more inclusive social units that *depersonalize* the self-concept, where *I* becomes *we*."[87] "A central concern for Alexander Wendt – and, indeed, many other constructivists – is to show that identities can change through interaction."[88] Wendt claims that "interaction at the systemic level changes state identities and interests."[89] "It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions,[90] which in turn produce a *collective identity*.[91]

In other words, creating new definitions of self is crucial to structural change in the states system. The relationship between *self* and the *other* is always in process, and not given as considered by realists. "How a state satisfies its corporate interests depends on how it defines the self in relation to the other".[92] "Social identities and interests are always in process during interaction."[93] Thus, identity and social context are inseparable. Identity is not a static concept; it is influenced by endogenous and exogenous factors. Norms define identities or regulate behavior, or they do both.[94] "To the extent that mechanisms are at work that promote collective identities, models that ignore them will understate the chances for international cooperation and misrepresent why it occurs."[95]

"For Constructivists, identity is the context from which national interests are divined and interpreted by policy makers. Identity does not determine foreign policy but it provides a contextual template for the determination and pursuit of national interests. It thus defines the framework from which policy choice ensues."[96] There is a strong link between the identity of a state and the formulation of its foreign

---

[86] Ibid., p. 38.
[87] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 22.
[88] Checkel, "Social Construction and Integration", p. 8.
[89] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p. 384.
[90] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 397.
[91] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p. 384.
[92] Ibid., p. 385.
[93] Ibid., p. 386.
[94] Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, p. 5.
[95] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p. 391.
[96] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 181.

policy. The perception and interpretation of identity by leaders and policy makers shape foreign policy choices to a large extent, even perhaps on equal footing as technical and security issues. As this is true for Turkey, regarding the identification with the West, it is also true for EU members, who truly defend their unique European identity. The hesitant foreign policy approaches of EU leaders in view of Turkish accession prove the existence of the relationship between identity and foreign policy.

According to Samuel Huntington, "people can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change."[97] Even though culture and identity are not static concepts, they do not change so smoothly either. While modes of behavior concerning economic and technical developments are relatively easier to alter, culture can be transformed only at the end of a long and slow process.[98] Huntington predicts that the new political order will be marked by cultural differences. "The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural."[99] It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization."[100] "Cultural identity, though linked to the past, remains a work in progress."[101]

---

[97] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p. 24.
[98] F.H. Burak Erdenir, *Avrupa Kimliği*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005), p. 29.
[99] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p. 22.
[100] Ibid., p. 23.
[101] Alexander Stutzman, "Europe's Fake ID", *International Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2001), p. 96.

2. How is Social Constructivism Different?

Each political unit is unique in its own context. "The global order seems to be transforming itself culturally even faster than it is changing geopolitically or economically, it is neither surprising nor improper that the IR discipline should similarly reconfigure its theoretical and empirical gaze."[102] Theories prior to constructivism do not pay enough attention to the way International Relations are socially constructed. Realism overemphasizes the effects of anarchy, ignoring the possibility of cooperation, neofunctionalism is too optimistic about the spillover effect, intergovernmentalism lacks the tools to explain deeper integration and cooperation among states, and liberalism ignores security issues. "History cannot be reduced to a perpetual recurrence of sameness, conflict, and balancing. History is a process of change that leaves an imprint on state identity."[103] Therefore, constructivism offers a different outlook, which these theories have not considered before, concentrating on the effects of sociological factors such as culture and identity on politics. Any analysis, which only focuses on systemic factors and ignores the role of actors in shaping their social context and identity, bears the risk of being incomplete.

"Yes, international politics is in part about acting on material incentives in given anarchic worlds. However, it is also about the reproduction and transformation, by intersubjective dynamics at both the domestic and systemic levels, of the identities and interests through which those incentives and worlds are created."[104] "A fundamental principle of social constructivist theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which."[105] Constructivists argue that there may be more important variables besides anarchy and power for explaining how states behave. They especially attempt to show the relevance of identity, culture, norms and ideas to explain how advanced forms of cooperation are achieved. Identity and interest are very important variables, which help to predict how states will behave and interact with each other. Constructivist models of thought draw our attention to the

---

[102] Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory", p. 4.

[103] Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, p. 23.

[104] Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" p. 62, 63.

[105] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 396, 397.

irrelevance of a so-called gap between the "natural world"[106] and the "social world"[107] as argued by rationalists. Constructivist approaches attempt to relate the two worlds, arguing that without taking the social world into consideration, explanations based only on the natural world would be inadequate. "Constructivists musk ask questions such as to what extent is foreign policy constructed or regulated by collective belief structures?"[108]

"In Wendt's terms, structure is not only made of material capabilities, but also social relationships."[109] Wendt offers a very clear distinction between the three major competing paradigms: realism, neoliberalism and constructivism. In a *competitive* security system, "states identify negatively with each other's security so that ego's gain is seen as alter's loss."[110] This is the essence of realism and power politics. A milder approach is the *individualistic* security system, where "states are still self-regarding about their security but are concerned primarily with absolute gains rather then relative gains. One's position in the distribution of power is less important, and collective action is more possible."[111] This is the neoliberal view.

Contrary to both of these systems, constructivism entails a *collective* security system "in which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all."[112] The appealing point of the constructivist explanation is that it leaves room for the evaluation of the collective dimension and social construction, while taking states to be the central actors in a system. States have requests and goals other than security. They also want recognition, prosperity and peace. Constructivists "pay close attention to the prevailing discourses in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of behavior."[113]

Constructivists realize these requests and make a more accurate analysis. "Perhaps paradoxically, if the desire for recognition is about being accepted as different, the effect of mutual recognition is to constitute collective identity or

---

[106] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 174.
[107] Ibid.
[108] ibid,, p. 180.
[109] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 17.
[110] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 400.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Stephen Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998), p. 41.

solidarity."[114]   This is how the constructivist paradigm transforms the issue of anarchy and risk of war into a socially constructed collective action.   States' perceptions and expectations of each other are equally important as their material capabilities. Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as power or trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas. Instead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specific historical processes."[115]

"Constructivists argue that it is better to consider that actors in world politics are dynamic; that the identity and interests of states and other actors change across contexts and over time."[116]   This approach is in significant contrast with the neorealist and neoliberal assumption that actors have a more or less fixed nature. Who actors are and what actors want are determined by their interactions with other actors and by the larger social context in which they exist. At certain times, some states will be security-conscious and power-hungry, not because there is something inherent about states that make them this way, but rather because states learn to be this way by interacting with other states within a specific historical context. At other times and in other contexts, interactions can lead states to have different identities, interests, and behaviors."[117]

Moreover, how a state regards another depends on its perception of the other. Rather than worrying that today's friend can be tomorrow's enemy like realists[118], members of an international institution should also consider the relative losses that would result from not being a part of that cooperation scheme. Because realists concentrate on the *survival* of a state rather than its *well being*,[119] the prospects for cooperation are limited. Nevertheless, anarchy is unable to explain the "variation in patterns of conflict and cooperation among states."[120] No matter how we define anarchy, a state of chaos, or lack of government or order, the effects of anarchy are

[114] Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State is Inevitable", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 512.
[115] Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", p. 40.
[116] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 20.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", p. 118.
[119] Ibid., p. 127.
[120] Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War", p. 287.

not definite: anarchy under different conditions and settings may produce different outcomes. This is what Alexander Wendt from the constructivist school of thought means by his famous quote: "Anarchy is what states make of it."[121] States do not necessarily have to be confined to an inhibiting state of anarchy, they can learn to turn the state of anarchy to their advantage, or at least minimize risks. "Anarchies may contain dynamics that lead to competitive power politics, but they also may not, and we can argue about when particular structures of identity and interests will emerge."[122]

The dominance of rationalist approaches has restricted the development of the literature on European integration, but social constructivism can offer more convincing explanations.[123] "Constructivist approaches, which emphasized the potentially transformative potential of the EU"[124] began to emerge in the late 1990s. IR scholars increasingly resorted to the constructivist approach to explain the social dynamics behind integration. European integration is one of the highest stages of cooperation, and it cannot be explained without considering the context it has started in, and the transformations it has been going through.

"Constructivism bears enormous potential for research on European integration and ought to be actively pursued to overcome limitations in the field."[125] Realism, neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and liberalism fail to capture the crucial detail that identity shapes interests, as well as economic and security factors. Both neorealists and neoliberals take the self-interested state as the starting point of their theory.[126] Contrary to the realist view, the existence of the EU shows that anarchy is not the prevailing state of relations in an international system. If France and Germany had acted according to the realist paradigm to maximize their power, they could be fighting forever. Social constructivists argue that states can learn to want things other than power and economic efficiency - state interests can change."[127]

---

[121] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 395.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Steve Smith, "Social constructivisms and European studies: a reflectivist critique", *Journal of European Public Policy*, No. 6, Vol. 4 (1999), p. 684, 685.
[124] Pollack, "Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?", p. 359.
[125] Christiansen, Jørgensen, Wiener, "The Social Construction of Europe", p. 529.
[126] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 392.
[127] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 20.

"Neorealist and neoliberal perspectives focus on how structures affect the instrumental rationality of actors. Neorealists emphasize that the competitive pressure of an anarchic international system is a constant in history,"[128] while neoliberals argue that "international institutions provide an alternative structural context in which states define their interests and coordinate conflicting policies."[129] Neoliberalism has an efficiency-oriented view about international institutions, which neglects the crucial fact that institutions can constitute, to varying degrees, the identities of actors and thus shape their interests. Both neorealism and neoliberalism ignore the potential of actors in shaping their context. Constructivists focus on this very missing part, by examining the social factors that prompt change. "A rationalist approach makes sense when state interests really are exogenous to interaction."[130] But when this is not true, as in the case of the European Union, rationalism may ignore important possibilities and/or strategies for cooperation."[131]

One of the basic assumptions of the constructivist paradigm is that "actors create their own common understandings-their social context-through their actions and interactions."[132] The history of European integration is full of examples showing how individuals and national actors can shape the future of integration. Indeed, European integration started with the initiatives of two individuals, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, who evaluated the context they were in very carefully, devising a cooperation strategy out of a devastated post-war Europe. The core powers of Western Europe in the post World War II era decided to change the doomed and unpromising future of a weak and demolished Europe, and pooled their resources together in the ECSC, while peacefully integrating Germany and thus preventing a much-feared repetition of German anger without alienating it.

But it was not only the context of post World War II that prompted the Europeans to act this way. In an effort to create a change for better, they took the initiative and cooperated to create their own context. "The states of the EU have ideas of 'Europe' - what it is and what it signifies – that come to govern their interactions with one another and the political order in Europe. Thus, for

---

[128] Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, p. 12.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p. 384.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 21.

constructivists, the EU is not merely a forum to help states reach cooperative results. Instead, the EU has become a fundamental part of the European states' social context. It is a forum that contains ideas, meanings, and rules that come to shape how these states view the world, how they view themselves, how they decide what they want, and how they decide to take action."[133]

If we were to evaluate neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism based on their degrees of optimism about cooperation, neorealism would be at the farther end of the scale. Neoliberalism would fall in the middle, and constructivism would be on the positive side. As opposed to the pessimistic realist view about cooperation, "world politics is not a homogenous state of war: cooperation varies among issues and over time."[134] Wendt defines three ways in which "identities and interests are transformed under anarchy: by the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by international efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities."[135] The third proposition corresponds to European integration perfectly well.

Not all factors affecting the behavior of European states in Post World War II were exogenous. It is up to the states to decide what to do with their context, just as Monnet and Schuman took the opportunity to launch the European integration project when the time was ripe. In other words, France and Germany chose to cooperate, maximizing their collective gains. Constructivism is especially well suited for a "process of long-term political and social change in Europe."[136] After the initial stages of integration, the development and expansion of the *acquis communautaire* over time can be explained from a constructivist perspective. "Constructivism can account for both change and for continuity in change."[137] The Single European Act served as a boost to integration theories, after a period of stagnation, which was marked by Europessimism. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) marked a turning point with the introduction of the Euro as a single currency, and the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced integration by "extending the use of qualified majority

---

[133] ibid, p. 25.
[134] Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 85.
[135] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 395.
[136] Christiansen, Jørgensen, Wiener, "The Social Construction of Europe", p. 538.
[137] Tanja E. Aalberts, "The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe-A Constructivist Reading", *JCMS*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2004), p. 39.

voting and the delegation of powers to supranational institutions."[138] These developments showed that nation states could willingly act together, refusing to act on the sole basis of national priorities and power struggles.

Today, the EU is interested in issues besides economic gains or security. Member states promote human rights, democracy and rule of law, environmental considerations, improvement in the educational system, and the list goes on. In order to examine why actors behave differently than expected, the concepts of social context and identity emerge as indispensable tools. Actors have two main stakes or incentives for cooperation: economic development and security. These factors facilitate cooperation, when actors have a common interest in acting together on these issues. The European integration project has been more successful in some aspects, but has faltered in other policy areas. The distinction between *high politics* and *low politics*, concepts that were originally introduced by Haas, helps us to distinguish the weaknesses and strengths of the EU. To this day, the EU has been successful in *low politics*, i.e. economic integration and trade, but could not go that far in *high politics*, i.e. issues regarding security and defense, where domestic priorities of national governments have reasserted themselves.

The fact that states remain at the center of the constructivist analysis does not undermine the collective action and level of interconnectedness reached at the EU level today; but reminds us to reconsider the position of member-states as sovereign actors within this economically, physically and politically growing body. As a result of the analysis on how to fulfill their corporate interests, states may decide to cooperate. In other words, actors do not always wait for the context to shape or lead them; but they develop their own context, as in the case of the EU. The ECSC project was also motivated by the mutual economic gains that members would be able to appreciate due to cooperation. So, the security aspect can be attributed to realism, and the economic aspect to liberalism. The cooperation scheme of the EU has helped its members to digest the developments in the post World War II era and during the Cold War in the smoothest way possible, thus deepening the level of integration.

The conflicting attitudes that the EU displays during the processes of enlargement at different times depending on the actors involved and the context,

---

[138] Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration", p. 223.

necessitates examination of all political, economic, security-related, social and cultural dynamics. The constructivist approach which puts special emphasis on social factors and the relationship between identity and context is a suitable tool for this purpose.

The following figure offers a summary of the prevailing theories of European integration that we have mentioned so far:

1950's
* Post World War II era
* European integration through ECSC: 1952
EEC: 1958

1960's
* Empy Chair Crisis caused by De Gaulle.
* Luxembourg Compromise, return of the nation-state
* Stagnation
* Europessimism

1970's
* Economic recession, strong national governments

1980's
* Economic liberalization,
* SEA: 1986

1st half of 1990's
* Maastricht Treaty (1992), European integration reinforced
* End of the Cold War

2nd half of 1990's & 2000's
* Rise of culture & identity in IR
* Emphasis on European identity
* Increased social interaction

neofunctionalism   intergovernmentalism   liberalism   constructivism

FIGURE 2. Theories of European Integration on a Timeline

CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

A.   Historical Overview

In order to be able to come up with a definition of European identity, first of all we need to conduct a brief historical overview, and evaluate the circumstances that laid the basis for today's European identity. If we were to name the initial building blocks that Europe was built upon, those factors would be the Greek and Roman civilizations, and Christianity. "Over the centuries Europe created the most powerful combination of political, military, economic, technological, and scientific apparatus that the world had ever seen."[139] "The first Indo-Europeans to emerge into the clear light of history, in what is now called Europe, were the Greeks."[140] The Greek city-states were the starting point of many modern concepts such as democracy, philosophy, education and art. In 146 B.C., Greece was occupied by the Romans, who kept their own Latin language, but also rapidly absorbed what they could of the intellectual and artistic culture of the Greeks. The Romans established a very strong empire that expanded towards Egypt, Greece, Asia Minor, Syria, and in the West today's Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Spain, Portugal, France, Switzerland, Belgium and England. Though violent in their process of conquest, the Romans in the long run acted as civilizing agents, transmitting to these previously backward countries the age-old achievements of the East and the more recent culture of Greece and of Rome itself.

"The thousand years during which the Greco-Roman civilization arose and flourished were notable in another way even more momentous for all the later history of mankind."[141] All major prophets and religions, including Jewish prophets, Jesus of Christianity, and Mohammed of Islam emerged between 700 B.C and A.D.700. Christianity initially spread among the poor, and gradually spread to the higher classes of society. Even though Christianity acted as a unifying agent, it could not prevent the disintegration of the Roman Empire. In A.D. 330, the Roman emperor

---

[139] R. R. Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), p. 9.
[140] Ibid., p. 11.
[141] Ibid., p. 15.

Constantine founded a new capital in Byzantium, which he named Constantinople. From that point on, the Roman Empire was governed in two halves; with the main competition from the Islamic Arab world. The Western part of the Roman Empire was under the threat of invasion by Germanic Western barbarians. "The Germans who overran the old Roman provinces found it difficult to maintain any political organization at more than a local level. Security and civil order all but disappeared."[142] As the center of gravity shifted towards the East, the West was going back. From A.D. 500 onwards, Europe was in the so-called Dark Ages. Only one institution maintained a tie with the civilized past, and that was the Christian church.[143] In the political power vacuum that developed, the pope emerged as the main source of authority.

But the pope needed a protector against barbarian neighbors and the political claims of the Byzantine Empire upon the city of Rome. That protector turned out to be Charlemagne, and the pope crowned him as the emperor of the West in 800. "It is in Charlemagne's empire that we can first see the shape of Europe as a unit of society and culture distinct from the Mediterranean world of antiquity."[144] Meanwhile, Germanic tribes continued to settle down in different parts of Europe. "By the year 1000, or soon thereafter, the entity that we call Europe had been brought into existence. From the turbulence that followed the collapse of the Greco-Roman civilization had issued the peoples and the countries of modern Europe."[145] A kingdom of France was in being, adjoining Germany to the east. There were small Christian kingdoms in northern Spain and a number of city-states in the Italian peninsula. In the north there were now a kingdom of England and Scotland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden had also taken form. In the east rose the three great kingdoms of Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary. Slavs and Russians in the Balkan peninsula also formed kingdoms of their own. Also, Europe took the offensive against Islam starting from the 11th century, and so the crusades began.

Starting from the year 1000, the face of Europe began to change radically. "The economic, social and cultural transformations of Europe during the 10th and 11th centuries were as profound as the political transformations of that period. Demographic upsurge, revolution directing agriculture towards markets rather than

---

[142] Ibid., p. 22.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid., p. 25.
[145] Ibid., p. 26.

subsistence, the rebirth of towns and the development of complex commercial networks transformed the lives of Europeans elsewhere. As peasants emerged from servitude and established autonomous social and cultural traditions, aristocrats wove together strands of Christianity and the warrior ethos to create an enduring social stratum whose values dominated elite ideology until the twentieth century."[146]

Meanwhile, the existing kingdoms were turning into national monarchies that would survive through inheritance. These Western monarchies had a significant importance in the sense that they created a free political unit which provided the means by which people could take some part in their governments. "In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, royal power continued to face challenges from traditions of private lordship and family ambitions. Familial rivalries engulfed the feudal monarchies of France and England in the Hundred Years' War."[147] At the same time, new directions in elite and popular culture encouraged a flowering of a fragmented but intellectual life. The 12th and 13th centuries had seen the founding of the first universities, and by 1500, there were almost a hundred universities in Europe.[148]

The monarchies introduced the system of elections so that local liberties could be affirmed. The right of electing an emperor was vested in mainly influential princes and lords. In 1452, the electors chose the Archduke of Austria, Habsburg to be the emperor.[149] "The Habsburgs, by using the resources of their hereditary possessions in Austria and elsewhere, and by delicately balancing and bribing the numerous political forces within Germany, managed to get themselves consistently reelected to the Holy Roman Emperorship in every generation."[150] However, the supremacy of the Hapsburgs was being threatened by the Ottomans, who had started to pursue expansionist policies towards the West, starting from the 14th century. With the fall of Constantinople, the Ottomans had gained control of the Black Sea and the main routes to the Balkans. The Ottomans continued to expand through the Balkans towards inner Europe and the Mediterranean. "The impact of the Ottoman

---

[146] Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, Patricia O'Brien, R. Bin Wong, *Societies and Cultures in World History*, (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995), p. 272.
[147] Ibid., p. 296.
[148] Palmer and Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, p. 39.
[149] Ibid., p. 74.
[150] Ibid.

Turks on sixteenth-century Europe was far reaching."[151] In that respect, Turks played an important role in shaping European history.

Aside from these political developments, the Church was becoming more and more corrupt and bureaucratic everyday, disregarding public opinion and the pressures to reform itself. "Disaffection with the church, or the thought that it might not be the true or the only way to salvation, spread in all ranks of the society."[152] In Italy in the 15th century, a new attitude towards the world was observed. "The Renaissance, a French word meaning 'rebirth', first received its name from those who thought of the Middle Ages as a dark time from which the human spirit had to be awakened. Medieval people had thought of the times of Aristotle or Cicero as not sharply distinct from their own. In the Renaissance, with a new historical sense, arose the conception of 'modern' and 'ancient' times, separated by a long period with a different lifestyle."[153]

It is true that the basic institutions of Europe, the very languages and nationalities, the great frameworks of collective action in law, government, and economic production, all originated in the Middle Ages. The origins of modern natural science can be traced more to the medieval universities than to the Renaissance thinkers. But the Renaissance marked a new era in thought and feeling, by which Europe and its institutions were in the long run to be transformed.[154] The novelties of the Renaissance "involved the area of culture which is neither theological nor scientific but concerns essentially moral and civic questions, asking what man ought to be or ought to do, and is reflected in the matters of taste, style, propriety, decorum, personal character, and education. In particular, it was in Renaissance Italy that an almost purely secular attitude first appeared."[155] Indeed, a scientific outlook to the world had been discovered by Leonardo da Vinci, artist, engineer and scientific thinker of the Renaissance era, who made very important discoveries about the human body, sketched designs for submarines and planes, speculated on the use of parachutes and poison gases. However, Leonardo had not published his works, eliminating the chance of progress and transmission of his ideas.

---

[151] Geoffrey Woodward, "The Ottomans in Europe", *History Review*, Issue 39 (March 2001), p. 45.
[152] Palmer and Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, p. 51.
[153] Ibid., p. 53.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.

Dissatisfaction with the Catholic Church was increasingly being pronounced by some circles. The Protestant Revolution was led by Martin Luther, who was a monk and also a professor at the University of Wittenberg. Luther believed that what justifies a man was his faith in God alone, but not prayers or confessions.[156] Luther gathered many supporters in Germany, where there was a good deal of resentment against Rome. He urged people to find the Christian truth for themselves not in the sayings and declarations of the Church, but only in the Bible. To implement his ideas, he called upon the princes of Germany and issued an invitation to the state to assume control over religion. Luther was placed under the Ban of the Empire, but Saxony and other north German princes took them under protection, and Luther began to translate the Bible into German. The Holy Roman Emperor Charles V wanted to repress Luther, because he knew that only in a Catholic world did the Holy Empire have any meaning.[157] Charles V urged the Pope to assemble a European-wide Council to consolidate matters, but the Papacy delayed it out of fear that Catholics might also demand reform. Germany entered into a state of civil war between Catholic and Protestant states, which ended in victory for the Protestants with the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555. This peace allowed each state of the Empire to be either Catholic or Protestant as they chose.[158]

Luther was not the only person who expressed his thoughts on religion. John Calvin from France, both a priest and a lawyer, published *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, which was addressed to people in all countries. Calvin agreed with Luther's criticisms of the Catholic church. However, he had a very idealistic description of a just man; he thought that only a few were blessed by God. Also, Calvinism refused to recognize the subordination of the State to the Church, and wished to remake the society into the image of a religious community.[159] Even though Calvinism was far from democratic in any modern sense, it argued that the state and public life was subject to moral judgment. Also, the idea that a man's labor and honest work had a religious dignity for God appealed to many followers.[160] Thus, Calvinism spread widely across Europe. The Catholic Church responded to these challenges to its authority with the Catholic / Counter Reformation. In Spain,

---

[156] Ibid., p. 76.
[157] Ibid., p. 77.
[158] Ibid., p. 79, 80.
[159] Ibid., p. 81.
[160] Ibid., p. 82.

where much of the Catholic feelings first developed, St. Loyola Ignatius established the Society of Jesuits, meaning the followers of Jesus. The Jesuits were authorized by Paul III, recruited members from all countries, and acted as an international missionary force for the Catholic Church.

The century following 1560 was marked by Wars of Religion in Europe, which eventually ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, following the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). "The Wars of Religion was also a time of economic renewal. From the beginning of the 16th century, society was transformed by contacts with a newly discovered overseas world, by expanded trade routes, an emergent capitalism, and the formation of new social classes." [161] Population in Europe began to rise again, and cities grew substantially. This Commercial Revolution was followed by the change in the methods of production and the introduction of factories in late 18th century.

Ironically, the emergence of a religious divide in Europe laid the roots of the modern nation-state system. The modern European state system or system of sovereign states can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia. The leadership of Western Europe became established in the half century following Westphalia, and was to have a tremendous impact on the rest of the world, with the French, Dutch and English as the principal actors.[162] The 17th century is also called the century of genius, for a scientific view of the world and human affairs emerged and became characteristic of European society. This was the great age of scientists, philosophers and writers: Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Bacon, Descartes, and Montaigne.

This awakening led to the Age of Enlightenment in the 18th century. "The past was regarded as a time of barbarism and darkness."[163] Famous philosophers of the era, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau, who had differing views, made political and social analyses in their works. Montesquieu argued for a separation of powers, Voltaire was interested in freedom of thought, and Rousseau questioned the relationship between men and society.

"Ideas of Europe were long confined to small elites-rulers, religious leaders, intelligentsias of science, law and the arts. Over the past two thousand years, and especially since the Renaissance, three features of European life became particularly

---

[161] Ibid., p. 106.
[162] Ibid., p. 160.
[163] Ibid., p. 314.

distinctive: the pervasive pressure of Christianity, the rise of a dynamic mercantile economy that promoted trade and urbanism, and the growth of pan-European artistic expression in architecture, sculpture, painting, literature and music. Only in the late eighteenth century however, did consciousness of being European begin to extend beyond these realms of life to a wider community of participants."[164] The French Revolution broke out right at this point in 1789.

"The French Revolution was by far the most momentous upheaval of the whole revolutionary age."[165] It replaced the absolute monarchy in France with republicanism, and the French sector of the Roman Catholic Church was forced to undergo radical restructuring. Paradoxically, France in 1789 was one of the richest and most powerful nations in Europe. Nevertheless, the *ancien régime* was brought down, partly by its own rigidity in the face of a changing world, partly by the ambitions of a rising bourgeoisie, allied with aggrieved peasants and wage-earners and with individuals of all classes who were influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment.[166]

Main causes of the French Revolution can be summarized as a bad economic situation and an unmanageable national debt, resentment of royal absolutism, aspiration for liberty and republicanism, the rise of Enlightenment ideals, food scarcity, high unemployment, resentment of religious intolerance, and the failure of Louis XVI to deal effectively with these phenomena. As the revolution proceeded and as power devolved from the monarchy to legislative bodies, the conflicting interests of these initially allied groups would become the source of conflict and bloodshed. The French Revolution is widely seen as a major turning point in continental European history, from the age of absolutism to that of the citizenry, and even of the masses, as the dominant political force.[167] Liberty, equality and fraternity were the slogans of the Revolution. The most important concept brought about by the French Revolution was nationalism.

By the mid 19th century, "Europe had begun to symbolize ideals of progress and freedom against autocratic rule and social backwardness. Much of the impulse

---

[164] David Lowenthal, "European Identity: An Emerging Concept", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2000), p. 316.
[165] Palmer and Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, p. 361.
[166] "French Revolution", *Wikipedia*, Accessed from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Revolution on March 26, 2006.
[167] Ibid.

for European reform was couched in terms of opposition to repressive Habsburg and Papal, Ottoman and Russian regimes."[168] "The idea of progress is often said to have been the dominant or characteristic idea of European civilization from the 17th century to the 20th."[169] Europe reached its peak in the beginning of the 20th century and set an example of modernization for others. For Europe, the period until the First World War (1914) was marked by "unparalleled material and industrial growth, international peace, domestic stability, the advance of constitutional, representative and democratic government, continued faith in science, reason and progress."[170] Progress in science, industry, transportation and communication was observed. With the use of steam power and electricity, steel production, automotive and aviation industries came about.

But this perfection did not last long, and was threatened with the break out of World War I. "By one of the ironies of history, the imperialist rivalries of the European powers, while representing the world's supremacy, also contributed to the disaster of the First World War, and so to the collapse of such supremacy as Europe had enjoyed."[171] Imperialism was the European way of bringing their civilization to remote parts of the world. The Second World War even produced a bleaker picture in which the great powers of Europe almost completely destroyed the advancement, wealth and accomplishment they had achieved with their own hands. The European integration project started as an attempt to prevent another war of such scale. All of the historical experiences and events mentioned in this chapter played a role in shaping and transforming the core features of European identity.

---

[168] Lowenthal, "European Identity: An Emerging Concept", p. 316.
[169] Palmer and Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, p. 315.
[170] Ibid., p. 583.
[171] Ibid., p. 643.

B . The Definition of European Identity

1. The Pan-European Ideology

The motives for creating a single entity were always present in the European integration project. The EEC was based on a pan-European ideology, which was determined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe. One of the key elements to deepening the sense of integrity in the EU is developing a common European identity. Differently said, a common European identity is a complementary tool for economic and political integration. "A nation is a society united by a delusion about its ancestry and by a common hatred of its neighbors."[172] Europe is neither a nation, nor a complete federal union, but the members of the EU have certain claims about having a distinct European identity. This was expressed very clearly in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1989 Strasbourg Summit, right at the time when the issues of culture and identity were gaining increased importance:

> "All community policies in the economic and social spheres contribute directly and indirectly to consolidating a common sphere of belonging. This movement must be broadened and accelerated by the adoption of concrete measures which will enable European citizens to recognize in their daily lives that they belong to a single entity."[173]

The concept of *identity* plays an important role in the structure of a political unit or system of states. In a realist anarchic structure, states identify only with themselves.[174] But if they identify with each other as in the case of the EU, this creates a basis for the construction of a collective identity. But what is European identity exactly? Is it a historical, cultural and religious reality, a set of shared values, or a deliberate political creation? The definition of Europe entails a combination of "history, politics, demographics and culture as well as geography."[175] As a matter of fact, the European Commission admitted in Article 7 of its Report

---

[172] Lowenthal, "European Identity: An Emerging Concept", p. 321.
[173] Strasbourg European Summit, Conclusions of the Presidency (December 1989), Accessed from: http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/strasbourg/default_en.htm on March 31, 2006.
[174] Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" p. 47.
[175] James A. Caporaso, "The Possibilities of a European Identity", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer/Fall 2005), p. 65.

titled "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement" that there is a lack of a satisfactory definition of the term 'European':

> "The term 'European' has not been officially defined. It combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed, into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation. The Commission believes that is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the future of the European Union, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come."[176]

As the Commission acknowledges, the term 'Europe' is laden with a combination of mythological, geographical, historical and cultural meanings. Western Europe has developed a shared sense of identity over the course of history, due to various reasons: geographical proximity, cultural similarity, and Christianity as a unifying element. "Those who claim to identify themselves as European contend with different references to Greek mythology, Roman history, Judeo-Christian tradition, and the legacy of Enlightenment thinking which are constructed in imagination as markers of origin."[177] European culture and identity have always been associated with positive concepts: civilization, the aesthetic beauty in Greek form, the law in Roman times, Reason in Enlightenment, civil society, bourgeois culture, individual rights in liberalism.[178] Today, European identity is perceived as a way of life, and for Europeans, the basis of their identity originates from sharing a common civilization and heritage.

The two tragic events that marked the twentieth century, World War I and World War II made European nations realize that they could not risk another war of such scale ever again, which led to the idea of peaceful European integration that started with the ECSC. In that transition, the concept of European identity was also being shaped along the lines of culture and identity this time. More than a feeling of belonging, European identity implies a more abstract notion of cultural harmony, but this is not yet enough for the ambitious EU project, which opts for an EU citizenship. When the European Community evolved into the EU, the effort to instill a strong European identity became an increasingly important agenda item, as politicians realized that the best formula to create a further unified Europe could not be possible

---

[176] Commission Report, "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement" (June 24, 1992), Accessed from http://www.ena.lu on April 1, 2006.
[177] Banu Helvacıoğlu, "The Paradoxical Logic of Europe in Turkey: Where Does Europe End?", *The European Legacy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1999), p. 18.
[178] Ibid., p. 23.

without the will of the people. Therefore, the need to work towards cultivating a common identity was evident.

The first official initiative was taken by the European Commission in the 1973 Copenhagen Summit, which underlined the necessity to support a stronger sense of Community identity.[179] Ten years later, the Solemn Declaration of 1983 confirmed the need to emphasize European identity and culture in order to develop a consciousness of being European."[180] The Commission started to launch programs on education and culture to increase dialogue and trigger cultural unity. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 provided a legal basis for initiatives about culture. The motto 'united in diversity'[181] was mentioned here, which implied recognition of different and distinct national components; but also opted for a more united Europe by respecting national identities.

The much-debated European identity still remains a vague concept that has been laden with different meanings depending on context and the actors involved. European identity has not progressed parallel to the integration process, and national identities of EU member states are still relevant. Therefore, more than a reality, European identity is an historical construction or symbol that is shaped according to the circumstances of the era. Back in history, European identity implied glory and enlightenment. The post World War II period necessitated the newly created European identity to indicate peace and unity. The diverse structure of the EU today has transformed the EU motto as 'united in diversity'. As diverse and united as the EU can be, Turkey is not allowed to join this Union on the grounds that Turkish identity is incompatible with Europe.

"The domestic and international environments of states have effects; they are the arenas in which actors contest norms and through political and social processes construct and reconstruct identities."[182] Both of these take place in the EU. The domestic politics of member states influence the integration process and the accession of new members, European identity and the benefits of the Union are constantly debated in line with the international context. European integration

---

[179] Edith Cresson, "Learning for Active Citizenship: Challenge on Building Europe of Knowledge", *Europa Archives*, Accessed from http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/archive/citizen/citiz_en.html on March 19, 2006.
[180] Erdenir, *Avrupa Kimliği*, p. 105.
[181] Ibid., p. 106.
[182] Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, p. 25.

differs from other regional and international organizations in the sense that being a member implies belonging to a community, and being a part of the European identity. Member states of the EU claim to share a common culture and identity that distinguishes them from the rest of the world. There exists an imaginary boundary drawn to externalize and exclude the *other*, which is conceived as being inferior to Europe.[183] The concept of identity, besides its inherent meaning, has a political connotation in this setting. For this reason, identity emerges as one of the most important variables that play a role in the integration process.

2. The 'Self' and the 'Other'

"The process of unification, underlined by a concerted effort to define or create a European culture and identity, has recreated or rediscovered perceptions of other."[184] "In the process of communication norms can emerge in a variety of ways: spontaneously evolving, as social practice; consciously promoted, as political strategies to further specific interests; deliberately negotiated, as a mechanism for conflict management; or as a combination, mixing these three types."[185] In the case of the EU, conscious promotion and deliberate negotiation play an important role in creating the norms that set the standards for an idealized European identity.

Despite the distinct national, linguistic, cultural, political, and financial disparities between the members of the EU, the concept of European identity suddenly becomes easier to define, when it comes to differentiate the 'European' from the 'other'. According to the constructivist perspective, identity is defined with reference to the other. In other words, the behavior of an actor towards another depends on its perception of the other. Likewise, "the self-identification of Europe always required another entity, broadly defined as non-European or not Western."[186]

As Europeans had contact with the outside world through conquest, colonialization and trade, they began to define themselves in negation to these

[183] Helvacıoğlu, "The Paradoxical Logic of Europe in Turkey: Where Does Europe End?", p. 22.
[184] Penelope D. Safioleas, "Identity Shift and Europe's Changing Perception of Others: Europe, Turkey, and the Issue of Self-Identification", *Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2.1*, Accessed from http://www.trinstitute.org on January 23, 2006.
[185] Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security" p. 21.
[186] Helvacıoğlu, "The Paradoxical Logic of Europe in Turkey: Where Does Europe End?", p. 22.

linkages. "From a historical perspective then, the positive connotations of European identity have been shaped by a multitude of negative images such as 'barbarians in Asia', 'Arabs' in the Mediterranean, and 'Turks' on the outskirts of Vienna which are historically categorizes as external enemies."[187]   Historically, due to the expansionist policies of the Ottoman Empire, "Turks represented all that was negated in the European identity; savage, barbarian, despotic, oppressive, violent, and a threat to European civilization."[188]

Between the 14th and the 17th centuries, the Ottoman Empire expanded into Europe through wars and conquests. The Ottomans penetrated the Byzantium Empire and conquered Istanbul in 1453, and pushing through Hungary and menacing central Europe. In 1517, the Ottoman sultans adopted the title of 'Caliphate' and the Turks became the leaders of the Muslim world, further deepening the divide between Europe due to the clash with Christianity. They besieged Vienna in 1529. "To the Christian world the Turks were a mystery as well as a terror. Their dominions extended, about 1650, from the Hungarian plain and the south Russian steppes as far as Algeria, the upper Nile, and the Persian Gulf."[189] "At its height, the Ottoman Empire encompassed a significant proportion of modern Europe."[190]

But by the mid-seventeenth century, the Ottomans were falling behind, doomed to become 'the sick man of Europe'. In the new political order based on national monarchies in Europe, the Ottoman Empire played an important role in the balance of power game and the emerging European states system. Maintaining the Ottoman Empire as part of an established order against the expansionist ambitions of Austria and Russia was the main motive. After the Crimean War and the ensuing Treaty of Paris (1856), The Ottoman Empire was accepted into the Concert of Europe. But Europe, faithful to the 'Republica Christiana' ideology of the Medieval times, never really accepted the existence of an Islamic state on European territory, and this tendency has survived to this very day.

So, it would not be wrong to argue that the basis of European identity depends on a process of exclusion and definition with regards to the 'other'. The

---

[187] Ibid., p. 23.
[188] Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 27.
[189] Palmer, and Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, p. 219.
[190] Meltem Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe*, (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 13.

dominance of a Western tradition and Christian European identity has always been present right from the beginning of European integration. "The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity."[191] The spread of Christianity in Europe had been one of the most important unifying factors. Starting from the 7th century, Islam has emerged as a defining factor for the 'other'. We see that the enmity towards Islam led Christianity to become a unifying ideology for different ethnic and linguistic groups in Europe.[192] Even though Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment have replaced the dominance of Christianity with reason and science, Christianity has always been a hidden unifying agent for Europe.

A reflection of this reality has been witnessed during the debates on the draft constitution of the EU. While Spain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Netherlands, Romania, Lithuania, Ireland, Checz Republic and Christian Democrats in the European Parliament insisted that the preamble should emphasize 'God' and Europe's 'Christian' heritage, France and Britain argued that this was against the principle of secularism and would further divide Europe. This issue is inevitably linked to Muslim Turkey's accession process, and the Muslim population living in EU member states. The effort to underline Europe's Christian features was clearly an attempt to exclude the foreigners and close the door to newcomers such as Turkey.

The process of defining European identity based on the concept of the 'other' shows that European identity is not really that mature. "The relationship between individuals and the emerging polity is an increasingly important focus of research both in terms of the development of the institution of Union citizenship and in terms of reconstructing identities through the practices of, for example, socialization and symbolic politics."[193] What the EU tries to instill in its citizens today corresponds to the constructivist approach. A common currency, and EU flag, a Europe day, a European anthem, these are all symbols of a constructed collective identity. "This is a basis for solidarity, community, and loyalty and thus for collective definitions of interest. Having such interests does not mean that actors are irrational or no longer calculate costs and benefits but, rather, that they do so on a higher level of social

---

[191] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p. 24.
[192] Erdenir, *Avrupa Kimliği*, p. 55.
[193] Christiansen, Jørgensen, Wiener, "The Social Construction of Europe", p. 540.

46

aggregation."[194] However, this increased level of social aggregation underlines the differences with others, while further cementing Europeans.

Still, this is not to say that an idealized concept of European identity will persist forever. "The existence of multiple loyalties is at the heart of the debate over "European identity" and may generate substantial role conflict."[195] The problematic ratification of the EU Constitution shows that member states are still preserving their national sensitivities. However, an idealized version of European identity based on a common history, religion, geographical location and culture definitely exists, and indeed plays a very active role in the integration process. This idealized European identity has been enlarged to embrace values such as democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech and thought, and human rights. As emphasized by the Copenhagen Criteria[196], accession to the EU requires the unconditional fulfillment of these principles. But the question remains: if a candidate meets all of these requirements and adopts the *acquis communautaire*, can it become a member without experiencing any difficulties? Or will the concept of compliance with European identity come into play once again?

The shared understandings of Europe consist of a spatial/geographical conception of where Europe ends, and a civilizational aspect involving ideas about common cultural traditions, historical experiences, and the evolution of Western constitutional and political principles. As a matter of fact, there exists a significant difference between what Europe claims to be in terms of liberal values and democracy, and how Europe defines itself in terms of culture and civilization. Even though the EU has asserted that any European state ruled by democracy and devoted to implementing liberal values, respecting human rights and the rule of law can apply for membership, experience shows that the definition of European identity in terms of culture and civilization acts as a barrier to accession in certain cases. In other words, the definition of European identity with regards to culture and civilization

---

[194] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p. 386.
[195] Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" p. 53.
[196] The Copenhagen Criteria came into being at the European Council Summit in 1993, and consists of the following conditions:
1. Political criteria (Stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
2. Economic criteria (A smoothly functioning market economy with the capacity to deal with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.)
3. Administrative criteria (The capacity to meet the obligations of membership, including adherence to the objectives of the political, economic and monetary union.)

supersedes the definition of European identity in terms of liberal values. The accession process of Turkey, which will be explored in the next chapter, provides a very suitable example to this dichotomy.

CHAPTER 3

FORGING THE LINK BETWEEN
ENLARGEMENT AND IDENTITY

A.   The Motives Behind Enlargement

The founding myth of European integration starts with a definition of the European situation after World War II. Europe was devastated by the apocalypse of fascism and war, removed from the center of the international system, and threatened by Soviet communism. Only a union of the democratic European states could create lasting peace among them, strengthen their domestic as well as international ability to resist totalitarianism, and make Europe's voice felt in International Relations. European integration was thus based on a pan-European, liberal, both antifascist and anticommunist ideology and identity.[197]

"Since its beginnings, European integration has been legitimated by the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-democratic states. This ideology is reflected in the membership rules of the EU."[198] Even though the accession criteria are clearly defined, we see that the EU evaluates some candidate countries based on other factors besides the accession criteria, and the most prominent factor of all appears to be identity. At first sight, the enlargement of the EU appears to be a technical issue that has clearly defined preconditions. But "the enlargement of the EU is a key political process both for the organization itself and the International Relations of Europe in general."[199]

"Enlargement rests on the convergent interests of existing and potential members."[200] The first and second enlargements of the EC were the marked by political and economic calculations of member states and the acceding countries. Britain was vetoed twice by France due to the uncompromising policies of De Gaulle, and "it was not until 1973 that the EC could finally be enlarged to include

---

[197] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 66.
[198] Ibid., p. 48.
[199] Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Theorizing EU Enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (August 2002), p. 500.
[200] Andrew Moravcsik, "Bargaining Among Unequals", *New Presence: The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2003), p. 6

Denmark, Ireland and UK. "In contrast to the first enlargement, which presented no profound economic challenge for the EC, the prospect of southern enlargement would intensify the prevailing economic imbalances and regional diversities within the Community. Yet, the Community responded favorably to the membership applications of Greece, Spain and Portugal."[201] Greece joined the EC in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986.

"The process of southern enlargement illustrated the primacy of political considerations over economic ones in determining further expansion. Furthermore, it also effectively introduced additional membership criteria for the future candidate countries: adherence to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Thus, it may be argued that the southward expansion of the EC generated a reformulation of the external identity of the Community."[202] This trend was further reinforced in the 1990's.

After successfully deepening European integration from the mid-1980's with the Single European Act in 1987, the agenda in the 1990's was again dominated by the issue of enlargement. In 1993 and 1994, negotiations were conducted with the four EFTA countries, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway, leading to the accession of the first three to the EU on January 1, 1995. Already during these negotiations, it became apparent that the Central and Eastern European countries, suddenly able to conduct their own foreign policy after the end of the Cold War, also wanted to become EU members.[203] In 1994, Hungary and Poland applied to join, followed by Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria in 1995, and the Czech Republic and Slovenia in 1996. Apart from this group of CEE countries, Malta and Southern Cyprus had already applied to join in 1990.

"Is the process of enlargement driven by political or economic factors? Should enlargement be viewed as a purely material process inspired by implicit cost-benefit calculations or as a normative process rooted in ideational factors?"[204] European integration is the combination of an interactive process of economic and political forces, but the degree of influence and impact of these forces may change

---

[201] Sevilay Elgün Kahraman, "Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 4, 5.
[202] Ibid., p. 5.
[203] Bieler, "The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration", p. 575.
[204] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 164.

depending on the context and the actors involved. The latest wave of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe provides the framework for answering these questions, and shows that there is much more to enlargement than the technical admission criteria. With the collapse of communism and convergence towards the East, "the scope of Europeanization expanded, covering the impact of EU integration on countries with previously different political and economic experiences."[205] The necessity to define its future borders is a new challenge for the Union, which emerged with the Eastern enlargement.[206] "The EU's evolving enlargement policy has been a major challenge not only for the CEECs but for other applicants as well, including Turkey. The pre-accession strategy, a centerpiece of EU's enlargement policy, has been offered only to the CEECs, drawing a distinction between Turkey and these countries. [207]

1. The Post Cold War Period and The Accession of CEECs

The theorizing of International Relations and politics can be divided into two halves as the pre Cold War and post Cold War period. Before the Cold War, "scholars have tended to highlight material capabilities and constraints as main variables accounting for the behavior of states posited as rational actors. It has also been hypothesized that the prime motivation at the level of interstate politics is the maximization of one's security and wealth."[208] However, this approach increasingly came to be questioned in the post Cold War period, and gave its way to the dominance of culture and identity as determining variables of state interests and behavior.

"In the twentieth century, Eastern Europe was solidified as a political reality with the Cold War."[209] The decision to enlarge the EU to Central and Eastern Europe cannot be explained as the result egoistic cost-benefit calculations and

---

[205] Othon Anastasakis, "The Europeanization of the Balkans", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer/Fall 2005), p. 78.
[206] Sandra Lavenex, "EU External Governance in Wider Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (August 2004), p. 682.
[207] Kahraman, "Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement", p. 1.
[208] Dimitar Bechev, "Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism in Southeast Europe", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 2004), p. 79.
[209] Ibid., p. 84.

patterns of state preferences and power.[210] "The end of the Cold War played an important role in legitimating constructivist theories because realism and liberalism both failed to anticipate this event and had some trouble explaining it. Constructivists had an explanation: Specifically, former president Mikhail Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideas such as 'common security'."[211] New concepts like *glasnost* and *perestroika* were tools of this change. "From a constructivist perspective, in fact, the central issue in the post-Cold War world is how different groups conceive their identities and interests. Although power is not irrelevant, constructivism emphasizes how ideas and identities are created, how they evolve, and how they shape the way states understand and respond to their situation."[212] So, "the Cold War is at base a cultural rather than material structure, and thus the end of the Cold War was a 'structural change' along that dimension."[213]

There has been an increase "in the relevance of issues of cultural identity in international politics"[214] after the Cold War, and the place of culture and identity in IR theorizing has been reinforced.[215] This gave rise to the necessity to evaluate concepts of security, state sovereignty and international cooperation from a whole new perspective. "The global eruption of separatist nationalism set in motion by the abrupt ending of the Cold War has directly and inescapably forced the IR scholarly community to rethink the theoretical status of culture and identity in world affairs."[216] Constructivism can explain the changing aspects of EU's overall approach to enlargement in the 1990's. Especially after the Cold War, enlargement has acquired a social and cultural dimension, besides the political and economic considerations of the EU, and the technical criteria that candidate members are expected to comply with. Thus, social constructivism emerges as the most suitable theory to unravel the actual reasons behind the enlargement to CEECs.

The Cold War context had placed security concerns at the top of the agenda in Europe, reducing the importance of culture and identity. "In the post Cold War

---

[210] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", p. 49.
[211] Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", p. 41.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" p. 49.
[214] Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, p. 7.
[215] Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory", p. 3.
[216] Ibid., p. 4.

period, European identity has become a focal point for analyzing European politics. European identity has been reconstructed with ethno cultural dimensions clarifying who is European and who is not."[217]   Besides security and power calculations, the post Cold War context gave rise to new concerns about European integration related to collective identity. "For example, the shape and speed of the European integration process and the question of how that Europe will relate to the outside world is of critical importance and has given rise to xenophobia and a new wave of nationalism."[218]

"The emergence of the Central and Eastern European reform movement in the mid-1980s, leading rapidly to the end of the Cold War, challenged the EC's potential scope of 'European' integration."[219] "The end of the communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe was initially greeted with enthusiasm in the West, since it signaled the victory of liberalism and promised to boost the West's international and domestic legitimacy."[220]   But, "the collapse of the Soviet Union created a vacuum of uncertainty across Eastern Europe. A vast political and economic space lay open to the contest of ideas and profits."[221]   "The Yugoslav wars strengthened further the negative image of the Balkans, equating the latter with backwardness and opposing it to the democratic and enlightened West."[222]   For the EU, embracing the CEECs was a method of separating them from the unpleasant and violent undertakings in the Balkans.

The CEECs also defined their strategy to break away from the Balkans by preferring to join the EU, which would lead to economic prosperity and democratization. For the same reasons, the EU was more flexible towards the CEECs in its accession strategy, because having these countries on its own flank would secure the future of the continent, reducing the risk of conflict in the region. Therefore, instead of turning its back on them, the EU opened its doors to the CEECs to internalize them. Western Europe could not risk leaving Eastern Europe on its

[217] Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", p. 25.

[218] Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security*, p. 22.

[219] Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, (New York: Palgrave, 1999), p. 186.

[220] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", p. 67.

[221] Jan Zielonka, "Challenges of EU Enlargement", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January 2004), p. 22.

[222] Bechev, "Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism in Southeast Europe", p. 85.

own, in this vulnerable state of being. "Enlargement was a means of asserting the EU's imperial control over the less-stable part of the continent."[223]

"After the collapse of communism, the uniting of Western and Eastern Europe was perhaps the most important single policy instrument available to build a more stable and prosperous continent."[224] The accession of CEECs would close the chapter "under the history of Soviet tyranny in Europe outside Russia. Looking forward, it signified an awesome new beginning for the European democratic project."[225] This accession was the only tool to turn "Cold War threats into opportunities."[226] With the convergence towards the East, the scope of Europeanization expanded, covering the impact of EU integration on countries with previously different political and economic experiences."[227]

The latest enlargement showed that the EU was eager to promote widening as well as deepening. After the addition of 10 new members to the EU mainly on cultural grounds, and the signing of the Draft Constitution on October 2004, which promised to forge a tighter political union among its members as well as a stronger European identity; one can thus speak of a 'New Europe' geographically, politically and culturally.[228]

---

[223] Zielonka, "Challenges of EU Enlargement", p. 23.
[224] Andrew Moravcsik & Milada Anna Vachudova, "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement", *Perspectives*, Vol. 19 (Winter 2002/2003), p. 21.
[225] Clive Crook, "A New Europe is Born. Will it Survive?", *National Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 19 (5/8/2004), p. 1393.
[226] Kahraman, "Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement", p. 6.
[227] Othon Anastasakis, "The Europeanization of the Balkans", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer/Fall 2005), p. 78.
[228] Paul Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", *World Affairs*, Vol. 168, No. 2 (Fall 2005), p. 67.

2. The Costs and Benefits of the Eastern Enlargement

At first, not all EU members were positive about enlarging to the east. One group of governments called the *drivers*[229] supported enlargement, while opponents called *brakemen* tried to delay the process. The drivers promoted the latest accession because they considered enlargement to be their long-term economic and geopolitical interest.[230] These intentions were first pronounced in the Presidency Conclusions of the Strasbourg Summit of December 1989. As the Presidency Conclusions underlined "the current changes and the prospects for development in Europe demonstrate the attraction which the potential and economic model of EC holds for many countries."[231] Specifically, it was emphasized that the path of the EC "lies not in withdrawal but in openness and cooperation, particularly with other European states."[232]

Obviously, acceding to the EU had numerous benefits for the CEECs, the most important advantage being economic. For the CEECs, entry into Europe's richest club was seen as a fast track to prosperity.[233] But the puzzle posed by this enlargement was not why the accession countries were so anxious to enter, but why the EU-15 were willing to let them in. In the case of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, the underlying rationale for the EU in accepting these post-communist and relatively weak and poor countries have to be questioned. Here, the additional puzzle is the question of the social purpose driving the EU's readiness for further enlargement, despite the relative economic backwardness of the applicants.

Unlike the EFTA countries, which are net contributors to the budget, the CEE applicants were less developed countries in need of significant financial assistance.[234] Accession to the CEECs would put a considerable amount of burden on the budget of the Union, because the newcomers would be the net recipients of economic aid. Their presence would also put considerable amount of pressure on the Common Agricultural Project (CAP), which was already an issue of debate due to the pressure

---

[229] The *drivers* were Austria, Finland, Germany, Britain, Denmark and Sweden. The *brakemen* were Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

[230] Moravcsik & Vachudova, "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement", p. 21.

[231] Strasbourg European Summit, Conclusions of the Presidency (December 1989), Accessed from: http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/strasbourg/default_en.htm on March 31, 2006.

[232] Ibid.

[233] Lindsay Percival-Straunik, "Will Bigger be Better?", *Director*, Vol. 56, No. 10 (May 2003), p. 49.

[234] Bieler, "The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration", p. 576.

it exerted on the community budget. Moreover, this accession would bring an organizational burden to EU institutions and the decision-making process, making it more difficult for 25 member states to speak with one voice.

On the one hand, enlargement would bring new investment opportunities and production locations for the EU. The CEECs constituted a suitable market for investment and production, since the labor wages were much lower compared to Western Europe. For this reason, the promise of membership would not only ensure a restructuring of Central and Eastern Europe in line with the EU's own development, but also satisfy the needs of European transnational capital for further expansion of capitalist accumulation.[235]

On the other hand, these benefits could also become setbacks when viewed from another angle. "Besides the prospect of growing competition for jobs with CEE migrants in their own country, a large majority of EU citizens also worried about the transfer of jobs to countries with lower production costs."[236] Societies of more developed member states with relatively higher wage levels such as Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France and Netherlands worried about the competition from alternative cheaper production locations.[237]

In the end, it turned out that the opportunity costs of non-enlargement for the EU were high. Admitting the CEECs would in the long run considerably raise the power and prestige of the EU in the world.[238] The EU would serve as a modernization anchor, and the prospect for membership would serve as a commitment device for CEECs. The tasks to be fulfilled for entry by the CEE governments would keep them on the path of democracy and market reforms. Thus, integration would help the process of democratization and modernization, bringing about political predictability and stability in the region, benefiting not only the CEECs, but the EU as well. "These geopolitical and security benefits are unquantifiable but arguably at least as important as the economic benefits."[239]

---

[235] Ibid., p. 590.
[236] Dóra Husz, "Public Opinion-A Stumbling Block for Enlargement?", *Perspectives*, Vol. 20, (Summer 2003), p. 16.
[237] Ibid., p. 16.
[238] Ibid., p. 7.
[239] Ibid.

The pre-accession strategies for the CEECs were centered on these thoughts. Initially, pre-accession was not handled in a systematic way. The EU's PHARE program, for example, financed foreign consultants, which had the task of advising CEE governments on economic restructuring in general and privatization in particular. Originally created in 1989 for Poland and Hungary initially, PHARE has expanded from Poland and Hungary to cover ten countries. Moreover, the Europe Agreements firmly redirected CEE trade to the EU. It was, however, the promise of membership, made at the 1993 European Council summit in Copenhagen, which systematically pushed CEE countries towards adopting the neo-liberal economic-political model of the EU. It was stated that potential new members had to achieve a stable democracy, a functioning market economy, the ability to withstand competition within the EU, and to take on the full acquis communautaire including the aims of political and economic and monetary union.[240]

On June 1995, the Cannes European Council passed the internal market White Paper, which extended the alignment process to the free movement of services and capital. It identified the key areas of legislation and the necessary administrative and technical structures for its implementation. Applicant countries were left with the task of drawing up programs and timetables for implementation of the respective legislation. Adaptation to the EU has been further intensified since December 1997, when the Commission was given the task by the European Council of publishing regular reports on the progress made by the applicant countries in relation to the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria.

During the accession strategies for the CEECs, the idea of expanding the European zone of peace and prosperity was also relevant, because Western Europe did not want to create a false division with its next door neighbors. Most importantly, the accession of CEECs was a continuation and affirmation of the liberal values that advocated by Europe. "The drivers among the member states as well as the associated CEECs regularly justified their demands for enlargement on the grounds of commitment to liberal values and of the Community's collective identity."[241] "In the domestic sphere, the liberal principles of social and political order, social pluralism, the rule of law, democratic political participation and

---

[240] Bieler, "The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration", p. 589, 590.
[241] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", p. 66.

representation, private property, and a market-based economy are derived from and justified by these liberal human rights. In the international sphere, the liberal order is characterized by democratic peace and multilaterialism."[242]

"If the EU is conceived of as the organization of the European liberal community of states, its decision to open accession negotiations with Central and Eastern European countries can be explained as the inclusion of those countries that have come to share its liberal values and norms."[243] Even though the economic costs and benefits were a hot issue of debate, this enlargement was primarily the product of a political goal, driven by cultural and ideological motivations. In this enlargement round of CEECs, "the discourse concerning values, norms, and moral obligations held more sway and helped account for an EU decision to expand"[244], despite short-term material costs. As affirmed by the European Commission, "the main driving force behind the enlargement process is foreign policy."[245]

3. The 'Return to Europe'

"Actors who can justify their interests on the grounds of the Community's standard of legitimacy are therefore able to shame their opponents into norm-conforming behavior and to modify the collective outcome that would have resulted from constellations of interests and power alone."[246] Being aware of this fact, the CEECs pursued a very clever strategy prior to their accession to the EU. They interpreted accession as an opportunity to *return to Europe*, and used this argument to speed up the negotiation process. As Schimmelfennig argues, the opponents to Eastern enlargement found themselves rhetorically trapped[247], because failure to accept CEECs as members would be a denial of their liberal democratic values. In facilitating their accession to the EU, the CEECs used the method of 'rhetorical action', which is the "strategic use of norm-based arguments in pursuit of one's self-

---

[242] Ibid., p. 59.
[243] Ibid., p. 48.
[244] Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", p. 72.
[245] Franz Neueder, "Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement", *Intereconomics*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (July/August 2003), p. 190.
[246] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", p. 48.
[247] Ibid.

interest".[248] "Rhetorical action thereby has the potential to modify the collective outcome that would have resulted from the constellations of interests and power alone."[249]

Being an EU member is a tool for confirmation of one's identity. "Following the end of the Cold War, the CEECs looked to the EU not only for financial support, market access, and technical assistance but also for recognition of their 'Europeanness'."[250] They argued that they have traditionally shared the values and norms of European culture and civilization, have always aspired to belong to the West during the years of the 'artificial' division of the continent, and have demonstrated their adherence to the European standards of legitimacy during and after the revolutions of 1989 to 1991. From a constructivist perspective; this shared understanding of a common past gave the CEECs a natural right for accession.

"Since the Central and Eastern counties and their supporters in the Community did not possess sufficient material bargaining power to attain enlargement, they based their claims on the constitutive values and norms of the EU and exposed inconsistencies between, on the one hand, the EU's standard of legitimacy, its past rhetoric, and its past treatment of applicant states, and on the other hand, its policy toward Central and Eastern Europe."[251] They made a reference to the intentions of the forefathers of European integration envisioning peace and stability in Europe.

The CEECs implied that Western Europe has a moral duty towards them, referring to the shame at the surrender to Stalin at Yalta when they were consigned to the Soviet sphere of influence. Resorting to this emotional blackmail, they planned to convince Western Europe that enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe was inevitable. They even sent threatening signals to Western Europe that they might turn away from the West and their commitment to liberal democracy if they are excluded. "To achieve early admission and, possibly, water down the stringent admission criteria, they have claimed that, in the absence of a concrete timetable for

---

[248] Ibid., p. 63.
[249] Ibid., p. 64.
[250] Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, p. 185.
[251] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", p. 48.

enlargement, the West risked the Central and Eastern European societies turning away from liberal democracy."[252]

"The scenario for the decay of pan-European liberalism and the betrayal of the Community's founding myth were most dramatically outlined by Czech president Vaclav Havel when he spoke about enlargement in 1994 before the European Parliament: "Anything else would be a return to the times when European order was not a work of consensus but violence... If the future European order does not emerge from a broadening European Union, based on the best European values and willing to defend and transmit them, the organization could well fall into the hands of a cast of fools, fanatics, populists, and demagogues waiting for their chance and determined to promote the worst European traditions."[253]

The leaders of CEECs also used the Nice Summit of 2000 as a platform to express their opinions on enlargement. Janos Martonyi, the Hungarian Foreign Minister of the period said: "If there's failure at Nice there would be disappointment, demotivation and frustration, and the enlargement process will be significantly impeded. We all have to face our historic opportunity. This is an historic moment, and in such moments people can take the right or wrong decisions. The consequence of a wrong decision is that the price will be paid by all of us."[254] Toomas Ilves, Estonia's Foreign Minister, said: "It's imperative that enlargement proceeds apace. The alternative, slowing down in enlargement, would harm and destabilize these governments that have taken the political risks to move ahead."[255] The Nice Summit was evaluated as a success by the Hungarian press, where the EU leaders expressed hopes that the CEE candidates can expect to become full members before the European Parliamentary elections in June 2004,[256] which eventually turned out to be true. Overall, the CEECs used the favorable atmosphere that developed after the collapse of communism to their advantage, and acceded to the EU, which otherwise would not have been so smooth and quick.

---

[252] Ibid., p. 70.
[253] Ibid., p. 84.
[254] Martin Fletcher and Philip Webster, "Eastern Europe pleads for EU enlargement", *The Times* (12/08/2000).
[255] Ibid.
[256] "Nice Raises Accession Hopes for 2004", *The Budapest Sun*, Vol. 8, No. 50 (December 14-20, 2000).

Likewise, EU leaders did not want to exclude their Eastern counterparts and create a divided Europe either. After all, the Community had committed itself ideologically and institutionally to the integration of *all* European liberal societies from its beginnings and had continually confirmed this commitment in its rhetoric.[257] This will had been evident in the statements made right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. "In his 1990 Bruges speech, German president Richard von Weizsäcker first recalled the founding myth of European integration and the ideas of Schuman and Monnet, and then appealed to the Europeans to follow their example under the present conditions."[258] British Prime Minister Thatcher proposed in her 1990 Aspen speech that the Community should declare unequivocally that it is ready to accept the Central and Eastern European countries, basing this claim on identity and consistency: "We can't say in one breath that they are part of Europe and then European Community is so exclusive that we won't admit them."[259] All of these assessments were formally mentioned in the Commission's Report titled 'Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement', prepared for the Lisbon Summit in 1992:

> "The division which resulted from the Cold War has come to an end, and the countries concerned embarked on the path of democratic and economic reform. The integration of these new democracies into the European family presents a historic opportunity. In the past, enlargement of the Community took place in a divided continent; in future, it can contribute to the unification of the whole of Europe. The Community has never been a closed club, and cannot now refuse the historic challenge to assume its continental responsibilities and contribute to the development of a political and economic order for the whole of Europe."[260]

At the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, the EU committed itself to a full enlargement round. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Southern Cyprus and Malta were told that they could join by 2004. The following year, Günter Verheugen, European Commissioner for Enlargement summarized the objectives of this enlargement as follows: "The first objective is to create a Europe that guarantees peace and stability by guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights, and protection of minorities. The second objective is to create a

---

[257] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", p. 66.
[258] Ibid., p. 71.
[259] Ibid.
[260] Commission Report, "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement" (June 24, 1992), Accessed from http://www.ena.lu on April 1, 2006.

market that is open and competitive and gives us a possibility to let the Eastern European countries, which are still suffering from the communist heritage, to catch up and provide their people with better opportunities to make at least a decent living."[261]

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer affirmed this commitment in his speech in 2000, at Humboldt University: "following the collapse of the Soviet Empire the EU had to open to the East, otherwise the very idea of European integration would have undermined itself and eventually become self-destructed."[262] "The CEECs had been cut off from Europe either by incorporation into the Soviet Union, or by Soviet occupation and domination. The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union therefore presented an historic opportunity to reintegrate Europe culturally, politically and economically. EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe is an important part of that process."[263] Therefore, the EU decided to embrace the CEECs mainly for ideological reasons and to reinforce the collective identity that it was trying to promote, despite the economic and institutional setbacks. For the sake of completing the development of the liberal European sphere of influence and identity, the EU-15 decided to go forward with this enlargement despite the evident economic and organizational burdens.

On May 1, 2004, the EU-15 embraced the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta and Southern Cyprus as new members to the EU. It is yet early to make a complete analysis about the economic and political repercussions of these newcomers to the EU. After all, "enlargement is a process, not an event."[264] What is difficult about this enlargement is that "many of the political gains are intangible and based on negative arguments, which are usually less convincing than positive arguments."[265] But still, we can safely argue that the driving force and the main motive for the EU-15 to accept them were political and ideological. Overall, the latest enlargement was a product of the social model of the EU, one built on the concept of values, culture and identity.

This enlargement reinforced the relevance of identity in the enlargement of the EU, and justified the place of culture and identity and the impact of the external

[261] Günter Verheugen in *European Affairs*, No. 397 (June 2000), p. 19.
[262] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 184.
[263] Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, p. 185.
[264] Neueder, "Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement", p. 190.
[265] Husz, "Public Opinion-A Stumbling Block for Enlargement?", p. 19.

context on IR, affirming the constructivist theory. According to the rationalist perspective, "in the absence of net economic or security benefits, having common values and norms is not a positive incentive for expanding the organization. By contrast, in the sociological perspective, sharing a community of values and norms with outside states is both necessary and sufficient for their admission to the organization."[266]

"Regional identity is what people, politicians and states make out of it; it is what meaning they inject into history and culture."[267] The fact that the region named Balkans came to be pronounced as Eastern Europe shows that Western Europe decided to embrace this part of the continent and include it within its own sphere of influence. "What we learn from constructivists, therefore, is that geopolitical identities change over time and that defining others and drawing borders between 'us' and 'them' is a key step in the articulation of identities."[268] Compared to previous theories of integration, constructivism offers a deeper and fuller understanding of the historical and cultural templates that facilitated the return to Europe. As O'Brennan points out,

> "...the constructivist reading of the EU's enlargement process to the CEE stresses the importance of shared understandings of what the European project represents. The constitutive values of the European political order, reflecting a common collective identity and manifested in the Copenhagen Criteria, represent the key building blocks for this enlargement round..."[269]

"One could invoke a similar argument with respect to the Copenhagen Criteria in that they represent not just the rational basis for the incorporation of non-member states in to the EU but also a cogent representation of the EU's own self-identity. As such, once the criteria are laid down, they cannot be departed from as the basis for acceptance."[270] It can be argued that the conditions for accession to the EU are actor and context dependent. Besides requesting the fulfillment of political and economic criteria, the EU differentiates between candidate countries based on sociological factors such as culture, norms and identity. The problematic accession

---

[266] Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", p. 61.
[267] Bechev, "Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism in Southeast Europe", p. 84.
[268] Ibid.
[269] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 186.
[270] Ibid., p. 185.

process of Turkey, which will be explored in the next section, is the most obvious example.

B.   Turkey's Accession to the EU

According to the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU is an idea, an economic, political and social ideal; "not a tribe to be defined in ethnic or religious terms."[271] Turkish accession would "demonstrate that Europe has overcome a more parochial, backward-looking, narrower self-identity in favor of a broader, forward-looking, political identity. There exists a very useful categorization offered by Helene Sjursen for comparing the contradicting aspects of European enlargement: The EU as a problem-solving entity, a values-based community, and a rights-based union.[272] The problem-solving aspect refers to the initial foundation purposes of the EEC, when the basic drive for cooperation was economic and security-based. The second level of a values-based community is one defined by cultural and social citizenship. This is the level the EU often gets struck on, and deliberately resorts to, for excluding non-European others, such as Turkey.

If ever realized, "Turkish membership could thus have a transformative impact, far more than the 2004 expansion did."[273] However, the road map offered for full membership to Turkey contains mixed elements of a values-based community and a rights-based Union as described in the Copenhagen Criteria. As long as this discrepancy exists, Turkey has little chance of becoming a full member. "Put bluntly, Turkish accession would require social engineering, something never raised in debates over East and Central European applicants."[274]

The last stage of a rights-based, post national union would emphasize political citizenship.[275] "As opposed to cultural exclusivity, this model would stand on universal principles."[276] This model corresponds to an eventually federal union, or the idea of a United States of Europe. Nevertheless, since this is not likely to be

---

[271] Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", p. 74.
[272] Ibid., p. 71.
[273] Ibid., p. 75.
[274] Ibid., p. 73.
[275] Ibid., p. 72.
[276] Ibid.

realized in the near future, especially after the addition of the CEECs in 2004, making the EU as diverse as it could, the enlargement of the EU is bound to get stuck on the second level. If the values-based version of the EU becomes too dominant, the rights-based post-national union might never be realized. "The Turkish case is crucial to the EU because there is a disjunction between the values-based rationale and the rights-based rationale, in a sense, Europe must choose which is more important."[277]

1. The Traces of History

"Turkey has a long history of interaction with Europe, but its status as a European country has always been ambiguous. Certainly, the Ottoman Empire was for centuries a major player in European politics, but its encounters with Europe were often hostile, and the Turks themselves did little, until the 1800's, to foster diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with Europe."[278] World War I brought an end to the Ottoman Empire, and after the War of Independence ending in victory against the Allied Forces, Mustafa Kemal put Turkey on a Western course.[279] In a way, from the Turkish point of view, the contact between Europe and Turkey resembles a love-hate relationship. On the one hand, European powers partitioned the Ottoman land and invaded Anatolia following World War I, which led to the War of Independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. But on the other hand, the modern Turkish Republic identified with the positive aspects of European identity, copying their secularism, civil code and laws.

Even though Turkey derived much of its cultural heritage from the Muslim Middle East,[280] she aligned herself with the West, along with the legacy of Atatürk. "Turkey's decision to integrate itself into the West was tied to Turkey's new Western identity constructed in the years following the Independence War."[281] "Atatürk believed that Turkey's future lay with Europe and the West."[282] Turkey's effort and

---

[277] Ibid., p. 72.
[278] Ibid., p. 68.
[279] Ibid., p. 68.
[280] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 4.
[281] Ibid.
[282] Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe*, p. 17.

will to become a member of the EU is a continuation of this legacy. For Turkey, joining the EU is meant to complete the long historical course of the Westernization process that started in the late 19th century. Even though Europeanness in not part of a natural historical legacy for Turkey, it is perceived as a political project.[283]

Even if not clearly pronounced, the historical heritage of Turkey, and the expansionist aspirations of the Ottoman Empire toward European territories, has a stake in the formation of negative feelings towards Turkish membership in the eyes of European citizens and even politicians. As the Ottoman Empire expanded into Europe through territorial conquest, relations between the two evolved around military confrontation. In the 16th century, the Ottomans introduced the Islamic culture to Europe, which has been a source of tension ever since. Turkey's Islamic character and the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire are invisible hunchbacks of Turkey during the accession process. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe is embedded in the collective memories of Europeans, and this fact still influences their behavior towards Turkey. "In consequence, Turks are still perceived in certain quarters as the perpetrators of the siege of Vienna and as a threat to European civilization."[284] "The perception of Turks as the 'Other' in Europe is deeply embedded in Europeans' collective memories."[285] Some scholars such as Turkish historian İlber Ortaylı even argued that the substitution of the term 'Southeast Europe' for the 'Balkans' in fact seeks to downplay the heritage of 'Turkey-in-Europe'.[286]

On top of these historical reservations comes the fear of an influx of workers upon a possible Turkish membership. In the EU today, migrant laborers and refugees are regarded as enemies who have penetrated into Europe.[287] The adaptation problems of the migrant Turkish population living the EU add to this image of fear of identity crisis. "Turkey seems to be confronted with a cultural arrogance and cultural hatred from some quarters in Europe."[288] Especially four members of the EU, Germany, France, Netherlands and Austria are sensitive about

---

[283] Nilüfer Göle, "Europe – an identity or a project?", Accessed from www.signandsight.com, on December 15, 2005.
[284] Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe*, p. 13.
[285] Ibid., p. 28.
[286] Bechev, "Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism in Southeast Europe", p. 90.
[287] Helvacıoğlu, "The Paradoxical Logic of Europe in Turkey: Where Does Europe End?", p. 23.
[288] Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", p. 28.

Turkey's accession due to similar reasons and reservations: a society of immigrant Turks, cultural incompatibility with minorities and fear of rising unemployment for their own nationals. Germany and Austria, which have a shared history with Turkish migrants as workers and the following generations, have not done a very good job in integrating them into their own society, and they are especially skeptical about Turkey's membership. The public opinion in these states is fearful that Turkey's accession would further fuel unemployment, and underline already existing cultural differences.

2. A Test Case for the Relevance of Identity

In a press release by the Center for European Reform, it was emphasized that "the cozy, cohesive club that many of Turkey's opponents seek to defend ceased to exist a long time ago. With 25, and soon 27 members, the EU is already becoming more diverse and flexible. Turkish accession will reinforce these trends, which will help the EU to keep functioning in the long run."[289] As the EU High Commissioner for CFSP Javier Solana said in 2004, "Turkey has a geographically strategic position in a world shaken by crises in the Middle East and the threat of global terrorism."[290] Besides, "a young and fast growing Turkey could add new dynamism to a slow-growing and ageing Europe."[291] What is the problem then? "For the first time in EU history, candidate country negotiations are now being held with a deliberate statement of their open ended nature and no guarantee of their conclusion."[292] Why does the Turkish accession process appear to be more problematic compared to other candidates? The answer to this question lies in the identity debate, which is an integral variable of the constructivist approach. "The future of Turkey within the EU

---

[289] Katinka Barysch, Heather Grabbe, Steven Everts, "Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey", *CER (Center for European Reform) Press Release* (September 8, 2005), Accessed from http://www.cer.org.uk on December 23, 2005.

[290] "Solana: Turkey Must be in EU for Europe's Security", *Turkish Daily News* (October 19, 2004).

[291] Barysch, Grabbe, Everts, "Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey".

[292] Greg Austin & Kate Parker, "The Mono-cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration Politics", *Turks in Europe: Why are we afraid?*, by Sarah Schaefer, Greg Austin, Kate Parker, Pamphlet of Foreign Policy Center, London (September 2005), p. 19.

is more complicated than that of other candidate countries because of questions regarding Turkey's identity."[293]

Since the Ankara Agreement of 1963, the first official contact between Turkey and the European Community which affirmed Turkey's literally European status, the relations between Turkey and the Community have continued in periods of ups and downs. On the one hand, Turkey is a good trading partner, a member of the Custom's Union with which the EU pursues good neighborly relations. On the other hand, Turkey's candidacy for full membership has generated heated debates among the European public and political spheres. "Turkish candidacy became the most controversial issue, since the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen (December 12, 2002) to determine the calendar for opening negotiations with Turkey. Even though the EU officially decided to start accession negotiations on October 3, 2005, this is bound to be a long and 'open-ended' process, a much-favored term by the EU.

"Turkish-EU relations have not only been based on strategic partnership but also involved, in large part, factors such as culture and identity, thus, making the conflicts more difficult to resolve."[294] "Of all the countries at the periphery of the EU, the question of inclusion or exclusion presents Turkey with the greatest problems concerning identity."[295] The member states of the EU are divided on the accession of Turkey for several reasons. "The question of Ankara's full membership involves all of the possible geopolitical aspects one can expect, from demography to cultural identity, from geostrategy to economics, and from the internal European political balance to the EU's relations with both the US and the Middle East."[296] Turkey's Islamic culture, the strong emphasis of the military on political life, and demography (forecasts state that it will be the EU's most populated country in 2015-2020) are perceived as disruptive of European identity and political balance inside the Union.[297] But most important of all, the impact of Turkish identity on the accession process is the main handicap for Turkey.

---

[293] Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", p. 21.
[294] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 68.
[295] Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe*, p. 11.
[296] Federico Bordonaro, "Turkey's Accession Divides the EU", *Power and Interest News Report* (October 5, 2005), Accessed from http://www.pinr.com on January 22, 2006.
[297] Ibid.

The Maastricht Treaty provides that "any European State whose system of Government is founded on the principle of democracy may apply to become a member of the Union."[298] Even though the Union has clearly defined its accession strategy with the Copenhagen Criteria, the reactions and policies of the national governments of member states towards Turkey show that identity still plays a very crucial role in shaping enlargement and the integration process. Today, Turkey continues to suffer from a backward and non-European stereotype image during the accession negotiation process for full membership. The Turkish candidacy will be a significant determinant in showing the impact of a conceptualized European identity on the integration process and enlargement. Turkey's much debated membership reveals very important clues about Europe's conception of its own core values and identity. As a matter of fact, Turkey serves as a test case for determining the way European identity will take shape and influence European integration in the future.

In broader terms, "there is a new political contest about the relationship between the Union and its 'national components', and how they should all deal with 'outsiders'. This has been provoked in large by the enlargement of 2004, by prospective enlargements including Turkey, and growing anxiety about immigration and integration."[299] The economic burden of the latest enlargement, unemployment, stagnating growth rates, an aging population are already pressing issues that Europe needs to solve in the short term. On top of all these, the idea of Turkey becoming a member is more than some members of the EU can deal with.

Those who are against Turkish accession are concerned whether the EU will be able to absorb Turkey or not. What is exactly meant by 'absorption capacity'? In the real sense of the term, absorption capacity implies the degree to which the EU can integrate Turkey into its economic, political and institutional mechanism. However, there is another hidden meaning behind this term. Even though the absorption capacity of the EU should be measured by economic growth, budgetary plans, and the reforming of the institutional mechanism; cultural and religious differences of Turkey are intentionally brought to the foreground to emphasize the identity problem.

---

[298] Commission Report, "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement" (June 24, 1992), Accessed from http://www.ena.lu on April 1, 2006.
[299] Austin & Parker, "The Mono-cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration Politics", p. 42.

"While actors (individuals or states) have a single personal (or corporate) identity, they have multiple social identities that may vary in salience."[300] This is especially true for describing the relationship between Turkey and the EU, where identity becomes a major determinant. Due to the strong relevance of the concept of identity, Turkish accession into the community appears to be a much tougher one compared to previous enlargements. The perception and interpretation of Turkish identity by the EU influences and shapes the integration process as much as the technical accession criteria that Turkey needs to fulfill.

In comparison to the idealized European identity described in the previous chapter, the modern Turkish identity, which was established with the foundation of the Republic, is relatively young. The model of "modern democratic government originated in the West. When it has developed in non-Western societies it has been the product of Western colonialism or imposition."[301] But Turkey is an exception, because modern Turkey adopted this model willingly, under the leadership of Atatürk.

Many things have changed since the Ankara Agreement, the first official contact with the EEC. Back then, the EEC was an economic organization, and did not have a long list of political admission criteria. The real problem is that Turkey has been slow to grasp the growing importance of political and cultural elements in the Community's accession strategy over the years, which started in the 1980s with the southern enlargement of Greece, Spain and Portugal; and intensified with the accession of CEECs. In 1987, Turkey made a formal application under the Özal government, after a series of attempts to liberalize the economy and democratize the country following the military coup in 1980. However, "Turkish authorities failed to notice the shift in Community priorities as reflected in the criteria for membership"[302], and renew the accession strategy accordingly. The Turkish application was rejected on both economic and political grounds. Turkey has been struggling to meet these conditions ever since.

Turkey entered the Customs Union in 1996, but could not go further than that. Turkish leaders and people were even more disappointed, or even mad, when Turkey was declared ineligible at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, whereas most post-

[300] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 22.
[301] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 41.
[302] Kahraman, "Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement", p. 5.

communist states with also weak economic and political records were announced as candidates. Many European leaders proclaimed that the EU was a civilizational project in which Turkey had no place.[303] The Turkish government responded by freezing all political dialogue with the EU, following the Luxembourg Summit. As a result, Turkey was granted candidate status at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, even though it was repeated again that the accession criteria was still far from being met. Afterwards, Turkey started a vigorous program for called National *Program for the Adoption of the Acquis*, and implemented a series of reforms: abolition of death penalty, curtailment of the influence of the military, increased freedom of expression, more freedom for the use of and study of Kurdish. Having started accession negotiations on October 3, 2005, Turkey has a long way to go, but there is also the risk of not being able to see the light at the end of the tunnel at all.

The end of the Cold War is a very important determinant for explaining the changing attitude of the EU towards Turkey. "Until the end of the Cold War, the West seemed to have acknowledged Turkey's European identity."[304] During the Cold War, Turkey was a very important strategic and political partner for Europe due to her strategic location, and her alliance with the West and membership in NATO. Turkey acted as a buffer state against the Soviet Union, and "as long as the line of demarcation was the Iron Curtain, *realpolitik* dictated that Turkey's Europeanness not be openly questioned."[305] However, as the Soviet threat disappeared, Turkey lost its importance, and the identity debate started to reassert itself significantly.

---

[303] Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", p. 69.
[304] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 79.
[305] Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", p. 29.

3. Fair Judgment or Double Standard?

Samuel Huntington had defined Turkey as a "torn-country"[306] back in 1993, meaning that Turkey is neither completely Western nor Eastern. "Turkey does not share in the Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, but neither does it belong to the predominantly Arab Islamic culture."[307] While the Kemalist Turkish elites define Turkey as a Western society, Western elites refuse to accept the country as such.[308] Moreover, the multiple and contrasting identities and/or attributes that Turkey has – big but relatively poor, Muslim but secular, modern but traditional – confuse the EU and blur the image of Turkey. EU members evaluate Turkey based on these different traits from time to time and arrive at different conclusions. On the one hand, Turkey is a good trading partner, member of the Customs Union since 1996, a strategic partner geographically, a good role model as a secular Muslim state. But on the other hand, Turkey is culturally, historically and religiously different, and politically unpredictable. Moreover, if Turkey becomes a full member, the EU will be neighbors with Syria, Iran and Iraq, and get closer to the troubled areas in the Middle East.

From the European point of view, the geographical and civilizational boundaries of Turkey and Europe do not intersect. Turkey sees herself as a natural part of Europe geographically, and believes that she has much to contribute to the cultural and civilizational fabric of Europe. However, the EU does not agree with these evaluations. Even though Turkey is neighbors with Europe, there exists an imaginary line that separates Turkey from Europe. Ironically, the accession of the Greek administration of Southern Cyprus, which is on the same geographical plane with Turkey shows that the geography factor can be eliminated or disregarded depending on the political interests of the EU.

The determination of identity is a mutual construction. In other words, "an actor's self-created corporate identity must be recognized and accepted by others. An actor's identity acquires meaning only when it is recognized by others as such. If an actor's belief about his identity is not shared by others, then, that identity will not

---

[306] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p. 42.
[307] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 68.
[308] Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe*, p. 11.

work in their interaction."[309] Turkey experiences exactly the same problem in her relations with the EU. "Seen from Ankara, the cultural distance between Turkey and Europe appears much shorter than viewed from Europe."[310] But since the EU will be the determining mechanism in the Turkish accession, how the EU perceives Turkish identity is perhaps more important than how Turkey identifies herself.

Categorization clearly acts as a boundary to social construction, and draws the line between different identities.[311] "The in-group and out-group distinction should be considered a constitutive element of individual identity formation. This means that members of groups will be primed to see the members of other groups as competitors."[312] "No matter how trivial or ad hoc the groupings, and in the apparent absence of any competing values, the mere perception of another group leads to in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination."[313] Out-grouping is a significant reality in the EU's relations with Turkey. Because of the identity problem, the EU places Turkey within its out-group, while Turkey struggles to be placed as an in-group actor.

Obviously, the accession process of the EU operates according to a politics of inclusion and exclusion, based on the classification of identity. It would not be wrong to argue that the EU is actually a pan-European integration scheme. The EU's evaluation of other candidate countries such as Bulgaria and Romania were found to satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria, despite the fact that their democracies are no stable than that of Turkey and that Turkey is ahead of these countries in its economic capacities and its ability to adopt the *acquis communautaire*.[314] So, the position of the EU in theory and practice are inconsistent. It was expressed in the 1989 Strasbourg Presidency Conclusions that "the Community has taken and will take the necessary decisions to strengthen its cooperation with peoples aspiring to freedom, democracy, and progress and with States which intend their founding principles to be democracy, pluralism and the rule of law."[315] Turkey has expressed her willingness

---

[309] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 79.

[310] Müftüler-Bac, *Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe*, p. 12.

[311] Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 95.

[312] Ibid., p. 84.

[313] Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1995), p. 238.

[314] Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", p. 24.

[315] Strasbourg European Summit, Conclusions of the Presidency (December 1989), Accessed from: http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/strasbourg/default_en.htm on March 31, 2006.

to proceed in this direction and started to implement concrete reforms, but this time the EU leaders based their arguments on the identity problem, which was beyond any type of reform for accession. "Thus, there must be another variable, aside from politics and economics that accounts for Turkey's perpetual outsider status. That variable is identity."[316]

"Europeanization as an identity formation project can be defined by its relationship or juxtaposition with the civilizational 'other', often assuming culturalist or essentialist and exclusionary conceptions of Europe. Turkey's accession to the EU adds a culturalist angle to the debate. It forces the EU to distinguish between a Christian, geographically narrow Europe and a broader, multicultural Europe of values."[317] In defining European identity, it has been mentioned in the previous chapter that its meaning is bound to change depending on context and the actors involved. The different attitudes displayed towards Turkey at different times confirm this argument. For instance, Turkish identity was never questioned during the Cold War, when Turkey was a close ally of the West and a buffer against the communist Soviet Union threat as a NATO member. However, when the Soviet Union disintegrated and security concerns of Europe were minimized, the importance of Turkey as a strategic ally suddenly diminished; and European identity was again defined in reference to culture and identity. Turkey's candidacy for the EU has caused Europe to question its limits. Indeed, Turkey serves as the 'other' for the redefinition of European identity.[318] Turkey's candidacy "triggered an anxiety of identity loss and a desire for boundary maintenance for European publics"[319] and revealed the dichotomy between European identity and the EU project.[320]

By expanding to the East in 2004, the EU added countries that until recently lacked the most basic requirements of EU membership, whereas since World War II, Turkey has had a market economy and a democratic government, although not perfect.[321] "Superficially, the Copenhagen Criteria, as well as the constitutional process at work in Europe, are based on a more rights-based approach, but the expansion in 2004 also revealed other aspects of European identity."[322] As Ziya

---

[316] Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", p. 24.
[317] Anastasakis, "The Europeanization of the Balkans", p. 79.
[318] Göle, "Europe – an identity or a project?".
[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid.
[321] Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", p. 74.
[322] Ibid., p. 72.

Öniş rightly argues, the EU is not only an economic or political project, but ultimately a cultural and civilizational construction.[323] Europe is at large a mental construction that "promotes cultural commonality."[324] How compatible is Turkey with European identity? The EU struggles to find the answer to this question, while delaying Turkey's accession process as much as possible.

4. Is Turkey 'too Muslim' to join?

Christianity is also a key element of European identity, which comes to the surface in EU's relations with Turkey.[325] Indeed, it would not be possible to explain the differential treatment of the CEECs and Turkey, countries broadly at the same level of economic and political development, without reference to the religion factor.[326] Contrary to the Turkish case, economic backwardness and a poor democratic record have been motives for the EU to integrate CEECs, whereas these factors have been presented as obstacles for full membership in the case of Turkey. "If post communist states could enter the EU under the mantra 'Return to Europe', Turkey has no such advantage, as its European credentials are at the heart of disputes over its prospective membership."[327] This casts a doubt on the EU's sincerity about its admission criteria and inevitably brings the identity debate to the foreground.

"After the end of the Cold War, Europe began to emphasize cultural factors in their self-definition, creating fundamental differences between Turkey and Europe in terms of basic characteristics, values, opinions, attitudes, experience, historical commonalities, which brought Europeans together"[328] but excluded Turkey. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the source of threat, Europe started to highlight its inherent culture and identity. "The definitions of Europe and Europeanness have been linked closely to geography,

---

[323] Ziya Öniş, "Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization", *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Summer 1999), p. 117.
[324] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 92.
[325] Öniş, "Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization", p. 113.
[326] Ibid.
[327] Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", p. 67.
[328] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 79.

politics and culture"[329], which worked to Turkey's disadvantage. Also to the dismay of Turkey, the ideological vacuum that developed after the demise of communism was filled with *Islamophobia*, and solidified especially after the September 11 terrorist attack to the US and Western values in general.[330] This ideological shift in European politics worked to the disadvantage of Turkey, which was never considered to be genuinely European anyway. Consequently, "the social, political and cultural incompatibilities were magnified throughout the 1980's and 1990's."[331] From the EU's point of view, expanding beyond the imaginary line in Eastern Europe could endanger the envisioned pan-European community.

Turkey's accession process actually serves as a case study for proving whether the EU is a Christian Club or not. "Since Christianity is one of the most important common bonds among the EU members, one can make the assumption that EU membership is open only to countries of a Judeo-Christian identity."[332] Ironically, not all Europeans who truly defend their Christian identity are devout Christians in their daily lives. Apart from the strong presence of Christian Democrats in political parties of member states and the EP, Christianity does not play an important role in the lives of more than half of the EU citizens.[333]

The caricatures published in a Danish newspaper which were regarded as an insult to the moral values of Islam underlined once again how the concepts of 'Muslim', 'violence' and 'social incompatibility' were intertwined in the EU. "The cartoon controversy was really about the clashes within two civilizations: Western Europe and global Islam. The cartoons' publication was not merely an academic exercise in freedom of speech, but something that reflects underlying tensions racking Europe."[334] It is very dangerous to link Turkish accession with Islamic extremism, but the way Islam is portrayed by European media and politics, being associated with Islamic terrorism, further complicates the accession process for Turkey.

---

[329] Kahraman, "Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement", p. 6.
[330] Erdenir, *Avrupa Kimliği*, p. 76, 77.
[331] Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, p. 92.
[332] Ibid., p. 92-93.
[333] Erdenir, *Avrupa Kimliği*, p. 122.
[334] "Cartoon crisis frames *Europe's* conflict within", *USA Today* (February 14, 2006).

As a matter of fact, Europe "has an interest in supporting those countries that espouse the principle of secularism even if a majority of their citizens are Muslim. Turkey is the most visible and important example."[335] Proponents of Turkey believe that Turkish membership would help Europe boost its influence in the Muslim world. For instance, Tony Blair added that "the accession of Turkey would be proof that Europe is committed not just in word but in deed to a Europe of diverse races, cultures, and religions all bound together by common rules and a sense of human solidarity and mutual respect."[336]

> "Integration is a two way street, which is one of many reasons why Turkish membership of the EU is about much more than trade and defense. Accession would send a powerful signal not only to Turkey itself, but to those of Turkish extraction already living in Europe. It would be a dramatic step forward in the history of European multi-culturalism and in the more urgent efforts, post 9/11, to find ways of ensuring that Muslims and non-Muslims can live side by side. In the long term, Turkish membership might encourage the emergence of a truly modern, European version of Islam: that is a form of Muslim living that also incorporates a basic set of European values, women's equality and human rights."[337]

As idealistic as these opinions may sound, it will not be so easy for the skeptic European public and politicians to get rid of their inherent reservations about Turkey's Islamic character. For the time being, this appears to be a bottleneck rather than an asset.

---

[335] Giacomo Luciani, "Turkey, Islam and European Identity" (July 30, 2004), Accessed from http://www.weltpolitik.net on January 22, 2006.
[336] Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", p. 71.
[337] Stephen Twigg, Preface for *Turks in Europe: Why are we afraid?*, by Sarah Schaefer, Greg Austin, Kate Parker, Pamphlet of Foreign Policy Center, London (September 2005), p. iii.

5. Rightist Politics, Rising Xenophobia and Negative Public Opinion

Populist right-wing parties in the EU underline the theme of incompatibility of Turkish culture, state tradition, religion and values with Europe, taking advantage of the return to the emphasis on culture and identity and making this a tool for their own political and electoral campaigns. This shows that some EU politicians will resort to nationalistic goals whenever possible, by shaping the current agenda items to their advantage. The opinions of various politicians about Turkey's accession are worth examining within this context. Former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the architect of the European Constitution, went so far as to claim in 2003 that "Turkish membership would signal the end of the EU. Turkey was not a European country; it had a different approach, and a different way of life."[338] French president Jacques Chirac suggested to hold a referendum on whether Turkey should accede to the EU or not, because he wanted to avoid criticism from the public. Referendum was a safe solution for Chirac: the responsibility of the resulting vote, most likely negative, would not be his own, but that of the French people. "French prime minister Dominique de Villepin reiterated French concerns over EU enlargement and said Turkey's bid to join the union was a process whose outcome must remain open until the end of negotiations."[339]

Conservative politicians of the EU such as Nicolas Sarkozy of France, and Angela Merkel of Germany have expressed their nonsupportive opinions for Turkey's accession for several times. Turkey became the center of debate even during the federal elections in Germany. The positions of Schroeder and his coalition partner Fischer as opposed to Merkel towards Turkish accession became one of the major tools of the election campaigns. While Schroeder and Fischer assumed a pro-Turkish tone, Merkel struck a cord in the nationalistic sentiments of German voters, by emphasizing the negative prospects that Turkish membership could cause. She especially underlined the incompatibility of Turkish culture and identity with Europeanness.

---

[338] Ian Treynor, "In 1683 Turkey was the invader. In 2004 much of Europe still sees it that way", *The Guardian* (September 22, 2004).

[339] Jamie Smyth, "Villepin opposes further expansion of Europe", *Irish Times* (01/28/2006).

Opponents to Turkish accession have come up with the 'privileged partnership' model as a substitute for full membership, especially with the leadership of Austria. The idea of a privileged partnership was a tactic designed to prevent the EU from falling victim the *rhetorical entrapment* that would inevitably lead to full membership[340], as they had experienced during the accession process of the CEECs. The logic behind the privileged partnership formula is that "Turkey is not seen as part of the broader European family or civilizational nexus but as an important nonmember with which relations primarily of an economic nature need to be developed."[341] Merkel, before she continued with her election campaign in Germany, insisted on convincing Ankara for the status of a privileged partnership. But Turkey did not fall for this trap, and refused very decidedly any other formula besides full membership. For Turkey, anything less than full membership would mean a second-class status, and therefore unacceptable.[342] After all, joining the EU was a question of honor, which would confirm Turkey's admission to the world of developed states[343], as the road envisioned by Atatürk.

Merkel also made it very clear right after the European Council on December 17, 2004 that "criteria for Turkey's EU accession should go beyond the Copenhagen Criteria."[344] Merkel's statement about Turkey clearly unveils the role identity plays in European integration: "Turkey is not European enough in terms of culture and history to join the EU. Moreover, the European Union is full and there is no room for Turkey."[345] We may wonder whether Merkel would have still made this statement if Turkey had been a Christian country. The accession of 10 new and relatively poor members to the Union with the latest enlargement on May 1, 2004 showed that the Union might be willing to share its resources with the countries, which they identify as 'European'.

The problematic ratification process of the EU constitution in France and Netherlands hinted at a return to national priorities, with Euroskepticism on the rise.

---

[340] Kubicek, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", p. 74.

[341] Öniş, "Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization", p. 135.

[342] Steve Wood and Wolfgang Quaisser, "Turkey's Road to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context and Implications for Europe", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10 (2005), p. 148.

[343] Ibid.

[344] Demir Murat Seyrek, "Annual Update: Turkey's Road to the EU", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2005), Accessed from http://www.turkishpolicy.com on December 10, 2005.

[345] Demir Murat Seyrek quotes Merkel based on her statement in *Deutsche Welle* (December 18, 2004).

"The discussions about Turkey's membership were shaped around referenda for the ratification of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands."[346] Even though "the connection between Turkey's accession and the European Constitution was difficult to establish"[347], "discussions on Turkey became part of domestic politics and were used by many politicians for their own gain."[348] Politicians who were against Turkey's accession used the ratification of the Constitution for their own purposes, deviating from the real reasons behind the rejection of the constitution by their national parliaments. "While other issues like globalization and problems of social integration and economics were the main reasons why voters rejected the Constitution, Turkey was used as a scapegoat by some politicians as one of the main culprits for this result."[349]

There are already numerous political, legal, economic and social issues that Turkey has to deal with, during its accession negotiations with the EU. The Cyprus problem, the so-called Armenian Genocide accusation, human rights, freedom of speech and thought are among the most heated topics of the debate. The question of the compatibility of Turkish identity with the EU further complicates the process. The issues of culture and identity cannot be closed like a technical chapter in the screening process. Turkey will need much time and effort to curb the negative stereotypes and public opinion, which are equally important as government policies. As Jacques Chirac said, "Turkey will need to complete its 'cultural revolution' in order to be fully accepted into Europe-a sentence signaling that cultural issues are far from settled."[350]

However, as long as the revolution that Turkey is expected to go through is defined in terms of identity and religious compatibility, it might just never be enough for Europe. "It can seem paradoxical to note that when Turkey started to get closer to European criteria for democracy, the arguments against Turkish membership in Europe became articulated and expressed in offensive tones. In other words, the debate started when the Turkish file grew thinner, that is when Turkey, as observers would put it, has started to do her homework."[351]

---

[346] Seyrek, "Annual Update: Turkey's Road to the EU".
[347] Ibid.
[348] Ibid.
[349] Ibid.
[350] Bordonaro, "Turkey's Accession Divides the EU", *Power and Interest News Report* (October 5, 2005), Accessed from http://www.pinr.com on January 22, 2006.
[351] Göle, "Europe – an identity or a project?".

One of the most efficient ways to eliminate negative public opinion and misconceptions about the culture and identity of the "other" is actually to increase the public awareness of both groups, by allowing them to get to know and observe each other. In that respect, The European Commission has initiated a series of useful programs on culture and education, which Turkey is also able to participate. For instance, the educational and cultural exchange program of the EU has been named after Erasmus, one of the most influential thinkers of the Renaissance period, in order to underline the importance and necessity of cultural tolerance and mutual understanding. More than an academic exchange program, Erasmus is designed allow students and instructors to explore a different culture on their own, getting rid of the influences of embedded prejudices and stereotypes.

Turkey has become eligible to participate in the Erasmus program after she became a candidate for the EU. Accordingly, Turkish universities participate in student and staff exchange activities with partner universities from different EU countries. The Erasmus program is a very good tool and opportunity for outgoing young Turkish university students and academicians to promote Turkish culture and identity in a right way. Likewise, the incoming students or instructors from the EU have the chance to make their own observations about Turkey. However, this is by no means enough to curb the idea that Turkey culturally is not European. The presence of the cultural barrier is still evident. The EU does not reject forming relations with Turkey. They want to do trade, exchange students, invest, and do joint projects. But they want to do this under the title of "privileged partnership" instead of full membership, which is clearly an out-grouping against Turkey, because of the incompatible identity issue.

When it comes to full membership, "the redefinition of Europe's identity along ethno national and cultural lines-emphasizing a shared culture, civilization and heritage-may mean that Turkey will not qualify for EU membership"[352], no matter how hard she tries to meet the accession criteria. Due to the unique traits of Turkish identity, Turkish accession will not be easy at all. Even if the chapters exploring the compatibility of Turkish laws and implementation of policies with the *acquis communautaire* of the EU are settled, Turkey has to curb the negative aspects of the image of Turkish identity that Europe has. Supposing that Turkey does her

---

[352] Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", p. 32.

homework perfectly well during the accession process, first and foremost, the EU has to be willing to embrace Turkey. As Samuel Huntington confirms, "the dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert."[353]

"For its part, the EU has to stick to its designated agenda, to keep the same rules and standards for all the countries in order to protect its own achievements of economic and political integration."[354] If the EU stops seeing cultural plurality as a threat to its cultural integrity and identity, this will give Turkey a stronger hand during the accession negotiations. Unless EU leaders and citizens show their willingness to contribute to the creation of a common European identity that is flexible and open to change, the concept of European identity is bound to remain elusive. As long as there is no clearly proposed official definition of European identity, European enlargement in the future is likely to proceed in a subjective and case-by-case manner. This will inevitably affect Turkey negatively, who will struggle to meet a verbally pronounced but officially nonexistent criteria.

---

[353] Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", p. 44.
[354] Anastasakis, "The Europeanization of the Balkans", p. 84.

CHAPTER 4

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

A. Enlargement and Sovereignty

With regards to the realization of a rights-based, post-national EU, we should also discuss the relationship between enlargement and sovereignty. "In Western Europe, the debate continues over whether EU integration has rescued the state or undermined it."[355] Arguing that the traditional concept of the Westphalian nation-state has disappeared due to European integration and supranational institutionalism of the EU would be a claim too extreme. However, refusing the fact that the concept of nation-state and sovereignty are being transformed would be to deny the European integration process. Inevitably, the sharing of sovereignty with a supranational body creates a tension for member states of the EU. This paradox between the concepts of state sovereignty and supranationality is not easy to grasp, "but social constructivism can explain the paradox by considering sovereign statehood as a process-dependent institutional fact."[356] As a matter of fact, state sovereignty is not being eroded, but being transformed, as deemed necessary by the process of European integration and context. The concepts of state and sovereignty are not static; they are being redefined in the context of European integration, as identity being the dependent variable.

According to Wendt, the internationalization of political authority points toward a gradual but structural transformation of the Westphalian states system.[357] "Even when international state formation does not involve the formal cession of sovereignty to supranational institutions, it does relocate individual state actors' de facto sovereignty to transnational authorities."[358] "The erosion of individual state sovereignty does not imply the erosion of the state... By transferring it upward to a collective body, states may actually strengthen their capacity to solve problems."[359] In other words, "internationalization is a way of reorganizing and redeploying state

---

[355] Helen Wallace, "Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the Challenge of Analysis", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (August 2002), p. 664.
[356] Aalberts, "The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe-A Constructivist Reading", p. 23.
[357] Alexander, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p. 393.
[358] Ibid.
[359] Ibid.

power, not a withering away of the state."[360] In fact, since sovereignty is defined in relation to the other states, meaning that other member states have to recognize each other, social constructivism brings a sigh of relief to those who fear that member states of the EU are losing their sovereignty. "As long as states accept and *act* upon each other as being sovereign, they *are*."[361]

Developing his views about states and considering the future of international organizations, Wendt foresees the slow but inevitable emergence of a 'world state'. Supranational integration schemes like the EU can be a step forward in realizing this end. He argues that three fundamental changes would be necessary for realizing the world state: (1) the emergence of a universal security community, (2) universal collective security meaning that other members of the system must act if a threat to one is a threat to all, (3) universal supranational authority which would require territorial states to surrender sovereignty to a global subjectivity in the security domain.[362]

When Alexander Wendt talks about a collective internationalization of the state, he does not necessarily predict the total erosion of the nation-state and national sovereignty. A world state would not require its elements to give up local autonomy, subsidiarity[363] could be the operative force, and it could be compatible with the existence of national armies, and finally, it would not require a world government in the sense of a unitary body with one leader.[364] Cooperative institutions are practicing various elements of Wendt's world state today. For example, NATO and the famous 5th clause stating that a hostile act directed against one of its members shall be considered an attack against all, sets a good example for the security dimension.

Wendt also underlines that "the elements of a world state would no longer be 'states' in a strict sense, but local realizations of a larger state."[365] The EU, which is at the heart of our study, seems to correspond to the supranationality debate at first sight, because the EU is already not far from meeting these requirements on a

---

[360] Ibid.
[361] Aalberts, "The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe-A Constructivist Reading", p. 40.
[362] Wendt, "Why a World State is Inevitable", p. 505.
[363] The concept of subsidiarity implies that decisions should be taken as closely to the people as possible.
[364] Wendt, "Why a World State is Inevitable", p. 506.
[365] Ibid., p. 505.

regional level. Were a 'completed' EU to be globalized it would be a world state."[366] In the case of the EU, sovereignty is shared with a supranational order above national governments, which is binding on all member states. "The European Union has gradually extended its authority over matters historically regarded as within the exclusive preserve of states."[367] Member states have delegated some of their sovereignty to a higher body that is above state authority. The most successful aspect of European integration in which its supranational traits have been significant has been its progress and cooperation in the field of economics. But when it comes to more sensitive and state-specific issues like security, foreign policy and defense, the national governments of member states are still relevant. The supranational authority has not yet penetrated into areas where member states are still sensitive about losing their authority such as foreign policy making. Especially the security dimension, which Wendt bases the construction of the world state upon, has not been internalized by the EU members yet; with a relatively weak CFSP, in stark contrast to the degree of cooperation in economics.

This dichotomy can again be explained with constructivism. The actors of the EU shape and adjust their degree of cooperation and integration, in other words their context, depending on their preferences and sensitivities. EU members cooperate at varying degrees in different fields, according to their own interests. This is not imposed upon them by the context, but they are rather motivated by the developments going on in world politics and International Relations. For instance, the US intervention in Iraq, the division between European governments and the Bush administration and the limited military capabilities of Europe raised the question of the necessity of improving the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is not an attempt to undermine the effect of the international and supranational cooperation schemes, but we should also keep in mind that "domestic politics offers a mechanism-a 'transmission belt'- by which international impulses are translated into policy."[368]

Hence, "none of this means that the Westphalian polity is disappearing. Instead, it is evolving into something different alongside new polities."[369] And in the

---

[366] Ibid., p. 506.
[367] Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory", p. 40.
[368] Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community", p. 55.
[369] Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory", p. 40.

context of this new construction, identity plays the determining role. Identity acts as a unifying agent among EU member states, and provides a substitute for the political union they have failed to achieve. In other words, the idealized concept of European identity makes up for the so-called political union that the EU lacks. Even though EU member states retain their own national priorities and policies, they all embrace the idealized European identity that creates a common awareness, and distinguishes them from the rest of the world. As long as the differences between cultures and identities are underlined deliberately by the EU, the objectivity of their liberal democratic values is put to danger. The EU has always defended its distinct identity, and will continue to do so in the future; which is likely to influence future enlargement processes negatively, as far as Turkey is concerned.

B.   A 'United States of Europe'?

If we try to apply Wendt's 'world state' to current political life, the nearest match could be a federal union. This analogy creates the opportunity to discuss whether the EU carries the potential of becoming a federal scheme or not. The EU is a unique model in the sense that it mingles a federal first pillar of Community competence with more intergovernmental second and third pillars. In the first pillar, member states have delegated part of their sovereignty to a supranational decision-making process on issues of economic, monetary, agricultural, environmental and social areas. From one perspective, the EU can be described as a confederation of nation states, although that terminology is politically sensitive in some states. However, it is certain that under the terms of the treaties, supranational European law is created which then forms part of the national law of each member state, as there is a supranational European Court of Justice whose opinions are binding on all national courts, and a European Commission that can be seen as more of a federal institution because it is independent from the member states.   Members have ceded their legislative and executive competences to the EU institutions in defined areas, and share competences with EU institutions in others.

It is true that in those specific areas where member states have transferred national sovereignty rights such as their currency, monetary policy, the internal market, and foreign trade to the Union, the EU displays a more federal feature. It is

interesting to note that the increasing legislative powers of the European Parliament over time, and the existence of a higher body of EU law that is above national laws on binding on all EU citizens might hint towards a gradual federal setup. Also, the existence of the Euro as a common currency can be evaluated as signaling towards greater unity. But still, despite this increased degree of cooperation in the first pillar, we cannot safely argue that the Union is organized federally. The member states also remain the Masters of the Treaties, and the Union cannot transfer additional competences from the member states onto itself. The fact that 3 members of the EU-15, UK, Denmark and Sweden opted out of the Eurozone scheme indicates that not all elements that are supposed to make up the federal setup are willing to do so by all means. The monetary policy of the EU is still being shaped, and still far from reflecting a federal one.

As for the second pillar of CFSP and third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs, national governments seem to act more cautiously in order to protect their national interests. The absence of a common foreign and security policy that is agreed upon by all member states is another handicap that takes the EU out of the federal picture. The formulation of a common foreign security and defense policy largely depends on the individual will of member states to proceed in this direction. Perhaps only then, can the EU enter a more federal phase. However, after the latest enlargement, the EU-25 will find it increasingly difficult to get its members to speak with one European voice on all matters.

The EU can perhaps be classified as being closer to a federation in the economic field with its huge common market that accounts for more than half of world trade, an evolving monetary policy and the common currency Euro with some exceptions of participants; but it does not even come close to a confederation in the fields of a common foreign and security policy. It is also worth remembering that the founding fathers of the EU and particularly Jean Monnet favored a more incremental integration for the start. They did not talk about setting a federation, but rather a system to solve problems and prevent conflicts. The neofunctionalists were too optimistic to believe that the cooperation in the economic field would spillover to foreign policy and defense areas. Although the EU embraces a wide range of institutional responsibilities and power-sharing arrangements since the 1990's, the larger political entity of the EU still rests upon the separate constitutional orders of states, which, through their sovereign nature, continue to act as 'Masters of the

Treaties'. The distinct national identities of member states come into play continuously on sensitive issues.

The signing of the EU Draft Constitution might be regarded as a further step towards the formation of a federal framework at first sight. Even though the member states seem to share this ideal in principle, the degree of implementation remains to be seen. The road towards a greater federal union necessitates greater public will from the European citizens besides the efforts of governments. The possibility of becoming a federation cannot be possible without the will of "European" citizens. In order for the draft European Constitution to be operational, all of the parliaments of member states must ratify it, which is likely to be a long and cumbersome process. Paradoxically enough, the EU requires the consent of member states to legislate even in its areas of exclusive competence, which ensures that states retain significant leverage over the EU. Again, this takes us to the relevance of social constructivism in evaluating the processes and future of the EU, due to the active role of member state as actors still shaping the integration process alongside the strictly supranational character of the Union.

According to skeptics, Turkey's membership would damage the coherence in the EU and distort the idea of forming an ever closer union among EU members. But then, another question comes to our mind: Even if Turkey is not admitted, will the EU ever form an 'ever closer union', implying increased political unity resembling a federal setup? In my opinion, this is far from being realistic. "The recent emphasis on ethnicity and culture poses a serious obstacle for a dynamic transformation into a United States of Europe."[370] Even though EU members advocate the idealized European identity in their relationship to non-Europeans, they continue to hold onto their own national identities. "How compatible is the progressive formation of a supranational 'Brussels Man' identity with the persistence of local and national identities?"[371] The answer to this question lies at large in the hands of member states, but the words of Jacques Chirac gives a hint about the future direction of the EU: "We do not envision the creation of a European super-state that would be a substitute for our nation states."[372]

---

[370] Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", p. 33.
[371] Stutzman, "Europe's Fake ID", p. 94.
[372] Krause and Martin, "Reformers or Practical Politicians?", p. 24.

C.   Conclusions

Theories emanate from real life, with an attempt to organize political data and historical experiences. They are developed by examining facts, to simplify and categorize the flood of information, and to make predictions about possible outcomes that are to follow. While these theories are quite diverse, "there are also obvious signs of convergence. Most realists recognize that nationalism, militarism, ethnicity, and other domestic factors are important; liberals acknowledge that power is central to international behavior; and some constructivists admit that ideas will have greater impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material forces. The boundaries of each paradigm are somewhat permeable, and there is ample opportunity for intellectual arbitrage."[373] Even though world politics is increasingly being shaped by norms and ideas, the use of force is likely to be a recurring theme in International Relations for the time being. Different theories may apply to different forms of state behavior and international organizations. For instance, while the constructivist approach provides a whole new outlook for evaluating European integration, the realist legacy might still be relevant for explaining the reasoning behind the Iraq war.

Kenneth Waltz once said in another context that "a theory's ability to explain is more important than its ability to predict."[374] The predictions of a theory might not always turn out to be true at the end, as in the case of neofunctionalists who projected a natural spillover in European integration. However, a theory's credibility also depends on its ability to predict, besides its attempt to explain the present. That is why social constructivism is a suitable paradigm for explaining European integration, which involves social and cultural dynamics besides political ones; and makes predictions about the future of integration possible based on these ongoing observations.

Today, the major focus which scholars of International Relations should be concerned about is "the major question of whether and how ideas could be linked to political outcomes."[375] Each state or organization is unique in its own context, and

---

[373] Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", p. 42.
[374] Waltz, "Evaluating Theories", p. 916.
[375] Bechev, "Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism in Southeast Europe", p. 91.

should be analyzed with regard to the social dynamics at display. The EU is one part of the world where constructivism finds life, even though various aspects of previous theories are still relevant for explaining state behavior and the changing balance of power. "The structure of the states system is dependent on but not reducible to the properties and relations among state actors."[376] This analogy can be successfully applied to the EU in the sense that what the EU adds up to is much more than the aggregation of its member states. As I have argued in my introduction, the EU is more than the sum of its parts. The much-debated European identity is not only the aggregation and a synthesis of the norms and national identities of its members. The EU as an integration project and social actor also contributes to the transformation of this identity. Even though the EU started out as an economic cooperation framework, it is becoming increasingly politicized, bringing issues of identity to the foreground. Constructivism is flexible enough to keep this in mind and describe the future of European integration as an ongoing process.

According to the constructivist approach, actors and context continue to influence and shape each other and identities mutually. "Though constructivists focus on the power of ideas, they do not ignore other sources of power. Material power is not irrelevant in constructivist analysis."[377] This means that we do not have to compromise or disregard other theories while working with the constructivist approach. But we should not bypass the relevance of culture and identity in determining the fate or a nation or a unique integration framework like the EU, either. Even though material factors are crucial in determining politics and foreign policy decisions, identity can either be a catalyst or obstacle, depending on the circumstances and the actors involved.

Like all theories, social constructivism is not perfect either. It has some flaws and it is still developing. The main criticism directed towards constructivism is its primary focus on a sociological framework instead of a political one. Kenneth Waltz argues that "sociologists have, in approaching the problem of war and peace, often erred in omitting all reference to the political framework within which individual and social actions occur."[378] The difficulty in analyzing social constructivism arises from

---

[376] Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" in p. 50.
[377] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 29.
[378] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 81.

the fact that we do not have fixed variables to work with. As for the risk of being labeled as being too abstract and optimistic, Alexander Wendt takes a very simple but convincing defensive position: "My idealism is that of Durkheim and Mead, not that of Pollyanna and Peter Pan."[379] "Social constructivism is more complicated than other perspectives because it assumes constant dynamism and change."[380]

In my opinion, the most problematic aspect of the constructivist framework is Wendt's concept of the "internationalization of the state."[381] This concept might be susceptible to easy misunderstanding at first sight; leading to the false assumption that constructivism disregards the nation-state. On the contrary, the nation-state continues to be the central unit of the constructivist approach, but the sovereignty is transformed and shared with a collective identity by consent of the members of the community. The European Union, which is at the heart of our analysis in this study, is the best example of this nuance.

Internationalization of the state requires the development of two qualities: (1) legitimacy, in other words identification with respect to some state function such as military security, economic growth, and (2) enforcement power.[382] This definition partially embraces the level of interaction between the EU members today. The most successful achievement of the EU has been in the economic field. Even though the Union is currently experiencing a slow growth rate, the elimination of quotas and tariff barriers through the Customs Union, the establishment of a Single Market and a common currency are indicators of an almost state-like body. However, the lack of implementation in the Common Foreign and Security field shows that the EU still has not become an international state in the sense of a 'United States of Europe'. Nevertheless, the fact that the EU institutions and community laws have direct applicability on member states and individuals proves that the EU is indeed developing state-like mechanisms and a collective identity.

The EU is a unique institution, fluctuating between a federal / confederal model. It is definitely more than a merely treaty based international organization. On account of its unique structure, the European Union can be regarded as a "sui generis" entity unlike any other. Probably, the word that best describes the current

---

[379] Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" p. 50.
[380] Ba and Hoffman, "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", p. 21.
[381] Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", p. 388.
[382] Ibid., p. 392.

standing of the EU would be "hybrid". Perhaps the EU is destined to create a new type of political system borrowing federal principles in the areas of international trade and monetary union, but preserving more traditionally sovereign issue areas as member state competences. The degree of competences of the EU institutions which are above national laws and binding on all EU citizens resemble a federal pattern, but the nature of the model regarding security, defense and a common foreign policy resembles more of an intergovernmental or confederal pattern. "The boundaries between the 'domestic' and the 'international' spheres as well as between the 'state' and 'society' have to be crossed when talking about the EU."[383]

Overall, the EU is much more than a loose arrangement of states. It is an institutional system aiming towards greater European unity in all aspects, whether we name it as federal or confederal. It is beyond doubt that the EU has gradually reduced its original intergovernmental configuration to acquire the features of a supranational organization, without acquiring however the features of a fully pledged federation. It seems that the members of the Union preserve their diversity within a flexible and innovating system. The *acquis communautaire* of the EU has such a nature that is constantly evolving depending on the changing economic, social and political dynamics of Europe and elsewhere. Rather than considering the EU as a federal or confederal model and confine it within strict limitations and definitions, perhaps it is better to evaluate it as a unique system, where sovereign rights are shared and divided between national and supranational levels. The tension between nation-states and supranational institutions like the EU is likely to be a recurring theme in IR theories.

The rules, norms, ideas of the EU have been reinforced over time through practice. The *acquis communautaire* of the EU has penetrated into the network of European society and national governments. A collective identity of the Union has been deliberately reinforced to this day, with each new treaty, enlargement, increasing role of the institutions and the ever-growing subject list of the European Commission. After this point, it is highly unlikely that European integration will go back. "The ability of states to create new worlds in the future depends on the old

---

[383] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1996), p. 54.

ones they created in the past."[384] There might be periods of stagnation as there have been in the past, but this is again created by the behavior and / or unwillingness of national governments to further advance integration.

All in all, we need more than one paradigm to fully explore all stages of European integration, and should not get stuck on one theory. We should not attempt to explain EU integration through a single lens. We need the tools from several theories to make a comparative analysis. "As with other polities, the future of 'Europe' rests on establishing authority in a particular domain, supported by identity and ideology."[385] The incentives preparing the ground for European integration could be realist and liberal, but the method is constructivist. "Even if egoistic reasons were its starting point, the process of cooperating tends to redefine those reasons by reconstructing identities and interests in terms of new intersubjective understandings and commitments."[386] For these reasons, the constructivist perspective, which focuses on the concept of identity and context, offers a better explanation for European integration.

Europeanization "signifies a certain political, socioeconomic, and cultural reality, but it is also an ideology, a symbol, a myth. It has universal value by virtue of its historical, holistic, and globalizing nature."[387] Today, the EU serves as the tool for Europeanization. "This debate of Europeanization is closely linked with the geographic and cultural boundaries of Europe. It can be exclusionary or inclusionary depending on the understanding of European identity."[388] In other words, "the understanding of Europeanization is dynamic, multifaceted, and malleable. It is introverted and linked with the internal development and enlargement of the EU, and extroverted in comparison with the geographical or the cultural 'other'."[389] The interpretation of identity plays a crucial role in the future of the EU and the coming processes of enlargement. Identity is bound to be the determining tool in evaluating compatibility with the EU.

However, if the definition of European identity is left to be rigid as it is today, its future might be bleak. The "emerging nationalistic European identity, tied mostly

---

[384] Wendt, "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics" p. 55.
[385] Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory", p. 41.
[386] Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", p. 417.
[387] Anastasakis, "The Europeanization of the Balkans", p. 78.
[388] Ibid., p. 79, 80.
[389] Ibid., p. 80.

to Christianity and anti-Muslim attitudes, may turn out to be quite different from what European leaders have been advocating, namely a political Europe consisting of European citizens."[390] "Politically, culturally, and economically, Europe is a multi-level phenomenon."[391] Thus, "European identity must be forward-looking, rooted in the future"[392], rather than being confined to strict definitions and limitations. The attitude of excluding the 'other' might have far-reaching implications, as advocated by Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis. "Rather than fall back into some abstract or ethnically driven identity debate, the EU must become more tangible and visible in the eyes of its constituents."[393]

European integration is an open-ended process, a term much favored by the EU in describing the nature of accession negotiations with Turkey. As described previously, feelings of xenophobia, historical reservations, religious incompatibility and negative public opinion of some EU member states have a very strong impact on the accession process of Turkey. This shows that the future enlargement processes of the EU will be more dependent on the effects of ideas, common values and a shared understanding of what it takes to be European. For this reason, the social constructivist paradigm will be especially helpful in evaluating the future steps of European integration, which is most likely to be shaped by the behavior of the European people and national governments. The future of the EU is largely based on public opinion and political standing of member states regarding "normative understandings of what the European construction is about."[394] Thus, identity emerges as the most important variable that will shape the fate of the EU and its future members.

The relationship between enlargement and identity can either become a source of division, or help to enrich the cultural fabric of the EU. If European identity continues to be transformed along cultural and civilizational lines, there is the danger that "the very richness of the European past and heritage turns against themselves, against its claims for universalism, as Europe develops a fixation on identity and hence an obstacle to creating a common dream, a common project."[395]

---

[390] Sieglinde Rosenberger, "The Other Side of the Coin", *Harvard International Review* (Spring 2004), p. 25.
[391] Caporaso, "The Possibilities of a European Identity", p. 65.
[392] Stutzman, "Europe's Fake ID", p. 96.
[393] Ibid.
[394] O' Brennan, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", p. 186.
[395] Göle, "Europe – an identity or a project?".

While claming to preserve the idealized version of European identity, the EU is indeed hampering its own vision of creating a dynamic and multicultural union. After the lifting of the Iron Curtain with the end of the Cold War, this time, a new division made up of cultural and ideational differences might develop, which will be even more difficult to handle.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anastasakis, Othon, "The Europeanization of the Balkans", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer/Fall 2005), pp. 77-88.

Austin, Greg & Parker, Kate, "The Mono-cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration Politics", *Turks in Europe: Why are we afraid,* by Sarah Schaefer, Greg Austin, Kate Parker, Pamphlet of Foreign Policy Center, London (September 2005), pp. 19-44.

Axelrod, Robert & Keohane, Robert O., "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 85-115.

Ba, Alice and Hoffman, Matthew J., "Making and Remaking the World for IR 101: A Resource for Teaching Social Constructivism in Introductory Classes", *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 4 (2003), pp.15-33.

Baldwin, David A. ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Barysch, Katinka, Grabbe, Heather, Everts Steven, "Why Europe Should Embrace Turkey", CER (Center for European Reform) Press Release (September 8, 2005), Accessed from http://www.cer.org.uk on December 23, 2005.

Bechev, Dimitar, "Contested Borders, Contested Identity: The Case of Regionalism in Southeast Europe", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 77-95.

Bieler, Andreas, "The struggle over EU enlargement: a historical materialist analysis of European integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9, Issue 4 (August 2002), pp. 575-597.

Bordonaro, Federico, "Turkey's Accession Divides the EU", *Power and Interest News Report* (October 5, 2005), Accessed from http://www.pinr.com on January 22, 2006.

Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, (New York: Routledge, 2003).

Caporaso, James A., "The Possibilities of a European Identity", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer/Fall 2005), pp. 65-75.

_____."Cartoon crisis frames Europe's conflict within", *USA Today* (February 14, 2006).

Checkel, Jeffrey T., "Social Construction and Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1999), pp. 545-560.

Christiansen, Thomas, Jørgensen, Knud Erik, Wiener, Antje, "The Social Construction of Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 6, No.4 (1999), pp. 528-544.

Cresson, Edith, "Learning for Active Citizenship: Challenge on Building Europe of Knowledge", *Europa Archives*, Accessed from http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/archive/citizen/citiz_en.html on March 19, 2006.

Crook, Clive, "A New Europe is Born. Will it Survive?", *National Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 19 (5/8/2004), pp. 1393-1394.

Dinan, Desmond, *Ever Closer Union*, (New York: Palgrave, 1999).

Erdenir, F.H. Burak, *Avrupa Kimliği*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005).

_____."Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement", Commission Report (June 24, 1992), Accessed from http://www.ena.lu on April 1, 2006.

Fletcher, Martin and Webster, Philip, "Eastern Europe pleads for EU enlargement", *The Times* (12/08/2000).

_____."French Revolution", *Wikipedia*, Accessed from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Revolution on March 26, 2006.

Geyer, Robert, "European Integration, the Problem of Complexity and the Revision of Theory", *JCMS*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2003), pp. 15-35.

Göle Nilüfer, "Europe – an identity or a project?", Accessed from www.signandsight.com on December 15, 2005.

Grieco, Joseph M., "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 116-140.

Helvacıoğlu, Banu, "The Paradoxical Logic of Europe in Turkey: Where Does Europe End?", *The European Legacy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1999), pp. 18-34.

Husz, Dóra, "Public Opinion-A Stumbling Block for Enlargement?", *Perspectives*, Vol. 20 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-39.

Kahraman, Sevilay Elgün, "Rethinking Turkey-European Union Relations in the Light of Enlargement", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 1-20.

Katzenstein, Peter, "Hare and Tortoise: The Race Toward Integration", *International Organization*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1971), pp. 290-295.

Katzenstein, Peter J., ed., *The Culture of National Security*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Keohane, Robert O., "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War", in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Realism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 260-300.

Kishlansky, Mark, Geary, Patrick, O'Brien, Patricia, Wong, R. Bin, *Societies and Cultures in World History*, (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995).

Krause, Axel & Martin, Terry, "Reformers or Practical Politicians?", *European Affairs*, Issue 399 (September 2000), pp. 22-24.

Kubicek, Paul, "Turkish Accession to the European Union", *World Affairs*, Vol. 168, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 67-78.

Lavenex, Sandra, "EU External Governance in Wider Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (August 2004), pp. 680-700.

Lowenthal, David, "European Identity: An Emerging Concept", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2000), pp. 314-321.

Luciani, Giacomo, "Turkey, Islam and European Identity" (July 30, 2004), Accessed from http://www.weltpolitik.net on January 22, 2006.

McCormick, John, *The European Union*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996).

Mercer, Jonathan, "Anarchy and Identity", *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1995), pp. 229-252.

Moravcsik, Andrew, "Bargaining Among Unequals", *New Presence: The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 6-8.

Moravcsik, Andrew & Vachudova, Milada Anna, "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement", *Perspectives*, Vol. 19 (Winter 2002/2003), pp. 21-31.

Moravcsik, Andrew, "Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community", *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 19-56.

Müftüler-Bac, Meltem, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 21-35.

Müftüler-Bac, Meltem, *Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe*, (Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1997).

Neueder, Franz, "Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement", *Intereconomics*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (July/August 2003), pp. 190-195.

_____. "Nice Raises Accession Hopes for 2004", *The Budapest Sun*, Vol. 8, No. 50 (December 14-20, 2000).

O' Brennan, John, "Re-Conceptualizing Europe: Social Constructivism and EU Enlargement", Accessed from http://www.unige.ch/ieug/B6__O'Brennan.pdf on August 23, 2005, pp. 161-187.

Öniş, Ziya, "Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization", *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Summer 1999), pp. 107-136.

Palmer, R. R., Colton, Joel, *A History of the Modern World*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995).

Pentland, Charles, *International Theory and European Integration*, (New York: The Free Press, 1973).

Percival-Straunik, Lindsay, "Will Bigger be Better?", *Director*, Vol. 56, No. 10 (May 2003), p. 49.

Pollack, Mark A., "International Relations Theory and European Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 221-244.

Pollack, Mark, "Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 8 (2005), pp. 357-398.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, "Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 53-80.

Rosenberger, Sieglinde, "The Other Side of the Coin", *Harvard International Review* (Spring 2004), pp. 22-25.

Safioleas, Penelope D., "Identity Shift and Europe's Changing Perception of Others: Europe, Turkey, and the Issue of Self-Identification", *Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2.1*, Accessed from http://www.trinstitute.org on January 23, 2006.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union", *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 47-80.

Schimmelfennig, Frank & Sedelmeier, Ulrich, "Theorizing EU Enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (August 2002), pp. 500-528.

Schmitter, Philippe C., "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration", *International Organization*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 1969), pp. 161-164.

Schuman, Robert, "Declaration of 9 May 1950", Accessed from http://europa.eu.int/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm on January 3, 2006.

Seyrek, Demir Murat, "Annual Update: Turkey's Road to the EU", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2005), Accessed from http://www.turkishpolicy.com on December 10, 2005.

Smyth, Jamie, "Villepin opposes further expansion of Europe", *Irish Times* (01/28/2006).

Smith, Steve, "Social constructivisms and European studies: a reflectivist critique", *Journal of European Public Policy*, No. 6, Vol. 4, (1999), pp. 682-691.

_____ "Solana: Turkey Must be in EU for Europe's Security", *Turkish Daily News* (October 19, 2004).

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 73-97.

_____.Strasbourg European Summit, Conclusions of the Presidency, (December 1989), Accessed from:
http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/strasbourg/default_en.htm on March 31, 2006.

Stutzman, Alexander, "Europe's Fake ID", *International Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2001) pp. 94-96.

Treynor, Ian "In 1683 Turkey was the invader. In 2004 much of Europe still sees it that way", *The Guardian* (September 22, 2004) .

Twigg, Stephen, Preface for *Turks in Europe: Why are we afraid?*, by Sarah Schaefer, Greg Austin, Kate Parker, Pamphlet of Foreign Policy Center, London, (September 2005).

Verheugen, Günter, *European Affairs*, Issue 397 (June 2000).

Wallace, Helen, "Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the Challenge of Analysis", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (August 2002), pp. 658-665.

Walt, Stephen, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998), pp. 29-46.

Waltz, Kenneth N., "Evaluating Theories", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-916.

Waltz, Kenneth N., *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

Waltz, Kenneth N., "Reductionist and Systemic Theories" in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 47-69.

Wendt, Alexander, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.

Wendt, Alexander, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-396.

Wendt, Alexander, "Why a World State is Inevitable", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 491-542.

Wood, Steve & Quaisser, Wolfgang, "Turkey's Road to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context and Implications for Europe", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10 (2005), pp. 147-173.

Woodward, Geoffrey, "The Ottomans in Europe", *History Review*, Issue 39 (March 2001), pp. 41-45.

Zielonka, Jan, "Challenges of EU Enlargement", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 22-35.