PORTRAYAL OF EUROPE IN TURKISH FORMAL EDUCATION:

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF HISTORY OF TURKISH REVOLUTION AND ATATURKISM TEXTBOOKS

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ABSTRACT

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The aim of this study is to analyze the identity dimension of Turkey-EU relations by focusing on the perceptions of Europe in Turkey. Previous studies on the issue tend to deal with the problem by classifications as modernists vs. Islamists, protectionists vs. reformists, and globalists vs. nationalists, which are based on the ideological positioning of citizens. In order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding about perceptions of Europe among Turkish citizens, this study examines how Europe is reflected in Turkish formal education. In doing so, three "History of the Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism" textbooks for high school students are analyzed by means of evaluative assertion analysis.

Keywords: Turkey-EU relations, identity, education, History of Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism, content analysis

ÖZET

AVRUPA'NIN TÜRK RESMİ EĞİTİMİNDE TASVİRİ:

T.C. İNKILAP TARİHİ VE ATATÜRKÇÜLÜK DERS KİTAPLARININ İÇERİK ANALİZİ

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Bu çalışma Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin kimlik boyutunu Türkiye'deki Avrupa algısına odaklanarak analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Konuyla ilgili daha önceki çalışmalar meseleye bireylerin ideolojik konumları üzerine kurulu olan modernist-İslamcı, korumacı-reformist ve globalist-milliyetçi ikili karşıtlıklarıyla yaklaşmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki Avrupa algısı hakkında daha kapsayıcı bir anlayış edinmek için Avrupa'nın resmi eğitimde nasıl yansıtıldığını incelemektedir. Bu amaçla liselerde öğretilmekte olan "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük" ders kitapları içerik analizi yoluyla içelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, kimlik, eğitim, T.C. İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük, içerik analizi

To my parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

THE AIM AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

Turkey-EU relations have various dimensions, including legal, economic, political, and identity. This study aims to analyze the identity dimension by focusing on the perceptions of Europe in Turkey. Previous studies on the issue indicate that perceptions on Europe vary according to the ideological positioning of individuals, which can be based on classifications as "modernists vs. Islamists", "protectionists vs. reformists", and "globalists vs. nationalists." This study aims to contribute to the literature by analyzing the portrayal of Europe in Turkish formal education. This would allow a more inclusive understanding of the Turkish citizens' perception of Europe, because, as explained in the first and second chapters, the compulsory nature of formal education means that it potentially has a greater influence than the ideological positioning of the individual. The sample for analysis is chosen from among "History of the Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism" textbooks for high

school students. These are examined through evaluative assertion analysis, which is a branch of content analysis.

The study consists of four chapters. The first chapter provides the literature review on identity question in Turkey-EU relations, including a brief summary of history of Turkey-EU relations as an introduction and then focusing on how Europe is perceived in Turkey. This chapter also identifies the motivation behind this study. The second chapter discusses the role of education in identity formation. Moreover, it analyzes the Basic Law of National Education in order to reveal the formal aims of education in Turkey regarding identity development. The third chapter explains the methodology of the study, specifying the research question, providing brief information about the research method, putting forth the criteria of case selection, and introducing the model employed and necessary amendments on it. The concluding fourth chapter presents and interprets the findings of the study.

CHAPTER 1

IDENTITY QUESTION IN TURKEY-EU RELATIONS

This chapter presents similarities and differences among Turkish and European identities stated in Turkey-EU relations literature. The first section presents a brief summary of history of Turkey-EU relations to shed light on identity question and also constitute a background for the question whether the developments in Turkey-EU relations change the perceptions on Europe in Turkish formal education. The second section focuses on opinions of supporters and opponents of Turkey's EU membership in Turkey by grouping them according to their standpoint. In addition, the second section introduces some certain problems of the dichotomies and suggests analysis of education as a more comprehensive way to understand perceptions of Turkish citizens on Europe, which constitutes the basis of the study.

The Course of Turkey-EU Relations

No other candidate than Turkey has been waiting to become a full member of the European Union (EU) for more than a half century. Turkey-EU relations have

officially started in 1959 when Turkey applied for associate membership to European Economic Community (EEC). Although the 1960 *coup d'état* caused a delay, Turkey signed an association agreement (Ankara Agreement) in 1963 with the EEC. Association agreement established a relationship including mutual rights and obligations, common action, and special procedures; and it meant more than trade and cooperation but less than full membership (Kahraman, 2000). This was the first step taken by both Turkish and European sides for accession. Then, in 1970, Additional Protocol was signed to conclude the customs union between Turkey and European Community (EC). The deadline for achieving the Customs union was set as 31 December 1995. The Protocol was also foreseeing full membership when Turkey would be ready for accession without stating an exact date.

Despite these early developments, Turkey-EU relations did not follow an even direction. As an economically unstable country, Turkey experienced difficulties on maintaining requirements for full membership. It was not a big deal for the 1960s when there was an economic boom throughout Europe but as the economic recession arose in the 1970s economic instability became an important obstacle for Turkey.

Turkey was not only economically but also politically an instable country. After the 1980 *coup d'état* Turkey-EC relations were frozen. There were no significant developments until Turkish government applied for full membership in 1987,

assuming that it fulfilled economic requirements of membership by adopting liberal economic policies. However, EC's response came two years later in 1989 stating that EC was dealing with digesting its previous enlargements to Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and also was trying to finalize the common market; therefore, accepting new applications could not be considered (Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, 2010).

Dealing with Kurdish separatist movement on the one hand and rise of political Islam on the other during late the 1980s and early the 1990s, Turkey did not pay much attention to its relations with the EU. Nevertheless, as the final date for completion of the Customs Union got closer, Turkey attempted to fulfill its requirements and the Customs Union eventually came into effect in January 1996. Since then Turkey-EU relations presented fluctuations with severe ups and downs.

Establishment of the Customs Union tantalized Turkey for further developments on the road to full membership, but the 1997 Luxembourg Summit reminded Turkey that it still had a lot to do. Although integration of newly independent Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) was the main issue of the Summit, Turkish accession was ignored. This position did not change for the following two years. In Helsinki Summit held in December 1999, EU reversed its policy towards Turkey and approved its candidate status (Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, 2010).

As a formal candidate, Turkish government accelerated the process of necessary legal and political reforms to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria which is required for starting the accession negotiations. Almost one third of the articles of the Constitution were amended through several harmonization packages mainly on civil-military relations, individual and group rights and freedom, and institutional structure. Accession negotiations for Turkey started in October 2005 and since then only one chapter of accession negotiations is opened and closed. There are 13 chapters opened to negotiations but three of them and five other chapters were suspended in 2006 due to the requirement of the Additional Protocol to remove all barriers to trade between member states (Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2009). The suspension will not be held until Turkey opens its ports and airports to Cyprus.

Regarding the historical evolution of Turkey-EU relations, it would not be wrong to say that there is a love and hate relationship between Turkey and the EU. The love side of the relationship consists of mainly security concerns for the EU and modernization project for Turkey. During its membership to United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Turkey has been an important ally to the EU. "The intergovernmental nature of NATO membership, the existence of the common external enemy and Turkey's contribution to the realization of Europe's strategic security interests prevented the Europeans from perceiving Turkey as an 'other' throughout the Cold War years" (Oğuzlu, 2003). Collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War slightly changed the nature of the relationship but not totally affected it. Being liberated from the communist threat,

the EU might not have to consider Turkey as a security ally but unanimous voting in the NATO decisions gives Turkey a significant power that the EU has to consider. Turkey has the opportunity to sit on a proposal reflecting EU security interests during the negotiations in NATO. A good example is that Turkey has boycotted joint EU-NATO military planning and tried to exploit its position in order to strengthen its power within NATO and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Missiroli, 2002). Therefore, the EU seems to preserve its marriage with Turkey may be not for the sake of love but for its own security interests.

Besides, Europe is the prince charming for Turkey. Throughout its modernization process Turkey has almost always seen Europe as the role model, and tried to reach it and even leave it behind. Therefore, EU membership has been a goal of state policy for Turkey and has been pursued by governments of mainstream political parties regardless of their ideological positions (Öniş, 2007). As Cizre (2001, p. 61) states "No Turkish leader can sustain a consistent and durable anti-Western strategy for any length of time without the risk of losing support and prestige in the country." Turkish public opinion sees integration with the EU as a panacea. Almost all participants of political spectrum in Turkey including liberals, secularists, Islamists, nationalists, and Kurdish separatists anticipate some benefits from EU membership (Cizre, 2001).

The hate side of the relationship is more complex than love side. According to the Turkish side, there is a double standard that the EU has accepted post-communist

CEEC for membership but not Turkey who is an associate member since 1963. On the European side, there are reservations not only about Turkey's eligibility for full membership but also its Europeanness. As Sakallioğlu (1998, p. 5) states "the European perception that Turkey's cultural identity is non-European, or simply of a lesser degree, lies at the heart of the problem." However, when such arguments are pronounced either by the EU officials or by national politicians, initial reactions from Turkey tend to be aggressive. That is possibly because of the perception that cultural identity is mainly consisted of religious identity. The Turkish elite seem to be certain that the EU is insisting on remaining as a Christian club and that is why Turkey is kept out (Livanios, 2006). Dağı (2005) claims that EC's response in 1989 to Turkey's application affected self-perception of the Turks as being excluded from the West due to its religious difference and this is valid even for pro-western and secular groups.

This argument is not totally unfair since there are claims on Turkey's non-Europeanness referring to religious differences on the one hand, there are certain reservations of many Europeans about Turkey's democratic experiences leaving no ground for Turkish petulance on the other hand. For instance, Benelux and Nordic countries opposed Turkish membership during the Luxembourg Summit because of their concerns about problems in Turkish democratization (Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, 2010). The pathetic thing here is that Turkish public opinion tends to react against those criticisms quite similar to the objections about its religious

roots. Turks feel that the problem is a result of Europe's reluctance to see them as a part of its own (Kushner, 1997).

It can easily be seen that the hate side of the relationship contains ideational factors mainly. When Turkish accession is on the table and the question is identity, different dimensions of the problem are emphasized by different actors. Supporters of Turkey's accession to the EU underline the similarities while opponents stress the differences between Turkish and European identities. The next section presents the literature on how Europe is perceived in Turkey.

Europe in the Eyes of Turks

A brief overview of the studies that are aiming to explain the dynamics in Turkey regarding the identity question provides us three groups of dichotomies: modernists vs. Islamists (Dağı, 2005; Helvacioglu, 1996; Kösebalaban, 2007; Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu, 2009), protectionists vs. reformists (Cizre, 2001; Cizre 2004; Polat 2006; Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2003) and globalists vs. nationalists (Aktürk, 2007; Çayır, 2009; Kushner, 1997; Öniş, 2007; Ryoo, 2008). This section analyses these dichotomies in detail and presents a framework for a unanimous view of European identity perceived by Turkish people.

Modernists vs. Islamists

The modernists-Islamists dichotomy is probably the most pronounced among those three. Indeed, it is a reflection of the long time conflict between modernists and Islamists since the beginning of modernization period the later periods of the

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Ottoman Empire. While modernization has meant westernization since 18th century, "Islamic political identity was traditionally built in opposition to the West, western values and, equally important, to the history of westernization in Turkey" (Dağı, 2005, p. 23). Secularist tendencies in late Ottoman times and a formal declaration of secularism as a state principle enlarged the gap between modernists and Islamists, which has polarized the political debate. As a result of this polarization, the westernization project in general and cultural reforms in particular are analyzed in the light of this opposition between rational, secular, and modern European identity on the one hand, and a traditional obscurantist, mystical or reactionary religious standpoint, on the other (Helvacioglu, 1996). According to secular position, Islamists are threatening Turkey's modern and western identity (Helvacioglu, 1996) and integration with Europe will help to cope with fundamentalist Islam (Sakallioğlu, 1998). Islamists, in contrast, are submerged in the myth of *asr-i saadet* and continue to pursue a return to that golden age of Islam (Helvacioglu, 1996).

This polarization evolved throughout history, but more recently the division has centered on the indivisible integrity of state and the preservation of Kemalist reforms. Secularists present themselves as protectors of both of these and focus on the threat of Islamic law and attempts to change the political regime (Helvacioglu, 1996). As a result, political Islam is viewed as the antithesis of the state (Helvacioglu, 1996) and Islamists feel excluded and marginalized (Dağı, 2005).

It is at just this point where the polarization between secularists and Islamists become blurred. Until the mid-1990s it was easy to determine the positions of secularists and Islamists vis-à-vis the European identity. Secularists were pro-western, pro-EU, and therefore more European; while Islamists were against both adopting western values and Turkey's accession to European Union. However, since mid-1990s the Islamists realized that they could overcome their exclusion by secularists and legitimize their position by becoming bound to certain western values such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law (Dağı, 2005). Since then, a majority of Islamists began to redefine themselves as European in the sense that they follow Hegelian logic (Helvacioglu, 1996). The progress experienced in the process of EU membership under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, known as a post-Islamist political entity, has made the polarization more and more complex.

This blurred division of secularist-Islamist polarization since mid-1990s is not the only problem of the dichotomy. Sakallioğlu (1998) denies the dichotomy by claiming that the role of Islam in consisting the Turkish identity is not just a pattern of resisting and reacting to westernization, but a pattern of dialectical interplay with the state. Therefore, although secularization had been an important aspect of Turkish national identity formation, Islam itself had in fact been an important constituent of a European-like Turkish identity (Sakallioğlu, 1998).

Protectionists vs. Reformists

Since the establishment of Turkish Republic, preservation of Kemalist principles has been an important subject matter of politics in Turkey. Kemalist principles have been seen threatened by different actors for different purposes, for example secularism was seen to be under the threat of Islamist obscurantism, and the indivisible integrity of the state has been perceived to be threatened by communism and Kurdish separatism, and so on. All four military *coups d'état[1]* were claimed to be a result of disengagement from Kemalist principles and aimed to preserve secular and unitary character of the state. Within such a political framework, it is possible to see any kind of intervention from outsiders as a deception aimed at undermining or even overthrowing Kemalist principles.

Although the Kemalist reforms constituted a radical part of continuing westernization process, daily practices based on this statist and nationalist doctrine do not coincide with western values such as liberal democracy and human rights (Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2003). The distinction between Kemalist principles and western values became more and more salient when the EU began to emphasize the importance of democratic consolidation and respect for human

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[1] i. May 27, 1960: The Democratic Party government was abolished and a military government was established, instead.
ii. March 12, 1971: The President Cevdet Sunay was given a memorandum and the Justice Party government was forced to resign, then a technocratic government was established.
iii. September 12, 1980: The Nationalist Front government, established by Justice Party and supported by Nationalist Movement Party and National Salvation Party, was abolished, the Parliament was demolished and a military government was established after the *coup d'etat.*
iv. February 28, 1997: The National Security Council warned the government, composed of the Welfare Party and the True Path Party, that the secular character of Turkish Republic was under threat and forced it to take action in conjunction with the decisions of the Council. The government was not abolished but had to resign four months later. The process is known as "post-modern *coup d'etat.*"

rights as a precondition for membership. Kemalist elites tend to see EU's emphasis on such issues, including minority rights, as a threat to unity of the state and fear the disintegration of state will result from granting autonomy rights to minorities like Kurds, or rise of Islamist political parties (Schimmelfennig *et al.*, 2003). Correspondingly, simultaneous engagement of Islamists and Kurdish nationalists to the EU enhanced Kemalist fears.

Unlike the Kemalist protectionists, reformists, mainly the pro-European liberals, assert that the EU should be seen as a formal leverage to the necessary reforms in the country (Polat, 2006). The difficulty for Kemalists here is that they consider democratic compromises required for EU membership a high price to pay (Cizre, 2001) on the one hand, and on the other they find themselves increasingly presenting an anti-western attitude (Öniş, 2007), despite the fact that they embraced the westernization process since the establishment of Turkish Republic.

Globalists vs. Nationalists

Identity is a multi-dimensional and flexible concept; thus, an individual might carry on a European identity together with national identity. However, individuals with strong attachment to national identities perceive integration as a threat to their national identity (Kentmen, 2008). The dichotomy in Turkey between the European identity and Turkish identity is a result of that attachment to national identity.

Individuals who can adopt a European identity are often known as globalists. They hold a positive view of globalization and see European integration and Turkish membership to the EU as positive processes (Öniş, 2007). For them, globalization in general and integration with the EU in particular not only bring about economic benefits but also provide an attachment to liberal democracy, human rights, and rule of law. The globalist camp in Turkey is a conglomerate consisting of liberals, moderate Islamists, and Kurdish reformers (Öniş, 2007).

On the contrary, nationalists regard globalization as a threat to national sovereignty and preservation of existing borders (Öniş, 2007). National sovereignty and preserving the borders are important issues for nationalists everwhere but nationalists from countries with an imperial background are more likely to be sensitive to such issues. With its imperial legacy, one of the main aspects of Turkish nationalism is the perception that a nation cannot be regarded as a great one without achieving a position of independence throughout history (Aktürk, 2007). That is why, Turkish nationalists are hyper-sensitive over outside interventions into domestic and international policies of the Turkish state. Unsurprisingly, whenever the EU ascribes the Cyprus issue, the Kurdish question, or the rights of Christian minorities, Eurosceptic reactions begin to emerge in Turkey (Öniş, 2007). As in the case of protectionist reactions, a conflicting feature of the nationalist Euroscepticism is the attitude of Kemalist elite. The Republican Peoples Party (RPP), reflecting the concerns of Kemalist elites, has been increasingly using the

nationalist Eurosceptic discourse since 2002 (Öniş, 2007), although it has been the holder of pro-Western flag throughout the history of Turkish Republic.

Another important concern for nationalist bloc in Turkey about Europe is that European states were the sworn enemies of Turks, and it was against them that the War of Independence was fought. The dilemma in the process of European integration is not easy to solve for Turkish nationalists, for whom trying to become integrated with the old enemies is unacceptable and even unthinkable.

To sum up, studies on the perceptions of Turks on Europe refer to dichotomies based on ideological positions of individuals. The modernist-Islamist dichotomy is a continuation of a historical debate that has emerged from centuries of modernization attempts. The protectionists-reformist dichotomy is a result of perceptions of the EU as a threat to Kemalist principles and the integrity of the state on the one hand, and an impetus to the democratization project of Turkey on the other. Finally, globalist-nationalist dichotomy is based on the debate as to whether Europeanization is a positive process in terms of economy and democracy, or a threat to national sovereignty.

No doubt that all three dichotomies listed above are based on a certain amount of justifications. However, this does not prevent them to have some problems. The problem with modernist-Islamist dichotomy is the changing character of Islamists' attitude towards the EU. A majority of the previously anti-western Islamists are

now pro-EU for instrumental aims, such as self-legitimization, and even coming to see themselves as Europeans, following the Hegelian logic. In this respect, the JDP, known for its attachment to Islamic values, has achieved the implementation of a significant number of legal and political reforms necessary for EU membership.

The problem with the second and third dichotomies is that they often overlap. It is often hard to determine the differences between protectionists and nationalists or reformists and globalists. Moreover, these two dichotomies resemble more to a Europhiles vs. Eurosceptics division than a division of identities.

A final problem to be mentioned here is that all three dichotomies present ideological positions of different groups in Turkey. Although ideologies are important constituents of individual or group identities, there are several other determining factors of identities, of which education is one.

Formal education provides a basis for imposing certain cultural and political understanding. Since the establishment of Turkish Republic "education has been seen as the most important means of creating a new nation based on a single national culture, a single ethnic identity and a single religion and language" (Çayır, 2009). Thus, it is difficult to claim that formal education in Turkey is politically neutral. Students are likely to be subjected to certain political arguments, especially in education at primary and high school level, where curricula is determined by the Ministry of National Education.

In such a context, as official discourse on Turkish identity is unavoidable for the ordinary Turkish citizen (Aktürk, 2007), it seems important to examine the content of formal education. This study aims to reveal how Europe is reflected in formal education, and thus, how Turkish citizens come to perceive European identity. In order to do so, the textbooks on the History of Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism are analyzed through a content analysis. There have previously been studies on the effects of history courses, in general, and textbooks on the History of Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism, in particular, on identity formation in Turkey. Tanör *et. al.* (1997) state that History of Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism courses were first designed to cement the regime, and are now seen as a political shield, a source of arguments for contemporary political debates, and an area of political propaganda rather than a matter of history. It is also mentioned in the study that the discourse of the textbooks creates a sense of unity that binds citizens into a group, and creates 'othering'. Copeaux (1998) examined the textbooks for signs of the role of Islam in Turkish identity on the one hand, and the relationship between geography and history on the other. The study indicated that the textbooks are designed in a way that presents three different antecedents; as Asian Turkish Ethnic, Eastern Mediterranean and Near East, and Islamic antecedents and concluded that the proportion of each of those antecedents in the textbooks changes according to the political and cultural changes in Turkey. Moreover, the the study also analyzed visual elements used in the textbooks in order to see the effects of Kemalist ideology in their design. Arıkan (1998) analyzed the narration of

European history in the textbooks and shows that the information in the textbooks is conventional. Çayır (2009) analyzed various textbooks, including one History of Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism textbook, in order to observe whether the curricula reform in 2005 related to the start of accession negotiations had any effect on the nationalist discourse of the textbooks. Çayır (2009, p. 53) revealed that the textbooks are "characterized by an exclusive and narrow definition of nationalism and citizenship, backed by the myth of origin, ethnocentrism and an essentialism." All above-stated studies constitute an important part of the academic literature on the analysis of history courses in Turkey; however, there is a lack of information about how Europe and European identity is presented. The aim of this study is to address this important omission in the literature.

The next chapter analyzes how education affects identity formation. It also focuses on the formal aims of education in Turkey through a detailed analysis of the Basic Law of National Education of Turkey.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN IDENTITY FORMATION

It is stated in the previous chapter that formal education might be a way of imposing certain cultural and political understanding and it was seen as one of the most important instruments of creation of a new nation since the establishment of Turkish Republic. Therefore, examination of the content of formal education is important since it would provide an understanding of ordinary Turkish citizens' perceptions of certain phenomena.

Anabritannica (2004) defines education as instruction and guiding activities followed in schools or resembling institutions aiming to transfer values, and knowledge and skill deposits of a society to following generations. Building on this definition, the aims of education can be stated to be the transfer of a cultural aggregation to new generations and the direction of youngsters to their future roles by shaping their attitudes in the direction of adults' life styles.

Stating the aims of education through the words *directing* or *shaping* might at first sight seem irritating and exaggerated. Is education a means of society engineering or it is just instruction of various academic disciplines? Paradoxically, the answer is, probably, yes for both and neither of the questions, simultaneously. Hence, the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (2009, p. 205) indicates education as "a philosophical as well as a sociological concept, denoting ideologies, curricula, and pedagogical techniques of the inculcation and management of knowledge and the social reproduction of personalities and cultures." According to this definition, education can be seen as a way of forming identities, as well as providing knowledge of natural and social phenomena. A further inference of the statement might be that education provides both individual and group identities. As a final illustration in a similar vein, The Cambridge Encyclopedia (1997, p. 363) describes education as being "seen as something which should develop the whole person, not just as a narrow academic training."

Obviously, not only the dictionaries and encyclopedias attempt to define the meaning and aims of education, since it is a question posed throughout the history of mankind. Various statements ranging from personal writings to official documents have dealt with the issue. It has been interest of philosophers, academicians, politicians, entrepreneurs and so on. The role ascribed to education varies according to the viewpoint of each and every actor. It is seen as a way of conserving particular knowledge, increasing human capital, initiating critical

thinking, developing awareness, reproducing certain cultural and religious practices and beliefs, enhancing patriotism, nation-building, and several other objectives.

In fact, many of the studies dealing with the relationship between education and identity forcus on social and cultural reproduction (Carney and Madsen, 2008). Formal education held in schools, which is controlled by the state, is not a requirement to achieve social and cultural reproduction. However, it is seen as a necessary part of state power to control education and to teach what is thought to be worth learning (Harris, 1999; Hare, 1999); therefore, education contributes to "building and sustaining the nation, and a certain cultural, social, political, and economic order." (Carney and Madsen, 2008, p. 187) Moreover, it is quite probable that formal education paves the way for such objectives, since it maintains a tradition of specialization that increases effectiveness.

This chapter aims to focus on the role of education in identity formation. The first section examines the theoretical foundations of the role of education in forming identities. In this section, education is described as a tool of providing a self understanding for students both as mere individuals, as well as members of the society to which they belong. The second section, on the other hand, focuses on the specific role ascribed to formal education in Turkey. In order to do so, the Basic Law of National Education of Turkey will be examined in a detailed manner.

Education as a Means of Forming Identities

The relationship between education and identity formation is studied in two categories as individual identity and group identity. Since the subject matter of education is individuals, what necessitates differing individual identity from group identity? If it is still individuals who develop identity via education, then why is their identity attributed to a group? If not, is it the groups' identities attributed to individuals? Before digging into the relationship between education and identity, it is essential to try to answer the above-mentioned questions.

Individuals define themselves according to self-perceptions (Stets and Burke, 2000). These perceptions may be related to their own personality or a group, such as a neighborhood, an association, a union, a religion, a race, a nation and so on. Such affiliations constitute an important part of individuals' identities. The group identity, which individuals adhere to, underlines some differences from other groups. Actually, what signifies a group identity is the emphasis on its differences. A race, a nation, a culture, a religion, whatever sort of group identity it is, is defined in relation to the *others*, as who they are and *who they are not.*

The next section of the chapter will analyze the role of education in identity formation with this aim in mind. Firstly, the role of education in formation of individual identities will be examined. Secondly, the role of education on the formation of group identities will be discussed.

Individual Identities

Education plays an important role in forming individual identities, mainly by creating awareness. Individuals become aware of their selves through education, by trying to answer the questions of who they are, and what distinguishes them from others. Carney and Madsen (2008, p. 183) state that "education is a space for negotiating identity and constructing meanings that can reflect and create individuals' visions about their lives." Moreover, education helps to develop independent thought and capabilities so that each and every individual going through an educational process is not only made aware of, but also can transform personal identity. In other words, students improve their existing capacities, raise new ones, and learn how to position themselves relative to others (Soudien, 2008).

It can be claimed that education has many functions in forming individual identities. The first, probably the foremost, function that can be gained through education is related to becoming *homo economicus*, rational and self-interested human beings. Education helps individuals to find out how to use their reason. It enables them to seek for and discover the truth, and overcome delusions, to choose the most accurate mode of thought among those provided, and enlightens reason as a mediator (Standish, 1999). Thus, individuals can understand the conditions they find themselves in and consider what is best for them. Especially liberal education, inspired by analytical philosophy, follows such an objective, though learning to use reason is not necessarily selfish. Individuals can develop intellectual virtues, such as critical thinking, that allows questioning of certain opinions, beliefs, and

decisions via education (Steutel and Spiecker, 1999). Hence they can analyze a situation, identify the problems, and look for justifications or amendments. Nevertheless, there are counter arguments to considering analytical or critical thinking as an objective of education. Conservative groups, particularly, claim that education is not about teaching students how to think but "to read and write and spell correctly" (Harris, 1999, 6). Moreover, states themselves may be opposed to critical and independent thinking in some cases. Janmaat and Piattoeva (2007) states that questioning inherited cultural norms and myths may threaten the fate of the nation. In order to prevent such an undesirable consequence, governments may prepare educational systems in a way that do not allow, or at least try to exclude criticism of national values. Therefore, it is not surprising that emphasis on being *good citizens* or *good members of society* is quite common in educational policy rhetoric (Telhaug, Medias and Aasen, 2004).

A second and somewhat related function of education is to make individuals a part of human capital. Human beings are increasingly regarding their role in industrial relations as a component of their identities. Individuals tend more and more to define and describe themselves according to their knowledge, skills, and abilities, which can be the considered components of human capital (Gershanovich, 2004) that make them more productive and enable them to earn more income in exchange of their labour. As a matter of fact, education is seen as an investment in human capital (Kubow, 2008) and increasingly organized parallel to the demands of industry (Harris, 1999).

Third function of education is to provide a certain understanding. Individuals become familiar with different modes of thought, such as theories, ideologies, believes, and religions via education. By using their reason, which was stated to be another function of education, they can choose the most appropriate and accurate among the given sets of ideas; thus, define themselves accordingly. However, assuming that individuals are well and fully informed is an idealization. Organizers of educational systems may favor some sets of ideas and ignore or even suppress the others. A state may be willing to facilitate organizing –even controlling- citizens; thus, may formulate the curricula or education program in a way that gather individuals around a specific understanding (Swain, 2005). This includes providing not only an aggregate view of the society, nation, or the world but also a self-image of citizens themselves. Self-images to be created may be either egalitarian or differential. For instance, ethnic, social, or cultural differences might be reflected in schooling practices in discriminatory ways that encourage citizens to regard themselves either in a certain social hierarchical status (Soudien, 2008) or in egalitarian ways that creates self-respect, a sense of belonging, and mutual understanding among citizens from different classes (Telhaug, Medias and Aasen, 2004).

Providing an environment for the development of a democratic or obedient character is the fourth function of education. Particularly in post-revolutionary periods or after separation from authoritarian regimes, governments tend to use

education as a means of enhancing democratic understanding among citizens. Citizens are encouraged to participate in political activities. This is not limited to voting in the election. Since democratic identities are dependent on political participation (Kubow, 2008), students are educated to become accustomed to participating in political debates, to form and express individual ideas, respect others' thoughts, develop competences for administration and opposition and so on. Moreover, as a universal, indivisible and inalienable part of democracy, awareness of human rights can be developed through education (Davies, 2001). In contrast to the democratic character developing function of education, it can also be used to raise obedient citizens by authoritarian regimes. Developing opposition, questioning the authority, and expressing independent individual ideas are undesired actions in authoritarian states, as stated above, in contrast to democratic ones. Therefore, education might be used as an instrument for producing indisputable and unquestionable doctrines, cults, and taboos. The Soviet regime's use of education as an instrument of sustaining "Soviet patriotism" among citizens (Janmaat and Piattoeva, 2007) or the obtaining of subordination, obedience, perpetuation of power, and maintenance of the status quo through education during Franco's dictatorship in Spain are good examples for delineating the role of education for raising obedient citizens in authoritarian countries. In contrast, European Union regards education as a way of fostering democracy among citizens as can be seen in its Education for Democratic Citizenship Project (Forrester, 2003) or Lisbon Process (Council, 2001).

Group Identities

Development of group identities through formal education is, actually, a process of politicization. Throughout this process, governments aim to mobilize the society towards a desired set of cultural, religious, national or other such values; since such values generally compose chosen identities rather than given ones (Okuma-Nyström, 2008). As one of those given identities, cultural identity is open to construction and reconstruction through formal education. Governments may be willing to preserve certain cultural practices in order to transfer them to succeeding generations, while letting others be forgotten. As Strike (1999) states that such an education may aim to sustain community and solidarity, non-alienating and appropriate environment, and freedom from cultural oppression and domination. The problem with such a culture-based education is that it might be at the expense of minority cultures. "In such cases, school education has sometimes been utilized as means of colonization, and has caused devastation of cultures and loss of cultural identities" (Okuma-Nyström, 2008, p. 30). The case for religious aims of education is not significantly different than culture-based education. Similar to promoting some cultural practices and ignoring or oppressing others, academic curricula or educational systems may be arranged according to requirements of a particular sect or religion (Bayefsky and Waldman, 2007; Ouellet, 2000).

Probably the most common and frequently studied aim of education is nation-building. In fact, it is not surprising for a world composed of nation-states. The need

for nation-building is felt most strongly in new states of former minority nations, the new nations' identities are promoted and independence is legitimized by disgracing former rulers (Janmaat, 2008). However, all states seek to achieve nation-building, regardless of whether it is a democratic or authoritarian, newly established or with a long history, a former colony or having an imperial heritage, with changing practices according to each case. However, a homogenous, single nation is the idealized form. Thus, educational programs and curricula are designed in a way that emphasize a common culture and history among citizens, even from different races, and disregard differences among different groups. Thereby, the citizens are bonded to the nation and the bond is strengthened through education (Janmaat and Piattoeva, 2007).

Of course, all such aims and practices are results of the common view, with some objections, that nations are imagined communities (Enslin, 1999). In other words, national identities are constructed rather than given. A nation-building process through education, therefore, should focus on those elements of national identity which can be gained through learning. Probably the most important and most generally observed one is the language education, but also include common values, common historical memories, myths, mass culture, and traditions as important elements of national identity (Smith, 1991). Language is one of the primary means that holds a nation together. A common language "facilitates communication between groups and gives the appearance of uniformity to the outside world" (Swain, 2005). Language is not the only tool that helps nation-building through

education. Literature, geography and history related courses are among other instruments. The curricula, textbooks and exams of such courses can easily be determined to serve the nation-building process. In Zajda's (2008, p. 5) words, "school history texts, as instruments of ideological transformation and nation-building, are currently closely monitored by the state, in counties like Japan, China, the Russian Federation, and Greece, to name a few." In fact, using history courses as a means of nation-building can distort historical reality. Nation-building may require the rewriting, and even the falsification of history (Janmaat and Piattoeva, 2007).

Identity Formation and Formal Education in Turkey

Previous section explored the general objectives and functions of education. This section will look for their reflections in Turkish formal education. In order to gain deeper insight about the role ascribed to formal education in Turkey *Milli Eğitim Temel Kanunu* (Basic Law of National Education of Turkey), Law No. 1739, will be examined through an in-depth analysis. First initiated and published in *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette) in 1983, the Law was subjected to nine modifications over 26 years. The final version, which is used in this study, was published in 2009.

The reason for choosing the Law No. 1739 is because of its content stated in Article 1. The article states that Law No. 1739 "covers main aims and principles in formulating Turkish national education, general structure of education system, teaching profession, school buildings and facilities, education equipments, and major provisions about duties and responsibilities of the state related to

education." Those aims and principles stated in the Law are analyzed by referring identity developing functions of education stated in the first section.

Article 2 of the Basic Law of National Education lists the main aims of Turkish National Education. The 2nd paragraph of the article is mainly allocated for objectives those would help students to realize and develop their individual identities. The paragraph states that the aim of education is that every member of Turkish Nation is to be raised as a constructive, creative, and productive individual who possesses independent and scientific power of thinking and a broad worldview, respects human rights and appreciates individuality and enterprise.

It can be claimed that emphasis on individuals being constructive, creative, and productive could be related to human capital function, as stated above. Every Turkish citizen is expected to enhance their own skills and capabilities, to increase overall human capital and contribute societies' wellbeing, which is an objective stated in 3rd paragraph of Article 2. Independent and scientific thinking is obviously a goal of initiating students to learn to use their power of reason. Moreover, the word *scientific* may be seen a symbol of positivism; hence, an aim to familiarize students with a specific understanding. A concern more related to this is the appreciation of individuality and enterprise. Since such concepts are keywords of liberal theories, it would not be mistaken to claim that all students are expected to be brought up as individuals who define themselves as liberal.

Human capital related aims continue on Article 14 by stating that enhancement of national education is planned and realized in accordance with economic, social, and cultural development objectives; by considering education, labor, and employment relationship in a way that focuses on vocational and technical education that will provide necessary technological development in industrialization and agriculture.

Article 11 mentions one of the main principles of Turkish National Education as developing a "democratic consciousness as a requirement for citizens to realize and sustain a strong, consistent, independent, and democratic society." This statement reveals the intention to create democratic understanding among citizens through education. Nevertheless, the education system is not totally arranged in a way that allows the enhancement of democratic personal identities. The Article goes on by saying that "however, ideological indoctrinations against Kemalist nationalism stated in the constitution and participation to such daily political events and arguments cannot be allowed in educational institutions." This shows how a state can be unwilling to enhance critical thinking among its citizens under certain circumstances. These two conflicting statements also reflect the tension between *citizenship education*, which emphasizes knowledge and critical evaluation of institutional arrangements and encourages involvement in common life, and *education for citizenship* that focuses on national loyalty and serving for society (Forrester, 2003).

The role of education for creating an egalitarian self-image among citizens is stated in Article 4. This Article states that educational institutions are open to everyone regardless of language, race, sex, and religion; and no person, family, group or class can be granted privileges in education. By doing so, it aims to avoid, at least formally, any kind of difference that would result in a hierarchy among students.

Finally, just as stated above, the emphasis on good citizens is found in Article 23, which defines the aim of primary education as to give every Turkish child the necessary knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behavior to be a good citizen and to raise them according to national ethics.

An examination of the Basic Law of National Education of Turkey reveals that it focuses more on the formation of group identities than individual identities. Not only are the expressions chosen stronger in regard to group identities, but these are given clear priority. The very first paragraph, Paragraph 1, of Article 2 starts with the statement that Turkish National Education aims to raise every member of the Turkish Nation as citizens bonded to Atatürk revolutions and Kemalist nationalism, as expressed in the constitution. The emphasis on raising every member of Turkish Nation as loyal to Kemalist nationalism represents, needless to say, a significant effort at nation-building through education. The paragraph continues by stating the aim of raising members of Turkish Nation to be citizens dedicated to "internalizing, preserving, and developing national, ethical, humane, moral, and cultural values of Turkish Nation." Moreover, the citizens are expected

to be loyal to, and strive to glorify, his/her family, country, and nation. Stressing both national and cultural values, and family, country, and the nation clearly reveals how the Turkish educational system is intended to form a certain type of group identity.

Article 10 of the Law expresses that all educational activities, and preparation and application of curricula are based on principles of Atatürk's revolutions, and Kemalist nationalism. The emphasis on national culture is continued in Article 10. The second paragraph of the Article begins with the statement that national ethics and national culture are to be preserved, enhanced and taught in their sui generis form within universal culture.

It was stated above that language is an important part of nation-building process in education, and Law No. 1739 emphasizes the importance of Turkish language in education. In the second paragraph of Article 10, Turkish language is indicated as a principal element of national unity and collectivity; and, thus, required to be taught in its unadulterated form. Paragraph 1 of Article 20 also concerns the role of language, where, the aim of pre-primary education is specified to be ensuring that children speak Turkish language accurately and coherently.

On the question of religious reproduction through education, the Basic Law of National Education propounds a conflicting argument. In Article 12, secularism is mentioned to be a principal of Turkish national education. However, the Article

goes on to confirm the place of religious culture and ethics education among compulsory courses in primary schools, high schools and equivalents. The conflict is not only related to the compulsory nature of religious culture and ethics education courses but also related to their contents. The courses are designed in accordance with the beliefs of the *Hanafi* sect of *Sunni* Islam, and require that each and every student should follow same curriculum, even though they belong to a different sect. Only the students from religious minorities officially recognized by the state are exempt from religious culture and ethics courses.

The first section of this chapter presented the role of education as a means of forming individual and group identities. Education is stated to be a means of raising rational and self-interested human beings, providing individuals knowledge, skills, and abilities to increase human capital, providing a certain understanding of different modes of thought, developing democratic or obedient characters, cultural reproduction, and nation-building. The second section, presented a critical evaluation of the Basic Law of National Education of Turkey to examine formal identity-related aims of education. In doing so, not only the role ascribed to education in identity formation is asserted but also some contradictions within the Law are revealed.

The following chapter presents the methodology of the study by putting forward the research question, research technique, case selection criteria, the model employed, and necessary amendments to the adopted model.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter focuses on the methodology of the study. It begins with formulation of research question with reference to the reasons behind the study. Following this, the aims, usage and major points of content analysis are briefly explained. Third, the criteria for case selection are discussed with special reference to Turkish education system. Finally, the model employed and necessary amendments on the adopted model are presented.

Research Question

The first chapter of this study provided a literature review regarding the identity question in Turkey-EU relations and stated the necessity for an encompassing view through bypassing dichotomies. It was stated in the first chapter that an analysis of formal education can be an important alternative approach to analyze percetions of Turkish citizens on Europe. Building on this proposition, the key question for this study can be formulated as follows "How is Europe portrayed in Turkish formal

education?" Answering this question, or at least getting close to an answer, would contribute to academic literature on identity question in Turkey-EU relations by shedding light on the perceptions of ordinary Turkish citizens on Europe and European identity. To answer this question, a content analysis is used on "History of the Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism" textbooks for high school students. The aims of the course curriculum and the era it covers are main reasons of choosing the course as a case to provide an answer to the above-mentioned research question. These reasons will be discussed in a detailed manner in the next section.

Content Analysis: A Brief Description

The term *content analysis* as a research technique is very recent one regarding the history of social sciences, that appeared towards the mid-20th century (Krippendorff, 2004). However, analysis of contents of textual messages goes much further back in time. Krippendorff (2004) dates the very first examples of content analysis back to 17th century, as the church examined the newspaper contents to prevent the spread of nonreligious materials. In the 18th century, in Sweden, the State Church analyzed a collection of hymns published under the title of *Songs of Zion*, and this investigation "foreshadowed many of the methods of content analysis" (Dovring, 2009). In the early 20th century, Columbia Journalism School performed quantitative studies on newspapers in order to keep a record of headlines, to observe development of the press, to measure the level of sensation, and to compare rural and urban publications (Bilgin, 2006). Nevertheless, the real development in analyzing the message contents corresponds to the rise of importance in propaganda activities during the Second World War (Atabek, 2007)

when the analysis of message content and redesign of texts became an important policy tool for effective propaganda. Shortly after, in 1950s content analysis became an academically approved technique for communication studies following the publication of the book titled *Content Analysis in Communication Research* in 1952, written by Bernard Berelson (Atabek, 2007). Since then, the use of content analysis has become widespread, being adopted by increasing numbers of researches and spreading into various areas of social sciences such as sociology, political science, humanities, medicine and so on.

There are various definitions of content analysis as a research technique, therefore, there are different characteristics attributed to it. Early definitions of content analysis seem to have been efforts to prove its merit as a scientific research method. As its use increased, it became accepted as a legitimate technique, and discussions began to focus on its functions. Berelson (1952) briefly defines content analysis as a systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics. Krippendorff's definition (2004, p. 18), on the other hand, emphasizes "making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use." Another definition reported by Bilgin (2006) from Annick Bouillaguet and André Désiré Robert's *Analyse de Contenu* (1995) describes it is a research technique providing a methodic, systematic, objective and –if possible- quantitative analysis in order to classify and interpret the main elements of various texts which do not reveal the meaning at a fists glance.

Case Selection

There are various ways to examine the reflections of Europe in Turkish formal education. One is to explore the course curricula. Subjecting teaching practices and class discussions to in-depth analysis is a possible alternative. Suggested reading materials would be examined or topics and expectations of essay contests and debate competitions would be analyzed. Also the textbooks would be examined through discourse or content analysis. Using a content analysis provides an aggregation of messages given in the textbooks in a systematic manner, leading to meaningful interpretations. Moreover, textbooks are standard course materials that each and every student uses, thus, their messages are much more permanent than the other methods of analysis mentioned above.

There are two main reasons for choosing the "History of the Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism" textbooks as cases to be analyzed. The first is related to conceptualization of history courses in general as an important instrument of identity formation in Turkey. The second is the era History of the Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism course comprises.

History courses in Turkey are designed to provide not only knowledge of historical events but also a sense of identity for students and an understanding of the society they live in. The general aims of history courses are stated at the beginning of each course curriculum prepared by a commission employed by the Ministry of National Education. Despite some differences in expression among curricula prepared by

different commissions or for different academic years, the general idea remains the same. In "Contemporary Turkish and World History" course curriculum (2008) these general aims are stated in fifteen items, many of which are related to identity development. Item 3, for instance, states that one aim of history education is to ensure students' take responsibility for preserving and improving cultural heritage by conceiving main elements and processes of Turkish history and culture. Items 4 and 5 state that students should comprehend the development of national identity, elements of this identity, the need for its preservation, and importance of national unity and collectivity by linking past and present. Item 11 also emphasizes the importance of connecting past and present, stating that students should analyze political, social, cultural, and economic intercommunal relationships and make inferences about present reflections of these interplays. Finally, in Item 13, students are expected to interact with different cultures, but remaining attached to their own culture.

In comparison, History of the Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism courses include even more significant examples. Statements in the course curriculum (2010) about the aims of the course are not only more clarified in this regard but also address the international aspects of the issue. Item 2 indicates that one of the aims of the course is to emphasize and promote the idea that the Turkish nation can overcome every sort of difficulties, with reference to the War of Independence. Item 4 states that students should comprehend national and international dimensions of the Turkish War of Independence and Turkish Revolution and to know that this has

been imitated by other nations. Finally, in Item 9, students are expected to be aware of internal and external threats by assessing regional and global impacts of Turkey's geopolitical position.

The second reason that makes History of Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism textbooks most suitable for this study was stated to be the era it comprises. The course covers history of late Ottoman times from the beginning of 20th century, the First World War, the War of Independence, the establishment of the Republic and the Kemalist reforms. It is an era in which there were two kind of relationship with Europe, first as the enemy that to be fought against to preserve independence, and secondly, after gaining independence, as the role model to be followed. These two facets represent not only the situation of that time but also the current dichotomy in the literature. This study, then, aims to determine whether the textbooks reflect this contradiction or they present a more coherent path.

The study covers analysis of three of the six textbooks published after Turkey was officially nominated as a candidate country for EU membership in 1999. Turkey's being declared a formal candidate of EU membership would result in a more positive attitude towards Europe in the textbooks. Therefore, this period is important to test whether there is a change on the attitude towards Europe in the textbooks from the beginning of the period to the end of that period.

Changes in the textbooks used in formal education do not show a regular pattern. The book to be used is determined by *Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu Başkanlığı* (Head Council of Education and Morality) each year and announced in *Tebliğler Dergisi* (Journal of Communiqués). Due to this lack of regularity in changes, in order to select samples the time frame 2000[2]-2010 has been divided into equal parts, and books are chosen from the partition years, 2000, 2005, and 2010. The textbooks analyzed in this study are *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* (2000) written by Ahmet Mumcu and Mükerrem K. Su; *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkilap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* (2005) written by İdris Akdin, Muhittin Çakmak, and Mustafa Genç; and *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkilap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* (2010) written by Kemal Kara.

The Model of the Study

Among the various techniques of content analysis, evaluative assertion analysis is the one employed in this study. It was designed by Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy Tannenbaum to measure positive and negative attitudes of a message towards a subject matter (Bilgin, 2006). The specific reason for applying evaluative assertion analysis is that this study intends to identify the ways Europeanness is reflected in the selected textbooks, whether positively or negatively. The theoretical background of the technique is based on the understanding that individuals' perception on a subject redounds on the words selected by while talking or writing about it; thus, by analyzing the words about the

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[2] 1999-2000 academic year had already started when Turkey was declared as a formal candidate of the EU membership. Therefore, the period is started from 2000-2001 academic year.

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subject matter one can determine the direction of attitudes towards it (Bilgin, 2006).

Original Model

The model employed in this study is a modified version that developed by Ole R. Holsti (2009). Holsti follows a step by step approach while applying the model. In the first step, attitude objects and common meaning terms are determined. Then the message containing attitude objects and common meaning terms are translated into two generic assertion forms and placed to a seven columns data chart as follows:

Form A: Attitude Object$_1$ (AO$_1$)/verbal connector(c)/common meaning term (cm)

Form B: Attitude Object$_1$ (AO$_1$)/verbal connector(c)/ Attitude Object$_2$ (AO$_2$)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Source	AO$_1$	C	Value of Column 3	cm or AO$_2$	Value of Column 5	Product: Columns 4*6

The next step is to determine c and cm or AO$_2$ values. The values take are determined according to two criteria; whether positive or negative (+/-) and according to strength (1, 2, 3). This means verbal connectors, common meaning terms, and Attitude Objects$_2$ can get 6 different values, +3, +2, +1, -1, -2, -3. When all messages are transferred into the data chart, the final evaluation value for AO$_1$, the subject matter of the study, is calculated by dividing total value of Column 7 by total number of observations. This would produce a weighted result for the value of

AO_1, between +9 and -9. In order to indicate on the ±3 scale, the result can be divided to 3.

Amendments to the Original Model

Holsti's model is generally suitable for the purpose of this study. However, it requires some amendments due to some constraints of its application. The first amendment on the model is about Attitude Object$_1$. Since the subject matter of this study is Europe, the attitude objects should be related expressions such as Europe, Europeans, European states, European countries, and European nations. All such expressions are interchangeable considering the scope of this study, and would provide a proper understanding about the perceptions on Europeanness in the textbooks. Unfortunately, such expressions are rarely used in the textbooks and very few of them have an evaluative character. Since a greater number of attitude objectives are needed to obtain accurate results, the number of observations must be increased. In order to overcome this difficulty, states and nations in Europe can also be used as attitude objectives. The words like France, French, Germany, German, England, English, Greece, Greek, and so on also represent a European identity to some extent, although they are less representative than the previous ones. One cannot change the expression *European states* with *Germany*, for instance, and still claim that the message is the same. Thus, such expressions should also be subjected to ranking.

The model is changed as following to overcome the problem. Attitude objectives to be placed in the Column 2 of the data chart are divided into three groups and given

a ranking multiplier according to the group they belong to. The first group, with a multiplier set as 3, consists of expressions representing Europe as a whole, such as Europeans, European states. The second group consists of states (e.g. France, Germany, England), nationalities (e.g. French, German, English), and groups of people representing their state or nation (e.g. French army, German troops, English armada) with a multiplier of 2. The final group, with a multiplier set as 1, consists of individuals mentioned with their states or nations; such as French general, German delegate, English prime minister.[3] Then a column is added to the chart after Column 2 to write down the value of each attitude objective. After this amendment, the chart appears as follows:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Source	AO_1	Multiplier of AO_1	c	Value of Column 4	cm or AO_2	Value of Column 6	Product: Columns 3*5*7

The second amendment on the model is a more inclusive one. The messages in the textbooks are generally suitable to be transferred to Form B. This means the study should deal with the values given to Attitude $Object_2$. This does not seem to be a problem at first sight but when the size of the textbooks; and thus, the variety of messages, is considered, it causes difficulties to overcome in completing the data chart. Considering these three hypothetical sentences would give an understanding of the kind of problem.

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[3] Although Europeanness is not just a matter of being a member of the EU, the states and nationalities sought for in the textbooks during the study are EU members since the study is located in the general area of identity question in Turkey-EU relations.

"European states helped Ottoman Empire to pay its debts." Let's assume that AO_1 *European states*'s multiplier is 3, verbal connector *helped* is valued as +3 and AO_2 *Ottoman Empire* is valued as +2 while placing this hypothetical sentence to the data chart. The final value of the message, *Product*, is then 3*+3*+2= +18.

"European states helped rebels to defeat Turkish forces." Multiplier of AO_1 and value of verbal connector are the same with previous example. Assuming AO_2 *rebels* is valued as -2, the final value of the message is 3*+3*-2= -18. As against to the first one, the message in the second hypothetical sentence is extremely negative.

"European states provoked rebels to fight against Turkish forces." Suppose AO_1 *European states*'s multiplier is, again, 3, AO_2 *rebels* is valued as -2, and verbal connector *provoke* is valued as -2 in this third hypothetical sentence. The final value of the message is then 3*-2*-2= +12. This means the message given in the sentence is a positive one, but, obviously, this is not the case. Changing the valance of either verbal connector or Attitude Object$_2$ would be a solution, but this would give an expression two different values in the same data chart, which would harm consistency of the study.

In order to deal with this problem without changing the valance of expression, AO_1, verbal connector, common meaning term, and AO_2 are decided to get absolute values, all positive. In order to identify valance of the message, one more column is

added before *Product* column to place the valance multiplier of the message as +1 or -1. The data chart with this final amendment appears as follows:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	AO_1	Multiplier of AO_1 (1, 2,3)	c	Value of Column 4 (1, 2, 3)	cm or AO_2	Value of Column 6 (1, 2, 3)	Valance multiplier (+1, -1)	Product: Columns 3*5*7*8

These amendments require a change in the formula to calculate the final value for AO_1. Since Column 3 and Column 8 add two multipliers the final weighted value would be between $9*3*\pm1=\pm27$. Thus, the final value can be indicated on ±3 scale through dividing the weighted value by 9.

This chapter presented methodology of the study by formulating the research question, providing brief information about content analysis as the research technique of the study, identifying the criteria in case selection, introducing the model employed, and explaining the necessary amendments to the model.

The next chapter will present the results of the study through item-by-item approach. Reflections of Europe in each sample are indicated one by one with some, if any, notable remarks. Then, an overall evaluation of all three sample textbooks will be presented in order to provide a general idea.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

As stated in the previous chapter, this study aims to address the question "How Europe is portrayed in Turkish formal education?" through an evaluative assertion analysis of three "History of Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism" textbooks. This chapter presents the findings of the study. First, the value of AO_1 for the whole textbook is presented in each case. Following this, AO_1s are analyzed in a more detailed manner. The value of AO_1 for statements directly referring to Europe is determined. Also the values for most commonly cited countries and nationalities are presented for each textbook.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük written by Ahmet Mumcu and Mükerrem K. Su

The _Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkilap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük_ textbook written by Ahmet Mumcu and Mükerrem K. Su was used in formal education between 1982 and 2005. The sample copy used in this study was published in Istanbul, 2000.

The total number of evaluation statements found in the textbook relevant to this study is 122. Total value of evaluation statements, the sum of values in Column 9 of the final data chart provided in previous chapter, is -879. So the value of Attitude Objective$_1$ (AO$_1$) on the ±3 scale is -879/122/9=-0.82. The result indicates a negative attitude towards Europe in this textbook. However, the strength of negativity is not high since it is closer to 0 than -3 on the ±3 scale.

When we analyze the textbook in a detailed manner, we observed that only 4 of the 122 statements directly refer to Europe as AO$_1$. All other statements have indirect references to Europe through European countries and nationalities. Among the countries, the most frequent AO$_1$s are Greece and France, and Greek, English, and French are the most frequent AO$_1$s among nationalities. The total value of 4 statements referring to Europe directly is -18, thus the value of AO$_1$ just for these 4 statements is -18/4/9=-0.5. The values of Greece and France as AO$_1$s are -0.07 and 0.44, and the values of Greek, English, and French are -1.1, -0.97, and -1.22 respectively. These results show us that the negativity of statements referring to Europe indirectly through nationalities is higher than direct references. The

striking point here is that countries' themselves have more positive results than the nationalities they represent. Although the value of Greece is negative it is very close to 0 while the value of Greek is -1.1. The situation for France is more interesting since it has a positive value whereas French has the highest negativity among three nationalities.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkilap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük written by İdris Akdin, Muhittin Çakmak, and Mustafa Genç

The second textbook that is examined is the *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkilap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* written by İdris Akdin, Muhittin Çakmak, and Mustafa Genç. It was used in formal education between 2002 and 2008. The sample copy used in the study was published in Ankara, in 2005.

The number of evaluation statements found in this textbook is 134, which have a total value of -1173. The value of AO_1 on the ± 3 scale is then $-1173/134/9=-0.97$. This means Europe is portrayed in a negative manner in the textbook. Although the strength of negativity is higher than the textbook written by Mumcu and Su, it is still closer to 0 than -3 on the ± 3 scale.

There are 16 statements which directly refer to Europe as AO_1. AO_1 for the rest of the statements are single European countries and nationalities. The most commonly mentioned of these are England, Greece, and France; and Greek, English, and French, respectively. The total value of 16 statements is -123 and the value of

AO_1 for these 16 statements is -0.85. The values of England, Greece and France are -0.77, -0.63, and 0; and the values of Greek, English, and French are -1.17, -1.36, and -0.95, respectively. These results present a similar pattern to the Mumcu and Su textbook. Although the statements directly referring to Europe have a greater negative value than those in Mumcu and Su's textbook, it is similar that the strength of their negativity is lower than the overall value of AO_1 in this textbook. The range between values of countries and nationalities is narrower; however, in common with the Mumcu and Su textbooks nationalities have more negative values than countries.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkilap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük written by Kemal Kara

The third textbook that is analyzed is *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İnkilap Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* written by Kemal Kara. It was used between 1994 and 2002. It was not used in formal education between 2002 and 2006, was brought back into use in 2006. The sample copy used in the study was published in İstanbul, in 2010.

The number of evaluation statements in the textbook appropriate for this study is 106. The total value of evaluation statements is -771. Therefore, the value of AO_1 on the ±3 scale is -771/106/9=-0.81. The result reveals a similar attitude towards Europe to the textbook written by Mumcu and Su, both in direction and the strength. Nevertheless, it is the most positive one of three textbooks with a slightly closer proximity to 0 than the others.

Expressions referring to Europe directly compose AO_1 for 5 of the 106 statements. AO_1s for the rest of the statements contains European countries and nationalities. Greece and Italy are the countries most frequently referred to, and Greek, English, and French are the most frequently mentioned nationalities. The 5 statements directly referring to Europe have a total value of 12 with a combined AO_1 value of 0.27. This is the only positive result for such statements of all those in the three textbooks. The values for Greece and Italy are -0.56 and -0.44 respectively, and the values of Greek, English, and French are -1.13, -0.83, and -1.19 respectively. The values for nationalities are more negative than the values of the countries, as in the previous two textbooks. Thus, it can be said that the textbook written by Kara is similar to the other two.

An Overall Evaluation and Remarks

Inferences about whole formal education in Turkey can be made through content analysis of the three above-mentioned textbooks. All three present a negative attitude towards Europe. Although, the negativity of statements is due in part to the negation the of nations who fought against during the First World War and the War of Independence, the statements directly referring to Europe as a whole also present a negative attitude. Therefore, it appears that Europe is portrayed in a negative manner in Turkish formal education.

While the study indicate the negative portrayal of Europe, certain points should be highlighted to put this negativity in perspective. First, it may be expected that

Turkey's formal education would present a more positive attitude towards Europe as the accession negotiations started in 2005. However, neither the textbook by Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak, published in 2006, nor that of Kara, published 2010, present a more positive attitude towards Europe then the textbook written by Mumcu and Su, the one published in 2000. Moreover, interestingly, the textbook by Akdin, Çakmak, and Genç, published in the year accession negotiations started, presents the most negative attitude of all three. Therefore, it is not possible to claim that the course of accession negotiations influenced the attitude towards Europe in formal education in a more positive direction.

Secondly, an interesting pattern found in all three textbooks is the greater negation of nationalities compared to countries. Although the range between the values countries and nationalities vary in each case, countries generally have more positive values than the nations they are founded on. This can be interpreted as a nationalist reaction, in which the actions of individuals or groups from a particular nation are perceived as seperate from the country they belong to.

Third, the only country that has positive values in all three textbooks is Germany, which was an ally of Ottoman Empire in the First World War. This premise can be seen as supportive of the argument that negative perceptions of Europe are due to the struggle against European powers during the First World War, and later, in the War of Independence.

Finally, the books are divided into two parts, representing the pre-republican and republican periods; a significant distinction emerges between the numbers of evaluative statements in two parts. Understanding the reason for this requires looking outside the scope of the present study, and considering the books from a different perspective. The number of evaluative statements in the second part for all three textbooks is lower than the number of evaluative statements in the first part. A careful reading, not necessarily detailed, reveals two reasons. First, the statements in the second parts are generally neutral rather than evaluative. Second, mention of Europe in largely absent in regard to the elements which were important to the Turkish modernization process, such as secularism, democracy, and republicanism. These concepts are presented as already existing in Turkish society and culture but have been hidden for a period of time, or have been developed by the leaders of national struggle.

CONCLUSION

CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

Identity is one of the major dimensions of Turkey-EU relations. The literature on the perceptions of Europe in the minds of Turkish people focus on ideological positioning of the individuals, as indicated in the second section of the first chapter. The literature presents three dichotomies, modernists vs. Islamists, protectionists vs. reformists, and globalists vs. nationalists. The first dichotomy holds the legacy of centuries-long debate between promoters of modernization in Turkish society and their opponents due to religious reasons. The protectionists vs. reformists dichotomy is based on the question of whether European integration paves the way for the necessary reforms for the state and the society, or it poses a threat to Kemalist principles. In a similar fashion, the globalists vs. nationalists dichotomy questions whether Turkey's EU membership threatens national integrity as opposed to bringing economic as well as democratic benefits. Although the individuals' point of views in regard to these dichotomies generally reflects their

attitude towards Turkey's integration into the EU, there are contradictions in the dichotomies, which may not be as clear-cut as they seem. This may stem from Europe being both the enemy of the War of Independence, but also the role model for Turkish Republic after its establishment.

Regarding this dichotomous character of the literature, this study analyzed one aspect of formal education in order to gain an impression of an all encompassing feature that every Turkish citizen shares regardless of their ideological positions. The research was based on the idea that education has an important role in identity formation, no matter whether individual or group identity, analyzed in detail in the second chapter. The aim was to reveal the general pattern of evaluation of Europe in Turkish formal education. Not only the literature on the relationship between education and identity development but also the statements in the Basic Law of National Education of Turkey and the course curricula supported this expectation.

In order to discover how Europe is portrayed in Turkish formal education, a content analysis was conducted on History of Turkish Revolution and Ataturkism textbooks for high schools. The reasons for case selection and the research technique applied were stated in the third chapter. The results, as expressed in the fourth chapter, revealed a negative attitude towards Europe in the textbooks, although of a relatively low level. We can maintain that this negative attitude is mainly based on the hostility towards European nations which were fought against in the War of Independence. In addition, the attitude does not change over time

regarding the period the textbooks are used, as against the expectation that the start of accession negotiations would result in a more positive attitude towards Europe in formal education.

This study makes a contribution to the literature of identity question in Turkey-EU relations by revealing the view of Turkish formal education. However, due to time limitation, this study has restricted aims. Subsequent studies, analyzing a larger sample would provide a more comprehensive understanding of how Europe is portrayed in Turkish formal education; and thus, how Turkish people in general perceive Europe.

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APPENDIX: THE DATA CHART

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO₁ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Mumcu and Su	Italians	2	invaded	3	12 islands	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Germany	2	got close	2	Ottoman Empire	2	1	8
Mumcu and Su	Bulgarians	2	started threatening	2	İstanbul	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Germany	2	got close	2	Ottoman Empire	2	1	8
Mumcu and Su	Bulgarians	2	signed	1	peace settlement	3	1	6
Mumcu and Su	English armada	2	shelled	3	Turkish emplacements	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	French armada	2	shelled	3	Turkish emplacements	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	English ships	2	landed	2	Gelibolu Peninsula	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	considering to provoke	2	Arabs living in Ottoman Empire	1	-1	-4
Mumcu and Su	English spies	1	provoked	3	Arabs living in Ottoman Empire	1	-1	-3
Mumcu and Su	Germany	2	help	1	Ottoman Empire	2	1	4
Mumcu and Su	Greek navals	2	were anchoring	1	İstanbul port	1	-1	-2
Mumcu and Su	English	2	entered	2	Urfa, Antep, and Maraş	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	French	2	invaded	3	Adana and surroundings	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	French	2	armed	2	Armenians	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Italians	2	seized	3	Konya, Antalya and surroundings	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	prepared to invade	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	enhanced their countries	1	against Turks	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	were going to invade	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greek armada	2	had moved	1	İzmir	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	English ships	2	strengthened	2	Greek armada	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greek soldiers	1	restrained	2	unarmed officers and civil servants	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	had landed troops	2	Agean coasts	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	marched on	2	fast	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	performed	1	attacks and cruelties	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	committed	2	murders	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	European public opinion	3	occured	1	a movement in favor of Turks	3	1	9
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	had armed	2	secessionists	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	European states	3	intent to partition	2	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	European states	3	prompted	1	non-Muslims	3	-1	-9
Mumcu and Su	English	2	support	1	Pontus question	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	French	2	support	1	Pontus question	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greece	2	strive to establish	1	Pontus state	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	English	2	invaded	3	Samsun and Merzifon	3	-1	-18

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO₁ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	were going to reestablish	1	Byzantine	2	-1	-4
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	armed	2	secessionists	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	European powers	3	preserve existence	1	aims on Anatolia	2	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greece	2	preserve existence	1	aims on Anatolia	2	-1	-4
Mumcu and Su	Greece	2	tries to revive	1	Orthodox secessionism	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	English	2	were colliding	3	Mustafa Kemal Paşa	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	English	2	were pressuring	2	Sublime Porte	2	-1	-8
Mumcu and Su	Greek units	2	entered	2	Manisa and Turgutlu	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	take out on	3	Turks	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Greek units	2	invaded	3	Menemen	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Greek army	2	march on	2	inland of Anatolia	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	took over	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	invade	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	invade	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	invade	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	help	1	Kuvay-ı İnzibatiye (rebel)	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	English units	2	landed	2	İstanbul	3	-1	-12

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO₁ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Mumcu and Su	English	2	did not harm	2	the Sultan and his government	1	1	4
Mumcu and Su	English soldiers	1	are entering	2	ministry	1	-1	-2
Mumcu and Su	English marines	1	invaded	3	police station	1	-1	-3
Mumcu and Su	English soldiers	1	are invading	3	Tophane	1	-1	-3
Mumcu and Su	English soldiers	1	invaded	3	Harbiye telegraph office	1	-1	-3
Mumcu and Su	English	2	busted	3	Mızıka police station	1	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	English	2	are invading	3	İstanbul	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	English	2	were colliding	3	Turkish soldiers	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	English	2	were aiming to hold	1	the Straits	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	English	2	support	1	Ahmet Anzavur (rebel)	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greek spies	1	provoked	3	Çopur Musa (rebel)	3	-1	-9
Mumcu and Su	French	2	invade	2	Urfa	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	French	2	support	1	Armenian Revenge Brigade	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	invaded	3	Western Anatolia	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	English	2	equipped	2	Greek army	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	supported	2	Greek units	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	decided to invade	2	Eastern Thrace	3	-1	-12

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Mumcu and Su	Greek units	2	started to march on	2	Bursa Uşak line	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	seized	3	Bursa	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	landed troops	2	Tekirdağ	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greek units	2	performed	1	assault	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	English	2	provoked	3	Armenians	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	English	2	had entered	2	Adana, Antep, Urfa, and Maraş	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	French	2	were setting against	3	Armenians	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	French	2	could enter	1	Antep	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	French soldiers	1	were increasing	2	their recklessness and nerve	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	attacked	3	Eskişehir	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	was aiming to suppress	1	National Struggle	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	marched on	2	fast	2	-1	-8
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	started attacking	3	İnönü, Eskişehir, Afyon, and Kütahya	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	marched on	2	Sakarya river	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	had entered	2	Central Anatolia	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	reached	1	Sakarya	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	had landed troops	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO₁ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	had started to march on	2	inland of Anatolia	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	had invaded	3	some parts of Anatolian lands	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	French	2	had invaded	3	some parts of Anatolian lands	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Italians	2	had invaded	3	some parts of Anatolian lands	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	France	2	seized	3	Turkish lands	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	France	2	recognized	2	new Turkish government	3	1	12
Mumcu and Su	Italian government	2	followed unaggressive policies	2	Turkish Great National Assembly government	3	1	12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	preserved	1	hostile attitude towards new Turkish state	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	could escape	1	scatteredly	3	1	6
Mumcu and Su	France	2	recognized	2	Turkish state	3	1	12
Mumcu and Su	French	2	had appreciated	1	Turkish claims	3	1	6
Mumcu and Su	France	2	made peace	3	Turkish Great National Assembly government	3	1	18
Mumcu and Su	Greeks	2	started to prepare	2	defence war	2	-1	-8
Mumcu and Su	Greece	2	did not attend	1	peace parley	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	English government	2	accepted to start	1	armistice dialogues	2	1	4
Mumcu and Su	English public opinion	2	understood	1	rightfulness of Turks	3	1	6
Mumcu and Su	English	2	had exploited	3	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-12

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Mumcu and Su	France	2	had exploited	3	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	provoke	2	Greece	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	gave forth	2	Sheik Said rebellion	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	drive a wedge	2	Musul and Turkey	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Germans	2	prepared	2	secular civic laws those are great works	3	1	12
Mumcu and Su	Greek government	2	seized	3	properties of Turks in Western Thrace	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	Greek	2	tensed	1	relationships with Turks	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greek	2	started to develop relationship	1	Turks	3	1	6
Mumcu and Su	Greek	2	started	2	friendship	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	Greek	2	entered a climacteric phase	1	relationships with Turks	3	-1	-6
Mumcu and Su	Greek nation	2	owns	1	a common fate Turks	3	1	6
Mumcu and Su	Greece	2	developed	1	friendship with Turkey	3	1	6
Mumcu and Su	France	2	was in good relations	2	Turkey	3	1	12
Mumcu and Su	Italy	2	signed	1	cordial treaty pact	3	1	6
Mumcu and Su	Austria	2	prepared	2	secular civic laws those are great works	3	1	12
Mumcu and Su	Greece	2	got close	2	us	3	1	12
Mumcu and Su	English	2	is regarded	1	heartland of democracy	3	1	6

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO_1 Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Mumcu and Su	English	2	divided	2	south of Taurus Mountains	3	-1	-12
Mumcu and Su	French	2	partitioned	3	south of Taurus Mountains	3	-1	-18
Mumcu and Su	English	2	landed troops	2	Gelibolu Peninsula	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European states	3	intervene	2	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Italy	2	declared war	3	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Italians	2	landed troops	2	Agean islands	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Italy	2	surrounded	1	Dardanelles	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	landed troops	2	Agean islands	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Bulgarians	2	took over	2	Edirne, Kırklareli, Lüleburgaz	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	invaded	3	all island except İmroz and Bozcaada	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Bulgarians	2	marched on	2	Çatalca	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Germany	2	ally	2	Turks	3	1	12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	declared war	3	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	France	2	declared war	3	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English armada	2	started bombing	3	Turkish bastions	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French armada	2	started bombing	3	Turkish bastions	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	invaded	3	Hatay, Adana,Urfa Antep, and Maraş	3	-1	-18

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	landed troops	2	Samsun, Merzifon, İstanbul, İzmit, and Eskişehir	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Italians	2	invaded	3	Muğla, Antalya, and Konya	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek Prime Minister	1	wanted to take over	1	all Agean islands, Thrace, and Western Anatolia	3	-1	-3
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	support	1	Greek Prime Minister	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English delegates	1	supported	2	Greece	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French delegates	1	supported	2	Greeks	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek soldiers	1	landed	2	İzmir	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	started	2	cruelty	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	performed	1	attacks and cruelties	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek soldiers	1	participated	1	rapes and seizures	3	-1	-3
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	committed	2	murders	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European public opinion	3	started	1	movements in favor of Turks	3	1	9
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European public opinion	3	occured	1	movements in favor of Turks	3	1	9
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek army	2	performed	1	inquisitions	1	-1	-2
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek soldiers	1	landed	2	İzmir	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek soldiers	1	shredded	3	defenceless Turks	3	-1	-9
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek camp	2	committed	2	crime	3	-1	-12

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek troops	2	attempted to enhance	1	invasion region	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek soldiers	1	killed	3	Turkish women and children	3	1	9
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European states	3	partition	3	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	support	1	Pontus question	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	support	1	Pontus question	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek Prime Minister	1	was willing to take over	1	Thrace, Western Anatolia, Agean Islands, and Eastern Black Sea Region	3	-1	-3
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	supported	2	Greeks	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English units	2	invade	2	Samsun and Merzifon	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	armed	2	Pontus gangs	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek troops	2	were going to invade	2	Sivas and Erzurum	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European powers	3	preserve existence	1	aims on Anatolia	2	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greece	2	preserve existence	1	aims on Anatolia	2	-1	-4
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greece	2	tries to revive	1	Orthodox secessionism in Eastern Black Sea Region	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greece	2	support	2	Pontus gangs	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	supported	2	Kürt Teali Cemiyeti (rebel)	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	support	1	Armenian Revenge Brigade	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English units	2	landed	2	Çanakkale	3	-1	-12

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO_1 Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	invaded	3	Çukurova Region	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European states	3	made	1	plans	2	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	started invading	3	Turkish lands	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	started invading	3	Turkish lands	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	started invading	3	Manisa and Aydın surroundings	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	had landed	2	Samsun	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French officers	1	arrest	2	Mustafa Kemal	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	invaded	3	İzmir	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European states	3	provoke	2	minorities	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	abused	2	religious beliefs	2	-1	-8
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	supported	2	rebels	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	forced to rebel	3	society	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	support	1	Greeks	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	attacked	3	Thrace	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	seized	3	Thrace	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek units	2	invaded	3	Balıkesir and Bursa	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	collided	3	our forces	3	-1	-18

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO_1 Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	seized	3	many strategic regions	2	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	started	2	assaults	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek army	2	invaded	3	Yenişehir and İnegöl	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	gave memorandum	2	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-8
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	France	2	gave memorandum	2	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-8
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	help	1	Tashnak Committee leaders	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	invaded	3	Urfa, Antep, Adana, and Maraş	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	marched on	2	south of Anatolia	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	cooperate	1	Armenians	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	cooperated	2	Armenians	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	cooperated	2	Armenians	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	lowered down	1	Turkish flag	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	invaded	3	Adana	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	acted in concert	2	Armenian minorities	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	cooperate	1	Armenians	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	entered	2	Antep	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	had invaded	3	Antep	3	-1	-18

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO_1 Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Italians	2	left	1	Anatolia	3	1	6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek soldiers	1	started to apply	1	plan to establish Magna Graecia	2	-1	-2
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	provoked	3	Greeks	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek troops	2	attacked	3	Eskişehir	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	seized	3	Bursa	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	attacked	3	Eskişehir and Afyon	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	were willing to seize	2	Eskişehir and Kütahya	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	planned to invade	2	Ankara	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek units	2	fled	1	Afyon	3	1	6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	released	2	Turks	3	1	12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	was provoking	3	Greeks	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	was providing financial aid	2	Greeks	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	seized	3	Afyon, Kütahya, and Eskişehir	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	invaded	3	Adana and surroundings	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	developed	1	friendship	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	cooperated	2	Armenians	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French writers	1	chum	3	Turks	3	1	9

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French public opinion	2	supported	2	our rightful struggle of independence	3	1	12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greece	2	was willing to seize	2	Ankara	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek army	2	approximated	1	Ankara	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek units	2	started to march on	2	Turkish emplacements	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greece	2	willing to dissolve	1	National Struggle	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	knuckled down	1	invasion	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French public opinion	2	were supporting	2	Turkish War of Independence	3	1	12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	France	2	recognize	2	Turkish Great National Assembly government	3	1	12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	burned	3	villages and towns	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	left	1	our lands	3	1	6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	implicitly recognized	1	new Turkish state	3	1	6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	were supporting	2	Sheik Said rebellion	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	England	2	contacted	1	Sheik Said (rebel)	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	provoked	3	rebels	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English	2	supported	2	rebels	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Europeans	3	directing world public opinion	2	against Turks	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European countries	3	developed	1	fast	3	1	9

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO_1 Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European states	3	started invading	3	Turkish lands	3	-1	-27
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek	2	started	2	friendship	3	-1	-12
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European missioners	1	provided support	2	minorities	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greek Prime Minister	1	made	1	friendly dialogues	3	1	3
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	English soldiers	1	started colliding	3	Turkish soldiers	3	-1	-9
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European states	3	intervene	2	Turkey	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	France	2	made	1	treaty of amity	3	1	6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greece	2	made	1	treaty of amity	3	1	6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Italy	2	made	1	treaty of amity	3	1	6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greece	2	developed	1	friendship	3	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	France	2	did not respect	2	terms of agreement	1	-1	-4
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	French	2	had invaded	3	Hatay region	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	France	2	reached a consensus	1	Turkey	3	1	6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European states	3	had seized	2	main sources of Ottoman Empire's income	1	-1	-6
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	European states	3	had dominated	2	Turkish trade	3	-1	-18
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Europe	3	experienced	1	development	3	1	9
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Europeans	3	were superior	1	Ottomans	2	-1	-6

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO_1 Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Akdin, Genç, and Çakmak	Greeks	2	attacked	3	Kütahya Eskişehir region	3	-1	-18
Kara	European states	3	intervene	1	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-6
Kara	European states	3	intervene	1	our internal affairs	2	-1	-6
Kara	Italy	2	force	2	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-8
Kara	Italy	2	was fighting	2	Ottoman Empire	2	-1	-8
Kara	Greeks	2	landed troops	2	Agean islands	3	-1	-12
Kara	Italy	2	invaded	3	12 islands	3	-1	-18
Kara	Bulgarian army	2	invaded	3	Edirne	3	-1	-18
Kara	Bulgarian army	2	surrounded	1	Edirne	3	-1	-6
Kara	Bulgarian army	2	marched on	2	Çatalca	3	-1	-12
Kara	Germany	2	was going to support	1	Ottoman Empire	2	1	4
Kara	Germany	2	was going to give financial aid	1	Ottoman Empire	2	1	4
Kara	English	2	fought	2	Turks	3	-1	-12
Kara	French armada	2	started bombing	3	Turkish defence lines	3	-1	-18
Kara	English armada	2	started bombing	3	Turkish defence lines	3	-1	-18
Kara	English	2	attacked	3	Turks	3	-1	-18
Kara	French	2	invaded	3	Adana and surroundings	3	-1	-18
Kara	English	2	landed troops	2	Samsun and Merzifon	3	-1	-12
Kara	French	2	organized	1	Armenians	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greeks	2	presented	1	false documents	2	-1	-4

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Kara	Greek Prime Minister	1	wanted to take over	1	İzmir and surroundings	3	-1	-3
Kara	Italy	2	landed troops	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greeks	2	were aiming to establish	1	a great Greek state	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greeks	2	landed	2	İzmir	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greeks	2	started to spread	2	Agean region	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greeks	2	invaded	3	İzmir	3	-1	-18
Kara	Greek	2	started	2	cruelty	3	-1	-12
Kara	European public opinion	3	started	2	movement in favor of Turks	3	1	18
Kara	European public opinion	3	occurred	1	movement in favor of Turks	3	1	9
Kara	Greek soldiers	1	participated	1	rapes and seizures	3	-1	-3
Kara	Greek army	2	performed	1	inquisitions	1	-1	-2
Kara	Greek headquarters	2	committed	2	crime	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greek soldiers	1	shredded	3	defenceless Turks	3	-1	-9
Kara	Greeks	2	provoked	3	Greeks in Black Sea region	3	-1	-18
Kara	Greeks	2	supported	2	Greeks in Black Sea region	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greece	2	were supporting	2	secesssionist Orthodox gangs in Black Sea region	3	-1	-12
Kara	England	2	supported	2	Greece	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greek army	2	was cooperating	2	Pontus gangs	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greece	2	was willing to establish	1	Pontus state	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greece	2	was aiming to realise	1	Megali Idea	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greece	2	is trying go recreate	1	Pontus question	3	-1	-6

Source	Attitude Object 1	AO₁ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Kara	English	2	support	1	İslam Teali Cemiyeti (rebel)	3	-1	-6
Kara	English	2	support and help	1	communities against national essence	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greeks	2	were marching on	2	Thrace	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greek gangs	1	were attacking	3	Turks	3	-1	-9
Kara	Bulgarian gangs	2	were attacking	3	Turks	3	-1	-18
Kara	Greeks	2	started invading	3	İzmir, Aydın, Manisa and surroundings	3	-1	-18
Kara	Greeks	2	invade	3	İzmir	3	-1	-18
Kara	Greeks	2	landed troops	2	Ayvalık	3	-1	-12
Kara	English	2	were controling	1	İzmir telegraph office	1	-1	-2
Kara	Greeks	2	were controlling	1	İzmir telegraph office	1	-1	-2
Kara	English soldiers	1	started busting	3	pollice stations	1	-1	-3
Kara	English soldiers	1	started invading	3	state offices	2	-1	-6
Kara	English privates	1	are entering	2	Ministry of Military Affairs	1	-1	-2
Kara	English marines	1	are entering	2	Tophane	1	-1	-2
Kara	English	2	busted	3	Mızıka police station	1	-1	-6
Kara	English marines	1	are entering	2	police station	1	-1	-2
Kara	English	2	were aiming to hold	1	Bosphorus and Dardanelles	3	-1	-6
Kara	English	2	were supporting	2	rebels	3	-1	-12
Kara	English	2	were supporting	2	rebels	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greeks	2	provoked	3	Çopur Musa (rebel)	3	-1	-18
Kara	Greek Prime Minister	1	was willing to take over	1	Western Anatolia, Cyprus, Thrace, Trabzon and surroundings	3	-1	-3

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Kara	Greek delegate	1	was willing to take over	1	Thrace and Western Anatolia	3	-1	-3
Kara	England	2	signed	1	Sevr Treaty	3	-1	-6
Kara	Italy	2	signed	1	Sevr Treaty	3	-1	-6
Kara	France	2	signed	1	Sevr Treaty	3	-1	-6
Kara	Belgium	2	signed	1	Sevr Treaty	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greece	2	signed	1	Sevr Treaty	3	-1	-6
Kara	Poland	2	signed	1	Sevr Treaty	3	-1	-6
Kara	Romania	2	signed	1	Sevr Treaty	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greek forces	2	invaded	3	Tekirdağ	3	-1	-18
Kara	European missioners	1	took part in	1	Armenian rebellion	3	-1	-3
Kara	French	2	invaded	3	Antep, Maraş, and Urfa	3	-1	-18
Kara	English	2	invaded	3	Antep, Maraş, and Urfa	3	-1	-18
Kara	French	2	entered	2	Urfa	3	-1	-12
Kara	French	2	armed	2	Armenians	3	-1	-12
Kara	French	2	cooperated	2	Armenians	3	-1	-12
Kara	French	2	lowered down	1	Turkish flag	3	-1	-6
Kara	French	2	attacked	3	Antep	3	-1	-18
Kara	French	2	started attacking	3	Turks	3	-1	-18
Kara	French	2	entered	2	Maraş	3	-1	-12
Kara	French soldiers	1	entered	2	Maraş	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greeks	2	wanted to take over	1	Ankara	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greeks	2	arrived	1	İnönü region	3	-1	-6
Kara	Italy	2	approached with good	2	Turks	3	1	12

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Source	Attitude Object 1	AO$_1$ Multiplier	Verbal Connector	Value of Column 4	Common Meaning Term or Attitude Objective 2	Value of Column 6	Valance	Product
Kara	English	2	released	2	Turks	3	1	12
Kara	French	2	invaded	3	Zonguldak	3	-1	-18
Kara	French	2	improved	1	relationships with Great National Assembly	3	1	6
Kara	France	2	recognized	2	Turkish Great National Assembly government	3	1	12
Kara	English	2	were supporting	2	Greek army	3	-1	-12
Kara	English	2	were supporting	2	Greek army	3	-1	-12
Kara	Greek army	2	pulled back	1	Eskişehir, Kütahya, and east of Afyon	3	-1	-6
Kara	Greeks	2	set fire	3	İzmir	3	-1	-18
Kara	Italy	2	pull back troops	1	Çanakkale and İzmit	3	1	6
Kara	Italy	2	established	1	schools in Ottoman country	1	1	2
Kara	England	2	implicitly recognized	1	Turkish Great National Assembly government	3	1	6
Kara	English	2	provoked	3	rebels	3	-1	-18
Kara	English	2	supported	2	rebels	3	-1	-12
Kara	English	2	were providing financial and military aid	2	Sheik Said (rebel)	3	-1	-12
Kara	France	2	established	1	schools in Ottoman country	1	1	2
Kara	Germany	2	established	1	schools in Ottoman country	1	1	2
Kara	Austria	2	established	1	schools in Ottoman country	1	1	2
Kara	Greece	2	signed	1	treaty of amity	3	1	6
Kara	French	2	did not apply	1	terms of agreement	1	-1	-2
Kara	French	2	invaded	3	Antakya and İskenderun	3	-1	-18
Kara	French	2	did not behave	1	obdurately	3	1	6
Kara	English government	2	is	3	democratic	3	1	18