

AGENDA-SETTING AND FRAMING EFFECTS OF MEDIA ON PUBLIC OPINION
ABOUT TURKISH EU MEMBERSHIP

OLGU GÖKALP

MAY 2011

AGENDA-SETTING AND FRAMING EFFECTS OF MEDIA ON PUBLIC OPINION
ABOUT TURKISH EU MEMBERSHIP

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
IZMIR UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS

BY

OLGU GÖKALP

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ART
IN
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

MAY 2011

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Cengiz Erol
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art.

Prof. Dr. Gulnur Aybet
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Art.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Cigdem Kentmen
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Petek Askar _____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Isık Gurleyen _____

Asst. Prof. Dr. Cigdem Kentmen _____

ABSTRACT

AGENDA-SETTING AND FRAMING EFFECTS OF MEDIA ON PUBLIC OPINION
ABOUT TURKISH EU MEMBERSHIP

Gokalp, Olgu

MA, Graduate School of Social Sciences

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Cigdem Kentmen

May 2011, 89 pages

This thesis analyzes the role of media on public opinion about Turkey's accession to the European Union. Even though there is a substantial amount of literature concerning the role of media on public opinion in the EU, a little research has been designed to analyze the media's effect within the context of Turkey's prospective membership. First I utilize a content analysis of total of 302 news articles published in *the Guardian* prior to Eurobarometer surveys no. 57 (2002), no. 58 (2003), no. 63 (2005), no. 64 (2006), no. 66 (2007), no. 69 (2008) in order to assess the visibility of the news and presence of both valence and issue-specific frames. Then, I compared the results with the data presented in each Eurobarometer about attitudes in Britain towards Turkey's membership. Results suggest that the media can increase the awareness about Turkey's membership through agenda-setting effect which is conditional to the context and the degree of controversy. In addition, the media can affect the perception of its audience through valence frames if the issue becomes salient enough through agenda-setting mechanism. Lastly, results suggest that there is a weak correlation between issue-specific frames and attitude in Britain towards Turkey's membership which may be a result of disparity between the driving motives of public opinion in Britain and common issue-specific frames in the *Guardian* about Turkey's membership.

Keywords: EU membership, Turkey, public opinion, media, agenda-setting, framing

ÖZET

MEDYANIN GÜNDEM KURMA VE ÇERÇEVELEME YOLUYLA TÜRKİYE'NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NE ÜYELİĞİNE DAİR KAMUOYU OLUŞTURMAYA ETKİSİ

Gökalp, Olgu

Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Dr. Çiğdem Kentmen

Mayıs 2011, 89 sayfa

Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyeliğine dair kamuoyunun şekillenmesinde medyanın rolünü analiz etmektedir. Avrupa Birliği kamuoyunun şekillenmesinde medyanın rolüne dair zengin bir literatür olmakla birlikte, bugüne dek çok az çalışma medyanın etkisini Türkiye'nin muhtemel üyeliği bağlamında ele almıştır. Bu çalışmada ilk olarak haberlerin görünürlüğünü ve gerek değer çerçevelerinin gerekse konu bazlı çerçevelerin varlığını tespit etmek amacıyla, Eurobarometre'nin 57 no'lu (2002), 58 no'lu (2003), 63 no'lu (2005), 64 no'lu (2006), 66 no'lu (2007), 69 no'lu (2008) raporlarından önce *The Guardian* gazetesinde basılmış toplam 302 yazıya içerik analizi uyguladım. Daha sonra bu sonuçları söz konusu Eurobarometre raporlarında bulunan İngiltere'de Türkiye'nin üyeliğine dair tutum ile ilgili verilerle karşılaştırdım. Sonuçlar gösteriyor ki, medya gündem kurma etkisi yoluyla Türkiye'nin üyeliğine dair farkındalığı arttırılabilmekle birlikte, bu etkisi bağlama ve ihtilafın derecesine bağlıdır. Bunun yanısıra konu medyanın gündem kurma etkisi ile görünür hale gelmesi halinde, medya değer çerçeveleri yoluyla okurlarının algısını etkileyebilir. Son olarak, araştırmanın sonuçlarına göre konu bazlı çerçeveler ile Türkiye'nin üyeliğine dair İngiltere'deki tutum arasındaki ilişki zayıf olmakla birlikte, bu durum İngiltere'de Türkiye'nin üyeliğine dair kamuoyunun başat saikleri ile *The Guardian* gazetesinin sıklıkla kullandığı konu bazlı çerçevelerin uyumsuzluğundan kaynaklanıyor olabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB Üyeliği, Türkiye, kamuoyu, medya, gündem kurma, çerçeveleme

To My Family

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	14
2.1 Literature on Determinants of Public Opinion.....	15
2.1.1 Cognitive Mobilization Approach.....	16
2.1.2 Utilitarian Approach.....	17
2.1.3 Identity-Based Approach.....	24
2.2 Literature on the Public Opinion about Turkey's Accession	29
2.3 Literature on the Public Opinion and the Role of Media	32
3. NEWS FRAMING, RESEARCH METHOD AND MEASURES OF ANALYSIS.....	40
3.1 News Framing.....	41
3.2 Research Method	44
3.2.1 Content Analysis	45
3.2.1.1 Time Frame	45
3.2.1.2 Data Collection	47
3.2.2 Measures of Content Analysis	48
3.2.3 Measures of Public Opinion	54
4. RESULTS	55
5. CONCLUSION	72
ANNEX.1	79
REFERENCES	84

1. INTRODUCTION

As the European unification has evolved over time from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the European Union (EU), the accession of new member states has become the center of attention. Successive enlargement rounds and accession negotiations revealed that the accession process itself has a considerable transformative power over the candidate states as well as the EU members. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) suggest, the enlargement process has led to a “gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms.” It has inevitably increased the number of actors whose actions are normatively patterned and governed by the norms of the EU.

As the EU enlargement brings significant changes both to the member and candidate countries, it is vital to answer some important questions in order to understand the rationale behind the decision to enlarge: Why does a particular state decide to apply for a membership and bear all costly procedures of accession negotiations? Why do member states support one applicant country for membership but oppose another?

In addition to the importance of answering these questions, it is also crucial to evaluate possible embedded costs and risks of the enlargement, which has direct effects over the issues of immigration, budget contribution proportions and redistribution of financial assistance and regional funds through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). First of all, since the admission of a candidate state

inevitably leads to a change in the organizational set up of the EU as well as the voting power of the member states, Europeans think that it might threaten the internal stability of the Union. Second of all, while the enlargement of the EU means new borders and neighbors, it might pose a risk of tension with those new neighbors due to the shift in the European balance of power. Given those associated costs/risks, the question is why the EU member states prefer to enlarge and what kind of a polity the EU adopts. According to Sjursen (2006), equally important questions are how and in what way decisions to enlarge are implemented. An analysis based on these questions helps us to identify three ideal types: a utility-based problem-solving entity whose aim is to promote and protect the interests of its members; a value-based community which stems from revitalization of a common identity based on European values and traditions; a rights-based post-national union oriented towards universal rights and democratic procedures (Sjursen, 2006).

There is a considerable volume in the literature devoted to the investigation of actors and their actions in negotiation process emphasizing the role of utility, value or rights as driving motives that shape the attitudes of those actors (Grabbe and Hughes 1998; Kubicek, 2003; Schimmelfennig, 2001; Sedelmeier, 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Sjursen 2002). What is common in these theoretically different perspectives is the special emphasis on the need of the actors to legitimize their actions with different types of arguments in the eyes of other actors who are involved in decision-making process as well as in the eyes of public in general.

Turkey's accession to the EU is such a complex and multidimensional process which could not be fully understood without taking public consent into an account. Irrespective of driving motives behind policy formations, there is the need to legitimize those policies and arguments in order to acquire the consent of voters (or public in general).


It is evident that especially after the Helsinki Summit of the European Council in December, 1999 and the official recognition of Turkey as a candidate for full membership, the debate over the issue of Turkey's accession has become more prominent in public sphere as well as in political and academic circles. Therefore, the stasis points of this particular debate could be classified in general terms as economic, political and cultural. However, before elaborating on the determinants of public consent or opposition regarding Turkey's membership, we need to clarify how the arguments and policies of European elites, Eurocrats and politicians are formulated in terms of those stasis points.

The formulation of arguments and policies with respect to Turkey's candidacy in view of those stasis points basically stem from two theoretical approaches: rationalism and constructivism. From the rationalist point of view, EU actors make a cost/benefit analysis and discuss whether the marginal benefit of accession of Turkey exceeds the marginal cost of it. There are numerous determinants affecting this cost/benefit analysis such as trade volume, labor market, monetary and fiscal policies, re-allocation of regional development

funds etc. In contrast, from the constructivist point of view, those actors argue whether Turkey shares the collective identity, values and norms of the EU. The determinants here can be cultural and centered on how being “European” is defined with respect to shared values and identity. Norm based determinants are political, which mainly focus on whether Turkey has a stable political environment with consolidated democracy, where the rights of citizens rights are fully respected (particularly human rights). There are also a number of dichotomies in this debate like “East / West” and “Christian / Muslim” dichotomies embedded in the rhetoric used by the actors.

When the data gathered from successive Eurobarometer surveys between 2000 and 2009 are analyzed, despite the fact that the ratio of approval for Turkey’s membership fluctuated over time, Turkey’s candidacy was supported until 2009. Regarding the issue of the EU enlargement, the ratio of people in 25 member countries supporting the enlargement reached to a peak point in 2004, according to Eurobarometer no. 62 survey, which was conducted first time after the Eastern enlargement. However, the same ratio dropped and was surpassed by the ratio of people who are against the EU enlargement in 2009.


Figure 1. The public opinion in EU Member Countries about the Enlargement



Source: Eurobarometer Surveys from 54 to 71 (2000 – 2009)

Turkey is the least supported and the most opposed candidate country in various Eurobarometer surveys from 1999 to 2008. Moreover, there has been an increase in the share of European citizens who are against the accession of Turkey, which was 47 % in 1999 and rose up to 55 % in 2008.

Figure 2. The public opinion in EU member countries about the accession of Turkey



Source: Eurobarometer Surveys 52(1999), 53 (2000), 54 (2000), 56 (2001), 57 (2002), 58 (2002), 63 (2005), 64 (2005), 66 (2006), 69 (2008)

Based on these results, it could be argued that there is a clear bifurcation of the public opinion in the EU regarding Turkey's membership. Although Turkey is the least supported country, there is also a remarkable increase in the number of European citizens who support the accession of Turkey. Given such a controversial issue where some member states wholeheartedly support Turkey's

membership while the others fiercely oppose, a comprehensive research on the public opinion and its dynamics becomes vital.

European integration is often described as an elite-driven project where its institutions, the Commission and the Council, are regarded as the main players. Public has a limited role in decision-making processes, mainly via the European Parliament. However, unproportional share of the Parliament in decision making process, compared to the share of the Commission and the Council together with a decreased turnout in Parliament elections eventually lead to a debate on whether there is a democratic deficit within the EU, which implies that decision-makers in the EU are not sufficiently responsive to the preferences of EU citizens. However, public consent is a necessity for decision-makers as they need to legitimize their actions in order to remain as an authority. Considering that the voting turnout at the European Parliament elections has been steadily decreasing from 61.99 % in 1979 to a record-low 43.2 % in 2009, the debate over democratic deficit and thus the legitimacy of the EU governance becomes even fiercer.

Given the circumstances, national referendums on the integration of Europe have been crucial to express the public opinion. Especially after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by Dutch and French citizens in 2005, it became evident that European integration project could not be sustained as an elite-driven project and public consent is vital for further integration.

Considering that public support is now one of the major determinants for European integration, the crucial question is: which factors have an impact on dynamics of the public opinion towards further integration? The role of the actors in decision making process as well as citizens' preferences towards integration could be assessed in view of the literature on the enlargement by analyzing to what extent they prioritize utility, value or right for this particular policy.

Even though Turkey's accession is one of the most controversial and debatable issues on the agenda of the EU, the literature on decisive factors that shape the public opinion about Turkey is relatively scarce. Most of the studies concerning EU citizens' perceptions and attitudes towards Turkey's candidacy formulate the public opinion in terms of expected material benefits or feeling of identity (Canan-Sokullu and Kentmen, 2010). Particularly, the most neglected determinant is the media and its effect on the formation of the public opinion through "visibility of news" or "news framing."

Expected material benefits from an accession of a new country could be an important factor in order to understand the public opinion towards the enlargement. European citizens could perceive the whole process of enlargement in terms of its affects over their economic well-being. Through the rational calculation of economic interests, people either support or disfavor it. As it is not easy to predict how the enlargement will affect the pockets of

citizens individually, such calculation could be done at a societal level and argued that EU citizens would support the enlargement as long as the enlargement is beneficial to their national economy in general (Kentmen, 2008).

Non-economic concerns could be important factors to understand the public opinion towards the enlargement as well. Those factors are based on the identity of EU citizens and manifest themselves by how they describe the effect of the enlargement on the way of their living. In other words, EU citizens would support enlargement as long as they think the accession country shares the same historical, cultural, religious values or norms such as democracy, freedom and human rights (Carey, 2002).

According to Lauren McLaren (2007), even though the public opposition to the inclusion of other countries in the union may be related to economic self-interests, in the case of Turkey's candidacy, economic concerns have a little role in explaining the opposition. In fact, individual-level feelings of perceived cultural threat to group resources and culture have more explanatory power with regards to opposition to accession of Turkey. McLaren (2007) asserts that this peculiar situation can be better understood if the experience of EU citizens with Turkish immigrants could be considered as a key factor to explain this hostility.

In line with the above arguments, De Vreese, Boomgaarden and Semetko (2008) indicate that "soft" indicators such as feeling of identity and attitude towards immigrants outweigh the "hard" economic and utilitarian indicators in

explaining the public opinion about the accession of Turkey to the EU. That does not necessarily mean that EU citizens do not consider material benefits while forming an attitude towards Turkey's membership. In fact, the importance of economic and utilitarian indicators is mediated through soft indicators such as anti-immigration attitudes.

As mentioned before, the integration of Europe is an abstract and complex process that an ordinary citizen might not assess thoroughly all aspects of this phenomenon due to the lack of necessary information channels. Perceptions towards a candidate country generally stem from a limited direct experience with the citizens' of that country, mostly through immigrants. That is why media becomes an important information tool for the formation of the public opinion about a candidate country. Media is not only a source that transmits messages about the enlargement process but also an influential factor, which shapes the perception of citizens towards a candidate country.

As European integration has been deepening and has no longer been an elite-driven top-down project steered by the actions of European elites, EU policies have become more integrated with domestic politics of the member countries more than ever. The interaction between the EU policies and policies at a national level has started to affect the nature of the news regarding the EU and the role of media. The deepening of European integration has indeed strengthened the media and made it a more powerful and complex instrument with regards to perception of European citizens. The news about the EU policies

are now inevitably perceived and interpreted by citizens in conjunction with imminent implications on domestic policies.

Recent studies reveal that visibility of an issue in the news influences the importance attributed by public to this issue (De Vreese et al. 2001, 2006). This is the agenda-setting role of media which manifests itself by the visibility and the salience of an issue in the news. Moreover, media-priming theories suggest that visibility of an issue in the news not only influences the perceived importance of that issue but also provides a basis for the public to evaluate institutions, political parties and its leaders. Framing of an issue in the news may be another determinant on the perception of public in addition to its visibility and salience. Framing is a narrative technique about how the story of a particular issue is built in the news. News framing analysis goes beyond the agenda-setting and media-priming studies and suggests that media could affect the perception of public not only by imposing what to think but also how to think about a particular issue.

Besides the difference in their scope and instruments to test the effect of media, the common point of previous studies is that “media matters” (De Vreese et al. 2001, 2006; Weaver, 2007). Media directly affects the perception of public both at an individual and societal level. If media is considered a major information source for the citizens of the member countries on the EU enlargement, then the role of media becomes crucial.

In this regard, it is necessary to understand the role of media in the formation of the public opinion about Turkey's membership to the EU. However, there is no research, which provides empirical findings to allow scholars to construct a relationship between media and the public opinion in the EU towards Turkey's accession. Therefore, this study is an attempt to fill the gap in the literature by elaborating on the effect of media in the public opinion formation regarding Turkey's membership.

First, the study aims to contribute to communication studies by providing empirical evidence about the role of media as an instrument in altering perceptions through priming specific issues in the news and framing them in a particular way. Second, it aims to contribute to the public opinion literature by analyzing the determinants of the public opinion and elaborating on the image of those determinants in the news. Last but not least, analyzing the role of media in the public opinion formation would help us to better understand the dynamics that affect the public opinion and the role of the public opinion on further integration of the EU.

The aim of this study is not to predict the results of any upcoming European referendum on Turkey's accession, nor to provide tools that would affect the results of such referendum. The main motivation of this study is to test whether there is a relationship between media and the public opinion about Turkey's accession. Exploring this relationship by providing empirical findings is

insightful for all the parties involved in the enlargement process. In this sense, the purpose of this study is to show the importance of the media industry as an instrument to shape people's perceptions by deciding on the visibility of news in news coverage as well as the framing of them in order to attract the attention of the readers. This study also provides insights for the elites -as cue givers- about the impact of the media as an agent and underlines the fact that it is necessary for media to frame this "cue" in order to transmit the intended message to the public. Lastly, this study provides insights for public as readership and reminds that news covered in media shape our perceptions towards a particular issue not only by providing core facts but also by genuinely framing those facts.

Therefore, the primary question examined in this study is to what extent the visibility and framing of news on Turkey's EU membership affects the public opinion. In order to find an answer to this question, a case study was designed to focus on the role of one of the most consequential British newspapers, namely the *Guardian*, over the thinking of British citizens towards Turkey's candidacy. Although British governments have consistently supported the idea of Turkey being in the EU, the British public opinion towards this issue has not been steady over time. Latest Eurobarometer survey no. 69 (2008) showed that majority of the citizens in Britain are against the accession of Turkey. In this respect, the case study designed in this research offers a fruitful insight to explore the role of media as a transmitter between elite discourse and the public opinion.

Firstly, various news in *the Guardian* about Turkey's membership six months prior to six different Eurobarometer surveys between October 2001 and October 2007 are analyzed in order to assess the visibility of those news and how they were framed either positively (opportunity) or negatively (risk). Parallel to this, Eurobarometer surveys no. 57 (2002), no. 58 (2003), no 63 (2005), no. 64 (2006), no. 66 (2007) and no. 69 (2008) are examined to further evaluate the public opinion on this issue. Lastly, whether there is any relationship between media and the public opinion about Turkey's accession is evaluated.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

While the EU has been evolving from a basic economic cooperation to a supranational and fully integrated political entity, it is clear that public has been a transformative power which could change the rule of the game by shifting the balance of power in decision making process (Schmitter, 2008). Hooghe and Marks (2008) point out that in sixteen years following the Treaty of Maastricht, which was signed in February 1992 and created what was commonly referred as the pillar structure of the EU, twenty-seven referendums in total were held. This figure was only seven in twenty-five years prior to the Treaty. Clearly, there has been an increasing tendency, after the Treaty, for member states to resort to the public opinion more frequently about issues regarding European integration. Statistics also reveal that out of those twenty-seven referendums, six were rejected by public and, among them the Dutch and French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, and the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in

2008 appeared to be the most remarkable breaking points in the integration project.

The rejection of those treaties indicates that public has an immense power over the issue of the EU enlargement. Another revelation is that there is no *permissive consensus* between European elites and mass public anymore on the direction and speed of the integration. If neo-functionalist and inter-governmentalist elite arguments on economic interdependency of the member states and efficiency in policy-making process no longer convince public for further integration, what are the dynamics of public mobilization, and thus the determinants of an attitude formation towards European integration?

2.1. LITERATURE ON DETERMINANTS OF THE PUBLIC OPINION

Since it is clear that the public opinion has emerged as one of the major determinants that has an important affect on decision-making process regarding European integration, most of the literature deals with this crucial question: which factors do have an impact on the formation of the public opinion? This question inevitably leads us to ask another basic question which is: why do some EU citizens support further integration of the EU while some others do not? That is why the vast literature on the public opinion deals specifically with the categorization of citizens based on various parameters, which cause a variation in people's support for European integration (Gabel, 1998a; Hooghe, 2007). This study reviews three major strands in the literature to explore the

determinants of the public opinion towards the enlargement of the EU: cognitive mobilization approach, utilitarian approach and identity-based approach.

2.1.1. COGNITIVE MOBILIZATION APPROACH

Cognitive mobilization approach, which increases individual's capacity to receive and interpret messages, is one of the most important determinants of public support for European integration (Inglehart, 1970; Dalton, 1984; Janssen, 1991). The rationale behind this approach is that if the individual becomes more aware of the EU politics, it becomes easier for them to develop a sense of commitment. According to this hypothesis, a person with a higher level of education and of political knowledge has a greater capability to receive and interpret messages and is more inclined to support the idea of European integration. Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1991) and Jansen (1991) elaborated on this hypothesis and provided evidence to support that if the cognitive mobilization of a citizen increases, she or he will be more competent to internalize the concept of integration, and thus more prone to support it. However, according to Gabel (1998 a, b), both studies omit necessary control variables, which makes them insufficient to test alternative explanations of public support.

2.1.2. UTILITARIAN APPROACH

The expectations of citizens whether further integration would provide them material benefits could be regarded as another influential factor to understand the public opinion towards European integration. This specific strand of literature provides us with various economic models based on a utilitarian cost / benefit analysis. Those models assume that citizens would support European integration if the marginal benefit of further integration exceeds the marginal cost of it. The starting point here is to define the rationale in the minds of individuals, since it provides a basis for such a utilitarian calculation. The utilitarian theories of the public opinion can be categorized under two groups relating to whether they assume that citizens prime *egocentric* or *socio-tropic* evaluations in their cost / benefit analysis (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998a; Gabel and Palmer, 1995).

According to the *egocentric* perspective, citizens form their opinion about a particular policy (i.e. integration, enlargement) as a result of an individualistic cost / benefit calculation, which allow them to assess how this specific policy change could affect him/her individually. This perspective is micro-economic in its nature as it generally employs parameters at an individual basis such as income and occupation (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998a, b; Gabel and Palmer, 1995).

On the other hand, according to the *socio-tropic* perspective, citizens' attitude towards a policy change is influenced by their country's overall economic configuration, considering how this policy change could affect them not individually but rather collectively as a nation. Contrary to the *egocentric* perspective, *socio-tropic* perspective is macro-economic in its nature as it employs nation-wide parameters like gross domestic income (GDP) and inflation (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Brinegar et al., 2004; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005).

Utilitarian theories of the public opinion could be further extended into two strands based on whether subjective or objective factors are taken into consideration in analyzing issues. Accordingly, citizens may form an attitude towards European integration based on rational, objective, and economic evaluations either through an *egocentric* perspective considering their individual income, educational level, occupation etc. or through a *socio-tropic* perspective considering their nations' GDP, inflation, net fiscal transfers, unemployment rate etc.

In order to make objective economic evaluations, citizens should be informed about the content of the integration and its economic effects on them either individually or collectively. As Anderson (1998) argues, if citizens are not well informed about the EU, they tend to use "proxies" in order to evaluate the organization as a whole. Those proxies are based on their perceptions. Keeping this in mind, if they have a lack of information about European integration,

citizens tend to form attitude through subjective economic evaluations about their individual (*egocentric*) or national (*socio-tropic*) economic prospects based on their retrospective and/or prospective perceptions about the economic condition (Gabel and Whitten, 1997). In this respect, if there are no sufficient information channels for public to assess actual policy implications of the integration process, it would not be the facts and figures that form the basis for the cost/benefit calculation of citizens, but rather their vague state of mind about economic well being and interests.

Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) specifically elaborated on whether European citizens' attitudes towards the integration are affected by their objective evaluation of macro-economic parameters such as national GDP, inflation and unemployment. Eichenberg and Dalton's analysis of the public opinion is based on a *socio-tropic* economic model, which assumes that European citizens make objective utilitarian calculation of collective costs and benefits at a national level. Eichenberg and Dalton analyze the period between 1973 and 1988 in order to test the effects of those macro-economic parameters together with international economic factors such as a share of intra-EC export in total trade and EC budget return on public support at a national level. The findings of their research indicate that inflation and the share of intra-EC exports in total trade are the most significant factors that affect how public evaluate the integration. Although the effects of GDP and unemployment on public support for the integration are proved, their relative explanatory power is much weaker compared to inflation and the share of intra-EC export in total trade.

Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Anderson and Reichert (1996) argue that European citizens' support for the integration is shaped by their objective evaluation of expected material gains from the integration process. Their analyses are based on a micro-economic model, which claims that citizens' utilitarian evaluations are individualistic in the sense that socio-economic parameters such as income, occupation, education etc. need to be taken into consideration in utility expectations of citizens. According to this perspective, if citizens make their utilitarian evaluation based on accessible objective information about economic condition, it is more likely for an ordinary citizen to acquire it from individual economic parameters which have a more direct effect on personal economic well-being than national economic parameters.

Gabel (1998a) further extends this microeconomic model in order to elaborate on a variation in support for the EU membership among skilled and unskilled workers. Gabel hypothesizes that EU citizens' attitude towards the EU membership is formed and shaped according to their occupation-based economic interests. More specifically, the EU membership introduces the elimination of the barriers for goods, services, labor and capital within the EU, which eventually provides different levels of gains and losses for workers, professionals and executives. Therefore, Gabel asserts that due to the consequences of market liberalization, unskilled manual workers of the EU would evaluate the issue of the EU membership relative to their wages. On the other hand, since professionals and executives from advanced economies are

more competent in a liberalized market, support among those professionals and executives would be positively correlated with relative value of their human capital. The results of Gabel's analysis therefore provide significant evidence that citizens' support for the EU membership is consistent with their occupation-based economic interests.

Gabel and Whitten (1997) modify the *socio-tropic* economic voting model of Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) by taking sub-national (i.e. regional) economic conditions into account. They investigate the effect of subjective economic evaluations of citizens on the formation of an attitude towards the integration. Their analysis is relatively more comprehensive as it investigates the effect of both objective and subjective economic conditions while controlling for a variety of individual level factors. In this analysis, inflation, employment, and GDP are used as indicators of objective economic conditions. Two questions from Eurobarometer surveys are used to test the effect of retrospective evaluations of citizens over both their personal and national economic situation. The statistical analysis conducted by them provides evidence that it is the "subjective" considerations about economy rather than the "objective" ones, which influence the support for the integration. The results conclude that citizens' support for European integration could vary in accordance with a change in their economic perceptions. More importantly, no matter how much the integration is beneficial, it is the perception of citizens which becomes decisive at the end.

Brinegar and Jolly (2005), while admitting that it is the *socio-tropic* evaluation of citizens that mostly affects the support for the integration, claim that failure to specify the link between individual and national contextual factors might lead to a biased conclusion. In contrast to the general consensus on the notion that lower-skilled workers are more prone to have negative evaluations about the integration, Brinegar and Jolly assert that the effect of skill levels could only be understood through the frame of national factor endowments. Their analysis provides significant evidence that skill-endowment is negatively correlated to support for the integration, showing that citizens in low-skill-endowment countries support the integration at a higher level compared to citizens from high-skill-endowment countries. Accordingly, lower skilled workers in low-skill-endowment countries - where labor is more abundant – are expected to support European integration in general (more specifically free mobilization of labor) at a higher level than lower skilled workers in high-skill-endowment countries where labor is relatively scarce, and thus lower skilled worker has more bargaining power.

The unprecedented decline in 1990s in the support for European integration brought the economic utilitarian model and its neo-functionalist background under the lash of criticisms. Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) revisited their *socio-tropic* model in order to explain this *anomaly* in public support which began to be apparent following the Maastricht Treaty. Eichenberg and Dalton claimed that the Maastricht Treaty was a system transforming event, which altered both the nature of the integration and citizens' cost/benefit calculations. Especially,

the transition to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) during the post-Maastricht era and its new convergence criteria led citizens to become aware of the direct implications of this policy change to their livelihood. Eichenberg and Dalton suggested that even though it is unwise to ignore the explanatory power of macro-economic indicators, it is necessary to consider more specific policy preferences of European citizens as the integration now affects their livelihoods more directly. As they put it “the politics of integration are no longer the politics of absolute welfare; they are the politics of re-distribution” (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007: 146).

The primary assumption that lies beneath the economic utilitarian models of the public opinion is that citizens form attitudes towards the integration according to their material cost/ benefit calculations. Utilitarian calculations are inherently made in rational claiming that actors have the necessary information in order to assess costs and benefits of a particular action. Therefore, utilitarian theories of the public opinion tend to have more explanatory power, provided that European citizens can evaluate economic consequences of the integration with a considerable degree of accuracy. Otherwise, as Anderson (1998) points out, if there is a lack of such information, citizens tend to use “proxies” instead of actual economic parameters in forming attitude towards the integration.

However, as Garry and Tilley (2009) point out, since the EU is a moving target which continuously evolved from an economic entity into a more political entity, driving motivations of the public opinion also moved and transformed

themselves, which make utilitarian economic models inadequate to explain the complex nature of this emerging political entity. That is why concerns about the limitations of utilitarian economic models led scholars to focus on alternative theories, mainly identity-related ones in order to capture what is missing in utilitarian economic models.

2.1.3. IDENTITY-BASED APPROACH

The basic distinction between a utilitarian approach and an identity-based approach manifests itself by the primary assumption, which lies beneath an identity-based approach, that it is not the economic and material considerations of citizens but rather intense feelings of a group loyalty that primarily shape people's attitudes towards the integration. Notwithstanding the fact that the conceptualization of "identity" varies within the literature, the most common terminal societal grouping is considered as "nation-state." In this respect, identity-based approach explores the casual relationship between citizens' feelings about their national identity and their attitudes towards European integration.

McLaren (2002) argues that the shifting of sovereignty from a nation-level to the EU-level might be perceived by some EU citizens as a threat to the capacity as well as to the role of their nation-state and such a perceived threat might lead citizens to protect their in-group ('nation') against their out-group (the EU). Perceived threat is framed as antipathy towards other cultures, which mainly

stems from nationalistic attachments. McLaren measures perceived threat using two parameters derived from the literature –realistic threat and symbolic threat. McLaren’s model implies that in-group protection may arise either from a realistic threat which is the result of the worry that other groups would take their national resources (i.e. abuse of social benefits by migrants and other minorities), or from a symbolic threat which stems from a perception that other groups pose a threat to their culture and life style (i.e. threat posed by religious practices of minority groups).

The results of McLaren’s study indicate that even though the utilitarian concerns are still relevant in shaping attitudes towards the integration, perceived threat, which manifests itself with hostility towards other groups in order to protect their own group, produces equally strong effects on support for the integration. In this sense, we may expect that while the integration provides mobilization for European citizens within the EU, it may not be welcomed by EU citizens who believe that such a freedom would end up with the abuse of national resources and/or become an impediment to their lifestyle because of the fact that migrants and minorities also benefit from such mobilization.

De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005) argue that it is not an in-group protection which stems from nationalistic attachments but rather negative out-group bias which explains opposition to the integration. De Vreese and Boomgarden extend the “perceived threat” argument presented by McLaren (2002) and state that threat posed by outsiders which results in a general hostility towards migrants is

a key to understand opposition. They argue that although national identity and economic concerns are related with anti-immigration sentiments, national identity and immigration concerns are conceptually different. The findings of their analysis indicate that anti-immigration sentiments in Denmark and the Netherlands are strongly related to Euro-skeptic attitude of citizens in those countries apart from the level of attachment to the nation or national pride among citizens of those countries.

From a different point of view, Carey (2002) demonstrates that higher feelings of national identity decrease support for European integration as a result of the tension caused by the sovereignty transfer from a nation-state to the EU. Carey explores three alternative conceptualizations of national identity: intensity of feelings towards nation; level of attachment to nation relative to other territorial entities; and perceived cultural threat posed by other cultures. Although the study confirms that national identity in terms of an attachment to a country and national pride is negatively related to support for European integration, it is not necessarily the case if the individual has a strong attachment to another territorial identity (i.e. Europe) at the same time. In view of this, if a citizen in Netherlands has pretty much same level of attachment to the Dutch identity and European identity at the same time, having strong feelings about the Dutch identity would not necessarily trigger a skeptic attitude towards European integration.

The relationship between national identity and anti-integrationist sentiments are “nuanced,” thus sensitive to the conceptualization of national identity. Various studies with contradictory results regarding the relationship between national identity and Euro-skepticism confirm this assertion. In Swiss case, Christin and Trechsel (2002) found that national identity is negatively related to support for accession to the EU. Likewise, according to Carey (2002), national pride is an obstacle to European integration. Adam Ludtke (2005) confirms this negative relationship by exploring public attitude towards harmonization of a specific policy area, which is an immigration policy. Unlike Christin and Trechsel, Carey and Adam Ludtke, Richard Heasley (2001) asserts that there is a positive relationship between Scottish identity and support for European integration. Similarly, Diez Medrano (2003) confirms that Spanish citizens may feel attached to multiple identities such as Catalan, Spanish and European at the same time.

In order to generalize the nature of the relationship between national identity and support for European integration, Hooghe and Marks (2004) suggest a distinction between exclusive and inclusive national identities. They argue that a sense of national identity exclusive of other territorial entities is likely to be the root of skepticism to multi-level governance. In this sense, citizens who identify themselves exclusively Belgian are more prone to oppose European integration, while citizens who identify themselves both Belgian and European at the same time are more prone to support integration.

If we consider the impact of national identity on attitudes towards European integration not as uniform across Europe, then what makes some citizens to hold an exclusive sense of national identity while forming an opinion about a particular political object (i.e. enlargement of the EU)? Hooghe and Marks (2005) claim that the connection between national identity and attitude towards European integration is constructed through socialization and political conflict. Their analysis indicates that exclusive national identity is a strong predictor of attitudes towards European integration where national elites are divided on the EU politics. On the other hand, De Vries and van Keerbergen (2007) provide an alternative explanation to the conditionality between national identity and support for European integration, suggesting that explanatory power of exclusive national identity depends on how individual level economic factors are perceived by citizens.

As identity-based approach has been gaining importance among the academic and scientific circles, many studies explored the comparative explanatory power of economic-utilitarian approach and identity-based approaches. Those studies assume that these two approaches are inherently competitive. However, Garry and Tilley (2009) argues that economic-utilitarian and identity-based theories are not competitors but rather need to be treated as complementary in the sense that the impact of national identity is conditional to the macro-economic context of a country. Garry and Tilley introduce the term “economic xenophobia” which means that citizens from relatively developed countries feel more threatened from economic migration, thus more likely to oppose further integration of the

EU. Furthermore, Garry and Tilley claim that citizens of countries, which are net contributors to the EU budget, are more likely to attach themselves to their national identity exclusively, thus more prone to form Euro-skeptic attitudes.

2.2. LITERATURE ON THE PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT TURKEY'S ACCESSION

It is evident that especially after the approval of the Maastricht Treaty – which is considered a system transforming event – attention of scholars to the dynamics of the public opinion in the EU has considerably increased. There is a rich literature analyzing the determinants of the public opinion on European integration. However, studies exploring attitudes of European citizens towards the accession of Turkey are relatively scarce. Although it has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 with the prospect of a full membership, Turkey could only gain its candidate status in 1999 and was able to start accession negotiations in 2005 after massive political and economic reforms. Considering the fact that Turkey's candidacy is one of the most contentious issues in the agenda of the EU and Turkey is the least supported and the most opposed candidate country in various Eurobarometer surveys since 1999; and that some of the member states already declared that they would call a national referendum regarding Turkey's accession, the prospect of Turkey becoming an EU member in the future might come to a halt by the decisions of EU citizens. Therefore, it

is crucial for us to find an answer to the striking question of why public opposition in EU countries to Turkey's membership is so high.

Lauren M. McLaren (2007) analyzes the attitude of EU citizens towards Turkey's membership by employing two key theoretical approaches in a multi-level analysis: rational economic self-interest and group-level interest. The results of her study indicate that even though the rational economic model has an explanatory power regarding public opposition to other countries' candidacies in general, it does not help us to understand the opposition to Turkey's membership. Furthermore, McLaren investigates group-level interest by conceptualizing perceived threat in two alternative ways: threat to group resources and threat to culture. While the impact of both 'threat to group resources' and 'threat to group culture' is statistically significant and the impact of those parameters is pretty much the same for other pre-2004 candidates, it is again inadequate to understand the particular fear among public about Turkey's membership. The peculiarity of the Turkish case could then be best understood when the threatening context provided by the influx of Turkish immigrants into the EU is added to this multi-level analysis. According to McLaren, what makes EU citizens hostile to the candidacy of Turkey more than any other candidate member is their experience with Turkish immigrants and their high level of threat perception associated with it.

Similarly, de Vreese and Boomgaarden (2008) explore the impact of both "hard" economic utilitarian factors and "soft" identity related factors in order to

understand the dynamics of the public opinion about Turkey's membership. The results of their study suggest that even though "soft" predictors such as exclusive identity and anti-immigration sentiments outweigh "hard" predictors such as economic considerations, "hard" predictors are not totally irrelevant, but rather mediated through "soft" predictors (particularly the issue of immigration). Based on these findings, de Vreese and Boomgaarden draw attention to the fact that given the importance of identity related considerations about foreigners, a broader view about the role of media content covering economy, immigration, integration policies is needed to be taken into consideration in order to evaluate the formation and alteration of attitudes of European citizens towards the integration.

A satisfactory and effectual analysis concerning the determinants of the public opinion towards the integration in general and the enlargement in particular would inevitably need to deal with an amalgamated issue of Euro-skepticism. Hooghe and Marks (2007) state that although both the level and nature of Euro-skepticism varies across Europe, the causality of it appears to be patterned. In the early stages of the EU, it was mainly an opposition to market integration (economic concerns), while especially after the Maastricht Treaty, and the political integration, it turned to be an opposition to the shift of national sovereignty from a nation-state to a supranational authority to defend nation as a terminal community (identity concerns).

2.2. LITERATURE ON THE PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ROLE OF MEDIA

As Euro-skepticism grew and evolved into a more complex phenomenon in nature, the gap between pro-European elites and Euro-skeptic public has widened further. Steenbergen et al. (2007) claim that the legitimacy of the future integration depends on constructing an effective elite-public linkage, which requires both awareness of and interest in the EU. According to Timus (2006), such a linkage can be provided by broad informational campaigns conducted in every member state, which would in turn allow elites to “re-sell” the benefits of European integration. In this sense, media plays a crucial role and is considered the most powerful mediating actor that provides various channels for elites to cue the masses.

Media is not only a transmitter between elites and EU citizens which helps them to exchange their preferences and opinions about the EU integration, but also an exclusive factor that could directly shape the public opinion through news. Media is also a very powerful tool that it could easily affect the public opinion on any particular issue by giving more weight to that issue in its news coverage to attract attention. Moreover, if that particular issue is highly controversial like the issue of European integration, by focusing on a specific content and giving more news coverage to certain aspects of the issue (i.e. economic, political, moral etc.), media could directly influence the direction of public debate. Another mechanism that media uses extensively is news framing, in which news

about a certain issue is tried to be fit in a particular mindset by using certain language in order to evoke perceptions and predispositions of public.

Dalton and Duval (1986) assert that at the very early stages of the EU integration, there was a strong relationship between the British press and its influence over the British public opinion about the integration. Even though the study of Dalton and Duval does not test the direct impact of media on the public opinion, it indicates that events in political environment could shift the public opinion in short term, although this mechanism is conditional to the visibility of events. Thus, political events are needed to be differentiated from public events. Whether a political event is considered major or minor within the context of politics, it does not make sense unless the issue clearly dominates news coverage where media sets the agenda for public.

Page and Saphiro (1992) demonstrate that media is more powerful to shape the public opinion on international issues rather than domestic ones since citizens could experience at firsthand the ramifications of domestic politics, which in return diminish the need for news for further information. This finding is important in the sense that it enables us to assert that EU citizens would be more inclined to resort to media in order to obtain information about the EU enlargement policies and the integration process as these subjects are relatively abstract and more complex than domestic issues, where citizens have almost no direct experience with.

Numerous approaches within the communication literature assume that media is potentially influential over the formation of citizens' attitudes and thus shaping effectively the public opinion towards different issues. The important distinction among those approaches could be found in answers given to these two questions: how does media affect the public opinion (i.e. agenda-setting, priming, framing effects) and to what extent its effect is conditional to various characteristics of audience (perceptions, predispositions, ideological preference, political sophistication etc.). Even though the answers are diversified with respect to their emphasis on to what extent media is influential on the public opinion, it is clear that media could not merely be considered as a source of information, but rather as a manipulative instrument which could affect the public opinion through information it provides.

In short, agenda-setting implies that media can affect the public opinion by emphasizing some issues more than others and by giving more coverage and repetition for those issues in news. In this way, media can set public agenda by influencing the perception of audience about what is more important. Similarly, priming, which is employed to evaluate political issues and politicians, implies that media can alter criteria of audience through priming some issues more than others. For example, if media attributes more importance to policies of social security rather than foreign policy issues, it inevitably influences its readers and makes them evaluate their government performance based on its approach and actions towards social security issues rather than foreign policy ones. When it comes to framing, it means that media can affect the public opinion not merely

by giving more space to certain issues in its coverage, but by interpreting those issues in an authentic way in order to change the perception of audience about those issues (Scheufele, 2009).

Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) indicate that the primary difference between accessibility-based models (agenda-setting and priming models) and applicability-based models (framing model) is their locus of effect which can be interpreted as the difference between the way we think of an issue and how we think about it. Scheufele and Tewksbury state that although the locus of effect is different in accessibility-based models and applicability models, those concepts cannot be isolated from one another. It is clear that an issue will be more applicable when news is more accessible. Likewise, an inapplicable issue will be ineffective to influence the perceptions of audience, no matter how much it is emphasized in news.

Chong and Druckman (2007) point out that the impact of news framing on the public opinion is conditional to a number of mediators and moderators, namely the strength and repetition of the frame, competitive context of an issue, individual predispositions and prior knowledge, the credibility of a source, the ability of the frame to invoke longstanding cultural values of audience and the availability of other information about an issue.

Claes H. de Vreese (2007) investigates the role of media on Euro-skepticism by testing whether news that frames Euro-politics as an arena of self-serving

politicians increase public cynicism on the EU. The study covers and compares, in terms of their content, a total of 1477 articles from five most widely read newspapers and a total of 1477 news stories from widely watched television programmes in Denmark and the Netherlands in order to explore the dynamics of Euro-skepticism in a panel survey. The panel survey is supported with an experimental design to test the relationship between media and Euro-skepticism at an individual level by asking 83 randomly selected respondents to read experimentally manipulated news story about Euro-politics. The results of the study confirm that there is a strong relationship between strategically framed news on Euro-politics and the level of cynicism about European integration. However, this particular framing effect of media is conditional upon both the pervasiveness of strategically framed news and characteristics of the respondents (i.e. their political sophistication and prior knowledge about the issue). On the other hand, news about the EU –if they are not strategically framed – is positively related with the decrease in cynicism and skepticism about European integration.

Scharkow and Vogelgesang (2007) explore whether domestic media can affect people's attitude towards European integration by providing factual information about the EU. The study provides a cross-national analysis by employing structural equation modeling techniques to Eurobarometer data in order to test whether news provided by domestic media can generate awareness about European politics and increase public support for the EU integration either directly or indirectly. Even though the study does not include a content analysis

considering how news about the EU is framed, it confirms that factual knowledge about the EU is the strongest predictor of public support for European integration, and because of the fact that domestic media supply public with a good collection of news about the EU, it could be said that media positively influences public support for further integration.

Maier and Rittberger (2008) employ an experimental design in order to test whether exposure to media can affect public attitude towards the enlargement through news about a candidate country and its economic situation, level of democracy and its cultural match with the EU. In this experimental analysis, 95 university students were asked to read experimentally designed pairs of newspaper articles, which framed three issues either positively or negatively: Macedonia's economic condition, the level of democracy in Macedonia, and cultural match between Macedonia and the EU. Even though the sample is relatively small and only limited to university students who are supposed to have a higher degree of political sophistication relative to ordinary citizens, the results of the study confirms that media exposure can affect citizens' attitudes towards the enlargement of the EU by changing the standards of citizens which are used to evaluate a candidate country. Considering the fact that cultural match is already a primary determinant in citizens' minds in evaluating a candidate country, only an exposure to news about the level of democracy in a candidate country has a significant priming effect to change people's attitudes towards that country.

From a different perspective, Schuck and de Vreese (2009) investigate the role of positive framing of news on referendum campaigns in electoral mobilization of skeptics. The rationale behind the idea of a “reversed mobilization” is that exposure to news that frame a referendum campaign positively could increase the risk perception of citizens who are against a proposal of a referendum which further make them to participate in elections in order to prevent an undesired outcome. This multi-methodological study combines a panel survey and an experimental design in order to test the effects of news framing within the context of the referendum on the EU Constitution in the Netherlands in 2005. The findings of the study confirm that positive news framing about the referendum mobilize skeptics to vote against it. More importantly, the results demonstrate that if citizens hold strong attitudes about a particular proposal, the persuasive effect of media decreases.

A recent study by Vliegenthart et al. (2008), which reviews the effects of both the visibility and framing of EU news for support for European integration at an aggregate level, provides us with important insights regarding the role of media. The study covers articles from newspapers of seven member states (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) between 1990 and 2006. The analysis first reviews the effects of news on attitudes towards the EU in general in terms of visibility of EU news. Then, it considers the effects of framing of EU news by measuring the presence of benefit frame, disadvantage frame and conflict frame respectively in articles about the EU. The result of the analysis suggests that framing of EU news in

terms of benefit and conflict has an impact on public support in the sense that benefit framing increases public support for European integration while conflict framing decreases it.

De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) further investigate the effects of media on the public opinion about the enlargement of the EU in order to find an answer to the question of how the content of news influences public support for the enlargement. Their analysis takes into account a number of variables that have been found effective on the public opinion such as gender, age, educational status and ideological preferences. Through a comprehensive literature review on the issue of the public opinion, the study investigates not only the effect of media but also other influences, such as economic evaluation, anti-immigration sentiment, domestic political considerations and cognitive mobilization. The regression analysis regarding possible determinants of public support for the enlargement is based on the surveys conducted in Denmark and the Netherlands. The analysis of the content of various television news and newspapers prior to the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in December 2002 provides evidence that although media matters for the public opinion, it does so conditionally. Media only matters if citizens were exposed to a considerable level of news coverage with a consistent evaluative direction.

According to Schuck and De Vreese (2006), it is important to investigate to what extent the Eastern enlargement is framed in terms of risk and opportunity, and what their effects are on public support for the enlargement. In order to

investigate how the Eastern enlargement is portrayed in newspapers (either as a risk or an opportunity), their study, which covers a time period between November 2002 and October 2003, gathers data from four national daily newspapers in Germany namely, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Die Welt*. An experimental design is employed to test the effect of those frames on the perceptions of individuals towards the enlargement. The findings of the experiment, which was conducted in January 2004 by the participation of 88 undergraduate students at the University of Greifswald in Germany, suggest that news framing on the EU enlargement in terms of an opportunity (risk) affect the direction of the public opinion towards the enlargement positively (negatively). Moreover, it is noticed that this effect is moderated by political knowledge in the sense that people with less knowledge on this particular issue are more prone to be affected by risk framing.

3. NEWS FRAMING, RESEARCH METHOD AND MEASURES OF ANALYSIS

This section provides detailed information about the theoretical background of this study. The first part explores the news framing mechanisms by reviewing the literature on media and the public opinion. It then offers three research questions in order to explore how news framing is used in the case of Turkey's EU membership and what its implications on the public opinion are. The second part explains the research method by providing information about the content

analysis, the time frame of the study and data collection process. Furthermore, this section clarifies the measures of the content analysis by delivering a list of questions that are used during the research in order to identify frames in collected newspaper articles.

3.1 NEWS FRAMING

Citizens take political decisions almost every day, which might affect their life either directly or indirectly. Their political judgments are formed and shaped based on their need in processing political information according to its relative importance and priority (Gelpi, 2010; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). This study expects media to play a central role in agenda-setting process not only by providing required information about an issue, but also prioritizing this issue through repetition in news coverage.

In order to assess the role of media in the construction of the public opinion, the media's agenda-setting role especially in shaping the attitudes of British citizens towards Turkey's EU membership is analyzed. Therefore, this study aims at exploring whether there is any relationship between the visibility of the news about Turkey's membership and the awareness of public about the issue.

The agenda-setting role of media implies that repetition of an issue over and over again in news might affect and eventually change the public opinion towards the issue of Turkey's membership. This is done by simply highlighting

the aspects of the issue to which decision makers desire the attention of public to be drawn. The media could also influence the perception of audience on a particular subject by framing it in a particular way. In other words, the media acts as a cognitive lens through which individuals view the certain aspects of the world (Lakoff 2004; p. xv).

As Gamson and Modigliani claim news framing is “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (1987; p. 143). Entman agrees and adds that news framing “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (1993; p. 52).

In identifying a frame in a news story, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) uses framing devices such as metaphors, catch phrases, depictions, visual images and exemplars. In addition to these devices, Tankard (2001, p. 100) employs a more comprehensive list of framing mechanisms, or focal points to identify framing, including headlines, subheads, leads, selection of quotes, pull quotes, statistics, charts, graphs, and concluding statements or paragraphs of articles. Through employing either of these mechanisms to identify frames in a news story, the focal point is to first identify the context and background of an issue, and then the stasis points of a debate over that issue. The next step is to elaborate whether these framing mechanisms are employed in order to make some certain stasis

points more salient than others or to promote one side of the debate against the other in news.

Valence frames interpret an issue in either positive or negative terms (Schuck and de Vreese; 2006). Thus, if there is a valence frame in a text, news story generally favors one side of the debate over a controversial issue. In the case of Turkey's membership to the EU, a valence frame either highlights positive or negative consequences of the membership. Furthermore, a frame mechanism can be employed in order to make the particular dimension of an issue or stasis point of the related debate more salient than others. If a certain frame is pertinent to a specific topic or event, it can be labeled as an issue-specific frame (de Vreese, 2005). Issue-specific frames might affect the attitude of audience towards a particular issue as far as they can assign and change the criteria of evaluation and judgment by emphasizing some aspects of an issue more than others and interpreting them as the focal point.

The stasis points of the issue of Turkey's EU membership, as previously mentioned in the literature review section of this paper, can be categorized under three headings: political, economic and cultural. Each of these stasis points could be interpreted positively or negatively in a news story, which raise three research questions:

R1 : What is the visibility of the news about Turkey's EU membership?

R2 : To what extent is Turkey's EU membership framed as either positive (opportunity) or negative (risk)?

R3 : To what extent is Turkey's EU membership framed in the news in economic, political or cultural terms?

Based on these research questions, the hypotheses constructed are as follows:

H1 : The exposure to news about Turkey's EU membership affects the public opinion by increasing public awareness about the issue (Agenda-Setting Hypothesis)

H2 : Positive valence news frames influence public in favor of Turkey's EU membership while negative valence news frames influence public against the membership (Valence Framing Hypothesis)

H3 : Identity related news have more impact on people's attitudes towards Turkey's EU membership than economic and political news (Issue-Specific Framing Hypothesis)

3.2 RESEARCH METHOD

The research design of this study is based on the content analysis method, which is employed to better investigate both the frequency of news about the Turkish membership in the news coverage of *the Guardian* and also various

interpretations of this issue either in positive or negative terms. Moreover, a deeper content analysis is provided in order to examine whether related news highlight certain aspects of a political debate over this issue by framing it either in political, economic or cultural terms. As a next step, the effects of visibility of the news about the Turkish membership in the news coverage of *the Guardian* and of frames embedded in those texts about the British public opinion towards Turkey's EU membership is thoroughly assessed.

3.2.1 CONTENT ANALYSIS

The content analysis is carried out on a sample of news articles derived from *the Guardian*, which positions itself in the center left of the political spectrum in Britain. *The Guardian* is one of the three quality newspapers with the highest circulation rate in Britain together with *Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*. Moreover, the website of *the Guardian* had been the most visited newspaper website in Britain between 2001 and 2008 (Luft, 2008). These two facts clearly show that *the Guardian* could be considered as the most popular newspaper in Britain within the time frame of this study, which covers the era between October 2001 and October 2007.

3.2.1.1 TIME FRAME

Since the unavailability of the survey data before October 2001 prevents us to examine a larger time period, the time frame of this study is chosen to be

between October 2001 and October 2007. The public opinion in Britain towards Turkey's EU membership has been measured and published in six different Eurobarometer surveys so far. The first one is Standard Eurobarometer no. 57, which was published in October 2002 and the last one is Standard Eurobarometer no. 69, which was published in July 2008. The content analysis method here is applied to the articles published in *the Guardian* within six months period prior to the starting date of the fieldwork for respective Eurobarometer to identify the impact of news on public attitudes.

Eurobarometer No	Date of Fieldwork	Newspaper Dates
57	31 March 2002	1 October 2001 - 30 March 2002
58	1 October 2002	1 April - 30 September 2002
63	15 May 2005	11 November 2004 - 11 May 2005
64	15 November 2005	15 May - 15 November 2005
66	6 September 2006	6 March - 6 September 2006
69	1 April 2008	1 October 2007 - 31 March 2008

3.2.1.2 DATA COLLECTION

The respective articles were collected from the website of *the Guardian*, “www.guardian.co.uk”, which contains all of the news coverage of *the Guardian* and its sister papers, namely, *the Observer* (Sunday newspaper) and *the Guardian Weekly* (weekly newspaper). The archive of the website is free to all online users and it dates back as far as 1998 (although this research only focuses on the time period between 2001 and 2008 due to the limitations of the Eurobarometer data which is also utilized in this study).

While extracting articles from the website of *the Guardian*, the ones that were originally published in *the Observer* and *the Guardian Weekly* have been omitted. In the selection process, two levels of content selection were enforced successively. In the first level, articles containing at least one of the following keywords were selected in order to gather all of the articles that mention Turkey: Turk, Turkish, and Turkey. In the second level, articles containing at least one of the following keywords were selected from the list, which was created in the first level, in order to gather all of the articles that mention the accession of Turkey to the EU: European Union, EU, membership, accession, candidate, and candidacy.

As a result of this two-layered selection process, a total of 302 articles on the subject of Turkey’s EU membership were gathered to conduct further content

analysis (See Annex.1 for some of those articles which include valence frames and/or issue-specific frames).

3.2.2 MEASURES OF CONTENT ANALYSIS

VALENCE FRAMES

In this study, a total of 302 articles are categorized under three groups according to presence or absence of a valence frame within a text: (1) neutral / mixed (if an article portrays the issue either in a neutral way without any positive or negative evaluation or in a mixed way by reflecting both positive and negative aspects of the issue), (2) positive (if an article highlights positive aspects of the issue, such as advantages, benefits and opportunities) and (3) negative (if an article highlights negative aspects of the issue, such as disadvantages, costs and risks)

In order to assess the presence or absence of a valence frame, all of the articles collected are manually coded based on the answers given to two sets of six questions. These questions are designed in line with previous valence frame studies conducted by Schuck and de Vreese (2006) on risk/opportunity frames about the EU enlargement and by Vliegenthart et al (2008) on benefit/disadvantage frames about European integration.

The presence or absence of a positive framing about Turkey's EU membership is assessed by the following six questions:

1. Does the article present rational arguments that support the accession of Turkey to the EU?
2. Does the article deliver facts, figures, or statistics that support the accession of Turkey to the EU?
3. Does the article contain subjective expression which favors the accession of Turkey to the EU?
4. Does the article cite a quote from an actor which supports the accession of Turkey to the EU?
5. Does the article praise the current state of Turkey or foresee a positive future development in Turkey within the context of the accession of Turkey to the EU?
6. Does the article outline the accession of Turkey to the EU together with future benefits or opportunities for the EU, Britain or Turkey?

The evaluation of the presence or absence of a negative framing about Turkey's EU membership is also made by the following six questions:

1. Does the article present rational arguments that oppose the accession of Turkey to the EU?
2. Does the article deliver facts, figures, or statistics that highlight the negative aspects of the accession of Turkey to the EU?
3. Does the article contain subjective expression which criticizes the accession of Turkey to the EU?

4. Does the article cite a quote from an actor which opposes the accession of Turkey to the EU?
5. Does the article criticize the current state of Turkey or foresee a negative future development in Turkey within the context of the accession of Turkey to the EU?
6. Does the article outline the accession of Turkey to the EU together with future costs or risks for the EU, Britain or Turkey?

ISSUE-SPECIFIC FRAMES

As one of the most esteemed academicians who mostly contributed in the EU enlargement literature, McLaren (2007) describes Turkey's candidacy as a peculiar case, where group interests become more important than economic and utilitarian considerations in forming attitudes towards the accession of Turkey. McLaren (2007) claims that particularly the massive Turkish migration and a higher degree of threat associated with it plays a crucial role in the opposition towards Turkey's membership. De Vreese and Boomgarden (2008), on the other hand, provide an empirical research, which reveals that soft predictors such as exclusive identity and anti-immigration sentiments outweigh the hard predictors such as economic considerations.

This study, by exploring the relative weight of issue-specific frames in collected articles, provides an opportunity to analyze whether the news coverage of the membership issue in *the Guardian* reflects above findings. With this purpose,

issue-specific frames about Turkey's EU membership are categorized under three groups: political frames, cultural frames and economic frames.

In order to assess the presence or absence of those issue-specific frames, the articles are manually coded based on the answers given to questions listed below. These questions are designed in line with the recent study of de Vreese et al. (2011) to measure the effects of issue-specific frames on public support for Turkey's membership to the EU. Even though the study by de Vreese et al. categorizes the issue-specific frames under three groups as cultural, economic, and security frames, political frames instead of security frames with a wider scope is suggested in this study in order to capture frames stressing issues about democracy, human rights, freedom of expression and etc.

Political Opportunity Frame:

1. Does the article make a positive evaluation about the state of democracy in Turkey?
2. Does the article praise developments on human rights in Turkey?
3. Does the article praise the reforms made in Turkey about freedom of expression and minority rights?
4. Does the article make a positive evaluation about Turkey's attitude towards Cyprus within the context of Turkey's membership to the EU?

5. Does the article portray the new borders of the EU after accession of Turkey as an opportunity to sustain stability?
6. Does the article emphasize geopolitical advantages of Turkey's membership to the EU?

Political Risk Frame:

1. Does the article make a negative evaluation about the state of democracy in Turkey?
2. Does the article criticize human rights violations in Turkey?
3. Does the article criticize the lack of reforms about the freedom of expression and minority rights in Turkey?
4. Does the article make a negative evaluation about Turkey's attitude towards Cyprus within the context of Turkey's membership to the EU?
5. Does the article portray the new borders of the EU after accession of Turkey as an opportunity to sustain stability?

Cultural Opportunity Frame:

1. Does the article portray cultural differences between Europe and Turkey as an opportunity to furnish cultural diversity in the EU?

2. Does the article portray religious differences between Europe and Turkey as an opportunity to form a dialogue between Christian and Muslim societies?
3. Does the article make a reference to the shared norms and values of Europe and consider Turkey as part of it?

Cultural Risk Frame:

1. Does the article make a negative evaluation of cultural differences between Europe and Turkey?
2. Does the article make a negative evaluation of religious differences between Europe and Turkey?
3. Does the article make a reference to the shared norms and values of Europe by alienating Turkey?
4. Does the article suggest that British citizens' way of living is under threat if Turkey becomes a member of the EU?

Economic Opportunity Frame:

1. Does the article suggest that accession of Turkey to the EU pose economic opportunities for the EU or Britain?
2. Does the article make a positive evaluation about the state of economy in Turkey within the context of Turkey's membership to the EU?

3. Does the article portray immigration from Turkey after membership as a remedy for aging population in the EU or Britain?
4. Does the article make a positive evaluation about Turkey's membership in terms of cheap labor, expanding markets, new trade/investment opportunities?

Economic Risk Frame:

1. Does the article suggest that accession of Turkey to the EU pose economic risks for the EU or Britain?
2. Does the article make a negative evaluation about the state of economy in Turkey within the context of Turkey's membership to the EU?
3. Does the article portray immigration from Turkey after membership as a disadvantage for labor market in the EU or Britain?
4. Does the article state population of Turkey as an economic burden for the EU or Britain?
5. Does the article mention development level of Turkey as an economic burden for the EU or Britain?

3.2.3 MEASURES OF THE PUBLIC OPINION

In this study, the results of six Eurobarometer surveys conducted in Britain in different times were used to measure the British public opinion towards

Turkey's EU membership. These surveys in chronological order are Eurobarometer no. 57 (March 2002), Eurobarometer no. 58 (October 2002), Eurobarometer no. 63 (May 2005), Eurobarometer no. 64 (November 2005), Eurobarometer no. 66 (September 2006), and Eurobarometer no. 69 (April 2008). In order to quantify the public opinion in Britain towards Turkey's membership, responses to the following Eurobarometer question were used:

*“For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union?
(Turkey)”*

With the aim of analyzing whether the news coverage relating to Turkey's membership in *the Guardian* are mirrored in the public opinion either through agenda setting, valence framing, or issue-specific framing, the results of the content analysis are combined by the results from the respective Eurobarometer surveys.

4. RESULTS


The earliest figures about the public opinion in Britain towards Turkey's EU membership could be found in Standard Eurobarometer no. 57, which was conducted in March 2002. In this survey, the ratio of citizens supporting Turkey's membership (%34) is seen very close to the ratio of citizens opposing it (%33). However, the most striking finding of the survey about attitudes of British citizens is that the ratio of people who neither supports nor opposes Turkey's membership (%33) is the highest among all Standard Eurobarometers,

which means that those who are neutral towards Turkey are equal to the share of opponents and supporters of Turkey.

According to the agenda-setting theory, media could affect the public opinion about Turkey's EU membership by increasing the salience of the issue through repetition in news. In order to test the explanatory power of the agenda-setting theory within the framework of this study, the idea of whether there is any negative relationship between the number of articles about Turkey's membership in news coverage of *the Guardian* and the proportion of British citizens who neither support nor oppose Turkey's membership is explored. Moreover, as the issue becomes more visible in news, the rate of increase or decrease over time in the percentage of people who do not have an idea about Turkey's membership to the EU is examined (Hypothesis 1).

In Figure 3, the term "number of articles" refers to a total number of articles that mention Turkey's membership to the EU at least once in their content. All articles used in this analysis were published six months prior to the fieldwork date of the respective Eurobarometer survey in Britain.

Figure 3. The public opinion in Britain about accession of Turkey to the EU and Number of Articles published in *the Guardian* prior to surveys



Source: Eurobarometer Surveys 57 (2002), 58 (2002), 63 (2005), 64 (2005), 66 (2006), 69 (2008)

Figure 3 shows that there is a steady increase between the intervals of Standard Eurobarometer no. 57 and Standard Eurobarometer no. 64 in the number of articles published prior to the fieldwork date. After Eurobarometer no. 64, a sharp decrease in the number of articles is observed. The lowest number of published articles is noticed prior to Eurobarometer no. 57. In line with that figure, the highest rate of “do not know” answers can be seen in Eurobarometer

no. 57, which means that as a result of the low frequency of news in the media about Turkey's membership, 33 % of people were not able to form an opinion about this issue. Accordingly, as the number of articles published in *the Guardian* increased over time, the issue became more salient in public and therefore, more British citizens were able to have an opinion either for or against the membership of Turkey.


“Do not know” answer to the question of “would you be in favor or against Turkey becoming part of the EU?” means whether a person who does not know enough to form an opinion about the issue of Turkey's EU membership or despite the fact that he/she is knowledgeable about the issue and well-informed about the pros and cons of such a political move, he/she could still be hesitant to answer the question. Within the time frame of this study, only in one Eurobarometer survey, an increase in the proportion of people who preferred to answer the question about Turkey's EU membership as “do not know” is witnessed. While the proportion of “do not know” answers was 18 % in Eurobarometer no. 63, it increased to 20 % in Eurobarometer No. 64. What makes this particular figure worth mentioning in terms of the agenda-setting theory is that there had been a dramatic increase in the number of articles on Turkey's EU membership prior to Eurobarometer no 64.

When the rates of respondents who preferred “do not know” as an answer to the question about Turkey's EU membership are examined, it is observed that there was no dramatic fluctuation in results between Eurobarometer no. 63 and

Eurobarometer no 69. This could be interpreted as although there had been times during which both a dramatic increase in the number of articles (between May 15, 2005 and October 15, 2005) and a dramatic decrease (between March 6, 2006 and September 6, 2006) were witnessed, there happened to be no significant change regarding in the proportion. This might have been due to the repetitive content of news. Therefore, this thesis does not reject Hypothesis 1.

Notwithstanding the fact that the ratio of “do not know” answers stayed fairly stable from Eurobarometer no. 63 to Eurobarometer no. 69, there were dramatic fluctuations in the percentage of “for” and “against” responses during this period. The agenda-setting theory could only help us to measure the role of media in influencing people’s awareness and shaping their attitude. Therefore, in order to understand how media could make people form their opinions either *for* or *against* this issue once the issue become salient, the valence-framing theory needs to be enforced, according to which positive valence frames utilized in news texts influence public in favor of an issue while negative valence frames do the opposite. In the case of Turkey’s membership to the EU, valence frame highlights either positive aspects (advantages, benefits and opportunities) or negative aspects (disadvantages, costs and risks) of the membership.

Figure 4. Number of Articles published in *the Guardian* prior to surveys
Framing Turkey's accession to the EU either positively or negatively




Source: Data gathered from the Guardian.

Figure 4 shows that both positive and negative frames about Turkey's membership to the EU fluctuate in accordance with the total number of articles. In Figure 4, fluctuations in negatively valence frames are almost identical with fluctuations of the total number of articles published within the time frame of this study. In addition, net difference between positive frames and negative frames is seen fluctuating over time and the number of negatively framed

articles stay always higher than the number of positively framed ones, which is interesting given that the elite discourse in Britain is always regarded as in favor of Turkey's accession to the EU.

Figure 5. The public opinion in Britain about accession of Turkey to the EU and Number of Valence Frames in articles published in *the Guardian*



Source: Eurobarometer Survey Series and *the Guardian*.

Since the number of valence frames in the articles published prior to Eurobarometer no. 57 and no. 58 are very low, it might be misleading to claim a relationship between the change in the number of valence frames and the change in support for Turkey's EU membership during that time. Nevertheless, there was a drastic increase in both positive and negative frames prior to

Eurobarometer no. 63, which led to an increase in the ratio of respondents who were either for or against Turkey's EU membership when compared with the figures in Eurobarometer no. 58. Therefore, it could be claimed that the reason behind the dramatic decrease in the ratio of "do not know" answers from 28 % in Eurobarometer no. 58 to 18 % in Eurobarometer no. 63 does not only stem from the agenda-setting role of the media but also from the increase in valence frames, in which various arguments either for or against the issue were presented to affect people's perception.

Given that the number of negative frames are always higher than the number of positive frames when it comes to the issue of Turkey's EU membership, focusing on the pattern of net negative frames (negative frames – positive frames) could provide us another insight to understand the role of valence framing on the public opinion in Britain towards Turkey's accession. According to the figures in Eurobarometer no. 63, 45 % of British people are in favor of Turkey's membership while 37 % are against it. When the very same question is directed to people in Britain only six months later, the climate seemed to be reversed as the ratio of people in favor of Turkey's membership decreased to 38 % while the ratio of people against it increased to 42 %. The reason is that during that six months period, net negative framing in the articles dramatically increased, which bombarded people with numerous arguments and opinions against Turkey's EU membership.


Likewise, in Eurobarometer no. 66, the ratio of people in favor of Turkey's EU membership increased to 52 % while the ratio of people against it decreased to 30 %, which in return reversed the situation in Eurobarometer no. 64. This time the number of net negative frames decreased sharply prior to the fieldwork of Eurobarometer no. 66, which means that published articles contained much less arguments and opinions against Turkey's accession to the EU. These two consecutive sharp fluctuations in the number of net negative frames in the articles that caused major shifts in the ratio of people who are for and against accession of Turkey are considered good examples in illustrating the power of media and its effects on public perception by dictating not only what to think but also how to think. Therefore, this thesis does not reject Hypothesis 2, which states that positive frames influence British public in favor of Turkey's EU membership while negative frames influence them against it.

In any debate there are stasis points which are major dimensions of the controversy. In this respect, media could employ frame mechanisms in order to make particular dimension of an issue more salient than others. Accordingly, issue-specific frames might alter the perception of audience towards an issue as far as they could change the evaluation criteria by emphasizing some aspects of an issue more than others and interpreting them as the focal point of that issue. As previously discussed in the literature review, arguments regarding the debate on Turkey's membership to the EU are categorized under three stasis points: political, economic and cultural. The literature on the public opinion towards Turkey's EU membership underlines a peculiarity in the case of Turkey, where

group interests, identity related factors and anti-immigration sentiments outweigh economic and utilitarian sentiments.

This study aims to test whether news in *the Guardian* reflects the above findings by exploring the relative weight of issue-specific frames in collected articles. Issue-specific frames about Turkey’s EU membership are categorized under three groups: political frames, cultural frames and economic frames.

Figure 6. The public opinion in Britain about accession of Turkey to the EU and Number of Issue-Specific Frames in articles published in *the Guardian*



Source: Eurobarometer Survey Series and the Guardian

Figure 6 shows that issue-specific frames underlining the economic aspects of Turkey’s accession to the EU are always the lowest. This finding is in line with

the existing public opinion literature which underlines that group interests, identity-related factors, and anti-immigration sentiments outweigh economic and utilitarian sentiments. Another point is that although political frames are generally the highest among other three frames, it is observed that identity frames exceed political frames prior to the surveys of Eurobarometer no. 63 and Eurobarometer no. 64.

What is noticed prior to Eurobarometer no. 64 is the enormous increase in the total number of articles as well as the rate of issue-specific frames within articles. Interestingly, the figures in Eurobarometer no. 64 relating to the British public opinion towards Turkey's EU membership reveal a major shift between the ratio of respondents who are in favor of and the ratio of respondents who are against the membership with respect to Eurobarometer no. 63.

To explore the dynamics behind this peculiarity, a cross-sectional analysis for the time period of six months before the fieldwork of Eurobarometer no. 64, which covers the time frame between 15 May 2005 and 15 November 2005, is employed. A couple of months prior to the beginning of this period, the European Council decided to start accession talks with Turkey. Nonetheless, while Turkey's accession seemed to be imminent in the EU's political agenda, the "no" votes of French and Dutch to the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty in referendums in 2005 created turbulence within the EU and caused a delay in the case of Turkey. The interesting thing is that although only 6 % of French "no" voters and 3 % of Dutch "no" voters cited Turkey as a reason for

voting against the Constitutional Treaty (Ruiz-Jimenez & Torreblanca, 2007), like many others in the media, *the Guardian* portrayed the opposition in France and the Netherlands against Turkey's EU membership as one of the main reasons behind the rejection of the Treaty.

Another important thing that needs to be analyzed is whether public perception in Britain about Turkey's EU membership is conditional to the same factors mentioned above. Eurobarometer no.64 (2005) provides us with the data gathered from the answers given to the below question:


QA45. For each of the following please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree:

- *Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography*
- *Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history*
- *Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region*
- *Turkey's accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values*
- *The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this accession*
- *Turkey's accession would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European population*
- *Turkey's joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the EU*
- *To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights*
- *To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy.*

The question aims to understand the dynamics behind people's attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the EU. The answers can be categorized under three groups as political, economic and cultural, which are in line with the questions designed in this study to capture issue-specific frames in articles.

The answers relating to geography, history, cultural differences, and comprehension of values refer to cultural factors, while rejuvenation, immigration and state of economy refers to economic ones. Answers relating to security and human rights refer to political factors.

Figure 7. Reasons behind the attitude of EU citizens towards Turkey




Source: Eurobarometer Survey Series.

Figure 7 reveals that majority of European citizens agree that in order to join the EU in ten years, Turkey would have to respect human rights while improving

the state of economy. It can be said that fear from immigration outweighs the expectation of rejuvenation, and fear from cultural differences outweighs the perception that accession leads to a better comprehension of European and Muslim values. The crucial question is whether these findings in Britain are in line with the general perception of people in other EU countries.


Figure 8. Reasons behind the attitude of British citizens towards Turkey



Source: Eurobarometer Survey Series.

Figure 8 shows the same results as seen at the EU level, which is that according to the majority of the British citizens Turkey would have to respect human rights and improve its economy in order to join the EU in ten years. Likewise, fear from immigration outweighs the expectation of rejuvenation in Britain. However, fear from other cultures or cultural diversity do not play an important role in the perception of British citizens towards Turkey's EU membership. Based on these findings, it could be argued that identity related frames might not be as important as political and economic frames as foreseen by the literature and as hypothesized in this thesis (Hypothesis 3).


Figure 9. Issue-Specific Frames in articles published in *the Guardian*



Source: Eurobarometer Survey Series and the Guardian

When we look at the direction and share of issue-specific frames in articles, except the ones published prior to Eurobarometer no. 64, negative issue-specific frames seems to be higher than positive issue-specific frames. However, this trend was reversed when Turkey started the reform process to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria before the start of the accession negotiations and, accordingly, positive political framing started to increase prior to Eurobarometer no. 63 and exceeded negative political framing prior to Eurobarometer no. 64. Especially, on the verge of formal accession negotiations in October 2005, intensified efforts by British elite to frame Turkey's membership favorably were on the rise. Since British elite chose to illustrate Turkey's membership as a way to establish a link with Muslim communities, which is called the soft power of the EU, positive identity frames exceeded negative ones during that period. In fact, negative economic frames exceeded positive ones partly as a result of the frequent use of the term "large and poor country" to define Turkey.

Figure 10. Issue-Specific Frames (Positive-Negative) in articles published in *the Guardian*



Source: Eurobarometer Survey Series and the Guardian.

Based on the findings shown in Figure 10, it could be said that dramatic increase in the number of positive political frames emphasizing recent reforms on human rights and freedom of expression in Turkey did not lead to an increase in the ratio of citizens favoring Turkey's EU membership notwithstanding the fact that the vast majority of British citizens agreed that Turkey could join the EU on the condition of respecting human rights and improving its economy which, they think, would mostly prevent the influx of migrants into EU countries. It is

evident that a threat to group resources and a potential risk of immigration played a more crucial role in Britain in shaping the public opinion and changing people's attitude towards Turkey's EU membership compared to cultural and political factors. Therefore, this thesis rejects Hypothesis 3.

When issue-specific frames in *the Guardian* about Turkey's EU membership are analyzed, it is noticed that those frames are predominantly either political, emphasizing issues related to human rights and freedom of expression or cultural, emphasizing the East-West or Christian-Muslim dichotomy in positive or negative way. Hence, there seems to be a disparity between the driving motives of the public opinion in Britain and common issue-specific frames in *the Guardian* about Turkey's EU membership. This might be the reason why there is a relationship between issue-specific frames in articles of *the Guardian* and figures in Eurobarometers about the British public opinion on Turkey's EU membership.

5. CONCLUSION

Dutch and French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 as well as Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 turned out to be important incidents in the history of European integration process. Those rejections, while announcing the end of an era which manifested itself with a permissive consensus between pro-European elites and mass public, indicated that public has gained an absolute power in time and its power reached to a certain point that could directly affect

the decision making processes in EU at a supranational level via referendums. Irrespective of the rationale behind the elite-driven arguments regarding European integration, the rejections of treaties in referendums necessitated the need for European decision-makers to acquire the consent of public in order to legitimize their political decisions and actions. In the case of European integration, neither neo-functionalist nor inter-governmentalist elite arguments about the economic interdependency of EU members or efficiency in EU policy-making process seems no longer to be convincing for further integration. In that case, the questions need to be asked: what does make public to be in favor of or against a particular policy change? Which factors do affect citizens' perception and attitude towards European integration?

After the Maastricht Treaty, scholars studying European integration began to pay more attention to the dynamics of the public opinion. Even though there has been immense literature on the public opinion in EU, studies about people's attitudes and inclinations specifically towards Turkey's EU membership are relatively scarce. What makes this gap more significant is the fact that membership of Turkey to the EU is one of the most contentious issues on the agenda of the EU where public opposition is very high. Although Turkey's journey to join the EU started in 1963 as an associate member, the country was officially recognized as a candidate for full membership in 1999 and could only start accession talks in 2005 following a massive economic and political reform program. Turkey has been the least supported and the most opposed candidate in various Eurobarometer surveys conducted since 1999 and that some of the

member states already declared that they would call a referendum on Turkey's EU accession. Since the public opinion seems to be a significant determinant regarding this controversial issue, it could be argued that Turkey's EU journey might be interrupted and come to a halt in the future by decisions of EU citizens.

The important role of media in shaping people's opinion and attitudes is undeniable. Since the integration of EU is an abstract and complex process and it is not easy to assess all aspects of the enlargement due to limited information channels and inadequate interaction with a candidate country mainly through its immigrants, media helps enormously by transmitting messages about the process, thus affecting the perception of citizens towards a candidate country.

When the case of Turkey's EU membership is analyzed, it is seen that especially after the Helsinki Summit of the European Council on December 12, 1999, the debate over Turkey's accession has been more prominent and heated both in political, academic and public spheres. In this study, following a thorough literature review, it was realized that the issue of Turkey's EU membership is multidimensional and the vast majority of the arguments on this issue could be categorized under three major stasis points as economic, political and cultural.

The main purpose of this thesis, therefore, has been to explore whether media has an impact on the public opinion about Turkey's EU membership and more specifically, to what extent visibility and framing of the news on Turkey's accession to the EU could influence the public opinion. The main argument of

the study is that media could affect attitudes of audience either through the repetition of an issue in news coverage (agenda-setting effect) or framing that issue in a particular way (framing effect). The agenda-setting effect is based on the expectation that media could influence public by simply suggesting what is more important and which subjects deserve more attention. On the other hand, framing implies that media could influence public by interpreting an issue in an authentic way in order to change the perception of audience about that particular subject.

In order to analyze the agenda-setting effect and framing over shaping attitudes and opinions of British citizens towards Turkey's EU membership, related news articles in mainstream British newspaper, *the Guardian* daily, were scanned and analyzed. Then, a detailed content analysis of those news was done six months prior to six different Eurobarometer surveys conducted between October 1, 2001 and October 1, 2007, namely Eurobarometer no. 57 (2002), no. 58 (2003), no 63 (2005), no. 64 (2006), no. 66 (2007), and no. 69 (2008), 2007, in order to evaluate the visibility of news and the way they were framed either as positively (opportunity) or negatively (risk). In addition, article samples were reviewed to assess the presence of issue-specific frames (political, economic, and cultural) and how they see Turkey's membership to the EU. Lastly, the way media could influence the public opinion in Britain, either through agenda-setting or framing, is explored.

The results of this study suggest that media could affect the public opinion through agenda-setting and repetition of an issue in news by altering the salience towards that issue. The data shows that the proportion of British citizens who prefer to answer the question about Turkey's membership as "do not know" was as high as 33 % in Eurobarometer no. 57. Parallel to the increase in the number of articles highlighting the issue in news coverage, the proportion of "do not know" answers decrease to 28 % in the next Eurobarometer survey and reached to 18 % in Eurobarometer no 63. In the most recent Eurobarometer, this proportion decreased to 16 % which is the lowest among all Eurobarometer surveys. Even though the data is mostly consistent with the agenda-setting theory, the results from Eurobarometer no. 64 present a peculiarity. In spite of a remarkable hike in the number of articles mentioning Turkey's membership prior to Eurobarometer no. 64, there is only slight increase in the proportion of "do not know" answers compare to the previous Eurobarometer survey, which was conducted only six months ago. It could be argued that a significant increase in the number of both valence and issue-specific frames in news highlights that the debate on Turkey's EU accession became fierce prior to the beginning of accession talks, which in turn made people more hesitant and forced them to question their initial opinion about the issue.

Moreover, the results indicate that news framing may affect the perception of British citizens towards Turkey's EU membership either positively or negatively. However, this is conditional to the salience of the issue, which depends on how frequently the issue comes up and is mentioned in the news.

Even though the net framing of news about Turkey's membership in *the Guardian* is almost always negative, dramatic increase in the share of net negative frames prior to the survey seems to be in line with the hike in the ratio of respondents who are against Turkey's membership. This is important since only six months prior to this survey, the ratio of respondents who were in favor of Turkey's EU membership was higher than the ratio of respondents who were against it. In addition, a dramatic decrease in the number of net negative frames prior to the fieldwork of Eurobarometer no. 66 was followed by a major hike in the ratio of respondents who are in favor of Turkey's EU membership. Despite fact that the change in net negative framing before the earlier surveys are not in accordance with the change in the public opinion, both the number of articles and the usage of valence frames were too low to affect the perception of citizens in Britain. That is why, this study claims that valence framing could affect perceptions of audience, but it is conditional to the salience of an issue as well as the extensive usage of valence frames.

Lastly, results of the content analysis suggest that issue-specific frames in *the Guardian* are predominantly political and cultural. Political frames generally highlight issues related to the state of democracy, human rights and freedom of expression in Turkey, while cultural frames emphasize East-West or Christian-Muslim dichotomies in talking about Turkey's accession to the EU. The results from Eurobarometer no. 64 reveal that British citizens are less attentive to cultural issues and their attitude towards Turkey's EU accession is mostly shaped by the state of human rights in Turkey, their perceived threat to group

resources, which is directly related to the state of economy in Turkey, and risks posed by Turkish immigrants. This leads us to conclude that there is a disparity between driving motives of the public opinion in Britain and common issue-specific frames in *the Guardian* about Turkey's EU membership. This might be the reason why there is a weak relationship between issue-specific frames in the articles of *the Guardian* and the figures in Eurobarometers about the public opinion in Britain on Turkey's membership.

ANNEX.1

Positive Identity Frame

[As Turkey's strongest champion in the EU, Mr. Blair last night hailed the deal as "an immensely significant day for Europe." "It shows that those who believe there is a fundamental **clash of civilizations** between **Christian and Muslims** are actually **wrong**; that they can work together; that we can cooperate together."]

(The Guardian, 18 December 2004)

Negative Economic Frame

[Turkey is embracing Europe less in enthusiasm than with a mix of pride and desperation, while Europe is embracing Turkey with reluctance and a degree of **fear. Not fear of Turkey, but of its population.**]

(The Guardian, 18 December 2004)

Positive Identity Frame

[Turkey has been a stalwart member of NATO since 1952 and was first recognized as a potential member of the European Club as far back as 1963, and only few years after the creation of the EEC. Britain is a **keen advocate** of

Turkey's EU membership, as is the United States. Both of them see a secular Muslim democracy as a key regional ally, a beacon for Islamic and Arab countries and a proof that a "clash of civilizations" with the West is not inevitable.]

(The Guardian, 9 September 2005)

Negative Identity Frame

[The immediate effect of this crisis is that it is hard to imagine that Turkey will be able to begin its membership talks in October, since anti-Turkish feelings were a key issue of the French and Dutch "no" campaigns.]

(The Guardian, 30 May 2005)

Negative Economic Frame / Negative Identity Frame

[But after French and Dutch voters voiced deep opposition to Turkey's EU membership, there are fears that the talks may drag on for years and never reach a conclusion.... The ferocity with which French anti-constitution voters played on voters' concerns over admitting a big, impoverished and mostly Muslim country.]

(The Guardian, 3 June 2005)

Negative Identity Frame

[Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president and the author of the EU draft constitution, said the admission of Turkey would be “the end of the European Union”. He said Turkey had “a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life..... its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population live outside Europe. It’s **not a European country.**”]

(The Guardian, 17 December 2004)

Negative Political Frame

[In 1963, Turkey applied to join what was then the European Economic Community. Turkey was declared a formal candidate in 1999, but issues including its restrictions on **human rights** have held things up.]

(The Guardian, 3 December 2001)

Negative Political Frame

[The tough stance adopted by Mr. Erdogan showed how Turkey’s EU membership talks are heading for a crisis in the autumn when the European Commission delivers its annual progress report. Olli Rehn, the European enlargement commissioner, has warned of a “**train crash**” unless Turkey opens up its ports and speeds up reforms on **human rights** and **free speech.**]

(The Guardian, 17 June 2006)

Negative Economic Frame / Negative Identity Frame

[Turkey, which finally began membership negotiations last October but labeled under the **impediment of size, poverty and strong anti-Muslim prejudice**, has even more reason to be concerned.]

(The Guardian, 17 June 2006)

Positive Identity Frame

["Our top priority must be to keep our promises on enlargement," French Foreign Minister David Miliband said. "Enlargement is by far our most powerful tool for extending stability and prosperity... If we fail to keep our promises to Turkey, it will signal a deep and dangerous **divide between east and west.**"]

(The Guardian, 16 November 2007)

Frame Economic Frame

[Germany and its neighbor Austria, which are among EU countries most afflicted by "**enlargement fatigue**," notably concern that entry of new members from **poor countries** in the Balkans - **and Turkey** – would bring an **unmanageable influx of migrant workers.**]

(The Guardian, 22 August 2006)

Frame Political Frame / Frame Economic Frame

[Turkey, a candidate to join the EU since 1999, has been under pressure to improve its **human rights** record. But some EU diplomats warn that Ankara is moving away from fulfilling all the requirements. One of the stiffest tasks, implementing the reforms, still lies ahead. It was, for example, not clear if Kurdish language schools could immediately be opened. The country must also address claims of widespread torture. Turkey's year-end **inflation target** of 35% is also far off what is required to join the euro zone.]

(The Guardian, 5 August 2002)

Positive Economic Frame / Positive Identity Frame

[The Union of 25 needs Turkey for its youth, zeal and commitment to development, a tiger in our tank. Europe inside the gates has many millions of Muslims anyway and, for the most part, it embraces the contribution and the mix.]

(The Guardian, 20 December 2004)

REFERENCES

- Anderson, Christopher J. and M. Shawn Reichert (1996) 'Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the EU: A Cross-National Analysis', *Journal of Public Policy*, 15(3), 231–249
- Anderson, Christopher J. (1998) 'When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes towards Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration', *Comparative Political Studies*, 31(5), 569–601
- Brinegar, Adam P., and Seth K. Jolly (2005) 'Location, Location, Location: National Contextual Factors and Public Support for European Integration', *European Union Politics*, 6(2), 155-180
- Canan-Sokullu, Ebru and Cigdem Kentmen (2010) 'Turkey in the EU? An Empirical Analysis of European The public opinion on Turkey's 'Protracted' Membership,' In Armagan Emre Çakir (ed.), *Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story*, London: Routledge, pp. 104-135.
- Carey, Sean (2002) 'Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?', *European Union Politics*, 3(4), 387-413
- Dalton, Russell J., and Robert Duval (1986) 'The Political Environment and Foreign Policy Opinions: British Attitudes towards European Integration, 1972-1979', *British Journal of Political Science*, 16(1), 113-134
- De Vreese, C.H., Susan A. Banducci, Holli E. Semetko, and Hajo G. Boomgarden (2006) 'The News Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries', *European Union Politics*, 7(4): 447-504.

- De Vreese, C.H. and Hajo G. Boomgaarden (2003) 'Valenced News Frames and Public Support for the EU: Linking Content Analysis and Experimental Data', *Communications* 3(4), 361–381.
- De Vreese, Claes H., and Hajo G. Boomgaarden (2005) 'Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and Support for European Integration', *European Union Politics*, 6(1), 59-82
- De Vreese, Claes H., and Hajo G. Boomgaarden (2006) 'Media Effects on The public opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(2), 419-436
- De Vreese, Claes H., Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Holli A. Semetko (2008) 'Hard and Soft: Public Support for Turkish Membership in the EU', *European Union Politics*, 9(4), 511-530
- De Vreese, Claes H., Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Holli A. Semetko (2011) '(In)direct Framing effects: The Effects of News Media Framing on Public Support for Turkish Membership in the European Union', *Communication Research*, 38(2), 179-205
- De Vreese, Claes H., Jochen Peter, and Holli A. Semetko (2001) 'Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News', *Political Communication*, 18(2), 107-122
- Dixon, Jeffrey C. (2010) 'Opposition to Enlargement as a Symbolic Defence of Group Position: Multilevel Analyses of Attitudes Towards Candidates' entries in the EU-25', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61(1), 127-154
- Eichenberg, Richard C., and Russell J. Dalton (1993) 'Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration', *International Organization*, 47(4), 507-534
- Eichenberg, Richard C., and Russell J. Dalton (2007) 'Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004', *Acta Politica*, 42(2-3), 128-152

- Elgun, Ozlem, and Erik R. Tillman (2007) 'Exposure to European Union Policies and Support for Membership in the Candidate Countries', *Political Research Quarterly*, 60(3), 391-400
- Gabel, Matthew, and Harvey D. Palmer (1995) 'Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration', *European Journal of Political Research*, 27(1), 3-19.
- Gabel, Matthew, and Guy D. Whitten (1997) 'Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration', *Political Behavior*, 19(1), 81-96
- Gabel, Matthew (1998a) 'Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European Union', *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 936-953
- Gabel, Matthew (1998b) 'Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories', *Journal of Politics*, 60(2), 333-354.
- Gabel, Matthew, and Kenneth Scheve (2007) 'Mixed Messages: Party Dissent and Mass Opinion on European Integration', *European Union Politics*, 8(1), 37-59
- Garry, John, and James Tilley (2009) 'The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes towards the EU', *European Union Politics*, 10(3), 361-379
- Grabbe, Heather and Kirsty Hughes (1998) *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Hooghe, Liesbet (2007) 'What Drives Euroskepticism? Party-Public Cueing, Ideology and Strategic Opportunity', *European Union Politics*, 8(1), 5-12
- Hooghe, Liesbet (2003) 'Europe Divided?: Elites vs. The public opinion on European Integration', *European Union Politics*, 4(3), 281-304

- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2004) 'Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive The public opinion on European Integration?' *Political Science and Politics*, 37(3), 415-420
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2005) 'Calculation, Community and Cues: The public opinion on European Integration' *European Union Politics*, 6(4), 419-443
- Inglehart, Ronald (1970a) 'Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity', *Comparative Politics*, 3(1), 45-70
- Inglehart, Ronald (1970b) 'The the public opinion and Regional Integration', *International Organization*, 24(4), 764-795
- Inglehart, Ronald and Jacques-René Rabier (1991) 'Analysing Trends in West European Opinion: The Role of Eurobarometer Surveys', in Karl-Heinz Reif and Ronald Inglehart (eds) *Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European The public opinion*, pp. 1–26. London: Macmillan
- Kentmen, Cigdem (2008) 'Determinants of Support for EU Membership in Turkey: Islamic Attachments, Utilitarian Considerations and National Identity', *European Union Politics*, 9(4), 487-510
- Kubicek, Paul (ed.) (2003) *The European Union and Democratization*, London: Routledge.
- Luetke, Adam (2005) 'European Integration, The public opinion and Immigration Policy: Testing the Impact of National Identity', *European Union Politics*, 6(1), 83-112
- McLaren, Lauren M. (2001) 'Immigration and the New Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in the European Union: The Effects of Elites and the EU on Individual-Level Opinions Regarding European and Non-European Immigrants' *European Journal of Political Research*, 39(1), 81-108
- McLaren, Lauren M. (2002) 'Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?', *Journal of Politics*, 64(2), 551-566

- McLaren, Lauren M. (2004) 'Opposition to European Integration and Fear of Loss of National Identity: Debunking a Basic Assumption Regarding Hostility to the Integration Project', *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(6), 895-911
- McLaren, Lauren M. (2006) *Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan
- McLaren, Lauren M. (2007) 'Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU', *European Union Politics*, 8(2), 251-278
- Nguyen, Eric S. (2008) 'Drivers and Brakemen: State Decisions on the Road to European Integration', *European Union Politics*, 9(2), 269-293
- Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro (1983) 'Effects of The public opinion on Policy', *The American Political Science Review*, 77(1), 175-190
- Schimmelfennig, Frank (2001) 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union', *International Organization*, 55(1): 47-80.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds) (2005) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Schuck, Andreas R.T., and Claes H. de Vreese (2006) 'Between Risk and Opportunity: News Framing and its Effects on Public support for EU Enlargement', *European Journal of Communication*, 21(1), 5-32
- Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2000) 'Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality, and Role-Compliance', in M. G. Cowles and M. Smith (eds) *The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sjursen, Helene (2002) 'Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(3): 491-513.

- Tankard, J. (2001) 'The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing', in S. Reese, O. Gandy and A. Grant (eds) *Framing Public Life*, pp. 95–106. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Trens, Hans-Joerg (2008) 'Understanding Media Impact on European integration: Enhancing or Restricting the Scope of Legitimacy of the EU', *European Integration*, 30(2), 291-309
- Weaver, David H. (2007) 'Thoughts on Agenda Setting, Framing, and Priming', *Journal of Communication*, 57(1), 142-147.
- Vliegenthart, Rens and et al. (2008) 'News Coverage and Support for European Integration, 1990-2006', *International Journal of The public opinion Research*, 20(4), 415-438