

CHALLENGE AND POWER:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER AS AN
AUTHORITARIAN FIGURE IN THE LIGHT OF GEZİ EVENTS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
IZMIR UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS

BY
AYŞEGÜL DURU CİVAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ART IN MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES

AT
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

FEBRUARY 2014

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences



Prof. Dr. Cengiz Erol

Director


I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of
Master of Arts.



Asst. Prof. Dr. Gökçen Karanfil

Head of the Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Media and
Communication Studies.



Assoc. Prof. Pantelis Vatikiotis

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Pantelis Vatikiotis

Asst. Prof. Dr. Derya Duman

Asst. Prof. Dr. Aysun Akan



ABSTRACT

CHALLENGE AND POWER:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER AS AN
AUTHORITARIAN FIGURE IN THE LIGHT OF GEZİ EVENTS

Civan, Ayşegül Duru

MA, Department of Media and Communication Studies

Supervisor: Assoc.Prof. Pantelis Vatikiotis

January 2014, 70 pages

In this paper the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's authoritarian approach is presented by taking into critical discourse analysis practice and the French philosopher Louis Althusser's statements regarding ideology and state apparatuses on theoretical basis during the Gezi Park events in Turkey.

In this context, it is aimed to ask the reasons why Erdoğan had such stance and how he practiced this through media, police and religion and subsequently he reflected into his public discourse. Moreover, as understood from the title, it is analyzed comparatively how this behaviour is exhibited and what the reactions from the society are in return.

Keywords: political discourse, power, ideology, state apparatuses, critical discourse analysis, citizen journalism, authority, mass self-communication.

ÖZET

MEYDAN OKUYUŞ VE GÜÇ:

GEZİ PARKI OLAYLARI ÇERÇEVESİNDE TÜRK BAŞBAKANIN OTORİTER FİĞÜR OLARAK ANALİZİ

Civan, Ayşegül Duru

Yüksek Lisans, Medya ve İletişim Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Pantelis Vatikiotis

Ocak 2014, 70 sayfa

Bu çalışmada Türk Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Türkiye'deki Gezi Parkı olayları çerçevesinde sergilediği otoriter duruş eleştirel söylem analizi pratiğinde ve Fransız filozof Louis Althusser'in ideoloji ve devlet aygıtlarını öngören ifadeleri doğrultusunda sunulmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda Erdoğan'ın neden böyle bir tutum sergilediği ve bunu sırası ile medya, polis ve dini kullanarak kamusal söylemine nasıl yansıttığının cevaplarını bulmak amaçlanmıştır. Başlıktan anlaşıldığı üzere böyle bir tavrın ne şekilde sergilendiği ve karşılığında halktan nasıl tepkiler aldığına karşılaştırmalı olarak yer verilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi söylem, güç, ideoloji, devlet aygıtları, eleştirel söylem analizi, vatandaş (yurttaş) gazeteciliği, otorite, kişiler arası toplu iletişim.

To my dearest family members

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Associate Professor Pantelis Vatikiotis for his sincere guidance as well as reflections throughout my research and studies at İzmir University of Economics. I am much indebted to him as he supported me in every possible way to see the completion of this work. Most importantly, none of this would have been possible without the love and patience of my family. To my husband, Yiğit, and my little family members I offer my heart-felt gratitude for their support and faith in me. And lastly, I am also thankful to my daughter, Güliz Alin Ada, who provided me with strength and enabled me to complete my dissertation even before she was born.

I hereby declare that all information obtained in this document is in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work.

Date

Ayşegül Duru CİVAN

12.02.2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	9
The Purpose and the Focus of the Dissertation.....	9
Chapter 1	12
1.1 Erdoğan: The Eminence of a Political Figure	12
Chapter 2.....	19
2.1 The Events- How did they take place?.....	19
2.2 The Development of the Events	20
2.3 The Reactions	22
Chapter 3	24
3.1 Two Contrasts: Submission and Challenge.....	24
3.2 Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses.....	26
3.2.1 Media as an Ideological State Apparatus.....	29
3.2.2 Police as an Repressive State Apparatus	34
3.2.3 Religion as an Ideological State Apparatus	37
Chapter 4.....	40
4.1 Analysis of Discourse.....	40
4.2 The Relation in Question	41
4.3 Methodological Approach	42
4.4 Research Field.....	43
4.4.1 Example	44
The Prime Minister’s Opening Speech on at the Ground Breaking Ceremony of the Third Bridge in Istanbul.....	44
4.4.2 Example	45
The Prime Minister’s Opening Speech for the New Service Building of the Ottoman Archive in Istanbul.....	45
Chapter 5.....	40
5.1 The Analysis of Findings	49
5.2 Interpretation Levels	55
Chapter 6.....	58
Conclusion	58
Appendices.....	60
References.....	64

Introduction

The Purpose and the Focus of the Dissertation

This paper analyses power enforcement within the discourse of the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during 2013 Gezi Park events in Turkey within the perspective of theoretical framework concerning ideological and repressive state apparatuses coined by Louis Althusser.

Allowing for the hypothesis, it is argued in this the paper that Erdoğan's discourse is nourished by his authoritarian approach that fueled the degree of increase in the protests inclusive of Gezi Park events. In addition, how he reflected this in practice through ideological and repressive state apparatuses, Althusser prescribes, by using media, religion and police forces shall be detailed by asking the main research question regarding "How power was enforced in Erdoğan's discourse during the events?" also by taking the points as reference for further research, which can be subsequently listed as "How Erdoğan's political approach has been shaped over the course of time?", "How did seemingly an environmental issue turn out to be a country-wide protest"; and, "What were the main parameters considering the media, police and religion used as an apparatus for the enforcement of power during the events?"

Considering all these points, the paper starts with an analysis of the overall picture of political history in Turkey in the medium term by taking into account how the Turkish Prime Minister raised himself as a political figure in this course, set his political agenda and kept strategically a kind of 'political stability' for a while. Then

it moves to second chapter explaining the overall outline of Gezi protests; i.e., how the events started and turned out to be a mass uprising as well as what the underlying reasons were there considering Erdoğan's and the ruling party's latest practices in action so that nearly a nation-wide riot brought about by referring to certain points as given in the following:

- a historical outline of possibly other relevant protest activities during Erdoğan's ruling period of time;
- how the event emerged as well as
- basically how an environmental issue turned out to a nearly overall riot;
- and, what the public did; how the government reacted in general.

The third chapter focuses on the theoretical framework which is based on Louis Althusser's ideas on ideology and 'state apparatuses' in the light of power relations and enforcement practices through media, police force and religion as tools which refer to 'apparatus' in this context.

The fourth chapter follows with the methodological approach in relation with the findings in previous chapter by asking main research question specified at the outset. Here, the Prime Minister's approach is analyzed in detail by giving insights from critical discourse analysis as the research method with relevance to themes such as power enforcement, power abuse and inequality found in his discourse.

The fifth chapter subsequently gives the analysis of findings where all the retrieved data is detailed in line with the hypothesis and asked questions. Finally, the dissertation concludes with a summary of overall ideas mentioned in previous chapters through retouching the main points.

Considering the literature review, it would not been correct to say that there has not been so many researches and studies considering the main subject areas in this dissertation which are critical analysis and state apparatuses; indeed, many scholars have contributed to this field, well-knowns are definitely Norman Fairclough and Van Dijk. In relation with the overall concept of this paper, the studies on the Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis by van Dijk (1993) and Language and Power by Fairclough (1989) were utilised mostly. However, taking Gezi events as the basis, it can be said that it is one of the new spheres of research areas in this field as the events are nearly a new topic; therefore, it is aimed to show that the asserted hypothesis is supported with related materials from media sources. However, one last thing to consider is that since these events are very recent, there have not been so many academic resources as material, except for the theoretical framework and methodological approach as said, but lots of current pieces of news and contributions from social media practically. Therefore, the dissertation is indeed rich in up-to-date references.

Chapter 1

1.1 Erdoğan: The Eminence of a Political Figure

Politics in Turkey has gone through countless phases of change. For ninety one years, the Turkish society has witnessed different courses of political reformation and recreations as well as many challenges and difficult periods from wars to recessions, honours to celebrations.

Generally speaking, the game of making politics requires certain rules due to its nature. Principally, it is essential to define from the start that how a political formation can be in power or what kind of a base keeping it up-to-date and take constant public attention as well for long; because, politics is a living organism irrisistant to change in time. It is enlived by actions, by thoughts, by expressions and assertions, which are all of and for humans. Therefore, it can be the primary concern to have this basis.

As being the head of the government, prime minister has many duties and responsibilities for four years in order to survive in this game. After Ismet Inonu, the Prime Minister and the second President of the Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the only leader who has been in office as the Prime Minister for more than ten years in Turkish political history. His political background goes back to center-right Welfare Party, founded in 1983, by which he was elected as Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor between 1994-1998. In spite of being sent to prison for reciting a poem's verses in religious perspective and legally disqualified

from making politics afterwards, Erdoğan founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001, which became the ruling party as the 58th Government of the Turkish Republic by taking the two-thirds of the national votes in the following year and became a parliament member in 2003. Since then, he and his party have been reselected for the third time, nearly doubling the votes.

It is well-known that Erdoğan comes from a conservative background and started his career at an early age within a right-wing party; however, he refers his political formation in conservative democracy. These two terms are disputable; nevertheless, it is seen in his actions, expressions and affiliations in last ten years that he had exposed an image of a leader who did not involve in religious-based policies but the one presenting how people with conservative background do actually in politics, especially in his first years as he said “We have laid off doing politics through religious narration, we will not do such; we want to show how politics is done by religious people.” (Erdoğan: 2000).

This is maybe that nuance separating him, together with his fellows who founded the Justice and Development Party, from his original party as they referred themselves not being a continuation or exemplary of it. However, this image seems to have been changed considerably in time. Then the question emerges: What happened to a leader that once called himself reformist democrat turned into an authoritarian figure in the eyes of people and what kind of practices or developments he disclosed?

The case is that it is reasonable to name a political entity as centre party in politics if it is to aim holding the votes of the majority practically. Erdoğan arranged

his time opportunely and made his move by referring it in this kind of formation; because, as Kalaycıoğlu analyzes (2009), the local conjuncture changed in 1990s in certain Central and Eastern countries, particularly when the USSR dissolved into independent republics as peoples started to grasp the ideas of ethnicity, cultural and traditional backgrounds, national and religious values as well as economic attempts to be able to stand on their own.

In those times, the Turkish society started to lose interest in the left-wing, as it was partly reminiscent of previous state interventions in Turkey, and saw that in many parts of Europe people fought for independence for their ethnical and traditional backgrounds as well as some sort of economic relief. This was because until that time political debates had been around social class differences, but now people started to speak of different values such as their sects, which ethnical background they came from and so forth. Therefore, certain parties in Turkey held the trend of moving towards the center and center right as what Erdoğan incubated since he also knew that he could address to more people if he would orient the new party towards the center, which was also crowd-pleasing. In any case, he would not continue carrying out the tradition of his original party as he attempted to create a kind of political and economic relief for the public in his own style; otherwise he must have known this would not be so prominent. For this reason, the Justice and Development Party was referred as a liberal, economy tended center party having regard to ethnicity and religious values by getting the benefit of the potential of new voters, which contributed great amount to his career as a popular political figure and even secured his position from the start.

It goes without without saying that there have been other unchallenged leaders in Turkish political history, as the most well-knowns is definitely Atatürk, the unchallenged leader who invested with authoritarian power(Eldem, 2013). However, what distinguishes Erdoğan from him is probably the fact that while Atatürk is attributed to be a charismatic leader, Erdoğan is more famous for his rhetorical persuasive skills as well as his manipulative discourse over his electorates. However, from his first years up to current times things seem to have changed especially by the latest political developments, or else, introductions as follow:

- weakening the interference of the judicial system as the executive power; and, of the Turkish Armed Force (TAF);
- the Kurdish question and the Turkishness issue, which also had a broad repercussion in press;
- removing the initials of the Turkish Republic (T.C.) from state banks, long-established governmental offices,
- as well as setting the party's own cadre in public offices, the news media, education, judiciary and so forth by also having close relations with, also known as Pennsylvania Imam, Fethullah Gülen (although this linkage is about to change due to recent corruption and conflict news in late December);
- enabling female MPs wear headscarves within the parliament, which is a highly sensitive symbol, and the dress code for the state workers. This

process was preceded by the improvement on headscarf regulations at universities beforehand.

As well as introductions in social, cultural and economic life as appeared in the press:

- restriction of school children' celebrating certain national holidays such as the Commemoration of Ataturk, Youth and Sports Day, and the National Sovereignty and Children's Day in stadiums
- as well as the removal of the daily oath of allegiance to the Turkish Nation to be said every day in elementary schools;
- implicit advice on having at least three children and lessening cesarean sections;
- reopening religious vocational junior high schools, adding Arabic language and Koran lessons into the curriculum;
- Opening or allocating public bids of construction, etc. for moguls and giving excessive freedoms for their activities;
- curbing alcohol sales after 10 p.m. and its advertising on public spaces, newspapers, etc. as he once addressed regular alcohol drinkers as alcoholics.

- Excessive urbanization and its consequent effect towards environment and open green areas.
- The plans for the third airport and the latest project to build the third bridge and naming it after Yavuz Sultan Selim who is known to have killed around 40.000 Alawites, who are partisans of a sect following the Caliph Ali.
- The decision to rebuild Halil Paşa Topçu Kışlası, which was an Ottoman military barracks notorious for being a symbol for rebellion and sharia law.
- Surveying university student houses with the idea of enabling the separation female students from living with those from opposite sex on moral grounds.
- Relevant activities towards privatization of general directorate of national lottery and horse racing with the idea of having undeserved gains, which is forbidden by Islam.

It cannot be so true to say that the rest of the public ignored these changes by the ruling party at the very beginning; however, they presumably turned a kind of blind eye for a while, supposingly to enjoy economic ease, even though it was not generally equitable for all segments of the society at large, and for their content towards the developments for the membership to the EU as well as the progress in the fight against PKK, Kurdish armed terrorists. What can be said here is that the idea at first the PM stood behind seems to have turned into the opposite way round where he is now blamed for extremism by those who reckon him as the least favoured leader elected. This can show his policy has supposedly changed from

pluralistic democracy into a majoritarian composition as he repeats nearly in every speech that he counts on the consent of the majority as he takes the advantage by saying he can mobilize the crowds of his party's loyalists anytime at his will. This is possibly the underlying reason why he is attributed to be so domineering by those who disagree.

All these mentioned recent developments show that these introductions are no longer subtle and gradual in the Party's policy; however, in point of fact Turkish society has become more and more polarized as Erdoğan's authoritarian approach gets ahead of his political activity, which is one of the crucial elements to have intermittent conflicts within the society. Interestingly enough, Gezi Park events may be the peak point showing this kind of contrariness proving that he can be both popularly elected and powerfully authoritarian (Watson and Levs: 2013).

Chapter 2

2.1 The Events- How did they take place?



Image 1: The clashes among water cannons and tear gases at the Taksim Square in Istanbul (Associated Press)

As underlined in the points asked in the introduction part, Gezi Park events are one of their kind that shook the patterns which started to become traditionalized due to religious and hegemonic based developments in Turkish politics in the medium term under the rule of Justice and Development Party.

There had been other events before that put wear on tensions such as Emek Movie Theater's going under wrecking ball in the middle of a night, which was the oldest movie center of the Republican Period, even though certain protestors

including well-known actors tried to make themselves heard and the legal process had not been previously finalized. Similarly, Taksim Square had been closed, which is the symbol of May Day demonstrations by trade unions and non-governmental organizations, on the Labor Day this year by Hüseyin Avni Mutlu, the Governor of Istanbul. Nevertheless, the celebration took place but ended in a little while due to heavy gas fire by the police operation without a warning.

Although these instances give the hints of how the police could use disproportionate force and what kind of a manipulation was made upon it by the authorities, the Turkish history has recently witnessed maybe the biggest protest in masses which began as an environment-related issue and turned out to be an extensive reaction towards authoritarian relations under monist opinions at their climax where the society was surrounded by splits in many spheres of social, political, economic and cultural life.

2.2 The Development of the Events

The events date back to 2011 when a project on pedestrianization of the Taksim Square was approved by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. In 2012, the project was enhanced with the construction of an Ottoman military barracks called Halil Paşa Topçu Kışlası, and a shopping centre, which would eradicate the overall presence of greenery park zone in Taksim, Turkey.



Image 2: Demolition of trees at Gezi Park at early days through the smoke of tear gas fired by the police (Deniz Atam)

Through the end of May, non-violent demonstrators, most of whom were architects, city planners and middle-class activists gathered upon the arrival of heavy construction vehicles to Gezi Park. They spent the night together to stand guard as the officials were not actually authorized to uproot the trees without a receipt of permission or an approval. In the morning, they were dispelled by a group of civilians who were most probably municipal or civil police; however, this turmoil caught more and more people's attention as they arrived in increased numbers to the Park to prevent the trees from being cut and to protect the Park from being destroyed. But this green movement surprised brutally by the police from its first day who

fired tear gas and used rubber bullets upon demonstrators disproportionately plus no explanation was made by the authorities in advance. Therefore a peaceful demonstration turned out to be a country-wide protest.

Following initial communal protests, Istanbul and most of the other big cities 'united' against harsh interventions by the police together with Erdoğan's as well as his team's aggressive and provocative speculations as he said they would go ahead with the destruction of the Park no matter what the protestors do. The protests turned into be widespread as each evening people went out to the streets banging pots and pans in their hands and tooting.

2.3 The Reactions

Even though being an environmental issue, the events show that much of anger also centers on the struggle over Istanbul's public spaces. Erdoğan's government has proceeded with disputed urban development plans with little public input, while his police forces have increasingly used tear gas against peaceful protesters, resulting in scores of injuries (Arango and Yeginsu, 2013). Indeed, in the short run, it has been put into words by many scholars, journalists, etc. inside and outside of the country that Erdoğan has donned the shield of power by which he has tried hard to orient the state as he has desired without asking or attracting public attention through infinite political maneuverings. Gezi Park was possibly one of them but was highly impeded by remarkable mass movement of the communal protestors and their organized alliance.

It is without dispute that police's role increased this anger incrementally as there were casualties, even deaths occurred. Considering the overall occurrences, the nation-wide turmoil may have been avoided to outgrow before coming to the phase of an outburst if the government would act discreetly enough and take necessary precautions accordingly. Throughout the protests, on the contrary, Erdoğan maintained a defiant tone, insisting he would not be bowed by what he described as a vocal minority; as police clashed with protesters in Taksim, he insisted again that the unrest was part of a conspiracy against his government. The demonstrators, he said, "are being used by some financial institutions, the interest rate lobby and media groups to (harm) Turkey's economy and (scare away) investments." (Becatoros: 2013). As Einssentat reflects, he showed disdain towards the protests, calling the participants "bandits" and "looters" (2013: 24). But Erdoğan and his team were characteristically obstinate, which cause severe consequences for both the welfare of the country, their popularity and the image of institutions like the police, media and religion.

Chapter 3

3.1 Two Contrasts: Submission and Challenge

Then it is necessary to move to the theoretical background of the dissertation to fortify the hypothesis, which is an authoritarian approach to the Gezi Park protests is found in Erdoğan's discourse as well as media, religion and police practices as state apparatuses, are to be analyzed in terms of Louis Althusser's statements about ideological and repressive state apparatuses.

The French philosopher, Louis Althusser (1918-1990) was one of the well-known thinkers of the Generation 68; he is known as structural Marxist as he gave a new impulse to Marxist theory by his interpretations, especially on class struggle. His contributions considering what he refers as 'ideological and repressive state apparatuses' are related with the nature of this paper, therefore providing a sound basis for the hypothesis. However, before giving certain instances related with Gezi Park protests, his main statements regarding his reflections on these apparatuses should be explained beforehand by also relating with the content of this paper.

Althusser coins in his words that in order to last long, every social formation should reproduce the conditions of production, which is the ultimate condition he prescribes. He refers to reproduction of the conditions of production by making references towards the mode of production, which he says every social formation arises from a dominant mode of production; the process of production sets to work the existing productive forces in and under definite relations of production

(Althusser, 1970:100). Therefore, for the continuation of a production cycle, productive forces and their existing relations within production should be reproduced without giving a pause.

Considering what the reproduction of the conditions of production is about, it refers to the necessity in continuance of material conditions and the process of production by taking into account each phase from renewal of instruments to every possible requirements such as premises, necessary equipments and technical mechanism, etc. However, this can be thought like a chain of mechanism all the capitalists, as Althusser assumes in the light of Marx's utterances, should be within the cycle of reproduction to infinity so that demands for reproduction can be provided adequately and reasonably.

Then he moves to reproduction of labor-power, which is also called productive forces. Here, the question appears: How can reproduction of productive forces be made possible? Althusser explains this as it is possible to provide them with material needs; i.e. wages to enable their own needs such as housing, clothing, family needs, education, heating, etc.; and, to be in the production field again next day. However, wages are not enough to ensure these material conditions of their reproduction since productive forces also need to be diversely skilled, which refers learning know-how techniques about their profession as well as morality related rules such as conscience, virtue, and respect. This calls for a kind of submission to certain things though, as Althusser mentions labour-power requires not only a reproduction of the skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order; i.e., a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling

ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class in words (Althusser, 1970:104).

Then it is possible to sketch an image of society accordingly: An entity divided into two as 'infrastructure' and 'superstructure'. Infrastructure creates an economic base where there is a kind of unity between productive forces and relations of production while superstructure is divided into two within politico-legal segments such as law and state; and, ideology such as religious or ethical values. It is indispensable that both infrastructure and superstructure are linked to another: superstructure cannot stand alone without the base of the infrastructure and infrastructure cannot last long without the latter.

3.2 Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses

In the light of all these aforementioned perspectives about the characteristics of a social formation, state is then referred to have a repressive existence in relation to requirements of legal practices such as police and courts functioning by force. As Althusser calls (1970), the state and its existence in its apparatus has no meaning except as a function of state power. Therefore, all political struggle is about the state seizure by a certain type or an alliance of class. Referring to the claims by Marxist classics, he lists the following, even though he still finds it too descriptive:

- The state is the repressive state apparatus,
- State power and state apparatus must be distinguished,

- The objective of class struggle concerns state power, and in consequence the use of the state apparatus by the classes (or alliance of classes or of fractions of classes) holding state power as a function of their class objectives; and,
- The proletariat must seize state power in order to destroy the existing bourgeois state apparatus and in the first phase, replace it with a quite different, proletarian, state apparatus then in later phases set in motion a radical process, that of destruction of the state (the end of state power, the end of every state apparatus) (Althusser, 1970:109).

If it is required to relate all these with the concept of this paper, it is seen in Gezi events that there was a kind of challenge applied by the protestors toward state ruling and the leadership of Erdoğan as well as his followers. Here, the term proletariat can refer to the protestors who showed their discontent about the events and the latest developments; i.e., introductions as mentioned on previous pages, on their posts onto social sites, at public gatherings and even graffities on the streets.

However, state apparatus can survive as it is observed in the case of Gezi where the government did almost anything to suppress the protestors by prohibiting them to enter to the milieu of the Park or used tear gase and water cannons to not let people to have protests on the streets. Or else, it was also appeared in the press that Erdoğan criticized the main opposition party heavily that they stirred up the public unrest from the start.

Althusser touches on the idea of ideological state apparatuses as well, which are also related with the content of this dissertation as he says. Ideological state apparatuses are a number of realities which present themselves to the immediate

observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions (Althusser, 1970:110). These can be various such as education, religion, family, media, culture and so forth.

Maybe the best way to explain more about ideological state apparatuses is to show distinctive characteristics separated from repressive ones. The first thing may be the fact that ideological state apparatuses are plural: There were many instances during the events that the government; i.e, the ruling party, made its tactical planning from near and far; they manipulated media to show unrelated news, a documentary about penguins had a broad repercussion, for example. Hüseyin Avni Mutlu, the Governor of Istanbul, wrote on Twitter warning the parents to take care of their children discreetly; Erdoğan flew into rage in his political party's group meeting that misguided protestors entered the mosque with their shoes on by addressing to the vehemence of the situation, and so forth. Considering these examples, one can say that repressive apparatuses are constrained due to their limit as a physical force nature in public sphere while ideological ones are applicable upon masses through religious, cultural, etc. ideologies like in these examples in private domain. Indeed, the police used disproportionate ferocious force during the clashes and this caused thousands to get injured and even few to die; but, behind this mentality there were also a common ideology instilled in them that using physical force is a part of their duty conferred themselves by the state. However, it is necessary to remark that ideological state apparatuses have their own way of punishment as well: For instance, during the events there was a kind of censorship applied upon mainstream media; those who were against this tacit manipulation had to either resign, to go on compulsory leave or fired from their posts.

Even though the leaders or the ruling class (the moguls, and the party loyalists in this context) handling repressive state apparatuses also need to apply ideological ones practically, they cannot stay longer if not so much concern is given to the latter; because, ideological state apparatuses are more effective in enabling the reproduction of relations of production. It is seen that police force as repressive power brought about agony and fury from many parts of the country; however, they did not intervene in people's breaking fast together. It can be said that Erdoğan was able to prolong his leadership more than 5 years and has doubled his votes for three times by getting the benefit of reference to religion, the importance of family (e.g. his comments on making at least three children and granting subsidies for newlyweds, etc.) and cultural values (party marches displaying the image of fraternity and unity, as seen on TV), which shows how actually he gives importance to secure his and his party's position by using this kind of ideological apparatus.

In the following paragraphs, what kind of tactical moves were applied during the protests and what the reactions to them were are to be elaborated by taking media, police and religion as ideological and repressive apparatuses into account.

3.2.1 Media as an Ideological State Apparatus

In today's world, large and rapidly growing knowledge industries are based on information technology stemmed from resources of all kinds. There is extensive computerization of organized activities as well as an exponential growth in the

production and flow of texts, images and data by way of numerous overlapping and cross-cutting communication networks (McQuail, 2003).

Gezi Park events is an example of such phenomenon by which there was a vast source through which people were organized, acted and stood together, becoming 'masses' in their protests. Peaceful sits-in of the demonstrators at Gezi Park interrupted by excessive force of brutal police intervention at the very early dates. However, traditional media did not cover anything about the events at first but broadcasted irrelevant news. This was due to the almost monopolistic, concentrated ownership of media channels; the dependence of the local media moguls on the government; and, fears of retaliation from the ruling political party which proved to be intolerant of any social, cultural or economic criticism. If the media had covered the protests, then it would have been only to re-utter the official line stated by the government, turning the private media to the communicator of the provocative language used by the government officials (Alternatif Bilişim, 2013). However, this was not the first time that such kind of embargo is imposed; in 2011, Erdoğan's government had in some way censored media when Uludere Massacre took place in which fighter jets at Turkish Air Force had mistakenly killed more than 30 civilians crossing the Iraqi border.

All these developments led people have their own way to reach their own masses. There were indeed an increase in the reliance upon social media: hashtags, trending topics were all about Gezi. People organized major events and gatherings on Facebook and shared their ideas on Twitter and published pictures on Instagram and Tumblr to protest police brutality and the silence of the mainstream Turkish media. Now people on streets became journalists; definitely, citizen journalism was coupled

with live video shots, blog comments and online polls, etc. for informing people as quickly as possible about the safe zones from police, who were taken to custody, what happened to casualties, or urgent medical needs, and so forth.

This showed that mass self-communication reached an enormous rate for the first time in Turkish history with the help of technology as there was an implicit censorship applied by the ruling party. The dominance of communications of this ideological apparatus also showed itself at the social media: Erdoğan once speculated to unfollow the events by saying “There is an evil called Twitter” and “Social media is the evil called upon societies.” (Robertson, 2013). Accordingly, even certain people were taken to custody through government’s surveillance of their social media participation.



Image 3: Article on Gezi Events (Hurriyet Daily News)

However, in response to traditional media's acceptance of the hegemony of the current government, citizens have not only come to use these alternative communication channels, but to celebrate them as well. Mainly using Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr and Vine, people have given pluralist accounts of the events using creative slogans. Databases have been created to collect evidence of police brutality and the compiled documents have been distributed via blogs, open folksonomies such as Ekşisözlük and other mass communication platforms (Alternatif Bilişim, 2013).

In addition to all these, a group of hackers under the name of Redhack involved in many clandestine activities. Set up in 1997 and has been active especially in blocking websites of state institutions since then, this group was also popular during Gezi events due to their rebellious and determined stance. Main members participated in tv programs with their faces covered to talk about their activities and standpoints on HalkTV, a TV channel which began its broadcasting life as of 2005 by Deniz Baykal who was the leader of Republican People's Party (CHP) at that time.

Interestingly enough, Halk TV was the first time most popular channel in its nearly nine year-old of journey; one reason can be the fact that many channels in mainstream media were not able to televise related news or live transmissions due to the factors explained in above paragraphs; literally, people who had not use to know at which number this channel was on previously, became suddenly addicted to its programs at any hour; for an instant, Turkey turned back to its single channel times.

Naturally, there was a pressure from the government for this as an ideological state apparatus as well. In order to control in its hands, the channel was given steady fines by *theRadio and Television Surpreme Council* (RTÜK) for the reason that it triggered protests and supported violence in the events. However, this was not a burden for the channel itself; but, rather the makers continued to televise daily streaming and even gave a documentary of penguins by splitting the screen into two while showing Erdoğan's speech to his party loyalists at one of the meetings in order to tease other main channels. Briefly stated, the public really found something in it and affiliated itself with this sarcastic, straightforwardly Kemalist and also rebelling tv channel with its cost efficient 'live-on-tape' broadcastings in a very short time.

Regarding from the protestors' side, on the other hand, social media reached its peak in this largest wave of protests in Turkey. "My generation used to chant, 'The whole world is watching.' Today, the whole world is not only watching but Skyping, Tweeting, and sending pictures and videos in real time. During the first few days of the protests in Turkey, the official media focused on news about penguins, while Facebook and other social media outlets showed millions of viewers around the world what was actually going on, and not only in Istanbul." says Seyla Benhabib, Professor of Political Science at Yale University, in one of her interviews with Begum Adalet et al (2013) about the overall image of Gezi Park protests. Indeed, people from different profiles found their own way of criticizing: they teased government's ruling with caricatures, opened forums and online pages, added *çapulcu* (looter), *ayyaş* (alcoholic) and *TC* (the Turkish Republic) in front of their names on their profiles on Facebook, etc. On the other hand, government members could keep up with what protestors did: Although largely being a figure of fun, the

Mayor of Ankara, Melih Gökçek, and Istanbul Governor Hüseyin Avni Mutlu were very active during the events; they were not compromising but in some way provoking as they carried on supporting the activities of the ruling party as their narrative was also ambiguous.

Regarding all these, it is seen that media in Turkey failed and lost much of its prestige during and following the events since the government insisted on using it as a tool or apparatus; however, it increased considerably and gradually at the side of the public; citizen journalism found its own way to be successful enough to reach masses and outside the borders, and social media replaced mainstream media. It is indeed without question that if power holders silence or make ineffective the means of communications and informations by ignoring what is really going on and convert into a symbol or an apparatus of a single-party regime, the people naturally start finding their own way of communicating like what they did through social media applications since it has turned out to be nearly impossible to carry out journalism in its real sense. There are a few tiny, brave independent outlets, which break stories that are critical of the government, but these stories are hardly ever picked up by the mainstream media and therefore have little impact (Baydar, 2013).

3.2.2 Police as an Repressive State Apparatus

Police power was maybe the most debatable issue of the events. The government's heavy-handed response to the protestors by using unbalanced police force as a repressive apparatus caused severe criticism by the majority.



Image 4: Police firing excessive tear gas at protests (Reuters)

Although the event actually started for a lofty aim, many, especially police, resorted to excessive physical force. Even though Erdoğan said the crackdown was towards only illegal groups having the idea that they were to destabilize his government and the welfare of the country, the brutality inflated thousands to go out to the streets and protect themselves physically; however, they confronted excessive police arrests and harsh operations in turn. Thousands got injured and even few died.

The operations clashed against a democratic country's image and government's accountability substantially; however it is evident that there was an affront to democracy in any case and a crime against human rights; because, protesting to protect the environment cannot be taken for granted as a crime to be charged with heavy fines by using the police as a tool. The policy makers like the Governor or Muammer Güler, the Minister of Internal Affairs of that time, did not fulfil their duties and responsibilities during the events but conferred abundant power

to police stealthily; nevertheless, when they were criticized for their authorization they hid behind their statements that the police was there for illegal groups.

Without a doubt, the government applied police force as a repressive state apparatus. It is essential to act responsibly to keep common sense at maximum and provocation at minimum within local or nation-wide events. However, the government failed to lose its people's confidence one more time because of this extreme power carried out using water cannons, rubber bullets and tear gas; their guard with no registration number on his helmet by doing nothing to a machete attacker assaulted passer-bys; their Prime Minister praising his police for the 'heroic' actions saying "We will not let circles who have been adversaries of Turkey or international and national media to wear down our police. I and my government congratulate our police wholeheartedly. On behalf of my country and nation, I would like to thank all my police siblings for standing up against incidents that have been going on for weeks, with sacrifice and patriotism. Sustaining such a long-term struggle without disrupting its solemnity and its discipline for 48 hours, while remaining hungry and thirsty, I am saying this clearly, is a task only our police can achieve. As the Prime Minister of a government that has extended freedoms to this extent, increased the standards of democracy and done so many reforms, I am expressing this with all my heart and all my sincerity: We are a government that says 'zero tolerance to torture.' We are a government that changed, democratized our police's rules of intervention into incidents and of custody and interrogation. If our police made a mistake, we would say it openheartedly and do what was required. However, nobody, regardless of who they are, whether a lawmaker or someone, has the right to swear at and insult our police." (Erdogan, 2013).

3.2.3 Religion as an Ideological State Apparatus

Another sensitive issue is religion, which has always been a subject matter of debate by nature. An influential narrative nourished by religion is always a good way to attract masses. Being aware of this fact, Erdoğan had the benefit of applying this during his leadership as much as he could on a country nearly 95% of its population is Muslim.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, there had been previous regulations put on social, economic and cultural life. Due to his background, Erdoğan is known to be affiliated with moral values colored by religion; for the very reason, there were instances that he manipulated millions by using this apparatus and make the majority stable; this case was perceived in a different way during Gezi unrest, though.

In a republic defined to have parliamentary regime, a primer minister should run the government on democratic grounds, too; he or she cannot intervene in fundamental rights and freedoms even if s/he has 100% of the public's consent; or, should s/he shows religion as reference and tries to manipulate certain impositions through it as an apparatus, that person may no longer be credible.

It is seen that Erdoğan felt into this dilemma, too as he referred in one of his speeches, he talked about a law is made by a couple of looters, for example.

Maybe the most evident example is the case is that he insisted on the allegation about the protestors' entering into DolmabahçeBezmiâlem Valide Sultan Mosque with their shoes and having alcoholic drinks there, which is a taboo all by

itself. This speculation was not verified; but there were many news and pictures showing the injured protestors running from the police force and having this place as a shelter or infirmary.



Image 5: Interns having treatment to the injured on iron police barriers in the mosque
(Hürriyet)

The events showed that if a leader opts not to be reconciliatory manner but acts with hyperactivity to change things into his favour by using certain tools rather than abiding by the priorities of democracy; and on the top of it all these, chooses a patronizing and imperative tone and discourse there will be reactions naturally coming from the voices of the people on the street. Without going too far; i.e., not causing severe consequences like deaths or other catastrophes, it is the citizens' right to seek their claims within the framework of democracy. However, as seen in the instances given in these three apparatuses, the government did fail to give this right

to its own people and radically disappointed them by perceiving this as an attack to its presence or the part of a strike plan from terrorists.

Indeed, Erdoğan's approach is open to argument in addition to certain operational faults: As explained, due to the autocratic tendencies towards governing must have changed and prolonged the total course of the events. If police force had not been used that extremely, the media had not been limited and the religion had not been exploited nearly at every turn, there would have been less negative consequences but possibly good steps towards democracy.

Chapter 4

4.1 Analysis of Discourse

In previous chapters, it was aimed to reflect upon how authoritarian approach of the Prime Minister is enforced in a theoretical framework. Here, it is time to underline how he has put this into practice inclusive of Gezi Park events. For this, the term discourse will be main area of interest, in addition to the theoretical base in this dissertation.

A study on discourse is chosen for this dissertation since it presents the general idea setting language in a structure in terms of different patterns where people's utterances are shaped according to the places they take part in certain areas of social life which can be various domains like politics, culture and media. Due to its nature, it goes a long way from linguistics to sociology; from philosophy to other disciplines in social sciences as Fairclough mentions (1989:24) "the whole process of interaction of which a text is just a part". Bayram notes (2010) a particular discourse, either spoken or written, can stem from different sources such as power relations, cultural or social background, regional or social status; and, language has a key role in the exchange of these values and transforming them. Its analysis is therefore involved to discover or interpret what speakers actually say within an expression as it provides a higher awareness of hidden motivations behind attributing to certain values such as power or criticism, domination or prestige. At this point, it is better to examine such relations as it is aimed to highlight how power was enforced in Erdoğan's discourse during the events in this dissertation.

4.2 The Relation in Question

It is incontestable that language plays a crucial role also in politics through which leaders address, reach as well as influence their voters in certain ways. Further to this basic assumption, language use also presents the interplay of domestic and interstate operational policies and power relations where certain ideologies or enforcements dominate and the people as receivers perceiving the messages within.

It is a common knowledge that politics is concerned with power: the power to make decisions, to control resources, to control other people's behaviour and often to control their values (Bayram, 2010:28). Language and power are therefore reciprocal: Language is influential when used for the exchange of power and social status related purposes; and, power gains effectiveness when applied through language. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish that political discourse is not only thematic and practical: limited to ad-hoc campaigns, party programmes or parliamentary talks; but rather extends how to reach people through press briefings, social media, general elections and so forth. Through the effective functionality of language, leaders can reflect the ideas they want to implement in the way they want to be perceived. This is sometimes authoritarian, sometimes compromising and sometimes reconciliatory; however, highly specific to cases as well as the character of the person.

According to Bayram, attitudes towards language can be positive or negative, stemming from issues such as social or cultural background, power and status. When the Turkish Prime Minister's representation in media enriched by ideological components is considered, it is well-known how powerful Erdoğan can express

himself with eloquence by using his own style of language as an effective tool (also considering the fact that he is a graduate of religious vocational high school; therefore he is well trained in preaching); his attitude and expressions at World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009 where he refused his counterparts in a proud manner can be a good instance supporting this idea. It is true that the discourse he opts is highly favoured by his supporters and particular business circles; however, a prime minister who is reaching millions and whose party is now in power a decade should also modulate the tone of his voice in terms of other electors as well since the responsibility he shoulders is exceptionally critical. Therefore, as the words have a strong influence on attitudes and the overall image, the perceptions as well as the reactions of the receivers are shaped accordingly.

4.3 Methodological Approach

Regarding this overall information, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is chosen in this dissertation as it aims to explore and tries to interpret the relationship among discursive strategies on social or cultural events having regard to power or social inequalities and imbalances as well as investigates and reveals perspectives of power relations by means of language use with an eye on the possibilities for social change created within the utterances of the Prime Minister's political discourse and how dominantly he reflects his constructed system of reality by favoring his party's interests at certain levels. Regarding the information given in previous chapters, the aim here is to underline how his supporters have been affected with social power abuse, dominance and inequality within political and such social context that is

sought through critical discourse analysis within the framework of Gezi Park events and; correspondingly how more powerful he controlled the agenda of public discourse in turn and whatkind of consequences of suchcontrol and inequality occured during the events.

4.4 Research Field

Taking the overall history of the events into account, the materials which are related with the case in question in news articles, Erdoğan's official speeches and online videos on social networking sites between the ends of May and November 2013 are sought, transcribed and subsequently analyzed in the light of critical discourse analysis in a qualitative way by relating to the research question of "How power was enforced in the Prime Minister's discourse during the events combined with the hypothesis regarding Erdoğan's discourse is far authoritarian and this brought about an increase in severeness of the events.



Image 6: Erdoğan making one of his statements to the press (Baskahaber)

Below, there are two examples showing how Erdoğan used what kind of discourse to steer his supporter's thoughts for the persuasion of his political claims. In that, how power is enforced in the language he used shall be analyzed in terms of critical discourse analysis at micro, meso and macro levels giving insights for the details.

4.4.1 Example

The Prime Minister's Opening Speech on at the Ground Breaking Ceremony of the Third Bridge in Istanbul

The transcript below is transcribed from his speech between 17:06 and 18:52 minutes in a video shot in 2013, May 29 and translated into English:

English Version:

“... My dear brothers, less talk more work. Some people come up and say this and that happened at Taksim Square and Gezi Park, they are to hold demonstration, anything, so and so... You do whatever you want. We have decided, and will implement this decision. If you do respect the history, you do respect it, first search on that place called Gezi Park, go ahead. We are going to bring that place into life. We shall pedestrianize and give that place, Taksim Square totally to the service to people. People will stroll there. Its lanscape architecture, and everything... and for the time being, at the period of Justice and Development Party’s leadership, my dear brothers, the number of trees we have planted in the category of 10 year-old and above, 2 year-old and above and 3 year-old and above is 2.5 billion all across Turkey, 2.5 billion! This government planted these trees, rapidly. As long as people have an interest in planting trees, we allocate place for them. Take 500 thousand square meter area, come to plant trees. Without a charge. Why? We are environmentalists. And we take these steps...”

4.4.2 Example

The Prime Minister’s Opening Speech for the New Service Building of the Ottoman Archive in Istanbul

The transcript below is transcribed from his speech between 03:42 and 11:56 minutes in a video shot in 2013, June 02and translated into English:

English Version:

“... See, the approach in these kind of issues is in the same invalidity of whom has been asserting themselves allegedly to be the protector of 12 trees at Taksim Square for days. Our government is the one planted nearly 3 billion saplings at various age ranges in Turkey (applause). Look, I do not talk about 3 thousand, it is 3 billion. And we are the one constructing around 160 national parks. It is not 5, 10 or 20 decare-area; but tens of hectares. During the period when I was Mayor of Istanbul, we planted above 10-year old plane trees from central refugess to side tracks along trans european motorway (TEM) and E5 Highway... these were all planted by our government, local government. Look at these trees now. Look how tall acacia trees are. Look at these plane trees. Is it possible to refer a ruling party which has done these against the environment? Can it ever be hostile to trees?

I fought against those who cut down, spoilt tens of grown trees in Kilyos district during my mayorship. Where were those environmentalists? Where were the officials of this main opposition party, its representatives? When I was in jail, together the president of the period they (referring to Republican People’s Party authorities) once speculated by asking “Where are the opposed ones?” in an inaugural ceremony. The president talked like this. But we came up and gave our legal fight. And won by verdict. Now, that university has become The Ministry of Forest and Water Affairs’s property. Now they are our tenants (applause). Tenants.

We cannot forget about these events, these realities. Look, I talk frankly: We are executing our project on pedestrianization project of Taksim Square, and we will do that (applause). This will be finished. Secondly, Republican People’s Party

mentality demolished and turned Topçu Kışlası (Ottoman Barracks), which was built in 1780, at the time of 3.Selim rule, into a stadium. We are going to build that historical barrack identically, in the same format with its old structure (applause and slogan chants praising Erdoğan). I apologize, but I put it on the line, we are never deterred by those a couple of looters' coming down to the Square and provoke our people with misinformation (applause). Because this society voted us for the purpose of protecting its history, for protecting its nature. See, we are constructing the third bridge, right? Today around 300-500 people went there to protest. So what? Shall we stop constructing just because those people went there? Just because the main opposition party opposed it... Ah they had objected to the first bridge, objected second bridge, and now this. These opposed to the sub-sea tunnel, tubes. Ah, they do not have a tendency of putting something together in their temperament! Nope. No (applause). They did not.

They say Erdoğan is a dictator. Well, I am not the lord of the nation. There is no dictatorship in my blood. Neither in my temperament. I am the servant of this nation (applause). If they look for a dictator, go and look at their past. Their own history! If they look for a dictator, for which purpose those break the window and harm people's, shopkeepers' properties at Taksim Square, in Ankara, here and there? I ask. In the name of what they do so? Is it related with law? Related with democracy? Is it about the fight for rights? Who is going to pay their costs now? Will they? There is the share of the poor orphans here. The poor orphans. We are the one who get to work on... yes, this government, this states is going to repair that.

The mentality the Republican People's Party contributes this terrorists, my dear brothers. Because those from this party have this in their souls, natures. And

now we conduct three projects one within the other. Environment is there. History is there, culture is there. And my people will be able to walk among the green areas with underground traffic with their folks. And Ataturk Cultural Center (A multi-purpose cultural and opera center called AKM in Turkish)... if God lets, we are going to tumble it down and build a magnificent opera and cultural center in its place. We are the one who will do (applause). I heard someone saying about mosque; yes, we are going to build one. Yes we are going to build a mosque (applause and increasing slogans). Of course, I am not going to have a permission for that from the leader of the Republican People's Party! And not from a couple of looters! The people who voted for us already gave permission of this. They said you do it (slogan chants).

And now some people come up and say dear Mr. Prime Minister, these are too provocative. My brothers, I am a servant. I never have purpose for provocation. Two plus two is four. It is four in summer, four in winter; four in a day and night. This is the truth. The reality. No one can ever try to deny realities. We are the victims of these realities. We speak in the name of them. And we will do whatever is required.”

Chapter 5

5.1 The Analysis of Findings

As mentioned, critical discourse analysis investigates the areas within power related imbalances and persuasiveness uttered by either part in a speech; the groups who control most influential discourse also have more chances to control the minds and actions of others. In this context, social power is considered and analyzed in terms of this kind of control where the minds and actions of the power groups control less powerful ones mostly through manipulation and persuasion.

First of all, if the two transcriptions are to be analyzed in general, it is observed that the audience as the less influential group; i.e, the citizens with party flags at the ground breaking ceremony in the first example, and the businessmen together with party loyalists at the organization for the new service building of the Ottoman Archive, is influenced not in a direct but implicit ways through the persuasive tone in the Prime Minister's effective discourse as seen in below:

Secondly, as seen in the following, the sentences are broadly made with repeated words, which is a good way to have a proficient and effective speech before a crowd so as to make the audience's attention alive.

Example:

“... **Look at** these trees now. **Look** how tall acacia trees are. **Look at** these plane trees. **Is it possible** to refer a ruling party which has done these against the environment? **Can it ever be** hostile to trees?..”

What can be also said here is that the forth and fifth sentences are in the form of rhetorical questions, which is key for persuasiveness by this context. Additionally, it is understood that the audience is influenced at required degree since applauses and chants take place as feedback.

Seen below, the bold words are all direct and clear; what is expected from the audience is not to wait for their affirmative feedback but to be convinced enough to follow his expressions; therefore, the word ‘respect’ is repeated consecutively to make the audience see how they are determined about their decision on Gezi Park.

Example:

“... You do whatever you want. We have **decided**, and will **implement** this decision. If you do **respect** the history, you do **respect** it, first search on that place called Gezi Park, **go ahead**. We are going to bring that place into life...”

As van Dijk (1993: 16) summarizes these overall points, the persuasive moves and credibility in discourse can be analyzed more in detail, which can also be related with the two cases in question:

- **Argumentation:** The negative evaluation follows from the ‘facts’.

“... Ah **they** had objected to the first bridge, objected to the second bridge, and now this. **They** opposed to the sub-sea tunnel, the tubes. Ah, **they** do not have a tendency to put something together in their temperament! Nope. No (applause). **They** did not...”

Here, it is aimed to criticize the main opposition party by putting them in a less favourable position due to the objections they made previously for the implementations (these are the ‘facts’ here in this context as van Dijk prescribes) by the Justice and Development Party.

- **Rhetorical Figures:** Hyperbolic enhancement of ‘their’ negative actions and ‘our’ positive actions; euphemisms, denials, understatements of our ‘negative’ actions.

“... Who is going to pay their costs now? Will they? There is the share of the poor orphans here. The poor orphans. **We** are the one who get to work on... yes, **this government, this state** is going to repair that...”

Here, this time it is aimed to give a hyperbolic expression so as to benefit from the audience’s conscience, telling that certain people are in need because of negative consequences; and, in turn, it is intended to show that only the leadership of Justice and Development Party (here it is we, this government, this state) can fix this.

- **Lexical Style:** The choice of words that imply negative (or positive) evaluations.

“... Of course, I am not going to have a permission for that from the leader of the Republican People’s Party! And not from **a couple of looters!**”

According to this point, Erdoğan gives the hints of understatement examples by calling the protestors ‘ a couple of looters’. There are also other examples, on the other hand, clearing his name out of a negative reference as he says he is not a dictator but the servant of as the follows:

“... They say Erdoğan is a **dictator**. Well, I am not **the lord of the nation**. There is no **dictatorship** in my blood. Neither in my temperament. I am the **servant** of this nation (applause). If they look for a **dictator**, go and look at their past. Their own history! If they look for a **dictator...**”

- **Story telling:** Telling negative events as personally experienced; giving plausible details above negative features of the events.

“... **If fought against** those who cut down, spoilt tens of grown trees in Kilyos district **during my mayorship**. Where were those environmentalists? Where were the

officials of this main opposition party, its representatives? **When I was in jail,** together the president of the period they (referring to Republican People's Party authorities) once speculated by asking "Where are the opposed ones?" (referring to himself) in an inaugural ceremony. The president talked like this. But we **came up** and gave **our legal fight**. And **won** by verdict... We cannot **forget** about these events, these realities..."

Here, the Prime Minister gives an anecdote which he had an unpleasant experience with the authorities from the previous government by telling how they were able to deal with.

- Quoting credible witnesses, sources or experts, e.g. news reports.

"... And we are the one constructing around **160 national parks**. It is not **5, 10** or **20 decare-area**; but **tens of hectares**. During the period when I was Mayor of Istanbul, we planted **above 10-year old plane trees** from central refuges to side tracks along trans european motorway (TEM) and E5 Highway... these were all planted by our government, local government. Look at these trees now. Look how tall **acacia trees** are. Look at these **plane trees**. Is it possible to refer a power which has done these against the environment? Can be ever hostile to trees?.."

And finally, he underlines his statements by giving certain facts; i.e., quantitative details about the party's activities in order to be more convincing.

As seen in these examples, the parts within a discourse take turn in terms of control; the more control one has, the less powerful his counterpart gains and therefore becoming less influential. In addition to considering all these in terms of

persuasiveness and credibility parameters, it is also possible to have a regard within the perspectives of context, text and the volume of talk.

Context is defined considering the overall situation such as setting; i.e., the place, physical environment, etc., and mental expressions such as goals, decisions, and so forth. As these two organizations took place in the form of big conventions, it is possible to address decisions and plans to thousands at one sitting. One point to remember is that Erdoğan always speaks before considerably large crowds; his expressions, supposing also his educational background as an orator, are influential and therefore effective enough to control a great part of the majority proportionally. It is clear that the public attention does not stop or decrease; but, is kept on a stable mood in these two examples.

Text and the volume of the talk are shaped just as the context where the powerful speaker controls and arranges the discourse genre, which is the political one where Erdoğan enhances with personal stories, past memories or developments, according to the number of the audience.

5.2 Interpretation Levels

The details become more fruitful if discourse is interpreted in terms of micro, meso and macro levels. Micro level includes basic linguistic analysis of what is actually said within a discourse also by having reference to the details of sentences' structures. In this sense, when the two examples are considered, it can be said that the syntax is not well-ordered as this not a written text; and, the sentences are structured mostly in rhetorical forms with active voices, even though there are not so many figures of speeches to be allowed for.

The statements with numerical data are short and direct enough to convey overall messages. There are not so many indirect quotes since Erdoğan is the first speaker; however, he refers to other speakers as well. The words, gestures, the tone and the registers such as 'cibiliyet' (temperament) and 'meşrep' (soul, spirit) are populist expressions for a person who speaks in front of hundreds.

There are also references to religion like the speculations considering the building plan for a mosque in the related area and direct criticism to the main opposition party. Overall, as explained before, he knows well how to persuade the audience to be in line with the comments by using certain values like religion, deserved rights, challenge and so forth.

Meso level analysis gives hints about the basic setting of the discourse taking place. The relation between discourse and social power can be analyzed in terms of how a powerful group (It is the Prime Minister and the Justice and Development Party in this context) can control less powerful ones (It is the audience at the organizations in these two examples) in this sense.

Furthermore, within mesoscale analysis focuses on the way how the discourse is created and consumed; i.e, what kind of a theme is required to be reflected in what sense. Naturally, when analyzed both texts have political attributions where Erdoğan diversifies with examples as in the following telling about the plans to be conducted in social and cultural life:

“... Environment is there. History is there, culture is there. And my people will be able to walk among the green areas with underground traffic with their folks. And Ataturk Cultural Center (A multi-purpose cultural and opera center called AKM in Turkish)... if God lets, we are going to tumble it down and build a magnificent opera and cultural center in its place... I heard someone saying about mosque; yes, we are going to build one. Yes we are going to build a mosque (applause and increasing slogans)...”

Finally, at macro analysis, discourse analysts consider the framework in broader sense where, in this respect, the discourse of Erdoğan can be further analyzed in terms of the relationship between the text and its relevance with social events.

In the first example, Erdoğan made this speech at a sensitive time as the events started to take place towards the end of May and increased day by day onwards. There had been already a criticism for the construction of the third bridge for the danger of deforestation across the relevant area in Istanbul; plus, many people disliked the idea of naming it after I. Selim, an Ottoman emperor known for his grimness, for the reason that he had killed around 40.000 Alawites.

In the second example, it is observed that The Prime Minister is more criticizing than the first one, in his tone and the word usage. And, on the other hand, he is putting himself in a guiltless position, partly degrading himself; he is the servant of the nation not a lord, for example. One point here is that his supporters are more vibrant chanting slogans in favour of him, showing their respect and commitment at macro level.

As it is seen in all these statements, Erdoğan's discourse is pretty much fortified through the elements as Van Dijk (1993) prescribes. In addition, there were speculations from other authorities who are from the top of certain administrative institutions such as the governorate or the police department supporting and verifying his expressions readily. Indeed, they accompanied him in this way; however they also confronted severe criticism and condemned by the majority in society for not fulfilling their duties and taking sides, as explained in detail in Chapter 3.

Overall, power and dominance are crucial in discourse. As van Dijk refers (1993) context, text, and talk are more or less controlled by powerful speakers, and such power relation is controlled at the expense of other participants as seen in above examples.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

By the time Erdoğan filled his political seat, there had been conducive developments providing necessary conditions to turn this snowflake into a snowball. Through well-prepared manoeuvres in politics as well as the popularity he gained in turn, the Turkish Prime Minister rather secured his position from the very beginning.

However, all this image has started to exhibit negative representations in the last run as he has always been in the public eye, defending favourable interests while criticizing the rest. Gezi events can be the last but also the most influential one that crossed this line and showed people inside and outside the country that how power and challenge can clash to the extremities. The events were also specific to its kind as showed that the young is no longer apolitical who took the lead actively and physically. So indeed there has been a 'challenger' image standing against the authoritative administration which started to be rooted nearly in every sphere of the social life as well as the practices it regulates. Siddiqui suggests in his article (2013) that with each passing day, Erdoğan got more provocative, reigniting the protests just as they would be dying down. "Tayyip, resign," became the most ubiquitous sign. He responded that he would bring "a million of my people" out in the streets. The protests kept growing, with newer disgruntled groups. All the suppressed resentments of the old established order dethroned by the AKP in 2001 bubbled to the surface.

It can be said that Erdoğan has showed off authoritarianism in recent period: With these events, it became once more evident that Erdoğan used sensitive and religious-rooted taboos and the media's transparency and impartiality as well as the position of the security forces. It is the matter of question who will be further dominating in this struggle; but it is precise that the obstinacy caused by Erdoğan's authoritarian perspective will do and bring about negative consequences.

Local elections are soon in Turkey. If this country is governed on democratic basis, it is then necessary that even its Prime Minister respects this ground, reads the developments objectively and acts not personally or domineering but accordingly; because, it is always better to not hold on the 50%, but also win the rest of it democratically.

Appendices

Example -I :

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Opening Speech on May 29th, 2013 at the Ground Breaking Ceremony of the 3rd Bridge in Istanbul

The transcript below is extracted from his speech between 17:06 and 18:52 minutes in a video:

Original Version

“... Değerli kardeşlerim, biz laf üretmiyoruz. Biz iş üretiyoruz. İşte birileri geliyor Taksim Meydanı'nda yok Gezi Parkı şöyle olmuş, böyle olmuş, orada gelip gösteri yapacaklar, şudur budur vesaire... Ne yaparsanız yapın. Biz kararımızı verdik, dediğimiz gibi bunu işleyeceğiz. Eğer tarihe saygınız varsa, tarihe saygınız varsa, önce o Gezi Parkı denilen yerin tarihi nedir onu araştır bak. Biz orada tarihi yeniden ihya edeceğiz. Orayı tamamıyla, Taksim Meydanı'nı yayalaştırarak insanın emrine sunacağız. İnsanoğlu orada gezip dolaşacak. Peyzajıyla, her şeyiyle... Ve şu anda Ak Parti iktidarı döneminde, değerli kardeşlerim, bakınız belli yaş gruplarında, Türkiye genelinde diktiğimiz ağaç miktarı, fidan on yaş grubu üzeri, beş yaş grubu üzeri, 3 yaş grubu üzeri ağaçlar olmak üzere, değerli kardeşlerim, yaklaşık 2,5 milyardır. 2,5 milyar! Bu ağaçları bu iktidar diyor, süratle. Yeter ki ağaç dikme merakı olsun insanların. Onlara da yer tahsis ediyoruz. Al sana 500 bin metrekare alan, burada gel ağaç dik. Bedelsiz. Niye? Çevreciyiz. Ve bu adımları atıyoruz...”

Example -II:

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Opening Speech on 2nd June, 2013 for the New Service Building of the Ottoman Archive in Istanbul

The transcript below is extracted from his speech between 03:42 and 11:56 minutes in a video:

Original Version:

“... İşte günlerdir Taksim Meydanı'nda 12 tane ağacın güya koruyuculuğunu yaptığını iddia edenlerin yaklaşım tarzındaki sakatlık neyse bu konulardaki tarz da aynı anlamdadır. Biz ki şu ana kadar 3 milyara yakın fidan ve çeşitli yaş gruplarında Türkiye'ye ağaç dikmiş bir iktidarız (alkışlar). Bakın 3 milyon demiyorum, 3 milyar diyorum. Ve 160 civarında milli park inşa eden bir iktidarız. Öyle 5 dönüm, 10 dönüm, 20 dönüm değil; hektarlarca. Şu İstanbul'a belediye başkanlığı yaptığım dönemde gerek TEM'de gerek E5 üzerinde orta refüjten yan şeride varıncaya kadar oralarda 10 yaş grubu üzerindeki çınar ağaçları... bunların hepsi iktidarımızın, yerel iktidarımızın o dönemde diktiği ağaçlardır. Şimdi bakın bu ağaçlar ne hale geldi. Akasyalar ne hale geldi, çınarlar ne hale geldi. Bunları yapan bir iktidar çevre düşmanı olabilir mi? Ağaç düşmanı olabilir mi?

Belediye başkanlığında Kilyos'ta onbinlerce yetişmiş ağacı kesen katledenlere karşı savaş verdim. Nerdeydi bu çevreciler? Nerdeydi o zaman bu ana muhalefet partisinin yetkilileri, temsilcileri? Hapse girdiğimde dönemin cumhurbaşkanıyla açılış yapıyorlar ve açılışta “Buraya karşı çıkanlar şimdi nerede?”

diye soruyorlardı. Cumhurbaşkanının konuşması öyleydi. Çıktık, biz yasal mücadelemizi verdik. Ve yargıda kazandık. Şimdi de o üniversite Orman ve Su İşleri Bakanlığı'mızın oldu. Şimdi bizim onlar kiracımız (alkışlar). Kiracımız.

Bu vakaları, bu gerçekleri bir kenara koyamayız. Bakın ben gene açık konuşuyorum: Biz, Taksim Meydanı'nın yayalaştırma projesini yapıyoruz, yapacağız (alkışlar). Orası bitecek. İki: 1780 yılında, 3. Selim döneminde orada yapılmış olan Topçu Kışlası'nı CHP zihniyeti daha sonra yıkarak stada çevirmiştir. Orayı da aslına burada nasıl sahip çıkıyorsak, orada da yine biz o tarihi kışlayı yapacağız (alkışlar, Erdoğan'ı öven sloganlar). Afedersiniz, çok açık net söylüyorum, biz bir kaç tane çapulcunun o meydana gelip insanımızı, halkımızı yanlış bilgilendirmek suretiyle tahrik etmesine biz pabuç bırakmayız (alkışlar). Çünkü bu millet bize reyini verirken tarihime sahip çık diye verdi, tabiatıma sahip çık diye verdi. Buyrun şimdi biz 3. Köprüyü yapıyoruz değil mi? Buyrun bakın, oraya yine bugün bir 300-500 kişi gitmiş. Ne oldu? Şimdi biz oraya 300-500 kişi gitti diye köprü inşaatını mı durduralım? Ana muhalefet partisi bu işe karşı çıktı diye... ya bunlar 1. köprüye de karşı çıktılar, 2. köprüye de karşı çıktılar, buna da karşı çıktılar. Bunlar denizin altından yaptığımız geçen tüp geçitlere, tünellere de karşı çıktılar. Ya bunların cibiliyetinde bir taş taş üstüne koymak, böyle bir şey yok! Yok (alkışlar). Yapmamışlar.

Efendim, Erdoğan diktatör. Valla ben bu milletin efendisi değilim. Diktatörlük benim kanımda yok. Cibiliyetimde de yok. Ben bu milletin hizmetkariyim (alkışlar). Eğer diktatör arayanlar varsa kendi geçmişlerine baksınlar. Kendi geçmişlerine baksınlar! Eğer diktatör arayanlar varsa işte Taksim Meydan'nda, Ankara'da, şurda burda milletin, esnafın camını çerçevesini indirenler

ne adına indiriyor? Soruyorum. Ne adına indiriyor? Bunun hukukla bir alakası var mı? Bunun demokrasiyle bir alakası var mı? Hak mücadelesiyle alakası var mı? Kim ödeyecek şimdi onların paralarını? Onlar mı ödeyecekler? Tüyü bitmemiş yetimin hakkı var burada. Tüyü bitmemiş yetimin hakkı. Gene kalkacağız oraların camını çerçevesini... evet, bu hükümet yapacak, bu devlet yapacak.

Bu terör estirenlere destek çıkan CHP zihniyetidir, değerli kardeşlerim. Çünkü bunların meşrebinde, mizacında bu var. Ve biz şimdi Taksim'de 3 projeyi iç içe yapıyoruz. Orada çevre var. Orada tarih var, kültür var. Ve orada bütün meydan trafik yer altına alınmak suretiyle benim vatandaşımın yeni yeşillendirmesiyle birlikte gelecek çoluğuyla çocuğuyla o meydanda rahatlıkla gezip dolaşabilecek bunlar. Ve AKM... inşallah, AKM yıkılacak oraya da muhteşem bir opera binasını da bir kültür merkezi olarak onu da biz yapacağız. Onu da biz yapacağız (alkışlar). Oradan bir ses geldi, cami yapacağız diye; evet, cami de yapacağız. Evet cami de yapacağız (alkışlar ve artan sloganlar). Herhalde ben bunun iznini gidip de CHP'nin genel başkanından alacak değilim! Ve bu bir kaç tane çapulcudan da alacak değilim! Bunun iznini bize oy verenler verdi zaten. Dediler siz bunları yapın (sloganlar).

Şimdi birileri çıkıyor, sayın Başbakan ya bunlar çok tahrik edici oluyor diyor. Kardeşlerim, ben hizmetkarım. Benim tahrik etmek gibi bir derdim asla yok. İki kere iki dört eder. Yazın da dört, kışın da dört; gece de dört sabah da dört. Bunun adı hakikattir. Gerçektir. Hakikatleri, gerçekleri ters yüz etmeye kimsenin gücü yetmez. Biz o hakikatlerin kurbanıyız. Biz onlar adına konuşuyoruz. Ve bu neyi gerektiriyorsa onu yapacağız...”

References

Bibliography

- Adalet, B. et al (2013, September 15). The Gezi Park Protests and the Future of Turkish Politics: An Interview with Seyla Benhabib. Dissent Magazine. Retrieved November 28, 2013, from http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-gezi-park-protests-and-the-future-of-turkish-politics-an-interview-with-seyla-benhabib
- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. (2013). Yönetim. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan AK Parti Genel Başkanı. AKP Official Site. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/yonetim/genel-baskan>
- Akbudak, Ö. (2013, June 05). Mehmet Altan: Gezi olayları medyanın cenaze töreniydi. Haberdar. Retrieved November, 10, 2013 from <http://www.haberdar.com/mehmet-altan-gezi-olaylari-medyanin-cenaze-toreniydi-3918202-haberi>
- Arango, T. & Yeginsu, C. (2013, May 31). Peaceful Protest Over Istanbul Park Turns Violent as Police Crack Down. The New York Times. Retrieved September 21, 2013, from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/world/europe/police-attack-protesters-in-istanbuls-taksim-square.html?pagewanted=all>
- Atam, D. (2013, August 7). Meseleyi anlama kılavuzu! Ya da Gezi'deki çevreci gençlere yapılanlar! Personal Blog. Retrieved September, 8, 2013 from <http://denizatam.wordpress.com/2013/08/07/aptallar-icin-meseleyi-anlama-kilavuzu-ya-da-gezideki-cevreci-genclere-yapilanlar/>

- Althusser, L., (1970), Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. Notes towards an Investigation. pp.100-141, Mapping Ideology, New Left Review, 1994.
- Alternatif Bilişim (2013, June 5). An analysis of Gezi Parki. Alternatif Bilişim. Retrieved December 15, 2013, from https://www.alternatifbilisim.org/wiki/An_analysis_of_Gezi_Parki
- Baydar, Y. (2013, July 19). Opinion: In Turkey, Media Bosses Are Undermining Democracy. The New York Times Sunday Review. Retrieved October 20, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/in-turkey-media-bosses-are-undermining-democracy.html?_r=2&
- Bayram, F. (2010). Ideology and political discourse: a critical discourse analysis of Erdogan's political speech. Arecls, Volume 7, pp. 23-40. Newcastle University. Retrieved August 10, 2013, from http://research.ncl.ac.uk/ARECLS/volume7/bayram_vol7.pdf
- Becatoros, E. (2013, June 11). Clashes in Istanbul extend into night in Taksim. Associated Press. Retrieved September 13, 2013, from <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/police-move-past-barricades-istanbul-square>
- Direniş Günlüğü. (2013, May). Ç. Z. Retrieved June, 20,2013, from <http://www.direnisgunlugu.com/>
- Einssenstat, H. (2013, September 18). Turkey's season of struggle: unrest in Istanbul. The Christian Century. Retrieved September, 25,2013, from https://www.academia.edu/4407014/Turkeys_Season_of_Struggle_Unrest_in_Istanbul
- Eldem, E. (2013, June 16). Turkey's false nostalgia. The NY Times The Opinion Pages. Retrieved January 08, 2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/opinion/turkeys-false-nostalgia.html?_r=0

- Erdoğan, R. T. (2000, May 16). Dinci siyaseti bıraktık. Hürriyet. Retrieved October, 20, 2013, from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-154638>
- Erdoğan, R.T. (2013, June 24). Prime Minister Erdoğan blesses Turkish police for 'heroic' action during Gezi unrest. Hurriyet Daily News. Retrieved August 28, 2013, from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-prime-minister-erdogan-praises-polices-intervention-in-gezi-protests-as-heroic.aspx?pageID=238&nid=49356>
- Fairclough, N. (1989) Language and Power, London: Longman
- Kalaycıođlu, E. (2009). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın siyasi yolculuđu. Neden? TV Program. Retrieved November 8, 2013, from http://www.candundar.com.tr/_v3/index.php#!#Did=9666
- Karakaya, K. (2013, July 4). Gezi olayları Türk medyasını sarsamaya devam ediyor. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved November 1, 2013, from <http://www.wsj.com.tr/article/SB10001424127887324399404578585543820609944.html>
- McQuail, D. (2003). Media accountability and freedom of publication. Oxford University Press, the UK..
- Oskay, Ç. (2013, June 16). Halk tv yayın yönetmeni hakan aygün sert konuştu: yanlış yapsın chpye de çıkarım. Hürriyet Pazar. Retrieved on July, 22, 2013 from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/pazar/23512996.asp>
- Siddiqui, H. (2013, June 11). Turkish democracy cutting Erdogan down to size. The Star Commentary. Retrieved November, 19, 2013 from http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/06/13/turkish_democracy_cutting_erdogan_down_to_size_siddiqui.html

- Sivashlı, N. (2013, October, 14). Polis şiddeti daha çok baş ağrıtabacak. Avrupa. Retrieved October, 20, 2013, from <http://www.avrupagazete.com/necdet-sivasli/18463-polis-siddeti-daha-cok-bas-agritacak.html>
- Şahin, H. (2013, June 13). İktidar sarhoşluğu ya da kibir sendromu. Yurt Gazetesi. Retrieved September, 21, 2013, from <http://www.yurtgazetesi.com.tr/iktidar-sarhoslugu-ya-da-%E2%80%9Ckibir-sendromu%E2%80%9D-makale,4759.html>
- van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Principles of critical discourse analysis. *Discourse and Society*. Volume 4(2): 249- 283.
- Watson, I. & Levs, J. (2013, June 4). Turkey's Erdogan: Successful leader or dictator? CNN. Retrieved October 2, 2013, from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/04/world/europe/turkey-erdogan/index.html?iid=article_sidebar
- Yanarocak, H. E. C. (2013, June 5). Istanbul united. *The Jerusalem Post*. Retrieved October 31, 2013, from <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Istanbul-united-315566>

Images

- Article on Gezi events. (2013). DHA. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-york-times-responds-to-turkish-pms-criticism-over-gezi-park-ad.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48451&NewsCatID=338>
- Demolition of trees at Gezi Park at early days through the smoke of tear gas fired by the police. (2013). Atam, D. Retrieved from <http://denizatam.wordpress.com/2013/08/07/aptallar-icin-meseleyi-anlama-kilavuzu-ya-da-gezideki-cevreci-genclere-yapilanlar/>

- Erdoğan making one of his statements to the press. (2013). Zileli, G. Baskahaber.org. Retrieved from <http://www.baskahaber.org/2013/11/totaliter-diktatorluk-ilan-edilirken.html>
- Interns having treatment to the injured on iron police barriers in the mosque. (2013). Hürriyet. Retrieved from <http://fotogaleri.hurriyet.com.tr/galeridetay/69917/2/17/bezmi-alem-valide-sultan-camisinde-o-gece-yasananlar>
- Police firing excessive tear gas at protests. (2013). Reuters. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/01/us-turkey-protests-idUSBRE94U0J920130601>
- The clashes among water cannons and tear gases at the Taksim Square in Istanbul. (2013). Stavrakis, T. Associated Press. Retrieved from <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-photos-police-end-2-weeks-turkey-protests>

Videos

- The Ground Breaking Ceremony of the 3rd Bridge in Istanbul. (2013, May 29). Erdoğan, R.T. Mins 17:06- 18:52. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zC--OV9Zt9o>
- Opening Speech for the New Service Building of the Ottoman Archive in Istanbul. (2013, June 02). Erdoğan, R T. Mins 03:42- 11:56. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrl7hJ3iW0>

