SOFT POWER POLITICS IN MIDDLE POWERS: BRAZILIAN AND TURKISH

FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 2003-2015

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Approval of Graduate School of Social Science

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science/Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aimes to contribute to foreing policy literature with the analyzing of soft power politics of the middle powers with the case Brazilian and Turkish soft power politics in the period of 2003-2007. Soft power is a dimension of power and differentiating from hard power by peaceful ways without using thread or payments to get to reach policy outcomes that states wished.

In this regard, this thesis analysis the soft power politics of Turkey and Brazil in a comparative manner with explanation of their historical characteristics of foreign policy, soft power resources and public diplomacy activites to gain influence.

Brazilian and Turkish foreign policies in the first decade of twenty first century has been very successful in terms of influence, admiration and creating positive perception with vibrant economic rise. However, since the beginning of the second decade they have begun to lose their effectiveness and influence thanks to domestic and foreign policy mistakes.

Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy, Soft Power Politics, Middle Power

ÖZET

ORTA BÜYÜKLÜKTEK GÜÇLERDE YUMU AK GÜÇ S YASET : 2003-2015 ARASINDA BREZ LYA VE TÜRK DI POL T KALARINDA YUMU AK GÜÇ S YASET

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası li kiler, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Tez Yoneticisi: Doç. Dr. Balkan Devlen

Bu tez, 2003-2015 yılları arasındaki Brezilya ve Türkiye'nin dı politikalarındaki yumu ak güç siyasetini analiz etmeyi ve bu ekilde uluslararası ili kiler literatürüne bir katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Yumu ak güç, gücün bir boyutudur ve tehdit ya da zorlamalar yerine daha barı çıl yollarla arzulanan hedefler ula mayı ifade ederek sert güçten farklıla maktadır.

Bu anlamda, bu tez Brezilya ve Türkiye dı politikalarını, bu ülkelerin sahip oldu u tarihsel karakteristiklerin, yumu ak güç kaynaklarının ve etkili olmak için kullandıkları kamu diplomasisi aktivitelerinin açıklanması yoluyla analiz etmektedir. Brezilya ve Türkiye dı politikaları, yirmi birinci yüzyılın ilk on yılında nüfuz kazanma, takdir edilme ve olumlu algı olu turma açısından enerjik ekonomik yükseli leriyle dikkat çekici bir ekilde ba arılı olmu lardır. Ancak, yirmi birinci yüzyılın ikinci on yılının ba langından beri iki ülke de iç ve dı politikada yapılan hatalar sonucunda etki ve nüfuz açısından parlaklıklarını yitirmeye ba lamı lardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Brezilya Dı Politikası, Türk Dı Politikası, Yumu ak Güç Siyaseti, Orta Büyüklükte Güçler

To Gülçin...

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INTRODUCTION

Since post-Cold War period, global balance of power structurally has changed and this change is continuing even today. For a short time, the world has witnessed an economical and political unipolar world order during the 90's, and it has begun to ending with rise of undeveloped or developing countries from the beginning of twenty first century. Admittedly, there are many reasons of it such as rising of commodity prices and the entering of China to WTO in 2001. Nevertheless, it was apparently a success story for the new emerging powers or middle powers.

Having the beginning of global and regional shifts of balance of power in the world, newcomers have begun to struggle to increase their power resources in the economical and political field. In 2000, the emerging world accounted for 20% of global GDP but, by 2010, this figure had risen to 32% as well as 44.8% by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Over the same period, its share of world trade rose from 8% to 20%, while its share of global equity market capitalization rose from 7% to 30%.[1] As

As one of the most remarkable indicators of their rise, they have begun to build new cooperation with other emerging middle or great powers to increase their hard power resources such as with economic and political groupings and special relationships. Declining West hegemony and occurrence of new opportunities has facilitated their struggle to increase power and its implications.

Soft power, as I shall to explain in the next chapters, is closely related with the changing nature of the traditional power understanding. The nature of power has changed and power relations of countries among each other have become more societal thanks to information age and its productions. In addition, the number of democracies has been rose since ending cold-War. International political or economical crisis or events have been becoming more visible for peoples and

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[1] Ernst and Young, "Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index", Spring 2012, URL=http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Driving-growth/Rapid-growth-markets-soft-power-index-Soft-power-defined

creating strong images and feelings. As a consequence of this trend, foreign policies of countries are becoming more domestic issue than as was in the past. People have been gaining more influence and awareness on the foreign policies of countries. Thus, states need take into account the values, identities and expectations of both their citizens and others in the making foreign policy. In such a world that people have become more integrate with each other by information technologies, legitimacy of policies, and universality of values and attraction of cultures are incontrovertibly significant.

In this regard, as two middle power or regional powers, Brazil and Turkey were two of these rising powers at the beginning of new century. They were very well aware of that becoming more powerful in terms of economy does not provide enough power to reach their targets and getting result. Therefore, their economic rise and assertiveness both at regional and global level has required to their soft power policies on the foreign policy field.

Why I have investigated these countries? Brazil and Turkey, both of them are middle power in power hierarchy in terms of economic and military size. Furthermore, these countries have witnessed a rising period during the last decade as in most of the emerging countries and they desired to increase their power over the countries with soft power politics. For both countries, it is impossible to reach their regional and global policy outcomes they wish without soft power resources.

In this regard, this paper examines the historical and political reasons, ways of implementations and results of Turkish and Brazilian soft power politics in between 2003-2015.

Therefore, in the First Chapter, it is aimed a general investigation in the literature of power in IR. Unlike its centrality and importance, power is one of the most disputed concepts of the politics and IR. Power has different dimensions and different functions and importance of influence in the concept of power will be analyzed.

In the Second Chapter, the concept of power will elaborated in light with main-stream schools of thoughts of IR such as realism, liberalism and constructivism. Their differences or similarities will be examined the rationales behind these approaches.

Third Chapter will consist of an exploration of the father of soft power concept Joseph Nye's views on soft power and its correlation and importance with theoretical approaches in line with methodology of thesis. As known, soft power is a evolving term in international relations and theoretical discussions are continue over the term.

Fourth Chapter constitutes an investigation on the concept of middle power to healthy analysis of Brazilian and Turkish Foreign policies in terms of their soft power politics. In the foreign policy analysis, structural determinants of countries and their places in the global power hierarchy play structural roles over the fate of foreign policies.

In the Fifth Chapter, traditional foreign policy characteristics of Brazil and Turkey and its effects on soft power politics during the first decade of twenty first century will be analyzed. Considering the importance of historical, geographical and cultural existence of countries is describing their limitations on the soft power politics. In this regard, Chapter Five aims to take historical pictures on soft power politics of these countries.

Sixth Chapter will look into the soft power politics of Brazil and Turkey in their regions and the world. Structural transitions with economic boom and circulations of elites has enabled to playing new fundamental roles in the global politics for them. This combination also gave the chance to increase their influence with soft power instruments and public diplomacy activities. In this sense, Sixth Chapter will detail these soft power policies of Turkey and Brazil at their regions and global scene and find out which instruments have used in this era for which aims of these states. In addition, soft power resources of these countries independent from their governments will explored. Moreover, with the help of soft power indexes and polls current situation of their influences over their targets and domestic problems that effected foreign policy and perceptions of countries will explained.

CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF LITERATURE OF POWER IN IR AND DEFINING POWER

The concept of power is probably one of the most important concepts of international relations or more ostensibly of political science. The concept of closely related to some fundamental issues of political life, either in inter-state and domestic politics or on individual level with war, security, wealth, peace and even fear and happiness (Mearsheimer, 2004). Some thinkers, like Bertrand Russell and John Mearsheimer, have underlined the importance of its centrality in politics and international relations. For instance, John J. Mearsheimer describes the power as currency of international politics (Schouten, 2012) and Bertrand Russell see it as a fundamental concept of social science (Russell, 2004).

In here, I should be stressed that as a concept of power traditionally has been saw as related with realism. Concept of power has been dominated by realism for a long period. As a representative of realist school of thought during twentieth century, Edward Hallet Carr observed power as a fundamental dimension of politics. In addition, he described the power as an indivisible existence (Carr, 2015:147), however, he shows that it can be divided into three categories as military, economic and power over opinion. At the same time, Carr argues that these three dimensions of power indispensably bound to each other and without one of them, it is too hard to maintain their high performance in the long run (Carr, 2015:153).

Another remarkable representative of the classic realist school of thought was Hans Morgenthau during the twentieth century. For Morgenthau,

> "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs. They may also try further its realization through nonpolitical means, such as technical co-operation with other nations or international organizations.

But, whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power" (Morgenthau, 1993:29).

As observed above, despite being focal point of Morgenthau's realist world, his description of power is unclear. In spite of its central role in political science and international relation literature, it is almost impossible to find a consensus over its description, such inconsistencies on even the most basic defitions stemming largely from different locations of theoretical perspectives of thinkers. As Dahl expresses,

some people have more power than others is one of the most palpable facts of human existence. Because of this, the concept of power is as ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast. If these assertions needed any documentation, one could set up an endless parade of great names from Plato and Aristotle through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto and Weber to demonstrate that a large number of seminal social theorists have devoted a good deal of attention to power and the phenomena associated with it (Dahl, 1957: 201).

Nevertheless, the definitions and discussion on the power analysis in international relations begin with that of Robert Dahl's in his article "The Concept of Power" in 1957. Dahl's definition is that "if A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something would not otherwise" (Dahl, 1957: 202).

In 1962, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz criticized the definition of power of Robert A. Dahl and provided a new explanation as called second face of power. According to Bachrach and Baratz;

The definition of Dahl is not enough in the explaining power relations and they claimed that power has a second dimension with unobservable agenda setting to power and its political control" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962).

Bachrach and Baratz hold that "power is also exercised thorough agenda-setting where the powerful depend on the ignorance of rivals to avoid open conflict.

According to Peter Digeser;

From the second face of power explanation, to understand the exercise of power in a given political relationship more fully, investigators must also consider decisions that were not made. The political scientist must ask whether prevailing political values and procedures limit decision-making and mobilize bias in favor of some groups as opposed to others (Digeser, 1992).

In addition to those, Steven Lukes developed the third face of the power approach in his famous book of Power: A Radical View (Lukes, 2004). In this work, Lukes display the structural differences between the approaches of Dahl and Bachrach-Baratz concerning power.

According to Lukes, first dimension of power as can seen below relates to five issues (Lorenzi, 2006). Lukes criticises Dahl's approach due to his inclusion of the potential power understanding with those of Bachrach and Baratz's actual power understanding. Lukes expressing the differences between Dahl and Bachrach-Baratz's approaches to power states that former approach needs to possession of power and latter the exercise of power. Then, he develops a three-dimensional approach to power; listed below are the categories as first second and third dimensions of the understanding of power from Dahl to himself. The third dimension of power is heavily related. With the hegemony over preferences, this view is derived from Gramchian perspective and contains the arguments, and then actors may have the ability of shaping the interests of others. This is the missing part in the works of Dahl and Bachrach-Baratz (Berenskoetter, 2007).

Having mentioned Carr's notion above, I now will discuss below Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, K. J. Holsti draws attention to the importance of influence and perception in power case. With his analysis about importance of influence in international politics, Holsti can be considered one of the founding fathers

For Holsti, the concept of power is divided into three categories: firstly, "it is the act of (process, relationship) of influencing other factors; secondly, it includes the capabilities used to make the wielding of influence successful; and thirdly, response to the act" (Holsti, 1964).

According to Holsti;

Influence (an aspect of power) is essentially a means to an end. Some governments or statesmen may seek influence for its own sake, but for most it is instrumental, just like money. They use it primarily for other goals, which may include prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security, or alliances (Holsti, 1964: 181).

By quoting the influence description of J. David Singer (Singer, 1963), Holsti points out,

The exercise of influence implies more than merely A's ability to change the behavior of B. Influence may also be seen where A attempts to get B to continue a course of action or policy which is useful to, or in the interests of, A. The exercise of influence does not always cease, therefore, after B does X. It is often a continuing process of reinforcing B's behavior. Nevertheless, power is "situational" to the extent that it is exercised within a framework of goals.

Secondly, Holsti argues;

The influence has relational and multilateral function in politics. For him, it is almost impossible to find an instance where B does not also have some influence over A. Holsti's model suggests that influence is exercised only in one direction, by A over B. In reality, however, influence is multilateral. State A, for example, would seldom seek a particular goal unless it had been influenced in a particular direction by the actions of other states in the system" (Holsti, 1964: 182).

Thirdly, Holsti draws attention to the importance of the level of the relations in politics for influence.,

"If A has more relations with B than C, naturally A and B can influence more critically among each other in proportion to C."

Fourthly, he describes another relationship model for the concept of influence, "it is the concept of "anticipated action". For him, that is the situation, frequently found in international relations, where A might wish B to do X, but does not try to influence B

for fear that B will do Y instead, which is an unfavorable response from A's point of view" (Holsti, 1964: 183).

Fifthly, "power and influence may be measured quite objectively by scholars and statesmen, but what are important in international relations are the perceptions of influence and capabilities that are held by policy-makers." (Holsti, 1964: 184)

As for influence of objective capabilities, Holsti argues that to measure the capability of a state in terms military or economic dimensions of its power is not always yield the truth. Holsti underlines that "the deduction of actual influence from the quantity and quality of potential and mobilized capabilities may, in some cases, give an approximation of reality, but historically there are too many discrepancies between the basis of power and the amount of influence to warrant adopting this practices as a useful approach to international relations." In here, the instance given by Holsti is remarkable; he compares the powers and their capabilities in line with the influence perspective from 1925 to 1930:

> "If actual influence had been deduced from the quantities of "great essentials" possessed by the major actors the following ranking of states would have resulted: (1) United States, (2) Germany, (3) Great Britain, (4) France, (5) Russia, (6) Italy, (7) Japan. However, the diplomatic history of the world from 1925 to 1930 would suggest that there was little correlation between the capabilities of these countries and their actual influence. If we measure influence by the impact these actors made on the system and by the responses they could invoke when they sought to change the behavior of other states, we would find for this period quite a different ranking, such as the following: (1) France, (2) Great Britain, (3) Italy, (4) Germany, (5) Russia, (6) Japan, (7) United States" (Holsti, 1964: 187).

From Holsti's viewpoint, influence is exercised by six different ways: Persuation; the offer of reward: the granting of rewards; the threat of punishment; the infliction of non-violent punishment; force (Holsti, 1964: 190).

CHAPTER 2: POWER IN IR THEORIES WITH THEIR MAIN ARGUMENTS

2.1 Realism

Since Thucydides, the author of **History of the Peloponnesian War**, realism has been thought as an unchangeable character of international politics. More specifically, since Westphalia Agreement in 1648, realist theory had a dominant illustrative theoretical framework in international relations literature and it was almost identified with the field itself. First and foremost, the trait of realist tradition begins with pessimism regarding human nature and its creations; this is one of the main pillars of the classical realism in realist tradition (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). The essentiatial pessimism of realists, either domestically or internationally arises from their understanding of human nature.

As one of the most important thinkers of classical realism, Hans Morgenthau draws a picture of this in six articles in his most famous book, **Politics among Nations**. According to Morgenthau;

> Firstly, "politics like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature" (Morgenthau, 1993:4). Secondly, "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power" (Morgenthau, 1993:5). Thirdly, "realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category that is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all" (Morgenthau, 1993:10). Fourthly, "political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. However, morality and politics is profoundly different to apply the state actions. The individual says Morgenthau, may for himself, "fiat justitia, pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world perish)", but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care" (Morgenthau, 1993:12). Fifthly, "political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe" (Morgenthau, 1993:13). Finally, the difference between political realism and other schools of thoughts is real, and it is profound. However much the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.

> Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles. The economist asks: "How does this policy affect the wealth of society, or a segment of it?" The lawyer asks: "Is this policy in accord with the rules of law?" The moralist asks: "Is this policy in accord with moral principles?" And the political realist asks: "How does this policy affect the power of the nation? (Morgenthau, 1993:4)

Realist school of thought in international relations has state-centered understanding; therefore, states are considered the main players in international politics. This perspective shapes all scenarios and explanations. Realism represents historically pessimistic views relating to international peace and cooperation among states.

Aforementioned, realist theory takes as its focal point the state-centered thinking and its dimensions such as sovereignty and state behavior, in addition those, realist power understanding largely relies on hard power resources namely material power capabilities like military power and economic power.

According to this type of thinking, international arena is a place that in the state of nature and due to the absence of a powerful world sovereign over states is anarchical. In such a place without supreme sovereign that regulate the relations of the states, states are the only decisive units with their power capacities. In that sense, the roles of international institutions play an insufficient role in the regulation of conflicts of interests among states fairly.

In such an anarchical world, "states fear from other states and always compete with each other to power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states" (Mearsheimer, 2014:2). Survival of state in an anarchical world is the most important characteristic of the realist thinking, to survive in such a world, states are constantly in a search of power. Most important reason for this searching is that states cannot be certain about the intentions of their rivals, thus creating a security competition for security amongst the states. In terms of security, ascertaining the survival of the state

depends on a particular dominance of the state over its rivals. As a contemporary realist scholar, Stephen M. Walt very well summurizes;

> Realism sees power as the centerpiece of political life and sees states as primarily concerned with ensuring their own security in a world where there's no world government to protect them from others. Realists believe military power is essential to preserving a state's independence and autonomy, but they recognize it is a crude instrument that often produces unintended consequences. Realists believe nationalism and other local identities are powerful and enduring; states are mostly selfish; altruism is rare; trust is hard to come by; and norms and institutions have a limited impact on what powerful states do. In short, realists have a generally pessimistic view of international affairs and are wary of efforts to remake the world according to some ideological blueprint, no matter how appealing it might be in the abstract" (Walt, 2006).

Apart from the general characteristics of realist theory of international politics, there exists certain differences amongst realist thinkers varying in their perspective. In fact, realists are divided two groups; first are the classical realists that follow its pioneers like Morgenthau and Machiavelli. The second are structural realists that represent two approaches to state behavior as defensive and offensive. For example, while offensive realists argue that the states should attempt to maximize its power to survival; defensive realists argue that states should not attempt to maximize their power to maintain its existence, because it would result in a backfire. While main arguments used by offensive realists suggests that the states should not maximize its power but maintain its position in the system, offensive realists think that states are ought to seek to power in order to establish hegemony withing their regional bases, on the grounds that it constitute the most secure position to be taken in the international arena (Dunne, Kurki and Smith, 2010: 82).

In spite of the centrality of power distribution in international scene, realists disassociate amongst themselves about which power share and dominance system is stable or not. For instance, some realists, like Kenneth Waltz and J. Mearsheimer are proponents of the bipolar international system and some of them like Geoffrey Blainey, Robert Gilpin, and William Wohlforth are the proponents of unipolar world (Betts, 2006).

2.2 Liberalism

Unlike the millennial history of realist school of thought, liberal international relations theory was derived from the classical liberal thought and its relatively short history dates back to eighteen and nineteen centuries of Europe. Throughout these centuries, most important thinker for the internationalization of liberalism as subject of inter-state relations is the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The importance of Kant on the liberal international relations theory relies on his most famous article about "**Perpetual Peace**". As a masterpiece of Kant, "Perpetual Peace" is a work of investigation focusing on an eternally peaceful world order. In this work, Kant shows the pre-conditions for the peaceful order among states and draws the main political infrastructures that states should accept either domestically or internationally to be a part of a peaceful order.

Peacefulness and anti-war perspectives are the main pillars of liberal ideology, because liberal interpretation of the human in the state of nature argues that human kind is inherently good. Unlike the realists, liberals think that people naturally tend to cooperate with one another to live in a community and they can show solidarity in the face of danger. However, unlike the proverbial cliché, liberals do not directly believe in the human's goodness, rather, the liberal believes that "human beings are potentially good" (Steans, Pettiford, Diez and El-Anis, 2010:50). Human behavior is largely the product of various interactions that take place within its social environment. This point of view can be seen as starter forinterdependence theories of liberal international relations. The need for security and solidarity in our interactions with our social environment requires some fundamental regulations and institutions. International organizations in economical and political fields are based on this dimension of liberal thought. In addition to that, liberals highlight the importance of the limitation of hierarchical positions in the economical and political field, they regard the limitless and lawless organizations either domestically or internationally to be dangerous. Hence, the power of states or international organizations should be distributed and because of this reason, states, NGOs, and multinational corporations are important actors in international relations. State power is the most hazardous thing if it accumulates its power without check-balance mechanisms; however, liberals recognize the importance of states as necessary

entities. In a parallel way, liberals believe that states are the main actors of international arena.

The importance of the distribution of power politically and economically relies on the assumption of the harmony of interests in those areas. Therewithal, the human being has fundamental rights and liberties, which should be protected by domestic or international laws and regulations.

As in domestic politics, Liberals tend to argue in the favor of international free trade and political cooperation; therefore, international economic and political organizations became the two pillars of classical liberalism. After the Second World War and during the Cold War, interstate relations and interactions have increased. To explain this increase and its creation of new mutual interaction processes, Joseph S. Nye and Robert Keohane have come up with a new approach called the dependence theories. They wrote books and articles as an integral and continuing part of each other about that issue in **Transnational Relations and World Politics** (Nye and Keohane, 1972), they pointed out the importance of multidimensional economic, social and ecological interdependence of the 1960's. Moreover, they began to discover new realities in international politics and insufficiencies of the realist thought in the face of these changes.

In **Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition**, they criticize the modernist writers who see that era as one in which the territorial state, which has been dominant in world politics for the four centuries since the feudal times ended, is being eclipsed by non-territorial actors such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements and international organizations (Nye and Keohane, 1987). As a realist thinker, Kenneth Waltz responded to these new challenges with revised the realism in his Theory of international Politics. Waltz proposed that "states should have revised their location in such an anarchical world" and he stated, "states have to maximize their military capacity to remain as unchangeable subjects of international politics" (Waltz, 1979).

As another thesis of liberalism or neo-liberalism, democratic peace theory stresses the importance of the democratic structures established domestically within the states. According to this approach, democracies less inclined to involve a war against other democracies, but authoritarian regimes and monarchies much more inclined.

The requirement for accountability in democratic regimes is adebilitating factor upon taking of the decision to wage war. In that sense, authoritarian regimes or monarchies tend more towards going to with the other states. Briefly, this approach underlines that domestic politics is a crucial factoring international peace.

2.3 Constructivism

Constructivism is one of the youngest and most efficient theoretical explanations of the field of international relations. Despite the neo-neo debates, this approach has emerged with the new challenges of international politics during late cold-war period, due to the insufficiency of explanations developed bymainstream theories like realism and liberalism. For instance, mainstream traditions of schools of thought could not foresee the end of Cold War and the new realities of the post-Cold War period.

In the late of 80's constructivists appeared with new starting points with their ontological and epistemological challenges. Despite being a sociological concept, constructivism re-produced in international relations. At the same time, though having gained recognition with Alexander Wendt's works, the history of constructivism begins with Nicholas Onuf in international relations. In his famous article, Onuf expresses that his start point comes from Antony Giddens's structuration theory (Jorgensen, 2001: 55). The theory of Giddens, located between the positivist-post-positivist debates as a third way (Kiraz, 2014: 211), calls for social sciences to focus on the study of social practices. According to Adler, "constructivism occupies the middle ground between rationalist approaches (whether realist or liberal) and interpretive approaches (mainly postmodernist, poststructuralist and critical), and creates new areas for theoretical and empirical investigation" (Adler, 1997). In addition, it is possible to find out that the origins of constructivism date back to the English school of tradition in international relations field (Steans, Pettiford, Diez and El-Anis, 2010:181).

The main objective of constructivism according to Emmanuel Adler is to provide both theoretical and empirical explanations of social institutions and social changes with the help of the combined effect of agents and social structures (Adler, Ibid).

Since the beginning of the process, empirical approach towards new realities has been the most effective approach of this new way of thinking. Constructivism makes the epistemological claim that meaning and, hence, knowledge is socially constructed (Guzzini, 2005).

As for ontology, Alexander Wendt argue;

> Neorealists see the structure of the international system as a distribution of material capabilities because they approach their subject with a materialist lens; Neoliberals see it as capabilities plus institutions because they have added to the material base and institutional superstructure; and constructivists see it as a distribution of ideas because they have an idealist ontology (Wendt, 1999: 5).

Also, constructivists claimed that materialist and individual commitments lead realists to conclude that anarchy makes international politics a necessary conflictual and "self-help" world. But, in the view of constructivists, anarchy with the spectacular phrase of Wendt's is "what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992). In addition, for constructivist "the existence of anarchy is not a subject; the subject is the variety of ways it could be understood as. The epistemological explanations of realists and their static perception of international relations is heavily criticized by constructivists who argued that. Constructivists focus on the intersubjective dimension of knowledge, because they wish to emphasize the social aspect of human existence—the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure constraining and shaping behavior" (Copeland, 2000).According to Wendt;

> The character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other and these are constituted largely by social than material structures. This does not mean that material power and interests are unimportant, but rather than their meaning and effects depend on the social structure of the system, and specifically on which of three "cultures" of anarchy is dominant Hobbessian, Lockean and Kantian (Wendt, 1999: 20).

In the constructivist lens; ideas, values, culture, institutions and norms of people are the most important factors for the behavior of people and foreign policy possesses similar features with those of humans'. States have identities, which are created by historical processes and historical events, and behavior of states is described by their identities. Namely, global politics is mostly guided by these elements (Copeland, 2000). Nevertheless, this does not mean that identities and norms are unchangeable; these can change with historical processes or events that constitute breaking points. Identities play a crucial role in the process of forming the foreign policy of a state; more specifically identities describe the interests of the states. Despite the importance of ideas or norms in state behavior, constructivists do not ignore the critical roles played by interests. However, what is important for a constructivist in terms of interests is how they are formulated. For the constructivist, unlike the determinacies of neo-realist or neoliberal theories, such ideational factors unveil an ideational structure which is created by interactions of agents among each other. This structure is also shaped by agents and it has a capability to change on agents.

Furthermore, Wendt claims, "power is always thought with realist theory, it cannot only be related with realism, the related things are mere material dimensions of power." "Power", in his viewpoint, "is produced by social relations with ideational ways of agents in structure" (Wendt, 1999: 97). In this point, Wendt gives an example and he state;

> The German invasion of Poland in 1939 was caused by largely by ideas, but the material advantage enjoyed by the Germans was an important factor about the situation; given their aggressive intentions, it made easier, and therefore more likely, for the Germans to invade. However, in acknowledging the independent effects of material conditions it is also important not to lose sight of discursive conditions that invest them with meaning. Germany today probably enjoys a comparable preponderance over Poland as in 1939, but there is almost no possibility of an invasion now, largely because of a diffrient distribution of ideas (Wendt, 2000).

Similarly, Niklas Luhman stresses:

> Power is not in action, but in communication. 'Will' and motives traditional attributes for the explanation of action, are not important for the assessment of action for power. 'Will' is not prior to power, in the sense that an act of power would overrule a preexisting will. In a codeestered communication, expectation can be such that the will is neutralized by power, not broken. Power steered communication constitutes the will of one partner by attributing to his actions successes, expectations and respective motives. 'Power does not instrumentalise an already present will, it constitutes that will and can oblige it bind it make it absorb risks and uncertainties, can tempt it and make it fail. Motives are not an origin or cause of action. In the execution of power, the communication process itself attributes motives to systems. This allows thee communicative system to socially understand action. Power does not cause an outcome, but communicatively regulates the attribution of causality for understanding that outcome (Guzzini, 2005: 505).

Briefly, constructivism was a turning point of international relations with its sociological and practical understandings. This new theoreticl approach has challenged to main-stream theories with the new explanations such as the rise of the importance of social and ideational factors in international relations that influencing on states.

CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER

Since its arise, the concept of soft power has been one of the most discussed approaches in international relations. As aforementioned, its rise is a result of critical approaches directed towards the realist paradigm. Indeed, new realities of this increasingly globalizing world and inter-connected economical or political systems have led to the questioning of realist narratives in international relations. These structural changes of international systems have changed the nature of power, then; the concept soft power is a product of such a conjuncture. Actually, the intellectual origins of the concept of soft power and its philosophy rely on Nye's work, **Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,** coauthored by Robert Keohane (Nye and Keohane, 1977).

The concept of soft power coined by Joseph S. Nye and is first used in his book '**Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power'** in 1990 (Nye, 1990) and since then, Joseph Nye has been continuingly developing the term including the response to claims of the decline of the American power in the world scene. In this process, Nye has produced numerous publications. For instance, in 2002, he published **The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone** (Nye, 2002); in 2004 he published the **Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics** (Nye, 2004); in 2008 he published **The Powers to Lead** (Nye, 2008)**;** in 2011 he published **The Future of Power** (Nye, 2011), and finally in 2015, he published the **Is the American Century Over?**. As partly understood form their names; these publications, apart from their theoretical importance, represent the the struggle of empowerment of the American power in the world scene. In these works, he uses a patriotic language referring to the superiority of American soft-power over all great powers and rejects the decline of American power on the basis of a soft-power dimension of power distribution.

3.1 WHAT IS THE MEANING OF SOFT POWER?

The meaning of soft power is closely related to the changing nature of power in international politics. It is the product of a process that intensified the relations among states and and societies by means of economic and political globalization and

transformative effect of information age. This process has increasingly connected the states and peoples in the face of each other. Because of this process, in spite of the rising sums of military expenditure, conventional wisdom concerning power has been changed and the role of military relatively subsided.

According to Giulio M. Gallarotti;

> The world has become and is continuing to evolve into a "softer world." World politics in the modern age has been undergoing changes that have elevated the importance of soft power relative to hard power. In this transformed international system, soft power will be a crucial element in enhancing influence over international outcomes because it has become more difficult to compel nations and non-state actors through the principal levers of hard power (i.e., threats and force). The world stage has become less amenable to Hobbesian bruts, and more amenable to actors that are sensitized to the soft opportunities and constraints imposed by this new global environment (Gallarotti, 2011).

In addition to that, as a globally, peoples of world are increasingly gaining awareness about domestic and international politics. In such a world, the values of people have been gaining importance. In such a world, decision makers should be pay more attention to people's expectations and worldviews. In that sense, Joseph Nye argues the importance of soft power to gaining more power in the world scene. According to Nye;

> Soft power is a fundamental dimension of power with its military and economical dimensions. "While hard power rests on inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks"), soft power rests on the ability to shape preferences of others."(Nye, 2004:5) "Hard and soft powers are related, because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in nature of behavior and in the tangibility of resources. Command power -the ability to change what other do- can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power –the ability to shape what other want- can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in manner that makes

other fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic" (Nye, 2004:7). "Soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. Moreover, soft power is more than just persuasion. Or the ability to move by argument, though that is an important part of it" (Nye, 2004:6).

Soft power, also can understood in the international politics as a power of legitimacy. The acts of a state in international politics should be legitimate in the eyes of other state to become easily accepted and supported. Nye underlines;

> When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others they encounter less resistance to their wishes. If a country's culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others. If it uses institutions and follows rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots or sticks (Nye, 2004:10).

With the rise of soft power in international politics, public diplomacy comes into prominence. Despite its conceptual history far older older than soft power, public diplomacy has become one of the most important wielding ways of soft power policies. Governments have built new institutions to spread theirsoft influence via cultural and interactive diplomacy channels towards target states, peoples and regions. Aforementioned above, global transformations have changed the nature of classical diplomacy. According to Nye, "when classical diplomacy is targeting the states and their representatives to communicate, public diplomacy and its institutions target the people of target states" (Nye, 2011:101). In that sense, a new type of diplomacy has emerged and indirectly followed the state policies with soft policies.

3.2 The Place of the Concept of Soft Power in IR Theories

As a dimension of power, the concept of soft power was associated with the second and third faces of power by Joseph Nye. (Nye, 2011:101). As we have seen above,

second and third faces of power are related with other agendas and preferences, and in this point soft power is completely relevant to 'others' and their actions that concern us. Thus, as is seen below, Joseph Nye has associated the classical three faces of power understanding with separation of hard and soft power (**Nye**, 2011:91):

> **FIRST FACE** (Dahl): Inducing others to do what they otherwise would not do:
>
> Hard: A uses *force/payment* to change B's existing preferences.
>
> Soft: A uses *attraction/persuasion* to change B's preferences.
>
> **SECOND FACE** (Bahcrach-Baratz): Framing and setting agenda:
>
> Hard: A uses force/pay to truncate B's agenda (whether B likes it or not)
>
> Soft: A uses attraction or institutions so that B sees the agenda as legitimate.
>
> **THIRD FACE** (Lukes): Shaping others preferences:
>
> Hard: A uses force/pay to shape B's preferences (Stockholm syndrome).
>
> Soft: A uses attraction and/or institutions to shape B's initial preferences.

Soft Power as a dimension of power in the face of the new realities of the world closely intersects liberalism and constructivism, but it does not meant that it is separated from realism. As David W. Kearn argues, theoretically, soft power is built upon the assumption of an increasingly complex interdependent world (Kearn, 2011). In this point, Nye says,

> The stage of world politics is becoming more crowded with extra actors, the distinction between domestic and international is not so neat, and the politics of transnational relations and complex interdependence need an understanding of liberal and constructivist approaches as well as classical realism (Shouten, 2008).

Soft power locates on such a theoretical ground in international relations, because, as we see have seen above constructivist and liberal approaches stress the centrality of co-operation of states and trans-national organizations and NGOs in a socially constructed world. In that sense, soft power and these approaches are compatible with each other. In terms of soft power, there are no sharp distinctions among main-stream theories and all of those could be used as an integrating part of the explanation of relations of states their social character. For example, militarily made co-operations and personel changes among armies, military aids from a developed country to an underdeveleoped one, can increase the admiration, gratefulness and positive perception of developed ones. In contrast to traditional realist assumptions, hard power resources and soft power resources could be used to integrate each other's performance and effectiveness. In spite of conventional ontological differences of materialist and idealist assumptions of realists and constructivist-liberals, in such a globalized and interdependent world these can't be separated with each other easily.

CHAPTER 4: THE CONCEPT OF MIDDLE POWER

Before the comparison of the foreign policies of Turkey and Brazil, we should look at their hierarchical positions on the power scale in the international arena. With a population of 78 million[2], GDP of $798.4 billion[3] and having the 10th Biggest Army of the World[4], Turkey clearly maintains a serious capability in regard to power share. Similar to Turkey, Brazil has a population of 204 million[5] and $2.346 trillion GDP[6], and unlike Turkey, Brazil has relatively small army and less military capacity and is 28th Biggest Army of World.[7] Thus, Turkey and Brazil can be considered as two middle power or emerging power states and on the basis of this consideration, primarily, we should look at what is the conceptual meaning of *middlepowerhood* and what is its importance in the international politics.

As early as 1589, Bartolous of Sassoferrato, the Italian post-glossator, divided states into three types: small city-states, medium states, and great states. It is interesting to note that he states,

> "Middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and the wealth and power being moderate, passions are less violent, ambition[s] find less support … than in large state[s]" (Lee, 2012).

Despite such an importance, "the issue of middle powers has been significantly less studied in international relations than great powers and their relations" (Fels, 2012).

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[2] Türkiye Istatistik Kurumu, "Temel Istatistikler", URL=http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist 2015 Numbers

[3] The World Bank, "Turkey", http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ 2014 Numbers

[4] Global Security, "World's Largest Armies", URL=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/armies.htm

[5] Cia The World Factbook, "Brazil", URL= https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html

[6] The World Bank, "Brazil", URL=http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil

[7] Global Security, Ibid.

However, in order to comprehend the current international political system and itsactivities, it is important to analyze middle powers. At the same time, for its critics, as most of the social concepts, there is no consensus on the concept of middle power in international relations literature. The concept of middle power has lack of clarity, due to, military and economic strength of a state. Another problematic issue is inconsistent state behavior among the middle powers and because of that, it impossible to draw certain frames.

As Ungerer's wrote;

> The term has been used variously to describe geographic, material, normative and behavioral attributes among a diverse group of middle ranking states from Iran to Japan. Such ranking exercises based on selective criteria, however, are fraught with difficulty because, as other scholars have shown, there is little or no correlation between a country's size or position in the international system and the conduct of its diplomacy. In short, being a middle-sized country does not determine foreign policy behavior. But, "having middle-ranking economic, military and diplomatic capabilities and actively pursuing a middle power approach to international affairs does offer some insight into what certain states can do (Ungerer, 2007).

In his unpublished MA thesis, Anton Bezglassnyy, describes three distinctive attributes for middle powers. First is that, "medium sized material capabilities." States, which have medium material capabilities militarily, economically and in terms of population, are middle powers. Secondly, those states adopt multilateral foreign policy and struggle to use soft power mechanisms to maximize their relative power in the world scene. Thirdly, these states identify themselves as a middle power to domestic and international audiences, and are recognized as such by international community (Bezglasnyy, 2013:2). Despite all these ambiguities, we can summarize it as a state, which is neither great nor small power and Turkey and Brazil are two representatives of the middle power states in the hierarchy of power in the international system.

In addition to those, there are some controversies, in the problem of theoretical approaches to those states, those specialists use these approaches to understand the middle powers. For example, Sook-Jong Lee lists four approaches to use on the

middle powers. Firstly, he uses the positional approach that includes militarily, population and economic strength. Secondly, he uses the geographical magnitude as a dimension of bigness of that state. Thirdly, he uses the normative approach to show the wisdom, virtuousness and trustworthiness through their peaceful diplomatic relations with other states. Finally, he uses the behavioral approach to define the middle power by its behavioral tendency to engage in *middlepowermanship*,

In contrast to Lee, Paul Gecelovsky distinguishes the theoretical approaches to middle powers in two categories as positional and behavioral approaches. Positional approach of Gecelovsky emphasizes the relevance ofthe place of a state in international system, in terms of its relative capabilities such as gross national product and population and its ideological location in the international system that has become more evident during Cold War period. Behavioral approach of Gecelovsky is attributedto the styles of middle-sized states. According to Gecelovsky:

> Middle powers are concerned with maintaining a peaceful and stable international system through participation in efforts to manage and resolve conflicts when problem arise. The style of a state behaviour pursued by middle powers to achieve these aims combines functionalism and internationalism or capability and willingness (Gecelovsky, 2009).

By the same token, some political scientists argue that *regionalpowerhood* ismore important than *middlepowerhood* (Cooper, 2013:29). Despite their middle power status, while some middle powers can change and control the results of certain international or regional problems, others cannot. This is the most important feature of the power of *regionalpowerhood* compared toan ordinary *middlepowerhood* and closely related with that state's position in proportion to its neighbors. For instance, as neighbor of the global hegemon US, Canada is a self-evident middle power in the international system based on its economic and technological capacity and power of production, but it is not a regional power. Despiteits enormouseconomic or militarily advantage, Canada can displayits power on fewer regional issues than its weaker counterpart Iran does.

In that sense, it is reasonable to accept Hart's distinction on the measurement of the power of middle powers. Hart enunciates three perspectives on measuring power in

international politics. According to Hart, control over resources, control over actorsandcontrol over events and outcomes are three dimension of measurement of power (Hart, 1976).

Furthermore, there are some general characteristics in the explaining thebehaviors of middle powers. For example, it is generally accepted that middle powers support the goals of international peace and security because they are ultimately interested in a stable and orderly environment. They try to build consensus around multilateral issues, such as non-proliferation or environmental protection, as a means to overcome their lack of material capabilities.They base their demands in international institutions on a discourse of global justice and democratic multilateralism (Lopes, Casaroes and Gama, 2013).

Since the early 2000's, "emerging powers" or "emerging middle powers", have gainedrelative importance in the sharing of world power. The decline of relative economic weight of EU and US has changed the balance of power and new power centers have arisen such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, and Turkey.

Having their economic rise, these countries have increasingly used their influence to challenge the legitimacy of post-Second World War Order, calling for more pluralist or multipolar conceptions. Moreover, the influence of emerging powers is rising. In this rise, Hart&Jones draw attention to three factors to help explain their rise.

> The first are the deep, bilateral economic and political ties these states have with certain 'fragile' or 'rogue' states. Trade datas show that emerging powers are often in a position to exert much greater economic leverage over many weak and fragile states than are the Western powers. Secondly, the relative influence of the rising powers compared to the West is further amplified by Western disunity. Finally, within multilateral institutions the BRIC states can often wield influence disproportionate to their individual economic size or formal voting power (Hart and Jones, 2010: 75).

As is seen above, middle powers or emerging powers seek more power in the balance of power over all regions through peaceful alliances, trade agreements and pluralist institutions. As Gilley's stressed, middle powers are playing a legitimating role and

contribute to stable orders (Gilley, 2011). In here, soft power approach has remarkable significance on middle powers' policies in terms of gaining more power. Middle ranking states are more capable while they are using soft power as an instrument of foreign policy than hard power.

CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF TURKEY AND BRAZIL IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

5.1 Turkish Foreign Policy

In the beginning of the assessment of traditional characteristics, I want to cite Mustafa Aydın's analysis. For Aydın:

> Turkey is not one of the great powers of the twentieth century. Its geopolitical location however, has enabled it to play potentially higher role in world politics than would have been otherwise. It holds the key not only to the Turkish straits but to lies along the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. It is a member of the biggest surviving military bloc and most of the European Organizations, as well as an associate member of the European Union. Its political involvement and exposed position assign it an importance hardly matched by any other middle power (Aydın, 1999).

Traditional Turkish Foreign Policy, dating back to the late Ottoman Era was remarkably consistent with the world-views acknowledged by thebasic founding principles, validated with the birth of the modern state and by its founding fathers, from its very first days to AKP era. Modern Turkish State was born from the ashes of Ottoman Empire and the collapse of the Empire has left deep impacts on the new Republic. The broad borders of Empire were dwindled at the end of the First World War and geopolitics of Middle East and Anatolia completely changed. Having been defeatedin WWI, independence was won and a different Turkish State created in 1923 with quite limited sources, under difficult conditions and while wrestling with invaders.

After the declaration of theNew Turkish Republic, staggering reforms taken place under the guidance of Atatürk who was the founding father of Turkey. The imperial state structure of the Ottomans had been transformed into Turkish nation state, the pluralistic structure of Empire, both ethnically and religiously, had been turned into a more homogeneous one, and consequently, the new state would no longer maintain as its constituents a multi-religious and multi-ethnic social structure.. Sultanate and caliphate were abolished in order to establisha new secular and constitutional

democracy. All these structural changes compelled the creation of a new identity in the youngRepublic of Turkey. Until the establishment of the new state, throughout its history, the Ottoman Empire had grappled with identity crises, arising from its location intersecting distinctly different civilizations and its heterogenous population. The change of identity of in the new state was one of the most important steps for founders of theNew Republic. New identity was a combination of secularism and nationalism in line with Western orientation (Yavuz, 2007). These were thought as the most important requirements for their project of westernization or modernization. Despite the new geopolitical and ideational changes in the environment of Turkey, the western oriented foreign policy was a process that had a continuum encompassing the late Ottoman period as well as the new Republic. The collapse of the empire was associated with the anachronism of its state structures and peoples, and on this ground, all creations of theNew Republic had been relevantto efforts of modernization, and of acquisition of wealth and power both for the state and its people.

 New Turkish state abandoned the imperial policies of Ottoman Empire and adopted principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states (Çiller, 1996). In this point, Stone highlights that "policy of neutrality is the first and foremost distinguishing character of newly formed states" (Stone, 2001). In parallel way, Turkish Foreign Policy was located on neutrality and peaceful relationships with her neighbors and the Great Powers of that era. This policy of neutrality ended shortly after WW2 with the dangerous demands of Stalin of USSR on straits and territorial integrity of Turkey.

Within the context of western political concepts and political history, Turkey has a unique history and experiences in terms of state and people relations or peaceful evolutionary political modernization in its institutions. The abolishment of the symbols of the ancient regime was considered as relatively peaceful and evolutionary transformations. Ataturk's pragmatic policies and strategic mind enabled gradually the establishment of new institutions and perspectives such as secularization of state institutions. As Stone argues, "unlike his contemporary counterparts, Ataturk's foreign policy was not chauvinistic, adventurist and revanchist" (Stone, ibid). The reforms of Ataturk's in the domestic politics were consistent with his foreign policy

perspectives and modernization projects. For instance, secularization of institutions, modernization of judiciary system with European Law systems, adoption of Latin alphabet and Western Calendar were harmonizing efforts with the West. With these reforms, Ataturk brought Turkey closer to the West.

The lack of interest of the Kemalist foreign policy understanding of Turkey over Middle East has been interpreted more ideologically in the Turkish politics. The lack of interest in thethe Middle East and policy of non-interventionism continued until AKP era. Danforth believes"the policy of Ataturk or Turkey on Middle East was one of the most revolutionary split of Turkish foreign policy in history". For Danforth, "the rejection of imperial ambitions in the region closely related with the creation process of Turkish nation state and risen Arab Nationalism" (Danforth 2008).

Danforth argue;

> New elites of Turkey saw the Arab betrayal during the WW1 with their rebellion that supported by British Empire against Ottoman Empire. Those elites were serving mostly as soldier in WW1 and their feelings and perspectives had decisiveness and doubts about Arabs. With Turkey still weak and European powers firmly in control of the Middle East, though, the question of a Turkish policy toward the region —motivated by anger, sympathy, or anything else— was essentially moot. Instead, Ankara focused its interwar diplomatic efforts on the European great powers whose actions would determine the world's fate in the turbulent decades leading up to World War II. In fact, "Turkey's one formal diplomatic commitment in the Middle East during this period was a 1937 treaty with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran partly intended, after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, as a signal to the rest of the world that the four independent Middle Eastern states would oppose any attempts by one of the European powers to pick them off individually" (Danforth, 2015).

In this era, Turkish foreign policy makers and elites were aware of their limits and powers. They wanted to tackle with their problems in line with international agreements and international legitimacy. In parallel way, Turkey peacefully and realistically gave up her ambitions/rights over the Mosul issue, became member of

League of Nations, and annexation of Hatay (Antioch) were examples of this characteristic.

The general picture of the Republican Era in the foreign policy as givenaboveUnlike the unending conflicts with Russians in the 19th Century, this peaceful era was the longest period that passed with mutual peaceful relations since 1833— the Treaty of Hünkar skelesi (Hale, 2013). At the end of this process, as a victorious power of WW2, USSR removed theagreement andthreatened Turkey to take base privilege on the straits with the revision of Montreux Convention, and demanded few cities in the far east of Turkey. Despite the official denunciation of those demands in the following times of Stalin's death by Soviet officials, Turkey's accession to NATO and integration with West in terms of grand strategy of Turkey had already done (Aydın: Ibid: 168). The promulgation of Marshall and Truman aid programs by UK and US helped the development of Turkish Security and Economic structure.

Only military intervention of Turkey taking place abroad was that of Cyprus since foundation of Republic. It was carried out to prevent what has turned into violent acts perpetrated by the Greek Cypriots over Turkish Cypriots in 1974. Theintervention of 1974 and its aftermath have remained an unsolvable and one of the most problematic issues of Turkish Foreign Policy since its beginning. In addition, during the Cyprus Intervention of Turkey and its embargoes and US approaches to Turkey before the intervention adversely affected the alliance between the West and Turkey,; thereafter, Turkey began to regard the West as suspicious like in the crisis of 'Johnson Letter'.

As Hale argues, "International recognition as a member of the western community of nations had been an objective of Turkish leaders since the days of the Tanzimat, and was seen as a logical extension of Turkey's membership of NATO and other western institutions" (Hale, Ibid:128). Therefore, Turkey's application to European Economic Community should be understood in this context. Even today, the accession effortsof Turkey to European Union stems from this subconscious of Turkish Foreign Policy.

Throughout the Cold War period, Turkish Foreign Policy mainly focused on the threatsthat came from USSR and ethnic and religious challenges that came from Middle East. In the beginning of the Cold War period, the threat of communism and imperial ambitions of USSR on Turkey were main threats, but after 1980's, the

falling process of USSR and the rise of Kurdish secessionist movement, PKK and Islamist movements changed the old dynamics of threat perception (Cooper, 2002) Thanks to these new challenges, Turkey's Middle East Policy was reorganized and relations with Irak, Iran and Syria regulated with those problem fields in post-Cold War Period. The fight against PKK had sometimes been criticized by Western countries and triggered serious tensions.

The years of 90's were also witnessed the speed up process of Turkey's accession to European Union—for example The Status of Candidacy to European Union given to Turkey in the Helsinki Summit in 1999.

Despite some new steps and renewal perspectives put forward after the Cold War, fundamental characteristics continued until AKP era. AKP government have changed the basic understanding of Turkish foreign policy and declared new soft power policy with neighbors and interlocutor countries in the foreign policy field in line with the Strategic Depth doctrine of Ahmet Davuto lu who was a former political science professor, diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and is currently the Prime Minister of Turkey.

5.2 Brazilian Foreign Policy

In analogy toTurkey, the Foreign Policy of Brazil is quite consistent with its history and has fundamental continuations. It should be acknowledged that two countries, Turkey and Brazil, are located in regions with fundamentally different geopolitical outlooks and both have followed different historical paths, Brazil maintaining better stability and a less conflictual environment during which. The roots of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century and Rio Branco's decade-long tenure as foreign minister (Burges, 2009:18).

As the father of Brazilian diplomacy, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior Barão do Rio Branco (1845-1912), basically wanted to havea safe country in the face of threats that come from Spanish speaking neighbors of Brazil, European Powers and United States. Therefore, in the hegemonic rivalry of European Powers, especially Great Britain and United states he tried to build a balanced relationship via peaceful

alignments and agreements. In this way, he solved most of the border disputes, some of which dating back to four hundred years ago with their neighbours and focused on increasing economic prosperity thorough trade and investments (Burns, 1967). Secondly, he developed a more assertive foreign policy understanding in Brazilian diplomacy and wanted to become one of the world powers. Thirdly, he created a more respected and co-operative image among global and regional powers. Fourthly, he drew a picture whereBrazil plays a leadership role in the South America and involving to disputes among South American Countries. Fifthly, Rio Branco successfully directed relationships with Great Britain and United States. As a result of this successful process, United Stated became a new political mentor in international relations of Brazil. As of this critical junctures of history, following the death of Branco, these strategic principles adopted as pillars of Brazilian Foreign Policy during the next fifty years (Burns, Ibid:198).

After Rio Branco, his successor Lauro Müller followed his policies on foreign policy and avoided. Until joining the WWI in 1917, he successfully followed those principles and protected balance of power in the foreign relations of Brazil. Following the sinking of Brazilian ships by German attacks, Brazil declared war against Germany and became one of the parties of war in the side of Allies. Indeed, Brazil was clearly in a neutral position during the WWI, however it resulted with Brazil joining and the resignation of Müller. WWI provided an expanded opportunity for Brazil to pursue its ambitions in the renegotiation of the international order that subsequently took placeat Versailles. It not only joined the Allied cause in WWI as a co-belligerent, providing anti-submarine naval patrols in the Atlantic, but also sought a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations in the peace that followed. This pursuit of a status in the League of Nations reserved for the great powers is illustrative of Brazil's self-perception as a potential major power. Brazil actually withdrew from the League in 1926 when the recently defeated Germany was granted membership in the Council in precedence over Brazil's claim as a member of the victorious alliance. Withdrawal from the League was a recognition that Brazil's strategy had failed to convince the existing major powers that it should have the same status in decisions about the structure of world order (Trikunas, 2014).

The collapse of coffee exports during the Great Depression brought Getulio Vargas to power and he led towards structural economic reforms, which were based on

industrialization with a developmentalist perspectives and social welfare. In this interregnum era, Latin America was a battlefield of ideological camps that formed by German and US influence and rivalry. While Germans were offering anti-parliamentary authoritarianism, Americans were promoting liberal democracy (Moura, 2013: 51). Such a rivalry of Great Powers risen the bargaining power and manoeuvre capability of Brazilian leadership that was led by Vargas in the fields of international trade and international military aids and this process was called pragmatic equilibrium (Moura, Ibid: 68). German activities mostly consisted of economic and military trade and aid agreements to overcome the results of Great Depression in Latin America. This set of German military, cultural, political and economic activities in Latin America disturbed the American authorities who, in the mid-1930s started a series of initiatives in order to reduce or eliminate them. Therefore, Americans initiated comprehensive political and economical relationships with those countries and especially with Brazil with **Good Neighbourhood Policy**. This program aimed to initiate an exchange program in the field of military officer training and to providemilitary equipments to Brazil and increase trade between US and Brazil. On the eve of the war, there was no clear definition of a military partner for Brazil. While the navy was faithful to its British suppliers, the army was divided between the advantages and disadvantages of German and American partnership (Moura, Ibid:74). Despite pro-fascist and pro-Axis coup initiatives against Vargas, Brazil remained neutral in the face of WW2. However, similarly as in WW1, until Germans sank a Brazilian ship, Brazil protected its position. On September 26, 1940, the Vargas government decided that, in the case of German aggression, it would place all of Brazil's resources on the American side (McCann, 1995). After that time, Brazil attended WW2 and sent her troops to the Italian front. McCann lists the strategic aims of Vargas Leadership in the attendance of WW2,

1. A better position in world politics;

2. Consolidation of its superiority in South America;

3. A more secure and intimate cooperation with the United States;

4. Greater influence over Portugal and its possessions;

5. Development of maritime power;

6. Development of air power;

7. Development of heavy industries;

8. Creation of war industries;

9. Creation of industries -agricultural, extractive, and light mineral- complementary to those of the United States and essential for world reconstruction;

10. Expansion of Brazil's railways and highways for economic and strategic purposes;

11. Exploration for essential combustible fuels (McCann, Ibid.).

As is seen above, this strategic aims of Brazil foreign policy were quite consistent with Rio Branco's principles that also will continue throughout next twenty years. According to Trikunas;

> Brazil joined the Allied cause after the United States entered World War II and again sought to become a major power by joining the victorious Allies in the hope it would be able to help write the rules governing the peace. To strengthen its claims, Brazil participated to a more significant extent than in World War I, contributing an army division to the Italian front. Brazil also participated vigorously in the diplomacy surrounding the founding of the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt even advocated for Brazil's permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council when this body was first proposed. However, this idea faced with resistance from the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and after Roosevelt's death, President Harry S. Truman agreed and dropped the proposal (Trinkunas, Ibid.).

US cold policy towards Brazil triggered theshift of Brazil's position after WW2 period. Brazilians were disappointed with this process, especially development of closer relations with Argentina because, unlike the Brazil's cooperation, Argentina remainedneutral in WW2 and gained more attention from US. This process resulted with the development of anforeign policy of independence from US influence (*Politica Externa Independente*) in Brazil. Called *Operaçao Pan American* (OPA- Pan American Operation) was a new perspective in Brazilian Foreign Policy and aimed at regional cooperation with economic and political dimensions launched by Juscelina Kubitschek in June 1958. During the 60's, Brazil struggled to increase

economic and political ties withits neighbors and other states in the region. Castelo Branco who was one of the leaders of 1964 Coup and president thereafter, declared thereturn to traditional foreign policy in July 1964, after an ambiguous process undertaken during post-WW2 era. This declaration included some principles such as world peace, disarmament, self-determination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism.

For that reason, Castelo Branco that the nation's exterior policy followed the dictums enunciated by the founder of its modern foreign policy, the Baron of Rio-Branco. He advised, "*In order to worthily represent Brazil abroad, you need to have nothing more before you than the teachings of Rio-Branco*" (Burns, Ibid: 196). In addition, the declaration arguedthe use foreign policy to increase the national power through socioeconomic development (Burns, Ibid: 195).

 Most effective method for that policy was trade with neighbours and every member of the international system. In this period, the multilateral relations of Brazil with other emerging countries raised and Brazil played a significant role in the Group of 77.

Between 1968-1973, Brazil witnessed remarkable economic growth and in this era, Average Annual GDP rose about 10 percent (Burges, Ibid: 25). Having successful growth rates increased the self-confidence of Brazilian politicians and they emphasized the role of Brazil as a World Power (Hurrel, 1986: 150). The successful, peaceful and co-operative relations between Argentina and Brazil by military regimes of two countries since the 60's began to deteriorate in 1973. Main arguments of this deterioration were focusing on geopolitical, commercial and political relations between Brazil and Argentina, and difficulties continued during 80's (Rosenbaum, 1973).

This process took 11 years and transition to democracy was achieved in 1985 (Codato, 2006). According to Hurrel, "during Geisel's tenure, Brazilian Foreign Policy was composed of four fundamental principles that were consistent with the tradition. The first was adopting an assertive foreign policy understanding. The second was an emphasis on pragmatism. The third one was adopting flexibility and keeping open the maximum number of options" (Hurrel, Ibid: 199).

These principles played a major role on the issues of multilateral policies and regional economic and political integration of South American Continent. The motto of Cardoso Era in the foreign policy field was *autonomy via participation*. In this period, Brazil provided important contributions to international and regional projects. For instance, though built by his predecessors, during Cardoso's tenure Mercosur (Southern Common Market) was institutionalized as a regional trade organization with Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.

A summary of the characteristics of Brazilian Foreign Policy form the very beginning to today is listed below:

1) Strong demand to increase national power and climb to the highest ranks of power hierarchy in the world

2) Non-interventionism and peacefulness

3) Regional and global collaborative understanding

4) Strong desire to establish stable and peaceful commercial diplomacy, both regionally and globally

5) Pluralistic and pragmatist perspective

6) Tolerance to regimes and cultures in the foreign policy field

CHAPTER 6: SOFT POWER POLITICS IN TURKISH AND BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICIES

6.1 Soft Power Politics of Turkey: Transformation in Turkish Foreign Policy in AKP Era and Davutoğlu Effect

Unlike the traditional politics, the period of AKP government since 2002 has seen radical transformations in the domestic and foreign policy fields. In the foreign policy field, AKP leadership redefined Turkish foreign policy and, after 2002; most significantly by its main architect was Ahmet Davutoğlu. In 2001, as a chief architect of the new foreign policy understanding, Davutoglu delineated his vision for a renewed and prospective Turkish Foreign Policy in his most famous and controversial book, the *Strategic Depth* (Davutoğlu, 2013).

According to Strategic depth doctrine;

> Turkish foreign policy did not build upon its historical inheritance and identity. For that reason, Turkey has alienated itself with identity crisis and discontinuations and it should have rebuilt by historical and cultural backgrounds. As a central country of Ottoman past Turkey should develop its relations in line with immediate neighbours who are Islamic and Turkic nations with cultural, historical and political inheritances (Davutoğlu, Ibid: 145).

This approach often criticised and labelled as new-Ottomanism by some elites of Middle Eastern countries, Westerns analysts and dissidents of Turkish politics (Rubin, 2011). As William Hale, argue;

> AKP's policies, far from being new, were 'neo-Ottoman', implying a reversion to pre-republican practices. The argument was complicated by the fact that 'neo-Ottomanism' was often advanced as a domestic policy principle of multiculturalism, resting on the idealized vision of an Ottoman Empire in which people with diverse religious and ethnic identities supposedly lived in harmony. This principle had been adopted by Turgut Özal and promoted by the journalist Cengiz Çandar, aiming to

reinstate Ottoman history and culture as part of Turkish collective memory. The principle of cultural pluralism was used to address the Kurdish question, and could be adopted as the basis of more liberal, less ardently nationalist, foreign policies. However, 'neo-Ottomanism' was usually interpreted differently in the foreign policy context, where it could also be used to refer to the idea that Turkey should be more active in the former Ottoman space, stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East and North Africa. This was seen as corresponding to Ahmet Davutoglu's emphasis on Turkey's role in its geographical neighbourhood, most of which had once been part of the Ottoman Empire, and was used by the AKP's radical critics in the USA and elsewhere as the basis of a highly exaggerated argument to the effect that the AKP was turning Turkey away from the west towards a 'neo-Ottomanism' inspired by Muslim radicalism" (Hale, Ibid: 254).

The dissidents of neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy field, stressed that this vision could change the main pillars of Turkish state like nation-statehood, secularism and republicanism (Özda , 2013).

As is expressed above, neo-Ottomanism is a pessimistic term and mostly used by the westerners or westernizers of Turkish domestic politics to explain the new opening of Turkish foreign policy towards historical Ottoman geography. Unlike the suspicions of Turkey's shift from West axis or Islamization of Turkish foreign policy, AKP members invariably argue that the Turkey's foreign policymakers are not seeking to revive the Ottoman Empire. Instead, they "seek Turkey's historic reintegration into its immediate neighbourhoods, thereby correcting an anomaly of the Cold War years" (Kınıklıo lu, 2009)

Turkey's revised foreign policy under Davuto lu's consult from the very beginning of AKP era to Davutoglu's tenure as the Minister of Turkish foreign affairs and premiership. Unlike the neo-Ottoman critics, Turkey's new opening with neighbours and historical Ottoman countries was schematized with the slogan of 'zero problems with neighbors' (Davuto lu, 2010)

In his one of the most famous articles, Davutoglu lists three methodological and five operational principles in the frame of Zero Problems with Neighbours Policy. The first methodological principle of it is "visionary" approach to the issues instead of crisis-oriented attitude that dominated foreign policy during the entire Cold War. The second is to base Turkish Foreign Policy on a "consistent and systematic" framework around the world. The third is adaptation of new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region. As for operational principles, the first is balance between security and democracy. the second is economic cooperation and interdependence with neighbours. The third is proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, which aims to take measures before crises emerge and escalate to critical level. The fourth principle is adherence to multidimensional foreign policy. The fifth is rhythmic diplomacy, which aspires to provide Turkey with a more active role in international relations (Davuto lu, 2010).

In light of these perspectives, Turkish Foreign Policy has entered a new phase and initiated new policies to increase its influence through such soft policies in the its immediate geography. Therefore, the following chapter will analyze the foreign policies of Turkey and its ruling party, AKP, from 2002 until the Arab Spring.

6.1.1   Soft Power Recources of Turkey in its Region and the World

In the beginning of the new century, Turkey has experienced a chain of economic and political crises. Civil Military tensions, widespread corruptions and fight against separatist-ethnic nationalist terror waves exhausted Turkish people and reduced the effectiveness of Turkey's domestic and foreign politics. Having such a troublesome period, the 2002 victory of AKP heralded a revolutionary change in Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. Because, unlike the establishment side of Turkish Political sphere, AKP meant atransformation of mainstream Islamist movement Milli Görü (National View). Islamism and Islamist political movements have been always perceived as a threat for the future of the secular and nation-statehood characteristics of the Turkish Republic.

At the same time, the world was entering a new period that characterized by the attacks of 9/11 and Afghanistan-Iraq invasions of the US. Following the destructive

attacks and invasions, radical Islamist movements have raised to the first stage in the global threat rankings. In addition to those, despite its original roots, AKP expressed itself as a conservative democratic party like the European Christian Democratic parties. This radical change of identity and future perspectives of AKP has given incredible credibility and positive image both in Western public and in publics of Muslim countries and especially in Middle Eastern countries.

Furthermore, after the collapse of Turkish economy in 2001, AKP has successfully implemented the IMF supported 'Transition to Strong Economy Program' and following years Turkey has reached important growth rates (Gürsel, 2014). This remarkable economical success gave self-confidence to Turkish elites in foreign relations and became one of the pillars of Turkey's foreign policy during the 2000's. The AKP government' zero problem policy with their neighbours, including decisions such as lifting visa requirements, contributed to another transformation of Turkey's trading trends; the country's trading partners became diversified, with Europe's share diminishing (but never shrank to under 40% of Turkey's trade) while that of the Middle East and other regions steadily rose (Yınanç, 2015). To diversify Turkey's trade, Middle East openings of Turkey were remarkably successful.

Moreover, economic achievements of Turkey during the 2000's were appreciated by Muslim nations among the immediate neighbours of Turkey in the region and world public, this process was another important component of the rise of Turkey's soft power. Turkey exports and import rates remarkably increased with multilateral trade and investment process with all around the world. As is seen below, the foreign trade of Turkey dramatically increased, especially in near and Middle Eastern countries, Russia, and African Countries.

In this point, Kemal Kiri çi draws attentions to Turkey's behaviour in frame of economic relations and stresses that Turkey was behaving as a trading state. For Kiri çi, "from the perspective of the priorities of a trading state, Davuto lu attributed to importance to economic interdependence as a means of achieving order in the Middle East" (Kiri çi, 2009).

As a specialist on Turkish politics and Turkish Foreign Policy, Henry Barkey draws attention to this story. According to Barkey;

Turkey's new activism in the Middle East and the world in general is driven by two important factors. The first is the deep structural change that has transformed the Turkish economy from an inward looking to a robust export-driven one that is engaged in a continuous search for new markets. The second is Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party, AKP, leadership's ambitions to transform Turkey into a global actor (Barkey, 2011).

The growth of Turkish economy during the early years of 2000's has triggered the Turkish business class to become one of the fundamental coalition partners for ruling party AKP and most effective tools of Turkish Foreign Policy. Known as the Anatolian Tigers, new bourgeoisie class' political and religious orientation was almost parallel with that of AKP and it is began to rise with former Turkish President Turgut Özal's liberalization reforms during the 1980's (Murinson, 2012). Besides, according to M. Hakan Yavuz, the rising Anatolian Tigers meanta change of identity of the country and society; therefore, the rise of the religious bourgeoisie and the change of political sphere are the factors that feed each other (Yavuz, ibid.). Indeed, Ozal's economic diplomacy approaches were owned by the AKP leadership and consistently were continued throughout first decade of 2000's. According to these approaches, starting point was "economy over geopolitics" and diplomacy was pragmatically far away from security-based understandings (Ö ütçü and Do ru, 2016).

According to Kemal Kiri çi;

> The liberal market policies put into place in the 1980's eventually led to the emergence of strong business interest groups increasingly able to access the government as well as foreign policy decision-makers. The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MÜS AD), especially since the AKP government has come to power, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association(TÜS AD), and the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), not to mention the Turkish Exporters Assembly (T M), the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DE K),the International Transporters Association (UND), and the Turkish Contractors Association (TMD) are some of the more influential and powerful business associations. It is also possible to add local business associations, such as the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (SO)

as well as numerous bilateral business associations with most countries with which Turkey trades as actors capable of shaping and influencing Turkish foreign policy. These interest groups not only interact with various government agencies, but also have direct access to the government itself and are capable of shaping public opinion. They are also able to form alliances with government agencies as well as their counterparts in other countries, for the purposes of lobbying in support of policies typically associated with a trading state (Kiri çi, Ibid: 46).

On the other hand, fundamental characteristics of Turkish state structure, like being a secular democratic country governed by a religious ruling party and European vision experience represented the gainings for Turkish soft power in both Western and Eastern public. Therefore, the rise of Islamist terror threat all over the world facilitated the presenting of Turkey's 'Model Country' status by the West for the Middle East and other regions of world that has Muslim population. After the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan invasions by, US triggered anti-American and anti-West sentiments in Muslim Countries, this atmosphere raised questions about Huntingon's Clash of Civilizations argument (Huntington, 2014). One of the most important reasons for the Turkey's position as a 'model country' or 'axis country' is to prevent such a conflictual atmospheres. 'The Greater Middle East Project' was a product of such perspectives and including Turkey's taking a role in the transformation of Middle East and North Africa in line with the integration of those countries into global political and economical system. As the only Muslim country that has a democratic and secular system Turkey was the natural stakeholder of this initiative proposed in G-8 Summit of 2004 (Oran, 2013: 31).

According to Murinson;

> Some Washington policy-makers, including then President George H. W. Bush, proposed that Turkey, with its tradition of eclectic, Sufi-influenced Islamic tradition and secular regime, could serve as a perfect example of coexistence between modernity and Islam; hence, the idea was named the "Turkish model." In the meantime, the lack of clarity of both the concept itself and several resulting policies have created political and social chaos of global proportions in the process. Turkey felt encouraged by US policies to reach out to Islamists in other Muslim countries and support

these movements. Along the way, some American policy-makers, most recently in the Obama administration, have tried to redefine Islam and subordinate it to the American interests in the region by ushering in a new generation of the so-called "moderate" Islamists, chiefly amongst the Arabs (Murinson, Ibid: 5).

As for the soft power of Turkey, during the preparation process of Iraq invasion, US government demanded a transit way for the entering Iraq from the North and opening a North Front for the deployment of US soldiers in the Southern cities of Turkey. Thereon, Turkey's parliament voted in opposition to American proposal, finding it unaccetable. Despite the transformation of US's expectations intodissatisfaction and frustration, this result increased the Turkish soft power over the Arab World. In addition to those, Meliha Benli Altunı ık draws attention to structural reasons; for her, AKP's ascent to power comprises an asset for Turkish Model, as it demonstrates both the evolutions of Islamist movement in Turkey, and the potential for reconciling democracy and Islam in the government (Altunı ık, 2008).

Especially, the controversial Davos meeting of Israeli President Shimon Peres and Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdo an in 2009 the Turkish soft power peaked in the eyes of the nations of the region. In this meeting, Premier Erdo an seriously and publicly criticized the Israeli leader because of the activities of Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza War (Akgün, Perçino lu and Gündo ar, 2010:5).

In addition, after the Gaza Flotilla Raid in 2010 and harsh critics of Turkish politicians against the Israeli attack and the spirit of the solidarity of Arab and Muslim societies with Turkey, helped to increase the awareness Arabic public opinion in regard to the effect required by Turkey. This process led to Turkish Premier Erdogan's transformation to a popularfigure in the eyes of Arab and Muslim societies of world. Following this process, wherever Erdogan went in Arap Countries, he was greeted like the local president.

Moreover, it was observed the positive transformation of Turkish image in the eyes of Arabs during the first decade of century. According to Altunı ık;

There are several reasons for this: First, the coming to power of the AKP has had a positive effect on perceptions of Turkey in the region. Several Arab intellectuals have made public their perception that the Turkish experiment (i.e. the democratic system that allowed the AKP to come to power and to transform itself into a party that accepts secularism and democracy), as important and successful. As a result, Turkish democracy is increasingly seen as genuine, rather than a façade. More importantly, the AKP's coming to power challenged beliefs long-held by Arab intellectuals in regard to Turkey. Both Arab nationalists and political Islamists in the Arab world have for a long time held a very simplistic view of Turkey that perceived a binary opposition between a "small secular elite" and "populous but powerless Islamic masses." Thus, the coming to power of a party with Islamic roots dramatically challenged that view and led to a conceptual revisiting of Turkey at a time of deep crisis in the Arab world" (Altunı ık, Ibid: 47).

On the other hand, the existence of an existential threat for Muslim societies, which persists today, accelerated the attempts to find a way to deal with this threat in terms of the Muslim public of the Middle East. In the face of such a threat, some public opinion makers tried to challenge Islamic radicalism using the Turkish experience. For example, Jordanian journalist Ha im Salih argued, "it will be possible to learn from Turkey's experience. This will mean that the reforms will come from a great Islamic country". The author went on to argue that reforms attained in this manner would become much more palatable than would otherwise be the case (Salih, 2004).

In this conjuncture, Kemal Kiri çi drew attention to the possibilities of Turkey's demonstrative effect on the Middle East by its historical and political experiences via Huntington's 'Third Wave of Democratization' perspective appeared in the results of a survey conducted by Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) in 2009.

According to this survey, Turkey's positive image was found to be 75% and this result was higher than that of Egypt, which sees itself as the leader of Arab World (Kiri çi, 2011)

In addition to that, Palestinians supported Turkey's initiatives for the solutions of Palestine-Israel conflict in proportion as 89% and in overall seven Arab Countries, peoples supported Turkey in proportion as 79%. Most dramatic result was that

despite the secular structure of Turkey, 61% of the people of seven Arab Countries thought that Turkey could be a model for them and 64% of those people supported the Turkey's European Union Membership (Akgün, Perçino lu and Gündo ar, Ibid.).

In parallel way, according to PEW Research Center's an after Arab Spring Survey in 2012, freedom and democracy demands of Middle Eastern societies rose and Turkey's role over the those nations in terms of democracy found favorable with 5% and Turkish Premier Erdogan's popularity rose to number one with the 65% among the other Middle Eastern leaders.[8]

Figure 1: Turkey's Perception in the Muslim World [Source: Pew Research Center]

With the leadership of Davuto lu, new Africa openings in early 2000's of Turkey increased the interactions between Turkey and African countries. Having increased

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[8] PEW Research Center, *"Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life"*, July 10, 2012, URL: http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/

relations, Turkey and Turks perception in the eyes of African nations is highly positive.

In the results of 2011 African countries public opinion poll of B LGESAM, an Ankara based think-thank, this positive perception easily can be seen. According to these results, 76% of Egyptians, 64.2% of Moroccans, 75.7% of Senegalese, 61.3% of Tanzanians saw the Turks as hospitable. 69.6% saw as honest people, 72.5 saw as helpful and 70.2% saw as honest. General approval ratings of Turkey and Turks among these countries are also positive. 81.3% of Egyptians, 69.5% of Senegalese, 60.9% of Moroccans, 57.3% of Tanzanians expressed that they saw the Turkey and Turks as positive.[9]

On the other hand, one of the most fundamental soft power resources of Turkey is its European Union perspective. In line with this perspective, Turkey has been aiming to become a member of the EU and EU membership is requiring the upgrading of democratic standards of Turkey and Rule of Law structure. As Nye's argue, the soft power of a country rests primarily rests on political values and foreign policies (Nye, 2004:11), Turkey's foreign policy and democratization process in line with EU membership has positively contributed to its soft power.

After a new period began in the relations between Turkey and the EU after Turkey assumed "candidate status" during the Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999, with AKP government Turkey accelerated the required regulations by EU. At the Brussels Summit on 16-17 December 2004, the decisions taken in the 1999 Helsinki Summit were reaffirmed, as the Council took note that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria and decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005.[10] As a Muslim country, Turkey's accession process to EU attracted the attention of Muslim nations. According to a special report of Open Society Foundation in Turkey, Arab public of Middle East highly welcomed this break point

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[9] BİLGESAM, "Afrika'da Türkiye ve Türk Algısı", Rapor No: 39, Ankara, December 2011

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey, "Turkey-EU Relations",

URL=http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa

of negotiation process in that time and Arab media presented as a positive development for both Turkey and EU.[11]

6.1.2 Cultural Factors

In the returning process of Turkey to the Middle East and soft power policies, cultural interactions played an important role and raised mutual understanding, especially in terms of Middle Eastern nations. The more advantageous feature of these interactions was Turkey's cultural proximity to these people, it facilitated the rise of Turkey's soft power by comparison to its Western counterparts, however, Turkey's cultural productions, and cultural diplomacy was not limited with the Middle East.

During the first decade of the century, one of the most important components of Turkish soft power, Turkish cultural products like soft dramas and films, became popular among immediate neighbours and unexpectedly showed remarkable effectiveness in cross-cultural relations (Kimmelman, 2010).

In addition, Turkish filmmakers, artists and singers became more visible in the international platforms. For example, some filmmakers and directors such as Nuri Bilge Ceylan, Ferzan Özpetek, Fatih Akın, Zeki Demirkubuz, and Ye im Ustao lu have been awarded with international film prizes and heralded the rise of Turkish film industry. Turkish soap operas like, Deli Yürek (Crazy Heart), Gümü (Noor in Arabic), Binbir Gece (One Thousand and One Nights), Muhte em Yüzyıl (The Magnificent Century), Suskunlar (The Game of Silence), Yabancı Damat (Synora Agapis in Greek) etc. have became popular from China to Chile (ahin and Çevik, 2015: 433). For instance, in 2011, Turkish TV series reached to 150 Million people in 76 different countries and watched more than 10000 hours (Özedincik, 2013).

The attraction and effectiveness of these products in terms of soft power can be seen in the example of Gümü and Kısmet soap operas. For instance, as one of the most successful TV dramas, Gümü (Noor in Arabic) aired in 2008. The Middle East

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[11] Açık Toplum Vakfı, "Türkiye AB İlişkisinin Müslüman Dünyadaki Yansımaları", 1. Baskı Temmuz 2009, İstanbul, P.17

Broadcasting Corporation said, about 85 million people, more than 51 million of them women, watched the final episode.

Having its attractiveness among the Arab women, Qatar-based media outlet Al Jazeera examined these Turkish dramas and made a documentary about it.[12] Turkey has benefited from its newly found soft power among its Arab neighbours. Figures from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism reveal a steady increase in visitors, particularly from Gulf countries, with a 34% increase in visitors from Saudi Arabia, in the years following the airing of Gümü (Juburi, 2015).

As the second remarkable opera, Yabancı Damat (Synora Agapis in Greek) which became popular in Greece helped the softening of historical hostilities between two nations. The raproachment process of Turkey and Greece had already begun in the late 90's with Sirtaki Diplomacy and the earthquake diplomacy of these two countries in the 1999. After the earthquake disasters, Turkey and Greece helped each other to deal with the results of these events. Then, the soap opera of Yabancı Damat facilitated the softening process and unlike the traditional foreign policy behaviour, Greece supported the candidacy of Turkey for European Union membership in 2005 (Yörük and Vatikiotis, 2013).

With the rise Turkish soap operas and films, Turkey gained an important representation opportunity. For example, as the location of most of the soap operas and films, stanbul gained attraction and increased its share of tourists (Toksabay, 2011). Especially, its Middle Eastern consumers liked the image of Istanbul and Egyptians choose it as twelfth most important global city and third most attractive city. [13] According to Yörük and Vatikiotis, in the popularity of Turkish TV productions in the Middle East, Balkans and Greece cultural proximities and historical transitions cross-cultural played an important role than other regions of the world (Yörük and Vatikiotis, Ibid).

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[12] Al Jazeera, "Kismet: How Soap Operas Changed the World", 15 Jan 2014, URL=http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2013/11/kismet-how-soap-operas-changed-world-20131117152457476872.html (15 April, 2015)

[13] Simon Anhold-City Brands Index, URL=http//www.simonanholt.com/Reserch/researchintroduction.aspx August, 2014 cited in Şahin and Çevik, 2015

Eurovision song contests were another successful experience of Turkey in terms of gaining attraction through popular music all around the Europe and World. Between 2003-2012 years, Turkey gained championship once, made the second best song one time as well, and became twice the fourth best group/singer and song.[14] The direct vote system of election process of Eurovision was a remarkable example of attraction gaining and its measurement in terms of popular culture productions and soft power.

6.1.3 Public Diplomacy Activities and Tools of Turkey

Unlike the traditional diplomacy among statesmen, "public diplomacy" is about building relationships: understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for we can find common cause. Nye stresses;

> The difference between public and traditional diplomacy is that public diplomacy involves a much broader group of people on both sides, and a broader set of interests that go beyond those of the government of the day" (Leonard, Stead, and Smewing, 2002:9). NGO's, news media, corporations, intergovernmental organizations and cultural activities that extending cross-cultural interactions become the most useful tools and targets of soft power wielding and all of those are components of public diplomacy. However, as Nye's pointed out that soft power is more difficult to wield, because many of its crucial resources are outside the control of the governments, and their effects depend heavily on acceptance by receiving audience. Moreover, soft power resources often work directly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes take years to produce its desired outcomes (Nye, 2004:99).

In the rise of soft power of Turkey during the first decade of century, public diplomacy activities of Turkey were another important component of its success. The

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[14] Wikipedia, "Eurovision Şarkı Yarışması'nda Türkiye",
URL=https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurovision_%C5%9Eark%C4%B1_Yar%C4%B1%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1%27nda_T%C3%BCrkiye

critical importance of public diplomacy in the information age understood well enough by AKP government and some important steps have been taken at the level of state and promoted non-governmental organizations to increase their existence abroad.

The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations

The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) is an global public diplomacy initiative that Turkey taken co-chairmanship with Spain, proposed by the President of the Government of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 2005.

After 9/11 attacks and invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and escalation of tension with bombings of Western Capitals by Islamic fundamentalist terrorist and the reasons like caricature crisis have triggered the formation of a conflictual climate in the world and UNAOC is a result of such a process.

Referring to Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis, Alliance of Civilizations aimed to cooperation and understanding different civilizations and especially between Islamic and Western worlds. As a solution of rising extremist terrorism and war on terror rhetoric, UNAOC programmed to engage with political solutions and dialogue (Balcı, 2006). Since 2008, the UNAOC has convened seven Global Forums: In Madrid in 2008, Istanbul 2009, Rio de Janeiro in 2010, Doha in 2011 and Vienna in 2013, in Bali 2014, and Baku in 2016.[15] UNAOC has gave to Turkey as a democratic Muslim country more legitimacy in international politics and helped to transform its image to a friendly and benign one. Turkey's democratic political system, secular state-society relations and peaceful foreign policy has supported the claim of model country and transformed to a spokesperson of Islamic world leadership in UNAOC pleasantly greeted by Muslim public.

Despite promising foundation and taking responsibility of leadership, after first decade of century, UNAOC has become less visible and attractive in terms of Turkish Foreign Policy.

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[15] UNAOC Official Web Page, URL= http://www.unaoc.org/global-forums/

TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)

TIKA was one of the most successful Foreign Policy tools of the AKP era of Turkey in terms of its soft power policies and multilateral relations with countries. In the beginning of its story, TIKA created within Foreign Ministry of Turkey to provide technical infrastructure, development assistance, and to play a builder role on the cultural and social reformation of Post-Soviet nations in Central Asia and Caucasus, most of which have Turkic origin, in 1992.[16] The years of 90's were relatively passive and unsuccessful for TIKA because of its inexperience and unqualified human reources. Furthermore, unstable domestic political landscape and economic deficiencies played an important role over this relativepassivism.

In 1999, TIKA separated itself from Foreign Ministry, was connected to the Prime Ministry of Turkey, and was structured in there. Its legal definitions and responsibilities are redefined. These responsibilities were composed of economic, technical assistance and improvement of cultural relations in line with Turkish Foreign Policy and its target countries included firstly Turkic nations (ahin and Çevik, 2015: 244). In addition, TIKA has the protection and restoration responsibility of historical, cultural and social Turkish heritage in abroad. Having its activities, it was seen that these responsibilities were highly compatible with AKP's foreign policy vision consisting of strong historical ties rhetoric and strategic depth doctrine.

Apart from these, TIKA is undertaking the responsibilities of development and coordinating projects, reduction of unemployment and poverty projects, education projects, technical assistance humanitarian aid and implementation projects in frame of mutual agreements in target countries. Its services are planned and carried out by the Offices of Program Coordination in those countries in the hierarchy of TIKA. The numbers of these strategic departments of TIKA were increased from 12 in 2002, to 33 in 2012 and finally to 50 and these offices spread around 48 countries. As of 2013, TIKA projects and responsibilities included about 120 countries; TIKA implemented 1,816 projects in 2013, with 1,728 country projects and 88 regional

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[16] TİKA Official Web Page, URL= http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/sayfa/hakkimizda-14649

ones primarily aiming to develop social infrastructure and services.[17]The relative passivism of TIKA during the 90's can be understood, considering that TIKA finished 2241 projects between 1992-2002 years. In the period of 2002-2012 TIKA finished 15504 projects (ahin and Çevik, 2015: 255).

As for the regional ranking of assistance; Africa ranked first at 33.7%; followed by South and Central Asia at 21.83%; Middle East at 21.74%; and Balkans and East Europe at 21.4%. The distribution of Turkish assistance was well aligned with Turkey's geopolitical standing. As largest recipient countries of Turkish assistance in 2013, Palestine ranked first (20.20%); followed by Tunisia (12.24%), Somalia (10.71%), Afghanistan (7.97%), Pakistan (6%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (4.55%), Montenegro (4%).[18]

Turkey's humanitarian aids and development aid were carried out by TIKA and their increases were remarkable. Of the total Turkish ODA (Official Development Aids) in 2013, 49% was reported as humanitarian aid. Reaching a figure of 1,629.18 million USD, the Turkish humanitarian aid to GNI ratio went up to 0.21 from 0.13 of the previous year, making Turkey the top donor country of humanitarian aid in the world. By aid amount, Turkey ranked the third in the world after the United States of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK). The per capita humanitarian aid was estimated about 22 USD in 2013.Turkey continued to implement her "open-door policy" for Syrians who have left their country to enter the Turkish territory since April 2011 following the onset of civil unrest. Turkey has been keenly providing for all the needs of Syrian guests in camps in her territory for more than 2 years. Owing to the process, Turkish humanitarian aid of 1,040 million USD in 2012 placed Turkey as the 4th largest donor (after USA, EU and UK). In 2013, Turkish assistance to Syrian guests amounted to 1,571 million USD.[19] According to Muharrem Eri , the explanation of this significant numbers in proportion to national wealth was aiming to create a great power perception in the eyes of target countries and to improve the soft power over them (Ek i, 2014:226).

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[17] TIKA, "Annual Report" 2013, P. 16,
URL= http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf
[18] TIKA, "Annual Report" 2013, P.18
[19] TIKA, "Annual Report" 2013, P13

Figure 2: Turkey's Official Develepment Aids by Years [Source: Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, Turkey]

Yunus Emre Institute

Yunus Emre Instute built to play important roles on Turkey's cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy in the interactions with world in light of the some historical examples of British Council of UK, Goethe Institute of Germany, and Cervantes Institutes.

This institution created in 2009 in frame of the specific responsibilities such as "promoting Turkey, its cultural heritage, Turkish language, culture and art; improving the friendship between Turkey and other countries and increasing the cultural exchange; making the related information and documents available in and outside the country for use in the world; providing services abroad to people who want to have education in the fields of Turkish language, culture and art.[20]

As of 2014, Institute has 38 centres in 30 countries, most of which located on historical boundaries of Ottoman Empire in Middle Eastern countries and Balkans.[21] Since 2009, more than 20.000 students joined Turkish courses that provided Institute, and activities that carried out by Institute reached more than 100.000 participants.[22] The branches of Yunus Emre Institute in countries, are acting in

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[20] Yunus Emre Instute Official Page, "Mission", URL= http://www.yee.org.tr/en/mission/ , April 4, 2016

[21] Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, "2014 Faaliyet Raporu", P.6,
URL= http://www.yee.org.tr/CMS/Files/yayin/faaliyet-raporu.pdf

[22] Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, "2014 Faaliyet Raporu", P.120

coordination with other soft power actors of Turkey. Even if, we cannot say that Yunus Emre Institutes were successful in terms of Turkish Soft Power in last decade, it is obvious that it will be one of the most important actors of it. In addition, as a part the Turkey's strategy to become a great power, Institute increasingly launching Turkish language course and struggle to dissemination of Turkish language.

YTB (Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities)

Just as Yunus Emre Institute, YTB was one of the institutions that opened in AKP Era. In the beginning of the building process, YTP planned to deal with problems of Turkish Diaspora in abroad. Indeed, Turkish diaspora quite important in the foreign relations of Turkey, as of today, there are about six Million Turkish people living in outside the Turkey. Turkish government paying attention to the organization and integration of these people in their live countries, therefore YTP has a critical responsibility in this regard. Successful integration of Turkish people to their live countries and organizing as a pressure group or organized Diaspora will increase Turkey's influence through these people.

In addition to these responsibilities, YTP authorized to control and regulation over the Turkey Scholarships Program that were highly complicated among Turkey's different institutions before 2012. This scholarship program intends to distribute Turkey scholarships in line with foreign policy and to make Turkey an education base in the world. The numbers of students seeking scholarship in Turkey was just 8000 in 2011, and remarkable it reached 95000 from 182 countries. In spite of this increase, just 15.000 of 70 000 foreign students benefiting Turkey's scholarship potentials However, there are strong hopes to future of Turkey's scholarships. [23]

As very well known, scholarships and student imports one of the most concrete soft power instruments among countries in the world. These students and their perspectives on Turkey will remain positively in the long process and they contribute to Turkey's image and influence in their countries.

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[23] Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, "Türkiye Bursları Başlıyor", February 26, 2016, URL= http://www.ytb.gov.tr/haber_detay.php?detay=4957

Presidency of Religious Affairs

The Foreign Relations of Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey began in 1971 and some religious official sent in times of eid for Turkish communities in Europe. In frame of mutual agreements, PRA is helping Turkish Diasporas through religious officials that bound to directly PRA.

Historically PRA was a controversial institution within Turkish State system because of Turkey's protracted harsh laicism. While sometimes, it was claimed that existence of such an institution is an inconsistence with the secular state, and sometimes its monopolistic role over religious minorities like Alawites in Turkey. However, after the rise of religious awareness and religious extremism, the importance of PRA becomes more understandable. When globally engaging with Turkish communities, PRA acting always pre-emptive about radicalism.

In this regard, it could be said that one of the main reasons in the less participations of Turkish citizens to radical terrorist activities than other Muslim countries, or in the less participation of Turkish Diaspora to in Europe than other Muslim citizens of European Countries is existence of PRA and its religious services. The soft interpretation of Islam by Turkish nation and its promoting by PRA increased Turkey model country position among Muslim nations.

Among Muslims from all around the world, PRA hosted international religious conventions, for example, since 1995 RPA eight times organized the Eurasia Islam Forum with 38 Eurasian Countries. In addition, remarkably PRA hosted 125 Muslim Leaders from 37 countries in First Summit of Asia-Pacific Religious Leaders in 2015.[24] Furthermore, RPA is providing special scholarships for students in world that want to study in Turkey. In line with Turkey's openings from Balkans to Africa works of PRA was highly compatible with Turkish foreign policy. These features show that Turkey's RPA is quite useful tool for increase its influence over Muslims in all around the world. Moreover, it can play an important role on the perception of Western Public with its liberal Islamic interpretation.

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[24] Daily Sabah, "First summit of Asian, Pacific Muslims to focus on cooperation", October 13, 2015, URL= http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/10/14/first-summit-of-asian-pacific-muslims-to-focus-on-cooperation

KDK (Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy)

KDK as was in other examples is one of the new institutions to promote Turkey's soft power policies and created in 2010. Therefore, KDK organized representation meetings with foreign journalist, intellectuals and political figures to help in the explanation of Turkish Foreign Policy.[25] However, KDK's activities intensified on Domestic viewers than foreign ones. This could be counted as a limited dimension of its vision in the last five years. Turkey's image after Syrian Civil War and suspicion on the sponsorship of terrorism in Syria has decreased and in the face of such a result, it could be said that KDK failed in that period.

Despite its relatively less effectiveness, first Director was Ibrahim Kalın and following years he have seen as one of the most important actors at the background of Turkish Foreign Policy and this can be interpret as importance of this institution in the eyes of Turkish Government.

TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation)

TRT was founded as a state initiative in 1964 and a long time was monopoly on media sector until 1990. After that period, Turkish media spacebecame a diversified market for broadcasters. The development of the private sector and surging importance of television broadcasts across the world has changed the perspectives employed by TRT. Then, after the dissolution of USSR and following the wave of independence in the Turkic nations of Central Asia and Caucasus, TRT Avrasya (TRT Eurasia) began broadcasting with aims to increase Turkish influence in those areas. The name of it has changed two times; first transformation was to TRT Türk in 2001 and second was TRT Avaz in 2009. At the same period, TRT's foreign broadcasting activities continued with a different channel like TRT International.

In addition, TRT founded new channels in 2009 TRT Kurdi aiming Kurdish people of Turkey and its neighbours and TRT Arabic aiming to reach Arab People in Turkey's periphery in 2010.

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[25] Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy Official Web Page, URL=http://www.kdk.gov.tr/en/

As a more global initiative, TRT founded TRT World in English language and reached the global audience in 2015. TRT world employs experienced journalists and correspondents who were worked in global outlets like BBC and Al Jazeera. Moreover, in the body of TRT world people can choose their language and TRT World web site has different language options nearly 40 language in its web site.

Despite the desire of to improve Turkish influence abroad, TRT's broadcasts in most of the time are engaged with Turkey's domestic policies and Turkey's foreign policies. It is limiting the efficiency of TRT channels in terms of attracting foreign viewers and they do not have enough power to compete with their global rivals like BBC, Al Jazeera and Russia Today. Therefore, Turkey's expectations and messages cannot reach at an equal level as those, which rival it.

TURKSOY (International Organization of Turkic Culture)

TURKSOY, the International Organization of Turkic Culture also known as the UNESCO of the Turkic World was established in 1993 upon signature of its founding agreement by the Ministers of Culture of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Turkey. Later on, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Republics subject to the Russian Federation, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Altai, Sakha Yakutia, Tyva and Khakassia also joined the organization along with Gagauzia (Moldova) as member states with an observer status. For more than 20 years now, TURKSOY has been carrying out various activities to strengthen the ties of brotherhood and solidarity among Turkic peoples and transmit their cultural heritage to future generations.[26]

As another useful soft power instrument of Turkey in Central Easia, TURKSOY is in search of dissemination and unification of Turkish language and Turkish culture among Central Eastern Turkish Republics. In the responsibility of this organization, there are annual activities for instance; some cities are selected as a Culture Capitol of Turkish World that would undertake serious cultural meetings. In addition, scientific meeting and conferences arrange to leash scientific communities to each

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[26] TURKSOY Official Web Page, URL=http://www.turksoy.org/tr/turksoy/about

other and organize specific projects. Since 1990's TURKSOY has been one of the most important soft power initiatives in the Central Asia and serving even today.

6.2 The Fundamentals of Brazil's Soft Power Politics

Brazil has long been in the search of great power status on the power ranking and easiest way of this policy is become a soft power in terms of its demography and geography. To pursue a soft power policy for Brazil, it could attributed as a destiny thanks to there is no logical reason to gaining power in the world without soft cooperation with its neighbors and other countries of the world. In that sense, the geopolitical landscape of South American Region is most important dimension of Brazilian soft power resources. Unlike the other places of world, South American Region has quite peaceful environment and lesser prone to conflicts than most of the regions of the world.

In addition, there is a distinctive supremacy of Brazil on the continent both economical and demographically. For example, Brazil constitutes nearly half of the GDP of the continent and is seventh-largest economy of world. Similarly, Brazil has nearly half of the population of South America and is the sixth populous country of the world. Therefore, a direct challenge by its neighbours to Brazil is nearly impossible in such proportion of share of population and economy.

In such a region, military expenditures or armament and the possibilities of wars remained remarkably low throughout much of its history. In 2012, Brazil was 68th in the world in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and 11th in the world in terms of total amount spent.[27]

Therefore, the conflicts that Brazil' has engaged in were rare occasions and since 1860's and 1870's Brazil did not engage in any war with its neighbors. Such a peaceful environment provides Brazil with better opportunities for softer policies than its rivalries or counterparts of her in the world, thus, geopolitics of Brazil one of the basic resources of its soft power.

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[27] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
URL=http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/copy_of_sources_methods

Dynamic economic growth was remarkable in the history of Brazil, during the second half of the century called the Brazillian miracle. For example, Brazilian economy grew more than 5 percent on average in the 1950's, approximately 6 percent in the 1960's and then nothing less than 8.6 percent in the 1970's. In addition, the transformation of Brazilian economy to industrial one was completed in 1980's (De Castro, 2007:18).

The successful and stable growth of Brazilian economy created important attraction and affirmation in the world and gave the opportunity to decrease social equality and increase infrastructure spending. Furthermore, multilateralism and pragmatic co-optive foreign policy increased the role of Brazil among the many platforms and groupings such as BRICS and IBSA forum. In spite of the lack of enough military power, formidable diplomatic skills of Brazilians gave the soft supremacy than other emerging powers. Strong commitments to prevent conflicts and building peace perspectives also differentiated Brazil from other emerging powers and gave it highly important legitimacy in its activisms. Reformation demands of Brazil on liberal western world order and in its institutions were supported by most of the emerging countries.


Figure 3: Growth Rates of Brazil 1990-2012 [Source: Brazil Institute of Geography and Statistics, URL= http://www.focus-economics.com/country-indicator/brazil/gdp]

6.2.1 Soft Power Recources of Brazil in its Region and the World

The strategy of becoming an effective soft power country is crucial for Brazil to shows its power and to reach the permanent status in United Nations Security Council and to become a great power. It is also expected that soft power of Brazil will serve as an attractive factor in the gaining foreign direct investment to continuation of development and growth. Indeed, Brazil is fifth recipient of foreign direct investments (FDI) and largest one in Latin America. Foreign direct investments into Brazil boomed over the period 2009-2011 and reached USD 64 billion in 2013.[28] It was partly a result of the rise of Brazil's image in the world.

In the last decade, Brazil was one of the most important defenders of the anti-climate change policies, nuclear non-proliferation policies, and global health policies that aim to prevention of epidemics, property rights, trade liberalization and trade rights of emerging countries. All of these policies were instance of Brazilian co-optive foreign policy and soft power producer initiatives.

First and foremost facilitator of the rising soft power and attractiveness of Brazil was its economic growth. Brazil is the 8th largest economy in the world and the largest in Latin America inasmuch as Brazil surpassed the UK in 2012 and had became 6th largest economic power.[29]

Apart from her successful economic growth story, Brazil also showed remarkable social solutions in the reducing of poverty and successful preventing on the spread of epidemics. As a result of these policies, Brazil has become first developing country to offer free ARV (anti-retroviral drug) treatment to HIV/AIDS patients and achieved remarkable decline in AIDS related morbidity and mortality. Dramatic decline in AIDS-related morbidity and mortality as a result of its treatment program turned into a success story that has served as a role model for the expansion of global support for HIV/AIDS treatment in other countries. In this way, Brazil helped bridge a chasm between public health and trade policy through its national HIV/AIDS policy (Lee,

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[28] Santander Trade Portal: "Brazil Investment", URL=https://en.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/brazil/foreign-investment
[29] BBC News: "Brazil Overtakes UK's Economy", March 6, 2012,

URL=http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17272716

Chagas and Novotny, 2010). The Brazilian National AIDS Programme won the UNESCO's Human Rights and Culture Award in 2001 and the Gates Award in 2003 the country's stance, in defiance of US trade policy, and was also vocally championed by prominent civil society organisations led by Medicins sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders). State and non-state actors in countries, notably India, Thailand and South Africa, struggling to meet the cost of ARVs and other treatments, also aligned themselves with Brazil's position. Its principled stance undoubtedly earned Brazil much respect and recognition as a rising global leader (Lee and Gomez, 2011).

As a government policy, Bolsa Familia social initiative saved millions of Brazilian people from poverty. According to World Bank numbers, Bolsa Familia reached 11 million families and more than 46 million people, a major portion of the country's low-income population.[30] With cash transfers, people and their children reached regular health controls and their fundamental needs. After ten years, extreme poverty reduced from 9.7 to 4.3% of the population (Wetzel, 2013). Having implication of Bolsa Familia, it has become easier to keep the children in schools and aimed to prevent the transmission of poverty from parents to children.

Brazilian Ministry of Social Development (MDS)'s success story has turned Brazil into a centre of attraction in terms of poor and developing countries. Between 2011 and 2014, MDS received 345 delegations interested in learning from their competency. 95% of the delegations came from developing countries (MDS, 2015) – half of the delegations came from Latin America and a third came from Africa (MDS, 2014). These activities are mainly demand driven in the sense that the ministry is answering a request from countries that want to learn from its experience, but MDS also projects Brazilian social policy in a more proactive way: In 2014 MDS and partners launched The Brazil Learning Initiative for a World without Poverty (WWP) – which constitutes a website and various seminars that aim at sharing the Brazilian experience with poverty reduction programs with the rest of the world (Flatjord, 2015).

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[30] World Bank Official Web Page, "Bolsa Família: Changing the Lives of Millions in Brazil",

URL=http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21447054~pagePK:64257 043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html

Moreover, from the beginning of his reign, President Lula da Silva personally has positively affected the Brazilian image. Lula da Silva's personal story came from poor classes of Brazilian society, a former automobile industry worker and assertive unionist. This personal story positively influenced to Brazilian perception in the abroad that known as a country of poors and inequalities. Apart from his dramatic personal past, Lula's hyperactivity and rhetoric on foreign policy issues including global inequalities, health issues has positively contributed Brazilian visibility and image (Cardenas and Neves, 2010). In addition, having a stable democratic system of government has increased the legitimacy of Brazil's policies and activities.

Relations with African countries have also played a crucial role on the rise of Brazilian soft power. Historical ties of Brazilian black people (Afro-Brazilians) with Africa facilitated Brazilian initiatives with African countries. Community of Portuguese Language Countries strengthened Brazil's cultural and political relations with Lusophone Countries of Africa that include Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe. As a result of this close relations with African countries, Brazil elected as non-Permanent Member of United Nations for 2010-2011 season and in the process of election most of the African Countries supported.

Most importantly, as a result of transformative effect of globalization, economic, political and cultural relations have become more intertwined and developed in favour of emerging countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, Turkey, and Mexico. Decrease in the economic and political influences of US and EU has provided a beneficial conjuncture to these developing countries. Transformation of the Liberal Western World Order in 2000's, has been ended uni-polar post-Cold War order and unveiled a multi-polar world order through new groupings. As I shall explain in the next chapters, Brazil successfully used this advantageous era to gain influence and increase its visibility by multilateral platforms.

Attendance to peacekeeping operations was one of the most importantan dimensions of Brazilian soft power resources in the body of United Nations. As an element of Brazil's traditional foreign policy, contribution to global and regional peace and stability is carried out under article 4 of the Federal Constitution. According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil,

Brazil has acted in more than 50 peacekeeping operations and similar missions, having contributed with more than 33,000 military officials, police officers and civilians. It currently takes part in nine peacekeeping operations with a contribution of more than 1700 people: MINURSO (Western Sahara), MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNIFIL (Lebanon), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNISFA (Abyei), UNMIL (Liberia), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire).[31]

During the 2000's MINUSTAH was most important peacekeeping operation in term of Brazilian Foreign Policy, because Haiti was the first time the USNC appointed Brazil command a peace operation (Valença and Carvalho, 2014). MINUSTAH was renewed and expanded – especially after the hurricanes in 2008 and the earthquake in January 2010 and Brazil's existence in Haiti transformed a humanitarian aid force. The leadership and performance of Brazil army in Haiti has increased its crebility in the eyes of countries of region and contributed to Brazil's positive image to become a reliable leader.

6.2.2 The Multilateral Organizations That Brazil Has Played Inportant Roles and Acquired Soft Power

Multilateralism at both global level and regional level of Brazilian foreign policy, as I have argued before, is traditional characteristic. As a former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim stressed that "Brazil hopes to contribute a more balanced international order, one less subject to hegemonies of any kind, without losing sight of the importance of mutually beneficial partnership with developed countries" (Amorim, 2013).

Through multilateral organizations and groupings, Brazil aims to economically diversify its trade dependencies away from the US and EU and politically find allies

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[31] Foreign Ministry of Brazil, "Brazil's Participation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations", URL=http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/paz-e-seguranca-internacionais/6283-brazil-s-participation-in-the-united-nations-peacekeeping-operations

to challenge the Western dominance in the world (Collecott, 2011). As I will show below, most important groupings of those are MERCOSUR, UNASUR, IBSA and BRICS groupings. These groupings play an important role for the Brazil's traditional opposition to unilateralism and support for sovereignties of countries.

MERCOSUR (South American Common Market)

MERCOSUR is a result of a long historical reintegration process of South American Countries since creation of LAFTA (Latin America Free Trade Association) in 1960 and created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción, which was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto. MERCOSUR aims to free movement of goods, capital, and services among its members and therefore called as "Common Market of the South".

MERCOSUR's primary aim to reduction of tariffs, gradually elimination obstacles of political and economical integration of South America and prevent the inequalities of region. Ricardo Lagos, the president of Chile, said in an interview that he has always maintained that "MERCOSUR is a fundamentally political undertaking and thus cannot be understood simply as a customs union. The starting point for our entire foreign policy is MERCOSUR, and so we have to strengthen MERCOSUR in whatever ways we can" (Rohter, 2002).

In this sense as a main driver of MERCOSUR, Brazilians planning to solve political crisis through economical integration as in projected by founding father of European Union. According to Sweig, Brazil appears to be seeking a fragile balance: opposing undemocratic political forces in a multilateral setting, protecting its considerable economic interests, and asserting its diplomatic weight in South America (Sweig, 2012).

As one of the most remarkable success stories of Brazil in terms of MERCOSUR is that from 2001 to 2005, Brazilian investment in Chile increased 56 percent, in Venezuela 400 percent, in Peru 650 percent. While total Brazilian direct investments abroad reached 28 billion U.S. dollars in 2006, those to Argentina represented 5.5 percent of that amount (Amaral, 2007).

Sum up, MERCOSUR is a regional integration project that can be quite useful to increase its hard and soft power influence over neighbouring countries.

UNASUR (Union of South American Nations)

The South American Community of Nations (CSN, Spanish Acronym) was created at the Meeting of Presidents of South America held on December 8th of 2004 in Cuzco Peru. This later gave way to the formation of the Union of South American Nations, UNASUR. The CSN was created with the aim of integrating regional processes developed by the MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. Thus on September 30th of 2005, in Brasilia and on December 9th of 2006 in Cochabamba, Bolivia, the Heads of State of the member countries established a strategic plan to agree on a common agenda in the region. In April of 2007, during the South American Energy Summit held on Margarita Island in Venezuela, the Heads of State changed its name from; South American Community of Nations to Union of South American Nations, UNASUR. On May 23rd of 2008, the Treaty of the Union of South American Nations was approved. In which it designated the permanent headquarters of the General Secretariat to be in Quito, capital of Ecuador, and its Parliament to be in Cochabamba, Bolivia.[32] The members of UNASUR composed of 12 South American countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, and Venezuela). The creation of UNASUR was part of a recent process of overcoming the mistrust that existed between South American countries since the independence movements of the 19th century.[33]

IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum)

IBSA Dialogue Forum was established with Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003 by Brazil, India and South Africa to develop tight cooperation among those countries. The principles, norms and values underpinning the IBSA Dialogue Forum are participatory democracy, respect for human rights and the Rule of Law. The strength

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[32] UNASUR Official Page, "History", URL=http://www.unasursg.org/en/node/179

[33] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil Official Web Page, "Union of South American Nations – UNASUR", URL= http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/integracao-regional/6348-unasur

of IBSA is the shared vision of the three countries that democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and key to sustainable peace and stability.[34] IBSA Forum aims to cooperate in various areas about member countries and non-member countries. Its workings concentrating on the fields of Agriculture, culture, defence, education, energy, environment, health, human settlements, transport and infrastructure, public administration, revenue administration, science and technology and information, society, social development, trade and investment and tourism.

Furthermore, as a public diplomacy samples, IBSA forum created some sub-forums within the bloc like Academic forum, Business council, Editors´ Forum, Intergovernmental Relations and Local Government, Parliamentary Forum, Tri-nations Summit on Small Business, Women's Forum.[35]

As of 2015, it is expected that trilateral trade volume of IBSA countries will reached to 25 Billion USD. In addition, IBSA members are signing regional trade agreements on their regional projects like MERCOSUR.[36] The intensifying economic cooperations will lead to political and social cooperation and it will create a beneficial conjuncture for the soft power policies of these countries.

IBSA initiative is a platform of similar countries in terms of political characteristics. All members of platform are democratic countries, have emerging status and regional and global aspirations. Former Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, in the closing speech of second summit, said, "IBSA is a unique model of trans-national cooperation. Our three countries come from three different continents but share similar worldviews and aspirations. If we can make a success of our model of cooperation based on collective self-reliance, it will serve as an example for all developing countries" (Singh, 2007).

BRICS (Brazil-India-China-South Africa)

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[34] IBSA Official Web Page, "About IBSA Background", URL=http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/about-ibsa/background

[35] IBSA Official Web Page, Ibid

[36] Analist Dergisi, "Demokratik BRICS'ler Küresel Yönetişimin Geleceğini Etkileme Potansiyeline Sahip", Number: 58, December 2015, P.23.

BRICS is an acronym to describe the five emerging states and their economies coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill in a future prospect report on the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China that published in 2001 (O'Neill, 2001). In 2006, the four countries initiated a regular informal diplomatic coordination, with annual meetings of Foreign Ministers at the margins of the General Debate of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). This successful interaction led to the decision that the dialogue was to be carried out at the level of Heads of State and Government in annual Summits. First Summit of BRICS was held in Yekaterinburg in 2009, the depth and scope of the dialogue among the Members of BRICs – which became BRICS in 2011 with the inclusion of South Africa – was further enhanced. [37] Following years of Yekaterinburg Summit, BRICS conventions were held annually and after first summit, five annual Summits were held (Brasilia, 2010; Sanya, 2011; New Delhi, 2012; Durban, 2013; and Fortaleza, 2014). The main themes of these summits consisted of the demands and calls to revision on liberal-western oriented global economic and political order.[38] In addition, BRICS countries are aiming to cooperation on trade, finance, security, agriculture, health, science and technology among themselves.

According to K. V. Kamath, together, the four original BRIC countries comprise in 2014 more than 3 billion people or 41.4 percent of the world's population, cover more than a quarter of the world's land area over three continents, and account for more than 25 percent of global GDP.[39] BRICS, at the present time, occupying 29 percent of its territory with representing 20 percent of global investments. In addition, they possess huge reserves of fossil fuels (Russia) and minerals (Russia, China and Brazil) in addition to being large producers of food. They are also among the countries with major international reserves (China in first place with more than US$4 trillion) (Arkonada, 2016).

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[37] BRICS Ministry of External Relations, "Information about BRICS",

URL=http://brics.itamaraty.gov.br/about-brics/information-about-brics

[38] BBC News, "Nations Eye Stable Reserve System ", 16 June 2009,

URL=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8102216.stm

[39] New Development Bank BRICS, "About New Development Bank of BRICS",
URL=http://ndbbrics.org/

BRICS countries are promoting to democratization of international political and economic system through cooperation in the face of domination of West, and they want to increase their influence on global politics. For instance, former President of China Hu Jintao described the BRICS countries as defenders and promoters of developing countries' interests (Radebe, 2012). Global Finance Crisis in 2008 affected more benignly BRICS countries than Western Powers and global sharing of GDP of BRICS incrementally increased and importance of BRICS platform showed its power in this process.

Furthermore, democratic BRICS countries' cooperations and interactions are softer than the other members of BRICS. Global South Initiative among Brazil, India and South Africa and in their activities based on democratic liberal values and this dimension of Global South is improving their legitimacy in the eyes of other.

According to Freedom Index of Freedom House in 2015, Brazil, India and South Africa were free countries.[40] In that sense, it can be said that the effectiveness of BRICS policies more advantageous for these democratic countries than authoritarian Russia and China in the face of non-BRICS countries, in parallel way, Nye described limitations of authoritarian China and Russia in an article (Nye, 2013).

Moreover, BRICS organization provided remarkable economic cooperation increase among its member, for example, while Brazilian exports to BRICS were slowly increasing until 2008, as is seen in the graphic below, after building cooperation under umbrella of BRICS platform rapidly increased.

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[40] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2015", URL= https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VyUEQfmLTIU

Figure 4: Brazil's Exports to BRICS [Source: UNCTAD STAT[41]]

As I have mentioned above, one of the main pillars of Brazilian Foreign Policy was the aiming of creation of multi-polar political and economical order and other emerging powers and their demands coincided with Brazilian expectations during the BRICS conventions.

6.2.3   Cultural Factors

Culture is a reflection of way of life a nation and it distinctiveness than other nations. In this sense, culture gives people chance to learn differences and similarities among nations and triggers their curiosity over other nations. The supremacy of cultural is its spreading, sharing, adoption made by non-threatening ways. In this sense, culture is most important part of soft power of a country.

The attractiveness of Brazilian culture and its assets can count most important dimension of Brazil's soft power. Brazil has countless cultural and touristic places, historical artefacts, and natural beauties like dazzling and pristine beaches, fabulous musical productions. For instance, Christ the Redeemer, Iguaçu Falls, Amazon River, Rio Carnival, world's largest wetland The Pantanal, Historical Center of Olinda, Fernando de Noronha, Teatro Amazonas, Brazil's best-preserved colonial town Ouro

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[41] Oliver Stuenkel, "The G-7 and the BRICS in the post-Crimea World Order", Valdai Papers No: 14, May 2015,
URL=http://valdaiclub.com/publications/valdaipapers/valdai_paper_14_the_g7_and_the_brics_in_t he_post_crimea_world_order/

Preto, tropical forests, waterfalls, emerald sea and coastal mountains, and lastly, as most visited city of South America Rio de Janeiro.

All these cultural assets attracting million of tourists from all around the world and as of 2014, 6.4 million tourists visited Brazil.[42] As one of the most known carnivals of the World, the Rio Carnival attracting many people all around the world and attracted so many people who do not participate. According to the Secretaria Municipal de Turismo, known as Riotur, during the 2015 Carnival celebrations the city of Rio de Janeiro welcomed approximately 977,000 tourists (Hearst, 2015).

Moreover, as very well known football is the most popular sport field and Brazilians identified with soccer. Brazil's national football team is the most successful team in the history of FIFA World Cups. Brazil's national soccer teams twenty times gained to attendance to tournament and five times gained the championship. Successful past and present of Brazilian football, serves the image of Brazilians very well and creating sympathy all around the world. Most of the most famous football players are Brazilian, Ronaldo, Ronaldinho, Rivaldo, were famous players in 2000's and legend Pele is known even today.

According to a report, nearly 1800 Brazilian football players plays in abroad and representing their country and nearly 1100 of those are employed in Europe.[43] These players represent their country's culture and soft power in the world. Apart from their contribution of Brazilian soft power, if we consider that a significant portion of their earnings sent to their country, Brazil has significant revenue from this player exports.

Most importantly, Brazil's natural features like demography, culture and politics are producers of its soft power capacity. Demographically, Brazil has various ethnicities and races like Portuguese originated people, indigenous people and as an extension of slavery, Black-skinned African originated Brazilians Unlike the low rates of political racism as in Europe or other places of world, economic racism and class distinction is a serious problem in Brazil. Black-skinned people suffering from these

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[42] The World Bank Official Web Page, "International Tourism, Number of Arrivals", URL=http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.ARVL

[43] CIES Football Observatory, "New Study: Exporting Countries in World Football", October 7, 2015, URL= http://www.football-observatory.com/New-study-exporting-countries-in-world-football

distinctions and exposed some disadvantages in different areas of daily life. In contrast to these situations, intermarriage is a normal thing in Brazil. Brazil's African originated people are an important soft power source in relation with African Countries. Unlike the perception of European powers in Africa, Brazil's perception is highly positive and not perceived as a racist or colonialist power by Africans.

Furthermore, Brazilian policies easily compromise with authoritarian regimes or dictatorships of Africa thanks to pragmatic nature of Brazilian Foreign Policy. Therefore, in this relationship, while Brazilians are perceived as a friendly country by African countries, it also perceived as a supporter of dictatorships in Africa through unconditional aids by Western and democratic world. In similar way, Freedom House criticised Brazilian policies towards to anti-democratic policies and violations of human rights in Latin America. According to Freedom House, Brazil has ignored to defence of the liberal values during the Venezuela's incursion to MERCOSUR. [44] Pragmatically, while Brazilians were strongly opposing to coup attempts in its region, they have chosen to silent in the face of Russia's annexation of Crimea.

As another carrier of Brazilian culture and image in the world are soap operas. Brazilian soap operas, since 90's, might be called as most viewed soap opera tradition in the world. There are so many globally successful examples of Brazilian soap operas and it called be said that soap operas one of the most important soft power exports of Brazil. For example "Avenida Brasil" broadcasted in 106 countries, Da cor do pecado broadcasted in 100 countries, Terra Nostra broadcasted in 95 countries, O Clone 91 in Countries, Caminho das Índias Escrava Isaura in 79 Countries, Laços de Família in 77 Countries, Por Amor in 74 countries (Bruha, 2015).

6.2.4 Public Diplomacy Activities of Brazil

Humanitarian and Development Aids

With the rise of Brazilian economy, Brazil's use of humanitarian and development aids increased from Far East Asia to Africa during the 2000's. President Lula da

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[44] Oliver Stuenkel, "Brazil", Freedom House,
URL=https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_Demo_Reports_Brazil_final.pdf

Silva (2003-2011) has attached great importance to solidarity with humanitarian and developmental aids in terms of South-South Cooperation. Near the beginning of his presidency, in 2005, Brazil's international assistance totaled $153mn. By the end, in 2010, some estimates put combined contributions from direct aid and technical assistance at around $4bn– a 26-fold increase in five years. Additionally, Brazil contributed around $10bn to international aid organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and other UN programs (Cohen, 2012).

In the rivalry of assistance with China in Africa, Brazil use different and more respectable way. While Chinese focusing on infrastructure projects with Chinese engineers and workers, Brazil is helping on the prevention of disease, technical experience transportation. Between 2003-2010 years, Brazilian assistances in African countries were composing of 31% agriculture sectors, 27% of health sector and 17% of education and professional training (Chatin, 2014).

Brazil's aids labelled as "rogue aid" by Western countries and perceived as a threat for the development of democracy of continent, because these aid given in the frame of non-conditionality and respect for sovereignty of states (Stuenkel, 2014). On the other hand, these policies have done in line with the principle of foreign policy and constitution such as solidarity in diplomacy, attention to the demands of developing countries, avoidance of direct transfers of money etc.[45]

However, Brazil is a relatively small humanitarian donor, ranking 34th in terms of volume and 53rd in terms of international humanitarian assistance as a proportion of gross national income (GNI). Humanitarian assistance from Brazil amounted to US$124 million during 2005–2014. Its US$14.9 million contribution in 2014 was almost six times that of 2005 (US$2.6 million). Contributions peaked in 2012 at US$52.4 million with almost half allocated to the WFP to tackle hunger and food insecurity in Somalia. Brazil favours multilateral channels of delivery; in 2014 contributions were channelled to UN agencies with the World Health Organization (WHO) being the largest recipient to support the response to Ebola in West Africa.

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[45] World Bank Report, "Bridging the Atlantic Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South Partnering for Growth",P.37,
URL=http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:23061951~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:258644,00.html

Brazil also directed funding through pooled funds – with US$1.9 million going to the CERF and US$0.6 million to the Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund.[46] Brazil's largest international humanitarian aids have gone to African Countries. These aids, was focusing on social programmes, agriculture and technical transportations. As for political targets of these aids, in 2006, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil Celso Amorim highlighted that technical cooperation was an essential tool of Brazilian Foreign Policy.[47]

According to ABC (Brazilian Agency for Cooperation), 53 percent of aids gone to African countries and most of rest spend for Latin American countries. ABC director Marco Farani said these cooperation policies providing national prestige and standing in the eyes of recipients and world (Frayssinet, 2011).

According to a The Economist analysis, these aid efforts have wide implications. Lavishing assistance on Africa helps Brazil compete with China and India for soft-power influence in the developing world. It also garners support for the country's lonely quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.[48]

Mega Sportive Events

Since a long time, international sportive organizations, tournaments and Olympics has been following by masses all around the world. According to Nelson Mandela, it may be the most effective means of communication that can reach billions of people in different parts of the world, as in 2010, when South Africa hosted the FIFA World Cup (Bruk, 2013).

Incomparable effects on national branding and country image of these organizations led to cutthroat competition among countries to catching the arrangement opportunity. With the arrangement of these events, host countries is catching an important opportunity to exhibition of their beauties, sending their positive messages

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[46] Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015, P.41

[47] World Bank Report, Ibid, P.35

[48] The Economist, "Brazil's Foreign-Aid Programme: Speak Softly and Carry a Blank Cheque", July 15, 2010, URL= http://www.economist.com/node/16592455

to world public, governments and transnational holdings and expecting to expansion of their influence on political and economical fields in the world scene.

In search of a becoming a leader of developing countries and one of the great power in the world, Brazil is aware of the importance of such organizations. Therefore, Brazil has taken the responsibility of FIFA 2014 World Cup, 2016 Olympics, 20th World Masters Athletics Championships, 2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympics Games etc...

FIFA 2014 World Cup

Having organized World Cup championships, FIFA declared the numbers of this event. According to these numbers, during the tournament, more than one billion fans tuned in to watch the final of the 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil, with the competition reaching a global in-home television audience of 3.2 billion people, according to final figures from FIFA and Kantar Media. An estimated 280 million people around the world watched matches online or on a mobile device, in a sign that more and more fans are embracing new technology for sports content. The 2014 FIFA World Cup broke several TV audience records in key international markets, including the United States and Germany. The final between Argentina and eventual champions Germany attracted an in-home audience of 695 million, up by 12 per cent on the 2010 final for viewers watching for 20 minutes or more. The total audience for the final, including in-home and out-of-home figures for viewers watching for at least one minute, hit 1.013 billion. The impressive figures are a result of intense global interest in Brazil's second hosting of the competition, and were achieved even though many matches were broadcast during the night and early hours of the morning in Asia, which is home to nearly two-thirds of the world's population. Broadcasters showed some 98,087 hours of match footage in total from Brazil, up 36 per cent from 2010.[49]

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[49] FIFA Official Page, "2014 FIFA World Cup™ Reached 3.2 Billion Viewers, One Billion Watched Final", 16 Dec 2015, URL=http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=12/news=2014-fifa-world-cuptm-reached-3-2-billion-viewers-one-billion-watched--2745519.html

In can be understood the importance of these numbers with the comparison of UK Premier League. While 2014 World Cup in Brazil has attracted 3.2 billion viewers, 4 million viewers watch UK Premier League during the whole league period (Mordecai, 2016).

2016 Olympic Games

Olympic Games are one of the most attractive sportive organizations in the world and Brazil will host the 2016 Olympics. During the weeks of Olympics Brazil will be a spotlight for the international viewers through their televisions and computers. Millions of people will follow the competitions and even grandiose opening and closing ceremonies will attract more people than ordinary competitions.[50]

If we consider that, the London 2012 Olympic Games delivered the biggest national television event since current measuring systems began.[51] Furthermore, London Olympics is estimating to reached 3.6 billion people and 4.4 billion viewers of Beijing Olympics in 2008, 2016 Olympics may once again one of the most viewed sportive events in the history. This certainly will promote the recognition and positive perception of Brazil in the world scene.

Moreover, sportive organizations are not just soft power tool for host country, it also a soft power tool for participant countries. Participant countries can contribute to the Olympic movement not only by participating in the Olympics and other sports events, but also by their athletes' performance in the games. Strong sports performance becomes a soft-power asset that benefits the country, because a positive reputation in sports can cement a country's global status and position in world politics (Cha, 2009). This is also valid for Brazil.

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[50] The Guardian, "Top 10 Olympics TV Events: Opening and Closing Ceremonies Dominate" August 13, 2012,
 URL=http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/aug/13/top-olympics-tv-events-ceremonies

[51] BBC News, "London 2012 Olympics Deliver Record Viewing Figures for BBC", August 13, 2012, URL=http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2012/olympic-viewing-figs.html

TV Brasil Internacional

Brazil launched to broadcasting with a new international channel in Portuguese, *TV Brasil Internacional*, in May 2010. This channel previously scheduled to broadcast to 49 countries in Portuguese spoken Africaan countries and it is hoped that in years it may grow and reach North America, Europe or Asian countries.[52] In addition, Brazil has widened its diplomatic centers and now has 37 embassies in Africa, up from 17 in 2002. In the face of its counterparts, this step was taken too late for Brazilian presence in Africa. Neverthelese, Brazil is a poor country in terms of international media outlets to foreign public. This situation is limiting Brazil's agenda-setting capacity and shows Brazil's weak side of soft power.

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[52] BBC News, "Brazil launches international TV station for Africa", May 25, 2010
URL=http://www.bbc.com/news/10152301

Chapter 7: JUDGEMENT OF TURKISH AND BRAZILIAN SOFT POWER POLITICS

7.1 Soft Power of Turkey

Turkey has experienced radical changes in the foreign policy field during the 2000's. Traditional realist security based foreign policy transformed a more constructivist one. Soft power policy was a production of this era until the eruption of Arap Spring. Turkey's image and admiration in the abroad was highest level in the beginning days Arab Spring and as result of mismanaged foreign policy and failure on the domestic develepments, it was destroyed.

According to Monocle, Turkey was in the 25th rank in 2010 and rose firstly to 23th rank in 2011 and lastly to 20th in the in 2012. As of 2012, it is shown that Turkey is losing its ground in terms of soft power. In the 2015, survey of Monocle Turkey declined to 26th rank.[53] Similarly, Portland, a London-based PR firm has posits Turkey 28th rank in its list.[54] Ernst and Young's Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index of 2012 ranked Turkey 4th among emerging countries soft power list, it is unknown that following years' Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Indexes whether published or not.[55]

Since 2000's, one of the most visible indicators of the rising of Turkey's soft power was winning the non-Permanent Membership of United Nations Security Council in 2008 for 2009-2010 era. There were a total 192 countries in the United Nations and Turkey won 153 of their votes during the election. The Security Council is the most important U.N. decision-making body, with its five permanent members Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States each having a power of veto over its decisions. The 10 non-permanent seats are filled by the General Assembly, with five countries elected each year to two-year non-renewable mandates. Non-

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[53] Monocle, "Soft Power Survey 2014/15", November 2014,
URL=https://monocle.com/film/Affairs/soft-power-survey-2014-15/

[54] Portland, "The Soft Power 30: A Ranking of Global Soft Power", URL=http://www.portland-communications.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-Soft-Power-30_press-release.pdf

[55] Ernst and Young, "Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index" Spring 2012,
URL=http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Driving-growth/Rapid-growth-markets-soft-power-index-Soft-power-defined

Permanent Membership process of this platform has always been related with popularity and gaining solidarity of other countries, namely, it has always been an issue of "soft power over others" of Middle or Small Powers.

As I have briefly summarized above, Turkey's humanitarian aids and development aids increased its soft power over the recipient countries. According to Karagül, with these aids, Turkey's rising soft power over Balkan states was an important component of this successful result (Karagül, 2013).

However, in the next years, Turkey has lost its supporters in UN to re-elect for the non-Permanent Security Council Membership with just 60 votes in 2014 because of deterioration of its image in the international scene. It was one of the indicators that Turkey has begun to lose its positive image and soft power (Yetkin, 2014).

Furthermore, after a tumultuous summer with Gezi Protests and harsh repression in 2013, Turkey has begun to election phase of Olimpics in a disadvantageous conjuncture. Turkey was expecting to take chance to hosting of 2020 Olympics but has lost to Japan in 2013. This result was another indicator of the erosion of Turkish soft power and positive perception.

In the next paragraphs, I will detail the reasons of the failures of Turkey's image and prestige in abroad.

Firstly, Turkey has tended to give up from EU perspective and ignored criticisms and warnings for violations about civil rights and rule of law. Progress on the EU issue almost at critical juncture and harsh criticisms of each side to one another is escalating the shift. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's rhetoric and different statements of different countries of EU has undermined relations. As a Muslim and secular-democratic country, with this shift from EU perspective, Turkey has lost its one of the fundamental soft power resource. Turkey's Europeanization in line with EU has also increased Turkey's legitimacy and democratic aspect in the last decade. However, from late 2000's Turkey has felt politically self-confidence, abandoned the way of EU, and gradually turned away from it. Even, Turkey's demand to join to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was seen as step of the distancing from EU perspective. According to hsan Da 1, Turkey's new vision, for

SCO was a project for get rid of the EU surveillance on fundamental rights, freedom of express and rule of law (Da ı, 2015:166)

Secondly, there was one negative perception about Turkish government and its internal policies that undermine the Turkey's soft power resource like democracy, rule of law, human rights and secularism. This process has begun to intensifying during the Gezi Protests (Sandıklı, 2014). Gezi Protests were opposition demonstratations to prevent a government plan to build new shopping center and cutting trees in the Gezi Park of stanbul and spreaded from Istanbul to all over the country in 2013. Harsh responds of police officers to protestors and violation of freedom of express have created negative images for Turkey's democratic standards and deteriorated its EU path in the process of Gezi Protests. During the protests, Prime Minister declared that Turkey does not recognize such criticisms that came from EU (Ergin, 2013). Considering successful rise of the soft power of Turkey with Islamic identity, secularism, modernism and democracy, harsh responds, violations, and majoritarian democracy discourse have also negatively affected Turkey model country image in the Greater Middle East region (O uzlu, 2013). Another reason about internal politics that worsen Turkey's soft power elements and model country perception in abroad was that corruption scandals and government pressures on media and judiciary system (Kiri çi, 2013).

As a result of these processes, according to Freedom House reports, while Turkey's freedom grade was 3.0 in 2010, has decreased to 3.5 in 2015. While civil liberties grade was 3 point in 2010, fell to 4 in 2016.[56] (1 is best and 7 is worst)

In addition, Turkey's grade has been reduced in the Corruption Perception Indexes of Transparency International from 2010 to 2015. While in 56th rank in 2010, Turkey fell to 66th rank.[57] Similarly, in the freedom of press field, Turkey has lost serious credibility due to the high numbers of arrested journalist and visible pressures on media, according to, Press Freedom Index of Freedom House, between 2010 and

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[56] Freedom House, "Freedom Index in 2010" , URL=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/turkey and "Freedom Index in 2015", URL= https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/turkey

[57] Transparency International, "Table of Results of 2010 and 2015 Years", URL=http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table

2015 Turkey fell from 106th to 144th rank. Turkey's place in the world democracies also declined. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2015, Turkey ranked as 97th and it could be as a failure when we look at the 2007's ranking; in 2007, Turkey's place was 88th rank in the same index.[58]

Thirdly, structurally most disruptive obstacle of Turkish soft power has always been Kurdish issue and external criticisms about balance of freedom and security is in the center of this issue for a long time. As is well known, most important actor of this issue is PKK (Outlawed Kurdish Worker Party and it is recognized as terrorist organization by thr EU and the US). Despite the PKK's terrorist activities and historical characteristics, Kurdish political movement and Kurdish Parties in Turkey support it. For now, Kurdish Political Movement and PKK are intertwined to each other (Çandar, 2011:19). As Nye stressed;

> When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less resistance to their wishes. If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interest and values, its action will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others (Nye, 2004:11).

If government policies at home were anti-democratic, conflictual and citing with violation of human rights, it is impossible to gain a legitimacy and attraction from the eyes of others. Turkey's images and perception about Kurdish issue has always been problematic except for during the Peace Process or Kurdish Opening in terms of legitimacy and attraction. AKP leadership launched peace process in 2009 through direct and indirect lines with PKK and Kurdish Political Movement representatives. Main target was Peace Process was the abolishment of armed conflict in Turkey, justifying of PKK gradually and increase the possibilities of peaceful political process. Until 2015 summer, Turkey's struggles to deal with this issue highly admired by democratic world and supported. Turkey's democratization steps and peaceful resolution campaign increased its democratic visibility and changed prejudices about Turkey. As for 2015 summer, armed conflict reoccurred between

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[58] The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2015 and The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2007

Turkish security forces and PKK. This rising conflict and losing of lives will negatively affect to Turkey's positive image and credibility in international scene as was in past.

Fourthly, Arab Spring has changed the Turkey's approaches to Middle East fundamentally and as main pillars of Foreign Policy of AKP Era; Turkey lost its model country image and zero problem with neighbors. Fourthly, Arab Spring has changed the Turkey's approaches to Middle East fundamentally and as main pillars of Foreign Policy of AKP Era, Turkey lost its model country image and zero-problem with neighbours policy. Good neighbourhood policy, soft power politics over immediate neighbours and gains of last decade severely affected from new radical shifts in the Middle East Policy of Turkey.

During the revolutions, from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria Turkey has changed fundamental approaches to region and supported to people to overtake their dictators. Turkey's support to people policy in Arab Spring, unlike the other regimes of Middle East and North African countries, has faced a critical miscalculation in Syria. According to Karaveli, Turkey may have been prompted to make a quick break with its erstwhile partner, wrongly anticipating the precipitous collapse of the Syrian regime (Karaveli, 2012). However, this calculation or supposition did not work and political situation and chaotic civil war has deepened.

Partly collapse of the authority of Syrian government on its territory and citizens, as a neighbour of Syria that has longest common borders, Turkey's has faced serious stability problems that came from Syria. From 2011, escalation of Syrian Civil War has made difficult of the controls of Turkey's Syrian Border. Collection of foreign terrorists within radical Islamist terrorist organizations and their illegal flow from Turkey to Syria has led to radical criticisms over Turkey's border security policy.

Turkey's peaceful image has transformed to a supporter of terrorist organizations that fighting in Syria and especially from Syrian government to US and Russian governments, many international actors criticised Turkey's this image and policies. The stubborn rhetoric and harsh criticisms of Turkish government on the issue of leaving Baath Party Regime of Bashar al Assad from government, has led to occurrence of suspicions of Turkey's illegitimate regime change policy endeavours in international field (Karaveli, Ibid).

In addition, Turkey's image has evolved as a supporter country of sectarian conflicts and Turkey has lost its credibility. Last four or five years, Turkey has been perceived as a country that ruled by an authoritarian Islamist government in the international media and elites (Vick, 2013). Turkey's foreign policy failures harmed its model country perception about democratization and secularization of Islamic world.

During the Gezi Protests, as one of the symbols of the Egypt Revolution in Tahrir Square, Gigi (Gihan) brahim, told his frustrations about Turkey's suppressive policies on protestors and changes on the model country image of Turkey in terms of Egptians to BBC Turkish Service (Hamsici, 2013). In a WSJ (The Wall Street Journal) interview, an Arab intellectual has summarized this result:

> Turkey was a model of sorts for a while, but the years after the Arab Spring have completely shattered that image of Turkey," said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a professor of political science at United Arab Emirates University. "First of all, Turkey has taken a side, the side of Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood. Second, Erdogan is acting as a dictator of sorts, cracking down on freedoms and demonstrators. The liberals of the Arab world no longer take Turkey as a model (Trofimov, 2014).

Failure of Turkish model in Middle East region resulted with the rise of nightmare of Ottoman past and felt with deep hubris of Turkish politicians. According to Jean Loup Saaman, elites of Arab countries still view Turkey's grand strategy as being shaped by Ottoman legacy and primarily a consequence of the failure of European Union membership (Samaan, 2013).

Turkey's visa-free travel policy was also praiseworthy policy to increase interactions among people and creation attractiveness for the tourists. Since 2002, Turkey has eliminated visa restrictions with 27 countries and totally reached 69 countries through bilateral aggrements. [59] However, Turkey's place of visa list is highly

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[59] Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy Official Web Page, "Türk vatandaşları 69 ülkeye vizesiz seyahat ediyor", August 2015, URL= http://kdk.gov.tr/sayilarla/turk-vatandaslari-69-ulkeye-vizesiz-seyahat-ediyor/10

negative in the ranking of The Henley & Partners Visa Restrictions Index in 2016. According to this index, Turkey has ranked as 51st in the list.[60]

Turkey has accepted officially 2.3 million refugees from Syrian Civil War, and spent around 10 Billion USD for their accomodation.[61] With the dramatic rise of refugees in Turkey since the beginning of Syrian Crisis, Turkey has become world largest refugee refugee-hosting nation. As of 2014, Turkey is sevent nation in terms of per capita (Mc Carthy, 2015). Despite the fact that it can be seen as a positive perception source for international scene, Turkey's bargaining process with European Union to sharing financial responsibility of refugees and to stop illegal crossing into Europe was seen as an immoral aggrement in international public in terms of Turkey and EU. Turkey's demands in the bargaining process on refugee crisis to protect European Union's Schengen Area are composing of free visa-free travel rights for Turkish citizens and return to accession to European Union process.

As of 2015, Turkey has lost an important portion of its positive image and crebility among European Countries, some of Middle Eastern Countries such as Syria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia. However, Turkey's positive image and credibility is continuing in African countries and some Gulf States and Saudi Arabia.

However, Turkey's one of the most influential non-governmental organization, the Gulen movement was one of the carriers of Turkish soft power in African countries and in the eyes of African elites. Gulen movement has begun to fight with government elites of Turkey in 2013 and dissolute by government with an allegedly coup initiative and parallel state structuration investigation. Following years, Gulen movement assessed as a terrorist organization and become number one of security threat list of Turkey. In an official visit of Turkish President Erdo an, Turkey officially demanded of the closure of Gulen movement schools and ended activities of such community (Karaku , 2015).

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[60] The Henley & Partners Visa Restrictions Index 2016, URL=https://www.henleyglobal.com/files/download/HP/hvri/HP%20Visa%20Restrictions%20Index%20160223.pdf

[61] Turkish Directorate of Migration Management (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü), "Geçici Korumamız Altındaki Suriyeliler", February 12, 2016, URL= http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/gecici-korumamiz-altindaki-suriyeliler_409_558_560

Thanks to dissolution of members of Gulen movement from state bureaucracy, the possibility of the losing of soft power of Turkey in Africa has occurred and its results will have been seen in the next years.

Morever, the fight of Gulen movement of current government party AKP has led to occured biggest corruption scandals that involved high-ranking government elites even President Erdo an and his families. Occurance of corruption scandals and following government pressures on judicial system has harmed to Turkey's credibility and transparency of Turkish politics. Even, it has not felt very well for today, in the following years it can effect seriously Turkey's foreign direct investments and credibility of Turkish business sectors in foreign trade. As a result of this process, Turkey's ranking in the Corruption Perceptions index of Transparency International fall from 56th in 2010, to 66th in 2015.

After all, Turkey's peaceful zero-problem with neighbors policy completely eroded and disappeared. As one of the charming rising soft powers of first decade of 2000's, Turkey has been almost isolated and lost the capability of transformation and setting agenda in its region (Werz, 2016). Turkey domestic and foreign political crisis have serious possibilities to negatively effect of Turkey's soft power at both regional level and global level.

Lastly, one of the most important weaknesses of Turkish soft power is its universities. According to Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2015-2016, Turkey has not any university in the first 200 and just has 4 universities in first 500.[62]

7.2 Soft Power of Brazil

Unlike the Turkey or other emerging middle powers, Brazil has a peacefull political environment in its region and this is reducing the possibilities of the rivalry with hard power instruments. Brazil's peaceful environment and undisputed hegemony in its continent was an important dimension of the nature of its soft power politics and co-optive power. If we take example the other emerging nations, China's soft power

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[62] The Times Higher Education, "World University Rankings 2015-2016", URL=https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2016/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/country/674/sort_by/rank_label/sort_order/asc/cols/rank_only

politics has serious limitations with hard power rivalry in its dangerous region, similarly Russia has so many security threats and it is an obligation to become a hard power and is an obstacle to become soft power, in the same way India has dangerous security threats and powerful neighbours in terms of hard power and limits its soft power resources, Turkey has been located on instable region and at the center of dangers and it is doomed to hard power resource. For all examples, these countries are doomed to become strong and deterrent hard power elements. Hard power is center of their foreign policies, but in the Brazilian case, it has not such n importance.

As have expressed previous chapters, Brazil's dramatic economic growth rates and rise of Brezilian economy has provided positive image to Brazil during the first decade of century and this was one of the most important dimension of Brazil's attraction and appeal. For all that, it was a beneficial combination and a result of global developments and global conjuncture for all emerging nations. Succesful rise of China and other Asian nations has given important opportunities to Brazil to make trade with Brazil's commodities like iron ore, crude oil, raw sugar, In addition, Brazil's regional and global position on the multilateral organizations has contributed its economic rise. According to Harold Trikunas, thanks to such a global conjuncture Brazil quickly recovered from global financial crisis in 2008 and become an attractive destination for foreign capital (Trikunas, 2014). This advantageous climate has provided to Brazilian economy become sixth largest country in 2010 with surpassed UK.

Succesful growth rates have provided to Brazil become more autonomous in international political system and opportunity to fight with in the reducing of poverty that has long been a chronic problem for Brazil. The fight with poverty and its results also contributed to Brazil's perception and image. The methods and programs of fight with poverty increased Brazil's soft power in many developing and underdeveloped countries. Brazil's poverty reducing program Bolsa Familia inspired many nations and they have begun to learn Braziliam experiences. At the fight with poverty, Brazil was more successful than other emerging countries like India and China. As it can be seen in the Gini indexes, reducing poverty also declined inequality in Brazil. For example, Brazil's Gini ratio had 58.01 score in the beginning of the Workers Party Government Era in 2003; it was reduced to 52.67 in

2012.[63] Despite succesfyl results of fight with poverty, yet inequlity is a fundamental problem for Brazil and its image.

Brazilian endeavours in health sector to expand the reaching to health services of poors and fight with epidemics have become a global story and reached as a tool of diplomacy to many nations.

Brazil's functional democracy was another important dimension of its soft power. Apart from its peaceful environment, Brazilian democracy is another superior side of Brazil than other emerging nations such as China and Russia. According to Trikunas;

> On the range of other principles that also undergird the international order... Brazil is largely supportive, and much more so than countries such as China and Russia (Trikunas, 2016).

In The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2015, Brazil ranked as 51st and one of the members of the 'flawed democracies' category.[64] However, in terms of Brazil, this ranking and flawed democracy status does not provide negative image and on the contrary it provide positive image. Brazil has acted as like a guarantor of democratizon in its regions and successfully defending democratic values. Harsh responses of Brazil to coup initiatives in neighbouring countries are supported by its regional neighbours.

As a result of these successful years in economy and foreign policy during last decade, Brazil's visibility and positive image rose in the world. For example, according to Monocle, Brazil ranked on the 17th in the world soft power list in 2012 (McClory, 2013). Similarly, soft power list for rapid growth markets of Ernest &Young in 2012, Brazil has been ranked as fourth among 10 emerging countries.[65]

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[63] Index Mundi, "Brazil - GINI index", URL= http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/brazil/gini-index
[64] The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2015

[65]Ernst & Young Global Limited, " Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power Index: Spring 2012", URL=http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Driving-growth/Rapid-growth-markets-soft-power-index-Soft-power-defined

As can be seen in the PEW's poll results, Brazilian perception in the world was highly positive in 2014. [66]

Figure 5: Positive Ratings for Brazil across Much of the Globe [Source: PEW Research Center]

Considering as an important indicator of appeal and attraction, Brazil is quite attractive in terms of visa implementations of so many countries. In 2016, Brazilian citizens had visa-free or visa on arrival access to 153 countries and territories and in terms of visa ranking 21st country in the world.[67]

Moreever, Brazil positioned itself in the opposite location to non-democratic changes or foreing interventions everywhere in the world. For example, Brazil has showed serious timidities on the issue of Arab Spring and powers of statusquo in Tunisia, and Libya and Egypt. According to some experts, Brazil has lost its pro-democratic image in those countries and located on the wrong side of history (Cotinho, 2012). In parallel way, Brazil condemned coups in Thailand in 2014 and Egypt in 2013 and defended established governments. Brazil non-interventionist foreign policy some times has faced a number of hard issues and showed silence or hesitations. For example, despite Brazil has largest Syrian diaspora in the world and rejected to join

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[66] PEW Research Center, "Positive Ratings for Brazil across Much of the Globe", June 11, 2014, URL=http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/11/positive-ratings-for-brazil-across-much-of-the-globe/
[67] The Henley & Partners Visa Restrictions Index 2016, URL=https://www.henleyglobal.com/files/download/HP/hvri/HP%20Visa%20Restrictions%20Index%20 20160223.pdf

Geneva II Conference on the Syrian Crisis in early 2014. Brazil has stayed silence on the Annexation of Crimea by Russian Federation and President Dilma Roussef declared that "Brazil doesn't have a position on Ukraine" in G-20 Summit in Australia (Simon, 2016). Summerizely, as a continuation of its historical foreign policy understanding and as a follower of the principle of respect of sovereignty of nations, Brazil did not want to intervene to domestic problems of countries and democracy promotion. As a consequence of this problematic dimension of its foreign policy, loyalty to the principle of respect for sovereignty of nations was criticised by Western countries for the relations with authoritarian regimes and their actions. This feature of Brazilian Foreign Policy has serious risks for soft power over the liberal Western powers and developing nations.

Brazil's participations to multilateral organizations both at regional level and at global level have increased its potentials. As I have summerized in the chapter 4, Brazil behaved as a coherent example of the middle power concept. As a regional and middle power, Brazil has aimed to stable and peaceful environment both in its region and in the world. In line with this strategy, Brazil participated or created international or regional trade or political unions and groupings. In this regard, G-20, MERCOSUR, UNASUR, IBSA, BRICS, World Trade Organisation (WTO), were highly useful platforms to Brazil to increase economic and political strengh. In recent years, Brazilian candidates have been elected Secretary General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and of the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation. Those groupings and platforms have given to Brasil the role of behaving like a champion of developing world and Global South, and have enabled to become a mediator between North and South.

Brazil's environmental destructions were one of the most criticised issues for the Brazilian government for a long time period. During the second term of Lula presidency, Brazil has seriously efforted to prevent environmental destructions. Lula approached as a priority to the struggle for the deforesration in the Amozons. As a result of this policy, Brazil has gained an incredible success over deforestration while economically rising and turned into a success stroy for the developing world and developed industrial countries. Neverthelese, as for protection of human health and protection of ecosystems, the place of Brazil in the global environmental performance index of Yale University is 77th and there are so many things that have

to be done for the environmental policy of Brazil.[68] However, it is easily could be said Brazil's global environmental rhetoric has gained remarkable legitimacy.

Brazil's winning the hosting right to World Cup and 2016 Olympics were fascinating indicator of Brazil's soft power and its affirmation in the global scene. Moreover, Brazil has achieved to be elected to UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for the 2010 – 2011.

Brazil has also been an important actor in the multilateral organizations since Rio Earth Summit such as Conference of Parties (COP), The Global Environment Facility (GEF), United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and International Biofuels Forum etc.. In these forums or platforms, Brasil acted as a pioneer of environmentalist issues for both developed and developing countries to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and to defend the environment associated with development (Visentini and Da Silva, 2010).

Despite for all efforts, Brazil has faced some difficulties in the last decade. For example, Brazil could not reach its historical foreign policy target UNSC permanent membership. In that process, Brazil could not take the support of US and its major strategic partners BRICS countries and its regional neighbours such as Columbia, Argentina and Mexico. Unlike the remarkable numbers on the Brazil's growth rates, Brazil is facing a risk to lose its brightness in economy and growth rates have been declining in a continuous manner since 2013. More importantly, according to many economists, the decline and recession in the Brazilin economy will continue for a long time in the next years, as will be in the other emerging countries (Åslund, 2016).

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[68]Yale Environmental Performance Index – 2016,
URL=https://issuu.com/2016yaleepi/docs/epi2016_final

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Figure 5: Brazil GDP Growth Rates after 2010 [Source: Trading Economics]

Furthermore, as biggest corruption scandal of Brazilian history, Petrobras scandal, which has resulted with the impeachment of President Dilma Roussef and investigation of political elites of country, has seriously and negatively impacted on Brazil's image and perception. Upon Petrobras scandal, Brazil's place dropped from 69th rank in 2012 to 77th in 2015.[69]

Danny Leipziger says, "corruption scandals and widespread frustration with the low quality of public services are fueling social discontent and reducing investor confidence in Brazil" (Leipziger, 2013). Economical recession has also led to cuts on the foreign policy budget and Brazil is facing the risk of losing its shining efficiency over diplomacy. If we consider hyperactive diplomacy of Lula during the rising period, cuts on the Brazilian foreign policy budget can limits its capacity.

Moreover, Brazilian soft power is undermined by other problematic issues like highness of inequality rates, murder and crime rates, and some ilnesses like Zika virus and microcephaly.

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[69] Transparency International, "Corruption Perception Index 2012 and 2015",
URL=http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 and http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results

Brazilian universities is remaining as a weak side of Brazil's soft power, according to Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2015-2016, Brazil has not any university in the first 200 and just has 2 universities in first 500. [70] Summarizely, Brazil's global ınfluence has entered a new phase and risky process that can face crucial obstacles.

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[70] The Times Higher Education, **"**World University Rankings 2015-2016",
URL=https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2016/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/country/116/sort_by/rank_label/sort_order/asc/cols/rank_only

Chapter 8: CONCLUSION

As was in other emerging countries, Turkey and Brazil have reached fascinating economic growth rates in the first decade of 2000's. Having such a successful period, as two middle powers, Brazil and Turkey aimed to increase their influence in their regions and the global arena through soft power politics.

As we have seen in the Chapter 4, one of the most important explanatory reasons of their power struggle in the last decade were their middle power characteristics. Both of two countries politically, economically and regionally were middle powers and most easier and logical way of the gaining power and ability to what they want to get ability to political outcomes through attraction or persuasion without hard power elements such as threat or payment of middle powers are soft policies and to build multilateral cooperations in the face of their counterparts or hegemonic rivals. Nevertheless, in their soft power politics, the cruciality of their economic risings should not be overestimated. Because without economic strength, states cannot create positive perception, admiration or credibility from other countries and in such a position states cannot reach their political wishes.

Apart from their economic successes in the first decade of century, Turkey and Brazil had some certain supremacies over their counterparts in their regions and at the global level. For instance, Brazil has strong democratic and freedom lover institutions and political culture than Russia, China and other autocratic emerging countries and South American countries. Similarly, Turkey has enjoyed from its uniqueness as a secular democratic country among Muslim world. Liberal democratic and secular characteristics of Turkey and Brazil were another important dimension of their soft power. Without these liberal values and vibrant culture it is impossible to be admired or to get ability to reach their targets over other countries and their peoples. Admittedly, it is a fact that most legitimating feature of the soft power of a country is these values except for economic success.

In this regard, Turkey and Brazil has successfully mobilized their soft power resource in the first decade of century. However, their soft power resources have reached to their limitations at the beginning of the second decade of the century. For example, Turkish and Brazilian economy has crucially lost their momentum since

these years and their legitimating elements such as democratic values and politically stable images have begun to lose their brightness.

This thesis summarily shows the correlation between economic and political power and soft power. If one of them is lack, soft power would be lack and inefficient in a country. When Brazil and Turkey economically and polically successful in the first decade of century, their soft power was on the rise, with their economic and political instabilities that they face as of early years of second decade of century, their soft power is melting.

This thesis is an attempt to explanation of the rising of their soft power resources and soft power politics. First Chapter of thesis was assigned to analysis of the concept of power and theoretical discussions among scholars who worked on the concept of power.

Second Chapter was composed of the examining the approaches and understandings of main-stream IR school of thoughts. In this sense, realist, liberal and constructivist theories and their views on power were analyzed to enlighting the methodological or theoretical framework of the paper.

In the Third Chapter, theoretical location of soft power was investigated by main stream IR theories with returning the concept of soft power. However, instead of focusing one theoretical approach, the concept of soft power was seen as a central concept among them and their views was not separated from each other and evaluated as a combination.

In the Fourth Chapter, is composing of the exploration of the concept of middle power and its fundamental characteristics. The similarities and differences between regional powerhood and middle powerhood were analyzed and underlined the basic feature of being a middle power in the global power hierarchy by means of academic literature on the concept of middle power.

Fifth Chapter was an overhaul and reassessment of Brazilian and Turkish Foreign policy in historical viewpoint and described their determinants in line with more than centennial historical period. In this period of time, ups and downs and breaking

points also analyzed. In this regard, was described that while Turkey was having traditionally realpolitic and security based foreign policy and having troublemaker geographical location, Brazil was located on relatively and continuing peacefull geographical position and having stable neighbours than Turkey. In such a climate, Brazil did not need to improve its military power resources and even today it is a weak country in terms of military power. After all, ın historical and geographical locations and neighbourhood relations of these countries has played an important role in the mobilization of their soft power resources.

The objective of Sixth Chapter was to provide a general picture of the soft power politics of Brazil and Turkey in terms of their foreign policies during the 2003-2015. The date of 2003 was an important year because of this year was the beginning of the strong and democratic one party government in these two countries. Especially in the case of Turkey this year was also beginning year of economic prosterity and growth. In this portion of thesis, mostly was examined the soft power resources of these countries and explored how they mobilized their resource with which tools and which public diplomacy activites.

As latest Chapter of thesis, Seventh Chapter is consisting of measurement and judgement of soft power politics of Brazilian and Turkish Foreign Policies. In this regard their successes and failures was analyzed and limitations were described.

To sum up, Brazil nd Turkey has experienced remarkably succesfull era in terms of soft power politics from the 2003 to 2010. But after 2010, their brightness has begun to disappear and their domestic and foreign policy mistakes harmed their perception and admiration. As is seen in the example of Brazil and Turkey, expensive efforts to increase soft power and positive perception are undermined by cheap mistakes. With citing to Alexander Wendt's phrase, it could be easily said that soft power is what states of make of it in the domestic and foreign policy fields.

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