MAPPING ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: EVOLUTION IN KENYAN FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH THE "LENS" OF NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

MUHAMMAD SIRAJE

MAY 2017

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
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
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ABSTRACT

MAPPING ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: EVOLUTION IN KENYAN FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH THE 'LENS' OF NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

SIRAJE, MUHAMMAD

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Balkan Devlen

If there is any major decision throughout Kenya's political history, it can't be any other than the invasion of Somalia. This bold move in the country's foreign policy is an unprecedented for it has taken a high-risk decision departing from fundamentally traditional low risk and non-interventionist approach to conflicts abroad. This research examines the trajectory of Kenya's foreign policy transformation, focusing on the causes of the state's dramatic reorientation towards Somalia. By applying a neoclassical realist framework, the research traces the intricate interplay between shifts in Kenya's strategic environment, domestic politics and the security policy decision-making process. While as traditional realist assumptions explain enormously state behaviour in detail, they have not been widely used to account for

significant alternative tools of state intervention, for instance, normative and economic strategies. Whereas the manifest catalyst that sparkled the incursion into Somalia was the security concern linked with border protection, this was pre-contemplated as early as 2009 on how to deal with increasing spill-over of Somali crisis by both Kenya's military officials and policy makers. The research argues that neoclassical realism explains better both policy makers' motivation and areas of concern and effectively unveils the complexity of states' security policy as well as foreign policy formulation as it pertains to the case of Kenya.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Reorientation, Invasion, Neoclassical Realism, Security Policy

ÖZET

SÜREKİLİĞİN DEĞİŞİMİN HARİTALAMA ELEMANTLARI: NEOKLÂSIK REALİZM'IN 'OBJEKTİFİN' VASITASIYLA KENYA'NIN DIŞ POLİTİKASINDAKİ EVRİMİ

SIRAJE, MUHAMMAD

**SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSRARASI İLİŞKLER**

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Balkan Devlen

Eğer Kenya'nın politik tarihinde vermiş olduğu en büyük siyasi karar nedir? diye soracak olursak hiç kuşkusuz bu Somali'nin işgali kararıdır. Bu cüretkâr karar ülkenin dış politika tarihinde eşi benzeri görülmemiş derecede yüksek risk taşır ve ülkenin geleneksel düşük riskli ve dışarıdaki çatışmalara müdahaleci olmayan siyaseti ile taban tabana zıt bir tutum sergiler. Bu araştırma Kenya'nın Somali işgali ile başlayan dış politika transformasyonunu incelemektedir. Araştırma neo-klasik realist çerçevede Kenya'nın stratejisini, iç politikasını ve güvenlik politikasındaki karar mekanizmalarını incelemektedir. Geleneksel realist görüş ziyadesiyle devlet

davranışlarını detaylı bir biçimde incelese de müdahale için elzem araçlar olan normatif ve ekonomik stratejileri geniş yelpazede ele almamaktadır. Her ne kadar Somali istilası sınır güvenliği kapsamında güvenlikçi bir kaygı olsa da bunun önceden tasarlanmış temeli 2009'a dayanan Somali sorunu ile başa çıkma yöntemlerinden biri olarak Kenya askeri kurmayları ve siyasiler tarafınca ele alındığını görüyoruz. Araştırma, Kenya vakasında neo-klasik realizm bakış açısının; siyasilerin karar sürecini ve kaygılarını incelemede, devletlerin karmaşık güvenlik politikasını anlamada ve dış politika oluşumundaki etmenleri ortaya çıkarmada daha etkin bir yöntem olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Diş Politika, Yeniden Oryantasyon, İstila, Neoklasik Realizm, Güvenlik politikası

DEDICATION

To my parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

1. **AIAI:** Al-Ithaad Al-Islamiyya
2. **AMISOM** : African Union Mission in Somalia
3. **ASWJ**: Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jamah
4. **AU**: African Union
5. **BATT**: British Army Training Team
6. **BFO**: British Foreign Office
7. **CIA**: Central Intelligence Agency
8. **COMESA**: Common Market For Eastern And Southern Africa
9. **EAC**: East African Community
10. **EAF**: Ethiopian Air Force
11. **ECOWAS**: Economic Community of West African States
12. **EU**: European Union
13. **FDI** : Foreign Direct Investment
14. **FPE:** Foreign Policy Executive
15. **GSU**: General Service Unit
16. **IBEA**: Imperial British East Africa
17. **IBEAC/IBEACo**: Imperial British East Africa Company
18. **ICU**: Islamic Courts Union
19. **IGAD:** Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
20. **IR:** International Relations
21. **KADU**: Kenyan African Democratic Union
22. **KANU:** Kenyan African National Union

23. **KDF**: Kenya Defence Force

24. **KGB**: Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnost / Committee for State Security

25. **LAPSSET**: Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor

26. **NCO**: Non-Commissioned Officer

27. **NFD**: Northern Frontier District

28. **NFDLA**: Northern Frontier Districts Liberation Army

29. **ODA**: Official Development Assistance

30. **OPEC**: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

31. **RAF:** Royal Air Force

32. **SADC**: Southern African Development Community

33. **SFG**: Somali Federal Government

34. **SNA**: Somali National Army

35. **SNG** : Somali National Government

36. **SRC**: Supreme Revolutionary Council

37. **SSDF**: Somalia Salvation Democratic Front

38. **SYL**: Somali Youth League

39. **UIC**: Union of Islamic Courts

40. **UK** : United Kingdom

41. **UN**: United Nations

42. **UNHR**: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

43. **UNSC**: United Nations Security Council

44. **US**: United States

45. **USSR:** Union of Socialist States of Russia

46. **WWI**: First World War

47. **WWII**: Second World War

MAP OF EASTERN AFRICA

Figure 01: illustrates greater Horn of Africa

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

After a lengthy perseverance with its traditionally antagonistic neighbouring state, Kenya finally decided to deviate from her non-interventionist approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping towards Somalia, with Kenya Defence Force's (KDF) incursion into Jubbaland on October 2011 (Harper, 2012 and Menkhaus, 2012). Yet since 1963 direct military confrontation with Somalia has been eluded by Kenya rather it opted for an alliance with Ethiopia against a common adversary or covertly supporting rebel militias against the Somali government (Kabukuru, 2015). This research examines the trajectory of Kenya's foreign policy transformation, focusing on the causes of the state's dramatic reorientation towards Somalia. By applying a Neoclassical Realist framework, the research traces the intricate interplay between shifts in Kenya's strategic environment, domestic politics and the security policy decision-making process as well as the current outcome of Kenya's grand strategy in Southern Somalia. The study carefully underlines 'Southern Somalia' for the state splited up where some territories remained either semi-autonomous with the Mogadishu central government in the south such as in case of Puntland, or completely dissociated itself from the federation for instance defacto-state Somaliland which unilaterally declared itself independent in 1991 following the ousting of Siad Barre, although not internationally recognised for in the outside world it appears to be quite much of a mere autonomous region of Somalia and still

subjected to the Somali Federal Government (SFG) in Mogadishu (Streleau and Ngesi in Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio, 2003).

MAP OF SOMALIA

Figure 02: illustrates Political Entities in Somalia. Source; British Broad Casting Service (BBC).

The study contends that Neoclassical Realism explains better both policymakers' motivation and areas of concern, and effectively unveils the complexity of states' security policy as well as foreign policy formulation as it

pertains to the case of Kenya. It attempts to address the following research questions; how can the changes and continuities in Kenya-Somalia relations be analysed from a Neoclassical Realist perspective? Why Kenya for a long period of time preferred buck-passing to interventionism while dealing with Somalia?

In the recent years and past years various studies holistically attempted to analyse evolution of Kenya's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa, while others particularly focused on Kenya-Somalia relations over a given period, for instance, Howell, (1968); Nzoma, (1981); Makinda, (1983); Gordon, (1987), (1994); Payne , (1988); Adar, (1994), (2007); De Hoyos, (1995); Thompson, (1995); Parsons, (1999), (2003); Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio, (2003) ; Percox (2004); Menkhaus, (2005), (2012); Chau, (2010); Stanford University, (2010) ; Harper, (2012); Cornelissen et. al (2012); Hornby, (2012); Munene, (2015); Mwangi, (2016); Cullen, (2016), Mabera, (2016): yet their studies are criticised for lacking systematic theoretical models and not critically and ironically present a sufficient analysis of Kenya's foreign policy behaviour, the fact that the ignored models could help scholars and policy actors map and explain the complex institutional configurations of Kenya's policy landscape makes that situation problematic. The direct contribution of this study to the body of available Kenya's foreign policy literature, therefore, would be filling that vacuum by basing its research findings on empirical data and a well-defined theoretical model, since it draws attention to the deficiencies of existing theories for understanding foreign policy development in Kenya.

Among the previous studies that attempted to explain Kenya's pursuit of a non-interventionist foreign policy in the first phase was John Makinda's article 'From Quiet Diplomacy to the Cold War Politics', analysing Kenya's foreign policy move from a dependency theoretical perspective. Makinda fundamentally perceived Kenya's quiet diplomacy directly contingent on foreign capital, for economic development was very imperative to the nation and consequently, the state wouldn't take a radical stand like other African states in international affairs did that would adversely affect the inflow of foreign capital. Likewise, he argued that it would also have affected the local elites' interests who were in fact beneficiaries of that capital (1983:302). Although he did provide an excellent account for the continuity in Kenya's foreign policy during that time, Makinda didn't take into consideration some factors such as the weakness of Kenya's militaries and the security concern that

was equally a priority for Kenya (global security, 2000), moreover, ironically there is a continuity in Kenya's dependence on foreign capital and prioritisation of the economy up-to-date yet it has altered the foreign policy approach.

The following sections give Neoclassical Realist insights on the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy approach towards Somalia that has been perspicuously explained. The study proceeds in seven chapters; In chapter one the subject matter is introduced, in which the main research question is clearly stated, and two other subordinate questions are also included, to which a hypothetical answer is related. The second chapter presents previous academic works or studies that are related to the subject researched, delineating the structure and ideological background of African International Relations and the essence of Kenya's foreign policy. Chapter three includes a brief historical antecedents of Kenya and Somalia because reflecting on the colonial and post-independence events in both states which are the critical antecedents, facilitates a comprehensive understanding of the relics in the relations between the two states and background of institutional settings in the following periods. The chapter is devoted to the provision of a sequential account of general political antecedents that occurred in both states, which were central in shaping their socio-political perspective about each other and consequently contributing to the domestic political framework in Kenya and exoteric policies that Kenya applies within the regional context and with peculiarity towards Somalia.

Chapter four continues with the explanation of method and methodology employed to reach final findings and it also emphases alternative theoretical approaches that can be used in answering the question in the context of the research. Process tracing method which is defined as a systematic evaluation of diagnostic evidence selected within a framework of research question and hypothesis (Collier, 2011: 823). The main reason for choosing this method is what can be found in Kisangani's explanation that among the various advantages of process-tracing is that it is one of critical mechanism that can be used to elaborate the issue pertaining to complexity of variables since various causal factors can have their own causes (Kisangani, 2015:35). Neoclassical Realism is adopted as an approach to explain the whole phenomena in Kenya-Somalia relationship. The approach perfectly fits the research study's objective for it does give a multifaceted explanation of causes of change and outcome in a state's foreign policy (Devlen and Özdamar in Freyberg-

inan et. al, 2009: 136; Lobell et al. 2009; Ripsman et al. 2016: 170-177). However the approach has been criticised for being a mere extension of structural realism and it's difference from Foreign Policy Analysis approach has been question, two which responses has been provided to clarify the doubt.

Chapter five focuses on specific seminal eventualities that shaped Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Somalia. They included the 1960s' North-eastern frontier conundrum in relation to the *Greater Somalia* thesis, beginning with Belvin plan which consequently led to the advent of '*Greater Somalia'* notion in 1940s that would become a very a major determinant in triggering nationalistic sentiments under *pan-somalism* after almost 30 years and onwards and subsequently destabilising relations between Kenya and Somalia for the two states had become traditionally arch-enemies. And by far ultimately the wars that culminated from there turning inwardly resulting in the collapse or failing of Somali state (Payne, 1988: 29 and Elmi and Barise, 2006: 33-36). Besides, this didn't only stop there the Al-Shabaab insurgence actually emerged from the very power vacuum created by anarchy in Somalia that came into existence from the struggle to liberate Somalis abroad back-firing inwardly. Second, the Lanet incident of 1963 and 1982 attempted coups that followed the outbreak of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) conflict, basically exposed weakness of Kenyan state and explicitly illustrated its reliance on foreign forces when a battalion revolted against Kenyan government as a part of wider wave of 1960s army mutiny in East Africa (Johnson et. al 1984: 621; Karangi and Ebo, 2006: 102; Stubbs, 2015; Parsons, 2007; MacRae and Laurence, 2007:96). The incidents partially explain why Kenya didn't opt for a direct combat with Somalia despite the clear evidence of Somalia subversive activities in North eastern province. In the sixth chapter, continuities and changes in Kenya-Somalia relation are mapped and interpreted through the lens of neoclassical realism based on two-fold explanation i.e. structural and unit level. For easy comprehension of that evolution from 1963-2000s, it is divided into three phases, the first stage from 1963 to early 1970s, phase two started from mid-1970s to early 1980s and finally the third cycle is further divided into two parts, the first part being from late 1980s to mid-1990s and the second part from late 1990s to the present or 2000s. In the last chapter, an overall assessment of the factors that have been influencing Kenya's foreign policy is made and a conclusion is provided.

1.1. THESIS RATIONALISATION

Kenya's foreign policy is worth studying for various reasons; firstly, being the region's trade and financial hub in Eastern Africa, the region's landlocked states such as Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) relies quite much on Kenya's Mombasa port for exports and imports therefore any instabilities within Kenya would directly affect economy of those countries for instance the 2008 election violence that affected the transportation of goods from Mombasa port (Cheeseman, 2008:167-168 and Wanyama, 2013), and indeed there are various studies correlating Kenya's intervention in war against Al-Shabaab and Kenya's future anticipated massive economic project—the Lamu Port-South Sudan Transport Corridor project which would connect New Lamu Port with Ethiopia and South Sudan (Mc Evoy, 2013) (LAPSSET).

Secondly, the stability of Kenya definitely guarantees both security in the region specifically pertaining the security threat from Somalia-based Al-Shabaab militia since it acts as a buffer zone to countries such as Uganda and Tanzania for they could hardly reach those countries without passing through Kenya. Thirdly, Kenya has never engaged in any military expedition beyond its border since independence despite serious challenges over border conflicts from its neighbours such as Somalia in 1963 and Uganda in 1982 (Umbright, 1989:16; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997: 450; Khadiagara, 2014; Menkhaus, 2012), this obviously makes the country's recent incursion into Somalia a surprising issue and an interesting topic to research in order to learn the underlining reasons behind this foreign policy reorientation. Lastly, the length of the conflict between Kenya and Somalia, which dates back to 1960s, Kenya and Somalia has been antagonistic since it gained her independence challenging the sovereignty and integrity of Kenya, and related humanitarian crisis that has been covered for years by various media outlets.

1.2. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS

The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the discussion around Kenyan foreign policy, by considering three questions:

1. How has Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia been evolving from 1963-2000s?
2. What are the elements of continuity and discontinuity within the Kenya-Somali foreign relationship?
3. How can Neoclassical Realism perspicuously make the change in Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia, with the peculiarity of a drastic shift in 2011 more understandable?

Tentatively the research study contends that Neoclassical Realism explains better both policymakers' motivation and areas of concern, and effectively unveils the complexity of states' security policy as well as foreign policy formulation as it pertains to the case of Kenya. The second premise on which the study argues is that despite domestic determinants playing a crucial role in influencing Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia, overwhelmingly systemic factors have been influential in shaping kenya's foreign policy through all the phases.

1.3. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The main limitation of this research is the deficiency of primary sources. During the proposal stage, the researcher had proposed collection of primary data especially from national archives but various issues have contributed to the failure of that, including the absence of sufficient funds. Due to this fact, the study is conducted outside the target countries i.e. Somalia and Kenya. Therefore the researcher largely depended on secondary source mainly from documented literature; books, journals, government/corporate reports, dissertations, internet and magazines, newspapers, articles, confidential papers, conference proceedings. This added more difficulty to go through several materials, to find related information that is relevant to the study.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

The available scholarly literature on the core subject of this research study (i.e. studies that put the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia) are scarce, and the few accessible academic works related to the theme of the study are divided into three categories as it will be explained more concisely in the following sub-chapters below; first, those that are connected to the description of Kenyan foreign policy in general among other is the concise work by Usa titled Kenya Foreign Policy And Government Guide. The second category includes studies just confined to Kenya-Somalia relations for instance among the essential books are Adar's book—'Kenyan Foreign policy behaviour towards Somalia, 1963-83' and Kithinji, Koster and Rotich's 'Kenya after 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones' etc. Lastly, the rest of scholarly readings are related to a framework in which African international relations works. For the fact that the available scholarly work is confined to the above categories without being comprehensively enough to include a neoclassical realistic approach to analyse the evolution of Kenya-Somalia foreign relations creates a vacuum that can be felt by this research study, and as such its contribution to the understanding of Kenyan Foreign Policy.

2.1. Foreign Policy

According to Christopher Hill, foreign policy refers 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations' (Hill, 2003; 3). Regarding the analysis of foreign policy, Hill proposes an idea of plurality (multiple actors, more than one epistemology and plenty of methodologies) and an approach that integrates several levels of analysis (international and domestic levels) should also be adopted. On a different account, Adesola (2004) describes foreign policy as the courses of action adopted by a nation in the interest of the welfare of its people. And concisely it refers to the policy pursued by a state in its dealings with other states. For him foreign policy by itself consists of three elements; the first being the overall orientation and policy intention of a particular state towards another. The second element he identifies is the objective that a state seeks to achieve in its relation with other states. And the final element is the means of achieving that particular objective. Policy as a term denotes planning which in turn suggests step by step procedure towards a known and defined goal. Foreign policy deals with how and why a nation-state sets particular goals, orders its own governmental policy making machinery utilising its own government policy making machinery and its own human and natural resources to compete with other states in the international arena. Adesola also puts differently another explanation that converges with Jackson and Sorensen (2013) as well as Christopher Hills' (2003), when he asserts that 'foreign policy could be seen as the totality of all its actions, decisions, overtures or interactions between states in the international arena. Such could be directed or based on economics, politics, culture or creating understanding or co-operation' (Adesola, 2004). However, a slight divergence appears in Jackson and Sorensen's definition when they included also the relation between states and non-state actors' i.e NGOs and International organizations.

The literature on foreign policy is loaded with both empirical and theoretical suggestions of the correlation between domestic determinants and external behaviour of states. It can be observed from any perspective whether traditional/realist or

radical/political economy, foreign policy behaviour is generally viewed as the external expression of a state's domestic concerns. To this extent, the domestic variant of a state's behaviour is as much a determinant of such a state's external behaviour as is the external environment itself as illustrated by Roseneau. This classical linkage thesis in foreign policy is amply evident in the corpus of knowledge, generally regarded as foreign policy literature (Roseneau, 1969). For Hornby's (2005) explanation external policy is a function of internal policy, what makes the difference between the two is thus not a matter of substance. Rather it derives from the fact that a state's foreign policy takes account of the relevant attitudes, actions and reactions of other actors whereas its domestic policy is not, in general, burdened with such considerations. It should be clear that the more the resources and instruments at the disposal of a state, the greater it's potential to influence the development of the international system in a direction favourable to itself or its interest. The central idea that permeates the available literature on foreign policy is simply that there is a direct correlation between internal politics and external environment to which policy is intended to address itself. In this logic, this lays a foundation to a Neoclassical Realist argument in the international relations.

In an attempt to reconcile the domestic interest with external circumstances taking into account of the available means, resources, and institutions for doing so, Muller and Southall as well as Spies agrees with Roseneau (1969) when they affirmably asserts that it is extremely significant to understanding foreign relations at specific within endogenous and exogenous context and the interplay between these two atmospheres. As major players in foreign policy, elite operate between institutions that continually constrain them, however usually, these policy makers can work around such limits and manage the tension between domestic and international community. The results are usually interesting for their answer far-reaching questions about how elites achieve their foreign policy goals, specifically how they balance means and objectives (Spies: 2008; Southall: 2006; 27-58). The answer to the above question lies in Prys' explanation that essentially the major oppugn to foreign policy is its implementation, its proper management is central to the success or failure of the implementation of foreign policy. Foreign policy plus the administration of the diplomatic service and of the policy itself give rise to the implementation of foreign policy. Prys challenges the traditional approach of

dividing foreign affairs into the policy and administrative aspects because if not, the implementation of foreign policy itself will continuously face a clash between policy makers and administrators (Prys, 2008).

Yet on the same trajectory from the previous argument McGowan et al.. more precisely emphasis that the class that controls state power basically shapes foreign policy and most probably in accordance with its own group interests despite the fact that those interests might be rationalised ideologically as the interests of the entire nation. However, it should not be mistaken that always that's the case since it would mean ignoring public opinion on inter-state issues especially in the West (McGowan, Cornelissen and Nel :2004). As such Lentner (2005) notes that according to the given political circumstances, issues such as defending state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of a country, among other things, all correspond to the interests of the nation as a whole.

2.2. Structure of Foreign policy in Africa: The Ideology Underlying beneath the African International Relations

In the early 1960s during the decolonisation period, Senegalese Foreign Minister Doudou Thiam wrote one of the first scholarly books on African foreign policy giving a precise summary of general traits of African states' foreign policy especially during the Cold War era, when he contended that the international relation of newly established states were essentially founded on two ideologies *nationalism* and *socialism*. Substantially the nationalism ideology takes two forms- micro-nationalism and macro-nationalism, the former putting emphasis on sovereignty of the new African states as they emerged from colonial rule and the latter referring to Pan-Africanism which is related to wider geographical groupings and African Unity. He puts an emphasis on the pan-Africanism[1] as the pinnacle determinant in foreign policy among African states for he argues that 'Pan-Africanism tendency serves as a factor of cohesion in relation with outside world, and ultimately the nature of the

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[1] According to Esedebe Pan-Africanism refers to a political and cultural phenomenon that regard Africans and African descendants abroad as a unit. He argues that the movement glorified the African history and illustrated pride in African values (Ta'a: 2014; 65-66).

relationship between African states and rest of the world will largely be determined by whether Africans can unite or whether the current fragmentation remains.' However, Thiam observed that there was a contradiction between the two forms of nationalism. For the matter of fact, the desire for unity is obstructed by the extremely strong inclination for sovereignty and territorial integrity, yet this is at the fore front of the relations between African states themselves, as it will be seen in the case study of Kenya-Somalia relations in this research study. The second major factor influencing the foreign policy of African states pointed out by Thiam is socialism, though he doesn't hesitate to say that it took a different form which African leaders have developed i.e African socialism, for instance, Tanzania's Nyerere meddled it into "Ujamaa" socialism. According to Thiam's reading a more significant factor than socialism that impacts the foreign policy among African states is the desire for development, for this is more influential no matter how much important socialism ideology can be for domestic policy (Thiam, 1965).

In his expounding of the concept Pan-Africanism, Andrain mentions in his article that the idea is about bringing together the African continent together as people who share a common history and have for years lived in a world that is dominated by the western ideologies. Pan-Africanism underlines the spirit of togetherness which can ultimately be used by African countries to articulate imperative issues such as development in the international arena. Adrian argues that heads of African states are expected to respond to Pan-Africanism by having policies that reflect the ideology for instance, through the promotion of regional integration and industrialization of Africa, consequently this will reduce foreign economic dependency that Africa has with its former colonial's masters as he puts it in his own words—'organisation. As a general goal, the inclusive idea of Pan-Africanism seeks the eventual unity of all African peoples. In more particular senses, one form of Pan-Africanism desires to attain economic and social progress through pragmatic, or functional, union' (1962; 6-7 and Kantembo, 2008). The contemporary examples of projects that echoes Pan–Africanism is the formation of regional economic blocks such as the integration of the East African community (EAC) , Common Market For Eastern And Southern Africa (COMESA) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) , Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and so on. However, some of these regional integrations are yet to make

any substantial progress. For instance, the East African Community was once a thriving regional integration system in Africa but it eventually collapsed due to internal wrangle within the region. Moreover, Kenya seemed to benefit more than any other country hence this triggered suspicion from other countries in the integration (Reith and Boltz, 2011; Braude, 2008).

In late 1990s another scholarly work by Stephen Wright compiled in a book 'African foreign policies' illustrated the consistency in African foreign policy reflecting the arguments forwarded previously by Thiam, when Wright posited that 'The three decades of African decolonization have not produced significant changes in the content and substance of foreign policy, and the policymaking environment has not altered fundamentally over the years.' Well complimenting on the same quantum of arguments, Don- Nanjira emphasised that Africa's foreign policy is driven by its own value system. Hence, aspects such African socialism, Ujamaa, Ubuntu, negritude ought to be reflected in Africa's foreign policy. It is said that if African leaders can unite and implement the ideology of Pan–Africanism in their foreign policy then the African nation can be reborn. This new African nation can even reach the extent of surpassing anything that the western countries have done. Regardless, of the weakened state of the concept of Pan-Africanism due to globalisation, regionalism, poor intra-African relations and so forth there is still a chance of reviving it. However, African leaders must be prepared to re-introduce African values such as solidarity when relating with other African states (2010: 453). He continues by stating that Africa's Foreign Service, African diplomacy and foreign policy are essential in African international relations. Even though there are independent and sovereign states in Africa and each states' foreign policy are driven by the county's national interest. African states share a common history when it comes to the issue of colonialism and exploitation by white man. This means that Africa can enhance its relations with African states through the ideology of Pan-Africanism (Don-Nanjira: 2010; 455).

In summary, there is convergence in an argument between Don-Nanjira and McDougal when they point out that the key determinants of Africa's foreign policy range from the national level, regional and global level. The external level is an elevation of the internal level interests say development, sovereignty etc. Both scholars continue to argue that the contemporary foreign policies among African

states are an outcome of the various adjustments that Africa has had to historically undergo especially as a continent that acted as a battlefield of the Cold-War politics. Consequently, Africa's foreign policy has been developed and nurtured according to the international power theory of the two conflicting ideologies during the Cold War. Despite the fact that Africa had resorted into a nonalignment policy, it was greatly challenged by a state's need to maintain its sovereignty. A state's survival in a competitive environment depends on how its perception of the nature and rules of global politics today. It is therefore, crucial for foreign policy makers to come up with policies that will boost their ability to survive and at the same time meet its national interest. The prevailing global economy depicts the highest form of capitalism, which is manifested with the spread of liberalisation of the world markets since the early 1990's. Don-Nanjira specifically argues that African states have thus acted as sovereign states and make decisions that will place them in a better position, which often implies disregarding its own values of Pan-Africanism that encompasses negritude, Ujamma, Ubuntu and so forth. Yet for McDougal the problem of persistence of underdevelopment in Africa today is a result of the interplay between adoption of a wrong foreign political methodology and self-centred leaders, for African states were historically forced, coerced and manipulated to adjust to foreign policy that fostered underdevelopment rather than their anticipated objective of development after decolonization, coupled with leaders who were less committed to serving their citizens (Don-Nanjira: 2010; 474 and McDougal: 2009; 65).

On the other hand, for Landsberg it was a paradigm shift in African foreign policy with setting up political projects that reflected pan-Africanism, he denotes the establishment of the African Union during the Cold War era. Given the fact that, states like South Africa were leaning more towards African continentalism, which was an agreement on policies that favour regional state cooperation. Contrarily he argues that this was an inverse of Pan-Africanism which advocated for the amalgamation of the autonomous African states into a single bloc. In addition to this, states created novel but similar institutions, political structures and principles where the latter agree to live in harmony through adhering to similar norms (2012;1). Likewise in way of complimenting the argument by Landsberg (2012), Kantembo calls attention to the fact that EAC as explicit extension of Pan-Africanism, and he maintains that other than being a regional trading bloc the community shares a

common language[2] and institutions such as the East African Parliament and East African Court (2008;107). The ideology of Pan-Africanism is thus far from being realised, African states still hesitate to form a solid union rather they put more emphasis on regionalism or state cooperation. Regionalism appears to be more appealing for it does not affect state sovereignty. Therefore conclusively the established regional economic blocks have diluted the idea of Pan-Africanism in Africa's foreign policy.

Conversely, another counterpoint is brought up by Gilbert M. Khadiagala, positing that although frameworks were established over the last half-century to explain the conduct of African international relations, they were short of autonomy that would have yielded a concrete and universal African set of ideas to meaningfully shape interstate relations. He stated two reasons similar to the argument of previous scholars that primarily explains the root cause of the deficiency of autonomous ideas with the credence to propel behaviour and affect change within the African interstate systems. First, the geopolitical fragmentation of African states and domestic pressure against the African ideas. The territorial, geographical, and political fragmentation of African states has remained the major impediment to the realisation of universal African ideas. Paradoxically, ideas such as Pan-Africanism and the African Renaissance that have attempted to address the multiple problems of fragmentation have never sufficiently germinated on the infertile and impermeable ground of sovereignty that underpins the African interstate system.

Second Khadiagala asserts that the production and dissemination of African ideas have been for years, obstructed by strong individuals with only weak domestic politics support. The legitimacy and survival were in a limbo of majority of such leaders and individuals with the ambition of Africanism or united Africa. As he puts it in his words

'....there is precariousness to continental leadership both in ideas and practice, particularly when this leadership is disengaged from wider national domains. This precariousness invariably precludes the production of autonomous ideas by making leadership on African issues a dangerous enterprise and, furthermore, it reinforces and deepens the absence of

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[2] Swahili language

overarching and universal African ideas. There is yet another instructive paradox in this regard: leaders that have had ideas with some coherence and force of action have seldom survived, while those with neither credible philosophic standing nor kingly dispositions have had more staying power.'

2.3. Essence of Kenyan Foreign Policy

Singer elaborated that the nature of the international relations in general that Kenya finds itself with its foreign policy. He dichotomizes the nature of foreign policy into two groups; the first one including small and developing states such as Kenya and the second group consisting of strong, large and developed states including US and Russia. He then describes the first category as poor, weak and underdeveloped and contends that these states have less power in the international system because they lack wealth, organisation, international status and the will to change their condition. This weak position that these small states occupy in the international system of stratification, means that to a very large extent their foreign policy alternatives are limited if not wholesomely determined or constrained by external elements (1976; 263-290). Similarly Zartman contextualizes the African continental system in which foreign policy is practiced, that since the nature of African international relations among states has no centre in terms of systemic structure, distribution of values and the dynamics of relations engendered within and by that distribution, consequently African policy consisting of; temporary initiatives on the regional level, delicate positions of predominance within a sub-region and a limited array of resources available as a power base even for the strongest (1976; 569-594). Therefore Singer and Zartman both agrees on the same reasons that makes African foreign policy being weak and specifically Kenyan external policy in sub-region, though the diverging point between the two scholars is within Zartman's argument that the fact that African states are weak at international stage, it doesn't hinder them to be dominant at sub-regional level despite their dominancy lacking consistency.

Similarly, in the case of Kenya, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations office in Geneva elaborates that since attainment of

sovereignty Kenya's foreign policy has been guided and shaped by her own national interest. This self-interest could be grouped into three main tiers: Peace and stability are a pre-requisite to social and economic development. The government's commitment to guarantee the security of its people and the preservation of national integrity and sovereignty within secure borders underlies the desire to advance national interests by guaranteeing a secure political environment for development. Economic development has played a dominant role in shaping Kenya's foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). The need to pursue an open economic policy and the demand for foreign capital and investment flows, inter-alia Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA), has influenced Kenya's approach to foreign policy (Makinda, 1983:302 and Adar in Munene et al., 1995: 90). Kenya's foreign policy in the region has been shaped by factors such as the presence of overlapping ethnic community across borders and the fact that Kenya is a littoral state of the Indian Ocean and which influences relations with landlocked neighbours. While Kenya's foreign policy objectives have not appreciably changed over the years, the international environment has witnessed a lot of changes that have continued to necessitate appropriate responses and adjustments.

Mc Evoy agrees with the official explanation of Kenya's Permanent Mission in Geneva when she affirms that Kenya has promoted itself as a modest, peace-loving nation with a firm respect for the norms of respecting the sovereignty of neighbouring states, good neighbourliness, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. This extended to its consistently refraining from behaving in an interventionist or aggressive manner, which in turn gained it a reputation as an "unwilling regional power" and even as a passive object of neighbouring countries' geostrategic interests. However she conversely argues that Kenya has traditionally 'punched below its weight' in terms of influencing regional geopolitics, in the absence of a cogent narrative that articulates its changing geostrategic interests and implementation strategies, and she correlated this paradigm shift in Kenyan foreign policy to two factors that she outlined as 'a paradigm shift in favour of economic diplomacy and growth under former President Mwai Kibaki and an offensive military incursion into Somalia in late 2011 to protect its national interests.' (2013:2)

According to Ochieng (1997), factually prior to Kenya's independence in 1963 the foreign policy was a direct political subject of the British imperialist company known as IBEAC (Imperial British East Africa Company) from 1888 under Sir William Mackinnon to 1895, the year Kenya became a British protectorate and later British colony in 1920 under the administration of British Foreign Office. During all this time, Kenya's external affairs were an appendage of the British foreign policy, hinging on the legal definition of a colony as being part of the empire though administratively autonomous.

The classical contextualization of Kenya's foreign policy just five years after achieving its independence was done in 1968 by John Howell who doesn't divert much from Mc Evoy's argument, when he correlated the state's external relations to the specific nature of its domestic politics by assessing Kenya's objectives within the international system. Howell explains the need for Kenya's foreign policy at a domestic, regional, continental and international level. He looks at the institutional structures, the pursuit of values and the context within which the Kenya acted out its policies. Howell's main concern was to explain how a newly established independent African state behaves in world affairs like similar states within the continent (1968; 29-48). He argued that essentially Kenya presents various faces in the international arena that can be compartmentalised into three, whereby firstly global affairs its external policy are 'markedly radical in nature and characterised by a strong sense of morality and idealism.' In the most cases a lot of Kenyan foreign policy statements echoes criticism of 'present international order and optimism about the desirability and attainability of a peaceful international community'. Secondly, when it comes to the issues related to East African region tends to encounter it maintains a more conservative and legitimist approach especially for the issue that seems to affect Kenya's national interest such as national security and national development.

However, Howell claims that the radicalism within the external policy is subjected to a relatively low level of restraint. Basically, it is the domestic factors that result in a pressure leading towards a broadly radical policy internationally and towards a more cautious conservatism within the East African region. Lastly concerning inter-African affairs, Kenyan has been acting as a neutral actor between the so-called 'radical' and 'moderate' states, here Kenya's foreign policy is '…far less a product of domestic pressures, and contingencies of history and factors of

personality reassert their importance in foreign policy analysis.' The fact that Kenya is between the committed groupings of states to right and left; she and moderate states places her in a position Howell called 'prestigious neutral '. Therefore concisely Howell posits that Kenya's policy in terms of relation with the continent are quite much a result of internal politics within the state itself, most of the times the leader has less influencing the decisions Kenya takes here, as a conclusion he claims that it can be said there is a paradox of (1968: 45-46).

While as Howell (1968) assessed Kenyan foreign policy in the international arena considering the interplay of two variables i.e. both system level and unit level as the result of certain external policy of the state, for Samuel Makinda (1983) takes a divergent approach while explaining country's foreign affairs which one can consider being more or less close to a structural realist approach when he assessed Kenya's foreign policy within the context of the Cold War, postulating that Kenya's foreign policy practice was the summation of an overly dependent state rather than an eager entrant in world affairs. The premises Makinda argued upon were similar to those of Don-Nanjira (2010) and McDougal (2009) especially when he conversely argued that Kenya's actions at different levels of the international system are a result of it being entirely dependent on foreign capital. He adds on that at the beginning, economic issues and the border security were the primary concern of Kenya's foreign policy. As Thiam (1965) pleaded above that there was a paradox in dual nationalism, which he referred to as a paradox between desire for territorial integrity and pan-Africanism or call it 'united Africa' as this became more transparent in Kenyan case, when Makindi explained that despite the fact that Kenya 'occasionally issued statements proclaiming her nonaligned status and participated in OAU deliberations, nonalignment and pan-Africanism were low priority issues.' Kenya eventually takes a clear stand with one of the superpowers abandoning the 'quiet diplomacy' approach it had previously adopted. Among the vital points Makindi brings up is the North-eastern Frontier Conundrum as an instrumental seminal event in shaping foreign Kenya's relations with the Horn of Africa, in which Somalia is located.

In short, where Makinda and Howell divert is the analytical approach they take to explain foreign policy phenomena in Kenya, Where the former maintains categorical analysis of Kenya's relations into three i.e. her relation with Africa as a

continent, relation with East Africa as a region where the state is located and the rest of the world say the international community, compendiously relating the three to other three foreign policy approaches such as neutral, radical and conservative , moralistic and idealistic as explained above. On the other side, Makinda examines Kenyan foreign policy basing on the global politics which was prevailing the major events by then i.e. the Cold War. There is an agreement between the two scholars when it comes to Kenya's neutrality in African position, the paradox around this position especially when Howell posited that 'Kenya has certainly not been reluctant to involve herself in the affairs of the continent, but it would be wrong to assume that she has deliberately set out to pursue a policy of influential neutrality (1968:46).' And Makinda's argument that 'Kenya's recent plunge into the Cold War politics and the signs that she is moving towards political accommodation with Somalia could have a few obvious repercussions (1983:318).' A conclusion can be made from both scholars that Kenyan foreign policy superficially seems to be firm yet the fact is tactile as par various examples they presented.

When Mc Evoy maintained that Kenya's engagement in peace support has evolved from peacekeeping operations to more complex peace enforcement in conjunction with the African Union (AU) in recognition of the global emphasis on a collective interest in peace and security (2013;2). For Don-Nanjira he perceived contemporary international relations aspects such as foreign policy and diplomacy have become very vital in the management of inter-state relations. Furthermore, within diplomacy and foreign policy, there has been a shift from basic goals— political or security concern such as the maintaining peaceful relations with external entities to socio-economic agenda i.e. the development objective. This is particularly among African states (2010; 456). Likewise, Kimenyi depicts Kenyan foreign policy as that which has made various strides struggling to achieve her development objective. The ideology of Pan-Africanism has also been used to emphasis development for instance, through being part of institutions such as the East African Community, a regional economic bloc and the African Union.

Together with its other partners that is Uganda and Tanzania, Kenya has absorbed other countries within the region such as Burundi and Rwanda to be part of the East African Community. Countries within the East African region seem to have realised that their development is highly dependent on the kind of relationship it has

with its immediate neighbours. And as such in 1999, a treaty was signed in respect of the East African Community (EAC), with a primary aim of promoting cooperation that is in the political, economic and social fields (Kimenyi: 2012;1). However, Mc Evoy contrarily maintains that still at the continental level Kenya plays an active role at the AU, partially through the Kenyan deputy chair of the AU Commission. From a general point of view, it is not seen to be a particularly strong, visionary or proactive leader, in contrast to other leading African states such as South Africa. Neither does it seek to position itself as an equivalent or rival to other African economies, such as South Africa and Nigeria, rather preferring to maintain a "modest posture" (2013;2-3).

Despite the fact that the chief objective of East African Community was a promotion of economic cooperation, technically it would be hard to do so when there is no peace as according to the community itself. A prosperous East African region could only be enhanced when there was peace, thus to ensure this political or security agenda a summit was held in Nairobi that would see Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania unanimously agree to support SADC's mediation position in bringing peace to the East African region. In order to achieve perpetual peace and security in the region where it is located i.e. both East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Wanyama illustrated that Kenya as a sovereign state that has provided leadership through various prominent regional diplomatic initiatives in solving regional conflicts such as the Sudan Peace process that resulted in the creation of a new state, Southern Sudan. There was also the establishment of a transitional federal government in Somalia. On the other hand, Kenya is privileged to be a host for various international organisations and diplomatic missions. In order to maintain its legitimacy as the headquarters of important and international institutions as well as a hub for investors Kenya has strived to maintain its policy of good neighbourliness in the region (2013;9-10). Peace diplomacy has, therefore played an important role in Kenya's foreign policy since stability in the region can guarantee the achievement of Kenya's national interest.

Suggestively Ojwang and Franceshi (2002) clarify that the constitutional and legal recommendations need to be improved in the practice of foreign affairs within the context of reforms and the constitutional making process that has been taking place over the last twenty or so years. This is especially the case, now that a new

constitution in Kenya has taken effect upon its promulgation and is currently being implemented. Korwa G. Adar and Mutahi Ngunyi's analysis of the politics of integration within East African states shows what Kenya's regional attitudes and relations are. Korwa G. Adar's book, Kenyan Foreign Policy Behaviour towards Somalia, 1963-1983, is a foundational text explaining the pre-1992 foreign policy environment with regards to relations with Somalia.

2.4. Kenya-Somalia Relations

Concerning the inter-state behaviour between Kenya and her neighbouring countries, the dictum that should be recalled is that Kenya tends to take a radical and conservative approach as it was posited by Howell (1968) and Makinda (1983), both reflecting the argument of Thiam (1965) who definitely postulated that the paradox in the ideologies that guide inter-state relations within African continent, for African foreign policy was determined by both pan-Africanism on one hand and on the other micro-nationalism-that involved preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Kenya-Somalia relations are an archetype of this paradox as Adar (1994) incontestably articulated that the cause and effect of Kenya-Somalia misunderstanding were fundamentally about principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. Primarily the determinant of Kenya's foreign policy towards the federal republic of Somalia is as Adar concisely explained it that "It is the external factors which influence Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Somalia" (p. 137). The conflict appeared out in two momentous events: the disputed Kenya's Northern Frontier District (NFD), and the halls of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) where juridical promises of sovereignty clashed with the equally emotive notions of self-determination. Adar explicitly explains the main reason as to why the issue of territorial integrity was a prevailing central concern during colonial era and post-independence period, the NFD covered over 40 percent of Kenya's total area, and surprisingly the official British NFD Commission report figures overtly indicated that more than 80 percent of NFD's population was in favour of unification with great Somalia (p.41).

On the same note complimenting Howell (1968) and Adar (1994), in her report titled 'Shifting priorities: Kenya's changing approach to peacebuilding and peace-making' Mc Evoy points out more recent developments in Kenya's praiseworthy role played mediating a peace deal within the region, especially in Sudan and Somalia. For instance in mid-2012 and early-2013 talks were hosted by the state on the political future of Somalia's Jubbaland region; also in February 2012, it co-hosted an international anti-piracy conference with the UN. However, she counter argues that Kenya's unprecedented engagement in Somalia is perhaps an inevitable part of the general shift in Kenya's engagement with the world as part of a general trajectory towards more strategic, self-interested and confident policymaking. Ironically she points out that the intervention is part of a pragmatic approach to foreign policy that was adopted by the Kibaki government and that this was quite a unique case in Kenyan foreign policy.

It is asserted by Baylis et al., that legitimacy is an aspect that all sovereign states including Kenya strive to achieve. Legitimacy is a belief that an entity or in this case a state is acting according to the values that the international community upholds. Hence, the greater a states' legitimacy, the easier time they will have in influencing others to corporate with their policies whereas, the lesser legitimacy a state has the more costly the action it will have in convincing other entities to corporate (2010; 159). Kenya, therefore, seeks to emphasis its legitimacy through partaking in leadership roles that encourage peace. For instance, Kenya is a member state of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (A.U) which have a mandate to bring stability to Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND CONCEPTUAL ACCOUNT OF THE TWO STATES

Contemporary Kenyan foreign policy orientation towards Somalia partially has its roots in the state's chronicles, likewise the political history of Somalia on the other hand contributed to the current turbulent situation within it, quintessentially making it a collapsed state or what some scholars like Abdi Ismail Samatara (2016) and Ken Menkhaus (2014) referred to as a failed state, a situation invoking international and regional intervention (Harper 2012; Woodwards 2013; Howell 1968). Therefore reflecting on the colonial and post-independence events in both states which are the critical antecedents, facilitates a comprehensive understanding of the relics in the relations between the two states and background of institutional settings in the following period. The institutional settings are essentially the critical juncture that is crucial in decision-making process pertaining to Kenyan foreign policy. This chapter is devoted to presenting of a sequential account of political antecedents that occurred in both Kenya and Somalia, which were central in shaping their socio-political perspective about each other and consequently contributing to the domestic political framework in Kenya and exoteric policies, that the state applies within the regional context and with peculiarity towards Somalia.

While conceptualising, substantially this subsection's primary focus will be on post-colonial period for it was the period in which major events impacting the

inter-state relations of the continent occurred; among others are achievement of independence in 1960s an event that paved away to a new age in African international relations (Cornelissen, 2012: 88), for it was characterized by both nationalistic spirit of unification of African states or pan-Africanism, at the same time containing antagonistic feelings of maintenance of territorial integrity as designated by the imperialists during 1884-1885 Berlin conference. As a result, it leads to external balancing at a regional level as well as international level i.e alliance with the Cold War superpowers and regional powers to counter the threat. Also a brief historical account of colonialism will be given for the two states, since. More to the point though, Kenya's colonial legacy is pivotal in understanding the path she took immediately after independence.

3.1. KENYA

Map of Kenya Showing Ethnic Localities

Figure 03: Source, CIA, UK Foreign Office, African Study Studies Centre

In January 1964 after having no recourse left Kenya formed an alliance with Great Britain to solve the problem within its unruly military in the infamous Lanet incident in Nakuru (Parsons, 2007), this would later resonate in Kenyan policy towards Somalia as it attempted to appropriately balance the threat from Somalia by seeking alliance with Britain in her war against security threat more recently after 11 September 2001(Tylor and William 2004: 42). However, this was not the first case in Kenyan history to happen as Beck reveals that while attempting to preserve their autonomy from the Omani Sultanate of Sayyid Said in 1822, a clamour for British military assistance was raised among the indigenous Swahili clans in Mombasa which is an integral part of the state we refer to as Kenya today, though there was a delay in offering the assistance, in late 1823 it was proffered as quid pro quo (Beck,

2010). Maxon and Ofkansky relate that in the following year on 9th February British Protectorate was officially declared over Mombasa town by Captain William Fitzwilliam Wentworth Owen (2014: 17).

This was the foundation of the Anglo-Kenya foreign relation that has impacted Kenya's formation of political institutions and in turn influenced her relations with other states in the region as it will be elaborated. It is significant to recount that ultimately the power to make foreign decision was in the hands of Mazrui Council of Mombasa though it was a British Protectorate, later this was lost to British East Africa Company in 1877 . The Sultan had granted British company a concession of administration in East Africa and with that, they completely ignored the Swahili people -only negotiating with the Sultan of Zanzibar, for their prejudices made them believe that the East African Coast has only developed because of the Arabs. 11 years later in order to reconcile between the British and German imperial conflicts over East African territory, the Anglo-German agreement was signed on 1 November 1886, resulting into apportioning more territories to British side that today is known as Kenyan side.

Imperial British East African company under Sir William Mackinnon which was formed in early September of 1888 acquired partial administrative powers from the royal charter, to pursue its economic motives in East Africa, until July 1895 that the British Foreign Office (BFO) assumed responsibility for the company's territory and officially formed a protectorate in the area and renamed it British East Africa. The most significant point to be underlined here is that factually since the arrival of the British until the independence of Kenya in 1960s, all the decisions which were pertaining to the territories that formed the state of Kenya and particularly concerning the external policies were solely taken by both IBEA and foreign office[3]. It is evidently manifested in the treaties that were signed in line with the claim of territories over East African region between the British, Germans and French alongside the imperialist companies and the Sultan of Zanzibar. Rashid profoundly articulates it more clearly that 'By the end of nineteenth century, the British colonial system fell into three categories; firstly, the crown colonies, under the aegis of the

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[3] The Foreign Office was created in 1782 and later became the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1968, responsible for foreign affairs with other states with exception of occupied territories abroad, although later in 1968 it assumed the role of running former and remaining British dependencies (The National Archive, 2016).

colonial office; secondly the protectorates, most still at this point under the foreign office and the chartered company, also theoretically under the colonial office but only loosely supervised at best. Most of the men, who governed the colonies, were called governor.' (2014: 10)

The pattern of political and governmental activities in the post-colonial period can be better grasped if viewed against the background of structures laid down and the processes set in motion during the colonial era, which Arendt in her magnum opus and Brett unequivocally sums up that; the colonial power is obliged to use a different from the one back in their home countries, which was the same case in Africa. The system itself has to overcome the difficulty of authority, distance and cost, that is to cunningly induce the colonised subject to internalise both the colonial statute and institutions, thus facilitate its legitimacy among the subjects. Brett adds on that '… to create an organisational capacity capable of transmitting orders from the centre and enforcing them on the periphery- and to do all this without cost which is so high that render the whole exercise valueless.' (Brett 1973: 53 and Arendt 1973).

On 12 December 1963 Kenyans earned a magnificent triumph over the British imperialist bondage as viewed from an Afro-centric lens, a date that was a turning point as well as a critical juncture in the Kenyan state history yet not different from the decolonization phenomena happening in the same period (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990: 861). The British had willingly returned the authority into the hands of Kenyans and decided to peacefully vacate the administrative premises after the claim that now Africans were ready enough to govern themselves, a quiet Eurocentric point of view. Despite their laudable claim, ironically the British had left behind two bewailing phenomena in Kenya just like in any other country they had colonised. First, a Kenyan citizenry deeply fragmented along ethnic and tribal fraternities, deprived of a sense of community contemplating less about a common Kenyan community with some Kenyans rather apparently feeling robbed of a chance to participate in mainstream domestic politics (Chau, 2010; 68). Second, was the dissatisfaction of allocation—as Adar factually draws attention to the then demeanour that from British official records, there was a widespread feeling of discontentment within a substantial part of Kenya's North-eastern region? Next question would be what probably accounted for the mentioned phenomena? And

what repercussions did they have on the new state's foreign policy? Pertaining to the former problem were two factors British colonial policy of divide and rule in conjunction with indirect rule—specific ethnic subgroups, called "tribes," were created in a form that had not existed previously and a chief was assigned to them who was responsible for transmitting imperialists' demands such as tax collection. The ethnic groups were assigned to live in separate areas of the colony.

The British allied with some tribes and ethnicities against the others, the depth of these divisions among Kenyans were quiet projected during the post-independence partisan politics as it would be precisely explained later and in the next factor. Important to note was shifting frontier which is the primary concern of this paper and acting as the second factor accounting for the problems mentioned above in newly established Kenyan state. This was a chronicle problem not only for Kenyan government but also during pre-independence period as lamented by Donovan C. Chau that of all the neighbouring countries, Somalia has proven to be the most troublesome for Kenya in both the colonial and postcolonial eras (2010:67). The imperialists' partition and re-demarcation of Horn of Africa was a great challenge to Kenyan state and undoubtedly influencing the foreign policy towards Somalia. For as Thompson profoundly puts it that as the shifting frontiers continued during colonial era, likewise the human frontiers shifted too but '... the official perceptions of the Somalis in this frontier region of Kenya and emphasis on their being different from others, assisted in the formulation of the Somali-received tradition of themselves as a people distinct from other Africans in the zone-a fact further encouraged by British government spokesmen such as Ernest Bevin after the second World War.' (1995: 1). This would later worsen the Kenya-Somalia relations for it resulted in secessionist movement backed by Somali government as it would be the subject of the following chapters[4].

It is imperative though to mention that correlating all the above problems to imperialism would simply be a fallacy or a superficially deterministic explanation because to get a wider perspective of causality of problems faced by Kenyan state during independence other factors have to be examine too. Rather it seems to be a function of continuity and discontinuity against intensity and impassivity. Politics in newly established state of Kenya was quite much of tribal based that was persistent

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[4] See chapter five

in the post-colonial politics as Maxon and Ofcansky illustrates—major parties such as Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was chiefly for Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu ethnic groups while as Kenya African National Union (KANU) was majorly for Luo and Kĩkũyũ (2014:158). The question by then was how they could reconcile politically and socially polarised Kenyan society? And how to progress as an independent state? Similarly like in the case of Somalia's former Italian colony and Somaliland instantaneously striving to unify after independence despite their ideological differences (Harper 2012:51-53; Le Sage: 2005), Kenya's mainstream parties with divergent views concerning the structure of autonomous Kenya struggled to reconcile. This was extremely significant for the state in order to pragmatically deal with the fractured society, in 1964 KADU gave up its proposal for a federal constitution and it dissolved merging with KANU, an advocate of centralization and then a one-party republic was formed with Kenyatta from Kĩkũyũ ethnicity as the president (Makong'o and Muchanga: 2006:191). Later as it would be seen this impacted the foreign policy of Kenya.

From independence to mid-1970s there seemed to be remarkable continuity in issues that faced Kenya's external relations and also how it reacted to them. The agenda of Kenya was predominated with the legacies of colonial rule and regional issues and within this period Kenyan foreign policy was defined as 'quiet diplomatic' (Howell 1968, Khadiagara 2010 and Adar, 1994). And then from the late 1970s a discontinuity was witnessed, there was a shift in the foreign policy agenda at the same time the state traversed into more actively indulging in exoteric affairs. Basically what accounted for that transformation can be traced from numerous elements that David F. Gordon elaborated in his article called 'Anglophonic Variants: Kenya versus Tanzania' that elements such as '…the collapse of East African Community (EAC); the East African Community (EAC); superpower involvement in the conflicts in north-eastern Africa; the emergence of southern Africa as a major focal point of global political interest; the overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda and the subsequent continuing instability in that country; the growing conflict between economically strapped Third World nations and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; and the growing interest of the United States in playing a more direct role in the Indian Ocean as a response to the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan.' (Gordon 1987: 89). The same argument resonates in Makinda's point when he asserted that partially it was Kenyatta and Moi's weakness that was due to reliance on foreign capital leading them to resort quiet diplomacy (1983:303).

Well, it's a common argument that there is a direct link between the politics and economy, and likewise, Kenya's foreign policies adopted in the post-imperial decades can be interpreted in relation to her performance in the international economy as seen from a Marxist argument that the superstructure determines the base. It was not until the late 1960s that Kenya was still so much structurally dependent on the global economy while at the same period trying to alter its domestic structures so that to diversify and improve their positions in the international economic order. So what possible economic measures would Kenya take to solve reach its objective global economy? During that time Kenya's economy suffered from a balance-of-trade deficit, the trade between Kenya and Britain started to steadily reduce for instance by 1982 Kenya's imports from Britain decreased from 31 percent to 18 percent . On the export side, Kenya aimed at diversifying her economy in doing so, an attempt was made to search for a market in other industrialised countries as well as developing states rather than substantially depending on Britain. Consequently in the early 1980s an achievement was made in Kenyan exports when they were balanced between exports to developing countries (both African and non- African) and exports to the industrialised states.

To come to the point, it was observable in the first decade after her independence that there was a rapid growth of trade volume yet in the second decade was characterized by stagnation- between 1963 to 1973 the GDP grew at an annual average of 6.6% (Global Security, 2000), there was a persistent low growth in the later period and limited economic development-that is i.e the 1980s and 1990s yet within the same period Kenya maintained measures of political stability and developmental strategy (Kimenyi et.,al 2016). Kenya was put into a serious balance-of-payments crisis in the early 1980s due to the second oil shock and international crisis yet historically Kenya has always been experiencing negative trade balance which was always covered up by the revenue and foreign exchange generated from tourism and foreign investment. Also, Kenya's foreign aid came mainly from Western industrialized countries, with Britain becoming less main provider since mid-1970s and the US replacing her as the major aid's provider yet prior to that,

Kenya didn't allow any of the two superpowers to play a big role in development assistance. Additionally, other foreign assistance comes from multilateral institutions such as European Economic Community, World Bank and IMF (Gordon, 1987:91).

3.1. SOMALIA

''*African states are commonly defined in terms of what they are not, rather than what they are and the issue of correcting their 'wrongness' has high priority in international politics.*'' (Louise Wiuff Moe)

The early 1960s signified a critical change in the international system and African continent, take on new dynamics and characteristics. Although the higher level of optimism was raised concerning the success of imposed model of modern bureaucratic statehood and multiparty system democracy by the post-colonial states, the opposite was true more than 30 years later. The model failed to bring expected transformation in most of the post-colonial states rather it became a factor behind conflict and unrest, and soon the dominant discourse became of state failure (Cornelissen et al, 2012: 88-89). Against that backdrop, this subsection's main objective is present a well-founded and accurate understanding of Kenya-Somalia relation in a historical context. By juxtaposing historical eventualities in Somalia we can find answers to perplexities that the Somali state ended up to be in, enormously forcing other states such as Kenya to change their operational code and action template towards her. Somalia a country once labelled the 'Switzerland of Africa' for her peace and stability reached through the practised of a liberal democracy and multi-party politics, good relations with most of the states in the international community (Metz, 1992) , and for the matter of the fact serving as a democratic model during decolonization era. Yet within the course of history, Somalia turns to be the most notorious state in the Horn (Woodward, 2013), a situation that has imperviously seized to change rather deteriorating further by becoming a threat even to the surrounding states and beyond[5]. In an attempt to give a brief background of Somalia we ask what went wrong in the country? And specifically, how did the internal anarchy spilled over to Kenya and other countries? Yet the most vital question here is how does historical account explain realist approaches taken by Kenya to counter balance the threat from Somalia?

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[5] i.e the US and European States

Retrospecting on the pre-independence period gives a clear imagery of Kenya-Somalia relation which precedented contemporary reaction of both states as Chau points it out; ''the pre-independence historical background lays the groundwork for comprehending the relations between these two peoples and governments in the contemporary world'' (Chau, 2010; 67-68 and Hamilton, 2007). And indeed it was the case with Somalia, especially when tracing Kenya-Somalia relation a bit earlier than Berlin conference of 1884-85 where a large number of Somali nomads moved from the Darood and Hawiye clan-families, expanded southward and westward from the Horn of Africa, acquiring territory southwest of the Juba River and west along the Shabelle River during the pre-imperial era. And later on with the arrival of British colonialist, Somalis of Issaq found themselves on the opposite side of the border in in a carved British Protectorate which they felt was demographically far different from them (Payne, 1988), a mismatch made which would later subtly mitigate nationalistic feelings and intricacies in today's human security in the region. However, isn't this a superficial recurring scapegoat theme in Afrocentric explanation of foreign policy putting the blame on imperialism concerning contemporary African problems?

By the end of 19th century, Somalia was occupied by innumerable categories of colonisers – major, middle range and minor imperialists including the French, British and, later, Italians and Ethiopians. The primary mercantile objective of those colonialists was gaining control of the waters of the Nile River and ensuring that they benefited from the geo-strategic position of the country. Likewise, Linda De Hoyos reverberates a similar argument when she observed that the states in Horn of Africa being a victim of British balance of power and geopolitics practiced by Henry Kissinger and his mentors at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and that essentially occurred in two phases (1995;12).   But just like in the case of Kenya, while anticipating to achieve their goal, the imperialists didn't attempt cessation of volatile clan competition rather they opportunistically exploited it to gain power and introduced rules to develop new economic structures (Abubakr, 2015 and Pmnier, 1996). And today various scholars cited clannish competition among the major internal factors causing chaos in Somalia as resonantly cited by Peter J, Schreader when he mentioned Somalia as an intriguing case study for scholars of African nationalism since the country is synonymous with ethnic chaos and state collapse

(Lowell, 2006:107). Kenya-Somalia relations were greatly impacted by the European colonial expansionist policies with various treaties signed in an attempt pertaining to relative gain amongst them (Hess, 1964; 416). However Pan-Somalism is neither a colonial nor post-imperial phenomena in Somalia, while Abubakr explaining maintenance of social order in pre-colonial Somali societies, he denotes vitalised kin-ordered system (based on kinship (descent or tol) and contract (xeer) system which provided mechanisms and social sanctions for effective conflict resolution (2015: 18-19).

This social fact of descent groups' significance was in fact intrinsically modified and transferred to the national level when Somalia attained its autonomy from colonial domination (Nelson, 1986). Thus arguably simultaneous unification of the two Somali territories was not a stunning phenomenon rather a continuance of a deep feeling of nationalism as this resilience is concisely illustrated by Nyambura that unlike most African States, Somalia had extremely strong sense of national identity combined with explicit inclination towards Islam (2011:184), a similar point Nelson strongly stresses. A similar sentiment that would later be spread across the border in countries with substantial populations of Somali ethnicity. This event instantly followed the independence of *Somali Italiana* on 1 July 1960 and just after its counterpart-the British Somaliland had achieved its independence too in the same year but a five days earlier (Williams, 2011: 102; Elmi and Barise, 2006; 124).

The two states formed a federal republic characterized by parliamentary government-democratic in nature, substance, and function—that was basically established in a culturally, religiously, and linguistically homogeneous society of more than two million people as Nelson expounds: 'Although British Somaliland retained its colonial status until independence, changes instituted by the United Nations in the trusteeship territory influenced political developments there as well. As a result, Somalia's independence as a unified, multiparty parliamentary democracy was attained relatively painlessly' (1982: 3). How could these two states get along with each other since they had different colonial experiences? Conversely, Somali-Landers and southern Somalis had adopted parallel administrative systems, and they were exposed to infamous divide and rule policy that essentially created internal conflicts i.e the gross inter-clan relation. Fascinatingly for the preponderates of united Somalia were more overwhelmed by ethnic homogeneity instead of

attentively focusing on colonial political differences, thus fundamentally contemplating less on the complexities of inheriting a modern state system and all its institutions in a society based on traditional and religious political institutions (Lewis, 2008 and Abubakr, 2015). Similar to other newly independent states in Africa, the early years of the post-independent Somali government was characterised by a fixation on liberation of the other Somali territories and political struggles among the elites, internal struggles against corruption and favouritism and massive dependence on external contributions for development that consequently weakened the Somali civil state (Lewis, 2008).

During that period Somalia was pre-occupied with two main problems; full integration of the two former colonial territories for as Powella et al, lamented that no sense of national identity existed, because different languages, monetary systems and styles of government all made the new central governance difficult, however there were attempts of drafting a single integrated political system (2008; Le Sage, 2005: 17; William, 2011). On the same note, like the Kenyans of Somali ethnic background in Kenya's North-eastern region formerly known as Northern Frontier District (NDF) who abandoned regional and national elections (Global Security, 2000), Williams mentions a similar antagonism in Somalia when the main northern political party boycotted the unification referendum (2011: 102), the party's idea would resurface three decades later and consequently paving way to a horrifying civil war as it will be observed later. The second problem, more serious than the previous one was the interference into the conflict with Ethiopia and Kenya arising from Somalia's irredentist demands (Nelson, 1982), also this would later distort the relation of Somalia with those two states. It was an accumulated external threat that invoked the two states to balance appropriately against somalia both internally and externally, and in fact it counted more as a serious threat on the side of Kenya which extremely gave primacy to territorial integration and also was presupposed that the success of the Somali irredentists would provoke more disintegration of other territories in state (Global Security 2000 and Thompson, 2015). A similar claim that was based on pertaining OAU's resolution on Somalis claim for territories 1960s and in 2002 it was used to decline the recognition of Somaliland plausibly for the fact that it could appeal in other states (Williams, 2011:103), which is against the very objective of the organisation among other reasons.

The conflicts between Horn of Africa's states in the 1960s and 1970s were demonstrably turned into an entry of sponsorship and proxy war arena between the then superpowers (De Hoyos, 1995: 12). It was crystal clearly observed in Somalia's effort to counter its post-independence problems; foreign aid was sought for economic development and for enhancement of Somalia's military capability to accomplish its objective. The aim of establishing the Somalia had been incorporated in the constitution, a move that drew angry responses from neighbouring states yet a large segments of Somali citizenry was in favour of unification with the other Somalis' territories in Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia.

So was President Adam Abdulle Osman, he attempted alliance seeking support from the United States for the development of a large army to boost his state's military capability and thus promoting national security intertwined with already mentioned state interest of achieving Great Somalia . The government turned to the Soviet Union after the former's denial of its request, and soon Russia willingly proffered military equipment, advice, and training. Contrary, according to De Hoyos the insufficient financial assistance offered by the Western states was the reason for Somalia's resort to Russia's more appealing package (1995; 13). However this created a security dilemma not only for Kenya and Ethiopia but also with antagonistic western powers, for the very initiative of internal balancing resulting from chain ganging with the communist camp obliterated the congruous Somali relation with the other camp, as it was evidently underlined by Nelson that: ''Moscow's assistance was retained, and the army continued to grow. Many foreign observers, including the government in Washington, remained wary but felt that Soviet influence was offset by the general pro-Western orientation of Egal and other Somali leaders and by the equipment and training aid provided for Somalia's national police force by the United States and other Western countries. But the army, whose leaders were influenced by Soviet political and military doctrine, had clearly become the best organised and strongest institution in the state.'' (Nelson, 1982).

After accumulating relatively sufficient capabilities in 1963, a brief Somali-Ethiopian war occurred the following year under a pretext of liberating oppressed secessionist Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden region, in the same year Somalia was accused of sponsoring a similar movement in Kenya (Harper, 2011 and Yihun, 2014). In 1967 a moderate Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal assumed office

through the electoral process, turning Somali relations with neighbouring countries from confrontational and hostile to accommodating—but without abandoning the ultimate Greater Somalia objective (Nelson, 1982). For the first time, this was happening in history because the inherited national objective of unifying Somalis was to be relaxed.

In a nutshell, not only US was threatened but also Kenya by Somali military program, yet generally the first 10 years of independence were marked by vibrantly flourishing of Somalia though alongside corruption and internal political conflict, and eventually dysfunctional multiparty democracy, subsequently opening the way to a more bewailing tragedy pertaining to state-public relation and the neighbouring states (Harper, 2012; 53). As Harper clarifies the following incidents that on 15 October 1969, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, the second Somali President was assassinated. This is where the turbulence in Somalia would begin, although it would take a gradual move to reach a critical point of devastation in the Somali chronicles which would end up with a state collapse as Noam Chomsky puts in his work- 'failed state': the abuse of power and the assault on democracy, or how Abdi Samatar another expert on the politics of Horn of Africa prefers it to be described as rather a state that basically failed.

3.2. The Somali Crisis

The destruction of Somali state can simply be summarized as an interplay of superpowers and local agents—on one side USSR and US alongside others in an effort pursuing their interests in the region and thus perennially not being committed to their alliance rather switching sides, and on the other hand the nature of Somali society essentially characterised with dual loyalty within which the primary allegiance is to the clan and sub-clans thus proving very hard to contain (Cornelissen et al, 2012; De Hoyos,1995; Everill and Kaplan 2013:129). Indeed formation of a mono loyalty would later be among the objectives of Barre's revolution, for he believed as Othman O, Mahmood, articulated that clan loyalty brought no good rather than breeding more tribalism, nepotism and corruption, as well as misrule and root cause of state dysfunction (Othman, 2001: 5-8). However, what positive results

did the revolution yield in such a society with extreme attachment to clannish identity? Shortly in late autumn of 1969 while the government was trying to reorganise itself a handful of military officials in corporation with the police carried out a 'bloodless coup' and their leader Major General Muhammad Siad Barre assumed leadership, this was similar to a wave of military mutiny five years early in post-independent East African states (Parson, 2007:51; Bienen, 1974: 489), though Kenya managed to contain it as it will be discussed at length in the next section, the Somalia case a revolution soon would take place. With the help of Russia and Cuba General Barre would introduce his developmental strategies through scientific socialism, establishing fundamental reforms through new institutions in Somalia society yet his system was equally criticised for fracturing the society like his predecessors (Elmi and Barise, 2006: 34).

While pursuing his expansionist policy or the national interest of Great Somalia, in 1977 Somalia invaded Ethiopia seeking to annex predominantly Somali areas in South-eastern Ethiopian regions plausibly capitalising the situation that followed up United States' spurned ties with Ethiopia (Everill and Kaplan, 2013), but contrary Somalia ended up losing the war for the matter of the fact that France, Britain, and the U.S. refused to supply Somali with weaponry as long as it continued to attack Ethiopia (Mohamoud, 2006), on another account, Everill and Kaplan notes that among the major reason for the loose of the war was the reverse of external alliance by USSR alongside Cuba, when they decided to back-up a newly established Marxist military regime in Ethiopia. That defeat would setup terrain for state collapse in Somalia and consequently emergence of humanitarian crisis (2013: 125), the defeat was a blow to internal coherence of Somalia and likewise it impacted Pan-Somali nationalism for Greater Somalia because the defeat of Somalia was coincidental with French Somaliland's (Djibouti) independence on 27 June 1977 that in turn diffused itself from joining the Somali federation. Following the defeat, the Barre's regime became increasingly repressive leading to clan-based opposition factions challenging state authority and eventually ousting General Barre out Somalia in 1991 (Othman, 2001). Samatar notes that shockingly socio-political situation didn't return back to normal after the overthrow of the military dictatorship rather a dangerous civil war led by the very clan militias that defeated Barre broke out (1992: 638). In the same year, former British Somaliland declared itself

independent from Southern Somalia, though until today it failed to get a substantial recognition from the international community. Between 1991-2000 Somalia lacked a formal government, later Transitional National Assembly (TNA) was inaugurated on 13 August 2000, it managed to gain international recognition because immediately during its establishment the elected president and his prime minister moved throughout the neighbouring states including Kenya and Ethiopia. However, what is acute is the failure to gain domestic legitimacy within their own country, and some of their effort to reconciliate between Somali communities and factions has been challenged by both Somaliland and Puntland (Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio 2003; 156-158).

CHAPTER FOUR

Methodological and Theoretical Framework

To reach final findings in this research study, the main literature that has been surveyed can be divided into primary and secondary data were employed, ranging from press e.g. the Daily Nation newspaper, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and others, ministerial documents for instance from Kenya ministry of foreign affairs, official websites, reports and publications (AMISOM and others), academic books, annuals, articles etc. It is imperative to point out, that both latest and earlier works on the subject were carefully selected to fit in academic standard and thus maintaining reliability of this research study. However, it is worth mentioning, a substantial part of this research study is built upon secondary data due to the limited access to primary sources and the designated time frame for completion of the research, and for certain reasons some academic sources which were extremely appropriate for the study were either not accessible at all or not fully accessible, so only excerpts from them was used, and among others were; Adar's *'Kenyan Foreign Policy Behaviour Towards Somalia, 1963-1983*', Mwangi's book chapter titled '*Continuity and Change in Kenya's Defense and Foreign Policies: The impact on New Security Dilemma*' in Kithinji (2016) and other works. All the above are assessed within process tracing method and interpreted in a Neoclassical Realist framework. This chapter essentially explains in detail the method and methodology employed in this research study while addressing the following question; why process tracing method and Neoclassical Realism were used? What are their

advantage and disadvantages? Probably, alternatively what methods and methodologies could be used if possible?

The study is based on process tracing method or somewhat refer to as causal process-tracing or causal-process observations, basically it can be defined as a single case research method applied within-case to deduce presence or absence of causal mechanisms. Yet for Collier it refers to a systematic evaluation of diagnostic evidence selected within a framework of research question and hypothesis (2011: 823). An in-depth analysis of a single case is involved in this method, it's an effective technique for examining or testing theories of causality-in-action by evaluating the intervening steps (or variables) and thus bridging between theory and the real world (Reilly, 2010:735). In this case the *explaining-outcome process tracing* that is case-centric rather than theory-centric is chosen because the study's objective is to evaluate a given case with already developed theory i.e. explaining the evolution (continuity and discontinuity) of Kenya foreign behaviour towards Somalia with neoclassical realist theory[6].

Two themes are fundamentally significant in process tracing method—description and sequence; the method intrinsically explains trajectories of change and causation, however if there is insufficient description in each step in this trajectory, the analysis cannot be successful. Hence a "static" description at each step is essentially necessary in analysing the studied process. Equally significant, Process-tracing gives importance to sequential arrangement of all variables[7] (Collier, 2010: 823). Similarly, in this research paper, events are orderly arranged beginning from the pre-colonial period, colonial, post-independence[8], cold war, post-Cold War to current time. Since many causes can have their own various causes, process-tracing as a critical mechanism can effectively illuminate that issue of confounding variables for instance the reason for Kenya's alliance with Britain and Ethiopia in 1960s against Somalia because of being suspicious of an invasion from Somalia, due to territorial dispute which has its causal factor in of itself. The approach links critical junctures to critical antecedents to explain the outcome of interest.

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[6]The logic is that the main explanation presented is relevant to a specific researched case and thus irrelevant to be generalised.

[7] Independent, dependent, and intervening variables

[8]At the same time was the Cold War period

Critical juncture refers to a period "in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases onto divergent long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory. Critical antecedents, on the other hand, are factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture'' (Goldstone et. al, cited in Kisangani, 2015: 35). Elements of continuity and change are included in critical antecedents and this is the primary objective of the research-to explain evolution of Kenya's foreign policy and specifically in its relation with the Federal Republic of Somalia from advent of Kenya as an independent state in 196s to 2000s, thus what is explored in this paper are the elements of continuity and discontinuity within a given time frame[9] and more so, the factors underlying those continuities and discontinuities within the Neoclassical Realist theoretical perspective. Slater and Simmon contentiously maintain that in several cases divergent long-term outcome is produced by a combination of successional factors or conditions following critical juncture and with factors during a critical juncture. Notably they clearly underline that it is not always at the critical juncture that every critical happens (2010: 887). The paper illustrates that most of critical junctures in Kenyan history were eventualities when Kenya's non-interventionist foreign policy was into existence, which refers in general but in this case it relates specifically to the Federal republic of Somalia[10]. Critical antecedents is comprised of elements of continuity and discontinuity (change)—the latter includes increase in military capability, global war on terror, new alliance, domestic stability etc. And the elements of continuity are Kenyan state and its colonial defined boundaries, and perception of Somalia, Kenya's perception of Somalia didn't change that much from 1960s to the present, rather as Vincent Bakpetu Thompson puts it that the current phase in Kenya-Somalia relations, is anguished by the spill over effect of Somali failed state such as cross border incursions and incidents as well as influx of refugees. Basically the threat changed from being the Somali state to a militia group (Al-Shabaab) operating within the state[11] which has shaken Kenya's internal security (Thompson, 2015). And the outcome is the ultimate decision to invade Somalia.

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[9]1963 to 2011

[10]It is worthy mentioning that, that Kenya was once at logger head with Uganda and Tanzania especially in 1970s over border issue with the former (Khadiagala 2010:272).

[11]Threat perception can still be categorised as change. However it is preferably put under continuity because even when the state failed or collapsed in 1990s, Somalia remained a source threat to kenya— with a massive follow of refugees and the outbreak of Al-Shabaab insurgence.

Figure 04. A Process-Tracing Model of Kenya's Invasion of Somalia

Critical Antecedents	⇨	Critical Junctures	⇨	outcome

• Continuity   • Continuous Security threat   • Invading Somalia

• Change

Process tracing method was chosen due to the merits it possesses as a research method for according to Kisangani among the various advantages of process-tracing is that it is one of critical mechanism that can be used to elaborate the issue pertaining to complexity of variables since various causal factors can have their own causes (Kisangani, 2015:35). Reilly argues that as a method its efficacy is in its ability to capture the evolvement of an issue, situation or event, particularly when dynamics of time and change are the focal points of the case as in the case of what this thesis paper, where the focus of analysing is on the changing of Kenya's foreign policy within a given time frame. And hence making the method being a good fit for the research study. Additionally, the causal relationships linking independent variable and results are 'unveiled' by using process tracing, and also response of social actors in their context are considered and events are tracked from a static pre-causal point to the final outcome of their interest for instance this is more common with states which were once colonised like Kenya and Somalia (2010:735-736).

Process-tracing method was also found compatible for the study since it can be used for identification and description of policy events, and to illustrate one or more causal factors, concerning building and testing theories of policy change over time, especially in supporting a theoretical pluralism that addresses policy studies' complexity, numerous methodological merits are presented by this method (Kay and baker, 2015: 2). It facilitates mapping out a single or multiple possible causal trajectories persistent in the outcome and the evidence in a case studied (Reilly, 2010: 736), the single or multiple paths leading to a particular policy events can be identified and illustrated by applying this approach. The method has been used in

diverse substantive disciplines[12] to study cognitive processes behind decision-making, innovation and problem-solving. (Kay and Baker, 2015; Reilly, 2010).

Finally, process-tracing as a qualitative tool can help in addressing certain inefficiencies faced by quantitative analysis, however the method itself is not free from pitfalls, among others—the process may not exactly indicate the appropriate causal-inference test causing doubts, and the other shortcoming were precisely summarised by David Collier; '…Doubts may arise as to which causal-inference test is appropriate. The analysis may face standard problems of missing variables. Measurement error can be an issue, and probabilistic relationships are harder to address than in quantitative research.' (2011:828). Alternatively, structural modelling approach could be used in this research, whose focus basically is on the results of the decision process, nevertheless Process-tracing method primarily analyses the pre-decisional behaviour or situation sequentially that ushers into a decision or an outcome (Ford et. al., 1989: 76).

After a lengthy perseverance with its traditionally antagonistic neighbouring state, Kenya finally decided to deviate from its non-interventionist approach to peace building and peacekeeping towards Somalia, with Kenya Defence Force's (KDF) incursion into Jubbaland in October 2011 (Harper 2012 and Menkhaus 2012). Yet since 1963 direct military confrontation with Somalia has been eluded by Kenya rather it opted for alliance with Ethiopia against a common adversary or covertly supporting rebellious militias against the Somali government (Kabukuru, 2015). This research examines the trajectory of Kenya's foreign policy transformation, focusing on the causes of the state's dramatic reorientation towards Somalia. By applying a Neoclassical Realist framework, the research traces intricate interplay between shifts in Kenya's strategic environment, domestic politics and the security policy decision-making process as well as the current outcome of Kenya's grand strategy in Southern Somalia. The study contends that Neoclassical Realism explains better both policymakers' motivation and areas of concern, and effectively unveils the complexity of states' security policy as well as foreign policy formulation as it pertains to the case of Kenya. It attempts to address the following main research question; how can the change and continuity in Kenya-Somalia relations be analysed

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[12]Such as organisation studies,Policy studies, international relations, political science, Detective Fiction, Public Health, American Politics etc.

from a Neoclassical Realist perspective? Why Kenya for a long period of time preferred buck-passing to interventionism while dealing with Somalia?

A substantial number of scholarly works have attempted to explain the continuity and discontinuity in Kenya-Somalia relation through different periods, yet there is so far none which have incorporated a Neoclassical Realist perspective in their critical explanation of the phenomena in Kenya's foreign policy, which in itself is the contribution of this research to the body of the available literature on the subject. Using process tracing method and Neoclassical Realist theoretical framework the study analyses the intricateness of domestic and systemic factors that determines Kenya's foreign policy from 1963 to 2011, for 1963 is the year Kenya started to make independently decisions concerning its foreign affairs and in 2011 a landmark change happened in the state's relations with Somalia.

4.1. PARADIGM SHIFT IN KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Analysing international relations or foreign policy of states takes a wide range of approaches and theoretical perspectives, essentially the significance of theories is in their ability to helps us make sense of the world, shaping assumptions and thereby facilitating comprehending complex phenomena by simplifying it (Nossal,1998). Then how can various International Relation theories explain the continuity and discontinuity within Kenya's foreign policy? And what are their limitations? Most of the International Relations theories are internally and externally challenged; obviously due to their short-comings as a result few scholars have been affiliated with one or another. In this subsection only main stream International Relations theories are being presented alternatively to explain the shift in Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia. More significantly their inefficiencies are underlined which is the reason they were not selected to interpret the foreign policy phenomena in question.

To begin with realism whose basic tenets include the principle objective of state being security, maximization of power, influence and sovereignty, and states are rational actors, although they acknowledge that states do not always follow a

rational path while making a foreign decision (Morgenthau, 1993:7; Grieco, 1997; Burchill, 2001). As factually documented throughout Kenya's history it has been heavily relying on Ethiopia since they had been sharing a common adversary, a typical archaic case to be presented is the conclusion of Ethio-kenyan defense pact in 1964 instantaneously after Kenya's independence, and it was renewed in 1980 and 1987 joining forces to counter the growing Somali threat (Global Security, 2000 and Thompson, 2015). Also Maxon and Ofkansky points out that during the Ethio-Somali war or Ogaden war of 1977, Kenya's president Daniel Moi offered assistance to rebels to fight against Barre regime, in the initial stages of the war when Somalia was gaining ground and seemingly Ethiopia losing the battle (2014: 318). Kenya did not abandon this buck-passing tradition but instead substantially relying on it as a survival strategy not until the recent development in Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia pertaining to 2011 grand strategy. So the realists especially defensive realists and offense-defence theorists observed Kenya's rigorist approach as a negative result of buck-passing[13] for the paradigm shift in Kenya's foreign policy came about as a result of failure by both state actors and non-state actors actively involved in Somalia these are Transitional Federal government (TGF), Ethiopia and other Somali proxies[14], which Kenya had previous relied on so much, in its pursuit of buffer-zone creation in Jubbaland in order to reduce the security threat, and the unsuccessful war against Al-Shabaab militias (Stanford University, 2010 and Menkhaus, 2012:3). The problem with buck-passing thesis is that it does undermines the amplified dynamism and self-reliance of Kenya's security posture and it also fails to consider new political developments—changing domestic setting for example public opinion, as a factor leading to such shifts.

Second, for the liberals who possess a more complex and less cohesive body theoretical assumption contrasting the realist paradigm, maintaining that the international system strongly tends toward peace and cooperation among states, which can be realised through economic interdependence among states[15],

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[13]Buck-passing refers to one states' efforts to pass the cost of opposing a potential enemy onto other state or states with whom they may or may not be in an alliance. The state counts on the other states to take upon themselves the cost of a common good, yet at the same time minimizing the expenditure of their own economic and military power.
[14]The current Somali proxies supported by kenyan government and encouraged to work under a 'Joint Task Force' include Ras Kamboni movement, the most powerful Somali armed militia allied, and other five groups that are parallel to Al-shabaab (Menkhus, 2012).
[15]Economic liberalism

transnational ties among non-state actors within society[16], emergence of a common body uniting all the states, and others. Kenyan economy by large is the best in Eastern Africa, with a geographical advantage such as being a home to the largest seaport in East Africa (Mombasa port), and controls access to landlocked Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan through its Northern Corridor. And the government for decades has been giving primary importance to the improvement of it economy which is a rejection throughout its long history of co-operation with the two neighbouring states (Uganda and Tanzania)(Emmanuel, 2014), for instance just like Kenya's predecessors, Mc Envoy stresses how the Kibaki administration[17] enormously focused on regional economic integration backed up by the revived East African Community (EAC) which has always been the negotiation arena for the region, and also transcending the East African region by creating more ties with other economic unions[18] the same path was followed by the incumbent Uhuru's government (2013; 2). According to the liberals, basing on the innumerable studies that have illustrated the nexus between a country's domestic settings and circumstances, and its external diplomacy. Kenya's prioritisation of trade and economic measures over military force as the key policy instrument while countering disputes, for war is extremely costly, led Kenya to maintain a non-interventionist approach (Makinda, 1983:302; Mc Evoy, 2013: 3-4; Emmanuel, 2014). This was apparent in Kenya's involvement in the creation and sponsorship of TGF intended to solve the Somali crisis. The liberals' over exaggeration of the influence of domestic economic interests over geostrategic concerns and undermining the limitations of economic interdependence as a security provider are the weakness of their explanation.

Yet even the revived East African Community with all its optimistic aim of good ties among the member, once collapsed in 1977 due to divergent nation interests among its member states. Implying that it is not always the economic factors that can yield stability, other factors have to be taken into consideration too. Nevertheless, the first phase (1963 to mid-70s) of Kenya-Somalia relation can perfectly be explained through the democratic thesis-democratic states hardly go to

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[16] Transnational liberalism

[17] Kibaki government lasted in office from 30 December 2002 – 9 April 2013, before it all the two presidents equally vitalised EAC.

[18] These include Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

war with each other; despite accusing Somalia for arming and training the Northern Frontier Districts Liberation Army (NFDLA) in the North-eastern region evidently observed in the Somali state propaganda through the Radio Mogadishu (Whittaker, 2015), both states never confronted each other militarily rather at almost the end of that phase a rapprochement was established between Kenya and Somalia which existed until Ogaden War[19] with Ethiopia in 1977-8 which was not a democracy. Somalia and Kenya were democracies, for instance Ahmed and Green points out this fact in Somali constitution prior to the Barre's regime: 'The constitution of 1960 guaranteed not only the unity of two Somali territories but also democracy and a forum that sanctioned multipartyism with guarantees to de jure freedom of expression. Significant political differences encouraged a proliferation of parties `to the point where Somalia had more parties per capita than any other democratic country except Israel''(1999:116)[20]. Still, the democratic thesis proponents cannot answer why in the same period Kenya embarked on military capacity build-up, and the much suspicion Kenya had about Somalia although Kenyatta administration accepted to sign the memorandum of understanding over the contested region.

Finally, from constructivism or ideational perspective, that is built on the premise that state behaviour can be explained by understanding the meanings attached to the determinants of interest such as military capabilities, commercial relations, international institutions, or domestic preferences, which are related to a sophisticated web and particular combination of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs. The constructivists arguably underline indispensable normative basis of Kenya's foreign and security policy. The unprecedented foundation of Kenya's foreign policy immediately after independence in 1963 was effective in nurturing Kenyan policy makers in not believing in interventionism and be more bothered by the repercussion of militarism (Howell, 1968).

Additionally the longevity of shifta war in NFD indirectly involving Somali government, lasting from 1963-67 with its ominous cost on the newly established state left deep relics on Kenyans, and a similar tragedy witnessed by Kenya in

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[19]Although it was between Ethiopia and Somalia, kenya was concerned because it had previously concluded alliance agreement with Ethiopia.
[20]Even though they their political system contained alot of pitholes, both kenya and Somalia still fits in liberal democratic category without considering strict categorisation of Fareed Zakaria (Zakaria,1997).

eastern Africa's Katanga region that indeed was graphically stated by a KANU delegation to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) stated in 1963; 'We have seen the tragedies and the shedding of blood resulting from Moise Tshombe's secessionist attempts in Katanga.' (Branch, 2014: 642) Kenya was not will to take the same path by confronting Somalia. Moreover without forgetting the past colonial conflicts, 1964 military mutiny and failed military coup in 1964 and 1982. However since its advent, constructivists are still in a continuous struggle to explain inter-state and intra-state relations in convincingly a better way than the alternatives, for instance in case of a sudden shift in Kenya's foreign policy orientation which seemingly more complicated ideationists cannot clarify exactly how the normative basis of Kenya's policy evolved over time or explain the exact timing of transformation. Besides, the constructivists cannot present external factors that led to the paradigm shift in Kenya's foreign policy. Constructivism can be the future area of analysing of Kenya-Somalia relation because of the share norms in the region and less scholarly work has tackled this point.

To sum up, any single paradigm cannot analytically delineate international politics due to the complex link between power, interest and norms, through analytical eclecticism rather than parsimony, the variables are made more comprehensible by drawing selectively on different approaches (Sherrill and Hough, 2015: 237). And with that due to the complexity of the Kenyan case, Neoclassic Realist approach is selected in order to understand various dynamics that possibly led to the transformation of Kenya's foreign policy approach—for multi-faceted explanation underlies in the tenants on which it is constructed as explained in the following subsection.

4.2. NEOCLASSICAL REALIST FRAMEWORK

Of recent realists scholars of International Relations observed a necessity to push the realist theoretical limits, transcending its deterministic structuralism accounts essentially with necessary limited explanatory and predictive power, while at the same time restraining an uncontrolled proliferation of explanatory determinants derived from taking into account first- and second-image factors that may shape international politics (Devlen and Özdamar in Freyberg-inan et. al, 2009: 136). Considering the explanatory deficiency within other International Relations theories as delineated above, neoclassical realist explanation is better for this research for its conceptual inclusiveness that theoretically fills the vacuum, by taking into account the material and ideational elements as well as the domestic and external components left out, as Devlen and Özdamar concisely underlines it; ' Its focus on the importance of agency in formulating foreign policies of states while taking their relative power and domestic factors into account provides opportunities to benefit from various methodologies in IR that focus on individual decision-making, such as game theory and operational code analysis.1 Its eclecticism and multi-level theorizing are among the primary strengths of Neoclassical Realism.' (Devlen and Özdamar in Freyberg-inan et. al, 2009: 136). However it is worth mentioning that Neoclassical Realism is not a single theory, but rather a framework, which stems from the realist tradition which is apparent from it etymology and particularly focuses on foreign policy studies, basically it is a collection of theories, Neoclassical realism includes many realist foreign policy theories, such as Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory (1987), Thomas Christensen's political mobilization model (1996), Randall Schweller's balance of interest argument (1998), Jeffrey Taliaferro's balance of risk theory (2004), Steven Lobell's foreign policy executive model (Lobell et al. 2009), as well as Nicholas Kitchen's idea-based neoclassical realist model of grand strategy (Kitchen, 2010).

Neoclassical Realism provides an explanation of a states' foreign and security policy by integrating both system and unit-level. The neoclassical realists construct their research on structural realism, treating the system's power distribution as the main independent variable in shaping a state's foreign policy (Lobell et al. 2009:13).

Essentially it considers the system's constraining effect on states' behaviour yet repudiates Kenneth Waltz's intentional ignoring of unit-level factors (Waltz, 1979:71-72). Rather, Neoclassical Realists consider the basic realist tenets that stresses leaders' role and their statesmanship at home and abroad, likewise they focus on the significance of foreign policy executive (FPE) to overcome the level-of-analysis problem. FPEs are critical for neoclassical realism since they constitute the prism through which all inputs are collected and infused into the policy-making process. Therefore, Neoclassical Realists borrow explanatory power from classical realism, 'emphasising the complex relationship between the state and society … without sacrificing the central insight of neorealism about the constraints of the international system' (Lobell et al. 2009, 13). They introduce intervening variables at the unit level to mediate the connection between international system and state behaviour, because 'the systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level' (Rose 1998, 145-6). To a certain extent, neoclassical realists exchange the parsimonious feature of neorealism in international politics for a more flexible and powerful framework to explain foreign policy.

However this theory has been criticised on basis of simply being an extension of structural realism, and it has been questioned how different it is from Foreign Policy Analysis to which its defendants (Ripsman et al. 2016: 170-177). To the first critic neoclassical realists do agree with it; however for the second critic they argue that unlike Foreign Policy Analysis that is focussing more or less on foreign policy decision makers, for neoclassical Realist approach the focus is more comprehensive, analysing not only decisions made by Foreign Policy Executives but also the ultimate outcome of their decisions made.

CHAPTER FIVE

Kenya-Somalia Relations: Key Events

By large Kenya's external relations have been shaped by numerous factors since independence though it can also be argued that even factors prior to independence equally influenced the state's foreign relations, those factors can range from colonialism, raise of pan-Africanism, the Cold War, globalisation, to a global war on terror and many others. This chapter particularly focuses on major historical antecedents that structured Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Somalia, reflecting on those eventualities can help in mapping the reasons behind fluctuating Kenya's contemporary and previous foreign policies in times of crisis especially when the country had to embark on alliance with the western superpowers, or opting for a rapprochement with the federal republic of Somalia or buck-passing with Ethiopia a pretty similar tactic employed during 2006 US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia (Degroot, 2007:52 and Menkhaus, 2012:3). In relation to those events the chapter gives a glimpse of what happened at the same moment on Ethiopian side, for the fact that both Ethiopia and Kenya shared the same adversary, essentially this became a major factor in balancing against Somalia. Three major events are reviewed, beginning with the post second World War orchestration of Belvin plan after the end of the victor's appeasement policy towards Italy, which consequently led to the advent of 'Greater Somalia' notion in 1940s that would become a very influential factor triggering nationalistic sentiments under pan-somalism after almost 30 years and onwards and subsequently destabilising relations between Kenya and Somalia for the two states had become traditionally arch-enemies.

And by far ultimately the wars that culminated from there turning inwardly resulting in the collapse or failing of Somali state (Payne, 1988: 29 and Elmi and Barise, 2006: 33-36). Besides, this didn't merely stop there the Al-Shabaab insurgence actually emerged from that very vacuum created by the absence of a functioning state. Second, the Lanet incident of 1963 and 1982 attempted coup that followed the outbreak of NFD conflict, which basically exposed the weakness of Kenyan state and explicitly illustrated its reliance on foreign forces when a battalion decided to stage a mutiny a part of a wider wave of 1960s army mutiny in East Africa. The incidents partially explain the reason why Kenya didn't opt for a direct combat with Somalia despite the clear evidence of Somalia subversive activities in the North eastern province.

5.1. Greater Somalia thesis, Somali Question and 1963-67 Shifta War

Map illustrating Greater Somalia

Figure 05: CIA Map from the 1970s with 'Greater Somalia' highlighted in red

Shifta conflict is among the typical cases in the history of Kenya-Somalia relationship though Somalia was not directly involved yet the intensity of the threat from it was felt by Kenya, that would perfectly fit Stephen Walt's definition of threat, when he controvertibly asserted that threat is a composition of (1) a state's

aggregate power; (2) its geographic proximity; Somalia neighbouring Kenya in the North-Eastern frontiers (3) its offensive military capabilities; the Somali military capability being almost three folds of Kenya's and (4) the perceived aggressive intentions of its leaders in this case the Greater Somalia ideology in relation with the expansionary foreign policy of Somali (Walt,1987). A single nation theory pertaining to the Somali people due to claimed or rather dubious presumption to a certain extent shared demographic and ethnic traits has been summarised in the concept of '*Greater Somalia*' which unfortunately is obstructed on one hand by a shape and linear border line between Kenya and Somalia[21] and on the other by the curvy borderlines with Ethiopia, just like in other similar African cases where arbitrary lines sliced populations leaving clans close to the border with similar ethnic backgrounds and languages . Both lines disguises the reality of a demarcation that is porous, unsettled, and historically contested which is apparent in the foreign policy of the states sharing Somali population in the region. Extremely essential question is how did the borders end up the way they are? And then how the fragmentation of 'Greater Somalia' did impact Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards the Federal Republic of Somalia? The image above illustrates in red the territory that has historically been referred to as 'Greater Somalia' (Laitin and Samatar, 1988).

Similar to various scholars and analysts' arguments concerning African conflicts, De-Hoyos presupposes that in modern history the trigger to the Horn of African wars essentially began with the so called Belvin plan of 1946 (1995: 12-14) —An idea which literally referred to the creation of Greater Somalia, in that the predominantly Somali regions with the exception of French administered territory i.e. former Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, the Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier District (NFD), which were under British military administration were to be wholesomely brought together under one polity run by British but under the trusteeship of UN (Payne, 1988: 29). Well, though that claim would only be true to a certain extent, besides it is a superficial Afrocentric approach towards root cause of African conflicts, for as in the case of other territories during the pre-colonial period Somali clans clashed with each other over territories and most importantly 'for the control and access to the limited water, grazing land and other limited resources in this region' (Cechvala, 2011). Belvin plan didn't materialise as delineated by Harper

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[21] As shown on the map above in figure 05

and Payne that the other post-war powers including France, Russia and the United States incongruous with the Belvin's view (Harper, 2012: 51 and Payne 1988: 29), it was first adopted by the energetic Somali Youth League (SYL), a Somali Italiana based political party, who would later actively campaign for that idea throughout predominantly Somali regions with a common slogan: "Unity of all Somali Territories" (Schraeder in Barrington , 2006). Contrary Chau arguably calls attention to the fact that the spirit of Pan-Somalism and the Greater Somalia notion hacks back to 1899 during Muhammad Abdille Hassan's struggles against imperialists in the region with the aim of uniting Somali territories (2010:68). A similar view is held by Mary Harper and other scholars.

The very struggle for Greater Somalia would become a more serious threat in the aftermath of colonial era and ultimately distorting the relationship of Kenya and Somalia in 1963, when it instigated the outbreak of shifta war in the NFD. Basing on Gibert M. Kadiagala's observation of Somali irredentism as the primary challenge to Eastern African border, which is a principal pillar in its territorial revisionism (Kadiagala, 2010: 269). It was through the Anglo-Italian Treaty of London (1915) that up to 150,000 ethnic Somalis were absorbed into the East Africa Protectorate and, later, Kenya Colony in 1920. then the area known as Jubbaland (approximately 12,000 square miles) was ceded to Italy in 1925 and by 1934 the eastern border of Kenya had the force of law, yet, shifting of the frontiers hardly relieved Kenya from the problem of feuding among antagonistic Somali clans on the one hand, and between them and other groups, such as the Boran, on the other (Chau, 2012 and Kadiagala, 2010:268).

What could be the possible underlining political motivation behind the demarcation? According to Otunnu the British extended its influence over those Somali arid areas with a pure power balancing strategy for they wanted to cynically create a buffer zone between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia on the one side, and the East African railway and the white settlers in the highlands on the other. Also to check on possible Ethiopian expansionism against annexing Boran and Gabro and similarly to deter the Somali south-westward expansion (1992:21 and Ringquist, 2011: 101). Yet from a more Eurocentric perspective, Fratkin and Roth refutably maintains that the demarcation was part of '*Pax Britannica*' between the warring pastoral Somali clans in the then NFD (2005: 30). Whatever the intent might have

been, more attention is drawn to the then future impact of demarcation on the people living in those areas. So with that Khadiagala convincingly and unequivocally asserted that traditional historical-political processes were not circumscribed by most of the Eastern African boundaries, resulting in to a specific challenge of transformation of legal title into political communities that existed throughout colonial era and post-colonial regimes. That was due to 'The fact that most of these boundaries did not coincide with pre-existing socio-cultural contexts leading to the widespread notion of their ''artificiality'' and ''unnaturalness,'' the conceptual lexicons in the postcolonial discourse yet as most critics of this argument have charged, almost all political boundaries have always been products of social convention.'(2010: 269)

Astonishingly the NFD has been neglected by the British without any serious effort made to foster the socio-economic and political integration of this area into the rest of Kenya and thus being marginalised (Otunnu, 1992 and Whittaker, 2012: 346), implying that the Somalis of that area have clearly felt alienated and deprived of delectation of feeling togetherness with the rest of the Kenyan as one scholar in 1995 precisely put it that 'One of the main reasons why the former NFD Somalis struggled to join "Greater Somalia" on the eve of Kenya's independence was the total dissatisfaction with their socio-economic position since the establishment of the British administration in Kenya in 1895.'(Al-Safi, 1995: 34) Which actually manifested itself in the outbreak of shifta conflict, due to the fact that more meaningful relationships were made between Kenyan Somalis and the northerly Somali clans across the border in Somalia, than with the rest of the Kenyan state, a view which also Major John Ringquist finds convincing. As such, this was a great opportunity for SYL to utilise in their campaign for greater Somalia.

The residents of NFD were supported and mobilised by SYL which was a pan-Somali irredentist movement that had started in 1950s and swept across the horn of Africa campaigning for unification of Somali-lands (Ringquist, 2011:105-107). At that moment, with the lifting of proscription on Somali parties in the area in 1960 and the unity between Somali Italiana and British Somaliland on July 1, 1960 to form the Somali Republic, the struggle for self-determination intensified in the NFD (Otunnu, 1992). Whilst Kenya's major aspiring ruling elites from KADU and KANU were unanimously against the campaign, (Whittaker, 2012), Adar laments that since

the area covered by NFD is 40% of the total area of Kenya, this made the issue of NFD a serious concern to both Kenyan government and the British (1994:41), some of the British officials were in favour of Somali unification.

During the February 1962 Lancaster House Conference in London both parties that were for and against the unification were granted admittance. Despite Pro-secessionists who were the majority backing up the principle of self-determination on premise that they were ''kindred'' to the people in Somalia and ''alien'' to the people and likewise backed by the overwhelming support from 1962 plebiscite held about the in NFD, it was ironic that their demand was downplayed after Britain's announcement that they would transfer the whole of NFD to Kenya in December 1963 (De-Hoyos, 1995:13), for the British valued more the post-independence relation with the Kenyan government than the 'Somali Question', though it was clearly known that what they have had done was going to end up into fissiparous situation in Kenya as delineated by Rinquist and De-Hoyos (2011: 107 and 1995), a similar intentional mistake made with Ogaden region and other areas when it was transferred to Ethiopia in 1948 yet Somalis saw it as rightly belonging to them, causing inherent grievance that would result into first and second Ogaden War in which Kenya had to support Ethiopia for they shared a common adversary as it will be seen later (Mahmood, 2001: 3 and Harper, 2012: 51).

The NFD Somali politics became more astounding when it turned to be that minority Somalia faction in opposition of NFD unification would be considered as a the representative of Somali population and the main government agent influencing administrative policies in their own interest, maintaining the status quo as Ottunu articulates it: 'As agents of the central government, these "collaborators" took upon themselves the delicate task of balancing the conflicting interests between the state and "their limited constituency."' (1992:21). However counter-arguably the British had hoped that Kenya would continue with the federal path which would be partially the solution to the 'Somali question', after Kenyan Federalists' success at the Lancaster House constitutional conferences in London. Albeit after independence the pro-centralisation won the debate in 1964 as a result Kenya's government opted for a centralized constitution leaving behind the idea of 'Majimbo' (federalism) and federal constitution-, amplifying the incongruous Somali-Kenya relationship. For the matter of fact, Kenya Somali delegates at the Lancaster conferences, represented by

NFD Legislative Council's Rashid Abdi Khaliff, repudiated signing of the final document because of its failure to acknowledge the autonomy of the NFD (Colonial Office, 1962: 29), and soon as profoundly speculated in May 1963 pro-Somali secessionist parties boycotted regional and national elections and resorted, again, to political violence, claiming the NFD as a part of Greater Somalia (Global security, 2000).

Likewise, the independence demeanour was simply explained by Jenkins and Kposowa in a nutshell that the observers optimistically assumed *Black African* states would strive to solve their economic and social problem within a civilian constitutional regime framework while distancing themselves from consequential cost of military intervention such as gross human right violation, diversion of state resources into greater military capabilities build-up and political repression (1990: 860). Unfortunately all this seemed to be a mistaken assumption if not a mere pretence especially when the great powers lined behind the proxy wars that caused great turbulence in short and long-run in the horn during the Cold War period, they also remained silent amidst gross misuse of powers since they were side-lining with the oppressive dictators such as Kenyatta, Moi, Haile Selassie, Siad Barre. Additionally, the hopes about the newly independent countries was in vain when between 1960-1985 almost all African states experienced pervasive military coups d'état, military governments, and political instability (Johnson et. al, 1984 ; Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990), as it will be explained in the case of Kenya in the following subsection.

The notion of Greater Somalia had become an unalienable part of official Somali state ideology, in fact it had been incorporated in the constitution, a move that drew negative reaction from neighbouring states (Nelson, 1982: 23), which in itself was the ultimate goal to be realised at the inception, but putting Somalia in a dilemma for the state wanted good neighbour relations yet at the centre of detachment of Somali territories was a core principle political elites believed in (Thompson, 2015 and Metz, 1992), that would be embedded in its expansionary policy which was made a legitimate claim as Sarah Cechvala puts it : 'Somalia's post-independence solidarity movement was the country's attempt to unify all Somali regions held under different colonial rule (including Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland as well as the Northern portion of Kenya and Eastern Ethiopia) as

a voluntary solidification of Somali identity. The concept of "Pan-Somalia" had infiltrated the post-colonial mentality of the national leaders was therefore infused into the country's foreign policy objectives…' (2011). The policy was a clear rejection of the colonial borders that separated Somali communities from each other and thus emanating from profound political desire for the unification of all the Somali populations including those within other nation-states such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti (Payne, 1988: 29). However, strong nationalism and the irredentist policy engendered regional conflicts throughout the 1960s between Somalia and its neighbours and also Britain, for on 14 March 1963 Somalia reprobatively severed diplomatic relations with Britain and even later declined their military assistance, instead they resorted to forging alliance with USSR and Cuba (De-Hoyos, 1995: 13 and Cechvala, 2011). The NFD dispute which seemed to be a mere Kenya's domestic issue would become a major factor in shaping the foreign relationship between Kenya and federal republic of Somalia (Whittaker, 2015: 130) and thus proving the premise on which neoclassical realist argument is based concerning foreign policy.

The Somali secessionists waged guerrilla attacks against Kenyan government, which equally reacted with extreme aggression , by declaring a state of emergence in the region and the establishment of a draconian emergency rule in the North Eastern province in Kenya, which was not lifted until 1992, for as Ringquist contends, the conflict posed an intractable difficulty to the post-colonial Kenyan state because it threatened political and national unity of Kenya, a nation containing over 87 ethnicities which were thought to claim for succession in case the Somalis were successful in their claim (2011:100-101). Kenyan government's aggression against the Somali was even way beyond extreme reaction, which manifested itself in the ruthless measures that Kenya took leaving even the British shocked who were willing to assist them, perhaps it can be the reason to its loss of commitment in the secrete Bamburi Understanding aimed at helping Kenya against Somalia as it will be explained in the following subsection. The Police and army personnel was granted unrestricted power that ranged from confiscation of suspects' properties and livestock, twenty-eight days remand without trial, summary execution to extra-judial torture (Whittaker, 2015: 346-347).

Kenyan government charged that Somali state directly trained in Somalia and equipped the secessionists with Soviet arms. Despite Mogadishu refuting the accusation, it could not hide the apparent fact that Somali radio exerted an influence on the level of North-eastern separatists' activities by the militant tone of its broadcasts beamed into Kenya. At the same time in February 1964 armed conflict erupted along the entire length of the Somali-Ethiopian frontier, which initially had begun as a minor clash between police and the local Somalis in the Ethiopian Ogaden region, before the war would last longer auspiciously Organisation of African Union (OAU) in April 1964 arranged an acute armistice, but the two parties remained highly and ominously susceptible to future conflict perhaps because of the anti-Somali irredentism attitude of most of the OAU members and obviously without ignoring other factors (Global Security, 2000 and Thompson, 2015).

Shifta conflict became more difficult to the Kenyan government because in spite of the fact that OAU's effort at different occasions to settle the differences between Somalia and its neighbours, the agreements were never perennial rather some reported superfluous incidents in North-eastern province that happened later would inflame public opinion of both sides leading to escalation of propaganda and subsequently aggravating the level of hostilities. In order to deal with this situation after dereliction of what can be referred to as '*pax africana*', Kenyatta had no recourse left except turning to the British, because the NFD irredentists were covertly yet explicitly supported by Somali government and the Kenyan army unreliable since in that period they were conspiring to overthrow him (as it is explained in the next sub-section) as delineated by Daniel Branch (Branch, 2014:643).

This vicious cycle of hostility would ease temporarily from 1967 to mid-1968 during Egal's administration who initiated a rapprochement with Somalia's neighbours through OAU. According to Global Security, his objective was to shift Somalia's irredentist foreign policy from militaristic confrontation to a more diplomatic approach with a hope that it would usher conducive atmosphere for Somalis' self-determination in the lost territories (2000) as it will be seen later in the following chapter. Additionally, the 1967 rapprochement can also be traced in the different means for attainment of Greater Somalia proposed by various political elites, precisely elaborated by Nelson; that although all Somali citizens unanimously supported the unification of their fellow Somalis, their point of divergence was on

the means of accomplishing it (1981:22-23). What is usually not high-lightened in 1967-1969 Somalia-Kenya rapprochements is the realist interpretation; on one side of the coin, Kenya remained highly suspicious of Somalia's effort to ameliorate their relations, for Kenyatta knew it quite well that the Greater Somalia notion wasn't relinquished rather it was turned into a long term objective thereby becoming a long term threat.

And on the other side Somalia had paused its pursuit of Greater Somalia in order to build a mega military capability with the help of the Soviet Union that would be almost unmatchable in the Horn, for Egal was quite conscious of Somalia's internal weakness, a belief shared by the Somali modernist with whom he was affiliated as Metz p elucidates (Metz, 1992). Somalia's behaviour would subsequently lead to security dilemma for Kenya would be forced to balance appropriately.Indeed Somali's enigmatic nature was exposed when Siad Barre assumed power after Egal, abandoning the rapprochement in 1975 despite initially having been committed to observing it (Kadiagala, 2010: 269-270 and Yihun, 2014), and the resurfacing of war in North-Eastern province as underlined by global security that 'Misgivings about Somalia's intentions seemed to be confirmed in 1974 by a revival of guerrilla activity in North-Eastern Province by the clandestine United Liberation Front of Western Somalia.'

Besides ignoring Somalia's claim against the country's suspicion for the revival of the insurgency in the disputed areas, Kenya would join the arms race by filling its arsenal with British and American weapons, additionally more soldiers were trained both within the country and abroad (2000). Ethio-Kenyan security pact was rejuvenated earlier in 1978 and Kenya would overtly commiserate with Ethiopia against Somalia during 1977-78 Ogaden war. In the winter of 1979 Kenya and Ethiopia signed a 10 year agreement of friendship and cooperation despite possessing two divergent political system. In 1980 though Nairobi remained condemning Somalia for the resurgence of shifta activity, Moi didn't hesitate to strongly reproach Somalia and demand that the country has to renounce the greater Somalia claim and pay the war Ogaden reparations (Global Security, 2000).

5.2. Lanet Incident and Paetoranism: Manifestation of Kenya's Chronical Internal Weakness

'Clubs become trumps when no rule of trump is established' (Thomas Hobbes, cited in Zimmerman, 1978:406).

A midst the ongoing civil war in Kenya's North-Eastern province another internal problem broke out, when in the military institution in late January 1964 a segment of soldiers took arms against the government, the act that would be reiterated in 1980s during Moi's administration (Karangi and Ebo, 2006: 102 ; Stubbs, 2015). One can easily question how the 1964 mutiny and 1982 attempted coup d'état related with Kenya's foreign policy? The logic is to explain Kenya's foreign policy in relation with domestic, regional and global events that directly or indirectly impacted the state's ultimate decision. And in this case in this chapter it is argues that the mutiny and failed coup manifested a chronicle weakness in Kenya's military which perhaps in turn influenced its ultimate decision against Somalia as it will be explained further. Would Kenya's post-colonial government rely on the military despite its borders being severely contested for? And if not, as a member of non-alignment movement how can Kenya balance appropriately against Somalia which was backed USSR?

The mutiny was part of the ongoing waves of military revolts which was neither strange in its period or the region for as some scholars in early 1980s statistically explained it that from 1960 through 1982, 55% (22 states) of the 45 majority-ruled states of Sub-Saharan Africa have been exposed to 52 successful military coups d'etat. There were also 56 attempted coups and 102 reported coup plots. In total 84% of the 45 countries (38 states) saw some form of military

intervention between the beginning of 1960 and the end of 1982 (Johnson et. al 1984: 621). Assensoh and Alex-Assensoh elaborately complemented that the wide circulation of military takeovers on the continent in 1960s, formed a belief among scholars that those incidents were temporary and they were yet to varnish soon, but rather in most states they became not only integral but also normatively a legitimate way of getting rid of democratically-elected regimes. And despite all that 'Early on, these military events were never identified within the spectrum of either the ongoing the Cold War between the Capitalist West and the Socialist East or an ideology in general' (2001: 128). In the regional context, in early 1960s armies successively revolted first in Tanzania, then Uganda and later Kenya against their governments, much as they were in different states more or less they echoed similar grievances (Parsons, 2007; MacRae and Laurence, 2007:96). Immediately after the Tanganyikan Rifles protest, Kenyan government was concerned for 'all the three East African states were so similar in origin and organisation,' all of them were part of the former colonial armies which were inherited as form of power transfer during independence time (Parson, 2003 and Hornsby, 2012: 97-98).

On 23 January 1964 the armoury of Lanet Barracks was taken over by soldiers of 11th Battalion of the Kenya Rifles, a revolt ignited by a similar incident in Tanganyika and Uganda. Although the manifest cause was due to disgruntlement over pay and condition, the expulsion of British expatriate officers and perhaps the latent or invisible cause was the success of a similar insurgence in Tanganyika and moreover the fear of mutineers' future under a KANU government was another factor (Hornsby, 2012: 98). Unlike Uganda and Tanganyika's leaders who negotiated with their rebellious soldiers Kenyatta took a divergent militaristic and punitive approach to deal with Kenyan mutineers, which was reflected in the press on 25 January as follow:

> '*Those who took part in the Lanet incident have gravely broken military discipline and must be dealt with firmly. They will be dealt with according to military law. There will be no compromise on this, and I do not intend to meet them or to allow any of my Ministers to negotiate with them.... I must warn all our people most firmly whether they are in the Army, Police, and youth wing. Members of Parliament or just members of the public that the Government*

will deal most severely with any breaches of the peace or acts of disloyalty and destruction.' (Tanganyika Standard (TS) quoted in Parsons, 2007)

Following the above censure Kenyan government didn't hesitate to seek assistance from the British—surprisingly the government turned to the very officers whom Kenya's rifle was dissatisfied with, immediately the British forces stepped in to settle the situation which they did without serious combat. By then, 5,000 British troops were still in Kenya, concentrated near Nairobi and at Gilgil in the Rift Valley (Hornsby, 2012; 98). However, why would Kenya resort to the British to settle its internal problem rather than facing it? And why couldn't it be USSR or United States? Timothy Parsons in his article 'The Lanet Incident, 2-25 January 1964: Military Unrest and National Amnesia in Kenya' argued that the weak state in which post-colonial Kenya was in, was explicitly exposed in its resort to Britain for help (2007: 51), and likewise Percox reverberated a similar standing point when he maintained that the intervention of 24th Brigade to assist in cracking down the revolt demonstrated in no uncertain terms that Kenya still relied upon British military largesse (2001: 217). More so, it solidified Kenyatta's regime and reinforced Kenya's military relations with Britain. This can partially help in explaining the approach Kenya took in facing Somalia during the first phase of their relationship basically from early 1960s to mid-1970s (Gordon in Barkan, 1994: 235-239). That was because Kenyatta could not face Somalia which had a military that was at least more organised compared to Kenya army. How would Kenyatta then re-organise Kenyan army? Meanwhile in form of balancing against Soviet backed Somalia, first Kenyatta had to recruit extra soldiers in the army, air force and navy who would be trained by the British Army Training Team (BATT), thus establishing close military ties with the United Kingdom. This was evident in a joint communiqué issued by Prime Minister Kenya and British Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys as follows;

'*British would cooperate with Kenya in plane to expand the country's army and air force and to set up a small naval force for coastal defence. It was also agreed that the British service personnel and British troops would continue to play as important part for some time to come in the training and development of Kenya's armed forces.*' (Tanganyika Standard, cited in Nzoma, 1981: 315)

Yet at the same time arrangements were made to withdraw British troops and to replace British officers in 'executive command appointments' with Africans the following year, this was essentially an attempt to address the problem that had caused soldiers' rebellion at Lanet Barracks. However this was a quid-pro-quo Anglo-Kenyan relationship for in return for the British military assistance, Britain's Royal Air Force would have access to Kenyan facilities, that it would use for overflying and staging, Mombasa port would provide British Naval vessels a place for maintenance and from time to time a joint exercise between Kenya and British army would be carried out and overall nearly a sum of US$40 million would be provided to Kenya's defence by the British (Nzoma, 1981: 316 and Hornsby, 2012: 97-98). In the meantime, British forces will continue to insure internal security in the North-eastern part of Kenya. Contrary to Kenya's plan pertaining to the 'Africanisation' of the army, UK's conditionalities were that assistance will be extended to Kenya at a zero cost as long as British officer remained in the command of Kenya's army. Also UK agreed to disclaim right to most of their owned military properties and over GB£6 million in military loans would be cancelled (Hornsby, 2012: 97-100).

Lanet incident was more than a civil-military relation, it exploited the deeper struggles which Kenya was going through during the post-colonial period, which in itself exposed the weakness of the state in comparison with Somalia that was actually a part of the causes of antagonism in North-Eastern province as already mentioned above in length. Somalia was one of few unique cases in black Africa that are largely and ethnically homogeneous   meaning that creation of national identity was easier to them unlike Kenyan politicians and elites who were by then struggling to build national identity through selective recollection of the past (Schraeder in Barrington, 2006: 107). In fact this was one of Kenya's weaknesses which Somalia exploited because if at all Kenya's national identity was that strong enough perhaps the pan-Somali concept wouldn't spread through predominantly Somali regions and subsequently shifta conflict would not have happened and probably Kenya would have taken a different foreign policy approach towards Somalia.

Besides the manifest reasons behind Lanet incident which have been already mentioned, the latent push factors towards the incident were covertly embedded in the fragmented nature of extremely heterogeneous social foundation of Kenyan

society, which was apparent in the ethno-political approach in the government. As Parsons puts it; 'The Lanet incident took place against the backdrop of an internal struggle within KANU between left and right wing factions over the shape of the new nation.' (2007: 64), moreover, Oginga Odinga, an ethnically Luo left-leaning Minister of Home Affairs, not only suspected that the statement issued by Kenyatta in the press during the course of mutiny was at least partially and circuitously directed towards him. Also he was suspicious of the event being orchestrated by the British Army in form of a 'perception management' to justify their remaining in Kenya backing up Kenyatta and pushing him further to the right (Parsons, 2007: 63-65).

It should be recalled that Kenya's ethnic problem that essentially weakened it internally hacks way back to the period prior to independence, observable in the formation of political parties on ethnic basis, though the problem seemed to have been minimised during the early period of the republic especially as already mentioned when the mainstream parties merged, the residuum of chauvinism remained firmly rooted across all the spectrum among Kenyan politicians, elites and the military, affecting the progress of the nation. Kenya's military was predominated by specific ethnic groups i.e. Kamba and Kalenjin each comprising approximately 70% or more of postcolonial Kenyan army and the remaining 30% or less included various remainders of the other ethnic groups, a composition which was not accidental rather by intent since it was previously part of King African Rifle (KAR), whose members were carefully selected through the British peculiar emphasis on conscription of members of the so called 'martial race' (or literally the fighting race) into the military (Amone, 2013: 392 and Parsons, 1999: 671), the description which Stubbs argues that the Kambas perfectly fitted in, in fact the imperial army's top officer were exclusively British and Kamba (Stubbs in Zirker, 20:1571). Other ethnic groups such as the Kĩkũyũ were deliberately not preferred thus being underrepresented due to British exclusion policy and to their participation in Mau-Mau rebellion (Bates, 1987). Likewise the pre-colonial administrative sector was overwhelmingly Kĩkũyũ-dominated, not only the President himself but also the civil servants. What implication would this ethno-politics distribution of patronage and services have on the internal stability of the state?

The consistency of ethno-politics in Kenya ushered the continuum of similar internal instability depriving the state from constructing a sense of national identity based on togetherness in a period they had a common adversary, for in 1966 Oginga Odinga established the Kenya People's Union (KPU), expressing his disapproval towards Kenyatta and permanently diverting the Luo community's support from him and his KANU. Subsequently, the Luo community became second-class citizens since they had lost their significant status for instance all-over the public sector[22] (Stubbs, 2015). In simple terms Odinga fragmented Kenyan society more, and in order to copy with that hideous situation the Kenyatta administration simultaneously augmented the reliance on external military assistance from British, a policy that had begun right from 1963 and continued throughout sixties not until in 1970s that it will be altered (Nzoma, 1981: 316). In 1966-67, another Anglo-Kenyan military agreement was surreptitiously negotiated and particularly pertaining to Somalia. With the agreement Britain was to intervene, helping Kenyan side in case of any aggressive attack from Somalia by providing necessary military assistance, however compared to the previous pact, the Bamburi Understanding or the 'boute de papier' as it was known before was more loose. It was limited to consultation service though military assistance was not ruled out in case it was necessarily unavoidable (Poppy, 2015: 165-170).

Throughout Kenyatta's term in the office, he aimed for a pragmatic solution to the problems of Kenya with a realist approach by prioritising security of the state and its integrity, in other words defeating Somali separatists and deterring any potential military coups given the period throughout 1960s-70s was the region was characterised by military uprisings and more significantly inhibit Somalia. He showed craftsmanship through various measures which can be simply interpreted as internal and external balancing. Besides Kenyatta's personal authority or dictator tendencies made a coup against him almost impossible, as FES and Citizens of Justice depicts his repressive character and approach towards opposition that was based on the colonial repressive philosophy of curbing any assumed or real opposition and favouritism. He also points out that '...Soon, repression began all over again as manifested in politically motivated murders, detentions without trial, imprisonments, disappearances, harassment, gagging of the media and political

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[22] Such as the police, military and parastatals they were increasingly distrusted.

intimidation. For fifteen years, Kenyatta's rule was dominated by institutionalised repression.' (2003:8 and Hornsby, 2012:180).

He also restructured the army by making it predominated by non-aligned ethic groups and continued the reservation of the key posts to the British officers for they would watch out for any potential military threat and basically protecting Kenyatta in of itself (Hornsby, 2012). However, were those measures successful? And to what extent did Kenyatta's measures relinquish Kenya's basic internal weakness? To a greater extent Kenyatta's measures were successful because besides remaining in power until he passed away naturally at his home in Mombasa on 22 August 1978, until that time he set up measures to protect Kenya ranging from forging alliance with both regional and international powers for instance signing security pacts both Ethiopia and Britain essentially to protect Kenya against Somalia which was actually successful (Maxon and Ofkansky, 2014). This was so visible in the success of the first rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia which subsequently calmed the tension in North-Eastern region as it is already explained in the previous subsection (Global Security, 2000). Apart from his success, Kenyatta's legacy-ethno-politics could not vanish rather adopted by Daniel Moi replaced him, it chronically haunted Kenya's political institutions like a plague leaving almost the state elusively weak. Its negative effect would again be observed in another military as it was before, resurfacing in an attempted coup in 1982 (Stubbs 2015: 75). This elusion was precisely elaborated by Hornsby in his lengthy work on Kenyan politics that; 'The events of 1966-9 were a radicalising experience for many young Luos. It was not a coincidence that the leadership of the 1982 coup attempt were mainly Luo in their 20s and 30s, who had been teenagers during this period and had seen both injustice and the powerlessness of their leaders to respond constitutionally. The ethnicisation of the power struggle of the 1960s also created an association between Luo identity and anti-government protest that was to endure through the 1980s, and reinforced a communal political solidarity that proved more enduring than that of any other ethnic group. It was to continue through the lives of Oginga Odinga, his second son Raila, James Orengo and many other Luo leaders' (2014: 215).

Resonating Hornsby's argument in an earlier work, FES foundation and Citizen for Justice maintained that the coup was carried out by a group of junior Kenya Air Force servicemen including Hezekia Ochuka, Pancras Oteyo, Ireri

Njereman, Patrick Lumumba and Odira Ojode who were discontented with excessive dictatorship in Moi's regime. Fighting broke out in Kenya's capital (Nairobi) and at the air force base outside Nairobi (Embakasi) resulting into the killing of more than 129 persons (2003; 17).

Fascinatingly yet not really an odd issue, is that the main denominator pertaining the cause of the 1964 mutiny and 1982 coup was ethnic grievances, which was echoed by the latter's architect- James Waore Diang'a, that his Luo tribe was representation in the army and political positions tilted. Diang'a noted in his book that the Moi Cabinet at the time of the coup, in 1982, had only three Luos (Mutunga, 2012). But were they the only ethnic group holding grievances over Moi's rein?

According to Stubbs, while as the abortive coup was masterminded by Luo, a few Kĩkũyũ junior and non-commissioned officers, it was dismantled by both the General Service Unit (GSU), and members of the army still loyal to Moi were responsible for crushing the coup attempt (2015: 75). Although the coup didn't last long due to poor organisation spontaneity and distrust among the plotters and more significantly it was based on ethnicity, it was a moment of jubilation around the country when their voices were heard over Radio Kenya and the post-coup tension was exploited by Moi to crush his opponent, launching one of the most brutal crackdowns in Kenya's history arresting more than 3000 people and entire Air force. 'For the six months following August 1, Kenya was effectively under the rule of the army.' The coup plotters from Kenya Air Force and civilians were either imprisoned or sent to the gallows (FES and Citizens of Justice, 2003: 17-19). The abortive coup equipped him with necessary tool to legitimise his long waited moment 'to settle old scores and assert himself by systematically instituting an oppressive one-man state through consolidation, centralisation, and personalisation of power while neutralising disloyal elements, real and imagined.' The post-coup period was used by Moi as an opportunity to neutralise the armed forces and police, both institutions were successfully reshuffled (Mutunga, 2012).

Despite the fact that Stubbs described him as previously being loved and found to be ethnically neutral amidst political contending Luo and Kĩkũyũ tribes, and '…a far more autocratic ruler than his predecessor. A deft populist and manipulator of ethnicity...' (2015:75). President Moi essentially learnt nothing from his

predecessor rather as Stubbs contends that Moi was quite mindful of the ethnic tensions which were part of the former regime he took over and particularly Kĩkũyũ dominance, so he skilfully played ethnicities against each other for instance playing the divided Kĩkũyũ contingents on one side while at the same time soliciting support from his fellow kalenjins and also the Luhya, numerous coastal ethnic minorities and pastoralist tribes on the other side. He acutely mastered the tactic of surrounding one's self with less challenging people or 'zero threat' causing people from Kenyatta, for as part of 'neutralisation' of the military he replaced Kĩkũyũ and Luo officers with Kalenjins and non-ethnic challengers for instance General Mahmoud Mohammed of Somali ethnic background, was appointed the army chief of general staff and other six top military positions were reassigned to officers from Kamba, Kalenjin and Somali ethnicities, totally ignoring the Kĩkũyũs and the Luos for their potential threat. Also there after he embarked on the other institutions such education, parliament and judiciary in the aftermath of the coup (Stubbs, 2015: 75-78 and Mutunga, 2012). From what has been seen from above, it can be deduced that Kenya from 1960s to until almost 2000s faced a serious internal weakness that had to be dealt with first before the state considering confronting a hostile neighbour-Somalia that was relatively more organised. Kenya's ethnic problem had infiltrated and weakened the core institutions and more significantly the military which is a vital factor in making foreign policy decision towards Somalia.

CHAPTER SIX

Continuity and Change in Kenyan Foreign Policy

In this chapter, a theory of foreign policy decision-making in times of crisis is presented, drawing on a core Neoclassical Realist insight pertaining to the centrality of individual agency and domestic structural constraints on leaders' choices. A Neoclassical Realist framework is used to explore the evolution of the Kenya-Somalia relations. Historically continuities and changes have been an integral part of Kenya's foreign policy within its 53 years of an independent state, for better comprehension of that evolution twofold explanation is presented based on domestic and structural factors within the three phases of Kenya's foreign policy. These phases are further systematic extension of a previous work on Kenya's foreign policy by David F. Gordon (1994), because of the limitation of his work; in this thesis, the time frame covered to 2000s. Taking the three phases in consideration, how did Kenyan's foreign approach evolve from the first to the current phase? From a Neoclassical Realist perspective, how did is and structural factors constrain Kenya's foreign policy executives at each stage? And finally, what determinants accounts for the paradigm shift in Kenya's foreign policy in the current phase?

6.1. PHASE I: POST-INDEPENDENCE TO MID-1970s

Gordon gives a general preview of Kenya's foreign policy in the first phase, which was roughly from 1963 to early 1970s: As a newly established state Kenya's foreign policy was pre-occupied by imperial legacies and narrowly defined regional issues, devoting much of its energy on the well-functioning of East African Community. During this period Kenya's foreign relation was described as 'quiet diplomacy' (1994: 236). Kenya's foreign policy behaviour towards Somalia was a derivative of an interplay between domestic, regional and international politics— Kenya was struggling to boost its weak economy which was given a primary attention (Malinda, 1983:), though the significance of military also was not downplayed for at that time around the country faced secession threats from Coastal towns and a more direct threat from Somalia due to the contested region in the North-eastern part, but the military sector suffered from both lack enough capabilities and ethnopolitical conflict . Another territorial challenge came from Kenya's coastal towns who also aspired for autonomy (Mwangi in Kithinji et. al., 2016). Likewise, the state's political elite class was infiltrated by not only ethnic conflict but also the global ideological rivalry contending the direction of the nation either to follow communist Russia who was pro-Somali Republic or capitalist West that Somalia had turned its back against. And most significantly from 1967, it was then influenced by two the rise to power of two charismatic leaders: first president Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal who initiated the first rapprochement with Kenya, and second General Muhammad Siad Barre who essentially ended it and launched an attack Kenya's ally (Ethiopia) (Otunnu, 1992; Stubbs in Zirker, 2015; Hornsby, 2012).

Momentarily during the initial period of post-colonial, Kenya signified its neutral stand in the then dichotomised international politics between the Western and Eastern blocs, ironically deep under the fabrics of the state was the contentious struggles between the sympathisers of the Soviet Union and China and pro-capitalism presenting the real image of the state's ideology in contrast to the vaguely claimed membership to the non-alignment movement (Khapoya and Agyeman-Duah, 1985: 19). Branch and Mabera clearly illustrate that irony, when they recount the

incident where simultaneously dispatch of delegates to both eastern and western blocs to promote Kenya's national interest (Branch, 2014 and Mabera, 2016). Kenya's socialist affiliation with its protagonist Prime Minister Odinga Oginga inclination bothered Britain which was the main military and financial supporter of Kenya and counting much on its geo-strategic advantage in Eastern Africa, Britain made sure that Kenya was neutralised from those communist elements and eventually was pulled towards the Western sphere of influence. In fact it was clearly plausible that Kenya's foreign policy was western oriented by 1965, the period when the economic policy paper on African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya was adopted, 'Kenya's foreign policy has moved from quiet diplomacy to full identification with one of the superpowers; from a position of partial neutrality in pan-African affairs to one of leadership of the OAU' (Malinda 1981: 300). Therefore deductively it suffices to presume the fact that domestically ideological antagonism was apparent within Kenya during that time. In the same period, from 1963-67 Kenya was faced with serious problems that challenged its territorial integrity from Somali secessionists who were allegedly supported by Somali government as already mentioned in the previous chapter (Kithinji et al. 2016: 7 and Cullen, 2016).

Even though Somalia refuted the Kenya's accusation, it was discovered that the landmines used by the Shiftas were had been supplied to Somali Army by the United Arab Republic (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1967). Despite the threat from Somalia, why did Kenya prefer pursuit of a non-interventionist policy towards that state? Two impetuses can be presented as inserting influence on Kenya's foreign policy during this phase: During the 1960s Kenya was extremely weak economically and militarily, the country had just emerged from the 'horrors' of colonialism. The country's urgent priority was economic development rather than military expedition as already pointed out from above, Kenya was heavily dependent on foreign capital, in form of foreign aid and grants and on the wider regional economic market i.e East African community as underlined by Mabera; 'The pro-West foreign policy also found resonance in considerations of national economic development and the ascendancy of foreign capital. Kenya was heavily dependent on foreign aid and on the wider East African market.' (2016: 370). Makinda resonated the same argument for Kenya's pursuit of quiet diplomacy, observing it as being directly contingent on foreign capital, for economic development was extremely

imperative to the nation and consequently, the state wouldn't take a radical stand like other African states in international affairs did that would adversely affect the inflow of foreign capital. Likewise, he argued that it would also have affected the local elites who were beneficiaries of that capital (1983:302). If the economy was the priority why would Kenya embark on the arms race in 1964? A Kenyan scholar contended that Kenya's foreign policy in the 60s was driven by;

'First, the threat of secession in Kenya's coastal and north-eastern provinces alerted her to the primary need to consolidate her boundaries ... Second, Kenya realised that a good neighbour policy based on mutual understanding between her and her neighbours was a logical step for the security of both her people and her territory. Third, a policy of vigorous economic development at home and economic cooperation and cultural exchange with her neighbours would strengthen her position in Africa ... Finally, nonalignment was to remain a major tenet in her foreign relations.' (Professor John Okumu quoted in Makinda 1983: 301)

An overwhelming factor that draws attention to a more convincing reason for that case was the lack of enough military capabilities. During the post-independent period, Kenya was obliged to diversify her link with the western powers in order to balance appropriately with Somalia as a threat that was embedded in forming 'Greater Somalia,' for Kenya was not willing to lose a substantial part of her territory of the Northeastern province. Kenya's military was plagued with tribalist instincts or resentment that led to a 1964 mutiny at the most significant moment when military discipline was extremely essential for at that time the state was struggling against Somali-backed Northern Frontier Districts Liberation Army (NFDLA) in the North-eastern region as it was claimed. The residents of North-eastern region identified themselves with the Somali Republic and they had turned violent after a failure of diplomatic negotiation with the British vis-à-vis the mainstream Kenyan political (Parsons, 2007; Whitaker, 2012; Branch, 2014). As the Lanet incident unmasked the weakness of Kenyan army on one side, on the other the occurrence of shifta conflict exposed the shortage of national unity between the large Somalia ethnicity and the rest of the other ethnicities in Kenya unlike its counterpart Somalia with one of the strongest sense of nationhood in Africa (Schraeder in Barrington, 2006: 107).

Despite unanimously uniting against Somali irredentists who wanted to be identified with the "Greater Somalia" ideal and their guerrilla activities forcibly shifted Kenya's priority seeing the urgent need for military capability (Global Security, 2000), ironically Kenyan civil society by large was chronically affected by not only ideological conflict but also ethno-politics with all its negative aspects such as political exclusion that had infiltrated not only the military but also the other spheres of the society. Hardly had the new country's political elites solved some crucial political dilemma such as which governmental structure should be followed after independence , than a new problem emerged in the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) , it clearly fragmented along influential figures within it—'radical' Oginga Odinga, Minister of Home Affairs on one side and 'conservative' Tom Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning on the other who was Kenyatta's choice after losing hope in the former and by early 1965 saw Odinga as the greater threat to him it will be seen. The political instability in Kenya was that intense that even the British observers were pessimistic about Kenya in late 1964 to early 1965. Indeed in late summer of 1964, a British diplomat described that demeanour; 'Kenya at present is temporarily and superficially stable, in the sense that no major upheaval seems likely to occur within the next four months', and 'An Odinga attempt at a coup d'etat therefore seems unlikely in the near future' (Gilchrist quoted in Cullen, 2016:3).The zenith of Kenya's ethno-politics manifested itself in 1966 when Oginga Odinga formed a pre-dominantly Luo opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU)(Stubbs in Zirker, 2015)—swaying a substantial number of KANU's Luo supporters, fragmenting the state further and as a result becoming internally more destabilised compared to its Somalia whose internal stability was precisely delineated by one scholar that Somalis were strongly united as long as they still had a common adversaries and a joint national interest, in fact, the situation that would change later on .

Although Thomas Stubbs argued that; 'The Kenyan army had already been built up by 1964 to confront the shifta, a Somali secessionist movement in northern Kenya that sought union with the kindred groups in Somalia.'(Stubbs in Zirker, 2015: 72). However to what extent were they ready in comparison to Somali Army? After the ignominious defeat in 1964 Somalia…embarked on extremely massive military capability construction program unmatchable of its kind in the Horn of Africa, for as

one scholar described it as three-folds Kenya's military sector and for Wanjohi Kabukuru's articulation suffices anyone to comprehend the imagery of Somali might when he said: 'In the 60s both Ethiopia and Kenya had come to appreciate Somalia's large military and its extensive support and armament from the USSR due to its Cold War allegiance to the Soviets.' However, that wasn't a 'positive appreciation' instead a negative one paving a way to security dilemma due to crashing interests specifically over the claimed territories by Somalia in both Kenya and Ethiopia (Kabukuru, 2015). Indeed in return, it would ignite arms race and alliance seeking in the Horn of Africa to counterbalance Somalia, since the Cold War main actors were ready to sponsor anyone as long as he was to promote their interests as it will be below.

The state of Kenyan army in the 1960s was terrifying, Global Security recounts that like other Sub-Saharan countries Kenyan army was formerly part of larger King's African Rifle (KAR), which in December 1963 received former British's the 3rd, 5th, and 11th battalions who constituted roughly 2500 soldiers became the new country's army . Surprisingly the other soldiers who would make an increment in Kenya's army population were disbanded i.e. the militia unit, the white-dominated Kenya Regiment and the Kikuyu Guard. An additional favour came in form of cash for Kenya's military sector also lacked sufficient funds and weaponry. So the three transferred Battalions' equipment was also given to Kenya and additional grants equivalent to US$9.8 million in arms, ammunitions and other equipment, installations and other assets worth US$23.8 million, and US$3.6 million in assistance to establish a navy. 'At independence, the Kenyan army had 80 African commissioned officers, who constituted 48.5 percent of the total officer corps. The bulk of these were former effendi, most of whom had been given regular commissions after 1961; others were non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who had undergone a short officer training course. The new African officers were nearly all of junior rank, but one African lieutenant colonel commanded a battalion.'(Global Security, 2000). Even the officers who had been trained abroad such as in Bulgaria, Egypt, China, the Soviet Union, Israel etc. under special arrangements were not trusted by the Ministry of Defence for their unsanctioned training was perceived as a political threat to the nation.

A further instance that demonstrated weakness of 'Young Kenya' was the reservation of the British officers who almost comprised entire middle and senior rank officers, the rationale for this appeared on two premises— first in this critical transition moment the British officers' presence would provide continuity and stability in the new Kenyan army and more pragmatically there was dearth of experienced Kenyan Officers to replace the British. Second, it would provide the newly established government with relative sufficient time to adjust to the then ongoing ethno-political impact of Africanisation of the army in the country (Stubbs in Zirker, 2015). However, to their dismay, this would back-fire them in infamous Lanet insurgency and subsequently anti-British rhetoric echoed by the main politician such as Oginga Odinga (Parsons, 2007: 63-65). Having seen the pit-holes in Kenyan army and political sphere, how would Kenya balance appropriately against Somali threat?

In this first stage of foreign policy, Kenya took realists' notion of 'security of a state is self-help' that is essential for the survival in the anarchic world, and therefore despite Kenya's conviction in 'good neighbourliness' following the 1964 Mutiny the Kenyatta administration was compelled to deal with the internal problem both in the military and the unstable political atmosphere and without forgetting the threat at its door steps (Somalia). This was the beginning of a massive enhancement initiative to surge up Kenyan military with a peculiar reaction towards Somali military might , essentially it would be implemented in two forms first external balancing against Somalia by diversifying alliance with the Cold War rivalry blocs, and regional powers—The Kenyatta administration was tasked to solidify Kenya's relations with its old ally i.e. the United Kingdom; After seeking assistance from the British against the mutineers which they offered instantly, signed an agreement with British Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys in the same year to continue assist in the Shifta war, and they would corporate with to expand the country's army and air force and to set up a small naval force for coastal defence. Additionally, the Defence Ministry would receive around US$40 million. Also, British troops would continue to train Kenya's armed forces (Nzoma, 1981: 315). In 1966, 'Bamburi Understanding' was covertly reached a commitment between Great Britain and the Kenyatta administration, assuring Kenyan government consultation service and

perhaps military assistance in case it was necessarily unavoidable (Maxon and Ofkansky, 2014; Poppy, 2015: 165-170).

Notably, in this deal there was no strong commitment from the British side, a fact that manifested itself in the British reply; "If Kenya were the victim of outright aggression by Somalia, the British government would give the situation most urgent consideration. While the British government cannot in advance give the Kenya Government any assurance of automatic assistance, the possibility of Britain giving the Kenyans assistance in the event of organised and unprovoked armed attack by Somalia is not precluded" (Quoted in Opiyo, 2016). The secret military deal was established when President Kenyatta dispatched Attorney-General Charles Njonjo and Agriculture Minister Bruce Mckenzie to London purposely to present a request of an another favour; to provide Kenya with additional sophisticated weapons. Besides relying much on Great Britain, Global Security presents a different account where through special agreements between various individual states such as Egypt, Israel, China, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria and Kenyan political factions soldiers were sent for special training, for instance, the 'Kikuyu paramilitary' General Service Unit (GSU) were trained by Israel (2000).

At a regional level, Kenya signed the first Mutual Defense Pact with the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1963 basically because they shared a common adversary, Somalia and the fundamental idea underpinned in the pact was a united response towards a Somali attack. As already described the previous sections, in the Horn two states were more concerned Somali government's expansionist policy perhaps more than even the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Besides, their attention was more drawn to Somali massive military development. From Maxon and Ofcansky's delineation as Kenya's North-Eastern conflict intensified, the state sought for allies and on December of 1963, a Defense Pact was concluded (2014: 314), for Ethiopia suffered from a similar external threat like Kenya. Unlike Kenya the genesis of Somali-Ethiopian goes back to pre-colonial era in 13th-16th century, however during the colonial era Ethiopia had acquired Somali-lands through agreement between the empire and the European colonialists , although for the Europeans this was more of greater imperial stratagems, Barnes emphasise that 'Colonial administrators in British Somaliland saw the territorial concession to Ethiopia as a mistake and the subsequent boundary agreement as unworkable, storing

up problems for the future. The boundary with Ethiopia became an obsession upon which the many woes of an economically poor and administratively volatile colony were blamed' (2007:278). And during the inter-war period, Ethiopia was annexed by Italy's Benito Mussolini in 1935-36 after emerging as the victor from the Italo-Ethiopian War forcibly putting Ethiopian empire including the Somali-lands it under an Italian administration. In the aftermath of Second World War and with the end of European appeasement policy towards Italy, from 1944-49, Ethiopia was granted three predominantly Somali territories; Ogaden region, Haud-Reserve area and the Harar region. (Payne, 1988:27-29; Mahmood, 2001:3; Woodward, 2003; Berhe, 2003: 94-110).

Meanwhile, Somali nationalist organisations' activities had started to penetrate these Somali inhabited regions. In 1960, all the agreements that had resulted into demarcation of Somali-lands and deprived Somalis wherever they were their self-determination were officially not recognised by the Somalia government particular the validity of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1954 recognising Ethiopia's claim to the Haud or, in general, the relevance of treaties defining Somali-Ethiopian borders (Global Security, 2000). Though in the case of Kenya direct engagement remained limited, it was more or less rhetorical attacks directly related to irredentist sentiments from Somali officials as Harper mentions the constant propaganda from Voice of Somali Radio in Mogadishu broadcasted in the former NFD (2012:). In one of the recorded speeches conducted by Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke echoed those sentiments as follow;

'Our misfortune is that our neighbouring countries, with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary 'arrangements'. They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pastoral lands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture and the same traditions. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?'(Dr.Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke quoted in Harper, 2012:52)

And immediately the government embarked on endless endeavours to bring the Somali brethren into Somali folds, as one scholar put it precisely: '…Somalia

was loud in its desire to absorb all outlying ethnic Somali-occupied territories beyond the official Somali borders, namely, French Somaliland, the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and north-eastern Kenya'(Munene, 2015: 124). This took a form of diplomatic negotiation, military confrontation and covert involvement in proxy wars for instance in 1963 Kenya claimed Somali separatists were equipped with Russian arms supplied by the Somali government (Anderson, 2014). With Ethiopia there were no much alternative, in 1961 disengagement without negotiation occurred when a similar revolt like in former NFD of Kenya broke out in Haud region just within six months after Somali gained independence, as yihun elaborately explained; 'After 1960, the intensification of Somalia's diplomatic offensive on the irredentist issue instead provoked a worsening of relations between the two neighbours' (2014: 677). A small scale war erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia along the frontiers from February until April when Sudan mediated between the two states OAU. In 1964 another disengagement happened Somalia and Ethiopia took place but this time with negation. And worst disengagement happened in 1977 not only terribly affecting Ethiopian-Somalia relations but the progressing Kenya-Somalia relationship. For both Kenya and Ethiopia neither did they believe in the concept of elasticity or contractibility of post-colonial states as will be discussed later (Kornprobst, 2002: 381 and Woodward, 2003).

Secondly Kenya also balanced internally, by starting an initiative of reforming the army structure ethnically and racially in order to prevent another mutiny, Africanising it at the same 'Kikuyunisation' the government administration for the mutineers' grievances were at one point concerned with the military composition at the high-rank level i.e. British officers and Kikuyu dominance— 'Kenyanisation' process took a gradual pace, for instance, a British army general continued to serve (on secondment) as army commander and as Chief of the Defence Staff until 1969 which was actually part of the Anglo-Kenyan agreement in 1964 (Hornsby, 2014). It is underlined by Global security that it indeed it was not until 1969 that the large British Army Training Team was pulled off and a Kenyan Major replaced the position of Air Force in 1970 that Africanisation process was complete (2000). Despite all these initiatives Kenyatta didn't trust Kenyan army because, in the course of improving the military, an alternative militia—General Service Unit (GSU)

was set up, and a pre-dominantly Kĩkũyũ (a tribe he belonged to) commanded paramilitary autonomous from of both the army and the police.

Partly the GSU was established to maintain order in the ethically insinuated political atmosphere of post-independent especially in situations where the army couldn't be deployed, which indeed worked very well in suppressing internal uprisings even though missed to some extent. In order to allay ethnic conflict in the army, more ethnically Kamba soldiers were disproportionally conscripted so that they can balance between the main rivals – Kĩkũyũs and Luos (Stubbs, 2015:73). In fact, this was even more apparent in spring of 1965 incident code-named Operation Binnacle Operation Binnacle, when British military intervened on Kenyatta's request due the suspected coup perpetrate by the pro-communist elites with the help of USSR, although it later turned to be a mere rumour. Despite previously receiving arms from Eastern European countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, in a way of denying Soviet influence in Kenya 'On 14 April, a Soviet ship Fizik Lebedev arrived in Mombasa loaded with weapons and military advisers rumoured to be intended for a coup. Yet, fairly quickly the situation quietened.'(Cullen, 2016: 3; Hornsby, 2014; Parsons, 2007).

In 1967 another factor emerged that influenced Kenya-Somalia relationship- the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia. Despite Somalia's endless endeavours for liberating Somali inhibited regions of North-Eastern region in Kenya through the state since the 1960s, Kenya on the other side stood firmly against all kinds of attempts to disintegrate its territory as designated by the British colonialists (CQ Researcher, 2011: 243). Not until the late 1960s that the tensions between two states would be reduced, when on September 11-4 both governments reached a diplomatic agreement at the fifth Assembly of Heads of OAU in Kinshasa, and under the auspices of the O.A.U. with Zambia's President Kaunda acting as mediator, on October 28 a memorandum of agreement was signed in Arusha (Tanzania) during the Arusha Conference by President Kenyatta of Kenya and Mr Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, the Prime Minister of Somalia (Thompson, 2015). Basically, the essence of the agreement was to end the 'Somali quasi-war' over territorial dispute and restoration of diplomatic relationship between Kenya and Somalia and specifically there was a call to gradually suspend emergency regulations on both sides, 'emergency regulations on both sides; the cessation of hostile propaganda; and the establishment

of a committee comprising representatives of Kenya, Somalia, and Zambia, who would supervise the implementation of the agreement and seek satisfactory solutions of the differences between the two countries.'(Keesing's Record of World Events, 1967: 22386). The conclusion of the Arusha Accord was the first landmark in Somalia-Kenya relationship, for the fact that Somalia's perception of Kenya changed which was in fact echoed in President Egal's speech; "…we in the Somali Republic make no claims on the territory of any of our neighbours…we do not wish to annexe the territory of any state whatever, nor to expand into such territory." (Quoted in Duhur, 2012). But was this implicitly projecting Somalia's later position pertaining North-eastern region? How about Kenya's Perception of Somalia, did this diplomatic development change it this later period of phase I?

Ironically, it would be a misinterpretation of Somali posture which Kenya was suspicious about, for in the same speech Egal Somalia's ironism on the contended territories was subtly put forward when he added: "…we do intend to champion the cause of Somali territories under foreign domination, in order that they may attain sovereign independent status through the process of self-determination". It can be perceived as a Somali stratagem due to variance of factors from the time Somalia gained independence to 1967 in Somalia and Kenya—The rise to power of Muhammad Ibrahim Egal as a premier of Somali Republic who Helen C, Metz describes as possessing a more moderate stand on pan-Somalism was he was generally preferred by the majority of the political elites which was apparent in his nomination with relatively low opposition, he had a close relation and ideological affiliation with President Shermarke and besides that, he was extremely interested in improving Somalia's foreign relations with other African countries.(Metz, 1992). Perhaps his interest in détente may be traced in Somalia's loss of war with Ethiopia over the Haud region in 1961 and OAU's interest in resolving Somali irredentist claims in other states. In fact, another factor was that in 1964 the Organisation for the African Union passed a resolution against any form of state expansionist policy and reconfirming official colonial boundaries. Also, the on Arab states could not be counted for their support of Somali objectives since they had become weak after their defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israel War Six Days' War. Arab states had been on the side of Somalia and equally supporting its unification ambitions as well, perhaps this can

be related to Somalia's membership in the Arab League in a period where solidarity among member states was strong (Yihun, 2014).

The Arab moral and material support manifested itself in two instances—some weapons such as landmines used by the shiftas were indirectly supplied by Arab to them through Somalia Army. Second, in summer of 1967, President Kenyatta invited Egypt's premier Nasser to Kenya in order to see the condition of border tension in North-eastern Kenya and his invitation was turned down. Additionally about the same time Dr Mungai visited several Arab states including Iran requesting for restriction of arms supply (Carment et. al, 2006: 88 and Keesing's Record of World Events, 1967: 22386). Thus the willingness to reach a rapprochement with both Kenya and Ethiopia. On the other side Kenya's President Kenyatta even though welcomed the agreement, he could not cease to perceive Somalia with oddity for he suspected Somalia's ignobility of the Accord, as Somali government's posture was profoundly expressed in Egal's eccentric speech delivered to the parliament: "we the Somali Republic declare our support to the Somalis who are waging their struggle for independence.

We are with them and will give them moral and material support at all times and at all international gatherings . . . we shall in no way retreat from this." The Bamburi Understanding was signed just nine months before Arusha meeting and Kenyatta didn't dare to cancel it, for Kenya was doubtful concerning Somalia's willingness to fulfil the conditionality which was presented before the détente agreement by Dr Njoroge Mungai, the Kenyan Minister of Defence;—'the reopening of normal relations with Somalia would be possible as soon as Somalia renounced all claims in the Northern frontier area and ceased its aid to the so-called "liberation" movement and President Kenyatta offered a month to the shiftas for surrendering so that amnesty can be granted to them (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1967). Kenya's pessimism would be more accentuated when a military junta-Major General Muhammad Siad Barre took over Somali government with the help of police through a bloodless and unplanned coup On October 21, 1969, after a sudden assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke (QC Researcher, 2015 and Metz, 1992). As Odhiambo L, Opiyo describes that subsequently the 1969 political atmosphere in the Somali Republic essentially intensified the fear among senior Kenyan officials suspecting General Barre to resuscitate the Greater Somalia ambitions (Opio, 2016).

Interestingly, in most of the reviewed literature, the 1969 rapprochement is analysed from Kenyan side, yet both states were equally cynical about each other.

According to Neoclassical Realists factors that account for this, first from systemic level strategically: As already discussed in detail above were; Kenya sought to diversify her link with the western powers in order to balance appropriately with Somalia as a threat that was embedded in formation of the 'Greater Somalia,' and consequently that meant Kenya losing a substantial part of it territory of the NFD. Kenya formed an alliance with Britain with whom Somalia had severed relation in 1963 over its decision in favour of Kenya retaining the NFD (Barkan, 1994). Indeed as lamented by Maxon and Ofkansky Kenya didn't feel safe at all from Somali threat, in 1967 'Bamburi understanding' was secretly reached upon between Nairobi and London, where by Britain was committed to intervening in case Somalia strikes at any time (2014; 318).

And US was ready to help Kenya, as long as Somalia was on the other hand assisted by USSR. At a regional level, a bilateral military cooperation agreement was signed between Kenya and Ethiopia in 1964 whom they shared a common adversary i.e.Somalia (De Hoyos, 1995: 12). Then before the culmination of pan-Somalism during a regime of Siad Barre in late 1970s, the previous government in 1967 had made a détente with Kenya and in fact, Barre had initially maintained it. Secondly, at unit-level, several factors can be pointed out that contributed to Kenya's maintenance of a uniform foreign policy in the first phase. Among others weakness of economic and shortage of military capability. Kenya was faced with extremely low economic development level resulting into paying more attention to the improvement of the national economy; in fact, this was on the top of the foreign policy agenda during the Kenyatta administration.

Also there was a division within Kenyan political elites on the nature of political system that should be adopted immediately during the post-independence period, and serious contest was among the mainstream parties, which actually reflected a deep division within the citizenry since the parties were formed along ethnic ties, this would reappear in 1964 an opposition party, Kenya people's Union (Maxon and Ofkansky 2014). Likewise, Makinda points out the fact that Kenya devoted herself to a developmental strategy based on foreign capital from the West

and maintenance of the already existing foreign investments in the country, therefore, guaranteeing protection to the substantial colonial settlers, unlike the path which other African states took that enable them to have a radical stand on international affairs, so all Kenyan politicians who had parallel views about this were later ousted out from power this followed the passing of the Foreign Investment Protection Act in 1964 (1983: 302; Mwangi in Kithinji et al. 2016; 146).

In addition the military was extremely weak during this period after the 1963 mutiny so presumably the state was trying to on improving it military capabilities, indeed this manifest when Kenya had to turn to the British in order to curb the mutiny and in the winter of 1963 financial assistance was received from Britain to improve Kenya's military capability (Parsons, 2003, 2007; Global Security, 2000). Also, the state relied on assistance from British counterinsurgency experts to win Somali guerrillas in NFD. During this phase, Kenya concentrated more energy in the functioning of East African Community as a means of cooperation although it intensified regional tension (Barkan, 1994).The question in context is how did the events in the first phase impact the later developments in Kenya's foreign policy?

6.2. PHASE II: *1975-Early 1980s*

Unlike in the first phase where Kenya's foreign policy could generally be described as dominated by economic development and security concern more than the less vitalised issues of the time such non-alignment and pan-Africanism (Mwangi in Kithinji et al. 2016: 7), in the next phase which speculatively began around late 1970s to mid-1980s Kenyan foreign policy was subjected to re-assessment as lamented by David F. Gordon that Kenya became more involved in the exoteric affairs and widened the issues of foreign policy agenda as well as making a change as he puts it '…issues related to colonial legacy gave way to broader regional and international issues and to relations with IMF and World Bank' (Barkan, 1994; 236 and Mabera, 2016).

With Kenya-Somalia relations the peculiarity took four forms: first the end of détente with Somalia due to re-awakening of Somali expansionist ambition after the

outbreak of Ogaden war, which subsequently led to second form, the revival of the defense co-operation between Kenya and Ethiopia in 1980 against Somalia (Payne, 1988 and Mwangi in Kithinji et al., 2016), in fact Kenya's spokesperson asserted that Ethiopia's victory in that war would be a victory of Kenya which was a true prophecy as it will be explained later (Landford, 2015). Third, Kenya explicitly identified its side in the Cold War politics aligning with the West, which was quite for an obvious reason i.e to counter balance Somalia due to Somalia's definitive relationship with USSR and Cuba. In return for military and economic aid, Kenya offered the United States with air and navy facility (Makinda, 1983 and Gordon, 1994: 89-91). Whilst Kenya was struggling with Somalia in the North-eastern part, in the western part, Uganda's Idi Amin started similar territorial claims leading to the two states almost to a blink of war (Umbright, 1989:16; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997: 450; Khadiagara, 2014). What is more vital to know, are the factors influenced Kenya's foreign policy in at this stage, and compared to the first previous stage what elements of continuity and change can be underlined in this new stage?

Despite Kenya not impugning Somalia's commitment to the rapprochement immediately, the sudden change of regime in Somalia seemed to it as an impediment to the bilateral agreement with the previous government. In fact even before the coup Somali government's decision of pacifying relations with the neighbouring states was pretty much perceived as treacherous, this has alluded in the events that followed in Somalia after the establishment of the agreement with Kenya. Although Egal was popular among the political elites his decision to make a détente with Kenya was rather unpopular (except the national parliament) especially within his party-Somali Youth League (SYL) which subsequently prompted his expulsion from the party following altercations with the other members over Arusha Agreement (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1967: 22386). The internal tensions within Somalia started to accumulate particularly clannish grievances until when Barre took over the government.

Meanwhile General Barre, a chief of staff of the Somali army was among the clique of army officers who were not satisfied with Egal and Sharmark's fragmented, faction-ridden government and dysfunctional parliament and in the aftermath of the coup when he became the state leader after being chosen by the new governing body-the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), they unfolded a new system

relinquishing almost all its reminiscence in a revolution that subsisted in 'scientific socialism.'(Abbink, 2003: 349)—deposed civilian government, suspending the constitution, political parties and detaining their political members, the existing treaties were not to be impeded so long as they weren't in line with state ambition of Greater Somalia, consequently national liberation movements and Somali unification were to be supported (Mertz, 1992). This explicitly implied that not only Arusha Accord was null but also Somalia-Ethiopia tension that was reduced by Sharmarke's administration when a ministerial delegation led by Somali Minister of the Interior (Mr Yasim Nur Hassan), was sent to Addis Ababa for talks aimed at harmonising diplomatic relations between the states (Duhur, 2012).

Unlike Somalia that was close to the Cold War actors, receiving funding from USSR and Cuba, generally, Ethiopia had become more diplomatically isolated in 1969 especially due to rise to power of anti-Ethiopian regimes in the region- '…in Sudan (May), Libya (September), and Somalia (October). The governments of Nimeiry, Gaddafi, and Barre would each harness their resources against the interests of Ethiopia in the coming years, but it was the Somali threat that seemed the most immediate.'(Yihun, 2014: 678). In this period Kenya had become more involved in regional issues, in which its rational calculation was manifested in the continuum of Kenya's relation with Ethiopia despite the changes that occurred in the state. Greater Horn of Africa witnessed various changes in the late 1960s from coups to the ideological shift, change in alliance with the Cold War actors. In Kenya's case, a diplomatic relationship with the United States was strengthened which followed American strategic interest in Kenya, implying an element of continuity from the first phase. Prior to the Cold War era with the exception of the interwar period and 1941 Washington had had an interest in African affairs and didn't dare to interrupt with European domination of the continent. So in this period the U.S-Soviet rivalry unequivocally replaced historical European imperial bout, with peculiarity to the Horn (Khapoya and Agyeman-Duah, 1985: 18). At this juncture how did US-Soviet rivalry impact Kenya-Somalia relationship? Both Kenya and Somalia were susceptible to the Cold War contestation, in that incentives in form of foreign aids were presented to them with geopolitical motivations behind, verifying Hans Morgenthau's argument alluding to much of the so-called 'foreign aids' in form of economic development and military assistance being simply 'bribe', for they aim at

influencing the recipients (1971:242-244). As it was already mentioned in the previous chapter, through containment policy United States attempted to draw Somalia to the Western bloc during its post-independence though it was not successful for the USSR offered it with a better deal through the Russian military aid agreement of 1963, strikingly US and USSR were less concerned with the internal and regional dynamics of the conflicts to a certain extent as long as their own state interests were not affected (De-Hoyos, 1995).

The typical case was the coup in Somalia that didn't distort Somali-Soviet relation rather nourishing it for in the eight years Barre spent with the Soviets their partnership translated into significant military alliance, giving Somalia enough military confidence after being supplied with sophisticated Soviet military and espionage consultants, and weaponry including SAM-2 missile defense system, MiG-21 jet fighters and T-54 tanks etc. (Lewis, 1988: 209; Metz, 1992:188). With the agreement, the Soviets were allowed access to strategically located base at Berbara port, near the Red Sea and Indian Ocean from which they could counter US military movement in the Middle East and North Africa, in addition to commercial purpose. As Somalia got much entangle with USSR on the other side Kenya became a western bloc associate, a phenomenon which various scholars and observers contend that has been persistent in the state's history arguably for developmental reasons (Khapoya and Agyeman-Duah, 1985: 19).

Essentially, Adar lamented that Kenya-US and UK closeness free been a result of Kenya's 'continued dependence' whose genesis goes back to 1950-60's economic-linkage for all the parties believed in 'capitalist values and idea'. In 1964 a US embassy was set up in Nairobi, yet ironically the following year Kenya adopted the Sessional Paper No. 10 based on African Socialism in which prior to its official release, the Minister for Economic Planning explained that the paper indicated Kenya's neutrality pertaining the then contemporary paradigm while taking the path to economic development (Adar in Munene et al., 1995: 90), seemingly Kenya relinquishing socialist cliché attached. Why then later did Kenya decide to become closer to the US? And how would US benefit from its relationship?

Kenya's foreign policy in this phase as much as it was focused on economic development; security was inevitable to be taken into consideration among top

priorities. As North-eastern insurgency (shifta conflict) became assiduous on Kenyan side with the Soviet-backed Somali 'involvement ', For purpose of deterrence Kenya turned to US forging a more closer military relationship as delineated by Munene et al., that Kenya's increasing nearness to US foreign policy interest in the Horn subsists in the 'inevitable outgrowth of her continued dependence'(1995:91-92). Which they readily accepted for it was like what Khapoya and Agyeman-Duah articulated in 1985; '…"Greater Somalia" has truly shaped the domestic priorities of these leaders ever since the country became independent. This dream has had a remarkable impact on Somalia's relationships with her neighbours and has created an ideal situation for great power rivalry that has not diminished and is not likely to diminish in the future.'(1985:21).

Americans accepted Kenya's request because, in order to contain Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf, it was strategically vital to obtain military base rights, facilities and transit authorisations from the Horn and East African countries due to their proximity to it. Additionally, the end of Carter Doctrine related to employment of military measures in order to promote US interest in the Persian Gulf became another factor that vitalised the significance of the Horn, for Americans were pushed to look for non-militaristic means (Clough, 1992:11). So accordingly in 1980 Kenya-US military relationship was formalised with a Facilities Access Agreement that essentially permitted Americans to use three airfield and granted them an access to Mombasa seaport in return for equivalent of military assistance worth USD 20,000,000 with an expectation of a gradual increment up to USD 30, 000,000 in the following year (Nelson, 1984:227; Gordon, 1994:248; Macharia, 1995).

Interestingly, with this agreement it implied that Kenya officially shifted from the neutral position it had previously claimed in the first phase to the Western bloc, subsequently solidifying it antagonistic position with Somalia since for Somalia had aligned with the Soviets, and finally British's status as the main backup of Kenya was displaced with Americans being Kenya's major arms suppliers. A notable effect of this agreement was observed during Gulf War where American warships were allowed to dock at Mombasa port (Macharia, 1995). Nevertheless, duality in Kenya's foreign policy behaviour in the period highlights its own ironism; Around the same time Eastern bloc-Kenya diplomatic relation improved perhaps due to change of administration i.e the rising to power of President Daniel Arap Moi, who personally

visited China to improve agriculture and economic status of the country and as Magero states the main underlining objective which was to diversify sources of Kenya's external development funds (Magero, 2007).

Despite identifying itself with Western bloc, Kenya renewed its defence pact with Ethiopia's communist regime against Somalia after the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1980. Proving a point raised by Neoclassic Realists about the temporary applicability of ideologies, an essentially a refutation of ideationalists. As already seen Somalia's Siad Barre had kept close relationship with USSR which militarily aggrandised Somali military might, that was concisely explained in a comparative manner by Global Security as follow (2000); 'Before the Ogaden War, the most striking feature of the 23,000-man SNA had been its large armoured force, which was equipped with about 250 T-34 and T-54/T-55 Soviet-built medium tanks and more than 300 armoured personnel carriers. This equipment gave the SNA a tank force more than three times as large as Ethiopia's. The pre-war SAF also was larger than Ethiopia's air force. In 1976 the SAF had fifty-two combat aircraft, twenty-four of which were Soviet-built supersonic MiG21s. Facing them was an Ethiopian Air Force (EAF) of thirty-five to forty aircraft.

Ethiopia also was in the process of acquiring several United States-built Northrop F-5 fighters from Iran. At the outbreak of fighting, Ethiopia had approximately sixteen F5A /Es.' With the failure of Sovietica pax, in 1977 Soviets switched side supporting Ethiopia's Marxist regime through a large-scale supply of intended armours and artilleries for Somalia to Ethiopia's Derg during Ogaden war. Yet before that in late 1976 USSR signed a secret agreement with Ethiopian delegation, which was done without ruling out 1974 Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Allison, 1988:225 and Yihun, 2014). And accordingly in the same year on 13 November the Somali government renounced its treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, that led to the end of Soviet utilisation of naval facilities, ordering all Soviet military and civilian advisers to leave within seven days, and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba and with all Cubans being given 48 hours to leave the country, due to the fact that of "Cuba's brazen decision to commit its troops on the side of the Ethiopian Government and its propaganda against Somalia". (David, 1979: 69 and Keesing's Record of World Events: 28760).

Despite the Derg's official ideology being parallel with Kenya, Kenyatta administration had a close relationship with Ethiopia even during the war it openly supported Ethiopia against Somalia for an obvious reason, the main cause of Ogaden was the endless Somali ambition Greater Somalia, a similar problem that Kenya faced. This was so evident when President Barre exclaimed that '...the fighting in the Ogaden desert had become internationalised and that the integrity and independence of all Ethiopia's neighbours-Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and the Sudan-were being threatened.'(Keesing's Record of World Events: 28760). And as such being susceptible to Somali threat In 1979 Kenya renewed the Defence Pact with Ethiopia to sustain their alliance for 10 years. Nevertheless, Kenya didn't hesitate to condemn Somalia for its offensiveness and pressured it to pay the war reparation which was part of the conditions Ethiopia put before Somalia in case it was willing to make another rapprochement with it (Yihun, 2014: 687). And in cooperation with Ethiopia, Kenya covertly continued sponsoring anti-Barre regime militias based in Ethiopia after Ogaden War.

In summary, this second stage was characterised by a slight tilt in Kenya's foreign policy in general nevertheless the phase substantially there were consistencies in Kenya-Somali relations. Two main changes in Kenya's foreign policy can be mentioned; First Kenya-Somalia détente ended with the revived expansionist ambitions of Somali government under Siad Barre despite being strongly opposed by Organisation of African Union (Payne, 1988) that unfolded itself in the Ogaden War probably due the fact that there was a replacement of a liberal regime towards Greater Somalia ideology with a radical, nationalist and militant regime in Somalia.

Second, Kenya explicitly identified its side in the Post-Cold War era-aligning with the West (Makinda, 1983), and also becoming a more active actor in the Horn of Africa's conflict. The reasons for this can be traced from changing relations with Somalia due to its offensive tendencies that threatened Kenya's interest. In order to pursue a grand strategy, Kenya deepened strategic relations with the US and not only devotedly supporting Soviet-backed Ethiopian regime in the 1977-78 Ogaden proxy war against Somalia, but also renewed the Defence Pact with Ethiopia in 1989. Kenya-US relationship was an explicit quid-pro-quo, as Kenya benefited from an enormous American military and economic assistance in return

Kenya provided the US with strategic access to the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa as well as permitting them to use Mombasa Port and Airfield and other military bases (Gordon in Barkan, 1994; 240). Clearly what is observed in this period is the continued avoidance of direct military confrontation between Kenya and Somalia rather Kenyan policymakers continued preferring buck-passing. In the domestic political realm, there was a continuum of de facto one-party system dominance in the state affairs, this was in conjuncture with accumulation of all powers in the president's hand who was at the same time party leader (Nyström, 2000), therefore the president having too much influence on the state policies including the foreign policy.

In this phase factors that accounted for the change and continuity in Kenya's foreign policy from a Neoclassical Realist perspective are observable from both global and regional context as follow; First the exacerbated superpowers intervention in the Horn's conflicts due to a perception of Africa as of more or less geo-strategic importance. Kenya-Somalia relation continued to be harmonious for in the early 1980s for Barre's government maintained the détente initiative of the previous regime as explained by Gordon that '…The United States effectively mediated a discord between Nairobi and Mogadishu, and although relationship remained stable, Kenya's sense of threat was removed… '(Gordon in Barkan, 1994; 248).

In the later period the failure of '*Pax Sovieticus*' led to USSR and Cuba shifting support to the newly established Marxist-Lenin Ethiopian regime, yet previous the Soviets had helped in augmentation of Somali military capability since 1963, and it ended with the abrogation of 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two states due to the Ogaden war (Payton, 1980: 493; Payne, 1988: 27), a fact that had drawn attention of Kenya and US consequently resulting into a security dilemma. However, with the cancellation of the treaty all the intended ammunition and financial assistance for Somalia were transferred to Ethiopia as Payton elaborated; '28 November 1977 the Soviet Union launched a major military airlift of arms and materiel bound for the Horn of Africa. In succeeding weeks the U.S.S.R. employed An-12 (NATO Cub) and An-22 (NATO Cock) transport aircraft along with seagoing cargo vessels to deliver an estimated $1 billion in fighter-bombers, tanks, artillery, and ammunition to the Ethiopian regime…' (Payton, 1979).

This augmented dross Ethiopian military and enabled Kenya to juxtapose itself in gang-chaining against Somalia as explained above and continue with its previous policy towards Somalia since Ethiopia was strong enough to confront Somalia. At the regional level, the collapse of East African Community (EAC) in 1977 greatly affected Kenya's economy over the long internal tensions due to ideological differences and unfeasible policies among the member states for instance when Uganda and Tanzania adopted socialism through 1969 Common Man Charter respectively and 1967 Arusha Declaration (Boesen et al., 1977).

The organisation's decline was a big blow to Kenya forcing it to search for alternative markets other parts of Africa and the Middle East. The situation even worsened with the closure of Kenya-Tanzanian border in 1977 and 1982. Kenya lost several million dollars' worth of Kenyan vehicles and private aircraft due to Tanzania's first closure of the border in February 1977, though there wasn't any retaliation on Kenyan side perhaps due to two reasons (Mann,1977); first, worsening border conflict with Uganda in the western frontier and second on the North-eastern side, Somalia had ended the 1967 Arusha Accord by starting a war with Kenya's ally (Ethiopia), and third, Kenya was still trying to find a way it could diplomatically deal with the new regime in Ethiopia that was fundamentally Marxist in essence yet Kenya had aligned itself with the Western bloc (Yihun, 2014; Payne:1988; Johnson Et, al.:1984; Reid, 2017).

The tension between Tanzania and Kenya rose out of state economic competition when East African Airways in January 1977 that was owned jointly by the two countries and Uganda. The former countries had decided to establish their own national airline leading to more complication in the division of EAC assets after its collapse (Mann, 1977). At around the same time border conflict between Kenya and Uganda erupted over the Western frontiers (Mabera, 2016; 3), Uganda's President Al-Haj Field Marshal Idi Amin Dada claimed for a substantial pre-colonial territories that belonged to Ugandan side along Kenya's western boundaries including Turkana, part of Lake Rudolf , West Pokot, Tranz-Nzioa, Bungoma, Busia, Kakamega, Central Nyanza, Narok etc (Musinguzi, 2011). He claimed these were very fertile Ugandan territories that were wrongly allotted to Kenyan side by the British and that his claim could be verified by geographical and historical fact that were available. The situation became tense not until President Kenyatta threatened to

block Mombasa Port from being accessible to Ugandans, yet it was the only port Uganda relied on for its export and imports (Umbright, 1989:16; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997: 450; Khadiagara, 2014).

Within Kenya, the sudden death of President Kenyatta in 1978 and the ascending to power of Arap Moi in the same year shifted Kenya's orientation in foreign policy. Since the conducting of foreign affairs is a prerogative of the Kenyan president, being regarded as the initiator, articulator and director of foreign policy. Unlike Kenyatta, President Moi was of a different personal trait, characterised by being more personally more active in foreign issues perhaps this links to his several foreign responsibilities that were assigned to him during Kenyatta administration as a vice president. Moi can also be described as being more aggressive and controversial compared to Kenyatta for instance during his reign Kenya ignored its association with the Western bloc and rather kept on going closer to the Eastern bloc associating with People's Republic of China and Ethiopia's Soviet and Cuba-backed Derg regime for the reasons already explained (Yihun, 2014; Khapoya and Agyeman-Duah, 1985: 19).

Moi's administration maintained the tradition of non-interference into other states' domestic affairs and national integrity, compared to Kenyatta, Moi was more involved in the foreign policy decision-making thus directly influencing both the other policy makers and the policy (Orwa in Ouma, 1994). Notably, Moi's regime was mostly preoccupied with economy which was more apparently on his various trips to the Western Europe, Middle East and Asia in search of loans. That was due to the fact that in 1980s Kenya went through a period of economic recession that was worsened by the 1979 oil crisis, the collapse of the East African Community because of conflict of interests among the member states formally by 1983, yet Kenya depended on this co-operation. Other determinates were drought contributing to food shortages and fluctuating prices due to the poor economic conditions (Gordon, 1989).

6.3. PHASE III (first half): *Mid-1980s – early1990s*

Major changes in history of Kenya's foreign policy happens in this phase for it was in this period that the breaking away from the known Kenyan approach towards interstate relations especially with Somalia occurred due to almost similar reasons in the previous stage, although more sudden changes were specifically observed in the second part of the third wave as it will be discussed later. Generally, this phase in Kenya's foreign affair more or less can be described in terms progress and regress, in the both segments that it can be divided into , basically the first half begun in mid-1980 ending in early 1990s according to Gordon, a period characterised by drastic changes in the surrounding of Kenya that was in of itself projected in a shift of state's foreign policy: The end of the Cold War and dissolution of the bipolar system leaving the US as the major actor at international level, and consequently implying a demise in the entire dynamics of African international relations. In addition, the end of the Cold War and trends in global economy led to the marginalisation of Africa's strategic importance in global political and economic affairs (Gordon in Barkan, 1994: 235-239). At the regional level, the emergence of anarchy in Somalia due to ousting of Barre's regime on one side marking the end of Somalia's expansionism up-to-date and on the other side Somali threat towards Kenya being persistent and changing its dynamic in terms of spill-over effect due to anarchy and war lordism that rose out of it .

And Kenya's relation with other regional actors such as Uganda and Tanzania was improving, partly the factor leading to that was the ascending to the power of friendlier regime after the decline of Idd Amin's government due to Uganda-Tanzania War, Amin was antagonistic with Kenyatta over similar claims like Siad Barre. Yet before this progress was realised, in late 1980s other tensions had risen when Uganda accused Kenya of backing-up anti-government elements and in return Kenya responded by alleging that Uganda had conducted incursions into Kenyan territory. By the early 1990's, however, diminishing protectionism was a push factor for regional integration that was gaining ground again in the East African politics (Reith and Boltz, 2011). The presidents of Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya held a conference about re-establishing cooperation in Arusha, Tanzania in November 1993. A permanent tri-national Commission, once again named the East African Cooperation (EAC), was inaugurated in March 1996, whose first secretary-general, Francis Muthaura, was Kenyan.

In Somalia, after losing in the Ogaden war immediately Barre's regime lost popularity among the Somali clan, which subsequently resulted in arms conflict between several clans and the government ((Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio, 2003:165 and Harper: 2012). In order to concentrate on the internal problems which were seriously plundering Somalia Siad Barre commenced a rapprochement in the Horn, first with Kenya's Moi, who later encouraged him to extend it to Ethiopia, and accordingly in 1988 he signed a peaceful Accord with Ethiopia so that not to support each other's enemies (Country Study, 2003). At the same time President Barre had also started a similar initiative with heads of socialist states to '…facilitate its rapprochement with Ethiopia and the USSR' and Somalia was advised to accept the conditionalities put forward by Ethiopia as the first step towards diplomatic agreement, and fortunately it led to the January 1986 meeting in Djibouti between Ethiopia's Mengistu and Siad Barre that later resulted to another detent as already mentioned.

However, Ethiopia remained extremely cautious of Somalia appeal for a rapprochement as well as Kenya would be, for historically it was a Somali stratagem to bring up a similar detent in order to reorganise itself as it was in a case of 1960 just few month after Somali independence and 1967 consecutively. And in fact during the post Ogaden war period Barre was threatened by economic and political crisis seemingly making his initiative for peace a mere '"temporary gesture," with the ulterior motive of buying time to crush the growing political opposition (as was demonstrated by the relative success of the Somalia National Movement (SNM) and Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)'.

In the aftermath of the Cold War Kenya continued to maintain its traditional approach towards its relations with Somalia, essentially because by then the threat perception from Somalia was drastically reduced due to several factors: first Barre with his megalomania idea of Greater Somalia was weakened by both Ethiopia's victory in the 1978/79 war as it was already mentioned that Ethiopian victory was predicated by Kenyan government as also its victory over Somalia, and loss of substantial foreign support that subsisted in its relationship with USSR and Cuba (David, 1979: 69; De Hoyos, 1995; Keesing's Record of World Events: 28760), second as Kenya was extremely affected by Western shift of interest from Africa in 1980s, Somalia too could not escape that. The third determinant was an internal

weakness of Somalia due to division in the military, in fact, this was more clearly seen with 1978 failed attempted the coup, this was coupled with an enormous reduction in military capability as Somalia lost almost a third of its soldiers in the war. Also resurfacing of clan rivalry consequently a civil war broke out in 1981 when two rebel groups, the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) pertaining to different clans were established and united against Barre weakening Somalia more (Harper, 2012). Despite the above weakness, Nairobi didn't completely rule out Mogadishu as 'no threat', rather Moi's administration covertly supported the Ethiopia based Somali rebels until the peace agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia, though later Barre claimed Ethiopia had violated the accord (Maxon and Ofkansky, 2014; 318).

After losing in the war certain segment of Somali army formed guerrilla units against Barre's regime with the tacit support of Kenya's Kenyatta and later Moi covertly sending airlifts of Somali fighters after being trained in Kenya to Ethiopia where the rebel bases were located as confessed by one of the founders of these rebel groups: "We asked the Kenya Government to give us a base, but they said they could only assist us secretly. Ethiopia accepted to explicitly host us and Kenya said it was ready to facilitate the ferrying of rebels to Ethiopia." (Mohammed Yusuf Quoted in Somalia online, 2003). The predicament was exacerbated when Kenya's relations with Arab nations deteriorated more after Kenya seized an Egyptian plane en route to Somalia transporting arms. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya have been gradually diminishing; a fact that was projected in President Moi's an unprecedented July 1984 visit in Kenya's history to Mogadishu to negotiate border claims and promote trade cooperation and he proposed to mediate between President Barre and Ethiopia (Harkavy, 1989).

Following that historical visit was the granting of amnesty and return of numerous Kenyan-Somalis from Somalia to Kenya who was previously belonging to Northern-Frontier District Liberation Front (NFDLF), and in a logical way of assuring Kenyan government of 'zero conflict' between the two states and Kenyan-Somalis, NFDLF declared its Mogadishu headquarter closed. Additionally, to formalise the diplomatic understanding reached upon in late December 1984 an agreement was signed between Somali and Kenyan border security government declaring the end of 'shifta conflict' which was manifested in positive response to

second general amnesty by other top former heads of shifta conflict in mid-1985 (Landford, 2015).

To sum up, in this first part of the third wave, there was a more stability between Somalia and Kenya which was mostly be related to regional factors such as Ethio-Somali War that subsequently weakened Somalia and active personality of President Moi, Albeit what can't be ruled out was diminished interest of global actors in the Horn's conflict who previously had stirred negative relations between Kenya and Somalia. Kenya-Somalia tension eased with the collapse of Barre's regime in 1991 and disintegration of Somali Republic with Somaliland declaring independence and Puntland semi-autonomous in 1991 and 1998 respectively from Mogadishu seemed to be the end of a serious Somali threat in the region.

However was it really the case for Kenya-Somali relation in the following period? The collapse of the central state in Somalia was both a curse and a blessing for Kenya, for without a government Somalia would no longer threaten Kenya anymore since it lacked organisation ability which was crippled by internal conflict. Yet, incidents in Somalia unfolded a novel threat to Kenya, especially when in early 1992, Kenya expressed the economic burden and security threat it was facing due to the presence of approximately a quarter million Somalia refugees in addition to 70,000 Ethiopian and 30,000 Sudanese refuges along Kenyan border. Therefore Somalia remained a chronical threat to Kenya throughout the century and the improving relationship between the two states kept on worsening as it will be discussed in the next sub-section.

6.3. PHASE III (Second Half): *From Late 1990s up-to present; A Pivotal Approach in Kenya-Somalia Relations*

Map of Eastern Africa illustrating significant Al-Shabaab Linked Attacks

Figure 06: Source: criticalthreat.org

Throughout the history of Kenya's foreign policy the second half of the third phase that dates from the late 1990s to 2000s, contains one peculiar change that draws much more attention, i.e the drastic shift in Kenya-Somalia relations. Pertaining to the context of the research what to be addressed are factors that led to that drastic change, from Kenya's traditional low-risk, non-interventionist approach to peacebuilding and peacemaking. From a superficial point of view Kenya-Somali

tension appeared to have diminished to a greater extent after the end of Barre's reign as claimed by Maxon and Ofkansky (2014), because there was no more central authority in the country that would instigate interstate conflict, however that was not actually the case due to the dynamics of the problem merely taking another form which in fact provided the backdrop for America's 1992 intervention and later would influence Kenya's foreign policy approach towards Somalia to gradually shift from non-interventionist to interventionist (Woodward, 2006; 2013). One scholar in early 2000s precisely summarised it; 'The Somali remain an enigma. Fiercely attached to their independence and rebellious towards any perceived or real outside interference in their country, their society appears deeply divided and chronically unstable, as exemplified by the absence of a central state since 1991. Certainly, the decentralised and centrifugal Somali political culture, marked by localised if not fragmented authority structures, is one explanation' (Abbink, 2003). The third wave is also characterised by Horn of Africa recapturing of international attention because of the global war on terror. Notably, in this stage, Kenya-Somalia 'state relationship' is no-longer like in the previous phases characterised by enmity or suspicion rather friendship and mutual cooperation, yet new non-state actors' e.g. Al-Shabaab have emerged to challenge this relationship.

Additionally, Streleau and Ngesi articulates this critical juncture when they argued that the aftermath of defeating Barre didn't leave behind any central authority, rather a continuum of anarchy until the establishment of a transnational government of Salat Hassan in 2000, who failed to gain internal legitimacy but struggled to solicit international support from the neighbouring countries including Kenya (Streleau and Ngesi in Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio, 2003: 158). In an attempt to reconstruct Somalia's fragmented state, Kenya helped in the establishment of a Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 led by President Abdullahi Yusuf, which in itself was a 15th attempt since the collapse of the state in 1991(Menkhus, 2008), not to mention the 14 attempts in 19 years to settle the dispute in Somalia by both locals and United Nations (Wise, 2011). So the initiative by Kenya seemed to be a success story, though the extent to which that assertion is valid deserves to be examined separately. Not only did Kenya host TFG until 2006 but also before that it involved itself in solving Somalis' complex realities with its landmark negotiations in which a '4.5 Formula' was bargained that reflected clan influence in the Somali

social setting in such a way that all the four major clans and five minority constituencies were equally represented in the TFG's proto-parliament (Hesse, 2016:581). However, the greatest challenge to TFG and Kenya's optimism about the establishment of stability in Somalia is Somalia-based Al-Shabaab militia which initially gained public support because for the TFG didn't seem legitimate at all as Menkhus noted it '…was intended to be a government of national unity, tasked with administering a five-year political transition.

But the TFG was viewed by many Somalis, especially some clans in and around the capital Mogadishu, as a narrow coalition dominated by the clans of the president and his prime minister, Mohamed Ghedi. It was also derided by its critics as being a puppet of neighbouring Ethiopia' (2008:1), its legitimacy was worsened with Ethiopian invasion which claimed to have done so, with the request from TFG to protect it (Anderson and Mcknight, 2014; Degroot, 2007: 52). Definitely, the question the might pop-up is who are the Al-Shabaab? How would they influence Kenya-Somalia relationship?

Table 1.1 Peace agreement Developments in Somalia from 1991 to 2009

YEAR	ACTION
1991	National reconciliation conference hosted by Djibouti in July
1992	No major action
1993	Addis Ababa agreement hosted in Ethiopia
1994	No major action
1995	No major action
1996	The Sodere agreement
1997	The Cairo agreement hosted in Egypt
1998	No major action

1999	No major action
2000	The Arta agreement hosted in Djibouti
2001	No major action
2002	Kenyan effort to bring together the Transitional National Government and opposition failed, Signing of Declaration on cessation of hostilities held in eldoret, Kenya
2003	Amendment of Transitional Federal Charter held in Kenya
2004	Inauguration of Federal Transitional Parliament hosted by Kenya
2005	June 2005 Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed Elected as president of TFG
2006	Alliance of Islamic courts took control of Mogadishu in June 2006 Signing of Khartoum 1 agreement to recognize TFG and ICU, this was never implemented and fighting broke out in December 2006 in which the Somalis, backed by Ethiopian troops defeated the ICU.
2007	National Reconciliation Congress held in Mogadishu with participation of 2,600 delegates representing clans, women and Diaspora. ARS (Re-liberation of Somalia) was established by former parliamentarians and Islamic courts Union in Asmara, September
2008	TFG and ARS signed Djibouti agreement in August 2008 witnessed by international community including AU, IGAD, US, UK, EU, France, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. December 29th 2008 President Abdullahi Yusuf resigned
2009	Withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia On 31st

	January 2009 chairman of ARS, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed elected as Somalia‟s new president, he ran against former Somalia president Siad Barre, Maslah Mohamed Siyad, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake appointed as the Prime Minister by president Sheikh Sharif on February 13th 2009.

Source: United Nations Political Office for Somalia December 2009 (Modified by the researcher) quoted in Nyambura (2011, 188-189)

Al-Shabaab, literally meaning "The Youth" in Arabic, is by far the largest hard-line Islamic militant organisation fighting to oust the Somali government and its allies e.g. AMISOM. The group's primary objective is to seize control of territories within Somalia in order to establish a society based on Islamic law. Although based in Somalia, Al-Shabaab also conducts its activities including attacks and recruitment in neighbouring countries, such as Kenya, Uganda and on other continents including United States, UK, Scandinavian countries etc. Al-Shabaab emerged as an offshoot of Union of Islamic Courts or Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that had collapsed in late 2006 with Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, it had served as the military wing of ICU or as its Sharia enforcement wing and later and evolved into extremely a powerful militant group, as par the account given by Shuriye in his article on the ideology of the group and hierarchy within it, making its emergence contingent on the courts (2012: 277-279).

Yet prior to involvement with the courts, Al-Shabaab's genesis indicates its ambiguous origin in the earlier affiliation of its first leader- Aden Hashi Ayro with an Islamist movement called Al Ittihad Al Islamiyah (AIAI) that he had been conscripted into around 1991, on the contrary after six years it was disbanded and later he happened to join another movement within ICU. The courts gained more political influence around mid-2006 with almost full legitimacy before the public for it had curbed downed all sorts of crimes in Central and Southern Somalia and more significantly relinquishing anarchy, as Mary Harper argues for the first time since state collapse Somalis enjoyed a bit of stability under the courts (Harper, 2012). A discussion to expand the interest of ICU by connecting with the global jihadist or maintaining nationalistic interests within the confinements of Somali borders appeared among the heads of ICU. Al-Shabaab became stronger with the December 2006, United States and United Nations-backed Ethiopian offensive—along with

TFG forces, the Kenyan government and other competing proxies, disbanding ICU completely. Ethiopian invasion was a total debacle in strategy despite being traditionally perceived as Somalis' enemy and infidel, it enhanced Al-Shabaab who would later fiercely fight against Ethiopians, in such a way that it could easily justify its recruitment and soliciting of funds because Ethiopians were seen as foreign non-Muslims troops invading a progressive Islamic State (Degroot, 2007: 52; Menkhus, 2008: 2; Wise, 2011).

In March 2007, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent was formed out of African Union troops from Uganda and Burundi with a principal objective of pacifying and stabilising Southern Somalia. Late in 2007, former ICU leaders, members and heads of other opposition groups attempted to form an alliance among the anti-Ethiopia (and its allies) militant groups, but Al-Shabaab didn't not acknowledge that meeting. In early 2008, the relationship between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda strengthened whereby in May 2008 the new top leader of Al-Shabaab 'published a statement that praised Al-Qaeda and explicitly shifted toward emphasising the struggle in Somalia as part of a global jihad. Al-Shabaab aligned itself more closely with Al-Qaeda in ideology and tactics. It began to target civilians through suicide attacks much more frequently, and the organisation's leadership began to include many Al Qaeda members. Al-Shabaab leveraged its relationship with Al Qaeda to attract foreign fighters and monetary donations from Al Qaeda's supporters.

Additionally, Al-Shabaab members travelled abroad to train with Al-Qaeda' (Stanford University, 2010). In the same year the militant group launched a fierce offensive against Ethiopian troops and its allies including use guerrilla and terror tactics, and Ethiopia was forced to withdraw from Somalia the following year, leaving Al-Shabaab in control of most of southern Somalia and some of Mogadishu by early 2009, and through a video record Al-Shabaab explicitly pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. At that moment Al-Shabaab lost popularity due to several reasons but among others was the rise to power of President Sheikh Sharrif as the head of TFG, a former ICU leader, who pledged to implement Sharia. Subsequently in, August 2011, Al-Shabaab withdrew from the capital, claiming that it was simply a tactical retreat, though for Sharrif's government perceived it as the defeat of the militia as part of the combined effort with AMISOM. And with its expulsion from Mogadishu, Al-

Shabaab lost other territories and significantly its economic sources, such as access to seaports and trade (e.g. charcoal trade). And in 2011, Kenya directly involved in a fight against Al-Shabaab, however, why would Kenya after a long period of avoiding direct confrontation with Somalia suddenly decides to send its troops into Somalia?

The extremely imperative point, is the spill-over effect of Somali anarchy into Kenya that came into two forms; First humanitarian crisis that came in form of refugee beginning from 1991 when around 90,000 Somalis flocked into Kenya to the present making the country a base to world's largest refugee camp (Hesse, 2016:581). Second, was the terrorist threat from Al-Shabaab militia, of whose impact has also worsened the already existing humanitarian crisis by escalading the influx of refugees, who apparently go up to officially documented 500,000 refugees not to mention the unknown figure of illegal Somali migrants, security crisis-due to constant attacks on Kenya. The amplified Somali crisis went beyond its border and Kenyan boarders stretching to Tanzania and Uganda in specifically 1998 and 2010 respectively, and further more to the Western world ranging from the recruitment of young European Jihadists to the links with Al-Qaeda. Terrorist threat revived the geo-strategic importance of Kenya to the West that had been downsized since the end of the cold war; this in itself enormously shaped Kenya's foreign policy in this post third wave of evolution in Kenya-Somalia relations (Wise, 2011).

Conceptualizing this period to fit in the neoclassical realist theory, below a detailed explanation provided for the drastic change observed in Kenya-Somalia relations; Kenya's traditional approach to conflicts that was founded upon principle of ''good neighbourliness" and respect for 'national sovereignty" shifted dramatically in October 2011 with a rare military incursion in Somalia (Mc Evoy, 2013). From systemic factors that account to this shift include both regional and international dynamics. Kenya gained strategic importance due the terrorist activities going on in the region since the mid-1990s as will be mentioned below, pressure has been piled up on newly established Kibaki administration by the west specifically from the United States and the United Kingdom in 2003 just two years after 9/11, US as one of the main aids supplier to Kenya threatened revoke its funds if the new Kenya government doesn't include measures against terrorist activities in Kenya by implementation of new measures in the internal security, reforms in Kenyan security services and reorganisation of key security units responsible for anti-terrorist

intelligence. For In almost the middle of 2003, Kenya's tourism industry that had been deteriorating since the previous year, was worsened by Britain and US' issuing of heightened security alert for its citizens to Kenya and temporary suspension of British Airlines and Israel Airline El Al's services to the country (Lansford, 2015). Since then Kenya-US cooperation on anti-terrorism policies has substantially grown stronger however not complete for as Tom Lansford points out that; 'Kenya has refused to support immunity for US personnel from war crimes prosecution' (Lansford, 2015). Despite American's concern over Kenya's chronic corruption in public sector, its foreign aids towards Kenya has accordingly increased. At the regional level, Kenya had initiated a regional security objective in East Africa in March 2003 by signing a Strategy and Plan of Action implementation agreement with Uganda and Tanzania that was agreed upon back in 2001. In May 2003, two Kenya Defense Force (KDF) were deployed along the north-eastern border to defend Kenya from infiltration of potential terrorist elements. Yet in 2006 there was an increment in a number of refugees along Kenyan border with over 34000 refugees located there due to exacerbated violence in the beginning of that year and the following year Kenya-Somalia border was closed.

Following attempts to gain US' support, Kenya invaded Southern Somalia with the endorsement from African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in conjunction with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is a regional organisation in which all the Eastern African states are members agreed on the decision of Kenya to join the war on Al-Shabaab, with exception of Ethiopia was not in favour of Kenya's decision. IGAD made alliance with the Somali local militias such as Gedo Defence Forces, Azania, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama (ASWJ) and Ras Kambon, this helped Kenya to get reliable alliance to fight along the Al-Shabaab and thus in June 2012 Kenya officially became a full member of African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM)(Menkhus, 2012; Anderson and Mcknight, 2014).

Domestic factors determined a change in Kenya-Somalia relations are multifaceted- embedding economic, political and military dynamics. Merely over a decade Kenya's Foreign Policy Executives (FPEs) were less active, on the spill-over of the Somali crisis including economic and security threats such as piracy which directly impacted the economy in terms of shipping cost, and destabilisation of

security especially in the northern Kenya-Somalia borders with activities ranging from cross-border kidnappings to illegal entrance of Somali migrants including Al-Shabaab members (Anderson and Mcknight, 2014).

That side effect was not only restricted to Kenya but also other states in the region main Uganda and Ethiopia. Kenya and Ethiopia have severely suffered from sporadic attacks from either Somali militants or indirect relation between Somali militants and other terrorist groups throughout recent history attracting global concern on terrorism related to the Horn of Africa; Among the most eminent ones being 1998 Al-Qaeda attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi in August, resulting in the death of 213 people. It was simultaneously coordinated with the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which led to the death of 12 people. And also in late 2002 Al-Qaeda militants attacked the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, killing 15 people and in the same city attempting to shoot an Israeli charter plane with a missile that failed to hit its target (Kamau, 2006: 133 and Lansford, 2015). Notably, Kenya's association with forces fighting Al-Shabaab in Somalia such as Ethiopia and others paved way for insecurity in its own territories and in return justified Kenya's incursion into Somalia. On the other hand, in Ethiopia, the 1995 assassination attempt on the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, also in 2006 a massive killing of Chinese Oil workers and Ethiopians in the Somali Region of Ethiopia related to armed opposition groups that are accused of having a link with Somali extremist groups shocked the world.

As Ethiopia and its allies invaded Somalia in 2006, Al-Shabaab vowed to fight any force that intervened in Somalia, both in the country and at their home. So series of attacks were organized against those countries many being successfully fulfilled and others failed, amongst them were the following: 2015: Garrisa University College attack-left 147 dead, 2014: Gunmen hijack a bus travelling to Mandera County, 2013: Westgate Mall siege - 67 dead, 2012: series attacks on VIPs and on places such as night club, police etc, 2011: Grenade attack in a Nairobi bar and a car blast at bus terminal. In Uganda 2015: police and counterterrorism police was at alert expecting an attack from Al-Shabaab as informed by US embassy in Kampala, in 2010: over 70 died due to a Suicide mission carried out by Al-Shabaab. In October 2008 Al-Shabaab coordinated five suicide bomb attacks that hit the UN Development Programme compound, the Ethiopian consulate and various

government offices, killing several dozens (Muthano, 2011 and Fredrick, 2012). Therefore the change in Kenya foreign policy behaviour towards Somalia can be deducted from the domestic and regional insecurity caused by militias based in the country that the TFG has failed to deal with.

Another determinant that led to the shift in Kenya's foreign approach that is related to the above reason was to create a buffer zone along its borders after the failure of Kenya assisted TFG, using its improved military capabilities which are far better compared to previous phases as already discussed. Despite historically not having engaged in any war abroad, the Kenyan Defence Force is recently reported to have become politically belligerent in the past years (Menkhus, 2012), with increased expenditure on the military both internally and externally addition to Kenya- US military cooperation in training, the plan to invade Somalia goes back as early as the period between 2007-2010 in which Eastern African Standby Brigade stuff sketched out a plan to take over Kismayo. Although it didn't materialise on spot, KDF's intention was further increased by the generous funding made to the participating soldiers in AMISOM by US and EU (AMISOM, 2012).

In December 2011, the Kenyan government formally requested to be recognised as part of AMISOM, in should be remembered that its incursion into Southern Somalia was not endowed by UN. The Security Council approved its request although the process of harmonising their roles and mandates with those of AMISOM is not an entirely straight-forward matter since both have divergent interests in Somalia. Thus not being an easy task in a short run, which may be in the long-run. According to Ken Menkhus the planned strength of the Kenyan contingent, which will remain in the south, is 4,700 personnel (Menkhaus, 2012), in July 2012 command of the Kenyan forces in Somalia was formally put under AMISOM, and a total number of 4664 Kenyan personnel were integrated into AMISOM, making the AMISOM force strength to be slightly over 17,000 troops out of a total authorized strength of 17,731 which is comprised of soldiers from Burundi, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia (AMISOM, 2012). The KDF is expected to harmonise its ambitions with AMISOM in order for both parties to work well since the broader ambition is to defeat Al-Shabaab and thus it this will help in preventing situations whereby the two groups are seen as different from each other and pursuing divergent objectives. While coordinating their efforts with each other, the KDF and AMISOM

were expected to be able to contribute efforts to stabilize Somalia and eliminate Al-Shabaab and other militia groups from all parts of the country (Luckystar, 2012), Although this has proved a challenging task to both forces due to various obstacles among other is the reduced funds from contributors like European Union which subsequently led to reduction in the number of soldiers (BBC, 2016). Also, the problems facing forces at home such as Burundi which is accused of misappropriating the funds given to them for the cause of pacifying Somalia.

Other factors that contributed to a shift in Kenya's foreign policy are Kenya's growing confidence as a regional power that is seen on one hand economically doing better than other states, Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi on Somalia was partially intended to securing the mega project of Lamu Port-South Sudan Transport Corridor project (LAPSSET) which would connect New Lamu Port with Ethiopia and South Sudan (Mc Evoy, 2013). The Lamu corridor is a transport and infrastructure project in Kenya that was initially conceived in 1975 but never took off due to various political and economic reasons, it was later included in Kenya's Vision 2030 National Development Policy after being revised, at its completion it will be Kenya's second transport corridor apart from the other transport corridor i.e the Mombasa port and Mombasa – Uganda transport corridor that passes through Nairobi and much of the Northern Rift.

It's blueprint is comprises of seven major components—a port in Lamu, oil pipeline from Juba, South Sudan to Lamu, Oil refineries in Lamu and Isiolo, a railway line linking to South Sudan and Ethiopia, three resort cities and airports at Lamu, Isiolo and Lokichogio and a High Grand Falls along River Tana for Hydropower generation. The LAPSSET Corridor will link South Sudan and Ethiopia, both landlocked countries, with the Indian Ocean through Lamu, Kenya (Kenya Vision 2030, 2016). The need to protect the project led to intervene into Somalia for broadly considered to have been both strategically prudent and inevitable, all most all the states in the Horn had involved themselves in Somalia due to the growing perception of heightened insecurity, for example, Somali piracy was on the increase. Making the LAPSSET project in dire need of protection, additionally, for several years Kenya had been trying to create a buffer zone between itself and Somalia which was in vain (Mc Evoy, 2013: 3). The LAPSSET is one single largest investment project in Africa currently which is expected to facilitate

Kenya's prosperity in the future yet it is challenged by the unsecured border between Somalia and Kenya (Menkhus, 2014). This massive project becomes a priority task to be freed from security threats since it is extended to Somali corner, motivating involvement into Somalia. Despite Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda (backed by the United States and the European Union) have secured their own economic and security interests intercepting Al-Shabaab's activities and curtailing piracy, a united Somalia complete with a universally recognised central government, by far remains a distant dream for now (New African Magazine,2013).

It is worth mentioning that the time period when the invasion was carried out almost coincided by the 2013 presidential campaign and at the same time Kenyans were still struggling to recover from the brutal election violence between 2007 and 2008, the atmosphere was filled with the rhetoric guaranteeing security amidst Al-Shabaab attacks. The intervention was an opportunity to facilitate garnering support for the incubate government and the ruling party in 2013 elections, by showing their ability to defend Kenyans (Daniel, 2011). In a short, Kenya's foreign behaviour towards Somalia changed in the second half of the third stage, when the KDF eventually decided to invade Jubbaland after a long silence on the spill-over effect of the anarchic nature of Somali state. Though officially the primary reason was increasing security threat along Kenya-Somalia frontier, the obvious reason was embedded in economic reasons such as urgent protection needed to secure the LAPSSET project and social-political factors including the need to win legitimacy of the public in the election and the endorsement from Kenya's allies' e.g IGAD.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ASSESSEMENT AND CONCLUSION

This research paper sought to explain evolution in Kenya-Somalia relation, underling changes and continuity in Kenya's foreign policy from the time it became an independent state to 2000s, relation to the main research question as stated in the introductory part. Besides the main theoretical paradigm preferred in the research, various International Relations approaches were employed to explain the phenomena, however it was found out that their explanations were insufficient for most of them either left out some factors or simply could not explain exactly the relationship between different variable within a particular time frame as it was in the case of constructivism. Neoclassical Realism was later adopted for it was found satisfying since it explains better the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia and the recent departure from the traditional approach since it took into an account both systemic and unit level analysis.

Using process tracing to map the continuities and discontinuities in Kenya's foreign policy towards Somalia within three phases, the main findings indicates that; in the first phase Kenya would not militarily confront Somalia despite clear evidence of its support Kenyan-Somali separatists i.e. North-Eastern Frontier Liberation Army (NFDLA), because its priority was economic development as argued by Makinda (1983), Mwangi (2016) and others, yet other major factors such as politically being fragment and more importantly Kenyan military was extremely weak compared to a complex military capability that Somalia had constructed with the help of the Soviets obviously deterring any state that would think of military confrontation.

And at the end of that phase, a rapprochement that was initiated would calm the tension between the two states although it was more of a truce than a rapprochement for the already mentioned reasons. In the second Phase, Kenya kept the same posture towards Somalia because the country was faced with new border challenges; on the Western frontiers Uganda's Idi Amin claiming a large chunk of

Kenya's territories and Tanzania closes its border with Kenya following the collapse of East African Community (Mann, 1977; Umbright, 1989:16; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997: 450; Khadiagara, 2014), so definitely Kenya could not engage in a fight at on all those fronts. The first half of the third phase Kenya-Somalia threat perception shifts from being expected to attack Kenya as it had been in the previous phases to a source of humanitarian crisis and economic burden on Kenya due to collapse of central authority in Somalia following the ousting of Siad Barre in 1991, and consequently the anarchy that emerged led to influx of thousands of refugees in Kenya beyond what the country could accommodate and it soon faced accusations from Human Rights and UN over it relationship with Somali refugees.

In the second half, a paradigm shift happens in Kenya's foreign policy when in 2011 it invaded Jubbaland with a claim of security threat posed by Al-Shabaab and related militias in Somalia. Kenyan government was in dire need to create a buffer zone along its border with Somalia. However much that move was perceived by many analysts as sudden, it was not the case, for Kenya had been pre-planning incursion into Somalia for years early than 2011 (Menkhus,2012). Its incursion into Somalia ended a long historical policy of buck-passing with Ethiopia, and that was because Kenyan army gained confidence contingent on support from the West and alliance with other forces already battling Al-Shabaab.

Despite that Kenya's invasion was not fully endorsed by some Allies who saw it as interruption for instance over objective and various analysts arguably foretold that it might end up into a debacle which indeed came to be true for Ethiopian troops have withdrawn from Somalia last year and latest studies and news updates show how Al-Shabaab is gaining ground again in Somalia. In summary Kenya's consistency of non-interventionist approach towards Somalia during the times of both high level and low level threat perception which was evidently manifested in Kenya's forging alliance not only with the western states such as US and Britain, but also Ethiopia and continuing to practice buck-passing and the break away from that traditional approach depended on similar factors without ignoring economic reasons.

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