

**POPULISM AND THE EU: HOW DID UKIP AND NIGEL
FARAGE DETERMINE POPULIST PARTY POSITION
AROUND THE EU'S SUPRANATIONALISM? 2010-2016**

ÖNDER LEVENT SOYSAL

MAY 2019

**POPULISM AND THE EU: HOW DID UKIP AND NIGEL
FARAGE DETERMINE POPULIST PARTY POSITION
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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
OF
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ÖNDER LEVENT SOYSAL


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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Efe Biresselioğlu
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements
as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.



Prof. Dr. Çiğdem Kentmen-Çin
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and
that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and
quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.




Prof. Dr. Çiğdem Kentmen-Çin
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members



Prof. Dr. Çiğdem Kentmen-Çin



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Müge Aknur



Dr. Serhun Al

ABSTRACT

POPULISM AND THE EU: HOW DID UKIP AND NIGEL FARAGE DETERMINE POPULIST PARTY POSITION AROUND THE EU'S SUPRANATIONALISM?

2010-2016

Soysal Önder Levent

Political Science and International Relations

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Çiğdem Kentmen-Çin

May 2019

Rising populism has been one of the most debated issues in European politics recently. In this regard, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is considered one of the important representatives of populism and Euroscepticism in Europe, because of its role in the United Kingdom's (UK) departure from the European Union (EU). This thesis aims to find the role of the EU in the populist discourses of the UKIP and former party leader Nigel Farage. This thesis also aims to find how the populist discourses of the Nigel Farage and UKIP were changed across different time periods. Populism, because of its antagonist, nationalist and absolute majoritarian rule, poses a serious threat to principles of pluralism, equality, democratic representative institutions, and separation of powers where the liberal democracies and the EU project stands on. Hereof, this thesis presents a detailed review of populism and explores the populism in the discourses of Farage and in the manifestations of the UKIP by using 24 keywords that represent the three different components of populism—antagonism (EU opposition), general will (majority rule), and people orientation (nationalism). To compare the changes within UKIP's populist discourse, this thesis has examined the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and Brexit Referendum periods. As a result, the thesis presents that although the UKIP and Farage have shown volatility due to periodic effects on party policy, the EU opposition is the principal issue for the UKIP. After the Brexit decision, the party's support has faded with the change of leader and the disappearance of party's single policy.

Keywords: Populism, UKIP, The EU, European Populism, Party Policy

ÖZET

POPULİZM ve AB: UKIP ve NIGEL FARAGE, POPULİST PARTİ KONUMUNU
AB'nin ULUSLARÜSTÜ YÖNETİMİ ÇEVRESİNDE NASIL BELİRLEMİŞTİR?

2010-2016

Soysal Önder Levent

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler


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Avrupa siyasetinde son dönemlerde en çok tartışılan konulardan biri yükselen populizm olmaktadır. Birleşik Krallığın, Avrupa Birliğinden (AB) ayrılmasında önemli bir rol oynayan UKIP, Avrupa'daki AB karşıtlığının ve yükselen populizmin en önemli temsilcilerinden bir kabul edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda tez AB'nin UKIP ve parti eski lideri Nigel Farage'nin söylemlerindeki rolünü incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Ayrıca UKIP'in ve Nigel Farage'ın populist söylemlerinin zaman içerisinde nasıl değiştiğini göstermek istemektedir. Populizm sahip olduğu çatışma, milliyetçilik ve çoğunluğun mutlak hakimiyetini gözetten değerleri nedeniyle, liberal demokrasilerin ve AB'in dayandığı çoğuculuk, eşitlik, temsili demokrasi ve güçler ayrılığı ilkelerine tehlike oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda tez populizmin detaylı bir incelemesini yaparak, populizmi Nigel Farage'nin söylemlerinde ve UKIP'in parti manifestolarında populizmin üç önemli bileşeni olan AB karşıtlığı, çoğunluk egemenliği ve milliyetçilik kavramlarını belirten seçilmiş 24 kelime ile incelenmiştir. Populist söylemlerdeki değişimi anlayabilmek için ise Lisbon Anlaşmasının onaylanma ve Brexit referandumu dönemleri incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak, tez Farage ve UKIP'in dönemselsel politik etkilerle değişken bir politika izlese de AB karşıtlığının UKIP'in ana unsuru olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu bağlamda, Brexit kararıyla ana parti politikasını ve liderini kaybeden partinin zayıfladığını belirlemiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Populizm, UKIP, Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa Populizmi, Parti Politikası

DEDICATION



To my wife

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I express my sincere appreciation to Prof. Dr. ıgdem Kentmen-in for her endless effort while guiding me in this enormous work.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
APE	Anti-Political Establishment
BNP	British National Party
BREXIT	British Exit from the EU
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
ENF	Europe of Nations and Freedom
EP	The European Parliament
EU	The European Union
FIDESZ	Hungarian Civic Alliance
FN	Front National
FPO	Freedom Party of Austria
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
PODEMOS	We Can
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left
UK	The United Kingdom
UKIP	The United Kingdom Independence Party
US	The United States
WWII	The World War Second

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) is created with the participation of six countries to design a common market and customs union in Europe with limited authority on member states. Today, by encouraging neighboring countries to take part in further integration, the EU has become a significant example of interstate cooperation in European history. During the process of integration, member states have to respect candidates, and candidate countries have to adapt to the *acquis communautaire*, which refers to the 35 chapters of the EU's total body of law. Amendments to the EU member states brought significant changes to legal, political, and economic aspects. The growing political influence of the EU on its member states as a result of widening and deepening policies has been perceived to be a threat to national identity and sovereignty. Thus, the supranational rule and integration process of the EU have begun to be questioned by the European public and have increased skepticism toward the EU.

Besides sovereignty debates, the effects of the EU's austerity policies on business and labor markets during the 2008 financial crisis have increased the people's dissatisfaction on the economic function of the EU. In addition, the refugee crisis after the Syrian war and the terrorist attacks have enhanced the reactions over the EU's open-door policy and provided suitable conditions for debates on national identity. In short, over time, the rising supranational decision-making of the EU, economic concerns, and the impact of the rising immigration on labor markets and identity politics have increased the anxiety and concern of ordinary citizens. Populist parties that set policies on these themes have become more popular in Europe (Hooghe & Marks, 2016; Kreisi, 2014; Algan et al., 2017).

In this regard, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which was

established in 1993 after the Maastricht Treaty to ensure the United Kingdom's (UK) withdrawal from the EU, became the most prominent representative of populism in the UK. In particular, UKIP and its party leader Nigel Farage, who combined EU opposition with populist discourses, played an important role in the results of the Brexit referendum (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Goodwin & Heath, 2016), which caused many economic and political uncertainties.

By having all these impacts in mind, the thesis thus seeks to find an answer to the question: Why and under what conditions does the EU affect populist discourses of UKIP and Farage? Associated to the main research question, two sub research questions will be investigated: (i) How has the EU's growing supranational power influenced UKIP and Nigel Farage's populist rhetoric and party policy? And (ii) how volatile are the populist discourses of UKIP?

Especially since the beginning of the 21st century, populism has become a buzzword. It is used academically to describe different political parties, leaders, and discourses with different characteristics, from Latin America to Europe (Weyland, 2001; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013; Aslanidis, 2016; Taggart, 2006). Although the concept of populism is used for different actors, populists share some common features. Accordingly, populists divide the political ground into two groups, which conflict with each other (Mudde, 2004). On the one hand, "people" are mostly depicted by populists as pure, ordinary, or native. On the other hand, "the elites," "the establishment," "the state," and "the system" are usually used in populist discourses as the sources of crisis, breakdown, corruption, or dysfunctionality, as opposed to "the people" (Moffitt, 2014, p. 391). For populists, a political system ruled by elites or the establishment does not reflect the will of ordinary people. Thus, populists create a sphere to express themselves as representatives of the people and promise to restore popular sovereignty by stating that politics has been removed from ordinary people. Additionally, populists are highly critical of the growing power of courts, judges, and civil servants (Zaslave, 2008); and they reject the authority of political institutions that are not elected by the people. In this context, populists claim that institutions of the EU, such as the European Central Bank and the European Commission, and domestic bodies, such as supreme courts and central banks, do not reflect the will of the people. Because of their democratic deficits, these

institutions' implications are considered illegitimate by populists.

Populists build their democracy on three bases—"the people," "sovereignty," and "majority rule" (Canovan, 2002, p. 25)—and they aim to establish a direct link between the public and government institutions to increase the representation of the people. Therefore, the EU, as a supranational organization, frequently finds its place in populist discourses as an organization with weak electoral mechanisms and heavy laws and legal institutions over the will of the people and the majority rule. In other words, populists claim that there is a "democratic deficit" in the EU. Yet scholars like Moravcsik argue that democratic deficit claims are the evaluation of simple majoritarian and plebiscitary democracy supporters. Institutions of the EU are controlled by the separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances. Just because of the nonparticipatory nature of institutions, it is hard to get negative conclusions about the legitimacy of the EU (Moravcsik, 2002).

Populists generally give the impression that they aim to build a democratic political system based on the principle of popular sovereignty, which is desired. Yet populist emphasis on sovereignty is a straightforward way of exercising majoritarian power (Galston, 2018), which is absolute and omnipotent. In this regard, Farage's depiction of the Brexit referendum results as a "victory for real people" can be considered a fine example of how populism evaluates the majority. The concept of democracy based on majority rule ignores or even does not accept the existence of some parts of society. Accordingly, the populist ideology only considers some parts of the community as real. Populists argue that decisions taken with the approval of the majority should not be questioned democratically. Therefore, the populist understanding of democracy, which is constructed based on the majority rule, brings two major challenges for liberal democracies, which the EU is based on. First, although populists always emphasize democracy, they do it in a majoritarian way. Depending on their political views, populists determine the use of majority in constant arguments. In the European perspective, the factors that define the majority could be nationality, religion, and language for right-wing populists and social classes for left-wing populists. These identifying factors that populists build their majoritarian rule on only consider a certain part of society and ignore the rest of the population that is not included in this group ethnically, religiously, or as a

social class. This approach creates a path for discriminatory politics by threatening pluralism and the rights of minorities. Second, especially when populists play the role of the government, they tend to politicize institutions. For populists, institutions and their members do not reflect the will of the people—which needs to be sovereign—since they are unelected. For this reason, the populist ideology proposes to politicize institutions to make them accountable to the representatives of the people. Thus, populists tend to consolidate their power and argue that people should “govern themselves and their society without institutional restrictions. And populist leaders claim that they alone represent the people, the only legitimate power in society” (Galston, 2018, p. 12). This idea brings the destruction of institutions, which are very important elements of democracies to counterbalance the power of executives.


In this regard, liberal democracies and the EU are built on constitutional principles, individual and minority rights, procedural democracy, and forms of mediated representation. To the contrary, populist interpretations of democracy are one-dimensional, omitting crucial elements of liberal democracies (Zaslave, 2008). Populist emphasis on popular sovereignty poses a challenge to the principles of pluralism, equality, democratic representative institutions, and separation of powers, on which liberal democracies and the EU stand. In short, the growing impact of the EU on member states is seen by populists as a threat to democracy, yet populist reaction to the democratic deficit of the EU is incompatible with liberal democracy. Therefore, populists’ demands are considered to be an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism (Mudde, 2015).

The challenge of populism to the values of the EU has been the main idea of the formation of this thesis. Populism in Europe and the cosmopolitan liberal values on which the EU is based are located in two distant points of politics, and they are in conflict with each other. In this regard, populism stands for the side of monoculturalism against multiculturalism, a single nation against international solidarity and assistance, closed borders against free movement of people, ideas, and capital. Populist values represent traditions and historical conservatism against change and development. This conflict between populist values and the EU is creating challenges to economic and social cohesion. After the end of the Second World War (WWII), the EU has played an important

role in achieving economic growth and maintaining peace by improving interstate cooperation. To keep the positive gains of the cooperation and cohesion created by the EU, we need to understand the reasons of populist movements, which mostly use anti-EU rhetorics.

In this regard, the study focuses on UKIP, an anti-EU party, which has been recognized as a single-issue group and advocates the withdrawal of Britain from the EU. UKIP gained significant momentum in the national and EP elections, especially after the leadership of Nigel Farage, and achieved very significant successes. The party won third place in the 2015 general elections with 12.6% of the votes and first place in the 2014 EP elections with 27.9% of the votes and became the first party to win first place in the UK at national level elections, aside from the Conservatives or the Labour Party. Populism has not only increased its votes in the UK, but in many EU member states, support for populist parties has been observed. Especially by obtaining a high number of votes in the elections at the European Parliament (EP), populist parties have had the opportunity to be represented at the supranational level, and representatives of populist parties have increased their seats from 56 to 108 in the last EP elections (EU Parliament, 2014).

Figure 1: Voting Rates of Populist Parties in the 2014 EP Elections (Source: <https://www.economist.com/europe/2014/05/30/the-eurosceptic-union>)



The rising number of populist seats in parliament is related to the second order nature of the EP elections, which gives an opportunity for polls to express their dissatisfaction with governance and mainstream parties. European elections are seen by electors as less important than national ones, so they consider EP elections to be an opportunity for protest votes (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). In fact, the 2014 EP elections were an early warning for another shock of populist victories in Poland, Hungary, Austria, and Italy, as well as for Brexit.

In contemporary Europe, for various reasons, many populists from the left and right wings started to question the same notion of the “increasing supranational power of the EU” on their native states. For left-wing populists (Syriza and Podemos), questions mostly originate from the austerity politics of the EU. For right-wing populists (FN, UKIP, AFD, FPO, FIDESZ), the rising number of migrants and bailout programs of the EU became the roots of the complaints. Thus, in contemporary Europe xenophobic and Eurosceptic discourses became a driving force and winning formula for populist parties in many countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Austria, and Italy, as well as for pro-Brexit campaigners in the UK (Clarke & Newman, 2017).

Eurobarometer surveys have shed light on the reasons for the growing support for populist parties. A Eurobarometer survey (May 2018) conducted in spring 2018 made it clear that European people lack trust in the EU. According to the survey, even when trust in the EU has reached its highest level since 2010, still, it is only 42%, while the percentage of those who think negatively about the EU is 48%. The 2018 Standard Eurobarometer also showed that the majority of the EU feel that their voice does not count in the EU, as 45% (+1 percentage more since autumn 2017 and +7 since spring 2016) of them said that their voice counts in the EU, while 49% said otherwise. All these numbers could be an indicator of dissatisfaction with the EU. According to the same survey, the concerns of the people originate mostly from “migration” with 38%, the second biggest concern comes from “terrorism” with 29%, and the third one is the “economic situation” with 18%. When populist discourses are considered in Europe, it can be seen that the central characteristic of these discourses puts emphasis on “the

protection of the nation, of the native people and culture, against the enemies of the nation and dangerous others: immigrants, foreigners” (Stavrakakis et al., 2017, p. 421). Populist parties who use these complaints in their discourses tend to seek popular support. Interestingly, according to a Euro-barometer survey, 56% of the people see relatively new anti-establishment parties as an option that can bring real change to Europe. On the other hand, only 34% of them view those parties negatively.

All in all, these results could be an indicator of dissatisfaction and skepticism about some but not all policies of the EU. As a consequence, people express their reaction with relatively new anti-establishment parties. The rising support for populist parties may have a transformational effect on mainstream parties, and Euroscepticism may become more persistent and embedded at both national and the EU levels (Usherwood & Startin, 2013). Therefore, the increasing support for populism needs to be considered carefully. If it is done so, it could be useful in correcting problems and complaints about the political systems (Muller, 2016), such as developing reforms for citizens who are willingly or unwillingly ignored by governments or mainstream parties. But when populism is ignored and has the ability to rule because of its conflictual and unreconciliatory nature, it may cause problems that could be difficult to repair. By having an existing challenge between populism and the EU in mind, this study will examine the impact of the supranational rule of the EU on the populist discourses of UKIP and former party leader Nigel Farage.

To address research questions, this thesis will rely on content analysis. To be able to assess the effect of supranational power on populist discourses that populists often refer to, speeches of Nigel Farage in the EU plenary meetings will be used, and his former party UKIP’s 2014 manifesto will be evaluated to understand their national discourses and to compare party’s and leader’s discourses.

The main reason why this thesis focuses on Farage and UKIP is that they are the significant actors of populists’ rise in the EU. Their role in the Brexit referendum can be considered an important populist challenge in European politics so far. Additionally, they both represent a strong emphasis on Euroscepticism. They fit in the main components of populist explanations. The study focused on Farage’s speeches in the EP, as UKIP is leader-oriented and takes advantage of Farage’s charisma (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017;

Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Clark et al., 2016). The thesis relies on plenary speeches of Farage in the EP, because it contributes valuable written documents for researchers. Additionally, it provides visibility for populists to target local bureaucrats and other MEPs, which they subjected to trading the people's sovereignty for their personal careers. Lastly, parties can carry messages over to the voters as they present their interests in the EP.

This thesis will examine the time period, 3 months before and after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. This time period is selected since it represents an increase in the supranational characteristics of the EU. To be able to compare changes within UKIP's populist discourse, the thesis will also examine three months before and after the Brexit referendum, which fueled widespread anti-European and nationalist discourses. Although there are previous studies on this subject about the EU and the rise of populism, they are more explanatory (Taggart, 2006; Mudde, 2016; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). In some, Euroscepticism has been used as an important indicator of populism (Franzosi et al., 2015). In others, left-wing populism (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014) and right-wing populism (Vieta & Poynting, 2016; Pirro & Van Kessel, 2017) are examined in the EU. Yet none of them focus on the supranational notion of the EU in populism. In this context, this thesis aims to fill this gap by contributing a detailed study of populism based on UKIP. By doing so, this thesis attempts to unroll the effect of the increasing supranational power of the EU on the party position of UKIP and Farage.

In previous studies, people's orientation and Euroscepticism have been used as an important indicator of populism (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011; Bonikowski & Gidron, 2015). In addition to the current literature for operationalization, this study will extensively use three distinctive components of populism: people centrism, general will, and antagonism (Mudde, 2004). In general, people orientation in populist literature represents shared traditions and racial integrity. Therefore, nationalism, which is an important element of populist rhetoric, has been expressed by people orientation. According to populists' view, general will refers to people as a collective and sees them essentially as having one will, which allows populists to come up with an idea that is good for everyone, which is against the pluralist understanding of liberal democracy. In other words, populists understand general will as the decline of people's sovereignty and

aim to make people's voice and participation possible but want to do so by seeing society as a homogeneous whole. Finally, in populist understanding, antagonism represents criticism toward elites and possesses anti-establishment features. This creates a dichotomy that populists use to oppose establishments and elites. In this regard, antagonism is used to express opposition to the EU and elites. 24 keywords have been selected for populist investigation. For the adoption of these words, former studies on a related topic and new words that could possibly express the populist discourses of UKIP and Nigel Farage were used. For the operationalization of the keywords following question were asked: In the speeches, did the keywords indicate antagonism, general will, or people? Consequently, is it plausible to express what portion of the party discourse were populist? And how did UKIP and Farage form their populist discourses?

This thesis primarily aims to demonstrate the importance of the EU in populist terms by using three populist indicators. Additionally, by researching two different time periods, this thesis attempts to provide information about the volatility of populist discourses. As a result, by using three different indicators—antagonism (EU opposition), general will (sovereignty), and people orientation (nationalism), this study considers UKIP's populist discourses. Accordingly, Farage and UKIP use their opposition to the EU as a central party policy. Additionally, the study found that during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which is assumed to represent the rise of the supranational decision-making of the EU, Farage focused more on sovereignty debates by presenting himself and his party as true democrats. On the other hand, when the Brexit period and the 2014 party manifesto were examined, the study discovered that sovereignty debates were replaced by hard Eurosceptic and nationalist policies. In this regard, the study argues that although the EU's rising supranational decision-making has had effects on the populist discourses of UKIP and Farage to focus more on sovereignty debates, this needs to be seen as a periodic effect because, in the Brexit period, rhetorics mostly focused on nationalism besides their EU opposition owing to the party's ideological weakness, which has allowed them to shift their party policy.

Regarding the volatility of UKIP's populist discourses, the study showed that UKIP was very flexible and successful in adapting different political elements to their main party policy, and the party's policy was in coherence with the environment changes.

The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides the theoretical and conceptual starting points of this research. Chapter 2 gives information about populism and the factors affecting its rise. Chapter 3 considers the empowerment of the EU Parliament and Euroscepticism.. Chapter 4 indicates the reasons for the party position changes. Chapter 5 presents the historical development and populist policies of UKIP. Chapter 6 discusses the research design, methodology, and findings. Finally, the last chapter provides a conclusion and remarks.



CHAPTER TWO

WHAT IS POPULISM?

Populism is a concept used to express different figures in different meanings. In this section, detailed information about the concept of populism will be presented, how it occurs, which features it has and how it is shaped in Europe will be discussed. Thus the concept of populism which is relevant to Europe will be conceptualized.

2.1. Definition of Populism

In today's political scale populism receives a great deal of attention from the literature on political science. Yet, in terms of meaning, it is a controversial concept and there is no scholarly consensus on how to define populism. The challenges of defining populism stem from the fact that the term is used to describe political movements, parties, ideologies and leaders in different geographical, historical and ideological contexts. (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p.3). In general, many scholars tackled the challenges of defining the concept of populism and provided many different contributions in literature. (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969; Laclau, 2007; Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000; Meny & Surel, 2002, Mudde, 2004; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008).

Early scholars consider populism as a global concept. They traced the existence of the populism in various geographies which includes the 19th century movements in the United States (US) and Russia and the 20th century populism in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Their research claims that populism characterized by different players in a wide range of political ideologies and hard to get a conclusion or consensus on the meaning of the concept (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969). In the 1980s, scholars also explained populism in abstract terms, such as as “shadow of democracy” and avoided making a conceptual definition. Among them, Canovan claimed that populism appears in

different forms including farmers radicalism, revolutionary intellectual populism, peasant populism, populist dictatorship, populist democracy, reactionary populism and politician's populism (Canovan, 1981, p.13).

In the 2000s, scholars were still defining populism as a difficult and slippery concept which does not have a general explanation and has no tangible features (Taggart, 2000, p.2). Yet, in order to conceptualize populism, Taggart offers six features: First two themes are related to individuals, movements, or groups, primarily defined as populists. Accordingly, those who may be considered as a populist are "hostile to representative politics" and identifying themselves with an "idealized heartland within the community they favor". Other four themes related to the meaning of the concept in which populism is considered "as an ideology lacking core values", developed itself "as a powerful reaction to a sense of extreme crisis", it contains a "fundamental dilemma that makes it self-limiting", and finally populism has a "chameleonic features adopting the colors of its environment" (Taggart, 2000, p.2).

According to Gidron and Bonikowski, attempts to define populism and perception of it can be examined in three forms as a "*discursive style*", "*political movement*" and finally "*political ideology*" (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013). These three interpretations of populism have led to different operationalization and measurements.

First, discursive style perspective, according to this approach populism is a "mode of political expression that is employed selectively and strategically by both right and left, liberals and conservatives" (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p.8). In another word, populism emerges as a result of examining the expressions of the actors rather than personalities. Discursive populist style is constructed on dichotomy. According to Laclau, the symbolic distinction between "us" and "them" constitutes populist expression (Laclau, 2007). In this sense populism gets the Manichean formation and divides the political ground into two sections (People vs. elite, natives vs. immigrants). Interestingly, neither the pure people nor the corrupt elites are actual entities, but rather, they are moral sets of ideas, whereby the elite is seen as a pathological entity, and the people is depicted as a homogeneous and virtuous community. (Kaltwasser, 2014). In this context, populists while representing the challenges of people over authority and sovereignty, at the same time they use anti-elitist and anti-establishment discourses. Thus, it becomes a way of

making claims about politics. In particular, the populist parties in Europe claim that they are representatives of ordinary citizens, and seek to use anti-establishment discourse. Because, they see the mainstream parties and policies of the EU as causes of immigration, loss of job and cultural changes in their native land. Therefore, they turn themselves away from the political decision-making process which occupied by established parties and the EU and they use protest-based discourses.

Second, in contrast to discursive approaches, some scholars advocate for an understanding of populism as a mode of political strategy (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p.10). This approach is often used by researchers who evaluate Latin America in their works (Laclau 2007; Kaltwasser 2010; Roberts 2006; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011). According to this approach, populism is not a formation that reflects the general will of people from the bottom up relation. On the contrary, it underlines the charismatic leader that can represent the challenges against authority by reflecting general will of the ordinary people from top to bottom. In similar vein, Levitsky and Roberts argue that populism is “political mobilization of the masses in a top down manner by leaders who claim to challenge political or economic elites on a behalf of an ill-defined pueblo” (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011, p.6). Populist strategy requires a two necessarily objects first one is the “mobilization” of the masses and second is the “discourses” of the leaders. In this sense, populist strategy can be defined as a political action that aims to mobilize and encourage the ordinary people by using anti-establishment and nationalist discourses (Jansen, 2011, p.82). Studies of populism as a political strategy focus on determinants of populist mobilization such as, social movements, leaders of parties and it tends to use comparative and historical case analysis (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p.17).

Third, as an ideology, populism can take a various form of interconnected social and political ideas by different actors. Accordingly, political parties can be populist as well as party representatives. Therefore, ideological explanations focus on manifestations and generally party leaders and their statements used as an unit of analysis by researchers. (Akkerman, 2012; Mudde, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Vieten & Poynting, 2016). For ideological approach, populism having a diverse form and it may stand in the different part of political spectrum. In European context it refers to anti-immigration, xenophobia and gets the shape of right-wing politics, where as in Latin America, it alludes

to clientelism and economic mismanagement that represents the left-wing concerns (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Mudde, 2007). In this sense “*empty heart*” of populism and “*the lack of key values*” in it, makes the populism to “*liable to the politics of personality*” (Taggart 2000, p.101). Different approaches to define populism can be summarized as follows.

Table 1: Three Approaches to Define Populism (Source: Gidron & Bonikowski 2013, p.17)

	Definition of Populism	Unit of Analysis	Relevant Methods
Populism as Discourse	A way of making claims about politics; characteristics of discourse	Texts, speeches, public discourse about politics	Interpretive textual analysis
Populism as Political Strategy	A form of mobilization and organization	Parties (with a focus on structures), social movements, leaders	Comparative historical analysis, case studies
Populism as Ideology	A set of interrelated ideas about The nature of politics and society	Parties and party leaders	Text analysis (partisan literature)

Although populism appears as a global concept and many different theoretical approaches tend to explain populism in different forms, there is a minimal definition of the populism that many scholars had a consensus on which explains the populism in European case (Kaltwasser, 2012; Norris & Inglehart, 2017; Werner, 2017; Kreisi, 2014; Tournier-Sol, 2015). According to Mudde, populism should be conceived “as a thin centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups the pure people versus the corrupt elites and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte generale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p.543). Thesis will take this ideological definition as a starting point. Because, this definition of populism gives some components that are very useful for understanding the populist surge in Europe. Additionally, it will help to research to separate populism from the similar phenomena’s that resemble it. Finally, ideological explanation of Mudde will provide a clear understanding of the research subject selection.

Why the UKIP is selected as resemble of the populist rise in Europe.

Accordingly, Mudde's definition makes clear that populism has three core concepts: the pure people, the corrupt elite, general will. In next chapter, thesis will scrutinize these components which will be very useful to grasp the idea of populism.

2.2. Components of Populism

Behind these diverse features of populism, the main pillar that it stands on is the people. As Ionescu and Gellner put "populism worships the people" (Ionescu & Gellner 1969, p 4). Populism has a strong dependence on the people, derives from the desire to represent the masses on a democratic basis. As Decker puts "Where there is a democracy, there is always populism" (Decker, 2003, p.48). Then, populists use "the people" as a source of their legitimacy. Yet, according to scholars, populist meaning of the people is vary (Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000; Kaltwasser, 2014). The definition of the people for populists alters according to time, place and the environment in which they find themselves. According to Mudde, how populist sees the people is vague. On the one hand, people term is used by populists as an apparatus in their discourses, does not intent certain group of society. On the other hand, populists by using term people tend to refer some precise part of society but not whole (Mudde, 2004, p.545). Moreover, Kaltwasser explains the populist understanding of people as imagined communities which constructed in very different ways by specific populist actors and constituencies. In fact, the classification of who belongs to the pure people and the corrupt elite varies not only from one populist manifestation to another but also throughout populist experiences over time (Kaltwasser, 2014, p.478).

Taggart by relating the concept of people with ideologies argues that the conceptualization of the people is complex and it is derived, to some extent, from the commitment of populism to other political ideologies (Taggart, 2000, p.91). Accordingly, the meaning of people which is very relevant to contemporary European politics as Taggart puts is the "*heartland*". This is a construction of an ideal world and it is constructed retrospectively from the past (Taggart, 2000, p.95). In this sense, many right-wing populist parties in Europe use the slogans of "we will bring back to glorious past of our fathers" to represent themselves as a defender of their heartland which is under the

attack by migrants. In this case, the idea of the heartland allows the populist rhetorics to highlight the concept of people not as factual, indeed they are mythical and represent only some part of the population (Mudde, 2004, p.546).

According to Canovan in populist discourses, people appear in three different way. The first is the “*united people*” of the nation which oppose to parties or fractions that are threatening this unity. The second form is “*our people*” which has ethnic expression or kinship. This form mostly opposes the others who are not belonging to a nation like immigrants. The third form is the “*ordinary people*” whose demands ignored or overridden by the arrogant, corrupt and cosmopolitan elites. Populists leaders, in this case, present the voice of the silent majority and mobilize them. In short, the expression of people in populist discourses identifies unity of the nation, blood-based inhabitants the same land who are underestimated (Canovan, 1999, p.5).

For populists, the people are more than demos, they are ethnos. If this approach was taken by populist to extremes that may pave the way to use it in a discriminatory manner and it becomes incompatible with a democratic perspective (Pasquino, 2008, p.16). Therefore, in the very heart of populist ideology there is a replacement of equality for unity, and thus “populism opposes social and political pluralism. Its extreme consequence is to transform a political community in a corporate-like entity, where class and ideological differences are denied and mastered in the attempt to fulfill the myth of a comprehensive totality of state and society” (Urbinati, 2013, p.146). In this regard, like the minimal definition of Pappas, populism gets the shape of “democratic illiberalism” (Pappas, 2016, p.28) and populists oppose the values of liberal democracies. Liberal democracies stand on the strong arches of individual rights, respect for the rights of minorities and cosmopolitanism. Populists instead of the cosmopolitan and international perspective of liberal democracies offer a unity of the heartland which is constituted by natives of the state. Contrary to checks and balances populists tend to use the idea of popular will which is very substantial as a central notion of their political system.

Therefore, the components of the populist ideology are creating a danger for the liberal democracies. In this regard, populism is seen as a pathology of democracies which brings destructive effect for individual rights and representative institutions (Kaltwasser, 2012 p.188). The anxiety of the liberal approach over populism gets its origin from the

analysis of Alexis de Tocqueville. According to Tocqueville biggest challenge for the democracies is the emergence of “*Tyranny of the Majority*”. One man clever enough can take the control of democratic institutions and becomes omnipotence, rules everything in the name of the majority (De Tocqueville, 2003). Thus, constitutive elements of liberal, “Madisonian” democracy like the rule of law, the division of power or respect for the rights of minorities are rejected because they confine the people’s sovereignty that populists represent (Kreisi, 2014).

Who adheres to the model of liberal democracy usually see populism as pathology, which is more relevant to Europe and relates the populism with racist, nativist, or even in some fascist ideology of the far right. Yet, contrary to this background some scholars who support the idea of direct democracy sees populism as an option to increase representation (Kaltwasser, 2012, p.187). Relatedly, Laclau, challenges the negative view of populism, apart from European negative meaning of populism, Laclau sees populism, not as a potential danger for the liberal democracies. Yet, slightly different democracies in nature are conflictual and populist discourses work like a reformation of the democratic systems. In this approach liberal democracy is seen as a problem and radical democracy gives the solution. In this case, populism can help to achieve radical democracy by reintroducing conflict into politics and fostering the mobilization of excluded sectors of society with the aim of changing the status quo (Laclau, 2005). According to radical democrats’ populism as a concept that is not fully conflicting with the democracy and its components, it is against the shortcomings of the liberal democracy, in other words, it is the illiberal answer for the maladies of the liberal democracies. Kaltwasser, when explains the populist agenda and its relation with representation argues that “populist forces indeed tend to promote the use or introduction of plebiscitary instruments, and usually attack elected politicians and unelected officials, they are not against representation per se, but rather want to see their own representatives in power” (Kaltwasser, 2014, p.484). According to him to able to understand the impact of populism on democracy, claims should be answered first and foremost empirically rather than based on normative and/or theoretical arguments (Kaltwasser,2012).

In this sense, to able to understand the impact of populist movements empirically we need to have evidence such as legislation created by populists. In this regard, when

populist take the position of governing, tend to show more authoritarian bias, they declare themselves as a voice of people and claim that having legitimacy from the people. That makes populist democracy more illiberal because it only takes the idea of “government by the people” which gives a very strong commitment on the popular will and rejects checks and balances. (Pappas & Kreisi, 2015 p.5). Similarly, Muller to explain the populist emphasis on pluralism refers to Erdogan in his book and quotes his speech that Erdogan says “We are the people, who are you?”. In this respect, the majority becomes omnipotent and representative of the majority has the ability to do everything for the sake of people (Muller, 2017). As Kriesi pointed “populist democracy is also an illiberal vision of democracy because of its monolithic conception of the people, which implies that the popular majority [the general will] is always right” (Kriesi, 2014, p.363). This perspective of the populist approach which is mostly related with right wing populism of contemporary Europe do not favor minorities makes them outsiders and excludes them from the society.

Besides the people, another important component of populism is the general will. Populists construct the general will in a particular way. In this sense, general will transferred to common sense that may use for aggregation against to common enemy. Populists use the criticism of representative democracy and they use the republican idea of Rousseau that self-governing citizens make law and execute them (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.17). Populists in this frame argue that establishments do not take the general will into account. Therefore, populists to able to show the general will of the people about the issues, offer plebiscites and referendums quite often for the solution of the problems. By doing so, they claim that demands are having a source from the people and have a legitimate origin.

Although, populism in this sense seems a kind of democratization force since it defends the principle of popular sovereignty, which gives priority to groups that feel not represented in politics. As Canovan says, it stands for “*the redemptive side of democracy*” (Canovan, 1999). Yet, for populists general will is not transparent it is absolute therefore it may open the way for authoritarian regimes. In other words, it paves the way for legitimizing attacks on anyone who doubts the homogeneity of the people. (Abts & Rummens. 2007, p.409). As Arditi puts, “Right-wing populists in Europe and elsewhere

do this in the name of the people without always losing legitimacy or popular support. With their penchant for demagogic claims, they invoke the trope of corrupt or self-serving elites that have lost touch with the people, or they prey on people's fears by claiming that stricter policing and immigration controls will solve economic and social problems" (Arditi, 2004, p.142). It is important to mention that not to have a misunderstanding, populists do not criticize the idea of democracy rather populists criticize the lack of representation of the "ordinary people" in the institutions of the representative democracy. For populists, the general will theory which can be interpreted and applied easier and more efficient than the representative mechanisms and institutions. Thus, leaders who elected by the majority of the community becomes a legitimate representative. Yet, the strong emphasis of the populists on the general will creates a conflict between populism and constitutionalism. According to Meny and Surel "representation has helped to make democracy workable and constitutionalism has guaranteed its survival". Yet, populism by using popular sovereignty aims to create a direct, leader-oriented, top-down organizational style and trying to diminish the checks and balances and rule of law which are prominent for the constitutionalism. (Meny & Surel, 2002).

Populists tend to give a strong dependency to people which makes them the legitimate representative of the masses in political systems. Thus, general will or more generally democracy becomes a toll for them. Likewise, UKIP's insist about the promised referendum for the UK's exit from the EU and Turkish case of a referendum for constitutional changes can be considered in this frame as a legitimate source of populist demands. In this regard, referendums needed to be triggered to get peoples decision for the very important issue which seems very democratic. Yet, in democracies for very important issues better to get consensus than just 51% of the citizens.

The third important ingredient of the populist approach is the anti-establishment. In this regard, populists tend to divide the political sphere into two sections on one side the "ordinary people" on the other side the "elites or establishment". In this manner, the populist presents antagonist vision. Their conflictual world view possesses uncompromising division in which "*there are only friends and foes*". Consequently, conciliation has become almost impossible (Mudde, 2004, p.544). In this sense, the

division of political ground is moralistic rather than programmatic. Accordingly, if the distinction between elites and people based on ethnic and moral conditions, populist ideology emerges on nationalist discourses with xenophobic tendencies (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, p.14). According to Albertazzi and McDonnell, populists tend to represent elites or outsiders as a group who are reducing the sovereignty, prosperity, and culture of the native people (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2014, p.3). During the refugee crises right wing populists of Europe like, UKIP, NF, and AfD accused the parties and organization like the EU who supports the immigration and they claim that elites are taking the interests of immigrants more than natives.

According to Taggart, for populists the connection between the silent majority and representatives has been broken because of two problems. The first is the corruption of politics leads to the corruption of politicians. In particular, because of their conservatism, this problem often highlighted by right-wing populist parties. Right-wing populist parties argue that this corruption causes a social decay and moral collapse in the nation. Second problem is the special interests of the elites which take over the political process. For populists, these special interests are often related to economic giants like big companies or supranational organizations like the EU (Taggart, 2000, p.93). On the other hand, if the distinction between elites and people based on economic conditions, the loosen ideological context of populism helps it to lean more left wing. Populist blames that the economic power of the elites blocks the rise of parties that represent the ordinary peoples will. In this regard Tsipras often blames elites that keep the economic power in their hands, blocking democratization efforts of the state.

In addition to three core concepts of Mudde's definition, another important element of the definition of populism is to be a "*thin-centered ideology*" (Mudde, 2004, 544) that makes it easy to engage with other ideologies such as nationalism and socialism. Thus, in combination with other ideologies, populists express themselves in different parts of the political scale. Therefore, populism gets as Taggart claims "*chameleonic*" (Taggart, 2000, p.3) features that scholars talk about right- or left-wing populism. Additionally, populist agenda offers no international solutions for the problems whereas macro or thick-centered ideologies, like liberalism and socialism, as overarching networks of ideas offer solutions to all the important political issues. Because populists

rely on a restricted morphology that may answer some (but not all) political questions that societies generate (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p.150). As, Stanley (2008, p. 100) puts, “*there is no populist international*”; and populism appears local rather than universal. In this context when populist propagandas are considered, populists tend to give nativist declarations such as “make the America great again!”, “Osterreich zuerst” (Austria first), and “les français d'abord” (the French first). Especially in Europe, populist discourses emphasize national and cultural superiority. Against national unity, migrant workers, refugees, and minorities represented as a group that is trying to crack down the national identity of the imagined communities (Rosenberger, 2004). In general, research on populism tends to explain the nature of populism as an antagonistic, culture bounded and takes the shape of an environment that appears (Arter, 2010, pp.490-491).

In short, according to populist approach, elites are the group that represents the establishment and they stand against to general will of the people. Populists claim that elites have a leading position in media, in politics, in the economy, who only care about their special interests above the general interests of the people. In this context, populists tend to represent the deprived people against established elite organizations (Kaltwasser & Mudde, 2017, p.16). By using the moral distinction between ordinary people and corrupt elites especially in the European context, many populist parties claim that in the EU political elites put their interests over the national interests of the countries and “ordinary people” cannot express themselves due to elitist restrictions. Because populists see the EU as the source of almost all problems, they tend to stigmatize the EU and its bodies. These complaints of populists that based on representation are not new. They have historical backgrounds that can be traced until the nineteen centuries. Accordingly, the modern day concept of populism first appeared in the late nineteenth century in Russian Empire as a Narodniki (Intellectual middle class movement involved rural communities by using populist arguments against Tsarist Russia) and in the US as a People’s Party (mobilization of a particular regionally based agrarian communities against the economic and political power of the North and against the failure of the party system to represent this new agrarian force). These movements are considered to be the first populist movements with “objection to politic institutions as a lack of representation” (Taggart, 2000, p.110) and they offer “the glorification of the people” which are very relevant

claims to populism in current Europe. From this point of view, after giving components of populism, the thesis will shed light on the historical development of populism and it will evaluate how the populist formations in Europe are shaped.

2.3. Different Populist Movements

Populism is not a new phenomenon that appeared in Europe in the last decade. It was a concept that exists across time in a different part of the world. Conventional wisdom places the origins of populism at the end of the nineteenth century, by the Narodniki in Russia and the People's Party in the US. They both classified as agrarian populists (Canovan, 1981). Another type of populism, namely socio-economic populism was very common to witness in Latin America. It was occurred in the mid-twentieth century from irresponsible economic policies governments. Most common examples of socio-economic populism is associated with the Argentine military officer and politician Juan Domingo Peron. Finally, in the past decade populism has been associated very strongly with radical right parties in Western Europe, such as the FPÖ, FN, and the British National Party (BNP) which are having xenophobic themes. (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013 pp.155-156). In next section thesis will explore the historical development of populism in more detail.

2.3.1. Agrarian Populism

Scholars generally consider Russian Narodniki movement which dates back to 1870s as one the first the populist attempt. (Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The Russian Narodniki was a group of middle-class intellectuals, who had a belief that society should be based on agricultural economies of co-ops and small farms. Although, Russian movement Narodniki related to populism, it would be more accurate to call them as "peopleist", that derives from "going to the people" to change the existing system (Mudde & Kaltwaser, 2013, p.495). In the 1870s, in order to create a rebellion against the Tsarist regime, intellectuals of the Russia went to the countryside (people) to train the peasants, which they thought society should be based on (Taggart, 2000). Yet, the peasantry showed a lack of devotion for the revolution and backfired the intellectuals (Canovan, 1981). Although, Narodniki did not receive much attention from the Russian countryside, the movement has inspired the future agricultural populist

movements such as Eastern European and Russian socialists (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p.495).

The second type of agrarian populism appeared in 1891 under the name of “Peoples Party” in America. This populist movement which was considering the peasantry as a real people, predominantly supported by farmers like Narodniki. Their concern was the industrialization and they see it as a threat to their values and economic power. Demands of the populist movement were the nationalization of the railroads, reducing inflation and bringing about referendums as a political institution. This populist movement by combing both progressive and reactionary ideas became a powerful regional and national political force that fundamentally changed American economics, politics, and society. Later, the discourse and ideas of this movement were adopted into the Democrat Party and this populist movement disappeared over time. (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p.495).

In short, the core aspects of populism could be found in the case of Russian and American populism. Both considered “people” as a central object and aimed to improve the conditions of them. Additionally, the distinction between the “the peasants” and the “Tsarist regime” or “Government”, contains the main division of the populist rhetoric of “pure people” and “elites” as well. According to Canovan, since the Narodniki’s motivation was socially oriented rather than political, it resulted unfruitfully. She explains the backlash of peasants to Narodniki’s populist expectations; “the latest way of doing things must be the best” and expecting from people to join revolutionary movements is only underestimating the populist skepticism and vanguardism. According to Canovan, populist rhetoric may show up in two different ways protectionist and progressive way. Long-standing popular customs and traditions need to be taken seriously which are having deeper roots than new values (Canovan, 1982). In this frame, it is possible to see the reflection of Canovan's idea in Europe by observing the rising Eurosceptic, xenophobic, nationalist thoughts against newly introduced multicultural and liberal democratic values. In contemporary Europe, the mentioned anti-progressive ideas are feeding themselves from the decline of the material well-being, lack of representation and flow of refugees. Mostly, they present the national governments and the EU as an unresponsive for the challenges of globalization. In fact, they see the EU and

governments as the root causes of these problems. Therefore, they get anti-establishment characteristic and they claim that they are the only representative of the ordinary people and the one who speaks as a voice of the silent majority.

2.3.2. Socio-Economic Populism

Socio-economical populist movements came into view during the period of the great depression in Latin America. In general, socioeconomic populism establishes a link between politics and socioeconomic conditions and it adopts basic policies related to expansionary economic programs and generous distribution measures (Weyland, 2001, p. 5). Socio-economic populism gets its roots from the working class, which did not benefit from the expansion of the industrial economies after the recession in the 1930s. Contrary, the real wages of them were in decline. When the masses are started to be included in politics, populist leaders mobilized a large number of people against the establishment. In this regard, Peron from Argentina, Vargas from Brazil, Fujimoro From Chile are considered as fine examples. All these leaders by building their strategy on the idea of “Americanismo”, that claims that people of Latin America are united. They disprove the initiatives of the imperial powers that damage this integrity (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.29). They offered self-sufficient, import-substituting industries. In a short period of time, these movements were successful but in the long run, their strategies ended up with very big fiscal deficits due to the huge amount of state expenses.

One of the prominent examples of early socio-economic populism was Juan Peron. His strategy “Peronism” can be express as the re-evaluation of citizenship with a new meaning in a societal context. Peron aims to provide full participation and recognition for the ignored classes not through political parties, directly by labor unions. The success of Peron derives from the discourse of political inclusion of the groups which was previously excluded (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.10-11). In this frame, the first wave of socio-economic populism and contemporary European populism share the antagonism of “common people” vs “corrupt elites” Yet, first wave Latin American populism as being inclusionary by offering a unity of the deprived classes differs from European populism which ignores immigrants and ethnic groups in an exclusionary way.

Later in the 1990s Latin America again witnessed the rise of a new kind of

populist figures, who were followed neoliberal economic approaches. Presidents like Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil (1990–02), Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990–2000) and Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989–99) were employed a populist ideology and implemented reforms in favor of the free market, with the aim of controlling inflation and generating growth (Weyland, 1996). In sharp contrast to old socio-economic populism, the contemporary one, by criticizing the state involvement in the economy was on the favor of neoliberalism. By using antagonism in a different way, the second wave of populism was depicted the corrupt elites as those who were favoring strong state power and opposing the development of a free market economy. (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp.10-11).

In a nutshell, socio-economical populist movements were using the important component of the populism “the people” as an equivalent to exploited classes at the beginning. Later in the second wave of populism people is used to present the citizens who had no voice in governments. Consequently, leaders of the second wave of populism argue that the time has come to give sovereignty back to people. In contemporary Europe, similar claims are coming from populist parties when they express their opposition to the EU. In this regard, the following section will more closely examine European populism.

2.3.3. European Populism

Contrary to Russia, the US and Latin America, Europe does not have a long tradition of mass populism. Populism in Europe has become visible only in the 1990s, and particularly in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Mudde, 2007). As Taggart refers “*new populism*” has grown in Europe as a reaction to economic practices and institutions of modern liberal democratic systems (Taggart, 2010, p.75). The loose ideological nature of populism allows these new parties to perceive the problems with their own national and cultural experiences and let them to offer different political solutions. Relatively new populist parties have emerged with different political views on the right and the left wing of the politics. Yet, predominantly populist movements of Europe get the shape of far-right politics. Populist radical right parties share a theme that is derived from strong anti-elite feelings and nativism (Vieten & Poynting, 2016, p.536). More generally they tend to refer to establishment as a cause of problems and they use

the anti-establishment rhetoric and behaviors to mobilize the masses. They oppose not only all major political parties but also they rail against the establishment, which includes all cultural, economic and media elites. They argue that establishments are deluding the citizens by fake promises and by putting “their own or immigrants’ interests above the general will of the native people” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p.499).

Rise of the populist right wing in Europe mostly related to growing new cleavages in European politics. Kreisi argues that the last 30 years Europe has witnessed a big transformation of politics and newly established populist parties have pioneered the patriotic responses to economic cultural and political challenges (Kreisi, 2014, p.369). Moreover, for Kreisi in the European context, populist parties are not only representing the political discontent but they also show the grievances which are embedded in deep feelings of societal life in general. Similarly, Spruyt and colleagues argue that the rise of the right-wing populism is the indicator of the sharp distinction between the people and the established elites. This division derives from the people who feel deprived and confounded by new economic, social settings. Additionally, people who have lost their advantageous economic conditions as a result of changes and who feel barriers to find a better position in society express their dissatisfaction with anti-establishment parties (Spruyt et al., 2016).

Especially, when populist radical right parties have begun to find their existence in governments, they became more proverbial (Northern League (Lega Nord) in 1994 and the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) in 2000). Although many of them have not taken apart in governments so far, parties like UKIP from the UK, National Front from France, Alternative for Germany from Germany and Party for Freedom in the Netherlands are having a big number of supporters to shape their national as well as international political climate. The growing popularity and success of relatively new populist parties are pushing to mainstream parties to become more conservative especially in the debates on migration and integration (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, p.918).

On the other hand, new political challenges in the European context do not involve only right-wing populist movements. At the same time, it paves the way for the left-wing populism. Until very recently, left-wing radical populism was related to political movements in Latin America. Yet, the electoral victory of the Syriza in Greece

and the rise of Podemos in Spain brought two examples of left-wing populism to Europe. Especially, anti-austerity politics and 2008 financial crises had a prominent role in the rise of left-wing populism like early Latin American examples. These rising new populist challengers on the left wing are most likely to prefer to frame their discourses on the denationalization processes in socio-economic terms (Kreisi, 2014). As Stavrakakis and Katsambekis mentioned, discourses of the Syriza, as well as Podemos, were constructed on the populist principle of antagonism. They framed a political model that divides the society into two sections on one hand “us/the people” on the other hand “them/the establishment”. By using Manichean discourses, left-wing populists tend to become a spearhead of the populist resentment towards national governments and transnational elites of the EU (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014).

The majority of new populist movements in Europe, from left to right tend to use the grievances of the society that are triggered by processes of globalization and Europeanization. In this regard, they aim to stress the “status loss” for the emergence of radical positions within the voters (Vieten & Poynting, 2016, p.537).

In short, European right-wing populist parties tend to use the important component of the populist phenomena, the “people” as an equivalent to the indigenous population of a country. They aim to use it as a contrast to immigrants as well as to the national elites and international organizations such as the EU. In this regard, elites and the immigrants are linked with an economic and social decline in general. Elites in this process are accused of being self-interested, that they care only about their material well-being. On the other hand, European left-wing populists present the people as a working class, those who left behind during the process of globalization. Left wing populists refuse the privatization, global economies and business. Additionally, European left-wing populists tend to stress the consent of the exploited classes. Therefore, they considered as an inclusionary. Moreover, they argue that as a consequence of EU's elitist organization and austerity policies the states went into harsh economic conditions (Deiwiks, 2009). Thus, they take the Eurosceptic position like right-wing populists in Europe and they aim to present the European project as the source of all problems. Regarding the historical development of the populism, it is possible to summarize the populist movements.

Table 2: Historical Development of the Populism (Compiled by the Author)

Type of Historical Populism	State	Period	Features of Populist Movement
Agrarian Populism	Russian	Second half of 19th. Century	Idealization of traditional village communities as a common people. Rural Communities vs Tsarist Russia.
	USA	End of 19th. Century	Anti-industrialism, anti-modernism. Confrontation between common people and economic, political elites.
Socio - Economic Populism	Latin America	After WWII	Charismatic leaders, manipulation of masses. Economic populism. Strong state power, anti-establishment.
European Populism	Western & Central Europe	1990's	Idealization of traditions, anti-modernity, xenophobic, Eurosceptic, anti-austerity, anti-establishment.

After giving information about populism in general, since the thesis deals with populism in Europe and its relation with the EU, so in the next chapter the thesis will give more details about the populist surge in Europe and will focus on reasons that effects populists rise within the EU.

2.4. Rise of European Populism

Populist parties throughout Europe have achieved significant gains in the elections. Some became in a government position after national elections (Hungary, Poland), some others became the main opposition party (France). Those who could not gain any chair in the national parliaments are forcing the mainstream parties to adopt populist policies. Besides their national success, many populists sent a significant number of representatives to EP. Populists parties are represented in the EU parliament with a total of 82 members in two separate groups; Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), as a third major force in parliament

they join the debates. The national and international success of populist parties in Europe is creating a chance for them to shape national as well as European politics. Accordingly, one of the important factors that influence the rise of populist parties in the EP is the peoples' attitude towards the EP elections. In this context, when the EP elections compared, it is observed that every election is performed with less participation. While the participation rate was 61.9% in the first EP elections in 1979, this rate goes down to 42.6% in the last 2014 elections (EuroParl, 2014).

Table 3: Turnouts at the European Elections (Source: European Union Web Page, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html>)

Years and Number of EU Members	1979 EU 9	1984 EU 10	1989 EU 12	1994 EU 12	1999 EU 15	2004 EU 25	2009 EU 27	2014 EU 28
Percentage %	61.99	58.98	58.41	56.67	49.51	45.47	42.97	42.61

Many studies have done by scholars to understand the factors that influence participation in EP elections. For example, Clark (2014) argues that, if the citizen's trust is high to the EP and the EU, the participation of the people becomes greater. On the other hand, states who receive greater subsidies from the EU they tend to show greater turnout (Mattila 2003, p, 466; Stockemer, 2012). Reif and Schmitt's (1980), explanation about "second order" nature of the European elections is the most referred one. Accordingly, electors consider the European politics less important than the national one. They tend to use their votes in EP elections to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with domestic parties (Hix & Lord, 1997). Therefore, EP elections are generally evaluated as an option where national concerns and problems are expressed rather than questioning the accountability of the EU. Additionally, second order elections give an opportunity for the electors to vote for the niche or protest based parties in which they do not favor to vote in the national elections not to waste their votes, but in fact, they support their policies. In this frame, UKIP becomes one of the most important examples which confirms this theory.

Scholars who are concentrating on populism tend to explain the emergence of the

phenomena with demand and supply-side factors. (Mudde, 2007; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Guiso et al., 2017). Accordingly, demand-side factors mostly deal with the grievances and concerns of constituencies. It focuses on the reasons that affect voters' ideas, preferences, and attitudes. Supply-side factors focus on, opportunities and internal-external constraints in political systems that give rise for the populist parties. In the next part, the thesis will scrutinize these factors.

2.4.1. Demand Side Factors

In general scholars who are conducting a studies about the electoral success of the European right (Lubbers et al., 2002; Mudde, 2007; Akkerman et al., 2016; Muis & Immerzeel, 2017) and left (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014; Kioukiolis, 2016) populist parties and the decline of confidence in the EU focus on two elements. The first one is the “*Cultural Backlash*” as a reaction to values such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism which are developed after the bad experiences of the W.W.II (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). In the European level, the EU became a pioneer in social changes by creating a system which is aiming to increase the economic dependency of its members to protect the peace. After the W.W.II period, especially the people of developed Europe were experienced peace, prosperity, industrialization, economic growth, urbanization, secularization, mass education and literacy, occupational specialization, social mobility, and the emergence of welfare states. All these positive achievements have brought post material values like freedom of expression, environmental protection, gender equality and tolerance to foreigners. Newly introduced post materialist values have drawn attention to cultural issues more than the classical political debates of Left-Right wing politics and the redistribution (Inglehart, 1997).

The emergence of new values and cultural changes have created a reaction among older and less secure social classes who felt intimidated from the dissolution of traditional values (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). As a result of these challenges, the people who reject these new values claim that post material values are being in conflict with national interests and traditional values, as well as they are posing a threat to national identity (Buras, 2017). Similarly, Lynch and his colleagues by using data of yougov.com argue that in the 2010 elections the UKIP by using these challenges in their propaganda has

received support from the regions with a population of 65 years and older, with a low level of education and in a large number of self-employed areas. Additionally, supporters of UKIP were concerned about immigration, more than the voters for the three main parties in the UK. They tend to see immigration as the most important issue of their country (Lynch et al., 2011). Reactions to postmaterialist values in other European states like Austria, Hungary, created an intolerant attitude toward refugees, asylum seekers, and foreign workers as well. These reactions are often expressed by the people with their rising support to populist parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2007; Akkerman, 2012).

Besides the cultural reactionist theories, another important indicator for the rise of populist parties is the “economic concerns”. Many scholars emphasized the declining economic security and rising economic inequality gave a lift for the rise of populist parties in Europe (Algan et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2013). Accordingly, intensive integration of global markets, competition pressure from third world countries with large human labor pools, the decline in demand for semi-skilled workers and large immigration from underdeveloped countries lead to people of European states to question new capitalistic, post-modernistic Europe. In other words, the decline in the labor markets and the fear of future economic decline created the argument of the “losers of globalization/losers of modernization” that used by scholars to describe to economic concerns (Kriesi, 2014; Inglehart & Norris, 2016).

After the W.W.II period, the real income of most people in developed Western nations has stagnated or declined; despite substantial economic growth of the nation, the gains have gone almost entirely to the top ten percent of the population, largely to the top one percent. Economic inequality has been grown by increasing computerization and outsourcing (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). After the global economic crises, the rise in unemployment and economic insecurity, as well as the increase in inequality in revenues as a result of global economies and technological developments have fostered populist parties as an alternative to the mainstream. As a result, especially in Europe, due to its supranational character, the EU has become a scapegoat for the globally emerged economic problems. Contrary to this argument, Buti and Pichelmann (2017) argue that albeit the EU was successful in terms of economic development and promoting growth in Eurozone. Yet, many member states have failed in terms of profit contribution.

Therefore, economic-based populist rhetoric for Europe emerges from the countries' own income distribution problems. In this respect, the conditions of the countries rather than the accusation of the EU may be explanatory about the rise of populist parties.

Another important demand side factor for the rise of populist parties is the “ethnic competition”. The growing number of immigrants in Europe creates an increasing competition, especially on the labor markets, on the housing and on the welfare state benefits which are regarded as a scarce resource. Consequently, competition from foreign elements is perceived by the natives of the state as a threat to material well-being. That leads them to choose the parties with nationalist and ethnic discourses. In this regard many right-wing populist parties in Europe like NF, UKIP by representing themselves as a protector of the nation and natives are using existing tension in society and increasing their supports.

Growing political discontent in the European societies can be another explanatory factor for the rise of populism. Accordingly, increasing political alienation and dissatisfaction, especially in Western European democracies allowed the populist parties to reinterpret “there is no alternative” politics. Populists claim that the mainstream parties and members of them serve just for their personal interests and they ignore the demands of ordinary people. By using dissatisfaction within society, populist parties tend to spread anti-establishment ideas. In this context, populist parties challenge the mainstream parties by presenting themselves as an outsider and only real alternative to change the corrupted system (Mudde, 2016; Rosenberger, 2004).

In sum, although cultural and economic factors are important indicators to explain the rise of populist parties in Europe these factors are not mutually exclusive and interact each other (Algan et al., 2017, p.310). Additionally, they are not the only explanatory factors for the rise of populism in Europe. Therefore, different circumstances depending on countries own experiences need to be considered for the rise of populism.

2.4.2. Supply Side Factors

On the other hand, supply side factors can be considered with external and internal political factors. Institutional constrains, electoral system, political opportunities and mass media coverage represents important factors of the external side (Muis &

Immerzeel, 2017).

2.4.2.1. External Factors

Institutional constraints can be one of the important factors that affect the success of populist parties. Accordingly, “if there are no institutional constraints in the electoral system and the political space left open by political competitors, populist parties show better result. Low thresholds and proportional electoral systems mostly considered as a favor for relatively new parties” (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, p.913). Yet, majoritarian electoral systems like the British give a transformative effect for the parties. In this case, for the success, the parties in this system refrain from being extremists and tend to take a position similar to the mainstream parties. Likewise, UKIP tends to moderate their radicalism on their core issues and they avoid extremist discourses and promote neo-liberal policies, like flat taxing (Lynch et al., 2011).

Another important factor that affects the rise of the populist parties is the position of the mainstream parties. In this context, if the mainstream parties are adopting a more exclusionary “cordon sanitaire” position towards populist parties. Although the chances of on being in government decrease for the populist parties, research of Muis and Immerzeel proved that populist parties contrary have increased their support. Because by adopting a different position from the members of the government populist parties are became a real alternative for the voters (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, p.915). Additionally, the position of government may give an effect to populist parties especially on the issues that populists use in their discourses like immigration and European integration (Rooduijn et al., 2014). If these issues were ignored by governments, populist parties tend to use them to enhance their support. Furthermore, if the populist parties had an electoral success by using the issues of immigration and integration, in this regard, the mainstream parties tend to be more restrictive on the same issues. (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, p.918). Also, on a similar issue, Akkerman argues that governments with populist members bring stricter policies on the issues of immigration and integration (Akkerman, 2012).

Meir in his work while expressing the rise of the populist parties in Europe as an alternative, portrays the rise of “*responsibility*” and reduction of “*responsiveness*” functions of the mainstream parties. Accordingly, Meir argues that the new set of

principles, which is stemming from globalization and Europeanization, have created a number of new principles that governments must act responsibly for. The series of new rules, which mandates governments to act in a certain way and defines their responsibility has expanded considerably. Therefore, governments are not only responsible for their own constitutional restrictions, but they are liable to fulfill international responsibilities derived from the EU or from the Council of Europe (in the European level). In addition to this, in the past, parties were able to persuade voters and supporters through various campaigns. Yet, today this is less easily conceivable. Because mainstream parties have begun to lose their relations with civil society organizations and the party organization have become less responsive to the new demands of the society. As a result, the constraints on government have become much greater, the ability to respond to voters has been much curtailed (Meir, 2009, pp.14-15). This growing gap between responsiveness and responsibility or between what citizens might like from governments to do and what governments are obliged to do is paving the way for the relatively new parties as an alternative. Particularly, populist parties by representing themselves as a protector of the peoples' sovereignty and blaming international organizations like the EU are aiming to use this dissatisfaction.

In a similar vein, Kreisi and Pappas see the lack of responsiveness of established parties as a reason for the rise of the right-wing populist parties. Additionally, they put the economic dimension of the grievances into account and argue that “losers globalization” provided a chance for the mobilization of the new populist right. The rising economic transformation and almost no regulatory answers from the political authorities are provided anti-establishment sentiments in public. The grievances of the people are provided an opportunity for the new populist contenders. On the other hand, after the global economic crisis, the stagnation in the economies has helped the rise of populist parties (Kreisi & Pappas, 2015). As a result, in the European context, some voters began to see political parties and political elites as an identical, non-representative and far from society.

As a last external factor “the media” gives a very big opportunity for populist parties to express their position and messages to masses. For political communication, the mass media offers a direct channel to reach the people for the populists. By using this

opportunity populist parties tend to benefit from the media regardless of whether the publications on the media are positive or negative. On one hand, populist actors by using the internet can bypass many obstacles posed by traditional media and they enhance their visibility (Aalberg et al., 2016). On the other hand, social media may allow populist parties to strength their links with supporters in a more personal way and keeps them away from the control of the traditional gatekeepers of mainstream media.

2.4.2.2. Internal Factors

If the external structures are favorable for the rise of the populist parties, organizational characteristics of the populist parties like, leadership and party's political ideology have become crucial for the rise of populist parties as internal factors. According to Muis and Immerzeel organizational characteristics of the parties can only explain the persistency of the populist parties (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, p.917). It cannot be the only variable, which describes the rise of the populist parties (Luo, 2017).

In this regard, Carter (2005) argues that there is a connection between the parties' ideological stance and the continuation of their success. If the parties move to an extreme nationalist position, their success decreases. In this context, especially the populist parties in Europe started to change the Anti-Semitist ideas previously used by extremist parties with Anti-Islamism and xenophobia along with the wave of migration from the Middle East. Likewise, Hungarian populist party Jobbik launched a new strategy with the aim of repositioning the party from antisemitism root to avoid from stigmata of society (Biro-Nagy & Boros, 2016, p.260).

Leadership can be considered as another important internal factor on the rise of populist parties. In general populist parties display a different attitude than established competitors whose leadership is less personalized and more institutionalized (Van der Brug & Mughan, 2007, p. 44). Populist parties generally show an ideologically weak character. Therefore, populist parties often witness the personalization of leadership. Populist leaders aim to create a distinctive process of political mobilization by using antagonism. Accordingly, populist leaders by presenting themselves as an outsider they put a clear line between themselves and establishment. Thus, they tend to create an understanding that they do not belong to the elites which are corrupted. The populist

leaders do not portray themselves only as a representative of the people, but as an indispensable part of the people, as a servant, as the people's spokesperson, as a member of the same imagined community that they created and manipulated (Viviani, 2017).

The success of populist leaders and the rise of populist parties are more related to the political culture of the society in which leaders operate. Mudde and Kaltwasser argue that, countries with traditional culture and conservative political views tend to see more populist strongman as a leader, while capitalist states prefer populist entrepreneurs. Female leaders aim to create a more traditional figure in right-wing populist parties than in left-wing populist parties (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.77). According to Burg and Mughan leadership is not a necessary condition for the rise of populist parties. In fact, personalized leadership reduces the life of the party, because those leaders appear for some particular problems of the community in an episodic way (Van der Brug & Mughan, 2007). Yet, in Europe populist parties like UKIP, SRYZA and FN are benefited from the personalization of the leadership.

All in all, the demand and supply side factors contribute several reasons and different conditions for the rise of populism in Europe. While demand-side factors focus on resentments, supply-side approaches often conduct micro level investigations by focusing on political constraints and opportunities. These two approaches should not be regarded as competing theories, but rather as theories that complement each other. As the explanation of the Kriesi about challenges between national and international politics and its effect on the populist rise, multiple elements should be considered on the rise of populist parties. Especially in the European case the increasing importance of supranational governance structures like the EU, contributes a gap between "*front-stage*" and "*back-stage*" politics. More specifically, the EU and its Commission's non-majoritarian and non-accountable form makes it less visible and allows it to operate at the backstage. By operating at the backstage, the EU increases its power on the level of decision making over member states. This power shift to the EU is decreasing the level of representation of the parties which is operating in domestic politics as a front stage figure (Kriesi, 2014, p.365). Therefore, mainstream parties at the domestic level are becoming less reliable. This formation is giving an opportunity to populism, which has protest based anti-elite discourse and defends partyless unmediated politics between

strong leaders and their followers (Leconte, 2015, p.256). Like, political entrepreneur Nigel Farage who represents himself as an advocate of the interests of ordinary British citizens against elites of the EU. His rhetorics against the EU borrow the term from the populist agenda “us vs. them” and includes very strong Eurosceptic notions.

Studies about populism reveal that Euroscepticism is the driving force in many countries. Fitzgibbon and Guerra (2010) argue that Euroscepticism is the main actor for the populist discourses in Poland and Ireland too. Likewise, in their wider research which considers populist parties in all EU member states Boros and his colleagues pointed out Euroscepticism as a significant actor for populist parties (Boros et. al, 2016). Some scholars argue that the idea of Euroscepticism is gradually spreading and becoming embedded in European nation-states (Usherwood & Startin, 2013; Brack & Startin, 2015). Parallel to the same idea, Mudde contributes that mainstream parties could not respond to the switch of public demands, by refusing the idea that populism is a pathology of democracies, contrary he states that populism will gradually develop in the discourse of mainstream political parties. Thus, according to Mudde the future will be the “*Populist Zeitgeist*” (Mudde, 2004). Similarly, several studies confirm that the success of relatively new populist parties has given acceleration for the transformation of established parties as well, especially on the debates of immigration, multiculturalism, and integration. (Han, 2015; Akkerman, 2015). Yet, Rooduijn et al., (2014) found no evidence in Europe for the populist zeitgeist in their researches. Additionally, one of the main reasons for the grievances arising in contemporary Europe is the ongoing immigration (Ivarsflaten, 2008). The influx of refugees, nationalism and economic grievances creates a populist surge (Mudde, 2016) in Europe. In this regard, populists tend to present the EU and its institutions as an organization over the sovereignty of the state and people. Therefore, populists argue that the implementation and sanctions of the EU are not having any validation on the member states since the EU doesn’t represent the general will of the people. In addition, politicians who cooperate with the EU and support it, evaluated by populists as elites that stand against the general will of people. Hereof, Farage argues that, those who do not implement the Brexit decision which was given by the public in betrayal to the country (ITV, 2019). In this regard, rising supranational power of the EU on member states which often subjected by populist will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

EMPOWERMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND EUROSCEPTICISM

Since its creation, the EU has demonstrated a particularly well performance at preserving peace, strengthening democracy and economic growth in Europe (Gill & Raiser, 2012). EU's goal of promoting democracy, peace, and prosperity has developed silent assumptions on the member states about the integration process. Undisputed objectives of the EU became important elements for ensuring the penetration of the idea of integration to the member states (Sternberg, 2016, p.28).

However, in the last 50 years, European societies have witnessed many social and political changes as a result of globalization and technological developments. All these changes have created a new political ground with new values in Europe (Inglehart, 1990). Four classical cleavages introduced by Lipset and Rokan, the center-periphery, rural-urban, church-state and owner-worker which shaped the European political space before, according to Kreisi and his colleagues are not relevant anymore. They argue that in contemporary Europe, political systems have two-dimensional cleavages socio-economic and cultural. On one hand, the socio-economical dimension focused on new cleavage between pro-state and pro-market. The pro-state position is more protectionist, statist in this case new labor or leftist parties stand in this position. Pro-market position in favor of more open markets and competitiveness, in this case, right-wing and conservative parties takes this position. On the other hand, the cultural dimension of the new cleavage defends ethnic or nationalist characteristics of the states. Cultural cleavage opposes European integration and migration, nationalist and right-wing populist parties of Europe such as UKIP and FN can be classified in this position (Kriesi et al., 2006).

In contemporary Europe, the increasing number of refugees from the Middle East and migrants from Eastern Europe to wealthy states of Europe have brought the cultural dimension of the cleavages on the political spectrum. Mainstream parties, which were focused on pro-state and pro-market debates are having difficulties to produce new policies and solutions for the current problems. Contrary, niche parties like the populist and radical right wing, because of their xenophobic features are benefiting from the transformation of the political context. Mostly populist parties like UKIP, NF, and SYRIZA in their debates criticize the European integration process as the reason for newly occurred problems like refugee influx and global financial crises. By doing so they are bringing the EU on the front stage and they use it for the operationalization of various forms of political claims (Dechezelles & Neumayer, 2010). Thus, the EU perceived by populist parties like UKIP as an organization in which ruling elites or high-rank bureaucrats have no accountability to people because of its weak electoral mechanisms. Therefore, they claim that the technocratic and uncontested decision-making process of the EU institutions are reducing the legitimacy of the EU (Surel, 2011, p.3). In other words, “democratic deficit” claims about the EU have become widespread and used by many parties. Some discourses of the UKIP in the 2015 manifesto can be given as an example of the democratic deficit claims “Unless we leave [the EU] our democracy, our law-making powers, and our sovereignty will continue to be salami-sliced away by the EU” (UKIP, 2015). In this frame, the EU demonstrated as an organization that represents major restraints on the UK and it has seen as an obstacle to states’ sovereignty and democracy.

Although democratic deficit claims for the EU are often used, there is no certain explanation for defining the concept. Democratic deficit claims used interchangeably according to perceptions of scholars, political parties or individuals. First, democratic deficit claims in the EU “has meant an increase in executive power and a decrease in national parliamentary control” (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p.534). These claims are based on an abstract democracy model and tend to equalize community institutions with familiar national institutions (Yigit, 2009, p.111). Second, despite the EP's growing power, still representation in the EU is weak (Hix, 2013). Due to the second order nature of the EP elections, voters see the European arena less important than the national one,

therefore, participation to EP elections becomes less favorable. Additionally, voters having a chance to register their protest votes. As a result, parties on the fringes of national political scale are having chance to be represented at the EP. However, in such a case these parties, because of their niche political views are not becoming members of the EP's important political groups. Therefore, they are losing their representative ability and capability to be active on the policy-making process (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Consequently, declined participation in European elections and little impact of the representatives makes the EP remote from the representation of the people in the EU level (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p.536). Third, argument of the democratic deficit claim is the EU is too distant from voters and the policy process is fundamentally technocratic rather than political, which creates a policy drift from people. Democratic deficit claims in this frame argue that the EU makes legislation without the support of citizens. Thus, policy-making goes far from the citizens of the member states (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p.537). To conclude, democratic deficit claims about the EU derives from a comparison of the EU with a nation-state and equation of democracy with representative democracy. Consequently, the EU tends to reduce the effects of democratic deficit claims by increasing participation and transparency (Yigit, 2009).

In addition to democratic deficit claims, populist parties in Europe have focused on the theme of European integration. Throughout the process of European integration, the EU moved towards the functions attributed to the nation-state and began to use some nation-state symbols. For example, with the transition to the Euro as a part of common foreign policy and with issues covered by Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), like free movement of the people, custom and police cooperation are created a perception for the EU which is gaining more and more nation-state status (Taggart, 2004, p.277). Thus, populists argue that the EU is getting many functions of a modern state and by taking a stand against the EU, populists demand the limitation of European integration.

Another populist argument for European integration is the process of integration confiscating the liberty of the people. In this frame, populist parties in Europe by using mostly nationalist arguments claim that the integration process of the EU is creating a homogenization of diverse cultures of Europe and undermining or even damaging the national specifics and identities (Buti & Pichelmann, 2017). These kind of claims mostly

come from the right-wing populist parties because of their nationalist characters and they demand the Europe integration process to be reconsidered or slowed down (Surel, 2011, p.3). For example, UKIP argues that European states are losing their control on borders as a result of the founding principle of the EU “free movement of the goods, people and knowledge”. These principles are represented by them as an explaining factor of the flow of migrants, even in some cases as a reason for terror acts. Therefore, in their manifestos, UKIP is claiming to “take back to control of [UK's] borders” (UKIP, 2015) by leaving the EU.

The EU in order to reduce democratic deficit claims and to increase the support for the integration process has been inclined to empower institutions such as the EP. By doing that the EU tends to create a balance of power between institutions of the EU. On the other hand, not only democratic deficit claims, additionally supranational and the intergovernmental contentions within the EU also had an impact on the empowerment of the EP. From its foundation, the EU operates on two organizational frames. The first one is the intergovernmentalist organization, which refers to preservation of Member States' sovereignty on forming legislation, creating policies and making decisions. In this regard, the European Council can be considered as an intergovernmental institution of the EU. The second one is the supranational organization that describes the centralized features of the EU. In this regard, Member States transfer some of their powers to institutional structure of the community (Goebel, 2013, p.82). Thus, institutions can make binding decisions in legislative and executive procedures. In this frame, the Commission from the beginning and EP after Single Act can be considered as supranational institutions of the EU. Thus, it is possible to think that supranational and intergovernmental actors are in a competition to be effective in the decision-making process. In this regard, Moravcsik argues that supranational actors such as Commission and EP are the agents of the national governments. In order to reach the common goal member states delegate some of their power to these organizations. Therefore, these agents are becoming responsible for the solution of some specific problems. Yet, their actions are strictly examined by national governments and they need to act in accordance with some rules (Moravcsik, 1993).

In the early stages of formation of the EU the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) were appointed by the national assemblies. This assembly, which

usually consists of representatives of mainstream parties, was providing favorable conditions for European integration and there were almost no oppositions in it (Brack, 2013, p.87).

Especially, after the integration of the more states to the European Community to reach the idea of common market, member states tend to transfer some of their authority to the supranational institution. But at the beginning, French and British unwillingness to give their national authority resulted to deliver only a limited amount of power to EP. Additionally, states (especially major member) guaranteed their authority in the decision-making process with Qualified Majority Voting. In this regard relatively smaller countries were aiming to support strong supranational power. Like Benelux countries. Countries like Britain, France, and Germany appear to play an important role to support the intergovernmental institution (Moravcsik, 1993, p.496). In short, the EU by empowering the Parliament tends to put majoritarian institution of the EU on an equal footing with non-majoritarian institutions. As a majoritarian institution, EP ensures, its legitimacy as being an accountable to the voters. In this frame political decisions become legitimate in functional meaning because they are taken by elected representatives of the EP. On the other hand, European Commission as a non-majoritarian institution of the EU, has no accountability to voters or peoples' representatives since it is formed by technocrats who have not been elected. Thus, it is seen as an obstacle against the democratic mechanisms (Rittberger, 2003, p.205). Therefore, the EU by changing the formation of the EP from appointed members to elected members aim to increase the democratic functionality of the EU by redesigning the EP as a majoritarian institution and at the same time, the EU tend to enhance the participation on decision making process.

Additionally, the EU tends to create more involvement from different domestic parliaments with the so-called “yellow card” option. Accordingly, national parliaments of EU Member States can object the legislation draft within eight weeks’ time as a result of subsidiarity principle. With this option the EU tend to establish more scrutiny over the policy outcomes (Jans & Piedrafita, 2009). Because, in order to continue for further European integration, the balance of power between the executive and the parliament had to be ensured in the EU (Haroche, 2018).

From a different view Sternberg argues that, elections can be considered as a

reflection of public opinion about the EU. Therefore by directly elected EP, the EU projected not only as representing the electorate's interests, preferences, and desires but also tend to act upon public opinion and try to effectively mobilize the public support (Sternberg, 2016, p.33).

In this context, the EP in the last 60 years has evolved from the toothless legislature of the European Coal and Steel Community to the co-legislator of the EU (Hix and Høyland, 2013). At the beginning the EP, formerly the European Parliamentary Assembly, as an advisory body had a consultative power to the European Council. Consultative power was possessing major issues, such as agriculture, budget, freedom, and security, justice, social affairs. However, the opinion of the EP in this consultation process was non-binding. Although the EP's role in the decision-making process seems insignificant, Kardasheva argues that during the consultation process EP by using the power to delay gained importance in the policymaking (Kardasheva, 2009). Because the treaty which gave the consultation right for the EP does not set a specific deadline for the consultation. Especially during the case of the isoglucose ruling. EP's power of delay became very obvious and it used this power to reshape the policy outcome. However, in general, there is a consensus on the EP's power in the decision-making process was very limited.

Reforms for EP, to enhance the participation and to create a balance of power in between institutions of the European Community has begun in the 1970s. Accordingly, after authorizing the Parliament on the EU's annual budget and given the power to veto on "non-compulsory expenditures". The Political Committee has begun to send questionnaires to member states and their national parliaments about the concerns of the election of the EP, about the dual mandate, conflicts of interest of Members of the European Parliament and their term in office and the distribution of seats in the Parliament. However, the introduction of the rapporteur Patijn was allowing Member States the freedom to decide about possible EP elections. After a year-long discussions commission submitted the second draft in 1974. In this regard, six founder states of the Community because of their export-based economies were aiming to reach a single market and political integration. therefore, they were positive about an increase in the power of the parliament as a supporting element for achieving their goals. Yet, new

members of the Community UK, Denmark, and Ireland were having questions derived from the dual mandates and the proportional representation (CARDOC, 2009). Finally, member states reached a conclusion in 1979. Then, for the first time, direct elections of the EP held by the European Community in 1979. After, with some extension, the Parliament had the right to declare an “official opinion” on the draft law before the adoption of the legislation in the European Court of Justice (Hix & Høyland, 2013, p.172).

Later, the main desire of the European Community to reach the common market and monetary union is paved the way for the preparation of the Single European Act and Maastricht Treaties. In this regard, the plan of Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission which was offering the introduction of the European Monetary Union in three stages started the negotiate by the member states. In this period, although all member states were open to the plan of a single market. However ideas of a common currency and political cooperation were opposed by some member states, especially by the UK. For the treaty, Intergovernmental Conferences was held in two categories. Foreign Ministers were responsible for the conference on Political Union, while the Finance Ministers were having a meeting on the Economic and Monetary Union. After tenacious negotiations draft Treaty on European Union (1991) was introduced by Luxembourg Presidency. The draft treaty was dividing the administrative power of the European Community into three areas (pillars). The first pillar which represents the supranational role of the community was regulating the activities of the member states such as Customs Union, Common Agricultural Policy and Monetary Union. The second pillar was on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third pillar was devoted to JHA. The second and third pillars that Community will stand on were representing the areas where member states would negotiate between them. Therefore, they were defining the intergovernmental role of the states (CVCE, 2019).

Beside economic reasons, another important factor that affected the member states for the treaties was the need for CFSP. In this regard, the uncertainty of Europe during the Cold War period was impelling the member states' national governments to form a European Political Cooperation (EPC) vis-a-vis to Washington and Moscow. Later, the unexpected and sudden end of the Cold War was pushed member states to

eliminate the security-based concerns and tend to cooperate for CFSP. Although there were different intergovernmental views, the positive impact of the EPC and CFSP components convinced member states to discuss these agreements (Dinan, 2013, pp.125-126).

During this period positive feelings about the single market program and the promise of a border-free Community brought public attention and widespread support. However, public opinion was not as enthusiastic about the European Monetary Union. The idea of a common currency in the union and the constraint of national fiscal policies have brought some concerns which were based on national sovereignty. As a result, the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the Danish referendum has brought some questions about the EU's democratic identity (Dinan, 2013, p.127) and gave a sparkling for the Eurosceptic ideas in the EU.

From this perspective, it can be argued that the Single European Act (1987) is provided a major step for the empowerment of the EP on decision making. Prior to the European Single Act, European legislation was adopted by the EU member states after the consultation procedure. This procedure used to start by the proposal of the legislation by the Commission and ends by the Council's approval. During this legislation process Council couldn't approve the legislation without getting the opinion of the EP yet, this was only an advisory function. However, the Council was not necessarily needed to take the EP's suggestion into account. In other words, the Council had no obligation to accept the EP's suggestions (Single European Act, 1987).

The Single European Act while introducing the cooperation in this procedure also was added another reading. According to the new addition, by qualified majority votes, the council takes a position and sends the proposal to Parliament for evaluation. If, EP approves the position of the Council may validate the legislation by qualified majority. Yet, if EP rejects the amendments of the Council then Council needs unanimous consent for legislation. Thus, Parliament reaches not full but a limited legislative power with the “procedure of cooperation” with the Council (Hage, 2011).

The Maastricht Treaty introduced so-called “Co-Decision” process in 1993. Like the Single Act, the Maastricht Treaty extends qualified majority voting within the Council to cover most decisions under the co-decision procedure and all decisions under the

cooperation procedure (Nugent, 1999, p.72). Accordingly, the co-decision procedure consisted of three readings with a conciliation stage between the second and third. If the Council refuses the amendments of the EP, the Conciliatory Committee joins the process for mediation between EP and Council. This committee consists of an equal number of delegations from both the Parliament and the Council (Hix, 2002, pp.261-262). If there is no consensus about common legislation in the 3rd. reading than “take it or leave” offer comes from the Council and EP could not refuse the amendment of the Council (Tsebelis et al., 2001, p.578). Although the Treaty of Maastricht is considered to bring more power to the Parliament in terms of the legislative process compared to the former “consultation and cooperation” activities. In fact, the Council still had the final word in policymaking. In this context, it would be wrong to say that the Council, which has an intergovernmental structure, has lost its power in policy making to a supranational organization.

Similarly, there are several studies about the power competition of the EU institutions after the Maastricht Treaty and the result of them varies. For example, Crombez claims that the Maastricht Treaty has increased the Parliament’s powers by providing co-decision procedure with three readings and Conciliatory Committee. Because if the Conciliation Committee couldn't manage to create an agreement between Parliament and Council after third reading then it will be very hard for Council to create a unanimous majority for the amendments (Crombez, 1997, p.113). On the other hand, Tsebelis and his colleagues examine the role of the three institutions of the EU under cooperation and co-decision procedures reveal that different than conventional wisdom, Parliament was more effective in cooperation procedure on the legislative outcomes. They argue that “the conditional agenda-setting power provided by the co-operation procedure is more important for parliamentary influence on policymaking than the absolute veto power provided to the Parliament by the co-decision”(Tsebelis et al., 2001, p.579).

Later, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) removed the last part of the co-decision process introduced in Maastricht, accordingly, if there is no consensus created by the conciliation committee between the Council and the Parliament after 3rd. reading with new changes Council will not able to redefine its common position for the amendment of the law (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999). In addition to the Maastricht Treaty new procedure

so-called “Co-decision II” introduced. According to the new co-decision procedure, legislation can be adopted in the first reading, if Parliament and the Council adopt the proposal of the Commission unamended, or if both institutions agree on the same amendments, then the legislative activity takes place at the first reading. In this regard, Hix and Hoyland argue that newly introduced rule, adoption after first reading seems like a minor change yet, in fact after passing years it became a procedural norm which is reducing the scrutiny of the parliaments on the EU policy outcomes (Hix and Hoyland, 2013, p. 173).

With the Treaty of Nice (2003), Parliament's legislative and supervisory powers are increased and qualified majority voting is extended to more areas within the Council (Treaty of Nice, 2003). Lastly, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), brought a right to Parliament to appoint the President of the Commission, on the basis of a proposal from the European Council. Lisbon Treaty puts the European Parliament on an equal footing as lawmaker with the Council in areas where this was not previously the case, notably in setting the EU budget (Parliament enjoys full parity), agriculture policy and justice and home affairs (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009).

All in all, Parliament now has a significant impact on policy outcomes in Brussels, particularly under the co-decision procedure (Hix & Hoyland, 2013). Increasing the power of the Parliament in the legislative process aims to enhance the EU's legitimacy not only directly by empowering the only institution that represents European citizens, but also indirectly by strengthening the accountability link between government representatives in the Council and their national parliaments and electorates (Hage, 2011, p.19).

Bocquillon & Dobbels argue that the EU's reforms in order to increase the power of the EP bring about a kind of power debates among the institutions within the EU. Accordingly, even EP increased its own power yet, in reality, the tandem of the Commission and Council still has a significant impact on the legislative process in the EU. This relation can be named as “*joint agenda setter*”. Generally, the European Council and Commission relations are based on cooperation rather than contesting and two institutions tend to act jointly. This mutual relationship between the Council and the Commission is beneficial for both parties and by cooperating in this way, they aim to

protect their policy outcomes (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2014, pp.26-27). Similarly, Costello and Thomson argue that after the co-decision process, the power of the EP, which is the Supranational institution of the EU, is increased at the decision-making process. Yet, this empowerment is less than officially proposed. As the Council is closer to the status quo, it has the “*bargaining advantages*” against the Parliament. Thus, it becomes more effective than the Parliament in terms of determining the decisions. Despite the formal balance between institutions, structurally, the Council has an information advantage over the EP. This causes the EP to be weaker than the Council in policy outcomes (Costello & Thomson, 2013, pp.1036-1037). Nugent and Rhinard approach the empowerment process from the Commission's perspective. By considering three important functions of the Commission; agenda setting, legislation and executive claim that in agenda setting Commissions ability to set the debates of the EU in normative terms still very high. Although new actors are involved in the legislative process, in reality, there is no reduction in the legislative activity of the Commission. And executive power of the Commission still high especially the Eurozone economic crisis and the Lisbon Treaty have created new agencies, but this has helped to further the empowerment of Commission (Nugent & Rhinard, 2016, p.1211). Contrary Dehousse argues that there is no hegemonic power in the EU since European institutional architecture has been carefully designed to avoid any concentration of power. The absence of a clear institutional power in the EU, allows three political European institutions to influence the rules, governing structure and functioning of agencies and their operation equally (Dehousse, 2008).

Auel and Christiansen, who are considering the empowerment of the EP from the perspective of national parliaments claim that especially with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional capacity of the national parliaments was significantly altered. Thus, more participation of member states and legitimacy in the decision-making process was desired. At the European level, although national parliaments have been explicitly authorized, their institutional capacities vary considerably between member states and are largely based on internal regulations and procedures (Auel & Christiansen, 2015). Therefore, the effects of national parliaments at the EU level vary according to their own regulations. On the other hand, there is an important point to be mentioned, the

empowerment of the EP, as a supranational competitor, generates pressure on national parliaments to take measures to protect their authority. Winzen and his colleagues by considering support of EP in national parliaments argue that the national parliaments, mostly composed of liberal parties, tend to give higher support to the EP because they are ideologically more prone to the EU enlargement. On the contrary, the national parliaments, formed by parties with strong nationalist identities and cultural preferences, tend to be more critical for transnational organizations (Winzen, et al., 2014, p.79).

All in all, empowerment of the EP received different reactions from the different perspectives of the politicians and member states. Some members like Germany considered the EP as a preconditional element of their unionist motives and an indispensable part of the democratic legitimacy. Some others, see the increasing power of the EP as a potential threat to their national sovereignty because of the idea that the main source of the democratic legitimate rule cannot be delegated to supranational organizations it is regarded only to the nation-state (Goetze & Rittberger, 2010, p.44). In this frame, Rittberger argues that member states consider the empowerment of the supranational organization from their perspective differently (Rittberger, 2003).

In this respect, the deepening of the supranational integration process received different reactions from the national parliaments. Some member states showed solidarity and spearheaded the integration process like Germany, some see the EP as a supranational rival to their national authorities like the UK. Additionally, in the last 10 years, the European political hemisphere affected by two critical events: Eurozone financial crises and refugee crises. In this frame, populist parties used these developments to increase their support by creating new policies like protection of national sovereignty, conservation of national values, and opposition to immigration (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). Pirro and Kassel argue that populist parties of Europe successfully tied all these events with the EU by claiming the complex and elite oriented decision-making process threatens the sovereignty of nation states. Additionally, in their discourses, they framed the EU's integration process as a threat to cultural identities as well (Pirro & Kassel, 2017). In this regard, Euroscepticism becomes one of the key instruments for the populist surge. Similarly, the Guardian's recent research which is conducted with scholars revealed that populist rise in Europe was not only limited with European elections which mostly

seen as second order in national elections populist parties almost tripled their votes (The Guardian, 2018). Brack considers the populist support from a similar perspective and argues that with the increasing support of the populist parties in contemporary Europe, the Eurosceptic debates have become a substantial part of European politics at both national and supranational levels (Brack, 2013, p.85). Yet, no need to forget that both concepts populism and Euroscepticism is not identical and require separate analytical frameworks. Eurosceptic parties do not necessarily show pronounced populist features yet, current populism in Europe displays a clear link with Euroscepticism (Kneuer, 2019). In the next chapter thesis first will give brief information about Euroscepticism, then will focus on to British Euroscepticism which created a background for the emergence of the UKIP.

3.1. Euroscepticism

Scholars mostly consider Maastricht Treaty as a milestone for the emergence of the Euroscepticism, before Maastricht, Europeanization was regarded as a permissive consensus of the citizens to the European project through the process which is created by the national elites. However, after the Maastricht Treaty, critical approaches to the European project not fully but slowly emerged (Di Mauro & Memoli, 2016). Debates between and among political parties have begun to concentrate more on European integration and the criticism towards the EU has increased after this period (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002, p.298). In the long run, those criticisms have become embedded in party policies and became a way of making claims in European politics especially by populist parties (Pirro et al., 2018).

In today's Europe, Euroscepticism is very widely used by populists. Yet, the origin of the word Euroscepticism is usually located in Britain and associated with the Conservative Party. Similarly Collier explains the emergence of Euroscepticism and relation with Britain and argue that, “in the early 1990s, what was called Euroscepticism across the EU was largely based on the Britain in the wake of the ratification of the Treaty on European Union in 1992 – 1993 Euroscepticism used, to describe group of Conservative Member of Parliament (MP's) who had voted against or abstained on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, regardless of their leader's voting instructions”

(Collier, 2015, p.100).

Due to its widespread use, in the current literature, there are many explanations about Euroscepticism that was emerged as a result of the discussions of the political parties in the UK on the EU. Taggart's definition have created a common ground for many researchers. Accordingly, he defines Euroscepticism as an “idea of a contingent or qualified opposition as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). Later definition developed and dived as “*hard*” and “*soft*” Euroscepticism and it became a touchstone for the description of the concept. Accordingly, “Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration - therefore - parties [offer] withdraw from membership or - oppose the whole project of European integration “(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002, p. 3). The definition makes it clear that hard Euroscepticism offers total rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or remaining members of the EU (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p.300). Contrary “Soft Euroscepticism is - not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on only one or a number of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002, p.4). From this perspective, UKIP stands in the hard Eurosceptic tradition which opposes the whole project of the EU. The official page of the UKIP also confirms the party’s Eurosceptic view and say “UKIP was founded in 1993 to campaign for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Not because we hate Europe, or foreigners, or anyone at all; but because it is undemocratic, expensive, bossy – and we still haven’t been asked whether we want to be in it” (UKIP, 2009).

Mostly Euroscepticism considered as negative phenomenon yet, Eurosceptic dissent is recognized by some scholars as a democratic reaction and sign of a healthy integration process like “national political systems, the possibility to express legitimate dissent within the EU is normatively desirable” (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p.164). However, in the hand of the populists, Euroscepticism can be a dangerous element. Similarly Krouwel and Abts argue that if this political discontent is used by the populists, it may transform the citizens' perception into a non-flexible, negative or hostile attitudes (Krouwel & Abts, 2007, p.268). In contemporary Europe, Euroscepticism is becoming

integrated into populist parties and their party policies. The linkage between Euroscepticism and the crises are no longer a necessary condition. Populists by taking the Euroscepticism to the front stage are making it as an integral part of their antagonist discourses (Pirro & Taggart, 2018, p.260). In this regard, Vasilopoulou argues that Euroscepticism already integrated to policies of the many political parties and it has become an independent variable. In the early 90s primarily seen as a dependent variable in which the emergence of it related to other factors (Vasilopoulou, 2013).

3.2. British Euroscepticism

Britain after became a member of the EU, Euroscepticism has appeared in party politics as an important element of political debates. In this regard, Gifford argues that Euroscepticism appeared as a consequence of sovereignty and national identity debates and it became a perpetual feature of the British political outlook within the parliament and in public debates (Gifford, 2014, p. 519). Before Britain became a member of the EU and during the membership process there were already Eurosceptic voices in the UK from Conservatives and Labors. Additionally, during the accession process, Britain's membership to the EU was vetoed twice by France. In this respect, it can be argued that the EU membership process has begun to be problematic for the UK and the situation has increased the skepticism in the country.

Albeit there were Eurosceptic voices in the UK, the reason that affected Britain for being a member of the EU was basically economical. In general, Britain was considered as a global and economic powerhouse. However, in the 1960s, the country's economy faced difficult conditions. Therefore, the UK has seen Europe as an alternative option for the failed economic reforms. However, this attempt is considered quite controversial in British politics. Moreover, the British dominant political thought of being different from the Europe entailed the Euroscepticism (Davis, 2017). Accordingly, British Euroscepticism considers European culture extremely diverse, therefore British way of Euroscepticism argues that there are no European “demos” therefore it is impossible to achieve real integration (Spiering, 2015).

Later after being a member of the EU in 1973, the UK experienced many internal

political debates about European integration. Particularly during the Thatcher period, the UK showed strong resistance to EU integration except for the economic aspects. Her position towards the Maastricht Treaty in 1990 became influential for the British stance to the EU. Thatcher was of the opinion that an increased role for the EP with the Maastricht Treaty would violate the legislative role and position of the British houses of parliament. Her emphasis is derived from the parallel scrutiny of the government by select committees of the Lords and Commons in Britain. Therefore, she often argued that the “United Kingdom in 1973, had entered into an economic and monetary union promising nothing more or less in the form of federalism” (Kullaa, 2016, p.70). Later similar concerns find its position in the populist discourses of the UKIP in their 2014 manifesto party claim that “The EU is not just the trading bloc we thought we signed up to. It’s about ever closer union” (UKIP, 2014). Similarly, Gifford argues that the UK as being a post-imperial state has specific skepticism towards Europe. UK has been contested the EU by Eurosceptic mobilizations that privileged from the exclusive conceptions of political identity and national sovereignty (Gifford, 2014, p.513). In short, British Euroscepticism opposes the transfer of executive and legislative power from the British government and parliament to EU institutions.

In general, British Eurosceptics are hostile to European integration, except for economic integration. Particularly to the “ever closer union” concept which describes the cultural unification of countries within the framework of enlargement policy receives more reactions. This idea finds its reflection in the British Eurosceptic Bruges Group which is one of the oldest and most influential Eurosceptic extra-parliamentary groups in the UK. This Eurosceptic group influenced and named by Thatcher's famous Bruges speech in which she warned the dangers of a federal Europe. Mainly this group was aiming the withdrawal of Britain from the EU (Fitzgibbon, 2015, p.177). By having many political entrepreneurs including Nigel Farage this group was very influential to shape the British opposition to the EU. Accordingly, Thatcher in her speech argues that “*Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality*” (Thatcher, 1988 in Spiering, 2015). Parallel to this speech, “British cultural Euroscepticism argue that there is no such

thing as Europe it is the collection of diverse nation-states, on the other hand, Europe does exist as something alien to the British way of life which is essentially different” (Spiering, 2015, p.31). Therefore, British skepticism can be considered more general than the EU skepticism, it is against the cultural and political unity of Europe or to European integration.

Even though, Britain had a great impact on Brussels after becoming a member of the EU, the general Euroscepticism concept emerged as a result of British political parties' discussions about the EU. The UK especially was a driving force on the liberalization of the markets, on the enlargement process, on competition and trade as well as on foreign policy of the EU. UK's special approach to the EU is considered by Warlouzet (2018) as an “active awkward partner” In other words, despite its self-isolation, the UK had a big impact on the EU. According to him, the UK by joining to EU yet, staying as a skeptic created very important contributions to the EU. First, Britain as being a skeptic stands against the French and German domination in the EU. Britain's opposition to French and German domination in the EU is ensured a balance of power, at the same time this opposition is provided a control on France and Germany not to impose their national interests in the EU. Second, UK by joining the EU and as being an agenda setter created a pivotal position in the EU despite the French hurdle. Third, Britain has provided many privileges from the very beginning of her membership. For example, The UK has been the only EEC member not to be included in the common currency and Schengen agreement. Because the UK was perceiving common currency and open borders as a threat to state sovereignty. Additionally, received a special rebate in the budget. Before received the rebate, although the UK was the third poorest member, it was the country that contributed the most to the community budget. This was largely due to the relatively small share of the UK's farm subsidies. In this regard, Thatcher by threatening to halt payments for the budget received a special rebate (Warlouzet, 2018, pp.961-962).

Similarly, Hix and his colleagues argue that the UK had a big influence on EP in the decision-making process. Many key positions such as rapporteurships and committee chairmanships in EP was occupied by British politicians. Additionally, when all member states compared, the British MEP's were over-represented in key positions of the EP. This was allowing Britain to have significant power in the policy outcomes (Hix, et al., 2016).

On the other hand, UK's size on proportional representation in EP brought 73 MEPs (9% of the EP). That makes the UK as the second most represented country in the EP after Germany. UK delegation generally brings large groups of MEP's from the same party, since the British political system has a comparatively small number of successful parties, compared to other EU states. Thus, the British MEPs, which had the chance to act in collaboration, were influential in policymaking. (Salamone, 2014). Yet, after 2009 UK's influence on EP slowly diminished as a result of shrinking mainstream participation in EP and the populist surge of UKIP. Especially after the 2014 elections, many British chairs in EP were filled by UKIP, which changed the UK's power balance in the EP. Although Blair and his government were pro-European, UKIP's position on EP was a factor that was reducing the power of the UK in the policy outcomes. As a result, the UK was getting into a weak position in the branch of the EU's legislative system. In the current EP, most British MEP's do not sit in the groups that dominate the EP's agenda. Although some British MEP's take part in more powerful groups, they are insufficient to influence group decisions. All these factors make the UK in EP more vulnerable. Consequently, it affects the impact of the UK and its representation in the EU (Hix et al., 2016). Thus, existing historical skepticism towards the EU and its institutions has begun to increase in the UK, which gradually lost its importance in policymaking.

Additionally, some unexpected events that happened in the last decade created favorable conditions for the British Eurosceptics more specifically for the UKIP. First, the Eurozone financial crises appeared, which used by Eurosceptics to present the economic and political failure of the EU (Gifford, 2014, p.520). Eurosceptics in the UK claim that the economic burden of the countries which hit by crises will affect Britain and British taxpayers' billions of pounds will go to the EU's common budget as part of the bailout programs. Even though the British government rejected these Eurosceptic claims, it created an increase for anti-EU thoughts. Second, the influx of refugees to Europe is used by Eurosceptics especially by Farage. In this regard Farage argues that it does not matter the UK in the Schengen zone or not as being a member of the EU, UK would be sharing the burden of refugee inflow (Bale, 2018, p.270). Lastly, terror actions in the UK have created a threat to British culture and lifestyle. In this regard, Eurosceptics in the UK and in other European states hold responsible to the EU's open-door policy for the

terror attacks. Therefore, in order to create a security, Eurosceptics like UKIP offer to “take back the control of the borders” (UKIP, 2014).

To conclude, the EU's shift towards supranational decision-making has pushed some member states to seek to preserve their national sovereignty and increased the Euroscepticism, particularly in the UK. Especially in Britain Euroscepticism was accompanied by a reduction in Britain's contribution to policy-making within the EU. Thus, the EU was perceived by Britons as a remote institution which does not reflect the public interests of the British people. As a result, the rising Euroscepticism in British society has created many opportunities for UKIP. Additionally, UKIP benefited from the rising immigration to the UK and discontent from the mainstream parties. UKIP as being a hard-Eurosceptic political party ties different populist discourses to the EU and tends to reach British voters with broader political arguments. The remainder of this chapter will give a theoretical background for the reasons of the policy changes in party politics, which will help to understand the motivations of the UKIP's policy shifts.

CHAPTER FOUR

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK WHAT MOTIVATES POLITICAL PARTIES TO CHANGE THEIR POLICY POSITION

In democratic societies, political parties are the important political actors to reflect the citizen's preferences to political systems. By doing so they increase the representation and create a link between citizens and policy outcomes. In this regard, Walgrave and Nuytemans call political parties as “*brokers*” who are mediating between people and politics. In this mediating process, political parties which are principle political actors to reflect the people's will in politics, express their political positions through their manifestos. Although manifestos are generally not followed by voters, in fact, they are the important documents of the political parties that represent the plans, political programs and ideas of the parties. Additionally, in later stages, they become an important source of the party's accountability for policy making (Walgrave & Nuytemans, 2009, p.191). On the other hand, because manifestos are not well followed by citizens, therefore parties apply different methods to address their supporters. In this frame, speeches that are carried out through the media in the national or European Parliaments are becoming valuable features to define the party policies. Principally, scholars who are conducting research on the party policies tend to refer to these information. Therefore, this thesis also rely on these information to understand policy shifts of the UKIP.

In general, the literature on party politics claims that political parties are rigid institutions that are not open to change (Harmel & Janda, 1994, p. 266; Budge, 1994). The parties tend to amend their policies with the effect of a number of factors that occur over time or suddenly. In this section, the thesis will examine the reasons that lead the parties to policy change. Reasons will be considered as internal and external reasons. The

internal factors include party structure, leadership, and status. The external factors may include previous election results, changes in public opinion, and policy change in opposition parties.

4.1. Internal Reasons

One of the first internal factors that may affect the party position is the parties organizational structure. In this regard, Schumacher and his colleagues argue that political parties with strong leader tendencies in which the power concentration on party leader or on a selected group around the party leader, tend to be more reactive to changes in general voters' position. Contrary, parties with strong activist domination, in which policy-making and veto power are diffused in broader cohorts are responsive to only party members positions (Schumacher et al., 2013).

Because, party leaders in activist dominated parties like the Labour Party in UK or Social Democrats in Germany which have a strong connection with labor unions, tend to be tune with party members to consolidate their authority. As a result, they are becoming more receptive to the demands and preferences of the party members. On the other hand, in the leader-oriented parties, the party tends to change the policy more flexible, as the increase in the party's vote has seen as a strengthening element of the party leader. Additionally, less opposition in the party organization makes the party leader more resilient in order to stay unchallenged.

Similarly, Meyer, argues that parties with strong intra-democracy are less flexible to policy changes than the parties in which decision making is centralized. Because more inclusion of the party members in the decision-making process and to give them vote power allow party members to impose their own perceptions to party in which creates a limit for the policy shift of the party. On the other hand, in the same study, Meyer argues that contrary to general belief, there is no solid evidence between the financial support to political parties and the policy change (Meyer, 2013, pp.212 -213).

Another internal factor that may affect the policy shift of the party is the changes in party leadership and leader's prestige. Party leaders mostly considered as public faces and most influential figures of the parties. In general, when the parties had a decision to change their leader media attention becomes high around the personality of the new

leader. As a result, voters get more frequent information and messages from the party which increases the visibility of the party policies. At the same time, leadership changes may give some negative attitudes towards the parties. In this case, especially rival parties may criticize the new leader's policies and they may blame the party as being unstable (Somer-Topcu, 2017, pp.66-68). Party leaders with long term on a leadership position are mostly associated with certain party policies. Consequently, it would be hard for them to change the party policies even they succeed it, public support, in this case, will be not guaranteed. However, new leaders could have more possibility to turn over a new leaf for the party and the acceptance of the new policies would be higher in this case. On the other hand, party leader's personality or their acceptance by the party supporters may affect the party policy shift. Leaders with higher prestige effects the acceptance of the policy shifts (Meyer, 2013, p.152-155).

Studies on this case revealed different results. For example, the study of the Harmel and Tan within five parties in the United Kingdom and Germany demonstrated that there is no interaction between policy and leadership changes (Harmel & Tan 2003, p.421). Contrary, the research of Somer-Topcu argues that when the leadership change was supported by policy shifts, it may reduce the voters' disagreement about the party positions. In this regard, Somer-Topcu uses examples of Spanish Rojas's and Obama's campaigns and concludes that in both cases leaders' intention of changes in policies openly, publicly advertised. Thus, people received more information about the new party position and this information share, creates a higher consensus about the new position of the party (Somer-Topcu, 2017, p.71). Meyer's research on ten Western European countries on the same subject demonstrates that newly elected party leaders are less likely to change the party policy. Contrary, leaders who are having longer tenure more likely to policy switches. Meyer explains this result with two reasons: First, the new leader may have a lack of resources for the policy changes. Second, old and new leaders may share the same policy preferences, therefore new leaders can be reluctant to policy changes. Additionally, Meyer concludes if party leader's prestige is high, there is a more possibility to policy shift due to the acceptance of the party leader (Meyer, 2013, pp.154-155).

Party status can be considered as a third important internal factor. Political parties mostly show different priorities in their party programs some focus on the economy, some

on environmental issues. In this regard, Meguid argues that niche parties different than mainstream parties, represent a narrow set of ideas in restricted issues while mainstream opts wider political view (Meguid, 2005, pp.347-348). For example, Green parties give priority in their party programs to issues which are relatively getting little attention from other parties, such as environmental protection and nuclear disarmament. Contrary mainstream parties represent more “catch-all” behaviors. Therefore, Ezrow and his collaborates claim that mainstream parties tend to be more compatible with average voter shifts to gain more electoral success. Yet, they stay unresponsive to the policy change of their supporters. On the other hand, niche parties like green, radical right or communist parties are more policy-oriented than short term electoral gain. Their existence related to the policies which are ignored by mainstream parties; therefore, they do not tend to shift party policies to protect their real supporters. As a result, they show less transformative position, and they tend to be in a line with electoral base (Ezrow et al., 2011).

Meyer and Wagner by challenging the scholars (Ezrow et al., 2011; Adams et al., 2006) who consider the niche parties as stationary organizations, argue that niche status of the parties are not fixed and unchangeable features. They consider these arguments of the scholars as a simplistic consideration of the party families such as Radical Right, Radical Left or Green parties. Although niche parties may pursue distinct goals, the main ambition of all parties are to be in the office. Therefore, parties may change their policies between niche and mainstream profiles, due to strategic incentives. They conclude that particularly niche parties which are small, newly established and opposition parties tend to switch their policy more according to mainstream rivals (Meyer & Wagner, 2013, p.1247). Contrary, Adams and his colleagues research on eight Western European democracies from 1976 to 1998 suggest that niche parties such as Green, Communist, and Extreme Nationalist Parties tend not to change their programs. Even they shift their policies towards central party positions then mostly they punished by voters in the ballot box. Contrary mainstream parties show more flexible attitudes towards to public opinion and they are able to change their position easily comparison to niche parties (Adams et al., 2006, p.514). On the other hand, Walgrave and Nuytemans argue that, Mainstream parties, which belongs to the traditional party families, with loosen ideological party programs tend to behave moderately to policy shifts. Smaller and nontraditional parties

with issue extremely punctuated party programs tend to behave stricter to policy changes. In this regard, the Christian-democrat parties which are covering the center position in many European countries with a less outspoken ideology they are able to switch their programs more easily. Contrary, nontraditional or niche parties like Green Parties because of their direct democratic and participatory intra party organization shows resistant to policy changes. When they aim to change their programs mostly members can veto these attempts. Additionally, they argue that niche parties with a single issue and loosen ideological connections may adopt their policy to different circumstance without any opposition (Walgrave & Nuytemans, 2009, p.199).

Another important indicator for the party position is the parties governmental status. In general, political parties considered as an office seeking organizations. Therefore, parties on government tend to protect their position and they are expected to be constant on their policies. Contrary, parties on the opposition are becoming more flexible in party policies as they need more votes to move the government. In this regard, Schumacher and his colleagues argue that when leader orientated parties excluded from the government, they likely to change their policy position or vice versa, if parties remain in government, they tend to keep their party positions which provided them success (Schumacher et al., 2013, p.467). Walgrave and Nuytemans argue that political parties which have a long history in government and parties with stable electoral results tend to keep their party programs more consistent (Walgrave & Nuytemans, 2009, p.201).

Budge (1994) states that, unlike government parties, opposition parties have strong reasons for preparing innovative and alternative programs. In this regard, opposition parties can be flexible in changing party policies as they will need to maximize their votes to take place in the government. At the same time, opposition parties because of not being in government, their control and accountability are less than the government parties, consequently, they tend to be more resilient to create new policies. On the other hand, parties in government with their policy outputs create an easy conditions for the public to compare their actions with their discourses. Therefore, their accountability becomes higher. As a result, government parties tend to increase their accountability by adhering to their programs. They also refrain from changing their party policies which brought them to office.

4.2. External Reasons

After giving information about the internal reasons that affect the party position, in this part thesis will scrutinize external reasons for the policy changes of the parties. In this regard, one of the important external factors is previous election results. In general, political parties considered as organizations to defend and disseminate certain political ideals. As the success of the parties depends on the support of the people, the desire of the political parties to produce policies that are compatible with the public opinion leads to a dilemma for the parties. In this context, new party policies which are related to public opinion can remove political parties far from their original party policies and this may cause them to lose their current support. In addition, the party's credibility may change in the eyes of party members and party donors. On the other hand, parties seek to gain more votes to survive and they tend to be in the office to implement their policies. In this regard existing research on how the elections affected the policy positions revealed different results.

For example, Somer-Topcu's research on 23 OECD democracies after the post-war period, argues that previous elections are an important indicator for the parties to understand their positions. Accordingly, elections give a real data for the public opinion and parties by analyzing these results take a position for the next elections. Research findings present that in the previous elections if the parties increased their votes, they tend to insist to determine their policies in the same direction. However, if there is a loss in votes, in this case, parties tend to change their policies on the opposite direction. Additionally, Somer-Topcu argues that the parties use past election results to determine their future policies but when time passed by after previous elections, if parties had not changed their position, they stay reluctant to policy shifts (Somer-Topcu, 2009).

In this frame, for success parties in representative democracies need to have a close linkage with public opinion. Consequently, they tend to response shifts in public thoughts. On the other hand, in order to keep their existing support, they need to stay in tune with party supporters. From this perspective, parties need to have a “trade-off between vote seeking and policy keeping” (Somer-Topcu, 2009, p.239). Therefore, election results are important for the parties for two reasons. First, elections provide real information about the public opinion and parties may determine their policies. Second,

elections give them a report about their policies and support base. If the parties observe a success according to election results, their policies tend to continue in the same way. Because, changing policy seen as a risky strategy, that may enhance the mistrust of the party members, donors, and voters. On the other hand, if there is a fail in elections parties tend to act according to public preferences. Because loss in votes, represents public expectations and thoughts are shifting away from the main party position. Therefore, parties in order to keep their future prospects alive, they need to consider those results as an important source to rearrange their party policies.

Similarly, Ezrow and his colleagues argue that mainstream parties tend to move their policy according to the results of elections. However, this policy shift is not the necessary case for niche parties due to their policy orientation (Ezrow et al., 2011, p.285). From this perspective, political parties according to Storm and Muller, tend to show three different goals and behaviors. First, parties may have “office seeking goals” to get the advantage of office benefits in this regard controlling the executive branch will provide political effectiveness and will increase the chance of being elected in the future elections. Second parties show “policy seeking behaviors” in this regard parties seek to promote their policies when these parties have a chance to be in office they tend to put public opinion on a line with their policies. Third, parties may show “vote seeking behaviors” to be in the office and spreading out their policies (Storm & Muller, 1999, pp.5-9). Accordingly, analyzes of Ezrow and his colleagues suggest that mainstream parties in Western European democracies mostly are organized in the center of the political scale with vote-maximizing attitudes. Therefore, they become more flexible to policy changes and they may adopt some policies from the left wing or right wing to their parties according to the last election results. Consequently, their supporters tend to be less reactionary to this policy shift since the party centrally located on the political scale (Ezrow et al., 2011). On the other hand, Adams and his collaborators in their research which includes eight Western European democracies had not found any evidence of party policy changes as a response to past election results. Parties that shifted their position to right or left even if they have lose the votes, they show no intention to shift their position to an opposite direction. Even if the parties gain votes in past elections, they display no tendency to keep their party policies as well (Adams et al., 2004, p.590). Similarly, one

of the early studies on the same subject offers slightly different results. According to Hermel and Janda, even elections had an impact on party policy shifts yet, this shift is not more than the effect of leadership changes in the party. Therefore, they divide probable reasons on the party policy changes into three categories. First, is the external shock, in the meaning of election defeat or loss of office, second, a leader change, lastly a shift in the prevailing faction (Hermel & Janda, 1994).

On the other hand, changes in public opinion considered by scholars as another external reason on the party policy shift (Adams et al., 2004; Hermel & Janda, 1994; Ezrow et al., 2011). In this regard, Adams and his colleagues found a correlation between changes in public opinion and policy shift of the parties. Yet, interestingly, they argue that this is not always the case, if the public opinion shifts create an obvious disadvantage for the party, then parties tend to go for policy changes that they named this change as “*Dynamics of Disadvantaged Parties*”. Accordingly, parties mostly have vote-maximizing or office-maximizing motivations when the public opinion change becomes disadvantageous for the party. For example, when the leftist parties see public opinion shift to right-wing policies, they tend to show strong initiative as a result of their vote seeking and office seeking behavior to lean more to the right-wing policies. Because party elites realize that policy shift is the only chance for winning office or gaining votes for the party. On the other hand, if the effect of the public opinion change has no big disadvantage on party Hermel and Janda argue that parties tend to stay solid on their policy position (Hermel & Janda, 1994). In this regard, Ezrow and his collaborator argue that niche parties are more reluctant to public opinion changes than mainstream parties. Their research did not find strong evidence of the public opinion shift on the party policy change (Ezrow et al., 2011, pp.286-287). This result cannot be the reasons of policy-orientation and long-term strategical determinations rather than short-term electoral success. But also it can be derived from the activists domination of the parties which they show strong ideological connections than other parties (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011; Schumacher, et al., 2013).

In some cases policy changes in the rival parties effects the opponent parties policies as well, in this regard in their research of 25 democracies of the post-war period Adams and Somer-Topcu argue that political parties have a tendency to change their

policies in the direction of the opponent party in which had some policy changes in previous elections. Particularly, political parties tend to change their policies as a response to policy changes of the parties which they see ideologically close to them (Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009, p.826). In this context, Conservative parties tend to change their policy regarding policy switch of Christian Democrats. Communist parties tend to do the same accordance to Socialist rivals. Contrary, Budge argues that when parties had limited information about opponent's policy position, they tend to maintain differentiation between themselves and ideological rivals. Consequently, parties aim to choose a distinctive position that gives them an advantage against ideological rivals (Budge, 1994, p. 461).

Lastly, scholars argue that global economic changes affect the party policies. In this regard, Adams and his colleagues argue that especially parties from central and right-wing positions tend to adapt their party policies more to global economic changes than left-wing opponents (Adams et al., 2009, p.627). It can be three reasons for this. First, leftist parties are having more policy seeking behaviors than right-wing opponents and as being more policy-oriented they show limited to response and they tend to be less reactionary to the policy shift. Second, leftist parties are more activist-oriented organizations. Most of the European leftist parties like the Labor Party in the UK, Social Democrats in Sweden and Germany have direct linkage with labor unions. Consequently, if leftist parties move away from their main party policy, they risk losing connection with their electoral base. Therefore, they stay reluctant to policy shift regarding global economic changes. Third, leftist parties have more distinctive party organizations that can be classified as mass parties. Contrary right-wing parties show more catch-all behaviors. As being a mass organizational party, leftist parties are more member centered and connected to social groups. As a result, they tend to behave according to expectations of the party base (Adams et al., 2009, pp.615-616). In a similar case, Ward and collaborators proved that when the globalization is more diffused to a country the more parties will be lean on to the right wing of the political system. Because, more open and liberal policies will be needed to benefit from globalization, therefore parties which prepare policy in this direction will be strengthened their support (Ward et al., 2011).

As a result of all these debates, it would be hard to expect from all political parties to take the same position under the same consequences. Political parties are not a stationary organization, they strategically seek to ensure the maximization of the peoples' support or they just simply seek to represent some policies through their own systematic negotiation processes. Consequently, parties do not respond in a similar manner to changes in their peripheries. In this context, studies reveal that in many cases parties showed different behaviors on the policy changes. For example, the parties with strong leadership represent a more flexible attitude to policy changes yet, if they are in government for a long time then they became more robust to changes. In the light of these discussions, when the UKIP is considered the first thing about the party that appears is the niche character of it. As discussed on party positions, niche parties are organizations that are expected to perform differently than mainstream parties because of their size and party organizations. In this context, in the next section thesis will scrutinize the UKIP's party position.

4.3. UKIP's Party Position

Existing literature represents relatively new and small parties which behave different than mainstream parties and demonstrates a distinct political view as niche parties. These parties mostly bring about the subjects which are underestimated by mainstream counterparts, like environmental issues, regional issues, and radical right or left thoughts (Meguid, 2005). In this regard, UKIP with its distinct political view mostly underlines the negative effects of EU membership on the economy, on state sovereignty. On the other hand, UKIP tends to show the effects of immigration on job markets, on British culture and on criminal justice by representing immigration as the biggest single issue of Britain. In this respect, Lynch argues that UKIP can be considered as a niche party in the British and European politics which built its party policy on issues like Euroscepticism and anti-immigration, neglected by mainstream parties (Lynch et al., 2011).

In general, scholars consider niche parties as policy-oriented parties rather than having an office and vote-seeking behaviors (Ezrow, 2011; Adams et al., 2006). As a result of their policy orientation, niche parties' willingness to change their policy seems

limited. Because, when they shift their position towards to median voter they can be considered as “selling out” or “trading off” the main policy and they would risk to lose their supporters, donors and party activists. Adams and his collaborates research by proving this assumption argue that when niche parties change their party position, voters tend to penalize them in the ballot box (Adams et al., 2006). The main concern of the niche parties are preserving their electoral support in the long term, while mainstream parties are more short-term-oriented. Therefore, niche parties may show less response to the shift in public opinion in the short term to stay loyal to their supporters. Additionally, party organizations of the niche parties are smaller and more horizontal in comparison to mainstream party organizations. This organization features of the niche parties encourage more participatory and active membership (Ezrow et al., 2011). Therefore, it is not likely to go into policy changes at the niche parties, which focus on party membership and the participation of party members to the policy-making process.

Han evaluates the niche parties in a different way and argues that niche parties have a different level of nicheness. In this regard, some niche parties like Green and Radical Right and Left parties are more ideology oriented, and hard for them to switch their party policy. Contrary, some niche parties that we may include the UKIP in this category are more issue-oriented. These parties are more responsive to public opinion and they may switch their policies easier than other niche parties (Han, 2018). Therefore, no need to expect similar behavior from all niche parties. Relatedly, UKIP as the thesis will show in order to keep its supporter base and enhance its support tend to build other issues on their main issue Euroscepticism, which makes them more flexible to change their policies according to public preferences.

On the other hand, Schumacher and his colleagues underline very important differentiation in the niche parties. In this regard, ecologists and radical parties are mostly activists dominated. However, niche parties with nationalist tendencies are more leadership dominated. Therefore, it is unlikely to consider them into the same category with ecologist and green parties (Schumacher et al., 2013, p.470). From the same point of view UKIP considered by scholars as leader oriented right-wing populist party, (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Clark et al., 2016). UKIP mostly benefited from the charisma of the Farage. As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) mentioned charismatic

leadership in populist parties may bring momentum and ends the possible intraparty cleavages. Similarly, UKIP experienced these debates until Farage consolidate his power in the party. Another important indicator for the effect of the Farage in UKIP is the 2017 general elections. After Farage's departure from the UKIP party was unable to protect its public support in previous elections and received only 2.1% votes. For sure this cannot be the only explanation for failure in the elections. But, no need to underestimate his personality and ability to shift party policy to the wider ground that attracted many people to the party. In this regard, it would be very logical to argue that Farage's leadership and his policy shift from a single issue to more mainstream policies brought success for the party especially in the EP elections. Hereof, the arguments of Walgrave and Nuytemans about single issue niche parties fit for the UKIP. Party easily expanded its policy with liberal arguments (Walgrave & Nuytemans, 2009) by offering low taxing and less control on markets. As a result, UKIP is attracted more supporter from the unsatisfied Conservatives (Tournier-Sol, 2015). From a different perspective when we considered the 2017 elections, UKIP, in order to get more support, tends to offer more mainstream promises yet, this attempt as Adams and his collaborates mentioned punished by the fundamental supporters of the party (Adams et al., 2006).

UKIP as Taggart (2000) mentioned show diverse ideological features in party policy, yet Euroscepticism likely to stay as a main feature of the party. UKIP tends to increase its support by building other issues on the EU. Therefore, when the UKIP's policy, which is based on Euroscepticism is questioned especially during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, it is expected to perceive the increase in the discourse of general will (popular sovereignty) beside the anti-European emphasis.

Because, although there are still supranational and intergovernmental debates about the functioning of the EU. Generally, scholars argue that with the ratification of the Maastricht the importance of the supranational rule is increased. To represent this expansion even scholars argue that European Community converted to "Union". In particular, after the Lisbon Treaty, the EP as a supranational institution of the EU has almost reached an equal level with the Council on the decision-making process (Goebel, 2013; Bradbury, 2009). As a result, the increasing supranational influence in the decision-making process is expected to increase the debates on national sovereignty in the member

states. Therefore, the first hypothesis argues that;

H1 During the ratification period of Lisbon Treaty Farage's populist speeches will have concerns based on "General Will" beside the Anti-EU rhetorics.

Especially after 2010, British society faced with new challenges: Economic stagnation after Eurozone financial crises, rising immigration from Eastern Europe were creating more pressure on labor markets. Additionally, after the civil war in Syria, a significant number of refugees from the Middle East who are ethnically, culturally and religiously different arrived to Europe. This wave of migration perceived as a threat and added cultural concerns besides the economical one (Gietel-Basten, 2016, p.676). Moreover, terrorist attacks in different European cities created fear and xenophobic feelings towards the refugees. As a result, hostility has become more common in British society. Farage took advantage of those feelings and successfully exploited existing dissatisfaction with his exaggerated discourses. In this regard, Farage in the EP during the debates about negotiations with Turkey on the refugees, argues that "this dream of the free movement of people, it has meant the free movement of Kalashnikov rifles. It has meant the free movement of terrorists, and it has meant the free movement of jihadists" (Independent, 2015). Thus, UKIP adopted more nationalist discourses into their 2015 manifestos like, "British jobs for British workers and quota for immigration" (UKIP, 2015). Yet, like Budge's (1994) argument UKIP by drawing a distinct position from Nationalist BNP, represents moderate policy shift not to lose their main supporters and they aim to create an advantage over rivals. Another reason for the policy shift of the UKIP as Somer-Topcu mentioned (2009) is the electoral achievement of the party in the past 2014 EP elections. That success encouraged the party to be more aggressive in the same way that brought many chairs in EP. As a result, especially during the Brexit referendum, immigration and nationalist discourses became the main topic for leave campaigners. In general, it is thought that discussions should focus on more anti-EU themes, which is the main policy of the UKIP. However, it is thought that the increasing nationalist discourses in this period should be reflected in Farage's speeches as well. Therefore, for the second hypothesis, I argue that:

H2 During the referendum period of the British exit from the EU, it is necessary to observe a rise on "people orientation" (Nationalism) on the discourses of the Farage.

Although the discussions in this period are expected to be focused on Anti-EU and nationalist themes. It will be essential to see, how the weak ideological connection of UKIP allows the party to switch their policy loosely. On the other hand, the reorganization of the populist rhetoric based on nationalism, xenophobia, and fear which UKIP has established upon the main party policy, pushed the country to cope with harder political problems. Therefore, we may argue that the populist ideologies if had a chance to rule or had a chance to affect the ruling politicians, it can cause problems on the administration which would be very hard to deal with it. In this regard, in the next section, the historical development of the UKIP will be examined, to understand the basis and the formation of the UKIP's populist policies.

CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKIP

UKIP as a voice of Euroscepticism in the UK is established in 1993 during the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. UKIP's trace can track back to Anti-Federalist League, a cross-party group formed in 1991 to represent the opposition to the Maastricht Treaty. Founder of the Anti-Federalist League Alan Sked, a professor in the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) also was the member of the Bruges Group in its early 1990s. Later he inspired some members of his political group and created a political party, called UKIP (Usherwood, 2008; Lynch et al., 2011, p.736).

From its foundation, the main goal of the party was the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, and this remains as a reason d'être of the UKIP. Even, UKIP does offer policies across a range of other issues including health, education, immigration and taxation, all of these are linked to the question of EU membership (Hayton, 2010, pp. 27-28). As expected from the newly established single-issue party, in the first years of its establishment UKIP didn't show any success in national and EP elections. Due to lack of professionalism and political experience in the party management, lack of financial source and supporter for the campaigns. Therefore, UKIP tend to send their messages through television broadcasts (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, p.42). Additionally, UKIP suffered from internal policy differences and constant leadership changes as well (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009).

Six years after its establishment at 1999, on elections of EP, UKIP won three seats. UKIP increased its votes to 16% in 2004, became the second party in the UK. Yet, as time goes by, the UKIP which is related to a single issue began to face the dilemma. Politically while they are aiming to maintain their support, at the same time party wishes to advance and expand their representations on wider issues to bring more supporters. However, if they go far beyond from their main roots and to make inferences about other

issues, they would risk to lose current supporters of the party (Usherwood, 2008). This dilemma caused internal ideological disagreements as a result party changed its leader many times. However, between 2006-2009 Nigel Farage became a leader of the UKIP, his ability to express himself as a British common man who is in tune with the beliefs and concerns of the people improved the popularity of the party (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p.36). Nigel Farage as a new face of the party brought another success for the next EP election at 2009 and UKIP received 16.5% of the votes with 9 seats. After the EP elections, Nigel Farage stepped down from the leadership of the UKIP in order to focus on his personal campaign for the 2010 general election. His ambition to win a seat in House of Commons did not happen then he reelected as party leader in November 2010 (Sutcliffe, 2012, p.120). In the second term of the Nigel Farage, UKIP tends to change its own political stance from a single-issue party to a broader view in order to gain more support in general elections. With Farage party went through some changes and broaden up its political base from a single-issue party to wider political ground by offering some liberal and nationalist policies, such as flat tax, opposition to identity cards and freezing the immigration for five years. Besides these new arguments party build populist criticism over the mainstream parties. This new anti-establishment narrative of the Farage depicted three major parties of the UK as the same and no difference between them. He called them a “*Lib/Lab/Consensus*” and blamed them for ignoring the concerns of the people about the EU and immigration (Lynch, et al., 2011).

These new tactics of Farage finally worked and in the last EP elections, UKIP became first in the UK with 26.77% of votes and won 24 seats in EP at 2014. In the national election at 2015, UKIP reached the highest level of support in their history by 12.6% vote rate which made them as a third voted party in the UK. Yet, they won only one seat at House of Commons as a result of first past the post system. However, in general elections in comparison to EP elections, UKIP had poor performance, in 1997 elections they received just 0.3 percent, in 2001, 1.5 percent, 2005, 2.3 percent, 2010, 3.2 percent. In the last general elections in 2017, UKIP received just 1.8 percent vote.

This distinction between European Elections and General Elections considered by some scholars as an indicator of the two different supporter groups of the UKIP. On one hand, “*strategic*” supporters who had voted for UKIP at European Elections and on

the other hand “*core*” supporters who kept their support to UKIP at general elections. Strategic supporters are those who generally vote for the Conservatives yet to show their discontent towards the EU policies for EP elections switched their preferences to UKIP. Core supporters are the group who are indigent, working class, and the deeply dissatisfied groups, more similar to the supporters of the British National Party (BNP) and the other radical right-wing parties of Europe (Ford, et al., 2012, p.206).

Increasing support of UKIP in the last ten years took the attention of the scholars on the reason for the populist surge of UKIP. Time series analyses of Clarke and his colleagues revealed that, opposition to EU membership and anti-immigration discourses have been important drivers of UKIP support. Accordingly, anti-EU attitudes and support of mainstream parties to British membership to the EU are the factors that they were increasing the vote intentions to the UKIP. Another factor that was boosting the support of the UKIP was the general dissatisfaction about the performance of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition (Clarke, et al., 2016, p.149). Tournier-Sol's research on the survey of the “YouGov” reveals that the main motivation of British voters who claim to vote for UKIP is the immigration. UKIP has successfully bound concerns on immigration with its core policy on withdrawal from the EU and they use it as a main driver of the party support. Besides concerns on immigration second important reason for the support of UKIP is leaving the EU and the third important factor that UKIP attracted people is dissatisfaction to mainstream parties. Tournier-Sol considers all these reasons as traditional populist policies, which are articulated under the leadership of Farage. In this frame, she argues that the supporters of the party are influenced by populist policies of the Farage and these populist claims were played an important role on the rise of UKIP (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p. 151).

In short, UKIP in order to increase its support and to reach more voters, combined the Euroscepticism with populist themes. In this regard, UKIP by increasing the emphasis on anti-establishment rhetorics aim to attract dissatisfied voters of the mainstream parties. Additionally, by using another populist rhetoric of general will tend to represent the EU as an organization which is restricting to the emergence of the people’s sovereign. Lastly, UKIP by using nationalist ideas, takes a position as a defender of the identity and culture of British people. In this regard, UKIP demonstrates immigration as the biggest single

issue in Britain. Especially during the Brexit referendum period party put a strong emphasis on immigration and its effect on British culture and economy. Therefore, Ford and his collaborates argue that the supporter profile of the UKIP can be identified by their hostility to the immigration, their discontent from EU integration and their disaffection with the mainstream political parties (Ford et al., 2012, p.206).

UKIP's strong message on immigration creates a tendency to see the UKIP as an extremist right-wing populist party (Lochocki, 2018) or as a polite alternative to BNP (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p.151). Yet, UKIP's discourses mostly based on a single issue which is Euroscepticism. Additionally, in their manifestos almost has no marks of extreme nationalist discourses. Moreover, UKIP after reaching their main promise of withdrawal from the EU could not keep, its support in the 2017 elections, their votes dropped from 12% to 2.1% in national elections. This can be the indicator of the party's great emphasis on the EU and its ideological weakness. Therefore, it is hard to consider UKIP as an extreme right-wing or alternative to BNP. In contrast, UKIP differentiates itself from the ethnic nationalism which based on "blood and soil", rather the UKIP tends to create a sense of civic nationalism. On the other hand, UKIP priorities the British culture by opposing multiculturalism and aiming to create a single British culture by melting all races and religions in one pot (March, 2017, p.17). In this regard, the ideological weakness of the UKIP allows them to unite many different aspects around the EU such as uncontrolled immigration, financial crises, terror actions. This allows the UKIP to reach different voters with diverse preferences.

Research on the increasing support of UKIP generally argues that there is a transition from Conservative party voters to UKIP due to the fact that the reform movements in the Conservative party is weakened the party's connection with its roots. Especially on the issues which are related to the EU, there was a significant contention between the party leader and MP's (Lynch & Whitaker, 2013, p.305). Additionally, Cameron's initiatives of modernization created an inconvenience among traditional Conservative voters (Bale, 2018). All these concerns paved the way for UKIP to get the attention of dissatisfied Conservative supporters (Lynch, 2015, p.187) and draw its support from the traditional Conservative vote base, especially middle-aged, financially insecure men (Ford et al., 2012, p.206). In short, the UKIP is often seen as an alternative

voice of the people and especially as an alternative to the Conservative party. When Tory supporters are not satisfied with party policies such as European integration and migration, they tend to use protest vote for the UKIP in European elections because of its second order nature.

Additionally, scholars argue that UKIP's motivation based on three different issues. First one is hard Euroscepticism that opposes Britain's EU membership. Second is the strong opposition to immigration and concern about its effects on the British economy and society. And the third one is the dissatisfaction with established politics in Westminster and how the established parties have managed immigration and the 2008 financial crisis (Ford & Goodwin, 2014). These arguments can be considered as a reflection of the populist policies of the UKIP, in the next section, the thesis will be examining these arguments in the frame of anti-establishment, general will and people.

5.1. Populist Justification of the UKIP

As mentioned before in previous sections populism is difficult concept to have an consensus on. For the identification of the concept scholars provided different contributions to populist literature. Yet there is a general consensus about the minimum definition which is provided by Mudde. Accordingly, populism has three defining elements: Anti-establishment, general will and people orientation. In the next chapter, the thesis will shed light on the populist identity of the UKIP by taking a closer look to the party's discourses.

5.1.1. UKIP's Anti-Establishment (Euroscepticism)

Hostility towards European integration is not a new phenomenon just introduced by UKIP on British political debates. As the study mentioned before Euroscepticism has a strong root in the UK. It has been expressed by both Conservatives and Labor parties since Britain became a member of the EU. Especially, during the debates on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in parliament, some members of the Conservative party have represented their objections about the loss of sovereign in the decision-making process. Similarly, between 1997-2000 the Labor party government have represented their objection to the EU for domination of big businesses within the development of the

European market beside the sovereignty debates (Sutcliffe, 2012, p.112). Yet, in last two decades, it can be argued that UKIP has become the most prominent representative of the existing Euroscepticism in the UK.

UKIP was created as a single-issue party that aimed to the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. This policy constitutes the very *raison d'être* of the party (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p.142; Sutcliffe, 2012, p.114; Usherwood, 2008). As being a hard-Eurosceptic party, UKIP strongly opposes the EU and its institutions. In this regard, UKIP's party constitution in article 2 states that "main aim of the party is the withdrawal of the UK from the EU in order that the UK shall again be governed by laws made to suit its own needs by its own Parliament, which must be directly and solely accountable to the electorate of the UK" (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009, p.6). Hence, the anti-establishment discourses of the party include a strong Euroscepticism, and it is almost integrated into the party.

Especially after 2010 UKIP was successfully tied many issues on the theme of the EU. As a result, the EU is perceived as a threat to the British nation. UKIP by highlighting issues like the costs of the EU membership, criminal justice, immigration, agriculture and fisheries policies (Lynch et al., 2011, p.734) and biding them with the EU opposition tends to increase its support. In general, UKIP does not tend to rely on only socio-economic issues and materialistic values as the traditional parties of the UK do (most notably the Conservatives and Labour) additionally, they prioritize sociocultural issues and post-materialist identity values as well. That puts them in a status of catch-all parties and as a catch-all attitude, UKIP received a great deal of attention in domestic politics. Especially during the Farage period, this attitude became more evident (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p.152). This attention comes to UKIP, not only from Eurosceptic conservatives and nationalist voters but also from the dissatisfied working-class labor voters that they see themselves as a losers of globalization.

However, Euroscepticism always stays as a central pillar for the UKIP that they build other issues on it. In their discourses UKIP mostly claims that the membership of the EU is causing many limitations and threats to Britain especially on the economy, on the national sovereignty, and on the national identity. Especially in the last decade party

was very successful to combine the immigration with the EU policies. In this respect, Farage very often claims immigration as a “biggest single issue facing this country” (BBC, 2013). Accordingly, UKIP claims that Britain “can never control immigration while we continue to be a member of the European Union” (UKIP, 2015). Furthermore, for UKIP the EU membership is increasing the number of immigrants in the country and causing more burden on the country in terms of economy. In this regard, UKIP states that “Under EU rules, anyone in the EU can come to the UK and live, claim welfare and government services they have not contributed to” (UKIP, 2014). On the other hand, “mass immigration has coincided with soaring youth unemployment and stagnant wages that have not kept pace with the cost of living” (UKIP, 2014). These statements reveal that the UKIP evaluates the economic problems of Britain in the framework of EU membership and in fact UKIP demonstrates migration as a root cause of all these problems. In short, UKIP was very successful to integrate the migration which is a very high salient issue of the last decade with their single-issue Euroscepticism (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p.146). By doing so, UKIP benefited from deep-rooted British Euroscepticism and immigration issues and broaden up its support. The UKIP is generally engaged in politics by stating that the political, economic and legal structure of the UK has changed as a result of the EU's intervention. Moreover, party focus on the effects of these changes on the life of the British people. In this frame, the EU is represented by UKIP as “a bureaucratic organization writing our laws and costing us all £55 million per day in membership fees” (UKIP, 2014).

Additionally, UKIP shows anti-establishment attitudes in domestic politics as well. In domestic politics UKIP by representing itself as a protector of the ordinary British people claiming that the professional politicians of the major parties who have allowed, and continue to allow the corrupt foreign organization to run Britain, is destroying the British national sovereignty. Furthermore, UKIP mostly argues that legislation which is created from Brussels, bring additional economic burden to British citizens. Moreover, UKIP by opposing the integration process, claims that EU policies brought many immigrants to the UK who are threatening British culture, exploiting the welfare system and reducing the opportunities for the British workers in the job market. In this frame UKIP argue that “If you believe that we are big enough to make our own laws, in our

own parliament; if you believe we should have the sovereign right to control our own borders; if you believe that we should be fiscally responsible, and stop adding to our national debts and expecting our children and grandchildren to pay the bill, then we are the party for you” (UKIP, 2015).

UKIP shows anti-establishment character in national and international politics. Similarly, Abedi and Lundberg argue that UKIP is an Anti-Political Establishment (APE) party. Accordingly, party fulfills three criteria offered by them. First, UKIP as being an outsider challenges the status quo. Second, UKIP shows contention to the parties which composed the political establishment and lastly, UKIP claims that there is a fundamental division between the political establishment and the people (Abedi & Lundberg, 2009, p.5). In this context, UKIP can be regarded as a prominent example of the APE party due to its opposition the EU and it's a challenge the status quo by claiming the members of the mainstream parties are distant from people and seeking their personal goals greater objective than national interests. In this context, Farage regularly states “Frankly, you can't put a cigarette paper between them and that is why there are nine million people who don't vote now in general elections that did back in 1992” (BBC, 2006). Consequently, for Farage mainstream parties are having no policy differences and they are unable to produce new policies, as a result of these circumstances depoliticization is spreading out in the UK. Furthermore, by representing his party as a real alternative Farage argues “if you have a feeling that successive governments were no longer representing the will of the British people. Now, there is something to vote for” (UKIP, 2015). In this context, the UKIP is aiming to arouse an interest to the fact that mainstream parties and ruling elites are far from being responsive and failing to create policies for the public concerns (Lynch et al., 2011, p.755). In this way, UKIP tends to represent itself as an organization of ordinary British people who understands the concern of them. Similarly, in the rhetorics of Farage mainstream parties are presented as composed of professional politicians, who are very far to understand ordinary British citizens. In this context, Farage claims that “They [mainstream politicians] all look the same, and sound the same - They all go to the same schools, the same Oxbridge colleges. None of them ever had a job in the real world and not one of them is in politics for principle” (BBC, 2013). Additionally, UKIP promise about abolishing House of Lords which is not

functioning for the people, and “stuffed with party donors and fundraisers, ex-MPs, and favored former employees” (UKIP, 2017).

To conclude, Populist rhetorics of UKIP on anti-establishment tend to use strong antagonism that divides the British community into two sections as national/international elites and ordinary British citizens. On one hand, national elites demonstrated by UKIP as members of the mainstream parties who lost their touch with people, goal seeking, professional politicians. International elites are the members or cooperates of the EU organization. In this frame, the EU is represented by UKIP as an undemocratic, technocratic organization composed of unelected bureaucrats with heavy law enforcement on the state. On the other hand, ordinary people suffer from the rule of national and international elites. In this regard, UKIP by using fundamental division of the populist idea “ordinary people vs. establishment or elites” represents itself with anti-establishment rhetorics. Thus, UKIP offers an opportunity to ordinary British citizens to be represented in politics, by promoting itself different than national and international elites as a party of amateurs who understands the concerns of the ordinary citizens. Thus, UKIP tends to benefit from anti-establishment arguments by designing their discourses in a simplistic and efficient way. This construction makes the party to reach a large supporter base which is fundamentally suppressed by the establishment.

5.1.2. UKIP's General Will

One of the important pillars of the populist rhetorics of UKIP is the defense of democracy. In this regard, the party strongly oppose the EU which is considered as an organization with a weak electorate connection and far from the representation of people's will. In UKIP's perspective, democracy can only appear at the national level, supranational democracy is the created or fantasized idea of the EU that can be never reached. Because only the nation-state can offer prerequisite conditions for the democracy which are joint society and collective ideas in it. Contrary in the European level there is no cultural bonds and collective thoughts. From this perspective, in the rhetorics of the UKIP, the EU's insist about supranational level democracy mostly presented as a failing attempts. In this regard, UKIP underlines the lack of European “demos” and criticizes the EU as being only “kratos” (Hawkins, 2010) and claim that the

EU without people's support in the decision-making process is losing its legitimacy.

In the discourses of the UKIP, the EU mostly emerges as super-state which is reducing the diverse political interests of the member states into a single political entity. Thus, the EU considered as foreign power over the general will of people, which makes legislation for the whole Europe with a lack of popular legitimacy. UKIP by depicting itself as a defender of the democracy, claims that the only way to bring the power of the people back to Westminster from Brussels is to leave the political unity. In this regard during the Brexit campaigns, Farage was often claiming “the leaving would mean that we would be taking back control. That those we elect as MPs would be the ones who make and decide our laws, rather than a bunch of unelected old men in Brussels who most people cannot name and who we cannot vote for or remove” (Independent, 2016a).

Another allegation of UKIP that regularly repeats about the EU is the British democracy became a surrender of the illegitimate rule of the EU. In this frame UKIP argue that British people had not consulted about the full meaning of EU membership and they thought that UK had signed on a free trade deal (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p.142). Accordingly, the EU considered undemocratic because it has never confirmed by people in a democratic way, therefore it has no legitimacy to rule the UK. In this regard, UKIP argues that “Back in 1972, we were told we were joining a common market. What we actually joined was a supranational political union. We have lost our rights of self-government in the stealth creation of a United States of Europe” (UKIP, 2015).

UKIP does not only question the democratic legitimacy of the EU also it gives strong emphasis to democracy in domestic affairs as well. Accordingly, UKIP gives great emphasis on referendums and direct elections (Lynch & Whitaker, 2013, p.295). As a result of this thought, UKIP represents itself as, how Canovan defines the populists “real democrats”, expressing the voice of popular grievances and opinions which were ignored by governments and mainstream parties. Their main purpose is to gain support from the promise of democracy “power to people”. Therefore, they favor “direct democracy” and decision-making process by referendums and popular initiatives (Canovan, 1999, p.2). Similarly, Farage promotes his party that aims to restore the power of the people by having direct involvement to policy making with referendums. In this regard, Farage argues that “by giving people the chance to call a major national referendum or sack a

rotten MP, people might feel more empowered and more favorable to government and what they are doing” (The Guardian, 2014). Here in this speech Farage while defending pluralist democracy using traditional populist conflict between ordinary people and corrupt elites and opposing the elite based feature of the parliament. Additionally, UKIP by representing the importance of the participation in their latest manifesto offers citizens initiatives that allows citizens to influence legislature directly, by giving them “the power to initiate a binding referendum on the issues of most importance to them” (UKIP, 2017). Furthermore, UKIP claims that “House of Lords has no legitimacy” (LBC, 2018) and they offer to create a new chamber to replace the House of Lords which will have members from the people who have served in public service for a long period of time.

All in all, UKIP put a strong emphasis on democracy and demonstrate itself as a defender of the general will. By relating their promises with independent self-governing democracy claims, they tend to create a legitimate background for themselves. In this frame, UKIP mostly questions the democratic legitimacy of the EU and represents it as an obstacle to national sovereignty. For UKIP, the EU is an undemocratic organization, because the policy-making mechanism of the EU composes of unelected bureaucrats. Therefore, UKIP stresses the necessity of leaving the EU to regain national sovereignty back. On the other hand, in nation wise, the party emphasizes the importance of applying referendums to ensure the people's sovereignty. Moreover, the function of the House of Lords criticizes by the party to a great extent. UKIP claims that the composition of the House of Lords does not reflect the general will of the people since they are not elected. Yet, House of Lords has a great influence on policy outcomes. According to UKIP, two institutions (EU and House of Lords) compose of unelected members and they do not reflect the will of the people. Therefore, they have weak commitments to democracy. In this regard, UKIP argues that, in order to establish the general will of the British people, these two institutions must be abolished. Then the general will of the people may emerge.

5.1.3. UKIP's People Orientation

In general, people on the populists' rhetorics appear differently depending on the populists' political view. According to Canovan, people used by populists in three different ways, people as united, people as blood bonded and finally people who are

exploited or underestimated (Canovan, 1999). In the discourses of the UKIP, people appear in two ways: The First one is the people as united in which they see the EU as a threat to national unity and sovereignty. Secondly, people used by UKIP as an ethnic expression as equivalent to heartland or how Kaltwasser says “*imagined communities*” (Kaltwasser, 2014). From this perspective, discourses on nativism and national identity were used by UKIP as an important tool to oppose the immigrants. Similarly, scholars who are conducting researches on UKIP almost with consensus argue that the party was very successful combine two issues Euroscepticism and immigration to increase their support (Whitaker & Lynch, 2011; Hughes, 2019; Geddes, 2014).

According to UKIP, as a result of the UK's commitment to the EU for free movement of the people, the country has become unable to protect its borders. Therefore, in their discourses beside the withdrawal from the EU, reducing the number of immigrations appears as an another important goal of the party. In this regard, the immigration highlighted as a “biggest election issue of all” and mostly related with unemployment, housing and public services such as education and the national health care system (Tournier-Sol, 2015).

Relevant to this matter when the latest manifesto of the UKIP examined it can be seen that, UKIP in order to reduce the immigration party offers Migration Control Commission with five years ban for immigration. Additionally, UKIP offers Australian style point system that would allow the UK to choose skilled migrants. On the other hand UKIP offers to ban the wearing of the niqab and the burqa in public places. Furthermore, in the fields of work and housing, UKIP tends to prioritize British citizens and tend to offer “native people more job opportunities, rather than foreigners” and affordable houses for British citizens (UKIP, 2017).

In general, UKIP's position about nativism can be described as a civic nationalism and party especially avoids ethnic nationalism in their manifestos. UKIP by making a clear line with BNP tends to avoid criticism based on extreme nationalism and aims to benefit from the concerns on increasing immigration in British society through non-fanatical discourses. Farage also makes it clear their distinction from extremist BNP and argue “Indeed, we are the only party in Britain who have banned former BNP members from joining our party. UKIP is a free-thinking, egalitarian party opposed to racism,

sectarianism, and extremism” (Channel 4, 2013).

However, it is possible to track some xenophobic and nationalist thoughts in their public discourses. UKIP especially in order to mobilize peoples' support tend to use migrants as a threat to the nation, economically and culturally. In this regard, on the discourses of UKIP immigrants are reflected as a threat for different reasons. First, in the discourses of UKIP immigrants can be seen as “dangerous others” related with a crime. In this regard, Farage argues that, British people are “experiencing a Romanian crime wave” (Independent, 2013). Second, immigrants presented as a group that is taking the job opportunities as cheaper labor force and “soaring the unemployment and stagnating the wages” (UKIP, 2014). Third, for UKIP immigrants are exploiting the national health care and welfare systems. Therefore, UKIP offer before “migrants come to the UK must show proof of health insurance as a condition of entry to the UK” (UKIP, 2014). Lastly, for UKIP the growing number of immigrants are creating a threat to British culture. In this regard, Farage claims that already “UK has become unrecognizable due to the impact of mass immigration over the past decade” (BBC, 2014). On the other hand, UKIP by using the anxieties over the terrorist acts and violence tends to increase their support and relating migrants from the Middle East with terrorism. In this regard Farage argues that “Frankly, if you open your door to uncontrolled immigration from Middle Eastern countries, you are inviting in terrorism” (Independent, 2017).

Furthermore, UKIP has made significant contributions to the UK's exit from the EU by increasing the doubts on immigration in the British society with exaggerated messages before the Brexit vote (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2016). In this regard, Farage by aiming to increase doubts about immigration in British society very often represents the Turkey as a potential member of the EU. The possible impact of Turkey's geographic position, population, culture, religion, and economy to Europe mostly used in the speeches of Farage. Accordingly, Farage argues that “most worrying of all, it is now clear that Turkey will be fast-tracked into membership of the European Union. [Brexit] Referendum on June 23rd will become a referendum on whether we wish to be in a political union with Turkey” (Independent, 2016b).

In conclusion UKIP by relating the populist concept of the people with nativism tend to reach apprehensive voters about the rising immigration. Additionally, UKIP tends

to use migration and its effects on the British economy, culture, and identity. In this regard, UKIP describes the native people of Britain who are suffering from foreigners in the labor market and represents the immigrants as a threat to national values. Therefore, UKIP plays anti-immigration cards, even in some cases their behaviors become xenophobic. All in all, people orientation which is one of the decisive criteria for the populist identification of the parties appears in the discourses of the UKIP as well. In UKIP's narratives, people presented as natives of Britain who are under the threat of foreign influx. As mentioned before this danger does not only derives from economical concerns, additionally, according to UKIP cultural, social and traditional values of the British nation is under the threat as well. UKIP successfully binding these anxieties with the single issue of the party Euroscepticism and creates a “fusion strategy” (Ford & Goodwin, 2014 p.282). Furthermore, as a defender of the British nation, UKIP offers the withdrawal of the UK from the EU as a solution to all these problems.

After giving information about theoretical background for the study and populist justification of the UKIP, in next chapter thesis will focus on design of research, main finding and discussions.

CHAPTER SIX

MAIN FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

The focus of this thesis will be on addressing the following research questions: (i) How are the populist discourses of UKIP framed on the supranational character of the EU? (ii) How volatile are the populist discourses of UKIP? To address these two research questions, this thesis will rely on content analysis. The study will examine the populist speeches framed by Nigel Farage in EP plenaries 3 months before and after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. This time period is selected since it represents an increase in the supranational characteristics of the EU. To compare the changes within UKIP's populist discourse, the thesis also will examine the speeches of Nigel Farage that he delivered in EP in 3 months period before and after the Brexit referendum, which fueled widespread anti-European populist discourses.

Because of UKIP's leadership-oriented political understanding, the speeches of Nigel Farage as a party leader will be analyzed. There are three reasons for the reliance on plenary speeches besides the fact that it provides rich written records for researchers. First, it provides an open scene for populists to target local politicians and other MEPs, which they hold responsible for transferring the people's sovereignty and rights. Second, EP allows populists to receive a level of visibility and media attention, who suffer disproportionate media coverages. Third, in relation to the second one, the party can send messages across to the electorate as they represent their concerns in the EP.

Even though many scholars describe populism with a different meaning, this thesis will rely on the Mudde's (2004) definition, which gives populism three components. In a similar subject, previous studies have used "people centrism" and "Eurocepticism" as important indicators of populism (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011;

Bonikowski & Gidron, 2015). In addition to the current literature for operationalization, this thesis will extensively use three distinctive components of populism: people centrism, general will, and antagonism.

In general, “people centrism” in populist literature represents shared traditions and racial integrity. Therefore, nationalism, which is an important element of populist rhetoric, is expressed by people centrism. “General will,” the second component in the populist genre, refers to the people as a collective and sees them essentially as having one will, which allows populists to come up with an idea that is good for everyone, which is against the pluralist understanding of liberal democracy. In other words, according to populist understanding, general will refers to the decline of people’s sovereignty (representation) and aims to increase people’s voice and participation. Yet it wants to do so by seeing society as a homogeneous whole. Populists claim that “lack of representation” and “democratic deficit” will be addressed by using “general will.” Finally, populists build a dichotomy to make political claims, and they divide the political ground into two. On one side are “the ordinary people,” while on the other side are “the corrupt elites” whom they are in conflict with. Being on the side of ordinary people, populists confront elites and establishments. Therefore, populists’ claims of skepticism over the EU and criticism toward national and supranational bureaucracy are represented by “antagonism”.

A total of 23 keywords have been chosen for populist analysis. For the selection of these words, previous studies on a similar subject and new words that could explain the populist discourses of UKIP and Nigel Farage were used. For the operationalization of the keywords, the following question was asked. In the discourses, did the keywords mean people, general will, or antagonism? Thus, it is possible to show what share of the party discourse was populist and how UKIP and Farage built their populist discourses. Additionally, the variation of populist discourses across different time periods can be measured. By measuring populist discourses, the study can detect evidence of how populist discourses are shaped and prioritized in the direction of the increasing supranational authority of the European Union and how these populist discourses have developed and changed in the Brexit referendum period in which Euroscepticism and populism have reached a peak point. Thus, the study aims to reach a conclusion about the

general validity and consistency of populist discourses.

Table 4: Key Words for Research

Key Words	
Sovereignty	Islam
British / Britain	Brexit/ British Referendum / Referendum
Independent / Independence	Others
Democracy	Enemy
People	Brussels
Immigrants /Immigration	European Parliament
Nation(al) (ist) Multinational	Commission
The EU	Lisbon Treaty
Elites	Threats (cultural, criminal, security, economic)
Bureaucracy	Stealing works
Integration	Borders
Northern Ireland	Commonwealth

Table 5: Key Words and Their Possible Meanings

General Will	People	Antagonism
Sovereignty	British / Britain	Immigrants /Immigration
Independent / Independence	Independent/ Independence	The EU
Democracy	People	Elites
The EU	Immigrants /Immigration	Bureaucracy
Brussels	Nation(al-ist) / Multinational	Islam
European Parliament	Integration	Others
Commission	Islam	Enemy
Lisbon Treaty	Others	Brussels
Brexit / British Referendum/ Referendum	Threats (cultural, criminal, security, economic)	Brexit / British Referendum/ Referendum
	Enemy	Threats (cultural, criminal, security, economic)
	Stealing works	Commission
	Borders	Lisbon Treaty
	Commonwealth	
	Northern Ireland	

6.1. Period That Represents Debates During the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

Before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, in the 2009 European elections, Euroscepticism was a central debate and the main driver of support for UKIP. After the ratification of the treaty, Farage continued his populist agenda with mostly debates on general will. Accordingly, Farage presents the Lisbon Treaty and, in general, the EU as an obstacle to the emergence of people's sovereignty. Farage claims that the Lisbon Treaty has been accepted without public consultation and that some referendum results were ignored by the EU. Debates on popular sovereignty and the increasing sovereignty of the EU over member states have played a central role in his speeches. The keyword research that represents populism in three different ways also confirms this observation.

Accordingly, when UKIP leader Nigel Farage's speeches are considered during the period of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which represents the EU's increased supranational character. The study reveals that 70.76% of the speeches contained populist components. The vast majority of populist discourses have included complaints based on the decrease of popular sovereignty (general will), (68.26%). The most repeated word in populist vocabulary is "the EU." The EU has presented by Farage as an organization that stands against the general will of the people in an antagonist way (anti-establishment). The second most referred word in populist vocabulary is "democracy." This word predominantly is used to express the sovereignty of the people. The third most mentioned key phrase is "Lisbon Treaty," which is used to express complaints based on sovereignty debates as well. During this period, Farage used the populist component of "people" very rarely at only 13.77%. This scenario proves that the period of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty represents the growing power of the EU, and it is perceived as a danger to popular sovereignty in the speeches of Farage. Another important element is that there was no considerable migration flow during this period. The absence of migration influx indicates that the weight of the speech was mostly on the general will theory and the direct EU opposition.

Farage used three words almost proportionally to voice debates based on "general

will.” In this case, “democracy” was the most referred word to express complaints about the decrease in sovereignty of the people, which was repeated 26 times. The second most mentioned phrase to represent the general will is “Lisbon Treaty,” which was repeated 21 times. The third most cited word is “the EU,” which was repeated 20 times. In Farage’s populist agenda, these three phrases were used interchangeably to express the insufficient representation in the EU and to argue that the EU is acting against popular sovereignty. It was also emphasized that the EU tends to protect its own interests rather than the interests of the nation-states.

Second most referred populist expression in the speeches of Farage was antagonism (30.54%). Antagonism (Euro-scepticism) was expressed mostly using two keywords: “the EU,” which was mentioned 17 times, and “multi/nation (-al, -ist),” which was mentioned 12 times. In Farage’s discourses, “the EU” is reflected as an elitist organization which bureaucrats want to take part in for their career projects with high salaries. On the other hand, Farage demonstrated the EU as a supranational organization that holds its own interests above the interests of the member states. Thus, the EU was depicted by Farage as against ordinary people. Multi/nation (-al, -ist) was used by Farage to represent two different groups that are in conflict with ordinary people. On the one hand, national elites and politicians were depicted by Farage as a group which are far from the understanding of public concerns and they oppose the needs of ordinary British people. On the other hand, international or multinational organizations are a group that is composed of unelected bureaucrats and do not reflect the sovereignty of the British people. Thus, Farage used multi/nation (-al, -ist) in an antagonist way to represent them in a challenge against the interests of the people. In this regard, to break the rule of national elites, Farage offers to stand against mainstream parties and presents his party as the only alternative to these mainstream parties. At the international level, Farage offers to leave the EU so that his country will become a sovereign nation again.

People-centric (Nationalist-nativist) discourses take a small portion (13.77 %) in the speeches of Farage. People centrism is expressed by Farage using two very repeated words: “multi/nation (-al, -ist),” which is mentioned nine times, and “Britain/British,” which is mentioned eight times. Accordingly, multi/nation (-al, -ist) refers to a group betraying the country. In a national case, these are politicians who cooperate with the EU


for their career trajectory. On a multinational level, it is the EU. The word “British/Britain” in the speeches of Farage is used to represent opposition to other nations and the EU. It is also used to represent the natives of the country with kinship.

Table 6: Lisbon Treaty Period

Key Words	How Many Times Used	People (Native)	General Will (Sovereignty)	Antagonism (Dichotomy)	Populist	Non Populist
Sovereignty	2	0	2	0	2	0
British / Britain	24	8	4	3	15	9
Independent / Independence	1	0	0	0	0	1
Democracy	35	0	26	1	27	8
People	34	4	12	4	18	16
Immigrants /Immigration	1	1	1	0	1	0
Nation(al), (ist) Multinational	19	9	3	12	17	2
The EU	64	0	20	17	37	27
Elites	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bureaucracy	5	0	3	3	5	0
Integration	0	0	0	0	0	0
Islam	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brexit/ British Referendum / Referendum*	18	0	18	7	18	0
Others	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enemy	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brussels	1	0	0	1	1	0
European Parliament	4	0	1	0	1	3
Commission	4	1	3	0	3	1
Lisbon Treaty*	24	0	21	3	22	2
Threats(cultural, criminal, security, economic)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stealing works	0	0	0	0	0	0
Borders	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commonwealth	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	236	23	114	51	167	69
Percentage		13.77%	68.26%	30.54%	70.76%	29.24%

*Repeated words in the same sentence are not taken into account.

Figure 2: Key Word Research in Lisbon Treaty Period



6.1.1. Analysis of the Lisbon Treaty Period

Following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty after the second referendum in Ireland, Farage has represented a speech in the EP on the debates of the outcome of the referendum in Ireland. Accordingly, he defines the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty as a victory of the EU bureaucrats and business people over national sovereignty. He represents the EU as an obstacle to national democracies and he denotes national sovereignty has been lost by being a member of the EU. Farage claims that the only way to regain national sovereignty is to leave the EU. In this regard, Farage's statements, which emphasize two populist elements, "general will" and "antagonism", are as follows.

"We have had one vote against the Treaty in Ireland and one vote for the Treaty in Ireland. But it looks like we have got the victory of bureaucracy over national democracy. - It is a victory for big money and a victory for bureaucrats - if you want national democracy, you cannot remain a member of this European Union, and we will campaign for Britain to leave and to leave as soon possible" (Farrage, 2009a).

Later, Farage by using the general will, which is one of the determinants of populism, criticize the EU's growing sovereignty over the member state. During the questioning of President of Commission after the ratification of Lisbon Treaty, Farage remarks:

"You could have democratized the EU with this Treaty. You chose not to. Does national democracy matter, or is the European Union, in your opinion, a greater good" (Farrage, 2009b).

According to a speech, Farage states that the new treaty could be structured to increase democracy in the EU. Instead, it gave the EU more authority over member states. As a result, the national sovereignty of the members declined and supranational organization increased its power over the national democracies.

Farage by accusing the EU which ignores and doesn't accept the decision of the people after referendums, claims that the EU stands against the general will of the people. Additionally, he claims that the EU to get the decisions as it wants threatening the nation states.

"You have managed to ignore the French referendum result, you have managed to ignore the Dutch referendum result and you have managed to bully the Irish into

submission the second time around. So you have almost got your Treaty” (Farage, 2009c).

Farage claims that, Tony Blair by cooperating with the EU is aiming to introduce Euro to the UK which is a symbol of multi-nationalism over national unity. By using the symbolism of the Euro over national currency Farage shows nationalist behaviors. Additionally, with anti-establishment rhetorics, he blames Blair as being pro-European accepting demands and giving people's money to the EU without any questions. As a result, Farage claims that Blair will be rewarded as the next president of the EU. On the other hand, Farage argues that Blair is not giving a referendum on withdrawal from the EU and underestimating the general will of the people.

“Now, of course, it is time to pick the President - Tony Blair is the odds-on favourite - his continued support for Britain to join the euro, his surrender of GBP 2 billion a year of the British rebate and his whole approach towards Britain’s membership of the European Union - his refusal to give the British a referendum – all show that he has sufficient pro-European credentials to become the President” (Farage, 2009d).

One day later, during the discussion of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, Farage again has accuse Blair. In this case, he argues that Blair is not giving an option for the national democracy and ignoring to general will, because Blair ignores the demands for the referendum. Farage claims that Blair is betraying to the country by cooperating with the EU giving away two billion pounds for nothing.

“Until we get a referendum on this, I will refuse to recognize the legitimacy of this Treaty. - Please do appoint Tony Blair; the man that gave away GBP 2 billion of the British rebate in return for nothing; the man who promised us a referendum on the constitution and refused to give it to us. It is perfectly clear that, in this European Union, the prize for national betrayal is a high one indeed. So please appoint Tony Blair. It will bring home the truth to the British people that it is not the elected representatives that matter in this European Union, it is people that give away national democracy in favour of the European Union that win the top jobs. Please, please, give us Tony Blair as the first President of Europe” (Farage, 2009e).

When the UKIP members had written explanation about the voting on the budget of the EU which increases the tribute of governments. Farage and UKIP represent

themselves as protectors of the ordinary people against to tyranny of their government. They argue that people need to be asked for the tributes of the states to the EU.

“Whether or not the sum involved runs into millions, the local populations affected would have been justified in associating the UKIP with the tyranny of their own governments, if the UKIP delegation had voted against these amendments. we oppose any increase in the budget and because the limitation in the use of these budget lines, as proposed by the ECR, may result in a reduction in payments out of the budget” (Farage, 2009f).

During the debates about the preparation of the European Council meeting, Farage by using the most common populist claim that elected politician’s vs non-elected ones. Argues that non-elected politicians have a democratic deficit and they do not represent the people’s sovereignty. Thus, Farage argues that, unelected bureaucrats stand against democracy.

“Baroness Ashton, she has never been elected to public office in her entire life. She takes an enormously powerful job, and the peoples of Europe, of Britain, of everywhere else, do not have the power to hold her to account and to remove her, and that, fundamentally, is what is wrong with this whole European Union. It is all about bureaucracy versus democracy” (Farage, 2009g).

Later, he continues talking about the EU and its bureaucratic unelected nature. He gives strong accusations to Cathy Ashton as being an enemy of the West. According to Farage, leaders are in general betraying their nations as being a member of the European state. He again calls for a referendum to apply people's will for the Lisbon Treaty and for staying as a member of the EU. By using antagonism, he argues that high paid bureaucrats of the EU are betraying to national democracies. They follow their career trajectories across European and in the national political arena, for shaping their political discourses.

“We have a new president of Europe, Herman Van Rompuy. he is going to be paid a salary that is bigger than Obama’s, which tells you all you need to know about this European political class and how they look after themselves.- But at least he is an elected politician, unlike Baroness Cathy Ashton, She has never had a proper job, and she has never been elected to anything in her life. So I guess she is perfect for this European Union - She has not been elected, and the people do not have the power to remove her.-

are we really happy that somebody who will be in charge of our overseas security policy was an activist a few years ago- she took funds from organisations that were opposed to Western-style capitalism and democracy? That question must be asked. - Did she take money from enemies of the West? - they have all betrayed their national democracies. The European state is here. We are about to get an avalanche of new laws because of this Lisbon Treaty and there is no question in my mind that there has to be a full, free, fair referendum in the United Kingdom to decide whether we stay part of this Union or not. I hope and pray that we vote to leave, but either way the people simply must be asked” (Farage, 2009h).

By using general will and antagonism UKIP had an explanation about vote on the cooperation in energy efficiency. They claim that unelected officials cannot rule.

“The UKIP is not opposed to cooperation in the field of energy efficiency, but insists that such cooperation must be conducted by democratically elected governments and not by their unaccountable proxies in an anti-democratic supranational organisation such as the EU” (Farage, 2009i).

Farage is accusing MEP and Council members being like a dictator’s of Iron Curtain countries. He argues that, even though socialist systems does not exist anymore, the EU is behaving in the same way. He claims that the members of the Council are ruling Europe in coup d'etat, without bullets. By using strong antagonism Farage claims that unlimited power of the bureaucracy is ruling all Europe and unelected members destroying the democracy acting like dictators of the Iron Curtain countries and ignoring to people.

“The politicians in charge became very greedy; they wanted money for themselves and they wanted power. So they resorted to lies and deceit, they staged the most spectacular bureaucratic coup d’état that the world had ever seen. But they did not need to use any bullets to do it. They were much cleverer, much more scheming than that. What they did is they put in place a new treaty – it was called the Lisbon Treaty. Then they gave 27 people total unlimited power. These would have been the people who made all the laws. they ignored the people. What they did, whether they knew it or not, was to recreate the very evil system that the people in Eastern Europe had lived under before” (Farage, 2010a).

Farage, by borrowing three components of the populist agenda (General Will, Antagonism and People Centricism) claims that the Lisbon treaty has no democratic legitimacy. The EU acts like Iron Curtain countries ignoring the will of the people. Extreme Euro-nationalism of the EU puts pressure on the nation-state and he calls for a referendum to bring back to people's sovereignty.

"This treaty [Lisbon] that gives this Commission these powers does not have democratic legitimacy in the European Union at all. You ignored referendums, you denied referendums, and you bullied the poor Irish into voting a second time.- Whilst, 60 years ago, an Iron Curtain fell across Europe, today we have the iron fist of the European Commission.- We need democratic solutions to this. If you go on pushing your extreme euro-nationalism, this will lead to violence. We must vote against this Commission. We must put the future of Europe to people in every Member State in free and fair referendums" (Farage, 2010b).

Farage questions the legitimacy of the new president of the European Council. After his first traditional speech in parliament Herman Van Rompuy with a very aggressive way greeted by Farage. He claims that Van Rompuy is an unelected president who does not reflect the general will of the European people. In this regard, Van Rompuy is being accused by Farage as an assassin of the democracy and nation-states. Farage also argues that Van Rompuy is the correct person for the EU because he is from a country that is not a nation state

"I don't want to be rude... Who are you? I'd never heard of you, nobody in Europe had ever heard of you - I have no doubt that it is your intention to be the quiet assassin of European democracy and of the European nation states. You appear to have a loathing for the very concept of the existence of nation states; perhaps that is because you come from Belgium, which, of course, is pretty much a non-country. - I can speak on behalf of the majority of the British people in saying: we do not know you, we do not want you, and the sooner you are put out to grass, the better" (Farage, 2010c).

In general, when the speeches of Farage during the Lisbon Treaty period is considered within the frame of the first hypothesis, this research proves H1. During the ratification period of the Lisbon Treaty, Farage's populist rhetoric, in accordance with the

change in political environment, had strong concerns about the “general will.” Additionally, the secondary element in Farage’s speeches was Euroscepticism, which represents the main party policy. The study realized that, most of the time, the populist rhetorics of Farage on general will and antagonism complement each other. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that concerns about national sovereignty are built on the principal party policy of Euroscepticism.

In this regard, the study shows that, in accordance with the main policy of the party, Farage as a party leader built his rhetorics on debates on national sovereignty. This construction supports two ideas about party policy shifts. First, niche parties, in general, tend to avoid changing the primary policies of the party in order not to lose their main supporters (Ezrow et al., 2011; Adams et al., 2006). During this period, Farage showed his sensitivity to political changes by giving a strong emphasis on sovereignty debates. At the same time, by keeping his Eurosceptic position, he aimed to reach the grassroots of the party. In this context, policy change in the party did not take place in a way that was contrary to the party’s main aim and the expectations of its supporters. On the contrary, the party took a position based on the new political situation that emerged within the framework of the main party policy. Therefore, the theory of Han (2018) could be best explain UKIP’s position change. Accordingly, UKIP is ideologically weak; in fact, it is a single-issue party, which makes it very open to policy changes even if it has niche characteristics. Consequently, the party was able to switch its priority to sovereignty debates besides Euroscepticism. Second, this period proves the effect of the party leader on the determination of the party policy (Schumacher et al., 2013). As a charismatic face of the party, Farage has the ability to define the party policy in the same direction as the political environment.

In short, especially after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the increase in the supranational decision-making power of the EU was expected to grow doubts about state and popular sovereignty. By presenting “general will” as the most discussed subject on the discourses of Farage, this study has proved these expectations. In the speeches of Farage, the EU has been characterized as a supranational organization that has no legitimacy and has taken over the characteristics of the nation-state. In this respect, the study indicates that, besides its main policy, the party has the ability to switch its position

regarding changes in the political environment. The party's ability to switch its position immediately proves another element of the party that has an ideologically weak character. Additionally, Farage's ability and influence on the party policy change should not be denied.

6.2. Period Represents the Brexit Referendum

Regarding the speeches of Farage in the EP during the Brexit period, which were assumed to indicate the highest Eurosceptic rhetorics, the study found that 66.04% of the speeches contained populist elements, which is a little less than during the previous period. This suggests that more emphasis has been placed on national discussions than in the European platform. As expected, Eurosceptic and anti-European rhetorics (both considered to be antagonistic) took the biggest share during this period and reached 55.71%. "People centrism" (nationalism), which had little place in the populist rhetorics of Farage before, became the second most important populist rhetoric, reaching a share of 35.71% with an increase of more than 100%. This is thought to be a confirmation of the widespread anti-immigrant discourses used in the Brexit campaign. Additionally, the rise of people centrism also proves that the populist ideology put so much emphasis on nationalism when it achieved success or gained support. Sovereignty speeches, which were getting a share of 68.07% before, suffered a big decline during the Brexit period, and its share dropped to 22.86%. This could be an indicator of sharper populist statements based on xenophobic and Eurosceptic thoughts during the Brexit referendum.

During this period, the three most referred words in populist vocabulary were "people," which was used 15 times; "the EU," which was mentioned 14 times; and "British/Britain," which was repeated nine times. Farage predominantly used the terms "people" and "the EU" to express his antagonism over the EU in a straightforward Eurosceptic way. As expected, "British/Britain" was used to express people centrism (nationalism) as well as antagonism.

The most referred populist approach during this period was antagonism. The most common word used by Farage to express his antagonism was "the EU," which he mentioned 13 times. In his speeches, the EU was mostly depicted as an organization that stands against ordinary people. The second most referred word in an anti-establishment

way was “people,” which was used 10 times. The third most referred word was “British/Britain,” which was used six times.


People-centric or nativist arguments were used by Farage more during the Lisbon Treaty period, and the two most referred words were “British/Britain” and “people.” He used these two words as opposed to refugees, for the possible members of the EU and migrant workers in a different way. The most referred word used as an expression of general will was bureaucracy. By using this word, Farage mostly presents the EU, which is composed of unelected members, as an organization that stands against national sovereignty and the general will of the people.

Table 7: Brexit Referendum Period

Key Words	How Many Times Used	People (Native)	General Will (Sovereignty)	Antagonism (Dichotomy)	Populist	Non Populist
Sovereignty	1	0	1	0	1	0
British / Britain	15	5	1	5	9	6
Independent/Independence	1	0	1	0	1	0
Democracy	9	2	6	0	6	3
People	18	5	4	10	15	3
Immigrants /Immigration	5	2	0	1	3	2
Nation(al), (ist) Multinational	6	2	1	3	6	0
The EU	34	0	2	13	14	20
Elites	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bureaucracy	0	0	0	0	0	0
Integration	0	0	0	0	0	0
Islam	2	2	0	2	2	0
Brexit/ British Referendum / Referendum	6	3	0	3	5	1
Others	1	1	0	0	1	0
Enemy	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brussels	0	0	0	0	0	0
European Parliament	3	0	0	2	2	1
Commission	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lisbon Treaty *	2	0	2	0	2	0
Threats(cultural, criminal, security, economic)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stealing works / jobs	0	0	0	0	0	0
Borders	3	3	0	0	3	0
Commonwealth	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	106	25	16	39	70	36
Percentage		35.71%	22.86%	55.71%	66.04%	33.96%

* Repeated words in the same sentence are not taken in to account

Figure 3: Key Word Research in Brexit Period



6.2.1 Analysis of the Speeches in Brexit Period

Farage by using “people centrism” in his speeches with xenophobic arguments argues that by regarding Brexit referendum.

“We are going to go into political union with a country that is poorer than anybody else in the European Union and give free movement to 75 million people and join up with a government that is increasingly Islamist and authoritarian. - It is pretty clear to me that a vote to remain is a vote for Turkey. A vote to remain is a vote for massively increased immigration into Britain and a vote to remain is a vote that makes Britain more vulnerable to terrorism. Safer to vote to leave and take back control of our borders” (Farage, 2016a).

In this speech Farage by using a sharp distinction between natives and immigrants, represents immigrants as dangerous others. For Farage, highly populated Turkey is a potential member of the EU. Because of Turkey's political instability and its location, Farage presents his complaints about the possibility of massive migration from Turkey and the danger of terrorists that would pass through Turkey to the UK. Therefore, Farage claims that for the security of the country and to take back to control of borders, the UK needs to leave the EU.

During the parliament meeting about the outcomes of the EU and Turkey summit which was about the ongoing refugee crisis. Farage within the framework of nationalism, people's sovereignty, and antagonism, states that every European state has its own national identity. Therefore, according to Farage European cooperation must be based on the rules of the common market not on the rules of political unity.

“I think we should all have our own individual nation-state democracies and I want a Europe, Mr. Eriksson, where we trade together, cooperate together, work together, are friends and good neighbours with each other. What I do not want is that flag, an anthem, and all these presidents. I do not want political union. I want genuine European friendship” (Farage, 2016b).

Farage before Brexit referendum during parliament meeting about the outcomes of the EU and Turkey summit by using all populist components (antagonism, people and general will) makes a speech. Accordingly, Farage again with xenophobic expressions,

refers to migrants as a danger. He indicates that the Brexit vote will be an important decision for the security of the country. By using a strong antagonism, he states that the EU is against the will of ordinary people. He argued that financial resources of the EU and the support of the financial institutions to the EU, will be overwhelmed by the people who use the technology well [Farage refers Gianroberto Casaleggio Italian blogger and co-founder of Italian populist party Five Star Movement]. In the same speech, Farage by referring the Dutch referendum about the EU's enlargement argues that the general will of the people will be victorious over the EU.

“Mr. Juncker tells us this morning that we are making progress. Let us just examine that. 1.8 million people have come to the EU in the last 18 months and we have sent back 300. It does not sound like it is going very well to me.- The one group that will be pleased, though, are ISIS. They have now managed to put 5000 of their operatives into the European continent, according to the boss of Europol: something that should send a shiver down our collective spines. I have to say that, in the end, I think it is what the British referendum will turn on. I think we will vote for Brexit and the reason is we will vote to put our own safety first. It is going to be as it was in the Netherlands last week – a battle of people versus the politicians. You may have the big money, the big businesses and Goldman Sachs, but we have got our armies of bloggers. In the end the people’s will is going to prevail. This place will not survive” (Farage, 2016c).

During the debates on midterm reviews about investment plans, Farage argued that rising immigration from relatively poor countries, as a result of the EU's open-door policy, has created a particular concern over the Northern European countries. This situation increases the rise of nationalist parties in Europe. He asserts that the EU's heavy influence on the life of the European people is the reason for the rise of nationalist parties.

“When I was first elected here the word immigration did not even appear on my election address. We did not use that word once when the first three of us got elected here. But now, as we have allowed much poorer countries to have the free movement of peoples, we see considerable anger in Britain and in many countries across the north of Europe. And yes, it has led to the rise of parties that some may consider to be deeply unpleasant, but that is what happens when you take control out of people’s lives” (Farage, 2016d).

He continues his speech with antagonism, by referring to the upcoming Brexit referendum, as an Independence Day of the UK and end of the EU as well. By using people centrism and general will, he argues that if the UK leaves the EU that will bring their nation-state status and their sovereignty back to the UK.

“I hope that on 23 June it is not just Independence Day for the United Kingdom. I hope it brings an end to this entire project and in a few years’ time we could be sovereign, democratic nation states that work and trade together. I hope this is the last time I will be speaking in this Parliament from a Member State. I hope that we are going to leave this Union on 23 June. And so I am going out now; I may be some time” (Farage, 2016e).

After the Brexit referendum during the debates of the outcome of the referendum in the UK, Farage explains his reason for being in politics in an antagonistic way as opposed to the political class of the UK and the EU. By using the sovereignty debates, he adds the decision of the people (Brexit decision) will change the political class and will take the UK out of the EU. He represents his party openly as an antagonist party and accusing the EU being antagonist as well.

“I got into politics because our political class in Britain led us towards a European political project. So, if that result last week sweeps a few of them away, so be it. But I am looking forward next year to celebrating our independence day on 23 June - You are quite right, Mr. Schulz, UKIP used to protest against the establishment, and now the establishment protests against UKIP, so something has happened here” (Farage, 2016f).

Farage using antagonism after the Brexit referendum claiming that the EU project rejected by people and giving the example of a decline in exchange rates of Euro claiming the whole project is failing.

“Mr. President, isn’t it funny? When I came here 17 years ago and said that I wanted to lead a campaign to get Britain to leave the European Union, you all laughed at me. Well I have to say, you’re not laughing now, are you? And the reason you are so upset, the reason you are so angry, has been perfectly clear from all the angry exchanges

this morning: you, as a political project, are in denial. You are in denial that your currency is failing” (Farage, 2016g).

Farage represents the Brexit as a victory of the ordinary people over the multinationalism of the EU and its oppression. Additionally, he claims that ordinary people put their voice up against bureaucracy and economic elites and finally they took their borders and sovereignty back. He is hoping that this decision will give a desire to other nations to take back their controls.

“What happened last Thursday was a remarkable result. It was indeed a seismic result, not just for British politics, for European politics, but perhaps even for global politics, too, because what the little people did, what the ordinary people did, the people who have been oppressed over the last few years and seen their living standards go down, they rejected the multinationals. They rejected the merchant banks, they rejected big politics, and they said, actually, we want our country back. We want our fishing waters back, we want our borders back, we want to be an independent, self-governing normal nation, and that is what we have done and that is what must happen. And in doing so, we now offer a beacon of hope to democrats across the rest of the European continent. I will make one prediction this morning: The United Kingdom will not be the last Member State to leave the European Union” (Farage, 2016h).

During the negotiations of the Brexit, Farage argues that the EU is aiming to create a hard Brexit deal for the UK and acting in an EU nationalist manner.

“In terms of Brexit, you are probably right to be slightly critical of the British Government who, I agree, ought to get on with it. But is pretty clear that the EU is getting on with it, and you have already appointed your divorce lawyers. On behalf of the European Parliament we have got Guy Verhofstadt: he is the man who is going to be negotiating Brexit. If you were to think of this building as a temple, Mr. Verhofstadt is the high priest, a fanatic. In fact, there is only one real nationalist in the room and it is you, Mr. Verhofstadt, because you want flags, anthems and armies. You are an EU nationalist, and I frankly think that this appointment amounts to pretty much a declaration of war on any sensible negotiating process. If you stick to the dogma of saying that for reciprocal tariff-free access to the single market we must maintain the free movement of people, then

you will inevitably drive us towards no deal – no deal on trading under WTO rules for the United Kingdom, which is actually not too bad because it is very much better and cheaper than the current deal we have got” (Farage, 2016i).

When the Brexit period was examined for the second hypothesis, as expected, besides Farage’s anti-EU rhetorics, the study also observed an increase in people orientation. In other words, a rise in nationalist speeches was seen. With popular sovereignty being the most widely used discourse during the previous period, the contrary was the least expressed populist expression during the Brexit period. In this regard, research on this period proved the rise of the antagonistic and people-oriented discourses of Farage, which aligns with the second hypothesis. The big refugee wave after the Syrian war and terrorist attacks in different European capitals, including London, created fear and xenophobic feelings. Farage, who took advantage of this situation, pioneered the change of party policy by combining the increasing nationalism and xenophobia with the opposition to the EU. In this regard, the shift in the party policy could be explained by four different reasons. First, niche parties with nationalist bias tend to be more leader oriented (Schumacher et al., 2013). As a result, parties with a strong leadership are more likely to change their party policy (Meyer, 2013). Second, the ideologically weak character of UKIP and its issue orientation allowed the party to change its policy position according to the political environment (Walgrave & Nuytemans, 2009). Third, UKIP tries to expand its party support by using the policy of its rival parties (Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009). In this regard, by adopting more nationalistic discourses from its rival, the British National Party (BNP), UKIP tries to expand its party base and get more support for the Brexit referendum. Lastly, another reason might be the electoral success of UKIP in past elections (Somer-Topcu, 2009). This success might have encouraged UKIP to adopt more aggressive policies during the Brexit referendum.

In conclusion, research on this period revealed that during the Brexit referendum, UKIP established its party policy on Euroscepticism and nationalist elements. By considering the political developments during this period, UKIP has successfully changed its party policy. Farage also managed to play a very important role in the Brexit referendum, in which he blended the anxiety of British society over terrorism and immigration with Euroscepticism.

6.3. UKIP's 2014 Election Manifesto and It's Analysis

A study on the 2014 EP election manifesto of UKIP reveals that 72.22% of the keywords were used in a populist way. Parallel to the main policy of the UKIP, the manifesto is dominated by Eurosceptic emphasis at 56.92%. In contrast to the Lisbon Treaty period, only 12.31% of the arguments had complaints about sovereignty. This decline could indicate UKIP's switch to more nationalist policies besides Euroscepticism. Especially, existing anti-immigrant feelings of the British community and the influx of refugees in Europe have been used by UKIP as perceived threats to the economy and welfare system. All these factors are associated with EU membership and they have been widely used in the party manifesto. As a result, after Eurosceptic claims, nationalist thoughts took the second position with a 35.38% share.

In this respect, UKIP is observed to act in a manner consistent with the policy changes in the environment. At the same time, during the Brexit referendum period, Farage's speeches were observed to have changed in the same direction, which prove the coherence of the party with the leader. In addition, this observed policy change being in the same direction as Farage's speeches reveals the dominant role of the leader in the policy-making process of the party. This result shows that, contrary to the general opinion about niche parties, UKIP is not dominated by activists. Therefore, the party seems flexible to shift its policy position.


In the manifesto of UKIP, the most referred word in populist vocabulary was "the EU," which was used 34 times. This phrase was mainly used to represent antagonism 22 times. Interestingly, other defined populist keywords took no significant number in the UKIP manifesto. The phrase "the EU" was used nine times to represent people orientation. In this regard, this word was used to emphasize nationalist ideas based on anti-European opposition. Especially the rising migration and its effect on the British economy and welfare were mostly demonstrated using this word. At the same time, "the EU" was used by UKIP to represent concerns based on sovereignty. In this regard, the phrase was used three times to depict the EU and its institutions as home of elites that took away national sovereignty from the hands of native British people.

Table 8: UKIP's 2014 Manifesto for European Parliament Elections

Key Words	How Many Times Used	People (Native)	General Will (Sovereignty)	Antagonism (Dichotomy)	Populist	Non Populist
Sovereignty	0	0	0	0	0	0
British / Britain	4	0	1	4	4	0
Independent / Independence	1	0	0	0	0	1
Democracy	2	0	0	1	1	1
People	1	1	1	0	1	0
Immigrants /Immigration	6	2	0	3	4	2
Nation(al - ist) Multinational	3	2	0	0	2	1
The EU	52	9	3	22	34	18
Elites	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bureaucracy	1	0	0	1	1	0
Integration	0	0	0	0	0	0
Islam	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brexit/ British Referendum	2	0	1	1	2	0
Others	5	1	1	1	3	2
Enemy	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brussels	2	0	0	2	2	0
European Parliament	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commission	2	0	1	1	2	0
Lisbon Treaty *	2	1	0	1	2	0
Threats(cultural, criminal, security, economic)	2	2	0	0	2	0
Stealing (works / jobs)	2	2	0	0	2	0
Borders	3	3	0	0	3	0
Commonwealth	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	90	23	8	37	65	25
Percentage		35.38%	12.31%	56.92%	72.22%	27.78%

* Repeated words in the same sentence are not taken in to account

Figure 4: Key Word Research in UKIP's 2014 Manifesto



UKIP's manifesto is titled "create an earthquake." The party's ambition to be the voice of Eurosceptics in the UK is clearly indicated in it. Accordingly, the manifesto starts with a citation from the party leader, Farage: "We're the only party being honest about immigration, jobs and housing" (UKIP, 2014). Emphasis on immigration, jobs, and housing tends to give a populist message in a straightforward way. By presenting itself as the only real alternative to mainstream parties, UKIP points out migration as the reason for the unemployment and pressure on the house market. UKIP claims that, as a member of the EU, the UK "lost the control of our[its] borders" (UKIP, 2014). Therefore, it is a big necessity to have a referendum as quickly as possible. This reasoning is repeated many times in the UKIP manifesto. Consequently, the party considers EP elections to be a referendum and claims, "We don't need to wait until 2017 to have a referendum: let's have one right now. Use the European Elections on 22 May to tell them what you think about the EU" (UKIP, 2014).

The rising supranational rule of the EU is described by UKIP as follows: "The EU is not just the trading bloc we thought we signed up to. It's about ever closer union" (UKIP, 2014), which has more control in many areas than just the economy. UKIP claims that "the only way to regain control is to leave the European Union" (UKIP, 2014). In this regard, three major parties of the UK are accused by UKIP as collaborators of the EU, and they are depicted as obstacles to the emergence of the UK's freedom from the EU. By using antagonism toward mainstream parties and the EU, the party argues that "until we leave the EU, our hands are tied by Brussels, with the support of the Conservatives, Labour and the Lib Dems" (UKIP, 2014).

UKIP depicts the EU as an organization with heavy legal components and a bureaucratic organization, which is very costly to the British economy. The cost of being a member of the EU is regularly repeated in the manifesto of UKIP. In this regard, the party asserts that "since 2010, 3,600 new laws have been imposed on us by the European Union. With an estimated 13 million words, they would take 92 days to read. This is the European Union we find ourselves in now, a bureaucratic organization writing our laws and costing us all £55 million per day in membership fees" (UKIP, 2014).

All in all, a study on UKIP's manifesto reveals that UKIP is very consistent with its main party policy in line with its party leader, Farage. Euroscepticism appears to be

the main populist discourse in the manifesto. Opposition to the EU is reflected in the UKIP manifesto, where the union is described as the main reason for other problems in the country. These problems are usually listed by UKIP as unemployment, pressure on the health-care system and home market as a result of uncontrolled migration, increasing cultural and social changes in British society, and decreasing public representation in politics as consequences of the political effect of the EU on British politics.

In accordance with the main policy of the party, in the manifesto of UKIP, Euroscepticism was the most widely used populist discourse in an antagonist way. In this respect, the study considers UKIP to have a quite stable party policy.



CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

The concept of populism, which is widely used to describe parties, leaders, and party policies in today's political science research, is an older concept than it is thought to be. It has existed for more than 100 years in different forms in diverse soils, from Russia to the US. However, in the last two decades, populism has become a widespread phenomenon, especially in Europe, which have drawn more attention from many researchers. Because of states' diversified political organizations and various expectations of the public, the modern concept of populism appears in different forms. As a result of its content and controversial nature, populism has been defined differently by various scholars. In this regard, scholars tend to describe populism as a party ideology, a party discourse, and a party organization (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2013).

Populism has been interpreted in various ways because of its complex structure. It is sometimes seen as an integral part of democracies (Canovan, 1982), sometimes as a key element for the development of direct democracy (Laclau, 1967). In the European perspective, populism is mostly considered to be a negative concept because of its uncompromising antagonist view, extreme majoritarian legitimacy, and nativist comprehension (Mudde, 2004). These components of populism make it incompatible with liberal democracies, which tend to be reconciliatory and multicultural. As a result, the EU, whose foundation is based on liberal democratic values, and populist parties challenge each other.

This conflict was the main factor in the creation of this study. In this respect, when the factors that lead to the emergence of populism in Europe are evaluated, generally, scholars point out three important elements: relative limitation of state sovereignty as a result of increased EU influence, austerity policies as a consequence of the financial crisis,

and the increase of immigration (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2013; Kreisi & Pappas, 2015; Mudde, 2007). Consequently, populist parties in Europe have formed policies based on their opposition to EU, economic protectionism, cultural conservatism, nationalism, and xenophobia. Although studies on this subject have mostly provided a great deal of information on the general understanding of populism, the mentioned reasons influenced by the emergence of populism in Europe are not mutually exclusive. They may exist in different communities simultaneously because of various factors. Therefore, to better understand the populist surge in Europe, the factors that cause the formation of populism should be examined, such as parties, politicians, and political systems. In this regard, UKIP and its former leader Nigel Farage were chosen for this study to give comprehensive information about the relationship between the EU and populist policy change. The reason why this study examines UKIP and its former leader Nigel Farage is that they are one of the most important representatives of populists' rise in Europe, who take anti-EU discourses as their main party policy. Additionally, UKIP strongly demonstrates the three elements of the definition of populism, which are generally used in populism research. Therefore, by studying these elements, this thesis aims to know the impact of the EU on populist rhetorics and how the party changes its policy over time.

Primarily, this thesis defines populism using its most referred definition in literature, which was introduced by Mudde. According to this definition, populist parties carry three elements in their policies: antagonism, people orientation, and general will (Mudde, 2004). In this regard, the study has used the UKIP party manifesto and the rhetorics of Farage to show the populist vein of UKIP and to demonstrate how these three themes are very strongly used by UKIP in different periods.

Accordingly, the antagonism of UKIP has been considered to be an invariant element in the party manifesto and in the discourse analysis of Farage. The antagonism of UKIP appears to be an anti-establishment posture in both national and European levels. On the national level, mainstream parties, members of the House of Lords, and national elites are criticized by Farage as being disconnected from the people. In this regard, Farage claims that national elites and members of mainstream parties are putting their career goals and personal interests over people's needs. Additionally, for Farage, especially the members of mainstream parties are betraying the country by cooperating with the EU. In

these claims, the study perceives the traditional populist division of ordinary people versus corrupt or distant elites. In this regard, by presenting himself as an ordinary Englishman with straightforward language, Farage claims that his party represents the common sense of the British people against the elites, who think only of their interests.

On the international level, the antagonism of UKIP appears to be an anti-EU attitude. This policy, in fact, is the main party policy in establishing of the party. UKIP formulates all its other party policies based on Euroscepticism. In this regard, the study has presented British Euroscepticism as an important factor in the emergence of UKIP and the dissemination of anti-EU ideas in Britain. From the very beginning of the accession process, there were Eurosceptic voices in Britain mainly from Conservative party members. The UK's hesitation originated not only from economic or political concerns but also from cultural factors that had an effect on British Euroscepticism. Therefore, we can argue that Euroscepticism has been embedded in British politics.

By using the existing Euroscepticism in the UK as its basis, UKIP has built other policies on it. In this respect, UKIP has shown the EU as the reason for many social and political problems in the UK. The party claims that, by delegating its decision-making power to the supranational institutions of the EU, the UK is losing its own national sovereignty. UKIP and Farage consider the supranational decision-making process of the EU to be illegitimate because of its unelected composition. Therefore, according to UKIP, the EU is far from reflecting the general will of the people and destroys national sovereignty. To restore national sovereignty, UKIP underlines the importance of the referendums designed especially for the withdrawal from EU membership. On the other hand, by depicting immigration as the biggest single issue in the UK and relating it to the open-door policies of the EU, UKIP claims that the rising number of immigrants is creating problems in the UK, such as unemployment, cultural challenges, exploitation of the welfare system, and the rise of terror and criminality. As a solution, UKIP offers withdrawal from the EU.

The study demonstrated general will as another theme of the populist vein of UKIP. Accordingly, UKIP presents itself as a defender of democracy; and for UKIP, real democracy may appear only at the national level through public participation. For this reason, UKIP prioritizes referendums, which are some of the main instruments of direct

democracy, and defends the decisions of parliaments that have representatives elected by the people. For UKIP, decisions made through public participation or by the representatives of the people are legitimate. In this regard, UKIP questions the legitimacy of the House of Lords at the national level and the supranational decision-making of the EU at the international level. UKIP claims that since both institutions are not elected by the people, their decisions do not reflect the general will of the people and both institutions have a democratic deficit. In this respect, UKIP in their manifestos and Farage in his discourses claim that the only way to bring the sovereign power of the people back is to withdraw from the EU and abolish the House of Lords. Although UKIP and Farage present themselves as true democrats, they appreciate democracy in a narrow framework and espouse majoritarian democracy. Thus, the strong emphasis of the party on popular will threatens the separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances and puts pressure on minority rights.

The third theme that proves the populist foundation of UKIP is people orientation. In general, UKIP's people orientation appears as nativist policies. Based on the discourses and manifestos of UKIP, this study concluded that, for UKIP, people are natives of Britain, who are under the threat of the influx of immigrants. This threat does not only create economic concerns; UKIP also depicts immigration as a threat to the cultural and social values of the UK. Especially during the period of the Brexit referendum, the study observed an increase in UKIP's anti-immigrant attitude. During this period, the party tried to connect immigration with terror and use the public's anxiety. Furthermore, the study found out that UKIP and Farage have avoided extreme nationalist rhetorics in the manifestations and EP speeches. This attitude is considered by this study to be UKIP's willingness to show itself as an alternative to mainstream parties by separating their nationalist discourses from those of the extreme right-wing BNP.

Especially in the last 5 years, UKIP was very successful in combining the party's single issue of Euroscepticism with immigration and in creating a fusion strategy. Similarly, other niche parties such as BNP in the UK and the NF in France hold identical views as those of UKIP about the EU. However, these parties have been framed by explicit xenophobia and nationalism and are more ideologically oriented. In the case of UKIP, nationalism is not embedded in party policies. The party just uses nationalist discourses to

expand its electoral base and gain more supporters. Tournier-Sol, who has divided the development of UKIP in different sections, explains this episode as a “transition period.” In this regard, UKIP attempts to broaden its policy position by using less radical languages and offers flat taxation and more expenses for state welfare, such as health care, housing, and schools (Tournier-Sol, 2015, p. 146–7). Therefore, it is not easy to make a conclusion about UKIP’s policies. The party tries to compose various political policies around the main issue of Euroscepticism.

In this regard, when UKIP’s and Farage’s discourses were considered, study found that there is a strong dedication to antagonism in both periods. Farage’s antagonist speeches are likely to stay as central party policy for quite some time. Consequently, the study argues that UKIP’s main party policy is Euroscepticism. In this regard, this research indicates that during the period of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, by using the anxiety about the rising supranational rule of the EU, Farage created a policy shift in party rhetorics to sovereignty debates. But these discourses are based on the idea of EU opposition.

From this perspective, with respect to the research question, when the study examined only the period of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the increase in the supranational decision-making of the EU could be said to have a direct influence on Farage’s and UKIP’s populist rhetorics in line with sovereignty debates. But when the Brexit referendum period was examined, the study revealed that antagonistic “Eurosceptic” rhetorics remain a central issue for Farage. Additionally, besides Eurosceptic rhetorics, in accordance with the shift in the political environment, Farage changed his rhetorics in people-oriented “nationalist” way. With the findings on the two periods combined, it would be wrong to argue that only the increase in the supranational decision-making of the EU has had an impact on the populist discourses of Farage, because, by taking advantage of the weak ideological character of UKIP, Farage aimed to construct diverse populist rhetorics on Euroscepticism in accordance with the policy shifts in the environment. Therefore, with regard to the first research question, the study argues that supranational decision-making has had an effect on populist discourses, but it is not the only condition that has affected the policy change of UKIP. When the Brexit period and the 2014 manifesto of UKIP were considered, the study found that besides Eurosceptic discourses, nationalist discourses were on the rise too. Therefore, the study claims that

UKIP's policy changes have been coherent with the environment. Increasing supranational debates were only indicative of UKIP's policy change at a certain period.

In light of this result, when the study examined the second research question, which is about the "volatility of the discourses," it found that UKIP's rhetorics are quite volatile around the main issue of the party. As mentioned before, when the first period was examined, the study showed that Farage's speeches had a strong emphasis on "national and public sovereignty" and "Euroscepticism." Especially during this period, Farage acted like a defender of the general will of the people. In this frame, he questioned the EU and the role of the supranational institutions of the EU in the decision-making process at the international level. At the local level, he presented the national elites as enemies of the public since they have cooperated with the EU, which has taken away the sovereign rights of the people and the state. By acting this way, Farage attempts to highlight legitimacy debates. During the second period, the study found that Farage emphasized "Euroscepticism" "and nationalism" in a more aggressive and direct way. Consequently, this study argues that this policy change needs to be considered cautiously within the framework of the structure of the EU Parliament and its periodic political effects.

In this regard, during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU did not provide a platform for people-centric populist discourses, because most party supporters do not follow debates in the EU and it is a platform that has members from different states with different political interests. During the period of the Lisbon Treaty, there were not so many Eurosceptic voices in the parliament as well. Therefore, Farage had different tactics during this period. By avoiding aggressive and direct antagonism towards the EU, he expressed his opposition with democratic deficit claims. He was a more polite opposition to the EU. Yet after the 2014 EP elections, the number of Eurosceptics in parliament were higher, and the social and political situation in Europe became more favorable to a harder opposition. During this period, Europe was the target of many refugees from the Middle East, who did not share any religious and ethnic similarities with any European state. In addition, the anger and xenophobia that emerged as a result of the terrorist attacks in Europe made the EU Parliament open to discussions on national identity.

Especially during the Brexit period, Farage escalated these anxieties by claiming that Turkey, which is overpopulated, politically unstable, and economically poor, would

become a member of the EU. As a result, he claimed that the EU would have a border in the war zone and that all member states would face a big flow of immigrants. Therefore, the study perceives that the open-door policy of the EU during the refugee crisis provided a fertile ground for debates on national identity. Additionally, more Eurosceptic party members joined the EP after the 2014 elections. Consequently, the EP has become open to more aggressive political debates involving nationalism and Euroscepticism. By using these conditions, Farage has been more flexible in changing the policy of UKIP to gain an advantage in Brexit debates. Farage extensively used people-centric speeches to heighten people's fear before the Brexit referendum. On the other hand, according to Hughes, UKIP's campaigns during the Brexit referendum motivated about 2.8 million people who had not participated in the elections before. Most of them used this opportunity to express their reactions to mainstream parties and the EU (Hughes, 2019, p. 2). Consequently, the study argues that the UKIP switched its position during the Brexit referendum period to a more Eurosceptic and nationalist stance. This answers the second research question: Farage's rhetorics showed high volatility. However, the study found that Euroscepticism in both periods was the main issue of the party. Therefore, the flexibility of the party policy was based on their opposition to the EU, and change was implemented in consideration of other environmental political changes. In light of these results, the study also found that Euroscepticism was the single issue of the party that other policies were built on. In other words, in addition to anti-EU rhetorics, other political discourses were used as complementary elements of the party's main policy.

Another important indicator of UKIP's single-issue orientation was the results of the 2017 general elections. The result of the elections showed that support for the party decreased to a very low level (2.1%). When other general elections are considered, it is normal to see some decline in the local election performance of UKIP. However, its decline in the 2017 elections had a huge margin (-12.1%). This happened after the withdrawal decision was made in the Brexit referendum. Consequently, the single issue of UKIP disappeared. After the withdrawal decision, political debates in the UK shifted from debates discussing leave campaigns to more local debates determining whether the Brexit process would be hard or soft. In this regard, UKIP attempted to create broader discourses on issues such as education, housing, and liberal market economy. However, they could

not convince their supporters with these issues after they lost their main discourses. As a result, when EU opposition lost its importance, UKIP remained without an issue. Their efforts to create more policies did not get any response from the voters. Hence, it would not be wrong to come to this conclusion: while UKIP had a significant impact on the outcome of the Brexit referendum, it was preparing its own end because of being a Eurosceptic single-issue party.

Additionally, the results of the 2017 general elections are an indicator of UKIP's leader dependency. After the resignation of Farage, UKIP failed to keep their previous successes in elections. To sum up, the study argues that UKIP is a single-issue party with a strong dependency on a leader. As an issue party, UKIP was flexible to shift its policy according to the political wind. However, UKIP's leader and issue orientation created a limit for the party. After the Brexit decision and their loss of Farage, UKIP failed to create a new policy to keep their voters.

In conclusion, the research on UKIP's and Farage's discourses in two different periods and on their manifesto showed that UKIP is a leader-oriented, single-issue party. In this context, UKIP successfully revealed the people's growing concerns about the supranational rule of the EU in its populist discourses during the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. In light of this, with respect to the first research question, the study found that UKIP's populist rhetoric is concentrated on democracy and sovereignty and centers on the increase of the supranational decision-making of the EU. But it would be wrong to use this argument as a standalone indicator, because the study found the effects of the different elements in the discourses of UKIP as well. Particularly during the Brexit referendum, the increasing number of refugees and terror actions linked to economic, social, and security concerns was successfully tied to EU membership. By creating new policies based on Euroscepticism, UKIP had a strong effect on the outcomes of the Brexit referendum. Therefore, study argues that although the increasing supranational decision-making power of the EU is an effective issue in UKIP's discourse, this is a periodic effect, because when the Brexit period and the 2014 manifesto of UKIP are examined, it can be seen that UKIP is very flexible and successful in adapting different political elements to the main party policy. On the other hand, the flexibility of UKIP answers the second research question. UKIP's discourses show a volatile character as well. The reason for the flexibility of

UKIP's party policy originates from the party's ideological weakness and single-issue orientation. Additionally, another factor of UKIP's flexibility is the significant role that Farage played in determining the party's position. His personality and supporters' acceptance of him allowed the party to be more flexible to policy shifts.

In short, UKIP is a typical populist party that has built its policies on a single issue in a leader-oriented manner. UKIP was able to easily respond to political changes because of its weak ideological character and leader-oriented structure. Farage's straightforward rhetorics in the political debates and his ability to portray himself as an ordinary British man have helped increase his party's support particularly during EP elections, which are considered to be less important than national ones. However, the main party policy of UKIP, which is based on EU opposition, has lost its appeal as a result of the UK's departure from the EU. Additionally, the resignation of Farage drove the party into a corner, and UKIP lost its supporters. However, UKIP has shown us that populist discourses that are based on binary opposition can be dangerous to democracies.

To this end, by examining UKIP's populist rhetorics in detail, the study shows how populist parties may use the EU as a strategic tool to gain more support. In this regard, this study focused on populism at the international level. For a deeper understanding of populist policies, further studies may compare populist discourses at the national and international level in a comparative perspective. Although many populist parties and their discourses have been examined by scholars, not enough research has been done on populist party leaders. In this regard, comparative studies on populist party leaders and their effects on policy changes may be conducted. Also, not many studies focus on how populist parties behave before and after being a member of the parliament. Also, studies may compare populist party policies before and after being in government as well.

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