

THE CHANGING MASCULINITY IDENTITY: CHANGES IN UPPER-MIDDLE CLASS
FORMER ISLAMIST MEN AFTER FEBRUARY 28

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THE CHANGING MASCULINITY IDENTITY: CHANGES IN UPPER-MIDDLE CLASS
FORMER ISLAMIST MEN AFTER FEBRUARY 28

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
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ABSTRACT

THE CHANGING MASCULINITY IDENTITY: CHANGES IN UPPER-MIDDLE CLASS FORMER ISLAMIST MEN AFTER FEBRUARY 28

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There have been important political, economic, and social changes after the February 28, 1997 military intervention in Turkey. These changes have affected different people in various ways. Furthermore, these changes influenced some social labels by changing balances as well. The purpose of this study is to explore the thoughts and feelings of Islamist men regarding these changes. The study includes ten Islamist rooted, college educated, and married businessman. The political, economic, and social changes directly affected Islamism and conservatism as well. According to the results, the relationship between these two ideologies has expanded by these changes. The qualitative results showed that most of the Islamist men accept the changes, both positively and negatively. Some see the change as corruption, whereas others believe the changes were needed and have been in favor of Islamists. Political, economic, and social changes are the reasons former Islamists change into new conservatives. Specifically, masculinity identity has changed in the eyes of these men. During the shift from former Islamists to new conservatives, gender roles have also changed. What all these results demonstrate are

the changeability of identities according to social, economic, and political changes, and also time and culture.

Keywords: Islamism, conservatism, religiosity, masculinity, power, gender, identity

ÖZ

ERKEKLİK KİMLİĞİNİN DEĞİŞİMİ: ÜST ORTA SINIF ESKİ İSLAMCI ERKEKLERİN 28 ŞUBAT SONRASI DEĞİŞİMİ

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Türkiye’de 28 Şubat’tan (1997), sonra politik, ekonomik ve sosyal olarak büyük değişimler yaşanmıştır. Bu değişimler farklı kişilere çeşitli şekillerde tesir etmiş, üstelik değişen dengelerle birlikte bazı sosyal kimlikleri de etkilemiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı İslamcı erkeklerin bu değişim hakkındaki duygu ve düşüncelerini araştırmaktır. Bu tez İslamcı kökenleri olan, üniversite eğitimi almış, evli ve işadamı olan 10 kişi ile gerçekleştirilmiştir. Politik, ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel değişimler, İslamcılık ve muhafazakârlık ideolojilerini de etkilemiştir. Eldeki verilere göre bu iki ideoloji arasındaki mesafe açılmıştır. Nitel sonuçlar İslamcıların değişimi negatif ve pozitif olarak kabul ettiklerini gösteriyor. Bazıları değişimi bozulma olarak görürken, bir diğer kısmı bu değişime ihtiyaç olduğunu ve bunun İslamcıların yararına olduğuna inanıyor. Politik, ekonomik ve sosyal değişimler eski İslamcıların yeni muhafazakârlara dönüşümünün temel sebepleri olarak görülüyor. Bütün bu veriler neticesinde erkeklik kimliğinin bu erkeklerin gözünde değişime uğradığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Eski İslamcıların yeni muhafazakârlara dönüşürken cinsiyet rollerinin yeri de değişmiştir. Kimliklerin sosyal,

ekonomik ve politik deęişimlere, ayrıca zamana ve kltre gre de deęişebileceęi sonucuna varılmıřtır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslamcılık, muhafazakarlık, dindarlık, erkeklik, gç, cinsiyet, kimlik

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I hope this study will help anyone who is interested in the subject and can contribute to the field.

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Introduction

The subject of this thesis is to understand the influences of the February 28, 1997, process¹ on upper-middle class, university educated, former Islamist² businessmen. The aim is to find out the influences of socio-economic and cultural changes that happened during and after February 28 in these former Islamist businessmen, more importantly, their perception, feelings, and thoughts regarding the change. Above all, the main aim is to analyze the changing masculinity identity of these men. Despite the obvious social, economic, and political changes that took place after the February 28 military intervention, how did the upper-middle class university-educated former Islamist men (UUFIM) perceive these changes, especially in the context of their masculine identity?

This study sheds light on the current situation of former Islamist men who were also target, other than religious women, of the February 28 military intervention. This study starts from the changes that have taken place in the terms and identifications given to these men by the community before and after February 28. Also, in order to understand the change, it is necessary to start with the terms and identifications that are given these men before and after the process.

This study is important to show that politics does not only affect the governmental and international level, but also influences daily life. It shows the changeability of gender roles through the perspective of former Islamist men. It is the first study that works on the changing masculinity identity

¹ 'February 28 process' describes the time from the 1997 until 2002 elections.

² Former Islamists refers to those who have been in an Islamic or Sufi order from a young age and still a member of them.

specific to February 28 processes. To understand today, we need to look back to the historical background of the terms and people. Terms and symbols change in time and if we do not see the changes in their meaning, it is not possible to completely understand the changes.

A qualitative research method was used as literature review and depth-interview. Most of the interviews were done at the interviewees' place of work. They were done in a conversational tone. The men were relaxed and open to discuss. Most of the men accepted the usage of a voice recorder. Analyses of these men are taken as a reference point. The ideas and information they gave are important since they came from Islamist backgrounds, but even more so since they came from different Islamic sects, Sufi orders, and Islamic groups. Therefore their ideas and information included their personal thoughts as well as some general ideas about what the members of these groups and orders think and believe. Although the study included a small number of men, the ideas and constructions extracted may be applied to a wider group of people.

1. Historical Background

Although it has been over fifteen years since the February 28 military intervention, its social, economic, political as well as psychological effects are still ongoing in different parts of society, especially among former Islamists. The changes that began by the February 28 military intervention have taken some former Islamists men to a new point that changed their social and private lives in the history of Turkey. February 28 was the latest large influence on former Islamists. To understand all the changes existing today, one must look further than the last fifteen years in Turkey. Rather, some changes had already begun politically and socially before the February 28 process, and this process became the threshold of the changes occurring in

the society today. In that respect, to better understand the last fifteen years and today, it is necessary to evaluate the past.

Turkey has an unstable history with military coups and interventions from the declaration of the Turkish Republic. The last one was the February 28 military intervention that took place in 1997. It was painful and hard for the religious, conservative, and Islamists people. The pressure on the religious people in Turkey dates back to the 1920s. The Turkish Republic aimed to constitute unity under the umbrella of modernity and a single nationality. Turkish modernization imitated European modernization standards, which led to the ideas of Westernization and modernity having the same meanings in Turkey (Kentel, 2008, p. 11). Furthermore, the idea of modernity in the new State was accepted as erasing all religious practices and symbols from the public sphere in the name of progress. As M. Hakan Yavuz paraphrases from Owen Chadwick, “Political development literature, which is based almost exclusively on European experiences, assumed the removal of religion from politics and societal life through the process of secularization as part of an inevitable and linear historical progression that is seen as being positive and progressive” (2009, p. 145). Visibly religious people in society, especially women with the scarf and the men who rejected wearing a hat, were restrained by the government. Since then, the ideas of religiosity and modernity are considered the opposite of each other within the constructs of Turkish modernity.

Modernization was accepted as a symbol and a path toward progress, whereas religion was equated to backwardness and the symbol of what was old and rejected. Accepting the religious and cultural norms as the primary reason of backwardness in the East, Republican elites believed that not only the Westerns technologies, but also Western culture and beliefs should apply (Schick, 2011, p. 27). This acceptance directly divided Turkish society into

two opposite sides and created a society that described itself by 'otherness'. The whole installation of Turkish modernity created an 'otherness'. Either you will be like me or you will be a nonbeing was the language of this new state (Kentel, 2008, p. 52). In other words, a description of one's identity was directly related to who you are not, instead of who you are. This process has created an extant social otherness process.

Elitist Republicans were accepted as more modern whereas the 'others', who did not give up on religious priorities and could not get along with the new rules, were accepted as reactionary (gerici) and have been labeled with this title until present times. This otherness process created its own accepted state elites and gave them superiority against the 'others' or minorities and religious people. Furthermore, these 'others' were accepted as second-class citizens in the new State. These 'others' were neither seen as equal citizens nor treated equally.

The idea was to create a homogenous society under the control of a Military based new state with four interventions, in 1960, 1971, 1980, and lastly February 28, to keep up its existence. Although all four interventions were done in the name of producing a stable and secure environment, to the result protected the Republican elite status in the government and society. The fear of reaction (irtica) was also considered. After the first three interventions ended by the end of 1980s, the right-wing Motherland Party (MP) by Turgut Özal came into the power.

The two important aims of Özal were economic development and a broader democratization idea. Through his liberal economic legislation, the economic balances began to change. The middle class Anatolian capital, which was already more visible in the business world by the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1960s, took a big step into the business world. Thus, the new economic,

social, and urbanization process became lively again. The new Anatolian capital, comprised mostly of conservative people, brought their culture and beliefs along with themselves. With his broad democratization policies some other religious groups felt free to be a part of social life. The women with headscarves would have the right to go to universities again, where they were banned by the 1980 military intervention. Therefore, the visibility of conservative and religious people increased in the public sphere. Unlike the past, this time there were many conservative and religious people in working places and universities. Unfortunately, these freedoms did not last for long.

In chronological order, Turgut Özal became Prime Minister between 1983-1989 and then President between 1989-1993. After five years of the presidency, he had a heart attack and died in 1993. Although during his presidency the conservative middle class people had a chance to be a part of the economy and public sphere, after his death the stable environment turned upside down. There was a troublous 4 years that took Turkey to the February 28 post-modern coup. After Özal's ministry, there were two to three party coalitions until 2002. After several coalition governmental changes, in 1995 the Welfare Party (WP) took the most votes; whereas, the Motherland Party (MP) formed a coalition government with the True Path Party (TPP).

With governments after the Ministry of Özal, reaction (irtica) discourses started and attempted to produce chaos. Lastly, when the WP came to power, after the collapse of the coalition of the MP and TTP, it was the last straw for the military because of the existence of increasing pro-Islamic political parties.

In 1996, the coalition of the WP and TTP formed the government and Necmettin Erbakan became the Prime Minister, but it did not last long. Before the end of the first year the opposition parties and the President called for an

early election. On February 28 the National Security Council (NSC) made decisions regarding the will of the WP. On May 21 the Supreme Court of Appeals Prosecutor's (SCAP) office sued the WP for leading against the laicism. Erbakan had already resigned his office while the case continued. On the other hand, after the NSC decisions Turkey entered the February 28 process officially. Then, until the Justice and Development Party (JDP or AKP in Turkish) came into the power in 2002, several other coalition governments took place again.

Unlike the earlier three interventions, this post-modern coup seemed less violent; the coup was mostly a result of public relation campaigns. Sevgi Akarçesme paraphrases from N. Narlı (2001) as the, "Army also engages in public relations work by promoting 'national security concept' to raise citizens' consciousness about internal and external threats that it identifies." (2006, p. 47). The military did the same thing during the process of February 28. Most of the people did not feel safe, either economically or socially. The most important campaign discourses were 'preventing the reaction' (irticayı engellemek) and 'protect the laicism' (laikligi korumak). While some television channels, newspapers, academics, and columnists were supporting the military intervention, others were labeled as political Islamists or as a threat of separatism under the name of fighting against the reaction (irtica). Some journalists were expelled just for not writing and speaking in favor of military and the coup. The name of specific businesses and institutions were labeled as enemies of the secular Turkish Republic in the media. Some companies were labeled as 'green capital', which represented the religious companies, and the military directly and publicly asked the citizens not to work with them. These demands acted as political, economic and psychology lynching toward religious people.

On the other hand, spreading oppression and cruelty to a much broader group of society created unity and reaction in the long run. Oppression and prohibitions on different parts of life, such as schools, work, television, and newspapers, made the February 28 military intervention a negative influence on many people from different angles. In fact, this common oppression gathered different people together under the umbrella of the AKP after a couple of years.

Cruelty and oppression continued a couple of years until the AKP won the elections, but of course winning the elections alone was not enough to change the oppressive measures. It was a start toward change.

2. This Study

Turkey has experienced large political and social changes in the last fifteen years. Islamist, conservative, or religious people have felt negative change the most after the three military interventions, February 28 military intervention was the last military intervention that affected society politically and socially. Since being the government's 'persona non grata', this process made them the 'other' once more. Changes have affected them not only politically and economically, but also psychologically. This is one of the reasons that why the terminologies, Islamist, conservative, or religious, have changed in different times and eras.

On the other hand, after February 28 the military intervention lost its influence on society through a new government and changes, which began a new era. This time these 'persona non grata' became the people who gained power politically and economically. This shift after oppressive years was new for the people and brought with it new social changes and an adjustment period.

This study will give a voice to the former Islamist and new conservatives who were affected by the February 28 process. It will try to discover who these men are and what they thought and felt during and after the February 28 military intervention. It will work on the idea that although these men mostly seemed silent when it comes to protecting or defending the rights of women with headscarves, not being able to get involved and have to stay silent caused long-term negative results. After February 28 process ended, these women have spoken regarding their psychological state and trauma, and how they felt left alone by these men. None of the men have spoken of their inability and desperation in their relationships with their wives and daughters. After the process ended, a change occurred between men and women regarding family life and gender roles. This study also asks whether the gender roles have changed, and if so, what made this change.

Qualitative methods have been used in this study. A variety of primary and secondary sources related to the history of Islamism, conservatism, masculinity, and culture were used to gain historical and theoretical backgrounds. The background was then consulted to analyze the data extracted from in-depth interviews conducted with former Islamist men from Istanbul.

The study has been done with a small group that includes ten interviews with men who mostly had and today still have Islamist roots. The interviews were selected according to marital status, age group, and educational level. All of the interviewees were married and have, at least, a college education. The ages were from forty-five to sixty-five years. All of them had Islamist roots with different groups and some were still in these religious groups. The conversations mostly started by asking about the February 28 military

intervention. After talking about the process and past, the topic reached present time and today's changes.

The interviews showed that some terms should be redefined in order to better understand and named a new group. First, Islamism must be redefined. Whether Islamism is still alive or not is one of the concerns of the academics who currently study ideology. Changes have occurred since the terminology was first used in Turkey. So the aims of Islamism seem obsolete in some ways, whereas others believe that the one that has changed are Islamists themselves and not Islamism as an ideology. Instead of focusing on the change of Islamism, this work will focus on the change of the Islamists. Especially since the JDP (AKP) say they are Conservative Democrats, it has been a question mark in the minds of people whether the Islamists have changed or they only changed the label.

In this study, these men will be identified as 'Islamist' referring to before and during the February 28 process. When referred to as 'new conservatives' (NC) or 'former Islamists' (FI), this means those Islamist post-February 28 processes and today. The NC group is a heterogeneous group that includes former Islamists, cultural conservatives, and religious conservatives who are mostly educated and economically comfortable. Although the backgrounds of these people seem different from each other, according to the changes and similarity in their lifestyles made them gather under the label of NC.

Certain changes occurred before, during, and after the February 28 processes. According to interviews, there are three stages in the changing process of these men. Before the February 28 process when they were Islamists, during the process when they were confused and could not get involved in the lives of their wives and daughters, and lastly NC stage where they are still confused but more settled. Furthermore, their feelings, thoughts, and lifestyles in these

three eras will be compared by the interviews. With social, political, and economic changes, their gender role ideas have changed as well; they do not know whether the gender role changes happened consciously or not.

This study consists of 3 chapters. The first mainly deals with Islamism and conservatism ideologies. The first chapter discusses the background and backbones of this work. The relationship of Islamism and conservatism in the history of Turkey will be discussed. The question of the religiosity as a common point of Islamism and conservatism will be examined.

The second chapter focuses on religiosity from a different point. The main question in this chapter is whether religiosity is losing its influence on Islamism and conservatism. Whether or not religiosity influences the gap between Islamism and conservatism will be examined. The relation of socio-economic changes with religiosity will be another topic of discussion.

The last chapter discusses the changes and challenges faced by the NC. This chapter is the main part that discusses the thoughts and feelings of NC and the changes and events before, after, and during the February 28 military intervention. In this chapter the terms of manhood and womanhood will be discussed. Furthermore, the effects of culture and the religion on manhood will be examined. The effects of social changes on gender roles will be discussed.

This study attempts to examine the effects of political and social changes from a closer point. How political and social changes can create a more heterogeneous social structure will be analyzed. The transitivity of social identities and how hard it can be to identify people even if they have religious or ideological symbols will be evaluated. Therefore, this study will examine

the social constructed identities and their changeability by time and social changes.

All interviews for this thesis were done in Turkish and translated into English. This study is an effort at understanding the social changes influencing people's minds and lives. The reason for this study is to understand different perspectives and lives. New ideas from the 'others' who were not heard before are revealed.

CHAPTER I

1. Islamism and Conservatism, and the Role of Religiosity

Islamism, conservatism and as a common interest religiosity have been hot topics for years in the history of the Turkish Republic. The relation between these three terms and the importance of religiosity between Islamism and conservatism are confusing, yet popular, topics recently. During all of these years, both Islamism and conservatism have had their own social evolutions and ideologies from different perspectives. Although these two ideologies have different roots and meanings, they have resembled, even sometimes became interchangeable from time to time.

Although Islamism and conservatism are two different ideologies in terms of tradition, history, and time, they have met in a common ground and became interchangeable terms in Turkey. The most important difference is that Islamism has revolutionist roots and conservatism means stability and slow change or resistance to change. Hakan Yavuz describes the difference as:

Islamic groups always searched for an opportunity to change the character of the regime through center-right parties; whereas conservatives, who controlled center-right parties, used the discourse of spiritual (Islamic) values (*manevi değerler*) and religious symbols to expand their electoral base and to contain the demands of the religious groups within the secular system. The focal point became change in the regime rather than change of the regime. (2009, p. 37)

Islamism was born as a communitarian (ummetci) movement, whereas conservatism has been more centralist. Conservatives want to make changes in the regimes; whereas Islamists want to change the regime with a new one. While Islamism wants to make an entire change, conservatism intends small and slow changes in the regime.

In the case of Turkey, either global Islamism or centralist conservatism ideologies come closer in a common ground called religiosity. Furthermore, the Islamism movement has turned into a conservatism movement in time. Even today the Islamist rooted party AKP called itself a Conservative Democratic Party. The interchangeability of these terms has also affected the content and definition of each.

As Prof. Duran says, being affected by different ideologies in the history of Turkey is the first feature of Turkish Islamism that should be realized (Duran, 2010). The questions of what Islamism and conservatism mean do not have easy and clear answers for Turkey. How the two ideologies came closer and have affected each ideology is another question of investigation.

This chapter will focus on the meanings and history of Islamism and conservatism ideologies. At the same time, the chapter will try to understand religiosity as a common ground of these two ideologies. How come these two ideologies join on the same ground and what brought them together are mainly questioned.

1.1 The Difference Between Islamism and Conservatism

1.1.1 Islamism

The term Islamism has a story in the history of Turkish modernity. In order to make a sound analysis of Islamism and understand its evolution, it is important to be aware of the different usage of the term in the history of Turkey. The meaning of the term in Turkish culture is another feature that changes in time. Although it is a term used in political, social, and economic literature in the world, it does not have the same meaning in every culture.

While trying to understand the change of Islamism that has taken place in Turkey, this part will look at the term Islamism from the perspective of history, politics, and social change at the same time.

Historically, the Islamism ideology was born as a way of bringing all Muslims together to have a new life due to the difficult situations of most Muslim countries in the world during that time. TDV Islamic Encyclopedia (Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi) offers a comprehensive definition for Islamism. It says, "Islamism was born as a way to make Islam dominate one's life in terms of belief, thought, moral, politics, and administration and law, in order to create unity and solidarity between Muslims to save them from the backwardness of the West in the second part of the XIX century of the Ottoman intellectualism." (Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, number: 23, p. 60)

This description suggests that unity and solidarity among Muslims are the main purpose of the newly established Islamism, as well as rejecting the "backwardness" of the West. Professor İsmail Kara gives an extended and more detailed description for Islamism as:

Islamism is a movement that covers Islam as a whole (as belief, practice, morality, philosophy, politics, law, education, etc.) into the 19th and 20th century. Islamism makes the Islamic world dominant again in a rationalistic way, to rescue the Islamic world from Western colonization's cruel and despotic governors, slavery, imitation, and superstitions. It is a movement that involves being civilized, unified, and in the name of development activist an eclectic of politically, intellectually, and scientifically workings and seeking. (Kara, , 2011, p. 1)

This definition gives more information about the existence of the ideology of Islamism. Professor Kara takes the emergence of the Islamism ideology back

to the 19th century. To understand the existence of the term, it is important for one to answer the questions of where, when, and how this creation first happened.

From the first usage of Islamism until today there have been different stages in Turkish Islamism. All these changes were influenced by different social, economic, and political reasons. That means the ideology of Islamism has changed by the various impacts of those three factors in the course of time. Also it is still changing by the means of social influences. For example, Ali Bulaç explains the change of Islamism in three stages in the history of Turkey.

According to Bulaç the first generation of Islamists formed between 1850-1924, the second generation between 1959 -2000, and the last stage started in 2000 and continues until today (2004, p. 48-49). This means that with respect to time and other influences the meaning and the structure of Islamism has changed. The last change occurred after the February 28 process and this Islamism still continues today. There are many important political and economic changes that are directly influencing Islamism.

The meaning of Islamism, from different sources, shows that the main purpose of Islamism is to create a Muslim unity. Muslim unity is emphasized to defend against oppression. Muslims uniting acted as protection against oppression from Western colonization or backwardness (oppression) from the West. The Islamism ideology was a tool toward freedom for Muslims during colonial times. Moreover, the idea of freedom did not come alone; it also brought along with it social and political demands.

In retrospect, this is understandable if the social, political, and economic situations of most Muslim countries are taken into consideration during that time. Westerners colonized most of the Muslim countries, so the West was

seen as the biggest power and enemy to overcome. For that reason alone, the emphasis on Western ideas is still so important today. This may feel traumatic in the mind of Muslims as a force that they have been trying to overcome. Furthermore, imitating the West was a failed mission for years, but there was a desire to reach their standards. The West is viewed with both resent and envy by religious groups, including Islamists.

In time, the importance and power of the West as an enemy has changed. The meaning of the West is a good example of changing concepts; the West was once an enemy and, in time, a friend. It shows that concepts change by social, economic, and political influences so that an old enemy can be a friend suddenly. Noticing the change is not enough by itself. Awareness of the change is the first step and then the change should be examined and understood.

Consequently, most Muslim countries were fighting for their freedoms against the colonization by Western countries. In order to be free of colonization, a movement began to unite all Muslims together. This movement included political, social, psychological, and economic parts of the lives of Muslims. It was inevitable not to include politics within their movement toward freedom. Thus, the Islamism ideology started as a way of enabling unity and starting a movement for freedom.

In the case of Turkey and Islamism, this kind of Western colonialism did not occur. However, the new Turkish Republic made reforms that lead to discrimination, oppression, and suppression in the name of Turkish modernity. To clarify, the new government prohibited religious symbols and practices in daily life in different ways; for instance, they established a hat reform in 1925 and an alphabet reform in 1927. According to the new government, all of the changes were to modernize Turkey; they eliminated

the Arabic alphabet, since it was a symbol of Islamic belief and culture, and made changes in clothing styles by bringing the European style hat. The old alphabet and clothing styles also represented the Ottoman Empire, which were thought of as backward and underdeveloped. Anything Ottoman Empire related equated as backwards.

These reforms led to Turkey becoming an oppressive government. These oppressive reforms made Turkish religious people feel the same as those Muslims in colonized Muslim countries. Oppression was not the only common ground; the West equaling modern and progressive methods was another factor that brought Turkish Islamists closer to the other colonized Muslims. Clearly, being oppressed by the West for colonized countries and being oppressed to be like the West for Turkish Islamists created a common enemy, the West. The West became an enemy of all Islamists around the world.

The second generation of Islamism is between 1950-2000. The most important political tendency for the second stage Islamists in Turkey was to start an Islamic society and an Islamic government as the other Islamist movements in colonized Muslim countries wanted. Islamism preached governance or getting the control of the government. It was like this not only in Turkey, but also in Iran and Afghanistan around the same dates (Bulaç, 2004, p. 49). The elimination of religion, religious practices, and consequently religious people from the social and governmental structure made Islamists think and feel like a stranger or the 'other' in this new government. Furthermore, these people become 'persona non grata' in society. Having political power, in other words an Islamic government, seemed the only way to be saved from colonization and oppression and to become a part of society again. As a result, politics and political movements became mainstream methods of Islamism.

Today the changes in mainstream Islamism, in time, in Turkey are important. After a couple of military coups and interventions, including one was directly against Islamic groups and conservative people, an Islamic rooted right wing JDP (AKP) has come to the power. The JDP (AKP) run government can be taken as a success or a failure of Islamism from different perspectives. The AKP was an Islamist rooted government in power despite previous military interventions. This means, the mainstream purpose of Islamism came true in Turkey. The Islamism ideology has taken a new route by the third generation.

The third generation of Islamism begins from the year 2000 to today. By the third generation the idea of Islamism, expectations from Islamism, and purposes of former Islamists started to take a new route. These former evolved Islamists is described as new conservatives in this thesis. These new conservatives, who were former Islamists, created a new understanding of the structure of the government different than the AKP government. Former Islamists did not need to think about gaining power since they were already in power. The purpose of new conservatives turned into adopting the social life abandoned for years prior. This purpose change in the ideology brought with it plenty of new criticism. The real meaning of Islamism was misunderstood by many; some believed Islamism was not entirely political, whereas others believed Islamism was heading toward destruction by the third generation and therefore out of the political spectrum soon. Islamists changed drastically after the February 28 process and the changes brought their own problems and questions.

1.1.2. February 28 Process and Its Effects on Islamism

Awareness that Islamism is not the only way to describe Muslim life in Turkey is important to gain a better understanding of the last generation of Islamism. Islamism is an ideology and life style chosen by some Muslims; it is

not the only one (Bulaç, 2004, p. 50). The ideology and perspective of Turkish people about the world and religion varies. As an ideology, Islamism is not about saving the religion; rather, it is a way of protecting religious people's life style in Turkey. The religion was already there, but some Muslims could not practice and apply it to their lives as they wanted. Islam became a way of life and chosen for that reason. It should be understood that if one is not an Islamist, it does not mean that one is not Muslim. Islamism has occurred as a particular way of adapting the religion to life. It is not a description that covers all forms and applications of Islam or ways of practicing Muslims.

After having an Islamic rooted government, even if the government stops calling itself Islamist, the question of being a Muslim with and without the Islamism description comes to the table. After all of these governmental changes, former Islamists started to examine old practices and what they believe today. One of the interviewees, Mr. D. who is in his 50s, has a university education, married with five children, and also the founder of an Islamic association, says he saw the past Islamism movement as a way of living religion. Furthermore, he compares what he believed in the past with today. He also criticizes himself and his group for overlooking gaps they had in their institutions and groups in the past. He believes that the February 28 process was a way to renew themselves and their foundations:

The February 28 process showed us what we can and cannot do and how well the government was organized as a way we did not recognize before. It occurred that to get power through community organizations was only a dream. It showed us how badly our foundations got corrupted. Also it gave us an opportunity to think about problems that we have not have time to discuss until today. It has greatly contributed to reevaluating and judging our lives and ourselves. (interview, 30 November, 2011)

Instead of accusing the change by naming it corruption, Mr. D. admires this change because it sparked a conversion regarding the way of living Islamism. Mr. D.'s perspective shows that the February 28 processes have made former Islamists to think about the Islamism ideology from the past with respect to today. It seems as the last stage that starts with the February 28 process has brought new feelings, thoughts, and ideas to former Islamists. During their struggle to gain power, they overlooked many important aspects in their lives such as family functions and social interactions. Mr. D. mentions that family life is an important part that they missed. Their previous lack of interest in family life confused them regarding the difficulties within women's lives after the February 28 process. After the February 28 process women joined the public sphere. Most women who were suffered from educational discrimination in Imam Hatip High Schools chose different lives. Therefore most of the men did not know how to react in these new situations and preferred to stay silent.

Recently new conservative men struggle with their new social and private lives instead of political or business life. Unlike the past, this time the change was more about being active in social and daily life, instead of politics. In the past, gaining political power as a way to exist was the priority, whereas recently the tendency is more about social life. These changes are the results of past political, economic, and social influences.

It is obvious that February 28 was a turning point for some former Islamists. The result of February 28 processes turned the dream of former Islamists into a reality unexpectedly. Unfortunately, the change started with personal traumas and crises that shaped the personalities of these men.

In the beginning, the February 28 military intervention was traumatic for some Islamists. This period produced various economic, social, psychological,

and political results. According to some academics, the February 28 military intervention was an economic move against the green capital (yeşil sermaye), but its social, psychological, and political long-term effects are undeniable.

This period put pressure on those people who were religious. Women with headscarves were banned from the public sphere; some religious companies whose owners were religious were banned from the market because of being green capital. Green capital represents the conservative group's capital; they were politically lynched through the media. For a couple of years attempts of religious discrimination succeeded. Women could not go to school with headscarves or get hired and outwardly known Islamist men could not get into the job market either. Like all other coups, it did not last forever. After the AKP won the election in 2002, the process started taking a new route. Of course it did not mean that everything changed in one night, but the change had started.

Change did not happen that quickly, but over time. Change started politically, then economically, and eventually affected social norms as well. The former Islamists, or new conservatives, began to participate more in every part of life.

One of the most important recent changes is the mutated meaning of the West for these new conservatives. The West is not an enemy anymore; instead it appears as a desired association. The issue of being a part of the European Union (EU) has been widely debated and given too much importance after the JDP (AKP) government. In this sense, the West was not an enemy any more; instead joining to the EU has become an important step toward development. The enemy changed into envy in time. Participating with the West is not something to fear anymore. Becoming modern and accepting modernization is a new change for new conservatives. So the old purpose of gaining power from the biggest enemy, the West, has lost its meaning. By losing the ex-

enemy, a gap emerged, and they felt the need for a new purpose. As Mümtaz'er Türköne mentions in his column, the changing position of this ex-enemy emptied a place to be filled again. Losing the ultimate enemy created a need for a new world view.³

After a long and traumatized period a new era, or a new world, has begun for former Islamist. This means that a new, long, and hard process has also started for them. By the era of February 28, the terms Islamism and conservatism gained new meanings as well. Former Islamists began calling themselves new conservatives due to the new changes occurring.

Recently, an important debate between the terms Islamism and conservatism has started. In order to understand better, we will examine conservatism and its meaning. What does conservatism mean? Does it have the same meaning in Turkey as the rest of the world? What has changed in the minds of Islamists about conservatism? Can we currently separate conservatives from Islamists in Turkey? Although it is not that easy to separate these terms in Turkey's new conjuncture (konjonktür), understanding some changes in the meaning of the terms with respect to society will be discussed next.

1.1.3 Conservatism

In the case of Turkey, conservatism may be understood in two ways. First, conservatism is an ideology that affects Islamism. Second, conservatism is the ideology that has taken the place of Islamism, as the Prime Minister calls himself a Conservative Democrat instead of an Islamist. In the first, it is used as an adjective or maybe the supplementary of Islamism. In the second, there

³ Mümtaz'er Türköne / Zaman / 26 June 2012, Thursday

is an attempt to put conservatism in the place of Islamism. This gives a clue for understanding conservatism in Turkey.

The term “conservatism” is a result of the France Revolution of 1789–1799. The French Revolution changed absolute powers, which were aristocracy, monarchy and religious authority. Rebellions wanted the change from the top, which is God, to the very bottom, which meant the Father is head of household. They did not want any kind of authority beyond individuals. Although the revolution was done for equality, citizenship, and inalienable rights, it turned into a Reign of Terror after three years. All of a sudden The Reign of Terror (September 5, 1793 – July 28, 1794) became a period of violence that continued for four years after the onset of the French Revolution.

The ‘Reign of Terror’ is important because it showed people wanted the monarchy, the old system, to return. The bloody revolution made people think that although the revolution was to bring equality and citizenship, it did not work out that way. On the contrary, it brought disturbance, violence, and instability. At this point, representatives of the right winged Gaullist groups were supported for being nationalistic, emphasizing tradition, stable, and the reformation of France.

Edmund Burke, known as one of the founders of conservatism in Great Britain, was the most important supporter of conservatism in France. In his famous book “Reflections on the Revolution in France” (1790), Burke writes intense attacks against the French Revolution. The main claim of the book was that revolutionary France must be defeated militarily and that the ancient regime must be reinstated; this was a break from other British politicians who did not support the revolution. (Hampsher-Monk 2005, p. 65)

To understand the way conservatism developed in France, it is necessary to understand the social, political, and cultural concept of the region at that time since conservatism was an offspring of the social conditions of that time. During the revolution conservatism began as a strong and powerful ideology and a movement that wanted to bring the old monarchy system into power by blaming the revolution for the death of thousands of people. Michael Oakeshott describes conservatism as, "To be conservative is to be disposed to think and behave in certain manners; it is to prefer certain kinds of conduct and certain conditions of human circumstances to others: it is to be disposed to make certain kinds of choices." (On Being Conservative, p.1)⁴

Many questions come to mind after that description. What kind of conservatism did they want? What does that conservatism mean for them? What does conservatism mean in general? What were the general features of conservatism? Maybe the most important question is what is understood by conservatism in Turkey?

From the emergence of conservatism, it seems that it was a movement to regain the governmental and social stability that they had before. The revolution lost its importance after instability took over. According to conservatives, change is acceptable only when it is slow and if it does not make radical changes, because radical changes bring chaos with them. Moreover tradition, culture, and gender roles are important and have their own place, which should be protected and which are not changeable. The patriarchal structure, which is directly related to gender issues and social superiority, is very important for conservatives.

⁴ <http://faculty.rcc.edu/sellick/On%20Being%20Conservative.pdf>

In the West, initially, conservatism was the idea of bringing back the old monarchy regime. The monarchy system is hierarchical, and it refers to the absolute position of God at the top, then to the church as God's representative, then to the King, which is then followed by men or father. From that perspective, conservatism is not only about politics or governance; it is also about family and the social life of people. So, it can be said that conservatism is an idea, which supports the place of the men as the governor in the family. Another way to phrase this is to say that conservatism supports the idea of manhood and the ideas of masculinity.

During the revolution all young people were considered adults by the age of 18, which was not acceptable for the conservatives. These young people could make their own decisions and be free from their parents. It seemed that the old and ordinary system was in danger since a younger generation could take the place of a King in politics or the place of the father in the house.

Religion and the importance of religion in conservatism in Turkey are important. An idea that starts with God and related to the church must come from the religion in the West. The difference between the West and Turkey is that in the West conservatism was a reaction to aristocrats, who were directly related to church and God. The bourgeois and the lower class wanted to have their own territories, which meant they wanted their freedom by leaving or ignoring religion. Territories did not only have economic meanings, but they had political and social goals such as freedom.

When it comes to Turkey the usage of conservatism is a little bit more complicated. Besides being a part or adjective of Islamism, conservatism usually is related to religiosity in Turkey. Conservatism does not gain power from aristocrats in Turkey; conservatism sprung from the ones who were left behind on the way to be to a modern and Western new Turkish Republic.

After the proclamation of the new Turkish Republic and during the Turkish modernization, most religious symbols were swept from social life. This symbolic sweep was not only to gain power, freedom, and private territory, but rather it was a way to rid the old system and to become more modern. There were many other political and economic reasons, but this one is the most important one in terms of shaping the meaning of conservatism that we have today in Turkey.

The ones who wanted to keep the religious beliefs and symbols in their social and private lives are labeled as conservatives or “reactionary” (gerici) or the one who want to bring back the beliefs that set them back. Those were mostly the Islamists who wanted to live their religious life. Religiosity became the main common ground of conservatism and Islamism in Turkey.

1.1.4. Religiosity: As a Common Point of Islamism Conservatism

Islamism and the usage of conservatism, in Turkey, are interchangeable. From some point of views it is understandable. On the other hand, if we look at the birth of the terms and the meanings they have in the world we can see a clear difference between two of them.

Islamism was a movement to start a revolution for freedom of life and beliefs; whereas conservatism was a reaction to the revolution to maintain the old system, which was more stable but unequal. Islamism wanted a revolution to gain power and rights as soon as possible. On the other hand, conservatism never supported quick and big changes. Change was only accepted, conservatively, if it is slow.

Islamism sprung from oppression due to colonialism and forbidding freedom of religion. To include their beliefs into social and political life, Islamists could support a huge and sudden change. How change occurs is where the similarity and the discrepancy with conservatism occurs. Returning and keeping religiosity in social and private life is a common idea for both Islamism and conservatism. So although conservatism does not approve of big and sudden changes, the reference to religiosity creates a close relationship between them. Hence, the way of change and the importance of time are different for Islamism and conservatism, whereas the main target has brought these two different ideologies on the same ground.

For fifteen years after the February 28 process, something has begun to change. First, most of the former Islamists have abandoned the name Islamism; instead they have begun to use conservatism. This time this replacement is different from the past, because they use conservative to avoid being labeled as Islamist. They created new social, political, and economic conservative groups that include people, not only from Islamist backgrounds, but also from different backgrounds. This new conservative group has become more heterogeneous.

There are other groups who did not have Islamist backgrounds, but have traditional belief systems or lifestyles, in this new powerful conservative group. During these social changes, the terms have taken on new meanings. Also, interestingly, religiosity has started losing its importance in this new complex group.

1.2. Conclusion

This chapter has constituted the terminological groundwork for the following two chapters. It has explained the relationship between Islamism and

conservatism and religiosity between two of them. The next chapter will be more about the change of former Islamists who are called new conservatives.

The next chapter will analyze the influence of religiosity on old Islamists and the new conservatives. It will give information about whether decreasing the importance of religiosity caused this change or not. More importantly, whether there are some other factors that caused that change, other than the decrease of the influence of religiosity. How come conversion of the purpose of the Islamism ideology and losing the importance of West as an enemy can influence these changing processes?

The last chapter will specifically focus on the change of the men after the February 28 process. Those are the men who called themselves Islamist in the past and now do not know how to call or name themselves. They will be referred to as new conservatives after that explanation. It means that the group that has occurred after February 28 processes by the JDP (AKP) government will be called 'new conservatives' in the next chapters. The focus will be on the effect of the February 28 process with respect to manhood and family life in the last chapter. Lastly, there will be a discussion regarding the transitivity of identities and social roles in Turkish society.

CHAPTER II

2. Losing the Importance of the Religiosity in Islamism and Conservatism

Especially after the new Turkish Republic, Islamism and conservatism both have had complicated and mutual relationships. Although the roots and purposes differ from one another, they are still considered twin brothers for the sake of religiosity in the history of Turkish modernity. Occasionally they complete each other and other times they substitute each other. Religiosity has always been a part of these two ideologies throughout this time frame. The amount of the effect of religiosity has changed from time to time. When analyzing the history of the Republic of Turkey, it seems that religiosity was the main idea of conservatism for one group.

This does not mean that conservatism only focuses on religiosity even though the usage of conservatism usually relates to most religious people. There are conservative leftists, conservative laicists, and other conservative groups; even so, in Turkey, conservativeness generally refers to more religious.

Therefore, the connection between Islamism and conservatism over religiosity is necessary for Turkey. Religiosity, or a religious life, was the main concern of Islamism. Although Islamism can be described as a reactionary movement because of its evolution and conversion and its support of conservatism in daily and private life, Islamism and conservatism became interconnected. In other words, these three concepts have a mutual and interchangeable relationship.

This chapter will discuss what happened with this mutual relationship after the February 28 process. Furthermore, it will also explore whether it adapted into a new relationship.

2.1. The Gap Between Islamism and Conservatism

Although Islamism was a revolutionary ideology in the beginning, its evolution within Turkey process turned Islamism into conservatism. There are many influences in creating this relationship and religiosity may be one of the most effective factors that brought these two ideologies together currently. The main question here is whether religiosity is the main factor that continues to have a powerful influence on this relationship or not.

According to the interviews it seems that Islamism and conservatism differed in giving weight to religiosity. For some of the interviewees, the main reason that caused this separation is the replacement of religiosity by secularization. In other words, when religiosity began losing its importance, secularization started to replace religiosity. While discussing these relationship changes, the interviewees especially emphasize the era of Turgut Özal. There is an opinion that the period of Özal brought the idea of conservatism and Islamism closer. Mr. D. says, “Before February 28. Muslims did not recognize Özal’s government. Özal seriously influenced conservatism and the liberalization of Muslims” (interviewee, November, 30 2011). By saying so, Mr. D. clearly points out that the close relationship between Islamism and conservatism began during Özal’s era.

From this perspective, can we say that the process of Islamists and conservatives merging closer was a serious step? On the other hand, can we ask whether this closeness has changed, especially in the last fifteen years? In

other words, can we say that conservatism has fallen out of application with Islamism?

There is a consensus between the interviewees that Islamists have changed during the past fifteen years. Most of the criticism explains how and why Islamists have changed. Most of the interviewees I talked to criticized the fact that Islamists started to turn into more secular people. Mr. G. is fifty-four years old, married with four children, earned a Bachelor's degree, and has his own company. He says:

This is the problem with today's Islamists: they run after success with the criteria of the West. In other words, the Ottomans' success is trying to be attained with a secular approach. While they treat this world differently and carry out their trade and daily lives with Western criteria, they, on the other hand, undertake their prayers and religious talks in the mosques. The point in question here is a secular way of life (interview, December 13, 2011).

What Mr. G. tries to say is that today's Islamists separate their private, social, and work life from each other. With each of them, they preferred different systems; religiosity in private lives and secularism at work.

This is an interesting statement because Mümtaz'er Türköne takes this situation as the end of Islamism. As he states:

Turkey has changed. If we were to ask the question: Who changed it? And if we are to look for actors reservedly, we need to give the first place to those who once defined themselves as Islamists. If you were to ask this question today, most of them will talk about childish things from their youth with an innocent smile covering their face. Those, who strongly opposed the government earlier, are speaking on behalf of the government today. The expression 'on behalf of the government' seems to be insignificant; they are directly speaking "as if they are the government." Is it that easy? This

is the government we're talking about. Did the Islamists change the government? They secured it, but it is the government that changed them.⁵

Türküne claims that although Islamists have achieved their dreams, they are not the same people as they were in the past. With a capital letter, he says that they became the power that they were against in the beginning. This is another point that shows how Islamists turned into conservatives by preserving the state system.

On the other hand, this paved the way for another question to surface. Were these new conservatives trying to separate religiosity from their daily lives and keep it within their private lives? This change, whether it happened by accident or intentionally, was similar to the laicists' approach toward religion. The religion became more about private life; the public sphere, business careers, and social life were separate from religion all of a sudden. Therefore the main mission of the new Turkish Republic and laicists was accomplished without their intervention since the new Turkish conservatives reached the same conclusion in time. Mr. C. is in his 40s, married with three children, and is the owner of his own company. He states:

Business networks are now comfortable. In fact, laicism has jarred into the bones of conservatism. There are a significant number of these secular conservatives within these business networks now. Perhaps, they were always there but started to surface recently. 'This is the way it needs to happen,' 'this is how it is meant to be,' and 'the two worlds should not be entangled' are some ideas that have come forward. The conservatives, who have been accepted into this circle, have

⁵ Türkiye değişti. "Kim değiştirdi?" sorusuna, mütevazı sınırlar içinde failer arıyorsak, ilk sırayı bir zamanlar kendilerini "İslâmcı" olarak tanımlayanlara vermemiz lâzım. Bugün sorsanız, çoğu yüzüne yayılan masum bir tebessümle gençlik yıllarına ait unuttuğu çocuksu şeylerden dem vuracaktır. Dünün keskin devlet karşıtları bugün devlet adına konuşuyorlar. "Devlet adına" lafı hafif kaldı; doğrudan "devlet olarak" konuşuyorlar. Kolay mı, koskoca devlet. İslâmcılar devleti değiştirdi mi? Devleti ele geçirdiler, ama devlet de onları değiştirdi. Mümtaz'er Türküne / Zaman Newspaper / 24 July 2012, Tuesday

brought that ease that pre-existed within their own natures along with themselves. While there wasn't any abuse in those circles where the conservatives had dwelled in, this abuse exists more than those conservatives. For instance, it is just like those, who postpone paying their debt and go under more debt. The truth of the matter is that there are work ethics in the other circles, but the conservatives do not have ethics (interview, December 12, 2011).

He describes the change as how laicism and conservatism resemble each other since they separate one's private and social lives. Furthermore, the adoption of the 'two separated worlds' idea brought a new kind of lifestyle and point of view to Turkey.

Overall the common ground in each interview is that there is a change and this change is acceptable as long as it does flourish from the West or secular life. The question that comes to mind is whether this kind of change is acceptable or suitable with the given definition of Islamism.

When it comes to changes in Islamism, different explanations are given by authors, interviewees, and scholars. Mümtaz'er Türköne is an author who believes that change eliminated the old Turkish Islamists and created a new social group. According to Türköne:

Which one has changed more? Of course the Islamists have, in fact, change is not the issue here, they have moved to a completely different dimension. Do they have political projects hidden in their bags in the name of Islamism? No. Did they administer all of them and finished them? No. They completely forgot and abandoned them. This is different to stripping one's business identity off. This act of stripping one's identity and casting one's net this wide was a political choice while abandoning Islamism was a necessity to move on with democracy. History has given this chance to the Islamists.⁶

⁶ Hangisi daha çok deđiřti? Elbette İslâmcılar; deđiřmek ne kelime bambařka bir boyuta tařındılar. İslâmcılık adına çantalarında siyasî bir projeleri var mı? Yok. Uygulayıp mı tükettiler? Hayır. Tamamıyla

Türküne attributes his idea of such a drastic change in Islamism to democracy. He accuses Turkish Islamists of not having the same dreams as they had in the past. Whether we should label these changes a creation of a new social group or just a form of diversity may be debated. However, when we look at today's discourse in one's social and political life, we can say that the new conservatives are not a total death of Turkish Islamism.

From one point Türküne's argument is valid, but is it possible to expect anything to be as it was in the past? Is it possible to make some changes in the way that we look at Islamism or do some changes equate a total change in belief? Although there are different answers for those questions, the main question here is what happened to the relationship between Islamism and conservatism?

According to the readings and the interviewees, a distance came between conservatism and Islamism. The 1980s were the most active times of Islamist movements in Turkey. Most of the interviewees believe that Islamism is a revolutionary movement; actively living with an ideology should be a part of today's Muslims as it was in the past. Although the relationship of Islamism and conservatism was always close, the February 28 process brought them much closer. For instance, an individual who wore a headscarf for religious or traditional purposes was perceived as Islamist through this process. This was not something expected or planned, but unified the different groups under an umbrella.

unuttular ve vazgeçtiler. Bu iş gömlek çıkartmaktan farklı. Gömlek çıkartmak, yelpazeyi geniş tutmak için siyasî bir tercihti. İslâmcılıktan vazgeçmek ise, demokrasi ile yola devam edebilmek için bir mecburiyetti. Tarih İslâmcılara bu şansı verdi. (Mümtaz'er Türküne / Zaman Newspaper / 24 July 2012, Tuesday)

Wearing a headscarf became a common ground for conservatives and Islamists. This was an unexpected result of the February 28 process. Although this era was a time when the two ideologies merged, it seems that today this relationship split. After fifteen years the distance has expanded. Although these two ideologies had a mutual relationship, depending on political and social changes, the closeness and distance has changed from time to time. Mr. B. is in his 50s, married with 5 children, earned a Bachelor's degree, and founder of an Islamic community from a young age. He describes the changes:

The February 28 process seriously damaged and challenged traditional foundations. It also caused wrong and insufficient functions in relation to Quran Courses and Imam Hatip schools. For instance, they did not intervene with the Quran Courses when there were many issues within them; for example, those people, who were taught there, had problems but these were never spoken about (interview, December 30, 2011).

Mr. B. mentions many religious institutions, how they were treated as sacred places, and people desired to preserve the institutions. After February 28, the founder and members of the institutions started thinking about the role and structure of the institutions. They also started to ask about what should and should not happen in these institutions. The relationship between conservatism and Islamism was a changeable relationship at that point. However, this change is not something only former Islamists see within themselves; how the rest of society views the changes also matters. According to the interviewees, one of the reasons, or one of the conclusions, of this separation is the decreasing influence of religiosity in this new group.

2.1.1. Religiosity Lost Its Influence on New Conservatives

All of the interviews indicate a change within this evolved group, which includes former Islamists, conservatives, and other new groups. They believe that a new social group has emerged, which grew its roots mostly from Islamists and conservatives. According to interviewees, the creation of this new heterogeneous group depends on the fading of religiosity. In other words, losing the influence of religiosity on Islamists and some conservatives has been one of the most influential reasons to change.

Mr. Z. is in his 50s, married with 3 children, earned a Bachelor's degree, and has been in an Islamic community since his college years. He says that the current position of Muslims is worrisome for the next generation. Living in an Islamic way and prioritizing the Islamic rules are not of any concern to this new group. Also, he says secularism has replaced religiousness. The importance of fashion brands has increased, whereas religiousness has lost its importance" (interview, June 15, 2012). As many academics, thinkers, and columnists believe, the interviewees define this change as increased secularism. In other words, a new way in which Islamists has lost religiosity has surfaced. Therefore, they believe that this separation is frightening for the next generation.

Mr. E. is in his 50s, married with three children, earned a Bachelor's degree, and was in a radical Islamic group since a young age. He points out another issue when he says, "The İsmailağa community⁷ started to wear high heels under abaya (çarsaf). This shows that while attire choices were considered important in consumerism, it is also triggered by these choices. Standing out

⁷ An Islamic order in Turkey

and consumerism behavior changed and the only thing that remained the same was the use of the headscarf” (interview, December 15, 2011).

Mr. E.’s words are important for two different reasons. First, this explanation negates the idea that the communities (cemaatler) and religious orders (tarikatter) did not change much; it also shows that those who left these communities have changed easily, quickly, and more than expected. This observation and explanation shows that when there is change in social life, people from different groups and religious orders became affected in different ways to various degrees. If a group is affected differently, it does not mean that they were not affected at all. Society changes as a whole in different ways and quantities.

Secondly, the visibility of women makes them a direct target of criticism. While wearing high heels may act as a way of decreasing religiosity in this group, we do not hear any commentary about men in the same group. We learn how the women in this group have changed, yet we do not hear anything regarding changes, or lack thereof, from the men.

When discussing visibility Mr. E. says, “Men do not consume much, but when they do, they will purchase a car. While women do purchase many small things, and that is why it doesn’t stick out like a sore thumb!” (interview, December 15, 2011). This is a new perspective. He says that although the visibility of women is much more apparent than men, the way of consumption makes men’s visibility more irritating. It seems consumption does not seem important to them, but instead social pressure makes them uncomfortable. Nevertheless, is the change really the way they perceive it? Why do the men think women’s expenses are not that visible?

There is an important point that is overlooked during the comparison of women and men during this changing process; the meaning of their changes varies. Women are buying and wearing expensive clothes; according to him, this is a way of degrading religious beliefs and accepting secularization. On the other hand when a man buys a car, from his perspective, it is something that can just change by money and therefore it is not secularization or derogation of religion. It is just an economical change in his mind. This idea is acceptable and normal in his view. At most, the behavior might be labeled as immodesty. However, it does not mean a total change or deterioration.

As Mr. C. says during our conversation, a group of conservatives has started to believe that separating two worlds from each other is a rule to live by. Actually, this is one of the main aims of laicism, to separate this world from the Hereafter. Today, this happens in a way that is not expected.

In relation to losing religiosity, there is confusion whether what is 'lost' is religiosity or individual and cultural attributes. Mr. C. goes on to say that these conservatives, the new heterogeneous group, have brought their characteristics with them into this new world. He states:

The conservatives, who have been accepted into this circle, have brought that ease that pre-existed within their own natures along with themselves. While there wasn't any abuse in the circles where the conservatives had not dwelled in, this abuse exists more within the circles where conservatives take place. For instance, it is just like those who postpone paying their debt and go under more debt. The truth of the matter is that there are work ethics in the other circles, but the conservatives do not have this (interview, December 12, 2011).

This comment is interesting because it takes us back to the argument that Islam does not have a culture in Turkey. So when these conservatives form a new group they do not bring the Islamist culture with them; they bring their

personalities or their social and private lives, which might become culture. Therefore, it is never clear whether the attributes brought are from themselves, their lives, or from Islamic culture, and there is no measuring stick or standard for these people. It is not as clear whether the change comes from a lack of religiosity or an increase of visibility from different groups whose priorities are not religious rules.

As a supporter of the idea that accepts changes as a deformation or secularization of religion, Mr. G. brings a new term to describe the situation, which is 'contamination' (kirlilik). "Contamination has not affected only men, but also women. Women have also been affected by the contamination of capitalism" (interview, December 13, 2011). He says that capitalism is another reason for this corruption and the decrease of the importance of religiosity. This means that the contamination that comes with capitalism first affected men, and then women. Capitalism has influenced these changes and can be a cause of decreasing religious sensibility.

Mr. T. is 60, married with three children, earned a Bachelor's degree, and has been involved in a religious group since his 40s. When he interprets the issue he also touches on religious sensitiveness:

They need to be modest. They are adapting their lifestyles to their religion. They are not living a life like the way they believe; they believe just like their lifestyles. This is where the problem stems from. What do we need to do? We need to live a more modest life. We need to adopt the life of the Prophet. For instance, I went to Hajj and stopped shaking hands with females. This caused a lot of reactions. We are a little nonrestrictive within MÜSİAD, too. We act in a nonrestrictive manner. It is either this or that. There is no line in between. It is either living the way Allah has shown us, or don't live at all (interview, December 13, 2011).

When he criticizes the change he mostly underlines the religious discourses that are not seen as priorities to Muslims, and how a Muslim should be and should live. He emphasizes the importance of a modest life as exemplified by the Prophet Mohammed. According to him, there is only white and black and no place for gray. He goes on by giving examples of more religious people by saying, "People who have become hafiz (who have memorized the Quran) are in the line of loan at interest in the banks. What is important is living the Quran" (interview, December 13, 2011). Capitalism causes most people to trade with banks with interest, which is against Islamic religious principles. Therefore, this is also a symbol of decreasing religious priorities.

Furthermore, the change of the women with headscarves mentioned by the interviewees is related to religiosity and faith, as well. The way they wear the headscarf and chosen clothing styles are all signs of corruption, according to Mr. T. These women have changed their priorities as a result of losing religiosity. Change has occurred within these women by lessening religiosity and faith in their daily lives. Their priorities changed from religiosity to elegance, according to Mr. T.

On the other hand, Mr. G. approaches this argument from a different perspective when he says:

The need to be preferred is also a part of our disposition. On this point, the only precedent they have is the models presented to them by the West through fashion, clothes, and apparel. I do not believe that these criticisms are sincere; they are only done for the purposes of criticism. We cannot say that profusion is Islamically prohibited for a man who lives a luxurious life. What is the truth is the question of whether it is a necessity or not, or whether his earnings have been attained legitimately or illegitimately. Or else we cannot put a limit to luxury. Who can?! If Allah has created it and permitted it and it does not interfere in its use, then you cannot interfere and reproach it. You can ask whether he is working for it or not.

The question of the criticisms against women is the fact that our women are being affected by the contamination of capitalism and materialism established in this world. There are problems of faith in relation to this implicit power (interview, December 13, 2011).

He starts with the criticism of appearance. Instead of accusing women directly, he claims that the only example we see today is Western fashion, lifestyle, education, etc. He says the women have no other choice but to take the examples of the West. Furthermore, he does not believe that this is constructive criticism; instead he accuses those people of being insincere. He brings religiosity priorities to the table again from a different perspective. To him, these kinds of consumption criticisms are all made without much thought. He points out the importance of social economic changes. According to him there are some religious rules, such as zakat (alms), and if a man fulfills his religious obligations then no other has a right to criticize him. He says that there are no certain social rules that can restrict the expenses of a Muslim if s/he performs obligations according to the religion. It seems the social economic change is another criticized reason. Is social economic change another reason increasing the gap between religiosity and Islamism or conservatism? Or is this only social pressure not justified?

2.1.2 Socio-Economic Changes Creating a Gap

According to Nilüfer Göle Turkey entered into a new timeframe after the 1980s and the free market economy brought importance to 'today' and 'now'. When the Turks had money, they loved the present or today. They started to earn quickly, spend directly, and gain status (2000, p. 7). Göle gives a general description about the socio-economic changes in the 1980s; hence, we cannot separate the Islamists or religious conservatives from this change. A new socio-economic change has began since 1980s and still continues today.

Hakan Yavuz also agrees on the idea of change by the Özal Government. In addition, he mentions the creation of a new economic group that is the Anatolian business class:

Turkish history after 1960 reflects the conflict between the emerging bourgeoisie and the hegemonic civilian–military bureaucracy over the definition and speed of the process of modernization, as opposed to Westernization. In this regard, class structure and the structure of political alliances went through a radical change during the Özal period as the influence of the military–civilian bureaucracy waned and the new Anatolian business class, along with the Istanbul-based industrialists, increased its power (2009, p.16).

Most of the interviewees agreed on the ideas expressed by Göle and Yavuz. They agreed that Özal’s reform policies created new opportunities of a liberal economy. This time it was not only for a small, currently rich group; instead it was a liberal economy that caused the creation of an Anatolian business class. As Fahrettin Altun says, this new liberal economic change intended to give an opportunity to Anatolian entrepreneurs, meet social requirements of Muslims in that modern world, and bring mattress-saving from European Muslims workers to Turkey (Altun, 2004, p. 55). Besides the value decline of religiosity, liberal economic politics have had an important effect on this change by creating a new business class.

On the other hand, this change did not only create a new Anatolian business class. In fact different conservative groups started to form in time. As Göle explains, the Islamic movement is neither the oppositional party, nor the only speaker of the conservative movement. Instead the change has created a new appearance and groups. As a matter of fact, urbanized, educated, and professional middle classes have occurred. And this new group has constituted the base of the Welfare Party (WP) and Virtue Party (VP) (2000, p.14). In other words, new reform policies created different conservative or

Islamist groups and changes were mostly related to economic and social movements.

The most heterogeneous conservative group, which has come into existence over the time, resumes today. How do today's conservatives or old Islamists view those economic changes?

2.2. How to Perceive Economic Influence

According to Mümtaz'er Türköne, the fear of socio-economic changes in the Islamic capital was the main reason for the February 28 military intervention, but interestingly the assumed result of the intervention backfired. Since the Özal government and reform policies, the Islamists have had an economic change which caused a new social group with new lifestyles in social and private lives. The most visible changes are driving expensive cars, wearing expensive designer clothing, and living in large, expensive houses. The criticisms of the change are mostly about the social-economic changes in everyday life due to the increase in luxurious living. Therefore, the socio-economic dimension of the change is important.

The change is perceived from different perspectives. For some, the changes are the reason that increased the gap between religiosity and the new conservatives. To put it differently, economic welfare has directly decreased the importance of religiosity within this new group. These changes caused new groups to surface. According to them, economic welfare has affected one group more than others and the visibility of this new group is much more evident than others. Mr. E. describes the old and the new groups as:

There are two types of Muslims: The first one is those who were rich from their families (e.g. the Topbaş⁸ sect) were also rich before the 90s and so there wasn't such a great change with them. They were a rightist, conservative, and religious group. They were a part of institutions, such as Elibüyükler and İlim Yayma. These rich people always existed; they already had capital and they existed without getting too involved in capitalism and the interest system. They are the conservatives of the 80s. The second one is, until the 90s, a group which came from Anatolia with an ideological cause and certain ideas and criticized the first group. It was this group which was deformed. (interview, December 15, 2011).

In other words, they first lost their value as human beings and the religion did not suit them any longer. Although change seems acceptable for Mr. E., he considers this new group as more deformed than changed. The old ones were not affected by this change because they were always there and they already had economic welfare. While he continues describing the change he directly refers to this new group. Mr. E. continues to describe the new conservatives:

Now there is a form of Islamism at a level of slogans. What is currently in fashion are those cafes with people who are not interested in reading and thinking. Those İftar⁹ dinners that were served at houses earlier now have glided into restaurants like Kaşibeyaz and Konyalı. In other words, people used to drink alcohol in weddings in the past, but now there are ornaments instead of alcohol everywhere (interview, December 15, 2011).

Change in everyday life, as having religious practices in social life and out of homes, is a sign of corruption, according to him. This means they

⁸ An Islamic sect in Turkey

⁹ The breaking of the Ramadan fast.

have money now to go out for an İftar meal. But the question is what is wrong here?

According to Mr. E., spending so much money on dinner, taking out this religious practice, and not inviting guests to houses are signs of corruption. It is obvious that change comes with money in daily life, but is that truly corruption or a new lifestyle? He supports his thesis with another example:

Up until 1995, and even 2000, we were surrounded by poor people. However, these days there aren't any poor people. The point we have currently reached is that the poor cannot reach the rich. There aren't students or poor people at our İftar dinners anymore. Now, there are those poor people left in the past that cannot be reached. We now have a life of building complexes and visits that can be achieved with prior appointments and waiting at doors. The business world style has also started to seep into every day living. (interview, December 15, 2011).

This explanation makes it clear why this change seems corrupt. Different religious practices have different private and social purposes. Not having social interactions represents the lack of the social purpose of this religious practice, according to him. On the other hand, modern life practices were infused into religious practices. He talks about not being able to go to a friend's house without an appointment. This is related to the economic change directly, whereas this can totally be perceived as a modern practice that is a part of life or a new cultural norm.

Others believe that the economic change does not only relate to new conservatives. Mr. B. says the economy is not a big change for them. He says that instead it is a surprise for the other who did not expect this kind of change from the JDP (AKP) government:

The idea that the JDP (AKP) is protecting the Islamists business is out of the question. However, as the general atmosphere of the country has changed, some AKP members, founding members of the AKP, and those Muslims who have a close relationship with them have had significant economic and social gain. However, we did not have such a change as this. I am the same as I was during the February 28 process and I am continuing to do the same work that I was back then. We are psychologically more at ease with the more liberal people who we believe to be more just in those positions compared to the military oppressive governance we had back then. In fact, we could state that February 28 has provided better results for those groups who did not know how this time era would end (interview, December 30, 2011).

Although he does not see so much difference before the February 28 process, he recognizes the psychological relief of the last years. He also points out that this economic welfare was not only about conservatives; the entire country changed. Interestingly, he agrees with Mr. E. that the new group is the more visible one. Mr. B. says, “Those girls who wear designer clothes and drive jeeps were already there. However, it became easier to attain now. Turkey’s middle class income attained ten-thousand dollars during this process and what could have been done with this money anyway? (interview, December 30, 2011). The expanding of the middle class conservative groups causes more visibility in social life due to changing consuming habits.

Some interviewees believe that this change is normal and acceptable in religion, too. According to them only some corrections apply in order to include modernity. Mr. G. describes this relationship as:

For instance, the reason why we cannot completely turn down capitalism is our disposition (fitrat). However, we can refine this with religion as well as with alms and helping the poor. If this is undertaken then the system will advance in a more just manner. The concept of justice is crucial in religion. Generally, it is compared with equality. It seems as though those things that are not equal are unjust. However, equality is the biggest

injustice to mankind because it is not indigenous. Based on this, I cannot completely stand up against these criticisms because I am a part of this system too and I could have mistakes in my evaluations of the change too (interview, December 13, 2011).

The change of the free market economy and capitalism are all seen as acceptable changes. For him those changes are not scary or a sign of corruption. These interviewees believe the main idea is that there is change that came with Özal's reform policies. For some, those changes are acceptable and normal, whereas some others see those changes as corruption and secularization. According to the interviewees the economic influence seems to be the biggest influence on these changes, whereas the other factors have not been mentioned as much.

Although it seems that there is one type of new conservative group that represents the same ideologies or beliefs, that is not the case; this new group is not as homogeneous as it was in the past. Variety and dissimilarity are growing day by day with different factors. This new heterogeneous structure creates a fresh group that overlaps each other more than before.

CHAPTER III

3. The Trauma and Crisis of the February 28 Military Intervention and the Changes in Masculinity

The history of Islamism and conservatism and the importance of religiosity have given background to the changes that old Islamists come across today. A shift in politics and economics made macro and micro changes by influencing family lives as well. Furthermore, it created personal identity crises and traumas that still influence today. The thoughts, feelings, and changes faced by former Islamist men, who are also called new conservatives, will be the main topic of this chapter.

To understand society better it is necessary to understand the macro and micro parts of it in detail, which includes family, women, men, children, etc. Although the February 28 process was effective for both men and women, the perspective and personal experiences of former Islamist men have not been analyzed. How did the influences of economic, political, and social prohibitions and oppressions influenced these men in the concept of their private lives? Furthermore, how did the forbiddance of women from the social and public sphere affected them? These questions will be answered.

Within these concepts, as a result of the interviews, are some subtopics. Man, maleness, and masculinity are the topics in this chapter. The general meanings and the meanings these two concepts have in Turkey will be examined. In this context, power and the effect of power in masculinity will be another important topic.

Hence, in this chapter there will be three main parts. This chapter will be divided into three parts. These parts include masculinity identity, the

traumatic or crises effects of the February 28 process on the men, and the effect of culture on creating this masculinity identity.

The first topic will discuss the general masculinity idea with the example of Turkey. In this part, the theoretical process of creating the idea of masculinity in terms of historical, social, religious, and cultural effects will be discussed and the reflection of these effects to the society will be analyzed.

For second topic, the direct focus will be on the era of February 28 and the effects during the past fifteen years in Turkey on the former Islamist men. The main concern will be the social and psychological traumas and crises of the era on these old Islamist men. How they were affected and the reasons that affected them will be discussed as well as how these political changes influenced one's masculinity identity. Furthermore, the relation between power and masculinity will also be discussed.

Lastly, the effect of culture on the masculinity identity will be discussed. How can cultures create their masculinity ideas and why can this constructed identity change from time to time?

3.1. Man, Maleness, and Masculinity

'Masculinity' rather than 'femininity' after the post-modern coup is discussed in order to understand the other side of this changing process or the male side. In most Muslim countries gender relations are directly related to women's lives and rights. Lahoucine Ouzgane says the same thing in his *Islamic Masculinity* book. He points out that when it comes to Muslim countries gender studies all relate to women's lives, roles, and the representations of women in literature. He sees this approach as a reason to neglect the construction of masculinities within Muslim societies (2006, p. 6).

Overall this work aims to shed light on the perspective of former Islamist and new conservative men.

Turkey, as a Muslim country, focuses more on women's issues than men's. After the February 28 processes the change of women, whether positively, negatively, or neutrally, has been discussed; whereas, the change in the new conservative men has not yet become discussed.

In order to better understand the synonymous wording used the words 'man, maleness, and masculinity' will be explained. Cornwall and Lindisfarne give a description from the Oxford dictionary, with some examples, as follows:

The *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (1973) offers definitions of the adjective 'masculine' as 'having the appropriate excellence of the male sex; virile, vigorous and powerful'. 'Masculine' may describe attributes, actions and productions as well as certain inanimate objects which are connected with the male sex because of some essential quality, such as relative superiority or strength (1973: 1284). The primary definition of 'male' is simpler: 'of or belonging to the sex which begets offspring, or performs the fecundating function' (1973: 1265). Yet the apparent certainties of such definitions are themselves contradicted: 'masculine', when used of a woman, suggests that 'she has the qualities proper to a man' (1973: 1284) (1994, p. 11).

According to this description it seems there is a complicated correlation between the terms. Although the term 'male' is described only by biological explanations, when it comes to 'masculinity' the prominent words are superiority, strength, and power. The first noticeable difference of 'masculinity' is that it is not only about something one begins at birth, it is something created and given to one by social, economic, and historical interactions. To explain the creation of the term further, Cornwall and Lindisfarne go on as such:

We argue that the conflation of the notions male/men/masculinity and female/women/femininity in Western constructions of difference must be investigated and documented historically and ethnographically. We suggest that the three terms do not necessarily overlap and that each term of the two triads has multiple referents, which blur, qualify, and create the possibility of ambiguous interpretations in any particular setting. Thus notions of maleness, designations of manhood and attributions of masculinity have no essential referent, nor even a finite range of referents. Rather, each of the three terms can be used to describe a wide variety of different and even flatly contradictory aspects of human bodies and human behavior (1994, p. 9-10).

The usage and certain meanings of the terms are still confusing and uncertain. Tim Edwards gives a starting point to help understand the reason of this uncertainty by bringing in the social effects. He paraphrases, from Macobby and Jacklin, the relationship between being a socially acceptable 'man' and 'masculinity':

The first wave, as I have already started to outline, saw masculinity as a socially constructed identity into which boys were socialized to become socially acceptable men. This identity was primarily defined in terms of sex role theory, which argued that masculinity was simply the consequence, effect or outcome of the male sex role. The elements of this role, and indeed its emphasis, centered on the key institutions of family, work and education through which boys became men and, in particular, by which strong values of competitiveness, careerism and success were instilled. Consequently, many studies sought to demonstrate how boys were encouraged to participate in sports and other outdoor or competitive activities while their emotional sensitivities were otherwise actively repressed through the withdrawal of physical affection and the increasing stigmatization of expressions of vulnerability such as crying (Macobby, Jacklin, 1974, p. 92). (2006, p. 92).

These explanations show that although masculinity includes accepting one as a man, being acceptable as a man is directly related to strength and power both physically and psychologically. The meanings of strength and power in society are factors that directly affect the meaning of an acceptable man. Another remarkable point here is when Tim Edwards uses the term 'socially constructed'. Social construction is the most important factor of creating gender identities.

As Tim Edwards focuses on the sex role theory to create strong and powerful men, Cornwall and Lindisfarne add another idea where masculine powers are used as a privilege for some and a disadvantage for others:

Ethnographic studies of the production of gendered difference offer new ways of looking at 'masculinity' which take us beyond the structures imposed by continued use of a single category, 'men', on the one hand, and the endless play of fragmented identities on the other. In its hegemonic forms, masculinity privileges some people and dislocates and disadvantages others. However, such hegemonic discourses may themselves be dislodged over time. The shifting and contingent relation between 'masculinity' and 'men' and power becomes clear when we examine the *enactment* of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities in a single setting (1994, p. 9-10).

The importance of power, the effects of power in creating the 'masculinity' idea, and different effects on the powerful masculinity idea are socially constructed identities. Interestingly, this superiority idea is not between different sexes; rather this superiority case is among the same sex, which is male. Strength, power, and socially accepted makes one more masculine, which means makes one more acceptable and desirable by society. This thought process is a circle that turns around itself.

Every study does not work on the masculinity idea from the same perspective. As Tim Edwards says in the introduction of *Culture of Masculinity*, “To put it quite simply, cultural or media studies and sociology or sexual politics do not often even consider the same topics in relation to masculinity or ask the same questions, let alone come up with comparable answers”(2006, p. 3). To understand the concept properly, looking from the right perspective is necessary. This work is not asserting to answer all the questions in this field; instead it gives an angle to view one perspective.

The next part discusses the creation of the masculinity idea during the history of the Turkish Republic. Governmental change is not only a political movement, but a social change that creates new, acceptable citizens. Mostly drastic governmental changes have their own ideal citizen characteristics. The Turkish Republic experienced the same fate in this respect. The proclamation of the new Turkish Republic created its own ideal men and women whose physical, sociological, and psychological characteristics are well described.

3.2. The Creation of the Masculinity Idea in Turkey

It is possible to find the roots of masculinity in Turkey during the creation of the new Turkish Republic and Turkish modernity. During the modernization process of the new Turkish Republic, women with outwardly religious appearances receded and disappeared from secular and religious consciousness of the public sphere. Women who did not wear headscarves or perform religious practices in public were welcomed in the society and forced psychologically and socially to become samples of the modern, new Turkish Republic. There were some changes and expectations of men, with hat reforms, too. Moreover, those expectations came from a government that only had men councilor members. This does not mean that the government before

the Republic was not male dominated; it was male dominated, as well. The new Republic declared modernity and egalitarianism. Therefore, it should not have been male dominated and instead it should have been socially, governmentally, and economically equal with both men and women councilors. This was not the case.

The new male-based government foresaw new men and women prototypes as good and acceptable citizens. So the modernization process of the new Republic turned into a different form of masculinization for men, from a masculine government to more masculine societies. Banu Helvacioğlu talks of the idea of creating new prototypes of women for the new modern Turkish Republic:

On the one hand, the legal, administrative and cultural reforms aimed at creating an ideal, pro-Western, educated, professional woman as the prototype of the new Republic; on the other, traditionally, Islamic gender roles for women remained intact in both the official ideology of nationalism and its different articulations. The predominant discourse on this transformation is that the break from the Ottoman Empire brought a pro-Western, secular attitude at the level of state and society (2006, p. 48).

Although this explanation is about the prototype of women it gives a clue to the changes and the expectations of this new governance from its citizens. While expecting to have modern and secular women in society by breaking from the Ottoman Empire, the government also meant to have modern, secular, and masculine men in the new society. This caused confusion for the religious men. They were not sure whether they should become more religious and Islamist as they preferred or whether they should turn into what this new governance wanted, leaving religious appearances and practices. Their struggle lay between religion and modernity. The confusion

in identity for men according to religiosity and masculinity goes back to these dates.

Today, especially in the last fifteen years in Turkey, the confusion of the new conservative men has taken an unexpected turn. Although this identity or masculinity idea is not something new, a change in new social variables, women's expectations, and family lives affected them differently from the past. This did not clear their minds, but left them trying to find the right place for themselves within family and society.

Although the expectations and changes in the meaning of masculinity have affected the men in Turkish society; the new conservatives have been the ones who have felt the horns of the dilemma. Religion or religiosity was an essential part of their identity and in their social and private lives. Alternatively, the importance of religiosity changes time to time and within different aspects of their lives, as it happened during and after the February 28 process.

3.3. The Trauma that Caused a Masculinity Crisis by February 28

3.3.1. Trauma and Crisis

Trauma and crisis will be discussed here. The data from the interviews indicate that it is necessary to analyze these concepts in detail. Some interviewees explained that the February 28 period traumatically affected them psychologically. Although the idea of trauma has mostly been used for women who experienced the February 28 periods, it is observed that old Islamist men also feel the February 28 time era as traumatic.

Crisis is another important term. The usage and meaning of trauma is, in the literature, acts as a reason or cause of crisis. These two terms should be understood together as the cause and effect at the same time.

Trauma is a response to an unexpected experience. The Alberta Health Services website on “Spiritual Care” starts with the explanation that, “Deeply personal questions arise when people are faced with life challenging crises created by illness or trauma.”¹⁰ Trauma may be one of the reasons of crises. This means that sometimes trauma can cause crises.

The crisis is defined as “An unstable condition, as in political, social, or economic affairs, involving an impending abrupt or decisive change” or “An emotionally stressful event or traumatic change in a person's life.”¹¹ The description of trauma is “An event or situation that causes great distress and disruption.”¹²

This differentiation is important to understand the interviewees’ use the terms. When an interviewee says trauma it should be known that this trauma caused a crisis in his life after February 28. The effects of this crisis on their lives are observed.

3.3.2. The Crisis of February 28 Trauma

Most traumas create long-term crises. As all other social and political oppressions and rejections, the February 28 military intervention has had traumatic effects on many religious people. The trauma created long-term crisis, which still exist today. It is believed that women were the ones mostly

¹⁰ <http://www.albertahealthservices.ca/services.asp?pid=service&rid=4828>

¹¹ <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/crisis>

¹² <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/trauma>

affected. However, there were men who felt the effects of February 28, as well.

Mr. B. says, “The February 28 time era had the worst and hardest impact on women at colleges, and the old Islamist men could not help out with their daughters and wives” (interview, December 30, 2011). During the interview he described the situation as “not being able to get involved to end the pain.” He felt he could not protect his family from the world or perform his responsibilities toward them. In other words, not being able to take part meant losing power in, what was once, their territory. This is a good example to compare with what Tim Edwards says about the relationship between crisis and masculinity:

What constitutes a crisis as such is equally unclear. In particular, the concept of crisis is used to incorporate a sense of panic or anxiety that on the one hand has already happened or on the other might happen, and is applied equally to masculinity as a concept or to the experiences of men themselves (2006, p. 6).

This gives a perspective that shows how this kind of a crisis can last for years, even after the event takes place. Panic may be viewed as a short-term effect, whereas anxiety is long-term. The men, who have experienced this crisis in their lives, experienced this as long-term anxiety regarding their power and satisfaction in protecting their beloved ones. This crisis caused a huge change in the idea of being a man or keeping their masculinity. Edward goes on to give some detail about what happens after the ‘crisis from within’ happens:

The first I call the crisis from without. This includes some partially empirically documented concerns relating to the position of men within such institutions as the family, education and work. A specific concern here is the perception that men have lost, or are losing, power or privilege relative to their prior status in these institutions. The second I call the

crisis from within. This is far less easily documented as it centers precisely on a perceived shift in men's *experiences* of their position *as* men, their maleness, and what it means. Most importantly, this often refers to a sense of powerlessness, meaninglessness or uncertainty. The continuity concerning the importance of *power* here highlights not only its significance for masculinity *per se*, but rather the sense that this is a key factor that informs the entire masculinity in crisis thesis (Edward, 2006, p. 6-7).

Losing power in the workplace and social status, and more importantly, 'not being able to get involved to end the pain' of their families during the February 28 process made the men experience trauma that created long-term crisis. In Mr. D.'s words:

Nobody cared much about the girls' psychologies who became media materials, whose photos were taken during the time they had to take off their scarves, or some 3-5 girls who did buzzed-cuts of their hair, or some others gave up wearing head scarves. But I cannot even think of any worse situation a Muslim can face. Most of them are traumatized and they lost their psychological and mental abilities. But in not being able to get involved, step in, or not having enough power to protect their women, they created silent risings and their pulling away needs to be taken seriously (interview, December 30, 2011).

Keeping silent and pretending nothing happened was a way of handling the situation. Although they wanted to be part of the situation, they could not. Leaving the men out and taking their paternal power created silent anger, which comes until today.

Another interviewee, Mr. Z. agrees when he says:

You were trying to do your best in a situation that you stand by with crossed arms by legislations, or by law enforcement officers, but it could not be sufficient. There occurred incapability, sure this reflects on your family and motivation (interview, June 15, 2012).

He experienced a psychological situation where he was physically free, whereas his feelings and thoughts were imprisoned. These men existed, but not permitted or able to take part, not even in their own thoughts, in the lives of the women. This trauma change confused those men about the future.

Interventions in the work place and social life influenced this trauma. The old Islamist men could not hire workers with scarves, because of the governmental rules. In other words, they were forced into banning these women from the workplaces and social life, what made them feel powerless and helpless. These men sat under the government's power, which made them feel meaningless and powerless within their own lives.

Most of these women were their own daughters or wives. Although these women were educated and eligible to work, they had nowhere to work. Some of these men had the economic power to create a chance for these women, but this did not change the results. Governmental rules and oppression did not allow opportunities for women. In Mr. B.'s words:

We also have a private school, which was set up for the women with scarves to work comfortably, but then we had to cancel their rights of employment. We could not let them work with their scarves until quite recently, and also, we could not ask our daughters to wear scarves, because we did not want to have the same problem once again (interview, December 30, 2011).

When these former Islamist men say they could not ask the women to wear scarves, it also applied to the men with religious tendencies. This was one of the most important traumas of this crisis. Instead of having the same painful experience again, they preferred not to experience the same situation; in other words, they left behind what they thought and believed. The

expectations of the women and the ideal woman prototypes have changed as well during this process, by the oppression and rejection enforced by the government.

This was not the first headscarf ban in the history of the Turkish Republic; this time there were many more women observing the headscarf in schools and in the social sphere. There were different reasons for a wider range of women practicing this time, such as economic and social changes that affected the middle class conservatives. With these changes more women went to school and became a part of the social structure. During the February 28 process these women went out, however, never came back as they were before. Those women were out and found solutions to stay in the social sphere. Perhaps this time the number of the women struggling for rights was higher than in the past, so the effect of the process influenced a much larger group. It was the first time for men to feel this hopeless and insufficient for their wives and daughters, while women were battling in the field.

First, the men could not work with the women wearing scarves because of government rules and oppression. Then the men tried to find other ways to protect women and gave them the chance to work and exist in the social sphere, but this did not give the men worth either. The men succumbed to feeling unproductive and weak in protecting their families. The power of these men had collapsed due to oppression, which reduced the masculinity idea in their minds.

3.4. The Change in the Concept of Masculinity by February 28

After oppression, prohibition, trauma, and crisis, the construction or definition of maleness or masculinity has changed unwittingly. This does not mean that the men decided to change overnight; there were also varying

levels of change leading to a turning point. During the interviews the men mentioned many times they underwent change in their lives regarding the roles of women and the expectations from women. The change in their minds and in their lives took place over time.

Although it is known what happened politically or economically during the February 28 process, much is unknown about how this period affected the feelings and thoughts of these men and about why their feelings changed. Mr. B. explains it this way:

For the Turkish man chastity means to have the power to govern the women in some respects. We could only watch while our daughters and wives were truncheon by the police. So I believe that has had serious effects on conservative men. Maybe the lack of confidence and pretending nothing was happening had a bad effect on their future family lives (interview, December 30, 2011).

He explains the idea of masculinity, which is related to power and women. Governing women is the first step of the masculinity idea of these men. During this process, the governing power passed to other hands. This meant losing the heart of masculinity. Losing power in society started with losing power in the family. Today, the role exchange and expectations of women have affected the conservative men who underwent changing experiences.

Another interviewee, Mr. C., explains the idea of governing and protecting women as:

There is no need for women to be in all of the places; actually I disapprove of most of the places. It is not proper for them to go in an unapproved business environment. I want neither my wife nor my daughter to work in a place that requires long trips. My daughter can get her education abroad within

certain rules, in a controllable way. I want my daughter to do the same things as my son, but in a controlled way (interview, December 12, 2011).

Their overprotective style was suddenly not an option and they lost their control to the government. They felt ineffective socially, economically, and within the family. Both physical and psychological oppression confused their masculine identity.

Gender roles as well as the responsibility and social expectation of religious women began to change by the February 28 process. One of these changes included the new status that women had in society. Women were ready and strong members of society after the February 28 process. They had already fallen behind within society and workplace for many years and did not want to keep the same situation any longer. Men did not know where to position these women or how to treat them after a long time. The men did not know the place of these women in a society built for men.

Mr. B. says:

About family life: our women had already been given a social life before the 28 of February process by the Welfare Party's (WP) political period and the Beyazid protests. Then these women did not come back to their daily routine at home. Suddenly some new questions popped up; where could the women work after finishing school? After the women came back from foreign countries, who was going to hire them? We could not hire them because we did not work with women; it was not proper according to our religious beliefs. We were not prepared for this new social change. Women came into social life and work life before we discussed it from the perspective of religion. So there were two opinions about the women's new situation. It was acceptable for some of us and not for some others. Women are on the streets again and working members of the society (interview, December 30, 2011).

As seen, the social life of women with scarves goes back to the Welfare Party. After the socialization process of February 28 they were expected to take off their scarves or go back to their homes by social and governmental rules. This time it did not work in that way and these women did not go back to their homes and their old lifestyles. They tried to find different reactions to oppression in order to choose their own lives and not have the government choose for them. Certainly, changes in the social and private lives of these women changed their responsibilities and places in society, which meant a change occurred for the men as well.

Although these men believed the women were already in society, it was not the case. These women were out during the Welfare Party (WP), which acted as a protected zone. Women were mostly active in the women's branch of the party. They were in the female social area mostly and usually men had been already aware of what was happening in female dominated areas. The change after the February 28 socialization process was different. These women wanted to take place in every aspect of society. This idea was new to the Islamist men and made them feel helpless.

What Mr. B. said earlier is important to view changes from the perspective of women. Although old Islamists believed they could not work with women because of religious beliefs, the political, economic, and social changes made working with women feel normal. They began to look at gender issues through a different lens. It became acceptable and normal for some, whereas it was the end of a period for others.

In order to adapt to the changes, the Islamist men imitated others who were already in society and accustomed to the new ways. Imitating others seemed the easiest way to adapt to the new situation. Mr. C. says, "Men do not want their wives to be different from the other women in society, so good or bad

examples trigger one another this way” (interview, December 12, 2011). The February 28 process resulted in more social and visible women and so the expectations of men also changed. Most of the men expected their wives to be a part of society as all other women. This may be interpreted in two ways. First the new conservative men did not know what to expect from women, so they let the women be as all others in society. Secondly, after those changes, no one wanted to be left alone or become a stranger. As Bauman points out:

Ethnic-religious-cultural strangers are all too often tempted to embrace the liberal vision of group emancipation (erasing of a collective stigma) as a reward for individual efforts of self-improvement and self-transformation. Frequently they go out of their way to get rid of and to suppress everything which makes them distinct from the rightful members of the native community—and hope that a devoted emulation of native ways will render them indistinguishable from the hosts, and by the same token guarantee their reclassification as insiders, entitled to the treatment the friends routinely receive. The harder they try, however, the faster the finishing-line seems to be receding (1998, p. 71).

To be included in this new group, they had to be like all others. While they wanted inclusion, when they did not feel good or comfortable with the change they still could blame women for the bad sides of the change. Mr. C. says, “So, good or bad examples trigger one another this way.” When he says good or bad examples he means women who started a new trend. From the perspective of some of the new conservative men, most of the women encouraged one another so that change happened. This is how he interprets the changes. This could be taken as a way to legitimize the parts of change that they do not like.

Mr. C. felt that the increased visibility of modern looking wives in society was a sign of the lack of self-confidence in men. In his words, “Because of the lack

of self-confidence, men let women be more visible in a more modern and presentable way” (interview, December 12, 2011). After accepting the new situation of women in the society, men found another way to gain esteem again. Showing off their wives in a more modern and presentable way made them feel more powerful. There were two kinds of power. The first relates to the time where they could not take their wives with them to any public sphere. By showing off, the new conservatives show how they regained power over their wives. Secondly, displaying their modern wives shows their economic and social power.

Mr. B. goes on to talk more about the change men and women experienced:

Before the 80s it was not acceptable to let a woman go outside by herself, but now when my daughter comes home at 9 pm or 10 pm it does not seem problematic to me. I am not really sure if we changed our minds or if we accepted this situation by force. We all, our wives, daughters and us, have changed. The responsibilities and we have changed. We have more feminine men and more social women. When a problem occurs the men leave the house, not the women. This is real now. We do not know the direct relation with the February 28 process. It may be the consequence of the earlier social life, too (interview, December 30, 2011).

‘Feminine men’ and ‘social women’ are two descriptions of the change in men and women. ‘Abandon the home’ after having an argument is a female jester. However, now men leave the home after an argument, which indicates the replacement of the actors in family life. Leaving home in an act of defiance is a female characteristic that makes these men more feminine, instead of masculine. Leaving the house may be interpreted as a result of losing power at home, which is a sign of decreasing masculine identity. The changing expectations of women appear in the actions that they can do and cannot do. The women who do not leave the house after a fight or come home late are examples of the subtle, unnoticeable changes that occurred.

'Being social' seems to be a part of maleness and women claimed that role as well. These terms and descriptions are general ideas of gender roles in old Islamist days. These descriptions are good examples of how these men view the changes in comparison with the past and present.

These men believe the change came with corruption. While they talk about the change in themselves to the younger generation, the word corruption comes into play. In Mr. B.'s words:

I think our boys are corrupted more than our girls, because they are more irresponsible. They are more incapable of taking responsibilities. The expectations from girls were to get married and leave the house in the past, but now there are new expectations from girls about their family and home, as having a good career and looking after their parents (interview, December 30, 2011).

The change brought new gender roles and different expectations from both men and women. It was not easy for conservative men to face these changes; the change was mostly accepted and a comparison started among new generations. While talking about the change in expectations, it seems the change added more responsibility to women again.

While the change took place, naturally, some conservative men saw it as corruption. Mr. M. says, "There are no more young Muslim men, because they all want their wives to work" (interview, May 20, 2012). During the interview Mr. M. said this about the young men who certainly want working wives, not as a choice of women but as their responsibility. Expecting a working wife does not seem to be a result of modern life. These expectations are related directly to religiosity and manhood of this new conservative generation. This

change is not always acceptable for conservative men; instead, it is an unpleasant situation for some of them.

On the other hand, there are others who believe this change is for the good. They also support the idea that superiority and power of masculinity should not be related to natural disposition (fitrat) alone. Mr. H says, “There will be a shift towards the natural disposition (fitrat) as long as information is produced. The shift is a result of the established system’s insufficiency, because the established system does not get along with our natural disposition (fitrat). As long as freedom and rapid information increase, people will return to their natural disposition (fitrat), and this natural disposition (fitrat) is not a male dominant thing” (interview, December 13, 2011). The change in gender roles is not a problem for Mr. H. He already believes this system is not correct and is opposed to one’s natural disposition. He is not happy with today’s gender roles. He does not accept the power and superiority of masculinity that joins cultural and social norms.

Mr. T. looks at gender roles from a religious perspective. He indicates that religious rules do not mix with social and cultural traditions. In Mr. T.’s words:

Our women should participate in social life with religious rules. The wife of the Prophet worked. *Mehir*, a present given to a bride from her groom during the wedding, is given to the wife to use as she wants. She has the right to use it as she wants without her husband’s permission. There are the rules for men and women in Islam (interview, December 13, 2011).

Instead of bringing back the idea of a powerful masculinity identity, Mr. T. mostly mentions the contradictions of religion and social norms today. In other words, religion does not observe masculinity with the same as typical social and cultural norms.

3.5. Power and Masculinity

The relationship of power and masculinity go hand in hand. To understand masculinity, one must first understand the important role of power in masculinity. Power equals more masculine, desirable, and accepted by society. Losing power means losing the most important part of a man's identity, which is masculinity.

In modern times, one of the most important indicators of a man's power is his work, which is directly related to social status and money. The work place, social networks, position, and surely the money one makes are the main factors that develop the masculine identity. A man is related to power, which is money, in modern times. During the February 28 process, many conservative men were rejected from the market or lost their jobs due to their beliefs or thoughts. Therefore, losing jobs and rejection have a direct negative impact on the masculinity identity of these men. Tim Edwards says work, a social aspect in life, is an important building block of masculinity:

Historically, work has often stood as the most fundamental foundation of masculine identity, particularly in relation to modernity or, more specifically, advanced Western industrial capitalism. Moreover, it was a key thesis of many of the earliest critiques of masculinity working within the sex role paradigm that work was seen to be the most fundamental element in the formation of successful masculine identity (see, for example, David and Brannon, 1976; Farrell, 1974; Tolson, 1977) (2006, p. 7).

Losing work and rejection from social networks have affected their masculinity and identities, according to the superiority idea. The relationship of power and masculinity is about superiority of one over another. Superiority is not only between opposite sexes; it is also an issue between the same sexes. According to Cornwall and Lindisfarne:

We argue that interpretations of maleness, manhood or masculinity are not neutral, but rather all such attributions and labels have political entailments. In any given situation they may align men against women, some men against other men, some women against other women, or some men and women against others. In short, the processes of gendering produces difference and inequality: and nowhere more obviously than in the versions of masculinity associated with (masculinized) notions of power (1994, p. 9).

Cornwall and Lindisfarne point out this is a hegemonic relationship between the same and different sexes. In this regard, power or work makes one superior to his fellows and the opposite sex, and makes one more masculine. Losing work and power causes these men to lose the identity created for them earlier. To create a new identity and find a place for oneself, both in the family and social life, can be traumatic and take some time to adapt to. This may be seen as another unexpected and overemphasized outcome of the period of old Islamist men.

Mr. G. explains the change of old Islamist men as indulging power, which is more related to secularization and money. In Mr. G. 's words:

Humans give themselves to power. They become distant to religion, as they now believe in power. So the powerful person becomes the rightful one. In our civilization, the rightful one should be powerful. Taking this as a reference point, the reference becomes wrong and the Muslims live in conflict (interview, December 13, 2011).

He says that seeking power took these conservative men away from religion and pulled them toward a more secular life after the process ended. The men tried to regain their lost masculinity identity with the rules of this new world. Acceptance comes after others accept you. As R. Jeckings paraphrases from Barth, "One of the Barth's key propositions is that it is not enough to send a

message about identity; that message has to be accepted by significant others before an identity can be said to be 'taken on' " (1996, p. 23). In order to become accepted as a man, these new conservatives had to use current resources. This way the new conservative men had a chance of being viewed as accepted men in this new society.

Some believe the power that came with money to this new conservative group caused confusion for a while. In Mr. Z.'s words:

Money is power, and it takes some time to get used to this power. A part of the Anatolian capital could not get used to this when they suddenly became the government. This process surreally reflected on their family life, too. This is also a process. It is not easy to manage money and living with this money in the religious life for the one who does not have a religious manner and a strong desire to live with religiosity. Then he can go in any direction (interview, June 15, 2012).

After handling oppression and rejection, then gaining power and money, some of the new conservatives became corrupt since they were unable to handle, yet again, new changes. Perhaps this is an expected result after the changes that occurred economically and socially. It usually takes time to adapt to new situations. Either this renewed power can be accepted as power lost that is regained or new power in new times. Mr. Z. goes on to explain the usage of power as a result of oppression behind during the February 28 process as follows:

About the February 28 process, you were trying to do your best in a situation where you stand by with crossed arms by legislations, or by law enforcement officers, but it was not enough. Incapability was a theme and, surely, this reflects on your family and your motivation. It is so normal to have the desire to use any opportunity, when you get a chance after some time. The desire of getting back to good times is very

normal when previously taken away” (interview, June 15, 2012).

3.6. The Effects of Culture on Masculinity Identity

To understand the changes of new conservative men after the February 28 military intervention, the effects of culture and society and the expectations that have been created by these variables should be taken into consideration. Also, the affect of culture on creating identities as a social constructor is universally accepted; it is not something only happening in Turkey. In this respect, Cornwall and Lindisfarne talk about Western cultures as examples and how this is a universal concept:

First, we argue that the male/female dichotomy has no intrinsic biological or other essential reality. Rather, this dichotomy is a potent metaphor for difference in western cultures whose import must be understood in terms of historical and ethnographic specificities. This is not to say that dichotomous gender attributions are not available elsewhere, perhaps even as near-universal metaphors for aspects of human sociality. However, there are no fixed ways these metaphors are grounded or employed in social life. They are only one among many other sets of metaphors used in the construction of human identities (1994, p .9).

The usage of the word ‘construction’ supports the ideas mentioned earlier. Acceptance of the universality of the metaphors gives a clue as to why all cultures and beliefs can create their own metaphors for human social identities. Connell reinforces this construction as “Masculinities are neither programmed in our genes, nor fixed by social structures, prior to social interaction. They come into existence as people act. They are actively produced, using the resources and strategies available in a given social setting” (2000, 12).

This explanation is also important as a different point of view to consider. Connell explains this construction process by production. While using resources and strategies, he emphasizes the importance of 'given social setting', which means all cultures, beliefs, and thoughts take form in social settings. Again, he supports the idea that the production and construction of the 'masculinity' idea is also a total construction of society.

After many changes, the new conservative men tried to become accepted and preferred in society. They wanted to take part in this new social structure, but they were unsure of how. The confusion began far before the February 28 process. The migration and urbanization that came with Özal's liberal economic legislation started the old Islamist's confusion. Mr. S. is in his 30s, single, earned a Bachelor's degree, a member of a religious trade institution, and migrated from an Anatolian city to Istanbul ten years ago. He wants acceptance by society, but he wants the society to be the way it was before the process. He says, when they first came to the big city they brought their culture with them. Then they learned the ways of urban life through the media and felt confused about their identities:

After the 80s there was a group that migrated from Anatolian villages to cities. These conservative groups brought their conservative culture with them to the cities. During the migration period, when those people first saw television programs, they could not recognize the difference between being popular and being modern; this discourse is still a problem. Although modernism was a problematic term since the foundation of the republic, Westernization in meaning was replaced by being popular or being the accepted one; it gains recognition like this. Consequently, the prototypes represented by media or television was seen and accepted as the modern and the rightful one (interview, November 24, 2011).

This bilateral communication between Anatolian conservative people and the people of the urban culture affected both sides as well as urban social life. These people brought their conservative culture to big cities. On the other hand they were affected by the new urban culture. According to Mr. S., the problem they had is the confusion between modernity and popular culture. This is a current problem in Turkey. When assimilating into a new culture, confusion can cause a difficult time in differentiating between the clashing cultures.

Generally, it seems that following popular culture is the only path to acceptance in society. During the creation of identities, as mentioned earlier, acceptance and approval by society are the two main hurdles in the adaptation process. In other words, acceptance by society meant acting like other for these men, but they also had conservative cultures and religious beliefs. Adapting was confusing and difficult.

For the conservative Anatolian men, this new modernity or the urbanization idea started to create new gender roles as well. Traditional expectations of women and men started to change. The change began in their social lives and then in their minds. This new urban lifestyle introduced new social activities, reflecting on their family. Mr. S says:

Neither men, nor women feel satisfied anymore. The socialization of men made them less interested in the home. Although they don't look for it, the fun part of social life can confuse them. When you put men outside and women inside of the houses the relationship is distorted. The place of men should be the home after getting married. The solution is not leaving women to go out, but rather getting men back home. Nowadays, men and women are living their marriages separately (interview, November 24, 2011).

Participating in a social life and taking on new roles in society changed the minds of these men when it comes to the idea of family life. They preferred power and acceptance in society, instead of in the family. This may not be a conscious choice, but in the long run this caused changes in the gender roles in the family. Instead of playing the role of protector and head of the house, they turned into money making husbands who have separate social lives. Mr. C. believes modern life is a way of expanding choices with its new cultural changes:

Whether men want it or not, with the opportunities that came with modern life and financial situations, these men turn to different areas. There occurred an inequality between men and women, because wives could not take the advantage of this new situation as men did. While they were walking together as husband and wife in life, suddenly the social lives of men have expanded too much, whereas the women's situation stabled at a certain degree. Everything is being done on behalf of social life. The change in men starts with renunciation and corruption. The old Turkish Islam was a result of lack of choices. When choices increased, it appeared that we were not that faithful. (interview, December 12, 2011).

According to Mr. C. having less choices kept conservative men religious, which decreased by having more choices in this modern new urban life. The new urban culture brought a different lifestyle that connects men more to the outside. Of course, at some point, the changes directly affected the expectations of men from their wives. While men were trying to get positions and power in society, they left women at home to take care of everything related to family life. Mr. E. supports this idea by saying, "It is true that men left out their wives and daughters. In return for this neglect, they could buy iPhones as hush money. Thus, men buy their freedom (interview, December 15, 2011).

As an important part of culture, 'power' should be studied as an influencer on masculinity. As aforementioned, the importance of power on masculinity is universal, whereas the influence of culture on masculinity is necessary. The meaning and content of power change from culture to culture and time to time. This means that the meaning of masculinity, or the idea of being a man, is influenced in different ways by different cultures. As Ahmed Durres says, "Thus, as used in psycho-symbolic-sacred sense, culture becomes a crucial concept, not only as archetypal canvas but also as a diagnostic one" (2006, p. 15). In some cultures this can be money, age, or knowledge. Cornwall and Lindisfarne describe the power of men in the West as dominating others (1994, p. 3). According to Cornwall and Lindisfarne being a 'man' is directly about power; the meaning of power is to dominate others, in the West. If one has enough power to dominate others, this means he is complete and accepted in society.

This means if one loses this power, he loses the most important necessity as a man. If there is a more powerful man who can dominate him, this means he is more of man or more masculine than the other. Cultural dominos are significant. The critical norms in a culture are related to power and this power affects others in society; this influence is directly related to the masculinity idea in society.

There is more than one constituent of power in the Turkish culture, such as economic, social, and political ones. By changing the social and economic status of new conservatives, family life and women become a way of showing power. Although they left women at home and did not expect any social partnership in the beginning, after the changing social status they began expecting different types of women. This new urban culture brought with it a new, more modern, and urbanized idea of women to mind. Moreover, no one wanted to seem less powerful or less modernized. As mentioned earlier, with

this urban culture and economic change, new women types were needed; women who could be more socially active in society and of those who could be good representatives of their husbands began to emerge. In Mr. B.'s words:

Traditional women were preferred for three religious reasons. After the changes in our social status we looked for women who could be good partners in social life and who could say 'hi' when they came in a new community. So tradition and religion was not the general reasons for decisions. Men needed women who could be good partners and would not be too visible in this new community (interview, December 30, 2011).

Women that were protected and kept in secret, culturally and religiously in the past, became a way of power and showing off for the conservative men in society. The changing gender roles and the representation of women in society took on different paths with the influence of modern urban city life. These are the changes of power and gender roles over time and culture.

The effect of culture on power created different masculinity identities for each culture. This means gender roles and sexual presentation are constructed by the society in which they exist and can change from time to time. Cornwall and Lindisfarne say:

We suggest that the oft-used analytic categories 'gender role', 'sexual orientation' and 'biological sex' have little explanatory value, since they too imply a false dichotomy between the sexed body and the gendered individual. Though this biological/social opposition has been the basis of most studies of gender, we insist that both the sexed body and the gendered individual are culturally constructed and that biology is no more primary or 'real' than any other aspect of lived experience (1994, p. 9).

Culture is the social constructor of the masculinity idea in the universe. It creates social roles and expectations that are taken as gospels. Power is an

important element of culture, which has a direct effect on the masculinity idea as well. Culture is a diagnostic concept for the production and construction of the masculinity identity. The man, who balances his socially constructed masculinity identity, will be more accepted and powerful in society. This makes him feel approved of and fulfilled.

Conclusion

Big political and economic changes certainly influence social equilibriums toward new routes; these drastic changes mostly occur after sudden events in the history. The February 28 military intervention was one of these events that brought new social norms to Turkish society. Although the method of the February 28 process differs from all of the other three military interventions, it still had a negative impact on society. Despite the fact that every intervention and coup had their own purposes in the eyes of their planners, their results were not always as expected. The February 28 process ended in an unexpected way by creating new hybrid identities and groups that became more visible and active in society in surprising ways.

Turkey has a problematic history with the idea of identification, because of the 'one nation' politics. This 'one nation' politics affected different minority groups, ethnicities, and religious people in various ways. For some religious people it turned into a revolutionary approach and created the Islamism movement. Historically religiosity and conservatism were considered synonymous. This relationship between Islamism and conservatism did remain close as it was in the beginning.

In time, the relationship between Islamism and conservatism passed to another dimension. Islamism lost its power and popularity, whereas religiosity lost its importance as a common ground for Islamism and conservatism. However, conservatism became more popular after the declaration of JDP (AKP) government itself as a Conservative Democratic Party. There are different reasons that triggered the changed relationships between Islamism, conservatism, and religiosity. The socio-economic changes

and being satisfied with fulfilling the long-term goals are the primary and most important reasons in this changing process. The socio-economic changes also started a class distinction suddenly. It put a new indicator for new conservatives during their integration into society.

On the other hand, identity problems started again. Some immense changes occurred in micro lives, too. The traumas and crises created by the February 28 process caused new identity problems, mostly for Islamist men and women. During this change, Islamist men turned into new conservatives who were still confused due to identity issues. First, the meaning and the concept of the masculinity idea changed from the past. Power changed from being dominated over women to having more socialized and presentable women with them. Whether this change happened consciously or unconsciously is still a question, even today. On the other hand, culture was the mainspring of creating a masculinity idea. In a sense, changing cultural values also affected the new meaning of masculinity. The new masculinity idea was more about economic and social acceptance by others.

The changes created a hybrid society. The February 28 process changes showed that many identities sprung from political, social, and economic changes. After the conditions changed, the meanings and the features of those identities changed; in this case it was the masculinity identity. Most of identities are already socially constructed, which means these identities can change and collapse according to the time and space. J. F. Bayart says, "There is no such thing as identity, only operational acts of identification" (2005, p. 92). Identity can change from time to time and from case to case.

Moreover, Claire Mitchell differentiates between religious affiliation and religious identities in her article. She points out that affiliations are used to label a group that has cultural and ethnographic differences (2006, p. 1135). This shows that religious affiliations can join people under the same umbrella, despite the lack of religious identification for themselves. Furthermore, the labeling process is an external portrayal that gives to the 'other' an identity in society. Having an identity differs from being given an identity. The gap between these two identification processes can create vast gaps between people since one may not understand the position of others.

Apart from these given and felt identities, there are also many other identities to describe anyone such as male, white, Christian, Kurdish, etc. All of these identities are intersectional. This nested structure of identities makes it sensitive to different factors, according to priorities of the person or society.

According to the history of Turkey and Turkish modernization, creating identities is based on the principle of the one nation identity and male dominated culture. When this 'one nation' idea is combined with a traditional masculine culture, it creates a male dominant society. As Baobaid says, "In most Muslim countries, the teaching of Islam has been mixed with inherited cultural tradition. Both Islam and culture have been practiced in a manner biased in favor of men" (2006, p. 165). Learning the religion by the effects of cultures also created a variety of religious people. The political and socio-economic reasons that were forced by the state in the past hold these religious people together, until the balance shifted. Either political or cultural forces created a confused nation that is not sure of their identities.

Furthermore, being a projected nation created a sense that if you are not needed then you are not accepted. The other qualifications you have are neither important nor an identifier for who you are. Identities are constructed on the idea of what you are not, whether inside or outside the circle. That identification establishes by what you are not, rather than who you are. Furthermore, it created a nation that neither accepts you as you are, nor interested in who you are. The only way to know each other is by labeling first and then accusing each other of living by the wrong side.

The identity change these former Islamists experienced includes a long and old story in the history of the Turkish modernization process. They began as 'persona non grata' by the state to being the one in the power. Then they learned to be a man from a masculine based culture that created former Islamists who have undergone a change after February 28. The changeability of identities, because of being social constructed, mostly entail this change as well.

This study was done with ten former Islamist men. Despite the limitations of the number, this study still provides insightful and useful information that should be interested by academics and all others who want to discover new ideas about the Islamist Turkish male's change after the February 28 process.

This study tried to look at the changes from the perspective of a group of men who are accused of negatively changing. Results of this study can therefore vary with a much larger group. A more detailed study, with more interviewees, would provide refined results.

An interesting and informative alternative would be to perform this study with a younger group, in their early 20s, and make a comparison between these two generations.

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