

MILITARISM AND WELFARE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A FUZZY SET
QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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ISTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

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MILITARISM AND WELFARE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
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
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
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ABSTRACT

MILITARISM AND WELFARE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A FUZZY SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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Most of the Middle Eastern countries display a stark contrast with the developed world in terms of welfare efforts, but they also have qualitative differences among themselves. This study sheds light on the political economic conditions leading to good and poor welfare efforts in the Middle East, but with a particular emphasis on those having to do with the militaristic aspects of states. The analysis of causal relationships between different configurations of conditions and welfare efforts by states is carried out with a systematic method of inference making called the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). For this comparison eight Middle Eastern countries – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen – are selected based on their relevance to the topic and the availability of data.

The model includes seven condition variables and two outcome variables. Social expenditure as of central government expenditure and social security coverage are both included as indicators for welfare effort, thus two separate fsQCA analyses are implemented with these two outcome variables. Outputs of the fsQCA analyses support the hypotheses asserting negative relationship between militarism and welfare efforts. Mostly, the absence of militaristic aspects such as high military expenditure, high amount of armed forces personnel and praetorian relationship between the military and the government are associated with good welfare efforts. Since this is a qualitative study, it does not provide explanation about the net effects

of each variable on the outcome. However, it could serve as a preliminary study that provides insights to future research about some spurious and significant factors.

Keywords: Middle East, militarism, social policy, political economy

ÖZ

ORTADOĞU'DA MİLİTARİZM VE SOSYAL REFAH: BULANIK KÜME KARŞILAŞTIRMALI
NİTELİKSEL ANALİZ

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Sosyal refah çabaları konusunda birçok Ortadoğu ülkesi ile gelişmiş dünya arasında keskin bir farklılaşma gözlenirken, bu ülkeler kendi aralarında da bu konuda ciddi farklılıklar sergilemektedir. Bu çalışma, Ortadoğu ülkelerinde sosyal refah çabalarının zayıf olmasına neden olan siyasi-ekonomik faktörlere odaklanmaktadır, ve bu faktörler arasında özellikle militarizm ile ilgili olanlar çalışmanın ana konusunu teşkil etmektedir. Bu konuyu ele alırken Bulanık Küme Niteliksel Karşılaştırmalı Analiz metodundan faydalanılmaktadır. Bu karşılaştırma için veri uygunluğu ve tezin ana konusuyla alakasına göre sekiz adet vaka seçilmiştir. Bunlar sırasıyla Cezayir, Mısır, Ürdün, Lübnan, Fas, Suriye, Tunus ve Yemen'dir.

Bu analiz için oluşturulan model yedi koşul değişkeni ve iki sonuç değişkeninden oluşmaktadır. Sosyal refah harcamalarının toplam hükümet harcamaları içindeki payı ve sosyal güvenlik kapsamı sosyal refah çabalarının iki alternatif göstergesi olarak modele dahil edilmiştir, ve bundan dolayı bu iki sonuç değişkeni için iki farklı analiz yürütülmektedir. İki analizden elde edilen sonuçlar militarizm ile sosyal refah çabaları arasında negatif bir ilişki öngören hipotezleri destekler niteliktedir. Çoğunlukla yüksek askeri harcamalar, yüksek askeri personel oranı ve hükümet ile askeriye arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılık gibi militarist özelliklerin yokluğu yüksek düzeyde sosyal refah

abaları ile birlikte gzlemlenmektedir. Bu alıřma niteliksel bir zellik tařıdıđından her bir kořul deđiřkeninin sonu deđiřkeni zerindeki net etkisine dair bir aıklama getirmemektedir. Bununla birlikte, bu alıřma militarizm ile sosyal refah arasındaki iliřkiyi aıđa ıkarmaya alıřacak olan daha ileri dzey alıřmalarda deđiřken seimine yardımcı olacak n bir alıřma olarak kullanılabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortadođu, militarizm, sosyal politika, siyasi ekonomi

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Introduction

One possible answer to the question why the Arab people rose up against their rulers in the past several years could be the failure of governments to fulfill the social welfare demands of their societies. Apart from the factors like oppressive treatments of authoritarian regimes to societal groups and unfair elections, the great discrepancy between the developed world and the Arab countries –excluding wealthy Gulf monarchies— in terms of social welfare seems to be one of the fundamental sources of people’s grievance.

Most of the Middle Eastern states perform below the world mean in terms of the extent and scope of social welfare provision.¹ While this is the case for welfare indicators, one list in which majority of the Middle Eastern states rank quite higher than the world mean is the Global Militarization Index (GMI).² A simple juxtaposition of the two pictures arises questions regarding the relevance of their militaristic aspects with their poor performances in terms of welfare provision.

The general landscape of welfare provision in the world illustrates the significant role of countries’ economic capacity on their state’s welfare provision efforts. Data from 2009 indicates that on average high income countries’ total public social security expenditure amounted to 19.4% of their Gross Domestic Products (GDP), while middle and low income countries respectively spent 7% and 4.1% of their GDPs.³ These facts suggest a significant correlation between income level and social policy

¹ See Randa Alami & Massoud Karshenas (2012, February). Deficient Social Policies Have Helped Spark the Arab Spring. Retrieved from School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London: <https://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/file74447.pdf>

² See Global Militarization Index. (n.d.). Retrieved from Bonn International Center for Conversion: <http://gmi.bicc.de/>

³ See The International Labour Organization. (2011). World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_213759.pdf, p. 3.

performances. However, low and middle income countries' poor performance could not be reduced to their economic capacity. This work argues there should be space for political factors in explaining the variation between the developed and less-developed world, and also the variation among the members of the same income level.

In an environment of persistent inter-state and intra-state conflicts, many Middle Eastern states spend extravagant amounts on military personnel and equipment. Excluding the natural resource abundant Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Middle Eastern countries have limited economic capacity, and this military burden on central government budgets might have significant consequences on well-being of citizens. Excessive military burden might be a barrier in front of the flow of public resources to social welfare and productive investments.

This work will analyze this issue by elaborating on the status of military in the political economic systems of Middle Eastern countries, and will attempt to answer the question in which ways the militaristic aspects of their systems might constraint or enable welfare efforts by the governments. To reveal the dynamics of this issue, the study employs a comparative approach. The analysis is carried out with a systematic method of inference making called the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). It is a set theoretical and qualitative technique, and therefore it is based on a configurational understanding of causation. Conclusions of the study will put forward which configurations lead to good or poor welfare efforts. For this comparison eight Middle Eastern countries – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen – are selected based on their relevance to the topic and the availability of data. Further information on why other Middle Eastern states are not included in the study are given in the second chapter that elaborates on research design and methodology.

The whole study revolves around the relationship between the two phenomena represented by the concepts of militarism and welfare efforts. Before the analysis, the meaning of these concepts should be clarified. A simple definition of militarism

frames it as “aggressive military preparedness”.⁴ It might propel public policy makers to channel excessive amount of resources to military spending, to mobilize a great amount of people for military service, and might lead to unbalanced civil-military relations. In one of the earliest and one of the most profound definitions, Alfred Vagts describes a militarist polity as a setting where “a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars” are observed and “yet transcending true military purposes”.⁵ This second definition captures well the abnormal and harmful nature of the phenomenon. On the other hand, the concept of welfare efforts could be defined as the sum of actions by governments to fulfill their welfare responsibilities to society. T.H. Marshall’s definition of social rights succinctly designates these responsibilities:

The right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services.⁶

The most common indicator for measuring welfare efforts is social spending as of Gross Domestic Product or as of central government spending. An additional indicator could be the level of social security coverage that is very likely to have a strong correlation with the first indicator.

This work offers several hypotheses about the relationship of the two phenomena in the Middle Eastern context. Firstly, a high level of military spending as of central government spending has a negative relationship with welfare efforts of governments. Allocation of excessive public resources to military expenses narrows the share of budget available for welfare expenses. Secondly, the size of military personnel relative to the size of the total employment primarily has a constraining effect on welfare efforts, but in some cases it might have a contributory effect. Out

⁴ See Daron Acemoglu & Pierre Yared (2010). Political Limits to Globalization. American Economic Review, 100(02), p.83.

⁵ See Alfred Vagts. (1959). A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military. New York: Meridian Books. P.13.

⁶ See Thomas H. Marshall. (1964). Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. p.79.

of the risks military profession poses to human life and well-being, military personnel are provided with comprehensive welfare programs. When the ratio of military personnel to population is significantly high, more people benefits from the welfare programs provided by military, and that increases the legitimacy of governments' military spending policies, which in turn makes them less in need of deriving political legitimacy through social spending on the rest of the society. Finally, a praetorian relationship between the military and the government negatively affects latter's welfare efforts. Military absorbs extravagant public resources, in turn it provides security to the regime against domestic and external threats. These are the characteristics about armies that are present in the Middle Eastern countries with different configurations. This work argues the variation between the Middle Eastern states in terms of the abovementioned aspects of militarism might provide an explanation for the variation in their social welfare efforts.

This work consists of three chapters. The first one focuses on three topics related with the inquired relationship. The role militaristic aspects of states play in the emergence of fundamental political economic outcomes like economic growth and development, the formers' relationship particularly with welfare efforts of states, and the dynamics of social policy in the Middle East are elaborated on and remarkable works focusing on those topics are briefly reviewed to locate this study within the subfield of political economy. The second chapter is devoted to research design, methodology and data. Indicators for welfare efforts and variables considered to have effects on them are introduced. Subsequently, the underlying causal approach and procedures of the fsQCA technique are described in detail. Finally, information about the collection and features of the data are provided. In the third chapter, firstly the raw data for all variables are given in tables, and then they are converted into fuzzy set membership scores that indicate a case's degree of displaying a condition or outcome. The outputs of the fsQCA analyses that are produced by the software follows these two steps, and finally the results of the analysis are commented and also complemented with a comparative analysis of three individual cases.

Chapter 1

Militarism and Political Economic Outcomes

A consensus on the meaning and scope of the term “political economy” could not have been achieved yet, however usually a contemporary social scientific study might bear these words in its title out of mainly two reasons. It might deal with a subject matter which falls into the intersection of politics and economics, or it might borrow the formal methodological tools of mainstream economics to model dynamics lying under a political phenomenon.⁷ Scholarly works from the classical literature of political economy published in the 19th and early 20th centuries studying the coevolution of novel economic and political systems could be counted among the typical examples for the former style.⁸ The latter tradition is a more recent endeavor of dealing with political phenomena, and it benefits from the mathematical tools of economists for modeling the issues like democratization, inter-state conflict, institutional change etc.⁹ The former one is the most common way of using it, and this work for the most part embraces that way, because the main research question revolves around a typical issue which could not be analyzed isolated from politics or economics.

The relationship between militarism and welfare efforts within the contexts of Middle Eastern states is the main focus of this work, and it will be an attempt to reveal the dynamics of the former’s effect on the latter one. While welfare related topics have been most commonly studied within the mainstream social policy studies,

⁷ See Barry R. Weingast, Donald A. Wittman (2006). The Reach of Political Economy. In B. R. Weingast, & D. A. Wittman, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* (pp. 3-28). New York: Oxford University Press Inc.

⁸ Joseph Schumpeter’s *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Karl Marx’s *Das Kapital* and Daron Acemoğlu’s *Why Nations Fail* are among the typical examples

⁹ For a typical example, see Norman Schofield (2008). *The Political Economy of Democracy and Tyranny*. München: Oldenbourg.

which to a certain extent has achieved to isolate itself as a separate social scientific discipline, the inclusion of militarism in the research question necessitates a political economic approach which mainly deals with the implications of political power on political economic outcomes.¹⁰ Given this nature of the research question, this work will be among the ideal examples of a political economic study.

This study is related with several literatures in the subfield of political economy. Firstly, it focuses on the guns vs. butter problem, therefore it is related with the general literature on the effects of military costs on fundamental political economic outcomes like economic growth, distribution of wealth, volume of trade etc. Secondly, it has a specific concern on welfare efforts, and that feature includes it among the works inquiring the relationship between militaristic aspects of states and their social policy performances. Finally, it is a study only focusing on the region of the Middle East. There is a growing body of works on the topic of social policy in this part of the world, but they mostly concentrate on individual cases. This work with its comparative analysis of the eight cases could contribute to this literature by making researchers familiar with region-wide dynamics of social policy making.

This chapter will shed light on these three issues and make a brief review of the discussions around them. The next section elaborates on the complex relationship between militarism and general economic outcomes. The following two sections are dedicated to the review of the other two more specific issues.

1.1. A Political Economic Approach on Militarism

In modern history, the overburden of military on the political economic outcomes arguably became most evident in the early 20th century when European great powers were occupied with waging a total war, namely the First World War. They depleted an enormous amount of their productive resources, but after the war they could flex their productive muscles again with the help of the United States of America. The US

¹⁰ See Chris Holden. (2005). Social Policy and Political Economy: A Tale of (at least) Two Disciplines. *Social Policy and Society*, 4(02), 173-182.

was a latecomer to the war field, but it also consumed enormous financial resources for a swift mobilization of military personnel and war machines. It is estimated around 4.7 million Americans served during the US involvement in the war, and the total cost of that involvement amounted to 52.2% of the Gross National Product.¹¹ However, interestingly it was able to achieve an economic boom just after the end of the war, while the European powers, both the victorious and defeated ones, were undergoing a harsh economic situation.

In the early years of the war, the US was absent in the war field and were supplying weapons to Allied Powers, and in the aftermath of the war it was the financier of the post-war European infrastructural development and the main supplier of the post-war European demand for industrial goods. These were significant contributory factors behind the emergence of the USA as the greatest industrial power of the 20th century. It was able to allocate most of its resources – as it should be during the normal times of a modern economy at the time— to industrial production, while its rivals in the industrial competition crucially ran out of productive resources and were using the available stock for the treatment of war destruction, but not for innovative industrial production. By the late 1920s the US was supplying almost 40% of the world demand for industrial goods, and the sum of the production by the Western European countries and the United Kingdom, who were the leading industrial actors of the 18th and 19th centuries, was almost 35% of the world demand.¹² These different outcomes produced under similar conditions of military burden suggests there should be some contextual differences in this success and failure of the west and east coasts of the North Atlantic. When combined with different contextual variables excessive military mobilization could be a cause both for blossom and wither of an economy. A simple binary comparison of this two historical experiences by two different parts of the western world reveals that they did not share a similar political economic situation before and during the war. The US had been emerging as a hub

¹¹ See Hugh Rockoff. (2004, June). *Until It's Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I*. Retrieved from National Bureau of Economic Research: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10580.pdf?new_window=1 , p.19.

¹² See Robert C. Allen. (2011). *Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. p.7.

for innovative industrial production towards the end of the 19th century, while the others had gradually been getting stuck in a fierce military competition. When this competition resulted in a war in the early 20th century, the continental supply of weapons were not sufficient in Europe and the USA were ready in terms of industrial infrastructure to become an exporter of weapons, in other words it turned weaponry into a business. From this picture it seems the flow of big financial capital through arms sales both to the US military and European powers, and the triggering effect of the huge demand for weaponry on the research and development activities in military and related industries created a fertile context for the domination of positive effects of militarism over its negative effects.

After the Second World War, European powers could have decreased their military mobilization to normal levels, and then they experienced a sharp increase in terms of the average socioeconomic status of their population. In that period, with the increasing tensions between the US and the USSR, the former continued to consume huge amounts of its financial resources to the development of its military, but its huge economy and its ability to make profit from the arms industry made it able to finance its democratic militarism.

This extravagant military mobilization is still observed to a more modest degree in the Middle East. Militaries have been taking the lion's share from the state budgets in most of the Middle Eastern countries, however this has not been the case because they have been continuously warring states, but because they have been enjoying an exclusive position within the political economic structures. The surrounding conditions in these countries seem to contribute to the dominance of negative effects of militarism on economic growth and development. Excessive financial resources are spent for the imports of expensive military equipment or for the expenses of armed forces personnel. The weakness of domestic industries in terms of technological research and development is a barrier in front of the emergence of positive externalities of excessive military expenditure. Additionally, the recruitment of a considerable share of labour force in the military is a factor preventing the blossom of a productive private sector, and this channels another negative impact of militarism on the economic development.

These stories illustrate the complexity of the relationship between militarism and political economic outcomes, mainly the economic growth and development. Deger and Sen (1995)¹³ navigate through this complexity and theorize a comprehensive list of causal channels through which the militaristic aspects of states might affect economic growth. Besides, their work also provides insights about militarism's effects on other political economic outcomes. They introduce nine channels with varying directions of influence on the outcomes. Among them some remarkable ones are the resource allocation channel, aggregate demand creation channel, budgetary crowding-out channel and growth spinoffs channel.¹⁴ The first one conduces a negative effect on economic growth since the aggregate investment level decreases as the military expenditure increases. The second one is the classical Keynesian demand creation mechanism through increasing government spending. If there exists a domestic arms industry and a large amount of people recruited by the military, then military expenditure might contribute to short term economic growth. The third channel points out the reduced government spending on health and education as a result of the increasing military expenditure. Health and education spending contributes to individual's efforts for human capital formation and that is argued to consist a fundamental driving force of economic growth. Finally, the growth spinoffs channel draws attention to possible positive externalities which militaristic aspects of a political economy might create on the modernization of industries and technological development.¹⁵ This last one refers to the Benoit hypothesis that asserts a positive relationship between militarism and economic growth in the context of developing countries. His arguments mainly revolves around the contribution of a high level of military mobilization on the processes of research and development in the industry.¹⁶

¹³ See Saadet Deger & Somnath Sen. (1995). Military Expenditure in Developing Countries. In K. Hartley, & T. Sandler, Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume 1 (pp. 270-302). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

¹⁴ Ibid, p.279.

¹⁵ Ibid, p.280.

¹⁶ See Emile Benoit (1973). Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, Emile Benoit (1978), Growth and Defense in Developing Countries, Economic

As the aforementioned story from the early 20th century and theoretical insights by Deger and Sen (1995) suggest the relationship is hardly reducible to a simple unidirectional effect of militarism on political economic outcomes. This complex nature of the relationship reverberates in the literature as contradictory conclusions by different works about the direction of it. Bowman describes this situation in the literature with the words: “While the conventional wisdom and the case study evidence conclude that large militaries are negatively associated with development, a large body of cross-national research finds that lots of soldiers are good for economic growth and equity in developing countries”.¹⁷ This sentence summarizes well the state of the literature on the political economy of militarism, and also indirectly points out the theoretical and methodological roots of the division.¹⁸

In a period of high political tension around the globe and of arms race between the two great powers in the context of the Cold War, the nature of this relationship was one of the most debated political economic questions. Benoit’s works in 1973 and 1978 have been the forerunner of those arguing positive influence of military expenditure on economic growth. The mechanism producing this effect in his study were human capital improvements thanks to the disciplined education provided by the military and increased level of research and development activities.¹⁹ Benoit’s argument subtly claim that militarism is good for economic growth, because a higher level of military expenditure, which is the most common and fundamental proxy variable for militarism, means also greater positive effect on growth. Another remarkable study from this period was DeGrasse’s analysis of military spending and economic performance in the United States. Similar to Benoit’s analysis, this one also

Development and Cultural Change, 26 (02), 271-280.

¹⁷ See Kirk S. Bowman (2002). *Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. p.3.

¹⁸ The following two articles discuss the effects theoretical framework and methodology preferences on the conclusions regarding the nature of the relationship Aynur Alptekin & Paul Levine. (2012). *Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis*. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 28(04), 636-650, Sefa Awaworyi & Siew L. Yew (2014). *The Effect of Military Expenditure on Growth: An Empirical Synthesis*. Retrieved from Monash University, Business and Economics: <http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2014/2514effectawaworyiyew.pdf>

¹⁹ See Emile Benoit. (1978). *Growth and Defense in Developing Countries*. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 26(02), 271-280.

found a positive relationship, and according to this analysis the effect flows through the channel of increased job opportunities with the increased military mobilization and the resulting increase in the buying power and ultimately in aggregate demand.²⁰ The popularity of the modernization theory at the time was influential in the formation of the framework researchers employing to analyze development related questions. Militaries were seen as a tool for swift and effective modernization in education and technology for Third World countries, therefore high military expenditure were beneficial to economic progress for them.²¹

With the end of the Cold War this question has become even more popular. In the two decades after the collapse of this international order, many works in mainstream economics and political science have been published on this issue. These works produced different results about the relationship, but still a considerable majority found a positive relationship. The significant decrease in the level of tension was accompanied with a decrease in military spending in the US, Russia and their former satellite states, however this trend did not last long because of the conflicts in the Middle East, particularly for the US.²² This variation in military spending has created a better empirical ground for testing hypotheses about the guns vs. butter arguments. Some significant works published early in this period were Weede (1992), Bullock and Firebaugh (1990) and Arias (1994).²³ The results of the first two indicated positive effects of militaristic aspects on development, while the last one argued a negative effect.

²⁰ See Robert W. DeGrasse. (1983). *Military Expansion, Economic Decline: The Impact of Military Spending on U.S. Economic Performance*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

²¹ See Samuel P. Huntington. (1957). *The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

²² For a detailed survey of the issue, see James M. Cypher. (1991). *Military Spending After the Cold War*. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 25(02), 607-615.

²³ See Erich Weede. (1992). *Military Participation, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality*. In S. Chan, & A. Mintz, *Defense, Welfare and Growth* (pp. 211-230). London: Routledge.

Oscar Arias. (1989). *1987 Address to the United States Congress*. In M. Edelman, & J. Kenan, *The Costa Rica Reader*. New York: Grove Weidenfeld.

Brad Bullock., & Glan Firebaugh. (1990). *Guns and Butter? The Effect of Militarization on Economic and Social Development in the Third World*. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 18(02), 231-266.

One popular concept having to do with this issue and that was coined in this productive period of the literature was “peace dividend”. It was originally popularized by the US President George H. W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and was addressing positive economic yields obtained from significant cuts in defense spending by Western nations after the Cold War. The following words from a formal treatment of the concept summarizes the significance and underlying mechanisms of peace dividend arguments:

[...] the effect of reduced defense budgets is interpreted as a type of *investment process*. In such a process the immediate effects are costs, in the form of unemployment of resources and various conversion costs, while the ultimate effects are benefits, as the unemployed are resources are reemployed using the market mechanism, to produce civilian goods. With this interpretation, the peace dividend is only a myth if it refers to immediate benefits derived without cost from reduced defense budgets, but it is a reality if it refers to the ultimate benefits from using markets to convert military production to civilian production.²⁴

Here, the emphasis is on the diversion of resources from military to other public expenses that are expected to generate more benefit for the society. Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003) focus on three cases from the Middle East for inquiring the effect of excessive use of public resources for military purposes. Their multivariate analysis of military spending and long-term economic growth in Israel, Syria and Egypt for a period around 30 years finds a negative relationship between the two.²⁵ Among other endeavors attempting to make sense of the relationship one comprehensive study is Bowman’s *Militarization, Democracy and, Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America* that also finds a negative relationship.²⁶ Another remarkable work in the literature of political economy of militarism, but with a different dependent variable is Acemoğlu and Yared’s (2010) analysis of militarism and trade volume. They empirically found that in the last 20 years up to 2010, the countries experiencing

²⁴ See Michael D. Intriligator. (n.d.). The Concept of A Peace Dividend. Retrieved from UNESCO-EOLSS: <http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c13/E6-28A-02-04.pdf> , p.1.

²⁵ See Suleiman Abu-Bader & Aamer S. Abu-Qarn. (2003). Government Expenditures, Military Spending and Economic Growth: Causality Evidence from Egypt, Israel and Syria. *Journal of Policy Modelling*, 25(06), p.579.

²⁶ See Kirk S. Bowman. (2002). *Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.

increasing militarism – measured by the proxy indicators like military spending and the size of military— have performed poor in terms of the growth in their trade volume.²⁷

One common feature of the majority of works cited until now is their methodological orientation. They all inquire for the existence of a correlational relationship between military expenditure and economic growth or related outcomes by analyzing data. The lack of consensus among them in terms of the existence of a significant relationship or the direction of it stems from several factors. Firstly, they use different samples of cases for their cross-national analyses. The trend is testing hypotheses with a sample derived from countries in a specific region such as Latin America or East Europe. Since the quantitative methods generally ignores contextual differences between regions, contradictory results for bivariate or multivariate relationship are not rare. Secondly, their economic growth models differ and that in turn might affect the results obtained from the same data. Definitional differences or the choice of indicators might result in contradictory results, as well.

Qualitative studies generally have a complex understanding of causality, therefore the role of contextual differences are treated better. However, the issue of militarism and economic outcomes are not handled in a systematic way in qualitative tradition. This study embraces a qualitative understanding of causality that brings a configurational explanation to relationships, and uses a methodology that systematizes this complex and context dependent causality. The contradictory results of the works cited until now might arise out of their ambitious endeavor to explain this very complex relationship in simple terms.

Another common problem within the literature is equating the definition of militarism with the excessive defense expenditure. As mentioned before, while high defense expenditure is the foremost indicator of militarism, there are also other mechanisms that might channel the effect of militarism towards the political economic outcomes. A high ratio of the military personnel to the population or to the labour force of a country, though it has not totally independent from the defense

²⁷See Daron Acemoğlu & Pierre Yared. (2010). Political Limits to Globalization. *American Economic Review*, 100(02), p.88.

expenditure, could be counted as another significant indicator for militarism. Mutual exclusiveness between explanatory variables in terms of their effect on the outcome is not a *sine qua non* in qualitative methods. Two variable displaying significant correlation might hinder to measure net effects by each of them, but in a configurational explanation for the presence and absence of a certain outcome these two variables could take place in the same combination. Military expenditure and military personnel have such a feature. A country having a high level of armed forces personnel is very likely to have a high level of military personnel too, or vice versa. Military personnel might have different channels of effect on political outcomes than military expenditure. Additionally, a case might have a high level of military expenditure, but low level of military personnel, and the former might be present out of expenses on equipment. Therefore, this study will include these two variables as two aspects of militarism.

Apart from the empirical works mentioned until now, a policy making perspective on this issue might provide further insights to understand the functioning of militarism within the political economic structures of states and the effects it produces on political economic outcomes. Policy making in modern states is a complex process whether it takes place in a democratic or non-democratic ground. In highly institutionalized democracies, a certain policy is finalized most often as a result of a multitude of interactions between the government, bureaucracy and societal actors. Concerns of representation and accountability necessitates the consent of people or at least of their representatives, and that creates a significant transaction cost towards the formulation and implementation of policies. In non-democratic or semi-democratic contexts this process is less constrained by these concerns, however some influential societal or state actors might lead to significant costs by creating biases that result in inefficiencies in the final outcomes. In militaristic and authoritarian contexts of Middle Eastern states, priorities of military and security policy domain are privileged over others. The allocation of resources for the expenses of each policy domain in such a context is likely to cause inefficient outcomes in economic growth or equity.

Institutional approaches on political economy of public policy making facilitates to understand the underlying mechanisms creating these biases. Acemoğlu, Johnson and Robinson's model for explaining the emergence of different types of institutions and their effects on economic growth offers a very simple framework to understand how militarism affects political economic outcomes. In their theory, the initial allocation of political power among various actors of a polity determines the type of future political and economic institutions, which they see as the most fundamental factor explaining the variation in economic growth and development. These institutions constraint or enable policy makers and individuals in their actions.²⁸ An important aspect of their theory is the distinction between de jure and de facto political power. In Middle Eastern countries constitutions do not give de jure political power to militaries, but given their critical role in the formation processes of nation states, they usually enjoy considerable de facto political power whereby military priorities and norms are institutionalized.

This institutional perspective is very popular in the literature of political economy of economic growth and development, but also could be benefited for understanding the emergence of different social policies. This work is not an institutionalist account of welfare efforts in the Middle East, but this perspective is given here as a highly relevant explanation for revealing the mechanisms of militarisms effect on political economic outcomes.

1.2. Militarism and Social Policy Dynamics

The budgetary crowding out effect²⁹ introduced in the previous section is the most relevant analytical tool to make sense of the relationship between militarism and social policies of states. A high percentage of military spending as of central

²⁸ See Daron Acemoğlu, Simon Johnson, & James A. Robinson. (2005). Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. In P. Aghion, & S. N. Durlauf, Handbook of Economic Growth (pp. 385-472). Amsterdam: North-Holland. p. 392

²⁹ It is one of the nine channels introduced by them, and the one that implies the budgetary tradeoff between the security and welfare policy domains.

government spending directly narrows the proportion of resources that could be allocated to social spending. While this is the most salient and usually most dominant effect, there are other channels that could have positive effects on welfare efforts of state.

In contexts where formal employment are limited and mostly concentrated in public sector, a citizen employed in a state office or public enterprise is by far more likely to get social security coverage. Since a higher level of military personnel means a higher level of public employees too, this aspect of militarism sometimes might contribute to welfare efforts by states. Particularly, in the early phases of state formation many people benefit from state's welfare provision through their entitlements in the military. Skocpol's groundbreaking analysis of the emergence and expansion of social benefits in the United States in the late 19th century found their roots in the military mobilization for Union Civil War. In *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*, she illustrates how hard conditions of war propel states to behave more generous to warring citizens and how these behavior is institutionalized as citizen rights after the hard times had passed.³⁰

Empirical works on this more specific issue is less common compared to the more general one in the previous section. However, since the income level of a country matters much for social policies of the state, this literature provides insights about the outcome of welfare efforts, as well. When the dependent variable is economic growth, the relevance of budgetary crowding-out has to do with its influence on human capital investment and infrastructural development. High military burden might narrow down state's capability to help citizens' human capital formation, and this ultimately might lead to decrease in economic growth. Also, public investment for infrastructural development, that is almost a necessary condition for sustainable economic growth, might decrease since the military burden might crowd out public spending on investments that could not be carried out solely by the private sector such as the construction of roads, telecommunication infrastructure or railroads. On the outcome of welfare efforts, as proxied by social spending or social security

³⁰ See Theda Skocpol. (1995). *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in United States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

coverage, crowding out has a more direct effect through decreasing share in the central budget for state's use in social policy domain.

Some works focusing on this more specific issue generally choose social spending or a closely related phenomenon as the dependent variable. A sophisticated research by Henderson (1998) finds a negative association between military expenditure and poverty, but points out declined social welfare spending as a reason why military spending leads to this outcome. In this study the relationship is also analyzed by disaggregating military spending into operations and maintenance (O&M), and research and development (R&D), but this does not change the conclusion.³¹ Töngür and Elveren (2012) focus on different welfare state regimes and inquire if there is any association between military spending and the type of the regime. Their findings indicate the emergence of social democratic welfare states which are known with their very high level of welfare efforts are negatively affected by high military expenditure.³² Another empirical study, by Yıldırım and Sezgin (2002), analyzes military expenditure's effects on two components of social spending –respectively health and education spending – with data from Turkey's republican era. They conclude that while there were a negative trade-off between military and health spending, the trade-off is positive between military and education spending.³³ In contrast to the first issue covered in the previous section, the finding of various studies is more consistent for militaristic aspects' effect on welfare efforts.

On this issue of military spending vs. social spending one important topic that is not touched upon sufficiently in the empirical literature is the use of social spending as a source of political legitimacy. It is particularly important for regimes in their early formation phase and for those who suffer from the lack of democratic or rational legitimacy in general. This issue is left mostly to literature of state formation and

³¹ See Errol A. Henderson. (1998). Military Spending and Poverty. *The Journal of Politics*, 60(02), p.503

³² See Ünal Töngür, & Adem Y. Elveren. (2012, December). Military Expenditures, Inequality, and Welfare and Political Regimes: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis. Retrieved from Economic Research Center: <http://www.erc.metu.edu.tr/menu/series12/1210.pdf>

³³ See Jülide Yıldırım & Selami Sezgin. (2002). Defence, Education and Health Expenditures in Turkey, 1924-96. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(05), 569-580.

political legitimacy. In the classical tripartite view developed by classical figures of modern political philosophy such as Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber, states are entitled with three basic functions: internal and external security, representation of people in the political realm, and the provision of welfare and wealth.³⁴ Thus, political legitimacy of rulers in a modern state depends on these three inputs.

Weak states usually fail to fulfill these functions sufficiently. Some might be failing in all three, while some others might be failing only in one of them. A typical example for the latter situation is the resource abundant rentier states. They do sufficiently good in terms of security and welfare, but they usually ignore representation function. To offset this deficiency they sometimes resort to repression, but also try to increase their legitimacy through generous welfare provision that they finance with natural resource rent, and achieve to keep their weakness at sustainable levels. Authoritarian regimes that do not enjoy the luxury of excessive resource rent are not able to spend much on welfare provision, therefore they could not derive as much legitimacy as their resource abundant counterparts from the welfare function. They face a critical trade-off between their security and welfare budgets, but they usually tend to prefer the former and channel excessive resources to military and police. This exacerbates their legitimacy crisis, but they tend to respond this situation by allocating more resources for security.

1.3. Social Policy Making in the Middle East

Welfare efforts by Middle Eastern states have been under influence of many domestic and external factors. Economic capacities of states, ideological orientations of regimes, level of vulnerability to social risks in the society, the size of public sector relative to private sector or forces of globalization are among more significant ones. To a certain extent the poor state of social policies in the region could be explained

³⁴ See Rolf Schwarz (2008). The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab-Middle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization. *Review of International Political Economy*, 15(4). p.602.

with these variables, but a study ignoring the phenomenon of militarism, a political feature that is more particular to this region, will have a limited explanatory capacity. A summary account of the general state of social policies in the region by Rana Jawad states:

[...] social policy exists in the Middle East in a truncated form, squeezed by the taxing climate of militarism and globalisation. At the heart of this difficult situation is the propensity for hostile confrontation between most Middle Eastern states and the societies they govern, which reaches its most acute expression in the competition with Islamic social groups over control of the public sphere.³⁵

These words from a prominent expert of social policy dynamics in the Middle East points out particularities of the region, but also the centrality of militarism for states' social policy performances.

Unlike the developed world, social policies in this region have not been based on norms of citizenship or workers' rights,³⁶ but for the most part were a component of state-building processes or a response to pressures from society during periods in which regimes were suffering from a low level of legitimacy.³⁷

One remarkable historical dynamic that forced serious cuts in government spending was economic liberalization programs that became popular around the world after the neoliberal turn in 1980s. This has been a very popular theme of studies focusing on social policy in the region. A study of Jordanian neoliberal transformation by Baylouny (2008) points out the contraction of welfare provision as a result of structural adjustment policies, but also the expansion of military and other security services. Prior to neoliberal reforms, social policies of the regime were an important source of political legitimation and it had a considerable base of support in the

³⁵ See Rana Jawad (2008). Social Policy in the Middle East. Retrieved from Social Policy Association: http://www.social-policy.org.uk/policyworld/PolicyWorld_Spr08.pdf p.10

³⁶ See Massoud Karshenas & Valentine M. Moghadam. (2006). Social Policy in the Middle East: Introduction and Overview . In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics (pp. 1-30). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p.3.

³⁷ Ibid p.4

society. After the reforms, Baylouny (2008) argues, the military and people benefiting from this expansion have replaced the old base of support.³⁸

Another popular theme in this literature has been the religious welfare provision. Islamic social movements constitute an important element of the social and political landscape of the region. Similar to political regimes, a significant source of support for them is welfare provision to poor people. Jawad & Yakut-Çakar (2010)³⁹, Jawad (2009)⁴⁰, and Dean and Khan (1997)⁴¹ provide comprehensive descriptions of religious dynamics of welfare provision in the region. This literature has developed mainly as a reaction to the dominant rentier state arguments to explain the welfare effort dynamics in the region. They mainly argue that rentier state framework cannot capture the complexity of welfare provision dynamics in the Middle East and the broader set of actors involved in the process welfare.⁴² They draw attention to non-state actors who are motivated by their religion to improve the welfare of poor in their society. While religious welfare literature do a good work in terms of expanding the scope of welfare studies, they fail to combine their cultural elements with political ones and to generate a more comprehensive framework that accounts for both political and non-political dynamics of welfare provision in the region.

Another group of works consists of individual case studies. They generally employ a historical or cross-sectional perspective, and describe the problems of social policies in the countries. A comprehensive work on the social policy in Egypt by Bayat (2006) surveys the changes in social policies from the period of Nasserist socialism to

³⁸ See Anne M. Baylouny. (2008). Militarizing Welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy. *Middle East Journal*, 62(02), 277-303.

³⁹ See Rana Jawad & Burcu Yakut-Çakar. (2010). Religion and Social Policy in the Middle East: The (Re)Constitution of an Old-New Partnership. *Social Policy & Administration*, 44(06), 658-672.

⁴⁰ See Rana Jawad. (2009). *Social Welfare and Religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese Perspective*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

⁴¹ See Hartley Dean & Zafar Khan. (1997). Muslim Perspectives on Welfare. *Journal of Social Policy*, 26(02), 193-209.

⁴² See Rana Jawad. (2009). *Social Welfare and Religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese Perspective*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, p.14.

neoliberal transformation after 1990s.⁴³ Among other notable examples of this literature are the works on Tunisia by Romdhane (2006)⁴⁴, on Algeria by Layachi (2006)⁴⁵, and on Morocco by Ennaji (2006)⁴⁶.

This work differs with its interest in region-wide dynamics of welfare efforts, its emphasis on political factors, and its systematic comparative technique. While most of the studies offer particularistic explanation for each case, this work will attempt to make at least a modest generalization about the determinants of good and poor welfare efforts.

1.4. Conclusion

The discussion of the three issues in this chapter primarily indicated the intricacy of militaristic aspects' influence on political economic performances of states. The search for a simple linear relationship in the literature has produced contradictory results. This work differs from the dominant quantitative tradition in the literature, and attempts to bring a less ambitious explanation that is not generalizable to all contexts.

In most of the Middle Eastern countries, along with limited economic capacities, nature of political regimes seems to be the most significant constraint on social policy making. The phenomenon of militarism that constitutes a significant pillar in most of these regimes is popularly cited among the foremost of those constraints. This

⁴³ See Asef. Bayat (2006). The Political Economy of Social Policy in Egypt. In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, *Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics* (pp. 135-154). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴⁴ See Mahmoud Romdhane. (2006). Social Policy and Development in Tunisia since Independence: a Political Perspective. In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, *Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics* (pp. 31-77). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴⁵ See Azzedine Layachi (2006). Algeria: Crisis, Transition and Social Policy Outcomes. In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, *Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics* (pp. 78-108). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴⁶ See Moha Ennaji. (2006). Social Policy in Morocco: History, Politics and Social Development. In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, *Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics* (pp. 109-134). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

qualitative study analyzes which combinations of militaristic aspects and some relevant contextual characteristics might lead to good or poor welfare efforts. With these features, it could be counted as a member of literature on political economy of militarism, politics of social policy and social policy in the Middle East.

Chapter 2

Research Design and Methodology

2.1. Middle East as a Regional Unit

What makes the Middle East a regional unit like Latin America or Central Asia are many common cultural, social, and political characteristics shared by the countries in this part of the world. Due to the colonial background it connotes, the reality of this conception is contested⁴⁷ and discredited by some scholars.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, there are significant practical advantages to defining Middle East as a regional unit for making inter-regional and intra-regional comparisons. Although, a region named as the Middle East did not exist before the 20th century or the late 19th century, today most of the social researchers, international organizations, and multinational firms treat the Middle East as a separate regional unit. The main discussion regarding the status of the Middle East revolves around its boundaries, that is, whether countries like Turkey, Iran, or even Pakistan could be treated as Middle Eastern countries. However, the most common definition includes only the Arab majority countries.

Almost all the countries in the Middle East region are populated predominantly by Muslim and Arab people. Their emergence as nation states has been a result of the First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire in its aftermath, and many of them underwent military coups after the Second World War prior to being fully institutionalized nation states. To make meaningful comparative analysis of social events or phenomena on certain units of analysis like states, regions, or social

⁴⁷ See Roderic H. Davison (1960, July). Where Is the Middle East? Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/71575/roderic-h-davison/where-is-the-middle-east>

⁴⁸ See Hassan Hanafi (1998, August). The Middle East, in whose world?. Retrieved from UIB: <http://www.org.uib.no/smi/pao/hanafi.html>

movements, a sufficient similarity in terms of contextual characteristics should exist among the members of a certain population.⁴⁹ Given the social, cultural, and political characteristics shared by most of the Middle Eastern states, they provide a convenient set of cases for applying a comparative method.

While all the countries resemble each other in many characteristics, they also have significant differences between them. Particularly, in terms of the political institutions that structure policy making in these countries there are quite different examples. Roughly, two types of political systems exist in the region. First, there are monarchies which are ruled by traditionally powerful families and which lack formally institutionalized functioning of politics. Second, there are authoritarian republics where exist elections and parliaments. However, they do not function effectively to translate the democratic will of the people into policies. While some states fall only into one of these two categories, some share the characteristics of both. For example, Saudi Arabia does not have any republican political institution and the traditionally influential Saud Family rules the country, therefore it is a pure example for the first type. There are countries such as Egypt and Syria where no monarchical institution exists, but their political structures shows strong authoritarian characteristics. Countries such as Jordan and Morocco share some features of both types. They have kings at the top of the political hierarchy, but they also have parliaments, which could have an influence in policy making. After the upheavals in the recent period, Tunisia has gone beyond this classification by achieving a social contract that is likely to relieve the destabilizing effects of social cleavages in the society, therefore it could no longer be classified within the rows of monarchies or authoritarian republics. However, our study covers a time period within the period before the upheavals, and in that period Tunisia, under the rule of Ben Ali, was among the ideal examples of authoritarian republics.

Depending on the research question, including all the Middle Eastern states in an analysis might not be useful, and it could be necessary to exclude irrelevant cases. If abovementioned political characteristics are relevant for the subject matter of a

⁴⁹ See Charles C. Ragin (1987). *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.14.

study, and if they are not the mainly focused explanatory variables, then it could be better to choose a subgroup from this Middle Eastern population of states. In this study, mainly the relationship between militaristic characteristic of states and their welfare efforts are being investigated. For having a sufficiently homogenous set of cases in terms of contextual characteristics, it is better not to include the states, which have monarchical political economic structure. What monarchies have in common is the enormous income they derive from the export of oil and natural gas, and small populations compared to the rest of the region. Thanks to their excess financial resources and their rentier political economic structures, they are able to implement very generous welfare policies over their relatively small populations. Beyond basic needs such as health and education, some countries even provide free or subsidized housing and food. These generous benefits that could not be experienced to this extent in other parts of the world has led to the framing of a new welfare state type remembered with the Gulf states.⁵⁰ Since the critical issue in this study is the trade-off policy makers face while allocating resources for different policy domains, the Gulf countries, which overlap with the set of full monarchies as well, will not be included in the analysis.

When the Gulf states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—are excluded from the study there remain the countries to the west of the Arabian Peninsula, and Yemen which is located in the southern shores of the peninsula but does not share the same political economic characteristics out of the lack of natural resources. Among these remaining countries, some countries do not collect or reveal data about their political economic performances, characteristics, or outcomes. Among them are Libya, Sudan, Palestine, and Iraq. What all these countries share in common is the weak institutionalization of their political economic systems, and even arguably they could be defined as failed states. They either do not have the institutional capacity to collect data, or they prefer not to reveal the data because of the widespread corruption. Given these conditions, these four states also

⁵⁰ *For some examples of welfare efforts in Gulf countries, see Sharifa Alshalfan. (2013). The right to housing in Kuwait: An Urban Injustice in A Socially Just System. Retrieved from London School of Economic and Political Science: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/kuwait/documents/The-right-to-housing-in-Kuwait.pdf>*

will not be included in the study. After excluding the Gulf Countries and these four states, eight states remain for conducting a comparative analysis. These countries are respectively Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.

When compared with the standards of the developed and emerging world, these eight countries considerably resemble to each other in terms of their political, economic, and social development levels. However, when a deeper attention is devoted exclusively to them they exhibit a remarkable variation on the outcome of interest, namely the welfare effort, and on the factors that might be relevant for the explanation of variations on the outcome. In general, all are militarist countries, but they vary in degree. The difference becomes more evident when the phenomenon of militarism is disintegrated into its components. These features makes this sample of cases a convenient one for applying a comparative method. Following sections of this chapter will be dedicated to a specific type of comparative method, which this study will benefit, and the detailed explanation of the outcome variables and the condition variables that are expected to explain the outcome of interest.

2.2. Methodology

As social research has become more sophisticated through the decades, some methodological traditions have crystallized with their distinctive view of social reality and different data collection techniques. The main split has occurred between the qualitative and quantitative traditions. Qualitative researchers commonly assume a complex social reality for which a generalization across time and space is hardly achievable, and they usually attempt to explain their subject matter with many factors whose various combinations might be a recipe of a certain outcome. This qualitative tradition, although not as systematical as its recent form that developed in the last decades⁵¹, has been the most common way of dealing with the social

⁵¹ *For a prominent example of attempts to make qualitative research more systematic, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, & Sidney Verba. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.*

phenomena in disciplines such as political science, sociology and cultural studies. Quantitative tradition, on the other hand, assumes a more linear and a simple conception of causation in the social life, and researchers who embrace a quantitative position usually have a desire to make exact conclusions about effects of each factor on the outcome.⁵²

These two traditions have different templates for comparative research. The conceptualization of the split as case oriented (qualitative) vs. variable oriented (quantitative) research makes this distinction more salient.⁵³ A qualitative comparative study generally takes a single or several cases relevant to its issue of interest, and conducts a systematical comparison either between cases, or between a case and a theoretically ideal situation. Each case embodies a certain combination of characteristics, and any characteristics, which are designated as variables in quantitative research, is not meaningful out of this combination. Given this, final conclusions are made about cases, in other words, about the configurations of the characteristics. Causality is assumed to be context dependent. Therefore, a characteristic might or might not lead to an outcome depending on the other characteristics consisting the context of a case.

In the variable oriented template, variables are abstracted from the context of cases and they are treated as context independent. If an analysis proves a significant effect of an independent variable, by assumption this variable is expected to produce its effect in any context, that is, not depending on the values of other variables. In this template causality is additive, but not configurational. The total effect on dependent variable is the sum of effects by each significant independent variable. If an outcome that is expected to be produced by a certain significant variable is not observed, then it is because of the dominance of effects by other significant variable(s) that have an effect on the dependent variable in the opposite direction.

⁵² *For a detailed comparison of qualitative and quantitative templates, see Charles C. Ragin. (2013). New Directions in the Logic of Social Inquiry. Political Research Quarterly, 66(01), 171-174.*

⁵³ *See Charles C. Ragin. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. p.23.*

As the name of these traditions suggests, while quantitative methods always make use of numbers and mathematical symbols as a language for making sense of the social reality, qualitative methods rarely resort to numbers, but predominantly dependent on the verbal language which is more capable to penetrate into the complexity of the characteristics and relationships between them. The use of numbers in the former template arises the problem of measurement. Being able to make a quantitative analysis, aspects of the social reality should be translated into a mathematical language, and a scale of measurement should be available. Most of the time, it is hard to find a directly measurable social phenomenon, but it is achieved through indicators that are considered to approximate to the reality of the phenomenon. This feature is widely criticized by the followers of the qualitative tradition, because they argue this translation leads to a significant loss in the meaning of concepts through which scholars make sense of the social reality.

Although it is sometimes argued the split between qualitative and quantitative traditions is only a stylistic one⁵⁴, indeed there are some insurmountable gulfs between the two traditions. The abovementioned difference regarding the initial assumption they make on the nature of causality is hard to disregard. However, there have been some attempts to find a way between the two and achieve a greater capacity of explanation both through penetrating to the complexity and being able to make generalizations across time and space. The most common way has become the use of a mixed strategy that uses both methods in one study. A particular and more sophisticated attempt has been undertaken by Charles C. Ragin with his method of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). This one offers a synthetic technique that to a certain extent achieves to incorporate some advantages of the two traditions into a single methodology. This work will benefit from Ragin's method, and the next section will give a more detailed picture of the QCA as an approach and a technique.

⁵⁴ See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, & Sidney Verba. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p.3.

2.2.1. Qualitative Comparative Analysis

QCA is a result of Ragin's efforts to offer an alternative template for social research, which shares the view of causality of the qualitative tradition and the systematic inference making of the quantitative tradition. QCA systematizes the context dependent and configurational causality of the qualitative research with the tools borrowed from mathematics and logic. It bears the word qualitative, because it is a case oriented method. Its final conclusion does not give information about the net effects of individual variables on dependent variable. However, different from the traditional qualitative methods, its technical aspects enable to include more than a couple of cases into a comparative analysis. This feature also helps to achieve modest generalization across cases, which is not much possible in the traditional case study methods.

Each case could be viewed as a particular combination of characteristics.⁵⁵ QCA translates these characteristics, whose certain qualitative states are termed as conditions in the QCA vocabulary, to the language of the set theory and formal logic. Each condition constitutes a defining property of a set, and a case is located in the intersection set of the conditions whose combination makes up the case. After determining the conditions to be included in a study, each case is investigated for which conditions are present or not in it. To do that in a systematical way, QCA uses truth tables as shown in the Table 2.1. Configurations of conditions are distributed along the rows, and each column is assigned for a particular condition. Cases having the same configuration share the same row. If a certain condition is present in a configuration it takes a value of 1, which represents the presence of that condition, and 0 otherwise. The column to the right of condition columns is used for the outcome variable, and the same procedure of assigning a number to present its absence or presence within the case is run.

⁵⁵ See Charles C. Ragin. (1987). *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press. p.16.

The truth table makes it easier to understand the general picture of a causal relationship in the social reality for a sample of cases. It matches configurations that are embodied by cases, with outcomes. If there are cases sharing the same combination then it is investigated whether they share the same outcome. When this situation arises for a handful of cases, it is possible to make significant conclusions about the causal relationship between a configuration and the outcome. There could be more than one configuration that consistently produce the outcome of interest or consistently not produce. This is called multi-conjunctural causality or equifinality in

Table 2.1: A truth table example

	Condition A	Condition B	Condition C	Condition D	Outcome	Number of Cases
Configuration 1	1	1	1	1	1	4
Configuration 2	1	0	1	1	1	2
Configuration 3	1	1	0	1	0	1
Configuration 4	1	0	0	1	0	3

the qualitative tradition.⁵⁶ The QCA systematizes this kind of explanation to the social phenomena. After constructing this truth table, and making explicit the various configurations leading to the presence or absence of the outcome, a formula that expresses the causal relationship is generated. The expression summarizing the above truth table would be as follows:

$$\mathbf{A*B*C*D + A*b*C*D = OUTCOME,}$$

⁵⁶ See James Mahoney, & Gary Goertz. (2006). A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research. *Political Analysis*, p.236.

$$A*B*c*D + A*b*c*D = \text{outcome},$$

Here the two expressions describe the paths to the presence or absence of the outcome. The symbol * represents the AND operation of the formal logic, and the symbol + represents the OR operation. The upper case letter means the condition represented by the letter or the label is present, and vice versa if the letter is lower case. The last step is minimizing this expression to achieve a more parsimonious explanation. It is processed by an algorithm built in the fsQCA software which is provided by Ragin.⁵⁷

In the truth table above, the absence or presence of conditions and outcome are coded respectively with the numbers 0 and 1. This kind of representation permits only to translate dichotomous qualitative states. This way of dealing with the data is called crisp set QCA. It is based on a binary logic that is only able to describe dichotomous qualitative states of conditions and outcome. The language and operations of the Boolean algebra is utilized to summarize and make operations on the data. Sometimes this way of dichotomous analysis do not suffice to describe the categories of characteristic and to explain the relationships between them. For example, to include the GDP per capita variable as an explanatory condition in a study, one should define two dichotomous qualitative states of it. For this variable, these two conditions would be high GDP per capita and low GDP per capita. However, in most cases it would be very spurious to classify countries as either a high or low income country. To overcome this problem, two different QCA techniques have been developed. The first one is multivariate QCA (mvQCA) in which conditions could be defined with respect to more than two qualitative states. In mvQCA the income level of a country, that is measured with the GDP per capita, would be able to defined as low, medium, or high, and if required more qualitative states could be added between the extremes of low and high. In mvQCA, the outcome variable is still

⁵⁷ Information and download links for the software could be reached through the following link: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml>

defined dichotomously. This variant of the QCA is mostly preferred when a crisp set QCA technique produces contradictory results. Therefore, mvQCA may resolve the contradiction by letting more variation for one or more conditions. The other variant is the fuzzy set QCA which differs from the first two in terms of the level of sophistication in translating and analyzing the raw data. In this study, this variant will be utilized as the method of inference making, therefore it deserves an exclusive focus.

As its name suggests, it is built on fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory, which enables to go beyond the binary nature of classical logic and crisp sets. In fuzzy sets an object does not have to be either a full member or full non-member of a set, but it could have a degree of membership and non-membership to it. When this is applied to QCA a qualitative state could be observed with a degree of presence and absence in a case, and the case could have a degree of membership or non-membership to the set defined by a certain condition. The state of full membership and full non-membership are respectively coded as 1 and 0, and the values between these two extremes are assigned to the objects or cases that are neither full member nor full non-member of a set. For example, if fuzzy logic is applied to the set of high income countries, a country such as Mexico will be less member of this set than the United States. While the US would have a fuzzy set membership score close to 1, the Mexico would probably have a score around 0.5, which denotes the state of ambiguity between the two extremes. The subset relationship between fuzzy sets is the critical property for establishing a causal relationship between a configuration, which corresponds to the intersection set of conditions making it up, and the set defined by the outcome. When a case's membership score to the former becomes lower than the latter, a subset relationship is constituted and if this relationship holds consistently true across cases, then a causal relationship could be defined. In fsQCA there are some confidence measures for the reliability of the causal relationship. Consistency and coverage measures are the two ways introduced by Ragin for achieving a greater level of sophistication in fsQCA analysis.⁵⁸ The consistency measure indicates how

⁵⁸ See Charles C. Ragin. (2008). *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p.45.

consistently the fuzzy subset relationship is observed across cases, and the coverage measure indicates in what portion of a sample of cases a certain consistent relationship is observed. Table 2.2. and Table 2.3, facilitates to understand the concepts regarding fsQCA and the procedures of conducting the analysis.

Table 2.2 illustrates a hypothetical example of assigning fuzzy set membership scores of cases to the combinations of conditions. In this example there are five cases and three conditions. There are eight possible combinations of conditions in Table 2.2, because the number of combinations for three conditions is 2^3 . The fuzzy score of a case's membership to a combination is the lowest membership score this case has among the three conditions. For example, for the first combination $A*B*C$, in which all conditions are present because they are written in capital letters, case 1 has a membership score of 0.2 , because among the three conditions C is the one which this case is the least member with a score of 0.2. After applying this procedure for all

Table 2.2. Fuzzy Set Membership of Cases in Combinations of Conditions

Case	A	B	C	A*B* C	A*B* c	A*b* C	a*B* C	A*b* c	a*B* c	a*b* C	a*b* *c	O#
1	0.7	0.9	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.6
2	0.2	0.8	0.7	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.5
3	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.8
4	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.3
5	0.7	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7

Note: # The letter "O" represents the outcome variable

cases and combinations, a fuzzy truth table could be constructed based on the threshold level that determines the criterion for a combinations' inclusion into the truth table. The most common value is 0.5, which represents the state of ambiguity in terms of membership to a set. A value above this number means a case is a more

member than non-member to a set, and vice versa when the value is below this number. The truth table below is derived from the above table, and it enables to illustrate the causal relationship in a functional form.

Table 2.3. An example of Fuzzy Truth Table

A	B	C	Number of Cases	Outcome	Consistency
1	1	1	1	1	1.000000
1	1	0	1	1	0.928571
0	1	1	1	0	0.888889
1	0	1	1	1	1.000000
0	0	1	1	0	0.705882

Through this truth table a solution of the analysis in the form of a functional expression of the causal relationship could be written. It will be the most complex solution if any assumption is not made for the logical remainders to which no empirical case corresponds. When there are many logical remainders, it would be better to include them into the analysis to produce a more parsimonious solution. They could be assumed to produce or not produce the outcome of interest based on a theoretical or substantive knowledge. This example is a hypothetical and simple one, but it helps to understand the basics of fsQCA analysis that will be applied to a more complex data in the next chapter.

2.3 Explanans and Explanandum

The outcome of interest in this work, as mentioned many times before in the text, is welfare efforts by the Middle Eastern states. The broadest definition of the concept has to do with any policy and programs implemented by states to increase the well-

being of their society through providing benefits and securing them against the risks of social life. However, the scope and extent of the definition is disputed in the literature and there is not a standard aggregate measure agreed upon by researchers. There are some indicators such as the social expenditure and the social security coverage that are popularly used to approximate the level and quality of welfare efforts, because they correlate significantly with the outcomes that are widely considered to be the results of welfare efforts by states, i.e. the human development, the social development etc. This work, as well, will use these two indicators as outcome variables, in other words as explananda.

Aspects of militarism observed in the political economic structures of the subject countries will constitute the main explanatory factors of the study. That does not necessarily mean they are the ultimate, or fundamental factors of the variation in terms of welfare efforts by Middle Eastern states, but this work will specifically focus on their effects on this outcome. Sometimes all militaristic aspects might be present in a configuration, which corresponds to a specific case or more than one cases, while other times some or none of them might correspond. Since this study is not a quantitative one, the net effects of individual variables will not be available as a conclusion, but only how these militaristic aspects combine with each other and with other contextual variables to produce a certain outcome.

The most salient feature of a militaristic political economy is extravagant military expenditure, which could be measured through dividing it by GDP or the central government expenditure. This work will prefer the second option out of the assumed trade-off between different components of the central budget. Other militaristic aspects included in this study are the high ratio of military personnel in total employment, and a highly interdependent relationship between the military elite and central government regarding their survival, which could be observed in many cases to a varying degree.

In addition to these central variables, this work will include contextual variables, which are considered to be relevant to the emergence of the outcome of interest. In political economic literature GDP per capita is almost a *sine qua non* factor whose effect should be investigated. Among the other factors comprising the political

economic context of states, some relevant ones are government effectiveness, the ratio of public sector employment to the total employment, and foreign military aid. All these factors will be introduced below in more detail.

2.3.1. Outcome Variables

This work will conduct two fsQCA analyses. One with the social expenditure as the outcome variable, and the other with the social security coverage as the outcome variable. Below, a more detailed description of these two variables is given.

2.3.1.1. Social Expenditure

While welfare effort is the most widely used independent variable to explain the overall quality of a state's social policy or to explain welfare state development, it is most commonly operationalized as social expenditure as a percentage of GDP.⁵⁹ However, in this study the concept of welfare effort will be operationalized as social expenditure as a percentage of the central government spending, because the central issue is the trade-off between different components of the state budget. The fuzzy set for this outcome will be defined as high social spending, and the country having the highest raw value for this variable will get a fuzzy score close to 1, and the country having the lowest raw value will get a fuzzy score close to 0. Therefore, this analysis will take into account the relative difference among them, but not the differences relative to a universal standard.

⁵⁹ See Ricardo Alaez-Aller, & Pablo Diaz-DE-Basurto-Uraga. (2013). Beyond Welfare Effort in the Measuring of Welfare States. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 15(03), p.275.

2.3.1.2. Social Security Coverage

Another measure for approximating the level of welfare effort is the social security coverage. The definition of this indicator is borrowed from the International Labour Organization (ILO). It gives information about how many of the ten branches⁶⁰ of social security counted in the ILO's extended definition for social security are covered by a state. Based on this measure countries are distributed into four categories ranging from comprehensive social security to very limited statutory provision. In this study, a case belonging to the highest category will get a fuzzy score of 0.95, and it will descend respectively to 0.65, 0.35 and 0.05 for lower categories.

2.3.2. Explanatory Variables

As stated before, explanatory variables are presented in two groups: those related with the main focus of the study, namely militarism, and contextual variables that might be relevant for the qualitative variation of the outcome.

2.3.2.1. Militaristic Aspects

Military expenditure

This work is not an analysis simply measuring the correlation between the military expenditure and social expenditure. The qualitative nature of the study suggests the causality should be configurational, and therefore the explanation should be like a

⁶⁰ These ten branches defined by the ILO are as follows: protection in sickness, medical care, income support in the form of cash sickness benefits, protection in disability, protection in old age, protection of survivors in case of a death of a breadwinner, protection in maternity, protection in responsibility for the maintenance of children, protection in unemployment, protection in case of employment injury, general protection against poverty and social exclusion.

recipe⁶¹ that presents causal paths to a certain outcome. Such a recipe that primarily focuses on the ingredients pertaining to the militaristic characteristics of political economies for offering the map of causal paths to better welfare efforts should include military expenditure as the foremost aspect of militarism. Given there is not any country that could be labeled militarist without excessive military expenditure either as a percentage of GDP or of central government expenditure, how much states spend on their militaries will constitute a component of explanatory configurations.

As in the case of social expenditure, this aspect of militarism will be measured as a percentage of central government expenditure. The country having the highest ratio will get a fuzzy score of 0.95, while the lowest one will get a score of 0.05, and the other countries will score between these two extremes.

Military Personnel

The extreme concern of being prepared for any potential war is another important feature characterizing a militaristic state. Even though modern militaries are more dependent on weapons for warring capacity, the need for human resource is still at considerable levels. In low levels of technological development this need is even higher, and when combined with a militaristic culture the amount of personnel recruited by the military might constitute a substantial portion of the total employment.

A high amount of people supplying wage-labour for the military might lead to an overburden on the state budget, and constrain the ability of the central government to spend on welfare of the society. However, this aspect of militarism might also have an increasing effect on the level of overall welfare provision, because the exhaustive and risky nature of the military profession force governments to guarantee a relatively comprehensive welfare scheme to military men. Therefore, a high amount

⁶¹ See Charles C. Ragin. (1987). *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press. p.52.

of people serving for the military also means a high amount of people benefiting from comprehensive welfare schemes. In a nutshell, this aspect might affect the outcome of welfare efforts in two directions.

While assigning a fuzzy membership score to each case, the country with the highest ratio of military personnel over the total employment will be given the highest value. It will be scored 0.95, which means it has almost full membership to the set of countries with high ratio of military personnel in total employment. On the other hand, the country with the lowest ratio will get the score of 0.05, which corresponds to almost non-membership to this set.

Military Government Relationship

In advanced democracies, even in those exhibiting some militaristic characteristics, the military usually does not enjoy a dominant status within the political economic structure of the country, unless there is an unusual circumstance in terms of the perceived external threat. However in non-democratic and militarized political economies military generally occupy a central place, and governments might feel constrained by this dominance. Governments suffering from a shaky state of political legitimacy might depend on the military for their survival, and the military elite also might depend on the government consent for the sustainment of their dominant position. At its extreme levels this interdependent situation embodies the definition of praetorianism in which the rulers depend on the protection by the military men for political survival, and the former enjoy an exclusive status.

The relationship between the governments and the militaries in the Middle Eastern countries differ in terms of praetorian characteristics. While a country like Syria could serve as a typical example of this phenomenon, a country like Tunisia could hardly be counted as an example. The degree of praetorianism in other countries included in the study lie between these two extremes. Table 2.4 assigns fuzzy scores to each case based on the knowledge in the literature regarding the nature of the relationship between the two parties.

Table 2.4. Fuzzy Scores for the Condition of Military-Government Relationship

Country	Fuzzy Score	Explanation
Algeria	0.7	In its post-colonial era, Algeria has usually been remembered with the excessive role of the military in politics. In the last decade, its praetorian hold over the government has been curbed to a certain extent, but it is still among the highly militarized polities in terms of the civil-military relations. ⁶²
Egypt	0.6	Although the military has marched towards the center of the politics after the coup in the summer of 2013, it was not that interfering before the Arab Spring period. It had achieved a somewhat organizational independence from the government and the two were not feeling their fates were much tied to each other's behavior.
Jordan	0.7	Jordan's military is weakly institutionalized, and high ranked positions are generally occupied by the close relatives or trusted men, however this patrimonialism is not as extreme as in the case of Syria. The regime has other sources of legitimacy that makes it less reliable on military relative to the Syria for its survival.
Lebanon	0.4	After the civil war the military has no longer been an influential actor in politics. The political cleavages emanating from the religious or ethnic differences reverberated to the institution of military as well, and various factions' struggle for it prevents its emergence as a strong institution seeking its interests through politics. ⁶³

⁶² For a detailed discussion, see Rachid Tlemçani. (2007, June). Bouteflika and Civil Military Relations. Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

<http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/08/19/bouteflika-and-civil-military-relations/fgku>

⁶³ See Aram Nerguizian. (2011, November). Lebanese Civil-Military Dynamics: Weathering the Regional Storm? Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for Peace:

<http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/21/lebanese-civil-military-dynamics-weathering-regional-storm/7nsz>

Table 2.4. Fuzzy Scores for the Condition of Military-Government Relationship
(Continued)

Morocco	0.4	Moroccan army has been under great control of the monarchical establishment, and relative to many countries in the region it could be classified as a subordinated to the ruling establishment. The coup attempts in the past has become unsuccessful and paved the way for its being controlled closely, however there has not been a substantive level of ⁶⁴
Syria	0.9	Syrian military has been the most extreme case in terms of centrality as an actor in politics. Its behavior since the beginning of the protests and during the three years of civil war has indicated the interdependence between it and the government for their survival.
Tunisia	0.2	Tunisia has had the most subordinated military in the region. This feature has also been very influential for a successful collapse of the old regime and for a smooth transition period after it. In a nutshell, its behavior since the beginning of the Arab Spring process has confirmed its subordination and the weakness of interdependence with the government.
Yemen	0.7	In Yemen the military has been perceived as a significant threat by the Saleh regime, and therefore the latter had a considerable effort to establish a praetorian unit within the military with personnel from the family of Ali Abd'allah Saleh. ⁶⁵

2.3.2.2. Contextual Variables

Any policy emerges as a result of intricate relationships between numerous components of a political system. However, some features of them become more

⁶⁴ See International Business Publications. (2011). Morocco: Foreign Policy and Government Guide. Washington DC.

⁶⁵ See Michael Knights. (2013). The Military Role in Yemen's Protests: Civil-Military Relations in the Tribal Republic. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 36(2), p.262.

fundamental in determining the outcome. In political economies where the military officials have a dominant position over policy making processes, abovementioned militaristic features are expected to play such a fundamental role towards certain outcomes. The presence and direction of the effect imposed by these fundamental variables might depend on the context they exist. For instance, in a context of high level of gross national income, these militaristic features might impose a negligible constraint on welfare efforts by states. In this section, some relevant contextual variables will be introduced that might be effective to change the effect of militarism variables.

Gross Domestic Product Per Capita

A simple juxtaposition of any indicator of welfare effort and income level reveals the parallelism between the two.⁶⁶ The most widely used indicator for the income level of a country is GDP, and GDP per capita is the version adjusted for the size of population. GDP per capita is the foremost contextual variable expected to be relevant towards the outcome of interest. A meaningfully higher GDP per capita in a case compared to another one might make it more able to finance comprehensive welfare programs and social security schemes since more financial resources will be available for the government through the inflow of tax revenues and public enterprise profits.

The eight countries in this study do not vary very much in terms of that indicator. There is not any high income country among them, but they are either lower or middle income countries. However, at lower income levels, small differences might matter much than at higher levels. Assignment of fuzzy scores to the cases for that variable will be undertaken based on the relative differences between them. Therefore, the country having the highest GDP per capita among the eight will get a

⁶⁶ See The International Labour Organization. (2011). World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_213759.pdf, p.3.

fuzzy score close to 1 which represents the state of almost full membership to the set of countries having a high GDP per capita, and the country on the other extreme will get a fuzzy score close to zero.

Government Effectiveness

Middle Eastern nation states have long been suffering from state weakness in terms of being independent from external influences in making and executing policies particularly out of the legacy of a stillborn state building process. This factor has become a critical barrier in front of the economic and political development. The measure of government effectiveness produced by the World Bank has been a good indicator for the success of policy making process and its outcomes. It is defined as “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies”.⁶⁷ Although Middle Eastern countries share a common backwardness in that feature compared to the standards for the developed world, they differ among themselves, and there are some countries approximating to the developed world. This factor could be a significant one towards the level of welfare efforts by the states. The logic is simple, countries achieving more effective policies in overall sense are expected to achieve more effective welfare policies as well.

The raw data for that condition has a range from -2.5 to 2.5, which respectively might be translated as full government ineffectiveness and full government effectiveness. Eight states included in the study do not have scores close to these two extremes. Given this fact, while the raw scores are converted into fuzzy set membership scores the range will be narrowed to the interval between -1.5 and 1.5.

⁶⁷ See Worldwide Governance Indicators. (n.d.). Retrieved from The World Bank: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>

Public Sector Employment

Economic development of the Middle Eastern states has been highly dependent on public sector and this is pronounced among the primary factors of not being able to achieve the economic potential.⁶⁸ This has been partly a result of the socialist policies in the early processes of state formation in the second half of the 20th century, and partly a result of the quest for control over the means of production for preventing the emergence of a strong capitalist class independent from the regime that might one day threaten the authoritarian structures of political economies.

In the eight Middle Eastern countries where the economy is dominated by the public sector, a great share of the labor force is employed by the state institutions or public enterprises. While in some cases this share hits extreme values, in some others it takes more modest values. In less developed countries of the globe, as the ones in this works, many people enjoy welfare benefits and social security programs through their employment in the public sector. The persistent problem of informality in the private sector leaves many people without any financial support from the state for social protection and development purposes. Similar to the other variables, the highest fuzzy score, which will be close to 1, will be assigned to the country having the highest ratio of public employment within the total employment.

Foreign Military Aid

Middle East was among the areas of Cold War struggle between the US and the USSR. These two states were scrambling in the region to form alliances with the newly emerged nation states such as Egypt and Syria. After the end of the Cold War, the interest of the US for the Middle East persisted, and even increased. It has mobilized a great amount of resources to be used in the region for security purposes. This included financial and military aids to some of the countries. For example, Egypt has

⁶⁸ See Dimitris Tsitsiragos. (2013, December). Private sector key to development in Middle East, North Africa. Retrieved from Al Monitor: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/private-sector-key-develop-middle-east-north-africa.html#>

been benefiting an aid around \$1.5 billion annually, and most of it has been provided in the form of military equipment. When the amount of the aid is significantly high, it might be expected to relieve the burden of the military on the state budget. States getting no military aid will get a fuzzy score of zero, for that variable, while the country with the highest foreign military aid will get a fuzzy score of 0.95, which means it is almost a full member to the set of countries benefiting high amount of aids from the US.

2.4 Data Sources

This study benefits from various sources for measuring the aforementioned outcomes and relevant conditions towards them. In this section these sources and the properties of the data they provide will be introduced very briefly before conducting the analysis in the next chapter.

For the outcome variables, namely the social expenditure as of central government expenditure and social security coverage, the data provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO) will be utilized. The former one is measured by the ILO as a percentage of GDP⁶⁹, therefore an additional information regarding the share of central government spending in GDP will be required to measure the outcome of interest in this study. Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom⁷⁰ includes government spending as a variable, and it provides data about that indicator. The data for the other variable, social security coverage, is provided in the World Social Security Report 2010/11 published by the International Labour Organization.⁷¹

⁶⁹ See Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. (n.d.). Retrieved from International Labour Organization: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=E-1c

⁷⁰ See Index of Economic Freedom. (n.d.). Retrieved from Heritage Foundation: <http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year>

⁷¹ See The International Labour Organization. (2011). World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_213759.pdf, p.32.

For each condition variables related with militarism a different procedure of producing the raw data will be carried out. The military expenditure will be measured as a share of the central government expenditure. The most renowned institution measuring this indicator is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and its data on military expenditure will be compared to the Heritage Foundation's government expenditure data. For the condition variable of military recruitment, World Bank's indicator of armed personnel as a percentage of total labor force will be used⁷². Any coherent information is not available for the characteristics of military-government relationship, but it is possible to classify the degree of the interconnectedness of their fate based on the knowledge in the literature and the information revealed after the recent historical events in the region.

Data for GDP per capita is available from various sources, but this work prefers World Bank's measure.⁷³ Government effectiveness is an indicator exclusively measured by the World Bank as a part of its Worldwide Governance Indicators project.⁷⁴ As mentioned previously, it is originally measured between -2.5 and 2.5, but for a healthier conversion to fuzzy scores the range will be narrowed to -1.5 and 1.5. Public sector employment data will be borrowed from a working paper published by the IMF in 2013. It is given as a ratio of private sector employment, but since the two makes up the total employment, it is possible to calculate the public employment as a percentage of total employment. Lastly, data on the foreign military aid variable will be taken from the U.S. Department of State.⁷⁵

⁷² See Armed Forces Personnel (% of Total Labor Force). (n.d.). Retrieved from The World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.TF.ZS>

⁷³ See GDP Per Capita (Current US\$). (n.d.). Retrieved from The World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>

⁷⁴ See Worldwide Governance Indicators. (n.d.). Retrieved from The World Bank: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>

⁷⁵ See Foreign Military Financing Account Summary. (n.d.). Retrieved from U.S. Department of State: <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm>

Chapter 3

QCA Analysis of Militarism and Welfare Efforts in the Middle East

This chapter constitutes the core of the study where the empirical data is analyzed through a systematic method of comparison. The procedure will be guided by the fuzzy set version of the QCA method. In the first section, raw data for condition and outcome variables will be presented in a table, and then will be converted into fuzzy-set membership scores based on the criteria determined in the previous chapter. In the following section the results of the fsQCA analysis, which are executed by the software Charles C. Ragin provides⁷⁶, will be presented and interpreted. In the last section of the chapter some crucial cases will be discussed based on the results of the analysis to achieve a deeper understanding of the relationship.

3.1. Raw Data and Conversion Procedure

Except for the condition variable of military government relationship (milgov) and the outcome variable of social security coverage (soccov), data about any condition or outcome variable in this study is not available in the fuzzified form. In this section, firstly the raw data and details about their measurement are presented and then the table including fuzzified version of the data is constructed.

Table 3.1 includes the raw data for 8 cases, 7 conditions and 2 outcomes. As long as the raw data are available, values have been measured as average of five years from 2006 to 2010. This interval covers a time period before the eruption of recent upheavals that created a new political context. For other variables, the values in the table belong to years for which data were available within this period. Details about

⁷⁶ The software is called fsQCA 2.0 and could be downloaded from the following link: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml>

the exceptions and other important information are given in footnotes. After constructing this table, the next step is fuzzifying these values, so that the fsQCA technique could be applied. To convert these values into fuzzy scores the *calibrate* operation built into the software is used.

Table 3.1. Raw Data For All Variables

Case	gdppc ¹	govafc	pubsec ²	foraid ³	milexp	milper	milgov ⁴	socexp ⁵	soccov
Algeria	4028	-0,55	33	0	12.593	2.98	0.7	24.094	0.9
Egypt	2130	-0,37	28	1300	6.862	3.44	0.6	38.841	0.7
Jordan	3587	0,20	24	300	13.694	7.12	0.7	33.544	0.1
Lebanon	7039	-0,36	16	100	12.736	5.28	0.4	3.274	0.7
Morocco	2611	-0,13	9	9	14.724	2.14	0.4	8.935	0.7
Syria	1919	-0,70	29	0	17,077	7	0.9	8.628	0.1
Tunisia	3976	0,40	10	15	5,067	1.28	0.2	38.060	0.9
Yemen	1236	-0,95	12	0	9,306	2.3	0.4	8,462	0.3

Notes:

¹ GDP per capita values present the average of five years from 2006 to 2010 and they are in current U.S.

² For some cases, public sector employment data does not belong to 2010, but to years close to 2010. For more information about the raw data on this variable see the previous chapter.

³ Foreign military aid is measured in millions of U.S. dollars and belongs to 2010.

⁴ *milgov* is already in the fuzzified form, because its values are not assigned based on a pre-measured raw data, but given in this table, so that it includes all the variables.

⁵ Social expenditure as of government expenditure data belongs to the year 2011

In the below functional expression, the input “name” corresponds to the label of variable, and the following inputs x_1 , x_2 and x_3 correspond to the raw data values that respectively determines the upper bound of the membership status, the ambiguous state for membership, and the lower bound of the membership status.

calibrate (name, x₁, x₂, x₃)

To give an example, the fuzzification of the values for government effectiveness variable is conducted as in the functional expression below. Firstly the variable labelled *govefc* is inserted, and then respectively 1.5, 0, and -1.5, the values representing the upper bound, state of ambiguity and the lower bound for membership, are replaced with x₁, x₂, and x₃. After inserting these values, the function produces fuzzified version of the raw data as the output.

calibrate (govefect, 1,5 , 0, -1,5)

Table 3.2 includes the output of the above function for all condition and outcome variables. Since QCA is a method based on set theory, conditions and outcomes are defined as sets, and their defining property is made up by a theoretically determined qualitative state. The result of the analysis associates certain combinations of these qualitative states with outcomes that represent a certain qualitative state too. For instance, the variable *pubsec* in Table 3.2 represents the condition of high public sector employment within the total employment. A case's degree of membership to this set is determined by the degree it displays the condition of high public sector employment. Therefore, as the value a case has for the *pubsec* increases, the degree of public sector employment observed in that case increases. If the case was defined as low level of public sector employment, then it would be vice versa. This logic applies to other variables as well in Table 3.1.

Table 3.2 Fuzzy membership scores of cases to conditions and outcomes

caseid	gdppc	govafc	pubsec	foraid	milexp	milper	milgov	socexp	soccov
Algeria	0.45	0.25	0.95	0.05	0.62	0.33	0.7	0.62	0.95
Egypt	0.12	0.32	0.85	0.95	0.11	0.39	0.6	0.94	0.65
Jordan	0.35	0.6	0.68	0.23	0.73	0.93	0.7	0.88	0.05
Lebanon	0.93	0.33	0.22	0.08	0.64	0.72	0.4	0.05	0.65
Morocco	0.18	0.44	0.05	0.05	0.82	0.23	0.4	0.12	0.65
Syria	0.1	0.2	0.88	0.05	0.93	0.93	0.9	0.11	0.05
Tunisia	0.44	0.69	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.15	0.2	0.94	0.95
Yemen	0.06	0.13	0.1	0.05	0.27	0.25	0.4	0.11	0.35

3.2. Causal Models and FsQCA Analysis

In this section of the chapter, results of the analysis produced by the software using the truth table algorithm will be presented. These results will indicate how militarism related conditions combine with each other and with contextual variables to produce the two outcomes that are both used as proxies for good welfare effort.

Prior to presenting analysis results, a brief review of the procedure executed by the software should be given. The fsQCA software applies the truth table algorithm on data to produce the functional expressions that depicts the causal relationship between conditions and the outcome. After entering the fuzzified data into the software, an outcome variable is specified and variables that are considered to explain the variation on it are defined as conditions. In fuzzy set QCA, each possible configuration of conditions represent a corner in the vector space. The amount of corners are same with the amount of rows in a crisp set QCA analysis. For example, if four conditions are included in the analysis, then the possible configurations are 2^4 . That means there will be 16 corners in the vector space, each corresponding to a possible configuration. Each case has a membership to every corners, but with varying degrees. The corner to which it has a membership score greater than 0.5 –

the value representing the state of ambiguity for membership in fuzzy set language— consists a row of the truth table as the configuration that is observed in a case.

After applying this criterion for each case, a crisp set truth table is obtained. After each case is assigned to a certain configuration of conditions, the next step is determining if the outcome is observed in the case displaying this certain configuration. The consistency measure is used to decide the presence or absence of the outcome in a case by providing information about the subset relationship between former and the latter on which the inference of causality is based in set theoretical methods. A threshold for consistency is chosen, and cases having a consistency score greater than that threshold for the subset relationship between their configuration and the outcome are determined to display the outcome. In this study the consistency threshold is chosen as 0.8 which is the default score defined in the software, therefore the cases having a consistency score above 0.8 have been given the score of 1 for the outcome for representing its presence, and the score of 0 for absence.

The last step of the analysis is producing the logical expression that illustrates the paths to the presence or absence of the outcome. It is obtained through the Quine McCluskey minimization algorithm. It enables to eliminate the spurious conditions from combinations by determining those conditions whose presence or absence does not matter for the outcome. The below example basically illustrates how this algorithm proceeds.

$$A*B*c*D + A*B*C*D + A*B*C*d + A*b*C*d = O \quad (1)$$

This hypothetical expression has four conditions represented with letters A, B, C, D, and the outcome represented by the letter O. Capital letters correspond to presence of a condition, and small letter to the absence of a condition. There are four combinations that display the outcome, but they could be reduced to two with a basic logical minimization operation.

$$A*B*D*(C + c) + A*C*d*(B + b) = O \quad (2)$$

$$A*B*D + A*C*d = O \quad (3)$$

Expressions (2) and (3) are logical equivalents of (1). In the first two combinations of the expression (1) the condition C is present in the second one (A*B*C*D) and absent in the first one (A*B*c*D). The other three conditions are all present in both combinations. Therefore, it means the presence or absence of C does not matter for the emergence of the outcome, so it could be eliminated and the two combination could be reduced to ABD. The same reduction is applied to the third and fourth combinations, and consequently the minimized expression (3) is obtained for the symbolic representation of the causal relationship. This procedure is applied by the software to the data, but mostly the problem of limited diversity constraints to make effective minimizations and to produce a parsimonious explanation. To overcome this problem, combinations that are logically possible but not having an empirical correspondence are included to the analysis with counterfactual assumptions that is a common practice in qualitative tradition.⁷⁷

In this study there are two outcome variables, therefore there are two causal models of the relationship. The first model uses high social expenditure as the outcome, and the second one uses comprehensive social security as the outcome. This way of explanation with two outcomes is preferred, because data for social expenditure variable might be flawed for some cases. For example, in International Labour Organization's database Lebanon's social spending as of its GDP in 2011 is reported as 1.12%.⁷⁸ This is a value which sounds unreasonable given the fact that social security coverage in this country is classified as semi-comprehensive, which is the

⁷⁷ See Charles C. Ragin & John Sonnett (n.d.). *Between Complexity and Parsimony : Limited Diversity, Counterfactual Cases, and Comparative Analysis*. Retrieved from University of Arizona: <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/download/Counterfactuals.pdf>

⁷⁸ See Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. (n.d.). Retrieved from International Labour Organization: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=E-1c

second best category.⁷⁹ Data for the social security coverage seems more compatible with the general landscape of social policies in the region. Thus, an analysis with these two models could help to make a sounder conclusion. If similar solutions are obtained with two different indicators, that could help to achieve a higher degree of robustness for causal claims.

The software produces three different solutions for the analysis of data with each models, including the complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions. The complex solution is the functional expression which is produced only with the configurations corresponding to an empirical case. There are eight cases in this study, and the complex solution is obtained by applying the minimization algorithm only on those cases which display outcome among the eight. The parsimonious and intermediate solutions are generated with the inclusion of logical remainders – combinations of conditions that are not embodied by any empirical case. These combinations are included into the analysis by making assumptions on whether they display the outcome or not.⁸⁰ For the parsimonious solution, the software makes its own assumptions about the conditions so that it could produce the functional expression with least possible amount of condition variables. However, for the intermediate solution assumptions are made by the researcher based on theoretical or substantive knowledge.

The output in Table 3.3 includes the intermediate solution for the model having high social security expenditure as the outcome. The counterfactual assumptions that are benefited for the inclusion of logical remainders are given below the table. Based on these assumptions the intermediate solution indicates

⁷⁹ See The International Labour Organization. (2011). World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/publication/wcms_213759.pdf, p.32.

⁸⁰ For two good examples of using counterfactuals in an empirical analysis, see: Olav Schram Stokke. (2004). Boolean Analysis, Mechanisms, and the Study of Regime Effectiveness. In A. Underdal, & O. R. Young, Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies (pp. 87-119). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, and Barbara Da Roit & Bernhard Weicht. (2013). Migrant Care Work and Care, Migration and Employment Regimes: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis. Journal of European Social Policy, 469-486.

Table 3.3. Analysis of Causal Paths to High Social Expenditure*

	raw	unique	
	coverage	coverage	consistency
	-----	-----	-----
• milper * PUBSEC	0.432361	0.175066	0.881081
• PUBSEC * GOVEFC	0.408488	0.151194	0.855555
• milgov * milper * milexp * GOVEFC	0.445623	0.188329	0.844221
solution coverage: 0.771883			
solution consistency: 0.866071			

* Counterfactual assumptions: milgov (absent), milexp (absent), FORAID (present), GOVEFC (present), GDPPC (present)

three paths to the outcome of high social expenditure in the Middle East. The frequency cutoff was set at 1, because the number of empirical cases are limited. It has a satisfactory level of consistency with 0.866071, which describes the extent of causal paths' membership to the set of outcome. It is measured in a scale ranging from 0 to 1. While the lower bound denotes full non-membership, the upper bound denotes full membership. A value close to 1 is acceptable for establishing causal connection between configurations and outcome.

The first combination associates high public sector employment and low level of armed forces personnel as of total employment with high social security spending. This result is in line with the hypothesized effects of these two conditions. Based on the membership scores of cases to the set defined by the intersection of these two conditions, Algeria and Egypt are the two cases displaying this configuration. They have membership scores greater than the state of ambiguity represented by 0.5, or in other words, their scores are greater than the most common threshold used to determine membership status of a case to a set. The substantive meaning of this

causal path is that the similar outcome in the two cases could be explained with the combination of high public sector employment rate, and low armed forces personnel rate, and the rate of military expenditure and the nature of civil military relations are not relevant to this outcome.

The second result does not require the presence of any militaristic aspect for the emergence of the outcome, but the third one includes all aspects of militarism and associates their absence with the outcome of high social expenditure. While the second configuration is displayed with a degree of membership greater than 0.5 by the cases of Jordan and Tunisia, the third one is only observed in the case of Tunisia. Since the two combination have different number of conditions, Tunisia's membership in two different combinations has become possible. The similar outcome in Jordan and Tunisia could be explained with high government effectiveness and high public sector employment.

Overall, this solution suggest contextual variables such as GDP per capita and foreign military aid do not lead to a qualitative difference in the outcome variable of social expenditure. On the other hand, the other five variables combine in three ways towards the emergence of high social expenditure, or in other words good welfare efforts in regional standards. Effective use of resources and good governance, measured as government effectiveness, seems to be an important predictor of high social spending.

The output in Table 3.4 presents the solution for the negation of the *socexp*, that is, low social expenditure. Similar to the first output it has a satisfactory degree of consistency with 0.848718, however the four configurations designated as the paths to the outcome are too complex to make a meaningful conclusion about contributions of each variable to the emergence of the outcome. A fair conclusion is that the presence of militaristic aspects, but not the absence of them, combining with other conditions toward the low social expenditure supports the hypothesized relationship between the three militaristic conditions and the welfare efforts. While this solution does not give a result that supports the opposite of hypothesized relationships, it is hard to make assertive causal claims about the trueness of hypotheses.

Table 3.4. Analysis of Causal Paths to Low Social Expenditure*

	raw	unique	
	coverage	coverage	consistency
	-----	-----	-----
• MILEXP * foraid * pubsec * govefc * gdppc	0.304965	0.037825	0.865772
• MILGOV * MILEXP * foraid * govefc * gdppc	0.505910	0.238771	0.826255
• MILPER * MILEXP * foraid * pubsec * govefc	0.356974	0.134752	0.883041
• MILGOV * milper * foraid * pubsec * govefc * gdppc	0.347518	0.104019	0.913044
solution coverage: 0.782506			
solution consistency: 0.848718			

* Counterfactual assumptions: MILGOV (present), MILEXP (present), foraid (absent), govefc (absent), gdppc (absent)

The solution for the second model, *soccov* as the outcome variable, is presented in Table 3.5. This solution with a frequency cutoff of 1 and a 0.988235 degree of consistency, indicates two paths to the outcome of comprehensive social security coverage. The fsQCA analysis of the model with *soccov* apparently has greater level of explanatory capability due to the higher level of consistency and having a more parsimonious expression as the intermediate solution.

In this solution, only three out of seven condition variables are found to be relevant for the emergence of the outcome. The first configuration specifies the absence of a praetorian relationship (*milgov*) combined with the absence of high level of military personnel (*milper*), and the second one combines the absence of *milper* with the presence of high public sector employment. Morocco and Tunisia are the two

Table 3.5. Analysis of Causal Paths to Comprehensive Social Security Coverage*

	raw	unique	
	coverage	coverage	consistency
	-----	-----	-----
milgov * milper	0.646512	0.360465	0.985816
• milper * PUBSEC	0.420930	0.134884	0.978378
solution coverage: 0.781395			
solution consistency: 0.988235			

*Counterfactual assumptions: milgov (absent), milexp (absent), FORAID (present), GOVEFC (present), GDPPC (present)

countries having a degree of membership greater than 0.5 to the first one, and the second one is observed with a degree of membership greater than 0.5 in the cases of Algeria and Egypt. Similar to the solution for the first model, this one does not find the contextual variables GDP per capita and foreign aid as relevant to the outcome, but additionally the government effectiveness and the military expenditure are added to the array of these irrelevant variables.

Based on this solution, it could be argued that high public sector employment and low degree of militaristic aspects enable these Middle Eastern states, which have limited economic capacity, to allocate more resources for welfare efforts, as measured by social security coverage.

The output for the last analysis in which the outcome is the negated version of the *soccov*, is given in Table 3.6. It suffers from a low level of consistency with 0.755611, and similar to the second output it provides a very complex explanation. Therefore, commenting on the relationship between the condition variables and the outcome of very limited statutory provision (*soccov*) based on this analysis could be misleading.

Table 3.6. Analysis of Causal Paths to Very Limited Statutory Provision

	raw	unique	
	coverage	coverage	consistency
	-----	-----	-----
• MILEXP * foraid * pubsec * govefc * gdppc	0.345946	-0.000000	0.859060
• MILPER * MILEXP * foraid * pubsec * govefc	0.383784	0.075676	0.830409
• MILGOV * milper * foraid * pubsec * govefc * gdppc	0.367568	0.102703	0.844721
• MILGOV * MILPER * MILEXP * foraid * pubsec * gdppc	0.513513	0.294594	0.871560
solution coverage: 0.818919			
solution consistency: 0.755611			

* Counterfactual assumptions: MILGOV (present), MILEXP (present), foraid (absent), govefc (absent), gdppc (absent)

In a nutshell, the fsQCA analysis of the data that is conducted with two different outcome variables supports the arguments that associates militarism with poor welfare efforts, and more generally with poor political economic outcomes. The configurations associated with good welfare efforts in Table 3.3 and Table 3.5 include the absence of militaristic aspects, and those associated with poor welfare efforts include the presence of these aspects. In conclusion, the absence or presence of militaristic aspects are found to be relevant for a qualitative difference in the outcome of interest, and in line with the hypothesized relationship. However, out of several reasons the results presented in this chapter should be treated as suggestive evidence for the negative relationship between the militarism and welfare efforts. Firstly, the conversion of the raw data values into fuzzy set membership scores was

carried out based on regional standards, that is, the scores reflect the relative states of cases for each condition and outcome variables. Therefore, this explanation could not be valid for all regional contexts. For example, GDP would probably be a significant factor to explain the qualitative variation across all countries in the world, but it is irrelevant when the focus is narrowed to the Middle Eastern context where there is not much variation in terms of economic capacity. Secondly, the designated causal paths to the outcomes were in such parsimonious level thanks to the inclusion of the logical remainders by making counterfactual assumptions about some condition variables. This is a common practice in qualitative tradition and in QCA methods, and is carried out on a theoretical or substantive basis. Finally, a challenging task faced by researchers of the Middle East is the lack or flaws of the data. Countries do not reveal their information for being able to measure many political, economic or social indicators, and institutions resort to estimations based on their models. However, sometimes this practice might lead to unreasonable measurements as mentioned previously in this chapter for Lebanon's social expenditure level. Despite these limitations, the analysis offers an exploratory introduction to the guns vs. butters tradeoff between financing the militarism and welfare efforts. It might serve as a preliminary examination before a more sophisticated study that is supported with more empirical cases and more reliable data.

3.3 A Special Focus on Three Cases: Syria, Tunisia and Egypt

In this section of the chapter a brief examination of three cases will be carried out. A specific comparison of Egypt, Tunisia and Syria might help to achieve a better understanding of the relationship. Syria is the case having the worst outcome in terms of welfare efforts, and Tunisia is the one having the best. While Syria allocated 8.62% of its central government budget on social spending, in Tunisia this value was 38.05% in 2011. Additionally, social security coverage in Syria is qualified as very limited statutory coverage, but Tunisia has a comprehensive coverage.⁸¹ This strong contrast

⁸¹ Values for social spending and information for social security coverage are obtained from Table 3.1

in outcome variables are matched with a strong contrast in many condition variables. Egypt shares some conditional characteristics with Syria and Tunisia, but it displays a far better outcome than Syria both in terms of social expenditure and social security coverage. This part will attempt to solve this puzzle to a certain extent by employing a specific focus and benefiting the results of the fsQCA analysis.

3.3.1. Syria

Syria is an extreme case for the phenomenon of militarism not only in its region, but also in the world. The Global Militarization Index (GMI) published in 2010 ranks it third after Israel and Singapore.⁸² Situated in one of the most conflictual parts of the world, the size of its military has been legitimized in the eyes of a considerable portion of its society. The tension with Israel and sometimes with Lebanon helped the regime to sustain an extreme level of mobilization. However, it was not only the external threats that helped the regime to channel a great amount of resources to the military, also the uneasy relations with some societal groups rendered the military a praetorian unit serving for the security of the regime.

Since its early formation period, Syria has been suffering from a failure to unify under a single national identity. The Baath Regime's efforts to this end were carried out through the security apparatus and in the form of violent repression or threats of violent repression.⁸³ Those who tried to promote their non-Arab identity or religious identity as a reaction to Arab nationalist policies of Baath regime has amounted to a considerable portion of society. Nationalist ambitions in the face of major opposition and governmental weaknesses, both before and after Hafez Al Assad, got the regime stuck into a legitimacy crisis. The regime's response to these challenges has been strengthening its military muscle against its people. This situation has not been

⁸² The GMI could be reached through the following link for years from 1990 to 2012: <http://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=gmi-new>

⁸³ See Raymond Hinnebusch (2008). Modern Syrian Politics. *History Compass*. 6(1), p.264.

observed uniformly across all authoritarian contexts. Some authoritarian regimes achieved to derive legitimacy from economic or cultural factors like the abundance of natural resources or representing a major ethnic or religious group in the political realm. Syria, in contrast, does not have abundant resources that could let the regime to establish a rentier state, and the regime rarely lets the members of Sunni majority to compete for positions in state offices and military. The sectarian attitude of the regime that favored Alawite minority over the Sunni majority, reverberated in the military, as well. Most of the higher positions in the military ranks were held by the people from this minority. Regime's dependence on military for its survival and military elites' dependence on the regime for keeping their privileges created a symbiotic relationship between the two, which has become crucially harmful for political and economic development of the country.⁸⁴

The militarism observed in the Syrian case is almost a pure example for Vagts' definition⁸⁵, that is, the extreme level of mobilization transcends true military purposes, but serves to the non-military purposes like the survival of the regime. It could not be described only with the size of military and praetorian characteristics, but also the diffusion of military priorities across all arts and industries. It has the highest scores for all three militarism variables, and the lowest score for most of the contextual variables. This extreme state of militarism and poor political economic indicators offer a plausible explanation for the very poor performance in welfare efforts. Beyond that, one additional aspect that could not be included in the study is the power structure of the regime.

The survival of the regime in the recent turmoil has proven the significance of the distinct position of the military in the political structure. Among the most compelling explanations of the failure and success of revolts in terms of toppling the authoritarian regimes has been built upon the variation in the structure of militaries and the nature of their relations with the heads of the regime across Middle Eastern

⁸⁴ See Itamar Rabinovic. (1972). Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963-66: The Army Party Symbiosis. Tel Aviv: Israel Universities Press, p.3.

⁸⁵ See Alfred Vagts. (1959). A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military. New York: Meridian Books. P.13.

countries.⁸⁶ In Syrian case the symbiotic relationship between the military and government made military willing to repress the revolts, and this factor has become very decisive for the failure of opposition movement until now. However, another component of the regime has also been decisive to this end. The business networks that enjoy privileges in the market competition thanks to their close ties with the regime constitute another pillar of the resilience of the status-quo.⁸⁷ The first one generates legitimacy through a militaristic culture and the recruitment of a large amount of people by the military. The business networks, on the other hand, creates a sense of economic liberalization on a section of the society benefiting from the contraction of the public sector.⁸⁸

In authoritarian contexts one common motivation behind generous welfare provision is the politically legitimizing effects it generates. This nature of the Syrian regime relieves the pressure on it for deriving legitimacy through welfare provision. The so called Arab Spring events has shaken the structure of the regime, but the repressive apparatus has achieved to sustain the status-quo. In the immediate future, it seems the persistence of this political economic structure will be a barrier in front of effective welfare efforts and other political economic outcomes.

3.3.2. Tunisia

The popular upheavals in the last few years have spread from west of the region towards its eastern parts, but the only success story until now has been the country where the upheavals first sparked, namely Tunisia. Among the primary factors producing this outcome were the different characteristics of the political structure of

⁸⁶ See Eva Bellin. (2012). Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring. *Comparative Politics*, 44(2), 127-149.

⁸⁷ See Bassam Haddad. (2011). *Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience*. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press. p.5.

⁸⁸ See Bassam Haddad. (2012). Syria, the Arab Uprisings, and the Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience. *Interface*, 4(1), p.118.

this country. These features were also the underlying reasons for the relatively more successful political economic outcomes in the previous decades.

There is not very much thing to tell about Tunisian military and its role in Tunisian political economy, because since the rise of Habib Bourguiba to the power in late 1950s it has been gradually subordinated by him, and shrank in size. As a result, it has become an insignificant actor in politics and economy. This feature of Tunisian political economy, even not achieved with democratic intentions, differentiated Tunisia among the authoritarian countries of the Middle East in terms of political and economic outcomes. Today, Tunisia scores the least values in all three militaristic aspects included in this study, and also it has the best score in terms of government effectiveness, and a fair level of public sector employment. Its GDP per capita score is not the highest one, but as the fsQCA analysis has indicated, differences in GDP per capita did not matter significantly to the end of good welfare efforts.

Tunisia has the highest scores for both indicators of welfare efforts. Since independence social policy has had a strong emphasis in governments' agenda and through decades the level of provision has consistently increased even during periods of structural adjustment in the economy that most of the time exerts great pressure

Table 3.7. Aggregate Indicators of Welfare Efforts in Tunisia 1986-2002⁸⁹

Years	Total Public Social Spending *	Social Spending/GDP (%)
1986	2881.8	18.9
1990	3495.4	19.5
1994	4035.1	19.4
1998	4867.3	19.3
2002	5860.8	19.5

* Values are measured in millions of 2002 dinars

⁸⁹ See Mahmoud B. Romdhane. (2006). Social Policy and Development in Tunisia since Independence: a Political Perspective. In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics (pp. 31-77). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. P.64.

on governments to cut public spending. Table 3.7 shows total public social spending and social spending as a share of GDP between 1986 and 2002. This table gives an idea about the level of provision across time. The values illustrate the commitment of the governments to achieve consistent performance in welfare efforts. The political aspects of the regime lying under this relatively better performance of Tunisia are the low level of budgetary pressure exerted by the military and effective governance and use of resources. In stark contrast to Syrian case, Tunisian regime chose to subordinate the military establishment to increase the security of the regime, but instead expanded the police force. However, compared to the military, the police force is a low cost alternative for internal security.

The politically legitimizing aspect of welfare provision that lacks in the Syrian case has become a central motivation of the authoritarian rulers of the country.⁹⁰ Interestingly the recent upheavals initiated in Tunisia, and primarily out of the miserable socioeconomic conditions. Although, the statistics draw a brighter landscape for Tunisia, the eruption of these events arises the question how egalitarian were the welfare efforts implemented.

3.3.3. Egypt

Despite Egypt is closer to Tunisia in terms of the outcomes of social expenditure and social security coverage, it is closer to Syria in many of the conditions of the models presented in this study. This fact makes it an interesting case that deserves a specific elaboration. In fact, any study dealing with the Middle East cannot ignore this case, because it has the biggest population and provides a rich history of events, and a complex social and political setting to test hypotheses.

In the two solutions presented in the previous section, Egypt embodies the configuration of high level public sector employment and low level of armed forces personnel towards the outcomes of high social expenditure and comprehensive

⁹⁰ Ibid. p.33.

social security coverage. This explanation makes sense given the fact that Egyptian private economy suffers from weakness and insistent problem of informality. In Egyptian private sector it is very hard for an employee to find a job that provides social security coverage, but it is the public sector jobs that offer social security coverage. When this combines with statist policies and the strategy of deriving legitimacy through job creation in the state offices and enterprises, the relationship between the high public sector employment and relatively better welfare efforts becomes clearer. Additionally, the low level of military personnel that proxies a low level of military burden on the central budget enables the government to channel resources to be used more in implementing social policies.

One distinct feature peculiar to Egypt that the solution of the fsQCA analysis cannot capture is the commercial operations of the military establishment in markets. After the coup d'état in the July 2013, this market empire has drawn more attention. It is estimated that the Egyptian military has 35 factories that operates in non-military industries such as chemical, home appliances, food production etc.⁹¹ Beyond the military's presence in private markets as the owner of manufacturing and service sector companies, another form of influence by the military in markets is the appointment of high rank military officials to high managerial positions in public and private firms.⁹²

Military establishment's adventures in the economy started in the early periods of state formation under Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule. Military was an actor of the state's expansion in the economic realm through nationalizations or founding new public enterprises. During Anwar Sadat's rule the military's economic power was contracted a little, but with Mubarak's rise to power it returned to the game more powerfully. An odd reality from this period was the fact that one of the main beneficiaries of

⁹¹ See Zeinab Abul-Magd. (2012, February 9). The Generals' Secret: Egypt's Ambivalent Market. Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/02/09/generals-secret-egypt-s-ambivalent-market/fdc9>

⁹² See Zeinab Abul-Magd. (2013, October). The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy: Recent History and Current Transition Status. Retrieved from CHR Michelsen Institute: <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4935-the-egyptian-military-in-politics-and-the-economy.pdf>

Mubarak era private sector expansion was the military.⁹³ They were quite comfortable with the new neoliberal policies, because the actors of private sector was dwarfed by the military in terms of financial capacity to exploit the opportunities of economic liberalization.

Military's operations in markets might be affecting Egyptian rulers' welfare efforts in two different directions. Thanks to the huge revenue it derives from economic activities, its burden on the central government budget might decrease and might enable government to spend more on welfare. However, it might also be harmful for welfare efforts, because the Egyptian military's economic activities are exempt from taxation. While the average effect of these activities on welfare efforts are not very clear, it is hard to claim that these activities are good for the general economic performance of Egypt.

Similar to Tunisia and many other authoritarian cases, the Egyptian regime has been in shaky situation in terms of its political legitimacy, and welfare provision has been a part of legitimization efforts. Tarek Masoud's comparative study of the elections in Mubarak period and in its aftermath supports this argument.⁹⁴ His main question revolves around the competition between the Mubarak government and Muslim Brotherhood affiliated politicians for the votes of the poor people, but also sheds light on the fact that the social spending for the poor people during Mubarak era was one significant factor behind their consistent electoral support to the regime in successive elections.

In a nutshell, a very high amount of public sector employees combined with a relatively less burden imposed by the military seems to be the main reason for Egypt's better position in the Middle East's social policy landscape. Also similar to Syria and Tunisia, it supports the theoretical argument claiming a negative relationship between the militaristic aspects and welfare provision.

⁹³ Ibid, p.2.

⁹⁴ See Tarek Masoud. (2013). The Political Economy of Islam and Politics. In J. L. Esposito, & E. E.-D. Shahin, The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics (pp. 89-111). New York: Oxford University Press. P.102.

Conclusion

Nation state formations in the Middle East took place under strong influence of military men. When the shadow of colonial powers had begun to fade away in the interwar period and particularly after the World War II, big nation states such as Syria, Egypt and Tunisia have emerged in the Levant and Maghreb. Traditional rulers were replaced by charismatic military men, and those new rulers initiated social, political, and economic modernization programs that were intended to achieve swift transformation of the social life. The ultimate goal of these ambitious endeavors were reaching to the standards of the developed world, but the current landscape of the region proves their failure to achieve this end. Massive protests, and conflicts between regimes and societal groups have been a defining property for Middle Eastern politics for decades, and in recent years some countries have been a stage where these conflicts have turned into violent confrontation between state and society.

Development programs of today's developed countries in the post-war period had strong emphasis on free market principles, democracy and right to social security, however military rulers of the new nation states in the Middle East were far from embracing these intermediate ends for development. With the help of anti-colonialist sentiments in their societies, those charismatic military officials, such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Houari Boumediene of Algeria, pursued socialist and Arab nationalist transformation projects that left many stillborn elements in political economic institutions. One accompanying motivation to these ideological pursuits were keeping priorities of security policy domain over others. Accordingly, the institution of military and its interests have generally dominated others. The conflictual environment in the region, and the need for regime security helped military to absorb a great share of public resources. When this overburden of military combined with stillborn aspects like an inefficient economy suffering from the lack of

a strong private sector, and weakness of society against states, successful political economic outcomes were hardly achievable.

The social policy has been one of the mostly suffering domains from the overburden of excessive military mobilization in this part of the world. The only way for many people to have access to social security and welfare benefits has been to be employed by a public institution or a public enterprise. In Middle Eastern countries, states recruit significantly higher amount of people compared to the standards of the developed world, but still most of the people works in the informal private sector. Besides, militaries expenditure on high-tech equipment is extravagant, but they lack domestic military industries that could channel military expenditure's positive effect on economic growth, and ultimately on a country's economic capacity. Sometimes they get external financial aid for their military mobilizations, but the problems of ineffective public administration and low degree of accountability decreases the likeliness of deriving significantly positive contributions to lower the military's burden on economy in general, and more specifically on social policy expenses. These contextual characteristic renders militarism bad for welfare efforts of states, and ultimately social development of societies.

This study has dealt with the relationship of conditions having to do with the militaristic characteristic of states and welfare efforts, and attempted to reveal militaristic dynamics of good and poor welfare efforts in the region. Three aspects of militarism were determined as condition variables, and four contextual political economic characteristic accompanied them in the analysis. The two outcome variables of social expenditure as of central government spending and social security coverage have been chosen as indicators of welfare efforts. Results of the fsQCA analysis indicated several paths to good and poor welfare efforts, and the combinations of conditions mostly included militaristic aspects like high military expenditure, high level of armed forces personnel and praetorian relationship between government and military. The inclusion of logical remainders to obtain modestly generalizable functional expression of the causal relationship eliminated some contextual variables like GDP per capita, government effectiveness and foreign aid. This result does not mean that these factors do not have any effect on the

outcome of interest in this study, but means that they are not too meaningful for the explanation of relative performances of the eight states in terms of welfare efforts. This qualitative explanation for the variation of welfare efforts among some Middle Eastern states does not provide a universal explanation that could be applied to any context, but it is only meaningful for the specified context. However, with the same methodology but with a different causal model, a more universal explanation is possible.

Future research could use this study as an introduction to the issue of militarism and welfare efforts in the Middle East. Sophisticated quantitative works inquiring net effects of political characteristics of states on welfare efforts could benefit from it for choosing the variables to include in their causal models. Although, as underscored before, results of the study are not universal, the same causal model could be applied to regions like Latin America and Central Asia, the regions having a similar social and political context.

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