

THE TURKISH STATE AS A “NEOLIBERAL LEVIATHAN”
UNDER THE AKP RULE:
THE CASE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

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İSTANBUL ŐEHİR UNIVERSİTY

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THE CASE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

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ABSTRACT

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THE CASE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

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This study focuses on private security companies as a component of the AKP’s security policies, which has enabled the Turkish state to extend its dominance over the society. The AKP era, spanning over ten years in Turkey, is a continuity of the neoliberal transformation that began with the Özal era in the 1980s. As the new actor of neoliberal transformation in Turkey, the AKP has implemented the transformation in question extensively. Thus, the AKP reign has become a period when the institutionalization of neoliberal regime in Turkey has become perceivable with all its aspects. In this study, the revamping of the state dominance in the neoliberal era is discussed within the theoretical analysis of Loïc Wacquant’s anthropology of neoliberalism. The study treats the AKP’s role in constituting the neoliberal hegemony as a period that has institutionalized the state control by recalling Wacquant’s notion of the “Neoliberal Leviathan.” In this manner, the study links the revamping of the state authority with the rise of privatization of the security services. The ratification of Law 5188 on Private Security Services enacted during the AKP era is portrayed as the step that lays the foundation for the existing private security sector in Turkey. Thus, this study concludes that private security companies enlarge the state’s capacities of surveillance and supervision.

Keywords: neoliberalism, the “Neoliberal Leviathan,” AKP, security, private security companies, Law 5188.

ÖZ

AKP DÖNEMİNDE TÜRK DEVLETİ: “NEOLİBERAL LEVİATHAN”

ÖZEL GÜVENLİK ŞİRKETLERİ

Şanver, Abdullah

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Bu çalışma, AKP'nin güvenlik politikaları bağlamında özel güvenlik şirketlerine odaklanıyor. AKP'nin Türkiye'deki on yılı aşkın iktidar dönemi, 1980'lerde Turgut Özal'la başlayan neoliberal dönüşümün bir devamı niteliğindedir. Türkiye'deki neoliberal dönüşümün yeni aktörü olan AKP, çok geniş bir alanda reformlara imza atmıştır. Her anlamda AKP iktidarı neoliberal birikim rejimini kurumsallaştırmıştır. Bu çalışmada, devlet egemenliğinin neoliberal dönemde pekiştirilmesi, Loïc Wacquant'ın neoliberalizm değerlendirmesi ışığında tartışılıyor. Bu tartışma Wacquant'ın “Neoliberal Leviathan” kavramı bağlamında, AKP'nin devlet egemenliğini kurumsallaştırmasına odaklanıyor. Buna paralel olarak bu çalışma güvenlik hizmetinin özelleştirilmesi ve devlet otoritesinin artması arasında bir bağlantı kuruyor. AKP döneminde yürürlüğe giren 5188 sayılı Özel Güvenlik Hizmetleri Kanunu, hem güvenliğin özelleşmesinin önünü açması hem de Türkiye'deki özel güvenlik şirketleri sektörünün temelini atması noktasında ciddi öneme sahip bir gelişme olarak tartışılıyor. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışma özel güvenlik şirketlerini devletin denetim ve gözetim kapasitesini artıran bir unsur olarak değerlendiriyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: neoliberalizm, “Neoliberal Leviathan,” AKP, güvenlik, özel güvenlik şirketleri, 5188 sayılı Kanun

To Mom and Dad

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Thank you all,

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Deniz Cenk Demir

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Lana Del Rey

Room 325

And,

My parents; Tuba and Davut

My brother; Ahmet Faruk

My sisters; Hümeýra, Zehra and Sümeýye

My little nephews; Abdullah Azzam and Halid Yasir.

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INTRODUCTION

This study is based on the argument that the AKP era, spanning over ten years in Turkey, is a continuity of the neoliberal transformation that began with the Özal era in the 1980s. As the new actor of neoliberal transformation in Turkey, the AKP has implemented the transformation in question extensively from health to privatization, from education to a reduction of social security accumulation. Thus, the AKP reign has become a period, when the institutionalization of neoliberal accumulation regime in Turkey became perceivable with all its aspects. In other words, the neoliberal hegemony in Turkey reached a state of relative stabilization under the AKP rule.

This study argues the revamping of the state dominance in the neoliberal era within the theoretical analysis of Loïc Wacquant's anthropology of neoliberalism. The study treats the AKP's role in constituting the neoliberal hegemony as a period that has institutionalized state control by recalling Wacquant's notion of the "Neoliberal Leviathan". This notion describes neoliberalism as the market-conforming statecraft with the intention to impose market dominance over society by the state.¹ Accordingly, the AKP period corresponds to an era when the state's visibility and dominance is expanded.

This study links the revamping of the state authority with the rise of privatization of the security services. In this manner, private security creates new channels for the state to control parts of daily life. It also expands state's legitimacy as the higher authority for commodification of security.

In Turkey, the ratification of Law 5188 on Private Security Services enacted during the AKP era is portrayed as the step that lays the foundation for the existing private security sector in Turkey. From this point, the study suggests thinking of private

¹ Loïc Wacquant (2012) "Three Steps to Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism," *Social Anthropology*, vol. 20, pp. 66-79.

security companies as a component of the AKP's security policies, which has enabled the Turkish state to extend its dominance. Private security companies enlarge the state's capacities of surveillance and supervision. Private security is not a form of deviation, but a subsidiary element of the "Neoliberal Leviathan".

To unfold the above-mentioned argument, in the first chapter, I begin with a general discussion on the concept of neoliberalism by focusing on selected critical readings about the use of an ill-defined and ambiguous concept of neoliberalism. This kind of conceptualizing assumes neoliberalism as an independent power from the practices of social actors, and triggers a lack of consensus in defining neoliberalism. Hence it causes to a considerable illusion over the explanation of the concept.

After this general discussion, I focus on what the concept of neoliberalism refers in this study. I utilize Wacquant's explanation of neoliberalism since his exploration provides a well-defined definition of the concept. He portrays the anthropology of neoliberalism as polarized between variants of market rule and studies deriving from Foucault's notion of governmentality. Thereby, he proposes a *via media* between these two approaches. According to Wacquant, with neoliberalism, we see the revamping of state imposition of the market dominance over society. In this manner, it entails a political project that goes beyond the market rule approach. Rather than an economic treatment, this approach gives a dynamic role to the state. He further suggests that neoliberalism brings not the shrinking of the government, but the building of a "centaur state". This centaur state, liberal at the top and paternal at the bottom, takes a hypocrite attitude that it shows comely visage toward the holders of capital, whereas it is fearsome and castigatory when it comes to ruling the lower class which is destabilized by the diffusion of work insecurity and otherness.

In the second chapter, the study briefly analyzes the historical background of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. Two points are elaborated: first, the neoliberal experience that the AKP inherits; second, the AKP rule as a continuity of this neoliberal transformation. I argue that one should also examine to what extent the successive governments of the AKP overlap with the neoliberal hegemony in Turkey.

The third chapter focuses on the link between the Turkish state under the AKP rule and the Wacquant's notion of the "Neoliberal Leviathan". I examine the increasing power of the executive branch; the integration of the following three branches – the execution, the legislation, and the jurisdiction; the increasing role of mass media; neoliberal populism; the using of libertarian themes; and the reconfiguration of the security field.

The next chapter reviews how the state increases its control upon society over reconfiguration of the security field. First, I discuss how the perception of security has been shaped in the neoliberal period, and I also question the private security as a core element of the political instrumentalisation of security. After explaining the relation between neoliberalism and privatization of security, the study discusses the security policies in Turkey during the neoliberal period. I briefly analyze the positions of military and police force in the security system of the Turkish state before the AKP rule. I then argue how their relative sovereignty has transformed in the AKP period. Finally, I focus on the new security culture developed by the AKP in this neoliberal framework. This new culture, a result of successful institutionalization of neoliberal policies under the AKP rule, refers to a new perception of individuals, so called responsible citizen.

The fifth chapter focuses on the private security companies in Turkey, which have raised after the ratification of the law of Private Security Services, Law 5188, ratified on 10 June 2004. In this chapter, I first examine articles of the law, and then discuss the relation between private security and the public force. Lastly, I consider the private security companies in the framework of the rise of state surveillance in Turkey during the AKP era.

CHAPTER 1

THE REVAMPING OF THE STATE DOMINANCE

Over the past four decades, the concept of neoliberalism has been widely used in the social sciences. A great number of academic studies, conferences, panel discussions, articles, and topics use the concept of neoliberalism. It has become one of the most popular concepts in the social sciences. Scholars now study the relationship between neoliberalism and every contemporary issue in social sciences from wealth to poverty, public to private, and cities to citizenship.²

Scholars use neoliberalism as a main concept in explaining current issues of politics, economy, culture and society. It is also combined with the other popular terms of social sciences, i.e. neoliberal globalization or neoliberal capitalism. Indeed the concept of neoliberalism now substitutes for what the concept of capitalism meant in social science analyses previously.

To sum up, the number of social facts that explained by reference to the concept of neoliberalism is limitless: economic policy, law, education, cinema, art, media, social policy, urban area design, privacy, sexuality, and so on. Further, the popularity of neoliberalism brings different disciplines such as cultural geography and political ecology together. The dialogue over the concept of neoliberalism is transdisciplinary. It involves "geographers engaging with work produced in cognate disciplines such as anthropology, economics, gender studies, planning, political science, and sociology."³

The popularity of the concept in social science analyses reveals a close link between the underlying idea that the concept of neoliberalism is a primary and unquestionable notion, and a definition of the contemporary world:

² Simon Springer (2012) "Neoliberalism as Discourse: Between Foucauldian Political Economy and Marxian Poststructuralism," *Critical Discourse Studies*, vol. 9(2), p. 135.

³ Kim England and Kevin Ward (2007) "Preface," in England and Ward (eds.) *Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples*, Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, p. xvii.

A perplexing mix of overreach and under specification has accompanied the troubled ascendancy of the concept of neoliberalism in heterodox political economy. The concept has become, simultaneously, a terminological focal point for debates on the trajectory of post-1980s regulatory transformations and an expression of the deep disagreements and confusions that characterize those debates. Consequently, 'neoliberalism' has become something of a rascal concept – promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested.⁴

Concurrently, forceful critiques of neoliberalism have risen in social sciences. These critical readings⁵ offer to go beyond the discussions, focusing on the negative results of political, economic, social, and cultural neoliberal transformations occurring in the last three decades. They open up the popularity of neoliberalism for discussion. These readings criticize scholars who usually put neoliberalism at center of their analyses without any question, and accept the ambiguous use of the concept. They treat it as something that needs to be explained in particular places and with reference to particular people, territories, states and cultural formations.⁶

Moreover, these critical readings also mention other analytical problems about the conceptualization of neoliberalism. They assert that most of the neoliberal literatures make Euro-centric analyses.⁷ Accordingly, several Western scholars interpret neoliberalism as a naturalized phenomenon that is produced in the West, and then exported to the rest of the world. Thus, neoliberalism is considered as an indisputable guidebook to follow, and, the non-Western political geographies are positioned as passive receivers of neoliberal policies.⁸

⁴ Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore (2010) "Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways," *Global Networks*, vol. 10 (2), pp. 183-184.

⁵ Catherine Kingfisher and Jeff Maskovsky (2008) "Introduction: The Limits of Neoliberalism," *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 28, pp. 115-126; Kim England and Kevin Ward (2007) "Introduction: Reading Neoliberalization," in England and Ward (eds.) *Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples*, Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, pp. 1-22; James Ferguson (2009) "The Use of Neoliberalism," *Antipode*, vol. 41(1), pp. 166-184.

⁶ Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008), pp. 123-124.

⁷ Berna Yazıcı (2013) "Güncel Sosyal Bilim Analizinin Sihirli Anahtarı: 'Neoliberalizm'?" *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 128, p. 10.

⁸ *ibid.*

These critiques, within the frame of assessment mentioned above, demonstrate that the popular use of neoliberalism reveals a reified conceptualization. It assumes neoliberalism as an independent phenomenon, unaffected by the practices of other actors. Hence, I criticize the conceptualization of neoliberalism which promotes a top-down social analysis that neglects historicity, ability of social actors, and the existence of a variety of social and political processes.

Critical readings,⁹ advocate for the use of neoliberalism as a basic analytic tool for explaining larger concepts such as power relations and inequality. Hence, the purpose of these studies is to re-conceptualize the concept of neoliberalism. This approach treats neoliberalism "as a process rather than a *fait accompli*. And it also emphasizes that its rise to global prominence has been fraught with contradiction and partiality and subject to limitation."¹⁰ Thus, neoliberalization should be considered with other political-cultural formations and governing projects, that consider specific socio-cultural formations and political priorities. Consequently,

It is worth noting the degree to which neoliberal policy agendas have themselves been transformed through their interaction with inherited institutional landscapes and power configurations during the last three decades.¹¹

After this general discussion, I now focus on what the concept of neoliberalism refers in this study. I argue that the popular usage of neoliberalism mentioned above is misleading. It is important to remark that the widely usage of neoliberalism has a risk of confusion over the meaning of the term, "since the meaning of the term can slip in the course of an argument being passed from author to reader."¹²

⁹ England and Ward (2007); Ferguson (2009); Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008); Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010).

¹⁰ Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008), p. 115.

¹¹ Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002) "Cities and Geographies of Neoliberalism: Theoretical Debates," in Brenner and Theodore (eds.) *Spaces of Neoliberalism*, Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, p. 14.

¹² Ferguson (2009), p. 171.

The contemporary theorizations of neoliberalism, as Springer argues, are framed by a false dichotomy between an insurgent approach fueled by loose derivations of the Foucaultian notion of governmentality and a hegemonic conception anchored by (neoclassical and neo-Marxist) variants of market rule.¹³ This dichotomy causes a lack of consensus in defining neoliberalism. It also prevents a discussion on how various approaches of neoliberalism might be gathered together. Springer proposes:

Moving our theorizations forward through an understanding that neoliberalism is neither built from the ‘top-down’, as in Marxian understandings of ideological hegemony, nor from the ‘bottom-up’, as in notions of governmentality.¹⁴

In order to go beyond the problem mentioned by Springer concerning the definitions of neoliberalism, I employ Wacquant’s conceptualization of neoliberalism. Wacquant portrays the anthropology of neoliberalism as a polarization between variants of market rule and studies stemming from Foucault’s notion of governmentality, and proposes a *via media* between these two approaches. I will briefly discuss these approaches before I examine Wacquant’s view.

1.1. The Market Rule Approach

The market rule approach treats neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project. This understanding points at:

The places and the peoples behind its origins that are involved in its apparent uptake in geographically discrete but socially connected parts of the world. In this *approach* political (and indeed cultural) dominance is exercised through the formation of class-based alliances – elite actors, institutions, and other representatives of capital – at a variety of spatial scales, who produce and circulate a coherent program of ideas and images about the world, its problems, and how these are best solved. All of these are, of course, informed by gendered and racialized power hierarchies. Certainly, hegemony is not only about political and economic control; it is also the capacity of the dominant group to project its own

¹³Springer (2012), p. 133.

¹⁴ *ibid*, p. 135.

way of seeing the world so that those who are subordinated by it accept it as "common sense," even "natural."¹⁵

This quote demonstrates the relationship between the power of the neoliberal doctrine and its hegemony referring to the idea of 'freedom.' From the perspective of the dominant group who takes advantage of neoliberal policies, neoliberal project is not about imposing a formula, but about 'willing consent' by those being subordinated. 'Common sense' becomes how the subordinate group lives their subordination.¹⁶ In this manner, David Harvey unveils the charm of neoliberalism, in search of the cultural coding of political and economic problems, and the political success of talking by using "common sense":

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political practices that proposes that human well being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.¹⁷

Harvey, in a sense, seeks to understand how the neoliberal doctrine can be appealing, despite its contradictions. Neoliberalism as a doctrine refers to 'common values of our civilization,' 'human dignity,' and 'freedom.' However, in practice, neoliberalization is a "worldwide strategy of accumulation and social discipline that doubles up as an imperialist project, spearheaded by the alliance between the US ruling class and local capitalist coalitions."¹⁸ Harvey reveals the doctrine's power of emphasizing the theme of "common sense" to explain the penetration and 'success' of neoliberalism despite this contradiction between theory and practice.

The turn to neoliberalism, according to Harvey, entails the withdrawal of the state from social welfare areas achieved through deregulation and privatization. Despite its promise of liberation, he argues, as a political project, neoliberalism aims only to foster a good business climate to optimize conditions for capital accumulation.

¹⁵ England and Ward (2007), p. 11.

¹⁶ *ibid.* p. 12.

¹⁷ David Harvey (2007) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p. 2.

¹⁸ England and Ward (2007), p. 12.

States begin to perform "the financialization of everything and the relocation of the power center of capital accumulation to owners and their financial institutions at the expense of other factions of capital"¹⁹ towards accumulation via dispossession.

Neoliberalism as a system of accumulation by dispossession comprises four main pillars:²⁰ (1) *Privatization and commodification* of all kinds of public goods (water, telecommunication, and transportation), social welfare provision (education, health care, social housing), public institutions (universities, prisons) and even warfare that aims to open up new fields for capital. The privatization has become a basic policy throughout the capitalist world and beyond. The commodification of cultural forms, histories, and intellectual capital entails wholesale dispossession. (2) *Financialization* refers to how a product can be turned into an instrument of economic speculation and predation. Deregulation allows the financial system to become the main centers of fraud and thievery. Stock promotions, structured asset destruction through inflation, the promotion of levels of debt incumbency, dispossession of assets by credit and manipulations have become main features of the financial system on the global scale. (3) *The management and manipulation of crisis* refers to the ways in which crises creation, management and manipulation on the global scale have evolved into the fine art of deliberative redistribution of wealth from poor countries to the rich. Whether floods, wars, or financial meltdowns, the structural programs administered by the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex take care of any danger in favor of the neoliberal agenda. (4) *State redistributions* entail the state, once neoliberalized, as an agent of the upward redistribution of wealth. It refers to reversing the flow from upper to lower classes that had occurred during the era of embedded liberalism.

Within the context of this reigning view of neoliberalism, the market rule approach states that particularly the US transports the self-regulation market system to other countries around the globe. This is the extension of the neoliberal project that captures any reaction against it.

¹⁹ David Harvey (2006) "Neo-liberalism and the Restoration of Class Power," *Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development*, Verso: New York, p. 13.

²⁰ Harvey (2007), pp. 160-163.

1.2. The Governmentality Approach

Michel Foucault's approach of governmentality dwells upon how each citizen should behave and conduct his affairs. According to this approach, man's success of governing himself determines his capability of governing of his family, which also is a precondition for successful government of the state. Thus the approach constitutes two different types of continuity, an upward continuity between man, family, and the state; and a downward continuity 'in the sense that when a state is well run, the head of the family will know how to look after his family, his goods and his patrimony. This in turn means that individuals will behave as they should.'²¹

The art of government, as becomes apparent in this literature, is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the management of the state – that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods, and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children and servants) and of making the family fortune prosper.²²

Similar to a father's certain amount of surveillance and control over his family, goods and patrimony; the state would implement same practices to monitor its citizen's wealth and behavior. Hence, the family becomes a model of the art of government.

In this context, Foucault states that we live in the era of governmentality that first appeared in the eighteenth century. When the sovereignty of single rulers started to loosen its grip there was a power-transmission from principality to the emerging bourgeoisie class. Foucault emphasizes that this power-transmission enabled the family as a model for the art of government to become mobilized on the entire population. Besides, he argues that the coming of more 'democratic' types of government would not mean a decreased need for discipline. On the contrary:

²¹ Michel Foucault (1991) "Governmentality," in Burchell, Gordon and Miller (eds.) *The Foucault Effect*, The University of Chicago Press: USA, p. 92.

²² *ibid.* 92.

The need for discipline was never more important or more valorized than at the moment when it became important to manage a population; the managing of a population not only concerns the collective mass of phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also implies the management of population in its depths and its details.²³

The concept of governmentality emphasizes the rationalities that are the base for the forms of governance. By this word, Foucault means:

The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and its essential technical means apparatuses of security.²⁴

In this way, one of the most urgent tasks is to consider that power is exerted by some particular institutions such as local governments, police, and army. These institutions transmit the orders, apply them and punish people who do not obey. However, political power is also exerted by a few other institutions such as schools, media companies, etc. that seem to be unrelated. They appear to be independent entities, but at a closer examination they actually are not. For example, educational systems are supposed to distribute knowledge. In many cases they maintain power in the hands of a certain social classes while excluding several others.

Foucault argues that the real political task in a society is to interrogate the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent. If one wants right away to define the profile and formula of future society, s/he should criticize all forms of political power that are exerted in society.²⁵

The studies derive from Foucault's notion of governmentality refers to:

The ways in which the relations among and between peoples and things might be imagined, assembled, and translated, to effect coordination at a distance. Both the economy and the state are involved in the construction of autonomous, responsabilized 'neoliberal subjects'. Through

²³ *ibid.* 102.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Micheal Foucault (1971), "The Debate on Human Nature by Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky," <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wfN12L0Gf8>.

privatization and personalization, neoliberal governmentality aims at transforming recipients of welfare and social insurance into entrepreneurial subjects, who may be motivated to become responsible for themselves. Such a project of transformation may be based either on a social work model of helping, training, and empowering, or on a police model of governing every aspect of life.²⁶

This approach implies neoliberalism not as an economic policy, but a global rationality, which embodies itself in the act of governing of populations and people. This notion of governing refers to an act that draws its power from strategies and techniques for ‘the conduct of conduct’, which refers a form of activity aiming to guide, or affect the conduct of some person.²⁷ The governmentality approach claims that this global rationality tends to structure and organize not only the actions of governing, but also the conduct of the governed.²⁸ Thus, the idea of governmentality reflects the variation of the governing acts of the people, whether they are inside the ruling mechanism or not.

Similarly, for Wendy Larner, the optic of "governmentality makes a useful distinction between government and governance", and she argues that while neoliberalism means less government, it does not imply less governance. While on the one hand neo-liberalism problematizes the state, on the other hand it involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market.²⁹ Accordingly, neoliberalism is a technology of governing ‘free subjects’ that co-exists with other political rationalities. As a governing by calculation, it suggests new relations between the governing, the self-governed and the space of administration.³⁰

²⁶ England and Ward (2007), p. 13.

²⁷ Colin Gordon (1991) "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in Burchell, Gordon and Miller (eds.) *The Foucault Effect*, The University of Chicago Press: USA, p. 2.

²⁸ Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2012) *Dünyanın Yeni Akli: Neoliberal Toplum Üzerine Deneme*, trans. Işık Ergüden, Istanbul Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, pp. 8-9.

²⁹ Wendy Larner (2000) "Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality," *Studies in Political Economy*, vol.63, p. 12.

³⁰ Aihwa Ong (2007) "Neoliberalism As A Mobile Technology," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol. 32 (1), p. 7.

1.3. Wacquant's Notion Of The "Neoliberal Leviathan"

In *Three Steps to a Historical Anthropology of Actually Existing Neoliberalism*,³¹ Wacquant argues that conceptions of market rules and governmentality are defective approaches as they obscure what is 'neo' about neoliberalism. He insists that the market rule approach is "exceedingly narrow, shorn of institutions, and verges on the apologetic when it takes the discourse of neoliberalism at face value."³² Governmentality scholars, on the other hand, draw a very extensive and ambiguous map of neoliberalism, i.e. "overpopulated with proliferating institutions all seemingly infected by the neoliberal virus, and veers toward critical solipsism."³³ Wacquant proposes an understanding that is situated between these two conceptions:

This core consists in an *articulation of state, market, and citizenship* that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the third. So that all three of these institutions must be brought into our analytic ambit. I diverge from market-centered conceptions of neoliberalism in that I prioritize (political) means over (economic) ends; but I part with the governmentality framework in that I prioritize state-crafting over technologies and non-state logics, and I focus on how the state effectively redraws the boundaries and tenor of citizenship through its market-conforming policies.³⁴

According to Wacquant, the anthropology of neoliberalism means "a concrete political constellation from a 'thin' economic conception centered on the market to a 'thick' sociological conception centered on the state."³⁵ Neoliberalism enables the revamping of the state that imposes the impact of the market dominance over the society. In this manner, it entails a political project that goes beyond the market rule approach, and gives a dynamic role to the state.

The state is the culmination of a concentration of all political and administrative

³¹ Loic Wacquant (2012), pp. 66-79.

³² *ibid.* p. 68.

³³ *ibid.*

³⁴ *ibid.* pp. 70-71.

³⁵ *ibid.* p. 71.

institutions that control markets. So, the market acts in the direction of policies of current political parties in power. To specify this neoliberal reconceptualization, Wacquant maps out the articulation of four institutional logics: (i) commodification as the extension of the market; (ii) disciplinary social policy that means a shift from protective welfare state to corrective workfare state; (iii) expansive and pornographic penal policy as a projection of the sovereignty of the state in the everyday life; and (iv) the illusion of individual responsibility and the motto of culture that concentrate various components of state activity.³⁶

Wacquant further suggests that neoliberalism brings not the shrinking of the government, but the building of a centaur state.³⁷ He propounds Bourdieu's concept of bureaucratic field to grasp the way of thinking of this revamping of the state. This concept construes the state as a dissected space of forces that make the final definition and distribution of public goods.³⁸ In this regard, the contemporary state is traversed by two internal struggles: while there is a battle between the "higher state nobility" of policymakers who are decisive in imposing marketization, the "lower state nobility" of executives are attached to the protective missions of government. The second one involves the "left hand," which is the feminine side of the Leviathan, and is characterized by social functions – public education, welfare, etc.- it protects and supports the categories shorn of economic and cultural capital. The "right hand" is the masculine side, and it promotes fiscal constraints and market discipline.³⁹ Wacquant argues that:

I adapt the concept of bureaucratic field to bring into a single analytic framework the punitive shifts in welfare and penal policies that have

³⁶ *ibid.* pp. 71-72.

³⁷ Loïc Wacquant (2010) "Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare and Social Insecurity," *Sociological Forum*, vol. 25 (2), p. 217.

³⁸ As a concentration of the different species of capital, Bourdieu says: "the state exercise power over the different fields and over the different particular species of capital, and especially over the rates of conversion between them (and thereby over the relations of force between their respective holders). It follows that the construction of the state proceeds apace with the construction of a field of power, defined as the space of play within the holders of capital struggle in particular for power over the state." In Pierre Bourdieu (1994) "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," *Sociological Theory*, trans. Loïc Wacquant and Samar Farage, vol. 12 (1), pp. 4-5.

³⁹ Loïc Wacquant (2010), pp. 200-201.

converged to establish the double regulation of advanced marginality through supervisory workfare and castigatory prison fare. And I add the criminal justice arm –the police, the courts, the prison and their extensions: probation, parole, judicial data bases, civil and bureaucratic liabilities attached to criminal sanctions, etc, - as a core component of the right hand of Leviathan.⁴⁰

This centaur state, "liberal at the top and paternal at the bottom, "takes a hypocrite attitude that it shows comely visage toward the holders of capital, whereas it is fearsome and castigatory when it comes to ruling the lower class "destabilized by the diffusion of work insecurity and otherness."⁴¹ A "Neoliberal Leviathan" arises from struggles within the bureaucratic field of the state that monopolizes each space in the society.

Wacquant argues that the systematic altering of state activities from the "left hand" to the "right hand" of the bureaucratic field is an open-ended process. This process precedes the growth and glorification of the penal wing of the "Neoliberal Leviathan." The expansion of paternalist penalization accompanied by market dominance, and the exaltation of both public and private forces, enable the rulers to rebuild the state authority. This expansion also allows for overcoming the deficit of legitimacy the authority suffers during the shift from being a protective welfare state to a corrective workfare state occurs.⁴²

⁴⁰ Loïc Wacquant (2012), p.73.

⁴¹ *ibid.* p. 73.

⁴² Loïc Wacquant (2010), p. 198.

CHAPTER 2

THE TRANSITION TO NEOLIBERALISM IN TURKEY

This study treats Turkey under AKP rule as a penal state and views the coming of private security as a core extension of the "Neoliberal Leviathan", which "governs physical space, cuts up social space, dramatizes symbolic divisions, and stages sovereignty."⁴³ To unfold these arguments, one first needs to elaborate on two points: the neoliberal experience that the AKP has inherited and AKP rule as a continuation of this neoliberal transformation. From this perspective, the extent to which the successive governance of the AKP overlaps with Turkey's neoliberal hegemony also needs to be examined.

The process of neoliberal transformation required a comprehensive social transformation. As mentioned above, it necessitated the building of a centaur hybrid state that helped overcome the obstacles in developing marketization and building governing institutions. These two lines within neoliberal ideology developed over two periods. The first was the Washington Consensus, which lasted from the 1980s until the late 1990s, and was a period where a state-controlled "free" market was established along with privatization policies. The post-Washington Consensus period involved further movement towards the conception of the state's dominance that provided governing structures and constitutional assurances into the hands of the holders of power and capital.⁴⁴

The historical conditions that smoothed the way for the state's policies to create neoliberal ground in Turkey must be viewed through the lens of the deepening crisis of capital accumulation in the late 1970s. The hegemonic crisis which arose in the early 1960's because of the rapid development of capitalist policies and the social conflicts it caused, resulted in the state not being able to pay its overseas debts and it

⁴³ Loïc Wacquant (2012), p. 75.

⁴⁴ Pınar Bedirhanoglu (2010) "Türkiye'de Neoliberal Otoriter Devletin AKP'li Yüzü," in Uzgel and Duru (eds.) *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, 2nd ed., Phoenix Press: Ankara, pp. 46-47.

was also not able to manage the challenges that came from public opposition.⁴⁵

The idea to work through this crisis by implementing neoliberal policies was put into action when two stand-by conventions were signed with the IMF in 1978 and 1979. However, the neoliberal transformation became a state strategy with the January 24 Decisions. This transformation started quickly with the new restrictions placed upon labour and social opposition by the September 12 military coup in Turkey.⁴⁶

It is not a coincidence that Turkey turned towards a neoliberal program at the end of the 1970s with the implementation of the January 24 Decisions. This plan involved decisions that were an outgrowth of IMF-oriented economic programs, starting with a currency devaluation of 32 per cent and an extensive economic reform executed according to a plan prepared by the then Prime Minister, Turgut Özal. It was a milestone in the transition to neoliberalism in Turkey.⁴⁷ Beginning in 1980, Turkey started to experience a neoliberal centralization. The period between the 1980s and the end of the 1990s corresponds to the Washington Consensus period, where "two authoritarian centers of power, namely the military rulers and the neoliberal managerial bureaucracy became the basis on which the neoliberal economic growth strategy relied."⁴⁸

During the early 1980s, Turkey was one of the countries in which neoliberal principles were put to the test. This redesign and construction phase took place with the collaboration of the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. The country became more dependent on external financial aid during the major economic crisis of the late 1970s, which certainly worked in favor of these international economic

⁴⁵ Muharrem Tünay (1993) "The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony," in Eralp, Tünay and Yeşilada (eds.) *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Praeger Publishing: Westwood, p. 17.

⁴⁶ Korkut Boratav (2002) *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2002*, Imge Kitabevi Publisher: Ankara, pp. 145-150.

⁴⁷ Ahmet Bekmen (2013) "State and Capital in Turkey During the Neoliberal Era," in Akça, Bekmen and Özden (eds.) *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony*, Pluto Press: London, p. 51.

⁴⁸ *ibid*, p. 52.

institutions.⁴⁹

This change also terminated the ISI coalition⁵⁰ (the Import Substitution Industrialization strategy) which was then replaced with an export-oriented coalition. The domestic coalition is notable because its establishment came along with policy transformation unlike the previous phase, which developed before any political reform. Establishment of a neoliberal model was easier to design after the coup d'état in 1980. The key members of the coalition were also the main constituents of the large-scale business community. This newly designed bureaucracy placed them at the center of the neoliberal program which they consequently also administered. During the 1980s, Özal became the linchpin of the coalition for the first ten years of neoliberal reforms.⁵¹

The Özal government made a shocking impact on the country in just a decade of neoliberal policy. However, Bekmen argues that:

The same impact cannot be claimed for the 1990s. Due to the both reconfiguration of the political sphere and the peculiar financialization of its economy, Turkey's articulation to the new course of the neoliberal agenda that emerged in 1990s was delayed by about a decade.⁵²

The reason for secular stagnation during the 1990s can be found in the system itself that had been established during the Özal period. First, Özal was a technocrat. His urge to establish neoliberalism in Turkey had been justified by the military regime.

⁴⁹ Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses (2007) "Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and A Reactive State: Major Policy Shifts in Post-war Turkish Economic Development," *METU Studies in Development*, vol. 34, p. 268.

⁵⁰ *ibid.* p. 267: "This coalition embodied the rising industrialists of the 1960s, who were making the transition from landownership or commercial entrepreneurship to industrial entrepreneurship, a process which, indeed had started earlier, under the creeping protectionism of the late 1950s. The basic logic of ISI strategy was to industrialize, moving stage by stage to higher levels of industrialization without undermining balance of payments equilibrium. The strategy was quite effective over the period 1963-1977 in terms of accomplishing relatively high rates of economic growth and substantial structural change."

⁵¹ *ibid.* p. 269.

⁵² Bekmen (2013), p. 54: According to Peck and Tickell's classic definition, the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s represented a shift from a negative agenda preoccupied with active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivists institutions to a constitutive one focused on the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations. Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) "Neoliberalization Space," *Antipode*, vol. 34(3), p. 384.

However, after the relative retreat of the military regime in 1987, administering neoliberalism was not a matter of vision anymore. Secondly, besides the hegemonic crisis during the 1990s⁵³, "the successive economic crises of 1994, 2000, and 2001, with last two being particularly devastating, crushed the already weak social base of consent for the existing system instituted by Özal."⁵⁴ In all respects, after the 1970s, the 1990s were the second hegemonic crisis Turkey had to bear. In the times that followed the crises, the acceleration of the implementation of neoliberal policies, which were based on financial liberalization, showed the neoliberal transformation in Turkey as a structure that fueled itself with economic crises.⁵⁵

It should not be viewed as a coincidence that the Washington Consensus period ended with a financial crisis that bankrupted several small banks.⁵⁶ Actually, it was the constant shortage and reappearance of 'hot money' in the economy that facilitated Turkey's slide into the economic crises of the 1990s.⁵⁷

Unable to keep pace with its debts along with constantly growing inflation, Turkey had no choice but to depend on the IMF when the crises hit. But the terms of the 1998 agreement with the IMF in particular were less than ideal. It did not save Turkey from other economic crises. Two big blows to the Turkish economy followed, one in November of 2000 and another in February of 2001. Turkey was obliged to negotiate with the IMF once again to constitute the coalition government. Yet, this new set of adjustments was no less radical.⁵⁸

Ex-World Bank employee, Kemal Derviş, was the Minister of Economy and he

⁵³ For a further analysis see, Ümit Cizre (1997) "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 29(2), pp. 151-166.

⁵⁴ Bekmen (2013), p. 55.

⁵⁵ Pınar Bedirhanoglu (2010), p. 54.

⁵⁶ Boratav (2002), pp. 151-152.

⁵⁷ Şebnem Oğuz (2009) "The Response of the Turkish State to the 2008 Crisis: A Further Step Towards Neoliberal Authoritarian Statism," Presentation at Third IIPPE International Research Workshop, http://www.iippe.org/wiki/images/a/ac/Oguz_IIPPE_Ankara.pdf (accessed 5 September 2014), p. 7.

⁵⁸ Bekmen (2013), p. 57.

started structural reforms in 2001. His transformation programme can be expressed in three main steps: (1) to create an independent Central Bank; (2) to integrate independent regulatory institutions into the system, mainly under the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK); and (3) rearrangement of both public and private finance to control debt. Turkey's telecommunications, energy and banking systems were reinforced through the establishment of new independent institutions with the ability to regulate the instruments of neoliberal design.⁵⁹

The reforms of 2001, in the guise of de-centralization, were actually an epidemic of centralization in status, which was different from those of the 1980s. With these reforms, new institutions became extensions of centralist regulatory mechanisms operating on a global level. Secondly, to keep these institutions intact, financial apparatuses of the state were consolidated and further isolated. The purpose of this reform was centralization. It was a means to establish and regulate powerful institutions through a regulatory apparatus, all which were compatible with the international standards of neoliberal capitalism.⁶⁰

Kemal Derviş was authorized to make the amendments for the reform process which can be summed up as: "15 laws within 15 days." On the other hand, as the entire political order was fractured by the military coup of 1980, political power was again to be reshuffled in the early 2000s. It revealed itself with the 2002 elections. It was the beginning of a new era for Turkey with the AKP's rise to power.

2.1. The AKP Era

The neoliberal policies implemented in the post-Washington Consensus era, emerged after crises occurred in countries across Eastern Asia, Russia, Argentina and Turkey during the late 1990s.⁶¹ The Washington Consensus was impacted by Turkey's economic crisis in 2001 and brought about revisions of some of its key

⁵⁹ Ümit Sönmez (2011) *Piyasanın İdaresi*, İletişim Press: İstanbul, pp. 145-218.

⁶⁰ Bekmen (2013), p. 58.

⁶¹ Joseph E. Stiglitz (2002) *Küreselleşme, Büyük Hayal Kırıklığı*, Taşçıoğlu and Vural (trans.), Plan B Press: İstanbul.

principles.⁶² The most important difference of the post-Washington Consensus era was the extension of the neoliberal reforms which were executed during the Washington Consensus, but now included over-market factors. According to the ideals of the post-Washington Consensus, state and market are complementary to each other and the state is an important actor during the "improvement" period.⁶³

In this regard, the AKP era, which corresponds to the post-Washington Consensus period, is a continuation of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey.⁶⁴ The AKP period in constituting neoliberal hegemony has been a period that institutionalized state control,⁶⁵ which borrowing from Wacquant's notion, is a portrayal of neoliberalism as a market-conforming statecraft.⁶⁶

The AKP appeared at a junction point between the beginning of the neoliberal transformation period started in 1980s with the Özal era that was disrupted in the 1990s, and the mobilization of Islamic movements in the Middle East.⁶⁷ This confluence helped the AKP cultivate significant international support. For the first time in Turkish political history, a political actor received the support of MÜSİAD, TUSKON, and Nakşibendi communities as well as TÜSİAD and the liberal community when it came to power. On the other side, it had political relation with some Middle Eastern countries – namely, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar - and their vast financial wealth given their oil reserves along with the political clout that came with

⁶² Öniş and Şenses (2007), pp. 270-271.

⁶³ Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses (2005) "Rethinking of the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus," *Development and Change*, vol. 36(2), p. 276.

⁶⁴ İlhan Uzgel (2010) "AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü," in Uzgel and Duru (eds.) *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, 2nd ed., Phoenix Press: Ankara, pp. 11-39.

⁶⁵ Evren Haspolat (2012) *Neoliberalizm ve Baskı Aygıtının Dönüşümü*, Notabene Press: Ankara, p. 196.

⁶⁶ This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

⁶⁷ Examination of this particular confluence detailing the AKP's rise to power would exceed this purview of this thesis. For further details see, Ümit Cizre (2008) *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey*, Routledge Press: New York; Yüksel Taşkın (2006) "Türkiye Sağ'ını Anlamak: Soğuk Savaş ve Sonrası İçin Bir İzah Denemesi," in Ülman and Akça (eds.) *İktisat, Siyaset, Devlet Üzerine Yazılar – Prof. Dr. Kemâli Saybaşılı'ya Armağan*, Bağlam Press: Istanbul, pp. 337-354; İlhan Uzgel (2010); M. Hakan Yavuz (2006) *The Emergence of A New Turkey – Democracy and the AK Parti*, The University of Utah Press: Utah.

both US and EU support those countries had.⁶⁸

The AKP supported the aforementioned economic programmes that were introduced after the crisis of 2001. In other words, the AKP period pushed for further entrenchment of neoliberalization policies.⁶⁹ These economic policies after the 2001 crisis are important to understand why the AKP era refers to a continuation. They were characterized by these main action points: (1) to reduce debt, the IMF determined a strict fiscal policy that dictated the primary rate of 6.5 per cent; (2) to ensure price stability, the government and the independent Central Bank implemented anti-inflationary measures to be overseen by the Central Bank; (3) to ensure the inflow of foreign funds, which would keep interest rates high; and (4) to take advantage of existing global conditions that provided abundant and relatively cheap foreign funding, an export-led growth strategy was designed which was based on private sector initiatives.⁷⁰

Because of this, in the mid-2000s, foreign investments rapidly increased by 65 per cent in 2004 and 260 per cent in 2005. In 2006, a 101 per cent rate of increase was witnessed.⁷¹ As interesting as these increases are, this is also very much connected with the AKP's determination of overcoming the unorthodox aspect of Turkish neoliberalism, "namely its extremely slow process of privatization: 35 billion USD, out of the total privatization income between 1986 and 2011 of 43 billion USD, has been acquired during the AKP's period in office, which foreign direct investment constituting 36 per cent of this total income."⁷²

From 2002 to 2008, the AKP benefitted from the abundance of liquidity around the globe, which allowed for it to remain in a favorable position when the global economic crisis struck. Also, foreign investments were being made directly as a

⁶⁸ For a detailed analysis of the mediating position of the AKP see, Ahmet Bekmen (2013), pp. 58-71; Cihan Tuğal (2009) *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism*, Stanford University Press: Stanford.

⁶⁹ Bekmen (2013), p. 60.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ *ibid.* p. 61.

⁷² *ibid.*

result of cheap credit that enabled businesses the same global liquidity. Actually, in this manner, the AKP policies were shaped to be compatible with the EU and its economy to be compatible with the IMF.

The AKP's main motivation for its "new" approach towards the institutions and administrative features of regulated neoliberalism was the global economic crisis of 2008. Though it harbored a nebulous position after the termination of the agreement with the IMF, on the other hand, neoliberalism was so internalized, it became a part of the government's own mentality thus reflecting this style of functioning in all of the state's apparatuses. Moreover, it gathered economic gains and direct influence in regards to executive power again. The state used this crisis as a "chance" to reform its governance structure and policies.

The AKP remained loyal to the general laws of the neoliberalization process within Turkey. As a constant process that started in the 1980s, this goal was passed on to its current standard bearer, the AKP. Along with its role in historical processes, the context in which the AKP rose to power also enabled the AKP to institutionalize neoliberal policies in Turkey.

In this chapter, I briefly examined Turkey's transition into a neoliberal era and the AKP's position in this period. In the scope of this thesis, I will discuss below how neoliberalism has reconfigured the state authority in Turkey. In this context, I analyze the AKP era as one of the institutionalization of neoliberalization and creating a strong state apparatus.

CHAPTER 3

THE TURKISH STATE AS A “NEOLIBERAL LEVIATHAN” UNDER THE AKP RULE

The AKP era is a continuity of neoliberal transformation that began in Turkey in the 1980s. As the new agent of neoliberal transformation, the AKP government has implemented changes from education to a reduction of social security benefits, from health to privatization. The AKP period⁷³ in Turkey has been a period of the institutionalization of the neoliberal regime that focuses on the accumulation of capital in Turkey, which can be witnessed in all the aspects of its functioning.

Viewing the AKP’s leadership in the framework of Loïc Wacquant’s conception of neoliberalism that I expounded on in Chapter One, we need to clarify the institutionalization of neoliberal capital regime. According to Wacquant, neoliberalism as political constellation, is a political project that refers to the revamping of the state using stratification and classification as a machine driving the neoliberal revolution from above. This project, which is different from the idea of market rule, which is based on economic pronouncements, features the state in a dynamic role. In other words, the market is a political creation, ruled and controlled by the state itself. It gathers all political and governing institutions solely in its own hands. Contrary to what orthodox neoliberal expression implies, Wacquant suggests that neoliberalism brings not the shrinking of the government, but the building of a centaur state.

This neoliberalization process is literally the institutionalization of a dominant state. It is during the germination of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey, especially during the AKP period, that all of the traits of what Wacquant calls a "Neoliberal Leviathan" are demonstrated. Accordingly, this period corresponds to an increased expansion of the state's visibility and dominance.

⁷³ The period coincides with November 3, 2002-2014. The period in question has not ended yet. As of the date this study, 2014 was used as a reference point for the period.

Even though the AKP, in the periods before and after it rose to power, claimed that it had a different ideology of state, as I will argue below, the evidence shows that it had not. The state apparatus during the AKP period was in a position of enormous power that enveloped the society as a whole and can be illustrated in a formula that includes class, regional and international dynamics.

3.1. The Increased Domain Of Executive Power

One of the most important effects of the conversion process toward neoliberalism is the additional weight given to executive power. The power of the government passed to the executive branch from the legislative branch and concentrated solely on the execution of programmes - in the hands of the prime minister or the president; and usually came along with the emergence of a strong ruler. The efforts that reinforced executive power had come from a political mindset whose intention was to eliminate the barriers to fulfill the neoliberal conversion and in this way, safeguard the enactment of neoliberal policies from any kind of opposition.⁷⁴

The first step towards strengthening executive power was taken in the 1982 Constitution. The 1982 Constitution enlarges the scope of the executive power demonstrated in Article number 104, which strengthens the president's position.⁷⁵ Also, the president was given the right to issue decrees. The Council of Ministers was given several regulating executive jurisdictions including legislation by decrees.⁷⁶ In addition to the 1982 Constitution, the new 10 per cent lowest passing vote for Deputy Election Law⁷⁷ reinforced the regulatory framework to create a potent executive power.

Because of this strengthening of power, the executive branch could bypass previous legislative restrictions and could make regulations. For example, within the

⁷⁴ Bedirhanoğlu (2010), p. 52.

⁷⁵ Bülent Tanör (2014) *Osmanlı Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri*, Yapı Kredi Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 394-402.

⁷⁶ Sonay Bayramoğlu (2010) *Yönetişim Zihniyeti – Türkiye’de Üst Kurullar ve Siyasal İktidarın Dönüşümü*, İletişim Press: Istanbul, pp. 285-286.

⁷⁷ Deputy Election Law, Article number 33: The political parties cannot have member in the parliament if they do not surpass 10 percent of the votes in the general elections.

abovementioned legal framework, during Turgut Özal's tenure, a total of 34 executive orders were decreed. These executive orders provided instruments to Özal to "bypass" the parliament and rule over the government himself. This sort of authority made the executive branch totally preeminent over the legislative branch, and almost creating a separate power.

Besides, the Deputy Election Law that brought 10 per cent lowest passing vote, aimed to prevent democratic representation of the different political affiliations within the parliament.⁷⁸ These different groups were marginalized as the "destructive" left, the "separatist" Kurdish and the "reactionary" right. Using this election tactic, Özal came to power by holding 211 deputies out of 400 in the 1983 elections and 292 deputies of 450 in the 1987 elections.

During its tenure, the AKP repeatedly strengthened executive power in contrast to legislative power. In the elections of 3 November 2002, with a vote percentage 34.3 percent, the AKP had 363 deputies out of 500; in the 2007 elections, with a vote of 46.6 percent, it had 341 deputies; and in the 2011 elections, with the vote of 49.8 percent it acquired 327 deputies.⁷⁹ The AKP held a high number of seats in the parliament which allowed the government to enact any law without any difficulties. Parallel to this, it also had the power to prevent the opposition parties to pass any bills into law. The distinction between the executive and legislative powers blurred, since the party held the majority of seats. Thus, in practice, the parliament started to act in the direction of what has already been decided by the executive branch. To put it another way, the parliament has become an entity which merely approves the government's decisions.

3.2. The Integration Of The Three Branches Of The State – The Executive, The Legislative And The Judicial

The second implementation in the neoliberal period is to accelerate the integration of the three branches of the state (the executive, the legislative and the judicial). This is

⁷⁸ Mehmet Ö. Alkan (2006) "Türkiye'de Seçim Sistemi Tercihinin Misyon Boyutu ve Demokratik Gelişime Etkileri," *Anayasa Yargısı*, vol. 23, pp. 133-165.

⁷⁹ The statistics are available on www.tuik.gov.tr.

accompanied by a decline in the rule of law in favor of personalized regulations.⁸⁰ To be able to put neoliberal policies into action, there is a need to increase political pressure on judicial bodies. The policies aimed at unifying the executive body and the legislative body which was practiced during the AKP period, was intended to be established through judicial institutions. For instance, a law was proposed stating that if a lawyer was to be assigned as a public prosecutor or a judge, s/he was obliged to take a written exam given by the Ministry of Justice (in place of the High Commission of Judges and Prosecutors). Even though the president vetoed the proposition, the AKP tried to legitimize it on multiple occasions.⁸¹

The policies aimed at unifying the three branches of the state were of paramount importance after the 2007 elections when the AKP government reached a majority in the parliament that enabled it to make constitutional changes. During this period the abovementioned initiatives were proposed, and the judicial reforms the AKP government brought to the fore in 2009 were justified under the pretext of "integration into the EU." Clearly, the AKP government was working to create a judiciary that is dependent on the executive body by making changes in the structure of the High Commission of Judges and Prosecutors. It also intended to modify the rules of procedures that involved assignments as well as the structure of high levels of the judiciary such as the State Council, the Court of Appeals and the Constitutional Court.⁸² The amendments to change the Constitution passed in the parliament with a simple majority. The referendum was held on September 12, 2010 and passed with a 57.9 percent vote in favor.⁸³

⁸⁰ Bob Jessop (1991) "On the Originality, Legacy, and Actuality of Nicos Poulantzas," *Studies in Political Economy*, vol. 34, p. 97.

⁸¹ Fikret Gülen (2010) "AKP'nin İktidarda Olduğu Dönemde Yasama Faaliyetleri (2002-2007)," in Uzgel and Duru (eds.) *AKP Kitabı – Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, 2nd ed., Phoenix Press: Ankara, p. 197.

⁸² Haspolat (2012), p. 202.

⁸³ In regards to the constitutional changes that were passed into law by the referendum, the High Commission of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) became vulnerable to executive power. In this manner, when we take into account that the members of the State Council and Court of Appeals would also be elected by the HSYK, it could be said that after the passage of this legislation, the judiciary too had come under the influence of the executive branch.

In this context, Commissar Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya's resolution to investigate the Secretary of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) Hakan Fidan is noteworthy.⁸⁴ Because, in context of the law which was passed after this event, MIT personnel, (which also includes other commissioned entities and persons, such as commissioned courts) who report directly to the prime minister, can only be investigated with the prime minister's approval.⁸⁵

3.3. Rising Role Of Mass Media

Another notable factor used in the foundation of government authority during the neoliberal process is mass media. Media plays a pivotal role in providing political legitimacy on behalf of the government. Moreover, it chooses its agenda from the government.⁸⁶ Truly, in the neoliberal process in question, official media outlets of the state, such as TRT, the Anadolu Agency, the Islamic newspapers and TV channels, and "central media" such as Çalık, Karamehmet, and Demirören-Karacan, all supported the AKP government's policies.

Both the agenda and the desired perspectives that the government wanted the public to hear, had all been disseminated to the community via the abovementioned media outlets. In an environment where the power of media increased and became diversified, opponents of government policies are not given any voice in media organizations and are only covered by the opposition press.

The official media corporations, such as TRT and the Anadolu Agency, make news on the behalf of government's policies. These are followed by private press corporations such as Sabah, Star, Yeni Şafak, Akit and TV channels like ATV, Beyaz TV, Kanal 7, A Haber, 24 Haber, Ülke TV, and Tvnet. In addition to these, media corporations called "central media" including TV channels such as Kanal D,

⁸⁴ Habertürk, "İfadeye Gitmeyen Dört MİT Mensubu Hakkında Yakalama Kararı, " February 10, 2012; Zaman, "Fikri Sağlar: MİT Kanunu'nda Değişiklik, Hukuk Devletini Zedeler, " February 14, 2012.

⁸⁵ According to this ruling, the prime minister will be the only person that has the right to investigate a large number of offenses (38 different crimes), from the crime of being in a gang up to the crime of disrupting the state. For further details see, Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 250.

⁸⁶ Jessop (1991), p. 97.

Show TV, Star TV, Sky Türk, Haber Türk, Bloomberg TV, NTV and newspapers such as Vatan, Akşam, Habertürk give considerable support to the government, especially sharing government's vision on the economy, international affairs, and employee-employer/union relationships. They, for instance, gave a great deal of support to the government on critical internal policy agendas such as the 1 March Certificate and the Ergenekon Matter. They assent to every single application made by the government and have become the instruments of justification for the government's actions.⁸⁷

Furthermore, the government's control of media outlets has become a salient issue during the AKP's reign. The ongoing Ergenekon, Balyoz, Oda TV investigations which began in July 2007 illustrate the increasing power of government control. During this process of the AKP government's increasing grip on the media, media itself became divided into two perspectives which can be classified as "partisan-oppositional". The partisan side has increased in numbers, whereas the weight of "oppositional" media groups has decreased. Besides, for instance, the Doğan Media Group was fined 3.7 billion TL in tax liability and had to fire its flagship newspaper's (Hürriyet) editor in chief after opposing government policies. The Doğan Media Group was also forced to sell a part of its media empire to a pro-government conglomerate, Erdoğan Demirören. Another example highlighting this case is the sale of Star TV to the pro-government Doğu Group while firing all of its "opposition"-oriented personnel.⁸⁸

The government also took precautions against opposing voices in social media. Counter measures included blocking access to social media sites used by the masses such as YouTube and Twitter, and this occurred on multiple occasions. The period post-2007 has been clearly an era of the AKP government's expanded media control and power.

⁸⁷ Haspolat (2012), pp. 209-210.

⁸⁸ Cnntürk, "Star TV'nin Doğu'ya Satışı Tamamlandı," November 3, 2011.

3.4. Neoliberal Populism

Another distinguishing mark of the state apparatus in the AKP period was the rise of the new plebiscite and populist consent techniques alongside a new technocratic and liberal legal system.⁸⁹ An international technocrat, Kemal Derviş who worked for the World Bank for years, reformed Turkey's economy after the 2001 economic crisis. In this manner, policies were applied by the "bowdlerization of [the] economy from politics," and had put politicians in a position where they would execute demands of only those policies that had a direct impact on their desired economic goals. In other words, people had no ability to have their voices heard in regards to economic issues. The process in question at first had occurred in the High Council which was established in 1981. Without any public or political responsibilities, this "new bureaucracy" has created a troubling transformation from what had been a publicly and politically responsible bureaucratic structure.⁹⁰ This means that the transformation process was being developed in a way that promoted the effectiveness of technocratic corporations through the mechanism of decrees. In addition to this process, regulations which included practices such as the election of the president by the people, the decreasing of deputy elections to once every four years, the judicial reform of high-level courts are examples of their technique for disenfranchising the plebiscite.

As for the techniques in gaining populist consent, they were clearly visible in the AKP's "neoliberal populism" applications: free distribution of school books in public schools, enabling citizens with public health insurance to receive treatment in private hospitals, and the regulation of green cards whose numbers reached 13 million. Social assistance and solidarity mechanisms that brought about solidarity with the ruling party including social programs that originated from municipalities and government ministries are just some of the ways that neoliberal populism produced consent within the general population.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Jessop (1991), p. 100.

⁹⁰ Bayramoğlu (2010), pp. 304-306.

⁹¹ Deniz Yıldırım (2010) "AKP ve Neoliberal Popülizm," in Uzgel and Duru (eds.) *AKP Kitabı – Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu*, 2nd ed., Phoenix Press: Ankara, pp. 92-102.

In this new technocratic frame, the dual bureaucracy system created by high councils created opportunities to increase the power of administrative networks. Bob Jessop argues that:

Parallel power networks cross-cutting the formal organization of the state have grown – networks which exercise a decisive share in its activities, promote a growing material and ideological community of interests between key civil servants and the dominant mass party, and consolidate policy communities which cement dominant interests outside the state apparatus with forces inside at the expense of popular forces.⁹²

Today's Turkey, along with its high councils, has a dual public bureaucracy. While, the traditional bureaucracy fulfills both public and political demands, the new bureaucracy, consisting of high councils, is accountable and responsible neither to the parliament nor to the public.

The fields being regulated by these high councils are:⁹³ the Capital Markets Board (Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu); the Competition Authority (Rekabet Kurumu); the Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu); the Council of Telecommunication (Telekomünikasyon Kurumu), the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu) – encompassing electricity, natural gas, and oil; the Council of Sugar (Şeker Kurumu) – the sugar exchange market; the Public Procurement Authority (Kamu İhale Kurumu); the Council of Tobacco (Tütün Kurumu) – encompassing both tobacco and alcohol; and finally, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu) – which includes both savings accounts and accession funds.⁹⁴

Because these high councils are not politically responsible to anyone, they attempt to exceed their given authority and encroach on the responsibilities of both the legislative body and the courts. In other words, the sphere of activity of these new

⁹² Jessop (1991), p. 97.

⁹³ Some of these councils were founded before the AKP period: the Capital Markets Board (1981), the Competition Authority (1994), the Radio and Television Supreme Council (1994), the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (2001), the Council of Sugar (2001), the Council of Tobacco (2002), and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (1983). The Council of Telecommunication and the Public Procurement Authority were founded in the AKP period.

⁹⁴ Bayramoğlu (2010), pp. 306-307.

networks formed by the high councils reached such a high level that it blanketed the duties of the legislative body, the executive body and the courts. The board of directors of these councils presents a good example of how Turkey's neoliberal transformation has led to unequal and unjust forms of representation. For example, one of the seven members of the board of the Council of Sugar represents the factories producing sugar (Konya Şeker Fabrikası AŞ.) and another member represents companies concerned with amyli-based production, (Amylum Nişasta Sanayi AŞ.) The manufacturers are represented by Pankobirlik S.S. Pancar Ekiciler Kooperatifler Birliği (Alliance of Beet Cultivators Cooperative).⁹⁵ The board members are taken from the companies that are directly involved in the industry. Therefore it demonstrates a conflict of interest.

Lastly, the integration of certain liberal and libertarian themes in favor of instrumental rationality and technocratic logic is another tool of the neoliberal populism.⁹⁶ Especially after the 2001 economic crisis, the process of reestablishing the economy and government, lay in the hands of the recently elected AKP government. Although their election represented "public will" and "democracy", it applied policies that were mostly determined by the technocratic structure mentioned above. Although this platform was presented as within the borders of "democracy", it actually serves the purpose of restructuring government.

3.5. Reconfiguration Of The Field Of National Security

Another development in the revamping of the state has been seen in the increase of the state's control by redefining national security. In other words, this control mechanism, was seen in diverse, new constructs in the neoliberal period and made its way into the state apparatus reaching new areas which it had not been able to access before.

In this manner, the reconfiguration and amplification of national security during the neoliberal period is one of the distinguishing features of AKP rule. This period, which included privatization, security and threat assessments, reconstructed the

⁹⁵ Haspolat (2012), p. 215.

⁹⁶ Jessop (1991), p. 98.

government as a semantics source and enabled it to control and supervise the society on all levels. In the next chapter, I will review how the government increased its control over society through the redefinition of national security. First, I discuss in general how the perception of security was shaped during the neoliberal period. Then, I explore security policies within Turkey during the neoliberal period. Finally, I focus on the "new security culture" developed by the AKP under this framework.

CHAPTER 4

RECONFIGURATION OF THE SECURITY FIELD IN TURKEY

4.1. Security As A Perception

The concept of threat is usually viewed as an objective fact and not as a constructed order. Is it really true? What if, in reality, threat is a constructed discourse through everyday control of society by rulers, or a core element of the political instrumentalization of security?

In the 20th century's conception of security, the underlying idea was the defense of the state, threatened by other states, based on the ideology of national security. This ideology tended to embody itself with a certain distinction between insider and outsider security threats. By relying on the release of the neoliberal project, a shift appeared from the nation-state towards the market-state. All sorts of legitimization theories according to which neoliberalism means the shrinking of the state authority in favor of a self-regulated market are elaborated, and one can read this shift as an acceleration of the distinction between the public forces and the security industry. Nevertheless, in reality, by the commodification of security, this shift provides a new field for the state, which is already stuck in a restrictive and clear sense of authority.⁹⁷ In other words, this new security policy draws its conclusive power from the ambiguity of threat that allows the political instrumentalization of security.

Frank Furedi studies the relationship between social control and political construction of threat. He warns against the normalization of the 21st century's fear culture that causes the deflation of the status of human subjectivity, and, the inflation of the threat that external forces pose to the individual self. Fear keeps people on guard against threats to their security.⁹⁸ Dominant institutions such as the

⁹⁷ Evren Balta (2014) "Bildiğimiz Anlamda Devletin Sonu Mu? İmparatorluk ve Özel Ordular," *Birikim*, vol. 178, pp. 11-19.

⁹⁸ Frank Furedi (2007) "The Only Thing We Have to Fear is the 'Culture of Fear' Itself," <http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/3053#.U39IKi-Nlo4>.

government, the army, and the police, socially construct security discourses to be ahead of public fear. Once a consciousness of threat and fear is institutionalized, from this point onwards, there is a one-way ticket to defeat "insecurity" with more security.

To think security threats not as objective facts, but as constructed orders and elements of a specific culture or discourse has become very important with the growth of the security industry during last fifteen years. Mark Neocleous examines the direct relationship between the security industry and the ascending security anxiety through exploring the increasing connections between capital and security as follows:

Examining the ways in which both capital and the state benefit from the obsession with security, and thereby reading security as the basis for both a sustained capital accumulation and a constant political policing of civil society, takes us away from the liberal assumptions inherent in the public-private distinction and towards a different framework entirely, allowing us to focus more directly on the ongoing commodification of security.⁹⁹

The neoliberal project integrates public assets as new fields into the process of capital accumulation inasmuch as they are profitable.¹⁰⁰ The transition to a neoliberal state from a responsible social state means that facilitating conditions for profitable capital accumulation is henceforth the primary mission of the state. All public utilities, at least as long as they bring profit, have been privatized starting with the 1980's. The privatization of security "services" was the latest stage of the transformation of the state apparatus in the context of the neoliberal project;¹⁰¹ it has become one of the most profitable, and penetrative fields.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Mark Neocleous (2008) "Security, Commodity, Fetishism," *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory*, vol. 35 (3), p. 349.

¹⁰⁰ David Harvey (2006) "Neo-liberalism and the Restoration of Class Power," p. 29.

¹⁰¹ Evren Balta Paker (2009) "Güvenlik Endüstrisi ve Güven(siz)liğin İnşası: Bir Toplumsal Paranoyayı Anlamak," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 115, p. 214.

¹⁰² Global violence organized by hegemonic states, which hold the monopoly of violence, is not a tideless or natural phenomenon, but a consisted fact within the process. The supply of violence per non-state actors was very common before 20th century. Also, for that period, it is hard to talk about a state monopoly over violence or security. In this context, even though, today, non-state actors provide the supply of security and violence, it is not in the same way that happened before 20th century.

To show the relationship between the privatization of the security "service" and the change of security perception as well as the standards of the need for security, Tanıl Bora explores two concepts of neoliberalism. The first is the shrinking of the social wing of the state under the conditions of fiscal prudence. The other is the increase of security anxiety throughout social life.¹⁰³ In this way, on the one hand, security field gets involved in the capital accumulation process, and, on the other hand, state increases its domination over society. Accordingly, Neocleous suggests the reading of the security industry through the notion of the security fetish. In order to give the measures of this idea, it is enough to think of security, ideologically constructed and developed, as an interest of both capital and state.¹⁰⁴ This tutelary fetishistic view of anxiety makes security amorphous and ambiguous. In this regard, Ian Loader refers to grasp security as a "whole range of technologies and practices provided, not only by public bodies, (...) but also by commercial concerns competing in the marketplace".¹⁰⁵ The distinctions between public and private security are blurred and fuse into networks of institutions and practices.¹⁰⁶ Thus with the 'aura' of ambiguity, security and thereby the number and kind of commodities that can bring profit become limitless.¹⁰⁷ By the commodification of security, the need for security becomes a basic need.

By making sure that one cannot even think of someone who believes in the possibility of a secure space, the security industry reveals the sense that one can never be secure anywhere. It renders the idea that being secure is only possible

Because, today's case refers to a totally new process that involves the integration of violence into capitalism and the commodification of security. In a manner, non-state actors have a direct connection with the state authority. So, today, the supply of violence and security does not bear a resemblance to pre-capitalist period. For a detail analysis see, Charles Tilly (2003) "Armed Forces, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650," in Davis and Peredge (eds.) *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York.

¹⁰³ Tanıl Bora (2004) "Özel Güvenlik ve 'Polis Toplumu'," *Birikim*, vol. 178, p. 23.

¹⁰⁴ Mark Neocleous (2008), p. 349.

¹⁰⁵ Ian Loader (1997) "Private Security and the Demand for Protection in Contemporary Britain," *Policing and Society*, vol. 7, p. 147.

¹⁰⁶ Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams (2007) "Securing the City: Private Security Companies and Non-State Authority in Global Governance," *International Relations*, vol. 21 (2) pp. 242-243.

¹⁰⁷ Mark Neocleous (2008), p. 349.

through consuming the product of security, to compensate for "insecure" conditions, which are also constructed by the industry itself.¹⁰⁸ The framework of Neocleous is well suited to see how, in reality, both the fabrication of insecurity and the security paranoia mean endless supplies of raw material, and there is no lack of demand or willingness to pay for these products:

To make a profit, the security industry must sell security. And to sell security, it must first help generate insecurities. In so doing, it reiterates the central logic around which the national security state is organized: that citizens need to be afraid, and need the state to secure them. Like any industry, the security industry interpellates consumers as sovereign subjects -the customer is king. But it simultaneously interpellates them as fearful and insecure. In so doing, it plays a key role in the fabrication of a much wider culture of insecurity.¹⁰⁹

If one reads the market's logic that paves the way of the security industry for the securitization of every aspect of social life, it may help to realize the market is excessive. In other words, supply creates its own demands. The market pushes the industry to have security experts who can make all the decisions regarding security.¹¹⁰ This way the neoliberal project does not reveal an apolitical "consumer," but a full concentrated political "consumer".¹¹¹ The risk does not belong to public forces anymore. It is now burdened with individual responsibility, then, individuals transfer their responsibilities to the private sector to protect them from a variety of threats that flourish via the insecurity discourse.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.* p. 50: "The security industry aims to turn the feelings associated with (in) security into the consumption of commodities. It thus offers a 'solution' to fear and insecurity in entirely commoditized forms. What is generated is a need for security – a need recognized by capital only as a need that can be satisfied by this or that commodity – and so the production of more and more commodities marketed in 'security' terms. The security industry thus uses its purported concern for human beings and their security to reinforce the logic of both security and the commodity form across the face of society."

¹⁰⁹ Mark Neocleous (2008), p. 350.

¹¹⁰ Anna Leander (2005) "The Market Force and Public Security," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 42 (5), p. 612.

¹¹¹ Zeynep Gambetti (2007) "Linç Girişimleri, Neo-liberalizm ve Güvenlik Devleti," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 109, p. 32.

¹¹² Marieke De Geode (2008) "The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol: 14 (1), pp. 163-164.

It is in the line of insecurity production that the ‘aura’ of security appears to be the common benefit for the state. Since the security industry cannot be contained within the traditional distinctions of inside-outside, global-local or public- private, it requires the dissolution of the ‘state-territory-authority’ alliance.¹¹³ The state needs security paranoia to expand its legitimacy in the field as the higher authority capable of the production of security. Thus, the privatization of the security field ensures the continuity of capital accumulation, and it simultaneously enables state authority to control social life. Therefore, securitization is the great producer of social control that consolidates state apparatus.¹¹⁴

Louise Amoore calls for the notion of algorithmic security to see this process. The move of authorized algorithmic computing applications, biometrics, risk management systems, and surveillance technologies, to the private commercial world renders an emerging geography of securitization in everyday life. To sum up, the result of emerging resonance among security activities "is a stitching together of the mundane and prosaic calculations of business, the security decisions authorized by the state, and the mobilized vigilance of a fearful public".¹¹⁵

The concentration of security consciousness and thinking of an omnipotent and omnipresent form of threat, encircle any fields both at the national and global levels. The urgent priority would have been the precautionary security practices, rather than the deterrence policy.¹¹⁶ In this sense, continuity emerges between the individual security culture regarding daily routines and the consciousness about extraordinary

¹¹³ Abrahamsen and Williams (2007), p. 238.

¹¹⁴ Gencer Özcan (2006) "Türkiye’de Siyasal Rejim ve Güvenikleştirme Sorunsalı," in Ülman and Akça (eds.) *İktisat, Siyaset, Devlet Üzerine Yazılar: Prof. Dr. Kemâli Saybaşılı’ya Armağan*, Bağlam Press: Istanbul, p. 357.

¹¹⁵ Louise Amoore (2009) "Algorithmic War," *Antipode*, vol. 41 (1), p. 50.

¹¹⁶ Jon Coaffe argues how, in London, the boundary between the securities of the city and the nation has become blurry after September 11 events. In the following years, wherein terrorism mentioned as a serious threat, over 1500 surveillance cameras have been placed in London. But the cameras are not only against to terror threat; they are also used to determine defective drivers in traffic, to catch thieves. This situation causes to an increasing automatic control and militarization of the urban area. Jon Coaffe (2007) "Londra’da ‘Terrörizm’ ve Risk," *İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları*, vol. 59, pp. 74-77.

events, i.e. terror.¹¹⁷ The security fetish dominates every aspect of social life.¹¹⁸

4.2. The Reconfiguration Of National Security In Turkey During The Neoliberal Era

As I previously stated, there was a transition from a 'social state' to a 'security state' in the neoliberal era. This new state apparatus was expressed by Wacquant as a "Neoliberal Leviathan", which witnessed the blanketing commodification of everything from education to national security, and was a total restructuring of state authority. The reconfiguration of national security is just another state policy which highlighted increased control and domination over every aspect of society.

We must bear in mind that the security sector is the fastest growing and the largest market in the world.¹¹⁹ There is a close relationship between commodification of security in the neoliberal period and the control and domination of the society by the state. This close connection causes a certain paradox. This paradox, produced by the so-called restructuring of security by the security sector, actually is rooted in a type of security paranoia whose aim is the total restructuring of the state's authority. In light of these policies, the result was an increase in security "openings" and security "fears". In other words, by designing a state of insecurity and creating security concerns, a centaur state can be (and is) established.

In addition to the general definitions being critiqued, here I examine neoliberal socialization within the framework of the concept of "security". Because when we examine how societies are redesigned through the concept of "security", we are then able to discuss this self-maintaining and control-oriented state apparatus.

¹¹⁷ Evren Balta Paker (2009), pp. 207-208.

¹¹⁸ "Even with the September 11 attacks included in the count, however, the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s (which is when the State Department tracking this data) is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning or by accident-causing deer or by severe allergic reaction to peanuts. In almost all years the total number of people worldwide who die at the hands of international terrorists is not much more than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States. (...) The fear of violence, thus, is often much greater than its actuality, and the record with respect to fear about crime suggests that efforts to deal coherently with the risk of terrorism will prove difficult. For example, fear of crime rose notably in mid-1990s even as statistics were showing that crime was in pronounced decline." John Mueller (2004) "Why Isn't There More Violence?", *Security Studies*, vol. 13(3), p. 195.

¹¹⁹ P.W. Singer (2003) *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Cornell University Press: USA, p. 19.

In this context, starting in 1980's, "security" entered a restructuring process in Turkey. Since the 1980 military coup, expressions denoting violence of some sort including such things as martial law, state of emergency, national security, the Kurdish problem and Islamic regime, are almost permanent apparitions in the lexicon of the state. In this chaotic period in which "security" ended up becoming a salable good through the means of privatization and as an outgrowth of the confusion and changes brought about by the definition of the modern state, the AKP period restructures "security" and presents a sustainable, new security culture through its neoliberal acts of institutionalization and socialization.

At this point, I would like to present an idea opposing the idealizing that characterizes Turkey in the 1990s as a state of security, and accepting the changes in the 2000s as a transition to a liberal democracy.¹²⁰ Because in Turkey, in Öztan's words, we are transforming on a much deeper level from a state of security to a security regime.¹²¹ A security regime is a mindset that distributes a state's intelligence gathering upon different actors within the security sector. We are talking about a regime that increases its capacity to rule by repositioning the army, and sometimes, the police force, along with empowering other diverse security actors.

The AKP period, rather than aiming to remove the political system based on an "overly secure" state created by the 12 September military coup, instead adopted the mindset of redesigning the political system and sustaining the benefits of security to the state. A state with strong national security was constantly being redesigned between the periods of 1980 to 2002 and became a different platform during the AKP period. At the end of the day, the security paradigm developed and expanded by the state's official security institutions during the neoliberal period was fully accepted and expanded upon by the AKP leadership.

Yet, compared to the previous period, under AKP's rule, neoliberalism was both institutionalized and the commodification of the security industry greatly accelerated. This period, in which the perception of an ambiguous threat along with

¹²⁰ This point is being detailed later on this chapter.

¹²¹ *Agos*, "Güven Gürkan Öztan Röportajı," March 28, 2014.

the concept of "responsible citizen" emerged and gave birth to a new kind of socialization. Also, this created a period of chaos that resulted from the introduction of bio-technological methods used by security forces which established control over all living space by establishing mechanisms of domination. The combination of private security services with official security institutions, thus expanded state authority that resulted in the rise of a penal state.

To sum up, under both this study's scope and in an effort to view the big picture, the army, police and private security forces are to be evaluated in the framework of the state power they fall under. In this manner, (1) I will touch on the security policies that were established above the state's official security apparatus in the pre-AKP neoliberal period. I will also discuss the scope of the pre-AKP security apparatus and despite their repositioning, the way they served the state's power in Turkey even during the AKP period. Following this, the main focus of this study will show how the concept of security evolved during the AKP period. I will examine (2) the social integration of security by clouding the definition of threat; (3) technological surveillance techniques introduced during the AKP period as new security tools; and (4) expanding privatized security service.

4.2.1. National Security

National security is a pivotal concept in Turkey. This concept has historical significance as well as a continued importance today, and runs parallel to the military's political status in the Republic of Turkey.¹²² National security as a part of the political sphere gained new facets during the 1980s. On September 12, 1980, the commanders of the force that took control of the country were named "National Security Council". It introduced a new way of ensuring the military's primary role in civilian politics.¹²³

¹²² To cover the process that the concept of national security has been used as an instrument of political discourse and social analysis, see, Gencer Özcan (2010), "Türkiye'de Milli Güvenlik Kavramının Gelişimi," in Balta Paker and Akça (eds.) *Türkiye'de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, Istanbul Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, pp. 307-350.

¹²³ Özcan (2010), p. 342.

The 1982 Constitution introduced national security as a way to legalize the application of the concept of "state's reason". "National security" was the most widely used concept by the National Security Council, as it narrowed individual rights and freedoms. The national security approach created permanent effects upon society which were not directly related with security at all.¹²⁴ In this manner, Article number 13¹²⁵ of the Constitution removes the rights and freedoms that should never be limited in a civilian society; secondly, political authority had right to limit individual rights and freedoms with superficial reasons.¹²⁶ As a result, we see that with the 1982 Constitution the definition and expression of national security as a concept became different and every institution of the state was reshaped and restructured according to this mindset resulting in the utter domination of society.¹²⁷

On November 9, 1983 with Law 2945, the National Security Council (MGK) and General Secretariat of the National Security Council reinforced the institutional nature of the concept of national security¹²⁸ and in addition to this, tried to retain political authority, which caused the civilian government to weaken. In 1992, the public learned that the nation's security policy, already noted in different laws, was going to be codified. The document, known as National Security Policy Document (MGSB), was prepared by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council in collaboration with the relevant ministries, companies and other institutions, was to be treated as confidential. Enumerating the threats against national security, this document determines the state's political agenda for each scenario.¹²⁹ During this

¹²⁴ Meryem Erdal (2009) "Anayasalarda Milli Güvenlik," in Bayramoğlu and Insel (eds.) *Almanak Türkiye 2006-2008 – Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, Tesev Publishing: İstanbul, p. 35.

¹²⁵ Article number 13: "Basic rights and freedoms can only be restricted based on the reasons stated in the Constitution's relevant articles, without intervening the essence of these rights and freedoms. These restrictions cannot contradict the constitution's speech and gist, requirements of the democratic society and the secular republic's requirements and principle of proportionality."

¹²⁶ Mithat Sancar (2008) *"Devlet Akli" Kıskaçında Hukuk Devleti*, 4th ed., İletişim Press: İstanbul, p. 146.

¹²⁷ Erdal (2009), p. 36.

¹²⁸ National security was defined as "protection and overseeing of the state's constitutional order; national unity; all political, social, cultural and economic interests of state in the international arena; and the law against all aspects of internal and external threats."

¹²⁹ Özcan (2010), pp. 344-345.

period, the state's perception of threat and security also changed.¹³⁰ However, the definition of social and political reactions toward an enemy power as a collective process remained the same.

In the 2000s, the transition to globalization also had an impact upon national security definitions. As the focus turned to civilians, the weight of official security actors over the security policies decreased. But in the context of the recreation of the state's authority, official security actors were transferred on to other actors/institutions under guise of neoliberalism and turning private. In the process, new actors and new actions underlined the state's domination. As I will examine later on in detail, traditional security actors kept their place within the control mechanism as the watchdogs of the state apparatus.

Starting from the 2000s, there were two major changes concerning the positioning of the MGK and the MGK General Secretariat. Changes were made to the law in compliance with the code of the European Union. First, the Constitution was changed in 2001. Within the context of this change, the number of civilian members of the MGK increased. It has been stated that the decisions made by the MGK were to be taken as advice and not as decrees. Second, a change was made in the Law 2945 in the year 2003. With this change, three regulations were implemented: The authority to oversee the MGK was transferred to the deputy prime minister. Also the meeting of the MGK, which took place each month, was set to take place bimonthly. Finally, the law allowed the election of a civilian from among the council members as the MGK's general secretary. In parallel to this, the MGK general secretary's confidential regulations were terminated. But, it is hard to say if these important changes created any great change. This is because the MGK has continued to influence political issues ranging from economic policies to international affairs.¹³¹

After the AKP came to power, there was an updated version of the National Security Policy Document dated 2006. This document, despite some changes within national security, involved a range of policies similar to the previous document dated 1997.

¹³⁰ This point will be detailed later on in the section of Lynch Culture and Responsible Citizen.

¹³¹ Ali Bayramoğlu (2009) "Asker ve Siyaset," in Insel and Bayramoğlu (eds.) *Bir Zümre Bir Parti Türkiye'de Ordu*, 4th ed., Birikim Press: Istanbul, p. 107.

The document asserts utilization of the military in case of internal security threats and taking command of the government to eradicate security threats when needed. In this context, while the radical right-wing movements were viewed as internal threats under the scope of "factors that should be kept under observation", radical left-wing movements were blacklisted with labels such as separatist, terrorist and reactionary movements.¹³²

On the other hand, the Internal Security Strategy Document was leaked online in March 2006. In addition to traditional threats, this document also featured topics such as illegal immigration and refugees, prisons, civilian violence and. But the suspicious things about the document were the topics that fell under "Other Operations." Featured in the document were items such as Armenians, Assyrian minorities, Greeks and other nationalities, Alevis, missionary operations, and non-governmental organizations working with foreign-based or international institutions.¹³³

4.2.2. Neoliberalism And The Police Force In Turkey¹³⁴

It can be said that as an institution the police force administers the law and in so doing extends into every aspect of daily life by establishing the power of the state

¹³² Hale Akay (2009) *Türkiye’de Güvenlik Sektörü: Sorular, Sorunlar, Çözümler*, Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, p. 11.

¹³³ *ibid.* p. 12.

¹³⁴ The police force in Turkey has gone through cycles of being directed by different authorities. But under the scope of this study, using a wholistic point of view, the police force has been evaluated as being the security apparatus of a strong central state that wished to reestablish/restructure its own authority. I used Biriz Berksoy's studies on police sub-culture as a manifestation of government strategies and the transformation of the police force during the neoliberal period. In this manner, I seek to draw out a chapter which is brief, but adequately enlightening. Also, I will be reviewing the police force again under the scope of the relationship between law enforcement and private security. See, Biriz Berksoy (2007) "Neoliberalizm ve Toplumsalın Yeniden Kurgulanması: 1980 Sonrası Batı’da ve Türkiye’de Polis Teşkilatları ve Geçirdikleri Yapısal Dönüşüm," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 109, pp. 35-65; Biriz Berksoy (2009) "Devlet Stratejilerinin Bir Tezahürü Olarak Polis Alt-Kültürü: 1960 Sonrası Türkiye’de Polis Teşkilatında Hakim Olan Söylemlere Dair Bir Değerlendirme," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 114, pp. 98-130; Biriz Berksoy (2009) "Polis Teşkilatı," in Bayramoğlu and Insel (eds.) *Almanak Türkiye 2006-2008 – Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, pp. 230-242.

which it too is a part. The transformation of the police force in Turkey took place in 1980s and was a way that the state could shape the public sphere.¹³⁵

The police force in the post-1980s kept its militarized mode of operation while favoring violence as it does today and also effectively using its surveillance and control strategies that came to the fore during the neoliberal period.¹³⁶ In that period, the class balance was readjusted in favor of the rich, both unemployment and poverty came to be accepted as normal, and social opposition was criminalized in the name of "power and order", along with the excuse of "national insecurity" permanently solidified the control the police rendered.

Today's police force follows the state's strategies which enable it to pervade society, and also employs the legality of those strategies as it puts the state's agenda into practice. So, evaluating the police force as a sole entity and taking its mandate as a reference point would be to overlook the big picture.

The state's violent face, seen in its militarized police force targeting the groups that were unable to create a strong opposition, was becoming visible more often. Each of those groups was perceived as "threats" or the "enemy within" by forensic policy, portraying the total confusion of the system itself. The police force adopted the state's line of thought which thinks of itself as sanctified, creating straw men among national conservatives, militarists and some sections of society, and doing away with human rights on the other hand. Examples of these policies also include investigating and creating police files of Armenians and raids in Roman and Kurdish neighborhoods (who came to Istanbul as a result of internal migration - for examples, see raids that took place on January 18, 2006, and February 23, 2006).¹³⁷

Lastly, the extension of the police authority in the use of force changed in the Police Duty and Authority Law in 2007 and is one of the most important points to underline. When this law was enacted, the increase of violence and torture was

¹³⁵ Berksoy (2007), p. 62.

¹³⁶ Loïc Wacquant (1999) "How Penal Common Sense Comes to Europeans: Notes on the Transatlantic Diffusion of the Neoliberal Doxa," *European Societies*, vol. 3 (1), pp. 319-352.

¹³⁷ Berksoy (2009), pp. 98-130.

revealed.¹³⁸ This signaled that AKP, which identifies itself with a democratic-liberal revolution, rather than transforming the authoritarian governmental structure in Turkey, pursued a policy which reproduces authoritarianism.

4.2.3. Lynch Culture And “Responsible Citizen”

During the neoliberal period, going beyond its scope of being a legitimate power, the state is also an agency that monopolizes both the legitimate and symbolic use of power and contextualizes the changes it creates in society under the rubric of security. However, the community-policing project, a strategy of policing that serves to build a close working relationship between the police and community members, is an important contribution to the new security culture in Turkey.¹³⁹

As a means of interpretation, the state is the agent of change during the neoliberal period and also imposes these changes in the society. Zeynep Gambetti discusses this aspect of the socialization of these changes with the attempted lynching that took place in Turkey after the 2000s defined as "post-war violence."¹⁴⁰ This discussion helps us to understand how the AKP created a new security culture just by modifying the state's existing security policies, which had been in effect since the 1990s. In the 1990s, the state's evidence of "terror" used to battle the PKK (The Kurdistan Worker's Party)¹⁴¹ was based on a perception of a certain enemy in a certain region. Nevertheless, the increase in violence and attempted lynching in the

¹³⁸ For the evidence that prove how violence and torture increased after the change in the Police Duty and Authority Law, see, Bianet, "Vazife ve Salahiyetle Gelen Polis Şiddeti," November 27, 2007, www.bianet.org. It contains a list of news that show the great increase of violence after the law.

¹³⁹ Community policing is one the best examples of this socialization practice. *Radikal*, "Temizlik İşçileri Polise Çalışacak," April 26, 2012.

¹⁴⁰ Zeynep Gambetti (2007), "Linç Girişimleri, Neo-liberalizm ve Güvenlik Devleti," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 109, pp. 7-34.

¹⁴¹ The Kurdistan Workers' Party, commonly referred to by its Kurdish acronym, PKK, is a Kurdish political and military organization. From 1984 to 2013, they fought an armed struggle against the Turkish state for cultural and political rights and self-determination of the Kurds in Turkey. Kurds comprise between 10% and 25% of the population and have been subjected to official repression for decades. The group was founded in 1978 in the village of Fis (near Lice) by a group of radical Kurdish students led by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK's ideology was originally a fusion of revolutionary socialism and Kurdish nationalism, seeking the foundation of an independent state in the region known as Kurdistan.

following years¹⁴² began to devolve and shows that the Turkish state made changes to its perspective regarding security and security measures and the ways these functioned in society.

The neoliberal period does not mean the shrinking in size of the government, but its rise to a bigger and stronger power. Under this framework, the 2000s (or during the time when neoliberalism became institutionalized), the Turkish state's domination was preserved and even strengthened and began to create a merger in the state-economy-society trinity. Privatization of state's functions, as a paradox, decreased the gap between the state and the society. In this manner, after touching on the concept of "internal threat" that the state began in the 1990s, I will discuss how the state expanded its power with a new security culture in the period after the war against the PKK cooled.

In the 1990s, the perception of enemy changed in Turkey. The perception of a strategic threat and national security was redefined. In this period, the Turkish state was facing new conditions that were different from those of a conventional war.¹⁴³ National borders were no longer adequate in determining the identity of enemies. So the Turkish state needed new legitimizing strategies suitable to this new era. With the uncertainty of the identity of the enemy, the definition of friend-foe was reset with the circulation and description of internal and external threats.¹⁴⁴

By the 1990s in urban Turkey, policies developed generating a need for security and the redefinition of crime. The focal point drew on the idea of the criminalization of the 'dangerous' others, who were portrayed as abnormal and deserving of punitive responses. Deniz Yonucu and Zeynep Gönen state that this negative portrayal of 'criminals' is not unique to Turkey. In fact, the neoliberal discourse of crime and

¹⁴² For detail see, Gambetti (2007), pp. 7-34. In this study on the lynching attempts, Gambetti analyzes the events occurred in 2000s. A high number of news are collected as an evidence for the increase in violence and lynching attempts.

¹⁴³ Gencer Özcan (1998) "Doksanlı Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Değişen Güvenlik Ortamı," in Özcan and Kut (eds.) *En Uzun Onyıl – Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, Boyut Press: Istanbul, pp. 13-34.

¹⁴⁴ Burak Ülman (1998) "Türkiye'nin Yeni Güvenlik Algılamaları ve 'Bölücülük'," in Özcan and Kut (eds.) *En Uzun Onyıl – Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, Boyut Press: Istanbul, pp. 101-129.

security posits this portrayal of provoking and legitimizing violence by ‘innocent citizens’ against ‘criminals’.¹⁴⁵ This means the Turkish state constructed an internal threat to strengthen its authority.¹⁴⁶

In this manner, the Turkish state in the 1990s to legitimize the war against the PKK, defined internal enemies as external. In effect, the enemy was neither fully ‘within’ nor fully ‘out there’; the enemy became a "natural" outsider.¹⁴⁷ In this period, the war against the PKK was launched as a by-product of the infiltration by a stranger/enemy aiming to weaken the country from inside. This situation did not just see these problems examined as a social matter, but also fueled the strategic isolation instinct best explained by the saying, "The Turk has no friend, but the Turk."

To fully see how and where post-war violence in Turkey was triggered, it is important to make note of its relation to the concept we can describe as state of security in neoliberal polity rather than seeing it as ordinary nationalism. After 1980, and especially during times of war, nationalism as an idea was a dominant thought within the culture. However, in the 2000s, it became a cover for the neoliberal transformation of the state as it kept merging with neoliberal social objectives.¹⁴⁸

To comprehend the emergence of the culture of violence, rather than the idea of why people attempt to use violence, the right question to ask is how norms cause violence to rise within a society.¹⁴⁹ In this manner, it is important to review the state’s statements about security in Turkey after the 2000s. First of all, the idea that everyone opposed to the state in any form can be viewed as a threat and not a part of

¹⁴⁵ Deniz Yonucu and Zeynep Gönen (2012) "Legitimizing Violence and Segregation: Neoliberal Discourses on Crime and the Criminalization of Urban Poor Populations in Turkey," in Bourke, Dafnos and Kip *Lumpencity: Discourses of Marginality, Marginalizing Discourses*, Red Quill, p. 80.

¹⁴⁶ Evren Balta Paker (2010) "Dış Tehditten İç Tehdide: Türkiye’de Doksanlarda Ulusal Güvenliğin Yeniden İnşası," in Balta Paker and Akça (eds.) *Türkiye’de Ordu, Devlet ve Güvenlik Siyaseti*, Istanbul Bilgi University Press: Istanbul, p. 430.

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.* p. 422.

¹⁴⁸ Gambetti (2007), pp. 15-16.

¹⁴⁹ Chrissie Steenkamp (2005) "The Legacy of War: Conceptualizing A ‘Culture of Violence’ to Explain Violence after Peace Accords," *The Round Table*, vol. 94, p. 254.

"us" continued to hold sway. But the slight difference herein was the highlighting of a "traitor among us" rather than an "enemy".

While an enemy would clearly manifest itself, the "stranger" among us, as a category encompassing many different elements, increases confusion and ambiguity.¹⁵⁰ The "enemy" in this manner (the PKK) expands and works its way into all parts of a society and becomes faceless. That spreads the sense of "threat" broadly. Danger has no more direction and source now; it could come from anyone. This uncertainty causes two important outcomes. First, it removes any obstacles to the state's claims of an enemy. Within this simple equation, supporters of the state become a natural part of the whole; and opposing forces become "strangers".

The second, important outcome of this uncertain environment is the promotion of a watchman over the responsible citizen. The state's function as a regulator of the society is passed onto civil society and creates a police citizen.¹⁵¹ Individuals tend to be more patriotic than the government itself, as they try to follow the government's ideological signposts. Since it can be argued that each of us is only giving an impression of who s/he truly is, in actuality any one of us can be a potential "traitor". It is the duty of a "responsible" citizen to watch over others, to report in when needed and to intervene directly when called for.

With every attempt at lynching by this "responsible citizen" against any "strangers" who opposes the state view, both government and citizen redraw the borders of violence. During times of war in the 1990s, violence was under the state's purview. Now the jurisdiction to kill or spare life has been passed onto "society". Individuals who ranked as founding members of the state and for all intents and purposes took part in governance became the sole carriers of the law. In identifying themselves with the will of the ruling government, they also rigorously obey the government's ideology. Thus leading to increased control of state authority by letting security be a

¹⁵⁰ Jef Huysmans (1998) "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 4(2), p. 241.

¹⁵¹ Gambetti (2007), p. 15.

matter handled by the public in spite of the fact that it generates its own – and a largely unfettered level of - violence.¹⁵²

Under this scope and contrary to neoliberalism's claim that argues that people are the subject; the state apparatus keeps its repressive position. People tend to view their happiness by how secure they feel. The neoliberal subject, who positions security as a value, redesigns her/his life according to the national security goals determined by government officials.¹⁵³ Society is fertile ground for the state to reclaim its control because whenever "subjects" maintain the strategies of order, the power of state wielded by them in the state's name is easily concealed.

Throughout this new culture of security, the hand of the state extends its security policies. It secures its questionable authority and its own economic deviousness brought about by its adherence to neoliberal market order. During the AKP period, alongside the reestablishment of state authority and its institutionalization of every section of society, along with creating a "concerned citizenry", the state began experimenting with/creating the "Neoliberal Leviathan." The establishment of this "Leviathan" was most acutely felt in its use of bio-techniques and the privatization of security "service".

4.2.4. Bio-Administration

In today's world, surveillance is a must for a state's existence. Surveillance has reached a level, which covers all of society, and thus, it is at the state's disposal. The Republic Turkey has derived great benefit from this fact, and has acquired neatly edited information about its populace.¹⁵⁴ But the state's needs and its tendency to expand its network of control have caused a mutation of the characteristics and the quantity of this information. The system of gathering information from the populace underwent a transformation during the 2000's when the state started using new political means and technologies to gather the aforementioned information. In this

¹⁵² *ibid.* p. 20.

¹⁵³ *ibid.* p. 27.

¹⁵⁴ Ferhunde Özbay (2010) "Türkiye'de Ulus-devlet, Gözetim ve Nüfus Bilgisi," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 118, p. 167.

manner, starting with a pilot study in 2007, an electronic ID card system was a crucial step in the merging of all the other previous systems creating one unified whole.¹⁵⁵

In the year 2000, citizenship numbers (ID numbers) were introduced and became obligatory not just for official business, but to define an individual within every political, administrative and commercial network. In this manner, the period following the 2000 census points to a change in the approach of population tallying and classification. This approach aimed to replace the census-based system with a registry-based system. The main database concerning the population was to be a registry instead of a census. The main point to note here is that it is possible to merge the data coming from the registry system with an individual's personal information with the ability to track the data using an individual's profile.¹⁵⁶

In this case, Turkey followed the EU concerning the identity registration system and took steps accordingly. In terms of population statistics, these steps resulted in two main transformations. The first was the standardization of classifications and definitions, thus determining the type of data to be gathered as well as the institutions that would process it. The other change was about the method of getting information of population. The data began to collect from the registry system. Thus enabling up-to-date individual data flow without having to wait for a census. The information gathering techniques, which had been dependent on statistics measured by geographical units, developed into a means of tracking an individual data.¹⁵⁷

In 2002, as a part of this transformation, citizenship numbers were put online by the Central Population Administration (MERNİS). In other words, the registry office became digital and information was digitized. Since 2005, the gathering of statistics in both national and international level came with Law 5429¹⁵⁸, which determined

¹⁵⁵ Alanur Çavlin Bozbeyoğlu (2011) "Nüfusun Biyopolitikasına Yeni Açılım: Türkiye'nin Biyometrik Ekelektronik Kimlik Kartı Sistemi," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 122, pp. 54-55.

¹⁵⁶ *ibid.* p. 60.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ See, Law 5429 on Statistics of Turkey, published in the Official Gazette no. 25997, dated 10 November 2005.

which institutions were responsible for the different areas of information. The process began under the auspices of the Official Statistics Program.

Moreover, the National Address Database, which was established between the years of 2006-2007, and Address Based Population Registry System (ADNKS),¹⁵⁹ synchronized the population with data concerning their address. This data has also become a source of information for other systems. In a side note, the Turkish government collaborated with the EU on this project.

Official ID cards are the sole basis of the state-citizen relationship. ID numbers have a key role in forming the discipline-control-surveillance network. This system controls individual data, enables the system to establish bases on any grid rather than creating a singular centralized presence.¹⁶⁰ In other words, today there is no one single operator in a certain grid but many grids in which an operator may be found. This enables the tracking of individual data from multiple bases, while increasing the feeling of being followed, and it also increases the amount and variation of data that can be tracked with a potential to escalate the systems' overall efficiency in finding examples of transgression. As we see in Turkey, ID numbers do not just connect each and every personal data network, they also make the data trackable and controllable from anywhere without needing a centralized control point.¹⁶¹

Apart from ID numbers, there have been two major adjustments to the ID cards. First, a new law in 2006 stated that people were no longer obliged to indicate their religious views on their IDs. This change was based upon the constitution. The article number 24 states "No citizen can be forced to declare his/her religious beliefs to the government." However, this inclusion in the citizen's identity cards violates

¹⁵⁹ Law 5490 on Population Services, published in the Official Gazette no. 26153, dated 25 April 2006.

¹⁶⁰ Matthew G. Hannah (2009) "Calculable Territory and the West German Census Boycott Movements of the 1980s," *Political Geography*, vol. 28, p. 69.

¹⁶¹ Çavlin Bozbeyoğlu (2011), p. 63.

religious liberty in Turkey,¹⁶² particularly under a "neutrality" conception of that right.¹⁶³

Secondly, biometric ID cards were introduced following a pilot study completed in November 2010. This is what is known as a "smart card". Its aim is to replace every other card such as the driver's license, health certificate and social security card. A chip on the card stores chosen population data. As a biometric security measure, it also stores fingerprint data. The card also has a six-digit passkey.¹⁶⁴

Digital ID cards have basic information about the individual and the ID number written on it. Yet, the card does not include such data as the whereabouts of the individual's local registry. While the card can store a significant amount of information through the aid of the chip without the need for written information, (and also with the activation of ADNKS), the individual's regional reference point is no longer based on their official registry office, but on their permanent residence. Thus, family ties don't have as much significance anymore, the reference point becomes where the individual lives, studies or consumes, aided by the places that are integrated into the system.¹⁶⁵ Another interesting fact is that the card also contains its owner's signature on it. This is just one more confirmation of the individual's participation in the system and it also verifies other activities embarked on domestically and abroad.

Lastly, biometric ID cards are digitally and physically compatible with other smart cards used in other countries.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, these cards are already functioning internationally.

¹⁶² In 2004, Sinan Işık's request to write 'Alevi' in the religion section of his identity card was rejected.

¹⁶³ Esen and Gönenç (2007), pp. 579-580.

¹⁶⁴ www.ekds.gov.tr.

¹⁶⁵ Çavlin Bozbeyoğlu (2011), p. 65.

¹⁶⁶ Mücahit Mutlugün and Oktay Adalier (2009) "Turkish National Electronic Identity Card," *Proceeding of the 2nd International Conference on Security on Information and Networks October 6-10, 2009, North Cyprus*.

4.2.5. Privatization Of Security

As we have examined in the Chapter "Security as a Perception", the precautions we have used to remedy our "insecurity" are based on political and historical considerations. Today, the security industry is one of the biggest and most profitable sectors. The income derived globally from this sector was 55.6 billion USD in the 1990s and reached 100 billion USD in the year 2000. The total income from the sector was approximately 200 billion USD in 2010.¹⁶⁷

The growth of private security means not only that the state authority has secured its dominance by influencing private security agents within society, but also by producing a new security culture. This new culture feeds a feeling of insecurity that a person can avoid only through more security precautions that are no longer procured only by the state, but also through private security organizations.¹⁶⁸ In this manner, security becomes a real need for people, who feel insecure.

The need for security is the determining factor for the commodification of security as it creates customers. Nevertheless, we can view the process in the opposite direction as well. The triggering factor for this need is the growth of the security sector. The accelerating supply of various security services triggers fear and the feeling of insecurity, thereby convincing the customer there is an increase in the crime rate and there is a need for more security.¹⁶⁹ To sum up, commodification works hand in hand with the intensification of the division, polarization, and fragmentation of urban space. For instance, the AKP as the agent of the neoliberal agenda in Turkey, mutes the voice of opposition groups against the state ideology by defining them as 'others.' An example of this is the neoliberal urban transformation project that engages in a basic form of gentrification that 'eliminates problem areas' and has been a project involving marginalization and exclusion.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ P. W. Singer (2003), p. 19.

¹⁶⁸ Orhan Esen (2007) "Sonu Belli Bir Hikayeye Yatırım Yapmak," *İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları*, vol. 59, pp. 106-129.

¹⁶⁹ Sibel Yardımcı (2009) "Kuşatma Altında Gündelik Hayat: Özel Güvenlik, Kent Yaşamı ve Yönetimsellik," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 115, p. 232.

¹⁷⁰ Yonucu and Gönen (2012), pp. 94-96.

On the other hand, the security industry's integration into capitalism must be understood not just as the privatization of security services, but also as a wider process. Privatization of security has caused a separation of security practices distinct from official authorities and parallel to this, resulted in the redefinition of private and official security services. But as revealed in practice, the privatization of security services are just new channels for the government to control every part of daily life as the sector is commoditized.

As this study demonstrates, the direct result of commodification of security as a sector was the deepening of feelings of insecurity and the increasing of official security expenses rather than a decrease of those expenditures. Following this, the differences between internal and external security as a concept no longer existed after 1990s. Today, the perception of security has been reestablished. The implementation of new surveillance technologies and tracking systems gives more control to the state in this new security culture environment and has made the state's existence noticeable in all aspects of daily life. Thus, in this culture, the state spreads its own security concerns to society. According to this way of thinking, the threat has no concrete definition and can now arise from any place at any time.

Private security companies are entities that not only rely on existing feelings of insecurity, but also create new areas of insecurity. In the following chapters, after a short examination on how private security companies develop globally, I will evaluate private security companies in Turkey.

CHAPTER 5

PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

5.1. An Overview Of The Privatization Of Security

There has been a remarkable increase in the proportion of private security companies since the late 1970s in the United States and the Europe. This is a result of the neoliberal transformation process in the centralized nation-states that portrays security as a commodity endowed with market value. According to the most basic idea of neoliberalism, which tends to read the privatization of security as the coming of a small government, the provision of security by private or non-state actors is a unique phenomenon for the last quarter of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the monopoly of the state over use of force is an exception in world history, rather than a rule.¹⁷¹

In the period when the states could not constitute regular armies, mercenaries enabled the states to have non-state security forces for their need of soldiers during war. To provide force by private and non-state actors was a routine practice of both global and national levels before the 20th century.¹⁷² Especially after the Westphalia order in 1648, the idea that states are providers of security during war became important.¹⁷³ To sum up, until the last quarter of the 20th century, one could talk about the existence of private providers for security, and during the period between the 18th century and the late 1970s, it was a fact that states slowly monopolized security.

¹⁷¹ P.W. Singer (2003), p. 19.

¹⁷² Filiz Zabcı, p. 7,
http://www.tasam.org/Files/PDF/Raporlar/yeni_savaslarin_gizli_yuzu_ozel_askeri_sirketler_d3ad2e36-9fa4-4222-a919-a4d2177e86c3.pdf (website access: May 23, 2014).

¹⁷³ Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini (2005) "Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies," *Occasional Paper for Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces*, no. 6, p.1.

Today, however, the idea of security has been superseded by a much more complex reality. We have to think of it together with the ideology of neoliberalism. Yet, the regulation of the provision of security through neoliberal policies does not imply the emergence of a small government.¹⁷⁴

5.2. Private Security Companies In Turkey

In Turkey, one should treat the growth and development of the private security sector as the resurgence of state authority over security issues. This inclusive argument unfolds with the emergence of private security as a key figure dealing with daily life public order cases and the accelerating increase of the state's concentration on terror and anti-state movements.

This given role to external actors in means of providing security is a part of neoliberalism itself. It is also an inherent part of information based ruling mechanism, which reorganizes authoritarian relations in the society. This mechanism is developed to control and direct individuals and to enable a direct assumption by state's official apparatuses. Consequently, it is the state process of consolidation of itself through new actors; this is a fundamental transformation of the neoliberal state's definition of a traditional state.¹⁷⁵ The commodification of security after 1980 should be evaluated as a process in which the state reestablishes its own authority.

5.2.1. Law 2495

Following along the lines of the socio-political turbulence of the 1970s in Turkey, "bank squads" a quasi-formal arrangement made between banks and the police department, were created as a solution arising from the need for private security. During that period, banks donated cars to the police department that were specifically used for the bank's own protection and security. Hiring retired policemen or military officers to their board of directors, was another way that banks

¹⁷⁴ Yasin Yıldırım (2003-4) "Batı Siyasal Aklının Analitiği: Yeni Bir Egemenlik Formuna Doğru," *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 99, pp. 52-53.

¹⁷⁵ Mehmet Atılgan (2009) "Özel Güvenlik," in Bayramoğlu and Insel (eds.) *Almanak Türkiye 2006-2008 – Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, p. 261.

gained the right to have armed personnel on their premises.¹⁷⁶

However, the security sector came to the fore only after the ratification of Law 2495, the Law for the Protection and Securing of Some Institutions, on the 22nd of July 1981,¹⁷⁷ which allowed strategic public and private institutions to found their own security units. The law thereby created a number of provisions for private security endeavors in Turkey. Parallel to the emergence of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology around the world, private security companies increased and became a market endeavor.¹⁷⁸ The increased numbers of attacks in eastern and the southeastern Anatolian regions in the 1990s, and the assassinations that caused fear, such as the Özdemir Sabancı case,¹⁷⁹ kept matters of security on the agenda and caused a flourishing private security service culture.¹⁸⁰

Law 2495 highlighted the pre-1980's violent political environment as an excuse for its inception and stated that the ones who had attempted to weaken and destroy the state would attack the institutions that had been formed at great cost and man power to damage the state's wide-ranging development ventures. Because of this statement, the institutions in question were obliged to take "more effective security" measures. In this manner, Law 2495 runs parallel with the mindset that formed the 1982 Constitution.¹⁸¹ Consequently, in an environment of separatist and destructive

¹⁷⁶ Sibel Yardımcı and Zeynep Alemdar (2010) "The Privatization of Security in Turkey: Reconsidering the State, the Concept of 'Governmentality'" and Neoliberalism," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, vol. 43, p. 39.

¹⁷⁷ Law 2495 on Protecting and Securing Some Institutions, published in the Official Gazette no. 17410 dated 24 July 1981.

¹⁷⁸ Atılğan (2009), p. 262.

¹⁷⁹ Özdemir Sabancı was gunned down on January 9, 1996 in his office in the heavily-guarded Sabancı Towers in Levent, Istanbul along with the manager of ToyotoSa and a secretary by assassins hired by the armed group DHKP-C. The assassins were given access to the building by Fehriye Erdal, a female member of DHKP-C, who was an employee at that time. Recently released information suggests that the assassination of Mustafa Duyar, Özdemir Sabancı's assassin, was planned by retired general Veli Küçük, who was detained in the Ergenekon investigation.

¹⁸⁰ Yardımcı (2009), pp. 229-230.

¹⁸¹ The 1982 Constitution begins with "[a]n unrivaled separatist, destructive and bloody civil war in the Republican era, against the eternal unity of the Turkish homeland and to the holy Turkish Nation."

actions, a forensic groundwork which justified "security measures" was laid out.¹⁸²

Article number 1 of this law states that companies that are public or private institutions can found a private security organization for certain purposes. The institutions and companies covered by the law are defined as follows: (1) having a significant contribution to the national economy or the state's defense capabilities, (2) the institutions and companies whose damage or collapse (partially or totally) or who would be temporarily disabled would have a negative impact on national security, the national economy and on society. The companies and institutions fitting this description are authorized to establish a private security organization according to these reasons: (1) these institutions and companies can defend themselves against the threats of sabotage, arson, theft, vandalism, looting or destruction; (2) prevention of the removal by force of their employees and to preserve their health/bodily integrity from the threats/dangers in question. Also, international entry and departure points like customs houses, airports, and harbors are covered by this law. Entry and departure procedures including document checks at these locations are to be handled by these private security units. The law also ensures that individuals whose entry and/or departure from the country are prohibited can be detained.

According to Law 2495, the companies and institutions that can benefit from private security services are: "the Ministry of Education, dams, power plants, refineries, power lines, oil lines, depots, loading facilities and similar places which make a significant contribution to the economy and the government's military defense strategy, as well as airports and harbors open to civilian traffic and historic relics, ruins, protected areas and museums as well as industrial, commercial and tourist facilities." (Article number 2)

Furthermore, Law 2495 indicates the purpose and sphere of service as follows: private security organizations are to be established within the aforementioned company and institutions (Article numbers 3, 8), thus limiting the scope of their duties within the confines of these companies' sphere of activity (Article number 11). The Council of Ministers is assigned as the regulator of these entities, and also

¹⁸² Haspolat (2012), pp. 183-184.

in regards to the kind of security measures to be taken within these institutions and/or if it is necessary or not to establish a security organization (Article number 3) and in the case of the abatement of these needs, to duly terminate these security entities (Article number 6). In addition to this, the law states that individuals on duty in private security organizations are to be counted as officials when applying the Turkish Penal Law, and persons acting against them are to be penalized as if they had attempted a crime against state officials (Article number 13).

When evaluated together we can state that with all its articles, Law 2495 considers private security as a part of general security. Private security organizations are not considered to be an organization rivaling the police department, which is responsible for domestic security, and their formation and termination at any time depends on a decision by the Council of Ministers. Under this framework, the main duties of internal security as well as their secondary duties are shared between the police department and any private security organization to be formed. Consequently, while the police department ensures internal security through their general duties; the secondary responsibilities, such as the security of private places such as factories, banks, bazaars, historical and tourist areas are to be fulfilled by private security organizations.¹⁸³

In addition to the private security organizations established by Law 2495, another development occurred within the private security sector. Some bogus companies were established as commercial companies to look like cleaning or consulting firms and began to meet the needs of various private institutions which were not covered by the law, but who still felt the need for "private security." These firms were under the scope of Turkish Trade (TTK) and Debt Law, and were established as commercial companies that sold "security services" to their clients.¹⁸⁴

The private security organizations that fell under the scope of Law 2495 were established to protect and provide security to the institution to which they were connected. During the AKP period, Law 2495 was repealed and it was replaced by

¹⁸³ Evren Haspolat (2006) "Devlet-Güvenlik İlişkisinin Değişen İçeriği: Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Özel Güvenlik," *Eğitim Bilim Toplum Dergisi*, vol. 4(13), p. 68.

¹⁸⁴ Haspolat (2012), p. 218.

Law 5188 and it enabled the establishment of private security companies that also operated out of their linked institutions.

5.2.2. Law 5188

During the time Law 2495 was enforced (which covered a period of more than 20 years), security in Turkey became more commercial and more market oriented. Accordingly, the supply of private security services in Turkey increased at an unprecedented rate.¹⁸⁵ The passage of a comprehensive law regarding the private security sector had to wait until 2004. This law was the Law for Private Security Services, Law 5188, and it was passed on the 10th June 2004.¹⁸⁶

Law 5188 principally clarifies these topics:¹⁸⁷

- (1) Every company and individual serving in the private security sector is to be registered. Persons, buildings, and facilities will be covered and benefit from private security services and will involve the protection of possessions and transfers of cash. This will mean that the private security sector will be equipped with advanced technological equipment and instruments.
- (2) The establishment of security services is the juncture between general and private security. The assignment of tasks has already been determined and the public arm (police department) has been given the duty of supervising and regulating private security. Any companies or private educational institutions that are suspected of operating outside their scope or are sources of unlawful activity are to be decommissioned. The founders and chief executive officers of the companies that have been shut down resulting from these violations will never be allowed to establish or manage any other private security companies or private security training facilities.

¹⁸⁵ Atılgan (2009), p. 262.

¹⁸⁶ Law 5188 on Private Security Services, published in the Official Gazette no. 25504 dated 26 June 2004.

¹⁸⁷ M. Bedri Eryılmaz (2006) "Özel Güvenlik," in Ümit Cizre (ed.) *Almanak Türkiye 2005 Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, Tesev Publishing: İstanbul, pp. 125-126.

- (3) As a rule, private security personnel are to serve unarmed unless it is necessary in special circumstances.
- (4) All vested rights of private security organizations are based on Law 2495 and their current employees are reserved for 5 years starting with the law's enactment. At the end of the fifth year, licenses are to be renewed and security personnel are also obliged to receive re-training in order to keep their qualifications current.
- (5) The companies offering security services that are not covered by Law 2495, but based on Trade Law are to be allowed to keep operating if they perform certain required duties after 6 months of the regulation's enactment.

Under the general scope of Law 5188, I will examine and evaluate the position of private security companies. But first, it would be beneficial to discuss the articles of law so as to be able to examine the upturn in profits of private security companies after the enactment of the law. Law 5188 laid the foundation for the existing private security sector in Turkey. Law 5188 permits the provision of private security companies to regulate their own licensing and supervision of their own institutions and the people who would provide this service (Article number 2). The law formally founds the field, and defines how this new public service will be provided; it also names the participants, and delimits their actions. It defines methods to be followed in order to establish a private security unit (Article numbers 3-4), or a private security company (Article number 5). This law defines the responsibilities of security guards, under which conditions they are allowed to carry and use their firearms, and their line of duty (Article numbers 7-9). It also specifies the conditions on becoming a security guard (Article numbers 10-14).

The general preamble of Law 5188 states that one of the most important duties of the state is to provide security for the public. An individual has the right to protect her/his life and property. This right is given to a person who wants to obtain protection for herself/himself in addition to the general security that is provided by the state. No doubt, this overarching framework is supported by everyone in the

private security sector.¹⁸⁸ This legal framework enables considerable growth in the security market and favors those in the private security sector – for example, private security companies and security guards. This legislative framework also shows the neoliberal mindset of governance, which instrumentalizes individual enterprise.¹⁸⁹

Before the ratification of Law 5188, the private security sector had already become significant. The number of private security guards was about 100,000, and there were approximately 500 private companies in the field. After the 2004 law, there was a significant increase in the number of private security companies and schools, and private security guards.¹⁹⁰ As of March 2014 in Turkey, the number of locations authorized to have private security was 65,187. There are 640,475 private security guards who have been given identity cards. 460,073 guards are in the private security sector. The same source has 1,325 companies and 565 private schools in the field of policing. Additionally, there are 29 companies and 8 private schools in the gendarmerie.¹⁹¹ These numbers prove the rapid growth and development of the private security sector in Turkey.

5.2.3. The Nexus Of Private Security And The Public Force

According to the third article of Police Force Law 3201,¹⁹² the public force has authority across the country and it encompasses the gendarmerie, the police force and coast guards. In the same article, besides the public force, the forces formed by special law and with relatively limited jurisdiction that operates in their predefined areas are defined as the private security force.

Considering the existing legislation, it is not possible to fit private security units, organizations and companies in a certain manner. Law 5188 and its related

¹⁸⁸ Yardımcı and Alemdar (2010), p. 40.

¹⁸⁹ Atılğan (2009), p. 262

¹⁹⁰ Haspolat (2012), p. 239.

¹⁹¹ <http://www.ozelguvenlik.pol.tr/Sayfalar/istatistikbilgiler.aspx>. (website accessed on 18 April 2014)

¹⁹² Law 3201 concerning the Police Force, published in the Official Gazette no. 3629, dated 12 June 1937.

regulations do not include a statement which lists the exponentially-growing private security companies as official forces.¹⁹³ The first article of Law 5188 clearly states that "the purpose of this law, is to determine the main regulations and practices of private security services which is a complementary element of public security." This underlines private security services' "complementary" function to public or general security. The article also does not clarify the term "public security" when it mentions public security.

As is generally acknowledged, public security is a type of security whose aim is keeping a society secure and whose objectives are to be provided by public security forces and as a service benefits society. Services are to be run by either public institutions or by specialists who are under strict supervision by related public institutions.¹⁹⁴ In this manner, it is neither the gendarmeries' nor the police's duty to perform private security service or to provide oversight to private clients or protect private property, which is regulated by Law 5188. According this law, private security services, by maintaining the security of private property, indirectly contribute to public security. Consequently, any other areas that are not a matter of public security or its extensions, are "open" and fall under the larger (private) scope of the security field.¹⁹⁵

Moreover, private security guards, as they attend to their legal duties are authorized to give aid to public forces, and also have the same jurisdiction of public forces for the crimes attempted against them.¹⁹⁶ They are also prohibited to go on strike or resign en masse in order to prevent the disruption of public order, which could occur in their absence.

All these regulations, when evaluated with the private force's obligation to be audited by the public force as stated in Law 5188 in numerous articles, seem to cloud the distinction between the private security sector and the public force.

¹⁹³ Atılğan (2009), p. 263.

¹⁹⁴ Şeref Gözübüyük (1997) *Yönetim Hukuku*, Turhan Press: Ankara, p. 245.

¹⁹⁵ Haspolat (2012), p. 227.

¹⁹⁶ Law 5188, Article 23.

5.2.4. Duties And Jurisdictions Of Private Security Guards, And The Police Society

Private security personnel mingle in public wearing their uniforms that are similar to those of the police and are in yet similar roles, also undoubtedly increase the effect and quantity of policing personnel in daily life. In their uniforms, they are authorized to use force to protect private property and private interests.¹⁹⁷ The physical appearance of private security guards within every field of life shows us that contrary to assumptions, the state's capacity to control and supervise daily life has increased.

There are no obvious differences between the scope of service of private security services and the public force in fact and in practice. According to official discourse, private security guards have jurisdiction only during their working hours and only at their place of employment. It also states that these hours and areas can be determined by examining their hours under contract.¹⁹⁸ But, in reality, private security guards are called upon to act in cases where there is a need by public forces to preserve public security, even if the duty call is out of their area.

Private security personnel may be assigned to duties of preserving public security by local authorities.¹⁹⁹ Many official institutions in Turkey are secured and protected by private security companies. Countrywide, municipalities that have a difficult time recruiting law enforcement officers increasingly benefit from the services of private security companies. All these applications are indicators of the growing area of private security organizations' scope of duty, which includes unspecified areas of

¹⁹⁷ Tanıl Bora (2007) "Güvenlik Alanının Özelleşmesi: Gariba 'Emniyet', Kibar Muhitlere 'Özel Güvenlik' Mi?" *İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları*, vol.59, p. 61.

¹⁹⁸ Eryılmaz (2006), p. 127.

¹⁹⁹ According to Law 5188, Article 13: Local authorities may claim the right to apply and supervise private security measures to preserve peoples' lives and possessions. They can ensure security as well as social freedoms and can also request changes to the procedure for security measures taken previously or take additional measures and/or ask for suspension of the measures that are beyond the private security personnel's jurisdiction. (...) In a state of disturbance of the public order, private security personnel and overseers are to inform the gendarmerie immediately. When it is understood that peoples' lives and possessions are/will be in danger in an area protected by private security, local authorities are to task the gendarmerie. At such a time, private security personnel will be under the command of local authorities and the chief of the public force.

private domain along with the state's official institutions.²⁰⁰

According to the view that defends a very limited area of scope for private security guards, Law 5188 gives them jurisdiction²⁰¹ only for activities fall under "prevention." In other words, these authorities are complementary to the "service of security" provided by state's own official security personnel. Consequently, private security personnel can "borrow" the powers of the public force only to justify their work.²⁰² But in circumstances lacking the audits anticipated by the regulations, private security guards often tend to exceed their authority and violate individual rights and freedoms.

The auditing of the private security sector is a bit of a puzzle even though the law regulates it.²⁰³ The underlying reason behind the misuse of authority among security guards stems from the perception which makes them to think they are sort of police force. A great number of examples confirm this perception. Certain cases are described below:

Ahu and Murat Dindar are a married couple who were attending a Ramazan Festival held in Karaalioğlu Park. With them was their disabled daughter Armağan Dindar (aged 13) seated on the back seat of their

²⁰⁰ Atılğan (2009), p. 264.

²⁰¹ According to Law 5188, the mandates of private security personnel are: (1) to have visitors walk through metal detectors and into the designated areas they are posted to watch, to scan visitors' bodies for unauthorized possessions, to place visitors' belongings through x-ray or similar security devices, (2) to check IDs, at conventions, concerts, sporting events, stage shows and similar events as well as funerals and weddings, (3) According to 127th Article of Criminal Court Process Law (CMK) 1412 no. (90. Article of the current CMK), to search a suspect in relation to their arrest, (4) to search for and arrest individuals that currently have an outstanding arrest warrant or conviction, (5) during natural disasters such as fires and earthquakes, if a distress call is received, to enter buildings, houses and shops falling under their purview, (6) to request IDs at public transportation centers such as airports, harbors, stations and terminals and to use metal detectors to scan visitors' bodies for unauthorized possessions, to place visitors' belongings through x-ray or similar security devices, (7) to inform the gendarmerie immediately of the seizure of any possessions during their search which are illegal, evidentiary or non-evidentiary, but dangerous, (8) to take abandoned or found possessions into custody, (9) to take an individual into custody to protect him/her from immediate danger, (10) to arrest an individual and to guard a crime scene and evidence according to Article no. 157 of CMK (according to Article no.168 in the current CMK, to apply forced ban – not sure, banning someone from the scene)

²⁰² Eryılmaz (2006), p. 128.

²⁰³ Aksiyon, "Özel Güvenlik Krizde" <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-12873-34-ozel-guvenlik-krizde.html>

bicycle. They were told that they could not enter the festival area and were harrassed by private security personnel.²⁰⁴

Students of Osmangazi University in Eskişehir wanted to protest meal prices and were stopped by the private security personnel. Five students were handcuffed and brought to congress building and then handed over to the police.²⁰⁵

Soner Akkurt had met his girlfriend the previous evening in the garden of Cerrahpaşa Medical Faculty Hospital. He was badly beaten and hospitalized. Akkurt stated that he was severely beaten when he confronted security personnel who were indecently harassing his girlfriend.²⁰⁶

In an incident that took place in the Taksim Metro station, 20-year- old Aykut Kelek was injured when security personnel hit him in the head with their metal detector. He received emergency treatment in the Taksim Metro station before being taken to the hospital in serious condition.²⁰⁷

As the private security sector grows and recruits more personnel, the occurrence of personnel exceeding their authority and the use of unreasonable force increases. In this manner, with the enactment of Law 5188, such as within universities overseen by private security guards, students are prevented from organizing the most common social activities including such things as meetings.

5.2.5. The Private Security Sector And Its Relationship With The Public Force

While not a part of the state, private security is mostly thought of as a sector that is controlled by the state. It is expected to aid the public force's struggles and does so covering areas the state cannot afford to service. Studies by Mustafa Gülcü, a high-ranking member of the Turkish National Police Force, on the philosophy of private security is an important reference point that examines the understanding of the

²⁰⁴ *Milliyet*, "Ramazan Şenliğinde Özel Güvenlik Terörü," September 23, 2008.

²⁰⁵ *Radikal*, " Osmangazi Üniversitesi'nde Protestocu Öğrencilere Özel Güvenlikten Müdahale, " March 11, 2013.

²⁰⁶ *Hürriyet*, " Özel Güvenlik Terörü, " November 30, 2012.

²⁰⁷ *Radikal*, " Yine Özel Güvenlik, Yine Ölçsüz Şiddet, " December 30, 2013.

sector in Turkey. In *Özel Güvenliğin Felsefesi*,²⁰⁸ Gülcü promotes this neoliberal project in pure and perfect order. Gülcü describes the privatization of security as an element of democracy that draws its intellectual power from the political and economic power of neoliberalism. This means that it breaks state supervision, enhances personal and social satisfaction to the detriment of absolute state authority, and makes citizens active consumers of the public service. He believes, in this way, that the quality of security services then improves and citizens feel safer. In fact, he sees private security not as an end, but a fresh start leading to private investigation services private forensic services, private experts, private criminal laboratories, a jury system for criminal cases, and private prisons.

One sees how the supporters of this neoliberal project, whose need for security could not be supplied without the use of private security services, embody the dominant way of thinking of private security. They demand extra security packages. Moreover, they become proponents of incentives and sedition for private security. Security anxiety no longer is visible in all strata of society. The propagation of insecurity simultaneously imposes the idea that there can be various security standards.²⁰⁹

Also, I must draw attention to the fact that privatization of security has occurred in a manner different from Gülcü's theory. It is not easy to transfer or share duties and authority of the public force by private security organizations even if only partially. As I stated above, from the very beginning, Law 5188 is designed to create a sector occupying an ambiguous field which is stuck between the state and the private sector. Consequently, the privatization of security, even as it has been stated in the law, was never meant to be solely a competing sector which is free of the state's interventions.²¹⁰

When examined under this scope, it is interesting to note that the managers of

²⁰⁸ Mustafa Gülcü, "Özel Güvenliğin Felsefesi," *Polis Dergisi*, vol. 31-32, <http://www.polisdergisi.pol.tr/Sayfalar/arsiv.aspx>

²⁰⁹ Bora (2007), p. 60.

²¹⁰ Yardımcı (2009), p. 329.

private security companies and their training facilities mostly consist of retired members of the public force. These people's entry and activity in the private security sector are facilitated by certain legal arrangements.²¹¹ It showed that the state intended to allow private companies to recruit people into the chain of command who had been trained by the state; thus making the private security sector much more controllable.²¹²

With the legalization of private security operations, many who retired from the state's official institutions took their place in the sector as founders or managers and they were followed by people who had expectations of making money in this profitable business. These people applied for retirement and transferred over to the private sector. Brigadier General Veli Küçük,²¹³ the former governor of Istanbul Erol Çakır,²¹⁴ and the former undersecretary of the Intelligence Service Sönmez Köksal²¹⁵ are just a few of these retired officers. To understand the meaning and the logic of the construct of private security, as well as the extent to which its activity is an integral part of the neoliberal state, which tends to dominate every space within the life of the society, one needs to recall the speech of the former director of the

²¹¹ This statement was added to the 3rd Clause of the 5th Article of Law 5188. It facilitated the transfer of people who are members of some public force and assigned them as managers or rangers in private security companies. Decree: "Regular officers are not required to be graduates of a four-year college."

²¹² Atılgan (2009), p. 264.

²¹³ Veli Küçük is a retired Brigadier General. He served in the Gendarmerie Regiment Headquarters of Edirne, Eskişehir, Van, Ağrı, Kocaeli and Hatay. He was promoted to general in 1996. As a general, he was stationed for two years as district commander of the Giresun Gendarmarie District Command in Giresun on the Black Sea. While he was Brigadier General at Çanakkale Headquarters, he transferred the brigade to the city of Bilecik. In 2000, he retired in Bilecik as a Brigadier General.

²¹⁴ Erol Çakır served as a Civil Service Inspector, a Secretary of the Supervisory Commission, as a member of Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Governorships of Rize-Bursa-Muğla, the Central Governorship, as the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He started his duties as governor on July 24th of 1997. Then he was assigned to the Governorship of Istanbul on August 6th of 1998. He was succeeded by Muammer Güler on February 16th of 2003.

²¹⁵ At the Ministry of International Affairs Sönmez served in the following roles: He began as the Department Manager of the Office of International Economic Affairs, as the Consul General in Burgas, the Under Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Paris, the Manager of the Middle East Offices and Research, the Assistant General Manager of the Office of International Economic Affairs, and the Consul General of Bagdat and Resident Representative of Turkey in the European Council. Lastly, he served as General Consul in Paris. Between November 9th of 1992 and February 11th of 1998, he served as the Director of the National Intelligence Agency.

Narcotics Office of Istanbul Nihat Kubuş:²¹⁶

In 1999, the governorship of Istanbul started to search for a mechanism that would control and provide surveillance within every aspect the everyday life after the incident of the Blue Bazaar Fire.²¹⁷

The enlightening interviews²¹⁸ conducted by Yardımcı and Alemdar with people related to the security sector show the sector causes considerable problems in its own right. First, the adaptation of retired public officers to the security sector does not go without the transfer of their privileged status to the private companies where institutional management is different. It matters that companies are responsible for providing equal opportunities to everyone, but they should not contain a strict hierarchical mechanism, and should not promote the retired officers' authoritarian demeanor toward their civilian co-workers. However, the owners of companies find it difficult to avoid this.²¹⁹

Despite all of this, private security companies are not blameless in their allowing retired officers' access to ways that enable companies to bypass certain procedures.²²⁰ The companies profit from the retired and former officers' access to governmental networks and enjoy the benefits of having "a friend in court". This is important to the owners or board members of private companies. Using the retired officers and their close relationships to public forces, they can easily use these networks to prevent possible audits. This demonstrates how, eventually, the hierarchical structure runs in favor of the sector.

We can link the transfer of personnel from public to private institutions to the establishment of an ambiguous division of work among these institutions, and this

²¹⁶ Tan Morgül and Volkan Aytar (2007) "Türkiye'nin Özel Güvenliği: interview with Nihat Kubuş," *İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları*, vol.59, p. 90.

²¹⁷ The fire in Mavi Çarşı was an armed assault that occurred on the 13th of March of 1999 and caused the death of 13 citizens.

²¹⁸ Yardımcı and Alemdar (2010), pp. 33-61.

²¹⁹ Umur Talu, "Özel Güvenlik Kamusal Tehlike," <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/10/18/talu.html>

²²⁰ Yardımcı and Alemdar (2010), p. 43.

runs parallel to the confusion in the mindset of a government that was inspired by neoliberalism. To sum up, everything points to the idea that the relationship or cooperation between the security sector and the police force prevents a healthy audit mechanism. In Turkey, the state has penetrated private security activities and it may easily disable the audit and judicial mechanism as well.

Lastly, while discussing the presence of the state in the private security sector, we should consider that as murky as the difference between public institutions and the private sector is, this is also true between civilian and state offices. To understand the complex and versatile structure of private security in Turkey, its operations must be considered part of the state's strategy to rule, which exceeds every traditional and political category that comes to mind.

5.2.6. Problems Of Private Security Sector

The increase in the numbers of private security companies and training facilities brought several problems in practice. Due to some private security companies basing their motivations on stealing market share rather than keeping their service quality high with well-trained personnel, delivery of ethical security services have become harder. In this manner, clients requiring private security services by making their choices in favor of these companies are preventing the service of private security to be performed at a certain quality.²²¹

As seen on the regulation about the private security sector, considering the sector's commercial worries, lawmakers are stretching legal regulations. It is obvious that the Turkish state is trying to strike a balance its control over the security sector and the sector's economic interests. However, problems in the regulation and the education of the personnel in private security are causing a lot of exploits in practice.

Article number 3 of Law 5188 regulates what kind of arms and equipment private security personnel may bear when in service. Yet, this regulation neither clarifies what the physical protection precautions are nor indicates necessities or guidelines for use. Likewise, it is uncertain that who will provide these arms and equipment.

²²¹ Atılğan (2009), p. 265.

Because of this reason, private security companies and their training facilities exploit the uncertainty.

Namely, Law 5188 states that the weapons and equipment of the private security personnel that will be used during the security service are to be provided by the hiring person or company. Consequently, according to the law, private security companies cannot have or purchase firearms. But there is an exception to this. According to Article number 8, with the approval of the governor and the commission decision, private security training facilities may be given authorization to purchase, carry and use firearms to be used in firearms training, escorting transfer of money or valuables and to give temporary armed protection or security services. The Law created a problem in a very large area alongside another problem it did not predict or regulate. Giant capital institutions can establish such a private security company to serve within themselves to provide security to their companies which turn such capital institution into a self-sufficient armed force.²²²

Because of the exploitation, capital institutions become a monopoly by buying private security companies, turning them into a self-financing alternative armed force within the state. This shows us that transferring security services to free market, in contrary to the claims, is far from giving the transparency promised by de-militarization.²²³ As stated before, most of the actors in private security sector are veterans of army or police force. These problematic compromises are being exploited by these people to run counter-guerilla operations, forming militias, mafias and attempting other illegal activities:²²⁴

²²² Haspolat (2012), p. 230.

²²³ Yardımcı (2009), p. 245.

²²⁴ In the investigations made under the scope of the operation known as Ergenekon, some confidential information was released to the media. According to Istanbul Chamber of Commerce company records, the ex-mayor of Istanbul, Erol Çakır, retired Brigadier General Veli Küçük, and Nihat Kubuş, who was also Çakır's clerk for some time, founded a private security company called Stratejik Güvenlik Koruma ve Eğitimi Anonim Şirketi (Strategic Security and Training Joint-Stock Company) on November 29, 2004. Here I must touch on Kubuş's promotion during Çakır's years as mayor and his assignment as the Narcotic Unit Manager. Following the end of Çakır's time in office, Kubuş served as the Chief of Police of the Büyükçekmece Region. Çakır's partnership with Küçük and Kubuş goes back to 2006. It's believed that the company had an office in Trabzon and Veli Küçük's name was also mentioned as a suspect in the Hrant Dink murder case. The allegations effectively ended the partnership. (*Milliyet*, "Tuhaf Bir İş Ortaklığı," August 8, 2008) Also commonly

It is revealed that Nurullah İlgün, who attempted to assassinate Erdoğan Teziç, the Director of YÖK, was working as a private security personnel in Istanbul for five years. As Private Security Law dictates, high school graduate Nurullah İlgün had gone through security investigations and acquired a private security license from the Police Department.²²⁵

In this context, privatization of security carries the risks of creating commercial entities which have the authority to use deadly force in order to protect their interests and territories. I should note that exploitations of private security operations are not casual troubles and this sector, being mentioned within such illegal activities, needs to be strictly inspected. But the law oversees the hierarchical relations and cooperation between the private security sector and the public force and it makes healthy investigations difficult. As seen in similar exploitation cases which official apparatuses of the state have involved and court authorities have claimed to preservation of "state's interests", investigations and judgment mechanisms can easily become dysfunctional.

5.2.7. Private Security Companies And The Rise Of State Surveillance

The private security companies, which were founded with Law 5188, are perceived to be a control mechanism of the majority of the population because of their surveillance and operations overseeing and infiltrating every area of daily life. Private security companies help the state to have vast control of society through their services and operations.

First, the proliferation of private security is an aspect of a surveillance society, and this is what is known as a police state.²²⁶ The private security guards wearing special uniforms are under the control of the police force by law, but they have the authority to use force in certain areas to relieve security anxieties/interests. These guards are given almost as much authority as the police force because of the problems arising

known as "Sauna Çetesi" (Sauna Gang), they were operating from February of 2006. There was mention of a private security company owner along with some high-ranking government officials that were being targeted because of some illegal connections he had. This person had been taken into custody because he had been deemed to have "established a profit-making criminal organization to operate within his organization." (*Sabah*, "Sauna Çetesi'ne Asker El Koydu", February 22, 2006)

²²⁵ *Hürriyet*, "Suikastçi Özel Güvenlikçi Çıktı," April 26, 2007.

²²⁶ Can Kozanoğlu (2001) "Polis Toplumu, Özel Güvenlik, Bodyguard," in Kozanoğlu *Yeni Şehir Notları*, İletişim Press: Istanbul, pp. 137-176.

from the law mentioned above. They can act as symbols of state authority in practice.²²⁷ This goes as far as being tasked, if required, with maintaining order alongside the police force.²²⁸ Taking the view that is in opposition to the dominant way of thinking, this proliferation shows that a police state has emerged, which is supported by enlarging the modes/scope of surveillance and supervision.

Second, the privatization of security functions as a bio-administration that allows for the extension of the state's surveillance. This privatization enables a group of private guards to collect information and to intervene in situations in their place of work. Nonetheless, this is not the whole story. First, as I mentioned before, the authority of these private guards is valid only at their stations, and they are also expected to be law-abiding employees. It is a fact that they can appear in any and every moment of daily life. In other words, even if the law limits the authority of a guard, their appearance is continuous in the practice and this transforms people's use of public space.²²⁹

In addition, the professionalization of security precautions is the result of technological surveillance that has launched extensive changes in security equipment. Closed-circuit camera systems and turnstiles make surveillance technology available at every turn. It becomes an employer's routine monitoring of an employee, or a parent of his/her child, or a school principal of their students.²³⁰ In brief, these precautionary security practices are a change away from the focus on actual crimes to increasing the ability of collecting evidence, which enables the continuation of security anxiety throughout social life.²³¹ Some examples of surveillance technologies are as follows:

²²⁷ Atılğan (2009), p. 263.

²²⁸ In Şırnak, Mehmet Avcı, the Chief of Police, talks about how private security guards help the police force: "Private security supports us. It means that we no longer need to assign squads to the places where private guards work. It also increase our mobility. Thanks to private security, we can increase our control points." (www.medya73.com, 2009 July)

²²⁹ Yardımcı (2009), p. 250.

²³⁰ Haspolat (2012), p. 254.

²³¹ Tanıl Bora (2011) "Polis ve 'Cemaat'," *Birikim*, vol. 264-265, pp. 3-9.

A new type of security control system has been released. A private company, named Perkotek with a large number of customers in Turkey, has begun to sell a ‘toilet-tracking system.’ This system promises customers that they will uncover employees that spend too much time in toilet, by installing card or fingerprint reader terminals on the doors.²³²

In Adana province, the robbery of a jewelry store by three young girls was caught on security cameras. It drew attention to the fact that one girl with stolen jewelry was walking behind the other two girls, who were trying to hide her.²³³

Fatih Koç, the department chief of Crime Scene Investigation and Identification, said that there are 17.5 million persons on record in the department’s fingerprint system. The persons recorded in the database consist of those who apply for driver licenses, passports, and licenses to bear arms; and include private security guards or police officers. Also, included are those who have court cases.²³⁴

The Turkish Football Federation e-ticket system has been designed in a way to record private information of all football fans. If one wants to go a football match, s/he buys a card called Passolig to enter the stadium. To obtain this card s/he also has to provide a photo, national ID number, and a residence document.²³⁵

Medical service scams would be a thing of past. The Social Security Institution Biometric Identification Project came into effect on September 1, 2013. Citizens are able to authenticate their identities by fingerprint analysis.²³⁶

As seen in the examples, the proliferation of technological security has enabled the authorities to keep every space of daily life under surveillance and to supervise everyone’s behavior. Neoliberalism is an idea that allows seeing capital accumulation as public service. In short, there is a change in a country’s make up with the release of what can be seen as the public domain into the marketplace. Thus, the re-construction of public places is accompanied by the construction of monstrous buildings that severely strain infrastructure services and create ‘yawning

²³² *Hürriyet*, “Şimdi de tuvalet takip sistemi,” March 17, 2009.

²³³ *Radikal*, “Kuyumcu soyan üç kız kardeş yakalandı,” August 27, 2008.

²³⁴ *Hürriyet*, “17,5 milyon kişi parmaklarından tanınıyor,” January 13, 2014.

²³⁵ Ezgi Başaran, “Yeni gözetleme, pardon, biletleme sistemi,” *Radikal*, September 26, 2013.

²³⁶ *Sabah*, “Biyometrik Projesi 1 Eylül’de Başlıyor,” June 29, 2013.

gaps' within the space those buildings occupy. These gigantic constructions, with shopping centers and office towers produce 'insecurity' and call for security services to oversee these occupied areas. In other words, the commodification provokes insecurity, and then develops a security circle against it.²³⁷

Third, private security works with the public force and it helps the public force function to help "constitute public order". In this manner, the police force withdraws from secondary security fields (private, public, or semi-public places; such as stadiums, hospitals, schools, etc.) and security is transferred to private security organizations.²³⁸ The police force concentrates on "primary problems" that threaten the society.²³⁹ In this way, the state creates public opinion that private security not only guards the rich, but the entire society, and it hides the results of the privatization process that in fact punishes the poor.²⁴⁰ While private security companies focus on the "crimes against the public order", the police and the army develop and reconstitute the state's authority while referencing the greater "problems" that threaten the system.²⁴¹

To understand the immediate and total control that the state order elicits, it is also necessary to consider Article number 23 of Law 5335²⁴², which eases the transfer of retired public officers into the private security sector that helps to create an ambiguous private security field. According to Article number 23, one can see that the "dilemma between framing security as a commodity freely bought and sold in the market, and keeping the state as the ultimate authority to which the security

²³⁷ Kerem Kabadayı (2007) "Kent Dokusunun Arz Ettiği Tehdit: Azman Yapılar, Tekinsiz Boşluklar," *İstanbul Dergisi Tarih Vakfı Yayınları*, vol. 59, p. 72.

²³⁸ By saying of the legal forces: "While we strive against kidnapping and the bombers; let private security protect stadiums, airports, and brothels." Gülden Aydın, "Özel Güvenlikçi Sayısı Polisi Geçti Askerlik Şubelerini Bile Onlar Koruyacak," *Hürriyet*, May 21, 2006.

²³⁹ "We see that airports, museums, tourist areas can provide security by employing private security companies. Thus, the public force can focus more on public security." Ahmet Karagöz, December 1, 2001. (www.caginpulisi.com.tr)

²⁴⁰ Haspolat (2012), pp. 249-250.

²⁴¹ Bedirhanoğlu (2010), p. 60.

²⁴² Law 5335 on Decisions to Change of Some Codes and Executive Orders, published in the Official Gazette no. 25798, dated 27 April 2005.

sector has to report" has occurred.²⁴³ Thereby, it is unclear whether private security companies are part of the police force or not.

To sum up, for all intents and purposes, private security acts as a component of the police force and helps complete the police force's mission to "secure public order". Accordingly, the police direct private security guards during the process of processing crimes and criminals, and concordantly, they set examples of how the security sector should be governed. This portrait of private security as a component of the "Neoliberal Leviathan" helps us grasp the idea that security is an instrument of surveillance and oppression in Turkey, and describes to what extent the public force extends its dominance.

²⁴³Yardımcı and Alemdar (2010), p. 40.

CONCLUSION

In this study, the revamping of the state's dominance during the neoliberal era is discussed within the theoretical parameters of Loïc Wacquant's exposition of neoliberalism. According to Wacquant, neoliberalism as a political constellation is a project that refers to the restructuring of the state using stratification and classification as a machine driving the neoliberal revolution from above. Wacquant suggests that neoliberalism brings not the shrinking of the government, but the building of a centaur state.

This neoliberalization process is literally the institutionalization of a dominant state. It is during the AKP period that all of traits of what Wacquant calls a "Neoliberal Leviathan" are demonstrated. Accordingly, this period corresponds to an increased expansion of the state's visibility and dominance.

This study argues that characterization of the 1990s as a securitization period and the 2000s as the transition to a liberal democracy as a two-pronged idea is incorrect. More specifically, the AKP period, rather than aiming to remove the "overly secure" foundation of the political system created by the September 12 military coup, adopted the idea of redesigning the political system it inherited and moreover, fortified the state's need for security (both as a concept and as a practice).

Compared to the previous period, neoliberalism during the AKP period was institutionalized and the commodification of the security industry was accelerated. This period can be characterized by the feeling of uncertainty in the populace exacerbated by the perception of a threat to the state and the evolution of the "responsible citizen" which gave birth to a new kind of socialization. Under this framework, the expansion of the security forces (both private and public) and the acceleration of the privatization of the security industry in Turkey during the AKP era as a whole did not mean there was a specific and effective response to crime itself or the overall feeling of insecurity. This also did not imply the maintenance of a small government. In fact, these are some of the components of the "Neoliberal Leviathan" that had come into being in Turkey.

Accordingly, the transition to neoliberalism in Turkey correlates closely with the idea that neoliberalism facilitates conditions for profitable capital accumulation, and becomes the primary mission of the state. It invites the shrinkage of the social wing of the state under the banner of fiscal prudence, and increases anxiety around the idea of security in every aspect of a citizen's life within society.

The 'aura' of security shapes the perception that there are threats. This creates a need for more security and calls for a private security sector, which works side by side with the public force. The orthodox discourse claims that privatization of security ends up with a separation of security practices from those of official entities. Parallel to this, this discourse redefines the private and the official under the scope of security. However, in practice, the privatization of security services only creates new channels for the government to control every part of daily life as the sector is commodified.

Therefore, in Turkey, one should treat the growth and development of the private sector not as the harbinger of a small government, but the resurgence of the state authority over all security issues. This inclusive argument unfolds with the emergence of private security as a key figure dealing with cases of public order within daily life and the increasing attention on the state's concentration on terror and anti-state movements.

This role which was given to outside agents as a means of providing security, is not only a part of neoliberalism itself, but also, an inherent part of the information-based governance mechanism. It reorganizes authoritarian relationships within the society by enabling the control of individuals by the Turkish state. Consequently, it becomes the state process of consolidating itself through its new agents; which is a fundamental transformation of the neoliberal state's definition of a traditional state. Thus the commodification of security should be evaluated as a process whereby the state reestablishes its own security.

Similarly, the expansion of private security causes an increase in the number of arms within the society. It also calls for the re-organization of public space, and militarization of daily life by constructing new methods of surveillance. This all, in turn, results in the making of a state hegemony which would more completely

envelope society. In conclusion, the division of labor between public and private security forces enabled the sector to expand its dominance. This shows us how the privatization of the security industry transforms our daily life and contributes to the building of the "Neoliberal Leviathan."

I want to finish this with a Cizre quotation, which I believe guides us for a better understanding of civilization and democracy in Turkey:

[...] Main reform is about the change in the ideas and conceptions of non-technical fields. Because, actually the alluded reality is: to rehabilitate the institutions that are responsible to establish security, about the definition of security concept and in the social philosophy in parallel by abstracting them about the lifestyles, democratic preferences and changes accruing in material world and new trends coming up, is an effort in vain. All it's going to be, this effort is, only physical modernism. Essential thing is, to be able to battle at two frontlines at the same time, while working on the institutions to establish a more effective and active security, on the other hand all these actions has to be fitted in a more democratic and peaceful frame as a wider and blanketing mental project. Consequently, in the hot conflict zone we live in, it's not to reinforce this country's security policy spectrum no matter what, but to unite it on modern democratic priorities very strongly. Because, at this point, this is what "security" means.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ Ümit Cizre (2006) "Giriş ya da 'İtaat' Kültürü Yerine Bilimsel İtiraf ya da İtiraz," in Ümit Cizre (ed.) *Almanak Türkiye 2005 Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim*, Tesev Publishing: Istanbul, p. 9.

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