

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN IRAQ: BUILDING SECURITY FORCES IN POST-CONFLICT  
MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES

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AUGUST 2014

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN IRAQ: BUILDING SECURITY FORCES IN POST-CONFLICT  
MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
ISTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY

SALİH AKPINAR

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  
IN  
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST 2014


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
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## ABSTRACT

### SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN IRAQ: BUILDING SECURITY FORCES IN POST-CONFLICT MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES

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August 2014, 87 pages

The purpose of this study is to grasp the dynamics behind the security sector reform in Iraq after the American invasion of 2003. The Iraqi State had to be rebuilt from the beginning because of the total annihilation of the Baath regime and its institutions. The analysis has been made through the concepts of Peacebuilding, Nation-Building and State-Building. The historical background has also been analyzed in order to grasp the present dynamics between different ethnic and sectarian factions living in Iraq. The main used method has been the literature review of the used theories as well as the follow-up of daily Iraqi news. The results indicate that neither State Building nor Nation-Building have succeeded in the Iraqi case. The only attained objective is that democratic institutions have been rapidly implemented but they have failed because of the internal dynamics. The Security Sector have been reorganized but the presence of strong militias, the lack of leadership and the policies of the invaders and the local politicians still hinders the State to have the monopoly of violence over its territory. Constituting a new Security Sector is intertwined with the political and socio-economic aspects of the State. This is the reason why Nation-Building and State-Building must be operated in a harmonious way. However, the Iraqi case has been a total failure of such endeavors. The presently on-going events show that Iraq will most probably split into two or even three distinct States.

Keywords: Security Sector, Iraq, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Nation-Building, State-Building, Peacebuilding

## ÖZ

### IRAK'TA GÜVENLİK SEKTÖRÜ REFORMU: MÜLTİ-ETNİK TOPLULUKLARDA ÇATIŞMA SONRASI GÜVENLİK GÜÇLERİNİN OLUŞTURULMASI

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MA, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı : Yrd. Doç. Dr. Talha Köse

Ağustos 2014, 87 sayfa

Bu çalışma, 2003 Amerikan işgalinden sonra Irak'ta güvenlik sektörü reformu arkasındaki dinamikleri kavrama amacıyla yazılmıştır. Baas rejimi ve onun kurumlarının toplamının imhasından dolayı Irak devletinin başından itibaren yeniden inşa edilmesi gerekiyordu. Bu analiz, Barış-İnşası, Ulus-İnşası ve Devlet-İnşası kavramları üzerinden yapılmıştır. Tarihsel arka planı da Irak'ta yaşayan farklı etnik ve mezhepsel gruplar arasındaki mevcut dinamikleri kavramak amacıyla tahlil edilmiştir. Ana kullanılan yöntem, teorilerin literatürü yanı sıra günlük Irak haber takibi olmuştur. Sonuçlar, Irak'ta ne Devlet-İnşası'nın, ne de Ulus-İnşası'nın başarılı olmadığını göstermektedir. Sadece demokratik kurumlar hızla hayata geçirilmiştir ama iç dinamiklerden dolayı hemen hemen hepsi başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştır ve işlevsel değillerdir. Güvenlik Sektörü yeniden oluşturulmuş, ama güçlü milislerin varlığı, liderlik eksikliği, işgalcilerin ve yerel politikacılar siyasi tercihleri hala Irak devletinin toprakları üzerinde şiddet tekeline sahip olmasına engellemektedir. Yeni bir Güvenlik Sektörü oluşturmak devletin siyasal ve sosyo-ekonomik yönleri ile iç içedir. Bundan ötürü Ulus-İnşası ve Devlet-İnşası ahenkli bir şekilde işletilmelidir. Ancak, Irak'ta yürütülen çabalar başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştır. Halen devam etmekte olan olaylar Irak'ın muhtemelen iki ya da üç farklı Devletlere bölünmüş olacağını gösteriyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik sektörü, Irak, Savaş sonrası yapılanma, Devlet-İnşası, Ulus-İnşası, Barış-İnşası

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I need to thank many valuable people who have supported me during the hard work that had to be done to come up with such a result. First of all I want to thank my supervisor, Talha Köse who supported and guided me from the beginning of the process till the end. He always told me that I could do better, and I listened to his encouragements. I am also very thankful to Berdal Aral and Yakoob Ahmed who took the time to read my first draft and told me about my general mistakes concerning the content of the thesis. I would like to thank my fellow graduate students, and the multitude of undergraduate friends with whom I discussed my thesis. Finally, I am very grateful to İhsan Fazlıođlu, İshak Arslan and Ekrem Karakoç because without them, I would not have accomplished such a work and I would not even think about completing a Master's degree. Thank you for believing in me and holding my hand when I needed the most...

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## INTRODUCTION

In the framework of his Freedom Agenda, George W. Bush at the head of the United States had decided to invade Iraq in order to topple Saddam Hussein who was considered as a tyrant dictator towards his population and as a threat to international security. In 2003, Saddam Hussein had been removed from power, but the Iraqi state entered in a whirlpool of a disaster. The many ethnic and sectarian problems in the region have been revived and it still has many repercussions all over the country as well as its surroundings. 'Operation Iraqi Freedom', as it was called, liberated the Iraqis from Saddam Hussein, brought democratic institutions in the state, and unleashed whole new dynamics for the population. The main objectives of the invasion were to come up with a federal system where specific guaranties would be given to the Kurds in the north, a system of power-sharing where different ethnic and sectarian communities could participate in political life, the removal of the Baath system, and the introduction of a market economy<sup>1</sup>. For instance, a new constitution was written in 2005, and the U.S. completed its withdrawal of military personnel in December 2011. However, the insurgency is ongoing and continues to cause thousands of fatalities. New terrorist groups have appeared such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) who give the signal that war will still be a reality of Iraq for the next few years.

Even if the war has ended for the United States, it is still a harsh reality for Iraq's population. The state apparatuses are weakened, the population is divided more than ever, and security issues are omnipresent. This is why it is important more than ever to study the country's dynamics in order to end the disorder and put the state back on track so it can fulfil its functions properly. To realize such an objective, many aspects of Iraq should be given attention inter alia, the local population's composure, the governance, the constitution, as well as the economic and political conditions. However, in this research, I will concentrate on the establishment of a functional and

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<sup>1</sup> Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Westview Press, 2012), 51.

effective security sector in Iraq as a part of the post-conflict reconstruction. My focus is thus to understand how the army and the police forces are built in post-conflict situations in multi-ethnic/multi-sectarian states, and to explain why this process has failed in Iraq. In order to achieve such a task, the period that I will cover will start from 2005 when the new constitution was ratified until the present day where peace and security continue to be an unattainable objective.

In the covered period, I will first assess the determinants of a functional state and analyze the situation of Iraq to see first if it is a failed state or not. Then, I will assess the general conditions of the country in the framework of Nation-Building, State-Building and more specifically, Security Sector Reform, in a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian society. The theoretical approach will thus be based on these concepts, which I will eventually explain and clarify in order to determine my own approach and find out the peculiarities of the Security Sector in Iraq with regard to the related theories. Once the theoretical background has been clarified, I will pass on to the practical side of the question where I will assess the claims and aspirations of different ethnic groups living in Iraq. Hence, it will be possible to decipher the principal discrepancies between various groups, which led them to take conflicting positions against each other and hinder them to act in harmony. As I have mentioned, Security Sector will be my focus in this research. I will try to decipher and find out the most appropriate roadmap in order to erect a functional security system including the army, intelligence services and the police force.

The thesis is separated into four chapters where the first will explain and clarify certain theories on which I will base my own approach for the Iraqi case. The first chapter will also include the general political situation of today's Iraq as well as its historical background, which determined the present dynamics between different factions of the society. It will thus constitute the theoretical and historical base for the following chapters. All the notions within the framework of Peacebuilding will be clarified in order to better grasp the practical issues on the field. The second chapter includes the chronological description of the events following the invasion of 2003. Responsibilities

and roles of the United Nations and of the United States of America (USA) are described and assessed in order to see whether the theory has been applied properly or not. The general situation in Iraq in terms of its structures, constitution and societal settings are also assessed to see the effects and outcomes of the conducted reforms. In that sense the state of security apparatus such as law enforcement, police force and the armed forces are assessed within the framework of democratization and state-building. The third chapter includes the assessment of local actors in order to apprehend the real sources of disorders and the areas where their objectives are divergent. The fourth chapter includes the general principles to follow for an effective Security Sector reform for the Iraqi case by protecting the entity of the state. The general path followed by the UN and the USA are also assessed in order to see if their policies were suitable for the Iraqi state. The last chapter will be the conclusion in which I will assess the theories and decipher if they are enough to explain the Iraqi case. I will finish by explaining the causes of the failure of the Iraqi case and extract lessons from such a complex case.

## CHAPTER 1

### POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS IN IRAQ

#### 1.1 The History of Iraq

##### 1.1.1 Iraq from 1920 to 2003

Neither history nor geography has played in Iraq's favor. Since its formation in 1920, the country has experienced many rebellions and conflicts, which still continue to this day albeit in different forms and for various causes. The state has been carved from three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Baghdad, Mosul and Basra - and created under British aegis as a mandate<sup>2</sup>. Under the Ottomans each province was ruled by its own separate administration, and each province had little in common with the other two<sup>3</sup>.




Figure 1.1: Iraq under Ottoman rule

<sup>2</sup> Hala Fattah and Frank Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq* (Facts on File, 2009), 67.

<sup>3</sup> Gokhan Cetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890 – 1908* (Routledge, 2006), 28.

However, the British administration decided to divide the three Ottoman provinces into fourteen distinct provinces<sup>4</sup>. People from various cultures were already living in the region mostly the Kurds, Arabs Shias and Arab Sunnis. Once the state was proclaimed, conflicts appeared immediately between different factions concerning state affairs. In 1932, the Iraqi state gained its independence and became a sovereign state. King Faisal asserted with sorrow in 1925 that no Iraqi people live in Iraq, there are only people divided ideologically, nationally and religiously who are unable to engage in a common activity. It is still possible to reaffirm such a sentence in the present Iraqi context. In the 1920s and 1930s, Kurds formed 23 percent of Iraq's population or 2 – 2.5 million people, the Arab Shias have always been the majority of the population and the Arab Sunnis were bolstered by the Baath regime. On July 14, 1958, the Brigadier General Abdul-Karim Qasim overthrew the monarchy. In 1963, the members of the Baath party who deplored his close association with the communists overthrew him. The presidency was then given to the Aref brothers who consecutively ruled the country from 1963 to 1966 and from 1966 to 1968. Abdul-Rahman Aref was on his turn overthrown by the Baath party through a coup d'état and the latter took power. The most ambitious member of the Baathist regime was undoubtedly Saddam Hussein who moved up the ranks of the party and assured himself a political base within it. Following a power transition within the party, Saddam Hussein came to command in 1979 where he firmly ruled the country through different institutions until the U.S invasion in 2003. Saddam Hussein relied on patronage networks including the 'mukhabarat services', tribal loyalties and financial incentives. However, the most important institution in Iraq has always been the security forces.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Hala Fattah and Frank Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq* (Facts on File, 2009), 71.

<sup>5</sup> Hala Fattah and Frank Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq* (Facts on File, 2009), 82.



Iraq's history is a mix of Arab nationalism, Iraqi nationalism, self-determination and oil resources<sup>6</sup>. It is important to have an idea about historical dynamics between different factions living in Iraq if we want to grasp the actual tensions between them. The third chapter will include details about the beliefs and aspirations of each ethnic and sectarian group, but here I will just draw a broad image of historical developments<sup>7</sup>. The most important period to remember starts from 1968 where the Baathist group overthrew the government by a coup and took full power of the Iraqi state. The motto of the party was "unity, liberty, socialism" which broadly explains its principal tenet. Unity is for the independence of a strong Arab Nation, liberty is for freedom from colonial oppression, as well as freedom of expression, and socialism is the main ideological approach of the party identified by the Baathist as the closest ruling system to the last prophet in Islam. Pan-Arabism was fostered by the Baath party, which even started a campaign of Arabization within the country during the 1970s. Because it was anti-imperialist and socialist, the Baath party believed that the resources in the region ought to be destined to the Arabs only. This is the reason why the party completely nationalized Iraq's oil industry in 1975. Economic development, redistribution of wealth and industrialization and diversification were on the agenda of the Baath party.<sup>8</sup> Many investments were poured in the military and the development of nuclear program because of the vision of Arab world leadership.

### 1.1.2 The Baath Party and Saddam Hussein's rule

The Baath party ruled over the country from 1968 to 2003. However, the last Baathist president was Saddam Hussein who took the helm in 1979 by a relatively smooth transition where he convinced the president to let him lead the party and the state. Saddam who was a fervent defender of Pan-Arabism waged many Arabization campaigns in the region above all towards the Kurds. Saddam also enhanced his own

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<sup>6</sup> Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Westview Press, 2012), 112.

<sup>7</sup> Historical details do not have primary importance here because of our limitations; therefore, I will not get into details with the past.

<sup>8</sup> Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Westview Press, 2012), 121.

powers and grasped more control over the military by appointing himself field marshal. He waged war against Iran in 1980 for several reasons. He waged the 'Anfal Campaign' where the Iraqi army used chemical weapons against the Kurdish population in the north in 1988 and where the systematic and deliberate murder of at least 50,000 and possibly as many as 100,000 Kurds had taken place. With the largest army in the Middle East, Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990 because he believed that Kuwait was part of the Iraqi state.

After the war against Iran, which lasted for eight years, Saddam Hussein got out of the turmoil, being extremely indebted to countries that supported him financially, politically and militarily. Until the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had the largest military in the region with 750,000 men, ground forces organized into ten corps and sixty-seven divisions<sup>9</sup>. It is possible to assert that the military played a prominent role in Iraq's history. It is still an important matter for the Iraqi state because the security apparatus of the state is very weak and it is the source of many conflicts within the Iraqi society. The military was the strongest barrier protecting the Sunni Arabs as a minority from Shia and Kurdish opposition. Sunni Arabs have always been granted high positions in the military even if they came from different classes, tribes or regions. Hussein, who assumed the title of President of the Republic, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, appointed some Shias and Kurds to key positions also because of his pan-Arab ideology. However, they were very limited in number. The vast majority of the lower ranks in the armed forces, close to 85 percent, were filled with Kurds and Shias<sup>10</sup>. The main success of Saddam Hussein's Baath party was to bring the military under civilian control. The army has always been a source of threat to the regimes, the officers organized coups against any regime with which they did not agree, but Hussein was aware of it and managed to take control of the situation. He personally erected a totalitarian system where he was

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<sup>9</sup> Ibrahim al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed forces, An Analytical History* (Routledge, 2008), 76.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 167.

able to bring stability to civil-military relations. Saddam Hussein's patrimonial and authoritarian regime gave prominence to personal ties. He recruited members of the military, the intelligence, and the security organizations among his own family members, his tribe, and then the tribes that were loyal to his regime.

### 1.1.3 The US Invasion of Iraq and its consequences (2003 to 2014)

In 2003, Saddam Hussein was removed from power following the US-led occupation of Iraq and the dictatorship was brought to an end. Elections were held after the interim government where Jalal Talabani became president and Nouri al-Maliki was elected as prime minister. Besides security and sectarian violence, the most urgent problems facing Iraq's government were the wrecked economy, the decreased energy output, massive food shortages, and a shattered health system<sup>11</sup>. Iraq is presently a parliamentary democracy where power-sharing practice in order to give the opportunity to different factions to have a certain political control have literally failed. The present political system is not welcomed by the Arab Sunnis who have lost many advantages following Saddam's death. Many policy makers question the constitution and its strength to reflect the needs of the Iraqi population, as well as the fair political representation of ethnic and sectarian groups. For instance, whereas the Iraqi officer corps were recruited primarily among Arab Sunnis until 2003, this body consisted of mostly Shia and Kurdish officers after the regime change. The UK and the US envisioned the new Iraqi Army as an institution that could incorporate Iraq's various communities by transcending ethnic, religious and sectarian differences<sup>12</sup>. However, the present configuration of the army does not satisfy the Arab Sunni faction. Ethnic and sectarian loyalties in the military ultimately threatened the cohesion and integration of Iraq's communities in the army, a dynamic that persisted throughout Iraq's history and which

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<sup>11</sup> Sultan Barakat, "Post-Saddam Iraq: Deconstructing a Regime, Reconstructing a Nation", *Third World Quarterly*, (Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 2005). 571-591.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

continues in the reformed Iraqi military in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war<sup>13</sup>. The new Iraqi Army was envisioned by the CPA to function as a light infantry force, to maintain internal security without a strong logistics component or heavy armor, thus reassuring its neighbors that the new Iraqi Army would be incapable of invading a country outside of its borders<sup>14</sup>.

It is true that elections have been held many times in Iraq. However, this democratic process only served to solidify ethnic and sectarian fragmentation because of power issues where the Kurds and Shias have been empowered and the Sunni Arabs have been marginalized. Indeed, the Shia Islamist parties have grasped huge power since the elections of 2005, and they continue to hold approximately 50% of the Council of Representatives. The Kurdish groups are the second most numerous where they hold an average of 22% of the seats in the Council of Representatives since January 2005. The Arab Sunni groups are the least represented at the Council of Representatives where they share only 3% of the available seats<sup>15</sup>.

#### 1.1.4 Political progress in Iraq after 2003

As it is globally known, The United States of America breached international norms by invading Iraq in 2003. This caused the, international system to be questioned on its legitimacy level. This is the primary reason why the United Nations has reticently participated in the reconstruction process of Iraq. There was no legitimate background for the invasion, and the UN did not want to endorse such an attempt engaged by the United States. However, for humanitarian reasons, in the framework of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the UN actively contributed to the reconstruction process of Iraq. In its own website, the UN specifies that the UNAMI is a political mission *“established by the 14 August 2003 UN Security Council*

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<sup>13</sup> Ibrahim al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed forces, An Analytical History* (Routledge, 2008), 166.

<sup>14</sup> Walter B. Slocombe, *Iraq's Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform 'Under Fire'* (2008), 88.

<sup>15</sup> Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Westview Press, 2012), 92.

*Resolution 1500 at the request of the Government of Iraq. It has been on the ground ever since, with its role greatly expanded in 2007 with the passage of Resolution 1770*<sup>16</sup>. In summary the UN asserts that

Since its inception in 2003, UNAMI has played a crucial role in providing significant support in the drafting of Iraq's 2005 Constitution, assisting in six elections, coordinating UN humanitarian efforts and the financial assistance of the donor community and providing advisory support to the Council of Representatives. UNAMI continues to assist in political dialogue towards a resolution of issues related to Kirkuk and other disputed internal territories of Iraq.<sup>17</sup>

The Mission is administered by the UN's Department of Political Affairs and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as the Department of Field Support<sup>18</sup>. It is also specified that the UNAMI is mandated to advise and assist the Government, "*at the latter's request*", on a number of issues. Since 2007, the UN has progressively increased its presence in Iraq and plans to continue expanding operations throughout the country. Currently, there are approximately 170 international staff and more than 420 national staff working for the UN in Iraq distributed in all 18 Governorates<sup>19</sup>. The United Nations thus helped Iraq in its postwar reconstruction process in diverse sectors. Many projects are being developed for the sake of the Iraqis. In that sense, the protection and promotion of human rights is the cornerstone of the presently conducted mission in Iraq.

As I have mentioned, the US and UK's main objective in Iraq was the de-Baathification of the state and its full integration into the international system through democratization and liberalization. For that purpose, the foreign administration followed a roadmap that eliminated all the institutions related to the Baath Party and

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<sup>16</sup> uniraq.org

<sup>17</sup> uniraq.org

<sup>18</sup> uniraq.org

<sup>19</sup> Graham Day and Christopher Freeman, "Policekeeping Is the Key: Rebuilding the Internal Security Architecture of Postwar Iraq", *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, no. 2(2003): 299-313.

took the Baathist personnel out of the game. It excluded from public-sector employment the top four ranks of the party, immediately affecting about 30,000 individuals<sup>20</sup>. Hence, there was a power vacuum that lasted for certain months until the transitional government of the Coalition Provisional Authority took necessary measures to grasp the power and fulfil important tasks in order to form the new Iraqi State apparatus until its dissolution in 2004. By analyzing the reconstruction process, it is easy to remark that crucial importance has been accorded to the constitution-making and democratization processes. However, these processes have been done in an accelerated and rapid manner. The biggest mistake made by the US administration was to dismantle the Iraqi army and the security apparatus of the country<sup>21</sup>. The United States also left people in a state of disorder and chaos for a while for no rationally explainable reason. Looting was widespread in museums, governmental institutions and valuable places. In that sense, the looting devastated Iraq's infrastructure, set back its reconstruction effort, and undermined what confidence the population may have had in the new administration<sup>22</sup>. A reasonable level of security and peace are the necessary conditions for the initiation of economic, political and cultural reconstruction processes. This is the reason why most investors hesitate before investing into the reconstruction of the infrastructure of Iraq.

Presently, it is estimated that 60% of the population depends on the "oil for food" program administered by the United Nations<sup>23</sup>. Unfortunately, people who do not know the peculiarities of Iraq and its indigenous population have drafted the initial plan made for the reconstruction of Iraq. Inappropriate steps have been made in order to

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<sup>20</sup> Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson, "Decentralized Local Governance In Fragile States: Learning From Iraq", *Research Triangle Institute*, (March 2010): 12.

<sup>21</sup> Benjamin Svacool and Saul Halfon, *Reconstructing Iraq: merging discourses of security and development*. (Review of International Studies, 2007), 33.

<sup>22</sup> Ami C. Carpenter, *Community Resilience to Sectarian Violence in Baghdad*, (Springer, 2014), 91.

<sup>23</sup> Michael Rear, *Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State*, (Routledge, 2008), 144.

liberalize the country, but they were incompatible with the cultural settings of the country. The CPA in itself had many bureaucratic problems because of unexperienced staff who did not know the region and also because of the lack of consultation with the local population. A calendar has been resorted and followed in order to respond to American needs instead of Iraqi needs. The calendar's objectives were more political than humanitarian.

Iraq's reconstruction is currently funded from three principal sources: the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), a product of UN resolution 1483; balances from the U.N. Oil for Food program; and previously frozen Iraqi funds<sup>24</sup>. The U.S. government also contributes to international assistance efforts with France, the U.K and Russia. Under the CPA, reconstruction efforts focused mainly on large infrastructure repair and construction with particular stress on oil, water and electricity. However, security problems made it difficult for the organization to work efficiently and deliver effective work. Because the United Nations Security Council never sanctioned the intervention, the UN has been exceedingly cautious about operating fully in Iraq<sup>25</sup>. The international legal situation has evolved considerably in the wake of the initial conflict. After an extensive and sometimes acerbic debate within the Security Council, that body passed Resolution 1483, which (1) lifted pre-existing economic sanctions on Iraq, (2) acknowledged the United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers, and (3) invited other powers into Iraq to work with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)<sup>26</sup>. UN activities in Iraq cover three broad areas: coordinating and implementing projects for the economic and social reconstruction of Iraq; managing and overseeing the use of funds provided for the reconstruction of Iraq; and lending support to the political and

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<sup>24</sup> Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson, "Decentralized Local Governance In Fragile States: Learning From Iraq", *Research Triangle Institute*, (March 2010), 12

<sup>25</sup> Michael Rear, *Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State*, (Routledge, 2008), 148.

<sup>26</sup> Michael Rear, *Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State*, (Routledge, 2008)

constitutional process. Capacity building, reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance are top priorities.

The earliest stages of state-building process are consumed with the issues of establishing territorial boundaries and consolidating power in the hands of a single individual or institution<sup>27</sup>. This is why at a meeting of the Security Council 22 July 2003, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Kofi Annan's representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello presents a severe observation on the action of the intervening forces and advocates an accelerated timetable for transition. On 8 September, Bremer presented a plan for such a transfer, which involved a constitution, a referendum on that constitution, an election, and only then a turnover of authority to Iraqis<sup>28</sup>. This is the meaning of the Agreement signed on 15 November following between Jalal Talabani, secretary of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the administrator Paul Bremer, providing an early award of executive powers to a new interim government. A few months later, on 8 June 2004, Resolution 1546 of the Security Council endorsed the dissolution of the CPA and the transfer of sovereignty to the new authorities. It also gave them the opportunity formally to ask for the early departure of coalition troops. On June 28, 2004, the first "sovereign" Iraqi –interim- government was finally born, headed by Iyad Allawi, appointed prime minister and the Sunni tribal leader Ghazi Yawar appointed president. It consisted of sixteen Shiite ministers, eight Sunnis, seven Kurds, a Turkmen and a Christian, all loaded to run the country until the first general elections in January 2005.

Many insurgencies erupted until the elections of 2005. However, the elections were held as intended. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), a provisional constitution, was the framework for the political sphere for a certain period. The new and

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<sup>27</sup> Alina Rocha Menocal, "State Building for Peace: a new paradigm for international engagement in post-conflict fragile states?", *Third World Quarterly*, no. 10 (2011): 1715-1736.

<sup>28</sup> Andrew Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, no. 5(Oct., 2005): 1013-1038.



permanent constitution was written and presented to referendum where it was accepted and became the new framework for the Iraqi State. The Sunni faction was the most irritated by the new constitution and its members started a new struggle against the more advantaged others in order to protect their rights. Sectarian war was revived and distrust between ethnic and sectarian groups deepened. Besides security and sectarian violence, the most urgent problems facing Iraq's government were the wrecked economy, the decreased energy output, massive food shortages, and a shattered healthcare system<sup>29</sup>.

In order to come up with a permanent democratic system, the TAL was replaced by the newly approved constitution and new elections were held in December 2005. Hence, the new government was born with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a member of the Da'wa party, the president Jalal Talabani, and the United Iraqi Alliance as the leading party with approximately 47 percent of the available 275 seats in the Council of Representatives. Thus, Shia Islamist groups who gained the majority of the seats in January 2005 elections demonstrated approximately the same performance during the elections of December 2005.

Here are the major points of the Constitution concerning Security Sector:

Article 9/1/B.

The formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is prohibited by the constitution.

Article 59/1.

The Council of Representatives quorum shall be achieved by an absolute majority of its members.

Article 78.

The Prime Minister is the direct executive authority responsible for the general policy of the State and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

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<sup>29</sup> Ami C. Carpenter, *Community Resilience to Sectarian Violence in Baghdad*, (Springer, 2014), 67.

Article 116.

The federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, as well as local administrations.

Article 117/1.

This constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.

Article 120.

Each region shall adopt a constitution of its own that defines the structure of powers of the region, its authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, provided that it does not contradict this Constitution.

Article 121/5.

The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region.

Following the elections, new tensions arose and one of the holiest Shrines in Shia Islam, the Askari Mosque in Samarra', was bombed. Violent conflicts were to be present more than ever before. As Phebe Marr asserts, "*the gradual but decisive shift in power to the Shia religious parties, aligned with their Kurdish allies, and their potential ability to consolidate that power once and for all using elections and control of the government became increasingly clear and was seen as threatening by Sunnis Arabs*"<sup>30</sup>. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of November 2006 Saddam Hussein was sentenced for crimes against humanity. It was al-Maliki who signed the execution order and he was accused of doing this in revenge rather than for justice. This perception brought anger to the Sunni Arabs and Baathist communities. Terrorist acts became abundant. Security problems are still pervasive in Iraq.

In the following years, Maliki strengthened his position and that of the central government. He wanted the state to have the monopoly of the use of force. He started by controlling the security forces and directed operations against local militias such as the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Kurdish peshmerga troops in the North. In

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<sup>30</sup> Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, (Westview Press, 2012), 127.

March 2010 general elections, Nouri al-Maliki won 27 percent of the seats in the Council of Representatives at the head of the State of Law party. The Shia Islamist groups won a total of 49 percent of the seats. Kurdish groups got 17 percent and Sunni groups got only 3 percent of the available 326 seats.

The political framework has been implemented in a rapid manner where the ancient regime's legitimacy has completely disappeared. The new political process, which started with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) created by the Pentagon, has been transferred to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) mainly due to its lack of authority, personnel, and resources. The ORHA were lead by Jay Montgomery Garner, an ancient lieutenant general of the US army. Lewis Paul "Jerry" Bremer III who is a well-educated American diplomat however headed the CPA. Even if the main responsible of the mission has changed, Bremer's office was still a division of the US Department of Defense. Hence, the reconstruction process was directly guided by a relatively narrow-minded administration. This is the reason why the reconstruction process has been slow and ineffective. Indeed, there were no coherent plans for establishing governance, providing security, or restoring public services because since the beginning of the operation the Department of Defense focused on the goal of removing Saddam Hussein from power. Then, the CPA wrote the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which served as the blueprint for the elections of the Interim Government and for the drafting of the permanent constitution. Elections have been held three times already. Thus, the electoral process is being more and more accepted by the Iraqi people. In this process, al-Maliki has created and enhanced his own influence within the bureaucracy, the security forces, the judiciary and the energy sector as well. Even if the Council of Representatives and the government itself are relatively weak, al-Maliki nonetheless took some measures that made him look like an authoritarian leader trying to assure his own leadership. Maliki created extra-constitutional security-bodies to bypass the defense and interior ministries, he appointed his preferred officers (mainly Shias) to head the most significant command

positions and after the 2010 election, he greatly expanded his control over many of Iraq's civilian institutions, including the judiciary and independent bodies such as the elections commission, central bank, and the anti-corruption watchdog<sup>31</sup>. However, the results of the latest elections could alter the present dynamics in the country because Sunni Arabs and Kurdish factions do not want to see al-Maliki for a third term at the head of the State. In the political sphere, it is possible to assert that democratization, in terms of establishing an electoral system has been a success for the United States and the United Nations. However, Institution-building is still dismissed by foreign powers because they lack cultural and historical knowledge of the country but they mostly lack political will. In the political sphere, the emphasis has been put on the electoral procedures rather than democratic institutions. The political sphere thus suffers legitimacy because of the lack of proper institutions, and the security issues are also still present; terrorism is a harsh reality for all Iraqis.

#### 1.1.5 Security Sector progress in Iraq after 2003

Following the invasion of 2003, Iraq faced many conflicts, fights and battles within its territory and the security issues have never been resolved. Especially from 2003 to 2008, Iraq was one of the most insecure places in the world<sup>32</sup>. The insurgencies that erupted exponentially during 2006 urged the concerned parties in the conflict that necessary steps had to be taken if Iraq was to be stabilized. The ethno-sectarian conflicts have even made the academics and policy makers to consider the fragmentation of the state. However, recent developments in the security sector of the state could change the volatile situation. In this part, I will draw on the core security institutions, which include the armed forces, the police, paramilitary forces, coast guards, militias and intelligence services.

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<sup>31</sup> Marisa Sullivan, *Maliki's Authoritarian Regime*, Middle East Security Report No. 10, Institute for the study of War, April 2013

<sup>32</sup> Robert Muggah, *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war*, (Routledge, 2009), 191.

The core function of any state is, as Max Weber put it, the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a particular territory<sup>33</sup>. The first task of peacebuilding is to restore this monopoly as a foundation and precondition for all further institution-building efforts. According to the Department for International Development (DFID), Security Sector Reform is the transformation of the security system “*which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework*”<sup>34</sup>. Responsible and accountable security forces reduce the risk of conflict, provide security for citizens and create the right environment for sustainable development. The overall objective of security sector reform is to contribute to a secure environment that is conducive to development<sup>35</sup>.

Whereas the de-Baathification order had been popular, the sudden end of the Iraqi army came as a shock to much of the population. All of a sudden, there was no official Iraqi army anymore which meant no security at all from within and without the country. CPA officials believed that disbanding the army had an important symbolic purpose. As Bremer later noted “*It’s absolutely essential to convince Iraqis that we’re not going to permit the return of Saddam’s instruments of repression—the Ba’ath Party, the Mukhabarat security services, or Saddam’s army. We didn’t send our troops halfway round the world to overthrow Saddam only to find another dictator taking his place*”<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Walter B. Slocombe, *Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire’, 2004*

<sup>34</sup> OECD Report on SSR and Governance, 2005.

<sup>35</sup> David Chuter, “Understanding Security Sector Reform”, *Journal of Security Sector Management* no. 2 (April 2006):18-22.

<sup>36</sup> Walter B. Slocombe, *Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire’, (2004), 52.*

The refusal to reconstitute and use of Iraq's regular army contributed more than anything else to the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the country. To re-establish the security forces, the CPA began a campaign of rapid recruitment of inexperienced recruits and officers. However, competing loyalties to tribes, political groups, sectarian affiliations and ethnic identities was the impediment to the formation of a professional and effective army. In May 2003, the CPA had forbidden militias but made an exception for the Peshmergas in the north. With such a vantage point, between 2006 and 2010, using their better-developed Peshmerga and security apparatus, the Kurds sealed off their area and maintained a zone of relative peace that included most of the "disputed territories" they had absorbed since 2003<sup>37</sup>.

The Peshmerga forces fought side by side with the American troops in the 2003 Iraq War in Iraqi Kurdistan. They were the second largest military force present on the field after the American forces numbering approximately 60 000 troops. Since that time the Peshmerga have assumed full responsibility for the security of the Kurdish areas of Northern Iraq<sup>38</sup>. The peshmergas are the only federally recognized militia group in Iraq. However, they do not constitute a united group. The troops of Barzani and Talabani are still separated and operate on different orders. This is why there could be squabbles between those distinct Peshmerga groups. Furthermore, even if the Peshmerga group is allowed to protect the Kurdish territory, the Iraqi army is the only one that has the mandate to protect Iraqi territory as a whole. The region of Kirkuk, which is still disputed by the Kurds and the Iraqi government, strains the tension between these entities. However, the Kurdish region of Iraq is presently the most secure region of the State mainly because of the organization of the Peshmergas and the unity of the Kurds. Because Al-Maliki wants a unique security apparatus and a strong government, he has often made use of harsh force against those groups who declared war against the Iraqi

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<sup>37</sup> Michael Rear, *Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post Colonial State*, (Routledge, 2008), 73.

<sup>38</sup> Michael Rear, *Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post Colonial State*, (Routledge, 2008), 113.

government. For instance, he supported the Sons of Iraq and the Sahwa groups and tried to eliminate Al-Qaida, the Baathists and the Mahdi Army. Hence, Al-Maliki seems ready to fight any group disturbing the security and stability of Iraq without considering their ethnic or sectarian affiliation.

The Iraqi Army is theoretically attached to the Ministry of Defense. However, on September 6, 2006, the US handed over control of the new Iraqi armed forces command to the government of Nuri Al-Maliki, Iraq's Prime Minister, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces<sup>39</sup>. Beginning in 2007, Maliki began to increase his control over the army and the security services by appointing people loyal to him personally and to institutional structures. On 10 January 2007, President George W. Bush announced a "surge" of 50,000 US troops, to be placed primarily in Baghdad<sup>40</sup>. This was due to the increase in violence in the State. Maliki's most important achievement in 2008 was the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States, a pact that promised withdrawal of US forces by 2011 and a shift to a more civilian-dominated relationship defined in a long-term strategic framework agreement. Maliki himself told the Americans to leave the country because he gained confidence in his army after the military actions against Sadr's militia in Basra and the Kurdish peshmergas in Diyala. Today, the Iraqi government, army, police and judiciary have come under the control of the Shias, who are trying to remain in power by virtue of their majority in the parliament and also through political maneuvering and bribery, driving the Sunnis to rebel.

The police force, contrary to the armed forces has not been abrogated. It has undergone a series of reforms and is attached to the Ministry of Interior. The number of police officers is approximately 125.000 and they pass through a disciplined education before they could work officially. The problem of the police force lies also on the issue of representation. The police forces still have problems of loyalty to the Iraqi

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<sup>39</sup> Benjamin Sovacool and Saul Halfon, *Reconstructing Iraq: merging discourses of security and development*. (Review of International Studies, 2007), 33.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

government because they are prone to serve the interests of their own groups before the State. According to Paul Jackson who has conducted some interviews with Iraqi police officers, most police officers readily admit that if they were the victims of crime they would not turn to the police for action or support; instead, they would rely on traditional tribal or militia networks<sup>41</sup>. Hence, it is possible to assert that the police force's legitimacy is questionable. The coordination of forces is also a problem.

When the Iraqi army is analyzed in terms of personnel, it is possible to remark an increase in quality and quantity which took a bigger scope after the withdrawal of the US army. The Iraqi army had approximately 116.000 troops at the end of June 2006. A year after, this number increased to approximately 159.000 and in 2008, it approached 200.000<sup>42</sup>. In that sense, the Iraqi army is augmenting its power in terms of personnel and it is trying to grasp full authority in terms of security within the country as the sole protector of the State. The Iraqi security forces' main problem remains education and loyalty. The equipment of the security forces is also limited and it is hard for them to counter any large-scale attack to the country. Without the help of the United States, the Iraqi army is weak and unresponsive to urgent needs.

Nation-Building issue involves the creation of a homogeneous population with a clear sense of national identity prior to the establishment of a democratic political system. This is the point where Nation-Building and State-Building processes could go against each other in terms of priorities. Whereas proponents of Nation-Building emphasize on democratization, the proponents of State-building gives primordial importance to Institution-Building. Another point where scholars are not agreeing is the extent to which foreign actors should be involved in the State-Building and Nation-Building processes. For authors like Chesterman, Narten and Carothers, State-Building efforts must originate from within the state. The international community's expectations and

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<sup>41</sup> Mark Sedra, *The Future of Security Sector Reform*. The Centre for International Governance and Innovation, (CIGI, 2010), 178.

<sup>42</sup> Cordesman and Mausner, *Withdrawal from Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces* (CSIS, 2009), 23.



involvement should be limited and modest. Goldsmith asserts that effective Institution-Building is crucial for the development of democracy. Zartman emphasizes that power structures should be constructed from the bottom up and that fostering constructive participation is vital for the restoration of legitimacy. What is certain is that both processes are necessary in order to constitute a functional State in which lives a warm society and where every individual have the same opportunities of achieving their personal happiness.

To sum up the overall postwar process, it is possible to assert that the Iraqi reconstruction and postwar governance was done through the neocon prism within the U.S department of Defense. Hence, the policy makers and the personnel on the ground did most of the Nation-Building and State-Building procedures in a top-down model where the population had to undergo the ordered changes instead of embracing new models. In that sense, top-down implementation of institutions makes things more difficult because the population's realities are much more different than what is offered by the occupying administration. However, knowing that the fundamental purpose of peacebuilding is to establish the conditions for stable and lasting peace in countries that are just emerging from civil wars, the US administration followed what seemed to be what is best for the global system and not for the Iraqi population. By this, I mean that the US administration's priorities have been decided along US interests that were to be done in a short term period. Much more had to be done however to respond to the needs of the Iraqi people. The infrastructure and the institutions had to have primary importance. In my view, institution building is much more important than democratization and has to come first. Nevertheless, in the liberal peace-building framework, institutions that are to be constructed must reflect democratic values and functional mechanisms. That is why institution-building and peace-building are interconnected. Nevertheless, this changes the whole process to follow because it is a long-term project and it is much more expensive and heavy burden to the donor countries. Just as Zartman, I believe that a bottom up process, which could be much more time consuming and needs more investment, is a better

way to implement the necessary measures that are compatible with the urgent needs of the Iraqi population.

The United States' most urgent actions have been made in the political sphere and the economic sector. The security sector have been supported by American troops but once they have gone, insurgencies started over and the integration of the militias to the army remains a difficult endeavor because of the clashing loyalties of each individual in the security sphere. It is strongly argued that without the provision of stable security by legitimate and democratically accountable security forces, long-term development of democratization programmes cannot succeed. This is why the US policies concentrated on democratic issues. It is true that SSR clearly requires international assistance and cooperation. However, it is important that SSR programmes be internalized and owned by those undergoing reform. Nevertheless, the SSR and democratization programmes have all been implemented by foreign powers by following a top-down model which angered the local inhabitants of Iraq. Above all, the Sunni faction is clearly against a system imposed by the West that puts it in a weak position among the other ethnic and sectarian groups.

In a post-conflict environment, the context is particularly important and the institutional environment in which SSR may take place is highly politically charged<sup>43</sup>. This is the reason why the choice of institutions is a crucial step for further peacebuilding. Institutions define incentives and constraints that will lead agents to invest in certain assets, acquire certain skills, cooperate, or be opportunistic<sup>44</sup>. DDR and SSR must be complementary if the normalization process is to work efficiently. In the field of institutions, two institutions can be said to be complementary when the presence of one increases the efficiency of the other<sup>45</sup>. Institutions are set of rules that

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<sup>43</sup> Mark Sedra, *The Future of Security Sector Reform*. The Centre for International Governance and Innovation, (CIGI, 2010), 138.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 156.

<sup>45</sup> Robert Muggah, *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war*, (Routledge, 2009), 212.

structure social interactions in particular ways. According to Bruno Amable, the author of the book “The Diversity of Capitalism”, institutions are rules that provide information about how “agents are expected to act in certain situations, and can be recognized by those who are members of the relevant group as the rules to which others conform in these situations”<sup>46</sup>. Iraqis are thus constrained by an inappropriate constitution for the State’s political reality and by dysfunctional governmental institutions, which shapes their perceptions of reality in their country.

#### 1.1.6 The Present Situation in Iraq (Year 2014)

In its first article of the first section, the new Iraqi constitution indicates that Iraq is a single federal Republic, “independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, representative parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of Iraq”<sup>47</sup>. The constitution also asserts that Islam is the official religion of the State and that the two official languages of Iraq are Kurdish and Arabic. Within such a framework, parliamentary elections were held across Iraq on April 30<sup>th</sup> 2014. The elections were held for the 328-member Council of Representatives which, in turn, had to elect a new president and prime minister. The new prime minister will then appoint a cabinet. Over 250 political groupings, divided into approximately 100 lists and 39 coalitions, competed in the election<sup>48</sup>. The election was the first to be held in the absence of US military forces, which withdrew in 2011. The United Nations monitored the general course of the electoral progress.

The actual prime minister’s bloc gathered the most out of the latest elections according to the Iraqi High Electoral Commission. The State of Law Alliance of Nouri al-Maliki has obtained 95 seats out of 328 and it has marked a major difference between the other

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<sup>46</sup> Roland Paris, *At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 210.

<sup>47</sup> Iraqi Constitution, 2005.

<sup>48</sup> Sultan Barakat, “Post-Saddam Iraq: Deconstructing a Regime, Reconstructing a Nation”, *Third World Quarterly*, (Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 2005). 571-591.

parties by being the first party in 10 of the 18 provinces<sup>49</sup>. During the 2010 elections, al-Maliki had obtained 89 seats which means that he has increased in popularity and support. However, the results are not enough for the Maliki coalition to form a government on his own and he will have to negotiate with other political formations in order to be redirected to a third term in office. The principal rivals of Al-Maliki have obtained between 19 and 29 seats each<sup>50</sup>. Moreover, their leaders are against the idea of a third term for al-Maliki whom they accuse of monopolizing power and failing to eliminate the ongoing violence in the country.

Most probably, al-Maliki will be reappointed prime minister because he is supported by the United States and by Iran. However, he will have to make some concessions towards the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds if he wants to bring peace and stability in his country. From the beginning of his reign, Maliki had created and funded a security sector in order to consolidate his power in the political system, which threatens the other identity groups and undermines the country's security<sup>51</sup>. Therefore, political representation and the recognition of political requests by each ethnic and sectarian group must be considered by any political group leading the State because the non-recognition or the negligence of these requests will automatically result into upheavals and increase in violence. In that sense, negotiation becomes the keyword for a state like Iraq.

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<sup>49</sup> The National, 2014.

<sup>50</sup> Idem.

<sup>51</sup> Fanar Haddad, *Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity*. (Columbia University Press, 2010), 22.

## CHAPTER 2

# THEORIES AND CONCEPTS CONCERNING POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION

### 2.1 Peacebuilding

Conflict Resolution is a multidisciplinary field in social sciences that endeavors to understand and define the parameters of human conflicts. Moreover, it tries to transform the conflict and reconcile conflicting parties by considering its peculiarities and by setting a framework of possible actions. The foundational period of the field took place during the 1950s and 1960s. It developed further during the 1970s and 1980s<sup>52</sup>. Moreover, it is now a field of study having its own domain with specific and well-defined terminology. For instance, Nation-Building, State-Building and Peace-Building are the concepts that will be used frequently in the following lines. Hence, I will define and delimit these concepts in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in terms of their development, processes and goals.

It is possible to assert that Peace-Building is the overarching concept which transcends State-Building and Nation-Building. Peacebuilding is a broad concept that establishes processes and mechanisms in order to create an environment where peace and security reign in a certain State. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, similarly defined the purpose of peacebuilding as the attempt to *“identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”*<sup>53</sup>. In that sense, Peacebuilding is a multifaceted endeavor that includes building democratic governance, protecting human rights, strengthening the rule of law and promoting sustainable development, equitable access to resources and environmental security<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Polity Press, 2011), 225.

<sup>53</sup> Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson, *State-Building: Theory and Practice* (Routledge, 2007), 135.

<sup>54</sup> Michael J. Butler, *International Conflict Management* (Routledge, 2009), 187.

Nation-Building refers to the process of constructing or structuring a nation using the power of the state, and this process aims at the unification of the people or peoples within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run<sup>55</sup>. According to Hippler, there are three central elements of nation-building: ideological legitimation, social integration, and the development of a functional state apparatus<sup>56</sup>. The notion itself has flowered during the 1990s when the Cold War ended and many intra-state conflicts mushroomed. Nation-Building processes can involve extremely different dimensions and instruments, such as economic integration, cultural integration, political centralization, bureaucratic control, military conquest or subjugation, creation of common interests, democratization and establishment of common citizenship<sup>57</sup>. Because the predominant paradigm of the international system is based on Nation-States as the primary sovereign actor, Nation-Building becomes very significant in a world where the integrity and unity of States are of primordial importance. In that sense, nation-building needs a national infrastructure where the population has a sense of attachment to their State before anything else such as blood ties, tribal lines or religious communities. In this positive conception of sovereignty as responsibility, governments are expected to provide protection and assistance to their needy populations, and when they cannot for reasons of lack of capacity, should invite or at least welcome international assistance<sup>58</sup>.

State-Building is another concept to define because it is confounded with the aforementioned concepts in terms of its content. State-Building mechanisms enter in the process where the State is considered being weak, fragile, or failed. Generally, a weak state's key characteristics are its lack of authority or control over the whole of its territory and a lack of monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, its persistently

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<sup>55</sup> Jochen Hippler, *Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation*, (Pluto Press, 2005), 210.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, 106.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, 211.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 217.

weak institutions and governance systems that often lack legitimacy in the eyes of the population, and its fundamental lack of leadership, state capacity and/or political will to fulfil essential state functions, especially in terms of providing basic services to the poor<sup>59</sup>. State-Building is thus the endeavor to establish strong state-society relations by enhancing the capacity of the state, its institutions and its responsiveness to the population's needs and wants. By improving such aspects, the state will gain its legitimacy, which is the most important aspect for a state to function.

These concepts are now better defined than before and it is probable that over time, these concepts will be better determined and separated into several approaches. I will now explain with details the approaches that could be taken while analyzing a case. Peacebuilding for example has two main tendencies differing in terms of its aim, its means, its temporal aspects, the main actors involved in the process as well as the process itself and its organization. In terms of its aim, the first tendency emphasizes on promoting good governance and dispute settlement mechanisms, while the second's central purpose is to address the root causes of the conflict. The first tendency could be called the 'liberal approach' to peacebuilding because it is primarily a political intervention where the main organization undertaking the process is the United Nations which gives peculiar attention to co-ordination with other local and international charitable organizations. The main actors are thus from the international community, and the temporal goals are short-termed. The second tendency does not emphasize only political processes but also economic, security and humanitarian spheres of activity. The temporal goals are long-termed and the main actors are indigenous to the conflict rather than external ones. In that sense, it is not possible to separate the two tendencies hermetically because they have overlapping aspects. However, even if they have similarities, they emphasize different aspects of Peacebuilding. The available literature on Peacebuilding broadly explains these two distinct approaches in conflicts.

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<sup>59</sup> Raphael Veit, "Iraq: Failed State or Phoenix?", *Australian Quarterly*, Vol. 76, no. 3 (2004): 15-19.

## 2.2 Nation-Building

Nation-Building has undergone a rebirth after the Cold War where new States appeared and there was a need for these blossoming Nation-States to build their own identities and social ties. Nation Building also has its own goals, means and procedures. However, it is easily confounded with State Building, which has similarities and connections with Nation Building but does not represent the same process. In other words, State Building is one important aspect of Peacebuilding just like Nation Building. The main purpose of Nation Building was, at first to develop a State that could be able to participate in the world market<sup>60</sup>. Nonetheless, the realist assumptions that the world is inherently unstable and anarchic; that self-interested states remain the key actors in the world; and that power is still the primary arbiter of international relations are still predominant in the present international system. In that sense, territorial integrity of a state remains of primordial importance for the United Nations and for the United States as well. Within this territory should live a population able to govern itself with functional social mechanisms that can regulate the relations among the inhabitants of the State. Applied to multiethnic states, this means, for example, convincing the population that material prosperity, inner security and a peaceful future will only be guaranteed if all ethnic groups contribute towards equality, mutual trust and acceptance. Harmonization is thus a path to follow in order to build common values and ideals. According to Fukuyama, the core objective of nation-building is a regime change or survivability because in order to implement its plan, an outside power must overthrow a hostile regime and implement or maintain a friendly indigenous regime<sup>61</sup>. In terms of means, the deployments of ground troops as well as the use of military and civilian personnel are of great importance for an effective

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<sup>60</sup> Wendy Lambourne, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation", *Peace, Conflict and Development* (April 2004): 59-62.

<sup>61</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 280.



nation-building process<sup>62</sup>. External peace-building's main idea is that there is a need for assisting a state in achieving its own goals at a shaky period in its history. The main external actor in today's world remains the United States of America with the help of the United Nations and its affiliated organizations. It is important to remember that the prime objective of any nation-building operation is to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones prosperous or authoritarian ones democratic. However, Etzioni who supports the foundations of liberal peacebuilding asserts that there are three elements of nation building: unification, including pacification, democratization and economic reconstruction. Democratization thus remains the cornerstone of the liberal approach to peacebuilding. The main purpose of Nation Building is to allow people in a certain territorial entity to live together despite their differences by working around a common societal project. Even if Nation Building is sometimes an agenda imposed by the United States, experience teaches us that it is mainly a domestic matter. Only a nation's citizens can develop national institutions, and external actors have no more than a supporting role to play. According to Arthur A. Goldsmith, Nation Building has three foundational legs; the founding of democratic government institutions is one leg of nation building; establishing a capable state administration is the second leg of nation building; and nation building's third leg is the consolidation of a market economy. In that sense, well-run nation states distribute public goods efficiently, predictably, and in the right quantities with the help of a functional and effective state apparatus. Sovereignty in that sense is an important concept having ties with nation Building because sovereign power entails that *"both legislation and law enforcement are in the hands of the ruling power alone. All law enforcing institutions, the military included, must be under the control of the sovereign power, or else the power is by definition not sovereign"*<sup>63</sup>. In other words, Nation-Building is about the establishment

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<sup>62</sup> Jochen Hippler, *Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation*, (Pluto Press, 2005), 35.

<sup>63</sup> Robert Muggah, *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war*, (Routledge, 2009), 82.

of a sovereign nation who will be able to decide the direction to take in order to advance in the present international system. In the political realm, liberalization and democratization are inseparable and they point to the promotion of periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience. Moreover, the challenge of Nation-building calls for the establishment of a constitutive process that ensures democratic participation, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, and equitable opportunities for sustainable development<sup>64</sup>. In that sense, beyond being sovereign, a liberal State must be responsible towards its inhabitants and fulfil its basic duties.

### 2.3 State-Building

State-Building is the concept that has the most clear-cut and defined frontiers because its content and definition are widely accepted by the academic milieu. State-Building is the concept that includes within itself the aspect of Security Sector Reform, a very important concept in our present study. The literature about State-Building is abundant and it is very easy to adopt a well-defined approach while analyzing a case. According to the OECD, there are twelve important conceptual findings concerning State-Building in situations of fragility. As a summary, it is possible to enumerate these points as follows:

1. State Building is an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations.
2. State Building is founded on political processes to negotiate state-society relations and power relationships among elites and social groups.
3. State Building is a virtuous cycle of legitimacy.
4. State Building is based on minimum administrative capacity.
5. State Building is both a descriptive term and a normative concept.
6. State Building is a continuous process that is non-linear and asymmetrical.
7. State Building is central to establishing resilience.

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<sup>64</sup> Dr. Kirsti Samuels, "Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making", *Chicago Journal of International Law*, No. 2 (2006): 52-55.

8. State Building is a process that takes place at all levels of state-society relations.
9. State Building is distinct from Nation Building.
10. State Building is distinct from institution building.
11. State Building is distinct from Peacebuilding.
12. State Building is a process with which international actors can align.<sup>65</sup>

These are the main recent findings established by the OECD. However, because it is a multidisciplinary concept, State Building has a wide literature. It is therefore hard to identify one and only coherent perspective of State Building. However, I will focus on its definition within the discipline of International Relations. For many authors, State Building is something that primarily happens in post-conflict contexts. In addition, to be successful, State Building efforts must originate from within the State. More precisely, State Building becomes unescapable when there is a breakdown of political authority within a State and where the infrastructure is not responsive to the population's needs. In a case where the State is unable to provide law and order, unable to provide stable property rights, and unable to provide key public goods and welfare distributions, it is considered as being a fragile or weak state. State Building becomes the key concept to give the State the necessary tools in order to rule over its sovereign territory with a certain capability. In that sense, legitimate use of force requires a legitimate state<sup>66</sup>. A legitimate state is characterized by transparency, trust of the government by the governed, and accountability. In fact, a state needs three types of resources: coercion, capital and legitimacy. If legitimacy is absent, then the existence of the two others could not be justified and people will not abide by the laws of an illegitimate state.

Among the wide literature on State-Building, the most accepted or widespread among scholars remains the liberal approach. According to this approach, State Building refers to *"the process of constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of*

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<sup>65</sup> OECD, *State Building in Situations of Fragility*, August 2008

<sup>66</sup> Muna Ndulo, *Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation: When the wars end*. (University College London (UCL) Press, 2007), 91.

*providing citizens with physical and economic security*<sup>67</sup>. The liberal State-Building approach focuses on the *“constitution of free markets designed to stimulate growth led by the private sector”*<sup>68</sup>. The private sector is emphasized in order to have sustainable development. Liberal State building requires the international community to support the construction of very specific planning and co-ordination among institutions capable of guiding industrialization efforts. In terms of task list, liberal State Building consists of assuring security, including the issues of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Functioning systems of law and order, sound economic and fiscal policy, as well as reforms in education are all included in the State Building process. The choice of effective institutions for effective governance must be democratic in order to implement a democratic system in the post-conflict situation as the best alternative to negotiate the terms of political and economic power. Legitimacy is a major concept to observe in State Building processes because it is the primary requirement for peace, stability and resilience over the long term. Because democratic institutions are based upon negotiation and compromise, the most accepted outcome in post-conflict settings are the ones based on democratic values and institutions. In that sense, State Building remains deeply political in nature because it is a process where negotiation among different factions of a society is strongly present and it is directed by democratic institutions in order to assure a certain level of predictability and a roadmap to follow to better grasp the available options between negotiating parties. In fragile situations, liberal State Building tends to strengthen the central government in order to allow an overall system to emerge.

It is possible to assert that Peace-Building is situated as the overarching concept which includes Nation-Building and State Building that are distinct concepts but have nonetheless some overlapping aspects. This is the reason why Nation-Building and

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<sup>67</sup> David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building*, (Pluto Press, 2006), 43.

<sup>68</sup> Lingyu Lu and Cameron G. Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State Building in the Middle East”, *Political Research Quarterly*, no. 66 (2013): 239.

State Building need to be understood not only in terms of building the technical capacities and effectiveness of state institutions, but also in terms of the dynamic political process of reconstituting the political and social contract between state and society so that it may become more resilient and sustainable over time<sup>69</sup>. Whereas Nation-Building undertakes the process of building a common identity, common values and shared common projects; State-Building undertakes the political part in order to build a functional state apparatus and infrastructure. In other words, State-Building is a process which tries to redress the essential elements of State Function. These elements include peace and stability; effective governance; territorial control and porous borders; and economic stability<sup>70</sup>. Because it mainly occurs in post-conflict settings, State-Building focuses on security issues first and then passes on to elevating democratic institutions. In that sense, security is the most important and most urgent aspect to assure before any other for the reason that security is an essential prerequisite for electoral and constitutional processes to work properly and succeed. The main purpose of Nation-Building and State-Building together is to construct a framework of peace with justice and a mutual sense of belonging and participation on equitable bases, without discrimination based on divisive factors of identity. According to the liberal approach, countries emerging from conflict will almost always need to depend upon the international community to varying degrees for resources in order to conduct effective reconciliation, institution-building, and reconstruction. The following chart shows how the field should be understood in terms of hierarchy.

Hitherto I have given a broad assessment of the literature on Peacebuilding and its constituents. I will now explain the approach that I will use more precisely in order to apply it to the Iraqi case effectively. In post-conflict reconstruction strategies, I have the same approach as Roland Paris who is an assistant professor at the University of

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<sup>69</sup> Paul Jackson, "Security Sector Reform and State Building", *Third World Quarterly*, no. 32 (2011): 10.

<sup>70</sup> Paul Jackson, "Security Sector Reform and State Building", *Third World Quarterly*, no. 32 (2011): 12.

Colorado and who is the author of the book “At War’s End, Building Peace After Civil Conflict”. In his book, the author analyses many cases by using the liberal peace thesis and Wilsonianism for an accurate peacebuilding process. According to the author, peacebuilding is a process that includes many aspects that are to be developed in order to have a peaceful environment. His definition is as follows:

The typical formula for peacebuilding includes promoting civil and political rights, such as the right to free speech and a free press, as well as freedom of association and movement; preparing and administering **democratic elections**; drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; training or retraining police and justice officials in the appropriate behavior for state functionaries in a **liberal democracy**; promoting the development of independent civil society organizations and the transformation of formerly warring groups into **democratic political parties**; encouraging the development of **free-market economies** by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital and goods within and across a country’s borders; and stimulating the growth of private enterprise while reducing the state’s role in the economy<sup>71</sup>.

Post-conflict Peacebuilding encompasses many processes from establishing a system of democratic institutions to democratization and economic reform. In that sense, the author adopts a liberal approach where he gives the examples of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and their type of peaceful state. Both men believed that a law-based regime operating under constitutional rule, capable of defending society against internal and external threats could be successful in attaining peace. A powerful sovereign or a ‘supreme authority’ is also necessary to have peace, security and freedom of all. However, the sovereign must be constrained by the rule of law so that he does not swerve towards tyranny or dictatorship. When the sovereign is not able to protect his population and serve them effectively, the social contract between the population and the sovereign becomes void and chaos is to arise because of the lack of legitimacy and protection against threats. As it is clear today, a nation state’s exclusive mission has always been to set frontiers, defend borders and property and increase the individual’s

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<sup>71</sup> Roland Paris, *At War’s End, Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 19.

possibilities of self-development for the good of society<sup>72</sup>. Moreover, if the nation-state could not fulfil these functions properly, its legitimacy is questioned by its own population as well as the international community.

We have asserted that State-Building occurs in post conflict situations in fragile or weak states. The breakdown of political authority within such states is a major source of conflict and warfare, and of the humanitarian problems, such as refugee flows, that stem from conflict. Hence, post-conflict societies are characterized by the lack of respect for the rule of law, gross human rights violations, impunity, and economic devastation and decay. A failed or weak state is a state that does not have “*capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways*”<sup>73</sup>. In that sense, a weak state cannot respond to the needs and wants of its population, it cannot regulate the distribution of wealth effectively and it has many loopholes in its administrative design. Hence, a weak state is not able to adapt itself with regard to the civil society’s settings. The problem resides in the fact that the structures of the country are problematic. The economic structures are imbalanced, political structures are unsatisfactory, and social structures are lagging. In order to become ‘organic’ a State must be clothed with a stable security system. To assure a secure environment in post-conflict societies, the first step must be to eliminate the easy spread of weapons and limit them to legitimate armed and police forces only. The second step, which could go along the first, is to establish a security system with functional bureaucracy, functional institutions and effective rendering. The first step is called Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), and the second step is called Security Sector Reform (SSR).

Even if liberal State-Building is widely accepted by the international community, it has its critics. For some observers such as David Chandler and Roger MacGinty, the

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<sup>72</sup> Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson, *State-Building: Theory and Practice*, (Routledge, 2007), 138.

<sup>73</sup> Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, (Princeton University Press, 1988), 48.

problem of the liberal peace building efforts relies in the fact that the intervener's political power becomes an obstacle to the needed reforms for the local population. The intervener has too much power and guides the reform processes as he wishes. The reforms thus do not reflect the needs of the local population but are shaped according to the interests of the intervener. Authors like Jeffrey Herbst, Pierre Englebert, Deniz Tull and Jeremy Weinstein criticize the fact of intervening in a failed state. They suggest that indigenous state building may be much preferable for nations seeking to recover from war. However, the most credible critique comes from Micheal Pugh who asserts that liberal peacebuilding has an agenda of spreading values and norms of the dominant powers who are basically the western ones. In that sense, the paradox stems from the fact that the west accepts the difference of eastern countries, but at the same time, liberal peacebuilding efforts impose the same agenda on every case. This fact pushes the interveners not to acquire the necessary knowledge about the local conditions in which they will operate. There is also the fact that the rule of law is extolled by the intervener. However, the intervener is not constrained by any institution during the invasion. As an example, all international agreements, including The Hague and Geneva Conventions, do not give a foreign power the right to impose a constitution on an occupied country<sup>74</sup>. Despite this, the US occupying power in Iraq after 2003 annulled the existing Iraqi constitution, laws and regulations and issued its own code. Liberal Peacebuilding thus neglects in many ways the local population's culture, traditions and customs which hinders the reconstruction process because of the employed methodologies and techniques that are not embraced by the local population. This standardization of applying western values and systems into any state where State-Building is needed became a problem of liberal peace. Furthermore, all of the critics accept that 'innocent assistance' is nonexistent because every foreign intervention has a political motivation behind it. No intervention could be explained only by good will or the principles of international law.

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<sup>74</sup> Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht, *Reconstruction Security after Conflict: Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 188.



## 2.4 Security Sector Reform

For any post-conflict peacebuilding to take place, a minimum level of security is required in order to make steps forward. This is why the processes of DDR and SSR are of crucial importance for Peacebuilding to advance. As a matter of fact, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are two sides of the same token. Indeed, in order to meet the security needs of the population and ensure a secure environment, DDR operations must go hand in hand with SSR operations. In terms of definition, the primary focus of DDR in post-conflict societies is the removal of widespread arms – or at least to contain and limit them - , the neutralization of potential spoilers, and the reintegration of ex-combatants into the armed forces or civilian life. The prevention of the recurrence of war is also a task of DDR. The most difficult part resides in dismantling armed groups who are unwilling to drop their weapons without any agreements in their favor. DDR processes are frequently undertaken by international agencies such as the United Nations or NATO, and by national governments. DDR's main purpose is thus to create a suitable and sustainable environment for the sake of stability and development. DDR activities range from information sharing, confidence building to the promotion of the rule of law. As the past experiences show clearly, DDR programmes are viewed as essential to decreasing the incentives for ex-combatants to take up arms in the future. In fact, once disarmed, combatants are to be prepared to return to civilian life in demobilization sites where they are to be given basic necessities, reinsertion allowances, counselling, and eventually transportation to local community where he could live permanently. The process of adapting to civilian life is the reintegration part of DDR where the aim is to assimilate the ex-combatant to the economic, political and social life within his neighbor. DDR may occur as part of a general military reform process, including the integration of regular soldiers and militia into formal security structures and shedding of excess personnel. DDR programmes potentially serve as an important first step in limiting violence by disarming large numbers of armed actors and disbanding illegal,

dysfunctional or bloated military structures<sup>75</sup>. A key goal of DDR is to build confidence and trust between parties through a staged and negotiated standing-down of the factional armed forces<sup>76</sup>. This is why DDR is primarily a bottom-up process targeting the implicated population and shaping a new environment of trust and serenity.

SSR is about the re-establishment of sustainable security apparatus to the State. In other words, the State must have the monopoly of physical force over its territory. One facet of DDR is to establish such a task; this is why it is inherently linked with SSR. For a successful implementation of DDR and SSR, the establishment of real and perceived legitimacy is the central aspect to focus on. DDR interventions have clearly shifted from a narrow military focus to one that is more deeply invested in promoting sustainable development and progressive liberal transformations in the governance sector which strengthen its link with SSR<sup>77</sup>. The population needs an accountable, rights-respecting and responsive police force, armed force and judiciary. If they are not present, then popular discontent and alienation from the government will rise. In order to have strong structures and legitimate institutions, a well-governed security sector is an inescapable and non-negligible institution to have in order to protect the state and its inhabitants so that the population could live in a safe environment. The security sector consists of many elements, but I will focus on the establishment of legitimate armed forces and police forces. Because SSR is a political endeavor, in contrast to DDR, it is a top-down process where the officers and generals are appointed by the commander-in-chief. However, for both the processes to work, they must be complementary to each other. SSR must consider the ex-combatants and include them into the armed and police forces. DDR process must also train the ex-combatants in order for them to function properly in the civil society or in their new environment. Institutions must be

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<sup>75</sup> Michael J. Butler, *International Conflict Management*, (Routledge, 2009), 86.

<sup>76</sup> Mark Sedra, *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, (The Centre for International Governance and Innovation (CIGI), 2010), 33.

<sup>77</sup> Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 221.

complementary so that the accomplishment of a task in DDR could be easily transferred and continued through another institution such as the military or the job market where ex-combatants could be reintegrated. In that sense, DDR and SSR projects have their own peculiarities for each and every situation because local conditions differ from case to case. If Iraq is to have a self-sustaining security, it will require a competent police, intelligence services, border patrols, and other security organs, as well as military forces and local paramilitary reserves.

Before going further, it is crucial to assess the two main approaches to SSR. It is possible first to define the Security Sector as *“all those organisations which have authority to use, or order the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight”*<sup>78</sup>. The first is the narrow one, which focuses on the military and the police forces who are authorized to use force and considered as the uniformed services. The second and broader approach incorporates also non-uniformed services such as the judiciary and *“essentially the entire justice and security system from private security companies and border guards through the military, intelligence and civil governance mechanisms in the latter case to the traditional authorities, courts, and the judicial and penal systems in the former case”*<sup>79</sup>. Security Sector Reform is thus a wide concept that attempts to establish civilian and democratic control over instruments of lethal force<sup>80</sup>. It is about reducing regional and internal security dilemmas by reorienting organizations, promoting confidence, and establishing cross-border working partnership. In the narrow approach, SSR’s main objective is to create professional armed forces that are able to fulfil their functions in an effective, efficient and legitimate manner. In the broader perspective, the aim is both to improve

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<sup>78</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, “Security Sector Reform: Prospects and Problems”, *Peace, Security & Global Change*, no. 15 (2003): 101-119.

<sup>79</sup> Paul Jackson, “Security Sector Reform and State Building”, *Third World Quarterly*, no. 32 (2011): 12.

<sup>80</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, “Security Sector Reform: Prospects and Problems”, *Peace, Security & Global Change*, no. 15 (2003): 101-119.

the “capabilities of the security sector and also the accountability, oversight and governance of security institutions by civilian authorities”<sup>81</sup>. Whether to adopt the narrow or the broad definition, the values of democracy, good governance, gender equality, transparency and accountability, as well as a desire to propagate human rights are at the core of SSR values. Because it performs within the liberal ideology, SSR programmes are conducted in that framework where they promote democratic values and institutions. In that sense, legitimate and legal internal security by professional armed forces is clearly an important precondition for democratization<sup>82</sup>.

The professionalization of security forces is also an important matter because once DDR programmes are in progress; it would be dangerous and problematic to engage inapt civilians in the armed forces. Hence, professionalization would also provide an important “normative barrier to military intervention in politics, permitting the creation of strong civilian institutions such as parliaments, judiciaries and bureaucracies that reinforce civilian supremacy over the military”<sup>83</sup>. SSR programmes are also for the reduction of costs related to the armed forces. Because military expenditures take a big portion of the national budget, SSR aims to reduce those costs and drain them in another sphere of the State in order to provide better services. The liberal theory also emphasizes the fact that SSR programmes need international assistance in order to succeed. Nicole Ball identifies five type of assistance by foreign donors:

1. The strengthening of civil institutions
2. The professionalization of civilian defense and security personnel
3. The professionalization of security forces

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<sup>81</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, “Security Sector Reform: Prospects and Problems”, *Peace, Security & Global Change*, no. 15 (2003): 101-119.

<sup>82</sup> David Chuter, “Understanding Security Sector Reform”, *Journal of Security Sector Management* no. 2 (April 2006):18-22.

<sup>83</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, “Security Sector Reform: Prospects and Problems”, *Peace, Security & Global Change*, no. 15 (2003): 101-119.

4. The institutionalization of mechanisms to develop security policy and identify security needs
5. The provision of assistance to overcome the legacies of war

Even if foreign donors could help in the construction of a functional Security Sector, it is necessary for the local population to embrace and appropriate the process and act in good faith in order to support the necessary steps to make in order to live in a secure environment.

According to Lake and Rothchild, a security dilemma occurs at the domestic level when the survival of identity groups is threatened. Collective fear of the future causes these groups to organize and participate in armed struggle to protect themselves from the potential aggression of the central government<sup>84</sup>. The core of the problem in multi-ethnic or multi-sectarian States is that *“even an ethnically balanced military or perceived legitimacy cannot function properly without a balanced political leadership or perceived legitimacy”*<sup>85</sup>. The security sector is thus intimately tied to the political sphere, which requires legitimacy in order for the population to accept changes made at the public sphere. In multi-sectarian countries, every group needs to have the same access to political and economic resources as well as a proportional access to political, economic and social opportunities. In that sense, in building up effective Iraqi military forces, attention should be given to the ethnic balance, as this will strengthen their legitimacy and have the advantage of being representative of the whole Iraqi population. Thus, any structured forms of inequities from class position, gender position to economic and political relations must be overcome. Pluri-ethnic or pluri-sectarian societies watch carefully if the regime in which they live is concerned with their rights and privileges. Therefore, any injustice or inequality in governmental institutions or at any level of the state apparatus lead to conflict.

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<sup>84</sup> Dereck McGee, *Security, Citizenship and Human Rights, Shared Values in Uncertain Times*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 112.

<sup>85</sup> Pieter Koekenbier, *Multi-Ethnic Armies: Lebanese Lessons and Iraqi Implications*, (CSRC, 2005), 13.

Care should be taken that a situation does not develop where the privilege of military service is pre-empted by one group. Nor should employment and promotion in the Iraqi military be based on a quota system, as this carries major risks of its own<sup>86</sup>. A 'universalistic' system of military employment should be used, combined with possible upward mobility for all members and ethnic mixing in sub-units<sup>87</sup>. Hence, oversight mechanisms are to be implemented in order to monitor such an institution and prevent any injustice at the regular army and police members but above all at the officers' level. Rebuilding the security sector thus becomes very complicated as it is intimately tied to many other governmental mechanisms.

Nation-Building and State Building are thus two sides of the same coin where the ultimate aim is to come up with a functional state in concordance with the present international system. In that sense, it is a certain kind of integration process of failed states into the international community. Accomplishing such a mission is long and difficult because of the many issues encountered by the intervened country, but also by the intervener. Many issues must be faced by the local population and by the donor countries, and troubles are not absent because of many misunderstandings, cultural differences and historical remnants. However, Peacebuilding operations must be undertaken in order to transform the failed states into functional ones so that they can also benefit from the international community. Iraq is the example that shows us all the trials and tribulations of an integration process. It is in that sense, a very good example to take lessons from and produce better policies. The following chapter studies the Peacebuilding operation undertaken by the US, UK and UN in Iraq.

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<sup>86</sup> Dereck McGee, *Security, Citizenship and Human Rights, Shared Values in Uncertain Times*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 135.

<sup>87</sup> *Idem*, 142.

## CHAPTER 3

### POLITICAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN IRAQ

It is often highlighted by authors and practitioners of the field that every conflict has its own dynamics and that's why it is hard to establish common roadmaps for different conflicts. Each conflict differs in terms of the implicated actors, the challenges and stakes, the causes and viable solutions which make them unique cases to study and assess with regard to their own dynamics. For the Iraqi case, I have already described the general postwar reconstruction process. However, it is important to consider the primary actor's concerns in order to be on the right track and keep in mind their fears, worries and requests in order to rebuild a peaceful Iraqi state. Iraq's historical and geographic settings made it one of the most ethnically diverse country in the Middle East. Indeed, Iraq's capital of Baghdad dates back to the eighth century, when it was founded by the Abbasid Empire<sup>88</sup>. The current composition of Iraq's society is plural in many ways. There are not only ethnic or linguistic differences, but also sectarian tensions between major groups. Iraq has a population of 32 million, and its biggest group is shaped by the Arabs who compose approximately 80 percent of the population. The second largest ethnic group is composed by the Kurds with approximately 20 percent of the population. Turkoman who are mostly Sunni form an ethnic minority. At the sectarian level, 60 percent of Iraq's population is composed of Shia Muslims, 37 percent are Sunni Muslims and the rest 3 percent is composed of religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis. The province or region may be the first clue to the religious affiliation of its inhabitants. Thus, Shiites, exclusively populate the two holy cities of Shiism, Najaf and Karbala. Southern Iraq is mainly Shiite, Sunni with a few pockets in it; for example, the city of Basra has always been multi-religious and cosmopolitan. In contrast, the central provinces of the country are mainly Sunni, and U.S. forces have also often called the area as "Sunni Triangle", including Baghdad

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<sup>88</sup> Hala Fattah and Frank Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*, (Facts on File, 2009), 177.

south east Baquba, Ramadi in the west and extending up to Tikrit in the north. The cities of Samarra and Fallujah are also included. In the past and today, sectarian rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites is the product of the legacy of the transition from Sunni Muslim Ottoman Empire to the secular modern state under the British government<sup>89</sup>. It is also due to irregular integrators and inclusive process under successive undemocratic regimes. In addition, during the occupation of the United States, the conflict between Shiites and Sunnis was aggravated by the political vacuum existing at the center and the overwhelming influence of political Islam on both sides of the internal division. With the invasion of 2003, the Shia Arabs embraced the prospect of democratic elections as a way to obtain political power which they had been prohibited from for a long time. Their present will to grasp and keep power is related to their long history of grievances against the dominant Sunni Arab community. Concerning the Kurds, it is possible to assert that since the US-led coalition is committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq, *“the Kurds had more to gain by operating within the Iraqi political system than they could hope to achieve by following the example of the Sunni Arabs and boycotting the elections”*<sup>90</sup>. In that sense, de-Baathification was popular with most of the population, especially among Shi’a and Kurds. In the following lines, I will assess the main claims and concerns of the aforementioned groups in order to decipher where the security problem stems from.

### 3.1 The Kurds

In Iraq, the Regional Government of Kurdistan (RGK) gives the official numbers of 5.3 million inhabitants but the Iraqi government does not rely on this and it counts only 4.3 million because it permits it to underestimate and reduce the budget grant accorded to the Kurdish provinces in terms of their population<sup>91</sup>. However, if we include the other

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<sup>89</sup> Hala Fattah and Frank Caso, *A Brief History of Iraq*, (Facts on File, 2009), 234.

<sup>90</sup> Michael Rear, *Intervention, Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Iraq: A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State*, (Routledge, 2008), 174.

<sup>91</sup> Idem, 192.



regions outside the RGK such as Kirkuk, we could evaluate the existence of 6 to 6.5 million Kurds in Iraq. In Iraq, the small Shiite Kurdish population was massacred or deported by Saddam Hussein in 1987-1988. Some of those Shia Kurds from Iraq live in refugee camps in Iran. Since the fall of the Baath party, they have begun to return to Iraq, but they are at most 20,000. In northern Iraq, the Kurds have experienced a civil war from 1992 to 1996. Major regional powers supported one or the other party in turn. Brother enemies of the PUK and KDP were finally reunited in 2003. However, this war that almost sank their dreams of independence remains a traumatic memory for the Kurds.

Iraq is divided into 18 provinces. The three northernmost (Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah) are the autonomous regions of Kurdistan. The Kurdish identity there has always been strong, and rebellion against the central government in Baghdad was not infrequent.



Figure 3.1: Iraq's Administrative Divisions

In 1991, the Kurds took part in an uprising against the Iraqi army which was quickly suppressed by the then President Saddam Hussein. It was then that the Security

Council of the UN decided to prohibit the Iraqi Air Force to fly over the 36th parallel, which gradually permitted the Kurds to organize politically at north of this line. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by a US-led coalition in 2003, the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 recognized Kurdistan as a federal and independent entity. In that sense, the vast majority of the Kurds had welcomed Washington's war against Saddam because it was seen as the only way of bringing down the dictatorship and benefiting from the power vacuum to erect better territorial control. Moreover, during the initial Baathist period, a form of ethnic cleansing known as "Arabization" was utilized against the Kurds. The "Anfal campaign" that was conducted between 1986 and 1989 and culminating in 1988 was part of this process. In this particular case, it consisted of efforts by the Iraqi military to eliminate most, if not all, of the Kurdish population in the North. Today the Iraqi Kurdistan spans three governorates, Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. But the territorial dream of the Kurds does not stop there. Their country, they say, extends beyond the "disputed territories", some areas of the city of Mosul, mostly Sunni, Kirkuk, Salahuddin, as well as villages in the Nineveh Plain. The dispute with the central government in Baghdad over these territories is open. Kurdish Peshmerga groups (armed forces) are already in some disputed areas such as Kirkuk, but are not yet able to control the security there. Today, the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government is Massoud Barzani, son of Mustapha Barzani who is the historic leader of the Kurdish national movement in Iraq. The parliament has 111 seats, divided between the KDP Massoud Barzani (38 seats), Goran (24 seats), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Jalal Talabani, President of Iraq (18 seats) and the Islamic parties (17 seats).

Following the invasion of 2003 and the reinforcement of their political power, the government of Iraqi Kurdistan has signed forty contracts with foreign companies without informing the Ministry of Petroleum. It even omitted to transmit the contracts to the central government of Iraq. According to Abdul Karim Luaibi, the Minister of Oil in Iraq since 2010, this is an unacceptable fact for all the Iraqis. He says that *"No Iraqi, whether Arab or Kurd, could accept that. So ultimately, the Kurdistan region must*

*strategically decide whether it is part of Iraq or it is an independent state. It's his choice. But they must be clear with us*"<sup>92</sup>. Economic issues are thus very important for Kurdish leaders because they want economic power before assuring their prospective political independence in order to determine their own fate as a distinct nation.

Now that they have regional power, Kurds will work even harder in order to have more control over resources and territory. They already have their own political system, economy, as well as an effective security sector. Their infrastructure is thus more and more solidified. In essence, the Kurds wanted a virtually independent state in the north in a voluntary union with Iraq – a confederation – with a right to secede<sup>93</sup>. It is hard to predict whether Kurdistan will become a state entity because of many internal and external factors such as the regional dynamics and the international conjuncture. It is important to bear in mind that Kurds are divided not only into Sunnis, Shias, and Alevis, but also into Kurmanji – and Sorani – speakers and, more important supporters of the rival Barzani and Talebani clans<sup>94</sup>. Time will show if Iraqi Kurdistan is better-off by being attached to a bigger Iraqi state or if it is more beneficial to secede and found a state in the middle of an agitated area.

### 3.2 The Shia Arabs

Since the Iraq crisis of 2003, Iraqi Shiites have become major players in the political reconstruction in Iraq. However, to understand this development, we should return to history by explaining that this community - which represents approximately 60% of the population and distributed throughout the country - has long been deprived and marginalized from the political scene since the formation of contemporary Iraq. Under the Baathist regime, the deportation of Shia and Iranian population was massive. The

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<sup>92</sup> Raphael Veit, "Iraq: Failed State or Phoenix?", *Australian Quarterly*, Vol. 76, no. 3 (2004): 15-19.

<sup>93</sup> Derick W. Brinkerho and Ronald W. Johnson, "Decentralized Local Governance In Fragile States: Learning From Iraq", *Research Triangle Institute*, no. 21505 (March 2010): 14

<sup>94</sup> Derick W. Brinkerhoff, *Governance in Post-Conflict Societies: Rebuilding fragile states*, (Routledge, 2007), 103.

first wave took place in 1969, a second one, targeting the Shiite Kurdish minority during the years 1975 – 80 as well as a high increase in violence and expulsion of 75,000 Shiites accused of being of Persian origin and opponents of Saddam Hussein. In 1983, in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war, a fierce crackdown fell on religious leaders questioning the loyalty of the soldiers.

Shia groups were acting cautiously during the first period of the invasion because there was an atmosphere of insecurity. On the one hand, they were relieved and thankful that Saddam Hussein had been toppled. At the same time, however, they were very suspicious of US policy, accusing it of striving for supremacy in the region and control of the Iraqi oil deposits<sup>95</sup>. The political system that Americans established in Iraq initiated a division of the Iraqi classes in terms of increasingly regional, local and even private interests. This phenomenon is clearly observable in ministries: each minister has his own private militia and it maintains a patronage network that brings it back to its provincial social base.

The period after 2003 has seen the large scale emergence of Shiite groups on the political scene and their actual willingness to participate in the political reconstruction of Iraq. However, it is above all a reaction against a long history of marginalization, reinforced by the fear of losing another opportunity to gain power. The Shia Arabs embraced the prospect of democratic elections as a way to obtain political power<sup>96</sup>. The phenomenon of Shia alliance is therefore a timely response to this past and the progressively increasing differences between the parties proves thereby that the union of the Shiite bloc is not a religious issue but more a problem of accession to control. Indeed, in the south of Iraq, the Shias were divided between those who were more secular in their orientation and those who were more religiously motivated<sup>97</sup>. Shias are

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<sup>95</sup> Ahmed Hassin, *Tribes and Conflict Management in Iraq*, (2011), 34.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, 38.

<sup>97</sup> Ami C. Carpenter, *Community Resilience to Sectarian Violence in Baghdad*, (Springer, 2014), 99.

also divided by tribal differences. It is primordial to consider such facts in order to understand the current events and the political reconstruction of Iraq.

### 3.3 The Sunni Arabs

The Sunni Arabs constitute the group who has lost most out of the Iraqi invasion. However, they were once the predominant ruling group in Iraq. During the first Baathist coup of 1963, and the rise of Saddam Hussein after 1968, the idea of an Iraqi "Sunni State" spread. Saddam Hussein developed, in fact, an increasingly confessional policy syntax by appointing loyal members to key positions, but at the same time by organizing an omnipresent oversight body over all existing security system. Repression of Shiite and Kurdish populations have accentuated the image of a Sunni-dominated state even though to remain in power, the Iraqi dictator had orchestrated major purges among the Sunni Baath elites, while crushing resistant tribal Sunnis who were proven against him, especially in the 1990s, and thwarting coup attempts fomented by Sunni officers. There has never been a Sunni "community" or "state" in Iraq, even if the perception of a minority denomination monopolizing power has structured a Shiite and Kurdish opposition to the former regime, especially among refugees abroad as political actors until 2003.

This political marginalisation, combined with the dissolution of the Iraqi army and "de-Baathification" of the country caused alienation among Sunnis who used to make up most of the military and administrative framework. This was even more the case when the U.S. military operations concentrated in the Sunni areas, suspected for hosting supporters of the old regime. On bad terms with the occupation as with Kurdish and Shiite formations that have got a better position within the state, Sunnis have then opted for the withdrawal from the newly established institutions. The 2005 elections have been massively boycotted by Sunnis, which helped to further increase their isolation. Even if some of their representatives have tried to influence the process of drafting the new constitution in the summer of 2005, by particularly opposing

federalism, which has subsequently been imposed, the majority has ratified the constitution.

The 2009 provincial election did not result in the emergence of a Sunni leadership; but the Sunni community tried everything during the 2010 parliamentary elections by joining the Iraqi List (Iraqiyya) led by Iyad Allawi. Although Shiite himself, Iyad Allawi was able to capitalize on the resurgence of nationalism among the Sunnis. Personalities such as Saleh al- Moutlak and Tarek al- Hashemi in particular joined Allawi hoping for a return of Sunnis in national politics. However, the elections resulted in a deadlock. Allawi's victory was not recognized by Al -Maliki who, after nine months of crisis, was reappointed Prime Minister and expected to organize a fair sharing of power by appointing people from various factions to strategic positions in the framework of the Erbil agreement. The agreement was a deal to restrict Maliki's power and to both distribute executive positions and create new ones so as to make the government more inclusive. The terms of the agreement were not met however, and the Sunnis operated an unexpected separatist turnaround in 2011. According to the constitution, several Sunni provinces, Al- Anbar where major gas deposits have been discovered, decided to constitute themselves into a federated region to the image of the Kurdish regional Government in order to overcome their political exclusion at the central level. However, this attempt failed and sectarian tensions resumed in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal with the issuance of an arrest warrant against Sunni Vice President Tareq al - Hashemi.

At the time, while U.S. troops have partially withdrawn from the country, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi (Sunni) is exposed to a warrant, which forced him into exile and weakens the already precarious stability between Sunnis and Shiites. This has weakened the balance established by the Americans between Sunnis and Shiites in the government. A year later, in December 2012, the bodyguards of former Finance Minister al-Issawi Rafeh (a Sunni member of the secular Iraqiya bloc), were arrested. The arrests marked the starting point of demonstrations in predominantly Sunni areas

of the country. Recently, the situation has escalated with the arrest of Sunni MP Ahmed al Alouani and the mobilization of the army to crush the demonstrations.

In a regional context that tends to be structured around religious lines since the fall of Baghdad in 2003, strengthened today by the Syrian civil war, tensions at work in Iraq is inseparable from external influences. The Sunni faction protests and opposes a power perceived by the protesters as having fallen into the hands of Iran with the complicity of the Shiite coalition installed in Baghdad. The position of Nouri Al -Maliki towards the Syrian Alawite regime, which he has supported since the outbreak of fighting, is a fact that reinforces such belief. Since Shiites, who have been oppressed during the reign of Saddam Hussein, constitute the majority in the country, they are accused by the Sunnis to reign as supreme rulers of the state and to oppress the Sunnite minority. *"The Sunnis accuse the Prime Minister of authoritarianism and of monopolizing the power,"* explains Karim Pakzad, a specialist in the matter at the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS). *"Nouri al-Maliki, in place since 2006, is Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of Interior, and of National Security."* In that sense, we could assert that all three elections solidified ethnic and sectarian fragmentation, giving power to Kurds in the north and Shi'a religious parties in the center and south and marginalizing Sunnis.

Currently, the country is in a deadlock. It is very difficult to envisage any improvement. The Baghdad government is in a logic of escalation, and the only way to stop the radicalization of the Sunni Arabs would be to bring them back to the political process or integrate them into the ranks of the army and security forces; but these measures are being delayed. The first king of Iraq Faisal Ibn-Hussein said before the international investigation committee *"My heart is full of sorrow, because I believe that there is no an Iraqi population in Iraq. There are only human groups who are not able to get along because of a lack of national identity. Iraq is a country where national, religious and ideological unity is absent. In such a situation, the country is nothing more than a divided entity from within"*. Unfortunately, the remarks of the king are still valid. With such divisions along ethnic and sectarian lines, Iraqis do not constitute a unique nation.

Iraq is shaped by three distinct “nations” who are the Arab Sunnis, the Arab Shias and the Kurds.

To summarize the general identical situation in Iraq, it is important to recognize that the State falls under four identity categories: religion and sect, language, lineage (tribe, clan), and geographic homeland (city, region, country). People are not only loyal to their own sect or ethnic group, but also to their tribe and clan. In that sense, many divisions exist within the Iraqi civil society and any reason could be visible as legitimate when declaring a war against a certain group. The best example to demonstrate this is the operations undertaken by the radical Sunni Islamist Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who deliberately tried to foment sectarian violence in Iraq from 2003 until his death in 2006 by targeting Shias in ways that he hoped would provoke Iraq’s Shias to retaliate against Sunnis. Sectarian violence escalated considerably following the February 2006 bombing of the Shias’ Askariyya Shrine in Samarra. It is than impossible to assert that there is an Iraqi nation willing to work as a unique identical group. Each and every group has a different and contradicting political agenda. The interests at stake are thus incompatible and mostly conflicting.

### 3.4 Armed Groups in Iraq

One of the most important reason of a failed Iraqi Security Sector is the presence of strong militias. According to the USA's former Terrorism Knowledge Database, there were more than seventy non-state armed groups present in Iraq as of early 2008<sup>98</sup>. Security forces have progressed since the establishment of new security institutions. However, militia groups are still present in Iraq. The Mahdi Army lead by Muqtada al-Sadr is a strong and effective group ready to fight for the sake of Iraqi Shiism, it has strong connections with Iran and it is presently the largest militia with more than 40 000 members. Its aim is to defend the Iraqi State from foreign intervention and preserve the State’s territorial integrity. Even if the leader is ready to negotiate with

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<sup>98</sup> [http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/non-state\\_armed\\_groups.php?id\\_state=110](http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/non-state_armed_groups.php?id_state=110)



Sunnis, the protection of Shia interests is the predominant priority. Badr Brigade, the military arm of Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), is another Shia group that has signed a disarmament treaty with the CPA but has not yet been completely disarmed.

The Brigade is thus officially dissolved and it is being integrated in the new Iraqi Security Forces. On the Arab Sunni front, there is Al-Qaida who counts more than 2000 members in Iraq. Al Ansar is another Sunni group that operates mainly in the Northern region of Iraq. It has between 500 and 1000 members. The Islamic army of Iraq is another Sunni group having close ties with Al-Qaida and it has approximately 1000 members. Sunni and Shia militias undergo many terrorist attacks towards each other and there is not a day without an explosion or a murder. The table on the next page shows the most influent and major militias in order to have an idea of the emergency of the situation.

The Iraqi security issue is an urgent concern if the policymakers aim to stop the chaos. All the militias must be disarmed and integrated to the civil-society in a way or another if the sovereignty of the State is to be re-established. However, because of an environment filled with mistrust, militias are unwilling to disarm. Absorbing militias into the military is possible as long as there is a political incentive for the groups they represent, and as long as former militia membership is not an impediment to a military career<sup>99</sup>. The growing number of militias and short-term agreements between them complicates the process of DDR and impedes the establishment of a strong and resilient Security Sector.

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<sup>99</sup> Mark Sedra, *The Future of Security Sector Reform*. The Centre for International Governance and Innovation, (CIGI, 2010), 182.

Table 3.1: Armed Groups in Iraq

NAME	IDENTITY	OBJECTIVE	MEMBERS	ALLIES	FOES	SUPPORTERS
<b>Islamic Army of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)*</b>	Jihadists, Sunni Arabs and Kurds	Establish an Islamic State	20 000 +	Sunni Tribal militias	Peshmerga, Iraqi Security Forces	Al-Qaeda, Taliban
<b>National Council for the Salvation of Iraq</b>	Sunni Arabs	Fight for Sunni Rights	10 000 +	Sunni Tribal militias	Maliki Forces and Shias	US Military
<b>Ensar Al-Islam (Ensar al-Sunnah)</b>	Salafis, Sunni Arabs and Kurds	Transform Iraq into an Islamic State	5000	Sunni Tribal militias	PUK, KDP	Al-Qaeda
<b>Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance</b>	Sunni Arabs	Establish Sharia Laws in Iraq	3000	ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Naqshbandi Order	Occupiers	Local Sunni Groups
<b>1920 Revolution Brigades</b>	Sunni Arabs	Free Iraq and establish Sharia Laws	2000	ISIS, IFIR	Occupiers and Shias	Hamas
<b>The Naqshbandi Order</b>	Sunni Soufis, Arabs and Kurds	Pan-Arabism and Islam	2000	Ansar al-Sunna, ISIS, 1920 Revolutionary Brigade	Iraqi Security Forces	Members of the Baath party
<b>Mahdi Army</b>	Shia Arabs	Protect the entity of Iraq and establish a Sharia based State	40 000	Shia Muslims, Badr Organisation	Sunni rebels	Iran
<b>Badr Organization</b>	Shia Arabs	Islamic Revolution	10 000 +	Shia Tribes and Families	Sunni Forces	Iran
<b>The League of the Righteous</b>	Shia Arabs	Islamic Revolution	4000	Shia Tribes and Families	Occupiers	Iran
<b>Soldiers of Heaven</b>	Shia Arabs	Spreading Chaos to hasten the return of the 12 <sup>th</sup> imam	3000	Shia Tribes and Families	Occupiers	Iran
<b>Kata'ib Hizbollah</b>	Shia Arabs	Islamic Revolution	1000	Mahdi Army	Occupiers and ISIS	Iran
<b>Peshmerga</b>	Kurds	Protect KRG	200 000	PUK, KDP	ISIS	KRG, Baghdad

\*ISIS is the umbrella militia that regroups inter alia: The Patriotic Army for the Liberation of Iraq; The God is Great Forces; The forces of Muhammad, Messenger of God (Sunni Arab fighters); the Asad Allah Forces; the Iraqi Islamic Resistance Battalions; The Salafi Mujahedin Group Battalions; the Battalions of the Clans of the Iraqi People; the Iraqi Islamic Army; the Ajnad Al-Islam Group Battalions; the Victorious Sect Army; the Ansar Al-Sunnah Army; Al-Qari'ah Organization Battalions; the Free Men of Iraq Army; the Abd Al-Qadir Al-Kilani Army; the Victor Salah Al-Din Battalions; the Black Banners Army; the Ababil Army; and the Martyr Ahmad Yasin Brigades<sup>100</sup>

It is true that Iraqis are attached to their territory; the inhabitants identify themselves with the Iraqi land. However, this tie to the territory is not enough to give them a

<sup>100</sup> Kathleen Ridolfo, A Survey Of Armed Groups in Iraq, Radio Free Iraq, p. 5

common national identity. This is why various militia groups are much more present in Iraq than in Lebanon. The Kurdish Peshmerga group, for example, existed well before 2003 and their integration to the national military forces started recently. The Shia Badr Brigade also existed before 2003 and it is being integrated into the new military force. The Sunni Sons of Iraq are also being slowly integrated into various branches of the security structure. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is another Sunni group operating in Syria and Iraq. They are the equivalent of the Free Syrian Army in Syria and easily travel between Syria and Iraq. The Sahwa militia achieved significant successes by expelling the Iraq branch of Al-Qaida from the cities. Nevertheless, its members who were supposed to become part of the regular army were suspected by Maliki of being disloyal to the State and the integration process succeeded only in the case of 20 percent<sup>101</sup>. The Mahdi army is still operative but it seems that Moqtada al-Sadr has tried to appease the present violent atmosphere by calling his troops to stop the violence.

Iraq, just like Lebanon, tries to incorporate the militia groups in its security forces because there is practically no other way to motivate those groups to stop their struggle. In that sense, Sunnis, Shias, Kurds, Turkmens and all other ethnic and sectarian group must be represented, at least in the military force, in one way or another. The national defense is the public good that every individual would like to benefit from. Moreover, if one does not feel himself represented in that entity, he will not have the feeling of being protected by his own State. This is the reason why representation remains the most important feature of the security forces. The problem remains in the fact that the last census made in Iraq dates back to 1997; it did not however include questions related to ethnicity and religious affiliation<sup>102</sup>. This makes the present population percentages approximate and reliable only to a certain extent.

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<sup>101</sup> Florence Gaub, "Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning From Iraq and Lebanon", *SSI*, (2011): 21.

<sup>102</sup> Florence Gaub, "Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning From Iraq and Lebanon", *SSI*, (2011): 26.

Professionalism in the Iraqi armed forces is the most difficult endeavor because Iraqis are mostly loyal to their tribes before anything else. Iraqi nationalism in that sense is quasi non-existent. Hence, cohesion is also hard to establish within such an institution because ethnic and sectarian differences are very noticeable and national identity is very fragile even among the officer corps. Lack of trust, confidence, material resources, national identity and ideology all contribute to the fragile nature of the present Iraqi army. There are efforts by competing Iraqi actors to control and re-orient the Iraqi security forces. To preserve its unity and effectiveness, the Security Forces must be a reflection of the Iraqi society as a whole and serve every citizen equally without considering ethnic or sectarian affiliations.

To resume the situation, ethnic and sectarian differences contribute to the lack of cohesion between the members of the security forces. This is not mainly due to the lack of political representation, but also to misrepresentation in the security forces. The inequality towards the opportunity to benefit from the economic outcomes is also a factor contributing to the upheaval of many tribal groups. As Kaplan argued, the abundance of natural resources is the key to violent conflict and state collapse<sup>103</sup>. Considering the fact that Iraq holds the second largest oil reserves in the world, economic issues constitute a large part of the present conflict. All these problems are related to the process of Nation-Building. Even if effective State-Building is achieved, without a common goal, a common identity, a common vision of the world, there will never be an Iraqi nation willing to make the necessary effort for the common good. Hence, Iraq is the case that shows us how Nation-Building is crucial if one wants to preserve the entity of the State. Without a common Identity, the State will always be divided and the only solution would be to return to the old Ottoman division of the region or to consider Biden's plan for the 'soft partition' of Iraq. On the one hand, Sunnis have lost their privileges and been relegated to the bottom of the social ladder, and on the other, the Kurds have already progressed on the road of proclaiming their

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<sup>103</sup> Heiner Hänggi, *Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective*, (DCAF, 2005), 45.

own sovereign State. With such inequalities and divergences in political goals, Nation-Building remains an impossible endeavor for the Iraqi population. Therefore, this indicates us that Iraq is still the same Iraq as of 1921: a territory inhabited by different ethnic and sectarian groups having almost nothing in common in the country for approximately a hundred years.

Nation-Building involves various dimensions that are all related to the integration of the citizens to the social, political, economic, cultural and bureaucratic life of the land. Without an integrative ideology, a national identity, a sense of belonging to the State, the Iraqi nation has no chance to emerge. The bad news is that the United States was so concentrated and obsessed with regime change that they forgot to meticulously calculate the ethnic and sectarian tensions after Saddam's death. Nation-Building was thus not a priority of the invading powers, and it became part of the post-conflict reconstruction process only after the burst of harsh violence. The poorly developed civil society and civic culture of the Iraqi people remains an impediment to create a shared vision of the reconstruction process of the State. Mechanisms for collaborative governance of various institutions are also difficult to keep because of the diverging objectives of the population. The unclear and unstable divisions of power as well as unemployment mounting to 30 percent only contribute to the resentment of misrepresentation of different Iraqi ethnic and sectarian factions within the government apparatus.

<b>Total Security Forces</b>		
<b>SERVICE</b>		<b>ASSIGNED PERSONNEL</b>
<b>Ministry of Defense</b>	Iraqi Army	200,000
	Training and Support	68,000
	Air Force	5,053
	Navy	3,650
	Army Air Corps	2,400
	<b>Total MOD</b>	<b>279,103</b>
<b>Ministry of Interior</b>	Iraqi Police	325,000
	Facilities Protection Service	95,000
	Training and Support	89,800
	Department of Border Enforcement	60,000
	Iraqi Federal Police	45,000
	Oil Police	35,000
	<b>Total MOI</b>	<b>649,800</b>
<b>Counter-Terrorism Force</b>		<b>4,200</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>933,103</b>

Figure 3.2: Iraqi Security Forces as of October 10, 2011<sup>104</sup>

At the end of March 2004, the CPA announced the creation of the Iraqi ministry of interior. There were new security forces including the police, facilities protection service, border enforcement agents and civil defense forces. The Iraqi army was already attached to the ministry of Defense. However, obligatory military service was relieved as of 2003<sup>105</sup>. New police forces were to be trained in Jordan, Basra and the Arab Emirates. In 2004, during the first month of the operation, more than 9000 police units were formed and started to work mainly in Baghdad<sup>106</sup>.

<sup>104</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai, and Daniel Dewit, *Shaping Iraq's Security forces*, CSIS, 4. December 16, 2013

<sup>105</sup> Ibrahim al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed forces, An Analytical History*, (Routledge, 2008), 121.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid*, 128.

Civil Defense Corps are men and women who are to be integrated in the army by patrolling only in their neighborhood and look after the peaceful reconstruction of their respective areas. Due to the dissolution of the secret services similar to the Iraqi army, new agents are being recruited and trained by the CIA agents. Security forces are being rebuilt and progress is present in many parts of Iraq. However, terrorist attacks are a daily reality for the Iraqi population.

There is presently a social or group conflict in Iraq and it involves according to Coser, – a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and other scarce resources in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values, but also to affect, change, or injure rivals<sup>107</sup>. The specific tactics employed can range from efforts at influence or persuasion, to the use of positive inducements, to forms of constraints or coercive action<sup>108</sup>.

Eckstein identifies two major classes of theoretical explanations of political violence:

- a) *contingency theories, which assume that individuals and groups are generally peaceful and only engage in political violence when their basic needs have been severely frustrated, and*
- b) *inherency models, which assume that people are primarily interested in increasing their degree of power and privilege and that they will readily engage in political violence for the achievement of these ends whenever the potential gains of violence are seen as outweighing the costs*<sup>109</sup>.

In Iraq, there is now a window of opportunity for every group to get the most out of the power vacuum and they are ready to do anything in order to increase their power. Above all, for the Sunni Arabs who have lost the most after the American intervention, it is now time to fight for their lost privileges.

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<sup>107</sup> Dereck McGee, *Security, Citizenship and Human Rights, Shared Values in Uncertain Times*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 156.

<sup>108</sup> *Idem*, 163.

<sup>109</sup> John T. Jost, Jim Sidanius, *Political Psychology, Key Readings in Social Psychology*, Psychology Press, 346.

Simon and Klandermans argue that collective identities become “politicized” to the extent that these identities become consciously engaged in a power struggle on behalf of their social groups<sup>110</sup>. Political conflict becomes more likely as people become aware of additional grievances held by other members of the ingroup and as people begin to increasingly attribute the causes of their grievances to the actions of outgroup members and demand that corrective action be taken by society as a whole. Once politicized identities are formed, social and psychological consequences include increased conformity to ingroup norms, as well as increased stereotyping, discrimination, and even violence against outgroups. In Iraq, identities are now more relevant than any other time in its history. The degree of polarization is at its highest levels and there are no legitimate institution where to negotiate. There are no places nor leaders for negotiations. Social struggle is to continue as long as a legitimate and effective security sector is not developed.

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<sup>110</sup> Simon, Bernd; Klandermans, Bert, Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis. *American Psychologist*, Vol 56(4), April 2001, 319-331.



## CHAPTER 4

### LESSONS TO LEARN FROM IRAQ'S POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

Iraq's unique history has thus been analyzed by considering civil society and the political elites. However, that which is even more important is to set the proper ground in order to rebuild the state in the proper way. As we have overtly seen in the past, colonial policies and decisions made during the process of state formation shape a society's trajectory. It is thus crucial to assess the theoretical approach and see whether the theory is enough to be applied to the Iraqi case. To do this, one must bear in mind that what could illuminate us for the future will always be the past. Historical facts remain the most important signposts in order for policymakers not to repeat the same mistakes. For instance, Arab Sunni domination in twentieth-century Iraq is often linked to Ottoman and British policies that favored Sunnis for administrative and military positions<sup>111</sup>. There must be a reason why such Empires have bolstered the Sunni faction in the Iraqi State. In that sense, understanding the past will help us better discern the present mistakes made by the invading powers and the political entrepreneurs.

Because of their obsession with completely eradicating Saddam Hussein and everything that is related to him, the United States has completely destroyed the Iraqi State's economic, political and societal system. For the sake of the removal of the Baath party, which was omnipresent in the Iraqi territory, the invading forces had no choice but to reboot the Iraqi State. They did not want the ancient system to re-emerge, so they fostered different groups not in order to have a functional society, but in order to eliminate any re-emergence of the ancient regime. This is the reason why the Shias are being supported and the Kurds had already realized a big portion of their wishes in 1991.

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<sup>111</sup> Ibrahim al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed forces, An Analytical History*, (Routledge, 2008), 113.

#### 4.1 Iraq's Administration during the Ottoman Period

Already during the 1880s, Abdurrahman pasha, the Vali of Baghdad, had warned that Iraq has its own peculiarities because of the various cultures, sects, customs and traditions present in the region and thus could not be kept under a lawful and ordered system in an ordinary way<sup>112</sup>. He had three recommendations to the Sublime Porte for the administration of Iraqi provinces. First, he said that Iraqi provinces need more security and order than any other region of the empire. Second, he asserted that the gendarmerie and security forces must be expanded in terms of personnel as well as the quality and quantity of equipment. Third, that local courts and civil administration must be reinforced<sup>113</sup>. The solution proposed by Namik Pasha in 1879 in a report was to unite Baghdad, Basra and Mosul as *“one province under one powerful vali, with full authority over civil, military, and financial administration”*<sup>114</sup>. During the same years, Suleyman Pasha and Nusret Pasha suggested that the security and order problems might be resolved by forming a unique tribal militia similar to the Hamidiye Regiments operating in eastern Anatolia<sup>115</sup>. According to Suleyman Shevki Pasha, who wrote a report in 1906, the root causes of instability in Iraq were that almost all tribes in the region possessed illegal weapons<sup>116</sup>. Moreover, corruption and the incompetence of local officials had a deep impact over the sustainability of Iraq's security. Disarmament of tribes was thus a major point for Suleyman Shevki Pasha in order to start peaceful reforms in Iraq. Broadly, the main problems of Iraq perceived by the Ottoman administration were the tribal outbreaks and the involvement of Iran in Iraqi politics

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<sup>112</sup> Gokhan Cetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890 – 1908*, (Routledge, 2006), 27.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, 32.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. 35.

<sup>115</sup> Gokhan Cetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890 – 1908*, (Routledge, 2006), 48

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 53.

through the Shia population in Basra as well as corruption and misconduct among officials<sup>117</sup>.

According to Anthony D. Smith, nations have the following characteristics: a distinctive shared culture, a common myth of ancestry (descent) involving a shared history, a strong sense of group sentiment and loyalty, an association with a specific territory, territorial contiguity with free mobility throughout, equal citizenship rights, vertical economic integration, and a common language<sup>118</sup>. Based on these characteristics, there are some conditions that must be present in order for a society to form a nation. First, a memory of a common past; second, linguistic or cultural ties that enable a higher degree of social communication within the group than that which takes place beyond it; and third, a conception of equality between members of the group that is organized as a civil society. If a group does not possess these three conditions, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify as a people or to bond as a nation<sup>119</sup>. Having these definitions in mind, it is easier to see how the Bush administration neglected many peculiarities of Iraq.

According to Mason, *“it is only if citizens have a shared sense of belonging together that they will value participating together politically”*<sup>120</sup>. However a sense of belonging together has four distinct assumptions. According to Miller, a shared national identity is required in pluralistic societies to avoid certain groups from being alienated from their political institutions. Miller maintains that liberal political institutions are unlikely to be stable or enduring unless citizens share a national identity. A shared national identity is the precondition for the existence of the kind of trust, which makes compromise

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid, 56.

<sup>118</sup> Elizabeth Cousens, “Context and Politics of State-Building”, *American Society of International Law*, Vol. 99 (2005): 36-38.

<sup>119</sup> Elizabeth Cousens, “Context and Politics of State-Building”, *American Society of International Law*, Vol. 99 (2005): 36-38.

<sup>120</sup> Dereck McGee, *Security, Citizenship and Human Rights, Shared Values in Uncertain Times*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 176.

possible in the face of conflicting interests. In addition, a shared national identity is a necessary condition for a politics of the common good, including widespread support for redistribution on grounds of social justice. Unfortunately, this sense of belonging together has never developed in Iraq and its seeds are more fragile than ever<sup>121</sup>.

As noted earlier, if one takes a look at the Iraqi map, he will see that the divisions made by the Ottoman Empire already reflected the linguistic and sectarian differences of the region. The one point that almost anyone who knows the region agree with is that it needs a strong effective security force able to respond whenever needed. According to Saideman et al., federalism is a system that reduces the level of ethnic violence<sup>122</sup>. Moreover, Borromeo concludes that federal institutions are effective means of successful accommodation in cases of ethnic conflict<sup>123</sup>. In the Iraqi case, federalism and decentralization may be an effective way of attenuating the tensions between Kurds and Arabs. However, Nation-Building will never be successful in such a case. By referring to the definition of what constitutes a nation by Anthony D. Smith, it is obvious that Kurds and Arabs have different identities and thus cannot form an “Iraqi Nation”. The United States and its allies have probably seen that fact because there was no effort made for such an objective. However, Sunni and Shia Arabs are brothers of faith and have much cultural and historical commonality. Nevertheless, Nation-Building remains a difficult endeavor between them because they have different interpretations and definitions of being an Iraqi citizen. The way they perceive each other differs mainly on their sectarian affiliations rather than their nationality. In such settings, State-Building becomes the first priority, and security is the most important aspect of this plan because in a non-secure environment, no progress could take place.

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<sup>121</sup> Idem, 201.

<sup>122</sup> David Chandler, *Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building*, (Pluto Press, 2006), 170.

<sup>123</sup> Alina Rocha Menocal, “State Building for Peace: a new paradigm for international engagement in post-conflict fragile states?”, *Third World Quarterly*, no. 32:10 (2011): 1715-1736.

On the 16<sup>th</sup> of January 2014, the Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki asked new arms from the United States. An armament campaign is thus going on in Iraq for the establishment of better-equipped armed forces. This is mostly due to the actual divisions in Iraq that stemmed from the decisions of the occupying authorities to dismantle the army and the government. This fact opened a window of opportunity for several confessional militia groups to emerge and gain from the power vacuum. The Maliki Government however tightened its grip over the security services and systematically marginalized the Sunni faction by increasing the number of arrests. On January the 30<sup>th</sup>, the Maliki government dismantled the Sunni protest camp in Ramadi and it only revived the tensions between these factions which were already tense. Terrorist attacks that affect the country as a whole are the most urgent problems of Iraq. Many militias are able to escape from prison, and security is still an issue affecting the daily lives of all the Iraqis. 2013 was one of the bloodiest years for Iraq. Many analysts and diplomats assert that is it due to the marginalization of the Sunni groups that they have been relegated to the bottom of the Iraqi society.

#### 4.2 The Lebanese example, a path to follow

The effective building of security forces in Iraq must be done by considering its multi-ethnic/multi-sectarian composition. By neglecting this fact, it would be impossible to build an effective army serving the interests of the Iraqi nation. As noted earlier, the existence of any militia group outside the official army is prohibited by the constitution. The only entity having the right to establish security forces is the Kurdistan region for the internal protection of the territory. In order to eliminate already existing militia groups, the solution is either to wage a campaign against them – which could be very expensive and time consuming- or to integrate them into the armed forces or in any branch of the security forces.

The best example to demonstrate the outcomes of building a multi-sectarian army is the one conducted in Lebanon following the civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990. As

is it well known, eighteen officially recognized religious groups inhabit Lebanon where – according to the census of 1932 – Christians form the majority and Muslims follow them. The Lebanese state also faces sectarian problems. However ethnic issues are absent because of the homogeneity of the local population. Following the Taif accord, there was a need to rebuild the Lebanese armed forces in order to give the State its monopoly over the use of violence. The withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005 was the opportunity for the Lebanese Armed Forces to reorganize and function more effectively. Lebanon thus succeeded to rebuild its army largely without international assistance<sup>124</sup>. According to Florence Gaub, armed forces in plural societies face a particular challenge: *“while most state institutions, especially those in the security sector, usually prefer to recruit proportionally more soldiers from groups deemed loyal to the state and regime, an exaggerated unbalance can create political unrest or even lead to the break-up of the very country”*.

Loyalty is crucial in security forces. This fact was obvious during the Saddam era where he mostly advantaged members of the Sunni faction. The present Maliki government is accused of doing the same mistake by discriminating members of the Sunni faction and privileging members of his own group. Ethnic balancing is thus more important in the security forces than in any other sector of the State. There are two levels on which ethnic balancing takes place: upon recruitment and within the existing body of the security forces<sup>125</sup>. The Lebanese army, for instance, decided to reintegrate about 3,000 Christians who fought during the civil war. This was done mostly in order to balance the ethnic representation of the army, and integrate already trained units in the new army. The Lebanese military thus created a complicated system of ethnic representation within the army in order to have members of various groups at the command posts. Horizontal and Vertical balance of religious groups were at the heart of constituting the

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<sup>124</sup> Florence Gaub, “Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning From Iraq and Lebanon”, *SSI*, (2011): 9.

<sup>125</sup> Florence Gaub, *Military Integration after Civil Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 2012, 61.

new Lebanese army. The problem of applying quotas to different ethnic groups brings the problem of religion into a national institution that has to recruit upon meritocratic principles<sup>126</sup>. Therefore, once established, it is hard to abolish this kind of system where each group wants representation. Its main advantage resides in the fact that every citizen has the possibility to identify himself with such an institution representing the real national pride of a State.

The image of the army is important because it has to protect and represent the population as a whole. It is said that the recruitment of staff from different members of the society by applying quotas could have the effect of dividing the staff from within. Sectarian and ethnic differences could take over the national identity, and disturbances could burst from within the armed forces. However, in the Iraqi case, things are more complicated than this. The officer corps in Lebanon is one of religious quota where it doesn't necessarily reflect the composition of the society, but creates an artificial parity between the present groups and allocates equivalent shares to all of them<sup>127</sup>.

In March 1991, Lebanon passed a law granting amnesty for all political crimes committed prior to its enactment<sup>128</sup>. Indeed, none of the militia leaders (except Samir Geagea) were judged and tried for the acts committed during the civil war. All the militias (except the Hezbollah) were disbanded and thousands of former militia members were integrated into the Lebanese army<sup>129</sup>. The Lebanese case is one of official reconciliation and "unofficial discrimination of those who had compromised themselves during the war"<sup>130</sup>. Because of the reconciliation process, the Lebanese army succeeded to introduce itself as a symbol of multi-sectarian cooperation and

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<sup>126</sup> Florence Gaub, "Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning From Iraq and Lebanon", *SSI*, (2011): 10.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, 13.

<sup>129</sup> Florence Gaub, "Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning From Iraq and Lebanon", *SSI*, (2011): 14.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, 15.

peace within the State. The Lebanese army has earned the trust of the local population and it conserves a positive image in its eyes. Even if the army has its weaknesses, the general population prefers to feel protected by a national army than by any other militia group. The Lebanese army agrees to coexist with the Hezbollah which operates mainly in the southern part of the country and is much more responsive than the former. The security forces and specifically the army must be bound by a certain sense of cohesion among its members. If there is no sense of duty to nation and state, the security forces won't be able to function properly and the investments will drain away.

The Lebanese security apparatus has been re-erected by due regard to sectarian differences. At the rank and file level, the society is represented proportionally, but at the officer's level, it is divided in a balanced manner among different religious factions. Taking into account the balance of sectarian affiliations within the security forces seems to be fundamental in order for the local population to feel protected by such a national institution. Professionalism is an essential requirement within the armed forces because the responsible must be loyal to the State above anything else. Tribalism is also present in Lebanon which engenders the problem of loyalty and dedication to service. Nevertheless, the Lebanese army has managed to give the soldiers the necessary training and education so they could have a sense of belonging to their State before their tribe or sectarian affiliation. Even if the army has its weaknesses and has to work with the presence of another militia group (Hezbollah), it has earned the trust of the people in general.

The case of Iraq has its peculiarities because it does not only have sectarian but also ethnic differences. All the years of dictatorship have deepened the grievances between groups, and it is now very hard to reconcile them. In Iraq it is practically impossible to speak of an 'Iraqi' nation. There are no common overarching goals that could bring Kurds, Shias and Sunnis together. There is not a common national ideology, and violent acts that are still present in Iraq only further the differential gap between those factions. It is known that the Shias were underrepresented traditionally in the Ottoman



army officer corps and in the early Iraqi armed forces as well<sup>131</sup>. After the invasion of 2003, and the disbandment of the army, US officials had to engage new staff to reconstruct the army. In that sense, whereas the Lebanese army had been mostly reformed, the Iraqi army had been reconstructed from scratch. The Iraqi army had to be reconstructed however as fast as possible in order to reassure the provision of security in the country. This is why the US officials had to recruit from the Sunni faction as its members had the greatest experience in security affairs. Albeit de-Baathification operation where all the Arab Sunnis have been targeted, it is still possible to see them in the senior officer ranks. However, in the Iraqi armed forces, the balance of the population is reflected at all levels. Despite this policy of representation within the army, the Maliki government attempts to increase the Shia influence in such national institutions. The Prime Minister uses the words ‘terrorist’ and ‘Baathist’ to refer to the Sunnis and accuses them of being the perpetrators of violence in the State.

#### 4.3 Iraq’s Administration during the CPA Period

To understand the present postwar reconstruction process of Iraq, its security sector, its political atmosphere and its economic structure, one must analyze the policies developed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. When Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad in 2003, he had the privilege to dispose of all Iraqi state assets and control all Iraqi government officials. Thus, he possessed full executive, legislative, and judicial authority<sup>132</sup>. Most of the CPA’s staff were Americans and officials from allied countries filled a significant minority of positions. Hence, no Iraqi was to operate within the CPA. Only after a few months, The Governing Council was to appoint Iraqi ministers at the head of each agency. The CPA however retained veto authority over major decisions<sup>133</sup>.

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<sup>131</sup> Philippe Le Billon, “Corruption, Reconstruction and Oil Governance in Iraq”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, no. 4/5 (2005): 685-703.

<sup>132</sup> Stephen Blackwell, “Between Tradition and Transition: State Building, Society and Security in the Old and New Iraq”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, no. 3 (May, 2005): 445-452.

<sup>133</sup> Idem.

After the dismantlement of the army, new security forces were to be engaged as fast as possible because unchecked looting was widespread mainly in Baghdad, and many government buildings were damaged. Already in late 2003, the CPA had created many of Iraq's security institutions such as the New Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police Force, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the Iraqi Border Police. Later on, Iraqi Coastal Defense Force and the Iraqi Air force were formed in order to expand the military forces and their operational sphere. In a departure from the Saddam era, the CPA decided that the new Iraqi army would be an all-volunteer force<sup>134</sup>. The CPA also decreed that the army – and other security forces more broadly – would reflect the ethnic, religious, and regional diversity of the country<sup>135</sup>. This is a significant step towards the representation of all the Iraqis. However, as I have mentioned, the CPA did not consider the deeper scissions between the people of Iraq. In that sense, as some specialists from the field have asserted “*with respect to security, arguably the most important aspect of any postconflict mission, Iraq comes near the bottom in any ranking of postwar reconstruction efforts*”<sup>136</sup>. Security Sector Reform in Iraq is still in a state of failure and much work has to be done before a secure environment is established within the State. The United States' failure in reconstructing Iraqi institutions and societal mechanisms that bind the people together constitutes the crux of the present problem. Regime change in Iraq has repealed any functioning institution from the social arena and accelerated the collapse of the Iraqi state, which was already in a poor situation before the war. The administrative and coercive capacity of the state must be rebuilt with more precaution and care.

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<sup>134</sup> James Dobbins, *Occupying Iraq A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority*, (RAND Corp, 2009), 187.

<sup>135</sup> Stephen Blackwell, “Between Tradition and Transition: State Building, Society and Security in the Old and New Iraq”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, no. 3 (May, 2005): 445-452.

<sup>136</sup> James Dobbins, *Occupying Iraq A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority*, (RAND Corp, 2009), 193.

Close to 600 soldiers and police officers were killed in 2014. Nobody has the capability or the ability to stop or even retain those violent acts. Iraq's inhabitants live in an environment where insecurity reigns more than ever and the present political, economic and social atmosphere is in a critical state. Indeed, by the end of 2003, the CPA estimated that more than 30 militias were active in Iraq<sup>137</sup>. In the political sphere, most of the parties are alliances and coalitions. The Iraqi society is thus fragmented more than ever and it is impossible to predict any positive gathering for the near future.

To resume the whole story, Saddam's period was one of a highly centralized administration in which all important decisions were made in Baghdad. The invasion of 2003 toppled Saddam from power, rescinded all working social, economic and administrative mechanisms from the Constitution to the governmental institutions, and invigorated new power dynamics between different factions in Iraq. The CPA chose to leave the disarmament operation of militias to the local police instead of fighting them with the US military in order to avoid man losses. The 'special' treatment of the Kurdish peshmerga groups however served as an incentive to other militias not to disband, and thus conserve their armed strength. The militias are all suspicious of one another because they are afraid that while they are giving up arms, the others could do the opposite and become more powerful. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operation is thus very difficult to undertake in Iraq and it is a very long process that could last for decades.

In social reality, evaluations and recommendations that do not take into consideration the historical experience of the society could not offer them an effective cure for their good as a community. It should be noted that a vision that has no affiliation with the historical experience of a culture could not offer them a viable systemic alternative. However, this is what happened in 2003 with the Iraqi invasion which was primarily and extensively a military operation rather than civil or humanitarian. Any military

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<sup>137</sup> Florence Gaub, "Rebuilding Armed Forces: Learning From Iraq and Lebanon", *SSI*, (2011): 17.

operation is effective on imposing and coercing but not on negotiating and understanding the other. The United States' obsession with regime change has not only broken the fragile state of Iraq but it also triggered a series of unstable regional dynamics. The present conflict in Iraq is one of control over government, but also over territory. This makes the possibility of a peace process even more difficult to conduct.

To assess whether a policy has been successful or not, the best thing to do is to measure the differences between the targeted objectives and the position where we stand at present. The ultimate goal of any conflict resolution process is the reconciliation of conflicting parties and the re-establishment of peace, security and stability. However, it is easy to notice the precarious situation in Iraq. The objectives set by the United States and its allies were to change the Baathist regime, bring democracy to Iraq, and integrate the country to the international community by imbuing the predominant liberal values to the state's institutions. However, George W. Bush made clear the reason for the war when he asserted clearly "*Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict*"<sup>138</sup>. Hence, getting rid of Saddam's army particularly and getting rid of the formal institutions was a part of the general policy of making clear that all of the elements of the Saddam regime were dismantled. Considering a dismantled army composed of more than 400 000 soldiers, the apparition of militias was an inescapable outcome. This is what resulted exactly because in 2003, many new militias were formed and coordinated by supreme leaders. Ebu Bakr Salafist Battalion, Youths of Islam Salafist battalion, Call to Jihad salafist battalion, the Black Flag, Mujahideen brigade, the Anger brigade, and the Secret Army of Islam were some of the newly formed militias mainly on the Sunni Side. All in all, the new enemies of the Iraqi State were the Sunni brigades, the Shia Mahdi army, the former army officers, and Al-Qaida. According to Saleh Motlaq however, militias on the Shia side were state-supported in every detail; their vehicles belonged to the state, their weapons belonged to the state, their communications gear belonged to the state, and their logistical support came from the

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<sup>138</sup> George W. Bush, 2003

state. It was obvious that Al-Maliki was conducting a sectarian policy. Even if members of the former army – approximately 105 000 - fought against Al-Qaida, they weren't to be incorporated in the new army because Maliki said that they were not pro-government. Their loyalty was put in doubt by Maliki and it caused a big problem for the Sunni side. From all of the Sunni militias, only a few portion of each is being regained to the official armed forces, whereas Shias constitute the major members of the intelligence and security forces of the State. Since the beginning of the war in 2003, more than 200 000 people died and terrorism is still present in Iraq.

The Americans have succeeded in their aims. However, the Iraqis have much work to do and obstacles to overcome if they really want to live together in a peaceful atmosphere. For the security of Iraq, it is possible to assert that the key point is reached when *“reconstituted national forces are, first, under secure host government control and, second, decisively stronger than remaining undemobilized forces or private armies”*<sup>139</sup>. Until this stage is reached, the situation in Iraq will be volatile and insecure. Moreover, security problems are interrelated with the political, economic and institutional spheres of the Iraqi State. The political framework of the Iraqi state as well as its socio-economic foundations and the reconciliation process will be of crucial importance for the Iraqi population. As Paul Jackson has clearly stated *“In Iraq the United States attempted to construct a Western-style state armed with a whole range of neo-liberal state theories that view the institutions of the state as almost being separated from existing politics”*<sup>140</sup>. It dismantled the state that existed and started all over again, constructing a new set of ahistorical institutions alien to the local population. Holding an election does not necessarily constitute state formation, even though the assumption is that democracies can be created in this way within project horizons. Aside from the issues with multiparty democracy in a post-conflict situation,

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<sup>139</sup> Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (Polity Press, 2011), 159.

<sup>140</sup> Mark Sedra, *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, (The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010), 120

*“the real issues with Iraq lie in a fundamental misunderstanding of what the project of state-building actually means in practice”<sup>141</sup>.*

#### 4.4 The reconstruction of the armed forces

In the Iraqi case, the building of a well-functioning army after the American occupation has failed because of three principal reasons; the lack of leadership within the army, the existence of strong militias, and the image of a weak and dysfunctional army due to occupation. Because Saddam’s regime was privileging his own entourage in the recruitment of officers and military corps, once the leaders have disappeared from the game, no officer was trained enough to get the initiative to rule the army. Saddam’s family was so worried of losing power that any officer trained enough was considered as a potential coup planner and was either killed, exiled or at the better case dismissed from his functions. There could be no real commander outside Saddam’s family members. All the necessary and secret knowledge was within the hands of Saddam’s family only. Saddam knew very well that a successful military career was the best mean to take the control of a political movement. Hence, once the Americans entered Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein, there was no military who could take the lead and conduct an effective counter-attack against the allies. If we look back at the first Gulf War, there is no important figure who has been emphasized because Saddam did not want any hero who is loved and exalted by the population. During the eight years’ war against Iran, the principal weakness of the Iraqi army has been precisely this absence of military leadership<sup>142</sup>. Hence, at the reconstruction process, there is no important figure who could reassemble the army as a whole and conduct the necessary reforms. The only leaders have always been Saddam himself and his family. Once they have disappeared from the map, no one had the ability to take the control of the army who has completely lost its fragile image of national unity after the 2003 invasion.

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<sup>141</sup> Mark Sedra, *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, (The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010), 120

<sup>142</sup> Pierre-Jean Luizard, *La question irakienne*, (Fayard, 2002), 129

The image of the army was destroyed mainly because of the invasion itself. The army has not been able to protect neither its territory nor its population. Sectarian groups were already suspicious of the army and their suspicion was confirmed with such a fragile army. As I have mentioned, Maliki's sectarian policies did only added fuel to the fire. Still today, the extended family and the clan are at the base of power. Even if the ideology and the official political system tends to mask the tribal and sectarian membership, Iraqis first identities are related to their own ethnic and sectarian groups. Thus, the army has never been an effective symbol of national unity in Iraq. Neither nationalist political parties nor the army has never strived for at least an Arab unity. Because the army has always served a certain ideology with a certain family at its head, once disappeared, the army officers lacked the incentive to act and preferred to serve the interests of their own groups instead of serving the Iraqi State.

The third reason is war, which is strengthened and extended due to the presence of strong militias. This fact particularly only served to render the army completely obsolete. Americans are proud of citing numbers of workforce in the army, however, those numbers hides the fact that the army is completely ruined. The regular armed forces who counts for the majority of the military power has been verily affected by the Gulf wars, the embargo as well as by the uprisings within the country. The Iraqi army has been very usurped from 1991 to nowadays and the tendency still continues. Instead, militia groups are more and more powerful as seen with the ISIS case, and the army has no power to confront such armed groups by itself.

The reconstruction of the army has failed because of the CPA who disbanded the army and completely embarrassed the national symbol. Maliki's policies also contributed to the failure of a healthy reconstruction. However, my thought is that the army needed to be reconstructed already during Saddam's era. The army needed heroes; it needed physical and material resources, but Saddam's policies, the embargo, the Gulf wars, and the reforms of the CPA only contributed to weaken an already weakened army. All these events made of the Iraqi armed forces an institution without any solid strategy to recover from its wounds. The army is still destabilized because of compelled top-down

reforms conducted by the USA and because of the lack of clear strategy for the Iraqi State. The army has difficulties to recover also because of the present hostile environment in Iraq. So many militias and terrorist groups only delays the training of the military by compelling them to a war against terrorism. The military thus needs a time of serenity so it can recover faster to become more efficient. In such an environment, the process will take much more time and consume much more effort.



## CONCLUSION

Iraq is a recent case of post-conflict reconstruction and it is unfortunately falling again into the fire. The present ethnic and sectarian differences hinders the reconstruction of the country as a whole because of a history full of grievances and hatred within all of the present groups. The security forces particularly are still in a very-fragile state because of the present militia groups attached to different groups having divergent interests. This fact hinders the army and the population to have a figure on which to rely for an equitable and just reconstruction of the security forces and the Iraqi State as a whole. The invasion which totally destroyed the army as well as its image as a strong symbol of unity, is also one of the main reason of an Iraq incapable of staying on his feet.

The well-functioning of the Iraqi State is not only the responsibility of the Iraqis, but also of the regional powers surrounding the State<sup>143</sup>. In that sense, regional cooperation, acknowledgement of human rights, and national integration, are the best security policies for the new Iraq. There is first social strife, the product largely of socioeconomic disparities, asymmetrical development, ideological rivalries, relative deprivation, and feelings of neglect and dispossession. If the socioeconomic disparities persist and the resulting hostilities are unappeased, particularly if accompanied by feelings of threatened communal legacy and confessional loyalties, conflict and discord are inclined to become more militant and bellicose.

In Iraq, the problem is very difficult to encircle or specifically define and solve because of the many interrelated issues and changing internal and global dynamics. However some recommendations are still possible to make in order to establish a secure and peaceful Iraq. Nation-Building has been a failure in Iraq and after this moment, it has become practically impossible. Therefore, the construction of an Iraqi nation is too

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<sup>143</sup> Dereck McGee, *Security, Citizenship and Human Rights, Shared Values in Uncertain Times*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 188.

much idealistic for anyone knowing the region. However, a sense of patriotism could be developed among the Iraqi population. According to Gordon Brown, "*patriotism defines a nation not by race or ethnicity, but by seeing us all as part of a covenant, in which we recognize that our destinies are interlinked*"<sup>144</sup>. A sense of belonging to the same territory and a sense of unity could be developed by using Islamic terminology. Governmental institutions could also imbue patriotic values to the population by using various instruments. The major challenge in Iraq is to foster a sense of belonging which transcends differences<sup>145</sup>. This endeavor is very difficult because every citizen wants to feel that he is equal to any other. In that sense, developing the capacity of one institution and not another can fundamentally alter the balance of power and is likely to be resisted by some parties as much as it is welcomed by others<sup>146</sup>. The biggest role is to be played by al-Maliki who has to use the security forces not to secure the regime but the civil society. He, as the leader, must recognize the common humanity of all ethnic and sectarian groups in the country and direct the State's institutions in that sense.

A bottom-up approach is necessary for the population to recognize the rights of each other. But a top-down approach is necessary for the government to give the population the feeling of really being equal before the law and governmental institutions. Relations of recognition is the point to start at both level of the State. Second, local ownership is a must in any reconstruction process. The population and the elite must own and feel that they can do something for the well-being of their country. Local leaders must do the state-building process by taking into consideration the population's needs and wants. The present deadlock stems from the fact that militia groups have no incentives for giving up their arms. The political and constitutional frameworks thus impede SSR. In that sense, a holistic view is to be developed in order

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<sup>144</sup> Dereck McGee, *Security, Citizenship and Human Rights, Shared Values in Uncertain Times*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 193.

<sup>145</sup> Idem.

<sup>146</sup> Idem.

to rebuild the capacity of the State and restore its legitimacy. A whole new set of negotiations is to be held among the ethnic and sectarian leaders. The process however must be welcomed by every group and it must be conducted internally by local leaders.

The integration process of a State is not only the responsibility of the State itself but also its surroundings. However, the integration of a State in terms of institutions and democracy is much easier than the integration of a nation into the predominant paradigm. State Building in that sense takes much less time than Nation Building and it is a process of instituting the right conditions for a State to integrate the liberal system. A nation however cannot be formed within years or even decades. As for Iraq, the potential of reconciliation has diminished because of new segregated neighborhoods, which have hardened and intensified patterns of internal conflict. This is the reason why Iraq's near future will inescapably follow a perilous path where the end is still nebulous.

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