

**THE MILITARY IN EGYPT (1798-2013):
THE GENEALOGY OF THE MILITANT FUNCTIONAL GROUP IN THE SECULAR AGE**

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**ISTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY
SEPTEMBER 2014**

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
ISTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY

ABDULRAHMAN HOSSAM


IN PARTIAL FULLFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS
IN
MODERN TURKISH STUDIES

SEPTEMBER 2014


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
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A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Abdulrahman Hossain", with a long horizontal flourish underneath.

ABSTRACT

THE MILITARY IN EGYPT (1798-2013)

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MA, Modern Turkish Studies

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Okumuş

September 2014, 185 pages

This thesis problematizes resistance to modern imperial power. By addressing the Egyptian military as a functional group, this thesis argues the military is the indispensable guardian of the Western Matrix of control. Reviewing the Western literature on civil-military relations, the thesis concludes this literature is historically anachronistic, sociologically obsolete, and politically opaque. Beginning with the 2013 coup, this thesis argues we could not understand this coup unless we trace it back to the late 17th and 18th centuries. Thus, this thesis examines the genealogy of the militant functional group since its beginning after the French imperial invasion in 1798 and through four phases. First, modern disciplinary power was implanted in Egypt, and Islam was displaced as a frame of reference, together comprising the weltanschauung upheaval. From that moment Egypt entered its secular age, and its ruling elite became a mere functional group. Second, the British invasion proceeded the French mission by completely detaching Egypt from the Ottoman state and creating Egypt as a territorial space with territorialized institutions (Cromer's automaton), in which the British created a system of secular benign nationalism. However, although the Cairo Burn signaled the failure of the colonially created state, in the third phase the American Nasser's coup restored and reinstalled Cromer's broken automaton, Nasser clung to the colonially created nation state as a structure for social organization, and kept trying to drive Cromer's automaton by absolute oppression turning the Egyptians into "Misrables". And fourth, this thesis tackled the American reorientation of Cromer's automaton, why the secret CIA-Nasser relation turned into a blunt American-Egyptian strategic relation, how Egypt was militarily and economically tied to the US, the American role in the development of the officers' republic, how this officers' economic empire was constructed, and their functional group was established through isolation/seclusion and infiltration/ubiquity.

Keywords: Egypt; the military in Egypt; civil military relations; power and resistance.

ÖZ

MISIR'DA ORDU (1798-2013)

Hossam, Abdulrahman

MA, Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları

Tez Yönetici: Yar. Doç. Dr. Ahmet Okumuş

Eylül 2014, 185 sayfa

Bu tez modern emperyal güce direniş sorunsallaştırmaktadır. İşlevsel bir zümre olan Mısır ordusunu ele alarak, ordunun Batı denetim matrisinin önemli bir muhafızı olduğunu tartışmaktadır. Batı Avrupa literatüründeki sivil-asker ilişkilerini gözden geçirdikten sonra bu tez şu sonuca varmaktadır: bu literatür tarihsel açıdan anakronik, sosyolojik açıdan demode, politik açıdan anlaşılabilir bir literatürdür. Bu tez, 2013 askeri darbesinin, geç 17. yüzyıl ve 18. Yüzyıla kadar geriye yaslanmadan anlaşılmayacağını tartışmaktadır. . Bu nedenle, bu tez 1798'deki Fransız emperyal işgalinden itibaren askeri zümrenin soyağacını dört aşamada tetkik etmektedir. İlk olarak, modern disiplinler güç Mısır'a yerleştirilmiş, paradigma değişikliğiyle birlikte İslam bir referans çerçevesi olarak yerinden edilmiştir. Buradan itibaren Mısır seküler dönemine girmiş ve yönetici elitler Mısır'ın tek işlevsel zümresi olmuştur. İkinci olarak, İngiltere'nin işgali Mısır'ı tamamen Osmanlı Devleti'nden ayırarak ve seküler ılımlı bir milliyetçilik yarattığı Mısır'da bölgeselleştirilmiş kurumlarıyla (Cromer'in otomatonu) ayrı bir bölge kurarak İngiltere, Fransa'nın misyonunu devam ettirmiştir. Ancak, Kahire Yangını vakası kolonyal bir tarzda kurulan devletin başarısızlığının sinyallerini vermesine rağmen, üçüncü aşamada Amerika destekli Nasır'ın darbesi Cromer'in bozulan otomanonunu onarmış ve yeniden uygulamaya koymuştur. Nasır sosyal organizasyon için bir yapı olan kolonyal şekilde inşa edilmiş ulus devlete sıkı sıkıya tutunmuş ve uyguladığı zulümlerle Mısırlıları "Sefiller"e dönüştürerek sürekli olarak Cromer'in otomanonunu ikame etmeye çalışmıştır. Dördüncü olarak, bu tez Cromer'in otomatonun Amerikan yeniden oryantasyonu ile ilgilenmektedir, niçin gizli CIA-Nasır ilişkisi kör bir Amerika-Mısır stratejik ilişkisine dönüştü, Mısır askeri ve ekonomik açıdan nasıl Amerika'ya bağlandı, Amerika'nın subay cumhuriyetinin kurulmasındaki rolü, bu subayların ekonomik imparatorluğu nasıl kuruldu ve onların işlevsel zümresi izolasyon ve sızma vasıtasıyla kurulmuştur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Mısır; Mısır'da Ordu; sivil askeri ilişkiler; güç ve direniş.

To V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Allah for all the blessings in my life, and for giving me the will, guidance, and the energy to write this thesis. I want to express my profoundest gratitude to my mother and father for all their passionate love and limitless caring and support. Special thanks to all my family members who surrounded me with love and care.

I would also like to extend special thanks to all my dear friends in Istanbul whose vital support made it possible for me to survive the two years from Fall 2012 to Fall 2014, during which I did my course work and wrote this thesis. To Osama Seyam, Hamza Bayram, Said Alhag, Wasem Massroja, Ahmad Badriddin, and all my friends: I am blessed to have you in my life and I appreciate all our moments together.

I could not have accomplished this work if I did not have the opportunity to learn from the extraordinarily dedicated, and passionately caring professors: Nadia Mostafa, International Relations Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, former Chairperson of the Department of Political Science, Founder of the *Al-Hadara* Center for political studies, and Founder of the Civilizational Studies Center and Dialogue among Cultures at Cairo University. Saifuddin Abdelfattah Political Theory Professor in the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Co-founder and former Director of the *Al-Hadara* Center for political studies, and Co-founder of the Civilizational Studies Center and Dialogue among Cultures at Cairo University. As well as, Heba Raouf Ezzat Political Theory Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Co-founder of the *Al-Hadara* Center for political studies, and Co-founder of the Civilizational Studies Center and Dialogue among Cultures at Cairo University. I want also to thank the media guru Mr. Tawfiq Ghanem for his significant insights and precious advice.

Meeting the exceptional Hazem Salem in 2011 was a real turning point in my life, I want to thank him for all the time we spent together sharing thoughts, discussing issues, dreaming about the future, watching movies at the cinema, and buying lots of ice cream. Hazem limitlessly offered his help and he was tirelessly persistent and tenaciously enthusiastic.

Yakoob Ahmad was very helpful in pushing me to start and continue the writing process and gave me the push I needed in the right time. David Reed Albachten continuously and tirelessly reviewed and proof read my writings, thank you indeed. I appreciate the help and encouragement Professor Qasim Abdo Qasim gave me although his sickness and work. I owe Professor Mesut Özcan, whose understanding and appreciation left me speechless and granted me precious time. Here is my work thanks to Allah. I want to thank many people who spent time reading parts of my work, more than once sometimes, and enriching the thesis with their insightful remarks: Hazem Salem, Yakoob Ahmed, Islam Mostafa, and Amr Tharwat Maklad.

Many friends helped me find the sources I needed and answer some thorny questions: Fadel Yousif, Mohammad Elhamy, Islam Mostafa, Amr Tharwat Maklad, Ahmad Fatehelbab, Emad Hamdi, and Professor Emad Shahin.

I am very blessed to have Ali Abdallah with whom I discussed and discovered the flaw in some of my initial ideas, Mokhtar Bakkar was a great information source on Abu Ghazala. Great thanks to the most important Facebook page: *Kolena Khaled Said*. I would like to thank my friend the artist Mahmoud Atef who wrote the *aya* of *surat Al Hadid* in Arabic calligraphy.

I want to thank all the friends and colleagues who helped me obtain the books I needed: Abdulrahman Hamdy, Almuzaffar Qottoz, Amr Ashraf, Amr Tharwat Maklad, Ethar Hesham, Fadl Omran, Heba Abdulgawwad, Moataz Zaher, Mohammad Ali Atiyya, Mostafa Thabet, Ramy Habash, Shaima' Abdelfattah, Shamsuddin, Somaia Abdelmohsen, and Wasim Masroujeh.

I am indebted to a number of exceptional eye-opening daring books, on top of which are: Ismail Al-Faroqi's *AlTawhid*, Mahmoud Shaker's *The Path to Our Culture*, Mona Abul-Fadl's *AlUmma Alqotb*, AbdelWahab AlMessiri's *Partial Secularism and Comprehensive Secularism* and *Fiqh Al-Tahuyyuz*, Ali Izetbegović's *Islam Between The East and The West* and *The Islamic Declaration*, Kalim Siddiqui's *Beyond the Muslim Nation-States* and *Altawhid wa Altafsikh*, Fadi Ismail's *Contemporary Arab Discourse*, Galal Kishk's *And The Horses Entered Alazhar* and *The American July Revolution*, Osama Hmaid's *The Synopsis of Social conflict in Egypt*, Edward Said's *Orientalism*, Khaled Fahmy's *All The Pasha's Men*, Timothy Mitchell's *Colonizing Egypt*, Ahmad Abdelfattah's *Ruling elites in Egypt as Functional Groups*, Tamim Al Barghouti's *Benign Nationalism*, and others.

I want also to deeply thank and express my appreciation and gratitude to the avant-gardes Rami Mohammad, and Anas Tolba and all Axeer Studio wonderful fellows for their marvelous art products that inspire me. I owe these bold movies for their iconoclastic inspiration: *The Matrix* trilogy, *V for Vendetta*, *Avatar*, *Inception*, *The Best Offer*, *Les Misérables*, *Django Unchained*, *Cloud Atlas*, *Snow Piercer*, *Divergent*, *The Hunger games*, *13 Sins*, and *Minority Report*.

I would like to thank all who read and commented on the draft of this thesis: Yakoob Ahmed, Hazem Salem, Dr. Basheer Nafi, Abdulrahman Ayyash, Dr. Ahmet Okumus, Dr. Berdal Aral, and Dr. Mehmet Akif Kayapinar.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

THE HOAX OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Muslim political scientists must now talk as a group of prisoners. They must define the scale and model of the prison in which they live. They must map the prison in detail. The three dimensions of this prison are social, economic, and political. These dimensions are linked by intellectual corridors of which the political scientists themselves are the leading exponents as well as its victims - Kalim Siddiqui (1977, p. 6).

Those thinking the modern civilization brought to our minds pure goodness are wrong, for the modern civilization had brought us terrific evil... it was a source of ignorance and stagnation - Taha Hussein, 1936 (*Shaker*: 1987, p. 163).

[Western] modernity was not a progressive alternative to backwardness but was a destruction of the means and possibilities of development, thus the modernizing experiments we have witnessed and are witnessing will not bring about a virtuous city or a civilizational renaissance - Fadi Ismail (1993, p. 165).

Neither Adam Smith nor Thomas Jefferson will meet the psychological, emotional, moral, and social needs of urban migrants and first-generation secondary school graduates. Jesus Christ may not meet them either, but He is likely to have a better chance. In the long run, however, Mohammed wins out - Huntington (1996, p. 65).

That is only our fifth drastic failure or so on the way to success, the people of "Egypt" would say!

Across their consecutive revolutions in roughly the past two centuries (against Napoleon-Khorshid 1798-1805, Orabi revolution 1882, 1919, late 1940s-1952, and 2011-2013) the people of "Egypt" have failed to win their freedom. The people did not set themselves free, their own world was shattered, and their religion was secularized and marginalized. The people of "Egypt" could not achieve the radical change in political, economic, cultural, and social systems enabling them to unleash and mobilize the power and energy of the *Ummah* to establish the state and society

their own way, eliminate the imperial interests, and earn a share in the world market as an independent actor.

This was the essence of the global conflict between the imperial states and the imperialized people. However, in the case of “Egypt” there were peculiar significant elements adding strategic depths to the conflict. Some elements are ancient: Islam, which is the most important (see: Nutting: 1964; Gibb: 2000), then the burden of geography and history. Some others are contemporary: the Suez Canal, then oil, and Israel.

With every failure, with every defeat, a system was born. Regardless of any other variables, the most substantial constant was a striking fact revealed by the American Department of State: “the new regime is in fact a new sweeper achieving a rupture with the past” (see the correspondence between the American department of state and Jefferson Caffery, the American ambassador in Cairo, about 1952 coup, in: *Kishk*: 1988, p. 312)*. The new regime, or the sweeper, sweeps the revolutionary groups and roots and reconsolidates imperial control. What is the new regime? It is clear and relentless. The new regime is largely a traitor non-patriotic system, a new system of control. The new system is secular and anti-Islam. The new regime is military not civil. Moreover, in the last fifty years, the new regime is neo-liberal. The new regime is certainly a despotic one and absolutely unaccepted by the people.

The US and the West are deeply afraid of allowing any country to gain independence. A successful independent development, which might become a model for others, is their typical nightmare. Not to mention the rest of the world is forced to sustain the high living standards of Western nations whose governments they choose keeps plundering the own resources of that other rest and committing other considerably terrible crimes.

With every new sweeper, a drama starts. After the revolution against Napoleon-Khorshid, Mohammad Ali started the drama of pursuing a personal empire. After Orabi’s revolution failed, began the drama of subjecting “Egypt” to the British imperial plundering. After the 1919 revolution, began the drama of the British, the palace, and the military conspiracy over the people of “Egypt” to sustain the plundering. The potential revolution late 1940s-1952 turned into the drama of expelling Britain out of the Middle East and subjugating it to the USA. Finally, the potential 2011 revolution was aborted in 2013 by the secular neo-comprador functional group backed by the post-neo-colonial powers, and the drama started. The drama of the American strife not to lose its grip although its inevitably diminishing power.

Remarkably, in all these dramas the problems of “Egypt” are defined as natural, not political problems. The issues and challenges of social and economic inequality,

* Some references are italicized to indicate they are in Arabic.

ignorance and illiteracy, underdevelopment, imperialism, and the massive oppression and injustice are being obscured and hidden by spurious reduction claiming the issue is about some people who did not yet catch up, or caught up just lately, with the 20th century, although paradoxically most of these problems were produced and exacerbated by the very forces of the last two centuries. Most importantly, an independent variable, which is very significant if not the most, is omitted out of analysis: imperialism.

All these dramas have always been a miserable melodrama for the people of "Egypt", the melodrama of killing the Ummah and fabricating, secularizing, and Westernizing a modern nation, "to perform the nation, groups must be included by first declaring them excluded for their lack of civilization, villages destroyed in order to preserve them, pasts declared lost so that they may be recovered" (Mitchell: 2002, p. 191), the people of "Egypt" by force submitted to the imperial architect who "to preserve their heritage, the architect first had to destroy it ... The preservation of the past required its destruction so that the past could be rebuilt" (Mitchell: 2002, pp. 191-192). They became, for more than two centuries, nothing more than a "shoe" the imperial powers swap. Heikal, the CIA maven agent, wrote describing the advent of the Americans replacing the British: "America was putting on the shoe Britain took off" (Heikal: 1986, p. 183). However, as if the shoe was not sufficiently humiliating, an American policy advisor described the role of pro-US "Egypt" in the late 20th century: "A compliant "Egyptian" partner could fill the shoes of America's regional pillar left empty since the fall of the Shah" (Satloff: 1988, p. 59).

George F. Kennan, the head of policy planning department in the American state department, clearly stated the reason of this imperial system of control in 1947: "We have 50% of the world's wealth and only 5.3% of its people, this situation surely raises the resentment of the rest of the world. Our real mission in the coming era is to design a model for relations allowing us to sustain this variance without causing a certain harm to our national security" (*Gardener*: 2013, p. 20). That is why America has developed a new generation of imperialism as George C. McGhee, Troman's envoy to Cairo, said in April 1951 (see: *Gardener*: 2013, pp. 15-50).

Israel itself is part of this system of control, and a prototype of the functional state serving the Western strategic interests. This is vibrantly obvious in the letters and speeches of the British and Zionist politicians: Max Nordau, Richard Crossman, Chaim Weizmann, Winston Churchill, Theodor Herzl, Ya'akov Meridor, and Ariel Sharon (*AlMessiri*: 1998; 2002). Israel effect equals ten aircraft carriers, yet far less than their cost, said Meridor to the radio of the US army (*AlMessiri*: 1998). It is very important to bear in mind an important fact: talking about the military in "Egypt" necessarily means talking about the US and Israel. The US and Israel are arguably the two countries in the world most affecting "Egypt" in the last 60 years at least. "Egypt" remained the second country in the world to receive US assistance. Significantly the first is Israel. The "Egyptian" military and the US support remained

the substantial topic in the USA-“Egypt” relations, if not the only one (*Gardener: 2013, p. 50*).

This quest is extremely important, only studying the “Egyptian” military as a secular neo-comprador functional group backed by the post-neo-colonial powers will give us a true answer on what Miles Copeland, the CIA officer, alleged: “In those countries where the economic and social conditions appear hopeless—or, at least, beyond the local resources of a government the usual outcome is either for a local leader shouting ‘freedom from imperialism’ to hold on by sheer demagoguery as his country goes to ruin, or for a practical type to take over the country with foreign aid and hold on, as a ‘stooge of the imperialists’ or an ‘agent of Moscow,’ with foreign protection” (Copeland: 1970, p. 27). Is it impossible to resist or refuse succumbing to Western domination? But if resistance was possible, why has it failed?

This thesis is a study on the untrustworthy and elusive nature of the modern imperial power, its production, consumption, and resistance. This study is a comprehensive account on how modern disciplinary power and Western secularism has been planted and evolved in Modern “Egypt” constituting a full-fledged system of control, I shall call it “the Matrix”. This study is mainly concerned with the plan and its execution, the law and its implementation, the model and reality. Although the question of resistance is the terminus, resistance is mentioned sporadically in context, for the interactions of the plan, its execution, and its resistance in the full historical context shows how this resistance was never commensurate to power and its plans it was resisting in the first place, because resistance never understood power, its nature, and its tricky games. This study aims to problematize resistance to power, its plans, and implementation. It is true, as Khaled Fahmy (2002) put it, “power ... as much as it attempts to silence, to be all-inclusive and to penetrate minds and control bodies, is always constantly negotiated, suspended, and resisted” (p. 318), however this does not explain why, using the very example Fahmy studied and his own words, “the soldiers did resist the army, yet found themselves, nevertheless, winning for the Pasha his great victories” (Fahmy: 2002, p. 315). Modern power is not of monolithic nature nor is it inevitable, then why is resistance overwhelmed. In other words, the most important question this study is pondering upon is: why does the people’s resistance to power seem to end up fulfilling power plans? Why does the Matrix survive people’s resistance? Why does resistance fail? And in the case of “Egypt”, why does the automaton created by the British colonization, absorbing and building upon the modern disciplinary power Mohammad Ali had implanted in “Egypt”, never die? Although “the automaton Cromer wanted independent “Egypt” to be had a structural defect, for it was built over the body of a people who, like any other people, was very much alive, and whose movement contradicted the movements for which the automaton was built” (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 295), the automaton had survived and is still surviving.

In light of power and resistance, it is very significant and revealing to address how Western literature approaches the military issue. Ominously, the dominant Western

literature on militarization and civil-military relations (Huntington: 1957; Janowitz: 1964; Hurewitz: 1982; Haddad: 1965; Nordlinger: 1977; Finer: 2002; Johnson: 1962; Be'eri: 1970; Koonings & Kruijt: 2002; Perlmutter: 1981) is almost completely misleading and largely redundant. Not only is it obsolete, but also more significantly it is obscuring the reality, it is a big lie preventing us from seeing the truth. The truth is the ruling regimes in the colonized polities are “a buffer between the occupied and the occupation” (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 232).

Western discourse has its limits and it imposes them over the process of realization (*AlMessiri*: 2001). Similar to how the West handled the Holocaust phenomenon: the West determined the meaning of the Nazi genocide against the Jews, and its generalization and specification levels, then the West reduced it, and imposed a narrow Western logic over it through manipulating the levels of generalization and specification and through stripping it out of the its modern Western civilizational and political context (*AlMessiri*: 2001; *Bauman*: 1989); the West did the same to other phenomena and concepts for different reasons like distorting them, dismounting its resistant epistemological load, or even to fabricate invented dilemmas to blind, distract, and mislead people.

The civil-military discourse obscures the actual power relations, it is historically anachronistic, sociologically obsolete, and politically opaque. I must conclude the civil-military discourse is part of the silent structural violence cultural imperialism is committing. Likewise, the literature on Modern “Egypt” (e.g.: *T. Osman*: 2013; *Long, Reich, & Gasiorowski*: 2011) is largely trapped in analyzing the strife for power within the regime, while ignoring the real struggle between the regime and those who challenge it. The Arabic literature on civil-military relations and the military in “Egypt” (*Abdelmalek*: 2012; 2013; *Ramadan*: 1977; *Beialy*: 1993; *Hammad*: 1987; *Alnabulsi*: 2003; *Abdallah*: 1990) is following the Western literature and fooling its reader either by reductionism, playing the propagandist role for a certain regime, employing limited historical scope, or all the former. Fadi Ismail offers an enlightening comment:

In the conflict arena, the winning party imposes the boxing technique and its logic over the defeated, it is paradoxical then that the defeated is forced to hit in the spaces offered by the winner, these spaces turns out to be the most invincible and immunized whereas the real weak points goes forgotten and impossible (*Ismail*: 1993, p. 94).

The dominant literature keeps discussing factors like: the military’s degree of institutionalization or patrimonialism, the strength or weakness of its relationship to society at large, conscription and professionalism, etc. however it remains blind to the secular functional cliental nature of the military in the neo-colonial world, which was created by a Western imperial country in a polity created by the Western imperial countries. Furthermore, this literature totally ignores the real and substantial militarization of the society, namely the panopticization and secularization of the society. The prevailing debates obscure the nasty reality of hegemony, control, and imperialism. For example, the central debate over how to

achieve civilian control of the military (Lutterbeck: 2011) traps and blinds us from seeing and asking the right questions: where are the people? Who controls the military? Who controls the civilians? What and whose interests do the civilians and the military serve? Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1964) kept arguing for separation vis-à-vis convergence respectively on how to achieve civilian control, but both of them are deliberately hoaxed or hoaxing. They neglect the facts: modern nation states in the Arab world were created to serve imperial interests, they were divided according to the balance of power between the imperial powers, modern Arab nationalities (!) are nothing more than European-created imagined communities designed to curb the idea of the Islamic Ummah, and the modern Arab militaries are the heir of the previous imperial armies that had to leave. This is pretty clear in Peter Feaver's introduction to his article (1999), Feaver claims the civil-military problematic comprises of a simple paradox: "the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity" (Feaver: 1999, p. 214). Feaver, like all the dominant literature, neglects questioning who created the military in the first place, and whose interests the military is serving. Furthermore, Augustus Richard Norton and Ali Alfoneh argue "Feaver's claim is as true in the post-colonial Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as in the North American and Western European context" (Hoffmann: 2009, p. 7), they ignore the fact almost all MENA states and militaries were created by North American and Western European states.

Samuel F. Finer (2002) concluded military intervention is more likely in general and more extensive in what he called countries of "low political culture", contrasted with countries of "developed political culture". Nevertheless, military coups occur because they are designed, supervised, and orchestrated by those very countries of "developed political culture" (e.g.: Blum: 2003). Finer (2002) also mentioned two motives of military intervention he argued they are salient in "Egypt's" case, first he argued military professionalism may lead to its reluctance to coercively use violence against government opponents, however the exact opposite happened in 2013, Alsisi's coup was the answer to "the question ... how the military would respond to mass popular challenges to the regime -- be they major protests over governmental corruption or part of a wider Islamic expression" (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997). Second, even when Finer spoke of the corporate interests of the military motivating it to intervene when it feels its autonomy, status, or privileges is threatened or it is prevented from fulfilling its objectives and goals, he did not speak about the military's real objectives, goals, or mission. It is astonishing how the Western literature neglects the comprehensive reality and reductively resorts to other superficial or overstated elements and constructs: "birth-right principle" (Koonings & Kruijt: 2002), "low political culture" (Finer: 2002), "praetorianism" (Perlmutter: 1981) or "the modern praetorian state" (Perlmutter: 1969), "the political sociology of the officer corps" (Nordlinger: 1977), "peculiarity of the country" (Welch & Smith: 1974), "modern and post-modern armies" (Frisch: 2001), "the agriculture bourgeoisie" (Abdelmalek: 2013), "social systems" (Alkhoury: 1990), etc.

In one his most recent articles on the “Arab Spring”, Robert Springborg implicitly tells us the unspoken about the military, democracy, and the people in the Arab World: “the security concerns of global and regional powers are thought by them to be better served by at best a very cautious, tentative democratic transition [to make sure power will not be in the wrong hands]” (Springborg: 2011, p. 12), democracy for these “global and regional powers” is only meant to sustain Western control otherwise democracy is terminated, this is one important, though not mentioned, aspect of what Springborg called the securitization of the Arab World (p. 5). Speaking of Tunisia, Springborg mentioned “Tunisia enjoys a much more favorable context in that democratization carries fewer security risks for the country’s external friends” (p. 12), “external friends” is another politically correct term instead of the imperial patron of the local functional client. Springborg concludes “the Arab Spring of 2011 will probably prove to be more akin to the 1848 failed revolutions than to the democratic transitions set in motion by the crumbling of the Soviet Union in 1989” (p. 12), apparently, although Springborg did not mention it, because democratization of Eastern Europe in 1989 meant incorporating it into the Western political, economic, cultural, and strategic settings, thus it was favored and fostered by the West. Whilst, “revolutions” in the Arab World had the potential of emancipating it from these Western systems of control, a threat undoubtedly intolerable by the West.

We can conclude the civil-military relations discourse and expertise is a ruse. It presents ideas and discussed issues that are very fake and marginal with regard to the real actual power relations, the Arab scholars blindly accepted the “presuppositions” of this ideological blinding.

The wide spreading of the civil-military relations discourse has almost nothing to do with its academic validity but is rather related to the US strategic plans, unfortunately nobody has academically worked on “unraveling the political genealogy of such expertise on the Middle East” (Mitchell: 2002, p. 151). Such expertise is “a complete fiction” (Mitchell: 2002, p. 127), however “This blindness to historical transformation is carefully achieved” (p. 128). Addressing the question of “the peasant” in particular, Timothy Mitchell (2002) has explained, “how pervasively the CIA influenced the production of academic and intellectual culture around the world in the second half of the twentieth century” (p. 151; see also: Saunders: 2013). Mitchell established:

The emergence of peasant studies as a new field of expertise more than half a century ago can be located quite precisely in the widespread rebellions that rural populations were able to organize against occupying European powers during the interwar years. In the Arab world, for example, rural uprisings in “Egypt”, Morocco, Syria, and Iraq in the years after World War I were followed by the Palestinian uprising of 1936–39, the first sustained anticolonial revolt, which required one-third of Britain’s armed forces to suppress it and a commission of colonial experts to examine rural life in Palestine and explain the rebellion’s causes. In Indochina, peasant uprisings during the early 1930s that succeeded in establishing self-governing soviets were the background to [meticulous] studies (Mitchell: 2002, p. 124).

While studying one of the prominent classical works of peasant studies, Mitchell was extremely surprised:

James Critchfield, I subsequently discovered, worked for the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The discovery led to further questions about the production of Critchfield's portraits of the Third World peasant. James Critchfield belonged to the founding generation of the CIA. After working closely with former Nazi intelligence officers in postwar Germany, he was appointed the first director of CIA clandestine operations in the Near East in 1959, and went on to become a senior architect of US policy in the Middle East for three decades ... One might also notice the way his choice of villages, always portrayed as out-of-the-way places, followed the changing focus of US imperial concerns, some of them at the time quite secret. He was in India and Nepal in 1959–62, the years coinciding with probably the largest CIA operation of the time: (Mitchell: 2002, p. 148-149).

In his important book *Capital in the Twenty-first Century* (2014), Piketty argued the wealth concentration problem is not only a matter of distribution but also rather a matter of production. I claim this reality applies not only to economics, but also to politics, and to power per se. The power problem is a matter of production not distribution. The Matrix is designed to maintain itself by empowering who submit to and become part of it, and by pulverizing whoever dares to challenge it. In her book *Faces of the State*, the social anthropologist Navaro-Yashin (2002) studied the production of the political in the public life of Turkey in the 1990s. Examining different sites generating the political power, she argues the faces of the state are actually omnipresent. Navaro-Yashin explained why the political and the state endure and survive deconstruction as the new comers from the periphery to the center eventually become haunted by the logic of the state, and hence reproduce it.

It is important to ask what I actually mean by "Egypt". By "Egypt" I do not mean the alleged created imagined-community of a distinct national entity and a pure and uncontaminated nature that could be traced back in its pristine form to Pharaonic times. But I mean the Western-colonization-created polity, the almost-two-century-old "Egypt", which was born out of Napoleon campaign's archaeological discoveries, Mohammad Ali's project, London agreement, the privatization of agricultural lands, and then grew up at the hands of the British colonization who drew its borders and set its institutions pursuing an automaton, which was maintained, restructured, and reoriented several times later. I mean "Egypt" as an imperialism-created state, for "the state, or the polity, that imperialism creates is part of the process of its redefining, or renaming, the vanquished colonized to ensure it will remain vanquished" (*Al Barghouti*: 2007, p. 21). "Belonging to an imperialism-created polity, guarantees that the those who belong to it remain weak or colonized, their joy of gaining independence is nothing but a completion of the process of the imperial redefinition of them" (*Al Barghouti*: 2007, p. 22).

For when the polity is created by imperialism, then nationalism does not substantially contradicts the imperial's interest, and independence is nothing but a colonization with local hands. The reason for this is not [only] that the responsible for

independence are traitors, but that the polity was created and designed in a manner attaching its interest with the imperial's interest, therefore should the polity resist the imperial it will collapse and disintegrate (*Al Barghouti*: 2007, p. 24).

It is almost always forgotten that the modern state that emerged in the north-Eastern corner of Africa in the nineteenth century was not yet a nation-state, Mohammad Ali and his sons ruled within Ottoman sovereignty, even if nominal especially after the London treaty (1840) and the British occupation. However, the formal link with the Ottoman Empire was not formally ended until the eve of the WWI in 1914. I put "Egypt" between quotation marks along the way until 1914, to remind us of the fact until this date, formally there was no "Egypt".

1.1. The Matrix and its Modus Operandi

First, we must face that unexpected revelation, the strip tease of our humanism. There you can see it, quite naked and it's not a pretty sight. It was nothing but an ideology of lies, a perfect justification for pillage; its honeyed words, its affectation of sensibility were only alibis for our aggressions - Jean-Paul Sartre (*Fanon*: 2013, p. 33).

The world is governed by very different personages to what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes - Benjamin Disraeli (1906).

The Matrix is a full-fledged control system evolved and formed to keep the peoples under control and manipulate humanity, for the interest of sustaining the Matrix and those who succumb to it. However, it is not what seems to be understood from statements like Benjamin Disraeli's: "the world is governed by very different personages to what is imagined by those who are not behind the scenes" (1906, chapter xv), for nobody is in control of the Matrix. For the Matrix has become Frankenstein, it feeds and survives not only on whom it destroys but also on those who serve it.

Foucault thought wherever there is power, there is resistance. However, he did not notice how the modern power has persuaded the people to be citizens and believe in "the democracy game" within constructed borders of an imagined nation. Academic works studying ways how people resist the practices of modern power (Fahmy: 2002; Scott: 2008) obscures the fact they are actually desperate and miserable. Such works celebrate the small acts of resistance, which of course represent courage and persistence, yet obscure the striking fact: the Matrix is still working, surviving, and thriving regardless of any celebrated resistance. The Matrix absorbs any challenge and contains any resistance, in a way best explained by the

Hegelian dialectic: a given society is forced into a dialectical process, a continuous series of a thesis, opposed by an antithesis, and reconciled in a synthesis rolling all and over as every synthesis becomes a thesis of a new dialectic, until the society ends up as closest to the absolute Western idea and there is no more resistance, namely until the synthesis is so perfect giving no rise to an antithesis.

Where there is a society, there is power. Power exercises authority over society, consolidates its grip over society, and penetrates and permeates society. Not only does power use force and practice power materially, it also does so on the level of discourse trying to legitimize, rationalize, and justify the use of power. In contrast, society through employing revolutionary knowledge resists, also on the two levels, yet in the other order: discourse and, then, praxis. The structure of the state/society reflects this power-knowledge conflict, power aims to maintain the structure of the state/authority and its role through suppressive actions, and the society resists. As Figure 1.1 illustrates.




Figure 1.2: The Matrix and its Modus Operandi

The explicit conflict over the state and society structure, through both discourse and praxis, has another implicit conflict, yet more essentially contested. It is the contest over, first, the frame of reference comprising the source of legitimacy and sovereignty, and second, the nature of power in the society. Roughly, in the 18th century waves of imperial campaigns started attacking the margins of the Muslim lands after failing in crushing its core, simultaneous waves of Westernization and secularization struck the heart of the Muslim lands disguised in modernization attempts. All these waves, symbolized in the destruction of the Ottoman caliphate and cutting it into Western-created imagined communities and polities (formally in 1924), ended up with the dismantling of and fighting Islam as a frame of reference and the panoptification of the society, namely planting secular modern disciplinary power in the society and imposing its comprehensive techniques over it. Doing so, the modern Middle East “was largely of British design, tailor to fit Britain’s imperial needs” (Shlaim: 1995, p. 21). This demonstrates how epistemology shapes and reshapes concepts, methodologies, and paradigms through the power that disseminates a certain pattern of knowledge supporting a certain power structure. This also suggests that to defy and challenge such power and the knowledge it creates and sustains, people need alternative knowledge.

The destruction of the Ottoman Empire was not followed by a new order but a new disorder-the post Ottoman syndrome ... [that] grew out of the settlement imposed on the region by the European great powers in 1918-22, following the destruction of the Ottoman Empire ... Its consequences remain to the present day - Avi Shlaim (1995, pp. 18, 132)

How did or does the Matrix work? How is a certain country incorporated and maintained in its systems? Simply through colonialism and imperialism, when Western powers colonize a country using armed violence they destroy all the indigenous institutions as much as they could to seize control, for indigenous institutions empower the people and provide them the sufficient base to resist, at least spiritually if not also materially. Among this destruction, two substantial transformations happen: the frame of reference is altered, and the nature of power is changed. With such colonial destruction, another imperial process occurs using not armed violence (which becomes useless and exorbitantly overpriced at a certain point) but structural violence, the imperial creates certain structures to consolidate its power and disempower the people, these structures are symbolized in and comprises the system of *Benign Nationalism* the imperial creates. Tamim Al Barghouti (2004) revealed in his dissertation, *The Case of “Egypt”: A National Liberation Movement and a Colonially Created Government*:

1- The social interests of the elite leadership of the national liberation movements put them in the position of representatives in need of the acceptance of two opposing forces. 2- This results in a strategy of replacement where the national elite promises independence to the native population and promises securing the colonial relation of dependence to the colonial power, which is embodied in the colonial definition of the entities led by the national liberation movements. 3- The above strategy contributes to

the inability of the national liberation movement to fulfill either one of the two promises, and eventually results in the movement's loss of supporters as well as loss of credibility vis-à-vis the colonial power (p. 20).

Basing the argument on the structural contradiction between the interests and compromises of the native and the colonial, as well as the insufficiency of the military force at a certain point. Al Barghouti (2004) explains what he called the twin paradoxes of representation and replacement, Tamim Al Barghouti explained (Al Barghouti: 2004, pp. 286-287).

Mainly, the structural violence of the Matrix is brought about through three significant functional groups comprising the basis of *Benign Nationalism*: an imperial bourgeoisie (Fanon: 2013), an imperial political party (Fanon: 2013; Al Barghouti: 2004), and an imperial cultural and intellectual elite or intelligentsia produced through oblivion and inception (Shaker: 1987; Ismail: 1993). This *Benign Nationalism* operates in a frame conditioned and designed by the imperial, the features of such a TIMID frame are: 1) a Territorial state created by the imperial, 2) controlled representative Institutions that contain and soothe the anger energy of the people, 3) the created polity becomes a Market destined to dependence on the imperial, 4) a created Imagined community and national identity, and 5) the created polity is strategically and militarily exposed and bound to international law. Through such structures, the Western imperial capital keeps ruling the colonized country. The functional groups are created and maintained through the seducing idea of being in control of the "rent circuits", Robert Vitalis in his study of "Egypt" (1995) coined the term "rent circuits" meaning "the profits to be made from privileged control of the economic resources circulating through the country" (Mitchell: 2002, pp. 32-33). I shall abstract and extend the term beyond economics. The *raison d'être* of the functional groups marks a shift, a development in the art of imperialism, the imperial power is no more a centralized colonizing force seeking colonies abroad by extending out from the political center but rather it is constructing its power locally through channeling and even constructing local forces into activities extending rather than threatening the imperial. Through the most independent variable, economy, and debts in particular, the polity and its ruling elite is put under conspicuous surveillance and rendered fragile (Perkins: 2004).

Imperialism worked on tightly attaching the parts sloughed from the Muslim societies, like the Western-cultured elites and the modern economic and trade sectors [with the military elite at the heart of the process], to the Western political, economic, and cultural systems. These sloughed parts became responsible for expanding the circle of sloughing, disintegration, and chaos to include the undamaged and resistant remaining parts of the traditional societies through producing modern, 'progressive, and civil' political, social, economic, and pedagogical policies (Ismail: 1993, p. 115).

The military became the local guardian of the Matrix after "independence" and the evacuation of colonizing armies, through its doctrine the military is continuously reoriented to the needs and interests of the Matrix, because "a military establishment comes as close as any human organization can to the ideal type for

an industrialized and secularized enterprise” (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997). Western imperialism created and maintained “national” militaries either with their invasion like in the “Egyptian” case or in the context of the post-WWI settlement (*Hammad: 1987, Fromkin: 1992*). The Military tames other groups, crushes the opposition, and uses force if needed, the rule governing how the military deals with the society and its groups is: “cooperate with them, contain them, but maintain all the-power-to-politically-decide in our hands at any price” (*Abdulmalek: 2013, p. 29*). This is the real rule of the so called “civil-military relations” in “Egypt”, whenever this rule is threatened the military intervenes with arms. In turn, the rule governing the patron-client relation and how the imperial center deals with the military functional group in the dialectic evolution and change of the Matrix is: create them, indulge them as long as they are profitable for us, maintain all the-power-to-strategically-decide in our hands at any price, and if they tried to exceed their limits or become a burden get rid of them.

Remarkably, the Western-created national Arab armies in the Western-constructed Arab polities remained under British and French supervision until the mid-1930s in general (*Hammad: 1987*), it was created in the first place as a tool in imperial hands (*Alnabulsy: 2003*). Furthermore, the military did not play politics in any way until “independence” in the second half of the 20th century, the Western-constructed Arab polities directly depended on these armies to create and sustain legitimacy, even armed de facto legitimacy, regardless of the regime type: republic, kingdom, sultanate, or *Mashyakhah* (*Alnabulsy: 2003*).

Though armed violence is materially destructive, noisy, and conspicuous, structural violence is very silent, unnoticeable yet more destructive: it works on the minds and souls of the people, it misleads and wastes the peoples’ energy, including the violence energy, in false paths. Lord Cromer considered colonial control as a process of continuous tutoring, he imagined the ideal colonial official as an omnipotent yet silent school teacher: “he was to exercise supreme authority over his pupil, and at the same time ... his authority was to be unfelt” (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, p. 280). Zygmunt Bauman explains it with a different metaphor:

With the rise of modernity ... everything ... in modern society ... had now to be manufactured, built up, rationally argued, technologically designed, administered, monitored and managed. Those in charge of pre-modern societies could assume the leisurely and confident attitude of gamekeepers: left to its own resources, society would reproduce itself year by year, generation after generation, with scarcely a noticeable change. Not so its modern successor. Here, nothing could be taken for granted any more. Nothing should grow unless planted, and whatever would have grown on its own must have been the wrong thing, and hence a dangerous thing, jeopardizing or confounding the overall plan. The gamekeeper-like complacency would be a luxury one could ill afford. What was needed instead was the posture, and skills, of a gardener; one armed with a detailed design of the lawn, of the borders and of the furrow dividing the lawn from the borders; with a vision of harmonious colors and of the difference between pleasing harmony and revolting cacophony; with determination to treat as weeds every self-invited plant which interferes with his plan and his vision of order and harmony; and with machines and poisons adequate to the

task of exterminating the weeds and altogether preserve the divisions as required and defined by the overall design (Bauman: 1989, p. 57).

This leads us to discuss the essence of the Matrix, what Michael Foucault (1977) called modern disciplinary power:

The Inspector-General of Schools, appointed in March 1873 to organize a national system of school inspection, compared these techniques of order and surveillance to the uniform and invisible force of a magnetic fluid. "The pedagogic influence of the master on the pupil", he wrote, "is like a magnetic fluid which transmits itself in a manner that is slow, hidden, and permanent ... without external manifestation. At the moment when you attempt to surprise it, it may be absent, because it does not like to be under surveillance. Remove yourself and it will return, reactivated once more; the current will be reestablished" (Mitchell: 1991, p. 79).

Not only did modernity and the industrial revolution increased the destructive capability of arms, but also more importantly power, per se, has substantially changed from arbitrary power to modern disciplinary power. Modern disciplinary power is implicit in the transformation from violence to punishment, and the appearance of order and the disappearance of power, power became uninterrupted and omnipresent yet largely operates in a slow manner and without any external manifestation. Traditional pre modern power, namely arbitrary power, was basically personal, concentrated in personal command, porous and uncertain, and liable to diminish. Modern disciplinary power is systematically and uniformly diffused. "The diffusion of control required mechanisms that were measured rather than excessive and continuous rather than sporadic, working by invigilation and the management of space" (Mitchell: 1991, p. 175). Modern power is "something which circulates [which] is never localized here or there ... [something that is relentlessly exercised through] continuous and permanent systems of surveillance" (Foucault: 1980, pp. 98, 105).

Through employing Michel Foucault's conception of modern power as corporal and disciplinary and Jacques Derrida's conception of modern power as metaphysical and representational, Timothy Mitchell's work (1991) reveals the modus operandi of the modern disciplinary power and the Matrix. Modern disciplinary power is twofold, it has micro-physical and meta-physical parts. The micro-physical is the structure, all the apparatuses where power permeates, is diffused, and is implicit, it is what makes the idea of modern disciplinary power possible, and it is the secularization, rationalization, subjugation, and engineering of the world through external surveillance, punish, and violence, working mainly on physical bodies and material space. The meta-physical is the effect of the structure, it is what creates the need of the structure and makes the idea of modern disciplinary power indispensable, and it is the secularization, rationalization, subjugation, and engineering of the human inside through internal surveillance and self-internalization of power. The micro-physical creates the appearance of order while the meta-physical produces the order of appearance (Mitchell exemplifies referring to the "Egyptian" military and the rebuilding of Cairo, 1991, p. xii).

All this at the beginning and the end is “an essential part of the process of political control” (Mitchell: 1991, p. 176). For “power is not simply a centralized force seeking local allies as it extends out from the political center but is constructed locally”, the center does not “initiate change, but ... channel[s] local forces into activities that would extend rather than further threaten the weakening influence of the regime” (Mitchell: 2002, p. 169). Jeremy Bentham invented the Panopticon:

[T]he institution in which the use of coercion and commands to control a population was replaced by the partitioning of space, the isolation of individuals, and their systematic yet unseen surveillance. Foucault has suggested that the geometry and discipline of the Panopticon can serve as an emblem of the micro-physical forms of power that have proliferated in the last two centuries and formed the experience of capitalist modernity (Mitchell: 1991, p. x).

“Bentham's Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition” (Foucault: 1977, p. 200), the panopticon is the prototype of modern society, the modern state extended the panopticon to the whole society. The birth of modern nations as created imagined communities was made possible only through another indispensable novelty, namely the modern disciplinary power. For although the modern state monopoly over means of violence was crucial, modern nations were brought into being as a byproduct of a multiplicity of discourses and practices transforming the state apparatuses from being mainly concerned with taxation and maintaining law and order into a modern government enjoying and devising modern techniques of control and using more effective and more subtle ways to manipulate its population.

Modern disciplinary power, whose techniques are based on “the re-ordering of space and the surveillance and control of its occupants”, is “by nature colonizing in method” (Mitchell: 1991, p. x). The effectiveness of modern disciplinary methods “lay not in their weight or extent, but in the localized ability to infiltrate, rearrange, and colonize” (Mitchell: 1991, p. ix). Modern disciplinary power achieves political order “not through the intermittent use of coercion but through continuous instruction, inspection, and control” (Mitchell: 1991, p. xi).

Disciplinary methods have two important consequences for an understanding of the colonial and modern state--only the first of which is analyzed by Foucault. In the first place, one can move beyond the image of power as a system of authoritative commands or policies backed by force that direct and constrain social action. Power is usually imagined as an exterior restriction: its source is a sovereign authority above and outside society, and it operates by setting limits to behavior, establishing negative prohibitions, and laying down channels of proper conduct.

Disciplinary power, by contrast, works not from the outside but from within, not at the level of an entire society but at the level of detail, and not by restricting individuals and their actions but by producing them. A restrictive, exterior power gives way to an internal, productive power. Disciplines work within local domains and institutions, entering into particular social processes, breaking them down into separate functions, rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and precision, and reassembling them

into more productive and powerful combinations. These methods produce the organized power of armies, schools, and factories, and other distinctive institutions of modern nation-states. They also produce, within such institutions, the modern individual, constructed as an isolated, disciplined, receptive, and industrious political subject. Power relations do not simply confront this individual as a set of external orders and prohibitions. His or her very individuality, formed within such institutions, is already the product of those relations (Mitchell: 1991, p. xi).

Realizing the modern disciplinary power is very important for understanding the peculiarity of modernity, secularism, capitalism, and imperialism. Modern power is two dimensional, it is internalized as much as it takes the form of external structures.

All this is structurally related to Western enlightenment and modernity, Imperialism is not just a historical stage, it is a *Weltanschauung*, the Western epistemological vision is an imperialist one (AlMessiri: 1994). Mitchell (1991) emphasized “the connections between a Cartesian notion of the mind and the politics of colonial order” (p. 178), giving the example of Marshal Lyautey, the first French Resident-General in Morocco (1912-1925), Mitchell revealed how the imperial officers and architects “conceived of the nature of colonial order in the same terms as Descartes conceived of the nature of the human subject” (p. 177).

Although some scholars proficiently capture the reality of power and its dual nature, Mitchell for example, however he failed to explain it. This duality is intrinsically related to the evolution of modernity and the modern secular nation state. Carl Schmitt explains:

“All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development-in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver-but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the manner which the philosophical ideas of the state developed in the last centuries” (Schmitt: 1985, p. 36).

The complex experience of “Egypt”, and the Arab and Islamic world in general, goes unnoticed or downplayed, namely the transformation from and inclusion of arbitrary power into the modern disciplinary power. In January 1907, Hafiz Ibrahim, the poet of Nile, successfully described this complex experience in a line of Arabic poetry (Ibrahim: 1987, p. 339):

Despotism

had chaotically prevailed amongst us;

and thus,

it became organized, structuralized, and then, it became systematized.

« لقد كان الظلم فينا فوضى فهْدَّ بَت حواشيه حتى بات ظلما منظما »

The military in the colonized created-polities is a mere guardian of this imperial order, a local warden of the Matrix. From the dawn of humanity, tribes vanquished other tribes with primitive weapons. Throughout history, those in power used to suppress other people through armies until we reached modern armies with advanced hi-tech arms. Both the rise of the modern nation state with its monopoly over the use of violence along with modernity and the industrial revolution were very remarkable, things dramatically changed, not only did arms gain an increasingly destructive power leading to a major development in warfare, but more importantly the power per se has changed.

The ancient Samurai, the Mamluk groups, and the janissaries have evolved today to become modern armies and military industrial complexes. The military has become, more or less, a functional group. A functional group (*AlMessiri*: 2002; 2006; 2013) is comprised of groups of people, either fetched from outside the society or recruited from inside, entrusted with different functions the majority of the society cannot do for various reasons. Either because it is disgraceful (usury, prostitution), distinguished (judiciary, translation), or very sensitive and of a security nature (the king's guards or his doctor, ambassadors, spies). Then, members of this group become defined in terms of their strict limited function, not in light of their complex spacious humanity (and from here comes the naming).

Methodologically, the functional group as a concept has its origins the in the Western thought and scholarship (Karl Marx, Max Weber, Abraham Leon, Werner Sombart, Georg Simmel, and Zygmunt Bauman) (*AlMessiri*: 2002, chapter 10), and was developed by the persistent, extraordinary efforts and works of AbdelWahab AlMessiri. There are different types of functional groups, forming a continuum, ranging from slaves on the one hand (where humans become a mere tool, an instrumentalized human material transformed into an energy without a will, loyalty, or ethics). And on the other hand, *Almujahideen* or liberation armies (where human possesses pure will refusing submission and instrumentalization feeling completely loyal to its absolute moral ideal). So, we can imagine a taxonomy of functional groups, where the main criterion of classification is the degree of instrumentalization and lack of free will. A functional group may perform more than one function simultaneously, a colonizing and financial function, or a financial and warfare function, or a colonizing, financial, and warfare function. Also, its function can change and transform. For example, the *Samurai* who were a warfare functional group transformed into capitalists who built Japan's special feudal-like capitalism.

A functional group has basic characteristics:

1. Contractualism: neutrality, utilitarianism, instrumentalization, and rationalization.
2. Isolation, foreignness, and disablement and clinging to the ruling elite.
3. Detachment from time (the history) and place (the homeland) and feeling an (false) identity.
4. Double standards and moral relativeness.
5. Mobility.
6. Vacillation between self-centrism and absolute freedom on one side, and object centrism and the inevitable fate (the eminent pantheism).

The military sectors in many third world countries, if not all, were and are being reproduced in the form of functional groups, whose members are recruited from within the society. These groups are isolated through various benefits and symbols, they are even isolated sometimes in distinct neighborhoods enjoying a number of services, and also special hospitals and schools are limited to these groups' members and their children.

After completion of the isolation and segregation process, the military sector and its leadership then have "interests" different from the interests of society, thus become able to consider the wider society in a neutral way (outside values, history, and humanity), hence the foreign powers or ruling elites become able to employ these groups to their advantage. Also, these groups can control the society and manage it to their advantage and become like mercenaries or stranger contractors, although their political discourse may be a nationalist, revolutionary, and socialist (*AlMessiri: 1998*).

One can argue militaries in the third world are colonial agents to a continuation of the imperial domination. We can conclude the function of the military in "Egypt" in ten points (Hossam Abulbokhary):

1. To maintain the secularity of the state, while manipulating religion as a tool among the tools of the secular establishment to use it when needed.
2. To sustain the strategic relation with the US and its allies, and continue their role in implementing the international will in the region.
3. To preserve the Camp David peace treaty with Israel, and protect its borders.
4. To defend the prolongation of Mubarak's regime (the deep state) as it is, any personnel change should never affect the core determinants and key pillars of the system.
5. To eliminate the revolution and its idea, recycling it and discharging it of its content.
6. To tighten their grip over the popular will and adapting it according to the vision of the regime or even completely dislodging it if necessary.

7. To conserve all the economic and political privileges of the military establishment and the survival of its moral and material hegemony on the state and the masses.
8. To manage capital transmission operations, market policies, the influence of the giant corporation on the economic structure of the “Egyptian” state, and keep the state in the state of an economic downturn preventing it from achieving any developmental breakthrough.
9. To keep the ability of robbing the society on the religious, moral, ethical and educational levels to fixate and freeze the “Egyptian” case at a certain level of scientific, religious, and civilizational ignorance.
10. To get rid of Islamists (for many reasons) at the level of the ideas, society, and power.

This study will trace the origins and the historical continuity of the military functional group controlling “Egypt”, its main characteristics (does it have special characteristics other than the general characteristics of any functional group?), and its type. This study will also explore the interests the military functional group maintains and defends. It is also important to ask whether the “Egyptian” military became a mercenary, killing the “Egyptian” people. Why? How?

This genealogical study will trace the evolution of the military in “Egypt” through its different phases, reflected in the change in the military doctrine. The military doctrine provides any military a joint conceptual framework answering four questions: “Who are we?”, “What do we do?”, “How do we do that?”, and “How did we do that in the past?” (Grint & Jackson: 2010). The military doctrine fully represents any military, and cuts short many details such as: the national security concept, national defense strategy, the armament policy, military expenditure, etc. “The point of a genealogical analysis is to show that a given system of thought (itself uncovered in its essential structures ...) was the result of contingent turns of history, not the outcome of rationally inevitable trends” (Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy).

The event I am studying is the 2013 coup in “Egypt”, I consider the coup as a moment whose roots are in the past and its continuity is in the future, and as part of a wider repetitive pattern. “The current moment cannot be understood unless we recognize the past [and] the part cannot be realized until the whole and the pattern is discerned” (*AlMessiri*: 1990, p. 21). I argue the coup happened and succeeded because the “revolution” had failed to deconstruct the Camp David military functional group and the militarized structure it had created, and that is because the people were neither aware of it nor its nature. The putschists thrived since the “revolution” did not dismantle, or even try to dismantle, 1) the nature of the military as a secular neo-comprador functional group backed by the post-neo-colonial powers and 2) the TIMID system of benign nationalism.

In this thesis, I am viewing the coup in a way transcending the level of the published news, the written incident, and the military's allegations and illusions about itself and others so I can realize the reality in its totality and syntheticity. This realization is not an abstract contemplative process nor is it a relaxing academic work. But it is the only way for a purposeful movement towards changing the reality and increasing the people's ability to deal with it. Because the general (passive receptive) observation leads to depression, for it is the son of defeat and oppression. Peculiar observation (that captures the subject comprehensively, the obvious and the essence, and it puts the phenomenon in its historical context) opens the fields of action in front of us, thus the vistas of freedom and hope (*AlMessiri: 1990*).

1.2. The ten paradigmatic themes of modern “Egypt”

Through my work, I was able to notice ten structural themes repetitively occurring throughout the modern “Egyptian” history, they are neither sporadic nor coincidental but rather paradigmatic. Given that they are meticulously discerned through my work, I shall abstractly outline them and exemplify on three of them.

1. “Egypt” is controlled by a Matrix: its ruling elite always is/becomes a client functional group orchestrated by an imperial patron. This functional group is either a frank agent or disguised in benign nationalism.
2. The military is the local warden of the Matrix, it is the “legitimate” heir of the imperial and its most significant proxy.
3. Any possible popular revolution or renaissance potential is pre-empted by a military intervention, internal or external. Any popular revolution is secularized and “surfaced” by the secular benign elite.
4. Words like reform, change, freedom, justice, independence, development, etc. is merely a ruse, a ploy used to soothe the people’s anger, disappointments, and aspirations. The rule is: “any reform, whatever radical it may be, is far better than the chaos of a popular movement and the change a real revolution might produce”. Reform is allowed as long as it does not alter the core power structure, thus it is always a ruse to befuddle and confuse the popular anger energy and avoid a real popular revolution.
5. The change of the imperial patron leads to a restructuring of the client functional group. Besides, every new imperial patron develops what might be called as the art of imperialism.
6. Speculation and gambling is the way the rulers of “Egypt” rule it. Conspicuously, all these speculations and gambling turn out to disasters and crises for the people.
7. The rulers of “Egypt” are even miserably unable to employ the art of investing their functional relationship and extorting the imperialist patron.

8. The imperial patron maintains a zero-tolerance policy towards any possibility of acquiring pure power by the subaltern people, especially true independence and acquisition of arms. The imperial is safe as long as the subalterns are contained in politics and “the democracy game”, any deviation from this allowed democratic opposition is considered a radicalization and escalation. A deviation should be confronted and crushed even by extreme power if needed, which is if it is potential to become a real threat.
9. There are two simultaneous trends: first, emancipating the state from social control and granting this state the monopoly over means of violence enabling it to pursue its audacious engineering top down projects and ambitions. Second, the dismantling and crushing of all the apolitical power resources and endogenous social institutions. This process, as Zygmunt Bauman (1989) describes it, enables the modern state to achieve its terrorist Holocaustic acts and dreams.
10. The crushing state is always secular and the crushed social power is largely Islamic. Furthermore, Islamic resistance, either led by scholars or intellectuals, is always secularized through an agent cultural functional group.

I shall exemplarily elaborate on three themes: the second, the fifth, and the sixth. The second theme states the military is the local warden of the Matrix, it is the “legitimate” heir of imperial power and its most significant proxy. For example, the military in “Egypt” has for so long, especially in the last three years 2011-2014, fiercely and nervously refused any discussion on the military budget and subjecting it to civil scrutiny and accountability or even addressing the issue. Surprisingly, this very issue was the main cause of the British colonialism in 1882. Furthermore, the military in “Egypt” adopted the Israeli perfected technique to dispossess the Palestinian land (Bill & Springborg: 2000) to seize the lands it desired. Military soldiers would arrive in the desired area, declare its designation for military maneuvers, then simply and forcefully chase out any occupants. Robert Springborg described the military’s encroachment in civilian industry as “the military’s colonization of the industrial sector” (Springborg: 1989, p. 111), he explained:

[T]hat process is more appropriately termed colonization, for instead of military industries emerging from the civilian manufacturing sector, as was their history in North America, Europe, and Japan, they spring to life in “Egypt” as a result of bilateral agreements between the “Egyptian” military and foreign arms manufacturers. “Egyptian” nonmilitary industries that can provide inputs into weapons manufacturing, such as Benha Electronics, are incorporated into this system. The managerial elites of these companies become in a very real sense part of the military-industrial complex, although in a far more subordinate role than their US counterparts. A related aspect of the military’s colonization of the industrial sector is its increasing production of civilian goods, which in 1985-86 amounted to a total value of about £E250 million. In sum, the expansion of armaments and civilian goods manufacturing in military factories and the militarization of domestic industry have grown at a remarkable pace since 1982. In the meantime, the domestic nonmilitary industrial sector has stagnated (Springborg: 1989, p. 111).

Although being among the most impoverished populations suffering from severe social inequality, the Arab World and the Middle East is the most militarized place in the world, in terms of the proportional size of the military compared to population and the proportional military expenditure compared to total government expenditure (Bill & Springborg: 2000). Nevertheless, although the fancy ideological slogans and preambles, and the tremendous amount of resources the militaries seized, it has succeeded in a relatively very short time in discrediting itself and revealing its true essence as mere functionalist agent for the imperial. All the claimed justifications for the military supremacy were shattered and the military constituted itself by force, it failed in all its claims: to socially and economically integrate nations, to achieve economic development, and most importantly to maintain national security and defense.

The fifth theme dictates speculation and gambling is the way the rulers of “Egypt” rule it. Conspicuously, all these speculations and gambling turn out to disasters and crises for the people. Mohammad Ali and his son Ismail adopted a gambling policy to expand their empire, playing Britain against France and Turkey against Russia (*Himdan*: 1994, pp. 640-642). Nasser's gamble in Yemen ended with the 1967 drastic defeat and the decline of “Egyptian” power (Ferris: 2012). Sadat's largest gamble was his turn to the West: Sadat aimed to attract financial aid from the West and stopping the war with Israel while restoring friendly relations with the Arab countries (Long, Reich, & Gasiorowski: 2011). Furthermore, gambling is rooted in the creation of polities in a colonial context, for the colonial-created state is an embodiment of “the compromise between colonial powers and national liberation movement under occupation, [which] is self-contradictory and bound to fail” (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 20). For TIMID benign nationalism, gambling is inevitable:

Since representation is the basis of transferring power, it becomes the core of native politics in the colony. Various groups within the colonially created elite compete to prove to the colonial power how far they can go in accepting the colonial logic, as well as how much influence they have among their population. The competition for representation, leads the national elite to propose forms of independence that guarantee the continuation of colonial interests (Al Barghouti: 2004, pp. 286-287).

For example:

As early as 1917, “Egyptian” politicians were drafting proposals for “Egypt's” independence. All the drafts proposed, whether by Zaghoul or by his competitors, revolved around the idea of an **“Egyptian” independence that would preserve British interests**. The sponsors of all drafts agreed that the guarantees of preserving British interests would be the very terms of “Egypt's” independence.

The drafts, which differed more in form than in essence, were the tools by which the different “Egyptian” politicians **competed for the recognition of the colonial power** as representative of the “Egyptian” people. When the representative capacity of the national elite, led by Zaghoul and supported by Yakan and Rushdi, was denied by the British High Commissioner in November 1918, they adopted the program of Al Hizb Al Watani, with which they gained the support of the native population and resorted to

open rebellion. Yet, **what was a strategy to the constituencies, was only a tactic to the leadership**, since as soon as the representative capacity of the Wafd was recognized, it returned to the pre-revolution drafts and proposals (Al Barghouti: 2004, pp. 143-144, emphasis added).

Saad Zaghloul is a paradigmatic example:

Zaghloul adopted a hardline position throughout 1919, when his representative capacity was denied by the British, and then shifted back to his conciliatory strategy as soon as that representative capacity was recognized, first during his negotiations with Milner, and later on when he became Prime Minister in 1924 (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 182).

Thus as the example of Alwafd and its counterparts showed, Benign Nationalism is the ruse created by imperialism to maintain and extend imperial rule and contain any resistance in a system of tamed, non-harmful opposition, the non-substantially-divergent parties will compete yet not over real issues of disagreement but rather over 1) replacing imperialism and 2) representation, being representative of both: the people, and the imperial.

The sixth theme states the rulers of “Egypt” are even miserably unable to employ the art of investing the patron-client functional relation and extorting the imperialist patron. This fact is strikingly obvious when we compare the Arab functional elites with the Israeli’s. Israel used to sneak wins not agreed by its patron. For example, extending their borders beyond the UN lines in 1948, using the Lebanon crisis in the 80s to block the negotiations sponsored by America on the future of the West Bank, selling American-produced equipment without America’s permission, exerting influence on the American Gulf policy, etc. (Shlaim: 1995). Mohammad Galal Kishk (1988) proposed an explanation:

The CIA sought to work with the Mossad, while Nasser was the one who worked with the CIA, thus Israel used its contact with the CIA for its own interest, and was able to oppose the US policy and challenge it in the trio aggression 1956 ... and in Lebanon ... whereas Nasser subjected “Egypt’s” basic interests to the USA’s demands and directions through his relation with the CIA, because the people of Israel put their rulers in power and displace them, but in “Egypt” the CIA is the one who puts rulers in power (p. 323).

1.3. “The Democracy Game”: consent or conquest

[T]he best hope of success lay in the Controllers submitting themselves to a self-denying ordinance. They would have to pull the strings behind the scenes, but appear on the stage as little as possible - Evelyn Baring Earl of Cromer (1908, Vol. 1, p. 165).

If voting changed anything, they’d make it illegal - Emma Goldman.

What Europeans mean when they talk of "Egyptian" self-government is that the "Egyptians", far from being allowed to follow the bent of their own unreformed propensities, should only be permitted to govern themselves after the fashion in which Europeans think they ought to be governed - Evelyn Baring Earl of Cromer (1908, Vol. 2, p. 276).

Timothy Mitchell mentioned a significant incident:

One of the rebel chieftains on the northern front, who was keeping up a stubborn resistance to General Henrys, heard a description of the exhibition and was seized with an irresistible curiosity. He requested a truce, and permission to go there and then resume his post of warfare against us. As strange and unacceptable as such a request appeared, it was granted. He was warmly welcomed, and after his visit he and his tribe made submission (Mitchell: 1991, p. 162).

The previous incident is more understandable in light of this case:

Despite their apprehension about allowing enormous numbers of the lower classes to congregate in European capitals soon after the events of 1848, the authorities encouraged them to visit exhibitions. Workers were given permission to leave their shops and factories to attend, and manufacturers and benevolent societies subsidized the cost of their travel and accommodation. The result was an example of mass behavior without precedent. "Popular movements that only a few years ago would have been pronounced dangerous to the safety of the State", it was reported after the 1851 exhibition, ... have taken place not only without disorder, but also almost without crime (Mitchell: 1991, p. 20).

The previous two incidents remarkably substantiates the argument: all (existential) conflicts are soothed when the multi-dimensional human is reduced to only one dimension. This secular, objective attitude of the exhibition visitor reveals not only the true nature of the modern individual as modernists had envisioned, but also the model of behavior for the modern political subject. "To submit and become a citizen of such an exhibitional world was to become a consumer, of commodities and of meanings" (Mitchell: 1991, p. 162). Egypt, among many other countries in the world, was forced to consume Western democracy, not as a mechanism of governing a polity but rather as a tool to keep it under control.

The modern West claimed and established law, the modern state, and democracy as the opposite of violence (the social contract theory). However, this is just superficial, for violence is implicit in the very structure of law, the modern state, and democracy. Modern law, the modern state, and modern democracy are part of the Matrix, and whenever they fail to achieve its interests they are skipped and violence crudely and scandalously erupt. Thus, democracy, in this sense, is just a game, it becomes meaningless, rootless, and redundant. It is a skit, it does not have any power in itself or in its players. It rather derives its strength from the

stakeholders, beneficiaries of its continuation. Thus, they certainly interfere if the game yielded any unprofitable results.

“The democracy game” is a continuation of imperialism, it is one of and its games, if not the best, democracy is “a world of passages ... leading into a labyrinth of further corridors” (Mitchell: 1999, p. 5). The motive is the same: the lust for power and control. Also, one logic governs all the games: “pull the strings behind the scenes, but appear on the stage as little as possible” as Cromer revealed (1908, Vol. 1, p. 165). It is part of the shift from armed violence to structural violence, which means the indirect domination over the internal structure of the “independent” states (see: *Marcel Merle*: 1986, p. 499-500). The imperial powers believe they have the right to rob other nations and control the peoples of the world, and they do it either by consent, “using the people against the people” (*Fanon*: 2013, p. 74), or conquest, this order that has been created by the sword and canon have to live by the sword and canon. The more strategically important a country is, the more “the democracy game” becomes apparent: violence and even war becomes the natural continuation of politics of domination and imperialism. Bahrain and eastern Saudi Arabia are striking examples (Chomsky & Vltchek: 2013, p. 119).

Democracy in the end is part of the system, the Matrix. The Matrix is designed to maintain order, an order sustaining the state of inequality and exploitation securing the luxurious wellbeing of the powerful and their control over the others. A control maintaining the others in severe weakness and feebleness, retardation and underdevelopment, dependence, subjection, and subordination, and most importantly anomy, oblivion, and alienation from their civilizational self.

The system must work and order must be maintained. As long as the system is working, at any price, there is no problem whatsoever. Otherwise, when order breaks down or the system stops working, violent interference is inevitable.

It is pretty clear when one recalls the British occupation of “Egypt” in the summer of 1882, it was “a quintessential feat of imperialism” (Karsh: 2003, p. 15). Albert Hourani maintains: “order had broken down”, the claim of the British invasion was “that the government was in revolt against legitimate authority”. However the real reason was “that instinct for power” (Karsh: 2003, p. 15).

It is all about power. Freedom, brotherhood, equality and all those stunning mottos are just myths. Even Gladstone himself “recognized the irony in the situation. On 10 August 1882, he had stated that an indefinite occupation of “Egypt” would be ‘at variance with all the principles and views of Her Majesty’s Government, and the pledges they have given to Europe, and with the views, I may say, of Europe itself’” (Karsh: 2003, p. 27).

At any price, the system must work, the Matrix must function. “On 3 January 1883, Granville promised that Britain would withdraw from “Egypt” ‘as soon as the state of the country, and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive’s authority, will admit of it’. This promise was to be repeated 66 times

between 1882 and 1922, when “Egypt” became [nominally] an independent state” (Karsh: 2003, p. 27).

In 1990, Ahmed Abdalla (1990) asserted the military in “Egypt” certainly would not take over. His explanation was: “the system is working”. He proceeded even in 1977 and 1986 when the military was called to crush the popular intifada or the state apparatus revolt, the military went back to its barracks again and the civil authorities remained dominant (yet he remarked the military does not need to take over the power because it is already on its top). We must ask, why did the military come out in 2013? Did the system stop working? Was the Matrix endangered?

The strange thing is whenever some “Cromer” appears (Cromer was in charge of the British imperial campaign on “Egypt” in 1881), his violent appearance is always done through an imperial invasion or a military coup. “The democracy game” is very ancient.

When Napoleon invaded “Egypt” in 1798, he was very keen on establishing a “democratic” body (*Aldiwan*) on the very first day he entered Cairo. *Aldiwan* was a political frontage to employ some of the people of “Egypt” in the process of the imperial control over “Egypt”. Surprisingly, the list of the members invited to *Aldiwan* was prepared in advance and with meticulous attention (*Shaker*: 1987, p. 103). The rule governing the choice of *Aldiwan* members was: “to be of the notables (*Ayan*) of the country who are significant in their scientific position and competence and their way of receiving the French” (Alrafi’i: 1987, p. 104).

Eighty years later, France and Britain pressured the Ottoman Sultan in 1879 to dismiss Khedive Ismail due to Ismail’s stubbornness and opposition to the Western strategic interests in “Egypt” and Africa (*Shaker*: 1987, pp. 24-25).

After the Orabi revolution in September 1881, Sharif Pasha became the prime minister and a parliament was freely elected on the 26th December 1881. In January 1882 Sharif Pasha proposed a draft constitution to the elected parliament, however Britain and France sent a joint memorandum to the Khedive confirming their support of him and expressing their opposition towards constitutional rule (Hammad: 1987, p. 107). In 1893, when Khedive Abbas Hilmi II Overrode lord Cromer, the real power center in “Egypt”, and tried to appoint Fakhry Pasha as prime minister without Cromer’s approval, Cromer threatened him with dismissal. The Khedive retreated and Fakhry pasha’s government resigned (*Shalabi*: 1986, vol. 5, p. 437).

In late July 1928, the British toppled the democratically elected Alwafd government replaced it with another minority party by force, and in 19 July the parliament was dissolved. The British secretary of state for foreign affairs Austen Chamberlain said nothing in front of the British parliament but this threatening, despotic sentence:

We will not allow any power, whether there is a constitution or not, to neglect the British reservations about independence whatever the type of government King Fuad

and his people choose for they have to bear in mind and give reparations for these reservations in return" (Hammad: 1987, pp. 107-108).

In the five years following the 1923 constitution the "democratic" British government sent four warnings to the new constitutional government in "Egypt" against legislative efforts in the "Egyptian" parliament enacting laws granting relatively more liberties to the "Egyptian" people (Hammad: 1987, p. 107). Tamim Al Barghouti noted "the constitution, which was supposed to be the means for the "Egyptians" to express themselves, was the main reason behind the "Egyptian" people could not express their opinion towards the British presence" (2004, pp. 150-151), he further explained:

The new government, however, had learnt the lesson of 1924, as Ramadan says: 'fear for the constitution, (i.e. fear of a British intervention that would oust the Wafd and suspend the constitution) was driving the government and the parliament to avoid adventures and making trouble with the English (p. 150).

When Italy was advancing in Ethiopia in 1935, Britain felt the threat, being surrounded by the Italians from the South East (Ethiopia) and the North West (Libya), so Britain managed to conclude a treaty with "Egypt" to guarantee a native strong government would guarantee and maintain security and be able to keep the people from rebelling in should a war break out between Britain and Italy (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 154). Frantz Fanon (2013) revealed how political parties in the colonized countries are largely an imperial tool, an intermediary between the imperial and the people, fulfilling the imperial needs with the people's consent (!). The Alwafd party was part of the game between the British and the palace, Alwafd won every single free election, yet was not allowed to govern except at the times the British were in need of its presence. In 1936, when the King Fouad fell sick, the British fearing from a power vacuum that might lead to an uncontrollable situation, brought Alnahhas to government (Shalabi: 1986, vol. 5, p. 500).

In 1942, Rommel was approaching "Egypt" with his armies and "Egyptian" student demonstrations broke out welcoming him. On the 14th of February, Sampson, the British high commissioner, ordered the British tanks to besiege the Khedive's Palace, ordering him either to appoint Alnahhas as prime minister or be disposed. After less than an hour, Alnahhas became the prime minister (*Gardener*: 2013, p. 61). The military coup against the first democratically elected "Egyptian" president on 2 July 2013 comes in the same context.

Robert Springborg provided another example of "the democracy game" played in the late 1980 Mubarak's "Egypt" explaining how inclusion into "democracy" coupled with superficial economic enhancements is just another face of Nasser's despotic tyranny:

Liberalization ... has stimulated a real increase in political participation, which in turn will eventually legitimate the regime in a rational-legal manner. More "Egyptians" engage in political debate, exercise their right to join interest groups and parties, and

participate in electing candidates to offices than ever before. As they do so, they are laying the foundations for the emergence of a much stronger state and one that will not have to rely only on rents generated from sources external to the productive sectors of the economy, as its weak predecessor has done. As liberalization facilitates the emergence of a consensus behind the need for a sharing of burdens and benefits, the state's ability to extract and distribute resources will grow. The state, in short, will exchange some of its autonomy in decision making for access to some of the abundant resources held by its citizens. The potential for economic development unlocked as a result of this trade-off will ... be further enhanced by social and economic changes already under way (Springborg: 1989, pp. 296-297).

In his marvelous, brilliant novel *Seeing*, José Saramago (2013) maintains democracy in the West is permitted to function as long as it serves the interests of the ruling elites (Chomsky & Vltchek: 2013). We should further generalize arguing politics is the continuation of war (of all against all) with other means. Politics in "Egypt" (and in the South countries at large) is the continuation of imperialism with other means, democracy in the South is allowed to function as long as it serves the interests of the imperial. This is "the democracy game", a Matrix, a control mechanism, designed and maintained by the imperial to preserve its interests with a hands off nose in approach, a lethal iron fist in lofty silk gloves. Should democracy not produce its favorable outcomes, the iron fist shows up. Hence, war becomes the continuation of "the democracy game" with other means.

The creation of the contemporary Middle East rendered the rulers and the armies as mere clients. The British and the French created "a-legitimate" authorities suffering from the lack of real power and the lack of indigenusness. Thus, it had to create a fake legitimacy (through what else?! "the democracy game" of course) and it had to serve its master, the Western country that put it in its place (see: W. Cleveland: 2000).

The West, especially America, prefers anything but real democracy, a term equivocally manipulated almost always. For example, the US reconstituted the mafia in southern France and in Sicily (the Corsican Mafia) to wreck the labor movement and break up strikes. In exchange for their constructive efforts, the US granted the mafia control over the heroin industry (Chomsky & Vltchek: 2013; see also McCoy, Read, & Adams: 1972). Extremely out spoken, Magdi Hammad brilliantly wrote:

The West basically opposes the Arab "progress", even if it took the West itself as a model for that progress. And indeed the West is fundamentally concerned with its direct economic, political, and strategic interests ... the Western preaching of its culture and values is merely to stampede the heritage of the Arabs and to destroy its unified civilizational entity (Hammad: 1987, p. 109).

Certainly, the 2013 US-orchestrated Alisi military coup by its exposition of "the democracy game" in such a central state in the Arab, Islamic, and Third World will have tremendous effects on the Middle East and the global strife between Western secularism and Islam. Western secular democracy has clearly proven its failure in

containing and accepting the with-various-degrees “secularized” Islamists. Western Democracy has spectacularly failed. In the name of democracy, democracy was abandoned, and freedom was killed in the very name of freedom.

When the officers failed in “the democracy game”, when they could not constitute their custodianship and parlay their powers through rigged democracy, and when their tricks was exposed and no longer bore its fruits, the tanks swept the streets of “Egypt”, while the Western “free” “democratic” world decided to be blind.

The failure of Western democracy in the Muslim world is inevitable, the reason is revealed by a recent doctoral dissertation written at the American Naval Postgraduate School under the supervision of Robert Springborg, the reason is that real democracy will bring more-or-less Islamists to power and the thesis concluded “the primary characteristic of any Islamist political organization is to Islamize the state rather than to democratize it—a characteristic that has important implications for how Islamist governments assert their authority over the military” (Tuininga: 2013, p. v). The same idea is echoed in media outlets, for example *the 700 Club* show on CBN TV dedicated one of its episodes expressing the fear: “Arab spring feeding push for Islamic Caliphate”. In an interview with the *CNN live* Mike Rogers, Chairman of the house intelligence committee in the American Congress, commented on Al Sisi coup maintaining:

The military is the one stable factor there. They did not over react during the Mubarak overthrow. The military was reacting to the calls of the secularists and more liberal and modern factions in “Egypt”. I think the army should I think continue to be rewarded for that kind of activity. **The army is the one cultural structural stabilizing force in “Egypt”. Muslim Brotherhood was using the instruments of democracy to try to Islamacize and Ikhwanacize**, which means the brotherhood is going into all the agencies of the government and trying to take over. We should continue to support the military, the one stabilizing force in “Egypt” that I think could temper down the political feuding that is going on now, and then help a process that will allow for multiple factions and parties and beliefs to participate. The rush the last time I think got us the MB who used democracy to undo freedoms in “Egypt” today. There is a better way to do this if we have a longer period to allow this parties to get established and interim government a march to true democracy. US has to play a more leadership role in at least lining up what a democracy looks like and not allowing the MB to take away freedoms in the name of democracy.

1.4. The Theoretical and Methodological Framework

1.4.1. Meta-methodology

Any methodology, not to mention any culture and civilization, is shaped by the epistemology and ontology it stems from. There is no such methodology that is not biased to its foundational principles, which Mahmoud Shaker called “meta-

methodology” (Shaker: 1987, p. 63). AbdelWahab AlMessiri differentiates between two exclusive types of foundational bias: bias to human, or bias to nature. Bias to human means believing the human is capable of transcending his imminent reality, through the divine breath in him comprising his soul and his conscience. The human is a free creature who makes history, he is part of the nature but independent of and cannot be reduced to it, for he transcends nature and its material natural laws. Thus, the phenomenon of the independent-from-nature human cannot be explained unless there is a transcendent God. On the contrary, bias to nature means the precedence of material nature over the human, the human is part and parcel of nature, and the human can never transcend nature for he is totally subject to laws of nature just like other animals and creatures.

Based on works like that of Ismail Al-Faroqi, Mahmoud Shaker, Mona Abul-Fadl, and Kalim Siddiqui, we can conclude there are two Weltanschauungs on which any perspective, methodology, or approach to human reality depends: *Eman* (Transcendence) or *Kufr* (Immanence), e.g.: Islam, Western secularism respectively. The Islamic model stem from a transcendent *emani* frame of reference (Tawhid), whereas the Western model is a product of a pantheistic material frame of reference (secularism).

I would employ the following quote of Timothy Mitchell as an introduction to discuss the contradiction between Tawhid and secularism:

In fact I would argue that the notion of “theological bonds” that loosen or become broken, leaving the individual confronted by the world, continues to govern our understanding of the historical encounter of the Middle East with the modern West, and even of political struggles in the Middle East today (Mitchell: 1999, p. 5).

Mitchell actually is saying:

That the notion of “theological bonds” [which involves the connection between the human being and God as well as Islam and its teachings and values shared inside the community/society and among the people of the Muslim nation] that loosen or become broken [in the secular age of secular colonial modernization and secularization], leaving the individual confronted by the world [without God against the local and external colonial powers], continues to govern our understanding of the historical encounter of the Middle East with the modern West [as basically a historical epistemological cultural confrontation between *Tawhidi* Islam and secular modernist west], and even of political struggles in the Middle East today [which is basically religious not national or ethnic] (Mitchell: 1999, p. 5).

Mitchell does not view the conflict in light of the contradiction between Tawhid vs. secularism, for he sees the conflict in light of the contradiction between secular modernity and religious anti-modernity (though he himself is a postmodernist). He could see Tawhid, but he is a secular post-modernist. He sees the power of religion and religious identity, but he does not believe in it because of his past secular experience, it like saying: "I respect religion, but I do NOT believe in it. I can see its power in driving the people of the Middle East to resist secularization. The Muslims

have been resisting the forced secular religion because of their attachment to Islam".

Other militant and politicized secular scholars will take Mitchell's argument to the extreme to say: Now we know that Islam is the issue. It is the enemy to modernity. It is the barrier against secularizing and colonizing this part of the world. We need to secularize Islam from within (e.g.: Sufi way by Ali Gomaa and Salafi way by Yasser Burhami) so that it accepts military secular regimes, and we should fully eliminate political Islam in the Arab as a whole through military officers (e.g.: Alsisi, Haftar, Alasad, and Dahlan).

It was Tawhid and Islam that enabled popular movements in the Arab and Islamic societies to confront and stand like an impervious dam in facing the tremendous Western quests to destroy Muslim people and their identity. It was Tawhid and Islam that rendered the destiny of the Muslim different than that of the perished civilities and civilizations of Aztec, Inca, Maya, etc. under the Western genocides and ethnocide. Eugene V. Rostow, former Dean of Yale Law School and served as head of the US State Department planning division, US Secretary of State Assistant, and adviser to President Johnson on the Middle East affairs until 1967, once said:

We must realize that the existing differences between us and the Arab peoples are not differences between countries or peoples, but are rather differences between the Islamic civilization and the Christian civilization. It has been a raging conflict between Christianity and Islam since the middle ages, and it continues until this very moment, in different ways. And since one and half century, Islam has been subordinated to Western control and the Islamic heritage has been subjugated to Christian heritage.

The historical circumstances confirm that America is an integral part of the Western world, the Western philosophy, faith, and regime. This makes America stand hostile to the eastern Muslim world, with its Islamic philosophy and faith comprised of the religion of Islam. America cannot but maintain this attitude antagonistic to Islam and siding with the Western world and the Zionist state, because if it did otherwise it is actually contradicting its language, philosophy, culture, and institutions ... the objective of imperialism in the Middle East is to destroy the Islamic civilization, the rise of Israel is indeed part of this schema, it is nothing but a continuation of the crusaders (*Al'alem*: 1987, pp. 24-25).

Fadi Ismail explains:

The Tawhidi epistemology is capable of achieving a gradual rupture with the dominant [Western] epistemology for the former is the only that opens the horizons of complete change, horizons that does not confront the Western epistemology on one side to reconcile with it on the other ... the epistemological rupture and the primacy of another epistemology, as it happened in the 19th and 20th century in the Arab and Islamic world, cannot happen fully away from power equations and the movement of conflict between the socio-historical patterns (*Ismail*: 1993, p. 12).

The contradiction between secularism and Tawhid is the very essence of the clashes and conflicts in the Arab and Islamic World in the last three centuries at least. In

1983, Ernest Gellner wrote his book *Muslim Society* complaining Islam is the only transcendent religion Western modernity and secularism has failed to penetrate, for the revival of Islam proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to Western modernization and secularization.

Ahmet Davutoğlu (2006) stressed: the Western challenge to the Islamic civilization is not merely a challenge of alternative polity and institutions, but it is a challenge of an alternative *Weltanschauung*. Davutoğlu further argued the strategies of forcefully changing institutions applied against the Islamic societies cannot overcome this dissonance, for the high internal consistency of the theoretical Islamic framework always enables the potential production of an alternative political culture provided that a direct connection is achieved between Islamic ontology and politics, namely as long as the Tawhid-based existential substance is existent in culture and socio-political perceptions (p. 65).

Foucault argued modern disciplinary power was something “absolutely incompatible” with the concept of state authority or sovereignty. However, the sovereignty theory, he argues, was employed merely as an ideology, “to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques” (Foucault: 1980, pp. 104-105). Timothy Mitchell proposes:

My own response to this apparent contradiction is that discipline and representation are two aspects of the same novel strategies of power, linked by the notion of enframing. Disciplinary powers acquire their unprecedented hold upon the body by methods of distributing and dividing that create an order or structure in which individuals are confined, isolated, combined together and kept under surveillance. This 'order' is, in effect, a framework that seems to precede and exist apart from the actual individuals or objects ordered. The framework, appearing as something pre-existent, nonmaterial and non-spatial, seems to constitute a separate, metaphysical realm - the realm of the conceptual. It is such 'order' that the modern and colonial state claimed to have introduced into “Egypt”; what was introduced, with this order, was the effect of the world's division into two realms; the material and the conceptual. In the same way as it divided the world, this division separated the human person into two distinct parts, a body and a mind. The power of representation worked in terms of this correspondence between the division of the world and the division of the person (Mitchell: 1991, pp. 176-177).

Similar to the ideological role concepts like sovereignty played in camouflaging modern discipline and domination mechanisms, other concepts like freedom, democracy, etc. performed and covered the horrible reality of Western dis-modernity and un-civility.

1.4.2. Methodological Framework

This study pursues real knowledge and comprehensive explanations, based upon a complex and rigorous observation of the reality. As AbdelWahab AlMessiri suggests

(*AlMessiri*: 2006; 2010; 2013), there are two kinds of observation: the direct observation (the objective receptive observation) and on the other hand there is observation through frequent patterns, which we call paradigms.

The objective observation assumes the human mind is negative and receptive, the reality is simple, and the objective of knowledge is conveying the reality as it is, refuting peculiarity, maintaining impartiality and rejecting subjectivity, and achieving continuous accumulation of data. The objective receptive observation is a product of Methodological Imperialism (*imberyaliyat almoqolat*), being haunted by the other (*alestilab*), and full submission (*alestinamah*). Here the main issue becomes the number of the references and data, also the techniques of research become more important than its scientific result and explanatory power (*AlMessiri*: 1990).

On the other hand, the explanatory methodology views the whole reality as merely raw material in deep need for explanation. This does not mean rejecting the objective reality, but it only means not receiving it as it is in a direct (objective receptive) way and recognizing it creatively through a compound process of deconstruction, abstraction, and reconstruction. For the facts, according to the explanatory methodology, are readily found in reality, but the truth is a thing that a human abstracts from facts, data, and statistics, to put it in a frame governing the similar phenomena. The explanatory methodology distinguishes itself by combining objectivity and subjectivity, as we can abstract whatever theses we can think from the objective reality then we test it on the objective reality, then if these theses reasonably explained the reality, they are more explanatory than the other theses that do not explain but limited sides of this comprehensive reality.

The process of deconstruction, abstraction, and reconstruction must aim at pursuing common patterns through which it is possible to recognize data and facts, not as scattered atoms but as a significant network of relations. In this study, I will employ the paradigm methodology that does not only accumulate data, but puts it in a general historical context and in a frame of repetitive patterns, so the data becomes part of a synaptic frame of relations and patterns.

1.4.3. The explanatory methodology: The Paradigm as a methodological tool

This methodology is distinguished, it moves the focus of attention from the materialistic phenomenon in itself to the phenomenon as a complex structure and a subject for explanation (*AlMessiri*: 1990). Thus, it has its specific research process and procedures, discussed thoroughly below (*AlMessiri*: 1990; 2005; 2006; 2010).

Simply, the paradigm is a conceptual structure or a cognitive map the human mind abstracts (consciously or unconsciously) from a tremendous amount of relationships, details, and (objective) facts. The mind excludes some of insignificant

details (from his point of view) and retain others, and then connects them, and abstracts a general pattern from them.

The paradigm has its roots in Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of scientific revolution*, however, Kuhn applied the concept to the field of philosophy of science. Also, the paradigm has its roots in the word "Theme", it means the central and abstract idea in a literary work that transcends the work, but it remains latent within it and all its parts, giving the work its basic unity and uniting its various components. The paradigm also can be traced to term "Ideal type" used by Max Weber.

Paradigms are inevitable. Human behavior is based on perception, thus to analyze human behavior one must reach the human perception, abstract it, and then use it to explain (this is what I call a paradigm in social science). Furthermore, the differentiation between man and nature/material stresses the necessity of using paradigms to analyze and explain human phenomena. The analytical process is essentially the process of observing the cognitive patterns inherent in the words and actions of others, and the process of forming paradigms.

There are at least three advantageous characteristics of the paradigm as a methodology. First, the process of linking and forming connections is inevitable before abstraction, and both of them roughly emancipate the data from its private space (its direct time and place), thus it gains a high explanatory power. On the other hand, the main characteristic of the receptive objectivity is it separates between data, keeping every piece of data stuck to its space thus, it becomes impossible to understand it in a general pattern, and hence one can impose any meaning or direction over it.

Second, the paradigm does not only observe what is explicit, for it is also capable of observing the implicit. Thus, the paradigm is a revolutionary instrument, unlike the receptive objectivity that hallows the status quo. Third, one forms a map after the processes of analysis, drawing connections, abstraction, exclusion, and inclusion. This map is as much identical in its interconnection and symmetry to the relations between the components of the studied reality as the map maker could.

However, the paradigm is almost ahistorical, because it seeks the frequent pattern implicit in the events. Also, the paradigm has low ability to observe change and movement, for it seeks the pattern and the moment of manifestation of the paradigm. Here comes the importance of two analytical concepts germane to the paradigm, enabling the paradigm to combine both kinetics and stillness. Namely, the paradigmatic successive and the paradigmatic moment.

The paradigmatic successive is like the paradigm, a conceptual structure the human mind abstracts from events and phenomena. But the successive observes the phenomena not in its terms of their stillness, but of their development and evolution through different phases, the successive observes the historical and active dimension. The present may be different from the past, yet it is simultaneously one of its fruits.

Conversely, the paradigmatic moment is the other way around. It is based upon the belief there is a substantial difference between reality and the dominant paradigm, which cannot fully materialize in reality. However, there are rare moments when the paradigm approaches the state of full materialization. This moment, though its rarity, may express the essence of the paradigm more than the other moments. Thus, the paradigmatic moment is the moment of the crystallization of the paradigm, when the paradigm reveals its true face.

1.4.4. The Process and Procedures

Here beneath I discuss the process and procedures of building a paradigm (AlMessiri: 1990; 2005; 2006; 2010).

- Building a paradigm is, in its essence, a process of deconstructing and reconstructing the phenomenon.
- The researcher starts the deconstruction process by dividing the phenomenon to separate units.
- Then, he abstracts these units (via roughly isolating it from its direct time and space). Only through this way, he can attach one to another as well as to other details.
- He connects these small units and form larger groups.
- Then, the researcher abstracts these larger groups, and relates them to each other, he puts every group of similar groups in an independent pattern, until he locates all the groups (with all its units and details) in different patterns.
- At that point, the researcher abstracts these patterns themselves, and tries through mental deductive operations to put them into more abstract patterns of similarity and divergence. Thus, the neutral sentences and shattered details will start gaining a specific meaning or more depth, and the features of the paradigm will start showing up.
- Until this moment, the researcher moves inside the borders of the phenomena doing abstractions from inside. However, he has to abandon these borders and move outside, he has to try comparing the patterns, details, and problems he reached with similar patterns outside the phenomenon itself. This is one of the best ways to reach patterns with a high explanatory and classifying ability.
- It is important for the researcher to realize that the process of forming the main problems and reaching the implicit basic pattern and classifying and giving it an eminent content cannot be done through a mere internal analysis only. But through awareness of the historical and cultural patterns (and problems) surrounding the phenomenon. Thus, the researcher has to educate himself about the studied subject so that his prospect gets wider than the direct moment and the direct observation of the phenomenon.
- The researcher must construct a group of hypothetical patterns and try their explanatory power, accordingly he excludes the patterns with low power and

retains those with high power until he discovers the more explaining patterns and modifies and intensifies them.

- The researcher must observe the patterns through different sequences: a stable successive with a high explanatory power deals with what exists, another probable successive deals with what exists and what may exist, and an impossible successive enabling him to realize the moments of complete rupture.
- Through the process of searching for patterns, the researcher must state observing what can be called “the worrisome details”, these are instable and do not follow an obvious pattern, thus will lead him to new patterns.
- Through the process of abstraction, the researcher’s eyes must keep focused on the details to make sure not to get lost in the whole and neglect the partials, and not to float over the surface of generalities abandoning the very curve of the phenomenon.
- Through the trial of reaching the implicit patterns, the researcher’s hypothetical patterns and sequences must include elements of the reality as it is in reality, as well as other elements of the reality as some actors imagine it, symbols through which they realize reality, and meanings they project on it. Also, the researcher must include material realistic borders, implicit abilities, and idealistic ambitions. Neglecting the latter will exclude the unmaterialistic elements.
- This process will lead to realizing the main pattern implicit in all these similar, various, and conflicting patterns.

Finally, concerning the sources, the phenomenon analyzed here is current. Thus, secondary sources will not be enough to draw a comprehensive and dynamic portrait of such a vibrant phenomenon. Primary sources will be very beneficial.

Thus, beside the secondary sources, this study shall depend on these primary sources whenever deemed necessary: news, newspapers, leaks, formal releases by the military, public speeches by and interviews of the putschists, and personal interviews.

1.5. Prologue: The Pimp in a post-neo-imperialist world

I will probably disturb people by saying you could trace Alsisi back to American involvement in the late 1860s in “Egypt” - Michael Oren, the former Israeli ambassador in Washington.

Abdel Fattah Alsisi is the rightful heir to my father’s political legacy - Hoda Gamal Abdel Nasser.

I am very proud of the fact that we have been teaching two main actors of the whole drama [the coup] general Al Sisi and general Sobhi, and had them say to me that is kind what you taught us in your war colleges, wow! - Colonel Ken Allard, the retired US Army colonel, and Former Dean of the US National War College.

Al Sisi famously known as “the pimp”, due to a viral, sweeping social media hashtag that began on the very day Sisi announced his intention to run for presidency, although his numerous denials since the coup, on 26 of March and was retweeted more than 100 million times around the world within days and nearly 500 million almost a week after the campaign according to *Google keyhole, Inc.*, is said to be the rightful heir to Nasser’s political legacy according to his Nasser’s daughter Hoda (Springborg: 2013). But is he really Nasser’s heir? Answering this question requires us to go back in time.

In the American Joint Chiefs of Staff Confirmation Hearing on 18 July 2013, in which the Senate Armed Services Committee heard from General Martin Dempsey and Admiral James Winnefeld, both of whom had been nominated to remain in their senior military posts on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dempsey said:

The “Egyptian” military has acted with great professionalism and restraint throughout the 3 years of difficult transition since the 2011 ouster of Hosni Mubarak ... First, we must maintain the strength of **this relationship to enable us to assist and influence “Egypt’s” military leaders**. Second, the United States would be short-sighted to overlook **the return on investment we get from the “Egyptian” military**, for example, Suez Canal transits for our carrier battle groups, intelligence cooperation, and counterterrorism cooperation. These are examples of the benefits we derive from this relationship. Third, the “Egyptian” military has played **a stabilizing role during “Egypt’s” transition**. And fourth, our commitments under the Camp David Accords have yielded sustainable peace between Israel and “Egypt” ... [I do] agree ... regarding **the importance of military-to-military relationships as enablers of US foreign policy** ... [I do] agree ... that we should continue to maintain and foster the strength of the U.S.-“Egyptian” military relationship ... **the “Egyptian” military [is] a very strong partner of the United States** ... **The Israeli military considers the “Egyptian” military a strong partner** ... they are worth the investment (emphasis added).

In his first interview after the military coup against the first democratically elected “Egyptian” president in history, Mohammad Morsi, published by the Washington post on August 3, 2013, Al Sisi’s justification for the military coup was: “the dilemma ... originated from the ideology that the Muslim Brotherhood adopted for building a country, which is based on restoring the Islamic religious empire”. The same idea was echoed several times by countless “Egyptian” and American officials, for example the “Egyptian” PM Ibrahim Mahlab in front of the American chamber of commerce in Cairo in late March 2014 and Michael Scheuer, the former CIA intelligence officer and adjunct professor at Georgetown University, in his media appearances and documentaries.

When the Washington post interviewer asked Al Sisi if any US official called him, Al Sisi answered: “[Defense Secretary Chuck] Hagel. Almost every day”, he also revealed:

The United States was never far from anything that was going on here. We were very keen on providing very clear briefings to all US officials. Months ago, I told them there was a very big problem in “Egypt”. I asked for their support, for their consultation, for their advice, as **they are our strategic partner and allies** ... Months

ago. The developments and complications of the situation were very clearly provided for the Americans many months ago (emphasis added).

Al Sisi graduated from the “Egyptian” Military Academy in 1977, when Camp David was already secretly binding, US-“Egyptian” military relations was being consolidated, and the military doctrine was drastically changed to be based on three pillars: 1) inscribing “Egypt” into the US strategy of consolidating its control over the Middle East, 2) maintaining zero-threat to Israel who is to be perceived as a friend not an enemy: overriding the Palestinian question and protecting the security and safety of Israel, and 3) hooking “Egypt” within the American defense projects through maintaining, arming and training the “Egyptian” military to perform military and security mandates. Al Sisi did not witness 6th October war nor did he ever fight against the Israelis, his field record includes only fighting against Iraq in the American Gulf War, and against the so called Sinai Insurgency.

Even Camp David now has become something of the past, since the 2011 January “Egyptian” tanks were on the borders with Israel in violation to the Camp David yet in coordination with Israeli. Al Sisi further included “Egypt” in the American war on the so called terror, in his book, *The Road to Tahrir Square*, Lloyd C. Gardner explained, since the “Egyptian” participation in the Gulf War in 1991 until Obama’s famous speech in Cairo the American administration did not stop demanding changing doctrine of the “Egyptian” military from a traditional army with a doctrine based on comprehensive and symmetric war with Israel, only busy with the Eastern front against “an inexistent enemy” as the Democratic senator Tom Lantos put it, into what the Israeli analyst Hillel Frisch described as **a post-modern army, namely a military of a functional state with global mandates**. This meant expanding the role of “Egypt” militarily, politically, and regionally to face Iran and “terrorism” in the Middle East and extensively serving the American interests (*Gardner: 2013*).

In a clear sign of how Al Sisi is drastically different even from the older military generals who witnessed the October War yet later abided by the peace treaty with the Israeli enemy, the son of Camp David generation Al Sisi treated Israel as an ally and served it through security and military assistance. Soon after the military coup, in August 2013 Al Sisi ordered the full destruction for all the tunnels to Gaza. Significantly, though besieging a million human beings in Gaza, Mubarak and Tantawi refused abolishing the tunnels, a playing card they held in their hands to pressure the US, as the wikileaks document has revealed by a letter titled: “Scenesetter for Mindef Tantawi's visit to the US March 24-28”. On the contrary, Al Sisi wretchedly lacked any legitimacy and pursued the support of Israel, this was the price. Whereas Mubarak and Tantawi refused to militarily participate in the Afghanistan war or confronting piracy in the Red Sea, Al Sisi is now working to turn the “Egyptian” military into mere mercenaries, expected mandates are: Gaza, the Gulf, and Libya.

In an interview with *Reuters* in May 2014, Al Sisi was asked if there is anything he wanted to say to President Obama, Al Sisi answered: “we are fighting a war against

terrorism. The “Egyptian” army is undertaking major operations in the Sinai so that it is not transformed into a base for terrorism that will threaten its neighbors [Israel] and make “Egypt” unstable”. Earlier, in late March Al Sisi declared, in a video published by the formal Facebook page of the military spokesperson, the establishment of a new Rapid Deployment Force for the first time in the history of the “Egyptian” military. Military sources revealed to the Israeli intelligence website DEBKAF^{file} that a new unit has been established in the “Egyptian” army under the direct “personal” command of Alsisi as a robust means to consolidate his regime. The military spokesperson mentioned on the Facebook page:

The special airborne RDF is characterized with high capabilities, special nature of operations, and armament according to the latest global armament systems, enabling it to spread and rapidly intervene to perform all symmetric and asymmetric tasks and access operations fields **inside and outside the country** as soon as possible professionally and under different circumstances due to its high fire and combat capabilities, maneuverability, and agility (emphasis added).

In a recent paper, professor Nadia Mostafa, the former political science department head at the faculty of economics and political science in Cairo university, scrutinized the internal, regional, and international contexts of changing alliances leading to the transformation in the doctrine of the “Egyptian” military, she concluded the terminus is creating an image, an idea that revolutions do not lead to change and democracy, revolutions do not lead but to the ascendance of the terrorists who pursue dominance and tyranny using religion to acquire power, thus there is no way out except the military again with superficial democracy and religious backer, which reframes the relation between Islam on one side and the individual, society, groups, and state on the other in a way supporting despotism and tyranny in a frame of a distorted artificial religiosity. (*Mostafa*: 2014).

Owning more than 87% of all the undeveloped non-agricultural land in “Egypt”, by a presidential decree in 1997, and almost half of the “Egyptian” economy, the military is determined to further expand and consolidate its grip over the “Egyptian” economy. On many occasions, including media interviews as a presidential candidate, Al Sisi harshly responded to any questions about the military and its budget in particular saying: “do not put your nose in the military issue”. Alsisi, as well as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces during 2011-2013, fiercely and nervously refused any discussion on the military budget and subjecting it to civil scrutiny and accountability or even addressing the issue. Surprisingly, this very issue was the main cause of the British colonialism in 1882, is the military is the “legitimate” heir of imperialism?

Alsisi, famously known as the pimp, became a field marshal without a war, a presidential candidate without a program, and a president without elections. As if a “revolution” had not happened?! The days following the 25th of January 2011 were undoubtedly exceptional and glorious yet they were not a revolution. Developing and investing in the legend of the peaceful revolution, the ouster of Mubarak was a

carrot thrown to the freedom-hungry people to lead them blindly to their death and defeat. Mubarak ouster was a maneuver to gain time for the deep state (the intelligence, the military, the security apparatus, the ancient regime, the business blocs, the church) to prepare for using force, which have been impossible given the unified high tide of anger. The power of the raging people were unified and intact, it was the right moment, but they did not achieve the desired change. For the deep state, the game was simple: direct anger in the wrong paths and use the people against the people through democracy. Frantz Fanon wrote an enlightening piece:

After the war the candidates on the nationalist list were triumphantly elected. Immediately after, organized repression began of the cells of the Democratic Movement for Madagascar Restoration. Colonialism, in order to reach its ends, used the usual traditional methods: frequent arrests, racist propaganda between tribes, and the creation of a party out of the unorganized elements of the lumpenproletariat. This party, with the name of the Disinherited Madagascans, was **created to give the colonial authorities by its distinctly provocative actions the legal excuse to maintain imperial order** (Fanon: 2013, p. 99, emphasis added).

The Muslim Brotherhood, largely tamed and incorporated into the Matrix, treated the “revolution” “as a sort of manna [miracle] fallen from heaven, and pray[ed] to goodness that it'll go on falling” (Fanon: 2013, p. 100). On the contrary:

The enemy is aware of ideological weaknesses, for he analyzes the forces of rebellion and studies more and more carefully the aggregate enemy which makes up a colonial people; he is also aware of the spiritual instability of certain layers of the population. The enemy discovers the existence, side by side with the disciplined and well-organized advance guard of rebellion, of a mass of men whose participation is constantly at the mercy of their being for too long accustomed to physiological wretchedness, humiliation, and irresponsibility. The enemy is ready to pay a high price for the services of this mass. He will create spontaneity with bayonets and exemplary floggings (Fanon: 2013, p. 116).

The 2011 “revolution” and 2013 coup proved how much the people aspiring for change are naïve and fragile. The disposal of Mubarak by the military deceived the people, who thought the game was over and they really did a revolution, they misused the chance they had and lost the momentum that could have led to a real revolution. Meanwhile, the military was playing them against each other waiting till it is time to ingenuously play his cards. The military imposed its bidding over the society by force. The Brotherhood, although confident about its ability to sweep the elections, was gradually losing its bases: the mass base through demonizing media campaigns, the revolutionary base through its alliance with the SCAF, and its own organizational youth and audacious base through wrong political choices and short sighted decisions.

Since the 1952 coup that established “Egyptian” republicanism, the military establishment (comprising the armed forces and the intelligence services) has provided the framework within which “Egyptian” presidents have ruled. Despite Nasser's popularity and appeal, Sadat's transformative changes and Mubarak's long

reign, all three relied on their military credentials, gravitas gained by leadership in war, and the unquestioned support of the military establishment – the only institution in the country able to effect change by force – to buttress their rule (T. Osman: 2013). Thus it was not hard to expect the quick fall of Morsi given the shortsightedness of not only the Brotherhood but also almost everybody. Everybody was fooled into “a democracy game” before and without even touching any pillar of the deep state, which earned the full chance and time to disrupt and crush the broad consensus among the political forces, but also to dismantle and distract the revolutionary and anger energy of the people and redirect it against each other.

Since 1952 coup, “Egypt’s” three presidents genuinely depicted themselves as the military establishment “sons” and its, almost sole, representatives enjoying the “right” to lead the country. However, the functional nature of the regime hardly appeared, arguably “Egypt” has never been a military dictatorship the Latin American way. However, in 2014 the military apparatus decided to rule assuming the role of the guardian of the state. Robert Springborg 1989’s book revealed the reason:

The main contenders to overthrow the weak state would be either the military or, much less likely, those able to channel the energies of the mob ... The military would impose a version of the Latin American authoritarian state, whereas those associated with the other alternative would strike off in an egalitarian, militant, anti-Western direction (Springborg: 1989, p. 296).

The military is simply and bluntly the local warden of keeping “Egypt” on the Western rods. James F. Petras (2012) revealed the 2013 coup is the way the Empire struck back against the Arab popular uprisings that overthrew the public faces of the imperial-backed regimes. In “Egypt”, the ruling military junta backed indirectly by West and America and directly by its KSA and Gulf autocratic partners drowned the people’s movements in blood. In 2011, the “Egyptian” military, disguised in the will of the “Egyptians”, worked to restore the Matrix, and expel the anomalies, thus it toppled Mubarak, maintained the regime, and gave credit to the naïve people and fabricated an image of the patriotic military siding with people and directing the country towards democracy, unlike Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Meanwhile, the sightless, unwitnessed Brotherhood filled the political vacuum. Chomsky (2013) thought “the U.S., Britain, and France are quite willing to tolerate the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood because they are basically neoliberal (pp. 116-117), so why did the coup happen?

It was not only the military who feared of losing its firm grip over the country, but more importantly the West feared the Muslim Brotherhood may threaten its, already troubled, local, regional, and international position, shortly the Matrix. Basically because if the revolution in “Egypt”, and the Arab Spring in general, had gone in its direction, it would have significantly changed the nature and structure of world order. Not to mention the oil and gas in the East Mediterranean (see for

example Aljazeera documentary “*Egypt’s*” *Lost Power*), extremely important, “the ‘cold peace’ that prevails between Israel and “Egypt” allows “Egypt” to continue its support for the Palestinians without the threat of Israeli invasion into the Sinai to counter that support” (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 22), America and Israel decided to use their “Egyptian” military in “Egypt” to achieve this objective. Chomsky (2013) himself said:

As far as the US and the West are concerned, it would be almost intolerable to allow functioning democracy in this region ... it’s pretty obvious that London, Paris, and Washington are not going to allow this to happen if they can help it ... They have to do whatever they can to undermine the democratic elements of the Arab Spring, which in fact is what they have been doing. And that is quite consistent with past practice, not just in this region ... In “Egypt” and Tunisia, the US and its allies followed the traditional game plan, which has been used over and over again, where some favored dictator can’t hold on any longer—maybe the army turns against him—like Somoza, Marcos, Duvalier, Suharto, Mobutu, and others. Support him to the last moment and when it becomes impossible send him off somewhere and try to restore the old order, and of course talk about how much you love democracy. It’s routine. It takes real genius not to see it ... Somehow it can’t be seen. It’s another example of the internal colonization. No matter how many times it happens you can’t see it. The only thing that we can see is our love of democracy (118-120).

If the Arab Spring actually moves towards developing some kind of functioning democracies in the region, the US and its allies would be in real trouble ... so there have been very major efforts to keep democracy in the region under control [or rather to keep the region under control through “the democracy game”] (pp. 158-159).

Colonel Ken Allard, the retired US Army colonel, Former NBC News Commentator and Former Dean, US National War College, expressed his pride in an interview with the “Egyptian” channel *alqahira walnas* in the 30th of September 2013 that he taught two of the main actors in the coup: Al Sisi and Sidki Sobhi, the chief of staff after Al Sisi, at the American war college, saying: “I am very proud of the fact that we have been teaching two main actors of the whole drama [the coup] general Al Sisi and general Sobhi, and had them say to me that is kind what you taught us in your war colleges, wow!”, in the Coptic Solidarity Fourth Annual Conference held at the Westminster Institute in Washington, D.C. Ken Allard explained what he taught Al Sisi at the war college:

Why we have armies, for two reasons, they control populations and they fight other armies. What is the time “Egypt” fought another army? In 1973. What they have done since? Control populations. So what they are and who they are is extremely important to the “Egyptian” society.

This thesis is an inquiry into the state and society, structure and agency, East and West, and the military and its function in all these contexts. Although some scholars in the early 1980s were celebrating “the waning of the military coup in Arab politics” (Be’eri: 1982), the military today has come back on horseback (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011), why has this happened? In the late Eighteenth century, one finds a

revolutionary such as Abdullah Alnadiem writing in his weekly newspaper real stories featuring militarization and the rule of the military during his time (2001). The dilemma of the state and society, and the civil and the military in the Muslim world can even be traced back to the first century of Islam, when the Caliphate based on the will of the people was turned into a despotic monarchy lead by military force. In a session in the Atlantic council on 10 February 2014, Michael Oren, the former Israeli ambassador in Washington, stated: "I will probably disturb people by saying you could trace Alsis back to American involvement in the late 1860s in "Egypt", this task is pursued in the coming chapters.

CHAPTER 2

“EGYPT” IN THE SECULAR AGE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE RULING ELITE AS A FUNCTIONAL GROUP

[Mohammad Ali's creation of the new army] was in itself the establishment of a principle of order which spread over the entire surface of society - John Bowring, Jeremy Bentham's friend and assistant and an English advisor to the "Egyptian" government.

The rebel's weapon is the proof of his humanity ... the imperial violence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of these enslaved men at arm's length; it seeks to dehumanize them. Everything will be done to wipe out their traditions, to substitute our language for theirs and to destroy their culture without giving them ours - Frantz Fanon.

The contest over the interpretation of history is not a luxurious phenomenon, nor is it merely a dispute over the interpretation of the past, but it is in the first place a dispute over the way to the future - M. J. Kishk.

He who controls the past controls the future. He who controls the present controls the past - George Orwell, 1984.

Every work of history is a political document - H. Zinn.

After more than four centuries since the defeat of the French in "Egypt" in 1250, the failed campaign where thirty thousand French soldiers perished and Louis IX of France was captured, the fascist dream still lived. The German mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in 1672 was the first to invite Louis XIV of France to invade "Egypt" once again. But the French government stayed reluctant although the continuous calls and reports from people like Baron de Tott (1733-1793), and Monsieur Moore. When the French revolution occurred in 1789 Charles Magallon, the French merchant who had spent more than thirty years in "Egypt", became the French consul. In 1797, Magallon set off to France to persuade his government about the necessity of colonizing "Egypt" to protect the French merchants' interests, both Talleyrand and Napoleon bought the idea (*Shaker: 1987*, pp. 11-116).

Ignited with the eight-century long heritage of failed crusaders (1096-1291), the painful memories of the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, and the lustful hopes renewed after the extermination and expulsion of the Muslims of Andalusia (1492). And pushed by the Orientalists' urgency (from Roger Bacon 1214-1294 and Thomas Aquinas 1225-1274) to ward off the danger of the coming Islamic "renaissance" (see: *Shaker*: 1987, pp. 47-79, 87, 120). As well as the French expansive ambitions in the Islamic East and their desire to take revenge for their expulsion from India by Britain (1761). France launched a campaign to colonize "Egypt".

As Napoleon's first leaflet (*Manshour*) was being read in Alexandria, the French were sowing the first seeds of the imagined "Egyptian" nationalism, which the British will reap its fruits later. Napoleon was the first to use the term "the "Egyptian" nation" in the *Manshour* distributed to the people of Alexandria the moment he broke into the city. Napoleon wanted to equate the French and the Ottomans, to make the Ottoman Turks no more than invaders, while the French are bringing civilization to "the "Egyptian" nation".

The main objectives of Napoleon's campaign was: the removal of Islamic law (*Sharia*) and the establishment of secular ordinances instead, and awakening the Pharaonic self as a prelude to isolate "Egypt" from the Islamic world, or take it out of it and Islam itself (*Qotb*: 1997; *Young*: 1951). "Periodically an effort was made to present the Pharaonic past as a source of modern "Egyptian" national identity" (*Mitchell*: 2002, p. 181).

However, even until 1919, at least, the people of "Egypt" did not perceive themselves as part of a secular liberal Pharaonic "Egyptian" nation. A simple look at a number of incidents reveals the fact, in 1906 a dispute happened between the Ottoman empire and the British over the ownership of Taba in 1906, the people of "Egypt" supported the right of the Ottomans in Taba despite the British allegation of "Egypt's" ownership (*Issa*: 2013; *Fahmy*: 2002, pp. 93-128; *Al Barghouti*: 2004). In 1911 with the Italian invasion of Libya, a huge wave of sympathy widespread in over "Egypt", securing the success of a fund raising campaign for *Almujahideen* in Libya. Moreover some "Egyptian" military officers participated in the Jihad against the Italians like Aziz Almasri, even some "Egyptian" students terminated their study in Europe, came back to "Egypt", and went to Libya for the same reason, e.g.: *Abdulrahman Azzam* (*Al Barghouti*: 2004).

Napoleon was not the prophet of civilization who came to get "Egypt" out of darkness to light and enlightenment. On the contrary, the ignorant savage came disguised in a dress of civility. The other objective of Napoleon's campaign was to not only destroy Cairo and establish a French city out of its ruins, but rather to abolish all the roots and dynamics of "renaissance" evolving in "Egypt" at that time (*Shaker*: 1987, pp. 96-99). The French were very cautious about destroying all the science books they found and pursued (*Algabarti*: 1998, vol. 1, p. 6). Furthermore, one of the conditions of the evacuation was the right of the French to take all what

they need of their papers and books, even the books and papers they had stolen from “Egypt” (*Algabarti*: 1998, vol. 3, p. 183).

Ignoring the previous fact misleads us in our answers on important questions: When did “Egypt” begin her modern age? Did “modernity” ever occur in “Egypt”? Which “modernity”? Whither “modernity”? Was the Ottoman era an era of stagnation and backwardness? Was the French campaign an imperialism or enlightenment? Can foreign invasion bring modernization to any country? What did Mohammad Ali really do in/to “Egypt”? What are the modern institutions in “Egypt” all about?

For many years, nearly since the French invasion itself, there was almost a stubborn demagogic answer to the previous questions representing and stemming from what we may call the 1798 paradigm. The 1798 paradigm dominated the “Egyptian” mind, the academic writings, and the historical and social studies. It also enjoyed a pressing dominance upon the common culture and memory. This fabricated paradigm is an imperial control technique, remarkably “the contention by colonialism that the darkest night of humanity lay over pre-colonial history concerns the whole of the African continent” (*Fanon*: 2013, p. 171). The 1798 paradigm takes the year 1798 as a point of departure, and it considers it the starting point of the contemporary “Egyptian” history and political thought. The 1798 paradigm has three main elements: first, the historical isolation and stagnation, the 1798 paradigm considers the “Egyptian” society during the Ottoman era a completely stagnant and backward society in deep decline, history had stopped in that poor society desperate for any solution to its crisis because any cure from inside was impossible. Second, the positivity of the role of the West. The Western intervention saved the stagnant society from decline; it moved the helpless society from darkness to light, from weakness to might. Through the Western intervention, life came back and history became possible. Third, the duality of the despot and the slaves. The 1798 paradigm ignores the history of the subalterns, and upholds history is nothing but the history of the powerful men. A history of the state and power not a history of the people and the society.

However, roughly in the mid-20th century, a new paradigm was evolving, trying to find its way ahead. Numerous writings appeared challenging the 1789 dominant paradigm. The new works changed parts of the picture; the fog is lifting, but we are still blind! We need a paradigm shift.

The 1798 paradigm is essentially dubious, above all one cannot consider a certain year or a specific event as a starting point of a new age in the history of peoples and nations. Cardinal social transformations do not happen due to a single event that abruptly steers the wheel of history. Transformations happen because of steady and continuous social changes taking place along time. Continuity exists in the movement of time in all systems and stages, although in different degrees. The river of history never stops flowing even if its surface seemed stagnant. History is always in an infinite motion of transformation. There is continuously a deep motion

present and dynamic inside the river. Algabarti captured this meaning in his poetry (time while seeming stagnant is not so, but it is steady to change dramatically):

بساكن لكنه مستجمع لوثوب

«وما الدهر في حال السكون»

The 1798 paradigm and its followers approach, narrate, and present history stubbornly and ideologically. Instead of thoroughly studying the history of “Egypt” during the Ottoman era, they keep asking: when did modernity begin? When did the modern era start? When did the modern state appear? When did capitalism commence?

From the mid-17th century, during the Ottoman era and before the French invasion, until the early 19th century the “Egyptian” society was witnessing its own “renaissance”. Significant and substantial trade, economic, social, cultural, and intellectual changes and dynamics were synergistically at work (*Shaker: 1987, p.82*). These dynamics were spontaneous and internal, fostered by the lively forces within the society. It was an important stage, it was the base for the coming developments. One can pinpoint three main trends. First, the trade prosperity (symbolized in *AboTaqiyya*, the largest trade family), second, the rise and *tagdid* of religion, thought, and culture (symbolized in the trilogy *Albaghdadi*, *Algabarti* the father, and *Almortada Alzobaidi*), and third, the consolidation of an urban “bourgeoisie” (expressed by *Algabarti’s* description of the social formation at that time). “Modernity” had its logical and historical base in “Egypt” itself, many of the economic and social transformations in the mid-18th century contributed to this base (*see Peter Gran: 1979; Shaker: 1987; Alshalq: 2005*).

The 1798 paradigm’s dominance has nothing to do with its validity, it is in fact largely untrue and cannot be historically or socially substantiated. “Egypt” in the 17th and 18th centuries was not stagnant, on the contrary it enjoyed a live and dynamic culture and society. “Modernization” was possible and it preceded the European imperial invasion, “Egypt” could have achieved it on its own.

Peter Gran (1979) suggests the French imperial campaign caused a historical rupture and distorted “Egypt’s” spontaneous capability to modernize. Daniel Crecelius (1981) asserts “Egypt” had found its way to Europe half a century before Mohammad Ali as *Ali Bey al-Kabir* reopened the Red Sea trade route for the European merchants and he also employed European officers to develop his army.

Abdulrahim Abdulrahman Abdulrahim (1990) studied the court documents (*almahkama alshar’ia*) and concluded they prove the flourishing state of trade and the growth of the economic life in the “Egyptian” urban space. Most importantly, he asserted the “Egyptian” market started to witness the beginning of trade “capitalism”.

After studying the culture of the bourgeoisie in Ottoman “Egypt”, Nelly Hanna (2004) stated “Egypt” witnessed a trade rise even before the end of the 16th century. “Egyptian” merchants were at the top in terms of wealth and influence, even politically. A number of huge wealthy houses and families appeared in “Egypt”, thanks to their involvement in international trade. She most importantly remarked the merchants were largely independent from the state and political control.

Christopher Herold (1964) downplays the effect of the French invasion on “Egypt”, and stresses that “modernity” would have inevitably taken place in “Egypt” regardless of the French invasion. Aside from some French administrative practices, the invasion applied nothing except the modern mechanisms of military suppression and coercion. The French committed horrible and terrifying crimes against humanity to suppress the people’s resistance to the invasion (*Alshalq*: 2005). Almost, nothing remained from the invasion that can lead us to conclude that the invaders had ever done any good to “Egypt”. Kenneth M. Cuno (1992) stressed the invaders did not apply any of their “reformist plans”, instead they squeezed “Egypt” like a lemon. Peter Gran suggested “Egypt” was on her way towards “capitalist” transformation, but the French invasion caused a historical rupture and destroyed the society's ability to develop and progress.

Unfortunately, most of the “Egyptian” historiography are still stubbornly indoctrinated and overwhelmed with the 1798 paradigm (*Ghorbal*: 1944; *Awad*: 1987; *Ref’at*: 1920; *Abdelmalek*: 2012, 2013; *Alsorboni*: 1996; *Othman*: 2002; *AbdelKarim*: 1938, 2011; *Albatriq*: 1999, 1948; *Shokri*: 1963; *Safwat*: 1959; *Alshafi’i*: 1957; *Girgis*: 1989; *Awad*: 1925; *Amer*: 1958; *Alaqqad*: 1979; *Alsa’id*: 1994; *Anis*: 1984; *Badawi*: 1950; *Ramadan*: 1977, 1983, 1996; *Algema’i*: 1992; *Lashien*:1976; *Mostafa*:1967; *Lihata*: 1944; *Alhetta*: 1958).

Regrettably, even when some studies somehow emancipated from this trap (*Alshalq*: 2005; *Abbas*: 1976, 1983; *Abdelrahman*: 1990; *Abdellatif*: 1976; *Alazabawi*: 1997, 2006; *Farahat*: 2012; *Hanna*: 2004; *Afifi*: 2005) they unfortunately missed the most significant, paradigmatic feature. They ignored what Aljabarti, the most significant historian who witnessed the invasion, had described as the Weltanschauung upheaval “*in’ekas almotbo’ wa inqelab almawdo’, inqilab al’alam wa taghayyur alnamos*” (*Algabarti*: 1998, vol. 1, p. 1; *Kishk*: 1990). The Weltanschauung upheaval in my conception meant two things: the frame of reference has been changed, and the nature of power has been transformed. Unfortunately, although being brilliant to at least grasp the substantial change even if partially, no one study has tackled the issue altogether. Mahmoud Shaker (1987), Mohammad Qotb (1997), Mohammad Galal Kishk (1990), and Fadi Ismail (1993) significantly discerned the change in the frame of reference and its consequences, yet they failed to detect the change in the nature of power. Khaled Fahmy (2002) and Timothy Mitchell (1991) amazingly contributed to our understanding of power

transformation, however, they failed to transcend their secular belief, thus, took the secularity of “Egypt” as given.

The Weltanschauung upheaval meant the phenomenon of “comprehensively reorganizing life on Western principles” (Gibb: 1951, p. 230), a mission thoroughly pursued by the French (Gibb: 1951, p. 230; *Shaker*: 1987; *Kishk*: 1990; *Qotb*; 1997). Although they did not spend much time in “Egypt”, they paved the road for Mohammad Ali, whose reign will prove to be a fruitful experience for the French indirect imperial control. The French invaded “Egypt” to pursue the goal European mission accomplished elsewhere: deconstructing the endogenous structures and replacing them with European ones (*Fromkin*: 1992, pp. 629-670). This is what modernization meant: constituting and consolidating the modern disciplinary power, best defined by increasing control while reducing the cost, new imperial mechanisms are needed to sustain the Matrix in troubled times. Winston Churchill owes his fame in the British imperial history to his “smart” imperial strategy enabling Britain to control her colonies in the Middle East without high costs (*Fromkin*: 1992, p. 360).

Historical evidence proves the French did not come only to abolish the growing roots of “renaissance”, but most importantly to prevent an upcoming revolution led by Alazhar scholars (*Shaker*: 1987, pp. 126-129). Before the French invasion and Mohammad Ali, Alazhar was the spring of intellectual life, and its natural environment (*Zaher*: 2014). The invasion managed to replace it with orientalists and Western scholars. Through orientalism “European culture was able to manage-and even produce- the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively” (Said: 1979, p. 3).

However, the people of “Egypt” fought and their resistance forced the French to leave the country. They resisted the French invasion with scarce courage and valor, but not as “Egyptians” fighting “French” as depicted later on by the national history books. In fact, they perceived themselves and fought as “Muslims” fighting infidels invading their lands. Alazhar scholars were the resistance leaders. Thus, Napoleon directed his rage towards Alazhar as the main element of resistance of the crusade invasion. Soliman Alhalabi, Alazhar student who killed Kléber, was not an “Egyptian” but a Muslim from Aleppo pushed by his faith to kill the leader of the campaign invading his Muslim lands (*Qotb*: 1997; *Zaher*: 2014, pp. 33-97).

But why is the 1798 paradigm trap still haunting us, Sohail Alqash answers:

“The conqueror provides the vanquished a vision of the conflict, whose essence is symmetry and reconciliation. This does not mean the conqueror is not aware of the real nature of the conflict, nor is the resistance of the vanquished absent of his attention, the conqueror is rather methodologizing for the vanquished the legitimate continuation of his defeat. But this denial does not obliterate the conflict with the vanquished, it rather wipes the hostile nature of this conflict and proposes the possibility of peace and reconciliation as a solution to the irreconcilable contradiction. Thus, the Ideological process the conqueror performs is not absolute for it collides with the limits of the vanquished resistance, which the conqueror includes in his

calculations and formulates the ideology on the basis of his implicit knowledge of the existence of the resistance while explicitly asserting its absence, erasing and distorting it. The ideological blinding and mystification the conqueror practices deals specifically not with the contradiction between the conqueror and the vanquished, but rather with the distortion of the vanquished resistance against domination. This resistance is rooted in the vanquished direct conscious enabling him to view the relation as a sharp rivalry contradiction and severe distinction, and this is what the conqueror works to wipe and replace it with another vision. The other vision the conqueror promotes depicts the conflict as a natural variance and stresses the sameness of identity and eternal symmetry between the two parties, with a lasting promise to the vanquished about the delusive paradise of equality outside the actual power relations" (*Alqash*: 1980, p. 85).

The defeat of Napoleon, the most prominent and powerful military leaders of Europe, was an extremely spectacular and significant event. It alarmed the British about the acuteness of "Egypt's" geographical location, Napoleon once emphatically said it is "the most important country in the world" (Cromer: 1908). Britain was deceived, she thought the French's defeat would enable Britain to secure the ascendance of Mohammad Alalfy, the pro Britain Mamluk leader, to power in "Egypt". It is true France lost much of its prestige and influence in "Egypt" after its defeat, but France and Napoleon had a plan B.

Napoleon moved quicker than the British, in 1803 he sent Mathieu de Lesseps and Bernardino Drovetti as personal delegates to "Egypt" for a specific mission under the cover of diplomatic Commissioners for Foreign Relations, which might be the official beginning of orientalism in its political face (the consuls and diplomats). Mathieu de Lesseps was the French consul to Morocco, before he was posted, in 1800, to "Egypt" as liaison to "the "Egyptian" Army" and as superintendent of trade relations. Mathieu de Lesseps benefitted from his presence and started establishing strong relations with the scholars of Alazhar, especially those who agreed to be members of Napoleon's *Diwan*. He left "Egypt" a year later with the defeated French invasion campaign.

In the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Matthew de Lesseps is mentioned in the Foreign Honorary Members section, the proceeding clarifies Matthew de Lesseps mission:

"After the failure of the "Egyptian" expedition, Napoleon, in 1803, instructed Matthew de Lesseps, Political Agent in "Egypt", to nominate for election and for the Sultan's approval an officer of ability to serve as Pasha of Cairo. Matthew de Lesseps named one who was then in command of a regiment of Basha Bazouks, a Macedonian, who could neither read nor write, and who had come to "Egypt" as a subordinate of contingents. This man was Mehemet Ali, -the wise and terrible,- who subsequently made himself master and mortgagee of "Egypt"." (H. Mitchell: 1895, p. 374; see also: *AbdelKarim*: 1938, p. 217).

In 1803-1804, Napoleon appointed Matthew de Lesseps the Commissariat-Generalship of "Egypt". With considerable foresight, Mathieu at once realized the important role Mohammad Ali, the simple colonel then, could play. Matthew de

Lesseps approached Mohammad Ali, managed to forge a firm relation with him, later Matthew de Lesseps will present Mohammad Ali to Alazhar scholars. Matthew de Lesseps supported Mohammad Ali throughout his rise to power and when Mohammad Ali became viceroy, he guaranteed him France's support. The friendship forged then was to be extremely important 50 years later not only for his son Ferdinand, but will also considerably affect "Egypt's" history.

Mohammad Ali, who became the viceroy of "Egypt", considerably owed his position to the recommendations made on his behalf to the French government by Mathieu de Lesseps, France intervened and pledge to the Sultan to send Mohammad Ali to "Egypt" as a governor, Ali shall pay the price later, for the entirety of his life (*Qotb: 1997; Shaker: 1987, p. 136; Youssif: 2006; AbdelKarim: 1938, p. 217; Mitchell: 1895; The Association du Souvenir de Ferdinand de Lesseps et du Canal de Suez*). Remarkably, the Matthew-Ali relationship will become a prototype and a method for the imperial powers to deal with "Egypt" and the Arab World from then on. Further examples will be discussed hereafter: Ferdinand-Said, Cromer-Zaglol/Abduh, Kermit-Nasser, Hagel-Alsisi. Other examples from other Arab countries are: Sharif Hussein- Lawrence and Hosni Alza'im-Steve Meade.

The first written experiment of this functional relationship between a prospect governor and a foreign official (mostly an intelligence officer) is that of Thomas Edward Lawrence, especially about his experiment with Abdullah son of Sharif Hussein who became the King of Transjordan. Lawrence foresaw Abdullah could superbly become an ideal agent of Britain in the region because he does not enjoy great power and he was not from the people of Transjordan. Thus, Abdullah is going to depend on Britain for keeping his throne (*Fromkin: 1992, p. 568*). Thoughtfully, Lawrence justified his plan about Abdullah to his government by arguing the summing cost of Abdullah is less than that of one regiment, the most important thing, Lawrence stated, is that Abdullah does not enjoy a big popularity and does not be extremely efficient (*Fromkin: 1992, p. 575*). This was Lawrence's edition of the functional group, which will be developed later with Kermit Roosevelt.

So, France established a unique position for itself in "Egypt", without invasion or war, simply through Mohammad Ali. After Matthew de Lesseps had accomplished his mission, another Frenchman replaced him. Napoleon appointed Matthew's companion Bernardino Drovetti as the French consul general. Drovetti became the actual counsel of Mohammad Ali in politics, military, and administration. Yet before Matthew de Lesseps leave Cairo, Mohammad Ali assigned him the mission of upbringing his son, Said.

France further consolidated its position in "Egypt" through a group of French men, who became the entourage of Mohammad Ali and led many of the substantial changes in "Egypt", especially the Westernization and panoptification of "Egypt" (see: *Mitchell: 1991, p. 33*). Military men like Colonel Sieve or Soliman Pasha the French (originally Joseph Anthelme Sève), whose great-granddaughter became Queen Nazli of "Egypt", wife of King Fouad, and mother of King Farooq, were

recruited to help build the “Egyptian” army on the European model. Many scientists, engineers, and doctors came, like Charles Lambert who became the director of the *Boulaq* engineering school, and Clot bey (Antoine Barthelemy Clot) became the head of the military doctors. Monsieur Gomar supervised the education missions program Mohamad Ali initiated (*Youssif: 2006*). Moreover, through the Saint-Simonians who “found in Muhammad Ali’s land policy their ideal ... “Egypt” was the only place where they could realize and apply their social ideology” (Hanna: 1972, p. 208).

Through the Saint-Simonians, the West will tremendously affect the people of “Egypt”, not through invasion but through engineering. Philippe Régnier (2011) considered the advent of Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin “the second French cultural campaign on “Egypt” (*Régnier: 2011, p. 10*) and “a reproduction of Bonaparte campaign” (p. 31), the campaign was “secretly set” with the French government (p. 15), he explained:

Those scientists were paving the road for a second campaign, not known except by few people, for it was not accompanied with noise of weapons ... the campaign of the Saint-Simonians [was] a scientific campaign, purely industrial and cultural, it started in 1833 and its effect extended beyond 1950 for a number of decades (*Régnier: 2011, p. 11*).

The Saint-Simonians were the “secular priests of engineering ... [who believed] ‘human ingenuity’ could ... dominate the ‘mighty elements’ of nature”, the Saint-Simonians traveled to “Egypt” in the nineteenth century and initiated and completed extremely influential irrigation projects, especially the Aswan Dam, which “was among the first and most dramatic examples anywhere in the world” (Mitchell: 2002, p. 35). Through such irrigation projects and later the Suez Canal, “the bizarre religion of the Saint-Simonians [turned] into an everyday belief” (p. 35). The terminus of the Saint-Simonians’ projects was “to promote the global economic and political transformation” (p. 17), to open the world for the “free” movement of money and commodities. Significantly, Enfantin set the inauguration ceremony of the Aswan Dam on Napoleon’s birthday: 15 August 1834 (*Régnier: 2011, p. 16*). More significantly, when Enfantin got disappointed due to his failure in realizing his ideas with Mohammad Ali he decided the solution is: “to put “Egypt” under temporary European custody after a military ramble to end the Turkish hegemony” (p. 112).

Those Frenchmen were behind most of the drastic changes Mohammad Ali overtook, and proved to be very destructive to the people of “Egypt” (*Shaker: 1987, p. 136*). Mohammad Ali was a thirty-five-year-old man when he became the viceroy of “Egypt”. He was ignorant, did not know anything about sciences, and he could not read or write until he turned out forty-five. He had spent most of his life as merchant trading in cannabis and hashish before joining the Ottoman military. The consul and orientalist surrounded Mohammad Ali, the ignorant hashish merchant, and through their deep relation with him they controlled him and his state, they

almost built his state not only through their advice and guidance but also by meticulous, active participation.

With the close guidance and active participation of his French friends, Mohammad Ali, pushed by his personal greed and power hunger, crushed and destroyed the economic, social, and cultural structures of the society that enabled the people to defeat Napoleon French campaign in 1801 and Fraser British campaign in 1807 (see: *Moro*: n.d., pp. 36-62).

Furthermore, the Suez Canal was an imperial dream and project that came true. Napoleon wanted to dig the Suez Canal, yet he abandoned the idea after his engineer's calculations suggesting the impossibility of the project. However, the calculations of the French engineer was wrong, the Saint-Simonian Enfantin proposed the idea to Mohammad Ali but he refused acknowledging the strategic hazards of such a project. Through the Austrian Chancellor Metternich, Enfantin proposed once again to Mohammad Ali who offered to dig the Canal under full "Egyptian" supervision, with "Egyptian" money and hands, using foreign technical expertise if needed, the European states did not accept as it wanted to control the Canal (Hussien: 1980, vol. 1).

The French Saint-Simonian hopes were realized, although their project was robber, with the advent of Khedive Said, son of Mohammad Ali who was raised by the French Matthew de Lesseps in France where a deep friendship was forged between Said and Matthew's son, Ferdinand de Lesseps who used his relations with his mother-in-law Madam Delamalle and Empress Eugenie to rob the Saint-Simonians technical efforts (*AbdelKarim*: 1938, p. 217).

Significantly enough, when Artin Pasha started translating Machiavelli's *The Prince* Mohammad Ali stopped him after reading part of the book telling him: "I ascertained there nothing I would learn from him, I know much more tricks than he does, so you do not need to translate more than you did" (*Ismail*: 1993, p. 78). In 1907, while Mohammad Ali was in Upper "Egypt" chasing the Mamluks, a British campaign invaded "Egypt" led by Fraser and took over Alexandria. "Mohammad Ali panicked and pretended to be busy with the Mamluks, he did not participate in the resistance and lagged in Upper "Egypt". He tarried on his way back to Cairo" (*Albishri*: 1988, p. 13). Meanwhile, the people's resistance led by the scholars overpowered the British campaign. The resistance revealed once again the power of the people led by the scholars, as had appeared before in resisting the French, and appointing Mohammad Ali, and as will appear later in their opposition to Mohammad Ali's huge taxes.

After conquering the top two powers of the world in less than ten years, the popular Jihadi wave was gaining increasing momentum. Moreover, the people developed an important industrial base, symbolized in the gunpowder the people locally manufactured during the second Cairo revolution in 1800 (*Kishk*: 1990). After the failure of the two military campaigns, Europe had to edit her imperial plans. For some endogenous elements are still holding the Islamic Ummah. These elements

were four. First, the idea of Islamic unity (*aljami'a alislamiyya*). Second, the spirit of jihad rooted in the Muslim masses. Third, the attachment between the masses and Jihadi leaders especially Alazhar scholars. Forth, the presence of an economic and social system that enables the masses to fulfill their duty of Jihad with the leadership of the scholars whether the rulers allowed them or not.

So what did Mohammad Ali do? When Mohammad Ali came back from Upper "Egypt", he found the people led by the *Ulama* had achieved with their self-power a decisive victory over the British. The leaders of the people suggested all of them (the people and the army) continue the Jihad. Mohamad Ali unequivocally replied: "the people need not to fight, they just have to help with money for the foddors and mashes of the army" (*laysa 'ala ra'iyat albald khorog wa ennama 'alayhim almosa'ada bilmal li'ala'if al'askar*).

In his reply, Mohammad Ali concluded his philosophy. In any state, ancient or modern, the army is part of the political, economic, and social structure. But for Muhammad Ali, the army was the structure itself (*Moro: n.d., p. 321; Alrafi'i: 1987*). The 1831 census revealed Mohammad Ali conscripted around 276 thousand of the 5.5 million "Egyptians". In 1839, the overland army numbered 235,880 (*AbdelMalek: 2012, p. 59*), and reached more than 376 thousand (*Alrafi'i: 1987, p. 543*).

For example, Mohammad Ali established an education system only for the needs of the army and the bureaucracy, the education system was militant in itself of its purpose. The school of agriculture was one of the latest schools he established, apparently because of the indirect need of it for the military. The number of the students reached 9 thousand (*Albishri: 1988*) while the military reached 376 thousand. Mohammad Ali did not aim at stimulating a scientific rise in the country, thus, when Mohammad Ali's army was largely downsized in 1940, most of the schools were closed (*Alrafi'i: 1987, P. 406; AbdelKarim: 1938*). Until April 1868, all the schools were military schools (*Mitchell: 1991*).

Furthermore, through Mohammad Ali the French were able to penetrate the minds, the value system, and the culture of the people. The paradigmatic example is Rifa'a Altahtawi who went to France as part of the education missions program Mohamad Ali initiated under the supervision of Monsieur Gomar in 1809, the same year Ali achieved his despotic solo rule. As a graduate of Alazhar, Rifa'a Altahtawi was a chance the French did not miss. Rifa'a Altahtawi was grabbed and surrounded by Monsieur Gomar, the orientalist Silvestre de Sacy, Cont De chabrol, and others. On one hand, through Altahtawi, the French orientalist were able to find a huge outlet for them to implant the culture they want in the minds of the people of "Egypt". On the other hand, they created a rift and a duality in the mind and conscience of the ummah between Alazhar and the translation school Altahtawi will be persuaded to establish. And on the third hand, they found a way to fight and weaken Alazhar, which was the center of the emerging "renaissance" and the persistent leader of resistance to any foreign invasion (*Shaker: 1987, pp. 142-147*). Significantly, the

translation school Altahtawi established will perform a substantial function, Thomas Babington Macaulay the British imperialist and architect of the British education policies applied in the colonies eloquently described this role: “we have to nurture a class that translates what we want to the millions we are ruling, a class of persons of Indian blood and color, but of English sense, ideas, orientation, ethics, and mind” (Akash: 2009, p. 101).

The ultimate goal of sending the missions and the languages school was to establish a consolidated and sustained base capable of accomplishing the cultural, social, and political transformation from Islam to comprehensive secularism. As H. A. R. Gibb put it: “the intellectual leaders of the Muslim countries may well be forced to come to closer grips with Western thought” (Gibb: 1951, p. 238). The final target is the creation of “a new elite of political thinkers, trained in Western schools and animated by a passionate faith in the ideals held up before them by Western education. These men spread among their fellow-countrymen the gospel of Western liberalism and democracy” (Gibb: 1951, pp. 229-230).

Western imperialism was not sufficiently satisfied with the explicit defeat of the Muslims, it wanted to get through the depth of Islam to hit the implicit power, and “since the existence of the Muslim society is conjunctiva with Islam [*alshar*] then banishing, encircling, marginalizing, and isolating the latter became a strategic concern for the triumphant” (Ismail: 1993, p. 109). This Western strategic concern was realized through “expanding the initial military-political defeat into a comprehensive and universal civilizational defeat” (Ismail: 1993, p. 110), on the executive level:

The Westernization process commenced by smashing the hinges of Islamic society that was based on *'aqeda* and culture and put on the top of its priorities to alter social relations and exclude *alshar* of education and nurturing patterns. These thing, if achieved, would help consolidate economic plundering and render the society in a permanent dependency relation with the triumphed European center. Socially, the Westernization policy targeted replacing another structure of social relations between the individuals and the society through introducing the European concepts regarding the structure of the family, the man's relation, and the woman's role, and the solidarity and intimacy relations like the village, the family, and the neighborhood, and replacing them with another weaker units more liable to fragmentation and control like the individual and the city (Ismail: 1993, p. 110).

Westernization targeted in the first place relegating Islam away from the political and legal level, for **separating religion of the state comprises an important condition among the conditions for annexing the indigenous society to the modern state ... but when *alshar* was secluded and isolated from the statist political-ideological sovereignty, the Muslim society that lost the center of its comprehensive cycle -the state- disintegrated** in a movement isolated from the partitioning process taking place at the state level and remained regressively resisting in the countryside, the popular neighborhoods, and the cities lacking a general unification base (Ismail: 1993, p. 114, emphasis added).

For Mohammad Ali, “Altahtawi was the ‘cultural ally’ of ... [the] Pasha and his political project (1805-1849) but he was a subordinate ally” (*Ismail*: 1993, p. 73), Hassan Dieqa (1987) explains: “this position occupied by this scholar [Altahtawi] in Moahammad Ali’s modernization apparatuses required providing a political and a religious [*fiqhi*] justification for the choices of this modernization experiment, in which Altahtawi was not a founding partner but rather enrolled in it as comprehensively dependent” (see: pp. 130-133).

The *ulama*, led by Omar Makram, were an independent political power conjunctiva with the masses defending the interests of these masses. Through the leadership of the *ulama* the people became the source of authority, they succeeded in appointing Mohammad Ali as viceroy. Then they opposed Ali when he imposed huge taxes. The people became uncontrollable, Mohammad Ali had to abolish their power to serve his power hunger (*Algabarti*: 1998; *Moro*: n.d., pp. 10-18).

In Mohammad Ali's era, the modern nation state was rooted and established in the Islamic world. Since 1805, the state has been abducting and dominating the society. In 1805, Mohammad Ali fully abolished the *hisba* institution, then he eliminated the Mamluks as a social force. Mohammad Ali eliminated the independence of Alazhar, terminated the *ashraf* syndicate, and exiled Omar Makram for ten years. Then, he destroyed the *Haya't Alulama* (the league of scholars), which was the point of convergence for the *Azhar ulama*, the *mashaiekh* of *Sufi* orders, the *alashraf*, and the professional syndicates (*tawa'if alhiraf*). By doing so, Mohammad Ali destroyed the “Egyptian” intelligentsia (*haya't alulama*) (Saied: 2007). Mohammad Ali's modern state abolished the middle class in “Egypt” (*alboyuotat alrafia'*) that played a vital role in reviving the society and protecting its balance with the Mamluk authority. He abolished all the intermediary institutions between his state and the people: he cancelled all the professional syndicates and applied a monopoly system in agriculture, industry, and trade. Through the monopoly system, Mohammad Ali 's modern state in “Egypt” had absorbed the production surplus of the society. He terminated all the *Awqaf* and confiscated it. He established a secret security apparatus to spy on the people (*Algabarti*: 1998). He destroyed the independence of the judiciary and set the first military tribunal in “Egypt’s” history in 1842 (Alrafi'i: 1987, pp. 526-527). He made himself the owner of all the land of “Egypt”, bestowing whatever land he wishes to his entourage and family, which will create the agriculture feudal aristocracy later (see: *Rivelin*: 1967; *Aldisokui*: 1975). Since Mohammad Ali, the state has monopolized all the power in its hands.

Aljabarti and Alrafi'i tell bloody and nasty details (Alrafi'i: 1987; *Algabarti*: 1998). Mohammad Ali became everything in “Egypt”, he became the one, and the rest became zeroes on the left. Mohammad Ali created power in its modern sense in “Egypt”: the panopticon. He further fully confiscated the public sphere, everybody was no longer capable of mobilizing the masses after Ali had obliterated all the political, economic, and social spheres and established a structure providing him the absolute rule.

Mohammad Ali killed the spirit of jihad, and confiscated the sources of the society's power and self-immunity. He smashed the people's "capitalism" and industrial rise (the people of "Egypt" manufactured gunpowder and cannons by themselves without any European experience in Cairo's second revolution in 1800).

We can consider Mohammad Ali's crack down upon the societal forces that put him in power and his achievement of solo despotic control in 1809 as a symbolic start of secularism in "Egypt's" history (*Hmaid*: n.d.). Some historians uphold Ali had a project of a modern nation state (*Albishri*: 1988), or he aimed at reviving the Ottoman state (*Ghorbal*: 1944), but historical events clearly prove it was only a project of personal glory, nothing more. Using Mohammad Ali's own words, his project was to: "strengthen the foundations of my dynasty" and to "carve a place for my family and my dynasty's families in history to be remembered in four or five centuries' time" (*Fahmy*: 2002, p. 284).

Otherwise, how can anybody explain his wars? In his wars in Arab peninsula 1811-1819 he wanted to support his position vis a vis the Sultan, besides it was an excuse to impose new taxes. His greed led him to a certain defeat in Greece 1821-1828, he lost his fleet and thirty thousand soldiers. When he found his losses were without any compensation he turned to fight the Ottoman state 1830-1838, this was the way Mohammad Ali resolved his "ambivalent feelings towards both his "Egyptian" subjects and his Ottoman Sultan ... [his ambivalent feelings resulted from] his untenable position within the Ottoman Empire". The question remains: why he did not expand in Africa? Why he consciously entered the trap set for him by the Europeans and Russia to play him against the Ottoman state, to weaken both of them and create a room for European intervention at any time. Was it his ignorance or greed? Or was it a long-term effect of his French counsels?

Mohammad Ali created a rupture in the history of "Egypt". The era since Muhammad Ali's reign until now is substantially distinct and different from the times preceding it, culturally, politically, and socially. Arguably, given the first shot by the French invasion, Mohammad Ali created an epistemological and historical rupture with the society's heritage and legacy. A new era begun, almost totally discrepant to its predecessor, characterized with imitation, role modeling, and fascination of the West, leading to what *Malek Ben Nabi* later coined as imperialism-ability (alqabiliyya lilisti'mar) (*Aref*: 2013).

Mohammad Ali project is better understood if we contextualize it within the Western imperialist strike upon the Islamic world. "Egypt" witnessed this imperialist purge in 1798 through the French military campaign that aborted the indigenous renaissance project and historically ruptured the internal rejuvenation process of the "Egyptian" society in the late 18th century. This imperial strike pursued the dedication and continuation of the civilizational retardation "Egypt" was suffering, it did not allow but a limited transformation of the structure of the Arab society, only to the extent sufficient to tie the country politically, economically, and culturally to and rendering it dependent on the West. Moreover, in addition to the dependency

burdens the region was torn into political entities upon which rested the interests of a certain elite tied up with the imperial center and served its policy.

Starting from Mohammad Ali and his sons, the political system was constructed upon Western lines, changing the system's imperial face but without changing its despotic/ disciplinary essence. Thus, the state became superficially developed and structurally retarded and underdeveloped. The making of the state in "Egypt" destroyed and confiscated the power of the people. A mission that will be resumed and even further developed later by the British. In other words, Mohammad Ali started enhancing what Foucault called the "bad economy of [pre modern arbitrary] power" (Foucault: 1977, p. 79) and ended up constructing the modern disciplinary power that is panopticing "Egypt". T. Mitchell (1991) notes Jeremy Bentham had actually corresponded with Mohammad Ali "advocating the introduction of the panoptic principle and other new techniques" (Mitchell: 1991, p. x), "Egypt" was one of the first countries outside Britain and France to apply Bentham's ideas. "John Bowring, the friend and biographer of Jeremy Bentham who served as an advisor to Muhammad Ali and produced a report on "Egypt" for the British government" (Mitchell: 1991, p. 40).

[Mohammad Ali] was clearly aware that his appointment to that important and lucrative post was made against the Sultan's wish and he was equally aware that first Sultan Selim III and then Sultan Mahmud II had tried to have him removed from "Egypt". Realizing that he lacked an effective military force that would enable him to rebuff any attempt by Istanbul to dislodge him forcibly from his wealthy province, he made numerous attempts to found one, culminating in the crucial attempt to create a modern army based on conscripted fellahin in 1820-1 (Fahmy: 2001, pp. 310-311).

So, in short, Mohammad Ali suddenly and most importantly against the Sultans' will found himself on the top of one of the wealthiest Ottoman provinces, Ali considered it a must to have a powerful military force to protect his position, he need funds and a system of order to realize this must, thus he executed "the numerous changes he managed to effect in the "Egyptian" economy and society" (Fahmy: 2001, p. 310).

Mohammad Ali created his modern army in the early 1820s "by instituting novel practices of surveillance, control and management that radically altered the nature of the government in Cairo and fundamentally changed the manner in which it dealt with the "Egyptian" population" (Fahmy: 2002, p. ix). Not only did the army occupy the "central stage among the Pasha's numerous institutions and was the *raison d'etre* of various other impressive institutions" (Fahmy: 2002, p. 12), but more significantly Mohammad Ali transformed the whole society into a modern militarized prison, in his army, peasantry/agricultural, architecture, and compulsory schooling institutions he subjugated the people of "Egypt" to a stark panopticon: "a severe, strict, and uniform system encompassing all their activity and inactivity, and handling their entire time day and night, their clothing and food, their sleep and awakening, their work and rest, with their own selves and with the others" (Fahmy:

2001, p. 63; see also Mitchell: 1991). John Bowring, Jeremy Bentham's friend and assistant and an English advisor to the "Egyptian" government, remarked: "[The creation of the new army] was in itself the establishment of a principle of order which spread over the entire surface of society" (Mitchell: 1991, p. x). The British developed and built upon the structure Mohammad Ali created and further established what T. Mitchell called "the power to colonize" (1991, p. ix). The power to colonize does not simply refer "to the establishing of ... [imperial] presence but also ... the spread of a political order that inscribes in the social world a new conception of space, new forms of personhood, and a new means of manufacturing the experience of the real" (Mitchell: 1991, p. ix).

Briefly, while dismantling and crushing all the apolitical power resources and endogenous social institutions, Mohammad Ali succeeded in emancipating the political state from social control and granting this political state the monopoly over means of violence enabling it to pursue its audacious engineering top down projects and ambitions. This process, as Zygmunt Bauman (1989) describes it, enabled Mohammad Ali through the modern state apparatuses to achieve its terrorist "Holocaustic" acts and dreams.

Mohammad Ali modernized and disciplined the arbitrary power including it into modern disciplinary power. A British imperial English administrator in India once wrote revealing words: "compared to the universal rules of a modern system of law, native government proceeded by personal decision and the caprice of power ... It is in the nature of arbitrary power to make exceptions" (Mitchell: 2002, p. 54), Timothy Mitchell makes a significant comment: "In non-European government ... power gained its strength from its arbitrariness. Modern government ... Its strength lay in its universalism" (p. 54). However, modern disciplinary power did not eradicate the arbitrary power but absorbed and included it.

In January 1907, Hafiz Ibrahim, the poet of Nile, successfully described this complex experience in a line of Arabic poetry (Ibrahim: 1987, p. 339):

Despotism

has chaotically prevailed amongst us;

and thus,

it became organized, structuralized, and then, it became systematized.

« لقد كان الظلم فينا فوضى فهْدَّ
بَتَّ حواشيه حتى بات ظلما منظما »

This shift from and inclusion of arbitrary power into the modern disciplinary power is explicit if we examined "the genealogy of the law of landed property in "Egypt"

and its relation to the formation of the larger institutional structure of the modern state” (Mitchell: 2002, p. 11).

The government officials and European advisors who helped establish the law considered it the opposite of the older forms of rule that the modern state replaced, which appeared to them to rest upon arbitrary decision, the making of exceptions, and the prerogatives of unrestrained power. (The same distinctions were made at the end of the twentieth century, when the universal rules of property and the price mechanism were advocated as a replacement for forms of central command, arbitrary state power, and the irrational allocation of resources that characterized nonmarket political economies) ... **we should be suspicious of this distinction.** Did the establishing of a law of property replace the forms of arbitrariness, particularism, and force said to characterize the old order? Or was it rather a process that redistributed, concentrated, and concealed within itself these negative elements? What role do the negatives that colonialism or contemporary reform programs claim to banish play in making possible the rule of law or the market, or the institutionalized forms of power that accompany that rule? (Mitchell: 2002, pp. 11-12, emphasis added).

The principle of property was presented as the opposite of arbitrary power or coercion, represented by the state ownership of land ... [and although] it justified a violent exercise of power, and in fact was established by this violence ... **Private property was seen as the reversal of the old order of state ownership.** Law based on private rights represented a rupture with the previous world of arbitrary and despotic power. **Yet many of the property claims that were to be consolidated as private rights, especially the largest ones, came into being through the “arbitrary” grants** that Ismail had made, and those of his uncles and grandfather before him (Mitchell: 2002, p. 56, emphasis added).

The appearance of modern private ownership was nothing more than an imperial order: “In the 1870s the estates were transformed from tax responsibilities into landholdings [*Al’izba*] over which the recipient enjoyed what came to be called private ownership. This change did not occur because the holders sought the development of private rights. It was forced upon them by the government’s and the foreign bankers’ further demands for revenue ... **Private ownership emerged not as a right won by individuals against the state but as part of a penalty imposed upon them as a means of paying government debts, a penalty** that in fact caused many smaller landholders to fall into debt themselves and lose their land ... The estate represented a system of supervision and coercion that succeeded for the first time in fixing cultivators permanently in place on the land and preventing them from abandoning cultivation or moving to another region. They could now be forced in large numbers to grow crops under the orders and for the benefit of an outsider ... the inhabitant of a medium-sized estate with ninety-five acres of land that was broken up after the 1952 agrarian reform remembered it as **a prison** ... The law of property claimed to be a universal right, based upon undisputed principles true in every country. But this general truth enclosed within it a zone of arbitrariness ... the *izba* encircled a realm of exception, within which power operated without rights ... micro colonialism within a larger colonial domain ... The estate represented a method of fixing workers in place and at the same time making other workers mobile. Both the fixing and the mobility depended upon the rapid removal of land from village control and its transformation into estates. A census carried out on the eve of the occupation in 1882 indicated that there were then five thousand estates in the Delta alone, housing 12 percent of the population ... by 1901, half the country’s agricultural land was held in estates of this size ... The

development of the agricultural estate transformed the Nile valley in the nineteenth century. I have argued that we should describe this development not as “the emergence of private property,” but as the development of new ways to manage those who farmed the land, achieved after earlier failures, through new methods of devolution, incarceration, surveillance, and exclusion ... as an arrangement created by the state to bring order to the system of landholding and increase its own powers over rural society ... until this period neither state nor society was imagined to exist ... The local powers generated by the estate system served the purposes of the central authority but always exceeded its control. This excess of power cannot be grasped in terms of any simple distinction between state and society (pp. 67-75).

The colonial presentation of law as a conceptual structure brought from abroad performs the silencing of the actuality out of which property is made. But it is not just the colonial legal texts that produce this difference. The very act of colonial occupation produces it. By the time the law of property was in place, the British could claim that the days of the old abuses were over. The colonial occupation marked a rupture with the past, and the arbitrary rule of despots had given way to the rule of law. The rupture of colonial occupation was not a complete break with the past, however ... **The new legal order, rather than ending exceptional forms of control, created a thousand arbitrary powers ... Rather than creating a rupture with arbitrary forms of power, the rule of law rearranged the arbitrariness** (Mitchell: 2002, pp. 77-78, emphasis added).

The *awqaf* is another example clearly comprehending this reality, namely the domination of the state and its abduction and confiscation of the society and transforming and including the arbitrary power into modern disciplinary power institutions. For centuries, the weakness of the caliphate and the political authorities did not affect the *awqaf* activism or works. The *Awqaf* was springing from the society and pouring into it, thus it continued in various forms, and more importantly presented what the disordered political authorities failed to present. In the last two centuries starting from Mohammad Ali the centralism of the state in modern “Egypt” curbed the river of *waqf* and dried its fountains (*Ghanem*: 1998; *Manna’*: 2008).

Mohammad Ali was the son of the Ottoman elite who stubbornly believed the army, the cornerstone of the European power as they had envisaged and seen, is the main, if not only, way to reform and modernize. Mohammad Ali and his vision was completely the antithesis of the *tagdid* and civilizational rejuvenation efforts that realized that crisis exceeds the issue of military modernization. However, Mohammad Ali took the road that deepens the rift between the state and the society, achieving a rupture with the dynamics of the Islamic civility.

Furthermore, although the modern army Mohammad Ali created to serve his personal greed comprised the pushing force behind building the modern bureaucratic state and introducing the instruments of modern disciplinary power (*Fahmy*: 2011, p. 12). Mohammad Ali 's experience has even varied from the Ottoman modernization model, that is it presented a model of fusion between the central authority and the state, granting it a totalitarian feature through which it hampered the functions of the (civil) society (*Saied*: 2007).

Arguably, Mohammad Ali would not have created a real “renaissance”, because he manipulated all facets of the state and society towards his own private project. Mohammad Ali wanted to consolidate his grip and seize full control over the society through deconstructing the old regime with all the social and cultural solidarity relations it had included and encompassed.

“What did Mohammad Ali do?” under this title Mohammad Abduh had written an article in *Almanar*, the distinguished magazine in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (*Abduh*: 1902). Muhammad Abduh answers: “[Mohammad Ali] could not revive but he could kill” denoting the schizophrenia between the state and the society, and the disorientation of the state's modernization project that diverted from employing the powers of the society to exploiting it for the self interests of the ruling elite and the royal family. Muhammad Abduh concluded the effect of MA's project saying: “he was a merchant, a peasant, a good soldier, and an efficient governor, but he vanquished and crushed “Egypt” and executed her real life” (*Abduh*: 1902). The state had dismantled the society and crushed its power.

More surprisingly and importantly, this is not a matter exclusive to “Egypt” but rather associated with the modern nation state as an organizational model of the state and society emanating from a specific philosophical outlook, namely Western modernity. John Gray, one of the most prominent contemporary philosophers of liberalism, notices the state has become a burden over the civil society, especially in the West, the modern state has become an enemy to the civil society more than a protector of it. He concludes: “we [in the West] have survived the anarchy of the stateless unlawful society just to fall into the anarchist bondage of the unlimited government” (Gray: 2005, 378).

We cannot describe what Mohammad Ali did as an indicator of “a development toward the formation of a new hegemonic bloc with a broader social base than before” (Akarli: 2001, p. 2). This is neither a social diffusion of power in the society as some scholars suggest (Akarli: 2011b). Nor is it “a process whereby power, authority, influence and wealth became more widely disseminated in society” (Akarli: 2001, p. 2).

Not only had Mohammad Ali “tried to achieve too much, too fast” (Akarli: 2011a, p. 5), the failure of Mohammad Ali cannot be attributed to his ambitious overestimated project alone. Neither can it be justified by a European conspiracy. It is something much deeper. Mohammad Ali continued the Westernization path initiated before him by the French occupation in 1898-1801 causing what *Aljabarti* described then as the Weltanschauung upheaval (*in’ekas almatbo’ wa inkilab almawdo’*) (*Aljabarti*: 1998, p. 1) yet more systematically and sustainably. The question is indeed not “who can put a price on survival?” (Akarli: 2001, p. 17) which seems helpless, justificatory, and apologetic, the real question is: which survival?! Whither survival?!

Using M. Hodgson's thesis, argued Europe became so unprecedentedly powerful due to the social power generated by the modern states (Hodgson: 1993 , p. 45;

Hodgson: 2009, pp. 177-178). He meant "European enterprises, such as firms or churches or, of course, governments, could muster a degree of power, intellectual, economic and social, which was of a different order from what could be mustered among even the most wealthy or vigorous peoples in the rest of the world" (Hodgson: 2009, p. 178). Exactly the opposite happened in "Egypt", the state has smashed (drew or fragmented) the society, disempowering and jeopardizing it! In "Egypt", Mohammad Ali either confiscated or desiccated all the genuine and endogenous sources of social power in the society while technically modernizing it for his own interest.

Moreover, Hodgson attributed the rise in social power to the Industrial revolution (Hodgson: 1993 , p. xix), a similar revolution was said to take place in "Egypt" if it was not for the French imperial campaign and Mohammad Ali who interrupted the internal dynamics of the society and eradicated any indigenous source of societal power (*Kishk*: 1990). How can we approach our future with such an ambivalent and distorted sense of our past?!

The Western tornado stormed almost every corner in the world, destroying the indigenous social and political structures and replacing them with European or quasi European forms of organization. The globe has been redrawn according to a European pattern imposing European laws based on European concepts. However, David Fromkin wonders if the European imperialism would produce its same results in the Middle East (*Fromkin*: 1992, pp. 629-670). What will be the future of Western modernization in the Middle East at the end? As modernization meant basically constituting and consolidating the modern disciplinary power, best defined by increasing control while reducing the cost, new imperial mechanisms are needed to sustain the Matrix in troubled times. Winston Churchill owes his fame in the British imperial history to his "smart" imperial strategy enabling Britain to control her colonies in the Middle East without high costs (*Fromkin*: 1992, p. 630).

Fromkin himself unconsciously answered his question within his criticism of the 1922 settlement. He was very wary arguing that Britain and France did not eradicate all the significant local opposition to their decisions and plans. He was afraid that still today there are powerful local forces in the Middle East incompatible with the imperial orders and settlements and may topple them (*Fromkin*: 1992, p. 632).

One must admit Fromkin has transcended the surface and achieved a degree of depth. It is true the dispute is more beyond borders and rulers, as true as there are substantial demands and aspirations. However, these demands and aspirations are much deeper than "the right of countries to exist", it is about the right of adhering to a self-chosen frame of reference, *Weltanschauung*, and certain values, and the activation of all these in reality to exist. Fromkin just touches on this issue when he asserts that the modern belief in a secular state is considered a strange doctrine in this part of the world (*Fromkin*: 1992, pp.632-633).

The issue Fromkin triggered concerning the secular modern nation state Europe had germinated in the Middle East is essential and central. But Fromkin did not continue the on road to its end. He did not speak of the root of this contradiction, of the two irresolvable conflicting duality: Secularism vs. *Tawhid*. This is due to feigning ignorance rather than to mere ignorance, even the “outdated” general Kitchener was aware of the nature of this contradiction (*Fromkin*: 1992, p. 633).

This is not to suggest an indifference to historical change and the real variances between the dynamics of different times. Indeed, the beginning and the end of the 19th century cannot be reduced into one undifferentiated picture. However, regardless of the details, an abstraction might find the basic trend still prevailing.

Forty-two years after Mohammad Ali, “Egypt” fell prey to a British invasion. During those Forty-two years, “Egypt” was subject to intense pressures posed by three factors. First, the debts entrapment. Said Pasha started the debts in 1860, on the most outrageous terms, “he concluded a private loan in Paris for 28,000,000 francs and in 1862, he concluded the first state loan for 60 million francs (£2,400,000)” (Lutskiil: 1969, p. 156). Second, foreign capitulations and consuls increased the Western penetration and domination. “In 1840, there were only 6,150 Europeans in “Egypt”, whereas by 1871, their number had risen to 80,000” (Lutskiil: 1969, p. 162; see also: *Alimam*: 1999). Third, the Christian missionaries and schools (see: W. J. Roome: 1898; Andrew Watson: 1898; D. Sheffield: 2011; *Wright*: 1987).

The London treaty 1840 created the structure of the functional relation between the “Egyptian” authority and elite on one side and the foreign powers on the other. It dictated the full dependence of Mohammad Ali’s heirs on the full Western support to keep the artificial independence of their polity from the Sublime Port.

The 1840 London treaty was the kickoff in the long process of colonial redefinition of “Egypt”:

Politically, the treaty created “Egypt” as an internationally recognized entity, whose relative independence from the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed by the military might of the European powers. Economically, the treaty extended the system of capitulations, which was applied in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, to “Egypt”. In doing so, the system of monopolies which had allowed Mohammad Ali, the autonomous Ottoman ruler of “Egypt”, to concentrate economic surplus and start investing in industrialization, was terminated. The army that Mohammad Ali had built, by recruiting “Egyptian” peasants for the first time in centuries, as the main engine driving his modernization scheme, was reduced into insignificance (Al Barhgouti; 2004, pp. 288-289).

The London treaty created an institution or a polity called “Egypt”, and created a national elite to lead it. Furthermore, the treaty created a seducing stake for the rulers of “Egypt” in the country’s relative independence however it deprived them from any means by which they would preserve such independence: “with state-driven development no longer an option, the successors of Mohammad Ali were left

either with dependent development or with no development at all” (Al Barhgouti; 2004, p. 289).

“Egypt” became a producer of cotton entirely dependent on European markets, dependency led to a severe debt problem which the government attempted to remedy by accelerating privatization. Nevertheless, privatization of land and the invitation of foreign investments aggravated “Egypt’s” debt problem. This also created a national elite of private landowners who were dependent on Europe (Al Barhgouti; 2004, p. 289).

Thus, the 1840 London treaty recreated “Egypt”, politically and economically, in a manner rendering it dependent on and defenseless against European intervention. Great Britain, with France’s association at times, created the “Egyptian” national elite. Furthermore, the private landowning elite that came to existence was caught in a paradox.

[T]he “Egypt” they wanted to lead could not have existed without European intervention, yet that very same intervention was what kept them from assuming complete control over “Egypt”. Thus they were prone to reject the colonial presence but accept the colonial logic (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 289).

Regardless of whether or not we can include Mohammad Ali with the naked prototype of functional elites and groups, Mohammad Ali’s project created three reasons contributed to this transformation. First, he crushed the society and the Ummah and destroyed all the intermediary institutions, thus he rendered the authoritative relation between the power and the people direct without any intermediary. Moreover, he put the military at the center of power, it became the logic of power, the purpose of everything. He smashed the society into weak individuals, every individual has to lonely confront the state with all its power.

Second, the modern disciplinary power Mohammad Ali introduced to the “Egyptian” traditional society is primarily colonial in its method. Mohammed Ali created the modern state with its lethal centrality and absolute control over the society in order to ensure the progress of his “modernization” plan as he wanted. The modern state as an entity belongs to the world of matter, that is, others can crush it from outside with a more powerful entity and this is what actually happened. Third, the production mode Mohammad Ali introduced in “Egypt” to achieve the surplus, which enabled him to build a military-industrial base, incorporated “Egypt” within the international market system before it was ready, and thus it was always in the dependent position.

Why “Egypt” did not fall subject to imperialism to the French in 1798, when the Mamluks and the Ottoman viceroy were defeated, or to the British in 1807, when Mohammad Ali panicked and wasted time in Upper “Egypt” while the British were in Alexandria, is a substantial question. We have to consider two elements: the source of legitimacy and the pattern of power in the society

The Mamluks ruled with historical legitimacy, with the legitimacy of defending the lands of Islam against the Crusaders and the Mongols. Islam was the zeitgeist, Islam was the faith, the *asabiyya*, the gender, the nationality, the homeland, and the nationhood altogether (*Himdan: 1994*). The main source of legitimacy was the ability to save Islam and the Islamic unity from foreign threats. To the extent the elite of the *Fatimid* caliphate themselves call the *Ayyubids* to replace themselves due to its failure in facing the infidels, the *Ayyubids* themselves constructed the Mamluk bands and paved their way to rule, and the Mamluks themselves opened their doors for the Ottomans (*Wata'o bani Othman wa inhazmo lahom*) and cooperated with them (*Wahida: 1950*).

The Muslim society was based upon *sharia*, even it theoretically, as the only source of legislative and spiritual mandate (*alwilya*) for the ruler and the ruled. This decreases the collision and friction between them very much (*Abdelfattah: n.d.*). Moreover, the pattern of power and the state apparatus did not allow the ruling militant elite to penetrate the society and confiscate it as Mohammad Ali did. While the Mamluks were fighting against each other, the "Egyptian" society was continuing its path building civilization. The society with its intermediary institutions, especially Alazhar, the *awqaf*, the sufi orders, *Alashraf*, and the merchants...etc., was powerful enough to defend its lands when the political authority failed or escaped. This is the society Mohammad Ali destroyed.

These two factors, the source of legitimacy and the pattern of power in the society, shaped the military doctrine before Mohammad Ali. The military comprised of Muslim *Mujahiden* from the entire Muslim world fighting under a leadership that was rarely "Egyptian". Islamic faith and religion was their basic motive to defend the Islamic lands against foreign invasion or expand the Muslim lands, with some exceptions in which the aim was defending the ruling elite. Beside the organized army, thousands of Muslims repeatedly joined the military meeting the call for jihad.

However, this military doctrine totally changed with Mohammad Ali. He laid the very foundation of the modern nation state, namely the disciplinary power institutions, in which the people do not fight, they just, as he put it, "help with money for the foddors and mashes of the army". Remarkably, Mohammad Ali created his modern army to protect his important and lucrative post he reached against the Sultan's wish, being aware that Sultan Selim III and then Sultan Mahmud II had tried to remove him from "Egypt" and that he lacked the necessary effective military force enabling him to rebuff any attempt by Istanbul to forcibly dislodge him from his wealthy province. Since Mohammad Ali, the "Egyptian" military comprised of "Egyptian" recruited by force, working under a non-"Egyptian" leadership. The military's mandate was to execute whatever Ali orders, to the extent of doing two completely contradicting actions: supporting the Ottoman Sultan and later fighting against him and fighting to liberate a Muslim land and later separating the Muslim lands. But no surprise, Mohammad Ali's policies cannot be

understood unless we recognize the huge role his French entourage played, in the case of the military Ali applied the French school in military through Joseph Anthelme Sève who was recruited to help build the “Egyptian” army on the European model.

Thus, Mohammad Aly's “reforms” were nothing but the *seni quo non* for achieving the mission of fully westernizing “Egypt”. As Lewis V. Thomas puts it, in 1798, Western Europe decided to “thrust the facts squarely home” by itself ... This really came only with Napoleon's invasion of “Egypt” and Syria, and perhaps even more clearly with Muhammad Ali's sub-sequent career as a Westernizer in “Egypt” and beyond it” (Thomas: 1951, p. 173).

In 1951, H. A. R. Gibb wrote: “If we look back at the situation as it was little more than a century ago, we should find then no common ground whatsoever between the West and the Muslim East ... How greatly the situation has been transformed in one short century! Although it can be said, with truth, that the change has been more profound on the planes of cultural contact, it has affected also political and economic relations ... The first approaches were made in the time of Muhammad Ali ... to consolidate his [individual despotic] power and to expand the material resources of his province [for his own interest]” (Gibb: 1951, pp. 228-229).

Mohammad Ali was the official beginning of secularism in “Egypt” (*see: Hmaid: n.d.; Latifa Salem: 2000*), he led a “complete restructuring of “Egyptian” society ... which made it more accessible to European control” (Fahmy: 2002, p. 31). Mohammad Ali panoptitized the “Egyptian” society mainly through his military, education, and model village projects, his sons will further this panoptitization process through education, new Cairo construction project, the parliament, and publishing. If not personally part of it, he laid the roots for limiting the ruling elite to the role of a functional group serving the imperial. His sons grew up in the hands of foreign consuls and orientalis and later ruled under their supervision and surveillance. Ali's worst sin is destroying the “Egyptian” indigenous “capitalism” and intelligentsia, which were the leader of the Ummah who could absorb the military defeat and contain its destructive results. Mohammad Ali killed the Ummah and ejected it out of the struggle (*see: Kishk: 1988, p. 83-84*). Interestingly, Mohammad Ali failed, even before his death a large number of the factories, schools and other establishments that he had founded were either closed down or were abandoned and neglected (Fahmy: 2002).

The “Egyptian” nation was brought into being as a result of a multiplicity of practices and discourses that transformed the administration in Cairo from being interested mainly in taxation and in maintaining law and order to a government devising modern techniques of control and using more effective and more subtle ways of manipulating its population (Fahmy: 2002, p. 313).

The “Egyptian” society was harshly squeezed in favor of a coercive modernization centralized in the authority insular from the society:

No craft or profession has remained, not a single mosque imam has remained in Upper "Egypt", not a man owning a gun or inspecting a land or a farm has remained, nor a village sheikh nor a holder of a document proving property, sustenance, or *waqf*, unless the supreme Pasha had seized it. **Mohammad Ali's reign**, which some sees in it an empire building, **was the first embodiment of imperial national projects, a process of throwing an enormous trammel over a complete society and crushing it** (Ismail: 1993, p. 80, emphasis added).

Mohammad Ali's worst sin was destroying the society that pushed back the French and the British imperial aggression and displacing the Islamic '*Aqeda*' it held. Fadi Ismail (1993) concluded "Islam ... [is] the most effective means to defend freedom, independence, heritage, and land" (p. 101). Hassan Dieqa explains:

Discerning the conflict different periods shows the ability of the Islamic '*Aqeda*' to confront the imbalances and penetrations happening on the level of the society en bloc through Islamic movements incomparably more effective than the central state in confronting the imperial ... when the imperial destroyed the political and economic cycle of the society and smashed the production "infrastructures" of the society, this did not entail any retreat or atrophy in the role and position of Islamic '*Aqeda*' in the society's life but on the contrary of this we note that the deepening of the imperial external violent action in the society's structure entails more overlapping and superposition between the Islamic '*Aqeda*' and the Muslim society, and what is generated out of this of high dynamism did its role in maintaining the fabric of the society and engendering a jihadi fighting path confronting the imperialist, is distinctively different than the resistance path led by the ancient regime forces, be this in terms of effectiveness or principal, political, and strategic endurance although all the extermination and eradication campaigns the imperial practiced (1984, p. 33).

CHAPTER 3

CROMER'S AUTOMATON PULLING THE STRINGS BEHIND THE SCENES: SECULAR NATIONALISM

You have fought the battle of all Christendom and history will acknowledge it. May I also venture to say that it has given the Liberal Party a new lease of popularity and power - Edward Malet, the British consul in "Egypt" at the time, in a letter to a member of the Gladstone Cabinet congratulating him on the invasion.

The mission of the white man, whom the divine had put on top of this country ("Egypt"), is to consolidate the pillars of the Christian civilization to the maximum extent possible, so that it becomes the basis of the relations between people. But it was a must for him (to prevent arousing suspicion) not to try to Christianize Muslims, and to take care of the fake and bogus appearances of Islam - Cromer.

I do not think we would ever subjugate this country unless we break the bones its spine, which is its language, culture, and spiritual heritage - Thomas Babington Macaulay, the architect of the British education policy for its colonies (Akash: 2009, p. 13).

In dealing with the question of introducing European civilization into "Egypt", it should never be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed; that is to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it is something else ... The truth is that, in passing through the European educational mill, the young "Egyptian" Moslem loses his Islamism, or, at all events, he loses the best part of it. He cuts himself adrift from the sheet-anchor of his creed - Cromer.

Colonialism is not eighty thousand British soldiers squatting over *Alariesh* shores, colonialism lies in *Alfalaky* street [the premises of the ministry of education] - Sayyed Qotb.

It is said Mohammad Ali became mad and lost his mind after he had seen all his dreams of personal glory shattered and cast away. Things in "Egypt" got even worse after Mohammad Ali.

The sons of Mohammad Ali transformed the "Egyptian" military into a group of mercenaries sent on an external mission almost every ten years (see: McGregor: 2006, pp. 120-138). In 1854, they were sent to fight in the Crimean war together with the Ottoman state (yesterday's foe). In 1863, they were sent to suppress the

Mexican revolution for France and French-backed King in Mexico. In 1874, they were sent in two disciplinary campaigns under the leadership of an American and another Austrian to punish the Abyssinia king. Only 300 returned out of the 5,000 “Egyptian” soldiers assigned to Abyssinia campaign, which was one of the direct reasons for the Orabi’s revolt.

Abbas Pasha (1848-1854) was more afraid of the power of the people than his father, he terminated all factories and schools and further eliminated any remnants of Mohammad Ali’s project. He was also skeptical about the West, so he did not deal with any European bank and did not borrow to bridge the budget deficit (*Albatiriq*: 1999).

On the contrary, Said Pasha (1854-1864) extensively granted capitulations to the Europeans and began “Egypt’s” long journey of European debts as well. After the collapse of Mohammad Ali’s monopoly system, the “Egyptian” market was flooded with cheap goods brought by foreign merchants. Soon after, these foreign merchants created financial houses and began extending many loans not only to the rural population, but also to member of the ruling royal family triggering a debt spiral rendering “Egypt” to become increasingly in economic dependent on the West (Fahmy: 2002). Said further issued the Saidi Regulation (*Ala’iha Alsaidiyya*) in 1858 allowing Europeans to own “Egyptian” lands, sent the “Egyptian” military to aid France in its war against the Mexican revolution for his friend Napoleon III (*see*: R. Hill & P. Hogg: 2012), and granted his French friend Ferdinand De Lesseps the Suez Canal prerogative with extremely unfair terms for “Egypt”. “Egypt” provided the land, the men, and the money for the Suez Canal, paying 17 out of 18 million, in exchange for only 15% of the profits, which she actually lost later because of the increasingly overwhelming debts!

However, Edward Said explained the real effect of the Canal, which was drastically far beyond the debts:

In the Suez Canal idea we see the logical conclusion of Orientalist thought and, more interesting, of Orientalist effort. To the West, Asia had once represented silent distance and alienation; Islam was militant hostility to European Christianity. To overcome such redoubtable constants the Orient needed first to be known, then invaded and possessed, then re-created by scholars, soldiers, and judges who disinterred forgotten languages, histories, races, and cultures in order to posit them-beyond the modern Orient's ken -as the true classical Orient that could be used to judge and rule the modern Orient. The obscurity faded to be replaced by hothouse entities; the Orient was a scholar's word, signifying what modern Europe had recently made of the still peculiar East. De Lesseps and his canal finally destroyed the Orient's distance, its cloistered intimacy away from the West, its perdurable exoticism. Just as a land barrier could be transmuted into a liquid artery, so too the Orient was transubstantiated from resistant hostility into obliging, and submissive, partnership. After de Lesseps no one could speak of the Orient as belonging to another world, strictly speaking. There was only "our" world, "one" world bound together because the Suez Canal had frustrated those last provincials who still believed in the difference between worlds ... De Lesseps had melted away the Orient's ,geographical identity by

(almost literally) dragging the Orient into the West and finally dispelling the threat of Islam (Said: 1979, pp. 91-92).

In Said's reign, as well as Ismail's, the main trends prevailing in Mohammad Ali's time persisted and gained momentum, significantly, the duality of institutions, and the creation of a new secular elite. Subsequently, new trends synergistically appeared. Substantially, the origination of secular "Egyptian" nationalism. After Said cancelled the government education system, a worse system replaced it. The missionary associations raced to establish new private schools with the help of Said's French friendships he made while studying in France. In his study on the American "Egyptian" relations, Lenoir Chambers Wright tells how Said Pasha showed compassion on the American Mission granting her in November 1861 a \$25,000 building in Cairo to use as a school, his heir Ismail will later meet a group of American missionaries and promise them protection and assistance (*Wright: 1987, p. 183; see also: Elyafi & Elkhateeb: 1920; Elkhaleidi & Farrokh: 1973; Abdelwadud Shalabi: 2003; see also the works of Anwar Algendy & Abdelwadud Shalabi*).

The missionary schools produced generations in the most critical periods in which the governmental administration was being "Egyptianized" in the Said era. The activity of these missionary schools was of great concern to Richard Beardsley, the US Consul General, who wrote a report mentioning them in 1873. According to the Beardsley report, three-quarters of government employees in the telegraph, railways, and post offices have been schooled in the missionary schools (*Wright: 1987, p. 187*). This was also the case in the government and bank employees, and in 1870 all the government administrations and posts were "Egyptianized", except the army, and all these generations had not received any Islamic education (*Hmaid: n.d.*).

The army was largely devastated and ruined, of the nine military schools that kept working until Ismail's time only one will remain and all the shipyards, armories, and arsenals were shut down (*Abdelmalek: 2012*). Furthermore, the conscription method had huge consequences. Since Mohammad Ali, all the high ranking officers were only Turk or Mamluk, Orabi was the first "Egyptian" to reach a high rank in the military, and this happened due to an exceptionally unparalleled circumstances. The Turk- Mamluk officers comprised a new military and "feudal" aristocracy being the largest land owners, from which the 20th century Pashas families came (*Abdelmalek: 2012*).

In 1863 Ismail Pasha who became the Khedive

Gave one hundred acres of land to his coffee maker. He gave another hundred to his head barber ... and within eighteen months he allocated to those around him more than sixty thousand acres of the Nile valley. The recipients were military officers and high officials, family members and household staff. In the same short period he also added more than fifty thousand acres to his own estates (*Mitchell: 2002, p. 54*).

Like his predecessors, Ismail made his largest seizures of land to create estates for himself and members of his family. In a single week in October 1863 he took more

than thirty thousand acres belonging to twenty-six villages in the province of Sharqiyya and all the land registered as untaxed or uncultivated on the borders of the neighboring province of Daqhaliyya. By the end of his reign Ismail and his family controlled 916,000 acres, or almost one-fifth of the taxable agricultural area of the country, including much of the most productive land. The governing power was the largest "private" landowner (pp. 75-76).

Making "Egypt" a part of Europe was the dream of Ismail Pasha (1863-1879). Ismail took up and further developed his grandfather's program of Westernization and consolidation of despotic power (Gibb: 1951, p. 229). Thus, Ismail revived the government schooling system to pursue his dream. In Ismail's era, the European counsels and orientalists achieved unprecedented prestige and influence, even during Mohammad Ali's time (*Shaker*: 1987). The intense presence of the European counsels and orientalists was inevitable for Ismail, for "he wished to introduce European civilization into "Egypt" at a rapid rate, but he had little idea of how to set about the work. He had neither the knowledge nor the experience necessary to carry out the task" (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 1, 143).

In addition to the indirect long-term cultural hazards, Ismail heavily indebted "Egypt", opening the country to direct foreign political intervention. In Ismail's time, "Egypt's" budget did not exceed £E10.5 million, however Ismail borrowed 98 million dollars, of which only 39 million were spent on vital public projects while the rest (59 million) was plundered and wasted over royal concerts, palaces, and tourism in Europe (*Shaker & Yaghi*: 1993, p. 24).

In Ismail's reign, foreign direct intervention began with the establishment of The Caisse de la Dette Publique (the Public Debt Commission). The Public Debt Commission was an international commission established by a decree issued by Khedive Ismail of "Egypt" on 2 May 1876 to supervise the payment by the "Egyptian" government of the loans to the European governments following the construction of the Suez Canal. This commission put "Egypt" under the dual control of France and Britain, representing Europeans direct intervention in "Egypt's" financial affairs (W. Cleveland & M. Bunton: 2012).

Soon after, the commission exerted its pressure to form the first government in "Egypt" in 1878 and insisted on the presence of three men in this government: a French minister and an English minister (so it was called the mixed government), under the premiership of Nubar Pasha. Nubar Pasha was a pro-Britain Christian of Arminian origin (*Safwat*: 1959), described by Charles Gordon, the first British governor of Sudan, as a filthy Arminian (*Shalabi*: 1986, vol. 5, p. 435). The people rejected the government headed by the "filthy Arminian", for the overt foreign presence in it, and its decisions the people rejected. Nubar disrupted the public facilities and pensioned 2,500 of the "Egyptians" in the army. The people rejected as well the following premiership by Prince Tawfik for the same reasons.

Furthermore, Ismail sought American military expertise to train and modernize the "Egyptian" Army, whose strength drastically declined after Mohammad Ali. More

than 50 American officers served in the “Egyptian” military. Many of them served in senior positions, like Lieutenant General Charles P. Stone, who served as chief of the general staff 1870-1883 (see more: McGregor: 2006, pp. 139-156). The military’s failure in its 1875-1876 campaign against Abyssinia and the country indebtedness forced nine of the ten remaining Americans in 1878 to leave, 80 percent of the “Egyptian” Army was reduced as well. This downsizing of the military, dismissing only “Egyptians” not Circassians, and the large number of officers and soldiers who were forced to quit were the direct impetus for Orabi’s rebellion in 1881-1882 (Raugh: 2004).

With the collapse of the “Egyptian” finance in the second quarter of 1876, the Europeans start further escalated their confrontation with Ismail. They worked on two sides: ending Ismail massive possessions in Africa, and further penetrating “Egypt” and controlling lands as a guarantee for the debts. Shocked by his “friends” actions and most importantly their pursuit to seize Ismail own land property (see: Mitchell: 2002, p. 73), Ismail changed his beliefs and strategy. He abandoned the idea of absolute rule, and began to engage people in addressing this dilemma, he established a new parliament in 1879 (*majlis shoura alnowwab*) with binding decisions (unlike the other one he establish earlier as a European ruse). Ismail forced Nubar Pasha to resign, and re-formed the government after the removing the foreign ministers, he invited Sharif Pasha to form a new patriotic government.

Sharif Pasha formed a new government enjoying exceptional popular support. However, the European powers pressured the Ottoman Sultan to dismiss Ismail after his bias against Western interests in 1879 (*Shaker*: 1987, pp. 24-25). Albert Farman, the US consul in “Egypt” clarified this in a report he sent to his government on July 8, 1879 (Shalabi: 1986, vol. 6). In an earlier report, Farman warily wrote “it is impossible to interpret the track followed by England and France on purely financial basis ... and it seems to the neutral observer that the (English) purpose is the provocation of a revolution if possible, to have a justification to take over the country” (*Wright*: 1987, p. 140; *Albatriq*: 1999: pp. 190-192).

The advent of Tewfik Pasha (1879-1892) not only underlined the massive and blunt European intervention in “Egypt”, but the increasing British influence in “Egypt” as well. The imperial sponsor changed from France (with Mohammad Ali) to Britain. Tewfik owed his throne to the British, so he threw himself in their jaws. Especially with the increasing persistence of the parliament and the military led by Uraby to thoroughly review the state budget. Uraby was the military front of *Alwatani* party, an Islamic revolutionary group that later will establish a political front led by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and another economic front under the same name (*Hmaid*: n.d.).

Thus, it was not the alleged military takeover in May 28, 1882 (Ramadan: 1977) or the financial mismanagement (Long, Reich, & Gasiorowski: 2011) that paved the way for British military intervention on the following July 11 as some historians argued. It was rather the British fear of things getting uncontrollable after the Parliament, backed by Urabi’s army, insisted on its right to review the budget in

detail. Urabi's army position and demands threatened to fully destabilize the system created by the 1840 London treaty. "Egypt" was occupied. On the 8th of January 1882 Britain and France sent a warrant to the Khedive assuring their support for him, on the 26th they requested denying the "Egyptian" parliament any right concerning the budget (*Beialy*: 1993).

Britain and France decided to intervene, they declared the responsibility of defending the "Egyptian" throne and sent a joint fleet to Alexandria. Tewfik welcomed the European protection and went to Alexandria. The impotent Sultan Abdul Hamid II was overwhelmed by the various challenges and opened fronts. Britain, the empire on which the sun never sets because people cannot trust it at night, had already set the clashes and distractions the British consul in "Egypt" Edward Malet had suggested (*Albatriq*: 1999, p. 216). In 11 June 1882, the plot for saving the massive British investments in "Egypt" was executed (Hopkins: 1986). What started as an ordinary quarrel between an "Egyptian" and a Maltese enjoying British protection, was orchestrated and ended up with massacre of about 200 killed people, a quarter of them were Westerners. Britain began harassing "Egypt", and despite the all the international efforts and also the attempts of Sultan, it was over.

In Lewis Wallace's words, the US minister plenipotentiary in Istanbul, "In short ... the Sultan is not able, not with promises nor with granting rights, to avoid the British firing at Alexandria unless he has given the British government document of concession of the Canal and "Egypt"" (*Wright*: 1987, pp. 155-156). In 11 July 1882, the British began bombarding Alexandria, and colonized it two days later. When the British broke into the city, the Khedive welcomed them and received Admiral Seymour (*Abdelmalek*: 2012). Orabi spectacularly defeated the British in *Kafr Aldawwar* and *Alqassasin*, the personal representative of the Khedive Sultan Pasha accompanied the British army and abundantly distributed money to forestall Orabi's (*Abdelmalek*: 2012), the British decided to maneuver and sent troops to the Suez Canal. Orabi was too naïve to believe De Lesseps' promises on the neutrality of the Canal, he was deceptively defeated in *Altal Alkabir*. After the success of the invasion, Edward Malet, the British consul general in "Egypt", sent a congratulatory letter to a member of the Gladstone Cabinet: "You have fought the battle of all Christendom and history will acknowledge it. May I also venture to say that it has given the Liberal party a new lease of popularity and power" (Hopkins: 1986, p. 385).

In 19 September 1882, after just six days of *Altal Alkabir* battle, the khedive issued a three-word decree: the "Egyptian" military is dissolved, and a law was issued allowing exemption from mandatory military service in return for an certain amount of money (*Abdelmalek*: 2012). The military doctrine of the "Egyptian" army witness substantial changes at this point, the soldiers then would say: we are patriotic, Islamic "Egyptian" soldiers, oppressed by a leadership dominated by the French and the British. We are poor soldiers in an army downsized by orders from our enemy

(the French and the British). We are struggling to get our rights and liberate our country and our people. We do this through a peaceful then a militant revolution.

After the British victory in late 1882, Cromer, the British controller-general in "Egypt" during 1879 and the consul-general (1883-1907), became the only source of all authority in "Egypt". The British resumed the sacred mission initiated by the French and took care of by Mohammad Ali and his sons so far. But unlike them, Cromer did the job the English way: slow but sure. In Cromer's own words: "the mission of the white man, whom the divine had put on top of this country ("Egypt"), is to consolidate the pillars of the Christian civilization to the maximum extent possible, so that it becomes the basis of the relations between people. But it was a must for him (to prevent arousing suspicion) not to try to Christianize Muslims, and to take care of the fake and bogus appearances of Islam" (Qotb: 1997).

Cromer clearly stated granting independence to "Egypt" is the British occupation's ultimate goal of the, however Britain should design such independence, just like "a skillfully constructed Automaton" (Cromer: 1908, vol. 2, p. 155). Thus, Cromer perceived his mission in "Egypt" is a mission of educational nature:

Once explain to an "Egyptian" what he is to do, and he will assimilate the idea rapidly. He is a good imitator, and will make a faithful, even sometimes a too servile copy of the work of his European teacher. His civilization may be a veneer, yet he will readily adopt the letter, the catchwords and jargon, if not the spirit of European administrative systems. His movements will, it is true, be not infrequently those of an automaton, but a skillfully constructed automaton may do a great deal of useful work (Cromer: 1908, vol. 2, pp. 154-155).

"Egyptian" official was always predisposed to be an automaton/ Once Europeanized — more especially if he be Gallicized — his automatic rigidity becomes more wooden than it was before (Cromer: 1908, vol. 2, pp. 240-241).

The drastic change brought by the British colonization is symbolized in the change in the name of the ministry responsible for the military. *Aljihadiyya* ministry became secularized to be the war ministry *Alharbiyya* (Y. Rizq: 1975, pp. 112, 118).

The British staunchly contributed to the construction of the imagined secular "Egyptian" nationalism, mainly through the main three imperial tools to create a nation: the census, the map, and the museum (Anderson: 2006). The British held the first census of kind, drew the first map, and established the museum in 1902 (see on the "Egyptian" museum as an imperial tool: Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 33).

The British comprehensively controlled "Egypt", militarily, politically, economically, administratively, financially, culturally, and socially. Militarily, the British disbanded and dissolved "Egypt's" army led by Orabi, and formed another small army in 1883, the new army comprised of just six thousand soldiers under British leadership. The mandates of this new army were limited to maintain security, eliminate the anti-British movements, and prevent any revolution or intifada (Shaker: 1987, p. 30). The "Egyptian" soldiers were trained under the command of Cromer who chose 26

British officers to support him. The 6,000 “Egyptians” served four years in the army, four in the police, then four in the reserves (Raugh: 2004).

To mobilize personnel for the “Egyptian” units, the British resorted to irregular conscription among the fellahin (peasants), who went to great lengths to avoid military service. Potential conscripts, however, could make a cash payment in lieu of service. This practice resulted in units that were staffed mostly by the poorest members of society. “Egyptians” who became officers were almost always from wealthy and distinguished families (Metz: 1990).

The new “Egyptian” army was no more than a cheap battalion in the British military. The size and armament of the “Egyptian” army differed as the British strategic needs dictated. More than 17,000 of the twenty-five thousand “British” soldiers at the Battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898 were actually “Egyptians” and “Sudanese” (H. E. Raugh: 2004). Furthermore, the “Egyptian” military was used by the British for fulfilling its imperial pursuits. According to the British historian Dogh Johnson, Britain colonized Africa basically through African armies. For example, the “Egyptian” army, which was remodeled by British officers and British infantry and artillery, colonized Sudan for the British while the British forces were designing the military and political strategy and securing the British interests (D. H. Johnson: 2014). Furthermore, Lord Dufferin suggested importing the arms and equipment for the new “Egyptian” military from Britain, thus all the arms factories in “Egypt” were abolished, as well as the “Egyptian” navy and Alexandria armory (Shalabi: 1986, vol. 5, p. 477).

Valentine Baker was offered the post of commander-in-chief of the “Egyptian” army. However, before he arrived in Cairo, the British discovered Baker was charged with offensive assault of a young woman on a train, he was found guilty and convicted in a civilian court, sentenced to twelve months imprisonment, fined, and consequently dismissed from the British army. Thus, Baker was assigned only as inspector-general of a new police force comprising of a new semi-military gendarmerie. In announcing his death, the *Times* wrote: “[Baker’s] career might have been among the most brilliant in our military services” (H. E. Raugh: 2004).

Politically, the British dissolved the free parliament, and formed other superficial unbinding institutions. Administratively, they deprived the local governors of their mandate over the police and restructured all the police forces under an interior government headed by a British inspector. Every “Egyptian” minister was forced to have a British “counsel” beside a British inspector to monitor the ministry. Financially, the British cancelled the dual control and became the sole controller of “Egypt’s” finances. Economically, the British managed to incorporate “Egypt” into the British market and granted special attention to “Egyptian” cotton needed for British factories, “[n]o other place in the world in the nineteenth century was transformed on a greater scale to serve the production of a single industry” (Mitchell: 1991, p. 16). Socially, the British encouraged moral degradation, usury, extravagance, wine drinking, adultery, and all sorts of social sins and disorders

(Shaker: 1987, pp. 30-31). Most importantly, a political alliance was born between Britain and the agriculture aristocracy comprised of the large land owners, of which the ruling dynasty was the largest, with the British invasion “Egypt” became a massive cotton farm securing the supply British Lancashire factories needed as well as a steady increase of the large land owners’ wealth (Abdelmalek: 2013). Remarkably, General Allenby conveyed the designed role of this alliance: “the British can evacuate “Egypt” with a relaxed mind, for in fact they have created a class of large land owners Great Britain can depend on to implement its policies in “Egypt” (Abdelmalek: 2013, p. 93). Likewise, the British abruptly formed and constructed a modernized industrial bourgeoisie as an ally and small partner in the imperial plundering of “Egypt” (Abdelmalek: 2013). Furthermore, the British planned to create a civil class owing them its social and economic status, hence completely compliant to British policies. Thus the British put an end to the Circassian superiority in the “Egyptian” society and opened the door for specific “Egyptians” selected to serve the British. Cromer explains this:

“What is quite clear is, that if Western civilization is to be introduced into “Egypt”, it can only be done by Europeans, or by “Egyptians” who have imbibed the spirit of that civilization, and have acquired the knowledge necessary in order to apply Western methods of government. The extent to which Europeans, or “Egyptians” who have received a European training, should respectively be employed, depends mainly on the supply which is available of the latter class. The main difficulty of dealing with the question is that, for the present, the demand for qualified “Egyptians” of this class is greatly in excess of the supply. The general policy which has been pursued since the British occupation of the country took place, in 1882, has been to ... employ “Egyptians” in the very great majority of the subordinate and in a large number of the superior administrative posts, and gradually to prepare the ground for increasing the number of “Egyptians” in high employment” (Cromer, Vol. 2, pp. 294-295).

Thus, most importantly and significantly disruptive on the long term, Cromer perceived his mission in “Egypt” as a pedagogical mission: “it is nothing less than this, that the new generation of “Egyptians” has to be persuaded or forced into imbibing the true spirit of Western civilization” (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, p. 538). So the British drastically tampered with education in “Egypt” in an unprecedented way. “The truth is that, in passing through the European educational mill, the young “Egyptian” Moslem loses his Islamism, or, at all events, he loses the best part of it. He cuts himself adrift from the sheet-anchor of his creed” (Cromer: 1908, p. 230). That was Cromer’s vision, the way he realized it was terribly astounding. On 17 March 1897 Cromer appointed the missionary and Trinity College graduate Douglas Dunlop as a counselor for the ministry of education, however the real power vested in his hands. Dunlop created the “Dunlop-system” in “Egyptian” education upon which he pledged the French missionaries to achieve their objectives (Mission and Missionaries, the British museum library; Qotb: 1997).

For the British to consolidate their grip over “Egypt”, they had to displace the French education system and cultural agents who were loyal to France, their imperial adversary. With the appointment of the pastor and missionary Dunlop, the

conflict arouse between Britain and France (*Shaker: 1987, p. 148*). However, despite the virtual conflict, Dunlop, the British orientalist, was actually continuing the work of Altahtawi and the French orientalism, and even further extraordinarily developing it. It was just a matter of influence and interests not more.

The game was over!

Dunlop came to set the destructive education system we are still suffering from (*Shaker: w.d., p. 1239*), Oblivion is what Dunlop wanted to achieve, through laying the foundations of cultural draining and discharge (*Shaker: 1987, pp. 151-167*), and investing the echoing calls for a Pharaonic “Egypt” since the nineteenth century (*Atiyya & Abdelraziq: 2010*). He set a system to discharge the school students of their past (*Fanon: 2013*), by cutting all its Arabic and Islamic roots and connecting it to a blurry extremely ancient Pharaonic past. He replaced the rich, lively Islamic culture with another exceedingly poor, dead culture. However, the real aim of Dunlop was not to refill the students with Pharaonic history and culture because there is no such a thing, but rather to fill it with the invaders’ sciences, arts, history, and languages, or even some peels of all that, shortly, Dunlop’s target was inception. Dunlop schools had produced drained and alienated generations suffering from disorientation and disintegration. Generations grew up in a spiral of cultural, political, and social transformations. The nascent “Egyptianism” was the imperial constructed answer to the fabricated questions about identity, frame of reference and direction, for centuries the people of “Egypt” had the answer, however now the answer caused trouble and must be eradicated.

As if the purpose was not clear enough:

I do not think we would ever subjugate this country unless we break the bones its spine, which is its language, culture, and spiritual heritage - Thomas Babington Macaulay, the architect of the British education policy for its colonies (*Akash: 2009, p. 13*).

Language and religion are the Indians’ last defense line and must be eliminated – Captain Richard Henry Pratt, the founder of the Indian schools (*Akash: 2009, p. 93*).

The English language is not just a means of knowledge and light but it is in the first and last place the way of believing in Britain – Charles Grant, 1st Baron Glenelg, member of the British parliament and president of the British East India Company (*Akash: 2009, p. 93*).

This American counterfeit of the Indians culture targets to penetrate the Indians’ sentiment and recreate it anew so they see themselves through the eyes of their hangmen. We are talking here of an absolute spiritual enslavement completing the physical enslavement. But if they succeeded in this then our souls, other than which we have nothing left other, will vaporize like how rain beads vaporize in the volcano crater – Pvam Colorado, an Indian researcher of the Oneida people (*Akash: 2004, p. 73*).

There they are now, after they have eradicate our people, they want to distort the Indian soul, and to eliminate the most precious of what we cherish. They want to erase

our history, and mess with our spiritual traditions. They want to rewrite that from the beginning and recreate it. Indeed their lies did not stop yet and their thievery has no limits - Margo Thunderbird, of the Indian movement, 1988 (Akash: 2002, p. 115).

In a session in the Atlantic council on 10 February 2014, the former Israeli ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, mentioned the destructive role the American universities in the Arab world have been playing, he said:

The United States also had a no less transformative impact on the Middle East, and mostly not through – not through economics, not through oil, but through education. America built the universities in the Middle East. It built the American University of Beirut. It built the American University of Cairo and universities in Turkey through which American educators imparted American ideas. And perhaps the most influential idea was the idea of nationalism and independence. And those ideas percolated through educated classes, first through – many through Middle Eastern Christians, then into the military. And understand that there's a direct link between America's educational involvement in the Middle East and the emergence of an Arab nationalist idea, the Arab awakening – and to use George Antonius' term – and the struggle for Arab state independence throughout the course of the 20th century.

Cromer came to provide custody and care to seeds Mohammad Ali and Ismail had sowed. Cromer wrote:

We are justified in substituting a sanguine in the place of a despondent metaphor. Where once the seeds of true Western civilization have taken root so deeply as is now the case in "Egypt", no retrograde force, however malignant they may be, will in the end be able to check germination and ultimate growth. The seeds which Ismail Pasha and his predecessors planted produced little but rank weeds. The seeds which have now been planted are those of true civilization. They will assuredly bring forth fruit in due season (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, p. 558).

Cromer was so sure, he challenged:

Interested antagonism, ignorance, religious prejudice, and all the forces which cluster round an archaic and corrupt social system, may do their worst. They will not succeed. We have dealt a blow to the forces of reaction in "Egypt" from which they can never recover, and from which, if England does her duty towards herself, towards the "Egyptian" people, and towards the civilized world, they will never have a chance of recovering (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, pp. 558-559).

However, the planted seeds did not bring forth fruit in subsequent season as Cromer wished. On 1906 a dispute over the ownership of Taba caused a collision between the British and the Ottomans. To the British's surprise Mustafa Kamil, the 32 old young man who received his intellectual and political culture directly from Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani in Latif Selim Pasha's salon before the latter's exile from "Egypt", was capable of mobilizing the whole population against the British in support of the claim Taba was not "Egyptian" but Ottoman and should be returned. This incident forced the British to change their policies, they discharged Cromer, who remained in power for almost quarter a century and kept reporting to London

and assuring the end of any Islamic resistance. Cromer did not forget to retaliate against the “Egyptians” in *Dinshway*.

As soon as Sir Eldon Gorst succeeded Cromer as the consul-general in “Egypt” in 1907, he applied the new British strategy. Under the contagious motto of giving the “Egyptians” greater responsibility in managing their internal affairs, The British unlimited the freedom of parties hoping the secular parties would attract most of the “Egyptians” and keep them away from Mustafa Kamil. Thus, 1907 was the year of forming political parties in “Egypt”, however the number of the formed parties did not exceed the fingers of one hand (Y. Rizq: 1984). Nevertheless, the most significant party in the perspective of this study is *Alumma* party, which was established by Christian senior landowners in Assiut, such as: Senyot Hanna, and Tawfiq Dos. However, they put Ahmed Lutfi El-Sayed at the head of the party. Alumma party was composed of landed aristocracy who supported the continuation of the British colonialism to defend their class interests, this aristocracy will evolve into agro-capitalists and after 1919 it will segue to become the industrial and commercial business elites (T. Ismael & J. Ismael: 2011). Vehemently significant, in 1907 before he left “Egypt” Cromer expressed his deep satisfaction and relief because he had already established the main base to sustain the British colonization of “Egypt”, he was actually talking about this party. In response, Mostafa Kamel established *Alwatani* party the very same year, as well as the high schools club, which served as the organizational structure of the intellectuals who responded to his call. Thus, in 1907 two currents crystallized although their two roots had existed since Mohammad Ali before the British colonization: An anti-colonial Islamic current, and a secular current compromising with and loyal to colonialism (*Albahiy*: 1964).

The secular current’s acceptance of the notion of “Egypt” led it to accept the whole colonial logic. Tamim Al Barghouti brilliantly notes the significance of the contrast between the names of the two parties, and how it is very telling of their different political orientations:

The name of Al Umma party involves an attempt to make a shift in the meaning of the concept of Al Umma. The term usually used to refer to the community of Muslims, now the term referred to the “Egyptian” people as an Umma. Al Hizb Al Watani however, used the word Watan which means homeland to refer to “Egypt”, “Egypt” is simply a geographical location whose inhabitants belong to the Islamic Umma and should regain the Watan i.e. the homeland, they lost to a non Muslim power i.e. they are not an Umma by themselves. It should be remembered ... that the expression ““Egyptian” Umma” was first introduced into the Arabic language by Napoleon in 1798 (Al Barghouti: 2004: p. 65).

Mohammad Abduh is significant example, not only does he represent the continuation of the panopticization process along from Mohammad Ali to the British imperialism, but also he symbolizes the secularization, Westernization, and panopticization of Islam and how it affected the resistance to imperialism. Indeed:

Abduh's view of a reformed Islam, as a system of social discipline and instruction with which an intellectual and political elite would organize the country's 'political education' and thus assure its stability and its evolution, was indebted to his reading of Le Bon and other French social scientists; and indeed when he visited France he paid a call on Le Bon (Mitchell: 1991, p. 125).

Abduh was Cromer's accomplishment of Napoleon's dream:

When it seemed obvious to Napoleon that his force was too small to impose itself on the "Egyptians", he then tried to make the local imams, cadis, muftis, and ulemas interpret the Koran in favor of the Grande Annee. To this end, the sixty ulemas who taught at the Azhar were invited to his quarters, given full military honors, and then allowed to be flattered by Napoleon's admiration for Islam and Mohammed and by his obvious veneration for the Koran, with which he seemed perfectly familiar. This worked, and soon the population of Cairo seemed to have lost its distrust of the occupiers. Napoleon later gave his deputy Kleber strict instructions after he left always to administer "Egypt" through the Orientalists and the religious Islamic leaders whom they could win over; any other politics was too expensive and foolish (Said: 1979, p. 82).

Although being a prominent scholar, Mohammad Abduh led the pro-British current, he abandoned any revolutionary thought and crucified politics in 47 words (*Reda*: 2006). The scholars of Alazhar rejected Mohammad Abduh's project for the development of education at Al-Azhar, thus the gap increased between them, and Abduh became a much frequent guest at Cromer's Office (*Albahiy*: 1964). In his annual reports, Cromer "spoke of him in high terms, and no one regretted his premature death more sincerely than myself [Cromer]" (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, p. 181). Abduh became a model of the "potential builders of "Egyptian" nationalism along British lines" (Al Barghouti: p. 290).

However, although Cromer gave Mohammed Abduh "all the encouragement" in his power, it was "uphill work, for, besides the strong antagonism which he encountered from conservative Moslems, he was unfortunately on very bad terms with the Khedive, and was only able to retain his place as Mufti by relying on strong British support" (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, pp. 180-181). Cromer explained the functional importance of Abduh for the British colonization and Europeanization of "Egypt":

The political importance of Mohammed Abduh's life lies in the fact that he may be said to have been the founder of a [remarkable] school of thought in "Egypt" ... The avowed object of those who belong to this school is to justify the ways of Islam to man, that is to say, to Moslem man. They are the *Girondists* [the moderate leaders] of the "Egyptian" national movement. They are too much tainted with a suspicion of heterodoxy to carry far along with them the staunch conservative Moslem. On the other hand, they are often not sufficiently Europeanized to attract the sympathy of the "Egyptian" mimic of European ways. They are inferior to the strictly orthodox Moslem in respect to their Mohammedanism, and inferior to the ultra Europeanized "Egyptian" in respect to their Europeanization. Their task is, therefore, one of great difficulty. But they deserve all the encouragement and support which can be given to them. They are the natural allies of the European reformer. "Egyptian" patriots ... will find in the

advancement of the followers of Mohammed Abdu the best hope that they may gradually carry out their program of creating a truly autonomous "Egypt" (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, p. 180).

Abduh was a paradigmatic example of the imperially-created elite of "Egypt":

[A] new "Egyptian" national elite was created throughout the second half of the nineteenth century due to various forms of colonial interventions. The treaty of London signed in 1840 resulted in the collapse of Mohammad Ali's monopolies, and the inability of the rulers of "Egypt" to accumulate surplus for military and industrial projects. The privatization of land created a class of "Egyptian" large and medium size landowners. The fact that "Egypt" had already been incorporated into the world economy since the reign of Mohammad Ali, coupled with the continuous privatization, resulted in "Egypt's" ever worsening debt problem, which the government sought to remedy with yet more privatization. By the end of the nineteenth century, a formidable and politically active class of "Egyptian" landowners existed in the country. Politically, the treaty of London created an internationally recognized "Egypt", whose separation from the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed by the signatories to the treaty, thus creating a political institution by the name of "Egypt", the power over which was accessible to the newly emerging, landowning elites. Those elites were thus caught into a paradox, politically, their desire to increase their influence was hampered by the heavy foreign presence in "Egypt", whether before or after the British occupation, yet, economically they benefited from the colonial settings, which had brought them to being as political actors in the first place. Among all other sections of the "Egyptian" society, they were the most beneficent of the colonial situation, and thus the most willing to accept the colonial discourse (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 44-45).

The students of Mohammad Abduh split, some of them became even spies and agents working for the British. The most significant of the latter was Saad Zaghloul (we will talk about him in details hereafter). Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid was reactionary against the idea of Islamic unity, describing it as "illusions no way to achieve them ... an "Egyptian" would rather think of himself and his interest before anything else". Cromer took good care after of this category of "Egyptians" whom he described as a group as "suspicious atheists lacking self confidence ... [however I am] trying to instill confidence in them to take over the governance of the country later. But my efforts seem to be in vain ... It is premature to judge whether this experiment will succeed or fail" (*Hmaid*: n.d.).

The Islamic anti-imperialist current was all concerned with expelling the British from "Egypt", and did not care much about social and economic issues. It revolved around the idea of the Islamic Unity (*see: Altikriti: 2011*), which was launched by Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the people of "Egypt" did never imagined the idea of the independence of "Egypt" from the Ottomans, unlike what nationalist historiography and official school textbooks dishonestly purport.

Mostafa Kamel died in 1908, Mohamed Farid, who was more Islamic, succeeded him. Mohamed Farid completed the organizational structure of the party, and expanded the scope of its membership, he included the peasants and proletariat, and to achieve this purpose he established the handicrafts workers' syndicate in

1909 and the night people's schools in most of "Egyptian" villages. Actually, the story of the *Wattani* party Essam Diauddin revealed (1987) suggests this party is the most successful organization of its kind in the history of "Egypt" in terms of mobilizing the masses. The party came to the stage using violence by the assassination of Boutros Ghali in 1910 for his role in the 1899 agreement separating "Egypt" and Sudan and for his intention to extend the Suez Canal franchise forty years more. Investigations revealed the party had 85 secret organizations (*Metwally*: 1985), the snowball kept rolling until it met its momentum in 1919 despite Herbert Kitchener's arrival in 1911 who adopted an iron fist policy, he kept tightening things up for Mohamed Farid forcing him to leave "Egypt" to Germany in 1912.

The assassination of Boutros-Ghali by Ibrahim Nassef Alwirdani on February 20, 1910 was just the beginning of a series of assassinations for nine years, killing 200 British soldiers as well as some "Egyptian" agents in preparation for the revolution. The newspapers supporting the idea of Islamic unity played a great role even, even Crome mentioned "those newspapers could provoke a violent revolution against the colonization", thus he demanded an increase in the forces of the British army (*Metwally*: 1985). Al-Ahram paper wrote: "the Muslims of "Egypt" consider His Majesty the Sultan Abdul Hamid II their Caliph, they pray for his victory and the his enemies oppression" (G. A. L. B. Lloyd: 1933, Vol. 1, p. 40). Mohammad Farid discussed with Azmi Pasha, the director of Istanbul police, the arrangements for an Ottoman attack on the British in "Egypt", supported by *Alwatani* party popular revolution. However, although the revolutionary actions and preparations and the planned Ottoman attack in 1915 (see *Hmaid*: n.d.), WWI erupted and changed everything. WWI revealed once again both the British iron fist and the functional role the British created "Egyptian" military was destined to play (see: McGregor: 2006, pp. 201-219). In 1914 the British appointed Sir John Maxwell as the military governor of "Egypt", disposed Khedive Abbas Hilmi II (1892-1914) and declared "Egypt" as a protectorate. They replaced him with Sultan Hussein Kamel (1914-1917) who was a mere puppet and became "the main support front for the British" as Carl Brockelmann described him (*Shalabi*: 1986, vol. 5, p. 494; Search *Brockelmann*: 1968, 46-47).

Although the people of "Egypt" did not ever think of nor demand -not even *Alwatani* party- the independence of "Egypt" from the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary Mohamed Farid confirmed and stressed "Egypt's" links to the Ottoman Empire, in the introduction of his book *The History of the Ottoman State*, he wrote: "the Ottoman reign had united the Islamic states ... Europe's policy is based on religious stubborn intolerance towards the Ottoman Empire and the states under its control ... the credit for the survival of the Muslim Ummah is assigned to the Ottoman Empire, the reason for the Europe's animosity is the Ottoman care for and protection of the Muslims" (*Farid*: 1981, p. 7). Moreover, before Mohammad Farid and Mostafa Kamel had written on 25 November 1905 calling for an Islamic revolution and pledged the Muslims to support the Ottoman Empire (*Amal Fahmy*:

2002, p. 261). However, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in WWI put the people of “Egypt” in front of a fait accompli, they found themselves in an artificial and arbitrarily created nation state, and since then Egypt kept suffering from national integration problem and crises (see: *Y. Rizq*: 1983;1967; *Metwally*: 1949; *Shokri*: 1963; *Shokier*: 1916; *Abdelwahid*: 1995; *Amal Fahmy*: 2002; *Alrashidi*: w.d.).

The nominal change from *Aljihadiyya* to *Alharbiyya* was far from nominal it was substantial. It reflected a new military doctrine. Who are we? We are peasants forcibly serving in the Egyptian military under an extremist crusade British leadership. What do we do? They told us we are protecting the Egyptian territory from the Ottoman enemy, however we discovered we were actually handing it over to our real enemies. How do we do that? We are fighting the Ottoman army for a crusader campaign. Indeed, Britain provided training and equipment to the Egyptian military until after WWII (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997).

Although General Maxwell pledged not to hurl the Egyptian military into WWI, in four years the number of Egyptians conscripted to serve the war exceeded one million and seven hundred thousand (*Abdelmalek*: 2012). In 1916, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) was formed to undertake, in association with T. E. Lawrence, the execution of all the Allied forces operations in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria (1916-1918). 100,000 “Egyptians” joined other thousands English, Irish, Australian, Indian, New Zealanders, French, Italians, Armenians, Burmese, and most shockingly the Jewish Legion in what they considered a Crusade war. Other 500,000 of “Egyptians” were used as forced labor for the non-battle services. With the help of the “Egyptian” military, the modern Crusaders colonized Gaza, Nablus, AlQuds, Damascus, and Aleppo and wiped out all Turkish resistance in both Palestine and Syria (E. E. Force: 1919; Bullock: 1988; Mortlock: 2010; Bruce: 2002). Lord Milner revealed: “the services the Egyptian military has performed can never be sufficiently appreciated, for the Palestine campaign was impossible without it [the Egyptian military]” (*Abdelmalek*: 2012, p. 67). The BBC frankly tells the story:

After a difficult advance across the Judean hills, he [Allenby] walked through the Jaffa Gate on 11 December 1917 as the 34th conqueror of Jerusalem, the first Christian conqueror since the Crusades. Many of Allenby's soldiers were deeply conscious that they were fighting on sacred soil, and some viewed themselves as modern-day crusaders (BBC: 2011).

Remarkably, in November 2013, after almost a century, the Egyptian defense minister sent his deputy to celebrate the passing of 99 years of Egypt participation with Britain in WWI, in which AlQuds was lost (Alahram newspaper, issue 46362).

The British exhausted the people and the economy of Egypt for their war, formed a strong alliance with King Fouad (1917-1936), with a zero tolerance level the British arrested 14 thousand members of *Alwatani* party, and for the first time established prisons were established outside Cairo. However, the British preemptive actions did not stop the resistance, of which one of the most prominent incidents was the unsuccessful assassination attempt of Sultan Hussein Kamel. “Who agreed to be

appointed a Christian state" as Mohammed Khalil, the merchant who sold his clothes shop to buy a weapon and assassinate the traitor Sultan, said before he was executed in April 1915. Soon after another attempt by the palace servants to burn the whole palace with the Sultan inside was aborted at the last moment. Months later the Sultan's parade exploded in Alexandria, but the Sultan survived. The Egyptian society was living the highest level of tensions and disruption, assassinations were prevalent, the British were chasing the wanted resistance, laws restricting press freedom, and the military governor was issuing warnings almost daily (Latifa Salem: 2000). With the defeat of the Ottomans and their retreat Allenby proceeded with his forces (including 100,000 Egyptian soldiers) to Palestine, entered Jerusalem in 1917 and said: "now the Crusaders are over", Egypt was cut forever from the Ottoman Empire.

Moreover, the Allied forces had secret plans and agreement to partition the Middle East, about which "Colonel House presciently remarked that 'It is all bad and I told Balfour so. They are making it a breeding place for future war'" (Fromkin: 1992, p. 288). In this perspective, we may understand the limits within which those powers would tolerate any ambitious military in the Egypt. However, the Allied forces strategy was greatly affected by fear, a deep fear of the power of Islam. Thus, they worked for a design for the Middle East that would render Islam innocuous and redundant (Fromkin: 1992, p. 326).

Prince Omar Toson, member of the royal family, thought of forming a delegation to speak on behalf of Egyptians in Paris Peace Conference to hold Britain to its promise of independence after WWI (Elfatlawi: 2008). He started collecting signatures directly from the people for this proposed delegation, since Omar Toson was hated from the British, he proposed to assign this task to the deputy of the legislative assembly (*aljam'iyya altashri'eyya*), Saad Zaghloul, who "belongs to a school with a long history of direct understanding with the British" (Ramadan: 1983). In November 1918, Saad Zaghloul went with his colleagues Abdul Aziz Fahmi and Ali Shaarawi to house of the British controller-general Wingate for the visa, Wingate vehemently told them: "the Egyptian people are no more than peasants, they cannot run a state", so Saad weakly asked for a self-governance, but the meeting ended with Wingate's rejection (Alrafi'i: 1987, vol. 8).

The break out of the revolution was just a matter of time, because its reasons have been synergistically in play for at least ten years. The British wanted to settle the arrangements of their colonies, and receive a recognition over them at the peace conference. London requested a report on Saad Zaghloul from British intelligence in Cairo, the report arrived on 7 March, and it is stated: "Saad Zaghloul spends his time drinking and gambling, and he has lost control over the intellectuals". Finding what it had been searching for, London seized the moment and Saad was arrested the very next day (Hmaid: n.d.). A demonstration of 200 law students protested against this violation of the law, Abdel- Aziz Fahmi went to disperse them and said: "stop this children games and let us negotiate with them" as Mahmoud Metwally

conveyed (w.d.), this was the position of *Alwafd* party and its leaders concerning 1919 revolution: *Alwafd* party did not want a revolution, nor did it expect it, and when the revolution happened *Alwafd* party disowned it and managed to crush it. It is pretty much clear also in what Ahmad Lotfi Alsayyid's said to the British military authority at Savoy Hotel on 16 March 1919 (Al Barghouti: 2004).

The real 1919 revolution began on the next day by those who the British intelligence described as "the ignorant and intensely enthusiastic groups of Alazhar students, consisting of Egyptians, Javanese, Moroccans, Turks, and Arabs who have proven they do not respect the words of their religious superiors" (*Hmaid*: n.d.). Within a few days revolution spread in almost all the towns and villages, the people cut off the railway and telegraph lines, formed revolutionary committees to run the country, announced the independence of *Zefta*, and raised the Ottoman flag over the *Shoubra* police department. The British savagely retaliated by destroying many villages such as *Al-Azizia*, *Nazlet Alshobak*, and *Alshabanat*, and committing genocide such as killing a hundred people in *Mit alqurashi* village alone, and using aircraft to suppress the revolution in *Assiut* and the armed clashes with the rebels in *Alfayoum*. The British killed three thousand Egyptians and executed 70 people in rash military trials. Alazhar was the main source of revolutionary incitement so the British directed Sultan Fouad to exert his influence over the Mufti and *Sheikh Alazhar* to control the students. When they failed, half of the students were expelled, and the rest graduated after false examinations, thus the number of students at Alazhar decreased from ten thousands to only a thousand. However, the revolutionary incitement continued from Alazhar, so the British broke into it in December 1919.

When the British arrested Saad Zaghloul they wanted to "polish" him, to make him a symbol and a star, so they exiled him to Malta. So when the real revolution happened Saad Zaghloul had already achieved enough fame to be used to curb the revolution (*Ramadan*: 1983). The British released him on April 7 and allowed him to travel to France, however the conference ignored him. The United States and Germany recognized the British protectorate over Egypt in May, despite the announcement of the US President Wilson on January 14, 1918 concerning the right of peoples to self-determination and his protest on the British prevention of Saad and his delegation traveling to Paris. Nevertheless, this did not change *Alwafd* party's adoption of negotiations as the only option available .

Saad did nothing but writing some articles in the newspapers, and he quit so the people forgot him, the British exiled him again to the Seychelles to polish him again, and sent a British committee headed by Lord Milner to investigate a political solution to end the revolution. The committee reported: the British perception was Egyptian elite before the revolution was composed of the extremists, who are patriots demanding independence like Saad Zaghloul, and moderates, who are senior capital and agricultural land owners demanding autonomy like Adli Yakan, the Prime Minister. This perception was wrong, because the events of the

revolution have shown that there are no moderates, but there are two trends: responsible extremists, who are the patriots, and the irresponsible extremists, who are the Islamists. The report literally said: “the reins of the revolution moved from the hands of the responsible extremists into the hands of the irresponsible extremists” (Albishri: 1988, p. 155). However, the report equivocally obscured the truth. Cromer sponsored the innocuous secular negotiating “nationalists” and played them against the intractable Jihadi Islamists demanding real independence.

While Minler was in Egypt, the *Alwafd* party formed its organizational structure, significantly all the members of the pro-British Palace backed *Alumma* party’s joined the *Alwafd* and many of them held leadership posts, Tamim Al Barghouti (2004) notes:

The composition of the first Wafd (the original seven) is telling, five out of seven of the Wafd were members and supporters of Hizb Al Umma: Zaghioul, Sharawy, Abdul Aziz Fahmi and Mohammad Mahrnoud were either members of the party or strong sympathizers, Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid was the party’s theoretician, he was the only member of the delegation who was not a member of the Legislative Assembly (p. 98).

The genealogy of the *Alwafd* party reveals its functional nature, serving the interest of the palace, the British colonization, and the Europeanization of Egypt. The history of Saad Zaghloul before 1919 reveals he was a British agent and ally, his performance after the revolution also confirms the fact. The British created Zaghloul’s false patriotic image to keep the revolution under control through him. It was also Zaghloul who started the novelty of negotiations with British, dumping the revolution in the dark bog of negotiations. The leaders of the *Alwafd* party are the prototype of *Benign Nationalism* (Al Barghouti: 2004), for they are generally Pashas with vast land properties and effective influence over the peasants, they dealt with the British colonialism in a manner that preserves not threatens their interests. Hence, it is extremely rare to find among this class someone who confront colonialism sacrificing his money, properties, and family. Thus, their conflict with colonialism was a gradual reconciliatory negotiating political conflict, which never prefers armed resistance or frank struggle but desires to hold the illusion negotiations and political solutions will achieve independence.

Mohammad Abdu, Lutfi Al-Sayyid, Saad Zaghloul and Mustafa Al Nahhas, all met Cromer’s criteria. When they were young urban intellectuals, they had all been staunch oppositionists to colonial influence; after their personal socio-economic interests were defined they shifted to adopt a discourse the assumptions of which did not contradict those of Cromer.

Abdu had been a disciple of Afghani, then he became a personal friend of Cromer, Zaghioul was a disciple of Afghani too, one who called for Jihad in the first days of the British occupation until he was released from jail and got acquainted to Cromer, who found him a job first as a judge, and then as a minister of education. Sayyid and Nahhas were both supporters of Al Hizb Al Watani; they shifted their position as soon as their personal socio-economic interests were defined

Those members of the elite were accepted by the colonial power as representatives of the majority of the Egyptian population precisely because their discourse was more like that of the colonial power than that of the majority of the Egyptian population. Those among the Egyptians who held a different world view than the one preached by Cromer and accepted by the Egyptian liberal nationalists to be, were considered, either illiterate, irrational *fellaheen*, or immoral agitators such as Mustafa Kamel ... this position of representation enjoyed by the members of the Egyptian elite led to their acceptance of a colonially defined state i.e. led them to seek and accept an independence whose essence was to perform the functions of occupation (Al Barhgouti; 2004, pp. 83-83, emphasis added).

[T]he very individuals, who, in terms of ideology and in terms of political action, led the Egyptian nationalist movement that culminated in the 1919 revolution, are those who met Cromer's criteria, and were brought into politics by the consent of the colonial power, rather than against its will. Not only did these individuals come from the class of large and medium size landowners who were brought into Egyptian politics by the colonial intervention of the nineteenth century, but also their own individual interests became intertwined with the colonial presence in Egypt. Saad Zaghloul, Ahmad Lutfi Al Sayyid and Mustafa Al Nahhas were all anti-colonial hard-line students, yet once they started looking for a position in the colonially created political institutions of Egypt, they seemed to have accepted the colonial discourse. Moreover, there was a dialectical relation between the formation of those personal socio-economic interests and the adoption of the colonial discourse: their social position led them to accept the colonial logic and that led the colonial officers to accept them as representative of the Egyptian people which in turn bettered their socio-economic standing. Those members of the elite were accepted by the colonial power as representatives of the majority of the Egyptian population, precisely because their discourse was more like that of the colonial power than that of majority of the Egyptians (Al Barhgouti; 2004, pp. 290-291).

Saad Zaghloul was an alcohol and gambling addict who lost fortunes gambling even the lands he inherited, in his autobiography he asked the people in his to curse him if he did not quit (Zaghloul: 1987). He was one of men of the British in Egypt, he was the education minister Mustafa Fahmi's premiership, a man dubbed the title of the most famous friend of the British in Egypt, he held the first premiership after the colonization and headed the Coptic conference. Saad served next in the premiership of Boutros Ghali, a man of the British who withdrew the Egyptian army out of Sudan, headed the notorious Court of Denshawai, and agreed to extend the franchise of the Suez Canal for an extra 40 years. Saad then joined the premiership of Mohammed Said the close friend of the British Foreign Office adviser. After the ministry Saad became the deputy of the Legislative Assembly (*aljam'iyya altashri'eyya*), the bogus parliament established by the British. Surprisingly, Saad acted as a mere mark for the British while he was a minister. In every school Saad appointed spies to monitor the pupils albeit the expenses this costs, as he personally mentioned in his autobiography. He also sent spies to Europe on the ministry's expense to monitor the Egyptian students there, in his memoirs he was always mocking patriotism (Zaghloul: 1987). He was a perfect agent for the British, Cromer gave him his full attention and advice.

Through people like Saad Zaghloul, the British secularized the popular Islamic revolutionary resistance. Saad Zaghloul transformed the Islamic Jihadi current against Western imperialism (Omar Makram, Aljabarti, Suleiman Alhalabi, Jamal Aldin Alafghani, Mostafa Kamel, Mohamed Farid, Mahmoud Shaker,...etc.) into a Westernization secular current disguising in the mask of patriotism and nationalism (Altahtawi, Mohammed Abduh, Qasim Amin, Taha Hussein,...etc.). In his memoirs Cromer stressed the extreme importance of granting the support of the British (behind the scenes of course) to the national bargaining elements at the expense of the Islamic jihadi elements (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 1, 226-227). Coincidentally significant, Saad Zaghloul's house was situated in the separating border between the two Cairos: the Arab Islamic Cairo and Ismail Europeanized Cairo (Al Barghouti: 2004). Saad Zaghloul got rid of the idea of Islamic Unity on which the antecedent Islamist resistance was based, and promoted the idea of the modern secular nation state. This was undoubtedly a stunning success for England in developing the art of imperialism, for since less than a century Napoleon's style in subjecting the people of Egypt was stripping the country of arms and killing five or six men in Cairo alone, and having their heads wandered in Cairo streets with every sunrise (*Alrafi'i*: 1987, pp. 1-283). Some 50 years later, the Americans followed in the British steps through programs allegedly claimed to promote democracy, however Timothy Mitchell (2005) revealed the real purpose behind those programs was to create institutional environments encouraging neoliberal structural adjustment programs, thus these programs were a hoax obscuring how the US supported specific political forces and groups in Egypt and the Arab world at large which in turn appreciated and supported the US economic policies.

The essential difference between the Islamic jihadi Resistance and the secular negotiating "resistance" is Islam, Islam as a resilient, inexorable and, untranscendable essence defying the process of Westernization (see: *Al'alem*: 1987). As Cromer himself said: "in dealing with the question of introducing European civilization into Egypt, it should never be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed; that is to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it is something else" (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, p. 227-228), the same strategy is still intact till today (see: Benard, Riddile, Wilson, & Popper: 2004). The Egyptians in the late 19th century became trapped in the futile question: "why did the West develop and the Muslims lagged behind?" (*Shaker*: 1987, p. 153). This lousy question reflected the transformation that happened under the pressing defeat from the original question: "how do we expel the imperial and its relations out of our land?" to the question of benign nationalism: "how do we quickly build a modern nation state", which is a politically correct expression instead of "how do we enhance the conditions of our engagement in the global imperial club?" (*Ismail*: 1993, p. 106). The Arab renaissance thought and discourse was generally limited within the West-centric comparison problematic put by the triumphant West: the defeat of Islam and the triumph of the modern West, however, this orientalist presupposition promoted by

the West and its followers of the Arab intellectuals arbitrarily ignores the history of revolutions, uprisings, and resistance.

The advent of Western invasion pervasively aggravated a resistance all over the Arab and Islamic world: Alazhar (Egypt), Abdelqader, Almagrani, and Alrahmaniyya (Algeria), Alsunusi (North Africa), Omar Almokhtar (Lybia), Almahdi (Sudan), Alzaytuna (Tunis), Alkhatabi (Morocco), Alnajjaf (Iraq), the tobacco revolution (Iran), Alafgghani (Afghanistan), and in other places like Somali, North India, and Central Asia (*Ismail: 1993; Albishri: 2005*). The prime wave of resistance was mainly led by Islamic movements of indigenous, civil nature pursuing *osouli* objectives and goals. Proceeding from the complete and decisive rejection of the West as a colonization and a military, political, and economic dominance on one hand, and as a Weltanschauung, a civilization, and an organizational model, the prime resistance believed true civility is absolutely equivalent to Islam and true progress is in the very origin of Islam's concept, and in the face of the civilizational challenges the prime resistance retroversively rummaged the Islamic cultural system seeking not epistemological answers but political and historical ones.

Nevertheless, as Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1988) mentioned, "the defeat of the prime resistance, although its legendary valor, set the stage for the societal acceptance of other reactions to the Western invasion: simulation [full Westernization] and reconciliation [partial Westernization]" (p. 135-138). So, the modern state was built by force, over the blood and bones of hundreds of thousands of martyrs. Miserably, the society could not accept such transformation nor accept the legitimacy of the triumphant. However, the fact of the military and political defeat could not allow more than a negative rejection of the legitimacy of the modern politics, as a state, systems, institutions, and laws, and a retroversion to the glorious mighty past (*Ismail: 1993, p. 118*).

Wajih Kawtharani (1981) asked a significant question wondering about the possibility of choosing the faces of modernization if this modernization was associated with dependence and the predominance of the imperial interests, how can this be possible if the indigenous resistance does not separate or distinguish between the religious and the political nor between the religious and the civilizational, this separation was proposed and absorbed by the path of Abduh-Reda and their disciples to strike upon the prime resistance, to pass the [imperial] fractionating, dismantling plans, and to absorb the society with the modernization projects. The secularizing role many intellectuals played was eventually one of the main elements that procured the defeat, for "if the society and its expressing elite integrate its civilizational, religious, and political *assabiyyas* in one general *assabiyya*, then separating and differentiating these coherent *assabiyyas* historically meant weakening and dismantling the society (*Ismail: 1993, p. 107*). [When] Islam was lost, the elements of the existence of the [Muslim] Ummah and the means of its survival as an independent distinguished nation was lost with it. Indorsing the system of the other (the West) to respond to it (to the West) does not lead but to

admit the universality of its culture, that is accepting its dominance (*Ismail: 1993, p. 105*).

So, the second wave of “resistance” was either fully simulating or partly conciliating with the West, it was absorbed in the system of benign nationalism, raised the mottos of reform, mainly religious, cultural, and pedagogical, and borrowing from the Western principles and organization models to reorganize the state and society as a priority, although “these mottos historically meant more disruption, division, and weakness at a time of imbalanced power relations and a comprehensively striking European domination” (*Ismail: 1993, p. 105*). Altahtawi and Muhammad Abduh, and others like them, are the legitimate heirs of the scholars who submitted to Napoleon and agreed to join his *Diwan* whom Aljabarti called the scholars of all times (*mashayiehk alwaqt*). Not only do they provide the cultural and ideological foundations (the humane preambles covering all the anti-human ideas and projects) for the ruling functional group, Mohammad Ali for example (the authority) and for the benign nationalism, Saad Zaghloul, for example (the tamed opposition participating in “the democracy game”). But also they urged the people to give up resistance, surrender, and submit to the invader, at the time of the French invasion “those scholars tried to mediate between the invader and the city, but the people rejected, threw the scholars’ turbans, and told them bad words. The people kept saying: the scholars apostatize and made themselves French” (*Ismail: 1993, p. 87*). Edward Said analyzes the psychological aspect of this process and exemplifies it best in the Robinson Crusoe-Friday relationship, Friday will always remain Crusoe's subordinate and shall always call Crusoe "master", Crusoe will never see Friday as his equal, even after Friday converts to Christianity. Friday's acceptance of his new name and servitude is the basis for Crusoe's dominant relationship. The other aspect of this process is the political economy. Since Mohammad Ali, the modern intellectual's pursuit to gain a share in the network of interests was the direct reason for his transformation from Islam to secularism, from seeking emancipation to adopting dependence and defending imperialism, and from armed revolutionary resistance to benign political opposition to earn and enhance his position inside the imperial system. Hassan Dieqa (1987) clarified the process by which Mohammad Ali spoiled and corrupted both the scholars and the modern intellectuals through Ali's policy of responding to their usufructuary ambitions in return for the service they must do, no sooner than then they quickly disappear away. Fadi Islamil (1993) wondered how the “revolutionary” role of the Mohammad Ali's missions did end, he found most of them became large land owners of lucky senior bureaucrats. Hazem Saghiya (1980) concluded culture has played the role of a tractor transporting modern intellectuals towards participating in the profit and distribution shares and being engaged in the network of dependence on the capitalist center. Just as an example of how absurd and bizarre this become, the “enlightened” “modern” intellectual Altahtawi considered Mohammad Ali “Allah's caliph in his land, he is accountable only to his god, thus he does not bear any responsibility for any of his subjects” (*Ismail: 1993, p. 88*).

This was the harvest of a long century of imperialist and orientalist efforts very welcomed by the ruling function groups. A century earlier the orientalists were writing Napoleon's statements scornfully received by the people of Egypt. When Napoleon became sure about the failure of his campaign in Egypt after his ignominious defeat in front of Acre's walls, he escaped to France and sent Kleber, his heir, a message on his way back saying: "the French warships will certainly appear this winter in Alexandria or *Alborullus* or *Damietta* ... Strive to collect 500 or 600 of the Mamluks, and when the French warships appear arrest them in Cairo or the county side and send them to France. And if you did not find enough number of Mamluks, substitute them with Arab hostages. So when those arrive at France, they will be locked there for one or two years, during this time they will see the greatness of the French nation and get used to our traditions and language, so when they go back to Egypt they shall form a party for us other Egyptians will join" (Awad: 1925, pp. 409-410, the letter is documented in the French military ministry, no.: 4374). Napoleon wanted to guarantee uprooting and shattering our culture, he wanted to dig a grave for her in which the dazzling French lights may shine while Islam is being buried forever. However Kleber failed Napoleon the paver.

Still, Mohammad Ali and Ismail gave way to Monsieur Gomar and company to achieve what Kleber could not achieve after Napoleon escaped. Thus, the British were politically enjoying the harvest. Both Cromer and Saad Zaghloul revealed in their memoirs the depth and warmth of their Crusoe-Friday relation. "[Cromer] spent hours with me Crusoe-Friday talking to me about various issues to enlighten me in my political life" (Zaghloul: 1987, chapter 28, p. 1516). Cromer explained the huge British benefit from this Crusoe-Friday relation: "it is nothing less than this, the new generation of Egyptians has to be persuaded or forced into imbibing the true spirit of Western civilization" (Cromer: 1908, Vol. 2, p. 538). And he further elucidates: "What is quite clear is, that if Western civilization is to be introduced into Egypt, it can only be done by Europeans, or by Egyptians who have imbibed the spirit of that civilization, and have acquired the knowledge necessary in order to apply Western methods of government" (p. 294).

In 1907 Cromer announced that he is tranquilly leaving Egypt having already formed the main base rule for the sustainability of the occupation, the *Alumma* party. Flagrantly, in the farewell the *Alumma* party held for Cromer's leave, Cromer swore at all Egyptians, but praised only one man, Saad Zaghloul.

Saad Zaghloul wrote about Cromer's leave and its impact on him in his memoirs, he was sitting in his house with Hassan Pasha Assem and Mahmoud Pasha Shoukry when they received the news of Cromer's resignation on 4 November 1907, "I was like someone who is heavily hit on the head or stabbed with a sharp object yet did not feel anything because of the intensity of pain he felt (Zaghloul: 1987, chapter 6, p. 240). "My head was filled with illusions, my heart strongly bet and my chest became was tightly fed" (Zaghloul: 1987, chapter 6, p. 246). Saad was among the first calling for bidding a farewell for Cromer, he never those who criticized Cromer

after his resignation and said “everybody agreed upon the perfection of his qualities” (Zaghloul: 1987, chapter 6, p. 245). For Saad’s relief, Cromer’s heir Eldon Gorst welcomed Saad when he visited him and accompanied him until the garden door of the British Agency.

In 1918 the *Alwafd* party, largely composed of the *Alumma* party fully loyal to the British the creators of Egyptian nationalism, did not gain the support of the Egyptians to speak on their behalf except after deceitfully announcing its adoption of the full program of the *Alwatani* party. *Alwafd* party tactically adopted the program of *Alwatani* party although the *Alwafd* and *Alumma* essential contradiction with the *Alwatani*, which was working on supporting the Muslim Unity, strengthening Egypt’s attachment to the Ottoman state, internationalizing of the Egyptian cause so as not to turn into an internal issue within the British empire, while reinforcing the Egyptian society through projects such as night schools the indigenous university project, and rejecting any negotiation before the announcement of full evacuation. Tamim Al Barghouti concluded:

As early as 1917, Egyptian politicians were drafting proposals for Egypt’s independence. All the drafts proposed, whether by Zaghloul or by his competitors, revolved around the idea of an Egyptian independence that would preserve British interests. The sponsors of all drafts agreed that the guarantees of preserving British interests would be the very terms of Egypt’s independence. The drafts, which differed more in form than in essence, were the tools by which the different Egyptian politicians competed for the recognition of the colonial power as representative of the Egyptian people. When the representative capacity of the elite, led by Zaghioul and supported by Yakan and Rusdi, was denied by the British High Commissioner in November 1918. They adopted the program of Al Hizb Al Watani, with which they gained the support of the native population and resorted to open rebellion. Yet, what was a strategy to the constituencies, was only a tactic to the leadership, since as soon as the representative capacity of the Wafd was recognized, it returned to the pre-revolution drafts and proposals (Al Barghouti: 2004, pp. 143-144).

[For example] Mohammad Hussain Haikal reports that, he met Lutfi Al Sayyid in Zaghioul house, and asked him whether the Wafd really believed that demanding British withdrawal and the right of self-determination was prudent, Lutfi clearly tells him that that is but a bargaining tactic to facilitate the only practical solution, which is to conduct direct negotiations with the British in London (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 101).

[T]he fact [is] that these demands were not the original demands of the elite ... after they were recognized as representatives of the Egyptian people, these radical demands were abandoned ... such demands look like a tactic to gain recognition rather than a strategy to gain independence (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 101).

There was not any relation between the vision of those who made the revolution, and the system it produced. The British made sure to create a system totally discrepant to the hopes and demands of the people. The liberal system, which was a typical extension of the colonial administration with its same figures, came as an effect of 1919 revolution. The period 1809-1922 was an introduction to the distorted liberalism applied between 1922-1952 and represented in the state

apparatus through a severe secularization of law and judicial system (*Alsanhori*: 1964; *Ouda*: 1967; *A. M. Shaker*: 1988; n.d.; 1992) although it was not accepted by the people nor did become a recognized life style. Liberalism was also represented by a group of Western civilization agents and flunkies who launched the largest offensive campaign in Egypt's history against religion, language, and morality, especially in culture and arts (*Abdelrazzaq & Ateyya*: 2010), but it was a unique occasion to reveal the extent to which the Muslim world can resist and by the early 1930 those flunkies admitted the impossibility of their task, so those who remained determined to promote Westernization was forced to chose a compromising approach (*altawfiqiyya-altalfiqiyya*) (*Hmaid*: n.d.). This mediation logic took place not only in terms of security arrangements and economic interests, but also on the level of culture and identity, "where an accommodation between the Arab Islamic identity of Egypt on the one hand, and western secular liberal Pharaonic nationalism, on the other was attempted" (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 232, see also: Reid: 2002; Badran: 1996; Ghannam: 2002; Khouri: 1971; *Alansari*: 1979; *Kadhem*: 2004).

Saad Zaghloul sent a letter to the British Commissioner saying: "I have nothing to do with politics from now, I shall close myself in my house, and I have no relationship with any events taking place or will take place in the future" (Latifa Salem: 2000). When the British realized the extent of Saad's defeatism they decided he was the right person they need to deliver him Egypt's government, which happened in January 1924 when Saad became prime minister, he was supposed to become another Atatürk. However, while creating Saad as a hero five Islamists assassinated the British commander of Sudan Lee Stack on his visit to Cairo (Mahmoud Metwally: 1985). The assassination spoiled the British plan, Sa'd was forced to resign and his role was so forth confined to the role of opposition in the bogus parliament until he died in 1927, a shrine was established for him in the Pharaonic style, which the *Alwafd* newspaper kept complaining of the people who have turned the tomb to rubbish dump.

From the 1919 revolution until the 1952 coup, the right wing of the bourgeoisie dominated the government through its minority parties, especially the *Aldostori Alhor* party the representative of the large land owners, and *Alsaadien* that was very connected with the two increasingly expanding sectors of the bourgeoisie: the industrial-financial sector and the independents who were representing the King and the foreigners-related interests (*Abdelmalek*: 2012). Egypt continued to be Lancashire's cotton farm, however the British increasingly desired Egypt would become its main imperial political and military base (*Abdelmalek*: 2013).

At that time, politically there were three forces in Egypt: the British, the king, and the *Alwafd* party. The *Alwatani* party was present, but it became very weak because its youth base was no longer content with political activism after they left the prison, so the youth groups lost the target and lacked the vision, some thought of assassinations, from which was those who assassinated Lee Stack. Because the King

became the weakest of the three forces at that time, he sought to form political parties to support his position, so the *Aleltihad* party was established in 1925 and Adli Yakan formed the *Alahrar Aldostouriyiyien* party. However, these parties did not receive but only sparse votes so they became known as the minority parties, and thus people looked at the *Alwafd* as the majority party. Although the fact is in this liberal era elections did not reflect the choice of the people, and was not promoted except by those who have family partisanships. In 1950 elections, the most important elections of this liberal era, only 5% of the Egyptian electorate participated (Azza Wahbi: 1985). Moreover, the King succeeded in denying the *Alwafd* any access to the parliament except very few times due to British pressures over the king. With WWII approaching, a front was formed to negotiate with the British including all the parties except the *Alwatani* who boycotted it and kept firm with its no negotiation until full evacuation motto. The negotiations ended with the Alnahhas signature over 1936 treaty with the British. The 1936 treaty was significantly telling, it revealed:

1- ... the whole state was defined and structured in a manner that would guarantee its functioning as a colony 2- these documents were reached through competition among the ranks of the native elite, who competed to prove to the colonial master, with whose power they wanted to be entrusted, how trustworthy they were in guaranteeing colonial interests 3- the national leaders also competed in how much control they could exert over their native constituencies: their discourse to the masses naturally contradicted their discourse to colonial power, yet their appeal to the masses was part of their appeal to the colonial power i.e. **controlling the masses was a tactic in the strategy of proving their abilities to colonize the country rather than liberate it** (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 291-292, emphasis added by AbduRahman).

Al Barghouti concluded:

[The treaty] was the last of a group of documents that expressed the logic of replacement. The treaty was mainly the fruit of the competition for representation between Nahhas' Wafd and the Constitutional Liberals ... **The independence they were both seeking was one designed to guarantee the execution of British policies with Egyptian hands**" (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 181-182, emphasis added by AbduRahman).

Militarily:

Before World War II, military service was compulsory for men between the ages of nineteen and twenty-seven, but because of the limited size of the army—about 23,000 in 1939—few were actually conscripted. During World War II, Egypt's army grew to about 100,000 troops. Britain maintained a strong influence in the military and provided it with equipment, instruction, and technicians. Under the terms of the 1936 treaty, British troops remained in the country to defend the Suez Canal. During the war, Egypt became the principal Allied base in the Middle East ... Some Egyptians flew patrol duty in British planes with British pilots during the war, and Egypt inaugurated a naval service with a few patrol boats supplied by Britain. Egyptians were used primarily for guard duty and logistical tasks rather than for combat (Metz: 1990, p. 295-296).

Importantly, the 1936 Treaty eliminated the British vestige of having a British general at the top of the Egyptian military. This led to drastic changes as Egypt expanded the army, making it possible for young middle-class Egyptians to enroll in the Military Academy and pursue a subsequent army career (Metz: 1990). However, King Fouad was determined to maintain the continuity of the military loyalty at any price, so he appointed Mohammad Haidar Pasha as the general commander, later Haidar Pasha will become the military minister in Farouk's time then in Nasser's era. Mohammad Haidar was a police officer who earned his notorious fame by shooting the demonstrators in 1919 revolution then he ascended in posts until becoming the manager of the prison apparatus. After his appointment, Mohammad Haidar undertook the mission of filtering the army by expelling any non pro-British or non pro-the King members (*Najieb*: 1984). The military was the force upon which the King depended to impose his dictatorship through minority parties. However, the King was merely the shade of the British, for they were the only real force in Egypt at that time. For example, when Rommel was approaching Egypt in 1942 with his armies, some Egyptian student demonstrations broke out welcoming him. In 14 February Sampson, the British high commissioner, ordered the British tanks to besiege the Khedive's Palace, ordering him either to appoint Alnahhas as prime minister or be himself disposed. After less than an hour, Alnahhas became the prime minister (*Shalabi*: 1990, vol. 10, pp. 72-73).

On the other hand, King Farouk (1937-1952) in alliance with the British totally controlled the military (Vatikiotis: 2012), the military was at the king's service and thus the British's (*Shalabi*: 1989, vol. 9, pp. 40-42). On the day of Cairo Burn a military officer stood in the party the King had and said: "the military is the king's sword" (*Alboghdadi*: 1977, p. 42).

The military participated in the Cairo Burn, which some believe it was an American plot (Woddis: 1978). On the black Saturday 26 January 1952, the British reported: "the Egyptian armed forces are considered not only unsupportive to the Egyptian government, they have even expressed their desire to avoid any collision with the British, the Egyptian army units in the Canal area accept our supervision over their moves. The Egyptian military outside the Canal area promised to get off our way" (*Heikal*: 2004, p. 695). Although some Egyptian officers joined the armed resistance to the British, the military as an institution was against any revolution, furthermore it soon resumed its role of serving the Regime. When it was given orders to set a curfew, the military executed immediately. Interestingly, when Cairo was burning the large land owners were still in control of the political stage banning any change in the class structure.

Significantly, the targeted buildings in the Cairo Burn "represented the trio of Secular Egyptian liberalism, foreign military occupation, and dependent capitalist economy" (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 232). Al Barghouti further comments:

The Burning of Cairo, and the coup of the Free Officers six months later, brought to an end the trilateral combination of Egyptian nationalism, economic dependency and

parliamentary rule leading to negotiations with Great Britain, which were the essence of the strategy of replacement. In essence, the Wafd was not being punished for what it did it was being punished for what it was. The very elements that caused it to exist, i.e. the functions of representation and replacement, were the very elements that caused its doom, and that is the paradox (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 295).

However, within the military the officers were on the brink of disruption, anger had prevailed since the shameful 1948 catastrophe when the Zionist gangs defeated seven Arab armies and colonized Palestine, four thousand Egyptians were killed out of the 20 thousand troops sent to Palestine. The Egyptian army suffered from lethal problems with arms and equipment due to its primitive military education, some argued the weapons were corrupt, however they were not, the real problem was the officers did not know how to use them, the weapons were more sophisticated than they knew (*Alshazly*: 2003). After the 1948 war, the military doctrine changed to dictate that the enemy is coming from the East: Israel, this will remain for a long time to come. Other substantial changes in the military doctrine occurred: Who are we? A national Arab military dreaming of the Arab unity completely distrust civilians, what do we do? We reform the military, unite the Arab, and liberate our land, How do we do that? By dictatorship and centralization of power, opposition means death or jail. These changes will surface after the 1952 military coup.

The government proposed a law allowing her to revoke the Egyptian nationality from any person doing any revolutionary propoganda, the law provoked furious demonstrations. The King thought of using the *Alwafd* party to soothe the outraged people. So, elections were held and the *Alwafd* won. Some historians are still confused about explaining how the King and the *Alwafd* resolved their historical contradictions and how *Alwafd* abandoned its “revolutionary” history and adopted the law the King proposed. However this is very logical and understandable since *Alwafd* was no more than a political functional group. The revolutionary atmosphere of the 1910s and the party’s tactical endorsement of a revolutionary discourse concealed the real nature of the party especially with the British being very attentive about pulling the strings only from behind, however the circumstantial transformations forced them to play the game on the stage, for *Alwafd* revolution was just a tactic to win the competition with other parties over the position of replacing the imperial British.

The *Alwafd* firmly confronted social violence. The *Alwafd* last government was very rogue that it formed a team to assassinate the labor strike leaders in Alexandria and the *Kafr Aldawwar* factories, the assassins used to dump the dead bodies in the *Almahmoudiyya* conduit. However, this did not stop the labor strikes, in 1950 49 strikes happened and increased to 200 in the following year, moreover some peasant revolts occurred like those of *Kafr Nigom* and *Bihot*, many newspapers were confiscated by the government, martial law was declared, and Egypt was a despotic military state with a parliament (Vatikiotis: 2012; *Hmaid*: n.d.). Egypt was at the brink of a revolution. 0.5% of the landowners owned 50% of land space (3 of 6 million acres), and another 0.5% of the landowners owned another quarter of the

space. The land owned by any normal peasant family, if they were lucky, was no more than few acres on average, most of the peasants were starving and impecuniously destitute without any owned land nor with an ability to hire one (*Hmaid*: n.d.). “Between October 1951 and Black Saturday, all socio-economic strata, political organizations, professional societies, and segments of the rural centers united in a popular uprising” (T. Ismael & J. Ismael: 2011, p. 348). Furthermore, “the period from late 1951 to the launch of the *coup d’état* on July 23, 1952 was one of widespread militant radicalization in opposition to monarchical despotism and the British use of naked force” (T. Ismael & J. Ismael: 2011, p. 349).

Most probably the British were behind the conciliation between the King and the *Alwafd*, the latter two were no more than pawns in the game. Later on, the King conspired with the British to stop the armed resistance led by the Muslim Brotherhood against the British army in the Suez Canal through a plan to burn Cairo. The conspirators meant also to expel the *Alwafd* from government (*Hamroush*: 1977, p. 295). But why the British turned against the *Alwafd*, the party they, in way or another, created themselves. Simply the *Alwafd* became outdated and consumed, incapable of mobilizing the masses anymore, and more importantly uncontrollable in an increasingly turbulent environment. Some of the real patriots of the party exceeded the limits and participated in the armed resistance against the British in the Canal. Making use of the situation, the foxy leaders of the party encouraged them and used them to bargain with the British and pressure them. Fouad Serageddin, the prominent youth figure of *Alwafd*, supported and funded the armed resistance against the British even after becoming the interior minister in 1950, he was planning to explode the Suez Canal to expel the British (*Kishk*: 1988).

The Cairo fire on 26 January 1952 was either the last move of MI6, or the first operation of the CIA, or a joint operation by them both (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 101; *Gardner*: 2013, p. 64; *Alshammari*: 2013), according to the documents of the US department of state the British were expecting and seeking what happened in Cairo on the morning of 26 January 1952. Julius Holmes, minister–counselor in the United Kingdom, sent a message to the US secretary of state, suggesting: “what is needed now is taking any measure supporting the King to take an action against the *Alwafd*”, this was further echoed in a meeting between the American and British ministers on 9 January 1952 (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 102-103). In his book *Descent to Suez*, the former British diplomat Evelyn Shuckburgh (1986) wrote diaries on the period 1951–56, significantly although he was at the heart of affairs in London, as the principal private secretary to the foreign secretary Anthony Eden, Shuckburgh did not mention a letter about Cairo Fire as if it did not happen. It seems the English gentleman who burnt Cairo was too honest to lie about history, so he becomes a blind-deaf monkey unable to write history (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 199). On 17 January 1952 the British ambassador in Egypt stated: “whatever the policy of the coming government will be, what is important is we have got rid of the *alwafd*” (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 77).

On 8 March 1952 the American ambassador in Egypt sent a confidential letter to the foreign ministry warning of a revolution led by an alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood, the *Alwafd*, and the left, he also said: "the possibility of mass revolution and chaos in Egypt cannot be excluded, we are swiftly approaching the point of no return and if Egypt proceeded on this way I extremely doubt the Middle East will survive". When the American and British foreign ministers met on 28 June 1952, they agreed on the same idea. However, in October 1951 Time magazine had remarkably published an article about America's readiness to replace Britain, which became no longer able to control Egypt. The Americans decided to displace Britain from Egypt and replace them in the Middle East for their own interest (Heikal: 1986). Miles Copeland (1970) revealed the CIA formed a committee of specialists headed by Kermit Roosevelt to study affairs of the Middle East and presented its report early 1952 after a visit to Cairo in February 1952, Roosevelt's mission was exactly to organize a peaceful revolution led by the King through which he shall eliminate and replace all the old regime (p. 15), "thereby defusing the revolutionary forces which CIA agents had identified as much as two years earlier and which were by then reported to be on the verge of bubbling over" (p. 62). However King Farouk was totally drunk every time the committee members met him, so they reported: "the King has lost control of his senses". Besides, all the other forces and organizations were either part of the failed regime or rejected by the United States. The military was the only able institution to resolve the situation for the Americans, for the power it possessed, and most importantly its history of being a mercenary for the British and Western powers, the Americans were sure the Egyptian military will avoid any collision with the United States because it is not an ideological army (*Hmaid*: n.d.).

For the replacement process to succeed, it is inevitable to dismantle the patriotic movement especially any Islamic component, disperse the popular forces, cripple the political life, dissolve the parties and syndicates, and put the authority in hands of a dictator who does not believe in the separation of powers. This conditions for success of the American strategy was never to be fulfilled except by a military coup, a "sweeper", this made the Americans turn to the military and Nasser's organization and use them (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 108).

The further American objectives of orchestrating and supporting a coup in Egypt, according to a message from US secretary of state Dean Acheson to the American embassy in Cairo on 30 September 1952, was to override the Palestinian question and protect the security and safety of Israel, to hook Egypt within the American defense projects (especially the Middle East Defense Organization, MEDO), and to consolidate the US control over the Middle East (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 304; *Gardner*: 2013, p. 65-66).

Thus 1952 coup was not a product of the Arab Israeli contradiction, nor is it of the Islamic Western contradiction. But it was a consequence of the US British contradiction. Revealingly, M. H. Heikal reported a meeting between Nasser and the

US extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador in Egypt Jefferson Caffery in *Abdelmoneim Amin's* apartment. Conspicuously, Heikal conveyed Nasser accepted and furthermore, most significantly he did so not arbitrarily but deliberately, volunteered to declare that Israel does not bother his mind. This is the most important point in Nasser's meeting with the Americans, Copeland later said this action by Nasser and his indifference about Palestine opened up Washington's heart to support the forthcoming coup (*see Kishk: 1988, p. 162*). Who is Jefferson Caffery? Caffery was the oldest ambassador in the US diplomatic corps being in service since 1911, he was the most famous expert in the state department on constructing military coups with a record reaching almost 30 coups in Central and South America. His achievement in France after WWII was significant, he was appointed as extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador and he engineered the expulsion of Charles de Gaulle and communists out of government and enticement of the socialists to be on the American side, France then became ready for being the base for the Marshall Project and later NATO (*Hamroush: 1977*. Check more information about Caffery's role: Makkar: 1989; Emam: 1984).

So, the American solution to the challenge of the expected revolution was to preemptively strike the real revolution by a military coup virtually disguised as a revolution. While functioning as a watershed for the people's aspiration for change, independence, freedom, and justice, the coup's real function was to change and replace the old incompetent functional group (the liberal regime, the king, the *Alwafd*) with another one, however, serving the US this time not Britain (*see Kishk: 1988, pp. 104, 190*).

So, the American solution, as determined by the joint meeting of the US state department and the joint chiefs of staff of the American army on 2 May 1951, was to create loyal military functional groups serving the US interests (*Polk: 1965*) with high competence and cheaply. This was the American breakthrough in the art of imperialism (compare with Churchill's plan in Iraq after WWI, (*Fromkin: 1992, p. 360*) developed the art of American imperialism, it uniquely rationalized power in an unprecedented way. M. J. Kishk reveals the momentous consequent achievement:

80 thousand British soldiers in Egypt could not coerce the Egyptian people to accept joint defense of Turkey nor separating Sudan, nor could they dissolve the *Alwafd* or try the interior minister who conspired while he was in the government to blow-up the Suez Canal in order to expel the British out of Egypt. However, all this was achieved by the Egyptian military amid the masses chants and in the name of the mortal revolution. So who really did serve America more? The maniac generals who kept demanding the use of the navy and air forces, or the CIA men who put 'the required kind' on the top of the authority in Egypt?! (1988).

But what is "the required kind" the CIA agents were searching for? "The required kind" was simply a potential military functional group enjoying the following qualities (Copeland: 1970, *Kishk: pp. 193-197*). First, a power-hungry leader person who adores power and does not allow any participation in it, is ready to destroy

everything in order to remain in power, potentially is an effective leader, has the ability to unite people around fear, and most importantly this leader should have the authority of taking an unpopular decision from which American and the leader himself benefit. Nasser was this power hungry leader with the potential of becoming a bloody ruthless tyrant. Copeland defined the base of America's relation with Nasser: we must always remember, while dealing with Nasser, the repression base is the most important thing for him, "repression is primary" (Copeland: 1970, p. 290).

Second, the presence an organized group to hold the coup, the power-hungry person must ready to share the trophy (not power) with his followers in order to ensure the growth and sustainability of the functional group. In the case of Egypt, this group was the Free Officers who transformed to be power centers and later to the officers republic. Third, the leader must be someone who can afford the loss resulting from the unpopular decision, he must be able to some adapt our victory so that it does not become necessarily a defeat for him, while his fanatic masses see it through different lens as a sweeping victory of their inspired leader. This happened with all the spectacular catastrophes brought by Nasser: the defeat of 56 and 67, the separation from Syria, and the Yemen war.

Thus, the regime should provide a daily "meal" for the masses: a material meal (American economic aid would take care of this), and a moral "meal" (revolutionary preambles, victory in fake battles, fights against windmills, etc.). Thus, there is a central role for the media and propaganda machine in any functional group. M. H. *Heikal*, the American cultural agent who replaced the British agent Ahmad Amin, revealed the robust role of the Media machine:

The press in any country is part of its political life, and cannot be otherwise. In the Third World politics is not just a conflict of social interests, intellectual currents, and future visions, but it is also bloody wars for survival, apparent and hidden battles, and ambitions and plots. It is plans of superpowers playing with the fates and magnitudes of people, trying to impose its control over others taming zeal and dismounting their confidence until they become ready to accept anything, and then reshape their ideas and dreams in many ways beginning from a word and image and ending with the cannon and tank (*Heikal*: 1985).

This is the genesis of the American solution in Egypt, to achieve the American strategy of replacing Britain in the Middle East the US orchestrated and supported military coups (Shlaim: 1995; *Alnabulsy*: 2003), which avoids the dangers of real popular revolutions by delivering superficial social achievements while consolidating the authoritative power of the regime loyal to US imperialism threatening and fighting popular democracy. In other words, the dictator ruled in an absolute manner enjoying a constructed popularity allowing him to impose decisions and actions (or rather accepting the Americans orders and demands) rejected by his people and any other regime in the normal circumstances (see: *Kishk*: 1988, p. 197).

Nasser was the dictator America was looking for (see Stewart Alsop's and Joseph Alsop's articles in the Chicago Sun Times: *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 177-178). Nasser was "the required kind" of leader, according to US intelligence they were looking for a leader not only a cat's paw, Nasser was the dictator, the game could not continue without him (Copeland: 1970; *Kishk*: 1988, p. 182).

Nasser's coup was a preemptive abortion of a real and comprehensive popular revolution that was on the brink of being effected in late 1940s (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 80-86, 117-171; *Gardner*: 2013, p. 23) the people's activism exceeded the existing organized movements failing to rise to the level of the people's aspiration (*Albishri*: 2002), the interior minister himself participated in the armed resistance against the British forces and planned to blow up the Suez Canal to expel them. The British devised RODEO plan in 1951 fall, the plan was prepared for execution at the very night of Cairo Fire, but it was not implemented because "the Americans were not fully with the British" (*Heikal*: 2004, p. 242). In short, the coup was a manifestation of the ruthless imperialist will to crush the Egyptian's revolution and hopes.

CHAPTER 4

THE GANG AND THE “MISRABLES”: REINSTALLING THE AUTOMATON

Historians and researchers unaware of the secret history of the events, cannot explain for example why Nasser avoided the war with Israel when victory was probable, while he led his country to an inevitably losing war - Miles Copeland (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 20).

In the Third World politics is not just a conflict of social interests, intellectual currents, and future visions, but it is also bloody wars for survival, apparent and hidden battles, and ambitions and plots.

It is plans of superpowers playing with the fates and magnitudes of people, trying to impose its control over others taming their zeal and dismantling their confidence until they become ready to accept anything, and then reshape their ideas and dreams in many ways beginning from the word and image and ending with the cannon and tank - (*Heikal*: 1985).

The Free Officers relation with the US began in March 1952 - Khaled Mohy Eldin (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 123).

It was clear the CIA initiated a giant operation in Egypt, perhaps the biggest of kind since the establishment of the CIA - Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 261).

On the 23rd of February 1953, eight months after Nasser's military coup, the Egyptian ambassador to Washington Mohamed Kamel Abdulrahim made a revealing TV interview with the CBS *Longines Chronoscope* public affairs program, the interview was saved in the US national archive, Abdulrahim said:

Egypt's ambassador to Washington: We are ready to assume the sole responsibility for the Suez area, we have an army of one hundred thousand. We need some equipment, with this equipment we could be ready to defend our country and I can assure you **the country can defend its territory better than any other foreigners** ... this is limited to our possibilities of budget and so forth but ... we could raise up to one million soldiers.

The interviewer: Well that brings us to perhaps the most interesting point sir, here in America our policy for a long time has been to expand a military power in the Middle East, the Middle East is a power vacuum, it is an immensely rich area, 60% of the oil reserve of the earth, and we of course we as an American nation **we want to create a**

powerful military force in the Middle East and we want it to be Egypt ... you can support an army of million people, can't you?!

Egypt's ambassador to Washington: we can support but you know, the the the the the expenses of the new army is...

The interviewer: you can supply the man power?

Egypt's ambassador to Washington: we can supply the man power and we could through our budget also help in differing the expenses, some of the expenses ... **if US finds it for its interest to have a strong Egypt well equipped as it had found for its interests to have a strong Turkey well equipped in the North Eastern Middle East ... we are ready to have this aid, no doubt about it.**

The interviewer: I believe it is **the announced policy of our state department now that we want it, we want to help create such power** you suggest and the questions ... are these: first of all, how dependable would a strong Egypt be in the conflict between the West and Russia, **would you be a dependable ally?**

Egypt's ambassador to Washington: **we have been always dependable** during the last two world wars, in WWI we rendered a great service to our friends, the Western powers. The last world war we did the same thing, I don't find anything to the contrary for the any future war ...

The interviewer: Well Mr. Ambassador just looking ahead a little bit, **suppose you have your army** of a million, suppose they are equipped and supplied by the Americans and may be you got your training some help in that way. **Is there any chance at all of this big armed force being used aggressively against Israel?**

Egypt's ambassador to Washington: **I don't think there is any, any chance at all** of that thought, because we need the army for our defense, for the defense of our country. And we have no aggressive intentions whatsoever against anybody.

Confirming another message from US secretary of state Dean Acheson to the American embassy in Cairo on 30 September 1952, this interview outlined the three pillars that will govern Egypt since the 1952 Nasser's military coup: 1) inscribing Egypt into the US strategy of consolidating its control over the Middle East, 2) maintaining zero-threat to Israel who is to be perceived as a friend not an enemy: overriding the Palestinian question and protecting the security and safety of Israel, and 3) hooking Egypt within the American defense projects through maintaining, arming and training the Egyptian military to perform military and security mandates. These pillars are still intact till today, "indeed, with some minor adjustments, Washington's establishment of relations with Nasser's government can serve as the most promising template for a stable and productive relationship between the United States and Egypt today" (Springborg: 2013).

Nasser's military coup was the opening chapter of America's imperial control in the Middle East, Nasser was an excretion of the US-UK contradiction, he was the American way of replacing "Great" Britain, "not simply as a disastrous epilogue to Empire, but as one stage in the process by which **the United States sought to**

supplant the old imperialism with a new form of hegemony not as an episode that can safely be consigned to the history books, but as one act in a drama that is still played” (Heikal : 1986, p. xi, emphasis added by the source). Nasser is nothing but “a chapter in the play: ‘the British King died, the American president lived’ or in a Shakespearian expression: Nasserism was the slave the American son used to assassinate the British old father and inherit his herd and men” (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 41). The American way of dealing with the US-UK dispute over the Middle East was to support and orchestrate military coups against the British regimes, and the game begun with Syria, then Egypt, to Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Iran, etc. (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 47). This transformation was embodied in the Eisenhower Doctrine, "the English translation of this was that no one would be allowed to dominate, or have excessive influence, over the Middle East and its oil fields except the United States, and that anyone who tried would be, by definition, communist" (Hamm: 2005, p. 209), indeed Richard Crossman’s incident was one of the simple yet extremely revealing examples (see: *Kishk*: 1988, p. 49-50).

Mohammad Galal Kishk eloquently described how the US stunningly developed the art of imperialism:

Great Britain, while having around half a million soldiers colonizing Egypt, and in a time of a world war, needed to besiege Farouk’s palace with tanks and put a gun in his head to impose her point of view concerning Egypt’s prime minister! Ten years later the American ambassador’s whispering was absolutely enough to impose his point of view without any need for American tanks as the Egyptian tanks had already taken the task of the American tanks unfortunately. I do not think Egypt was one day more dependent than those days, nor do I think the American ambassador enjoyed such a compliance of a semi-independent government (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 170).

The dispute between Miles Copeland (1970) and Wilbur Crane Eveland (1980) over the reason for America’s failure in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s corroborates claiming the 1952 coup was purely American. In his book, Copeland (1970) argues the CIA plan to support and make the coup succeed was precise, but the other American apparatuses corrupted the plan causing the concomitant contradiction then collision between Cairo and Washington. On the contrary, Eveland (1980) offers another narrative expressing how intimidated he was at that time while he was serving at the American department of state, “in a closed room, with the defense department and operations coordination office representatives, Miles Copeland told them that Kermit Roosevelt was the one who created the new president of Egypt” (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 255-256). In the English edition of his book *Cutting the lion's tail*, Mohammad Hassanein Heikal mentioned the story of the CIA men who consecutively came to Egypt before the coup, on the top of whom were: William Lakeland (the political officer in the embassy), Kermit Roosevelt (the secretary of state personal delegate), and Miles Copeland (CIA director deputy for the Middle East affairs), Heikal commented: “it was clear the American intelligence was managing an operation separate from the embassy and more effective” (p. 47). Kishk (1988) confirms Roosevelt came to Cairo at least since 1943, was in Egypt

from January through March or May where he had the historical meeting with King Farouk then with Nasser's group in the Free Officers and decided to support the coup of this group and abandoning Farouk (p. 163). Who is Kermit Roosevelt? Kermit Roosevelt came to Egypt during WWII, had a close relationship with the king, stood by his side through 4th February 1942 crisis, and set his meeting with President Franklin Roosevelt on his visit to Egypt in 1945 (Kishk: 1988, p. 175).

Although some mentioned "Nasser was in contact with the CIA officer Stevenson during the WWII" (Barber: 2012, p. 374), we cannot take it as an evidence for granted, but we may consider it a supporting presumption. Nevertheless, Nasser-CIA relation definitely began at least on March 1952 (see: *Kishk*: 1988, p. 184), Copeland confirmed the contact person between the Free Officers and the CIA was an officer in the Egyptian intelligence (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 174; Eveland: 1980, p. 320), moreover, Heikal himself was the personal contact person between Nasser and the CIA (Eveland: 1980; *Kishk*: 1988). According to the member of the Free Officers Khaled Mohy Eldin, the Free Officers relation with the US began in March 1952 (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 123), before the coup, the Free Officers appeased the USA, Khaled Mohy Eldin testified: "being cautious not to anger the US starter on March 1952 when discussion arose upon using the expression 'Anglo American imperialism' in the leaflets, and the desire to limit it to British imperialism" (Hamrosh: 1977, p. 150; Shalabi: 1989, p. 83; *Kishk*: 1988, p. 83). In his book *Farouk of Egypt*, Barrie St. Clair McBride (1967) mentioned Nasser was seen with one of the American embassy officials in Alexandria in 1951. Barry Rubin confirmed "Kermit Roosevelt first met Nasser in January 1953, and from that time on CIA officers kept in close contact with him ... the CIA gave the Free Officers a great deal of organizational, logistical, and even ideological advice through 1953 and 1954" (Rubin: 1982, p. 80). One of the Free Officers, Hussien Hamoda revealed in his book *Pages of Egypt's History* Nasser maintained personal contact with the American military attaché between 1950-1952 (*Hamoda*: 1985). Mohammad Najieb, the first president of Egypt and the eldest officer of the Free Officers, referred four times in his memoirs (1984) to Nasser's relation with the CIA. Mostafa Amin, one of the most famous journalists, was jailed in Nasser's time due to charges of contacting CIA members, he sent a message to Nasser from his jail saying: "and I knew that the revolution leaders knew that all those men are of the American CIA but they found interest in contacting them" (*Amin*: 1984; *Heikal*: 1985, p. 188; *Kishk*: 1989, p. 130).

This patron-client relation between Nasser and the CIA was robust and produced exceptional results on the short run, e.g.: the amazingly easy success of the coup, preventing any British intervention, forcing Britain to withdraw from Sudan, opposing the Anglo-French aggression, yet on the long run when their interests stopped intersecting Nasser was totally exposed, especially concerning the Arab Israeli conflict and the Arab unity (see more: *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 22-23), *Kishk* (1988) emphasized the role of Israel and the Zionist lobby and its influence over the American institutions especially with the personal emotive nature of Nasser's foreign policy who thought that his secret relation with the CIA will solve the Israeli

influence problem and achieve all his demands surpassing the Congress and the state department.

In a few hours after the coup, Abdelrazzaq Alsanhuri was nominated to be prime minister, however Ali Sabri whispered in Gamal Salem's ear then the latter said he respects Alsanhuri but the American will oppose this nomination, because some Western papers attributed leftist tendencies to him when he signed the call for peace, and this was a sufficient reason to disregard the nomination of Alsanhuri (*Najieb*: 1975, p. 51-52; *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 168-169).

The CIA-Nasser relation persisted although Najieb's opposition, Najieb once saw Kermit Roosevelt in Nasser's office at the "revolution" command council (RCC), he warned of the "revolution" relation with the CIA, yet the relation continued (*Najieb*: 1975). The officer Mohammad Abunar, who was the manager of Salah Salim's office, mentioned that Salim's visit to Sudan was co-prepared by the American ambassador Caffery (*Hamroush*: 1977, p. 381). Mostafa Amin claimed Najieb's opposition was due to his desire to seize the exclusive access to the Americans and use their support in his fight in the "revolution" command council. Few days after the coup, the American ambassador was the only ambassador to attend the departure of King Farouk.

Nasser and his officers were extremely keen to satisfy America at the expense of their country's interest, they adopted the American anti-democratic position, this anti-democratic position was particularly required by the Americans who needed it for achieving the replacement of the British in Egypt and the Middle East (see the third meeting between Copeland and the Free Officers in March 1952: *Kishk*: 1988, p. 229), and the officers fulfilled the American demand of eliminating Najieb and disregarding Alsanhuri upon direct directives from Caffery (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 168-170). The incident of Yussuf Siddiq, whose effort was indispensable for the success of the coup (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 208), is also significant and telling (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 83).

The Nasserist historian Abdelazim Ramadan reveals another aspect:

The 23rd July revolution endorsed a policy against the precedent revolutionary Egyptian forces that terribly plagued imperialism, a policy most exaggerating imperialist would not have dreamt of. For in 20 months only this revolution had toppled Alwafd, imprisoned the communists, dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood then also imprisoned its members, wiped away the socialist party of *Masr Alfatah*, excluded the masses of political activism, and imposed the officers' political tutelage over Egypt. As if the revolution got rid of one Farouk to create numerous Farouks instead ... the revolution imposed an era of terrorism the fascist systems itself did not know (*Ramadan*: 1986, p. 49-52).

The CIA took full advantage of this opportunity to penetrate Egypt on all levels (Woodward: 2007). The CIA even created the Egyptian intelligence upon Kermit Roosevelt's recommendation, Nasser's encouragement, and Miles Copeland's supervision as Heikal revealed (2004). Before the coup, upon Kermit Roosevelt's advice the air force intelligence officer Ali Sabri was sent for a training in America

and became an agent of the CIA and one of the closest officers to Nasser (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 22, 143). After the coup, the CIA provided its expertise of establishing and organizing the intelligence, and the strategic institute was established in *Elgizeera* tower, which the CIA paid the cost of its construction (see Hamroush's account of Farid Tolan, the manager of the institute: *Hamroush*: 1977; *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 238-239; *Heikal*: 2004, p. 328). The CIA also technically and expertise-wise established the most famous Arab radio (*etha'at saut alarab*) (Eveland: 1980). US direct support for 1952 coup was not only political (Makkar: 1989; Emam: 1984), but also diplomatic and financial (Stewart: 1981).

[Although the Cairo Burn] signaled the failure of the colonially created state, one designed to independently function as a colony, just like an automaton is designed to do on its own, what other design it to do ... **The coup ... restored some of the remnants of the burnt parts of Cromer's creature** ... [Nasser] clung to the colonially created nation state as a structure for social organization ... he kept trying to drive Cromer's automaton, kicking it, repairing it, changing some of its tools, yet not burning it all together (Al Barghouti: 2004, p. 283, emphasis added).

So to conclude, what happened in 1952 was not a revolution, but a mere military coup fully supported and orchestrated by the US to pursue the American Strategy after WWII. The idea of a coup or a revolution was not even imagined by the whole Free Officers except Nasser and few others, as revealed by Tharwat Okasha the member of the Free Officers (1990, p. 11).

Anwar Abdelmalek (2013; 2012) concluded the evolution of Nasser's regime in three stages. In the first stage (1952-1956), the officers altered the power structure by excluding the ancient elite and replacing the British or French minded technocrats with American and German minded officers and technocrats. The officers completely seized the state apparatus (the cabinet, economic companies, local governors and administrators, interior and police, media, prisons, courts, universities, sports clubs, and others) (see: *Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 103-106, 229-232, 331-332, 642), the high and critical posts were occupied by intelligence officers (*Hamroush*: 1984). Nasser formed a group of supporters from the second rank officers and put them in critical posts in the state apparatus, and through them Nasser control the hinges of the state. Furthermore, Nasser maintained a high level of animosity between them so that they do not threaten his power (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 449).

The declaration of the republic on the 19th of June 1953 was the onset of the officers' rush to seize the civil posts, yet their economic and social program remained totally obscure. A similar opacity and indeterminacy envired both internal and external relations. Nevertheless, "when the officers consolidated their grip over power they increased their foreign policy activity, especially towards the US and Britain" (Abdelmalek: 2013, p. 118).

Form the beginning, the officers sent clear invitations ... to foreign capital. Jefferson Caffery, the US ambassador to Cairo, had maintained very friendly relations with the

military group, and his assistants, especially Assistant Air Attaché David Evans and his counselor ... enjoyed the same kind of relations ... the US objective was clear: to earn a commitment from the new regime, which did not hide its animosity towards the communists, to join, in a way or another, a military apparatus for the collective defense of the Middle East (Abdelmalek: 2013, 118-119).

Jon B. Alterman concluded Nasser's foreign policy in this four-year stage consistently attempted to win significant large-scale US' and West's foreign assistance (2002; 1998). Nasser's desperate need for economic and military aid turned him to the US from the very first day, however conditioned promises were all what he got. Nasser was frustrated as the Eisenhower Administration worked first to win the Egyptians then later it worked to contain and marginalize Nasser.

In the second stage (1956-1961), Nasser exclusively seized the-power-to-politically-decide, not just controlled the state apparatus. The military emphasized its control over the-power-to-decide in the economic, social, and ideological domains, while maintaining its firm grip over the general public life. Furthermore, the military formed an alliance with the financial and industrial sectors of the bourgeoisie (especially *Majmo'at Masr*), however for the Free Officers this alliance was mainly limited to economy whilst the-power-to-decide should remain the officers' indisputably exclusive domain.

Significantly, since Nasser the political decision became completely individualized and almost completely attached to the president's desires. Through various control and surveillance mechanisms the president was able to control, marginalize, and excluded the political elite from the decision making process, Maysa Algamal (1998) concluded this elite was never changed or replaced but recycled.

Nasser foreign relations dramatically changed from seeking aid from the US and the West to the USSR. Many factors interplayed here: the American reluctance, the fake feeling of glory and power Nasser had at Bandung, the arms agreements with Czechoslovakia, and the High Dam. However, "in 12 October [1958] John Foster Dallas, who had declared in 6 April that 'the US in completely concerted with President Nasser', declared the resumption of the American aid to Egypt, and the first payment reached \$13 million" (Abdelmalek: 2013, p. 143).

In the third stage (1961-1967), Nasser totally seized firm control over Egypt's economy, the officers controlled the economy and they did it the hard way:

With the advent of 1962, all banks, heavy industries, insurance companies, main economic projects, became state-owned, furthermore, all mid-sized economic units had to accept a governmental 51% share of its capital, hence its management ... the whole economic activity net was included into the recently created 'public enterprises', which numbered 38 at the beginning" (Abdelmalek: 2013, p. 18).

The officer's seizure of Misr Bank and the national Egyptian bank, the two main financial wings of Egypt, was the turning point in the alliance between the industrial and financial bourgeoisie and the officers, the conflict of the-power-to-decide in the

economic and social domain ruined the alliance (*Abdelmalek: 2013*). The officers socially and politically crushed the industrial-financial bourgeoisie after years of alliance. Furthermore, the officers swept the posts of the state apparatus

The officers ... received prime posts of the state, comprising the vast majority of senior diplomatic figures, a high percentage of public institutions' presidents, managers, and board members, etc., a very big number of ministers, minister deputies, and ministries undersecretaries, and a high percentage of key posts in culture, journalism, media, radio, and television (*Abdelmalek: 2013, p. 27*).

After Yemen war, a new rank was created: General (*Fariq Awwal*) leading to a considerable increase in the class of senior officers. The senior officers gained more weight in terms of the power-to-decide on both levels: politically and militarily (*Abdelmalek: 2013*). The government and the state apparatus (especially the intelligence, and military and interior ministers) became in the hands of the officers. Regarding foreign relations, Nasser accomplished a full circle going nowhere, "by the mid-1963 half of Egypt's wheat imports was coming from the USA, while Western Germany received a phenomenal number of Egyptian students ... meanwhile, a network of loans and joint projects was being set up" (*Abdelmalek: 2013, p. 20*).

[Under the officers' rule] the only expected thing is vanishing - Anwar Abdelmalek (2013, p. 169).

Military rule means only one thing: absolute submission to the officers. Although the officers did the coup in the name of the people, the officers never returned to their barracks and the people never got power. Since 1952, Egypt has been governed by a strong military-controlled state apparatus and economic technocracy, the officers created a new class of managers (*Abdelmalek: 2013*), and the officer corps became organically merged with the economic, administrative, and political apparatuses. Moreover, the people suffered also from the intellectual and ideological emptiness and the political wallow of the officers leading to political oscillations and fragmentations (e.g.: *Hamroush: 1977, p. 30, 433; Shalabi: 1989, pp. 65, 80; Alboghdadi: 1977, pp. 63, 46*).

The 1952 coup was not a revolution that ended up to a coup, it was a coup from the very first day and remained a coup, and anything else is a mere camouflage and propaganda, even Nasser himself clearly confessed: "this revolution has no popular base to depend on, and it does not have any supporter neither from the people nor from the military" (*Alboghdadi: 1977, p. 172, see more: Shalabi: 1989, pp. 125-127*). In the night of 27 July 1952 Nasser held a meeting with the founding members of the Free Officers except Najieb, the prime minister and the commander general of the military, declaring the success of the revolution and the establishment of the RCC (*Shalabi: 1989, pp. 153-157*). The RCC comprised of a group of beneficiary, pimp officers who canted Nasser in his face and criticized and conspired over him from behind (*Kishk: 1988, pp. 385-387*).

When the gullible officers and the credulous people deceived by Nasser began to realize what really happened in late February-March 1954, they were crushed by military force, fabricated popular demonstrations, precise plots, and high deception and maneuver (*Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 90-91, 346-357; *Kishk*: 1988, p. 389), interestingly Nasser set six explosions in Cairo to show the insecurity situation that necessitates the remaining of the officers (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 391; *Alboghdadi*: 1977, pp. 88-89; *Mohy Eldin*: 1992, p. 304-305). Ibrahim Altahawi, one of Nasser's men, expressed the reason why the officers extremely feared and forcefully resisted any democratic tendency: "I opposed that because our retreat meant going to jail so we decided to resist" (*Hamroush*: 1977, p. 17; *Shalabi*: 1989, vol. 9, p. 351. See also: *Shalabi*: 1989, vol. 9, pp. 122-123).

And I knew how atrocious the crime of the revolution against the Egyptian human was. And I knew in which swamp we have threw the Egyptian people. They lost their freedom. They lost their dignity. They lost their land. And their troubles geminated - major general Mohammad Najieb, RCC president and the first president of the republic (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 8).

Nasser reached farther than the pharaoh in his time or Cromer in his era - Abdellatif Alboghdadi, the Free Officers and RCC member (1977, p. 658).

O Anwar, a gang is ruling the country - Nasser speaking to Sadat (*Sadat*: 1979, pp. 177, 183).

The people in Egypt transformed into zombies - Sadat (*Sadat*: 1979).

The Gang comprised of Nasser at the center and his men, including the fourteen members of the RCC, all of which Nasser will gradually purge. Nasser and his men were paranoid, self-important, smug, incredulous, and self-exonerating persons (*Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 98-99). Most of them suffered from extremely parochial culture, for except Mohammad Najieb and Abdellatif Alboghdadi who studied at law and business schools, all RCC officers studied for one or two years at the military academy, which they entered because of their low high school degrees. There are many funny stories about their ignorance and stubbornness (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 100) and other sinister stories of their manipulation of all value and principles (*Haddad*: 1965; *Hamroush*: 1977; 1984; *Shalabi*: 1989).

Most importantly, the matter for Nasser and his men was not about a revolution or whatever, but rather "an apartment on the Nile" (*Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 140-141; 1990, p. 134) it was all about personal interests. Nasser was not that inspiring character the media had constructed, in reality Nasser was busy "watching three movies in the single night. He was concerned for a while with the American movies, then he was obsessed with the Italian and Indian movies" (*Heikal*: 1975, p. 181; *Shalabi*: 1989, p. 143). May be that is why Nasser did not take all the warnings of an

Imminent attack by Britain, France, and Israel sent to him from his ambassadors abroad and other foreign ministries seriously (*Hamroush: 1977, p. 106*).

Nasser loved to be the president and pursued the position (see: *Shalabi: 1989, pp. 144-146*), the CIA considered the most important element in Nasser's regime is that Nasser is persuaded that his position must have priority over any other target (Copeland: 1970). That is why Nasser always assured the Free Officers that the case is not a case of seniority, to surpass those who joined the Free Officers before him like Zakariyya Mohy Eldin (*Shalabi: 1989, p. 192*). Many of Nasser's men, like Sadat, Alboghdadi, and Salah Salem, talked about how Nasser was filled with hatred, envy, and suspicion (*Shalabi: 1989, pp. 147-149*). Najieb talked many times about Nasser's fraud and deception (*Najieb: 1975, pp. 69*), and Salah Salem complained of Nasser's temper, which cost the country thousands of lives and millions of pounds (*Hamroush: 1977, p. 194; Shalabi: 1989, vol. 9, p. 150*). Nasser revealed his extremely autocratic, despotic, and criminal mentality when he said: "I wish I would have a prison with twenty two million beds for all the Egyptians" (*Ashmawi: 1977, pp. 90-91; Shalabi: 1989, pp. 149*). History has known a kind of despotism that brought wealth and power to the people, however, Nasser's despotism was soaked in ignorance, evil, and impoverishment. Copeland documented how the CIA agent Steve Meade described the RCC officers:

[T]hey are happy to be called "the heroes of the revolution" but I did not find anyone among them who can describe to me what a revolution is, they are not interested in politics for Nasser's fortune, and for the fortune of all of us too... for they demand and need someone to tell them how to think and what to do... and there will not be any problem in getting rid of them (*Kishk: 1988, p. 235*).

And indeed, in what appeared like a new citadel massacre yet updated to the drastic changes that happened between the early 19th century and the 1950s, Sadat and Alboghdadi told how Nasser put and executed a precise plan to get rid of all his comrades, especially those who are with a higher rank than him, Nasser used them against each other (*Shalabi: 1989, pp. 157-159, 184-185, 193*. See also: *Kishk: 1988, p. 311*). Nasser brutally treated his comrades at the RCC who opposed him, Yusuf Alsiddik who was detained with his wife is a clear example (*Hamroush: 1977, pp. 482-483*), and another example is Kamaliddin Hussien whose wife was killed in the prison with him (*Shalabi: 1989, p. 214-216*). Almost nobody remained around Nasser of his old comrades and friends except a few who were a good "ass kisser" like Sadat and Hussien Alshafi'i. Nobody remained of the RCC members except those who abided by absolute obedience or complete passiveness, Najieb finally realized that: "the military subjugated the people, an officers council subjugated the military, and one of those officers subjugated this council" (*Najieb: 1975, p. 161*). Besides feeding Nasser's power hunger of course, the strife between Nasser and Najieb in particular a reflection of the US-UK strife and the CIA-state department conflict of interests (see *Kishk: 1988, chapter 5*). The consolidation of Nasser's power was the consolidation of the American CIA control over Egypt, the "sweeper"

became completely ready and at the service of the American master. Thus, the continuation of Najieb's previous quote is: the US subjugated this one officer, for its own interest and for Israel's interest. Had he was a Jew who has ruled Egypt, he would not have served Israel more than did Nasser (see: *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 345-406, 603-643).

Nasser was a sadist, he found a great pleasure in knowing the news of the detainees before, while, and after they were (being) tortured, when the prisons were moved outside Cairo he ordered technical sets to broadcast torture live from there to his office, and Nasser personally ratified the execution of Sayyed Qotb although his flagellants originally planned to issue a presidential remission to bolster Nasser's propaganda (*Abdelsamad*: 1979, p. 150). Furthermore, Nasser used to personally order the torturing of the detainees and to go and watch them being tortured for his own pleasure (*Gaber Rizq*: 1978, p. 26; *Alghazali*: 1980, p. 143; *Grisha*: 1975, p. 17-18; *Sabri*: 1977; *Riyad*: 1977; *Saifelnasr*: 1977; *Seliman*: 1977; *Abdelsalam*: 1975; *Hosni*: 2011). Although Nasser used to personally order the torturing the detainees and to go and watch them being tortured for his own pleasure (*Gaber Rizq*: 1978, p. 26; *Alghazali*: 1980, p. 143; *Grisha*: 1975, p. 17-18), testimonies by men close to Nasser reveal he was a coward "funky chicken at hard times" (*Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 160-163). Nasser even suggested that he and all the RCC officers commit suicide during the trio aggression in 1956 (*Alboghddadi*: 1977, p. 343). These testimonies show also Nasser was uninterested and cold-hearted (see: *Kishk*: 1988, p. 355), not to mention his lack of any political and military competence (*Mohammad H. Ismail*: 1987; *Kishk*: 1988, p. 356).

Nasser contributed to pushing the US completely towards Israel (Shlaim: 1995), he neglected Eisenhower's substantial role in stopping the trio aggression and over-applauded the USSR though it really moved after the American intervention, indeed the Israeli Mossad might have manipulated Nasser by stopping the American weapons deal (see: *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 263-265; *Eveland*: 1980). Nasser also is responsible for abandoning an alliance with Britain, which could balance the US-Israeli alliance, on the contrary the British allied with Israel against Nasser (see: *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 327-328). Nasser was fooled and manipulated by the USSR in 1967 when it told him Israel was mobilizing its army to issue a war on Syria, as he was gulled by the American assertion Israel will not issue the first strike (*Fawzi*: 1988, pp. 141-143).

Militarily, Nasser knows nothing but withdrawal, he ordered the army to haphazardly withdraw from Sinai in 1956 and 1967, and he chose an arrogant ignorant military minister, Shams Badran, who when asked about the US sixth fleet replied: "we have what will destroy it" (*Sadat*: 1979, p. 226; *Nadel*: 1973, pp. 286-287). Nasser defended his lousy performance in 1967 saying: I was waiting for the enemy from the North, but he came from the West! And in 1956 he neglected all the warnings sent to him, he even estimated the possibility of a war was zero (*Alboghddadi*: 1977, pp. 337-339). Nasser further embroiled Egypt in the Congo and

Yemen war, he sent half of the Egyptian army to Yemen just to satisfy his personal obduracy towards King Saud (*Heikal*: 1975, p. 155-156). Also, the 1967 catastrophe is a pure Nasserist product, Nasser demanded the UN Secretary General to withdraw the international emergency forces from Sharm Alshiekh, closed the Alaqaba Gulf banning any ship a path to Israel, challenged the US and the UK without any preparation and or responsibility, and refused any mediation by the UN Secretary General. Not to mention his financial scandals and thefts (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 164-168, 756; 1990, p. 136-148; *Alhamasi*: 1975, pp. 170-174, 189-212).

The most dangerous is treason, the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian armies were defeated in 1965 though they did not fight, they were prevented, Nasser issued a personal order of withdrawal, and he preferred to protect Israel from opening two other war fronts where an Israeli defeat was very likely (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 367; *Heikal*: 2004). Nasser did the very opposite in 1967 when he requested the participation of those armies although the defeat was definite. The CIA director deputy Miles Copeland explains: "historians and researchers unaware of the secret history of the events, cannot explain for example why Nasser avoided the war with Israel when victory was probable, while he led his country to an inevitably losing war (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 20). Moreover, Egypt lost its whole air force in 1956 because of Nasser's decision of cutting the army's budget and cancelling the shields protecting the on-earth planes, Egypt lost its whole air force again in 1967 because of another typical decision by Nasser (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 375-376). From the "the secret history of the events" we should be aware there are strong evidence Nasser was in secret relation with Israeli intelligence officers since the Palestine war in 1948 (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 381-382, 398-401).

Nasserism is neither an ideology nor a concept, except if you mean the fabrications of the Nasserist after Nasser, Nasser's behavior was a bizarre mix of chaotic contradictions: opposing birth-control then promoting it, heading West at the beginning then attacking the US after Bandung and heading left then returning back to America, his contradictory positions towards King Saud and King Faisal, his positions towards King Hussein, the Muslim Brotherhood, Russia, and the other Arab presidents or Kings (see: *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 172-176; see also *Younis*: 2012).

The military subjugated the people, an officer's council subjugated the military, and one of those officers subjugated this council - Mohammad Najieb (1975, p. 161).

The consolidation of military dictatorship crowned with "electing" Nasser for Egypt's presidency marked the end of the pro-Britain ruling agriculture aristocracy, it was the kickoff of the pro-America military rule. Nasser ended and replaced Alwafd's position in the benign-nationalism system, but the same power structure persisted, and Nasser even maintained the same state administrative apparatus "except the top governors, it is ostensible the middle and minor officials were figures of the ancient regime became reemployed" (*Abdelmalek*: 2013, p. 161).

When the Nasser's military completely consolidated its grip, seized the power, and subjugated the popular resistance to military rule they became aware that nothing would threaten their position except the military itself. Bearing in mind the nonstop series of coups in Syria at that time, Nasser was determined to wipe away any chance of another military coup. Yet it was not so easy, although it took Nasser two years to crush and soothe all the civil resistance to his rule, he did not fully control the military and eliminate all the political tendencies inside it until after five years (Abdallah: 1990). Nasser's strategy to maintain exclusive control over the military was through his friend Abdelhakim Amer. Abdellatif Alboghdadi, member of the Free Officer and the RCC, explained:

Appointing Abdelhakim Amer as the armed forces commander general gradually alienated military members from their military bases. He also took our comrades away with different means including threatening, efforts were exerted to bring the officers closer to Nasser and Amer through providing services, until many officers were not concerned but with getting close to Nasser and Amer or to those who are close to them greedily looking forward to a better post or a service ... this policy corrupted the military and produced pernicious military and political consequences. Strangely, Nasser sometime tortured many of the military individuals by their comrades (Alboghdadi: 1977, p. 87).

Nasser granted huge financial privileges to his men, as well as himself, for example when Nasser died his wife had 17 cars with two drivers each car at her own service, she also enjoyed Nasser's tax-free salary, which was £E2 million (Shalabi: 1989, p. 109). The officers also maliciously used their judicial privileges and immunities to mug and pickpocket the public money (Shalabi: 1989, pp. 112-121). The law no. 25 in 1966 totally separated the civil judiciary from the military judiciary, officers trials were absolutely the mandate of a military tribunal even in civil crimes (Shalabi: 1989, p. 107-108).

Through Amer, who was promoted four ranks at once, from *sagh* (major) to *liwa* (major general), Nasser exclusively controlled the military, the military became a power mechanism at the hands of Nasser and Amer. Alboghdadi witnessed: "I believe Nasser did not nominate Amer to lead the army except to gain the political control over the army without the rest of the RCC, depending on the string friendship between him and Amer" (Alboghdadi: 1977, pp. 77-78). However, Amer increasingly became a power magnate and Nasser continued to appease him, although the 1956 military smash Nasser mollified Amer and granted him many titles and positions: the commander general of the Egyptian and Syrian army during the unity, Amer was promoted to be a field marshal, the vice president, and then the first vice president.

However, Nasser ended up competing with Amer over controlling the military, Nasser tried three times to displace Amer but he failed. Nasser's failure in return increased Amer's power (see: Shalabi: 1990, p. 168; Fawzi: 1988, pp. 34-36). This competition was quenched with the Egyptians' bloodshed, Amer was never concerned with developing the army but with increasing his power and influence

even at the expense of the combat capability and readiness for war (see for example: *Riad*: 1986, p. 44). Nasser further consolidated his control over the military through two means: 1) cutting any relation or connection between the RCC officers and the military and isolating them from their comrades through threats or promises. And 2) forming a group of supporters from the second rank officers and giving them huge power, and through them Nasser ruled the military (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 341). The strife between Nasser and Amer was the toughest of the conflict and conspiracies between the RCC members in general, this strife reached the extent of detention, torture, and assassination (*Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 123-125, 130-136).

Expectedly, the military was completely ruined and devastated. Nasser further dismissed more than 500 high rank officers, to eliminate all the officers with ranks higher than his rank *bokbashi* (lieutenant colonel) (*Alboghdadi*: 1977, p. 64; *Hamroush*: 1977, p. 433). Some members of the Free Officers were killed by orders from Nasser or Amer (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 609) other competent officers were dismissed because Nasser did not trust them (*Heikal*: 1975, p. 187), and the military was emptied except of completely trusted officers, others who did not mind but their own private interests, and some few exceptions. However, even until the later years of his rule, and despite the defeat of the army in 1967, Nasser remained fearful that “military officers have practiced politics in the last fifteen years and some of them might use force and conspire against the regime” (*A. Farid*: 1979).

Everything from the people to the people, nothing for the people - King Louis Philippe.

Indeed the victory we have achieved was far beyond what we had wished for, and if the most severest enemy of Egypt had put a plan to smash the Egyptian army, he could not have achieved what Nasser's policy did achieve - Moshi Daayan (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 731)

Swept by Nasser's constructed charisma, the Egyptians were consumed with the fraudulent ideological preambles of Nasser's regime, the desire for social justice, and the dream of Arab unity. But what actually happened was totally and awfully different, as King Louis Philippe said: “everything from the people to the people, nothing for the people” (*Alnabulsi*: 2003, p. 111). The 1952 US-backed Nasser's coup was an uninterrupted epic of defeats and a bloody chain of pains. Sarcastically, Nasser practiced his despotic tyranny in the name of the people. For example, when the officers confiscated all the press and journalism outlets, M. H. Heikal wrote a series of articles from 28 May 1961 through 3 June arguing, “press was not confiscated but returned to the people” (*Abdelmalek*: 2013, p. 160). When the officers seized tremendous shares of the private properties under the fancy label of the public sector, Ali Sabri said: “the public sector, for us, is not the way we chosen to cancel ownership but the way that must lead to expand its base” (*Abdelmalek*: 2013, p. 167). Ihsan Abdelkodos wrote in March 1954: “if the revolution leaders had ideals or ideologies, those ideals or ideologies are limited in one ideal: the military is

for the people” (Abdelmalek: 2013, p. 207), however the events revealed the true and only ideal of the officers: the people, the society, the state, and everything is just for the military.

In the following pages I shall review the “achievements” the military did for the people to evaluate the previous claim by discerning the coup’s declared objectives regarding: elimination of imperialism, building a national army, promoting democracy, and achieving social justice. Ihsan Abdelkodos himself wrote a 158-page book (1986) declaring his failure and disappointment in his *quest for a revolution*, it took him thirty four years to realize the falsity of the revolution that failed to achieve any of its claimed objectives. The majority of the people were too naïve to realize the ruse, “the preface of the Actaulité paper ... [published] ten days after the coup was the only one to describe 23 July as a coup not a revolution” (Abdelamlek: 2013, p. 94). Shockingly, there is no achievements, the celebrated achievements of the coup turned out to be either a complete lie or a partial enhancement achieved with extremely hyper expensive price than if done otherwise. Remarkably, when Nasser died Egypt was lesser more than half its size in 1952, simply Nasser lost Sudan, Gaza, and Sanai.

The coup celebrated its elimination of imperialism, yet what happened was postponing the independence issue and separating Sudan from Egypt. President Najieb began the negotiations with the British ambassador on 27 April 1953, but they reached a deadlock and the negotiations stopped in May the 8th, but after the incidents of February and March 1954 when the coup forcefully crushed the people’s opposition to the coup and eliminated any resistance to the military coup, Nasser indulged the British regarding independence to soothe the pressure on his regime said Khaled Mohy Eldin (*Hamroush*: 1977, p. 157), Mohy Eldin also mentioned Nasser appeased Israel so it did not impede the agreement so secret communication was done with the Israelis to reassure them (*Hamroush*: 1977, p. 160). Negotiations was resumed in July 1954, an agreement was reached on 26 July, and fully signed in October, Britain evacuated Egypt on 18 June 1956 but the agreement was harshly criticized, especially Nasser’s acceptance of separating Sudan from Egypt, extending the Britain military base in Canal for more seven years, and granting Britain the right to occupy the Canal if an armed offensive was issued against Egypt, Turkey, or some Arab states (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 412; *Kishk*: 1988, p. 318; *Shaker*: 1987, p. 44).

Not to mention the global atmosphere was of independence of the colonies. Most importantly, Nasser brought the Israeli occupation, and completely destroyed the Egyptian independence by opening the door to the USSR, he granted the Soviets military bases, made them responsible for the Egyptian air force (*Sadat*: 1979, p. 257), and granted them comprehensive delegacy to act freely in Egypt and even to negotiate with the US in the name of Egypt (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 413).

When Nasser became the president on 26 July 1956, the first decision he made was the nationalization of the Canal. Nasser seized the Canal Company’s money in the

Ottoman bank (£E5 million), in return Britain seized Egypt's money in London (112 million sterling pounds), France and the US did the same thing (\$60 million). According to the Canal agreement, the Canal Company is to become totally Egyptian in 1968, just 12 years later, but thanks to Nasser due to the 1956 trio aggression and the 1967 defeat, the Canal was not used until after 1973 (see: *Ramadan*: 2000).

The coup claimed it aimed to establish a national army, and the 1948 defeat was the momentous moment for the Free Officers. Nevertheless, in 29 October 1956 the army was shamefully defeated without even fighting, "the US [was] the only triumphant" (Heikal: 1986, p. x), Israel described it as the victory in the war of existence, the offensive was aborted after Eisenhower's intervention on 5 November after half of the Egyptian army and all the Egyptian air fighters were destroyed, not to mention all the human and material losses, Egypt also lost Sharm Alshiekh and granted Israel an access to Alaqaba Gulf (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 504). Moreover, Israel became aware of the dangerous American-Egyptian relation threatening its expansion plans and its strategy to destroy Egypt, maybe this US-Egypt relation was the only point of disagreement between Nasser and Israel, Israel became too determined to lure Egypt into a confrontation with the US that it even set explosives in various American institutions in Cairo.

Moreover, Nasser economically and militarily embroiled Egypt in Syria for three years, then in Yemen for five years just to spite King Saud and the price was the lives of twenty thousand Egyptians and eliminating the Egyptian gold and silver account. In the Yemen war, "the number of Egyptian troops in the country rose from 20,000 in 1963 to 70,000 by 1965" (Metz: 1990, p. 297), almost half of the army, including many of its best troops, was bogged down in Yemen while Israel was attacking Egypt in 1967. The lieutenant general Mortaga, the leader of the Egyptian troops in Yemen, testified the Yemen war was a military and financial loss to Egypt. The Egyptian army was disgracefully crushed once again in 1967 without fighting, Nasser and Amer did not let a potential lacuna for the army to gain victory without eliminating in, nor did they let any flaw the Israelis could exploit without committing it (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 16), Israel once again won what it described as the war of the right for hegemony. Nasser ignited a war he was absolutely not ready for, thus he implicated the army in a war the military was not ready for and thus was destined to lose it (*Sadat*: 1979, p. 225; *Shalabi*: 1990, p. 174). Moshi Daayan, the Israeli defense minister, commented on the victory he achieved without even fighting saying: "Indeed the victory we have achieved was far beyond what we had wished for, and if the most severest enemy of Egypt had put a plan to smash the Egyptian army, he could not have achieved what Nasser's policy did achieve" (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 731). In the 1967 catastrophe, the Egyptian army lost 80% of its weapons and equipment beside all its air fighters (see: *Abuzekri*: 1988). On the other hand, Nasser's objective from the war was "I found the world sleeping so I loved to wake it up" (*Alboghdadi*: 1977, pp. 274-275).

The 1967 war was another debacle for Egypt. Astonishingly, on the 5th of June the Israelis took Egypt again by surprise although there had been numerous indications suggesting an imminent attack. Israel attacked the Egyptian air force while it was still on the ground, and “within three hours, the Israelis had destroyed 300 Egyptian combat aircraft, including all of Egypt's 30 long-range bombers” (Metz: 1990, p. 298). In fewer than twelve hours, the Egyptian forces were overwhelmed. The incompetent commander-in-chief Abdel Hakim Amer was panicked into withdrawing the whole army units from the East to the west bank of the Canal. Interestingly, the post-defeat revolution tribunal reports confirmed Amer on the night of 5th June 1967 was spending a good time in his second wife's villa. Devastatingly:

After four days of intensive fighting, Israel controlled the entire Sinai Peninsula up to the east bank of the canal. Egypt acknowledged that of approximately 100,000 troops in Sinai, 10,000 soldiers and 1,500 officers were casualties. Observers estimated that about half of the dead had succumbed to thirst or exhaustion in the desert. A further 5,000 soldiers and 500 officers were captured, many of whom were wounded (Metz: 1990, p. 299).

The coup also claimed it aims to establish a sound democracy, the most sincere expression of the coup's real position from democracy was the mottos chanted in the fake anti-democracy demonstrations secretly mobilized by Nasser on Saturday 27 March 1954: “down with democracy, down with freedom, down with the literates” (*Shalabi*: 1990, pp. 47-48). Nasser was always proud of being able to detain thirty thousand people in half an hour. He also wished to “have a prison with twenty two million beds for all the Egyptians” (*Ashmawi*: 1977, pp. 90-91; *Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 149).

Nasser eliminated all political parties and social forces, and got rid of all democracy supporters either by jail or execution, especially those in the military, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the press, and the universities. Significantly, Nasser destroyed AlAzhar appointing Shiekh AlAzhar for the first time on 16 September 1952, and on the 21st Nasser dissolved the senior scholars' assembly, which used to elect Shiekh AlAzhar. Nasser further issued the law of AlAzhar “development” in 1961, which was really issued to destroy AlAzhar and paralyze it, the law was discussed and agreed upon in one night regardless of the strong opposition of AlAzhar's scholars.

Nasser created power centers as means to extend his power and influence (see: *Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 627-629; *Heikal*: 1975, p. 103), the two major power centers were: Amer's group (the military and the feudalism committee) and Ali Sabri's group (*altanzim altali'i*, which was a secret organization), Nasser managed these power centers by inflaming the competition and conflict between them, he protected them as well in case they became subject to any accountability, which

was out of the ordinary (see for example what was known with “the major importation case”: *Abdelsalam*: 1975, p. 9).

Despite all the fancy socialist preambles fabricated later, just 20 days after the coup, the security forces brutally oppressed the labor demonstrations that erupted on 12-13 August 1952, three laborers were killed, 28 wounded, and 567 were tried in a military tribunal similar to the British Dinshaway tribunal, and the military convictions ordered the execution of Mostafa Khamis and Mohammad Albaqari and destined other eleven laborers. There are endless heartbreaking, eye-opening stories of the cruelty of the coup (e.g.: the university professor Rashwan Fahmi’s story: *Shalabi*: 1989, p. 74, and the military officer Hosni Aldamanhori’s story: *Hamroush*: 1977, p. 41).

Even the transformation from a kingdom to a republic was a Nasserist compliance with an American demand, as revealed by Fathi Redwan who was Nasser’s minister for six years (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 82), separating Sudan from Egypt was indeed another American condition in order to guarantee Egypt’s “independence” from the British. Although Nasser paid lip-service to Arab unity, he actually eliminated any chance to achieve such a unity in the future.

Nasser and his coup destroyed Egypt’s intellectual and economic capital (see: *Kishk*: 1988, pp. 84-85). Although Egypt had been a famous exporter of cereal grains for almost its whole history, it turned into a net importer under Nasser and Sadat (Goldschmidt: 2008, pp. 198-199). Before the coup, the Egyptian economy was a creditor, the English sterling was lesser than the Egyptian pound, few years after the coup the Egyptian economy turned from a creditor into a debtor, not surprisingly all Mohamad Ali’s and his family’s treasures disappeared. Another mystery is the disappearance of Egypt’s gold account. Until today nobody knows how 500 million English gold pounds disappeared (*Abaza*: 1985, p. 43; *Sadat*: 1979). Mohammad Asfor claimed in an article he published in *Alwafd* newspaper on 28 October 1988 that Nasser during the 1956 trio aggression transferred the gold account to his premises claiming to protect it from an expected Israeli-British-French attack, and this account was never returned. Tawfiq Alhakim (1974) claimed Nasser spent Egypt’s gold credit to buy the loyalty of the tribes in Yemen war (p. 58), Wagih Abuzekri (1970) further claimed when Nasser completely spent the gold he began to spend silver (p. 76). The officers terribly failed in their prime function: to defend the country, and they were extremely busy spoiling and robbing the country and its people. In 7 June 1967, Amer and his men were digging the gardens’ land to hide gold and foreign banknotes while the dead bodies of the poor Egyptian soldiers covered Sanai finding nobody to bury them (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 20).

Nasser’s concept of social justice was very telling, he always said the pre-“revolution” era was the era of the 0.5%, he explained social justice while justifying the nationalization policy saying: “it is inevitable, I had ten or twelve millionaires and they become now 300 or 400” (*Hamroush*: 1984, p. 75). Among those new millionaires is someone like the officer Ali Shafik who married the actress Maha

Sabri, Sabri was found murdered in his London apartment with cash money more than million sterling pounds not to mention the other millions deposited in banks, and yet Sabri was just a “simple” third or fourth rank officer. On the other hand, the public sector was no more than a huge myth and a wide gate for endless corruption (see: *Abulfath*: w.d.). The coup used state employment as a means to deprive the people of a free financial decision and render them a mere gear in a very huge machine they can easily control.

Under the fancy mottos of socialism and social justice and in the name of the people, by 1961-1962 Nasser had confiscated 85% of Egypt industry, trade, stocks, bonds, money, and other (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 581). It was not a matter of social justice, but in fact a nominal replacement, a mere superficial change in the faces without touching the unjust class structure of the society, Sadat described Nasser’s socialism as poverty distribution socialism.

Nasser’s agrarian “reform” is very revealing. The agrarian reform was a project of injustice not reform, as Najieb mentioned. The agrarian reform, whose law no. 178 was issued on 8 September 1952, modified twice in 1961 and 1969, and applied in four stages from 1952 through 1956 (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 273), did not emancipate the Egyptian peasant but exacerbated his sufferings, interestingly the cost of Nasser’s adventure in Yemen was sufficient to reestablish and modernize all the Egyptian villages. The aim of the agrarian reform was three-fold. First, it was used to build Nasser’s image and exploit it to make huge propaganda to absorb the anger energy of the people. Second, Nasser planned to crush the socio-economic base of the ancient regime through agrarian reform, most probably this was the reason Alnahhas and Fouad Serageddin rejected Nasser’s offer to form the cabinet provided applying agrarian reform, however they justified their rejection with technical and constitutional reasons. Third, the pro-agrarian reform people aimed to consolidate their position by ripping the large land owners of “their” money, land, and power, the new bureaucrats became the new masters (*Najieb*: 1975, pp. 106-107). Significantly, the agrarian reform was haphazardly and selectively applied against to destroy the property of those who Nasser apprehends (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 273). Furthermore, Heikal mentioned “these matters and others were in fact signs and gestures of Nasser’s psychological tendencies (*Heikal*: 1975, p. 62). Nasser’s agrarian reform destroyed Egypt’s capitalism (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 85-86), was applied only against those opposing Nasser and his regime, destroyed Egypt’s agrarian and animal wealth (*Shalabi*: 1989, p. 273), which was the reason some officers hesitated at the beginning (see Caffery’s telegram to the American state department on August 20 1952: *Kishk*: 1988, p. 304), and created massive unlimited corruption, frauds, and manipulations (see: *Shalabi*: 1989, pp. 273-273).

For the Americans, the aim of the agrarian reform was three-fold as well. First, the agrarian reform excluded the countryside from the map of any potential revolution by superficially defusing the main reason for social injustice in the countryside. Second, the agrarian reform eliminated the Competition of the Egyptian long staple

cotton with the American cotton (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 173, 309). Third, land property in Egypt and the socio-economic relations based on it was created by the British imperial system and at its service, the Americans aimed to deconstruct all this through agrarian reform and replace it with completely new relations compatible with their imperial system. Actually, the agrarian reform is an old American demand dating back at least to February 1945 when the American Roosevelt considerably urged King Farouk regarding this issue (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 43-45; *Gardner*: 2013, p. 14). Hamroush explained:

The US was gingerly watching the peasants' uprisings, because she saw in these uprisings the heralds of an unruly popular revolution that might lead to radical social changes substantially contradicting and thus opposing the aims of universal imperialism. Thus, the idea of the agrarian reform, present in the speeches of the American officials who flooded Cairo after the Cairo Burn, demanded social reforms that prevent the eruption of a popular revolution (*Kishk*: 1988, pp. 171-174).

Doreen Warriner revealed the compensation provided by the officers to the large land owners and the conditions of this compensation "represent a real indicator of the state political appeasement of the ancient regime and a silent rejection of revolutionary expropriation" (*Abdelmalek*: 2013, p. 96). Not only did the coup reconcile with the old regime but also it replaced it in terms of exploiting the poor peasants and agro-laborers. Significantly, and in an analogical continuity of the imperial policies, "the fifty-acre threshold, incorporated into the 1961 land reform law, was the definition of large landowner formulated in 1894 by the British consul-general in Egypt, Lord Cromer, in accordance with British political and fiscal interests" (Mitchell: 2002, p. 220). Furthermore, Anwar Abdelmalek concluded "the agrarian reform was set and executed in a top-down manner to stop any revolutionary initiative by the peasants" (*Abdelmalek*: 2013, p. 98). The capitalist apparatuses in Egypt did not express any worry or disturbance from the officers' agrarian reform, on the contrary the national Egyptian bank appreciated the agrarian reform saying: "indeed **any reform, whatever radical it may be, is far better than the chaos of a popular movement**" (*Abdelmalek*: 2013, p. 103). The agrarian reform was a ruse to befuddle the popular anger energy and avoid a real popular revolution, in Mitchell's words, "in order to divert a far broader popular discontent with the exploitative power of large landholders in the countryside, a power that in many cases the land reforms had strengthened" (Mitchell: 2002, p. 159). Anwar Abdelmalek has shown:

After the startling fear faded, the large land owners realized the real nature of the agrarian reform, especially its desire to prevent a peasantry revolution under the communist motto: "land is for who farm it!" and they realized that the revolution and the state born on 23 July protect them and were keen on paying important compensations to them ... they saw the Free Officers commanding the execution of Khamis and Baqary [the leader of the labor demonstrations in Kafr Aldawwar] three weeks after expelling the king, and they carefully witnessed the strong friendly relations between Jefferson Caffery [the American ambassador in Cairo] and the officers from 1952 through 1954 (*Abdelmalek*: 2013, p. 104).

Moreover, Anwar Abdelmalek statistically emphasizes “in fact no substantial difference has happened in income distribution between the various social classes of the rural areas of Egypt countryside in 1958 than in 1952” (*Abdelmalek*: 2013, p. 105). Even after the agrarian reforms of the 1950s through the early 1960s, government figures suggest that in 1965 “45 percent of agricultural families were still landless ... Among those owning or renting land, 95 percent held less than five acres, at an average of just over one acre per holding, while the top 5 percent of owners continued to control 43 percent of the cultivated area” (Mitchell: 2002, pp. 156-157; see also pp. 219-220). Anwar Abdelmalek (2012) emphasized all the nationalization wave was trying, yet in vain, to weaken the power of private capital, the nationalization wave had not lead but to reinforcing the status and power of the technocrats. The officers did not aim to enrich the poor, but to impoverish the rich, or rather some of the rich, the rich who does not submit to them and their rule.

Anyway, the 1967 war devastated Nasser, exposed his huge lies, and tarnished his constructed image. Amer was killed by the power centers, according to his second wife’s testimony, Berlenti Abdul Hamid. Mohammad Fawzi, who became the military minister and the commander in chief, together with Abdelmin’*m* Riyad, who became the chief of staff, led drastic changes in the military. One of these changes transformed the human capital of the army, they decided to admit the high degrees holders into the army correcting Nasser’s cyclonic previous decision. Another change altered the military doctrine dictating a new answer to “who are we?” question, “we are Muslims, performing jihad to liberate our land from the Jews”. The third change was regarding the military strategy setting the rule of no-withdrawal, since 1956 the army used to withdraw from any war leaving politics and propaganda to deal with the mess it creates. Together, Fawzi and Riyad led the war of attrition (see: *Fawzi*: 1988), which developed from defense to offense and amazingly build 100 missile defense bases that will become the base for the 6th October unpatrolled military accomplishment in 1973.

Since 1952, the military became the prominent institution and the backbone of power and authority in Egypt. It continued to be the backbone of the regime regardless of any changes on the top. The military became the core of the regime not only its defender, the military brutally ended the 1977 and 1986 demonstrations and riots, as long as the president “continues to retain the all-important confidence of the Egyptian military, his regime is stable” (Long, Reich, & Gasiorowski: 2011, p. 410). The military became the guardian over the secular pro-American course the nation was forced to pursue, and close American monitoring and orientation, through aid, became the guardian over the military’s role in that course (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997).

CHAPTER 5

CAMP DAVID: THE MATRIX REORIENTING THE AUTOMATON

Egypt is an American success story - Robert B. Satloff, the Washington institute for near East policy.

Abu Ghazala was [the USA-] Wilson's kind of man: a hero of the 1973 war, a true hater of communists, and best of all, a Muslim who drank whiskey [and] loved women - George Crile (2003).

People think that the \$1.3 billion [American military "aid" to the Egyptian military] is some sort of gift - the American retired General Anthony Zinni, previous commander of the US Central Command.

The Egyptian military was a strategic guarantee for America, thus the US invested \$50 billion in it in Mubarak's era alone - Louis C. Gardener.

In May 1966, the CIA decided to get rid of Nasser's regime or assassinate him before 1970 (*Magdi*: 2012). Surprisingly, Nasser died in late September 1970 and Sadat, who "earned from his colleagues the sardonic name Bikbashi Sahsa (Colonel Yes-Yes) for dissimulating his differences with the leader" (Goldschmidt: 2008, p. 188), became the president of Egypt in October 1970. Sadat was a Machiavellian pushy who pursued his ends regardless of the means, he was expelled after four years from the army in 1942 due to his cooperation with the German intelligence. Then he joined and co-founded the King's iron guard, which was established to assassinate the politicians opposing the King like Amin Othman, the King's iron guard was also accused of the Cairo burn. After the palace stopped its terrorist acts, Sadat used his contact with the palace to rejoin the military in January 1951. Nasser recruited Sadat to the Free Officers although the opposition of many members due to his history.

The common analysis maintains Sadat succeeded Nasser because the powerful men around Nasser feared each other, thus they agreed on inaugurating Sadat, whom they thought was the weakest. However, Timothy Mitchell provides a more reasonable account instead of the previous over simplistic narration:

[F]ollowing Nasser's death in 1970, the more populist and pro-Soviet political faction led by 'Ali Sabri was defeated by a faction led by the champion of state and large landowning interests and the future symbol of the country's reintegration into the North's global economic circuits, Anwar Sadat (Mitchell: 2002, p. 166).

Hassan Altohamy, the most powerful of Nasser's American men who was a personal link between Copeland and Nasser (Copeland: 1970) and whose house was one of the CIA's safe houses (Eveland: 1980), played a decisive role in determining Nasser's heir (*Kishk*: 1988, p. 157). Sadat came after Nasser who and whose coup was the achievement of Kermit Roosevelt school, Roosevelt believed in the possibility of employing some Arab states for America's interest and he further betted on transforming Egypt into America's watchdog in the region. However, although Roosevelt's numerous successes in restoring Iran's Shah and installing Nasser's regime, he lost his bet and James Angleton school won its bet on Israel for many reasons: the secrecy of Nasser's relation with the CIA, the American policy toward Egypt was the CIA's exclusive domain, the Zionist lobby in the US, Britain and Israel, the disagreement of and competition among the American institutions, and other.

Thus, the opportunist, pragmatic Sadat, whose job was to make Nasser laugh, did not find an easy way especially with his servile, ignorant, and arrogant mentality but to try persuading America Sadat's Egypt can be the first representative of American in the region. Sadat benefitted from the protean multiple-tongued Heikal, the old CIA man in Egypt. Hassan Altohamy will continue playing his extremely decisive role, especially in the negotiations with Israel leading to Camp David, which he attended as Sadat's adviser. Altohamy also will secretly meet Moshi Dayan in Rabat, Morocco to prepare for Sadat's historical visit to AlQuds in 1977 (Eveland: 1980, p. 99). Sadat also gave the Brothers Ali and Mostafa Amin, the latter was a CIA agent since the 1940s as he personally confirmed in his letter to Nasser (*Amin*: 1984; *Heikal*: 1985; *Kishk*: 1989), the biggest two papers in Egypt then: Alahram and Akhbar Alyoum.

On 1 May 1971, Nixon surprisingly sent to Sadat a top secret Soviet report obtained by the CIA, the report revealed a Soviet plot led by the pro-USSR Ali Sabri's group in the Egyptian regime to oust Sadat and take over (*Magdi*: 2012). Sadat cracked the power centers and consolidated his sole power over the regime.

Sadat gradually shifted towards the US away from the USSR. Although praising the USSR for its assistance to Egypt, inviting the Soviet president to attend the Aswan High Dam inaugural festivities, and signing the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Sadat was frustrated and angered with the Soviet reluctance of selling arms to Egypt, the chasm between Sadat and the Kremlin further widened after Sadat eliminated the power centers, especially the Soviet man in Egypt Ali Sabri. The Egyptian-Soviet relation was harshly terminated when Sadat expelled most of the 20,000 Soviet technicians from Egypt on 17 July 1972, Sadat further asked the parliament in March 1976 to abrogate the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Metz: 1990, p. 331).

Nevertheless, dissatisfied with the American acceptance of him and looking forward for a warmer American embracement, and pressured by the failing internal economic and political situation, Sadat initiated his gamble to push America to fully accept him through war with Israel, which he would manipulate to fake his personal

glory in the eyes of the Egyptians. Sadat wanted a war with Israel, to put the war results in the American hands to pass new facts, one of which is peace.

However, what neither Sadat nor American expected was the presence of the still patriotic and anti-imperial military leaders like Alshazly, who became the chief-of-staff in May 1971 through December 1973. Alshazly was the scarcest anomaly of and the severest threat to the Matrix, he was the momentous representation of the Islam-based anti-Israel military leaders who believed in jihad and worked for it. The military doctrine of Alshazly's army was completely contradictory to what Sadat and America worked for. Alshazly's military believed they are Egyptian Muslims, long suppressed and must fight for their rights, with very high Islamic and patriotic attachments, the offensive parole was "*Allahu Akbar*", the plan was called "the high minarets", and the date of the offensive was the 10th of Ramadan in the anniversary of *Ghazwat Badr*. They were perfectly ready for the war on all levels however under the absolutely worst political leadership.

Although the legendary success of Alshazly's crossing plan, the actual casualties did not exceed 20 percent though it was expected to reach 80 percent, Sadat decided to supersede the plan and proceed into the depth of Sinai. Sadat interference distorted and infringed the original plan, whose philosophy was based on two pillars: causing the maximum Israeli casualties and extending the war duration. Contrary to the plan, Sadat interference, specifically deciding to develop the offensive East and ordering the two reservoir armored Egyptian brigades to move from the Western bank of the Canal to the passes 50 km to the East in open lands with absolutely no air defense umbrella for 35 km, led to a series of fatal mistakes ending up with a strategic catastrophe: Sadat's desperate attack on the 14th October miserly failed and 250 Egyptian tanks were totally destroyed, all the Egyptian armored brigades became on the Eastern bank, Israel initiated a counter attack on the 15th October and penetrated through a 5-15 km gap between the second and the third Egyptian armies, the penetrating Israeli forces did not face any resistance as the original reservoir Egyptian forces were moved to the East. Strangely, Sadat stubbornly refused to withdraw any brigade from the East to stop the Israelis on the West on the 16th October, the situation escalated and sharply worsened. By the 20th October, five armored Israeli brigades arrived 15-20 km west the Canal with a 40-50 km longitudinal expansion, destroyed all the Egyptian air defenses on the West exposing all the Egyptian forces to punishing air attacks for the first time, and besieged the third Egyptian army in Suez until the cease-fire on October 24. Most importantly, the Israelis had a clear path to the only-100-kilometer-away Cairo while the first and second armies were on the Eastern bank of the Canal (Alshazly: 2003). Golda Meir proudly declared: "the Israelis are fighting now in Africa".

"Of the combined strength of 200,000 in Egypt's Second and Third armies, approximately 8,000 men were killed in combat. Egypt also lost more than 200 aircraft, 1,100 tanks, and large quantities of other weapons, vehicles, and

equipment” (Metz: 1990, p. 298). However, despite these losses the effect of the war on the armed forces was not debilitating but rather exhilarating, the Egyptian armed forces achieved a full miracle by crossing the Canal in a performance second to none. Nevertheless, Sadat’s devastating mistakes during the war turned the potential military breakthrough into an abject weakness and Egypt did not recover the Sinai. Furthermore, Sadat’s devastating mistakes after the war will make Egypt lose Sinai forever. Israel shall remain in Sanai until January 18th 1974, when Sadat and Golda Meir separately signed the first disengagement agreement and the Canal will remain closed until 1975, when the second disengagement accord was signed.

The outcomes of Sadat’s war did not grant him a power position, from where he could negotiate with the Americans as he thought, but did further weaken his position. On October 7th, the very second day of the war, Sadat corresponded with Kissinger hinting about a peaceful solution while the war was raging (*Magdi*: 2012). On 6 November, Kissinger visited Egypt where he frankly spoke with Sadat, the outcome of the visit was declaring six Israeli points Sadat claimed they were Egyptian as a proof of Egypt’s desire of a comprehensive change towards Israel. Through the two disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975, Sadat totally coalesced with the American view emphasizing the new Egyptian orientation towards America, one of whose bases is the Israeli peace.

On 1 September 1975, Sadat sent a letter to the American president Ford affirming he is committed to the peace treaty whose articles they had talked about, and stressing his guarantee of the American interests and the American economic priority in Egypt (*Magdi*: 2012). Apparently this was a secret peace agreement never disclosed, Sadat’s top-secret-classified correspondence, of which the first document was dated back to September 1975, with the White House reveals an undisclosed peace treaty between Egypt and the US.

Although Egypt ultimately lost the war militarily, Israel and the US were extremely aware of the miracle the Egyptians achieved under the command of Saad Eddin Alshazly, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces, they were also aware that without the massive American military and intelligence aid on one side and Sadat’s interference, due to his stupidity and despotism or mere treason we still do not know for sure, Egypt would have completely won the war on Israel, which is the worst of the US nightmares, but for the US and Israel’s relief Sadat turned the Egyptian incredible victory into a shameless defeat, Egypt lost the lead and Israel practiced its hobby of imposing facts on the ground under the absolute US protection and guidance.

After the miraculous achievement of the Egyptian military by crossing the Canal, the Pentagon issued a report asserting Israel is about to lose the war if it had not already lost it, America entered the war on the Israeli side with all its capacity militarily and politically. A \$2.5 billion military aid flooded from the US to Israel through a massive air bridge, the arms were sent with its crew and fuel ready to enter the war immediately. It was an American reconnaissance aircraft who

discovered the gap between the second and third Egyptian armies, the Americans sent this priceless data to Israel urging it to seize the moment and pass to the Western bank of the Canal. Furthermore, the US gave Israel green light to keep moving militarily even after the ceasefire.

Regardless the ethical issue general Bar-lev mentioned, most probably due to envy and jealousy, criticizing what Sharon' military move after the ceasefire acquiring lands more than double the lands he controlled before the ceasefire. It was a matter of power and imposing facts on the ground, a test in which Sadat has proven his absolute incompetence. The Egyptian military lost its great victory it had achieved under Alshazly, and the price was onerous, Egypt led by Sadat lost its sovereignty over Sinai according to the first and second disengagement agreements and Camp David accords. Furthermore, Egypt's relation with the Arab world was totally ruined. After the military and political defeat of Sadat, he found no way but adhering to the American and Israeli terms. Nevertheless, Israel and the US became determined to assure no other Shazly would appear in the future, especially with his sharp rebuke to the Americanized military establishment, for example Alshazly believed:

If Islamic groups are calling for the implementation of Sharia, this is no crime. The government must respond to those demands because it is not the demand of the Islamic groups only, but the demand of a large sector of the people (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997).

This objective of eliminating any chance for another Shazly to appear is to be achieved through maintaining a close relation between the Egyptian military and the US and its military-industrial complex through the aid program and the US-Egypt security cooperation. The most important element of this relationship is the training of the Egyptian officers in the US war colleges fostering close relationships between the Egyptian generals and their American counterparts in the Pentagon (Abul-Magd: 2013; Springborg: 1989).

[T]he bilateral military relationship has resulted in a couple of generations of Egyptian military officers receiving US military education (at various professional military education (PME) institutions in the United States), familiarization with US military doctrine, and a generally favorable disposition toward the United States. Egypt's purchase of US military hardware (which most of the military aid is used for) has resulted in better interoperability of forces between the two countries (Aftandilian: 2013, p. 5).

The Increasing military cooperation tying Egypt to the West provided numerous precious benefits for the officers. Direct government-to-government contracts provided the opportunity for nearly 200 officers per year to be trained in the United States (Springborg: 1989, p. 104; Springborg: 1987, p. 8). In his 1996 Ma. Thesis at the American Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, Gover (1996) revealed how "the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the International Military

Education and Training (IMET) programs serve as tools for the United States to exert influence” (p. v), he explained:

The FMS program influences Egyptian behavior through the development of numerous **U.S.-Egyptian personal relationships at all governmental** levels and through Egyptian dependence on the United States for weapons, training, financing, and follow-on support. The IMET program **influences the potential leaders of Egypt by providing students’ exposure to US culture and values**. US influence efforts in the case of Egypt have been most successful in obtaining short-term goals that were of mutual interest to both nations (Gover: 1996, p. v).

The American IMET opportunities were generously used by the Egyptian officers since the early 1980s sending soldiers and sailors to the American graduate schools, service academies, and command and staff colleges (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997). The masterpiece of the US military aid and training was “Operation Bright Star, joint Egyptian-American military operations begun in 1981 and repeated in odd-numbered years” (Goldschmidt: 2008, p. 215). Not only did the graduated Egyptian officers from the American and European military academies gradually institutionalize newly acquired expertise, but also most importantly their military doctrine radically changed. In just twenty three seconds, Raanan Gissin, the senior advisor to Ariel Sharon and the former spokesman of the Israeli government, captured the consequences of the American military assistance to Egypt, which were extremely miraculous for the Israelis and extremely disastrous for the Egyptians:

I remember when I was doing the Sinai withdrawal of the time, our major concern was that Sinai would be demilitarized, no Egyptian army in it. Jokingly we said: we want Sinai left only with Bedouins and camels, ghe! You know if I was that smart enough as I am today I would say: no take the Bedouins and the camels out, leave the army in. He he! (5 February 2013).

In a hearing session of the American Senate Armed services subcommittee on emerging threats and capabilities discussing the American military special operations command budget on 11 March 2014, after hearing from Admiral William Mcraven, the American military special operations commander, Senator Tim Kaine said:

I think the training that we do with the other nations might be one of the best investments we make not only in short term kind of building capacity but at the long term relationship building the folks we trained in that being defense ministers and prime ministers and presidents, that is an investment that really works and so I wanted to praise you on that.

The same appreciation of the tremendous effect of the American military training is echoed elsewhere by American official, like Ann Paterson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and the former US ambassador to Egypt and Pakistan, in her testimony in the Senate hearing session regarding the state department nominations on 19 September 2013. Another example is the testimony of Daniel C.

Kurtzer, the former US ambassador to Egypt and Israel, in the Senate foreign relations committee hearing on “the crisis in Egypt”, July 25, 2013.

On her blog, Sherifa Zuhur, the research professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute within the Army War College, published parts of her interview with Evan Hill of the Economist, which she Hill was reluctant to publish, she revealed:

I was a research professor of national security affairs (and later Islamic and regional studies) at the Strategic Studies Institute within the Army War College. The SSI is the Army’s think tank focused on strategy. My primary duties were research but a colleague had a stroke that year, so I took on more teaching duties. **Al-Sisi was one of 38 or so International Fellows** in the year-long Master’s program in strategic studies ... There was only one Egyptian officer per year. Sedky Sobhi, now Army Chief of Staff earlier. The year after al-Sisi ...AWC is the most senior of the Army service colleges, the foreign officers selected are usually well thought of and well-connected in their own military. They are slated for advancement as was al-Sisi who rapidly climbed from about 2008 to regional commander of the Egyptian Army for Alexandria and the north, and then to director of Military intelligence & reconnaissance (<http://sherifazuhur.wordpress.com>).

The sudden 1973 war and the unparalleled achievement of Alshazly and his men put the US and Israel in front of one single fact: It is the time to reorient Cromer’s broken automaton, Camp David was the blueprint and the inception of this mission, through comprehensively tying Egypt to the US, Robert Springborg exemplified:

Unlike the patronage network within the land reclamation sector during the Nasser period, which was constructed in the nexus that linked the military to public sector companies, the system now being established rests on the principle of farming out patronage to the private sector which, like its public-sector predecessor, is to be the military’s junior partner in these activities (Springborg: 1989, pp. 115-116).

Significantly, since Camp David, Egypt became the second largest recipient of US assistance worldwide, second of Israel itself (Long, Reich, & Gasiorowski: 2011). Sadat’s pursuit of a separate peace with Israel after 1973 war drastically changed the role of the military. The US did not just become the main source of weapons, it defined the very targets to which the US sold arms are to be directed. In the decade following the 1973 war, the size of the military decreased, the war with Israel was ended, no need for a huge army anymore. By eliminating any possibility of a future war with yesterday’s-foe-today’s-dear-friend Israel, Camp David mandated the Egyptian military with a new defense role, by which it was transformed into “a rapid strike force that could intervene in the reasonably proximate areas of the Horn of Africa, the Gulf, or Libya (Springborg: 1989, p. 95). Indeed, the mission of the Egyptian military was redirected toward Libya away from the eastern front (Springborg: 1989). Sadat began transforming the military into a swift strike force able to interfere in the African Horn, the Gulf, or Libya (Springborg: 1987).

The military doctrine drastically changed dictating Egypt's destiny is tied with the USA, the strategic relations with the US should never be touched, the major strategic objective of Egypt-USA relations is peace between Egypt and Israel, and finally Israel is not the enemy, Egypt's first enemy is the Islamic movement worldwide, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, this was the military doctrine Camp David produced. Remarkably, the name of the ministry responsible for the military changed from "the war ministry" to "the defense ministry" on 5 October 1978 (*Algawadi*: 1996, p. 76). The senior military leaders dominated the decisions on military issues, especially on how the American funds are spent. In a time of a declining budget, the US security aid and assistance provided the means and resources the Egyptian military needed not only for army maintenance and modernization (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997), but also for the filtering process within the military to expel anyone who dares to oppose the new orientation towards America and Israel.

In 1976, Egypt joined the supranational intelligence milieu called the Safari Club, which was declared as an alliance of intelligence services to fight communism in Africa, with the formal membership of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and France, and informal connections with the US. But in fact "the Safari Club, operating at the level of the deep state, was expressly created to overcome restraints established by political decisions of the public state in Washington" (Scott: 2014). The Safari Club was a covert CIA operation "to compensate for the CIA's retrenchment in the wake of President Carter's election and Senator Church's post-Watergate reforms" (Scott: 2014). Through the Safari Club, whose permanent headquarters was in Cairo, Egypt supported the general Mbumba to control Katanga region and plunder its treasures to the West, sent Egyptian troops to secure the African hooligans, and in 1979 bribed the Somali president Siad Barre out of Soviet embrace by \$75 million worth of Egyptian arms, paid by Saudi Arabia.

In a public panel dedicated to discuss "The Future Role of the Military in Post-Revolutionary Democratic Egypt" at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC in late April 2013, the American retired General Anthony Zinni, previous commander of CENTCOM revealed:

It is very important to understand what the US military-Egyptian military relationship has been ... from the 1979 peace agreement several things happened ... one was the demilitarization of the Sinai and the agreement that there would be a multinational force and the US committed three force brigades that have been there ever since the agreement. At that time, what I think most people don't realize is the Egyptian military made a commitment to move from their Soviet roots, training equipment to a US model, that was a big decision because **it is a major way of transferring in concepts and doctrine and equipment** and that commitment was very strong and it was very difficult to implement, in the course of time and the course of the US assistance the military's come a long way, has really adjusted to Western, particularly US, style of operations and equipment. Often times people look and some of our political leaders about the support we give and the amount we give and wonder why we are we giving and think it is still a relic of agreement between Israel and Egypt and **they don't realize**

what benefits we get in our relationship with the Egyptian military that are not tied to that. When right the year after the 1979 agreement president Carter created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in Tampa, Florida out of the old readiness command it was to become a three years later the US central command, the unified command president Reagan made a unified command. Carter did that because he feared the Soviet influence or even possible Soviet direct invasion into the Gulf region and into the Middle East and he created and obviously articulated the Carter doctrine that we would not accept that and we would be prepared to react in some way, and that RJDTF and CENTCOM was designated to be to insure that wouldn't happen and **we had several missions** one was obvious to ensure the free flow of energy resources from that region. but also to ensure access to the region and freedom a navigation, if any one looks at the map of the world he will see and understand that major trade routes from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab-el-Mandeb at the base of the Red Sea up to the Suez Canal, that is a critical lifeline for trade not just energy and oil and natural gas but obviously a trade route that is critical to the world's economy and Carter and the subsequent Presidents wanted to protect that. And also the mission of CENTCOM was to help try to ensure stability, now with that came the relationship military to military and security assistance programs we ran. It was a major Security Assistance Program we had with the Egyptian military, **what have we gotten from that?** the Egyptians sent a division to **the first Gulf war** to be by your side when Saddam invaded Kuwait, sent a brigade to be by our side in **Somalia**, and obviously **the interoperability the training together based on the same doctrine** that made it much easier to operate with them, and from the Central Command point of view that was a major commitment and a major ally to participated in that. With the creation of the CENTCOM and the RDJTF there was an understanding that we could not get access to that region if required with the major military force without Egypt, it was considered as a term I heard when I arrived at CENTCOM, **the keystone**, without the access through the Suez Canal, the over flight rights, basing rights in Cairo West and elsewhere, we could not flow forces to meet an emergency in there and to reinforce our forces, that has always been forthcoming from Egypt we have always had quick response on the need to get our planes over there to refuel and base in some of the bases particularly Cairo West, priority in the Suez Canal. In addition to that, like most areas the world **training space** is very difficult to come by and we ran in the time when we were concerned about major thrust into the Middle East or hegemons in the Middle East that might cause problems we were concerned about **a place to train that had the contiguous air, land, and sea space that we can operate at a scale we needed to practice, the Egyptians provided that.** and the largest exercise military exercise in the world Bright Star was conducted every other year and actually it was to the advantage of our European forces European command because they were able to participate and of course they didn't have that kind of maneuver space and that kind of agreement to provide that kind of a training in environment in anywhere in Europe. And I just bring this up because I think that **people think that the \$1.3 billion [American military "aid" to the Egyptian military] is some sort of gift** ... First of all much of that is done in kind with US equipment, US training, officers and NCOs come to US schools. I just lectured at Maxwell Air Force Base at our air command staff college there were Egyptian officers in there as they are in every one of our military schools. And so, that involvement, that close cooperation, **that close relationship has been critical to us since 1979 in accomplishing our military missions and the relationship officer to officer has also been very close.**

I watched as the events took place in 2011, I watched very carefully the reaction of the Egyptian military and of course I would say compare what happened there to what happened in Libya what happens now in Syria with their military, I think they remain

very restrained I think they were interested in making sure that everything turned out in a way that was in the best interest of the people and resolved itself in the way and it is still resolving itself that makes Egypt come back to be a prosperous country, **one with kind of democracy we would appreciate** ... The military's figuring out its role now and I would not want to break that tie at this critical moment between the US and the Egyptian military, it's been very strong, **we've been on battlefields together, they have given us everything we needed to respond to critical situations and been by our side when that happened**. I think it's important to get through this and work with them to find out what that right level right places in this evolving and emerging Egyptian political system and society.

Camp David turned the military into a top-heavy military that is looking for something to do in its totally war-free time, it was this time where the military extended its client network, pursued its drive to be self-sufficient, encroached the civilian domain, fostered its expansion into economic enclaves, and expanded its coalitions with the bourgeoisie key elements, including political representatives (Springborg: 1989, p. 104). Furthermore, after signing the Camp David peace treaty with Israel, the advent of any potential war largely faded away and the military switched its attention totally to economic activities. In 1978, the Defense Ministry created an economic arm called the National Service Products Organization (NSPO) for all the projects that were till then exclusively civilian, the NSPO was to be used as the key organizational means to broaden the military economic activities (Springborg: 1987; Abul-Magd: 2013).

Indeed, "American aid to Egypt was always a part of larger American strategy in the region" (Alterman: 1998, p. 69). Aid was the politically correct word to describe a comprehensive penetration and reorientation plan executed by the US, as Satloff (1988) puts it in his policy paper: "American access to goings-on inside the Egyptian armed forces stops at the gate of the first camp not supplied with American material" (p. 56). Although admitting "Egypt is an American success story, having rejected its identity as a pro-Soviet regional belligerent to become a pro-American partner in the peace process" (p. 55), Satloff complained and denounced the State Department acknowledgement "not being 'privy to' the Egyptian national security decision-making process *vis-a-vis* Gulf policy" (p. 56). Being "privy" for him meant to have "solid data on the workings of the ... large chunks of the army and other security services", as well as "basic information about the size of the Egyptian defense budget, the range of expenditures and the nature of military sales and purchases ... the Egyptian government [must share] ... precise data on its 'military debt' ... [and] 'total Egyptian military spending'" (p. 56), Being "privy" is deemed indispensable to evaluate if "Egypt may once again reemerge as a central focus of US regional strategy" (p. 55).

The whole aid program was meant to "keeping Egypt on track" (Satloff: 1988, p. 58). In other words: "American support for a more prominent domestic role for the [thoroughly penetrated and reoriented] Egyptian army would best serve the twin US interests of maintaining the stability of the Mubarak regime [critical for both: the American strategy in the Middle East and Israel] and fueling domestic economic

growth [a politically correct word instead of furthering the neo-liberalization process in Egypt]" (Satloff: 1988, p. vii). Furthermore, "military aid provides a continuing opportunity for US influence and the ability to check the pulse of the Egyptian military through U.S.-based education programs, combined training and exercises" (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997). The US penetrates the Egyptian society as well through the "substantial civilian aid (which was \$800 million for many years and is now between \$200 million and \$300 million a year)" (Aftandilian: 2013, p. 4).

The US successfully pursued its strategy regardless of any power changes in Egypt's presidency. Sadat was always afraid of the military, he kept removing potentially strong military figures liable to challenge his policies, his eleven-year presidency witnessed seven different war and defense ministers, he extremely manipulated the blurred distinctions of responsibilities between the two posts of commander-in-chief and the chief of staff. To forestall any reactionary backlash, Sadat relentlessly reshuffled the high command:

[Sadat] jailed Minister of War Muhammad Fawzi in 1971 and replaced him with General Muhammad Sadiq. A year later Sadiq was himself arrested after Sadat had ensured the loyalty of Chief of Staff Saad al-Din Shazli; Shazli was chased into exile once Sadat secured the loyalty of Minister of War Ahmad Isma'il and Shazli's replacement, General 'Abd al-Ghani Gamasi. Gamasi took over as minister of war after the death of General Isma'il in December 1974. Gamasi and his chief of staff, Muhammad 'Ali Fahmi, lasted until 1978, when Camp David required more pliant military chiefs. Kamal Hasan 'Ali, then intelligence chief, became minister of defense briefly and then foreign minister. 'Ali's successor, the popular Ahmad Badawi, died along with 12 senior officers in a helicopter crash in March 1980. He was replaced by Egypt's military attaché in Washington, General 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala (Springborg: 1987, p. 5).

Saad Eddin Alshazly, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces (1971-1973) and one of the most successful and professional military men of modern times who led the process of rebuilding the Egyptian armed forces and he was the mastermind of the successful Egyptian attack on the Israeli Bar-Lev line of defense, explained:

In dictator and totalitarian systems, the political leadership is a rapist system, and the rapist always wants to keep and defend what it had raped against any other probable rapist, and against any popular *Intifada* (revolution). Moreover, since the military power is the most efficient tool to suppress any popular Intifada against the rule, and since it is the first candidate to rape the power from its rapists. It has indeed become indispensable of the ruler to strictly seize complete control over the armed forces, hence, he can use it in suppressing any popular *intifada*, and he simultaneously guarantees the impossibility of any coup (Alshazly: 2003, chapter 41).

Although Sadat also cut down the military's budget and restricted its public role, he was careful "to protect the career interests of professional soldiers and to provide for the material requirements of the military. Although the size of the armed forces had decreased after peace with Israel, the officer complement remained intact"

(Metz: 1990, p. 304). Sadat's main achievement for America was the Camp David Accords, for "if the Camp David Accords achieved nothing else, they significantly reduced the likelihood of large-scale Arab-Israeli war" (Satloff: 1988, p. 59). Yet the Camp David Accords did achieve a lot more: it localized and nationalized the war with Israel into a Palestinian issue, granted Israel legitimacy, isolated Egypt from all the Arabs, and most importantly created the channels for the US and Israel to systematically penetrate the Egyptian military.

Strategically, the US-Egypt security cooperation served as the cornerstone maintaining Egypt's adherence to Camp David, bolstering peace and normalization with Israel, and serving the American strategy in the Middle East (Vogelsang: 2011). A monograph published by the School of Advanced Military Studies at the United States Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas concluded: "the evidence is that security assistance to Egypt brings many of the benefits for which the process was designed. However, it is an imperfect relationship", the report complaint: "the United States does not have basing rights in Egypt. US leaders discussed their interest in basing rights at the airbase of Ras Banas with President Sadat, but these were never enacted" (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 13). However, "in 1981 Egypt agreed to allow the United States Rapid Deployment Force (currently called the United States Central Command) to use Egypt's base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea" (Metz: 1990, p. 332), the project was shelved in 1984 due to technical disagreements.

The US explicit objectives behind security assistance include: "promoting coalition efforts in regional conflicts and the global war on terrorism; improving capabilities of friendly foreign militaries to assist in international crisis response operations; ... and supporting the US industrial base by promoting the export of US defense-related goods and services" (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 14). However, the US Department of State is not fully satisfied, "The relationship is again not perfect, allowing for disagreement on a wide range of issues. Approximately eighty percent of Egypt's votes in the United Nations oppose the US position" (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 14).

The military assistance programs grants the Cairo-based US Office of Military Cooperation along with several other program overseers, the right of providing guidance on procurement plans and objectives (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997; (see also: Vogelsang: 2011, pp. 19-21). Regional access is the first benefit of the USA, Mark A. Gunzinger, a former Pentagon and White House strategic planner and Air Force command pilot, clarified:

Losing access to Egypt, for military planners, would be part of a larger problem. We have operated in the past with a great deal of freedom of maneuver in the air, at sea, ... We always knew we could deploy the fighters, the carriers can get in close, there's no significant threat to bases, and our supply lines would be fairly secure ... the United States does not have an alternative if access to and through Egypt disappears (Vogelsang: 2011, pp. 20-21).

A report issued in 2006 by the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) concluded: “for the past 27 years, the United States has provided Egypt with more than \$34 billion in FMF [Foreign Military Financing] assistance to support US strategic goals in the Middle East” (GAO: 2006, p. 16). The report provided examples of security cooperation and assistance between Egypt and the US after a preamble stating: “Officials and several experts assert that Egypt supports the US goals of the FMF program, which are found in State’s annual Mission Performance Plan for Egypt and its Congressional Budget Justification” (GAO: 2006, p. 16). The report mentioned several examples of Egypt’s support for US goals, Egypt “deployed about 800 military personnel to the Darfur region of the Sudan in 2004; trained 250 Iraqi police and 25 Iraqi diplomats in 2004; deployed a military hospital and medical staff to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, where nearly 100,000 patients received treatment; provided over-flight permission to 36,553 US military aircraft through Egyptian airspace from 2001 to 2005; [and] granted expedited transit of 861 US naval ships through the Suez Canal during the same period and provided all security support for those ship transits” (GAO: 2006, p. 17). Also, Security cooperation “[a]ccelerated, safe access to the Suez Canal facilitates US naval access to the Mediterranean, as well as access to exercises in the Indian Ocean. Naval transit of Suez, as well as air landing and overflight rights” (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 13), which provided the indispensable access for the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the mid-1989, the US “stationed 1,200 military personnel in Egypt” (Metz: 1990, p. 332).

For the Egyptian military, “U.S. security cooperation allows Egypt to acquire the modern weaponry and equipment” (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 22). Surprisingly, if the US and Israel decided the military doctrine of the “Egyptian” military in Camp David, provided the “Egyptian” military with arms and expertise, destined the “Egyptian” military to serve US strategic need, etc., then the “Egyptian” military becomes no more than a new generation mercenary, this is what I call the neo-comprador functional group. It is a kind of labor division between the neo-comprador functional group and the post-neo-colonial power: the US provide the “Egyptian” military with doctrine, arms, equipment, training, and orientation, and the “Egyptian” military in turn “pursue[s] its unusual domestic role in the economy ... devote[s] itself to its economic organizations and protect[s] the wealth of the officer class” (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 23) to be ready to execute the assigned tasks by the US. Just not to get lost in the details:

[The American] main strategic interests vis-a-vis Egypt - ... [are] promoting the internal stability of a moderate, Western-oriented regime committed to peace with Israel and political alignment with other Western-oriented states in the region - it is clear that the benefits of this policy outweigh its costs. Other US interests in Egypt, from overflight rights to facility use agreements to programs of strategic cooperation, are only secondary to and derivative of that preeminent goal (Satloff: 1988, p. 62).

A report issued by the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College (Aftandilian: 2013) elaborated the importance of Egypt to the American strategy in

the region, and further mentioned how “many political figures in the United States consider the aid to be a form of leverage over Egypt ... From the Egyptian perspective, the aid is the least the United States can do to reward Egypt for all it does strategically and politically for the United States in the region” (Aftandilian: 2013, p. 5). The report also emphasized the inevitability of the American-Egyptian military relation:

Although the Cold War is over and Egypt may not be the cornerstone country it once was for US strategic planners, the idea of “losing” Egypt as a strategic ally is not an attractive option for US officials. At the very least, it would put the Arab-Israeli situation in jeopardy, contributing to instability in the region, and make it more difficult for the United States to confront security threats in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf region (Aftandilian: 2013, p. 6).

The American-Israeli plan applied to the Egyptian army in collaboration with Sadat, was a prototype of what was applied to the Egyptian society at large, supporting the fact “all modern armies are a microcosm of their larger societies in a crucial sense ... [they] reflect the [not only] class divisions within society at large [but also the cultural and political contestations as well]” (Fahmy: 2002, p. 33).

Economically, in 1974 the government began the liberalization program of the economy by applying the open-door policy, *infitah*, of which the direct manifestations were the immense construction boom and the return of the foreign banks (Goldschmidt: 2008). The *infitah* “main beneficiaries were the Egyptian bourgeoisie, some of whom celebrated their return from the Nasserite wilderness by spending their money on urban land, new villas, apartments, and hotels. Rarely did they invest in such productive enterprises as factories” (Goldschmidt: 2008, p. 198). This pre-1952 coup bourgeoisie (politically represented by the pro-British Alumma and Alwafd parties) “reemerged in alliance with the civil service technocrats and military officers to establish import agencies and to speculate in the brokerage and financial sectors” (T. Ismael & J. Ismael: 2011, p. 358).

Expectedly, like any liberalization economic experiment, the *infitah* did not improve Egypt’s economy, nor did it soothe the social inequality, it just “benefit[ed] the minority ... while neglecting the need of the majority” (Goldschmidt: 2008, p. 198). The open-door policy did not even attract new foreign capital, most of the funds was either public or private but domestic. “In 1980, the external debt was \$19.1 billion, and debt service was 13.4% of GDP. Between 1981 and 1990, rural poverty rose from 16.1% to 28.6% and urban poverty rose from 18.2% to 20.3%”, consequently, “the bottom 80% fared worse than previously, while the top 20% was better off” (T. Ismael & J. Ismael: 2011, p. 358). Tareq Ismael and Jacqueline Ismael concludes how the economic liberalization programs taking place since the *infitah* impoverished the majority of the Egyptians while enriching the few elite who supported close ties with the US and foreign capital:

The upper classes have profited from corruption, arms sales commissions, widespread bribery, and commercial services. As if to add insult to injury, their wealth tends to be

invested outside of Egypt, with a double indemnity for the country: there is little domestic investment in developmental infrastructure and taxes are avoided. According to a study by Mohammad Heikal, there are 50 Egyptians whose wealth is \$100-200 million; 100 with \$80-100 million; 150 with \$30-\$50 million; 350 with \$15-\$30 million; 2,800 with \$10-\$15 million; and 7000 with \$5-\$10 million. If Heikal is correct, then over the last twenty years almost 1,000 individuals have accumulated over \$50 billion, more than the foreign debt of Egypt, and all of them have accumulated this wealth from within the country — through estates, by setting up monopolies for essential goods, or as agents of international companies (T. Ismael & J. Ismael: 2011, p. 374).

Timothy Mitchell revealed the real and mostly unspoken aspect of *infitah*:

The years 1974–75 marked the beginning of a new American interest in rural Egypt ... Transferring farmland out of village control into large commercial hands coincided with the interests of American agribusiness corporations, including Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, for whom Camp David confirmed the ending of the Egyptian boycott of American soft drink companies and the opening up of an important new market... [Egypt was] the largest site in the world to be incorporated into this system of state-subsidized American farming ... The arm of the state that has organized this incorporation was USAID ... USAID's role as a source of subsidies to American agriculture and industry can be seen by examining how it spent the \$15 billion budget for "economic assistance" to Egypt from the start of its operations there in 1974–75 up to 1989 ... Almost every penny of this amount, it can be shown, was actually allocated to American corporations (Mitchell: 2002, pp. 126, 236).

Mitchell concluded:

The dominant theme in the description of the rural Third World at the close of the twentieth century remains the story of its capitalist transformation. The theme was exemplified in rural Egypt, where the reform and removal of state controls through the program known as structural adjustment was intended to turn the land and its produce into market commodities and remake the countryside for the twenty-first century as a fully capitalist economy (Mitchell: 2002, p. 244).

Sadat's superficial democracy was exposed in the bread uprising on 18-19 January 1977, and further in September 1981. In the next month, Sadat was assassinated by some military officers in a military parade on the very day of 6 October, Alshazly declared in a media interview from his exile:

[Who killed Sadat is] a courageous army officer ... he is one of the opposition, we consider him as one of the opposition and one of the most courageous officers in the Egyptian army ... We, the opposition as a whole, are responsible for the assassination of Sadat.

Remarkably, when Sadat was killed, the wealth his wife Jihan was up to \$600 million (Shalabi: 1990, p. 553). The reason why Sadat chose Mubarak as vice president is as unobvious as the reason why Nasser chose Sadat. However, there are two apparent remarks, first, it seems both, Nasser and Sadat, chose the most obedient, submissive, and compliant of the men around them. Second, the US was extremely omnipresent in the succession process, surely "behind the scenes", yet

exceptionally effective. The CIA men in the ruling elite played a decisive role, Hassan Altohamy in Nasser-Sadat case and Ashraf Marawan in Sadat-Mubarak case.

Mubarak came to power with a massive ambition to individually rule and control Egypt, his ambition coalesced with Washington's desire to make Egypt what the US always wanted it to be: a dependent and partisan ally confronting and inhibiting the radical feelings and orientations in the Arab World (*Gardener: 2013, p. 10*). The Egyptian military was a strategic guarantee for America, thus the US invested \$50 billion in it in Mubarak's era alone (*Gardener: 2013, p. 9*).

Unlike Sadat, Mubarak defended and consolidated his power through expanding the scope and role of a loyal military through not only allowing the military to build an economic empire but also by "supervising a government-military partnership that permits the army to command an increasing share of central government expenditure, control a widening sphere of government activities and exert greater influence in domestic politics" (Satloff: 1988, p. vii), this approach will give the military the whole opportunity and will end up with the construction and consolidation of the officers' republic (Abul-Magd: 2012; Sayigh: 2012). The military on the exceptional occasions of the violent 1977 food riots and the Central Security Forces conscripts uprising in 1986 proved to be the real safeguard of the regime.

In 1978 the military inaugurated numerous enterprises to produce goods for military and civilian use, these enterprises was controlled by the National Service Project Organization with the mandate of reorienting the military towards economic development, especially with the ever-diminishing military role of the military after Camp David. So, the military, which Sadat undermined much of its "independent" power, has since the late 1970s began establishing an economic empire siphoning scarce resources and money away from the civilian sector (Springborg: 1989) and providing the social and economic base for the Camp David militant functional group. One man was the keyword: Abdelhalim Abu Ghazala.

Abu Ghazala, the member of the political bureau of the ruling party, was Egypt's military attaché in Washington from 1976 through 1979, where he developed close ties with the American military, and when Camp David was born and imposed on Egypt. Abu Ghazala closely worked with Mubarak on developing the American military aid program to Egypt (Springborg: 1989, pp. 98-99). While serving as the chief-of-staff of the Egyptian military since May 1980, Abu Ghazala was named by Sadat as Defense minister in 1980 upon the recommendation of Mubarak (Springborg: 1989, p. 99), after the dramatic death of the precedent Defense minister Ahmed Badawy in a suspicious helicopter crash, later Mubarak promoted Abu Ghazala to field marshal and deputy prime minister in 1982. Abu Ghazala, the artillery officer then the military intelligence officer "was considered very pro-American having attended the US Army War College and served as the Egyptian Defense and Military Attaché to the United States from 1976-1980" (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997). When Abu Ghazala became defense minister, transformation of the military towards the US, making peace and collaborating with Israel, and being

incorporated into the American war against communism was the zeitgeist in Egypt, Abu Ghazala was specifically chosen to accomplish this mandate. Even after Mubarak dismissed Abu Ghazala, the latter continued not only to attend and be a key note speaker in the public conferences of the ruling party, but also to serve the American-Egyptian strategic and military alliance.

He is correspondingly pro-U.S. He has asserted that Egypt's security is inseparable from that of the United States and NATO and argued that Arab forces should be coordinated with the U.S.'s Rapid Deployment Force (now the Central Command) so that the latter could pose a credible threat to Soviet expansionism. He strongly favors the participation of US multinational corporations in the Egyptian economy. The Field Marshal, for example, was the Chairman of the Higher Committee for the Egyptian Passenger Car, a post from which he directed the effort to terminate the quarter-century relationship between Fiat and the public-sector firm NASCO, which assembled various of the Italian carmaker's models. Abu Ghazala succeeded in replacing this arrangement with a contract tying NASCO to General Motors and giving the latter a monopoly on new-car sales in Egypt (Springborg: 1989, p. 100).

Unsurprisingly, Abu Ghazala began his era with embracing the American military operation against Iran in a time the Gulf countries refused to be the operation base. Operation Eagle Claw, the US Armed Forces operation to end the Iran hostage crisis on 24 April 1980, was initiated from Egypt with Abu Ghazala's full collaboration. The American troops based in Wadi Abu Shihat airport, near Qena in Upper Egypt. Yet it was not a mere go-and-return point, but rather a base for American military operations, the Delta Force commander Colonel Charlie Beckwith led the operation from Alminya military airport.

No sooner Abu Ghazala was appointed as a defense minister than he became one of the key players in the Operation Cyclone, the CIA program promoted by Texas congressman Charlie Wilson to supply arms to the Afghan prior to and during the Soviet invasion (1979 to 1989). This story was told in Charlie Wilson's book (Crile: 2003) and the 2007 film *Charlie Wilson's War*. Abu Ghazala thoroughly executed the American assigned role for Egypt in Afghanistan war. Egypt became militarily and intelligence-wise under the service of the American war against the USSR in Afghanistan. The same happened when the Iran-Iraq war erupted. Abu Ghazala provided Saddam with all kinds of weapons, including the banned chemical weapons Saddam used against the Iranians and later the Kurds.

Abu Ghazala became the US and Mubarak's close collaborator in the first eight years of Mubarak's reign. Abu Ghazala was intelligent and bright, ranked among the top ten in the Egyptian national exam. There is a considerable disagreement over Abu Ghazala, some view him as a real patriot, while others believe Abu Ghazala was very smart, he knew the American thought he is their man and he exploited this fact and gave them whatever they asked for, yet Abu Ghazala was too smart to trust them, and he played behind their back. Although this disagreement, historical evidence shows Abdu Ghazala was America's man in Egypt, his policy and his work in the Egyptian military totally reflected the US vision and interests. Abu Ghazala

personally fully believed in the American-Egyptian alliance and considered Egypt's relation with the US the most important of Egypt's interests, he was not just a man doing his job as a minister but a man who pursued what he believed should be done. He tied the Egyptian military to the American military strategically, training-wise, and armament-wise. The Egyptian military rested its self-esteem on the constant flow of Western, mainly American, weaponry, although in quantities extensively less than those obtained by the Israeli and even Saudi forces. Almost all Abu Ghazala's armament work revolved around implanting the American arms in Egypt, replacing the Russian arms, and Americanizing the military, namely modernizing the military through aligning it with the American strategy and exclusive dependency on the American weapons. All the arms development, modernization, training, and maintenance projects, except two projects, were American. The consequence of this Americanization process is the full Egyptian dependence on America, Egypt cannot use its weapons unless the US agrees, and otherwise there will be no maintenance, training, and new arms.

In 1985 when Mubarak secretly decided to offer "safe passage aboard an Egyptian plane to the [Italian plane] Achille Lauro hijackers, [Abu Ghazala] informed the US, presumably through the military mission in Cairo, that the hijackers were being flown to Tunis" (Springborg: 1987, p. 7). This "was related on American ABC television on June 10, 1986. The following day it was denied by the State Department. Sources close to the Egyptian presidency and the American Embassy confirmed the ABC version of events" (Springborg: 1987, p. 16). Robert Springborg commented: "Abu Ghazala ... is more sensitive to the Reagan Administration's preoccupation with terrorism" (Springborg: 1989, p. 102, see more: p. 127). A month later, when Mubarak attempted to remove Abu Ghazala, "the US Embassy let it be known that it would look unfavorably on the transfer of Abu Ghazala from his current post. There the matter remained until the CSF riots some three months later" (Springborg: 1989, p. 103).

Along with Israel, Egypt was given the MNNA designation (Major Non-NATO Ally) by the US in 1987 with full Abu Ghazala's full support.

The MNNA is a designation given by the US government to exceptionally close allies who have strong strategic working relationships with American forces but are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ... Title 10 US Code Section 2350a authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to designate MNNAs for purposes of participating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in cooperative research and development programs (globalsecurity.org).

Under the MNNA umbrella, Egypt normalized its relations with Israel associating and sharing with it the same system of training, armament, information exchange, and joint research. Although, Abdu Ghazala claimed all this is done to develop the military, still the fact is Egypt is fully subject to the American approval on the kind and amount of her arms.

While expressing discomfort towards Israel, Abu Ghazala actually did nothing but mere lip service, in 1986 Abu Ghazala asserted “Israel still embraced a strategy of maintaining military strength superior to that of all of its neighbors combined”, Egypt's policy, he maintained was “to ‘neutralize’ this strength so that it could not be used for aggressive purposes threatening the security of the Arab states” (Metz: 1990, p. 302).

Furthermore, through the twin processes of what Robert Springborg (1989) referred to as 1) “the vertical integration of the military structure, which has converted it into an almost entirely autonomous enclave of middle-class modernity in an increasingly impoverished and marginalized Third World economy” (p. 107), and 2) the “horizontal military expansion, [meaning the] vast proliferation of its activities, facilitating access to patronage resources” (p. 107). Through these two parallel processes, Abu Ghazala not only reinforced his grip on the military and built his own fiefdom, but also established the required sustainable social and economic base for the altered post-Camp-David military doctrine to operate, and for a fully differentiated military functional group to appear as well. For “U.S.-Egypt security cooperation satisfies strategic military and political interests for the United States but for Egypt, the ties are not only political and military strategic ties, but also economic ones” (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 20). Furthermore, the US-controlled Egyptian military is to extent its control to the whole Egyptian society, “economic control is the structure on which the military’s power sits” (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 22).

After the irrepressible Abu Ghazala confronted the late February 1986 riots he no longer needed the support of the American embassy in Cairo to balance Mubarak’s desire of removing him, “Abu Ghazala bounced back stronger than ever” (Springborg: 1989, p. 103). Few months later, in June and November 1986, Abu Ghazala headed Egyptian missions to the US, in which he did not only discuss the military debt but also encompassed a much wider range of mutual relations and economic issues, especially the sensitive neoliberal reforms the IMF and Washington long sought to impose over Egypt.

Politically, Abu Ghazala dominated the cabinet especially after September 1985 (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997; Springborg: 1989), economically, Abu Ghazala built and expanded an extensive military-industrial base through activating and developing the dormant NSPO to become the principal organizational means for the enlargement of military activities producing goods for both military and civilian uses, and permeating the private sector as well (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997; Springborg: 1989). Abu Ghazala’s public appearance equaled and sometimes outsized Mubarak’s presence, Alahram agency compiled a collection of newspapers documenting Abu Ghazala’s activities in more than 2,500 pages.

Through a novel and wide benefits net, Abu Ghazala created a military elite that lives virtually isolated from the whole/civilian society (Springborg: 1989, p. 104), the Nasr City suburb is a clear example:

[A]djacent to Heliopolis and its military academy, large base, and military factories ... Nasr City has become the fastest-growing district in Cairo, its population having leapt to a quarter of a million in 1986 from less than 100,000 ten years earlier. [Furthermore] Nasr City is not the only location at which housing for the military is springing up. In 1985-86 almost 5 percent of all housing constructed in the country was built by and for the military. A substantial percentage of this is in the new military cities scattered in the desert, principally around Cairo (Springborg: 1989, p. 104-105).

Likewise, the officers and their families no longer have to compete with other Egyptians for daily needs, health services, leisure opportunities, recreational facilities, or even access to higher education. The military created a military consumer “cooperatives” chain to cater for the daily needs of the officers and their families, remarkably these pleasant cooperatives and shops were concentrated in the Cairo areas where officers reside, like: Heliopolis, Nasr City, and Abbasiya, and will be found in the future in the new military cities as well. The officers also benefit with their families from the convenient military hospitals, a chain of luxurious military resorts to spend a good time in their holidays, and a military travel agency providing its services not only in Egypt, but overseas as well. Indeed, entrance into this highly autonomous military world is strictly regulated by an increasingly exclusive and separate educational system, including the military academy, the military technical college significantly upgraded since 1981, the military academy for administrative sciences created in Abu Ghazala’s era, and the academy of military medicine also created in Abu Ghazala’s era (Springborg: 1989; Springborg: 1987; Vogelsang: 2011).

In continuation of the military predominance after 1952 coup, in an alignment with the American strategy of directing the Egyptian army toward missions not of its own: business and internal security of the regime, and to fund the increasingly expanding military encroachments into the civil domain, Abu Ghazala authorized the selling of the land “belonging to the military” formerly used as camps, to corporates and individuals (Springborg: 1987). This “military-owned” lands, were immediately adjacent to largest cities in Egypt, and thus was exceedingly valuable. Interestingly, even if the land was not “military-owned” the military managed to seize it by adopting the Israeli perfected technique to dispossess the Palestinian land (Bill & Springborg: 2000). Military soldiers would arrive in the desired area, declare its designation for military maneuvers, then simply and forcefully chase out any occupants. This is another significant story revealing how the military exploited its lost mandate (to fight with guns) in order to get more “butter” exclusively for its own. Under the motto of providing for the military’s needs and maintaining national security, Abu Ghazala initiated massive economic projects. The military steadily increased its involvement in Egypt's industrial, construction, military, agricultural, and other civil sectors. Abu Ghazala seized the until-then dormant National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), which was “created by the military in 1978 for projects in what were then exclusively civilian sectors”, to use it “as the principal organizational vehicle for broadening military activities” (Springborg: 1987, p. 11).

The vast proliferation of military economic activities, and its increasing access to patronage resources, what we call horizontal military expansion mainly occurred in four basic sectors: 1) military industries; 2) civilian industries; 3) agriculture and land reclamation; and 4) national infrastructure development (Springborg: 1989; Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997).

First, although Egypt is considered “the veteran Arab arms producer” (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997), the Egyptian military industry is obviously limited to non-advanced arms. For while the military pursued self-sufficiency and self-reliance, it provides roughly 60% of the Egyptian military needs, and however, it still exports significant quantities of weapons and ammunition. “In 1984 it was claimed that the gross figure already exceeded \$1 billion ... Paul Jabber stated in 1986, however, that exports to Iraq alone in 1983 exceeded \$1 billion (Springborg: 1989, p. 108). Nevertheless, self-sufficiency, autonomy, and self-reliance were never achieved, the military industry is just a local dependent agent an external power, either the USSR or the West, who on several occasions embargoed or refused to provide the arms Egypt needed. For example, in the aftermath of the 1973 war, the USSR “refused to rearm, provide repair parts or overhaul assistance to the Egyptian military and discouraged cooperation with Egypt by its other client states” (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997). Thus, arms dependence renders the idea of Egyptian independence in security matters and the Egyptian military to fight without foreign resupply, nothing more than a myth.

In 1997, the Egyptian Defense production:

[O]ccurs in some 30 factories and companies which reportedly employ up to 100,000 people. Value of production in the industry was estimated at an average of \$400 million a year in the 1980s. The Egyptian military industries also exported an annual average of \$191 million in the 1980s. The range of exports during the 1980s was from \$30 million in 1981 to \$550 million in 1988. The majority of exports were arms sales to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war ... once this war ended in 1989, Egyptian exports fell precipitously (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997).

After Camp David the Arab arms production consortium dubbed the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), formed in April 1975 of Egypt (who provided the manpower and infrastructure), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar (who provided the \$1.04 billion funding base), with the intention of producing arms to its members and export the surplus production to other Arab, Islamic and Third World Countries, was ruined, the other AOI members quit the and withdrew their funds. However, although it is a short life, the AOI provided Egypt the basis with for Abu Ghazala’s rapid expansion in manufacturing and assembly operations. Even after returning to the Arab world fold in the late 1980s, Egypt was not able to convince any Arab state to rejoin the AOI (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997). Moreover, in the late 1990s, Egypt's military production sector declined and suffered from the dearth of external markets, low productivity, and the lack of sufficient funding (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997).

Second, after establishing its military manufacturing base, the military began branching out into civilian industries under the auspices of NSPO, along with the ministry of military production and the Arab Organization for Industrialization. These military encroachments into civilian sectors started in the late-1970s but gained its momentum in Abu Ghazala's era. The military converted huge portions of Egypt's military production capacity into the production of civilian goods, manufacturing a wide spectrum of products ranging from tin cans, vegetable and fruits, bakeries, dairy and poultry, fish, cattle feedlots, and food-processing plants to clothing, stationary, household appliances, washing machines, heaters, maritime transport, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, and microscopes. Of course, most of these subsidized military products were sold to military (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997; Metz: 1990; Springborg: 1989). "The output of nonmilitary manufactured goods amounted to £E347 million in FY 1985" (Metz: 1990, p. 327), whereas the "military-operated facilities ... accounted for 18 percent of the nation's total food production in FY 1985" (Metz: 1990, p. 327) and covered "60 percent of the army's required consumables (food, uniforms, footwear, etc.) in 1985" (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997). In 1985-86, the military-produced civilian goods "is reported to be about £E250 million" (Springborg: 1987, p. 10). The Banha Electronics Company was a striking example of Military encroachment into civilian industries did not only antagonize civilians but also cemented the shared interests of both the few civilian and military managers, and the interests between the military and Mubarak's bourgeoisie (Springborg: 1989).

Third, the military justified its encroachment into in agriculture and land reclamation by arguing national security depends on food security (Springborg: 1989). In 1974 the idea of the military's engagement with civilian pursuits first appeared, by the establishment of a new Food Security Division (FSD) mandated with the task of making the military 100% self-sufficient in food. Due to the military's huge resources and power, "[t]he FSD became almost overnight the single largest agro-industrial organization in Egypt" (Springborg: 1989, p. 112). The agricultural military production "accounted for £E488 million in production in FY 1985, the last year for which data were available" (Metz: 1990, p. 325). This £E488 million worth of food produced by the FSD "was some 18 percent of the total value of food produced in Egypt that year" (Springborg: 1989, p. 113). The military also begun, once again, to reclaim land, this enabled Abu Ghazala not only of "granting" the NSPO reclaimed land, but also to "withhold it from his enemies. [Moreover,] ... he has also been able to help his friends in this area, who are primarily former officers with interests in private-sector investment companies, as well as their counterparts from the civilian bourgeoisie" (Springborg: 1989, p. 115). For example, In February 1987, "Abu Ghazala announced that his committee was awarding 50,000 *feddan*-s in al-Awniyat in the western desert to such companies (Springborg: 1989, p. 115).

Forth, starting from 1981 the military overtook national infrastructure development projects like construction of roads, schools, power lines, telephone links, bridges,

and overpasses in Cairo and elsewhere, and sewers (Metz: 1990; Springborg: 1989; Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997). In 1981 the infrastructure projects exceed £E300 million worth (Springborg: 1989, p. 116), the output of construction only amounted to £E174 million in FY 1985 (Metz: 1990, p. 327). Famous examples include: the Ramses overpass in central Cairo, the installation of new telephone lines, “of which the military’s share in the five-year plan of 1981/82-1985/6 was over 40 percent” (Springborg: 1989, p. 116; Metz: 1990, p. 327), combatting oil pollution, health care, travel (the Dahab travel agency). The military’s guiding principles and real motives, unstated of course, aimed to glorify the military and its traditions, to extend the patronage network spreading from the Field Marshal himself and the high command downward, to gain popular support, or at best to alleviate the growing hostility toward the military, to undermine the civilian bureaucracy while simultaneously cementing the military ties with the private sector, and to prove the military’s capabilities and commitment to the people’s welfare (Springborg: 1989).

In conclusion, Abu Ghazala was the first to establish the military competence to earn revenues independently of the state budget, while maintaining a high degree of financial autonomy. “Despite the government's fiscal austerity, Abu Ghazala was able to purchase expensive modern weaponry during the 1980s and to undertake vast housing projects to improve the living conditions of both officers and enlisted personnel” (Metz: 1990, p. 305). Abu Ghazala is the founder of the military business empire and the constituter of the military-exclusively-owed civil money of the people both surpassing any inspection or accountability.

Significantly, the profits from all the military projects and exports, military and non-military, always exclusively returned to the military coffers with absolutely no government accounting or interference, it was totally “Off-budget”, the law no. 32 of 1979, granted the military the right to maintain its own commercial bank accounts, and made its budget independent of the government’s budget (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997; Brumberg & Sallam: 2012). The matter is not only about the off-budget profits exclusively returning to the military's coffers outside the monitoring bodies purview, for although “the percentage of the GDP devoted to the military in Egypt decreased over the past twenty years to about 2.3 percent, the military benefits from off-budget profits on a wide range of economic activities. The Egyptian military budget is secret” (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 25). The military enjoyed lucrative subsidies and contracting privileges, and was always exempted from business permits, taxes, and import licenses (Metz: 1990; Brumberg & Sallam: 2012). Furthermore, the military was never held accountable neither for profits nor losses of its economic activities, therefore, military industries may well appear profitable on paper, while it actually constitutes an enormous net loss in the Egyptian national income (Springborg: 1989; Metz: 1990).

The military’s butter is protected by guns. Due to the lack of transparency and absence of accountability, nobody knows anything accurate about the military’s economic empire. While “official sources claim that the military’s economic

enterprises represent less than 10 percent of Egypt's gross domestic product (GDP); figures reported by news media have ranged from 5 to 40 percent" (Brumberg & Sallam: 2012, p. 4). "If the total military budget is extrapolated from estimates of GDP, the military budget is in the mid-single digits, perhaps \$5 billion, and the US contribution is important, perhaps one-third of the total (Vogelsang: 2011, p. 25).

There is absolutely no available figures on the budget, operating costs, fixed capital, profits or losses, nor workforce of military or any of its economic apparatuses. The zero-transparency and unaccountability policies not only provided hug room for skimming, leakage, and lucrative practices, but rather made corruption, robbery, chicanery, and misallocation and misappropriation of funds comprehensively and universally systematized and further methodologized, one of the cases disclosed cases involved Sadat's brother Ismat and several generals (Springborg: 1989, p. 106).

In 1993, the Wall Street Journal uncovered several cases of payoffs from US defense contractors to the Egyptian military. The perks ranged from expense-paid weekends in New York to \$1.1 million in "fat" that was added to a defense contract "to make every Egyptian officer happy" (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997).

The military comprehensive and universal systematized methodology of corruption, robbery, chicanery, and misallocation and misappropriation of funds mainly comprised of three steps: 1) getting subsidized inputs and resources, including cheap energy and almost free/forced labor, 2) the payment, for the subsidized military products and exports, goes directly to the military not into the national accounts, surpassing any civil or popular accountably, and; 3) the military has mastered the elusive techniques of extracting commissions from the Western appliance suppliers, benefitting the senior officers in charge of these rent-circuits.

Furthermore, not only is the military's butter protected by guns, it was actually at the expense of guns. Senior officers have long argued the military's economic projects does not affect the military's combat capabilities (Metz: 1990). Nevertheless, the facts proves this is totally a deceptive ruse. In one of the *Conversations with History* episodes on April 2012, Harry Kreisler, the Executive Director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, interviewed Steven A. Cook, the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the American Council on Foreign Relations, who demystified the previous claim:

Harry Kreisler: so during this period does the Egyptian military's capacity to fight wars remain at a high level?

- Steven Cook: I do not think so at all, **there is no evidence that the Egyptian forces is proficient at fighting**, they don't use the equipment that they have purchased from the United States with a tremendous manner of efficiency, they don't use them correctly, for example Egyptians have the M1A1 tanks which they use as set battlefield pieces, well that is a waste of technology, M1A1 tanks are supposed to be for maneuver warfare but they don't have the service to tanks they can't do the logistics

for tanks operating over long periods of time. Egyptian military pilots are not known for their proficiency, surely they can take off and they can land but in terms of other kinds of skills they are not as proficient as others, ***this is not a significant fighting force this is a military that is involved in economics and its own economic interest and maintaining control over the Egyptian population.***

Harry Kreisler: so in a way **the result of policies and relations** both with the Soviet Union in the first period and then **with the US really was about putting the military to sleep** really?

- Steven Cook: I wouldn't say so much during the Soviet period, remember during the time that the Egyptians had a Soviet equipped military they achieved the greatest military achievement in modern Egyptian history the crossing of the Suez Canal in the opening days of the October 1973 War. They didn't do so well after that heavily scripted crossing which suggested that there were problems there in war fighting, but since then when the United States and Egypt entered into this strategic relationship and the foreign military aid to Egypt from the United States began in the early 1980s, the goal was to make over the Egyptian armed forces into an American equipped force somewhere effective fighting force but **in fact over the course of 35 years essentially the aid program has demobilized the Egyptians as fighting force**, this has had unintended consequences for the Egyptian politics and the Egyptian economy which Egyptians are experiencing right now but **it is not an effective fighting force** (emphasis added).

In the 2014 Weinberg Founders Conference titled: "Strategy and Leadership: America's Core Challenges in the Middle East" held at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Ehud Barak, the former Israeli Chief of General Staff, defense minister, and prime minister of Israel, asserted: "we are stronger, under no plan we are preparing to give up any security interest, or to dismantle the idea, we will remain the strongest power thousand miles around Jerusalem whatever happens in the region for the foreseeable future". However, Barak need not to worry at all according to a leaked message from the American embassy in Cairo about the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Dr. Colin Kahl's meeting on 31 January 2010 with Egyptian military officials: Major General Mohammad Alassar, the SCAF member and the assistant to the Minister of Defense, Major General Ahmad Moataz, Chief of the American Relations Branch, and Major General Fouad Arafa, Consultant to the Military Intelligence Department. The leaked message remarkably mentioned: "[A]-Assar ... stated that the Egyptian military doctrine did not intend to gain an edge on any other country in the region or cause offense to anyone" (Wikileaks, Reference ID: 10CAIRO257).

Yezid Sayigh (2012) well concluded, it was not the professional military merit but rather the political loyalty of Tantawi and his officers to Mubarak that guaranteed their longevity in office, Sayigh concluded: "the erosion of the [Egyptian Armed Forces'] EAF's professional purpose and operational effectiveness is very much a function of the significant transformation that the officers' republic underwent after 1991 (Sayigh: 2012, p. 11). Sayigh substantiated this conclusion with the US embassy officials leaks in 2008 assessment, in which they considered the "tactical

and operational readiness of the Egyptian Armed Forces has degraded” (Sayigh: 2012, p. 10), Sayigh further refer to the American officers and officials, who are close to the military aid and assistance programs, who described the Egyptian military as not capable of combat anymore.

[T]he Egyptian army is not the tight professional force that many consider it to be. It is bloated and its officer core is indulged, having been fattened on Mubarak’s patronage. Its training is desultory, maintenance of its equipment is profoundly inadequate, and it is dependent on the United States for funding and logistical support. But even weapons systems the United States has given the Egyptian army, such as F-16s and M1A1 tanks, are underutilized. Many are also comparatively ineffective, in part because Minister of Defense Muhammad Tantawi, acting on behalf of Mubarak, denied them vital, state-of-the-art communication capacities. He did so to impede lateral communications within the officer corps and to prevent interoperability with nominally allied forces, including those of friendly Arab countries. The *raison d’être* of the military was always to support the Mubarak regime, not defend the nation (Henry & Springborg: 2011).

Although three decades of American training, aid, security assistance, and cooperation, and joint American-Egyptian exercises have passed, the retired senior officers Yezid Sayigh (2012) interviewed for his paper complained that the Egyptian military still clings to the Soviet operational doctrine and has not yet developed a genuine joint arms combat operations ability, the WikiLeaks cables also reflect an akin awareness of degradation among junior officers.

The military’s economic empire did not also work for the benefit of its true founder until the end. Abu Ghazala, who was widely considered to be Mubarak’s natural successor, was cautious not to appear as Mubarak’s political rival or to challenge his authority, although he did sometimes. It seems Mubarak could no longer stand or soothe his personality, intellectual, political, behavioral, and personal differences with Abu Ghazala’s (Springborg: 1989, pp. 98-100). Mubarak panicked from Abu Ghazala’s independence and prominence, his nightmares were becoming true as his increased reliance on Abu Ghazala transformed him from a superior into a subordinate especially after the 1986 riots where Abu Ghazala systematically expanded his power (see more on Mubarak-Abu Ghazala interactions: Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997; Springborg: 1989).

According to Mahmud Gami’ (*Ibrahim*: 2014), Mubarak’s deputy in his first presidential term, Mubarak out of his striking fear felt Abu Ghazala may turn against him and dispose him with the Americans’ consent, thus Mubarak decided to remove Abu Ghazala from office by deception. Being aware he could not sack Abu Ghazala without the American green light, Mubarak choose the best time when US-Abu Ghazala relations turned tense after Washington became very displeased discovering Abu Ghazala’s role in the dubbed “Condor II” or “Badr 2000” ballistic missiles project in partnership with Argentina, Iraq, and North Korea. Mubarak purported Abu Ghazala that he would be his deputy, however the reassured Abu Ghazala was quite surprised on the very day of the oath that he has been

“promoted” to be the president’s chief aide in April 1989, it was like a kick to the top for this was a delusive ceremonial post and its occupier never even goes to the presidency, however Mubarak did not give him even a chance to realize what was happening and sent him on the same day with an immediacy letter to Saddam on a multiple-day mission. Mubarak recalled Abu Ghazala’s elder counterpart, the artillery officer Yusuf Sabri Abutalib, Mubarak’s close ally who served as Cairo governor for the precedent six years, back to military service and appointed him as minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the military. However, Abutalib was merely a transition, he was one of Abu Ghazala’s students, nothing important happen during his office other than America’s war on Iraq, no sooner Mubarak found the subservient Tantawi than Abutalib was expelled.

Moreover, Abu Ghazala was not financially clean, he used to earn high commissions on the arms deals, and he was lustful and sultry, one of his personal stories has come public: the American congressman Charlie Wilson mentioned the important role the belly dancer Carol Shannon played to persuade him to cover the US involvement in Afghanistan against the USSR by sending Egypt-manufactured Soviet arms to the Afghans (Crile: 2003), this was portrayed in the motion picture *Charlie Wilson’s War*. Charlie Wilson documented: “Abu Ghazala was [the USA-] Wilson’s kind of man: a hero of the 1973 war, a true hater of communists, and best of all, a Muslim who drank whiskey [and] loved women” (Crile: 2003).

Mubarak could not have done it without the full American support, three years earlier Mubarak was even unable to discharge Abu Ghazala when he was in a weaker position because of the American embassy, so how could Mubarak do it without the American full support while Abu Ghazala is more powerful than before. Or conversely, may be Mubarak just did it and the US considered that their relation with Mubarak is more precious than having the irrepressible, manipulative Abu Ghazala in the defense ministry, so Mubarak was relieved, Abu Ghazala kept doing his mandate wings-cut, and the US maintained its interests without risking an open confrontation within the regime in Egypt. Abu Ghazala’s nasty personal and financial life may be was the reason why he did not say a word, yet the most important fact is that his displacement was an American decision after the condor missiles scandal, however Abu Ghazala-USA relationship remained, he still maintained the position of Mubarak’s envoy to the US, in capacity of which he engineered the cancellation of all the Egyptian military (half of the Egyptian total debt) in return for Egypt’s participation in the Desert Storm American operation in 1990-1991 with “40,000 Egyptian troops” (Goldschmidt: 2008, p. 215). Significantly, Mitchell revealed due to “further Egyptian debt defaults ... the US government wiped out Egypt’s entire \$7.1 billion military debt, using Egypt’s political support for a war against Iraq to overcome Congressional opposition” (Mitchell: 2002, p. 238). The military relations with Egypt is too important and has been a long and expensive investment to be simply abandoned.

Thus, it is not true “Mubarak removed Abu Ghazala in 1987 in a bid to depoliticize the armed forces and continue the civilianization of the political process that had been begun by Sadat” (Hashim: 2011). Mubarak removed Abu Ghazala because the latter posed a very imminent threat to his ambition of ruling Egypt individually. Thus, having learned a very costly lesson Abu Ghazala’s episode, Mubarak became determined not to allow any other officer to even think ambitiously or try positioning himself as a challenger. Owing his rapid promotion to “the fact that he organized the security detachment around the presidential retreat in Ismailiyyah” (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997), the undistinguished Tantawi was Mubarak’s ideal choice, Tantawi was later described as “Mubarak’s poodle” [dog] as some anonymous officers quoted in one of the American embassy 2008 leaks (Sayigh: 2012, p. 6).

Thanks to his political loyalty to Mubarak, Tantawi remained in his post for twenty years to be the military minister with the longest term since Mohammad Ali. Tantawi and Mubarak “inherited a restive military, inflation ravaged military salaries, such that in 1982 it was confided to a Western reporter that “a good secretary in a foreign oil company can now earn more than a full colonel” (Springborg: 1987, p. 6).

Concern has been voiced that the military's declining status coupled with the possibility of declining living standards for its officers would raise the level of regime dissent. The military's involvement in economic activities appears to have allowed the military to preserve its status and for the most part the privileges of its members. These derived perquisites appear to have been sufficient to prevent major dissent within the ranks (Gotowicki & Stephen: 1997).

Having learned from Abu Ghazala’s lesson, Mubarak did not only rely on “the exalted position of high-ranking military officers and their status as political ‘insiders’ ... to ensure their loyalty” (Kechichian & Nazimek: 1997). Furthermore, Mubarak used the impoverished and poor state of the typical member of the military along with economic rewards to set up a system of control to incentivize political loyalty among the military leaders. Tantawi was his man. Tantawi did not adhere to the guns-and-butter strategy of Abu Ghazala, he totally gave up “guns” and focused solely on the “butter” to buttress Mubarak and America’s control over the military. Significantly, Mubarak and Tantawi started applying the early retirement system to thoroughly filter the officer corps, from then onwards those allowed to proceed their military life were already meticulously screened, furthermore the officers wishing to continue their military life had to do so “standing”, for they have nobody under them due to the process of emptying the middle leaders aiming at prohibiting any potential of a threatening leadership to appear, for example: there were seven alumni between Mubarak and Tantawi, his direct subordinate, and twelve between Tantawi and his direct subordinate, Anan.

Tantawi refreshed and ensured the Egyptian military adherence to Camp David military doctrine: maintaining the strategic relations with the USA, maintaining

peace between Egypt and Israel, and fighting Egypt's first enemy: the Islamic movement worldwide, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Practically, Tantawi turned the military into an economic corps/empire, spoiled all the military leaders with benefits and privileges, abided literally by Camp David, sustained the total security coordination with American and Israel, and most importantly consolidated the officers' republic, which Mubarak employed as the primary instrument his presidential power (Sayigh: 2012, p. 1), it is this officers' republic that will evolve to become the power after Mubarak.

The officers' republic is constituted on military paternalism, namely the militaristic culture: 1) treating civilians as dependent or inferior; 2) believing that the military or the SCAF "necessarily knows best" and solely knows Egypt's interests and needs; 3) claiming "civilian politicians and bureaucrats are less competent, honest, and patriotic, or at the very least need paternal guidance" (Sayigh: 2012, p. 22). This Anti-civilian discourse has been widely and continuously used to justify the processes of the military infiltration of the state apparatus as well as the military encroachment into all economic sectors and social services.

The military and the officers believe they are, and want to be seen as, the saviors of the nation and the country from the hazardous perils of the incompetence of the civilian bureaucracy, the terrorism of the extremists, and the maliciousness of the Interior Ministry. This paternalist culture along with the military functional nature, role, composition, and position produces its colonialist nature, Robert Springborg exemplified:

The intentions of Abu Ghazala and the military with regard to land reclamation have now become manifest. Their dissatisfaction with what they perceive as the bureaucratic malaise that infects the public sector, combined with their desire for access to resources, has caused them to develop an autonomous capability, the management of which is concentrated in the NSPO, the personnel for which is drawn from the ranks of conscripts, and the necessary supplementary technical expertise solicited from various branches of the military, including the Technical College. Additionally, the military favors the private sector, not only because it perceives it as more dynamic and possessing superior resources, but also because of its ability generously to reciprocate favors granted (Springborg: 1989, p. 115).

Magdi Hassanain and Mohammad Gohar are among the prototypes representing the military's paternalist culture (see: Springborg: 1989, p. 112).

Today's massive, sprawling officers' republic is the cumulative outcome of two main functions it undertook during the last twenty years of Mubarak's rule. First and foremost, it remained the instrument of last resort for the president and a tool of regime maintenance through bureaucratic penetration of the Egyptian state. Its power was not wielded through direct domination of the ministerial cabinet as it was under Nasser. Instead, bureaucratic penetration focused in particular on select oversight and administrative agencies, local government, and, albeit in a tension-prone manner, the security services. The second function was to provide senior officers with post-retirement career tracks and financial security, and the armed forces as a whole with major income streams. This has probably been the more enduring legacy of

incorporation under Mubarak, and maintaining it is a primary concern of the officers' republic today. It was achieved through EAF penetration of the civil service in general; domination of certain public utilities, infrastructure and works, and land-related programs (many now in the form of state-owned commercial companies); and exclusive control of military-owned economic enterprises (Sayigh: 2012, pp. 11-12).

Robert Springborg (1989) and Yezid Sayigh (2012) revealed how the officers' republic first appeared in 1952, and although the superficial demilitarization of the cabinet and the seeming political marginalization of the military under Sadat and Mubarak, the officers' republic never waned but rather expanded in new ways "to become a mainstay of Mubarak's crony system, until it emerged from his shadow to assume full power in early 2011" (Sayigh: 2012, p. 4). Through upgrading Abu Ghazala's twin processes of vertical integration of the military structure and horizontal military expansion, into the paradoxical, parallel processes of isolation/seclusion and infiltration/ubiquity, Mubarak integrated senior officers, secured their loyalty and submission, while simultaneously keeping them in insulation from the political and social reality of Egypt. However, although this almost totally reduced their initiative and creative capabilities, it did not reduce their endless desire to protect the powers they acquired and the privileges they accumulated (Sayigh: 2012, p. 9).

After Tantawi became the defense minister in 1991, he began incorporating the senior officers into Mubarak's crony system through "the promise of 'a loyalty allowance' they would receive upon retirement in return for abstention from political engagement-and acceptance of relatively poor wages" (Sayigh: 2012, p. 5). Moreover, this loyalty allowance powerfully induced the second and third echelons of the officer corps to comply with the system while waiting for their turn. Through these promotion laws that prioritized loyalty, Tantawi confronted the politicization that has always threatened the cohesion within the military, "junior officers who were considered to have political affiliations or to be undeserving of trust were not promoted above the rank of major" (Sayigh: 2012, p. 5).

Tantawi maintained and expanded the officer's empire Abu Ghazala built, and furthered its self-reinforcing isolation effect, however Tantawi was not as egalitarian as Abu Ghazala, the senior officers exclusively procured most of the advantages and privileges, for example until 2010 the monthly salary of a brigadier general was £E2300 (roughly \$403). Tantawi's system drastically differed from Abu-Ghazala's system, the latter benefited the whole officer corps, while in Tantawi's era only a few minority among the senior officers continuously reaped the biggest rewards for being incorporation into Mubarak's system (Sayigh: 2012; Springborg: 1989).

The isolation process achieved both: strengthening the sense of the functional group as separate and distinct from the larger society, and preserving the coherence of the group in face of the economic hazardous effects of neoliberalism. For example, "the military established 24 housing cities to house officers, along with

a number of summer resorts and discounted services for its officers” (Sayigh: 2012, p. 22).

The officers’ republic continued managing its own economy generating off-budget income streams, the officers managed their economy through four main apparatuses: the Ministry of Military Production controlled the defense industry; the Arab Organization for Industrialization; the National Service Project Organization; and the military’s own income generating enterprises. “Increasingly, the military economy behaves like a commercial sector, seeking partnerships or joint ventures with local and foreign private sector firms and looking for sales and investment opportunities abroad” (Sayigh: 2012, p. 17).

Parallel with the isolation process, the military apparatus infiltrated the public institutions as well as private companies to preserve its interests and consolidate its presence and penetration, the military was especially keen on the presence of “senior executive officers and administrators in the Ministry of Interior and the Directorate of the General Intelligence affiliated with the president” (Sayigh: 2012, p. 6).

Military retirees staffed all levels of local government, acting as a parallel executive and security arm that ultimately reports to the president through the provincial governors he appoints. The EAF also provides active-duty officers to fill a significant number of command and senior administrative positions in the Interior Ministry and General Intelligence Directorate, underlining its integral role in regime maintenance (Sayigh: 2012, p. 6).

The Administrative Monitoring Authority, debatably the most significant among the many state oversight agencies, represents the most striking example of both: the military penetration of the civilian bureaucracy and reproducing the military penetration through bureaucracy. The military dominated the Administrative Monitoring Authority head and senior officials, and shared with the police the leading of its operational divisions and regional branches (Sayigh: 2012).

Through local government, where the highest concentration of officer-bureaucrats is found, the officers play a direct role in maintaining the regime at all the municipal authority levels, from the very vast governorates down to the small city boroughs and tiny villages. Governors serve as the president’s representatives, top security officials, and senior executives in all provinces. Retired officers were hired in various places over Egypt, however they “preferred positions where authority and capital merged” (Abul-Magd: 2013, p. 2).

For example, on the eve of 2011, 18 out of 27 provincial governors were retired army generals. These included key locations, such as tourist-oriented provinces in Upper Egypt, all three provinces of the Suez Canal, the two Sinai provinces, sometimes Alexandria, and major Delta areas (Abul-Magd: 2013, p. 2).

Significantly:

The parallel subdivision of Egypt into five military zones completes the overshadowing of civilian agencies, since one of the tasks of military commanders is to coordinate with the governors and local civil authorities to ensure domestic security ... the entire edifice is extensively staffed by former officers, providing them with post-retirement job security, while extending the reach of presidential power into every corner of the country. **Since the 1990s, 50-80 percent of the governors at any given moment have been drawn from the military, with another 20 percent coming from the police or internal security agencies** ... Governors additionally have military advisers who, not surprisingly, come from the EAF. Adding these retirees to the count inescapably takes the total number of former officers occupying administrative posts throughout the local government edifice the several thousands (Sayigh: 2012, pp. 13-15, emphasis added).

Former military officers also infiltrated the civil service, and the list is seemingly endless. A substantial number of (some active and mostly retired) officers occupy noteworthy posts on many state-owned public enterprises' directing boards (as heads or members). These enterprises include: key infrastructure with its related works and services, the aviation and airports holding companies, maritime and land transport (including all seaport authorities), electricity, water and sanitation, the public sector's natural gas and oil industry and their related services companies, Egypt Telecom, and the National Telecommunication Regulation Authority, plus many of their (partially or wholly) owned subsidiary companies. The retired officers are also "heavily represented in government ministries and agencies that deal with land-related sectors such as housing, real estate management, public works, agricultural development and reclamation, and tourism" (Sayigh: 2012, p. 16; Abul-Magd: 2013, p. 2).

With Mubarak's advent, the Sadat *infatih* bourgeoisie retained significant influence although Mubarak's sustained efforts to curtail its political power and undermine its economic preeminence (Springborg: 1989). However, Mubarak regime's 1980s-"politics of divide and rule, coupled to an economic policy that retains elements of the social contract while imposing greater fiscal austerity" (Springborg: 1989, p. 296) turned in the late 1990s into a "wholehearted endorsement of the basic canons of the faith of the new orthodoxy, including wide-ranging privatization" (p. 296) where Mubarak applied the full-fledged economic liberalization program prescribed by the IMF and World Bank (Abul-Magd: 2013). Mubarak decided to prepare his son Gamal to be his successor, and to balance the power of the military by the power of the new group of businessmen who surrounded his son. In return, Mubarak had to appease the military, which feared Gamal who had no military background and his neoliberal plans may undermine the military control and its economic empire (the military spending declined from 12.46% of the budget in 1990 to 2.2% in 2010 while the police spending greatly increased, El-Houdaiby: 2014). So, Mubarak allowed army officers, specially retired generals and colonels, to occupy high administrative posts in the public sector and the bureaucracy and to further expand their extremely profitable military businesses (Abul-Magd: 2013).

Mitchell contextualized the neo-liberalization process in the abrupt nature and evolution of the economic relations since the beginning of modern Egypt:

Economic relations had been formatted as a mix of government and so-called private processes since at least the creation of modern landed property, law, irrigation works, railways, policing, hygiene, and other networks in the nineteenth century ... and this formatting had gone through numerous crises and adjustments. The reforms of the last quarter of the twentieth century represented another series of adjustments, rather than any simple shift from “the state” to “the private sector” or, as it came to be known, “the market.” One important part of this reformatting was the new role played in Egypt by the three Washington-based political agencies increasingly active across the postcolonial world, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and USAID (Mitchell: 2002, p. 211).

Interestingly,

The reform program did not remove the state from the market or eliminate profligate public subsidies. Its main impact was to concentrate public funds into different hands, and many fewer ... it was not hard to figure out who was benefiting from the new financial subsidies ... the subsidized funds were channeled into the hands of a relatively small number of ever more powerful and prosperous financiers and entrepreneurs. At the top were about two dozen business groups ... These family-owned enterprise networks typically began as after 1974 when the government allowed large private entrepreneurs to reemerge following the years of import restrictions and state monopolies. Many depended on lucrative contracts to supply goods and services to the Egyptian military. They enjoyed powerful monopolies or oligopolies, in particular as exclusive agents for the goods and services of Western-based transnationals ... these groups, whose existence was hidden behind the bland formulations of “the private sector” and a revitalized “Egyptian economy ... [e.g.] The Seoudi Group ... The Metwalli family ... The Mohamed Mahmoud Sons group ... The Mansour family ... The Sawiris family ... The Bahgat group ... **Most large business groups were nurtured on government contracts, both civilian and military. Many of these contracts involved projects promoted and supported by USAID.** Besides receiving state funds, the business groups relied on close ties with private banks, which were often part of the same family networks (Mitchell: 2002, p. 282-285, emphasis added).

Within this context, since 1982 while civilian industry has stagnated, the military led by Abo Ghazala further expanded its encroachments into several areas of industry, mentioned in details above.

The process has antagonized some civilians, but it has also **cemented shared interests of civilian and military managers and the bourgeoisie** more generally. The *Benha* Electronics Company management, for instance, has mastered the technique of extracting commissions from Western appliance suppliers, a lesson which can be readily applied to its military operations. **The military's alliance with public and private sector enterprise and the proliferation of arms industries creates a class of military, and military dependent, *munfatihun***” (Springborg: 1987, p. 10, emphasis added).

While the military became increasingly detached from direct or overt political involvement in Mubarak's era, the senior officers became unprecedentedly intertwined with the state economy and apparatus and, thus, with Egypt's political economy. However, although the military was the warden of the regime, Mubarak did not put all his eggs only in the military's basket, along with the officer's republic he also built a state of corruption. Ahmad Shieha, the head of the importers department in the Egyptian union of trade chambers, maintained Mubarak created a class of businessmen to control the Egyptians, 1,000 businessmen dominate everything Egyptians consume, and 80% of those businessmen were created by Mubarak (arabi21.com).

Amr Adly (2011) studied Mubarak's state of corruption by scrutinizing the process of reproducing the regime through the networks that linked businessmen with the state and wealth with power for more than two decades. The suspicious public assets privatization, dubious natural gas exporting contracts, and allocation of publicly owned land cases reveals the "networks of privilege" (Sfakianakis: 2004) through which Mubarak's state of corruption operated by abusing state power, laws, decrees, and regulations to ensure favored market positions or allocate public assets to a politically selected few, this uneven distribution of wealth and property rights aims at either mere self-enrichment or reproducing the political regime. These networks gradually evolved through three phases: 1) Camp David Sadat's *infitah* in the mid-1970s, 2) the post-Gulf war Mubarak's neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, and 3) Mubarak's second neoliberal reforms by Nazif government (2004-2011) (see also: Soliman: 2011; Farouk: 2011; Saad: 1999).

In Abu Ghazala's time the subject-to-international-capital alliance was forged between the military and the bourgeoisie (Springborg: 1987) and the military created its own *infitah*, creating "a class of military, and military-dependent, *munfatihin*" (Springborg: 1989, p. 110). The General Motors deal was a stark example not only of the military intervention in civilian industry, but of the tri-alliance between the military, the bourgeoisie, and international capital (see: Springborg: 1989, pp. 110-111). Due to his relationship with the Egyptian military, Osman Ahmad Osman, "labeled the eminence grise of the *munfatihun* by David Hirst and simply the Godfather by the Egyptian opposition", personified the alliance between the military and the upper bourgeoisie, on which the corporate state was based.

In the aftermath of Mubarak-Abu Ghazala's quest for supremacy and Mubarak's pursuit of authoritarian political consolidation, the 1991 neoliberal transformations produced distorted and crony capitalist "development", which further gave the officers access to the very part of Egypt's economy that remained until then state owned. Unlike before, the "co-optation" did not just happen through appointing officers to companies' boards of directors, but rather through new generated opportunities "for former officers embedded in the civilian administration to acquire wealth or accumulate assets as well" (Sayigh: 2012, p. 7). However,

although the officers' largely passive adaptation in the first decade to the economic and social opportunities the deepening of neoliberal economic "reforms" offered, they responded proactively since the early 2000s:

[T]he senior officer corps members most firmly ensconced in the civilian economy have become more entrepreneurial. They straddle the divide between the military and civilian spheres, and between the public and the private, but so far remain entirely reliant on political appointment and bureaucratic position within the state for economic access and opportunity. Whether or not they consciously aspire to integrate fully into the upwardly mobile "new middle class," they certainly mimic it, pursuing opportunities for sharp increases in disposable income, speculating in real estate, and moving into the equivalent of gated communities (Sayigh: 2012, p. 18).

Significantly, "the value of the Egyptian pound has dropped from \$2.80 in 1952 to 17 cents in 2006" (Goldschmidt: 2008, p. 221). However, the priceless dignity and dreams of the people has been the cheapest, even cheaper than a military bullet taking lives away.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

THE JIHADI CLINCH

Who turned history upside down? ... There is a collective memory that cannot be long suppressed, for if history is raped ... it mightily and violently revenges if its basic indigenous facts are despised - Fadi Ismail (1993, pp. 94, 161).

Europe would have to alter not just the level of intelligence of a nation it hoped to modernize, as was then commonly thought, but its psyche. To enable it to bequeath its civilization to another people, it would be necessary that it should be able to bequeath its soul - Gustave Le Bon (Mitchell: 1991, p. 124).

Standing up for our rights does not make us a radical, it makes us a human being - Geoffrey D. Langlands.

They do whatever they like, they enslave all who is not of their color. They want to make slaves out of us, and when they cannot they kill us. Don't ever trust their words nor their promises. These are snares, believe me, for I know their long knives very well - Pvashintakiliyas, the leader of Delaware Indians (Akash: 2002, p. 57).

We need resurrection from oblivion!

We should not overestimate modern power for the institutions of power are not of a monolithic nature and their forms are not inevitable. The disciplinary power in Egypt is very clumsy and distorted, for while the modern disciplinary power institutions in Egypt was designed to follow the Western system in all its Foucauldian details, it could not be expected to have completely done so in a flawless and automatic manner. Even at its epic momentum at Mohammad Ali's time, there was an obvious discrepancy between the power plans and blueprints on one side and how they were actually executed on the other side (Fahmy: 2002; Mitchell: 1991).

In Chapter One, I clarified how the modern disciplinary power was implanted in Egypt, and Islam was put aside as a frame of reference, together comprising the

Weltanschauung upheaval brought by the French invasion campaign and Mohammad Ali. The most important trend was the panoptification of the society, namely implanting secular modern disciplinary power in the society and destroying all the indigenous intermediary institutions. From that moment Egypt entered its secular age, and its ruling elite became a mere functional group. In Chapter Two, the British invasion proceeded the French mission by completely detaching Egypt from the Ottoman state and creating Egypt as a territorial space with territorialized institutions (Cromer's automaton), in which the British created a system of secular benign nationalism that secularized the Islamic revolutionary resistance and absorbed the anger energy of the people. However, although the Cairo Burn signaled the failure of the colonially created state, in Chapter Three I traced how the American Nasser's coup restored and reinstalled Cromer's broken automaton, Nasser clung to the colonially created nation state as a structure for social organization, and kept trying to drive Cromer's automaton by absolute oppression and despotic madness turning the Egyptians into "Misrables". In Chapter Four I tackled the American reorientation of Cromer's automaton, why the secret CIA-Nasser relation turned into a blunt American-Egyptian strategic relation, how Egypt was militarily and economically tied to the US, the American role in the development of the officers' republic, how this officers' economic empire was constructed, and their functional group was established through isolation/seclusion and infiltration/ubiquity.

This is not to suggest there has been a continuous and all-encompassing plan or conspiracy taking place for more than two centuries, but rather to conclude the peoples' resistance never learn from history. The people will never emancipate and transcend the Western imperialist Matrix unless they alter their current frame of reference and the nature of power in their societies, and talk the language of power, which is the only language the Matrix understands.

The relentless and massive use of force by the West-backed-and-orchestrated military coup in Egypt is a sign of their fear and despair rather than of supremacy and confidence. For this very moment we are witnessing is not new in kind, but in degree, the Matrix is in the very point of its life cycle where it is substantially threatened and thus it is fighting back, either directly or through its local wardens, to maintain and sustain its order. Or as Robert Springborg put it twenty five years earlier:

To be sure, the country is confronting severe challenges and its fate currently is being guided by a political system that rests upon the decaying foundations of a weak state. Whether the process of decay will be paralleled by the emergence of a more pluralistic, responsive political order, capable of rallying the population behind policies and mobilizing the necessary resources to accomplish them, or whether that transformation will be blocked by inertia or by the seizure of power by a yet more exclusivist, authoritarian order will be determined by the choices of those currently playing leading or secondary political roles (Springborg: 1989, p. 298).

Thus, the crisis of subordination and injustice the Muslim, Arab, and third world polities are suffering is not only a product of the triumphant Western power but also a product of the vanquished resistance and the choices it makes whatever leading or secondary role it is playing. The main problem of any Muslim, Arab, or third world resistance to Western power is believing the Western hoaxes and myths, e.g.: Robert Springborg frames the crisis this way: “the dilemmas of development associated with having a weak state” (Springborg: 1989, p. 298). Whenever resistance to Western power buys and consumes the very Western conceptualization of the crisis, it is already defeated before it even goes to war.

Another complication is that the imperial modern power and its methods of enframing, containing, and disciplining have not only made the modern processes of control and indoctrination possible, “they created the very need for it” (Mitchell: 1991, p. 92). Then how would the people, who are the very subject and product of the Matrix, transcend and confront this Matrix? The examples of Abdelaziz Jawish and Orabi and his nationalist comrades (Mitchell: 1991, pp. 89, 132) are very revealing and problematic. The secularization and rationalization of the souls and psyches of the people resisting the Matrix pose the most severe and elusive challenge, for the Matrix endures and survives deconstruction as the people resisting it paradoxically reproduce it. The reason is explicit in the Christian Father Ayrout’s words: “we must work from the inside out” (Mitchell: 1991, p. 93), Timothy Mitchell further explained: “[p]ower now sought to work not only upon the exterior of the body but also 'from the inside out' - by shaping the individual mind” (Mitchell: 1991, p. 93).

In his book *Recognizing Islam*, Michael Gilsean cites from the report of a French military officer in Algeria, on an insurrection put down by his troops in 1845-46. To establish political authority over a population, wrote the officer, there are two modes, one of suppression and one of tutoring. The latter is long-term and works upon the mind, the former works upon the body and must come first.

In effect the essential thing is to gather into groups this people which is everywhere and nowhere; the essential thing is to make them something we can seize hold of. When we have them in our hands, we will then be able to do many things which are quite impossible for us today and which will perhaps allow us to capture their minds after we have captured their bodies (Mitchell: 1991, p. 95).

Emancipating the body from the Matrix’s iron cage cannot be done peacefully, whereas power alone is definitely insufficient to emancipate the soul, the psyche, and the mind. Thus, the mission of emancipation, although very simple: “the last shall be first and the first last”, is extremely synthetic. The modern West forcefully imposed its imperial structure, which it had raised in its imagination, using Marx’s own words (Marx: 2000, p. 493). The mission of emancipation does not only require abolishing a structure and building another alternative structure, it entails doing this simultaneously. Furthermore, we have to emancipate and transcend the logic and philosophy of this irrepressible structure the West have erected in our minds. It

is to have the power to imagine the void while it is forcefully preoccupied, it is to think about our future not only “un-panoptically” but rather “a-panoptically”.

But how would we transcend the irrepressible Western paradigm, epistemology, and Weltanschauung? Indeed struggle will give birth to new knowledge, but practically speaking, we should consider these steps: 1) knowing the Western without adopting it; 2) acquiring a critical awareness about the essence and elements of the Western; 3) criticizing the Western through different approaches, including the criticism from the West, 4) *ijtihad* in comparing the Western with the Islamic; 5) evoking the idea of transcending and of an alternative; and 6) *ijtihad* to construct the alternative.

We have to be aware of the importance of getting rid of the residues of the *Jahili* secular West and evoking the *Tawhidi* Islamic. The new paradigm is to be constructed in the context of the universality and humanness of the Islamic. Although the seeming prominence of the Western, it is subject to an increasing criticism, the dilemma is the Muslims should believe they are the most capable and responsible of criticizing the Western than other people in the East or the West.

People in the West and elsewhere criticize the Western, however through Western methodologies, and although their thinking is dominated by the Western Weltanschauung that is totally secular and pantheistic. Nevertheless, critical thinking is capable of deconstructing and fragmenting any human thought and any materialistic and organic paradigm. Still, deconstruction is not sufficient for achieving transcendence, we need to construct, and to do this we need a transcendent substance. Only Islam is still maintaining its transcendental essence, so even if our thinking and our methodologies are somehow affected by the Western, the other Tawhidi components, if really present, will enable us to transcend the Western and the Islamic to defeat the secular sediments inside. The basis is: being boldly audacious to criticize and deeply committed to *ijtihad* together with *Eman*.

The real emancipation is only in confronting the Matrix and the imperial center itself not its agents of facets. Moreover, this confrontation must not be only “external” through power, but should also “internal” targeting the very psyche, soul, and reason of the human being. The confrontation in its essence is a confrontation between Islamic Tawhid, *Hakimiyya* and secular pantheism, *Jahiliyya* (including its elusive pure secular, liberal with religious mask, sufi, and salafi, and other facets).

The Western secular “ocean” all humanity is drowning into cannot be emptied by a “bucket” (!). The problem of resistance to the Matrix is it always gets irrepressibly outsized and overpowered by the Matrix and its violence, not only militarily and politically but also, and ultimately, epistemologically, intellectually, and socially.

[In] abandoning the image of colonial power as simply a coercive central authority, one should also question the traditional figure of resistance as a subject who stands

outside this power and refuses its demands. Colonial subjects and their modes of resistance are formed *within* the organizational terrain of the colonial state, rather than some wholly exterior social space" (Mitchell: 1991, p. xi).

In Egypt, the 2011 "revolution" was the sign of the complete failure of the Camp David imperial order, yet the people were too naïve to realize the elusive nature of imperialism, it took them another coup to wake up, however there are many negative indications they are still oblivious.

The alternative that will end and empty the secular ocean all humanity is drowning into is not an atomic bomb drying it, for the bomb at the end is a structural part of the ocean. The people will make the alternative in years to come, might be soon, the basis of any alternative is an idea, an idea that will wither the Matrix and its nerve system, not only gaining more power but will change its concept for ever. Modernity, secularism, capitalism, and imperialism, have no singular logic, no essence, they are parasitically surviving. They will continue to survive so long as their antipode is not present yet.

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