

**SERBIAN COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF OTTOMAN RULE:  
ANALYSIS AND DECONSTRUCTION**



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**İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY**

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ANALYSIS AND DECONSTRUCTION

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

### SERBIAN COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF OTTOMAN RULE: ANALYSIS AND DECONSTRUCTION

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This thesis is an inquiry into the Serbian collective memory about the period of Ottoman rule. Looking at history textbooks, works of literature, the urban fabric of the city of Belgrade, official calendars, and social practices in Serbia, it aims at demonstrating how the perception of Ottoman rule has been shaped by Serbian collective memory.

The past three decades have been marked by a rise in scholarship about national identity and nationalism in Serbia and more generally in the Balkans. Many scholars coming from various different fields have aimed at exposing the ideological constructs (mis)used by nationalist discourses. While these studies showed an obvious awareness of the importance of how the period of Ottoman rule is narrated and remembered, and the role it may have played and did play in identity construction and popular mobilization, no research to date has addressed systematically, extensively, and exclusively the memory of Ottoman rule in Serbia. The present thesis aims at filling this gap.

Leaning on Maurice Halbwachs's conceptualization of memory as a process that is collectively shaped, this thesis seeks to expose how Serbian collective memory about the period of Ottoman rule has been continuously (re)shaped and handed down until today. Looking at both communicative and cultural memory (as defined by Jan Assmann), it sets out to unveil the process through which formal and informal tools of memory (were) shaped (by) Serbian collective memory. Therefore, this thesis is neither interested in finding the "truth" about Ottoman rule, nor is it an apologia of the Ottoman past: it is an analysis of perceptions, not historical realities.

**Keywords:** collective memory, Serbia, Ottoman rule, narrative, identity.

## ÖZ

### SERBIAN COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF OTTOMAN RULE: ANALYSIS AND DECONSTRUCTION

Dunja Resanović

MA, Kültürel Çalışmalar Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman

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Bu tez, Osmanlı egemenliği döneminin Sırp ortak hafızasındaki yansımalarına dair bir araştırmadır. Tarih ders kitaplarını, edebi eserleri, Belgrad'ın kentsel dokusunu, resmi takvimleri ve Sırbistan'daki toplumsal pratikleri inceleyerek Osmanlı egemenliğinin algılanışının Sırp ortak hafızasınca nasıl şekillendirdiğini ele almaktadır.

Son otuz yılda, Sırbistan'da ve daha genel olarak Balkanlar'da milli kimlik ve milliyetçilik üzerine yapılan araştırmaların sayısı artmıştır. Farklı alanlardan birçok araştırmacı, milliyetçi söylemin kullandığı (ve suiistimal ettiği) ideolojik yapıları ortaya çıkarmaya çalışmıştır. Ancak bu araştırmalarda Osmanlı egemenliğinin nasıl hatırlandığının ve aktarıldığının, ve kimlik inşasındaki ve toplumu seferber etmedeki öneminin elbette farkında olmakla birlikte, şimdiye kadar Sırbistan'daki Osmanlı egemenliğinin nasıl hatırlandığını ayrıntılı, sistematik, ve özgül olarak ele alan bir çalışma yapılmamıştır. Bu tez, işte bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Maurice Halbwachs'ın, hafızanın toplumsal olarak şekillendirildiği savına dayanan bu tez, Sırp ortak hafızasındaki Osmanlı egemenliği döneminin nasıl tekrar tekrar yeniden şekillendirilerek günümüze kadar getirildiğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Jan Assmann'ın tanımladığı biçimde hem iletişimsel, hem kültürel hafızaya bakarak, hafızanın formel ve enformel araçlarının Sırp toplumsal hafızasını nasıl şekillendirdiği ve onun tarafından nasıl şekillendirildiğini göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Bu sebeple bu tez, ne Osmanlı egemenliği dönemine ait “gerçeği” bulmayı, ne de Sırbistan'daki Osmanlı geçmişini savunmayı amaçlamamaktadır. Tarihsel gerçeklikler üzerine değil, algılar üzerine bir çalışmadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** ortak hafıza, Sırbistan, Osmanlı egemenliği, anlatı, kimlik.

To my dear Professor Dr. Írvin Cemil Schick



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## A NOTE ON PRONUNCIATION, TRANSLITERATION, AND TRANSLATION

### In Serbian

C, c	is pronounced like	“ts” in cats
Ć, ć		“ch” in chees, pronounced softer
Č, č		“ch” in cheese, pronounced harder
Đ, đ		“j” in jam, pronounced softer
Dž, dž		“j” in jam, pronounced harder
J, j		“y” in yogurt
Lj, lj		“li” in pavilion
Nj, nj		“n” in news
Š, š		“sh” in shop
Ž, ž		“s” in treasure

### In Turkish

C, c	is pronounced like	“ch” in cheese pronounced harder
Ç, ç		“ch” in cheese pronounced softer
Ş, ş		“sh” in shop
İ, i		“i” ‘n ship
I, ı		“i” in Sir
Ğ, ğ	is not pronounced	

The original spelling of names of people and places is kept, except for the case of capital cities, where most of the readers are familiar with the transliteration.

In direct quotations, the transliteration is kept as in quoted text.

The titles are also kept in original, with a note on most approximate translation into English language, except for “king” and “emperor”, the meaning of which does not differ much across diverse languages.

Both Serbian and Turkish transliterations of Ottoman words and names are used.

Translations from the non-English sources are mine, unless noted otherwise.

## PREFACE

I still have not found a way, nor am I aware that anybody has, to give a critical assessment about a construct, without reproducing it at the same time. This is the purpose of this very brief introduction, to make the reader aware of the problem I confront as the author of this text, and s/he as a reader. Two of the constructs were already reproduced with the title of this MA thesis and will be used as a frame throughout this work, those being “Serbian collective memory” and “Ottoman past”. Both of these concepts will be elaborated in more detail further on, but I deem it necessary to make the reader aware of them, before I entangle her/him into them. By “Serbian collective memory”, I define memory that was framed top-down within the borders of the Serbian state, or the Serbian collective, which the state is still trying to define. On the other hand, the framework of “Ottoman past” is taken exactly as it is framed by Serbian collective memory. It is problematic, as it may give an illusion that it takes issue with a different space and disrupts the continuity of time, but it is exactly the construct that this thesis will aim at deconstructing.

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Introduction to the Research

How would you present the history of Serbia to someone who does not know it?

First I would talk about the Nemanjić dynasty and the foundation of the Serbian state ... about Stefan Nemanja, then King Stefan, Saint Sava and autocephaly of Serbian Church, then Stefan Milutin and the unification of Serbian lands, then about Tsar Dušan, and then Uroš. Then comes the Kosovo battle, and I would talk about the traitors and the heroes, and about *Knez Lazar*. Then the Turks... and Turks are Turks, you know. Then I would talk about the Serbian uprisings, about Karađorđe, Miloš, about Mihailo Obrenović.... (Sandra, personal communication, July 1, 2015).

There is a common joke in the Balkans that everyone is a historian. Even when one is ready to admit to the scarcity of one's acquaintance with history, knowledge about the "Five hundred years of 'the Turkish yoke'" appears to be deeply rooted. Sandra's answer to my question was the most common one. No matter how detailed accounts of the rest of the history were presented, people I did brief interviews with would usually refer to one part of Serbian national history as "The Turks" or "The Ottomans," and would look at me nodding in confirmation that no further explanation is needed, as everyone knows what happened in this long period of history. The Ottoman past is assumed to be common knowledge, and to be very well remembered.

As Todorova points out in her discussion about history teaching of the Ottoman period in the Balkans: "even when it is translated into neutral 'Ottoman rule', it is still an inevitable cornerstone of the historical and literary education of the modern independent state... in the Balkans."<sup>1</sup> As it does appear at first glance that the Ottoman rule is the cornerstone of education, people do assume to have a vast knowledge about that period of history. The questions that remain unanswered are: To what extent is the Ottoman rule publicly remembered in the Balkans? How is memory of this period preserved and shaped? What type of knowledge about the Ottoman past is produced and offered to people in the Balkans and through which media?

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<sup>1</sup> Todorova, Maria, ed., *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, New York: New York University press, 2004, 4.

The illusion that the period of Ottoman rule is the central paradigm in remembering the past of the respective Balkan countries prevents one from realizing that in fact very little knowledge is acquired and therefore people have faint notions about this period of the past. This is very clearly expressed in Sandra's answer. While she introduced other parts of history with details about "big people and big events," five centuries of the past were reduced to a single word, which should have, to her best knowledge, sprung a whole set of associations for both of us. It seems that this period of history, often labeled "The Turks," "The Ottomans" is well remembered, but has the least narrative to mediate it. So why is it that everyone believes they are very well acquainted with this part of history?

Over the course of the nineteenth century, various local identities within the Balkans were transformed into a smaller number of national identities, being delineated by newly defined borders. Administrative borders that for centuries had defined different localities within the Empire were erased, merging some into a single nation-state. National discourse played a crucial role in producing new geographies and new imaginary within the Balkans. In that sense, it was rather important to silence the history that divided newly emerged nations into differently imagined communal identities. Thus, the narrative that was constructed in the course of the nineteenth century filled its silence with meaning, remembering the past in the way that would serve the new national ideologies.

In that sense, while one can generally agree "the Ottoman legacy as perception" has played a crucial role in the shaping of national identities across the Balkans, it is important to revise the narratives that have shaped that perception.<sup>2</sup> One should ask the question: What are those narratives speaking about, and what do they keep silenced? It is only in this way that one can acquire a certain level of knowledge about how the collective memory of the Ottoman rule is actually shaped. In his lecture "What is a nation?" Ernest Renan pointed out early on that in order for a nation to come into existence, its capacity to remember the past is as important as its capacity to forget it.<sup>3</sup> Therefore: Is the Ottoman rule remembered or forgotten? While

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<sup>2</sup> For detailed argument about Ottoman legacy as perception, and its role in shaping national identities in the Balkans see Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, 181-183.

<sup>3</sup> Renan, Ernest, "What is a nation?," in Bhabha, Homi, ed., *Nation and Narration*, London: Routledge, 1990 [1882].

forgetting the plurality of experiences of local pasts within the Empire was crucial for the construction of Serbian national identity, forgetting was at the same time essential in shaping the memory of homogeneous experience of Ottoman rule. Maurice Blanchot said that “being silent is still to speak,” hence, it can equally be said that to forget is still to remember.<sup>4</sup> Silenced plurality of the pasts within the Empire, shaped the homogeneous narrative about the Serbian nation, and Ottoman rule as well.

This MA thesis is a query about the produced and available general knowledge about the Ottoman rule, taking the case study of Serbia, it is a query about the Ottoman rule in the public narrative and in silence in Serbia, and it is a query about remembering and forgetting the Ottoman past. I placed the concept of collective memory at the center of my research, because I believe that this concept is at the heart of the knot composed of nation, identity, and geography, tied together by narratives, discourses, and myths that literature has so far aimed at untying.

## **1.2. Literature review**

The literature that rapidly emerged in the past two decades and brought into existence the field of Balkanology as an academic discipline can generally be divided into two groups: one which dealt with discursive-geographies, and another which dealt with national identities.<sup>5</sup> While the former dealt with the way the Balkans, or particular Balkan nation-states were produced and perceived in different political and historical periods, the latter predominantly attempted to explain the emergence of the violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, questioning the way in which different identities in the Balkans were constructed and/or mobilized over the course of the 1990's.

There is a vast literature dealing with the discursive production of the Balkans and/or specific Balkan nation-states, especially, that which dealt with the post-Yugoslav space. What this literature usually stresses is the persisting pattern of “self-beautification at the price of the other's ugliness” when it comes to the production of

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<sup>4</sup> Blanchot, Maurice, quoted in Ben-Ze'ev, Efrat, Ginio, Ruth, and Winter, Jay, eds., *Shadow of War-a Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 4.

<sup>5</sup> This division is made rather on the basis on the predominant focus of the study, as the study about space can never be disengaged from the study about identity.



self and alterity.<sup>6</sup> This model is usually framed by the East–West Orientalist binary, and aims at subverting the Eastern “other” vis-à-vis one’s self, be it a pattern used within the Balkans by neighboring countries, or towards the region as whole.<sup>7</sup>

However, when it comes to the perception of the Ottoman past and the discursive production of space, Maria Todorova’s book *Imagining the Balkans* is probably the most important work in that literature.<sup>8</sup> Directly influenced by Edward Said’s framework of *Orientalism*, she coined the word *Balkanism*, aimed at explaining the discursive production of the Balkans by the journalists, diplomats, travelers, etc. of Western Europe.<sup>9</sup> Looking at the whole region she demonstrates how the Balkans, as a unique and different region belonging to Europe, yet constructed as its internal opposition, as its periphery, had been discursively produced from the eighteenth until the twentieth century. “It would not be exaggerated to say that the Balkans are an Ottoman legacy,” stressing that both tangible and legacy as perception, played a crucial role in producing the Balkans.<sup>10</sup> What is essential in her assessment is that she demonstrates how this idea of East and West was internalized by the emerging nation-states which resulted in their complete rejection of the Ottoman past. Therefore, new nation-states were produced through strenuous struggle to de-Ottomanize themselves, in order “to achieve the coveted ideal of the polar opposite of being Ottoman (or Oriental),” i.e. to become European, Western, or modernized.<sup>11</sup>

Along these lines, Ellie Scopetea (2003), further concludes that not only had the Ottoman legacy influenced the imagination of the Balkans by the Western Europe as a separate region, or its periphery, but also it ambiguously positioned the Balkans between East and West.<sup>12</sup> As she stresses, the internalization of the East-West dichotomy played an important role in self-imaginings of the newly emerging

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<sup>6</sup> Bjelić, Dušan, and Savić, Obrad, eds., *Balkan as a Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation*, The MIT Press, 2005, 9.

<sup>7</sup> See: Bakić-Hayden, Milica and Hayden, Robert M., “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” in *Slavic Review* 51/1, 1992, 1-15, Bakić-Hayden, Milica, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,” in *Slavic Review* 54/4, 1995, 917–931.

<sup>8</sup> Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*.

<sup>9</sup> See Said, Edward W., *Orientalism*, London: Vintage, 1979.

<sup>10</sup> Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, 162.

<sup>11</sup> Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, 180.

<sup>12</sup> Scopetea, Ellie, “The Balkans and the Notion of the crossroads between East and West,” in Tziouvas, Dimitris, ed., *Greece and the Balkans: Identities, Perceptions, and Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, 170-176.

nation-states. However, it is important to note that each nation-state developed its own relationship towards the West, and self-perceived itself as Western, embracing different discourses. Likewise, each newly emerging nation-state was “labeled” as “Balkan” or “Eastern” by the West on different grounds. “Thus, a ‘Western identity’ may be looked upon as a privilege or right, which belongs to some, but not all of the inhabitants of the peninsula,” pointing out that this dichotomy has functioned both between “West” and different nation-states in the Balkans, as well as in-between states in the Balkans who discursively produced each other through the same dichotomy.<sup>13</sup>

Both Todorova and Scopetea dealt with the discursive production of space along with the emergence of nation-states in the Balkans, i.e. with the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. It can be said that nowadays very little of “Ottoman” and “de-Ottomanized,” as symbolic denominators of geography, have remained in present public discourses of Balkan nation-states, having been replaced by other symbolic East-West dichotomies. However, it is important to look at how much of it has been preserved in the narrative about the Ottoman rule, i.e. whether this discourse is still available and proffered.

The other scope of scholarship produced is that which dealt with the emergence and/or mobilization of national identities. Along with the reemergence of nationalistic rhetoric in the Balkans, and especially in the former Yugoslavia. The question raised by many scholars was how the Yugoslav space, which had seemingly been immersed in the ideology of “brotherhood and unity” and which had ostensibly catered to various different communal identities and grievances, was so easily and suddenly turned into a space of national mobilization and nationalist ideologies. Even though there is a vast literature dealing with nationalism and identity, analyzing different aspects of socio-political environment, for the purpose of this thesis, I will present a few which dealt with representation, with the uses and misuses of the past in Serbia.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Scopetea, Ellie, “The Balkans and the Notion of the crossroads between East and West,” 174.

<sup>14</sup> For different approaches to Yugoslav conflict see for example: Đokić, Dejan, ed., *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992*, London: Hurst & Company, 2003., Hayden, Robert M., “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics,” in *Slavic Review*, 51/4 1992, 654-673., Ramet, Sabrina P., *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War in Kosovo*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999., Silbler, Laura, and Little, Alan, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, London: Penguin Books, 1997.

The most numerous, and ever-expanding literature when it comes to Serbian nationalism and national myths, is that which deals with the Serbian perceptions of the Kosovo Battle.<sup>15</sup> Among the pioneers who gave an overview of the way in which the myth was constructed in Serbia was Thomas Emmert. His work was published one year after the sixth centenary of the battle, when the then President of the Presidency of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, gave his famous speech in Kosovo. This speech became one of the most frequently analyzed speeches, where a myth served as a ground for contemporary national mobilization. The works in this field vary from that of Dimitrije Đorđević, who analyzed the meaning of the myth in the formation of the Serbian nation-state in the nineteenth century; the work of Milica Bakić-Hayden, who analyzed the forms and patterns the myth incorporates in its core; Branimir Anzulović, who analyzed the aspects of Serbian nationalism and expansionism, rooting them directly in the formation of nationalist myths in the nineteenth century, to that of Florian Bieber and Dejan Đokić, who analyzed newly-emerging discourses around the Serbian myth of the Kosovo battle, rejecting any congruency of the way nationalist discourses were framed and the way the myth was constructed in the historical perspective.<sup>16</sup>

In his book *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Tim Judah went even further, dedicating almost half of the book to analyzing all the Serbian myths that were produced by the Serbian nation-state in the nineteenth century and discursively used in the course of the 1990s in order to mobilize national identities, placing them in historical perspective.<sup>17</sup> While most of the scholars dealt with myths and uses in contemporary discourse, Dubravka Stojanović, who wrote a brilliant history of the present exposing the discourses prevalent during the 1990s, saw

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<sup>15</sup> The word Serbian myth is intentionally used here, as there is also an Albanian myth about the battle, see Di Lellilo, Anna, *The Battle of Kosovo 1389: An Albanian Epic*, Elsie Robert, trans., London: I.B. Tauris, 2009, 1-47., Pavković, Aleksandar, "Kosovo/Kosova: A Land of Conflicting Myths," in Waller, Michael, Dreyov, Kyril, and Gökay, Bülent, eds., *Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion*, London: Routledge, 2001.

<sup>16</sup> Bakić-Hayden, Milica, "National Memory and Narrative Memory: The Case of Kosovo," in Todorova, Maria, ed., *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, 25-40., Anzulović, Branimir, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*, New York: NYU Press, 1999., Bieber, Florian, "Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo Myth from the 600<sup>th</sup> Anniversary to the Present," in *Rethinking History* 6/1, 2002, 95-110., Đokić, Dejan, "Whose Myth? Which Nation? The Serbian Kosovo Myth Revisited," in Bak, Janos M., Jarnut, Jörg, Monnet, Pierre, and Schneidmüller, Bernd, eds., *Uses and Abuses of Middle Ages: 19<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, Munch: Wilhelm Fink, 2009,

<sup>17</sup> Judah, Tim, *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.

it also indispensable to expose the teaching of history in schools over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She demonstrated how interpretations of the history of the Balkans in Serbian textbooks changed depending on the different state ideologies Serbia subscribed to in the course of the twentieth century.<sup>18</sup> While the ideas that the conflict was caused by the “ancient ethnic hatreds” can be rejected by now, what seems to be obvious to each scholar dealing with this problematic is that there was history narrative and myths available for those in power positions in the 1990s to (mis)use and discursively reproduce in order to forge the conflict.

### **1.3. Problematics, Research Questions, and Methodology**

By taking a closer look at the myths that were politicized and the historical facts that were (mis)used by nationalists in the 1990's, analyzed by the scholars mentioned above, one can easily see that they are almost exclusively connected to either the beginning or the end of Ottoman rule. In the case of the work of Dubravka Stojanović, while she elaborately explains how the interpretations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries history changed according to the needs of the state, at no point does she question why the history that narrates the beginning, or the end of the Ottoman rule has remained relatively stable in the textbook narratives, i.e. has not undergone any serious bricolage in order to serve different ideological purposes. The problem is that the already existing work postulated their problematics as whether historical narratives and myths were (mis)used and reproduced by the nationalists, rather than what was and still is available.

Furthermore, while there is an obvious awareness of the importance of how the Ottoman rule is narrated and remembered, and the role it could and did play in identity construction and mobilization, there is no specific research that approaches the memory of Ottoman Rule in Serbia systematically, extensively, and exclusively. Moreover, while the aforementioned literature may seem to be focusing on the representation of different periods of history, i.e. the Ottoman past, Serbian medieval history, and Serbian modern history, if one takes a closer look, it becomes

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<sup>18</sup> Stojanović, Dubravka, “Construction of Historical Consciousness: The Case of Serbian History Textbooks, in Todorova, Maria, ed., *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, 327-338. See also Stojanović, Dubravka *Ulje na vodi: Ogljed iz istorije sadašnjosti*, Beograd: Peščanik, 2010.

clear that those narratives work together in order to produce a single, coherent image of the past, resulting in the illusion of a single and coherent self-image. I argue that while the silenced Ottoman past did serve the purpose of producing a new geography, the narrative about both Serbian medieval country and Serbian modern history, which seemingly only frames the historical period of the Ottoman rule, actually infuses meaning into the silenced Ottoman part of the history of Serbia.<sup>19</sup>

In the first chapter of *The Erotic Margin: Sexuality and Spatiality in Alteritist Discourse*, Irvin Cemil Schick demonstrated how the production of place as a “rhetorical construct,” i.e. the rhetorical construction of what is “here” and “there,” is directly connected to the construction of self and alterity.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, it can be concluded that the construction of a new geography was achieved through the same process as the construction of national identity in the course of the nineteenth century. The whole period of history was spatialized as “there,” while “Ottoman” and “Turkish” identity were constructed as the alterity to Serbian identity and “Serbian place,” the Serbian nation-state.

While the perception and narrative of the Ottoman rule are certainly not the only element that shapes national identity, the question remains as to how much of it is still available and defining Serbian identity. Is the imago of the Ottoman rule, or the Serbian past vis-à-vis the Ottoman past still relatively unchanged, giving a relative stability to Serbian collective identity? This thesis does not aim at finding the truth about the past, but rather exposing the *process* by which the past has been collectively shaped through narratives and handed down from generation to generation until today. For this reason, I will approach this problematics using the concept of collective memory, which as a process best envelops the entangled relationship between history narratives and collective identity. As collective memory is mediated through narratives, in this thesis I will aim at answering the following question: *How do history textbooks, literature, monuments, and calendars bear witness to the Ottoman period in Serbia?*

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<sup>19</sup> Even though the nationalist narrative in order to make “biological continuity” of the Serbian nation has constructed the continuity between medieval Serbia and the Serbian nation-state that have emerged throughout the nineteenth century, I make a clear distinction between the two political entities.

<sup>20</sup> Schick, Irvin Cemil, *The Erotic Margin: Sexuality and Spatiality in Alteritist Discourse*, London and New York: Verso, 1999, 19-40.

This thesis is focused on the way the collective memory has been shaped top-down, and handed down until today. Therefore, it defines the “Serbian collective” as defined by the state. According to the *Constitution of the Republic of Serbia*, Article 1: “The Republic of Serbia is a state of the Serbian people and all citizens who live in it.”<sup>21</sup> It clearly defines “Serbian people” in ethno-national terms, within the borders of the Serbian nation-state. However, this thesis does not assume the passivity of reception of the collective narratives, nor does it assume the existence of one essential Serbian collective identity. While the reception and use of collective narratives certainly varies in different communal groups, this thesis is not focused on reception, but on analyzing narratives which are available and offered in Serbia.

Therefore, my main focus is on the formal ways of transmission of collective memory. I analyze texts, in the broadest sense of the word, through which collective memory of Ottoman rule is mediated. The outcome of my research is divided into three chapters, one dealing with history textbooks used in Serbia, the next dealing with the urban fabric of the Serbian capital of Belgrade, and the final one dealing with commemorative practices. However, each is complemented with the analysis of epic poetry which is one of the pillars of Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule. I have decided not to devote a separate part of the work to Serbian epic poetry because substantial work has already been done on the analysis of such poetry. However, as it is important to understand how poetry works in relation to other available narratives, and how it is constantly reactualized through different narratives, chapters will be complemented with analysis of epic poetry where applicable. Using the different methodological approaches of textual analysis, i.e. analysis of the narrative emplotment, in-context analysis of vocabulary (the meanings ascribed to words, and their consistency), the relationships between old and new text, between narrative and image, between place and practice (both looked at as texts). Through such analysis, I am aiming at deconstructing Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule. Also, as collective memory is not constituted solely of formal ways of transmission, i.e. formal texts, I will attempt to complement the analysis to the extent possible with examples of informal, oral transmission of collective memory.

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<sup>21</sup> *Constitution of the Republic of Serbia*, Article 1, available at: [http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice\\_o\\_srbiji/ustav\\_odredbe.php?id=217](http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav_odredbe.php?id=217)

#### **1.4. Outline of analysis**

This thesis aims at analyzing Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule, approaching it as a process that was established over the course of the nineteenth century and handed down until the present. By analyzing texts, in the broadest sense of the word, which mediate the memory of Ottoman rule, I aim at deconstructing the image of Ottoman rule that was formed within Serbian public discourse. Therefore, in analyzing and deconstructing the ways in which Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule was constructed, this thesis aims at dismantling the images of Self and alterity, as well as meanings infused into time and space.

The construction of Serbian collective memory was a long and complex process, which emerged in diverse ways in different parts of present day Serbia. However, as the emergence of nation-states encompassed the emergence of a center, i.e. the capital city, it was in this newly established center that all those differences converged, before being once again disseminated throughout the state, forming the illusion of a single cohesive identity. This is why I will use the case study of Belgrade as an emerging capital city, to trace how Serbian collective memory was formed, imposed through the newly established state, and handed down until today.

Chapter 2 of this thesis defines the concept of collective memory. As it is a concept that was elaborated extensively in the past few decades, the chapter presents a general introduction to Maurice Halbwachs's foundational conceptualization, and complements it with the more recent work of Jan Assmann and Pierre Nora. The concept is further elaborated with the conceptualization of Paul Ricoeur's narrative identity. This sets the theoretical ground for entering the discussion; however, each chapter of the analysis of the content of Serbian collective memory is complemented with relevant theoretical work within the general topics covered, i.e. history narrative, discourse, space and memory, and commemorative practices.

Chapter 3 gives a general overview of the history of the Ottoman Empire and the emerging Serbian nation-state, as the basis for the present thesis. I find it counterintuitive to begin this work, which aims at dealing with collective memory, with the historical background, but it seems indispensable as well. As any history narrative defines a collective, its space and time, the question was how to introduce the reader to the historical background. I also found it important to note that the

historical background will be framed in such a way as to better understand the time-frame used by the dominant Serbian historical narrative. In other words, the selection of historiographical work, the choice of where the history narrative begins and ends, and what it includes is directly related to what is relevant for understanding Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule; it is not claimed to represent history as it actually happened, or to be framing the collective in a particular, “correct,” way.

Chapter 4 deals predominantly with the analysis of history textbooks. However, the analysis is complemented with examples from Serbian language and literature. As primary schooling is obligatory education in Serbia, the analysis will include only primary school textbooks, which include the narratives about the Ottoman past. This is the most accessible source for studying the state-defined images of self-identity and alterity. The chapter includes the analysis of the texts, as well as of visual materials that accompany them. It is based on the most recent school syllabi issued by the Ministry of Education of Serbia for the school year 2014-2015. However, the analysis is complemented with a comparison a textbook used in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as an example of the most radicalized narrative, and compares it as well with textbooks from the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The analysis is focused on the way history narrative is emplotted, in order to deconstruct the perception of history framed through the organization of the narrative. It separates the time narrative emplotment from the verbal narrative emplotment in order to dismantle the image of the past that is created through such structuration. As the narrative in history textbooks represents only a selection of available historiographical work, the analysis in this part is complemented with aspects of historiography that were not included in the textbooks, in order to show how silencing one aspect of the past can contribute to the construction of collective memory in a certain (desired) way. In other words no claim is made.

Chapter 5 engages in the elaboration of the architecture of the city of Belgrade. Looking at the city as a palimpsest, it aims at demonstrating the text woven into the urban structure. As the Ottoman town was completely erased during the reconstruction of the city, this chapter aims at exposing the relationship of the narrative of the new capital city with the preexisting narratives of the Ottoman past. It analyzes the city through its memorials, realms of memory, and architecture, as well



as through the naming of streets, which infuses meanings into streets through the power of naming.

Finally, Chapter 6 deals with public calendars. It is through commemorative practices that collective memory is actualized. Not only do commemorative practices actualize collective memory, but they also serve as a platform for transmitting oral history, i.e. communicative memory, and foster high participation of groups in unifying collective performance. Therefore, commemorative practices enact the performative role of collective memory. The chronological analysis of the development of calendars is complemented with the examples of the ceremonies they follow, mainly analyzed through the newspaper announcements.

The thesis ends with a summary, concluding remarks, and recommendations for further research in Chapter 7.

## CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The past three decades have been marked by a rise in scholarship dealing with the concepts of “collective memory,” “cultural memory,” or “social memory,” be it in the form of theoretical discussion or application of theories on different case studies.<sup>22</sup> While this trend was labeled by some scholars as “a memory boom,” “fashionability of memory,” “the mnemonic turn,” there are those who have completely rejected the concepts, claiming that the emerging scholarship has nothing new to offer to the field of humanities, except for repeating what has previously been said under the umbrella of other concepts such as “myth,” “narrative,” “discourse,” or “tradition.”<sup>23</sup> As I will demonstrate in this discussion, the latter argument is valid to the extent that all these concepts either mediate collective memory or belong to the domain of what Maurice Halbwachs, the founding father of the concept, named *les cadres collectifs de la mémoire* (translated as *collective frameworks of memory*), but they cannot be interchanged with *mémoire collective* (translated as collective memory).

The problem of such misinterpretations about the concept of collective memory could be deriving from the fact that the only translation into English of Halbwachs’s main discussion, expressed in the book *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, is the work of Lewis A. Coser who omitted certain parts in his version, I

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<sup>22</sup> While Maurice Halbwachs used the term “collective memory” which will be used in this paper, Jan and Aleida Assmann conceptualized “cultural memory,” which will be further discussed, while James Fentress and Chriss Wickham put forward the term “social memory”. As my thesis leans on the concept of Maurice Halbwachs, this term will be used, with the further explanation on the choice through the work. For “cultural memory” see Assmann, Jan, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011., Assmann, Jan, “Communicative and Cultural Memory,” in Erll, Astrid, and Nünning, Ansgar, eds., *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 109-118.; for social memory see Fentress, James and Wickham, Chriss, *Social Memory*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

<sup>23</sup> Terms “memory boom” and “mnemonic turn” are used in *Introduction* in Olick, Jeffery K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, Vered, and Levy, Daniel, eds., *The Collective Memory Reader*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 3-49, while Todorova begins her discussion with “Memory is fashionable” in Todorova, Maria, ed., *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*. For critical discussions about the concept of collective memory see Gedi, Noa and Elam, Yegal “Collective Memory: What is it?,” in *History and Memory*, 8, 1996, 30-50., Bell, Duncan, “Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity,” in *British Journal of Sociology*, 54, 2003, 63-81.

believe these parts are necessary for understanding the concept.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, Halbwachs's work *La Topographie légendaire des Evangiles en Terre sainte: Etude de mémoire collective* (title translated as *The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land*), is still not available for the English-speaking audience, except for its conclusion, which can be found in Coser's translation.<sup>25</sup> However, this work represents an important source for theoretical discussion about collective memory as well, as he put his theory into practice in this book. Therefore, for the purpose of this theoretical framework, I will use parts of Lewis Coser's translation where applicable, and will supplement them, where I find it necessary, with my own translations of the original French work, for which I take full responsibility.

Maurice Halbwachs did not give a direct definition of collective memory, but rather through his elaborations aimed at demonstrating all the aspects of what it incorporates. This is why the concept has been challenged and elaborated by many scholars afterwards. While this framework will be based on Halbwachs's work, I will complement it with ideas of Jan Assmann, who coined the term "cultural memory," and Pierre Nora's work, who took a closer look at the concept of memory and its relationship to history, conceptualizing *lieux de mémoire* (translated as *realms of memory*). Both Assmann's and Nora's contributions to the field are important to this thesis, as they developed a closer look into the relationship between collective memory and historical memory, with which this thesis deals. I will finish this elaboration by linking the framework of collective memory to collective identity, using the framework of *narrative identity* in line with the work of Paul Ricœur.

## **2.1. The framework of Maurice Halbwachs's concept of collective memory**

Beginning his work by questioning the patterns and ways in which an individual remembers, Halbwachs set the ground for a sociological theory of memory. For his outline of the concept of *collective memory*, two sets of distinctions he makes

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<sup>24</sup>Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1994, [1952]., Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, Coser, Lewis A., ed., trans., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

<sup>25</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *La Topographie légendaire des Evangiles en Terre sainte: Etude de mémoire collective*, Paris : PUF, 2008, [1941].

should be understood: the relationship between individual and collective memory, and the distinction between frameworks of memory and recollection of events.

In his book *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, he begins his elaboration by dwelling on the way individuals remember, in order to slowly move away towards different social groups, i.e. the family, religious groups, and social class. Beginning his Preface with the assumption “One may say, that the individual remembers by placing himself in the viewpoint of the group, and that group memory realizes and manifests itself in the individual memories,” Halbwachs already expresses his main idea, and the foundational ground of his work, i.e. that collective memory and individual memory cannot be completely distinguished because, as he will further demonstrate, they are bounded by the use of the same frameworks.<sup>26</sup>

According to Halbwachs, even that which appears to be an individual’s memory is determined by the frameworks of the memory preserved by the collective to which s/he belongs. However, the collective memory only exists because it is actualized by individuals. By demonstrating the interdependence of the individual and collective memories, he does not deny the possibility for a person to have her/his own memories, but demonstrates that these are only perspectives, which are still experienced through the collective frameworks. In other words, Halbwachs does not deny individual perspective, but the departing point of reference of an individual is always what is collectively framed. Individual memories are always experienced and mediated through the different social and cultural forms an individual is born into, or which s/he adopts in the process of socialization.<sup>27</sup>

For this reason I believe Fentress and Wickham wrongly challenged the notion of collective memory, pleading in their Introduction for the use of the term *social memory*, and arguing that *collective memory* “renders individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying the interiorized collective will... [and brings] the image of Jungian collective unconscious.”<sup>28</sup> I believe Halbwachs used the term “collective” precisely in order to avoid such misconceptions of existence of one single model in which society thinks and remembers jointly. For Halbwachs, there are as many memories, as there are collectives. Also, he does not claim that an individual cannot have

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<sup>26</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, VIII.

<sup>27</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, 97.

<sup>28</sup> Fentress, James and Wickham, Chriss, *Social Memory*, ix.

memories of her/his own, but rather that all individual memories are made within internal or external collective frameworks: “it is that when people think they are alone, face to face with themselves, other people appear and with them the groups of which they are members.”<sup>29</sup> Collective is rather a body of individuals that construct and use the same frameworks, and it is those frameworks that an individual uses when s/he makes her/his own memories as well.

Analyzing the way dreams are framed and recollected, and the way one forms one’s relationship with them, Halbwachs demonstrates that even when dreaming “when the mind is most removed from society,” one recognizes, or remembers certain events only in relation to the framework of one’s group.<sup>30</sup> If a dream brings a new experience, or a new way into the mind of an individual, this is only recognized as such because it does not belong to the framework of the group. On the other hand, one does not include dreams into the corpus of memory, nor can they form a new collective framework of memory, as their experiences are not shared with another individual, and thus have no meaning for the collective experience of the life of an individual. It does not mean that a person does not recollect them, but they will not be incorporated into the memory constituted of both frameworks and recollections. In other words, recollections of dreams and events in dreams cannot become frameworks of collective memory, even though they are framed by them. This is why Halbwachs argues that memories are formed only collectively, or once a person is in collective space.

For this to be understood, it needs to be clarified that according to Halbwachs, memory constitutes the totality of the ways in which events that took place and which are mediated through collective frameworks through the act of recollecting, are situated in one’s mind. However, the concept of collective frameworks does not imply that the way the memory will be formed is predetermined, nor does it mean that events are not placed into one’s mind completely freely.

Either a relationship between the framework and the [memories of] events that take place exists, even though the two are not made of the same substance... Or the framework and the [memories of] events are identical by nature: the events are memories, but the framework is also made up of memories. The difference between the former and the latter

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<sup>29</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, 149.

<sup>30</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*.

is that the latter is more stable so we need to observe them at every moment and use them to recover and reconstruct the former.<sup>31</sup>

Even though memories of events are mediated through already existing collective frameworks, those frameworks are neither predetermined nor definite, and can (be) change(d) and interchange(d) with the events one recollects. The way events are stored in one's mind can become new frameworks, for other events to further be situated in. While the frameworks show a certain level of stability through time, memories of events are subject to constant change, each time they are recollected, or new memories are added. However, those changes can influence the change of framework as well. In that way, Halbwachs demonstrates that memory is rather a process than a structure, as is sometimes wrongly attributed to his work.

It was necessary to show, on the other hand, that the collective frameworks of memory are not constituted at once through a combination of individual memories, and that they are not constituted of simple, empty forms either, where the memories deriving from elsewhere would come to dwell, [it is necessary to show] that they [collective frameworks of memory] are, on the contrary, precisely instruments used by collective memories to reassemble an image from the past which is in line with every epoch and with the dominant attitudes of a society.<sup>32</sup>

Every time we place one of our impressions in the framework of our current ideas, the framework transforms the impression, but the impression, in turn, modifies the framework. It is a new moment, a new place that we add to our time, to our space; it is a new aspect of our group that makes us see it in a new light.<sup>33</sup>

Collective frameworks of memory represent everything what is available for a person to understand, interpret, and store the events in her/his mind. In other words, they are social and cultural forms that a person uses in recollecting past events. According to Halbwachs, frameworks are not established as a collection of independent individual impressions, but within a collective, a group. They can be various different cultural forms, like religious or language signs, which Halbwachs analyzes extensively, and frameworks such as space and time, which he looked at only

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<sup>31</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, 120, my translation.

<sup>32</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, III, my translation.

<sup>33</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, 135, my translation.

in the way they are framed within society.<sup>34</sup> Once those frameworks are established within a collective, they do not become predetermined structures which organize and infuse the meaning into one's understanding and recalling of past events. Those frameworks are subject to constant change and adaptations depending on the person who uses and interprets them, and depending on how the group/s/he belongs to use/s and interpret/s them. "Just as people are members of many different groups at the same time, so the memory of the same fact can be placed within many frameworks which result from distinct collective memories."<sup>35</sup> In other words, frameworks change from group to group, and are transformed through time, but the same person can use different collective frameworks for the same impressions, depending on the group s/he interacts with. Therefore, collective memory, as a totality, is a process as well, and is subject to constant reproduction.

Halbwachs makes the metaphor of relationship between events and frameworks of memory, comparing it to the relationship of the picture and frame "like the frame of a painting and the canvas that sits in it."<sup>36</sup> The frameworks are used to localize, and organize history, experiences, social relations, and events in the process of recollecting, creating the totality of memory. However, memories are reconstructed each time the act of recollecting of the event takes place. While on one side this is indicative of a process in which collective frameworks are constantly reproduced and handed down to new generations, there are frameworks that "society tends to erase from its memory."<sup>37</sup> According to Halbwachs, all that society sees that may separate individuals from a group tends to be erased, rearranging "its recollections in such a way as to adjust them to the variable conditions of its equilibrium."<sup>38</sup> By erasing the framework, erasing the recollection of event, the totality of memory changes as well.

When, as we believe, the collective memory essentially is a reconstruction of the past, when it adapts the image of the ancient events to the beliefs and to the spiritual needs of the present, the

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<sup>34</sup> Halbwachs conceptualization of time and space were most notably influenced by his teacher, the philosopher Henri Bergson, and the thoughts of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose work Halbwachs prepared for publication. See Douglas, Mary, "Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1941)," in Halbwachs, Maurice, *The collective Memory*, Ditter, Francis J. and Yazdi Ditter, Vida, trans., New York: Harper & Row, 1980, 1-25.

<sup>35</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, 52.

<sup>36</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, 120, my translation.

<sup>37</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, 182.

<sup>38</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, 183.

knowledge of what originally was or happened is secondary, if not quite useless, since the reality of the past, as a perceptual model to which it has to conform, no longer exists.<sup>39</sup>

It is actually through the whole process of memory, where recollections of the past, and frameworks are in constant interaction, that the disconnection from past events is effectuated. Memory is thus strictly connected to the present, as both the frameworks and the act of recollection are framed in the present. It is through these frameworks that different groups operate in one's memory constantly, giving one the ability to understand space and time surrounding one. In other words, it is through those frameworks that one goes through the process of socialization. The framework allows one to reconstruct images of the past, and to place them temporally and spatially. Those images, i.e. those memories, as well, help localize other time and space, and other images.<sup>40</sup> This is why for memory, the moment of truth, or of knowledge about past event are quite secondary, because what is framed within the collective memory is of much greater importance for the group and the individual's function in it in the present.

## **2.2. Communicative and Cultural Memory – Jan Assmann's contribution**

Maurice Halbwachs was primarily concerned with giving an outline of collective memory, and his work was only posthumously published, so many of his ideas remained unfinished. In his discussion about the relationship of history and collective memory, he made a clear distinction between collective memory, and history, or historical memory.<sup>41</sup> Collective memory, which is an extension of autobiographical memory, incorporates all the recollections of person's own life, as well as the life of his/her predecessors that person incorporates in his/her own memories. Each human being already comes to the milieu and gets interwoven into collective memory of his predecessor, "like a framework into which are interwoven his most personal memories."<sup>42</sup> Collective memory of his predecessors is handed

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<sup>39</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *La Topographie légendaire des Evangiles en Terre sainte*, 7, my translation.

<sup>40</sup> See Halbwachs, Maurice, *Les Cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, 103-105.

<sup>41</sup> See Halbwachs, Maurice, *The collective Memory*, 50-87.

<sup>42</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *The collective Memory*, 68.



down to him and he reproduces it, creating continuity. However, this memory stretches as far back into the past as it is relevant for a person's life.

On the other hand, for Halbwachs, there is historical memory, or what one can find written in history. Each person, each group situates itself in history, or historical contexts, but for Halbwachs, history is not a collective memory. According to him, all the knowledge one receives from history is just an empty framework. Since one cannot recollect events from history, therefore that "empty framework can never fill itself out alone."<sup>43</sup> For Halbwachs, while the events that are situated in collective memory are about continuity, history is concerned about events that emphasize discontinuities and changes. Once the change occurs, those memories are pushed into historical memory, and are, according to Halbwachs, no longer the subject of collective memory. Likewise, all standardized ways of transmitting historical memory are just the domain of tradition, and have no influence on collective memory. While this distinction is made very clearly in Halbwachs's work, it is questionable how much he found those ideas final, since he did not publish them himself.

However, the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann, rejecting Halbwachs's idea that all organized forms of memory, books, monuments, dates, commemorations, etc., are subsumed under the concept of tradition, and therefore are not memories, developed the idea of mnemo-history, seeing tradition as a phenomenon of collective memory. Departing from the distinction between autobiographical memory and historical memory, Assmann, together with his wife Adeline Assmann, developed concept of *communicative memory* and *cultural memory*, as forms of collective memory.<sup>44</sup>

"Communicative memory comprises memories related to the recent past," and as defined by Assmann, are most closely related to autobiographical memory.<sup>45</sup> They are collective memories that are passed on orally from generation to generation, they encompass the time-frame of 80-100 years, are based on everyday life experience, and personal biographies. On the other hand, he situates cultural memory which is

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<sup>43</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *The collective Memory*, 70.

<sup>44</sup> Assmann, Jan, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 13-141. Both Jan and Adeline Assmann developed the concepts and elaborated on them in their relevant work, departing from different starting points. However, I will use Jan Assmann's notions, which he further developed in his work, as they are more relevant for this thesis.

<sup>45</sup> Assmann, Jan, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*, 37.

“focused on fixed points in the past, but again is unable to preserve the past as it was.”<sup>46</sup> It is condensed in symbolic figures on which memory attaches itself, as such it is objectified and institutionalized, and in this way is transmitted to posterity.<sup>47</sup>

According to Assmann, those two forms of collective memory are antipodes. Communicative memory uses informal ways of transmission, while cultural memory uses formal channels, communicative memory is based on experience, while cultural memory is based on mythical history and an absolute past, communicative memory is lived, while cultural memory is formalized and belongs to the past. For contemporary societies, both of the forms of cultural memories are important. Giving the example of language, he demonstrates how contemporary societies use standardized and vernacular languages without strictly distinguishing between the two, or transmitting both to the next generation. This allows him to position contemporary society on a “sliding scale,” or the society for which both communicative and cultural memory form the corpus of collective memory.<sup>48</sup> In other words, a society’s collective memory is both comprised of frameworks and recollection of events that are transmitted through standardized forms such as education, and through direct communicative transmissions from generation to generation. With the introduction of these concepts, Assmann bridged the distinction Halbwachs made between historical and collective memory.

### **2.3. Myth and Collective Memory**

The modernist approach to the conceptualization of myth went hand in hand with assigning truthfulness to the writing of history and lack of truth to myths as shapers of events. Therefore, myths became the domain of unscientific and irrational shaping of reality by a community. However, postmodern thinking relativized “concepts like ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, which had previously been understood in absolute terms,” and brought new approaches to the construction of myths, blurring the line

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<sup>46</sup> Assmann, Jan, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*. 37.

<sup>47</sup> Irvin Cemil Schick also explains the importance of what Assmann names “cultural memory”, in the imaginary of a nation, see “Christian Maidens, Turkish Ravisher: The Sexualization of National Conflict in the late Ottoman Period,” in *Women in the Ottoman Balkans: Gender, Culture and History*, Buturović, Amila, Shick, Irvin C., eds., London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007, pp. 273-306.

<sup>48</sup> Assmann, Jan, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization*. 40-41.

between them and history.<sup>49</sup> “Myth and history are close kin inasmuch as both explain how things got to be the way they are by telling some kind of a story.”<sup>50</sup> McNail coined the word *mythhistory*, arguing that the line between history and myth is always blurred.

According to Barthes, “everything can be myth provided it is conveyed by discourse.”<sup>51</sup> However, as he pointed out “myth is not defined by the object of its message, but by the way it utters the message.”<sup>52</sup> Therefore, myth is rather a mode of discourse in which events of and about history are situated. Myths are constructed in such a way so as to promulgate communally constructed meanings. Thus, myth is essential for the construction of communal identity as well. As some events from the past are constructed in and through myths, it can be equally said that myths represent an important part of collective memory. In other words, myth as a mode of discourse represents a framework of collective memory, in which events from the past are situated in such a way, that they convey a certain message to and about the community. Therefore, myths represent essential aspects of communal memory through which communal identity is constructed.

In his elaboration, Assmann associated myths with the domain of cultural memory. He showed that important imagery of society is transmitted through myths, and that they contribute also to the reproduction of collective frameworks and collective memory. But, through his elaboration of collective memory, and especially of history, Halbwachs seems to reject the idea that myths can be part of collective memory, as they do not include the recollection of directly experienced events. However, in his work about the collective memory of religious groups he sees myths and religious texts (both of which belong to the domain of cultural memory according to Assmann), as pillars of religious collective memory. This aspect of religious collective memory is described and put into practice in Halbwachs’s *La Topographie légendaire des Evangiles en Terre sainte: Etude de mémoire collective*. In this study he attempted to demonstrate how the biographical topography of Jesus was formed in

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<sup>49</sup> Stråth, Bo, ed., *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community: Historical Patterns in Europe and Beyond*, Brussels: P.I.E., 2000, 21.

<sup>50</sup> McNeil, William H., “Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians,” in *The American Historical Review*, 91/1, 1986, 1-10, 1.

<sup>51</sup> Barthes, Roland, *Mythologies*, Annette Lavers, transl., London: Vintage Books, 2009 [1957], 131.

<sup>52</sup> Barthes, Roland, *Mythologies*, 131.

the Gospel, and in turn, how pilgrims who have walked the land and have performed rituals, as well as locals who have narrated stories about the land, have actualized and passed on collective memory of the life of Jesus. Halbwachs demonstrated how the lore from the Gospel about the life of Jesus was reconstructed through pilgrimage in such a way as to put a very limited amount of available data in a communally meaningful way into a coherent story. The way in which the story was shaped, became an important part of the Christian religious community, shaping further the Land through the construction of religious edifices, and which was further reinforced through the participation of the community in pilgrimage through the Land, shaping the collective memory of the life of Jesus.<sup>53</sup>

What is visible in his analysis, is that all the frameworks that are engaged in the construction of collective memory of the life of Jesus and the Holy Land pertain to the domain of myths (the mode of discourse in which the story was conveyed) and traditions (the way in which myths were handed down to the members of the community), are within the domain of what Assmann named cultural memory. Furthermore, in his elaboration of religious collective memory, Halbwachs does accept that myths and traditions form the basis of the frameworks of collective memory. This he finds in the fact that events in religious accounts, i.e. religious “truths on which they are built are atemporal in nature and the figure and the remembrance of the individual who has discovered them passes in background.”<sup>54</sup> Thus, irrespective of the way in which they are framed, “the religious element is entirely reducible to remembrances.”<sup>55</sup>

The distinction he makes between religious life and everyday life, lies in their relation to time. “Since the rest of social life is within the passage of time or duration,” Halbwachs states, “it stands to reason that religion withdraws itself from this.”<sup>56</sup> What he further explains is that these religious memories have bound themselves to profane elements, such as the fixation of celebrations in public calendars, the constructions of various objects, etc. It is in this way that collective memory is relived by the religious collective, and passed from generation to generation.

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<sup>53</sup> See Halbwachs, Maurice, *La Topographie légendaire*.

<sup>54</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, 88.

<sup>55</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, 89.

<sup>56</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, 89.

To make such a refined distinction for religion, and not to recognize the same patterns used in other “profane” memories, such as national collective memories, can only be the result of the time in which he wrote, when the notion of nationhood was as yet unquestioned. It is also a reflection of a time in which myths were connected and conceptualized as “irrational,” mostly religious practices, while other human faculties were seen within the domain of the “rational.” If one takes political myths, and national truths, all of which use patterns and forms of “religious” atemporality and sacredness, could one then not claim that national collective memories are as well formed and constructed through the frameworks of myths, traditions, and other forms of cultural memory? When it comes to any form of collective imaginary that uses the same patterns and forms as religion, such as atemporal truths and sacredness, the same forms of collective memory can as well be found. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, which deals with national memory, Halbwachs’s notions about religious memory can be of great importance.

#### **2.4. Pierre Nora, Between Memory and History**

Yet another contribution to the rethinking of historical memory and collective memory was given by Pierre Nora. Rethinking French history and the French nation, Pierre Nora coined the terms *lieux de mémoire* and *milieux de mémoire*. Even though he makes practically no reference to Halbwachs’s work, it appears as if Nora started from the question that seemed to be left unanswered by Maurice Halbwachs: what happens to the memories when they are threatened with fading into the past? In other words, how are memories preserved as memories instead of slipping into faceless history? “There are *lieux de mémoire*, sites of memory,” explains Nora, “because there are no longer *milieux de mémoire*, real environments of memory.”<sup>57</sup>

Nora postulates his argument in the opposite direction from Halbwachs. Instead of looking at what historical memory and collective memory each deal with, he starts his elaboration rather from the point of rupture, i.e. from the change that occurs within continuity, disconnecting the past from the present, and pushing collective memory into the historical memory. It is in that particular moment that

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<sup>57</sup> Nora, Pierre, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” in *Representations*, 24, University of California Press, 1989, 7.

collective memory becomes sifted from all the frameworks that are transferred to history. It is at this precise moment when existing memory fades away, since it is impossible to live within it, that, according to Nora, society crystalizes memory, constructing *lieux de mémoire* (realms of memory).

As opposed to Assmann's work, Nora assesses the modern ages, and the way in which the approach to memory and history has changed since the nineteenth century. In the age of big shifts and changes, in order for societies to relive faded memories, according to Nora, there has been a mass production of realms of memory, such as depositories, libraries, museums, etc. "As memory is no longer social practice ... the passage from memory to history has required every social group to redefine its identity," and it is a responsibility of every individual to relive those memories.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, with the new rupture that disconnected to a great extent history and memory, every individual, through uses of realms of memory, searches for collective memory and, on the other hand, historians, changing their perspective in research, more and more approach what used to be the domain of collective memory, researching depositories of ordinary people, oral history, etc. This is why realms of memory, products of the modern age, are rather positioned between memory and history, than dividing them.

According to Nora, realms of memory have three functions: material, symbolic, and functional.<sup>59</sup> They exist in the material world, in contrast to *milieux de mémoire* that were rather created through actions of a collective. They are used to symbolize a certain group, a certain event, to symbolically recreate what was pushed into the past. Finally, they are used to function as a guide through which collective memories of events, or particular groups, become available. They are made in interaction between history and memory, between the sources of history and sources of memory, and thus they represent places between history and memory, i.e. *les lieux de mémoire* and *les lieux d'histoire* (realms of history).<sup>60</sup> However, it is important to bear in mind that not every document, not every monument, not every museum is a realm of memory. According to Nora, it is important to distinguish the hierarchy of symbolic positions of those sites, in order to be able to identify and recognize those

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<sup>58</sup> Nora, Pierre, *Between Memory and History*, 15.

<sup>59</sup> Nora, Pierre, *Between Memory and History*, 19.

<sup>60</sup> Nora, Pierre, *Between Memory and History*, 19.

that carry memories to be relived. While Assmann demonstrated the continuity of history through cultural memory to our day, Nora showed how memories that were bound to fade into history, or did fade into history, were captured and actualized in the modern world, in order to be passed on to posterity. He also demonstrated the value memory has in identity construction, and sees the primary purpose of constructing realms of memory in the preservation of collective identity.

## 2.5. Narrative Identity and Collective Memory, Paul Ricœur

Even though Halbwachs noted that collective memory helps groups to “conceive their unity and peculiarity through the common image of the past,” and Assmann sees learning and transmitting a common identity as one of the main functions of cultural memory, they are not overly concerned with conceptualizing collective identity in their work. Furthermore, Nora’s work was entirely based on the relationship between history and collective memory, and identity and ideology. Moreover, he does not elaborate sufficiently extent the concept in his work, either. As this thesis conceives its argument on this relationship between collective memory and collective identity, now that the concept of collective memory has been defined, its relationship to collective identity should be established. I believe it is useful to introduce the phenomenological thought of Paul Ricœur at this point.<sup>61</sup>

Ricœur coined the concept of narrative identity, according to which identity is constructed through the stories one tells to both oneself and to others.<sup>62</sup> Narrative identity is based on three suppositions: “a) knowledge of the self is an interpretation, b) the interpretation of the self, in turn, finds the narrative among other signs and symbols, to be privileged mediations, c) this mediation borrows from history as much as from fiction, making the life story a fictional history, if you prefer and historical fiction.”<sup>63</sup> It is, according to Ricœur, through narrative that one recognizes one’s self

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<sup>61</sup> Ricœur wrote extensively on the subject of identity, narrative, time, and memory, but, due to the limitation of space, this thesis will incorporate only what is necessary for understanding of the concept.

<sup>62</sup> He first established the concept of narrative identity in an article published as a clarification of his conclusions in his book *Time and Narrative*, Vol. III, Blamey, Kathleen, and Pellauer, David, trans., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, see Ricœur, Paul, “Narrative Identity,” Moldoom, Mark S., trans., in *Philosophy Today*, 35/1, 1991 [1988], 73-81., to fully develop the idea in the book *Oneself as Another*, Blamey, Kathleen, transl., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

<sup>63</sup> Ricœur, Paul, “Narrative Identity,” 73.

as others, whose experiences one shares, but also recognizes others whose experience one cannot share. It is in this relationship of recognizing self and recognizing another that one constructs one's identity. His elaboration shows two important aspects of identity construction that are useful for this thesis. Firstly, construction of self is connected to construction of another (alterity), and secondly, it is a process operating in imaginary, which establishes narrative relation towards one's history.

He continues his elaboration by making a clear distinction between *idem* and *ipse identity*.<sup>64</sup> While *idem identity* is identification and re-identification of the same self over time, i.e. selfhood, *ipse identity* is identification and re-identification of the same traits of self over time, i.e. sameness. The difference that is made in the construction of identity is: who is distinct or what is distinct? But what both *ipse* and *idem identity* serve to demonstrate is that "self has permanence over time."<sup>65</sup> Therefore, durability and permanence of selfhood and/or sameness on one hand, and opposition of those traits in relation to another on the other, are the main characteristics of identity.

This process of identity construction is relevant for both individual and communal identity. The individual constructs itself in relation to sameness with another, or in relation to difference from another. It is not only one's narrative that can construct self-identity. If one recognizes sameness in another, one also accepts another's narrative as self-narrative. It is through intersubjectivity that the communal identity is constructed. According to Ricœur, a communal identity is formed through a "set of *acquired identifications* by which the other enters into composition of the same."<sup>66</sup> Therefore, the permanence of communal identity is also entangled in reaffirming what and who is distinct, i.e. operates as well through the *idem* and *ipse identity*.

As stated at the beginning, narrative identity is closely related to history narrative, i.e. one's relation to the narrative construction of one's history. Therefore, those narratives are the main carriers of the durability and permanence of one's identity. In line with what was previously discussed, one is already born into collective narratives about history that are transmitted through various forms of texts, i.e.

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<sup>64</sup> Ricœur, Paul, *Oneself as Another*, 118-121.

<sup>65</sup> Ricœur, Paul, "Narrative Identity," 75.

<sup>66</sup> Ricœur, Paul, *Oneself as Another*, 121.



through oral history, history teaching, monuments, museums, etc. It is through those narratives that one acquires a relationship with the surrounding, and forms the relationship towards self and other, towards here and there. Therefore, the relationship between narrative identity and memory is clear at this point. Both identity and memory are mediated through narratives about history. Therefore, acquiring one's group memory is central to acquiring one's group identity. On one hand, it is through narratives about the collective past that the continuity and permanence of collective identity are transmitted to posterity; and on the other hand, it is through recognition in ancestral narratives that one acquires group identity.

## **2.6. In Summary**

Collective memory is a process through which the totality of the group's relationships to the common past is established. It supposes a body of people that actualizes it and transmits it to posterity. Collective memory is actualized by and transmitted to different groups, and therefore through reception and re-actualization, it is subjected to constant change. It also allows an individual to form her/his perspective in relation to the group/groups to which s/he belongs. Therefore, one cannot talk of one collective memory, but of a plurality of collective memories. There are as many collective memories as there are groups.

Collective memory is composed of collective frameworks such as symbols, ideas, discourses, genres, etc. in which recollections of events, impressions, still more ideas, symbols, etc. are situated. Recollections show less stability through time, but can become new frameworks of collective memory acquiring durability in this way. This means certain forms of collective memory can exhibit durability over time as well. The interpretation of frameworks, and the way they will be actualized depends exclusively on the reader as the "author is dead." While this is certainly true, it is equally important to identify what continued to persist through the process of collective memory reconstruction. It is collective memory as a process that this thesis will aim at analyzing.

Collective memories can be transmitted through both informal and formal, i.e. standardized, ways. Even though the founding father of the concept, Halbwachs, to an extent did not recognize those formal ways as inherent to collective memory, Jan

Assmann in his elaboration situating those standardized forms of collective frameworks in the domain of cultural memory, demonstrated why both informal and formal ways are important for today's "sliding societies." Therefore, in order to analyze one group's memory, it is equally important to analyze both *cultural* and *communicative* forms of memory. This is a second notion important for this thesis, as it will deal both with cultural memory, by analyzing predominantly standardized forms of the transmission of collective memory, and communicative memory where applicable.

Collective memory is a process connected to the present, but it establishes a group's close relationship to the past. As such it is closely related to history, or in other words, collective memory is about and *of* history. Halbwachs rejected the idea that memory can be part of collective memory, as, according to him, it consists of big changes that happened in the past, and therefore is disconnected from present communities. However, through both the concept of cultural memory that transmits past memories to the present and Nora's *realms of memory* as the means of illusionary reconstruction of those lived memories (autobiographical or communicative memories), which are central to Halbwachs's concept, it was demonstrated that collective memory cannot be disengaged from historical memory. However, collective memory exceeds the concept of historical memory, as it represents, as seen above, more than just a recollection of events from history. As the production of realms of memory was particularly fruitful in the construction of nation-states, this concept will be very important in the elaboration of this thesis.

Finally, collective memory is transmitted and formed through any text, in the broadest sense of the word. It is through narratives that memories are actualized. As such, it is central for establishing one's relationship to the world around oneself, and therefore, it is also central for acquiring collective identity. Through Ricoeur's conceptualization of narrative identity, i.e. identity is constructed through stories one tells about oneself. Therefore, put into narrative, memory also plays a central role in binding and transmitting collective identity through time, keeping its permanence and durability through time. Moreover, collective memory plays a role in establishing the coherence of selfhood as well.

Therefore, acquiring a group's memory is central to acquiring a group's identity. As identity is always constructed in relationship to otherness, collective

memory mediates one's relationship to both self and other, which is as such transmitted to new members of the group. One is born into collective memory, and therefore already acquires identity. However, while one brings those memories to "life" by confirming and actualizing them, one can also disengage and acquire relationships to other memories, accepting other collective memories, and other identities.<sup>67</sup>



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<sup>67</sup> It is only language that one cannot choose.

### CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

"The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there"  
Leslie Poles Hartley, *The Go-Between*, 1953, 1.

It was only in 1878, when the Treaty of Berlin ended Ottoman suzerainty, that Serbia got its *de jure* independence, making Belgrade its capital city. However, this independence was gained half century after Serbia had won its autonomy within the borders of the Ottoman Empire in 1829, and was followed by almost three decades during which Serbia aimed at gaining the territory to which Serbian intellectuals and the political elite believed the emerging nation-state had a historical right. It took over a century for a state formed on the principle of the nation to replace the Empire, whose ideological principles were grounded in “*din ü devlet*,” religion, i.e. Islam, and dynasty/Empire, i.e. “the House of Osman.”<sup>68</sup> However, it was not only political geography that needed to be reestablished, but, as Mazower notes, “the leader of the state had to create Nation out of a peasant society that was imbued in the world-view of its Ottoman past.”<sup>69</sup>

It is with the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans that the region was administratively unified as the *Rumeli* Province. This is why the region is often approached and studied as a whole in the period of Ottoman rule. It is difficult to estimate the size of the population at that time, but the Balkans were not densely populated despite fertile soil, mostly due to the geography of the region, which did not lend itself to easy road communication. Thus the population was mostly composed of peasants who cultivated state-owned lands and their livestock. However, stasis was not the characteristic of this population, as sometimes entire villages would move seasonally, resulting in an ethnically mixed population. Also, population transfers practiced by the Ottoman Empire further contributed to population diversity. It was only with the construction of new roads, as well as the changes of the economic system

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<sup>68</sup> For ideology and identity of the Ottoman Empire see: Anscombe, Frederick F., *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, 21-30.

<sup>69</sup> Mazower, Mark, *The Balkans: A short history*, Random House Publishing Group, 2007.

in the nineteenth century, that the population would become more stationary.<sup>70</sup> Ottoman rule brought to the peasantry a certain level of stability over the centuries, which was much disturbed with “Increasing harshness in the preceding centuries” of various Greek, Slav, Venetian, and Catalan landowners ruling them.<sup>71</sup> There was a degree of continuity for the peasantry that accounted for almost 80% of the population, i.e. their allegiance remained to the Orthodox Church, which within the Ottoman Empire was united under the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. They were paying more or less the same level of taxes as they had prior to the arrival of Ottomans, and their attachment remained to the land on which their existence depended.

Giving a short overview of the socio-political and economic organization of the Empire that existed for six centuries, and that inevitably changed its organizational form, is no easy task. The Empire slowly incorporated Christian lands of the Balkans, allowing the continuity of Christian rule under the vassalage position to the Sultan. The core of the organization of the Empire was the distribution of land. The land was divided by *timar* system, which was essentially a military organization of the Empire. The cavalry (*timariots*) was given a portion of the state-owned land, from which they levied taxes (mostly in kind) from *reaya*, the tax paying subjects of the Empire, in return for providing military service when the state needed it. This system changed over the course of sixteenth and seventeenth century, evolving into a tax-farming system, which was triggered by multiple military and fiscal transformations of the Empire.<sup>72</sup>

“There was only one law of the land, and it was the Ottoman: *kanun* [sultanic decree] and *shari’a* [religious law].”<sup>73</sup> The existence of *kanun* allowed for the continuation of the non-Muslim subservience to the Islamic Empire. However, the Ottoman Empire granted non-Muslims a certain level of autonomy to organize themselves within their religious communities. After the consolidation of the Empire, non-Muslim communities only paid taxes (regular taxes imposed on all tax-paying

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<sup>70</sup> See Sahara, Tetsuya, “The Ottoman City Council and the Beginning of the Modernization of Urban Space in the Balkans,” in Freitag, Ulrike, Fuhrmann, Malte, Lafi, Nora, and Riedler, Florian, eds., *The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity*, New York, 2011,

<sup>71</sup> Mazower, Mark, *The Balkans: A short history*, 39.

<sup>72</sup> For more details about organization and distribution of Ottoman land see: Gradeva, Rossitsa, *Rumeli under the Ottomans, 15th-18th Centuries: Institutions and Communities*, The Isis Press, 2004.

<sup>73</sup> Anscombe, Frederick F., *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands*, 29.

subjects, plus *cizye* tax imposed only on non-Muslims), but were excluded, yet not exempted from military service. Through the system of *devşirme*, the “children of Christian peasants could be made the sultan’s slaves in contravention of the principle that non-Muslims who paid a head tax were protected against such penalties.”<sup>74</sup>

Cultural production was also influenced by religion. The production of both material and non-material culture, as well as both vernacular and high culture, had visible cross-religious influences, which was the result of the life that different communities shared within the Empire. All Orthodox churches were united under the Patriarchate of Constantinople, despite the different languages spoken by the various religious communities. However, as education was mostly connected to the Church, the language of education of Orthodox Christians was predominantly Greek.<sup>75</sup>

With the arrival of Ottomans, urbanization was occurring at a fast pace, changing the outlook of the towns that existed in the Balkans. Due to the fact that the Empire collected taxes from urban centers, they were economically, i.e. strategically important. The population was composed predominantly of Muslim notables, as Islam was the backbone of the Empire, even though there were Christian notables, whose number increased in the eighteenth century. Belgrade was one of the cities that rapidly grew as a commercial center after the Ottoman conquest. It was constructed as an economic center, rather than an exclusively military garrison town as it had formerly been under *Despot* Stefan Lazarević.<sup>76</sup> Fourteen years after the battle of Kosovo, after which medieval Serbia ruled by *Knez* Lazar, Stefan’s father, became an Ottoman vassal, the Ottoman Empire was struck by the interregnum period.<sup>77</sup> The *Despot* accepted the invitation of the Hungarian king and moved the center of his power to Belgrade. This influenced the transfer of both the nobility and the common population towards the north. The next two bigger transfers of population occurred during the Austrian conquests of the territories of the province in the eighteenth century. After

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<sup>74</sup> Anscombe, Frederick F., *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands*, 29.

<sup>75</sup> In Belgrade in 1810 there were two schools, and they both taught in the Greek language. See Mazower, Mark, *The Balkans: A short history*.

<sup>76</sup> Despot, the title given to Stefan by the Byzantine Emperor after sultan Bayezid was imprisoned by Timur in 1402, most equivalent to English *duke*.

<sup>77</sup> Kosovo Battle, as merely one among the battles between Balkan countries and Ottomans in the fourteenth and fifteenth century, is mentioned here due to its relevance to the Serbian collective memory. *Knez* is most equivalent to prince.

the re-conquest of those territories, the Serbian population, along with the episcopate of Peć, moved to the border region of Austria in 1769 and in 1790.<sup>78</sup>

After the Ottomans conquered Belgrade in 1521, it was designated as the central administrative town of Semendrine Sancağı, established by the Ottomans.<sup>79</sup> This is when Belgrade started developing further as an economic center. The way in which the Ottoman Empire was administered disrupted the institution of hereditary nobility that had existed previously in these lands. However, the peasantry did have their local Christian chieftains. Two of the chieftains in Semendrine Sancağı were leader of the peasant rebellions at the turn of the nineteenth century, known in Serbian national history as the “Serbian Uprisings,” Karađorđe, and Miloš Obrenović.

After the consolidation of Ottoman power, and a certain level of stability that had been reached for almost three centuries, the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century were marked by increasing problems posed to Istanbul by pashas in provinces, rather than by the foreign powers, as is usually assumed. The Janissary corps got out of Istanbul’s control in the Paşalık of Belgrade, which resulted in the terrorization of the local Christian population.<sup>80</sup> This prompted the population to take control in their own hands.<sup>81</sup>

The first uprising in 1804 was led by a local Serbian notable named Đorđe Petrović, nicknamed Karađorđe, who was backed by Russia, and thus pushed towards the secession of this part of Ottoman territory.<sup>82</sup> The second uprising in 1815 was led

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<sup>78</sup> The military border region named Vojna Krajina, was formed to protect the border of the Austrian Empire. However, the transfers of population was not as massive as Serbian nationalist insist it was.

<sup>79</sup> For history of Ottoman Belgrade see Đurić-Zamolo, Divna., *Beograd kao orijentalna varoš pod Turcima*, and Šabanović, Hazim, *Urbani razvitak Beograda od 1521. do 1688*. In nineteenth century Semendrine Sancağı will become known as Belgrade Paşalık.

<sup>80</sup> For the modern history of the Balkans see: Jelavich, Barbara and Jelavich, Charles, *The Establishment of Balkan National states 1804-1920*, Seattle. 1977, For the new approach to the uprisings and establishment of nation-states in the Balkans, which I follow in this paper, see: Anscombe, Frederick F., “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” in *The Journal for Modern history*, Vol. 84, N. 3, The University of Chicago Press, 2012, 592-606, and Anscombe, Frederick F., *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands*.

<sup>81</sup> Even though these uprisings were given a national interpretation in line with the events that occurred afterwards, by now scholars agreed that there is lack of nationalist strivings in these uprisings, see Paxton, Roger, “Nationalism and Revolution: A Re-Examination of the Origins of the First Serbian Insurrection 1804-1807,” *EEQ* 6, 1972, 337-362., Stokes, Gale, “The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics before 1840,” in *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 4, 1976, 77-90.

<sup>82</sup> Karađorđe derives from Turkish word “kara” meaning “black,” which was prefixed to the first name Đorđe, i.e. meaning black Đorđe. Serbian communicative memory affiliates this nickname to be given to Karađorđe by Ottoman Turks in figurative meaning of “black” as the one who meant trouble for the Ottomans. However, given the fact that he was a dark-haired and dark-eyed man, unless grounded in research, this remains in the domain of oral history.

by another Serbian notable, Miloš Obrenović, who opposed the politics of Karađorđe, showing loyalty to the Sultan. He aimed at obtaining a higher degree of autonomy for the Christian population within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, similar to that enjoyed by the Danubian principalities. The politics of Miloš Obrenović resulted in Sultan Mahmud II granting him the 1830 *Hatt-ı Şerif* that allowed him to autonomously rule the region of Sancak, with the hereditary title of *knez*.<sup>83</sup> Miloš was also granted the right to choose the eparch of the Eparchy of Belgrade, which was still under the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This marks the inception of the Serbian Principality, with Miloš's seat being town of Kragujevac, situated in the southern part of the Principality, while the Ottomans still controlled the town of Belgrade. Throughout his rule, Miloš strove for the transfer of his seat to Belgrade, before eventually reaching an agreement according to which he was to control the outside of the moat, whereas the Ottomans remained in control of the territory inside the moat of Belgrade.

The two political strings, one embodied in the politics of Karađorđe and his successors (the Karađorđević dynasty), infused with separatist ideas, which turned into a highly nationalistic discourse over the course of the nineteenth century, and the other embodied in the politics of Miloš Obrenović, an Ottoman ruler of Christian tradition, diverged and became fiercely opposed in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, they converged in the second half of the century, the latter accepting more nationalistic ideas, although less vehemently.

Using the unrest that took place after two Ottoman police officers killed a Serbian apprentice near one of Belgrade's water fountains, which was followed by Ottoman bombing of the town and four-year of diplomatic negotiations, in 1867, *Knez* Mihailo Obrenović (Miloš's son) was handed the keys of Belgrade. Along with Belgrade, he was then handed the keys of the remaining five cities in the Province that still had the Ottoman pashas, and the Turkish population of all six cities was expelled. This marks the beginning of Serbia's *de facto* independence.<sup>84</sup> The Principality whose borders were just slightly bigger than the Sancak, gained *de facto*

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<sup>83</sup> However, Miloš is referred to as *vožd*. It is the title used to denote both a popular and religious leader. It was only Đorđe Petrović - Karađorđe (1762-1817), and Miloš Obrenović (1780-1860) who were referred to as such. After 1860, rulers used the title *Knez*, which acquired more of the popular, and national character, indicating the shifts in ideology.

<sup>84</sup> Đorđević, Života, *Čukur-česma 1862: Studija o odlasku Turaka iz Srbije*, Belgrade: Nolit, 1983.



independence in 1878, and the following year the Serbian Church became autocephalous.<sup>85</sup> This is an important moment, because intellectuals who strove for strong national ideas helped the church to establish autocephaly, which allowed the peasantry, still loyal to the church rather than the state, to embrace a new national identity. Blending national into religious identity created blurred ties between nation and religion.

In order to delineate their new borders, the newly emerging nation-states across the Balkans undertook a host of military, economic, social, and cultural measures. Studies in the so-called “Macedonian question” have shown best how newly emerging nation-states struggled for the identity allegiances of the peasantry, which still perceived themselves as subjects of the Ottoman Empire, harboring only religious and local identities.<sup>86</sup> It was predominantly through education, language, and the Church that those allegiances were eventually established.

Romantic nationalism, which challenged the dominance of the Greek language as the language of education of the Christian elite in the Empire played an important role in rising Serbian nationalism. The radicalized views of the Serbian language reformer and collector of folk poetry, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, as well as intellectuals who worked closely with him and promulgated the same ideas, only fostered political ideas grounded in the Načertanije document, “which called for the liberation of all Orthodox Slavs still under Ottoman rule, as well as those in Habsburg lands.”<sup>87</sup> This is why both ethno-linguistic nationalism, i.e. pan-Serbism the emerging nationalism that intimately connected the Serbian church and state, and pan-Slavism, emerging among Croat, Slovene, and Serb intellectuals in the Habsburg monarchy, were all embraced and juggled with by the state elite.

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<sup>85</sup> Serbian church gained its autonomy from the Constantinople Patriarchate the regular way, contrary to the way it happened with the Greek and Bulgarian churches. See Kitromilides, Paschalis, “The Orthodox Church in Modern State Formation in South-East Europe,” in *Ottomans into Europeans: State and Institution-Building in South –East Europe*, Mungiu-Pappidi, and Van Meurs, Wim, eds., London: Hurst, 2010, 31-50.

<sup>86</sup> See for example Yosmaoğlu, İpek K., “Counting Bodies, Shaping Souls: The 1903 Census and National Identity in Ottoman Macedonia,” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 38/ 1, 2006, 55-77.

<sup>87</sup> Načertanije (The Draft) is a document written by Ilija Garašanin, the Serbian minister of foreign affairs who laid a detailed plan of unification of what he assumed to be, historically and rightfully, Serbian territories. Anscombe, Frederick F., *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands*, 165.

With the violent switch of dynasties at the turn of the twentieth century, the Karađorđevićs pursued at fulfilling Načertanije ideas. After the arrival of Ottomans, there was among the peasantry a preserved legend that the Christian Empire would come one day.<sup>88</sup> The newly established educational curricula that revived the history of the medieval Serbian kingdom and medieval Serbian Empire that had existed in the territories of Prizren and Üsküp *sancaks* of the Ottoman Empire, aimed at blending those sentiments and legends with the newly emerged Serbian kingdom. By promulgating the idea of “parts of the nation still enslaved by Ottomans,” the Serbian kingdom mobilized its population for waging the two Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913, after which two *sancaks* were incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbia. The final annexation of the territories nationalists claimed for Serbia, i.e. Bosnia, Vojvodina, and parts of Croatia, was accomplished after WWI, with the formation of a broader territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the introduction of dictatorship by King Aleksandar Karađorđević in 1929.

The blending of Serbian nationalistic ideas with pan-Slavism caused instability within the Kingdom, where different communities felt deprived of their political rights. Even though Socialist Yugoslavia, formed after WWII, claimed to have erased nationalistic strivings and insurgencies, uniting those lands under the ideology of “brotherhood and unity,” and ostensibly catering to all prior grievances, it was immersed in the nationalistic discourse that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia in the violent wars of the 1990s.

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<sup>88</sup> Mazower, Mark, *The Balkans: A short history*, Random House Publishing Group, 2007.

## CHAPTER 4 HISTORY TEXTBOOKS ANALYSIS

Textbooks represent a selection of materials of and about history that the state elite find relevant for the socialization of their citizens. As such, it represents a formalized way of transmission of collective memory par excellence. In the Republic of Serbia, primary school education is obligatory and is defined by the state as “an activity of immediate social interest which is effectuated as a public service.”<sup>89</sup> According to the Law on Primary School Education of the Republic of Serbia, one of the aims of primary education is:

The forming of attitudes, convictions and systems of values, development of personal and *national identity, raising awareness and feelings of belonging to the state of Serbia*, respecting and cultivating the *Serbian language* and one's mother tongue, the tradition and culture of the *Serbian people*, national minorities and ethnic communities, and other nations, developing multiculturalism, respecting and preserving *the national* and world cultural heritage.<sup>90</sup>

Whereas the related expected outcome of education is: “Having a developed feeling of *belonging to one's family, nation, and culture*, knowing one's tradition and contributing to its preservation and development.”<sup>91</sup> As Serbia is still a state defined by the ethno-national principle, this means that the national minorities are defined within ethnic borders as well.<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, the national minorities are allowed to organize education in their respective mother tongues. While this indicates, according to the aforementioned articles, that diverse ethno-national groups, through primary education, can develop different allegiances towards different national identities, it

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<sup>89</sup> *Law on Primary School Education* of Republic of Serbia, Article 2, my translation.

<sup>90</sup> *Law on Primary School Education*, Article 21, Paragraph 14, my emphasis added. The Republic of Serbia recognizes language and script of national minorities, and allows for primary and secondary education in the language of national minorities. In areas in which a national minority constitutes more than 15% of the population, the language and script of national minorities, next to the Serbian language and script, is allowed in public use (administration, street signs, etc.), see *Law on Public Use of Language and Script of the Republic of Serbia*. Most numerous national minorities in the Republic of Serbia are: Albanian, Bosniak, and Hungarian, but also: Bulgarian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Rusyn, Rumanian, and Slovak.

<sup>91</sup> *Law on Primary School Education*, Article 22, Paragraph 12, my emphasis added.

<sup>92</sup> According to the *Constitution of the Republic of Serbia*, Article 1: “Republic of Serbia is a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it.”

also indicates that textbooks written in the Serbian language aim at developing the Serbian national identity, preserving the Serbian tradition, and contributing to preservation and development of Serbian culture. This is why I believe that the textbooks written in the Serbian language, which have been approved by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and are used in obligatory schooling in Serbia, reflect best what is defined as the “Serbian collective memory.”

The Serbian primary school system lasts for eight years and is divided into two cycles, from first to fourth grade, and from fifth to eighth grade. It is only in the second cycle of primary school education that a more structured, disciplinary knowledge is provided to the students. This is why the main part of the analysis is concentrated on the textbooks used for history teaching in the second cycle of schooling. While historical memory reflects the basis of the collective memory of Ottoman rule, the teaching of history is not the only means through which this memory has been shaped. Therefore, the analysis will be complemented with examples from Serbian literature and language, and it will incorporate the analysis of the visual aids used in the books as well.

Books from several publishers have Government approval for the teach history in each year of the second cycle of primary school. While analyzing each publisher separately, it became clear that despite some stylistic differences in the choice of verbs, when it comes to content, all the narratives were emplotted in the same way. Also, the relationship of text and visual material was constructed in the same way. Therefore, I decided to use books from all of the publishing houses for this analysis. All the translations of the extensive quotations in textbooks are mine, and I take full responsibility them. At times a quotation from a particular publisher was selected for reasons explained before the citations. However, where not indicated, the publisher was selected as the clearest example of the same narrative emplotment, but also, where possible all of the narratives from different publishers are compared respectively.

#### **4.1. “Time Map” of Serbian History Textbooks**

Eviatar Zerubavel, analyzing primarily the phenomenology of history, and the way time is used and framed in historical narrative, aimed at contributing to the

sociology of memory.<sup>93</sup> For him, collective memory is made up of “social maplike structures in which history is typically organized in our minds.”<sup>94</sup> In a structuralist way, Zerubavel approaches the “topography of memory,” to reveal the modes in which the timeframe of historical narrative is usually organized, as well as the implications of its possible social meaning. Inspired by his work, the first level of the analysis of the textbooks will include the time framework of its narratives.

The four years of history education is divided into four textbooks according to the broadest historical periodization. According to the program of the Serbian Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development, the history teaching curriculum is framed as follows: the syllabus for the fifth grade encompasses prehistory and antiquity, and ends with the “Fall of the Western Roman Empire,” the syllabus for the sixth grade encompasses the “Middle Ages,” ending with the “Fall of Constantinople,” the syllabus for the seventh grade encompasses the “New Age,” ending with the “Berlin Congress,” and the eighth grade syllabus encompasses “The most important events of the late nineteenth and twentieth century,” ending with NATO operations in Yugoslavia in 1999.<sup>95</sup> This classification represents the general periodization of world history. However, as will be demonstrated below, the intertwining of the national time narrative into the general time narrative plot, infuses nationally constructed meaning into the general history time-frame. This way, the “Middle Ages” or the “New Age” become triggers of national history, which in turn organizes and shapes national collective memory.

As Zerubavel points out, any periodization marks social “full stops,” and contributes to “*historical assimilation* ... assigning each of the conventional blocks of history a single common label.”<sup>96</sup> These historical assimilations can happen on a broader level of history, like this periodization used in the general division of history into four major periods, but history can also be subdivided under different labels such as “The Nineteenth Century History,” “Mediterranean History,” etc. By looking into the general periodization of history textbooks in Serbia, it can be seen that yet another

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<sup>93</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.

<sup>94</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 1.

<sup>95</sup> See Program for History Teaching for V, VI, VII, VII of Primary Schools, issued by Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, 25.

<sup>96</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 86, Zerubavel’s emphasis.

periodization, i.e. “Ottoman rule” extends through the syllabi of the sixth, seventh, and eighth grades of history education. While in the sixth grade it is only restricted to acquiring general information about the Empire, and the period of its advancement into the Balkans, the seventh grade history textbook engages broadly with the period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, and the eighth grade history syllabus engages with the elaboration of the end of Ottoman rule. This way, it is only in grade eight that students round up the narrative about Ottoman rule. For the sake of this analysis, I look at each of the three narratives in those three books separately, and then demonstrate the cohesive story they present in the end. As will be demonstrated, this division of history in textbooks is not only done for the sake of easier organization of primary education, but it also reflects on the way history is shaped in the Serbian collective memory.

History education is organized to provide a complete outlook of the national historical narrative. Even though the name of the course is not Serbian history, by taking a close look into the textbook contents, one can identify the national framework of time. The sixth grade history textbook, encompassing the Middle Ages is, therefore, subdivided into the “early” and “late” Middle Ages, and afterwards the categorization of time is made according to division of space. While the Early Middle Ages are subdivided into: a) the European Early Middle Ages, and b) the Serbs in the Early Middle Ages, the Late Middle Ages are subdivided into: a) Europe in the Late Middle Ages, b) the Serbian People/Country and their surroundings/the Balkans in the Late Middle Ages, and c) *The Conquests of Ottoman Turks in the Balkans* (Publisher: Klett); *The Serbian States and their Surroundings in the times of the Ottoman Conquests* (Publisher: Zavod za udžbenike); *The Arrival of the Ottomans into Europe and the Serbian Lands* (Publisher: Freska); or *The Serbs and their Surroundings at the time of Ottoman Conquests* (Publisher: Logos).<sup>97</sup>

While the time narrative in the book in general is organized synchronically, the time narrative of the Serbs/Serbian country is positioned diachronically in relation to that of Europe. While synchronicity of time aims at demonstrating movement forward, diachronicity aims at demonstrating the qualitative similarity of time, i.e. the

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<sup>97</sup> Bubalo, Đorđe, *Istorija 6: Udžbenik za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Belgrade: Klett, 2011; Mihaljčić, Rade, *Istorija za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2015; Vekić Kočić, Marija, Kočić, Dragoljub, and Lopandić, Duško, *Istorija za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Belgrade: Logos, 2014; Šuica, Marko, and Redić, Redivoj, *Istorija za šesti razred osnovne škole*, Beograd: Freska, 2010.

similarity of historical developments, events, etc. In this way, both European and Serbian time narratives are demonstrated as passing through the same stages. European history is framed starting from the migration of peoples, i.e. the intensified migrations of Germanic tribes into Europe between 300 and 500 AD, to the establishment of the feudal countries and of the church in the Early Middle Ages; to be followed by the establishment of monarchies, the development of cities, and the Crusades in the Late Middle Ages. Likewise, the Serbian narrative goes through the migration of Slavs into the Balkans, the establishment of “Serbian medieval countries,” the establishment of the Serbian Autocephalous Church in the early Middle Ages, and continues with the formation of the Serbian Kingdom and the short-lived Serbian Empire in the late Middle Ages, and the flourishing of religious and cultural life. As time is associated with the idea of progress, “which invariably play up the theme of *development*,” the break that the Serbian narrative has, in comparison to that of Europe, gives a more dramatic note to the timeframe, infusing the meaning into the time plot.<sup>98</sup>

While the time narrative of European history in the Middle Ages ends in progress, Serbian history time narrative enters a period of decline, and abruptly plummets with the arrival of the Ottomans. “Progress implies an idealized future... [while decline is] essentially regressive mnemonic tradition [which] emphasizes *deterioration*.”<sup>99</sup> Such a mental timeframe, in which the beginning of Ottoman rule is positioned as a period of deterioration, leaves room for nostalgia for a romanticized past, which was shaped with the nationalist narrative of the nineteenth century, and through the process of collective memory handed down until today. This way the memory of romanticized national past of Medieval history is tied to memory of the downfall, associated with the beginning of Ottoman rule. In other words, the same point of history is framed as the memory trigger of national “Golden Ages” as well as national “downfall,” i.e. arrival of Ottomans.

The seventh grade textbooks, i.e. the “New Age,” follow the same time narrative structure as those of sixth grade. European and Serbian time narratives are positioned diachronically, while each is still being presented in its synchronicity. The New Age is again divided into two major periods. The first part, from the sixteenth

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<sup>98</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 14.

<sup>99</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 16, Zerubavel’s emphasis.

until the eighteenth century, covers: the rise of Europe, and the Serbian people under foreign rule, while the second, the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, covers new European states/revolutions and their contribution to the shape of the modern world, and Serbian people under foreign rule/ the Serbs in the nineteenth century. The Serbian history topics are further subdivided into: a) Ottoman Rule, and b) Austro-Hungarian Rule/Habsburg Rule and Venice.

In the first part of the seventh-grade history syllabus, European time narrative continues to be framed through the notion of progress, but the Serbian time narrative during Ottoman rule is framed in what Zerubavel named “cycles and rhymes.” It is the notion of time in which one gets a general idea that time moves forward, but on the other side “history basically envisions things being trapped ... in some eternal present.” The rhyme framework of time allows one to mentally lump similar historical figures, and similar historical events. Therefore, while having an overwhelming notion of being trapped in time cycles, this framework of time allows for the imagining of a bit more than just a notion of stagnation, as Mark Twain said: “History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes.”<sup>100</sup>

In the narrative about the first half of “New Age,” European historical narrative summarizes technological, cultural, and economic development, but the Serbian time narrative is framed through the themes of taxation systems in the Ottoman Empire, the position of the Serbian Patriarchate, and migrations into the Habsburg Monarchy. The taxation and rebellions against taxation (in the form of banditry) are recurring themes: the abolition, reestablishment, and yet another abolition of the Serbian Patriarchate take place, and finally two migrations into the Habsburg monarchy as well. Even though each of these topics had their own unrelated course, which will be discussed in the analysis of the verbal structure later, the cycles and rhymes allowed for lumping them together, and therefore shaping the period of Ottoman rule within one time frame.

In the narrative about the second half of the “New Age,” European history still remains in the progress time narrative, but this time the Serbian time narrative in relation to Ottoman rule rejoins the same time framework of progress, which ends in the abolition of Ottoman rule, and the formation of the Serbian state. Even though,

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<sup>100</sup> Cited by Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 25.



according to the textbook narrative, the economic and cultural progress of Europe was prevented by the existence of absolutist monarchies, the time narrative of progress was not stopped at any point. Once the progress had been blocked by the absolutist regimes, it re-emerged in the national revolutions narrative in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which continues the timeline of progress. However, the Serbian narrative, which had reached the bottom of the negative tendency line with the arrival of Ottomans, and which had remained on the bottom within the cycles and rhymes, rejoins the European “national revolution progress” which results in the abolition of Ottoman rule.

Furthermore, each of the textbooks used for the seventh grade dedicated on average two pages to an overview of the Ottoman past, introducing yet another time narrative division – “The Ottoman Empire,” or “The Turkish State and their Conquests.”<sup>101</sup> The Ottoman past has therefore a time framework of its own, which is not diachronically opposed to any of the given narratives in the textbook. If the diachronic position of the Serbian and European time narrative serves the purpose of demonstrating the similarity of quality of time, the lack of any such comparison with the Ottoman past infuses the meaning of the opposite quality of time. Furthermore, the time narrative framework of Ottoman past is reduced to progress and decline. However, the time map and therefore the memory of the period framed as “Ottoman past” and that of “Ottoman rule” is clearly not the same. The labeling of the same period as “The Ottoman Empire,” on one side, and “The Serbs in Turkey: *reaya* warriors and migrants” on the other, is used as a “social scalpel,” to make a distinction between the two.<sup>102</sup> However, they act directly in relation to each other, as cause and consequence. In other words, the Ottoman past is seen as the cause of the decline and downfall of Serbian time narrative, and this period of Serbian time narrative is labeled as the period of the Ottoman rule.

Looking at it from a different perspective, the periodization of time as the Serbian past, the European past, and the Ottoman past creates a temporal split between the three. However, the Serbian and Ottoman pasts overlap in the time framework of

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<sup>101</sup> Bačanović, Branka, and Jevrić, Jelena, *Istorija za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Belgrade: Klett, 2013; Ljušić, Radoš, *Istorija za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2003; Dujković, Goran, *Mozaik prošlosti*, Belgrade: Bigz, 2013.

<sup>102</sup> Ljušić, Radoš, *Istorija za sedmi razred*, 96.

Ottoman rule, and the Serbian and European pasts overlap in Habsburg rule, while the Ottoman and European pasts have no overlapping points. Moreover, the Ottoman and European pasts are not put in any diachronic relation, thus separating the two even further. Contrary to the Ottoman rule time narrative, the narrative of Habsburg rule follows the same diachronic line as European history. The cultural and economic progress in Serbian historical time narrative is blocked by the absolutist rule of the monarchy. However, the progress time narrative is reassumed after the national revolutions, which is in line with the European historical time narrative.

All the aforementioned splits and time narratives allow for the positing of a fault line in concluding that Ottoman rule is the cause of the lack of progress in the Serbian time narrative. As soon as Ottoman rule was abolished, or the Ottoman time narrative declined, the Serbian timeframe moved forward. This is further fostered through the comparative position of the Serbian time narrative within “Habsburg” rule, in which the Habsburgs, still falling in the same progress line, are presented rather as an obstacle to national strivings, than as an alien time that acts as a disrupter of the Serbian time narrative. Most probably such a threefold construction of time influenced Ellie Scopetea to conclude that Ottoman rule positioned the Balkans between the East and the West. Moreover, the time narrative in history textbooks is saturated with verbal guidance for such infusions of meaning, and, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.

The history of the eighth grade, i.e. “Contemporary History” draws a diachronic split between Serbian and European history. The beginning of the eighth-grade textbooks still sustains the progress line of the time narrative of Serbian history, and the decline line of the Ottoman history. The progress line reached its peak with the abolition of Ottoman rule after the Balkan Wars. Once the Serbian time narrative vis-à-vis Ottoman rule is seen in totality, through the sixth, seventh, and eighth grades, it is visible that it actually takes the course of a “zigzag time narrative.”<sup>103</sup> According to Zerubavel, it appears in two basic forms: “*rise-and-fall narrative* ... following some unfortunate event... a story of success turns into decline,” and the fall-and-rise or “*recovery narrative*,” which hits the bottom before rising again.<sup>104</sup> They involve

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<sup>103</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 18.

<sup>104</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 18-19.

turning points which are “mental road signs marking such perceived transitions.”<sup>105</sup> Those mental signs of the recovery narrative of the Serbian timeframe vis-à-vis the Ottoman Past are “the Kosovo Battle” and “the Serbian Revolution,” which frame the Ottoman rule timeframe. In such positioning of mental marks, Ottoman rule is infused with the meaning of “hitting the bottom,” or rather “remaining at the bottom,” which will further be explained throughout this analysis.

Also, the “recovery narrative” of revolution triggers the memory of Ottoman rule as well. The same way that the “downfall” inferred the memory of “Golden Age,” the “rising anew” infers the previous downfall. Therefore, the period of Ottoman rule, i.e. the “Five hundred years of the Turkish yok,” is framed by the nationalist mnemonic triggers. The memory, or the map-like structure of Ottoman rule, framed by the Kosovo Battle and the “Serbian Revolution,” is at the same time the map-like structure of the Serbian national history. In other words triggers of collective memory of the Ottoman rule cannot be disconnected from the collective memory of the “glorious national past.”

#### **4.2. Emplotment of the Verbal Structure of the Historical Narrative**

In order to further analyze the Serbian collective memory, as a historical memory mediated through the narratives of Serbian history textbooks, I will lean on the formalist approach to the structural components of historical narratives as formulated by Hayden White.<sup>106</sup> Hayden White is most famous for his complete rejection of the possibility of reaching any truth in history writing. According to him, even primary sources a historian uses to reconstruct the past are just representations of that past.<sup>107</sup> In other words, and in line with the theoretical framework of this thesis, they are already formalized memory of the event.

In building historical narratives, Hayden White distinguishes: chronicles, story, mode of emplotment, mode of argument, and model of ideological

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<sup>105</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 19.

<sup>106</sup> Even though Eviatar Zerubavel was inspired by Hayden White’s framework, for the analysis, I found it more useful to enter first into the framework of time and then into the analysis of the verbal structure.

<sup>107</sup> See White, Hayden, *Topics of Discourse Essays in Cultural Criticism*, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, 81-100.

implication.<sup>108</sup> Chronicles are raw materials historians use to build a story, but it is the emplotment that is particularly interesting for this analysis. “Emplotment is a way by which sequences of events fashioned into a story are gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind.”<sup>109</sup> In other words, emplotment strings events from the past into a coherent story, which can easily be understood in a particular way. Even though he bases his analysis on nineteenth-century history writing, it is fully applicable to the way in which most of the history textbooks in the world are still written, i.e. using a narrative mode, mostly based on political history, dealing with “big events” and “big people,” and wrapped up in such a way as to claim the truth about the past.

The same data can be arranged and rearranged in different ways, infusing different meanings to the story. Therefore, the overall meaning depends on the emplotment, i.e. on the mode of developing the story, the chosen points of departure and of ending of the story, and the selection of the events to be bound together into a coherent story. White further distinguishes four general modes of emplotment: Romance, Tragedy, Satire, and Drama.<sup>110</sup> “Romance is a drama of self-identification symbolized by the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it, and his overall liberation from it.”<sup>111</sup> While this is certainly the way in which the Serbian past vis-à-vis Ottoman rule is positioned, I will try to identify the mode of emplotment of each story in three history books separately, in order to understand how particular time triggers are in turn shaping collective memory. In other words, I will try to demonstrate how each separated time narrative, i.e. Middle Ages, Modern Age, and Contemporary History, analyzed in the previous section, is emplotted into a coherent verbal story. As emplotment relies on the beginning and the end of the story, each of the periods of Ottoman rule covered by the three different books is emplotted in a different way. However, I argue this separation of the narrative in three interconnected, but self-sufficient stories reflects the way in which the period of the Ottoman rule has (been) shaped (by) Serbian collective memory. These three coherent narratives are the ways through which members of the community are introduced to the collective memory, and through which it is handed over to the next generations.

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<sup>108</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in the Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, 5.

<sup>109</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 8.

<sup>110</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 8-11.

<sup>111</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 8.

“Satire is ... the drama of diremption, a drama dominated by the apprehension that man is ultimately a captive of the world rather than its master, and by recognition that, in final analysis, human consciousness and will are quite inadequate to overcoming definitely the dark force of death, which is man’s unremitting enemy.”<sup>112</sup> On the other side, comedy and tragedy demonstrate the possibility of a provisional liberation from complete darkness, but the possibilities are differently structured in the two. “Comedy’s hope is held out of temporary triumph of man over his world by the prospect of occasional reconciliation of the forces at play in the social and natural world.”<sup>113</sup> These “temporary triumphs” usually terminate dramatic occasions of events. In tragedy there are “false” and “illusionary” occasions of festivity, instead man’s world is full of hardship. However, “tragic play is not regarded as totally threatening to those who survive the agonic test.”<sup>114</sup>

The history textbook for the sixth grade enters the narrative about the Ottoman arrival in the Balkans immediately after the chapter depicting the Serbian Empire, its cultural, political, and economic development. Therefore, the new chapter of history begins by treating in parallel the end of the Empire and the arrival of the Ottomans in the Balkans. It begins with a brief introduction to the Ottoman past, depicting the Ottomans exclusively in terms of their military might, and then delves into the topic more deeply. Chapters are subdivided as follows: a) Description of the “Serbian State,” or the “State where Serbs live,” b) The Ottoman conquest of particular territory. By introducing each country —Mrnjavčević’s Serbia, Moravian Serbia, despot Stefan’s and despot Đurađ Branković’s Serbia, Bosnia, and Zeta — the verbal narrative first depicts them as successors of the Serbian Empire, and then goes on to describe the respective country’s conquest by the Ottoman Empire.<sup>115</sup> While the narrative about country’s succession of the Serbian Empire begins with the introduction of the discord of Serbian aristocracy on who has the right to inherit the

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<sup>112</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 9.

<sup>113</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 9.

<sup>114</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 9.

<sup>115</sup> The Serbian Empire was proclaimed in 1345 by King Dušan, after conquering the majority of territories of the European part of the Byzantine Empire. After this event, Emperor Dušan raised the Serbian Episcopate to the level of Patriarchate, which crowned him as the Emperor of Serbs and Greeks. His son, Emperor Uroš, did not have an heir, so the Serbian Empire is considered to have ended after his death in 1371. For more, see Fine Jr., John V. A., *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

Emperor's crown, as soon as the narrative enters the representation of the arrival of Ottomans, this story is pushed to the back. Also, the narrative of conquest by the Ottomans is sometimes accompanied by the narrative of the Byzantine Empire, or of Europe/Hungary that turned their back on Serbs/Serbia endangered by the Ottomans. For example, in the book published by Logos, under the title "The Defeat of Serbs on Maritsa River and the Loss of Macedonia," which also marks the first conquest depicted in the book for the sixth grade, the narrative goes as follows:

From the Valley of Maritsa River, the Ottomans attacked and looted the region of Ser. Their incursions forced the ruler of the Ser region, Despot Uglješa Mrnjavčević to reestablish relations with the Byzantine Empire... The Emperor John V Palaeologus did not accept the plan Despot Uglješa proposed to jointly attack the Turks. The despot was joined only by his brother Vukašin ... After their arrival at the Valley of the River Maritsa [with a large army] they set up camp to sleep... In the middle of the night, a Turkish battalion attacked them, and mainly because they were panic-stricken, the majority of Serbian soldiers got killed. In the battle on Maritsa River both of the Mrnjavčević brothers were killed. The Turks named that place Srb singidi [In Turkish *Sırp Sındığı*], which in their language means Serbian death. After the unexpected victory, the Turks hurried up to spread their military garrisons over Macedonia ...<sup>116</sup>

Additional text is provided to explain how this event was Ottoman trickery, as, according to their customs, they did not fight at night, so the attack came as a surprise. However, no further explanation was given to answer why John V Palaeologus rejected to proposal to jointly fight the Ottomans, and why the Ottomans gave up one part of the conquered land to the Byzantines to rule afterwards. The Ottomans are depicted as ultimate evil, Serbs as the victims of both Ottomans and Byzantines, and their defeat as the result of a tragic set of fatal circumstances.

This tragic depiction of events followed each of the "successor states of the Serbian Empire," no matter how strong and developed it was. The "states" could not defend themselves from "Ottoman invasions." The textbooks for the sixth grade published by Freska, Klett, and Logos end the story with the dramatic narrative of the migration of Serbian people into Hungary.<sup>117</sup> "After the Ottomans dealt *deadly blows*

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<sup>116</sup> Vekić Kočić, Marija, Kočić, Dragoljub, and Lopandić, Duško, *Istorija za šesti razred*, 169-170.

<sup>117</sup> The modern Serbian language uses the Latin form of the word migration, i.e. *migracije* in order to depict migrations, while the word used until the 19<sup>th</sup> century was of Slavic origin, i.e. *seobe*. The word

[to the Serbian state] ... people ran away before military looting and the leaders of the new religion,” according to the Klett publishing house textbook. “With each entry into Ottoman territories, Hungarians took with them, whether or not by force, a huge number of [Serbian] souls.”<sup>118</sup> Only the Zavod za Udžbenike textbook ends with the explanation of the Kosovo legend mirrored in the Serbian epic “The Death of the Mother of the Jugovitch,” stating that the song only used legendary characters to depict “*the real tragic end* of many young warriors whose life was cut short in the Kosovo battle.”<sup>119</sup>

Therefore, the Serbian history narrative is emplotted as a tragedy, at the point where the Ottoman rule is introduced for the first time. It is presented as a set of repetitions of tragic events, i.e. the arrival of the external evil, the fight between the leaders of “Serbian states” who all claimed the right to succeed Serbian Empire, the turn of the Back of Constantinople, as well as other European Christian countries, which all led to the tragic end of Serbian people and Serbian countries. However, each time, the narrative begins with a hope of triumph over those dramatic occasions, but despite the struggle, and at the time illusion of being able to escape the tragic destiny through numerous events and chances, the story led to a tragic end. The death of the “state” (and people) could not have been avoided in the devastating destiny of both “Serbian state” and Serbian people, drawn by evil forces. This way, the Ottomans are depicted as the cardinal evil, the cause of the tragic destiny, while the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire are depicted only as auxiliary evils and only at times. Therefore, in the Serbian collective memory, the arrival of the Ottomans functions as a trigger of images of tragic end and inevitable death, which in turn shapes the image of the Ottoman Empire in a particular way, which will further be discussed in this section.

The seventh grade syllabus begins with an overview of the Ottoman Empire, and it further continues into the narrative of the conquests of Smederevo, Belgrade, and the campaign of Vienna. Then the narrative turns into a more positive tone when

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*seobe* changed its form into *selidba*, which is only used for moving house in modern Serbian language. The word *seobe* is only used to depict the two migrations of the second half of the century, in connection to which there is a social and ideological meaning, i.e. “moving from the promised land”. However, it is used by the aforementioned books instead of the word *migracije*, transferring the social and political meaning of migrations.

<sup>118</sup> Bubalo, Đorđe, *Istorija 6*, 183.

<sup>119</sup> Mihaljčić, Rade, *Istorija za šesti razred*, 130.

the themes of “Renewal of the Serbian Patriarchate” and “The Serbian People’s Resistance to Turkish Rule” are introduced, followed by the “The First Great Serbian Migration” and the “Second Great Serbian Migration.”

After the conquest of the Serbian despot state, the Turks did not officially abolish the Serbian Patriarchate. But, squeezed by the Turks, the Patriarchate was impoverished and ceased to exist... The Serbian Patriarchate was renewed in 1557 under the name of Patriarchate of Peć. The help the Serbs provided to Turks in the conquest of Banat, and the interest of the Turks to organize the tax collection through the Church, made the sultan renew the Patriarchate ... The Patriarchate of Peć supported rebellions ... After the Great War of Vienna and Great Serbian Migrations, the Patriarchate was weakened. Turks did not believe in Serbs anymore, so instead of the patriarchs of Peć, they brought Greeks, who were not favored by Serbs.<sup>120</sup>

The story about the Serbian Patriarchate is a miniature of the narrative construction of the Serbs’ destiny under Ottoman Rule. It was not abolished, but, according to the narrative, the treatment it was given directly caused its end. Furthermore, the renewal comes as a small respite. Even though it is depicted as a positive event, at the same time it is explained that it was not caused by the change in Ottoman attitude, but rather as a small gratification resulting from Ottoman interest to collect taxes. As will be further explained below, this story is enriched with the romantic depiction of Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha Sokollu (in Serbian Mehmet Pasha Sokolović), who, according to Serbian collective memory, did a favor of reestablishing the Patriarchate to his fellow countrymen as a Serb, and not as an Ottoman administrator. Therefore, whatever the narrative is, Ottoman rule, with this small release, still remains shaped negatively in Serbian collective memory.

The most widespread form of resistance in the territory of the Ottoman Empire was the haydut/hajduk movement. The main cause for the emergence of such a form of resistance was the desire to avenge Turkish violence over the submitted Serbian population ... At the same time, with this form of resistance, the people’s desire for liberation was demonstrated.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Dujković, Goran, *Mozaik prošlosti*, 36-37

<sup>121</sup> Bačanović, Branka, and Jevrić, Jelena, *Istorija za sedmi razred*, 51.



*Hajduk* is the Serbian name for the outlaws of the Ottoman Empire. While it is derived from the Ottoman Turkish name *haydut*, which means bandit, in Serbian, the word *hajduk* has a positive connotation, and it conveys the meaning “a brave, valiant one.” The meaning in Serbian language has the notion of righteousness, which is again an example of how the language preserves collective memory. Even though the story of *haydutlar/haiduci* (pl.) was presented as a resistance to evil, the overall goal of the story was portrayed as the “liberation of the people.” The anachronism used in the interpretation of event in the seventeenth and eighteenth century as “liberation of the people” is certainly only one among many anachronisms shaped by collective memory throughout the nineteenth century and handed down until today. It was with the rise of nationalism that the events of the nineteenth century and those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were lumped together, giving an overall ideological coherence to the story. Nevertheless, after the depiction of the events that constructed a small relief in Serbian collective memory, the narrative embarks on the topic “Serbian Revolution,” in order to end with “The Abolition of Ottoman Rule.”

The Serbian Revolution had the character of a liberation struggle and social revolution. Its liberation character was mirrored in the desire of people to liberate themselves from Turkish rule. Even though it did not bring complete liberation, it was important that Serbs won autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.<sup>122</sup>

Further on, the narrative ends with the Congress of Berlin and Serbia’s de jure independence. The seventh-grade textbook is overall a Romantic emplotment, but at times, it takes the course of comedy and tragedy. “Comedy and Tragedy represent qualifications of the Romantic apprehension of the world,” White notes.<sup>123</sup> “It is possible for a Romantic writer to assimilate the truths of human experience revealed in Comedy and Tragedy within the structure of the drama of redemption.”<sup>124</sup> Therefore, the beginning of the story in the seventh-grade history textbook, depicting conquests, the abolition of existing institutions, etc. is emplotted as tragedy. However, it takes the course of comedy with temporary triumphs over the overall tragic course of events, with the renewal of the Patriarchate, or veneration of banditry. No matter

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<sup>122</sup> Bačanović, Branka, and Jevrić, Jelena, *Istorija za sedmi razred*, 89.

<sup>123</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 10.

<sup>124</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 10.

experience in which people were subjugated to Ottoman rule, it is through self-identification that “Serbian people” transcended the world experience. The narrative ends in “victory of good over evil” in the final part of the account. In other words, Ottoman rule remains framed within the notion of “evil,” but it is an evil that could be overcome.

The eighth-grade history textbook narrative begins with an overview of the difficult position of the Serbian people still living within the borders of the Turkish Empire, and the Serbian state launching unsuccessful attempts to help them. It is at this point that the term “Old Serbia” is introduced, to refer to the territory of present-day southern Serbia and the Sancak/Sandžak region, the territory of Kosovo, and Macedonia, which were still within the Ottoman Empire. Such time labeling aimed at binding the mental image of the territories of Medieval Serbian states and the newly emerging nation-state, i.e. New Serbia, through the narrative of continuity. This term has remained in the historical narrative, still shaping the collective memory of these events. “The conditions of life of the inhabitants of Old Serbia were the hardest in comparison to their compatriots in the other parts of the Balkans,” the textbook writes concerning the conditions of Serbs who still remained within the borders of the Empire, in order to explain the role of the Serbian state in the Balkan Wars. With the end of the Balkan Wars narrative, Serbian history vis-à-vis Ottoman rule achieves “overall victory of good over evil.” Such an emplotment represents the pure narrative of Romance. Even though in these history textbooks, the context of the complex political situation between the Ottoman empire and the European powers, known as the Eastern Question, is explained to some extent, it is presented as an aspect, rather than the context, of the political relations between Serbia and the Ottoman empire.

While the whole narrative of Serbian national history is emplotted as a Romance in which the ultimate evil is the Ottoman Empire, it is important to demonstrate how the narrative was slowly developed. I would like to put special emphasis on the way the topic of Ottoman rule is introduced into the history narrative in the Middle Ages, through Tragedy. This tragic narrative, as will be demonstrated in the following part, was shaped through the mode of myth. It illustrates a symbolic death, which allows for national resurrection in the nineteenth century. This is yet another narrative finally reshaped in the nineteenth century, which has been handed down to this day. However, this narrative demonstrates the continuity of narratives

framed through epic poetry, which reveals how collective memory as a process is continuously (re)shaped through time. Tragedy brings the ultimate dramatic tone to the introduction of Ottoman rule in Serbia, shaping the collective memory in a particular way.

### 4.3. The Kosovo Myth

According to White, “myth is an idea whose conceptual concept is difficult to specify,” but it is connected to the community’s memory, and its construction.<sup>125</sup> “The notion of ‘construction’ as applied to ‘society’ contains ambiguity and equivocation.”<sup>126</sup> Construction presupposes destruction of something else, and refashioning its fragments anew, but not into something new. Therefore, the construction of myth entails the organization of a community’s “traditional lore,” i.e. stories, folk tales, customs, etc., and “information about, and accounts of, a community’s past.”<sup>127</sup> The fragments of both “traditional” and “factual” lore can be reemplotted many times until the grounding of a meaningful story that which is a cohesive factor within society.

The Kosovo Myth is the foundational myth of Serbian nationalism that was grounded on accounts of a battle that occurred between a few allied Balkan principalities and the Ottoman Empire in 1389. However, even though there are sources written in Greek, Latin, Ottoman Turkish, and Slavic languages about the battle, information about and accounts of the event are few.<sup>128</sup> What they most often summarize is the clash that occurred between the two sides, the Balkan principalities led by *Knez Lazar*, and Ottoman side led by Sultan Murad I. Sultan Murad was killed in the field by Miloš (K)Obilić (Albanian *Kopiliqi*).<sup>129</sup> Sultan Murad’s son Bayezid

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<sup>125</sup> White, Hayden, “Myth and Memory in the Construction of the Community,” in Stråth, Bo, ed., *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community*, 49-74.

<sup>126</sup> White, Hayden, “Myth and Memory,” 49.

<sup>127</sup> White, Hayden, “Myth and Memory,” 53.

<sup>128</sup> For sources see: Trifunović, Đorđe, *Srpski srednjovekovni spisi o knezu Lazaru i kosovskom boju*, Kruševac: Bagdan, 1968, Emmert, Thomas A., “The Battle of Kosovo: Early Reports of Victory and Defeat,” in *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, Vucinich S., Wayne, and Emmert, Thomas A., eds., *Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs*, Vol. I, 1991, 19-40, Di Lellilo, Anna, *The Battle of Kosovo 1389*.

<sup>129</sup> While Serbian narrative entered official narrative according to which Miloš (K)Obilić was Serbian by origin, less known Albanian narrative, which has as much ground in sources as the Serbian, has it that Milosh *Kopiliqi* was Albanian. For more, see Di Lellilo, Anna, *The Battle of Kosovo*.

succeeded him during the battle, ordering the execution of his brother Yakub. *Knez Lazar* was also decapitated in the field. The battle was followed by years of a vassalage relationship between the various Balkan principalities and the Empire, until the fall/conquest of Constantinople, after which Ottoman power in the Balkans was consolidated and centralized.

Over time, the narrative about these events gradually evolved into myth, followed by many years of (de)construction and assembling the story's components through various Church and peoples' accounts about the event.<sup>130</sup> The accounts of the Kosovo battle evolved as a synecdoche of numerous events that occurred around the battle, and therefore, the Kosovo Myth, as a mode of discourse can be found in the accounts of the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. As myth-making is a continuous process, it can be concluded that only traces of the way in which the population re-structured the events that occurred in this period of history are preserved through epic poetry, most notably through the poems recited by the Albanian and Serbian communities.<sup>131</sup> "Myth ... explains or, rather, explicates the kind of situations which we moderns might characterize as calling for a 'reconstruction of society', by chattering, mapping, or identifying violation of the rule of propriety."<sup>132</sup> Therefore, both Albanian and Serbian epic poetry about the Kosovo Battle, today present the foundation of their respective national myths, explicating how the rule of propriety of localized space (what nationalists metonymically present as "Albanian" or "Serbian" territory) was violated, and its consequences. When this poetry is compared, it becomes clear that the emplotment of each of these epics was influenced by the religious cultures of the respective communities. In the Albanian epic, the lore of tradition used to emplot the epic is Islam, while the Serbian epic is under the influence of Biblical stories.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> The literature about the battle was abundant in Serbian church cronicles only thirty years after the event. See Trifunović, Đorđe, *Srpski srednjovekovni spisi*.

<sup>131</sup> It is important to stress that Kosovo Battle probably served as the synecdoche of the various accounts that span of events occurring over the century throughout which the medieval Christian countries were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>132</sup> White, Hayden, "Myth and Memory," 51.

<sup>133</sup> For example Albanian poetry, usually begins with a dream of Sultan's mother, which announces the tragic events that will occur for the Empire in the plane, using known interpretative symbols for dreams in Islamic tradition. On the other hand, Serbian poetry, as will be discussed in this subchapter is abundant of themes from the Bible.

When it comes to the Serbian Kosovo myth, while it may only appear that the events are emplotted as a tragedy, a closer look at Serbian epic poetry reveals that myth is conceived as a purely romantic narrative in which Serbs, or Christianity, transcends the worldly experience and comes out as an overall winner. According to epic poetry, *Knez Lazar*, referred to in poetry as “tsar,” chose the heavenly kingdom over the worldly before he was killed. Therefore, analogically to the resurrection of Christ, the death of the *Knez Lazar* was a tragedy that actually led to overall victory by opting for the *Heavenly Kingdom*.

"O, Dearest God, what shall I do, and how?  
Shall I choose the Earth? Shall I choose the Skies?  
And if I choose the kingdom,  
If I choose an earthly kingdom now,  
Earthly kingdoms are such passing things-  
A heavenly kingdom, raging in the dark, endures eternally."  
And Lazarus chose heaven, not the earth,  
And tailored there a church at Kosovo-  
O not of stone but out of silk and velvet-  
And he summoned there the Patriarch of Serbia,  
Summoned there the lordly twelve high bishops:  
And he gathered up his forces, had them  
Take with him the saving bread and wine.  
As soon as Lazarus has given out  
His orders, then across the level plain of Kosovo pour all the Turks.<sup>134</sup>

The Kosovo Myth is a very complex. It is the myth that conveys the meaning of sacrifice and resurrection, in epic poetry narrated as the sacrifice and resurrection of *Knez Lazar* and the Serbian people. Through the epic poem “The Beginning of Revolt against Dahija,” recited by a fiddle player named Filip Višnjić, in which the nineteenth-century Uprisings were described, this was symbolically transferred to the sacrifice of the Serbian medieval state, and its resurrection in the nineteenth century. The myth is also both an eschatological and foundational myth. It tells the story about the end of the Serbian Empire. It is also a foundational myth, because it has the capacity of narrating the origin of the Serbian community, the values and norms on which they are based, and therefore the rebirth of the nation that is based upon those values. It is also a myth of the clash between Christianity and Islam, in which Serbia

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<sup>134</sup> Serbian epic poem, *The Downfall of the Kingdom of Serbia*. What is your sources?

is depicted as ante-mural, i.e. a bulwark of Christian Europe. These are only some of the meanings that this complex myth incorporates.<sup>135</sup>

The Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule was largely shaped by Serbian epic poetry, which was recorded by the reformer of the Serbian language and alphabet, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić. Mediated through poetry, the Kosovo Myth became the mode of building history narratives about the events in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the Balkans. As Thomas Emmert demonstrates in his study, it was as early as the nineteenth century that historians started questioning the Kosovo Battle legend, but despite their efforts, the myth still influenced their writing.<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, the legends depicted in the poetry entered the history textbooks of the kingdom of Yugoslavia, as well as public discourse, by shaping and fusing with emerging nationalistic narratives. After the formation of Socialist Yugoslavia, the authorities being apparently aware of this fact, an explanation of the “Kosovo legend” was introduced into history textbooks to discern it from the depiction of the Battle “as it really happened.” However, the poetry remained in the domain of the literature syllabus. This approach to teaching about the Kosovo Battle has remained in place until today. The following explanation is the most extensive one found in contemporary textbooks:

The news of Serbian-Turkish clash from which the ruler of the powerful Ottoman Empire did not pull out alive, quickly spread to the remotest parts of the world. Nevertheless, there remain few testimonies about the event that shook the contemporary world. Many things have remained unrecorded and unclear. Because of incomplete knowledge of it, the Battle of Kosovo was soon transformed into a legend. Over time, the legend was enriched by new contents and new imaginative details, and continued growing. The Kosovo legend differs from an ordinary story. It is based on a conflict that really happened. Based on this legend, the historical awareness of the people was built. At its core is a true historical event. Also, Prince Lazar, Princess Milica, Vuk Branković, and Serbian warrior Miloš Obilić, are historical characters. They were complemented by imaginary, non-historical characters,

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<sup>135</sup> For more, see also: Bakić-Hayden Milica, “Kosovo: Reality of a Myth and Myth of Many Realities,” in *Serbien und Montenegro: Raum und Bevölkerung, Geschichte, Sprache und Literatur, Kultur, Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Recht*, Vienna: LIT, 2006, 136-142; Greenawolt, Alexander, “Kosov: Karadžić, Njegoš, and the transformation of Serb Memory,” in *Spaces of Identity* 3, 2005, 49-65.

<sup>136</sup> Emmert, Thomas A., *Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo 1389*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

such as the brothers Jugović, and the blood brothers of Miloš Obilić, Ivan Kosačić and Milan Toplica.<sup>137</sup>

Further on, the book tells about the legend and explains through which particular epic songs those invented characters were depicted. While this introduction of interpretation in the history textbooks can be regarded as necessary, it still does not eliminate Kosovo as a metaphor about Serbian medieval history, territory, and values, and the Kosovo Battle as a synecdoche of the beginning of Ottoman rule. However, the view that the myth will fade once the legendary aspects of the narrative have been disclosed is the modernist approach that views myths as non-truthful. As Halbwachs notes “No memory is possible outside of the frameworks used by the people living in the society.”<sup>138</sup> Therefore, the Kosovo Myth, as a mode of discourse that evolved out of narratives about the Kosovo Battle, is still the prevailing mode of shaping the historical memory of the beginnings of Ottoman rule, as shown in the self-contradictory passage above.

Furthermore, for collective memory, the truthfulness of the story is not a prerequisite. Therefore, poetry that is still intensively studied through Serbian language and literature courses are still an important part of Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule. Moreover, as will be demonstrated through visual practices, and especially through the chapter about the city and memorials, the poetry labeled “Historical epic poetry,” which is officially divided into the pre-Kosovo, Kosovo, and post-Kosovo Battle epics, is still present in the everyday life of Serbian society.

When it comes to the history narrative about the arrival of Ottomans, the very way in which the verbal narrative structure of the beginning of Ottoman rule is emplotted as Tragedy reflects on the eschatological narrative of the Kosovo Myth. Each narrative about the medieval state that was to be incorporated into the Ottoman Empire was first explained in its relationship to the Serbian Empire, in order to end abruptly in a clash with the Ottomans. The following example tells the story about the Bosnian medieval state:

The Bosnian Ban Tvrtko took advantage of the situation to expand his rule over the neighboring territories... Bosnia incorporated old Serbian territories of the Lim and the Drina valley. In this way, the monastery

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<sup>137</sup> Mihaljčić, Rade, *Istorija za šesti razred*, 129.

<sup>138</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *The collective Memory*, 38.

Miliševa was in his territory. Tvrtko believed that he had the right to inherit the title of king from the Nemanjić dynasty... Indeed his bloodline reached the Nemanjićs... This is how he came out a reformer of the Serbian Kingdom... He was most probably crowned in the Monastery of Mileševa... with the title of King of Bosnia and of the Serbs.<sup>139</sup>

The narrative establishes the territorial continuity with the Nemanjićs' medieval country, and the short-lived Empire, as well as blood-line continuity with the tsar. The continuity of the Serbian Church was also established. The Monastery of Mileševa was built by Nemanjićs, and was under the auspices of the Serbian Church. This narrative about the incorporation of medieval Bosnia into the Ottoman Empire is emplotted as follows:

Some Ottoman detachments were charging towards Lazar's and Tvrtko's territories ... The mighty Osman army targeted the territories of Lazar and Vuk Branković. In the early summer of 1389 they were countered, on behalf of the Serbs, by Lazar's army and that of Vuk Branković, which was also joined by a detachments sent by King Tvrtko. The battle was excruciating, leaving numerous victims on both sides. The death of the Sultan induced some contemporaries to declare the victory of Christianity. King Tvrtko issued such announcements... Judging by the consequences, this was a much harder blow for Moravian Serbia. Tvrtko's lands *were not directly affected*.<sup>140</sup>

The territory of Bosnia did not become part of the Ottoman Empire after the Kosovo battle, but was taken over by the Hungarian Kingdom in 1391, later to be conquered by the Ottoman Empire. However, the organization of the narrative is under the clear influence of the Kosovo Myth. First, the relationship between the Serbian Empire and Tvrtko's land is established. This is followed by a discussion of the relationship between Tvrtko's military and Lazar's military in the Kosovo battle, and it is concluded that Tvrtko's lands did not suffer losses directly. It is implied, however, that its incorporation into Hungarian territories, and the Ottoman conquest that followed, was an indirect consequence of the Kosovo battle. Furthermore, the narrative organization of the "Kosovo Myth" is also mirrored in the fact that the relationship between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Balkan territories is not

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<sup>139</sup> Bubalo, Đorđe, *Istorija 6: Udžbenik za šesti razred*, 166.

<sup>140</sup> Bubalo, Đorđe, *Istorija 6: Udžbenik za šesti razred*, 168, my emphasis added.



extensively elaborated, therefore the Hungarian Kingdom appears only as an ancillary villain, or the consequence of the Ottoman conquests.

The way in which the beginning of Ottoman rule is constructed through the eschatological myth, or as a tragedy, is possible due to the silence of the historical narrative. While it is mentioned that *Knez Lazar's* wife Milica gave her daughter's hand in marriage to Sultan Bayezid after the Kosovo battle, the political significance of that union is not explained. Therefore, the close political relationship that Stefan Lazarević had with the Ottoman Empire, including his support during the interregnum period, was fully silenced.<sup>141</sup> Moreover, the parts of history related to the state of Despot Đurađ Branković after the Kosovo battle, are silenced as well. Đurađ's relationship with the Empire was politically very close, as his daughter Mara was married to Sultan Murat II. Sultana Mara, as the co-mother of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, was certainly the most powerful Sultana in the early history of the Empire, who assumed an active political role, but none of this is recorded in the Serbian textbooks, nor in the public memory.<sup>142</sup> However, the literature that exists about the two sultanas of Serbian origin is also shaped through the discourse of sacrifice, which again reflect on Kosovo myth.<sup>143</sup> The marriage is emplotted as a sacrifice that the two Sultanas offered in order to "save their people."

Furthermore, the battle, which occurred between the Hungarians and the Ottoman Empire in 1448, is named "Second Kosovo Battle." Using ordinal numbers the continuity between the two history events are connected, and lumped together.<sup>144</sup> The Hungarian army was led by Janos Hunyadi, who is remembered in Serbian history and poetry as Sibirjanin Janko. After these battles, the Ottoman Empire was consolidated in the Balkans. Even though Despot Đurađ did not participate in those clashes, they are venerated in Serbian collective memory as the last defense of Serbian territories. This way, the eschatological moment of the Kosovo myth is transferred to the events than happened half a century later. However, the territory of Hungary, including Belgrade, was defended, and would only be conquered by the Ottomans

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<sup>141</sup> See Kastritsis, Dimitris, *Sons of Bayazid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-13*, Leiden: Brill, 2007.

<sup>142</sup> See Popović, Mihailo, *Mara Branković: Eine Frau zwischen dem christlichen und dem islamischen Kulturkreise im 15. Jahrhundert*, Ruhpolding: Verlag, 2010.

<sup>143</sup> See for example Giljen, Nikola, *Princess Olivera: a Forgotten Serbian Heroine*, Belgrade: Princess Olivera Foundation, 2009.

<sup>144</sup> See Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 52.

later. The memory, which puts those events in parallel to the Kosovo battle of 1389, are reflected in the Serbian proverbs: “Kasno Janko na Kosovo stiže,” [Janko arrived late at Kosovo], which is the equivalent of the English proverb “Too late the hero!”<sup>145</sup> Even this part of history is still constructed within the framework of the Kosovo Myth.

The visuals that are used in the textbooks are important for shaping the dominant narrative as well. The painting “The Kosovo Maiden” is used as a visual material next to the text about the Kosovo battle in the Klett publishing house textbook. It is one of the most famous paintings of the late nineteenth – early twentieth century, by the Serbian painter Uroš Predić. It was inspired by the epic song under the same name “The Kosovo Maiden” (see Figure 4.1.). This song is at the same time part of the curriculum of the sixth-grade Serbian language and literature class. The poem depicts the event right after the battle. A young woman enters the plain where the battle took place, and starts digging through the dead bodies. She finds one soldier alive, and gives him a mouthful of water and wine, asking him about her fiancé Milan Toplica, and his blood brothers Miloš Obilić and Ivan Kosančić. The soldier tells her that they all died bravely fighting, and moreover, that Miloš Obilić killed the Sultan. This song incorporates the message the military valor of the “nation” which the Kosovo Myth strongly conveys, but also illustrates the symbolic death of the Serbian people depicted in the dead soldiers, and the women who were left without their menfolk, reflecting the eschatological aspect of the Myth.

Furthermore, the Logos and Zavod za udžbenike publishing house history textbooks uses the image of the monument that is placed in Gazimestan, the place in the Kosovo plain where the battle allegedly occurred. The monument bears the text of the “Curse of *Knez Lazar*,” inscribed on it as well, which is also part of the curriculum of the Serbian language and literature course:

Whoever is a Serb and of Serb birth,  
And of Serb blood and heritage,  
And comes not to fight at Kosovo,  
May he never have progeny born from love,  
Neither son nor daughter!  
May nothing grow that his hand sows,

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<sup>145</sup> This Serbian proverb sometimes uses the name Marko, instead of Janko, referring to the legendary hero Marko Kraljević, whose image is part of the Kosovo Myth as well, and will be discussed later in this thesis.

Neither red wine nor white wheat!  
And may he be dying in filth as long as his children are alive!<sup>146</sup>

And finally, the Logos textbook uses a nineteenth century dramatic painting of the Kosovo Battle by the Serbian painter Adam Stefanović (see figure 4.2.). Even though *Knez* was decapitated during the clash, in line with the Kosovo legend, in the painting he is represented in the painting as dying on the horse. Also, as the legend narrates that God “poured Turks” after Lazar “chose” death, the two thirds of the painting are occupied by representation of Ottoman army. By juxtaposing the illustrations created in the romantic spirit of the nineteenth century and at the same time based on the legends of the epic poetry, it brings closer legend to the historical text. Finally, Serbian collective memory of arrival of Ottomans is not only shaped through history narrative, which is conveyed by Kosovo Myth, but also through legends, poetry, and paintings, through which the Myth emerged. Therefore, collective memory should be analyzed by taking into consideration all aspects of its formal representations, and not only history narratives.



Figure 4.1. Uroš Predić, *The Kosovo Maiden*, 1919, oil on canvas, National Museum of Serbia.

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<sup>146</sup> Serbian Epic Poem: Knez Lazar's Curse.



Figure 4.2. Adam Stefanović, *The Kosovo Battle*, 1870. oil on canvas, National Museum of Serbia, *Knez Lazar* represented dying on his horse on the left side of the painting.

#### 4.4. The Ottoman Past as a Formist Argument

In his discussion, Hayden White further explains that each historical narrative is emplotted with the argument to explain the “the point of it all.”<sup>147</sup> This explanation is a “formal, explicit, or discursive argument,” and it “is constructing a nomological-deductive argument.”<sup>148</sup> According to White, four modes of arguments can be developed: organicist, mechanistic, contextualist, and formist.<sup>149</sup>

The organicist argument pulls together dispersed events into a coherent story, demonstrating that there is a law that constructs the story as it is, from within. It operates as if there was something above the different parts of the story that is more integrative than the story itself. On the other side, the mechanistic argument is similar, but it is “reductive rather than synthetic.”<sup>150</sup> While in the organicist argument there

<sup>147</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 11-20

<sup>148</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 11.

<sup>149</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 16-29.

<sup>150</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 16.

are internal laws that bind the story, like the “cohesive force of nation,” the Mechanistic argument is constructed on outside laws that govern history, like the “rise and fall of the Empire.” However, both arguments show “the same tendency towards abstraction.”<sup>151</sup>

On the other side, a contextualist argument explains the events “within the ‘context’ of their occurrence.”<sup>152</sup> In that way, the isolated period of history becomes self-explanatory to the events, like the events happening in the context of French Revolution. On the contrary, a formist argument searches for the explanation inside the story. It uses the mechanism of identifying “unique characteristics of the objects inhabiting historical field ... [considering] an explanation to be complete when a given set of objects had been properly identified, its class, generic, and specific attributes assigned, and labels attesting to its particularity attached to it.”<sup>153</sup>

It has already been demonstrated that the arrival of Ottomans is emplotted through the Tragedy, in which the tragic destiny of the “Serbian state” and people was represented. This means that the main cause of tragic events represented as through the image of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the answer to the question of “what it all adds up to?” should be sought in the way the narrative about the Ottoman Empire was emplotted. If one looks closer into the story about the arrival of Ottomans in the Balkans is completed, it becomes visible the argument, i.e. the answer to the question “what it all adds up to” springs out in the form of a syllogism. In other words, I argue that the Ottoman past is a formist argument of the “Serbian tragedy.”

Before entering the discussion about Ottoman conquests in the Balkans, each of the textbooks gives a brief, one-and-a-half page history of the Ottoman Empire. I will first present the way the history of the Ottoman Empire is emplotted, and then put it in the context of how narratives about the other political formations in the Balkans were presented in the same book. This comparison and contextualization will add to a better understanding of how the Ottoman Empire is positioned in Serbian collective memory.

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<sup>151</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 17.

<sup>152</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 18.

<sup>153</sup> White, Hayden, *Metahistory*, 14.

The narrative usually introduces the origins of the Ottomans. After a brief introduction of the Seljuk Turks, the story continues to explain the formation of the Empire:

One of the beylik was formed in late XIII century by emir Osman, with the newly settled Turks. The country he founded was situated in the north-west of Asia Minor. Later, it was called the Ottoman Empire, and its subjects were referred to as the Ottomans.<sup>154</sup>

The only Empire that was introduced into the textbook previously was the Byzantine Empire, as a continuity of the Roman Empire. It was also explained to the reader that within the Empire various different ethnicities lived, “who did not speak the same language ... but Hellenistic cultural heritage was well nurtured in the Byzantine Empire.”<sup>155</sup> However, the multiethnic character of the Ottoman Empire was not elaborated in any of the textbooks. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire are depicted as the Ottoman Turks on one side, and subjugated Christians on the other side. The Christian population is mostly depicted comprising of Serbs, Greeks, and Albanians (in this hierarchical order), with no mention made of subjects of other ethnicities such as Arabs, Armenians, etc., who also constituted part of population in the Balkans during the Empire. The referred quote is the only exception in which the subjects of the Ottoman Empire were named “the Ottomans.” In the rest of the books, as well as in the further narrative of the quoted book, the Ottoman subjects are referred to as “Turks,” or “Ottoman Turks,” clearly depicting the ethnic differentiation between other inhabitants, and Turks. Such a depiction reflects on the ethno-nationalist ideology that shaped the collective memory of the Ottomans in the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century, and which has been handed down to this day.

In Serbian collective memory, the image of Turks is predominantly shaped by the epic poetry. This way, the poor history narrative about the Empire is complemented with the image from poetry. However, while the epic poetry constructs the binary oppositions between Muslims and Christians, representing always a Serb in clash with a Muslim Albanian, Arab, Bosnian, or Turk, in history narrative, the

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<sup>154</sup> Vekić Kočić, Marija, Kočić, Dragoljub, and Lopandić, Duško, *Istorija za šesti razred*, 160.

<sup>155</sup> Mihaljčić, Rade, *Istorija za šesti razred*, 34.

binary opposition remains between Serbs and Turks. Furthermore, in epic poetry while Muslims, usually those occupying important administrative positions, are portrayed as villains, there is a certain level of positive image of Istanbul as a center of the Empire, which reflects on the historical developments towards the nineteenth century where the population rebelled against the local administration, rather than the Empire.<sup>156</sup> However, the history narrative portrays Ottomans in a more essentialist way.

In history narrative about the Ottoman Empire, there is no explanation of the relationship between the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire, nor of the Ottoman relationship towards the “Hellenistic heritage.” The narrative further continues to explain the state organization:

The spahija (horsemen), infantry and janissaries comprised the bulk of the Turkish army. The spahija [in Turkish: spahi] received landed estates in return for military service -spahiluk, which consisted of several villages ... There lived and worked serfs of predominantly Christian religion. They were called 'reaya', which in Turkish means the flock. Most of the population in the Balkan Peninsula was in the position of “reaya.” Reaya gave Spahija/Spahi tithes of their income, and haraç/harač to the Sultan - a ducat for every man capable of work. The most difficult responsibilities were *danak u krvi* [lit. trans.: the tax given in blood], i.e. the taking away male children who became Janissaries. The boys were taken to Edirne and brought up in the Islamic faith.<sup>157</sup>

As can be seen, the Empire is portrayed only within its early modern form, in which military organization was at the heart of the allocation of land, and consequently of the socio-economic and political organization of the Empire. No further explanation is given for the socio-economic transformation which was unfolding within the Empire starting from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries onwards. Furthermore, it was not explained that *reaya* were the tax-paying subjects of the Empire, which included both the Muslim and non-Muslim populations. It is only at the later stages of the empire, and especially with *Tanzimat* reforms that *reaya* started being identified with the non-Muslim population, which again shows

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<sup>156</sup> For portrayal of Turks in Serbian epic poetry see Bošković, Sanja, “L’image du Turc dans la poésie épique Serbe”, in *Cahiers balkaniques* 36-37, 2008, 1-14.

<sup>157</sup> Bubalo, Đorđe, *Istorija 6: Udžbenik za šesti razred*, 168.

that the memory of the Ottoman rule is predominantly shaped as framed in the nineteenth century. However, it is indicative that parts of the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire are selected from its early modern stages, portraying it in the Orientalist view, as if the Empire had not gone through the modernization period, while other aspects directly derived from the memory of the nineteenth century, when the status of the non-Muslim population had begun to be questioned.

While the organization of the state is depicted in exclusively military terms, the subjects were from the beginning put into the position of an oppressed population. Although Ottoman socio-economic organization had much continuity with that of the medieval Serbian Empire, in case of the organization of Serbian country, the depiction of serfs was rather in terms that they gave part of their products in return for being allowed to live with their families on the property of the feudatory. In relation to the Ottoman Empire, subjects were portrayed solely as an exploited population without any reference to what the state may have provided them. Furthermore, the depiction of paying *haraç/harač*, and introduction of the *danak u krvi* contributes to the explanation of the dramatic positions of the population, in other words, of the oppression of Ottoman rule.

In the modern Serbian language the word “harač” is used in the meaning of “loot,” and the derivate verb “harati” as “looting.” This language transformation shows how the noun and verb were transformed in collective memory. It probably acquired a new meaning due to the events in the nineteenth century, when high taxes were imposed on the population. This is an example of how collective memory is handed down through the language. The word *haraç* was translated only as “Turkish tax.” Such lack of explanation of the Ottoman economic system, and the mentioning in the book of only one name of the tax which has a particular meaning in modern Serbian language, infuses meaning into the collective memory of the whole period of Ottoman rule.

On the other side, the term “*danak u krvi*” is used in each of the books to refer to the recruitment of Christian boys for the Janissary corps. This system had its Ottoman term “*devşirme*,” but the noun is not shaped through Serbian collective memory and therefore is not a collective memory bearer. Furthermore, the Serbian word “*danak*” is equivalent to Turkish “*haraç*,” however neither is used in modern Serbian language in their original meaning. “*Danak*” is used only to refer to “*danak u*



*krvi*,” i.e. “*devşirme*,” and it has a special memory value. Collective narrative about Ottoman rule, uses the language as the most powerful memory tool to hand down the collective memory of this period of the past. The words that would have had slipped to archaism are preserved through the meaning they were attached to in the past, but handed to new generations with more complex meaning constructed through the nationalist discourse.

Therefore, the memory of the Ottoman Empire is shaped as follows: it was an Empire in which “everything was submitted to the military,” which practiced a “backward form of feudalism,” and in which the “Christian population was looted.”<sup>158</sup> One extremely noticeable depiction is that the Ottoman Empire is represented as what I would name “an Empire without culture.” While each previous chapter of the book had entire pages devoted to the culture, and cultural continuity, no information is provided about the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, even within the chapter about Ottoman conquests, each new subtitle begins with the depiction of the architectural and/or cultural foundation of the Christian state the Ottomans were to conquer. The chapter abounds in pictures of Christian/Serbian churches, fortifications, frescos, statues, as well as paintings of the Balkan rulers and knights, while for depicting the Ottomans there are only three to four pictures, usually of a Sultan, and Janissaries (military). Furthermore, the words repetitively associated with the military politics of the Ottomans are: invasion, penetration, pressure, extortion, occupation, subjugation, and overrunning. All this representation carves the memory of a militaristic, barbarous, backward people and Empire. Such a depiction and classification of the Empire serves for the derivation of the formist argument of Serbian tragedy within the form of syllogism: “The Vandals will vandalize.” Such syllogism works as a memory trigger, and is best reflected in the answer Sandra gave me: “And Turks are Turks.” Therefore, the shaping of the collective memory in the form of Tragedy is the foundational moment of the Serbian collective memory of the Ottoman rule. It reduces the rule to a syllogism, which further explains how the period of Ottoman rule has so

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<sup>158</sup> In all of the books the economic system is referred to as “feudal,” even though the economic system cannot be referred to as “feudal.” For Ottoman economic system see Pamuk, Şevket, *Ottoman Economy and Its Institutions*, Variorum Collected Studies Series, Farnham: Ashgate Publishers, 2009, and Genç, Mehmet, “Economy and Economic Policy”, in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, Gábor Ágoston, and Bruce Alan Masters, eds., New York, Facts On File, 2009, 192-195.

much memory with so little narrative. Its counterpart in the time narrative framework is the downfall.

#### 4.5. Memory of Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha Sokollu/Sokolivić

The introductory narrative about the Ottoman Empire of the seventh-grade history textbook is shaped less assertively, in comparison to that of the sixth grade. However, it is structured in more or less the same way. The political and economic systems of the Empire are explained to some extent, but more in order to introduce the topic of the division of the land and the obligations of each of the subjects of the Empire. While this helps somewhat with understanding the Ottoman system of government, the visual materials and the narratives about the further conquests still depict the Empire in terms of military might. Only the Logos textbook has a chapter named “Culture and Science,” but it says the following: “Culture and science in the Ottoman Empire were a function of Islam and limited by traditional beliefs. Reason was a means in the service of faith.”<sup>159</sup> As can be seen, the cultural development was subjected to interpretation through the stereotype of Islam. Orientalist discourse is strong here as well, i.e. while a secularized Europe advanced in science, the Orient remained mired in religious views.

Therefore, the Empire, to the end of the narrative, remains depicted as an “Empire without culture.”

The life of the subdued peoples was difficult, and they endured harsh lawlessness, oppression and injustice. Out of numerous such instances, two phenomena left an imprint on our ancestors and their descendants – “danak u krvi” and Islamization. Having conquered the area of the Balkans, the Turks used to take children from the Christians, the healthy and clever ones, and take them away to the capital of the empire, Istanbul, where they were converted to Islam and given a decent education. Our people referred to this practice as blood tax, whereas the Turks used the term *devşirme*.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Antić, Čedomir, and Bondžić, Mirjana, *Istorija za sedmi razred osnovne škole*, Belgrade: Logos, 2015, 41.

<sup>160</sup> Ljušić, Radoš, *Istorija za sedmi razred*, 44.

Conversions to Islam, framed through the term “Islamization,” is highly negatively depicted in the textbooks, as a phenomenon that occurred among people either to “save their properties and families” or by force. However, out of a combination of these three negative forces, the first cycle of a positive event is depicted in the character of Grand Vezier Mehmed Pasha Sokollu/Sokolović. He is portrayed through the image of a Serbian boy, who was taken to Istanbul through the system of “*danak u krvi*.” According to the Serbian narrative “he never forgot his origins,” and that is why he renewed the Serbian Patriarchate. In such a narrative emplotment, the image of the Grand Vizier represents an important ideological aspect of construction of Serbian ipse and idem identity. Despite the “Islamization,” which is negatively depicted, according to Serbian narrative, he had remained loyal to his original identity, i.e. Christianity. In other words, he preserved his identity irrespective of the external circumstances. Through his image, the binary opposition of Islam and Christianity is fostered. Furthermore, the visual that always accompanies “*danak u krvi*” is his portrayal, which represents the idealized image of “Islamization.” However, the textbook for seventh grade, published by Bigz, has an illustration of *devşirme*, which reflects on how dramatically the event is shaped in memory (see Figure 4.3.). The Ottomans are depicted as forcibly taking boys from their homes, family at the doors looking how their sons were taken away, and boys who are looking back towards their homes. The image is layered even more on depicting the memory of Ottoman rule, the poverty of people, represented in modest Serbian house in the picture, and the barefoot boy who is taken away by the Ottomans. Also, the picture seems to imply that two boys were taken from the same household, something that was forbidden by Ottoman law.<sup>161</sup> Furthermore, while one of the Ottomans holds the boys with both of his hands, the other is holding his weapons with both hands, reflecting on the strong imagination of cruelty and military might of the Ottomans.

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<sup>161</sup> Ottoman *Kanuns* provided strict rules regarding the child levy. For example, if a family had only one male child, the child could not be levied, but also, no more than one child could be taken from a given family. See Ágoston, Gábor, “Devşirme,” in *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, Ágoston, Gábor and Masters, Bruce, eds., New York: File on File, 2009, 183-185.



Figure 4.3. Illustration of “Danak u krvi” in *Mozaik prošlosti*, Bigz, 2013, 35.

Furthermore, through the depiction of character of Mehmet Pasha Sokollu/Sokolović, for the first time cultural aspects of the Ottoman Empire have been presented. The architectural foundations such as the Bridge on Drina River in the town of Višegrad, and the water fountain at Kalemegdan fortress in Belgrade are presented. However, they are rather depicted in terms of the foundations sponsored by him, than in terms of the culture and architecture of the Empire. This way, the cultural foundations remained in the domain of “Serbian,” rather than “Ottoman.”

Such a nationalist romantic narrative about the Grand Vizier was made possible through the use of the tactics of silence. As of the beginning of Ottoman rule, the Serbian Patriarchate, proclaimed by Emperor Dušan, reverted to being under the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Mehmed Pasha Sokollu/Sokolović was a shrewd politician. After the conquest of Hungarian territories, he needed the church in charge of those territories, so he placed his cousin at the head of the church in Peć, and another cousin as Pasha in the newly conquered territories; this is never mentioned in Serbian history.<sup>162</sup> Therefore, this silence allows for the formation of the narrative of the temporal relief, and also provides additional explanation on how the Serbs remained for such a long time in such a “backward Empire.”

This narrative also contributes to framing the collective memory of the Church as a protector of the Serbian culture and identity until the state was “reestablished in the late nineteenth century.” This is clearly a narrative established in the nineteenth century, when the state and church were blended together with politics, in order to create the image of the new Serbian Orthodox Christian Nation, which has been

<sup>162</sup> In Anscombe, Frederick F., *State, Faith, and Nation*, 149.

handed down to this day. Furthermore, the migrations that occurred in the late seventeenth century were not as massive as the Serbian narrative depicts them. However, they represent an important part of collective memory.

#### **4.6. The Great Serbian Migrations Myth**

The narrative about Great Serbian Migrations is also emplotted in the mythical mode, blending the historical facts and the lore of Christian tradition within the narrative plot. After the Austrian-Turkish war, in 1690, the Serbian Patriarch Arsenije Černojević, along with lines of refugees, transferred to the territory of Austria. The narrative conveys the image of Serbian Orthodox Church as protector of Serbian people, and it gives the Patriarch a prophetic role of “leading the people out of the promised land,” i.e. Kosovo. Along with the Kosovo Myth, the Myth of Great Serbian Migrations has the most important role in shaping the collective memory of Ottoman rule.

While the Kosovo Myth promulgates the meaning of death and resurrection of the Serbian people and state, positioning the Ottomans as the evil force, the Myth of Great Serbian Migrations portrays endurance and suffering undertaken in order to preserve the Serbian ethos. This way, not only are the Ottomans portrayed as the evil side, but the image of Ottomans and Islam are grounded as alterity to Serbian identity. Looking closer into both myths, i.e. the Kosovo Myth and the Great Serbian Migrations Myth, in which a strong aspect of opposition of Christianity and Islam is portrayed, it becomes clear that the period of Ottoman rule is the most important national image. It is through the opposition of Ottoman (Turkish) and Serbian, Muslim and Christian identity, that sameness and selfhood, i.e. the both ipse and idem Serbian identity is constructed. While the image of Mehmet Pasha Sokollu/Sokolović illustrates this on the individual level, the Great Serbian Migrations illustrate it on a collective level. Both of the stories convey the message that despite the domination of Ottomans, constructed as alterity to Serbian identity, the Serbs preserved their identity,

Therefore, the myth that evokes the Serbian national identity, shapes the Serbian collective memory of the Ottoman rule through dialectic relationship. The only visual that is constantly repeated through all history textbooks (except from that

used in Socialist Yugoslavia), irrespective of the publishing house, is yet another painting by Paja Jovanović, “The Migrations of Serbs” (see Figure 4.4.). Even though Paja Jovanović, in his first original, portrayed the people more as a flock of refugees, the commissioner of the painting, Patriarch Georgije Branković, asked for people to be turned into the more organized military group.<sup>163</sup> Jovanović’s first version of the painting demonstrates how the myth was shaped by ordinary people, while the final version demonstrates how it was refashioned later on.



Figure 4.4. Paja Jovanović, *The Migrations of Serbs*, oil on canvas, National Museum of Serbia.

#### 4.7. The Beginning of the Revolt Against Dahijas

“The Beginning of the Revolt against Dahija” is the most famous epic poem, performed by fiddle player Filip Višnjić. He was a contemporary of the rebellions of the 1804, and the text of the poem, like many of those he performed, was recorded by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić. It is a song that each student learns in school, and which helps them understand the events referred to in history as “The First Serbian Uprising.” But who are the *dahijas*?

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<sup>163</sup> See Judah, Tim, *The Serbs*, 1.

The beginning of the First Serbian Uprising also states that in Belgrade the military named *dahijas* took over and started tyrannizing (Turkish-Arabic word *zulum* is used) the population. Therefore, the *dahija* is in Serbian narrative depicted as the ranks of Ottoman Turks who maltreated the Serbian population, thus triggering the Serbian uprising. However, the origin of the word may have two explanations in relations to the context of Janissary corps who took over rule of Belgrade Paşalık/Paşaluk. The word “dayı” in Turkish means “uncle,” and is used in the same way the word “Godfather,” or “chieftain,” i.e. the one who is in charge of the area.<sup>164</sup> At the end of seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century, as the Ottoman Empire discontinued the politics of conquest, the Janissary corps entered more into the everyday social life of the cities.<sup>165</sup> They had their coffee-shops in certain quarters, and were in control of certain parts of the towns. Many people in need of help would come to the coffees-shop, to the *dayı*, the head of the Janissary garrison, who would supposedly have the key to solving the problem. It may be that the Janissary corps, over which the Sultan had lost control, and who had killed Hacı Mustafa Pasha, the head of the Belgrade *Paşalık*, still continued calling themselves in this way.

However, in the dictionary, which was written by Vuk S. Karadžić and was published in Vienna in 1818, under the entry “*daia*” (as Vuk did not use the sound “h” at that time), the corresponding translation in Latin is “*exul (redux ex ultor)*,” meaning “the outcast (returning from prosecution).”<sup>166</sup> Furthermore, as an example of the word, the lyrics from the song “The Beginning of the Revolt against Dahijas” is given, and the derivate “*daiski*” in Latin “*exulum*,” or “*exiles*.” This may again indicate that the reference was used to indicate the Janissary corps that were outcasts and who demanded the reinstatement of the rights of the Janissaries.

Whichever is the case, the *dahija* is not an official title given by the Ottoman Empire, as Serbian collective memory would have it. Moreover, it demonstrates that the uprising was not against the official Ottoman Empire either, as Serbian collective memory shapes it, but against local informal power structures. This is yet another

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<sup>164</sup> I would like to thank Professor Dr. Irvin Cemil Schick, who draw my attention that the Ottoman ruler of Tunisia was called the Dayı, translated into English as Dey, while the ruler of Algeria was the Bey.

<sup>165</sup> Sajdi, Dana, ed., *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century*, London. New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007.

<sup>166</sup> See Stefanović Karadžić, Vuk, *Lexicon Serbico-Germanico-Latinum*, Vienna: 1818, 136.

example of the functioning of language as a carrier of collective memory. By losing the original meaning, the word served to infuse new meanings, which in the late nineteenth century were attached to events such as the “Serbian uprising against Ottoman rule.”

Furthermore, that song is an example of lumping together medieval history and the events of the nineteenth century, giving the final meaning to the Kosovo myth. It produced the outline of the collective memory of Ottoman rule. The Christian population had songs about the Christian kingdom that was to return one day. The song recited by Filip Višnjić best demonstrates how this collective memory merged with the events of the nineteenth century, slowly shaping collective memory through the prism of nationalism. The following part represents the conversation that the *dahis/dahijas* had among themselves when they saw that “the rejoiced orphan *reaya*, which could no longer pay fines and taxes,” is taking up arms and coming to Belgrade:

Turks and brothers, all ye seven *dahis!*  
Listen! Thus the holy book instructs us:  
When the men of old beheld such omens  
Over Serbia in the cloudless heavens  
When the world five hundred years was younger,  
At that time the Serbian Empire perished  
And the Turkish host the Empire conquered  
And two Wallach [Christian] emperors beheaded:  
Constantine in proud Constantinople  
By the Šarac, by the chilly streamlet,  
On the plain of Kosovo King Lazar.  
Then did Miloš, Serbia's king avenging,  
Slay the Sultan, but his blow was faulty.<sup>167</sup>

Even though the song does not depict the national character of the events, it is used as the framework of the historical memory of the events. The depicted “Turkish *zulum*,” i.e. “Turkish terror” in the song, is used throughout the Fresca publishing house Serbian textbooks, to depict the causes of the uprising. The word “*zulum*” is no longer in use in the Serbian language, but does not act as an archaism once used in relations to the events of the Uprisings. Also, the word “*zulum*” does not act as archaism only when depicting the Turkish, i.e. Ottoman terror, therefore it is not only

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<sup>167</sup> Serbian Epic Poetry: *The Beginning of the Revolt against Dahijas*, English translation available at [www.nbs.org](http://www.nbs.org).



acting in relation to the time, but also to the Ottoman context. Not only does it indicate how much the historical memory was actually shaped by the epic poetry, but also, how much language serves as a memory trigger, and carrier of the historical memory.

God in Heaven! The stupendous wonder!  
When 'twas time throughout the land of Serbia  
That a mighty change should be accomplished  
And new ways of ruling be established,  
Then the knezes welcomed not the quarrel,  
Neither were the Turkish tyrants joyful [Turskog zuluma].<sup>168</sup>

Leopold von Ranke, who worked closely with Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, was among the first to shape the events of 1804 into the discourse of “national rival” in his book *Die Serbische Revolution* (The Serbian Revolution), published in 1829.<sup>169</sup> This is how, until today, the collective memory of the events has been shaped as a “Serbian national uprising.” Even though the Second Uprising was against the formal Ottoman structures of power, which led to autonomy and then independence, it is hard to discern where “Christian unity” ended and became “national unity.” It still remains to be researched how the identity of peasants was transformed into national identity, whether the local parishes or notables played a key role in these transformations, or if some other allegiances may have been decisive.

“The Serbian Revolution,” is the period of three decades between 1804 -1835. It begins with the uprising, and ends with the adoption of the Constitution in 1835. This way, yet another timeframe is formed, which allows for dividing “Serbian” from “Ottoman Turkish” rule, even though one has to keep in mind that they could not be divided, as the Serbian Principality was still within the borders of the Empire. This division allows for the incorporation of orientalist narratives that shaped the memory of Ottoman rule. “On *Saint George’s day 1835*, Knez Miloš proclaimed that in Serbia, all the feudal duties and levies had been abolished,” writes the Fresca publishing house textbook, “Therefore, the main result of the Serbian revolution was the autonomous state *without feudal shackles*.”<sup>170</sup> It was explained that the tax was to be collected only twice a year. This was a law established at the level of the Empire by

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<sup>168</sup> Serbian Epic Poetry: *The Beginning of the Revolt against Dahijas*.

<sup>169</sup> Von Ranke, Leopold, *Die Serbische Revolution*, 1829.

<sup>170</sup> Ljušić, Radoš, *Udžbenik za sedmi razred*, 158, emphasis Radoš’s.

Sultan Mahmud II, and not independently by the Serbian Principality, as the national narrative has it. Such further narrative constructions shape the memory in which Serbia progresses, leaving behind the Ottoman Empire. Even though the period of “Ottoman rule” did not end in 1835, such a time narrative allows for binding the memory of modernization and Europeanization (as positive terms) with the discourse of de-Ottomanization. Therefore, through the discourse of progress, the memory of Ottoman rule was shaped as backward.

While this represents yet another crucial narrative for framing Serbian national identity, it is also crucial for mediating the collective memory of the period of Ottoman rule. It is reminiscent of the “Turkish zulum” under which Serbs were subjected to conversion, their children were taken from them, and which in the end forced them to leave the “Promised Land.” The identity narrative is the Romance in which good prevailed over evil, but the Serbian identity narrative at the same time constructed the alterity. Therefore, the Serbian collective memory of national revival is at the same time Serbian collective memory of “the cruelty of Ottoman rule.” This also shows that, apart from “The Migrations of Serbs” by Paja Jovanović, the only other visual material that is found in each of the textbooks is either a picture or a drawing of *Ćele kula* (from the Turkish *Kelle Kule*, Skull Tower). It is a tower built by the Ottomans in Niš after the First Uprising, in which 925 skulls of the rebels were built in (see Figure 4.5.). This shows that the collective memory of Ottoman rule is shaped through the memory of the events of the nineteenth century, projecting the image onto the entire period of Ottoman rule.




Figure 4.5. Side wall of *Ćele kula*, situated within the Chapel in Niš, Serbia.

#### 4.8. Collective Memory as a Process

The collective memory of the period of Ottoman rule is shaped within the framework of the image of the “dark ages.” It is a period of mythical “five hundred years of Turkish yoke,” as finally shaped through the discourse of the Balkan wars. The time frame of those five centuries falls between the Kosovo battle and the national revival of the end of nineteenth century, or with the Kumanovo battle of 1912. This is why those two periods are the most important as the triggers of the collective memory of the Ottoman past.

Serbian collective memory is shaped using different narrative strategies. The most powerful is the strategy of emplotment. As demonstrated, the temporal and verbal structure of the narrative can be emplotted in a particular way so as to incorporate a desired meaning. This emplotment uses the tactics of selection of events from history, and putting those events in a particular relationship so as to create a coherent story. By separating the analysis of the temporal and verbal narratives, I attempted to demonstrate that, even though they do support each other, they can achieve the same effect of shaping the collective memory independently of each other. In other words, the verbal shape of the past is not necessary to transmit certain images about the past, as the time frame of the events can infuse the desired meaning, no matter how neutrally they are presented.

Collective memory is a process, and through this analysis, I attempted to demonstrate how Serbian collective memory was constructed through the interaction of communicative memory of people, as sung in epic poetry, and was transmitted onto the historical memory of the events. However, as a final remark, I would like to briefly elaborate on some differences between a textbook used in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and one used in Socialist Yugoslavia, in order to demonstrate how collective memory was constructed within a time perspective.

At first glance, those two books appear to represent Ottoman rule in completely different ways. The one from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia has a very explicit verbal structure:

The Serbian people had a hard time under the Turks. The first and biggest evil that can befall a Serb ... the loss freedom. The Turks had become the masters, and the Serbs their slaves (reaya) ... The Serbs

were not allowed to go to church and pray to God. The monks and Serbian priests were being killed or terribly tortured ... Every fifth year, the Turks entered Serbian houses and took away the best Serbian children, to be led to Constantinople and converted into Turks ... Every male head paid tax (harac) and in addition to that, there was a special levy for the married ones, besides the amount they had to pay to the spahija/saphi.<sup>171</sup>

The narrative continues toward Mehmed Pasha Sokollu/Sokolović who “knew that he was a Serb and that a Serbian mother had born and breastfed him, so he often thought about Serbs and helped them.” Therefore upon the suggestion of his “brother” Makarije, he “allowed *the restoration and repair work on the old Serbia Patriarchate in Peć.*”<sup>172</sup> This also explains the existence of churches, and culture, which would otherwise have disappeared, according to the narrative in the Ottoman Empire, still represented as an “Empire without culture.” The themes of glorifying banditry the migration of the Serbian people follow in succession. Interestingly enough, the only visual material used in the book is the painting by Paja Jovanović, *The Great Serbian Migrations*. The uprisings are depicted in national terms, against “*dahijama zulumčarima*” [the dahis evil doers] and against the Sultan. It is very interesting that the book skips the part about the rule of Miloš Obrenović, labeling it only as a period of peace between Serbs and Turks. This may be because the Karađorđević family ruled the kingdom at the time of the publishing of the textbook. The book is more concentrated afterwards on depicting the pan-Slavic movement, and the politics of Austria, but Turkish rule in the book ends with “Wars for the Liberation of our people ... the whole world admired” i.e. the Balkan Wars. This is indicative of how the meaning of the early nineteenth century uprisings and of the Balkan Wars are interchangeable for framing collective memory of Ottoman rule.

The textbooks from Socialist Yugoslavia seem to stand at the other end of the ideological spectrum. The period of Ottoman rule being completely silenced, the themes of “Islamization,” Mehmed Pasha Sokollu/Sokolović, the Serbian Patriarchate, banditry, the transfer of population are non-existent. However, medieval

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<sup>171</sup> Stojanović M., Mihailo, *Narodna istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca za IV razred osnovnih škola*, Belgrade: Nakladom knjižare Velima Valožića, 1927, 70-72. This is only one of the textbooks use in Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The narratives in other books are emplotted in the similar way, conveying the same message,

<sup>172</sup> Stojanović M., Mihailo, *Narodna istorija Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, author’s emphasis.

history is taught to a much greater extent, and the “Fall of Serbia under Ottoman Rule,” is depicted more or less in the same manner. The only exception is that each of the states that fell under Ottoman rule was depicted without any ethnic affiliations and demonstrations of their continuity with the medieval Serbian Empire. The seventh-grade history textbook starts with the uprisings, covering all the topics that today’s textbooks do, but the terms used to depict hardship are much more neutral. However, the Ottomans are still labeled “Turks,” and the Ottoman Empire is still an “Empire without Culture.”

While Ottoman rule was silenced in the history textbooks in socialist Yugoslavia, the zig-zag time narrative framework remained, which implied that Ottoman rule was a period of complete downfall. On the other hand, students were extensively taught epic poetry in schools. When Josip Broz Tito, the first President of Socialist Yugoslavia, died, the Council of Education from Sarajevo first drew attention to the problematic teaching of certain parts of epic poetry in schools, pointing especially to the lyrics of Njegoš’s “Mountain Wreath.” The epic poetry that was taught covered all the relevant topics from the Kosovo battle, through the post Kosovo battle cycles which mainly described the hardships undergone by the people under Ottoman rule, to the cycle of songs about banditry which glorifies the practice and demonstrates the cruelty of Turkish rule. However, the epic poem written by the Montenegrin church and state ruler Petar II Petrović Njegoš, “The Mountain Wreath,” was seen as the most problematical: it recounts the planning of the uprising against the “Turks,” in which special emphasis is put on those who embraced Islam as the most threatening to the success of the uprising.

Now, listen. Vuk, and ye my other brethren!  
At what ye see in me ye should not wonder; -  
That I so tortured am by blackish thoughts (...)  
I fear them not, this Devil’s spawn,  
Though they be thick as autumn leaves,  
But I have fear of ills at home!  
Our kinsmen wild have own’d Mahomet’s Name;  
And if the renegades we should attack,  
Their Serbian kindred never would desert them.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Petrović Njegoš, Petar, *Gorski vijenac*, English translation, available at [www.njegos.org](http://www.njegos.org).

The fact that the narrative, which had been silenced in history textbooks, but kept alive through literature, was so easily mobilized in the 1990s indicates that even literature, i.e. cultural memory, however fictional it may appear, exerts an influence in shaping collective memory. The history narrative preserved a zig-zag time structure, infusing still the same meaning to the period of Ottoman rule. In this way, the historical narrative and poetry narrative were bound even closer together, building the narrative in the same way as that of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the value of communicative memory should not be underestimated in our “sliding society”: the historical narrative might have been silenced, but not the generations that remembered it.



## CHAPTER 5

### SERBIAN COLLECTIVE MEMORY INSCRIBED INTO THE CITY OF BELGRADE

Collectives build intimate relationships with their environments. It is within the built environment that mental images of a collective are placed and preserved. Within the physically constructed space, or the urban fabric of the city, the collective memories are best preserved. “Memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space, the sounder they are.”<sup>174</sup> Therefore, placing collective memories into built environments allows them to be more vivid in the everyday life of a society. Matt Matsuda drew a distinction between monuments and documents, monuments standing as reminders (from Latin verb *monere*, to remind), and documents having an instructive role (from Latin verb *docere* - to instruct). According to Matsuda, monuments have the role of “reminders of the past,” and documents “instruct the present and guide the future.”<sup>175</sup> However, if one observes the architectural complexes as texts intertwined within the city, it becomes clear that the urban texture is shaped both in the function of monuments and documents in the sense in which Matsuda defined them. Entire city complexes, or architectural unities, should be looked through this dichotomy, or by always asking the question: Which instructions (narrations) are those complexes reminding one of.

Prior to being conquered by the Ottoman Empire, Belgrade had not been continually ruled by one power.<sup>176</sup> Nowadays, looking at the signs of the city, there is barely any evidence of the existence of continuity of the Ottoman rule, whereas there is an impression of the everlasting existence of the Serbian people in it. However, the phenomenological study of the urban design reveals that the city is constructed as the theater of the Serbian collective memory. It reflects a living image of the period of Ottoman rule as shaped by the nationalist narrative, but it bears almost no evidence of the Ottoman past in this region. As Maurice Halbwachs notices, space is rarely a blank slate on which one inscribes one’s memory.<sup>177</sup> Thus, one should always bear in mind

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<sup>174</sup> Bachelard, Gaston, *The Poetics of Space*, Boston: Beacon Press 1994, 9.

<sup>175</sup> Matsuda, Matt, *The Memory of the Modern*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 62.

<sup>176</sup> Đurić-Zamolo, D., *Beograd kao orijentalna varoš pod Turcima*.

<sup>177</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*.

that the loud Serbian collective memories incorporated into the constructed environment are superposed on already existing memories embodied in the erased structures of the Ottoman town. In this way, new memorials are establishing dialectic relationships with collective memories of the early nineteenth century town. Even though the Ottoman town was completely erased after Serbia won its de jure independence, the memorials that were placed in the city speak vividly about Ottoman rule, as shaped in the Serbian collective memory. I propose that looking into the process of construction of today's city of Belgrade will reveal how the narrative of the Ottoman past within the city was written over, and replaced by the collective memory of Ottoman rule.

### **5.1. Kalemegdan: Whose Military Power?**

The most important harbor of the Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule is the city's fortress, Kalemegdan. As Đorđe Kostić concludes in his work, it was through the image of the fortress, as a symbol of military power, that Ottoman Belgrade was viewed by foreign eyes.<sup>178</sup> However, through the depiction of the Serbian epic poetry about the uprisings, most notably "The beginning of the Revolt against Dahijas," it can be concluded that it was a symbol of Ottoman military dominance and power in the Serbian collective memory as well. Its name derives from the Turkish words "kale" meaning castle and "meydan" meaning square. It seems that its name speaks louder about its Ottoman past, than all the efforts to alter the meaning of the site into a symbol of Serbian rule over it.

After power over Belgrade was fully assumed by the newly emerged Serbian nation-state, the fort was never again used for administrative purposes, and the decision to turn it into a park was made almost immediately. The Military Museum, founded in 1878 immediately after the Berlin Congress, was situated in the old Ottoman building that still existed in the heart of the fort. Ever since, the fort has been used for the exhibits of the Military Museum of Belgrade. The first exhibition was organized in 1904, marking the centenary of the First Uprising against Ottoman rule.

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<sup>178</sup> Kostić, Đorđe, "A fortress, a suburb, a town: the German view of Belgrade", in Kostić, Đorđe ed., *Belgrade in the works of European travel writers*, Belgrade: Institute for Balkan studies, spec. ed., 2003.



The new building of the museum was constructed in the Balkan style right on the watchtower of the fort. Nowadays, The Institution for the Protection of Monuments is situated in that building and the Military Museum acquired its final place, constructed in the form of a castle, in the space above the inner Istanbul gates of the fort, which it still occupies today.<sup>179</sup> The position of the Military Museum inside the fort, and its early inception, clearly served the purpose of retracing the image of the heart of Kalemegdan as the center of Ottoman military power, to that of the new Serbian military power.

Furthermore, the watchtower of the fort served as a marker of power for centuries, as it could be seen from every part of town, stretching at the foot of the fort, as well as from the rivers Sava and Danube flowing below. Stefan Lazarević had built the Ecclesiastical Church at this spot, from which it could be seen by anyone approaching the castle, and two other churches were located nearby. The Ecclesiastical Church was converted into a mosque after the conquest of Belgrade, and Sultan Suleiman I constructed a mosque right above it.<sup>180</sup> Those two mosques served as symbols of the city for the three centuries that followed. The mosques were destroyed, while the ruins of the Ecclesiastical Church were displayed once Serbia took over the keys of the fort. An old chapel and church that used to be nearby were rebuilt. The church was consecrated to the Holy Mother, and was rebuilt after the Balkan Wars. All the internal and external ornaments were made from melted cannons and ammunition, while the chandelier of the church is adorned with cartridge cases. Two statues of military officers made of the same material were placed at the entrance. One statue represents a soldier of the medieval Serbian Empire, and the other, a Serbian soldier from the Balkan Wars (see Figure 5.1.).<sup>181</sup> The symbolic shift of military and religious power is embodied in this church. Furthermore, the statues of the two soldiers from two different periods, regions, and traditions, created an illusion of temporal continuity between the two states. Through those statues, the spatial unity

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<sup>179</sup> Radović, Anđelija and Ležetić, Predrag, “Vojni muzej 1878-2000”, Belgrade: Vojni muzej, 2000.

<sup>180</sup> Also Austrians reconstructed churches after their reprisal of town in eighteenth century, only to be erased and rebuilt into Mosques after the reassertion of power by the Ottomans. \*\*\*reprisal does not seem to be used correctly here.

<sup>181</sup> Božović, Aleksandar, “Crkva Ružica u Istočnom podgrađu Beogradske tvrđave”, in *Nasledje*, Iss. 10, 11-28, Belgrade: Zavod za zaštitu spomenika grada Beograda, 2010.

of what was presented as “old Serbia,” symbolically embodied in the medieval soldier and “new Serbia,” embodied in the soldier of the kingdom of Serbia.

Moreover, this is a site in which the Kosovo myth is embodied as well. The eschatological meaning of the myth is embodied in the medieval soldier, and the foundational meaning of the myth in the soldier of the Balkan wars who is to continue the valor of the medieval warriors. Both of the soldiers, in this way, are symbols of Serbian collective memory of the fight against Ottoman military power. Furthermore, as shown in the previous chapter, the Kosovo battle and the Balkan Wars are the pivots of the Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule. Those two events from history have been shaped in such a way by Serbian collective memory, that they alone speak more about Ottoman rule than any other narrative about the events from the Ottoman period.



Figure 5.1. The entrance to the church dedicated to Holy Mother at Kalemegdan, left: statue of the soldier from the Balkan Wars, right: the medieval soldier. Both statues, the doors, and the icon above the doors are made of melted shields and cannons.

The monument that dominates the view of the fort is that of the Victor, today’s symbol of Belgrade. It had originally been conceptualized to represent the victory of the Serbian people over the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars. It was supposed to be placed nearby on the newly constructed Square of Victory next to the Serbian

Parliament, marking the victory in the Battle of Kumanovo in the Balkan Wars.<sup>182</sup> However, the Victor, as a bearer of collective memory of the liberation from Ottoman rule of all the territories to which Serbia believed it had a historical right, was placed on top of the fort. In this way, the symbol of Ottoman military power was overwritten by the symbol of overall Serbian military victory.

This tradition of shaping Kalemegdan as a Serbian realm of memory of Ottoman rule continued even throughout the period of Socialist Yugoslavia. For the centenary of the Ottoman handover of the keys of Belgrade to the Serbian *knez*, the state erected a monument at the entrance of the fort. It is rectangular, made of white marble, bearing a relief of the drawing “Handover of Keys” by Adam Stefanović who witnessed the event.<sup>183</sup> It depicts Ali Rıza Pasha handing over the keys to *Knez* Mihailo, and on the left side of the relief the following words are inscribed “On this spot on 6/19 April 1867 the *ferman* of Sultan Abdul Aziz III was read out, consigning the Belgrade, Kladovo, Smederevo and Šabac fortresses to the care of *Knez* Mihailo Obrenović III and the Serbian Army.”<sup>184</sup>

All the built memorials had the purpose of reminding Serbs of the abolition of Ottoman rule, but quite to the contrary, they made the collective memory of Ottoman rule embodied in the fort even stronger. This is probably why the monument representing Despot Stefan Lačević was erected in 1982. It has an important memorial role in connecting the image of Belgrade to Serbian rule. At its foot, Stefan’s words from *The Letter to Belgrade*, which he wrote once he established his seat in Belgrade are inscribed.<sup>185</sup> The monument is dedicated to the “Serbian ruler, poet and founder of Belgrade,” reminding the viewer of the city’s foundation, and therefore of its historical belonging to the Serbian people. However, his personality does not only symbolize the beginning of the existence of Belgrade as the center of “Serbian rule,” the very personality of despot Stefan Lazarević, as a sign, is reminiscent of the collective memory of the battle of Kosovo, where his father, *Knez* Lazar was killed

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<sup>182</sup> Vanušić, Danijela, “The Erection of Monument to Victory in Terazije”, in *Nasledje*, Iss. 8, 193-210, Belgrade: Zavod za zaštitu spomenika grada Beograda, 1990.

<sup>183</sup> Žarković, N., “Site-Place Where the City Keys Were Handed Over to the Serbs”, Belgrade: Zavod za zaštitu spomenika, 2010.

<sup>184</sup> Here and elsewhere translations of Serbian monumental inscriptions are mine.

<sup>185</sup> Filozof, Konstantin, *Povest o slovima : Skazanije o pismenih [tj. pismenih]*, Belgrade: Dositej, 1998 [cc. 1433].

by the Ottomans, and according to the focal national myth “chose Heavenly Kingdom over the earthly kingdom.”

In recent years, two new memorials have been placed in this spot. One is a white stone slab in which the following words are inscribed: “In this spot, on July 22, 1456, the defenders of Belgrade, led by Janos Hunyadi, gained a great victory against the Turks.” The latest monument, erected in 2011, is a bronze model of the castle of despot Stefan Lazarević. This way, the Serbian collective memory of the Kosovo battle and the beginning of Ottoman rule in the present-day territory of Serbia, the struggle against Ottoman domination embodied in Janos Hunyadi, and the overall victory of the Serbian people and the abolition of Ottoman rule are all embodied in the memorials of the fort. Even though almost all the symbols of Ottoman rule have been removed from the fort, all the erected monuments, being placed in relation to the existing collective memory of the fort as a symbol of Ottoman rule and military domination, document loudly Serbian the collective memory of that time.

## 5.2. From Three Gates to Three Realms of Memory

The first urban plan of the city was made by Emilijan Josimović in 1867, when the Serbian *Knez* assumed full power over Belgrade. However, the plan was effectuated only in 1878, after Serbia was recognized as an independent state.<sup>186</sup> In his urban plan, Josimović envisioned the erasure of the moat of the Ottoman town, and the construction of the city’s main square, as a meeting and rallying point, on the spot where the big gates on the outer moat of the Ottoman town (known as the “The Istanbul Gates”) used to be. On the site of the gates, the National Theatre was constructed as a symbol of national cultural revival. The Theatre building closed up the view on the Bayram Bey Mosque, situated right next to the entrance, which was supposed to welcome visitors to the town. After Serbia gained independence, state officials signed a binding agreement not to remove Muslim sacred places, i.e. mosques and tombs. At that point there were still fifteen mosques remaining in Belgrade.<sup>187</sup> The urban plan took the agreement into consideration, but unfortunately, future

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<sup>186</sup> Terzić, D., *Emilijan Josimović: vizionar urbanog Beograda*, Belgrade: Društvo urbanista Beograda, 1994.

<sup>187</sup> Đurić-Zamolo, Divna, *Belgrade Architects between 1815 and 1914*, Belgrade: Muzej grada Beograd, 2011.

architects used some mosques for other purposes. Such an example is the construction of the National Theatre in front of Bayram Bey's Mosque, so that the mosque building could be used to house a gas-powered unit for the Theater.<sup>188</sup> The Mosque, as all other mosques except for one still extant in the city, was demolished at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The building of the Funds' Administration was constructed across the road from the National Theater, retracing the place where market life had begun in the old Ottoman city. The ensemble of those two buildings signifies national cultural places, but also the revival of national culture and the establishment of a national economy, i.e. the abolition of the Ottoman economic system. Furthermore, the building of the Funds' Administration was turned into the National Museum which, as a realm of memory, hosts both the collection of medieval Serbian art, and the paintings of the nineteenth century Serbian painters whose works are visual markers of the Serbian collective memory. Both the *Kosovo Maiden*, and the *Migration of Serbs* paintings are kept in this museum.

The space opening in front of those buildings is dominated by the equestrian monument of *Knez Mihailo*. The pedestal of the monument is an oval relief frieze comprising four compositions. The front and back composition are dedicated to the time of the uprising: the front depicts *knez* Miloš with the Patriarch, symbolizing national continuity, and the back depicts the Serbian fiddle player Filip Višnjić, who appeals to the Serbs to recall the song "The Beginning of the Revolt against the Dahijas," or the first Serbian Uprising, as framed in Serbian collective memory. The west frieze "National Deputation in front of Grand Prince Mihailo," conveys the idea of the restoration of the golden period, i.e. the period prior to the Ottoman's arrival, in the restored state, whereas the east frieze "The Serbs take an oath over the grave of Prince Mihailo" represents the continuity of the ideas he fought for. At the foot of the monument, the names of the six cities in Serbia taken over from the Ottomans by the prince are inscribed, as well as the text, "To Prince Mihailo Obrenović from a grateful Serbia."<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Đurić-Zamolo, Divna, *Belgrade Architects between 1815 and 1914*.

<sup>189</sup> Vesković, Ivana, *Monument to Prince Mihailo in Belgrade*, Belgrade: Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture Beograd, 2010.

This monument does not only signify prince Mihailo, but conceptualizes the whole period of history, starting from the two uprisings, recalling the periods prior to the arrival of the Ottomans, to the period known as the “Liberation of the cities,” as well as sentiments and ideas behind those events. The *Knez*’s head is averted to the left and backwards, towards the old Istanbul road, in the direction of the interior of the old town, his right arm outstretched, pointing with his right hand index finger towards the south, or Istanbul. This gesture is interpreted as telling the Turks to go out of the city, or else, telling the Serbian people to advance towards the other lands in the South, still under the Ottoman rule (see Figure 5.2.).

The whole square should be regarded rather as a realm of memory, than a collection of particular signs. The period of Ottoman rule in Serbia is remembered through the myth of the downfall of the Serbian medieval state, as well as through the events of the nineteenth century, marked by the Ottomans’ maltreatment of the population of Belgrade. Since such living memories no longer existed, the realm of memory was constructed to keep those memories alive. The building built right next to the National Theater has on its façade two reliefs which represent the Ottoman entrance into town, and the Ottoman watchtower that used to be part of the moat, thus providing yet more visual reminders about the collective memory shaped by the Serbian uprisings.

The second road entrance, known as Vidin Kapı, was situated where the entrance to the Muslim part of the city used to be. The extent to which this part of town was shaped in Serbian collective memory as Turkish is best demonstrated by the fact that the only Ottoman toponyms still in use in Belgrade, apart from Kalemegdan, are there. Even though the official name of the quarter has been renamed “Old Town,” the publicly used names are still Ottoman Turkish: Dortyol/Dorćol and Zeyrek/Zerek. In the spot of the former gates, a small church consecrated to Alexander Nevsky was erected, which, at the beginning of the twentieth century, was duly replaced by the still existing monumental church. The symbolic aspect of the church is that it is dedicated to the Russian saint glorified as the defender of Orthodox Christianity in Russia, and that it symbolically stands at the entrance to the previously Turkish Muslim part of the town. The Karađorđević dynasty, after WWI, constructed a memorial for the victims of the “defense wars between 1876 and 1918.” As the collective memory of Ottoman rule was constructed through the negative image of

conversion to Islam to which, according to the narrative, Serbs were subjected, this symbolical retracing of the town where the Muslim population lived, played the role of a reminder of those events, as the defense of Christianity and “Islamization” are shaped as juxtaposed in Serbian collective memory.

The part of the moat surrounding the Serbian part of the city, where the so-called Varoš Kapija/Gates (lit. trans. town entrance gates) used to be, was reconstructed into three small squares, named after the three legendary figures of Miloš Obilić, Ivan Kosančić, and Milan Toplica, who were depicted as having fought and died in the Kosovo Battle.<sup>190</sup> “Three Voyvodas last of all did enter [the Kosovo plain]: First of them was Milosh, the great warrior, Ivan Kossanchich was close behind him, And the third, Toplitza Milan, followed.”<sup>191</sup> Miloš Obilić is shaped through the epic poetry as the bravest warrior who killed Sultan Murad in the Battle of Kosovo. Furthermore, even though it is well known by now that Ivan Kosančić is an invented historical character, the small square dedicated to him is adorned with his bust (see Figure 5.3.).<sup>192</sup> This is an extraordinary example of the way in which cultural memory is capable of shaping collective memory and making recollections more realistic for the collectives using them. The truth of the story is not important, in comparison to its value in shaping the collective memory of past event. Therefore, Milan Toplica and Ivan Kosančić, through forms of the cultural memory, preserve the memory of the Kosovo battle, about military valor and shaping the mythical value in the collective.

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<sup>190</sup> Squares are called “rims” which shows yet again that imagination of space was that this is the edge of the town, while it was constructed as the center of the city.

<sup>191</sup> The Kosovo Maiden, epic poem, verse 29-31.

<sup>192</sup> In 2011 a new Serbian school curricula introduced the explanation that those two warriors are fictional characters, which caused a huge outcry of the public.



Right: Figure 5.2.: Monument to *Knez Mihailo Obrenović* in the Republic Square.  
Left: Figure 5.3.: Bust of Ivan Kosančić situated on Kosančić Square.

In 2004, marking the bicentenary of the Uprising, the memorial plaques were placed on the buildings constructed in the places where those three gates used to stand. The plaque placed on the National Theater (see Figure 5.4.) bears the picture of the Istanbul Gates, and the following text:

In this spot, there used to be the Stamboul Gates, through which the road leading to Istanbul (Carigrad) was passing. During the liberation of Belgrade in the First Serbian Uprising, on December 13, 1806, 3,000 rebels went through the Gates, headed by Voivoda of Gračac, Vasa Čarapić. On that occasion, Čarapić was killed fighting for the ideals of freedom and the creation of the Serbian state.



The plaque is positioned on the building in the place where the Varoš Gates used to be i.e. the entrance to the Christian part of town is adorned with a stylistic picture (see Figure 5.5.). In the middle of the composition, a crossed pistol and a knife used in the Balkans in the beginning of the nineteenth century are depicted. They are encircled with a garland, half of which are lilies and the other vine flowers. This is highly symbolic representation of the armed struggle for peace and Christianity. The plaque bears the following explanation:



In this spot, there used to be the Varoš Gates, which was the entrance into the town of Belgrade. During the battle for the liberation of Belgrade in the First Serbian Uprising, on December 13, 1806, 3,000 rebels went through these gates, headed by *Knez* Sima Markovic. The heroism of the rebels and those who fell as victims during the liberation of Belgrade, will remain in their descendants' permanent memory.

On the school building next to the church of Alexander Nevsky, where the Vidin Kapi used to be, the plaque depicting a fragment of the Ottoman town, with a house bearing a crescent and star as an ornament on its façade is placed (see Figure 5.6.). Underneath the picture, the following text is inscribed:

In this spot, in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, there used to be the Vidin Gate, which was the entrance into the town of Belgrade. On the occasion of the liberation of Belgrade on the 13th Dec 1806, the rebels headed by Stanoje Glavaš and Vule Ilić Kolarac assumed control of the gate and penetrated the city. By occupying Belgrade, Karađorđe's rebels made a great contribution to the struggle of the Serbian people for the liberation from the century-long Turkish enslavement and for the creation of their state.



Left, Figure 5.4. Plaque positioned in the place where *Istanbul Gates* used to stand. Middle, Figure 5.5. Plaque positioned in the place where *Varoš Gates* used to stand. Right, Figure 5.6. Plaque positioned in the place where *Vidin Gates* used to stand.

It is noteworthy that the marking of the bicentenary did not involve the construction of monuments dedicated to the Serbian national past, but instead, the reconstruction of Ottoman sites. Those three sites, where the city gates used to be,

were reconstructed in a symbolical way at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. At that point, there was still a living memory of the Ottoman town, and the newly constructed sites had a dialectic meaning. However, in the beginning of the twenty first century, there was clearly no living memory of the Ottoman town, and communicative memory of those sites was fading, and therefore, the dialectic meaning was lost. In order to keep the memory of the Ottoman rule alive in the urban fabric, it was necessary to revive the memory of the Ottoman town. This way, the constructed sites of the city of Belgrade, i.e. Republic Square, church of Alexander Nevsky, and three small squares dedicated to Miloš Obilić, Milan Toplica, and Ivan Kosačić, with the new memorial plaques, continued to revive the dialectic meaning of the sites. In this way, those three sites became three realms of memory of the Ottoman rule. Furthermore, these plaques closely communicate with the sites in the capital of Serbia.

### **5.3. Four Ottoman Edifices – Four Serbian Realms of Memory**

With his sentence “Wouldn't it hurt our pride, if Belgrade were to retain the form it was given by the barbarians?” Emilijan Josimović began drafting his plan, which was to alter the image of the city, aiming at an ultimate breakaway from the Ottoman past. His attitude refers to the collective image created by nationalists of the Ottoman space as “backward,” one that independent Serbia needed to erase in the process of modernization.<sup>193</sup>

Cutting across the Ottoman town, and opening the boulevards, aimed at shaping the city through its new visual identity. Emilijan Josimović, who was also the first professor of architecture in Belgrade, saw the architect as a person who needs to foster “good taste in the people” and to teach them how to “like good European style.”<sup>194</sup> Architects constructing buildings along the new axis followed these instructions, constructing monumental edifices in the architectural styles of Vienna and Paris of the time.<sup>195</sup> This altered the collective expression of Ottoman architecture

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<sup>193</sup> Jovanović, Miloš, “The city in our hands: Urban Management and Contested Modernity in the Nineteenth Century Belgrade”, in *Urban History*, 40/1, 2013, 32-50.

<sup>194</sup> See Terzić, Dušan, *Emilijan Josimović: vizionar urbanog Beograda*, and IAB, Josimović, Emilijan, *Objašnjenje predloga za regulisanje onog dela varoši što leži u šancu*, 1867.

<sup>195</sup> Đurić-Zamolo, Divna, *Belgrade Architects between 1815 and 1914*.

of the town. Not only was the European architecture of the time incorporated into the city, but new generations of architects in search for “Serbian architectural style” incorporated motives from the architecture of medieval Serbian monasteries in their artistic expression.<sup>196</sup> This invention of tradition in the façades had an impact on the creation of an illusion of spatial unity and continuity of the two spaces, i.e. that of the newly emerging Serbian principality and that of “old Serbia,” shaping further collective memory through visual expression. On the other hand, works of Ottoman architecture still extant in some parts of Serbia were assigned the common label of “Serbian Balkan architecture” by Serbian art historians. It is a common thread of nationalist labeling of the vernacular Ottoman architecture in national terms, which happened in all the states that were established after the abolition of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>197</sup>

From the architectural point of view, present-day Belgrade has preserved only five houses bearing the visible influence of the Ottoman Balkan style. Those buildings are: *Knez Miloš's* Residency in Topcider and that of his wife Ljubica, built in the Serbian part of the Ottoman town, the merchant Manak's house, the Museum of Vuk and Dositej, and the tavern named “Question mark.” Turning those places into realms of memory reshaped collective memory of those places, i.e., to use Halbwachs's terms, a new canvas was put into the old framework, changing the framework as well.

*Knez Miloš's* Residence has been turned into the Museum of Serbian History that is devoted to the events of the nineteenth century and the emergence of the Serbian nation-state. At the entrance to the Museum, the timeline of the history events is given, that begins with the year 1789, as the date of French Revolution, to continue to 1804, i.e. “Serbian Revolution,” comparing and lumping ideological the two events. *Knjeginja Ljubica's* Residence has been turned into a museum as well. The museum is organized such that different rooms and different floors contain displays of furniture, pictures, and garments that were used by Serbian leaders, from the early nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. In other words, the museum follows the

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<sup>196</sup> See Pantelić, Bratislav, “Identity Reshaping in the Balkans in the First Two Centuries: The Case of Serbia”, in *Journal of Design History*, 20/2, 2007, 131-144.

<sup>197</sup> See Artan, Tülay, “Question of Ottoman identity and Architectural History”, in Arnold, Dana, Altan Ergut, Elvan Altan, and Turan Özkaya, Belgin, eds., *Rethinking Architectural Historiography*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, 85-110.

“modernization” of the Serbian elite’s visual expressions, from Ottoman garments to the adoption of European styles.

Manako’s house has been turned into a museum where the traditional clothes of the Kosovo Serbs are displayed. The building in which the Museum of Vuk and Dositej is situated today was originally built during the early eighteenth century as the home of a now unknown wealthy Turkish man, and as such represents the only Ottoman house preserved to this day.<sup>198</sup> Having been converted, the house no longer signifies the life of the rich Turk, but rather the Serbian national revival, changes in education, the rights Serbs gained by rebellions, recalling the rights they had not previously enjoyed. Yet again, this is a realm of memory of Serbian history that is juxtaposed to Ottoman rule. And the tavern “Question Mark,” represents the place in which the political ideas for the national uprising were shaped.

As collective memory of modernization of the city is dialectically connected to that of de-Ottomanization, therefore the carriers of the cultural memory of modernization are at the same time the bearers of collective memory of Ottomanization. In that way, the realms of memory of the modernization of Serbia are at the same time the realms of memory of Ottoman rule. These buildings are therefore the hallmarks of the image of “backwardness” in which the Ottoman Empire, as the “Empire without the culture,” is present within the city.

#### **5.4. The Poetics of Streets**

It is worth mentioning the symbolic quality of naming the streets in this part of the city.<sup>199</sup> The first law on the naming of streets was introduced in 1864, and almost all existing streets were named predominantly after the toponyms with which they were interconnected. However, after 1874, new streets with new names emerged. Even though Belgrade changed the names of its streets as often as the state of which it was the capital changed its ideology, most of the street names given in the nineteenth century and bearing the names of the figures connected to the Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule remained the same. The new street constructed in the city

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<sup>198</sup> Đurić-Zamolo, D., *Beograd kao orijentalna varoš pod Turcima*.

<sup>199</sup> For more on names of streets and squares in Belgrade: Radulović, Jovan et al (eds), *Ulice i trgovi Beograda*, 2 Volumes, Beograd: Biblioteka grada Beograda, 2004.

axis was named *Knez Mihailo's Street*, which continues into *Kralj Milan's street*, while the perpendicular axis was named *Knez Miloš's street*. The main orientation points of the city were in this way named after the figures perceived as the founders of the Serbian nation-state. The whole plexus of streets bears the names of historical figures connected to the nineteenth-century history of "national revival," as well as medieval Serbian historical figures and fictional characters connected to the myth of Kosovo.

Therefore, in the city center of Belgrade, for almost a century and a half, not only have there existed two streets named after the only two Emperors of the short-lived medieval empire, but also two more streets, called Emperor Lazar and Empress Milica street. Even though Lazar and Milica had only the titles of Duke and Duchess, this is how they are shaped in the collective memory of the Serbian epic poetry about the Kosovo Battle. Such shaping of the two characters in poetry allowed for the imagination of the end of the Serbian Empire with the arrival of the Ottomans. Therefore this collective memory and myth are shaped through the names of the streets as well. Moreover, the names of two other streets in the city center, i.e. Brothers' Jugović Street and Jug Bogdan's Street, are derived from the names of a father and his nine sons, who allegedly fought and were killed in the Kosovo battle. However, they are merely legendary figures.

Lord of Hosts, how passing the great marvel,  
When the army camps on Kosovo  
In its ranks the Juvovitch – nine brothers,  
And the tenth, the Jug Bogdan, their father.<sup>200</sup>

The collective memory of the Kosovo Battle shaped the epic song "The Death of the Jugovićs' Mother," which depicts the story of a mother who saw her husband Jug Bogdan (in the poetic imagination, Empresses Milica's brother), and their nine sons off to the army to fight in Kosovo. After the battle, in the aftermath of the horror and bloodshed, she (the Jugovićs' mother) finds all her sons and her husband decapitated, but is depicted as a brave woman who manages to sustain her sorrow. It

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<sup>200</sup> Serbian Epic poem "The Death of Mother Jugovitch", in Rotham, Helen transl., *Kossovo, heroic songs of the Serbs*, University of California libraries, 1920, 85.

was only when she, accompanied by her daughter-in-law, sees her youngest son's severed arm, and his dead body, that she dies as well:

“Thou dear hand, oh thou my fair green apple,  
Where didst blossom? Where has fate now plucked thee?  
Woe is me! Thou blossomed on my bosom,  
Thou wast plucked, alas, upon Kossovo!”  
And the mother's heart swelled big with anguish,  
Swelled the mother's heart, and broke with sorrow  
For her dead, the Jugovitch—nine brothers  
And the tenth, the Jug Bogdan, their father.<sup>201</sup>

These are the lyrics through which the collective memory of the Kosovo Battle is transmitted to society today. By using the power of naming this collective memory, it is being inscribed into the physical space of the capital city. Therefore, collective memory of the death that was inflicted upon the Serbian people by the Ottoman conquest is written upon the surface of the city center of Belgrade. Another street name, again according to the legendary figure, is that of Strahinja Banović, son-in-law of the Jugović family. The poem about Strahinja Banović is part of the “pre-Kosovo cycle of poems.” It says that, while he was visiting his in-laws, he received a message from his mother that the Turks had looted his property:

In all the Turkish hordes, there is one man  
More terrible and cruel than the rest-  
He is renegade Vlah-Aliya (...)  
(...) he came upon the road  
That leads to Banska, our Banska, my son,  
And bitter grief he brought to all of us.  
He destroyed our homes with burning fire-  
The very ruins scattered – nothing's left.  
Your faithful servants all have fled away  
And has done your mother grievous harm,  
He threw her under his horse and broke her bones,  
He seized your own true love, your very wife!  
And carried her away to Kosovo,  
And had her in his tent throughout the night.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>201</sup> Serbian epic poem “The Death of Mother Jugovic”, in Rotham, Helen transl., *Kossovo, heroic songs of the Serbs*, University of California libraries, 1920, 91.

<sup>202</sup> Serbian epic poem “Banovitch Strahinya”, in Locke N.W., Goeffrey, transl., *The Serbian Epic Ballad: An Anthology*, Belgrade: Tanes, 2011, 101-102.

The poem goes on to depict his bravery and wisdom, owing to which he managed to save his wife. He is portrayed as the most romantic of all characters in epic poetry, because he understood the position of his wife, who was doomed by the fact that she had been abducted, and would have been killed by her own brothers because of this, and had tried to kill him when she saw him coming. The important moment is that this is the first poem of a sequence depicting the abduction of Serbian women by Turks. Moreover, it outlines the inevitable death sentence that such an action would incur for the woman. Also, it puts the man in the position of savior of the woman, in order to protect his property, his face and his progeny. Such pictures of collective memory were actually used during the war in Bosnia in the 1990's to justify the mass rapes. Even more indicative is the fact that such things were never taught in history, but have been preserved through poetry in the collective memory.

Another character, a historical figure, an Ottoman vassal, but the way he and his feats were described in epic poetry is completely unreal. There are so many poems about him that they are divided into separate cycles. Marko is a macho character, who is always embroiled in some kind of dispute with the Turks, whom he always outwits or overpowers. The Serbian phrase *saterao cara do duvara* (trans. until the Sultan was against the wall), which is used to convey the meaning that someone has been cornered, is actually a line from the poem "Marko drinks wine during Ramadan." In that poem, during the month of Ramadan, Marko drinks wine, wears green robes and dances and sings during the day, and when Sultan Suleiman himself comes to reprimand him, Marko explains that he can do all those things as a Christian and unmarried man and makes it clear that he will fight back the person closest to him if attacked:

The Sultan looked all round. No one  
Was sitting nearer Marko than himself.  
The Sultan edged the way- Marko followed,  
Until the Sultan was against the wall.  
Then in haste, the Sultan reached his pockets  
And found a hundred ducats, which he gave  
To Marko: "There now, Marko, my good friend,  
Take these, and drink as much wine as you want."<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> Serbian epic poem "Marko drinks wine during Ramadan", in Locke N.W., Goeffrey, transl., *The Serbian Epic Ballads*, 177.

Although other verses from poems about Marko are currently used in metaphoric language, the poem “Marko Kraljević abolishes Wedding Tax” is compulsory in the school syllabi. In the poem, Marko meets a beautiful unmarried girl, who explains that she will not wed because a Turkish pasha in Kosovo has introduced “wedding tax,” which comprises high levies to be paid and his right to consume the first wedding night with the bride. Marko then finds the evil Turk, kills him and thus abolishes “wedding tax.” This is yet another way of building a memory of Ottoman Turks molesting women.

Next, there is a network of streets named after “famous” haiduk and “uskok” (“the ones who jumped in,” i.e. the ones who ambushed, from the surrounding territories of the Ottoman Empire and fought a guerrilla war). As already explained, they are glorified as brave people and even their wrongdoings are constructed through poetry in such a way that they are justified. It can be said that they are portrayed as figures similar to Robin Hood.

For here I guard the roads between the hills-  
I await the Sarajevo merchants,  
And relieve them of their golds and silver,  
Precious silks and velvet cloth; so that I  
And my company can dress like kings!  
For I am skilled in sally and retreat,  
And I can deal with perils of all kinds –  
There is no one I fear, but God Himself.<sup>204</sup>

The rest of the street networks were renamed according to the historical figures of the first and the second uprising, shaping the town through the collective memory of rebellion, and the retaking of the town from the Ottomans. The old Istanbul road, which still exists in the city starting from the National Theater and going straight into the fortress, was renamed after Vasa Čarapić. Čarapić was engaged in the First Serbian Uprising and wounded in front of the Istanbul gate (Location of the National Theater). This street continues into Uzun Mirko’s street, which enters the fort. It was named after a Serbian historical figure engaged both in the First and the Second Serbian

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<sup>204</sup> Serbian epic poem “Starina Novak and Kney Bogosav”, in Locke N.W., Goeffrey, transl., *The Serbian Epic Ballads*, 247.



Uprisings.<sup>205</sup> The street leading from the spot where the Varoš Gates used to be is named after *Knez* Sima Marković and Pop Luka, who were also leading figures of the First Uprising. All in all, forty-five streets are named after prominent figures who fought against the Ottoman rule, not necessarily Serbs. For example, one street was named after Rigas Feraios, who is venerated in Greek nationalist discourses as an enlightened revolutionary. The Ottomans killed him in Belgrade. There is also a monument to him at the beginning of the street. On the bicentenary of the Uprising, all the forty-five streets were labeled with marble plaques, bearing explanations about the figures and events they were named after. In this way, the names of those streets of Belgrade are not only reminders, but actually documents of Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule.

These are just a few examples of using the naming of streets as a means of fostering cultural memory. In this way, the streets in the city center became bearers of the Serbian collective memory. Even though they seem to be reminiscent of the narrative about the Serbian past, through a dialectic process, they at the same time serve as reminders of what those figures had fought against, shaping and remembering Ottoman rule in a particular way.

### **5.5. Two Memorials of Ottoman Rule**

As identity is constructed by simultaneously constructing alterity, this means that the narratives of “self” are at the same time narratives of the “other.” While the memory of Ottoman rule in Belgrade is placed almost exclusively within the narratives about “self”, there are two memorials that directly produce the narrative about “alterity.”

The memorial that dominates the view over the city and closes up the new axis is Saint Sava’s temple. Built as the largest Orthodox Christian temple in the Balkans, it was constructed at the alleged spot where the remains of the Serbian patron Saint Sava, previously exhumed from the Monastery of Mileševa in southern Serbia, were burnt in 1595 upon the order of Sinan Pasha.<sup>206</sup> The cult of Saint Sava is among the

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<sup>205</sup> For more on names of streets and squares in Belgrade: Radulović, J. et al (eds), “*Ulice i trgovi Beograda*“, 2 Volumes, Beograd: Biblioteka grada Beograda, 2004.

<sup>206</sup> Norris, D. A., “*Belgrade: A Cultural History*”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

most important among the Serbs, as he was the inceptor of the independent Serbian Orthodox Church, but also part of the “Serbian sacred family Nemanjić,” thus representing both a spiritual and a secular leader.<sup>207</sup> The first church consecrated to Saint Sava was built on this spot to mark the three hundredth anniversary of the event, and ten years later, the construction of the Saint Sava temple began.<sup>208</sup> While this temple is a memorial to Ottoman cruelty in the town, it is also pillar of the identity of the Serbian nation.

Another memorial that depicts the cruelty of the Ottoman rule in Belgrade is the water fountain constructed in the form of a monument named Čukur česma after Turkish name Çukur Çeşme (pit fountain), which in today’s Serbian language does not have any meaning, except for denominating the monument. Therefore, the very name of the monument incorporates the memory, which again shows how powerful a memory bearer language is. It was constructed in the place where a fountain in the Ottoman period existed, next to which a Serbian apprentice was killed by a Turkish police officer in 1862, which resulted in another rebellion by the population. Serbian collective memory takes this event to be the trigger for negotiations between *Knez Mihailo* and the Ottoman Porte. It is being remembered that after four years of negotiations starting from this event, *Knez Mihailo* was handed the keys of Ottoman Belgrade and six other towns. The monument depicting a dead, naked young boy, with water flowing out of his broken pitcher, gives a rather emotional character, demonstrating the torture and inhuman actions of Turkish fighters, and showing how the event is framed in the collective memory (see Figure 5.7.).<sup>209</sup> The inscription on the monument says: “In memory of the events of May 26, 1862, this monument was erected by Evandjel Toma’s Foundation.” The inscription indicates that it was not “an event” in which the apprentice was killed, but the set of events, i.e. cruelty of the Turkish rule that ended in the “Liberation of the Cities.” For the study of collective memory, it is not important to what extent the causes and effect of those events in the past were true or not. It is rather the discourse through which they have been shaped

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<sup>207</sup> Dynasty Nemanjić is called “sacred family”, as all of the rulers, except from Tsar Dušan, were proclaimed saints by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Simić Milovanović, Zorka “Simeon Roksandić 1873-1943“, *Godišnjak Muzeja grada Beograda IX-X*, Belgrade 1962-1963.

and handed down until the present that is important. Those collective memories are still extant in the city and as such represent society's tangible memory.



Figure 5.7. Čukur česma in Dobračina Street, Belgrade.

## 5.6. Final Remarks

Out of the entire Ottoman town of Belgrade, only four memorials harbor the memory of the Ottoman past, those being: two tombs, one situated in Kalemegdan and the other in Dortyol/Dorćol district, a modest mosque in the Dortyol/Dorćol district, and a fountain allegedly built by Mehmed Pasha Sokollu/Sokolović to serve Sultan Suleyman's mosque. While the fountain has the value in the Serbian collective memory embodied in the character of Mehmed Pasha, the other three Ottoman monuments only serve as reminders that the Ottoman Empire intermittently ruled the town over three and a half centuries.

On the other hand, Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule is not mediated as much through the narratives about the Ottoman past, as it is through the narratives about the Kosovo Battle, the uprisings of the nineteenth century, and the Balkan Wars. The reconstruction of the city of Belgrade which took place in the late nineteenth

century and the beginning of the twentieth incorporated this timeline of collective memory into the framework of the city. Through various tactics of construction of new memorials, construction of realms of memory, reshaping of the existing memorials from the Ottoman town, and the naming of streets, the town has been reconstructed as an epitome and guardian of the Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule. Moreover, the city emerged through the discourse of modernization, i.e. de-Ottomanisation. While this had the purpose of silencing the narrative of the previous structure of the town, the superposition of the dialectics of the modern city only fostered the image of the Ottoman town, therefore keeping its memory alive.



## CHAPTER 6 COMMEMORATIVE PRACTICES

Collective memory of Ottoman rule is closely connected with the construction of national identity. Therefore, the national narrative plays an important role in mediating collective memory, socializing individuals into society, and familiarizing the individual with collective identity. However, neither identity nor memory are structures that can be acquired once and for all; as processes, both memory and identity are continuously actualized and performed. As Homi K. Bhabha formulates it at the beginning of “DissemiNation Time, Narrative and Margins of Modern Nation,” “there is no simple formation, there are no simple answers to any social formation.”<sup>210</sup> For Bhabha, the origin of the nation is in the “effect of narrative struggle,” which is mirrored in constant tension between the pedagogical and the performative aspects of the narrative. People are “pedagogical objects” constructed in performance of narrative and “its emancipatory present marked in the repetition and pulsation of national sign.”<sup>211</sup> Therefore, while people are socialized into their communities through narratives, it is the performative aspect that would constantly challenge those acquired stories about self and collective.

The scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a coherent national culture, while the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle of national subjects. In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of writing the nation.<sup>212</sup>

In other words, it is not only important to familiarize an individual with cultural signs, but it is also necessary to continuously turn back to those narratives, to repeat and perform them. It is through the mode of repetition that those identities are enabled to reach a higher level of homogeneity.

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<sup>210</sup> Bhabha K, Homi, “DissemiNation: Time Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation”, in Bhabha, Homi, ed., *Nation and Narration*, London: Routledge, 1990, 291-323, 289.

<sup>211</sup> Bhabha K, Homi, “DissemiNation,” 299.

<sup>212</sup> Bhabha K, Homi, “DissemiNation,” 297.

Nothing is as powerful in reproducing collective memory as commemorative practices. While the community can produce new signs from time to time, contributing to the span of cultural memory, and in that respect secure the recursive practice of actualization of collective memory, commemorative practices secure this actualization through the fixation of rhythms for society. Not only does commemorative practice allow repetition in time, but it also allows for the “constancy of place.”<sup>213</sup> It actualizes the commemorative place and the accumulated signs, and therefore secures a social “replay.” When it comes to state practices, public calendar “constitutes powerful basis for ‘mechanical’ solidarity within the group.”<sup>214</sup> Public calendars “aim at highlighting similitude among groups members vis-à-vis other,” and therefore can serve both as unifiers and dividers of collectives.<sup>215</sup> Therefore, commemorative practices are the best example of the performative aspect of the identity narrative. In this chapter I will turn to the analysis of the official/public calendars and some of the commemorative practices initiated since the inception of independent Serbia, to see how collective memory has been replayed and handed down through the modes of performativity until today.

### **6.1. The Establishment of Public Calendars in the Serbian State**

When the Ottoman Empire introduced semiannual tax collection, it was proclaimed in the Autonomous Principality of Serbia that the taxes would be collected on Saint George’s (April 23) Day and on Saint Dimitri’s Day (October 26). The First Uprising is said to have begun on Palm Sunday (a week before Easter), and the Second Uprising on the Day of Presentation of Jesus to the temple (February 2). On that same date, February 2, 1835, the short-lived first Serbian Constitution was adopted in the Autonomous Principality of Serbia. Whether one can identify the exact day of the uprising is another question, but it is likely the people agreed to gather on that particular day and manifest their dissatisfaction with the way they were being governed. Given the fact that the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities within the Empire followed different calendars, the Church calendar was the way to fix time

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<sup>213</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 46.

<sup>214</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Hidden Rhymes: Schedules and Calendars in Social life*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981, 70.

<sup>215</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Hidden Rhymes*, 70.

for members of the Christian community to organize themselves. As the church collected taxes, the collection dates were fixed on dates venerating certain saints. The rhythm of society was organized according to the church calendar, and this might well be the reason why the Christians started the Uprising on Palm Sunday. These were the days that were important for the social organization of the community.

Since its inception as an autonomous principality, the Serbian state adhered to the Julian, i.e. the Orthodox Church calendar. It was only in 1918, after the formation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, that time began to be kept by the Gregorian calendar used in the rest of Europe.<sup>216</sup> However, the Serbian Orthodox Church has remained bound by the Julian calendar to this day.

The first official calendar was adopted in the Principality by *Knez* Mihailo. The calendar was shaped through state, Church, and dynastic celebrations. The official holidays were Palm Sunday, as the day of the Second Uprising, Saint Andrew's Day, after the patron saint of Serbia, and the *Knez*'s birthday. Working official holidays were the day of the *Knez*'s slava (family patron Saint), and his wife's birthday.<sup>217</sup> Therefore, already in the first calendar, the practice of commemorating the Second Uprising was established as a performative collective practice. As nationalism was on the rise at that moment, it was in this period that the Uprising was integrated into the "national revival" discourse.

After the Berlin Congress, and the achievement of de jure independence, the Serbian ruler Milan abolished religious commemorations such as "the day of the patron saint of Serbia" in public calendars. However, dynastic and state holidays still continued to be celebrated. Therefore, according to the announcement, besides the *Knez*'s and his son's birthdays as dynastic holidays, the official state holiday remained Palm Sunday. A new holiday was introduced on June 20.<sup>218</sup> This was the date when *Knez* Milan declared war against the Ottoman Empire in 1876.

On this day, the earth begins its seventh cycle around the sun since the war for Serbian independence was declared, for the liberation and

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<sup>216</sup> *Zakon o izjednačavanju starog i novog kalendara*, January 19, 1919, Official Gazette No 1. January 12, 1919.

<sup>217</sup> *Zbornik zakona i uredbi i uredbenih ukaza izdatih u Kneževstvu srpskom*, 5. jula do 28. oktobra 1878, knjiga 33, Beograd, 1883, strana 91.

<sup>218</sup> *Zbornik zakona i uredbi i uredbenih ukaza izdatih u Kneževstvu srpskom*, 20. jula 1882 do 19. februara 1883, knjiga 38, Beograd, 1883, strana 451.

unification of Serbs ... It entailed the powerful protection of the great Slavic empire, and with that protection, the glorious completion of the war was made possible... Without Đunis, there would not have been Nis, nor would there have been Grdelica, nor Vranje ... But there would not be Austria in Bosnia either, exclaim our enemies [Ottoman Empire], therefore, enemies of the war for freedom and independence. And it was easier to definitely seize Bosnia from rotten Turkey, than it will be from a sinewy and progressive Austria.<sup>219</sup>

The same year, Milan was crowned as the “the first crowned king after Kosovo,” the new calendar was introduced. The date of the Second Uprising remained among the official commemorations of Serbia, as long as the dynasty Obrenović was ruling Serbia. However, the day on which Serbia declared war against the Ottoman Empire was abolished, and the date of February 22, as the date of the independence of Serbia, i.e. of the Berlin Congress, and the date on which Milan was crowned, was established in calendars. It was declared to be “state and national celebration of Serbia’s independence and *renewal* of the Kingdom of Serbia.”<sup>220</sup> The coronation on the same date as independence has the role of establishing the rhythm of time as Zerubavel notes.<sup>221</sup> However, a crucial notion was made with the use of ordinal numbers in the official title. “*The first* crowned king *after* Kosovo,” in which “Kosovo” refers to the Kosovo Battle, suggests the continuity of the newly established Kingdom of Serbia with the medieval state. It indicates the renewal of the medieval kingdom, but at the same time the establishment of the new royal lineage, i.e. Milan Obrenović “the first king.” Furthermore, the crown title is in the support of the Kosovo myth, as it suggests the medieval kingdom ended with the Kosovo Battle, even though it was abolished before that event took place. It allowed the establishment of temporal continuity with the medieval kings of Serbia and the newly established kingdom, but it also allows for spatial imagination of the Kingdom of Serbia as having the historical right on the territory of the mediaeval Serbia. Most importantly, however, the mental time-map was shaped in this manner as the last kingdom before the Kosovo battle, i.e. the beginning of Ottoman rule, and the first after the Berlin congress, i.e. the abolition of Ottoman rule.

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<sup>219</sup> Daily Newspaper *Vreme*, June 20, 1882, 1.

<sup>220</sup> *Zbornik zakona i uredbi*, 1882, my emphasis added.

<sup>221</sup> Zerubavel, Eviatar, *Time Maps*, 46-48.



For Palm Sunday, the following program was announced to commemorate Independence Day every year:

Serbian Palm Sunday, commemorating the Takovo Uprising ... For every Serb, Serbian Palm Sunday invokes memories of heroic and outstanding deeds of *Knez Miloš* ... historical events instill us with courage and hope for a nicer and better future, and remind us of our debt of profound gratitude and the filial piety we owe the shadows of these great Serbian rulers.

Attendance of the thanksgiving rites, which will be performed in the Congregational Church and in the upper city [the Kalemegdan fort], decorating houses with flags and illuminating them in the evening, will be a token of our gratitude and recognition of the great MILOŠ ... and a manifestation of our love and devotion for their honorable descendent, our beloved Master and King, Aleksandar I.<sup>222</sup>

Such performances in the city were used to revive the collective memory of the Uprising, infused with a new meaning. The commemoration was held at the Kalemegdan fort, therefore performing the same acts as those of the people in the Uprisings who broke into the Belgrade fort in order to take it over. Each year, the state organized decorations of the houses in the city, and in that way, even those who did not participate in the event in the fort could participate in the performance of the whole event.

April 6, the date on which, according to the Julian calendar, *Knez Mihailo* received the keys of Belgrade, was commemorated on the local level with Church processions and laying flowers at the foot of *Knez Mihailo*'s monument. In the year 1889, the date of Palm Sunday coincided with April 6, so the two commemorations were held together. The program of the celebration for April 1, 1889, the date of the Palm Sunday that year, was as follows:

Cannons will be fired from the ramparts, a church service will be held, and after thanksgiving, the metropolitan will go with a priest and representatives of the Municipality to the monument of *Knez Mihailo*, where a church memorial will be held. The representatives of the Municipality will lay a wreath, and all the choral societies will sing the national anthem.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> *Beogradske Opštinske novine*, April 6, 1901, 1.

<sup>223</sup> *Beogradske Opštinske novine*, April 5, 1889, 1.

The program further envisioned musical performances in the city throughout the night, and plays commemorating these events in the National Theater. All the memorials that are in a dialectic position to their Ottoman past were revived through this manifestation. Furthermore, both the performances at the National Theater and the thanksgiving memorials functioned to perform the collective memory of Ottoman Rule, by expressing gratitude for its abolition through the events that are commemorated. In this way, the entire city became the theater of collective memory.

The end of the nineteenth century marks the period in which Serbia was still shaping its national political ideology, and this is reflected in the public calendar as well. Kosovo, in its symbolical meaning, was very vivid in the communicative memory of the society. By collecting and recording epic poetry, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić turned the communicative memory into cultural memory as well. While the symbolic Kosovo was vivid in collective memory, the geographical Kosovo was not, as it was still part of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>224</sup> However, with the crowning of the king, geography entered public discourse more vividly and started shaping the politics of the Empire more vigorously.

The end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries marked the crucial moment in shaping national identity, and therefore, in shaping Serbian (national) collective memory as well. However, at this point, using the term “the emergence of the Serbian nation” is still disputable, as peasants, who still made up the majority of the population, demonstrated local rather than national allegiances. The war Serbia declared on the Ottoman Empire had probably not yet been reshaped in the memory of the population, as a War of Liberation for the Serbian people. However, the Kosovo myth was part of their collective memory. Being crowned as “the first king after Kosovo,” not only allowed for interconnecting the symbolic with the geographical, but also for connecting the collective memory of Christians, who waited for the promised Christian kingdom to be resurrected, and the official kingdom of Serbia.

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<sup>224</sup> In her article, Milica Bakić-Hayden points to the geographical and symbolic aspect of Kosovo myth. For more, see Bakić-Hayden, Milica, “National Memory and Narrative Memory: the Case Study of Kosovo,” in *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, Todorova, Maria, ed, New York: New York University press, 2004, 25-40.

In 1889, King Milan abdicated in favor of his son Aleksandar, on 22 February, so the date gained a triple meaning: independence, and the coronation of two kings, sequencing the events from history. The same year was marked by the commemoration of the quincentenary of the Kosovo battle, and it was then that June 15 (as the Julian calendar was still officially in use) was made one of the official holidays as well. It entered the official calendar as the “memorial [day] for Serbian warriors who died for their faith and Fatherland.”<sup>225</sup> As Kosovo was not Part of Serbia, King Aleksandar went to Kruševac and laid the foundation for the construction of the memorial for *Knez Lazar* of the medieval state and for the Kosovo battle:

Here in Kruševac, in the former seat of Tsar Lazar’s throne, On Saint Vitus Day, the fifteenth of June of the year one thousand eight hundred ninety-nine since Christ our Savior was born; on the day of the five hundredth anniversary of the downfall of the Serbian empire at Kosovo, by the grace of God and the will of the people, the King of Serbia ALEKSANDAR I, in the presence of His Deputies, the Government, Hierarchs, representatives of state authorities, the people, the clergy, and the army, laid the foundation for this Monument of popular gratitude TO TSAR LAZAR and his glorious heroes who were slain at Kosovo on Saint Vitus Day on 15th June 1389, bravely defending the Fatherland, the Faith, and the Freedom of the Serbian people “To be narrated and handed down, as long as people and Kosovo shall be” [Verses from Epic Poem *Tsar Lazar and Tsaritsa Militsa*].<sup>226</sup>

Those ceremonies have the same function as the religious ceremonies that Halbwachs depicted in *Topography of the Holy Lands*. The same paths are walked, memorials are constructed, and through the performative practice, the collective memory is produced. It is indicative that *Knez Lazar* is referred to as tsar at this point as well. The following part of the speech delivered on that occasion confirms that this is also the pillar of the collective memory of the Ottoman Empire:

With the full force of its fanaticism, uncouth Islam overran the meek Serbian lands, building its glory on the shattered glory of the Serbian people. It is to that power— which in the East destroyed the ramparts of the formerly powerful and proud city of Constantinople, and shook the West itself, at the gates of imperial Vienna, that the Serbian people succumbed, but knightly, as in the ancient times a glorious commander

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<sup>225</sup> *Službeni vojni list* 1889, 1.

<sup>226</sup> *Beogradske Opštinske novine*, June 15, 1889, 1.

cried: “Everything is lost, only honor has been saved!” – and the whole world still admires that – yes, in the same way, the Serbian people can say today: “Everything had been lost at Kosovo, except the honor of the people!”<sup>227</sup>

The occasions of commemoration take the shape of communicative memory as well. However, if one looks at the emplotment of the narrative of the Serbian satire and that of the argument shaping the syllogism about the Ottoman rule, it does not differ from that which is present in history textbooks in Serbia today, almost 130 years later. This demonstrates how the collective memory is shaped and handed down through many different collective practices. Furthermore, in the speech, reference is still made to the fall of Constantinople, which will later be lost in Serbian narrative. This demonstrates that this is the moment in which the cultural memory of Christian community of the Ottoman Empire expressed through epic poetry about the Christian Empire to come, is under transformation and blending into the national memory.

As of the year 1900, the official state holidays, in addition to the dynastic ones, were Palm Sunday, February 22, and June 15. The calendar having been shaped within the frame of the Kosovo battle and the Serbian uprising, the collective memory of the promised kingdom was officially fixed in public discourse. Therefore, the idea of “500 years of slavery,” i.e. of Ottoman rule, shaped its overall meaning in collective memory.

The proliferation of celebrations of the commemoration of the Kosovo battle, June 15, was still more complex. “South Slavs celebrated Saint Vitus day, dedicated to an Italian saint from Lucania,” Dimitrije Đorđević wrote, explaining the emergence of the Day of Saint Vitus (Vidovdan).<sup>228</sup> Saint Vitus as the date of the Kosovo battle emerged along with epic poetry about the battle. It was collective memory that shaped the date through poetry. According to collective memory, the rivers used to turn red on Saint Vitus day, after the Kosovo battle. The first institution to put this communicative memory into the form of cultural, formal memory was the Orthodox Church. “Ecclesiastical calendars represented Vidovdan as ‘Emperor Lazar's Day’,” formally binding together the existing memory of this important religious holiday and

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<sup>227</sup> *Beogradske Opštinske novine*, June 15, 1889, 1.

<sup>228</sup> Sveti Vid in Serbian, “vid” meaning “sight” or “light,” is the counterpart of the meaning of Latin “lucia.” See Đorđević, Dimitrije, “The Role of St. Vitus Day in Modern Serbian History,” in *Serbian Studies*, 5/3, 1990, 33-40, 33.

the battle of the medieval Empire.<sup>229</sup> The replacement of the official Church calendar by the official state calendar brought in the ideological meaning of the date.

It was only three years later that a violent dynastic change would take place in Serbia. Therefore, the old calendar was erased, leaving only dynastic celebration, i.e. the birthday of King Peter I, and Vidovdan, i.e. the commemoration of the Kosovo battle, as the official state holidays. The commemoration of the first Uprising was seen as the Obrenović dynastic holiday and therefore abolished. However, the interconnection between the Kosovo battle and new kingdom was kept alive through the public discourse that was preparing the state and the people for war against the Ottoman Empire. The erasing of the Ottoman past from the surface of Belgrade became official policy, and political discourse was shaped in terms of “liberation of Serbian lands from the Ottoman Empire.” For example, the famous Batal Mosque (constructed as Eynehan Mosque in sixteenth century), which had a monumental significance for the town, was torn down and the Parliament building with a big round dome was built in its place.<sup>230</sup> On the opposite side of the Parliament, the Saint Marco’s Church was erected, according to the model of medieval Gracanica Church, founded by Serbian King Milutin in 1321, and situated in Kosovo. The remains of the medieval Emperor Dusan were placed in the Church. In this way, *lieux de mémoire* of the Kosovo Myth is constructed in city center of Belgrade. Therefore, the framework of the “reemergence of the medieval kingdom” was kept alive in public discourse until the Balkan Wars.

It is after the Balkan Wars, and taking over of territories of “old Serbia,” that the nation would finally be framed, casting the period of Ottoman rule as the downfall, and thus shaping collective memory of the period. The Balkan Wars gained the same importance for the Karađorđević kingdom that Palm Sunday had for the previous dynasty. However, the kingdom entered WWI as soon as the following year, and state

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<sup>229</sup> Đorđević, Dimitrije, “The Role of St. Vitus Day in Modern Serbian History,” 37.

<sup>230</sup> Eynehan Mosque was first mentioned as “Batal Mosque” in the eighteenth century, after it was severely damaged by the bombing of the town by Austrians, after which the Mosque was out of use. Therefore, it is most likely that the name of the Mosque originates from the Ottoman-Arabic word *batal* which means “abandoned,” rather than Ottoman-Turkish word *battal* meaning “large,” even though it was one of the biggest mosques in Belgrade. In the legend of the Austrian plan of 1789, the Mosque is labeled as “Sophia Mosque,” which may indicate that its monumental significance was compared to that Saint Sophia in Istanbul, given the fact that it dominated the view of Belgrade for someone coming from Istanbul road, and was also of the red color. For more on see...The Ognjenović, Tijana., *Blago Srbije: kulturno-istorijska baština*, Beograd: Mladinska knjiga, 2012.

ideology turned towards pan-Slavism, which resulted in the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the war. Even though the official commemorative date, apart from Vidovdan, would become December 1, as the date of inception of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Kumanovo battle would become a reminder that the state would mark each quinquennial or decennial anniversary of the battle. Moreover, the date of “liberation from Turks” began to be celebrated on the local level. Cities established commemorations of their respective days of “liberation,” as the date of the abolition of Ottoman rule was established locally. The cities as well erected memorials of liberty to commemorate these occasions. This demonstrates that the memory of battles in the Balkan Wars, with special accent on the Kumanovo battle at the state level, still remained part of the communicative memory and the performative narrative.

## **6.2. From the Reshaping of Calendars after WWII until Today**

During the Socialist period of Yugoslavia, all the commemorative practices connected to either Vidovdan or the days of liberation were abolished. All the official holidays were connected to the Second World War, so even on the local level, each city replaced the “Day of liberation from the Turks” with the day of its liberation from German occupation during WWII. However, even though those commemorative practice were abolished in the official calendar, they were remembered through other practices. One of the best examples is the placing of the monument at Kalemegdan, on the centenary of the liberation of six big cities from Ottoman rule.

The case of Socialist Yugoslavia serves as proof that the beginning and the end of Ottoman rule, marked as the end of the medieval Empire and the uprisings in Serbia, along with the Serbian epic poetry, are the most important transmitters of the collective memory of Ottoman rule. The only parts of this history that were taught in Serbia were exactly those periods, and the rest of collective memory has been shaped through the epic poetry. However, for the sixcentenary anniversary of the Kosovo battle, Slobodan Milošević, in the probably most carefully analyzed public speech in the history of Serbia, managed to mobilize collective memory shaped through the Kosovo Myth. That cultural memory shapes reality is demonstrated by the fact that in this famous speech, he continuously repeated “we do not know what is history and what is legend, nor is it important,” insisting on the meaning that was shaped in

collective memory, rather than on the truthfulness of the events. Moreover, the wars in the 1990s only proved that the collective memory of Ottoman rule, as a process, had been continuously shaped by epic poetry, by the constructed space of the cities, through communicative memory, and that irrespective of the fact that public discourse had previously been cleansed of this rhetoric, they were affectively mobilized in the course of the ninety nineties.

Milošević did not change the Yugoslav calendar to any significant extent. Vidovdan was reintroduced as an official holiday, and once more the declaration of War on Turkey in 1876 appeared in the official calendar. It was the only date in history in which the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro had signed an agreement on joint political action. Therefore, the commemoration was seen as appropriate for the only remaining republics within Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro. However, this was also an unsuccessful attempt to construct a new national identity by going back into history, when the national identities were first shaped. This also proves that collective memory cannot be imposed and changed overnight, top-down, that it is rather shaped and reshaped within its own frameworks. Even though each state had vivid its own collective memory of the Ottoman rule, and the Christian community used the common communicative memory to build it, that memory further evolved through the national prism, and not across the Balkans. This also demonstrate that, even though the memory of Ottoman rule in each of the states in the Balkans was constructed starting with more or less the same collective memory, i.e. legends about a Christian kingdom to come, banditry, etc., the particularity of the events happening at the local level through the process of nation building shaped the collective memory of the Ottoman past in a distinct way by lumping the meanings of the legends with new local and national events. Therefore memory cannot be separated from the collective which shaped it, nor transferred and imposed across borders. In other words, the collective memory of Ottoman rule in Serbia has no form without the memory of the uprising led by Karađorđe or *Knez* Miloš. In the same way, the war of 1876 has no place in collective memory, neither Serbian, nor Montenegrin.

After the federation ceased to exist in 2006, the Serbian calendar began to change, keeping only Vidovdan as a commemorative day. The very same year, the Presentation of Jesus to the Temple (Sretenje) as the date of the First Uprising was introduced as the Day of the Army of Serbia. However, in 2012, Serbia introduced the

same date as Republic Day, because the first Serbian Constitution was adopted in 1835 on that particular date. By 2013, all the major cities in Serbia —Belgrade, Vranje, Niš, etc. — returned to the commemorative practice of “Liberation from Turks” as the city’s official holidays. Belgrade even holds a spring festival named “The Days of Belgrade” during the week of Liberation Day. In this way the commemorative practices of the Republic of Serbia closely resemble those of the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, once again placing the period of Ottoman rule within the framework of national commemorations. Even though those events took place according to the religious calendar, Serbia still celebrates its commemorative days by adhering to the calendar of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and not the Gregorian, which is the “secular” state calendar.

This year, the commemoration of the Uprising, and of the Constitution, i.e. the Republic Day and the Day of Army, started with a salvo of gunshots at the Kalemegdan fort, which continued with a ceremonial performance of the Army orchestra, and an arms exhibition at the fort, while the President of the Republic laid a wreath on the monument to the Unknown Hero.<sup>231</sup>

The days of Belgrade, and the day of handing over the keys of Belgrade were commemorated across the capital, through various festivities. Ceremonial laying of garlands took place at both Kalemegdan, where the handing over of the keys occurred, and at the foot of the Monument of *Knez Mihailo*. And Vidovdan has become the “national pilgrimage” that starts from Belgrade, to the memorial of *Knez Lazar* in Kruševac, and ending next to the monument at Gazimestan in Kosovo.

President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić visited Kruševac on Saint Vitus Day and on that occasion laid a wreath on the Monument to the Kosovo Heroes. In the Square of the Kosovo Heroes, President Nikolić, accompanied by Minister of Defense Bratislav Gašić and the Chief of Staff of the Army of Serbia General Ljubiša Diković, greeted the assembled citizens and congratulated them on the Day of their city .... The marking of Saint Vitus Day had begun with a holy archpriests’ liturgy in the Lazarica church, which was served by the bishop of Kruševac David, together with the clergy. In that shrine, on the eve of the great Serbian holiday, a ceremonial wake was organized, in the presence of a large number of citizens. After the morning liturgy, a procession was organized to the Monument to the

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<sup>231</sup> *Politika*, April 19, 2015, 1.



Kosovo Heroes, where Bishop David served a memorial service to all the victims since the Battle of Kosovo (1389) to this day.<sup>232</sup>

A memorial service to the fallen Serbian heroes in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, followed by a liturgy, was served by the Serbian Patriarch Irinej and several bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, before several thousand people ... After the Saint Vitus liturgy, which he served before approximately one thousand religious followers, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church said that all Serbs are spiritually present at Kosovo today. "Today, the eyes, the thoughts and the feelings of all Serbs, not only in our homeland, but of the Serbs throughout the country, on all continents, are spiritually present here with us. There is no greater sacrifice than the sacrifice of one's own life and body, and that is the sacrifice made by *Knez Lazar* and countless Kosovo heroes, who joined him in the field of Kosovo and shed their blood there into this sacred land," said Patriarch Irinej... Gračanica and Gazimestan were also visited by pilgrims from different parts of Serbia, Montenegro, Republika Srpska and the diaspora; the commemoration of Saint Vitus Day was concluded with a memorial service to the fallen Serbian heroes. The Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral Amfilohije Radović gave a speech at Gazimestan, appealing to everyone to take the course of sacrifice for the good, progress, peace and love for their neighbor because, as he said, there cannot be greater love than that. In his speech on the occasion of the 626<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo and the martyrdom of Serbs and *Knez Lazar* in the battle against the Turkish army in the plain of Kosovo, Radović said that tsar Lazar and his knights had sacrificed themselves for their neighbors, for justice and honor, as well as for the truth and "the eternal heavenly kingdom."... Vidovdan is something that is deeply imbedded in our genes, and this does not only concern the Serbs, but also Christian Europe," added Kostić [Mayor of Gračanica in Kosovo]. After the Saint Vitus liturgy, the mothers of four or more children were conferred gold and silver decorations of "Mother of the Nine Jugoviés" by the Eparchy of Raška and Prizren."<sup>233</sup>

The ceremony of commemorating Vidovdan is organized in the form of a pilgrimage. Being both religious and state commemoration, it blends national with religious motives. The road between Belgrade and Kruševac, the seat of *Knez Lazar's* state, is covered partially by organized tours, and partially on foot, to continue further to Kosovo. The path that is walked each June 28 in Serbia, is covered with *aides-mémoires*, i.e. monuments situated in Belgrade, Kruševac, and Kosovo, commemorating the medieval Serbia, or erected in memory of the soldiers who died

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<sup>232</sup> *Politika*, June 28, 2015, 1.

<sup>233</sup> *Politika*, June 28, 2015, 1.

in the battle against the Ottomans. The recollections of the events enacted on the itinerary are transfigured in such a way that they “do not constitute ordinary historical facts anymore, but they form the supernatural events.”<sup>234</sup> The path from Belgrade to Kosovo, via Kruševac is converted into *lieux de mémoire* that enacts the Kosovo Myth. Through the enactment of the myth, the recollection of the events from medieval history the layer of sacredness. “It is through the eyes of faith that, beyond the appearance of the local [spatial] frameworks with the supernatural aspect in which [the recollection of events] is replaced [with imagined events], that one believes to perceive another world that does not completely live in that space anymore.”<sup>235</sup> By walking those ways, laying wreaths on the monuments, giving speeches about the past, etc., through the interaction between physical space and symbolical practices, the memories are actualized. In this way, through performative practice, spatial and temporal unity is achieved, turning historical memory into living memory. Therefore, it can be concluded that it is once the paths are walk that collective memory becomes tangible trough the performance of pilgrims. However, it also becomes tangible through the witnesses of the pilgrimage, enacted though the job of journalists, but readers and listeners of those news as well.

Today, starting from Belgrade and going southwards, the territories of the Republic of Serbia are commemorating the beginning and the end of Ottoman rule. Even though these commemorations are represented through the prism of the Kosovo Myth as both the end and the beginning of Serbian existence, as was demonstrated throughout this work, these events are in a dialectical relationship with the period of Ottoman rule. Furthermore, as demonstrated in previous chapters, the memorials constructed in the city of Belgrade, and analogously the similar practices taking place across the country, are as well in a dialectical relationship with the memories and constructions of the erased narratives. Therefore, walking the new ways, and actualizing newly constructed places in the city through commemorative practices at the same time acts as the reification of the erased narratives, and invisible constructions. Looking from the surface it may seem that Serbia changed the political form of its state, as well as its ideologies, and this may seem to have shaped and altered the collective memory of Ottoman rule. However, once they are looked at more

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<sup>234</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *La Topographie légendaire*, 1.

<sup>235</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice, *La Topographie légendaire*, 1.

closely, it becomes clear that the framework of collective memory did not change, and the collective process of shaping the past is still present in the performative public sphere.



## **CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION**

Collective memory is not history, but is of and about history. As a process, it has continuously (been) shaped (by) society, and handed down to new generations. Collective memory is mediated through various forms of narratives. In today's "sliding societies," collective memory can be transmitted both orally, in the form of communicative memory, and through different forms of formalized narrative, such as books, memorials, calendars, etc. Collective memory is therefore not characterized by fixity, it is continuously reframed and handed down to the new generations. Collective memory is closely related to group identity. Acquiring one group memory means acquiring one group's identity. Therefore, an individual is born into collective memory and socialized through narratives of and about the group, which at the same time mediate the group's collective memory. Even though the perception of collective memory can be different, individuals, once socialized within the framework of their group's memory, always position themselves in relation to it. However, this work was not about the perception of the group's collective memory, but rather aimed at analyzing and deconstructing what is available in group narratives.

Serbian collective memory of the Ottoman past was shaped through the process of the construction of Serbian national identity, in the course of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Therefore, it was closely shaped by the events that marked the end of the Ottoman Empire, but it also emerged on the foundations of the communicative memory of a Christian society living in the Ottoman Empire, and was shaped by the course of history. As any identity is constructed through defining self and alterity, Serbian identity was constructed in opposition to Turkish identity, and Ottoman space. Therefore, the narrative that shapes Serbian national identity at the same time mediates the Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule. This thesis aimed at exposing this process in which collective memory of Ottoman rule and national identity have (been) shaped (by) society.

This thesis has demonstrated that there are three main mechanisms through which the memory of Ottoman rule has been shaped: Myths, syllogism through which

Ottoman Empire is portrayed, and the silencing of Serbian narrative identity. The memory of Ottoman rule emerged on the foundations of the communicative memory of a Christian community that lived in the Ottoman Empire. Over the course of the nineteenth century, communicative memory was blended into the newly emerging national narratives. Therefore, the myth about the end of the Christian Empire with the arrival of Ottomans, which announced the resurrection of the Empire in the future, blended in with new national narratives across the Balkans. This myth, or the Kosovo myth as shaped by Serbian narrative, became both an eschatological and a foundational myth for the Serbian nation. Throughout this work I demonstrated how the myth, as a mode of discourse, still represents the main framework of Serbian collective memory of the beginning and end of Ottoman rule, and therefore is still the main vehicle for shaping the collective memory of Ottoman rule. It has been demonstrated that the framework of the myth still represents the foundation of the historical narrative and therefore historical memory. Moreover, as collective memory is not about the truth, but rather about how the symbolic value of the narrative functions within society, it has been demonstrated that epic poetry still has its place and value in framing the collective memory of Ottoman rule. Therefore, epic poetry, which not only lives through its own form, but is actualized through various forms of painting, naming of streets, constructing of memorials and events, still represents the narrative framework of the Serbian collective memory of the period of Ottoman rule.

While the Kosovo myth and related legends represent narratives about the Ottomans — or the Ottoman Turks, as Serbian verbal narrative frames it — the following two frameworks represent rather the lack of a narrative. It has been demonstrated that the way in which temporal narrative and verbal narrative about the Ottoman past vis-à-vis the Serbian past are positioned plays an important role in shaping the Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule. Through the temporal narrative, the Ottoman past is framed in a causal relationship with the temporal narrative of the Serbian past. On the other hand, the verbal narrative contracted the image of the Ottoman Empire as an “Empire without culture.” Therefore, the emplotment of time and verbal emplotment shapes the Ottoman Turks in the form of a syllogism, which in turn becomes a self-contained truth and explanation of Ottoman rule. Furthermore, even though this negative image of the Ottoman Turks is framed in historical narrative in the form of syllogism, as demonstrated, it is sustained through

the image of Turks in the Serbian epic poetry. In this respect, it has been demonstrated that Orientalist discourse plays an important role in shaping the collective memory. The Ottoman Empire is portrayed only within its early modern socio-economic and political organization, infusing a sense of the stasis and backwardness in the Empire vis-à-vis European states, to which Serbia is portrayed as belonging. On the other hand, the people, i.e. *reaya*, is elaborated within the framework of the status it acquired in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which triggered the peasant uprisings, projecting the image to the whole duration of Ottoman rule. Therefore, complex images, many folding binary oppositions, are at work in shaping the memory of Ottoman rule: Islam vs. Christianity, Backwardness vs. Modernity, and Religious Conservatism vs. Secularism.

Finally, it is the shape of the narratives about Serbian identity, which aimed at silencing the period of the Ottoman past, that plays an important role in framing the Serbian collective memory of Ottoman rule. As the identity narratives emerged in opposition to the Ottoman narratives, i.e. by silencing the Ottoman narratives, they were shaped in a dialectical relation. Therefore, narratives that seem to be foundational for shaping the image of Serbian identity, and the identity of the Serbian nation-state, play a crucial role in shaping the image of Ottoman Turkish identity, and Ottoman rule. Thus it is through silence that collective memory is constructed.

Serbian collective memory has been handed down to the new generations through both pedagogical and performative narratives. By analyzing these narrative forms, this thesis aimed at exposing these patterns, and not at finding “the truth” about the period of Ottoman rule and its aftermath. As collective memory is shaped through national discourse, even though it emerged from the same memory as those of almost all nation-states across the Balkans, it would be interesting to expose what mechanisms the Bulgarian, Montenegrin, and Greek collective memories used in shaping and transforming the common collective memory. This would contribute to an understanding not only of how identities and memories historically diverged, but also of the concept of collective memory itself.

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