CONTRACTING OUT THE STATE:
THE CASE OF ISTANBUL METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Sociology.

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines the reconstruction of state images in the process of contracting out public services. It basically investigates the entire process of certain public services offered by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality from their design to tender, from delivery to control. In the scope of this study, the state is accepted as a concept constructed by the social relations and experiences. It is argued that the "practices" of people during providing and receiving public services construct different state "images".

After 1980, in Turkey public administration has been reformed through neoliberalism. Due to new policies on decentralization and empowerment of local governments, municipalities have taken more responsibility in the delivery of social services. Management techniques started to be used in public administration, and private companies have become crucial actors in the delivery of public services for the purpose of efficiency, which has brought about the employment of the subcontracting system in public sector.

This thesis is based on a qualitative research, which focuses on certain social services of the İBB and illuminates the effects of the subcontracting system on state images. The fieldwork consists of in-depth interviews conducted with people employed in different departments of social services and participant observations conducted in an elderly care facility, during an inspection tour of Home Care Service, and in a workshop of subcontracted workers. At the end of the research three state images are found out: a company-like state, a gracious state, and a corrupt state.

Keywords: İBB, neoliberalism, public services, state, subcontracting system.

ÖZ

DEVLETİ İHALE ETMEK:
İSTANBUL BÜYÜKŞEHİR BELEDİYESİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez, kamu hizmetlerinin ihale edilmesi sürecinde oluşan devlet imajlarını incelemektedir. İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nin sağladığı belirli kamu hizmetlerinin tasarımından ihale edilmesine, sunumundan teftiş edilmesine kadar tüm süreç çalışmanın ana odak noktasıdır. Bu çalışma kapsamında devlet, toplumsal ilişkiler ve deneyimler tarafından üretilen bir kavram olarak kabul edilmektedir. Kamu hizmeti sağlama ve alım sürecindeki "pratik"lerin farklı devlet "imaj"ları oluşturduğu savunulmaktadır.

1980'den sonra Türkiye'de kamu yönetimi neoliberalizmin etkisiyle reformdan geçti. Adem-i merkeziyetçilik ve yerel yönetimlerin güçlendirilmesini öngören yeni politikalar sonucu belediyeler, sosyal hizmetlerin sağlanmasında daha çok sorumluluk almaya başladılar. Verimlilik sağlamak amacıyla kamu yönetiminde işletme teknikleri kullanılmaya başlandı ve özel şirketler kamu hizmeti sağlamada aktör haline geldi. Bu da taşeronluk sisteminin kamu sektöründe yaygın şekilde kullanılmasını beraberinde getirdi.

Bu tez, taşeronluk sisteminin devlet imajı üzerindeki etkisini göstermek amacıyla İBB'nin sunduğu bazı sosyal hizmetler üzerinde yapılan niteliksel bir çalışmayı kapsamaktadır. Saha çalışması sosyal hizmetlerin farklı aşamalarında görev yapan kişilerle yapılan derinlemesine mülakatları, bir yaşlı bakım tesisinde, Evde Bakım Hizmetleri'nin bir teftiş turu sırasında ve bir taşeron işçiler çalıştayında yapılan katılımcı gözlemleri kapsamaktadır. Bu araştırmanın sonucunda üç devlet imajına ulaşılmıştır: Şirketvâri devlet, lütufkâr devlet ve yozlaşmış devlet.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İBB, devlet, kamu hizmeti, neoliberalizm, taşeronluk sistemi.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. Ş.	Anonim Şirketi / Incorporated Company
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi / Justice and Development Party
EU	European Union
İBB	İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi / Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
KİK	Kamu İhale Kurumu / Public Procurement Office
KSM	Kadın Sağlığı Merkezi / Women's Health Center
P. C.	Personal Communication

INTRODUCTION

While I was walking on the street once, I overheard a conversation between two young men. One was talking about his recent visit to the recruiting center: "I went to the recruiting center bro, there was private security at the door, can you imagine?" and they laughed. I recognized then that my impression of the state's subcontracting of its responsibilities, which sounds contradictory to me, had a reflection on society. I wondered the effect of the subcontracting system on the perception of the state. I looked at the provisioning process of public services and tried to find the traces of state images on the everyday practices of people.

Ever since the 1980s the globe has been under neoliberal winds, which were blown from both political and economic sides. Turkey is one of the countries impacted by both trends. Neoliberal transformation is even defined as the third revolution of Turkish history: "after having made her national and democratic revolutions in the 1920s and 1940s respectively, Turkey is now [the 1980s] launching her liberal revolution" (cited in Heper, 1989, p. 1). Since then, Turkish governments have carried out neoliberal policies through privatization and decentralization in public institutions.

In the field of public services, after 1980s, the state was not the only actor. The responsibility of the state for the provision of goods and services to the public has moved from direct functioning to controlling. A market has emerged for public services. Private companies started to provide services directly. They have participated competitive tenders arranged by state institutions such as municipalities, and made temporary contracts with those institutions. This new structure based on contracting does not only impact on the emergence and functioning of companies, working conditions of subcontracted workers, and the service receivers but it also influences the state itself. The state is not a concrete, fixed, and uniform agent, but a concept that is continuously reconstituted by the actions, perceptions, and experiences of different actors. The main question of this research is then how the state's images are reconstituted through social practices and perceptions in the privatization

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process of the public sector institutions with a focus on subcontracting.

In the literature, there are certain studies that conduct anthropology of the state through looking at, for example, bureaucratic procedures in development programmes (Gupta, 2012), or the "margins" of the state (Das & Poole, 2004). Since the state is not a concrete entity, research on it can be possible only through "tangible" data, for instance, by investigating the implementations of related people and institutions. In this study, I used the provisioning process of public services as a methodological tool to look at the reconstruction of the state images for the Turkish state. However, public services have been more prevalently provided by local governments rather than the central state institutions as a result of the decentralization policies. Therefore, I conducted ethnographic research in Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, which is a local government with a wide range of services. The research consists of semi-structured in-depth interviews and participant observations. My informants were mostly from the service providers. Nevertheless, I found the opportunity to listen to the comments of service recipients during my observations.

In the first chapter, I present a background of the state in theoretical and methodological terms. Firstly, I review the theoretical debates on the ontological understanding of the state and its relation to the social sphere in the literature. Second, I will frame my methodological perspective on the state. In the second chapter, which constitutes the historical background of the study, the neoliberal transformation will be scanned in general and examined in the context of Turkey. I will mention, in particular, the history of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality briefly and its main service delivery strategy i. e. subcontracting. The third chapter will present my fieldwork, including "the subcontracting practices," with a methodological discussion. Ethnographic data will be analyzed under subtitles such as the İBB as an institution, the subcontracting system, service process, service quality, service agents, control mechanisms, the responsibility for services, and the common good. In the fourth chapter, through an analysis of "the images", I will argue that different states have emerged while subcontracting public services. I define those states with company-like, gracious, and corrupt images.

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. Stating the State

In order to understand the state, its theoretical analysis must be done in the first place. The literature on the state is so deep and broad that capturing all the authors and their studies is not feasible. The more one researches, the more one discovers. However, this quantity does not extend to a diversified number of theories, rather there are a number of basic debates on the perception of the state, which I will discuss here.

The first debate on the state is about the ontological approach, namely, the existence of the state as an entity, as an ideology, or as an image. The state's relation to society, and the line or the transitivity between the two constitutes the second debate. The two debates, namely the ontological being of the state and its relation to the society, are so intimate and interrelated that it is hard to identify the initiator or the sequent.

On the ontology of the state, there are two main approaches: The scholars who see the state as a distinct and real entity and the scholars who reject the state's reality and fixity. Sharma and Gupta (2006) call the former group "state-centered theorists". According to them,

> 'the state' is viewed as a clearly bounded institution that is distinct from society, and is often portrayed as a unitary and autonomous actor that possesses the supreme authority to regulate populations within its territory. (Sharma & Gupta, 2006, p. 8)

Therefore, for state-centric scholars, the state is a given actor, rather than a fabricated entity. The second approach to the ontology of the state argues that the state is constructed in society through everyday practices, social relations, and representations. As the scholars in this second approach take the construction of the state as inherently society-based, they can be defined as society-centered (Hay, Lister, & Marsh, 2005). In sum, in the ontological debate, while the state-centered group claims the "being" of the state as a concrete-real entity, the society-centered theorists assert its "becoming" as an abstract-formal

concept.

Mitchell argues that in order to understand the state, one should not "clarify such distinctions, but [...] historicize them" (2006, p. 170). In this direction, he mentions two different responses attempting to deal with the concept of the state in the postwar period. The first is "the systems approach" which abandons the state and replaces it with the term "political system". This approach that emerged in the 1950s, aimed to extend the narrow patterns of the state by using the concept of a system, but failed to determine the boundaries of the political system. In the 1970s, the second response did "bring the state back in" (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985). This group, "the neo-statists" see the state "as both an actor and an independent force in social causation, [and they emphasize] both the autonomy of the state from society and the power of 'state-centered' explanations of political outcomes" (Hay et al., 2005, p. 8). This second statist perspective thereby "reestablish[ed] a clear boundary between [the state and the society]" (Mitchell, 2006, p. 174). The state was in the conceptual realm and society in the empirical realm. According to Mitchell, however, a clear distinction between the state and the society brings about "an enormous narrowing of the phenomenon of the state" (Mitchell, 1991, p. 82). Although, Sharma and Gupta position Mitchell on the state-centered side because of his theory of a distinct state (2006, p. 8), Mitchell offers an alternative approach in which the state appears as a discrete social fact but with an internally drawn line between state and society. What Mitchell means is that the line drawn between state and society is elusive since both state and society have a mutual effect on each other within in the network of their institutional mechanisms. He gives the example of the effect of a private company decision on international relations of the state. Even if the company is "said to lie outside the 'formal political system,'" (Mitchell, 2006, p. 175) it does not indicate that the line between the company and the state is clear. Instead, it seems elusive since the company and the state behave in interaction. According to Mitchell, it is misleading to "tak[e] for granted the idea of the state as a coherent object clearly separate from 'society'" (2006, p. 176). However, by defining a line between state and society, even if an elusive one, Mitchell reproduces state and society in a dichotomy, which is the reason why he is mentioned in the state-

centered side of the debate.

On the opposite side, there is a "society-centered" group, which rejects the assumption that the state is an autonomous, distinct, stable, and unitary entity. Two Marxist theorists, Miliband and Poulantzas, are both in this group. They agree on the non-entity of the state (Abrams, 2006; Miliband, 1969), but diverge on the construction of the state. Miliband suggests that, "'the state' is not a thing, that it does not, as such, exist. What the state stands for is a number of particular institutions which, together, constitute its reality" (Miliband, 1969, p. 49). Those institutions are instruments for a specific dominant class to perform their power. To Miliband, "individual human subjects" control the state for their own interests, a point criticized by Poulantzas for being individualistic. Instead, Poulantzas argues a concept of the state which has a "structurally determined role" (Jessop, 1990, p. 30). This is a kind of structure versus agency debate between Miliband and Poulantzas. However, Abrams argues that recent Marxist discussions, while perceiving the non-entity of the state, "[fail] to cling to the logic of conception" (2006, p. 118) because they ascribe an agent role to the state by defining the state as "a machine of repression, which enables the ruling classes to ensure their domination over the working class" (Althusser, 2006, p. 90). Hence, according to Abrams, this supposed agent role of the state does not comply with its non-entity being as it reduces an abstract-formal entity to a concrete-real one, and being both a non-entity and an agent is a contradiction. As a scholar in post-Marxist theory, Althusser says, "the state has no meaning except as a function of *State power*" (2006, p. 91). While he stands away from the descriptive definitions of the state, Althusser uses the concept of the "state apparatuses" to understand the ideological and repressive role of the state in practice. While the instrument of the repressive state institutions, such as the army, courts, police, is violence, the apparatus of other institutions, such as schools, family, religious centers, is ideology. State power stems from both and thus penetrates into the society. Radcliffe-Brown opposes this argument because he does not accept "such thing as the power of the state; there are only, in reality, powers of the individuals such as individual kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters" (1987, p. xxiii). By accepting this, the concept of state is reduced to the sum of some personal acts so certain

individuals perform their power. It can be argued that such an individualistic gaze misses the abstract-formal being of the state while trying to avoid its concrete-real entity. In other words, Radcliff-Brown does not approach to the state as it has sovereignty or a will; he argues that the state is just "a complex system of relations" (1987, p. xxiii). Therefore, Radcliff-Brown exceeds other society-centered theorists since he also rejects the construction and representation of the state and presents the individuals as the absolute agents. According to Abrams (2006), avoiding the abstract-formal being of the state is the very thing that should be done. Rather than the argument that there is a real actor called the state behind the mask of political practices, the abstract image of the state obscuring the political practices is the fact, as Abrams argues. Thus, the state itself is a conceptual mask in front of those political practices, and this mask of the state should be abandoned. Miliband uses the concept of "the state-system" (Miliband, 1969, p. 46) in order to refer to political institutions and institutionalized practices. In addition to this, Abrams mentions "the state-idea" as the abstract-formal side of the state. The strong argument of Abrams is that "the state-idea" functions as a mask and conceals "the state-system" (2006, p. 125). He thereby offers two distinct objects of study constituting an inspiring theoretical framework for other society-centered scholars who position themselves against the state-centered model.

Society-centered scholars focus on the very construction of the state: the continuous constitution of the state-idea through the state-system. Namely, they argue that political institutions and social practices create images of the state. After an ontological debate on the state above, the second debate is about the link between the society through practices and experiences and the state as an image and representation. Sharma and Gupta describe the state as a "culturally embedded and discursively constructed ensemble" (2006, p. 27). While analyzing this construction process of the state, they look at two things: everyday practices and representations. Migdal also put these two elements of the state in a different way as "practices" and "image" (2001, p. 16). Sharma and Gupta call the first element, namely everyday practices, "the *routine* and *repetitive* procedures of bureaucracies" and Ferguson calls them "bureaucratic proceduralism" (Sharma & Gupta, 2006, p. 11). These practices are not limited

to bureaucratic ones. In addition to this direct relation between political institutions and people, the indirect relations between them (provided within social institutions, structures, and interrelations) are also included in those everyday practices. They are so diverse that as Migdal says, "practices have tended to be diverse, and, while there are certainly recognizable comparative patterns, they have defied neat categorization" (2001, p. 16).

All these everyday practices pave the way for people to constitute the second element, which is representation and imagination of the state in their minds. However, the image, namely the perception of the state, which is obtained through these diverse practices, "assumes a single entity that is fairly autonomous, unified, and centralized," according to Migdal (2001, p. 16). The construction of the state, from this perspective, can be seen as an inverse functioning prism, which transforms different colors of the rainbow, practices, into a white light image. In his theory of "state-in-society," Migdal points out that this image, the white light in my words, has two kinds of boundaries; territorial boundaries separating the state from other states; and social boundaries separating it from its subjects, i.e., the private sphere. While the former is an outcome of modern international systems, the latter, namely "the separation of public and private ... is a hallmark of the modern, bureaucratized state" as Weber noted (cited in Migdal, 2001, p. 17). Therefore, it is argued the state is separated from the society, but it is also elevated to an upper level since only the state claims "the representation of the commonality of the people" (Migdal, 2001, p. 18). However, the state can be detached from its subjects, namely the society, only in the image level because the state and the society are interrelated, and they mutually construct each other that the two cannot be separated in the society-centered perspective.

Briefly, there are diverse colorful practices at one facet of the prism and one unified white image of the state at the other. Therefore, according to Migdal, one should see the state in dual terms. Migdal's theory focuses on the "paradoxical quality of the state," namely the incompatible facets of the prism. It is not a one-way relation between the practices and the image. While the state image is constructed through the practices of people, the perception of the state has an impact on what people do and how they act.

Gramscian understanding of state also encapsulates this intertwined perspective. According to Troillot's reading of Gramsci:

One cannot theorize the state and then theorize society or vice versa. Rather, state and society are bound by the historical bloc which takes the form of the specific social contract of—and, thus, the hegemony deployed in—a particular social formation (Troillot, 2001, p. 127).

Here, society is divided into the political and the civil, the former uses force and the latter uses hegemony, and these thereby constitute the state as seen in the simple formulation of Gramsci: "State = political society + civil society" (2006, p. 80). Also, Althusser describes a similar approach by giving the concepts of the repressive and ideological state apparatuses as mentioned above.

I do not define the relationship between people and their state perception among the state's dual tactics of violence and ideology. Rather, I mention a mutual relationship. On the one hand, the state institutions (civil registration offices, municipalities, etc.), state officials (police officers, teachers, bureaucrats, etc.) or state-centered practices (military services, taxing, etc.) have impact to shape some practices of people. On the other hand, how people understand, experience and perceive the state is a constituent of the representation and image of the state. This mutual construction does not happen in a determined sphere, categorized as public or private.[1] Instead, a broad frame including everyday practices, rituals, perceptions, implementations, etc. builds a construction field.

Therefore, my approach does not equate the state with the "public sphere." The practices, dominations, and relations that construct the image of the state or state power spring from both the public and the private sectors. It is crucial then to define "the public," whether it directly represents the state or only refers to political or bureaucratic practices, which is a distinction also between being abstract and concrete. A similar ambiguity exists on the other side, in the equation of the society with a "private sphere." Everyday practices and experiences of people in relation to political and bureaucratic institutions are

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[1] I find it wrong to define the public and the private spheres. Public values and private preferences exist and interrelate in every time and place of the life so they are included in a wider social sphere.

parts of the social sphere. While the private is usually defined to be outside of the public in the sense of an abstract concept, actually the public and private institutions interact in practice. Discovering the correct definitions for these concepts is out of the scope of this research. Now I will conceptualize them in the framework of the research.

In this study, I employ the society-centered approach. I argue that there is an interrelation between the construction of the state image and the everyday practices of people. While my ultimate object of study is the image of the state, I do not limit the field of construction only within the state-system, which refers to political institutions, since social institutions also play a role. I will examine the people's perception of the state while they are receiving public services or taking part in the provision of services. Two points here are significant which will be detailed in the methodology section: The practices I focus on are performed during the provisioning process of public services, and the public and private sectors get involved in this process. Therefore, the study questions the mutual construction of the practices and images in the context of a relatively novel development, which is the partnership of the public and private sectors. Since a social construction does not happen in an expected and "perfect" way and "normal conditions" are out of the question in social sciences, the prism here might not give only one white light, namely only one consistent state image and we will obtain different representations of the state.

1.2. Which state?

The concept of the state can be analyzed from different perspectives or on different levels. It is an object of various disciplines in social sciences such as political science, sociology, and anthropology. In order to draw the borders of this study and show my approach in the fieldwork, it is essential to ask the question of Gupta, "Which state?" (2012b, p. 26). Gupta looks at the state through a three-dimensional grid. The first dimension is the level: that can be national, regional, local, or municipal. The second is the function: that can be legislative, judicial, or administrative. And the third is the subject area: that can be education, health, policing, pollution, housing, or industry. Hence, determining these aspects turn the state into a three-dimensional concept. The

level determines the scale of the study and research methods should be preferred accordingly. A qualitative research, for instance, would be feasible on local level rather than national. In addition, the image of a state might change on different levels. To exemplify, the local level people might not experience the high ratio of economic growth and GDP per capita of their country due to the socio-economic gap. Therefore, a situation in a certain level can be affected from wider level conditions and bear a resemblance to them, or can have a peculiar character unnoticeable from a superficial analysis. Regarding the function, the state can have different images while performing legislative, judicial, or administrative powers due to the contradictory usage of these powers. For example, the laws in the constitution of a state can provide a different impression of the state rather than the practices of those laws since every law might not be implemented in actuality. The subject area as the third dimension is also important while studying the state in order to specify the research.

Asad collects the widespread subject areas under three categories. He mentions three kinds of discourses of states, which are also helpful for one to determine a ground for research. Those are;

> […] the discourse of sovereign state (whether princedoms or republics) facing one another in war and peace; the discourse of state governance (in the regulation of behavior, the acquisition and distribution of resources, the care of populations, the maximization of security); and the discourse of state politics (the struggle to establish a nation-state; competition over policy) (Asad, 2004, p. 280)

The first one is about the sovereignty and territoriality of the nation-state, which are the subjects of political science and international relations. The second is about the goods and services the state provides to its citizens, which is an interest of the social policy. The third one is about the relation of the state to its subjects and the construction of citizenship, which is included in other disciplines such as political sociology.

I have certainly benefitted from these categorizations of the state while drawing the framework of my research. According to Asad's formulation, the state I examine is under the second title, namely the discourse of state

governance, more narrowly public services. In the scheme of Gupta, I examine the administrative and also the legislative processes of a municipal level provision of public services, which include nursing the elderly and disabled people, health care particularly provided for women, and home care services.

Although this study is a municipal level research, it includes more than one ethnographic site that provides conclusions on wider levels. In fact, the study is not a perfect multi-sited ethnography according to the methodology of Marcus (1995). A researcher undertaking multi-sited ethnography "follows" his/her object. It can be a thing, a metaphor, a story, etc. The researcher is able to reveal multiple layers while tracking the object and s/he can include different sites in micro and macro scales into the research. In the end, the researcher obtains a complex structure of relations explaining the object. This study is neither horizontally large nor vertically deep enough to be described as a perfect multi-sited ethnography. However, it is strategically located where micro and macro realms intersect. The micro realm is Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality as the institution; the provision of curtained public services as the subject; contracting out public services to private sector as an impacting factor; service providers, recipients, the state and company executives as the informants. On the other side, there is the macro realm, which contains global neoliberal transformation, empowerment of local governments, tendencies of governments to engage in the market, and so on.

1.3. Conclusion

The theoreticians studying the state are divided into two groups about its ontological structure. The first group, called the state-centered, sees the state as an autonomous, unitary, and fixed entity, whereas the second one, called as the society-centered, accepts the state as a concept constructed by society. Undertaking an anthropological research on such as abstract concept, as the second group describes, is difficult; however, it is possible by looking at the everyday practices of people. It is argued that there is a mutual relationship between those everyday practices and state images that they construct each other. While one's experiences with a public institution, for instance, play a role in creating his/her impression of the state, this very perception and acceptance

of that person have also certain impact on his/her practices. Therefore, in order to trace "the images", I will look at "the practices", which includes bureaucratic procedures, social institutions, structures, and interrelations, and legal processes. To specify the state concept, I examine the state providing public services for its citizens in the municipal level. My fieldwork focuses on Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality which has been under the effect of global neoliberal transformation. Although it is a municipal level study, I expect to reach general images for the state through analyzing micro and macro realms. Nevertheless, beyond the claims for generalization, I do not reject the unique nature of the fieldwork, which is under the impact of specific structures, individuals, and relations. The following section will reveal the macro realm, consisting of the neoliberal transformation. And then, the micro realm, i.e. the service delivery process under Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, İBB), will be elaborated through ethnographic data.

CHAPTER 2

NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION

2.1. Introduction

In the last decades, the state has been undergoing a transformation. The 1960s' idea of the social state, which had the whole responsibility for the well-being of people, has changed. After 1980, municipalities started to take more responsibility for social services due to new policies on decentralization and empowerment of local governments. Public administration was reformed through management techniques and private agents became an actor in the delivery of public services. The reason for this change is shown as seeking efficiency, which has become a significant issue in the *new* management system, not in the *old* bureaucratic administration. In order to provide services in a more efficient way, municipalities have begun to purchase the goods and services from private companies. Through this new method, referred to as contracting out, subcontracting or outsourcing, contracted companies provide public services via subcontracted workers and municipal officials evaluate the process considering the management criteria. Public administration reform paved the way for the subcontracting system. The historical and theoretical framework of this reform and its repercussions in Turkey and specifically in Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality will be discussed in this chapter.

2.2. The Neoliberal Transformation of the State

The time of abundance and welfare in the post-Second World War period was ceased in the 1970s due to the economic crises. The states decided to restrict the public expenditures to reduce their budget deficits. Economists such as Nobel laureate Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek theorized a new political economic theory, which would later be called neoliberalism. They championed a completely free-market and a "minimalist" or "watchman" state, which is retreated from the market (Loughlin, 2000, p. 19) Furthermore, the

neoliberal state is obliged to provide necessary legal and administrative conditions for entrepreneurs. Thus, the state comes off the stage but still at the coulisse. Main policies of the neoliberal state, such as privatization, deregulation, and competition, are claimed to "increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and reduce costs, both directly to the consumer through cheaper commodities and services and indirectly through reduction of the tax burden" as Harvey mentions (2007, p. 65). The first experiment field of the neoliberal theory was Chile (Harvey, 2005, p. 9). Through the 1973 military coup, done against the elected socialist government, new president Pinochet made economic reforms in order to open Chile to the global market. In 1979 and 1981, two important promoters of neoliberal transformation, Thatcher and Reagan, were elected as the leaders of state in both Britain and the United States respectively. These governments leading two grand economies of the world were products of the democratic processes that were different from the Chilean case. Harvey finds these processes relevant to "consent" and "hegemony" concepts of Gramsci (2005, p. 12). Reagan and Thatcher did not use military violence but took the consent of their people through hegemonic discourses. In this era, neoliberal reforms were presented as the only solution for an economic crisis stemming from inflation and stagnation.[2]

The rationale behind the neoliberal policies is to produce more efficiency and productivity. Actually, the modern capitalist state has been oriented through the motivations of efficiency and productivity during its history. However, the supporters of the neoliberal state "also believed that 'the market', understood as the arena of free exchange between individuals, could provide the range of services hitherto provided by the state more efficiently and effectively – a direct contradiction of the welfare-state idea" (Loughlin, 2000, p. 19). It is claimed that the market has the capability to offer better services at lower costs than the state. Therefore, what the neoliberal state has done as a novelty is to transfer its own responsibilities to other institutions, such as lower levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and private companies. This transfer of responsibilities is closely related to how the mechanism of governing is understood. As Harvey argues, under neoliberalism a "shift from government

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[2] To give an example; the slogan of Thatcher's party was TINA (There is No Alternative).

(state power on its own) to governance (a broader configuration of state and key elements in civil society)" has occurred (2007, p. 77). Rhodes defines governance as "a system of governmental 'steering'" in which more actors and networks other than government members and institutions are involved (Loughlin, 2000, p. 13). These actors undertaking state responsibilities can be at the international level such as the European Union institutions for member countries or also at a sub-national level to which this study is related. Therefore, a new understanding of governing emerged: the centralized state "administration" evolved into a decentralized "management". Governments put on their political and administrative agenda to involve "new governing techniques which are based on business administration [management] into the structural and functional processes of the public sector" (Ökten, 2008, p. 57).

In this neoliberal background, the attempts to reform the public administration, which is always on the world agenda (Yılmaz, 1), started to be re-discussed. The reform of public administration is necessitated by several common reasons, or "deficits" as defined by Kettl (1998). There were "three deficits" in the United States in the 1980s and the 1990s (Kettl, 1998) but Yılmaz (2001) also refers to these deficits as common actualities of other countries. First is the *budget deficit,* which stemmed from increasing government expenditures for welfare services after the 1960s. Second is the *performance deficit,* which emerged through public opinion on the inefficiency and expensiveness of the functioning of the state's bureaucracy. Third is the *confidence deficit,* which is caused by clientelism and corruption in the bureaucratic structure of the state. According to these explanations, the old type of public administration has lost its legitimacy. In addition, some other facts such as globalism, economic crises, urbanization, and increasing expectations of people due to the increase in women's employment and educational level, are seen as paving the way for the public administration reform (Yılmaz, 2001, pp. 3–6)

Furthermore, certain theoretical approaches, such as the principle-agent theory, and the purchaser-provider split (Vincent-Jones, 2005, p. 887), which project the regression of the state on sub-national level, support the public administration reform. Consequently, the traditional public administration

strategy was transformed into what is called "new public management" (NPM) approach: "the mission of the NPM is to replace the presumed inefficiency of the old-style 'bureau-professionalism' with the presumed efficiency of the market" (Langan, 2007, p. 159). The old administration methods based on a hierarchical mode of coordination (Plantinga, de Ridder, & Corra, 2011, p. 251), vertical bureaucratic organization, centralized and static planning, stable and permanent employment, and punishment-based evaluation (Bozlağan, 2008, p. 4) were replaced with strategical planning, horizontal stakeholder-based organization, flexible, contracted, and temporary employment, and performance-based evaluation (Bozlağan, 2008, pp. 9–10).

Langan (2007) mentions the principles of NPM under four titles. First, austerity: organizational sub-units with budgetary autonomy are created for rationing scarce resources, thus providing cost control and financial transparency. Secondly, market forces: a competitive welfare market emerged in which both public and private sectors involved and services are provided mostly according to the purchaser/provider split. Thirdly, the decentralization of managerial authority: the authority is separated into strategic management and operational management. Finally, the satisfaction of consumer demands: standards of performance are defined in public services for greater accountability (Langan, 2007, p. 159).

According to Newman, these NPM reforms have "reshaped the relationship between public and private sectors, professionals and managers, and central and local government" (2007, p. 45). Considering these new relationships, in the new order, firstly, public and private sectors collaborate with each other, they use similar techniques, and the purchaser and the provider of public services, i.e. state institutions and private companies, are integrated into the labor market. Therefore, the public sector is rendered to a field in which the neoliberal market system is being reproduced. Secondly, a new relationship has emerged in the provision of public services, between professionals performing the services in each field, for instance, doctors in the field of health, and managers charging the former through labor contracts for a limited working time. Hence, a hierarchy is established between professionals and managers, in which statuses matter rather than occupational functions.

Thirdly, while local governments have become economically independent from the central government through a decentralization process, they have also taken the full responsibility of public services. Rondinelli and Nellis define decentralization as

> transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or non-governmental private or voluntary organizations. (1986, p. 5)

Decentralization is legitimized under the pretext of an element of modernization (Newman, 2007, p. 50). Decentralization of the government is required in order to overcome the red tape. Through decentralization, local managers who have greater discretion in decision-making prevent the "ponderous procedures" of the bureaucracy in the central government (Rondinelli & Nellis, 1986, p. 10).

Decentralization does not consist of only the empowerment of local governments. Illy (1986) elaborates the term by offering different types: de-concentration, delegation, and devolution. The transfer of some authority and responsibility to lower levels within the central government machinery is de-concentration. In this type, officials remain as members of central ministries but work in local administrative units to satisfy the need of communication infrastructure in geographically diversified countries. If the responsibility passes to organizations outside the central bureaucratic structure, for example, public corporations, it is called delegation. Illy explains lastly, the meaning of devolution that subnational units, i. e. municipalities, having relative autonomy and being empowered financially and legally by the central government. The municipal officials are not appointed but elected through local elections. Hence, central government does not intervene services and daily business of municipalities. The last type, devolution, is the classical understanding of decentralization according to Illy (1986, pp. 121–124). Likewise, in this study

decentralization is referred to as devolution: the empowerment of municipalities.

Under the guidance of the NPM approach, municipalities having more financial and legal power started to sign contracts with agents outside the public sector for the provision of goods and services. These agents can be both non-profit organizations and private companies. An example for the non-profit organizations performing public service functions is quangos, namely "[q]uasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations [which] have proliferated, taking on regulatory functions, such as [...] responsibilities for the provision of previously 'public' utilities such as water, gas, electricity" which is called "quangoization" in the UK (Rose, 2006, p. 157). The second agents are private companies as winners of the tenders of municipalities to undertake the provision of public services. The entire process, in which private companies employ subcontracted workers for the service provision, is called *"taşeronlaşma"* in Turkish, from French "*tâcheron*", meaning "drudge".

Active participation of private sector in the provision of public services as a supplier indicates privatization in general terms. Municipalities can be in different relations with private companies while providing services. Savas (1999) mentions three broad methods in the privatization of services and functions:

> [Firstly] delegation, where government retains responsibility and oversight but uses the private sector for service delivery, for example, by contracting for services, or outsourcing; [secondly] divestment, where government relinquishes responsibility; and [thirdly] displacement, where the private sector grows and displaces a government activity. (Savas, 1999, p. 2)

Therefore, delegation corresponds to contracting out, which means that the private sector performs the public sector's responsibility for providing services. Divestment and displacement point to the transaction of a state enterprise or institution by a voluntary political decision in divestment, or an economic obligation in displacement. The focus of this study is the first method,

delegation,[3] i.e. contracting out in public services. In the method of contracting out, public and private sectors provide services with cooperation in a principal-agent relation. The public sector, the principal, appoints private sector, the agent, to act and provide services on its behalf. Hence, the services are provided by professionals who are subcontracted to private companies, and controlled by the managers in the public institutions. While subcontractors are private companies, primary employer bearing the responsibility of the provision is not the central government but local governments, i.e. municipalities.

Privatization through outsourcing is a debated issue having both supporters and opposition groups who assert their arguments in both ideological and practical terms. Supporters have "an ideological preference for private over public ordering and market over noneconomic values" (Dowdle, 2006, p. 84) and argue some functions of the government must even be delivered to the private sector. However, according to those who oppose privatization, some responsibilities of the state such as "policing, incarceration, education, transportation, health care, national defense, and foreign policy" are "inherent" and "categorically [sic] non-delegable" (Dowdle, 2006, p. 85). Their practical opposition, as Dowdle mentions, stems from the adverse impact of privatization on "liberal democratic norms of accountability, due process, equality, rationality" (2006, p. 87). On the other hand, a practical reason for preferring outsourcing is that, "the introduction of competition, choice, the entrepreneurial spirit, profit making, and business methods" can be beneficial for "the cost, quality, and accessibility of social welfare services" (Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989, p. 34). While the state, with its bureaucratic structure, is seen as incapable of practically producing goods and services, "private firms [using market methods above] are thought to be capable of providing the same or higher-quality services at a lower cost than can public agencies" (Dowdle, 2006, p. 86). The state's *modus operandi* brings about rules and formalities, which generally slows down the dealing with public affairs. In addition, according to Gupta (2012b), the red tape in the bureaucracy systematically creates arbitrary results in providing services, and fails to produce permanent solutions for social

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[3] The term of delegation is different here from the previous usage explained in Illy's conceptualization. While Illy refers to delegation as a type of decentralization, Savas mentions it as a privatization method.

problems such as poverty. Decentralization (Rondinelli & Nellis, 1986, p. 10) and privatization (Harvey, 2007, p. 65) are offered as solutions for the bureaucratic red tape. However, in order to solve this problem, "un-institutionalized" relations aiming to provide expertise are preferred for the sake of immediate solutions, rather than the improvement of malfunctioning mechanisms (Erder & İncioğlu, 2008, p. 114). Thus, privatization has been preferred to accomplish results in the short-term to improve the malfunction due to the red tape in the public sector.

Municipalities all over the world have been contracting out in the provision of public services, such as solid waste collection, cleaning, and transportation.[4] Reeves mentions that providing services in partnership with private companies is criticized for "being imposed on decision makers (for example, managers in local authorities) as the only available option" (2011, p. 96). When mayors commence a municipal service, according to the dominant trend, they routinize to contract out with a private company to provide the necessary input without considering the usage of the human and material sources within the municipality. In spite of criticisms, municipalities continue to prefer contracting out as if it is the "only game in town" (Reeves, 2011). Awortwi explains the justifications for this preference:

> As governments contract out part of their responsibilities in service provision to private agents, they harness the power of market competition which leads to efficiency in service provision, cost reduction, and improvement in service quality to citizens. [...] as the only producer and distributor of some public services, governments are inefficient because of generous benefits, political patronage, union influence, red tape, and a lack of incentives and sanctions to reduce costs and budgets. In addition, when governments undertake both production and delivery, they are unable to monitor both. (2012, p. 886)

In addition, according to the research of Auriol and Picard, subcontracting "is more desirable for activities with stronger technological uncertainty or

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[4] For example, see for solid waste collection services in Ghana (Awortwi, 2012); employment reintegration services in Netherland (Plantinga et al. 2011); water services in Ireland (Reeves, 2011).

lower market profitability and for governments with tougher financial constraints" (2009, p. 1466).

In addition to the conveniences of the subcontracting system, however, it changes not only the type of provision of a service but also the being and substance of that service, hence cannot be considered as a simple transfer of responsibility, as Leys mentions:

> Market-based provision of services is not just another way – allegedly more efficient – providing public services. To be markets they must be commodified, and commodification first transforms them into "products", and then further transforms these into different products, serving different ends. (2003, p. 211)

Furthermore, the relationship between a providing state and a receiving citizen is transformed into a relation between a selling entrepreneur and a buying customer. Not the public institutions but private companies working with entrepreneurial goals supply public services. Therefore, these services are rendered to commodities even though they are basic needs and rights of people such as health and education.

Through the privatization processes, the government retreats from the market. The irony of privatization appears here that while contracting, the government has to put in place some rules and regulations (Smith & Lipsky, 1993, p. 204), and also in a perfect system, government should control the functioning of provision for the well-being of its citizens. However, in the neoliberal order as Glynn says, "government action is needed *to facilitate and protect the neoliberal economy* [emphasis added], and so-called 'free market' demand a great deal of interference" (2009, p. 53). Similarly, Rose mentions that this new order is "the guarantor of both the freedom of the individual and the freedom of the capitalist enterprise" (2006, p. 151). Thus, neoliberalism is re-engineering of the state for the benefit of the market (Wacquant, 2009, p. 307). Wacquant identifies the neoliberal state with "centaur-state" whose human head thinks and acts for upper classes and horse feet trod on the others. In other words, centaur-state treats "liberal at the top and paternalistic at the bottom, which presents radically different faces at the two ends of the social

hierarchy" (Wacquant, 2009, p. 312). Wacquant mostly emphasizes on that the paternalist face of the state is fearsome and punishing the lower classes. However, its paternalism also contains protectionist features in order to control its subjects, which is one of the duties assigned to states in the new market system as Savaşkan mentions:

> States are supposed to carry out legal reforms in order to create and secure the property regime, which is the basis of the market system, on the one hand. On the other hand, states should take responsibilities to save disadvantaged groups who are influenced by the inequalities stemming from market relations. However, these responsibilities should be limited to minimize those inequalities without intervening in the active functioning of the market system. (2009, p. 210)

The capitalist state in Keynesian terms aimed to provide full employment at any price. However, in neoliberal terms, the issue of employment has never had a priority since the economic growth is supposed to create new employment areas in the long-run (Savaşkan, 2009, p. 213). Labor supply should exceed labor demand in the neoliberal system, which paves the way for cheap, temporary and unsecured labor force. The state plays a role in providing these labor conditions in favor of employers through legislative arrangements. Meanwhile, it implements social policies in order to provide public satisfaction, which is seen as "to manage 'social risks'" (Yükseker, 2009, p. 264). Therefore, the market system is protected from the adverse reactions of people through satisfying them with public services.

Consequently, the retreat of the state does not require the emergence of a "passive" state. On the contrary, the state is "active" to extend its own political power. The state gains power politically in the course of moving away from "a 'social state,' towards what one can call a 'social assistance state,'" through "the politicization of various distribution channels of social welfare abound" (Eder, 2010, p. 156). While the public sector becomes a marketing field in which companies invest and make profit, the state "*increases* its own political power, and its own reach" (Eder, 2010, p. 182) as the regulator of the game.

2.3. Turkish Municipalism in the Neoliberal Times

Turkey has a centralized state tradition (Ökten, 2008, p. 55). Even though municipality-like institutions[5] were founded in the last period of the Ottoman State and thereby, local administrations have a 150-year history, the central authority has always been powerful and prevented the empowerment of local administrations (Bayraktar & Massicard, 2012, p. 14). "[This] centralist nature of public administration is not only a tradition, which has been inherited from the Ottoman period, it has also been developed and enhanced by Republican administrations during the consolidation of the nation state" (Göymen, 2004, p. 17). To exemplify, in early times of the Republic of Turkey, municipalities, which declared as responsible for local public services, were still seen as the extension to the central government. Furthermore, "the newly founded ministries [in the 1930s] took over *de facto* many powers that were officially assigned to municipalities" (cited in Bayraktar & Massicard, 2012, p. 17). Therefore, "Turkish local governing system was institutionalized under the strict controls of the center" (Ökten, 2008, p. 55).

The necessity for the restructuring of Turkish public administration emerged due to certain specific reasons in addition to global reasons. Turkey's late democratization process is one of these reasons. The country was ruled under one political party until 1950. Even after the transition to the multi-party system, a complete participatory democratic system could not be achieved. The empowerment of local governments could have paved a way for public participation in the decision-making processes. Yet local governments bearing the responsibility of public services did not have sufficient budget. Political relations between the ruling party and municipalities played a role in determining the budget for municipalities. Therefore, political connections of municipalities made them economically dependent. In fact, the strict centralized administration was not able to provide effective and efficient services for people (Ökten, 2008, p. 54). The legal arrangements were outdated since the law on the municipalities enacted in 1930 was still in force in the 1980s

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[5] *Şehremaneti*s established in 1855 and notably the Sixth District and other 13 municipal districts established in 1858 were the first municipal organizations of the Ottoman State (Bayraktar & Massicard, 2012).

(Demiral, 2007, p. 242). Thus, the restructuring of local governments was urgently needed.

The concept of decentralization was firstly mentioned in the Constitution of 1961 but was not implemented. In contrast, the planned economy strengthened the central government with the establishment of the State Planning Organization (DPT) in 1960. In the 1970s, the Ministry of Local Governments was established as a solution to dysfunctional local governments. However, the Ministry was active only during 1978-79 and then failed due to partisan practices (Demiral, 2007, p. 241).

In 1980, neoliberalism came to the stage in Turkey with the January 24 Decisions, which were implemented through a military coup. These decisions required a market-oriented economic stability program. In the direction of this program, "wages were kept under control and there were stronger measures designed to encourage exports, such as tax returns for exporters, and tax exemption for imported industrial input" (Geyikdağı & Geyikdağı, 2009, p. 80). The integration of Turkey into the competitive world economy was aimed. "'Deregulation' and 'privatization' seemed to be the order of the day" (Yalman, 2009, p. 33). Decentralization was also a part of this new order. Neoliberal policies, "turning the classical public administration model toward new public management, requiring decentralization and efficient and effective use of public resources [...] gave additional responsibilities to local governments" (Tosun & Yilmaz, 2010, p. 73). Within the structure of a strict and ponderous central government, neoliberal policies would have been hardly implemented. Therefore, the idea of decentralization and empowerment of local governments were offered to put neoliberalism into operation.

During the military government (1980-3), new funds were provided for municipalities for the solution of recently emerged urban problems as well as for the provision of public services. In article 127 of the 1982 Constitution, it was declared, "the formation, duties and powers of the local administration shall be regulated by law in accordance with the principle of local administration. Special administrative arrangements may be introduced by law for larger urban centers." Therefore, legal background for metropolitan municipalities in the urban centers with a population of over 50.000 was

constituted. According to the Laws no. 2680 and 3030, both enacted in 1984, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir became metropolitan municipalities. These municipalities were inaugurated after the local elections of March 25, 1984 ("Büyükşehir Belediyeleri," n.d.). Hence, two types of municipalities emerged: metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities. However, this two-level municipal administration strengthened the metropolitan level and constrained the district levels (Marcou, 2006, p. 25). Since only the metropolitan municipalities were empowered, the process of empowerment remained one-sided. As Erder and İncioğlu (2008) argue, this reform created a new type of centralization around the metropolitan municipalities, which gained so much power in this process. Previously, municipalities were constrained by the budget strictly given by the state. Now district municipalities became dependent on metropolitan municipalities. While the budget of district municipalities did not enlarge notably,[6] metropolitan municipalities had a larger opportunity of economic resources since 3% of the taxes collected in their cities was transferred to the municipality budget. As Esmer mentions, "With the metropolitan municipality having a much larger budget than all the districts combined and also having the last word in all major investment decisions as well as master and implementation plans, the model is much closer to a centralized system" (1989, p. 70). In other words, the old system, in which political relations brought about inequality in the budgets of municipalities, was rearranged between metropolitan and district municipalities (Ökten, 2008, p. 55). Even though district municipalities are out of the scope of this study, it is significant to mention them to show the success level of decentralization.

Financial and administrative power is concentrated on the mayors of the metropolitan municipalities holding broad authorities (Erder & İncioğlu, 2008). These mayors "obtained substantial rights of veto and modification with regard to the decisions of the metropolitan and district municipal councils" (Bayraktar & Massicard, 2012, p. 18). As a result, the decentralization policies in the 1980s led to the emergence of more powerful metropolitan mayors. The accumulation

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[6] "In 1930, municipality budgets accounted for 10% of the national budget, whereas 24% of the population lived in cities. In 1998, municipal budgets represented 12.86% of the national budget, whereas 76.7% of the population was urban" (Bayraktar & Massicard, 2012, p. 47).

of authority in mayors was "dysfunctional for effective decentralization" (Heper, 1989, p. 76). Consequently, a full decentralization was not achieved.

Turkey's relations with the European Union (EU) have also had an impact on the process of decentralization. The EU started to emphasize local levels of governance in 1988 with the enactment of the "European Charter of Local Self-Government", which approved by Turkey in 1991. The EU adopted the principle of subsidiarity in the context of local governance and decentralization and explained the principle in the "Treaty of Maastricht" in 1992 as preferring local and regional solutions before the Union takes actions. According to the principle of subsidiarity, local governments, which are closer to people than central governments, are more aware of public needs. Hence, local governments are the primary actors to provide public services (Zeyrekli & Ekizceleroğlu, 2007, p. 30). In Turkey, the draft of the "Law on the Basic Principles and Reorganization of Public Administration" in 2004 aimed to introduce the principle of subsidiarity into the Turkish administrative system "to redefine the powers and responsibilities of the central and local administrative structures and to redefine central–local relations by giving more weight to the latter" (Güney & Çelenk, 2010, p. 255). However, the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed the law seeing it as a threat to the centralized authority.[7] The draft was also criticized to go to extremes about seeing the citizens as customers (Ökten, 2008, p. 71), which would have changed the system from social right-oriented to market-oriented.[8] Nevertheless, other laws involved in the reform package were enacted, which are the Metropolitan Municipality Law (No. 5216), the Municipalities Law (No. 5393) and the Provincial Special Administrations Law (No. 5302). According to the 15th, 18th and 67th(j) articles of the Municipalities Law (No. 5393), 10th and 12th articles of Metropolitan Municipality Law (No. 5216) and 10th (i) and 50th articles of Provincial Special Administrations Law (No. 5302) the right is accorded to local administrations to make private sector, non-profit organizations, professional organizations and universities provide

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[7] According to Güney and Çelenk, "the effects of Turkey's centralized state tradition create a number of major obstacles to restructuring the administration in its efforts to prepare for EU membership" (2010, p. 252).

[8] Civil-society organizations protested the draft in a meeting by claiming that "the country will turn to market; the state to a company; and citizens to customers" ("Sivil örgütler tasarıya sert tepki gösterdi," 2004).

public services on the condition that the responsibility of administration is reserved (Ataay, 2007, p. 374).

In this new legislation, local governments are authorized to incorporate with private agents freely under the principle of *administrative and financial autonomy* (*subsidiarity*). This change does not affect only the local government system "but the organization of public administration as a whole" (Bayramoglu Ozugurlu & Erturk Keskin, 2012, pp. 5–6). Similarly, Ökten says, "[t]he previous reform drafts about Turkish public administration were aimed at fixing the everyday life problems. New [law] aimed the change of mentality and understanding" (2008, p. 68). Therefore, the new legislation, which brought some technical novelties such as performance evaluation and permanent staff regulations, also enacted a new understanding, which sees the citizen as a customer and the local government as business, hence transforming from a social state into a regulatory state under the effect of neoliberal thoughts (Demiral, 2007, p. 246).

The main problem of the decentralization process in the context of Turkey is its partial-emergence. Heper divides decentralization into two functional and structural terms: "administrative decentralization: the degree to which the system functions efficiently and effectively and political decentralization: the extent to which self-government is realized" (1989, p. 73). Administrative decentralization has the priority in the agenda of Turkish politicians and businessmen. In this regard, several public institutions were established after 1990s (Çımat & Bahar, 2003), in addition to the empowerment of local governments. To mention the related one to this study, the Public Procurement Office (Kamu İhale Kurumu, KİK), which was established in 2002 as a public legal entity under the Ministry of Finance, was one of them. This office is "administratively and financially autonomous" and "assigned and authorized to carry out the accurate application of the principles, procedures and transactions specified in [the tendering] field" (Göymen, 2004, p. 23). Under the control of the KİK, municipalities prepare and announce tenders for the provision of goods and services. The KİK, as a control mechanism, promises transparency and fair competition in the system. On the other hand, political decentralization, Heper's second category, is overshadowed. If public

participation into the decision-making processes, as one of the goals of decentralization, is achieved, the public interest can be provided. Heper mentions that "while formal decentralization has occurred, actual delegation of decision-making powers has not taken place" in the case of Turkey (1989, p. 103). The lack of the political aspect of decentralization does not result in only the incompletion of empowering the local, but also causes an inverse outcome, which is the nonfulfillment of the well-being of the whole society.

2.4. The Provision of Services in the Case of the İBB

Before 1980, municipalities were providing certain services categorized under "traditional municipalism" such as collecting garbage, arranging instructions, granting the license to businesses (Erder & İncioğlu, 2008, p. 5). However, after a while, municipalities were not able to supply increasing demands of growing cities. Thus, the new legislative arrangements after the coup of 1980 increased the resources and funds for municipalities and also enlarged their field of authority and responsibility.

Istanbul as the most crowded city of the country was closely affected by these administrative changes. The Municipality of Istanbul assumed the title of "metropolitan municipality" according to Decree Law no. 3030 concerning the "Administration of Metropolitan Municipalities" enacted in 1984. Through this law, municipal administration in Istanbul converted into a two-tiered structure and also became centralized around the mayor. The first mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, İBB) was Bedrettin Dalan from the Motherland Party (ANAP). Dalan remained in the office between 1984 and 1989. Under his mayorship, the municipal council was dominated by the members who had a higher level of education in respect to previous councils, and had an entrepreneurial profile, according to the research of Erder and İncioğlu (2008). In addition, new members of the municipal council saw the İBB as an investor institution and were interested in "emergent investment projects" rather than "macro scale" and "long run" problems of the metropolis. In this sense, the understanding of "traditional municipalism" was replaced by "project based investor municipalism" (Erder & İncioğlu, 2008, p. 8). The

reforms made in this period "paved the way for the privatisation of some municipal services" (Bayraktar & Massicard, 2012, p. 18), since project based services were budgeted through outsourcing. This new understanding of municipalism continued during the mayorship of Nurettin Sözen from Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP). In both terms, municipalities actively exercised "plan approving authority," given by Law no. 3194 in 1985, through using funds transferred from the center and also creating local resources (Erder & İncioğlu, 2008, p. 11). After the 1994 Local Elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from the Welfare Party (RP) became the mayor. Under his rule, social aids such as food, coal, books, and school materials became permanent, which were previously distributed during the elections. Thus, the "social municipalism" approach merged with project based municipalism (Erder & İncioğlu, 2008, p. 12). The successor mayor, Ali Müfit Gürtuna, from the Virtue Party (FP), which was posterior to the dissolved RP, held office between 1998-2004. In the times of the RP and the FP, social municipalism was not a systematic strategy. It took place clearly as a party policy after the 2004 elections in the time of Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Erder & İncioğlu, 2008). Since 2004, Kadir Topbaş from the AKP has been in the office. In his time, the İBB took its current enormous structure with seven assistant secretaries general, 22 heads of departments, and 86 directorates.

Since the 1980s, both district and metropolitan municipalities started to contract out the provision of some services, mostly cleaning and catering. For instance, in 1985 Beyoğlu Municipality and in 1988 Adana Metropolitan Municipality contracted out cleaning services for the purpose of decreasing costs (Koç, 2001, p. 3). Also the İBB, with its large authority, adapted to this process and contracted out its internal and external services. Internal services are those provided for the municipality personnel such as transportation, catering, cleaning, and security. External services are the ones provided by the municipal institutions for all (or targeted) citizens in fields such as sport, health, nursing, public cleaning, cultural activities, funeral services, and so forth.

Procurement of internal services can be counted as in-house business. However, purchasing public services, which are under the intrinsic responsibilities of municipalities, since they are elected for the purpose of

providing services, sounds rhetorically ironic and also legally prohibited as it is stated in the Labor Law no. 4857: "The main work can not be divided and assigned to sub-employers unless for technological reasons required." In any case, subcontracting in public services has been commonly applied in practice for the sake of efficiency and speeding up the provision of the services. Subcontracted workers, however, bear the brunt of this system since they are deprived of exercising their legal rights such as a regular wage, job security, and seniority indemnity according to the Labor Law since "in Turkey as elsewhere, the lack of connection between the text of laws and their implementation is real" (Bayraktar & Massicard, 2012, p. 37). An important reason for the violation of rights is the lack of a system to make those workers, and also citizens in general, participate into the decision-making and controlling mechanisms. Decentralization operates only in administrative terms since the institutions are divided into subunits, directorates specialize in their jobs, and they employ different companies for every piece of work in the municipality. On the other hand, political decentralization, bringing more actors into the decision-making mechanisms, has not been achieved.

2.5. Conclusion

In order to meet the "deficits" (Kettl, 1998) experienced in the state bureaucracy in terms of budget, performance, and confidence, public administration reforms are being carried out all around the world. During this reform process, the centralized state "administration" has rendered to the decentralized state "management". Through policies of privatization and decentralization, neoliberal states have emerged. Public administration reform was radical since it did not change only the functioning mechanism of service delivery but also the substance of services. Opening the public sector to the market has brought the commodification of services, the transformation of citizens into customers, and prioritization of efficiency criteria over egalitarian concerns.

In addition, in the context of Turkey, other certain facts necessitated a public administration reform such as limited budgets of local governments, inability of central government to provide effective and efficient services, and the need of democratization through public participation in decision-making mechanisms. In the 1980s, local government regulations were rearranged through laws. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality was established in this period and held the power in political and economic terms. The public services under the İBB has become continuous in the 1990s. In the 2000s, the İBB acquired a complex structure consisting of specified directorates on different services. The İBB, during its empowerment process, has used the method of subcontracting as its employment strategy. The purchase of goods and services are conducted through tenders. Not only the internal services of the institution for its own personnel but also the external services directed to citizens are contracted out to private companies. Certain issues related to this topic have been debated publicly and academically such as the transfer of the responsibilities of a public institution to private agents, the fulfillment of the main activity by subcontracted workers instead of tenured officials, poor working standards of workers, high profit margins benefiting the company owners, etc. In this context, I conducted a research on the emerging state images through analyzing the subcontracting system, rather than bringing up normative judgments. The

following chapter presents the ethnographic data of this study, of which the fieldwork is conducted about the public services delivered to the private sector by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.

CHAPTER 3

ETHNOGRAPHY – The Practices of the Subcontracting System

3.1. Introduction

Fieldwork is the main resource of an ethnographical research. The knowledge and experience gathered in the field have the potential to change both the pre-investigational opinions of the researcher and the direction of the research. In other words, a research might not remain as it was designed in the beginning. The change in plans is not only to be tolerated, according to Marcus (2009), but also to be expected. Marcus calls this change "correction" which is that "the anthropologist starts out with the idea of researching one thing, but good, promising fieldwork often leads to something completely different, unexpected, and more interesting" (2009, p. 22). I classified the alterations in the fieldwork, which stem from "its virtuous unruliness" for Marcus, in thematic and technical terms. The thematic changes might stem from the inconsistency between what the researcher finds out in the field and what s/he argued before or the appearance of unexpected significant points, which can be the focus point in the research framework. In such cases, the ethnographer restructures the research question or shifts the direction of the main argument according to the fieldwork results. The technical changes pertaining to the methodological structure of the research can be caused by the failure to access some targeted persons/institutions or the irrelevancy of the interviews. The researcher might not be able to do the expected interviews with especially well-informed people. In such a case, the ethnographer can adjust the direction of the research by changing the limits of the field, the profile of informants, etc. Therefore, an ethnographic study is being established throughout the fieldwork.

In the beginning, I designed my research to investigate the social services provided in the facilities of a specific directorate for elderly people under the İBB. The directorate is responsible for a wide closed campus in which almost a thousand inpatients are taken care of twenty-four hours a day. In the campus,

there are nine building complexes named, among others, Hope, Love, Trust, and Peace. Inpatients are placed in these buildings in certain categories such as gender, being bedridden or self-sufficient, being mentally ill, and suffering from dementia or Alzheimer's disease. People who can apply to stay in the facilities are those living in Istanbul, not having anybody to be nursed by, being in a social and economic privation (approved by social survey report), not having any epidemics, being above the age of 55 for women and 60 for men. The accepted elderly people receive services such as clothing, social needs, nutrition, medical examination, treatment, physical therapy and rehabilitation in the facilities. The employees work in basically two different positions: office staff and service staff. The office staff work in the administrative units or research and development department. The service staff are directly connected to the residents since they provide the services. Approximately eight hundred employees work on the campus, however only a hundred of them are civil servants attached directly to the municipality. The others are subcontracted workers under private companies. Civil servants are mostly located in the administrative units while service staff consist of subcontracted workers. The directorate purchases human resource services from private companies every year through initiating tenders.

Public or private institutions are used to purchase support services such as cleaning, catering, and transportation. However, also the main activity of an institution can be tendered to anyone. In the facilities mentioned above, the directorate uses mainly subcontracted workers in services under its direct responsibility. Therefore, public services are delivered by non-public servants. The neoliberalization process has brought a new practice that private company workers can serve in state institutions. My aim was to find out the effects of this emerging phenomenon on the state image. Accordingly, I started to observe everyday practices in the campus of the facilities: what kind of services were provided, how service staff treated inpatients, how inpatients reacted, what working conditions official and service staff had, etc. Interviews would be the important part of my research in addition to observation. However, one worker told me about the requirement of getting permission from administration in order to interview the caregivers working there.

When I visited the director in order to obtain permission, I explained my research topic that I would like to study the process of outsourcing in the employment strategy of municipalities as public institutions. He asked whether I meant subcontracted workers while saying outsourcing the employment, and I agreed. When the director heard the concept of "subcontracted workers," he rejected to give permission due to political reasons. The issue of subcontracted workers is a sensitive issue because they work mostly in unjust conditions, their personnel rights are violated, and they cannot get regular wages. In addition, political parties might use the issue against each other. A thesis on the subcontracted workers or even mentioning them in a thesis, according to the director, could be used in political debates. Therefore, he did not take the risk and offered me to change my topic. Even if I intended to draw a larger picture of service mechanisms in the municipality rather than merely to explain the situation of workers, merely using an already politicized concept, i.e. the subcontracted workers, became an obstacle for my research. I had to change my scope since neither civil servants nor subcontracted workers in that directorate were willing to give interviews.

Therefore, I widened the field from elderly nursing services in the facilities of one directorate to the whole social services provided under the İBB. Going beyond the borders of one site gave me the opportunity to examine other kinds of social services such as Home Care Service and Women's Health Centers, tender processes, financial structure behind services, control mechanisms, and different actors in the whole formation process of services. Now I could obtain a larger scaled map of social services provided by the İBB by integrating more sites into the research. The delivery process of a service would be deficient to show the link between the social services and national neoliberal policies. Although the shortage of time spent in a place diminishes the depth of the knowledge collected there, the variety of spaces brings about a different type of in-depth knowledge. While the former reveals fine details on the object, the latter shows the network among a variety of actors in the formation process of the object. When I extended the scope of my research, alas I could not obtain every detail of the provision of a social service by the İBB but could show a holistic approach to the process of a service, from planning to implementation

phases, from tendering to controlling mechanism, from financial to human resources, each of which is integrated to the research as different sites. Therefore, the research acquired more than one site even if it was not a perfect implementation of a multi-sited ethnography of Marcus. During the fieldwork, I interviewed people not only from the Directorate of Social Services but also from other directorates such as the Directorate of Strategic Development and of Finance, which are not directly related to social services, in order to understand tendering mechanism and financial background common to all services of the İBB.

In the process of designing and delivering social services, more than one actor plays a role. Decision-making mechanisms, tendering processes, and provision of services are all multi-actor systems. However, these actors are mostly layered as municipality directors, civil servants, private companies, and subcontracted workers. The stratification among these actors means that, for example, a subcontracted worker cannot be involved in the decision-making mechanisms, participate in the project phase of a service or express opinion about the specification of a certain job although s/he faces the consequences of these processes. Therefore, a layered employment exists from the beginning of the design to the fulfillment of a service. I interviewed the actors from different ranks and tasks such as civil servants, workers contracted directly with the municipality, subcontracted workers attached to private companies or the İBB's affiliated companies, and private company agents. I categorize these actors among their status and functions. In terms of status, they are categorized either as public or private actors: while civil servants are public actors, contracted company members, and subcontracted workers are private actors. In other words, those who receive a salary from the state are part of the "public" and those who do not, namely earn their own money or get wages from employers are part of the "private." In this case, the members of the affiliates are also private actors since their wages are sourced from the affiliated companies, not the state. In terms of functions, as the second category, actors are diversified as decision-makers, service providing experts, and intermediary organizers. Administrative civil servants who get involved in the planning phases of services, arrange tenders, and evaluate workers are decision-makers. Civil

servants and subcontracted workers, who are specialists in a specific part of a service, and directly deal with citizens, are the service providing experts. Private company agents and affiliate executives, who get the budget from the İBB through tenders, have the responsibility of the service, make the workers provide the service, pay their wages and insurance, are intermediary organizers. Such categorization of people interacting with each other requires an organized analysis of a multi-actor system.

Not only the actors' relationship with each other, but also and more importantly their perception of the state is the subject of my research. While investigating the public services provided by the İBB, my focus is how the state image is constructed in these processes. The state institution I chose as the research field is a municipality, namely a local government. Although municipalities are not national institutions, they represent the state in the local level. Furthermore, as a result of the neoliberalization and decentralization processes, local governments are empowered and have taken the responsibility of public service delivery. Actually, the İBB as a public institution today supplies services in every field: education, health, nursing, sport, parking, construction, transportation, etc. meaning that the state appears in every field of life. Citizens come into contact with the state during receiving services. Therefore, the functioning mechanism of the state leaves marks on the lives of people benefiting from these services and their way of thinking about the state.

In this chapter, after a discussion section on methodology, I will analyze my fieldwork results.

3.2. On Methodology

The state is accepted as a concrete actor by some theoreticians, or as a constructed concept by some others (as discussed in Chapter 1). I presented my position on the latter side. When one sees the state as continuously reconstructed, its image is hard to trace and describe. However, since this reconstruction happens through everyday bureaucratic practices and interactions between public institutions and civil servants and citizens, one can look at these visible practices and interactions on behalf of making the

anthropology of the state. In order to analyze a phenomenon, it is essential to draw the lines and determine the limits of it. The state, in my research the state of the Turkish Republic, performs countless services and activities by thousands of civil servants in numerous central and local public institutions. What attracted me was the provision of public services by a local public institution, in my case the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (the İBB), through subcontracting.

I conducted an ethnographic research and used qualitative methods in order to obtain deeper information rather than generalizable data of quantitative methods. Ethnography, illustrated as "thick description" in the words of Ryle (cited in Geertz, 1973, pp. 9–10) makes the researcher spend more time in a specific place with people in their local settings, and learn their opinions, attitudes, relations, practices, and perceptions, which are previously like a foreign manuscript for the researcher. In order to "construct a [unique] reading of" this manuscript (Geertz, 1973), it is required to spend a significant amount of time together. I added the word "unique" since every researcher produces his/her own understanding and interpretation of the text/field.

However, the depth of a research does not depend on only the length of time but also the multiplicity of space. The scope of my field expanded from one specific public service delivered in the facilities under one directorate to different services under the responsibility of several directorates of the İBB. Therefore, rather than a long-standing focus on a particular space, I visited more sites spending less time in each of them. Falzon mentions the argument that "to abolish the interval … is to abolish depth" (2009, p. 8) since a large horizontal analysis including more spaces that prevents a vertical detailed analysis concentrating on one space. He presents three possible ways in order to avoid this argument. The first is that the increase in the number of spaces does not prevent spending sufficient time in each of those spaces. In other words, the researcher does not have to shorten the time spent in one site but protract the whole time of the research. The second is to accept the sum of several short-term fieldworks as a long-term research. The third is to take time and space methodologically interchangeable. More space also brings depth to the ethnography as more time does (Falzon, 2009, p. 8).

The multi-sited ethnography approach has also brought a new dimension to fieldwork: widening the space. Marcus, in his article introducing multi-sited ethnography, explained tracking strategies, which are following the people, the thing, the metaphor, the story, biography, or the conflict (1995, pp. 106–109). While tracking, the ethnographer gets beyond the limits of a particular local field and is able to connect local and global sites with each other. This kind of a horizontal, but also multi-layered, research enables the ethnographer to understand a variety of perspectives, to reveal more layers related to the object, and to analyze the interactions between institutions or people in different status and function. However, the ethnographer might fail to have a solid and deep grasp of the local, which is possible through a long-standing vertical following of the object in a limited space. In fact, both horizontal and vertical following can produce valuable ethnographic knowledge even if in different sorts.

In my research, I visibly tracked public services, from their planning stages to provision and evaluating phases. However, I traced the state image in this process, which can be seen as "following the metaphor" in Marcus' terminology. The state image appears in a tender room as the contracting authority, in a service recipient grateful to the state, in a municipal administrator differentiating her institution from the state, in a control engineer assigned by the state to control the contracted work whether processing in favor of public good. In this manner, the state can be traced through looking at the concerns, discourses, and practices of people.

This research, however, does not aim to prove "the reality" of one big state image. Crowley and Henry put the different approaches to "the reality",

> Classic ethnography's focus on the scientistic approach, with the researcher's supposed impartiality or objectivity, has met with critique from social science researchers, who argue that the social world consists of multiple realities, rather than one single objective one. (2009, pp. 42–43)

Correspondingly, I support the possibility of more than one reality about the state's image. Every informant can see or experience the state from his/her point of view. Even if the majority of people draw attention to similar

characteristics and images of the state, the minor perspectives are also significant in such a qualitative research. In addition, the researcher is not out of this process of construction of the state image since:

> [e]thnography, in practice, has evolved from the classic approach, where it was assumed the researcher could retain objectivity when exploring a new culture, to reflexive ethnography, where the role and background of the researcher is included as an integral element of the ethnographic undertaking. (Crowley-Henry, 2009, p. 39)

I also have my own judgment about the state image as a citizen. Therefore, I am an internal part of this research, which provides more than one absolute state image during contracted provision of public services.

In an ethnographic research "different methods [can be used], depending on the aim of the research and the methodological positioning of the researcher with regards to how the relevant research question(s) can be answered" (Crowley-Henry, 2009, p. 38). I undertook observations in public institutions in which services are planned and tendered, in the service fields such as houses of service recipients and special facilities, and in the workshop of subcontracted workers. In addition, I conducted 13 semi-structured and mostly open-ended interviews. I reached the informants through acquaintanceship and the snowball-sampling method. Six of the informants are contracted workers, another six of them are civil servants and one is a private company worker. They have a wide range of occupations including doctors, lawyers, engineers, translators, psychologists, and sociologists. They function in different positions such as administrative, coordinator, inspector, and provider. The interviews took between 30 to 90 minutes. Informants are asked about their working conditions, the registration processes, their expectations from the state, service quality, tender processes, and legal status of workers. In addition to the administrative functions, the judicial processes about the subject are inspected. I examined the present and changing laws, legal processes, lawsuits against tenders, and the repercussions. In the following section, my fieldwork notes are presented.

3.3. Fieldwork

I analyze the fieldwork results under the titles I found significant. First I mention the institutional structure of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB) and then focus on its method for service provision, namely subcontracting. After pointing to the justifications and accusations of the subcontracting system, I elaborate on the tendering process. Subsequently, I will describe the service provision process under the subtitles such as design, application, recording, quality, control mechanisms, and service agents. Last, I look at the informants' opinion on who must have the responsibility to provide services and whether the common good is achieved through subcontracting of public services.

The names of the informants are kept confidential. I do not prefer to use fake names, either. Instead, I will cite the passages from the interviews by naming the informants with their status, function, and occupation, such as the subcontracted doctor, the contracted lawyer or the project coordinator. I will give more information, about the directorate they work for, for instance, when necessary.

3.3.1. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality

The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality consists of seven assistant secretaries general, 22 heads of departments, and 86 directorates. A control engineer mentioned this huge institution by saying, "there are units related to everything, it is so specified" (personal communication, May 11, 2013). The directorates are on a wide-range of services such as health and hygiene, sport and youth, veterinary, parks and gardens, environment and waste, transportation and traffic, cultural affairs, municipal police, fire brigade, etc. In addition to the direct services, while some directorates deal with administrative affairs namely financial resources, tenders, and strategy development, some other directorates cope with more political issues like European Union relations or urban transformation. The policies on decentralization and the empowerment of metropolitan municipalities granted the İBB broad authority and brought about its enormous structure.

Decentralization is supposed to lead to faster response rates and more adequate responses to citizens' needs, assuming that local representatives will be closer to 'the people' and more sensitive to regional and local contexts and conditions" (McGregor, 2001, p. 86), which is also compatible with the subsidiarity principle of the EU. The İBB, as one of those local representatives, provides adequate opportunities for access to wide-ranging services. As regards to the empowerment policy, through the laws promulgated in 2004 and 2005, metropolitan municipalities gained new powers, which include a broader physical space under their control, easier collaboration opportunities with private companies and the authority in the cases of urban transformation (Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008, p. 13). By this way, the İBB attained an effective power containing almost every field of the society.

In addition to the budget provided by the state, the İBB uses also credits in order to cover the expenses of large-scale projects. A contracted translator, who worked in the Directorate of Finance, talked about the external loans taken for these large-scale projects,

> [Large-scale projects] increase the credibility of Turkey. The İBB should do business with foreign banks in order to write its name among the credible companies of the world. In other words, to say, "Look! I make investments too, recognize me, I can afford to pay back my loans on time." It is a matter of 'showing-off' at the same time. It works with foreign banks to be a global actor. Thus, internal loans are not taken anymore. (p. c., May 29, 2013)[9]

With reference to this situation, the İBB, which is a public institution, behaves like a private company developing projects, taking credits, making profits and paying the debt back. In order to be able to get more credits at longer dates, the İBB should get more credit scores from international rating institutions.

The İBB does not stay as an independent agent from the Turkish

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[9] Bu, Türkiye'nin kredibilitesini artıran bir şey. Adını dünyanın güvenilir şirketlerinin arasına yazdırabilmek için İBB yabancı bankalarla iş yapmalı. Yani, "Bak, ben de yatırım yapıyorum, beni tanı, borçlarımı zamanında ödeyebiliyorum." demek için. Bu aynı zamanda bir şov meselesi. Küresel oyuncu olmak için yabancı bankalarla çalışıyor. O yüzden artık yerli krediler alınmıyor.

government since both the İBB and the government have been under the power of the same party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), for the last ten years (2004-2014).[10] This unity burdens the people working in the İBB, that is to follow a rationale compatible with the AKP, the party organization or its policies. A contracted lawyer who has been working in one of the affiliated companies of the İBB, told how she felt this stress, "Because you work at the İBB you should join the party organization as the duty of loyalty, people say" (p. c., May 17, 2013).[11] However, it is not always a burden to support the AKP for everyone in the İBB, especially for those officials who are AKP constituents and able to get a position into the İBB thanks to the power of the AKP. The administrators sympathizing with the party can steer the municipal policies in order to ingratiate themselves with the party. The contracted translator exemplifies this situation,

> In the international arena, the İBB follows the state policies.
> Sometimes, it can be more royalist than the king. International rating
> institutions such as Standard and Poor's, Fitch, Moody's evaluates
> the İBB as well as the state of Turkey. Because the prime minister
> was so annoyed with one of these institutions [S&P] due to the low
> credit notes given to Turkey, the İBB terminated the agreement with
> this institution although the price ($30,000) was already paid.
> Furthermore, the state continued the agreement with that
> institution. (p. c., May 29, 2013)[12]

As it is seen even the speeches by the prime minister can be a determinant in the municipal policies worth large amounts. There are also such AKP constituents thinking that some officials derive extra profit thanks to their administrative positions. They just connive by satisfying with provided services as the contracted lawyer cited, "Even if they abuse their power, they provide

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[10] In the recent local elections, the AKP got the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality for the third time with the ratio of 47.9%.

[11] İBB'de çalıştığın için parti teşkilatına girmen vefa borcu, insanlara göre.

[12] Uluslararası arenada İBB devlet politikalarını izliyor. Hatta bazen kraldan çok kralcı olabiliyor. Uluslararası kredi derecelendirme şirketleri, mesela Standard and Poor's, Fitch, Moody's Türkiye devletini değerlendirdiği gibi İBB'yi değerlendiriyor. Başbakan bu şirketlerden birine Türkiye'ye verdiği düşük kredi notu yüzünden kızdığı için İBB o kurumla olan sözleşmesini ücretini ödediği halde iptal etti. Dahası devlet o kurumla olan kendi sözleşmesini sürdürdü.

services"[13] (p. c., May 17, 2013).

Behind the dynamic face of the İBB, that is providing new services and investing in important projects with huge credits, municipal workers behave in the tradition of local governments according to a subcontracted doctor, who has been working in one of health centers of the İBB,

> One should aim to work, not to avoid working. Avoiding work is typical to local governments. People come to local governments to be comfortable at work. (p. c., September 18, 2013)[14]

The contracted translator also mentioned that, especially in summer, discussions and quarrels occur between workers due to the lack of duty. In addition, workers loosen the working hours by coming late at morning and breaking of earlier at lunchtime (the contracted translator, p. c., May 29, 2013). When I visited an assistant director, who has been working in the Directorate of Strategy Development, I apologized for taking his time, and he responded, "this is okay, we are hacking around all day" (p. c., April 24, 2013). Therefore, working as a civil servant in the İBB is relatively "comfortable."

The employment strategy of the İBB is mostly contracting out. As Kadirbeyoğlu and Sümer stated, "Personnel limitations constrain some of [municipalities'] capacities and force them to seek alternative ways of employment," which is caused by "the framework of the labour market is determined by the central government, which is gradually downsizing the municipal budget" (2012, p. 354). I asked project coordinator of the Women's Health Centers (the KSMs), who is also a doctor by profession, whether it can be possible or not that the health services of the İBB are provided by the doctors tenured in the municipality. She stated, "Municipal personnel cannot do all these services because it is deficient in terms of number" (p. c., July 15, 2013). However, the subcontracted doctor disagrees since she had different experiences, "In the İBB, human sources are wasted. There are 30 workers assigned for a job that ten people could do. In some jobs, the more worker, the

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[13] Yeseler de yapıyorlar.

[14] Çalışmamak hedeflenmez, çalışmak hedeflenir. Çalışmamak biraz yerel yönetimlere has bir şey, buraya gelen insanlar bir şekilde rahat etmek için geliyorlar.

less quality" (p. c., September 18, 2013). In some cases, the multitude of workers, not lack of them, might bring about dysfunction. The contracted lawyer related the insufficiency of the İBB to its "ponderous structure so that [it] cannot do every action by itself" (p. c., May 17, 2013). Rather than the number of workers, how they function plays a more effective role in service provision. This reason is shown as the justification of that the İBB and also other metropolitan and district municipalities have been following the subcontracting system as the regular employment strategy in service provision for the last 20 years.

3.3.2. The Subcontracting System

Subcontracting system (*taşeronluk* in Turkish) is widely used in public institutions as well as private companies. It basically means, "formal separation of purchasing (planning) from provision (delivery)" (Kirkpatrick & Lucio, 1996, p. 3). Related directorate plans a public service, specifies its instructions, and then hires a private company through tendering for its delivery. The responsible company subcontracts with workers for the job. In other words, subcontracted workers do the municipal work under the responsibility of a private company in a qualified way in a determined time. The project coordinator of the KSMs proudly points to, "All services provided for the public are being tendered" in the İBB. "The administrative teams consist of civil servants, but 99.9% of the work is done through subcontracting, by Sağlık A.Ş." in the case of the KSMs (p. c., July 15, 2013). However, the subcontracted sociologist questioned the fields in which subcontracting system is acceptable. According to her, there should be a difference between, for example, construction and social services. Construction works can be fulfilled by subcontracted private agents, but social services should be under the primary responsibility of the state, the İBB (p. c., December 12, 2012).

On the other hand, there are those who completely oppose the subcontracting method by relating it with the neoliberal system. In the Subcontracted Workers Workshop arranged by Subcontracted Workers Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (Taş-İş-Der), it is argued that, "Subcontracting system is spreading like a virus in working life with neoliberal

policies" (p. c., December 22, 2012). The members of the foundation are against the neoliberal policies and subcontracting system since they are the ones who are directly influenced from the process, which I will mention later.

The two sides, the supporters and the opponents of the subcontracting system, point to different arguments. The most common argument of the supporters is that the subcontracting system brings efficiency. According to them, private companies are more efficient, "to replace monolithic state services with numerous competing providers" (Cordella & Willcocks, 2010, p. 82). The control engineer shares this opinion, "Private sector does work faster and is more qualified. Through this system, service is reached to the public faster" (p. c., May 11, 2013). A civil servant continues to receive a salary at the end of the month even if s/he does not do her/his duty properly. If a project cannot be completed on time by the responsible directorate, it is just postponed. However, if the contracted company does not finish the municipal work on time, they cannot receive money from the municipality. The fear of losing money motivates private company administrators according to the contracted lawyer: "Contracted companies provide qualified service because of fear" (p. c., May 17, 2013). The subcontracted workers aim to meet the time schedule because of the pressure about being unpaid. The provision of a service on time and in a qualified way depends on the control of the municipality. A contracted computer programmer, who worked in the Directorate of Public Relations, indicated how crucial the control mechanism was:

> Tendering makes the work faster. Through competition, it is possible to provide cheap and qualified services. However, control mechanisms should be stricter. Sometimes, work is done insufficiently due to lack of control. (p. c., June 13, 2013)[15]

In technical services, control engineers and in social services, inspection teams control the service. If an incompatibility or inadequacy is revealed, the contractor company or subcontracted workers are held responsible: the company might lose money or its contract might be cancelled in big cases as the

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[15] İhale yöntemi işi hızlandırıyor. Rekabet sayesinde ucuz ve kalifiye hizmet sunulabiliyor. Ama yine de kontrol mekanizmaları daha sıkı olmalı. Bazen kontrol yetersizliği sebebiyle işler verimsiz olabiliyor.

penalty or workers might not get their wage or lose their job. The control engineer stated that the municipality does not take any responsibility: "winning a tender means taking its responsibility. Money is paid when the work is completed. The company has to complete the work. This is the way how the state insures itself" (p. c., May 11, 2013).[16]

Another supporting argument related to efficiency is that the subcontracting system makes needs analysis and accordingly finds sources for each service. An executive doctor, who has been working in the Directorate of Health and Hygiene, used a metaphor on tailoring dress out of a fabric, "Firstly the need should be determined, and then the personnel should be supplied. In the municipality, there is already a fabric; you try to make a dress out of it. In the tendering system, you determine the dress first, and then buy enough fabric to tailor it."[17] The permanent staff of the municipality cannot be reorganized according to every project. Thus, temporary workers are employed for intended services.

Temporarily contracting out physical and human resources, rather than permanent possession of resources, is presented as a solution also in the field of research and development. Such a ponderous institution like the İBB might fail to keep up with the time and to adapt to recent developments in the field of services. In order to overcome this problem, the policies of hiring physical resources through contracting and periodically changing the outdated equipment are supported. The project coordinator of the KSMs stated that:

> I do not believe that the purchasing method is a correct method because you have to use what you purchased until it has aged and died. On the other hand, in the hiring method [namely subcontracting] you can update your system according to every development in an exchange of a lower price and without technical

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[16] Bir ihaleyi almak sorumluluk almak demek. Ve para iş tamamlandığında ödenir. Şirket sorumlu olduğu için işi tamamlamak zorunda böylece devlet kendini garantiye alıyor.

[17] Önce ihtiyaç belirlenmeli, sonra personel sağlanmalı. Belediyede bir kumaş var, onunla elbise dikmeye çalışıyorsunuz. İhale sisteminde önce elbiseye karar veriyorsunuz, sonra ona yetecek kadar kumaş alıyorsunuz.

responsibility. (p. c., July 15, 2013)[18]

In this discourse, it is argued that workers would be more motivated if they are contracted periodically. The circulation of the jobs also increases the quality of the service. However, politics should be out of this employment process according to the subcontracted doctor:

> In a completely fair system, without political relations and nepotism, I personally do not support that people hold the same office for long years. I support renewing contracts annually or biannually according to workers' performance evaluations, which motivate people to try to get better in their jobs. (p. c., September 18, 2013)[19]

On the opposite side of these arguments, the opponents of the subcontracting system express the gap between the rhetoric of New Public Management approach, as the background of subcontracting, and the reality. For example, in contracting out, the number of possible providers is more than one, which causes competition between them in the tendering process and competition means trying to be better according to the neoliberal thought. However, Kirkpatrick and Lucio cite that:

> […] the supposedly decentralized provider economy is becoming increasingly *organized.* That is, large private firms are achieving privileged, near monopoly status in the contracting process and hence restricting choice. (Kirkpatrick & Lucio, 1996, p. 6)

In the case of the İBB, if one of the affiliated companies joins tender, other private companies have very little chance to get the job because the İBB prefers to contract with its own company. For example, in the tenders on health services, mostly Sağlık A.Ş. wins the tender. Due to the necessity of work experience certificate (should be worth of at least one-fourth of the tender) while applying to a tender, the small or inexperienced companies are in a

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[18] Satın alma metodunun doğru olduğuna inanmıyorum çünkü alınan şeyi miadı dolana kadar kullanmak zorundasınız. Ama kiralama yönteminde sisteminizi her gelişmeye göre güncelleyebilirsiniz, hem de daha düşük maliyet karşılığında ve hiçbir sorumluluk almadan.

[19] Adil bir düzende, tabi siyasi kayırmacılık olmayacak, ben insanların ilelebet bir kadroda kalmalarından taraftar değilim kişisel olarak. Senede bir, iki senede bir, performanslarına göre kontratlarının yenilenmesinden yanayım ki işlerini daha iyi yapsınlar.

disadvantaged situation.

Another point is the profit margins of private companies. Both a subcontracted sociologist, working in elderly care services, and the contracted lawyer complained about the highness of the profit margins. Strategic Affairs assistant director explained how this happened. Before the announcement of a tender, civil servants in the related directorate calculate the approximate cost of the work. Supposing that the work is worth 100 Liras, the Directorate, however, announces the amount more than the calculated one, even as double, namely 200 Liras. A company joins the tender quotes less than 200 Liras to win the tender, let us say 195 Liras. If the company gets the job, it takes 195 Liras from the İBB, uses 100 Liras of it and makes a profit of 95 Liras (the assistant director, p. c., April 24, 2013). Therefore, in the subcontracting system, the provision of a public service paves the way for the transition of money from public to private, irrespective of the quality of the service. In addition, this situation is incompatible with the arguments that the tendering system brings efficiency by avoiding the waste of money.

The subcontracting system is mostly opposed with regards to the situation of subcontracted workers. The subcontracted sociologist expressed that the subcontracting system is the most problematic issue for the personnel. She complained about the ignorance of subcontracted workers:

> Service recipients are taken into consideration, but providers are not. In fact, executives should also take care of the health and well being of workers since their families, environment, children, and kindergartens are also affected. (p. c., December 12, 2012)[20]

According to subcontracting proponents, neoliberal implementations in public service promise more efficient outcomes and qualified services. Subcontracted workers are just human capital, which is an input in the equation for efficiency. In fact, those workers are also citizens, paying taxes, receiving services, having rights to work in good standards, and shortly being included in the common good. Nevertheless, this system makes them the slaves of time, so to speak, as the motto of Taş-İş-Der says, "Our name is *taşeron*, and our

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[20] Hizmet alanlar düşünülüyor ama hizmet verenler düşünülmüyor. Açıkçası yöneticiler çalışanların da sağlık durumunu önemsemeliler çünkü aileleri, çevreleri, çocukları, kreşleri de bu durumdan etkileniyor.

surname is slave." Basically bad and unsafe working conditions make them feel like slaves.

Subcontracting has been used as an alternative way by the municipalities when they cannot produce services with the present municipal staff. Since the administrative cadre of municipalities takes office through local elections, newly elected executives might not be in compliance with the personnel who were employed by previous administrators. Because the tenured personnel cannot be changed easily due to their employment rights, new administrators started to contract out in order to work with more compliant people. The subcontracted sociologist mentioned the large number of services provided by the Mayor Erdoğan by contracting out in the 1990s. However, those contracted workers are not chosen with only commercial concerns in order to increase efficiency, but also with political concerns. In other words, new administrators prefer to work together with those who support their political party or at least share a similar worldview, which means nepotism. According to the contracted lawyer, since the subcontracting system gives power to the executives to choose the people they want to work together, the system can be easily abused (p. c., May 17, 2013). Furthermore, these patronage relations might affect the quality of services if the contracted workers are not chosen with respect to their professional competence. The contracted translator told about her experience in one of the health centers:

> Medical services in the İBB Health Centers are insufficient. I went to a
> gynecologist and a dentist. The test results were incorrect. Servants in
> the health center knew about their insufficiency so they advised me to
> go another hospital. In addition to technical insufficiencies, doctors
> are also not successful. In these centers, the employed woman doctors
> were mostly suspended from university for a long time because of the
> headscarf ban. They have not been working as doctors for years,
> which decreases their performance. (p. c., May 29, 2013)[21]

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[21] İBB'nin sağlık merkezlerindeki sağlık hizmetleri yeterli değil. Ben bir kadın doğumcuya bir de dişçiye gittim. Test sonuçları yanlış çıktı. Merkezde çalışanlar da yetersizliklerini biliyorlar bana başka bir hastaneye gitmemi tavsiye ettiler. Teknik yetersizliklerin yanında doktorlar da başarısız. Bu merkezlerde çalışan kadın doktorlar genelde başörtü yasağı yüzünden uzun sure üniversiteden uzak kalmışlar. Yıllardır çalışmıyorlar, bu da performanslarını düşürüyor.

Therefore, subcontracting as a method, which is assumed to bring more efficiency, might result in opposite consequences. The subcontracted sociologist complained about the arbitrary treatment of administrators under the subcontracting system, thereby the workers are at the mercy of the administrators.

The subcontracting method is used for the jobs requiring expertise for technological reasons. In the Labor Act it is stated that, "The main activity shall not be divided and assigned to subcontractors, except for operational and work-related requirements or in jobs requiring expertise for technological reasons" (*Labor Act,* 2003). Therefore, a municipal institution has the right to subcontract in any subsidiary branch, such as cleaning, catering, or security, but, "the main activity" should be fulfilled by the municipality. However, in practice the main activity of a unit can be subcontracted to private companies; which is an illegal action. The contracted lawyer mentioned the case of workers in İSTON A.Ş., one of the affiliates specialized on concrete work: where the main activity, building concrete benches etc., was fulfilled by subcontracted workers. The workers used the factories and machines of İSTON A.Ş., did the same work continuously, received orders from the affiliate supervisors. They worked like İSTON A.Ş. workers but got wages from contracted company, which changed its name in every tender. There were some subcontracted workers who had worked for twelve years in İSTON A.Ş doing the same job. The affiliate workers got school aid, Ramadan rations, etc., while the subcontracted workers, working in same places, did not. The new general manager of İSTON A.Ş. tried to make all subcontracted workers affiliate personnel in order to equate the situation, but some executives in higher positions did not permit this. Then, a syndicate filed a complaint about İSTON A.Ş. and applied to the Social Security Institution (SGK) to take a legal action. The inspectors came to control and sued İSTON A.Ş. for the employment of subcontracted workers in the main activity. The affiliate lost the case and 450 subcontracted workers became İSTON A.Ş. personnel and acquired the right to have regular wages and job security. The lawyer said in the end, "We lost the case as the affiliate, but we were happy" since they also waited for the same result (the contracted lawyer, p. c., May 17, 2013). However, in

some other directorates the subcontracting workers continue to perform the main activity. They work like municipal workers, as mentioned by the subcontracted sociologist:

> In the process of performing jobs, any problem is solved with municipality servants, not with company executives. There is not much relation with the private company, except for taking payroll sheet, or signing contracts (p. c., December 12, 2012)[22]

Private companies, as intermediary organizers, only dealing with legal transactions such as registration, social insurance, wages, etc. of the workers do not appear during the process of service provision but earn high profit in the end.

3.3.3. Tendering Process

The İBB contracts out public services through several types of tendering procedures such as negotiated tendering, restricted tendering, direct supply, and open tender procedure. The last one, the open tender procedure, is the most prevalent and I refer to it while explaining the tendering process in this section. The preparation for a one-year contract tender starts in summer. A commission prepares the specifications in June by evaluating the previous years and determines the content in September. The tender is made in November or December and the service starts in January (the project coordinator of Home Care Service, p. c., April 9, 2013). In the specifications, the job description is explained according to the needs, as the control engineer said. The directorate calculates the approximate cost for every work. Also, the directorate asks companies to give prices and the tender price is determined accordingly (the control engineer, p. c., May 11, 2013). The contracted translator pointed to financial resources used by the municipality in big-scale projects:

> In order to pay the tender price to the contracted companies, the İBB

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[22] Çalışırken sorunlar belediye memurlarıyla çözülüyor, şirket çalışanlarıyla değil. Özel şirketle çok bir ilişkimiz olmuyor. Sadece maaş bordrosu alırken ya da sözleşme zamanında oluyor.

negotiates with banks and financial institutions of foreign origin. It gets the loan from an institution that demands the lowest interest rate. However, this process is for big investments. The others can be paid from the İBB budget. (p. c., May 29, 2013)[23]

To get back to the tender issue, the tender notice is announced on the website of the İBB[24], on the website of the Electronic Public Procurement Platform (the EKAP) under the KİK[25], and also in the mobile application of the EKAP for smartphones and tablet computers. Tender documents such as job specifications can be downloaded from the Internet or the mobile application. However, in order to apply to a tender, companies have to purchase the tender documents from the directorate. While applying, they present their work experience certificate and prove that their former works are worth of at least 25% of the tender price. The tender is made either in the committee room of the İBB's main building or in the tender room of the Directorate of Tender Affairs in the İBB additional service building. The tender committee is comprised of directors and supervisors who are chosen by the general director of the unit announcing the tender. On the tender day, the tender committee opens the sealed offers of participating companies. Under normal conditions, the lowest offer wins the tender in order to pursue common good, the control engineer said, because tender price is paid from the municipal budget (p. c., May 11, 2013). However, if the lowest offer is so much under the approximate cost, the directorate asks the company to prove how it can do the work with that low cost. If they cannot prove, the next company will win the tender. The result is announced to all companies. The tendering system is under the control of the KİK, and according to the control engineer, this indicates transparency. In addition, it is possible to complain to the KİK in the cases of alleged corruption. The control engineer as a person who is involved in the tendering process by writing job descriptions, preparing technical specifications and also controlling the provision of the service aftermath, said, "Nepotism is possible [in tendering]

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[23] İhale bedelini sözleşmeli şirketlere ödemek için İBB yabancı bankalarla ve finans kurumlarıyla görüşüyor. En düşük faiz isteyen kurumdan kredi almaya karar veriyor. Ancak bu süreç büyük yatırımlar için. Diğerleri belediye bütçesinden karşılanabiliyor.

[24] http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Pages/IhaleIlanlari.aspx

[25] https://ekap.kik.gov.tr

but nobody takes this risk" (p. c., May 11, 2013). The contracted programmer also agreed, "Arbitrary sanctions are out of the question. The process continues according to law" (p. c., June 13, 2013). On the other hand, the assistant director in Strategic Affairs personally witnessed the cases of forgery, especially in the work experience certificates. He described:

> Forgery in these documents is widespread. When the forgery is found out, the company is disqualified and loses its reputation. However, two companies can write mutual fake receipts worth big amounts to show themselves as if they have fulfilled the sufficient amount of work as specified in the job specification. In addition, this kind of forgery is hard to prove. (the assistant director, p. c., April 24, 2013)[26]

Once, the assistant director ascertained the fraud in the work experience certificate, and asked the manager of the company to withdraw from the tender quietly or this would be publicly announced. The company withdrew. In another case, the assistant director could not prove the forgery and the company got the tender with a fake certificate, and moreover, they gained a good reputation as a trustworthy company in their job (the assistant director, p. c., April 24, 2013). In addition, the report of conformity to environment safety is required in the application for certain tenders and, according to the contracted translator, these companies usually get these reports without actually meeting the standards (p. c., May 29, 2013). Furthermore, in the Subcontracted Workers Workshop, it was argued that private companies win tenders through bribery like a mafia and the state was accused of feeding this mafia network (p. c., December 22, 2012). Nevertheless, the accusation of bribery is an unproven argument in my research.

Some private companies, sometimes under one name or by changing their brand name every year, continuously win the tender of some specific services. This stability might affect the quality of service negatively if the company sees its position ensured. Kadirbeyoğlu and Sümer also observed this in their research:

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[26] Bu belgelerde sahtecilik çok yaygın. Bir sahtekarlık tespit edildiğinde şirket diskalifiye olur ve ayrıca itibar kaybeder. Ancak iki şirket karşılıklı büyük meblağlarda sahte makbuz yazabiliyor. Kendilerini yeterli iş tecrübesine sahipmiş gibi göstermek için. Dahası bu tarz bir sahteciliğin ispatlanması da çok zor.

Once a private firm gets a contract, it is most likely that the firm will continue to get the contract; even though this has not subjected the municipalities under examination to any danger so far, it may become problematic in the future in terms of the quality and pricing of services. (2012, p. 354)

On the other hand, in some cases inexperienced companies might win the tender by chance. A private company worker told that her company, which is a new one in their field, namely counseling and education services, joined to a tender of the İBB. Their aim was just to learn the procedure and gain experience. However, their offer was announced as the second lowest offer, and moreover the lowest one was disqualified. Therefore, they won the tender and had to provide the service. Because they did not calculate the expenses in detail and gave a low offer, they could not make a profit (the company worker, p. c., May 17, 2013). Therefore, the trend of winning companies might vary in different fields of services.

3.3.4. Service Provision Process

In the scope of my research, I gathered information about three types of basic social services provided by the İBB: elderly care, the Home Care Service, and the Women's Health Centers (the KSMs). I found the opportunity to listen to the design process of the KSMs directly from the coordinator of the project, to observe the service provision in elderly care facilities, and to accompany an inspection team in Home Care Service. Rather than elaborating these services under separate subtitles, I will discuss them in the phases of the general processes of services.

3.3.4.1. Design

The public administration approach has undergone a change in the twentieth century. Formerly, public services had an intrinsic feature, that is to say, some services seemed under the responsibility of state institutions without questioning. However, now the content of the services are accepted as changeable and negotiable within the formal measurements. Therefore, the

political power determines what the service content would be (Eser, Memişoğlu, & Özdamar, 2011, p. 210). While the political actors, government or executives in municipalities, decide how and in which fields they provide services, they are influenced by the market mechanisms and prefer to contract out the services. Cordella and Willcocks argue:

> The introduction of the contract state leads to a change in the nature of the services provided. Services are more specified and standardized and payment systems are precisely defined. (2010, p. 83)

This change has occurred as a result of the market research which has guided the municipalities to determine how many people share similar needs and desires, where they are located, through which strategy it is possible to reach them, how the resources should be organized, what the measured outcomes are, and how the social impacts can be extrapolated (Swenson, 2008, p. 632). Therefore, before starting to a public service project, market research enables the administrators to design a more efficient service. As an example, I cite the design process of the Women's Health Centers project from its coordinator:

> In 2002, when the Women's Health Centers project was written, I began to work as an administrator rather than a doctor. In the Directorate of Instant Relief and Rescue, we were doing health screening by using devices. We registered some information about common illnesses and bad habits of women. Then, we realized how unconscious people are of preventive health services. People go to the doctor when they get sick. However, we should teach them how to be healthy rather than to recover from illnesses. In order to plan what to do, we first looked at what others have done. In those days, there was not such implementation about preventive health services either in the body of the municipality and or in private hospitals in Turkey. The policy of municipality was to save the day, and pretend to be doing lots of work. In addition, people did not have any interest in having preventive health services because the result of health

screening could be negative. So we looked at international research; found out which diseases could be screened; calculated cost analysis of screenings; and evaluated technical and expertise sufficiency. In the end, we presented different methods [about providing health screening services] to the İBB by insourcing or outsourcing, which would serve the same purpose. The İBB rejected them. A district municipality accepted to finance our project. A year later the İBB also accepted the project. Now, after ten years, we provide much more qualified services for more people with less costs in the KSMs [under the İBB]. (p. c., July 15, 2013)[27]

Therefore, a public service is designed in the most efficient way in neoliberal times, rather than in an egalitarian way. Haque sees this "increasing tendency to marginalize earlier objectives such as achieving societal progress, living standards, and equality, by more narrow economic goals to enhance micro-economic growth based on greater efficiency and productivity" as an indicator of the transition toward a neoliberal state (2006, p. 202).

3.3.4.2. Application

While a subcontracted psychologist, working as a therapist in one of the KSMs, was explaining how they provide the service, she said, "We reach needy people" then she corrected, "Actually they reach us" (p. c., September 26, 2013). In all social services of the İBB, the needy citizens have to apply to the municipality. For some services, citizens can go to the related institution, such as health centers. However some services, such as the Home Care Service or therapy services in the KSMs, require application via the Internet or by calling

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[27] 2002'de Kadın Sağlığı Merkezleri projesi yazıldığında ben doktor değil yönetici olarak çalışmaya başladım. Acil Yardım ve Cankurtarma Müdürlüğü'nde cihazlarla sağlık taraması yapıyorduk. Yaygın hastalıklara ve kadınların bazı yanlış alışkanlıklarına dair bilgileri kaydettik. Sonra insanların koruyucu sağlık hizmetleri hakkında ne kadar bilinçsiz olduklarını gördük. İnsanlar doktora hasta olduklarında gidiyor. Ancak biz onlara nasıl iyileşeceğinden ziyade "nasıl sağlıklı kalınır"ı öğretmeliyiz. Ne yapacağımızı planlamadan önce başkaları ne yapmış ona baktık. O günlerde Türkiye'de ne belediye bünyesinde ne de özel hastanelerde koruyucu sağlık hizmetlerine dair bir uygulama yoktu. Belediyenin politikası günü kurtarmaktı, çok iş yapıyor gibi görünmekti. Ayrıca insanlar da koruyucu sağlık hizmetlerini talep etmiyorlardı çünkü sağlık taramasının sonucu kötü de çıkabilirdi. Bu yüzden biz de uluslararası çalışmalara baktık, hangi hastalıklar taranabilir bulduk, taramaların maliyet analizlerini hesapladık, teknik ve uzman yeterliliğini değerlendirdik. Sonuçta İBB'ye aynı amaca hizmet eden iç ve dış kaynaklı farklı metotlar sunduk. İBB reddetti. Bir yerel belediye projemizi finanse etmeyi kabul etti. Bir yıl sonra İBB de projeyi kabul etti. Şimdi on yıl sonra KSM'lerde daha fazla insana, daha az maliyetli, daha kaliteli hizmet sunuyoruz.

153. This situation makes the services applicant-based. In other words, only those who have heard about the services could apply to and benefit from them. The KSM project coordinator mentioned this, "Even if a service is provided perfectly, it would be inadequate if it is not well announced to people" (p. c., July 15, 2013). However, according to her the insufficiency of advertising activities is a problem for the KSMs. Unless some municipal incumbents go from door to door and give information about the services, citizens would be barely aware of services as the contracted translator put forward:

> The families of bedridden patients have to be aware of Home Care Service of the İBB in order to apply and benefit from it. The services are announced on billboards on the streets, but there are poor people who may never pass by those areas. (p. c., May 29, 2013)[28]

One can apply on behalf of someone else in certain services. In the Home Care Service, for example, applying for someone else, for a relative or an acquaintance, is called *ihbar,* which means "informing" literally and "denunciation" in common usage. Especially, elderly people living alone in low standards can be subjects of *ihbar*s. In Turkey, 1.1% of the population lives alone. The poverty ratio in the single-person households is 10.5%, and 81.1% of these poor people is above the age of 65 (Işık & Ataç, 2012), which means approximately 70,000 people. When I accompanied the inspection team of the Home Care Service, we visited the house of an old woman for whom her neighbors applied to the Service. We could not see the woman because she was alone at home and could not even walk to open the door. The inspector tried to communicate with her by shouting (the inspection tour, p. c., April 10, 2013). She had almost no chance to hear about the Home Care Service unless her neighbors made an *ihbar*.

In the cases where the responsibility of a public service is totally left to the private sector in both operational and administrative terms, the provider can "introduce user fees for services such as education, transport, and health" (Haque, 2006, p. 198) which used to be free as a civil right. Fees for services would bring about an unjust situation between well-off and poor people. While

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[28] Yatalak hastaların yakınları Evde Bakım Hizmetleri'nden haberdar değilse bundan yararlanamazlar. Hizmetlerin caddelerde billboardlarda reklamı yapılıyor ama fakir bir aile o yollardan hiç geçmiyor olabilir.

the former can easily receive the services in better conditions, the latter has difficulty in accessing to and benefiting from the services (Eser et al., 2011, p. 212). The result is the commodification of a civil right. However, the application to services under the İBB is free since the cost of services paid from the municipal budget, not by the companies. Therefore, all citizens can apply to social services as long as they are informed about them.

3.3.4.3. Recording

During the application, service recipients have to give some information about themselves. The Turkish Republic identification number is primarily required to approve their citizenship. In medical centers, applicants open an account and take a barcode number in the patient admissions office. Thus, they can be followed every time they come.

Some units in the municipality use an automation system to record information about service recipients. As the inspector in the Home Care Service said, an automation system is used in order to keep the general and medical information about patients: age, gender, monthly income, house rent, household population, disease, patient's suitability for transportation, etc. Patients have a five-digit "individual number" so observing them becomes easier. After each visit to the homes, a related health official, doctor, physiotherapist, or nurse, has to enter the data to the system. The data includes what the official does, how the medical situation of the patient is, and advice or notes the official would like to share with the inspector or other officials visiting the patient next time. The officials can note a specific situation of a patient, which others have to take into consideration. In addition, they can remark about the concerns of a patient's relative (the inspector, p. c., April 10, 2013). The inspector I visited took a copy of these notes before starting the inspection tour. In the notes he shared with me there were careless relatives, successfully or unsuccessfully closed cases, and other demands from relatives. Every detail was recorded.

In Psychological Counseling Centers working under the KSMs, applicants fill an application form based on personal information, psychological scales on life events and psychological problems, and consent form about sharing their information. The therapists write reports on each therapy via a computer

program in short time periods between therapies in order to inform their supervisors (the subcontracted psychologist, p. c., September 26, 2013).

3.3.4.4. Service Quality

The continuity of the quality in services can be obtained through institutionalization. However, the İBB does not have a master plan in social services, according to the subcontracted sociologist, so services are not institutionalized. It means that the course of a service can be modified as administrators change since every administrator can take the initiative about the services. A recently appointed administrator might not continue a service process in the same way as his/her antecedent. This discontinuity, or arbitrariness according to the sociologist, brings about the lack of motivation for workers in addition to interruption of work. In addition, the recipients can benefit from a service efficiently if only if the service is not suspended (the project coordinator of the Home Care Service, p. c., April 9, 2013).

In addition to the continuity, the quality must meet the standards. The project coordinator of the KSMs assertively described the conditions in the centers:

> People mostly like the order and hygiene in the centers. Every material is disposable. Workers are told to open the package of material in front of applicants. We work by appointment. Attendants are educated in terms of communications skills. Conversation is very important during the screening. Every stage should be explained to applicants. (p. c., July 15, 2013)[29]

Nursing services in elderly care facilities of the İBB seemed satisfactory as far as I observed being an outsider. Buildings and gardens are clean and halls are peaceful except the cries of mentally ill patients. Nurses are mostly responsive, however, there are those raising their voices against some difficult residents and calling the elderly women with their first names. The residents I interviewed mostly talked positively about the services. One said, "They look

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[29] İnsanlar merkezlerde en çok düzeni ve hijyeni beğeniyor. Kullanılan her malzeme disposable. Çalışanlara malzemelerin ambalajlarını hastaların yanında açmalarını söyleniyor. Görevliler insan ilişkileri hakkında eğitiliyorlar. Taramalar sırasında iletişim çok önemli. Hastalara her aşama açıklanmalı.

after us as if we are babies." Another one was repeating exactly the same sentence to all visitors, " I am very pleased, they take care of us very well." The residents are bathed regularly. Their pads are changed. Medical care is provided periodically. For example, one resident was completely bedridden when she first came to facilities. After long-continued physical and psychological rehabilitation treatments, she could now walk. Wheelchairs are provided for the needy ones. The subcontracted sociologist, doing desk-bound work at the facilities, evaluated nursing services as very good even if not perfect in national standards.

When I accompanied the inspector team in the Home Care Service, the inspector asked each patient's relative whether they are pleased with the treatment or not, whether the attendants wear gowns and galoshes, whether the attendants teach relatives how to dress the wounds (since most of the patients are bedridden, their relatives have to cleanse and dress their wounds every day). The answers were positive. People looked pleased with their relatives being treated in their own home (the inspection tour, p. c., April 10, 2013). The subcontracted doctor, working in a medical center, testified the quality of services with such words: "Home Care Service is very good. I know all of the physiotherapists working there. There is a saying, "May the municipality take care of you." So indeed, Home Care Service takes care of lonely people without any relatives" (p. c., September 18, 2013).[30] However, she is not ever so content with her own working place and also the KSMs. She describes her working conditions:

> I see 50-60 patients in a day. This is a huge number. An outsider
> might blame me claiming that I do not spare enough time for my
> patients. However, if we would say, "Let's see 10 patients in a day,"
> people would fight, there would be chaos. This huge number of
> patients is not okay, but it is compatible with the realities of Turkey.
> If I think that I could not spare enough time for a patient, I say,
> "Come again next week" to control his/her situation. (the

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[30] Evde Bakım Hizmeti çok iyi hizmetler veriyor. Orda çalışan tüm fizyoterapistleri tanıyorum, hepsi çok iyidir. Şöyle bir söz var ya "Sana belediye baksın" bu söz doğru. Kimsenin sahip çıkmadığı insanlara bakılıyor.

subcontracted doctor, p. c., September 18, 2013)[31]

In addition, the subcontracted doctor mentioned some technical problems in the medical centers, such as the curtains that are provided through tender: the responsible subcontracted company had not supplied proper curtains and also had refused to take them back because the contract was completed. In the end, the doctor had to provide their curtains by herself. She also complained about the transportation service:

> Personnel transportation buses are low in standard. Broken air conditioners, broken doors, pollution, drivers' speech, smell of sweat, etc. In such standards, these buses cannot be provided anywhere else. The İBB's buses are so many in numbers. Workers can go to work via public transportation. The İBB can provide carfare. (the subcontracted doctor, p. c., September 18, 2013)[32]

In addition to public service, the internal service for İBB personnel is also supplied by private companies. In the case mentioned above, the İBB brings low quality service for its own personnel through subcontracting which aims efficiency and high quality in theory. In fact, paying carfare to personnel would be sufficient according to the doctor.

As regards to the KSMs, the subcontracted doctor's ideas differed from those of the project coordinator. The coordinator told me how they worked hard to improve the quality of services. Every summer workshops are arranged with the participation of almost 25 people including field managers, administrators, financial managers, etc., in order to evaluate every center and service. By these evaluations, necessary services are provided where they are needed (p. c., July 15, 2013). However, according to the subcontracted doctor:

> The KSMs are a complete fiasco. They were, for example, doing the bone density measurement of people from all ages then sending

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[31] Ben günde 50-60 hastaya bakıyorum. Bu büyük bi sayı. Dışardan biri hastalarla yeterince ilgilenmediğim için beni kınayabilir. Ama günde 10 hastaya bakalım desek, kavga çıkar, kaos olur. Hasta sayısının bu kadar çok olması doğru değil ama Türkiye gerçeklerine göre böyle. Eğer bir hastaya yeterince vakit ayıramadığımı düşünürsem "Haftaya tekrar gel." diyorum.

[32] Personel servisleri çok kötü durumda. klimaları çalışmaz, kapıları çalışmaz, içleri pislik içindedir, taşıyan şoförlerin konuşma tarzları, ter kokuları. O servis araçları başka hiçbir yere kiralanması mümkün olmayan araçlar bence. Belediyenin servisleri çok fazla, çalışanlar toplu taşımayla işe gidebilirler, İBB yol parası verebilir.

them to me when I was working in a public hospital. This

measurement should not be done to people under a certain age

because then we had to deal with the wrong diagnoses. The İBB then

bought special machines to do bone measurement from the heel

bone. What happened to those machines now? Mammography

means radiation. Women feel obliged to take mammography every

year. In fact, if you do not have a case history in your family you

should only take a mammography twice a year after the age of 60.

They take unnecessary radiation by going to the KSMs every year. (p.

c., September 18, 2013)[33]

Two doctors disagree on service quality: The former thinks in quantitative terms, having a financially driven understanding of the purpose of the public service (Kirkpatrick & Lucio, 1996, p. 6), while the latter looks at the issue from a perspective of "necessity". A service might be provided excellently, but it is meaningless if not needed.

The subcontracted psychologist told that in the Psychological Counseling Centers a certain number of clients are projected at the beginning of the project. "The number is important here" since the success of service project is evaluated according to quantitative values (the subcontracted psychologist, p. c., September 26, 2013). Demiral points out that converting the services into numbers is one of the features of the public administration reform to make the evaluation easier. However, measuring public satisfaction, which is the main goal of the public services, by using numbers means the provision of commodities rather than services (Demiral, 2007, p. 246). While evaluating the service quality, looking at only hard measures such as the number of recipients, centers, vehicles, equipment, etc., is not sufficient. Soft measures, which investigate recipients' needs, satisfaction, providers' treatments, etc., do also matter in order to reveal how services are delivered.

Another important factor in service quality is the productivity of workers,

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[33] KSM'ler bana göre tam bir fiyasko, ben devletteyken onlardan çok çektim, ayaktan kemik ölçümü yapıp yapıp bana gönderiyorlardı. Bu tarama belli bir yaşa gelene kadar yapılmaz ancak bir problem varsa yapılır. Sonra yanlış teşhislerle uğraşıyorduk. Belediyeye o zaman aldılar bir sürü kemik ölçüm makineleri, şimdi ne oldu o makinelere? Mamografi radyasyon demek. Kadınlar mecbur hissediyorlar kendilerini her sene mamografi çektiriyorlar. Böyle bir şey yok, eğer aile geçmişin yoksa 60 yaşından sonra senede iki kere çektireceksin. Her sene Ksm'lere gidip gereksiz radyasyon alıyorlar.

which is closely related to their physical working conditions and motivation. If employees work long hours in unsafe or unhealthy conditions without taking leave, the service they provide is negatively affected. The subcontracted sociologist warned, "Workers themselves will need social services because of herniated disk illness or psychological problems, and they cannot spare enough time for their family" (p. c., December 12, 2012). In addition, the fear of job loss or position change demotivates the subcontracted workers. However, public services, according to the project coordinator of Home Care Service, "can be done by those who set their heart on it" (p. c., April 9, 2013).

The education of the service provider is also important for the service quality. In some units, education programs are organized for providers, for instance, training on communication skills. In the cases where the directorate does not arrange such programs, workers can become organized among themselves. The subcontracted psychologist talked about the supervision meetings in which all psychologists in Psychological Counseling Centers participate. These psychologists pay the cost of the training from their own pockets, which is, according to them, worth it since the training improves their career development in addition to the service quality (the subcontracted psychologist, p. c., September 26, 2013).

3.3.4.5. Control Mechanism

Even if the İBB transfers its responsibility of providing services to private companies, it still controls them. In the absence of control and inspection, the subcontracting system is open to corruption and abuse, as the contracted programmer previously pointed out.

According to the control engineer, thanks to the short-run plan of action and payment in tendered works, engineers in charge can regularly control the work. As a second level control mechanism, teams composed of three control engineers inspect the performance of each other and determine if there is a corruption. However, those teams might favor each other by just overlooking the work (the assistant director, p. c., April 24, 2013). A disciplined and incorruptible control engineer can be assigned in some specific work where the administration does not like the contracted company (the control engineer, p. c.,

May 11, 2013). In other words, control mechanism might become a use of authority affected by personal relations.

In Home Care Service, there are three inspection teams in Istanbul. The inspectors, who are civil servants, periodically visit the service recipients and perform oral evaluations on the satisfaction and complaints of the patients. Moreover, service cars are tracked with GPS whether the officials go to work or not. I asked the project coordinator if there are dismissal cases due to these evaluations. She said they terminated the contract of one nurse due to some complaints. It is in favor of employers to be able to dismiss a non-productive employee (the project coordinator of Home Care Service, p. c., April 9, 2013). Since the labor is accepted as a factor of production, flexibility in employment leads to an open-ended production process preventing getting stuck with an inefficient worker's performance. Therefore, employers, the İBB or private companies, can improve "productivity" through these control mechanisms. Since the service is subcontracted in every directorate of the İBB, the same control mechanism of dismissing the unproductive workers can be used in every unit. Connell, Fawcett, and Meagher mention "fractal organizational logics" which is explained as such:

> Each part of an organization is a microcosm of the larger unit in which it is embedded. In particular, each part of an organization functions like a profit-making firm, with its managers held accountable for the income/expenditure balance. Under neoliberalism, this principle holds down to the lowest level. (2009, p. 354)

For instance, the executives in the project of the KSMs, as a relatively lower unit, do their own profit/loss analysis every year and decide which centers will be closed or will continue. A sanction from top to down is not necessary when all level units are microcosms sharing common principles and organizational models. The project coordinator described this process:

> In 2013, we reduced the number of KSMs from 34 to 22. When you look at cost, performance, incoming patients, production and the alternative service providers, you see that some centers are not

efficient anymore. For example, in 2005 state policy changed,

cancer-screening program was involved into the system. Before that,

you had to pay for screening. In 2005, the service became free in

public hospitals, and also the number of doctors having the

capability to screen cancer increased. Under these circumstances,

the number of people who would like to come to a KSM can be

calculated and the work is evaluated accordingly. (p. c., July 15,

2013)[34]

Concerning social services, both civil servants and subcontracted workers are evaluated by their supervisors or service recipients. For example in Psychological Counseling Centers, supervisors evaluate working psychologists. They give a performance evaluation comprised of "points" from one to five. Evaluations are done three-four times in each term. In addition, clients are called and asked about their therapists. Therapists were not aware of this procedure until some clients told them (the subcontracted psychologist, p. c., September 26, 2013).

Also in other directorates, workers were subjected to evaluation. The contracted translator told about the daily controls in the Directorate of Finance. They use electronic cards in the entrance and the exit of the building in order to demonstrate their presence at work. However, noncompliance with the working hours did not require wage deduction. "If it would be so," the translator said, "no one in the İBB could get a wage" and laughed. Moreover, everyone should sign the attendance record in the first 15 minutes of work time in the morning. One may sign or swipe card on behalf of another worker so the director every day compares the card records and signatures if there is any inconsistency. Nevertheless, due to the absence of any significant financial sanction, workers violate the working hours. For example on Thursdays there had been a local bazaar around the work, and some employees got off work early and go shopping there (the contracted translator, p. c., May 29, 2013).

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[34] 2013'te KSM'lerin sayısını 34'ten 22'ye düşürdük. Maliyete performansa, gelen hastalara, üretime ve alternatif hizmet olanaklarına baktığınız zaman bazı merkezlerin artık verimli çalışmadığını görüyorsunuz. Mesela 2005'te devlet politikası değişti ve kanser tarama programları sisteme dahile edildi. Önceden tarama için ödeme yapmanız gerekirdi. 2005'te bu hizmet devlet hastanelerinde ücretsiz oldu. Ayrıca taramayı yapabilen doktor sayısı artırıldı. Bu şartlarda KSM'yi tercih edecek kişi sayısı hesaplanabilir ve buna göre değerlendirme yapılır.

Workers are evaluated also in terms of performance. Directors give points for every worker by asking their supervisors. Its financial sanction is nominal, 5-10-20 Liras. However, the translator mentioned different variables in this evaluation process:

> For example, the relationship between chief and director may affect the point of a worker. If they do not like each other, which means that a worker close to the supervisor cannot get many points from the director. (p. c., May 29, 2013)[35]

Thus, personal relations might have an influence on the evaluation, which is far away from a just and professional implementation. These kinds of informal relations can be supportive of undeserving workers. The subcontracted doctor told that her request for the change of an unproductive and lazy nurse working in her medical center was denied because someone in the administration pulled strings for the nurse (p. c., September 18, 2013).

Overall, the control mechanisms are mostly effective on the subcontracted workers who are under the threat of losing their job while they are not so binding for civil servants.

3.3.5. Service Agents

A service basically includes two agents: the providers and the recipients. With respect to public service, the former is the state and the latter citizens. However, the subcontracting system brings about a more complicated structure on the provider side. In this section, first the providers and then the recipients, namely citizens are elaborated on.

3.3.5.1. Service Providers

In the service provision process, not only civil servants but also private company executives, subcontracted workers, and workers directly contracted to the İBB take roles. Even if they do the same work, their personal rights and working conditions might differ. In terms of the entitlement of rights, the İBB

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[35] Mesela şef ve müdür arasındaki ilişki, çalışanın notunu etkileyebiliyor. Eğer birbirlerinden hoşlanmıyorlarsa bu demektir ki bir işçi şefe yakınsa müdürden yüksek puan alamaz.

provides the most secure conditions since it is a public institution, then the İBB's affiliated companies, and private companies come, as the subcontracted sociologist pointed out (p. c., December 12, 2012).

Civil servants are under the state guarantee: they take regular wages, benefit from the state retirement fund, and take annual leaves. According to the subcontracted sociologist, civil servants feel secure because they have the state to protect them (p. c., December 12, 2012). Regular work time is an advantage for civil servants, which one might not find in the private sector or subcontracting system. The control engineer said, "The reason why I became a civil servant is to spare time for myself in the evening" (p. c., May 11, 2013). Furthermore, civil servants have job security. They cannot be dismissed unless they violate regulations in accordance with Civil Servants Law No: 657. It is also hard to change civil servants' positions, as project coordinator of the KSMs pointed, so it is hard to control them. The difficulty in dismissal and sanction, however, results in certain unintended consequences. The Strategic Affairs assistant director talked about their lethargic attitude in doing work (p. c., April 24, 2013) since they got the wage at the end of the month anyway. The subcontracted sociologist complained, "Laziness penetrates into human nature" of the civil servants (p. c., December 12, 2012), which is demonstrated as a legitimate reason for the subcontracting system. Even if civil servants cannot be dismissed easily, they can be exiled as a punishment. For instance, the control engineer was exiled to Beykoz, a far district in Istanbul, because he was held responsible for a problem that occurred in a tendered work. Demotion is another sanction on civil servants. Administrative staff in the municipality, the director or supervisors can lose their position due to administrative as well as political reasons. Nonetheless, they work in the most secure conditions among other workers thanks to legal assurance (the control engineer, p. c., May 11, 2013).

The subcontracted workers, as the second group of providers, are not pleased with their general working conditions. The subcontracted sociologist gave voice to their demands, which are basically stable working hours, regular wages, a chance to progress in career, and job security (p. c., December 12, 2012). The subcontracted workers are deprived of the rights and working

conditions that the civil servants have. The private company executives, for their own profit, might be unfair to the subcontracted workers, which means low wages and excessive working hours for employees. As a consequence, they suffer from psychological and physical diseases, as the control engineer reported (p. c., May 11, 2013). Since they do not have job security, they might not complain about their problems. For example, a subcontracted worker, who has two babies, in the office of the contracted translator, could not complain about anything in the workplace because of the fear of dismissal (the contracted translator, p. c., May 29, 2013). Their annual work contract might not be renewed next time. The doctor in the medical center told the experience of her secretary whose contract was terminated:

> The annual contracts are a threat for Sağlık A.Ş. workers if they do not have any support behind them. My secretary started to worry at the end of the year: "Doctor, last year contracts came in the middle of December, this year they still haven't come. I think they won't employ us this year." In the middle of January she went mad, she said, "You cannot understand." However, the contracts were renewed in the end, and she was relieved. I could not understand the reason for this anxiety then. After a while, my secretary got pregnant. She used her right for maternity leave. I calculated she would return to work on January 4. In her absence, I did not demand a new secretary. Rather, I trained another nurse as a secretary in our team so that the position of the pregnant secretary remained. On January 4, the secretary returned to the job. However, we got the news that Sağlık A.Ş. did not renew her contract; they prolonged her unpaid leave instead. If an opening had emerged, they said, then they would have reemployed her. In short, they laid her off. I did not understand why. I called and asked the assistant directors. I, as a fifty-year-old woman, witnessed for the first time how a person was completely ignored by the others. I was disappointed because my close friends [in those positions] also ignored me. Fortunately, Sağlık A.Ş. Human Resources manager had brought his mother to me for treatment before, so we became friends. For the first time, I asked a

favor from someone. You can call it clientelism. I did it for another person. I learned from the director that another secretary had been employed in another department through cliental relations instead of my secretary on leave. As a result of my struggles, the administration reemployed my secretary since they had already acted illegally. If I had not treated the mother of that director before, my secretary would have been unemployed. (the subcontracted doctor, p. c., September 18, 2013)[36]

This event occurred in Sağlık A.Ş., in one of the affiliated companies of the İBB, where employees have better-working conditions and social rights compared to other private companies' workers, as project coordinator of the KSMs said (p. c., July 15, 2013). Those working for private companies encounter problems more frequently, such as problems in getting wages on time, taking leave, getting severance payment, etc. Furthermore, they do not have a promising career. For example, the subcontracted sociologist said, "I, as a well-equipped worker, have worked for seven years. If I had been a civil servant, I would advance in my career for sure" (p. c., December 12, 2012). The subcontracted workers do municipal works, passing from one company to another, without any advance in their career. They feel the confusion of whether being a municipal worker or not, as the coordinator of the KSMs said (p. c., July 15, 2013).

The payment from the İBB to a private company is done according to tender results. The company executives might raise their profit by decreasing wages of workers or shortening the time of completion. They want to complete

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[36] Yıllık sözleşmeler Sağlık A.Ş. çalışanları için eğer arkalarında kimse yoksa bir tehdit haline gelebiliyor. Yanımda çalışan sekreter kız, Aralık'ın sonuna geldik "Doktor hanım," dedi, "geçen sene sözleşmeler Aralık'ın ortasına doğru gelmişti, bu sene gelmedi, galiba bizi işe almayacaklar." Ocak'ın 10'u oldu, sekreter delirdi, "Siz bilmiyorsunuz." dedi, sözleşmeler gelince çok rahatladı, ben gene anlamadım. O arada sekreter hamile kaldı, senenin sonuna doğru doğum iznine çıktı, ben de hesapladım, bu senenin 4 Ocak'ında işe başlıyor. Bu arada ben de başka sekreter talep etmedim. Bizim ekipten bir hemşireyi sekreter yaptım ki öncekinin yeri boş kalsın. 4 Ocak tarihinde sekreter işe geri döndü, biraz sonra öğrendik ki Sağlık A.Ş. sözleşmesini uzatmamış, ücretsiz iznini devam ettiriyor, eleman açığı olduğunda tekrar işe alacakmış. Kızı işten çıkarmış demek oluyormuş bu, bunu da anlamadım. Müdür yardımcılarını şunu bunu aradım, ben 50 yaşında bir kadın olarak ilk defa bir insanın diğer insanlar tarafından hiç umursanmadığını gördüm ve çok büyük hayal kırıklığına uğradım, çünkü benim yakın arkadaşlarım da beni umursamadılar. Allah'tan Sağlık A.Ş. Personel Müdürü bana annesini tedaviye getirmişti ve bir dostluk oluşmuştu aramızda. Hayatımda ilk defa birinden yardım istedim, adı torpilse torpil, bir başkası için torpil kullandım. Müdürden öğrendim ki sekreterimin yerine başka bir müdürlüğe torpille başka sekreter alınmış. Uzun uğraşlar sonunda yönetim, sekreterimi tekrar işe aldı, zaten kanunsuz davranmışlardı. Ben o müdürün annesine bakmamış olsaydım sekreterim işsiz kalacaktı.

the work as soon as possible (the assistant director, p. c., April 24, 2013). The subcontracted sociologist found the workers guilty too since they do not complain. "We talk only to each other [about problems]," she said (p. c., December 12, 2012). The workers in her directorate were working for the Sağlık A.Ş. for several years. For two months, they could not take their wages. When they protested the unpaid wages, Sağlık A.Ş. withdrew from the tender. This was disadvantageous for them because they had to contract with other companies not providing better conditions than Sağlık A.Ş. Hence, subcontracted workers might not want to struggle, as they fear to have worse conditions. In the end, a subcontracted worker is replaceable if his/her performance evaluation is low, as the coordinator of the KSMs put forward (p. c., July 15, 2013). The control engineer, having a close business relationship with subcontracted workers, uses informal methods in order to motivate them and understand their situation:

> In order to encourage workers, I spend time with them, not with
> their contractor. Going to the cinema, Sunday meetings, and birthday
> parties. We have established Turkish style friendship so they trust
> me, and have become more open to collaborate in improving their
> work. (p. c., May 11, 2013)[37]

The poor conditions of subcontracted workers periodically come to national agenda. Some representatives of the government make statements including promises, new arrangements, and legal regulations. However, these words fail to convince some workers. In the Subcontracted Workers Workshop, organized by Subcontracted Workers Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (Taş-İş-Der), one of the speakers shows his distrust:

> The common goal of the subcontracted workers working in public
> services is to become civil servants, namely be appointed to the state
> cadres. The government promises to give cadres to subcontracted
> workers. "Hope balloons" emerged among workers, which breaks

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[37] İşçileri teşvik etmek için onlarla vakit geçiriyorum, patronlarıyla değil. Sinemaya gitmek, pazar buluşmaları, doğum günü partileri. Türk işi ahbaplık yapıyoruz, böylece bana güveniyorlar ve işi düzeltme konusunda iş birliğine açık oluyorlar.

the worker organizations. Neither the parliament nor the

government aims to appoint hundreds of thousands of workers as

civil servants. What they aim is to sustain the continuity of the

subcontracting system. (p. c., December 22, 2012)[38]

According to him, and many others, the government does ostensible rearrangements without aiming an exact solution to the subcontracting system. In addition, hoping for a solution and trusting in the government prevents some workers from struggling for their rights, and destroys the workers' union. Although the government might try to improve working conditions, however, according to another speaker in the workshop, to maintain this unsecured and flexible working system by seeking profit is what the government attempted (the Subcontracted Workers Workshop, p. c., December 22, 2012). In fact that the law no. 6552, which was enacted in 2014, aimed to protect the rights of subcontracted workers by ensuring their wages, annual leaves, and severance payments. However, the law also contained such a statement that public institutions can initiate tenders for the services in the case that employees do not suffice in terms of quality and number within the structure of that institution (Resmî Gazete, 2014). It is argued that this statement abrogates Law no. 4857, which restricts the conditions of subcontracting as the main activity in public institutions, by showing insufficiency as a reason (Gerek, 2014, p. 8). In addition, previously, the sanction of illegal subcontracting was linking the workers directly to the primary employer. However, according to the new legal arrangement, the sanction has become giving the subcontracted workers the equal wage as tenured workers. By this way, "the subcontracting system will continue forever by paying equal wages to workers" (Çelik, 2014).

Even if the subcontracted workers perform municipal works together with civil servants or administrators, they are under the responsibility of private company executives contracting with the İBB. These contractors can be both the İBB's affiliated companies such as Sağlık A.Ş., Ağaç A.Ş., İSTON A.Ş., etc. and experienced or novice private companies. The İBB's affiliated companies

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[38] Kamuda çalışan taşeron işçilerin ortak amacı memur olmak yani devlet kadrosuna girmek. Hükümet taşeron işçilere kadro vereceğini vaat ediyor. İşçiler üzerinde umut balonları oluşturuyorlar, bu da işçi birliğini bozuyor. Ne meclis ne de hükümet yüzbinlerce işçiyi memur yapmak ister. Onların amacı taşeronluk sisteminin devamını sağlamak.

are semi-public, semi-private companies since 50% of their capital comes from the municipal budget, the other 50% from private capital. They are profit-oriented institutions, but they have to give the half of the profit to the İBB. In this sense, according to the contracted lawyer, affiliated companies provide profit also for the public good at the end. These companies are administratively dependent on the Department of Resource Development and Affiliates under the İBB. Therefore, they are affected by the ponderous bureaucracy of the İBB, as the lawyer mentioned (p. c., May 17, 2013). The affiliates are established in order to prevent corrupt relations in the market and "provide new resources by rent seeking in the profitable trading areas" (Özdemir, 2008, p. 44). The assistant director of the Strategic Affairs told about the establishing process of Ağaç A.Ş., one of the affiliates specialized in trees and green zones. Before Ağaç A.Ş., some firms, having connections with some municipal civil servants in the directorate, were learning which trees the İBB would buy that year, and they bought all trees of that kind in the market. Thus, as the only provider of those trees, they had the power to increase the price, which was against both the public good and small-sized enterprises. While the İBB made more payments for trees, some private companies made more profit appropriating public money. Ağaç A.Ş. was established in order to regulate the market aiming to secure the fair competition among companies. However, similar connections also existed between some Ağaç A.Ş. executives and private company people, as the assistant director complained (p. c., April 24, 2013). Therefore, the affiliates might not always achieve their initial objective, pursuing the common good. On the contrary, they might pave the way for serving the interest of some private companies.

Corruption and irregularities might occur in the works of other contractors of the İBB. Some institutionalized and experienced companies do not create any trouble for either the İBB or the workers while some others do not give confidence. The İBB makes the payment according to a working plan for certain services. Unless the first part of the work is completed, the second payment will not be made. According to the control engineer, some company contractors demand the payment before the completion of the work and give the wages of workers as an excuse. In fact, they are responsible for organizing

the money and paying the wages in time. In addition, contractors usually behave in an ingratiating manner such as providing luxury cars for engineers, taking them to good restaurants, to please them (p. c., May 11, 2013). On the other hand, there are those companies working more professionally. The engineer talked about some big companies in his field, which did not cause trouble for both their workers and the principal institution, namely the İBB. The company worker from a counseling company doing municipal work said, "We do not think how we reduce cost. We care for the quality. We do our work to make a name for ourselves not in a perfunctory manner." They organize education programs for the İBB personnel. She showed their special designs for education reports and CD covers to be given to the İBB as an indicator of their carefulness (the company worker, p. c., May 17, 2013). Most of the tendering companies are small-scale companies rather than big holdings. They try to get tenders in order to break into the market and make some profit. While I was talking to the director of Tender Affairs, a company representative interrupted. He asked for some documents he had given to the directorate while applying a tender and told the director he needed the documents in order to apply to another tender. His situation epitomized those small companies.

The İBB signs contracts with not only the companies but also persons. Those persons directly contracted to the İBB are at a position between civil servants and subcontracted workers. The contracted workers are employed without any test or examination but with interview or advice of someone they are engaged in the İBB, as the contracted translator stated. In the fields where there is a lack of employees, contracted personnel are employed. The status of contracted workers is similar to civil servants in terms of wages and personal rights. In some cases, contracted workers and civil servants have problems because the former group might take more money than the latter (the contracted programmer, p. c., June 13, 2013). However, in other institutions this situation can be on the contrary. The contracted translator, working at the Directorate of Finance, earns less than civil servants who do equal work:

> According to the law of Social Balance, municipal workers started to get extra payments proportionally with their wages . . . the least the proportion reflected on me since I am at the lowest rank. How it is

balanced, I do not understand. (p. c., May 29, 2013)[39]

The translator mentioned some of the supervisors in the directorate are chosen among also contracted workers now, not only civil servants (p. c., May 29, 2013). It is because an amendment on the Labor Law which, "reduce[s] the experience required for appointment to higher posts at a public institution from 12 to five years, and five years of work experience in the private sector would also be considered sufficient" (Tenha, 2013). Therefore, those who formerly worked in the private sector obtained the opportunity to advance in a career in a public institution as a contracted worker.

The statuses of workers, namely being subcontracted, directly contracted or civil servants, are changeable in the İBB. For instance, the contracted programmer had worked as a subcontracted worker first. He got a certificate in computer programming and the İBB contracted directly to him thanks to this certificate (the contracted programmer, p. c., June 13, 2013). In addition, the coordinator of the KSMs told, "If a worker looks as not only an implementer but also a promising permanent producer, then administration can offer his/her name for the cadre" (p. c., July 15, 2013). Moreover, the transition can be done due to political reasons. For instance, in June 2013, the government made a legal arrangement enabling 96,500 contracted health workers in public institutions to become civil servants (Resmî Gazete, 2013). I met a worker in the scope of this law in the room of the coordinator of the KSMs. She involuntarily answered my questions about the law as if she was not pleased with the situation. The coordinator expressed her own opinion that there was not that much difference between a contracted worker and a civil servant. Making contracted workers civil servants was not efficient according to the coordinator since she supported flexible employment. Nonetheless, the arrangement was understandable since it was the election year (the project coordinator of KSMs, p. c., July 15, 2013).

This legal arrangement secured the jobs of thousands of contracted workers. However, there is not any improvement for hundreds of thousands of subcontracted workers suffering from the working conditions. Some

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[39] Sosyal Denge Kanunu'na göre çalışanlar maaşlarına oranla ek maaş almaya başladılar. En alt kademede ben olduğum için en düşük oran bana yansıdı. Bunun neresi denge anlamıyorum.

subcontracted workers hope the end of the subcontracting system. They demand "a just law" accepting the workers as an equal partner in the legal preparation process so that they can defend their own rights (İşçider, 2014). Some other workers do not trust the government to cease subcontracting (Taş-İş-Der Subcontracted Workers Workshop, p. c., December 22, 2012) since the system satisfies both populist and also neoliberal demands.

3.3.5.2. Service Recipients

The other agents of public services are citizens as recipients. Citizens are the targets of public services. The state is responsible for the provision of some basic services to its subjects in exchange for taxes. However, Haque mentions the focus shift in public services:

> [...] since the 1980s, the primary objectives of public service have changed from the realization of citizens' rights or entitlements to the accomplishment of economic goals based on efficiency and competition, although such economic achievements (assessed and claimed by experts) may not benefit the majority of the population. This change in public service mission from a citizen-centered to efficiency-oriented focus can be found in almost all industrial nations. (2001, p. 68)

The management policy of the KSMs epitomizes the words of Haque. The so-called inefficient centers are closed without considering citizens' right of accessibility to services in those regions.

In the neoliberal order, people appear as customers rather than citizens while receiving public services. The basic factor making a citizen a customer is having more than one option. Citizens are not obliged to go to a certain public institution. They are, as customers, able to "[choose] between different public providers of different services, or between public and private providers of similar types of services" in "public market" (Pierre, 1995, p. 68). For example, both public institutions such as municipalities, the ministry of health, public hospitals and also private institutions such as private clinics and hospitals provide similar health services. During the inspection tour in Home Care

Service, a patient's relative said he had called an ambulance from the municipality for the transportation of his patient. When it had been late, he had called another one from the ambulance services of the Ministry of Health. But he told laughingly that two ambulances had come successively (p. c., April 10, 2013). Thus, the state, even in itself, does provide more than one option.

Another element in this new world order is "the freedom to spend one's own money" (Clarke, Newman, Smith, Vidler, & Westmarland, 2007, p. 6). For instance, in elderly care facilities of the İBB, which I visited several times, I heard sentences such as, "I am paying the cost of this service" from two old ladies during a debate. In fact, there are other elderly care facilities of the İBB in which well-off people stay paying the expenses. However, the facility I visited is subservient to needy and lonely people. The residents who do not have social insurance made the payment with green cards, old-age pension or wage for disability, which are all given by the state. Those ladies think they are paying the cost, however, in fact, the state repays pensions to itself. Actually, the elderly care services could be completely free and pensions and wages could be cut which would give the same result. But then the old ladies could not feel this self-confidence.

Contrary to paid services being a consequence of complete privatization, citizens do not have to pay for most services the İBB provided, such as Home Care Service, medical centers, the KSMs as long as they are involved in the insurance system. In spite of neoliberal policies, which are in the interest of a specific group of businessmen, the government does not want to lose the support of the middle and lower classes in the elections. Therefore, both a neoliberal and also a populist character can be seen in "the government's practice of implementing active state policies addressing the most basic needs of the poor while showing its commitment to rolling back neoliberal policies…" (Özden, 2013, p. 158). The populist sentiment of the government prevents "growing public dissatisfaction and distrust with regard to public service [seen] in advanced capitalist nations" in the neoliberal times (Haque, 2001, p. 73). Most of the recipients, as I observed in the inspection tour and the subcontracted psychologist said, are pleased with the service. The psychologist told, "Clients usually do not see services as their rights. They thank us; they also

call 153 and thank them. They are not arrogant to say, 'The service should be provided anyways" (p. c., September 26, 2013). The experience of the subcontracted doctor is:

> They thank me and then leave. Sometimes they might complain, when I do not prescribe medication due to a reason, a nursing mother for instance, or when I warn those not following the procedures, by telling them to take barcodes, for example. (p. c., September 18, 2013)[40]

Even if some recipients have complaints, most of the citizens are pleased with the free services. According to Rhee and Rha, free services lower the expectation of beneficiaries, which increases satisfaction especially for lower socio-economic groups (2009). On the other hand, "[s]ocial workers tend to have higher expectations for social welfare services because they have a sense of social responsibility and professionalism" (Rhee & Rha, 2009, p. 1498). In this regard, the coordinator of the KSMs complained about the positive feedbacks from citizens and criticized them for being unconscious:

> Positive feedback makes me irritated. The reason why people are satisfied from the services, which I am not so satisfied as the provider, is that they do not know what they want. They benefit from free services and there are not any other similar services to compare. Service recipients do not lead us to more qualified works because we do not have conscious consumers. Their complaints have been helpful only in understanding the delay time in services. (p. c., July 15, 2013)[41]

Citizens cannot distinguish the difference between civil servants and subcontracted workers while receiving services. The subcontracted psychologist claimed that, "Clients are not aware if the services are provided by

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[40] Bana teşekkür edip ayrılıyorlar. Bazen şikayet de edebiliyorlar, emziren bir anneye bir ilacı yazmadığımda mesela ya da prosedüre uymayanları gidip barkod alın diye uyardığımda.

[41] Olumlu dönüşler beni rahatsız ediyor. İnsanların benim o kadar memnun olmadığım hizmetlerden memnun olmasının sebebi ne istediklerini bilmemeleri. Ücretsiz hizmetlerden faydalanıyorlar ve karşılaştırma yapacakları benzer bir hizmet yok. Hizmet alanlar bizi daha kaliteli hizmet sunmaya yöneltmiyor çünkü bilinçli tüketici değiller. Şikayetleri sadece bekleme sürelerinin uzun sürdüğünü anlamamıza yaradı.

civil servants or subcontracted workers. If I were a client, I would not recognize too" (p. c., September 26, 2013). This happens because the subcontracted workers perform municipal work while people usually do not assume anyone other than civil servants might provide public services.

Some citizens can exploit services provided for needy people. The contracted translator told:

> Some people, who are not deprived seriously, cheat for receiving services. There are people who spuriously divorce their spouses in order to get municipal aid. Therefore, people who are really divorced or widows have to prove their situation, which brings about lots of bureaucratic procedures. (p. c., May 29, 2013)[42]

The contracted translator also talked about the İBB's monetary aid for divorced women. The subcontracted doctor also mentioned the misappropriation of services, "People, whose case is not urgent, go to emergency services because in Turkey they are free, yet where they should go to is polyclinic services" (p. c., September 18, 2013). Such examples epitomize a certain profile for service recipients attempting to benefit from undeserved free services.

A traditional relationship between the state and its subjects is unilateral. The state executives decide which services are necessary and thus provide them. However, in the neoliberal system due to the variety of services and the flexibility of conditions, executives care about the opinions of the citizens and offer them an opportunity to give feedback. The feedback can be effective regarding the changes in services, employment of workers, etc. For example, psychological support was added to the Home Care Service due to demands of citizens. The recipients should be aware of deficiencies and problems and try to change them. The company worker said, "Municipalities are our servants, they exist for service, and we are not their subjects." Otherwise, "As citizens become needy subjects waiting for handouts from the state or the voluntary donors, as they become willing and ready to accept any litmus tests or community loyalty

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[42] Bazı çok kötü durumda olmayan insanlar hizmet alırken sahtekârlık yapıyor. Belediye yardımı almak için eşlerinden görünürde boşanan insanlar var. Bu yüzden gerçekten boşanan ya da dul kalan insanlar durumlarını ispat etmek zorunda kalıyorlar bu da bir sürü bürokratik prosedür demek.

in order to survive, the prospects for a transparent welfare governance based on rule of law, equality and all encompassing state institutions might diminish" (Eder, 2010, p. 184). From this point of view, receiving free services should not satisfy the citizens. The common good should be pursued in order to achieve welfare governance in which nobody earns unfair profit and nobody is subject to unjust implementations.

3.3.6. Responsibility

In addition to private companies, families also take the responsibility of the state (Yazıcı, 2012). According to McGregor, "Neoliberalists eliminate the concept of the public good and the community and replace it with individual and familial responsibility" (2001, p. 84). Home Care Service, for instance, basically aims to make families self-sufficient in caring for their patients ("Sağlık ve Sosyal Hizmetler," n.d.). The inspector in the Home Care Service, for example, checked on the patient's relatives whether they could cleanse and dress patients' wounds (p. c., April 10, 2013). The Home Care Service brings the doctors and other experts to patients rather than taking the patients to hospitals or nursing homes. Families taking the responsibility for care lighten the state's burden. However, the subcontracted doctor found families mostly irresponsible and unconcerned:

> In the Home Care Service, a patient with seven children would be transported to the hospital. One of her sons was at home. When the ambulance came he asked: "Do I have to come?" How can he ask this? He came to the center but without the identity card, and he blamed the health workers for not mentioning this. (p. c., September 18, 2013)[43]

According to her the relatives of the patients do not want to take the responsibility if there is someone else to take it:

> When another system cares for their relative, their concern lessens

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[43] Evde Bakım Hizmetleri'nde yedi tane çocuğu olan bir hasta hastaneye nakledilecekti. Bir tane oğlu yanındaymış, ambulans gelince demiş ki "Benim gelmem gerekiyor mu?" Bu kadar saçma bir soru olabilir mi? Hastaneye gelmiş ama nüfus kağıdını bile almamış mesela, diyor ki "Söylemediler."

and their expectations become higher. For example, the relative of a patient watches the physiotherapy exercises for such a long time that one could become a physiotherapist. However, the relative does not want to do it by herself. She can continuously bring the patient to the center. We try to be close to patients so that they let us help them. Their family is already close to them. They can help more easily, make them do exercise, etc. But they want someone else to come and do it. Concerned relatives are so rare. (the subcontracted doctor, p. c., September 18, 2013)[44]

The patients who have relatives might even experience difficulties because of their unconcerned relatives. Hence, most particularly the lonely patients and elderly people need help and suffer from the retreat of the state. Yazıcı claims the government's policy of "strengthening the family," which aims "to diminish state responsibility for social protection" rebounds on already vulnerable families, who mostly need the support of the state (2012, p. 105). When I asked service recipients in elderly care facilities, "Who is responsible for nursing services, do you think?" they mostly indicated the state. One woman pointed that the state as the responsible for services in return for nothing. Another one prayed for the state. A visitor said to a resident when she learned that the resident's stepchildren do not look after her, "May they not look after you, the children of state look after you anyway." Some expressions pointing to the state, however, imply the services as favors of the state rather than its responsibility. Those residents live in the facilities are mostly vulnerable that the support of the state is the only option for them. Therefore, they are so grateful to the state for what they should already receive as a social right. Even if some executives in the İBB, such as the project coordinator of the KSMs, decline to represent the state by reason of being a part of local governments, people benefiting from subcontracted municipal services, accept the state as the provider. However, some citizens avoid being a burden on the state. The

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[44] Hastayla bir başkası ilgilendiği zaman onların ilgisi de gittikçe azalıyor, beklentiler artıyor, mesela, bir hasta yakını fizyoterapi egzersizlerini o kadar uzun süre izliyor ki fizyoterapist olabilir. Ama kendisi yaptırmak istemiyor. Hastayı sürekli merkeze getirebilir. Biz hastalara yakın olmaya çalışıyoruz ki onlara yardım etmemize izin versinler. Aileleri zaten yakın. Daha kolay yardım edebilir, egzersiz yaptırabilirler. Ama başkası gelsin yaptırsın istiyorlar. İlgili aileler çok nadir.

inspector of Home Care Service, for example, tried to persuade such a patient relative to continue to receive services by saying, "State's responsibility is to take care of you, you served for twenty-six years as a civil servant." Also another relative commented on using public resources, "Why would I be a burden to state, it sounds illicit" (the inspection tour, p. c., April 10, 2013)

Therefore, the state is seen as the provider of public services by default. Even though it tries to transfer the responsibility to families and other non-governmental organizations, the state is still the only option for certain groups in society as a patient relative told, "We saw that we are not alone," at the end of a long treatment process of his paralyzed wife by the Home Care Service (the inspection tour, p. c., April 10, 2013).

3.3.7. The Common Good

The subcontracting system produces goods and services expeditiously in contrast to the ponderous structure of public institutions. Fast and qualified services are seen for the benefit of the common good. For this reason, the control engineer told, "The tendering system is vital for the advantage of citizens" (p. c., May 11, 2013). Private companies are supposed to be providing efficient services that the municipality could not. There is not a sufficient number and expertise of workers within the body of the İBB. Moreover, it is not efficient to buy necessary equipment and machines which will go out of date while there is an option of hiring them through subcontracting, according to the coordinator of the KSMs (p. c., July 15, 2013). Any failure the companies cause means a public nuisance. Cordella and Willcocks mention the results of the bankruptcy of a responsible company and add:

> [. . .] the public sector ethos of mitigating risk for the taxpayer and citizen can become seriously compromised where private sector practices and exposures are brought increasingly into play. (2010, p. 84)

In the case of a problem, the İBB is able to blame the companies since it transferred its responsibility to them. Aalbers comments this situation as "socializing risk and privatizing profit" (2013, p. 1086). The private companies take the biggest part of the profit from subcontracted works. In this way the

profit is privatized. On the other hand, in the case of incompletion of the service properly, all citizens receiving the service suffer. Thus, the risk is for the entire society.

The İBB, as a public institution, pursues the common good by making profit, and avoiding any loss. However, certain inconsistencies can be observed between municipal policies. The İBB takes loans from certain finance institutions for large-scale projects rather than using its own budget. The translator had asked her director why they did not prefer interest-free banks to finance institutions in order to apply the Islamic rules. The director had answered, "It is public money. Why pay more instead of less? It is in favor of us: the state, the municipality, and so the public" (p. c., May 29, 2013)[45] since finance institutions give lower interest loans, while interest-free banking requires more payments. The translator, however, had found his explanation inconsistent with the case of the terminated agreement with an international rating institution in spite of its paid price, "$30,000 went to waste, and it was public money, too" (p. c., May 29, 2013). Wasting the financial capital, which is public money coming from the taxes of citizens to the İBB budget, is not rare. The subcontracted doctor pointed to the money spent for special uniforms made for workers in the medical center, which were never worn. Her other example on the unused machines in the KSMs epitomizes the waste of physical capital. Furthermore, the idle civil servants not working properly but taking salaries indicate the waste of human capital.

The waste of capital in public institutions is actually used to justify the subcontracting system. In order to avoid wasting public money and pursue common good, the equipment and labor are hired temporarily through tendering. However, high-profit margins in tenders cause the transfer of the public money to private companies and discredit the subcontracting system. The private company worker confessed, "If I were the mayor, I would qualify and employ civil servants in municipal works since the money paid in tenders is public property" (p. c., May 17, 2013). Nevertheless, it is presented that efficiency can be provided only with subcontracted workers and it is worth to

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[45] Bu halkın parası. Neden daha fazla ödeyelim daha az ödemek dururken. Bu bizim lehimize. Hem devletin, hem belediyenin ve dolayısıyla halkın lehine.

exploit their rights for the sake of the common good:

> Lay-offs, cutbacks, downsizing, etc., are legitimate activities because they increase the chances of profit and a competitive advantage, regardless of workers' rights. These rights can be justifiably sacrificed for the greater good of economic advancement and for profit and wealth accumulation. (McGregor, 2001, p. 86)

However, the subcontracted workers are also a part of the public. They are not a simple factor in the production. Their well-being cannot be excluded from the common good. Therefore, the subcontracting system, providing common good as exploiting the workers, seems contradictory. The subcontracted workers, however, rejected the common good claims of the subcontracting system:

> We want to speak out once more and express our reaction against the theft and the labor exploitation made under the name of "public good" in the subcontracting system. We know that subcontracting is theft. We also know that there is not "public good" in subcontracting. (İşçider, 2014)[46]

3.4. Conclusion

In this study, I tried to reveal the conceptualization and the process of the subcontracted public services in order to find an answer what kind of a state image emerged in the subcontracting system. For this purpose, I interviewed thirteen persons being actively involved in different phases of the services. I also observed the delivery and controlling stages of some services. I asked the informants to tell about their working routines, control mechanisms, their opinions about the İBB, the state, public services, and the subcontracted system.

At the end of my fieldwork, I found Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (the İBB) wearing three faces. Firstly, the İBB is the state. In respect to its organizational structure, the leaders in the İBB are elected and the bureaucrats

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[46] Taşeron sisteminde, "kamu yararı" adı altında yapılan soygunu ve emek sömürüsünü, bir kez daha dile getirmek, tepkimizi belirtmek istiyoruz. Taşeronluğun soygun olduğunu biliyoruz. Taşeronlukta bir "kamu yararı" olmadığını da biliyoruz.

are assigned as other state institutions. Decentralization process gave the İBB the opportunity to perform its power in public services. While citizens receive public services delivered by the İBB, they see the provider as the state. Therefore, the İBB and state overlap in the recipients' perception. Secondly, the İBB is government. Since the same political party, namely the Justice and Development Party (AKP), won both the general election and the mayorship of Istanbul in the local election, people do not consider the İBB separate from the AKP in general. Actually municipal executives avoid diverging from the government policies. Lastly, the İBB is a company. The İBB act in a company-like manner since it tries to be a global actor, cares about its credibility, takes out loans in some cases, gets points from international rating institutions. In addition, its major strategy in providing services is contracting out.

The subcontracting system, which is the focus point of this thesis, is one of the hot topics in Turkey. In the neoliberal times, even the state prefers to transfer its responsibility for the service delivery to private agents. The reason for this preference, as found in the field, is efficiency. It is argued that in a subcontracting system a job can be done in a more qualified way in shorter time matching needs to resources. In addition, problems are solved more easily since the source of problems, a worker or a company, can be dismissed. The competitiveness among companies and also workers motivates the actors to do their job better. However, the opponents of the subcontracting system point to poor working standards for workers, job insecurity, low and irregular wages, demotivated workers, high-profit margins, unfair competition, and patronage relations. Accordingly, such unintended or disregarded consequences of the system contradict with the very aim of it.

In the next chapter, I will elaborate the state images constructed during the service delivery experiences under the subcontracting system based on my fieldwork.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION – The Images of The State

The concept of the state has been a research object in political science. During the process to "bring the state back in" in 1980s, the state-formation process started to be discussed by not only political scientists but also sociologists, anthropologists, and historians (Vu, 2010). The concept is so broad and complicated that one should draw the borders of the research and clarify its perspective. In the first chapter, I described which state I looked at in this study as the state that is obliged to provide public services; meanwhile, establishes relations with its citizens. While studying the state, I benefited from the approach of the society-centered theories, according to which the state is not a distinct, stable, and unitary entity. That is to say, the state is not an autonomous agent. Rather, it is "an institutional configuration in which human actors act" (Vu, 2010, p. 150), a network of power relations among individuals and their functions and statuses. According to the society-centered approach, the state consists of the state system (Miliband, 1969) and the state idea (Abrams, 2006). The former, which includes political institutions and social practices, constructs the latter namely the images of the state. We can shortly call these elements of the state "practices" and "images" respectively, by using Migdal's theorization (2001).

The practices of the state, constituting the fieldwork of this study, are based on the relations and experiences throughout providing and receiving processes of social services. Public service delivery has gone through a transformation in terms of form and content during the recent decades. As a result of neoliberal tendencies and decentralization policies, which can be gathered under the title of New Public Management (the NPM), local governments undertook the responsibility for public services and private companies fulfilled their delivery. The basic reason for this reform is the raising deficits of the public administration: budget deficit caused by the government expenditures for welfare services; performance deficit as a result of the ponderous bureaucratic functioning of the state; and confidence deficit raised

due to the clientelism and corruption in public institutions (Kettl, 1998). The NPM has been put into practice on the part of organizational sub-units responsible for their own cost and productivity analysis, by means of a competitive welfare market in which public and private institutions involved, through a decentralized structure, and with the purpose of customer satisfaction (Langan, 2007).

In this context, the Turkey municipalities, which are locally well organized, have started to play a large part in the delivery of public services. In addition, they prefer to subcontract the services to private companies due to reasons mentioned above. I investigated certain social services provided under Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB). The thoughts and experiences the informants shared about the whole service delivery process, from its design to control, revealed also the state images they produced. In other words, while I studied the İBB as a public institution, I looked for more general images of the state for the current Turkish state. My approach disclaims seeing the state as if it has a will by itself for a specific purpose, such as enabling " the ruling classes to ensure their domination over the working class" (Althusser, 2006, p. 90). However, it does not mean that the practices and relations constructing the state will never be for the benefit of certain groups in the society.
I do not expect to find an absolute image for the state as a research result. Rather, I tracked different state *images* through *practices* namely the experiences and interactions of people. When I put the data consisting of different colors of practices through the prism, figuratively speaking, I reached certain state images and gathered them under common titles in accordance with my fieldwork. The implications that will be mentioned below are not generalizable. And all general statements on the state images refer to the expressions in the scope of my fieldwork. I will not declare definite types of states; rather, mention certain images that I have drawn from the field. These state images, which are not mutually exclusive specifications, are categorized as: company-like, gracious, and corrupt.

Firstly, the strategies of public institutions under the rule of the NPM produce a *company-like* state image. In respect of this study, the İBB seems to act like a profit-seeking company. The institution is operated through

management principles such as increasing efficiency, profit and, quality, reducing costs, risks, and wastes, processing through short-term projects, and employing temporary workers. In order to produce fast and more services; meanwhile, not to be stuck in the ponderous structure of bureaucracy, the İBB contracts out the public services. Throughout the subcontracting system, needs and resources analyses, research and development activities, great care to satisfy citizens, and strict control mechanisms and evaluations, as seen on different levels in the various services in the scope of the field, indicate the company-like manner of the İBB. In addition, applicant-based services, more than one alternative of services provided by public institutions, and the attitudes of certain service recipients such as giving feedback on services and thinking as if they spend their own money create a customer profile for citizens as if they interact with a company. Furthermore, the concern of the İBB to be more credible in the international arena according to the scores given by the credit institutions projects a company image for it. The credibility of the İBB matters for the collaboration with foreign banks, making more investment, hence gaining more profit. Actually, such neoliberal schemes are performed also in certain directorates and projects of the İBB, which means "fractal organizational logics" function in the smaller units (Connell et al., 2009) and the neoliberal mode of management penetrates into whole institution. Therefore, the İBB, which neoliberal concerns embedded in its structure, gives the image of a profit-seeking company.

Secondly, a *gracious* state image can be inferred from the relationship that certain groups of citizens establish with the state while receiving services. Behaviors and comments of these recipients show that they do not internalize the services as their *social rights.* Rather, they benefit from the services as if the state provides them as a favor. Two recipient profiles are distinguished in this manner. Those belonging to the first profile are grateful to the state for free services. Some of them even feel embarrassment for being a burden to the state. Service providers can see these recipients as unconscious customers due to their easy satisfaction for services. The second is a self-seeking profile constituting people who try to derive as much benefit as possible from free services. They feel the conformity of finding the state taking care of their needy

relatives. In some cases, they cheat the state by presenting themselves needing aid in order to benefit from certain free services provided for people in specific conditions. It seems not as an abuse of others' rights, according to them, but a trick to use freely distributed public services. Therefore, the citizens in both profiles do not establish a right-based relationship with the state. The perception of social rights as social assistance makes the relationship between the citizens and the state based on grace and "*minnet*". Thus, this perception prevents citizens from being more critical about social policies and also from considering the rights of others. These kinds of recipient profiles indicate a gracious state image rather than a responsible one. Furthermore, being free of charges and the emphasis on "assistance" in the services support this populist image.

Thirdly, the contradiction between the reasons and the consequences of the subcontracting system brings about a *corrupt* image for the state. The system promises to meet the deficits of budget, performance, and confidence. However, in the case of the İBB, this promise is not perfectly fulfilled. On the contrary, it reproduces the problems it had to overcome. In respect to the budget deficit, through contracting out the services, it is aimed to lower the cost and improve the services. The fieldwork, however, revealed the cases wasting municipal budget. The case of that the İBB cancelled an agreement due to political reasons after paying its high charge epitomizes this waste. For another example, tender prices are announced as much more than the calculated cost of the work. Therefore, even the least offer in a tender can gain large amounts of profit in the case of winning the tender. Informants in different statuses and functions mentioned this fact of high-profit margins. Through this way, the new system became an instrument for the transfer of money from public to private, which also causes confidence deficit. A transparent, reliable, and fair process of service delivery provides a confidential state. However, particularly those whose labor is exploited under the subcontracting system do not believe the fulfillment of this promise by the state since some private company owners gain undeserved amounts of money in contrast to the poor working conditions of the subcontracted workers. Therefore, the inconsistency emerged between the state's aim of pursuing the public good and the conditions of the workers, which

are included in the public. In addition, the system does not offer a perfect competitive environment in the cases of nepotism, fraud, and privileges to affiliate companies. Since I do not accept the state as if it is a calculative agent, I cannot argue that these contradictory consequences of the subcontracting system are intended by the state. On the other side, the subcontracting system is open to abuse due to the combination of the macroeconomic context, power relations, personal preferences and interests, and arbitrariness. Under such unreliable conditions, meeting the performance deficit also becomes harder. The subcontracted workers who actually provide the services pointed out their lack of motivation because of job insecurity, bad working standards, and low wages. Therefore, the subcontracting system, reproducing the deficits that it promised to meet in the first place, seems inconsistent and unjustifiable, which indicates a corrupt state image.

While contracting out the public services, the İBB acts through both neoliberal and populist concerns as shown above. In fact, "the blend of populism and neo-liberalism seems paradoxical, because most researchers have assumed that populist movements achieve the support of subordinated social groups through redistributive policies combined with state-initiated processes of industrialization and expansionary monetary policies" (Filc, 2011, p. 221) while neoliberalism brings tighter monetary policies and the retreat of the state from most of the public services. This bipolarity "should not be ascribed to supposed vacillation by the government 'between conservative-liberal trends and universalist, right-based approach to social policy' (Buğra & Keyder, 2006, p. 211), but should rather be seen as a political strategy that is quite appropriate to the new type of neoliberal governing in the historical context of the post-Washington consensus" (Özden, 2013, p. 172). This political strategy of the İBB can be explained with neoliberal populist policies of the state. In the context of Turkey, the government legalized labor market flexibility through part-time, contractual, temporary work and subcontracting from 2003 onwards (Bozkurt, 2013, p. 391). However, in order to mitigate the effects of this new neoliberal structure,

It displayed its populism in the form of skyrocketing social assistance programs that most often rely on means-tested social assistance measures that are commonly regarded as incompatible with social citizenship rights, which ought to entail universal benefits to all citizens regardless of their financial condition. (Bozkurt, 2013, p. 391)

The İBB epitomizes these double-edged policies of the government. On the one hand, to handle bureaucratic problems, company-like management methods are used as an alternative, such as employing the subcontracting system. On the other hand, free social services are diversified in the fields of health, education, culture, etc. for the benefit of the public. Thus, it carries "liberal-paternalist" features (Wacquant, 2009), hence creating new marketing areas for certain groups and compensating some others for the negative consequences of its former act.

The public service delivery strategy of a public institution brings about large-scale consequences in the context of this study. The İBB prefers to contract out its internal and external services. In other words, it outsources its needs and responsibilities to private firms. This strategy causes the exploitation of subcontracted workers and the transfer of public money from municipality budget to private agents: both results prevent the fulfillment of the public good. Beyond these consequences, furthermore, the state is reconstructed through the subcontracting system. The images that I found out in this specific field are a company-like state: pursues more profit, efficiency and credibility like a company in the market; a gracious state: provides social assistance and free public services for its citizens; and a corrupt state: contradicts to its very aim i.e. the common good through abused powers.

These profiles indicate in a sense that the state expands its political reach (Eder, 2010) and becomes determinant on who takes advantages of the system and who suffers in the process. State's large amount of services in various fields introduces the current Turkish state as active and operative and also brings it a popular support. Therefore, the state does not retreat completely; on the contrary it overcomes bureaucratic barriers through subcontracting and obtains political and economic power. Under the new public management, the state institutions undertake the function of "steering" rather

than "rowing" (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). In other words, they provide guidance and direction while using private agents to provide goods and services in the public sector. In this process, the state as "an institutional configuration" gained a powerful and effective image as the regulator of the game. The practices and relations constructing this image also pave the way for the benefit of certain groups in the society rather than the fulfillment of the common good.

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