

AN EXAMINATION OF DAILY POLITICS
AND FACTIONALISM
AT THE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL COURT IN RELATION TO
THE REGICIDE OF OSMAN II (r.1618-22)

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İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

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
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
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ABSTRACT

AN EXAMINATION OF DAILY POLITICS AND FACTIONALISM AT THE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL COURT IN RELATION TO THE REGICIDE OF OSMAN II

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This thesis examines the changing dynamics of the practical politics and power relations at the Ottoman imperial court in İstanbul before the dethronement and murder of Sultan Osman II (r.1618-22) on May 20, 1622, upon a massive military rebellion. The regicide of Osman II was in several respect a watershed in the seventeenth-century crisis in the Ottoman practical and court politics. Even though many academic studies have examined the regicide of Osman II, they overlook the role of the daily politics and factionalism at the imperial court prior to the regicide of Osman II. This study attempts to provide some new perspectives on these omitted aspects of the Osman II's reign through using hitherto unexamined archival sources such as dispatches of the Venetian *baili*, the ambassadors resident in Istanbul. My main argument is that the regicide of Osman II was principally pertained to the alienation of imperial soldiers and the common people in the capital against the sultan while they were all confronting a serious economic/fiscal crisis. The crisis further deepened before the sultan's imperial campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1621. Upon the sultan's return to capital from the campaign, his intervention to the daily economic and social life increased the crisis in the capital. The mismanagement of this crisis by Osman II and his court faction soon led to a popular uprising directly targeting the sultan and his style of rule. In this thesis, I also discuss the accusation of Osman II's alleged secret plan of recruiting a new army to replace the Janissaries and *sipahis*. I find that this was most probably a rumor that

aimed to provoke the neutral soldiers and common people to join in the ranks of the rebellion in May 1622.

Keywords: Osman II, Daily Politics, Factionalism, Regicide, the *Bailo*, the *Dispacci*.

ÖZ

II. OSMAN'IN (s.1618-22) KATLİ BAĞLAMINDA OSMANLI SARAYINDA GÜNDELİK SİYASETİN VE HİZİPÇİLİĞİN BİR İNCELEMESİ

Çiçek, Fikri

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Bu tez, Sultan II. Osman'ın (s.1618-22) 20 Mayıs 1622'de İstanbul'da gerçekleşen büyük bir askeri isyan sonucu tahtan indirilişi ve katli öncesi Osmanlı sarayında gündelik siyasetin değişen dinamiklerini ve hizipçiliğini incelemektedir. 17. yüzyılın siyasi ve içtimai krizlerinde birçok açıdan kritik bir dönüm noktası olan Sultan II. Osman'ın katli pek çok akademik araştırmaya konu olmuşsa da, Sultan Osman'ın katli öncesi Osmanlı merkez sarayında gündelik siyaset ve hizipçilik göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu çalışma göz ardı edilen bu meseleyi inceleyerek, II. Osman'ın katline dair yeni bakış açıları sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, akademik literatür tarafından henüz kullanılmamış olan, İstanbul'da ikamet eden Venedik elçisinin raporları, *dispacci* (tekil, *dispaccio*) incelenmektedir. Bu çalışmada, II. Osman'ın katlinin öncelikle merkez ordusunun (yeniçeri ve sipahilerin) ve İstanbul halkının ciddi bir ekonomik/fiskal krizle karşılaşmasından kaynaklanan Sultan Osman'ın saltanatına karşı yabancılaşımla ilgisinin olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Sultan Osman'ın 1621 yılında Lehistan-Litvanya Birliğine karşı düzenlediği askeri sefer ise mevcut krizi daha da derinleştirmiştir. Sefer dönüşü II. Osman'ın ekonomik ve sosyal hayata müdahaleleri bu krizin genişlemesine yol açmıştır. II. Osman'ın ve saray hizbinin bu krizi yönetmedeki başarısızlığı kısa bir sürede büyük bir isyanı tetikleyip, sultanın ve yönetimin tarzının hedef tahtasına konulmasına neden olmuştur. Bu tezde ayrıca, II. Osman'a yöneltilen sözde yeni bir sekban ordusu kurup, yeniçeri ocağını kaldıracağı suçlaması da incelenmektedir. İsyen esnasında ortaya atılan bu suçlamanın yüksek bir ihtimalle bir şayia olduğunu ve isyan

hususunda kararsız kalan askerleri ve halkı kışkırtıp, isyanın saflarına çekmek amacını taşıdığı iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osman II, Gündelik Siyaset, Hizipçilik, Sultan Katli, *Bailo*, *Dispacci*.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis offers an examination of the changing dynamics of practical politics and power relations at the Ottoman imperial court in Istanbul in the years immediately preceding the regicide of Sultan Osman II (r. 1618-22) on May 20, 1622, upon a massive military rebellion. More specifically, it is an attempt to provide some new perspectives as well as to introduce some hitherto unexplored primary sources on the question of to what extent the daily politics at the sultan's court and the unremitting factionalism among the Ottoman ruling elite in Istanbul played a role in the dethronement and murder of Osman II, an incident which marked the first regicide in Ottoman history. I maintain that the military rebellion which resulted in the regicide of Sultan Osman was primarily related to the sultan's alienation of the rival ruling viziers at his faction-ridden court together with most of the high-ranking members of the *ulema*, the imperial soldiers and the people of Istanbul, at a time when the Ottoman Empire was facing a severe economic/fiscal crisis that further deepened before the sultan's imperial campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1621. I argue that the mismanagement of this crisis by Osman II and his court faction overlapped with a serious famine in the Ottoman capital during an abnormally cold winter and that it soon led to a popular uprising directly targeting the sultan and his style of rule, which some modern scholars consider to be highly assertive.¹

As is well-known, Osman II commanded the aforementioned Polish campaign in person, but his imperial army failed to capture the fortress of Hotin, the main target of the campaign. Then, five months after his arrival in Istanbul from the campaign, Osman II announced that he would undertake a pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina with a small retinue. Yet, his intention to leave the capital without an imperial army caused a number of rumors against the sultan, for instance,

¹ For a general evaluation of Osman II's sultanate, see s.v. "Osman II" by Feridun Emecen, *Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopesi*, vol. 33, pp. 453-456 (hereafter *DİA*). For a more detailed examination of the reign and regicide of Osman II, see Baki Tezcan, "Searching for Osman: A Reassessment of the Deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Osman II (1618-1622)," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 2001.

that Osman II had actually devised a secret plan of recruiting a new *sekban* (mercenary) army in Asia so as to replace both the imperial Janissaries and the imperial cavalry soldiers (*kapıkulu sipahileri*) upon their poor performance at Hotin, or that the sultan wanted to move the capital from Istanbul to a different city such as Bursa or Cairo. In any event, such rumors triggered a military rebellion on May 18, 1622, that soon resulted in the dethronement and murder of Osman II.

While the academic literature on Osman II generally emphasize the failures of the Polish campaign and the rumors about his secret plans as the main factors behind his regicide, there has been no in-depth discussion of the daily politics at the sultan's faction-ridden imperial court in relation to this important incident, which created a new wave of crisis and change in Ottoman imperial and dynastic politics in many decades to come.² Indeed, the political and social instability of this era was such a prevalent problem that a total of six sultans were disposed from the throne throughout the seventeenth century, among whom two were killed, as a result of the incessant rebellions alike.³ In effect, these military rebellions at the center of the Ottoman imperial establishment were directly related to the changes and/or new dynamics that many scholars today observe in the political, economic, military and social make-up of the Ottoman Empire since the 1580s.⁴

² For various assessments of the early modern Ottoman court see, Rifa'at Ali Abou el-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics*, (Leiden : Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984); idem, *The Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); İ. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Halil İnalcık, "Comments on Sultanism: Max Weber's Typification of Ottoman Polity," *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies* 1 (1992), pp. 49-72; Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Rhoads Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household, 1400-1800* (London: Continuum, 2008); Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) and His Immediate Predecessors," unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Ohio State University, 2010.

³ In this period of imperial crisis, Osman II (1618-22), Mustafa II (1617-18/ 1622-23), Ibrahim I (1640-48), Mehmed IV (1648-87), Süleyman II (1687-91) and Mustafa II (1695-1703) were deposed; Osman II and Ibrahim I were killed during rebellions.

⁴ For different assessments of the Ottoman imperial crisis and transformation in the seventeenth century, see Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980), pp. 283-337; Jane Hathaway, ed., *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); Rhoads Murphey, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late 17th Century," *Poetics Today* 14/2 (1993), pp. 419-443; Suraiya Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (Cambridge:

Accordingly, this study aims to fill a crucial gap in Ottoman historiography on the sultanate of Osman II and his regicide. Most importantly, I observe that the first popular opposition against Osman II's sultanate had actually emerged before his Polish campaign in that both the imperial soldiers and the people of the capital rose in revolt against the sultan and his court faction a few times protesting the miserable economic conditions that hit them hard. Furthermore, most scholars overlook the reactions against Osman II's style of rule through his royal favorites, namely, Dilaver Pasha, Hacı Ömer Efendi, Süleyman Ağa and Baki Pasha, whom the sultan personally empowered as his chief power-brokers in the business of rule. I would argue that these favorites alienated all other ruling grandees in Istanbul and thus became the target of the rebellious soldiers as they were accused of mismanaging the imperial affairs and misguiding the sultan. It was only when Osman II rejected the rebellious soldiers' demands to get rid of his favorites and to stop his plans regarding his announced pilgrimage that the growing discontent against the sultan turned into a full-fledged rebellion, now including all the 'neutral' soldiers and people of the capital, who then jointly toppled the sultan and his favorites from power.

Moreover, the scholarly literature on this period is predominantly oriented to the murder of Osman II while largely following the accounts of the contemporary Ottoman writers. That is to say, most scholars have rather an uncritical outlook towards this incident as their analyses are closely linked to the observations and commentaries of the Ottoman authors, most notably Hüseyin Tûgi, Bostanzâde Yahya Efendi, İbrahim Peçevi, and Hasan Beyzâde. As Feridun Emecen and Baki Tezcan point out, though, these Ottoman authors essentially represent the views and arguments of the rebellious soldiers in order to legitimize their actions against the sultan, thus they provide a highly limited or biased understanding of the historical problems and dynamics behind Osman II's regicide.⁵ In this respect, one of my main objectives in this thesis is to shed light on Osman II's regicide by utilizing a new set

Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 411-636; Cemal Kafadar, "Janissaries and Other Riffraff of Ottoman İstanbul: Rebels Without a Cause?" in *Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World: A Volume of Essays in Honor of Norman Itzkowitz*, eds. Baki Tezcan and Karl Barbir (Madison: University of Wisconsin Center of Turkish Studies, 2007), pp. 113-34.

⁵ For the problems of historiographical sources on Osman II's see, Emecen, "Osman II," pp. 455-456; and Tezcan, *The Second Empire*, pp. 1-14; idem, "The Politics of Early Modern Ottoman Historiography," in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, edited by Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman, pp. 167-98 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

of primary source, namely, the Venetian ambassadorial reports known as the *dispacci* (singular, *dispaccio*).

The diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Venice resident in Istanbul were called the *baili* (singular, *bailo*), just like in other capitals or courts in Europe. One of the chief duties of these Venetian diplomats was to send regular reports to their Doge and Senate in Venice in order to inform them about the political developments in the Ottoman capital. The *baili* thus had to keep a track of all-important figures, power relations, factional struggles and daily politics in Istanbul so as to serve the main interests of their Republic. Hence, they wrote detailed reports once or twice a week in which they commented on diverse aspects of the daily politics and its related actors at the sultan's court. In this thesis, I examine around one hundred and forty *dispacci* written by Giorgio Giustinian, who served as the Venetian *bailo* in Istanbul between 1620-1627, as well as a few reports penned by his predecessor Almorò Nani (1614-1620). The dispatches in question, which cover the entire reign of Sultan Osman, yet have not been examined by scholars, provide highly critical information as well as some new insights on the events and problems surrounding the regicide of Osman II.

i. Literature Review

In conventional historiography, Osman II has been seen as a reformer and progressive sultan at a time when the Ottoman Empire entered a 'decline' period.⁶ According to this literature, Osman II was the first sultan to revert this path of imperial decline by reforming the military and financial institutions of the Ottoman Empire. Most particularly, in twentieth-century Ottoman historiography, Osman II was investigated through the perspectives of the nationalist movement. This historiography tried to legitimize the reforms of the period led by Mustafa Kemal and his Republic Party by dating them to the period of an Ottoman sultan, that is, Osman II. He has been considered as one of the local and national reformists who

⁶ On the question and narratives of Ottoman imperial decline, see Douglas A. Howard, "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century," *Journal of Asian History* 22 (1988), pp. 52-77; Cemal Kafadar, "The Question of Ottoman Decline," *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 4/1-2 (1997-98), pp. 30-75; and Mehmet Öz, *Osmanlı'da "Çözülme" ve Gelenekçi Yorumcuları* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1997).

aimed to bring radical changes in the military, political and bureaucratic institutions of the Ottoman Empire. The republican historians viewed Ottoman-Turkish reformation age would have gone back three centuries earlier if Osman II had not been deposed and killed during the rebellion in 1622.⁷

Recent academic studies suggest that a radical revision of the sultanate of Osman II is needed. Among those historians who studied the reign and regicide of Osman II, Baki Tezcan offers the most significant such revision while challenging the decline paradigm that had been advanced to explain the post-1580 period in Ottoman history. Tezcan proposes a new framework for this period and provides a detailed examination of the historical background and aftermath of the regicide of Osman II. He calls this period, “the Second Empire,” in that it represents a gradual transformation in the institutional structures of the Ottoman Empire from a patrimonial-bureaucratic dynastic state towards a more absolutist monarchy. According to Tezcan, this second empire lasted until the abolishment of the Janissaries corps by Mahmud II in 1826.⁸

Tezcan challenges the dominant Weberian views of early modern Ottoman Empire as he finds them rigid and static, while arguing that the Ottoman polity was in fact divided along two main political groups by the late sixteenth century, which he names them as ‘absolutists’ and ‘constitutionalists.’ According to Tezcan, the ‘absolutists’ tried to increase the power of the sultan and his court faction in controlling the financial and economic sources of the empire, whereas the ‘constitutionalists’ attempted to limit the sovereign authority of the Ottoman ruler in these matters. Tezcan examines a series of military rebellions from the late 1580s to the early 1650s and reads them as fierce struggles between these two rival political groups. He shows that the regicide of Osman II in 1622 was in effect the first true epitome of this bi-polar struggle in the Ottoman political body at large. Upon examining a large pool of archival sources and narratives, Tezcan finds out that Osman II’s absolutist or assertive style of rule brought an inevitable confrontation with the ‘constitutionalists,’ such as the Janissaries and the Ottoman *mevali* (scholars-jurists).⁹

⁷ For details, see Tezcan, “Searching For Osman,” pp. 13-23.

⁸ Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, pp. 140-141.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-175.

Contrary to conventional historiography, Tezcan refuses to portray Osman II as a stubborn or a reformist, progressive sultan. Instead, he depicts Osman II as a “rebel” sultan in that he challenged all the alternative foci of power against his intentions. Moreover, Tezcan approaches the Janissaries and the *mevali* as new socio-economic actors who tried to limit the sultan’s authority and powers in the business of rule. In this regard, Tezcan points out to the growing power of the *mevali* from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards and to the roles they played in the decline of the medieval dynastic institutions of the Ottoman Empire.

Tezcan claims that the gradual socioeconomic transformation of the empire began with the years of 1450s and reached its zenith at the years of 1580s. During this transformation, the patrimonial regime failed to control the monetary sources of the empire. Local ruling elites of the empire instead obtained economic means to recruit personal mercenary armies in the provinces of the empire. Moreover, commoners began to buy positions in the imperial army from the ruling elites that made them acquire fiscal and political patronage and prestige that gradually challenged the sovereign authority. On the broader context of early modern history, Tezcan derives similarities between the regicide of Osman II in 1622 and the English King Charles I in 1648. In both cases, according to Tezcan, the rulers were deposed so as to try to limit the sovereign authority upon the fierce political struggle between groups.¹⁰

Gabriel Piterberg analyzes the narratives concerning the regicide of Osman II by contemporary Ottoman authors, such as Tûgi, Hasan Beyzâde, Peçevi, Kâtib Çelebi and Naîmâ. In his study, Piterberg employs the methods of inter-textuality and hermeneutics as advanced by Paul Ricoeur and Hyden White while delineating the similarities and differences among these Ottoman writers’ narratives, which he argues jointly created a perception of the events that later turned into an “official” historiography. Overall, Piterberg does not examine the daily political events and problems at the sultan’s court.

On the other hand, Sam White suggests an environmental framework for the rebellions that took place between the late sixteenth century and the early decades of seventeenth century, including the one under Osman II in 1622. He calls this period

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 36-43.

“Little Ice Age” in Ottoman history in which he observes a climate fluctuation and several natural disasters causing periodic shortages in imperial resources that occasionally triggered popular unrests including the one against Osman II. White claims that the regicide of Osman was actually linked to a “Great Drought” which lasted for years in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this period, he also notes, an extreme drought and cold weather broke down the Ottoman provision system, resulting in famines, epidemics, peasant flights and heavy death tolls.¹¹ In what follows, I will try to further enhance White’s arguments about the Ottoman ‘Little Ice Age’ by providing some new information on the extreme weather conditions and events during the reign of Osman II.

Inspired by the studies of Tezcan, Tülün Değirmenci offers an examination of the power relations at the imperial court under Osman II. Her discussion is based on the illustrated manuscripts produced at the Ottoman court in the seventeenth century, such as the *Şehnâme-i Firdevsî*, *Şehnâme-i Türkî*, *Dîvân-ı Nâdirî* and *Şehnâme-i Nâdirî*. Değirmenci tries to shed light on the ruling style of Osman II through an examination of the production of these manuscripts, which she locates into a broader context of power and patronage relations at the Ottoman court. Değirmenci’s discussion of the role of the chief eunuchs of the imperial harem in these networks of power and patronage especially provides important insights about the power elites and factionalism under Osman II, as well as his strategy of rule through his favorites.¹²

The historiography of seventeenth century portrays Osman II as 'misguided' and 'inexperienced' under the influence of his ill-will advisors. To be sure, Huseyin bin Sefer, his pseudonym Tûgî, occupies an important position in this perception with his account, *Musibetname*.¹³ He was supposedly a retired bodyguard (*solak*) of the sultan and participated several campaigns in Anatolia and Iran. In his account, Tûgî attempted to justify the actions of imperial soldiers in the rebellion. Accordingly, Tûgî separated the event into two as (i) the deposition and (ii) the regicide of sultan.

¹¹ Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹² Tülün Değirmenci, *İktidar Oyunları ve Resimli Kitaplar: II. Osman Devrinde Değişen Güç Simgeleri* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012).

¹³ Şevket Nezih Aykut, ed., *Hüseyin Tûgî, Musibetnâme* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004) [hereafter Tûgî, *Musibetnâme*].

In term of deposition, Tûgî accuses Osman II of having a secret plan to recruit a new army in Anatolia. According to Tûgî, the sultan's advisors as he calls "evil confidants" had spoken ill of the imperial soldiers. Most particularly, the Chief Eunuch Süleyman Agha and the Sultan's Tutor Ömer Hacı played a central role to antagonize the sultan against the soldiers under the pretext of their poor performance during the Polish campaign. They allegedly misguided Osman II to recruit a new army in Anatolia and Egypt and were returning back to the capital so as to eradicate the imperial army. However, in terms of the regicide, Tûgî showed an obstinate refusal to the accusation against the imperial soldiers of being a prime responsible group on the regicide of Osman II. Tûgî claims that the imperial soldiers aimed to depose Osman II, not to kill him. Tûgî accuses Mustafa II's brother-in-law, Grand Vizier Davud Pasha of killing Osman II in a dungeon at Yedikule Tower on May 22, 1622.¹⁴

Hasan Beyzâde Ahmed Pasha served as a high-ranking official in the imperial secretariat and the provincial administrations until his death. Hasan Beyzâde participated the several military campaigns, including the Polish campaign of Osman II. His account has been overwhelmingly favorable to the imperial soldiers in his account, *Hasan Bey-zâde Tarihi*.¹⁵ As discussed above, Gabriel Piterberg claims that Hasan Beyzâde's account is near verbatim of the Tûgî's account, however Tezcan shows persuasively that Hasan Beyzâde was not acquainted with Tûgî's account.¹⁶ On the other hand, similar to Peçevi, Hasan Beyzâde did not mention about the secret plan, rather he constructed his narrative on the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. This detail also separates Hasan Beyzâde's account from Tûgî's one.¹⁷

On the contrary to Tûgî and Hasan Beyzâde, Peçevi holds a favorable opinion about Osman II by disapproving the imperial soldiers' behaviors in his account, *Tarih-i Peçevi*.¹⁸ He spent his career mostly in provincial administration. During the

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 1-106. For details, see Tezcan, "The 1622 Military Rebellion in Istanbul: a Historiographical Journey," in *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire*, edited by Jane Hathaway (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Center for Turkish Studies, 2004), pp. 25-43. Also see Gabriel Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 71-91.

¹⁵ Nezihi Aykut, ed., *Hasan Bey-zâde Târîhi*, 3 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004) [hereafter *Hasan Beyzâde*, I-II-III].

¹⁶ Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy*, pp. 98-106; and Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 7-10.

¹⁷ *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 939-950.

¹⁸ İbrahim Peçevî, *Târîh-i Peçevî*, 2 vols. (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1283/1866) [hereafter *Peçevi*, I-

deposition of the Osman, he was the treasurer of governorship of Diyarbakır under Osman II's brother in law, Hafız Pasha. Similar to Tûgî and Hasan Beyzâde, he did not call the soldiers as rebels, but described their actions of soldiers as a disorder and sedition. Whether consciously or not, Peçevi did not mention the sultan's alleged secret plan of the recruitment, he rather gave voice to the rumor of the sultan's secret plan for the changing imperial capital from İstanbul to Cairo in Egypt. According to Peçevi, several inhabitants of Istanbul tried to spread the rumor in the preceding days just days of the rebellion. Unlike the rest of the writers, Peçevi did not accuse the advisors of the sultan for provoking him to undertake the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. According to Peçevi, the regicide of Osman II was linked to the increasing tension between the sultan and soldiers that had been rooted from the Polish campaign. Yet, similar to Tûgî, Peçevi indicates that Davud Pasha as the primary culprit for the regicide.¹⁹

Another contemporary writer is high-ranking jurist Bostanzade Yahya Efendi. He served in several high-ranking judicial posts, however he had been a retired chief judge of Anatolia since 1614. Bostanzade participated actively to the meeting of the ulema with the sultan during the chaotic days of the rebellion. According to Bostanzade, Osman abolished the retired revenue of the high-ranking *ulema*, the *arpalık* in the Polish campaign. Apart from them, Bostanzade predominantly accuses Hacı Ömer Efendi of being an ill-will advisor to provoke the sultan of undertaking the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca in his account. His main critics were to the high-ranking *ulema* members of Osman's imperial government. Bostanzade portrayed them as evil-confidants of the sultan whom provoked the inexperienced and young sultan to do so. Like the ones mentioned before, he too claimed Davud Pasha was most responsible for the regicide.²⁰

The rest of the contemporary sources predominantly construct their narrative under the influence of these four accounts. Most particularly, Tûgî's account has a

II]

¹⁹ Peçevi, II, pp. 380-388. Also see Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy*, pp. 106-112; Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 8-10; and *Diyanet İslam Vakfı Ansiklopedisi* [hereafter *DİA*], s.v. "Peçeyli İbrahim," by Erika Hancz, pp. 216-218.

²⁰ Orhan Şaik Gökyay, "II. Osman'ın Şehadeti" in *Atsız Armağanı*, ed. Erol Güngör (İstanbul, Ötüken Neşriyat, 1976), pp. 187-286 [hereafter Bostanzâde]; *DİA*, s.v. "Bostanzâde Yahya Efendi," pp. 311-313; and Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 5-6.

great impact on the Kâtib Çelebi and Naîmâ's accounts in terms of the arguments, causes and actors.²¹ Moreover, Karaçelebizâde's narrative was similar to Bostanzade, both of these members of *ulema* accuses Hacı Ömer Efendi of provoking the sultan to the pilgrimage campaign and having extraordinary power with the authority to decide on all high level appointments regarding the *ulema*.²²

ii. Sources and Approach

As noted above, the Venetian *baili* were the diplomats who represented the commercial and political interests of the Republic of Venice before the Ottoman sultan and his imperial government in Istanbul.²³ During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these seasoned diplomats provided the most regular and reliable information flow between the Ottoman capital and the rest of the Europe. Thus, their dispatches and reports constitute one of the most important, if not the chief, pool of source of information pertaining to the political, economic and military developments in the Ottoman Empire during this period.²⁴

The Venetian *baili* not only established close relationships with the leading Ottoman political figures, but also relied on an elaborate network of friendships and patronage in order to gather information. They also kept in regular touch with various other informants, such as the European merchants residing in Galata, the dragomans at the Ottoman court, porters and spies.²⁵

Overall, the *baili*'s dispatches were sent to the Venice once a week or twice depending on importance of the events they reported. Each dispatch typically

²¹ Zeynep Aycibin, "Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*: Tahlil ve Metin," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mimar Sinan University, 2007, pp. 651-683 [hereafter Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*]; Mehmet İpşirli, ed., *Naîmâ*, 4 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), vol. I, pp. 440-491 [hereafter *Tarih-i Naîmâ*, I-II-III-IV]. Also see, Piterbeg, *An Ottoman Tragedy*, pp. 114-124; and Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 11-12.

²² Karaçelebizâde Abdülaziz, *Ravzatü'l-ibrâr* (Bulaq: Al-Matba'a al-Amî riyya, H.1248/1832) [hereafter Karaçelebizâde].

²³ Eric Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic corps," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 16-2 (2001), pp. 2-7 and Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Fonds for the Sultan: How to Use Venetian Sources For Studying Ottoman History," *News on the Rialto* 32 (2013), pp. 22-28.

²⁴ Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople," pp. 1-2.

²⁵ Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople," p. 3 and Emrah Safa Gürkan, "Fonds for the Sultan," p. 24.

contains detailed information on the political and social events in Istanbul, the factional struggles at the sultan's court, the diplomatic relations as well as on the personal stories of various ruling elites in the empire, mostly in the capital. The *baili* particularly reported about his meetings and/or conversations with diverse Ottoman officials and other diplomats in the capital. Hence, the *dispacci* could be read for an examination of different political problems and actors.²⁶

Once a bailo's tenure expired, he was asked to write and present in person a final report about his embassy to the Senate in Venice. These reports are called the *relazioni* (singular, *relazione*). Unlike the *dispacci*, the *relazioni* were written in a highly formal and brief format. In these reports, the *baili* typically used their already submitted *dispacci* to give a summary of the main political events, actors, and problems during their tenure in Istanbul.

This thesis mainly utilizes the *dispacci* written by the Venetian *bailo* Giorgio Giustinian. He was born to a wealthy and prestigious Venetian family in 1572. He dedicated his life to politics instead of getting married, while his brother continued the lineage of their family, which was a common practice in Venice at the time.²⁷ At the time of his appointment to Istanbul in 1620, Giustinian was a very seasoned diplomat as he had served at different courts of Europe for many years.²⁸ Yet, he had some serious health problems at the time. In the event, he remained in the Ottoman capital for seven years and witnessed the entire reign of Osman II, including his regicide.²⁹ He died in Venice in February 1629 and left a considerable wealth to his heirs.³⁰

²⁶ Gürkan, "Fonds for the Sultan," pp. 23-24; and Natalie Rothman, "Between Venice and Istanbul: Trans-Imperial Subjects and Cultural Mediation in the Early Modern Mediterranean," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 2006, p. 214.

²⁷ Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople," p. 12.

²⁸ For instance, he was appointed to the court of the Duke of Savoy in September 1603 and then to England in March 1605. He worked at the English court until 1608. In March 1610, he was elected to serve as the Venetian ambassador at the court of France. However, the assassination of King Henry IV on 14 May 1610 postponed his position which he assumed a year later in May 1611. After three years of service, in January 1614, he was appointed as the ambassador to the Emperor Matthias of Austria. While serving in Prague, the Thirty Year's War erupted in 1618. For further details on Giustinian's career, see Giuseppe Gullino, "Giorgio Giustinian," *Dizionario Biografico degli Italia i* (Roma: Istituto dell' Enciclopedia Italiana Fondato da Giovanni Treccani, 2001), vol. 57, pp. 229-232.

²⁹ Dursteler, "The Bailo in Constantinople," p. 12.

³⁰ Gullino, "Giorgio Giustinian," p. 232.

In this thesis, I make use of more than 150 *dispacci* dated between the arrival of Giorgio Giustinian in Istanbul on August 20, 1620 and June 28, 1622, a month after the regicide of Osman II. During this period, Giustinian wrote a total of 140 *dispacci*.³¹ However, 71 of these dispatches, written between March 22, 1621 and February 19, 1622, are not available for the researchers in the Venetian State Archives, most probably due to their conditions. Despite this shortcoming, I utilize the *propri* (singular, *proprio*) which are the drafts of the *bailo*'s dispatches sent to Venice. I am thus able to compensate the lack of those 71 original *dispacci* with their copies. In addition, I use the *bailo*'s *relazione* which he presented to his Senate in 1627 following his return from Istanbul. Likewise, I look into relevant dispatches written by Giustinian's predecessor, Almorò Nani, who served in Istanbul between 1614 and 1620.³²

As to my methodology, I have tried to employ a critical reading of the dispatches in question regarding the political, economic and military problems and events of the period. While examining the Venetian dispatches along these lines, I compare them with the contemporary Ottoman chronicles, particularly by Tûgi, Peçevi, Hasan Beyzâde and Bostanzâde.

iii. Outline of Chapters

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter focuses on the political power exercised by Osman II and his favorites in the daily governmental affairs. My discussion covers the period from the succession of Osman II on February 26, 1618 to the death of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha on March 9, 1621. It examines the roles played in the factional politics of the period by the Chief Eunuch of the Imperial Harem, el-Hac Mustafa Agha, and his client, Grand Admiral Ali Pasha. Then, the reconfiguration of power relations under Osman II is examined. Most particularly, I

³¹ For the *dispacci*, Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice, Italy. Senato, *Dispacci Constantinopoli* (SDC), Filze 89,90,93. For the *propri*, Archivio di Stato di Venezia Senato, Venice, Italy. Senato, Archivio Proprio Constantinopoli (SPAC) 16, 17, 18. For details on the indexes of Giorgio Giustinian's *dispacci*, see Maria Pedani-Fabris, ed., *Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato*, vol. 14: *Costantinopoli, Relazioni inedite (1512-1789)* (Padua: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1996), pp. 40-41. See also Selvinaz Mete, "The Ottoman Empire as Reflected to the *Relazione* of the *Bailo* Giorgio Giustinian (1620-1627)," unpublished M.A. thesis, Fatih University, 2012.

³² For *dispacci* indexes of Almorò Nani, see Maria Pedani-Fabris, "Relazioni di Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato," p. 40.

discuss the rise of Ali Pasha to the office of grand vizierate within the context of the shifting power and changing dynamics among different court factions under Osman II. Moreover, this chapter sheds light on the methods employed Ali Pasha to eliminate his rivals at the sultan's court. It is also a close examination of the ruling style of Osman II vis-à-vis alternative foci of power in the capital. More specifically, it focuses on the priorities of Osman II in imperial affairs, which received harsh criticisms from the imperial soldiers and common people who were confronting some climatic, fiscal and military problems during these years.

The second chapter examines the daily politics at the court of Osman II within the context of a serious provision crisis, which overlapped with extreme winter conditions and a military campaign against Poland. My discussion covers the Venetian bailo's report on the outbreak of the extreme winter conditions on the February 9, 1621, to the sultan's return to the capital from the Polish campaign on January 9, 1622. In particular, it examines the provision crisis and the first reactions against Osman II and his imperial government.

The third chapter focuses on the increasing tension between Osman II and the imperial soldiers concerning his eagerness to undertake a pilgrimage. As noted above, this plan of the sultan triggered not only the imperial soldiers, but also the common people in the capital to form a much bigger opposition against the sultanate of Osman II.

The last chapter, finally, examines the accusation against Osman II pertaining to a secret plan of recruiting a new army instead of the existing the imperial one. This accusation was circulated as a rumor in the capital during the rebellion and it points out to the different scenarios invented or narrated by different contemporary writers to legitimize the dethronement and the murder of the sultan. More specifically, this chapter questions the rumor about whether Osman II actually aimed to leave his imperial army at the capital as he decided to realize his Pilgrimage journey.

CHAPTER 1

OSMAN II AND HIS REIGN

In the early seventeenth century, the Ottoman imperial politics underwent a severe crisis, which has its origins in the prolonged campaigns against the Habsburgs in the West (1593-1606) and the Safavids in the East (1578-90) as well as against the Celali rebels in the Anatolian countryside (ca. 1590-1610). These multi-front and relatively concurrent wars created no small amount of problems for the Ottoman sultan and his imperial government located in Istanbul. Most importantly, constant warfare resulted in a rampant inflation, thus in the devaluation of the salaries paid to the soldiers of the imperial army, who in turn rebelled against the imperial court protesting their payments with debased coinage as well as the mismanagement of the military affairs.

In the meantime, the traditional ways of Ottoman royal succession changed too. The ceasing of the tradition of fratricide during the early seventeenth century, which hitherto enabled a new sultan to execute all his living brothers upon his succession, led to the unusual succession of Sultan Mustafa I, the brother of Ahmed I (r. 1603-17), on November 22, 1617.³³ Since the rise of the Ottoman Empire from a small principality in the western Anatolia, over 300 years, it was the first time in Ottoman history that the throne did not pass from father to son, but from one brother to another. A new principle of seniority was thus introduced. This unusual succession marks a new era in the seventeenth-century Ottoman dynastic and political history. A series of underage sultans ascended to the throne, necessitating the *de facto* regency of the queen mothers in dynastic and court politics. The increasing role of the muftis, the chief eunuchs of the palace and the favorite viziers on the decisions-making processes further complicated the power relations and factional struggles within the Ottoman polity.³⁴

³³ ASVe, Senato, Costantinopoli (SDC), filza 84, no. 3a (dated November 22, 1617), fol. 178r: “*La notte passata mi fu portata aviso della morte del Re, et questa mattina, è stata assunto all’impero il fratello Sultan Mustafa al quale conforme l’ordinario, tutti li vesiri, et altri grandi li hanno baciata la veste.*” For the details on the unusual succession of Mustafa I, see Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 84-100.

³⁴ See Günhan Börekçi, “İnkırâzın Eşiğinde Bir Hanedan: III. Mehmed, I. Ahmed, I. Mustafa ve 17.Yüzyıl Osmanlı Siyasi Krizi,” *Divan Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi* 26 (2009), pp. 54-56; Feridun M. Emecen, “Osmanlı Hanedanına Alternatif Arayışlar Üzerine Bazı Örnekler ve

In this imperial crisis period, often a new sultan was chosen and enthroned by a collective decision taken by factional coups within the palace of the period, while the imperial army got involved in such factional struggles only to deepen the crisis in the seventeenth century dynastic and court politics of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, on February 26, 1618, only three months after the enthronement of Mustafa I, Osman II was the first sultan who succeeded to the imperial throne with the help of such a palace coup.³⁵

This chapter examines how Osman II and his favorites projected power in daily politics of the Ottoman imperial court by analyzing the dispatches written by the Venetian *baili* resident in Istanbul. My discussion covers the major events and affairs from the succession of Osman II on February 26, 1618 to the death of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha on March 9, 1621. While analyzing the dispatches in question, I will also compare the Venetian *baili*'s accounts and narratives regarding the events and affairs under examination vis-à-vis the arguments of the existing academic literature on Osman II's reign, thus try to reach at a better understanding of the political problems during this period.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part examines the succession of Osman II, which is an unusual event within the context of the dynastic and political problems that defined much of this era. In particular, my discussion will focus on el-Hac Mustafa Agha, the Chief Eunuch of the Imperial Harem, and Ali Pasha, the Grand Admiral between November 1617 and February 1618, as well as examine their roles in the succession of Osman II. The second part of the chapter investigates the reconfiguration of power and patronage relations under Osman II. More specifically, I look into the rise of Ali Pasha as Osman II's new grand vizier within the context of the changing balances of power among different existing court factions and alternative networks of political patronage. The third part then analyzes the process of the elimination of all the major power-brokers by Ali Pasha and accordingly his unrivalled rise to power in the imperial court under Osman II. This

Mülâhazalar," *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* 6 (2001), pp. 63-76; Tezcan "The Question of Regency in Ottoman Dynasty: The Case of the Early Reign of Ahmed I," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 25 (2008), pp. 185-198 [published in 2009]; and Gülru Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial and Power: The Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991).

³⁵ For the details on the reign of Mustafa I, see Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 168-175; and *DIA*, s.v. "Mustafa (I)," by Feridun Emecen, pp. 272-275.

part highlights the methods of elimination employed by Ali Pasha against his political rivals. The fourth part of this chapter finally studies the assertive ruling style of Osman II vis-à-vis the alternative foci of power among his ruling elite in the capital. Principally, this part explores the priorities set by Osman II in imperial affairs, which eventually would trigger a direct and harsher criticism against his sultanate and ruling style by the imperial soldiers (both the Janissaries and the *sipahis*) and the common people in the coming years.

It is my main general contention is that Ali Pasha's factional struggles against the sultan's royal favorites and his grandees of the court enabled Osman II to both assert his sovereign authority over the business of rule as well as create his own alternative court faction among his ruling elites. Accordingly, I observe that with every victory that Ali Pasha won over his political rivals, Osman II became more visible and more assertive in the daily running of his imperial government. However, this limited concentration of power in the decision-making processes by the sultan and his new grand vizier, in turn, directly made Osman II accountable for any failures in governmental affairs in the eyes of the imperial army and the people in the capital, while they were all confronting some serious fiscal, military and climatic problems.

1.1 A Palace Coup: The Succession of Osman II

On Thursday, February 26, 1618, only three months after the unusual succession of Mustafa I, the Venetian *bailo* Almorò Nani reported that Mustafa I was deposed for being incapable of ruling the empire. According to the *bailo*:

This morning, Sultan Osman, the eldest son of Sultan Ahmed, ascended to the imperial throne as the new king and his [Ahmed's] brother, Sultan Mustafa, was deposed, having ruled exactly for three months and three days. They locked him in the place where he was before [i.e. the *kafes*, the chamber of the Ottoman princes in the imperial harem]. This deposition was the work of the Mufti [Esad Efendi], the Deputy Grand Vizier [Sofu Mehmed Pasha] and the Chief Eunuch [el-Hac Mustafa Agha].³⁶

³⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 84, no. 35 (dated February 26, 1618, m.v.), fol. 376r: "*Questa mattina è stato assunto a questo Imperio un novo Re Sultan Osman figlio maggiore del gia Sultan Achmet et deposto Mustafa suo fratello, che ha regnato tre mesi e Re giorni appunto, et l'hanno posto serrato nel luoco, dove, era prima che fosse creato, tutto cio, propria del Mufti Caimecan et Chislar Agasi.*" In the early seventeenth century, March marked the beginning of a new year according to the Venetian Calendar.

The Venetian *bailo* further claims that the members of the palace coup invented numerous and diverse accusations in order to justify the deposition of Mustafa I in the public opinion. They thus circulated the following rumors by word of mouth about Mustafa I; girding a simple sword in the palace, wounding wantonly his inner-court servants, breaking very precious jewels at his whim, demanding alms from a crippled ghazi *sipahi* in the street, and finally, giving the said *sipahi* a royal writ to be delivered immediately to the Habsburg Emperor Matthias (r.1612-19). According to the Venetian *bailo*, el-Hac Mustafa Agha instantly stopped this *sipahi* and took the writ from his hand, preventing a possible diplomatic crisis which would leave the empire in an awkward position in the international arena.³⁷

The Venetian *bailo* further states that a favorite client of the dismissed Grand Admiral Ali Pasha told him at a dinner that, in this writ, Mustafa I mentioned some possible changes in the ranks of his government within 10 days. According to Ali Pasha's favorite, whose name is unidentified by the *bailo*, due to these important changes, his patron could be soon reappointed to his former office.³⁸ It was only three months ago that Ali Pasha was dismissed from the grand admiralty and replaced by Mustafa I's brother-in-law, Davud Pasha.³⁹ According to the contemporary chronicler Mehmed bin Mehmed, at that time, it was Davud Pasha who asked Mustafa I to appoint him in place of Ali Pasha for he was the sultan's brother-in-law.⁴⁰ Ali Pasha's initial dismissal might have set alarm bells ringing for el-Hac Mustafa Agha, who had been the chief power-broker at the Ottoman court under Ahmed I. He was also the patron of Ali Pasha whose career he sponsored from early on.⁴¹ The dismissal of his chief client Ali Pasha was a sign that el-Hac Mustafa

³⁷ Ibid., fol. 376r. For similar accusations about Mustafa I, see *Peçevi*, II, pp. 361-362 and *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, p. 927.

³⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 84 (dated February 26, 1618, m.v.), fol. 377v: “*ha [Mustafa I] scritto in essa polizza all'imperator, che dovesse immediate venirsene qui, perché le voleva rinovare il governo sta più di dieci giorni, che mi fu detto in gran confidenza da uno molto favorito del Capitan del mare deposto, che vere qui a desinare meco, che luna nova si vederebino gran mutazioni in questo governo, et che il suo patrone sarebbe ritornato nel carico.*”

³⁹ Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 169.

⁴⁰ *Mehmed bin Mehmed*, II, p. 49.

⁴¹ El-Hac Mustafa Agha had served as one of the eunuchs in the imperial harem under Murad III (r.1574-95) and Mehmed III (r.1595-1604). After the succession Sultan Ahmed I in December 1603, he returned to the capital from Egypt where had been in exile since 1602. Upon his return, Sultan Ahmed appointed him as one of his chief *musâhibs*. He was then promoted to the chief eunuch of the imperial palace on November 5, 1605. From then on, he accumulated enormous power under Ahmed I, while turning into the chief advisor and chief power-broker of the sultan. Mustafa Agha sponsored

Agha confronted with the new court faction under Mustafa I. He was now under the threat of losing his all favor and power at the Ottoman imperial court. Indeed, the Venetian *bailo* claims that el-Hac Mustafa Agha allied with Ali Pasha and they jointly opposed against the sultanate of Mustafa I in the first place.

Ali Pasha was in effect one of the masterminds behind the succession of Osman II in that he had provided crucial support for the deposition of Mustafa I.⁴² According to the French ambassador Baron de Sancy, Ali Pasha had informed Sofu Mehmed Pasha, the Deputy Grand Vizier, about Mustafa I's plan to replace him with his brother-in-law. In the meantime, Ali Pasha received a letter from Prince Osman promising to keep Sofu Mehmed Pasha in his position as the deputy grand vizier in the event of the deposition of Sultan Mustafa and his enthronement instead. Moreover, the French Ambassador claims that Ali Pasha made a deal with the *Segbanbaşı* Kara Hasan Agha, the Deputy Agha of the Janissaries, while Hüseyin Agha, Agha of the Janissaries, was serving in a campaign against the Safavids. Ali Pasha promised Hasan Agha to be promoted to the office of Agha of the Janissaries once they successfully manage to depose Mustafa I.⁴³

the political careers of many grandees such as Ali Pasha, Hüseyin Pasha and Dilaver Pasha who were all appointed grand viziers during the reigns of Osman II and Murad IV. As noted before, Mustafa Agha also played an important role on the succession of Osman II, but his client Ali Pasha exiled him to Egypt once he found the opportunity on July 14, 1620, as will be discussed below. Upon the succession of Murad IV (r.1623-1640), Mustafa Agha was invited back to the capital and resumed his position. Yet, he died shortly afterwards in 1624. On El-Hac Mustafa Agha and his career, see Değirmenci, *İktidar Oyunları*, pp. 59-83; and Tezcan, "Searching for Osman II," p. 166-175. Also see, Günhan Börekçi, "Factions and Favorites," pp. 242-249. For *musâhib*, see. *DIA*, s.v. "Musâhib," by Mehmet İpşirli, pp. 230-231

⁴² Maria Pedani-Fabris, ed., *Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato*, vol. 14: *Costantinopoli, Relazioni inedite (1512-1789)* (Padua: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1996), pp. 548 [hereafter Giustinian]: "...qualche tempo dopo Alì suo primo visir, quello che fu tanto mal affetto a questa Repubblica, huomo perfido et rapacissimo, uno anch'egli degli architetti della depositione del zio et della sua assunzione." See also Mete, "the Bailo Giorgio Giustinian," pp. 103-104. Ali Pasha was the son of Ahmed Pasha, the martyr governor of Tunisia. When he was a child, his father was killed in a battle against the Celali rebels in Anatolia. Due to the loyal service of his father, Ali was appointed to the governorship of Damietta in Egypt. During the reign of Ahmed I (r. 1603-17), Ali Pasha served in several prestigious governorships under the patronage of Mustafa Agha. According to Tezcan, İstanköylü Ali Pasha might have become acquainted with el-Hac Mustafa Agha while he was in exile in Egypt. At that time, Ali was the governor of Damietta, a coast region of Egypt. Moreover, during the campaign against the Celali rebels in Bursa, Ahmed I boarded Ali Pasha's ship for his journey to Bursa on the Marmara Sea. Tezcan asserts that this journey benefited Mustafa Agha and Ali Pasha to improve their personal relations. Thus, Mustafa Agha showed his patronage to his client Ali Pasha shortly after the latter was appointed to the governorship of Yemen. For a detailed discussion of Ali Pasha and his career, see Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 167-169; *Mehmed bin Mehmed*, II, pp. 46-47; and *DIA*, s.v. "Ali Paşa, Güzelce," by İdris Bostan, pp. 424-425.

⁴³ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 171-172.

All the accusations against Mustafa I aimed at revealing his incapacity to rule the empire, yet they did not fully serve the plot for his deposition. At this point, el-Hac Mustafa Agha tried to propagate the fear of the genealogical extinction of the dynasty as a last resort to ensure the removal of Mustafa I from the throne. According to the chronicler Hasan Beyzâde, Mustafa Agha sent a common warning message to Esad Efendi, the Mufti, Sofu Mehmet Pasha, the Deputy Grand Vizier, and other government viziers, urging them to consider that the Ottoman dynasty was under a serious threat and that, if not acted immediately, Mustafa I would attempt to kill all the Ottoman princes living in the palace. Furthermore, Mustafa Agha and Ali Pasha warned other ruling grandees in that Mustafa I appointed several incapable men to important offices, implying that their existing posts were actually under threat as long as Mustafa I occupied the throne.

Eventually such warnings about the threat for the genealogical extinction and the possible loss of their current offices paid. Esad Efendi and Sofu Mehmed Pasha began to support the idea of dethroning Mustafa I and then enthroning of Osman II instead.⁴⁴ In the end, Mustafa Agha, Esad Efendi, Sofu Mehmed Pasha and all other ruling viziers gathered in the imperial council under the pretext of discussing the issue of payments for the soldiery. During the meeting, Mustafa I were locked in his chambers in order to prevent him from intervening the ongoing deliberations. Then Osman II entered the council from a different door and succeeded to the throne, followed by the allegiance of the viziers to the new sultan. Shortly afterwards, other grandees of the court likewise congratulated Osman II on his succession.⁴⁵

1.2 The Reconfiguration of the Power Relations Under Osman II

The succession of Osman II brought several changes in the ranks of the imperial government and the balances of power among the Ottoman ruling elite. Most notably, Osman II immediately rewarded those leading figures of the palace coup that brought him to the throne by appointing them to top-level positions in the imperial government. Meanwhile, as part of this reconfiguration of power positions, el-Hac Mustafa Agha manage to have his own clients and close allies promoted to

⁴⁴ *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 919-920; and *Naîmâ*, II, p. 440.

⁴⁵ *Peçevi*, II, pp. 361-362; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 917-920; and *Naîmâ*, II, p. 441.

the strategic posts in the imperial administration. For instance, his long-time client Ali Pasha was appointed as grand admiral in early 1618.⁴⁶

While the reshuffling of the government and court positions were underway, those leading figures at the court of Mustafa I, such as Grand Vizier Halil Pasha, the Deputy Grand Vizier Sofu Mehmed Pasha, the Mufti Esad Efendi and the Grand Admiral Davud Pasha, gradually lost their once powerful positions, which enabled Osman II to exert more influence over the business of rule. For instance, Halil Pasha was leading a campaign against the Safavids as the commander-in-chief of the imperial army (*serdar-ı ekrem*) at the time of Osman II's enthronement.⁴⁷ After Halil Pasha returned to the capital, he found a very different political atmosphere. The deposition of Mustafa I enabled his chief rival, Sofu Mehmed Pasha, to consolidate his power in the imperial government under Osman II in early 1618.⁴⁸ Shortly before leaving the capital with the command of a new campaign against the Safavids, Halil Pasha complained to Osman II about Sofu Mehmed Pasha. According to Hasan Beyzâde, Halil Pasha accused his deputy of draining the imperial treasury for the accession donation of Mustafa I. Accordingly, Halil pasha induced Osman II to dismiss Sofu Mehmed Pasha and send him away from the capital as the Governor of Sivas on July 9, 1618.⁴⁹

Hasan Beyzâde also claims that Osman II considered Esad Efendi as one of the influential actors who made the enthronement of Mustafa I possible. Hence the sultan restricted Esad Efendi's authority in the appointments of the *ulema* hierarchy, leaving only the (fetva) authority to the Mufti in place. Meanwhile, Osman II empowered his royal tutor, Hacı Ömer Efendi, by giving him the authority to decide on the appointments concerning the top-levels of the *ulema* hierarchy in July 1618.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Furthermore, el-Hac Mustafa Agha had his client Cafer Agha appointed to the governorship of Egypt for his support in the succession of Osman II, see Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 171-172.

⁴⁷ *DIA*, s.v. "Halil Paşa, Kayserili," by Alexander de Groot, pp. 324-326; and *Mehmed bin Mehmed*, II, pp. 44-46.

⁴⁸ *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 922-925 and İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 6 vols. (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972), vol. III, p. 274.

⁴⁹ *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 922-925.

⁵⁰ Esad Efendi (1570-1625) came from one of the most powerful Ottoman *ulema* families in the sixteenth century. His father was Hoca Saadeddin Efendi, who was the royal tutor of Murad III and Mehmed III and one of the most powerful figures under these sultans. He created a powerful network of alliances both in the *ulema* and the Ottoman ruling elite in the capital. He married his son Esad to daughter of the Mufti Bostanzâde Mehmed Efendi (d. 1598). Thanks to the influential position of his

Osman II continued to appoint his favorite and trusted courtiers to important positions and tanks, while asserting his personal rule vis-à-vis all alternative foci of power that he deemed a threat to his sovereign will in the business of rule. With the help of Ömer Efendi, Osman II in effect intended to curb the power of Efendi so as to strengthen his sovereign authority in the business of rule.⁵¹

Moreover, Davud Pasha was dismissed from the grand admiralty. According to the French Ambassador, Baron de Sancy, Davud Pasha expected to be promoted to the deputy grand vizierate shortly before the succession of Osman II. De Sancy claims that Davud Pasha had offered Ali Pasha his office of grand admiralty in return for 50 thousand gold coins, because he expected to be appointed as the deputy grand vizier.⁵² However, upon the dethronement of Mustafa I, Davud Pasha's aspiration for a higher office came to naught; even, he lost his incumbent position as grand admiral upon the succession of Osman II on February 26, 1618.

As these changes in the government of Osman II had been taken place, Halil Pasha concluded a peace agreement with the Safavids on September 26, 1618.⁵³ According to the contemporary chronicler Peçeви, upon this development, the royal tutor of the sultan, Ömer Efendi, accused Halil Pasha of accepting some unfavorable terms of peace while the massive death toll of the Ottoman soldiers during the campaigns required different conditions. Indeed, shortly after his tutor's complaints,

father, Esad Efendi quickly rose in the *ulema* ranks and became the judge of Edirne in 1596 and the judge of İstanbul in 1599. He was then promoted to the chief judgeship of Rumeli when his elder brother Mehmed Efendi became the Mufti in 1608. In 1615, Esad Efendi became the mufti upon the death of his brother and kept his position until the regicide of Osman II in 1622. After the regicide, he resigned from his position, though, Murad IV reappointed him as the Mufti in 1624. In 1625, he died in the capital. For further details of his life and *ilmiye* career, see Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 116-124; *Mehmed bin Mehmed*, pp. 109-110; *DİA*, s.v., "Esad Efendi, Hocazade," by Munir Aktepe, pp. 340-341.

⁵¹ Ömer Efendi was considered one of the most powerful court figures. He began his career under the patronage of Mazlum Melek Ahmed Efendi, who was the royal tutor of Sultan Selim II's sons. Upon the enthronement of Murad III in 1574, sons of Selim II were all executed, thus Ömer Efendi went to live by his patron Melek Ahmed Efendi who served as the judge of Madina between 1577 and 1580. Ömer Efendi returned to the capital in 1582. Afterwards, Vizier Cafer Pasha appointed him as the professor of his college in the district of Eyüb in Istanbul. He was then appointed as the preacher at the Ayasofya, In January 1609, he became the royal tutor for Ahmed I's sons, Prince Osman and Prince Mehmed. Upon the succession of Osman II in 1618, he turned into a powerful royal favorite and functioned as one of the new sultan's power-brokers at the court. During the rebellion of 1622, the he was executed. For further details, see *Mehmed bin Mehmed*, II, pp. 114-115; Tezcan, pp. 186-194; and *Bostanzâde*, pp. 193-196. Moreover, Osman II gave his tutor's name to his son, Prince Ömer. See *Karaçelebizâde*, p. 549.

⁵² Tezcan, "Searching for Osman II," pp. 170-171.

⁵³ Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, III, pp. 275-276.

Osman II dismissed Halil Pasha and appointed Damad Mehmed Pasha as his new grand vizier on January 18, 1619.⁵⁴

Shortly after the elevation of Damad Mehmed Pasha to the grand vizierate, the newly appointed Grand Admiral Ali Pasha returned to the capital with valuable booties, thanks to his successful Mediterranean campaign in December 1619. He captured from Venetian and French ships valuable goods and presented them as gifts to the sultan as the Ottoman custom dictated. However, according to Hasan Beyzâde, Damad Mehmed Pasha was envious of Ali Pasha's success and accused Ali Pasha of hiding a large portion of the booty to himself, while donating only ten percent of it to the sultan. Moreover, the new grand vizier complained to the sultan about the booty that Ali Pasha did not take away from the enemies, but from the friends of the Ottoman Empire such as Venice and France. Furthermore, Damad Mehmed Pasha incited the ambassadors of these countries to make an official complaint before the sultan. Hasan Beyzâde notes that, in Ali Pasha's view, Damad Mehmed Pasha simply wanted his own share of the booty. Hence, Ali Pasha tried to silence the new grand vizier by giving him a share of the booty.⁵⁵ In the meantime, Ali Pasha secretly continued to send regular donations to Osman II.⁵⁶

Shortly afterwards, the Grand Admiral Ali Pasha rose to the grand vizierate on January 24, 1619. Hasan Beyzâde claims that presenting valuable gifts and money impressed Osman II helping Ali Pasha to become the sultan's favorite minister. Tezcan claims that the appointment of Ali Pasha as the new grand vizier could be related to his fiscal efforts to fund the imperial treasury. Overall, it is clear that Osman II trusted him in dealing with the fiscal problems which had deepened due to the recent wars against the Safavids. Moreover, Tezcan notes that el-Hac Mustafa Agha and Hacı Ömer Efendi played a crucial role in Ali Pasha's appointment to the grand vizierate. Yet, according to the French ambassador Cesy, Ali Pasha's promotion was more of an issue linked to a potential war with Poland.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ *Peçevi*, II, p. 381; and *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 922-923. For the terms of the peace in question, see Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, III, pp. 275-276.

⁵⁵ *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 923-924; *Peçevi*, II, pp. 381-382; and Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, III, pp. 276-277.

⁵⁶ *Naîmâ*, II, p. 450.

⁵⁷ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 197-198.

Upon his appointment as grand vizier, Ali Pasha immediately moved against his rival Damad Mehmed Pasha for his previous accusations on the share of the campaign booty. Ali Pasha demanded a lump-sum donation from Damad Mehmed Pasha in order to get the governorship of Aleppo, a highly lucrative position in the provincial administration. This appointment of Mehmed Pasha took place at the end of January 1619, but it actually meant for Ali Pasha the removal of a powerful rival from Istanbul.⁵⁸ The ‘exile’ of Damad Mehmed Pasha in this way was only a preview of ruling style of the new Grand Vizier Ali Pasha in the coming years.

1.3 Partition of the Court Faction of Osman II: Rising of Ali Pasha with the Unrivaled Power

Ali Pasha’s grand vizierate started a new era under Osman II. At the very beginning of his reign, Osman II had found himself within a court divided by factions and an imperial government functioning on complex networks of political patronage. The sultan was thus only one of the contenders for power in this faction-ridden political environment. Yet, soon, Osman II managed to exert his sovereign will and establish a more personal rule through the agency of his royal favorites, such as el-Hac Mustafa Agha, Ali Pasha and Ömer Efendi. Yet, empowering new favorites and their networks of clients in the business of rule enabled such figures to attain much more power within the imperial court. As a consequence, the imperial court was further polarized as tensions between different factions increased over time. Particularly, Mustafa Agha and Ömer Efendi began to function as power-brokers in the government of Ali Pasha. These favorites in short time began to restrain the power of the grand vizier. In response, Ali Pasha worked to eliminate the chief favorites of the sultan through ardently advocating that Osman II should rule alone. The sultan, in turn, allowed Ali Pasha to send his rivals away from the court, hence allowing him to consolidate an unrivalled political power as a minister-favorite, while Osman II consolidated his sultanate.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 923-925; *Peçevi*, II, pp. 381-383; and *Naîmâ*, II, p. 450.

⁵⁹ For a discussion of the minister-favorites in early modern Ottoman imperial court, see Börekcî, “Factions and Favorites,” pp. 199-234. For a discussion of European minister-favorites, see Antonio Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 27-47; and Ian A. A. Thompson, “The Institutional Background to the Rise of the Minister-Favorite,” in Elliott and Brockliss, eds., *The World of the Favourite*, pp. 13-25.

According to the Venetian *bailo* Nani, in early July 1618, el-Hac Mustafa Agha and Hacı Ömer Efendi quarreled in the presence of Osman II about the dismissal of the chief gardener of Edirne by the son of Hacı Ömer Efendi, Abdullah Efendi, the Judge of Edirne. El-Hac Mustafa Agha vehemently opposed to the dismissal of the chief gardener of Edirne for he was one of his clients. When the sultan asked the reason for the quarrel, el-Hac Mustafa Agha was so much frustrated at Hacı Ömer Efendi that he suddenly left the presence of Osman II without asking any permission. Hacı Ömer Efendi took advantage of this rude behavior of Mustafa Agha and immediately provoked the sultan to dismiss him. He incited Osman II by saying that his very powerful chief eunuch was actually very powerful to cause a disaster for his sultanate, chiefly because Mustafa Agha had a close relation with Kösem Mahpeyker Sultan, the mother of Prince Mehmed, whose age was old enough to be enthroned. This veiled accusation apparently convinced Osman II as he dismissed Mustafa Agha and then exiled him to Egypt. Mustafa Agha's wealth was also confiscated on July 14, 1620.⁶⁰

The removal of Mustafa Agha from the court and Istanbul no doubt benefited Ali Pasha for he was getting increasingly troubled by the power of the chief eunuch. Moreover, Ali Pasha also dismissed one of the clients of Mustafa Agha, Dilaver Pasha, the Governor of Diyarbakır, for he considered him a potential threat. In fact, Ali Pasha's concern was quite true, because Dilaver Pasha was appointed as the grand vizier in the last days of the Polish campaign in August 1621.⁶¹

Ali Pasha continued to eliminate such potential rivals and any opponent voices against his vizierate. According to the chronicler Peçevi, for instance, Ali Pasha sent Baki Pasha to the dungeon at Yedikule and confiscated all of his wealth simply

⁶⁰ ASVe, Senato, Archivio Proprio Costantinopoli (SAPC), Registro 16, no. 140 (dated July 14, 1620), fol.inpage. See also Giustinian, *Relazione*, p. 600: “*Nel bel principio del mio bailaggio, Ali primo visir per posseder solo la volontà di sultan Osman, et tirar ogni cosa a sé, lo indusse a levarsi dattorno il vecchio chislaragassi et il coza, di grande autorità, nella sua tenera età, con quel re, il quale poi nella maggior divenuto altiero et pertinace, credeva a sé solo, et poco ascoltava alcuno...*” For details, see Erol Kılıç, and Çevik Mümin, ed., *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10 vols (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1992), vol.VIII, p. 198 [hereafter *Hammer*, I-II-III-IV-V-VI-VII-VIII-IX-X]. I can verify this event in Hammer's reference on the *Bailo Nani's rubricario*, original *dispaccio* was demolished, instead of it, I can use *proprio* in order to read all story. On the other hand, Prince Mehmed was the son of Kösem as opposed to the established historiography which still lacks this important attribution first noted by Tezcan, see Tezcan, “The Debut of Kösem Sultan's Political Career,” *Turcica* 40 (2008), p. 94; idem, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 351-358.

⁶¹ ASVe, Senato, SAPC, Registro 16, no. 140 (dated July 14, 1620), fol.inpage.

because Baki Pasha did not agree with the grand vizier's fiscal policies.⁶² Moreover, Naîmâ claims that Ali Pasha used to take large amount of money from the dismissed statesmen and other grandees in the imperial and provincial administration, but he never forgot sharing his wealth with the sultan.⁶³ Ali Pasha utilized remarkably the economic tools such as confiscation and donations so as to maintain the sultan's favor and eliminate his rivals at the court of Osman II.

In this context, Ali Pasha's final critical move was the dismissal of Hacı Ömer Efendi. The Venetian *bailo* Nani claims that the reason behind this dismissal was Hacı Ömer Efendi's eagerness to launch a military campaign against Poland. Unlike the sultan's tutor, Ali Pasha approached this idea cautiously. According to the Venetian *bailo*, Ali Pasha considered that Hacı Ömer Efendi could easily influence the sultan as seen in the dismissal of Mustafa Agha. Similarly, he could possibly induce to the sultan to launch a military campaign against Poland.⁶⁴ However, the relevant scholarly literature portrays Ali Pasha as having a warlike stance. For instance, Tezcan refers to the French Ambassador Cesy in that the appointment of Ali Pasha as grand vizier was related to a potential war with Poland.⁶⁵ According to the *bailo*, though, Ali Pasha was not keen on declaring war against Poland. He instead provided every single reason for avoiding a war with Poland. He was thus troubled with Hacı Ömer Efendi's warlike tendency and his intervention to the imperial affairs, and then he played an important role on his dismissal.⁶⁶

Yet, according to the chronicler Tûgî, the dismissed el-Hacı Mustafa Agha gave a letter of Hacı Ömer Efendi to his successor Chief Eunuch Süleyman Agha. In the letter, Hacı Ömer Efendi spoke ill of Osman II during the enthronement of Mustafa I. According to Tûgî, Süleyman Agha delivered the letter to Osman II. After reading

⁶² Peçevi, II, p. 381; Hammer, VIII, pp. 188-189; and Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," p. 8.

⁶³ Naîmâ, p. 451; Hammer, VIII, pp. 188-189; and Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," p. 8.

⁶⁴ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 147 (dated August 22, 1620), fol. 14r: "*segui la desmission del Coza molto mal affetto a Vostra Serenità et nella causa de Bossinesi tutto contrario, ma piaccia a Dio che la sua caduta non sia in maggior stabilimento del Vesir il qual hora restando solo, et assoluto, et senza alcun emulo piglierà tanto più ardire et quel che grandemente importa il Cozza voleva la guerra di Polonia per ogni modo, et il Vesir la contraria quanto può, onde mentre la cosa sta in questa pendenza, è gran prudenza andar destreggiando seco per non dar occasione al suo pessimo animo, et a quei evitamenti, che in un Re giovane, et come si vede di presta, et prima impressione ponno far colpo.*"

⁶⁵ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," p. 197.

⁶⁶ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 147 (dated August 22, 1620), fol. 14r. The *Bailo* Nani and Giorgio Giustinian began to write *dispaccio* together, with advent of Giorgio Giustinian on August 22, 1620.

the letter, Osman II decided to dismiss his tutor.⁶⁷ However, we can assume that as being Mustafa Agha's court creature, Ali Pasha could have persuaded Süleyman Agha to deliver letter to the sultan. In any event, Osman II also dismissed Hacı Ömer Efendi and ordered his exile to Mecca on August 15, 1620.⁶⁸

The Venetian *bailo* claims that, after these dismissals, Ali Pasha reached the zenith of his power as grand vizier and in running the imperial affairs. However, as Ali Pasha tried to eliminate all power-brokers and his political rivals in the imperial government, he needed to establish new alliances to substitute old ones. For example, after the dismissal of Hacı Ömer Efendi, the charge for the appointments of the top-level appointments in the *ulema* hierarchy was reassigned to the Mufti, Esad Efendi. The Venetian *bailo* Giorgio Giustinian notes that Esad Efendi was assuming more power over Osman II and Ali Pasha at this time. Both the sultan and his grand vizier did not take any action without first seeking the Mufti's advice concerning any significant government affair.⁶⁹ As a matter of fact, Ali Pasha might have accepted the rising power of Esad Efendi, because, as the Venetian *bailo* claims, Esad Efendi did not intervene in the imperial affairs as much as Hacı Ömer Efendi.⁷⁰ Moreover, according to the *bailo*, Ali Pasha dismissed the grand chancellor, *Nişancı*, a client of Hacı Ömer Efendi, for he ill-spoke about Ali Pasha in relation to the dismissal of his powerful patron Ömer Efendi. Instead of Hacı Ömer Efendi's client, Ali Pasha appointed one of his own clients to the office of grand chancellorship upon taking with 20.000 gold coins for this promotion.⁷¹ Hence, according to the *bailo*, Ali Pasha held all the power in the government while every

⁶⁷ Tûgî, *Musibetnâme*, pp. 116-117.

⁶⁸ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 146 (dated August 22, 1620), fol. 486v: "Nel medesimo giorno che l'Eccellissimo signore Giustiano fece la sua entrata più privatamente, che fu a 15 del presente fu deposto l'Hogia del Re." According to the *bailo*, Ömer Hacı did not leave the capital city. He mentioned his old age as an excuse for such a challenging sea or land voyage to Mecca. See ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 150 (dated September 24, 1620), fol. 26r.

⁶⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 11 (dated December 26, 1620), fol. 228v: "crescendo ogni giorno piu l'autorità col Re, et col Vesir et non si potendo senza il suo assenso, o intervento risolvere cosa alcuna importante."

⁷⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 15, 1621, m.v.), fol. 274v: "viveva con non poco travaglio d'animo, poiche il Mufti non s'ingerisce fuori del suo carico, se non viene ricercato, et quelli dentro del Seraglio tutti dipendono da esso Vesir nella sola potestà del quale consiste tutto questo governo."

⁷¹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 149 (dated September 9, 1620), fol. 20v.

political figure at the sultan's court now depended on his discretion.⁷²

According to the Venetian *bailo* Giustinian, Ali Pasha knew the tight-fisted and ambitious nature of Osman II very well. The *bailo* notes that Ali Pasha never failed to present large sums of money to the sultan every two weeks, delivering Osman II half of the income that he received from bribes and confiscation.⁷³ For instance, Ali Pasha donated the sultan numerous gifts in relation to the Ramadan Festivities in 1620. According to the *bailo*'s count, he presented the sultan 17 horses, 18 beautiful slave girls, and 46 bundles of garment, various types of fruits, 40.000 gold coins, 30 gold-gilded clocks and 10.000 new coins, all of which made Ali Pasha maintain the royal favor of Osman II.⁷⁴

However, it was not easy to deal with ambitious nature of Osman II who wanted to personally lead an imperial campaign against the Polish Commonwealth. Ali Pasha could not divert his sultan's eagerness on the idea of a campaign. While shattering his hopes, the news of upcoming envoy of Poland for the peace talks gratified Ali Pasha. He might have considered the upcoming envoy as a last resort, because Ali Pasha detested launching an imperial military campaign against Poland.⁷⁵ The Venetian *bailo* Giustinian claims that the underlying reason behind the

⁷² ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 15, 1621, m.v.), fol. 274v: “viveva con non poco travaglio d’animo, poiche il Mufti non s’ingerisce fuori del suo carico, se non viene ricercato, et quelli dentro del Seraglio tutti dipendono da esso Vesir nella sola potestà del quale consiste tutto questo governo.”

⁷³ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 1 (dated september 10, 1620), fol. 80r: “cosi manifeste sono l’estorsioni et le tirranie di quest’huomo (ali pasha) che ogni ragion vorria che non dovesse durare se ben egli astutissimo conoscendo la natura del re molto avara et avida al danaro talle a tutti per presentar a lui solo col qual solo mezo si come s’è sin hora mantenuto cosi s’assicura di mantenersi per lungo tempo havendo anco per tal effetto usato tanta perfidia che ha fatto cacciar et depuner il chislar agassi et il coza auttori et protettori della sua grandezza rimeritandoli di questo modo et perche restando hora come resta nell’auttorità et assoluto commando solissimo tutto l’oro che veniva compartito negl’altri col asse in lui solo che donato poi da lui al re viene ad assicurarsi di continuar del presente suo assoluto commando.” In fact, the *bailo* accused Ali Pasha of being a tyrant should be looked as a political trope, which comes from *bailo*'s own worldviews. This criticism of Ottoman politics and society is conditioned by their own preoccupations, see Lucette Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). However, in the case of Osman II, the *bailo* frequently exemplifies his accusations to the sultan of being “tight-fisted nature and ambitious nature” as will be seen in the following parts.

⁷⁴ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 149 (dated September 9, 1620), fol. 19r.

⁷⁵ ASVe, SAPC, Registro 17, no. 148 (dated August 29, 1620), fol. 15r: “Per opera del Vesir presente qual come anco vien detto è stato causa della depositione del Coza, per non voler compagnia nel commando, onde sempre piu l’auttorità sua si fa maggiore. è capitato aviso che di Polonia venghi a questa porta un ambasciator grande con ogni maggior autorità per mantener la pace poiche l’altro ché partito non è venuto qui per altro, che per portar la ratificatione d’un capito lo della pace già seguita. Questa nova ha dato gran contento al primo vesir, sperando con la venuta di detto

opposition of Ali Pasha to the war was his lack of experience on any ground of war. Osman II was fixated to lead the imperial army in person.⁷⁶ The Venetian *bailo* purports that Osman II actually thought of dismissing the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha on the grounds of his inexperience in military affairs and that the Grand Admiral Halil Pasha might be the best candidate for the grand vizierate. In order to support his presumption, the *bailo* claims that Osman II sent an order to Halil Pasha to return immediately to the capital. However, Ali Pasha continued sending large sums of money to the sultan, which helped Osman II ignore Ali Pasha's inexperience at the dawn of the Poland campaign.⁷⁷ According to Tezcan, Osman II also considered that the funding of an imperial campaign was more important than leading the army in person.⁷⁸ For this possible consideration, he might have decided to keep Ali Pasha in his office for a while.

While Ali Pasha was enjoying his unrivalled position in the government, a fiscal crisis erupted in the capital. As will be discussed in the next chapter, a famine broke out in Istanbul on the eve of the campaign against Poland, which coincided with the cash shortage in the imperial treasury. This crisis brought the end of Ali Pasha as he was further and further dragged into the troubles pertaining to the monthly payments of the Janissaries, the *sipahis* and rest of the soldiers in the Ottoman imperial army, preparing for the upcoming campaign against Poland. According to the Venetian *bailo*, the sultan's tight-fisted nature accustomed not to spend but to collect from his grand vizier. On Wednesday January 24, 1621, Ali Pasha reported the payment crisis to Osman II in the *Arz Odası* (the sultan's chamber of petition) in the Topkapı Palace, but the sultan did not reply him. The sultan did not even grant a robe to Ali Pasha to show his favor to the grand vizier as usual occasions. It was a clear sign of the sultan's displeasure with Ali Pasha for the payment crisis. According to the *bailo*, Ali Pasha feared for his own life because the sultan started to kill with the fratricide of Prince Mehmed on January 15, 1621, as will be further discussed below. For the

ambasciator fuggir l'occasione d'andar in persona alla guerra di Polonia da lui grandemente abborita."

⁷⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 5 (dated October 22, 1620), fols. 123r-124v.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 124v.

⁷⁸ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," p. 198.

fear of being killed, insomuch as Ali Pasha visited several shrines of saints in the capital for praying to procure a help to his soul against his death risky trouble⁷⁹

The following day, Ali Pasha once again submitted to Osman II. This time, the sultan informed Ali Pasha to subsidize the military payments with 120.000 gold coins that were to be derived soon from Aleppo.⁸⁰ A few days later, Osman II summoned Ali Pasha at the palace gardens and invested him a robe with some words of praise, which was a sign of his royal pleasure. Osman II also ordered 120.000 gold coins to be delivered from his personal treasury to the grand vizier so as to thwart a potential military uprising due to the remaining unpaid payrolls of the soldiers.⁸¹ However, according to the *bailo*, the payment crisis did not end with the sultan's subsidy. The treasury needed an extra 400.000 gold coins to pay the Janissaries, let alone the *sipahis* and ordinary soldiers. Due to Ali Pasha's absence in the last two meetings of the imperial council, a rumor was spread that Ali Pasha pretended to be sick so as to escape the wrath of the sultan. His dismissal was murmured in the imperial court. Many expected that Halil Pasha would be promoted to the grand vizierate.⁸² However, Osman II continued to favor Ali Pasha.⁸³

The reason why Osman II did not dismiss Ali Pasha might be related to the sultan's aggressive fiscal policy.⁸⁴ As the Venetian *bailo* Giustinian reports, the sultan was "tight-fisted by nature and used to not spend but to collect from the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha."⁸⁵ Osman II took his grand vizier's efforts in financial matters as a priority, because Ali Pasha could still provide the sultan large sums of cash while

⁷⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 17 (dated January 26, 1621, m.v.), 293r-294v.

⁸⁰ Ibid., fol. 294v. Moreover after the death risky trouble, the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha donated sacrificed cow and visiting holy shrines of the capital, see *ibid.*, fol.294v.

⁸¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 325r.

⁸² ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 24 (dated February 25, 1621, m.v.), fol. 361r.

⁸³ Moreover, according to this report when the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha was a sick, the sultan sent his personal doctors to him with a two bottle of sherbet and saying a lots of appraising words, see ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 325r.

⁸⁴ Tezcan claims that the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha pursued of the aggressive fiscal policy in the empire, but I contend that he was most ardent implementer of aggressive fiscal policy of Osman II, because the aggressive fiscal policy came from the tight-fisted nature of Osman II, who continued the policy after the death of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, even the aggressive fiscal policy crystallized during the war of Poland under Osman II, see Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, pp. 133-134.

⁸⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 17 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 293r: "*che gli fosse porta al Re avaro per natura, et avezzo dal medesimo vesir a non spender, ma a incassar.*"

Halil Pasha could not.⁸⁶ Accordingly, I would argue that Ali Pasha had a certain impact on the tight-fisted nature of Osman II who continued to pursue an aggressive fiscal policy. An account by the Venetian *bailo* is further revealing in this respect:

It should be noted that Osman II would continue such an aggressive fiscal policy after the death of Ali Pasha on March 9, 1621. The sultan was to appoint Hüseyin Pasha as his next grand vizier who would approach the financial problems like the deceased Ali Pasha used to do. Indeed, as the Venetian *bailo* observed, Hüseyin Pasha promised the sultan to donate him frequently.⁸⁷ On the other hand, the Venetian *bailo* claims that the sultan expected the rest of the members of his imperial government to donate him as much as they could. Accordingly, they ranged always in spending money for the sultan; otherwise, Osman II could doubt them whether they were stealing money from him.⁸⁸ While asserting his sovereign will in this way and on such an important problem, the sultan's aggressive fiscal policy hung like a sword of Damocles over not only the members of the imperial government, but also to the capital:

They do not find an asper [*akçe*] not because of the extraordinary scarcity of money, now runs here, but it is caused by the great avarice of the sultan. He collects all money, and does not to give anything out. There may have left much less to the sultan for the war.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 24 (dated February 25, 1621, m.v.), fols. 362r-363v.

⁸⁷ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 25 (dated March 9, 1621), fol. 39v: “*Cussain ha fatto ogni sforzo per ottenerlo, credendosi che habbi promeso al Re di seguir il medesimo stile d’Ali nel presentarlo, et che non potendo in altra maniera, et essendo povero sia per mangiar et espilar come l’altro quant’è di buono che egli partira presto la guerra.*” In fact, as if Ali pasha did not die, he would highly possible continue his office. Moreover, Osman II cried for him, he was grateful to his late Ali Pasha see, *Ibid.*, fol. 37r: “*Questa mattina Ali Primo Vesir è morto da retention di orina dalla quale da pochi giorni in qua com’avissasimo, si trovava aggravato et si puo dir con gusto d’ogni uno fuori che del Re, il qual ha pianto la sua morte, et nell’infermità ha mostrato verso di lui segni di benevolenza grande, non havendo mai tutto che le provisioni della guerra, et tutt’i negotij patissero molto, voluto far in suo loco, concessogli gratia di far testamente et molti altre favori, tutti segni che se la morte non lo levava dal carico era per continuarci gran tempo.*”

⁸⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 24 (dated February 25, 1621, m.v.), fol. 362v: “*essendo il Re gravido della detta mossa, et impetuoso, dubita il Bassa, che vedendo il mancamento si sfoghi contro di esso, onde ha proposto a Calil di cambiar il primo vesirato col capitaneato del mare, ma quello huomo vecchio, et savio non gli ha dato orecchie, et veramente il Vesir ha usato tanto male il Re, col presentarlo spessimo di grosse somme di danari, espilate da questo, et da quel che par non si trovi chi ambisca piu tal carico conoscendo non poter sodisfar a Sua Maesta col far il medesimo, ne meno esso lo puo piu far perché tutti temendo della sua ingordigia, vanno nel spender, et in tutto cose molto ristretti, dubitando d’esser da lui espilati, da che anco in gran parte nasce la strettezza del negozio et del danaro, la maggior che da gran tempo in sia più stata.*”

⁸⁹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 29 (dated April 6, 1621), fols. 7r-8v: “*non trovano un aspro, non essendosi per l’extraordinaria strettezza di danaro, che hora qui regna, causata dalla gran avarizia del Re, che l’incassa tutto, et non ne da fuori niente, delli detti effetti alcun spazzo, et molto meno vi sarà partita che sia la Maesta Sua per la guerra.*”

In the meantime, severe winter conditions plagued the capital, increasing the price of the foodstuffs in the market and creating further financial problems. For instance, the Venetian *bailo* notes that there had been an extraordinary scarcity of all goods and money at the market in the capital for a long time.⁹⁰ The sultan's aggressiveness in fiscal matters was not beginning to show its impact. Hence, Osman II tried to limit the governmental expenses while increasing the income in imperial treasury by pursuing the aggressive fiscal policy as discussed in detail previously.

Severe fiscal troubles were not seen for the first time under Osman II. Since the 1580s, the Ottoman economy had been experiencing serious monetary problems, thus the devaluation of the akçe, the main currency, became almost a norm.⁹¹ Between November 1617 and February 1618, the imperial treasury faced even heavier burdens due to the accession donations of Mustafa I and Osman II that paid to the Janissaries and the *sipahis* within three months.⁹² Shortly after the succession

⁹⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 24 (dated February 25, 1621, m.v.), fol. 362v: "da che anco in gran parte nasce la strettezza del negozio et del danaro, la maggior che da gran tempo in sia più stata."

⁹¹ In the years of the fluctuations of the currency, the imperial government faced the problem of the ratio of silver content in the defective and substandard coins because the imperial government had serious difficulties with the defective coins against the stable Venetian ducat and other European coins at the market exchange rates. Daily and monthly changeable exchange rates led the ratio of silver content into the extreme fluctuations of currency. In the year of 1623-1624, the silver content of the akçe was to be devalued almost one third, less than two decades later, 1638-1640, it was to be debased about half of its content. However, the frequent fluctuations of the currency brought the deterioration of the content silver of akçe to the exchange markets. For that reason, the imperial government applied the system of the *tashih-i sikke* (correction of coinage) by returning to the old standard or installing a new standard to the exchange market. The government was to resort to the *tashih-i sikke* in years of 1600, 1618, 1624 and 1640, see Pamuk, *Monetary History*, pp. 138-140. Also see Tezcan, "The Monetary Crisis of 1585," pp. 30-83.

⁹² According to Hammer, within 6 months 6 million gold were spent due to the frequent enthronements, see *Hammer*, VIII, p. 180. *Bezyâde*, III, p. 922. On the other hand, the debasements and fiscal troubles coincided with the *sivîş* or leap year of the treasury, which was related to the timing of the Ottoman fiscal system. In this system, the imperial government collected revenues from variety of taxes such as agricultural sources and tax-farms based on the solar calendar, however it used to pay the payrolls of the soldiers based on the Islamic lunar calendar as four times in a lunar year. But, the solar calendar was 11 longer than Islamic lunar calendar. So then, once every 34 years Islamic calendar leapt a year as called *sivîş* year in fiscal system. A year of the solar started in March. The imperial government took revenue twice in March and in August. It skipped one more year, for instance every following 7 or 8 years, the treasury had to pay once more time, in other words every 7 or 8 years imperial treasury had to pay five times due to the leap year. The first payment of I.C 1064 had to pay in the year of 1063 (1654) before the arrival of the revenue of 1064. The expenditures were to start in 1070 six months early, in 1079 nine months early, in 1087 almost a year early before the arrival of the their revenues. These meant that the following 7-8 years after the leap year of the imperial treasury, the imperial government had to two methods: the first method was to delay the payments for 3 months in the first payment, then 6 months for the second payment, after then for 9 months in the third payment, finally for 12 months in the fourth payment. See Halil Sahillioğlu, "Sivîş Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire," in M. A. Cook (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 230-249.

of Osman II, the imperial government resorted to debase the value of the silver content in coins on December 19, 1618. The new standard coins began to circulate in the markets. For a while, the imperial government suspended circulation of the old standard coins, however it was one of the reasons for the scarcity of money in the markets. Later on, the imperial government allowed the circulation of the old standard coins in the markets.⁹³ Yet, the aggressive fiscal policy of the sultan, the famine, severe climatic weather and expenditures of the Polish campaign maximized fiscal troubles, which were like fiscal time bombs for the imperial treasury.

1.4 Osman II Asserting His Sovereign Authority vis-à-vis Alternative Foci of Power

On Wednesday, January 10, 1621, Osman II suddenly returned to his palace from Davutpaşa, one of the royal hunting grounds and a military halting-station (*menzil*) in Rumeli. He was supposed to come back a week later.⁹⁴ On the following day, Prince Mehmed, the son of Kösem Mahpeyker Sultan, the favorite concubine of Ahmed I, was strangled in the imperial harem.⁹⁵ The Venetian *bailo* notes that this fratricide came quite unexpectedly:

Yesterday, the sultan ordered to strangle his brother Mehmed, whose age was little different from the sultan. He was buried in the new mosque [Sultan Ahmed Mosque] with accompanying viziers and also the Mufti [Esad Efendi]. Three other brothers have been left. The eldest did not arrive 8 years old. This occasion has been very unexpected. No one knows whether it came from the sole resolution of the sultan or advice of others, but as it is, it is an evident sign that the sultan must go to the war.⁹⁶

The sudden execution of Prince Mehmed represents a visible change in Osman II's assertive attitudes. According to Hasan Beyzâde, Osman II asked the Mufti Esad Efendi for an affirmative legal opinion to execute his brother. However, Esad Efendi

⁹³ *Naîmâ*, II, p. 448.

⁹⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no.14 (dated January 12, 1621, m.v.), fol. 261r.

⁹⁵ Tezcan, "Debut Kösem," p. 94. The Venetian *bailo* corrected the age of the princes, see ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 12, 1621, m.v.), fol. 271r: "...era di età poco differente da quella di Sua Maestà essendo restati 3 altri fratelli, il maggior de quali non arriva a 8 anni."

⁹⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 12, 1621, m.v.), fol. 271r: "*Il Re hieri fece strangolare Mehemet suo fratello, et fu sepolto nella Moschea nova accompagnato dalli Vesiri, et dal Mufti ancora, era di età poco differente da quella di Sua Maestà essendo restati 3 altri fratelli, il maggior de quali non arriva a 8 anni. Questo successo è stato molto improvviso, ne si sa per ancora se provenghi da sola risoluzione del Re, o per consiglio di altri, ma come si sia questo è segno evidente, che il Gran Signore debba andarsene alla guerra.*"

refused to issue legal opinion. The Chief Judge of Rumeli Kemaleddin Efendi instead affirmed the execution of the prince.⁹⁷

The *bailo* Giustinian claims that Kemaleddin Efendi gave 6.000 gold coins in order to be appointed as the chief judge of Rumeli. Yet the Venetian *bailo* was surprised because he expected Hüseyin Efendi to be appointed to the position. The *bailo* further asserts that it might be related that Hüseyin Efendi did not spend enough money like Kemaleddin Efendi.⁹⁸ However, his appointment was evidently linked to the execution of Prince Mehmed. Kemaleddin Efendi most probably promised to confirm the execution if he was appointed as the chief judge of Rumeli.

On the other hand, Tûgî asserts that the new Chief Eunuch of the Imperial Harem, Süleyman Agha, together with Hacı Ömer Efendi, provoked the sultan to kill his brother.⁹⁹ However, Hacı Ömer Efendi was in exile during the fratricide of Prince Mehmed on January 11, 1621. He was to return from his exile two weeks later, on the fratricide on January 24, 1621. The Venetian *bailo* asserts that Osman II executed his brother so as to show his resolute to lead personally the imperial army against Poland. Under the light of all claims, we can assert that Osman II did not want to take the risk of leaving a potential rival brother for the throne in the capital while he was on the campaign.¹⁰⁰ That is to say, Prince Mehmed could pose a threat to his sultanate at the earliest opportunity. He could be enthroned by a palace coup just like Osman II was brought to the throne. So, Osman II had a good reason to get rid of his brother in the eve of his planned campaign.

Indeed, during the Polish campaign, a serious military uprising broke out in the army camp due to the delayed salary payments on November 23, 1621. In this uprising, a rumor was spread among the soldiers that the people of capital enthroned Mustafa I once again. Osman II immediately ordered all payments to be made so as to thwart the uprising from turning into a direct challenge to his sultanate. Indeed, if

⁹⁷ *Hasan Beyzâde* p. 927; Tûgî, *Musibetnâme* , p. 116; and *Naimâ*, II, p. 460.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 273r: “è stato deposto il Cadileschier della Grecia et fatto in suo luogo Chiemal Efendi di con donar 6 mille cechini al Bassa contro l’espertatione di ogn’uno che stimava dovesse riuscire Cussein Efendi huomo da bene et molto affetionato alla Republica ma questo non havendo da spender, non è stato abbracciato dal Vesir.”

⁹⁹ Tûgî, *Musibetnâme* , p. 116.

¹⁰⁰ For details, see Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” pp. 199-203.

Prince Mehmed had been not killed, his name would have most probably spread with the rumor.

Osman II empowered new royal favorites such as Süleyman Agha, the chief eunuch of the imperial harem, and Bebr Mehmed Agha, the chief gardener, so as to have them act as his power-brokers among the Ottoman ruling elites. In doing so, Osman II in effect took precautions against the unrivalled power of Ali Pasha. Most particularly, on the eve of Hotin campaign, Osman II re-assigned his tutor Hacı Ömer Efendi to the imperial court once again so as to challenge the unwillingness of Ali Pasha against Polish campaign. Ali Pasha tried his best to dissuade the sultan from his idea of personally leading the military campaign. Even, as a last resort, the grand vizier negotiated with Polish envoy to cancel the campaign.¹⁰¹ However, Osman II showed an obstinate refusal to the negotiations. His grand vizier's unwillingness to the Polish campaign, Osman II called his tutor Hacı Ömer Efendi, a warlike power-broker, to the Topkapı Palace. The sultan gave him a robe in order to indicate his renewed royal favor to his tutor on Wednesday, January 24, 1621.¹⁰² According to The Venetian *bailo*, by asserting his royal tutor to the ruling body, the sultan aimed to persuade the imperial government for the war and keep it secure.¹⁰³ Yet, the Venetian *bailo* Giustinian notes that after returning to the grace of the sultan, Hacı Ömer Efendi would make an all-out effort to take revenge from Ali Pasha for he caused his dismissal back on August 14, 1620.¹⁰⁴ This was in fact a severe blow to Grand Vizier Ali Pasha. Hacı Ömer Efendi could now act against him as the tutor regained the confidence of the sultan. He could, for instance, undermine Ali Pasha's standing or get him dismissed by using his regular access to the sultan. Ali Pasha, on

¹⁰¹ ASVe, SAPC, Registro 17, no. 148 (dated August 29, 1620), fol. 15r.

¹⁰² ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 326v-r.

¹⁰³ Ibid., fol. 326v-r : “*sin hora tutto che il tempo sia molto inanzi non resta per anco pubblicità, ne inalborata la Coda come è solito per l'alienatione del Primo Vesir dalla detta guerra, ma essendo il Re tanto fisso in essa, et il Coza tornato il gratia persuadendola, si tiene per sicuro, che il vesir non potrà sturbarla.*”

¹⁰⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no.17 (dated October 26 January, 1621, m.v.), fols. 294v-295r: “*quanto il Re l'istesso giorno chiamo a se il Coza, lo accarezzo et vesti di una veste, mostrando di voler rimetterlo in gratia che per esser stato deposto a instigatione del Vesir, se vi ritornerà, vorrà vendicarsi, et procurerà quanto potrà la sua rovina et è stata buona fortuna, che questa remissione del Coza sia seguita doppo l'accomodamento del negozio de Bossinesi poiche se fosse stata prima non si saria certamente concluso coll'avantaggio et sodisfattione, che s'è fatto, essendo egli tutto per loro, io procurerò coi i soliti mezi guadagnarlo, et supplico Sua Serenità scrivermi la quantità, se ben sarà difficile, essendo per quanto intendo huomo avarissimo, incapacissimo nemico di christiani et mal impresso di sua serenità.*”

the other hand, cared little about the return of Hacı Ömer Efendi to the sultan's favor.¹⁰⁵ What occupied him at the time was the military campaign against Poland. He threw his weight behind the peace with Poland rather than launching a military campaign against them. He might have considered that the upcoming war could be his ruin rather than that of Hacı Ömer Efendi.

In the meantime, Hacı Ömer Efendi quickly attained his former powers and influence over the sultan. Osman II ordered all judges to congratulate and respect to his tutor Hacı Ömer Efendi, which was an indication of his return to Osman II's grace. Once again in royal favor, Hacı Ömer Efendi lost no time in brokering for his clients and family members. For instance, he wanted to appoint his son Abdullah Efendi to the judgeship of Galata. However, some high-ranking members of the *ulema* first went to Ali Pasha instead of Hacı Ömer Efendi, but Ali Pasha continued to concern less about the rising power of Hacı Ömer Efendi in the appointments of the *ulema*.¹⁰⁶ In the end, Abdullah Efendi was appointed as the judge of Galata.¹⁰⁷

On the other hand, Osman II initiated his own court faction to be led by Ömer Efendi, Süleyman Ağa ve Bebr Mehmed Ağa, whose powers were immediately recognized by the Venetian *bailo*. Shortly before Osman II inserted Hacı Ömer Efendi into the imperial government as a power-broker, the *bailo* Giustinian reported to his senate that he had gained the friendships of the Mufti Esad Efendi and the Grand Admiral Halil Pasha, but he also needed to gain the favors of those inside palace for the interests of Venice. These people were none other than Bebr Mehmed Ağa and Süleyman Ağa. The *bailo* notes that Bebr Mehmed Ağa and Süleyman Ağa were the ears of the sultan, to whom the sultan had an inclination and affection. For this reason, the *bailo* suggested his senate that these two figures should be used to serve for the interest of the Venice so as to make a good impression on Osman II. Accordingly, it was possible to stop the "greediness" of Ali Pasha, who always demanded money from Venice. However, the *bailo* Giustinian admitted that the new

¹⁰⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 325r: "è vero che l'haver il Re ritornato il Coza nella sua gratia è stato con gran colpo al Vesir, et uno cattivo segno poichè farà quanto potrà per vendicarsi, et farlo depor come gli ha a lui fatto, tanto piu che a Maesta Sua mostra molta buona volonta verso esso Coza, havendo voluto che tutti i Cadi vadino a rallegrarsi seco, et honorarlo come prima, et fatto suo figliolo Cadi di Galata, vanno pero il visir, et lui dissimulando l'occhio quanto (?)."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., fol. 325r:

¹⁰⁷ Tûgî, *Musîbetnâme*, pp. 66-67.

favorites of the sultan had not fully established their grandeur and power. Their friendships might be acquired with generosity of Venice to both of them just before establishment of their sovereignty in imperial affairs. According to the *bailo*, if they established their power without knowing the generosity of Venice, it would be more expensive to gain their support for the interest of the Venice.¹⁰⁸ All of these accounts by the *bailo* testify to the formation of a new court faction under Osman II.

On the other side, Esad Efendi likewise recommended the *bailo* that he should to quickly gain the support of Bebr Mehmed Agha and Süleyman Agha as well as other servants of the sultan inside the palace, as they were similarly important advisors for the sultan. Since they were close to the sultan, the Mutfi noted, they could move away any adverse impression of the Venice in the minds of the sultan, while at the same time undoing any other officers in their opposition against the interests of Venice.¹⁰⁹

However, before the Polish campaign began, Ali Pasha died on Friday, March 9, 1621.¹¹⁰ After the unexpected death of Ali Pasha, it became relatively easier for certain alternative foci of powers to increase their influence over the sultan, most notably, the sultan's new royal favorites. Indeed, as the Venetian *bailo* observes, Osman II showed an extraordinary affection and trust to Bebr Mehmed Agha above all others. Only with Bebr Mehmed Agha, Osman II made incognito visits in the capital night and day. Meanwhile, Süleyman Agha emerged and began to function as another chief power-broker in court politics.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 9 (dated Novembre 22, 1620), fol. 206v.

¹⁰⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 11 (dated December 26, 1620), fol. 228v: "*il qual mufti mi ha di piu consigliato che stante la mala impressione del Re, che ho sopradetto facci ogni opera per guadagnar l'animo di doi, o di quei di dentro, che hanno l'orecchia et grazia di Sua Mesta come il Chislar Agasi, il Bustangi Bassi et qualche altro Agalar, acciò possino andargli levando la predetta mala impressione, opporsi alli mali uffitij d'altri, et favorir li numeri interessi*" However, the new chief eunuch Süleyman Agha was to make a contact with the *bailo* in those days see ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 17 (dated December 26, 1620), fols. 293v-299r.

¹¹⁰ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 25 (dated March 9, 1621), fol. 37r.

¹¹¹ Before the death of Ali Pasha, the Venetian *bailo* could deal with him the problems of the business in Aleppo without having consent and will of the new Chief Eunuch of the Palace, Süleyman Agha. Procuring the assent of the deceased Ali Pasha had been sufficient to deal with the business problem in Aleppo. The Venetian *bailo* destined a gift to the purse of sultan, so there would no need of doing anything else. As it was seen at the edicts obtained by his predecessors, they did little frame of the terms, the business was reduced in the terms, which was seen, procuring all necessary things to gain Süleyman Agha and his consent. The *bailo* sent a robe as gift to him, but he did not want to accept it,

Conclusion

The existing academic literature overwhelmingly focuses on the Polish campaign and its aftermath. It overlooks the changing dynamics and shifting power relations in the daily politics at the imperial court under Osman II before the Polish campaign. The Venetian *bailo* provides detailed information on the court politics under Osman II that enables us to highlight the predominantly overlooked period in the reign of Osman II. By utilizing hitherto unexamined archival sources of the Venetian *bailo*'s dispatches, I have tried to demonstrate how Osman II and his favorites assert their power in the daily politics at the imperial court. I hope that, at least partially I have illustrated the changing dynamics and shifting power at the imperial court under Osman II, covering the period of the succession of Osman II on February 26, 1618 to the death of Ali Pasha on March 9, 1621.

At the outset of his sultanate, Osman II had to rule in an imperial court divided by intense factionalism. Yet he soon managed to consolidate his power and authority vis-à-vis alternative foci of power among his ruling elite. At the beginning of his sultanate, his chief eunuch of the harem, Mustafa Agha, and his tutor, Hacı Ömer Efendi, played crucial roles in advancing the sultan's personal rule, while they inserted their own clients into important power positions at the court. However, such overwhelming influence of Mustafa Agha and Hacı Ömer Efendi in turn led to more factionalism at the center of the Ottoman political establishment. Perhaps more importantly, they attempted to curb the power of new grand vizier of the sultan, Ali Pasha, who was the most ardent supporter of Osman II's assertive policies. Indeed, as I tried to demonstrate, Ali Pasha discovered this nature of the sultan and then he further tried to make Osman II to adopt an aggressive fiscal policy by delivering Osman II half of the income that he received from bribes and confiscation so that he could maintain his powerful and unrivalled position at the imperial court. Ali Pasha thus tried to eliminate his rivals and/or any powerful figures at the imperial court, including Mustafa Agha, Hacı Ömer Efendi and Damad Mehmed. Eventually, Ali

rather he preferred money in order to give his consent for it, see ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 29 (dated April 6, 1621), fol. 6r.

Pasha's success in getting rid of such powerful favorites and court grandees made Osman II act more dominantly in the daily politics of the empire.

However, the sultan's eagerness to lead the imperial army against Poland challenged the grand vizier's intentions and political agenda. Due to his inexperience in actual military confrontations, Ali Pasha was very reluctant to undertake a campaign against Poland. He presented to the sultan every possible reason to avoid such a campaign.

In response to Ali Pasha's unwillingness to go to war, Osman II inserted his tutor Ömer Efendi in court politics, for he favored the idea of war. Ömer Efendi's such rise as one of the favorites of the sultan challenged the standing of Ali Pasha and helped to sultan to diminish his influence over the business of rule. However, Osman II did not dismiss Ali Pasha from office, because he prioritized Ali Pasha's fiscal efforts in procuring money for the Polish campaign, thus did not care much about his military inexperience. Nonetheless, during this period, the sultan and his government faced with some serious fiscal problems. For a long time, the scarcity of all goods and money had been prevailed in the capital. According to the dispatches written by the Venetian *bailo* Giustinian, these problems were a result of the tight-fisted nature of the sultan who was not accustomed to spend money, but rather used to collect it. On the other hand, the total expenditures of the Polish campaign were to deepen financial troubles of the empire in the midst of the scarcity of money and famine hitting the capital, problems which the next chapter will examine in details.

CHAPTER 2

THE ALIENATION OF THE IMPERIAL ARMY AND COMMON PEOPLE AGAINST OSMAN II

This chapter focuses on the daily politics under Osman II, covering the period from the Venetian *bailo*'s report on the outbreak of the extreme winter conditions on February 9, 1621, to the sultan's return to his palace from the Polish campaign on January 9, 1622. I claim that the provision and payment crisis of the imperial army must be seen as visible failures of Osman II in his management of the fiscal affairs. This fiscal mismanagement in turn alienated the people and imperial soldiers against Osman II's sovereign authority and his imperial government.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part looks into the provision crisis in terms of the public and military opposition against Osman II in the capital. The second part examines the Polish campaign that created a serious alienation among the imperial soldiers against Osman II in person due to his aggressive fiscal policy that directly affected the Janissaries and the imperial *sipahis*.

2.1 A Serious Provision Crisis

In 1621, Osman II and his imperial government faced a provision crisis due to harsh winter conditions in Istanbul and its periphery, including several weeks of snowfall and extremely icy winds. During this time the Bosphorus was frozen solid, enabling one to walk over the ice.¹¹² According to the Venetian *bailo*, the extreme winter conditions made the people to be stuck their home and close their workshops. Many dead wanderers were found at the sea and land due to the hard winter conditions. In those days, the palace servants found an abandoned vessel on the Black Sea, which its entire sailors froze to death except its helmsman.¹¹³ Under these

¹¹² For details see *Peçevi*, II, pp. 384-385; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 928-929; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 651; and *Naîmâ*, II, p. 459.

¹¹³ ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fol. 330v: “*Da alcuni giorni in qua regnano fredî con neve, et giacci tanto eccessivi, che tengono le persone sequestrate in Casa, chiuse le botteghe, et sospeso ogni negotio, essendosi agghiacciato questa Canale, che non v'è memoria, che sia piu seguito, et per quanto si dice trovati molti viandanti in mar, et in Terra morti dal freddo, si spera pero che habbi a servir per estinguer il mal contagioso, che andava crescendo. Siamo per senza*”

extreme weather conditions, the daily life and economic activities in the capital came to a halt, cutting Istanbul's vital links with its periphery off. Even shipmen were frozen in their vessels. As contemporary accounts testify, the Iskender Strait in the north, close to the Black Sea, was also closed due to extreme winter conditions. No ship could enter Istanbul from the Black Sea.¹¹⁴ However, this was just the beginning of a larger crisis: the cold and ice soon triggered a severe provision crisis for the Ottoman imperial center.

One of the Ottoman imperial government's priorities was to ensure the supply of necessary foodstuff and goods for the capital as part of its "provisionist mentality."¹¹⁵ According to this understanding, the goods must be ample, in high quality and cheap. When local demands were met, then all the remaining goods were transferred into other regions so as to meet the needs of the local armies and the imperial palace. Afterwards, a part of the surplus food was dispatched to the capital for the needs of guilds and residents.¹¹⁶ The imperial government orchestrated this provision system of basic foodstuff by setting a fixed price and quantity on sale items, while providing security during transportation and distribution of goods and products into the diverse parts of the empire. Supplying grain needs of the empire was the most essential priorities of the Ottoman provision system.¹¹⁷ The deltas of the Nile, the Danube and the Black Sea region were the primary sources for the imperial government particularly in grain provision. Local governments could send

lettere di Vostra Serenita, et le piu fresche sono de 22 Gennaio passato, et dubitiamo assai, che gl'huomeni, che portano le nostre per lei non perischino per il detto fredo, o almeno ritardino a gionger a Cattaro assai piu dell'ordinario....et li Agiamoglani del Seraggio del Gran Signore soliti sopratuta, un vascello di mar negro, che andava in abbandono, trovorno tutti li marinari morti di fredo, eccetto il timoniero, che stava per sperare, essendo nevicato, per 12 giorni contunui con furia grandissima de venti." The bailo reports about the threat of plague in ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 15 (dated January 12, 1621, m.v.), fol. 274r: "La peste d'alcuni gironi in qua si fa non poco sentire, et in questo numero vicinato si sono infettate alcune Case, ne si puo far altro che pregar il Vostra Dio, che, ne ci liberi da questo flagello. Di questo male il Re ne ha qualche timore, onde disegna per questo rispetto di fermarsi per qualche giono ancora a Davut Bassa ma il fredo, et la Neve, ch'e sopraionta le ha fatto mutar proposito."

¹¹⁴ Hasan Beyzâde, III, p. 928 and Peçevi, II, pp. 383-385.

¹¹⁵ For further details on the early modern Ottoman economic mentality, see Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2000), p. 69. On the provisioning of the Ottoman Istanbul, see Rhoads Murphey, "Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East," *Food and Foodways* 2 (1988), pp. 217-261.

¹¹⁶ Genç, *Devlet ve Ekonomi*, p. 47.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-52. See also Sam White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 23.

their surpluses in agricultural production as taxes and tributes to wherever the imperial government ordered. With these local food resources, the imperial government was able to supply the *ad hoc* needs of the army and/or the capital. For instance, Egypt annually sent foodstuffs to the imperial capital and Hejaz, where Islamic holy cities such as Mecca and Medina are located. Particularly, the imperial government used to receive thousands of tons of grain each year from this fertile region. However, when the Nile overflowed, it caused a big deficit in the grain supply for the provision of the Hejaz and the capital.¹¹⁸ Moreover, in the years of 1619 and 1621-1622, Egypt was plagued with famines and epidemics.¹¹⁹ This problem in Egypt particularly deepened the breakdown of the imperial provision system for Istanbul under Osman II.

However, at the dawn of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire was not the only state to face such severe climatic troubles. The same was true for England, France, Central Europe, Russia, India and China. Extreme cold and droughts hampered agricultural activities in these regions as well. In the ensuing extreme climatic conditions, the famine and some epidemic diseases followed in quick succession. Russia, for instance, faced the “Time of Troubles” at a time when extreme cold triggered a severe famine in the country. The number of domestic migrations greatly increased due to insufficient harvest. In the meantime, European peoples began to suffer under the bloody battles of the Thirty Years’ War. For example, a considerable proportion of the German population died due to violence, famine and severe weather conditions that plagued the region simultaneously.¹²⁰

It should be noted that in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, harsh climate played a critical role in the deepening of the Ottoman political and military crisis of this period. The abnormal drought and cold brought the Ottoman provision system to a breaking point, forcing the imperial government to struggle with extreme famines, epidemics, peasant flights and heavy death tolls. In the face of 1590s, the provisioning system of the imperial government was confronted with the problem of the rapid increase in the population of the cities and number of soldiers in the imperial army, whose demands for provisions during the prolonged military

¹¹⁸ White, *The Climate of Rebellion*, pp. 33-34. See also Murphey, “Provisioning İstanbul,” p. 221.

¹¹⁹ White, *The Climate of Rebellion*, p. 193.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-8.

campaigns both in the Eastern and Western fronts were not sufficiently met. Yet, in order to meet such high levels of demand in provisions, the Ottoman imperial government frequently ordered the provincial governors to transfer their local resources to those regions troubled by food shortages as well as imposed extraordinary burdens over the taxpayer subjects, such as the *avariz*.¹²¹

Similar to the abovementioned period of the 1590s and 1600s, the imperial capital suffered from a drastic shortage of provisions in the face of severe winter weather once more in 1621, which coincided with the preparations for the Polish campaign. The academic literature on the regicide of Osman II overlooks this particular provision crisis and the overlapping severe winter conditions. Scholars rather focus on the undisciplined behaviors of the imperial soldiers and Osman II's criticisms against them about the failure in the siege of the fortress of Hotin, the main target of his Polish campaign, while pointing out to Osman II's secret plans to recruit a new army to replace the existing imperial one. However, in order to properly understand the origins of the alienation between Osman II and his imperial soldiers and the people of the capital, one must investigate the aforementioned provision crisis and the sultan's aggressive fiscal policy together in the first place.

For instance, Osman II received the most direct protest regarding the incessant provision crisis on his route to a mosque in March 1621 in İstanbul. The Venetian *bailo* provides a rare glimpse into this provision crisis:

The sultan went to the mosque on Friday. Some poor men showed the sultan his bread and its price. This was very displeasing to the sultan. He showed he regretted what happened with gestures and words to his Grand Vizier [Hüseyin Pasha]. The sultan committed the Grand Vizier to compensate in any way, he rides every day to the city, and does as much as he can, but until now Grand Vizier did it without getting result.¹²²

Protesting Osman II with bread revealed the true magnitude of the provision crisis that had been now prevailing in the capital for close to two months. The provisions reserved for the capital had been transferred to the Polish frontier so as to

¹²¹ For further details see White, *The Climate of Rebellion*, pp. 123-227.

¹²² ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 27 (dated March 22, 1621), fol. 51r-v: “*et terzo giorno andando il Gran Signore alla Moschea da alcuni poveri huome gli fu mostrato il pane, che mangiavano, et il suo costo, cosi che dispiacque molto a Sua Maesta, la quale se ne dolse con gesti con parole col primo vesir gl'era vicino, commettendogli che rimediassse ad ogni modo, egli cavalca ogni giorno a tal effetto per la citta, et fa gianto puo, ma sin hora senza frutto.*”

meet the needs of the imperial army in the upcoming campaign. Hence, the amount of grain was drastically reduced in the capital, while the quality of the bread rapidly decreased and its price dramatically increased.¹²³

Grand Vizier Hüseyin Pasha, in the face of such provision crisis, looked for every possible solution, but the Ottoman provision system was already crippled under the extreme weather conditions as mentioned above. As the preparations for the Polish campaign were underway, according to the bailo, Hüseyin Pasha urgently sent some galleys into the Black Sea to seek for and, if found, to bring all the grain or grain-loaded ships to the capital, however the bailo considered that it was absolutely not possible to meet the grain needs of more than three hundred thousand people who were living in the capital at the time.¹²⁴ On the other hand, because Eastern Mediterranean was under a serious threat by the presence of a Spanish navy, provisions sent from Egypt to Istanbul were transferred slowly. Therefore, the Ottoman government divided its imperial armada that year and did not call local galleys from ports such Alexandria, Cyprus, and Rhodes so as to protect their local regions from the attacks of the Spanish warships.¹²⁵

Meanwhile, the Cossacks posed a similar problem in the Black Sea. They invaded and plundered the Ottoman coastal cities in the Black Sea with the support

¹²³ Ibid., fols. 50r-51v: “*La prima operazione di questo primo Vesir è stata di porger qualche rimedio all’esorbitantissima carestia, anzi mancamento di pane, che qui hora si prova, essendosi stati alcuni giorni senza trovarsene con gran mormoratione del Popolo et pericolo solevatione, perché essendo tutti li grani, che erano soliti venir qui per il bisogno della citta ordinati di passar a confini di Polonia per bisogno dell’esercito, s’è ridotta in tal mancamento, et carestia, che hora mangiamo il pane a ragion di 14, al staro venetiano, et cativissimo, et cosi la biada da cavallo, et tutte l’altr’a proportione, et medesimamente ogn’altra cosa, che si regola conformi il valor d’essere grano, onde se il vostro dio non provvede non so come potremo, et io doppo che regna la detta carestia convegno dar ogni giorno buona quantita di pane a Turchi, che me lo vengono a ricercare, ne si puo negarglielo, et medesimamente, la tavola ad assai piu numero di loro di quello, che venivano prima, il che apporta una gran spesa.*”

¹²⁴ Ibid., fol.51v: “*hanno spedito alcune Galere in questi contorni per far venir qua li Vascelli, che trovasse grani et si stanno con somma ansietà aspettando, se sperò se ne troverà, ne è possibile immaginarsi tra sua ragione simile alla loro di tener una citta ripiene d’infinito Popolo senza alcuna minima provisione, rimettendo la vita di tanto gente alla descrizione de l’vento, et del caso.*” On the other hand, the transportation of the goods was another barrier for the provision system in the early modern empires. They had to overcome the geographical, political and climatic obstacles in secure transportation. In the Ottoman Empire, the greater part of transportation of the grain was occurred at sea. Whether state-owned shipments or private shipments cost a fortune for the supplier, the expense of the transportation comprised of 15 percent to 25 percent of total value of the shipments. For details see White, *The Climate of Rebellion*, pp. 33-34. Moreover, Rhoads Murphey refers to Evliya Çelebi’s account of the total amount of bread needed for the capital, that is, 54,000 tons annually and 160 tons daily. For the population of İstanbul, see Murphey, “Provisioning İstanbul,” pp. 229-231.

¹²⁵ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no.30 (dated April 6, 1621), fols. 10r-11r.

of the Polish government which was now in war against the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁶ In short, the Ottoman provision system for Istanbul also failed under the maritime conflicts in the early 1620s. Overall, throughout this provision crisis, Osman II witnessed an ever growing discontent against himself and his imperial government while they were equally blamed for mismanaging the political, economic, financial and military affairs.¹²⁷

2.2 The First Plot against the Sultan

The Polish campaign brought quite a heavy burden on the imperial treasury as it had to pay the salaries of tens of thousands of soldiers and the entire provisions for such a large imperial army. According to the Venetian *bailo* Giorgio Giustinian, the size of the army exceeded 600.000, of which 200.000 were the soldiers from the Crimean Khanate, a vassal state of the Ottoman sultan.¹²⁸ But, the English Ambassador Thomas Roe doubts on this reported size of the Ottoman army. He instead estimates it at 300.000.¹²⁹ The Ottoman contemporary sources, on the other hand, are mostly silent about the strength of the Ottoman army in the Polish campaign. For instance, one of the contemporary authors, Halisi, claims that the Crimean soldiers numbered about 150.000, but according to Naîmâ, they were merely 50.000 thousand soldiers.¹³⁰ Although the authors obviously exaggerated the size of the Ottoman army, they (or their accounts) still indicate quite a large army mobilized for the Polish campaign.

¹²⁶ For details, see *Naîmâ*, II, p. 459, *Peçevi*, II, pp. 378-380 and Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 188-189.

¹²⁷ The Ottoman grand viziers of this period were afraid of any protests while accompanying the sultan in his Friday prayers as much as they were afraid of being punished by the sultan while submitting him petitions about the imperial affairs. See, for instance, Giustinian, *Relazione*, p. 545.

¹²⁸ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/V, no. 40 (dated June 2, 1621), fol. 7v: "*che gli prestano fede in vanno con di mostramento li molto disgusto et discontento cio non ostante continuano perli efficaci ordini del Re a passar di qua verso il Campo quelle d'Asia et d'altre parti in gran numero si che l'essercito tara numerossimo di 400 et piu mille person oltre i Tartari che passeranno 200 mille.*"

¹²⁹ Thomas Roe, *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte* (London: Society for the Encouragement of Learning, 1740), pp. 11-13: "*The Grand Signore hauing gathered his army of foot and horse about 300,000 men, though reported 600,000 and arriued at the confines of Poland, attempted firft the fortrels of Hottini, a caftle belonging to the prouince of Moldouia.*"

¹³⁰ Yaşar Yücel, ed., *II. Osman Adına Yazılmış Zafer-nâme* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1983. VI), p. 80 [hereafter *Halisi*]; and *Naîmâ*, II, p. 464.

In fact, the Polish campaign was a step towards extreme fiscal troubles for the imperial treasury. The imperial government had difficulties in meeting the tremendous needs of provision for the imperial army in the midst of a serious famine and lack of finance in the capital. Despite these problems, Osman II ordered his imperial army to march towards Edirne without any further delay so as to reach the Polish frontier on time. He knew that the campaign march could have coincided with the winter season of the region that would have made it very difficult to wage war against Poland. However, his order impetuosity irritated the soldiers, who demanded a few more days to complete their provision. The Janissaries publicly opposed the sultan's order regarding the departure from the capital without any postponement as they considered that without proper provisions, they could surely suffer in the midst of severe weather conditions in early 1621.¹³¹ On the other hand, the imperial soldiers did not receive their salaries in full. This payment crisis soon turned into a riot against the departure of Osman II from the capital. According to Venetian *bailo*, the bombardiers also rioted against the departure of the sultan from the capital due to the lack of the payments. They refused to accompany the sultan without being paid.¹³² While the ringleaders of this soldiery riot were punished, Hüseyin Pasha issued orders for the completion of the preparations for the Polish campaign as planned.¹³³ Yet, the government viziers insisted that Osman II should not to lead the imperial army in person, but rather appoint Hüseyin Pasha as commander-in-chief.

¹³¹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 34 (dated May 4, 1621), fol. 31r: “*gionti padiglioni piantati com’ho detto presso Daut, fece intimar, et publicar per il giorno seguente la mossa verso Adrinopoli con maraviglio, et disgusto di tutti, che mancando di molte provisioni per cosi improvvisa uscita, convenivano senza esse patir molto, et si sentirono pubbliche voci de Giannizzari di non voler, ne poter per il detto giorno in alcuna maniera seguirlo, per la quali il loro Aga temendo di qualche solevatione li persuase di far Arz a Sua Maesta, che forse con un poco di dilatione li haveria compiaciuti, il che havendo essi essequito, fu lei costretto contra sua volontà ardentissima nella detta mossa a prolungarla per 10 o 12 giorni ancora, con severissima intimatione d’esser all’hora in pronto senza alcuna scusa.*” For the provision problem of the soldiers, also *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, p. 929. Moreover, some Janissaries defected by claiming that they were exempt from the duty to go to war. Kadir Kazalak and Tufan Gündüz, “II. Osman’ın Hotin Seferi (1621),” *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi (OTAM)* 14 (2013), p. 133.

¹³² ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 34 (dated May 4, 1621), fols. 31r-31v: “*Anco all’uscita dalla Maesta Sua dalla Citta li bombardieri per mancamento di detti paghe tumultuorno, ricusando d’accompagnarla sopradetta non erano sodisfatti, il che fatto fa hora la Maesta Sua punir secrettamente molti di loro autori di tal solevatine.*”

¹³³ *Ibid.*, fol. 31r: “*tra tanto si trattiene il Re, Primo Vesir et altri grandi che devono seguirlo, a quali non ha voluto conceder di tornarsene nelle Citta, sotto li padiglioni, passando alle a Daut, dove il Vesir va espedendo molti negotij, et ordini per la guerra senza intermissione alcuna.*”

However, Osman II ignored this advice by his ministers.¹³⁴ The sultan was fixated with the idea of leading his army personally and he even refused to consider the peace offer by the Polish envoy. Yet, the imperial soldiers continued their insolence in the capital.¹³⁵ This obvious tension between the army and the imperial government made all concerned parties uncomfortable. However, the sultan ignored the fact that the tensions escalated to an alarming state. As a last resort, the government viziers tried to stop the sultan to undertake a military campaign under cover of the possible outbreak of rebellion and disorders during his absence in the capital.¹³⁶

The imperial government of Osman II not only struggled with financial problems, such as salary payments, but also had to deal with the extreme weather conditions that often impeded the ongoing preparations for the Polish campaign. In many instances, they had to abort their logistical-strategical planing due to the shortage of oxens and camels. The cold weather killed thousands of such war-animals and put the logistics of the imperial army at peril. The imperial government in turn tried to re-supply these animals, but this problem soon put the grand vizierate of Hüseyin Pasha under the threat of dismissal. Yet, the sultan's tutor, Ömer Efendi defended Hüseyin Pasha against the provisional casualties, so that the grand vizier managed to escape from the fury of Osman II.¹³⁷ As discussed before, Hacı Ömer

¹³⁴ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/V, no. 40 (dated June 2, 1621), fols. 6r-7v: "*Gionse il Re in Andrinopoli a 20 del passato dove non havendo trovato giunte ancora le militie d'Asia et d'altre parti, che hanno ordine di ridurcisi et carestia grande de viveri, s'è molto alterato col primo Vesir, et è stato necessitato a fermarsi qualche giorno, doveva pero partir domani o sabbato alla più lunga, non havendo potuto i Vesiri con tutti li efficaci officij farlo fermar in quella Citta, et lasciar andar il primo vesir coll'essercito alla guerra.*"

¹³⁵ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 34 (dated May 4, 1621), fol. 33r: "*Tra tanto non lasciano di sparger voce che Polachi col mezo del Bogdano ricerchino con gran offerte la pace, ma che essendole cose passate tant'oltre et fatte tante spese, il Re non voglia concedergliela.*"

¹³⁶ For detail, see ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 27 (dated March 22, 1621), fols. 52r-53v: "*Il Re solecita grandemente la spedizione della sua mossa per la guerra, et voleva andarsene in Adrinopoli senza maggior dilatione, et lasciar qui il Vesir a fenir provisioni che mancano, ma i vesiri con allegarli esser necessario rimetter gran numero de proprii camelli di sua maestà morti per i freddi, l'hanno fermata, et hora per quant'intendiamo, vogliono tentar di novo se potessero fermarla del tutto sotto pretesto, che per cosi gran carestia potria il Popolo nella sua assenza tumultuar, et seguir qualch'importante disordine, et che bastava per castigar Polachi et farli venir all'accordo la missione coll'essercito del primo Vesir solo senza che la maesta sua si movesse in persona a una guerra, et contra paese, nel quale non essendovi fortezze disort'alcuna non puo sperar gloria di qual che celebre espugnatione, et coso tali, che come si crede piu tosto irriteranno, che persuaderanno Sua Maestà, et seguitano tutta via le militie, et provisioni ad incasisarsi a quei confini alla volta di Belgrado, continuando pur sotto questo vesir la rissoluzione fatta sotto l'altro di aqiyutar et assister a Betelen Gabor.*" See also *Halisi*, pp. 70-71 and *Naimâ*, II, p. 461.

¹³⁷ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 38 (dated May 19, 1621), fols. 50r-51r: "*Nel campo che è con Sua Maestà e ben di poca gente caminando il sforzo per altra strada c'è carestia grandissima, sopra*

Efendi had a warlike stance that made him confront with Ali Pasha at the very beginning of the Polish Campaign. Even his warlike's tendency caused his dismissal from his imperial court in August 1620. The sultan asserted him in February 1621 once again in the ruling body in order to declare war against Poland in spite of his grand vizier. However, upon the unexpected death of Ali Pasha, Hacı Ömer improved his relation with Hüseyin Pasha who at least did not oppose the war like Ali Pasha. On the other hand, it is highly possible that Hüseyin Pasha did not object to the alternative role of Hacı Ömer Efendi as well as Ali Pasha. Unlike Ali Pasha, Hüseyin Pasha probably cared about the opinion of Hacı Ömer Efendi, in particular, in the court politics and imperial affairs.

However, Hüseyin Pasha's position was still in jeopardy.¹³⁸ Other government viziers seemed to be aware of the mounting troubles and they insisted that Osman II should appoint his grand vizier to the command of the army. They tried to convince the sultan by pointing out to a potential riot and disorder during his absence in the capital, because not only the viziers, but also the people of the capital feared about such an imminent riot. Indeed, the imperial soldiers would rise in a general revolt within the following days.¹³⁹

Moreover, the viziers considered that the conquest of Hotin was almost impossible, for it was one of most formidable strongholds in Poland. Until the last moment, they strived to persuade the sultan to let Hüseyin Pasha command the imperial army to Poland so as to assist his vassal the King of Hungary, Bethlen Gabor. However, Osman II's leading of the imperial army would provide an opportunity to increase his sovereign authority just like Mehmed II (r. 1451-81) did in the past by

tutto di Camelli, et cavalli per servizio dell'artiglieria, et delle bagaglie, che convengono perciò molte volte restar a dietro, da che sdegnato il Gran Signore col primo vesir è stato in gran pericolo d'esser desmesso, ma il Coza l'ha difeso gettando la colpa sul morto, a cui trovava far tal provisione et parendo esso, Vesir confuso, et sopra fatto del peso, et poco corrisponde all'espessione, che s'havea del suo valore, si tiene non durerà molto in questo carico, nel qual si ragiona assai, che sarà surrogato il Bustangi Bassi gratissimo a Sua Maesta che l'ha dichiarato Vesir, et compartitagli l'auttorità del governo col Caimecan, si che senza lui non può questo far cosa alcuna. Io lo visiterò, et presenterò com'è ordinario, et com'ho fatto esso Caimecan, dolendomi, assai che per tanti accidenti, et così spesse elettioni, et mutationi si convien moltiplicar in presenti et in molte spese, per risparmio delle quali ne con rissoluto di non presentar il Re, com' altre volte nelle loro gita, et ritorno dalla guerra è stato fatto, ma aspettar il suo ritorno per farlo con maggior frutto, et spesa minore, et medessimante il Coza, considerando, che per esser quasi decrepito potrà per li patimenti delviaggio lasciarvi la vita, et saria spesa gettata."

¹³⁸ Ibid., 50r-51r:

¹³⁹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/III, no. 27 (dated March 22, 1621), fols. 52r-53v.

his conquest of Constantinople in 1453. After this great success, Mehmed II consolidated his rule vis-à-vis all the aristocratic rivals in the empire.¹⁴⁰

On the other hand, the Venetian *bailo* claims that Osman II sought to imitate his great grandfather Süleyman I by wearing his armor and commanding the imperial army in person. Regarding Osman's imitation of Sultan Suleyman I (r.1520-66), his very powerful favorite, the Chief Eunuch Süleyman Agha played a greater role than Hüseyin Pasha. Although the Venetian *bailo* did not explain how Süleyman played this role, we can assume as Değirmenci points out in the case of el-Hac Mustafa Agha, Süleyman Agha could have used the illustrated manuscripts and a kind of tools that would have an impact on the imitation.¹⁴¹ Hence, as the Venetian *bailo* also observes, Süleyman Agha could easily influence the sultan as he was one of chief advisors whose opinions Osman II favored.¹⁴² Like Süleyman Agha, the royal tutor Ömer Efendi was also in favor of Osman II. Ömer Efendi regained his powers after the death of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha in March 1621, as noted before. The royal tutor was an ardent supporter of a campaign against Poland. Thus, Osman II empowered him with the privilege to attend the general council convened to discuss the campaign plans on February 4 1620, house of the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha. Even though this council resulted with a strong recommendation of considering peace talks with Poland as already suggested by the deceased Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, Osman II cared little for the recommendation and instead showed, once again, his resolution by insisting to go to war.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Baki Tezcan, "Khotin 1621 or How the Poles Changed the Course of Ottoman History," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 62 (2009), p. 189.

¹⁴¹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 54 (dated August 31, 1621), fol. 26r: "*il Gran Signore vuol saper et sopra intender a tutto et veste una voglia che Sultan Soliman era solito usar in guerra, delle cui attioni si professa gran imitatore, poco si serve del Primo Vesir, et molto del Chislar, il qual s'avanza sempre piu di gratia et autorità.*"; Değirmenci, *İktidar Oyunları*, pp. 59-83. Osman II was to make a peace agreement with Poles under the same conditions of the peace agreement that was approved by Süleyman I, see *Naîmâ*, II, p. 472; and Ziya Yılmaz, ed., *Topçular Katibi Abdulkadir (Kadri) Efendi Tarihi*, 2 Vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003), pp. 599-600 [hereafter Abdülkadir Efendi, I-II].

¹⁴² ASVe, SDC, filza 90, no. 84 (dated January 6, 1622, m.v.), fol. 15r: "*Si trova il detto Chislar cresciuto tanto di auttorita et di gratia appresso il Re che per confessione di tutti sapera di lunga quella di ogni altro, et guida et regola assolutamente la volontà di Sua Maestà.*" Almost all Ottoman contemporary writers portray Suleyman Agha as an influential figure. See, for instance, *Peçevi*, II, p. 353 and *Naîmâ*, II, pp. 473-74. Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, pp. 664-665.

¹⁴³ According to the *bailo*'s reports, the participants of the General Council were eight viziers from imperial court, the Mufti Esad Efendi the Chief Judges of Rumelia and Anatolia, and the

On August 17, 1621, the Janissaries, who were charged with providing order and security to the capital, started a riot against the Deputy of Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha, on the grounds that they did not receive their salaries. The rebellious soldiers marched towards Ahmed Pasha's palace and asked him to give assurance about their salary payments. In response, Ahmed Pasha treated them with prudence, uttered kind words, and promised to resolve this payroll problem.¹⁴⁴ Yet, on August 22, 1621, the Janissaries once again rioted; and this time it was truly a tumultuous rebellion. According to the *bailo*, the rebellious soldiers forcibly dismissed the elected Agha of Janissaries, Nasuh Agha. They elected their own agha from their ranks. The Deputy Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha had to accept it so as to moderate their fury.¹⁴⁵ However, at this time Ahmed Pasha could not calm entirely the Janissaries, thus he urgently sought for extra funds to make the salary payments and avoid this life-threatening rebellion.¹⁴⁶ According to the Venetian *bailo*, more than 10.000 Janissaries remained in the capital and did not participate in the campaign. Meanwhile, the imperial *sipahis* similarly posed a threat for the deputy grand vizier.¹⁴⁷

On August 31, 1621, this time at the military camp in Poland, the Janissaries rebelled and protested Grand Vizier Hüseyin Pasha in front of his tent about their

Yeniçeriağası, the Sultan's Tutor Hacı Ömer Efendi, see ASVe, SDC, filza. 90, no. 20 (dated February 9, 1621, m.v.), fols. 325v-326r.

¹⁴⁴ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 54 (dated August 17, 1621) fol. 27v-r: "*li Gianizzari che in qualche numero sono restati qui alla guardia della Citta l'altri giorno per mancamento delle paghe cominciorno a tumultuare, et già prese l'armi s'acciaccano alla casa del Caimecan per costringerlo con la forza a tal pagamento, ma egli con la sua prudenza, et buone parole et promesse li ha per hora aquietati.*"

¹⁴⁵ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 17, no. 55 (dated August 22, 1620), fol. 27v: "*Il moto che scrissi esser stato li giorni passati suscitato da Gianizzeri restati alla guardia di Costantinopoli per mancamento delle paghe, et acquietato per all'hora con buone parole dal Caimecan, è finalmente riuscito in una manifesta solevatione, per la quale andati in gran numero alla casa di esso Caimecan, et usato con parole, et fatti molti insolenze s'egli con la fuga non dava loco, correva manifesto pericolo, passando la solevatione tant'oltre che deposto tumultuariamente l'Agà eletto, et speditogli dal Campo dal Gran Signore, n'hanno eletto un altro del loro numero, il quale ricusando tal carico, bisogno che il Caimecan per temperarla lor furia, lo esortasse ad accettarlo.*"

¹⁴⁶ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 57 (dated September 14, 1621), fol. 35v: "*Il Questa settimana il caimecan mi ha fatto reiterate grandissime istanze, che trovandosi in necessita di soldar uno di questi giorni li Giannizari delle loro paghe, perle quali nacque l'ultima solevatione con tanto pericolo della sua vita.*"

¹⁴⁷ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 56 (dated August 31, 1621), fol. 33v: "*Questo militia de Giannizzari se ben caduta assai dall'antico valore, et numero, non trovandosene nell'essercito piu di 10 mille ritiene pero la pristina ferocità, che passata anco col loro essemio in quelle de Spai molto più numerosa succedono spesso in ambedoi di questo pericolose solevationi.*" Also see Kazalak and Gündüz, "II. Osman'in Hotin Seferi," p. 133, for those Janissaries who managed to avoid participating the campaign.

unpaid payrolls. In order to calm them down, Huseyin Pasha had to pay the Janissaries much more than their normal salaries. Upon this rebellion, on the other hand, Osman II made some changes in the government. For instance, he dismissed the Chief Treasurer, Hasan Pasha, and appointed him to the governorship-general of Rumeli, which had been held by Davud Pasha, Mustafa I's brother-in-law.¹⁴⁸

As Hüseyin Pasha was having hard times to handle the fiscal, military and provision problems, Dilaver Pasha asked the sultan to appoint him to the grand vizierate because of his personal wealth that could be used to partially cover the unpaid salaries of the soldiers. Osman II accepted this offer of Hüseyin Pasha and appointed him as his new grand vizier in October 1621.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, the sultan appointed Baki Pasha as Chief Treasurer, who had been dismissed back in September 1621. In addition, the Chief Treasurer Yusuf Pasha was appointed to the governership of Bagdad and the Agha of Janissaries as governor of Damascus while Kapıcıbaşı Mustafa Agha became the Agha of Janissaries.¹⁵⁰

As the Ottoman imperial army was besieging Hotin, official news arrived in the capital, giving the details of the difficulties confronted by the sultan and his soldiers during the war. The news clearly exaggerated the suffering and casualties of the Polish side so as to give the sultan and his imperial army a proud outlook. However, the reality was precisely the opposite. The Polish army had greatly defended Hotin. Casualties were less than expected while those of the Ottomans were high. The *bailo* Giustinian writes that the Ottoman imperial army lost around 80.000 soldiers,

¹⁴⁸ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 56 (dated August 31, 1621), fols. 32r-33v: “*La solevatione de Gianizzari nell’essercito, che scrivo nelle precedenti fu per mancamento delle paghe, per il qual corsero armati, et con gran tumulto al padiglione del Primo Vesir che corse anch’egli molto pericolo, et per aquietarli oltre l’esborso delle dette paghe il Re ha deposto il Defterdar grande, et sorogatogli il Beglierbei della Grecia, et nel loco di questo Daut Bassa.*” Some Ottoman contemporary writers claim that it was a ordinary donations in order to detect deserters of the imperial army, see Peçevi, II, p. 376; Hammer, VIII, p. 205; Halisi, pp. 90-91; and Naîmâ, II, p. 465.

¹⁴⁹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 67 (dated October 26, 1620), fols. 11r-16r: “*et avviato all’essercito chimato dal Gran Signore per farlo Primo Vesir in loco di Cussein deposto, et riponer sulle sue spalle il poco delle guerra ridetta in gravi difficolta, Dilavert Bassa di Mesopotamia, ricco, per le guerre di Persia venuto in riputatione di buon soldato, s’offerte a Sua Maesta servir in tal carico, non solo con la Persona, ma col danaro ancora, per dar una paga alla militie, per mancamento delle quale era principalmente seguita la depositione di Cussein, a istanza dei spai, che ne fecero richiamo al Gran Signore, il qual accettata l’offerta gli diede il sigillo, et lo creo Primo Vesir.*” Also see Kazalak and Gündüz, “II. Osman’in Hotin Seferi,” p. 139.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., fol. 15r: “*A Dilaver nel Bassalich di Mesopotamia è stato sostituito Yusuf era Defterdar, et a questo Bachi, che l’ha ancor essercitato, et Mustafa Capigi Bassi all’ Aga de Giannizzari predetto.*” See also Abdülkadir Efendi, I, p. 753.

including some leading statesmen like Karakaş Mehmed Pasha, the Governor of Buda.¹⁵¹ According to Halisi, the Ottomans captured 300.000 slaves and killed 100.000 Polish soldiers.¹⁵² All these numbers are clearly exaggerated so as to portray that the imperial campaign had devastating effects on the enemy.

However, after 39 days, the Osman II ordered to end the siege of Hotin on October 7, 1621. Thus this first imperial campaign led by a seventeenth-century sultan had failed at the trenches of Hotin. But Osman II seemed not to embrace the failure of the siege; rather he was fixated on waging a new war against Poland in the following year.¹⁵³ At the outset, the sultan refused to make peace with Poland, but there were some dissenting voices in his imperial government. Osman II consulted Ömer Efendi and Süleyman Agha, his chief advisors, on the conditions of a peace with Poland. Both advisors recommended the sultan not to accept a peace with Poland while Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha and other government ministers disagreed with the sultan's two advisors. Instead, they advocated the idea of starting the peace talks with Poland as soon as possible. They also tried to dissuade the sultan from spending the winter in Edirne.¹⁵⁴ However, Osman II decided to stay in Edirne to launch a new military campaign against Poland. This decision of the sultan was not welcomed in the capital. According to the *bailo*:

The sultan was resolve to spend the winter in Edirne. The army in the countries informed regretting to be there generally. Numerous merchants fear for the ruin in all business. They have experienced an intolerable famine of food and many other inconveniences in the absence of the sultan. They have been already doing nothing for many months. They

¹⁵¹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 65 (dated September 12, 1622, m.v.), fol. 6r. Some Ottoman writers accuse Hüseyin Pasha on the death of Karakaş Mehmed Pasha for he did not help him in the battlefield. For details, see *Peçeви*, II, p. 376 and *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, p. 934.

¹⁵² *Halisi*, pp. 180-186.

¹⁵³ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 67 (dated October 26, 1621), fol. 13r: “*Per questo, et altre difficulta, che sarà lungo a scrivere, scinta(vinta) l’ostinazione del Gran si intendeva per gli ultimi avvisi dei primi del corrente aver egli pubblicata la levata, che doveva seguir subito, ma per quanto dicono questi ministri con la solita istanza, con gran risoluzione, et minacci di ritornarsene l’anno futuro tanto per tempo.*”

¹⁵⁴ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 79 (dated December 21, 1621), fol. 51r: “*Il Primo Vesir, gli altri ministri, dal Coza, et Chislaraga in poi, che si trova in somma gratia del Re, et le militie ancora per l’avaritia di Sua Maesta, molto mal sodisfatte desiderano la pace, la qual adherendo ai consigli di questi doi conformi al suo proprio; si mostra sin hora risoluta di non volerla se non con le conditioni avisate.*” See also Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 19.

hope with the sultan's return with his court and the army and restoring somewhat the business.¹⁵⁵

On the way back to Istanbul from Hotin, the imperial army had already been concerned of the tight-fisted nature of the sultan and his aggressive fiscal policy. While the imperial army camped near the Danube, Osman II offered his soldiers to increase their salaries by one *akçe*, instead of a donation of 1000 *akçe* at once as their campaign bonus (*bahsis*). But the soldiers refused the sultan's offer. Instead, they wanted to receive their bonuses. In the end, according to the bailo, the sultan had to agree on giving 1000 *akçes* to hundreds of thousands the imperial soldiers.¹⁵⁶

But during the Polish campaign, the sultan refused to reward those soldiers who had not arrived at time to the imperial camp in Isakçı, known today as Isaccea in Romania.¹⁵⁷ By doing so, Osman II actually made a census of the soldiers campaigned with him. This census, however, caused great discomfort among the soldiers. It was a sign of the sultan's mistrust of the officers in the imperial army.¹⁵⁸ The sultan then decreased the amount of the rewards for every killed Polish soldier from two gold coins to one, resulting in further reactions by the soldiers, because they were accustomed to receive such rewards much more than the sultan granted. This problem played an important role in discouraging the soldiers to fight against the Polish soldiers.¹⁵⁹

Besides, during the Polish campaign, Osman II abolished the *arpalık*, a revenue which the high-ranking *ulema* used to receive towards their retirement or while

¹⁵⁵ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 66 (dated October 26, 1621), fols. 9r-10v: "*Questa rissoluzione del Gran Signore di svernar egli in Adrinopoli, et l'essercito nei Paesi avisati dispiace qui generalmente ad ogn'uno, provandosi per la sua assenza una carestia de viveri intolerabile, et molt'altri inconvenienti et temendo i numeri mercanti la total rovina del negozio, che non facendo gia molti mesi cosa alcuna, sperano col ritorno della Corte et dell'esercito di restorarlo alquanto.*" Also see Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 12.

¹⁵⁶ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18-VI, no. 51 (dated August 3, 1621), fol. 9r. Also see *Naîmâ*, II, p. 466; *Peçevi*, II, p. 376; and Tûgî, *Musîbetnâme*, pp. 15-16.

¹⁵⁷ Tûgî, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 16.

¹⁵⁸ *Peçevi*, II, p. 376.

¹⁵⁹ *Naîmâ*, II, p. 477; *Hammer*, VIII, p. 212; *Halisi*, p. 56; and Baki, "Searching for Osman", pp. 200-201.

waiting for an appointment to a post. The abolishment of the *arpalik* revenues articulated the grievances of the high-ranking ulema for the sultan.¹⁶⁰

While Osman II was determined to pursue such aggressive ideas and actions, the first plot against his sultanate was hatched on November 23, 1621, six months before his regicide. The Venetian *bailo* provides an account on this plot:

In fact, one of these days a very dangerous rebellion broke out against the sultan in the favor of his deposed uncle Mustafa I. This happened due to delays in the payments, he wanted to postpone them. A voice arose from the army that claimed in Constantinople the foresaid Mustafa I has been returned to the imperial seat by the people. It was heard and expanded with grand applause. It committed incredibly to the mind of the sultan who immediately ordered to do the payments so as to obtain that degree.¹⁶¹

The Venetian *bailo* also reports that the *sipahis* from the Anatolian provinces returned to their home in miserable conditions. The famine killed most of their horses; thus a great number of the *sipahis* had to return home on foot. They all accused the sultan's tight-fisted nature for the serious disorders in the army. The sultan was considered extremely tight-fisted in the military payments and donations. This made the soldiers refuse 'dicing with death' by fighting against the Polish soldiers. Most of the Janissaries returned back over the bridge of Danube, as they did not want to 'fight to die'. Particularly after the death of the governor of Buda Karakaş Mehmed Pasha, the undisciplined behaviors among the soldiers became evident, eventually culminating to a major military rebellion against Osman II.¹⁶²

As seen in the above-quoted dispatch, the soldiers exclaimed favoring the sultan's uncle, Mustafa I, because they considered that Osman II wanted to delay their impending salary payments. Meanwhile, a rumor spread among the imperial soldiers that the people of the capital had enthroned Sultan Mustafa. According to the *bailo*, this rumor angered the sultan so much that he immediately ordered to make

¹⁶⁰ *Bostanzâde*, pp. 203-204; Tezcan, "Searching for Osman", p. 265, refers to Hibri's account in that the sultan allegedly wanted to burn the registers which included the names of his household soldiers.

¹⁶¹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18-VII, no. 73 (dated November 23, 1621), fol. 30v: "Anzi un giorno con pericolo di una universal sollevatione contra la Maesta Sua a favor del deposto Mustafa suo zio, poiche soprastando il tempo dalle paghe, et volendo lei differirle, si levo tra le militie una voce, che in Costantinopoli il detto Mustafa fosse stato dal Popolo ritornato nella sede regale, la qual sentita, et ampliata da esse con grand'applauso, commesse incredibilmente l'animo del Gran Signore, che immediate fece le paghe, per ottener quel grado." See also Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 12.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, fol. 30v.

the payments of the imperial soldiers. Moreover, on the same day, he accepted the peace with Poland with the same conditions hitherto concluded under Süleyman I.¹⁶³

Overall, the military rebellion during the campaign of Hotin was the first attempt against the sultanate of Osman II and it signaled the enthronement of Mustafa I once again. The imperial soldiers had already proposed Mustafa I as the candidate for the Ottoman throne, instead of Osman II's eldest brother, Prince Murad. In fact, it could be seen as a rehearsal of the rebellion of May 1622 which would end the sultanate of Osman II. As will be discussed in next chapter, Mustafa I was actually re-enthroned not only by the Ottoman army, but also with public support.

However, Osman II failed to learn his lesson from the plot of November 1621, and increased his aggressiveness towards the imperial soldiers. When he arrived in Edirne, for instance, he abolished the pensions of the retired Janissaries, known as the *çerağ oturak*.¹⁶⁴ According to Tûgî, a total of 2000 pensions were cut off by Osman II.¹⁶⁵ For the sultan, this was a very risky attempt in that it could easily increase the alienation of the imperial soldiers who had been already annoyed by other fiscal actions of the sultan. I should also note that Osman's such aggressiveness alienated not only the soldiers, but also his government viziers and other high-ranking officials at the imperial court. According to the *bailo*:

I can tell much about it that the alienation for the most dissatisfaction of the avarice of the Sultan is not only from the leading ministers but also all the soldiers from the said war. They have suffered hardships in the campaign from the famine and many other aspects that reigns in all parts of the empire. Countless animals have been lost in the campaign.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 72 (dated November 23, 1621), fols. 24v-30v. Also see Hammer, VIII, pp. 207-208; Roe, *Negotiations*, pp. 12-13; *Naîmâ*, II, p. 472; and *Abdülkadir Efendi*, I, pp. 599-600.

¹⁶⁴ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 79 (dated December 21, 1621), fol. 51r: “*per la quale si dice esser pensiero nella Maestà Sua di regolarli, essendosi con quest’occasione certificata, che tra Cervagi, Otturach et altri di loro inabili, viene a sborsar dodici mille paghe l’anno senza alcun frutto, ma essendo stato in tutt’i tempi il metter mano a tal regolazioni molto pericoloso, si tiene che vi penserà ben premia.*”

¹⁶⁵ Tûgî, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 41.

¹⁶⁶ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18-VIII, no. 83 (dated January 6, 1621), fol. 12r: “*Tra tanto posso dirle che per l’alienatione non solo di questi principali ministri, ma di tutte le militie ancora dalla detta guerra malissimo sodisfatte del Re per la sua avaritia, per li patimenti che hanno sofferto in essa, per la carestia che per tutte le parti di quest’imperio regna maggiore che da molto tempo in qua sia stata per la perdita d’infiniti animali morti nell’esercito et per altri molti rispetti.*”

In sum, Osman II could not stand against the great opposition on spending winter in Edirne. He unwillingly accepted to return back to the capital. However, his return did not diminish the tension between him and his soldiers and the people of the capital, but rather visibly increased it, particularly when he announced his eagerness to make the Pilgrimage in Mecca.

Conclusion

As I have tried to demonstrate, Osman II came under criticism both at the beginning and the end of his campaign against Poland. In spite of the objections for waging war against Poland, the sultan was fixated on personally leading his imperial army. Accordingly, he re-inserted his tutor Hacı Ömer Efendi into his imperial council as a power-broker so as to have a support for his war plans. However, the sultan's plans were objected by his viziers and grandees on the grounds that there had been a severe provision and monetary crisis in the capital. Indeed, the Ottoman capital witnessed extreme winter conditions that halted daily economic activities and even cut the logistical links between the capital and its periphery due to icy winds and the frozen Bosphorus. In the meantime, the limited grain supplies of the capital were transferred to the Polish frontier so as to meet the needs of the imperial army. During this period, accordingly, Osman II faced with a direct protest by the poor people of the capital, who used bread as a symbol for their grievances, thus the provision crisis. I argued that this 'bread-protest' was a clear sign of the fiscal mismanagement of Osman II in the eyes of the people in the capital.

While people had been affected by food shortages and rampant inflation in daily goods, the Polish campaign deepened the fiscal crisis of the imperial treasury and larger economic crisis in Istanbul markets. In the midst of a famine, scarcity of money and extreme climatic conditions, the imperial government tried to handle serious troubles in the payments, provision and logistics of the overcrowded imperial army during the Polish campaign. From the beginning of this campaign onwards, the imperial army protested their unpaid salaries, a problem which, on November 23, 1622, turned into the first plot for the deposition of Osman II. That is to say, the

sultan's aggressive fiscal policy and actions alike throughout the Polish campaign increased the alienation of the imperial soldiers from his sultanate.

In the meantime, Osman II created his own court faction under the leadership of his new Chief Eunuch of the Imperial Harem, Süleyman Agha, his tutor Hacı Ömer Efendi and the Chief Gardener Bebr Mehmed Pasha. These figures became more visible and more powerful in imperial affairs in short time. Like in the case of Osman II, these figures as new foci of power at the imperial court would be targeted by the imperial soldiers and the public at large, who would demand their executions in the first days of the rebellion in May 1622.

CHAPTER 3

INTO THE STORM: THE REGICIDE OF OSMAN II

This chapter examines the increasing tension between Osman II and his imperial army and the people of Istanbul following the announcement of the sultan's plans to make a pilgrimage journey to Mecca in 1622. My discussion covers the period between the sultan's return to the capital from the Polish campaign on January 9, 1622 and his regicide on May 20, 1622. During this period, I would argue, a general public and military opposition came into being against Osman II and his pilgrimage plans. Moreover, the economic and provision problems prevailing in Istanbul further sharpened this public opposition, which soon turned into an open rebellion against Osman II and his sultanate once some unfounded rumors about the sultan's secret plans to recruit a new army under the pretext of pilgrimage began circulating in the capital. However, at this point, the main aim of the rebellious soldiers and common people was not the deposition of Osman II, but rather the execution of his royal favorites who were accused of misguiding the sultan and intervening in the business of rule. The Janissaries and the imperial *sipahis* started to openly pronounce the deposition of Osman II only when the sultan refused to turn over his favorites to the rebels. Accordingly, the rebels attacked the imperial palace in order to find and execute the sultan's favorites, namely, Süleyman Agha, Hacı Ömer Efendi, Dilaver Pasha, Baki Pasha and Nasuh Agha. Once they were inside the palace, however, the mutinous soldiers pledged their allegiance to Osman's uncle, Mustafa I, and declared him as the new sultan. The following day, the deposed Osman II was killed at the Yedikule dungeon.

In what follows, I will look into these critical developments while providing some hitherto unknown details regarding the daily events and affairs at the Ottoman imperial center. As we shall see, the Venetian bailo's dispatches are highly important in reaching a better understanding of the problems immediately preceding the deposition and murder of Osman II.

3.1 Osman II's Return to the Capital

On January 9, 1622, Osman II entered Istanbul through an elaborate military procession while his viziers and other court grandees accompanied him on horseback.¹⁶⁷ The sultan was no doubt expecting the people of his capital to crowd the streets and welcome his return cheerfully. However, according to the Venetian *bailo*:

I believe that the sultan has little pleasure in not finding the applause in faces and voices of people as it is usual in such occasions, but the majority of them went obstinately silent as a sign of discontentment with the sultan. The people and the soldiers have attributed his avarice, having much experienced, to the greatest famine and the mismanagement of war. It is publicly said that it is not remembered such a tight-fisted and less loved ruler between the Ottomans.¹⁶⁸

Osman seems to have paid little attention to his subject's growing discontent against himself, particularly in relation to his tight-fisted nature. Instead, soon after his arrival, he ordered a three-day festival in order to celebrate his return from the campaign as well as the recent birth of his son, Prince Ömer. One night during this festival, he travelled incognito in the streets of his capital, but he was much displeased to see some people consuming wine and tobacco excessively.¹⁶⁹ Hence, the following day, he issued a royal decree prohibiting the use of tobacco and wine in Istanbul. The Venetian *bailo* informed his Senate on the repercussions of this prohibition as follows:

The sultan travelled incognito in the night that displeased people, which could have known his dissatisfaction in the festivals. The sultan increased the severe prohibition of tobacco and wine much more by declaring immediately. The use of them is now being greatly found in

¹⁶⁷ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 8/VIII, no. 86 (dated January 20, 1622, m.v.), fol. 20v.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., fols. 20r-21v: "*cred'ho con poco suo gusto, non scoprendo nei volti, et nelle voce del Popolo di quelli appalusi, che li suoi maggiori in occasioni tali con stati soliti, ma andare ostinato silenzio, segno di discontento, et di mala soditiffazione causata della sua avaritia alla quale il Popolo attribuisce la carestia grandissima, che già tanto prova, et le militie la mala riuscita di questa guerra, in modo che pubblicamento si dice, che si come non n'è memora tra gl'Ottomani di Principe piu avaro, cosi non n'è anco del meno amato di questo.*"

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., fol. 21v-r: "*si senti una salva grande d'artellaria, et furono per tre giorni, et notti ordinati fochi per la citta, che consistono nell'addobbamento, et illuminatamente delle botteghe, et nel concorso del Popolo per vederle, essendovi anco di notte andata incognita la maestà sua, che dato poco gusto del Popolo nelle dette feste havera potuto conoscer la sua mala soditiffazione.*"

Turkish sales. Traders cannot bear it, if they do not know except tearing out money with the renovation of the concession. They have encountered the great famine of bread and all other things for a long time. Although the people hoped from the sultan's arrival, they feel and show a great discontentment but not remedy.¹⁷⁰

As the sultan was following such an aggressive policy towards the daily economic and social activities in the capital, the people's and soldiers' alienation from himself and his sultanate were equally increasing. As noted in the previous chapter, the famine and the scarcity of money had already struck the markets in the capital so hard. The merchants and the consumers were now suffering under a true economic depression.

Nonetheless, Osman continued his aggressive interventions and actions, more so particularly after the accidental death of Prince Ömer, who was born in the imperial harem on October 20, 1621, while Osman II was waging war against Poland. The *bailo* reports that the mother of the prince was Mehlika Sultan, the sultan's favorite Russian concubine. Mehlika was originally a slave of Kuyucu Murad Pasha, the former grand vizier under Ahmed I between 1606 and 1611. When Murad Pasha died, his wife presented her to El-Hac Mustafa Agha, by then the chief eunuch of the imperial harem, who in turn embraced her like his own daughter and soon liberated her from her slave status, thus Melika became a free Muslim woman. Later, Osman II wanted Mehlika to be his concubine, but it was not an option anymore. According to the Islamic law, a freed slave woman could not be made a concubine again. Hence, Osman II had to take Mehlika as an official wife, but he still treated her like a favorite concubine, *haseki*.¹⁷¹ At the time, this official marriage of Osman with a former slave received criticism from the *ulema* and the public at large.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., fol. 21r: “*essendovi anco di notte andata incognita la maestà sua, che dato poco gusto del Popolo nelle dette feste haverà potuto conoscer la sua mala sodisfattione, la qualè cresciuta anco tanto piu per la prohibitione molto severa del tabaco, et del vino, che subito gionto fece pubblicare, nell'uso de quali trovandosi Turchi hormai grandemente smerci, non potriano sopportarla, se non sapessero ella esser fatta a solo fine di cavar danaro con la rinovatione della concessione, ne vedendosi all'incontro sin hora alla lunga, et grande carestia del pane, et di tutte le cose, come pur sperava il popolo dalla sua venuta, rimedio alcuno, ne sente, et mostra un sommo discontento.*” Many shops had been closed because of the scarce of money. Ibid., fol. 23r: “*Sono hormai, in gironi dall'entrata di Sua Maesta et a questi numeri mercanti non apparisse lume alcuno del miglioramento del negozio, come speravano, continuando piu che mai la strettezza del danaro senza alcun spacio.*”

¹⁷¹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 66 (dated October 26, 1621), fol. 10v-r: “*che essendo la notte di 20 del Corrente nato a Sua Maesta il figliolo primogenito et suo successor all'imperio et speditogliene immediate in somma diligenza l'aviso che lo troverà per camino mutasse resolutione et si conferisce qui per goder personalmente di tal successo et visitar la Madre chiamata Melica*

Meanwhile, on February 5, 1622, the four-month Prince Ömer died under most unexpected circumstances. According to the Venetian *bailo*, when Osman II and Mehlika Sultan, together with their son and other female members of the dynasty, were watching a re-enactment of the sultan's Polish campaign organized as a big show at the palace, one of the *acemioğlans* playing the role of a Polish soldier discharged his gun and caused a ricochet. His stray bullet found and killed Prince Ömer instantly.¹⁷³ This was a great trauma for Osman. He was not only devastated, but started to display a more brutal character. It is reported that, during first three days after he lost his son, the sultan did not speak a word and remained aloof from the public while contemplating in deep grief. Then, he resumed his incognito travels in the capital in the company of a small retinue and began literally praying on any wrongdoer. For instance, he busted the taverns and the chambers of the Janissary officers (*yasakçı odaları*), where he severely punished all the soldiers and common people whom he found in the company of prostitutes or drinking wine.¹⁷⁴ Overall, after this tragic event, the sultan developed a more hot-tempered and intolerant nature, a problem which the academic literature on Osman II typically overlooks.

(Milicha), la quale Russia di nazione di bassa nascita, presa da piccola fanciulla, et fatta schiava di Amurat (murat) Primo Vesir, fu doppo morte di lui seguita in Persia donata da sua moglie al deposto Chislar Agasi, dal qual amata come figliola, et fatta libera, veduta un giorno dal Re, et invaghitosi della sua bellezza, che dicono esser molto rara, la ricercò adesso Chislar, che si scuso non poter per la legge essendo fatta libera, dargliela se la Maesta Sua non la sposava, il che havendo lei effettuata gli mostro sempre sopra l'altre su danne segni di molt'amore, et hora per questo parto, con che all'è divenuta, et sara nell'avvenir trattata come Regina per esser Madre del successore, si può creder crescerà tanto piu, con universal opinione che sia ella per haver grand'autorità col Re, et per indurlo ancora a richiamar il detto chislar, del quale riconosce ogni sua grandezza." For details of the *haseki*, see Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, pp. 91-99.

¹⁷² Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, pp. 106-107; and Hammer, p. 211.

¹⁷³ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 92 (dated February 5, 1622, m.v.) fol. 40v-r: "Una di queste passate notti fece il Re a istanza della Regina et dell'altre Sultane rappresentar in con Cortile del Seraglio un finto spettacolo della passata guerra di Polonia con l'oppugnatione di trincere fabricate di tavole nelle quali era hora numero di Acamogliani vestiti, et armati alla franca per la difesa, et altri di fuori alla Turchesca per il offesa, tra seguirono molti simulati assalti, scaramunie contiri di moschetti, con morte anco d'alcuno dell'azamoglani predetti, et se bene per non causar troppo strepita non fu sbarata l'artellaria, non fu pero si poco, che non cagionasse la morte del Principino figliolo di Sua Maesta, il quale per li patimenti del viaggio si trovava indisposto, sentita con molto dolare da lei che per tre giorni stete ritirata senza parlar con alcuno, doppo i quali ritornata ai suoi modi di predetta va la notte vagendo per la citta accompagnata da pochi per spiar, et castigar capitalmente li trasgressori dei suoi ordini, particolarmente li bevitori del tabacco, com'è seguito d'alcuno."

¹⁷⁴ Tügī, *Musibetnâme*, pp. 13-15. *Yasakçı* is a janissary officer responsible for public order. See İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapukulu Ocakları*, 2 volumes (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1984), vol. I, p. 197.

3.2 Osman's Plans for Pilgrimage

As these events were unfolding in the capital, the rebellion of Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n, the Druze *emir* in Lebanon, erupted and began occupying the agenda of the Ottoman imperial government. The Deputy Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha informed Osman II that Ibn Ma'n had long been in alliance with some European princes for many years, but he could not succeed in obtaining their full support. However, the vizier noted, the Polish campaign provided him the opportunity in that he recently managed to occupy several cities in the region as the Ottoman local forces were serving at the Polish frontier. The Venetian *bailo* claims that, upon learning the gravity of the situation, Osman II immediately sent 40.000 imperial Janissaries and *sipahis* to suppress this revolt.¹⁷⁵ As mentioned in the last chapter, Ibn Ma'n's revolt was used by government viziers to dissuade the sultan from his idea of spending the winter in Edirne and accordingly undertaking a new campaign against Poland the following season. However, the vizier's strategy failed in that, as Giustinian notes, Ibn Ma'n was in alliance with the Polish king, and also possibly with the Safavid shah, in his war against the Ottomans. Hence, the sultan had no option but to launch a campaign in the Eastern front, which meant the division of the Ottoman imperial forces into two, thus a much smaller army for a possible Polish campaign.

As Osman II focused on the suppression of the rebellion by Ibn Ma'n, one of the allies of the Druze emir and the chief enemy of the Ottomans, the Spanish king planned to send his armada into the Mediterranean, to make a joint attack with the Cossacks from the Black Sea.¹⁷⁶ Nearly six months into the rebellion of Ibn Ma'n, Osman II declared his will to personally lead an imperial army in order to punish Ibn Ma'n and thus dropped his intention to renew his campaign against Poland. Osman had already announced his plans for making a pilgrimage journey to Mecca and visit several major cities along the way. Now, his pilgrimage plans were mixed with an imperial campaign against Ibn Ma'n.

For this reason, on January 29, 1621, an extraordinary council was called at the palace with the participation of the Mufti, Esad Efendi, and the sultan's tutor, Hacı

¹⁷⁵ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VI, no. 56 (dated August 31, 1621), fols. 33v-r. See also Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 14.

¹⁷⁶ ASVe, SPAC, Registro. 18/VII, no. 67 (dated October 26, 1621), fol. 15v.

Ömer Efendi, in order to plan the sultan's pilgrimage and campaign in the east.¹⁷⁷ The following day, 150.000 gold coins were taken from the inner treasury for the preparation of the so-called Pilgrimage Campaign, which seemed to have aimed Ibn Ma'n in the first place. Only after the sultan successfully suppressed this critical rebellion in Lebanon, he could go to Mecca and make his pilgrimage. However, the amount allocated for his campaign indicate that it was for the pilgrimage journey rather than a full-fledged military campaign.

For his campaign against Ibn Ma'n, Osman II did not take the majority of the imperial Janissaries and the *sipahis* with him. He instead preferred a small and inexperienced army. According to the contemporary sources, for instance, there were 3.000 Janissary novices (*acemioğlans*).¹⁷⁸ The Venetian *bailo* notes that the reason behind this choice of the sultan was related to the poor performance of the imperial army at the failed siege of Hotin during his Polish campaign and that Osman sought to restore his reputation by undertaking a new campaign in the eastern front, yet without the same army.¹⁷⁹ Osman also knew that the Janissaries could pose a threat during his campaign as they already rose in revolt once about their unpaid payrolls during the Polish campaign. That is to say, Osman II might have thought that his imperial army could stage a similar rebellion during the long Pilgrimage campaign. Hence the sultan seems to rely on newly recruited sekbans from Anatolia and the *acemioğlans* from his imperial household rather than potentially rebellious Janissaries and sipahis.

At this moment, the Janissaries and *sipahis* opposed openly the sultan's pilgrimage campaign and they threatened the government viziers in that the sultan should not pass over Asia and move against Ibn Ma'n.¹⁸⁰ The campaign-weary soldiers were evidently unwilling to begin a new campaign immediately following the Polish one. Moreover, they were alienated from their sultan mainly because of Osman's tight-fisted nature, that is, his aggressive fiscal policy, as discussed before.

¹⁷⁷ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 91 (dated February 5, 1622, m.v.), fols. 36r-37v.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., fols. 39r-40v: "*Tenne anco la Maesta Sua li passati giorni una Porta grande, che cosi chiamano quando dal suo, et altri seragli manda fuori di quei giovani che si allevano in essi, facendoli passar megl'ordini militari di Muzafer Aga, che son lancie spezzate, Giannizari, spai, et altri, et ne sono usciti un numero di tre mille, con che riempendosi li predetti ordini è indicio di guerra, et già più di dieci anni che non s'era fatto.*"

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., fols. 37v-r.

¹⁸⁰ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 86 (dated January 20, 1622, m.v.), fol. 22r.

In addition, they had problems in receiving their payrolls, suffering from lack of provisions and other critical logistical needs. According to the Venetian *bailo*, all the Ottoman provinces had been suffering the famine, most particularly the lack of grain. The sultan had experienced the lack of provision had an adverse impact on the military campaign in the midst of extreme winter conditions.¹⁸¹

Despite all these problems, Osman II ordered his grand admiral, Halil Pasha, to build eighty new galleys in anticipation of a war against the joint Spanish-Cossack attacks in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.¹⁸² It is interesting to see that despite his well-known tight-fisted nature, the sultan spent a quite a large sum for the construction of these new warships.¹⁸³ Overall, Osman II was concerned in that, while he was fighting against Ibn Ma‘n, his imperial navy should have provided security for the sea routes and prevented any financial or military aid from European allies of the Druze emir.¹⁸⁴

As his war plans were underway, three of the most powerful figures of the imperial government, namely, Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha, the Mufti Esad Efendi and the royal tutor Ömer Efendi, together tried to change Osman II’s mind regarding his pilgrimage to Mecca.¹⁸⁵ The opposition of these three powerful advisors of the sultan convinced Osman. However, In the last days of the March 1621, he announced again that he aborted his pilgrimage campaign, which would be highly risky given that the Polish and Spanish forces in the West could easily threaten the stability of

¹⁸¹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 91 (dated February 5, 1622, m.v.), fols. 38v-r.

¹⁸² ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 171v: “*Quest’inverno in diversi de suoi arsenali 80 galee nuove per far l’anno futuro armata di 150, ne ancora si puo penetrar con qual disegno ben si sa essersi mosso a dar il predetto ordine quando tornato dalla querra et parlando col Capitan Bassa del numero che patria uscir quest’anno.*” See also Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 21.

¹⁸³ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 120 (dated May 11, 1622), fols. 236r-237v.

¹⁸⁴ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 96 (dated February 19, 1622, m.v.), fol. 51r: “*Di mi per le cause scritte stanno in sospetto, disegnando assediario da Terra, et da mar con parte dell’armata per impedirgli l’aiuto de Principi Cristiani, et il salvarsi nei stati loro con 4, Bertoni.*”

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, fols. 52r-v: “*La Maesta Sua sia per andargli contra in persona per le disuasioni del Primo Vesir, Coza, et Mufti, che dicono havergli di mostrato non convenuto alla sua grandezza moversi per un impresa di poca importanza, ne alli suoi interessi partirsi d’Europa mentre la pace con Polachi non è ancor sicura, et l’Ongharia travagliata dall’armi dell’imperatore dicendosi pero, che la Maesta Sua commettera il carico di quest’impresa a Cusein deposto hora di Bassa del Cairo con qualche parte delle militie d’Asia senza servirsi di quelle d’Europa, che per li patimenti, et danno sofferti nella guerra d’Polonia, et disgustate grandemente del Re difficilmente in passeriano, et quanto all’armata pascerà una parte di essa in quei mari al fine predetto, et con l’altra s’opponeranno alla Spagnola per in spedir i suoi disegni col tenerle militie d’Europa pronte per le cose di Polonia, et per quelle d’Ongharia ancora secondo ricercherà l’occasione, mandandole sotto il Primo Vesir, o altri senza moversi Sua Maesta.*”

the empire given while the sultan was away from his capital for another campaign which would take place at least for twenty months.¹⁸⁶ Ömer Efendi and Esad Efendi recommended the sultan to construct a mosque as an indicator of his religious devotion which would merit in God's sight as much as going to Mecca.¹⁸⁷

The abortion of his pilgrimage campaign allowed Osman to focus on his marriages. Mehlika Sultan had fallen from being the favorite concubine of the sultan soon after the death of her son Prince Ömer. Her *haseki* title was taken back.¹⁸⁸ In her place, Osman did not take another concubine, but rather he wanted to marry the grand-daughter of Pertev Pasha, born from an Ottoman princess. In doing so, Osman acted against the established Ottoman dynastic tradition of marrying women from inside the imperial harem. According to the Venetian *bailo*, his viziers opposed the sultan's will and warned him about some risks in marrying with a distant cousin. They tried hard to change the sultan's mind in this matter, but the sultan insisted.¹⁸⁹

Leslie Peirce notes that such royal marriages between the Ottoman sultans and the daughters of Ottoman ruling viziers paid the way for the emergence of some powerful *vüzerâ* families and of court factions. These families formed alternative foci of power among the Ottoman ruling elite, which in turn challenged the sovereign authority of the sultan.¹⁹⁰ However, in the case of Osman II, he did not just want to marry one woman. He considered three Muslim wives, all of whom came outside of

¹⁸⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fol. 105r.

¹⁸⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 101 (dated March 5, 1622), fol. 36v-r: "*havendo il Mufti, et Coza per divertirlo dal viaggio della Mecca fattolo certo, che con la fabrica della detta Moschea acquiterà appresso iddio molto maggior merito, et se lo adempirà sarà di grandissima spesa.*"

¹⁸⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 99 (dated March 5, 1622), fol. 21v-r: "*hora essendo alla perla morte del Principe caduta dal titolo di Regina, et per le varole sopragiontegli dalla gratia del Re, non occorre verso di lei far altro, et con questa nova delle qualità, che ho scritto, se ben si dice essergli molto in gratia, loderei per il mio riverente senso non far spesa alcuna, se prima alla non si vede stabilita in essa col parto del Principe, et col titolo di Regina, che deriva da esso.*"

¹⁸⁹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro.18/VIII, no. 96 (dated February 19, 1622, m.v.), fol. 53r: "*Per la morte dell'unico figliolo di Sua Maesta ha lei preso con altra moglie, non delle sue schiave del seraglio, com'è stato sempre solito dei suoi maggiori, ma una fuori nepote del già Portavi Bassa, che discendendo da Sultana, ha dispiaciuto assai ai Vesiri per esser cosa in solita, et di male conseguenze, et hanno fatto molto per rimuoverlo, ma essendo la Maestà Sua molto tenace del suo proposito, ha voluto eseguirlo et si dice ne piglierà dall'altre senza pero solennità alcuno.*" Moreover, the *bailo* mentioned also the reasons of the opposition "*numero 108 dell'altre risoluzioni fatte senza costume et ragione vedendosi in molte cose allontanarsi egli assai dal costume suoi maggiori de quali sogliono li Ottomani esser molto tenaci et particolarmente nelle amogliarsi con donne libere fuori del seraglio che da loro non è stato mai fatto et puo nell governo causar delle alterationi.*" See also Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 20.

¹⁹⁰ Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, p. 143. Tezcan, "Searching For Osman," pp. p. 377, n. 93.

the imperial harem. One of these wives was Akile, the daughter of the Mufti Esad Efendi, whose family, the Hocasades, was one of the most powerful *ulema* families in Ottoman history.¹⁹¹ At first, Esad Efendi refused the sultan's intention to marry his daughter, because such a marriage would constitute a serious break in the Ottoman dynastic tradition.¹⁹² The *bailo* Giustinian notes that Osman II was considered to be capricious and immature in the eyes of his people and that he acted without first consulting his advisors. Moreover, according to the *bailo*, these marriages were seen as new practices that could harm the well-being of the empire.¹⁹³

Meanwhile, the government viziers were concerned in that the sultan's marriage to the daughter of the mufti could disrupt the delicate balance of power in the imperial court for it would enable Esad Efendi to exert more influence over the sultan, thus emergence of an alternative focus of power among them. In the end, despite his initial refusal, Esad Efendi complied with the sultan's demand to marry his daughter. As the wedding dowry, Osman II gave 600.000 gold coins to his new father-in-law. The marriage was celebrated in the Old Palace with fireworks in March 1622.¹⁹⁴

The Venetian *bailo* comments on this marriage by saying that Esad Efendi had accepted it simply to dissuade Osman II from undertaking the Pilgrimage

¹⁹¹ Tezcan, "Searching For Osman," pp. 116-124; and *DIA*, s.v. "Hoca Sâdeddin," by Şerafettin Turan, vol. 18, pp. 196-198.

¹⁹² ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 101 (dated March 5, 1622), fols. 36v-r: "*Il Re oltre la moglie, che ha hora sposato, disegna sposare 3 altre come la loro legge gli permette, tra quali una figliola del Mufti, che sia hora si scusa di dargliela, come cosa non mai usata da suoi precessori di sposar altre che le sue schiave, et di male conseguenze, et essemplio che fa accrescer anco quel poco gusto, che par che la Maesta Sua tenga verso di esso.*" Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, pp. 69-71.

¹⁹³ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 101 (dated March 5, 1622), fols. 36v-r.

¹⁹⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fols. 105r-v: "*Ma in un Prencipe cosi grande, giovine et capriccioso può vedersi questa, dell'altre resolutioni fatte senza consiglio, et ragione, vedendosi in molte cose allontanarsi egli assai dal costume de suoi maggiori, de quali sogliono li Ottomani esser molto tenaci, et particolarmente nelle amogliarsi con donne libere fuori del seraglio, che da loco non è stato mai fatto, et puo nel governo causar delle alterationi, per ciò il Mufti ha fatto sin hora quanto ha potuto per non gli dar la figliola, ma finalmente potendo resister alla sua volonta, ha convenuto dargliela, et la Maesta sua mandatogli il Chibini di 600 mille cecchini per dote, terzo giorno la fece trasferir nel serraglio vecchio, dove lei si ritorna consumando seco il matrimonio, et celebrandolo con solennità di feste, et di fuochi, ad mettendo poi la mattina seguente li Visiri a baciargli la veste, et rallegrarsene, col mezzo della quale, se riuscirà, et saprà farsi grata a sua maesta, e da creder, che il Mufti acquisterà seco grande autorità, et sara molto servitio della Serenita Vostra per la sua buona continuata affettazione verso di lei.*"

campaign.¹⁹⁵ As noted in the last chapter, Esad Efendi had similarly tried to change Osman's mind towards not waging a war against Poland, but he was not successful at that time. This time, as the sultan's father-in-law and a long-time advisor, Esad Efendi managed to convince Osman not to leave the capital for another uncertain and dangerous campaign.

While Osman himself got married with Muslim women and establish close relations with the highest-ranking *ulema*, he also married his two sisters with two viziers, thus formed political alliances among his ruling elite. These brother-in-laws were known as the royal *damads*.¹⁹⁶ In late March 1622, the sultan married Ayşe Sultan, the ex-wife of former Grand Vizier Nasuh Pasha, to the Governor of Van, Hafız Ahmed Pasha, and his other sister, to the Governor of Damascus, Murtaza Pasha.¹⁹⁷

On the other hand, back in February 1622, Osman made some important changes in the administrative ranks. He appointed his royal favorite, Chief Gardener Bebr Mehmed Agha, to the governorship of Egypt and replaced Mere Hüseyin Pasha therein. As seen before, Bebr Mehmed Agha had been charged with the duty to providing the security of the capital during the Polish campaign. Upon Osman II's return to Istanbul, he presented him a new royal barge, which he constructed out of his personal wealth for a small fortune.¹⁹⁸ As a royal favorite, Bebr Mehmed clearly

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., fol. 106v-r: “*et che l'invecchiata prudenza del Mufti divenuto suo suocero, habbia a servir per moderar con i suoi consigli l'ardente giovinezza del Re, divertirlo particolarmente dal viaggio predetto.*”

¹⁹⁶ On Ottoman royal *damads*, see Peirce, *Imperial Harem*, pp. 65-67; and *DIA*, s.v. “Damad,” by Özdemir Nutku, vol. 8, pp. 434-435; Tülay Artan “Royal weddings and the Grand Vezirate: Institutional and Symbolic Change in the Early Eighteenth Century”, *Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires: A Global Perspective*, eds. Duindam, Jeroen and Artan, Tülay and Kunt, Metin (Leiden: Brill 2011), pp. 339-399.

¹⁹⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fol. 106r: “*Continua tuttavia la Maestà sua gia molti giorni nel detto serraglio, dove ha dissegnato maritar in diversi, soggetti 200 di quelle donne che vi habitano, havendo anche concluso matrimonio di due sue sorelle; una fu moglie di Nasuf, in Cafis Bassa di Van, che hora si trova in viaggio di ritorno, et fu gia capitan del Mare, et l'altra minor nel suo Tornacchi, che è un capo de Giannizzeri, di quelle, che hano cura delle Grue di sua maesta, et di quella caccia un'altra ne voleva dar al figliolo, che fu Cemecogli, ma egli sin hora si scusa con la povertà, riuscendo il matrimonio con le Sultane ne per la molto spesa, et per il loco predominio sopra i mariti, peso granissimo, et intollerabile dai Bassa di conto mai procurato. è stata la maestà sua questa settimana piu d'una volta incognita nell'Arsanele, per veder se si sollecita il lavoro, et ha donato al Capitan Bassa doi Veste a tal effetto, il quale affretta hora grandemente quello delle galee per mar negro, che saranno venti fra pochi giorni all'ordine per partir.*” See also Tezcan, “Searching for Osman,” p. 334, n. 58.

¹⁹⁸ ASVe, SPAC, Registro.18/VIII, no. 86 (dated January 20, 1622, m.v.), fols. 23v-r: “*Il Chiosco co he nell'absenza del Re ha egli fatto fabricate e riuscito alla Maesta Sua molto grato poi che quando*

knew how to influence his master or how to ask for new royal favors. For instance, in order to secure his appointment to Egypt, he promised the sultan a total of 300.000 gold coins as a downpayment for the annual tribute of Egypt, which was worth over one million gold coins. According to the *bailo*, it was typically the sword-bearer of the sultan who were used to get appointed to the governorship of Egypt, but this time, it was granted to Bebr Mehmed Pasha, because the power of his wealth was the only measure in the eyes of Osman for appointments rather than the power of sword.¹⁹⁹

Tezcan claims that the appointments of Bebr Mehmed Agha to the governorship of Egypt, and of the sultan's brother-in-laws, Chief Falconer Murtaza Agha and Hafiz Pasha, to the governorships of Damascus and Diyarbakır, respectively, were all related to the sultan's secret plan to recruit a new army with which he aimed to create a secure zone in Egypt and the Levant.²⁰⁰ However, the Venetian *bailo*'s reports suggest a different scenario. First of all, these appointments were related or noted to the sultan's secret plan by any contemporary source. In the case of Bebr Mehmed Agha, as mentioned above, his appointment was evidently a result of the sultan's interest in procuring more cash and funds for his personal treasury, whose chief source was the annual tribute of Egypt. Moreover, Murtaza Agha was most probably appointed to the governorship of Damascus only after the aforementioned sultanic marriages took place at the end of March 1622, that is, there was not enough time to create a secure zone in the region. Moreover, according to Bostanzâde Yahya Efendi,

fu a vederlo vi(gli) trovo dentro oltre gl'altri ornamenti 200 mille scudi contanti che il Bustangi haveva fatto riporre in certi armari nell'apprir de quali si rallegro molto la vista del Re et gliene dono 10 mille."

¹⁹⁹ ASVe, SPAC, Registro. 18/VIII, no. 90 (dated February 5, 1621), fols. 36r-v: "*tanto più sarà necessarie qualche provisione quanto che tenendosi per ferma la designatione del Bustangi Bassi huomo rapacissimo in Bassa del Cairo, che per ottenerla ha promesso al Re la meta di quel Casna d'un anno avanti tratto, che importa 300 mille cecchini seguirà l'esempio del presente che ha espilato dalli numeri mercanti 80 mille piastre senza speranza di ricuperarle, se non si vuol apertamente romper col detto Bassa... È stato per il passato quali sempre solito, che il Bassalaggio del Cairo principale di tutti gl'altri, et di gran provechio si conferisca al scilitar del Re, che è quello, che gli porta la spada, ma questa volta per riserbarlo al Bustangi il Re ha conferito all'altro quello di Buda, mosso dall'effetto verso esso Bustangi guadagnato con la forza dell'oro, che è il solo unico mezzo con Sua Maestà."* Bebr Mehmed Pasha departed from the capital on February 19, 1622. See ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 94 (dated February 19, 1622, m.v.) fol. 46r: "*essende come predissi con le passate mie riverenti lettere a Vostra Serenita sequita l'elettione del Bustangi Bassi in Bassa del Cairo che sta di partenza."*

²⁰⁰ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," p. 238.

Osman II was intending to do a long hunting trip in and around Damascus after he would eliminate the army of Ibn Ma‘n in Tripoli.²⁰¹

Osman II resumed the preparations for his Pilgrimage campaign shortly after the aforementioned marriages of his are completed in the Old Palace. As a last resort, the ruling viziers called Aziz Mahmud Hudai, a well-known sufi sheikh in the capital, to act as a mediator on their behalf before the sultan and to dissuade Osman from going to campaign. But Aziz Mahmud Hudai could not do much. He failed in his mission to deter Osman II from his plans.²⁰² The *bailo* claims that all the government viziers and the Mufti Esad Efendi had to accept the sultan’s firmness in this matter. Just like in the case of his Polish campaign, Osman was truly fixated in realizing this Pilgrimage campaign, with the main aim of eliminating Ibn Ma‘n. According to his plans, Osman II would first stop Konya and then he would reach Damascus, which was also known as the first gathering station of the pilgrims to Mecca. In Damascus, he would also visit the well-known Islamic shrines.²⁰³

On April 16, 1622, the Venetian *bailo* wrote to his Senate, informing them about the Pilgrimage campaign of Osman II in that the sultan would depart from the capital within a month and that the dismissed Grand Vizier Hüseyin Pasha and the sultan’s brother-in-law Vizier Recep Pasha would accompany him. Meanwhile, Osman II wanted his Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha and Esad Efendi to stay in the capital. According to the *bailo*, it was uncertain whether or not the Deputy Grand Vizier Ahmed Pasha would be left in the capital as well.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ *Bostanzâde*, p. 210.

²⁰² ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fols. 168v-r: “*et pero si sono anche li Visiri valsi del mezo di Mahamut effendi Santon di Scuttari, sperando che le sue persuasioni, et autorità potesse scioglier l’animo del Re da questo voto, ma non ha fatto effetto.*”

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, fols. 167r-v: “*Non ostante le efficaci dissuasioni di tutti i Visiri et del Mufti medesimo, nel suo fisso, et fermo proponimento al viaggio predetto, dal quale vedendo essi Vesiri, non ostante le tante considerationi di stato, et gl’interessi in contrario, non poter divertirlo hanno tra loro consultato di tentarlo, doppo che la Maestà Sua si sarà incaminata, sperando con la difficulta del camino in viaggio tanto lungo, et gli deserti che si hanno da passar, et per altri rispetti de incursioni de Arabi, et di altri mali incontri, molto pericoloso, et incommodo persuadergli quello, che non possono hora col fargli trovar meglio di andar a Cogna, citta in Natolia, poco discosto di qua, o pur in Damasco, dove si travano molti sepoleri de lor Santoni, poiche scoprono il pensiero del detto viaggio esser entrato nell’animo della Maestà Sua piu per stimolo di devotione.*”

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, fols. 168r-v: “*Dissegna la Maesta sua mettersi in viaggio fra un mese in circa, et condur seco per quanto si dice Cusseim, Rezep, et quale che altro Visir, et voleva lasciar qui al governo il Primo, egli temendo della sua assenza di restar scavalcato da Cusseim, ha fatto tanto, che lo condurrà anche, esso del Caimecan che dovera restar qui, non si sa ancora il certo, ma si parla di Caffis, novo cognato del Gran Signore, o di Cussiem, che vien dal Cairo, ambidoi absent, non*

Similarly, Osman II planned to leave his imperial army in Rumeli under the command of Dilaver Pasha in the face of potential threats from rival European powers. The imperial soldiers in Rumeli opposed the recruitment of new soldiers for the sultan's pilgrimage campaign. The Venetian *bailo* notes that Osman II would not intentionally mobilize a large army so as not to make Abbas I, the Safavid shah, suspicious of his campaign, because it had already been speculated that the Safavid shah suspected a hidden agenda by the Ottoman sultan that he would attack Iran during his Pilgrimage campaign. In order to show goodwill and to quell the suspicions of the Safavid shah, Osman sent Abbas valuable gifts as well as noted that he only recruited a small army of 2000 Janissaries and 1000 *sipahis* for his campaign.²⁰⁵ Overall, the total number of people who would participate in this campaign was estimated to be around 10.000, including Osman's two new wives.

Osman planned to spend the Ramadan festival in Jerusalem. Moreover, as a ritual of every pilgrimage year, a new cover for the Ka'aba was prepared with the sultan's name on it. Traditionally, this cover was sent to the sheriffs of Mecca and Medina well before the pilgrimage season. This time, however, the cover would be delivered to the sultan before his planned departure from Jerusalem in October 1622. Afterwards, Osman II would pass to Mecca to make his pilgrimage together with other Muslims. After Mecca, the sultan would then visit the tomb of Prophet Muhammed in Medina.²⁰⁶ Accordingly, the imperial government worked diligently to finish all the necessary logistical and military preparations for Osman's pilgrimage

conosciuti da me, ma per quanto intendo di pessima natura, et inclinazione, ma si crede che sopra intendente a questo et superior all'istesso Caimecan sia per lasciarvi il Mufti, la figlia del quale, o altre donne, non si sa ancora, se condurrà seco."

²⁰⁵ Ibid., fol. 168r: "*Quando alle militie non dissegna di condur altri, che 2 mille Giannizzeri et mille spai, et cio per non insospettir il Persiano, che questa sua mossa sia contra di esso, seben d'alcuni si va speculando, che anzi il principale fine del Gran Signore sia questo per indur quel Rè, con tale timore a mandarli il presente delle sede."*

²⁰⁶ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 122 (dated May 14, 1622), fols. 267r-268v: "*Mentre scrivo passano gran numero de cavalli, et camelli a Scutrai per il viaggio del Re, che dissegna condur seco 10 mille persone in tutto, cioè 2 mille Giannizari altre tanti spai, il resto gente di suo servitio, et dei grandi, che lo seguiranno, dicendosi anco, che condurra la figliola del Mufti, et un'altra sua moglie: si fermerà tutto il tempo del Ramasano, et del Bairan grande in Gierusalem vistando quei santi luochi, tenuti dal santo sepolero in poi, non credendo Turchi la morte di H.S, in molta venerate, dove, dio voglia, che sotto titolo di devotione non faccia qualche alterate a pregiudico di essi: partirà poi di la per la Meca, che sarà coperta per le mani del Rè, di un panno d'oro molto ricco, che a tal effetto porta seco, et che son soliti i Re Ottomani mandar ogn'anno alla Casa di detta Meca, dove dissegna trovarvisi al Bairan piccolo, che quest'anno cade al prossimo Ottobre, tempo proprio della visita di quel luoco, et nel quale tutti i pellegrini Mussulmani vi capitano, passando a Medina poiche giornate dicosto, dove è la sepoltura di Macometto, se ben vivono tuttavia i vesiri in speranza di poter per camino divertirlo ancora dal detto viaggio."*

campaign. Yet, these preparations were lessened by the Polish campaign. For instance, the sultan had to prefer a smaller royal tent and allocated fewer numbers of horses and camels.²⁰⁷

3.3 Waiting for a Rebellion

As noted before, various dissident views and voices had been already raised about Osman's prospective journey. According to the Venetian *bailo*,

The sultan is very much fixated on the idea of pilgrimage. It brings a dangerous consideration of his deposition that come from all aforesaid voices. The sultan has amused it since now. When it would be forcibly seen to do so, for the sake of Republic, it would conceive so great hatred and indignation against him that would be danger and wanted openly to end the campaign, and sent the sultan to the cage for which may have been forced to stop. Because, it has been agreed to make every effort to do every action for purging him from such impression. I have known very well that all viziers, the mufti, the sultan's tutor and the chief eunuch [Süleyman Agha] and every other have been against the sole and unique object. They have to cancel the campaign.²⁰⁸

This opposition came not just from the ruling viziers, but also from the sultan's chief favorites and advisors, most notably, Hacı Ömer Efendi, and Süleyman Agha. These power-brokers of the sultan were well aware of the growing uneasiness and the dissident voices against the sultanate of Osman II in the capital. However, they were clearly not successful in persuading Osman II to abort his campaign plans.²⁰⁹ Moreover, they must have been aware of the alienation of the campaign-weary Janissaries and *sipahis*, as well as the people in the capital from Osman II. On May

²⁰⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 169r: “*Volendo il Gran Signore veder partita l’una, et l’altra Armata, ha sollecitato tanto Il Captain Bassa che quella per il Mar negro di 17 galee non essendosi per la fretta potuto arrivar alle 20 è uscita da questo canale alli 11 del corrente transferendosi a Bisictas.*”

²⁰⁸ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 120 (dated May 11, 1622), fol. 238r-v: “*trovandosi il Re tanto fermo, et fisso nel pensiero del detto viaggio, che ruina consideratione è rispetto, ne il pericolo istesso della sua propria depositione che dalla voce di tutti gli vien predetta, ha potuto sin hora divertirlo, quando si vedesse costretto a farlo per causa della Republica, concepirebbe così grande odio e sdegno contra di lei, che sarà pericolo, che con aperta rottura volesse sfogarla, et mandar ad effetto la cagione, per la quale fosse stato sforzato a fermarsi, pero convenendosi far ogn’ opera per purgarlo da tali impressioni, et conoscendo molto ben io, haver in ciò tutti i Visiri, Mufti, Coza, Chislar, et ogni altro contrario per il solo, et unico oggetto, che hanno di distornar il detto viaggio.*” See also Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 34.

²⁰⁹ More interestingly, in spite of their opposition to the Pilgrimage campaign, most contemporary Ottoman authors accuse the sultan's favorites of not diverting the mind of the sultan from this campaign as well as recruiting a new army. I will further discuss this problem in the next chapter.

11, 1621, the Venetian *bailo* wrote a detailed report about to this alienation of the imperial army and the common people in the capital. According to the Venetian *bailo*, the imperial soldiers detested the pilgrimage campaign. They began to speak freely of the Osman II's deposition whether he carried the pilgrimage campaign out. The Venetian Bailo claims that they alienated from Osman II and his reign due to his tight fist nature and his intervention to the social life such wandering incognito in the streets of the capital, giving assault to the taverns and castigating the Muslims.²¹⁰ On the other hand, the contemporary Ottoman writer Peçevi claims that, a few days before the rebellion, a rumor started to circulate in the streets of Istanbul in that the preparations for the sultan's pilgrimage to Mecca was nothing but a deception and that the sultan in fact planned to relocate the capital from Istanbul to Cairo. This rumor deepened the alienation of the imperial army towards the sultan.²¹¹ Soon, all the accumulated grievances, discontent and alienation turned into a full storm, targeting directly Osman and his sultanate. On May 14, 1622, the Venetian *bailo* reported that,

Some speak very freely from each other about a great revolution and about the sultan's deposition for the usual difficulties in their payments.²¹²

Only four days after this dispatch, a massive rebellion erupted in the capital. At the beginning, though, the main target of the mutiny was the sultan's royal favorites.

²¹⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 120 (dated May 11, 1622), fol. 240r-v: "*combattendo la sua sola fissa, et forma volonta contra quella di tutti gl'altri, cosi grandi, come piccioli, et di tutte le militie in partizione, li quali detestano esso viaggio, et liberamente parlano della sua depositione, se lo effettuerà, et non dimeno si mostra egli pertinace in esso, come in ogn' altra cosa che gli cade nell'animo senza voler ascoltar alcuno, scoprendosi sempre più l'alienatione delle militie, del popolo da lui per la sua avarizia, et modi di proceder diversi da suoi passati, continuando più che mai a vagar ogni giorno incognito per la Citta a dar l'assalto alle taverne, et castigar i Musulmani che si trova in esso armato di certa coravina per dubbio della sua vita, et facendo altre cose tali, che lo rendono odioso et formidabili ad ogn'uno.*" Also see Bostanzâde, p. 225; and Tûgi, *Musîbetnâme*. pp. 13-14.

²¹¹ Peçevi, II, p. 380.

²¹² ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 121 (dated May 14, 1622), fols. 259r-260v: "*temendo tutti per la mala volontà delle militie verso il Re, et questo suo viaggio, che resterar quasi tutte qui, et per le solite difficoltà nei loro pagamenti di qualche grande rivoluzione, parlandosi, come ho scritto, molto liberamente da ogn'uno della sua della sua depositione.*" See also Tûgi, *Musîbetnâme*, pp. 5-6.

3.4 The Three Days of the Rebellion

At dawn on Wednesday, May 18, 1622, the Janissaries, the *sipahis*, and the people of the capital gathered at the Süleymaniye Mosque and rose in revolt. They then marched towards the neighborhood of Aksaray, where the Janissary barracks (Yeni Odalar) were located.²¹³ On the way, most soldiers were convinced that the sultan's advisors were guilty for they misguided him in imperial affairs. Moreover, some rebels claimed that the sultan had a hidden agenda to recruit a new army from Anatolia and Egypt under the cover of performing a pilgrimage.²¹⁴ Meanwhile, the royal tent was ready to be moved to Üsküdar, where final provisions for the pilgrimage campaign had already been carried over the Bosphorus. Shortly after the meeting at Janissary barracks, the imperial soldiers moved towards the Mosque of Sultan Mehmed so as to join with a large crowd composed of common people from every ranks. Thereafter, they marched along the district of Karaman, where a group of low-ranking *ulema* joined them. Then they all together came to the Hippodrome, which had been the ceremonial-social center of the capital, today known as the Sultanahmed Square. They then managed to prevent the provision boats from passing over Üsküdar.²¹⁵

Meanwhile, Dilaver Pasha asked the Agha of the Janissaries and other officers of corps to convince the angry crowd to end their mutiny. Yet, the crowd instead attacked them.²¹⁶ The crowd decided to ask for a *fetva* from the Mufti Esad Efendi in order to legitimize their actions and demands regarding the execution of the sultan's

²¹³ Tûgi, *Musibetnâme*, pp. 5-7.

²¹⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 281r-282v: “*la cosa è passata con accidenti forse maggiori che mai nella Casa Osmano siano successi et in questo modo, che continuando Osman nella sua ordinata risolute(risolutine) al viaggio della Mecca contra la volonta delle militie, et dei professioni della legge in particolar mentre s'imbarcava sopra tre Galee i suoi padiglioni et gran quantità di sue robbe per passarla a scutari le militie cosi de sipahi come gianizzari unite in numero più di 30 mille et gran quantità di popolo mal disposto come ho più molte scritto verso di esso, anticipatamente impresse dai detti professioni o vero, o falso et fosse che egli portasse seco tutto il tesoro con fine assoldar in Asia, et metter in piedi una nuova militia per licenziar et disfarsi di questa della qualsi trovava per la mala prova della guerra di Polonia.*” Tûgî, *Musibetnâme*, p. 9. Also see *Bostanzâde*, pp. 199-200; Roe, *Negotiations*, pp. 43-49; and Nuh Arslantaş and Yaron Ben Naeh, eds., *Anonim Bir İbranic Kroniğe Göre 1622-1624 Yıllarında Osmanlı Devleti ve İstanbul* (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), p. 32. Other writers, Hasan Beyzâde and Peçevi, did not mention anything about a plan for a new army. I will examine the rumors about the recruitment of a new army in the next chapter.

²¹⁵ Tûgi, *Musibetnâme*, pp. 6-8.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

advisors.²¹⁷ Esad Efendi provided the legal opinion to the rebels in which he sanctioned the execution of the advisors. Then, the crowd moved against the house of Hacı Ömer Efendi and told him to convey their petitions to the sultan, but the royal tutor had escaped from home. Upon this development, the crowd plundered his house.²¹⁸

Next, the rebels went to the house of Dilaver Pasha and similarly asked him to be their representative of grievances before the sultan. At this moment, they particularly demanded from the sultan to cancel his pilgrimage campaign and to punish all those responsible persons behind this plan. However, Dilaver Pasha ordered his guards to shoot at the rebels, which killed a few of them, but wounded many.²¹⁹ Meanwhile, Osman II learnt about the uprising and declared that he cancelled his prospective campaign. Yet, he refused to deliver Süleyman Agha and Hacı Ömer Efendi to the rebels as they asked for execution.²²⁰ The rebels decided to go to the public markets to take arms for themselves, but the artisans persuaded them not to steal their property. As it was getting dark, the mob decided to disperse only to gather again at the Hippodrome the following day.²²¹

On Thursday, May 19, 1622, the second day of the rebellion, the outnumbered rebels gathered with arms in the districts of Yeni Odalar and Etmeydanı. They marched once again towards the Mosque of Sultan Mehmed while sending delegates to the leading figures of the *ulema*, in order to invite or force them to join the rebellion. All the leading figures of the *ulema* came to the mosque so as to consult with the rebels. Afterwards, the rebels marched to the Hippodrome. Among these *ulema* were Mufti Esad Efendi, *Nakibü'l-eşraf* Şerif Gubari Efendi, *Zekeriyazâde*

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 21. In fact, among the contemporary Ottoman authors, only Tûgî mentions the legal opinion of the Mufti during the rebellion.

²¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 23-24. See also *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, p. 939; *Peçevi*, II, pp. 381-383; and Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 46.

²¹⁹ Tûgî, *Musibetnâme*, p. 25; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 939-40; *Peçevi*, II, pp. 381-383; and *Bostanzâde*, p. 200. ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 290r-v: “*per altro grandemente disgustata facevo in modo et le dette militie aggiunta all’ordinario odio questa impressione tutte unite et accompagnate da quantità di popolo ridussero alla Piazza del Hippodromo, correndo nell’istesso tempo una parte d’esse alla Casa del Coza et vesto’ del tutto saccheggiata et egli di salvo’ con la fuga, et un’altra a’ guella del Primo Vezir, che fa difesa dai suoi salvandosi a ne di essi, si andarono poi le dette militie tirando più vicino al Serraglio seguitate dal popolo assicurando li bottegeni et altri, che posti in gran spavento chiusero.*”

²²⁰ Tûgî, *Musibetnâme*, p. 33.

²²¹ Ibid., pp.20-27; and *Bostanzâde*, p. 200.

Yahya Efendi, Kafzâde Faizi Efendi, Bostanzâde Mehmed Efendi, Azimzâde Haleti Efendi, Kethüda Mustafa Efendi, Ömer Efendi, who was the preacher of Ayasofya, Sivasi Efendi, who was the preacher of the Ahmediyye Mosque, İbrahim Efendi, who was the preacher of Cerrah Pasha Mehmed Mosque, as well as the Derviş Efendi, and Kadızade Efendi, who were the prominent sufi sheiks of the period.²²² These leading *ulema* asked the rebels what they expected from this massive rebellion.²²³ They replied that they demanded the execution of the those ruling elite of Osman II and said that their death list included the royal tutor, Hacı Ömer Efendi, the chief eunuch of the imperial harem, Süleyman Agha, Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha and his deputy Ahmed Pasha, as well as Baki Pasha, the Chief Treasurer, and Nasuh Agha, the head of the Janissaries.²²⁴

After this meeting at the Hippodrome, a group of *ulema* chosen to represent the rebels appeared before Osman II at the Topkapı Palace. They conveyed the demands of the rebels to the sultan, but Osman II showed an obstinate refusal to their submissions.²²⁵ The delegation were convinced that the sultan would never execute his favorite men, so they left the presence of Osman II to inform the rebels about their failed mission.²²⁶ Upon hearing that their demands were not met by the sultan, the rebels attacked the Topkapı Palace. They were able to pass through the gates with the help of the guardsmen of the palace. They then divided themselves into three groups in order to find the six men in their death list.²²⁷ After a few hours of searching, the rebels broke into the imperial harem. Meanwhile, some of the rebels

²²² Tûgi, *Musîbetnâme*, pp. 29-31. Unlike Tûgi, Hasan Beyzâde and Bostanzâde claims that the members of the *ulema* were forced to join to the rebellion, see *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, p. 941 and *Bostanzâde*, p. 201.

²²³ “*Gulüvv-i âmmden murâdunuz nedür?*” Tûgi, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 38.

²²⁴ According to Bostanzâde Yahya, there were some other high-ranking members of the government, such as the chief judges of Rumeli and Anatolia, initially in the death-list of the rebels, Bostanzâde speaks ill of them. See *Bostanzâde*, pp. 193-197.

²²⁵ Tûgi, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 41; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 941-42; and *Peçevi*, II, pp. 356-357. ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 290r-v: “*Tutte le bosteghe et case, che non li saria fatto mal alcuno come hano anche osservato: Osman che era nel Serraglio, sentito questo tumulto, et credendo nascer per la sua andata alla Mecca, procuro d’acquietarli, mandando fuori alle dette militie suo Katicumacum (?) col quale gli prometteva di desister dal viaggio predetto, ma esse non contente di questo dimandorno le teste del Primo Vesir, Coza, Chislar, et alcuni altri dal Consiglio de quali credevano proceder nel Re, sotto pretesto del Viaggio della Mecca, la macchinazione predetta, il Ré per natura fermo, et estimado nel suo proposito non volsi assentire a questa dimanda.*”

²²⁶ Tûgi, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 42.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 942-943; and *Peçevi*, II, p. 382.

found Mustafa I in a room, where he had been confined for the last four years, and freed him.²²⁸

When Osman noticed that his uncle Mustafa was taken out from his room, he understood that he had no option but to turn over his favorite viziers and courtiers to the rebels. The sultan first sent Dilaver Pasha and Süleyman Agha, but he refused to give Hacı Ömer Efendi, Baki Pasha, Ahmed Pasha and Nasuh Agha. Then, Osman II asked the rebels to bring Mustafa I back into the palace, but the rebels did not obey his orders. Instead, they took a step further and forced all the *ulema* to pledge allegiance to their new sultan, Mustafa I. In the midst of these events, Kafzade Faizi Efendi died of a heart attack. After this *de facto* enthronement of Mustafa I, the rebels transferred him to the Old Palace, where his mother, Halime Sultan, lived.²²⁹

Upon this development, Osman II ordered his new Chief Gardener, Mahmud Agha, to immediately provide a ship and load it with some treasury, but Mahmud Agha informed the sultan that all the imperial gardeners had escaped from the palace. Meanwhile, a group of rebels freed prisoners from the prisons of Baba Cafer and Galata. Others plundered the houses of the chief treasurer, the judge of Istanbul and the royal tutor. Osman II made a move by appointing Kara Ali Agha as Agha of Janissaries, but the rebels in return attacked the house of Ali Agha in order to kill him and plunder his house. Ali Agha barely escaped from the rebels.²³⁰

On the other side of Istanbul, a rumor spread amongst the rebels that Osman II planned to attack the Old Palace in an attempt to kill his uncle Mustafa I. Thus the rebels took Mustafa I and Halime Sultan and transferred them to Orta Camii, a mosque near the Janissary barracks.²³¹ In this mosque, Mustafa I also appointed Ali Agha as the Agha of the Janissaries, and this time the rebel soldiers accepted him. When Osman II was informed of the relocation Mustafa I at Orta Camii, he appointed Vizier Hüseyin Pasha as grand vizier. By this time, Hüseyin Pasha and Mahmud Agha had advised Osman to go to the headquarter of Janissaries, known as

²²⁸ Tügi, *Musîbetnâme*, pp. 49-51; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, p. 944; *Peçevi*, II, p. 382; *Bostanzâde*, p. 219; Roe, *Negotiations*, pp. 46-47; and Arslantaş and Naeh, *İbranice Kroniğe*, p. 33.

²²⁹ Tügi, *Musîbetnâme*, pp. 51-59 and p. 64; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 944-945; *Peçevi*, II, pp. 382-383; Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 47; and Arslantaş and Naeh, *İbranice Kroniğe*, pp. 34-35.

²³⁰ Tügi, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 66 and pp. 80-81; and Arslantaş and Naeh, *İbranice Kroniğe*, pp. 35-37.

²³¹ Tügi, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 69-70; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 945-946; and *Peçevi*, II, p. 385.

the Ağakapısı, so that he could personally persuade Kara Ali Agha and other officers to cease their support from Mustafa I. When Osman met with Kara Ali Agha, the agha promised Osman that he would ask the imperial soldiers at Orta Camii to bring Sultan Mustafa I back to the Topkapı Palace.²³²

On Friday, May 20, 1622, the third day of the rebellion, Kara Ali Agha was brutally killed in the courtyard of the Orta Camii while trying to persuade the rebellious soldiers to return Mustafa I to Osman II.²³³ In the following hours, Mustafa appointed his brother-in-law Davud Pasha as grand vizier and several trusted men of Davud Pasha to crucial positions in the imperial government. In particular, Mustafa I promoted ringleaders of the mutiny to the high-ranking offices in order to consolidate his power against Osman II.²³⁴ Afterwards, the rebels decided to bring Osman II and Hüseyin Pasha to the Orta Camii from Ağakapısı, but Hüseyin Pasha was killed while he was trying to escape. Osman II was forcefully brought to the mosque, where it was said that the rebels insulted psychically and even tortured him.²³⁵

In the Orta Camii, Osman II tried his best to negotiate with his rebellious soldiers, but he failed to convince them to re-accept him as a sultan. Particularly, Davud Pasha, the grand vizier of Mustafa I, persuaded the rebels to take Osman to

²³² Tügi, *Musîbetnâme*, pp. 75-81; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III. p. 946; *Bostanzâde*, pp. 222-223; and ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 290r-291v: “*Ieri mattina al spuntar del giorno, armate di tutto punto, perché il giorno prima, parla maggior parte erano disarmate si ridussero alle porte del Serraglio in maggior numero non essendo state bostanzi le persuasioni del loro Aga, a cui diedero delle sassate ne quelle di Cusseim Bassa che per ordine del Rè promise ai Giannizzeri presenti 300 cecchini di donativo acciò si disunissero dai sipahi di ritenerli, in modo che sfollate le porte di serraglio che fecero poca difesa, entrarono nei cortili scrivo all’appartamento reale dove trovato il chislaragasi lo fecero in mille pezzi, come anco 15 altri eunuchi, che non li volsero insegnar dove si trovava Mustafa, risolte di farlo imperatore: uno de quali in fine li mostro una Cacca sotteranea quale Osman, sentito il tumulto l’havea fatto ripore, dove entrati con li spahi lo cavorno fuori, ridotto in tanta estenuatione per esser stato in quel luoco doi giorni senza cibo, et apena poteva formar parola ,et Re ricreatolo (?) con un poco di acqua ricercata da esso, lo gridorno imperatore , che lo condussero in Cocchio nel serraglio vecchio , dove si trovava sua madre, stando tutti li vesiri et grandi per timore delle loro teste dal furore popolare retirati et rinchiusi, essendo stato prima da Scuttari dove era fuggito, ritento et condotto di qua Dilaver-Primo Vesir il quale dalle militie resto in un momento in mille parti sbrenato.”*

²³³ Tügi, *Musîbetnâme*, pp. 81-82; *Bostanzâde*, pp. 223-224; Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 47; and ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no.125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 291r-v.

²³⁴ Tügi, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 84.

²³⁵ Tügi, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 87-88; *Peçevi*, II, p. 385; *Bostanzâde*, pp. 226-227; and Arslantaş and Naeh, *İbranice Kroniçe*, pp. 36-37.

the dungeon at Yedikule, where he was allegedly tortured to death.²³⁶ This tragic end of the young sultan has been reported by the *bailo* as follows:

Today, there will be not the imperial council for quelling the tumults of the army and the people that demand other executions and it is said to be responsible for the death of Osman in motion, because they considered only his deposition, not his regicide.²³⁷

According the *bailo*'s report on May 28, 1622, the imperial army and the people accused Davud Pasha of being behind the regicide of Osman II.²³⁸ Indeed, both the imperial soldiers and the common people did not consider their actions against Osman II as a regicide. They rather believed that they simply deposed a sultan and then pledged allegiance to a new one. In their eyes, the murder of Osman was a truly unexpected. It was evident for them that Davud Pasha could not have dared to order the murder of Osman II without the knowledge of Sultan Mustafa and Halime Sultan, who must have feared that the survival of Osman would mean another round of dynastic struggle over the Ottoman throne just like they had experienced back in 1618.

Conclusion

When Osman II came back to Istanbul from his Polish campaign, he faced a growing discontent by the common people, because they had been experiencing famine and poverty. However, the sultan ignored this discontent and instead extended his interventions in the daily economic and social life of the people in the capital. His

²³⁶ Tûgi, *Musibetnâme*, pp. 88-106; *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 947-948; *Peçevi*, II, pp. 387-388; *Bostanzâde*, pp. 227-229; Roe, *Negotiations*, pp. 47-48; Arslantaş and Naeh, *İbrance Kroniğe*, pp. 37-38; and ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fol. 293v.

²³⁷ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 293r-294v: "*Hoggi non sarà divano per acquietar prima il tumulto delle militie, et populo che dimandano altre essecutioni, et che si dice esser per la morte di Osman in moto, perché era ben sua intentione che fosse deposto ma non privato di Vita.*"

²³⁸ SDC, filza 93, no. 126 (dated May 28, 1622), fol. 274r: "*Osman appresso quella di Acmat suo padre con le cerimonie consuete, et con manifesti segni di dolor nei grandi et populo che l'accompagnavano con molte lacrime tanto piu che egli nella morte nostro la intrepidezza et vigoria solita diffendendosi dalla forza di dieci huomini destinati a questa quali furono necessitati a ferirlo con una piccata in testa altrimenti non potevano alterarlo et strangolarlo di quel modo, che i Prencipi di questa casa con soliti farsi morire: essendo grandemente: dispiaciuto al populo et alle militie et doppo morto gli sia stat con tanto poco rispetto al sangue reale recisa una orecchia, et portatala a Mustafa per segno della sua morte come poi gli fa anco portato il cadavero per assicurarlo che fosse seguita; il che tutto viene attribuito a Daut Primo Vesir, sapendo le militie molto ben, che Mustafa, il quale per la sua insensagine.*" See also Tûgi, *Musibetnâme*, pp. 105-106; *Peçevi*, II, pp. 387-388; and *Hasan Beyzâde*, III, pp. 947-948.

prohibition of the use of tobacco and wine, the two basic and highly popular consumer products in the capital brought great shock more to the traders than the customers, since the markets had been suffering from an economic depression for almost a year. On the other hand, the sultan increased his direct involvements in the social life of the capital, especially after he unexpectedly lost his only son, the four-month-old Prince Ömer. Upon this tragic loss, Osman frequently travelled incognito in the streets of the capital and punished many wrongdoers, including several Janissary officers and common people. Such aggressive and brutal actions by the sultan in turn increased the alienation of the imperial army and the common people towards himself. In a sense, the massive rebellion that cost his throne and his life was the final stage of this alienation.

The failed siege of Hotin and the death of his son made Osman II more ambitious to lead another imperial campaign in person. He found this opportunity when he heard about the rebellion of Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n. However, he neither wanted to command his imperial army in a second Polish campaign, nor he wished his imperial army to join his so-called Pilgrimage campaign, because he knew that his imperial army had been accusing him of mismanaging the fiscal and military affairs. In return, the sultan accused his imperial army of not showing notable performance during the siege of Hotin. Accordingly, the tension between the sultan and his imperial army escalated with every action of Osman II. In this regard, for instance, his marriages to free Muslim women were considered to be violations of the Ottoman dynastic tradition. With every such opposition or criticism, Osman II showed more arrogant and stubborn personality, which in turn diminished his sovereign legitimacy and authority in the eyes of his imperial army and the public.

In undertaking the Pilgrimage Campaign, Osman's plan was to suppress the rebellion of Ibn Ma'n and then move towards Mecca to perform the pilgrimage. However, as seen from the dispatches of the Venetian *bailo*, such a campaign was estimated to take place for almost 20 months, which meant that the sultan would be away from the capital for a long time. This was a serious problem in that the payrolls of the imperial army left behind as well as the cash flow in the markets in the capital would be seriously affected in the absence of the sultan.

Moreover, such a journey was risky for there had been reports about a serious military attack from the Habsburgs and Poland in the western frontiers. However, the

sultan seemed indifferent to these reports. Furthermore, he did not listen to the objections raised by his ruling viziers and advisors who tried hard to convince him to cancel his pilgrimage and campaign plans based on the potential security and fiscal problems in the capital. Overall, the stubborn character of the sultan was once again evident.

When Osman II accelerated his preparations for the pilgrimage campaign, more and more dissident voices were raised. The opposition to his campaign soon turned into a real threat towards his deposition. These opponents were chiefly from within the imperial army and the common people who now spoke openly about Osman's deposition in the public. The diverse rumors about the sultan's secret agenda spread through the capital and convinced more soldiers and people to join the ranks of a rebellion.

Shortly before the rebellion, at least two rumors spread to the capital. The first one was that the sultan was about to relocate the capital from İstanbul to Cairo. The second rumor was about the imminent executions of the sultan's uncle Mustafa I and his brother Prince Murad. Then, during the initial days of the rebellion, there was a talk among the imperial soldiers about a new army to be recruited in Anatolia. Upon these rumors, the imperial soldiers accused Osman II of having a secret plan under the pretext of performing a pilgrimage that he was going to abolish the existing imperial army and replace it with a new one.

The regicide of Osman II has two different phases. In the first phase, the rebellion against his sultanate was mainly related to the mismanagement of fiscal and military affairs by Osman II, a problem which had been witnessed for over a year in the midst of a serious famine and a failed Polish campaign. However, the rebellious soldiers considered the rumors about the recruitment of a new mercenary army a much more serious offense and thus legitimized their opposition against the sultan by pointing out his eagerness to undertake the Pilgrimage campaign to Mecca.

The second phase was solely about Osman II and his style of rule. The young sultan quickly became a target in the eyes of his imperial soldiers as they already considered his deposition a week before his regicide. However, at the beginning, the aim of their rebellion shifted from Osman II to his royal favorites who had been very influential in the business of rule. Particularly, his trusted advisors were accused of

supporting the sultan's idea to recruit a new army. In the end, the rebels turned against their ruler for good. They entered the palace and managed to enthrone Mustafa I. However, it was not their intention to kill Osman II when they took him to the dungeon at Yedikule. The Grand Vizier of Mustafa I, Kara Davud Pasha, they argued, in effect ordered the execution of the sultan. It is quite probably that Halime Sultan and Mustafa I also wanted this regicide as they were afraid of the possibility that Osman could still muster a force to take back his throne, which he occupied for only four years.

CHAPTER 4

THE RECRUITMENT OF A NEW ARMY: SECRET PLAN OR RUMOR

On Friday, May 20 1622, the Venetian *bailo* Giorgio Giustinian sent an immediate report to his senate about the regicide of Osman II:

On Friday, the soldiers and the people deposed Sultan Osman from the imperial throne and enthroned his uncle Sultan Mustafa. I have written before to Your Serenity, the matter is perhaps passed with greater mishaps but these never happened in the house of Osman in this way. Sultan Osman continued against the will of soldiers and the *ulema* in his resolve order to the campaign of Mecca. In particular, while his pavilions taking on board of three galleys and passing the great number of his robes to Üsküdar impressed early the soldiers such as the Janissaries and the sipahis united 30 thousands soldiers, great number of people and the *ulema* that were ill-disposed against the sultan. Whether true or false he would take away all treasuries with him in order to recruit army in Asia and establish a new army so as to dismiss and dismantle those soldiers for their ill effort in the Polish war.²³⁹

The rebellion finally took place in the capital. However, the Venetian *bailo* seems to have doubted the accusation of the recruitment of a new army. He had been reporting to his senate about the alienation of the imperial army and the people of the capital as well as the actions of Osman II regarding fiscal mismanagement in imperial affairs for months. But now, Osman II was accused of having a secret plan under the cover of the pilgrimage to Mecca to recruit a new army in Asia so as to eradicate the Janissaries and the *sipahis*. The *bailo* Giustinian seems to have been in doubt about the accusation as he was questioning “whether true or false”. Indeed, it was not possible to verify the accusation made by the rebellious soldiers, because all the accused persons were killed in the rebellion. Yet, whether it was true or not, the literature on Osman II has been predominantly influenced by the accusation of the

²³⁹ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 125 (dated May 20, 1622), fols. 289r-290v. 5 years after the report, in 1627, the *bailo* Guistinian represented a general report about his term in İstanbul to his Senate. He continued to his same arguments in his immediate reports about the rebellion. He still could not verify the accusation about the secret plan of Osman II, but differently he added with his new army, the sultan would have pursued of conquering all Europe, see *Giustinian*, pp. 553.

recruitment of a new army to eradicate the Janissaries and the *sipahis* in the empire.²⁴⁰

This chapter examines the accusation of the so-called recruitment that circulated as a rumor in the capital against Osman II. Particularly, my discussion focuses on the paradoxes that the accusation, cited in different contemporary sources, contains. This chapter claims that the rumor about the unfounded accusation was probably fabricated on the eve of Osman II's departure for the pilgrimage to provoke neutral soldiers and people of the capital to join the ranks of the rebellion. However, I observe that it also has inspired some contemporary authors such as Tûgî and The English ambassador Roe to change the axis of the opposition from the sultan to his favorites in their narratives. Most particularly, they brought the accusation of Osman II's secret plan to the forefront due to the rebellion and wrote his favorites as the main supporters of the sultan's secret plan.

The first part of the chapter examines the accusation of the recruitment of a new army in Asia. It compares all contemporary authors who narrated the alleged secret plan of Osman II. The second part of the chapter analyzes the accusation as a rumor that supposedly provoked neutral soldiers in the imperial army and people of the capital to join the rebellion. This part also asks several questions about the sultan's aim in leaving his imperial army at the capital, which essentially started the rumor on the eve of the Pilgrimage campaign.

4.1 The Alleged Secret Plan

The sources of the accusation regarding the recruitment of a new army were ambiguous. A rebellious retired soldier, Tûgî, was the leading accuser of the sultan's alleged secret plan. He claims that the information about the so-called secret plan leaked from the imperial palace servants at the very beginning of the rebellion.

²⁴⁰ The literature of Osman II embraced the accusation of the recruiting a new army from mercenary soldiers in Asia that would eradicate the Janissaries and the *sipahis*. The reason might be linked with the dominant source that was used by following writers. In this manner, one might assert that Tûgî influenced the leading historians such as Kâtib Çelebi and Naîmâ. Their writing on the regicide of Osman II was strikingly similar to the Tûgî's narrative. These two very well known historians wrote their narrative on the regicide of Osman II under the influence of Tûgî's account. On the other hand, the Ottoman official documents were all about the provision of the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. Naturally the alleged secret plan of the sultan was not mentioned in these sources. However, Baki Tezcan asserts that one cannot expect the official documents reveal the secret plan of the sultan. It was written according to the secret plan under the cover of pilgrimage campaign. Naturally, It should not have mentioned of the secret plan, see Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," pp. 382-383, n. 145.

According to Tûgî, a halberdier of the Old Palace, Eski Yusuf, was appointed to recruit this so-called new army for Osman II under the cover of providing provisions during the imperial pilgrimage to Mecca. In fact, Eski Yusuf was allegedly charged for recruiting Syrian and Turcoman mercenary soldiers for this new army of the sultan. Moreover, Tûgî claims that Osman II sent imperial orders to his governors for the recruitment of mercenary soldiers and the removal of the imperial soldiers in the province. With his new army of *segban*, composed of the mercenary soldiers, Osman II allegedly planned to return to the capital and eradicate the Janissaries and the *sipahis*.²⁴¹

For Osman II's secret plan, Tûgî accused the Chief Eunuch Süleyman Agha of provoking the sultan to the secret plan. Süleyman Agha was the leading adviser for the new army in Anatolia. He induced the sultan about the failure of the siege in Hotin and accused the imperial army of showing poor performance during the Polish campaign. He advised the sultan to recruit a new army in Syria and Egypt because in these regions mercenary soldiers were known to be very good soldiers who could serve the desired glories of the sultan. Moreover, Tûgî accused Hacı Ömer Efendi, as another leading figure in this recruitment process, but according to Tûgî, Hacı Ömer Efendi also had a hidden agenda for the pilgrimage campaign. He allegedly wanted revenge on the Sheriff of Mecca, because he had exiled his brother from Mecca. Tûgî claims that because of this, Hacı Ömer Efendi could have removed the Sheriff of Mecca. According to Tûgî's manuscript, the third leading figure of the secret plan was Dilaver Pasha. Tûgî did not to accuse Dilaver Pasha directly of having a place in the recruitment process, but he rather portrayed him as an innocent figure. Because Dilaver Pasha was only obligated to accept the imperial demand due to the fear of losing his office position in the Grand Vizierate.²⁴²

The English ambassador Thomas Roe brought Dilaver Pasha as a forefront figure on his accusation of recruiting a new army in Asia. According to the English ambassador Roe reported to his king a very different story from that of Tûgî. According to Roe, Dilaver Pasha spent years in action outside the capital. Accordingly, he did not establish any network of patronage in the imperial court. He

²⁴¹ Tûgî, *Musibetnâme*, pp. 18-19.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, pp.10-13 and p. 32.

was allegedly independent from any faction.²⁴³ Nevertheless, the Venetian *bailo* Giustinian claims that on July 14 1620, the Deceased Grand Vizier Ali Pasha dismissed Dilaver Pasha from the governorship of Diyarbakır, because he was the courtier of the former Chief Eunuch El-Hac Mustafa Agha.²⁴⁴ Indeed, it may have been difficult to govern one of the important provinces without being supported by any factions in the imperial government.

The English ambassador Roe insistently accused Dilaver Pasha of provoking Osman II to recruit a new army. According to Roe, Dilaver Pasha told Osman II that it was not possible to consolidate his power in the empire while the Janissaries held their existing power in imperial affairs. He could not be a real emperor under the shadow of the Janissaries. Moreover, the English ambassador claims that the Janissaries lost their ancient powers and became very notorious for their poor performance during imperial campaigns. Roe reported that Dilaver Pasha advised the sultan to recruit a new army in Damascus and also from the Kurdish population who have a reputation of being courageous mercenaries on the frontier. He claims that the sultan was convinced about the advice given by Dilaver Pasha. Accordingly, Osman II sent orders to all warriors and viziers who were linked to Asia to recruit a new army. Thousands of Kurd and Syrian mercenaries were recruited under the cover of the invasion of Persia. Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n also recruited 20 thousand soldiers on the pretext of the rebellion against Osman II; he was allegedly allied with the sultan in his secret plan. According to the English Ambassador, the sultan pretended to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca all the while recruiting a new army in Asia. In reality, he would stay in Damascus. Then with his new army, he would return to the capital to eradicate all Janissaries and *sipahis*.²⁴⁵ The English ambassador

²⁴³ Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 43: “This man was neuer bredd here, but had liued in action for many yeares, and fo had no faction, nor dependence in court, but stood vpon himfelfe, and being now vnlooked for advanced to this high dignity, he wrought vpon the kings discontent, and nourished yt, and in conlufion told him, it was true, he was no emperor, nor could bee, while the Janizaries had the power which had lately vfurped: that they were corrupted from their ancient infitution, and were lazy cowards, vnworthy of bread. But if he would follow his advice, he could prouide him a newe foldioury about Damafcus, and from the Coords, of meneuer bredd in the frontier warre, and of great courage, and that of them he fhould erect a newe militia, that fhould wholly depend of him only enterteyning 40000 in pay, which fhould allway be his guard.”

²⁴⁴ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 15, no. 140 (dated July 14, 1620), fols. 434r-442r.

²⁴⁵ Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 44: “The king, with his councill, gaue all to the viziers direction, who was true foldiour, and a very wife man, able, by his credit in Afia, to performe this and more; for he wasin the laft rebellion. Upon this conclufion betweene them, he sent his letters to his friends, and prouided 10000 thereabouts, and 10000 from the Coords all vpon pretence of invading Perfia; and had caufed

approached all-figures of the imperial agenda as allied figures of the conspiracy of the secret plan. He even accused Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n of supporting the secret plan of Osman II. According to Roe, Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n provided an opportunity to Osman II to go to Damascus to suppress the so-called rebellion, however Osman II would allegedly gather his new army and forces from Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n in Damascus.

Bostanzade Yahya Efendi constructed his narrative about the sultan's aim in the pilgrimage campaign. He blamed Hacı Ömer Efendi for being the main adviser of "the ill-motivated pilgrimage campaign" of Osman II. He portrayed Hacı Ömer Efendi as an evil-minded man.²⁴⁶ Bostanzade had been waiting an appointment to a high-ranking post since his dismissal in 1614. His major income, *arpalık* revenue was cut off by Osman II upon the Polish campaign. After the rebellion he was appointed as the chief judge of Anatolia. Under the consideration of his stance, Bostanzade accused Hacı Ömer Efendi of intriguing against the viziers and the *ulema* by provoking Osman II to get rid of them. According to Bostanzade, Hacı Ömer Efendi told Osman II that undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca and the holy places would assist God forgiving his sins. Moreover, due to the pilgrimage campaign, he could visit various countries in his empire that would increase his reputation. Accordingly, it could also be possible to extend the territories of the empire. In addition, Bostanzade described Süleyman Agha, the Chief Judge of Rumeli Sümbül Efendi, and the Chief Judge of Anatolia Hekimbaşı Musa as "evil-minded figures" and allies of Hacı Ömer Efendi. According to Bostanzade, they used to rule the imperial government behind the scenes in so much that even Dilaver Pasha could not talk directly to Osman II regarding imperial affairs. They enabled the sultan to appoint their courtiers to high-ranking positions in the imperial government.²⁴⁷ Bostanzade claims that Hacı Ömer Efendi and Süleyman Agha convinced Osman II to undertake the pilgrimage campaign in order to preserve their powerful position in imperial affairs. Soon afterwards, Dilaver Pasha joined the plan to persuade Osman II to go on

the Emir de Saida to raise 20000, which was called a revolt, but was indeed in aid of the king's purposes, who pretended to go privately to Mecca, but his end was to meet those foldiours, and to stay a year at Damascus until he had regulated his new army, and then to return to Constantinople, and root out and dissolve all the chambers of the Janizaries and cast the Spahies and Timariots, and to exauctorate all their captaynes, who came up his country."

²⁴⁶ Bostanzâde, p. 193.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 204 and pp. 194-199.

the pilgrimage campaign. He was charged with providing the provisions for the the campaign. According to Bostanzade, Osman II sent his officials to recruit distinguished soldiers for his pilgrimage campaign.²⁴⁸ Nevertheless, within the context of Bostanzade's narrative, this recruitment was for the security of the pilgrimage routes, rather than recruitment. Hacı Ömer Efendi and Süleyman Ağa were eager to undertake the imperial pilgrimage to Mecca in order to maintain their powerful status quo in the imperial government.

Bostanzade interjected the recruitment in his writings. He wrote the crowd believed a rumor that a recruitment of a new army in Anatolia was planned in Anatolia due to their poor performance of the imperial army during the Polish campaign. For this reason, an old halberdier Eski Yusuf was sent to Anatolia in order to recruit a new army for the sultan. On the way of the sultan's pilgrimage campaign, Eski Yusuf and the new army joined Osman II. Accordingly, the sultan could eradicate the Janissaries and the *sipahis*. Yet, Bostanzade conveyed the accusation as a rumor; he mentioned only once about the recruitment, although he was a member of the *ulema* that mediated between the sultan and the rebels. After the rebellion, Bostanzade was appointed as chief judge of Anatolia. As a member of the imperial government, he should have learned in detail about the accusation of the recruitment, but Bostanzade never stressed it in his writing about the regicide of Osman II. He approached the sultan's aim to undertake the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca as a forefront because of the rebellion.²⁴⁹

Bostanzade asserts while the imperial government was interested in the pilgrimage campaign, the people were still experiencing elevated food staple prices and famine. The provision of the pilgrimage campaign was confronted with scarcity of food and beverages. According to him, the famine and expensiveness caused considerable unrest directed at the imperial government. In order to prevent the hostile environment, leading figures of the *ulema*, the sufi sheikhs, and benevolent persons wrote a letter to Osman II. They warned the sultan that the timing of the pilgrimage campaign was not appropriate, since it was taking place immediately after the Polish campaign. They claim that everyone would grieve for undertaking a new campaign under these circumstances. But, the sultan decreed the appointment of the

²⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 197-198.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 199-203.

commander in chief of the imperial army; thus the capital would be confronted with incursion while he was away from the capital. This was a clear sign that Osman II was fixated on completing the pilgrimage to Mecca.²⁵⁰ Bostanzade wrote that on Wednesday, May 18 1622, leading figures of the army and the crowd consulted one another about the sultan's aim to the pilgrimage campaign. After the meeting, they arrived at the Topkapı Palace. They first demanded the sultan cease his will to complete the pilgrimage campaign, and send away inciters of the campaign such as Dilaver Pasha, Hacı Ömer Efendi, the chief treasurer Baki Pasha, and Süleyman Agha.²⁵¹

According to Bostanzade, Osman II told the mediators from the *ulema*, including him, that it was not certain the undertaking of the pilgrimage to Mecca would happen; perhaps he could go on a hunting trip to the region and remove the rebellious Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n as the enemy of state while on his route.²⁵² Yet, Bostanzade conveyed that during the rebellion, the rebels caught Osman II in the house of the Agha of the Janissaries and insulted him with obscene words, and assaulted the janissary officers along with any women who were at the scene as well, they punished the *sipahis*, who were to undertake the campaign. In these accusations, Bostanzade did not address the accusation of the recruitment.²⁵³ Moreover, in spite of his hatred towards Hacı Ömer Efendi, Bostanzade did not mention Tûgî's accusation of the hidden plan of Hacı Ömer Efendi to take revenge on the Sheriff of Mecca.

The accusation of the recruitment was not mentioned in contemporary writings. Whether consciously or not, Hasan Beyzâde did not write about the accusation but rather asserted that after the failure of the Hotin Siege, Osman II alienated his imperial army due to their poor performance during the Polish campaign. Although the sultan returned to the capital, he did not feel at ease with the failure of the siege. Then, he became resolve for leaving the capital whether by visiting Damascus or Mecca. Eventually, he decided to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca. When his royal tent

²⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 198-199.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 198-200. On the other hand, the rebels demanded also the execution of the Chief Treasurer Baki Pasha. In fact, it was not directly related to the pilgrimage campaign or alleged provocation of the recruiting a new army. He was accused of delivering broken and red coins to the soldiers, see Tûgî, *Musibetnâme*, p. 39.

²⁵² *Bostanzâde*, p. 210.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 225.

was moved to Üsküdar, it was received as a clear message that he was planning to leave. The imperial soldiers lost their hope to gain the gratefulness of the sultan again, and evidently opposed Osman II's eagerness to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca.²⁵⁴ They resorted to Dilaver Pasha and Hacı Ömer Efendi to persuade Osman II to cancel his pilgrimage campaign. Hasan Beyzâde asserted the imperial soldiers excused them of the harsh conditions in the desert, considering in particular the lack of water, and claimed there was no doubt that even camels could not bear the conditions during the long of pilgrimage campaign.²⁵⁵

Similar to Hasan Beyzâde, Peçevi claims that the poor performance at the siege of Hotin alienated Osman II from his imperial army. The sultan was very disappointed about the failure of the Polish Campaign. Osman II's mood caused him to want to go to the pilgrimage to Mecca. He was also alienated because of his misbehavior against the imperial soldiers during the Polish campaign.²⁵⁶ According to Peçevi, during the Polish campaign, the sultan called the imperial soldiers to pay their donation in the district of Isakçı, today known as Isaccea in modern Romania. The imperial soldiers walked in front of the sultan and took their donation group by group, but the way of giving the donations offended the imperial soldiers. They understood that it was a military census under the pretext of a donation.²⁵⁷ It was a sign of the mistrust of the sultan. Moreover, according to Tûgî, in terms of the donations in Isakçı, Osman II refused to pay the soldiers who came late to the military camp. Accordingly, during the siege of Hotin, the soldiers, who had not received their donations, refused to fight to death against Poland. They notified their commanders that the soldiers, who received donations, must have fought against the Poles, not the soldiers who had not received the donation yet.²⁵⁸ Furthermore, Peçevi claims that after the death of Karakaş Pasha during the Siege of Hotin, Osman II allegedly spoke ill of his imperial army due to the mistakes of the *sipahis*. Peçevi claims in the midst of a bilateral alienation some propagated a rumor that Osman II had an alleged secret plan to change the capital of the empire from İstanbul to Cairo.

²⁵⁴ *Hasan Beyzâde*, p. 937.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 938-939.

²⁵⁶ *Peçevi*, II, p. 380.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 380.

²⁵⁸ Tûgî, *Musîbetnâme*, p. 15.

According to the propagandists, Süleyman Agha was the one to talk Osman II into moving the capital from İstanbul to Cairo.²⁵⁹ Although Peçevi witnessed the rebellion of 1622, he never wrote about such alleged secret plan.

It was not only the main advisers of the so-called secret plan that were changing from source to source, but also the accusation of the secret plan was not given place in all of the contemporary sources. The accusation was not possible to be verified, because all the accused leading figures of the imperial government were killed during the rebellion.

4.2 The Rumor

The accusations were predominantly linked to the decision of Osman II to undertake the pilgrimage campaign without his imperial army. He would leave his imperial army at the capital, and only two thousands newly graduated Janissaries and one thousand *sipahis* would accompany him during the campaign.²⁶⁰ A few questions need to be asked regarding the contemporary sources in order to examine the accusation of the so-called secret plan. First, why did Osman II leave his imperial army in the capital? Second, why did the imperial army oppose the pilgrimage campaign? Third, why was Osman II so eager to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca in spite of the great opposition?

As seen in the previous chapter, the imperial army of the capital evidently opposed the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. All contemporary sources had the same reason that after the extremely exhausting Polish campaign, the Janissaries and the *sipahis* riotously opposed to being sent immediately to another military campaign. During the Polish campaign, they witnessed not only heavy weather conditions and lack of provision, but also the tight-fisted nature of the sultan. The imperial soldiers returned in misery to the capital from the border of Poland. Undertaking a new campaign immediately after the Polish campaign meant the Janissaries and the *sipahis* would once again register the same grievances. The pilgrimage campaign

²⁵⁹ Peçevi, p. 380.

²⁶⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, fol. 274r, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 279r: “*Quando alle militie non dissegna di condur altri, che 2 mille Giannizzeri et mille spai, et cio per non insospettir il Persiano, che questa sua mossa sia contra di esso, seben d’alcuni si va speculando, che anzi il principale fine del Gran Signore sia questo per indur quel Ré, con tale timore a mandarli il presente delle sede.*”

would last longer, taking almost twenty months.²⁶¹ According to Bostanzâde, famine and expensiveness prevailed in the capital. As noted in the third chapter, Osman II undertook the military campaign against Poland in midst of the provision crisis and scarcity of money in the capital. The crisis struck the markets and the daily economic life of the capital.

First, Osman II seemed to be eager to spend the winter in Edirne to undertake a new campaign against Poland. However, he witnessed great opposition not only from the imperial army, but from his viziers and the people in the capital as well. In particular, the guilds considered another imperial military campaign to be devastating and the markets of the capital could not afford another campaign. They all opposed Osman II's plan to spend the winter in Edirne in order to lead his imperial army again to Poland.²⁶² Nevertheless, immediately after his return to the capital, Osman II became eager to undertake the pilgrimage campaign. People were determined to oppose any addition of the Polish campaign, not only to Mecca. They strongly demanded the sultan stay in capital until everyone had recovered from the exhaustion, provision crisis and any other fiscal troubles in imperial affairs.

As noted in the second chapter, the alienation of the imperial army from Osman II emerged before the Polish campaign and increased during the campaign. The first evident plot against Osman II occurred during the Polish campaign on November 23 1621, six months before his regicide. The Janissaries and the *sipahis* rose to revolt in front of the tent of the incumbent Grand Vizier Hüseyin Pasha due to unpaid salaries. In the midst of the rebellion, they celebrated the rumor of the enthronement of Mustafa I at the capital. Accordingly, they showed their support to Mustafa I for the possible deposition of Osman II, rather than supporting his brother Prince Murad. This could be seen as a first test leading to the rebellion in İstanbul on May 18 1622.

It was evident Osman II would leave his imperial army at the capital. Besides their unwillingness to join the pilgrimage campaign, he could have acknowledged the

²⁶¹ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fol. 274r.

²⁶² ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 66 (dated October 26, 1621), fols. 9r-10v: "*Questa risoluzione del Gran Signore di svernar egli in Adrinopoli, et l'essercito nei Paesi avisati dispiace qui generalmente ad ogn'uno, provandosi per la sua assenza una carestia de viveri intolerabile, et molti altri inconvenienti et temendo i numeri mercanti la total rovina del negozio, che non facendo gia molti mesi cosa alcuna, sperano col ritorno della Corte et dell'esercito di restorarlo alquanto*" Also see Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 12.

warnings of the external military threats to Rumeli, the Western front of the empire. The viziers, *ulema*, and the leading figures of the empire warned Osman II while he was far from the capital, and the imperial government would confront the Spanish or the Habsburg attacks to the Mediterranean, or the Cossack's attack to the coastal side of the Black Sea. For this reason, according to the Venetian *bailo*, Osman II decided to leave his imperial army in Rumeli. The sultan did not call the imperial army to his campaign of the pilgrimage to Mecca. During his absence, he declared his Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha would be his deputy and commander in chief of the imperial army (*serdar-ı ekrem*) in the capital. Accordingly, the imperial army under the commandship of Dilaver Pasha could repel any attack from the Western front of the empire.²⁶³ Osman II also ordered the Grand Admiral Halil Pasha to build eighty warships for the potential threat coming from the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Hence, leaving his imperial army at the capital could be seen as a precaution against any possible external threat from the Western front of the empire. Osman II most probably wanted to recruit soldiers for providing the security of the pilgrimage campaign from the ones who did not attend the Polish campaign. For this reason, it was highly probable the imperial government could have wanted to recruit mercenary soldiers from Anatolia with the sole purpose of providing the security of the routes during the campaign.

On the other hand, the Venetian *bailo* claims that recruiting imperial soldiers for the pilgrimage campaign would cause the Safavid shah to suspect of being Osman II's real target under the cover of the Pilgrimage to Mecca. Taking only 10 thousand persons on his imperial retinue was meant to decrease the anxiety of the Safavid shah, because the usual military campaigns against the Safavids used to recruit a significant number of imperial soldiers to the army. Moreover, according to the Venetian *bailo*, Osman II sent gifts to the Safavid shah in order to demonstrate his goodwill to quell the shah's fear of the Ottoman military campaign against his

²⁶³ The Venetian *bailo* reported that the sultan would leave the Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha to the capital due to external threat from the West, see ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622) fol. 168r-v: "*Dissegna la Maesta sua mettersi in viaggio fra un mese in circa, et condur seco per quanto si dice Cusseim, Rezep, et quale che altro Visir, et voleva lasciar qui al governo il Primo.*" *Bostanzâde* asserted that a chief-commander was by the sultan in the capital the capital against any attack from the enemies, see *Bostanzâde*, pp. 199. By linking with these two sources, the Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha was most probably appointed as the chief-commander in the capital in order to secure the capital and the empire against any assault from outside.

lands.²⁶⁴ Osman II preferred to take his smaller royal tent and allocated a lesser number of horses and camels for his pilgrimage campaign than any other imperial military campaign.²⁶⁵

It was evident Osman II was reluctant to recruit his imperial soldiers to the pilgrimage campaign because he was not satisfied with their performance during the Polish campaign. He might have considered the imperial army of the Polish campaign could not bear another long-military campaign to the Eastern front of the empire. It was risky to take them on the pilgrimage campaign, because Osman II perhaps would witness once again the military rebellion that he faced during the Polish campaign on November 23 1621.²⁶⁶ The opponent soldiers threatened Osman II to go to Asia to join the rebellious army of Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n in Tripoli. This was a paradoxical threat to the sultan because during the rebellion, the sultan was accused of having the so-called secret plan.²⁶⁷

It is crucial to ask the reason of Osman II's eagerness to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca in spite of the great opposition to his will. The sultan was informed about the rebellion of the Druze Emire Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n Emir in Tripoli at the military camp of the Polish campaign on August 28 1621. According to the Venetian *bailo*, Osman II sent immediately an army to suppress the rebellion. On January 29 1622, the Venetian *bailo* reported that the sultan ordered the extraordinary imperial council to assemble for a possible imperial military campaign against Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n. After the extraordinary imperial council, nearly 150 thousand gold coins, which is a small amount for the expense was allocated from the imperial treasury, but this was not a suited amount for this long military campaign. In the same report, the Venetian *bailo* informed the Senate the first time about Osman II's eagerness to go to Mecca after Tripoli.

However, on February 1 1622, four months-old Prince Ömer, son of Osman II was accidently killed while the sultan were watching a play of the Polish campaign

²⁶⁴ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 168r: "*Quando alle militie non dissegna di condur altri, che 2 mille Giannizzeri et mille spai, et cio per non insospettir il Persiano, che questa sua mossa sia contra di esso, seben d'alcuni si va speculando, che anzi il principale fine del Gran Signore sia questo per indur quel Ré, con tale timore a mandarli il presente delle sede.*"

²⁶⁵ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 114 (dated April 16, 1622), fol. 274r.

²⁶⁶ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VII, no. 73 (dated November 23, 1621), fol. 30v.

²⁶⁷ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 86 (dated January 20, 1622, m.v.), fol. 22r.

with his household in the Topkapı Palace. According to the Venetian *bailo*, this was a severe trauma for Osman II. He did not speak for three days with anyone until the royal funeral of Prince Ömer was held. From then on, Osman II travelled incognito to the capital and castigated transgressors.²⁶⁸ Under the light of this trauma, as noted previously, one could speculate about the claim of Hasan Beyzâde that Osman II, because of his sorrow due to the failure of the Hotin Siege wanted to leave the capital. The accidental death of Prince Ömer could also have increased the sultan's desire to exit the capital. Hence, leaving could consolidate his eagerness to undertake the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. Most particularly, during the last two years of his imperial government, serious calamities, economic crisis and the military failure were witnessed. The death of his son could be received as the deciding factor to leave Istanbul. From then on, the axis of the campaign shifted more likely from Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n to the pilgrimage to Mecca.

As noted above, Bostanzâde claims that Hacı Ömer Efendi and Süleyman Agha suggested to the sultan that God would forgive his sins thanks to the pilgrimage campaign. In terms of the sins of the sultan, they might be referred to the fratricide of his brother Prince Mehmed. They might also be linked to the fratricide with the accidental death of his son, or the many calamities of the last two years. Tûgî conveyed that the Sufi Sheikh Aziz Mahmud Hudai interpreted a dream of Osman II. Aziz Mahmud Hudai suggested the sultan visit the holy shrines of the capital and sacrifice animals for God. For a while, Osman seemed to follow Hudai's advice about sacrificing animals to seek forgiveness from God. However, after he visited the holy shrines, Osman II decided to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca.²⁶⁹

Osman II was fascinated with traveling to the hunting grounds in the vicinity of the capital. As noted above, Bostanzâde conveyed his talk with the mediators of the *ulema*, where Osman II told them he would travel to the hunting grounds in the regions, while castigating Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n. Accordingly, Osman II appointed his brother in law Chief Falconer Murtaza Pasha to the governorship of Damascus.²⁷⁰ However, Baki Tezcan asserted the appointment of Murtaza Pasha to the

²⁶⁸ ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 92 (dated February 5, 1622, m.v.), fol. 40v-r.

²⁶⁹ Tûgî, *Musibetnâme*, p. 30.

²⁷⁰ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 108 (dated April 1, 1622), fol. 106r. See also Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," p. 334, n. 58.

governorship of Damascus and Bebr Mehmed Agha to the governorship of Egypt as an indication for the secret plan of the sultan. According to Tezcan, with these appointments, Osman II most probably aimed to set up a secure zone for himself in Egypt and the Levant.²⁷¹ However, the appointments could be also related with the personality of Osman II: his fascination with gold and hunting. As noted in the previous chapter, Osman II appointed Bebr Mehmed Agha to the governorship of Egypt in the aftermath of his promise to send 300 thousand gold coins as an advance from the annual payment of Egypt to the personal treasury of Osman II.²⁷² Moreover, one of the main reasons for the appointments of Murtaza Agha to the governorship of Damascus could be also related to Osman II's eagerness to travel to hunting grounds in the region.

As noted in the fourth chapter, a great number of the imperial soldiers and the people of the capital evidently detested the sultan's eagerness to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca. Soon after, their voice of opposition turned into a voice of deposition of the sultan. Yet, not only the Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha and the Mufti Esad Efendi, but also his favorites such as the Sultan's Tutor Hace Ömer Efendi and the Chief Süleyman Agha strove to dissuade Osman II from his pilgrimage campaign in midst of the of the deposition. They must have been aware of the upcoming storm, however the sultan ignored all opposition and showed his resolve to undertake the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca.²⁷³ During the three-day rebellion, the uncontrollable rumors succeeded in gathering a great number of soldiers and people in the capital. In the end, the new court faction of Mustafa I committed the regicide of Osman II in the dungeon of Yedikule on Friday, May 20 1622.

²⁷¹ Tezcan, "Searching for Osman," p. 228.

²⁷² ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/VIII, no. 90 (dated February 5, 1621), fol. 36r-v.

²⁷³ ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no. 120 (dated May 11, 1622), fol. 238r-v: *"trovandosi il Re tanto fermo, et fisso nel pensiero del detto viaggio, che ruina consideratione e rispetto, ne il pericolo istesso della sua propria depositione che dalla voce di tutti gli vien predetta, ha potuto sin hora divertirlo, quando si vedesse constretto a farlo per causa della Republica, concepirebbe cosi grande odio e sdegno contra di lei, che sarà pericolo, che con aperta rottura volesse sfogarla, et mandar ad effetto la cagione, per la quale fosse stato sforzato a fermarsi, pero convenendosi far ogn' opera per purgarlo da tali impressioni, et conoscendo molto ben io, haver in ciò tutti i Visiri, Mufti, Coza, Chislar, et ogni altro contrario per il solo, et unico oggetto, che hanno di distornar il detto viaggio."* See Roe, *Negotiations*, p. 34.

Conclusion

As discussed above, the rumors were probably related to Osman II's decision not to take his imperial army to the pilgrimage campaign. He would only recruit three thousand newly graduated and inexperienced Janissaries and one thousand *sipahis*. The rest of the imperial soldiers would stay in the capital. There were several reasons for him leaving the imperial army in the capital that triggered the rumor that spread all over the capital.

First, the imperial army evidently opposed not only the pilgrimage campaign, but any campaign in the aftermath the Polish campaign. They were determined to stay in the capital until they were fully recovered from the effects of the Polish campaign, provision crisis and any other fiscal troubles in imperial affairs. Moreover, the imperial army alienated itself from Osman II, because of his aggressive fiscal policies and fiscal mismanagements in the imperial government. They had already witnessed several payment and provision crises during the Polish campaign. Immediately leaving for a new campaign would cause them to face the same crises they previously had experienced.

Second, it was clear Osman II paid attention to the warnings of the potential Spanish and the Cossack threats on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. He would leave his army under the commander of his Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha at the capital and he ordered the Grand Admiral Halil Pasha to build eighty-war ships in following coming years. Accordingly, the imperial army could repel any attack from the West and provide security over the empire. Moreover, according to the Venetian *bailo*, the recruitment of the imperial soldiers for the pilgrimage campaign could make the Safavid Shah doubt the sultan's aim. The shah could assume he is the real target of the pilgrimage campaign. Osman II sent gifts to the shah in order to demonstrate his goodwill and quell the shah's fear for the imperial military campaign against the Safavids. Third, Osman II was evidently reluctant to recruit the imperial soldiers to the pilgrimage campaign to Mecca. He had been dissatisfied with their efforts during the Polish campaign. He most likely wanted to restore his reputation without recruiting the imperial soldiers during the pilgrimage campaign. Moreover, the sultan may have considered that the imperial army could not bear another long military campaign immediately after the Polish campaign. This would be perilous for the

sultan, because he had faced a serious military rebellion during the Polish campaign. The opponent soldiers began to pose a threat to the sultan that they wanted to go to Asia in order to join the ranks of the rebellion of the Fakhr al-Din Ibn Ma'n in Tripoli.

All the evidence shows the rumor of the recruitment of a new army circulated in the capital during the rebellion that accused Osman II of having a secret plan under the cover of the pilgrimage campaign. His plan would recruit a new *segban* army in Asia to eradicate the Janissaries and the *sipahis* in the empire. The unverifiable accusation was most probably fabricated during the rebellion to provoke the neutral soldiers and people to join the ranks of the rebellion in the capital. The rebellion escalated easily because over the last two years a great number of the imperial soldiers and the people of the capital had already alienated Osman II due to his fiscal mismanagement in the imperial affairs. However, the axis of the opposition changed from Osman II's fiscal mismanagement to the ill motives of his favorites Dilaver Pasha, Hacı Ömer Efendi, Süleyman Agha and Baki Pasha. The dispersed rumor strategically created doubts about Osman II's aim to undertaking of the pilgrimage to Mecca. Accordingly, Osman II could have prevented performing his religious duties, because he had a secret plan under the cover of the imperial pilgrimage to Mecca.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have attempted to illustrate the changing dynamics of practical politics and power relations at the Ottoman imperial court under Osman II. By utilizing hitherto unexamined ambassadorial reports from the Venetian State Archives, I have tried to shed new light on the historical problems, events and actors behind the dethronement and murder of Osman II in May 1622. In this respect, I have examined the roles of the sultan's favorite courtiers and viziers in daily court politics at a time when the Ottoman Empire was facing a severe economic crisis.

When he ascended to the throne in 1618, Osman II found himself in a court divided by complex network of alliances and factionalism. As a young and inexperienced sultan, Osman II was only one of the contenders for power among his ruling elites. Nonetheless, just like his immediate predecessors, namely Murad III, Mehmed III and Ahmed I had done before him, Osman soon adopted the strategy of ruling through his favorites so as to reconfigure the existing power and patronage relations within the Ottoman political body to his advantage as well as to consolidate his sovereign authority against any alternative foci of power in Istanbul. His style of rule by favorites was actually a highly assertive one. For instance, he empowered the dismissed grand admiral Ali Pasha as his new grand vizier and allowed him to wield enormous power as the minister-favorite. As long as his favorite remained unrivalled in his position, Osman II was able to exert more direct influence over the business of rule.

On the other hand, once Ali Pasha discovered the tight-fisted nature of the sultan, he regularly sent Osman II valuable gifts in order to maintain his royal favor while enhancing his own powers in the business of rule. He mostly financed these gifts through taking bribes and making confiscations from other ruling grandees. In the meantime, the sultan followed an aggressive fiscal policy that he accordingly collected money from the ruling elite and grandees by taking regular payments, making confiscations and abolishing retired salaries of imperial soldiers and high-ranking *ulema*'s such as *oturaklık* and *arपालik* as he kept most of it to himself. This aggressive fiscal policy created much alienation among the sultan's imperial army

and court. When Osman II and his government mismanaged fiscal and military affairs, the alienation of the imperial soldiers triggered a direct criticism against the sultan, as seen in the first rebellion of soldiery before and during the Polish campaign. In the end, Osman II's fiscal policies and the provision crisis deepened the general alienation of soldiers and people in the capital.

The sultan's eagerness to go to war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth challenged the powerful position of Ali Pasha at the imperial court. Unlike the sultan, Ali Pasha was in favor of the idea of signing a peace treaty with the Poles, because he did not have enough experience in land warfare. Despite this problem, Osman II kept Ali Pasha as grand vizier, for he was an ardent supporter of the sultan's fiscal policies, while Osman II tried to shift the balance of power at his court by empowering his royal tutor Ömer Efendi as his new chief power-broker in the business of rule.

Upon the execution of Prince Mehmed on the eve of Osman II's Polish campaign as well as the death of Ali Pasha in 1621, Osman II became more visible and dominant in court politics, only to receive more direct criticism from his imperial soldiers and the people of Istanbul pertaining to his style of rule.

The provision and fiscal crises on the eve of the Polish campaign were in fact visible failures of Osman's personal rule. The extreme winter conditions in 1621-22 cut the capital's crucial logistical links with its hinterland, disabling all daily economic activities in the capital for months. While Istanbul was suffering under these dire circumstances, its grain provisions were ordered to be transferred to the Poland frontier as required for the forthcoming imperial campaign. During this period, the famine hit hard particularly the poor people of the capital, who in turn protested Osman II in a 'bread riot' during a Friday prayer. Moreover, this provision crisis had also some serious effects on the imperial soldiers for they were not paid their regular salaries. Overall, the failed Polish campaign further increased the discontent among the imperial soldiers against their sultan, as they constantly had troubles or long delays in receiving their salaries and provisions due to the fiscal problems and climatic abnormalities of the period. In this context, the idea of deposing Osman II was hatched in the minds of the imperial soldiers and common people seven months prior to his regicide.

In the last two years of his reign, almost every action of Osman II escalated the tension between himself and his imperial soldiers and other people residing in the capital. Osman II in fact cared little about the discontent of the people who had been suffering under the cold weather, provision crisis and military problems. The sultan instead expanded his intervention in the economic and social standing of his ruling elite. During the Polish campaign, most notably, the sultan abolished the *arpaluks*, the revenues of the high-ranking members of the *ulema* that they were entitled to receive after retirement. Likewise, immediately after the campaign, Osman II cut off the salaries of the retired Janissaries known as *the oturak*. Moreover, he prohibited the use of tobacco and wine in the capital. In the midst of a severe provision and monetary crisis, the prohibition of these two consumer products shocked the traders more than their consumers. Furthermore, upon the death of his son, Prince Ömer, Osman II increased his interventions in the social life of Istanbul by traveling incognito and by punishing any wrongdoer in person. In addition, his marriage with the daughter of Esad Efendi, the Mufti, was considered to be a direct violation of the Ottoman tradition of royal marriages only with non-Muslim born concubines. All of these actions of Osman II made him lose his legitimacy and authority in the eyes of the imperial soldiers and common people, thus their alienation from himself and his reign.

Throughout his short four-year reign, Osman II inserted new agents of power in the business of rule, most notably the Chief Eunuch of the Imperial Harem, Süleyman Agha, and the Chief Gardener, Bebr Mehmed Pasha. These figures played important roles both during and aftermath of the Polish campaign. In particular, after the death of Ali Pasha, Süleyman Agha and Bebr Mehmed Pasha increased their power and influence in imperial and dynastic matters. Yet, their overwhelming control of daily affairs brought upon them direct criticism during and after of the rebellion of May 1622.

Despite all the aforementioned political and economic problems, Osman II paid little attention to the warnings of his viziers, grandees, as well as his favorites, particularly when he decided to make his Pilgrimage as discussed in the previous chapter. His advisors found it very dangerous for the sultan to leave Istanbul without first solving the provision and fiscal problems of his soldiers and other residents of the capital. Yet, the sultan insisted to undertake the long journey to Mecca and

Medina. When his imperial tent was put in Üsküdar, a clear sign of the sultan's departure in short time, the long accumulating military and public opposition against his sultanate evolved into a direct voice of deposition, thus the rebellion began.

During the rebellion, the target of the rebellious soldiers and people changed from Osman II to his favorites, most notably, Süleyman Agha, Hacı Ömer Efendi, Dilaver Pasha, Baki Pasha and Nasuh Agha, while some rumors began to circulate in the capital about Osman II's secret plan to recruit a new army to replace the existing one. The rumors were most probably fabricated to provoke all those soldiers and people who thus far remained aloof from the political developments and made them join the ranks in the rebellion. Meanwhile, as more and more soldiers and people accused the sultan of his secret plan, his royal favorites turned into a target for they were considered to misguide the inexperienced young sultan on this matter.

In this thesis, I tried to demonstrate these major problems and events regarding the reign and regicide of Osman II in the light of new information grasped from the dispatches of the Venetian *bailo*. These reports, which were written by the most vigilant contemporary observers of the Ottoman court in Istanbul, Giorgio Giustinian, are valuable and significant to delineate different aspects of the changing dynamics in power relations and factional politics at the court of Osman II. By means of Giustinian's reports, is it possible to find out some unknown issues present in the daily politics at the imperial court as well as checking the validity of the arguments used by contemporary Ottoman writers on Osman II's reign and regicide. Particularly, I attempted to elaborate on the overlooked issues such as provision crisis and climatic imbalance during Osman II's reign. Moreover, I kept track of rumors and debates regarding the sultan's actions both among the ruling elites and the imperial soldiers as well as common people. Furthermore, in the light of these sources, I tried to suggest the portrait and perception of Osman II at the imperial court and in the capital at a time he was trying to confront the climatic, fiscal and military crisis immediate before his regicide. I hope to partially fulfill this gap in recent Ottoman historiography.

I also discussed some views with the arguments of the recent literature on Osman II and his reign. First, in parallel with Tezcan's claim, I find that Osman II pursued an assertive policy that tried to reconfigure the dynamics of the practical politics and power relations in favor of his personal rule. Second, I observe that the reign of

Osman II influenced from the process of monetarization in Ottoman economy. I offer a detailed examination on the fiscal mismanagement of Osman II that alienated his soldiers and common people from his sultanate. On the other hand, in terms of Tezcan's separation of two main political groups as 'constitutionalists' and 'absolutists', I find that factionalism and practical politics at the imperial court under Osman II was not static and one-dimensional. Rather, it seems to have more dynamic and multi-dimensional aspects. Researchers should also count climatic imbalance, provision crisis, military and public grievances for fiscal policies of the sultan. I suggest that detailed climatic, fiscal and monographic researches on the leading issues and figures of the period will contribute much to our understanding of factionalism and daily politics of the era.

I hope that, this study will become more meaningful with complementary studies comparing Ottoman rebellions with that of the global rebellions, which became trend during the seventeenth century. By doing so, it will help to contextualize Ottoman rebellion history concerning global trends in world history.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A


ASVe, SDC, filza 93, no.125 (dated May 20, 1622), fol. 289v.

Herlo giorno dalle milite, esposito fu deposto dalla
L. deo Ingle Sultan Osman, et intomato in etta
Sultan Mustafa suo Cio, et in l. deo precedente, et
tratto a V. deo S. deo, et la vita e portata al occidente
f. deo mag. deo, et mai nella Casa Ottomanica
h. deo, et in questo modo, et continuando etma
nella tua offinata. *Disposizione* al viaggio della
Nacca con la volonta delle milite, et dei profes.
de. deo della lege in part. menti. L. imbarcamento
topra de Salee i tuoi padiglioni, e gran quantita
de tue robbe per portarle a Sultan, la milite
wt. de. deo, come de. deo, unite in n. deo
p. deo de. deo, et gran quantita de. deo, mal deposto
come si piu volte scritto uerto de. deo, anticipam. deo
imputate da. deo de. deo, o. deo, o. deo, et. deo,
che e. deo portate deo tutto il tempo, al fine de
affidat in A. deo, et metter in piedi una nuova
milite. *Disposizione*, et di. deo de. deo

The immediate *dispaccio* on the regicide of Osman II

Appendix B

ASVe, SPAC, Registro 18/IV, no. 27 (dated March 22, 1621), fols. 51r:



The Proprio on the Bread-Protest