

BETWEEN TURKISHNESS AND KURDISHNESS: SOCIAL COHESION OF  
CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS

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HAZAL DURAN

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Modern Turkish Studies.

Prof. Mesut Yeğen

(Supervisor)

Assist. Prof. Talha Köse

Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Social Sciences of İstanbul Şehir University.

Date

11.09.2015

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

First Name, Last Name: Hazal Duran

Signature:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'H. Duran', written in a cursive style.

## ABSTRACT

### BETWEEN TURKISHNESS AND KURDISHNESS: SOCIAL COHESION OF CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS

Duran, Hazal.

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Supervisor: Prof. Mesut Yeğen

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This study tries to display patterns in the political, social and cultural lives of Central Anatolian Kurds and how these patterns and Kurdish identity are impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness. In accordance with this purpose and to understand the roots of the existing Kurdish population in the region, the first phase of this study has examined the historical background of Kurdish settlement in Central Anatolia through the Imperial and Republican periods. In the second phase, semi-structured interviews with Central Anatolian Kurds and non-structured interviews with researchers and members of foundations were conducted to demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of social interactions with other groups as well as within the Central Anatolian Kurdish community, which give clues about their cohesion/exclusion level. Field work held as a part of this study is framed by Paul Bernard's classification of measuring cohesion in social, cultural, and political aspects under three dimensions named as 1) Recognition/Rejection: Dealing with experiences, feelings, expectations, preferences, and concerns about social relations; 2) Belonging/Isolation: Touching upon shared values shaped by elements of ethnic contours; and 3) Legitimacy/Illegitimacy: Interest in relations with political and institutional foundations. The main argument of this study is that ethnic contours of Central Anatolian Kurds have been shaped by elements of Turkishness as well as Kurdishness, placing this group in-between two ethnicities.

**Key words:** Central Anatolian Kurds, Central Anatolia, Kurdishness, social cohesion

## ÖZ

### TÜRKLÜK VE KÜRTLÜK ARASINDA: ORTA ANADOLU KÜRTLERİNDE SOSYAL UYUM

Duran, Hazal.

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Bu çalışma Orta Anadolu Kürtlerinin sosyal, kültürel ve siyasal hayatındaki tekrarlayan motifleri ve bu motifler ile Kürt kimliğini kuşatan Türklüğün etkisine nasıl maruz kaldığını göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda ve bölgedeki Kürt nüfusun varlığının kökenlerini anlamak için, çalışmanın ilk aşamasında Orta Anadolu'da İmparatorluk ve Cumhuriyet dönemleri boyunca devam eden Kürt iskanının tarihsel arka planı incelenmiştir. İkinci aşamada, Orta Anadolu Kürtlerinin kendi toplulukları içerisindeki ve diğer topluluklarla arasındaki uyum ve dışlanmanın boyutu hakkında ipuçları veren sosyal etkileşimin imkanları ve sınırlılıklarını anlamak için, Orta Anadolu Kürtleriyle yarı yapılandırılmış, araştırmacı ve vakıf temsilcileriyle de yapılandırılmamış mülakatlar gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu çalışmanın bir parçası olarak uygulanan saha araştırması, Paul Bernard'ın sosyal, kültürel ve siyasi alanlardaki uyumu ölçen ve üç boyut altında isimlendirilen sınıflandırmasına göre çerçeveselendirilmiştir: 1) Tanıma/Ret: Sosyal ilişkiler hakkındaki deneyimler, hisler, beklentiler, tercihler ve endişeler ile ilgilenmektedir. 2) Aidiyet/İzolasyon: Etnik sınırların unsurları tarafından şekillendirilen ortak değerleri içermektedir. 3) Meşruluk/Gayrimeşruluk: Politik ve kurumsal kuruluşlarla olan ilişkilerle ilgilenmektedir. Bu çalışmanın temel argümanı, Orta Anadolu Kürtlerinde etnik sınırların Kürtlüğün unsurları tarafından olduğu kadar Türklüğün unsurları tarafından da şekillendirildiği, yani iki grup arasında bir yere konumlandırıldığıdır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Orta Anadolu Kürtleri, Orta Anadolu, Kürtlük, sosyal uyum

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vii
ABBREVIATIONS .....	ix
LIST OF TABLES .....	x
LIST OF MAPS .....	xi
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1. Reason for the Study .....	3
1.2. Methodology of the Study .....	6
1.3. Limitations of the Study .....	10
1.4. Organization of the Study .....	11
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY .....	13
2.1. The Evolution of the Theory of Social Integration and its Units .....	14
2.2. The Theory of Social Cohesion in Light Of Reciprocity .....	21
2.3. A Close Examination of the Theory of Social Cohesion .....	25
3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS .....	37
3.1. Where is the Central Anatolian Region? .....	37
3.2. The Roots of the Kurdish Population in Central Anatolia .....	39
3.3. Centralization vs. Decentralization: Kurdish Tribes in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries .....	42
3.4. Systematization of the Settlement Policy: 19th Century .....	48
3.5. Central Anatolian Kurds in Westerners' Eyes: Diaries of Anatolian Travellers .....	55
3.6. Central Anatolian Kurds in the 20th Century: Enforcement of Turkish Identity .....	60
4. SOCIAL COHESION OF CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS .....	70
4.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Informants .....	70
4.1.1. Birth Place and Migration .....	71
4.1.2. Education .....	72

4.1.3. Occupation .....	72
4.2. The Dimension of Recognition/Rejection: Social Relations, Experiences, and Feelings of “Others” and “Us” .....	74
4.3. The Dimension of Belonging/Isolation: The Issues of Identity and Language88	
4.4. The Dimension of Legitimacy/Illegitimacy: Associations with Political Parties, State Institutions, and Other Organizational Structures .....	99
5. CONCLUSION .....	107
REFERENCES.....	115
QUESTIONNAIRE .....	122



## **ABBREVIATIONS**

BOA: Office of the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives

CA: Central Anatolia

CAK: Central Anatolian Kurds

CUP: The Committee of Union and Progress

JDP: The Justice and Development Party

KOMKURD-AN: The Association of Culture and Solidarity of Central Anatolian Kurds

PDP: The People's Democratic Party

PKK: The Kurdistan Workers' Party

RPP: The Republican People's Party

TIP: The Workers' Party

NMP: The National Movement Party

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1. : Necessary Actions for Providing Social Cohesion in the Eye of the Council of Europe.....	23
Table 2.2. : Measuring social cohesion: a two-by-two framework.....	27
Table 2.3. : The domains of social capital and appropriate neighbourhood policies to support them.....	28
Table 2.4. : Typology of the dimensions of social cohesion.....	33
Table 3.1. : Population of Haymana by years.....	54
Table 3.2. : Kurdish tribes in CA at the beginning of the 20th century.....	59
Table 3.3. : Ethnic Distribution of Polatlı and Haymana in 1927.....	63
Table 3.4. : Classification of Kurdish Tribes in CA (During the 1930s).....	66

## LIST OF MAPS

Map 3.1. : Settlement areas in CA (Today).....	39
Map 3.2.: Kurdish and Muhacir villages founded in the second half of the 19th century.....	49
Map 3.3. : Ethnic Situation in Ankara in the 19th Century.....	53
Map 3.4. : The villages exposed to changing toponomy.....	67

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. : Social Cohesion as a Cause and Effect.....	32
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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The Kurdish Question in Turkey is one of the prominent issues discussed by scholars in terms of its political, economic, and social aspects. Scholars familiar with the subject are used to people mostly thinking of the Eastern part of Turkey when they hear the term “Kurds,” which leads to the association of the Kurdish Question with the specific region and the people living within its borders. The background of this perception falls within the Turkish State’s naming of the problem as “reactionary politics, tribal resistance, brigandage, provocation of foreigners, or regional backwardness.”<sup>1</sup> Excluding from the Kurdish Question the daily lives of people living in the Western part of Turkey and instead restricting it to a specific area is a result of an effort to maintain distance between Kurds and “proper citizens” of the rest of the country. On the one side this distance aims to damage relationships between Kurds and the rest, while it also tries to ignore Kurds living in other parts of the country and subsequently make them unaware of their Kurdishness. This effort to perpetuate the unawareness of these people regarding their Kurdishness is called “assimilation” by even top government officials.<sup>2</sup> Central Anatolian Kurds (CAK) are also a part of this exclusion and the targeted distancing of state politics affecting the political, economic, and social elements that make them Kurds.

CAK have been living in the region for a long time. According to research dealing with the history of Asia Minor, Kurds have been living in the region since the 11th century, during the Byzantium era.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, the settlement of the Kurdish population in the region as groups took place by the 15th century. The first traces of forced migration of the Kurds to the region became visible with the exile of nomadic tribes in the 16th century, especially during the sultanate of Selim the First. This era can be interpreted as the first milestone of the enforcement of Kurdish settlement in

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<sup>1</sup> Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 222.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with Mesut Yılmaz, “Der Schlüssel Diegt in Bonn”, (The key lies in Bonn), *Der Spiegel*, accessed August 29, 2015, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8781958.html>

<sup>3</sup> Claude Cahen, *Osmanlılardan Önce Anadolu’da Türkler*, (İstanbul: E Yayınları Tarih Dizisi, 1979), 283.

the region. During the rest of the Ottoman administration, the Kurds were exposed to a settlement policy aimed at not only controlling them, but also promoting their adoption of a sedentary life. Especially policies of the CUP and the new Republic towards different ethnicities and religions, which aimed to create a homogenous society in terms of religion, ethnicity, and culture, finalized the distribution of CAK throughout the region in the first half of the 20th century. The Kurds, Turks, Tatars, Circassians, and Balkan immigrants were the main subjects of the region and the “ethnicity engineering” oriented politics of the 20th century affected all of these communities. Turkish nationalism’s aim to create a “classless, unprivileged society” required distributing the Kurdish population in the Eastern part of Turkey as well as bringing Kurdish settlements in the West under the control of the Republic. In the final stage, the state imposed its definition of “ideal citizenship” on society through education in schools and in other public areas such as in newspapers and on the radio.

In light of this information, this study examines the patterns in the political, social, and cultural life of CAK differentiating them not only from the rest of the region, but also from the Kurds living in other parts of the country. As the community living in a region where the effects of both Turkishness and Kurdishness are felt, CAK are affected by the multi-factorial characteristics of the region that are also contained within their lives. At this point, finding patterns in the political, social, and cultural life of CAK requires close examination of their experiences belonging to and living in urban-rural areas, their thoughts on the meaning of being a Kurd and its representation in daily life, their sense of (un)belonging to certain groups, their usage of Kurdish as a native language/second language, their relations with Kurds and non-Kurdish communities (in marriages, the neighborhood, business life, etc.), their perception of political parties and institutions, their experienced/witnessed discrimination events, and so on. Proper answers to the questions raised by these issues will help to answer the main research question: What are the patterns in the political, social and cultural lives of CAK and how, if at all, are these patterns and CAK' Kurdish identity impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness? Because a strong research question should be specific and limited by time and place, forming a good research question is very crucial for the success of the study. At this stage, three words are advisors of the researchers; what, how, and why. Preference for these

words changes the developmental, causal, comparative, or predictive nature of the study.<sup>4</sup> As aforementioned, the main research question of this study is formed on the question of “what” and “how” enabling us to ascertain the effects of a certain element on another subject. In this case, it will help to gather more reliable information during the research.

### **1.1. Reason for the Study**

A preliminary literature review of research about CAK proves the lack of academic work dealing with CAK in the fields of Sociology and Political Science. CAK are taken into consideration just in a few works generally approaching the issue as a part of History and transcribing official documents from the Empire and Republican periods without interpreting them within the context of relations between the state’s perception towards those belonging to different ethnicities, religions, and cultures and implementations towards them. The historical documents such as decrees, cadastral record books, and other public records are also important parts of this work enabling us to understand the background of gradually changing Kurdish settlements in the region according to different time periods. However, approaching social change in Central Anatolia (CA) specific to the Kurdish population in the region requires close examination of the current situation together with historical processes: the reasons for the first Kurdish settlements in the region, the approach of the administration towards the region during the Empire and Republican periods, the causative and methodological change of settlement policy over time and the general political, social, and cultural elements shaping the sociology of the existing Kurdish community in the region. Thus, existing literature needs to be handled with close research regarding the current situation. The lack of resources on the social conditions of CAK and the absence of a reflection of ethnic contours of them among historically based works is one of the prominent reasons for this study. Above all, this study will make important contributions to the literature of Kurdish studies by examining Central Anatolian Kurds from a perspective that did not previously attract attention.

In order to evaluate positive contributions and negative aspects of existing literature and to understand which gap this study will try to fill, it will be useful to closely

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<sup>4</sup> Jennifer Mason, *Qualitative Researching. (Second edition)*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), 18.

examine these works. However, due to the impossibility of examining positive and negative aspects of the entire literature in this chapter, prominent works dealing specifically with the subject or the pioneer work that made way for the formation of the limited literature on CAK should be handled. Except for archival documents, traces of CAK first played a part in diaries of researchers who had compiled their observations of Asia Minor, such as W. F. Ainsworth, William J. Hamilton, Georges Perrot, Frederick Burnaby, and William M. Ramsay. The observations of these researchers are very useful for gathering information about the details of Kurdish social life that is not available in official documents. Travel notes create pictures of the Kurds living in the region belonging only to the moment when the traveler was there; consequently, they cannot offer more detailed elements beyond these observations. As well as these notes, there are some works prepared from an analysis of official documents. The prominent work of this category is Cengiz Orhonlu's *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretlerin İskânı*, which functions as a primary source because it presents information on the settlement policy of Kurdish tribes in the region and the changing characteristics of settlement policy over the centuries. Another work formed by examining first hand resources belonging to Ottoman archives is Yusuf Halaçoğlu's work titled *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*. Both of these works offer valuable information regarding the reasons, methods, and outcomes of settlement policy, but, Yusuf Halaçoğlu's study resembles Orhonlu's one in many aspects which makes it far from being an original work. Also in his work, Halaçoğlu claims that members of Kurdish tribes were originally Turks (a claim that is very common) and continues to insist on the truth of this thought still today.<sup>5</sup> This argument centered on the original Turkishness of Kurdish tribes is defended in other works and Ziya Gökalp's *Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler* is among these works. It should not be ignored that the approach of these works addresses a wider perception: the state's "defensive-nationalist perspective" trying to create a homogeneous society.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, while on the one hand these works are crucial

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<sup>5</sup> Yusuf Halaçoğlu claims that 30% of existing Kurdish tribes were originally Turkish ones according to cadastral record books of the 1500s. "Halaçoğlu, 'Yüzde 30' demiş," *Radikal*, August 20, 2007. [http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/halacoglu\\_yuzde\\_30\\_demis-823375](http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/halacoglu_yuzde_30_demis-823375).

<sup>6</sup> Murat Somer, "Defensive- vs. liberal-nationalist perspectives on diversity and the Kurdish conflict: Europeanization, the internal debate, and *Türkiyelilik*," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 32 (2005): 76.



in the case of handling first hand resources, on the other hand they contain problematic information raising a question mark harming their objectivity.

In addition to these works based on first hand archival documents and prepared in a method suitable to academia, there are some other works that should not be disregarded in the case of CAK, even if they are inappropriate to academic studies. As a leading study among non-academic works, Rohat Alakom's *Orta Anadolu Kürtleri* can be interpreted as an inclusive study based on almost all works on the issue. Nonetheless, this work has a lack of objectivity in its emotional narrative and its lack of references to claims, which, especially in some parts, remain to be proven. Like Rohat Alakom's work, Seyyah Kandemir's *Ankara Vilayeti* and Halil İbrahim Uçak's *Tarih İçinde Haymana* were also prepared in a way inconsistent with academic literature, and a confusing presentation of information in these works is common due to the absence of a regular narrative form.

Last but not least, one of the most important studies on CAK is conducted by CAK living in abroad. In 1997, a group of Kurdish refugees mostly living in Germany and Sweden started to publish a quarterly journal focusing on the history and social structure of CAK. This journal began publication with the slogan: "Journal of Politics, Art, and Culture of the Central Anatolian Kurds: *Bîrnebûn*". In the preface of the first issue, the editorial board commented that by publishing this journal, they aimed to strengthen the identity of being CAK and investigate peculiarities of that identity.<sup>7</sup> Also, due to a lack of research and academic work, the difficulties of investigating Kurds living in this region were well known by the writers of the journal.<sup>8</sup> CAK were living in a sphere surrounded by Turkish groups and one of the aims of this journal was a better understanding of their cultures. In the first issues, the journal included articles both in Kurdish and Turkish. Nonetheless, the number of articles in Kurdish rose over time. This might have arisen from the facility of learning Kurdish in Europe during the 1990s and 2000s in comparison with Turkey.<sup>9</sup> Even if articles published in the journal provide valuable information about CAK, they somehow insufficient because of lack of objectivity.

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<sup>7</sup> Editorial, "Çıkarken," *Bîrnebûn 1* (1997): 2.

<sup>8</sup> Nuh Ateş, "Batı Kürtleri Gerçekliği ve Çözüm Perspektifleri Üzerine Sesli Düşünceler," *Bîrnebûn 1* (1997): 7.

<sup>9</sup> Amir Hassanpour et al., "Kürtlerin Eğitilmemesi: Kürtler açısından Durum (1)", Online Journal of Bosphorus University Literature Club, accessed August 29, 2015. <http://www.bued.boun.edu.tr/turik.asp?id=66>

As aforementioned, while historical information based on some works is problematic due to their subjectivity in academic manner and their lack of social aspects of CAK, non-academic works paying attention to social observation also have some problems with regards to objectivity and relaying information in chronological order. The importance of studies incorporating qualitative research and historical facts in the examination of this group arises from the gap in studies. Thus, this study aims to fill the gap in academia on CAK without ruling out existing social, political, and cultural features.

## **1.2. Methodology of the Study**

Before selecting a research methodology, as a Kurdish-origin person from the region I was aware that my closeness could be problematic for the objectivity of this research. Obviously, neutrality is an irrevocable issue as it is a determinant for ethical issues of the subject. Neutrality basically means “the proper distance between researcher and subjects that minimizes bias [...]. Thus, the objective researcher is seen as scientifically distant, that is, as someone who is not influenced by, and does not influence the study”.<sup>10</sup> To avoid these kinds of obstacles, detachment of the researcher from the subject should be kept in mind to be able to avoid unconscious manipulation of data.<sup>11</sup> If not, the reliability and objectivity of the research may come under question.

A researcher determined to overcome the problem of neutrality and willing to conduct research has to choose the right methodology enabling this person to complete the work. At this point, an inevitable question appears in mind: Qualitative or quantitative? For this research, a qualitative methodology will be used because of its appropriateness to the subject. Qualitative methodology enables the researcher to explore a “wide array of dimensions of the social world, and understandings, experiences, and imaginings of the participants, the ways that social processes, institutions, discourses or relationships work, and the significance of the meanings that they generate”.<sup>12</sup> As it is seen, the qualitative research methods deal with the social part of life that is not possible, except in some situations, to measure. Since the

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<sup>10</sup> Laura Krefting, “Rigor in Qualitative Research: The Assessment of Trustworthiness,” *The American Journal of Occupational Therapy* 45 (1991): 217.

<sup>11</sup> J. Lofland and L.H. Lofland, *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis*, (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984), 34.

<sup>12</sup> J. Mason, op. cit., 1.

qualitative research method is seen as “soft, and even not scientific, it helps to provide quite social analyses in social sciences”.<sup>13</sup> Case study, visual methods ethnography, participatory inquiry, interpretive analysis, participant observation, interviewing, and grounded theory are among sub-methods of qualitative research. As the main research question of this work is “What are the patterns in the political, social and cultural lives of CAK and how, if at all, are these patterns and CAK' Kurdish identity impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness?”, daily life experiences, thoughts, perceptions, senses, preferences, and relations are parts of the research. In light of these points, the interviewing method is chosen to collect data during the research.

Interviewing is a methodology consisting of a conversation with a purpose and knowledge from the interviews to relate them with the research topic. As seen, it is a well-based, preplanned, and regular method to collect data. Especially if a person is interested in gathering certain knowledge beyond emotions, the interviewing method is more successful.<sup>14</sup> To avoid ethical problems, interviewing, like other methods, must include important points such as objectivity, neutrality, and direct engagement to the subject. While conducting interviews, the researcher should be careful and not forget the aim of the research. At the end of research, the researcher gets data from “activities, behaviors, actions, conversation, interpersonal interactions, organizational or community process, or any other aspect of observable human experience” forming the core of field notes.<sup>15</sup>

The interviewing method can be detailed in terms of the “number and length of interviews, the appropriateness and breadth of the interview sample given the goals of the study, the types of questions asked, the level of transcription detail, the practices taken to ensure transcript accuracy, and the resultant number of pages of interview transcripts”.<sup>16</sup> Qualitative interviewing may be a one-to-one interaction or

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<sup>13</sup> Sylvia Gherardi and Barry Turner, *Real Men Don't Collect Soft Data*, (Trento: University of Trento Press, 1987), 5.

<sup>14</sup> J. Lofland and L.H. Lofland, *op. cit.*, 20.

<sup>15</sup> M. Q. Patton, *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (third edition)*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), 2.

<sup>16</sup> Sarah J. Tracy, “Qualitative Quality: Eight ‘Big-Tent’ Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research,” *Qualitative Inquiry* 16 (2010): 842.

a group interview. The preplanned questions can be changed, especially during discussions.<sup>17</sup>

Before examining how these methodologies were used in this study, the research design should be closely examined. At the first step, after deciding to study CAK, the formulation of a narrower research question was the first step to be fulfilled. After that, literature on CAK consisting of public records, decrees, cadastral record books, reports, research books, journals, and diaries were reviewed to evaluate the weaknesses and strengths of existing literature. In light of this information, the research question was refined to study the subject more efficiently. Classifying study materials and conducting research were other important stages that enabled successful completion of the research. As aforementioned, interviewing was used as a method to collect data from the field. One of the most crucial stages of this study was conducting interviews, which enabled access to first-hand information from the field. To be able to gather experiences, thoughts, senses, preferences, perceptions, and relations of informants, fifteen semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with CAK. The duration of face-to-face interviews varied between approximately half an hour and one and a half hours. All interviews were recorded on tape and transcribed. In the beginning of all interviews, the permission of informants was orally obtained, because Istanbul Sehir University Committee of Academic Honesty does not need written permission for interviews and oral permission is enough to be able to use the data received from interviews. In addition to semi-structured interviews with 15 people based on a pre-prepared questionnaire, non-structured interviews were also held with the board of directors of The Association of Culture and Solidarity of Central Anatolian Kurds (*KOMKURD-AN, Orta Anadolu Kürtleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği*), The Association of Social Cooperation and Solidarity for Haymanaians (*Haymanalılar Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği*) and some researchers working on the subject as a part of field research. Due to concerns of directors and researchers, interviews with these individuals were not recorded and just were noted on paper. Their permission for using data gathered from them was also obtained orally.

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<sup>17</sup> J. Mason, op. cit., 62.

As a target group for the semi-structured in-depth interviews, individuals between the ages of 18 and 60 representing both genders - 8 women and 7 men - found with the help of the snowball sampling technique according to specified categories were chosen. While the main sampling strategy was being formed, some important questions such as “What work do I want my sample to do? What is the wider universe or population from which I wish to sample? What is the nature of my existence in this universe or population?” were kept in mind to collect reliable data.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, this research required the restriction of informants’ residences to urban areas in order to reliably learn the level of relation and cohesion between Kurds and other groups. Furthermore, gathering reliable information from Kurds living in rural areas would have been difficult because of the rarity of their communication with people coming from different ethnic, social, and cultural backgrounds. The focus of this research is therefore comprised of Kurds from Haymana and Polatlı (Ankara) still living in these two provinces or in the city center and from Kulu (Konya) and Çiçekdağı (Kırşehir), but living in the center of Ankara. While 11 interviews were conducted with Kurds from Haymana and Polatlı provinces, 4 interviews were held with Kurds from the provinces of Kulu and Kırşehir. There are three reasons why the number of informants from Haymana and Polatlı is higher than the other two provinces. First, Haymana and Polatlı are two regions in CA that have an important Kurdish population identified with it. Second, as a Kurdish person from Haymana and living in the center of Ankara, the difficulty to access Kurds in other regions prompted me to stay in this region. Third, because the number of interviews would be just 15, I preferred not to diversify this group with people living in other parts of CA, which would have made it more difficult to find patterns in their lives. Additionally, because the adaptation of Kurds to urban life is among the points to be measured, nearly half of the informants also had life experiences in rural areas. The questions addressed to informants were composed of six dimensions, which are migration (urban-rural life experiences), identity, native language, social life, discrimination, and political/institutional behavior. Each of these dimensions have sub-questions, which enabled me to learn the level of social cohesion/exclusion of CAK in the region by concretization and adaptation of Paul Bernard’s classification about the theory of social cohesion comprising belonging/isolation,

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<sup>18</sup> J. Mason, *op. cit.*, 13.

legitimacy/illegitimacy, and recognition/rejection. The duration of time during which these 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted was from 16<sup>th</sup> June to 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2015, while non-structured interviews were held from 17<sup>th</sup> May until 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2015.

After transcribing the interviews and preparing notes from non-structured interviews, the issue of analyzing the data came to the forefront. During analysis of this data, the Nvivo software program was used to organize and classify raw data for analysis. As a part of this process, Nvivo also aided the issue of coding. In light of Paul Bernard's theory and questionnaire of this study, significant points from collected data were organized.

After all these stages, during the writing process of this study, regular interviews with my advisor were held to finalize the study with necessary requirements. Because of the difficulty of writing in English without mistakes, assistants of The Academic Writing Center at Istanbul Sehir University reviewed grammar and the content of the study.

### **1.3. Limitations of the Study**

The first obstacle of this study emerged during the literature review when I realized there are some important works comprising sociological and regional aspects of CAK in the German language. Especially some works of geologist Wolf-Dieter Hutteroth, which were not translated into English, made it impossible to examine them as a part of this study. Hutteroth's close examination of Kurdish villages in terms of their settlement layouts with the relation of villages belonging to Turks, Tatars, Circassians, and other immigrant groups could be compatible with the aim of my research question. Additionally, there were some other German works not translated into English focusing on the geographical settlement of villages in Asia Minor and their sociological dimensions. Thus, the first obstacle came to the forefront during the literature review.

The political situation dominating the period while I was conducting my fieldwork is another obstacle I had to face. It was hard to communicate with people before the June 7<sup>th</sup> election due to the probability of being provoked and the unnatural results that aroused from the effects of political discourses used by political parties. Because of this reason, the informants were contacted after the elections, which created the

obligation of simultaneously completing interviews in a short period. Furthermore, even after the elections, a re-arising conflictual environment in Turkey made it difficult to gather unhesitant answers from informants. Especially questions regarding political/institutional behaviors distracted some people, which I observed in their reactions and understood from their gestures. Even some people whom I wanted to interview rejected my request because they perceived this study as an investigation into current political issues.

Last but not least, another obstacle that might impact the success of this study arises from individual restrictions belonging to my educational background and personality. As an MA candidate having a bachelor degree in International Relations and currently studying in the program of Modern Turkish Studies, it was the first time I did field research as a part of my studies. I must admit I learned about opportunities and limitations of fieldwork during this study. Nonetheless, a series of focus groups on the Alewi Issue in Turkey, in which I participated with the SETA Foundation immediately before this study, provided important experience for me, without which I strongly believe the quality of this study would have been lessened. In addition to obstacles arising from my educational background, personality characteristics of mine also impacted the fieldwork. As a more introverted person, I felt I had a problem communicating with people, especially individuals I had not met before, which inhibited me from engaging them in further discussion during the interviews. Even if I tried my best, I have to admit that another person more familiar with field study and more comfortable during the interviews might gather more comprehensive data.

#### **1.4. Organization of the Study**

This study is organized in five chapters. As an introduction chapter, Chapter One examines the main issues regarding the reason, methodology, limitations, and organization of the study as well as stressing the research question and secondary issues motivating the study. Chapter Two draws a theoretical framework for the study based on the debates of social integration/cohesion in the literature by stressing similarities and differences between them. As a part of this chapter, the evolution of the term of social cohesion apart from theory on social integration and limitations and the possibilities of examining CAK in light of Paul Bernard's approach to social cohesion will be handled. Chapter Three elaborates on the historical background of

CAK by focusing on the changing settlement motivations of the Kurdish population in the region during both Imperial and Republican periods and the perception of the administration towards CAK that affected implementations and policies towards the region and determined the level of social, political, and cultural cohesion between CAK, other groups, and the authorities. Chapter Four includes the field research results from semi-structured in-depth interviews with people from the region and non-structured interviews with representatives of associations and researchers, providing valuable data for the measurement of social cohesion of CAK. Prominent issues revealed after analysis of the interview results are examined concordantly with the theoretical framework of the study. As a conclusion, Chapter Five aims to evaluate the general levels of social cohesion of CAK as a result of this study, stresses problematic areas concerning social cohesion of CAK and offers some concrete suggestions that may create positive impacts on their current situation.



## CHAPTER II

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

Which elements bond societies together? Do identities, common values, or institutions have this function? How important are loyalism and commitment as a part of this system of values? As potentially important elements, how should these abstract concepts be evaluated in research when trying to determine their contributions to social cohesion/exclusion? While examining the social cohesion of CAK, answers to these questions will be useful to gather information about contours of ethnic identity among CAK: How do they identify themselves in their daily lives? How do they differentiate themselves from their non-Kurdish neighbors and fellows? What are their perceptions towards the state? What are their views about political parties and institutions? Do they have any linkage with Kurds living in Eastern Anatolia where their ancestors lived once upon a time? All of these questions are quite important to answer our research question: What are the patterns in the political, social and cultural lives of CAK and how, if at all, are these patterns and CAK' Kurdish identity impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness?

In light of these questions, this chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework for understanding social cohesion/exclusion of CAK in case of their political, social and cultural relations with social groups and institutions. As the first step, the evolution of the theory of social integration in the 20th century and different approaches towards its concepts will be examined. As an important phenomenon, the emergence of the concept of social cohesion and how it differs from social integration will be handled. In this section, the reasons why social cohesion is conceptualized as a narrow-scoped relation occurring between social groups on the micro level while social integration is described as a more comprehensive term examining state-society relations on the macro level will be discussed. Specifying elements of social cohesion, prominent aspects such as equality, freedom, solidarity, and mutuality and how they are handled by scholars will be analyzed in detail to introduce the theoretical framework suitable for the study.

It also should be emphasized that Turkishness and Kurdishness are perceived as abstract concepts depending mostly on the difference in native languages in this study. This limitation arises from the state's differentiation of these terms by bringing native language to the forefront. While looking back through population censuses held in the early Republican period, it can be realized that the state's description of Kurdishness had depended on this issue. Furthermore, it should be noted that Turkishness and Kurdishness are also seen as a sociological fact and a part of people's description of themselves, not just as a part of the native language. In other words, all informants express that they establish relations with social groups without denying their Kurdishness, even if it is sometimes not very effective. It also should be emphasized that Kurdishness is not seen as a concept dependent on assumptions about their identity; it is rather perceived as an element, of which the study tries to understand its role in social relations. To serve this purpose, the theory of social cohesion is chosen to answer the research question rather than the theory of identity.

### **2.1. The Evolution of the Theory of Social Integration and its Units**

As an important phenomenon in the theory of social integration and social cohesion, an inversion of the works on this issue reflect the general characteristics of the topic's changing elements. Especially after the 1980s, with the rise of globalization and neoliberalism, economic inequality has increased in direct proportion to economic growth and a sharpened competitive environment has weakened the social state. All of these developments and their connections to each other have created a new atmosphere in which social cohesion has lost its power on societies.<sup>19</sup>

Auspiciously, this loss has allowed states to focus on the issue of social cohesion more than before. Globalization and new elements in the world order caused international organizations such as the EU and non-governmental organizations to care about the issue more than before.<sup>20</sup> Increasingly, expanding work on social integration and cohesion makes way for widening meanings while at the same time creating new discussions.

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<sup>19</sup>Ralf Dahrendorf, Frank Field and Carolyn Hayman, *Report on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion in a Free Society*, (London: Commission on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion, 1995), 38.

<sup>20</sup>Wolfgang Bosswick, Doris Lüken-Klaßen and Friedrich Heckmann, *Integration of Migrants: Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities*, (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006), 2.

In social theory, Emile Durkheim is the first prominent thinker dealing with social integration. He was more concerned with the direct bounds between the transformation of social order and the lack of social integration. According to his thoughts, after the differentiated and individualized social order came to the forefront, providing social integration in society became an issue.<sup>21</sup> Especially the new economic and social order through the end of the 19th century dissolved the effects of institutions as providers of social integration. At that point, Durkheim implies that with obligatory organic solidarism - arising from the needs of individuals - the loss of social integration in societies might be restrained. While making a comment on the differences in social relationship between groups and individuals, Durkheim uses suicides as an example to concretize his thoughts and categorize them according to their reasons in traditional and modern (individual-oriented) societies. Even if there are different reasons for committing suicide, one of the remarkable reasons for it depends on the complexity of forming social ties in individual oriented societies.<sup>22</sup> At this point, from the eye of Durkheim, individuals' ties with society that are dependent on moral values control individuals from committing suicide.

Durkheim's concentration on social integration and the important question of debating the probability of providing social integration in a new social order at the end of the 19th century paved the way for further research on social integration. One of the prominent researchers working on the issue was Talcott Parsons, who worked specifically on how social integration shaped a new order during the 1950s and after. Parson understands the importance of the new order in light of capitalism, pluralism, and liberalism shaping the postwar era.<sup>23</sup> According to him, social integration requires a hidden consensus formed by values of the new era: democracy, pluralism, social, political, and civil rights. As seen in both Durkheim's and Parson's thoughts on social integration, both of them see moral values and human beings as the main motivating source for social integration. However, there was a gap in promoting social integration for both state and societal levels because of difficulties in promoting social integration in that form. This gap would be filled with further

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<sup>21</sup>Ian Gough and Gunnar Olofsson, "Introduction: New Thinking on Exclusion and Integration," in *Capitalism and Social Cohesion: Essays on Exclusion and Integration*, ed. Ian Gough and Gunnar Olofsson (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 2.

<sup>22</sup>Thomas J. Scheff, "A Concept of Social Integration," *Philosophical Psychology* 20 (2007), 580.

<sup>23</sup>Ian Gough and Gunnar Olofsson, op. cit. 2.

research by the 1960s and social integration would start to be conceptualized by that time.

Post 1968, research of social integration was based on new social movements, subcultural elements and mass media, elements gaining popularity in that period. Concentrating on a busy agenda of world developments, academics did not concern themselves with forming a theoretical framework for social integration/differentiation theories.<sup>24</sup> Academic studies were based on field research and had a feature of anthropological studies. Nevertheless, David Lockwood's 1964 article, titled "Social integration and system integration," produced a systematic framework for the theory of social integration. Lockwood formed a framework both for system integration and social integration. According to him, individuals and social groups should be included more in analyzing the concept of social integration. In other words, both groups ignore the relationship between the parts (institutions) and actors.<sup>25</sup> While Lockwood was trying to understand how social change is internally generated in a society, he explains the mistake of normative functionalists and Marxist conflict theorists. According to Lockwood's thoughts, both normative functionalists and conflict theorists failed to evaluate social and system integration. Normative functionalists failed to understand reasons of social change related to functional incompatibility between institutional order and its material elements, because they attached too much importance to moral elements.<sup>26</sup> Also, conflict theorists could not establish a mutual relation between social change and system integration. The Marxist approach to conflict theory was problematic, because it overlooked the institutional axis in which the social system is differentiated.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the theoretical context of social integration was more diversified and held in detail by scholars such as Jurgen Habermas (1973), Anthony Giddens (1984), and Nicos Mouzelis (1991).<sup>27</sup> Habermas continued to use Lockwood's agency (part)/system classification by evaluating social

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid. 3.

<sup>25</sup> David Lockwood, "Social Integration and System Integration," in *Social Change: Explorations, Diagnoses, and Conjectures*, ed. George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, (New York: Schenkman Publishing, 1976), 376-377.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. 382.

<sup>27</sup> Ian Gough and Gunnar Olofsson, op. cit. 13.

orientations/actions from the system and its functional requirements.<sup>28</sup> In his case, he classifies social order from two points of view, one of which is social integration based on “a normatively secured or communicatively achieved consensus.”<sup>29</sup> Contrary to Lockwood, Habermas did not believe in a bond between social and system integration. For him, system integration deals with the economic and political institutional sphere while social integration can be examined through other communicative areas.<sup>30</sup> Thus, these two agency (part)/system classifications are incomparable.

When it comes to Giddens, the theory of social integration significantly changed. For Giddens, social integration is defined as: “regularized ties, interchanges or reciprocity of practices between either actors or collectivities.”<sup>31</sup> On the other side, his understanding of system integration is not related to agency/system classification, but is defined as: “reciprocity between actors or collectivities across extended time-space, outside conditions of co-presence.”<sup>32</sup> Giddens maintains social/system integration at respective micro/macro levels by unpopularizing the normative-functionalist distinction of Lockwood. Nonetheless, Mouzelis has criticized Giddens’s differentiation of time-presence issues between social and system integration by giving as an example agreements between heads of states, which exceed time and presence through the possibility of affecting the future.

One of the important developments in conceptualizing social integration was providing new definitions of social integration. However, all of the scholars working on the theory of social integration did not converge on an exact definition. Thus, while trying to figure out basic elements forming social integration, one should be aware of the different approaches to the issue. It is obvious that a prominent difference and turning point in the works of social integration came to light with the rise and differentiation of social integration/social cohesion. The concepts of social integration and social cohesion are paired together in social works while emphasizing

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<sup>28</sup> Nicos Mouzelis, “Social and System Integration: Lockwood, Habermas, Giddens”, *Sociological Review* 31 (1997), 114.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. 114.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 116.

<sup>31</sup> T. Jansen, N. Chioncel, and H. Dekkers, “Social cohesion and Integration: Learning Active Citizenship,” *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 27 (2006), 191.

<sup>32</sup> Mouzelis, op. cit. 116.

differences and similarities between them. While social integration was approached as a concept mostly showing representation and presentation of values belonging to a group by another one, social cohesion generally implies a relationship between social groups, which are equal in many aspects. In other words, while the concept of social integration is more concentrated on relations on the state-society level, social cohesion pays attention to relations between two groups. Also, the concept of social integration holds integration as a systematic unit in contrast to social cohesion, which considers individuals and social groups.<sup>33</sup> These differentiations should be examined in detail to understand differences in these concepts.

The one who first differentiated between social integration and cohesion in a framework was Lockwood. Differences of social integration and cohesion were held in Lockwood's later work examining relations between integration and class formation. For Lockwood, the elements forming social integration were determinant in class formation. In other words, social integration, which has as its primary reference point for the analysis the complex unity of democratic, market, and welfare state relations shaping the rights of political, civil, and social citizenship, establishes a framework for class formation.<sup>34</sup> Inequalities in class and status result whether there is social cohesion or exclusion. As in his previous work, Lockwood emphasizes the effects of moral values, which he names moral resources. The non-existence of moral resources, referring to "advantages conferred by social standing and social networks, command of information, and general know-how, including the ability to attain one's ends through the activation of shared moral sentiments," can damage social cohesion and cause social exclusion.<sup>35</sup> As it is seen in Lockwood's perception about social integration and cohesion, integration forms elements that shape the way for social cohesion/exclusion. Thus, in Lockwood's case, social integration is a more comprehensive term.

Another important differentiation between social integration and cohesion arises from debates insisting on the assimilative effects of social integration. In this approach, social cohesion is discussed in relation to the question of coexistence in

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<sup>33</sup> Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, *Sosyal Kaynaşma Bağlamında Kürt Meselesi*, TÜBİTAK Project 2012, 27.

<sup>34</sup> David Lockwood, "Civic Integration and Class Formation," *The British Journal of Sociology* 47 (1996), 532.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* 537.

multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, while social integration is used to examine the relation between locals and migrants belonging to different ethnic, cultural and religious roots.<sup>36</sup> Assimilation mostly happens in majority-minority classifications, in which the majority can aim to force assimilation by exercising control over the basic elements of a minority, such as language, religion or endangering physical presence of a minority through deportation, population transfer, or even genocide.<sup>37</sup>

Assimilation usually is implemented by state institutions and the ideology behind it. For example, as the first nation state, France insisted on political unity and an inclusive theory and practice of citizenship, which was implemented by schools, the army, the church, unions, and political parties and subsequently destroyed political, social, and cultural diversity.<sup>38</sup> At the present time, interpreting social integration as assimilation continues. As a part of social integration, the term “loyalty” comes into prominence as an indicator proving the existence of integration:

While different citizens would develop different emotions towards their community, all that is to sustain it and can legitimately be expected of them all is a basic concern for its integrity and well-being; what one might call patriotism or political loyalty. They might criticize the prevailing form of government, institutions, policies, values, ethos and dominant self-understanding in the strongest possible terms, but these should not arouse unease or provoke charges of disloyalty so long as their basic commitment to dialogue is not in doubt.<sup>39</sup>

In the case of social integration, the loyalty of citizens is perceived as a declaration of their commitment to states and their institutions. Especially in the case of labor migrants, political refugees and other asylum seekers, social integration is used as a process integrating “them” to be like “us” through cultural adaptation, such as ensuring their knowledge of and loyalty to the constitution, adequate knowledge of the language of that society, integration into that society, and a commitment to the state, which could be interpreted as cultural assimilation.<sup>40</sup> Actually, successful integration requires mutual relations and commitment to self-fulfillment. In that case, developing a sense of belonging necessitates “equally valuing and cherishing to the ones wanted to be integrated in all their diversity and reflecting this in its structure,

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<sup>36</sup> Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, op. cit. 39.

<sup>37</sup> Hans van Amersfoort, “‘Minority’ as a Sociological Concept,” in *Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation*, ed. Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 198.

<sup>38</sup> William Rogers Brubaker, “Introduction to Immigration and The Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America,” in *Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation*, ed. Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 212.

<sup>39</sup> Bhikhu Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 342.

<sup>40</sup> Michael Samers, “Immigration, ‘Ethnic Minorities’, and ‘Social Exclusion’ in the European Union: a Critical Perspective,” *Geoforum* 29 (1998): 133.

policies, conduct of public affairs.”<sup>41</sup> In other words, social integration should be handled as a mutual process to prevent its turning into assimilation of a group by another dominating culture. Furthermore, when the process of social integration prescribes a mutual relation at an equal level without restraining diversity, it shows more features of cohesion. In the case of Kurds in Turkey, the enforcement of cultural-linguistic homogeneity to create a new identity for those seen as prospective suspects was highly crucial for the sake of state ideology and its institutions. Thus, the policy of mutuality could not be implemented by the Turkish state.<sup>42</sup> However, Kurds and other ethnic groups establish contacts on a societal level in the case of developing mutual relations in schools, jobs, and social life (marriages, neighbor relations, daily life interactions, etc.). Both theories of social integration and cohesion are therefore valid in the case of Kurds in Turkey.

Just as supporters claim social integration as an accelerator of the assimilation process, there are also some counter arguments insisting on social integration’s positive contributions to interaction and cooperation. From the European Unions’ point of view, social integration that “originated from conscious and motivated interaction and cooperation of individuals and groups refers to the inclusion of individuals in a system, the creation of relationships among individuals and their attitudes towards the society.”<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, scholars who advocate the positive side of social integration include the existence of fundamental judiciary and social protection, discrimination laws, distribution of resources, housing policy and law and order as examples of social integration’s connective power; this contrasts with scholars showing a tendency to perceive social integration as a part of the assimilation process.<sup>44</sup> However, in social integration, the possibility of protecting elements belonging to cultural diversity, such as language, traditions and literature, remains a question that has not been answered clearly. In this case, the theory of social cohesion concentrating more on the exposure of cultural elements comes into prominence.

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<sup>41</sup> Bhikhu Parekh, *op. cit.* 342.

<sup>42</sup> Murat Somer, *op. cit.* 76.

<sup>43</sup> Wolfgang Bosswick, Doris Lüken-Klaßen and Friedrich Heckmann, *op. cit.* 2.

<sup>44</sup> Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, *op. cit.* 41.



## 2.2. The Theory of Social Cohesion in Light Of Reciprocity

The theory of social cohesion came to light with the evolution of works on social integration. These two different concepts are still seen as interchangeable definitions; even the aforementioned differences come to light in levels of communication.

Social cohesion is a unique definition that can be adapted to different conditions arising from its flexibility.<sup>45</sup> Academic works on the theory of social cohesion have become popular since the 1990s by efforts of prominent scholars such as Regina Berger-Schmitt, Ade Kearns, Ray Forrest, Joseph Chan, Bhikhu Parekh, Paul Bernard and Jane Jenson. These scholars associate social cohesion with different dimensions, such as equality, mutuality, welfare, and solidarity.

The concept of equality/inequality is a very popular dimension of the term held by scholars. The conspicuous property of social cohesion differentiating it from integration shows up in its requirement of equality that is interrelated with social order and its acceptance in society. Without recognition of social equality, referring to social cohesion will become difficult as is stated:

The two analytical perspectives on social cohesion that we have pursued have thus led us to the same two-fold conclusion. First, that equality is an essential element of the democratic social order, linked to liberty and solidarity in a dialectical relationship. Second, that this dialectic cannot be maintained in the dynamism of its totality and its contradictions unless it operates on two levels, which are themselves in a dialectical relationship: on the one hand, a formal level on which the fundamental equality of all members of society is affirmed with regard to recognition, inclusion and the legitimacy of conflict-resolution institutions; and on the other hand, the substantial level on which those who want to freely engage in social debates forge unifying values and seek social justice.<sup>46</sup>

As it is seen, in addition to equality, mutuality of social relations and their improvement are essential subjects in social cohesion. While the existence of social cohesion signifies the nonexistence of social exclusion, it also adds mutual acceptance of the values that create it such as social bonds, equal political, economic, and social rights creating equal citizenship rights, mutual recognition and inclusion.

The importance of social cohesion increased as works associated it with social welfare and solidarity. Especially works on these dimensions of social cohesion came into prominence with gaining popularity of the term by policy makers. The positive correlation between social cohesion and economic growth paved the way for the perception of social cohesion as a source of wealth and economic development.

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid. 5.

<sup>46</sup> Paul Bernard, *Social Cohesion: A Critique*, (Ottawa: CPRN, 1999), 23.

Also, a lack of social cohesion that damages civic engagement and solidarity in a society can cause an increase in the social expenditures budget.<sup>47</sup> These determinations also created a new means of interrelating social cohesion with economic, social, and political issues in the context of being a strong state. Additionally, the perception claiming the positive effect of social cohesion on political stability and security was considered important especially following the cases of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. These examples led to an increase in the number of works on Canada, Australia, and European Union countries including different ethnic groups and immigrants.

It should be noted that although there is now a remarkable literature on social cohesion, there is no exact definition of social cohesion. As a supranational organization containing a sizable population of immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers belonging to different ethnic and cultural groups, the EU pays quite a lot of attention to the concept of social cohesion and makes a comprehensive definition including dimensions of social cohesion. According to the definition made by the Council of Europe, social cohesion is “the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding polarization.”<sup>48</sup> The general aim of the Council is to find the best way to foster diversity by creating an enriching atmosphere and preventing conflict between diversified social units and groups. As a part of preventing conflict, polarization cannot be allowed. In response to critics who insist on the assimilation and standardizing effects of social cohesion, the Council declares full respect towards the autonomy of the private sphere and bounding individuals around the circle of solidarity.<sup>49</sup> In other words, sustainability of individuality in an atmosphere where social bonds are powerful is the main aim of the Council in light of social cohesion. Being successful in this aim requires taking the actions outlined in the table:

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<sup>47</sup> Regina Berger-Schmitt, “Considering Social Cohesion in Quality of Life Assessments: Concept and Measurement,” *Social Indicators Research* 58 (2002): 405.

<sup>48</sup> European Commission, *A new strategy for Social Cohesion*, Revised strategy for Social Cohesion approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 2004, 3.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* 13.

Table 2.1. : Necessary Actions for Providing Social Cohesion in the Eye of the Council of Europe<sup>50</sup>

Clarifying and maintaining the essential role of the State and other public bodies	The State, a guarantor of human rights and participatory democracy, protect vulnerable groups at risk of social exclusion. Also the state restores a sufficient degree of equity in the distribution of wealth through mechanisms of solidarity such as redistributive taxation and social security.
Integrating the social dimension into economic life	Commitment to eliminate poverty and to achieve sustainable development, sound macro-economic policies which led equality of opportunity to everyone, providing economically sustainable social protection, access to employment for all, social responsibility of economic actors.
Developing a new ethic of social responsibility	Developing the sense of mutual responsibility and interdependence, rebuilding a sense of society, of belonging, of commitment to shared social goals.
Supporting families and encouraging family solidarity	Being supportive of families and other networks and relationships which bring individuals together into wider circles of solidarity, supporting families in fulfilling their functions, providing the rights and dignity of children or elderly people in need of care.
Encouraging participation in civil society	Creating a favourable environment for encouraging charitable, sports and cultural associations, together with organisations for children and young people; recognising and providing support on non-governmental organizations.

As seen, providing social cohesion requires according both state institutions and tools among diversified social, economic, political, and cultural societies. It is not

<sup>50</sup> European Commission, op. cit. 8.

enough to prepare a legal framework for the adaptation of state institutions, but cultural adaptation of social structure is also required for cohesion. Regarding this point, some concepts, such as multiculturalism, come to the forefront as high demand mediators between state-society levels to get both sides used to social cohesion. Even if some academics look with suspicion upon multiculturalism, some theorists see it as a compulsory point. As Parekh implies, multiculturalism works as a hidden mediator between different groups in the same society:

A multicultural society cannot be stable and last long without developing a common sense of belonging among its citizens. The sense of belonging cannot be ethnic or based on shared cultural, ethnic and other characteristics, for a multicultural society is too diverse for that, but political in nature and based on a shared commitment to the political community. Its members do not directly belong to each other as in an ethnic group, but through their mediating membership of a shared community, and they are committed to each other because they are all in their own different ways committed to the community and bound by the ties of common interest and affection. Although they might personally loathe some of their fellow members or find their lifestyles, views and values unacceptable, their mutual commitment and concern as members of a shared community remain unaffected.<sup>51</sup>

Parekh's emphasis on a commitment to a shared community in every way possible is an important point to be able to live in a diversified country. In this manner, the autonomy of individuals and groups can be maintained by developing common living spaces and common values holding it together. However, even the Council of Europe is aware of concerns that present growing multiculturalism as a threat to traditional identities.<sup>52</sup> In another work, *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, Parekh examines the problematic sides of the perception of multiculturalism in the judicial system, education system, media, cultural institutions, health system, welfare regime, labor market, migrant and refugee policies, political system, and social institutions; he draws attention to deficiencies regarding how misperceptions of multiculturalism pave the way for discrimination and racism.<sup>53</sup> The effect of multiculturalism, whether as a connective or discriminative concept, is a much debated issue, especially between supporters of nation states, who stress the requirement of a common identity to bond society together, and multicultural pluralists, who support the creation of a new form of citizenship isolated from nationality.<sup>54</sup> All of these kinds of debates related to the aforementioned dimensions of social cohesion give way for examining social cohesion at all points and detailing the classification of its aspects.

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<sup>51</sup> Bhikhu Parekh, op. cit. 341.

<sup>52</sup> European Commission, op. cit. 4.

<sup>53</sup> Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, op. cit. 23.

<sup>54</sup> William Rogers Brubaker, op. cit. 220.

### 2.3. A Close Examination of the Theory of Social Cohesion

After examining basic features of the theory of social cohesion and the base of its differentiation from the concept of social integration, a further close examination of its elements is essential to understand social cohesion in the political, economic, and socio-cultural fields. Different theoretical frameworks and classifications developed for social cohesion should be suitable for gathering what is involved in and excluded from different perspectives through establishing an outline for it in different fields.

It has been stressed before that different points of view differently denote the concepts of social cohesion and integration, including assimilation, absorption, acculturation, accommodation, incorporation, inclusion, participation, cohesion-building, enfranchisement, toleration, anti-discrimination, and so on.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, theorization about social cohesion also carries these traces of different perceptions; in each theory, some features are brought to the forefront while others are disregarded. As one of the first further detailed classifications of social cohesion, Berger-Schmitt conceptualizes social cohesion as a part of the quality of life in political, economic, and social spaces of daily life and evaluates its existence through social relations, interactions, and its ties with the concepts of the inequality dimension and the social capital dimension.<sup>56</sup> “The strength of social relations, networks and associations; a sense of belonging to the same community and the ties that bind, in terms of shared values, a common identity and trust among members; equal opportunities; the extent of disparities, social cleavages and social exclusion” in a society form a base for the concept of social cohesion.<sup>57</sup> While Berger-Schmitt emphasizes the role of social capital in the concept of social cohesion, she designates three different dimensions, which are: 1) social relations and activities within primary social groups and associations; 2) quality of social relations in terms of shared values, feelings of affiliation, solidarity and trust; and 3) quality of institutions in terms of their functioning, efficiency, reliability, credibility and stability.<sup>58</sup> In the case of the non-existence of one or several of these dimensions, the effect of social exclusion as an inverse concept of social cohesion increases. From the point of the European Union,

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<sup>55</sup> Adrian Favell, “Integration and Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe,” in *Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation*, ed. Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010, 373.

<sup>56</sup> Regina Berger-Schmitt, op. cit. 403.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. 406.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. 409-411.

even if social exclusion is mostly understood from the economic perspective, such as the unfair distribution of income, it also points out that it is in the “multidimensional nature of the mechanisms that individuals and groups are excluded from taking part in the social exchanges.”<sup>59</sup> Like social cohesion, the term social exclusion has strong ties with economy.

In another study, Chan asserts that social cohesion is an ever-changing concept, which varies according to people (decision makers, policy analysis’s, and scholars), conditions, time, and dominating problems.<sup>60</sup> If a problem arises from ethnic conflict, policy makers try to provide social cohesion by adapting institutions to create a living space enabling cohabitation. Nonetheless, if the problem is based on an unfair distribution of income, they take measures towards overcoming this problem. For Chan, a decent definition for social cohesion is: “Social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging, and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral manifestations.”<sup>61</sup> Chan’s definition’s distinction from the others is the creation of vertical and horizontal levels for actors of social cohesion. Chan clarifies these actors with the vertical line referring to the relationship between state and society and the horizontal line referring to communication among different individuals and groups in society.<sup>62</sup> As aforementioned, in the case of Central Anatolian Kurds, Chan’s distinction of actors according to their interactions is quite useful, because of its contribution for handling the subject not only on a state-society level, but also on the individual and group level. When examined more closely, the perception of Chan’s dependence on social cohesion classifies the term according to its objectivity and subjectivity as well as its units of actors. While objectivity indicates that components of social cohesion, such as “people’s actual participation,” “cooperation,” and “helping behavior,” can be measured, subjectivity refers to more concrete elements, such as feelings of trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to help.<sup>63</sup> Chan’s

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<sup>59</sup> Andrea Brandolini, *On Applying Synthetic Indices of Multidimensional Well Being: Health and Income Inequalities in Selected EU Countries* (Rome: Bank of Italy, 2008), 3.

<sup>60</sup> Joseph Chan, Ho-Pong To and Elaine Chan, “Reconsidering Social Cohesion: Developing a Definition and Analytical Framework for Empirical Research,” *Social Indicators Research* 75 (2006): 274.

<sup>61</sup> Joseph Chan, Ho-Pong To and Elaine Chan, op. cit. 290.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. 290.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. 291.

classification dependent on both the unity of actors and subjectivity/objectivity is classified as follows:

Table 2.2. : Measuring social cohesion: a two-by-two framework<sup>64</sup> (Chan’s classification)

	Subjective component (People’s state of mind)	Objective component (Behavioural manifestations)
Horizontal dimension (Cohesion within civil society)	-General trust with fellow citizens -Willingness to cooperate and help fellow citizens, including those from “other” social groups -Sense of belonging or identity	-Social participation and vibrancy of civil society -Voluntarism and donations -Presence or absence of major inter-group alliances or cleavages
Vertical dimension (State-citizen cohesion)	-Trust in public figures -Confidence in political and other major social institutions	-Political participation (e.g. voting, political parties etc.)

The complexity of Chan’s classification arises from the complication, concretization and measurement of terms such as ‘trust,’ ‘willingness,’ ‘sense of belonging,’ ‘identity,’ ‘voluntarism,’ and so on. Chan also is aware of this complexity and gives sample questions to measure social cohesion in both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Furthermore, Chan reveals that vertical measurement of social cohesion is easier than in the horizontal dimension due to the convenience of asking direct questions such as: “How much trust or confidence do you have with the following personalities and institutions;” “How often did you participate in signing petitions, strikes, demonstrations;” or “How often did you vote in legislative council and local council elections?”<sup>65</sup> However, it is much more difficult to calculate trust,

<sup>64</sup> Joseph Chan, Ho-Pong To and Elaine Chan, op. cit. 294.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. 297.

willingness to cooperate and help, and sense of belonging or identity by asking simple and direct questions. Because of this, a methodology of observations, in-depth interviews and detailed research are required to gather reliable information. Chan points out another complicated issue in the measurement of social cohesion: Does the existence of trust, willingness, sense of belonging and other elements in a society refer to the presence of social cohesion? According to Chan, more important than the existence of these elements is that they provide inter-ethnic social ties, which means social cohesion. If these elements are effective just within ethnic groups and do not contribute to inter-ethnic relations, it is hard to speak of social cohesion.<sup>66</sup>

Elaborating on Chan’s classification of vertical/horizontal dimensions requires concentration on the quality of questions that should be asked for an evaluation of social cohesion within state-society and civil society. In this context, Kearns and Forrest’s evaluations on social cohesion that focus on functions of the neighborhood in relationship between social cohesion and social capital present valuable information. In their classification, social cohesion is composed of five domains: common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; social networks and social capital; and place attachment and identity.<sup>67</sup> Each of these domains has sub-domains intending to determine how strong social cohesion is in a society. Differently from Chan, Kearns and Forrest do not classify in terms of units of actors. Their methodology is based on just elements of social cohesion. This concentration gives them an opportunity for the elaboration of abstract concepts such as:

Table 2.3. : The domains of social capital and appropriate neighbourhood policies to support them<sup>68</sup>

Domain	Description	Local Policies
Empowerment	That people feel they have a voice which is listened to, are involved in	Providing support to community groups; giving local people

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. 292.

<sup>67</sup> Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns, “Social Cohesion, Social Capital and the Neighbourhood,” *Urban Studies* 38 (2001): 2130.

<sup>68</sup> Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns, op. cit. 2141.



Table 2.3. : continued

Participation	<p>processes that affect them; can themselves take action to initiate changes</p>	<p>‘voice’; helping to provide solutions to problems; giving local people a role in policy processes</p>
	<p>That people take part in social and community activities; local events occur and are well attended</p>	<p>Establishing and/or supporting local activities and local organisations;</p>
Associational activity and common purpose	<p>That people co-operate with one another through the formation of formal and informal groups to further their interests</p>	<p>publicising local events</p>
	<p>That individuals and organisations co-operate to support one another</p>	<p>Developing and supporting networks between organisations in the area</p>
Supporting networks and Reciprocity	<p>for either mutual or one-sided gain; an expectation that help would be given to or received from others when needed</p>	<p>Organisations which develop ideas of community support; good neighbour award schemes</p>
	<p>That people share common values and norms of behaviour</p>	
Collective norms and values		<p>Developing and promulgating an ethos which residents recognize and accept; securing harmonious social relations; promoting community interests</p>
	<p>That people feel they can trust their co-residents and local organisations responsible for governing or serving their area</p>	<p>Encouraging trust in their relationships with each other; delivering on policy promises; bringing conflicting groups together</p>
Trust		
	<p>That people feel safe in their neighbourhood and are not restricted in their use of public space by fear</p>	<p>Encouraging a sense of safety in residents; involvement in local crime prevention; providing visible evidence of security measures</p>
Safety	<p>That people feel connected to their co-residents, their home area, have a sense of belonging to place</p>	<p>Creating, developing and/or supporting a sense of belonging in residents;</p>
	<p>the place and its people</p>	<p>boosting the identity of a place via design, street furnishings, naming</p>
Belonging		

While Kearns and Forrest give details about the domains of social cohesion, they come to this conclusion by looking at social cohesion in small areas like neighborhoods. They used results of a survey on neighborhoods in West-Central Scotland and Britain to test their classification's result. The distinctive feature of their work arises from their suggestions of providing social cohesion in local areas. They believe these local areas could be experimental fields for large-scale implementations. Social cohesion of poor people in poor urban neighborhoods is a suitable example for politically, economically, and culturally disadvantaged and excluded groups and individuals. Because for Kearns and Forrest, investigating macro processes for social cohesion may fail to notice social cohesion in daily life practices and micro areas.<sup>69</sup> Actually, there are some works using quantitative methods for calculating social cohesion and exclusion in macro areas, such as the EU member countries. However, works based on the results of surveys regarding household income and living conditions could not measure social cohesion in socio-cultural areas.<sup>70</sup> Looking through social phenomena especially in restricted areas requires more than results of surveys and undetailed interviews. In this case, Kearns' classification of domains belonging to social cohesion and advice regarding providing social cohesion in local areas is quite useful to examine the social cohesion of the Kurdish population in Central Anatolia, especially with regards to institutional cohesion and trust.

Chan's classification depending on the unit of actors and Kearns and Forrest's concept considering domains of social cohesion in local areas allow for preparing a framework to investigate the social cohesion of Central Anatolian Kurds. However, additional research comprehends the main aspects of social cohesion and classifies them in a more systematic way. Jenson's definition of social cohesion according to five dimensions tries to establish a framework for major interrelations, both at the state-society level as well as regarding individual and group relations. That is why Jenson's classification can be implemented at both the macro and micro levels.

Jenson's five dimensions are given as follows:

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<sup>69</sup> Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns, *op. cit.* 2128.

<sup>70</sup> See Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître. "Vulnerability and Multiple Deprivation Perspectives on Economic Exclusion in Europe: A Latent Class Analysis," *European Societies* 7 (2005): pp. 423-450.

1. Belonging vs. isolation: This dimension is related to shared values and a sense of identity that allows people to feel committed.
2. Inclusion vs. exclusion: This dimension is related to economic institutions and especially one central institution of modern societies, the market.
3. Participation vs. non-involvement: This dimension is related to joining political actions, such as advocacy groups, political parties, unions, and governments.
4. Recognition vs. rejection: This dimension is related to citizens' feeling that others accept them, and recognize their contributions.
5. Legitimacy vs. illegitimacy: This dimension is related to the existence of formal or informal, public or private institutions acting as mediators.<sup>71</sup>

Interestingly, Jenson's detailed five dimensional classification indicates social cohesion and exclusion together in the same context. The absence of the above-mentioned elements suggests social exclusion in that specific unit of examination. For Jenson, both social cohesion and exclusion are terms related to each other, but powerful dominance of either does not imply the absolute absence of the other one. Regarding this point, Jenson considered whether too much concentration on social cohesion may create an exclusive atmosphere in which inclusion might refer to exclusion.<sup>72</sup> For both terms, extremism may create a complication for either cohesion or exclusion. Jenson's classification substantially insists that social cohesion/exclusion are not ill-defined terms and that their context differs according to conditions such as time, place, and actors. Because of this, while some conditions are determinative of social cohesion/exclusion, both social cohesion/exclusion can be determinative on the environment. In other words, social cohesion can be both a dependent and an independent variable that changes according to conditions:

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<sup>71</sup> Please see Jane Jenson, *Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of Canadian Research* (Ottawa: CPRN Study, 1998).

<sup>72</sup> Regina Berger-Schmitt, op.cit. 406.




Figure 2.1. : Social Cohesion as a Cause and Effect<sup>73</sup>

There are some other scholars who share the same opinion with Jenson’s thoughts claiming social cohesion both as a reason and a cause. Lars Osberg investigates the relation between economic processes such as health, the well being of children, macroeconomic performance, voluntary activity, and the role of community institutions, investment and regional development. He claims a virtuous circle between economic processes and social cohesion:

If societies with more social cohesion are able to produce more, that additional output will make it easier to resolve distributional conflicts, and a “virtuous circle” or positive feedback loop of more cohesion / more cooperation / more output / more cohesion may become established. Conversely, the economic costs to less social cohesion and less cooperation will mean there is less total output to share, which will tend to heighten distributional conflict and may set up a “vicious circle” in which lower output reinforces lower cohesion.<sup>74</sup>

A two-sided relationship network between economic processes and social cohesion can be observed in political and cultural cohesion, too. Paul Bernard, who elaborates Jenson’s classification, believes that the interrelatedness of elements of social

<sup>73</sup> Jane Jenson and Caroline Beauvais. *Social Cohesion: Updating the State of the Research* (Ottawa: CPRN, 2002), 5.

<sup>74</sup> Lars Osberg, *The Economic Implications of Social Cohesion* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 11.

cohesion provide equality, freedom, and solidarity. Because of his insistence on these issues, Bernard prepares a new classification based on Jenson’s five dimensions of social cohesion, but adds a sixth dimension, equality/inequality, which, according to him, is absent in Jenson’s classification.

Table 2.4. : Typology of the dimensions of social cohesion<sup>75</sup>

Character of the relation	Formal	Substantial
Spheres of activity		
Economic	(2) Insertion / Exclusion	(6) Equality / Inequality
Political	(5) Legitimacy/ Illegitimacy	(3) Participation / Passivity
Sociocultural	(4) Recognition / Rejection	(1) Belonging / Isolation

More than adding a new dimension to Jenson’s classification, Bernard categorizes these dimensions into three spheres of activities according to their formal or substantial characters nearly the same as Chan’s objective/subjective categorization aforementioned. Bernard also claims indefiniteness of social cohesion depending on its changing characteristics. For him, social cohesion is a hybrid quasi-concept, based on its two-faced concept:

I say hybrid because these constructions have two faces: they are, on the one hand, based, in part and selectively, on an analysis of the data of the situation, which allows them to be relatively realistic and to benefit from the aura of legitimacy conferred by the scientific method; and they maintain, on the other hand, a vagueness that makes them adaptable to various situations, flexible enough to follow the meanderings and necessities of political actions from day to day.<sup>76</sup>

While Bernard insists on the relativity and flexibility of social cohesion, he also sees three major issues - equality, freedom, and solidarity - as minimum requirements for the constitution of social cohesion. Prescription of a cyclical relation among these three issues causes “unipolar distortion” when one of these three units does not function. Uniformity, enforcement and tyranny can emerge in the case of the absence of one of these issues.<sup>77</sup> For example, unlimited freedom that is not balanced by equality and solidarity creates unipolar distortion, especially in economic areas.

<sup>75</sup> Paul Bernard, op. cit. 20.

<sup>76</sup> Paul Bernard, op. cit. 2.

<sup>77</sup> Betül Duman, Osman Alacahan, and Mustafa Kemal Bayırdağ, op.cit. 50.

Nonetheless, contradictorily, these issues can damage each other if they are not balanced. Liberty can threaten equality, and as a result of it solidarity in personal relations can be harmed.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, uncontrolled equality can turn liberty into uniformity and create an atmosphere disadvantaged for solidarity. Thus, a “golden proportion” for each of these elements is required for providing social cohesion.

In the case that two of these elements are dominant together, the absence of the third element results. Bernard classifies this situation in three dimensions. The first dimension is the liberty-equality axis, called ‘inclusive democracy,’ the second is the equality-solidarity axis, called ‘participatory democracy,’ and the third one is the liberty-solidarity axis, called ‘pluralistic democracy.’<sup>79</sup> Inclusive democracy indicates a welfare state. Even if there is a free market and equal opportunities for everyone, there is no solidarity among individuals and groups. Inclusive democracy, in that case, “always lives under the threat of a race to the bottom insofar as more deregulated countries, and the United States in particular, exert fiscal pressure on their competitors in an increasingly globalized market.”<sup>80</sup> When it comes to participatory democracy, even if equality-solidarity is common as in Scandinavian countries, there is tension between these two poles, such as the continuum of a gender-based segmentation of the labor market arising from family policies promoting children’s education. For Bernard, pluralistic democracy is the ideal option because of the function of solidarity in neoliberal societies in eliminating inequality. Cultural diversity - an increasingly unavoidable reality of modern times - should be taken into consideration and it can succeed in pluralistic democracy. Additionally, “exalting solidarity while focusing on respect for differences and failing to call on the State to implement social rights, common to all citizens, can only lead in one direction: that the responsibility for each community's welfare be taken on by its members and their relations.”<sup>81</sup> The balance between the two elements is conceptualized as “fragile bipolar equilibria.” Even if this concept presents a healthy environment in the case of social cohesion, a balanced relation between all three dimensions is required for social cohesion to function without a problem.

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<sup>78</sup> Paul Bernard, *op.cit.* 7.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.* 11.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.* 11.

<sup>81</sup> Paul Bernard, *op. cit.* 11.

For the case of CAK, Bernard's classification based on Jenson's five dimensional categorizations is quite useful to obtain sound results. For the purpose of this study, despite Bernard's multi-dimensional classification, the categorization of the theoretical framework is only put into practice for three dimensions due to the desire to examine cohesion in just social, cultural, and political areas. The framework that will be the basis of this study for examining the social cohesion of CAK is classified into the following three categories:

A. Recognition / Rejection: This dimension refers to whether existing social relations, experiences, and feelings in an environment depend on tolerance and respect for diversity. Recognition requires interaction between different social groups without destruction of aspects making them different from each other, as in the case of belonging to a particular ethnic, religious or cultural community and having active dialogue. It requires mutual relations and interactions to not become assimilative. Solidarity among people from the neighborhood or region; the existence of relations exceeding religion/ethnicity/class, such as friendship, marriage or cooperation; the presence of multiculturalism; and an absence of discrimination are major domains showing the existence of either recognition or rejection.

B. Belonging / Isolation: This dimension refers to shared values and a sense of identity between different social groups and individuals that create engagement and feeling safe in relations. Developing shared values without losing identity among different religion/ethnicity/class is required for having a sense of belonging. Also, a feeling of being part of the same community on an equal level with other elements while at the same time protecting social bonds with one's own groups - such as ethnic identity and language - is necessary to the dimension of belonging. Otherwise, the situation can result in the isolation of different groups from the society without developing common values.

C. Legitimacy/ Illegitimacy: This dimension refers to whether existing public and private institutions provide satisfactory democracy and equal services for different social groups without discriminating against anyone. The right to use political and institutional rights; trust in political parties, public systems (education, social security, health, judicial, etc.), local institutions (municipalities, governorships), and other organizational structures; participation in social organizations (membership in

NGOs, etc.); and participation in political organizations (membership in industrial unions, political parties, trade bodies, etc.) implies whether there is legitimacy to provide an atmosphere that paves the way for social cohesion.

The framework of this study will be formed within the context of the abovementioned three dimensions to aid in the examination of patterns in the political, social and cultural lives of CAK and how these patterns and CAK' ethnic contours are impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness. In light of these three dimensions, the possibilities and limitations of being a Kurd in CA will be observed.



## CHAPTER III

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS

A close examination of the established relations between Kurds in CA with administrative and other groups in the region enables the examination of patterns in the social, cultural, and political life of CAK within the context of their cohesion with or exclusion from administrative units as well as other groups in the region. An overview of how these dimensions of relationships were established is necessary to understand current dynamics shaping the structure of the region in the case of Kurds. Thus, the effects of settlement policy on the population structure and geography might be one of the most prominent dimensions that will be closely examined. At this point, it can be understood from the historical background of CAK that especially by the 15th century the administration tried to form mechanisms aimed to centralize governmental units throughout the Empire; uncontrolled Kurdish tribes in the region were also affected by this policy. Nonetheless, the Celali Rebellions paradoxically caused chaos and this lack of control made way for decentralization that lasted approximately two centuries. Additionally, the population structure of the region showed a change in every period because of dominating new dimensions will be held in detail. Especially by the 19th century, the administration used more organized and effective tools during the settlement of CAK and other new groups coming to the region such as Tartars, Circassians, and Balkan immigrants. In other words, the population structure fundamentally changed under totally different dimensions. Therefore, the administration needed more organized tools such as laws, regulations, and codes to implement a systematic settlement policy. During the CUP administration and following the Republican period, this systematic settlement policy turned into a kind of social engineering process. All of these processes will be useful to understand elements shaping structure of the region today.

#### **3.1. Where is the Central Anatolian Region?**

The region mostly described as “Inner Anatolia,” “Central Anatolia,” and “Western Anatolia” throughout history was not entitled with a specific name in the official Ottoman administration system. Ottomans classified its territory as the *Rumeli* and

*Anadolu* provinces (*beylerbeyliği*). In 1362, Edirne was announced as the capital of Rumeli. Subsequently, in 1391, Ankara was declared the center of the Anatolian region.<sup>82</sup> These provinces were governed with a similar division of power. The sultan appointed a governor (*beylerbeyi*) who had administrative power and the kadi (*kadi*) represented legitimate power. As newly-formed provinces were established, the boundaries of the state expanded. By the end of the 16th century, the number of provinces reached thirty-two.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, sanjacks (*sancak*), smaller governmental units forming provinces, could be transformed into new provinces. Ankara is one such example of a sanjack that later became a province. After its establishment as the center of the Anatolian province, it was announced a sanjack in 1461. By 1841, it was conditioned as a new province.<sup>84</sup>

With the expansion of lands and the increase in population, the CA region hosted important provinces. The frequently changing structure of the Ottoman territories' borders caused alterations in administrative units, too. In the 16th century, CA consisted of six provinces: Kara-Hisâr-ı Sâhib, Kangırı, Ankara, Bolu, Kastamonu, and Karaman.<sup>85</sup> Each of these provinces was composed of 5 to 24 sanjacks and was responsible for paying taxes and providing military service. In the Republican Era, the boundaries of CA were specified as a geographical unit and named 'Inner Anatolia' in 1941.<sup>86</sup> Nonetheless, the categorization of these geographical regions did not result in the formation of strict administrative units. For instance, some districts belonging to Ankara, Çankırı and Çorum in administrative issues are instead part of the Black Sea region.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, uncertainty of the Ottoman provinces'

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<sup>82</sup> Tahir Sezen, *Osmanlı Yer Adları* (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2006), preface.

<sup>83</sup> Halil İnalcık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu: Klasik Çağ (1300-1600)* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2003), 109.


<sup>84</sup> Tahir Sezen, op.cit., p. 29.

<sup>85</sup> Enver Çakar, "Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Kanunnamesine Göre 1522 Yılında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İdari Taksimati," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 12 (2002): 272-274. The following provinces consisted of sanjacks: **Kara-Hisâr-ı Sâhib**: Kaza-i Kara-Hisâr: Sandıklı-Bolvadin- Şühûd- Oynaş-Yarçınlu, **Kangırı**: Kaza-i Kangırı: Tosya-Kargu-Milân-Kurşunlu-Çerkeş-Koç-Hisâr-Karı-Bazarı-Kal'acık, **Ankara**: Kaza-i Ankara: Ayaş-Çubuk-Yaban-Âbâd-Bacı -Yörük-Murtâza-Âbâd, **Bolu**: Kaza-i Bolu: Mudurnu-Kıbrûz-Konrapa-Mengen-Mendirekli-Yörük -Yörük-i Bolu ma'a-Çeharşenbih-Gerede-Cağa-Taraklu-Borlu-Amasra-Viranşehir -Aklağan Yenicesi-Yorunes, **Kastamonu**: Kaza-i Kastamonu-Sinob-Boy-Âbâd-Turhân-Taş Köprü-Küre -Tatay-Arâc-Hoş-Alây-Göl-Yörük- Ayandon, Vilâyet-i **Karaman**: Kaza-i Konya-Larende-Niğde-Ereğli-Kayseriyye-Kara-Hisârcıklı-Ak Saray-Kuş Hisâr-Gülnâr- Ak Şehir-İshaklu-Virân Beğ- Ilgun-Seydi Şehri-Ermenâk-Çimen ili- Mût-Orta Köy-Ürgüb- Karı Taş- Eski il- Turgud ili-Zengicek- Ala Dağ-Anduğu

<sup>86</sup> Ali Özçağlar, "Türkiye'de Yapılan Bölge Ayrırımları ve Bölge Planlama Üzerindeki Etkileri," *Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi* 1 (2003): 12.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* 14.

borders made it difficult to strictly classify territories as regions. Thus, the regions' borders during the Empire and Republican era are not obvious due to differences in administrative and geographical classification. With an examination of the Kurdish population in CA, this work will refer to the main settlement areas of this group during the Ottoman and Republican periods. The area mainly includes Ankara, Kırşehir, Konya, Kayseri, Yozgat, Aksaray and Nevşehir.



Map 3.1. : Settlement areas in CA (Today)<sup>88</sup>

### 3.2. The Roots of the Kurdish Population in Central Anatolia

The first presence of the Kurdish population in CA is cited as occurring in different periods according to different archival documents. According to some researchers working on the causes of migration to Anatolia, the first Kurdish migration wave to CA arose from a need for Kurds to leave their living areas due to the effects of wars

<sup>88</sup> Suat Dede, "From Nomadism to Sedentary Life in Central Anatolia: The Case of Rişvan Tribe:1830-1932" (Master Thesis, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University Department of History, 2011), 43.

in the 11th century. Like Turks, Kurds came to the Anatolian region from Kurdistan and Khorasan at the same period. As a result of the first Kurdish migrations, ‘Germiyanoğulları Seigniory’ was established.<sup>89</sup> İbni Batuta’s *Vakayiname* is one of the documents supporting the argument claiming Germiyanoğulları as a Kurdish seigniory and proving its Kurdishness.<sup>90</sup> In mentioning the Sultan of Anatolian Seljuks’ use of people of different seigniories to repress the uprisings of Turks, such as the Baba İshak Rebellion, Batuta refers to these seigniories as consisting of “Turks and Germiyans.” Thus, this can be considered an argument that the seigniories consisted of Kurds as well, if they were not all Turks. However, it is clear that there should be some other evidence showing Kurdishness of the Germiyanoğulları Seigniory. Germiyanoğulları, settled first in Malatya and then Kütahya, was used during the struggle between Seljuk’s and Moghuls to protect the borders of Western Anatolia. During the Moghul Invasions, while Turks migrated to the center of Western Anatolia, it is understood from some memories belonging to that period that Kurds also migrated to this region.<sup>91</sup> Even if the Kurdishness of Germiyans is not clear, it can be assumed that there were some kinds of individual Kurdish settlements in Western Anatolia during the Moghul invasions. Thus, the first Kurdish presence of the region can be traced back to the 11th century.

The first official proven presence of a Kurdish population in the region occurred in 1463, as evident in the oldest document about Kurdish villages that were formed under the Sultanate of Mehmet the Conqueror.<sup>92</sup> The Cadastral Document Book of Ankara’s Shires dated H. 867 (AD.1463) provides valuable information about the administrative units of Ankara at that time. The Sanjack of Ankara consisted of 11 administrative districts<sup>93</sup> and Yaban Ovası, later called Yabanabad, was one of these districts. Today, Yabanabad district refers to the region between Kızılcahamam and

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<sup>89</sup> Claude Cahen, *op. cit.* 283.

<sup>90</sup> V. Gordlevski, *Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti* (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, 1988), 272.

<sup>91</sup> Rohat Alakom, *Orta Anadolu Kürtleri* (İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2004), 32.

<sup>92</sup> Emine Erdoğan, “Ankara’nın Bütüncül Tarihi Çerçevesinde Ankara Tahrir Defterleri’nin Analizi” (PHD Dissertation, Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004), 24. According to the author, the first official document from Murat I about Ankara cannot be found in the archives. Thus, we cannot know whether there was a Kurdish village before 1463 or not.

<sup>93</sup> Ahmet Nezih Turan, *Yabanabad Tarihini Ararken (Kızılcahamam-Çamlıdere): XV. Yüzyıldan XIX. Yüzyıla Bir Genel Tasvir ve Tahlil Denemesi* (Ankara: Kızılcahamam Belediyesi Yayınları, 1999), 24. In 1463, these districts were called *taallukat* or *vilayet*. In 1523, they were re-organized and called *kaza*. In 1463, the districts of Ankara were Bacı, Çubuk, Kasaba, Karacabey, Mürted Ova, Binari İli, Yaban Ovası, Şorva, Mudrıb, Uruş, and Ayaş.

Çamlıdere.<sup>94</sup> According to this cadastral document, there were two Kurdish populated villages named “Kürtler Köyü” and “Kuzköy” within the boundaries of Yabanabad district in 1463. The Kurdishness of these villages can be comprehended from the expression in the cadastral document book: “Kürtler and Kuzköy villages, consisted of Kurdish population.”<sup>95</sup> Thus, the official historical presence of the Kurdish population in the region can be dated to the 15th century.

It is obvious that there could have also been other Kurdish settlements in CA during the 15th century. However, there is confusion about whether the title of Kurds refers to the Kurdishness of these villages or not. Some sources classifying ethnic groups in Turkey in different periods categorize some tribes and communities as Turks even though they bear the name of Kurd and speaking Kurdish.<sup>96</sup> However, during this study it should be taken into consideration that the non-existence of Kurdish ethnicity was one of the main arguments for a Turkish state after its foundation. Evidence of this argument was circulated through some institutions and can be seen in some academic works. Thus, these kinds of classifications were not always prepared according to objective criteria. From the official document from 1463, the Kurdishness of these two villages in CA can be ensured. In addition to these two, there were also some other villages carrying the name of Kurds in that era. These villages were:

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<sup>94</sup> Ahmet Nezihi Turan, *ibid.* 24.

<sup>95</sup> “Kürtler ve Kuzköy, karye-i mezkurenin ehli Kürtlerdir” Both Ahmet Nezihi Turan and Rohat Alakom take Kürtler Köyü as a unique example of the Kurdish population according to this data. Nonetheless, it is obvious that Kuzköy is also a Kurdish village. Probably, they bring Kürtler village in the forefront because of its name. Ahmet Nezihi Turan, *ibid.*, p. 93; Rohat Alakom, *op.cit.*, p. 35. However, while Turan includes the transcription of Ottoman archival documents from AD 1463, 1523-30 and 1571/72, he gives the names of these villages as Kürtler-Kuzköy. (p.138) Thus, these villages could be the same.

<sup>96</sup> One of the best examples of this confusion can be seen in Cevdet Türkay’s work titled *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatler*. He classifies tribes such as Kürdî-i Kebîr, Kürdikânlu, Kürd Mehmedlü, Kurmanc, and Kürtkânlu as Turcomans. (113). The same situation can be seen in some other documents, such as Cengiz Orhonlu’s work *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin İskanı*. He considers Karaca-Kürd and Kürdilî-Kebir troops as Turcomans in Sivas (71) Kürd Mehmedlü and Karaca-Kürd groups are also classified as Turcomans in *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin Yerleştirelmesi* by Yusuf Halaçoğlu (76). As a field survey, Avni Candar’s *Memleket Tetkikleri: Ankara’dan Kırşehir’e* categorizes them as Turkish tribes (30). Both Cengiz Orhonlu and Yusuf Halaçoğlu used Cevdat Türkay’s classification based on Ottoman archival sources. Orhonlu classified the population of Anatolia as Yuruks, Arabs, Turcomans, Turcoman-Ekrads, Nomadic Ekrads, Persian Ekrads, and Circassians. However, showing Kurdish tribes as Turkish ones was a general tendency in the Republican era; please see İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğuda Değişim ve Yapısal Sorunla (Göçebe Alikan Aşireti)* (Ankara: Doğan Yayınevi, 1969)

The Year of Cadastral Document Book	Name of the Village	Place
1463	Kürtler Köyü	Yabanabad
1466	Kürtler Köyü	Beyşehir
1476	Kürtler Köyü	Aksaray
1584 Karaman	Kürtler Köyü	Larenda:
1584	Kürtler Köyü	Akşehir <sup>97</sup>

As is seen in official documents and secondary sources interpreting data from these original documents, the reasons for the first Kurdish settlements in the region are not clearly evident. Even if there is some information about the existence of Kurdish populations and some of their areas of residence, as stated above, their settlement process in the region before the 16th century cannot be analyzed due to a lack of required data. However, as far as it is interpreted, the first settlements seem to be the result of migration waves from the East because of the Moghul invasions and a chaotic atmosphere there. With the beginning of the 16th century, political developments in the Empire would then further shape settlements of Kurds in the region.

### **3.3. Centralization vs. Decentralization: Kurdish Tribes in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries**

Understanding the causes of the state's implementation of centralist policies and their results requires examining the social, economic and political changes in the Empire from the beginning of the 14th century. First, it should be understood that the Ottoman Empire tried to establish institutions of the state beginning in the 14th

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<sup>97</sup> Rohat Alakom gathers the names of these villages from works on cadastral document books in the 16th century. He uses the following sources to prove the existence of the Kurdish villages he lists: Uske, *Orta Anadolu'da İlk Kürt Yerleşim Bölgesi*, internet for Beyşehir; İbrahim Hakkı Konyalı, *Abideleri ve Kitabeleri ile Niğde-Aksaray Tarihi*, vol. I-III (İstanbul, 1974), 523 for Aksaray; Osman Gümüşçü, *XIV. Yüzyıl Larenda(Karaman) Kazasında Yerleşme ve Nüfus* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001), 63 for Karaman; Süreyya Faruqi, *Osmanlı'da Kentler ve Kentliler* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 241 for Akşehir. I checked all of these sources to see whether they are reliable and objective. Except the first source about Beyşehir, I controlled all of the other documents. Other than the first source on Beyşehir, these academic works are based on translations of archival documents. Thus, it is obvious that these villages holding 'Kurd' in their name existed. However, there is no information about whether they had a Kurdish population or not.

century. This new administrative system of the Empire aimed to accommodate new conditions, such as population growth and territorial expansion, as well as provide state authority. Before the centralization of the state, a multi-tribal structure, the nonexistence of land property, and a non-hierarchical system were the dominant elements of the state.<sup>98</sup> The state even tried to control the mobility of population and finances; however, these control mechanisms aimed at achieving increased centralization of the state somehow instead caused decentralization of the state by leading to revolts and economic crisis.

By the second half of the 14th century, the Ottoman administrative system had attained a centralist structure through the establishment of judgment (*kadılık*), *timar* and financial systems. This centralist structure of the state took its final form during the sultanate of Mehmed the Conqueror.<sup>99</sup> The state officials aimed to control decentralist elements in the borders of the Empire, of which tribes were one of the most prominent examples. Starting with Mehmed II, efforts were made to adopt leaders of tribes into regional administrative systems by giving them responsibilities as administrators. Kurdish tribes also took part in this policy. For example, leaders of Kurdish tribes on the border between the Empire and Dulkadir Principality were appointed as *sanjack beyi*, but some of them had tax exemption.<sup>100</sup> This means that even if the state officials tried to control these Kurdish tribes, they still lived in an autonomous system. Their responsibility to the state required only the provision of soldiers. That is why these sanjacks were called *hükümet*.<sup>101</sup> It can be interpreted that while the state tried to establish a centralist structure, the Kurdish tribes were still beyond the reach of this policy in the Eastern part of the Empire. Nonetheless, Kurds in CA were affected by the centralist policies of the state during that era. From this point, we can assume that the state shaped the confines of this policy guardedly and tried to prevent any negative effects of the policy.

At this point, the settlement policy of the Empire became more of an issue related to understanding the settlement of Kurdish tribes in Anatolia. Settlement policy and

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<sup>98</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı Nüfusu 1830-1914* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003), 12.

<sup>99</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Türk-İslam Devletlerinde Devlet- Kanun Geleneği," *İslamiyat* 4 (1998): 31. According to Halil İnalçık, the centralization of the state extends until the period of Orhan I. He established regulations for collecting taxes. Thus, efforts for centralization of the state can be seen as existing nearly from the foundation of the Empire.

<sup>100</sup> Yaşar Yücel, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Desentralizasyona (Adem-i Merkeziyet) Dair Genel Gözlemler," *Bellekten* 38 (1974): 661.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* 669.

centralization were directly related to each other and neither of them could be achieved without the other. It occurred sometimes in a natural way while frequently being put into action according to state policy. While the state was being established, individuals - mostly dervishes - colonized free spaces while migrating to the West and these migration waves resulted in newly established residential areas. As a state dependent on agricultural activities, it was very important for the Empire to ensure the continuance of agricultural production. Additionally, forced migrations to newly established areas contributed to the economic growth and Islamization of these regions.<sup>102</sup> By the 18th century, the state more professionally implemented the settlement policy and formed a framework for the settlement of different groups. CAK and their living areas also were affected by it.

The state's main motivations to implement this policy for these groups resulted from concerns about probable conflict between these groups and growing states with boundaries that were extending day by day. New state regulations during the transition from the state to the Empire needed immediate adaptation to the new structure. Nomadic groups and tribes used to live in unrestrained conditions and state authority could not be enforced among them because of their traditional life styles. Recently conquered lands suitable for agricultural activities were considered appropriate to adopt for sedentary life.<sup>103</sup>

Understanding the main motivations of the settlement policy requires closely examining the dominating political atmosphere of the era. In the Ottoman case, the 16th century was the century of long and successive wars. These wars forced officials to concentrate on emerging developments beyond their borders. Responsible for paying taxes to cover the expenses of wars, the people of the Anatolian region suffered from economic crises. One of the impacts of the economic crises was the new emergence of uprisings in Anatolia at the beginning of the 16th century. The uprisings, called the Celali Rebellions, subsequently shaped the internal structure of the Ottoman Empire for almost two centuries. While the state was expanding its borders across Europe and the East, these rebellions forced the state to deal with internal problems at the same time. These rebellions caused the state to lose time in

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<sup>102</sup> Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Bir İskân ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak Sürgünler," *İÜİFM* 11 (1951): 530.

<sup>103</sup> Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Asiretlerin İskâni* (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1987), 39-47.



implementing centralist policies throughout the Ottoman territories. While the Empire tried to centralize its territorial units through the settlement of nomadic groups on the one hand, rebellions as a result of current conditions created exactly the opposite situation on the other hand.

The Celali Rebellions first impacted Eastern Anatolia during the 16th century and extended its effects into CA by the end of this century.<sup>104</sup> As a result of the economic crises throughout the Empire, bandits and individual *eskiyas* became dominant in Central and other parts of Anatolia. While the Empire tried to control these bandits, they continued to be very effective for almost two subsequent centuries. These bandits mostly consisted of armed people who were supported at first by the Empire due to the probability of these groups' positive contribution to maintaining control of Anatolia. However, the gun was pointed at the wrong target, and these groups instead harmed order in Anatolia.<sup>105</sup> CA was one of the regions in which these groups were active in almost all parts. For example, in the province of Ankara there were some prominent bandits such as Sarı Handan, Şah Bey, Hersekoğlu Ahmed, Abdi, Mehmed, Budak, Yardım, Sarı Memi, Hasan Kethuda and Cıldanoğlu in the beginning of the 17th century.<sup>106</sup> These kinds of bandits were effective in other provinces of the regions such as Kayseri, Afyon, and Konya in the same period. From the most central to the smallest villages, all parts of the region were under the impact of the Celali Rebellions.

These rebellions resulted not only in the delay of the centralization of the Empire, but also changed its economic, social, and demographic structure. While the rebellions throughout the Empire's territories were continuing, the Ottoman population was in changing process. On the one hand, the Ottoman territories had enlarged, which had caused an increase in population. On the other hand, internal revolts resulted in the abandonment of Anatolian villages.<sup>107</sup> Even if the abandonment of villages was prohibited by the state under certain regulations, people had to ignore the rules under such an exceptional situation. In this period, Ankara consisted of six districts:

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<sup>104</sup> Mustafa Akdağ, "Celali İsyanlarından Büyük Kaçgunluk 1603- 1606: I," *Ankara Üniversitesi Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3 (1964): 11.

<sup>105</sup> Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997): 32.

<sup>106</sup> Mustafa Akdağ, op.cit. 21.

<sup>107</sup> Cengiz Orhonlu, op.cit. 31.

Kasaba, Çubuk, Murtazabad, Ayaş, Yabanabad, and Bacı.<sup>108</sup> The Celali Revolts and their destruction caused the villagers of Ankara's towns to leave their villages. For example, all 36 of Haymana's villages were abandoned in the beginning of the 17th century.<sup>109</sup> In total, two thirds of Central Anatolian villages were abandoned.<sup>110</sup> As an emerging condition, while villages were abandoned due to a deficiency of economic activities, new taxes, and the increased pressures of rebels in the village, the center of the provinces were settled by immigrants.<sup>111</sup> Indeed, the situation in the center was not very different than that in the villages; most neighbourhoods in the center of Ankara were burned.<sup>112</sup> The difficulty of providing state authority in the center and districts forced the state officials to make new decisions. According to an official record dated AD 1599, tradesmen in Ankara were authorized to protect people against rebels.<sup>113</sup> Thus, because of the Celali Rebellions, the authority of the Empire decreased throughout the lands.

Actually, before the emerging uprisings in Anatolia, the Empire had already started to implement settlement policies for nomadic groups. Demographic changes in CA were also rooted in pressures of political power during Yavuz Sultan Selim's sultanate during which Kurds in Eastern Anatolia were forced to leave their living spaces. The struggle between Yavuz and Shah Ismail brought the Shiah Question to the forefront in the 16th century. Kurdish tribes were directly impacted by Yavuz's repression towards the Alewis. For example, the most populated Kurdish tribe in CA, the Şeyhbizin, came to the region from the East in the beginning of the 16th century and settled around Haymana and Konya.<sup>114</sup> This tribe's settlement could be the first

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<sup>108</sup> As Özer Ergenç indicates, Kasaba today refers to the neighbourhood of Elmadağ-Kalecik; Çubuk refers to the same place; Murtazabad contains the territories around Ayaş; Mürted indicates the lands between today's Ayaş and Ankara; Ayaş comprises the lands between Ayaş and Beypazarı; and Bacı was situated around the neighbourhood of Haymana.

<sup>109</sup> Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *18. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006): 34.

<sup>110</sup> Mustafa Akdağ, *op.cit.* 46.

<sup>111</sup> Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *op.cit.* 34

<sup>112</sup> Mustafa Akdağ, *op.cit.* 49.

<sup>113</sup> Yaşar Yücel, *op.cit.* 685.

<sup>114</sup> Please see Cevdet Türkay, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Belgelerine göre Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Oymak Aşiret ve Cemaatler* (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1979). The Şeyhbizin Tribe came to CA from Iraq, Muş, Malazgirt, Varto, Elazığ, Palu, Erzincan, Gümüşhane, Bayburt, and Diyarbakır. Ziya Gökalp claims that Şeyhbizin Kurds were Sorani. According to some researchers, the name of Şeyhbizin probably comes from Iraq's Bazeyan region. For more information about this tribe, please see Halil İbrahim Uçak, *Tarih İçinde Haymana* (Haymana: Haymanalılar Yardımlaşma ve Tanışma Derneği, 1986), 151.

pre-planned and far-reaching Kurdish migration to the region.<sup>115</sup> One of the possible reasons for a rise in the population of the province of Ankara after the second half of the 16th century could be the forced settlement of tribes in CA. According to archival documents, at the end of the 16th century the population of Ankara province increased by almost 82%.<sup>116</sup> When this information is taken together with the duplication of the number of houses in Haymana from 1523 to 1571, the results of the intense migration waves to the region can be better understood.<sup>117</sup>

Before the settlement of the Şeybizin tribe, Haymana already had hosted a great number of nomadic tribes. During the 16th century, Haymana consisted of two parts and was called “taife” until the 19th century, when it started to be called “kaza.” Like the rest of the Empire, Haymana provided a living space to nomadic tribes. In the 16th century, more than 60% of the total population of Haymana was nomadic and lived mostly in rural areas.<sup>118</sup> Because of this, Haymana was the first-called “taife” in Ankara province and involved the biggest number of nomadic tribes.<sup>119</sup> However, from cadastral documents it is also clear that Haymana was directly connected to the center of Ankara. The people of Haymana belonged to the kadi of Ankara and all of their trials were held there.<sup>120</sup> It means that there was still a kind of centralist structure.

After the end of the Celali Revolts, the state took precautions against new uprisings by implementing forced settlement policies. Throughout the Empire, nomadic tribes were forced to adopt a sedentary life to restore order after the uprisings. Especially after 1691, orders from Istanbul were sent to governors of the provinces to settle these nomadic groups.<sup>121</sup> These groups were settled in both existing areas and in empty lands. The settlement of nomadic groups had the characteristic of exile due to

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<sup>115</sup> Mark Sykes, “The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire,” *The Journal of The Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 38 (1908) p. 481.

<sup>116</sup> Emine Erdoğan, op. cit. 2004, 107. Even if an increase in the population of Ankara province can be seen according to archival documents, the reasons for this rise can only be presumed by looking at the developments of that era. According to cadastral record books, marital status, religion, and tax payment of males can be learnt. Because of the lack of information about ethnicity, the total Kurdish population migrating to the region cannot be measured. For a detailed research of population change in Ankara during the 17th century please see: Özer Ergenç, p. 59.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. 107.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. 123.

<sup>119</sup> Emine Erdoğan, “Ankara Yörükleri: 1463, 1523/30 ve 1571 Tahrirlerine Göre,” *OTAM (Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 18 (2005): 123.

<sup>120</sup> Hülya Taş, *XVII. Yüzyılda Ankara*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 2006, p. 19.

<sup>121</sup> Cengiz Orhonlu, op.cit. 48.

the Empire's preferred methodology.<sup>122</sup> For instance, some Kurdish tribes, such as Batılı (Badıllı) and Cemkanlı, were forced to migrate from Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia to Rakka, a Syrian province. However, some members of these tribes also migrated to areas around Ankara.<sup>123</sup> It can be assumed that these population movements led to changes in the traditional lifestyles of nomadic tribes and contributed to the migration of Kurds to CA.

Investigating the causes of Kurdish population movements in CA requires a multi-dimensional point of view to see the different reasons behind these movements. As it is told, while the Ottoman population was rising from the beginning of the 14th century on the one hand, the lands of the Empire were a stage for fundamental changes. Newly-emerging territories and agricultural areas belonging to them were targets of the settlement policy for economic, social, and political reasons. Meanwhile, rising tensions on the Anatolian side caused the internal migration of the Kurdish population in Central and Eastern Anatolia. When it comes to the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the settlement of Kurdish populations in CA is better documented and more systematically implemented.

#### **3.4. Systematization of the Settlement Policy: 19th Century**

The 19th century is a very important period in the case of the settlement of the Kurdish population in CA. Actually, approximately one million Kurdish people as well as other groups throughout the Empire were subjects of the settlement policy due to continuous wars and big losses of territory, which also shaped the Empire's social structure.<sup>124</sup> Additionally, although before this century the settlement of Kurdish tribes was dependent on more provisional decrees and special resolutions, settlement was approached more systematically and professionally by introducing a law regarding nearly all nomadic groups in the 19th century. What is interesting in this century is that while the state tried to have nomadic groups adopt a sedentary

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
<sup>122</sup> Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *op.cit.* 116.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.* 116. Even if Halaçoğlu accepts these groups as Yuruks, these groups are accepted as Kurdish tribes. For one of the works accepting these tribes as Kurdish ones, please see Mark Sykes's aforementioned article.

<sup>124</sup> Kemal Karpat says the Kurdish population in the Ottoman Empire was approximately 1.5 million in the 1880s. See Kemal Karpat, *op.cit.* 98. Compared with the 16 million population in Asian territories of the Ottoman Empire, this number is more meaningful. However, it should be kept in mind that population censuses in the Empire had been held according to the religion of different groups. Thus, these are estimated numbers.

life, it paradoxically also decentralized units of the Empire by empowering local governments.<sup>125</sup>

The methodology of settlement policy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century also held different characteristics compared to the previous centuries. During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Kurdish nomadic tribes further adopted sedentary life through their settlement in existing villages together with permanent residents mostly consisting of Turks.<sup>126</sup> As a part of the homogenizing process, the Empire again attempted to implement this policy later on. However, the settlement of an increasing population required the establishment of new agricultural and living spaces. While at least two-thirds of Central Anatolian villages were established during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, nine-tenths of today's agricultural areas also started as agrarian zones at the same time.<sup>127</sup> It can be said that today's administrative units were formed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.



Map 3.2. : Kurdish and Muhacir villages founded in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>128</sup>

<sup>125</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman Empire tried to increase its effects on local governments. Developments in transportation and telgraph systems, the assignment of governors from İstanbul and the establishment of a tax farming (*iltizam*) system led to the empowerment of the centralist structure. However, with the announcement of the Rescript of Gülhane, the Empire placed emphasis on local governments and municipalities. Nonetheless, while the state tried to control the local units, it strengthened the state as well. For more information please see İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Yerel Yönetim Geleneği*, Hil Yayınları, İstanbul, 1985.

<sup>126</sup> Suat Dede, op.cit. 65.

<sup>127</sup> Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, "The Influence of Social Structure on Land Division and Settlement in Inner Anatolia," in *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*. Ed. Peter Benedict et. al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 21.

<sup>128</sup> Suavi Aydın, et al., *Küçük Asya'nın Bin Yüzü: Ankara*, (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 2005), Maps.

\*Tatar villages, \*Noghai villages, \*Bosnian villages, \*Circassian villages, \*Kurdish villages

The settlement of these nomadic tribes and immigrants can be interpreted as professional and pre-planned due to the settlement zones and the mixture of different ethnic groups. Both tribes and Balkan immigrants were settled either around existing living spaces or newly established villages in which they had to live together.<sup>129</sup> To contribute to agricultural production, villages were established on uncultivated lands. This strategy allowed both nomadic groups and immigrants to get used to their new living areas. However, because of the lack of forming a proper settlement law, as would be done in the 20th century, these living spaces could not be made regular villages. Nevertheless, the perception towards putting the settlement policy in order set a framework for laws and other regulations and formed a basis for policy in the 20th century.

The empire also used another tool to control nomadic tribes in the 19th century: education. During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II, the Imperial School for Tribes (*Aşiret Mektebi*) was founded in Istanbul for the education of the sons of leading tribal notables. This was a policy that aimed to raise loyal tribal leaders to control tribes in the future. However, it also attracted attention as a project of “taming” tribes and the school was closed in 1909.<sup>130</sup>

Before the 19th century, some Kurdish tribes in the region had adopted sedentary life through provisional decree. For example, the Tabanlı Tribe was settled near Ankara in the 18th century, but members of this tribe did not abandon their traditional behaviors and lifestyle.<sup>131</sup> Thus, one of the aims of governors was for these nomadic tribes to socially and culturally embrace sedentary life. As a result of this mentality, governors responsible for the settlement of tribes were appointed throughout the region. Nomadic tribes that normally changed their living spaces and migrated to summer and winter pastures had to stay in a single region. This was put into practice by new laws, regulations, and the founding of new institutions.

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<sup>129</sup> Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, op.cit. 24.

<sup>130</sup> Eugene L. Rogan, “Asiret Mektebi: Abdulhamid II's School for Tribes (1892-1907),” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 28 (1996): 83. pp. 83-107

<sup>131</sup> Cengiz Orhonlu, op.cit. 113.

As one of the most remarkable examples of these laws, the Code of 1842 related to the prevention of migration was the first mass-effective decision of the 19th century about nomadic groups. As a result of this code, nomadic groups could not migrate to another province even for their use as summer and winter quarters.<sup>132</sup> Brutal force could be used against groups protesting this code if necessary. Also, densely populated tribes were redistributed in different areas, as occurred in the cases of the Rıřvan, Reyhanlı, and Avřar tribes.<sup>133</sup> These tribes were settled around Amasya, Sivas, Konya, and Kayseri. People willing to work in agriculture were supported by allocating farms. In other words, while these groups adopted a sedentary lifestyle, their contribution to agricultural production and payment of taxes was also taken into consideration. Not only was the settlement of these groups cared about, but great importance was also attached to their getting used to social and economic life. Through the migration waves in the second half of the century, extensive agricultural areas of Ankara were opened for the settlement of emigrants. Based on agricultural production reports, Haymana's agricultural products met the needs of the whole province from the beginning of the 16th century.<sup>134</sup> Following the 19th century, emigrants were settled in agricultural areas and the state offered them new fields, enabling their contribution to agricultural production. Thus, the capacity of the region's agricultural production rose over time. However, against all obligations, some of Kurdish tribes still maintained their traditions in the late periods as Xalikan tribe using CA as summer pasture while living in Cukurova region during winters.<sup>135</sup>

All of these developments require considering the settlement policy within the context of all other instruments used to enforce these groups mostly living in feudal structure to sedentary life. After a while, as an indicator of this consideration, The Land Code of 1858 that standardized the land system across the Empire was announced and private landownership was made possible. Even if there is a general tendency to evaluate this land code as a protection mechanism of the rights of peasants due to the abolition of land collectives by one person, it was not successful due to the lack of clarity regarding the difference between public and private

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<sup>132</sup> Yusuf Halaçođlu, op.cit. 7.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. 8.

<sup>134</sup> Özer Ergenç, *16. Yüzyılda Ankara ve Konya* (Ankara: Ankara Enstitüsü Vakfı Yayınları: 1995), 62.

<sup>135</sup> Feridun, "İç Anadolu Kürtleri," *Bîrmebûn* 4 (1998): 5.

property.<sup>136</sup> Also, the prohibition of an orderly distribution of lands to peasants was broken by landowners' purchase of these lands from peasants.<sup>137</sup> Thus, this code made landowners the official owners of lands, which gave them the right to own private property while peasants remained unaware of how to register to own land.

In addition to legal developments, tension between settled groups and local peasants led to chaos in CA as well as in the rest of the Empire. The power of social and ethnic diversity as a determining factor in the daily lives of people in the region increased in the 19th century. While permanent peasants lived in and on the edge of mountains, nomadic and seminomadic Turks, Kurds, and Balkan migrants were the main groups of the region. By this century, CA amplified its multi-cultural and multi-ethnic structure due to its changing population. Nonetheless, it is obvious from different archival documents that this diversity and changing population balance also caused tension between different groups. One of the groups suffering from this tension was the Kurdish population assimilated to sedentary life. According to a document from 1830, tension between settled people and the nomadic Rıřvan tribe, for example, increased due to the tribe's migration during the harvest time. Additionally, while they migrated to their winter settlements, settled peasants living along their migration path were bothered because of their migration.<sup>138</sup> Thus, one of the reasons for nomadic groups' adoption of a sedentary life might have been complaints about nomadic groups documented in similar archival documents. These "vagabond" groups, mostly called "ekrâd eşkıyâ," were charged with damaging crops, dispossessions, and even assaulting others with an intent to rape.<sup>139</sup> Even if there are some cases affirming this discourse, it is also clear that it was used to legalize the settlement of all nomadic tribes as a crucial requirement for the centralization of the state.

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
<sup>136</sup> E. Attila Aytekin, "Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 6 (2009): 946.

<sup>137</sup> M. Macit Kenanođlu, "Miri Arazi," *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* 30 (2014), accessed August 29, 2015. <http://www.islamansiklopedisi.info/dia/ayrmetin.php?idno=300159>.

<sup>138</sup> Suat Dede, op.cit. 37.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. 52.





Map 3.3. : Ethnic Situation in Ankara in the 19th Century<sup>140</sup>

- \* Alevi villages, \*Abdal villages, \*Afşar villages, \*Cerit villages, \*Kargın villages,
- \*Barak villages, \* Old Armenian villages and regions of Kurdish tribes

Indeed, settlement policy became compulsory in the 19th century due to migration especially from the Balkans as a result of the wars occurring there. While on the one side attempts were made to adapt nomadic groups to a sedentary life, Balkan immigrants started to continuously come to Anatolian lands and the issue of settlement for them came to the fore. This migration began with the immigration of the Tartars after the 1828-1829 Ottoman Russian War and continued with the Circassians and Balkans especially after 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. For example, after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War, approximately 1 million immigrants from Rumeli migrated to Anatolian territories.<sup>141</sup> The Empire opened its doors for immigrants from the Balkans. According to the 1857 Decree, the


<sup>140</sup> Suavi Aydın, op.cit. Maps.

<sup>141</sup> According to analysis based on archival documents, during the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War, 474.389 people came to Anatolia from the Balkans. This number reached to 1 million in 1897. For more information please see: Bilal Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Gayrimüslim Tebaanın Yönetimi* (İstanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1996), 15.

immigrants were exempt from military service and the payment of taxes, and agricultural fields were given to them.<sup>142</sup> As a result of these migration waves, the total percentage of the Muslim population in the Empire rose from 59.6% in the 1820s to 76.2% in the 1890s.<sup>143</sup> These developments altered the ethnic and demographic structure of the Empire and paved the way for dominance of “being a Muslim” in politics both in the Empire and the Republic.

The ethnic structure of CA also entered a period of change as a result of the migration waves of Crimean Tatars. According to the reports of embassies, approximately 26 thousand immigrants from the Balkans and Crimean Tatars came to Ankara in 1880.<sup>144</sup> A group of these immigrants were settled in villages within the boundaries of Polatlı and Haymana.<sup>145</sup> Also, there were some other villages in Gölbaşı and Şereflikoçhisar. Thus, a new ethnic factor started to dominate the region.

Table 3.1. : Population of Haymana by years<sup>146</sup>



Officials began to take the issue of settlement more seriously and the Commission for the Settlement of Immigrants (*İskân-ı Muhacirin Komisyonu*) was founded to properly settle these immigrants from Circassia and Balkans.<sup>147</sup> Officials responsible

<sup>142</sup> Kemal Karpat, op.cit. 53. The immigrants could hold these fields until they left their living areas. They could not own these unless they lived on this territory for twenty years.

<sup>143</sup> Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 56.

<sup>144</sup> Kemal Karpat, op.cit. 111.

<sup>145</sup> Suavi Aydın, op.cit. 216. These villages are Karayavşan, Karakaya, Taşpınar, Eski Polatlı, Karakuyu, Toydemir, Karapınar, Tatlıkuyu, Üçpınar in Polatlı; Ahırlıkuyu, Çayraz, Çingirli in Haymana.

<sup>146</sup> The table is taken from Aysun Benlioğlu Yalçın, “XIX. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Haymana Vilayeti'nin Haymanateyn Kazası'nın Sosyal ve İktisadi Durumu” (Master Thesis, Gazi University Institute of Social Sciences, Department of History, 2009), 33. The author found this data in the Annual Books of Ankara (Ankara Salnameleri) present in the Ottoman Archives.

<sup>147</sup> This institution was first founded for immigrants from the Balkans and other parts of Rumeli. However, especially after amendments in 1914, this institution concentrated on the issue of tribal settlement.

for implementing the rules of settlement were even appointed to the provinces.<sup>148</sup> These initiatives of the Ottoman officials indicate their perception of the importance of controlling population movements in the Empire contrary to their previous practices that had depended mostly on temporary decisions. When the transformation of this institution to General Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants (*Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi*) in 1914 and its survival in the Republican era is considered, the validity of this comment is further strengthened.

### **3.5. Central Anatolian Kurds in Westerners' Eyes: Diaries of Anatolian Travellers**

In addition to archival documents, decrees, and laws, the diaries of researchers coming from the West to the region in the 19th century are among the most important resources regarding CAK during this time. Asia Minor had captured the attention of travelers during the Imperial time and continued its popularity during the Republican period. The observations of these explorers show valuable information apart from official data.

The English explorer W.F. Ainsworth is one of the most prominent researchers, who made valuable contributions to the literature on CA. One of his works, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea and Armenia*, comprises notes of his travels from 1835 to 1838 and is published in two volumes. In the first volume recording his travel from İstanbul to Malatya, Ainsworth shares observations of his travels through CA and especially through Haymana, the place he describes as a “living space of Turks and Kurds.”<sup>149</sup> His observations and comments on Haymana contain important information about social life in the 19th century. According to his notes, some of Haymana’s Kurdish villages, such as Gökçepinar, still maintained their nomadic style of life.<sup>150</sup> Also, Kurdish peasants of Koçhisar had a nomadic lifestyle and mostly lived in tents.<sup>151</sup> He implies that at that time, some of the Kurdish groups were disobedient to the rules and even killed some local people in the region.<sup>152</sup> From his observations, it can be understood that the villages of the Kurds and Turks were very close to each other and that there were some events that

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<sup>148</sup> Yusuf Halaçoğlu, op.cit. 9.

<sup>149</sup> William Francis Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea and Armenia Vol I* (West Strand, London: John William Parker, 1842), 3.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. 146.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. 189.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. 147.

increased the tension between them. His memoirs regarding Kurds living near Ankara state the fact that Kurdish nomadic tribes were still in a transition period from a nomadic lifestyle to sedentarization. Tensions between Kurds and Turks imply that the transition period was not quite easy for either side.

Nearly in the same period as Ainsworth, an American traveller, William J. Hamilton, also visited the Anatolian territories. In the second volume of his travel book entitled *Researchers in Asia Minor, Pontus, and Armenia* and published in 1842, Hamilton mentions Kurdish groups maintaining their traditional lifestyle in CA. When he talks about Kurdish groups living near Ankara, he claims that there is not a large number of Kurdish people living in the region except in Haymana. Contrary to other parts of the region, Haymana contained very many Kurdish nomadic tribes mostly living in tents. He describes Kurds he met in the region as follows:

The Kurds are a quite different race of people, and speak a different language; they have their own chiefs and leaders, and lead a thoroughly independent life. They likewise have no villages, and cultivate no land, but breed horses and keep large flocks. They invariably move into different districts according to the season, having their summer and winter stations. They are not numerous in Asia Minor, except in some parts of the great plain of the Haymana, and the country between it and Euphrates (Firat), to the south of Mount Argeus, the neighborhood of which is said to be constantly exposed to their depredations.<sup>153</sup>

In addition to these observations, Hamilton draws attention to differences between the Kurds and other peasants in the region. According to his statement, Kurdish women live in great liberty and show their faces to strangers contrary to other women in the region. Hamilton's statements are very crucial to understanding the social life of Kurdish nomads in the 19th century.

Georges Perrot, a French archaeologist, wrote one of the most contentful works on Central Anatolian Kurds in 1865 titled *Kurds of Haymana* (Les Kurdes de L'Haimaneh).<sup>154</sup> In this work, Perrot describes the social and economic life of Kurdish people in Haymana as observed in his travels in the beginning of 1860. As he indicates, the Kurds of Haymana engaged in animal breeding in that time. Most of them did not know Turkish except for a very few words. For Perrot, the culture he encountered in Haymana was very unique and had to be documented in writing. This work is also important to obtain some knowledge on when the Kurds migrated to the

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<sup>153</sup>William John Hamilton, *Researches in Asia Minor, Pontus and Armenia: With Some Account of Their Antiquities and Geology* (London: J. Murray, 1842), 221.

<sup>154</sup> Even if this work is very valuable, I could not specifically analyze it, because it is written in French. Thus, I benefited from Rohat Alakom's work in this section. Rohat Alakom, op.cit. 21.

region. Elderly people interviewed by Perrot claimed they had lived in Haymana for two or three generations. Even if they had lived for a long time in the region, their social relations with Turkish people were problematic. Marriages between Turks and Kurds were not well received and Perrot mentioned some examples supporting this fact. Perrot's research also implies that Kurds had a more modernized lifestyle although they were simultaneously maintaining their traditions.<sup>155</sup>

In 1877, another explorer, the English officer Frederick Burnaby, wrote up his observations about Anatolia in his work entitled *On Horseback through Asia Minor*. During his five-month visit to Asia Minor, he tried to understand Anatolian people's perception of a probable war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Indeed, he tried to understand the thoughts of Anatolian people regarding whether the Empire would win the war. As a result of his research, he stressed that Anatolian people were pessimistic about the Empire. Burnaby met Kurdish people living near Çorum in black tents and some women had unveiled faces. According to him, these Kurds chose to live a nomadic life because of the Empire's pressure about tax payment.<sup>156</sup> Near Yozgat, there were some Kurdish groups dealing with horse-trading.<sup>157</sup> As in Ainsworth's work, Kurdish people in Central Anatolia had a bad reputation in the case of committing crimes. In Sivas, the gaoler of the prison said to Burnaby that most of the prisoners were Kurds and Circassians convicted of horse and cattle stealing.

At the end of the 19th century, a Scottish researcher, William M. Ramsay, published his travel notes from Asia Minor. Ramsay narrates his memoirs of different ethnic groups in the 1897 book entitled *Impressions of Turkey: During Twelve Years' Wanderings*. In the parts in which he mentions Kurds, there is at first a sense of antipathy. According to him, the Kurds of Haymana "made on him the impression of being ruder in manners, more niggardly and grasping, and less hospitable, than Turks or Turkmens."<sup>158</sup> However, when he visited a Kurdish family in the eastern part of Haymana, he abandons his prejudice towards them. There had been a Circassian district governor (*kaymakam*) who had committed violent acts towards the Kurds and

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid. 23.

<sup>156</sup> Frederick Burnaby, *On Horseback Through Asia Minor* (London: Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1877), 173.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid. 213.

<sup>158</sup> William Mitchell Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey: During Twelve Years' Wanderings* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897), 114.

the owner of the house Ramsay visited attributed the recent quietness of the Kurds to this. Even after a long time among Turks, when Ramsay saw a man and woman walking together and laughing, he qualified this view as a “breath of Europe.”<sup>159</sup> In contrast to other explorers, Ramsay made a comparison between the Kurds in Haymana and the East. He decided that the Eastern Kurds were more favourable.<sup>160</sup>

Mark Sykes, another traveller who visited Anatolia and observed Anatolian people’s daily lives, presents substantial information about the pedigree of CAK. Mark Sykes was at the same time an English politician and had an important position in shaping Middle East policy in the 20th century. As a politician forming The Sykes-Picout Agreement, his travel in the Anatolian territories politically had a different meaning.<sup>161</sup> This agreement prescribed the future distribution of Asia Minor. In other words, Sykes’s observations in the region were required to include useful information on social, economic, and cultural aspects of the people in Asia Minor to find the best way to shape its future status. Sykes classified Kurdish tribes according to their origin of migration and where they lived at the present time. According to him, most of these tribes were forced to migrate to CA during the Yavuz Sultan Selim era. He orders the names of eighteen different Kurdish tribes living in CA at the beginning of the 20th century.

Sykes’ categorization of Kurdish tribes is based on his observations and interviews with “policemen, muleteers, mullahs, chieftains, sheep drovers, horse dealers and other people.”<sup>162</sup> He classified Kurdish tribes in Anatolia into six categories: A, B, C, D, E, F. Categories E and F consist of CAK. Although his research offers valuable information about Kurdish tribes, it also has some inaccurate findings on the topic. While the tribes are categorized, the categorization is only based on the expressions of local people. Also, his apparent orientalist approach towards people whom he met damages the quality of his work and its objectivity. He describes Kurds living in the eastern part of Anatolia as “thievish disposition, bloodthirsty, cowardly, and often

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid. 123.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid. 116.

<sup>161</sup> The Sykes-Picout Agreement was a secret agreement between Britain, France, and Russia regarding a probable distribution of the Ottoman territories. These three countries shared Ottoman territories on paper but after the Russian Revolution, the new government exposed the agreement and overrode it.

<sup>162</sup> Marks Sykes, op.cit. 451.

cruel.”<sup>163</sup> He defines women of this region as ugly. Thus, his approach to the topic is very subjective.

Table 3.2. : Kurdish tribes in CA at the beginning of the 20th century (based on information in Mark Sykes’ article)<sup>164</sup>

Name of Tribes	Place of Origin	Areas of residence at the Beginning of the 20th Century
Ukhchicemi	-	Sivas
Urukchili	-	Northwest of Sivas
Milli	Dersim or Karacadağ (Diyarbakır)	Osmancık (Çorum)
Shayk Bezeini (Şeyhbizini)	Erbil	Boyabat (Sinop)
Sheveli	Van	Çankırı
Badeli	Gümüşhane	Yozgat
Haji Banli (Khatun Oghli, Makhani, Omaranli)	Dersim or Karacadağ (Diyarbakır)	Kayseri
Barakatli	-	Aksaray
Tabur Oghli	-	Kırşehir
Shayk Bezeini	Erbil	Şereflikoçhisar
Judi Kanli	Şırnak	Şereflikoçhisar
Khalkani	Rowanduz (Iraq)	Kulu
Seif Kani	-	Kulu
Nasurli	-	Gölbaşı
Tirikan	Diyarbakır	near Ankara
Atmanakin	Siirt	near Ankara
Zirikanli	Erzurum	near Ankara
Janbekli	Bingöl	Cihanbeyli (Konya)

<sup>163</sup> Ibid. 455.

<sup>164</sup> A table of Kurdish tribes in Anatolia prepared with information from Mark Sykes’ article.

### **3.6. Central Anatolian Kurds in the 20th Century: Enforcement of Turkish Identity**

In the 20th century, the existence of Kurdish tribes in CA attracted the attention of both the Empire and the newly founded Republic. While attempts were made for Kurdish tribes and their members to adopt sedentary life, Kurdish tribes were treated as groups that could not only be adopted into “civilization,” but could also be Turkified through certain measures. Resistance of Kurdish tribes towards the centralization aims of the Empire continued during this century. Indeed, the perception of Kurdish identity and its reflection on officials did not sharply change from the Empire to the Republic. As is previously mentioned, while these nomadic tribes were seen as a threat to the state authority before the 20th century, they were still seen as a threat in this period, not only because of their being nomadic, but also as a result of their incompatibility in the new order depending on Turkification of the state elements.

By the 1908 elections, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) came more to the forefront in Ottoman political life. As an actor gaining power day by day, the party took measures of a social engineering process to change the social structure of the Empire already under uncontrollable social and ethnic change. Through the documents belonging to this era dominated by the CUP, the first steps of the Turkification of the Kurdish population in CA can be examined. By 1913, a dissociation of the multi-ethnic structure of the Ottoman Empire gained momentum due to the CUP’s political agenda of trying to homogenize Anatolia. The success of this policy also required extending the dominating Turkish ethnicity to different groups.<sup>165</sup> The CUP practiced an expansive settlement policy mostly linked with the assimilation of different ethnic groups in the Empire. According to a 1916 archival document, Talat Pasha, Minister of Interior Affairs, sent a telegram to the provincial officials of Konya, Kastamonu, Ankara, Sivas, and Kayseri and tried to get some information about CAK: How many Kurdish villages exist in their region? How many different populations do they include? Do they use Kurdish in their daily lives? How are their relations with Turkish people?<sup>166</sup> After these questions, another

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<sup>165</sup> To see the CUP’s implementations to dominate Turkish elements in the Empire please look Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks Crime Against Humanity*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2012; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, London, 2011.

<sup>166</sup> Fuat Dündar, op.cit. 140.



telegraph was sent to the same provinces to learn whether Kurdish people in these villages knew Turkish.

While Talat Pasha aimed to learn about the situation of existing Kurdish villages in the region, he also saw the region as a place of detention for Kurdish tribes. Kurdish tribes living in the Eastern part of Anatolia were therefore sent to CA under the CUP administration. In 1916, Talat Pasha sent a new order to the officials of Ankara, Konya, and Kütahya and commanded that members of Kurdish tribes coming from Diyarbakır, Sivas, Erzurum, and Elazığ be distributed into local villages, and that more than 5% of the members of these tribes could not be settled in the same village.<sup>167</sup> Additionally, leading cadre were separated from their tribes people to weaken their ties with them.<sup>168</sup> According to some research, the number of Kurds who migrated to Konya in 1916 was 50,000.<sup>169</sup> This orderly redistribution indicates that Kurdish tribes were not only forced to adopt a sedentary life, but they were also forced to change their affiliations. It was not possible for them to sustain their culture in social surroundings where they were in the minority. These decisions caused CAK to live under the dominance of different ethnic groups that mostly consisted of Turks; contrary to previous forced settlements, they could no longer sustain their traditional life living as a Kurdish community. The groups that mostly settled in Konya and Ankara constitute today's Kurdish villages in the region. Also after the Şeyh Sait Rebellion, some of the Kurds involved in this uprising were forced to migrate to Konya.<sup>170</sup> CA's prominence as a place of exile increased through deliberate decisions taken by the authorities.

As ethno-political actors, Kurds became more of an issue in the homogenization of society in the Republican period. Even if the state declared its position of seeing Kurds as a part of a new society dependent on their "being Muslims," their disparity with the Republic would be understood in a short period, when Atatürk declared Kurds a part of the new national border in 1919:

Gentlemen, this border is not a line which has been drawn according to military considerations. It is a national border. It has been established as a national border. Within this border, there are Turks, Circassians, and other Islamic elements. Within this border there is only one nation which

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid. 144.

<sup>168</sup> Kemal Karpat, *op.cit.* 19.

<sup>169</sup> Müzeyyen Güler, "Kulu Ovası'ndan İskandinav Fiyordlarına Göç," *Sosyoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi* 1 (2007): 121.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid. 5.

is representative of Islam. Thus this border is a national boundary of all those who live together totally blended and are for all intents and purpose made up of fraternal communities.<sup>171</sup>

From the beginning of the Turkish Republic, while the Kurds were tolerated - because of their being Muslim, contrary to Armenians, Greeks, and Jews - attempts were made to adopt them into the periphery of the state through regulations that tried to change them into “loyal citizens.” In other words, if the officials had not been hesitant about whether the Kurds’ Muslim identity would be enough for their “loyalty to the state,” they would not have taken some measures to control them. Understanding the state’s official discourse of seeing Kurds as a part of the national border and commenting on their “reactionary politics, tribal resistance, brigandage, provocation of foreigners, or regional backwardness,”<sup>172</sup> requires examining the decisions taken by the state.

Above all, it is obvious that the Republic aimed to learn about all aspects of Kurdish tribes to determine how policy towards these groups could be shaped. While on the one side sociologists such as Ziya Gökalp prepared detailed works<sup>173</sup> on Kurdish tribes, the state officials and institutions ran reports on the situation of Kurdish populations living in Eastern Anatolia on the other. As a common point in reports prepared by the MP Abdulhalik Renda, Ministry of Interior Cemil Ubaydın and other officials, the Kurdish population densely living in Eastern Anatolia had to be Turkified through the implementation of a new population policy that would homogenize Anatolia.<sup>174</sup> It required ethnic revision of the Anatolian population and therefore, as a starting point, the state tried to learn about the distribution of different ethnic groups. In 1927, a general population census was held and the official result reported a total Kurdish population of 1.184.446 out of a total general population of

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<sup>171</sup> “Suret-i umumiyyede prensip şudur ki hududu milli olarak çizdiğimiz daire dahilinde yaşayan anasır-I muhtelif-i İslamiye yekdiğerine karşı ırki, muhiti, ahlakî, bütün hukukuna riayetkâr özkardeşlerdir. Bizce kat’I olarak muayyen bir şey varsa o da hududu milli dahilinde Kürt, Türk, Laz, Çerkes vesair bütün bu İslam unsurlar müşterekül-menfaadır.” TBMM, Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, cilt 1, p. 73. (Taken from Mesut Yeğen, *Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 50.; and Bernd Jürgen Fischer, *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007), 149.

<sup>172</sup> Mesut Yeğen, opt.cit. 2006, 222.

<sup>173</sup> Please see Ziya Gökalp, *Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler* (İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınlar, 1992).

<sup>174</sup> In addition to these two reports, Hamdi Bey(1926), Ali Cemal Bardakçı(1926), İbrahim Tali Öngören(1930), Fevzi Çakmak(1931), Ömer Halis Bıyıktay(1931), and Şükrü Kaya(1932) run reports on the Kurdish population. These reports would be an important starting point to implement a new settlement policy. For more information please see: Hüseyin Yayman, *Şark Meselesinden Demokratik Açılıma Türkiye’nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası* (Ankara: SETA Yayınları, 2011), 66-110.

13.542.795.<sup>175</sup> As the first general population census during the Republican period, the 1927 census and the aim of its usage show how the state was concerned about ethnic groups living even in single settlement areas. As important places containing Kurdish populations, the districts of Polatlı and Haymana were also classified according to ethnic groups:

Table 3.3. : Ethnic Distribution of Polatlı and Haymana in 1927<sup>176</sup>

Ethnicity	Haymana (in 124 districts)	Polatlı (in 78 districts)
Turks	27944	10838
Kurds	14984	742
Bosnians	172	312
Tatars	1629	2557
Alewis		62
Muslim Coptics		12
Circassians	762	
TOTAL	45491	14523

As seen from these official documents, the state tried to learn about ethnic populations and their settlement routes by examining ethnic separation of these groups throughout the country. The questions asked in the population census attract extra attention because of their being so detailed. For instance, people's mother tongue was one of the remarkable questions asked in the census. According to the ratio used by the state, 1184 out of 13. 648 people declared Kurdish as their mother tongue.<sup>177</sup> However, demographic information belonging to Haymana and Polatlı given above is a result of a research done by the Prime Ministry and shows that except census results the state recorded Kurdish population as well as other ethnic groups in the region by considering every small districts. In other word, the state tried to learn more than people's declarations about their mother tongue: their ethnic roots. According to these documents, Haymana and Polatlı contained nearly all major ethnic groups of the Republic, with Kurds as the second largest majority after Turks.

<sup>175</sup> Soner Çağaptay, *Türkiye'de İslam, Laiklik ve Milliyetçilik* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), 31.

<sup>176</sup> BCA, 272..0.0.65, 23.03.2007.

<sup>177</sup> *Nüfus Sayımları 1927-1950* (Ankara: Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1953), 8.

This reality of Kurds as the largest minority was the result of both exile and settlement policies that had been used towards Kurdish populations for centuries. Indeed, Atatürk had already been aware of the Kurdish population in Central Anatolia. In 1923, he declared his opinions on the Kurdish issue as follows:

Kurdish problem, cannot be out of question for us, namely for the interest of the Kurds. Those in our national borders are only a Kurdish majority in limited places. Over time, by losing their population concentration, they have settled with Turkish elements in such a way that if we try to draw a border on behalf of the Kurds we have to finish with Turkishness and Turkey, for example in the regions of Erzerum, Erzinjan, Sivas and Kharput, — and do not forget the Kurdish tribes on the Konya desert.<sup>178</sup>

As seen in Atatürk's words, the heterogeneity of the Kurdish population through the country was shown as an indication of the impossibility of organizing them. However, the state still continued to see Kurdish populations as a threat to the building of a nation state. Even the "Kurdification of Turkish population" was seen as a potential threat for the Republic.<sup>179</sup> In other words, the Republic believed that it had to Turkify the Kurds not only for the future of the nation-state, but also to prevent ethnically Turkish individuals from assimilating. CA, at this point, was shown as a destination for the settlement of Kurdish tribes from the Eastern part of the country. The underlying reasons for the settlement policy in the Republican era are recorded in a document of the Ministry of National Education in 1926. In this document, there was an attention grabbing thought that can be an important indication for understanding how CA was perceived by the Republic with regards to the Kurdish population. In the official document, the author points out that whenever the state sent Kurdish tribes to CA, the possibility of an uprising against the Republic diminished.<sup>180</sup> Thus, there was a hidden motivation of state officials to develop a suitable policy towards Kurds who did not have a unique culture, language, and history. The state therefore aimed to Turkify Kurdish populations by forcing them to

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<sup>178</sup> Mustafa Kemal, *Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998), 82-83. "Kürt sorunu, bizim, yani Kürtlerin çıkarları için kesinlikle söz konusu olmaz. Çünkü, bizm ulusal sınırlarımız içinde Kürt öğeleri öylesine yerleşmişler ki, pek sınırlı yerlerde yoğun olarak yaşarlar. Bu yoğunluklarını kaybede ede ve Türklerin içine gire gire öyle bir sınır oluşmuş ki, Kürtlük adına bir sınır çizmek istesek, Türkiye'yi mahvetmek gerekir. Örneğin, Erzurum'a giden, Erzincan'a, Sivas'a giden, Harput'a kadar giden bir sınır çizmek gerekir. Ve hatta Konya çöllerindeki Kürtleri de göz önünde tutmak gerek". English translation was taken from Edel Hughes, *Political Violence and Law Reform in Turkey: Securing the Human Rights of the Kurds?*, *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 2 (2006), accessed August 29, 2015. <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4513/5324>.

<sup>179</sup> To understand how the state was afraid of Kurdification of the state elements, please see Ziya Gökalp, op. cit.; Tuğba Yıldırım, *Kürt Sorunu ve Devlet (Tedip ve Tenkil Politikaları 1925-1947)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011), 60.; Soner Çağaptay, op. cit. 36.

<sup>180</sup> Tuğba Yıldırım, op.cit. 42.

leave their areas of residence and adopt a sedentary life and the reorganization of the Law on Tribes aimed to enable the Turkification of Kurdish people.<sup>181</sup> When this text is taken into consideration jointly with the subsequent Rule of Settlement in 1934, its role in shaping state policy and the underlying tools of motivation can be better understood.

The Rule of Settlement in 1934 was the prominent legal implementation for creating a new society based on “Turkish-Sunni-Muslim” elements by ensuring the loyalty of “immigrants, refugees, nomads and itinerant gypsies” to Turkish culture. The assimilative aim of the settlement policy became more distinct in the declaration of the 1934 Settlement Policy. Most of the muhacirs and refugees coming from former Ottoman territories were settled in existing villages.<sup>182</sup> The law, consisting of fifty articles, was introduced to the public as a “tool of adopting Turkish culture,” “land reform,” and “demolishing the feudal system”;<sup>183</sup> however, it was very controversial because of its prescription for a fundamental change of the settlement policy. The rule classified territories into three regions: the first one would be arranged for providing a dense culturally Turkish population; the second would be reserved for those aimed to be adopted into Turkish culture; and the third consisted of areas prohibited for settlement due to military, economic, political, or public health reasons.<sup>184</sup> Even if the borders of these regions were not specified in the rule except regarding the third classified territory (which spread from the eastern ends of the village Ilica of the province Kars and the villages of Tokaltı, Serdarbulak, Karnıyarık, Şehrigerden and Yukarıniço of the province Ağrı, that also includes Mount Küçükağrı), the first region referred to areas with dense Kurdish populations in the East, while the second one indicated the western parts of the country dominated by a Turkish population.<sup>185</sup> In other words, the rule aimed to increase the Turkish population in Eastern Anatolia while reducing the Kurdish population in this region by settling them in Western Anatolia. The state could succeed in this policy by linking the settlement rule with continuity. Thus, newly-settled people were not

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid. 64.

<sup>182</sup> Wolf-Dieter Hütteroth, *op. cit.* 34.

<sup>183</sup> İsmail Beşikçi, *Kürtlerin Mecburi İskanı* (İstanbul: İsmail Beşikçi Vakfı Yayınları, 2013), 100-109, 127-132.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid. 110.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid. 110-111.

permitted to sell the properties given by the state for ten years.<sup>186</sup> The state even controlled the distribution of Kurdish settlement in the West to prevent Kurds from becoming a majority.<sup>187</sup> Considering all of these developments together, the Rule of Settlement in 1934 was successfully implemented from the standpoint of the state by closely following its regulations

Beyond official documents, observations of travellers in the region during the 1930s regarding the Kurdish population provide additional valuable information about the era. Seyyah Kandemir listed Kurdish tribes in CA mostly living in the villages of Bala, Haymana and Cihanbeyli with the suggestion of taking these illiterate people under control to educate them.<sup>188</sup> According to his observations, although these “loyal” Kurds were hardworking people, they still maintained a nomadic lifestyle even while they lived in villages. Depending on Kandemir’s classification, Kurdish tribes in the region could be classified as:

Table 3.4. : Classification of Kurdish Tribes in CA (During the 1930s)<sup>189</sup>

The Name of the Tribe	Communities Belonging to the Tribe
Riřvanlı	Mısırlı, Karanlı, Çelikanlı, Halikanlı
Şeyhbizin	Horasanlı, Havadanlı, Herfodanlı, Jirdikanlı, Leranlı
Cihanbeyli	Dervişanlı, Gürekli, Tozonanlı
Atımanlı	Gizranlı, Jelikanlı, Davudanlı
Mikailli	-
Seyfanlı	-
Koybanlı	-
Terkanlı	-


<sup>186</sup> “1934 İskan Kanunu”, Article 30. Koç University Migration Research Center, accessed August 29, 2015. [https://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/sites/mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/files/tr\\_leg11.pdf](https://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/sites/mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/files/tr_leg11.pdf).

<sup>187</sup> Soner Çağaptay, op. cit. 114.

<sup>188</sup> Seyyah Kandemir, *Ankara Vilayeti* (Ankara: Başvekalet Müdevvenat Matbaası, 1932), 246.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid. 246-47.

Besides the existence of these Kurdish tribes, CAK population was also rising due to new settlements. At this point, another element showing the state's aim of Turkifying these groups occurred: changing toponymies. This implementation mostly impacted the names of villages in the East and Southeast of Turkey.<sup>190</sup> However, Central Anatolian Kurdish villages were also effected by the state's approach towards changing village names. For instance, 32 % of the names of villages in Konya, numerically 232, were changed due to this policy.<sup>191</sup> Within this framework the names of 193 villages in Ankara, 76 in Çankırı, and 103 in Çorum were changed.<sup>192</sup> Even if not all names were changed solely because they carried Kurdish names, some of the changes were directly related to this. For example, the name of Kürtgökgözü village was changed by a decision of the Ministry of Interior, as was a Kürd Şeyh village in the same district.<sup>193</sup> The Turkification of toponymy was directly related to the same policy in other areas.



Map 3.4. : The villages exposed to changing toponymy.<sup>194</sup>

In both the 1935 census and the one in 1965, the ethnicity of the population was recorded by asking the native language of people. Even if this method has some deficiencies, the results of these censuses provide the only sources dependent on empirical data. According to their results, the Kurdish population in the country rose

<sup>190</sup> Please see Kerem Öktem, "The Nation's Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of Toponymes in Republican Turkey," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 7 (2008).

<sup>191</sup> Kerem Öktem, op. cit. 19.

<sup>192</sup> Harun Tunçel, "Türkiye'de İsmi Değiştirilen Köyler," *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 2 (2000): 28.

<sup>193</sup> BCA, 5484/ 30..11.1.0, 19/8/1930.

<sup>194</sup> Harun Tunçel, op.cit. 30.

from 1,480,246 to 2,370,233 between 1935 and 1965.<sup>195</sup> Nevertheless, further research in the 1990s trying to measure Kurdish population in the region shows a substantial Kurdish population not only in the Eastern part of the country, but also in CA. The Kurdish population in Central Anatolia was estimated as 243,000 in Ankara (6% of the total population), 3,500 in Çankırı (1.26% of the total population), 23,700 in Çorum (3.89% of the total population), 19,900 in Eskişehir (3.10% of the total population), 43,300 in Kayseri (4.56% of the total population), 17,000 in Kırşehir (6.61% of the total population), 104,800 in Konya (5.42% of the total population), 6,100 in Nevşehir (2.1% of the total population) and 13,100 in Yozgat (2.25 % of the total population) in the 1990s.<sup>196</sup> In general, the ratio of the Kurdish population in the region rose from 4.13% to 5.53%. Even if this appears as a slight change, the migration of Kurdish populations from CA to countries abroad should also be taken into account.

While examining the history of CAK, the gap following the 1930s that continues through today is significantly realized. This gap not only arises from absence of eye-catching issues, but it also arises from a lack of studies on them. That is why there cannot be clear examination about this period. However, it is understood from the results of the elections that CAK mostly tended to support center-right parties more than left-wing ones. For example, the Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) had been too infrequently supported in Haymana and Kulu in the 1965 and 1969 general elections. In 1965, the party received only 4 % of all votes in Haymana, while in Kulu the situation of the party was worse, with just 1.5 % of the votes. The center right parties kept their position for a long time.

In the light of all this information, it is quite obvious that beginning from the 16th century to the first half of the 20th century, Kurdish population in CA had been a part of structure of the region who both affected and being affected by changing dynamics. As a result of the state politics related to decentralization and the assimilation of the Kurdish population gaining momentum during the first half of the 20th century, the term ‘Kurdish society’ began to refer only to the ones living in the East and Southeast part of Turkey. A lot of government officials used this discourse while ignoring the presence of the Kurdish Question. For example, former Prime

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<sup>195</sup> Servet Mutlu, op.cit. 5.

<sup>196</sup> Servet Mutlu, op. cit. 10-11.



Minister Mesut Yılmaz admitted that Kurds living outside of the Southeast region were thought of as assimilated ones:

First of all, we do not know exactly how many Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin there are, maybe 8 million, maybe 15 million. But it is clear that about two-thirds live in other regions of Turkey, and are completely assimilated. Therefore, we are not talking about a Kurdish, but a Southeast problem. This goes beyond the extent of the ethnic definition.<sup>197</sup>

Among politicians and bureaucrats, defining the Kurdish Question as an economic problem related to the backwardness of the southeast region was a very popular tendency. Also, the general atmosphere and latest agenda of the country impacted the attitudes of the politicians and media. After the PKK attacks occurred, politicians mostly chose to use the term ‘terror problem’ to define the question. However, civil society organizations introduced the public with different perceptions towards the issue. Thus, the question started to be discussed from different aspects. The presence of CAK who had been settled in the region has been overlooked because of the state’s perception of Kurds in Turkey as a regional phenomena with a security-oriented perspective. Social, political, and cultural dynamics affecting the lives of CAK were not parts of social research until today. Nonetheless, a changing perception towards the Kurdish Question requires close investigation of the Kurds and has brought a new realization of social dimensions of the Kurdish population in other parts of Turkey. In light of information on the multi-dimensional factors of Kurdish settlement in CA, the current dynamics should be closely examined to understand social aspects of CAK providing patterns in their lives.

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<sup>197</sup> “The key lies in Bonn”, *Der Spiegel*, 22. 09. 1997. <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8781958.html>. “Öncelikle, tam olarak orada yaşayan Kürt kökenli vatandaşların sayısını bilemiyoruz, belki 8 belki de 15 milyondur. Fakat üçte ikisinin diğer bölgelerde yaşadığı ve tamamen asimile olduğu açıktır. Bu sebeple Kürt sorunundan değil, Güneydoğu sorunundan bahsediyoruz. Bu da etnik tanımın ötesine geçiyor.”

## CHAPTER IV

### SOCIAL COHESION OF CENTRAL ANATOLIAN KURDS

This chapter seeks to present from the field patterns in the social, cultural, and political lives of CAK to be able to understand how these patterns and CAK' Kurdish identity is impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness. The fieldwork held as a part of this study also enables us to see to what extent policies aiming to control ethnic contours of CAK discussed in the previous chapter continue to impact today's atmosphere in the region. It should be noted that the aim of this field survey is not a generalization of findings enabling their adaption to all circumstances to provide the same results. Instead, it just tries to take a picture of the field in a strict time period by analyzing data acquired from interviews, as well as considering observations, activities, actions, treatments, connections, dialogs, and other documentable data. In light of the theoretical framework used for this study (and explained previously in Chapter I), the findings will be considered in three dimensions. Firstly, the dimension of recognition/rejection deals with the social bonds of CAK with other groups in the region and the evolution of these relations by paying attention to their experiences, feelings, expectations, preferences, and concerns about social relations. The dimension of belonging/isolation touches upon the issues of identity and language in order to examine determinant factors shaping shared values and ethnic contours of CAK. Finally, the dimension of legitimacy/illegitimacy addresses political and institutional actions comprising relations with political parties and state institutions to understand association levels of CAK in this category. The questionnaire formed for this research can be found at the end of the study.

Before evaluating the information gathered from the field, the socio-demographic characteristics of informants should be examined.

#### **4.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Informants**

The socio-demographic characteristics of informants indicate personal information regarding their gender, birthplace and birthdate, level of education, occupation, and household size. Information in this section was gathered at the beginning of interviews with the guarantee that none of it will be used to emphasize or disclose

their identity in any way. Data acquired from interviews was classified by using the Nvivo Qualitative Data Analysis Programme. Information taken from 15 individuals participating in face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews is useful to gather details about the backgrounds of people chosen as samples representing CAK for the study.

At the beginning of the evaluation of socio-demographic characteristics, it should be noted that interviews were conducted with 4 women within the age group of 18-30, 4 women within the age group of 30-60, 3 men within the age group of 18-30 and 4 men within the age group of 30-60. All interviews were held in Ankara and its districts, Polatlı and Haymana. While two interviews were conducted in Haymana, 6 took place in Polatlı, and 7 interviews occurred in the center of Ankara. However, because of the close regional proximity of Polatlı and Haymana, nearly half of the informants in Polatlı were originally from Haymana but have been living in Polatlı for a long time. In total, four of the informants are originally from Kulu and Kırşehir but live in the center of Ankara, while 11 of the informants are originally from Polatlı and Haymana and still live in the same districts or center.

The average household size of informants is 4.0, including them. Conspicuously, there is no informant whose household size is larger than 5.0. The biggest household size is 5.0, contrary to the smallest one, which is 2.0. Additionally, all informants admit that they live as a nuclear family separated from their elders and other family members. From childhood memoirs of some informants, it is obvious that once they were living with their grandparents, uncles, aunts, and nephews. It should be stressed that choosing samples from city centers and districts may be the cause of having only nuclear families present in the study. There might be other results if samples were chosen among villages and hamlets.

#### **4.1.1. Birth Place and Migration**

Except for two informants interviewed in the center of Ankara from Kırşehir and Konya, all of the informants were born in villages belonging to Polatlı, Haymana, Kulu, and Çiçekdağı. Exceptionally, in fact, two people were born in Ankara, but their birth was officially recorded in their respective villages of Altılar and Yalnız ağaç. All other thirteen informants' birthplaces were appropriately recorded. Additionally, all of these informants had lived in a village during their childhood

until they migrated to the city center or districts with their family or on their own. As one male informant implies, “We attended the elementary school in Polatlı because there was no school in the village.”<sup>198</sup> Education is the most common reason for migrating from villages. Economic reasons follow behind as the second most frequent cause of migration; as one of the informants claims: “...My father was looking for a job. My family was living a settled life in the village long before I was born. But because the financial conditions in the village didn’t allowed them to continue living there, they migrated here, to Ankara, for a better life.”<sup>199</sup>

#### **4.1.2. Education**

It should be noted that there are no illiterate informants among the sample of the study. The reason for this arises from the difficulty of contacting and communicating with illiterate people, which was experienced at the beginning of the fieldwork. When I first wanted to begin my field survey, I talked to some people around me who do not have proper education and most of whom were nearly illiterate people. However, some of them did not want to talk too much because they were exhausted and were confused by the questions. Even if I tried to adapt my question into a new form that they could understand, my attempts remained inconclusive. Illiterate people were therefore expelled from the sample after this experience. Regarding the education levels of the women interviewed, three women within the age group of 18-30 and one woman within the age group of 30-60 are university graduates, three of them within the age group of 30-60 are primary school graduates, and one of them within the age group of 30-60 is a secondary school graduate. On the men’s side, one man within the age group of 18-30 and two men within the age group of 30-60 had graduated from university, one man within the age group of 18-30 and another man within the age group of 30-60 are high school graduates, and the other two informants within the age group of 18-30 graduated from secondary school.

#### **4.1.3. Occupation**

To have a look at the results of interviews held, one woman within the age group of 18-30 and two women within the age group of 30-60 are housewives, so they don’t have any proper income independent from their husbands (all of them are married)

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<sup>198</sup> “Köyde okul olmadığı için ilkokulu geldik Polatlı’da okuduk.”

<sup>199</sup> “Babamın iş araması. Benim ailem aslında ben doğmadan önce köyde yerleşik yaşayan bir aile idi. Ama köydeki maddiyat oradaki hayat sürdürmeye el vermediği için, daha iyi bir maddi hayat içinde buraya Ankara’ya göçtüler.”

and their own insurances. Other than these three women - who can be defined officially as unemployed - one woman within the age group of 18-30 is still waiting to be appointed as a science teacher and is hopeful about the next appointment period because of her expected high points on the Public Personnel Selection Examination (KPSS). She thinks that she cannot use her labor rights due to the corrupt institutional system, saying “You know there is a right called the right to labor among social rights and I can’t use my right to labor; this is bad for me. I graduated in 2013, I haven’t been able to be appointed for 2 years and this pushes me; I have complaints about this.”<sup>200</sup> Additionally, another woman within the age group of 18-30 was fired from the bank two years ago and is still searching for a new job. From her point of view, the problem of her unemployment is also related to a corrupt system in Turkey. As she states, "For instance, I'm an out-of-work banker now. I've been looking for a job for two years, but the age factor impedes me as does the public personnel selection examination. I was watching our president on the news last night and turned back as he was saying ‘Unemployed people in Turkey snub jobs.’ I am someone who makes updates on the Employment Agency every three days, but they never offered me a job I liked or didn't like and that Agency never called me for a job. In this case, I really want to know how unemployed people snub jobs.”<sup>201</sup> From observations during the interview, it can be said that she is very angry and frustrated because of her situation. Another woman within the age group of 18-30 is working as a researcher in a private company while a woman within the age group of 30-60 is working as a factory worker; the other woman within the same age group is working as a teacher in a public school.

When looking at men in this category, there is no person who is unemployed or looking for a job. Each of them has a proper job which means they have proper income and insurance. Within the age group of 18-30, two men are working for their family members in family companies. Another man within this age category is working as a helper in a drugstore owned by one of his relatives. The fourth man

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<sup>200</sup> “Bir kere çalışma hakkı diye bir şey ya, sosyal haklar içinde çalışma hakkı diye bir durum var ya, ben çalışma hakkımı kullanamıyorum mesela, bu benim için çok kötü bir durum. 2013'te mezun oldum 2 yıldır atanamıyorum yani bu beni zorluyor, bu konuda şeyim var, bu konuda sitemlerim var.”

<sup>201</sup> “Mesela şu an işsiz bir bankacıyım. İki yıldır iş arıyorum işte yaşa takılıyoruz, KPSS diye bir saçmalığa takılıyoruz. Dün Cumhurbaşkanımızın haberlerde izliyorum, “işsizlerimiz iş beğenmiyor” diye bir cümlesine dönüyorum. Ben sürekli, üç günde bir İŞKUR'dan iş güncellemesi yapan bir insanım ama bana beğendiğim ya da beğenmediğim bir iş İŞKUR'dan gelmedi, ya da bir iş araması gelmedi. Bu durumda işsizler nasıl iş beğenmiyor ben çok merak ediyorum.”

within this age group is a lawyer and working for a company. To classify men within the age group of 30-60, one man is working as a stallholder in a place that he owns. Of the other two men within this category, one man is a retired manager of a public bank while the other one is a retired teacher.

Gender, birthplace and birthdate, level of education, occupation, and household size are main categories describing personal information of informants and identifying the main features of the sample group chosen for this study. In the rest of this study, the cohesion/exclusion levels of CAK in their relations with other groups and understanding indicators of their affiliation between Turkishness and Kurdishness by examining patterns in their political, social, and cultural lives will be held in accordance with the theory of Paul Bernard on social cohesion. These patterns also help us understand sociological and political reflections of the contours of ethnic identity. The first dimension, recognition/rejection, will be useful to understand cohesion levels in social relations.

#### **4.2. The Dimension of Recognition/Rejection: Social Relations, Experiences, and Feelings of “Others” and “Us”**

As a part of the first dimension, domains belonging to social bonds, affiliations, daily life practices and other inter-relational tools affecting feelings and perceptions of people related to their groups and others provide valuable data in the case of evaluating social cohesion on the level of recognition/rejection. In this category, experiences pertaining to migration from urban to rural areas, results of first interactions with other groups in urban areas, the (un)sustainability of relations with relatives, and the possibilities and limitations in relationships with other groups will be touched upon to understand the level of communication in the region from the perspective of CAK and give clues about their social cohesion/exclusion from other groups.

One of the prominent determinants in the case of our sample group arises from their living experience in villages until a certain period in their life mostly coinciding with their childhood. Four female informants equally distributed in each age group and five men informants consisting of two within the age group of 18-30 and three within the age group of 30-60 had lived in villages during their childhood. Each informant migrated to districts and city centers due to educational needs and economic

conditions. As a male informant informs, educational needs most often reflect a lack of equipment: “We attended the elementary school in Polatlı because there was no school in the village. Of course, since there was no school in the village at that time. My father took us from the village to Polatlı and we studied there.”<sup>202</sup> Technical and infrastructural inadequacies in the villages are unable to provide an environment suitable for education. Even if industrialization improved the quality of life in villages, educational needs are still among the most common two reasons for migration.<sup>203</sup> At the second stage, economic problems also come to the forefront in the expressions of informants. After the division of territories among the next generations by means of inheritance, people become unable to make their budgets suffice with mere agricultural production. One of the male informants’ explanation making a connection between economic problems and patriarchal family structure as a reason for migration from villages is remarkable:

There used to be a patriarchal structure. The society we grew up in had a patriarchal family structure. A father, his children, his grandchildren, all worked together. This grandfather used to earn their livelihood. But over time, people began to be liberalized as the level of education increased. Children’s worldviews changed as they read. Lifestyles, standards changed, the demands changed. A patriarchal head could no longer provide for the family. Therefore, ruptures in the family started. We were losing the ability to support a family when the land was divided. Fragmented lands caused everyone to look for a job they could find by accident and they did find. Those who found one left the village. Hence the ruptures. People scattered, someone who managed to make a good life in the city was a model when he came to visit the village. You see, I left and I am comfortable. I got a job, I work. I am a worker at the factory and I pay my house’s rent with my salary. And I have spare income, said the village leaver and those who aspired left the village. This way, villages were abandoned gradually.<sup>204</sup>

The migration issue in the case of CAK occurred as a phenomena not only from villages to districts or city centers, but also as another phenomena related to the frequency of migrations abroad, which tears CAK between village and city life in addition to affecting their social conditions in the long term:

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<sup>202</sup> “Köyde okul olmadığı için ilkokulu geldik Polatlı’da okuduk. Tabii o zaman okul olmadığı için köyde. Babam bizi köyden Polatlı’ya getirdi şehre orada okuttu.”

<sup>203</sup> *Nüfus ve Konut Araştırması*, TÜİK Yayınları, Ankara, 2011, p. 53.

<sup>204</sup> “Şimdi eskiden bir ataerkil yapısı vardı.bizim yetiştiğimiz Toplum ataerkil aile yapısına sahipti. Bir baba çocukları, torunları hep birlikte çalışırdı. Bu büyükbaba onların geçim ve maişetini sağlardı. Ama zamanla eğitim düzeyi arttıkça insanlar özgürleşmeye başladı. Çocuklar okudukça dünya görüşleri değişti. Yaşam tarzları, standartları değişti, talepleri değişti. Bunu artık ataerkil aile reisi karşılayamıyordu. Dolayısıyla ailede kopmalar olmaya başladı. Arazi bölündüğünde de bir aileyi geçindirecek kabiliyeti kaybediyorduk. Parçalanmış arazi dolayısıyla herkes şehirde işte hasbelkader yapabileceği bir iş aradı, buldu. Bulanlar köyü terk etti. Böylece kopmalar başladı. İnsanlar dağıldı, şehirde iyi bir hayat kuran, iyi bir düzen kuran biri köye gelip diğerlerine de örnek oluyordu. İşte ben gittim, rahat ettim. Bir iş buldum, çalıştım. Fabrikada işçiyim işte maaşım evin kirasını veriyorum. Ama karşılığında gelirim var gibi şeyler söyleyince özenenler hep köyü terk etti. Bu şekil yavaş yavaş köyler terk edildi.”

People started to not be satisfied with what they produced. The village is something that has its very own cycle. You harvest, sell it if you can and if you can't you turn wheat into flour and eat it; but that wasn't enough for people or they didn't want it to be enough. Many people I know, for instance, were people who aimed to go to Sweden to study at university and come back to Turkey and achieve great things; but when they got there - you know Volvo is a popular brand of Sweden - they stayed either in a factory of Volvo or in a cleaning job. They are neither Swedish nor villagers now. They're stuck in-between.<sup>205</sup>

Actually, the tracks of CAK after their migration to foreign countries such as Germany, Sweden, Denmark, France, and so on created a perception in the minds of foreigners, too. As one of the informants claims, "They call Kulu 'the little Sweden,'"<sup>206</sup> which becomes important in this context when it is considered together with the reality of how Swedish prime ministers and other politicians have cared about this small district in each of their visits to Turkey; when the fact that approximately more than fifty thousand people from Kulu live in Sweden is considered, the explanation of the informant cannot be seen as an exaggeration.<sup>207</sup> The density of the Kurdish population in European and Scandinavian countries can be explained in two ways. First, as a result of the migration movements that started in the beginning of the 1960s, many Kurdish people, especially those who did not have proper jobs, applied to foreign countries to be accepted as workers. In addition, the ones who were not accepted in this context applied to European countries as refugees by asserting that they were under political repression of the state arising from their Kurdish identity and being exposed to economic discrimination in Turkey.<sup>208</sup> After that period, during the 1970s and 1980s, the political and social environment of Turkey forced lots of Kurdish political figures to take refuge in European countries. Especially after the 1980 Turkish coup d'état, 30,000 people had to go abroad due to the prevalence of violent conditions.<sup>209</sup> CAK were also among these people during these times because of their participation in political activities during that period. As one of the male informants expressed in his memoirs belonging to the 1970s, Polatlı

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<sup>205</sup> "Ya insanlar artık ürettikleriyle yetinememeye başladı. Köy çok kendi döngüsü olan bir şeydir. Ekin toplarsın, onu satabilirsene satarsın, satamazsan buğdayı una çevirir yersin ama insanlara yetmedi ya da insanlar yetinmek istemediler. Benim mesela tanıdığım çok kişi aslında İsveç'e gidenler örneğinde üniversite okuyup, Türkiye'ye dönüp büyük işler yapmayı hedefleyen insanlardı ama gittiklerinde hani, ya araba fabrikalarında Volvo çok meşhur İsveçliler için. Ya Volvo'nun bir fabrikasında ya da temizlik işinde kaldılar. Şu an ne İsveçliler ne hani köylüler. Öyle bir yerde sıkışıp kaldılar."

<sup>206</sup> "Zaten Kulu 'ya küçük İsveç diyorlar."

<sup>207</sup> "Swedish Prime Minister Reinfeldt due to Turkey", *Today's Zaman*, April 19, 2009; "Türklerin çok olduğu ülke: Kulufonya", *Zaman*, March 30, 2008.

<sup>208</sup> Müzeyyen Güler, *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>209</sup> "Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu Raporu", Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, vol. 1, November 2012, p. 698.



and Haymana were under the effects of leftist groups and provided people for leftist organizations such as DEV-GENÇ and Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Organizations (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları-DDKO*). That political atmosphere also forced people participating in these kinds of movements to be accepted as political refugees in foreign countries. In other words, in the second half of the 20th century, CAK were subject to two-fold migration waves, one of which was from rural to urban areas and the second, emigration to European countries.

CAK who migrated from rural to urban areas did not, however, break all of their connections with their villages. Particularly nine informants who were born and had lived in villages during their childhood express that their feelings towards their villages are still the same even if they are able to visit there only in summers for vocational purposes or during wedding ceremonies and funerals. One female informant touches on the issue as: “We go there every summer. We go if there is a funeral. When there is a wedding. There is no one left in the village now. They all moved to the cities.”<sup>210</sup> Their short-term purpose of visiting the villages discloses the fact that they maintain their relations with rural areas on a traditional level. In another point, because of mass migration from rural areas to urban places, informants feel alienated from villages and the people living there. As one female informant stresses: “That is, 95% of my village is here, living in Polatlı. I mean, I feel at home. All our kith and kin are here; we see those who stay in the village as strangers, because we see the villagers much less often. We’ve lived here with acquaintances and relatives for almost 30 years.”<sup>211</sup> In other words, the urban is a new determinative platform for CAK because of the fact that they have lived in urban areas longer and spend more time there than in rural areas; as a result, their ties with villages are weakened, which makes them feel alienated from their place of birth. It should be stressed that the same point of view towards villages is observed among informants born and raised in urban areas.

Even if the testimonies of informants emphasize their stronger bonds with the urban contrary to the rural, another common pattern comes in sight under the question of

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<sup>210</sup> “Yazdan yaza gidiyoruz. Bir cenaze olunca gidiyoruz. Düğün olunca gidiyoruz. Ya kimse kalmadı köyde artık. Hepsi şehirlere yerleşti.”

<sup>211</sup> “Yani, köyümün %95’i burada. Polatlı’da yaşıyor. Yani, evimde hissediyorum. Çevremiz komple burada, köyde kalanlara bile yabancı bakıyoruz, Çünkü köydeki adamı daha az görüyoruz. Polatlı’da; eş, dost, akraba hep burada olduğu için 30 yıla da yakın da oldu hani.”

their adaptation to urban areas at the beginning of their migration. This issue is important to provide insight into the problems they faced during the process of social cohesion/exclusion. Consequently, problems of adaptation arose from language as well as differences related to issues of social and economic condition. Three male and three female informants within the age group of 30-60 each expressed that they had experienced language as the prominent problem after migration. As people whose native language was Kurdish and who had limited Turkish knowledge, some of them postponed starting school. A female informant describes this process as follows:

For example, my first compliance problem was that I didn't start elementary school at seven, I did at eight. When we came here, there was no vacancy in the nearby school where my brother enrolled. Because there was no vacancy for first graders, they didn't accept me; the school a little further away from home could accept me, but since we didn't speak Turkish and we had to commute by ourselves I couldn't go to school that year. So to say, they didn't send me to school because I knew neither the language nor the city; I lost a year, so that has an impact.<sup>212</sup>

As it is seen, language problems influenced the quality of life after migration. Some informants said that the difference in language together with social differences isolated them from cities. It pushed them towards avoiding communication with local people who they viewed as totally different from themselves. A male informant stresses how the burden of city life affected his physical and psychological situation:

... We had missed the village and the villager. We were homesick. When I first arrived in Ankara, I joined the line for the minibus. In the morning on the way to work one day, I joined the line for the train. And while I was waiting in that line, I was pondering exactly what you asked: 'What the hell is this, am I going to live like this from now on? Am I going to wait in lines for buses every day,' I was thinking to myself. And I couldn't take it. I resented it. 'What is this, what kind of life is this?'<sup>213</sup>

Economic and social differences in urban areas additionally negatively affected all informants. There was no interviewee who experienced migration and did not have problems during the adaptation process. As another adverse effect of this adaptation process, the Kurds who migrated to the center of Ankara and Polatlı after village life

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<sup>212</sup> "Mesela ben hiç unutmuyorum benim ilk uyum şeyi normalde ben ilkokula yedi yaşında başlamadım sekiz yaşında başladım. İşte geldiğimizde evimize yakın olan okulun kontenjanı dolmuştu abim oraya yazılmıştı. Birinci sınıf kontenjan dolduğu için beni almadılar evden biraz daha uzakta okulda alınabilirdi ama Türkçe bilmediğimiz için kendi başımıza gidip gelme olayı sorunu olduğu için o yıl okula gidemedim yani dili bilmiyorsun şehri bilmiyorsun gidip gelme sorunu olacağı için yani beni bir sene geç gönderdiler okula bir yıl benim kaybım oldu yani tabi ki o etki ediyor yani."

<sup>213</sup> "...Köyü özliyorduk.köylüyü özliyorduk. Yani yaşadığımız yeri yadırgıyorduk... İlk kez Ankara'ya geldiğimde bir gün minibus kuyruğuna girmiştim. Sabah işe giderken bir gün tren kuyruğuna girmiştim. Ve o kuyrukta beklerken işte bu dediklerinizi sorguluyordum. Ya bu ne ya ben de bundan sonra böyle mi yaşayacağım? Her gün otobüs kuyruğunda mı bekleyeceğim diye düşünüyordum. Ve kabullenemiyordum. Zoruma gidiyordu. Ya bu ne ya böyle hayat mı olur?"

express that they had to face discrimination from people of other ethnicities arising from negative prototypes about the Kurds. As a male informant who migrated from a village of Haymana to Polatlı quotes about those days:

Of course, in the past they would get uncomfortable and distance themselves when they found out we were Kurdish. Sometimes, they were okay with it. Here's something I laughed at: a neighbor said "they called me Kurd from Haymana, but don't go, they'll eat you up." They presented us as enemies. But a friend of mine, for instance, told me "I am sorry, I badmouthed you, but it turns out you are not that kind of person." That is, we've been through and seen these.<sup>214</sup>

In addition to being exposed to these kinds of misperceptions about the Kurds, CAK also suffered direct assaults from people in their neighbourhood. As a male informant within the age group of 30-60 tells: "When we first came then, in the simplest term, they talked rudely about our clothing, appearances, haircuts or hair and even our speech. Mostly, we were mocked here many times. For instance, if you can't even clearly express yourself, he insults you."<sup>215</sup> CAK also suffered an affront: "They used the word 'filth Kurds' very often, it was such a common phrase."<sup>216</sup> These kinds of discriminatory behaviours worsened relations among children and adults. As a female informant narrates, children also were acting as if they had negative perceptions towards the Kurds:

I had come to Polatlı to finish elementary school. But I didn't speak Turkish, not a word. Language was a problem. My mother tongue was Kurdish. Tatars resided in our neighborhood mostly. We could never get along. I mean, they used to say something and we would blankly stare at them. And they used to stare when we did. In fact, they asked if we swore at them because we spoke Kurdish. I mean they did something in that sense. We didn't play together. They wouldn't let us among them. For instance, there were 3 kids playing with a ball once and I held the ball, as I was a child who wanted to play. They took their ball and left. And they would call our elderly "here's the Kurd". They wouldn't get off with us.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> "Tabii eskiden Kürt olduğumuzu duyduklarında rahatsız olur, uzaklaşırlardı. Zaman zaman alıştırlardı, ben buna çok güldüm mesela; bir komşu dedi ki, "ulan Haymanalı Kürt dediler dedi, ama gitmeyin yerler sizi" bizi düşman gibi gösterdiler. Ama bir arkadaşım mesela, adam geldi "ya hakkınızı helal edin, ben sizin için böyle şeyler söyledim ama siz gerçekten öyle insanlar değilmişsiniz." Söylendiğini gördük, yaşadık yani".

<sup>215</sup> "O zaman geldiğimizde mesela en basit bizim kılık kıyafetimize, fiziğimize, tıraşlarımıza, saçımıza ondan sonra konuşmamız onlara göre işte kaba şeklinde ifade ederler... Genelde burada çok dalga geçmelere uğradık. Mesela kendimizi ifade ederken bile net ifade edemiyorsun adam sana hakaret ediyor."

<sup>216</sup> "Hani o pis Kürtler kelimesini çok kullanıyorlardı yani bu deyim çok kullanılıyordu."

<sup>217</sup> "Ben ilk ilkokul okumak üzere Polatlı'ya gelmişim. Ama tek kelime Türkçe bilmiyordum. Dil sorunu vardı. Ana dilim Kürtçe'ydi. Mahallemizde genelde Tatarlar otururdu. Biz onlarla hiç anlaşamazdık... Yani bir şey söylerlerdi biz onların yüzüne bakardık. Biz söyledik onlar bakardı. Hatta bizim söylediğimiz Kürtçe konuştuğumuz için bana küfür mü ediyorsun derlerdi. Yani o anlamda bir şeyler yaparlardı. Birlikte oyun oynamazdık. Aralarına almazlardı bizi. Mesela top oynuyor 3 kişi ben de topu tuttum çocuğum ya topu tutum oynamak istedim. Toplarını alıp giderlerdi. Büyüklerimize de işte Kürt diye hitap ederlerdi. Yakınlık kurmazlardı."

When all of these expressions are examined, it is obvious that nearly half of the people among all age groups suffered a form of discrimination from other groups in their new living spaces. ‘Regarded as an enemy,’ ‘discountenancing,’ ‘alienation,’ ‘nationalism,’ and ‘racism’ are the words used by informants while describing the behaviors of non-Kurdish groups towards them during their initial migration. However, it has been pointed out that informants who migrated to the center of Haymana populated by Kurds were not exposed to discriminative practices too often. They felt more like being at home compared to the others experiencing discriminatory behaviors. Interestingly enough, a couple of informants emphasized that they were unluckier than the Kurds in the Eastern part in the case of being exposed to discriminatory behaviors because of being surrounded densely by non-Kurdish elements:

I cannot help but agree with you. I grew up in Ankara. My wife grew up in Diyarbakir. Most of the kids in Diyarbakır have Kurdish names so they don’t get bullied much at school, even if they speak with an accent or speak Kurdish. Here, there were people who would show disdain at the slightest speech with an accent. Many of our relatives experienced this, my father did too. That’s why they speak Turkish more smoothly than Turks. Our people speak a smoother Turkish than people from Çankırı, Çorum or Konya. Because they went through something different, they took offense at being mocked and they tried to learn it the best they could. A lot of people around me speak Turkish better than Turks.<sup>218</sup>

In addition to the ethnic composition of the newly settled area, the age group is another independent variable affecting whether interviewees were exposed to discriminatory practices. While all informants within the age group of 30-60 were exposed to a kind of discriminatory practice (although it varies in extent), the interviewees within the age group of 18-30 were subjected to discrimination less often, both in numbers and intensity. Especially because the center of Haymana consists of people mostly claiming Kurdish origin, they did not face difficulties in adaptation arising from their ethnic identity. To sum up, CAK who migrated to neighborhoods consisting of non-Kurdish elements were subjected to discriminatory practices in their initial migration. These discriminatory practices decreased overtime through an increase in direct communication among people. The more recent

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<sup>218</sup> “Ben ister, istemez katılıyorum. Ben Ankara’da büyüdüm. Eşim Diyarbakır’da büyüdü, Diyarbakır’da zaten çocukların çoğu zaten çoğu Kürtçe isim kullanıyor, onun için çok fazla okulda bir şey görmüyorlar. Kürtçe konuşsalar, şiveli konuşsalar dalga da geçilmiyor. Burada mesela, bizim sınıflarımızda biraz şiveyle konuşsa küçümseyen insanlar vardı mesela. Bunu etrafımızdan pek çok akrabamız yaşamış, babam yaşamış kendisi yaşamış. Onun için Türkçeyi daha düzgün konuşuyorlar, Türklerden daha düzgün konuşuyorlar. Çankırlı, Çorumlu, Konyalıdan daha düzgün Türkçe konuşuyor bizimkiler. Çünkü bir şey var, dalga geçilmesi ağırlarına gidip onu dile göndermişler onu en iyi şekilde öğrenmeye çalışmışlar. Etrafımdaki pek çok insan Türkçeyi Türklerden daha güzel konuşuyor.”

situation regarding the relations between Kurdish and non-Kurdish elements will be discussed in the next sections.

Regarding the issue of CAK' knowledge about their ties with the region, almost all informants - thirteen out of fifteen - have knowledge of the settlement of their ancestors and their original homeland. That is to say, their ancestors migrated to the region variously from the era of Yavuz to the 19th century. The most common period stated by informants is the 18th century. Tribes that migrated to the region came from around Adıyaman, Urfa, and Horasan. As one of the male informants states, not all of the tribes arrived to the region because of forced migration:

A few families who left Ziyaret village in Suruç in Urfa divided into four villages here. And the villages are also pretty big. There are villages with populations of near 6 thousand people. Our 80-year-old grandpas used to tell us tales as there was no TV or radio 50 years ago. These were told then. Our elderly used to say as follows and we would eagerly listen to them: "Mustafa, you know what I think. We came from the east about 200 or 210 years ago. It's been a complete 200 years," they would say. It used to attract my attention too in those days. So it was a full 200 years. What I am talking about was at the end of 1960s. So if we add 50 years, nearly 250 years ago we migrated from the east to here to dwell. That is, it's not an exile or anything. We came here on our own desire and we had a decree from the padishah. I mean, we are not a clan that was exiled. We came to dwell.<sup>219</sup>

Actually, this is the only example of voluntary migration given by informants.

Looking at the rest of the examples related to the issue, it is clear that migrations to the region arose from the enforcement of the administration during the Empire.

These tribes came from surrounding regions of Adıyaman, Urfa, and Horasan and were distributed throughout the region as is reported in detail in the third chapter.

As an important domain in the case of the recognition/rejection process, social relations at the present time should be examined more precisely. Bearing in mind that the initial relations between Kurdish and non-Kurdish elements were somehow problematic and showed discriminatory elements, these groups have taken important steps in their relations in case of providing social cohesion over time. Especially female informants frequently take their relations with neighbors to the forefront and

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<sup>219</sup> "Urfa'da, Urfa-Suruç ziyaret köyünden kopup gelmiş birkaç aile burada dört köye bölünmüşler. Köyler de bayağı büyük yani burada bayağı büyük. Yaklaşık beş-altı bin nüfuslu köyler var... 50 yıl önceki 80-90'lık dedelerimiz bizde tv, radyo gibi şeyler olmadığı için mesel anlatırdı. Bunlar o zaman anlatılırdı. Şöyle derdi büyüklerimiz birbirine anlatırken biz de kulak misafiri olurduk. Derlerdi ki; "Ya işte Mustafa şöyle düşünüyorum. Biz işte tam 200 yıl-210 yıl olmuş doğudan gelmişiz. Falan tam 200 yıl oldu" gibi söylentiler kulağımdıydı. O zaman benim de dikkatimi çekiyordu. Demek tam 200 yıl önce gelmişiz. Bu dediğim olaylarda 1960'lı yılların sonları. Bu da olduğuna göre bir elli yılda koyarsak yaklaşık 250 yıl önce bizler doğudan buraya ikamet etme amacıyla gelmişiz. Yani herhangi bir sürgün falan değil. Kendiliğinden, padişahın şey alınarak, ferman alınarak gelmişiz. Yani sürgünler sonucu gelen bir aşiret değiliz. İkamet etme amacıyla gelmişiz."

put too much stress on how they developed openhearted relations through face-to-face communication. However, as a common pattern in the minds of nearly all informants, categorical discrimination arising from misperceptions about the Kurds has a determinant role in relations between the Kurds and non-Kurdish population. A female informant attracts attention to the problem:

What we hear, what I am talking about is that two parties have distorted senses of each other. "Kurds are like bla bla, you don't look like a Kurd at all." However, the problem there is this, you are trying to be the ideal person -though everyone has a flaw - but you just try to reach an ideal communication point. We should be kind to each other, we should not break our neighbor's heart, neighborliness is holy, we treat someone without regarding their ethnicity. But what we get is, "You don't look like a Kurd at all."<sup>220</sup>

As stated above, even if CAK and non-Kurdish groups developed good relationships over time, these relations draw strength from profit-based face-to-face communication in which identities are invisible. From explanations of informants, it is easy to say that because Kurdishness is still seen as a threat, CAK kept silent about their ethnic identity to not destroy these 'unproblematic' relations: "I haven't had such a problem so far. Neither have I, nor they. I have lived in this building nearly 12 years. My neighbors are mixed. I mean, there are both Turks and Kurds. And others as well. Not at the moment, but maybe in big cities such as Istanbul. If I hit the streets and wave a PDP flag, it would be a problem I think. It's okay as long as we keep quiet."<sup>221</sup>

Remaining silent and suppressing their ethnic identity in social relations, CAK and their Kurdishness cannot be realized as much as among the Kurds in the East. On an individual level, CAK can be accepted equally as a part of the community in which they live. Nonetheless, they cannot be equally accepted by other groups with their ethnic identity revealed. Deep-rooted prejudices about the Kurds that create a hidden tension between the groups become concrete in discourse of non-Kurdish people according to an explanation of a male informant:

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<sup>220</sup> "Bizim duyduğumuz şey, bu başta bahsettiğim şey, iki tarafın birebiriyle algısı sorunlu. "Kürtler şöyledir, siz hiç Kürde benzemiyorsunuz." Hâlbuki orada sorun şu biz, ideal insan olmaya, ya da ideal insan herkesin bir kusuru vardır ama ideal iletişim noktasını yakalamaya çabalıyoruz sadece. Birbirimize karşı nazik olalım, komşumuzun kalbini kırmayalım, komşuluk hakkıdır, bir başkasına nasıl davranırsak, etnik kimliğine bakmadan öyle davranıyoruz ama duyduğumuz şey "Siz hiç Kürde benzemiyorsunuz."

<sup>221</sup> "Yani bugüne kadar öyle bir sorunum olmadı. Benim de olmadı onların da olmadı. Yaklaşık 12 yıldır bu binada oturuyorum. Komşularım karışık. Yani Türk de var Kürt de var. Başkaları da var. Şu anda yok ama benim yok ama İstanbul gibi metropollerde olabilir. Ben sokaklara çıksam ben Kürdüm desem HDP bayrağı sallasam sorun olur herhalde. Ses çıkarmadığımız müddetçe sorun yok."

... We were staying in the same room and one day she came to me and said that she thought Kurds had tails. She was absolutely not lying, we asked how come. This girl, our lady friend, studied in Ankara, I asked how, what she meant by tail. She said she thought Kurds were monsters with tails. And I said “Aaaaaaah, if we are monsters, you have stayed with us for 6 months, we talked and such together, changed clothes, etc. Did you see any tail, do I have a tail?” That is, an educated person can say this, she tells me we are monsters with tails. It still seems to me that it’s old hearsay to feed Kurdophobia.<sup>222</sup>

As implied above, deep-rooted prejudices about the Kurds prevent cohesion between the Kurds and others in social life. Unfortunately, only individual relations can break down the prejudices belonging to people communicated with, not with all Kurds.

Thus, prejudices are still being kept in mind. As a female informant indicates: “But there were a couple of reactions I got in the neighborhood; after that they got used to it too and they appreciated saying: ‘What’d you know, Kurds can be good friends after all. So Kurds have good ones among them too, we thought all of them are bad.’ They said all of this openly.”<sup>223</sup>

Because CAK were exposed to discriminatory behaviors in their relations, they prefer somehow staying in a circle formed by Kurds. As one expression admits: “We try to reside where Kurds are. We’re trying to be together with people who are close to our culture.”<sup>224</sup> This is one of the factors causing some ghettoization even in small districts. As an example of ghettoization, the Kurds in Polatlı have densely settled in the Esentepe neighbourhood since the 1960s.<sup>225</sup> In other words, they created a safe zone for themselves. Contrary to this safe zone, Turkish nationalists consisting of the Turks, Tatars, and Balkan immigrants formed another zone called Menteşe neighbourhood. Struggles between these two neighbourhoods sometimes turned to physical violence and still continue. Consequently, it is one of the factors damaging cohesion of the Kurds with other groups; despite the cosmopolitan structure of the

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<sup>222</sup> “...İşte bir arada sohbet ederken dedi işte aynı odada kalıyoruz ben dedi Kürtleri dedi kuyruklu biliyorum dedi. Kesinlikle yalan yok içinde öyle söyleyince nasıl dedik yani sohbet ortamında. Valla bu kız Ankara’da, bu bayan arkadaşımız Ankara’da okumuş nasıl olur dedim ya nasıl yani kuyruklu. Valla dedi ben Kürtleri dedi kuyruklu canavar diye biliyordum dedi. Öyle yapınca bende ona “aaaaaaa” dedim öyle bir ses ile madem biz canavarız kızım dedim sen altı ayır bizimle kalıyorsun beraber oturduk sohbet ettik beraber yan yana giyindik bilmem ne yaptık var mı bir kuyruk dedim gördün mü? Yani bunu bir eğitilmiş insan söyleyebiliyor bana yani Kürtler kuyruklu canavar diye bizim kuyruğumuz varmış diyor. Halen bana göre kulaktan dolma işte hani eskiden söylenilmiş daha da hani Kürt düşmanlığı beslemek amacı ile söylenmiş sözler.”

<sup>223</sup> “Ama ilk mahalleimde bir iki tepki aldım ondan sonra onlar da alıştı, demek ki Kürtlerden de iyi arkadaş olunuyormuş diye daha takdir ettiler. Demek ki Kürtlerin içinde de iyiler varmış biz hep kötü biliyorduk diye kendileri açık açık söyledi yani”, being good people is still seen an exceptional situation in case of the Kurds.”

<sup>224</sup> “Kürtlerin olduğu ortamda oturmaya çalışıyoruz. Kültürümüze yakın insanlarla bir arada olmaya çalışıyoruz.”

<sup>225</sup> Dr. Hecibram Mikailî, “Polatlı Kürtleri”, *Bîrnebûn*, Winter 1997, vol. 1., no. 1, p. 5.

district, the Kurds mostly prefer spending their time with other Kurds. To lend an ear to a female informant, she mentions the difficulty of communicating with people coming from other cultures: “Our family is so sincere. I feel more comfortable in environments where Kurdish is spoken. My friends in the east say the same. We used to gather and speak Kurdish. I expressed myself more comfortably. I felt like I belong to them. I would have a westerner as a friend but we are so different culturally that I couldn’t communicate with them properly.”<sup>226</sup>

Even if communicating with non-Kurdish people is somehow difficult, the Kurds still come together with their relatives and maintain their cultural aspects even in the districts and the city center. From the expressions of informants, it is obvious that Kurds mostly come together with their relatives during wedding ceremonies and funerals. Relations based on traditional aspects remain the most common way to see each other, even if it is infrequent. In other words, they still maintain traditional forms of celebration and mourning. As a male informant extrapolates:

We have lost nothing from our general custom. We dance the Kurdish halay and hold weddings. Even though it used to be forbidden, we would dance the Kurdish halay but the song would be Turkish. Now, thanks to God, we sing and dance Kurdish. Sometimes, there are weddings in the streets, in Haymana and Polatlı in particular. Kurdish halay is danced, folk songs are sung, especially at funerals, weddings, and in times of illness; so always we have a connection, togetherness. They come together at weddings or funerals even if they are crossed with each other or have daggers drawn.<sup>227</sup>

Although CAK prefer to come together with their relatives and other Kurds, it does not mean that they are a closed community opposed to all kinds of inter-ethnic relations. Marriages are the most common way of inter-ethnic relations, which bring strictly different cultures together. Even if consanguineous marriages are common in the families of nearly all informants, there was no informant expressly opposed to inter-ethnic marriages. Even a female informant whose family is not supportive of

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<sup>226</sup> “Bizim aile çok içtendir doğaldır. Kürtçe konuşulduğu ortamlarda daha rahat hissediyorum. Doğudaki arkadaşlarım da onu diyordu, böyle bir araya geliyorduk Kürtçe konuşuyorduk. Kendimi daha rahat ifade ediyordum. Kendimi onlara aitmiş gibi hissediyordum. Bir batılı oluyordu, batılı bir arkadaşım oluyordu ama yani o kadar farklıyız ki, kültürel olarak farklı her şey farklı onlarla iletişim kuramıyordum.”

<sup>227</sup> “Bizim geçmişten örf adet ve göreneklerden hiçbir şey kaybetmedik. Kürtçe halay çeker, düğün yaparız. Eskiden ne kadar yasak olsa da biz yani halayımızı yine Kürt halayı olurdu ama Türkçe söylerdi sazlar, şimdi şükür Kürtçe söylüyoruz, Kürtçe oynuyoruz. Bazen mesela şimdi mesela özellikle Haymana’da, Polatlı’da sokaklarda düğünler oluyor. Kürtçe halaylar çekiliyor, türküler söyleniyor... Özellikle cenazelerde, düğünlerde ve hastalıkta olsun her zaman yani öyle bir bağımlık var, birlikteliğimiz var. Birbirine küs de olsa, hiç konuşmasa bile, kanlı bıçaklı olsalar düğünlerde cenazelerde bir araya gelirler.”



this kind of marriage and the most distant among informants explains, it can be accepted even if not preferred:

Kin marriage is very common; they don't intermarry, I'll tell you that. Our people, they call the Kurds around Kırşehir desert Kurds. The priority is being a desert Kurd: they first ask where he is from, which village. But if he is a Turk, they don't really welcome him well, but they know enduring is silence. I have an uncle and an aunt who married Turks. It's kind of hard but we still allow them among us.<sup>228</sup>

Except two informants, the rest insist that inter-ethnic marriages are a problem neither for them nor for their families. Another female informant just adverts that it may create a problem while impressing Kurdish identity upon her children: "Rather than being Kurdish or not, it's enough for me that she is okay with me naming our kids Kurdish names and letting our kids speak Kurdish along with Turkish. In this sense, it may be more advantageous that she is Kurdish."<sup>229</sup> To sum up, inter-ethnic marriages did not matter to almost any of the informants, except two female interviewees within the age group of 18-30. In general, they mentioned that it is not important for them whether their children will marry Kurds or Turks.

As aforementioned above, CAK occasionally come together with their relatives on special days. At this point, it is observed in the field that there is not a strong solidarity or colloboration among CAK, which results from a lack of organization in urban areas. Certainly there are some fellow countrymen associations especially at the district-level. However, in the case of ones' belonging to CAK and their hometowns, these associations are not active enough to bring CAK together with their relatives and other Kurds from the region. While conducting an interview with a representative from The Association of Social Cooperation and Solidarity for Haymanaians (*Haymanalılar Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği*), it was learned that there were previously some initiatives to bring CAK living in urban areas to the rural areas by organizing regular spring festivals in the rural areas. Nevertheless, they had to end these traditional occasions because of their disfunctionality and lack of sphere of influence. As a member of the Board of Directors of the Association propounds, the administration had to cover the expenses of the occasions on their

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<sup>228</sup> "Yani akraba evliliği çok yaygın, dışarı kız vermiyorlar öyle söyleyeyim...Bizimkilerde şöyle bir şey var, bizim Kırşehir çevresine çöl Kürtleri derler. Öncelik çöl Kürt'ü olmasıdır mesela, hani hangi köyden, çevre köyden mi ilk onu sorarlar. Ama hani Türk olursa, ya onu çok şey yapmazlar yani, iyi karşılamazlar ama içlerine atmayı da bilirler. Çünkü Türklerle evlilik yapmış amcam var, hani halam var. Biraz zor oluyor ama yine de içimize alıyoruz."

<sup>229</sup> "Kürt olup olmamasından ziyade, benim çocuklarıma Kürtçe isim koymam onun için sorun olmasın ya da çocuklarımı hani Kürtçe öğrenmesi Kürtçeyi de Türkçeyle birlikte konuşması onun için sorun olmasın benim için yeter. Bu anlamda Kürt olması daha avantajlı olabilir."

own because of the unwillingness of people to contribute money. According to him, they could not enroll people for the association because of disinterestedness towards their hometown. This man complains a lot about Haymanaians in Ankara because of their perception of the Association as a place that gives scholarship. Even if the Association is not providing such kind of financial means, people were interested in the activities of the Association until they realized it is not providing financial aid. It is obvious that there is a need for an organized and comprehensive organization beyond functioning as a fellow countrymen association. As a newly established umbrella organization, The Association of Culture and Solidarity of Central Anatolian Kurds (*KOMKURD-AN, Orta Anadolu Kürtleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği*) was founded to fill this gap.

KOMKURD-AN was founded by a group of Kurdish people among Ankara, Kırşehir, and Konya with the aim of transferring Kurdish culture and tradition to the next generations of CAK to counter assimilation. In the founding declaration, it is stressed that the organization comprehends all people no matter which political view they have because of their aim to create a place for common struggle. Nevertheless, executives of the Association declared their support of the PDP in the June 7 elections, a party that is identified as the political party having the same goals with the Association. Because it is newly established, the association does not have a proper detailed activity schedule. Nonetheless, executives explained that they will bring CAK, especially young people, together by organizing events such as movie and documentary screenings, annual conferences, as well as supporting academic studies on CAK to fill the gap of which they are also aware. As one of the executives of the Association stresses, CAK had been exposed to state politics of assimilating their Kurdishness. He drew attention on the issue that CAK living in the center of Ankara mostly work in unqualified jobs, such as sellers in markets and taxi drivers, which arises from being unofficially blocked from other working sectors if they are not well educated. Additionally, the executive gives an anecdote that he recently experienced to show how people exhibit discriminatory behaviours towards Kurds. When the executives of the Association were looking for a space for rent to serve as a work place, two owners refused to let their places when they heard the name of the Association. He also insisted that CAK were exposed to these kinds of

discriminatory behaviours more often than Kurds in the eastern part of Turkey, who live in an atmosphere formed by the Kurds.

Along with the executive's personal experiences and observations on discrimination of CAK, as it is aforementioned, misperceptions and prejudices towards CAK harm mutual relationships between Kurds and non-Kurdish groups in the region. Other than a female informant within the age group of 18-30 and another one within the age group of 30-60, all informants faced some kind of discriminatory behaviour or were exposed to discourse on it. While eight informants personally experienced discriminatory implementations in social life, five of them witnessed discriminatory behaviours or discourses directed to other people. The Kurds especially suffer from misperceptions of Kurds during hiring procedures. A male informant gives an example about prejudices of Kurds in the business life:

This was the subject of a conversation, they were talking freely as nobody knew I was Kurdish; people couldn't badmouth Kurds in the presence of someone from Diyarbakır. They can't anticipate that you can be Kurdish or that there are Kurds in your family. They think it's okay when the person is from Kırşehir. They start to badmouth Kurds. One day, in my friend's house, there was another friend. He was the head of a paint company, some officer. He said something by the by, he said "Kurds come here sometimes, but I don't employ them, I discriminate against them," and I reacted to this. That was a quite tense situation.<sup>230</sup>

3 male and 6 female informants stressed that they reacted when they experience or witness discriminatory behaviours contrary to one male and one female informant within the age groups of 18-30, who declared that they just got angry in such cases. Another male informant who is very emotional emphasizes that he revolts against discriminatory behaviours that he cannot stand anymore. Just one female informant within the age group of 30-60 declares that she would take legal action in such cases. Consequently, emotional and personal reactions are preferred against legal procedures.

Although discriminatory behaviours are common towards the Kurds in the region, it did not result in common self-hiding mechanisms among CAK about their identities. Other than two informants (one male within the age group of 18-30 and one female within the age group of 30-60), interviewees do not hide their identities in social

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<sup>230</sup> "Bir sohbette konusu geçmişti, kimse benim Kürt olduğumu bilmediği için benim yanımda rahat rahat konuşuyorlardı, insanlar bir Diyarbakırlının yanında Kürtlere rahat rahat atıp tutamıyorlar. Senin girdiğin ortamda, senin Kürt, senin ailede Kürt olduğunu tahmin edemiyorlar. Kırşehir falan filan deyince, çok fazla şey yapmıyorlar. Kürtlere atıp tutmaya başlıyorlar. Bir gün işte bir arkadaşımın evinde onun başka bir arkadaşı vardı. İşte, kendisi bir boya firmasının müdürüydü, bir şeyiydi, yetkili bir isimdi. İşte, "Kürtler geliyor bazen onlara iş vermiyorum falan filan, onları ayırıyorum falan" diye sohbet arasında gelişmişti, tepki göstermiştim. Bayağı gerilmiştik, öyle bir şey olmuştu."

relations. These two informants said that they hide their Kurdishness in just special time periods and cases; as a female informant explains: “We were hiding it sometimes during our elementary school times, but we don’t need to now. We were limiting ourselves back then because we were fresh from the village, considering whether we would get a reaction. But, if that were to happen now, I would stand against limiting myself.”<sup>231</sup> In addition, what one male informant says seems to show he hides his Kurdishness just when he has to face racist people, with whom he cannot argue. Overall, the Kurdishness of informants however becomes visible in their social life when discriminatory actions occur.

To sum up, CAK needed to migrate from rural to urban areas due to educational and economic reasons, which subsequently initiated the challenging process of their adaptation to urban life. After their migration, they faced problems maintaining social bonds with their relatives because of weakened ties arising from difficulties of coming together. During the adaptation process in urban areas, they were exposed to discriminatory behaviours arising from negative perceptions about Kurds that prevent cohesion between Kurds and Turks, as well as experiencing language problems. Because negative perceptions about Kurds still exist, CAK were alienated. Although social relations between Kurds and other groups are now stronger than before, they still cannot develop powerful social bonds with other groups as well as they can among themselves.

#### **4.3. The Dimension of Belonging/Isolation: The Issues of Identity and Language**

As the second dimension in the case of measuring social cohesion of CAK, domains of identity and mother tongue indicate how people balance between their identity and sense of values and majority groups’ without causing either assimilation of their own identity or total isolation of themselves from the majority group. Questioning how they define themselves and the groups to which they belong, how they differentiate themselves from other groups, what Kurdishness means to them, how they approach contours of ethnicity in their preferences, and how language impacts their identity is important to understand social cohesion/exclusion in this category.

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<sup>231</sup> “İlkokula filan giderken bazen saklıyorduk ama şimdi gerek duymuyoruz. O zamanlar biz yeni köyden gelmiştik acaba bir tepki gösterilir mi diye kısıtlıyorduk kendimizi. Ama şimdi olsa o kısıtlamaya karşı gelirim kendim.”

To begin with the domains of social cohesion related to the dimension of belonging/isolation, the issue of how people define themselves is very crucial to show their relation with identity. In the case of CAK discussed here, this issue changes from person to person. Ten informants equally distributed in two genders define themselves as Kurds, while the rest (two females within the age group of 30-60, one female within the age group of 18-30 and two males within the age group of 18-30) define themselves differently, such as “in the middle of Turkishness and Kurdishness,” “both Kurdish and Turkish,” “ethnically Kurdish but Turkish in general,” “Kurdish but a citizen of the Republic of Turkey” and “ethnically Kurdish but feeling Turkish.” In other words, they do not use a proper definition to describe their identity. Like Kurdishness, Turkishness seems to form an important part of their identity. According to an explanation of a female informant, Turkishness can have an even greater impact on the identity of a Kurdish person in the region: “I am Kurdish now, but as a Kurd, I am someone with complete Atatürkist thought. Do I feel Kurdish? I understand, but I can’t speak. Did I make any effort for this? I didn’t. Is it hard to live among Kurds? It is. Does it have advantages? I think generally I feel like a Turk.”<sup>232</sup> As another domain in this context, informants’ perception of Kurdishness and what Kurdishness means to them are other important issues determining their definitions of identity. Informants describe the Kurds as a different group of people, especially in the case of their language tradition. Nonetheless, as some informants stressed, Kurdishness was mixed with Turkishness as if forming an interwoven building stone. Interactions between Kurdishness and Turkishness, with Turkishness somehow dominating Kurdishness in the region, become concrete in these sentences of a male informant:

In fact it is a little different to be a Kurd in CA: we accept being assimilated, our language is lost; I think the generation after ours won’t speak Kurdish, not more than 30 sentences. What’s that, because of what we talked about, we talk about Turkish Kurdish. Both our economic concerns and new generation, well how can I put this, they don’t see being Kurdish as an identity, they’ve started to see it more like the race of their fathers. It has started to lose its respect. I live among Kurds, speak Turkish; I don’t have much to do with Kurdish. It’s like a fancy language; if you come across 3-5 Kurdish friends then you can speak Kurdish a little bit and have fun, otherwise Kurdish is not spoken much. It seems to be that the ones after us won’t speak it at all, that’s the case in our village.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> “Ben şu an Kürdüm ama Kürt olarak tamamen Atatürkçü düşünceye sahip bir insanım. Kendi Kürt gibi hissediyor muyum? Anlıyorum ama konuşmıyorum. Bunun için herhangi bir çabam oldu mu? Olmadı. Kürtler arasındaki yaşam zor mu zor. Güzellikleri var mı var. Genel olarak ben kendimi sanırım Türk gibi hissediyorum.”

<sup>233</sup> “Kürt, İç Anadolu bölgesinde Kürt olmak aslında biraz ayrıcalıklı, asimile olduğumuzu kabul ediyoruz, dilimiz kayboldu, bizden sonraki nesil herhalde 30 cümle üzerinde Kürtçe bilmez. O da

For the case of CAK, it seems that Kurdishness has different connotations because of its existence under a majority ethnicity with other subsequent ethnicities in the region for centuries. Interactions between Kurdishness and Turkishness impact how informants define and perceive Kurdishness. It is obvious from the explanations of informants that approximately one third of informants stress they are under the effect of both Kurdishness and Turkishness. Because a considerable amount of the Kurdish population has been living under the effect of Turkishness for centuries, it is not surprising that informants describe themselves as being influenced by both ethnic groups. As a female informant within the age group of 18-30 implies, language is the most prominent element under the effect of Turkishness, which can be considered the majority ethnicity in the region. It is also one of the factors differentiating the Kurdish population in the region from the Kurds in the Eastern part of Turkey:

Here's the thing, living in CA is a little different. I can find myself very different from my friends from Diyarbakır. In terms of language and customs, there is a point at which the language started to turn into Turkish; among CAK the most important element of culture is the language and it started to meld into Turkish, a common language and a common culture are emerging. Turkish-Kurdish marriages, in my opinion, are more common among CAK because there is a mixed environment now. Therefore I can compare it to many regions and I can relate it to geography. For instance, Kırşehir Kurds and, say, Haymana Kurds are different from one another. I know this but it doesn't occur to me until now that there are still many differences between Kurds. We can find many similarities with, say, Adıyaman Kurds, maybe because our ancestors migrated from there and there are things that they preserved. But for another instance, we may not find common ground with a Diyarbakır Kurd. This is something, I think, that the time Kurds and Turks have spent together caused.<sup>234</sup>

Although informants insist that Turkish influenced Kurdish spoken in the region too much and even somehow Turkified it, Burhan Sönmez, a Kurdish author from Haymana, argues the exact opposite. From his perspective, based on his observations in the region, Kurdish spoken in the villages of CA is more original and unaffected

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nedir, Kürtçe konuşmadığımızdan, Türkçe konuştuğumuzdan dolayı. Hem ekonomik kaygılarımız, hem de yeni nesil pek, yani ne diyeyim, nasıl diyeyim, Kürtlüğü bir kimlik olarak görmüyor, daha çok böyle bir işte babanın ırkı gibi görmeye başladı. Çok fazla saygı duyulmamaya başladı. Kürtlerin içinde yaşıyorum Türkçe konuşuyorum, Kürtçe pek işim olmuyor. Şey olmuş, fantezi dili olmuş, 3-5 Kürt arkadaş bulursan, 3-5 Kürtçe konuşup eğlendikleri bir şey gibi, çok fazla Kürtçe konuşulmuyor artık. Bizden sonrakiler hiç konuşmayacak gibi geliyor bana, bizim köyde öyle.”

<sup>234</sup> “Şöyle bir şey var, ben biraz daha Orta Anadolu'da olmak biraz farklı bir şey ben kendimi Diyarbakırlı arkadaşımından çok farklı bulabiliyorum. Dil bakımından, gelenek görenek bakımından dilin de Türkçeleşmeye başladığı bir nokta var orta Anadolu Kürtlerinde bence kültürün en önemli ögesi Türkçeleşmeye başladığında şey oluyor hani ortak bir dil kuruluyor, kültürler de ortaklaşabiliyor. Türk-Kürt evlilikleri benim tahminimce Orta Anadolu Kürtlerinde daha yoğun çünkü artık böyle bir mix bir ortam oluşmuş. Dolayısıyla çoğu bölgelere benzetebilirim, coğrafyaya bağlayabilirim. Atıyorum Kırşehir Kürtleriyle ne bileyim bir Haymana Kürtleri birbirinden farklı bunu biliyorum, şu an aklıma gelmez ama Kürt'le Kürt arasında da çok fark var. Atıyorum bir Adıyaman Kürt'üyle çok ortak nokta bulabiliriz, belki atalarımız oradan göçtüğü için hala bunları korudukları, sakladıkları şeyler var. Mesela Diyarbakır Kürt'üyle de ortak nokta bulamayabiliyoruz. Hani bu bence, hani Türklerin Kürtlerle birlikte yaşadığı coğrafyada geçirdiği süreyle oluşturduğu bir şey.”

contrary to Kurdish commonly spoken in the Eastern part of Turkey. The region created a safe zone for the Kurdish language because CAK had to preserve their cultural aspects to ensure that they did not have another struggle towards assimilation. Nonetheless, he accepts that under the current situation Kurdish language is under the effect of Turkish influences in urban areas. The effect of Turkishness makes more sense with the fact that all informants claimed that their elders were defining themselves as totally Kurdish. In other words, while CAK were living in rural areas, they were feeling less effects of Turkishness. To sum up, there may be other results when investigating current situations in villages beyond the scope of this study.

As an interesting detail, some informants also complain about misperceptions dependent on perceiving Kurds as a single unit and instead differentiating themselves from the Kurds in the Eastern part of Turkey. A male informant complained about associating the Kurds with The Kurdistan Workers' Party-PKK (*Kürdistan İşçi Partisi-PKK*). Another female informant also said that she got annoyed of Kurds' support for the PKK and the association of the PKK with all Kurds. From the male informant's perspective, CAK are more willing to get along well with the state because Kurdish identity is secondary for them:

To be honest, CAK see themselves as a minority, but I see us as Turkish. Because one Kurd feels like a minority among 5 Turks, that's true. There is an image, sometimes a rumor, sometimes an opinion, that Kurds are bad and all. Typically, Kurds are uncomfortable with this, since this viewpoint of Kurds generally has to do with the PKK after these incidents in the East. Even people that don't have anything to do with that are stigmatized as well. Turks say, "They are Kurds, they support PKK," every time. There is a prejudgment, even if someone lacks any connection to the PKK, because he was stigmatized once. There are times when we go through adversity, but because we do not have a structure, and we built our relations on getting along - I am speaking for my own society - we sometimes laugh away things like this, we sometimes don't mind. This is also something religiously serious. Islam does not accept racism so it would be accurate to say that Kurdish identity is of second priority for us.<sup>235</sup>

Although CAK' perceptions about the PKK are not asked to informants directly, three informants insisted that they did not have a positive view of the PKK and its

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<sup>235</sup> "Vallahi, İç Anadolu Kürdü kendini azınlık gibi görür ama Türkiyelidir diye düşünüyorum ben. Çünkü 5 tane Türkün içinde bir Kürt kendini azınlık hissediyor, o bir gerçek. Biri imaj var, bazen söylenti, bazen görüntü, Kürtler kötüdür, şudur. Genelde bu Doğu olaylarından sonra Kürtlere bakış tarzları genelde PKK üzerinden yürüdüğü için Kürtler de bundan rahatsız. Hiç işi olmayan adamlar da bu damgayı yedi. Türkler en basit bir şeyde, bunlar "Kürt'tür, PKK'lıdır." PKK'yla alakası olmasa da o damgayı yediği için bir önyargı var. Sıkıntı yaşadığımız zamanlar oluyor ama şey bir yapıya sahip olmadığımız için, genelde iyi geçinme üzerine bir şeyimiz olduğu için, ben kendi topluluğum için söylüyorum yani böyle şeylere bazen gülüp geçiyoruz, bazen değer vermiyoruz. Dinsel de bunun ağır bir şeyi var, Müslümanlık çünkü ırkçılığı kabul etmiyor, onun için bizim için Kürt kimliği aslında 2. sırada dersek daha doğru olur."

armed struggle. In conjunction with this issue, Kurds are defined by informants as peaceful people, who avoid conflicts: ‘bravery,’ ‘respectfulness,’ ‘being gentle to family elders,’ ‘hospitality,’ and ‘reliability’ are the main qualities of Kurdish people from the eyes of informants. No informant used negative adjectives to define Kurds. However, three informants underlined that every ethnic group contains good and bad natured people separate from its own aspects. As a male informant emphasized, the Kurds are perceived as patriotic people, who have been deceived by politicians: “For instance, Kurds and Turks warred back to back in the past and there was no discrimination like this, no alienation; polarization happened. They lived together. Political speeches nowadays are all for schemes, profit, and political interest.”<sup>236</sup> Thus, except for their different languages, both groups arguably have similar lifestyles that make them closer in their social lives. Nevertheless, two female informants within the age group of 30-60 thought that CAK became different in the case of moral values observed in daily life, such as crossing legs in front of family elders, smoking cigarettes near them, or treating them in a respectful manner. According to these two informants, the Kurds are quite careful to obey moral values, contrary to the Turks. Another female informant, despite these two informants, said the exact opposite:

Let me tell you this. I’ve lived in Dikmen for 6 years and in the same building and my neighbors were Turkish. Now I live here with my mother, her neighbors are all Kurdish. Not a single Turk resides in this building. Not in Block A nor in B. All of them are Kurdish. If you ask the difference between them, I have still not gotten used to it here. In Dikmen, everyone lived in their own house happily and comfortably, no one disturbs one another there. But here, women sit on the pavement in the middle of the street, they bluster and kids squabble... It’s a literal street ambience, nothing else. Conflicts in the building, clamor during day and night - I mean there is no respect, and people don’t respect one another. No one even knows what respect means.<sup>237</sup>

Even if informants see the Turks and Kurds as two groups interwoven together, the perception of the state’s different attitude towards these groups finds voice in a male informant’s statement: “The difference between the two is a bit like the state’s naughty boy, I mean it is viewed as that. It’s like as if you do something wrong, the

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<sup>236</sup> “Yani mesela geçmişte Kürtler Türkler sırt sırta savaşmış böyle bir ayrımcılık olmamış, ötekileştirme, kutuplaşma olmamış, hep bir arada yaşamışlar. Şimdiki siyasi söylemler oyun, çıkar, menfaat siyasi çıkarlar için.”

<sup>237</sup> “Ben şöyle aktarayım; ben Dikmen’de yaşadım 6 yıl boyunca ve aynı binada yaşadım ve tüm komşularım Türk’tü. Şu an burada annemle yaşıyorum, annemin Kürt komşuları; hepsi Kürt. Tek bir Türk yok bu binada. A blokta da yok B blokta da yok. Hepsi Kürt. Aradaki farkı sorarsan ben buraya hala alışmış değilim. Mesela ben Dikmen’de kendi evimde herkes huzurlu bir şekilde kendi evinde kimse kimseyi rahatsız etmez, kimse kimsenin sesini duymaz. Ama burada; buranın kadınları sokak ortasında kaldırımda oturuyorlar, bağıra çağıra konuşmalar, çocukların didişmesi. Tam bir sokak havası, başka hiçbir şey değil. Bina içindeki çatışmalar, gece olsun gündüz olsun bağırış çağırış, yani bir saygı yok, insanların birbirine saygısı yok. Saygının ne demek olduğunu bilen yok.”



state pulls your ear like a punishment. It's not like this when you're Kurdish. Being Kurdish is very different. They directly try to destroy you, assimilate you and even kill you."<sup>238</sup> As aforementioned in previous parts of this study, CAK were exposed to discriminatory behaviors not only just from the state, as this informant says, but also from other groups in their social lives. Despite all discriminatory experiences, the fact comes in view as a general pattern that informants construct their identity by seeing themselves as a part of Turkey. Even people who define themselves totally as Kurds and detach themselves from Turks see the Kurds equally with other ethnic groups as a part of Turkey. A female informant says: "No. Never have I myself felt like a minority. I think this is something offensive, after all there are many Kurds living in the East or Southeast. They live in CA as well, which my friends find very strange; they ask, 'Are there Kurds in Kırşehir?' But I've never myself felt like a minority. I was born here, grew up here, this land belongs to me as well."<sup>239</sup> Moreover, some informants said that they were aware that some Kurdish and Turkish nationalists tried to antagonize the Turks and Kurds against each other and make the Kurds perceive themselves as a minority. To sum up, informants are inclined to believe and feel that they themselves totally belong to this country.

A strong interaction between Turkish and Kurdish identity arises in preferences of being together with Turks and Kurds in social life. However, as is understood from interviews, there is not a common pattern in this case. While some informants prefer to work and be friends with Kurds in their life - because they feel more comfortable with them - approximately two thirds of informants counter this argument by declaring that Turkishness or Kurdishness does not have any effect on their preferences. Even more politicized Kurds do not differentiate between people in social relations. As a female informant implies:

For example, in the site I reside now, my 2 neighbors in the building, how can I put this... The site is composed of 32 households. Maybe six of them are Kurds. The rest are Turks, but there have never been any problems. That is, I had an emergency at 3 o'clock in the morning, I had someone who got sick and I could have very easily knocked on any of my neighbors' doors. If I knock on my Turkish neighbor's door and tell them that my mother is sick and I live with her

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<sup>238</sup> "İkisi arasındaki fark Türkler biraz şey devletin böyle yaramaz çocuğu gibi o şekilde gibi görülüyor. Sanki bir kabahat işlesen kulağımı çekiyor ceza gibi, kenara oturturuyor. Kürt olduğunda böyle olmuyor. Kürtlük çok farklı oluyor. Direk seni yok etmeye, işte asimile etmeye, yeri geliyor öldürmeye."

<sup>239</sup> "Yok. Asla, asla yok hayır ben asla bir azınlık olarak hissetmedim. Bu bence kırıcı bir şey, sonuçta Doğu'da, güneydoğuda yaşayan bir sürü Kürt var. İç Anadolu'da yaşayan var, arkadaşların çok tuhafına gidiyor, "Kırşehir'de Kürt var mı aa?" diyorlar ama ya ben asla kendimi azınlık olarak hissetmedim. Burada doğdum, büyüdüm, topraklar da bana ait."

and I need a car urgently, they would all come running and help. The Kurd-Turk conflict may be defended politically and we argue different things politically, but like I said, interpersonal relationships are something else. I would succor no matter what, and they surely would too, even if it's 3 am.<sup>240</sup>

Regarding preferences of being with Kurds or other ethnic groups, it is understood from informants that they are more distant from other emigrated groups, such as those from the Balkans and Caucasia. As understood from the thoughts of informants, Balkan emigrants and Circassians do not have good relations with Kurds, contrary to the Turks and Tartars. In other words, Kurds and these emigrated groups were not in contact too often because of these groups' being more nationalist. A female informant says she is bothered by the attitudes of the Circassians when they are talking about Kurdish demands for education in their mother tongue. According to her statement, the Circassians say that if *they* do not demand mother tongue language education, neither should the Kurds. Another male informant suggests that their nationalist attitudes damage relations between these groups, as below:

Among these, the actual Turks are closer to us. That is, immigrants to Turkey, Bosnians, they are the real nationalists. There is no problem with actual Turks. They are closer to us. Because we have intermarried with them. We have mixed up with them. Their customs are closer to ours, especially the Laz. Their customs are identical to that of Kurds'. But there are ones that we call muhajir (immigrant) and Bosnians that have later immigrated to Turkey. They're more nationalist.<sup>241</sup>

The issue of Kurdish naming is another case that contributes to the issue of belonging. Other than one informant, who prefers a religious name rather than a Kurdish one, all informants have positive thoughts about giving a Kurdish name to their children. Among informants who already have children, five of eight informants declare that they gave a Kurdish name to their children. More than two thirds of informants experienced, observed, or heard that giving Kurdish names to children created problems in public institutions and other areas. Informants with Kurdish

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<sup>240</sup> “Yani benim mesela şuan oturduğum sitede benim oturduğum kattaki iki komşum üst komşularım yani nasıl diyim sitede 32 haneden oluşuyor. Belki altı tanesi Kürttür. Geri kalanı Türk ama hiçbir zaman yani bir sorun olmadı. Yani gecenin üçünde benim acil bir işim oldu sorunum oldu hastam oldu bir şey oldu yani çok rahatlıkla gidip herhangi bir komşumun kapısını çaldım. Türk komşumun kapısını çalsam işte benim annem hasta annemle yaşıyorum işte acil arabaya ihtiyacım var desem hepsi koşarak gelir yani hani o Türk Kürt olayı belki siyasal anlamda savunuluyor, farklı şeyleri savunuyoruz siyasi anlamda ama insani ilişkilerde diyorum ya gecenin üçü de olsa oda koşar bende koşarım kesinlikle.”

<sup>241</sup> “Bunlar içinde gerçek Türk olanlar bize daha yakın. Yani sonradan Türkiye'ye göç eden muhacirler, Boşnaklar asıl milliyetçiliği yapanlar onlar. Gerçek Türklere bir sorun yok. Onlar bize daha bir yakın. Çünkü biz onlara kız verdik onlar da bizden kız aldı. Karışık gittik. Bize daha yakın, örf adet görenekler. Hele de Lazlar. Örf adet göreneklere bizim Kürtlerden hiç farkı yok aynı. Ama o muhacir dediğimiz, Boşnak dediğimiz sonradan Türkiye'ye göç edenler var. Onlar daha çok milliyetçilik yapıyor.”

names had also frequently faced problems in the past. Even if there is a general perception that these problems stayed in the past, informants express that such problems still exist and are more likely to continue in the future. A female informant gives a recent example on the issue: "Our sister Berivan, for example, is a teacher. She uses the alias 'Perihan.' Why? Because the name Berivan is a Kurdish name. Official records say she is Perihan but we call her Berivan. There are a lot of people like that around me. Moreover, my aunt has changed her name; her name was also Berivan and she made it Berna. Yes, she had experienced various problems so she changed her name to Berna; it wasn't long ago, she did it around 2 years ago."<sup>242</sup> Although there is awareness regarding the risks of discrimination because of having Kurdish names, informants view giving their children a name from their native language as a right.

The issue of native language, is also seen as the most important aspect of Kurdishness for CAK. However, increasing levels of education resulting from migration from rural to urban areas decreased Kurdish knowledge, especially among youth born in urban environments. The rate of Kurdish speaking and comprehension among Kurdish-origin people in the region has decreased significantly in the last forty years.<sup>243</sup> All of the informants who took part in this study declared that they speak Turkish very well in comparison to Kurdish, which used to even be the native language of some of them during their childhood. Nevertheless, now 15 informants speak fluently in Turkish in contrast to Kurdish. As a female informant's statement exemplifies "Turkish in daily life, unfortunately. I forgot my own language; every now and then I talk to my mom and father and I can reply when they ask me something, but I cannot speak Kurdish as fluently as I speak Turkish. This saddens me a lot."<sup>244</sup> As another male informant mentions, they speak a 'primitive level' of Kurdish without being able to speak fluently. Kurdish is now just used among people who are middle aged and is used solely for communication with their family members. Seven informants within the age group of 30-60 and one female informant

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<sup>242</sup> "Berivan abla, öğretmen mesela. Perihan adını kullanıyor. Neden? Berivan ismi Kürt ismi olduğu için. Resmi olarak kayıtlarda Perihan diye geçiyor ama biz Berivan diyoruz. Çevremde böyle çok kişi var. Hatta yengem ismini değiştirdi, onun adı da Berivan'dı o da Berna yaptı. Evet, çeşitli sıkıntılar yaşıyordu o yüzde Berivan adını değiştirdi Berna yaptı ve daha yeni oldu 1-2 yıl içinde filan oldu."

<sup>243</sup> Nuh Ateş, "Orta Anadolu'da Kürt Gerçeği ve Kurumlaşma", *Bîrnebûn*, Summer 2001, no. 13, p. 28.

<sup>244</sup> "Günlük hayatta Türkçe maalesef. Kendi dilimi unutmuşum arada sırada annemle konuşuyorum, babamla konuşuyorum, onlar sorduğunda cevap verebiliyorum ama Türkçeyi akıcı konuşabiliyorum ya, Kürtçeyi konuşamıyorum. Bu da beni bayağı bir üzüyor."

within the age group of 18-30 say that they use Kurdish whenever they come together with their family members.

As mentioned in previous sections, informants who were born and spent their childhood in rural areas initially had problems when they migrated to urban areas arising from difficulties in communication with Turkish people. Even if their native language was Kurdish, they had to forget it to learn Turkish for their education. As one male informant expresses “Because we’ve learned Turkish by killing Kurdish, we can no longer get our tongues around Kurdish. Turkish is more comfortable since we speak Turkish for everything in some situations. I can’t express myself in Kurdish anymore.”<sup>245</sup> All informants within the age group of 30-60 were raised in an environment in which all elders and family members spoke Kurdish as a native language. However, as a common pattern, those within the age group of 18-30 were exposed to Turkish and Kurdish at varying rates during their childhood, but Turkish gained an edge over Kurdish after starting to attend school. One of the reasons that this age group does not know Kurdish properly is the lack of speaking practice in their childhood resulting from the attitudes of their parents. A male informant tells:

My parents taught me Turkish for me to avoid troubles and ostracisation due to the political conditions of that time. I’ve learned Kurdish on my own effort. Maybe others are like me too; those who learned Kurdish later in life or those who can understand but can’t speak. And there is this group of people, we can understand but can’t speak. They know themselves, their Kurdish identity, but they feel more like Turks or in between.<sup>246</sup>

From the expressions and feelings of informants during interviews, it can be observed that speaking Turkish properly is one of the main concerns of informants for their children. A female informant says about teaching Kurdish to their children, “When one speaks Kurdish, his Turkish regresses; it’s better he speaks just Turkish.”<sup>247</sup> Another female informant claims that her father had the same concern during her childhood: “Usually it was spoken Kurdish, but my father suggested that we speak Turkish because we were going to school, for us to get better grades.”<sup>248</sup> In

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<sup>245</sup> “Zaten Kürtçeyi öldürerek Türkçe öğrendiğimiz için artık biraz da dilimiz de dönmüyor artık. Bazı şeylerde, her şeyi de Türkçe konuştuğumuz için Türkçe daha rahat. Kürtçe ’de kendimi ifade edemiyorum artık.”

<sup>246</sup> “Ailem okula başlarken zorluk çekmeyeyim diye, dışlanmayım diye, dönemin siyasi koşulları gereğince de bana önce Türkçeyi öğretti. Ben Kürtçeyi kendi çabamla öğrendim. Belki dışarıdan benim durumumdakiler genelde böyle işte, Kürtçeyi sonradan öğrenenler ya da anlayıp konuşamayanlar. Bir de öyle bir kesim var anlıyoruz ama konuşamıyoruz. Onlar kendilerini evet Kürtlüklerini biliyorlar ama kendilerini daha Türk ya da arada hissediyorlar.”

<sup>247</sup> “Ya şimdi Kürtçeyi konuştuğu zaman Türkçesi bozuluyor direkt Türkçe konuşması daha iyi.”

<sup>248</sup> “Genellikle Kürtçe konuşulurdu ama okula gittiğimiz için babam bize Türkçe konuşmamızı tavsiye ederdi. Notlarımız daha güzel olsun diye.”

other words, speaking Turkish more than Kurdish did not arise merely from pressure in schools, but also emerged from internal pressures of parents to not cause their children to be excluded from society.

Another platform, through which informants maintain their relations with the Kurdish language, is the media. TRT Kurdî is the most popular TV channel among informants followed by Rudaw, Mezopotamya, Sterk, and Zarok TV. Even if it is not broadcasting in Kurdish, IMC TV was also mentioned in the answers of informants. According to responses, four female informants - distributed equally within the age groups of 18-30 and 30-60 - declared that they do not follow Kurdish TV or newspapers.

As another issue, the lack of being able to communicate in Kurdish disconnected younger people from their elders and resulted in their inability to understand them. Nearly all informants tell their memoirs of one of their elders who do not know Turkish and have problems in their life because of it. This is not just an issue of language; it also inhibits people from handing down traditions and personal memoirs to the next generation. As a male informant expresses:

Now, because my grandparents don't know Turkish, I can't produce memories about them in my memory. That is, how do you remember a person? You recall them from what they said and the things they said to you get imprinted on your mind and you recall them. You know what people say, 'My mother used to say this, my father that, my grandpa this.' I don't say this, because I didn't understand what they were saying; so, yes, there was an incapability to establish a bond between us. He spoke Kurdish at home, I didn't know what he thought on which subject; one shares their thoughts with those around them even while watching news on TV, but that was not possible for us. My grandma had no means to share her thoughts on events, so I don't recall anything she said; it is a very vague memory for me even though I was as old as 14 when my grandma died. I remember how she walked and moved around the house, but I don't have anything about what she thought, what kind of attitude she had, whether she was kind or rude, if she was wise or enlightened, because we never communicated.<sup>249</sup>

It is beyond doubt that even if informants give high importance to speaking Turkish very well, they also want their children to learn Kurdish to be able to be aware of

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<sup>249</sup> “Şimdi dedemin, babaannemin Türkçe bilmemesiyle kaynaklı benim onlarla ilgili hatıra belleğimde anılar oluşmuyor. Mesela bir insanla nasıl hatırlarsa mesela, söylediklerinden hatırlarsın, onun sana söylediği şeyler zihnine kazınır, onlar sen aklında tutarsın. İnsanlar derler ya, “annem şöyle derdi, babam böyle derdi, dedem böyle derdi” benim öyle bir şeyim yok çünkü dediklerinden hiçbir şey anlamıyordum, öyle bir bağ kuramama olayı vardı bizde. O Kürtçe konuşuyordu evde, hangi konuda ne düşündüğünü bilmiyordum mesela, insan aynı evde oturduğun kişi bir haber programını bile izlerken kendi düşüncelerin onunla birlikte söyler, paylaşır evinde oturan insanlarla, öyle bir imkân yoktu. Olaylara karşı düşüncesini paylaşabilme imkânı yoktu, onun için benim hatıramda onların söylediği bir söz yok mesela çok siliik geliyor bana hâlbuki babaannem öldüğünde 14 yaşında filandım, yaşım da vardı. Babaannemin yürüyüşünü, evde nasıl hareket ettiğini hatırlıyorum ama ne düşündüğünü, nasıl bir tavrı olduğunu, kaba ya da nazik bir insan mıydı, bilgili bir insan mıydı, aydın bir insan mıydı, bunlarla ilgili hiçbir şeyim yok, çünkü iletişime geçmişliğimiz yok.”

their Kurdish identity. Because members of the last generation do not know Kurdish properly as aforementioned, some informants within the age group of 30-60 regret not being able to teach Kurdish to their children. One of the male informants says:

Well, I haven't. But I regret it. I didn't think, I wish I had taught them. And I didn't have the environment to teach it. I would want their mother tongues to be Turkish even if I spoke Kurdish to them. That's why I didn't speak at first and then I had no chance. I didn't think. It became a routine. We couldn't help it. I mean, I didn't have any bad intention, but when I look at the events of the last years, when I see the reactions of some groups towards Kurds and Kurdish, I wish that I had taught my children Kurdish just as an act of defiance.<sup>250</sup>

When it comes to the issue of native language education, CAK identify two important related problems. First, some informants mix up learning Kurdish as one part of their education or being educated in Kurdish instead of Turkish. Even if the difference between these two situations is explained, some informants are still confused. It is obvious that informants prefer that their children learn Kurdish as a second language, rather than as a native language. In other words, they do not support the idea of education in Kurdish. Also, speaking Kurdish in public spaces is another issue because of discriminatory behaviors to which Kurds were exposed. Predominantly informants admit that they used to refrain from speaking Kurdish in public spaces because of negative reactions towards them. Additionally some of them say that they continue to refrain from speaking Kurdish in public spaces.

In light of this information in the dimension of belonging/isolation, it is evident that CAK are exposed to Turkishness, which shapes the contours of their ethnic identity. A pattern towards describing themselves in the middle of Turkishness and Kurdishness shows how they have been affected by the majority ethnicity in the region. Even if they differentiate Turkishness and Kurdishness on traditional issues - one of which is language - it is obvious that Kurdish spoken in the region was even influenced a lot by Turkish and even informants whose native language was Kurdish in their childhood declared they are now more fluent in Turkish. Despite being a group exposed to ethnic discrimination because of their names and language, CAK have a strong sense of belonging to the country and region. In other words, despite all the problems they experienced, they see themselves as a part of the region.

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<sup>250</sup> "Valla öğretmedim. Ama pişmanım. Keşke öğreseydim diye düşünmüyordum. Hem öğretecek ortam da yoktu. Hani kendi imkanlarımla onlarla Kürtçe konuşsaydım ben aslında ilk andillerinin Türkçe olmasını istedim. O yüzden konuşmadım ilk başta sonra da imkanım olmadı. Düşünmedim. Öyle bir alışkanlık oldu gitti. Şey yapmadık. Yani herhangi bir maksadım yoktu ama şu son yıllardaki olaylara baktığımda bazı halkın değil de bazı belirli kesimlerin Kürde ve Kürtçeye karşı tepkilerini görünce keşke ben de çocuklarıma Kürtçe öğreseydim inatlaşma gibi bir şey oluyor."

#### **4.4. The Dimension of Legitimacy/Illegitimacy: Associations with Political Parties, State Institutions, and Other Organizational Structures**

The last dimension within the context of social cohesion is about relations with political and institutional foundations. Questioning CAK about their political and institutional belongings helps gather information about their political choices, perceptions towards state institutions, and their experiences regarding interactions with them, which is quite important to understand associations of CAK on the political/institutional level. Actually, as is declared in the introduction chapter, this issue was the topic about which informants had the most difficult time speaking, due to the dominating political atmosphere both before and after the general elections. It should be admitted that if this research were conducted at another period, the results might be different than the existing ones.

As the first domain of this dimension, informants were asked regarding their membership in any political parties, non-governmental institutions, unions, and foundations. In light of informants' expressions, other than two women within the age group of 30-60 and one male within the age group of 18-30, there are no informants who have affiliations with any kind of institutions. Two female informants are members, respectively of the Republican People's Party (RPP) and the Education and Science Workers' Union (Eğitim-Sen), and the male informant is a member of the Justice and Development Party (JDP). The female informant who is a member of the RPP says that she resigned from the party because of a concern about her children's futures as they look for jobs after graduation. The female informant who is a member of Eğitim-Sen admits that she is a member of the union just because circumstances demand it. The male informant says he wants to resign from the JDP, as he is not supporting it anymore. In other words, informants do not have strong associations with any organizations.

All informants who took part in this study declared that they vote in general and local elections. Informants' expectations from political parties were categorized with preference for 'equality,' 'justice,' 'transparency,' 'honesty,' and finally economic welfare. However, it is obvious that two thirds of informants are of the opinion that politicians do not keep their promises most of the time. Thus, it can be said that they do not trust political parties even though they vote for them. A male informant reasons: "I don't expect too much, and parties don't give us anything either. We vote

just because we want to see some people in the parliament. But I am sure it will not change anything. Political parties all sound the same, I don't attach importance to them because I've never seen that they've changed anything."<sup>251</sup> Additionally, it should be said that while they are voting, the ideology of the party comes into prominence during general elections more than in local elections. Interestingly, a male informant says he voted for the National Movement Party (NMP) in the last local elections because of the well-being and trustworthiness of the candidate, even if the ideology of the party is quite distant from his values. A female informant within the age group of 18-30 exemplifies more pragmatic expectations during local elections: "I think rationally when I vote, especially while voting for local elections. It might be seen as pragmatism or pessimism by some but why would I approach a mayoral election ideologically? Whoever cleans the street I pass through, for example, will get my vote. Or I vote for whoever abolishes the tuition fee."<sup>252</sup> Pragmatism in local elections is less frequently observed than in general elections. In these elections, the ideology of political parties becomes more important. Additionally, expectations from the parties are more abstract and general in these elections. As aforementioned, 'equality,' 'justice,' 'transparency,' and 'honesty' in addition to economic welfare seem to be quite important for informants.

Informants were also asked whether being represented in the Assembly is important or not. According to answers to this question, people feel like they are more represented after the PDP's entry into the Assembly as a party with 80 representatives. It is observed that the PDP's vote gathered in the last election creates excitement among informants. Eleven informants declare the PDP as the party to which they feel closest among all other parties. Beyond these informants, one female within the age group of 30-60 did not want to answer this question, one male informant within the age group of 18-30 admits he feels closer to Kurdish-Islamist parties without giving a name, one female informant within the age group of 18-30 does not feel close to any political party, and one female informant within the age

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<sup>251</sup> "Çok fazla beklentim yok, partilerin pek bize verdiği bir şey de yok. Gider, işte sırf oyumuzu kullandığımız, birilerini orada görmek istediğimiz için. Ama bir şey değişmeyeceğine eminim yani. Siyasi partiler, hep aynı şeyleri söylediğine fark, hayatta farklı bir şey değiştirdiğini görmediğim için önemsemem yani."

<sup>252</sup> "Ben oy verirken rasyonel düşünürüm, özellikle yerel seçimlerde. Belki biraz pragmatizm ve bazıları tarafından kötü de algılanabilir ama bir belediye seçimine neden ideolojik yaklaşayım? Benim geçtiğim sokağı kim temizliyorsa atıyorum ona oy veririm. Ya da ben üniversite harçlarını kim kaldırırım diyorsa ona oy veririm."



group of 30-60 feels closest to the JDP even though she voted for the RPP in the last election. In other words, it is seen in the field that informants favor the PDP even if most of them - other than three informants - admit that they had not voted for Kurdish parties before. One male informant indicates:

I have voted for Recep Tayyip Erdogan for 3 election periods. Because of his statements regarding Kurds. For his resolution process, and approach towards the Kurdish problem, I've voted for AKP for 3 periods of election. But when I look again at the last two periods, it's not convincing anymore. His abolishment policy and promised pledges are not working and he even thwarts his own resolution process. Because it's not convincing for me anymore, the only party I find myself close to is Peoples' Democratic Party-PDP (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi-HDP*).<sup>253</sup>

The PDP is seen as more sincere than other political parties regarding its representation of the Kurds. Its discourse is seen as associative for all groups in Turkey. One male informant exemplifies it: "Because I believe it represents all the people, the oppressed and the sufferers, I was quite touched by that aspect of the party. I mean, I chose PDP because it claims it represents people who have been oppressed religiously, economically, educationally, and I believe them."<sup>254</sup> Another male informant associates PDP's associative discourse with the excitement created among people during the AK Party's first period. It is obvious that even if people do not trust political parties too much, they are hopeful about the PDP's future and believe that it will do a good job in the Assembly. One male informant gives an example about the associative power of PDP as follows:

PDP is like a savior party, it's a party of peace that will fix everything; that is, the people view it that way. A lot of people who don't defend PDP follow their work closely and they defend their good sides. "I hope they can go on doing that." That's what he says, the man is enrolled under grey wolves. I've seen it with my own eyes. And there is this guy, a member of the Turkish Educational Union, but he listens to what the man says and defends admirably, but he might not defend that party. But the party leader is listened to, because he is believed; we already hope that he will shine his own light as Erdogan did once.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> "Mesela ben 3 dönem Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a oy verdim. Kendisine bu Kürt söylemleri için. Yapacağı işte çözüm süreci, Kürt sorununu çözeceğine dair söylemlerinden dolayı, 3 dönem ben AK Parti'ye oy verdim. Ama son iki dönemde bakıyorum inandırıcı değil artık. Kandırma politikası, verilen sözler yerine gelmiyor hatta kendisinin başlattığı çözüm sürecine karşı geliyor. Bana göre inandırıcılığı kalmadığı için ben artık tek yakın olarak gördüğüm HDP."

<sup>254</sup> "Bütün insanları, ezilenleri, mağdurları temsil ettiğine inandığım için o yönü beni çok etkiledi. Yani dini yönden baskı görenleri, ekonomik yönden baskı görenleri, eğitim yönünden baskı görenleri, toplumda ezilen kitleleri temsil ettiğini iddia için ben de buna inandığım için HDP'yi seçtim."

<sup>255</sup> HDP içinde böyle sanki bir kurtuluş partisi her şeyi düzeltecek bir barış partisi yani halk bu göz ile bakıyor. Benim bir sürü HDP yi savunmayan insan onların çalışmalarını çok yakından takip ediyor ve güzel yani savunuyorlar. İnşallah bunu devam ettirebilirler. Bunu söylüyor yani adam ülkü ocaklarına kayıtlı. Buna kendi gözlerimle şahit oldum yani. Adam öyle Türk Eğitim-Sen üyesi ama adamın konuştuğu şeyleri savundukları şeyleri hayranlıkla dinliyorlar belki o partiyi savunmuyor. Ama doğruluğuna inandığı için dinleniyor zaten hani inşallah olur diyor hani böyle bir zamanlar Erdoğan'ın parlaklığı gibi inşallah onun ışığı olacak yani."

One female, who sees the PDP as the representative of the Kurds in the Assembly and who voted for them for this reason, makes the statement:

What makes PDP close to me is that you know Kurds' oppressed identity, well I don't know, I've really wanted Kurdish deputies to sit at parliament with their Kurdish identity. Ever since I was little, since I voted. It's a beautiful thing that they obtained 80 chairs in this election. You know what they say, I can't stand anymore seeing Kurds get oppressed and marginalized. Let Kurds voices be heard, too. There is a Kurdish fact in the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia. Turkey should accept this now, not ignore it. You know, they should help those regions either. You know what they say, 'we've built this number of schools and that number of hospitals'. None of my teacher friends wants to be appointed to the East or Southeast. Why is it so? Why? I want to these issues to be debated in the Parliament. Hence I sympathize with PDP.<sup>256</sup>

Favoring the PDP in the region can also be observed during meetings and other events. As a part of this study, before the general elections, the 16th Central Anatolia's Haymanian People's Hıdırellez Festival (*16. Emin Şahiya Xıdırelyas A Gelên Anatolya Ya Navîn A Haymana*) was participated in to observe people's reactions to the PDP, since the festival is organized by PDP and previous parties in line with it. First, people regularly participating in the organization say that the crowd at the festival site showed people's increasing demands of the party. Especially younger people participating in the festival were very fervent in their support of the party. MP candidates of the party in Ankara participated in the festival. During a speech, one of the MP candidates said that CAK had shown the biggest resistance of assimilation. The candidate claimed that even if they could not often vote for Kurdish parties because of their frequent fears about suffering the rage of the state, those trying to assimilate them would be surprised when they saw the results of the election. Every speaker insisted that CAK should show how they resist assimilation. It was evident that the issue of assimilation is used in the region as a part of propaganda towards CAK.

As aforementioned, the popularity of a Kurdish party in the region was not a common situation before. Only the People's Labor Party (HEP) achieved successful results as a party in the 1991 elections when it established an electoral alliance with the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). In other words, informants did not

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<sup>256</sup> "HDP'yi daha yakın kılan, Kürtlerin ezilmiş kimliği vardır ya, yani ne bileyim, hiç olmazsa o mecliste Kürt kimliğiyle oturan milletvekillerinin olmasını ben çok istedim. Küçüklüğümden beri, oy kullandığımdan beri, ne güzel bu secimde de 80 tane milletvekili çıktı. Ne derler, Kürtlerin artık ben ezilmesine, ötekileştirilmesine dayanamıyorum. Kürtlerin de sesi çıksın. O Güneydoğu'da ve Doğu Anadolu'da bir Kürt gerçeği var. Artık Türkiye bunu kabullensin, görmezden gelmesin. Hani, oralara da yardımlar gitsin. Hani deniliyor ya bilmem kaç tane okul yaptık, şu kadar şey yaptık. Yani bir kere öğretmenim, hiçbir arkadaşım, Doğu'ya ya da Güneydoğu'ya atanmak istemiyor. Neden yani? Niye? Ben bu sorunların, mecliste tartışılmasını istiyorum. Onun için HDP'ye sempati duyuyorum."

previously feel close to Kurdish political parties. However, it is somehow obvious that the National Movement Party (NMP) - as a Turkish nationalist party - has always been the party from which informants felt most distant. Other than two female informants within the age group of 30-60, every informant felt distance from the NMP. Two other female informants within the age group of 30-60 declare that they felt most distant from the PDP and JDP parties. It should be noted that the female feeling far away from the PDP defines herself as a Turk and Atatürk nationalist. The female informant's feeling far away from JDP reflects her being fired from her job for supposedly being a supporter of the NMP. However, regarding the issue of the NMP, informants are troubled with the party's discourse and its perception about Kurds. One male informant within the age group of 18-30 implies:

The one I feel the most distant is NMP, Nationalist Movement Party. It's a party whose policy is based completely on Kurdophobia. It has no other idea, movement or opinion on any other subject. It's a party that has spent its entire existence to treat Kurds as enemies, so I really hate it. There are many nationalist people around me, usually I don't start a topic about politics in order not to upset them but I will show strong reaction when they do.<sup>257</sup>

The NMP's presence in the parliament and its discourse towards Kurds created a negative impact on informants. As a male informant indicates, Kurds also see the PDP as a representative of Kurdish identity countering the NMP's discourse:

I never felt so thus far but especially for last two periods, the period that independent deputies got into parliament and for this period PDP getting into parliament, I now feel so. Why are you going to say? Because NMP's statements and approach, its emphasizing Turkish nationalism seems to me as racism. I am against both Kurdish and Turkish nationalism. I'm against all kind of racism. I believe and see PDP as a representative of the Kurdish people in the parliament.<sup>258</sup>

The PDP's success in recent elections throughout the country as well as in the region is exciting for CAK. Voting rates for the party in Kurdish populated districts such as Haymana (18.52%) and Kulu (28.07%) prove increasing demands towards the party compared to the results of previous elections in which Kurdish parties could not gain a significant portion of election rates. Even if the PDP's entry into the parliament as a party is quite new, informants do not follow its activities, meetings or events very

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<sup>257</sup> "...En uzak hissettim MHP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. Tamamen Kürt düşmanlığı üzerine bir siyaset yürüten bir parti. Başka hiçbir konuda; fikri, zikri, düşüncesi olmayan bir parti. Bütün varlığını Kürtleri düşmanlık ederek geçirmiş bir parti, onun için nefret ediyorum, hiç sevmiyorum. Etrafımda da çok milliyetçi insan var genelde de o insanları üzmemek adına fazla siyasetten konu açmıyorum ama onlar açtığında da sert tepki gösterilirim..."

<sup>258</sup> "Bugüne kadar hiç hissetmedim ama özellikle son iki dönemdir, geçen dönem bağımsız milletvekilleri, özellikle de bu dönemde HDP'nin meclise girmesiyle hissediyorum. Neden diyeceksin? Çünkü orada bir MHP'nin söylemi ve tutumu Türk milliyetçiliğini vurgulaması ırkçılık gibi geliyor. Ben hem Türk milliyetçiliğine de Kürt milliyetçisine de karşıyım. Tüm ırkçılıklarına karşıyım. HDP'yi orada Kürt halkının bir temsilcisi olarak görüyor ve inanıyorum."

actively. They follow its agenda on the TV and in newspapers, rather than joining actively or being a member. However, as a result of this fieldwork, it can easily be said that CAK favor the PDP contrary to other political parties.

Another prominent domain showing CAK's cohesion occurs in their relations with administrative units. Informants answered the question regarding their trust for state institutions by stressing that they did not, in fact, trust state institutions in general. However, some of them also orally stress that the lack of trust does not arise because of their Kurdish identity. Instead, it is because of the unsystematic structure of the state institutions. One female informant exemplifies this situation:

I don't think I am alienated here because I'm Kurdish, I just think there should be some improvements in public services but as I say, this has nothing to do with me being a Kurd, it a general problem. I can get things, maybe because I know how to demand, by pushing for them. Even if it takes months, I can get it by my effort. Maybe a Turkish friend goes through worse difficulties than I do because he is not demanding. I don't think it's anything to do with identity.<sup>259</sup>

Among state institutions, as a common pattern, informants have more confidence in health institutions than in other ones. Seven informants declared that they trust in health institutions, even if they have so many problems. Justice, police, army, education and government institutions that provide services throughout the whole country are only mentioned as trustworthy institutions once. Overall, however, informants do not see these institutions as trustworthy ones. In other words, health institutions can be claimed as the only institution in which informants trust. There is no other trusted institution mentioned multiple times by informants. Actually, the other institutions are seen as ones that cannot be trusted. One male informant within the age group of 30-60 tells why he trusts health services:

At this point, the thing I trust most is health. There is no discrimination. No matter who they are, everyone receives equal and quality service. The most standing-out thing this government has ever done, by the eyes of the public, health sector improvements. Citizens who had social security used to be unable to be treated. We couldn't have our children treated, we couldn't go into the hospitals. Now my children can go into hospital until the age of 18 without me even knowing it. Or I can go to the ER and get treated. You could only be treated with money in the past. You are nothing if you don't have money. No IOU's either, we've been through a lot. Now health sector is working like a clock.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>259</sup> "Ben buralarda Kürt olduğum için dışlandığımı düşünmüyorum, sadece kamu hizmetlerinin sağlanmasında biraz yol alınması gerektiğini düşünüyorum ama dediğim gibi bunun benim Kürt olmamla alakası yok, genel bir sorun. Türk arkadaşım da benden belki de biraz ben talep etmeyi bildiğim için, bir şeylerin yakasına yapışıp onu alabiliyorum. Aylarca sürse bile bir çaba sonucu onu alabiliyorum. Belki, bir Türk arkadaşım benden daha beter sorunlar yaşıyor talepkar olamadığı için. Bunun kimlikle alakası olduğunu düşünmüyorum."

<sup>260</sup> "Şu anda geldiğimiz noktada benim en güvendiğim sağlık. Ayrımcılık yapılmıyor. Kim olursa olsun herkese eşit mesafede, çok da güzel hizmet vermiyor. Şu anki, geçmişteki hükümetin de yaptığı

As well as state institutions, local institutions such as municipalities, district governorates and other ones are also seen as untrustworthy. Especially municipalities are seen as institutions that function and provide services according to people's political behaviors:

Everything has now been politicized. We see the municipalities doesn't these famous give social aid to people who are not politically on their side. My neighbor doesn't receive any, for example. Because my neighbor is a modern person but he has two kids who go to high school and college and they don't receive a penny. He is extremely poor. But when he applies to the municipality or social cooperation office, he comes back without any aid or payment, without any support. He lives off of his relatives' aids and he earns a livelihood by working below minimum wage despite being ill. I see that. He is at next door. How can we trust municipalities and all now? If you do not have a strong reference, you can't even receive social aid from them. You need to have a strong reference.<sup>261</sup>

Another issue that comes to the forefront is the disfunctionality of complaint mechanisms when people using these public services face problems. Because people do not trust institutions, they are unaware of the application methods to report their complaints. Other than one male informant stressing that he uses the Prime Ministry Communications Center (BIMER), informants declare that they use individual methods, such as talking with other staff and executives to solve their problems. Informants do not find the public and local services they use successful and encounter negative behaviors when they request services. However, as understood from the expressions of informants, these problems arise from laziness and the unsystematic structure of public and local services. In other words, these problems impact people regardless of their ethnic belonging.

To sum up, informants do not individually have strong affiliations with any kind of political or institutional organizations. They have expectations from political parties such as equality, justice, transparency, honesty, and economic welfare. Even if most of them did not support any kind of Kurdish political parties before, they supported the PDP in the latest election, because they view them as defenders of Kurdish

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en büyük halkın gördüğü, vatandaşın gördüğü en büyük nokta bu sağlık. Gerçekten ben mesela, vatandaşın BAĞKUR borcu var tedavi olamıyor. Ama çocukları, eskiden çocuklarımızı tedavi ettiremiyorduk, hastanelere giremiyorduk. Şimdi çocuklarım 18 yaşına kadar bana uğramadan hastaneye gidebiliyorlar. Ya da ben direk gidip acile tedavi olabiliyorum. Eskiden paranla tedavi ol yani. Paran yoksa sen hiçsin. Senet ver yok, çok şeyler yaşadık. Şu an sağlık çok güzel.”

<sup>261</sup> “Yani artık he şey siyasallaşmış. Belediyelerin kendilerinden olmayan insanlara bu meşhur sosyal yardımlarını yapmadığını görüyoruz. Benim komşuma yapmıyorlar mesela.çünkü komşum modern bir insan ama beş kuruş yardım geliri olmayan lise üniversite eğitimi gören iki tane de çocuğu var.tabiri caizse ekmeğe muhtaç bir insan. Ama belediye ya da sosyal yardımlaşmaya gittiğinde beş kuruş almadan hiç destek ve yardım almadan sürekli eli boş geliyor. Akrabalarının yardımıyla geçiyor ve hasta hasta asgari ücretin altında fiyatlara çalışarak geçimlerini sağlıyorlar. Bunu görüyorum. Hemen kapı komşum. Belediyelere falan artık nasıl güveniriz. Eğer sizin kuvvetli bir referansınız yoksa onlardan sosyal yardım dahi alamazsınız. Kuvvetli bir referansınızın olması lazım.”

identity and rights. Other than health services, as a common pattern, informants do not trust public and local institutions due to their unsystematic structure.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

This study has aimed to examine patterns in the political, social and cultural lives of CAK and whether these patterns and CAK' ethnic contours have been impacted by surrounding influences of Turkishness. The purpose of the study necessitates researching the historical roots of relations between CAK and administrative units, as well as other groups living in the region, to follow both continuities and distinctions present in policies and implementations towards the designated region. Furthermore, experiences, feelings, and opinions about relations with other groups and the state units in the region play a pivotal role in examining the social cohesion of CAK.

First, it should be admitted that the phenomenon of adaptation of CAK to the region is not a unique characteristic of Ottoman administration. It occurred during the Republic as a part of the Kurdish Question and became more of an issue because of problematics in forming an “unprivileged, classless society” separate from the distinctive features of social groups depending on their ethnicity. Before getting into this subject, the significance of the background of the settlement issue should be stressed to understand the process of how the establishment of the Kurdish population in the region developed. Research proving a Kurdish presence in CA extends prior to the 11th century, which makes the presence of CAK a long-standing phenomenon in the region. There is very little knowledge about the methodology of the first settlements in the region occurring as a result of wars. However, especially after the 16th century with the changing structure of the Empire, the matter of forced migration became the main motivation for Kurdish settlement in the region. As is explained in-depth in Chapter III, the centralization aim of the administration was reflected in the formation of policies - in this case provisional decrees and special resolutions - but the Celali Rebellions somehow caused confusion throughout the Anatolian lands of the Empire for almost two centuries. The systematization of the settlement policy began in the 19th century through the introduction of new laws. One of the aims of these laws was to adapt Kurdish nomadic tribes to sedentary life for social and economic reasons. Even if it could not be achieved completely,

through the establishment of the Republican regime and during the CUP administration immediately prior, the issue of CAK was affected by the ethnicity engineering project aimed to homogenize communities by bonding them around Turkishness and being a Muslim. CA came to the forefront as a place where tribes from the East were forced to migrate in accordance with the aim of homogenization. All of these main points are given in detail in previous chapters.

It is not difficult to say that Kurds in CA are different than Kurds living in the East and Southeast regions - their natural habitat - and those in the West, who migrated to the region not so long ago. CAK have been living in a place that is not their homeland for a long while. Consequently, how they develop relationships with other social groups and units is important to examine as well as whether their ethnic contours are affected by regional units. These issues are important, but have never been asked before by scholars in a broad manner. In accordance with this purpose, field work as a part of this study is formed on the classification of Paul Bernard's measuring cohesion in social, cultural, and political aspects under three dimensions named as recognition/rejection, belonging/isolation, and legitimacy/illegitimacy. In terms of the dimension of recognition/rejection, existing social relations, experiences, and feelings were examined regarding CAK' creation of an environment depending on tolerance and respect for diversity. In very general terms, explanations of informants as a part of this study show that relations of social groups are not close enough to create broader cultural concordance and establish unproblematic social connections between CAK and other social groups. After they migrated to urban areas from rural areas mostly due to educational and economic needs, they could not maintain their relations with their relatives as well as they previously had when living in a rural environment. As another related problem occurring at that point, they also suffered from not being able to get in contact with people in their new living areas. This problem, which makes familiarizing with other people difficult, arose from differences in their language and life styles. The situation of informants within the age group of 30-60 exemplifies how, as Kurdish people, their limited Turkish knowledge alienated them and their families from other social groups. Because of this, they could not explain themselves in daily life experiences and they were exposed to misunderstandings. Especially informants who migrated to urban areas during their childhood had to face the difficulties of being different in their



educational life as well as amongst their families. It should be noted that, according to explanations of informants, an adaptation problem preventing social cohesion from the perspective of CAK was less felt in neighborhoods consisting of Kurds rather than other ethnic groups. Ghettoization in particular areas of urban settlements is pretty common both in cities and districts, because as some informants stated, they feel secure and more confident amongst other Kurds rather than Turks and other groups.

It is obvious that CAK were exposed to two-sided discrimination: while the first aspect was the categorical discrimination arising from widespread prejudices about Kurds, the second one arose from their physical aspects, such as appearance, speech and way of dressing. In the case of suffering from discriminatory behaviors, CAK within the age group of 30-60 had harsher experiences than informants within the age group of 18-30. As a result of these discriminatory behaviors, all informants were unable to develop proper social relations in their lives.

It is important to mention the issue of social relations at the present time to understand the existing atmosphere about interrelations and whether there has been an improvement or lapse over time. In many aspects, interactions between CAK and other groups are going well on the grounds of mutual respect and solidarity. Especially in the case of female informants, they admit developing sincere relations with their neighbors belonging to other ethnic groups. However, as it is understood from explanations and examples, after they are adopted into an urban life-style, exposure to discrimination due to their physical aspects no longer occurred. In other words, they are not subject to discrimination arising from their own actions. However, a categorical discrimination towards Kurds depending on prejudices and misperceptions is still in use and apparent for almost all male and female informants. That is why some informants prefer to make their Kurdish identities invisible in public spaces. Even if their Kurdishness is known, a negative perception towards Kurds is verbalized by non-Kurds around them by stressing some excuses such as “Kurds have good ones among them, too” or externalizing Kurds from their life by even “dehumanizing” them, as one informant says.

Despite all of these negative aspects in social relations, inter-ethnic marriages and cooperation in business life are positive elements contributing to the development of

building relationships on the basis of mutual respect. In these cases, approximately all informants have positive thoughts and experiences. In the case of inter-ethnic marriages, some informants within the age group of 30-60 express that in contrast with themselves, their parents and other elder family members are more distant from accepting inter-ethnic marriages. Frankly, younger generations are more used to the reality of this subject than older ones.

The dimension of belonging/isolation deals with shared values and a sense of identity between different social groups and individuals and whether they engage them and make them feel safe in relations. Protection of ethnic contours as well as developing shared values is the key point in this dimension. Looking at the issue of how CAK define themselves, it is obvious that informants feel the effects of both Kurdishness and Turkishness on their personalities. It is exemplified in definitions of informants indicating that they are 'in-between' Turkishness and Kurdishness. While Kurdishness has a stronger influence on their identity, Turkishness is also effective in that case. When discrimination towards CAK is considered with informants' feelings indicating that they are still in a position of being excluded in social relations, the effects of Turkishness on their identity can be seen as a paradox. Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration that they have been exposed to elements of Turkishness from the beginning of their childhood. When this is taken together with the fact that CAK live in a sphere under the strong effects of Turkish identity, their remaining between Turkishness and Kurdishness is quite understandable. Obviously, the most prominent factor they feel is the effect of Turkishness on language. As a result of increasing levels of education among young people, knowledge of Kurdish has significantly decreased even to the point of functioning more as a second language rather than a native one. This situation has severed all ties between generations by causing younger people and their elders to no longer understand each other. Moreover, informants within the age group of 30-60 tell that even if their native language was Kurdish when they were a child, because they "learned Turkish by killing Kurdish," as one male informant stresses, they are now more fluent in Turkish than in Kurdish. Except one female informant within the age group of 18-30, there is no other young person who can speak Kurdish properly. One of the reasons for this harsh forgetting is dependent upon the interiorized domination for speaking proper Turkish among the parents of informants, which arises from the problematical

politics of the state towards making diverse ethnicities and their elements invisible in public spaces. It is seen in the explanations of some informants that they still view speaking Turkish in a proper way, without an accent, as a more important issue than learning Kurdish. At this juncture, it should be remembered that after Kurdish started to be offered as an elective course in 2012, no course was opened in the region due to a lack of demand.

While some elements belonging to the Kurdishness of CAK are under the effects of Turkishness, informants still attach an importance to maintaining their Kurdish ethnicity. It is clear in the interviews that informants define Kurdishness with positive adjectives and themselves feel close to their identity. Additionally, they feel they belong to Turkey as equally as Turks and other groups. In light of this information, it can be said that while CAK have developed a sense of “loyalty” to the country, they have not been able to protect some elements of their ethnic contours, above all their native language. The one issue that comes into prominence at this point is that informants complain about associations of Kurdish ethnicity with armed conflict, precisely the PKK. Even more politicized informants do not want to be identified with it. At this point, it has to be said that informants were not asked any questions related directly to the PKK. The first reason arises from the sensitive characteristics of the period of field research. However, it should also be added that there are a few examples of PKK support from the region. According to related data, of 8,011 deceased PKK militants between 1984-2012, 77 militants were registered in the Central Anatolian provinces.<sup>262</sup> These provinces and numbers of militants are 36 from Konya(Kulu and Cihanbeyli), 21 from Ankara, and 20 from Aksaray, Çorum, Eskişehir, Karaman, Kayseri, Kırşehir and Yozgat. These results also show that even if there are common complaints about the organization, there was also small-scale active support for it.

The third dimension named legitimacy/illegitimacy refers to relations with public and local institutions and whether they provide satisfaction and a sense of trust that each group has an equal right to use them. As a result of first domain questioning whether informants have organizational commitment to any political parties, unions,

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<sup>262</sup> I would like to thank Dr. Güneş Murat Tezcür from the University of Central Florida for providing details of his research to me. For more information about the research please see: Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Ordinary People, Extraordinary Risks: Participation in an Ethnic Rebellion,” *American Political Science Review*, (Accepted for publication on July 17, 2015).

non-governmental institutions, and foundations, it is understood that except for three informants, those interviewed do not want to be involved in these kinds of structures. Even if they do not prefer it, all informants are aware of their political rights and vote in general and local elections. Their expectations from political parties, such as equality, justice, transparency, honesty and economic welfare come into prominence. CAK have more pragmatic expectations in local elections, contrary to general elections, in which their voting behavior is shaped by ideological closeness. Even if almost all informants are using their right to vote, it is obvious that they do not trust political parties as a common pattern.

As a rising phenomenon in Turkish politics, the PDP attracts the attention of informants. The PDP's entrance into the Assembly as a party with 80 representatives makes them feel like they are more represented now. As a significant majority of informants, eleven respondents tell that they feel closer to the PDP nowadays, even if eight of them used to feel close to other parties. The party is seen as representing all oppressed and suffering people in Turkey. Additionally, the existence of Kurdish deputies with their Kurdish identities in parliament is another important motivation for informants to support the PDP. According to their explanations, it is obvious that informants feel distance from the NMP, mostly because of its perspective about Kurds and the Kurdish Question. It is seen as a party based on Kurdophobia. Thus, informants supporting the PDP see this party as a defender of Kurds against the NMP. However, it should be said that sympathising with Kurdish political parties and individual candidates had not been a common behaviour in the region until recently. While examining results of previous general elections, support towards Kurdish political parties in Cihanbeyli and Kulu can be easily recognized. By the 1995 General Elections, these parties received approximately 20% of votes in these cities. When it comes to Haymana, the results change according to existence of the parties or individual candidates. Individual Kurdish candidates could not get more than 2% of the votes, while Kurdish parties received approximately 6% of the votes from the second half of the 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s. In Polatlı, different from previous examples, Kurdish political parties could not get significant support and gained approximately less than 2% of votes.

When it comes to the issue of sense of trust towards public and local institutions, it is obvious that informants are not satisfied with any kind of public or local institutions

other than health institutions. In other words, neither political nor public and local institutions are providing sufficient service or trust. Informants stress that they cannot benefit from public and local institutions as they would like due to the unsystematic structure that dominates these institutions. They seem to have more confidence in health services, even if it also has many problems. Municipalities, district governorates and other local services are also criticized for providing services according to the political position of the demander. It also should be said that even if people are complaining about public and local services, other than one male informant, informants do not know how to make an official complaint. To sum up, it is obvious that they are not satisfied with services, but it is not because they are exposed to discrimination; instead, the cause of the situation is related to the unsystematic structure of public and local services.

Regarding a policy suggestion for providing cohesion between Kurds and other groups, it is obvious that negative perceptions and prejudices about Kurds should be removed from people's minds to pave the way for healthy communication. Before anything else, a new constitution based on equality of each and every ethnic and religious group in Turkey and the right of mutual respect should be established. It is obvious that there are common prejudices towards different ethnic and religious groups in Turkey, such as Armenians, Greeks, Alewis, etc. Thus, implementation of cohesion among these groups requires a new constitution providing an atmosphere suitable for it. In other words, it should be seen that cohesion is not just a problem for CAK; it is a deep-rooted problem that has to be solved. In addition to a constitutional guarantee for this issue, politicians and governors also have to take an important step towards changing people's attitudes about different ethnic groups. One of the reasons for misperceptions about Kurds arises from the negative discourses of politicians and their impact on the masses. Even if changing perception is a quite difficult and long-term process, it should be immediately applied.

As aforementioned, cohesion is a two-way process in which each individual or group should protect their own aspects. In the case of CAK, it is obvious that younger people are faced with the danger of not knowing the Kurdish language, which used to be the native language of their elders. As a first policy recommendation in this subject, the Kurdish language should be promoted as an elective course for Kurdish children in schools. As the German philosopher Heidegger says, "Language is the

house of being.” Because it is the most important aspect of identity, the protection of different languages should be taken under legal assurance. Moreover, private Kurdish language courses should also be supported by governmental incentives to become more widespread. Bearing in mind that states should be respectful of diversity, it is an obligation more than a necessity.

As a final word, it is clear that there is a huge gap in studies related to CAK and their social, cultural, and political situation. There should be further research conducted regarding these people who have been so often ignored. It is expected that this study will provide a good start for emerging and future academic works on CAK.

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## QUESTIONNAIRE

### SORULAR

#### Kişisel Bilgiler

Cinsiyet

Doğum tarihi (Yaş)

Doğum yeri

Eğitim durumu

Mesleği/şu anda yaptığı iş

Medeni hali

Hane halkı sayısı (Hane halkındakiilerin eğitimi, mesleği, yaşı)

#### Göç(Kırsal-Kentsel Yaşam)

Köyde yaşama deneyiminiz oldu mu? Ne kadar süre yaşadınız?

(Köyden göçenlere) Köyden kente göç etmenizin sebepleri nelerdi? Köyde kimliğinizi daha iyi koruyabiliyor muydunuz?( adet, düğünler, eğlenceler, cenazeler vb. açısından) Köyünüzü sıklıkla ziyaret eder misiniz?

Köyden kente göçtükten sonra kültürel, ekonomik, politik ve sosyal açıdan uyum problemleri yaşadınız mı?

Köyden kente göçtükten sonra yaşamaya başladığınız yerde ağırlıklı olarak komşularınız kimlerden(etnik açıdan) oluşuyordu? Onlarla ilişkilerinizde sorun yaşadınız mı?

Şehir hayatını mı yoksa köy hayatını mı tercih edersiniz? Neden?

(Kentte yaşıyorsa) Yaşadığınız kentte kendinizi evinizde hissediyor musunuz? Kendinizi misafir, yabancı gibi hissettiğiniz zamanlar/mekânlar/durumlar oldu mu?

Başka kentlerde/bölgelerde akrabalarınız var mı? Nerede? Ne sebeple gittiler?

Aşiret kültürüne dair ne biliyorsunuz? Bu kültürü sürdürdüğünüz noktalar var mı? Ailenizde bununla alakalı anlatılar var mı?

#### Kimlik

Kendinizi etnik açıdan nasıl tanımlarsınız?

Sizin için Kürt olmak ne anlama geliyor? Kürtleri diğerlerinden farklı kılan nedir?

Aileniz / Büyükanne-babanız kendilerini nasıl tanımlar/dı?

Kendinizi / ailenizin kendisini bu şekilde tanımlamasında nelerin etkili olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? [Nereli olduğu, Doğduğu/yaşadığı yer, eğitim süreci, komşuluk ilişkileri, askerlik, göç deneyimi, karşılaşılan ayrımcılık deneyimi, siyasi/ideolojik tutum ve fikirleri vb.]

Aidiyet hissettiğiniz topluluğu [...] tanımak isteyen birine öncelikli olarak nelerden bahsedersiniz?

Türklerle benzediğiniz ve benzemediğiniz özellikler nelerdir?

Türkiye’de kendinizi ev sahibi olarak görüyor musunuz? Azınlık olarak mı hissediyorsunuz?

Kürtlerle bir araya geldiğinizde kendinizi daha rahat mı hissedersiniz? Bu hissizin sebebi nedir? (Ailenizle, akrabalarınızla, bölgede yaşayan diğer Kürtlerle iletişimde bulunma sıklığı?)

Çocuklarınıza Kürtçe isim koydunuz mu/koymayı düşünür müsünüz?

(Evet ise) Çocuklarınıza Kürtçe isim koyarken/koymayı düşünürken ilerde sıkıntı yaşayacağını düşünüp tedirgin oldunuz mu/olur musunuz? Resmi işlemler sırasında çocuğunuza koyacağınız isim sebebiyle bir sıkıntı yaşadınız mı/yaşayacağınızı düşünüyor musunuz? Sizin haricinizde çevrenizde bu konuda sıkıntı yaşayan birini gördünüz ya da duydunuz mu?

Yanınızda birini çalıştırırken o kişinin sizinle etnik mensubiyetine dikkat eder misiniz? (Evet ise: Kürt kökenli birisini başka bir etnik aidiyeti olan biri karşısında tercih etmenizin sebepleri nelerdir?)

Yeni bir yere taşınırken komşularınızın Kürt olup olmadığına dikkat eder misiniz?

## **Anadil**

Günlük hayatınızda hangi dilde kendinizi daha rahat ifade ediyorsunuz? Kendinizi daha rahat ifade ettiğiniz dilin haricindeki dili(Türkçe/Kürtçe/diğer) daha çok hangi alanlarda(aile içi/akrabalar/arkadaşlar/işyeri/okul vs.) kullanıyorsunuz?

Çocukluğunuzda aile içinde hangi dil/diller kullanılırdı? Akrabalar arasında, büyük anne-büyük babalarla Türkçe dışında başka bir dil konuşan büyükleriniz var mıydı? Hangi dil/ler?

Bu dil/diller size aktarıldı mı? Siz anadilinizi çocuklarınıza öğretiyor musunuz/öğretmeyi planlıyor musunuz?

Siz ya da aile üyeleriniz bu Kürtçe kullandığınız için herhangi bir sorun yaşad mı?

Ailenizde ya da çevrenizde Türkçe bilmeyen bir birey oldu mu? Varsa o bireyin yaşadığı sıkıntılara şahit oldunuz ya da işittiniz mi?

İş hayatında, okulda, sokakta, markette vs. Kürtçe konuşmaktan çekinir misiniz? Kürtçe konuştuğunuz için hiçbir tepkiyle karşılaştınız mı? İş hayatında Kürt olduğunuzun bilinmesinden tedirgin olduğunuz durumlar oldu mu?

Kürtçenin okullarda anadil olarak öğretilmesi hususunda ne düşünüyorsunuz? Destekler misiniz yoksa karşı mı çıkarsınız? Sebepleriniz nelerdir?

Kürtçe radyo, TV, gazete takip eder misiniz? Ediyorsanız bunlar hangileridir?

### **Sosyal Yaşam**

Yaşadığınız yerdeki Kürt olmayan kesimlerle ilişkileriniz nasıldır? (benzerlikler, farklılıklar, hoşlanılan, sevilmeyen durumlar)

Komşularınız arasında kimliğinizi rahatça ifade edebiliyor musunuz? Bu konuda, ayrımcılık olarak düşünülebilecek tavır/söz/davranışla karşılaşılıyor musunuz? Geçmişte de böyle miydi?

Bölgedeki Kürtlerle ilişkileri: düğün, cenaze, eğlence vb. alışkanlıkları devam ettirebiliyor musunuz, bu noktada ihtiyaçlarınız nelerdir, bir araya gelebileceğiniz etkinlikler düzenleyebiliyor musunuz?

Akrabalık bağlarınız önemli midir? Ne sıklıkla bir araya gelirsiniz? Bir araya geldiğinizde Kürtçe konuşur musunuz?

(Bekar birisine) Evlenmek istediğinizde eşinizin Kürt olmaması sizi rahatsız eder mi? Kürt olmayan birisiyle evlilik hakkına ne düşünüyorsunuz? Aileniz ve çevreniz sizce böyle bir durumda nasıl tavır alır?

Çocuğunuz Kürt olmayan birisiyle evlenmek istese ne tepki verirsiniz?

Aile üyeleriniz, akrabalarınız ve çevrenizdeki insanlarla Kürtlerin sosyal-siyasal durumu hakkında tartışmalar yapıyor musunuz?

### **Ayrımcılık**

Kamuda iş başvurusunda siz ya da bir yakınınız ayrımcılığa uğradı mı?

(Etnik kökeninizden dolayı ayrımcılığa uğradıysa) Ayrımcılığa uğradığınızda herhangi bir tepki gösterir misiniz? Evet ise, nasıl gösterirsiniz?

Kürtlere yönelik ayrımcılık uygulandığına dair bir haber duyduğunuzda(TV, gazete, radyo, internet) ne tepki verirsiniz? (korku, acı, huzursuzluk vb.)

İş hayatında, sosyal hayatta ya da komşularınızla yaşadığınız yerde Kürt olduğunuzu sakladığınız durumlar oldu mu?



Türkiye’de yaşayan Kürtlerin ekonomik açıdan daha dezavantajlı olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Sizce bunun sebepleri ne olabilir?

### **Siyasal**

Herhangi bir STK’ya, sendikaya, vakfa ya da siyasi partiye üyeliğiniz var mı? Üye olup olmamada tereddüt yaşadınız mı?

Genel/yerel seçimlerde oy kullanır mısınız? Oy kullanırken beklentiniz nedir?

Oy kullanırken adayın özelliklerine mi, partiye mi oy verirsiniz?

Mecliste temsil edildiğinizi düşünüyor musunuz? (birey/grup olarak)

Sizi/ aidiyet hissettiğiniz grubu/toplumu temsil edecek bir lidere ya da partiye ihtiyaç duyuyor musunuz; böyle bir lider/partiden ne beklersiniz?

Yerel ve ulusal düzeyde politika yapan Kürt siyasi partileri hakkında bilgileriniz nedir?( Faaliyetlerini biliyor mu, ne düşünüyor, desteklemeyi ve faaliyetleri içinde yer almayı düşünür mü?)

### **Kurumsal**

Türkiye’de hangi devlet kurum(ların)a en çok /en az güveniyorsunuz: hukuk, meclis, ordu, hükümet, emniyet?

Yerel düzeyde hizmet aldığınız kurumlardan hangisine en çok/en az güveniyorsunuz: eğitim kurumları, sağlık kurumları, belediyeler?

Kamu hizmetlerinden yeterince faydalanabiliyor musunuz? Kurumlarla ilişki düzeyi nedir? Diğer kurumlarla ilişkiler (Büyükşehir ve ilçe belediyeleri, muhtarlık, SYDV, kaymakamlık, polis, asker; bunlardan herhangi birisiyle bugüne kadar hiç ilişki kuruldu mu, bu ilişkide karşılaşılan sorunlar, ilişki kurma biçimine dair bir örnek veya bir anı, ayrımcı uygulamalarla karşılaşıldı mı?)

Devlet kurumlarıyla, politikalarıyla ilişkili bir sorun yaşadığınızda, sorunu çözmek için nasıl bir yol izliyorsunuz? (kabullenme ve itiraz etmeme; ailenin, akrabaların desteği; mahkemeye başvurma; jandarma/polis/kolluk kuvvetlerine başvurma; bir siyasi partiye başvurma; belediyeye başvurma; dernek, sivil toplum örgütü, cami’ye başvurma)

[erkekler için] Askerlik yaparken kimliğinizden dolayı farklı muamele gördünüz mü/ayrımcılığa uğradınız mı?