

TURKISH ETHOS OF THE KURDISH QUESTION:
A CASE STUDY ON THE TURKISH SOCIETY IN THRACE-TEKİRDAĞ

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

BY

YUNUS EMRE ORHAN


IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MARCH 2016


This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations.

Examining Committee Members:


Assist. Prof. Talha Köse
(Thesis Advisor)



Assist. Prof. Hüseyin Alptekin



Assist. Prof. Elif Çelebi




This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Social Sciences of İstanbul Şehir University:

Date

24.02.2016

Seal/Signature



I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

First Name, Last Name: Yunus Emre Orhan

Signature:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Yunus Emre Orhan', written in a cursive style.

ABSTRACT

TURKISH ETHOS OF THE KURDISH QUESTION: A CASE STUDY ON THE TURKISH SOCIETY IN THRACE-TEKİRDAĞ

Orhan, Yunus Emre

MA, Department of Political Science and International Relations

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Talha Köse

March 2016, 104 pages

This thesis makes use of the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) theory to analyze the resistance of the Turkish society to change in the sense of the Kurdish question. It assumes that in the course of conflict both members of the parties involved in the conflict develop a socio-psychological infrastructure (SPI) to adapt the conflict and without transformation within the SPI, building peace is not completely possible. In the light of this extensive theoretical framework, the fundamental hypothesis of this thesis was formulated, as there are some shared beliefs in the Turkish society in terms of the Kurdish question leading to resistance to change. To explore this hypothesis, 20 field interviews with local opinion leaders were personally conducted in Tekirdağ, a periphery zone of the Kurdish conflict. The thesis starts with the development of the theoretical framework of the study. Then it provides a mapping of the Kurdish question. This is respectively followed by the analysis of the content of the EOC with respect to the Kurdish question, the functionality of the EOC, and the functionality of the SPI. Finally, I discuss the limitations of the thesis and the recommendations for further research regarding the need for change in the Turkish ethos.

Keywords: Resistance to change, ethos of conflict, Kurdish question, socio-psychological infrastructure, conflict resolution.

ÖZ

KÜRT MESELESİNİN TÜRK ETOSU: TRAKYA-TEKİRDAĞ'DAKI TÜRK TOPLUMU ÜZERİNE ÖRNEK BİR ÇALIŞMA

Orhan, Yunus Emre


MA, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Talha Köse

Mart 2016, 104 Sayfa

Bu tez, Kürt Meselesi bağlamında Türk toplumunun değişime karşı direncini, Çatışma Etosu Teorisinden istifade ederek analiz etmektedir. Bu tez, çatışma boyunca, çatışma içindeki her iki tarafın üyelerinin çatışmaya adapte olabilmek için sosyo-psikolojik bir altyapı (SPA) geliştirdiğini, ve bu SPA değişmediği takdirde barış inşa etmenin mümkün olmadığını varsaymaktadır. Bu teorik çerçeve ışığında, tezin temel hipotezi “Türk toplumunda, Kürt meselesi hakkında, değişime karşı dirence sebep bazı paylaşılan inançlar vardır” olarak formülize edilmiştir. Bu hipotezi incelemek için, Kürt meselesinde periferi bir bölge olarak kabul edilebilecek Tekirdağ'da, yirmi yerel kanaat önderi ile şahsen saha mülakatı gerçekleştirilmiştir. Tez, çalışmanın teorik çerçevesini geliştirerek başlamakta. Sonrasında Kürt meselesinin haritasını sunmaktadır. Bunu sırasıyla Türk etosunun içeriği, Türk etosunun fonksiyonelliği, ve SPA'nın fonksiyonelliği analizleri takip etmektedir. Son olarak da, tezin kısıtlamaları ve etostaki değişime ihtiyaçla ilgili gelecek çalışmalar için tavsiyeleri tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Değişime karşı direnç, çatışma etosu, Kürt meselesi, sosyo-psikolojik altyapı, çatışma çözümü



*To my father Erdoğan Orhan
and my mother Saadet Orhan*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Talha Köse, for his methodological and theoretical suggestions over the last two years. Dr. Köse gave me invaluable feedback and guidance in formulating and writing this master's thesis. His thoughtful comments and encouragement made this study a very fruitful academic research. My deepest appreciation also goes to the other committee members, Dr. Hüseyin Alptekin and Dr. Elif Çelebi for their advice and suggestions.

Equally, I am indebted other faculty members from Istanbul Şehir University who were not in the committed, especially Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı, Dr. Ahmet Okumuş, and Dr. Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu for their enthusiasm and constant supports during my studies at Istanbul Şehir University. I should also mention the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Istanbul Sehir University for their financial support. Their assistance enabled me to focus my energy on my research for two years.

Special thanks to my dearest parents Erdoğan Orhan and Saadet Orhan who have always materially and morally supported me and adorned my life with their compassion. I also thank my brothers Necmeddin Orhan and Tarık Orhan for their endless encouragement, understanding, and support.

I cannot sufficiently thank my loving wife and beloved friend Büşra Orhan for her patience, emotional support, and constant encouragement during the thesis process. Also, for her hours, generally being agreeable, and delicious cooking, I owe her many thanks.

I would especially like to thank my father-in-law Cem Akın, mother-in-law Güzide Akın, and brother-in law Bilal akin who have always cheered me up during the thesis process.

I have to deeply thank Asil family. I have been very lucky to be closely with Ercüment Asil, a life coach of my academic career. I would like to thank him for his visionary insights. Equally, I would like to thank Cahit Asil for his unforgettable support and friendliness in Egypt, in 2013. Many sincere thanks are due for Muhammet Ali Asil for the motivating talks, brainstorming, and especially warm friendship.

Last but not least, it is important to remember my friends. I give my thanks to Abdürreşid Şahin, İsmail Mutlu, Muhammed Yasir Okumuş, and Şener Boztaş for their invaluable moral supports.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xi
LIST OF TABLES	xiii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiv
INTRODUCTION	1
Purpose of the Research	1
The Research and its Contributions to the Field	3
Overview	3
CHAPTERS	
1. MAPPING OF THE KURDISH QUESTION	5
1.1. Conflict History	5
1.1.1. Brief Early History (Until 1923)	5
1.1.2. Formation of Republic of Turkey (1923 – 1938) – Radicalization and Rebellions Period	6
1.1.3. Silence Period (1938-61).....	7
1.1.4. Restoration of the Problematic (1961-1978).....	8
1.1.5. Foundation of the PKK, Propaganda, and Armed Conflict (1978-1989). 10	
1.1.6. Deep Armed Conflict (1989-1999)	11
1.1.7. The Capture of Abdullah Ocalan and The Ceasefire Period (1999–2004)	12
1.1.8. PKK Back to the Stage (2004–2012)	13
1.1.9. Peace Process between 2012-2015 and the Current Situation	13
1.2. Core Issues of the Conflict	14
1.3. Parties in the Conflict and Peace Initiatives	15
1.3.1. Parties in The Conflict.....	15
1.3.1.1. The PKK (<i>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane</i> , Kurdistan Workers Party) 15	
1.3.1.2. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)	17
1.3.1.3. The Government and Politicians	17
1.3.2. Conflict Resolution Strategies of the Turkish State and Peace Initiatives 18	

1.3.2.1. The TSK and Its Strategies to Resolve the Conflict.....	18
1.3.2.1.1. The Village Guard System	18
1.3.2.1.2. Internal Displacements	19
1.3.2.1.3. Cross-Border Operations.....	19
1.3.2.2. The Turkish Government and its Strategies to Resolve the Conflict or Peace Initiatives	19
1.3.2.2.1. Kurdish/Democratic Opening	26
1.3.2.2.2. Peace Process	26
1.3.2.2.3. Wise Persons Commission (WPC).....	26
1.3.2.2.4. Davutoglu Period.....	27
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	28
2.1. Introduction	28
2.2. Defining the Concept of Conflict.....	28
2.3. Defining Peace as a Public Process.....	31
2.4. Socio-psychological Infrastructure	35
2.5. The Ethos of Conflict Theory.....	39
2.6. Conclusion.....	42
3. METHODOLOGY.....	44
3.1. Scope of the Research	44
3.2. Methodology of the Research	45
3.3. Limitations of the Research.....	47
4. DATA ANALYSIS	49
4.1. Introduction	49
4.2. Findings	49
4.2.1. Collective Memory (CM).....	49
4.2.2... Shared Beliefs about the Justness of the TG and De-legitimization of the KG.....	52
4.2.3. Shared Beliefs about Security	58
4.2.4..... Shared Beliefs about a Positive Collective Self-Image and Image of the Opponent.....	60
4.2.5. Shared Beliefs about In-Group Victimization.....	63
4.2.6. Shared Beliefs about Patriotism	66
4.2.7. Shared Beliefs about Unity	66
4.2.8. Shared Beliefs about Peace	70

4.3. Discussion	75
4.4. Need for Change.....	81
4.5. Implications	86
CONCLUSION.....	89
Recommendations	91
REFERENCES.....	93
APPENDICES	103
A. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS	103
B. PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERVIEWS.....	104



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
- ARGK: Ardeşa Rizgeriya Gelê Kurdistan (Kurdistan People's Liberation Army)
- BILGESAM: Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies)
- BDP: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
- CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People Party)
- CAR: Conflict Analysis and Resolution
- CM: Collective Memory
- CR: Conflict Resolution
- DP: Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)
- DPI: Democratic Progress Institute
- EOC: Ethos of Conflict
- EU: the European Union
- HPG: Hêzen Parastina Gel (People's Defense Force)
- HRK: Hêzên Rizgarîya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Liberation Forces)
- KADEK: Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasîya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress)
- KG: Kurdish Goals
- KONGRA GEL: Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (Kurdistan People Congress)
- LOLs: Local Opinion Leaders
- MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)
- MUSIAD: Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association)
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NUTS: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
- PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
- SETA: Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)
- SPI: Socio-Psychological Infrastructure
- TBMM: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly)
- TEOC: Turkish Ethos of Kurdish Conflict

TESEV: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Foundation for Economic and Social Research of Turkey)

TG: Turkish Goals

TIP: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Workers Party)

TSK: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces)

US: The United States

WPC: Wise Persons Commission



LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Conflict Resolution Tools of the Turkish State	20
Table 1.2. Legal and Administrative reforms liberalizing Kurdish Identity and Language in Turkey in the post-1999 period	25
Table 4.1. Content of the Collective Memory	50
Table 4.2. Legitimization of the TG and De-legitimization of the KG	53
Table 4.3. Shared Beliefs about Security	58
Table 4.4. Shared Beliefs about Images	61
Table 4.5. Causes of the Violence of the Kurds	61
Table 4.6. Shared Beliefs about in-group Victimization	64
Table 4.7. Shared Beliefs about Unity	67
Table 4.8. Definitions of the Peace Concept	71
Table 4.9. The Peace Process Perceptions	71
Table 4.10. How can this conflict be resolved?	74

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. Attack Types of the PKK until 2013	16
Figure 1.2. Target Types of the PKK	16
Figure 2.1. Conflict Escalation and De-escalation Model	30
Figure 2.2. Levels of Leadership	33
Figure 2.3. Conceptual Model of Socio-Psychological Infrastructure	37
Figure 4.1. Socio-psychological Infrastructure of the Turkish society	79



INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Research

This study is an exploratory and descriptive inquiry of the elements of the Turkish ethos of the Kurdish conflict. It makes use of the Ethos of Conflict (EOC) theory (Bar-Tal, 2013) to analyze the resistance of the Turkish society to change in the sense of the Kurdish question. It assumes that in the course of conflict, both members of the parties involved in the conflict develop a socio-psychological infrastructure (SPI) to adapt the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007) and without transformation within the SPI, building sustainable peace is not completely possible (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kelman 2007; Lederach 2003; Mitchell 2014).

In light of this extensive theoretical framework, the thesis concentrates on the public dimension of the peace process and seeks to understand impact of the ethos on peace process. The central argument of this study was formulated as there are some shared beliefs in the Turkish society in terms of the Kurdish question leading to the resistance of Turkish society to change. In order to analyze profoundly the shared beliefs (Gordon, 1990; Markus and Kitayama, 1994; Bar-Tal, 2000) of Turkish members, the central questions of the research are formulated as follows: “How does the society respond to the peace process? What is the impact of ethos on responses? Is the Turkish society resistant to change? If yes, why? If not, why?” To make the analysis more in-depth, the following sub-questions have been determined:

- What is the general perception regarding the Kurdish conflict that arises from the ethos?
- In the context of the ethos, how do each shared belief relate to one another?
- What is the content of the Turkish society’s ethos (goals, security, de-legitimization, self-image, victimization, patriotism, unity, peace)?”
- What are the definitions of peace in use by participants?
- How do participants perceive the peace process?
- What are the participants’ criteria for the success of the peace process?
- How do participants define “they” and “we”?
- What do they think about the victimization of the Turks and Kurds?
- How do they explain the outbreak of the conflict?

- What are their thoughts regarding the demands of education in the mother tongue and the self-government of the region?

This inquiry provides an overview on the concept of the ethos of conflict (EOC), the public peace process, and reports the findings from qualitative in-depth interviews in which members of the Turkish society in periphery zones (in Tekirdağ as a representative sample for the Thrace region) were asked about their shared beliefs associated with the Kurdish question in Turkey. Throughout my research, I make use of the Ethos of Conflict theory, developed by Bar-Tal, arguing that a society involved in intractable conflict forms and creates a particular ethos that is shaped and influenced by the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). The ethos gives orientation to a society and is shaped and formed by societal shared beliefs (Bar-Tal, 2000). The ethos can be observed in cultural products, the educational system, historical narratives, and public discourse (Bar-Tal, 2003). Hence, my central argument is that there is a wide ranged shared beliefs at the societal level that prevent building sustainable peace, and allow resistance to change in an intractable conflict.

I chose the Kurdish question as a case study, for this research. Turkey was in a peace process until July 2015. Today, the general discourse and tendency of academic and political actors dominate that there is social agreement on achieving the peace process both in the Turkish and Kurdish society. In the thesis, the argument on social agreement is not entirely falsified but criticized. Throughout my research, I have observed that there are still various negative shared beliefs or attitudes at the societal level among the Turkish people in Turkey. In my view, determining these shared beliefs in order to develop policies is not sufficient, but necessary for achieving sustainable peace. These shared beliefs may provide knowledge about the society involved in conflict, and these widely shared societal beliefs may contribute to the formation, strengthening, and maintenance of the social identity of the group. Over time, these shared beliefs begin to act as a mechanism that preserves the existing social structure. They motivate and guide the social acts of group members. In this sense, in order to accomplish a peace process, Turkey needs transformation and change due to the functionality of societal shared beliefs.

So, the ultimate purpose of this study is to address the socio-psychological dimensions of implicit unwillingness to change, respectively by: 1) framing theoretical knowledge about the concepts used in the field (i.e. shared beliefs, EOC, public peace process, collective memory), and 2) providing new data from dynamic shared beliefs

of the Turkish party members associated with the ongoing peace process and the past, in other words, making implicit the shared beliefs, and explicit the attitudes regarding the Kurdish Question.

The Research and its Contributions to the Field

This thesis contributes to the literature on conflict resolution by focusing on the Kurdish Question, providing new data from Turkish party members' shared beliefs on the Kurdish question and their perceptions of the current peace process. The central question of the thesis seeks to show the multi-dimensional characters of the conflict. Unfortunately, the Kurdish question is generally issued by political-historical theories (Marcus, 2007; McDowall, 1997; Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997; Gunter, 2004; Somer, 2004; Bozarslan, 2008), and sociological theories (Yeğen, 2006; Ergil, 2009). Its multilayered character is generally avoided in such analyses. Studying the Kurdish question by using conflict analysis tools is nearly a brand new tendency in the literature (see Çelik, 2009). Thus, the thesis seeks to fill in a gap in the research on the dynamics of resistance to change in the Kurdish Question.

While the research provides new data from the field, it also demonstrates the current conditions of the peace process in June 2015, prior to the revival of the armed conflict. Even though it is crucial to research social attitudes and behavior separately, the study of the ethos or the whole structure of societal beliefs enable a more comprehensive and complete perception of a society. To conduct further longitudinal research on this issue, the present study may provide a general picture from 2015.

Overview

This thesis is organized in four chapters.

Chapter one, *Mapping the Conflict in Turkey*, by making use of Paul Wehr's conflict mapping guide, primarily summarizes the conflict history by classifying into nine periods. Respectively, (1) brief early history (until 1923), (2) formation of republic of Turkey – radicalization and rebellions period (1923-1938), (3) silence period (1938-1961), (4) restoration of the problematic (1961-1978), (5) foundation of the PKK, propaganda, and terror (1978-1989), (6) guerilla war (1989-1999), (7) Capture of Abdullah Öcalan and ceasefire period (1999-2004), (8) PKK back to the stage (2004-2012), (9) peace process and the revival of the armed conflict – current situation (2012 – to the present). By determining the core issues and the primary parties of the Kurdish conflict, it presents conflict resolution techniques and peace initiatives of the primary parties.

Chapter Two examines the literature in the field relevant to socio-psychology, ethos of conflict, and public peace process. Additionally, it develops the central assumptions and arguments of the research. This research argues that conflicts are dynamic phenomena, they may escalate or deescalate due to the complex relations of behaviors and attitudes (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse & Miall, 2012). So, conflicts have multi-dimensional, and CR has multi-phase characteristics (Cox, 1986; Galtung, 1967; Tonge, 2014). Peace, therefore, is not an event; rather, it is a process (Lederach, 2003). Within this framework, the thesis emphasizes that the socio-psychological infrastructure of the conflict makes difficult the resolution of conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal, 2013; Gordon, 1990). In addition, without transformation within the EOC, building peace on which the society embarks is not completely possible (Bar-Tal, 2003).

Chapter three explains the methodological framework of the inquiry. In addition, it limits the scope of the research and evaluates the limitation of the research.

Chapter Four presents the findings from the analysis of in-depth interviews structured by guiding questions. It categorizes all findings of the in-depth interview findings. Then, it analyzes the data and discourse in the light of the theory. Each actor's willingness and openness to discuss the problematic of the Kurdish question, and the need for change are also argued in this chapter.

In the conclusion, I review and summarize all findings of the research, and offer possible policy implications.

CHAPTER I

MAPPING OF THE KURDISH QUESTION

Paul Wehr defines conflict mapping as a “first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict. It gives both the intervener and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolution of the conflict” (Wehr, 1979: pp.9) Indeed, conflict mapping is an efficient pattern of demonstrating the multi-layer characteristics of a particular conflict. It provides a comprehensive and applicable methodology to analyze any conflict type, from international to interpersonal levels and to give a quick picture for a conflict climate. However, it should not be forgotten that every particular map demonstrates the standpoint and perspective of the author of the map.

A large majority of the Kurds lives in contemporary Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. Recent research in the last decades illustrates that the largest portion of the total population of the Kurds lives in Turkey (around 50%) and the Kurds are the largest ethnic minority (around %15) in Turkey; they mainly live in southeastern part of Turkey (McDowall, 1997).

In general terms, two important features shaped the trajectory of the Kurdish question: the Turkish state’s rejection of Kurds’ existence and the occurrence of its far-reaching challenge to the Turkish state including various revolts during the formation of modern Turkey (1923-1938), and guerrilla combat from 1978 to the present. (Bozarslan, 2008).

Hence, this chapter, through its own lenses, aims to provide mapping of the Kurdish Conflict by looking at the brief history and the origins of the Kurdish conflict. It seeks to describe the conflict and offers peace initiatives in order to solve the conflict.

1.1. Conflict History

1.1.1. Brief Early History (Until 1923)

Historically speaking, the roots of the Kurdish conflict go back a long way – to the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution period in the early 1900s (Bozarslan, 2008). After the rapidly dissolving of the Ottoman Empire because of the World War I, the Kurds was distributed into various new states (Turkey, Syria, and Iraq). In the sense of formation of Turkey, Kurds mainly fought together with the Turks during the

independence of war of Turkey, remaining loyal to the authority of Ottoman Empire without demanding any kind of separatist demand (Karpas, 1985).

In the early 1920s, the conventional Kurdish elites greeted Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's assurances associated with the Turkish–Kurdish solidarity, the liberation of the Mosul, and the protection of the position of caliphate in the future state structure to be established after the end of independence war of Turkey (Bozarlan, 2008).

1.1.2. Formation of Republic of Turkey (1923 – 1938) – Radicalization and Rebellions Period

In August 1922, the Turkish military forces won the war and new secular Turkish state was officially established in Ankara, on 29 October 1923. In the early years of the Turkish republic, Kurdish population had been represented in the new parliament by tribal chiefs of their region and were not evaluated as minority population in Turkey (only Orthodox Greeks, Orthodox Armenians, and Jews were recognized as minorities; see the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923). During the new reforms and laws, Kemalist ideology was accepted as founder regime of the state. The new governance was using the term “Turkish” in order to define citizenship, rather than ethnicity. Indeed, most of Turkey's ethnic groups – such as Caucasians, Bosnians, Lazs, and so forth – had easily acknowledged the term, even consisting of some portions of the Kurdish society (Somers, 2004; Karpas, 2000).

However, things would not go as planned. Due to various political, demographic, geographic, identity-related, and social-economic factors, Kurds posed the radical challenge to the new formation of modern Turkey. The most important outcomes of breakdown the relationship between the Turkish state and Kurds had been 17 soul-shattering rebellions from 1924 to 1938. The three most significant of them, the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, the Ararat Rebellion in 1930, and the Dersim Rebellion between 1936 and 1938, inflicted a deep wound on both history of Modern Turkey and Kurdish nationalism (Bozarlan, 2008). These rebellions demonstrated that Kurdish religious and political elites of the Republic period were not able to mobilize the entire population in the region. In addition, it must be mentioned that most of these revolts were not ethnic, rather religious, but they were realized by ethnically Kurdish people.

What were the distinctive elements led not to integrate Kurds into the new Turkish state? Many document and most researchers suggest that there are four main reasons for the rupture. First, the new Kemalist ideology was considering linguistic

variances as a potential threat to the new nation-building (Bozarlan, 2008). Second, abolition of the caliphate led to vehement reaction of Kurdish religious elites, considering the caliphate's existence as the only lasting pillar of the common ground of the Kemalist-Kurdish relations. Third, Kurdish elites unrestful due to final status of Mosul. (Bozarlan, 2008; Ergil, 2009). In addition, there were some other reasons alongside the mentioned reasons motivating Kurdish rebels. First, the Kurdish population was demographically the biggest portion of the whole population in Turkey. Second, the Kurdish population was geographically and homogenously living in the southeastern region of Turkey, which was difficult for the central administration because of the distance. The third was the tribal and feudal social structure of the Kurdish society (Bozarlan, 2008; Mango, 1994; Mango, 1999; Somer, 2005; Ergil, 2009).

Rebellions during the formation of modern Turkey had remarkable impact on the Kurdish policies of the Turkish state. Bozarlan (2008, pp. 338) mentions that the decision makers in Ankara were to a large extent unaware of the emerging Kurdish opposition and could have not taken serious security precautions to prevent these rebellions. As a consequence, the Turkish state put down rebellions by making use of severe military applications, and implementing several laws (transforming Kurdish names of places, limitations on using Kurdish language, and so forth) in order to delete the Kurdish history and identity and in order to build a Turkish nation state (Marcus, 2007). Nevertheless, whether these policies were correct or not, they were not only implemented towards the Kurds, but to any individual or group who struggled to accept the new norms, since the parliament lists show that there were some conventional political Kurdish elites in the parliament (Somer, 2004).

1.1.3. Silence Period (1938-61)

Turkey was governed by a one-party regime until the election of 1946. After the Dersim rebellion, speaking of Kurdish nationalism openly became rare, even during the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) period in which various democratic laws were implemented, few religious bans were abolished, and the constitution was transformed to ease the pressure of the state on its citizens. Many leaders of the rebellions such as Nuri Dersimi, Ihsan Nuri, and the Cemilpasazada brothers had understood that there is no other choice than to print their experiences in order to establish a written legacy, which had tremendous impact on the systematization of the future Kurdish nationalism (Bozarlan, 2008, pp.343). They had realized that the

impossibility of achieving their dreams in short-term periods. Thus, they should have created a collective memory.

Three important factors can be stated to understand the silence in that period (Bozarslan, 2008, pp.343). First, harsh military applications of the state had killed or exiled the main leaders of the armed rebellions. Second, unsuccessful Kurdish nationalist attempts in Iraq in 1943 by the Barzani Rebellion and the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 1946 in Iran had weakened the Kurdish resistance in the Middle East. Finally, since the birth of political pluralism in Turkey and the policies of the DP provided new opportunity windows for the Kurdish elite. To illustrate, the party implemented returning policies for many Kurdish deportees. In addition, broader economic integration of some Kurdish elites into the other parts of Turkey, the DP's political agenda on broadening relations with the Kurdish tribes, and new possibilities for many Kurdish youth to get an education in Istanbul and Ankara can be evaluated as important instances of the DP period.

However, the DP period did not last very long. The Turkish army organized a coup d'état in 1960, and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes along with two of his ministers were hanged. This showed that although the DP had won the elections in this period, secular elites were still powerful in the state – particularly in bureaucratic and military positions.

1.1.4. Restoration of the Problematic (1961-1978)

During the 1960s, the writings of the 1950s mentioned above circulated among some marginal younger groups and some Kurds were integrated into the new ideas. On the other hand, due to Ataturk's well-known *Nutuk* (Speech) (1927), consisting of few of Ataturk's letters to Kurdish elites during the independence wars, offered news sources for some Kurds in terms of self-awareness (Bozarslan, 2008). Although some signals of a new Kurdish revival were emerging by the end of the 1950s, such as the Society for the Liberation of the Kurds (*Kürtleri Kurtarma Cemiyeti*), the apparent revival of the Kurdish nationalism got on the stage during 1960s with the help of the 1961 constitution which extended civil rights (Anter, 1990, pp. 1-60).

Specifically, there were two other important reasons behind the new Kurdish revival. The first one was the external factor, namely the Kurdish national movements in Iraq conducted by Mustafa Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party, which had significant impact among few of the Kurds in Turkey, especially the youth generation (Bozarslan, 2008). In fact, Barzani's movement had allowed Kurds to reassess the

current situation of the Kurdish language and to interpret Mustafa Barzani as the moral authority of the Kurds (Yavuz, 2001). The second was the internal factor, the developing left-wing movement in Turkey. This socialist and communist movements affected Kurdish youth and large portions of Kurdish society in urban places and Kurds have started to discuss their unrest in the sense of social and economic inequalities among the regions of Turkey (Yegen, 1996; Marcus, 2007). Later, many Kurds joined the Turkish Workers Party (TIP, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) established in 1961.

There were three major reasons behind this interaction. The first reason was that the left-wing ideologies were advocating social and economic equality. Hence, it could be the best and new way to challenge the dominant political order for Kurds by using the marginalized and underdeveloped condition in the southeast region (Somer, 2004). The second reason was that the left-wing ideologies were also challenging Turkish nationalism (Bozarslan, 2008). The third reason was that the Marxist left ideology was providing new universal insights to the Kurds. Hereupon, in Bozarslan's words,

Under the influence of Lenin and Stalin, whose works were now being translated into Turkish, the left in Turkey accepted the legitimacy of the 'national question' (which became a synonym for the Kurdish question), and 'the rights of the oppressed peoples to determine their own fate'...Moreover, it also renewed a sense of Turkish-Kurdish fraternity, i.e. the fraternity of 'oppressed classes and oppressed peoples'...Marxism-Leninism played much the same role as the discourse of Islamic fraternity had done during the War of Independence. (Bozarslan, 2008, pp.346)

With regards to the 1970s, Kurdish students were dissatisfied with the TIP's program concerning the Kurdish issue. The party was banned after the 1971 military coup d'état and most of the members of the party including the Kurds were arrested. Immediately after the coup regime, few Kurdish socialists came to think that an armed revolution would be the only way to struggle to gain their rights. Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistanê*, Kurdistan Workers Party), was one of these Kurdish socialists in the early 1970s. With the disappointment due to the failure of Barzani's movement in 1975 in Iraq, Abdullah Ocalan and his friends established the Ankara Revolutionary Higher Education Student Association (Ankara Devrimci Yüksek Öğrenci Derneği) in order for the indoctrination of their ideologies, which was shaped by establishing a socialist governance in Turkey. Then, Ocalan recruited his first supporters in 1974. Ocalan will have defined this early stage in his writings in the 1990s as "schooling days" (Ocalan, 1996).

1.1.5. Foundation of the PKK, Propaganda, and Armed Conflict (1978-1989)

In early 1977, Ocalan and his supporters started to extend their propaganda campaign in Kurdish-populated cities such as Diyarbakır, Mardin, Tunceli, Ağrı, and Bingöl. During this time, Ocalan and his friends attempted to gain authority by challenging other Kurdish and Socialist groups (Karayılan, 2014). On November 27, 1978, Partîya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Worker's Party) was founded under the leadership of Ocalan in Diyarbakır, through the lenses of a socialist doctrine (Durna, Goktepe, and Keeling, 2008). The PKK's main objective was stated as saving the Kurdistan region from colonialism and fighting to feudalism. Hence, this objective defined the Turkish state as invaders and supporters of the state as traitors (Karayılan, 2014). According to the Ocalan, Kurdish traditional elites were supporters of the Turkish state, and were responsible for the feudal southeast region. They were, therefore, initial targets for the PKK's armed conflict (McDowall, 1997). The end of the 1970s were the years where the PKK sought to steal tribal chiefs' thunder over Kurdish population.

During these years, there was deep conflict between leftist and rightist political groups, and the PKK was solely one of these small groups, hence did not draw the attention of Turkish army forces (Özcan, 1999). On September 12, 1980, the Turkish army forces took control of the Turkish state, under the leadership of General Kenan Evren. Although, Abdullah Ocalan moved to Syria in order to establish the PKK's headquarters before the military intervention, the coup had tremendous impact on the PKK as 1.790 PKK militants had been arrested and 73 of them were executed under the death penalty (Karayılan, 2014).

The PKK organized its first congress in Lebanon in June 1981 with the participation of approximately 200 militants (Özdağ, 2010). There were two decisions of the congress: (1) establishing headquarter in Northern Iraq and Syria, and (2) withdrawing the PKK militants from Turkey. Later, the second congress gathered in August 1982 and the final decision was starting a long-term armed conflict against the Turkish state by taking the Mao's model as an example (Bal and Özkan, 2006). This model consisted of three strategies: strategic balance, strategic defense, and strategic offense (Özdağ, 2010). Then, until 1984, the PKK preferred to concentrate on rural areas and feudal chiefs rather than urban areas as rural regions were less impacted by the imperialist campaigns and they were relatively less protected areas than urban

regions (Özdağ, 2010). Starting in 1984, the PKK extended its objectives and targeted Turkish military forces and other governmental places. Kurdistan Liberation forces (HRK, Hêzên Rizgarîya Kurdistan), the military wing of the PKK, were established in 1984 (Karayılan, 2014) and organized two attacks on Gendarmerie posts in Siirt and Eruh on August 15, 1984. These attacks will be mentioned as the starting point of the PKK terrorism in the future (Bal and Özkan, 2006).

In October 1986, in Lebanon, the third congress of the PKK was organized and the HRK replaced by the Kurdistan People's Liberation Army (ARGK, Arêşîya Rizgeriya Gelê Kurdistan) to proceed for propaganda, recruitment, and armed struggle. During these years, many people who rejected to integrate with the PKK were killed and a large number of children were compelled to join the army forces of the PKK (Bal and Ozkan, 2006).

1.1.6. Deep Armed Conflict (1989-1999)

Adopting a socialist ideology and abandoning Marxist ideology, the PKK demonstrated ideological transformation at the end of the 1980s (Bal and Özkan, 2006). In the future, because of the failure of the Soviet Union, the PKK would abandon socialist perspectives, as well. Between 1989 and 1999, the PKK initiated in guerilla conflict with the Turkish army and during these years, the PKK became one of the biggest terrorist-guerilla organizations in the world. As from 1989 to the early 1990s, a great amount of new militants (According to PKK sources: 30.000, other sources: 15.000 (Marcus, 2007; Özdağ, 2010) joined the PKK military forces.

In the early 1990s, the PKK focused on intensifying its military forces to get prepared well for more deadly attacks. Although the village guards were threatening the PKK insurgency, the target of the PKK was changed from village guards to Turkish military and police forces by the decisions of the fourth congress on December 1990 (Özdağ, 1999), because killing village guards, who worked for the Turkish state, would weaken the PKK's authority on Kurds in the region (Tapan, 2007). On the other hand, this target change would increase the visibility of the PKK on the international stage and might provide a positive image for it (Rees, 1992). In the same year, the PKK organized its fifth congress in May 1990, in Lebanon and declared that the objective of the PKK was concentrating on establishing an independent-socialist Kurdistan (Karayılan, 2014).

In response to these increasing terrorist attacks, the Turkish army conducted large-scale counter-terrorism operations in the second half of the 1990s. This period

was written in history as the most intensive PKK terrorist actions in Turkey. Statistically, on the one hand, 40.799 terrorist attacks have been operated by the PKK, 5.564 government personnel and 4.727 civilians were killed; on the other hand, Turkish security forces captured 13.484 PKK militants, killed 27.136 (Şener, 2010). Although there have been two ceasefire periods, attacks from the both sides intensified during this period until 1999.

1.1.7. The Capture of Abdullah Ocalan and The Ceasefire Period (1999–2004)

Although he had been seeking asylum from Russia, Greece, and Italy, Ocalan was captured in February 1999 in Kenya as a result of Turkey's diplomatic pressures (M. Gunter, 2000). As might be expected, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan caught the PKK's leadership off guard. Later, the PKK organized the sixth congress without Abdullah Ocalan and declared that Ocalan was still the general secretary of the PKK organization (Karayılan, 2014).

In 2000, during his defense, Abdullah Ocalan transformed his discourse completely. He apologized to the Turkish society, called to the PKK to end armed struggle in order to seek political solutions. Immediately afterwards, the PKK leadership welcomed this message and declared that they were leaving Turkey. Throughout his trial, he proposed a new objective including "the Democratic Republic" program to end the Kurdish conflict in which all of the nations would live in peace. Thus, this rhetoric was projecting for Kurds to work for a justly democratic Turkey, rather than an independent Kurdish state (Kirişçi, 2004). His trial was due on June 29, 1999 and he was condemned to the death penalty by the Turkish court. Shortly after, however, the death penalty was revoked by the Turkish parliament in 2002.

The European Council added the PKK to the list of terrorist organizations in December 2001 (Bal and Özkan, 2006). This meant losing international support for the PKK militants. In April 2002, the PKK executives organized the eighth congress and altered the organization's name to the Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasîya Kurdistan (KADEK, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress). KADEK declared that the new objective of the organization was to pursue non-violent activities and political solutions in defending Kurdish people's rights.

Since the number of the attacks from the PKK had radically decreased, the problem was considered to have ended. However, the regional context in the Middle East was dramatically changed due to United States' presence in Iraq that started in

November 2003. Although the diplomatic pressures of the Turkish state, the Kurds in Iraq became de facto allies of the United States. Then, the PKK militants once again altered their names to the Kongra Gelê Kurdistan (KONGRA GEL, Kurdistan People Congress) and declared that they would initiate armed struggle in self-defense (Marcus, 2007; Özdağ, 2010).

1.1.8. PKK Back to the Stage (2004–2012)

2004 was the year that the PKK returned to the stage. In June 2004, the PKK's wing the Hêzen Parastina Gel (People's Defense Force, HPG) took control of the militant group and declared that the ceasefire was ended. HPG alleged lack of solution to the Kurdish question as a pretext of the revival of the attacks (Bal and Özkan, 2006). A large number of attacks re-increased during this period, especially by using urban bombings (Marcus, 2007). In 2007, the Turkish state enabled the Turkish military forces to carry out cross-border operations in Iraq. In 2009, the AKP government put its "Kurdish opening" policy in place by aiming the disarmament of the PKK and political resolution to the Kurdish conflict. However, due to the PKK and the Turkish Army's mutual escalating attacks, especially the Habur process and the PKK's Reshadiye attacks, made heavy weather of the Kurdish opening (Pusane, 2014).

Immediately afterwards, the Turkish government applied a new strategy against the PKK, on the one hand struggling militarily with the PKK, on the other hand holding a dialogue process open with the PKK's political wing, the BDP. This strategy was after a video was released to the media, demonstrating the BDP deputies' close relationships with the PKK militants (Pusane, 2014). However, despite these developments, the Turkish government officials proceeded to leave the door open for the possibility of re-assessing the talks with the Abdullah Öcalan. As a result, at the end of 2012, the peace process between the parties started with the Oslo Process, and talks between the National Intelligence Agency and the PKK followed.

1.1.9. Peace Process between 2012-2015 and the Current Situation

On December 28, 2012, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that talks with Abdullah Öcalan began. This was the first time a top official had reported the talks in Turkey's conflict history. The meeting began at the end of 2012 and some of the deputies of the BDP were allowed to talk with Abdullah Öcalan. In this process, Hakan Fidan, the chief of the National Intelligence Organization, served as the government's representative and deputies of the BDP was carrying messages from Abdullah Öcalan to the PKK executives (Aras and Duman, 2014).

These meetings revealed some significant political transformations regarding the Kurdish conflict. First, it showed that the Turkish state transformed its approach associated with the Kurdish politician and Öcalan's role in resolving the Kurdish question. Second, this period was the first time state officials openly suggested that the Kurdish conflict could not be resolved by making use of military instruments. Third, Öcalan's calls seemed to be willingness to discuss political solution. Fourth, aside from political support, many NGOs in Turkey stated that they are willingness to help both parties of the conflict in order to solve the problem (Aras and Duman, 2014).

However, during this period, the peace process witnessed various worrying developments. Protests for the Siege of Kobane, intractable conflicts in Syria, ISIL threat in the region, and the YPG's (the PKK's militia wing in Syria) integration into the US forces in external dimension; Gezi Protests, general elections under tension, and parallel state trial in internal dimension were the developments which escalated the tension between the Turkish state and the PKK (SETA, 2016). At last, Suruç Bombing, which was blamed ISIL affiliated group in Turkey for the bombing, was the end point of the peace process. On July 22, 2015, the PKK killed two policemen in Şanlıurfa and the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state has begun and are still going on (SETA, 2016).

All of these developments in the history reveals that there are still several obstacles in resolving an intractable conflict and finding a lasting solution. However, to study these obstacles are out of the scope of this thesis. The important point that one can point out now is as to what the core issues of the conflict in sum are. What were the peace initiatives during these mentioned periods? Who are the parties of the conflict? How did they define the conflict? What were their strategies to deal with the conflict? The next part will answer these questions.

1.2. Core Issues of the Conflict

Identifying the core issues of the conflict helps analysts understand and give meaning the nature of the conflict. Additionally, it provides a map for the peace-building phases of the conflict (Wehr, 1979). Theoretically, a conflict will emerge and develop around more issues. In historical narratives, they might generally point out one or two single issues, but in reality, these issues should be seen as the tip of the iceberg. Every conflict emerges around various complicated issues. If it is transformed into an intractable character, it is possible that various new issues can be constructed during decades.

As outlined by Çelik (2009), there are various core issues between the State and citizens, between the State and the PKK, and between Turkish and Kurdish groups in Turkey. These three categories have various economic, political, security related, social, and relational issues. In the economic category, the Kurdish conflict is affected by the damaged economic infrastructure, the delayed economic development, ownership disagreements, an illegal economy, and the unbalanced economic budget. As for security, the presence of village guards, the existence of the PKK, the presence of land mines, and the continuation of sporadic violence can be counted. Among the social issues of the Kurdish conflict, unemployment and poverty, weak social care, weakened social fabric and trauma, and conflict over collective rights (especially the linguistic rights) can be demonstrated as vital. Political issues can be listed as political parties and the various intellectuals' focus on the issues of the existence of strong coercive institutions, as well as election quotas, disturbed human-rights practices, legitimacy problems, education in the mother tongue, clashing views on the nature of the state whether it is unitary or federal, political participation, the end of violence, the release of Öcalan, and the transformation of the governmental system into a federal state structure.

1.3. Parties in the Conflict and Peace Initiatives

Conflict parties can be defined as decisional units of the conflict, which involved directly or indirectly in the conflict (Wehr, 1979). In the case of Turkey, in general, the two conflicting parties are: first, the PKK, a massive movement that uses weapons and violence in the name of defending Kurdish rights in Turkey, second, the government of the State that has used security services and military to deal with the terrorism and to get its own interests in the conflict.

1.3.1. Parties in The Conflict

1.3.1.1. The PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistanê*, Kurdistan Workers Party)

In this thesis, the PKK is the only party, which is placed in the opposite of the Turkish state. It was established by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 by intending to mobilize Kurdish individuals to form a Kurdistan in the Southeast region of Turkey. The years between 1970 and 1978 are the years of the pre-PKK, which is known as Pre-PKK (Bozarslan, 2008). PKK has executed its early activities and achieved its founding process between 1978 and 1984. The years between 1984 and 1999 are the years with escalation and de-escalation trends through the PKK's propagandas, terrorism and

guerilla war. In 1999, Abdullah Ocalan was captured (Marcus, 2007). Years between 1999 and 2004 have passed with ceasefire. Between 2004 and 2012, the PKK returned the stage and combatted in high intense. The peace process started in 2013 with the Oslo Process and ended in June 2015. Today, the PKK consists of both non-violent and violent groups and they have left separatist demands. High-position representatives of the PKK assert that the peace will be achieved when problems over the Kurdish language in education and the Kurdish identity recognition by the Turkish constitution and imprisonment of Öcalan.




Figure 1.1. Attack Types of the PKK until 2013 (Source: *Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed on 01/23/2016*)




Figure 1.2. Target Types of the PKK until 2013 (Source: *Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed on 01/23/2016*)

1.3.1.2. Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)

The TSK has the largest standing force in Europe (Evans-Pritchard, 2004) and the second largest in NATO (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). Therefore, as one guesses a large portion of the expenses are allocated for the TSK in Turkey. TSK has always been deeply active in politics; hence, it has been always an actor in the Kurdish question. As indicated in Part I, TSK has interpreted itself as the undisputed protector of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and has interfered in politics when it perceives any necessity (Zacharia, 2010). Over thirty years, the TSK has applied a large number of military attacks on the PKK. During this period, the PKK was perceived as a virus transmitted by foreign power that aimed to separate the unity of Turkey (Copur, 2009).

1.3.1.3. The Government and Politicians

Turkey has a parliamentary government system ruling by multi-party democracy with both a prime minister and president. Legislative branch consists of 550 memberships. Although few former governments perceived the Kurdish question as a regional security problem, in many cases, as Özal, the 8th President of Turkey from 1989 to 1993, and today's political parties perceive the Kurdish question in the way of social phenomenon. Today, the contemporary state actors specifically AKP are the most important decision-makers in the peace process. AKP has started Kurdish Opening process in 2009 and the peace process in 2013. During this period, there were three other opposition parties in the Assembly. First one is *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (*Republican People's Party*, CHP) – the founder party of the Turkish state, and *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (*Nationalist Movement Party*, MHP) – Turkish nationalist party in Turkey. On the other side the BDP (*Democracy and Peace Party*). From the beginning of the Kurdish question, governmental side of Turkey has implemented various policies to struggle with the issue such as diplomatic pressures on PKK, border security and cooperation treaties with neighboring countries as Syria and Iraq, democratic reforms, EU adaptation reforms, economic investments to the region, tax deductions and incentives, allowing education and publication in Kurdish language, and so forth. Peace initiatives of the governmental side will be presented in further detail in section B.

1.3.2. Conflict Resolution Strategies of the Turkish State and Peace Initiatives

1.3.2.1. The TSK and Its Strategies to Resolve the Conflict

Although it has transformed recently, the TSK's interpretation of the Kurdish question has been originated in "greed-based" perspective (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), rather, it rejected the existence of a Kurdish question. In the sense of this interpretation, the TSK was conducting various harsh military operations to the Kurdish "secessionist" movement. From the beginning, Kurdish militants were considered as puppets of external forces that wanted to separate Turkey's unity and to stop progress (Copur, 2009). The Kurdish question, therefore, has been denied, rather, it was an only a regional-security problem (Marcus, 2007). As mentioned in previous conflict-history part, between 1983 and 2002, after the coup, the TSK was the official administrator of the resolution strategies towards the PKK. In this period, southeast region of Turkey were declared as "State of Emergency Regions" (McGregor, 2007). For a long time, the TSK has believed that in order to finish the problem of terrorism, one more severe operation will be enough to root the PKK away (Marcus, 2007).

At the beginning of the PKK attacks, both the TSK and politicians undervalued the organization. They perceived the PKK as a small group of bandits impacted by the Iraq-Iran war. Since the PKK attacks regularly raised, the TSK become to focus on the issue as an anti-terrorism task. Immediately afterwards, special military units began to serve in the southeast region (Kundakçı, 2004). In the early years, small number of the TSK soldiers and the PKK militants were killed in the conflict. In order to damage the PKK's attacks and efforts in the rural areas, the TSK began to implement a new strategy, which is known as the "Village Guard System".

1.3.2.1.1. The Village Guard System

The system was put into practice in 1985. With this new system, the government chose several village guards candidates and trained them to secure their villages from the PKK militants officially. The recruitment was twofold. First, the villagers could join the system voluntarily. Second, the TSK and sub-governor gendarme forces could choose someone to be a village guard in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the Turkish Republic. Over the years, the village guard members were active in most of the security operations of the TSK, even sometimes they involved in attacks against the PKK.

1.3.2.1.2. Internal Displacements

As mentioned earlier in the section on conflict history, the PKK began its propaganda to get a logistical support and recruit new memberships specifically in rural areas in the southeast region due to the lack of security in these areas (Kirişçi, 1997). Since PKK's suppression on people to give their support to the PKK, the Turkish state preferred to displace village people in order to cut the support, without regard to people in villages have supported willingly or unwillingly. Evacuating process proceeded to 1997 (Arslan, Demir, and Duru, 2004).

1.3.2.1.3. Cross-Border Operations

The cross-border operations, by the TSK, were initially launched in 1983 to Iraq, by 7000 TSK soldiers (Gunter, 1994). Afterwards, several cross-border operation have launched in 1980s and 1990s based on intensity of the PKK attacks generally into northern Iraq and rarely into Iran. In 2000s, there are also large number of cross-border operations carried out by the TSK, especially in 2008 and 2012 (see TSK press releases: http://www.tsk.tr/20_ingilizce_tsktr/index.html)

1.3.2.2. The Turkish Government and its Strategies to Resolve the Conflict or Peace Initiatives

Although there were some approaches in the governmental side that were synonymous with the TSK's greed-based approach, the Turkish state cabinets and parliaments mostly perceived Kurdish question originating in "grievance-based" perspective (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) and attempted to improve economic and democratic conditions in the region and developed several conflict resolution tools (See Table 1.3.). More or less all of the major parties in Turkey have conducted researches, offered economic packages, mentioned social problems of the region, and suggested political solutions regarding the Kurdish questions (Akçura, 2009). In this part, I will to examine the last five leadership periods (Ozal Period, Demirel and Çiller Period, Ecevit Period, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu period) by pointing out peace initiatives and general characteristics of these periods.

The ten year period between 1983 and 1993 can be named as the Özal period in Turkish political history. After the three years of the Kenan Evren's coup regime, Turgut Özal was elected as the prime minister of the Turkish state until 1989. In 1989, Turgut Özal became the 8th President of the Turkish State.

Table 1.1. Conflict Resolution Tools of the Turkish State

CR Tool	Brief Explanation
Security of Borders and Treaties	Turkey signed the Border Security and Cooperation Treaty with the government of Iraq in 1983 and the very same protocol with Syria in 1985 (Oran, 2001). This treaty provided Iraqi, Syrian and Turkish military forces chances in order to secure their borders effectively by the right to chase borders at any insurgency (Özdağ, 2010).
Adana Treaty	With diplomatic pressures, threat of war, and the mediation of Mubarak, the current president of Egypt, Turkey persuaded Syria to sign Adana Treaty in 1998. The treaty included a protocol to take Öcalan out of Syria (Karakaya, 2009).
The PKK as a Terrorist Organization in the Official Lists of US and EU	The PKK was added to the US and the EU's official terrorist organizations after the Ocalan's capture (Bal and Özkan, 2006).
GAP	GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project), starting with the Özal period, multi-sector development project was designed to improve social and economic standards of people in the south-east region, including health, agriculture, irrigation, energy-production, infrastructure, education, and health.
Rehabilitation Project	In 1999, in order to provide an opportunity for families who wanted to turn back to their villages, Ecevit put "Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project" into practice (Marcus, 2007)
Tax Reductions and Investment Projects in the Southeast Region	From the late 1990s to the present, the Turkish state encourage investments by offering reduced taxes, discounts for electric usage, and low interest credits for many business companies in the southeast region.
Opportunity for Returning Home	The Turkish state implemented "repentance bills" many times to allow the PKK militants for granting amnesty or reducing sentences .
Newruz Celebrations	In Turkey, celebrating Newruz was banned several times due to the PKK's propagandas in these celebrations. It was assigned as a national holiday in Turkey in 1995 but reoccurring clashes between the Turkish security forces and Kurds led it to be banned again until 2009. From now on, celebrating Newruz is legal in Turkey.
State Emergency Regions	This strategy used almost twenty years and was abolished in 2002
European Union Reforms	Including a wide-range of consolidations and regulations in terms of social life, democratic rights, and minority rights, the Turkish state had passed several EU adaptation packages from 2002 to the present.

Özal was the president that focused mainly on the improvement of the Turkish economy through initiating free market policies, democratic reforms, and relations with the European countries (Güzel, 2010). Regarding the PKK's early activities, Özal interpreted the problem as a consequence of Iran-Iraq war (Evrensel, 1998). This might be understandable as the PKK's activities were not intense during his prime minister period. Nevertheless, the Kurdish question entered in the Turkish state's political agenda for the first time during the Özal's period. In this period, the public was confronted the new explanations and suggestions differed from the official thesis. Özal indirectly recognized the Kurdish reality by explaining his Kurdish roots from his grandmother's side. Second, Erdal Inonu, the head of the SHP, and some other politicians declared that the Kurdish question could not be solved by military means. Özal was an important actor for the conflict resolution that developed direct fruitful relations with the Kurdish leaders in Iraq, namely Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani (Ergan, 2002). However, the PKK's activism intensity rose during Özal's presidency period (1989-1993). From the beginning, according to Özal, the Kurdish question was a matter of democracy instead of ethnic matters. Thus, the solution should be shaped by political means, rather than military (Marcus, 2007). Although the TSK was still a dominant actor over Turkish politics during this period, contrary to the TSK's ideological clichés, Özal was insistent on removing limitations on usage of the Kurdish language and in 1991, writing and speaking in Kurdish was set free. The year before he died, he had been working on a general amnesty strategy for the PKK militants. In these years, everybody, even Abdullah Öcalan, believed a resolution of the Kurdish question was so close (Marcus, 2007). However, in 1993, on April 17, Turgut Özal, the 8th president of Turkish state, lost his life due to a (suspicious) heart attack and the death of Özal weakened the hope of a democratic resolution of the Kurdish conflict (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997).

On the other hand, there was an important civil initiative in the TBMM and this civil initiative was relatively more independent from the PKK organization than present conditions. Although there was an armed-conflict with the PKK during that period, it was not as deep as the conflict at present times. If the politicians of that period could have kept the civil Kurdish politicians in the TBMM, the principal of negotiation with the legitimate actors would have been achieved. At the same time, there were a number of civil politician, who were not engaged with the PKK or violence, within the RP political camps. They would also be viewed as the legitimate

actors for negotiations. However, on one hand, there was a strong military domination over Turkish politics at that time, on the other hand the defensive-nationalist tendencies of the public were the main obstacles for well-designed peace initiatives. The central threat for the politicians at that period were that the possible perception of making concessions to terrorism within the society.

The seven year period between 1993 and 2000 can be named as the Demirel period in Turkish political history. Suleyman Demirel, 9th president of Turkish State, was constantly careful in relationships with the TSK, due to his several experiences with coup d'états (Dündar, 1999). Hence, Even though he has some statements regarding the Kurdish conflict, Demirel was not actively engaged in recognition of the Kurdish question both in his prime minister period (1991-1993) and presidency period (1993-2000). Rather, once he stated that acknowledging the Kurdish question was synonymous with separating Turkey (Dünya Bülteni, 2009). In 1993, Demirel became the 9th president of Turkey and his colleague Tansu Çiller served as the prime minister until 1996. After death of Özal, Turkey could not maintain its political and economic stability due to early elections and a post-modern TSK coup d'état came true in 1997. In addition, the PKK terrorist attacks was incredibly increased and reached its peak level (Sener, 2010; Ergil, 2009). Although Çiller mentioned political and social means to resolve the conflict such as offering a Kurdish television channel or getting a Kurdish education as an elective course, she reversed her decision due to pressure from the opposition parties and favored military means to end the conflict, as TSK's main perspective (Sezgin, 1993). Later on, a large number of TSK operation were conducted towards the PKK. The entrance of HEP deputies with the SHP to the TBMM was a big chance to give a start to discussions and negotiations. However, the crisis of Kurdish oath-taking ceremony led to political crisis. Similarly, rupture of the relations between HEP and SHP due not to finish OHAL within the region removed the possibility of dialogues. Thusly, the political polarization in terms of the Kurdish question within the TBMM led to period of close of Kurdish-nationalist parties, respectively, HEP, OZDEP, HADEP, DEHAP, and DTP (Kirisici and Winrow, 1997).

Bülent Ecevit accepted the 1997 coalition of the Turkish state as a smaller party. At the very short term, Ecevit was the temporary prime minister of the Turkey until 1999 general election, and Abdullah Öcalan was captured during his term. In 1999, the capture of Öcalan provided a very important chance to Ecevit for gaining majority of the vote in the general election. Actually, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan

was an important chance for several reforms because the capture was meant as the defeat of the PKK. So, this perception would be useful to dispose of the perception of making concession to the PKK. However, the public was not ready for the reforms and there were several polemics within the TBMM at that period. Immediately afterwards, Ecevit became the prime minister of Turkey until 2002 by leading a coalition government. However, the Turkish economy was still in trouble and turned into a crisis in 2001. During Ecevit's period, the Kurdish question was considered to have ended due to Öcalan's capture. According to Ecevit, there was no Kurdish question, rather an issue of regional poverty. Nevertheless, constitutional amendment restricting freedom of expression in languages was prohibited by the law, which was an important step. However, in 2002, the parliament went through an early election.

In brief, until AKP come to power alone, political parties in Turkey possess various approaches regarding the conflict. DYP, MHP, and DSP were following the traditional line in terms of the conflict. According to them, there was no Kurdish question, rather a terror and security problem. During this period, this traditional line was represented by Demirel and Çiller. Yılmaz, next head of the ANAP after Ozal, could not maintain the brave and radical attitude of Ozal in terms of the conflict. Contrary to the mainstream right parties, the RP, the national vision movement, evaluated the regime problems as central causes of the Kurdish question and interpreted the wrong policies of the Turkish state as fundamental obstacles to establish sustainable solidarity. On the other hand, the leftist political parties of the period, SHP and CHP, were systematically publishing analytic reports in terms of the Kurdish conflict by defending the mistake of understanding the Kurdish question solely as a security question. According to them, the concepts such as democratic rights, citizenship, identity, and respect for all cultures should entered to the center of the debates in terms of the Kurdish question. MHP, from past to today, always define the question as an exterior terrorism and security problem. Despite everything, the TSK was still the most important actor for the conflict, and Ozal and Demirel were the most important actors in the political arena. Decreasing the suppression of the TSK requires constitutional policies but coalition governments and sensitive balances among them were not sufficient to reach constitutional steps. Thus, although there were few cease-fire periods, the Turkish state could never start the negotiation process with the opponents. The interpretation of neither the Turkish society nor the decision makers was adequate to solve the Kurdish conflict.

In 2001, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) had been established by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current President of Turkey, and a group of Welfare Party colleagues. Erdoğan won a landslide victory in the 2002 general elections and became the prime minister of Turkey until 2014. After eleven years or since the Özal period, Turkey turned to be governed by a single-party and this situation proceeds due to AKP's success in the regular elections of 2007, 2011, and 2015. AKP's governance during fourteen years has brought political and economic stability, and several fruitful transformations in terms of foreign affairs, democratic progress, relations with the EU and international relations of Turkey (Goldfarb, 2011).

As mentioned above, there was a lack of societal/political support and a suppression of the TSK as important obstacles in order to solve the Kurdish question. However, the EU orientation intention, EU reforms (See Table 1.4.), to come to power alone provided important chances to the AKP to turn these disadvantages into advantages. Henceforth, the AKP was the only actor for decision-making. In 2005, negotiation process between EU and Turkey officially started. As regards to the Kurdish question, Erdoğan's period has witnessed a large number of - perhaps the most intense period for peace initiatives (See Table 1.4.) – democratic and social developments to resolve the conflict such as freedom of press in Kurdish language, restoration of the names of some cities and towns, and many economic investments in the southeast region of Turkey (Arsu, 2009). According to Erdoğan's government, the Kurdish question should be considered mostly as a democratization manner. The other important point that the AKP regularly emphasized is the separation between PKK terrorism and the Kurdish question.

In terms of the Kurdish question, there were still many obstacles to develop more efficient tools to resolve the conflict. First, Turkey was in the most influential economic crisis in history, since 2000. In addition, Turkey was the victim of the Duzce earthquake of 1999. Hence, establishment of the new economic system was the primary issue for the AKP officials. Second, the AKP needs evidence for its maturity to strengthen its power. Therefore, developing policies for the candidanship of the EU was the other important goal for the AKP.

Table 1.2. Legal and Administrative reforms liberalizing Kurdish Identity and Language in Turkey in the post-1999 period

Reforms	Date
Constitutional amendment restricting freedom of expression in "languages prohibited by the law"	October 2011
Allowing broadcasting in Kurdish	March 2002
Allowing private course in Kurdish	August 2002
Abolishing prohibit on Kurdish personal names	June 2003
Public TV station broadcasting in Kurdish	January 2009
Allowing electoral campaigning in Kurdish	March 2010 - September 2013
Establishment of Kurdish language and literature programs at university level	January 2011
Allowing elected Kurdish language courses at the fifth grade	September 2012
Allowing limited defense in Kurdish at courts	January 2013
Allowing Kurdish language education in private schools	September 2013
Abolishing "Oath of Allegiance" (to the Turkish nation) recited by primary school students	September 2013
Allowing q,w, and x in computer keyboards	September 2013
Allowing village names revert back to their originals	September 2013

Third, as an international factor, the US was in warfare with Iraq and this warfare conditions lead to uncertainty of the geo-political conditions of the Kurdish question. Since the overthrowing of Saddam would allow pan-Kurdish movements in the region, the AKP government should guardedly take its steps. Therefore, taking these three important conditions into the consideration, although there were several developments in terms of the Kurdish question, various important brave steps could not have been achieved such as the future of the PKK or the general amnesty of the combatants of the PKK.

The Erdogan period witnessed armed conflict (2004-2008, 2015-present), Kurdish opening period, and the peace processes. The solution formula of the AKP

has nearly always presented the concept of the citizenship of Turkey as an umbrella concept for all identities in Turkey.

1.3.2.2.1. Kurdish/Democratic Opening

In 2009, the AKP government proclaimed its will power to initiate a Kurdish/Democratic opening associated with the prolonged Kurdish conflict by defining a new manner with respect to the Kurdish society. In addition, this opening was meant to bring upon the willingness to openly discuss the Kurdish question. However, although there are several political attempts as seen in Table 1.4, the process could not lead to negotiations among the parties due to the absence of a clear plan and a framework determining how the discussions among the parties should proceed or what the limitations of the opening. Rather, who the primary legitimate actor should be was unclear. Thus, the lack of adequate arrangement of both Turkish and Kurdish sides before starting the opening process leads to more marginalization of the radical political sides of the Kurdish side. The speeches of the Kurdish sides were obliged to act as a mouthpiece for Abdullah Öcalan.

1.3.2.2.2. Peace Process

In December 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that direct contact with Öcalan and the representatives of the PKK started in order to establish a peace process in Turkey. During the solution process, negotiations' ultimate purpose was to end violence with the PKK, ceasefire, taking weapons from the PKK, and reintegrating the members of the PKK into the society. In the process, negotiations were realized among the national security organization of Turkey on one side, and Abdullah Öcalan – the founder of the PKK – deputies of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), and few officials of the PKK on the other side. However, the peace process started in 2013 with the Oslo Process and ended in June 2015 (SETA, 2016).

1.3.2.2.3. Wise Persons Commission (WPC)

The most important resolution tool to establish a peace process was the Wise Persons Commission. The WPC can be seen as the first civil and comprehensive attempt in Turkey to explore citizens' minds and to learn what citizens' thoughts are. The commission was chosen to start its activities by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in April 2013. They worked in different regions of Turkey. The WPC can be shown as an insider-side of the resolution strategy that seeks to influence and inform the public associated with the peace process, to explore the expectations of the public from the solution process, and to enhance empathy among the ethnic, religious, and

cultural identities in Turkey. The commission was separated into 7 groups in order to work in seven geographical regions in Turkey (DPI, 2013). Although the WPC's function was to prepare society for negotiations, the influence of it was limited because the middle-range efforts cannot be spread through all of the levels of the society. (I will further discuss this situation in the data analysis chapter).

1.3.2.2.4. Davutoglu Period

In 2014, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former foreign secretary, became the prime minister within the current peace process. However, either internal developments (Gezi protests (Göle, 2013), parallel state discussions (Dalay, 2014), and presidential system discussion) or external developments (protracted-international conflict in Syria) both negatively impacted the peace process in Turkey and the context in the region has transformed. Today, Davutoğlu and Erdoğan still proceed to separate the PKK issue from the Kurdish question, insisting on the necessity of accordingly dealing with the PKK terrorism. Therefore, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have still a challenging issue on their hands and a long-term period to solve the intractable conflict. According to the thesis' main argument, the Turkish society is not ready to confront the brave steps needed for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1.Introduction

As defined previously in the introduction chapter of this study, the present research seeks to discover what the content of the Turkish society's ethos of conflict is. The former chapter sought to demonstrate the multi-dimensional characteristics of the Kurdish conflict. This chapter seeks to form a theoretical basis for the inquiry. The central focus of the research deals with the conflict, which was at the cease-fire/agreement stage. In the peace-making stage, resistance to change is the most crucial obstacle for transforming a conflict from a violent to a peaceful climate. Reaching sustainable peace requires assessment of all aspects of conflict. All political, sociological, global-contextual, psychological, and socio-psychological dimensions should be taken into the consideration to develop a comprehensive insight for resolution.

In order to understand and explain the causes of resistance, there is a myriad of theories in the literature (Bar-Tal, 2007; Collier, 2003; King, 1997; Sisk, 1997; Walter, 2002). Acknowledging the importance and impact of all dimensions, I would rather use socio-psychological models to give meaning to the resistance to change. In my view, generally the socio-psychological aspect is disregarded by many scholars analyzing conflict. This research aims to understand resistances at the societal level by using Bar-Tal's EOC theory.

This chapter, from macro lenses initially provides a brief introduction to define the conflict concept and indicates the multi-dimensional nature of CR. Second, it seeks to understand the peace phenomenon within the multi-dimensional conflicts and forms a basis for the thesis' central focus: public peace process. Third, it discusses one of the most important dimensions that include several obstacles for establishing sustainable peace, namely the social-psychological dimension by making use of Daniel Bar-Tal's theory of ethos of conflict.

2.2.Defining the Concept of Conflict

Early theorists in the field, such as Morton Deutsch, one of the most visionary scholars in the field, classified conflict between *destructive* and *constructive* (Deutsch, 1973, pp.17). According to this normative understanding of the CR, *destructive*

conflicts refer to conflicts that should be kept away but *constructive* conflicts suggest a valuable dimension of creativity of the human being. How then should one conceive conflict? First, the theoretical definition is made by Lewis Coser, the first sociologist that sought to bring structural functionalism and conflict theory together. For Coser, conflict is “a struggle over values, and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals” (Coser, 1956, pp.8). To give a starting point for a field, emphasizing on values and scarcity makes this definition very important in the physical sense but it is not adequate. Himes extends this definition and states, “Social conflict refers to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and gain status, power, resources, and other scarce values” (Himes, 1980, pp.14). Deutsch evaluates conflict as a situation that can be observed at the occurrence of incompatible activities (Deutsch, 1973). In my thesis, I prefer to use the concept of conflict in the meaning of Pruitt and Rubin’s (1986, pp.5) definition, “A conflict is a perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously”. In my view, the emphasis on the concepts of “perception”, “belief”, and “interest” in this definition gives a departure point to analyze conflict.

There may be various origins leading to destructive conflict that can be observed in situations such as social change, economic differentiation, psychological development, cultural formation, and incompatible goals. During conflict, the context of the conflict, actors of the parties of the conflict, the level of conflict, the issues struggled with as a point of disagreement – they can be fact-based, value-based, interest-based – may changeover. In other words, conflict is dynamic. Conflict may escalate or deescalate due to the complex relations of behavior and attitudes (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse & Miall, 2012). Therefore, various stages may form the conflict’s environment.

In order to analyze stages of the conflict, the *conflict escalation and de-escalation* model provides a helpful graph for analysts. As mentioned previously, conflicts should be considered as dynamic processes and they can expeditiously change and transform. Escalation and de-escalation waves of conflicts are very unpredictable and complex processes (see figure 2.1).




Figure 2.1. Conflict escalation and de-escalation Model (Source: Ramsbotham & Woodhouse & Miall, 2012)

Within this framework, various factors can cause fluctuations in the graph such as secondary conflicts with the parties involved in the conflict, or transformed strategies and goals, or context transformation, or issue transformation, or structural transformation (Vayrynen, 1991; Aggestam, 1999; Montville, 1993; Cunningham, 2006). The importance of the model in thinking about CR finds its reflection in the search of conflict analysts. The answer of “What should we do?” or “Which tools do we need for resolution?” can be found by answering the question as to what stage one is.

Conflicts are living organisms and hence there are ups, downs, ends, and breaks. The normal distribution curve starts with the difference stage. This level includes the initial differences in all parts of all social changes and developments. The following stage, namely contradiction, means to impossibility of the latency of the dispute on differences. In addition, this level demonstrates the occurrence of contradiction among the parties involved in the conflict. At the polarization level, relationships among parties take an antagonistic form and they not only dispute the differences, but also advance their manifests. At culminating point, by using direct violence, the war or armed conflict begins and this is the most harmful level of the conflict. However, as one might guess, these changes do not take a shape linearly. Finally, violence, war, and ceasefire stages can be considered as conflict containment stages that aim to end fight and prevent killings (Ramsbotham & Woodhouse & Miall, 2012).

The four deepest levels of the conflict curve, namely difference-contradiction and normalization-reconciliation, include both structural and cultural changes for peace- building (Fisher and Keashly, 1991). The polarization and agreement stages need elite peace-making processes. However, peace- building and peacekeeping efforts do not work in the stages of violence and ceasefire. The peace- keeping strategies are most useful to stop direct violence at these stages. At the culminating stage of war, the only way of ending war is with the strategies of war limitation (Fisher and Keashly, 1991). From the viewpoint of this terminology, the deepest four levels, in turn difference, contradiction, normalization, and reconciliation can be considered conflict transformation stages aiming to transform issues, actors, structure or goals of the parties. The polarization and agreement stages can be considered conflict settlement stages focusing on negotiations, third-party interventions to settle conventions and agreements (Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

2.3. Defining Peace as a Public Process

What creates a war “ending” or peace “starting” are themselves very complicated questions. All peace and CR research aims to improve theories and knowledge for these two tricky questions. In the sense of superficial understanding while “war” is a phenomena associated with bloody conflict, “peace” is considered a “non-war” or absence of conflict (Tonge, 2014). This understanding is a largely static and bereft of dynamism. Defining peace in such a narrow lens that it tells nothing about what peace should consist of, or avoid or about what action one needs to take (Cox, 1986). The concepts of war and peace may point to more complex definitions.

Galtung argues that in the literature the concept of peace has been superficially seen as a common label for non-war situations (Galtung, 1967). Yet, today one can easily see, war and peace are much more difficult to define. Considering the term peace as a utopian idea provides no prescription for CR. Defining peace as a process implies that the transformation from violence to non-violence or permanent endings of conflicts cannot be considered as linear conditions. Rather, it should be understood that they are subjects for non-linear conditions. The concept of peace process is a comprehensive label that indicates a multi-dimensional character of the permanent eradication of conflicts.

Concerning this issue, Tonge states preconditions to give a start peace processes can be specified as follows: “involvement of most combatants; the cessation of conflict (peace); the formulation and implementation of political arrangements,

whether interim or comprehensive accords; the prevention of the reignition of conflict (process) and the attempted political management of differences” (Tonge, 2014, pp.7). Although these factors reflect a comprehensive picture, Darby and MacGinty offer a slightly different checklist for elemental constituents of peace processes. Their offer involves five different components: 1) A willingness to address the key issues of conflict; 2) the end of violence; 3) prolonged agreement; 4) involvement of parties in process; and 5) conducting well-intended negotiations (Darby and MacGinty, 2003, pp.2).

In this study, I acknowledge Darby and MacGinty’s definitions as my central assumption regarding precautions because of their understandable terminology. It is clear all of these insights indicate that peace is a clustering of time, ideas, transformation, changes and developments. Therefore, using the term “peace process” admits that conflicts do not cease suddenly, but are transformed, changed, managed or may be resolved over a long period of time.

The myriad of works associated with conflicts and peace processes tends to analyze the political dimensions of peace processes and the parties or groups that are involved in negotiations. In Lederach’s view, the literature needs some extra categorizations within the peace process and political dimension should be considered as only one dimension carried out by elites, namely a top-down approach (Lederach, 1997). There should be two more running phases of the peace process (See Figure 2.2). The central assumption of this categorization is that peace processes should be sold to the masses at large after negotiations among elites. Although he acknowledges that the leaders of both parties involved in the conflict are most encouraged and motivated actors to build peace, the elite-level efforts of peace building completely adequate to building of sustainable peace (Lederach, 1997). According to Lederach, there are two opposing theories in the literature. One argues and suggests that peace can be built from the top-down while the other claims that it can be achieved from the bottom-up (Lederach, 1997). According to him, both insights are integrated and related. To demonstrate how they are integrated and related to one another, Lederach schematizes their relations as seen in the following graph.




Figure 2.2. Levels of Leadership (Source: John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, 1997, pp.39)

In brief, Lederach specifies three distinct levels of leadership: 1) Top-level leadership, 2) Middle-Range leadership, 3) Grassroots leadership (Lederach, 1997). Level-1 encompasses the key military and political leaders involved in the prolonged conflict. They can be the highest representative leaders of both sides and as such. Level-2 comprises the people in leadership positions as well. Although there are powerful contacts with top-level leaders of either government or the opposition group in this level, the leaders at Level-2 are not bound by the political ties. The ultimate function of these groups is to connect both the top and grassroots levels together and influence people across the human and physical geography of the ongoing conflict. The final group, Level-3 encompasses the large population, the grassroots of the society involved in conflict. War, conflict, and the mentality to survive are the most influential phenomena that shape the lives of members in the society (Lederach, 1997).

Given this categorization, Lederach advances three peace-building approaches: top-down, middle-range, and bottom-up approaches. The first one, top-down

approaches, offers a well-issue-oriented short-term peace process that is managed by involved top-level leaders. The second, the middle-range approach, offers peace building from middle to out. This approach presumes that the achievement of peace lies with cultivating middle-range leaderships to a peace process. The third approach is defined as the Grassroots approach, or, bottom-up approach. As I mentioned above, the grassroots level encompasses the masses of ordinary citizens within a society. Despite the expanse of population at this level, the emergence of important practical efforts by this level is not entirely impossible. The peace processes in Somali, and Mozambique provide various instances as local peace conferences and programmatic peace efforts to peace builders (Lederach, 1997).

I actually find Lederach's approach very useful for analyzing any conflict because of his efforts to bind these two approaches. In Lederach's view, the middle-range level efforts have a significant role to reach a sustainable peace as middle-range efforts may provide a useful infrastructure within a society in order to reach sustainable peace. Lederach specifies three major different instances as their efforts: problem-solving workshops, CR training, and the development of peace commissions (Lederach, 1997). These efforts can establish a relationship and skill-based ties among the society and top-level leaders. As it is understood from such types of activities, middle-range efforts focus on changing perceptions and establishing new networks to actors involved in the conflict.

If there is a lack of middle-range efforts, grassroots leaders confront distinct challenges from those facing top-level, mainly because of the mentioned factor, the expanse of population. In the level of grassroots, although contacting the masses is easier than other levels, developing a comprehensive effort that entirely reaches the population is very difficult. In addition, any citizen at this level has various daily struggles with their basic human needs. Thus, these masses may view CAR efforts as an "unaffordable luxury" (Lederach, 1997).

Actually, to determine how each of these peace approaches namely top-down, middle-range, and bottom-up to what extent contributes to the longevity or success of peace processes is a controversial issue of the literature on CAR. Debating and comparing all three levels are out of the scope of this research, however, as a matter of fact that the middle-range efforts can easily correlated with the concept of public peace process.

The public peace process approach claims the peace process consists of not only the diplomatic efforts applied by the elites of the primary parties involved in the conflict, but also the public efforts (Saunders, 1999). Saunders defines the concept of public process as following: “sustained action by citizens outside governments to change the fundamental relationship between groups in conflict.” (Saunders, et al., Chapter 3). This insight seeks to attach civil society and non-governmental organizations to peace processes in order to bring an alternative dimension to the official negotiations (Saunders, 1999, Gawerc, 2006). These efforts would develop alternative-innovative solution suggestions for the official negotiations but most importantly, these efforts would help the society to understand itself.

As explained in the introduction, this thesis focuses on the public dimension of the peace processes and seeks to understand why Turkey needs a public peace process and what the main obstacles behind initiating a public peace process are. The next part provides a theoretical basis by concentrating on the social-psychological dimension of conflicts, particularly the ethos of conflict.

2.4. Socio-psychological Infrastructure

Due the complexity and multi-dimensional characteristics of conflicts, explaining the mechanisms of resistance of both sides involved in the conflict to change requires a stronger model, in other words, a macro-social socio-psychological conceptual framework. All conflicts include socio-psychological factors that advance and mediate much of the behavior and attitude of societies (Kelman, 2007). Socio-psychology focuses on the incompatibility of group identities and stresses the basis of collective fears that provide appropriate ground for violence (Stein, 2002). Analysts in the field evaluate the concept of conflict either partially or predominantly as a subject of social processes depending on the context of conflict (Fisher and Keashley, 1991). Although some socio-psychological changes can seem as temporary such as the emergence of anger and fear, some others as perceptions, attitudes, and goals of members of the society involved in conflict last long and these concepts lead to negative feelings and beliefs (Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Fisher and Keashley, 1991).

In the literature of social psychology, the Bar-Tal’s model enables one to advance persuasive explanations of the mechanism of socio-psychological dimensions. The departure point of Bar-Tal’s theory presumes that socio-psychological dynamics that elucidate the psyche of the members of the society evolve during a violent prolonged conflict, and they have a decisive impact on the

development and continuation of the conflict. Hence, they make resolving conflicts extremely difficult (Bar-Tal, 2007). To explain the nature and content of socio-psychological dynamics, he uses the concept of socio-psychological infrastructure (SPI) (See figure 2.3).

To develop his model, Bar-Tal starts by defining the concept of intractable conflict, elaborating its own characteristics. Bar-Tal first uses four necessary features of intractable conflicts that are advanced by Kriesberg (1998). According to Kriesberg, to call a conflict intractable, it should be protracted, violent, it should be perceived as irresolvable, and the parties involved in the conflict should make extensive investment (i.e. economic, military) to manage violent situations (Kriesberg, 1998). Bar-Tal affiliates three more specific features for intractable conflicts based on Kriesberg's classification: intractable conflict should be perceived as zero sum in nature, should have a multifaceted nature, and should possess a central place in the society (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Bar-Tal determines the three fundamental challenges of intractable conflicts that the society and individuals require meeting to adapt to its conditions (i.e. stress, losses, suffering, hardship, solidarity and so on). Respectively, these challenges are satisfaction of needs, coping with stress, and withstanding enemy (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Satisfaction of needs as a concept refers to basic human needs that need to be fulfilled during intractable conflicts such as safety, positive identity, needs of knowing, and so on (Burton, 1990; Bar-Tal, 2007; Tajfel, 1982). The coping with stress concept refers to societies' requirement of living in difficult conditions during conflict. The concept of withstanding the enemy refers to challenges to maintain conflict on both a personal and societal level. The socio-psychological repertoire concept refers to eventually evolving the socio-psychological repertoire that consists of encompasses motivations, attitudes, emotions, and shared beliefs and that gradually transforms into a SPI. Since the SPI have a tremendous influence in intractable conflict, next, I will explain it at length, and analyze its functionality.




Figure 2.3. Conceptual Model of Socio-psychological Infrastructure (Source: Bar-Tal, 2012)

The SPI in intractable conflicts encompasses three elements, which are in mutual interrelations: ethos of conflict, collective memory, and collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tal, 2007). Collective memory (CM) and EOC are shaped by widely shared societal beliefs, attitudes, and emotions - namely a socio-psychological repertoire. This repertoire is eventually advanced and institutionalized by the media, political and military leaders, schools, cultural products, and in the public sphere. While ethos of conflict refers to a narrative that explains the present, collective memory provides a clear narrative to give meaning to the past (Bar-Tal, 2013).

According to Bar-Tal, collective memory has four significant functions: (1) Justification of the outbreak of the conflict, (2) providing a positive image of “us”, (3) de-legitimization of the opponent, and (4) presenting “us” as the victim of the opponent (Bar-Tal, 2003). On the other hand, the ethos of conflict has three crucial functions: (1) providing dominant orientation to whole society at present for the future, (2) determining the epistemic basis for social consciousness, (3) binding the society’s members together (Bar-Tal, 2007). Collective emotional orientation refers to the collective fear and hatred orientation of the society involved in intractable conflicts, which advance solidarity and affiliation within the society. Given all provided definitions, Bar-Tal’s (2007) ultimate claim is that without widely sharing ethos of conflict and collective memory, no society could meet the challenges of conflict specified above.

With regards to SPI as a whole, there are five crucial functions of the socio-psychological infrastructure that exists in a society: (1) presenting an epistemic background to enlighten to the conflict circumstance and fulfill the ideological background (ideological function) (2) justification of even violent or destructive in-group acts toward the opponent, (3) sharpening inter-group differences to advance a sense of differentiation and superiority (social function), (4) preparing the society for violent and threaten conditions of life (psychological function), and (5) motivating and encouraging members of the society for mobilization, solidarity, and action (moral function). Bar-Tal notes that the first three functions chiefly work for the first challenge of satisfaction of needs, the fourth one responds to coping with stress, and the final function refers to both the challenge of satisfaction of needs and withstanding the enemy (Bar-Tal, 2007).

This mechanism indicates that via the institutionalization of the socio-psychological repertoire, the infrastructure becomes to work as a prism (Bar-Tal,

2007). By this mechanism, new information collected by the society members and new experiences start to be interpreted and construed in light of biased, limited, rigid, and hegemonic-shared beliefs. This model shows the shared repertoire of the parties involved in intractable conflict fuels perpetuation of the conflict and it becomes a component of a vicious cycle of the conflict. In this sense, theory asserts that due to the socio-psychological infrastructure, parties become more rigid and resistant to change, thus, it prevents de-escalation process of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013).

Having presented the general focus regarding the mechanism, the present research generally focuses on Bar-Tal's theory, particularly the ethos of conflict phenomenon to understand the resistance in terms of contemporary narratives for the present and the future. The issues associated with collective memory, institutionalization of the repertoire, and relations between challenges and infrastructure are out of the scope of this research. Particularly, I would like to understand what are the main elements of ethos? How does Bar-Tal define the concept of shared beliefs? How can one define and limit it? What is the nature of it? The next part explores answers to such questions.

2.5. The Ethos of Conflict Theory

In Bar-Tal's definition, "the cluster of shared central beliefs that provide a unique, general, and dominant orientation to a society is called an ethos" (Bar-Tal, 2000). Thus, the ethos of conflict has psychological impact on ongoing intractable conflict. It emerges, extends, and gains strength as a consequence of the experiences of the society during the conflict. It can be observed in leaders' policies, school textbooks, public discourse, and cultural products (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Actually the term of ethos was initially used by Max Weber while he was investigating the Western ethos and its implications on Protestant beliefs (Weber, 1958). Then, the concept of ethos became used frequently in research (Bateson, 1958; Ossowska, 1973; Epstein, 1978). In the literature, two important debates over the concept of ethos have helped further research, offering a powerful basis to discuss: one is McClosky and Zaller's inquiry of the American ethos (McClosky and Zaller, 1984), second is Bar-Tal's work which should be evaluated as a first initiative to comprehensively defining the concept of ethos. Indeed, Bar-Tal's theory perceives the concept of ethos in a broader way than others.

Bar-Tal (2009) sees ethos as a major obstacle for peace building efforts. It prevents the de-escalation of the conflict and leads to its maintenance. Hence, it

induces unwillingness for peace processes and closeness to new positive information. I identify three central functions of ethos in Bar-Tal's articles. First, the ethos works as an ideology to give individuals of society a comprehensive biased and selective worldview (Ross, 1995) to perceive the current chaotic "reality" of an ongoing intractable conflict, reasons for its outbreak, aims of conflict, and a path for the future (Bar-Tal, 2009). Second, the hegemonic consciousness, present and future goals are advanced by ethos through generating the justification and motivation for members to behave and act in good agreement with the social system (Bar-Tal, 2000). Third, ethos assists individuals within the society to meet the challenges mentioned in the former part of coping with stress and satisfaction of basic needs (Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2006).

Bar-Tal constitutes the concept of ethos of conflict upon these eight themes. Eight themes of ethos's central societal beliefs respectively are beliefs of justness in own goals, of security, of de-legitimization of the opponent, of self-collective positive view, of self-victimhood, of patriotism, of unity, and of peace (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 2009). In detail, the ethos of conflict consists of eight themes of shared beliefs as follows:

1. *Societal beliefs about the justness of the goals* determine and explain the inter-groups' goal in the conflict, importance of these goals, and rationales regarding them through delegitimizing the opponents' goals.
2. *Societal beliefs about security* refer to the evaluation of threats and dangers towards society, concerns related to both personal and collective security, and conditions in order to reach security.
3. *Societal beliefs that refer to a positive collective self-image* reflect positive characteristics, values, patterns, self-esteem, and norms of in-group ethnocentric tendency to attribute such as heroism, fairness, bravery, and so on.
4. *Societal beliefs of in-group victimization* refer to portraying the victimization of "us" by opponent. These shared beliefs address moral initiative to seek justice as well as mobilizing political, economic, and moral support from the international community.
5. *Societal beliefs that refer to delegitimizing the opponent* reject and delegitimize humaneness of opponents. Thus, these shared beliefs illustrate in-group demands on exclusion of the opponents to outside. In addition,

these beliefs refer to the explanation of outbreak and the maintenance of the conflict.

6. *Societal beliefs of patriotism* refer to emotional affiliation of the members of the society to the country by love, care, loyalty, and sacrifice to enhance social cohesiveness.
7. *Societal beliefs of unity* refer to the significance of being united and propensity to disregard intra-state conflict in the face of external threats. These beliefs develop solidarity and belongings within the society and legitimize using the energy and forces of the society to cope with the enemy.
8. *Societal beliefs of peace* refer to determining peace as an ultimate goal and desires, and the attitudes of the members of the society regarding peace.

All of these societal beliefs constitute the whole structure and nature of the ethos of conflict and create a narrative regarding the ongoing intractable conflict that is shared by the members of the society (D. Bar-Tal and Salomon 2006). This ethos simultaneously leads to distortional and biased information delegitimizing the opponent as the victim of the conflict, and conversely, justifying the position of the group in conflict. Shared beliefs turn individuals' prejudices and stereotypes regarding the "other" into a confident repertoire leading to resistance to change (Bar-Tal, 2013).

As the literature illustrates, beliefs are formed by humans and their content do not have any limits. Beliefs are stored in humans' minds and express their thoughts with regards to their religion, ideology, values, goals, expectations, and so on (Gordon, 1990; Markus and Kitayama, 1994; Bar-Tal, 2000). Although they are implicitly protected in individuals' minds, they are also expressed in distinct human products, namely films, paintings, newspapers etc. Many psychologists define belief in order to reflect a cognitive repertoire of human beings (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists frequently analyze the concept of belief in their social and political theory such as Converse (1964), Dougherty (1985), and Merton (1957).

Beliefs can possibly be differentiated into two types: personal and common or social. Bar-Tal defines societal beliefs as a "collective ideas shared by society members" (Bar-Tal, 2000). As it is understood from the societal and belief term, contents of societal beliefs represent common concerns and the social reality of the society associated with the societal life framework. Societal beliefs psychologically connects society members to their own society and it provides a unique lens to show

each members' uniqueness and distinctness from members of other societies (Bar-Tal, 2000). Thus, it can be claimed that societal beliefs are the most significant factors in order to form social identity. These definitions and explanations suggest that societal beliefs can have meaning solely on a social level because of their impact on the characterization of the society as a whole. So, the concept of societal beliefs should be perceived as a social phenomenon. Likewise, Kitayama and Markus claim shared beliefs are fundamental determinants of the development and formation of the collective orientation of a society (Kitayama and Markus, 1994). Can shared societal beliefs be changed? And, how can this change contribute to the resolution of conflict? Bar-Tal claims ethos is an enduring phenomenon but not unchangeable (Bar, Tal, 2007).

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter provided the tools to develop the thesis' theoretical insight and helped extract major conceptualizations of the study to research the ethos of the Kurdish conflict. In light of this background, the Kurdish question should seem as a consequence of a wide range of distinct interests, beliefs and perceptions, and today, it should be named as an intractable conflict. For many years, the conflict was shaped and based on several interest-based, fact-based, and value-based issues as mentioned in the Chapter Two. Although the armed conflict has revived today, the Kurdish conflict was in between the ceasefire and agreement stages according to escalation and de-escalation model while this research was being conducted, and including various collective memories and ethos contents based upon several decades.

Before the peace process, I claim all but one of the preconditions existed, which is defined by Darby and MacGinty. As defined in the present chapter, they were "1) A willingness to address the key issues of conflict; 2) the end of violence; 3) prolonged agreement; 4) involvement of parties in process; and 5) conducting well intended negotiations (Darby and MacGinty, 2003, pp.2)". Turkey could not reach the prolonged agreement. Actually, the revival of the conflict verified that I am on the right track. I am aware of that course there may be ups, downs, ends, and breaks in conflicts. However, I seek to say that Turkey could not publicized the peace process and the Turkish and Kurdish ethos of the conflict was one of the major obstacle in order to establish a public peace process. This inquiry attempts to provide a contribution to the trajectory of the Kurdish question by its inquiry regarding the Turkish ethos in the Thrace region.

In order to solve and research this issue, Chapter Two provided a solid background, which shapes the socio-psychological infrastructure. It defined the major-minor parties, central issues of the conflict, and the peace initiatives and resolution strategies of the TSK and the Turkish state. There is no doubt all of these experiences had a tremendous impact on the collective memory and ethos of Turkish society. Next, I will proceed by explaining the scope, methodology, and limitations of the research. Later, in Chapter Five, I will present the analysis of the data I have acquired.



CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

3.1. Scope of the Research

As a case study, this thesis generally focuses on the Kurdish question, particularly on the peace process. The shared beliefs of local opinion leaders (LOLs) regarding the peace process in Turkey have been evaluated. I was particularly interested in the description of the public discourse within the Turkish society. Even though this point of departure provides a momentary aspect associated with attitudes and perceptions towards the Kurds, it is important to note that this data has high potential to have impact on new generations to come, additionally the discourse of formal social channels in the future.

In order to explore the socio-psychological repertoire of the non-Kurdish society, I conducted field research in indirect periphery zones of the Kurdish conflict. Researching in indirect periphery zones may provide pure approaches, which are affected by mass media and education. The institutions and cultural products of a society not only form and shape shared beliefs, but also contribute to the maintenance of shared beliefs (Bar-Tal, 2007). On the other hand, although citizens in indirect zones may not be affected directly by the uprisings, armed conflicts, and high levels of violence, there are various indirect influence points such as economic and psychological ones on their lives due to the ongoing-armed conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013).

Naturally, the interviews from indirect periphery zones may not represent the views of the whole Turkish society, however, specific patterns discovered in the data tells something regarding the trajectories of psychological and political positions and the relative social exclusion of the Kurdish identity. On the other hand, the discourse of reconciliation may be more apparent in these zones. It is most possible that citizens in indirect zones may consider armed conflict as a thing of the past while citizens of direct zones may think it will occur in the future again. Periphery zone citizens' perception of suffering – although *suffering* is a subjective concept – may be lower than citizens in direct zones. Therefore, their perception of victimhood may be lower than that of citizens in direct zones.

The determination of the shared beliefs of the LOLs in periphery zones is important data for the literature. If the actors and peace-builders of the peace process

cannot transform unwillingness to willingness even in periphery zones, how do they achieve sustainable peace in the southeast region, which has more intense concerns close to discussing peaceful issues and has experience with high level of violence?

In order to narrow the scope of the field research, I focus on the Thrace region, especially the LOLs in Tekirdağ. I limit my research by selecting Thrace as a region, because it is the furthestmost region to the eastern part of Turkey in terms of distance, culture, and perception of religion. On the other hand, there are two other reasons I chose Tekirdağ in the Thrace region. First, it is the most representative metropolitan city of Thrace, according to Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Second, it is the most ideologically plural city in the region.

Finally, it should be noted here that this research was constructed before July 2015. As stated, the Kurdish attacks and the Turkish state's counterattacks have restarted as a consequence of the heinous attack on July 20th (See Chapter Two). In the analysis of the thesis, the reviving of the conflict and the end of the ceasefire has not been taken into the consideration.

3.2. Methodology of the Research

This study is designed as a qualitative study based on fieldwork conducted in Tekirdağ from June 1st to June 30th 2015, and draws on 20 in-depth interviews conducted in Turkish (See Creswell's (2014) work on *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*). Determining and choosing participants for the research was relatively challenging for several reasons. Due to easy access and the aim of the research (focusing on the middle-range efforts), I target the civil society activists (7), businessmen (2), journalists (3), a government official (1), politicians (2), and NGO representatives (5). Much of my decision making on considering a sample that best represents the diverse stakeholders in the region was guided by the kind recommendations given to me by local researchers involved in working in the Thrace region, namely Tekirdağ branch of the MUSIAD (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*, Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), Trakya Gazetesi (Regional media firm), and my father Erdoğan Orhan, a thirty-year businessman and politician in Tekirdağ.

The research reached a representative sample size for the region. All of the participants were the representatives at high positions in NGOs, religious organizations, business world, and political camps that are influential on the Turkish society's mindset. While half of the participants were defining them as secular, the

other half of them was religious people. The other measurement to choose my sample is to reach different political camps. Therefore, the sample included at least three participants from the each political camps, respectively nationalists, conservatives, republicans, and others. The final determinant measurement to select participants was the socio-economic and occupational variety of the participants. Their age ranges between 45 and 87. 2 women and 18 men have been interviewed, without paying attention to the gender of the respondents. With respect to the education level of the respondents, the majority of the participants (12) stated that they have graduated from university. While 5 of the respondents reported that they have graduated from high school, 3 of the respondents reported to have completed a master's degree. 17 of the interviewees had visited the eastern side of Turkey such as Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, and Bitlis for either tourism or business. Except for one of the interviewees, all have Kurdish friends in their social life. No one has a Kurdish member in his or her family. As far as the worldview of the participants, 8 of the interviewees can be defined as secular persons, while the other 12 are conservatives. All interviews have been conducted at the respondents' own offices and each of them was conducted in a quite setting. The participants were extremely friendly and the mood of each session was very casual and positive.

Interview questions were pilot tested with two university students and two regular people. My interview consisted of 16 questions (See Appendix A) conducted with the people who define themselves as Turkish. One to one and 30-minutes interviews have been conducted with the participants. The questions in the interviews were specifically designed to explore the shared beliefs of the target groups on issues such as the peace process and the Kurdish question. The interviews addressed the personal beliefs of interviewees, paying special attention to angles of their Turkish political identity. During my field research, I had also the chance to meet and conduct off-the-record talks with many people from various backgrounds. However, in Tekirdağ, I encountered some difficulties. For instance, although four of the participants had accepted to have an interview with me before seeing the questions, after confronting the questions they rejected to proceed with the interview, because of some uneasiness regarding the topic, namely the Kurdish question.

Throughout my research, I make use of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources have been obtained via in-depth interviews. As the second method of the research was researching the literature related to public peace process and conflict

resolution theories. The secondary sources were reviewed via library research, academic journals and books regarding the Kurdish question's history. The secondary sources also include the reports from institutions such as *Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı* (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, SETA), *Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı* (Foundation for Economic and Social Research of Turkey, TESEV), *Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi* (Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies, BILGESAM), and KONDA Research and Consultancy in Turkey. To advance a solid background, I defined who the major and minor parties are, what the context of the conflict is, what the core issues of the conflict and the peace initiatives during the last thirty years (See Chapter 2).

Finally, I would like to note these methods of research have the capacity to accommodate me to reach knowledge in two dimensions. The in-depth interview method was useful for me to collect detailed information about persons' repertoire and behavior associated with the Kurdish question. On the other hand, the literature search was determinative on conducting the hypothesis and central assumptions of the research.

3.3. Limitations of the Research

One should consider that this research has limitations when it comes to the interpretations of findings. The first limitation of the research is the size and selection of the sample. There were fewer women than men, and the sample was limited to Tekirdağ in the Thrace region. The research might have been strengthened by choosing a sample that was more representative of the population in the Trakya region. Rather, the scope of the research was limited by periphery cities for the conflict. The research may also have been conducted in direct zones (i.e. Diyarbakır, Ağrı, Tunceli) and semi-direct zones (i.e. İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara), and the findings may have been compared. Time and funding limitations were the most important obstacles towards doing so.

The second limitation was age. The age range of the participants was between 45 and 87, due to my limitation in reaching local opinion leaders. The shared beliefs and the EOC of younger people may have been different from those of my participants. Third, my participants were highly educated. I had only five respondents that reported they graduated only from high school. To observe widely shared beliefs, the sample might have had a more inclusive population without college degrees.

The third limitation was size of the scope. The size of the research may not have been strongly representative of to what extent the general Turkish society has a shared EOC or as to what type of distinct contents the Turkish society has. Thus, this may have made it difficult to generalize the results of the research. Even so, the size of the present study can be considered significant, as it is by nature a qualitative research.

Analysis of large amounts of information in terms of eight themes of the EOC may have also been problematic. Additionally, participants might not have shared all their beliefs and emotions about the peace process and the Kurdish identity. It is still a sensitive issue in Turkey. It has political dimensions as well as security concerns for the people. Some people may not have felt free to share their own ideas openly, because of political concerns.

Nevertheless, the findings of the research on the EOC of Turkish citizens provide strong similarities, and indications regarding the EOC, even without having a representative sample for all the Turkish citizens in Turkey. In my view, the findings of the research were important and they may create a path for future researchers in this area.

CHAPTER IV

DATA ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter analyzes and discusses the findings of the research. Chapter one was organized to indicate what the complex dimensions of the Kurdish question are, what the peace initiatives to the conflict are, and at what level the Kurdish question is today. In this chapter, I demonstrate how these developments have shaped the Turkish society's shared beliefs. I will show how the Turkish society perceive and simplify the conflict by which repertoire. In addition, I seek to explain how the socio-psychological infrastructure implicitly works within the society. This chapter seeks to answer the main research questions pointed out earlier: ““How does the society respond to the peace process? What is the impact of ethos on responses? Is the Turkish society resistant to change? If yes, why? If not, why?””

4.2. Findings

This part demonstrates the contents of collective memory (CM), which defines the main cause of the outbreak of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2003, 2007, 2013). In addition, it analyzes the each of the eight-shared beliefs of Turkish ethos. Respectively, shared beliefs about the justness of Turkish goals (TG), de-legitimization of the Kurdish goals (KG), security, positive collective self-image and image of the Kurds, in-group victimization, patriotism, unity, and peace.

4.2.1. Collective Memory (CM)

The socio-psychological infrastructure of the society is constructed through EOC and CM (Bar-Tal, 2013). Additionally; the narratives of TEOC are supported by the CM, which is widely shared by the society (Bar-Tal, 2002). In my research, I determined three general top-categories shaping the CM. They were external explanations, internal explanations, and avoidance of the question. (See Table 4.1.)

The first category sees external/foreign powers or strategies of them regarding the Turkish state as a central cause of the Kurdish conflict. Hence, according to first category, the question is artificially created by the powers that have interest in the region. In detail, to support such claim, it is asserted that there are numerous foreign spies in the southeastern region of Turkey coordinated by foreign powers that deeply know the region's geography and sociology.

Table 4.1. Content of the Collective Memory

Categories	Explanations
External	Foreign powers and their strategies are the main cause of the Kurdish conflict
Internal	Inattention of the rulers, irreligiousness, not to keep promises in the past, ignorance, regional interest groups, and late wave of nationalism.
Rejection	Rejection of the Kurdishness of the conflict

These foreign powers desire to prevent the development of Turkey because of its high importance regarding its geo-political position. The following interview may revealed this pattern:

Türkiye gelişmesin diye planlanmış şeyler bunlar. Kürtlerin, en saf, temiz olanları ile konuştuğun zaman, hiçbir zaman savaştan yana düşünmezler. Buradaki asıl mesele, dış güçlerin desteği. İçeriden olmayan bir şeyler var. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)¹

The second category sees internal factors as the fundamental cause of the Kurdish conflict. Therefore, according to this category, the Kurdish question should be understood by the internal sociological, psychological, economic, political, and even religious dynamics. The first reason in this category was the inattention of the rulers.

Bu meselenin içerideki yöneticilerimizin gafletinden kaynaklanan bir yanı var, bir de dışarıdakilerin bu gafletten istifade edip meseleyi bir merkeze oturtma gayreti var, ve muvaffak oldular. (B.M. NGO representative)²

In this view, the inattention of the rulers of the past slighted the educational, economical, and developmental issues for the region. On the other hand, as one can see in the interviewee's explanation above, this approach sees the inattention of the rulers as a facilitator factor for the foreign powers. Some interviewees see the irreligiousness, not to keep promises in the past, ignorance, and even regional interest groups (as feudal structure of the region) other facilitator dynamics caused the Kurdish conflict.

¹ These things are planned so that Turkey does not advance. When you talk with pure and innocent Kurds, you see that they are never pro-war. The real issue here is the support of foreign powers; something that is not from inside.

² On the one hand, this matter has arisen due to the negligence of our rulers and on the other hand, foreign powers have taken advantage of this negligence and they have been successful.

Yani, jandarma baskısı sadece doğuda yok, bu bölgede de var. Bu bölgedeki halk isyan etmiyor. Orada yabancı güçlerin oynaması var ve İslamı da bilmiyorlar açıkçası. Malesef. Cehalet var. (R.U., doctor, executive)³

The last perceived internal factor was observed as late wave of nationalism. This ideological perception conceives of the conflict as the mobilization of the Kurdish people by the nationalism thoughts of their elite.

Demem o ki, Kürtlerin milliyetçilik ateşi, biz de mesela, 1920'lerde yanmışsa, Kürtlerde 70li yıllarda yakıldı. Geç bir milliyetçilikle karşı karşıyayız. Asıl tetikleyen geç milliyetçilik. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative)⁴

The third category completely rejects the existence of the Kurdish conflict. I mean they rejected the Kurdishness of the conflict. While the first side of this category claims that through the decades we live with the Kurdish people in peace in our society, the other extremist approach totally rejects the existence of the Kurdish identity.

Kürt arkadaşım, ahababım oldu. Ne onların, ne bizim sıkıntımız olmadı. Bu ayrıca aleviler içinde geçerli. Böyle bir şey, son yıllarda yaratıldı. Ben eskiden emin olun bilmiyordum bile bunların Kürt olduğunu. (M.K., politician, businessman)⁵

Kürtler, Türkmen aşiretidir zaten.. Kürtlükle alakaları yok. (M.S., intellectual, journalist)⁶

Şahsım adıma, Kürt meselesi diye bir sorun yok. Kürtlerle ilgili bir sorun, bana göre olmaması da gerekir. Yaratılıyor bu sorun. (L.C., businessman and NGO representative)⁷

The third category completely rejects the existence of the Kurdish conflict. I mean, they rejected the Kurdishness of the conflict. While the first side of this category claims that through the decades we live with the Kurdish people with peace in our society, the other extremist approach totally rejects the existence of the Kurdish identity.

³ So, the pressure of the gendarme is not a factor only in the East but also in this region (the West). The people in this region (the West) do not riot. However foreign powers have a role to play in the East. Frankly, they do not know Islam. Unfortunately, there is also the ignorance of the people in the East.

⁴ That is to say, the fire of Turkish nationalism was ignited in the 1920s, however, the fire of Kurdish nationalism was only recently lit in the 1970s. What we are facing is a belated nationalism. This is the principal trigger.

⁵ I have had Kurdish buddies. There was never any trouble between us. This also goes for the Alevites. Such a thing has been created only in recent years. You can be sure that I did not even know that my friends were Kurdish.

⁶ In reality, Kurds are from Turkmen tribes. They have nothing to do with Kurdishness.

⁷ If you ask me there is no Kurdish question. And there shouldn't be any problems. This is a problem that is being created.

As mentioned earlier, all of these three categorical perceptions shape the CM. This collective memory has been developed through the years to understand the causes of the outbreak of the Kurdish conflict within the Turkish society in peripheral zones. And they were shaped via the experiences mentioned in chapter one.

4.2.2. Shared Beliefs about the Justness of the TG and De-legitimization of the KG

Turkish citizens' shared beliefs about the justness of goals generally derive from nationalist insight (See Table 4.2.) For the justness of Turkish states' goals, indivisible territorial integrity is the common concept that is emphasized by almost all participants. The goal of securing territorial integrity seems to be an indisputable justification of counterterrorism operations.

All participants without any exceptions consider this territorial goal of Turkey is under attack by the PKK, accordingly foreign powers. The common phrase in the participants' discourse regarding the issue can be briefly summarized in the following answer:

Kürtler benim atalarım kanlarını döktüğü toprakları istiyorlar. Neden onlara bağışlayalım ki bu toprakları? Ordu dediğin nedir kardeşim? Ordu orada ülkenin toprak bütünlüğünü korumak için vardır! E yani terroristler sivilleri öldürecek de, asker onlara saldırmayacak mı? Savaştan bahsediyoruz, şakası yok bunun! (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)⁸

Another interviewee justifies the attacks of the Turkish army as:

Türkiye'nin güneydoğusunda bir çatışma olduğunu kabul etmeliyiz. Eee, çatışmalarda duygu, bilim, değer aranmaz... (B.I., retired müfti, merchant)⁹

As for the de-legitimization of the Kurdish goals, victimization was the central concept of the interviews. In the interviews, none of the participants accept any suffering of victimization of the Kurdish identity due to various reasons. There were six types of categories in terms of victimization understandings. The first category thinks they cannot even discuss the legitimization of the Kurdish goals, because of the intention of Kurdish demands, or martyrs, or the Turkish State's democratic and economic developments.

⁸ Kurds want the land where my ancestors shed their blood. Why should we give these lands to them? What is the use of an army, my brother? The army is there to protect the territorial integrity of the country. Terrorists kill civilians and soldiers should not attack them? This is a war we are talking about it is not a joke!

⁹ We must accept that there is a conflict in the southeast of Turkey. And in a conflict, feeling, science, and values are of little importance.

Table 4.2. Legitimization of the TG and De-Legitimization of the KG

Categories	Explanations
1) Legitimization of the TG	
	Indivisible territorial integrity
	Securing territorial integrity
2) Deligitimization of the KG (Victimization)	
2.1.) We cannot discuss the victimization	Intention of Kurdish people, martyrs, the Turkish state's economic and democratic developments
2.2) Victimization on one side, lack of victimization on the other side	Kurdish language rights, rejection of the Kurdish identity, victimization was in the past - not today, regional victimization - not the victimization of the Kurdish people
2.3) There is victimization. The Kurdish people are the cause of the victimization.	Feodal structure, preventer activities of the Kurdish people, rebellions.
3) Deligitimization of the KG (Attitudes of the Turkish State)	
3.1) We should separate the past and the present	Some officials were guilty - not the Turkish state, relatively misrecognition in the past,
3.2) The Turkish state has never been a discriminator	Democratic-Ideological-Economic rights of the Kurdish people, requirements of centralization process, security policies

The first group points out the intention and the martyrs as:

Kürtlerin ne istediğine de bakmamız lazım. Kürtler ne talep ediyor? Yani, ben, önümüze bir şey kondu şimdi bizim, Kürdistan, bağımsız kürdistan. Böyle bir niyet taşıyan kürt hareketi, nasıl bir mağduriyetle işe başlayacak TR'de? Vali olamıyorum, ekonomist olamıyorum, esnaf olamıyorum, okuyamıyorum, kürt oluşum bana engel mi diyor? Yoksa, bu söylemleri, Kürdistan devletinin kurulmasına giden yolda bahaneler olarak mı karşımıza çıkıyor? (H.E., journalist, NGO representative)¹⁰

Orada o kadar şehit var... Ne mağduriyeti tartışacağım? (N.S., pharmacist, NGO representative)¹¹

¹⁰ We need to look at what the Kurds want. What are the Kurds demanding? The demand for an independent Kurdistan is before us. How would a Kurdish movement with such intentions make their claims of victimhood? Do they say that I cannot be the governor, I cannot be an economist, or I cannot trade because I am a Kurd? Or, does such discourse-emerge as an excuse on the way to the establishment of a Kurdish state?

¹¹ There are so many martyrs there...What victimhood are we talking about?

The second group in this category thinks discussing the legitimization of the Kurdish goals today is meaningless due to the Turkish State's economic developments over the region and democratic developments over the country.

Ben Kürtlerin mağdur olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Kesinlikle düşünmüyorum. Ben Doğuya sıklıkla gittiğim için buradaki insanları biliyorum. Burası yep yeni bir şehir haline gelmişse, demek ki ayrımcılık diye bir şey söz konusu değil. O zaman nasıl bir ayrımcılık var? (L.C., businessman and NGO representative)¹²

Yani, ben mağduriyete katılmıyorum. Çünkü, demokratik haklarını istedikleri gibi kullanıyorlar. Bir, ben son olaylara kadar şu Türktür bu Kürttür diye hiç düşünmedim. Erzincan'da öğretmenlik yaptım, %30u Kürttü öğrencilerimin. Hala ilişkilerim sürüyor. Sonra bir çocuklardan bir kısmı genel müdüdü Ankara'da. Bir kısmı milletvekiliydi. Yani, toplumun içindeler, bir aradayız. (O.D., industrialist, intellectual)¹³

The third group in this category claims there are several classes or groups victimized in the past in Turkey. Therefore, the victimization argumentation cannot be used as claim in order to legitimize the Kurdish goals.

Valla, benim kadar mağdur edilmemişlerdir. Madem öyleyse, ben onlardan çok mağdur edildim. Ben katılıyorum onlara, ama, bunu bir silah olarak kullanmalarına karşıyım. (B.M. NGO representative)¹⁴

The second category de-legitimizes the KG by both relatively accepting and rejecting the victimization claims of the Kurdish people. The first group in this category accepts the victimization of the Kurdish society in terms of the laws in Kurdish language usage in the past and the rejection of the Kurdish identity.

Bir bakıma Kürtlerin mağdur olduğunu, bir bakıma olmadıklarını düşünüyorum. Kürtlerden bu ülkede Cumhurbaşkanı bile çıktı. Ondan dolayı fazla olmadıklarını düşünüyorum. Ama bir bakıma da, onların mağdur olduklarını düşünüyorum. Çünkü şöyle bir şey söyleniyor: "Efendim, Kürt yoktur, Türk vardır. Karda yürürken kart-kurt derken Kürt olmuş. Böyle bir ırk meydana gelmiş". Ben bu tezi kabul etmiyorum. (B.I., retired müfti, merchant)¹⁵

¹² I do not think that the Kurds are victims. I most certainly do not. I know the people there because I often go to the East. If these places have become brand new cities, it means that there is no discrimination. So what is this discrimination we are talking about?

¹³ Actually, I do not agree that there has been any victimization because they can use their democratic rights as they wish. I never even considered that he is a Kurd or she is a Turk until these recent events. I taught in Erzincan where %30 of my students were Kurdish. We still keep in contact. Now, some of them are general managers in Ankara and some of them are deputies in the TBMM. So, they are a part of the community. We are all together.

¹⁴ Well, they have not been as much a victim as me. If so, I have been more victimized than them. I agree with them, but I am opposed to them using victimization as a weapon.

¹⁵ In some ways I think that the Kurds have been victimized, and in some ways I think not. There was even a Kurdish president in this country. This is why I do not think that they have been victims. But, in a way, they have been victims because people say something like this: "There are no Kurds, only Turks. The name 'Kurd' came from the sounds of "kart-kurt" Turkish people in the mountains made when they walked in the snow I do not accept this theory.

Bu kardeşlerde en azından, dil konusunda, çok baskı yapıldığı bir gerçek yani. Ama bu baskının belki şiddeti, on üzerinden ikidir. Hiç konuşamıyorlar da değil yani. (M.U., pharmacist, religious organization representative)¹⁶

The second group in this category rejects the partial victimization in a different way. According to this group, although we should accept the victimization of the Kurdish people in the past, today, it is difficult to advocate the victimization of the Kurdish people.

Kürtlerin mağduriyetiyle olarak da, zamana, zemine ve şartlara bağlı olarak söylemek mümkündür. Özellikle, sosyal ve ekonomik açıdan bir mağduriyet yaşadılar. Çünkü, son yıllara kadar, gözle görülür bir şekilde yatırımların, yeten iş yerlerin fabrikaların, tesislerin, gerek sanayi gerek turistik açıdan kürtlerin yaşadığı bölgelerde çok görülmediği bir vakadır. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat)¹⁷

The third group in this category separates victimization from Kurdishness. From this view, on the one hand, it is a reality that the southeast region relatively more victimized region than other regions of Turkey. On the other hand, we should know that southeast region could not be stated completely as a Kurdish region.

Valla, Kürtler mi demek lazım, bölge mi demek lazım. Ben buna Kürt olarak değinmem burada yaşayan Kürt vatandaşımız da vardı, ihmal edilmemiştir. Ama bazı yerde, bölge ihmal edildiyse, orada tabi Kürt de vardır, Türk de vardır, Çerkez de vardır. Bana göre, bölgeler ihmal edildi dersek daha doğru olur. (M.K., politician, businessman)¹⁸

The last category acknowledges the victimization of the Kurdish society. However, for them, the main cause was not the Turkish state, rather, some other internal factors should be seem as main causes of this victimization. For instance, the following interviewee sees the social structure as a main cause for this victimization:

Mesele Türklük kürtlük değil. Orada, güney doğunun şu anki sosyal yapısı mağdur ediyor, problem üretiyor. Ağalık, efendim, kültürel aşiret yapısı.. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative)¹⁹

¹⁶ It is a fact that there has been a lot of pressure put on the Kurds in regards to their language. But the intensity of this pressure was maybe two out of ten. It's not like they can't speak Kurdish at all.

¹⁷ It is possible to speak of the victimization of the Kurds in regards to time, background, and circumstances. In particular, they experienced victimization in social and economic terms because it is a fact that until recent years, investments, businesses, and factories were not visibly seen much in the Kurdish regions.

¹⁸ Well, should we be talking about victimization of the Kurds or victimization of the region? I do not consider the issue a Kurdish issue because there were Kurdish citizens in our region (West) and they have not been victimized. But, in some places, if a region was ignored, of course there were Kurds, Turks, or Circassians there. If you ask me, it would be more accurate to say that the regions have been neglected.

¹⁹ The problem is not about being Turkish or Kurdish. The current social structure of the south-eastern region aggrieves and produces problems such as the rule of *aghas*, tribal structures...etc

The second group in this category sees the Kurdish people's preventer activities in the region as the main cause for victimization. From this view, the people in the region have always prevented the development initiatives of the Turkish state.

Hiç mağdur edilmediler. Ben, tüccarım. Düşünün, fabrika kuruyorsunuz, Kömür işletmesi kuruyorsunuz, bombalıyorlar. E kabahat kimin, TC'nin mi? Elektriği bedava kullanıyor, beş kuruş para vermiyor, gene isyan ediyor. Bu nasıl mağduriyet? (M.S., intellectual, journalist)²⁰

The third group in this category perceives the Kurdish rebellions as the main cause of victimization.

Tabi ki Kürtler şundan mağdurlar, bir ordu var. Ordu ne? Türkiye'nin bölünmez bütünlüğünü sağlamak için orada. E canım, onlar bu katliamları yaparken, orduda onlardan birçok insanı öldürüyor. Yani, savaş bu... Şakası yok bunun... Tabi ki ortada onlar da zarar görüyor. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)²¹

Another question regarding the de-legitimization issue was: "How do you evaluate the relationship between the Turkish state and Kurdish citizens?" This question tried to observe how the interviewees evaluate the Turkish state's attitudes over the Kurdish society. Without exception, all of the participants legitimize the Turkish State's attitudes over the Kurdish society as legitimate. However, in details, answers to this question were twofold.

The first category separates policies of the past and the present. Today, relationship between the Turkish state and the Kurdish citizens indicates no discriminatory character. One side of this category sees few officials responsible for illegitimate activities in the region.

Şimdi, devlet dediğinizde... Böyle resmi bir şey yok, yani Kürtçülüğü baskılamak adına, Kürtleri sindirmek adına. O bölgeyle alakalı hususi TC devletinin bir baskısı yok. Ama devleti oluşturan mekanizmaların içerisinde, sevk ve idare ile memur kesim diyelim, mesela, yıllarca o bölgeyle alakalı muazzam suistimaller yaptılar. (A.C., businessman, religious organization representative)²²

²⁰ They have never been victimized. I am a merchant. Imagine, you are setting up your factory, or a coal business, and they bomb it. Well, who is to blame? The Turkish state? They have free access to electricity, yet they do not pay a penny... But they are still rebelling. How is this a victimization?

²¹ Of course the Kurds are victims - there is an army. What is an army? The army is there to ensure the indivisible integrity of Turkey. Well, they are carrying out all these massacres, so the army is killing a lot of their people. So, this is war... It is no joke! So, of course some people are going to suffer from this situation.

²² There is no official pressure on behalf of the government suppressing the Kurds. Also there is no particular pressure by the Turkish state in that region. However, some administration officers within the state mechanism did cause some tremendous abuse for years in that region.

The other side of this category accepts some of the illegitimate activities in the past. And, these groups see the misrecognition as the main reason.

Yani, yaratılışlarından kaynaklanan özelliğin, devlet tarafından yeterince anlaşılmadığını düşünüyorum. Sosyal dokuda farklı. Dolayısıyla, iki vechesi var. Kürtlerin, müstakil bir devlet düşmanlığından bahsetmek, dediğim gibi, yeterince tanımamaktır. Ama devleti idare eden insanların, yöredeki insanların hassasiyetlerini çoğu zaman tanımamasından kaynaklanan elbette bir çatışma vardı. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat) ²³

The second category of the participants directly emphasized the non-discriminatory character of relationships between the Turkish state and the Kurdish citizens and rejected the claims of discrimination of the Turkish state. The first group rejected the claim by mentioning the democratic, economic, and ideological rights of the Kurdish society.

Devlet katiyen ayırım yapmadı. Yapsaydı, AKP’de bu kadar Kürt milletvekili olur muydu? Süleyman Demirel’in idaresinde o kadar ağa çocuğu milletvekili olur muydu? Cumhuriyet döneminde o kadar Kürt olur muydu? (M.S., intellectual, journalist)²⁴

Şu anda, Adana’dan, 48 geçit diye bir tabela gördüm... Nedir bu? Çayı arabanın üstüne koy, dökülmeden gidersin. Dağı delmişler, viyadükler yapmışlar... Şimdi bu hizmet kime kardeşim? Ben böyle rahatlık görmedim. Bu yol boyutu.. Ben bazı hastaneler gördüm, dedim ki burası üniversite mi? Bu insanlar bunu hak ediyor mu? Evet. Bunlara bu hizmet gitmiş mi? Evet. (L.C., businessman and NGO representative) ²⁵

Şimdiye kadar hiç ayrımcılığa şahit olmadım. Yani, Kürtler, TR’nin kesinlikle bir parçası olarak görülüyor. Kesinlikle azınlık olarak da görülüyor. (R.U., doctor, executive) ²⁶

²³ I think the natural characteristics of the Kurds have not been sufficiently understood by the Turkish State. The social fabric is also different. Hence, there are two aspects. Firstly, to mention hostility towards the state by the Kurds, as I said, means-that we do not know them well enough. But, secondly, there was a conflict that arose due to State officials’ not recognizing the sensitivities of the people of the region.

²⁴ There was never any discrimination by the State. If there was then, how do you account for such a high number of Kurdish deputies in the AK Party? Could there have been so many children of *aghas* in the Suleyman Demirel administration? Could there have been so many Kurds in the administration during the Republican period?

²⁵ I saw a sign showing 48 viaducts in Adana. What is that? Now you can load your tea on top of your car, and drive without it falling off. They’ve dug out the mountain, they’ve made viaducts. Tell me brother who was all of this for? I myself have never seen such comfort. This is the transportation aspect of the issue. I’ve seen some hospitals that look like universities. Do these people deserve all of this? Yes. Have these services been provided for these people? Yes.

²⁶ I’ve never come across any discrimination. So the Kurds are definitely considered a part of Turkey. And they are definitely not a minority.

The last group undoubtedly rejected the claims of discrimination by legitimizing the armed struggle of the TSK. According to this group, the Turkish state did what should have been done. On one side, the Turkish state must be centralized, on the other side; the Turkish state should secure the country.

Sert davrandı tabii ki. Çünkü Osmanlı merkezileşmeye başlıyor. Tabii, eskiden orada ağa falan, dediği dedikti. Yol yapayım diyor, yol yapılırsa diyor jandarma gelecek, o da merkezi hükümetin kontrolü demek, yolu istemiyor. Okul istemiyor. Eskisi gibi devam etsin istiyor. 500-1000 senelik sosyal yapının değişme sancıları bunlar. Yoksa, Kürt olduğu için değil bu şiddet, direnç olduğu için. Direnç nerede? Yol yaptırmıyor, okul yaptırmıyor. Kimlik değil problem. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative)²⁷

Biz yıllarca beraber yaşadık. Ben şuna inanıyorum ki, bir asker, bir Kürtü öldürürken, bir düşmanı öldürüyor gibi bakmıyor. Ama mecbur, o sıkınca, asker de sıkıyor. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)²⁸

To sum up, there is consensus on legitimization of the TG and the de-legitimization of KG. In the research, I observed that indivisible territorial integrity and securing it was the most fundamental argument for legitimizing TG. As for de-legitimization of the KG, Turkish society conducts an argumentation by rejecting the victimization and discrimination claims.

4.2.3. Shared Beliefs about Security

As to another enduring and widely shared belief is about the security of the state, during my research, I observed the Turkish society is concerned about its territorial security. In addition, it is not only a security concern but also focal anxiety (See Table 4.3).

Table 4.3. Shared Beliefs about Security

Problem	Factor of the Threat
Territorial Integrity	The PKK as a subcontractor organization of foreign powers
National Security	The PKK as a secret organization of the Kurds from abroad

²⁷ The State was tough, of course. Because the Ottomans have begun to centralize. Of course, before the *agha* used to rule the roost. The State said “Let me build roads”, but the *aghas* said “If roads are built, the gendarme will come. And that would mean control of the region by the State. So, they did not want any roads or schools in the region. They wanted to keep the social structure the same. These are the pains of transformation of the social structure of 500-1000 years. So the violence has not been against the Kurds for their Kurdishness, but rather because of their resistance. What kind of resistance? Resistance to the building of roads and schools. So, the problem is not about identity.

²⁸ We have lived together for years. I believe that a soldier does not think he is killing the enemy when he kills a Kurd. But, the soldier is forced to kill. When the Kurd shoots, the soldier shoots.

Allah korusun bu işin sonunda bir ayrılık olur korkusu dahi var. Çünkü, o topraklara gözünü diken çok adam var. Bunu herkes biliyor. Gizli saklı da değil zaten. (M.U., pharmacist, religious organization representative)²⁹

Dış güçler, gerek ekonomik, gerek siyasi, gerekse Türkiyenin bölünmez bütünlüğünü parçalamak istiyorlar... Çünkü ortadoğu'da Türkiye, güçlü bir yapıya sahip. Etrafımıza baktığımızda, bütün hepsi bize karşı, donatılmış. İran bile. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)³⁰

One can easily realize this preoccupation in the discourse of the narratives.

Without exception, all of the participants mentioned the national security threat as a fundamental part of their security.

Dün bu coğrafyayı paralayan, parçalayan ama bu gün hala bu ülke üzerinde programları olan ülkelerin hiçbir zaman ellerini ve eteklerini bu ülkeden çekmediklerini gördüm. (A.C., businessman, religious organization representative)³¹

Based on these common security shared beliefs, almost all participants perceived a threat from the PKK on their territorial integrity. So, when they were asked about the perception regarding the PKK organization, all of the interviewees defined the PKK organization in the sense of external roots. The external organization perception was twofold. The first group defined the PKK as an organization, which was built by the Kurds from abroad.

Onlar, Kürt devletlerini kuracaklar. Zaten kurdular... Tescil ettirecekler... Topraklarını genişletiyorlar şimdi.. PYD, PKK, Hepsî Barzani'ye bağlı. (M.S., intellectual, journalist)³²

TR'de, devletin de çeteleri yok mu kendi içinde? Var. Onların da çeteleri PKK, bu kadar. Bu da Kürtlerin kurmuş olduğu bir güvenlik teşkilatı. Türkiye dışındaki Kürtlerin kurduğu bir yapı. (M.S., intellectual, journalist)³³

The second group defined the PKK organization as a subcontractor organization of foreign powers, even Armenians, which threatens Turkish security in terms of political, military, and economic threats.

²⁹ God forbid, there is a fear of separation in the end. Because there are many who covet that land. Everyone knows this. It is not a secret.

³⁰ External forces want to tear down the economics, politics and the indivisible integrity of Turkey. Because, Turkey is a powerful structure in the Middle East. When we look around us, we see that they are all against us. Even Iran.

³¹ I see that those countries who have torn this geography up in the past have never in fact abandoned Turkey and they still have their own plans for Turkey.

³² They will establish a Kurdish state. They've already done so. They just need to have it officially recognised. They are expanding their territory now. The PYD and the PKK are all connected to Barzani.

³³ Are there no gangs in the Turkish State? Yes, there are. The PKK are their gangs. This is a security organisation established by the Kurds. It was established by the Kurds who live outside of Turkey.

PKK, bence, daha üst akıllardan destek alıyor. Kandil orada olduğu sürece, APO ile anlaşmak, HDP ile anlaşmak sorunu çözmeyecektir. Kandilde, dünya küresel güçlerin kontrolünde, etkisinde. Kandil şu anda revaçta, büyük bir pazarlığın aktörü. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative)³⁴

Ben bu PKK'nın, ASALA'nın devamı olan, kökünün de belki ermenilere dayanan bir teşkilat olduğunu düşünüyorum. Kökü içeride değil. İyi niyetli Kürtlerin, çözüm ortağı olmak için üretilmiş bir örgüt değildir. (L.C., businessman and NGO representative)³⁵

To sum up, whether the organization of foreign powers or the Kurds abroad, the participants think there are various enemies who want to destroy Turkey's potential high level economic growth and territorial integrity.

4.2.4. Shared Beliefs about a Positive Collective Self-Image and Image of the Opponent

Collective self-images and images of the opponent are very important to understand to what extent ethnocentrism is accepted within the Turkish society. The positive self-image repertoire provides some clues to observe the level of self-praise, self-glorification, and self-justification (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005). Among the interviewees, one groups thinks it is impossible to differentiate Turks from Kurds in terms of characteristics based on the same geography, culture, and inter-marriages. The other group advocates separation the characteristics of two ethnic identities because of either nationality or education. For this group, self-images of the Turks and images of the Kurds are observed as follows (See, Table 4.4.).

Self-Image

When the participants were asked what the main characteristics that differentiate Turks from Kurds are, they stated as follows: fair, possessed tradition of governance, educated, nationalist, tolerant, and individualist. As negative self-images: crafty, jealous, and envy were stated.

Images of the Kurds

Although I asked what the positive characteristics of the Kurds are, some of the participants stated merely negative stereotypes regarding the Kurds, some of the participants shared both negative and positive images of the Kurds together, and others

³⁴ The PKK, I think, receives support from higher minds. As long as Kandil remains, negotiating with Abdullah Ocalan or HDP will not solve the problem. Kandil itself is under the control of global powers. Kandil is currently in great demand and is an actor in a major bargaining process.

³⁵ I think the PKK is a continuation of ASALA, and is an organisation whose roots may go back to the Armenians. The roots of it are not internal. It is not an organization established by well-intentioned Kurds to be partners in the solution.

merely remarked positive stereotypes of the Kurds. Positive stereotypes of the Kurds were stated in terms of the following characteristics: hospitable, respectful, emotional, in-group solidarity, faithful, brave, knowing their history, sincere, amiable, having delicious foods. Conversely, for negative stereotypes: getting mixed up in wrong businesses, vindictiveness, complex of inferiority, less anger control, ignorance, self-seeking, unreliability, and evil-disposition were determined. Even one participant said: “Hiçbir iyi özelliği yok onların! (N.S., pharmacist, NGO representative) ³⁶”

Table 4.4. Shared Beliefs about Images

<i>Self-Image</i>	Positive: Fair, possessed tradition of governance, educated, nationalist, tolerant, and individualist
	Negative: crafty, jealous, and envy
<i>Separation Impossible</i>	It is impossible to separate characteristics of the Kurds from the Turks.
<i>Image of the Kurds</i>	Positive: hospitable, respectful, emotional, in-group solidarity, faithful, brave, knowing their history, sincere, amiable, having delicious foods.
	Negative: Getting mixed up in wrong businesses, vindictive, complex of inferiority, less anger control, ignorant, loser, self-seeker, unreliable, evil-disposed

The second question to observe negative images of the Kurds was as to why Kurds resorted to violence. The findings demonstrate that there are two categories of approach according to this problematic: external and internal explanations. (See Table 4.5.) I should mention although I allusively asked the question by saying “the Kurds”, only two of the opponents felt the need of separating the PKK from the Kurdish identity (I will analyze this issue further in the next part of this chapter).

Table 4.5. Causes of the Violence of the Kurds

External Explanations	Internal Explanations
Incitement of the foreign power	Economic and Educational Problems
	The PKK's ideology
	Violence as a language, methodology

³⁶ They have no good qualities!

Table 4.5 (continued)

Incitement of the foreign power	Genetic and cultural nature of the Kurds
	Action-Reaction Mechanism

The first category was the external explanations; this group explained the violence of the Kurds in terms of the incitement of the foreign powers.

Bu bölgeyi teröre boğacaksak, bu bölgeden terörle kazanç elde edeceksek bu grup kim olmalı dediler. Bu bölgede en uygun grup Kürtler. Bu yumuşak karın, o kadar ilginçki, üç büyük kavmin de yumuşak karnı. İran, Irak ve TR... (H.E., journalist, NGO representative)³⁷

The second category explained the violence through five different aspects. The first group in this category sees the economic and educational problems as a cause of violence. The second group perceives the violence as a result of the Kurds' ideology.

Sebep ideolojik aslında. Kürtlerin, şiddeti besleyen en önemli organizasyonu PKK. Daha öncesinde öyle çok şiddet yoktu. PKK, Kürdistan İşçi Partisi. Sosyalist bir harekettir, sosyalist hareketin temelinde de daima şiddet vardır. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative)³⁸

The third group tends to understand the violence phenomenon as a language or a methodology to achieve social goals. Therefore, these groups perceive the violence preference of the Kurdish people as a language to attracting notice.

İsteğini, düşüncelerini, mecliste bulamadıkları için... Şiddet, kötü bir dil. Türkiyeye bunun faturası çok oldu. Ya evet, şiddet onlara göre bir yöntemdi belki ama, hiçbir ülkenin, insanın kabul edemeyeceği bir yöntemdi. (M.K., politician, businessman)³⁹

The fourth group linked this preference to the genetic or cultural nature of the Kurds.

İnsanlar, yaşadıkları coğrafadan etkilenirler. Dolayısıyla, sahil bölgelerde yaşayan insanların mizacına sirayet eden meltem dokunuşu ile, yalçın kayalıkların ve ekonomik zahmetlerin yaşandığı bir zeminde yaşayan insanların yaratılışında bir farklılık olması, adeta tabiidir. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat)⁴⁰

³⁷ They said if we are going to drown this region in terror, if we are going to reap profit from terrorism in this region, then which group would be the most suitable for us? The most suitable group is the Kurds in this region. The Kurds are the soft belly for three countries: Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

³⁸ For ideological reasons, actually. The PKK is the most important organization of the Kurds that feeds the violence. There was never so much violence before. The PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party is a socialist movement. And violence has always been the basis of socialist movements.

³⁹ Because their demands were not met in the parliament. Violence is an ill form of communication. Terrorism has costs Turkey dearly. Yeah, maybe to them violence was a method, but it is a method that is unacceptable in any country.

⁴⁰ People are affected by their geography. Hence, there is a difference in the temperament of people who live in coastal regions and people who live amongst a background of economic troubles, it is completely natural.

The fifth group evaluated the issue due to the wrong policies of the Turkish state, as an action and reaction mechanism.

Şimdi, tepki-anti tepki olayı var ortada. Doğuda ve güneydoğuda, imkansızlıklar içinde boğuşan bir takım kesimler var. Ama, yine o bölgelerde, güllük gülistanlık içinde yaşayanlarımız da var, ağa, şeyh gibi. Bunlar, o insanları yönetir konumdalar. Bazı siyasiler, geçmişte, çıkarları için şiddete başvurdular. (T.Y., retired politician, businessman) ⁴¹

4.2.5. Shared Beliefs about In-Group Victimization

While the TEOC encompasses the self-image of the Turks as fair, able to govern, educated, and so on, it also encompasses a collective self-image of Turkey as a victim. (See, Table 4.6.) As a consequence of the Kurdish conflict, Turkish citizens perceive themselves as victims of the conflict. I could say the victimization was the leading theme throughout my interviews. By nature, the Turkish citizens in periphery zones mostly perceive the victimization in terms of indirect psychological and economic factors.

At the individual level, some participants stated there is no detrimental effect of the Kurdish conflict on them.

Yani, kendimi bildim bileli, meselenin mesele olduğunu, bakın bir mesele yok demiyorum, bu meselenin bir mesele olduğunu, bilerek, yaşamışım ama, çok da etkilediğini söyleyemem. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat) ⁴²

However, all other participants think they have been impacted by the conflict in terms of psychological, economic, and sociological factors. Economic factors points out to expenditures made and the economic future of the Turkish state.

Memleketimizin maddiyatı için üzülüyorum. Oraya harcanan milyon dolarlar beni çıldırtıyor. (M.U., pharmacist, religious organization representative) ⁴³

Kürt meselesi var, ve ben bundan doğrudan etkileniyorum birey olarak, vatandaş olarak. Ekonomik açıdan, sosyal açıdan...Gidip gönül rızasıyla gönlünce gezemiyorsun, geçmişini tanıyamıyorsun.. Diğer

⁴¹ Now here is a response-reaction. There are some sectors struggling with several impossibilities in the East and South-east. But again, in that area, there are some people living on a bed of roses such as the *aghas* and sheikhs. They are managing the people here. Some politicians, sheikhs and *aghas*, in the past, have resorted to violence for their own interests.

⁴² So, ever since I can remember – I am not saying there is no Kurdish issue – I have lived with knowing that there is such a thing called the Kurdish issue. But, I cannot say it has affected me that much.

⁴³ I feel sorry for the economy of our country. Having to spend millions of dollars over there drives me crazy.

taraftan bölgeler arası adaletle ilgili sıkıntılar... Ben elektrik ödüyorum onlar ödemiyor. (C.G., businessman, NGO representative)⁴⁴

Few of the participants think they are psychologically victimized due to Kurdish immigration to the Thrace, and by the martyrs.

Çok endişeliyim. Bunu babam söyledi zaten. 30 sene sonra Tekirdağ'da rahat rahat dükkanınızda oturamayacak, çarşıda gezemeyeceksiniz dedi. Tekirdağ, çok göç aldı. Ben düşünemiyorum, bir şalvarlının olabileceğini hiç düşünemezdim ben. Ve buraya kaç senede geldik biz? 30 senede. (N.S., pharmacist, NGO representative)⁴⁵

Kim ister oğlunun ölmesini.. Buradaki anne oğlunu askere gönderdiği zaman, uyku uyuyamıyordu. En çok psikolojik olarak etkilendi. (N.C., media owner, NGO representative)⁴⁶

Table 4.6. Shared Beliefs about in-group Victimization

Individual	Social
No detrimental Effect	No Detrimental Effect
Psychological (martyrs)	Psychological (hatred, paranoia, hostility, hate, and animosity, anxiety for the future)
Economic (Expenditures)	Relational (To become severe, not to act naturally)
Social (immigration, security)	

As for the societal level, there were three types of response category. The first category again rejected any social detrimental effect. Rather, it helps people understand the truth.

Şimdi, etkilenme diye bir şey yok. Herkes yolunda gidiyor. Bilakis, hakikati öğrendiler. Yani, Kürtlerin Türkiyeyi parçalamak emelleri hakkında bilgileri oldu. (M.S., intellectual, journalist)⁴⁷

⁴⁴ There is a Kurdish issue, and I am personally and directly affected by it, both economically and socially. You are not able to travel to these regions freely, you are not able to learn about your past. On the other hand, there are some problems with inter-regional justice. I pay for my electricity but they do not.

⁴⁵ I am very worried. My dad told us that in 30 years we would not be able to sit comfortably in our shops or walk in the city in Tekirdağ. Tekirdağ allowed so many immigrants in. I would never have thought that I would see a person wearing baggy trousers in Tekirdağ. And all this after how many years? 30 years.

⁴⁶ Who would want their son to die? Whenever a mother sent her son to the military, she could not sleep. We were mostly affected psychologically.

⁴⁷ First of all, there has not been any influence. Everyone is going on his way. Now they have learned the truth. I mean, they were informed of the Kurds' ambitions to divide Turkey.

The second category emphasizes that the Turkish society developed several attitudes due to the outcomes of the victimization of the Kurdish conflict. According to this group of participants, hostility, hate, paranoia, and animosity of the Kurds and fear increased within the Turkish society.

Tabi, medyanın şeyleriyle etkilendi. Paranoya gelişti. Her akşam şehit cenazeleri haberleri, toplumu baya bir gerdi. (R.U., doctor, executive)⁴⁸

Toplum etkilenmez mi? Adam çocuğunu gönderiyor, askerlik yapsın diye, şehit olarak geri dönüyor. En çok psikolojik olarak etkiledi. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)⁴⁹

Toplum çok etkileniyor, hatta, Allah korusun bu işin sonunda bir ayrılık olurmu korkusu dahi var. (M.U., pharmacist, religious organization representative)⁵⁰

Ülkenin geleceği açısından kaygılanırım. Eğer bu meseleyi biz çözemezsek TC vatandaşları olarak, birileri çözer bunu bir gün. Bu ülkenin insanları birbirinden koparlar, Allah korusun bu ülkenin başına çok kötü şeyler gelir. (T.B., businessman, politician)⁵¹

The third category outlined that the Kurdish conflict damaged the relationship between the Turkish society and the Kurdish society. To become severe, not to act naturally, disagreements among the Turkish society were the most important arguments of this category. First group in this category, define the victimization of the Kurdish conflict through its impact on the relations among the Turkish people.

Toplum etkileniyor. Mesela, benim en rahatsız olduğum konu, “ben Kürdüm diyor, adama zorla mı Türk dedirteceğiz, onlar da insan” falan..Yani, bir Kürt beni ikna etmesi lazımken, Türk beni Kürtler lehine ikna etmeye çalışıyor. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative)⁵²

The second group in this category pointed out becoming severe and not acting naturally.

Madde planında da mana planında da. Sertleşme hızla, İstanbula geldi, Adanayada geldi, Antalyaya, İzmirde de geldi. Türk olmayan toplumda

⁴⁸ Of course, the people were affected by the media. Paranoia developed. Every evening news of the funerals of the martyrs, has made the community pretty nervous.

⁴⁹ How can society not be affected? A man sends his child to complete his military service and he returns as a martyr. Society has been psychologically affected, more than anything else.

⁵⁰ Society has been greatly affected. God forbid there is even the fear of separation.

⁵¹ I am anxious for the future of the country. If we do not solve this problem as Turkish citizens, others will solve it for us. Then the people of this country will break away from each other. God forbid, terrible things could happen to this country.

⁵² Society is affected. For instance, what bothers me the most are conversations like this: “A man says: I am Kurd. We can’t make him a Turk. They are also human beings...” etc. I mean, Kurds should be the ones convincing me, but we have Turks who are trying to convince me in favor of the Kurds.

çok etkilendi. Sertleştik birbirimize karşı. (A.C., businessman, religious organization representative) ⁵³

Şüphesiz, bir kere, doğal davranamıyorsunuz. Mesela siz bir Kürt'le iş yapacaksınız. “Ya kürtlerle ortaklık yapılır mı? Kürtlerle evlenilir mi? Yola çıkılır mı, bilmiyormusunuz onlar kürt” dediğini varsayalım. Sizin için, şahsınız için problem olmazsa bile, dolaylı yönden elbette bir etkilenme söz konusudur. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat) ⁵⁴

4.2.6. Shared Beliefs about Patriotism

All interviewees emphasized their patriotic emotions and attitudes in their discourses. Nourishing loyalty and love, sacrifice, fighting for Turkey, and the national collective were encouraged by all of the participants. For them, all soldiers are actively engaged in the conflict and casualties are revered. For the sake of the goals of the state, the majority of the participants stated they were ready to give up their individual needs, and desires to defend their territorial integrity. Instances of such shared beliefs about patriotism can be observed in the following quotes from the participants' answers:

Her aileden bir şehit cenazesi geldi.. Şu anda.. Her bölgeden var... Ama buradaki insan diyor ki “ben ülkemi savunmak için gittim” diyor. Öl dediler, öldüm. Veya benim oğlum, vatana feda olsun diye gönderdim diyor kalan ailesi de... (M.D., teacher, NGO representative) ⁵⁵

Ülke bütünlüğü açısından daha dikkatli yürütülmeli.. Bir takım adımlar atıldığı zaman, karşı adımları planlamak gerekir. Bazı adımlar ileriye yönelik fayda getiriyor mu diye dikkat etmek gerekir. (O.A., businessman, religious organization representative) ⁵⁶

4.2.7. Shared Beliefs about Unity

There were three central questions in order to observe shared beliefs about unity; respectively, education in the mother tongue (Kurdish language), the self-government of the region, and the unity of the society. (See Table 4.7.)

⁵³ The effect has been both material and spiritual. Violence came to Istanbul very quickly. It also came to Adana, Antalya, and İzmir. The non-Turkish community was also very affected. We have become harsh towards one another.

⁵⁴ You definitely cannot behave naturally. For example, let's say you want to do business with a Kurd. And let's assume that someone says: How can you think of forming a partnership with a Kurd? Or how could you marry a Kurd? Do you not know that they are Kurds...” etc. Although it is not a problem for you, would be influenced indirectly.

⁵⁵ Every family in the region has had one member martyred. But the person from here says “I went to defend my country. They said “Die!” and I died.”. Or, his family says “I sent my son to be sacrificed for the sake of the motherland”.

⁵⁶ The process should be executed with caution for the integrity of the country. While the State takes one step forward, it should also prepare for the opposite plans. Some steps should be evaluated to see whether they bring benefits or not.

In terms of the demand for an independent Kurdistan, all of the participants evaluated this issue as the central threat of the Kurdish conflict and evaluate the demand of the self-government of the region as a separatist demand.

Konuştuğum çoğu kimse, alın doğuyu dediğim zaman yine hayır diyor. Ben yine senin himayende kalacağım diyor. Yönetim bende olacak diyor. Böyle saçmalık olur mu? Ben sana parayı vericem sen keyfini süreceksin olmaz öyle şey. (R.C., media owner) ⁵⁷

As for the education in the mother tongue, there were three categories. The first category completely rejects this demand as they think this permission may lead to other language demands in Turkey. Therefore, it may break the unity of the society.

Ben onu kendi adıma doğru bulmuyorum. Çerkez başka bir şey söyleyecek, laz başka bir şey söyleyecek, Kürt başka söyleyecek. Ne olacak? Nereye gidecek bu.. (C.G., businessman, NGO representative) ⁵⁸

Table 4.7. Shared Beliefs about Unity

Education in Mother-Tongue	Self-Governance	Unity of Society (Marriage)
Impossible (may break unity)	Impossible	Possible
Learning OK, Education impossible	Separatist demand	Possible, but suspicious
Possible		Impossible, not applicable
Main Ties Binding the Turks and the Kurds		
Interests, Republican government, common ideals, business, geography, inter-marriages, history, culture + tradition, religion		

The second category was more moderate. According to this category, although it is not possible to accept the Kurdish language as a national language, there is no problem to culturally learn the Kurdish language. However, there were three different argumentations rejecting the national education dimension. The first group in this category claimed it is too late to establish a Kurdish science language; therefore, it will damage the future of Turkey.

Ana dilde, rahat, özgürce konuşulabilirsin, hiç kompleks yaşamasin, basın, yayın, teşvik edilmeli, bu baskının, psikolojik manada, mutlaka

⁵⁷ Most people I talk to say no when I say take the East. They say I will remain under your protection but I will be in control. What nonsense is this? I will give you money so you can do whatever you want? That will not happen!

⁵⁸ Personally I do not think it is right. Circassians will say something different, the Laz people will say something different, Kurds will say something different? So what then? Where will this debate go?

izale edilmesi lazım. Ama, anadilde eğitim açısından aynı noktada değilim. Bir devletin, bir milletin, bir toplumun, müşterek dili olması gerekiyor. Okullar nezdinde, sizin bir dille yaptığımız eğitim, aynı zamanda dünya bilimiyle de yarışabilmeli. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat)⁵⁹

The second group in this category pointed out to the inadequacy of the Kurdish language to be a national language. Rather, they defined the Kurdish language as a clan language.

Biz milli bir dil kabul etmemiz lazım devlet olarak. Yani, bir kabile dili, milli dil haline gelebilir mi? Gelemez. Hiç sıcak bakmıyorum bu talebe. Ama, her dil, bir kişi dahi konuşan kalsa, çok büyük bir kültür hazinesidir. Çingenece bile olsa, her dil hazinedir. Bütün unsurlarıyla, ağız, diyalektik yapılarıyla, her şeyiyle tespit edilmeli, kayda geçirilmeli, mümkünse geliştirilmeli. Bunun önü açılmalı. Kürtçe de konuşulsun ve müsaade edilsin. Ama eğitim, milli dille olmalı. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative)⁶⁰

The third group in this category evaluates the demand of education in Kurdish mother tongue as a potential separatist demand. However, as a moderate, they make a distinction between education and training.

Şimdi, ana dili öğrenme ile ana dilde eğitim farklı olaylar. Ana dilde öğrenme, anasından öğrendiği dilin gramerini öğrenme, onunla ilgili kitap okuyabilme konusu. Ana dilde eğitim ise, okul öncesinden başlayarak, üniversiteye kadar kendi dilinde eğitim yapmak.. Anadil öğretilmeli. Ama eğitim bizim için tam bir açmazdır, ve yanlış olacaktır. Ayrılık sebebi olacaktır. PKK eskiden Kürt devleti istiyordu, şu anda diyor ki, hayır ben ayrılmak istemiyorum diyor, tabi taktik olarak. Ama diyor tek istediğim, ana dilde eğitim. Çünkü, artık dünya konjonktüründe kısa dönemde ayrılamayacağını anladı. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative)⁶¹

⁵⁹ Kurds should be allowed to speak their mother-tongue freely without having a complex. The media, press, and publication should also be encouraged. The pressure on language should be eliminated in the psychological sense. But, when it comes to education I do not have the same view. A state, a nation, a society, a community should have a common language. In a school, the education which is carried out in a particular language should be able to compete with knowledge from all over the world.

⁶⁰ As a state, we need to accept one national language. Can the language of a tribe become the national language? No. I do not look favourably upon such a demand. However, every language, even if there is only one person left who speaks it, is a huge cultural treasure. Even if it is Romany, each language is a treasure. Every language should be identified, recorded, and if possible, enhanced with all its elements, dialects and dialectical structures. Kurdish should also be spoken. But education must be provided in the national language.

⁶¹ First, learning one's mother-tongue and education in the mother-tongue are two different events. Learning one's mother-tongue consists of learning the grammar of the mother tongue and gaining the ability to read in the mother-tongue. But, education in the mother-tongue starts from pre-school all the way to university. The mother-tongue should be taught. But education in the mother-tongue is a dilemma for us, and it is wrong. It would be a cause of separation. The PKK wanted to establish a Kurdish state in the past. Currently, it says no, I do not want to separate, all I want is to be educated in my mother-tongue. Because they realised that separation is not going to be possible any time soon in the current state of the world.

The third category was the most optimistic side. From their view, there is no obstacle to establish education in the Kurdish language. For them, the Ottoman Empire's experiences provide a valid example to acknowledge this.

Ana dilde eğitim alabilmeli, devlete Kürtçe dilekçe verebilmeli. Orada bir de Kürt memuru bulunabilmeli. (B.I., retired müfti, merchant) ⁶²

Bence bir sıkıntı yok. Osmanlının yapmış olduğu sistem gayet mükemmel. Dinini de diline de karışmayacaksın. Bu zaten vardı. Bu inancımız. (O.A., businessman, religious organization representative) ⁶³

Last, to understand their perception regarding the unity of society, the participants were asked how they would consider a marriage of a member of their family to a Kurdish person, and what the main ties binding the Turks and the Kurds together are (See, Table 4.7).

There were again three categories of answers about permission for marriages. The first category was open and moderate to give their children permission to marry a Kurdish person. Few of the participants already had Kurdish daughter-in-laws and/or son-in-laws.

Şimdi, yani Kürt insan da bir vatandaş, insan nihayetinde. Etnik olarak Kürt olması çok şey değil bana göre. Ama tarz olarak, bizim standartlarımızdaysa, fikir, dünya, yani zırcahil değilse, insansa, işindeyse, neden olmasın? Önemsemem. (C.G., businessman, NGO representative) ⁶⁴

Gayet normal, olabilir. İngilizle evleniyorda, Amerikalıyla evleniyorda, Kürt benim vatandaşım, niye olmasın. Ailemde değil ama yakın dostlarımda var evlenen. (O.D., industrialist, intellectual) ⁶⁵

The second category said although they would not try to prevent this marriage, they might be uncomfortable because of this marriage. In other words, they would have reservations regarding such marriage.

Gönül işi bir defa... Kürt olduğu için kötü insandır girişimde bulunamayız. Ama, daha sonra, aile olarak karşımıza neler çıkacağını bildiğim için, uyarıcı olurum, sakıncalarını söylerim, bu dönemde, iyi olmadığını, sıkıntı getireceğini söylerim. Çünkü, farklılıklar artık orta yere çıktı. Çıkıyor. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative) ⁶⁶

⁶² One should be able to be educated in their mother-tongue, and should be able to submit a Kurdish petition to the state. A Kurdish officer should be available for them there.

⁶³ It is not a problem for me. The system of the Ottoman Empire was quite perfect: "You will not interfere in other peoples' religions or language". This was the case. This is our belief.

⁶⁴ Well, a Kurdish person is also a citizen of Turkey and a human being. Whether he is ethnically Kurdish or not is not a problem for me. In terms of manner, if he or she is in line with our standards, in terms of ideas, worldview, and he or she is not ignorant, why not? It's not an issue for me.

⁶⁵ It is perfectly normal. If people can marry an English person or an American then why shouldn't they be able to marry a Kurd The Kurds are our fellow citizens. No one in my family has married a Kurd but some of my close friends have.

⁶⁶ This is a matter of the heart... We cannot say that someone is bad just because they are Kurdish. But because I can foresee the consequences we will face as a family I would caution and warn of the

Ben sesimi çıkarmam, ama içimden evet demem. Adetim öyledir benim, ama içim OK vermez. Çünkü orada 30.000 tane şehit var. (N.S.)⁶⁷

The third category evaluates such marriage impossible or unacceptable. Interviewees in this category mentioned several times that they do not want to speak like politicians about this important issue.

Vallahi bunda siyaset yapamayacağım, kesinlikle vermem, istemem. (L.C., businessman, NGO representative)⁶⁸

İslami açıdan uygun bakmıyorum. İslamda küfuv var. Bunun içinde kültürel denklik de var. Kültürel denklik olmazsa, uyumsuzluk olur. Kültürel denklik olmadığı için, muhakkak sıkıntılar olacaktır. (O.A., businessman, religious organization representative)⁶⁹

Şimdi, bir siyasetçi olsa, ya olur falan derim, ama, şu bir gerçek ki, bu günkü şartlarda öyle bir evliliği tasvip etmek istemem açıkçası. Neden? Kardeşim, illa, toplumda bir şey çıkar. “Gitti bilmemneyn kızını aldı da, burada kız mı yok!” Öteki de diyecek ki, burada erkek mi yoktu da gitti kızını Kürt’e verdi. Şimdi genç birisi gitti, şehit oldu diyelim. Ben, Kürt’e kızımı vermiş biri olursam, o cenazeye nasıl giderim. Adam tükürür benim yüzüme orada. (N.A., media owner, NGO representative)⁷⁰

4.2.8. Shared Beliefs about Peace

Shared beliefs about peace were observed by asking three questions to interviewees. The first one is as to how they define the concept of peace. The perception of peace is presented in both negative and positive ways of understanding (Table 4.8.). The second question demonstrates what the participants think about the ongoing peace process (See Table 4.9). The perceptions regarding the ongoing peace process were threefold: positives, doubtful participants, and negatives.

problems. I would say that now is not a good time to marry a Kurd because of the trouble it will cause. The differences have now become and are becoming clear and apparent.

⁶⁷ I would not object, but inside I would not approve of it. This is how I am. Because there are 30.000 martyrs there.

⁶⁸ Well, I will not try to be politically correct here. I most certainly would not give my permission for such a marriage. I definitely would not want such a thing.

⁶⁹ I do not consider it appropriate from an Islamic perspective. There is the concept of “kufuv” (partner compatibility) in Islam. There should be a cultural match also. If there is no cultural match, there will be incompatibility. Due to the lack of cultural compatibility, there will certainly be trouble.

⁷⁰ Now, if I were talking to a politician, I would say that it would be okay. But frankly in today’s circumstances, I would not approve of such a marriage. Why? Because there will inevitably be someone in the community who will gossip. One will say, “Look! He married a Kurdish girl! Weren’t there any Turkish girls for him to marry?”. Another will say, “Couldn’t she find a Turkish boy? Why did he give his daughter to a Kurdish boy?”. Suppose that a young man from Tekirdağ was martyred. If I had allowed my daughter to marry a Kurdish boy, then how could I go to this funeral? They would spit in my face.

Table 4.8. Definitions of the Peace Concept

Negative Definitions	Positive Definitions
The lack of war	Equality/Justice/Freedom
The lack of terror	Democracy
The lack of discrimination	Common national ideals
The lack of fear	Good intention / Thinking in positive way
To be able to endure for war	Love of Humanity
Impossible to reach	Living Islam
	Tranquility / Happiness

The positive side presented various argumentations for the peace process. The first group on this side thinks the Turkish state understood the impossibility of ending the conflict by violence.

Bölgede bir kürt devlet istendiğini biliyoruz. TC devleti, ve onu yönetenler bunu aslında biliyorlardı ve görüyorlardı. Bir yere kadar onunla oynamak istediler. Önceden, döverek yaparız diyorduk, şimdi yapamayacağız dedik artık, anlaşarak o bölgeyi korumamız gerekiyordu, bu kabul etmemiz gereken bir gerçek. (A.C., businessman, religious organization representative)⁷¹

Table 4.9. The Peace Process Perceptions

Positives	Doubtful Participants	Negatives
Understanding of the impossibility to end the conflict by violence.	Fluctuations within the process	Acknowledgment of the PKK/APO as an actor
Self-initiated nature of the peace process	Need of time	Lack of socialization of the peace process
Lack of violence	International dimension of the conflict.	Peace or Democratization Process
		Not trust the Kurdish side

The second group highlighted the self-initiated nature of the peace process and stated this nature provides hope.

⁷¹ We know that they want a Kurdish state in that region. The Turkish state and its rulers know this They were willing to play this game with them up to a point. Previously, they said they could do it by beating them but now they know that this is not possible. Now, we realise that we need to protect that territory through mutual agreement

Çözüm sürecinin şu tarafı beni çok umutlandırıyor; kendi kendimize bir meseleyi çözmek için çalışmamız çok hoşuma gidiyor. (B.M., NGO representative)⁷²

Esasında bu Kürt meselesi ve bu meselenin çözümüyle ilgili bir akıl heyetinin bir çalışma gruplarının oluşturulması, taraflar arasında bir diyalog ve iş birliğinin oluşmasına vesile oldu diye düşünüyorum (C.G., businessman, NGO representative)⁷³

And, the last group mentioned that the lack of violence is a sufficient reason to support the peace process.

Ben 3 yıldır ölüm haberi duymuyorsam, demek ki bir başarı var kardeşim. Ben, ağlamayan annelerin, üzülmeyen kadınların yanındayım. (L.C., businessman and NGO representative)⁷⁴

The doubtful side of the participants, despite their support for the process, shared their reserved feelings regarding the peace process. The first group at this doubtful dimension highlighted the fluctuations within the process and said that these fluctuations make them doubtful.

Umutlanmak istiyorum, inşallah bu çözüm olur ama bir taraftan iyi olur diye sevinirken, diğer taraftan en ufak bir şey birdenbire bir kırılma noktası oluyor, birdenbire atmosfer değişiyor. (M.K., politician, businessman)⁷⁵

O, araya çomak sokanlar olmadığı takdirde belki... Misal, niye çözüm sürecine karşı çıkıyor bu diğer partiler, ben anlayamıyorum! (T.Y., retired politician, businessman)⁷⁶

The second group mentioned the need for time to achieve sustainable peace.

Çözmek gerekiyordu. Bu çözüm süreci bir umuttu. Zaman zaman engebeli olsa da, ki kolay olmuyor. Asırlar boyunca biriken problemler sihirli değnekle çözülmez. Ama meselenin kodlarını okumaya yönelik samimi bir gayret olduğunu görüyorum. Ama Zamana ihtiyaç var. Umudum da var. (F.A., teacher, bureaucrat)⁷⁷

The third group highlighted the international dimension of the conflict.

⁷² What gives me hope about the solution process is that I love the fact that we're working on our own to resolve a matter.

⁷³ I think that the establishment of a Committee of Intelligent People was a means for dialogue and working together to solve this Kurdish problem.

⁷⁴ If I have not heard any news of death for three years, then that is a success. I stand by mothers who shouldn't have to cry for their children and women who should not have to suffer.

⁷⁵ I want to get my hopes up, hopefully this process will provide a solution. However, on the one hand I am rejoicing, and on the other hand the slightest thing could be the breaking point and the atmosphere could change all of a sudden.

⁷⁶ It is possible if there were no obstructionists there... For instance, why are these political parties opposed to the solution process? I do not understand!

⁷⁷ It should have been solved. This solution process was a hope. Although from time to time it has been a bumpy ride and it is not easy. These problems have been accumulating for centuries and will not be solved with a magic wand. But I see a genuine desire to truly understand the issue. We need time. I have hope, too.

Şimdi, çözüm süreci gayet güzel bir çalışma ama, dış güçlerin ne kadar oynayacağı çok önemli. Malum, bölge çok karışık. Suriye, Irak... (C.G., businessman, NGO representative) ⁷⁸

The last dimension was the ones that view the situation negatively, to which I refer to as the negatives. This side of the participants stated several arguments made the peace process irresolvable. The first group on this side criticized the acknowledgment of the PKK or its leader Abdullah Ocalan as an actor of the peace process.

Metotta bir şeyler değişmeli. Çünkü, devlet böyle her eline silah alıp çıkana, ben sana gel bunun karşılığında bir şeyler vereceğim derse, bu işin içinden çıkılmaz o zaman yahu. (M.U. pharmacist, religious organization representative) ⁷⁹

The second group on this side was distressed due to the lack of socialization of the peace process. For this side, there is ambiguity within the process and the society should have been informed more clearly.

PKK tarafının yasal ve siyasal yollarını açmak için akıl adamlar ortaya çıkarıldı, ama bütüncül bir barışı ortaya getirmek için, esas, devletçi, memleketçi, ülkeci, bütünlükten yana bir stratejik uzmanlar kadrosu milletin önüne serilmedi. Sadece siyasi partilerin söylemleri yetmez. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative) ⁸⁰

Şu anda, süreci kimse bilmiyor ki? Tüm siyasi partiler, bütün STK'lar, herkes orada bir faaliyet halinde olmalıydı. Şu anda olamıyor ki? Kim var orada? Bakın üç tane aktör var: HDP-PKK işbirliği içinde, AKP, bir de HÜDA-PAR. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative) ⁸¹

The third group was uncomfortable due to the naming the process as the Kurdish peace process. From their standpoint, this process should have been named as the democratization period and should have included various identities throughout the country.

O günden bu yana, bence bu günde çok aşırı fazla değer veriliyor. Ama, Bir dönem çok önemsiz, bir dönem de çok önemli, bu defada haksızlık olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bence eşit muamele görsünler. O bölgenin

⁷⁸ Now, the solution process is a very good thing, but, to what extent the external forces will play a role is very important. Obviously, the region is very complicated. Look at Syria, Iraq...

⁷⁹ Something in the methodology has to change. If the government accepts the demands of everyone who takes up arms then we will always be stuck.

⁸⁰ The Committee of Intelligent People was established to open up the legal and political paths for the PKK. However, a statist cadre of experts for bringing about a holistic peace was not a strategic part of the process. Just the rhetoric of the political parties is not enough

⁸¹ Currently, no one knows what is happening with the process. All political parties and NGOs should have been there doing something. Right now they cannot. Who is there? There are three actors: HDP-PKK are in cooperation, there is the AKP, and HUDA-PAR.

yapısına uygun devlet oralara imkanları götürsün, ama onlar da vergi ödesin yani. (T.B., businessman, politician) ⁸²

Barış süreci değil, adı, demokratikleşme süreci olarak değiştirilecek deniyor. Şimdi, demokratikleşme süreci, sadece bir bölgeyi değil, bütün TR'yi şamil insanları kapsayacak şekilde olacakmış, bu çok doğru olur. problem sadece bir bölgeye has bir problem değil, demokratikleşmeye herkesin ihtiyacı var. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative) ⁸³

The final group was the most desperate among the negatives. This group has no trust in the Kurdish side. “Gidemeyecek, inanmıyorum. Bunlar şimdi bize baştan çok güzel gözükecekler, sonra yapacaklar yapacaklarını. (N.S., pharmacist, NGO representative) ⁸⁴”

The third and the last question aimed to bring out thoughts as to how this conflict can be resolved (See Table 4.10).

Table 4.10. How can this conflict be resolved?

Individual Level	State Level	Actor Level: PKK
Religious References	Educational policies	Elimination of the PKK pressure
Good intention and writing off each parties' debts	Democratic policies	Disconnect the ties between the PKK and international actors
Knowing each other	Need of spesific institutions	

The first group emphasized the religious references, good intention, knowing one another, and writing off each party's debts as the most important tool to end the conflict.

Özet, yapıcı bir niyet. Diğerleri ikincil...Biz, gerçek kürtleri bulup helalleşmemiz gerekiyor. (A.C., businessman, religious organization leader) ⁸⁵

⁸² From that day until now too much importance has been given to this issue. However at one stage it was not considered important, then it was given a lot of... But then this is unfair. I think they need equal treatment. The State should provide opportunities according to the structure of the region, but the people there should also pay their taxes.

⁸³ Some says that the name of the process will be changed from peace process to democratization process. The democratization process will not only focus on one region but will encompass the entire country. This will be the right thing to do. The problem is not only that region's problem. Everyone needs democratization.

⁸⁴ I do not believe them. They will seem attractive to us now, but then, they will do whatever they want.

⁸⁵ In summary, a constructive intent. The other issues are secondary... We need to find real Kurds and forgive each other.

Yıllarca bir arada yaşadık. Beraber kurtuluş savaşı verdik. Terörü bir tarafa bırakarak, masaya oturup, nedir talepleri bir düşünmek, konuşmak, tartışmak gerek. (O.D., industrialist, intellectual) ⁸⁶

The second group generally mentioned the structural state policies to bring an end to the conflict such as educational policies, democratic policies, and the need for specific institutions.

Eğitim ve öğretim sistemini yeniden düzenleyerek. Bu memlekette eğitim oldukça sorun olmaz. AKP iktidarından bu yana, TR’de yapılan her şey, sektör sektör, çok iyi seviyede yapıldı, ya da standart yükseldi. Ama, birey olarak, eğitim sisteminin, sınıfta kaldığını düşünüyorum. Bu kitlenin de doğru bilgiyle, doğru eğitimle, doğru öğrenimle donanması, bu memleketin aydınlık yarınlarına kavuşması olacaktır. (C.G., businessman, NGO representative) ⁸⁷

Meclise girdiler. Bu meseleyi mecliste çözecekler. Silahların bırakılması lazım. Yassıadadaki kişiyle, zaten devamlı kontakt halindeler, kimse onları engellemiyor. (T.Y., retired politician, businessman) ⁸⁸

Bizim en büyük derdimiz ne şu anda, Kürçülük problemi. Ama, Kürçülük ile ilgili bizim neyiz var Türkiye’de kurumsal olarak, hiçbir şeyimiz yok. Milli politikaya yönelen ve bu sorunu anlayan kurumlara ihtiyaç var. (H.E., journalist, NGO representative) ⁸⁹

The third group completely focused on the responsibilities of the PKK organization and the organization’s international ties.

Aşiret ve PKK baskısı kalkmalı. Bireyselleşme olmadan, o adamların gerçek ihtiyaçlarını bilemezsin.. PKK, bence, daha üst akıllardan destek alıyor. Dışarıdan besleniyor. Kandil orada olduğu süreçte, APO ile anlaşmak, HDP ile anlaşmak sorunu çözemeyecektir. (M.D., teacher, NGO representative) ⁹⁰

4.3. Discussion

As discussed in the chapter on theory, if a conflict is protracted, violent, interpreted as irresolvable, and the parties of the conflict have made extensive

⁸⁶ We lived together for many years. We fought the War of Independence together. We need to sit down and think about, talk about and discuss their demands.

⁸⁷ Through the reorganization of the system of training and education. As long as there is education, then there will be no problem. Since the AKP, the standards have isen and we had quality in every sector. But, individually, the education system has failed. Correct education and information of the Kurds will enlighten the future of this country.

⁸⁸ They entered the assembly. They need to settle this matter in parliament. They should put down their weapons. They are in constant contact with the man at Yassıada. Nobody is preventing them.

⁸⁹ What is our biggest problem now? The problem of Kurdish nationalism. What institutions do we have concerning Kurdish nationalism? Nothing! There is a need for institutions that are directed towards national politics and that understand these issues.

⁹⁰ Tribal and PKK pressure should be eliminated. Without individualism, one cannot know their real needs. I think the PKK receives support from higher minds. It is being nourished by external groups Agreement with APO or HDP will not solve the problem as long as Kandil remains.

investments due to violent actions (Kriesberg, 1998); in addition, if it has a multi-dimensional nature and possesses a central place in the society (Bar-Tal, 2007), one can call this conflict an intractable conflict. The author of the research calls the Kurdish conflict an intractable conflict as discussed in the first chapter. As I mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, this study assumes that in the course of conflict, both members of the parties involved in the conflict develop a socio-psychological infrastructure (SPI) to adapt the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007) and without transformation within the SPI, building sustainable peace is not completely possible (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kelman 2007; Lederach 2003; Mitchell 2014). In other words, the objective of this study is to evaluate the response of the Turkish society to the peace process and examine the general characteristics of the Turkish ethos of the Kurdish conflict (TEOC). In addition, the study aims to demonstrate how the ethos of the conflict (EOC) impacts societies' perception of social reality.

The first and the most important assumption of this thesis was that the EOC performs a moral function and provides an action guide for the society involved in the conflict. In this sense, the TEOC aids individuals within the Turkish society to encounter the challenges of the conflict, namely the (1) satisfaction of basic needs such as safety, positive identity, needs of knowing, (Burton, 1990), (2) withstanding the Kurds, (3) and coping with stress (Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2006). The results of the research met my expectations and indicated that each of the eight themes were involved within the TEOC. Although each of the shared beliefs was unique, all of them feed the holistic orientation (Bar-Tal, Halperin, Sharvit, and Zafran, 2012). In other words, each of the shared beliefs complements one another and constructs common explanations regarding the ongoing intractable Kurdish conflict. On the one hand, TEOC prepares the Turkish society for violent conditions and facilitates adaptation to the potential harmful conditions of violent confrontations. On the other hand, TEOC suggests that the TG is just and fundamental for secure life by motivating and guiding the Turkish society for solidarity and action.

This also demonstrates how the TEOC manages patriotic shared beliefs within the Turkish society. Findings of the research show that for the Turkish society, securing indivisible territorial integrity has been seen as an ultimate purpose of the state. Therefore, if this purpose seems under attack, all policies of the state can be seen as pardonable, excusable, and justifiable. Therefore, the TEOC morally justifies the Turkish states' and Turkish members' acts, intentional harm, and aggression towards

the Kurds, consisting of destruction, killings, and violence. Therefore, the Turkish society disposes of guilt, shame, and dissonance through the moral functionality of the TEOC (Bar-Tal, 2007).

The second assumption of this thesis was that in the Kurdish conflict, the EOC serves as a common ideology within the society and functions as a prism that influences evaluation of the social reality in the context of the intractable Kurdish conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007, 2013) In general, although the participants were chosen from different religious backgrounds and political camps (religious/secular, conservative / nationalist / republican / others), the findings of the research indicates that all of the participants shares the very same EOC in terms of four themes of shared beliefs , respectively de-legitimization of the KG, justness of the TG, security, patriotism, and victimization. (See Table 4.11) More clearly, without exception, for all of the participants,

- Turkish state and TSK should be evaluated as just as they sought to secure indivisible territorial integrity.
- Turkish side is the most victimized side of the conflict.
- There are several identities that victimized at least as much as the Kurdish identity. Maybe the victimization of the Kurdish people or the region can be acknowledged associated with the past but today there is no any evidence to support the Kurdish victimization. Due these bloody developments, the Turkish state's territorial integrity and its national security are under threat.

Therefore, all of the Turkish people are ready to die or fight against the opponents. EOC theory claims the shared beliefs about the justness of the TG and de-legitimization of the KG allow the Turkish society to believe that the conflict is intransigent and the Kurdish side is the only blamable side for eruption and maintenance of the Kurdish conflict, and for the outbreak of all armed confrontations, and the Kurdish side is only responsible side for the failure of past peace initiatives (Bar-Tal, 2009). Moreover, due to this theme, Turkish society views itself as right and humane and the most victimized side of the Kurdish conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Thus, the theme of the de-legitimization of the KG, for the Turkish society eases passing the responsibility regarding eruption and continuation of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). This theme also helps to legitimize violence to the opponent. Hence, de-legitimization theme consists of a significant ideological assumption that clarifies

the events during the conflict and encouraged the society for acting against the opponent (Bar-Tal, 1990).

These were the crucial and fundamental common findings that create homogeneity within the EOC. However, there were some levels of TEOC impacts on other shared beliefs and this differentiation lead to heterogeneity within the TEOC.

First, in my sample, the participants with higher TEOC saw the Kurdish people's negative characteristics as the cause of their violence preference, completely rejected the education in mother tongue and self-governance demands, additionally perceive these demands as separatist demands, and were completely against marriages with the Kurdish people. On the other hand, the participants with a lower EOC stated the Turkish state's past wrong policies as one dimension for their violence preference and mentioned the impossibility of blaming only the Kurdish people, even some participants made a distinction between the PKK and the Kurdish society, some participants even see the education-in-mother-tongue demand as possible, and were open to marriage with the Kurdish people. However, even the participants with low EOC were against to self-governance demands of the Kurdish side.

Second, in line with the EOC theory, participants with higher TEOC evaluated the Kurdish people with very negative stereotypes and the Turkish people with very positive repertoire than the participants with lower TEOC. Furthermore, those with a higher TEOC were speaking with a high aggressiveness regarding the Kurdish people. Participants with lower TEOC, however, evaluated the Kurdish people with both positive and relatively negative stereotypes, even some claimed that to make a distinction between a Turk and a Kurds is impossible.

Third, the negative view towards the Kurdish people can also explain the attributions of one-way blame to the Kurdish side. I can claim that, during the years of the Kurdish conflict, Turkish society constructed several beliefs that reject the Kurds' humaneness. The findings show that, some higher level EOC participants perceive the Kurdish people as totally cruel and primitive.




Figure 4.1. Socio-Psychological Infrastructure (SPI) of the Turkish Society

This whole structure and a set of contents of TEOC demonstrate that it is really possible to perceive the EOC as an ideology that describes the conflict and its related tasks. The findings indicate the TEOC in fact provide a common socio-psychological adaptation for the society. It makes clear explanations available, represents a societal view, and helps establishing an epistemological basis associated with the Kurdish conflict, and causes cognitive selectivity and biases (Bar-Tal, 2009). As a holistic

narrative, the ideological mode of the TEOC shapes the society's mind and lead to dogmatism and mental rigidity (Rokeach, 1960; Sorrentino and Roney, 2000). Therefore, through the aid of the TEOC the Turkish society cut loose from the ambiguity character of the social reality. Ambiguity of the world become more meaningful by the TEOC (Burton, 1990, Staub, 2011, Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2006) and the future situations become more predictable (Bar-Tal, Halperin, Sharvit, and Zafran, 2012). Moreover, the ideological and epistemic function eases coping with stress, as it needs clarified schemes to understand stressful conditions (Bar-Tal, e.g.).

The third assumption of the thesis was that the EOC performs a societal function for the Turkish society. In other words, the EOC contributes the formation, maintenance, and strengthening of the Turkish social identity (Bar-Tal, 2000). According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), motivations for improving the social esteem deepen the rejection of other groups. Therefore, the negative perceptions of the participants with higher TEOC regarding the Kurdish identity can be interpreted as the impact of social identity function of the TEOC. First, the security and territorial integrity threats most probably initiated negative generalizations associated with the Kurds (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). Second, the Turkish society considers unity as a unity of territory, unity of language, and unity of national ideals. Therefore, these shared beliefs strongly determine the attitudes towards the demands of a self-government and right to education in the mother tongue, expressed by the Kurds. However, on the other hand, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) argue that in each case, whether to form a society or a group, individuals must identify themselves with a social identity that points out their membership for a society to exist. Therefore, it is also a prerequisite and basic need to bind members together in the Turkish society (Tajfel, 1982). At a collective level, members of the Turkish society satisfy their need for security and belonging through their social identity affected by the intractable Kurdish conflict. Social identity increases in-group cohesiveness and solidarity. Solidarity and cohesiveness are the two phenomena that mobilize the society to act for the sake of the society (Bar-Tal, 2000). So, social identity reflects continuing experiences and circumstances of the Kurdish conflict and explains how the TEOC mobilizes members of the society to sacrifice themselves for their own society and why the generalized negative stereotypes toward the Kurds are gradually embedded in the Turkish society, especially by the younger generation (Bar-Tal,

2007). At this point, one can easily assume that the security threat and generalized negative stereotypes negativity consolidate each other.

The fourth assumption of the thesis was that the EOC creates a perception of superiority for the society involved in the conflict. In the findings of the research, the tradition of governance of the Turks was the remarkable feature the participants noted. This emphasis can be considered as an implicit perception of the superiority of the Turks for some proportions of the Turkish society. On the other hand, commonly shared beliefs on the de-legitimization of the KG, honoring the Turkish state's counterattacks on the PKK, acknowledged in-group victimization, and the relatively lack of differentiation between the PKK and the Kurdish identity can all be considered a differentiation process among the two identities and the impact of high TEOC. Within the context of the conflict, since these types of differentiations reinforce the rigidity of the TEOC (Bar-Tal, 2013), they can be evaluated as major boundaries or obstacles to make achieve resolution of the Kurdish conflict.

The final assumption of the thesis was that EOC restricts the perception of peace and make people think peace is a wish, a hope, and even a dream. The findings of the thesis indicated that the participants with a higher TEOC think that the peace between Kurds and Turks is impossible. The second problem in conflictual zones is to think peace as a lack of psychological violence, namely the negative peace perception (Galtung, 1990). Although the participants with a lower TEOC perceive achieving peace as possible, the findings indicates that they understand establishing peace in a negative way rather than that achieving lack of violence with establishing just institutions to stop structural violence at the same time (Galtung, 1967). The most important point that should be mentioned here is the possible impact of shared beliefs about victimization on the perception of peace. Even the participants with a lower TEOC think that there are no longer any victimization of the Kurds by pointing economic investments in the region, democratic policies on using their language, and democratic opportunities to be in the TBMM. Therefore, all of the requirements for establishing peace are made according to these participants.

4.4. Need for Change

Over the last decades, social scientists working on conflict resolution has become more focused on the reconciliation concept (Kriesberg, 1998; Rothstein, 1999; Lederach, 1997; Keogh and Haltzel, 1993) rather than focusing entirely on all phases of conflicts. Since the resolution of the conflict engaged in prolonged violence requires

a well-designed reconciliation process (Bar-Tal, 2000b), scholars became to think that the paradigm shift in the literature was inevitable. When such an armed conflict proceeds for so many decades, there is significant growth of hatred, prejudice, and animosity; CM is developed by issues regarding the conflict; several cultural products become more antagonistic; common negative shared beliefs are imprinted and are gathered in the EOC; and at least one generation within the society has grown up in the conflictual conditions (Bar-Tal, 2000b).

That situation very applies to the inter-ethnic conflict in Turkey. Then, the question of how one conflict reach and achieve a reconciliation process can be meaningful at that point. In theory, there is no one type of reconciliation for prolonged-violent conflicts due to characteristics of conflicts. Whether the outcome of formal resolution of the conflict is that the two parties of the conflict must proceed to live in one common political system (e.g. Turkey, Bosnia, Rwanda, El Salvador) or will live in two different political systems and states (e.g. France and Germany) is a determinant to choose reconciliation form. While in the first form, the parties should establish one common economic, political, cultural, and even educational system that integrate the two past adversary groups, in the second form, the past rivals can continue to live in two different political systems. Thus, the first form necessitates the construction of new peaceful and cooperative system to establish trust. In the second form, however, reconciliation process solely focuses on the bilateral relations of two parties from two different countries.

Although there should be different dimensions and types of reconciliation, all of the disciplines focused on this issue acknowledges that reconciliation necessitates socio-psychological transformation (transformation of beliefs and attitudes) whether the outcome of the reconciliation requires live in the same state or not (Bar-Tal, 2000b). Reconciliation concept in the socio-psychological discipline can be considered as a cultural and social process that includes the majority of the members of the parties involved in the conflict, who will construct new shared beliefs regarding the opponents, about their own socio-culture, and associated with the confrontations and relationships of the two parties (Bar-Tal, 2000b).

It should be noted that although the conflict resolution and negotiation processes accelerates the process of reconciliation, transformation of social shared beliefs may take many years, and even many decades after the signed agreements between the two parties. In the context of the Kurdish conflict, the socio-psychological

dimension of reconciliation has special significance as it refers to transformation of the deep-rooted TEOC. As discussed in the previous part, TEOC fuels and establishes psychological barriers to its resolution. Thus, transformation of the TEOC is at the heart of the process of reconciliation. TEOC fulfills an ideological, epistemic, moral, and societal function for Turkish society. It creates a perception of superiority and prepares the Turkish society for violent conditions.

Therefore, the question here is: can the TEOC change? If so, how? Bar-Tal (2000, pp.77) states, “Societal beliefs are durable, but not stable, as they may change with time”. In other words, it is not static, but can transform over time. I mean the TEOC can also weaken or strengthen. The findings of the research also support that the members of the society may live either lower or higher TEOC. To determine a vision to achieve the transformation of the TEOC, there are three key obstacles to prepare society for a sustainable peace: justness of the TG, de-legitimization of the KG, positive self-image and negative image of the Kurdish identity, and shared beliefs about peace (Bar-Tal, 2000b).

First of all, transformation of the TEOC requires the change in the shared beliefs about the justness of the TG. Turkish society legitimizes the TG by depending on indivisible territorial integrity or securing territorial integrity. To remove the cognitive-psychological fundamentals of the conflict, these types of shared beliefs need to be changed. In essence, this condition necessitates postponement or abolition or redefinition of the social visions and dreams that cause the continuation of the Kurdish conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000b). Peace agreements between the two parties of the conflict may be a fundamental catalyst of this transformation which is aimed to remove central contradictions between the TG and the KG. However, the official outcome of these agreements, arranged by the formal representatives of the two parties, must be translated into the formation of new TG and KG and their related beliefs. The outcome should transform the content and symbols of the TEOC (Bar-Tal, 2000b). The process of reconciliation between Germany and France after the World War Two ensamples that the transformation in shared beliefs about societal goals. From prolonged armed-conflict period and several contradictions of their goals to emerged new societal goals for both Germany and France, which focused on common goals and collaboration. Franco-German relations served as a founder pillar of the economic and political union of Europe (Ackermann, 1994; Willis, 1965). Therefore, this experience illustrates that a reconciliation, which abolishes all contradictions between the goals of the parties

and establishes desirable new aims, can allow living in peaceful coexistence with the adversaries and building collaborative relations between the opposing groups.

Second, transformation of the TEOC requires transformation of the negative images and stereotypes of the Kurdish identity. De-legitimization through thirty years unfortunately leads to negative image constructions and boundaries within the society. In essence, although the disposal of the stereotypes is impossible, the transformation of the shared negative images of the Kurdish identity may be achieved by balancing new stereotyping of the Kurdish identity (Bar-Tal, 2013). This means construction of positive images to negative images in any event because in order to establish a sustainable peace, the progressing de-legitimization process should disappear. These new stereotyping initiative will also help individuals to perceive Kurdish people not as a homogeneous group of people but as a group encompassing several different subgroups with distinct worldviews and characteristics (Bar-Tal, 2000b). All of these transformations are supposed to impact a new mindset, improve trust within the both Turkish and Kurdish sides, allow both sides of the conflict to consider each other's needs, and create a perception that sees the Kurdish or Turkish people as a partner to coexist on the very same territory and in the common political and economic system.

Third, transformation of the TEOC requires transformation of the positive self-images of the Turkish society, which glorify and praise the Turkish society in contrast to the Kurdish society. The transformation should provide a more objective perceptions particularly associated with the past and present events of the intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). Therefore, the new constructed perceptions must be more critical and multi-dimensional. The new perception should be able to evaluate the Turkish in-group contribution to the outbreak of the Kurdish conflict (if any) as well as the contribution of the Kurdish side. Such a transformation may have a tremendous impact on changing in the monopolistic shared beliefs about the victimization. The society should become recognize the victimization of both Turkish and Kurdish groups in the Kurdish conflict. According to Handl (1997), Czech-German Declaration, signed in 1997, can be shown as an example how declaration transform the self-in-group-images of both Czechs and Germans by making past unjust events explicit.

Fourth, the transformation of the positive self-images of Turkish society and negative images of the Kurdish identity may develop new relations between the Turkish and Kurdish side through providing a persuasive rationale. As for the future, the Turkish and Kurdish society should improve friendlier and more cooperative

beliefs. According to Bar-Tal, past experience in all over the world demonstrates that reconstruction of the past in mindsets is a crucial part of the reconciliation process, because the CM is developed with selective manner, mistrust, misdeeds of the opponent, hatred, and even animosity between the both sides of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000b). Thus, the transformation of the evaluation of the Turkish should be providing a balanced discourse with a critical examination in a more objective manner.

Finally, transformation of the TEOC requires transformation of the shared beliefs about peace and reassessment regarding the nature of peace. As discussed, on the one side peace can be perceived as a utopian aim, on the other hand peace can be perceived as just lack of physical violence without determining the nature or culture of peace or any useful tools to reach it. However, reconciliation necessitates new-shared beliefs that assess the necessary requirements (peaceful mechanisms such as negotiation, mediation, even arbitration) for living in peace (Bar-Tal, 2000b). Therefore, the Turkish society should understand and acknowledge the necessity of concession and compromise to achieve the sustainable peace after the thirty years armed conflict.

In sum, all of these findings, discussions, and analysis indicates and claims that the Kurdish conflict has developed a TEOC within the society and the normalization or reconciliation process requires several transformations and replacements of the share beliefs of the TEOC. The core needed transformations concerning conflictive-shared beliefs about the legitimization of the TG, de-legitimization of the KG, positive self-images of the Turkish society, negative images of the Kurdish society, and peace in order to establish the ethos of peace (Bar-Tal, 2013). Constitution of the ethos of peace in Turkey does not disqualify the shared beliefs about security, unity, patriotism, and even positive self-image of the Turkish society. Cohesive mobilization, basis for belonging, protection of society requires all of these mentioned four shared beliefs themes, even they are a basic need of the Turkish society. Hence, the transformation of the TEOC should not be understood as the rejection of these four themes. Whether in conflictual period or peaceful period, these four themes are very crucial and functional to survival of both the Turkish and Kurdish society as well. However, to being multi-dimensional and being open to discuss are still important in terms of these four themes as well as for other core themes.

4.5. Implications

To move from the armed conflict stage to reconciliation stage in the intractable Kurdish conflict, the mentioned transformations of the TEOC represent a really complicated process with various obstacles.

First and foremost, as I discussed earlier TEOC makes a great contribution to the Turkish society's social identity. Shared beliefs within the TEOC provide the epistemological basis related to meaning of membership in the Turkish society. Thus, the transformation initiative of these shared beliefs can be perceived as a threat to the members of the Turkish society, who does not want to lose a connective norm that binds the members of the Turkish society together (Oren, 2009).

Second, many of the shared beliefs of the TEOC are well based in the Turkish society. In the course of thirty years conflict, several educational, political, cultural, and social institutions and products publicize the contents of these beliefs and aid the society to retain them. In Turkey, one can find several books, films, literature, and leader's speeches that propagate and disseminate these beliefs of the Kurdish conflict without alternatives (Bar-Tal, 2000b).

Third, there are generations from both sides of the Kurdish conflict who are socialized in light of the Kurdish conflict obtaining the TEOC with its symbols and stereotypes. Therefore, the mindset of these youth generations is extremely challenging to transform.

Fourth, more importantly the TEOC serves as an ideological source through the Kurdish conflict for all different political camps in Turkey as a credo, and even a *raison d'être* (Bar-Tal, 2000b). Hence, even the minor modifications within the TEOC may lead to the strongest challenges.

Fifth, the Turkish society may develop some social mechanisms to defend TEOC climate to maintain coping with the stress. Individuals, groups, or even political parties may construct some formal or informal objection mechanisms when they feel any deviation from the TEOC. For instance, various objections from other political parties such as MHP can be understood in this way because established TEOC are seemed as validated reality for the group members. Therefore, the developed social mechanisms may attempt to stop or reject or block the construction of alternative explanations of the Kurdish conflict or ideas to solve it.

Although these difficulties are the obstacles for the transformation of the TEOC, the peace process in Turkey should involve this change. In order to start and

develop this process, the appropriate social climate for openness for alternative explanations and ideas should be came into existence. Therefore, political, cultural, educational, and social channels of communications that consist of all social institutions, such as NGOs should evolved not only in an official way but also in an informal way. I mean, the peace process should be publicized or socialized. There are some social factors to achieve the public peace process.

First, the determinative factor for sustainable peace process is a signed agreement between the parties of the conflict. Without the agreement, moving from the armed-conflict stage to the normalization and reconciliation stages is all but impossible.

Second, good will, mutual symbolic acts of peace and concession, wish tone in the leaders' statements, evolvment of institutions to support the peace process should come into exist and reflect the desire to transform the TEOC.

Third, international context is very important for the Turkey's peace process. The Syrian war and its political and security implications have very strong impacts on the Kurdish conflict. However, to construct a peace ethos and new common goals for both parties of the Kurdish conflict, international context should be used by both parties to create supportive conditions and peaceful pressure from influential international or supra-national allies.

Fourth, strong objections of official political parties and/or social organizations to the peace process, which have influence on the public, may procrastinate the public peace process by proceeding de-legitimization the members of the both parties of the conflict, which feeds the tension of the Kurdish conflict. The successful public peace process in Turkey necessitates establishment of wide-range and wide-spread support from the society to dilute the impact of oppositional actions to the peace process.

Fifth, political and social leaders and decision makers and their open support have crucial roles on their followers in terms of mobilization of the support of the peace process. The followers take them as models to think or act.

Finally, the impact of mobilization of cultural and educational institutions in the public peace process is very important. The educational policies may help the prejudiced youth to think alternative ideas and understand the importance of living in peace with the past opponent. Peace education policies may aid transformation of the shared beliefs and negative repertoire of the both societies. In addition, the cultural elite may contribute to the process via several cultural products such as films, books,

documentaries, or plays by providing new symbols of peace ethos and can help establishment of the peace culture.

In sum, these are the list of all possible dynamics that can impact the peace process in Turkey in terms of socio-psychological conceptual framework. This thesis sought to point out the importance and potential determinative influence of socio-psychological transformation in the TEOC. On the other hand, the research attempted to defend that socio-psychological dimension should be considered as an essential part of the peace process in Turkey because solely formal initiatives to resolve the Kurdish conflict provides no assurance to transform well-rooted political, social, economic, and psychological repertoire in the mindset of the society. The important point is that exclusion of the socio-psychological dimension from the road map of the peace process may lead to resurrection of the Kurdish conflict, as happened in July 2015.

CONCLUSION

The central research questions of the research were: “How does the society respond to the peace process? What is the impact of ethos on responses? Is the Turkish society resistant to change? If yes, why? If not, why?” In order to provide a persuasive framework to explain why people resist change, I specifically focused on the socio-psychological perspective of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Today, tens of cases indicate building peace in a society involved in intractable conflict points to a long-term commitment that seeks to create a new atmosphere across the levels of a society. Establishing social agreement depends on the contributions of multiple actors and activities targeted to accomplish negotiation and sustain peace. In this sense, I asserted that the socio-psychological dimension of the conflict offers a beneficial approach as to what factors prevent the resurrection of the conflict in the future, and unless taking precautions, all of the conflicts may revive. If these shared beliefs could be determined, peace builders and politicians could develop more effective strategies and policies to transform the conflict. Shared beliefs address the central and implicit problematics, stereotypes, concerns, and prejudices among the members associated with ongoing conflict feeding the continuation of the conflict. Thus, this thesis sought to provide a comprehensive analytical framework to shed light on the preventing character of the Turkish ethos in the peace process.

The findings of the research revealed there is relatively implicit resistance to change in the Turkish society due to the TEOC and its functionality. I proposed that the TEOC is part of the cognitive repertoire of the Turkish society that evolves in the context of the prolonged and intractable Kurdish conflict and provides a coherent and systematic orientation to the Turkish society regarding the ongoing conflict.

Chapter one provided a solid background for the Kurdish question. It addressed the major-minor parties, the history and context of the conflict, the core issues of the conflict, and the internal and external dynamics of the conflict. In addition, it discussed the past peace initiatives for the Kurdish question. As a whole, it provided significant historical breaking points that shaped the mindset and repertoire within the Turkish society.

Chapter two presented the theoretical framework of the research and explained why conflicts are dynamic phenomena. It sought to demonstrate that conflicts might

escalate or deescalate because of the roles of complex interactions of behavior and attitudes. In this sense, this chapter claimed conflicts should be considered as multi-dimensional realities and CR has multi-phase characteristics. Therefore, peace should not be viewed as an event, rather, it should be perceived as a process. On the other hand, to establish sustainable peace, conflict resolution strategies should involve middle-ranged actors as they have a vital role for the public peace. Finally, this chapter explained how the socio-psychological infrastructure of the conflict and EOC makes it difficult to resolve conflict by working as a rigid prism, and it claimed that without a transformation within the ethos of the conflict, building a sustainable peace is not completely possible.

In chapter three, I formulated central and sub-research questions for the research by limiting the scope of the research to fill in a gap in the literature. Additionally, I demonstrated the methodology of the research and explained how this research would contribute to the field. In fact, the present research provides new data from Turkish party members' shared beliefs on the Kurdish question and their perceptions on the current peace process. It also demonstrates the current conditions of the peace process. Even though it is crucial to research further the social attitudes and behavior separately, the study of the ethos of conflict theory enables a more comprehensive and complete perception of the society.

In Chapter Four, I analyzed the findings of the research. Primarily, I categorized the contents of the findings. The contents of the findings showed that the Turkish society legitimizes its goals by stressing the indivisible territorial integrity of the Turkish state, de-legitimizes the Kurdish goals, believes that Turkey's territorial integrity is under attack, possesses positive self-images and negative images of the Kurds, and thinks the Turkish society is the most victimized part of the society. The functionality of categorizations in terms of eight themes of the TEOC was also discussed. The study discussed that the TEOC has epistemic, moral, ideological, and societal functions within the society. It impacts the perception of superiority and the preparation of the Turkish society for violent conditions. Depending on the findings, I concluded that there is implicit resistance to change in the Turkish society.

This research is one of the first to study the ethos of conflict theory for the Kurdish question. The present study reveals that the Turkish society has relatively strong barriers to resolve the conflict. In addition, it indicates that the TEOC may include very strong and rigid thinking. The homogeneity of the TEOC can be showed

as evidence to support this argumentation. Throughout the research I provided various insights, roadmaps, and implications in order to transform the TEOC. The research claimed Turkey needs a transformation of the TEOC and this can be achieved via three general categories: (1) reevaluation of shared societal beliefs acquired and constructed during the prolonged conflict, (2) openness for new alternative information, and (3) acceptance of new ideas raised by alternative communication channels. To realize these steps, Turkey needs comprehensive inclusion of various actors to the process. Without inclusion, Turkey cannot succeed in establishing sustainable peace and peace cannot be established in spite of the anxieties of the society. Further, Turkey needs a new vision of positive peace to avoid doomed misery.

Recommendations

The present study raised a number of questions in need of further research. The PKK-Turkey conflict has lasted over thirty years. Over this long period, there have been bloody conflicts, attempts to resolve the conflict, and a solution process between parties. There are a large number of studies, reports, and research on the outbreaks of the conflict, solution maps, and strategies to solve the conflict. The present research points to another significant approach to the conflict, the EOC, which explains the socio-psychological dimension of the conflict and its impact on the attitudes of the members of the society.

The scope of the research is limited to examining the EOC in the public discourse. However, there are several other areas to examine regarding the EOC such as schoolbooks, mass media, cultural products (i.e. films, series, dramas, and so on), as well as the discourse of the leaders. These areas should be researched from the past to present to reveal how the EOC was created, extended, institutionalized, and maintained.

Additional research needs to be conducted in order to focus on how the EOC can be changed and transformed, under what conditions and with which tools. Specific policies and strategies must be advanced to build sustainable peace. However, to develop a comprehensive toolbox, there must be additional works focusing on the Kurdish ethos of the Kurdish question. A more detailed comparative analysis of the Turkish and Kurdish ethos would provide a better picture as a whole of the shared beliefs of societies in Turkey. Comparing the experiences of all members the whole society within the direct and periphery zones would be useful for the evaluation of contrary-shared beliefs created in the society.

Finally, it is important to note I do not claim the EOC theory is the most comprehensive explanation for the current conflict. But, on the other hand, I support the idea that the EOC should be considered as an integral part of the conflict. Second, the EOC is not the only component of the psychological dimensions of the conflict that advances major resistance to change or to negotiate with the opponent. However, in my view, the EOC includes the most important psychological repertoire that affects the attitudes regarding the armed conditions of conflict.



REFERENCES

- AGGESTAM, K., (1999). *Reframing and Resolving Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998*, Lund: Lund University Press.
- ACKERMANN, A. (1994). Reconciliation as a Peace Building Process in postwar Europe: The Franco-German case., *Peace and Change*, Vol.19, no.3 , pp. 229-250.
- AĞIRDİR, B., (2008). *Kürtler ve Kürt Sorunu (The Kurds and the Kurdish Issue)*, İstanbul: KONDA.
- AKCURA, B. (2009). *Devletin Kurt Filmi: 1925-2009 Kurt Raporlari*, İstanbul: New Age Yayinlari
- ANHEIER, H.K., (2004). *Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation and Policy*, London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.
- ANTER, M. (1990), *Hatıralarım*, İstanbul: Doz Yayınları.
- ARAS, B., Yasin D., (2014), *The Kurdish Peace Process and Presidential Elections in Turkey*, Washington DC: Wilson Center
- ARSLAN, F., Demir, F., & Duru, M. (August 30 2004). Köye dönüş ağır aksak, *Radikal*
- ARSU, S. (November 13 2009). Turkey Plans to Ease Restrictions on Kurds and Help End Decades of Conflict, *New York Times*
- ASMAL,K ., Asmal,L ., & Roberts, R. S. (1997). *Reconciliation Through Truth: Areckoning of Apartheid's Criminal Governance*, Cape Town:D avid Philips.
- ARTHUR, P. (1999). The Anglo-Irish peace process: Obstacles to reconciliation. In R. L. Rothstein (E d.), *After the peace: Resistance and reconciliation*, pp. 85-109,. Boulder, CO: LynneR ienne
- BAL, I., & Ozkan, E. (2006). *PKK Teror Orgutu Kronolojisi 1976-2006*, Retrieved Jan 25 2016
<http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/z6UFq2LoFkdiuzBbZSt9qHMi7u4Ke2.pdf>
- BAR-TAL, D., (2000a). *Shared Beliefs in a Society*, California: Sage Publications.
----- (June 2000b) From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis, *International Society of Political Psychology*, Vol.21, no.2, pp. 351-365

- (2003). Collective memory of physical violence: Its contribution to the culture of violence. In E. Cairns & M. D. Roe (Eds.), *The role of memory in ethnic conflict* (pp. 77-93). Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- (July 2007). Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol.50, No.11, pp.1430-1453.
- (2013). *Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BAR-TAL, D., Salomon, G., (2006). Israeli-Jewish narratives of the Israeli Palestinian conflict: Evolution, contents, functions, and consequences. In R. I. Rotberg (Eds.), *Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: History's double helix*, (pp. 19-46). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- BAR-TAL, D., Teichman Y., (2005). *Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BAR-TAL, D., Raviv A., Raviv, A., and Dgani-Hirsh A (February 2009). The Influence of Ethos of Conflict on Israeli Jews' Interpretation of Jewish-Palestinian Encounters, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.53, No.1, pp. 94-118.
- BAR-TAL, D., Halperin, E., Sharvit K., and Zafran, A, (January, 2012). Ethos of Conflict: The Concept and Its Measurement, *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol.18, No.1, pp. 40-61
- BARNES, C., (2009). Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Mapping Functions in Working for Peace, *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol 44, No. 1, pp.131-147.
- BATESON, G., (1958). *Naven, a Survey of the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of the Culture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three Points of View*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- BLUM, A., Çelik, A.B., (December 2007). Track II interventions and the Kurdish Question in Turkey: An Analysis Using a Theories of Change Approach, *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 12, No.2, pp. 51-81
- BOZARSLAN, H., (2008). Kurds and the Turkish State. In Reşat Kasaba, (Eds.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey – Vol.4: Turkey in the Modern World*, pp. 333-357, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BURTON, J. W., (1990). *Conflict: Human needs theory*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- CANETTI, D., Elad-Strenger J., Lavi, I., Guy, D., and Bar-Tal, D (February, 2015). Exposure to Violence Ethos of Conflict, and Support for Compromise: Surveys in Israel, East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, doi: 10.1177/0022002715569771.

- CELİK, A.B., (2009). Etnik Çatışmaların Çözümünde Siyaset Bilimi ve Uyuşmazlık Çözümü Yaklaşımları. In N. Beriker (Eds.). *Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya: Kuramlar, Süreçler ve Uygulama*, pp. 163-188, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları
- (2010). *Actors and Processes in the Kurdish Question: Exploring Different Alternatives to Peace*, Helsinki Citizens Assembly.
- CELİK, A.B., Kantowitz, R., (2009). Trauma and forgiveness: Comparing experiences from Turkey and Guatemala. In S. Bloch-Schulman, and D. White (Eds.). *Forgiveness: Probing the Boundaries*, pp. 179–190, Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press
- CELEBİ, E., Verkuyten M., Köse T., and Maliepaard M., (May 2014). Out-group trust and conflict understandings: The perspective of Turks and Kurds in Turkey, *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, vol.40, pp.64-75, 2014
- COLLIER, P., Hoeffler, A., (May 2000). Greed and Grievance in Civil War, *The World Bank Development Research Group*, policy research working paper.
- COLLIER, P., Elliot, V., Havard, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., and Sambanis, N., (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Oxford: World Bank/Oxford University Press.
- CONVERSE, P.E., (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics, In D.E. Apter (Eds.), *Ideology and discontent* (pp.106-261). New York: Free Press.
- COPUR, B. (2009). *Tarihsel Süreçte Kürt Sorunu. Avrupa Birliği Sürecinde ve Güncel Siyasal Gelişmeler Işığında Türkiye’de Kürt Açılımı*. Duisburg: Türkiye Avrupa İlişkileri Enstitüsü.
- CORNELL, S. E., (January 2001). The Kurdish question in Turkish politics, *Orbis*, Vol.45, No.1, pp. 31-47
- COSER, L., (1956). *The Functions of Social Conflict*, New York: The Free Press.
- COX, G., (1986). *The Ways of Peace: A philosophy of Peace as action*, Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.
- CUNNINGHAM, D.E., (October 2006) Veto Players and Civil War Duration, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.50, No.4, pp. 875-892.
- DALAY, G. (January 6 2014). Turkey’s Parallel State Strikes Back, *Aljazeera*, Retrieved January 27, 2016, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/turkey-parallel-state-strikes-back-20141545517864901.html>
- DARBY, J. and MacGinty, R., (2003). *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- DE LA REY, C., Owens, T (1998). Perceptions of Psychosocial Healing and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol.4, pp. 257-270.
- DEUTSCH, M., (1973). *The resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- DOUGHERTY, J.W.D., (1985). *Directions in cognitive anthropology*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- DPI (Democratic Progress Institute), (2013). *Civil Society Mediation in Conflict Resolution*, London: Democratic Progress Institute.
- DUNDAR, C., (June 5 1999). Özal - Apo Pazarlığının İçyüzü . *Sabah*
- DUNYA BULTENİ, (August 4 2009). PKK'yı çözememenin Türkiye'ye maliyeti. *Dunya Bulteni*
- DURNA, T., Goktepe, F., & Keeling, D. (2008). The History of the PKK. In S. Teymur, & C. Smith (Eds.), *The PKK, a Decades-old Brutal Marxist-Leninist Separatist Terrorist Organization*, pp. 9-17. Washington DC: Turkish Institute for Security and Democracy.
- EPSTEIN, Arnold L., (1978). *Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity*, London, Chicago: Tavistock Publications, Aldine.
- ERGAN, U., (August 12 2002). Barzani'ye 'Kırmızı Pasaport' darbesi, *Hurriyet*
- ERGİL, D. (2009). *Kurt Raporu: Güvenlik Politikalarından Kimlik Siyasetine*, Istanbul: Timas.
- EVANS-PRITCHARD, A. (December 2004). Turkish army crucial to EU power hopes. Retrieved January 27, 2016, from theage.com.au: <http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/Turkish-army-crucial-to-EU-power-hopes/2004/12/17/1102787272096.html>
- EVRENSEL, H. (1998). *Guneydogu Oykuleri*, Ankara: Umit Press
- FISHBEIN, M., Ajzen, I., (1975), *Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- FISHER, R., Keashly, L. (February 1991). The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.28, No.1, pp: 29-42.
- FRANCIS, D., (2002). *People, Peace and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action*, London: Pluto Press.
- GALTUNG, J., (September 1967). *Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking*, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.

- (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 167-191.
- (August 1990). Cultural Violence, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.27, No.3, pp.291-305
- (1996) *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, PRIO, OSLO.
- GAWERC, M.I. (August 2006). Peace-building: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives, *Peace & Change*, Vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 435-478.
- GAYER, C.C., Landman S., Halperin E., and Bar-Tal, D (December 2009). Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Peaceful Conflict Resolution, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.53, No.6, pp. 951-975
- GOLDFARB, M. (January 6 2011). Opinion: How Washington misreads Turkey. *Global Post*
- GOLE, N. (2013). Gezi – Anatomy of a Public Square Movement, *Turkish Insight*, Vol.15, no.3, pp. 7-14
- GORDON, S. T. (1990). Social structural effects on emotions. In T. D. Kemper (Eds.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions*, pp. 145–179, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- GUNTER, M. (October 2000). The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Öcalan's Capture, *Third World Quarterly* , Vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 849-869.
- (March 2004). Why Kurdish Statehood is Unlikely, *Middle East Policy* , Vol.11, no.1, pp. 12-25.
- GUZEL, H. C. (July 2 2010). Rekora koşan Türkiye, *Radikal*
- GPPAC, (2005). Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, ‘*People Building Peace: A Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Armed Conflict*’.
- HALLOWAY, R., (2001). *Towards Selfreliance: A Handbook for Resource Mobilization for Civil Society Organizations in the South*, London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.
- HANDL, V . (1997). Czech-German Declaration on Reconciliation, *German Politics*, Vol.6, pp. 150-167.
- HARBORN, L., Wallensteen, P., (July 2009). Armed Conflicts: 1946-2008, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.46, no.4, pp. 577-587.
- HIMES, J.S., (1980). ‘*Conflict and Conflict Management*’, Athens: University of Georgia Press.

- HOLT, R.R., and Silverstein B., (Summer 1989). Research on Enemy Images: Present Status and Future Prospects, *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol.45, No.2, pp.159-175.
- JABRI, V., (1996). *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsider*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- KARAKAYA, H. (September 18 2009). Türkiye-Suriye ilişkilerinin 11 yılı... İhtar'dan, İftar'a!, *Vakit*
- KARAYILAN, M. (2014). *Bir Savaşın Anatomisi: Kürdistan'da Askeri Çizgi*, Diyarbakır:Aram
- KARPAT, K. (1985). *Ottoman Population*, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- (2000). *Ottoman past and today's Turkey*, Leiden: Brill.
- KEANE, J., (1988). *Democracy and Civil Society: On the Predicaments of European Socialism, the Prospects for Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling Social and Political Power*, London: Verso.
- KELMAN, H. C., (1987). The political psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: How can we overcome the barriers to a negotiated solution? *Political Psychology*, Vol.8, No.3, pp: 347-63.
- (2007). Social-psychological Dimensions of International Conflict. In E.W. Zartman (Eds.). *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, pp. 191–236, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace.
- KEOGH, D., & Haltzel, M . H. (Eds.) (1993). Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation, Washington, DC : Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- KING, C., (1997). *Ending Civil Wars*, London: IISS.
- KITAYAMA, S., Markus, H. (1994). Cultural variations of self: Some consequences on cognition, emotion, and motivation. In D. Matsumoto (Eds.), *Revising psychology: A cross-cultural introduction*. Brooks/Cole.
- KIRISCI, K. (2004). The Kurdish Question and the Turkish Foreign Policy. In L. G. Martin, & D. Keridis (Eds), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 277-315, Cambridge: The MIT Pres.
- KIRISCI, K., Winrow, G.M., (1997). *The Kurdish question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*, Oxon: Frank Cass.
- KRIESBERG, L. (1998). Intractable conflicts. In E. Weiner (Eds.), *The handbook of interethnic coexistence* (pp. 332-342). New York: Continuum.

- KONDA, (2011). *Kürt meselesinde algı ve beklentiler* (Perceptions and expectations in the Kurdish issue), Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011
- KRUGLANSKI, A.W., (1989). *Lay epistemic and human knowledge*, New York: Plenum.
- KUNDAKCI, H. (2004). *Guneydogu'da Unutulmayanlar*, Istanbul: Alfa Press
- LEDERACH, J.P., (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- (2003). *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*, PA: Good Books.
- LUND, M. S., (1996). *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- MACK, R.W., and Synder R.C., (June 1957). The Analysis of Social Conflict: Toward an Overview and Synthesis, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.1, No.2, pp.212-248.
- MANGO, A. (May, 1994). Turks and Kurds, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.30, no.4, pp. 975-997.
- (1999). Atatürk and the Kurds, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.35, no.4, pp. 1-25.
- MARCUS, A. (2007). *Blood and belief: the PKK and the Kurdish fight for independence*, New York: NY University Press.
- MARKUS, H. R., Kitayama, S. (1994). The cultural shaping of emotion: A conceptual framework. In S. Kitayama & H. R. Markus (Eds.), *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence*, pp. 339–351, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- MASLOW, A. H. (1970). *Motivation and personality* (2nd Ed.). New York: Harper & Row.
- MCCLOSKEY, H., Zaller J., (1984). *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- MCDOWALL, D. (1997). *A modern history of the Kurds*. New York: St. Martin's.
- MCGREGOR, A. (November 2007). Turkey's Generals Speak out on Counter-Terrorism Strategies, *Terrorism Focus*, vol.34, no.38, pp. 38-42.
- MERTON, R.K., (1957). *Social Theory and social structure*, New York: Free Press.
- MITCHELL, C., (2014). *The Nature of Intractable Conflict*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- MONTVILLE, J., (1993). The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution. In D.Sandole and H. Can der Merwe, (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- NILSSON, D., (April 2012). Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace, *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, Vol.38, No.2, pp. 243-266.
- NORVAL, A .J.(1998). Memory, Identity and the Impossibility of reconciliation: The work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. *Constellations*, pp. 5250-265.
- OCALAN, A. (1996). *Devrimin Dili ve Eylemi* (The Language and Action of the Revolution), Köln: Serxwebun
- OREN, N., (2009). *The Israeli Ethos of Conflict 1967-2006*. Working Paper #27. Fairfax, VA: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University.
- ORJUELA, C., (March 2003). Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 195-212.
- OSSOWSKA, M., (1973). *The Knight's Ethos and Its Forms*, Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawn. Naukowe.
- OZCAN, A. N. (1999). *PKK: Tarihi, Ideolojisi, Yonetimi*, Ankara: ASAM.
- OZDAG, U. (2010). *Türk Ordusu PKK'yi Nasıl Yendi? Türkiye PKK'ya Nasıl Teslim Oluyor?*, Ankara: Kripto.
- POPE, Hugh, (2013). Turkey and the Democratic Opening for the Kurds. In Bilgin, Fevzi and Ali Sarihan, (Eds.), *Understanding Turkey's Kurdish Question*, Lexington Books, pp. 117-141, Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- POST, R.C., Rosenblum N. L., (2002). Introduction. In Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post (Eds.), *Civil Society and Government*, pp. 1-25, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- PRUITT, D.G., Rubin J.Z. (1986). *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement*, New York: Random House
- PRUITT, D. G., Kim S. H., (2004). *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, New York: McGraw-Hill.
- PUSANE, O.K. (March 2014), Turkey's Kurdish Opening: Long Awaited Achievements and Failed Expectations, *Turkish Studies*, vol.15, no.1, pp. 81-99

- RAMSBOTHAM, O., Woodhouse T., (April 1999). “*Options for the Development of Codes of Conduct for Conflict Resolution*”, Paper presented at Codes of Conduct Conference, Soesterberg, Netherlands.
- RAMSBOTHAM, O., Woodhouse, T., and Miall, H., (2012). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Malden: Polity Press.
- REES, J. 1992. Third World Communists May Yet Rule. *Orbis* , pp. 575-598.
- REICHER, S., Hopkins, N., (2001). *Self and nation*. London, Thousand Oaks and New-Delhi: Sage.
- ROSS, M. H., (September 1995). Psychocultural Interpretation Theory and Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflicts, *Political Psychology*, Vol.16, No.3, pp. 523–544.
- ROTHSTEIN, R. L. (Ed.) (1999). *After the peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*. Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner.
- RUPESINGHE, K., (1995). *Conflict Transformation*, London: Macmillan.
- SAUNDERS, H. (1999). *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts*, Basingstoke: Macmillan – Palgrave
- SENER, N. (June 24, 2010). 26 Yilin Kanli Bilancosu. *Milliyet* .
- SETA, (2016), *2015’te Türkiye* (Turkey in 2015), Istanbul: SETA Foundation
- SEZGIN, I. (March 19 1993). Turkish Minister of Interior Affairs. *Milliyet*, Interviewer
- SISK, T., (1997). *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, Washington: US Institute of Peace Press.
- SOMER, M. (Spring 2004). Turkey’s Kurdish conflict: Changing context and domestic and regional implications, *Middle East Journal* , Vol.58, no.2, pp. 235-253.
- (August 2005). Resurgence and Remaking of Identity: Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, and the Turkish Mainstream Discourse on Kurds, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.38, no.6, pp. 591-624.
- STAUB, E., (2011). *Overcoming evil: Genocide, violent conflict and terrorism*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- STEIN, J. G., (2002). Psychological Explanations of International Conflict. In Walter Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B.A. Simmons (Eds.). *Sage Handbook of International Relations*, pp. 292–308, London: Sage Publications.

- STEPHAN, W. G., Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), *Reducing prejudice and Discrimination*, pp. 23–45. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- TAJFEL, H. (1982). *Social identity and intergroup relations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press and Paris, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.
- TAJFEL,, H., Turner, J. C.(1986). Anintegrative theory of intergroup relations. In S.Worchel and W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations*, pp. 7–24. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- TAPAN, B. (2007). *Terorun Bekcileri*, Istanbul: Guncel Press.
- TONGE, J., (2014). *Comparative Peace Processes*, Malden: Polity Press.
- VAYRYNEN, R., (1991). *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, London: Sage Publications.
- WALLENSTEEN, P., (2012). *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, (3rd ed.), London: Sage Publications.
- WALTER, B.F., (2002). *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- WEBER, M., (1958). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York: Scribner.
- WEHR, P., (1979). *Conflict Regulation*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- WILLIS, F. R. (1965). *France, Germany and the New Europe 1945-1963*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
- YAVUZ, H. (September 2001). Five stages of the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, Vol.7, no.3, pp. 1-24.
- YEĞEN, M, (2006). *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* (The Kurdish question in State Discourse), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- ZACHARIA, J. (April 11 2010). In Turkey, military's power over secular democracy slips, *Washington Post* .
- ZARTMAN, I.W., (2000). ‘Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond’. In P. C. Stern and D. Druckman, (Eds.), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*. Washington: National Academy Press.

APPENDICES

A. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Please describe yourself in a few words.
2. What are the main causes of outbreak of the Kurdish conflict?
3. Some of the Kurds claim that they have suffered a lot in Turkey. What do you think about this claim?
4. Why did Kurds resort to violence?
5. How do you evaluate the relationship between the Turkish state and Kurdish citizens?
6. What do you think about the solution process? Are you hopeful about the process' future?
7. What are the positive characteristics of Kurds?
8. What are the main characteristics that differentiates Turks from Kurds?
9. What do you think about the PKK?
10. What are the main ties binding Turks and Kurds together?
11. How do you define the word of peace?
12. Do you consider that the Kurdish question impacted you and the society? How? And to what extent?
13. How would you consider a marriage of a member of your family with a Kurdish person?
14. According to you, how the Kurdish conflict should be resolved?
15. There is demand from the Kurdish citizens regarding education in mother tongue. How do you evaluate this demand?
16. Is there anything else you would like to add?

B. PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERVIEWS

Code	Age	Education	Marriage	Occupation	Kurds in Family	Visiting to the East
B.I.	71	High School	Married	Retired, Müfti, Merchant	Non	YES
N.A.	65	B.A.	Married	Media owner, NGO representative	Non	YES
L.C.	50	B.A.	Married	Businessman, NGO Representative	Non	YES
O.A.	57	B.A.	Married	Businessman, rel. org representative	Non	YES
T.Y.	67	B.A.	Married	Retired politician, businessman	YES	NO
T.B.	45	High School	Married	Businessman, politician	Non	YES
N.S.	63	B.A.	Unmarried	Pharmacist, NGO Representative	Non	YES
M.S.	87	High School	Married	Intellectual, journalist	Non	NO
M.D.	55	M.A.	Married	Teacher, NGO Representative	YES	YES
H.E.	63	B.A.	Married	Journalist, NGO representative	Non	YES
A.C.	48	M.A.	Married	Businessman, rel. org representative	Non	YES
F.A.	53	M.A.	Married	Teacher, bureaucrat	Non	YES
B.M.	58	B.A.	Married	NGO Representative	Non	YES
M.K.	53	High School	Unmarried	Politician, businessman	Non	YES
C.G.	47	High School	Widowed	Businessman, NGO Representative	Non	YES
O.D.	75	B.A.	Married	Industrialist, Intellectual	Non	YES
M.U.	57	B.A.	Married	Pharmacist, Rel. org representative	Non	NO
R.U.	49	B.A.	Married	Doctor, Executive	Non	YES
R.C.	41	B.A.	Married	Media owner	YES	YES
N.C.	45	B.A.	Married	Media owner, NGO representative	YES	YES